NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

RICHARD FELIX BARRIGA, II, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0348

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2009-150342-001

The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Terry M. Crist, III

Counsel for Appellee

DeBrigida Law Offices, P.L.L.C., Glendale

By Ronald M. DeBrigida, Jr.

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. BARRIGA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Richard Felix Barriga, II (“Appellant”) appeals his conviction 

for intentional or knowing child abuse under circumstances other than

those likely to produce death or serious injury. Appellant argues the trial 

court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict1 because the State 

presented insufficient evidence that he acted “intentionally or knowingly.”

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

¶2 In October 2010, a grand jury issued an indictment, charging 

Appellant with intentionally or knowingly causing his infant son, C.B., to 

suffer physical injury or abuse under circumstances other than those likely 

to produce death or serious physical injury, a class four felony and domestic 

violence offense. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) §§ 13-3601, -3623(B)(1).

3 The 

case proceeded to trial, and at the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, 

Appellant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion. 

Following a seven-day bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty and 

placed Appellant on probation for a term of three years. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).

ANALYSIS

¶3 We review de novo the denial of a Rule 20 motion. State v. 

Parker, 231 Ariz. 391, 407, ¶ 69, 296 P.3d 54, 70 (2013). A judgment of 

 

1 See Ariz. R. Crim. P. (“Rule”) 20 (“Judgment of Acquittal”).

2 In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we view the 

facts and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdict. See State v. Girdler, 138 Ariz. 482, 488, 675 P.2d 1301, 1307 (1983).

3 We cite the current version of the statutes because no revisions 

material to our decision have occurred since the date of the offense.
STATE v. BARRIGA

Decision of the Court

3

acquittal is appropriate only when there is no substantial evidence to 

support the conviction. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a); State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 

138, 865 P.2d 792, 799 (1993). Evidence is substantial if it could be accepted 

by any rational trier of fact as sufficient to support the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 16, 

250 P.3d 1188, 1191 (2011) (citations omitted).

¶4 To convict Appellant of child abuse under A.R.S. § 13-

3623(B)(1), the State was required to prove that, (1) under circumstances 

other than those likely to produce death or serious physical injury, (2) 

Appellant intentionally or knowingly (3) caused C.B. to suffer physical 

injury or abuse. Appellant concedes the State met its burden with regard 

to parts (1) and (3), but argues the State’s evidence as to part (2) is 

“unsubstantial” because the State presented “no direct evidence that 

[Appellant] inflicted the injury.”

¶5 Appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in relying on 

circumstantial evidence is unavailing. “Both direct and circumstantial 

evidence should be considered in determining whether substantial 

evidence supports a conviction.” West, 226 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 16, 250 P.3d at 

1191 (citation omitted). The mere existence of plausible alternatives is 

insufficient to overturn a trier of fact’s findings. See generally Parker, 231 

Ariz. at 407-08, ¶¶ 70-73, 296 P.3d at 70-71; West, 226 Ariz. at 563, ¶ 18, 250 

P.3d at 1192. If reasonable minds could disagree as to the inferences that 

could be drawn from the facts, a directed verdict of acquittal is improper. 

West, 226 Ariz. at 563, ¶ 18, 250 P.3d at 1192 (citations omitted).

¶6 At trial, the State presented the testimony of several 

witnesses, including C.B.’s treating medical providers, indicating the 

injuries sustained by C.B. were non-accidental. The State also presented a 

medical professional who had evaluated C.B. and testified to a degree of 

medical certainty that C.B.’s injuries were the result of acute “abusive 

trauma.” C.B.’s mother and half-sibling each testified that Appellant had 

care and custody of C.B. during the time the injuries likely occurred -– the 

evening when C.B. displayed intense crying, chest popping, and vomiting.

In his defense, Appellant argued the testimony provided was inconclusive

as to the time the actual injuries occurred, and other potential perpetrators 

had motive and opportunity to inflict C.B.’s injuries. The court rejected 

Appellant’s defense. See State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 555, 556-57, 521 P.2d 987, 

988-89 (1974) (recognizing it is the trier of fact’s exclusive role to weigh the 

credibility of testimony). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to sustaining the verdict, we conclude the State presented substantial 

evidence to survive a motion for a directed verdict.
STATE v. BARRIGA

Decision of the Court

4

CONCLUSION

¶7 We affirm Appellant’s conviction.