Present: All the Justices 

MICHAEL V. GREENAN, ET AL. 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 951683 June 7, 1996 

RICHARD SOLOMON, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY 

Joshua L. Robinson, Judge Designate 

 In this appeal, we consider whether a landowner has an 

easement to use a right-of-way described in a deed recorded among 

the land records in Fauquier County. 

 Michael V. and Sandra J. Greenan, husband and wife, filed 

their amended bill of complaint against Richard A. and Elinor H. 

Solomon. The Greenans, who own a 10-acre parcel in Fauquier 

County, alleged that they have an easement to use a way to travel 

across a parcel of land, consisting of approximately 50 acres, 

owned by the Solomons. The Solomons filed responsive pleadings, 

denying that the Greenans have an easement to travel across the 

property. The chancellor conducted an ore tenus hearing, and the 

Greenans adduced the following relevant facts. 

 Jonathan Taylor Burke acquired approximately 100 acres of 

land in Marshall District, Fauquier County, by deed recorded 

April 28, 1882. This tract, rectangular in shape, was referred 

to as the Burke Farm. Jonathan Burke died intestate, and the 

farm was divided among his heirs by a partition deed. Susan E. 

and John Hall, Burke's daughter and son-in-law, acquired the 

northern 40 acres. 

 In March 1936, Allie B. Hall and his wife, Lillie V. Hall, 

acquired 50 acres of the former Burke Farm, which was sold by the 
clerk of the court for payment of delinquent taxes. This 50-acre 

parcel is located immediately south of the 40-acre parcel that 

John and Susan E. Hall acquired in the deed of partition. 

 The remainder of the former Burke Farm consisted of a 10-

acre parcel immediately south of the 50-acre parcel owned by 

Allie and Lillie Hall. Although there is no deed of record 

conveying the land to Taylor Hall, Allie Hall's father, Taylor 

Hall had possession of, and paid taxes on, this 10-acre parcel. 

He also devised this parcel of land in his will dated August 23, 

1955. 

 Taylor Hall and Allie and Lillie Hall executed the following 

deed: 

 "THIS DEED made this 27th day of July, 1957, 

between Allie B. Hall and Lillie V. Hall, his wife, 

parties of the first part; and Taylor Hall, party of 

the second part: 

 WITNESSETH; that for the sum of $1.00 and natural 

love and affection between son and father, the parties 

of the first part do hereby grant and convey, unto the 

party of the second part, a right-of-way and easement 

of travel 2360 feet more or less in length over the old 

existing private roadway by the edge of the woods near 

the western fence line between the property of the 

grantors and the Eric and Lois Sevareid place. The 

easement hereby granted is over and across a tract of 

land owned by the said Allie B. Hall near Selone in 

Marshall District, Fauquier County, Virginia, described 

as containing 51 Acres, 2 roods [sic] and 10.8 poles 

which was conveyed to him by T. E. Bartenstein, Clerk 

of the Circuit Court by deed dated March 6, 1936 and 

recorded in Deed Book 142, page 386. A plat and survey 

of said property will be found recorded in Deed Book 

141, pages 377 and 378. The right-of-way hereby 

granted will afford an easement of travel to the said 

Taylor Hall from his home-place to another 10 Acre 

parcel owned by him." 

(Emphasis added). 

 After this deed was recorded among the land records in 
Fauquier County, the Solomons acquired the 50-acre parcel that 

had been owned by Allie and Lillie Hall. The Greenans acquired a 

quitclaim deed to the 10-acre parcel, and they filed a suit to 

quiet title. The Greenans obtained fee simple title to the 10-

acre parcel as a result of their suit to quiet title. 

Subsequently, the Solomons refused to permit the Greenans to use 

the right-of-way that extended over the Solomons' property. 

 At the conclusion of the Greenans' evidence, the chancellor 

granted the Solomons' motion to strike. The chancellor held that 

the Greenans failed to prove that Taylor Hall was the owner of 

the 10-acre parcel at the time the easement was recorded and, 

therefore, they did not establish that Hall had, or could have 

acquired, a property right in the easement. We awarded the 

Greenans an appeal. 

 The Greenans observe that they are the successors in 

interest to Taylor Hall and that the Solomons are the successors 

in interest to Allie and Lillie Hall. The Greenans contend that 

the Solomons are legally precluded from asserting that Taylor 

Hall had no interest in the 10-acre parcel because Allie and 

Lillie Hall recited in the above-referenced deed that Taylor Hall 

was the owner of the 10-acre parcel. Thus, the Greenans assert 

that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

 The Solomons, however, argue that the trial court properly 

granted their motion to strike. The Solomons point out that the 

Greenans failed to trace their title to Taylor Hall and that the 

Greenans could identify no deed which named Taylor Hall as the 

record owner of the 10-acre parcel. Thus, the Solomons assert 
that the Greenans failed to prove that Taylor Hall was the owner 

of the dominant tenement when the deed creating the easement was 

executed and, therefore, the Greenans failed to establish that 

the deed created an easement. 

 The Solomons correctly observe that the easement would have 

no legal efficacy if Taylor Hall had no legal interest in the 10-

acre parcel when the deed was executed. We have said that 

 "an easement [is] 'a privilege without profit, which 

the owner of one tenement has a right to enjoy in 

respect of that tenement in or over the tenement of 

another person, by reason whereof the latter is obliged 

to suffer, or refrain from doing something on his own 

tenement for the advantage of the former.' Stevenson

v. Wallace, 27 Gratt. [77,] 87; Goddard on Easements, 

2. 

. . . . 

 An easement is a right which is appurtenant to the 

dominant tenement, and imposed upon the servient 

tenement; and it is important to mark that it is not 

imposed upon the person of the servient owner; 

therefore an obligation upon him to do something for 

the benefit of the dominant tenement is not an 

easement." 

Tardy v. Creasy, 81 Va. 553, 556-57 (1886). 

 However, we have already stated that the Greenans have fee 

simple title to the 10-acre parcel. They acquired their title by 

proving adverse possession in a suit to quiet title against the 

heirs of Jonathan Burke. "The ownership thus acquired includes 

those things which would pass with a transfer by deed . . . . 

Easements appurtenant to the possessed land are thus acquired." 

7 Powell on Real Property § 1017 (1995). Without question, the 

easement described in the deed is an easement appurtenant to and 

runs with the land. See Coal Corp. v. Lester, 203 Va. 93, 97-98, 
122 S.E.2d 901, 904-05 (1961). 

 The Solomons admitted below that they are the successors in 

interest to Allie and Lillie Hall, and the Greenans are the 

successors in interest to Taylor Hall. And, as we have said: 

 "It is well established that a party who purports 

to convey an estate is estopped as against his grantee 

from asserting anything in derogation thereof. That is 

to say, a grantor cannot deny his title to the 

prejudice of his grantee. See School Board v. Smith, 134 Va. 98, 104, 113 S.E. 868, 869 (1922). Similarly, 

'"those who derive title from or through the parties, 

ordinarily stand in the same position as the parties, 

and are bound by every estoppel that would have been 

binding on the parties."' Richmond Cedar Works v. 

West, 152 Va. 533, 543, 147 S.E. 196, 199 (1929)." 

VEPCO v. Buchwalter, 228 Va. 684, 688, 325 S.E.2d 95, 97 (1985). 

 Applying these principles, we hold that the Solomons, who 

derived title ultimately from Allie and Lillie Hall, may not 

assert any fact in derogation of the easement that Allie and 

Lillie Hall conveyed to Taylor Hall. Simply stated, the Solomons 

may not assert that Taylor Hall did not own the 10-acre parcel 

when the deed creating the easement was executed because such 

assertion would be in derogation of the easement that Allie and 

Lillie Hall granted to Taylor Hall. We also note that the 

Solomons had, at the very least, record notice of the existence 

of the easement because it was recorded among the land records in 

Fauquier County prior to the Solomons' acquisition of title. See

Porter v. Wilson, 244 Va. 366, 369, 421 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1992). 

 Alternatively, the chancellor held that even if the Greenans 

established that Taylor Hall had owned the 10-acre parcel, the 

Solomons are, nonetheless, entitled to judgment because the deed 

was intended merely to grant access between the 40-acre and the 
10-acre parcels of land, and the Greenans intend to use the 

easement to access a public highway. The Solomons assert that 

the Greenans' "only motivation for initiating this action 

originally, and continuing it, is to obtain a right of way over 

Solomon to the public highway." 

 We disagree with the Solomons. The second paragraph in the 

above-referenced deed granted and conveyed to Taylor Hall "a 

right-of-way and easement of travel 2360 feet more or less in 

length over the old existing private roadway." This language 

created a clear and unambiguous right to use the right-of-way 

without any limitation on the ultimate terminus of the right-ofway. 

 It is true, as the chancellor observed, that the last 

sentence of the deed states that: "[t]he right-of-way hereby 

granted will afford an easement of travel to the said Taylor Hall 

from his home-place to another 10 Acre parcel owned by him." 

However, we have held: 

 "It is a settled rule of construction, both in 

deeds and wills, that if an estate is conveyed, or an 

interest given, or a benefit bestowed in one part of 

the instrument, by clear, unambiguous, and explicit 

words, such estate, interest, or benefit is not 

diminished nor destroyed by words in another part of 

the instrument, unless the terms which diminish or 

destroy the estate before given be as clear and 

decisive as the terms by which it was created." 

Smith v. Baptist Orphanage, 194 Va. 901, 908, 75 S.E.2d 491, 495-

96 (1953) (quoting Gaskins v. Hunton, 92 Va. 528, 531, 23 S.E. 

885, 886 (1896)); accord Salley v. Burns, 220 Va. 123, 134, 255 

S.E.2d 512, 518 (1979). Thus, the Greenans' motivations are 

immaterial and cannot divest the Greenans of their property 
rights in the right-of-way. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Greenans have a 

right-of-way and easement as described in the above-referenced 

deed. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment below, and we 

will enter final judgment here in favor of the Greenans. 

Reversed and final judgment.