### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON JU N E 18, 200 8 S es sio n
IN R E: A
. N
. F
. ( d/ o/b 10/ 24/ 99) , a C hi ld U nd er Ei gh te en Y ea rs of A ge
Direc t Appeals f

rom the Juvenile and Ge neral Sessions Cou rts for Mc Nairy County Nos. C-765 ( Juvenile) & 7525 (G eneral Sessions) Bob Gray, G eneral Sessions Court Judge

No. W2007-02122-C OA-R3-P T - F iled Septem ber 24, 2008

Th is o pin ion

inv olv e s tw o c on so lid a te d a pp eal s. Th e fi rs t c a se inv olv e s p os t- div or c e pe tit ion s to modify a par enting plan, filed by the hus band and the wife, reg arding custody of two childre n. The
s ec o n d ca s e w as fi l edb y

t h e w i fe an d

a t h i rd p arty , s ee k i n g t o es t ab l i s hth e t h i rdp arty ’s p ar en t age of one of the two childre n. For

the followingrea sons, we af firm t h e t ri al co u rt’s dec ision in t he custody case as modified, and w e af firm the trial c ourt’s dec ision in t he pate rnity case

.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e G eneral Sessions Court Aff irm ed as Modif ied; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Affi rm ed

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , P.J .,W.S ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and W A LTER C. K

UR TZ , S R ., J ., joined.

B e tty Sta ff or d Sc ott , Jac ks on , T N, fo r A pp e lla nts
Kelli Ba rr Summers, B rentwood, TN , for Appe lleeT o p ro t ec t t he an o nym i t y of t he m i no r ch i l d ren , w e w i l l refer t o t he p arti es using the i r i nit i als. 1

-2- OP IN ION

I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY
Mr. F and Mrs . F were li vi ng to gethe r in 199 9 when Mrs . F gave b ir th to a dau ghter , A. N.F. 1 Mr. F a nd Mrs. F wer e not marr ied at the time. Ac cordingto Mrs. F, she w as alre ady pregnant when she m et M r. F, and Mr. F knew that A.N .F. wa s not his child. Neve rtheless, when A.N.F . was born, Mr. F a nd Mrs. F br oug ht her home fr o m t h e h o s p i t al t og ether and ra ised her a s if Mr. F w as her fathe r. In 2000, when A.N .F. wa s eig ht months ol d, Mr. F a nd Mrs. F ma

rried. T h ey ex ecuted a voluntary acknow ledg ment of paternity naming Mr. F as A.N.F .’s father. Mr. F was then listed as A.N.F .’s father on her birth cer tificate, and A.N.F .’s last name was c hang ed fr om Mrs. F’s ma iden name to Mr. F ’s last name. I n 2002, Mr. F a

nd Mrs. F ha d a son, C.S.F.

I n 2004, Mr. F filed a complaint for divorce. Amongother thing s, he soug ht to be desig nated the primary

residential pa

rent of A .N.F. a

nd C.S.F. Mrs. F filed an answe r and c ounter-c omplaint also s e e k in g to b e n ame d th e p r im ar y r e s id e n ti a l p ar e n t. M r s

. F ’ s c o un te r
- c o mp la int s tate d that A.N.F . “wa s not father ed by [Mr. F], however, the minor child does have [Mr. F]’s last name and has known no other

fathe r.” The pa rties wer e divorc ed by

decr ee in Nove mber of 2004. T h ey co u l dnot rea ch an ag ree ment reg ardingchild custody , and the tria l court ente red a perma nent par enting plan providing that Mr. F a

nd Mrs. F w ould be desig nated “ joint primary residential parents with equa l pare nting time” until A.N.F. e nrolled i n s ch o o l

. Once A.N.F . beg an school, Mr. F would be the pr imary residential pa

rent, a nd the childre n would reside with Mr s. F ever y other wee kend and ever y other Wednesday

night. Dur ing summer

vaca t i o n , the opposite schedule would apply , and the c hildren
wou ldres id e pri mar il y

wi th Mrs . F. Shortly afte r the fina l decr ee, in F ebrua ry of 2 0 0 5 , Mrs. F c ontacted the Depa rtment of Chi ldr e n’ s Se rv ic e s ( “ DC S” ) a nd re po rt e d th a t A .N .F . to ld h e r s he ha d b e e n to uc he d in he r p ri vate
are a by Mr . F . A .N .F . w a s f

ive y e ars old

a t the tim e

. A DC S c a se mana g e r c on ta c te d Mr . F and tol d him that he was not permitted t o pick hi s children up from Mrs. F’ s visitation. DC S filed a petition th at r esu lt ed i n an ex part e res tr ain in g order andno con ta c t o r d er be in g ente red a gains t M r. F. A.N.F . was e x amined at a local eme rg ency

room for sig ns of sexual abuse, but none wa s found. E i t h er t h e t ri al co u rt o r D C S al s o re qu i re d th at A. N. F. re ce i v e c o un s el i n g.
Mr. F f iled a “Petition for the Immediate Return of the M inor Children to Petiti oner’ s Care and Petition to Modify Custody and Visitation.” Mr. F a lleg ed that Mrs. F had a history of making false a lleg ations of sexual abuse, and he contende d that M rs

. F’ s all eg ations about him abusing A.N.F . wer e fa l s e. He further alleg ed that Mrs. F was e motionally unstable, and tha

t she was
re pe a te dly

makin g de ro g a tor

y re mark s a

bo ut him in the pr e se nc e of the c hil dr e n. Mr s. F a lle g e dly told A.N.F. that Mr. F was not her “rea l” father, without consulting him, causing A.N.F

. to be upset-3-

and confused. The parties had previously ag ree d they would not tell A.N.F

. that Mr. F was not her fathe r until she was at least eig hteen year s old. Mr. F s u b m i t t ed a propose d pare nting plan that would reduc e Mrs. F’ s visitation with the children a nd require it to be supervised by a neutr al third party . He c ontended that supe rvision was nec essar y beca use Mrs. F ’s repe ated attempts to interfer e with his relationship with the children we re a dverse ly aff ectingthe childre n. Mrs. F then filed a moti o n t o continue the he aringon Mr. F’ s petition. At some point, i t appea rs that the trial c ourt allowed Mr. F to have supe rvised visitation with A

. N. F. p ending furthe r orde rs, and the c ourt allowed him to resume his re g ular visitation with C.S .F. On Friday , Aug ust 5, 2005, Mr. F r eturne d C.S.F. to Mrs. F for her w eeke nd visitation and tol d h e r t hat C. S.F ., the n thr e e y e ars old , ha d fa lle n an d hur t his leg jus t be fo re the y

le ft ho me . M rs

. F ini tia lly tr e a te d the inj ur y wi th an ic e pa c k, but late r t hat e ve nin g , s he too k C. S.F . to the ho sp ita l, wh e re do c tor s d isc ov e re d th a t he ha d a fr a c tur e d f

emu r. S om e on e at th e ho sp ita l no tif ie d Ch ild Protective Service s (“CPS”) beca use Mrs. F told hospital per sonnel that C.S.F. had bee n injured one to three da

y s ear lier, while he was in Mr. F ’s ca re, a nd that Mr. F did not see k medical attention for C. S .F.
Mrs. F the n filed a motion to modify the par enting plan see king t o be name d primary
re sid e nti a l pa

re nt f or bo th c hil dr e n b e c a

us e of the DC S and

CPS inve sti g a tio ns of

Mr . F. Mr s. F a lso fi le d a mot ion to s us pe nd

Mr . F ’s pa

re nti ngtim e wi th C .S. F . b e c a us e of the a fo re me nti on e d in c ide nt. Followin g a h ea ri n g o n Aug ust 22, 2005, the trial court a ppointed a guardia

n ad litem, order ed a DCS investigation of the f acts surr ounding C.S.F.’ s leg injury , and ordered that C.S.F. also reside with Mrs. F until the investigations were c ompleted. Followingits investigation re g ardingthe alleg ed sexual abuse of A.N .F., DCS filed a notice of dismissal of its petiti on beca use it found “[n]o factual eviden ce , n o medical pr oof, nor a ny counselingrec ords or re ports to substantiate the or i gi n al alleg ation of inappropr iate touchingor sexual abuse by

the father.” DCS completed i t s i n v est igation reg ardingC.S.F.’s leginjury on September 21, 2005. Acc ording to the orig inal ref err al r ep o rt , M rs

. F ha d initially repor ted that C.S.F. was injure d and unable to wa lk for about thre e day s, while in Mr. F’ s care, wi t h o ut rec eiving medical attention. Acc ording to a medical repor t, Mrs. F had repor

ted t o medical personnel that C.S.F. was injured the da y be fo re he wa s re tur

ne d to Mr s. F . Wh e n q

ue sti on e d b y

a CPS inve sti g ator , M rs . F did no t st a te that C.S.F. had been i njured for day s, but simpl y said she wa s told by

Mr. F that C.S .F. ha d fallen. I n summary , the DC S repor t stated, “I nvestig ator finds some va riation in the mother’s story shows no consistency

[si c].” After

interviewingMr. F and other witnesses, who e x plained that C.S.F. wa s running in the y ard a

nd fell, DCS concluded that the re was “ no evidenc e at this time to support the alleg ation of phy sical abuse ,” and it re commended that the case be close d.

Af te r t he inv e sti g a tio ns we re c omp le te d, on Oc tob e r 1 0, 20 05 , Mr

. F re ne we d his mot ion to modify the per manent pa re n t i n g plan to restric t Mrs. F to super vised visitation. The trial courtT h e ge n e tic te st w a s o b ta ine d in d e p e n d e n tly, r a the r tha n o rd e re d b y a c o u rt. T h e p a rtie s la te r stip u la te d to 2
t he accuracy of

t he genet i c t est , and i t s res ul t as t o the p rob ab i l i t y o f p at erni t y , b ut no t to t he ul t i m at e co ncl usi o n t hat M r. S i s t h e bi ol og i ca l f

at h er of A. N

. F.
-4- subsequently

returne d custody

of A.N.F . to Mr. F without r estrictions, but Mr s. F re tained custody of C.S.F. pendinghear ings on the parties’ petitions to m odify the par enting plan.

On Octobe r 22, 2005, Mrs. F ’s father pa id for g enetic te sting of Mr s. F’s former boy friend, Mr. S, and A.N.F . The test re veale d a 9 9 .99% proba bility that Mr. S is the biologica l father of A.N.F . On J anuar

y 9, 2006, Mrs. F a

nd Mr. S filed a joint petition to establish Mr. S ’s par entag e of A.N.F ., claiming that the g enetic te st created a rebuttable presumption that Mr. S was A.N.F .’s father under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 36-2-304( a)( 5). They soug ht to have Mr. S listed as the 2 fathe r on A.N.F ’s birth cer tificate, to have A.N.F.’ s last name chang ed to Mrs. F’ s maiden name , and to have sole c ustody

of A.N.F . awa

rded to Mrs. F

. Mr. F f iled a re sponse to the petition to establish pare ntag e, contending that he was A .N.F.’ s leg al father pursuant to the vol untary acknow ledg ment of paternity and Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1- 102(28). Mr. F al s o filed a c ounter-pe tition t o terminate the pare ntal rig hts of Mr. S on the g round of a

bandonment.

On Fe bruar

y 13, 2006, and May

22, 2006, the trial cour

t held joint hearing s to address the
or ig ina l pe tit ion s to mod if y the pa re nti ng pla

n, the pe tit ion to e sta

bli sh pate rn ity , and

the pe tit ion

to te rm inate pa

re nta l r ig hts

. A. The P ater nity and P arental Ter m ination P roce edings As previously

discussed, Mrs. F and Mr. F ex ec u t ed the voluntar y acknow ledg ment of pater nity on or about June 26, 2000, when A.N.F . was e ight months old. I t was neve r re scinded or revoke d. Mrs. F a

nd Mr. S fi l ed their joint petition t o establish pater nity of A.N.F . on J anuar

y 9, 2006, and Mr. F re sponded with the counte r-pe tition t o terminate Mr . S’s pare ntal rig hts based on abandonme nt.

Mrs. F te st i fi ed t hat she a nd Mr. S broke up in F ebrua ry of 1999 whe n she wa s alrea dy pr e g na nt w ithA. N. F . Sh e e xpla ine d th a t th e y we re bo th d

ri nk ing and ha d “a re a lly

bigargume nt” that included hitting, biting , and Mr. S kicking and damag ing her car. Accor ding to Mrs. F , Mr. S did not know that she was preg nant at the time of the bre ak-up. Mr s. F subseque ntly presse d char g es ag ainst Mr. S. She said she did not c all Mr. S after she g ave bir th to A.N.F., but she te stified that sh e ha d a lw ay s k

no wn wh e re he wa s.
Mr. S testified he knew for cer tain that A.N.F

. was his c hild in November of 2005 afte r the g enetic te st was per formed, but he “had a feeling ” she was his child even before the test. He te stified
a bo ut h is k no wl e dg e pr ior

to t he te st a s f

oll ow s:M r s

. F t es t i f i ed t hat he r s i s t er ’ s f

r i end “ bl abbed t he s ecr et ” t o M r

. S t hat A. N

. F. was hi s ch i l d. M r

. S t es t i f i ed 3 tha t t h is to o k p la c e w h e n A .N .F . w a s a b o u t t h re e ye a rs o ld

. -5- Q. [By

Mr. F’ s attorney ] Okay

. You also just testified on direc t that you had an idea that [A.N.F .] might have been y our daughte r before the DNA test; is that ri g ht? A. Ye s. Q. What gave you that idea? A. A frie nd of mine. . . .

. . . . Q. Did y ou ever

see or talk to [ Mrs. F] afte r you broke up? A. We spoke, y ou know. . . .

. . . . Q. Did y ou know she ha d a child? A. No , ma ’a

m. Q. You didn’t know she ha d a child? A. Ihad an ide a she did, but . . . Q. When did y ou g et this idea? A. Ig uess when [A.N.F .] was a small baby at the time. Q. Di d i t ev er oc cur to you that the timetable mig ht add up that y ou wer e the fathe r? A. Ye s, ma ’a

m. Q. I t di d? Did

y ou e ve r t hink to a sk

[Mr s. F ] ab out it ? A. No , ma ’a

m. Q. Did y ou ever

think abou t wa n t ing to a ssert your par ental rig hts if that was y our daug hter then? A. No , ma ’a

m.

. . . . Q. [By

the guar dian ad litem]

. . . Okay . When did y ou first – and this may have b e e na s k e d , b u t I

d o n ’ t r e me mb e r

th e an s w e r

to it

. Wh e n d id y o uf

ir s t r e a li ze that [A.N.F.] could be y our child? A. Iwould say

when she was a

bout thr ee y ear s old, but Ididn’t know for sur e 3 until November. Q. Until November of this y ear – of 2005? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay . When di d y o u fi rs t lear n of the e x istence of

[A.N.F.], that she even exis ted? A. When she was [a] small child. I don’t rec all how old she mig ht have be en.

. . . . Q

. A f

e w m o n t h s o l d ? A b a

b y? A. Yea

h, Iseen them around and a bout in [ town] a few times, but Idon’t know.M r s

. F l i ved wi t h her pare nt s at t he t i me of t he di vor ce, but s he s ubs equen t l y mo ved i nt o a s epar at e t r ai l er 4

o w n e d b y he r fa the r, lo c a te d ne x t t o he r p a re n ts’ h o u se

. M rs . F ’s fa the r te stif ie d th a t h e h a s a v e ry c lo se re la tio n sh ip w ith M rs. F an d he r ch i l d ren , an d he an d his w i f e testi f i ed at l en gth reg ard i ng t he ch i l d ren an d M rs. F ’ s circum st an ce s.
-6- Q. Ok ay . We ll, if

y ou saw he r as a ba

by – y ou re me mbe r havin g se x [withMr s. F ], r ig ht? A. Yes, sir. Q

. Why didn’ t it

d aw no ny o ua tt h a tp o i n ti nt i m e t h a t , h e y , t h i s m i g h tb e my child. Did it ever? A. Yes, sir. Q. I t did, but you just didn’t do any thing to come in and take r esponsibility for y our child until she was thre e [sic] y ear s old. A. No, sir. Q. You didn’t – A. Idid

n’ t w ant t o tr

y to i nte rf e re in n ob od

y ’s marr ia g e or

no thi nglik e that.

. . . . Q. [B y Mr

. S’ s a tto rn e y ] Di d y ou e ve r be lie ve that [A. N. F .] c ou ld h ave be e n h is
c hil d? Mr. [F ]’s ? A. No , ma ’a

m.

. . . . Q. Did y ou ever

suspect that Mr. [F] could be the biolog ical father? A. No , ma ’a

m.
Mr. S never financ ially supported or bonded with A.N.F . during the first six y ear s of her life. He testified that in the past three months since the DNA test, he had visited A.N.F. on most of the Sunday s when A.N .F. ha d visitation with Mrs. F, whic h was a ppare ntly ever y other we ekend. Mr

. S testified that he had g iven Mrs. F about $100 in cash to support A.N .F. in each of those three months, and he bought A.N.F. a winter coat onc e, bef

ore he “knew

for sure ” that she w as his child. Mr . F te sti fi e d that Mr. S ha d ne ve r c on ta c te d h im i n a n atte mpt to v isi t or su pp or t A .N .F ., and

Mr s. F’ s father testified t hat he had never seen M r. S with A.N.F. T here was c onflicting testimony about 4 how Mrs. F and Mr

. S re co n n ecte d duringthe custody litigation, but Mr. S testified that Mrs. F wanted him to g et involved in the ca se “to g ive her leg al rig hts to custody .” Mr. S did not return f or the sec ond day

of trial. Mrs. F testified that he wa s working

. The trial c ourt enter ed a le ng thy final orde r addr essing the pater nity petition a

nd the counter

pe tit ion to te rm inate the pa

re nta l r ig hts of

Mr . S, wi th t

he fo llo wi ngpa

rt ic ula rl y re le va nt f ind ing s: The Court finds that the testimony of [Mrs. F] and [Mr. S] in open cour t, as it relates to this matter, wa s not credible. Th e Court

fu rt her find s th a t th e Vo luntary Ac kn ow le dg me nt o f P a te rn ity executed by

[Mr. F] and [ Mrs. F] on J une 26, 2000 is valid and ha s not been
resc inded pursuant to t he laws of the State of Te nnessee . As such, the Court findsT he co urt recognized i n a f o o t no t e t hat t here i s a l i m i t ed st at ut o ry excep t i o n aut ho ri zi ng a chal l enge af t er f i ve 5
y ea r s “ i f f r au d a g ai n s t t h e bi r t h mot h er i s al l eg ed an d t h e i n t er es t s of t h e ch i l d a r e n ot a f

f ec t ed, ” bu t t h e cou r t c on cl u ded, “[t] h is is no t t h e c a se he re .”
-7- that neither [Mr. S ] n o r [ M rs

. F] has leg al standingin this C ourt to challeng e the p a te r n it y r igh ts o f [M r

. F ].

. . . . The Court fur

ther find s t h at [ Mr. S] had knowledg e of his pate rnity of the child as soon [as] the child was three (3) y ear s of age and that [Mr. S ] di d not attempt to s up po rt the c hil d o r h e r m oth e r a

nd did no t atte mpt

to e sta bli sha re latio ns hip wi th said child. The Court thus finds that [Mr. S] had reason to know t hat [A.N.F.] was hi s b io lo gical dau ghter

andwi ll ful ly

fai ledto ho no r hi s o bl igat io ns u n t i l [ M rs. F] contac ted him in an eff

ort to bolster

her c hance s in a custody

proce edinginvolving said child . . . . This Court has deter

mined by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that [Mr. S] has abandone d the minor child, [A.N.F.], a s define d in T ennesse e Code Annotated § 36- 1- 10 2. Spe c if

ic a lly , [Mr . S] h a s w ill fu lly fa ile d to v isi t and

ha s w ill fu lly

fa ile d to support or make rea sonable pa y ment toward the minor child for a period e x cee ding four ( 4) conse cutive months immediately prec edin g t h e fili ng of the Petition for Te rm inatio n o f P are nta l Rights

. F ur the r, [Mr . S] wi llf

ull y fa ile d to vi sit

and wi llf ull y failed to make r easona

ble pay ments toward the suppor

t of the child’s mother dur ing the four ( 4) months immediately prec eding the bi rth of t he child whose birth occurre d more than thirty

(30) da y s ag o. Th e Court

fi nd s th a t te rm inat ion of [Mr . S]’ s p are nta l r ig hts to t his c hil d is in the best interest of the child. This Court finds, by a prepondera nce of the evide nce, that [ Mr. F] is the leg al fathe r of [A.N.F .], acknowledg ing sa id child pursuant to Tenne ssee state law and holding sa id chi l d o u t as his own, and the Court finds that [Mr. F] should be and here by is give n full pare ntag e rig hts with respec t to said child.

. . . . T.C.A. § 24-7-113( e)( 2) provides that if a Voluntary

Acknowle dg ment of Pa te rn ity ha s n ot b e e n r e sc ind e d b y the sig nator y

to t he a c kn ow le dg me nt i n acc ordanc e with the statute, then it may only be cha lleng ed on t h e b as is of fra ud, duress or material mistake of fac t. Such challeng e must also be instituted within five (5) y ear s of the execution of the acknow ledg ment or it is barr ed by a fi v e ( 5 ) y ear statut e of lim itatio ns

. 5

. . . . The Court further finds that neither [Mrs. F] nor her Co-Plaintiff, [ Mr. S] , has standing to challeng e this Voluntary Acknowle dg ment of Paternity beca use such
c ha lle ng e is b arr e d b y

the a pp lic a ble statut e of

lim itatio ns

.

. . . .

. . . The Court, ba sed on the testimony of [Mr. S], believe s that [M r. S] and [ Mrs . F] col lu dedto b ri ng th is act io n fo r par ent age in an at tem ptto give [ Mrs . F]A l t ho ugh s o m e o f t he d o cum ent s f

i l ed i n t hi s C o urt l i st M rs

. F as t he o nl y ap p el l ant i n t he p at erni t y and 6
p a re n ta l t e rm ina tio n c a se , M rs . F ’s atto rn e y insists th a t she a lso re p re se n ts M r. S o n a p p e a l.
-8- lever ag e in pursuinga Motion to Modify Parenting Plan, wher eby she re quested that she be na med custodial par ent of he r children, which was pending

. . . at the time the g enetic te st was administered. The orde r wa s made fina l pursuant to Rule 54.02 of t h e T en nessee Rules of Civil P roce dure, a nd Mr s. F and

Mr . S j ointly

fi le d a no tic e of a pp e a l. 6

B. T he P e ti ti on t o M odi fy t he P e r m ane ntP ar e nt ing P lan

As state d a

bo ve , thre e months aft er th e fi na l de c re e of div or c e , M r. F fi le d h is p e tit ion to modify the per manent par enting plan af ter Mrs. F repor

ted t o DCS that he had sexually abused A.N.F

. He renew ed his motion afte r he was investigated by CPS reg ardingC.S.F.’s leginjury . Mr. F s o u g h tano r d e r

r e d u c i n g M r s

. F ’ s v i s i t a t i o nan d r e qu i r i n g h e r

v i s i t a t i o n t o b e s u

p e r v i s e d b y a neutra l thi rd party . Mrs. F a lso filed a petition to modify the par enting plan, see king to be named primary residential parent of both c hildren. B oth parties conte nded that the c ircumstance s surr o u n d i n g the DCS investigations constituted a mate rial cha ng e in circ umstances to justify modifying the pare nting plan.

Num erou s w it nes ses tes ti fi ed re gardi ng th e al l e gati on s t hat Mr. F sex ual ly abu sedA.N .F. Mrs. F a nd both of her pa

rents testified that A.N.F. told them she was touched in her private ar ea by Mr. F. A ccor ding to one DCS report, A.N.F

. initially stated to a DCS investigator that Mr. F touche d her outside of

her c lothing, by

acc ident; however , she later “re cante d” her

story . As mentioned
ear lier, either

DCS or the court re quired that A.N.F

. rec eive counseling following the alleg ations of abuse, but he r counse lor did not testify . Mrs. F subse quently took A.N.F. to a

licensed c linical social worker, J ulia Austin, who also counsele d Mrs. F, in a n attempt to deal with some ag g ressive behavior A.N.F

. was beg inning to display

. Mrs. F told Ms. Austin a bout the alleg ations of sexual abuse dur ing their first session. Ms. Austin testified t hat A.N.F. t old her duringone session that Mr. F touche d her pr ivate ar ea, but outside he r panties. A. N. F. s aid t his had only happene d one time. Ms. Austin could not r ec al l wh et h er s he aske d A.N.F . if anyone told her to say that she wa s inappropriately

touched, but Ms. Austin sai d s h e d i dnot detect a ny signs of coac hing a

nd she be lie ve d A .N .F . Ms. Au sti n did ac kn ow le dg e , thou g h, that A.N .F . mad e so me oth e r s tate me nts to he r t hat w e re no t tr

ue . Wh e n a sk e d wh e the r sh e ob se rv e d any sy mpt oms of se xua l a

bu se , M s. Au sti n re pli e d, “ B are ly , but mos t of the m we re the a c tin g out, g oin g to b e in c on tr ol, de fi ant, op po sit ion a l, ang ry .”

Th e g ua rd ian a d li te m’ s se c re tary te sti fi e d a

bo ut a n e nc ounte r s he ha d w ithA. N. F . Wh ile Mr. F was mee ti ng wi th th e guardi an ad lit em at his off ice , the secre tary was pl ayin g wi th A

. N .F. with some toy s in a separ ate of fice

. A.N.F

. was identifying various toy animals and suddenly blurted out that Mr. F ha d touched he r private are a. The secr etar y testified t hat s he was somewhat stunned by the re mark , th e n s he a sk e d A .N .F ., “ Why did y ou say tha t?” A. N. F . r e pli e d, “ [Mr s. F .] to ld m e to.”-9-

A.N.F . was e x amined f

o r sig ns of sexual abuse at a local eme rg ency

room, and none was found. DCS reporte d that it found “[n] o fac tual evidenc e, no medica l proof, nor a n y counseling
re c or ds or

re po rt s to su

bs tantiate the or ig ina l a lle g a tio n o f i na pp ro pr iate tou c hin g or

se xua l a bu se by the father.”

Mr s. F ’s fa

the r t e sti fi e d th a t Mr s. F ha d f a lse ly a c c us e d h im of se xua l a

bu se in t he pa st. Mr s. F a dmi tte d th a t app ro ximate ly six to te n y e ars e arl ie r, sh e did fa lse ly a c c us e he r f

a the r o f s e xua lly molesting he r. Mrs. F also admi tted that she had e rrone ously acc used Mr. F of sexually abusing A.N.F . on a pre vious oc casion, only explaining that she “thoug ht he had done something wrongand he did n’ t.” She ha d a c kn ow le dg e d d ur ingthe div or c e tr ia l that sh e ha d “ a te nd e nc y to l ie e sp e c ia lly about men in [her] li fe.” Mr. F testified that he would neve r molest A.N.F ., and he a ccuse d Mrs. F of makingup the story . Mr. F sa id, “that was just her way of g etting the kids away from me.”

The court also hear d extensive te stimony reg ardingC.S.F.’s leginjury . Mrs. F te stified that C.S. F . to ld h e r h e wa s r

unnin g in the y ard a ft e r he pu lle d a little g ir l’ s ha ir , and he fe ll a nd hurt his leg . Mr. F a

nd his f ather testified they

wer e sitting outside on a F riday afte rnoon bef

ore Mr . F ha d to m e e t Mr s. F wi th t

he c hil dr e n, and the y sa

w C .S. F . f

a ll whe n h e wa s r

unnin g a c ro ss t

he y ard wi th the other c hild. Mrs. F testified that the hospital per sonnel contac ted CPS beca use they wer e require d to do so by

law whe n a child suff

ere d a bre ak in a l ar ge bone. D r. Ray mond Stefko, the pediatric orthopedist who treated C.S.F., testified to the contra ry

. Dr. Stefko testified by deposition that he sees this ty

pe of fra cture in young children on a regular basis, and it is not the ty pe of f rac ture that is ty pically seen in someone who has be en struck by a dire ct blow. Rather, it would re quire a twisting-ty

pe motion, such as if someone was running and caug ht his or her foot in a hole . Dr. Stefko tes t ified that the ty pe of injury

itself did not sugg est any thing other

than an a ccide nt. He explained, “the thing that was c oncer ning to me w as the c ircumstance s around the injury and the f act t h a t , a tl e a s tf

r o mw h a tI w a s t o l d

b y th e m o th e r

w h o b r o u g h tth e c h i l d

i n , th e r e w a s a l l e g e d l y a signific ant delay

from whe n the fra cture occur red to whe n the child was presented f or medica l car e.” There fore , he instructed a nurse to contact CPS. A document in C.S.F.’s medical r ecor ds rea ds, “The fa t h er t o l d t h e m o t h er t h at t h e ch i l d t ri p p ed wh i l e r un n i n g theda

ybe for e and did not seek me dical
car e for the child.” (emphasis added)

. The DCS repor t indicates that Mrs. F repor ted C.S.F. had be en unable to wa lk for thre e day s while i n M r. F’ s car e, without medical attention. A bank employ ee testified that she spec ifically rec alled seeing C.S.F. at t he bank w ith Mr. F on F riday afte rnoon, and C.S.F. was uninjured a

nd walkingnormally

. Mr. F te stified that he did not rea liz e the sever ity of C.S.F.’s injury , and he w ould have take n the child to the hospital had he suspe cted that his legwas broke n. Mr. F sa id that C.S .F. stopped cry ing f or a while, his leg was not swollen, and the re w ere no visible sig ns that his le g was broke n. Dr. Stefko e x plained that as a n orthopedic sur g eon, he kne w simply by observingC.S.F.’s legthat it wa s broken; howeve r, he said a lay person might not know the leg was broken. Dr. Stefko rec alled
s o m e s w e l l i n g w h e n C

. S

. F

. ar r i v e d a t th e h o s p i t a l , b u t n o s i g n s o f b r u i s i n g an d n o f

e v e r

. M rs. F testified that she initially t o o kC.S.F. home and put an ic e pac k on his knee. Mrs. F ’s father witnessed C.S

. F. cr y i n g, an d he testified that he thought C.S.F. would “ be all rig ht in a littl e bit.”-10-

He testified that C.S .F. wa s somewhat c onsolable, and he did not imm ediately think that C.S .F.’ s leg could be br oken.

Mrs. F a nd her pa rents also testified that the children ha d suffe red o t h er i n j uries since the final dec ree of divorce while in Mr. F’ s car e. The y testified that C.S.F. once had a black ey e whe n he re tur ne d f ro m Mr. F ’s ho us e . T he y te sti fi e d th a t A .N .F . o nc e ha d h e r a rm in a sli nga ft e r s he fe ll
o f f t h e d o o r s t e p s a tM r

. F ’ s p ar e n t s ’ h o u s e

. T h e y a l s o s a i d A

. N

. F

. n e e d e d s t i t c h e s a b o v e h e r e ye afte r she wa s bouncing on a bed at M r. F’s house and f ell off. Mr. F acknow ledg ed A.N.F .’s two inj ur ie s r e qu ir ingthe sti tc he s and the sli ng , but he and his fathe r b oth de nie d e ve r s e e ingC.S. F . w ith a b l ac k ey e. M r. F s ai d h i s ch i l dre n h ad n ev er b ee n p urp o s ef u l l y i n j ure d

. He t es t i fi edt h at al th o u gh he super vises the childre n, they

play and sometimes g et hurt. Mrs. F acknow ledg ed that the childre n would occa sionally g et hurt during the parties’ marria g e by falling off beds or falling on stairs, like “norma l kids.” Mrs. F testified that since the divorce , C.S.F. had also bee n injured while in her car e by jumping off

the doorsteps, a

nd he had to be taken to the e merg ency room.
Mrs. F a nd her pa rents testified that since the divorce , they o b s er v ed b ruising on A .N.F.’ s bottom that could have been belt marks. Mrs. F’ s fathe r testified that there wer e thre e longbruises appe ar i n g across A.N.F .’s bac kside, but Mrs. F’ s mother testified that ther e wa s only one bruise, approximately

one inch wide and one inch l ong

. Mr. F testified t hat he had not seen the bruises on A.N.F .’s behind. He testified that A.N.F

. was not br uised or eve n spanked while in his custody when the bruising alleg edly

occur red. Mr. F said he had previously , “on occasion,” used a belt to spank the childre n, but he had not spanke d them with a belt since the parties’ divorce

. Mrs. F a lso contended that a mater ial chang e in circ u m s t an ce s h ad occ urre d beca use the children of

ten cr y , throw fits, and tell her the y do not want to g o to Mr. F’ s house. She introduce d a videotape of some visitation ex chang es in support of her alleg ations. Mrs. F’ s father testified that he had vide otaped “ basica lly ever y one” of their visitation ex chang es, and he said the childre n wer e not alway s upset. Mr. F a ccuse d Mrs. F of coac hing the children to cry at ex chang es, explaining that
s h e w o u l d ca rry t h em an d s t o p d i re ct l y i n fr o n to f t h e v i d eo ca m er a i no rd er t o re co rdth em cryi n g, and he c laimed that the childre n would stop crying a s soon as they g ot into his car . Mr. F te stified that the childre n no longe r cr y at exchang es, and Mr s. F a cknowled ged t h at A.N.F . had bee n throwing fits “up until rece ntly .” Mrs. F’ s fathe r simil arly testified that A.N.F

. was “ not as bad” at
e xch ang e s in

the pa st f e w m on ths , a

nd that C. S.F . is “ a lw ay s pr ou d” to se e Mr

. F and lik e s to g o w ith h i m

. T w o o f

M r

. F ’ s n e i g hb o r s t e s t i f

i e d th a t th e y h av e d i n n e r w i thM r

. F an d h i s c h i l dr e nw e e k l y, and that they

have a normal, loving relationship.

Mrs. F a lso claimed that her circ umstances ha d chang ed beca use, at the time of

the divorce , sh e wa s une mpl oy e d f

or me dic a l r e a so ns and

liv ingwi th h e r p are nts , w he re a s, a t the tim e of tr ia l, she wa s employ ed, ha d a ca r, an d lived in a sepa rate trailer ne x t to her par ents’ house. B y the conclusion of the tr ial, howeve r, Mrs. F was a g ain unemploy ed. She testified she was dra wing
un e mpl oy me nt, wo rk inga s a

c oo k o ne da

y pe r w e e k, and

“ wa iti ng on an ans wer to se e if the y ’l l
cover my colleg e I want to g o to.” Mrs. F testified t hat s he suffers fr om mild t o moderate depr ession “due to a hear t disease,” but she said her depre ssion was under c ontrol throug h medication.-11-

Mr. F’ s circumstanc es had a lso chang ed s o m ew h at. M r. F was brie fly marrie d to another woman, but he wa s in the proce ss of a divorce at the t ime of t rial. He testified that Mrs. F a ccuse d his ne w w if

e of pu sh ingC.S. F . a

nd c a us ing him to br e ak h is l e g , a nd that th e “ iss ue s” re g ard inghis custody dispute with Mrs. F led to his separ ation from his curr ent wife . Mr. F ha d quit his previous job shortly

afte r the divorc e to bec ome self- employ ed in a boat repa ir business. Mr. F te stified that thi s arr ang e me nt a llo we d h im t o h ave fl e xible ho ur s so that he c ou ld s up e rv ise the c hil dr e n. Mr s. F a ccuse d Mr. F of

failing to provide insuranc e for the children as re q u i re dby the par enting plan beca use hi s insurance throug h his former employ er was cancelled when he quit. Mr. F testified that A.N.F . had bee n cover ed under TennCar e, but it was ca

ncell ed b ec ause Mrs. F wa s drawingfood sta mps on bo th ch ild

re n whe n s he did

no t ha ve c us tod y of the m. H e te sti fi e d th a t he wa s tr yingto make a rra ng ements to provide them with cove rag e.
Mr. F c laimed a mate rial cha ng e in circ umstances ha d occur red be cause of Mrs. F ’s constant int e rf e re nc e wi th h is r e latio ns hip wi th t he c hil dr e n. He te sti fi e d th a t he and Mr s. F we re no t a ble to g et alongsince the divorce

. I t ap p ea rs that the police we re c alled to two of their visitation
e xch ang e s. Mr . F a lso de sc ri be d w hat he c on sid e re d to be ha ra ssi ngno te s f

ro m Mr s. F re fe rr ingto A.N.F .’s “re al dad.” He introduc ed anothe r note instructinghim not to bathe the children tog ether , wh e n th e y

we re a g e s tw o a

nd fo ur , o r e lse sh e wo uld

“ take th is mat ter to th e jud g e .” Mr . F a lso te sti fi e d th a t he did

no t li ke the fa c t th a t Mr s. F re tur ne d h is s on fr om v isi tatio n w ithhis toe na ils pa int e d p ink . Bo th part ie s tes tif ie d that the oth e r pare nt wo uld no t ans we r his or he r te le ph on e c a lls when the c hildren we re at the other pa rent’s house

. Mr. F te stified that he wa

nted the childre n to c ontinue having a relationship with Mrs. F, but in h is o pin ion , th e c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte rest was not be ingse rv e d b y inv olv ingthe m in

ba se le ss alleg ations, investigations, li es, and disputes. He said he considered Mrs. F to be a fit pare nt except for “ ever y thing she ’s tried to do since the custody was ha nded down to g et custody awa y from me.”

Mr s. F su bmi tte d a pr op os e d p are nti ngpla

n th a t a llo we d Mr

. F to h ave vis itatio n w ithbo th
c hil dr e n, e ve ry

oth e r w e e ke nd . A t tr ia l, h ow e ve r, Mr s. F te sti fi e d that Mr

. F sh ou ld b e re str ic te d to supervised visitation with A.N.F.

Th e tr i a l c o u rt u l t i m a t e l y f o u n d th a t n o m a t e r i a l c h an g e i n c i r c u m s t an c e s h a d o c c ur r e d to j u s t i fy ch an gi n g p ri m ary

cu s t o dy t o M rs

. F. Ho we v er , th e c o urt co n cl u d edt h at a m at er i al ch an ge i n ci rc u m s t an ce s d i d ex i s t t o wa rr an t re s tri ct i n g M rs

. F’ s v i s i t at i o n

. T h e t ri al co urt ’s fa ct u al fi n d i n gs ar e l e n g t h y, b u tt h e f

o l l o w i n g ar e n o t e w o rth y:
As ref lected throug hout the t ransc ript of t he parties’ di vorce proce eding s, filed as a n Ex hibit in t his cause, the trial court c annot d eny that the sepa

ration and divorc e of these pa rties has be en contentious and that [Mrs. F] has used the c hildren as pa wns to hurt [M r. F ] by

repe atedly

repor ting him to DCS. Specifica lly , with respe ct t o the alleg ations of inappropr iate sexu al touching , DCS completed a full, complete and t h o rough investigation of any and all alleg ations, and the [court] appointed aM r s

. F’ s f at her was ques t i oned about bei ng ex cus ed f r om t he cour t r oo m d ur i ng t he prev i ous di vor ce t r i al 7 b e c a u se the ju d g e c o n c lud e d he w a s c o a c h ing his w ife’s tes tim o n y. M rs . F ’s f a the r sta te d tha t he w a s n o t atte m p ting to
coa ch h i s w i f

e, a n d t h at h e h as a “ n er v ou s n ec k , ” wh i ch c au s es h i m t o n od a n d bob h i s h ea d.
-12- Gu ard ian A d L ite m to inv e sti g a te the matte r f or the Court

. At th e e nd

of the DC S investigation, . .

. DCS found no fac tual evidenc e, no medica l proof, nor a ny counselingrec ords or re ports to substantiate any claims made by

[Mrs. F]. . . . [Mrs. F] offere d no new f

actua l evidence , no medical pr oof and no c ounseling
re c or ds or

rep or ts at tr ia l. I

n f a c t, [M rs . F ]’s on ly

pr oo f c on c e rn ingthe DC S inv e sti g a tio n an d all e g a tio ns of ina pp ro pr iate tou c hin g we re the te sti mony of [Mr s. F], her pa rents and Julia Austin, a lice nsed clinical social worke r who did not counsel the child to deter

mine whether

or not she had be en sexually abused. As no te d in

the tr ia l tr ans c ri pt f

ro m th e pa

rt ie s’ div or c e and

a g a in at thi s tr ia l, [Mrs. F] admit tedly

lies about the men in he r life, even g oing so far as to ac cuse he r ow n f a the r o f s e xua lly mole sti nghe r b e c a us e sh e wa s ang ry

wi th h im. . . . Mother
a dmi tte d in

te sti mony

tha t sh e ha d, on

on e pr e vio us oc c a sio n, repo rt e d [Mr . F ] to DCS for sexual a

buse that was unfounded. The Court f inds that [ Mrs. F]’s testimony
conce rning any

alleg ations of inappropr iate sexual touching is not credible.

. . . T he Court

fi nd s th a t [Mr s. F ]’s pa

re nts ’ t e sti mony

is n ot c re dib le du e to the fa ct that [Mrs. F]’s father attempted to c oach the testimony of [Mrs. F ]’s mot her at the initial trial of divorce

. 7

. . . . Al so , th e Court fi nd s that [Mr s. F ]’s be havio r t ow ard [Mr . F ] sin c e [the date of t he d iv orce decr ee] is in keep in g wi th un tr ue st ate men ts

. S in ce th is dat e, [ Mrs . F] ha s thre a te ne d to take [Mr

. F ] b a c k to Court in an e ff or t to de str oy

his c us tod

y ri g hts for no r eason othe r than self ishness. . . . Th e Court

fi nd s th a t [Mr s. F ] of fe re d n o e vid e nc e, mu ch le ss a p re p o n d er an ce , t o s u

b s t an t i at e an y al l ega t i o n s o f i n ap p ro p ri at e se x u al t o u ch i n g. There fore , the fa ct that [Mr. F] was investigated by DCS for frivolous claims made by [Mr s. F ] , whi c h w e re late r d ism iss e d, do e s n ot c on sti tut e a mate ri a l c ha

ng e in
c i r c u m s t an c e s th a tw o u l d w ar r an ta c h an g e i nc u s t o dy. Second, [Mrs. F] alleg ed that since [t he divorc e dec ree ], t he par ties’ minor
so n, [C.S. F .] had be e n injure d w hil e in t he c are of [Mr . F ] an d [Mr . F ] ne g le c te d to obtain proper

medical c are for the c hild.

. . . . Ba sed on the testimony

of the pa rties and witnesse s, the m edica l rec ords, the repor t submit ted by

DCS and the deposition o f Dr. Stefko, the Court f inds . . . no evidenc e, much less a

preponde ranc e, to s ubstantiate any alleg ations of medica l neg lect or a

ny ty pe of ne g lect conc erningthis iss ue. . . .

. . . . [Mrs. F] has failed to establish a mate rial cha ng e in circ umstance, by

any individual alleg ation or by the collec tive alleg ations, since [the date of divorce], and as such, the pe tition t o modify custody must be denied.-13- On the other

hand, wi t h respe ct to [Mr. F]’s Moti on to Modify Permane nt ParentingPlan and as a lleg ed ther ein, the Court finds that Mother’s c ollective bad behavior since [the date of divorce ] constit utes a mate rial cha ng e in circ umstances that would war

rant limiting [Mrs. F]’s visit ation time with the minor children. First, the Court finds that Mother’ s al l egations conc erningfalse se x ual misconduct on the part of [Mr. F ] towar d the parties’ daug hter c onstitut es a material chang e in the childre n’s circ umstances. Spec ifically , . . . Mother has, at least twice, rep o rte d [M r

. F ] to D CS f o r mi s c o n d

u c t th a t tu

r n e d o u t to b e a

b s o lute ly false and unsupported by the child’s own statements or any other e vidence . Mother eve n went
so far as t o subject her

five y ear old child to an examination for evidenc e of se x ual abuse know ing no such abuse had occur red. The Court finds such conduc t was not only unnece ssary and cruel but endang ere d the phy sical and emotional well-be ing of the minor child and shows a rec kless disreg ard f

o r t h e we lfare of the c hild. Ad dit ion a lly , . . . Mo th er h a s a his tor y of makin g fa lse a lle g a tio ns of se xua l a bu se ag ainst people with whom she is ang ry

. . . . . . . [R eg ardingC.S.F. ’s l eginjury ,] [ b]ased on the testimony of the pa rties and witnesses, the medical rec ords, the re port submitted by DCS and the deposition of Dr. Stef

ko, the Court finds that [Mrs. F] knowingly lied to doctors, nurs es and other pe rsonnel at two ( 2) hospitals and to D CS in an eff ort to preve nt [ Mr. F] from exercising his full custody rig hts with the children. . . . The Court a lso f

inds that [Mrs. F] has re peate dly repor ted [Mr. F] to DCS for known fa lse conduc t on [ M r. F] ’s p art in an e ffor t to torment [ Mr. F] and use the
c hil dr e n as pawn s in the pa rt ie s’ on g oin g c on fl ic t. T he Court fu rt he r f ind s th a t [Mr s. F ] ha s b e e n le ss t

ha n tr uth fu l wi th D CS and

fi nd s th a t [Mr s. F ]’s c on du c t is no t on ly
an a bu se of the le g a l sy ste m, but su c h c on du c t is outr a g e ou s to t he e xten t th a t [Mr s. F] knowing ly

depletes f

unds from DCS that could be spent prote cting actua l abused children.

. . . . . . . [Mrs. F], by

her own testimony and the testimony of [Mr. S], int roduce d the par ties’ older da

ug hter, [A.N.F.], to [Mr. S] , a man alleg ed to be her biologic al fathe r, shatter ing the child’s un d er s t an d ing of her r elationship with [ Mr. F] and introducing her to a m an s h e n ever knew. . . . [Mrs. F] did not discuss such int ro du c tio n w ith[Mr . F ], w ho te sti fi e d th a t he did no t wan t to re ve a l th is information t o [A.N.F.] at t his point in time. The Court finds it interestingthat [Mr. S] testified on behalf of [Mrs. F ] at the init ial day of trial, . . . but appa

rently did not fee l compelled to return for the second day of t rial. The Court finds t hat [Mrs. F]’s
a c ti o n s w e r e inte n d e d

s o le ly to hurt [ M r

. F ] an d

f urth e r h e r c h an c e s o f

g a ining custody of the children at trial.

. . . The Court f inds that [Mrs. F] will stop at nothing to ens u r e th a t t

h e c h il dr e nar e n o t a ll o w e d to h av e a

h e a lt h y , p e a c e f

u l, loving relationship wit h their father, a nd that such beha

vior is not in the best interest of the chil dr e nan d

r e p r e s e n ts a

mate r ia l c h an g e in

c ir c u ms ta

n c e s u c hth a t t

h e p rese nt custody order of this court shoul d be modi fied to restric t the visitation and/or custody
r igh ts o f [M r s

. F ].A f t er M rs

. F f

i l ed her no t i ce o f ap p eal t o t hi s C o urt , s he f i l ed , i n t he t ri al co urt , a m o t i o n t o al t er or am end 8 and / o r f o r R ul e 6 0 rel i ef

, a l o ng w i t h a m o t i o n req uest i ng that the t ri al c o urt dis m i ss her not i ce o f ap p eal t o t hi s C o urt and t rans f er t he case t o chancery c o urt

. T he t ri al co urt ent ered an ord er purp o rt ed l y dis m i ss i ng her not i ce o f ap p eal and t r an s f er r i n g t h e c as e t o ch an ce r y cou r t , an d t h e c h an ce r y cou r t t h en den i ed M r s

. F’ s m ot i on t o a l t er or a men d a n d/ or f or R u le 6 0 re lief. M rs . F the n fi le d a se c o n d no tice o f ap p e a l t o this C o u rt.

T hes e s ubs equen t procee di ng s do not af f ect t he i s s ues pre s ent ed f or r evi ew, but we woul d re mi nd coun s el t hat a t r i al cour t ha s no j ur i s di ct i on t o cons i der a Rul e 6 0. 02 m ot i on o r R ul e 5 9. 04 m ot i on af t er a not i ce of

appeal ha s been fil e d

. Spe nc e v. Al l

s t at e I ns . Co. , 8 8 3 S.W

. 2 d 5 8 6 , 5 9 5

- 9 6 (T en n . 1 9 9 4 ); Spann v. Abr aham , 36 S. W

. 3d 452, 460 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 1 9 9 9 ). T h e a p p e llate c o u rt’s ju risd ic tio n a ttac h e s u p o n the fi ling o f t h e no tice o f ap p e a l. G r ande r s on
v. H i cks , N o. 02A 01

- 98 01

- JV

- 00 00 7, 199 8 W L 88 65 59 , at * 1 ( T enn

. C t

. A pp

. W

. S. D ec. 17, 199 8). I f a par t y wi s hes t o s ee k r el i ef

f r om a j u dg men t a f

t er t h at t i me, he ha s t h e opt i on of a ppl y i n g t o t h e appe l l at e cou r t f or a n or der of

r ema n d. Spence , 8 8 3 S .W .2 d a t 5 9 6

. -14-

. . . . The Court finds that re stricting [Mrs. F]’s visitation such that it is supervised is in the best interest of the c hildren.

. . . .

. . . A s n o te d b y [M r

. F ] in tr ia l, th e p arti e s ’ o ld e r d a u g h te r , [A.N.F. ], str ug g le d in sc ho ol. Du e to [M r. F ]’s wo rk tut or ing th e chi ld , sh e is e xpe c te d to move into first g rade in the fall of 2006, a fac t that was for

merly in question. . . . [T] he Court finds that the ca re of the minor children ha s been disrupte d thr ou g ho ut t

he pr oc e e din g s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s f oll ow ingthe br e akd ow n o f t he ir
marr ia g e

. . . . [A. N. F .] is no w se ttl e d wi th [Mr

. F ] a nd pr og re ssi ng we ll a t [the loc a l] El e me nta ry Sc ho ol. I t wo uld be to the be ne fi t of bo th c hil dr e n to liv e tog e the r f ull ti me w it h[M r

. F ].

. . . .

. . . [T ]he Court

fi nd s, by a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e , th a t it

is i n th e be st interest of both [A.N.F .] and [C .S.F.] that [ Mr. F]’s propose d Permane nt Parenting Plan be adopted a

nd approve d by

the Court such that [Mrs. F]’s visit ation is restricted to supervised visits on alternate wee kends. . . .

Mr s. F tim e ly

fi le d a no tic e of a pp e a l. 8

II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED On appe al, Mrs. F and Mr. S pre sent the followingissues, slightly restate d, for r eview:

1

. W h e t h e r

t h e t r i a l c o u rte r

r e d i na l l o w i n g M r

. F ’ s w i tn e s s e s t o t e s t i f y. 2 . Whether the trial c ourt err ed in deny ing the petiti o n t o es tablish Mr. S’s paternity and te rm inatin g his pa

re nta l r ig hts

. 3. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in fa iling to find a material cha ng e in circ umstances to justify chan ging cus to dy

to Mrs . F. 4. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in findinga mater ial chang e in circ umstances to justify restric ting Mrs. F ’s visitation.W i t hi n t he s ect i on of M r s . F ’ s b rief

a d d res s i ng t he i s s ue of wh et her a mat er i al ch ang e i n c i r cums t anc es 9

o c c u rr e d , she a sse rt s t h a t “ th e r u li n g a s to the p a rtie s’ inc o m e w a s c o n tra ry to the e v id e n c e .” S h e d o e s n o t sug g e st a proper f i gu r e a s t o t he part i es ’ i ncomes , s he do es not pres ent an i s s ue f or r evi ew r ega r di ng ch i l d s uppo r t , an d s he do es
n o t cite a n y a u tho rity in su p p o rt o f t h is a rg u m e n t. T h e re fo re , w e c o n sid e r it wa ive d

. See Newc om b v. Kohl er Co. , 222 S. W

. 3d 368, 400 ( T en n

. Ct

. App. 2006) (“ It i s no t t h e fu n c tio n o f the ap p el l at e co urt t o res earch and co nst ruct t he p a rtie s’ ar g u m e n ts.” ); Chi ldr es s v. U ni on R eal t y Co. , Lt d. , 97 S. W

. 3d 573 , 578 ( T enn

. Ct

. Ap p. 200 2) ( “ W e c ons i der
an i s s ue wai ved wh er e i t i s ar gu ed i n t he bri ef but not des i gn at ed as an i s s ue. ”)
-15- 5. Whe the r t

he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in de nyingMr s. F ’s re qu e st f or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.
For th e f o ll o w in g r e a s o n s , w e a f

f ir m th e tr ia l c o urt’ s ju d g me n t b u t mo d if y th e p ar e n ti n g p lan as provided he reina fter. 9

III
. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW On appe al, a tria l court’s fa ctual finding s are presumed to be corr ect, and we will not over turn those fac tual finding s unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst them. Tenn. R

. Ap p. P. 13(d) (2 00 7) ; Bo

ga n v . Bogan , 60 S .W. 3d

72 1, 72 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) . F or the e vid e nc e to p re po nd e rate ag ainst a trial cour

t’s finding of fact, i t must support another finding of fa ct with g reater c onvincing ef fec t. Watson v. Watson , 1 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d 6 9 5 , 7 0 1 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g W a lk er v. Sidne

y Gi lre ath & As so cs. , 4 0 S. W.3 d 6 6, 71 (T e nn . Ct. App . 2 00 0) ; The Realty Shop, Inc . v. R.R. W estminster Holding, Inc. , 7 S.W .3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)) . When the resolution of the iss ue s in a c a se de pe nd s u

po n th e tr uth fu lne ss of

wi tne sse s, the fa c t- fi nd e r, wh o h a s th e op po rt un ity to ob s e r v e th e w it n e s s e s in th e ir ma n n e r an d d e me an o r

w h il e te s ti f

yin g , is in a f ar b e tt e r p o s ition than t his Court to decide those issues. Machinery Sales Co., In c. v. D iam ondcut F orestry Prods., LLC, 102 S.W .3d 638, 643 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). T he we ight, f aith, and cr ed i t t o b e given to a wi tne ss’ s te sti mony

lie s, in t he fi rs t in sta

nc e , w iththe tr ie r o f fa c t, and the c re dib ili ty a c c or de d w ill be g iven g reat w eig ht by the appellate court. Id. We reviewa trial c ourt’s conc lusions of law under
a de novo standard upon the rec ord with no presumption of cor rec tness. U

nio n Ca r b ide Corp. v. Huddleston , 8 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d

8 7 , 9 1 (T en n

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Estate of Adkins v. W hite Consol. Indus., Inc. , 788 S.W .2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989))

. IV. D I S CUS S I ON A. Sequestrat

ion of Witn esses
F ir st, we wi ll a dd

re ss M rs . F ’s c on te nti on tha t th e tr ial ju dge erred

in a llo wi ngc e rt a in witnesses to testify . At the beg inning of eac h hear ing, Mr s. F’s attorney called f or “the Rule.” Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Ev ide nc e 61 5, fa

mil iarl y kn ow n a s “ the Rul e ,” pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art : At the re qu e st o f a

pa rt y the c ourt sh a ll o rd e r w itn e sse s, inc lud ingre butta l w itn e sse s, excluded at trial or other

adjudicator

y hear ing.

. . . The court shall order all persons not to disclose by

any mea n s t o ex cluded witnesse s any live trial testimony

or exhibi ts crea

ted in the cour

troom by a witness.-16-

“The purpose of

the ru l e, s i m p l y put, is to prevent a witness f rom cha ng ing or alteringhis or her testimony based on testimony hear d or fac ts le arne d from other testifying w itnesses.” Sta te v . Ba ne , 57 S.W .3d 411, 423 (Tenn. 2001). Duringthe sec ond day of trial, Mrs. F ’s attorne y stated that she objected to the c ourt hea

ring testimony

from any more of Mr. F’ s witnesses, who wer e si tting in t he hallway outside the courtr oom, beca use Mr. F ’s father’s girlf riend a lleg edly

left the c ourtroom
sever al times and spoke with the pe ople in the hallway

. The trial judge stated that he would a llow Mrs. F’ s attorney

to voir dire ea ch of the witnesses prior to his or her testimony

in order to de termine whether a violation of the Rule had oc curr ed.

B e fo re Mr . F ’s fa

the r t e sti fi e d, c ouns e l fo r Mr s. F a sk e d a bo ut h is c omm

un ic a tio n w ithhis g ir lf ri e nd outsi de the c ourt

ro om. Mr . F’ s fathe r sta

te d that whe n h is g ir lf

ri e nd le ft the c ourt ro om t o smoke, he a sked her

who was on the witness stand, and she told him that his son was on the stand. He testified that she di d not tell him any thing else about what wa s “g oing on,” and said, “ She can’ t hear what’s g oing on a

ny way . She’s har d of hea

ring .” The trial judg e then ove rruled the objection
w i t hr e s p e c tt o M r

. F ’ s f

a t h e r an d a l l o w e d h i mt o t e s t i f

y.
Mr. F’ s friend a

nd neig hbor was simil arly questioned befor e he testified. The fr iend stated that on one occ asion when the woman in questio n came outside the courtr oom, she told him t hat “mother” was on the stand, a nd she told him about the court t ak i n g a b reak. He sa id she did not discuss the ca se at a ll. The trial judg e over ru l ed M rs . F’ s attorney ’s objection and a llowed the witness to testify

. Finally , the af

oreme ntioned friend’ s mother, also a ne ighbor , wa s q u est ioned bef ore she testified. This witness stated, “She only came out to smoke and if she said any thing, it wasn’ t any thing a bout any thing in here

. . . . Other than she might have told who was on the witness stand, but other than that, she didn’ t say any thing a bout what was beingsaid.” The judge ag ain over ruled counsel’s obje ction and allowe d the witness to testify

. A trial cour

t has “broa d discretion” in deter mining whether to ex clude a witness suspected
o f vi olating T ennesse e Rule of Evide nce 615. Long v. Miller , No. E2006-02237- COA-R3-CV, 2 0 0 7 W L 2 7 5 1 6 6 3 , at * 9 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. S ep t

. 2 1 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Johnson v. J ohnson , No. M2000- 00358-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL980737, at *9 (Te nn. Ct. App. Aug . 28, 2001)). “ W hen a sequestration r

ule violation is raised on appe al, we c onsider the se riousness of the violation and the prejudice , if any , suffe red by the objectingparty .” Sta te v . L ill y , No. W2003-02156-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 948397, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr . 30, 2004). On a ppeal, Mrs. F does not specif y how she wa s prejudice d by

the over ruling of her

objection. The tria l j u d ge obviously believed the witnesses’ a ccounts of what transpire d outside the courtroom and that they wer e not i nformed a bout “any live trial testimony or ex hibits cre ated in the cour troom by a witness.” See Tenn. R. Evid. 615. We find no abuse of

discretion in the trial c ourt’s dec ision to overrule Mrs. F ’s objection.

B. T he Pe tit ion to E sta bli sh P ate rnit y & Co unte r-

Pe tit ion to T e rminat ePa re nta l Rig

hts To revie w, Mrs. F and Mr. F executed the voluntary acknow ledg ment of pate rnity on or about J une 27, 2000. Mrs

. F an d M r. S attempted to establish Mr. S’s pare ntag e on January 9, 2006.T here i s no co nt ent i o n i n t hi s case t hat t he vo l unt ary ackno wl ed gm ent of p at erni t y d o es not co m p l y wi t h t he 10

a p p lica b le sta tute s.
-17- Tenne ss ee C ode Annotate d section 24-7- 113 addre sses the ef fec t of a voluntary

acknow ledg ment of pate rnity

. I n revie wing the statute, we bear in mind that the “most basic principle of statutory construction is to asce rtain and gi v e ef fe ct to the leg islative intent without undul y restric ting or expanding a

statute’s cove rag e beyond its int ended sc ope.” Ove rs t r eet v. TRW Com m ercial Steering Div. , 2 5 6 S

. W

. 3 d 6 2 6 , 6 3 0 (T en n

. 2 0 0 8 ) ( q u o t i n g Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Re s., Inc. , 90 S.W .3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002) ). “In construingleg islative enac tments, we pres u m e that eve ry word in a statute has meaning and purpose and should be g iven full eff ect if the obvious intention of the Ge nera l Assembly

is not viol ated by

so doing.” Id. (c i t i n g In re C.K.G. , 173 S.W .3d 714, 722 (Tenn. 2005) ). I f the statutory lang uag e is clea

r and una mbiguous, we must apply its plain meaning in its n o rm al and ac cepte d use. Id. (c i t i n g Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson , 151 S.W .3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004) ).

Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 2 4- 7- 11 3 p ro vid e s, in r e le va nt p art : (a ) A v o lu

n ta r y a c kn o w le d g me n t o f p a te r n it y w h ic h is c o mp le te d un d er the provisions of § 68-3-203(g ), § 68-3- 302, or § 68-3- 305(b) or under simil ar 10 pr ov isi on s o f a

no the r state or g ov e rnme nt sh a ll c on sti tut e a le g a l f ind ingof pate rn ity
on the ind ivi du a l name d a s the fathe r of the c hil d in the a c kn ow le dg me nt, su bje c t to
resc ission as provided in subsection (c ). The a cknowle d gm en t, unless rescinde d pursuant to subsection (c ), shall be c onclusive of that f ather ’s p at er n i t y

without fu rt he r o rd e r o f t

he c ourt

. (b)( 1) A voluntary

acknow ledg ment of pate rnity which is completed u n d er the provisions of § 68-3-203( g ), § 68-3 -302, or § 68-3-305(b), or under similar provisions of another

state o r go v er n ment, when c ertified by the state re g istrar or other g overnme ntal entity maintaining the rec ord of the a cknowl e d g ment, or the c opy of t h e v o l u ntary

acknow ledg ment completed pur suant to § 68-3-302(e ), shall be a ba sis fo r e sta

bli sh inga su pp or t or de r w ith out r e qu irin g any fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s to
e s t a b l i s hp a t e r

n i t y. (2 ) A n a c kn ow le dg me nt o f p a te rn ity e xec ute d a s d e sc ri be d in

su bd ivi sio n ( b) (1 ) s ha ll be e nti tle d to f

ull fa ithand

c re dit in a ny jud ic ia l or

a dmi nis tr a tiv e pr oc e e din g in t his state. (3) No j u dicial or a dminist rative pr ocee dings a re r equire d, nor shall any such pr oc e e din g s b e pe rm itt e d, to r a tif y an un c ha lle ng e d a c kn ow le dg me nt o f p a te rn ity in
o r d e r t o c r e a t e t h e c o n c l u s i v e s t a tu s o f th e a c kn o w l e d g m e n to f

p a t e r n i ty.

. . . A voluntary

acknow ledg ment of pate rni ty e s ta b li s h e s a “ le g a l r e la

ti o n s hip” betwe en the named father and the c hild, In re Adopti on of W.J.P. , No. E2007-01043-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 246015, at *7A l t ho ugh M rs

. F t est i f i ed that no o ne p rovided he r wi t h an exp l anat i o n of t he vo l unt ary ackno wl ed gm ent 11 when she s i gned i t , s he d o es no t c o nt end that she d i d no t und ers t and the ef f ect o f the d o cum ent or t hat any t y p e o f f raud
was i nv o l ve d

. W e n ot e t hat M r s

. F s i gn ed t he do cumen t i mm edi at el y bel ow t he f ol l owi ng s ent enc es : “ I f ur t her ackno wl ed ge t hat I have b een o ral l y ad vi sed o f m y ri ght s and res p o nsi b i l i t i es as s et f o rt h i n Sec t i o n IV ab o ve i n s i gni ng
a n a c k n o w le d g m e n t o f p a te rn ity. I c e rtify th a t I u n d e r s ta n d a ll o f t h e info rm a tio n o n this fo rm a n d tha t I sign this
a c k n o w le d g m e n t o f p a te rn ity fre e ly an d vo lun ta rily.”
-18- (T e nn . Ct . App . Jan . 3 0, 20 08 ); In re A do ption o f A .M .H. , No. W2004-01225-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 3132353, at *78 (Te nn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2005) rev’d on other grounds , 215 S.W .3d 793 (Tenn. 20 07 ), and

se rv e s a s a me c ha

nis m by wh ic h unma

rrie d f a the rs may

“ le g a lly e sta bli shthe ir pate rn ity without the intervention of the c ourt.” Sta te e x rel . Robi nso n v . G le nn , No. W2006-00557-COAR3- JV, 2 00 7 WL 12 27 37 7, a t *2 (T e nn . Ct . App . Apr . 2 6, 20 07 ); State ex rel. Parks v. Parks , No. W2005-00957-COA-R3-JV, 2006 W L2032560, at *6 (Te nn. Ct. App. J an. 19, 2006). “A man

. .

. who has sig ned, pursua

nt to §§ 24-7-113, 68-3-203( g ), 68-3- 302 or 68-3- 305(b), a n unrevoke d and
sworn ac knowledg ment of pater nity under the provisions of Tenne ssee law ” is consider ed a “ leg al pare nt.” Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-1-102( 28)(D) (2005).

Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 2 4- 7- 11 3 als o set s out the mann e r in whic h a pa rt y mus t challeng e a voluntary acknow ledg ment of pate rnity and includes a

statute of limitations providing time limi ts in which a voluntary acknow ledg ment of pate rnity can be challeng ed. Robin son , 2007 WL 12 27 37 7, a t *4 ; Parks , 2006 WL 2032560, at *8. Section (c) of the statute pe rmits a signatory to t he a c kn ow le dg me nt t o r e sc ind it wit hi n si x ty da

y s o f i ts e xec uti on

up on the fi lin g of

c e rt a in sworn docume nts. Parks , 2006 WL 2032560, at *6 (c iting Te nn. Code Ann. § 24-7- 113(c) (2000))

. Alternatively , the vol u n t ar y acknow ledg ment may be cha lleng ed on the ba sis of “fr aud, whe ther extrinsi c or intrinsic, dure ss, or mat er i al m istake of f act” within five y ear s of the execution of the acknow ledg ment. Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 24- 7-113(e ) (2000) ). Clear ly , the time period for such cha l l en ges i n this case ha s passed. How ever , the statute also provide s that a cha lleng e to a voluntary acknow ledg ment of paternity “shall not be barred by the five ( 5) y ear statute of limitations wher e fr aud in t he proc ureme nt of the ac knowledg ment by the mother of the child is alleg ed and wher e the r equeste d relief wil l not affe ct the intere sts of the child, the state, or any Title I V-D
a g e nc y .” Te nn . Co de Ann. § 2 4- 7- 11 3( e )( 2) (2 00 0) . I f t he c ourt fi nd s th a t the c ha lle ng e r m e e ts a ll of these e lements, “then, a nd only then, the cour

t shall order pa

renta g e tests.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-7-113( e)( 2) (2000)

. T h e tr i al co u rt re co gn i z ed i n i t s wr i t t en fi n d i n gs an d co n cl u s i o n s th at a p arty m ay ch al l en ge a voluntary

acknow ledg ment of pate rnity afte r five year s “if fr aud ag ainst the birth mother is alleg ed
an d th e inte r e s ts o f

th e ch il d ar e n o t a f

f e c te d , ” b u t i t c o n c lu d e d , “ [t ]h is is n o t t h e c a s e h e r e

. ” We
a g re e wi th t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s c on c lus ion . Mrs . F an d Mr. S did no t alle g e fr a ud of a ny so rt , muc h le ss 11 “fr aud in the proc ureme nt of the ac knowledg ment by the mother.” The burden of provingsuch fr aud
was upon Mrs. F and Mr. S a s the cha lleng ers. State Dep’t of Hum an Servs. ex rel. Ellis v. Hu m es , No . W2 00 4- 00 60 2- CO A- R3- JV, 2 00 5 WL 56 27 53 , at *3 (T e nn . Ct. App . M ar. 10 , 2 00 5) ; se e als o Tenn. C o d e An n

. § 2 4-7-113( e)( 4) (2000) (“The burden of proof in any

such proc eedingshall be upon the challeng er.” ). I n order to challeng e the voluntar y acknow ledg ment of pate rnity based on fr a ud , th e y we re re qu ir e d to de mon str a te :M i chi gan’ s ac k n o w led gm ent s t at ut e si m i l arl y pro vi d es t hat a pa rt y s eeki ng revoca t i o n of a vo l unt ary 12

ac k n owl edg men t of

pat er n i t y un der s ome t h eor i es mu s t pr ov e t h at “ con s i der i n g t h e equ i t i es of t h e ca s e, r ev oca t i on of t he ack nowl edgment i s proper

. ” M i ch. C om p. L aws § 72 2. 10 11 ( 3). I n a pp l y i ng t hat s ect i on i n a ca s e s i mi l ar t o t hi s one, t h e M i ch i g an Cour t of

Appea l s r ec en t l y e x pl ai n ed:

It m a y w e ll b e tha t t h e L e g islatu re , w h ic h h a s a lw a ys b e e n c o n c e rn e d c h ie fly w ith the b e st inte re sts
a n d p r ot e c t i on of

c h i l dr e n a s r e f

l e c t e d i n va r i ou s l e g i s l a t i on , ma de a po l i c y de c i s i on i n e n a c t i n g M CL 7 2 2

. 1 0 1 1 (3), whi ch reco gni zed t hat , regardl ess of t he l ack o f biol o gi cal t i es, a chi l d ’ s well

- b ei ng m i ght b e b e tter se rv e d b y h a v ing a m a le a c k n o w le d g e r c o n tinu e c a rin g fo r th e c h ild a s fath e r, e sp e c ia lly if he has do ne so f

o r many y ears, rat her t han t raum at i cal l y remo vi ng t he m an f rom t he chi l d ’ s l i f

e and i nt rod uci ng a new m al e who i s ess ent i al l y a s t ranger.

Si ni cr op i v. M azur ek , 273 M i ch. Ap p. 149 , 161 , 729 N

. W

. 2d 256 , 264 , n. 4 ( 20 06 )

. W e f i nd t hi s r eas oni ng per s uas i ve.
-19- (1) a n intentional misreprese ntation with reg ard to a material fac t; (2) knowle dg e of the re prese ntation[ ’s] falsity – t h at the re prese ntation was made “knowing ly ” or “without belief in it s truth,” or “re cklessly” without reg ard to its truth or falsity ; (3) that the plaintiff rea sonably relied on the misrepre sentation and suffe red damag e; and (4 ) t hat th e mis re pr e se ntatio n r e late s to an e xistin g or pa st f a c t, or, if the c la im i s based on promissory fra

ud, then the misrepre sentation must “embody a promise of future a ction without the present intention to car ry out the promise.”

Jones v. State ex rel. Coleman , No. W2006-00540-COA-R3-JV, 2006 WL 3613612, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. Ap p. De c . 1 2, 20 06 ); Elli s , 2005 WL562753, at *3. Mr. S cer tainly did not rel y

on any misrepre sentation, or eve n the voluntary acknow ledg ment of pate rnity , to his detriment. At trial, he te sti fi e d a s f

oll ow s: Q. Di d you

e ve r b e lie ve that [A. N. F .] c ou ld h ave be e n h is c hil d? Mr. [F ]’s ? A. No , ma ’a

m.

. . . . Q. Did y ou ever

suspect that Mr. [F] could be the biolog ical father? A. No , ma ’a

m.

I n addition, even if Mr s. F a nd Mr. S had prope rly

established fr aud, “a

party seekingrelief under T.C.A. § 24- 7-113 outside the five y ear statute of limitations m ust also show that the re quested relief will not affec t the interests of the c hild, the state, or any Title I V-D ag ency .” Jones , 2 0 0 6 WL 36 13 61 2, at * 4; see Tenn. Code Ann. § 24- 7-113(e )(2) (2000). We conc lude that Mrs. F and Mr. S failed to meet this burden a s well. By i n cl u d i n g t his second re quirement in the statute, the leg islature cle arly

rec og nized that when a voluntar y acknow ledgm en t o f paternity has g one unchalleng ed for

over f ive y ear s, it ma y n o t be in the child’s be st interest to set aside that acknow ledg ment, even if

the named f

ather is not the biologica l f

ather

. Mrs. F a

nd Mr. S allowed 12 A.N.F

. to grow up believing that Mr. F was her fathe r. We c annot say that it “ will not affec t the interests of t h e ch i l d ” t o set aside Mr. F ’s voluntary acknow ledg ment of pate rnity now. We have previously

rec og nized that “[t ]he interest in determiningtrue pa renta g e must, of cour se, be we ighe d-20-

ag ainst the need for stabili ty for the child. Granderson v . Hicks , No. 02A01-9801- J V-00007, 1998 WL 886559, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S. Dec. 17, 1998). “ [P ]arentag e testingshould be denied when the equitabl e considerations do not support the disestablishment of pater nity .” Elli

s , 2 0 0 5 WL 5 6 2 7 5 3 , at * 3 (c i t i n g Sta te e xre l. R us se ll v . W

est , 115 S.W .3d 886 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003))

. Be cause Mrs. F a

nd Mr. S challeng ed the voluntary acknow ledg ment of paternity more than five y ear s after

its ex ecution, they

did not rely

on a fr aud theor

y , and they

did not demonstrate that the re quested re lief would not af fe ct t h e int ere sts of A.N.F ., their cha lleng e is barr ed by the applicable statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 24-7-113( e)( 2).

On a pp e a l, M rs . F and

Mr . S d o n ot a dd

res s th e vo lunta

ry a c kn ow le dg me nt o f p a te rn ity statutes at all. I nstead, they contend that our Supreme Court’ s rec ent dec ision in I n reT
. K. Y. , 205 S.W .3d 343 (Tenn. 2006) , controls t he outcome of this case . We respec tfully disag ree

. I

n reT
. K. Y. involved a child born a s the result of a n extra-marital a ffa ir, and the dis p u t e was be tween the mother’s husband a

nd her paramour , who had been adjudicated the child’s biolog ical father. Id. at 346. Both men w ere rebuttably presumed to be the child’s fath er p ursuant to Tenne ssee Code Anno tate d

s e c ti o n3 6

- 2

- 3 0 4 , an d

th e Co urt w a s f

a c e d w it han a ly zi n g T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tated sections 36-2-301 to -322 to determine pa renta g e. Id. at 349. Howeve r, that Part of Tenne ssee Code An notated “pr ovides a sing le ca use of a ction to establish pare ntag e of c hildren o th e r th an establishment . . . by ack

nowledgment of parentage pursuant to §§ 68- 3-203(g ), 68-3- 302 or 68-3- 305(b). ” T enn. C ode Ann. § 36- 2-301 (2005) (empha sis added). “ Absent an a g ree ment or an acknow ledgment of par entage as p re s cr i b edb y § § 6 8 -3 -2 0 3 (g) , 6 8 -3 -3 0 2 o r 6 8 -3 -3 0 5 (b ), a complaint to e sta bli shpa re nta g e may

be fi le d. ” Te nn . Co de Ann. § 3 6- 2- 30 5( b) (2 00 5) . In th is c a se , w e mus t also consider

the sepa rate statutory proce dure f

or dete rmining pa

renta g e. Pursuant to sec tions 68-3- 20 3( g ), 68 -3 -3 02 , 6 8- 3- 30 5( b) and 24 -7 -1 13 , the unre vo ke d v olu nta ry a c kn ow le dg me nt o f p a te rn ity executed in 2000 constitutes “a leg al finding ” of Mr. F’ s pater nity ; it is “ conclusive of that father’s pater nity without further or der of the court,” and it is “entitled to full faith and c redit in any judicial or administrative proc eedingin this st ate.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 24- 7-113(a ), (b) (2000).

Mrs. F a nd Mr. S cite I

n re T
. K. Y. for the notion that “onc e pate rnity has bee n established, t h e b i o l o gi ca l fa t h er

b ec o m es t h e le gal fa th er [

. ] ” 2 0 5 S

. W

. 3 d at 3 5 2

. T h ey

i n t er p re tth i s l an gu age to m e an th a t Mr . S a

uto matic a lly

be c ame the le g a l f

a the r o f A .N .F . a s so on

a s th e ind e pe nd e ntl y obtained DNAtest established the probability of his pater

nity . Howeve r, we do not rea d I n reT
. K. Y. as commandingthat result. The Supreme Court explicitl y stated in I

n reT
. K. Y. , “The leg al father may or m ay not be the biolog ical father of a child.” Id. at 351. By

statute, a “ leg al par ent” is def ined as, among other things, “a man who has be en adjudicated to be the leg al father of the child by any court or a dminist rative body of this state . . . or who h as s i gn ed , p ursuant to §§ 24-7-113, 68- 3- 203(g ), 68-3- 302 or 68-3- 305(b), a n unrevoke d and sworn a cknowledg ment of pater nity under the provisions of Tenn es s ee l aw.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-102(28) (2005) ( emphasis adde d). There fore , the Supreme Court stated, “the biologica l fathe r i s not automatically the leg al father of the child.” I

n reT
. K. Y. , 205 S.W .3d at 352. Rather, he become s the leg al father if he “has be en adjudicate d to be the father[.]” Id. Absent an adjudicative proce eding , then, the biolog ical father is not g iven the status of leg al fathe r. Id. Although the Court did state later in the opinion that “onc e-21-

pate rn ity ha s b e e n e st abl ishe d, the bio log ic a l f a the r b e c ome s th e le g a l f a the r, ” the Court

c le arl y envisioned pate rnity

beingestablished by

a c ou rt

. We a lso c onclu de th at Mr. S is n ot a uto matic a lly

e nti tle d to a

c ourt or de r a dju dic a tin g his pater nity , beca use in this c ase, the voluntary acknow ledg ment of pate rnity is conclusive of Mr . F’ s pater nity of A.N.F . I f M r. S wa s entitled to be named the leg al father, the c onclusiveness of the voluntary acknow ledg ment of pate rnity and the limited revoc ation proce d u re s s et forth in t he voluntary acknow ledg ment of pate rnity statute would be mea

ningle ss. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 24- 7- 113(a) -( e ) ( 2 0 0 0 )

. T h e v o lu nta ry acknow ledg ment statute does not provide that the acknow ledg ment will be automatically

revoke d i f ev er it is di scover ed that anothe r man is the biolog ical father. Ba lancingthe competinginterests whe n a child’s paternity is disputed is essentially a leg islative prer og ative. Sta te e

x rel . Cihla r v. C

ra wf ord , 39 S.W. 3d

17 2, 18 4 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 0) . T hu s, when leg islatures have rec og nized “a conc lusive presumption of parentag e,” even though the man is late r d e te r

mi n e d n o t to b e th e b io lo g ic a l f a th e r , th e y “ w e r e e s s e n ti a ll y ma k in g a public policy statement that the scale s should be balanc ed in f avor of prese rving the integ rity of the family unit.” Id.

Be cause Mrs. F a nd Mr. S did not present suffic ient g rounds to revoke the voluntary acknow ledg ment of pate rnity , it constitut es “a leg al finding of pate rnity on the individual named as th e fat her of th e chi ld in th e ackn owl edgme nt ,” an d i t i s co ncl us iv e of M r. F’s pat erni ty of A .N. F. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 2 4- 7- 11 3 (20 00 ). Th e re fo re , the tr ia l c ourt pr op e rl y dis mis se d th e c omp la int

to establish pare ntag e filed by Mrs. F a nd Mr. S

. Be cause Mr. S is not lega lly the par ent of A.N .F., we ag ree with Mr. F that it is not nece ssary to consider his counter -petition to terminate Mr . S’s pare ntal ri g hts

. C. The Petition s to Modify Cust ody and V

isitat ion The orig inal pare nting plan pr ovided that when A.N.F. rea ched school ag e, Mr. F would be the primary

residential pa

rent, a nd the childre n would reside with Mr s. F ever y other we ekend a

nd
ever y other W ednesda

y night. During summer vacation, the oppos ite schedule would apply , and the children w ould reside pr imarily wi t h M rs

. F. In her pe tition t o modify the par enting plan, Mrs. F
c on te nd e d th a t sh e sh ou ld b e awa rd e d p ri mary

c us to dy of bo th c hil dr e n b a se d o n th e DC S inv e sti g a tio ns of

Mr . F , the c hil dr e n’ s all e g e d cr ying fi ts at vis itatio n exch ang e s, Mr . F’ s r e fu sa l to
ans we r M rs . F ’s te le ph on e c a lls , an d the fa c t th a t Mr s. F ha d o bta ine d e mpl oy me nt a nd a se pa rate
re sid e nc e sin c e the div or c e

. Mr . F c la ime d th a t th e pa re nti ngpla

n s ho uld be ame nd e d to re du c e Mr s. F’ s visitation and require it to be supe rvised beca use of her false a ccusations and derog atory rema rks ag ainst Mr. F, he r inability to cooper ate with Mr. F accor ding to the parenting plan, and her alleg ed emotional instabilit y . The trial court denied Mrs. F’ s petition a nd g rante d Mr. F’ s petition, li miting M r s

. F to v is it a ti o n o n a lt e r n a te w e e k e n d s an d a lt e r

n a te h o li d ay s , an d r e qu ir in g s u p e r v is io nby “a neutra l third party

mutually ag ree able to the pa

rties.”

Exist ing c us tod

y arr ang e me nts are fa

vo re d be c a

us e c hil dr e n thr ive in s ta

ble e nv ir on me nts

. Ke lle tt v . St uart , 2 0 6 S.W .3d 8, 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). Acustody decision, once made a

nd-22-

implemented, is considere d res judicata upon the fa cts in exi stence at that time, or those that we re rea sonably fore seea

ble when the decision wa s made. Curt is v . Hi ll , 215 S.W .3d 836, 840 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 20 06 ); Ke lle tt , 206 S.W .3d at 14. Stil l, c ourts are authorized by statute to alter a

custody
arr ang ement as r equire d by interveningcirc umstances, or “as the as the e x ige ncies of the case may require .” Krupp v. Cu nningham -Grogan , No. M2005-01098-COA- R3-CV, 2006 WL 2505037, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 29, 2006) (c iting Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 101(a) (1) ( Supp. 2006)). The party pe tit ion ingto c ha

ng e the c us tod

y or de r m

us t pr ov e bo th t

hat a mate ri a l c ha

ng e in circ umstances ha s occur

red a nd that a chang e of custody is in the child’s best int ere st. Ke lle tt , 206 S.W .3d at 14. The “ threshold issue” in ca ses involving a proposed modificati o n o f an ex isting custody order is whether a materia l chang e in circ umstances ha s occur red since the initial custody deter mination. Blair v. Badenh ope , 77 S.W .3d 137, 150 (Tenn. 2002)

. A “c hang e in circ umstance” with reg ard to the pa renting schedule is a distinct c oncept f rom a “ c ha ng e in c ir c ums tanc e ” wi th r e g ard to t he ide nti ty

of the pr ima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt. M a s s e y- H o lt v . Ho lt , 255 S.W .3d 603, 607 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). T ennesse e Code Annotated
s e c t i o n3 6

- 6

- 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) p r o v i d e s t h e f o l l o wi n g i n s t

ru ct i o n re gar d i n g ch an gi n g custody , in pertinent pa rt :
I f the issue be fore the cour t is a modification of the c ourt’s pri o r d ec ree perta ining to custody , the petitioner must prove by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e a material
c ha ng e in c ir c ums tanc e

. . . . A mate ri a l c ha ng e of c ir c ums tanc e may inc lud e , but is not li m i t ed t o, failure s to adhere to the pare nting plan or an orde r of c ustody

and vis itatio n o r c ir c ums tanc e s th a t make the pa re nti ngpla

n n o lo ng e r i n th e be st i nte re st of the c hild.

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 36-6-101(a )(2) (C) then provide s the following instruction
re gar d i n g ch an gi n g a r esid e nti al p ar e nti ng

sc he du le , in

pe rt ine nt p art :
I f the issue be fore the cour t is a modifi ca t i o n of the c ourt’s prior de cre e per taining to a residential pare nting schedule , then the petitioner must prove by a pre pondera

nce of the e vid e nc e a

mate ri a l c ha

ng e of c ir c ums tanc e a ff

e c tin g the c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st.

. . . A materia l c hang e of circ umstance for purposes of modification of a residential pare nting schedule may

include, but is not lim ited to, significa nt chang es in the nee ds of the c hild ove r time, which may include chang es relating to ag e; sig nificant c hang es in the pare nt’s living or w orkingcondition that sig nificantly aff ect pare nting; fa ilure to adher e to the par enting plan; o r o t h er circumstanc es makinga cha ng e in the residential pa

rentingtime in the best interest of the c hild.

The statut e e s ta

b li s h e s a lo w e r thr e s h o ld

f o r mo d if yin g “ th e s p e c if

ic s ” o f a r e s id e n ti a l p ar e n ting schedule than that re quired to modify m o re s u b s t an tive matters such a s the desig nation of the primary residential pa

rent. Ma sse

y-H olt , 255 S.W .3d at 607.M r s

. F cont ends t hat t he t r i al cour t s houl d hav e g r ant ed he r pet i t i on t o cha ng e c us t od y becau s e T enn es s ee 13 Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on 36- 6- 101( a) ( 2) ( C) s et s “ a v er y l ow t h r es h ol d f or e s t abl i s h i n g a ma t er i al c h an g e of ci r cums t anc es

. ” See R ose v. L ashl ee , N o. M 2005- 00361- CO A- R3- CV , 2006 W L 2390980, at * 2, n

. 3 ( T en n

. Ct

. App. A ug

. 18, 200 6). I t i s t r ue t hat und er s ect i on ( a) ( 2)( C ) , “ [ m]er el y s howi ng t hat t he exi s t i ng ar r ang ement ha s prove n
un work abl e f

or t he part i es i s s uf

f i ci ent t o s at i s f

y t he mat er i al ch ang e of ci r cums t anc e t es t

. ” I

d. B y i t s t erm s, how ever, sect i o n (a) (2)(C ) onl y ap p l i es “ [i ]f t he i ss ue b ef

o re t he co urt i s a m o d i f i cat i o n

. . . pe rt ai ni ng t o a res i d ent i al pa rent i ng
s c h e du l e , ” a n d s e c t i on ( a ) ( 2) ( B ) a pp l i e s “ [ i ] f t h e i s s u e be f

or e t h e c ou r t i s a mo di f i c a t i on

. . . pe r t a i n i n g t o c u s t od y
. ” As d i scus sed i n M a sse

y -H o lt , 25 5 S.W

. 3 d at 60 7 , t he st at ut e creat es a di f f erent s t and ard f

o r each s i t uat i o n.
-23- “Custody decisions often hing e on subtle fa ctors, s u ch as the pa rents’ de meanor

and
cre dibilit y

during the proc eeding s.” Jo ine r v . G rif fi th , N o

. M 2 0 0 4

- 0 2 6 0 1

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 6 WL 2 1 3 5 4 4 1 , at * 2 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. J u l y 3 1 , 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Adelsperge r v. Adelspe rger , 970 S.W .2d 482, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)) . As su ch , t ri al courts have broad discr etion to fashion custody and visitation arrang ements that best suit the unique circ umstances of ea ch case

. Id. (c i t i n g Parker v

. Parker , 986 S.W .2d 557, 563 (Tenn. 1999) ). “It is not t he func tion of appellate courts to tweak a visitation order in the hopes of achie ving a more reasona ble result than t he trial court.” Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001)

. A trial cour t’s decision re g ardingcustody should be set aside only

when it “f

alls outside the spectrum of ruling s that might re asonabl y result from a

n application of the corr ect leg al standards to the evidenc e found in the rec ord.” Id. I f no er ror in the trial court’s ruling is evident fr om the rec ord, the rulingmust stand. Id. In sum, appellate c ourts are reluc tant to second- g uess custody decisions when so much depends on the tr ial court’s a ssessment of the witnesse s’ cr edibility , but we w i l l re v erse or modify a trial c ourt’s custody

decision if we conclude the dec ision rests on an error of law, or if the evidence pr eponder ates a g ainst the finding that there has or ha s not been a mater i al ch ange in the c hild’s circumstanc es or that the c hild’s interests will be best serve d by chang ing a

n exis ting c ustody

arr ang ement. Sc of

ie ld v . Sc of ie ld, No. M2006-00350-COA- R3-CV, 2007 WL 624351, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2007)

.

1. M r s. F ’s P e ti ti on Se e king a C hang e in C ust ody

F ir st, we wi ll a dd

re ss e a c h o f t

he c ir c ums tanc e s c ite d by Mr s. F in sup po rt of he r pe tit ion to be name d p ri mary

re sid e nti a l pa

re nt o f t he c hil dr e n. Mr s. F pr ima ri ly re lie d o n th e fa c t th a t D CS 13 was investig ating Mr. F for alleg ed abuse or neg lect of both c hildren. She deta iled the alleg ations in her pe tition and noted that Mr. F was limited to supervised par enting time with the children be c a us e of the on g oin g inv e sti g a tio ns . M rs . F c on te nd e d th a t th is c on sti tut e d a mate ri a l c ha

ng e in circ umstances justifying a chang e in custody

. The trial court summ arized i ts finding s on the matter b y s t a t i n g , “ t h e f

a c tt h a t[ M r

. F ] w a s i n v e s t i g a t e d b y D C S f o r f r i v o l o u s c l a i m s m a d e b y

[ M r s

. F ], wh ic h w e re late r di smi sse d, do e s n ot c on sti tut e a mate ri a l c ha

ng e in c ir c ums tanc e s th a t w ou ld
war rant a chang e in custody .” We ag ree

. I t is clea r t hat t he accusations of abuse in this case we re taken seriously and investi g ated thoroughly . DCS conducted full investig ations of the alleg ations involving both c hildren and conclude d that no abuse or neg lect occur red in e ither si t u at i o n

. The g uardia n ad li tem rea ched the same conclusion afte r hi s investigation. As the trial court noted, the proof of abuse pr imarily came from the testimony of Mrs. F and her

pare nts, whom the trial court specific ally

found “not c redible.” Although Ms. Au s tin also testified that during one counse ling
se ssi on , A .N .F . to ld h e r s he ha d b e e n to uc hed in a pp ro pr iate ly , th e re wa s e vid e nc e pr e se nte d toA l t ho ugh M s. A ust i n s t at ed t hat s he b el i eved A .N .F .’s s t at em ent ab o ut t he al l eged ab use, t he t ri al co urt 14
ap p arent l y d i scr ed i t ed M s. A ust i n’ s o p i ni o n. T he co urt ’ s f i nd i ngs no t ed t hat M s. A ust i n receive d a ll b a c kground i n f or mat i on a bou t t h e al l eg at i on s of a bu s e f r om M r s

. F, s h e a ck n owl edg ed t h at A. N

. F. l i ed t o h er on a t l ea s t on e occ as i on d uri ng co unsel i ng, she d i d no t co unsel A

. N

. F. f o r t he p urpo se of

de t erm i ni ng whet her t he ab use had o ccurred o r f o r t he p urpo se of

co nd uct i ng a chi l d cust o d y eval uat i o n, and M s. A ust i n had never o b ser ved A

. N

. F. wi t h M r. F. In co ncl usi o n, t he co urt f

o un d t ha t “t he t esti m o ny o f M s. A usti n d o es no t p ro vid e any ev i d en ce as to wh ethe r o r no t an y s ex ua l ab use
occ u r r ed, bu t h er t es t i mon y does con f i r m t h at t h e ch i l d’ s s t at eme n t ’ s a r e, a t be s t [ , ] n ot c r edi bl e. ” T h e t r i al c ou r t w as n ot req uired t o ac cre d i t M s. A usti n’s test i m o ny a s a n ex p ert w i t ne ss, e ve n i n t he ab sen ce o f co ntrary ex p ert o p i nio ns. M s. A ust i n’ s o p i ni o n, l i ke t hat of any o t her expe rt wi t ness , was advis o ry i n na t ure, a nd in m aki ng it s o wn judgm ent , the court
c o u ld giv e he r o p inio n w h a te v e r w e igh t i t d e e m e d a p p ro p ria te in ligh t o f t h e o the r fa c ts in e v id e n c e

. M cCl ai n v. M c C la in , N o . E 2 0 0 2 -0 0 9 1 3 -C O A -R 3 -C V , 2 0 0 3 W L 1 4 5 2 9 5 8 , a t *7 (T e n n . C t. A p p . M a r. 2 1 , 2 0 0 3 ); G u i ll v. C a rr , N o . 5 6 -1 9 5 R 2 , 1 9 9 3 W L 4 7 6 9 9 1 , at *6 (T e n n . C t. A p p . M .S . N o v . 1 7 , 1 9 9 3 ); R o b e rts v . R o b e rts , 827 S. W

. 2d 788, 795 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. 19 9 1 ).

T he M i d d l e Se ct i o n ap t l y exp l ai ned t he reason f o r s uch a rul e i n C ostl ey : 15

T he st at ut e’ s d i f

f erent i at i o n ba sed o n t he age o f th e chi l d ref

l ect s a l egi sl at i ve judgm ent t hat t he p ref erences of

y o unger chi l d ren are l ess rel i ab l e as gui d es t o t hei r b est i nt erest

. W het her or not a co urt cho o ses t o hear f

rom a y o unger chi l d , or even t o co nsi d er a chi l d ’ s p ref erences as a f

act o r i n t he d esi gn

(c o n tinu e d ...)
-24- sug g est that Mrs. F ha d instructed A.N.F . to make such statem en t s

. A. N. F. wa s examined at an 14
emer g ency

room, but no evidenc e of a buse wa s discovere d. Reg ardingC.S.F.’s injury , there wer e sever al documente d repor ts of various inconsistent a nd false statements made by Mrs. F, which led to the second investigation of Mr. F. I t is undisputed that Mrs. F ha d falsely repor ted alleg ations of abus e i n t he past. Consideringall the evidenc e in the re cord, w e find that the e vidence does not pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t th e tr ia l c ourt ’s c on c lus ion that Mr s. F ’s a llega tio ns we re , in fa c t, f ri vo lou s. There fore , we similarly

conclude that the fac t that Mr

. F was being investigated by DCS and was temporar ily

denied visitation with his children does not constitute a mate rial ch a n g e in c irc u ms tance s jus tif yinga c ha ng e in c us tod

y to Mrs

. F. “Whil e the e xiste nc e of ph y sic a l a

bu se un qu e sti on a

bly could, and likely

would, constitute a mater ial chang e in circ umstances f or purp o ses of c hang ing custody , altog ether unfounded a lleg ations most certainly cannot.” Mulkey v. Mulkey , No. E2004- 00 59 0- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 4 WL 24 12 61 0, a t *4 (T enn

. Ct

. App . Oc t. 2 8, 20 04 ). We h ave a lso considere d Mrs. F’ s insinuation that the ot her injuries suf fer ed by the childre n while in Mr. F’ s car e wer e the r esult of abuse and/or ne g lect by Mr. F, but we find no support for he r asse rtion.
Next, we consider Mr s. F’s c ontention that “both of the childre n have stated that they do not want to visit w i t h ” M r. F. The c hildren we re a g es five a nd three when Mrs. F filed her petition
makin g thi s a sse rt ion . “ A y oungc hil d’ s c ha

ng ing wi sh e s a

bo ut wh e re he or sh e wa

nts to l ive do no t, by statute or other

wise, cr eate a material cha ng e of c ircumstance s.” Cos tle y v . Benja min , No. M2004-00375-COA- R3-CV, 2005 WL 1950114, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 12, 2005). Onc e ther e has bee n a showingof a material c hang e in circ umstances, then the stated pref ere nce of a c hild is one of the statut or

y fa c tor s th a t c an b e c on sid e re d by a tr ia l c ourt wh e n d e te rm ini ngwh a t is in t he be st interest of the child. Mulkey , 2004 WL2412610, at *5 (c iting Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 106). Even then, howeve r, the c ourt is not require d to c onsider the pr efe renc e of a child y oung er tha

n twelve, and courts are instructed to g ive “g reater weig ht” to the pref ere nces of

older c hildren. See Tenn. 15(

. . . con t i n u ed) 15 of a par ent i ng ar r ang ement , t her e i s not hi ng i n t he appl i cabl e s t at ut es i ndi cat i ng ch ang i ng pre f er enc es
co uld co nsti t ute a m aterial cha ng e o f circum st an ce s. A y ou n g c h i l d’ s c h an g i n g w i s h es a bou t w h er e h e or s he wants t o l i v e do n ot , by s t at u t e or
o t herwi se, creat e a m at eri al change o f ci rcum st ances. C hi l d ren can easi l y d eci d e t hey wo ul d rat her l i ve
w i t h the m o re lenien t o r ge ne ro us p are nt rather than t he o ne wh o just refu se d t o b u y t he ne w est
m ust

- have i t em or who s et rul es t he chi l d did no t agree wi t h. N ei t her t he l egi sl at ure nor t he co urt s want t o enc our age par ent s t o s eek mo di f i cat i on of

cu s t od y on t he s ol e b as i s o f a chi l d’ s s hi f

t i ng pre f er enc es in th e a b se n c e o f a re a l ch a n g e o f circ u m sta n c e s tha t affe c ts the w e llb e ing o f t h e c h ild

.
C ostl ey , 2005 W L 1950114, a t * 16.
-25- Code Ann. § 36-6- 106(a) (7) ( 2005 & Supp. 2007). We fur ther note that it is not clear f rom the
rec ord that t h ese c hildren would ac tually pref er to re side with Mrs. F. Mrs. F attempted to testify as to the childre n’s allege d pref ere nces and claimed that the children would cry and “thr ow fits” at visitation ex chang es. Howe ver, she later testified that C.S.F. loves Mr. F and is upset when he does
no t g e t to vis it w ithhim . Sh e a lso te sti fi e d th a t A .N .F . ha d be e n thr ow ing fi ts at e xch ang e s “up un til
re c e n t l y
. ” M r s

. F ’ s f

a t h e r , w h o v i d e o t a

p e d e v e r y v i s i t a t i o ne xc h an g e b e tw e e nt h e p art ie s, acknow ledg ed that the c hildren we re not a lway s upset. He a lso testified that A.N.F . was “ not as bad” at ex ch an ges i n t h e p as tfe w m o n t h s , an d th at C

. S

. F. i s “a l wa y s p ro u d ” t o s ee M r. F a n d l i k es t o go with him. Mr. F also testified that the c hildren no long er c ry at exchang es, and he acc used Mrs. F of coa chingthem to cry

at the pre vious ex chang es. In su m , we fi n d t h at Mrs. F ’s contention
re g ard ingthe c hil dr e n’ s a lle g e d pr e fe re nc e s a s to c us tod y do e s no t c on sti tut e a

mate ri a l c ha

ng e in
c ir c ums tanc e s.
The ne x t basis for Mrs. F’ s petition to modify the custody arr ang ement was that Mr. F ha d failed to a dhere to various provisions of the par entingplan. She alleg ed that Mr. F was not allowing her at least two telephone calls per wee k with the children. A t trial, Mrs. F introduc ed ca ssette tape
rec ording s of messag es she lef t for Mr. F , but as the trial cour t noted in its findings, there was nothing to indicate whether her c alls were returne d. Mrs. F a lso claimed that Mr. F failed to provide health insuranc e for

the childre n, but the court found that their l ack of cover ag e was not due to Mr. F ’s ina c tio n. Th e c ourt

fo un d th a t A .N .F .’ s T e nn Care c ov e ra g e wa s su sp e nd e d b e c a us e “ the State of Te nn e sse e le arn e d th a t [Mr s. F ] wa s dra wi ng fo od sta

mps on [A. N. F .] whe n she did no t hav e fu ll custody of the child.” The court specific ally cre dited Mr. F’s testimony that he wa s actively seeking to reinstate Te nnCare c overa g e for A.N.F . After addre ssing these alleg ed viol ations and other s, the
c ourt fo un d th a t th e a lle g a tio ns did no t rise to the le ve l nec e ssa ry to co ns tit

ute a mate ri a l c ha

ng e in circ umstances that wa

rra nted cha n gi n g cu s t ody

to Mrs. F. The evidenc e pre sented doe s not preponde rate ag ainst the trial cour t’s conclusion. Finally , Mrs. F c ontended that a materia l chang e in circ umstances h a d o c c u rre d beca use since the divorce , she had se cure d employ ment, obtained a car , and moved from her pa rents’ house to a
se pa rate tr a ile r ow ne d by

he r f a the r l oc a te d n e xt to h e r p are nts ’ h ou se . B y the se c on d d ay

of tr ia l, howeve r, Mrs. F was ag ain unemploy ed. The trial court c oncluded that Mrs. F failed to show how the se c ha ng e s im pa c te d th e c hil dr e n “ in a

ny mann e r, muc h le ss a mate ri a l mann e r. ” We a g re e wi th-26-

the trial cour

t. A parent’s chang e in circ umstances may be a materia l chang e in circumstances f or t h e p u r p o s e s o f m o d i f yi n g c u s t o dy if

such a c hang e af

fec t s the child’s we ll-being in a meaning ful way , but Mrs. F ha s not demonstrated that these chang es in her l ife a ffe cted he r childre n in a way t h at j u s t ifies a c hang e in custody

. See Cal dwe ll v . Hi ll , 250 S.W .3d 865, 870-72 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2007) (discussingthe burde n of proof re q u ired to establish a material c hang e in circ umstances)

. None of the circ umstances c ited by Mrs. F, c onsidered a lone or take n toge ther, ne cess it a tes removing custody from Mr. F and g rantingcustody to Mrs. F.

2. Mr. F ’s P etition to Re strict Mrs. F ’s Visitation

I n Mr. F’ s petition to m odify the par enting plan, he c laimed that Mrs. F should be a war ded less visitation, and it should be super vised, bec ause of

her a lleg ed fa lse ac cusations and de rog atory
rema rks ag ainst Mr. F, he r inability to c ooperate with him acc ording to the pare nting plan, a nd her alleg ed emotional instability . The trial court g rante d Mr. F’ s petition upon finding that it was in the be st i nte re st o f t

he c hil dr e n f

or Mr s. F to h ave le ss v isi tatio n, su pe rv ise d b y

a “ ne utr a l t hird

pa rt y mutually ag ree able to the pa

rties.” On appe al, Mrs. F contends that the t rial court was prohibited from modifying the pare nting plan i n an y

w ay b a s e d o nM r s

. F ’ s r e p o rti n g o f a ll e g a ti o n s o f

a b u s e , c it in g T e n n e s s e e Co de Anno tat ed se c tio n 3 6- 6- 11 2( c ), a lso kn ow n a s th e “ Pr ote c tiv e Pare nt R e fo rm Ac t.” Th e statut e pr ov ide s:
I f a pa rent makes a g ood faith alleg ation based on a rea sonable belief suppor ted by fac ts th a t th e c h il d is th e v ic ti m o f c h il d a b u s e , c h il d n e g le c t, o r th e e f fec ts of do me sti c vio le nc e , a

nd if that pa re nt a c ts l awf

ull y and in g oo d f a ithin r e sp on se to that rea sonable be lief to protec t the child or see k treatment for the c hi l d , t hen that pare nt shall not be deprived of custody , visitation, or contact with th e chil d, or
res t ricted in c ustody , visitation, or contact, base d solely on that belief or

the
rea sonable a ctions taken ba sed on that belief

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-112(c ) (Supp. 2007). We would agree with Mrs. F if t h e re cord demonstrated that she ac ted “in g ood faith i n response to [ a] reasona ble belief ” that the c hildren we re victims of child abuse or neg lect. Howeve r, the trial judge conclude d that Mrs. F’ s repor ts of sexual abuse were “a

bsolutely false,” and that she “ knowing ly lied” to the doctor s and nurse s reg arding C.S. F .’ s le g inj ur

y
. As dis c us se d ab ov e , the re c or d sup po rt s th e tr ia l c ourt ’s c on c lus ion tha t Mr s. F’ s alleg ations wer e frivolous and intended to de prive Mr. F of custody of the childre n. There fore , M rs . F c annot claim the pr otection of the Protec tive Parent Ref orm Act. See Agee v

. Agee , No. W2007-00314-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2065996, at *7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2008) (r ejec ting the ar g ument that the Protective Parent Reform Act prohibited a chang e in c ustody when one pare nt continued to fal

se ly a c c us e the oth e r p are nt o f s e xua lly a bu sin gthe c hil d) ; s ee a lso Keislin g v. Ke isl ing , 1 96 S.W. 3d 70 3, 72 2- 23 (T e nn . Ct. App . 200 5) (r e je c tin g the argume nt t

hat r e pe a te d f

a lse
acc usations of child s ex ual abuse cannot c onstitut e a material c hang e in circ umstances) . We find
n o e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s r

u l i n g t h a t a m a t e r i a l c h an g e i nc i r c u m s t an c e s h a d o c c ur r e d t o j u s t i f y a-27-

reduc tion in Mrs. F’s visitation to alternating wee kends and the alternating holiday s provided in the pare nting plan.

Mr s. F a lso argue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld h ave awa

rd e d h e r at le a st s ome vis itatio n ti me with the children du ri ng brea ks from school for

Christmas, spring, a

nd summer vac ation. The provisions of the par enting plan addr essing S p ri n g an d S u mmer vac ation wer e lef t blank. The pa re nti ngpla

n’ s h oli da y sc he du le do e s n ot list

Chr istma s, but it

do e s p ro vid e that “ Othe r S c ho olFree Day s” w ou ld

be s pl it bet ween th e par ti es. In t he pro po sed pare nt in g plan pres ent ed b y Mr. F, he su bmi tte d th a t th e pa

rt ie s sh ou ld a lte rn a te vis itatio n ti me duri ng the Chr istma s holi da y s a nd a lso divide any

Spring va cation time from sc hool. Never theless, the trial court did not awar d Mrs. F a ny visitation during those times. We find that Mr. F’s proposal as to visitation was re asonable , and we modify the per manent par enting plan to include the pr ovisions he sugg ested:

The parties shall alternate the Christmas holiday s as follows: I n even y ears , t he mot he r s ha ll h ave the min or

c hil dr e n f

ro m th e tim e sc ho ol d ism iss e s unti l 2: 00 p. m. on Christmas Day

and the fathe r shall have the childre n from 2:00 p.m. on Christmas Da y un til sc ho ol r e sume s, a t w hic h ti me, the re sid e nti a l pa re nti ngtim e a s se t f

or th in Se c tio n [I .B

. of the pa

re nti ng pla

n o rd e re d b y

the c ourt ] sha ll a

pp ly . In o dd

y e ars , the father shall have the min o r children from the time school dismisses until 2: 00 p.m. on Christm as Da y and the mother shall have the children f rom 2:00 p.m. on Chr istma s D ay

un til 6:0 0 p .m. the night b e fo re sc ho ol r e sume s.

. . . . The pa rents will also divide any Spring sc hool vacation.

We will not alter the trial cour t’s decision to eliminate Mrs. F ’s leng thy summer vi sitation with t he children, which had been provided pursuant to the orig inal pare nting plan e ntere d when the pa rties divorce d.
Next, we must address the issue of supervised visitation. Mrs. F argues that there is no need for her visitation to be supervise d beca use there was no e vidence prese nted that she is a thre at to the children’ s safe ty . A dec ision reg ardingsupervision “stems fr om the delicate balanc ing of protec tion of the c hil d w ithpr e se rv a tio n o f t he c hil d’ s re latio ns hip wi th h e r p are nt, [an d] w e are c omp e lle d to
r e c o g n i z e t h a ts u c hd e c i s i o n s h i n g e o nth e tr i a l c o urt ’ s a s s e s s m e n to f th e p art i e s ’ c r e d i b i l i ty, specific ally , whether

the parent can be t rusted to spend t ime alone with the child wit hout violating the nec essar

y boundarie s.” B.M

.M . v . P .R. M. , M2002-02242-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL1853418, at *18 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug

. 18, 2004). Although “we acc ord appr opriate de fer ence to the trial court’ s a sse ssm e nt o f t he wi tn esses ’ c re dib ili ty , w e are a lso ob lig e d to e xami ne the re c or d in de pe nd e ntl y and revie w the trial court’s de cisions car efully .” Id. at *19. In other words, the gene ral rule is that the details of custody

and visitation are pe culiarly within the broad discr etion of the trial judg e, but
o n ap p eal, “we must reme mber that the w elfa re of the child has a lway s been the para mount consideration.” Bueno v. Todd , No. W2005-02164-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 2106006, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2006).-28-

A p are nt’ s r ig ht t o v isi t w ithhis or he r c hil dr e n is no t a

bs olute , a nd “ c ourt s ma

y re str ic t, suspend, or ter

minate visitation rights upon the pre sent at i o n o f clear and de finite evidenc e that permitting c o ntinued visitation wil l jeopardize the c hild phy sically , emotionally , or morally .” Bue no , 2 0 0 6 W L2 1 0 6 0 0 6 , at * 5 (q u o t i n g W ix v . W ix , N o

. M 2 0 0 0

- 0 0 2 3 0

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 1 WL 21 97 00 , at *1 0 ( Te nn . Ct . App . M ar. 7, 20 01 )) ; see also Eldridge , 42 S.W.3 d at 85. Th e be st i nte re st of the c hild may

require that the trial cour t place restric tions on, limit , or prohibit visitation. In re S.C. H. , No. M2003-01382-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 2941151, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 20, 2004). Supervisi o n i s sometimes nece ssary in order to pr otect the c hild, y et per mit the continuation of visitation. B.M

.M
. , 2 00 4 WL

18 53 41 8, a t *18. Ho we ve r, “ su pe rv isi on of a pa

re nt’ s v isi tatio n w ith his or her c hild is a signific ant intrusion on the pare nt-child relationship,” and the dec ision to require supervision should not be undertaken lightly or wit hout a re asonable basis. Id. The rig ht of the noncustodial pare nt to rea sonable visitation is clea rly favor ed. Bue no , 2006 WL 2106006, at *5 (c iting Suttles v. Suttles , 7 48 S.W. 2d 42 7, 42 9 ( Te nn . 1 98 8) ). “ Te nn e sse e ’s c ourt s hav e re pe a te dly
re c og nize d th a t c us tod

y and vis itatio n arr ang e me nts sh ou ld i nte rf e re wi th t

he pa re nt- c hil d relationship as lit tle as possible.” Id. (q u o t i n g W ix , 2001 WL 219700, at *10).

“B eca use of the leg al and psy cholog ical sig nificanc e of a pare nt’s visitation rights, persons
se e kin g to re str ic t or e lim inate vis itatio n mus t de mon str ate that the re is pr ob a ble c a us e that th e c hil d will be place d at risk if visitation is permitted.” Bue no , 2 0 0 6 W L2 1 0 6 0 0 6 , at* 6 (q u o t i n g W ix , 2001 WL21 97 00 , at *1 1) . T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 3 6- 6- 30 1 p ro vid e s, in r e le va nt p art :
After making an aw ard of

custody , the cour

t shall, upon request of the non-custodial pare nt, gr ant such rig hts of visitation as will enable the child and the non-custodial p ar en t t o m ai n t ai na p ar en t -c h i l d re l at i o n s h i p u n l es s th e c o urt fi n d s , af t er a h ea ri n g, that visitation i s likely

to endang er the child’s phy sical or emotional health. . . . I f the court finds that the non- custodial p ar ent has phy sically or emotionally

abused the child, the court m ay require that visitation be supervised or prohibited until such abuse ha s cea sed or until there is no r easona ble likelihood that such abuse w ill recur.

Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 3 6- 6- 40 6 f ur the r p ro vid e s, in p art : (a) . . . [A] pare nt’s residential time as provided i n the per manent par enting plan . . . shall be limited if it is deter mined b y the cour

t, based upon a

prior orde r or other
re lia ble e vid e nc e , th a t a

pa re nt h a s e ng a g e d in

any of the fo llo wi ngc on du c t: (1) Willful abandonment that continues for a n extended period of time or substantial ref usal to perf

orm pare nting r esponsibiliti es; or (2) Phy sical or se x ual abuse or a pattern of e motional abuse of the pa rent, c hild or of another person living with that child as define d in § 36-3-601.

. . . . (d ) Apa re nt’ s inv olv e me nt or c on du c t may have an a dv e rs e e ff e c t on the c hil d’ s b e st interest, and the court may prec lude or limit any provisions of a pare nting plan, if any
o f t h e f o l l o wi n g l i m i t i n g fa ct o rs ar e f o un d t o ex i s taf

t er a h ea ri n g:

. . . .-29-

(5) The abusive use of

conflict by

the par ent that create s the dange r of damag e to the
c hil d' s p syc ho log ic a l de ve lop me nt; (6) A pa rent ha s wi t hheld from the othe r par ent ac cess to the c hild for a pr otrac ted period without g ood cause ;

. . . . (8 ) Suc h ot h e r

f a c t o r s o r c o n d u c ta s t h e c o urte xp r e s s l y f i n d s a dv e r s e t o t h e b e st interests of the c hild.

These statutes have e ffe ctively cre ated “a pre sumption aga inst severe ly circ umscribing or deny

ing visitation t o noncustodial pare nts.” Bue no , 2 0 0 6 W L2 1 0 6 0 0 6 , at* 6 (q u o t i n g W ix , 2 0 0 1 WL 219700, at *11). Dr astic measure s are appropr iate only when other

arr ang ements less detrimenta l to the pare nt-child relationship are not ava ilable or wor kable a s a p ra cti cal matter

. Id. Th e le a st restric tive visitation l imits are favor ed in orde r to enc ourag e the pa rent-c hild relati onship. In re Z. A.W

. , No. W2005-01956-COA-R3-JV, 2006 WL 1627180, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. J un. 12, 2006).

“ Ap pli c a ble le g a l st and ard s r e qu ir e that r e str ic tio n, c ur ta ilm e nt, or e lim inatio n of vis itatio n r ig hts must be based on spe cific fi ndings, r esulting f rom clea r and de finite evidenc e, that one of the situations jus tifying suc h action exists.” In reS.C. H. , 2004 WL 2941151, at *5.

Her e, the tria l court conc luded that Mrs. F ’s alleg ations of sexual abuse ag ainst Mr. F w ere “absolutely

false,” y et she “ even w ent so far as to subje ct her five y ear old c hild to an examination for e vidence of sexual abuse knowingno such abuse had occur red. The court [found] such conduc t was not only u n n ec es s ary and cr uel but endang ere d the phy sical and e motional well-beingof the min or c hil d a nd sh ow s a re c kle ss d isr e g ard

fo r t he we lf are of the c hil d. ” Re g ard ing Mr s. F ’s fa lse statements following C.S.F.’s leginjury , the court found that her behavior “wa s intended to destroy the c hil dr e n’ s r e latio ns hip wi th the ir F a the r” wi tho ut r e g ard to “ ho w s uc h f

a lse a c c us a tio ns wo uld hurt the childre n.” The court c oncluded that Mrs. F had re peate dly used fa l s e allegations “in an eff ort to torment Father a

nd use the c hildren as pa

wns in the parties’ ong oing conflict,” and that her behavior was “ in complete disreg ard f or the be st interest of the minor c h i ldren.” The trial c ourt fou ndth at M rs. F “wi ll say or d o an y th in g to des tr oy th e mi no r chil dren ’s rela ti on sh ip wi th [ Mr. F] fo r h e r o wn

se lf ish g a in. ” Th e c ourt a lso a dd re sse d the fa c t th a t Mr s. F sim ply int ro du c e d M r. S to A.N.F

. as her biologica l fathe r, “shattering the child’s understanding of her relationship wit h [Mr. F] and introdu ci n g h er t o a man she never knew.” On this subject, the cour t’s finding s were as fo llo ws : The Court finds that [Mrs. F’s] actions wer e intended sole ly to hurt [Mr. F] and further her c hance s of g aining custody of t he children at t rial. [ Mrs. F] did not offer
any e vid e nc e of se c ur ing c ouns e lin g fo r the c hil d c on c e rn ing thi s r e ve latio n, no r d id she appear to consider the e motional ramifications that such life -alter ing inf ormation would have on suc h a young child. The Court finds that [Mrs. F] wil l stop at nothing to ensure that the ch i l d ren a re not a llowed to have a

healthy , peac eful, a

nd loving relationship wit h [Mr. F], and that such behavior is not in the b es t i n t erest of the chil dr e nan d

r e p r e s e n ts a

mate r ia l c h an g e in

c ir c u ms ta

n c e s u c hth a t t

h e p rese nt custody order of this court shoul d be modi fied to restric t the visitation and/or custody ri g h ts o f [M r s

. F ]. T h e Co u rt f urth e r f in d s th a t s u c h intr o d

u c ti o n e n d ang ere d the-30-

e mot ion a l w e ll- be ingof

the min or c hil d, and

de mon str a te s [Mrs. F ’s ] g ro ss i na bil ity to c on te mpl a te the c hil dr e n’ s bes t inte re sts wh e n it c ome s to the ir re latio ns hip wi th [M r

. F ].

. . . . I n essenc e, [Mrs. F] i s s o chil dish and shows such a disre g ard f or the minor children’ s welfa

re that she is willing to use the mi nor children as a pa wn to g et her way and hurt [Mr. F]. This is ce rtainly not behavior which fa cilitates or enc ourag es a strongrelationship between a pare nt and child.

I n sum, the court found that M rs . F’ s “collec tive bad beha vior” since the final de cre e of divorc e c on sti tut e d a

mate ri a l c ha

ng e in c ir c ums tanc e s. B a se d u po n th is f ind ing , th e c ourt or de re d that Mr s. F ’s vis itatio n be su

pe rv ise d at al l time s by “ a ne utr a l thir d part y mut ua lly a g re e a

ble to t he pa rt ie s, or in the eve nt the parties c annot ag ree by [bl ank].”

We rec og nize that accusations of child sex ual abuse by one par ent ag ainst the other pa rent prese nt one of the most difficult issues fa ced by a trial c ourt. Ke isl

ing v . Ke isl ing , 196 S.W .3d 703, 722 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Alleg ations of abuse provoke strongrea ctions to condemn the a lleg ed perpe trator a

nd to protect the child, and this desire to prote ct the child may lead many

well-motivated persons to presume that the allegations are true unti l proved otherwise. Gui ll v . Ca rr , No. 56-195R2, 1 9 9 3 W L4 7 6 9 9 1 , at * 4 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. M

. S

. No v
. 1 7 , 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Cra b tr e e v

. Crabtree , 716 S.W .2d 923, 926 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p

. 1986)). Suspicions of such a buse must be taken se riously and investigated thoroug hly , for t h e co n s equenc es to the child of a llowing a ny abuse to c ontinue are g rave

. Ke isl

ing , 19 6 S.W. 3d a t 72 2. “ Ho we ve r, mis take nly c on c lud ing that a pa re nt h a s a bu se d h is child, when in fa ct there has bee n no abuse, ha s serio us conseque nces a s well, including the almost-cer

tain destruction of the parent-child relationship and disgr ace to the acc used par ent.” Id. Sex ual abuse alleg ations “have proved to be a potent adver sarial wea pon whether

substantiated or not, and re g rettably

parties ha

ve abuse d the alleg ation itself by falsely acc using their estra

ng ed or former spouses in order

to ga in some tactica l advantag e.” Gui ll , 1993 WL 476991, at *4. Ther efor e,

“ any c on c e rn a bo ut r e po rt inga lle g a tio ns of c hil d se xua l a

bu se mus t be ba lanc e d w iththe awa re ne ss that f a lse a c c us a tio ns of

su c h a bu se c an b e a

‘r e pr e he ns ibl e too l’ a g a ins t an e x-sp ou se , r e mark a ble for its ‘bruta l effe ctiveness.’ ” Ke isl ing , 1 9 6 S. W. 3 d a t 7 2 2

. H ar m c an r e s u lt to a child “w hen a pare nt’s natura l and expected pr otectivene ss reg ardingth e p ro s p ec t of sexual abuse by the other pare nt goe s bey ond rea son, becomingobsessive hy p er v i gi l an ce.” Id. a t 72 3. I f t he pa re nt i s permitted to continue such c onduct, “the c onsequenc e ca n be lasting psy cholog ical dama g e to the child and the de struction o f a norma l pare nt-child relationship.” Id. (c i t i n g B.M.M. v . P.R.M. , M2002-02242-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 1853418 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 18, 2004)).

I n th is c a se , w e sy

mpathi ze w ith the tr ia l c ourt and re c og nize its fr us tr atio n in d e a lin g wi th the troubling situation Mrs. F needle ssly cre ated. Be cause of Mrs. F ’s fa lse alleg ations ag ainst Mr. F , h e wa s limit e d to supe rv ise d visi tatio n w ithon e or bo th o f t he c hil dr e n f

or jus t ov e r a

y e ar whil e the investig ations were pending . As discussed above , we ag ree with the t rial court’s conclusion that Mrs. F’ s beha

v io r c o n s titutes a material c hang e in circ umstances that justified re ducingher pa renting time with the children. Ne verthe less, we c onclude that the circumstanc es of this ca se do not justify-31-

a fur ther re striction on Mrs. F’ s visitation re quiring supervision at all times. Custody and visitation decisions ar e diffic ult, but “[r]ather t han calling for heavy handed, a

uthoritarian inter

vention, they require trial courts to exercise compassionate and prac tical j udg ment to devise an a rra ng ement that will promote the continuation and development of t he child’s relationship with both parents.” Wix
v . W ix , No. M2000-00230-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 2197 0 0 , at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar . 7, 2001) (c itatio ns omi tte d) . Cu sto dy and vis itatio n d e c isi on s are no t int e nd e d to r e wa rd or punis h p are nts , and visitation should not be g rante d or withheld for punitive purpose s. Id. ; se e als o Ma sse y-H olt
v . Ho lt , 255 S.W .3d 603, 610-11 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2007)

. Her e, the burden of secur ing supe rvision at all times by

“a ne utral third par

ty m u t u al ly

ag ree able to the pa

rties” would be difficult to bear consideringthat Mrs. F w as aw arde d overnig ht visit ation with the children e v er y other we ekend. We note that Mrs. F’ s motion t o alter or amend a ll ege dthat the par ties were unable to agree on a su ita ble pa rt y to s up e rv ise he r v isi tatio n b e c a us e Mr . F wo uld

no t a pp ro ve of su pe rv isi on by Mr s. F’ s p ar en t s

. T h er e i s n o s u gges t i o nt h at M rs

. F w o u l d p h y s i ca l l y

h armt h e c h i l dre n , an d

al t h o u gh
we a g ree with the trial court that Mrs. F was not ac ting in the be st interest of the c hildren by
re pe a te dly

lyinga bo ut M r. F and ke e pin g the c hil dr e n fr om him , it a pp e ars that th e re are le ss d ra sti c alternatives to controlling he r beha vior than re quiring supervised visitation. We sincere ly hope that the new pare nting plan’s reduc tion in Mrs. F’ s visitation will signa l to Mrs. F t h at co n t inued i n t er fe re nces w ith Mr. F’s r ights unde r the pa rentingplan may

result in further

restric tions on her pa re nti ngtim e . A lte rn a tiv e ly , M r. F ha s the op tio n of inv ok ingthe tr ia l c ourt ’s c on te mpt po we rs if Mrs. F willfull y fails t o comply with the parenting plan. The first paragraph of the new pa

renting pla n p ro vid e s, in e mph a size d la ngua g e , th a t bo th p are nts “ wi ll b e have wi th e a c h oth e r a nd e a c h c hil d
s o as t o p r o v i d e a l o v i n g, s t ab l e, co n s i s t en tan d nurturi n g re l at i o n s h i p wi thth e c h i l d ev en th o u gh they are divorce d. They will not speak badly of each other or the membe rs of the f

amily of the other pa re nt. Th e y

wi ll e nc oura g e e a c h c hil d to c on tin ue to lov e the oth e r pa

re nt a nd be c omf or ta ble in b o th f ami li e s

. ” B o th

p arti e s ar e g iv e nth e r igh t “ to b e f r e e o f un w ar r an te d d e r o g a to r y r e ma r k s

. ” We would advise Mrs. F to comply with these provisions and beha ve in a manne r consistent with the
c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re st, wh ic h me ans fa c ili tatin g and e nc oura g ingthe c hil dr e n’ s r e latio ns hip wi th Mr. F. I f she doe s not, the trial court c an and should take further action to addr ess the situation.

I n conclusion, we aff

irm the trial court’s finding that a material chang e in circumstances ha d
occur red to j u s t i fy re d u cingMrs. F’ s pare nting time as pr ovided in the new pa rentingplan. Howeve r, we modify

the par en ting plan to include the af oreme ntioned provisions reg arding Chr istma s and

Spr ing va c a tio n, and we re mov e the re qu ir e me nt t hat Mr s. F ’s pa

re nti ngtim e mus t be super vised.

D. Attorn ey’ s fee s
Mrs. F c ontends that she should be a war ded the attorney ’s fee s she incurre d in the trial court and on appeal pursua

nt to Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 36-5-103 be cause this case involves child custody

. The statute vests discretionar y authority in the court to a war d such fee s in cu s tody
case s. Shofn er v. Shofner , 181 S.W .3d 703, 719 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). “ In deter mining whe ther
an awa rd for attorney ’s fe es is war

rante d, we should consider , amongother fa ctors, the a bility of the reque sting pa

rty to pay his or her own attorney ’s fee s, the reque sting party ’s succe ss on appea l, and-32-

whether the reque sting pa rty has bee n actingin good f

aith.” Id. (c i t i n g Parchman v. Parchman , No. W2003-01204-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2609198, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov.17, 2004)) . We review the trial cour

t’s decision using the less s t ri n gen t “abuse of discre tion” standard of revie w. Richardson v. Spanos , 189 S.W. 3d 72 0, 72 9 (T e nn . Ct. App . 200 5) . In th is c a se , w e fi nd no a bu se of the tr ia l c ourt ’s dis c re tio n in de c lin ing to a wa rd Mr s. F he r atto rn e y ’s fe e s, and we fi nd it e qu ita ble to d e c lin e to a

wa rd Mr s. F a tto rn e y ’s fe e s o n a pp e a l.

V. C ONCL US I ON
F or the a fo re me nti on e d re a so ns , we a ff ir m the de c isi on of the tr ia l c ourt a s mo dif ie d. Cos ts of the a ppeal in the paternity

case are taxed to the appellants, Mrs. F and Mr. S, and their surety , for wh ic h exec uti on may iss ue if ne c e ssa ry

. Cos ts of the a

pp e a l in the c us tod

y c a se are ta xed

to M rs

. F, a nd her sur ety , for whic h execution may issue if nec essar

y
.

___________________________________ ALANE. HI GH ERS , P. J., W.S

.