Filed 5/31/23 Brown v. City of Inglewood CA2/1

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

WANDA M. BROWN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CITY OF INGLEWOOD et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 B320658

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 21STCV30604)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Deirdre H. Hill, Judge. Affirmed in part 

and reversed in part. 

Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, Walter J. Lack, Richard P. 

Kinnan and Christopher A. Kanne for Defendants and

Appellants.

Miller Barondess, Mira Hashmall and Colin H. Rolfs for

Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Respondent Wanda Brown has served as the elected 

treasurer for appellant, the City of Inglewood (the City), 

since 1987. Brown sued the City and several members of the

Inglewood City Council1 (the council), alleging that after she

reported concerns about financial improprieties, the City and the 

individual defendants defamed and retaliated against her. She 

alleged causes of action for (1) defamation; (2) violation of Labor 

Code section 1102.5, subdivisions (b) and (c),

2 which prohibit

retaliation against an employee based on the employee reporting

or refusing to participate in what the employee reasonably 

believes to be illegal activity by the employer (the section 1102.5 

retaliation claim); and (3) intentional infliction of emotional 

distress (IIED), based both on the alleged retaliation and the 

alleged defamation. The City and the individual defendants 

filed a joint special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic 

lawsuit against public participation, or SLAPP, under the antiSLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). The court granted 

the motion in part, but denied it as to the section 1102.5 

retaliation claim and the retaliation-based IIED claim against

all defendants. Defendants appeal, arguing the court incorrectly 

denied the anti-SLAPP motion as to the retaliation-based claims 

against the individual defendants. For reasons we discuss below, 

we hold that the retaliation-based claims against the individual 

defendants arise from protected conduct under the anti-SLAPP 

statute, and that the court should have stricken these claims. 

1 Specifically, respondents Mayor James T. Butts, Jr., 

Alex Padilla, George Dotson, Eloy Morales, and Ralph Franklin

(collectively, the individual defendants). 

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all unspecified statutory 

references are to the Labor Code. 
3

In all other respects, we affirm the court’s ruling on the 

anti-SLAPP motion. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A. Brown’s Lawsuit Against Defendants 

In her first amended complaint (the FAC), Brown alleged 

she had “reported to [individual defendants] that she had 

discovered facts indicating that [individual defendants] were 

mishandling the City’s finances, including an improper payment 

of nearly [$100,000] to a City [c]ontractor,” and “improperly 

fail[ing] to accurately report to the public the true financial 

health of the City.” She alleged that, as a result of her reporting 

these concerns, defendants took various adverse actions against 

her, including reducing her duties and authority as treasurer, 

reducing her salary by 83 percent, taking away her seat at the 

council meetings, and temporarily locking her and her staff 

out of their offices. Brown further alleged that, at a council 

meeting, one of the individual defendants, Mayor Butts, offered 

a “defamatory pretextual reason for taking away [Brown’s] duties 

and reducing her salary,” namely that she “[did] not know the 

procedure for handling bad debts, [and that] he had no choice but

to reduce her duties and her salary.”

B. Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion and Related 

Evidence 

Defendants filed a motion to strike all causes of action in 

the FAC under the anti-SLAPP statute. The anti-SLAPP statute 

is “designed to protect defendants from meritless lawsuits that 

might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and petition on 

matters of public concern. [Citations.] To that end, the statute 

authorizes a special motion to strike a claim ‘arising from any 
4

act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition 

or free speech under the United States Constitution or the 

California Constitution in connection with a public issue.’ 

(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. 

(2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884.) Such acts are referred to in 

anti-SLAPP parlance as “protected activity.” (Park v. Board 

of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 

1061 (Park).)

“Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step 

process. First, ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of 

establishing that the challenged allegations or claims “aris[e] 

from” protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.’ 

[Citation.] Second, for each claim that does arise from protected 

activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal 

merit.” ’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff cannot make this showing, 

the court will strike the claim.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health 

System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).) 

Defendants’ motion argued the FAC alleged claims 

arising from conduct that falls into two of the statutorily 

enumerated categories of protected activity: “any written or 

oral statement[s] or writing made in connection with an issue 

under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or 

judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law”

(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2)), and “any other conduct in furtherance 

of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the 

constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public 

issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) 

Specifically, the motion argued that each of Brown’s claims 

arose from voting and other legislative actions of the individual 

defendants and statements they made at the council meetings
5

in connection therewith. Defendants’ motion further argued that,

for various reasons, Brown could not demonstrate that her claims 

had minimal merit, including that the claims were barred by

government discretionary act immunity, that section 1102.5 does

not permit individual liability, and that Brown was neither an 

“employee” for purposes of section 1102.5, nor had she reported 

conduct that she reasonably suspected to be illegal, both of which 

are required under section 1102.5.

1. Evidence in support of and opposition to 

the anti-SLAPP motion 

Defendants primarily supported their anti-SLAPP motion 

with the following evidence: (1) excerpts from the City charter 

and Municipal Code; (2) City ordinances and a City policy 

adopted by a vote of the individual defendants that, collectively,

reduced Brown’s salary, investment authority, and duties, as 

alleged in the FAC; (3) excerpts of transcripts from various 

council meetings, including excerpts reflecting council votes 

passing the relevant ordinances and policy;

3 and (4) declarations.

3 At Brown’s request, the court took judicial notice of the 

first two categories of documents listed above, but declined to 

take judicial notice of the council meeting transcripts. On appeal, 

defendants contend this ruling was in error, and Brown raises 

no argument to the contrary. We need not resolve this issue, 

however, because regardless of whether the court erred in 

partially denying the request for judicial notice, the transcripts 

were attached to a declaration in support of the motion, and the 

anti-SLAPP statute expressly requires that, in its anti-SLAPP 

analysis, the court “shall consider the pleadings, and supporting 

and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability 

or defense is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) 
6

Under the City charter, the council is the City’s legislative 

body, and all powers of the City are vested in and exercised 

by the council, which consists of the mayor and four council 

members. The City treasurer is not a member of the council. 

Council meetings are open to the public. The council has the 

authority to “establish rules and regulations for the conduct of 

its proceedings” and the mayor is “responsible for maintaining 

the order and decorum of meetings.” The mayor, council

members, clerk, and treasurer are all publicly elected. The 

council has the authority to fix the compensation of any City

officer except the mayor and council members.

In fall 2022, the council passed two ordinances included 

in the documents supporting the anti-SLAPP motion. First, 

in September 2022, it passed Ordinance No. 20-16 regarding

“Assignment of City Duties” that, inter alia, transferred general 

auditor responsibilities once held by the treasurer to the City 

clerk, reduced the maximum amount of funds the treasurer 

was permitted to manage to $50,000, and adopted a revised 

investment policy.

4 In October 2022, it passed a second

ordinance, “Salary Ordinance for Fiscal Year 2020–2021,”

which adjusted the salaries of a number of positions, including 

the treasurer’s salary, which it reduced by over 80 percent as 

compared to the previous year.

Declarations from defendant Mayor Butts and the City’s

manager, Artie Fields, addressed allegations in the FAC that 

Butts had denied Brown a seat on the dais during council 

meetings and that the individual defendants had blocked 

Brown’s access to her office. Butts’s declaration stated that 

4 The defendants also submitted the policy itself in support 

of the anti-SLAPP motion.
7

the City treasurer “is not a member of the . . . council and so 

has no standing to sit on the dais during meetings of the . . . 

council,” but that “a previous mayor had decided to let the 

treasurer have a seat on the dais during meetings, and [Butts] 

[had initially] continued that practice.” (Capitalization omitted.) 

Butts continued that, in early 2020, Brown “began to disrupt 

meetings of the . . . council” and in July 2020 Butts “exercised 

[his] discretion as chair of the council and revoked the privilege 

of the treasurer to be seated at the dais during meetings of 

the . . . council.” (Capitalization omitted.)

The Fields declaration stated that, in October 2020,

“Brown’s proximity badge was deactivated because she had 

failed to present a negative COVID-19 test confirmation to the 

[C]ity, as required” and, as a result, Brown was locked out of 

her office at City Hall. Fields declared “[t]his same action was 

taken as to all personnel that did not provide a negative test 

confirmation. . . . Brown’s proximity badge was reactivated once 

she provided a negative test confirmation.”

The transcripts from council meetings reflect the votes 

by the individual defendants adopting the ordinances and 

policy noted above, Butts’s allegedly defamatory statements, 

and Brown’s statements criticizing the council and Butts. 

In opposing the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, Brown 

submitted, inter alia, a declaration and supporting exhibits in 

an effort to establish her status as an “employee” for purposes 

of section 1102.5. Specifically, Brown offered W-2 federal tax 

forms she had received from the City, which identify her as an

“[e]mployee[ ]” and her biweekly pay stub, which identifies 

various employee benefits such as health benefits and 
8

reflects a deduction from her regular earnings for “workers[’]

comp[ensation].” (Boldface and capitalization omitted.)

2. Court’s ruling on anti-SLAPP motion

The court granted the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion 

with respect to the defamation claim and the defamation-based 

portion of the IIED claim. The court denied the motion as to the

section 1102.5 retaliation claim and retaliation-based portion of 

the IIED claim, finding these claims did not arise from “protected 

activity.” The trial court explained, “[T]he individual defendants’ 

conduct in their decision making or voting is not the gravamen 

of the [retaliation] claim.” The trial court concluded that, 

instead, “the activities upon which the claim rests, which are 

adverse actions, are the reduction in her salary and duties and 

being locked out of her office and computer.”

Defendants timely appealed the court’s partial denial of 

their anti-SLAPP motion. 

C. Additional Procedural History

Defendants also filed a demurrer to the FAC, which the 

court heard on the same day as the anti-SLAPP motion. The trial 

court sustained defendants’ demurrer with leave to amend as to 

the claims that remained in litigation following the court’s antiSLAPP ruling (section 1102.5 retaliation claim and retaliationbased IIED claim). In so ruling, the court concluded that the 

FAC did not sufficiently allege that Brown had “disclosed to a 

person with authority over her or to an employee with authority 

to investigate a concern that certain illegal activity had occurred, 

and that she had a reasonable belief that Mayor Butts[ ] violated 

[the] law,” a necessary element of Brown’s section 1102.5 claim. 

The court further concluded that the remaining retaliation-based 
9

IIED claim was derivative of the retaliation claim and failed 

for similar reasons, in addition to being barred because the

Workers’ Compensation Act (§ 3200 et seq.) provides the 

exclusive remedy for any such injury.

5 (See § 3601, subd. (a)

[workers’ compensation is “the exclusive remedy for injury or 

death of an employee against any other employee of the employer 

acting within the scope of his or her employment”].)

Following the demurrer ruling, Brown voluntarily 

dismissed (without prejudice) defendants Dotson, Padilla, 

Franklin, and Morales and filed a second amended complaint 

asserting her claims under section 1102.5 and for retaliationbased IIED against the City and Butts.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that the trial court reversibly erred 

in denying their anti-SLAPP motion as to the retaliationbased causes of action against the individual defendants. 

Our review is de novo. (Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo 

Contracting Services, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1056.)

A. Anti-SLAPP Analytical Framework

In the first step in the anti-SLAPP analysis, the moving 

defendant bears the burden of “identify[ing] what acts each 

5 The court also addressed arguments, likewise raised 

on appeal in connection with the second prong of the antiSLAPP analysis, that the retaliation-based claims were 

barred by discretionary act immunity under Government Code 

section 820.2 and government act immunity under Government 

Code section 821. Finally, the court noted that the case law 

was unclear as to whether section 1102.5 provided a basis for 

imposing liability on an individual, nonemployer defendant.
10

challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are 

protected under a statutorily defined category of protected 

activity.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.) If the court 

determines that relief is sought “based on allegations arising 

from activity protected by the statute, the second step is 

reached” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 (Baral)),

and “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each 

challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient 

and factually substantiated.” (Ibid.) This step involves a 

“summary-judgment-like procedure.” (Varian Medical Systems, 

Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.) If the plaintiff fails 

to make the requisite showing to support the claim, “the claim 

is stricken.” (Baral, supra, at p. 396.)

B. The Retaliation-Based Claims Against the 

Individual Defendants Arise from Protected 

Activity (Anti-SLAPP Analysis Step One)

1. Identifying protected activity

We agree that the individual defendants’ votes adopting

two ordinances and a policy that, collectively, required the 

allegedly retaliatory reduction in Brown’s salary, authority and 

duties, are protected activity. The California Supreme Court 

held in City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409 that, 

because “votes taken after a public hearing qualify as acts in 

furtherance of constitutionally protected activity” (id. at p. 427, 

italics omitted), “elected officials may assert the protection of 

[the anti-SLAPP statute] when sued over how they voted.” (Ibid., 

italics added; id. at pp. 422–423 [in lawsuit against individual 

council members, “the council members’ votes, as well as 

statements made in the course of their deliberations at the city

council meeting where the votes were taken, qualify as ‘any 
11

written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative . . . 

proceeding.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1).)”].) Brown, however, argues

that we should recharacterize this activity as the individual 

defendants effectively reducing her salary, authorities and 

duties. But the individual defendants have no legal ability to

change the scope of Brown’s salary, authority, or duties; they

can only vote on ordinances and policies on these topics. After

the council passes an ordinance or adopts a policy, the acts

implementing the ordinance or policy—for example, actually 

paying the treasurer less or permitting her to invest less money—

are acts of the City, not of the individual council members. Thus, 

under Vasquez, the individual defendants’ involvement in the 

reduction of Brown’s salary, authority, and duties consisted solely

of the protected act of voting at council meetings.

The case on which Brown primarily relies in arguing to 

the contrary, Whitehall v. County of San Bernardino (2017) 17 

Cal.App.5th 352 (Whitehall), is inapposite, because it addresses 

an anti-SLAPP motion to strike claims against a public entity, 

not claims against individual public officials. In Whitehall,

the court concluded that a retaliation claim against the County

based on the County’s allegedly retaliatory act of placing an

employee on leave did not arise from protected activity, even

though the County supervisor’s investigation that preceded 

the leave was protected activity. (Id. at p. 362.) The court 

in Whitehall explained that the “act of placing plaintiff on 

administrative leave, with the intention of firing her, did not 

arise from the County’s protected activity. . . . Had plaintiff 

sued the specific supervisors who conducted the investigation 

on behalf of the County, a clear case of a SLAPP suit would 

have been established. But plaintiff challenged the retaliatory 
12

employment decision, not the process that led up to that point. 

The County’s act of placing plaintiff on administrative leave, with 

the intention of terminating her employment, was not an exercise 

of its petitioning or free speech rights.” (Ibid., italics added.) 

Because the only portion of the anti-SLAPP ruling at issue on 

appeal involves claims against the individual defendants, not 

the City, Whitehall is of no assistance to Brown.

Thus, the individual defendants’ role in reducing Brown’s 

salary and job duties was protected activity. 

2. “Arising from” analysis

We further conclude that the retaliation-based claims 

against the individual defendants arise from the individual 

defendants’ protected voting activity, as opposed to that activity 

“merely provid[ing] context” for those claims. (Baral, supra, 

1 Cal.5th at p. 394.) To determine whether a claim arises 

from protected activity, we consider whether the protected 

activity is necessary to satisfy any of the elements of the claim. 

(Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063.) One element of Brown’s 

section 1102.5 claim is that defendants took an “ ‘ “adverse 

employment action” ’ ” against her as retaliation for her reporting 

concerns about financial improprieties. (Morgan v. Regents of 

University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69 [reciting 

elements of section 1102.5 claim]; see § 1102.5, subds. (b) & (c).) 

Brown alleges that the same allegedly retaliatory adverse actions 

also satisfy the “ ‘ “extreme and outrageous conduct” ’ ” element 

of her IIED claim. (Unterberger v. Red Bull North America, Inc.

(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 414, 423 (Unterberger).) Through the

retaliation-based claims against the individual defendants, 

Brown alleges such adverse action and extreme and outrageous 

conduct primarily consisted of the City’s reduction in her salary, 
13

duties, and authority, something the individual defendants only 

engaged in via protected voting activity.

Brown also alleges the individual defendants engaged in 

retaliatory adverse actions and “extreme and outrageous conduct” 

by removing Brown from the dais at council meetings, such that 

even if the individual defendants’ voting conduct is protected 

activity, she need not rely on it to satisfy these elements of her 

claims. But removal from the dais cannot alone satisfy these 

elements of Brown’s claims, because it is not sufficiently material

(see Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 

1036 [defining an adverse employment action for purposes of 

a retaliation claim under the California Fair Employment and 

Housing Act (the FEHA) as requiring that the adverse action 

“materially affect[ ] the terms and conditions of employment”]),

6

and it is not an action “ ‘ “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of 

that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” ’ ” (Unterberger, 

supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 423.) Thus, Brown must rely on the 

protected voting activity of the individual defendants discussed 

above to satisfy these elements of her retaliation-based claims 

against the individual defendants, meaning the claims arise 

6 Although this definition was developed in the context of 

FEHA retaliation, courts apply it in the context of section 1102.5 

claims as well. (See Malais v. Los Angeles City Fire Dept. (2007) 

150 Cal.App.4th 350, 357 [applying FEHA definition of adverse 

employment action to a section 1102.5 claim, and noting that 

“[m]inor or relatively trivial adverse actions . . . that, from an 

objective perspective, are reasonably likely to do no more than 

anger or upset an employee . . . are not actionable”].) 
14

from protected activity.

7 (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063.) 

Accordingly, we analyze these claims under the second step of 

the anti-SLAPP framework.

C. Legal Sufficiency of Retaliation-Based Claims 

Against Individual Defendants (Anti-SLAPP 

Analysis Step Two)

In the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we consider 

whether Brown has “ ‘ “ ‘demonstrate[d] that [the retaliationbased claims against the individual defendants] [are] both legally 

sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of 

facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted 

by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” ’ ” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter

(2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 791.)

1. Section 1102.5 retaliation claim against 

individual defendants 

Defendants argue that the section 1102.5 retaliation claim

is not legally sufficient, because Brown is not an “employee” for 

the purposes of that statute. We agree.

Brown alleges the individual defendants violated 

subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 1102.5. By their own terms, 

these sections protect only “employee[s]” from certain types of 

retaliation by “[a]n employer, or any person acting on behalf 

of the employer.” (§ 1102.5, subds. (b) & (c).) Section 1106 

addresses the definition of the term “employee” in this context: 

“For purposes of Section[ ] 1102.5 [and other enumerated 

7 Because the removal of Brown from the dais was not 

sufficiently material, we need not and do not consider whether, as

defendants argue, removing Brown from the dais was protected 

activity as well. 
15

sections] ‘employee’ includes, but is not limited to, any individual 

employed by . . . any . . . city.” (§ 1106.) Notably, the Legislature 

did not reference elected officials as falling within the scope 

of the term “employee” for the purposes of section 1102.5. Yet 

when the Legislature intended to include elected officials within 

the scope of the term “employee” elsewhere in the code—namely, 

in defining the term for purposes of workers’ compensation—

the Legislature expressly defined the term “ ‘[e]mployee’ . . . 

[to] include . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [a]ll elected . . . paid public 

officers.” (§ 3351, subd. (b) [section of Workers’ Compensation 

Act providing: “ ‘Employee’ means every person in the service 

of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or 

apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether 

lawfully or unlawfully employed, and includes . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . 

[a]ll elected and appointed paid public officers”].) The plain 

language of these statutes thus unambiguously includes “elected 

officials” in the definition of “employee” for purposes of workers’

compensation, but not within the definition of “employee” for

purposes of section 1102.5. Because the plain language of a 

statute is the best indication of the Legislature’s intent (see 

Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977 (Wilcox)), this 

language reflects the Legislature’s decision to provide elected 

officials the benefits of the Workers’ Compensation Act, but to 

deny them the protections of section 1102.5. 

Brown argues that “[i]t is reasonable and sensible for 

California courts to . . . classify elected officials as employees

[under section 1102.5],” just as the California Legislature did in 

the context of workers’ compensation and the Internal Revenue 

Service does for purposes of federal tax law. (See 26 U.S.C. 

§ 3401(c) [defining “employee” under the Internal Revenue 
16

Code to include “an officer, employee, or elected official”].)

This argument flies in the face of basic maxims of statutory 

interpretation, because it asks us to interlineate section 1106

with words that the Legislature chose not to include—words

which, based on section 3351, the Legislature is clearly capable 

of employing. (See Blankenship v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2010) 186 

Cal.App.4th 87, 94 [“the Legislature’s omission of a term in a list 

of terms indicates the Legislature did not intend to include the 

omitted term”].)

Brown also urges us to look to case law defining “employee” 

for the purposes of section 1102.5, specifically cases incorporating

the “common law definition of employee” for this purpose. 

(Bennett v. Rancho California Water Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 

908, 927.) We need not resort to judicial interpretations of the 

definition the Legislature provided when that definition is clear 

and unambiguous. (See Wilcox, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 977 

[plain, unambiguous language of a statute is the best indicator 

of legislative intent in statutory interpretation].) Accordingly, 

Brown’s section 1102.5 retaliation claim against the individual 

defendants fails the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, 

and the court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motion as to that 

claim. 

2. Retaliation-based IIED claim against the 

individual defendants 

Brown’s IIED claim against the individual defendants fails 

as a matter of law, because it is “ ‘subsumed under the exclusive 

remedy provisions of workers’ compensation.’ ” (Miklosy v. 

Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 902.) 

As noted above, unlike the definition of “employee” for purposes 

of section 1102.5, the definition of “employee” for purposes of 
17

workers’ compensation includes “[a]ll elected . . . paid public 

officers.” (§ 3351, subd. (b).) Where, as here, purportedly 

wrongful conduct occurred at the worksite in the normal course, 

“workers’ compensation is plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy for any 

injury that may have resulted.” (Miklosy, supra, at p. 902.) 

Because we conclude the retaliation-based IIED claim against 

the individual defendants is not viable on this basis, we need not 

reach the other bases raised by the parties. 
18

DISPOSITION

The court’s order on defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion 

is reversed to the extent it denies the motion as to Brown’s 

section 1102.5 retaliation claim against the individual defendants 

and Brown’s retaliation-based IIED claim against the individual 

defendants. In all other respects, the order regarding the 

anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. 

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.