[Cite as Parrett v. Admr., Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 2017-Ohio-2778.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

PICKAWAY COUNTY 

BRADLEY E. PARRETT, : Case No. 16CA15 

 : 

Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 : 

vs. : 

: DECISION AND JUDGMENT 

ADMINISTRATOR, : ENTRY 

UNEMPLOYMENT : 

COMPENSATION REVIEW : 

COMM’N, : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : Released: 05/08/17 

_____________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES: 

Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, and David E. Lefton, Principal 

Assistant Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant, Director, 

Ohio Department of Job and Family Services. 

Mark Landes, Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor, LLC, Columbus, Ohio, for 

Appellant Pickaway County Educational Service Center.1

Bradley E. Parrett, Circleville, Ohio, Pro Se Appellee. 

_____________________________________________________________ 

McFarland, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Director, Ohio Department of Job and Family 

Services, appeals the Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas' decision 

reversing the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission's decision 

 

1

 Pickaway County Educational Service Center has not filed a brief on appeal in this matter and is not 

otherwise participating. 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 2

disallowing unemployment compensation benefits to Appellee, Bradley E. 

Parrett, based upon its determination that Appellee was discharged for just 

cause by Appellant, Pickaway County Educational Service Center. On 

appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in reversing the decision 

of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission, as its decision 

that Appellee was separated from his employment under disqualifying 

conditions was not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. 

{¶2} Because the decision of the Unemployment Compensation 

Review Commission was not unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest 

weight of the evidence, the trial court erred in reversing the decision. 

Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is reversed. 

FACTS 

{¶3} Appellee, Bradley E. Parrett, began working as a resource 

officer for the Pickaway County Educational Service Center in August of 

2011. His contract for employment for that position provided, among other 

things, that he "maintain a cooperative working relationship with the Ross 

County Sheriff Department[]" and that he "[b]e a commissioned law 

enforcement officer by the state of Ohio." (Emphasis added). At the time 

Appellee became employed with the Pickaway County Educational Service 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 3

Center, he was a commissioned deputy sheriff by the Ross County Sheriff's 

Office. However, after a complaint was made to the Sheriff's Office by a 

private citizen regarding Appellee in his capacity as a deputy, the Ross 

County Sheriff made the decision to revoke Appellee's commission in 

November of 2014. When the school was made aware that Appellee had 

lost his commissioned status, the school superintendent informed Appellee 

he must either resign his position or he would be discharged. Appellee 

submitted a resignation letter on December 12, 2014, stating that his 

resignation was "due to the fact that I am no longer affiliated with the Ross 

County Sheriff's Office." 

{¶4} Appellee made application for unemployment compensation 

benefits on December 12, 2014. The record reflects that Appellee's 

employer did not challenge the payment of unemployment benefits to 

Appellee. The Director's file contains a Determination of Unemployment 

Compensation Benefits dated January 14, 2015, which disallowed benefits 

due to "a disqualifying separation from employment[,]" and because 

Appellee was "discharged with just cause." The determination stated "[t]he 

employer discharged the claimant for not providing and maintaining the 

license, permit or insurability required to perform the work[,]" and that 

"[f]acts establish that the claimant was made aware at the time of hire that 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 4

he/she was responsible for maintaining the license, permit, or insurability." 

{¶5} Appellant appealed the determination and filed a letter 

explaining that: 

"As of November 2014 there was a complaint filed against me 

at the sheriff's office, The sheriff decided to pull my 

commission before all the facts were presented. With him 

pulling my commission I no longer had any deputy authority 

this means I could not arrest, pat down, detain or act in any way 

as an officer. With my employment working as a resource 

officer at the school it is in my contract the I must be a 

commissioned officer. At no time did I surrender/forfeit/resign 

or quit, giving up my commission at the sheriff's office. The 

sheriff pulled my commission and in return I did not meet the 

requirements of the contract at the school. The school in return 

laid me off giving me the opportunity to draw unemployment 

till all the facets could be worked out and my commission 

reinstated which would in return reinstate job with the school." 

On February 11, 2015, a Notice of Redetermination of an Initial Application 

of Unemployment Benefits was filed, again disallowing Appellee's 

application for unemployment benefits due to "a disqualifying separation 

from employment[,]" but stating "the claimant quit without just cause." 

{¶6} Appellee again appealed, making the same argument contained 

in his first appeal. On February 18, 2015, the matter was transferred to the 

Unemployment Compensation Review Commission. Thereafter, a telephone 

hearing was held on March 5, 2015. The Pickaway County Educational 

Service Center filed a notice prior to the hearing stating that it would not be 

participating in the hearing and that it was not contesting Appellee's 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 5

application for benefits. Appellee participated in the hearing and was 

permitted to testify. At this stage, however, Appellee testified that he was 

not aware he was required to be affiliated with the Ross County Sheriff's 

Office, but rather he understood he only had to be a "certified police 

officer." When asked whether his position as resource officer required him 

to be a "commissioned officer," Appellee testified that his contract only 

required that he be a "certified police officer," not that he had to be a 

"commissioned officer." He testified that he was still currently a "certified 

police officer." He claimed that any requirement that he be commissioned 

was a change in the job requirements. 

{¶7} The decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review 

Commission was filed on March 5, 2015. The Review Commission findings 

of fact included findings that 1) Appellee's position required that he be 

commissioned by the Ross County Sheriff's Office; 2) his commission was 

revoked on November 25, 2014; 3) the commission was revoked due to a 

complaint received by the Sheriff's Office; 4) once his commission was 

revoked he could no longer perform essential contract obligations of the 

position; 5) he was given the option of being discharged or resigning on 

December 12, 2014; 6) Appellee offered a letter of resignation in lieu of 

discharge; and 7) the employer was the moving party in the separation. The 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 6

Review Commission's stated reasoning was that the employer acted 

reasonably in discharging Appellee because he was unable to meet a 

condition of continued employment, as his commission had been revoked by 

the Ross County Sheriff's Office. The Review Commission further reasoned 

that "[w]ithout the commission he was not able to perform the essential 

functions of the position as he could no longer arrest, perform searches, and 

complete other essential resource functions." As such, the Review 

Commission reasoned that Appellee was discharged with just cause. The 

decision of the Review Commission ultimately affirmed the redetermination 

findings that disallowed Appellee's claim because he was separated from 

employment under disqualifying conditions, however, it modified the 

redetermination finding that Appellee "quit" his employment. The Review 

Commission modified that decision to instead find that Appellee was 

discharged with just cause. 

{¶8} By letter dated March 23, 2015, Appellee requested the March 

5, 2015 decision be reviewed, arguing that a requirement that he be 

commissioned by Ross County was a change in his contract and that he was 

unaware, when he was hired, that he had to be commissioned by Ross 

County Sheriff's Office. In support of his request for review, Appellee 

attached documents purporting to be copies of the contract presented to him 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 7

upon hire, as well as a new, revised contract that was created after he was 

discharged, that would govern the terms of employment for the resource 

officer position going forward. Appellant argued that because the new 

contract contained different requirements from his original contract, the 

terms of employment had changed. There is no indication from the record, 

however, that the contract language changed before Appellee was 

discharged from his position. Thereafter, an Unemployment Compensation 

Review Commission Decision Disallowing Request for Review was filed on 

April 15, 2015, disallowing Appellee's claim once again, based upon a 

review of the entire record, and informing Appellee of his right to appeal the 

matter to the court of common pleas. 

{¶9} Appellee subsequently filed a pro se appeal in the Pickaway 

County Court of Common Pleas. At this stage, both the Director of the Ohio 

Department of Job and Family Services and the Pickaway Educational 

Service Center filed motions to dismiss the appeal. Appellee filed a brief in 

support of his appeal that contained little argument, but instead appeared to 

be a compilation of documents contained in the Director's file, as well as 

several letters addressed "to whom it may concern," that are not part of the 

official record below. Appellants' position during that appeal was that 

Appellee's employment was expressly conditioned upon him maintaining a 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 8

license or certification (in this case a commission), and that his failure to 

comply with the condition was just cause for termination. Appellants urged 

the trial court to affirm the decision of the Review Commission, as it was 

lawful, reasonable, and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶10} On September 28, 2016, the trial court issued its decision and 

entry reversing the decision of the Review Commission. In its decision, the 

trial court found that the record supported Appellee's contention that the 

requirement that he be affiliated with the Ross County Sheriff's Office was a 

new requirement, that Appellee had not initially agreed that he must be 

affiliated with the Ross County Sheriff and that as such, Appellee was not 

terminated from his position with just cause. The trial court further reasoned 

Appellee had only agreed that he had to be a "certified peace officer." The 

trial court further reasoned that there was no conflicting evidence that the 

requirements of Appellee's position had changed, and that the manifest 

weight of the evidence leads to the conclusion that Appellee was discharged 

without just cause. Thus, the trial court reversed the decision of the Review 

Commission, finding that that the decision was unlawful, unreasonable and 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 9

{¶11} It is from this decision issued by the trial court that Appellant, 

Director, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services filed its timely 

appeal to this Court, setting forth one assignment of error for review. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

“I. THE PICKAWAY COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE 

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION REVIEW COMMISSION, 

AS ITS DECISION THAT THE APPELLEE BRADLEY PARRETT 

("MR. PARRETT") WAS SEPARATED FROM HIS 

EMPLOYMENT UNDER DISQUALIFYING CONDITIONS WAS 

NOT UNLAWFUL, UNREASONABLE, OR AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.” 

{¶12} In its sole assignment of error, Appellant, Director, Ohio 

Department of Job and Family Services, contends the trial court erred in 

reversing the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review 

Commission, a decision which Appellee argues was not unlawful, 

unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellee 

seems to contend that the trial court "understood" and therefore "came to the 

conclusion," that he "did not in fact quit his job," but rather that he resigned 

for circumstances beyond his control, and therefore correctly reversed the 

Review Commission's decision. Based upon our review of the record and 

the following reasoning, we agree with Appellant.

{¶13} Unlike most administrative appeals where we employ an abuse 

of discretion standard, see Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 10

Relations Bd., 40 Ohio St.3d 257, 260-261, 533 N.E.2d 264 (1988), our 

review of an appeal from the decision of the Commission is identical to that 

of the common pleas court. We must affirm the Commission's decision 

unless we find the decision to be unlawful, unreasonable, or against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. See R.C. 4141.28(N)(1); Tzangas, Plakas 

& Mannos v. Ohio Bur. Of Emp. Serv., 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 696, 653 N.E.2d 

1207 (1995).

{¶14} In making this determination, we must give deference to the 

Commission in its role as finder of fact. We may not reverse the 

Commission's decision simply because “reasonable minds might reach 

different conclusions.” On close questions, where the board might 

reasonably decide either way, we have no authority to upset the agency's 

decision. Irvine v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 18, 

482 N.E.2d 587 (1985). Instead, our review is limited to determining 

whether the Commission's decision is unlawful, unreasonable or totally 

lacking in competent, credible evidence to support it. Id.

{¶15} R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) provides that an individual may not 

obtain unemployment benefits if he “has been discharged for just cause in 

connection with his work.” See also Ford Motor Co. v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. 

Serv., 59 Ohio St.3d 188, 189, 571 N.E.2d 727 (1991). “Just cause” exists if 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 11

a person of ordinary intelligence would conclude that the circumstances 

justify terminating the employment. Irvine, supra, at 17. An analysis of just 

cause must also consider the policy behind the Unemployment 

Compensation Act, which was intended to provide financial assistance to 

individuals who become unemployed through no fault of their own. 

Tzangas, supra, at 697. Accordingly, “fault” on an employee's part is an 

essential component of a just cause termination. Id. at paragraph two of the 

syllabus. The determination of just cause depends on the “unique factual 

considerations” of a particular case and is, therefore, primarily an issue for 

the trier of fact. Irvine, supra, at 17. The Ohio Supreme Court has 

recognized that “[t]here is, of course, not a slide-rule definition of just 

cause.” Irvine, supra, at 17. 

{¶16} It is important to distinguish between just cause for discharge 

in the context of unemployment compensation and in other contexts. An 

employer may justifiably discharge an employee without incurring liability 

for wrongful discharge, but that same employee may be entitled to 

unemployment compensation benefits. See Adams v. Harding Mach. Co., 56 

Ohio App.3d 150, 155, 565 N.E.2d 858, 862 (1989). Further, the Supreme 

Court of Ohio has noted that "[i]n the case of a police officer, an 

interpretation of 'just cause' must consider the particular needs of police 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 12

departments." City of Warrensville Heights v. Jennings, et al., 58 Ohio St.3d 

206, 207, 569 N.E.2d 489 (1991). In Jennings, the Supreme Court further 

noted as follows: 

“In Jones v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 40, 43, 

555 N.E.2d 940, 944, we quoted approvingly the common pleas 

court's statement ‘ “ that police officers are held to a higher 

standard of conduct than the general public.” ’ We further 

stated, ‘Law enforcement officials carry upon their shoulders 

the cloak of authority of the state. For them to command the 

respect of the public, it is necessary then for these officers even 

when off duty to comport themselves in a manner that brings 

credit, not disrespect, upon their department.’ Id. ‘[I]t is 

incumbent upon a police officer to keep his or her activities 

above suspicion both on and off duty.’ Id. at 44, 555 N.E.2d at 

945. Because a higher standard of conduct applies to police 

officers, just cause may exist regarding those officers even 

though it would not exist regarding another employee.” Id. 

{¶17} The Supreme Court of Ohio has further held as follows with 

respect to suitability for positions: 

“Unsuitability for a position constitutes fault sufficient to 

support a just cause termination. An employer may properly 

find an employee unsuitable for the required work, and thus to 

be at fault, when: (1) the employee does not perform the 

required work, (2) the employer made known its expectations 

of the employee at the time of hiring, (3) the expectations were 

reasonable, and (4) the requirements of the job did not change 

since the date of the original hiring for that particular position.” 

Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv., supra,

at 698-699; see also, Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Job and Family 

Servs., 129 Ohio St.3d 332, 2011-Ohio-2897, 951 N.E.2d 1031 

¶ 27. 

Further, in Williams, the Supreme Court held that: 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 13

“when employment is expressly conditioned upon obtaining or 

maintaining a license or certification and an employee agrees to 

the condition and is afforded a reasonable opportunity to obtain 

or maintain the license or certification, an employee's failure to 

comply with that condition is just cause for termination for 

unemployment compensation purposes.” Williams at ¶ 27.2

{¶18} Here, Appellant contends that Appellee's employment was 

expressly conditioned upon him maintaining his commission with the Ross 

County Sheriff's Office, and that such commission was necessary for him to 

perform the essential duties of his job. Appellee seemed to agree with this in 

the early stages of his application for unemployment compensation benefits. 

In fact, Appellee himself stated, in a letter dated January 23, 2015, which is 

part of the Director's file, that he went through training to become a peace 

officer and was given a "commission" by the elected sheriff (in Ross 

County) and gained employment. In his letter, Appellee claimed that "[a] 

'Commission' is what the sheriff gives his deputy's that gives them the right 

to act in behalf of the sheriff in his absence." Appellee further explained 

that once the Sheriff revoked his commission, he "no longer had deputy 

authority this means I could not arrest, pat down, detain or act in any way as 

an officer." Notably, Appellee further stated in the letter that: 

"[w]ith my employment working as a resource officer at the 

school it is in my contract that I must be a commissioned officer. 

 

2

 Williams involved an employee who was discharged for failure to obtain her LISW certification, which 

was a condition of her employment. We find it applicable to the present case, which involves the failure to 

maintain the necessary "commission" to perform the essential functions of the job. 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 14

* * * the sheriff pulled my commission and in return I did not 

meet the requirements of the contract at the school." 

Appellee submitted this letter after the initial denial of his application for 

benefits. However, as set forth above, a redetermination was issued again 

denying Appellee benefits. 

{¶19} Somewhere along the way, primarily at the stage of the 

telephone hearing, Appellee began to argue that his contract did not require 

him to be a "commissioned" officer, but only a "certified" officer. He 

further argued that his contract did not require that he be affiliated with the 

Ross County Sheriff's Office. However, the transcript from the telephone 

hearing evidences that the hearing officer noted this discrepancy. The 

hearing officer repeatedly questioned Appellee about the contract 

requirement that he be a "commissioned" rather than a "certified" officer. 

Ultimately the hearing officer disallowed Appellee's claim as well, which 

disallowance was affirmed by the Review Commission. 

{¶20} Interestingly, the trial court reversed the decision of the 

Review Commission, stating in its decision that the requirement that 

Appellee be affiliated with Ross County Sheriff's Office was a new 

requirement and thus, that the requirements of the job had substantially 

changed. As such, the trial court reasoned that the fourth prong of the 

Tzangas test had not been met. The trial court further found that Appellee's 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 15

contract only required that he be a "certified peace officer," and not a 

commissioned one. However, both of these determinations were factually 

incorrect according to the record before us. 

{¶21} As set forth above, Appellee's contract of employment did 

require that he "maintain a cooperative working relationship with the Ross 

County Sheriff's Department." This is the equivalent of an "affiliation." It 

further required that he "[b]e a commissioned law enforcement officer by the 

state of Ohio." (Emphasis added). Taken together these provisions clearly 

indicate Appellee was required to have an affiliation with the Ross County 

Sheriff's Office, which he lost when he was decommissioned by the Sheriff. 

Further, the loss of his commissioned status was a failure to abide by 

conditions of employment. Additionally, we find Appellee's argument that 

he only had to be "commissioned" by the State of Ohio, or rather, be a 

"certified" officer, to be disingenuous. There is correspondence in the file 

by Appellee's own hand describing the fact that he tried unsuccessfully to 

obtain a commission from the Pickaway County Sheriff, but could not. 

When Appellee lost his commission through Ross County, he was no longer 

a commissioned officer, as required in his job description. 

{¶22} Appellee seems to argue, although not clearly, that because he 

did not voluntarily give up his commission, he was unable to perform his 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 16

essential job functions at the school through no fault of his own. "An 

employer may terminate an employee for economic necessity when some 

condition prevents the employee from performing the duties of his job." 

Sprowls v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Services, 156 Ohio App.3d 

513, 2004-Ohio-1317, 806 N.E.2d 1030, ¶ 22. However, "just cause for 

purposes of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) imposes a different standard; in this 

context, the condition or circumstance which resulted in the termination 

must be a matter for which the employee was at fault." Id. As further 

explained in Sprowls, “ ‘[f]ault’ necessitates culpability, or blameworthiness, 

on the employee's part. A mere causal nexus between the termination and 

some circumstance or condition affecting the employee is insufficient to 

show that the termination was for just cause.” Id. 

{¶23} We find Appellee's argument unpersuasive. Because Appellee 

had his commission revoked by the Sheriff due to a complaint made by a 

private citizen, we conclude some fault may be presumed on the part of 

Appellee in losing his commission. Further, as set forth above, "[i]n the case 

of a police officer, an interpretation of 'just cause' must consider the 

particular needs of police departments." Jennings, supra, at 207. Here, for 

reasons involving a complaint made to the Sheriff's Office, the Sheriff made 

the decision to revoke Appellee's commission. It appears, based upon this 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 17

record, that Appellee was at fault in having his commission revoked. 

Further, without a commission, Appellee could not perform the essential 

duties of his job. Finally, as set forth above, the record supports the Review 

Commission's determination that Appellee was aware of this requirement 

upon hire, that the requirements of the job did not change, that Appellee 

failed to maintain the required commission, as well as the required affiliation 

with the Ross County Sheriff's Office and, as such, could not perform the 

requirements of the job. Thus, the presence of these factors results in 

Appellee’s unsuitability for the resource officer position with the school 

under the Tzangas test. Tzangas, supra, at 698-699. 

{¶24} As such, because the Review Commission's decision was not 

unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, we 

conclude that the trial court erred in reversing the decision. Accordingly, the 

judgment of the trial court is reversed.

 JUDGMENT REVERSED. 
Pickaway App. No. 16CA15 18

JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED and that Appellant 

shall recover costs from Appellee. 

 The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing 

the Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

 Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of 

the date of this entry. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Abele, J. & Hoover, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion. 

For the Court, 

 BY: ______________________________ 

 Matthew W. McFarland, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from 

the date of filing with the clerk.