United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-51170

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Stuart Kyle Mayfield, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:19-CR-173-2

Before Haynes, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Stuart Kyle Mayfield appeals his sentence of 57 months of 

imprisonment following his guilty plea conviction of possession of a firearm 

by a felon. He contends that the district court erred by (1) applying the twolevel enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) for possession of three 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 7, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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firearms and the four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for 

possession of any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony 

offense. This court reviews the district court’s “application of the 

Guidelines de novo and [its] factual findings—along with the reasonable 

inferences drawn from those facts—for clear error.” United States v. 

Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2013). “A factual finding is not clearly 

erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Mayfield lived in a home with his girlfriend, Brandi Moore, where they 

shared a bedroom. Mayfield argues that the § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) enhancement 

is inappropriate because his constructive possession over the two additional 

firearms found in that bedroom was never established. When determining 

how many firearms were involved in an offense, the district court should 

include all “firearms that were unlawfully sought to be obtained, unlawfully

possessed, or unlawfully distributed[.]” § 2K2.1, comment. (n.5). 

“Possession of a firearm may be actual or constructive.” United States v. 

Hagman, 740 F.3d 1044, 1048 (5th Cir. 2014). “In cases of joint occupancy, 

this court will find constructive possession only when there is some evidence 

supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of 

and access to the illegal item.” United States v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 419 (5th 

Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have 

recognized that determination of constructive possession is fact-specific and 

requires application of commonsense. Id. 

Here, a commonsense, fact-based approach supports the conclusion 

that Mayfield had constructive possession over the two additional firearms. 

The two firearms were located in a cabinet in his bedroom that he shared with 

his girlfriend, a room that he likely utilized on a daily basis and the contents 

of which were unlikely to have escaped his knowledge. See United States v. 

Smith, 591 F.2d 1105, 1107 (5th Cir. 1979) (firearms located in the drawer of 

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a nightstand in the bedroom he shared with his wife). While the firearms were 

located in a cabinet in the bedroom (and, therefore, not visible to a passing 

stranger), there is nothing in the record that suggests the firearms were 

inaccessible or hidden from Mayfield’s view were he to open the cabinet or 

evidence specifically showing that Mayfield’s girlfriend was the owner of the 

firearms (unlike a rifle which she contended was hers). Cf. United States v. 

Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 348-49. Furthermore, the firearms were located in 

close proximity to 37 grams of methamphetamine, a distributable amount, as 

well as methamphetamine distribution supplies. Mayfield does not deny 

knowledge of the methamphetamine and distribution supplies. In cases of 

drug distribution, a firearm in close proximity to a quantity of drugs supports 

the reasonable inference that possession of the firearm was to protect the 

drugs kept. United States v. Condren, 18 F.3d 1190, 1198-200 (5th Cir. 1994). 

Thus, it is plausible that Mayfield had knowledge of and access to the 

firearms that were located in his bedroom. See Meza, 701 F.3d at 419. As a 

result, the application of § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) was not clearly erroneous. See 

Alcantar, 733 F.3d at 146.

Mayfield further argues that because he did not constructively possess 

the firearms found in the bedroom that were in close proximity to drugs, the 

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement does not apply. However, because the 

district court did not clearly err in determining that Mayfield had 

constructive possession of the two firearms found in his bedroom, Mayfield’s 

argument fails. The methamphetamine and distribution supplies were in 

close proximity to the firearms because they were found in the same 

bedroom. See Alcantar, 733 F.3d at 147-48. Thus, application of

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) was not clearly erroneous. See § 2K2.1, comment. 

(nn.14(B)(ii), (C)); Alcantar, 733 F.3d at 146; United States v. Jeffries, 587 

F.3d 690, 692-93 (5th Cir. 2009).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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