1 T h e re se e m s to b e a d isc re p a n c y in the a m o u n t o f t im e the D e fen d a n t se rv e d . A c c o rd ing to the D e fen d a n t’s b ri ef , s he was arr est ed on F eb ruary 24 , 20 0 6 , and was r el eased on b o nd on F eb ruary 25 , 20 0 6

. T he Stat e ci t es t o t he 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT JAC KSON D ec em be r 4, 200 7 S es sio n
ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v
. S EL ET TAM C KI N N IS

Interlocutor y Appeal f

rom the Circ uit Court for DyerCounty No. C06-340 Lee Moore , Judge

No. W2007-01537-C CA-R 9-CD - F iled Janu ary 22, 2008

T h e Defendant, Seletta Mc Kinnis, was ar rested a nd pled guilty

to failing to appea

r in court. She
rec eived a sentenc e of “time serve d.” The De fenda nt was subseque ntly

indicted on sepa

rate offe nses and applied f

or pre trial diversion. The pr osecutor de nied her applicat i o n , ex p laining that she had previously

serve d a sentence of confine ment. She appea led to the Circuit Court, which also denie d her a pplication, and now she appea ls, a rguing that her “time serve d” sente nce should not pre clude her f rom pretr ial diversion. Findingno err or, we aff irm the trial cour

t’s judgme nt. Tenn. R. App . P . 9 Interlocutor y Appeal; Jud gm ent of the Circuit CourtAff irm ed

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d theo p in ion of the cour t, in which D AVI D G. H AYES , and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

H. To d T aylor , D y e rs burg , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla

nt, Se le tta Mc Ki nn is. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a

nd Reporter ; Michael E. Moore , Solicitor Genera l; L acy Wil ber, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; C. Phill ip B ivens, District Attorney Gene ral, for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION I. F acts

On Fe bruar

y 24, 2006, the pol ice arre sted the Defenda nt for f ailing to a ppear in court, and sh e wa s r e le a se d o n b on d th e fo llo wi ngda y

. On F e br

ua ry 27 , 20 06 , sh e ple d g uil ty fo r t hat of fe ns e and re ceive d a sente nce of “time serve d.” On Octobe r 9, 2006 , t h e De fenda nt was ar rested on 1D istric t A tto rn e y G e n e ra l’s le tter to D e fen se C o u n se l, w h ic h sa ys tha t the D e fen d a n t se rv e d te n d a ys. W e m e re ly no te

t h e di s cr epa n cy f

or f u t u r e r ef er en ce an d con t i n u e wi t h our an al y s i s bec au s e i t i s n ot de t er mi n at i v e f or t h e i s s u e r ai s ed.

2 char g es o f ag g ravated assault and r eckle ss endang erme nt. The De fenda nt applied for pr etrial diversion, and the D istrict Attorney Gene ral de nied the application. T h e De fendant appea led for
cer tiorari to the Dy er County Circuit Court , b u t t h e C o urt also denied the pretria l diversion
a pp lic a tio n. Th e Cir c uit

Court a llo we d th e De fe nd ant t o p ur su e an inte rl oc uto ry a pp e a l, a nd thi s Court g ra nte d th e pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l pu rs ua nt t o T e nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e ll ate P roc e dure Rul e 9.

II. Ana lys is

Th e De fe nd ant a lle g e s that sh e is e nti tle d to pr e tr ia l div e rs ion be c a us e he r pr e viou s “t ime
serve d” sentence should not count as a period of confinement. The St ate a rgues that the De fenda

nt
wa s arr ested a

nd confine d in jail prior to making bond. U pon beingconvicted a

nd sentenc ed, the Def endant r ece ived a jail sentenc e equal in leng th to the “time serve d” betwe en her arr est and he r rele ase on bond. A s such, the De fenda nt has a prior

misdemeanor c onviction f or which a sente nce of conf inement was serve d, and thus, she is not statutorily qualified for

pretria l diversion. We ag ree with the State.

Pretrial diver sion allows the district attorney g ener al t o suspend prosecution for a period of up to two y ear s ag ainst a defenda nt who m eets certain statutory require ments. See T.C.A. § 40-15- 105 (a )(1) (A) ( 2006). In order to qualify

for pr etrial diver sion, the defe ndant must not have previously

been g rante d diversion under this statute; must not have a prior misdeme anor c onviction for which a sentenc e of c onfinement was serve d or a prior felony conviction within a five- y ear period afte r c o mp le ti n g th e s e n te n c e o r p r o b a ti o n ar y p e r io d f

o r s u c h p r io r c o n v ic ti o n ; an d mu s t n ot be seekingdiversion for a

Class A or B felony , a sexual offe nse, d ri v ing unde r the influenc e, or vehicular assault. T.C .A. § 40-15-105( a)( 1)(B )(i)( a)- (c) (empha sis added)

. Such elig ibilit y does not presumptively

entitle a defe ndant to pretrial diver sion, but rather pla ces suc h a dec ision withi n the discretion of the di strict attorney so long as the defendant is s tatutorily qualified. Sta te v . Cu rry , 988 S.W .2d 153, 157 (Tenn. 1999)

.
I t is the defenda

nt’s duty to demonstrate suitabili ty for pretrial diver sion. Sta te v . W ins e tt , 882 S.W .2d 806, 809-10 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1993). Howeve r, this re quirement does not relieve the prosec utor of his or her duty to consider a

nd articulate all the re levant fa ctors. Cur ry , 988 S.W .2d at 157. The district attorney is require d to consider a ll releva nt fac tors when de termining whether to gr ant pre trial diversion. Sta tev . Ca rr , 861 S.W .2d 850 , 8 5 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) . The Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court ha s ou tl in ed the c ri te ri a

that sh ou ld b e c on sid e re d b y the pr os e c uto r i n g rantingor deny

ing pr etrial diver sion: When decidingwhether

to enter into a m emorandum of understanding under the3

pr e tr ia l dive rs ion statut e a pr os e c uto r sho uld fo c us on the de fe nd ant’ s ame na bil ity to
corr ection. Any

fac tors which tend to ac curately ref lect whe ther a

particul ar defe ndant will o r will not become a repe at offe nder should be c onsidered. Such fac tors must, of course, be clea rly articula ble and stated i n t h e record in orde r that
me anin g fu l a

pp e llate re vie w m ay

be ha d. Am ong the fa c tor s to be c on sid e re d in add it io nto th e c ir c u ms ta n c e s o f th e o f f e n s e ar e th e d e f

e n d an t’ s c r im in a l r e c o rd, social history , the phy sical and mental conditi on of a de fenda nt where appropr iate,
and the lik e li ho od th at pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion wi ll s e rv e the e nd s o f j us tic e and the be st interest of both the public a nd the def

endant.

State v. Hamm ersley , 6 50 S.W. 2d 35 2, 35 5 ( Te nn . 1 98 3) ; ac c or d Cu rry , 988 S.W .2d at 157.

Where pretria l dive rsion is de nied by the district attorney , the fac tors and e v idence considere d in making the decision must be clea rly set forth in writing alongwith the weig ht acc orded to eac h fac tor. State v. Pinkham , 9 55 S.W. 2d 95 6, 96 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; W ins e tt , 882 S.W .2d at 810. The fa ctors must be “clear ly articula ble and stated i n the re cord.” Hamme rsley , 650 S.W .2d at 355. Fa ilure to c onsider and articulate all of the rele vant fac tors constitutes a n abuse of discretion. See Cur ry , 988 S.W .2d at 157-58.

A d e fe nd ant who ha s b e e n d e nie d p re tr ia l di ve rs ion by the dis tr ic t atto rn e y ha s th e ri g ht t o petition for a w ri t of ce rtiorar i to the trial court for an abuse of prose cutorial discr etion. T.C.A. § 40 -1 5- 10 5( b) (3 ). Al tho ug h a di st ri ct atto rn e y ’s de c isi on to gra nt o r d e ny

pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion

is pre s u mp ti v e ly c o r

r e c t, a tr ia l c o urt ma

y o v e r r u le a d is tr ic t a tt o r

n e y ’ s d e n ia l o f p r e tr ia l dive rsion wher e there has been an abuse of discretion See H ammersley , 6 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d

at3 5 6

. T h e t ri al j u d ge cannot simply substitut e his or her own judg ment for that of the district attorney

. State v. W atkins , 607 S.W .2d 48 6, 488 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) . To show prosec utorial abuse of discretion, the
rec ord must lack any

substantial evidence to suppor t t h e d en i al of pre trial diversion. Cur r y , 988 S.W .2d at 158. The leg islature veste d the authority to prosecute a case or divert it with the prosecutor r ather than the cour

t. SeeT. C.A . § 40 -1 5-105; Car r , 861 S.W .2d at 858. The tria l court “must not reweig h the evidenc e, but must consider wh et h er t h e dis trict attorney g ener al has we ighe d and
c on sid e re d a ll o f t

he re le van t f

a c tor s a nd wh e the r t

he re is s ub sta

nti a l e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d to support the district attorney g ener al’s rea sons f or denying diversion.” State v. Y ancey , 69 S.W .3d 553, 559 (Tenn. 2002) . On appe al, this Court is “bound by the fa ctual fi n d i n gs m ade by the trial
c o urt un le s s th e e v id e n c e p r e p o n d e r a te s a g a in s t them.” St atev . B e ll , 69 S.W .3d 171, 177 (Tenn. 2002). An a

ppellate c ourt should apply the pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e standa

rd of r eview of

the trial court’ s decision re g ardinga prose cutor’s a buse of d iscretion. Cur

ry , 988 S.W .2d at 158. “When the fa cts are undisputed, the underly ing issue that this [ C] ourt must det er m i n e on appe al
rema ins whether, a s a matter of law, the pr osecutor abused his or her discretion in deny ing pr etrial diversion.” State v. Carriger , No

. E 2 000-00823-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL1861823, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Dec . 20, 2000), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed

.4

In its letter denying the Def endant’ s application for pretria l diversion, t he prose cutor stated:

I [t ] ap p ea rs that this defenda nt is not a “qualified de fenda nt” for pr etrial div e rs ion . O n h e r a

pp lic a tio n s he lis te d o ne pr ior arr e st f or do mes tic a ssa

ult in Dy ersbur g City

Court in 2004 on which she receive d a sentence of 11/29 suspended with c ounseling and Court c osts. She doe s, howeve r, have another arr est on Fe bruar

y 24, 2006 in Dy ersbur g City Court for fa ilure to appe ar in whic h she re ceive d a ten day sentenc e which she did serve. She also had a n arr est in J uly , 2004 by

the Dy er County Sheri ff’ s Depa

rtment for dr iving on a

revoke d or suspende d license which sh e did no t li st.
The District Attorne y

Gene ral a

nd the trial cour

t both denied the De fenda nt’s petition for pre -trial diversion bec ause she had a period of confine ment from Fe bruar y 2006. The dispute betwe en the Def endant a nd the State i s whether a sentence of “time s erve d” counts as a “ period of c onfinement.” SeeT.C.A. § 40-15-105( a)( 1)(B )(i)( b). The T ennesse e Annotate d Code does not def ine “conf inement,” so we turn to its plain langua g e mea ning. Accordingto Blac k ’s Law D ic tio na ry , “conf inement” mea

ns an “a ct of imprisoningor re straining someone; the state of beingimprisoned
or re strained.” 318 (8th ed. 2004). T he De fenda nt spent at least one night in ja il after be ing a rre sted pursuant to a wa

rra nt, and she wa s not relea sed until she paid a bond. Up o n the entry of the De fe nd ant’ s guil ty

ple a , th e mun ic ipa l c ourt imp os e d a

se nte nc e of

c on fi ne me nt e qu a l in

le ng th t o the time the Def

endant spe nt i n j ail (“time ser ved”) befor e her

g uilty plea. We conc lude that the Def endant’ s “time serve d” sente nce w as a pe riod of con fi n em ent imposed by the municipal cour

t for he r misdemeanor

conviction and se rved by the Def endant. The ref

ore, the Def

endant ha d a prior misdemeanor c onviction f or which a sente nce of

confine ment was ser

ved, and the Def

endant wa s not statutorily

qualified for

pretria l diversion.

III. Conclusi on
B a se d o n th e fo re g oin g re a so nin g and a uth or iti e s, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

.

________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE