II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 434 

To seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran’s nuclear program, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 24, 2021 

Mr. MARKEY (for himself, Ms. WARREN, Mr. SANDERS, Ms. DUCKWORTH, 

Mr. LEAHY, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. MURPHY, Ms. BALDWIN, Mrs. MURRAY, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, and Mr. MERKLEY) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran’s nuclear program, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Iran Diplomacy Act 

5 of 2021’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 

8 (1) On July 14, 2015, the People’s Republic of 

9 China, France, Germany, Russia, the United KingVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:58 Mar 17, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S434.IS S434

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1 dom, the United States, the European Union, and 

2 Iran agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Ac3 tion (JCPOA). 

4 (2) When all parties fully implemented the 

5 JCPOA, it had increased the amount of time it 

6 would take Iran to acquire enough fissile material 

7 for one nuclear weapon, from approximately two to 

8 three months to at least one year, if Iran made the 

9 political decision to take such an action. 

10 (3) The JCPOA blocked Iran’s uranium, pluto11 nium, and covert pathways to a nuclear weapon, in 

12 the period when all sides had fully implemented their 

13 commitments, in part by— 

14 (A) imposing verifiable limits on Iran’s 

15 uranium enrichment and plutonium production 

16 capabilities; 

17 (B) reducing the number of Iran’s installed 

18 centrifuges by two-thirds; and 

19 (C) permitting the International Atomic 

20 Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor and verify 

21 all stages of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle to include 

22 requesting short-notice access to ‘‘verify the 

23 non-diversion of declared material’’ and ‘‘ab24 sence of undeclared nuclear material and activi25 ties’’ in Iran, consistent with its provisional imVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:58 Mar 17, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S434.IS S434

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1 plementation of the Additional Protocol to its 

2 IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. 

3 (4) The 2018 Department of State Compliance 

4 Report concluded, ‘‘Tehran’s adherence to these 

5 commitments will hinder its ability to produce a nu6 clear weapon even after the time-bound provisions of 

7 the deal expire, helping to ensure that its nuclear 

8 program remains exclusively peaceful in nature’’. 

9 (5) On January 29, 2019, Director of the Cen10 tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) Gina Haspel, testified 

11 before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

12 Senate that ‘‘at the moment, technically they [Iran] 

13 are in compliance,’’ with the JCPOA. 

14 (6) On January 29, 2019, Director of National 

15 Intelligence Dan Coats issued a worldwide threat as16 sessment, which observed that the United States 

17 ‘‘[does] not believe that Iran is currently under18 taking the key activities we judge necessary to 

19 produce a nuclear device’’ and ‘‘Iran’s continued im20 plementation of the JCPOA has extended the 

21 amount of time Iran would need to produce enough 

22 fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few 

23 months to about one year’’. 

24 (7) On May 8, 2018, President Donald J. 

25 Trump announced the United States unilateral abroVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:58 Mar 17, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S434.IS S434

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1 gation of the JCPOA, and announced that the 

2 United States would re-impose all of its sanctions 

3 that it had lifted after Iran verifiably met its nu4 clear-related commitments under the agreement on 

5 its implementation day of January 16, 2016. 

6 (8) The United States abrogation of the 

7 JCPOA is a violation of its commitments under the 

8 agreement and threatened United States relations 

9 with European allies, whose cooperation is necessary 

10 to counter Iran’s malign influence in the Middle 

11 East. 

12 (9) Prior to Iran’s first breach of the JCPOA 

13 on May 8, 2019, quarterly reports from the IAEA 

14 Board of Governors Reports found that since ‘‘im15 plementation day,’’ on January 16, 2016, Iran’s nu16 clear program was consistent with the JCPOA’s re17 strictions. 

18 (10) Following the removal of nearly all re19 maining waivers to United States nuclear-related 

20 sanctions on May 2, 2019, the Government of Iran 

21 committed a series of concerning, but reversible, 

22 breaches of its commitments under the JCPOA, in23 cluding by— 

24 (A) exceeding the allowable stock of low25 enriched uranium and heavy water; 


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1 (B) exceeding the allowable number of in2 stalled centrifuges at its Pilot Fuel Enrichment 

3 Plant; 

4 (C) enriching uranium at the Fordow Fuel 

5 Enrichment Plant; 

6 (D) exceeding the permitted Low Enriched 

7 Uranium (LEU) enrichment level of 3.67 per8 cent of the Uranium U–235 isotope and by en9 riching up to 20 percent; and 

10 (E) beginning production of uranium 

11 metal; 

12 (11) Since the full re-imposition of United 

13 States nuclear-related sanctions in 2019, the Gov14 ernment of Iran has also engaged in a series of 

15 escalatory actions outside its nuclear program that 

16 have put the United States Armed Forces, dip17 lomats, and strategic partners at risk and have 

18 heightened the threat of an armed conflict with Iran. 

19 (12) Tensions with Iran reached a high-point 

20 following the unauthorized United States strike 

21 against Iranian General Qassem Soleimani on Janu22 ary 3, 2020, and an Iranian ballistic missile strike 

23 on January 7, 2020, on two United States bases in 

24 Iraq, which left 110 United States service members 

25 with traumatic brain injuries. 


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1 (13) On January 5, 2020, Iran announced that 

2 it would no longer comply with the limits of the 

3 JCPOA, while also noting that it would not take the 

4 escalatory step of withdrawing from the Treaty on 

5 the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at 

6 Washington, London, and Moscow, July 1, 1968 

7 (NPT), which commits Iran to IAEA safeguards and 

8 obligates it to not obtain a nuclear weapon. 

9 (14) On December 21, 2020, the foreign min10 isters of each of the remaining parties to the 

11 JCPOA affirmed their continued ‘‘commitment to 

12 preserve the agreement,’’ and called for the ‘‘full 

13 and effective implementation of the JCPOA’’ by all 

14 parties, heralding it as ‘‘significant achievement of 

15 multilateral diplomacy that contributes to regional 

16 and international security’’. 

17 (15) Congressional review of the JCPOA under 

18 the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 

19 (Public Law 114–17; 129 Stat. 201) is already com20 plete, and that Act still provides a meaningful role 

21 for congressional oversight of the JCPOA through 

22 its reporting requirements that assess Iran’s ongoing 

23 compliance with the agreement. 

24 (16) During Secretary of State Antony 

25 Blinken’s January 19, 2021, nomination hearing beVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:58 Mar 17, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S434.IS S434

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1 fore the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen2 ate, he testified that President Joseph R. Biden’s 

3 position is that ‘‘if Iran returns to compliance with 

4 the JCPOA, we would do the same thing and then 

5 use that as a platform, working with our allies and 

6 partners to build a longer and stronger agreement to 

7 also capture some of the other issues that need to 

8 be dealt with regard to missiles, with regard to 

9 Iran’s activities and destabilizing activities in the re10 gion’’. 

11 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

12 It is the policy of the United States as follows: 

13 (1) Full implementation of the Joint Com14 prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) would represent 

15 a meaningful step to both preventing an Iranian nu16 clear weapon and a costly future armed conflict. 

17 (2) The United States and Iran should prompt18 ly return to full compliance with all of their commit19 ments under the JCPOA. 

20 (3) After such time that all sides return to their 

21 commitments under the JCPOA, the United States 

22 should lead international efforts to— 

23 (A) strengthen the restrictions Iran’s on 

24 ballistic missile program and counter the proVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:58 Mar 17, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S434.IS S434

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1 liferation of such technology to other countries 

2 and actors; 

3 (B) address the sunset of select provisions 

4 of the JCPOA and other elements of the agree5 ment that merit strengthening; and 

6 (C) advance any other diplomatic measures 

7 that promote United States, regional, and inter8 national security. 

9 (4) The United States should reaffirm its com10 mitment to United Nations Security Resolution 

11 2231 (2015). 

12 (5) Through implementation of the President’s 

13 January 21, 2021, National Security Memorandum 

14 -1, and other steps, the United States will better fos15 ter an environment in which financial institutions 

16 and entities can make practical use of existing ex17 emptions and mechanisms ‘‘allowing for the sale of 

18 agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and med19 ical devices to Iran,’’ and help Iran battle the 

20 COVID–19 pandemic. 

Æ 


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