* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 01-31449

_____________________

OSCAR DANTLZER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

THE CITY OF HAMMOND, LOUISIANA, ETC; ET AL 

Defendants,

THE CITY OF HAMMOND, LOUISIANA, a political subdivision of the

State of Louisiana

Defendant-Appellee.

__________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 00-CV-446-F

_________________________________________________________________

November 15, 2002

Before KING, Chief Judge, JOLLY, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Oscar Dantzler appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of the City of Hammond, Louisiana on his

Title VII and § 1983 claims of race discrimination. After

reviewing the evidence before the district court in the light most

favorable to Mr. Dantzler, we find that he has not established a

genuine issue of material fact with respect to any of his claims of
2

discrimination. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant

of summary judgment. 

Oscar Dantzler was employed by the Hammond Police Department

for two years. His employment history reflects numerous

disciplinary reports and disputes with his supervisors, which he

alleges demonstrate a pattern of racial discrimination. Plaintiff

filed two complaints with the EEOC. After he was terminated for

insubordination arising from allegations that he was twice found

sleeping while on duty, he brought suit in federal district court

alleging hostile work environment, discriminatory and retaliatory

discharge in violation of Title VII and § 1983. 

Relying on the 180-day limitations period in 42 U.S.C. §

2005(e)(1), the district court restricted its consideration to

evidence of alleged discrimination occurring between June 6 and

December 9, 1997, the date of his first EEOC complaint. Proceeding

to analyze Dantzler’s claim of discriminatory discharge under

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the district

court held that he could not establish a prima facie case of

discrimination on the basis of race, because his evidence was

“speculative, vague, generalized, lacking in detail concerning any

specific dates or incidence, self-serving and contradictory.” (Op.

18). Apart from disciplinary reports allegedly motived by race

discrimination, Dantzler alleged he was denied training and

vacation time, supporting these assertions with his own and another
3

officer’s general allegations of discrimination. The district

granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed

Dantzler’s claims with prejudice. 

Dantlzer urges this Court to review evidence of alleged

discrimination outside the 180-day period either as actionable

discrimination under a continuing violation theory, or as evidence

supporting his theory of actionable discrimination within the time

period. He presented no credible evidence that he should be

entitled to the continuing violation theory. This Court reviews

grants of summary judgment de novo. Celestine v. Petroleos de

Venezuella, S.A., 266 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir.2001). Even

considering the evidence that was allegedly erroneously excluded by

the district court, Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th

Cir. 2002), we find no genuine issue of material fact on his claim

of hostile work environment. He is unable to establish any

inference of intentional discrimination or ongoing harassment.

Price v. Federal Exp. Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 721 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002).

His subjective impression that he was being subjected to a hostile

work environment is inadequate to survive summary judgment.

Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 241 (5th Cir. 1998).

Dantzler also fails to establish a genuine fact issue in his

claim of discriminatory discharge. To survive summary judgment,

Dantlzer must show (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he

was qualified for the position, (3) he was dismissed, and (4) he
4

was replaced by an individual of a different race. Byers v. Dallas

Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2000). The

evidence indicates that he was replaced by an African-American

police officer. He therefore fails to satisfy the fourth element

of his prima facie case. Further, the City offered a legitimate

non-discriminatory reason for his discharge - insubordination -

which Dantzler has failed to rebut by establishing that the reason

was false and pretext for intentional discrimination. Lawrence v.

Univ. of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, 163 F.3d 309, 312-13

(5th Cir. 1999). 

Finally, Danztler cannot establish a genuine issue of material

fact on his claim of retaliatory discharge. He fails to establish

the required causal link between protected activity and the adverse

employment action. LaDay v. Catalyst Technology, Inc., 302 F.3d

474, 483 (5th Cir. 2002).

For these reasons, the decision of the district court granting

summary judgment for the defendants and dismissing Dantzler’s

claims with prejudice is

AFFIRMED.