Filed 5/31/23 Brown v. City of Inglewood CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

WANDA M. BROWN

,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CITY OF INGLEWOOD et al.

,

Defendant s and Appellant s

. B 320658

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21STCV30604 )

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, De i r dre H. Hill

, Judge. Affirmed in part
and r eversed in part. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, Walter J. Lack, Richard P. Kinnan and Christopher A. Kanne for Defendants and Appellants

. Miller Barondess, Mira Hashmall and Colin H. Rolfs for
Plaintiff and Respondent

.2 Respondent Wanda Brown has served as the elected
treasurer for appellant, the City of Inglewood (the City),
since 1987. Brown sued the City a nd several members of the Inglewood City Council 1 (the c ouncil)

, alleging that after she reported concerns about financial improprieties, the City and the
individual defendants defamed and retaliated against her. S he alleged causes of action for (1) defamation ; (2 ) violation of Labor
Code section 1102.5

, subdivision s (b ) and (c)

, 2 which prohibit retaliation against an employee based on the employee reporting or refusing to participate in what the employee reasonably
believes to be illegal activity by the employer ( the section 1102.5 retaliation claim) ; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), based both on the alleged retaliat ion and the alleged defama tion. The C ity an d the individual defendants
filed a joint special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation, or SLAPP

, under the anti

SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16 )

. The court granted
the motion in part, but denied it a s to the section 1102.5
retaliation claim and the retaliation

- based IIED claim against
all defendants

. Defendants appeal , arguing the court incorrectly
denied the anti

- SLAPP motion as to the retaliation

- based claims against the individual defendants

. For reasons we discuss below,

w e hold that the retaliation

- based claims against the individual defendants arise from protected conduct under the anti

- SLAPP statute, and that the court should have stricken these claims.

1 Specifically, respondents Mayor James T. Butts, Jr., Alex Padilla, George Dotson, Eloy Morales, and Ralph Franklin (collectively, the individual defendants).

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all unspecified statutory references are to the Labor Code.3

In all other respects, we affirm the co urt’s ruling on the
anti

- SLAPP motion

.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A. Brown’s Lawsuit Against Defendant s
In her first amended c omplaint ( the FAC) , Brown alleged
she had “ report ed to [individual defendant s] that she had discovered facts indicating that [individual defendant s] were mishandling the City’s finances, including an improper payment of nearly [$100,000] to a City [c] ontractor, ” and “ improperly fail[ing] to accurately report to the public the true financial health of the City. ” She alleged that, as a result of her reporting
these conce rn s, defendant s took various adverse actions against
her , including reducing her duties and authority as treasurer
, reducing her salary by 83 percent
, taking away her seat at the

c ouncil meetings, and temporarily locking her and her s taff

out of their offices

. Brown further alleged tha t, at a c ouncil meeting, one of the individual defendants , Mayor Butts, offered

a “ defamatory pretextual reason for tak ing away [Brown’s] duties and reducing her salary

, ” namely that she “[did] not know the procedure for handling bad debts, [and that] he had no choice but
to reduce her duties and her salary. ”

B. Defendant s’ A nti

- SLAPP Motion and Related Evidence

Defendant s filed a motion to strike all causes of action in
the FAC under the anti

- SLAPP statute

. The anti

- SLAPP statute is “designed to protect defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and petition on

matt ers of public concern. [Citations.] To that end, the statute authorizes a special motion to strike a claim ‘arising from any4

act of that person in furtherance of the person ’ s right of petition

or free speech under the United States Constitution or the
Ca lifornia Constitution in connection with a public issue.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)” ( Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883

– 884.) Such acts are referred to in
anti

- SLAPP parlance as “protected activity.” ( Park v. Board of Trustee s of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 ( Park ).) “Litigation of an anti

- SLAPP motion involves a two

- step

process. First, ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.’ [Citation.] Second, for each claim that does arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal
merit.” ’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff cannot make this showing,
the court will strike the claim.” ( Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 ( Bonn i ).)
Defendant s’ motion argued the FAC alleged claims arising from conduct that falls into two of the statutor il y enumerated categories of protected activity: “any written or
oral statement [s] or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, e xecutive, or judicial body, or any other offici al proceeding authorized by law ” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2)), and “any other conduct in furtherance
of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) Specifically, t he motion argued that each of Brown’s claims

aros e from voting and other legislative actions of the individual
defendant s and statements they made at the c ounc il meetings5

in connection therewith. Defendant s’ motion further argued that

, for various reasons, Brown could not demonstrate that her claims
had minimal merit

, including that the claims were barred by government discretionary act immunity, that section 1102.5 does not permit individual liability, and that Brown was neither an “employee” for purposes of section 1102.5, nor had she reported conduct that she reasonably suspected to be illegal, both of whi ch

are req u ired under section 1102.5.

1. Evidence i n s upport of and o pposition to the a nti

- SLAPP m otion

Defendants primarily supported their anti

- SLAPP motion
with the following evidence : (1) excerpts from the Ci ty c harter and Municipal Code ; (2) C ity ordinances and a City policy adopted by a vote of the individual defendant s that , collectively,
reduced Brown ’s salary, investment authority , and duties, as alleged in the FAC ; (3) excerpts of transcripts from various

c ouncil meetings, including excerp ts reflecting c ounc il votes passing the relevant ordinances and policy ; 3 and (4) declarations.

3 At Brown’s request, the court took judicial notice of the first two categories of documents listed above, but declined to take judicial notice of the council meeting transcripts. On appeal, defendants contend this ruling was in error, and Brown raises

no argument to the contrary. We need not resolve this issue, however, because regardless of whether the court erred in

p artially denying the request for judicial notice, the transcripts were attached to a declaration in support of the motion, and the anti

- SLAPP statute expressly requires that, in its anti

- SLAPP analysis, the court “shall consider the pleadings, and supporti ng and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)6 Under the City c harter

, the c ouncil is the City’s legislative body, and a ll powers of the City are vested in and exercised by the c ouncil, which consists of the m ayor and four council

m embers

. The City t reasure r is not a member of the c ouncil.
C ouncil meetings are open to the public. T he c ouncil has the authority to “establish rules and regulations for the conduct of
its proceedings” and t he m ayor is “responsible for maintaining
the o rder and decorum of meetings.” The mayor, c ouncil members, c lerk , and t reasurer are all publicly elected

. T he

c ouncil has the authority to fix the compensation of any City
officer except the mayor and c ouncil m em bers.
In fall 2022

, the c ouncil passed two ordinances included
in the documents supporting the anti

- SLAPP motion. First,
in September 2022, it passed O rdinance No. 20

- 16 regarding

“ A ssignment of C ity D uties” that , inter alia, transferred general auditor responsibilities once held by the treasurer to the C ity
clerk

, reduced the maximum amount of funds the treasurer

was permitted to manage to $50,000

, and adopted a revised
inves tment policy

. 4 In October 2022, it passed a secon d ordinance, “ S alary O rdinance for F iscal Y ear 2020

– 2021
, ”
which adjusted the salaries of a numb er of positions, including
the treasurer ’s salary , which it reduced by over 80 percent as compared to the previous year

. D eclarations from defendant Mayor Butts and the City’s manager, Artie Fields, addressed allegations in the FAC that
Butts had denied Brown a seat on the dais during council meetings and that the individual defendant s had blocked
Brown’s access to her office

. Butts ’s declaration sta ted tha t

4 The defendants also submitted the policy itself in support of the anti

- SLAPP motion.7

the City treasurer “is not a member of the

. . . c ouncil and so
has no standing to sit on the dais during meetings of the

. . .

c o uncil,” but that “a previous m ayor had decided to let the
treasurer have a seat on the dais during meetings, and [Butts] [had initially] continue d that practice.” (Capitalization omitted.)
Butts continue d that, i n early 2020, Brown “ began to disru pt meetings of the

. . . c ouncil” and in July 2020 Butts “exercised [his] discretion as chair of the c ouncil an d revoked the pri vilege
of the t reasurer to be seated at t he dais during meetings of
the

. . . c ouncil.” (Capitalization omitted.)
The Fields declaration stat ed that , in October 2020,

“ Brown’s proximity badge was deactivated because she had
failed to present a negative CO V ID

- 19 test confirmation to the [C] ity, as required” and, as a result, Brown was locked out of
her office at C ity H all. Fields declared “[t] his same action was taken as to all personnel that did not provide a negative test
confirmation.

. . . Brown’s proximity badge was reactivated once she provided a negative test confirmation. ”
The transcript s from c ouncil meetings reflect the votes by the individual defendant s adopting the ordinances and

po licy noted above, Butt s ’s allegedly defamatory stat ements, and Brown ’s s tatements criticiz ing the c ouncil and Butts. In opposing the defendant s’ anti

- SLAPP motion, Brown
submitted , inter alia, a declaration and supporting exhibits in

an effort to establish her status as an “employee” f or purposes of secti on 1102.5. Specifically, Brown offered W

- 2 federal tax forms she had received from the City, which identif y her as an

“ [ e ] mployee [ ] ” and her biweekly pay stub, which identifies various employee b enefits such as health benefits and8

reflects a deduction from her regular earnings for “ workers [’] comp[ensation] .” ( Boldface and c apitalization omitted.)

2. Court’s r uling on a nti

- SLAPP m otion The court granted the defendant s’ anti

- SLAPP motion
with res pect to the defa mation claim and the defamation

- based portion of the IIED claim

. T he court denied the motion as to the
section 1102.5 re taliation claim and retaliation

- based portion of
the IIED claim , finding these claims did not arise from “ protected activity

. ” The trial court explained

, “ [T] he individual defendants’ conduct in their decision making or voting is n ot the gravamen
of the [retaliation] claim.” The trial court concluded that, instead, “the activities upon which the claim rests, which are adverse actions, are the reduction in her salary and duties and being locked out of her office and computer.” Defendants timely appealed the court’s partial denial of
their anti

- SLAPP motion.

C. Additi onal Procedural Hist o ry
Defendant s also filed a demurrer to the FAC, which the
court heard on the same day as the anti

- SLAPP motion

. T he trial
court sustained defendant s’ demurrer with leave to amend as to
the claims that remained in litigation following the court’s anti

SLAPP ruling ( section 1102.5 retaliation claim and retaliation

based IIED claim)

. In so ruling, the court concluded that the FAC did not sufficiently allege that Brow n had “ disclosed to a person with authority over her or to an employee with authority to investigate a concern that certain illegal activity had occurred,
and that she had a reasonable belief that Mayor Butts [ ] violated [ the ] law

, ” a necessary element of Brown’s sect ion 1102.5 claim.
The court further concluded tha t the remaining retaliation

- based9

IIED claim was derivative of the retaliation claim and failed
for similar reasons, in addition to being barred because the Workers’ Compensation A c t (§ 3200 et seq. ) provides the exclusive remedy for any such injury

. 5 (S ee § 3601 , subd. (a) [workers ’ compensation is “the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against any other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his or her employment”].) Following the demurrer ruling, Brown voluntarily dismissed (without prejudice) defendants Dotson, Padilla, Franklin, and Morales and filed a second amended complaint asserting her claims under section 1102.5 and for retaliation

based IIED agai nst the City and Butts.

DISCUSSION Defendants argu e that the trial court reversibly erred
in denying their anti

- SLAPP motion as to the retaliation

based causes of action against the individual defendants

. Our review is de novo . ( Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal .App.4th 1049, 1056.)

A. Anti

- SLAPP Analytical Framework

In the first step in the anti

- SLAPP analysis, the moving defendant bears the burden of “identify[ing] what acts each

5 The court also addressed argum ents, likewise raised

on appeal in connection with the second prong of the anti

SLAPP analysis, that the retaliation

- based claims were barred by discretionary act immunity under Government Code section 820.2 and government act immunity under Government Cod e section 821. Finally, the court noted that the case law

was unclear as to whether section 1102.5 provided a basis for imposing liability on an individual, nonemployer defendant.10

challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” ( Bonni, supra

, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.) If the court determines that relief is sought “ based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is
reached ” ( Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 ( Baral ) )

, and “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. ” ( Ibid .) This step involves a “summary

- judgme nt

- like procedure

. ” ( Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.) If the plaintiff fails

to make the requisite showing to support the claim

, “ the claim
is stricken .” ( Baral, supra , at p. 396 .)

B

. T he Retaliation

-

Based Claims Against the Individual Defendants Arise f rom Protected Activity (

Anti

- SLAPP Analysis Step One )

1. Identifying protected activity We agree that the individual defendants’ votes adopt ing two ordinances and a policy that, collectivel y, required the allegedly retaliatory reduction in Brown’s salary, authority and
duties , are protected activity

. T he California Supreme Court
held in City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409 that, because “votes taken after a public hearing qual ify as acts in furtherance of constitutionally protected activity” ( i d. at p. 427, italics omitted)

, “ elected officials may assert the protection of [the anti

- SLAPP statute] when sued over how they voted.” ( Ib id.

, italics added; id. at pp. 422

– 423 [in lawsuit against individual council members, “the council members’ votes, as well as statements made in the course of their deliberations at the city council meeting where the votes were taken, qualify as ‘any11

written or oral statement or writing made befor e a legislative

. . . proceeding.’ ( § 425.16, subd. (e)(1).)”].) Brown , however, argues
that we should recharacterize this activity as the individual
defendants effectively reducing her salary , authorities and
duties

. But the individual defendants have no legal ability to change the scope of Brown’s salary, authority , or duties ; they

can only vote on ordinances and policies on these topics . After
the c ouncil passes an ordinance or adopts a policy, the acts implementi ng the ordinance or policy

— for example, actually paying the treasurer less or permitting her to invest less money

—

are act s of the City

, not of the individual c ouncil members. Thus,
under Vasquez

, the individual defendants’ involvement in the
reduction of Brown’s salary, authority, and duties co nsisted solely
of the protected act of voting at c ouncil meetings

. The case on which Brown primarily relies in arguing to
the contrary
, Whitehall v. County of San Bernardino (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 352 ( Whitehall ), is inapposite , because it addresses
an anti

- SLAPP motion to strike claims against a public entity,

not claims against individual public officials

. In Whitehall

, the court concluded that a retaliation claim against the C ounty based on the C ounty ’s allegedly retaliatory act of placing an employee on leave did not arise from protected activity, even though the C ounty supervisor ’ s investigation that preceded
the leave was protected activity. ( Id. at p. 362.) T he court
in Whitehall explained that the “ act of placing plaintiff on administrative leave, with the intention of firing her, did not
arise from the County ’s protected activity.

. . . Had plaintiff
sued the specific supervisors who conducted the investigation

on behalf of the County, a clear case of a SLAPP suit would
have been established. But plaintiff challenged the retaliatory12

employment decision, not the process that led up to that point. The County ’s act of placing plaintiff on administrative leave, with the intention of terminating her emp loyment, was not an exercise of its petitioning or free speech rights.” ( Ibid. , italics added.)
Because the only portion of the anti

- SLAPP ruling at issue on appeal involves claims against the individual defendants, not
the City, Whitehall is of no assis tance to Brown

. Thus, the individual defendant s’ role in reducing Brown’s salary and job duties was protected activity

.

2. “Arising from” analysis

We further conclude that the retaliation

- based claims against the individual defendan ts arise from th e ind ividual
defendants’ protected voting activity , as opposed to that activity “merely provid[ing] context” for those claims. ( Ba ral , supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394.) To determine whether a claim arises
from protected activity

, we consider whether the protected activity is necessary to satisfy any of th e elements of the claim

. ( Park , supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063.) One element of Brown’s
section 1102.5 claim is that defendants took an “ ‘ “ adverse employment action ” ’ ” against her as retal iation for her reporting concerns about financial improprieties. ( Morgan v. Regents of University of Cal ifornia (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69 [reciting
elements of section 1102.5 claim]; see § 1102.5, subds. (b) & (c).) Brown alleges that the same alleg edly retaliatory adverse action s also satisfy the “ ‘ “ extreme and outrageous conduct ” ’ ” element
of her IIED claim. ( Unterberger v. Red Bull North America, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 414, 423 ( Unterberger ).) Through the
retaliation

- based claims agains t the individual defendants

, Brown alleges such adverse action and extreme and outrageous
conduct primarily consisted of the City’s reduction in her salary,13

duties

, and authority, something the individual defendants only engaged in via protected voting act ivity

. B rown also alleges the individual defendants engaged in retaliatory adverse actions and “ extreme and outrageous conduct” by rem oving Brown from the dais at council meetings, such that even if the individual defendants’ voting conduct is protected activity, s he need not rely on it to satisfy these elements of her
claims

. But removal from the dais can not alone satisfy the se elements of Brown’s claims , because it is not sufficiently material ( s ee Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA , Inc. (200 5 ) 36 Ca l.4th 1028,
1036 [defining an adverse employment action for purposes of

a retaliation claim under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (the FEHA) as requiring that the adverse action “materially affect[ ] the ter ms and conditions of employment ” ] )

, 6
and it is not an action “ ‘ “ so extreme as to exceed all bounds of
that usually tolerated in a civilize d community

. ” ’ ” ( Unterberger,

supra , 1 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 423

. ) Thus, Brown must rely on the protected voting activity of the individual defendants discussed
above to satisfy these elements of her retaliation

- based claims against the individual defendants, meaning the claims arise

6 Although this definition was developed in the context of FEHA retaliation , courts apply it in the context of section 1102.5 claims as well. (See Malais v. Los Angeles City Fire Dept. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 350, 357 [ applying FEHA definition of adverse employment action to a section 1102.5 claim, and noting that “[m] inor or rel atively trivial adverse actions . . . that, from an objective perspective, are reasonably likely to do no more than anger or upset an employee

. . . are not actionable”] .)14

from protecte d activity

. 7 ( Park , supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063. ) Accordingly, we analyze these claims under the second step of
the anti

- SLAPP framework.

C. Legal Sufficiency of Retaliation

- Based Claims Against Individual Defendants (Anti

- SLAPP Analysis Step Two

) In the second step of the anti

- SLAPP analysis , we consider
whether Brown has “ ‘ “ ‘ demonstrate [d] that [the retaliation

based claims against the individual defendant s ] [are] both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. ’ ” ’ ” ( Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 791 .)

1. Section 1102.5 r etaliation c laim a gainst i ndividual d efendant s
Defendant s argue that the section 1102.5 retaliation claim
is not legally sufficient

, because Brown is not an “employee” for the purposes of that statute. W e agree. Brown alleges the individual defendant s violated subdivisions (b) and ( c ) of section 1102.5

. By their own terms, these sections protect only “employee[s]” from certain types of retaliation by “ [ a ] n employer, or any person acting on behalf
of the employer

. ” (§ 1102.5 , subd s. (b) & (c) .) Section 1106
addresses the definition of the term “employee” in this context: “For purposes of Section[ ] 1102.5 [and other enumerated

7 Because the removal of Brown from the dais was not sufficiently material, we need not and do not consider whether, as defendants argue, removing Brown from the dais was protected activity as well.15

sections] ‘employee’ includes, but is not limited to, any individual employed by

. . . any

. . . city .” (§ 1106.) Notably, the Legislature did not reference elected officials as falling within the scope
of the term “employee” for the pur poses of section 1102.5. Yet
when the Legislature intended to include elected officials within the scope of the term “employee” elsewhere in the c ode

— namely,
in defining the term for purposes of workers ’ compensation

— the Legislature express ly defined the term “ ‘ [e]mployee ’

. . . [to] include

. . . [¶]

. . . [¶]

. . . [a]ll electe d . . . paid public
officers.” (§ 3351, subd. (b) [ section of Workers ’ Compensation
Act providing : “ ‘ Employee ’ means every person in the service
of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, and includes . . . [¶]

. . . [¶]

. . . [a] ll elected and appointed paid public officers”] .) T he plain language of these statut es thus unambiguously include s “elected
officials” in the definition of “employee” for purposes of workers ’ compensation, but not within the definition of “employee” for purposes of section 1102.5. Because the plain language of a
statute i s the best indicat ion of the Legislature’s intent (see
Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977 ( Wilcox ) ), this language reflects the Legislature’s decision to provide elected
officials the benefits of the Workers ’ Compensation Act, but to deny them the prote ctio ns of section 1102.5.
Bro wn argues that “[i] t is reasonable and sensible for
California courts to

. . . classify elected officials as empl oyees [under section 1102.5] ,” just as the California L egislature did in
the context of workers ’ compensation and the Internal Revenue
Service does for purposes of federal tax law. (See 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c) [defining “employee” under the Internal Revenue16

Code to include “an officer, employee, or elected official”].)
This argument flies in the face of basic maxims o f statutory interpretation , because it asks us to interlineate section 1106
with words that the Legislature chose not to include

— words which, based on section 3351, the Legislature is clearly capabl e of employing

. (See Blankenship v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 87, 94 [“the Legislature’s omission of a term in a list of terms indicates the Legislature did not intend to include the omitted term”].)
Brown also urge s us to look to case law defining “employee” for the purposes of section 11 02.5, specifically cases incorporating the “common law defini tion of employee ” for this purpose. ( Bennett v. Rancho California Water Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 908, 927.) We need not resort to judicial interpretations of the definition the Legislature p rovided when that definition is clear and unambiguous. (See Wilcox , supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 977 [plain, unambiguous language of a statute is the best indicator
of legislative intent in statutory interpretation].) Accordingly,
Brown’s section 1102.5 retal iation claim against the individual
defendant s fails the second prong of the anti

- SLAPP analysis,
and the court erred in denying the anti

- SLAPP motion as to that
claim.

2. Retaliation

- b ased IIED c laim a gainst the

i ndividual d efendant s Brown’s IIED cla im against the individual defendants fails as a matter of law, because it is “ ‘ subsumed under the exclusive remedy provisions of workers’ compensation. ’ ” ( Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 902.) As noted above, un like the definition of “employee” for purposes of section 1102.5, the definition of “employee” for purposes of17

workers ’ compensation includes “[a]ll elected

. . . paid public officers.” (§ 3351, subd. (b).) Where, as here, purportedly wrongful conduct oc curred at the worksite in the normal course, “workers’ compensation is plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy for any injury that may have resulted.” ( Miklosy, supra , at p. 902.)
Because we conclude the retaliation

- based IIED claim against
the individual defendant s is not viable on this basis, we need not reach the other bases raised by the parties.18 DISPOSITION

The court’s order on defendant s’ anti

- SLAPP motion
is reversed to the extent it denies the motion as to Brown’s
section 1102.5 retaliation claim against the individual defendant s and Brown’s retaliation

- bas e d IIED claim against the individual
defendant s. In all other respects, the order regarding the
anti

- SLAPP motion is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

.

R OTHSCHILD, P. J. We concur:

BENDIX , J.

WEINGART , J.