NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DONNA M. BARBER,

AKA SAMUEL'S ENVI~ON INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5131

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00511-LB, Judge Lawrence J. 

Block.

______________________ 

Decided: February 8, 2016

______________________ 

 DONNA M. BARBER, Johnstown, PA, pro se.

 ANTONIA RAMOS SOARES, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR., ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., BENJAMIN C. MIZER. 

______________________ 
2 BARBER v. US

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Donna M. Barber appeals the final judgment of the 

United States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”)

dismissing her case for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

In May 2015, Ms. Barber filed a complaint in the

Claims Court alleging violations of a number of federal 

statutes, including the Tucker Act. She alleged that 

Pennsylvania state officials engaged in a variety of illegal 

acts, including unlawful imprisonment, slander, bullying, 

harassment, and oppression, among other allegations. 

The Claims Court sua sponte dismissed Ms. Barber’s 

action after concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear 

her claims. The Claims Court determined that Ms. Barber had failed to identify any money-mandating source of 

law to serve as a basis for Tucker Act jurisdiction. The 

Claims Court further concluded that, although Ms. Barber had named the United States General Services Administration as a co-defendant, none of the allegations 

made by Ms. Barber properly implicated any United 

States official. Ms. Barber now appeals to this court. 

DISCUSSION

We review the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Kam-Almaz v. 

United States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

Because Ms. Barber is a pro se litigant, we hold her filings 

to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 

by lawyers.” See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 

(1972). However, even a pro se litigant “bears the burden 

of proving that the Court of Federal Claims possessed 
BARBER v. US 3

jurisdiction over [her] complaint.” Sanders v. United 

States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

The Claims Court derives its jurisdiction from the 

Tucker Act, which gives the court “jurisdiction to render 

judgment upon any claim against the United States 

founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or 

upon any express or implied contract with the United 

States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases 

not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Khan v. 

United States, 201 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

The Tucker Act is “only a jurisdictional statute; it 

does not create any substantive right enforceable against 

the United States for money damages.” United States v. 

Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). “Instead, to invoke 

jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify a contractual relationship, constitutional provision, 

statute, or regulation that provides a substantive right to 

money damages.” Khan, 201 F.3d at 1377. Thus, a 

Tucker Act plaintiff “must assert a claim under a separate 

money-mandating constitutional provision, statute, or 

regulation, the violation of which supports a claim for 

damages against the United States.” James v. Caldera,

159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

We conclude that the Claims Court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Ms. Barber’s appeal. 

In her complaint, Ms. Barber asserted diversity jurisdiction as the basis for the Claims Court’s jurisdiction over 

her claims. But as stated above, the Claims Court’s 

jurisdiction is defined by statute to extend only to claims 

for monetary damages against the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Diversity jurisdiction thus does not 

provide a basis for jurisdiction in the Claims Court. See 

Dyck v. Albertelli Law, 98 Fed. Cl. 624, 627 (2011). 
4 BARBER v. US

On appeal, Ms. Barber argues that the Claims Court 

erred in failing to consider all of the facts, but she has not 

identified any particular facts that were not considered. 

She also contends that the Claims Court applied the 

wrong law and asserts that the correct law is “state law in 

[her] original filing” and other “suited laws . . . outlined” 

by the parties. See Appellant’s Informal Br. 1. None of 

the Federal statutes that Ms. Barber cites in her complaint, however, are “money-mandating” sources of law, 

as required for jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. Ms. 

Barber’s claims for harassment and slander sound in tort, 

and the Tucker Act specifically excludes tort claims from

the Claims Court’s jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); 

Phu Mang Phang v. United States, 388 F. App’x 961, 963 

(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The Tucker Act expressly excludes from 

the Claims Court’s jurisdiction tort claims against the 

government.”). Ms. Barber’s unlawful imprisonment 

claim also does not establish jurisdiction because recovery 

in the Claims Court for false imprisonment requires a 

conviction and subsequent reversal or pardon, 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1495, 2513, and Ms. Barber has not indicated that 

either has occurred. Because Ms. Barber has not identified any money-mandating source of law to serve as a 

basis for Tucker Act jurisdiction, the Claims Court 

properly dismissed her appeal.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board’s decision.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear their own costs.