NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

DANIELLE J., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, D.M., D.M., C.B., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. L8015JD201507010

The Honorable Douglas Camacho, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Offices of Heather C. Wellborn, P.C., Lake Havasu City

By Heather C. Wellborn

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Daniel R. Huff

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
DANIELLE J. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Chief Judge Michael J. Brown

joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Danielle J. (Mother) appeals the superior court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her three children. Mother argues the 

superior court erred in denying her motion to set aside default (given her 

failure to appear) and there was no clear and convincing evidence 

supporting a termination of her parental rights. Because Mother has shown 

no error, the order is affirmed. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 D.C.M. was born in 2010, D.N.M. in 2011 and C.B. in 2015.2

Beginning in March 2013, D.C.M. and D.N.M. were subject to a dependency 

when the Department of Child Safety (DCS) alleged Mother could not 

parent due to substance abuse and neglect. Mother engaged in services and, 

by October 2014, the two children were returned to her care. This first 

dependency was dismissed in February 2015.

¶3 By early April 2015, based on new reports, including accounts 

of Mother’s renewed substance abuse and neglect, DCS filed a new 

dependency for all three children. The superior court found the children 

dependent as to Mother, apparently in mid-April 2015.

3 The court adopted 

 

1 This court views the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the 

superior court’s findings. See Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 

205, 207 ¶ 2 (App. 2008).

2 Because the two eldest children share the same first and last initials, their 

middle initials are used in this decision to provide clarity. 

3 Filings from a mid-April 2015 hearing state Mother accepted service and

denied the allegations in the petition, but stipulated to the need for a 

dependency. The court’s orders addressed services, adopted a case plan,
DANIELLE J. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

a family reunification case plan, with a concurrent case plan of severance 

and adoption.

¶4 For the first several weeks of this second dependency, the 

record indicates Mother participated in DCS services. After her husband’s

sudden death in June 2015, however, Mother stopped participating in 

services. At an August 2015 permanency planning hearing, the court 

changed the case plan to severance and adoption. DCS filed a motion to 

terminate, alleging as to Mother substance abuse, neglect and removal of

two children within 18 months of being returned to her care. See Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. (A.R.S.) § 8-533(B)(2)-(3), (11) (2016).4

¶5 In November 2015, after Mother failed to attend a scheduled 

pre-adjudication hearing without good cause shown, the court found her in 

default and deemed her non-appearance an admission to the allegations in 

the motion to terminate and preserved the findings for a December 2015 

evidentiary hearing. Mother promptly filed a motion to set aside, claiming 

(without providing any evidentiary support) that she attempted to set up 

transportation to the November 2015 hearing herself (and not through 

DCS), that she did not hear from individuals she contacted for

transportation and that “her ride never showed up the morning of” the 

hearing. At the December 2015 evidentiary hearing, which Mother also did 

not attend, the court denied Mother’s request to appear telephonically; 

denied her motion to set aside default and, after receiving evidence and 

argument, granted the motion to terminate Mother’s parental rights.

¶6 The evidence showed Mother failed to complete substance 

abuse counseling and missed most drug tests. When Mother did test, the 

results were positive for various drugs, including methamphetamine, 

heroin and morphine. Although Mother was placed at a residential drug 

treatment program, she did not successfully complete the program because

she was asked to leave given her “bullying and noncompliance.” In 

addition, the DCS caseworker testified termination of parental rights would 

 

and set a permanency planning hearing, suggesting the children were 

found dependent as to Mother at that time. No transcript was provided for 

this hearing, where the court also directed DCS to lodge a dependency 

order. DCS did not lodge the order until late August 2015, and it was not 

entered until mid-September 2015. The court also found the children 

dependent as to their fathers, who are not a part of the appeal.

4 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
DANIELLE J. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

be in the best interests of the children because it did not appear Mother 

would become sober “any time in [the] near future.” 

¶7 After considering the evidence, the superior court granted the 

motion to terminate on all three grounds. This court has jurisdiction over 

Mother’s timely appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235, 12-120.21(A)(1) and -

2101(A)(1) and Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103-04.

DISCUSSION

I. Denial Of Mother’s Motion To Set Aside Default.

¶8 Mother argues the superior court abused its discretion in 

denying her motion to set aside default. The State argues, with some force, 

that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the denial because Mother’s 

notice of appeal was limited to the termination order. See, e.g., Kennedy v. 

Linda Brock Auto. Plaza, 175 Ariz. 323, 325 (App. 1993); Lee v. Lee, 133 Ariz. 

118, 124 (App. 1982); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 104(B) (requiring notice of appeal to 

“designate the final order or part thereof appealed from”). Mother, 

however, has not shown the superior court abused its discretion in denying 

her motion to set aside. To prevail on the motion, Mother was required to 

“show that (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect exists 

[for her failure to appear as directed] and (2) a meritorious defense to the 

claims [in the motion to terminate] exists.” Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ 

Sec., 217 Ariz. 299, 304 ¶ 16 (App. 2007). Mother’s motion did not provide 

any supporting evidence, and did not address the merits of the motion to 

terminate. Accordingly, even if appellate jurisdiction exists to examine the 

superior court’s ruling, Mother has not shown an abuse of discretion in 

denying that motion. See id.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Err By Terminating Mother’s Parental 

Rights.

¶9 As applicable here, to terminate parental rights, a court must 

find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground 

articulated in A.R.S. § 8–533(B) has been proven and must find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the 

child. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (App. 2005); Michael J. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12 (2000). Because the superior 

court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, 

judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” this court 

will affirm an order terminating parental rights so long as it is supported 

by reasonable evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 

¶ 18 (App. 2009) (citation omitted).
DANIELLE J. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

¶10 Mother argues DCS failed to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that she “has been unable to discharge her parental 

responsibilities due to a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs,” and 

that the death of her husband caused her to stop engaging in services. The 

termination of a parent-child relationship is justified when a parent “is 

unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of 

chronic abuse of dangerous drugs . . . and there are reasonable grounds to 

believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate 

period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). The evidentiary record before the superior 

court supports the termination order on this ground.

¶11 By the time of the severance trial, DCS had been offering 

Mother substance abuse services for more than two years during the 

dependencies. During this time, Mother frequently missed drug tests and, 

when she did test, the results were positive for illegal substances (including 

methamphetamine, heroin and morphine). She was repeatedly closed out 

of drug testing and substance abuse counseling for noncompliance. The 

DCS caseworker testified Mother cannot function as a “parent or a person” 

while under the influence of drugs and becomes “belligerent and violent.” 

The caseworker also testified Mother has not addressed “any of the 

underlying issues for her drug use” in her attempts to become sober and 

would likely not attain sobriety “any time in [the] near future.” On this 

record, Mother has not shown the superior court abused its discretion in 

finding Mother is unable to discharge her parental duties due to her history 

of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs and that there are reasonable grounds 

to believe the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate 

period.

5

 

5 Given this conclusion, this court need not address the other grounds for 

termination the superior court found DCS had proven. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 ¶ 3 (App. 2002). Moreover, although 

not challenged by Mother on appeal, the record supports the superior 

court’s finding that severance is in the best interests of the children as they 

are placed together with a familial, potentially-adoptive placement. 
DANIELLE J. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶12 The superior court’s order terminating Mother’s parental 

rights to D.C.M., D.N.M. and C.B. is affirmed.