NO. 82-229 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1983 

DORIS SONSTELIE, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

TBE BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR SCHOOL 

DISti'RICT NO. LO, Flathead County, 

Montana, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Flathead, The Honorable 

Robert M. Holter, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Billey & Loring, Great Falls, Montana 

Richard DeJana, I<alispell, 

E'or Respondent : 

Ted 0. Lympus, County Attorney, KalispeZl, 

Montana 

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Submitted on Briefs: November 24, 1982 

Decided: February 10, 1983 

FEE j. 1583 

Filed: 

d SifZ */ c$lM- --- 

Clerk 
.4r. Chlet Justice FranK I. Hasweil delivered the Oprnion or 

the Court. 

Doris Sonstelie petitioned the Flathead County District Court to invalidate a decision to terminate her 

employment. A nonjury trial was held on March 25, 1982. On 

hay 13, 1982, the District Court entered judgment in favor 

of the Board of Trustees. Sonstelie now appeals. 

Appellant was a nontenured teacher who had taught at 

the Cayuse Prairie School tor the three school years, 1978- 

1981. Cayuse Prairie, School District No. 10, Flathead 

County, is a third class district with fewer than a thousand 

people living in the district. There are three members on 

the Board of Trustees. The board meetings that are held can 

best be characeerized as informal. 

On Tuesday, March 10, 1981, the Board of Trustees held 

~ts regular monthly meeting. Appellant was present during 

the meetlng for a lengthy discussion of her teaching that 1s 

detailed In the minutes of that meeting. She made a statement in regard to her retention as a teacher and a number of 

other members of the public voiced their opinions on the 

situation. The possibility that appellant might be fired 

was clearly discussed. The chairman of the School Board, 

Stan Pine, informed the assembly that the Board would have 

until April 1 to issue tenure contracts and until April 15 

to issue nontenure contracts; that it had not yet made a 

decision on rehiring teachers for the 1981-1982 school year; 

and that it would consider the hirlng and make a decision in 

executive session as required by law. The meeting moved on 

to consider otner business and was adjourned at 11:16 p.m. 

At the close of the meeting, as Board members and 

members of the public were getting ready to leave, the Board 
members discussed the calllng oi a special lneetlny on 

Saturday, March 14, 1981, for the purpose of discussing 

teacher contracts for the coming school year. No time for 

the meeting was set. 

On March 12, 1981, Pine contacted the clerk of the 

scnool district, Bonnie Gagnon, in the early morning hours 

to inform her that the speclal meeting would be held at 9:00 

a.m. He instructed her to give appropriate public notice of 

the meetlng. From past experience, Gagnon knew that tnere 

was insufficient tlme for the notice to be published in the 

local newspaper. The paper would not accept such notices 

unless they were delivered at least two days prior to publication. She therefore contacted two local radio stations in 

Kalispell, KOFI and KGBZ, between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. on 

March 12, and requested that they broadcast notice of the 

meeting. No copy or transcript of the notice was kept by 

elther radio station. 

Gagnon then contacted the County Super in tendent of 

Schools, Wallace C. Vinnedge, to ask the correct method of 

jlving notlce of a speciai board meeting and whether posting 

of notice at the school would be sufficient. Vinnedge 

advised her that posting notice at the school was not sufficlent. He told her that if there was not enough time to 

publlsh the notlce, she should request the local radio 

stations to broadcast notice. 

The Board met on Saturday. Only the three trustees, 

the school clerk, and the head teacher attended the meeting. 

The minutes of the meeting retlect that "the board went into 

executive session to discuss and review teacher contracts 

for the 1961-1982 school year." Another speclal meeting was 
hela 011 Frlday, April 10, 1981, to discipline six teachers 

who had refused to distribute a letter from the School Board 

to the parents. The letter discussed teachers' salaries and 

benefits. The minutes of this meeting reflect that the 

Board did not specifically discuss the decision on renewal 

of appellant's contract. 

On April 13, 1981, chairman Pine notified appellant of 

the decision to terminate her employment. The next regular 

school board meeting was held on the following day. At that 

time, the Board was asked to reconsider its decision not to 

renew appellant's contract. The matter was discussed 

publicly and the Board accepted input from members of the 

public. Following that discussion, the Board again voted 

not to renew appellant's teaching contract for the 1981-1982 

school year. On April 13, 1981, appellant petitioned the 

District Court to declare the March 14 decision to terminate 

employment void because the meeting was held without adequate notice and was closed. 

We note at the outset that appellant has failed to 

delineate issues and all the facts relevant to the issues in 

her brief pursuant to Rule 23, M.R.App.Civ.P. See, School 

Dist. No. 1 v. Driscoll (1977), 176 Mont. 555, 568 P.2d 149. 

We summarize the thrust of appellant's argument in two 

issues : 

(1) Whether the School District complied with the 

notice provisions of the Public Meeting and dpen Meeting 

Acts; and 

(2) Whether the March 14 special meeting was 

improperly closed. 

Appellant contends that the School District failed to 
comply with the notice provisions established in the Public 

Meeting Act and that the inadequate notice violated Montana's Open Meeting Law. We disagree. 

The 1972 Montana Constitution, Article 11, Sections 8 

and 9 respectively, guarantees citizens the right of participation in the operation of government agencies prior to 

the making of a final decision and protects the right to 

observe deliberations of public bodies "except in cases in 

which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the 

merits of public disclosure." The Montana Public Meeting 

Act, section 2-3-101 et seq., MCA, and the Montana Open 

Meeting Act, section 2-3-201 et seq., MCA, provide the 

statutory guidelines to protect those constitutional 

guarantees. Appellant contends that the School District 

failed to comply with the notice requirements of these Acts. 

The Board is an agency pursuant to the Montana Public 

Meeting Act and the Montana Open Meeting Act, section 2-3- 

102(1), PICA. The Public Meeting Act requires agencies to 

develop guidelines to permit and encourage public participation in agency decisions of public interest. Section 2-3- 

103, MCA. The notice provisions of this Act are considered 

to have been complied with where: 

"(4) a newspaper of general circulation 

within the area to be affected by a 

decision of significant interest to the 

public has carried a news story or advertisement concerning the decision sufficiently prior to a final decision to 

permit public comment on the matter." 

Section 2-3-104(4), MCA. 

This Act also allows supplemental notice to be given 

by radio or television broadcast where an official of the 

state or any of its political subdivisions "is required by 

law to publish any notice." Section 2-3-105(1), MCA. In 
that event, the radio or television station broadcasting the 

notice is required to keep a copy of the notice and to provide a proof of publication by broadcast. These provisions 

do not mandate, as appellant contends, that notice must be 

published for all public meetings and that proof of publication by broadcast and a copy of the broadcast be retained. 

Rather, these statutes establish a presumption that adequate 

notice was given where those events occur. 

The only specific notice requirements established for 

calling a special school board meeting is that trustees must 

be given 48-hour written notice of the meeting. Section 20- 

3-322(3), MCA. A school district is not specifically 

required by law to publish notice of the meeting. That does 

not release the school district of the obligation to ensure 

that the public has ample opportunity to participate in 

board decisions before final board action is taken. Here, 

the District Court found that the public was presented with 

such opportunity. 

During both regular meetings, held March 10 and April 

14, tne Board formally opened the meetings for discussion by 

members of the public. The minutes of those meetings 

reflect that extensive comments were made by appellant and 

otners regarding ner retention as a Cayuse Prairie teacher. 

Ample evidence supports the District Court's finding that 

the Board complied with the provisions of the Montana Public 

Meeting Act. 

Appellant argues that inadequake notice of the March 

14 special meeting violated the Montana Open Meeting Act. 

She contends that the notice given by the school clerk was 

inadequate notice to the general public. 
This Court's function is to construe the law as it 

finds it. In the Matter of the Estate of Baier (1977), 173 

Mont. 396, 401, 567 P.2d 943, 946. We may not insert what 

has been omitted. Section 1-2-101, MCA; Chennault v. Sager 

(1980) I Mont . , 610 P.2d 173, 176, 37 St.Rep. 857, 

861. The Montana Open Meeting Act does not specifically 

mandate notice by publication. This Court will not formulate such a requirement. 

We have noted that " [w] ithout public notice, an open 

meeting is open in theory only, not in practice," and that a 

clandestine meeting "violates the spirit and the letter of 

the Montana Open Meeting Law." Board of Trustees, Huntley 

Project School Dist. No. 24, Worden v. Board of County 

Comissioners of Yellowstone County (1980), Mont. I 

6U6 P.2d 1069, 1073, 37 St.Rep. 175, 179, 180. In Board of 

Trustees, the county commissioners argued that a newspaper 

article concerning a preliminary plat of a proposed subdivision that was printed in a county newspaper constituted 

adequate public notice. The article did not provide sufficient facts on the time and place of the meeting "to inform 

the public sufficiently prior to the final decision to 

permit further public comment on the matter .'I 606 P.2d at 

1073, 37 St.Rep. at 180. Nor did the public have an opportunity to attend the meeting in which the decision was made. 

It was conducted by telephone and one of the county 

commissioners was also excluded from the vote. 

That is not the instant case. Here, the District Court 

heard testimony from the school clerk, the news directors of 

both radio stations, the three trustees, a parent, and the 

city editor for the local newspaper, the Daily Inter Lake. 
The stipulated facts establish that the school clerk contacted the radio stations to request notice be given. Both 

radio stations' news directors testified to their routine 

practices in running public service announcements. Such 

testimony is admissible pursuant to Rule 406, Iviont.R.Evid. 

The city editor of the Daily Inter Lake testified that 

public service notices are often not run even when delivered 

with more than forty-eight hours notice because paid advertisements and notices are given a higher priority for space. 

A search of issues of the Daily Inter Lake failed to 

locate notices of other special meetings that had been 

delivered to the paper more than two days prior to publication. The parent who testified indicated that he had taken 

part in the general discussion after the March 10 meeting on 

the time and substance of the special meeting to be held on 

March 14. Finally, the chairman of the School Board told 

the members of the public present at the March 10 meeting 

that decisions for contracts for tenured teachers and 

nontenured teachers had to be made by April 1 and April 15 

respectively and that the decisions had not yet been made. 

The next regular meeting was scheduled for April 14. Ample 

evidence supports the District Court's conclusion that 

adequate notice was given and that the March 14 meeting was 

open. 

Appellant finally argues that the special meeting was 

illegally closed in violation of the Open Meeting Act. This 

contention is without merit. The minutes of the meeting 

reflect that the trustees went into executive session "to 

discuss and review teacher contracts for the 1981-82 school 

year." When asked on direct examination why the Board went 
into executive session, chairman Pine replied that "there 

was a lot of things that could come up of a personal nature 

and privacy of the matters could get really touchy and would 

really outweigh the public need to hear what was said." The 

Open Meeting Act allows a presiding officer to close the 

meeting "during the time the discussion relates to a matter 

of individual privacy" where the officer has determined that 

"the demands of individual privacy clearly exceed the merits 

of public disclosure." That right of individual privacy may 

be waived "by the individual about whom the discussion pertains" and the meeting must then remain open. Section 2-3- 

203(2), MCA. 

Appellant asserts that the chairman of the Board did 

not first make such a determination because it is not 

reflected in the minutes (which must reflect "the substance 

of all matters proposed, discussed, or decided" pursuant to 

section 2-3-212, MCA). She objects to testimony by Pine on 

the Board's reasons for closing the meeting and contends 

that it amounts to parol evidence that contradicts the 

written record the Board is required by law to keep. These 

arguments fail. 

Appellant presented no evidence that such a determination was not made. Wor is the parol evidence inadmissible 

here. It does not contradict the official minutes of the 

meeting as it did in the case of Eastman v. School Dist. No. 

1 (1947), 120 Mont. 63, 180 P.2d 472 (overruled on other 

grounds, 128 Mont. 368, 275 P.2d 217), on which appellant 

relies. Rather, the parol evidence merely clarifies what 

occurred at the meeting. Appellant has failed to prove her 

assertions. She has also failed to demonstrate prejudice. 
It 1s clear from the record that ample public participation 

took place in regard to renewal of her contract. Adequate 

notice was given of the special meeting. 

Affirmed. 

'p.44, ~&& 

Chief Justice 

We concur: 

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Justices