Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2444 | May 21, 2019 Page 1 of 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Terrence Paschall

New Castle, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Frances Barrow 

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Terrence Paschall,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent

May 21, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-MI-2444

Appeal from the Henry Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

33C02-1801-MI-42

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2444 | May 21, 2019 Page 2 of 4

[1] Terrence Paschall appeals from the denial of his petition for declaratory 

judgment and preliminary injunction. Finding no error, we affirm.

[2] In May 2012, Paschall pleaded guilty to rape. He was sentenced to serve 

twenty years and is currently incarcerated at the New Castle Correctional 

Facility, with an earliest possible release date of December 14, 2019.

[3] In June 2018, Paschall filed a petition asking the trial court to order that, upon 

release from incarceration, he (1) would not be designated as a sexually violent 

predator; (2) would not have to register as a sex offender through the Indiana 

Sex Offender Management and Monitoring program (INSOMM); and 

(3) would not have to abide by parole conditions restricting his movements and 

residency. On August 27, 2018, the trial court denied Paschall’s petition, 

finding that it was not ripe because he was still incarcerated. Paschall now 

appeals.

[4] Paschall’s petition refers to Indiana Code section 11-8-8-22, which provides a 

process for offenders to file a petition to remove a designation or to register 

under less restrictive conditions. We will reverse a trial court’s ruling under this 

statute only if it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and inferences 

supporting the petition for relief. Lucas v. McDonald, 954 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2011). Paschall also requested declaratory and injunctive relief. 

Because the trial court denied his request, he is appealing from a negative 

judgment. Mann v. Johnson Mem’l Hosp., 611 N.E.2d 676, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1993). We will reverse a negative judgment only if it is contrary to law, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2444 | May 21, 2019 Page 3 of 4

meaning that “the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences to 

be drawn therefrom lead to but one result and the trial court has reached a 

different result.” Id.

[5] Initially, we note that Paschall has raised multiple arguments for the first time 

on appeal, including: (1) a sentencing argument under Indiana Appellate Rule 

7(B); (2) a separation of powers argument; (3) an argument related to the 

statutory authority of the Parole Board; (4) an argument about the 

constitutionality of two statutes; (5) an argument about the breadth and 

specificity of certain parole conditions; and (6) an Eighth Amendment 

argument. He has waived all of these issues by failing to raise them below, and 

we will not address them. E.g., Mid-States Gen. & Mech. Contracting Corp. v. Town 

of Goodland, 811 N.E.2d 425, 436 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

[6] With respect to Paschall’s argument that he should not have to register as a sex 

offender under INSOMM and participate with that program, we agree with the 

trial court that this issue is not ripe for review. He is still incarcerated and is not 

participating in INSOMM. Moreover, even if we were to attempt to address 

the substance of this argument, he fails to explain how participating in 

INSOMM violates any of his statutory or constitutional rights. Under these 

circumstances, the trial court did not err by ruling against him.

[7] Likewise, with respect to Paschall’s argument that he should not have to 

comply with certain restrictive parole conditions, including being designated as 

a sexually violent predator, we can only find that this claim is not ripe for 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2444 | May 21, 2019 Page 4 of 4

review. As he is still incarcerated at this time, we do not know what parole 

conditions will be imposed upon him and any review would be purely 

hypothetical. In other words, there is no evidence that he has been subjected to 

any parole conditions that reflect a particular sex offender status, registry 

requirement, or restriction on his activities and residency. Therefore, the trial 

court did not err by ruling against him. See Gardner v. State, 923 N.E.2d 959, 

960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that an ex post facto challenge to application 

of the violent offender registry was not ripe for review while the petitioner was 

still incarcerated). 

[8] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.