2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-31-2011

Laura Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 10-3178

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Laura Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 568.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/568
PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-3178

___________

LAURA SYMCZYK, an individual,

on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,

 Appellant

v.

GENESIS HEALTHCARE CORPORATION;

ELDERCARE RESOURCES CORPORATION

d/b/a GENESIS ELDERCARE

_______________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-05782

(Honorable Michael M. Baylson)

______________

Argued March 7, 2011

Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO and VANASKIE,

Circuit Judges.

(Filed: August 31, 2011)
2

GARY F. LYNCH, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)

Carlson Lynch

36 North Jefferson Street

P.O. Box 7635

New Castle, Pennsylvania 16107

GERALD D. WELLS, III, ESQUIRE

Faruqi & Faruqi

101 Greenwood Avenue, Suite 600

Jenkintown, Pennsylvania 19046

Attorneys for Appellant

JAMES N. BOUDREAU, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)

CHRISTINA TELLADO-WINSTON, ESQUIRE

Greenberg Traurig

2700 Two Commerce Square

2001 Market Street

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103

MICHELE H. MALLOY, ESQUIRE

Littler Mendelson

Three Parkway, Suite 1400

1601 Cherry Street

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102

Attorneys for Appellees

_________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_________________

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
3

Laura Symczyk sought relief under the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 216(b), on 

behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. The District 

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed 

Symczyk‟s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

after defendants Genesis HealthCare Corporation and 

ElderCare Resources Corporation extended an offer of 

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 in full satisfaction of her 

alleged damages, fees, and costs. At issue in this case is 

whether a collective action brought under § 216(b) of the 

FLSA becomes moot when, prior to moving for “conditional 

certification” and prior to any other plaintiff opting in to the 

suit, the putative representative receives a Rule 68 offer. We 

will reverse and remand.

I.

From April 2007 through December 2007, Symczyk 

was employed by defendants as a Registered Nurse at 

Pennypack Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On 

December 4, 2009, Symczyk initiated a collective action

under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of herself and all 

similarly situated individuals, alleging defendants violated the 

FLSA when they implemented a policy subjecting the pay of 

certain employees to an automatic meal break deduction 

whether or not they performed compensable work during 

their breaks.1 On February 18, 2010, defendants filed an 

 

1

Symczyk‟s amended complaint identified those “similarly 

situated” as

All persons employed within the three years 

preceding the filing of this action by Defendants 

. . . , whose pay was subject to an automatic 30 

minute meal period deduction even when they 
4

answer to Symczyk‟s complaint and served her with an offer 

of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 in the amount of 

“$7,500.00 in alleged unpaid wages, plus attorneys‟ fees, 

costs and expenses as determined by the Court.”

2

Symczyk 

 

performed compensable work during the unpaid 

“meal break” . . . .

These persons include, but are not limited to, 

secretaries, housekeepers, custodians, clerks, 

porters, registered nurses, licensed practical 

nurses, nurses‟ aides, administrative assistants, 

anesthetists, clinicians, medical coders, medical 

underwriters, nurse case managers, nurse 

interns, nurse practitioners, practice supervisors, 

professional staff nurses, quality coordinators, 

resource pool nurses, respiratory therapists, 

senior research associates, operating room 

coordinators, surgical specialists, admissions 

officers, student nurse technicians, trainers, and 

transcriptionists employed at any of 

Defendants‟ facilities during the three years 

preceding the filing of this action.

2

In part, Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 provides: 

(a) At least 14 days before the date set for trial, 

a party defending against a claim may serve on 

an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on 

specified terms, with the costs then accrued. If, 

within 14 days after being served, the opposing 

party serves written notice accepting the offer, 

either party may then file the offer and notice of 

acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk 

must then enter judgment.
5

did not dispute the adequacy of defendants‟ offer but 

nevertheless declined to respond.

The District Court—unaware of the offer of 

judgment—held a Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 scheduling conference

on March 8, 2010. Two days later, the court entered a 

scheduling order providing for “an initial ninety (90) day 

discovery period, at the close of which [Symczyk] will move 

for conditional certification under § 216(b) of the FLSA.” 

Following the court‟s ruling on certification, the parties were 

to have “an additional six (6) month discovery period, to 

commence at the close of any Court-ordered opt-in window.”

On March 23, 2010, defendants filed a motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(1), contending that, because Symczyk had 

effectively rejected their Rule 68 offer of judgment, see Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 68(a) (providing a plaintiff with 14 days to accept 

an offer), she “no longer ha[d] a personal stake or legally 

cognizable interest in the outcome of this action, a 

prerequisite to this Court‟s subject matter jurisdiction under 

Article III of the United States Constitution.” Symczyk 

objected, citing defendants‟ strategic attempt to “pick off” the

named plaintiff before the court could consider her

“certification” motion.

3

 

(b) An unaccepted offer is considered 

withdrawn, but it does not preclude a later offer. 

Evidence of an unaccepted offer is not 

admissible except in a proceeding to determine 

costs.

3 On March 29, 2010, defendants removed Symczyk‟s related 

state-court action to the United States District Court for the 
6

On May 19, 2010, the District Court “tentatively 

concluded” that defendants‟ Rule 68 offer mooted the 

collective action and that the action should be dismissed for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Symczyk v. Genesis 

HealthCare Corp., Civ. No. 09-5782, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 

49599, at *17 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2010). In its memorandum, 

the court explained:

Symczyk does not contend that other 

individuals have joined her collective action. 

Thus, this case, like each of the district court 

cases cited by Defendants, which concluded 

that a Rule 68 offer of judgment mooted the 

underlying FLSA collective action, involves a 

single named plaintiff. In addition, Symczyk 

does not contest Defendants‟ assertion that the 

Rule 68 offer of judgment fully satisfied her 

claims. . . . 

Id. at *16-17. The court instructed Symczyk to file a brief in 

support of continued federal jurisdiction on her state-law 

claims and her motion for class certification under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23 by June 10, 2010. Id. at *17. Symczyk did so but 

conceded she did not believe the court possessed an 

 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Thereafter, on April 13, 

2010, the parties jointly filed a proposed stipulated order 

providing Symczyk would voluntarily dismiss her related 

state-law action and amend her complaint in this action to 

include those state-law claims asserted in the related action. 

The District Court entered the parties‟ stipulated order on 

April 15, 2010, and Symczyk filed an amended 

class/collective action complaint on April 23, 2010. 
7

independent basis for jurisdiction over her state-law claims in 

the event her FLSA claim was dismissed. The District Court 

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

Symczyk‟s state-law claims in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(c) and dismissed those claims without prejudice. The 

court also dismissed Symczyk‟s FLSA claim with prejudice 

in accordance with its earlier memorandum. Symczyk timely 

appealed.4

II.

A.

Enacted in 1938, the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., 

was designed “to aid the unprotected, unorganized and lowest 

 

4

Prior to dismissing the action, the District Court had subject 

matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 

216(b). We exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the court‟s order granting 

defendants‟ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction is plenary. Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 

220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). Because defendants‟ 

motion to dismiss was based on facts outside the pleadings 

(i.e., their Rule 68 offer of judgment), the trial court was 

entitled to weigh and evaluate the evidence bearing on the 

jurisdictional dispute. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 

Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). This factual 

evaluation “may occur at any stage of the proceedings.” Id.

“When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 

12(b)(1), the plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion.” 

Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 

(3d Cir. 1991).
8

paid of the nation‟s working population; that is, those 

employees who lacked sufficient bargaining power to secure 

for themselves a minimum subsistence wage.” Brooklyn Sav. 

Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n.18 (1945). Under the 

“collective action” mechanism set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 

216(b), an employee alleging an FLSA violation may bring 

an action on “behalf of himself . . . and other employees 

similarly situated,” subject to the requirement that “[n]o 

employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless 

he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and 

such consent is filed in the court in which such action is 

brought.”

Prior to 1947, the FLSA permitted an aggrieved 

employee to “designate an agent or representative to maintain 

such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly 

situated.” Martino v. Mich. Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 

173, 175 n.1 (1946) (quoting Fair Labor Standards Act of 

1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 

(1938)). But in response to “excessive litigation spawned by 

plaintiffs lacking a personal interest in the outcome,” 

Congress amended the Act to eliminate “representative action 

by plaintiffs not themselves possessing claims.” Hoffmann-La 

Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989); see also

Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 

Stat. 84, 87 (1947). Further altering the collective action 

procedure in § 216(b), Congress inserted a requirement that 

similarly situated employees must affirmatively “opt in” to an 

ongoing FLSA suit by filing express, written consents in 

order to become party plaintiffs. See id.

In deciding whether a suit brought under § 216(b) may 

move forward as a collective action, courts typically employ a 

two-tiered analysis. During the initial phase, the court makes 
9

a preliminary determination whether the employees 

enumerated in the complaint can be provisionally categorized 

as similarly situated to the named plaintiff. If the plaintiff 

carries her burden at this threshold stage, the court will 

“conditionally certify” the collective action for the purposes 

of notice and pretrial discovery. In the absence of statutory 

guidance or appellate precedent on the proper definition of 

“similarly situated,” a divergence of authority has emerged on

the level of proof required at this stage. Some trial courts 

within our circuit have allowed a plaintiff to satisfy her 

burden simply by making a “substantial allegation” in her 

pleadings that she and the prospective party plaintiffs suffered 

from a single decision, plan or policy, but the majority of our 

circuit‟s trial courts have required the plaintiff to make a 

“modest factual showing” that the proposed recipients of optin notices are similarly situated. See Wright v. Lehigh Valley 

Hosp., Civ. No. 10-431, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 86915, at *7-

10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2010) (canvassing cases).

Under the “modest factual showing” standard, a 

plaintiff must produce some evidence, “beyond pure 

speculation,” of a factual nexus between the manner in which 

the employer‟s alleged policy affected her and the manner in 

which it affected other employees. See Smith v. Sovereign 

Bancorp, Inc., No. 03-2420, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 21010, at 

*10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2003). We believe the “modest factual 

showing” standard—which works in harmony with the opt-in 

requirement to cabin the potentially massive size of collective 

actions—best comports with congressional intent and with the 

Supreme Court‟s directive that a court “ascertain[ ] the 

contours of [a collective] action at the outset.” See Hoffman-
10

La Roche, 493 U.S. at 172.5 

 

5 Although this two-step approach is nowhere mandated, it 

appears to have garnered wide acceptance. And, while courts 

retain broad discretion in determining whether to 

“conditionally certify” a collective action, it is useful to 

prescribe a uniform evidentiary standard. Cf. In re Hydrogen 

Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316-20 (3d Cir. 2008) 

(outlining the guiding principles for a district court‟s 

discretionary evaluation of a class certification motion in the 

Rule 23 context).

This case illustrates how an uncertain standard may 

work to the detriment of § 216(b) plaintiffs. Here, the court—

unaware of defendants‟ Rule 68 offer—issued a case 

management order allotting Symczyk “an initial ninety (90) 

day discovery period” to compile evidence before she would 

be expected to move for “conditional certification.” Symczyk 

represents she considered the standard for “conditional 

certification” a “moving target in our circuit” and requested 

discovery in order to buttress the allegations in her pleadings 

with sufficient evidence to make a “meaningful motion” at 

this initial stage. Because defendants‟ Rule 68 offer preceded 

the commencement of this preliminary discovery period, 

however, Symczyk had no opportunity to gather such 

evidence before the court granted defendants‟ motion to 

dismiss. Had Symczyk been operating under the assumption 

that the court would employ the “substantial allegation” 

standard, she may have been prepared to move for 

“conditional certification” without conducting minimal 

discovery. And, had the court in fact facilitated notice to 

potential opt-ins based solely on the allegations in Symczyk‟s 

complaint, defendants‟ Rule 68 offer may not have antedated
11

After discovery, and with the benefit of “a much 

thicker record than it had at the notice stage,” a court 

following this approach then makes a conclusive

determination as to whether each plaintiff who has opted in to 

the collective action is in fact similarly situated to the named 

plaintiff. Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 

1233, 1261 (11th Cir. 2008). “This second stage is less 

lenient, and the plaintiff bears a heavier burden.” Id. Should 

the plaintiff satisfy her burden at this stage, the case may 

proceed to trial as a collective action.6

 

the arrival of a consent form from a party plaintiff, an 

occurrence that would have fundamentally transformed the 

court‟s mootness analysis. 

6 Because only the notice stage is implicated in this appeal, 

we need not directly address the level of proof required to 

satisfy the similarly situated requirement at the post-discovery 

stage. Although this standard must necessarily be more 

rigorous than the standard applicable at the notice stage, the 

fact-specific, flexible nature of this approach affords district 

judges latitude in exercising their discretion. See 45C Am.

Jur. 2d Job Discrimination § 2184 (2011) (listing fourteen 

factors courts may consider at the post-discovery stage). As 

we have explained:

A representative (but not exhaustive or 

mandatory) list of relevant factors [at this stage] 

includes whether the plaintiffs are employed in 

the same corporate department, division and 

location; advanced similar claims of . . . 

discrimination; sought substantially the same 

form of relief; and had similar salaries and 

circumstances of employment. Plaintiffs may 
12

Absent from the text of the FLSA is the concept of 

“class certification.” As the Eighth Circuit has noted, 

however, “[m]any courts and commentators . . . have used the 

vernacular of the Rule 23 class action for simplification and 

ease of understanding when discussing representative cases 

brought pursuant to § 16(b) of the FLSA.” Kelley v. Alamo,

964 F.2d 747, 748 n.1 (8th Cir. 1992). As a result, courts 

commonly refer to a plaintiff‟s satisfaction of her burden at 

the notice stage as resulting in “conditional certification,” see, 

e.g., Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 389 n.17 (3d Cir. 

2007), or “provisional certification,” see, e.g., Nash v. CVS 

Caremark Corp., 683 F. Supp. 2d 195, 199 (D.R.I. 2010). 

Similarly, the court‟s second-step analysis is traditionally

triggered by a defendant‟s motion to “decertify the class” on 

the ground that its proposed members are not similarly 

situated. See, e.g., Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 967 

(3d Cir. 1992). And, in the same fashion, a named plaintiff 

becomes a “class representative,” see, e.g., id. at 966, his 

attorney becomes “class counsel,” see, e.g., Harkins v. 

Riverboat Servs., Inc., 385 F.3d 1099, 1101 (7th Cir. 2004), 

and similarly situated employees become “potential class 

members,” see, e.g., In re Family Dollar FLSA Litig., 637 

F.3d 508, 518 (4th Cir. 2011).

Despite this judicial gloss on § 216(b), “the 

„certification‟ we refer to here is only the district court‟s 

exercise of [its] discretionary power, upheld in Hoffmann-La 

 

also be found dissimilar on the basis of case 

management issues, including individualized 

defenses.

Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 389 n.17 (3d Cir. 2007) 

(citations omitted).
13

Roche, to facilitate the sending of notice to potential class 

members,” and “is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 

existence of a representative action under FLSA.” Myers v. 

Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010); see also

Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1261 n.40 (“District courts following the 

two-step . . . approach should treat the initial decision to 

certify and the decision to notify potential collective action 

members as synonymous.”).7 Defendants here rely heavily on 

the superficiality of the similarities between the 

“certification” processes inherent in Rule 23 class actions and 

§ 216(b) collective actions in arguing Symczyk could not 

purport to “represent” the interests of similarly situated 

employees before anyone had opted in to the action. And, as 

noted, expedient adoption of Rule 23 terminology with no 

mooring in the statutory text of § 216(b) may have injected a 

measure of confusion into the wider body of FLSA 

jurisprudence. Although “conditional certification” may not 

vest a § 216(b) “class” with the independent legal status that 

certification provides a Rule 23 class, see Trotter v. Klincar, 

748 F.2d 1177, 1183 (7th Cir. 1984), this realization does not 

 

7

In Hoffmann-La Roche, the Supreme Court recognized the 

efficacy of § 216(b) hinges on “employees receiving accurate 

and timely notice concerning the pendency of the collective 

action, so that they can make informed decisions about 

whether to participate.” 493 U.S. at 170. To ensure this task 

“is accomplished in an efficient and proper way,” the Court 

interpreted § 216(b) as endowing district courts with “the 

requisite procedural authority to manage the process of 

joining multiple parties in a manner that is orderly, sensible, 

and not otherwise contrary to statutory commands or the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 170-71.
14

control our mootness analysis in the manner suggested by 

defendants. Provision of notice does not transform an FLSA 

suit into a “representative action,” but, as we will explain, its 

central place within the litigation scheme approved of by the 

Supreme Court in Hoffmann-La Roche necessarily shapes our 

approach to squaring Rule 68 and § 216(b).

B.

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the 

jurisdiction of the federal courts to “actual „Cases‟ and 

„Controversies.‟” Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 

554 U.S. 269, 298 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). “When 

the issues presented in a case are no longer „live‟ or the 

parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, the 

case becomes moot and the court no longer has subject matter 

jurisdiction.” Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 340 

(3d Cir. 2004). “An offer of complete relief will generally 

moot the plaintiff‟s claim, as at that point the plaintiff retains 

no personal interest in the outcome of the litigation.” Id.

Thus, whether or not the plaintiff accepts the offer, no 

justiciable controversy remains when a defendant tenders an 

offer of judgment under Rule 68 encompassing all the relief a 

plaintiff could potentially recover at trial. See Rand v. 

Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 1991). We have 

recognized, however, that conventional mootness principles 

do not fit neatly within the representative action paradigm. Cf. 

Lusardi, 975 F.2d at 974 (“[S]pecial mootness rules apply in 

the class action context, where the named plaintiff purports to 

represent an interest that extends beyond his own.”). 

Rule 68 was designed “to encourage settlement and 

avoid litigation.” Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985). In 

the representative action arena, however, Rule 68 can be 
15

manipulated to frustrate rather than to serve these salutary 

ends. Exploring this deviation from Rule 68‟s purposes, the 

Supreme Court has noted:

Requiring multiple plaintiffs to bring separate 

actions, which effectively could be „picked off‟ 

by a defendant‟s tender of judgment before an 

affirmative ruling on class certification could be 

obtained, obviously would frustrate the 

objectives of class actions; moreover it would 

invite waste of judicial resources by stimulating 

successive suits brought by others claiming 

aggrievement.

Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 

(1980); see also Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 

F.2d 1030, 1050 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (“By tendering 

to the named plaintiffs the full amount of their personal 

claims each time suit is brought as a class action, the 

defendants can in each successive case moot the named 

plaintiffs‟ claims before a decision on certification is 

reached.”). 

We addressed the tension between Rules 23 and 68 in 

Weiss. There, the named plaintiff filed a federal class action 

complaint alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and, prior to moving for 

class certification, received a Rule 68 offer of judgment in 

full satisfaction of the individual relief sought. The plaintiff 

rejected the offer, and the court granted the defendants‟

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss the complaint on mootness 

grounds. On appeal, we explored the applicability of the 

“relation back” doctrine to a scenario in which the 

defendants‟ “tactic of „picking off‟ lead plaintiffs with a Rule 
16

68 offer . . . may deprive a representative plaintiff the 

opportunity to timely bring a class certification motion, and 

also may deny the court a reasonable opportunity to rule on 

the motion.” 385 F.3d at 347. Finding application of the 

doctrine necessary to vindicate the policy aims inherent in 

Rule 23, we held that, “[a]bsent undue delay in filing a 

motion for class certification . . . where a defendant makes a 

Rule 68 offer to an individual claim that has the effect of 

mooting possible class relief asserted in the complaint, the 

appropriate course is to relate the certification motion back to 

the filing of the class complaint.” Id. at 348. As there had 

been no undue delay, we reversed and directed the district 

court to allow the plaintiff to file a class certification motion 

that would “relate back” to the filing of the complaint. Id.8

 

8

In Weiss, we noted that our opinion might be viewed as 

creating tension with Lusardi, which involved alleged 

violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 

(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. Section 7(b) of the ADEA

incorporates § 216(b) by reference. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). 

However, in distinguishing Lusardi, we did not rely on the 

differences between the procedures applicable to Rule 23 and 

§ 216(b) actions. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348-49. Instead, we 

explained that Lusardi, unlike Weiss, involved a voluntary 

settlement entered into by the named plaintiffs rather than “an 

offer of judgment made in response to the filing of a 

complaint.” Id. at 349. We wrote: 

In this appeal, the „picking off‟ scenarios 

described by the Supreme Court in Roper are 

directly implicated. In Lusardi they were not. . . 

. In Lusardi, no unilateral action by the 

Defendant rendered the plaintiffs‟ claims 
17

In essence, the relation back doctrine allows a district 

court to retain jurisdiction over a matter that would appear 

susceptible to dismissal on mootness grounds by virtue of the 

expiration of a named plaintiff‟s individual claims. In Sosna 

v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401 (1975), the Supreme Court found

federal court jurisdiction to adjudicate a live controversy 

between members of a certified Rule 23 class and a named 

defendant was not extinguished by the named plaintiff‟s 

claim becoming moot before the district court reached the 

merits of the case. Addressing the possibility that resolution 

of the controversy as to the named plaintiffs may occur 

“before the district court can reasonably be expected to rule 

on a certification motion,” the Court explained such 

certification “can be said to „relate back‟ to the filing of the 

complaint” when the issue might otherwise evade review. Id.

at 402 n.11; see also U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 

U.S. 388, 399 (1980) (preserving an Article III court‟s 

authority to review class certification issues when a named 

plaintiff‟s claims are “so inherently transitory that the trial 

court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for 

class certification before the proposed representative‟s 

individual interest expires”).

This equitable principle has evolved to account for 

calculated attempts by some defendants to short-circuit the 

 

„inherently transitory.‟ Defendants here used the 

Rule 68 offer to thwart the putative class action 

before the certification question could be 

decided.

Id. These considerations are not unique to the Rule 23 

context, and Weiss did not turn on the disparity between optin and opt-out actions.
18

class action process and to prevent a putative representative 

from reaching the certification stage. Certification vests a 

named plaintiff with a procedural right to act on behalf of the 

collective interests of the class that exists independent of his 

substantive claims. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399 (explaining 

that, once a class has been certified, the mooting of a class 

representative‟s individual claims does not invariably result in 

the mooting of the entire action because “the class of 

unnamed persons described in the certification acquire[s] a 

legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the named 

plaintiff]”). Although traditional mootness rules would 

ordinarily apply absent an affirmative ruling on class 

certification, “in certain circumstances, to give effect to the 

purposes of Rule 23, it is necessary to conceive of the named 

plaintiff as a part of an indivisible class and not merely a 

single adverse party even before the class certification 

question has been decided.” Weiss, 385 F.3d at 347. The 

rationale underpinning the relation back doctrine serves to 

shield from dismissal on mootness grounds those claims 

vulnerable to being “picked off” by defendants attempting to 

forestall class formation. As the Seventh Circuit has 

explained:

Normally, . . . a class action must be certified as 

such in order for it to escape dismissal once the 

claims of the named plaintiff become moot. But 

the courts have recognized that an absolute 

requirement would prevent some otherwise 

justiciable claims from ever being subject to 

judicial review. . . . [J]ust as necessity required 

the development of the relation back doctrine in 

cases where the underlying factual situation 

naturally changes so rapidly that the courts 
19

cannot keep up, so necessity compels a similar 

result here. If the class action device is to work, 

the courts must have a reasonable opportunity 

to consider and decide a motion for 

certification. If a tender made to the individual 

plaintiff while the motion for certification is 

pending could prevent the courts from ever 

reaching the class action issues, that opportunity 

is at the mercy of a defendant, even in cases 

where a class action would be most clearly 

appropriate.

Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 587 F.2d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 

1978) (citations omitted).

When a defendant‟s Rule 68 offer threatens to preempt 

the certification process, reconciling the conflicting 

imperatives of Rules 23 and 68 requires allocating sufficient

time for the process to “play out.” Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348. By

invoking the relation back doctrine, a court preserves its 

authority to rule on a named plaintiff‟s attempt to represent a 

class by treating a Rule 23 motion as though it had been filed 

contemporaneously with the filing of the class complaint. 

Consequently, “the „relation back‟ principle ensures that 

plaintiffs can reach the certification stage.” Sandoz v. 

Cingular Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 919 (5th Cir. 2008).

III.

A.

The issue we must resolve on this appeal, then, is 

whether an FLSA collective action becomes moot when (1) 

the putative representative receives a Rule 68 offer in full 
20

satisfaction of her individual claim prior to moving for 

“conditional certification,” and (2) no other potential plaintiff

has opted in to the suit.9 Animating our decision in Weiss was 

the ability of defendants to use Rule 68 “to thwart the putative 

class action before the certification question could be 

decided.” 385 F.3d at 349. Symczyk cites similar arguments

in the § 216(b) context and discerns no material distinction 

between the two procedures insofar as this consideration is 

concerned. By contrast, defendants contend Weiss does not 

apply in the FLSA context because a putative § 216(b) named 

plaintiff allegedly lacks the “representative” status that 

accords a Rule 23 named plaintiff a personal stake in the 

matter sufficient to confer continued Article III jurisdiction

once his individual claim has been mooted. We believe the 

 

9 Relying on a careful analysis of various district court efforts 

to grapple with the interplay of Rule 68 and § 216(b) 

provided in Briggs v. Arthur T. Mott Real Estate LLC, No. 

06-0468, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 82891 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 

2006), the District Court concluded Symczyk‟s case was 

distinguishable from those in which courts declined to 

dismiss complaints following Rule 68 offers because, in 

those, “other individuals had already opted in to join the 

collective action, it was unclear whether the Rule 68 offer 

fully satisfied the plaintiff's claims, or the plaintiff had 

already filed a motion for conditional certification under § 

216(b).” Symczyk, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 49599, at *13

(footnotes omitted). Here, Symczyk did not dispute the 

adequacy of the offer as it pertained to the value of her 

individual claim. However, as we will explain, we believe 

treating the other two conditions as dispositive would be 

imprudent.
21

considerations warranting application of the relation back

doctrine to Rule 23 class actions also apply to § 216(b) 

collective actions.

In support of their effort to confine Weiss to the class 

action setting, defendants rely principally on the dissimilar 

roles played by Rule 23 and § 216(b) named plaintiffs. As 

noted, the statutory form of aggregation provided for in the 

FLSA requires each party plaintiff affirmatively to opt in to a 

collective action by filing a consent form “in the court in 

which such action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Whereas a 

member of a certified class in a Rule 23(b)(3) proceeding will 

be bound by judgment unless he has intentionally opted out of 

the suit, resolution of a § 216(b) collective action will not 

bind any similarly situated employee absent his express, 

written consent. See id.; LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 

513 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1975).10 Defendants argue a § 

216(b) named plaintiff whose individual claim has been 

mooted by a Rule 68 offer before anyone has opted in to the 

action cannot purport to possess a personal stake in 

representing the interests of others.

11

 

10 Of course, class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or 

(b)(2) are “mandatory” class actions in that class members are 

not permitted to opt out. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v. Dukes, ---

U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011).

11 As noted, the Portal-to-Portal Act notionally abolished 

“representative actions.” See Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 

Stat. 84, 87 (1947). This amendment, however, did not strip 

an employee—such as Symczyk—of her right to act on behalf 

of similarly situated co-workers. Rather, the 1947 amendment 

eliminated the so-called “agency suit,” divesting nonparty 

representatives of standing to initiate actions under § 216(b). 
22

Although defendants‟ logic has some surface appeal,

reliance on the watershed event of an opt-in to trigger 

application of the special mootness rules that prevail in the 

representative action context incentivizes the undesirable

strategic use of Rule 68 that prompted our holding in Weiss.

12

 

See id. “By identifying „employees‟ as the only proper parties 

in a § 216(b) action, the Portal to Portal Act aimed to ban 

representative actions that previously had been brought by 

unions on behalf of employees.” Cameron-Grant v. Maxim 

Healthcare Servs., 347 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003); see 

also Arrington v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 531 F. Supp. 498, 502 

(D.D.C. 1982) (explaining Congress amended the FLSA “to 

eradicate the problem of totally uninvolved employees 

gaining recovery as a result of some third party‟s action in 

filing suit”). The FLSA does not prevent an employee, 

serving as lead plaintiff, from fulfilling a representative role.

When defendants made their Rule 68 offer of judgment, 

Symczyk represented only her own interests, and defendants‟ 

potential liability consisted entirely of the individual damages 

sought by Symczyk as named plaintiff. That Symczyk had yet 

to assume a representative role vis-à-vis the allegedly 

similarly situated employees listed in her complaint stemmed 

not from some purported statutory prohibition but instead 

from defendants‟ successful attempt to pick her off before the 

court had occasion to consider the suitability of allowing the 

claims to be litigated collectively with Symczyk as lead 

plaintiff.

12 In both Susman and Zeidman, the relation back rationale 

was deployed to salvage a court‟s jurisdiction over class 

complaints when the named plaintiffs‟ claims had ostensibly 

been mooted while their motions for class certification were 

pending. However, because “the federal rules do not require 
23

As the Supreme Court explained in Hoffmann-La Roche, 

actualization of § 216(b)‟s purposes often necessitates a 

district court‟s engagement at the notice phase of the 

proceeding. 493 U.S. at 170-71; see also Morgan, 551 F.3d at

1259 (“[T]he importance of certification, at the initial stage, is 

that it authorizes either the parties, or the court itself, to 

facilitate notice of the action to similarly situated 

employees.”). When a defendant‟s Rule 68 offer arrives 

before the court has had an opportunity to determine whether 

a named plaintiff has satisfied his burden at this threshold 

stage, and the court has therefore refrained from overseeing 

the provision of notice to potential party plaintiffs, it is not 

surprising to find the offer has also preceded the arrival of 

any consent forms from prospective opt-ins. If our mootness 

inquiry in the § 216(b) context were predicated inflexibly on 

whether any employee has opted in to an action at the 

moment a named plaintiff receives a Rule 68 offer, employers

would have little difficulty preventing FLSA plaintiffs from

attaining the “representative” status necessary to render an 

action justiciable notwithstanding the mooting of their 

individual claims.

In Sandoz, the only court of appeals‟ decision to 

 

certification motions to be filed with the class complaint, nor 

do they require or encourage premature certification 

determinations,” we explained in Weiss that “reference to the 

bright line event of the filing of the class certification motion 

may not always be well-founded.” 385 F.3d at 347. 

Consequently, we extended the doctrine to instances in which 

the plaintiff moved for class certification subsequent to 

receipt of a Rule 68 offer so long as he did so without “undue 

delay.” Id. at 348.
24

address the applicability of the relation back doctrine in the

FLSA context, the Fifth Circuit concluded Congress did not 

intend, through the enactment of § 216(b), to create an 

“anomaly” by allowing employers “to use Rule 68 as a sword, 

„picking off‟ representative plaintiffs and avoiding ever 

having to face a collective action.” 553 F.3d at 919. The court 

elaborated:

[T]he differences between class actions and 

FLSA § 216(b) collective actions do not compel 

a different result regarding whether a 

certification motion can “relate back” to the 

filing of the complaint. The status of a case as 

being an “opt in” or “opt out” class action has 

no bearing on whether a defendant can 

unilaterally moot a plaintiff‟s case through a 

Rule 68 offer of judgment. Although the 

differences between Rule 23 class actions and 

FLSA § 216(b) collective actions alter the 

conceptual mootness inquiry, each type of 

action would be rendered a nullity if defendants 

could simply moot the claims as soon as the 

representative plaintiff files suit. Thus, the 

policies behind applying the “relation back” 

principle for Rule 23 class actions apply with 

equal force to FLSA § 216(b) collective actions. 

Id. at 920 (citations omitted). There, the defendant tendered 

its offer of judgment approximately one month after Sandoz 

had commenced her FLSA action, and Sandoz waited thirteen 

months after filing her complaint to move for “conditional 

certification.” Id. at 921. Borrowing language from Weiss and 

holding that “relation back is warranted only when the 

plaintiff files for certification „without undue delay,‟” id.
25

(quoting Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348), the Fifth Circuit remanded 

for the district court to consider whether Sandoz had “timely 

sought certification of her collective action,” id.

B.

Although the opt-in mechanism transforms the manner 

in which a named plaintiff acquires a personal stake in 

representing the interests of others, it does not present a 

compelling justification for limiting the relation back doctrine

to the Rule 23 setting. The considerations that caution against 

allowing a defendant‟s use of Rule 68 to impede the 

advancement of a representative action are equally weighty in 

either context. Rule 23 permits plaintiffs “to pool claims 

which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.” 

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985). 

Similarly, § 216(b) affords plaintiffs “the advantage of lower 

individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of 

resources.” Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170. Rule 23

promotes “efficiency and economy of litigation.” Crown, 

Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 349 (1983). 

Similarly, “Congress‟ purpose in authorizing § 216(b) class 

actions was to avoid multiple lawsuits where numerous 

employees have allegedly been harmed by a claimed violation 

or violations of the FLSA by a particular employer.” Prickett 

v. DeKalb Cnty., 349 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003). 

When Rule 68 morphs into a tool for the strategic 

curtailment of representative actions, it facilitates an outcome 

antithetical to the purposes behind § 216(b). Symczyk‟s 

claim—like that of the plaintiff in Weiss—was “acutely 

susceptible to mootness” while the action was in its early 

stages and the court had yet to determine whether to facilitate

notice to prospective plaintiffs. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 347 
26

(internal quotation marks omitted). When the certification 

process has yet to unfold, application of the relation back 

doctrine prevents defendants from using Rule 68 to “undercut 

the viability” of either type of representative action. See id. at 

344.

C.

Additionally, the relation back doctrine helps 

safeguard against the erosion of FLSA claims by operation of 

the Act‟s statute of limitations. To qualify for relief under the

FLSA, a party plaintiff must “commence” his cause of action 

before the statute of limitations applying to his individual 

claim has lapsed. Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 24 

F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 1994).

13 For a named plaintiff, the 

action commences on the date the complaint is filed. 29 

U.S.C. § 256(a). For an opt-in plaintiff, however, the action 

commences only upon filing of a written consent. Id. § 

256(b). This represents a departure from Rule 23, in which 

the filing of a complaint tolls the statute of limitations “as to 

all asserted members of the class” even if the putative class 

member is not cognizant of the suit‟s existence. See Crown, 

Cork & Seal Co. 462 U.S. at 350 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Protracted disputes over the propriety of dismissal 

in light of Rule 68 offers may deprive potential opt-ins whose 

claims are in jeopardy of expiring of the opportunity to toll 

the limitations period—and preserve their entitlements to 

 

13 Plaintiffs seeking recovery under the FLSA must 

commence an action within two years of the alleged violation 

(or within three years if the violation is “willful”). 29 U.S.C. 

§ 255(a).
27

recovery—by filing consents within the prescribed window.14

D.

In sum, we believe the relation back doctrine helps 

ensure the use of Rule 68 does not prevent a collective action 

from playing out according to the directives of § 216(b) and 

the procedures authorized by the Supreme Court in 

Hoffmann-La Roche and further refined by courts applying 

this statute. Depriving the parties and the court of a 

reasonable opportunity to deliberate on the merits of 

collective action “conditional certification” frustrates the 

objectives served by § 216(b). Cf. Sandoz, 553 F.3d at 921 

(explaining “there must be some time for a[n FLSA] plaintiff 

 

14 Defendants contend a party plaintiff‟s cause of action vests 

at the moment he files his consent form and that no 

conception of the relation back doctrine would permit this 

statutorily mandated act of opting in to relate back to the 

filing of the collective action complaint. While perhaps true, 

this assertion is beside the point. For the sake of argument, 

consider a hypothetical co-worker of Symczyk‟s who was 

subjected to a willful FLSA violation and whose tenure with 

the company also ended in December 2007. Because 

Symczyk‟s complaint was dismissed before this (or any) 

employee had opted in to the action, this potential plaintiff 

forfeited any claim to relief in December 2010. The relation 

back doctrine cannot, at this juncture, redeem this would-be 

plaintiff‟s cause of action. However, had Symczyk been 

permitted to move—in timely fashion—for “conditional 

certification” in light of defendants‟ March 2010 motion to 

dismiss, this plaintiff may have received notice of the 

ongoing collective action prior to her claim growing stale.
28

to move to certify a collective action before a defendant can 

moot the claim through an offer of judgment”). Absent undue 

delay, when an FLSA plaintiff moves for “certification” of a 

collective action, the appropriate course—particularly when a 

defendant makes a Rule 68 offer to the plaintiff that would 

have the possible effect of mooting the claim for collective 

relief asserted under § 216(b)—is for the district court to 

relate the motion back to the filing of the initial complaint.

Upon remand, should Symczyk move for “conditional 

certification,” the court shall consider whether such motion 

was made without undue delay, and, if it so finds, shall relate 

the motion back to December 4, 2009—the date on which 

Symczyk filed her initial complaint. If (1) Symczyk may yet 

timely seek “conditional certification” of her collective 

action, (2) the court permits the case to move forward as a 

collective action (by virtue of Symczyk‟s satisfaction of the 

“modest factual showing” standard), and (3) at least one other 

similarly situated employee opts in, then defendants‟ Rule 68 

offer of judgment would no longer fully satisfy the claims of 

everyone in the collective action, and the proffered rationale 

behind dismissing the complaint on jurisdictional grounds 

would no longer be applicable. If, however, the court finds 

Symczyk‟s motion to certify would be untimely, or otherwise 

denies the motion on its merits, then defendants‟ Rule 68 

offer to Symczyk—in full satisfaction of her individual 

claim—would moot the action.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the 

judgment of the District Court and remand for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.