IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of the Estate of: 

DONALD S. OLSEN 

DECEDENT

_________________________________

CELESTE M. FLYNN, 

Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

BRYANNE OLSEN, et al., 

Respondents/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0343 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County

No. S1400PB201800202

The Honorable Roger A. Nelson, Judge

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Schneider & Onofry, PC, Yuma

By Charles D. Onofry

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Wong Carter, PC, Phoenix

By Rick K. Carter, Matthew Klopp, Shane Q. Parker

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee Bryanne Olsen

FILED 4-15-2021
FLYNN v. OLSEN, et al.

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Celeste Flynn ("Celeste") appeals the probate court's order 

granting a motion to dismiss filed by Bryanne Olsen ("Bryanne"). The 

probate court erred by dismissing Celeste's timely petition to appoint a 

personal representative. We hold that when a petition to appoint a personal

representative is timely filed under A.R.S. § 14-3108, the deadline to file 

claims under A.R.S. § 14-3803(A)(1) does not expire until after the probate 

court appoints a personal representative and the representative provides 

the notice to creditors required by A.R.S. § 14-3801. Accordingly, we 

reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 We recite only the facts necessary to resolve this dispute, 

viewing them in the light most favorable to Celeste, the non-moving party. 

See Johnson v. McDonald, 197 Ariz. 155, 157, ¶ 2 (App. 1999). 

¶3 Generally, Celeste asserts that her father, Donald Olson 

("Donald") defrauded a trust he created with his first wife ("First Trust") 

and moved assets that should have been in the First Trust to a trust he 

created with his second wife Bryanne ("Second Trust"). This purported 

fraud was discovered sometime after Donald died on November 15, 2016.

¶4 Celeste filed suit against Bryanne individually and as trustee 

of the Second Trust ("First Civil Case"). Bryanne moved to dismiss, 

asserting that Celeste needed to open probate because the personal 

representative of Donald's estate would be an indispensable party. Celeste 

responded that opening probate would serve no purpose because all the 

assets were in the Second Trust and complete relief could be obtained 

against Bryanne and the Second Trust.

¶5 In August 2018, the court dismissed the First Civil Case 

without prejudice, stating Donald's estate "is an indispensable party to the 

proceedings . . . . A probate case must therefore be initiated." On October 

17, 2018, within two years of Donald's death, Celeste filed a petition to open 
FLYNN v. OLSEN, et al.

Opinion of the Court

3

probate and requested appointment of a personal representative. Five days 

later, Celeste filed a new civil suit naming the yet-to-be-named personal 

representative as a fictitious John Doe defendant ("Second Civil Case").

¶6 By December 2018, the probate court had not appointed a 

personal representative. Bryanne moved to dismiss the probate case, 

asserting that "[o]pening probate proceedings will serve no purpose

because [] there are no assets to be distributed" and any claims against the 

estate were barred by Arizona's two-year nonclaim statute because no 

personal representative had been appointed within two years of Donald's 

death. See A.R.S. § 14-3803(A)(1).

¶7 Finding Celeste's claim time barred under A.R.S. § 14-3803, 

the probate court granted the motion to dismiss.1 Celeste timely appealed.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(9).

DISCUSSION

¶8 We review de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss. 

Premier Physicians Grp., PLLC v. Navarro, 240 Ariz. 193, 194, ¶ 6 (2016). We 

also interpret statutes de novo. Vega v. Sullivan, 199 Ariz. 504, 507, ¶ 8 (App. 

2001). "Our primary objective is to discern and give effect to the intent of 

the legislature . . . ." Id. The best and most reliable indicator of intent is the 

language of the statute. Id. at ¶ 9. "If the language is unambiguous, it must 

be given effect as written." Poulson v. Ofack, 220 Ariz. 294, 297, ¶ 8 (App. 

2009). 

¶9 Bryanne argues that the time to file claims expired when the 

probate court did not appoint a personal representative within two years of 

Donald's death. In response, Celeste argues that the deadline does not run 

until the personal representative provides the required notice to creditors.2

1 Based on this order by the probate court, the civil court dismissed 

part of the Second Civil Case because "a personal representative had not 

been appointed in accordance with" the order in the First Civil Case.

Celeste's appeal of the partial dismissal of the Second Civil Case remains

pending in this Court. See Flynn v. Olsen, 1 CA-CV 20-0451. We denied 

Celeste's motion to consolidate the appeals.

2 Because we remand for further proceedings on this basis, we decline 

to address other arguments Celeste raises.
FLYNN v. OLSEN, et al.

Opinion of the Court

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¶10 There is no dispute that Celeste timely sought the 

appointment of a personal representative. Arizona's Probate Code 

provides that a "formal testacy or appointment proceeding . . . shall not be 

commenced more than two years after the decedent's death," unless an 

exception applies. A.R.S. § 14-3108 (emphasis added). When an interested 

party timely moves to open probate, the court shall appoint a personal 

representative for the estate. See A.R.S. § 14-3103 (providing "a person shall 

be appointed [personal representative] by order of the court"). After an 

action is commenced, however, the Probate Code imposes no deadline on

the court to make the appointment. See A.R.S. § 14-3414 (describing formal 

proceeding to appoint representative); see also Kinnear v. Finegan, 138 Ariz. 

34, 36 (App. 1983) (noting the statute "requires notice and an opportunity 

to object"). 

¶11 Upon appointment, the personal representative must publish 

a notice to "creditors of the estate to present their claims within four 

months," and provide written notice to known creditors. A.R.S. § 14-

3801(A), (B); see also Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 

491 (1988) (holding that due process requires actual notice to known 

creditors). All claims against a decedent's estate that arose before the death 

of the decedent are barred if not presented within "[t]wo years after the 

decedent's death plus the time remaining in the period commenced by an 

actual or published notice pursuant to § 14-3801, subsection A or B." A.R.S. 

§ 14-3803(A)(1) (emphasis added).

3 

¶12 The plain language of A.R.S. § 14-3803(A)(1) supports 

Celeste's position. The statute expressly provides that the period to file 

claims is two years "plus the time remaining in the period commenced by 

an actual or published notice" required by A.R.S. § 14-3801. A.R.S. § 14-

3803(A)(1). If the appointment of a personal representative is timely 

sought, the time to file claims does not expire until after a representative is 

appointed and the representative gives the required notice. 

¶13 Bryanne's argument that notice cannot be given after the twoyear deadline would be compelling under a prior version of A.R.S. § 14-

3803. See A.R.S. § 14-3803(B) (1996) (barring all claims not brought within 

two years of the decedent's death); see also In re Estate of Barry, 184 Ariz. 506, 

3 Other statutes may shorten the period in which one may pursue 

claims. See In re Estate of Van Der Zee, 228 Ariz. 257, 260, ¶ 17 (App. 2011)

("Section 14-3803(A)(1) gives a claimant at least two years to file his claim, 

unless it would be earlier-barred by another statute of limitations or 

nonclaim statute.").
FLYNN v. OLSEN, et al.

Opinion of the Court

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509 (App. 1996) (noting claim barred pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-3803(B) (1996) 

"because it had not been presented within two years after the date of [the 

decedent's] death"). But in 1998, the legislature extended the two-year 

deadline to include the notice period. See 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 203, § 

11 (2nd Reg. Sess.) (H.B. 2360). Because an appointment was timely sought, 

and the required notice has not been given by the yet-to-be-appointed 

representative, any time measured from giving the required notice remains. 

¶14 Bryanne relies on a prior decision of this Court in which a 

creditor sought to bring claims against an estate three years after the 

decedent's death. Ader v. Estate of Felger, 240 Ariz. 32, 35, ¶¶ 2-3 (App. 2016). 

Bryanne cites a statement in Ader that A.R.S. § 14-3803(A) bars claims "if a 

personal representative is not appointed within two years . . . ." Id. at 43, 

¶ 36. But in Ader, no probate petition was ever filed, and no personal 

representative appointed. Id. at 41, ¶ 26. Admittedly, language in Ader

could be read to conflate the commencement of appointment proceedings 

with the appointment of a personal representative. See id. at 37, ¶ 10 (stating 

"we turn to § 14-3108, which generally requires a personal representative to 

be appointed within two years of a decedent's death"). But neither an

appointment nor any appointment proceedings occurred in Ader within the 

two-year deadline, meaning the distinction between commencing 

appointment proceedings and making the actual appointment was not at 

issue. Id. at 41, ¶ 26. Because Ader does not address the present situation—

where a creditor timely sought appointment of a personal representative 

but the probate court failed to appoint one within two years of the 

decedent's death—it is distinguishable. See Ariz. Corp. Comm'n v. Mountain

States Tel. & Tel. Co., 71 Ariz. 404, 412 (1951) (noting language "unnecessary 

to sustain the judgment of the court" may be considered "dictum"). 

¶15 Thus, when a petition to appoint a personal representative is 

timely filed within two years of a decedent's death pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-

3108, the deadline to file claims established in A.R.S. § 14-3803(A)(1) does 

not expire until after the probate court appoints a personal representative 

and the representative provides the notice to creditors required by statute. 

Because the deadline to file claims has not expired, the probate court erred 

in dismissing Celeste's petition.
FLYNN v. OLSEN, et al.

Opinion of the Court

6

CONCLUSION

¶16 We reverse the probate court's dismissal of Celeste's petition 

and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We deny 

Bryanne's request for attorney fees.