* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### OCT 9 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 98-8033
v. (D. Wyoming) HURON FIELDS,

Defendant - Appellant. (D.C. No. 98-CV-71-CAB)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , McKAY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. SeeFed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Huron Fields, having been granted a certificate of appealability by the district court, appeals the dismissal, on the groun d of untimeliness, of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In 1980, Mr. Fields pled guilty to multiple federal crimes and was sentenced to two consecutive life terms of imprisonment, and three consecutive fifteen-year terms, all to commence after he comple ted serving a sentence for state crimes. Mr. Fields’ federal convictions and sentences became final in 1980. He began serving his federal sentences in 1991 or 1 992. Subject to certain other triggering events not appl icable here, a prisoner may not file a § 2255 motion more than one year aft er the prisoner’s conviction becomes final. Id. In United States v. Simmonds , 111 F.3d 737, 746 (10th Cir. 1997), this court held that a prisoner whose convic tion became final before the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective D eath Penalty Act, i.e., before April 24, 1996, had until April 23, 1997, to file h is § 2255 motion. On April 14, 1997, Mr. Fields filed a motion in the district court requesting an extension of time to May 23, 1997, for filing hi s § 2255 motion, due to difficulties in assembling certain materials. Thatmotion was granted. On May 12, 1997, he filed another, essentially open-ended motion, for an extension of time to file. That motion was not granted. Mr. Fi elds ultimately filed his motion on March 23, 1998, well beyond the applicable one-y ear limitations period. The-3-

district court ruled, among other things, that the motion was untimely, and denied relief. Mr. Fields’ only relevant argument on the point is that the AEDPA may not be applied retroactively to those whose convictions and sentences became final before the effective date of the Act; therefore, he is not subject to the one-year period of limitations. We have rejected that argum ent on the ground that the limitations period would not begin until April 24, 1996, thus giving prisoners ample additional opportunity to file. See Simmonds , 111 F.3d at 746. Furthermore, this interpretation of the law does no t violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. An ex post facto law is one that retroacti vely alters the definition of a crime or increases the punishment for criminal conduct. Lynce v. Mathis , 117 S. Ct. 891, 896 (1997). Our holding in Simmonds , and the limitation period in the AEDPA, do neither. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson Circuit Judge