UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 00-4183

REGINALD LAMONT REAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.

N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Chief District Judge.

(CR-99-13)

Submitted: July 25, 2000

Decided: September 14, 2000

Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston,

Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Reginald Lamont Reams appeals from his conviction and sentence

for possession of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. He raises

three issues on appeal: (1) the district court erred in denying his

motions for a judgment of acquittal and directed verdict because there

was insufficient evidence to support the verdict; (2) the court erred in

giving an Allen* charge; and (3) the court erred in applying a twolevel sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice via perjury

under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual§ 3C1.1 (1998).

The district court's denial of Reams' motion for judgment of

acquittal is reviewed under a sufficiency of the evidence standard. See

United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1147 (4th Cir. 1992). To sustain the conviction, the evidence, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the government, must be sufficient for a rational trier of

fact to have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).

In making this assessment the government is entitled to all reasonable

inferences from the facts established to those sought to be established.

See United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).

Although Reams' attorney did an excellent job in cross-examining

the Government's witnesses and bringing to light uncertainties and

possible motives to testify falsely, viewed in the light most favorable

to the Government, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, Reams' conviction is supported by sufficient evidence

and the district court properly denied his motions for judgment of

acquittal and directed verdict.

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*Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).

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Next, Reams asserts that the district court erred in giving an Allen

charge without first inquiring as to the jury's possible confusion on

one issue, and with knowledge of the numerical split of the jury. We

review a district court's decision to give an Allen charge, as well as

its contents, for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Cropp, 127

F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 1997). For an Allen charge to be proper, it

"must not coerce the jury, and it must be fair, neutral and balanced."

Id. at 359-60; see also United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933, 936 (4th

Cir. 1995). This Court has repeatedly stated that"the most egregious

mistake that can be made in the context of an Allen charge is for a

district court to suggest, in any way, that jurors surrender their conscientious convictions." Cropp, 127 F.3d at 360 (quoting Burgos, 55

F.3d at 939); see also Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir.

1994). Moreover, this Court has stressed that a proper Allen charge

instructs jurors in the majority to consider the views of the minority

and vice versa. See Cropp, 127 F.3d at 360. The challenged charge

complied with these requirements.

As to Reams' contention that the court should have made inquiry

into a possible confusion held by the jury, the note to which Reams

refers did not request an additional explanation of the offense or the

instructions relating thereto. Instead, the overall impression created by

the note was not that the jury did not understand the law, but that it

was currently unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Neither party

objected to the court's response to this question, and Reams offers no

law in support of his proposition that the court was obliged to inquire

into the jury's "problem with the charge of possession with intent to

distribute" prior to giving the Allen charge.

As to Reams' assertion that the court's knowledge of the jury's

numerical split created undue coercion, we note that while a judge's

knowledge of the jury split may be a factor suggesting coercion, this

knowledge, standing alone, does not make the Allen charge coercive.

See United States v. Lorenzo, 43 F.3d 1303, 1307 (9th Cir. 1995)

(upholding Allen charge to 11-1 deadlocked jury).

Reviewing the overall tenor of the case and the charge itself, we

find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving an

Allen charge and that the contents of that charge were not coercive.

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Finally, Reams contends that the district court erred in enhancing

his sentence for obstruction of justice due to a finding that he committed perjury at trial. Whether Reams committed perjury is a factual

determination made by the sentencing court which is reviewed for

clear error. See United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161, 1165 (4th Cir.

1995). In order to enhance a defendant's offense level for perjury following an objection on that basis, a district court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful

impediment to, or obstruction of, justice. See United States v. Smith,

62 F.3d 641, 647 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Dunnigan,

507 U.S. 87 (1993)). When engaging in this review, it is preferable

for the court to address, in separate findings, each individual element

of perjury: (1) false testimony, (2) concerning a material matter, and

(3) made with the intent to deceive. See id. However, if the court's

singular finding encompasses all of these necessary factual predicates,

the enhancement is sufficiently justified. See id.

Reams takes issue with the first of these elements, asserting that the

mere fact that the jury chose to disbelieve his testimony and convict

him does not mean that his testimony was untruthful. Because the district court's finding of falsity is not clearly erroneous, Reams' challenge is meritless.

In light of the above discussion, we affirm Reams' conviction and

sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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