FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BIBIJI INDERJIT KAUR PURI;

RANBIR SINGH BHAI; KAMALJIT

KAUR KOHLI; KULBIR SINGH

PURI,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SOPURKH KAUR KHALSA;

PERAIM KAUR KHALSA; SIRI

RAM KAUR KHALSA; SIRI KARM

KAUR KHALSA; KARTAR SINGH

KHALSA; KARAM SINGH

KHALSA; ROY LAMBERT;

SCHWABE, WILLIAMSON &

WYATT, an Oregon Professional

Corporation; LEWIS M.

HOROWITZ; LANE POWELL PC,

an Oregon Professional

Corporation; UNTO INFINITY,

LLC, an Oregon Limited

Liability Company; SIRI SINGH

SAHIB CORPORATION, an Oregon

non-profit corporation; DOES, 1

through 5,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-36024

D.C. No.

3:10-cv-01532-MO

OPINION
2 PURI V. KHALSA

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael W. Mosman, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 10, 2016

Portland, Oregon

Filed January 6, 2017

Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Marsha S. Berzon

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher

SUMMARY*

First Amendment

The panel vacated the district court’s dismissal, as

foreclosed by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of

the First Amendment, of claims concerning a dispute over the

control of two nonprofit entities associated with the Sikh

Dharma religious community.

The panel held, based only on the pleadings, that the

claims were not barred by the First Amendment’s ministerial

exception. The panel held that the ecclesiastical abstention

doctrine did not apply because the claims could be resolved

by application of neutral principles of law without

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
PURI V. KHALSA 3

encroaching on religious organizations’ right of autonomy in

matters of religious doctrine and administration.

The panel addressed additional issues in a concurrently

filed memorandum disposition.

COUNSEL

Surjit P. Soni (argued) and Leo E. Lundberg, Jr., The Soni

Law Firm, Pasadena, California; R. Scott Palmer, Watkinson

Laird Rubenstein Baldwin & Burgess P.C., Eugene, Oregon;

for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Paul J.C. Southwick (argued) and John F. McGrory,Jr., Davis

Wright Tremaine LLP, Portland, Oregon, for DefendantsAppellees Unto Infinity, LLC; Siri Singh Sahib Corporation;

Kartar Singh Khalsa; Karam Singh Khalsa; Peraim Kaur

Khalsa; Siri Karm Kaur Khalsa; and Sopurkh Kaur Khalsa.

Janet M. Schroer (argued), Portland, Oregon; Ralph E.

Cromwell, Jr., Byrnes Keller Cromwell LLP, Seattle,

Washington; for Defendants-Appellants Schwabe,

Williamson & Wyatt.

Susan E. Watts (argued), Portland, Oregon; Joseph C.

Arellano, Kennedy Watts Arellano LLP, Portland, Oregon,

for Defendants-Appellees Lane Powell PC and Lewis M.

Horowitz.

Leslie S. Johnson, Kent & Johnson LLP, Portland, Oregon,

for Defendant-Appellee Siri Ram Kaur Khalsa.
4 PURI V. KHALSA

Stephen C. Voorhees and Candice R. Broock, Kilmer

Voorhees & Laurick PC, Portland, Oregon, for DefendantAppellee Roy Lambert.

Susan Bower and Rebecca M. Auten, Assistant Attorneys

General; Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General; Ellen F.

Rosenblum, AttorneyGeneral; Oregon Department of Justice,

Salem, Oregon; for Amicus Curiae State of Oregon.

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal concerns a dispute over the control of two

nonprofit entities associated with the Sikh Dharma religious

community. The plaintiffs, the widow and children of the late

spiritual leader of the Sikh Dharma faith, brought claims

against various individuals and entities alleging several

interlocking conspiracies and fraudulent activities designed

to exclude them from certain management positions and to

convert millions of dollars in assets from entities under the

individual defendants’ control for personal benefit. The

district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, concluding

their claims were foreclosed by the Free Exercise and

Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.1 We vacate

1 This opinion addresses only the defendants’ First Amendment

defense to the plaintiffs’ direct claims. The plaintiffs also brought several

derivative claims on behalf of Siri Singh Sahib Corporation and Unto

Infinity, LLC. In a concurrently filed memorandumdisposition, we affirm

dismissal of those derivative claims. The memorandum disposition also

addresses the parties’ remaining arguments regarding the plaintiffs’ direct

claims.
PURI V. KHALSA 5

the district court’s dismissal because we conclude, based only

on the pleadings, that the plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by

the First Amendment’s ministerial exception and can be

resolved by application of neutral principles of law without

encroaching on religious organizations’ right of autonomy in

matters of religious doctrine and administration.

BACKGROUND

This case comes to us on the pleadings, so we accept the

plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true. Our review is limited to

the facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ first amended complaint

(“complaint”) and the attached exhibits incorporated by

reference therein. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church,

375 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2004).

Yogi Harbhajan Singh Khalsa, also known as Yogi

Bhajan, was a spiritual leader and entrepreneur who spread

Sikhism and Kundalini Yoga in the United States beginning

in the 1960s. In 1971, he was designated the Siri Singh

Sahib, the Sikh leader for the Western Hemisphere. Yogi

Bhajan founded or inspired the creation of numerous forprofit and nonprofit entities that were held and controlled by

Siri Singh Sahib of Sikh Dharma (SSSSD), a California

corporation sole of which he was the only shareholder.2

Three of these entities are particularly relevant to this case:

Siri Singh Sahib Corporation, Unto Infinity, LLC, and Sikh

Dharma International.

2 Under California law, a corporation sole is a corporation “formed

. . . by the bishop, chief priest, presiding elder, or other presiding officer

of any religious denomination, society, or church, for the purpose of

administering and managing the affairs, property, and temporalities

thereof.” Cal. Corp. Code § 10002.
6 PURI V. KHALSA

Yogi Bhajan formed Siri Singh SahibCorporation (SSSC)

as an Oregon nonprofit religious corporation “to act as the

successor legal organization to [SSSSD]” following his death

or incapacity, “and in such capacity to conduct and/or

facilitate religious, charitable and educational activities.” 

SSSC would become “the guardian of those assets of

[SSSSD] which are conveyed to it,” and would replace

SSSSD as the sole member of Unto Infinity, LLC. Yogi

Bhajan was the sole director, or “trustee,” of SSSC at its

founding, but the SSSCarticles of incorporation provided that

following his death or incapacity, “the directors shall be those

persons designated in writing by [Yogi Bhajan],” with such

written designation to be “delivered to, and held in

confidence by, the attorney for the corporation.” The articles

also set out certain religious criteria for directors:

No individual will be eligible to be designated

or elected as a trustee unless he or she . . . is

currently qualified as a minister of Sikh

Dharma; . . . is an active participant in

Dasvandh [tithing]; . . . [and] is then living,

and participating in the affairs of the Sikh

community, in a manner consistent with the

teachings and values of [Yogi Bhajan], and

accepts the directives and proclamations of

[Yogi Bhajan] as Siri Singh Sahib of Sikh

Dharma, as such teachings, values, directives,

and proclamations are understood by the Siri

Sikdar Sahib/a of Sikh Dharma . . . .

Yogi Bhajan formed Unto Infinity, LLC (UI), as an

Oregon nonprofit limited liability company to serve as a

member or shareholder of various for-profit and nonprofit

entities. Under UI’s operating agreement, SSSSD was to be
PURI V. KHALSA 7

the sole member of UI until Yogi Bhajan’s death or

incapacity, at which time SSSC would assume that role, and

UI would become the sole member of Sikh Dharma

International. Acting by virtue of his exclusive control over

SSSSD, Yogi Bhajan appointed himself and four others to the

UI board of managers, which would “exercise full and

exclusive control over the affairs of the Company, subject to

restrictions on that authority under the Oregon Limited

Liability Company Act.” The UI operating agreement set

forth the same religious eligibility criteria for its board of

managers as the SSSC articles established for its directors.

Yogi Bhajan formed Sikh Dharma International (SDI) as

a California nonprofit religious corporation “organized to

advance the religion of Sikh Dharma and as an association of

religious organizations teaching principles of Sikh Dharma,

including by ordination of ministers of divinity and operation

of places of worship.” SDI’s sole member is UI.

Yogi Bhajan died in October 2004. He was survived by

the plaintiffs in this case – his wife, Bibiji Inderjit Kaur Puri

(“Bibiji”), and their three children, Ranbir Singh Bhai

(“Ranbir”), Kamaljit Kaur Kohli and Kulbir Singh Puri. 

They allege the general counsel and five board members of

UI and SSSC conspired to exclude them from participating in

the management of those organizations.

First, the plaintiffs assert they have been improperly

excluded from the SSSC board of trustees. They allege Yogi

Bhajan, acting pursuant to the SSSC articles of incorporation,

designated all four of them to become board members

following his death or incapacity and furnished the written

designation to defendant Roy Lambert, attorney for SSSC. 

Lambert allegedlyfailed to produce the designation following
8 PURI V. KHALSA

Yogi Bhajan’s death, and the defendants then held board

meetings without providing notice to the plaintiffs and

without the plaintiffs’ attendance, in violation of SSSC

bylaws and Oregon law. Second, the plaintiffs allege the UI

board of managers added Bibiji as a manager of UI on July

26, 2004, prior to Yogi Bhajan’s death, by unanimous written

consent, but the defendants failed to inform her of her

election and denied her the rights and duties of board

membership.

In support of their claims, the plaintiffs point to various

emails and corporate documents, attached to their complaint

and incorporated by reference, that they allege confirm their

allegations of wrongful exclusion from the SSSC and UI

boards. On July 26, 2004, all five members of the UI board

of managers apparently adopted a resolution increasing the

membership of the board to six and electing Bibiji “to fill the

new position as manager of the Corporation.” In October

2004, defendant Sopurkh Kaur Khalsa (“Sopurkh”), president

of the UI board of managers, left a voicemail message for

plaintiff Ranbir explaining that she and Lambert were

“proceeding on getting you guys on the Board” of SSSC and

UI. Sopurkh followed up by email with a “Memo of

Understanding” acknowledging that Bibiji was “already on

[the] board” of UI and confirming that all four plaintiffs

would be added to the SSSC and UI boards. In September

2005, Sopurkh apparently changed course, explaining to

Bibiji that the previous Memo of Understanding

“inadvertently omitted a statement regarding the corporate

involvement of you and your children,” and the “[m]emo was

not intended to indicate either current board membership for

you and your children or agreement that you and your

children would ultimately be elected to the listed boards.”

Sopurkh furnished a “revised Memo of Understanding which
PURI V. KHALSA 9

corrects the prior error,” clarifying that the memo constituted

her “understanding of the family’s request to be included in

the various boards in our organization.” The revised

document nonetheless reiterated Bibiji was “already on [the]

board” of UI. Two months later, when Lambert sent an email

listing “the board of [SSSC] as designated by [Yogi Bhajan],”

two of the plaintiffs’ names appeared on the list.

The plaintiffs’ complaint seeks a judgment that Bibiji

“has been a Manager of UI from and after July 26, 2004” and

that all four plaintiffs “be appointed to the Board of Trustees

of SSSC.” They also seek damages for lost compensation

they would have received for their services on the boards. 

After the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), the plaintiffs moved for leave to file a second

amended complaint. The district court granted the

defendants’ motions to dismiss, denied the motion for leave

to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice. 

The plaintiffs timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See

Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th

Cir. 2010). We accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of

material fact and construe them in the light most favorable to

the plaintiffs. See id. We also review de novo a district

court’s legal determinations, including constitutional rulings,

and its determinations on mixed questions of law and fact that

implicate constitutional rights. See Berger v. City of Seattle,

569 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
10 PURI V. KHALSA

DISCUSSION

The question before us is whether the Free Exercise and

Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment preclude a

civil court from granting relief on the plaintiffs’ claims,

which seek declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of

placement on the management boards of organizations

associated with the Sikh Dharma religious community as well

as damages for lost compensation due to their previous

exclusion from those boards. The defendants raise the

“ministerial exception” as an affirmative defense, and

contend even if that exception does not apply, the plaintiffs’

claims still cannot be decided by a civil court because the

requested relief would infringe on the sphere of autonomy

constitutionally guaranteed to religious organizations.

I.

A.

The Supreme Court has long recognized religious

organizations’ broad right to control the selection of their

own religious leaders. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic

Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929). Recently, the

Court “confirm[ed] that it is impermissible for the

government to contradict a church’s determination of who

can act as its ministers,” and formally recognized “a

‘ministerial exception,’ grounded in the First Amendment,

that precludes application of [employment discrimination

laws] to claims concerning the employment relationship

between a religious institution and its ministers.” HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.

Ct. 694, 704–05 (2012). This ministerial exception “ensures

that the authority to select and control who will minister to
PURI V. KHALSA 11

the faithful – a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical’ – is the church’s

alone.” Id. at 709 (citation omitted) (quoting Kedroff v. Saint

Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am.,

344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)). The Court explained:

Requiring a church to accept or retain an

unwanted minister, or punishing a church for

failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a

mere employment decision. Such action

interferes with the internal governance of the

church, depriving the church of control over

the selection of those who will personify its

beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister,

the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause,

which protects a religious group’s right to

shape its own faith and mission through its

appointments. According the state the power

to determine which individuals will minister

to the faithful also violates the Establishment

Clause, which prohibits government

involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.

Id. at 706.

Although the Supreme Court has not articulated the scope

of the ministerial exception beyond employment

discrimination claims, see id. at 710, our court has framed the

exception as applicable “to any state law cause of action that

would otherwise impinge on the church’s prerogative to

choose its ministers or to exercise its religious beliefs in the

context of employing its ministers.” Bollard v. Cal. Province

of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 1999); see

also Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference of United

Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1100 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004). 
12 PURI V. KHALSA

Thus, any claim “with an associated remedy . . . [that] would

require the church to employ [a minister]” would “interfer[e]

with the church’s constitutionally protected choice of its

ministers,” and thereby “would run afoul of the Free Exercise

Clause.” Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950. The ministerial exception

also bars relief for “consequences of protected employment

decisions,” such as damages for “lost or reduced pay,”

because such relief “would necessarilytrench on the Church’s

protected ministerial decisions.” Elvig, 375 F.3d at 966; see

also Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (“An award of such

relief would operate as a penalty on the Church for

terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no less

prohibited by the First Amendment than an order overturning

the termination.”).

B.

The ministerial exception is an affirmative defense. See

Hosana-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.4. It applies to claims that

impinge on protected employment decisions regarding “a

religious organization and its ministers,” Elvig, 375 F.3d at

955 (quoting Bollard, 196 F.3d at 945), and when applicable,

it flatly prohibits courts from “[r]equiring a church to accept

or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for

failing to do so,” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.

As an affirmative defense, the ministerial exception can

serve as the basis for dismissing a complaint at the pleadings

stage under Rule 12(b)(6) only when the elements of the

defense appear on the face of the complaint. See Jones v.

Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (citing 5B Charles Alan

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 1357 (3d ed. 2004)); Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc.,

735 F.3d 892, 902 (9th Cir. 2013). Therefore, if it is apparent
PURI V. KHALSA 13

on the face of the plaintiffs’ complaint that the defendants’

refusal to seat the plaintiffs on the disputed boards is a

“protected employment decision[]” under the ministerial

exception, see Elvig, 375 F.3d at 963, the plaintiffs’ claims

are altogether barred, and a civil court can neither order the

defendants to employ the plaintiffs nor award damages

against the defendants for past or future failure to do so.

The defendants argue the complaint should be dismissed

under the ministerial exception because it seeks relief for a

protected employment decision made by a religious

organization concerning its ministers. Specifically, they

contend the complaint alleges both that SSSC and UI are

“religious organizations” covered by the exception, and that

the disputed board positions are “ministerial” because they

can be occupied only by individuals meeting certain

“religious requirements,” including that they be Sikh

ministers. The plaintiffs do not dispute SSSC and UI are

religious organizations within the meaning of the ministerial

exception, but they argue the board positions are not

ministerial because, on the face of the complaint, it is not

apparent their duties involve conveying the church’s message

or carrying out its religious mission.3

As a threshold matter, it is not clear that the ministerial

exception could ever apply to the type of positions at issue

here. This is a dispute over seats on the boards of corporate

entities that are apparently affiliated with a church, but are

3 The plaintiffs also argue the religious requirements for SSSC board

membership do not apply to them, relying on an exhibit attached to their

disallowed second amended complaint. We do not reach this argument

because, even assuming the plaintiffs are subject to the religious

requirements, we conclude the ministerial exception does not apply.
14 PURI V. KHALSA

not themselves churches. Thus, the positions are far afield

from the “paradigmatic application of the ministerial

exception” to ordained ministers employed by a church, such

as Roman Catholic priests who “minister to the faithful” as

that term is generally understood. See Alcazar v. Corp. of the

Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1291 (9th Cir.

2010) (en banc). Neither the Supreme Court nor this court

has applied the ministerial exception to the governing boards

of church-affiliated organizations, let alone to those whose

responsibilities are largely secular, as the complaint alleges

here. There is, therefore, reason to question whether the

exception is even potentially implicated.

At the same time, neither the Supreme Court nor this

court has ever expressly limited the ministerial exception to

particular types of positions, and both courts have expressly

declined to adopt any bright line rule defining the scope of

the exception. As the Supreme Court has made clear, there

is no “rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies

as a minister” within the meaning of the ministerial

exception. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. Our en banc

court echoed that view in Alcazar, where we “declined to

adopt any particular test” for “determining whether a

particular church employee . . . should be considered a

‘minister’” for First Amendment purposes. 627 F.3d at 1291. 

Certain language in Hosanna-Tabor, moreover, suggests a

fairly broad application of the exception. The Court

explained “[t]he ministerial exception is not limited to the

head of a religious congregation,” and insulates a religious

organization’s “selection of those who will personify its

beliefs.” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706–07. The Court

further suggested the exception extends to “the Church’s

choice of its hierarchy” when that choice implicates “a

religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission.” 
PURI V. KHALSA 15

Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705–06. We too have

suggested a potentially broad reach for the exception. See

Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947 (referring to the ministerial

exception as protecting “a church’s freedom to choose its

representatives”). In practice, there may be little difference

between deciding whether a defendant has established the

affirmative defense of the ministerial exception with respect

to a hiring decision for a particular employment position in a

particular case and deciding categorically whether the

exception applies to hiring decisions for an entire type or

class of employment positions, such as governing boards of

church-affiliated organizations. As explained below, the

former analysis considers, among other things, “the nature of

the religious functions performed” and “[t]he amount of time

an employee spends on particular activities.” HosannaTabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709. Any categorical analysis likely

would turn on very similar inquiries.

Ultimately, we do not attempt to resolve the question of

whether the ministerial exception ever applies to the type of

positions at issue here. We need not categorically define the

scope of the ministerial exception, because even if it is

potentially available in a case such as this one, it is clear the

defendants here have failed to make out the defense at this

juncture. For the purpose of the following analysis, therefore,

we only assume without deciding that the exception is

potentially implicated with respect to the type of positions in

dispute in the case before us.

The Supreme Court has provided some guidance on the

circumstances that might qualify an employee as a minister

within the meaning of the ministerial exception. First, an

employee is more likely to be a minister if a religious

organization holds the employee out as a minister by
16 PURI V. KHALSA

bestowing a formal religious title. See id. at 707. Although

an ecclesiastical title “by itself, does not automatically ensure

coverage, the fact that an employee has been ordained or

commissioned as a minister is surely relevant.” Id. at 708. A

second consideration is the “substance reflected in that title,”

such as “a significant degree of religious training followed by

a formal process of commissioning.” Id. at 707–08. Third,

an employee whose “job duties reflect[] a role in conveying

the Church’s message and carrying out its mission” is likely

to be covered by the exception, even if the employee devotes

only a small portion of the workday to strictly religious duties

and spends the balance of her time performing secular

functions. Id. Finally, an employee who holds herself out as

a religious leader is more likely to be considered a minister. 

Id.

Based on the pleadings here, some circumstances weigh

in favor of considering the board positions ministerial. The

complaint alleges that a “mission and purpose” of SSSC and

UI is “to benefit the Sikh Dharma community and to advance

and promote [Yogi Bhajan’s] teachings,” and it is “surely

relevant” that their board members must be ordained

ministers of Sikh Dharma and must meet certain other

religious criteria. See id. at 708.

But, based on the face of the complaint, a number of other

circumstances weigh against applying the ministerial

exception. First, and most importantly, the pleadings do not

allege the board members have any ecclesiastical duties or

privileges. In assessing the responsibilities attendant to the

board positions, it is relevant that the entities involved are not

themselves churches, but rather corporate parents of a church. 

SSSC’s primary responsibility appears to be holding title to

church property, and UI, in addition to being the sole member
PURI V. KHALSA 17

of SDI – i.e., the direct corporate parent of the Sikh Dharma

church – owns and controls a portfolio of for-profit and

nonprofit corporations, including a major security contractor

and a prominent tea manufacturer. Although the complaint

alleges the board members have “fiduciary duties to UI and

SSSC to hold assets in trust for the benefit of the Sikh

Dharma community,” it is not clear on the face of the

complaint that these duties are “religious” or “reflect[] a role

in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its

mission.” Id.

No religious duties comparable to those found relevant in

Hosanna-Tabor appear in the pleadings here. In HosannaTabor, the Supreme Court observed the plaintiff was

“expressly charged . . . with ‘lead[ing] others toward

Christian maturity’ and ‘teach[ing] faithfully the Word of

God, the Sacred Scriptures, in its truth and purity and as set

forth in all the symbolical books of the Evangelical Lutheran

Church.’” Id. “In fulfilling these responsibilities, [the

plaintiff] taught her students religion[,] . . . led them in

prayer[,] . . . took her students to a school-wide chapel

service, and . . . took her turn leading it, choosing the liturgy,

selecting the hymns, and delivering a short message based on

verses from the Bible.” Id. The Court concluded, “[a]s a

source of religious instruction, [the plaintiff] performed an

important role in transmitting the Lutheran faith to the next

generation.” Id. By contrast, none of the allegations here

support a similar conclusion.

Although the Court has cautioned against relying too

heavily on “the relative amount of time . . . spent performing

religious functions,” it has recognized that “the nature of the

religious functions performed” and “[t]he amount of time an

employee spends on particular activities” are relevant
18 PURI V. KHALSA

considerations. Id. at 709. We, too, have “look[ed] to the

function of the position . . . in deciding whether the

ministerial exception applies,” Elvig, 375 F.3d at 958, and

have held, for instance, that the exception does not apply “to

lay employees of a religious institution if they are not serving

the function of ministers,” Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947. The

pleadings do not allege the board members “serv[e] the

function of ministers.” Id.

Second, the pleadings do not allege the board members

are held out as religious leaders, either by their respective

employers or by the board members themselves. A board

member of UI or SSSC has the job title of “manager” or

“trustee,” respectively, and the pleadings do not suggest these

apparently secular titles hold any ecclesiastical significance

in the Sikh Dharma faith. Although a board member must be

“qualified as a minister of Sikh Dharma,” and although we

have held “[t]he paradigmatic application of the ministerial

exception is to the employment of an ordained minister,”

Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1291, this paradigm applies to

employment by a church, as a minister. An employee’s

status as an ordained minister, standing alone, does not

trigger the ministerial exception when that individual is

employed in a secular capacity by an entity other than a

church. Cf. id. at 1292 (“[T]he ministerial exception may not

apply to a seminarian who obtains employment with a church

outside the scope of his seminary training.”).

UI and SSSC are not churches, and although their board

members must be independently qualified as Sikh ministers,

they are not employed or held out by the organizations as

ministers. Nor is there any indication the board members

hold themselves out as religious leaders. These factors weigh

against viewing the board members as “representatives” of
PURI V. KHALSA 19

the church or as being “close to the heart of the church.” 

Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Bollard, 196 F.3d at

946–47).

Finally, the pleadings do not show the board positions are

religious in substance, whether by requiring “significant

religious training,” by signifying ecclesiastical merit, or

otherwise. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707–08. In

Hosanna-Tabor, the Court gave substantial weight to the six

years of rigorous religious training required to become a

called teacher, encompassing “college-level courses in

subjects including biblical interpretation, church doctrine, and

the ministry of the Lutheran teacher.” Id. at 707. The Court

also observed that a teacher could receive her call “only upon

election by the congregation, which recognized God’s call to

her to teach.” Id. Although it is possible that carrying out the

disputed board positions here involves similarly substantial

religious training and recognition, the record before us does

not reveal what is entailed in becoming “qualified as a

minister of Sikh Dharma” and “accept[ing] the directives and

proclamations of [Yogi Bhajan] . . . as such teachings, values,

and directives are understood by the Siri Sikdar Sahib/a of

Sikh Dharma,” nor does the record establish any functional

connection between the duties of a board member and the

religious criteria for selection. Therefore, in construing the

allegations of material fact in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs, see Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 998, we do not

assume the board positions are substantively religious on this

motion to dismiss.

Absent any allegation that board members have

ecclesiastical duties or are held out to the community as

religious leaders, and with scant pleadings on the religious

requirements for the positions, we agree with the plaintiffs
20 PURI V. KHALSA

that it is not apparent on the face of the complaint that the

disputed board positions are “ministerial.” Whereas the

ministerial exception typically applies to those who are

employed by a church to minister to the faithful, this case

appears to concern board members who, in that capacity, are

neither employed by a church nor employed to minister to the

faithful. We do not foreclose the defendants from ultimately

establishing that the ministerial exception applies, but the

factual allegations in the complaint are too far removed from

the core of the exception for us to conclude at this stage of the

proceedings that the exclusion of the plaintiffs from the board

positions is a “protected employment decision” falling within

the ministerial exception affirmative defense.

II.

Given the defendants cannot at this point rely on the

ministerial exception to bar the plaintiffs’ claims, we next

consider whether other principles of the Free Exercise and

Establishment Clauses nonetheless preclude the courts’

involvement in the internal affairs of UI and SSSC under

what we have previously termed the “doctrine of

ecclesiastical abstention.” Paul v. Watchtower Bible &Tract

Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 878 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The plaintiffs do not dispute UI and SSSC are religious

organizations protected by the religion clauses of the First

Amendment, but they contend the district court can resolve

this case without encroaching on that protection.

A.

Long before it formally recognized a ministerial

exception, the Supreme Court developed a doctrine, grounded

originally in common law but later in the First Amendment,
PURI V. KHALSA 21

“limiting the role of civil courts in the resolution of religious

controversies that incidentally affect civil rights.” Serbian E.

Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.

696, 710 (1976). Under this doctrine of ecclesiastical

abstention, “a State may adopt any one of various approaches

for settling church . . . disputes so long as it involves no

consideration of doctrinal matters.” Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.

595, 602 (1979) (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches

of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367,

368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). The Supreme Court

has recognized two principal approaches to deciding church

disputes without “jeopardiz[ing] values protected by the First

Amendment.” Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary

Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.

440, 449 (1969).

The first, derived from Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.

(13 Wall.) 679 (1872), and its progeny, is simply to “accept[]

the decision of the established decision-making body of the

religious organization.” Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah

Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir.

1999).

[W]here resolution of the disputes cannot be

made without extensive inquiry bycivil courts

into religious law and polity, the First and

Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil

courts shall not disturb the decisions of the

highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church

. . . but must accept such decisions as binding

on them, in their application to the religious

issues of doctrine or polity before them.
22 PURI V. KHALSA

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709. But, recognizing that

deference can sometimes lead to entanglement of civil courts

in ecclesiastical issues and that some church disputes can be

resolved by application of solely secular legal rules, the Court

has also articulated an alternative to the Watson approach it

has termed the “neutral principles of law” approach. See

Jones, 443 U.S. at 602, 605.

1.

The Court first considered judicial intervention in church

disputes in Watson, when it was asked to resolve which of

two factions rightfully controlled the property of a local

Presbyterian church. See 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 681. Ruling

on common law grounds, the Court concluded “a broad and

sound view of the relations of church and state under our

system of laws” requires civil courts to defer to the

determinations of a church’s highest ecclesiastical authority

on “questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule,

custom, or law.” Id. at 727.

The Court later applied the Watson rule to an individual’s

claim of entitlement to a chaplaincy in the Roman Catholic

Church. See Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 10–11. Although the

plaintiff was entitled to the position under the terms of a will

establishing the chaplaincy, the archbishop had declined to

appoint the plaintiff because he lacked the qualifications for

the position as prescribed by canon law. Id. at 17–18. The

Court explained:

Because the appointment is a canonical act, it

is the function of the church authorities to

determine what the essential qualifications of

a chaplain are and whether the candidate
PURI V. KHALSA 23

possesses them. In the absence of fraud,

collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the

proper church tribunals on matters purely

ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights,

are accepted in litigation before the secular

courts as conclusive, because the parties in

interest made them so by contract or

otherwise.

Id. at 16.

The Supreme Court subsequently adopted the holdings of

Watson and Gonzalez as a constitutional rule insofar as they

pertained to the “[f]reedom to select the clergy,” explaining

that a church’s freedom to do so, “where no improper

methods of choice are proven, . . . must now be said to have

federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise

of religion against state interference.” Kedroff, 344 U.S. at

116; see also id. at 116 n.23 (quoting Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at

16–17). Under this principle of noninterference, extended to

cover judicial action in Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,

363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960) (per curiam), civil courts may not

“[b]y fiat . . . displace[] one church administrator with

another” and thereby “pass[] the control of matters strictly

ecclesiastical from one church authorityto another.” Kedroff,

344 U.S. at 119. Doing so would “intrude[] for the benefit of

one segment of a church the power of the state into the

forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to the principles

of the First Amendment.” Id.

The Supreme Court’s early church dispute cases

embraced “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an

independence from secular control or manipulation – in short,

power to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
24 PURI V. KHALSA

matters of church government as well as those of faith and

doctrine.” Id. at 116. This deferential doctrine recognizes

that “First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when

church [disputes are] made to turn on the resolution by civil

courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.” 

Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449.

This does not mean, however, that civil courts have no

role in disputes involving religious organizations. Unlike the

ministerial exception, which completely bars judicial inquiry

into protected employment decisions, the ecclesiastical

abstention doctrine is a qualified limitation, requiring only

that courts decide disputes involving religious organizations

“without resolving underlying controversies over religious

doctrine.” Kianfar, 179 F.3d at 1248 (quoting Presbyterian

Church, 393 U.S. at 448).

2.

The Court introduced the neutral-principles approach in

the context of a property dispute between two local churches

that sought to withdraw from the national Presbyterian

Church in the United States. See Presbyterian Church,

393 U.S. at 441–43. Presbyterian Church held that Georgia’s

departure-from-doctrine rule, an alternative to the Watson

approach never endorsed by the Court but nonetheless

followed by some states, “require[d] the civil courts to engage

in the forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church

doctrine” and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 451. In

so holding, the Court recognized “the First Amendment

severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in

resolving church property disputes.” Id. at 449. But the Court

continued:
PURI V. KHALSA 25

It is obvious, however, that not every civil

court decision as to property claimed by a

religious organization jeopardizes values

protected by the First Amendment. Civil

courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion

merely by opening their doors to disputes

involving church property. And there are

neutral principles of law, developed for use in

all property disputes, which can be applied

without ‘establishing’ churches to which

property is awarded.

Id.

A year later, in Maryland &Virginia Eldership, the Court

approved the Maryland high court’s use of the neutralprinciples approach to resolve a church property dispute

between a regional church and two secessionist

congregations. See 396 U.S. at 367–68 (per curiam). The

Maryland Court of Appeals “relied upon provisions of state

statutory law governing the holding of property by religious

corporations, upon language in the deeds conveying the

properties in question to the local church corporations, upon

the terms of the charters of the corporations, and upon

provisions in the constitution of the General Eldership

pertinent to the ownership and control of church property.” 

Id. at 367 (footnote omitted) (citing 254 A.2d 162 (Md.

1969)). The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that this

application of neutral state law principles “deprived the

General Eldership of property in violation of the First

Amendment” and dismissed the appeal for want of a

substantial federal question, because “the Maryland court’s

resolution of the dispute involved no inquiry into religious

doctrine.” Id. at 367–68.
26 PURI V. KHALSA

In a concurrence to the per curiam opinion in Maryland

& Virginia Eldership later drawn on by a majority of the

Court in Jones v. Wolf, see 443 U.S. at 602–03, Justice

Brennan explained, “a State may adopt any one of various

approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it

involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the

ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.” Md. &

Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring). 

“Thus the States may adopt the approach of Watson v. Jones,

and enforce the property decisions made” by a church’s

highest ecclesiastical authority. Id. at 368–69 (citation

omitted) (citing Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722, 724). But

“the use of the Watson approach is consonant with the

prohibitions of the First Amendment only if the appropriate

church governing body can be determined without the

resolution of doctrinal questions and without extensive

inquiry into religious policy.” Id. at 370. Alternatively,

“‘[n]eutral principles of law, developed for use in all property

disputes,’ provide another means for resolving litigation over

religious property.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting

Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449). For example, when

“the identity of the governing body or bodies that exercise

general authority within a church is a matter of substantial

controversy,” courts can avoid becoming impermissibly

entangled in that ecclesiastical dispute by “determin[ing]

ownership by studying deeds, reverter clauses, and general

state corporation laws.” Id. at 369–70.

In Jones, the Court definitively held that “civil courts,

consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the

Constitution, may resolve [church property] dispute[s] on the

basis of ‘neutral principles of law.’” 443 U.S. at 597. The

Court observed:
PURI V. KHALSA 27

The primary advantages of the neutralprinciples approach are that it is completely

secular in operation, and yet flexible enough

to accommodate all forms of religious

organization and polity. The method relies

exclusively on objective, well-established

concepts of trust and property law familiar to

lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to

free civil courts completely from

entanglement in questions of religious

doctrine, polity, and practice.

Id. at 603. The Court recognized “the application of the

neutral-principles approach is [not] wholly free of difficulty”

as it may, for instance, “require[] a civil court to examine

certain religious documents, such as a church constitution, for

language of trust in favor of the general church.” Id. at 604. 

“In undertaking such an examination, a civil court must take

special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular

terms, and not to rely on religious precepts.” Id.

Furthermore, “there may be cases where the deed, the

corporate charter, or the constitution of the general church

incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to

the ownership of property,” and, “[i]f in such a case the

interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require

the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the

court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the

authoritative ecclesiastical body.” Id. (citing Milivojevich,

426 U.S. at 709). Despite these challenges, the Court

concluded “[o]n balance, . . . the promise of nonentanglement

and neutrality inherent in the neutral-principles approach

more than compensates for what will be occasional problems

in application.” Id.
28 PURI V. KHALSA

Property disputes have proved especially amenable to

application of the neutral-principles approach. See Kianfar,

179 F.3d at 1249. But we are unaware of any authority or

reason precluding courts from deciding other types of church

disputes by application of purely secular legal rules, so long

as the dispute does not fall within the ministerial exception

and can be decided “without resolving underlying

controversies over religious doctrine.” Presbyterian Church,

393 U.S. at 449; see also Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710 (“This

principle applies with equal force to church disputes over

church polity and church administration.”). Indeed, “we must

be careful not to deprive religious organizations of all

recourse to the protections of civil law that are available to all

others,” because “[s]uch a deprivation would raise its own

serious problems under the Free Exercise Clause.” Kianfar,

179 F.3d at 1248.

B.

1.

The Supreme Court has made clear that “a State may

adopt any one of various approaches for settling church . . .

disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal

matters.” Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (quoting Md. & Va.

Eldership, 396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring)). It is

thus constitutionally permissible for a court to apply either

the Watson approach (deferring to a church’s highest

ecclesiastical authority) or the neutral-principles approach to

such disputes, as long as the court decides the dispute

“without resolving underlying controversies over religious

doctrine.” Kianfar, 179 F.3d at 1248 (quoting Presbyterian

Church, 393 U.S. at 449). But we are not without further
PURI V. KHALSA 29

guidance in deciding the proper approach for cases litigated

in federal court.

First, Jones suggested a clear preference for the neutralprinciples approach, noting that its “promise[] to free civil

courts completelyfrom entanglement in questions of religious

doctrine, polity, and practice” outweighed occasional

difficulties in its application. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603–04. 

Following Jones, we held that where a religious entity has

adopted civil “legal structures, it is incumbent upon the civil

court . . . to apply to those structures the secular law that

governs them.” See Kianfar, 179 F.3d at 1250.4

Second, where both approaches are available as a

constitutional matter, we have made clear a court may apply

the neutral-principles approach even though the Watson

approach would lead to a contrary result. See id. at 1249

(discussing the Supreme Court’s approval of a state approach

that required a decision “by neutral principles even though

the outcome might contravene the decision of the hierarchical

church” (citing Jones, 443 U.S. at 604–06)).

4 This holding follows from a principle announced in Watson itself.

See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603 n.3 (“[E]ven in Watson v. Jones, . . . the

Court[] stated that, regardless of the form of church government, it would

be the ‘obvious duty’ of a civil tribunal to enforce the ‘express terms’ of

a deed, will, or other instrument of church property ownership.” (quoting

Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722–23)). The Court’s endorsement of the

neutral-principles approach in Jones significantlybuttressed this principle,

and further supported its application where the “legally cognizable

form[s]” or structures are embedded within church-related documents,

such as corporate charters or even church constitutions. See Jones,

443 U.S. 603, 606.
30 PURI V. KHALSA

Third, the Watson approach is not appropriate when “the

nature of the religious organization or the identity of its

decision-making body is disputed on the basis of religious

doctrine.” Id. at 1248–49. Where the “locus of control . . .

[is] ambiguous,” Watson deference “would appear to require

‘a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church

polity.’” Jones, 443 U.S. at 605 (quoting Milivojevich,

426 U.S. at 723).

Finally, our general preference in federal cases for

resolving claims by applying neutral principles is further

supported here by the fact that most claims in this case are

based on state law. Oregon law would call for application of

the state’s neutral-principles approach if this matter were

before a state court. See Hope Presbyterian Church of Rogue

River v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 291 P.3d 711, 720–21

(Or. 2012) (outlining a neutral-principles approach after

“reexamin[ing] the proper methodology for resolving church

property disputes in Oregon” in light of the “new legal

context for evaluating church property disputes under the

First Amendment” provided by Jones).5

5 The Supreme Court has not outlined one specific neutral-principles

approach, and there may be significant variation in the approaches of

various states. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 599–610; see also Church of God

in Christ, Inc. v. Graham, 54 F.3d 522, 526–27 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying

Missouri’s neutral-principles approach and refusing to apply an element

of Michigan’s disparate approach). Additionally, other federal circuit

courts have considered the appropriate state lawto apply to resolve church

property disputes when sitting in diversity. See Scotts African Union

Methodist Protestant Church v. Conference of African Union First

Colored Methodist Protestant Church, 98 F.3d 78, 92–94 (3d Cir. 1996)

(applying New Jersey law, as predicted by federal court, to follow the

state’s neutral-principles approach); Askew v. Trs. of Gen. Assembly of

Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith Inc., 684 F.3d 413,

419 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting “Pennsylvania courts opt to apply neutral civil
PURI V. KHALSA 31

In light of the preference to apply neutral principles to

enforce secular rights where possible, the Oregon state law

character of most of the claims in this case, and Oregon’s

adoption of the neutral-principles approach, we proceed to

determine whether such an approach may be constitutionally

applied in this case.

2.

It appears a neutral-principles approach “may resolve . . .

the disputed . . . issues without significant constitutional

difficulties,” and is a proper means of resolving this dispute. 

Kianfar, 179 F.3d at 1249. The plaintiffs do not seek

recourse to civil courts for resolution of a controversy over

religious doctrine. Nor do they ask civil courts to decide

whether a religious organization properly applied

ecclesiastical rules in settling a leadership dispute, as was true

in Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708, and of the one request for

relief we held could not be decided by neutral principles in

Kianfar, 179 F.3d at 1250. Rather, the plaintiffs here ask the

courts to decide what amounts to a secular factual question:

under Oregon law and the secular governing documents of

UI, an Oregon nonprofit limited liability company, and SSSC,

an Oregon nonprofit religious corporation, were the plaintiffs

elected or designated to the disputed board positions? This

question is quintessentially“susceptible to decision byneutral

principles.” Id. at 1249.

law principles whenever possible to resolve such cases” before

determining that such approach was improperly applied to an

ecclesiastical question). Here, as in Kianfar, we do not seek to resolve

which neutral-principles approach may be properly applied. Rather, our

review is limited to the threshold constitutional question of whether the

issues raised can be decided at all without violating the First Amendment. 

See Kianfar, 179 F.3d at 1248.
32 PURI V. KHALSA

At this stage, the parties do not contest whether the

plaintiffs meet the religious eligibility requirements for the

disputed board positions, and the defendants “do not offer a

religious justification” for their failure to seat the plaintiffs on

the boards. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947. The dispute, which

“concern[s] the [d]efendants’ actions, not their beliefs,” turns

entirely on “what the [defendants] did, . . . and the texts

guiding [their] actions can be subjected to secular legal

analysis.” Elvig, 375 F.3d at 963, 968. As in Bollard, “[t]his

is a restricted inquiry. Nothing in the character of th[e]

defense will require a jury to evaluate religious doctrine or

the ‘reasonableness’ of the religious practices followed . . . . 

Instead, the jury must make [only] secular judgments . . . .” 

Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950; see also Elvig, 375 F.3d at 963. As

this dispute has been presented to us, it appears the district

court can resolve it “by relying on state statutes . . . and the

terms of corporate charters of religious organizations.” 

Kianfar, 179 F.3d at 1249 (citing Md. & Va. Eldership,

396 U.S. at 367). Thus, there is “no danger that, by allowing

this suit to proceed, we will thrust the secular courts into the

constitutionally untenable position of passing judgment on

questions of religious faith or doctrine.” Bollard, 196 F.3d at

947. Under these circumstances, the availability of the

neutral-principles approach obviates the need for

ecclesiastical abstention.

C.

Even if ecclesiastical abstentionwould otherwise preclude

resort to civil courts, the plaintiffs contend this dispute is

susceptible to judicial review under the so-called “fraud or

collusion” exception. See Askew, 684 F.3d at 418, 420 (“A

doctrinally grounded decision made during litigation to

insulate questionable church actions from civil court review
PURI V. KHALSA 33

may indeed raise an inference of fraud or bad faith,” and

“[u]nder those circumstances, the integrity of the judicial

system may outweigh First Amendment concerns such that a

civil court may inquire into the decision.”). Because we hold

it is not apparent from the complaint that ecclesiastical

abstention applies, we have no occasion to address the fraud

or collusion exception here.

CONCLUSION

“[A]pplying any laws to religious institutions necessarily

interferes with the unfettered autonomy churches would

otherwise enjoy, [but] this sort of generalized and diffuse

concern for church autonomy, without more, does not exempt

them from the operation of secular laws.” Bollard, 196 F.3d

at 948. As this case has been presented to us, the defendants

have not established that the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by

the ministerial exception, and the ecclesiastical abstention

doctrine does not apply because the dispute is amenable to

resolution by application of neutral principles of law. Thus,

the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims

under the First Amendment.

For the reasons stated here and in the concurrently filed

memorandum disposition, the judgment of the district court

is vacated in part and affirmed in part, and the case is

remanded to the district court.

VACATED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART AND

REMANDED.

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.