### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Jul y 6, 200 4 S es sio n

TAM I SP RIN TZ HA LL ET AL 

### v. RI CHARD HAMBLE N, ET AL 

### .

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 99-1663-I Ir vin H. Kilcrease , Jr., Chancellor

No. M2002- 00562-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Augu st 16, 2004

Ho me ow ne rs of

a ne w r e sid e nc e br ou g ht an a c tio n a g a ins t a su bc on tr a c tor

fo r breach of c on tr a c t, neg lige nt misreprese ntation, professional ne g lige nce, and violation of th e T en nessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found that there was a brea ch of contra ct and aw arde d attorney ’s fe es under the Tenne ssee Consumer Protec tion Act. Subcontrac tor appe aled insisting that be ca u se no violation of the TCPA was found, the trial court lacke d a basis to a war d attorney ’s fee s. We ag ree and re verse the judg ment of the trial c ourt with respe ct to the awa rd of attorney ’s fe es. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Reve rsed in Par t.

P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN , and F R ANK G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., joined.

Robert J . Notestine I I I , Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Richard H amblen d/b/a Contrac tor’s Mir ro r & Gl a ss.
Jill A . H a ns on , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lle e s, Ta mi Sp ri ntz H a ll a ndJef fr e y Ha ll.

OP IN ION

The sole issue prese nted in this appea l is whe ther the tria l court prope rly awa rded attorney ’s fee s pursuant to the Tenne ssee Consumer Protec tion Act (“TCPA”) in an ac tio n t h at i n v olved a contra ct for w indow installation services. The trial court did not provide in its order any finding that the subcontra ctor violated the TCPA, and the fee provision of TCPA doe s not support the awa rd of attorney ’s fe es without a violation. There fore , we hold that attorney ’s fe es pursua nt to Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109 c annot be a war ded to a pa rty unless that party

is found to have violated the TCPA. A l t h o u g h t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d i s l i m i t e d , s o m e f a c t u a l a n d p r o c e d u r a l b a c k g r o u n d i s n e c e s s ar y.T he H al l s i ni t i al l y hi red a general co nt ract o r t o c o nst ruct the ho m e, but l at er t o o k ove r t he res p o nsi b i l i t i es hel d by t he 1 fo rme r cont ract o r and hi red subc o nt ract o rs t o co m p l et e t he ho use const ruct i o n.

2 II. F A C TUA L B ACKG ROUND

Homeowne rs, Tami Sprintz Hall and J eff rey Hall, (“the Halls”) decided to build a r esidenc e for themse lves and a cted a s g ener al contractors. I n November , 1997, the Halls hired the de fenda nt 1 Richard Hamblen, sole proprie tor of Contrac tors’ Mirror & Gl as s (j o intly“CMG”) , to install t he windows in the couple’ s new house. I n an oral ag ree ment, the Halls ag ree d to pay CMG $33,757.00 fo r the ma te ri a ls a ndins ta llatio n. Th e on ly writt e n in str

ume nt f urnis he d to the Ha lls wa s a n e sti ma te of the c o s t o f t h e construction. The Ha lls paid CMG an advanc e payment of $16,898.00 on No ve mbe r 2 0, 19 97 . In Jan ua ry , 1 99 8, the Ha lls no tif

ie d CM G that th e c on str

uc tio n of the ho us e had prog resse d to the point that the company could install the windows. Although CMG took the field mea surements in January , the actual work did not commence until March. Onc e the g lass was delivere d to the construction site, the Ha lls p ai d CMG an additional $6,000.00 to beg in the ins ta llatio n. Whil e CMGins ta lle d th e wi nd ow s, the c omp a ny ra re ly c ommun ic a te d w ith the Ha lls and fa iled to show up for a pre- arr ang ed mee ting with them.

After installation, the windows beg an to leak, and construction of the house was delay ed as
a re sult of damag e fr om poor installation. CMG attempted to fix the l eaka g e through c aulking but thi s me a su re faile d to sto p th e pr ob le m. M r. Ha ll t e sti fi e d th a t CM G f a ile d to ins ta ll the pr op e r s ill plate , w hic h w a s su pp os e d to div e rt wate r a way

fr om the wi nd ow . CM G f a ile d to pr ov ide the Ha lls wi th a via ble so lut ion or

a plan to a dd re ss the pr ob le m, an d did not a dmi t its in abil ity to c omp le te the job. On Aug ust 25, 1998, the Halls and CMG’s attorne y met at the construc tion sit e and de cided that th e Ha lls wo uld hir e a no the r co mpany to co mpl e te the job

. Th e pa rt ie s ag re e d tha t CM G w ou ld
remove and stack the windows for possible r e-use

. The two parties did not reach an agr eement
conce rning the amount of money , if any , CMG owed the Ha lls.

At their own e x pense, the Halls hired Wall Br others Glass ( “Wall Bros. ”) to inst all the wi nd o w s

. S i n c e W a l l B r o s

. w a s ab l e t o u t i l i z e s o m e o f t h e g l a s s l e f t b y C M G , t h e c o s t f

orits service s was re duced by

$7,000. Mrs. Hall testified that a four m o n t h d el ay in the construction proce ss occur

red a s a re sult of the leaka ge. Mr. Her b Seloff, the subc ontrac tor that handled the dry wa ll i n th e ho us e , an d Mr. Ke n Jam e so n, the su bc on tr a c tor that hand le d th e e le c tr ic a l w or k, a lso testified that CMG’s inability to install t he windows prope rly cause d a dela y

in the construction.

II. T HE P R O C EE D ING S B E L OW
The Ha lls sued CMG for bre ach of contra ct, neg lige nt misreprese ntation, professional
ne g lig e nc e , a ndvio la tio n o f the TCP A b a se d on the su bc on tr a c tor ’s a lle g e d u nf a ir or de c e pti ve a c ts. At the be nc h tria l, the plaint if fs a ndfo ur

wi tne sse s tes ti fi e d th a t CM G f a ile d to c omp ly

wi th i ts
c on tr a c tua l ob lig a tio n to ins ta ll the wi nd ow s. Th e Ha lls a sse rt e d th a t CM G r e fu se d to c ommun ic a te with them, misreprese nted the ca use of the le aking windows, and failed to timel y i nform them of CMG’s inabilityto perform the terms of the a g ree ment. CMG, on the other hand, did not a ppear at3

trial, and no witnesse s testified on the compa ny ’s beha lf.

The trial c ourt filed a Me morandum Opinion in which it found that CMG brea ched its ora l contra ct to install the windows properly and aw arde d damag es for that brea ch. Specifica lly , the court found:

The De fenda nts breac hed the c ontrac t they ente re d into with the Pl aintiffs to install the windows in the house. The Def endants failed to install t he windows prope rly . The e vidence demonstrated that the Def endants failed to put sil l plates in the windows or installed them p ro p er l y , wh i ch re s u l t ed i n t h e w i n d o ws l ea k i n g.
Th e me a su re of da ma g e is the a mou nt pa id to the De fe nd a nts to se c ur e the m to ins ta ll the windows ($22,898.00) plus the differ ence between the contr act price of the Def endants ($33,757.00) and that of Wall Brother s Glass, I nc. ($42,280.00) less the
va lue of the g la ss l e ft

on the pr op e rt y ($ 7, 00 0)

. Th e re fo re , Plai nti ff s ar e e nti tle d to
a judgme nt a g ainst the [Defendants] in the amount of $24,421.00. Al l o th er cl a i ms for damage s are denied. A d d i t i o n a l l y, P l a i n t i f f s ar e e n t i t l e d t o r e a s o n ab l e a t t o r n e ys fee s pursuant to T.C.A. § 47-18-109 ( e)( 1). (e mphasis added)

. As the opinion makes cle ar, the Ha l l s did not prevail on their TCPA, neg lige nt misrepre sentation and prof essional neg lige nce c laims, and thos e claims wer e dis missed by the trial
c ou rt . D e sp ite the tr ia l cou rt de nying a ll of the Ha lls ’ cl a ims e xce pt fo r the br e a c h o f c on tr a c t c la im, the Halls we re a war ded $8,283.51 in re asonable attorney ’s fee s on the stated ba sis of the private right of ac tion provision of the TCPA.

CMGha s n ot c ha lle ng e d th e c ou rt ’s a wa rd of a c tua l dama g e s f

or the br e a c h o f c on tr a c t. T his appea l involves onlythe question of whe ther the tria l court prope rly awa rded attorn e y ’ s f

e e s pursuant the TCPA without finding a violation o f t h e Ac t

. CMG asserts that the Me morandum Opinion contained a

contra dictory

element, i.e. , it state s that the Halls wer e not e ntitled to damag es for anything other than t he breac h of contract, y et t hey rec eived attorney ’s fees base d on one of the other claims. The c ompany

also arg ues that attorne y ’s fees s hould not be awarde d to the Halls since the TCP A w a s n ot v iol a te d. Ad dit ion a lly , CM G c la ims that th e re is n oth ing in the re c or d th a t su g g e sts tha t it e mpl oy e d o r

u s e d u n f a i r o r d e c e p t i v e a c t s o r

p r a c t i c e s a s d e f

i n e d b y t h e s t a t u t e

. C MG
c on c e de s it

c omm itt e d a bre a c h of co ntr a c t, but a sse rt s it didno t c omm it a ny

un fair or de c e pti ve a c ts.

III
. A TTOR N EY ’ S F EES

Tenne ssee f

ollows the American Rule requiring “litiga nts t o p ay t heir own attorney ’s fe es in the absenc e of a statute or c ontrac tual provision otherwise.” State v. Brown & W illiamson To b a cco Corp. , 18 S.W. 3d18 6, 19 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; John Kohl & Co. v. Dearborn & Ewing , 977 S.W .2d 528, 534 (Tenn. 1998) . A pa rt y , even a prevailing party , is not entitl ed to an a war d of attorney ’s fe es absent a contra ctual or statutory provision a llowing such an awa rd. Tay lor

v . R os s ,4

73 6 S. W.2 d 6 14 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 7) . H e re , th e or a l con tr a c t did not inc lud e a fe e pr ov isi on , s o t h e H a l l s m u s tr e l y o n s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y.
The statute r elied on for

the Hall’s r equest a nd for the court’s awa rd is part of the TCPA and provides that “upon a findi ng by the court that a provision of this part ha s been violate d, the court may awa rd . . . re asonable attorney fee s and costs.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 47-18- 109(e) (1). Construction of a statute is a question of law whic h we r eview de novo , with no presumption of
corr ectne ss. Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 9 70 S.W. 2d92 0, 92 4 ( Te nn . 199 8)

. Ou r r ole is t o a sc e rt a in and g ive ef

fec t to leg islative intent, f

inding that intent, w heneve r possible, in the natura l and ordinary meaning of the wor ds used in the statute. Id.

The wor ds used in Tenn. Code Ann. § 47- 18-109(e )(1) are clea r and una mbiguous. To be
a wa rd e d atto rn e y ’s fe e s u nd e r the TCP A, a plaint if f mus t be suc c e ssf

ul on his or

he r T CPA c la im and the c ourt must find the defe ndant violated the Act. The rea sonablene ss of such a r equire ment cannot be questioned. He re, the trial court did not find that CMG had violated a ny provision of the TCP A. To the c on tr ary , th e cou rt di sm is sed a ll the Ha lls ’ c la ims e xce pt b re a c h o f c on tr a c t. Consequently , the statute provides no basis for any awa rd of f ees in this case

. My int

, 970 S.W .2d at 926 (holding that beca

use the insur ance company ’s conduc t did not viol ate the T CPA, plainti ff insureds we re not e ntitled to remedies under the Act, including attorney ’s fe es).

Th e Ha lls fi rs t c on te ndthat si nc e the tr ia l c ou rt c ite d Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 4 7- 18 -1 09 (e )( 1) in the Memora ndum Order

(but only as the ba sis for its fee awa rd), we should infer that the tria l court held there was a

violation of the TCP A. W e ca nnot make that infe renc e. The court c lear ly and specific ally

found a br eac h of contra ct and he ld defe ndants liable for damag es arising fr om that brea ch. The court c lear ly used the bre ach of contra ct m easur e of damag es and did not mention the
measure under the TCPA. Instead, the court dismiss ed all cla ims for damag es other tha n the bre ach of contra ct claim, which must nec essarily include th e TCPA claim. Simplymentioning the Tenne ssee Consumer Protec tion Act as a ba sis for fe es does not qualify as a f inding of a violation of it.

I n a se pa rate arg ume nt, the Ha lls c on te nd that the re is a mpl e su pp ort f or a fi nd ing that CM G violated the TCPA beca

use the re cord shows that CMG commit t ed u n fair or dec eptive ac ts or prac tices. I n essenc e, the Halls would have us disreg ard or re verse the trial court’s finding s on the ba sis fo r l ia

bil ity a ndits dis mis sa l of

the TCP A c la im. I n o rd e r t o r e ve rs e the tr ia l c ou rt ’s dis mis sa l, we would ha ve to find that the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst the find i n g t h at the Halls we re not entitled to relief unde r the TCPA. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

The statute c reating a

private right of

action for

violation of the TCPA, Te nn. Code Ann. § 47 -1 8- 10 9( a )( 1) pr ov ide s:2T he pl ai nt i f f mus t al s o s how t hat t he act s or prac t i ces t oo k pl ace i n t he conduct o f any t r ade or com merc e i n t hi s s t at e. M yi nt , 970 S. W

. 2d a t 926.
5 An y pe rs on wh o s uf

fe rs a n a sc e rt a ina

ble los s o f m on e y

or pr op e rt y , real , pe rs on a l,
or mixe d, or a ny oth e r a

rt ic le , c omm od ity , o r thin g of va lue wh e re ve r s itu a te d, a s a result of the use or employ m en t b y an o t h er pe rson of a n unfair or dece ptive act or pr a c tic e de c lare d to be un la wf ul b y thi s p art , may

bring a n a c ti on in div idu a lly to
re c ov e r a c tua l dama g e s. Thus, to establish a rig ht to recove r under t h e TCPA, a plaintiff must show the def endant
e ng a g e d in un fair

or deceptive a c ts, a s sp e c if ie d in the Ac t, that c a us e d p la int if f an a sc e rt a ina

ble los s. Myint , 9 70 S.W. 2da t 92 6; Mi lli k e n v . Cr y e -L e ik e Re altor

s , No. M1999-00071-COA- R3-CV, 2 2001 WL 747638, at *6 (Te nn. Ct. App. J uly 5, 2001) (pe rm. app. de nied Dec . 10, 2001).

Br eac h of contra ct and violation of the TC PA are two differ ent causes of action, and proof of the e x istence of

one does not ne cess ar i l yestablish the exist ence of the other . Every brea ch of
c on tr a c t, o r f

a ilu re to pe rf

orm a c on tr a c t, i s n ot a

vio la tio n o f the TCP A. A p art y bring ing a

TCP A action must prove that ther e was some dece ption, misrepre sentation or unfa irness, re g ardle ss of any brea ch of c ontrac t. Ha me r v. H ar ris , No. M2002-00220-COA- R3-CV, 2002 WL 31469213, at *1, (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2002) , (perm. app. denied F eb. 18, 2003).

Ba sed on our r eview of

the re cord, w e cannot conclude that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the trial court ’s i mplicit finding that either there was no violation of the TCPA or no
a sc e rt a ina ble los s a ttribu ta

ble to any su c h c on du c t.

IV. C ONCL US I ON

T h e H a ll s w e r e s u c c e s s f

u l o n th e ir

b r e a c h o f

c o n tr a c t c laim

a n d w e r e a w ar d e d b r e a c h of contra ct damag es. They did not preva il on their TC PA claim, and that claim was dismissed by the trial court. B eca

use the TCPA authorizes an a war d of attorne y ’s fe es only upon a findi n g of a violation, a nd beca

use there was no such finding here in, the re is no statutory authority for the a war d of fe e s. Con se qu e ntl y , we re ve rs e the tr ia l c ou rt ’s a wa rdof fe e s. Cos ts o f the app e a l are ta xedto the app e lle e s, Ta mi Sp ri ntz H a ll a ndJef fr e y Ha ll.

___________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE