[Cite as Yachanin v. Cleveland Civ. Serv. Comm., 2013-Ohio-4485.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 99802

GEORGE YACHANIN

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

vs. 

CLEVELAND CIVIL SERVICE 

COMMISSION, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-765387 

BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, J., Jones, P.J., and Kilbane, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 10, 2013 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Stewart D. Roll 

David M. Cuppage 

Climaco, Wilcox, Peca, Tarantino & Garofoli 

55 Public Square, Suite 1950 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Barbara Langhenry 

Director of Law 

James C. Cochran 

Assistant Director of Law 

City of Cleveland 

601 Lakeside Avenue, Room 106 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant George Yachanin (“Yachanin”) appeals the trial court’s 

judgment affirming the Cleveland Civil Service Commission’s (“the CCSC”) decision to 

sustain Yachanin’s layoff. We find no merit to the appeal and affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

{¶2} Yachanin began employment with defendant-appellee city of Cleveland 

(“Cleveland” or “the city”) in 1987. He worked in various positions including driver and 

laborer until January 2003, when he was appointed to the class of Construction 

Equipment Operator (“CEO”), Group B. He was made a regular member of the class in 

November 2008, when a charter amendment passed that allowed him to be grandfathered 

in as a regular, full-time member.1

 

{¶3} On May 16, 2011, Yachanin received a letter informing him he was going to 

be laid off as of May 30, 2011. The letter indicated the city was forced to reduce its 

workforce and lay off personnel as a result of state imposed budget cuts. At the time of 

his layoff, Yachanin was employed by the Division of Waste but was performing work 

for the Division of Streets. 

{¶4} Yachanin appealed the layoff to the CCSC. Following a hearing, the CCSC 

sustained the city’s decision, finding that the city complied with all applicable civil 

service commission rules. Yachanin appealed the CCSC’s decision to the common pleas 

 1

 There is evidence that Yachanin passed a civil service test. However, there is no 

evidence as to when he took the test or when he passed. Witnesses testified he was grandfathered in 

as a regular member. 
court. In affirming the CCSC’s decision, the common pleas court stated that it found the 

decision “is not unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or 

unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the 

whole record.” Yachanin now appeals and raises three assignments of error. 

Standard of Review

{¶5} In the first assignment of error, Yachanin argues the common pleas court’s 

decision should be reversed because it applied the wrong standard of review. 

{¶6} Yachanin brought this administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 119.12 and 

124.34 and contends that appeals brought pursuant to R.C. 119.12 are subject to de novo 

review. The city contends Yachanin had no right to appeal under R.C. 119.12 and that 

the standard of review applicable to appeals brought pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506 is the 

only applicable standard of review. 

{¶7} The right to appeal under R.C. Chapter 119, Ohio’s Administrative Procedure 

Act, is provided in R.C. 119.12. The first paragraph of R.C. 119.12 creates a right to 

appeal agency decisions affecting professional licensing. In the second paragraph, R.C. 

119.12 states, in relevant part: 

Any party adversely affected by any order of an agency issued pursuant to 

any other adjudication may appeal to the court of common pleas of Franklin 

County, * * * except that appeals under division (B) of section 124.34 of 

the Revised Code from a decision of the state personnel board of review or 

a municipal or civil service township civil service commission shall be 

taken to the court of common pleas of the county in which the appointing 

authority is located. 
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 119.01 defines “agency” as “any official, board, or commission 

having authority to promulgate rules and make adjudications in the civil service 

commission.” 

{¶8} R.C. 124.34(B) governs the reduction, suspension, removal, and demotion of 

civil service employees for disciplinary reasons. Deem v. Fairview Park, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 96843, 2011-Ohio-5836, ¶ 12. Yachanin’s complaint is that he was 

improperly laid off due to a lack of funds. Another section, R.C. 124.321(B)(1), allows 

lay offs necessitated by a lack of funds within an appointing authority. Because 

Yachanin’s complaint relates to a lay off for non-disciplinary reasons, Yachanin had no 

right to appeal his layoff to the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court and could only 

appeal the civil service commission’s order to the Franklin County Common Pleas Court 

under R.C. 119.12. Indeed, this court has previously held that “[t]here is no right of 

appeal to the court of common pleas under R.C. 124.34 for the determination of a 

municipal civil service commission in cases of employees’ reduction in pay and benefits 

for non-disciplinary reasons.” Garfield Hts. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Gillihan, 17 

Ohio App.3d 86, 477 N.E.2d 681 (8th Dist. 1984), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶9} Yachanin’s complaint is appealable pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506, which 

confers jurisdiction to the common pleas court and the appellate court to review 

administrative decisions of any agency or political subdivision. R.C. 2506.01 states, in 

relevant part: 

(A) Except as otherwise provided in sections 2506.05 to 2506.08 of the 

Revised Code, and except as modified by this section and sections 2506.02 

to 2506.04 of the Revised Code, every final order, adjudication, or decision 
of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department, 

or other division of any political subdivision of the state may be reviewed 

by the court of common pleas of the county in which the principal office of 

the political subdivision is located as provided in Chapter 2505 of the 

Revised Code. 

The CCSC is a municipal administrative agency whose final order may be appealed 

pursuant to R.C. 2506.01. Pub. Emps. Council No. 51, AFSCME AFL-CIO v. Univ. of 

Cincinnati, 39 Ohio Misc. 11, 314 N.E.2d 403 (C.P. 1974). Therefore, we apply the 

standard of review applicable to appeals brought under R.C. Chapter 2506 as set forth in 

R.C. 2506.04, which states: 

If an appeal is taken in relation to a final order, adjudication, or decision 

covered by division (A) of section 2506.01 of the Revised Code, the court 

may find that the order, adjudication, or decision is unconstitutional, illegal, 

arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of 

substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole record. 

See also Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142, 147-148, 735 

N.E.2d 433 (2000). 

{¶10} In affirming the CCSC’s decision, the trial court in this case stated: 

The court having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the appellant 

and appellee, the court affirms the decision of the Cleveland Civil Service 

Commission, finding the decision is not unconstitutional, arbitrary, 

capricious, unreasonable or unsupported by the preponderance of 

substantial, reliable, and probative evidence. 

Therefore, trial court applied the correct standard of review to this administrative appeal. 

{¶11} Yachanin’s first assignment of error is overruled. 
Appellate Review

{¶12} The standard of review to be applied by the court of appeals in an R.C. 

2506.04 appeal is “more limited in scope.” Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34, 465 

N.E.2d 848 (1984). R.C. 2506.04 grants a more limited power to the court of appeals to 

review the judgment of the common pleas court only on “‘questions of law,’ which does 

not include the same extensive power to weigh ‘the preponderance of substantial, reliable 

and probative evidence,’ as is granted to the common pleas court.” Henley at 147-148, 

quoting Kisil at 34, fn. 4. We therefore apply this more limited standard of review to the 

trial court’s judgment. 

Lack of Funds/ Seniority 

{¶13} In the second assignment of error, Yachanin argues the trial court erred in 

affirming the CCSC’s decision because the CCSC’s decision ignored Cleveland’s burden 

of proving that Yachanin was laid off due to a lack of funds. He also argues the trial court 

should have reversed the CCSC’s decision because his seniority prevented him from 

being laid off. 

{¶14} R.C. 124.321 allows municipalities to lay off employees for a variety of 

reasons including a “lack of funds.” R.C. 124.321(B); Penrod v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. 

Servs., 113 Ohio St.3d 239, 2007-Ohio-1688, 864 N.E.2d 79, ¶15-16. R.C. 

124.321(B)(2) provides that “a ‘lack of funds’ means an appointing authority has a 

current or projected deficiency of funding to maintain current, or to sustain projected, 

levels of staffing and operations.” 
{¶15} Ohio Adm. Code 124-7-01(A)(2) places the burden of proof on the 

employer to prove lack of funds. CCSC Civil Service Rule 9.70 states, in relevant part: 

“Though the appeal is brought on behalf of the employee, the appointing authority has the 

burden of proof.” Cleveland does not dispute its burden of proof. 

{¶16} Cleveland’s May 16, 2011 letter to Yachanin advised him that he was being 

laid off due to a lack of funds. Yachanin contends there was no proof that Cleveland, the 

appointing authority, “ha[d] a current or projected deficiency in funding to maintain 

current, or to sustain projected, levels of staffing and operations.” 

{¶17} However, Ronnie Owens (“Owens”), the commissioner of waste collection, 

testified that lay offs were based “on the city’s financial situation, as well as operational 

needs,” and explained that the city was receiving less funding from the state. The 

Division of Waste manages its own budget and payroll, which must be approved by city 

counsel annually. Owens also testified that there was substantially less trash being 

collected in recent years, so the city required fewer people to move it. 

{¶18} Further, Debbie Southerington testified that she became Cleveland’s human 

resources director in March 2011, just before numerous layoffs were going to occur. She 

stated that human resources interacted with all city departments and divisions concerning 

lay off notices because layoffs were occurring city wide as a result of the state’s funding 

reductions. The implication of this evidence is that as a result of state funding cuts, there 

was a projected deficiency in funds to sustain current staffing levels. Yachanin offered 

no evidence to refute the city’s evidence that lay offs were necessitated by a loss of state 
funds. Therefore, there was a preponderance of the evidence to support the CCSC’s 

finding that Yachanin’s lay off was necessitated by a lack of funds. 

{¶19} Yachanin also argues that because he had more seniority than other CEOs, 

those CEOs with less seniority than he should have been laid off before him. He 

contends the CCSC should have determined layoffs from a list that included all of the 

city’s CEO Class B operators regardless of the division in which they were employed. 

{¶20} However, Civil Service Rule 8.20, which governs lay offs, provides, in 

relevant part: 

Whenever it becomes necessary to reduce the working force in a 

classification in any Division of the City service, the appointing authority 

may lay off any appointee in such classification; provided that where two or 

more persons are employed in a classification, they shall be laid off in the 

inverse order of their appointment in such classification. (Emphasis added.) 

Civil Service Rule 8.20 clearly provides that lay offs are made according to seniority 

within a city’s division and not seniority within a classification as a whole. The rule 

expressly states that it is aimed at reducing “the working force in a classification in any 

Division.” 

{¶21} Yachanin concedes the two other CEOs employed in the Division of Waste 

had seniority over him. The fact that Yachanin had more seniority than other CEOs 

employed in other divisions throughout the city is irrelevant under Civil Service Rule 

8.20. Therefore, the CCSC and the trial court applied Civil Service Rule 8.20 correctly 

when it laid Yachanin off because he had the least seniority in the division. 

{¶22} The second assignment of error is overruled. 

Complete Record
{¶23} In the third assignment of error, Yachanin argues the trial court’s decision 

should be reversed because the CCSC failed to comply with R.C. 119.12’s mandate to 

prepare and certify a complete record of the proceedings within 30 days after receiving a 

notice of appeal. 

{¶24} As previously explained, R.C. 119.12 does not govern this appeal. 

Therefore, the sanction contained in R.C. 119.12 that requires the court to enter judgment 

in favor of the party adversely affected by the agency’s decision for failure to certify a 

complete record is inapplicable. Nevertheless, R.C. 2505.08 provides that “within forty 

days after the filing of a notice of appeal” the agency whose final order is being appealed 

“shall prepare and file in the court to which the appeal is taken, a complete transcript of 

all the original papers, testimony, and evidence offered, heard, and taken into 

consideration in issuing the final order.” 

{¶25} Yachanin does not argue that the CCSC failed to file the record in a timely 

manner or that any specific parts of the record are missing. He contends the affidavit 

from Munday Workman (“Workman”), the supervisor of CCSC records, attesting to the 

authenticity of the “Administrative Record,” fails to contain a certification that the agency 

has submitted a “complete record” of the administrative proceedings to the court. He 

argues, citing McKenzie v. Ohio State Racing Comm., 5 Ohio St.2d 229, 215 N.E.2d 397 

(1966), that unless the agency member who certifies the record specifically states that it 

“is a complete record,” the record is not complete. However, the McKenzie court 

discussed the record requirements for appeals brought pursuant to R.C. 119.12 rather than 
R.C. Chapter 2505, which does not contain the same sanction for failure to certify the 

record. 

{¶26} Moreover, in Arlow v. Ohio Rehab. Servs. Comm., 24 Ohio St.3d 153, 493 

N.E.2d 1337 (1986), which also involved an R.C. 119.12 appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court 

held that minor imperfections in the record do not warrant automatic judgment in the 

appellant’s favor and that the appellant must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the 

agency’s omission. Id. at 155. 

{¶27} In the affidavit certifying the record in this case, Workman states: “The 

attached documents are a true and accurate copy of the Administrative Record of the Civil 

Service Commission proceedings in the matter of George Yachanin.” The McKenzie

court held that certified copies of documents are sufficient to complete the record. 

McKenzie at paragraph two of the syllabus. Yachanin fails to demonstrate any prejudice 

caused by Workman’s failure to state that the true and accurate copy of the 

Administrative Record is a “complete record.” 

{¶28} Therefore, the third assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶29} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the common pleas court to carry this 

judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR