SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3029-15T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ORLANDO TRINIDAD,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Submitted January 18, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Simonelli, Rothstadt and Gooden 

Brown. 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 14-01-0314.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Richard Sparaco, Designated Counsel, on the 

brief).

Robert D. Laurino, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Kayla E. Rowe, Special 

Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

September 17, 2018
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PER CURIAM

Following a jury trial, defendant Orlando Trinidad, a former police 

officer, was convicted of second-degree conspiracy to commit official 

misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 (count one); second-degree 

official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 (count two); third-degree tampering with 

public records, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-7(a)(2) (count three); fourth-degree falsifying or 

tampering with records, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4(a) (count four); fourth-degree false 

swearing, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2 (count five); and fourth-degree simple assault, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a), amended from third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 

2C:12-1(b)(7) (count six). The charges stemmed from an incident on the Garden 

State Parkway on June 7, 2012.

Judge Michael L. Ravin merged count one with count two and sentenced 

Trinidad on count two to a five-year term of imprisonment with five years of 

parole ineligibility, concurrent to a three-year term on count three, nine-month 

terms on both counts four and five, and a six-month term on count six..

On appeal, Trinidad raises the following contentions:

POINT I – DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT 

TO A FAIR TRIAL DUE TO HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL 

COMMENTS MADE BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM 

THAT WERE SOLELY DESIGNED TO INFLAME 

THE PASSION OF THE JURY. (Not Raised Below).
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POINT II – DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE 

RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL DUE [TO THE] 

ADMISSION OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS 

LIEUTENANT'S LAY OPINION ON THE 

DEFENDANT'S GUILT. (Not Raised Below).

POINT III – THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE WAS 

EXCESSIVE.

(A) THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING 

TO SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT TO 

ONE-DEGREE LOWER.

(B) IMPOSITION OF THE PAROLE 

INELIGIBILITY TERM WAS 

UNWARRANTED.

POINT IV – THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 

JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL N.O.V. BASED UPON 

INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE SHOULD 

HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

(A) THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT 

EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE GUILTY 

VERDICT ON THE CHARGE OF 

CONSPIRACY.

(B) THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT 

EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE GUILTY 

VERDICT ON THE CHARGE OF 

OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT.

(C) THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT 

EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE GUILTY 

VERDICTS ON COUNTS THREE, FOUR 

OR FIVE.

We reject these contentions and affirm.
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The Underlying Incident

On June 7, 2012, Police Officers Sean Courter and Albert Sutterlin from 

the Township of Bloomfield Police Department (BPD) responded to a home on 

West Passaic Avenue on a report of a domestic violence incident between 

Marcus Jeter and his girlfriend, Ms. T. Killian. In his incident report, Courter 

gave the following version of what happened:

Responded to . . . West Passaic Ave. on a report of a 

Domestic. Upon arrival Officer Sutterlin and I rang the 

doorbell to the residence. While ringing the doorbell a 

black male, later identified as Mr. Marcus Jeter, stuck 

his head out the second floor window and stated, "Come 

and get me". A female, later identified as Ms. [T.]

Killian, then opened the front. While speaking with 

Ms. Killian, the girlfriend, she stated that her boyfriend, 

Mr. Jeter, just jumped out the back window. Officer 

Sutterlin and I heard an engine starting from the rear of 

the residence. A vehicle . . . came up the driveway at a 

high rate of speed. I stated to the driver, Mr. Jeter, to 

put the vehicle in park and give me his identification. 

Mr. Jeter ignored my order to put the vehicle in park 

and stated, "I did not do anything wrong". I spoke to 

Mr. Jeter through the front passenger side window, 

which was rolled down. As Mr. Jeter was speaking, I 

smelled a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage 

emanating from his breath and his eyes being 

bloodshot. In further observing the vehicle I observed 

the rear driver tire to be flat. I asked Mr. Jeter again to 

put the vehicle in park and give me his identification. 

Mr. Jeter refused and drove off at a high rate of speed, 

making a left onto West Passaic Ave. I ran to my 

vehicle and advised Central Communications and 

[Lieutenant Sean] Schwindt that I was pursuing this 
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vehicle. I activated my emergency lights and sirens and 

was able to view Mr. Jeter's vehicle make a right onto 

Broad St. from West Passaic Ave. Upon reaching 

Broad St., I observed Mr. Jeter's vehicle make a right 

onto Parkway South. I was able to catch up to Mr. 

Jeter's vehicle on the Parkway South. I pulled behind 

Mr. Jeter's vehicle, who continued to drive on the 

Parkway South. At this time, I observed the driver-side 

rear tire to be sparking, due to that Mr. Jeter was driving 

on the rim. After approximately 1,000 feet, Mr. Jeter's 

vehicle became disabled, due to that the driver-side rear 

rim was on its side. Mr. Jeter's vehicle came to rest at 

mile marker 154.1 on the Parkway South. I exited my 

vehicle with my handgun drawn on Mr. Jeter, who was 

still in the vehicle with the engine running. I gave Mr. 

Jeter multiple commands to shut off the vehicle and 

show me his hands. Mr. Jeter refused and stated "Fuck 

You, I did not do anything". Officer Sutterlin then 

arrived on scene. At this time I proceeded to the drivers 

side door and attempted to open it. The door was 

locked. I again gave Mr. Jeter verbal commands to 

open the door. Mr. Jeter refused and stated "Fuck You" 

and then rolled up his driver side window. I advised 

Central Communications that Mr. Jeter was refusing to 

exit the vehicle. Officer Trinidad arrived on scene and 

blocked Mr. Jeter's vehicle in from the front, due to that 

Mr. Jeter refused to turn off his vehicle. I again gave 

Mr. Jeter verbal commands to unlock the driver side 

door and exit the vehicle. Mr. Jeter refused. I then used 

my ASP, which is an expandable baton, to break Mr. 

Jeter's driver side window. When the window was 

broke, I gave Mr. Jeter verbal commands to open the 

door. Mr. Jeter refused. While Officer Sutterlin and 

Officer Trinidad stood by, I reached into the driver side 

window and opened the door. While reaching into the 

broken window, my left forearm was scraped by the 

broken glass. I was able to open the door. I advised 

Mr. Jeter to take off his seatbelt. Mr. Jeter refused. I 
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reached over Mr. Jeter and attempted to take off Mr. 

Jeter's seatbelt. While attempting to take off Mr. Jeter's 

seatbelt, Mr. Jeter began grabbing onto my holster in an 

attempt to get my handgun. I advised Mr. Jeter multiple 

times to stop resisting. Officer Trinidad, Officer 

Sutterlin and I then attempted to take Mr. Jeter to the 

ground, at which time Mr. Jeter struck Officer Trinidad 

in the face with his fist. We were then able to take Mr. 

Jeter to the ground. While on the ground Mr. Jeter put 

his hands underneath his body in an attempt not to be 

handcuffed. I advised Mr. Jeter multiple times to stop 

resisting and give me his hands. Officer Trinidad and I 

were able to handcuff Mr. Jeter. Mr. Jeter was then 

placed into patrol vehicle 4. 

[(Emphasis added).]

Courter also filled out a "Bloomfield Police Department DVD Discovery Form," 

which indicated that both his and Trinidad's patrol vehicles were equipped with 

video cameras, the cameras were on during the incident, and the hard drives 

were removed from the patrol vehicles after the incident and placed into 

evidence. 

In his incident report, Sutterlin gave the following version of the incident:

Responded to . . . West Passaic Avenue on a report of a 

[d]omestic. Upon arrival, Mr. Jeter opened an upstairs 

window and yelled: "Come and get me!" This officer 

then rang the doorbell until Ms. Killian responded. Ms. 

Killian stated that she just wanted Mr. Jeter to leave for 

the evening and that when she had gone to the door, Mr. 

Jeter jumped out the back window. Mr. Jeter was 

stopped at the end of the driveway as he was trying to 

leave. Officer Courter requested Mr. Jeter's license and 
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at this time, Mr. Jeter sped off, south on West Passaic 

Avenue. Mr. Jeter turned right onto Broad Street into 

the McDonald's [p]arking lot and then onto Garden 

State Parkway South. At mile marker 154.1, Mr. Jeter 

pulled over because his left rear tire had gone flat and 

the rim had broken. Mr. Jeter was ordered out of his 

vehicle and at this time, Mr. Jeter locked all the doors 

and rolled up all windows, refusing to come out. At 

this time, Lieutenant Schwindt acknowledged to use all 

necessary force to effect an arrest. At this time, the 

driver's window was broken. Mr. Jeter refused to take 

off his seat belt and while Officer Courter was reaching 

over him, Mr. Jeter attempted to gain control of Officer 

Courter's firearm. Mr. Jeter was then extricated from 

the vehicle and ordered to the ground. At this time, Mr. 

Jeter refused to submit to arrest and necessary force was 

used to effect an arrest.

[(Emphasis added).]

Criminal Charges Filed Against Jeter

On June 7, 2012, Courter signed complaint warrants against Jeter charging 

him with second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2B; third-degree resisting 

arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(a); second-degree attempting to disarm a police 

officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-11(a); and obstructing administration of law or other 

governmental function, a disorderly persons offence, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a).1 

 

1

 Courter also issued motor vehicle summonses to Jeter for driving while license

suspended, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40; reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; refusal to 

submit to an alcohol test, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2; driving while intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 

39:4-50; failure to comply with directions of officers, N.J.S.A. 39:4-57; driving 
8

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On September 19, 2012, a grand jury indicted Jeter for second-degree 

eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b); second-degree attempting to disarm a police 

officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-11(a); third-degree aggravated assault on a law 

enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-

1(b)(5)(a); and third-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(a). 

The Internal Affairs Investigation

Prior to his indictment, on June 12, 2012, Jeter filed a complaint against 

Trinidad and Courter with the Essex County Prosecutor's Office (ECPO), 

alleging they physically assaulted him. Jeter asserted that the officers turned on 

their police lights indicating for him to pull over, he pulled over, and "the cops 

approached [his] vehicle . . . beat him up and arrested him, never informing him 

why he was pulled over." He also alleged that a police vehicle crashed into the 

front of his vehicle. In response to Jeter's complaint, the ECPO contacted the 

BPD's Internal Affairs Division (IAD), which began an investigation. 

In an interview with Lieutenant Michael J. Cofone of the IAD, Jeter said 

that he stopped his vehicle on the Garden State Parkway South after he saw the 

police lights and his tire started smoking. Once he stopped, he saw police 

 

while intoxicated 1000 feet from a school, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.6; and creating risk 

of an accident, N.J.S.A. 39:4-56. 
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officers on both sides of his vehicle pointing their guns at him saying "get the 

fuck out of the car." As soon as he saw their weapons, he put his hands up and 

complied with their instructions to turn off his vehicle. At that point, a police 

vehicle (driven by Trinidad) came from Garden State Parkway North and 

crashed into the front of his vehicle. After the officer on the left side of his 

vehicle broke his window, the officers "opened his door and punched him in the 

face, he was caught off guard, the [o]fficers . . . tried to take off his seatbelt and 

'elbowed [him] in the face two times.'" After the officers removed his seatbelt, 

"they slammed [him] to the ground . . . handcuffed [him,] . . . patted [him] down 

and put [him] in the police car." During the encounter he asked to call his 

lawyer. As a result of the incident, he suffered a sprained wrist and cuts and 

bruises on his left arm, right arm, wrist, chest, and face. 

Cofone obtained Courter's and Sutterlin's incident reports, the video 

recording from only Courter's patrol vehicle, and radio and telephone 

recordings. He consulted with Detective Andrew Zachares and was told the 

video recording from Trinidad's patrol vehicle was not available. 

Cofone instructed Trinidad, Courter, and Sutterlin to submit 

administrative reports of the incident. In his administrative report, Trinidad 

stated:
10 A-3029-15T3

On Thursday June 07, 2012[,] at approximately 00[:]14 

hours[,] I was in marked unit #4 patrolling in my zone. 

Officer Sutterlin and Officer Courter received a call . . 

. that there was a domestic [violence incident] in 

progress at . . . West Passaic Avenue. I was originally 

dispatched by [C]ommunications[,] then I was told to 

disregard and resume patrol in my zone. Several 

minutes later Officer Courter relayed to 

Communications that [Jeter] . . . had fled the scene at a 

high rate of speed. . . . At this time I advised Central 

that I would be making my way to the scene. I activated 

my emergency over head lights and sirens and began 

making my way to the scene when I heard Officer 

Courter's next transmission that [Jeter] . . . had gotten 

onto Parkway South and [Courter] continued the 

pursuit until [Jeter] finally pulled over at mile marker 

154.1. I asked Central for authorization to go onto 

Parkway North so that I could expedite my arrival to 

assist Officer[s] Courter and . . . Sutterlin. Lieutenant 

Schwindt gave the approval and I took Parkway North 

to the motor vehicle stop. When I reached their 

location[,] I carefully crossed the black top median 

yielding to traffic. When I saw that no traffic was 

coming[,] I drove across [with the] lights and sirens still 

activated and parked my vehicle . . . bumper to bumper 

with . . . [Jeter's] vehicle so that he would not attempt 

to flee or use his vehicle as [a] weapon . . . . When I 

exited my vehicle[,] I observed Officer[s] Courter and 

. . . Sutterlin giving multiple commands . . . to [Jeter] 

to "[e]xit the vehicle . . . ." I immediately began giving 

verbal commands to . . . [Jeter] to "[e]xit the vehicle . . 

. [as he was] under arrest[.]" [Jeter]. . . refused multiple 

verbal commands from Officer Courter and myself. At 

this time I verbally advised . . . [Jeter] that if he did not 

exit the vehicle we were going to breach the window to 

effect the arrest. [Jeter] . . . ignored my commands 

again stating[,] . . . "Fuck off![] I didn't do shit man[.]" 

Officer Courter then attempted to open the driver side 
11 A-3029-15T3

door but the door was locked. Officer Courter then 

used his asp (expandable baton) and successfully 

breached the window. Multiple verbal commands were 

given to . . . [Jeter] to unlock the door and exit his 

vehicle, [but] he refused. Officer Courter reached into 

the driver side window and opened the door. Officer 

Courter ordered . . . [Jeter] to take off his seat belt and 

exit the vehicle. [Jeter] . . . refused to comply. Officer 

Courter reached over . . . [Jeter] to take off his seat belt, 

at which time I observed . . . [Jeter] grabbing Officer 

Courter[']s service weapon which he had holstered on 

his right hip. Officer Courter yelled[,] . . . "He's 

grabbing my gun . . . [.]" Officer Courter gave . . . 

[Jeter] multiple[] commands to let go of his gun and 

stop resisting. At that moment I was in fear for my 

partner[']s life and[] my own. Officer Sutterlin and I 

proceeded to grab . . . Jeter's hands off [of] Officer 

Courter's gun. Officer Courter was able to remove 

[Jeter's] seatbelt . . . . [When] attempting to extradite . 

. . [Jeter] from the vehicle, [Jeter] struck me in the face 

with a closed fist. After struggling with [Jeter,] we 

finally managed to take him to the ground. On the 

ground . . . [Jeter] continued flailing his arms and then 

plac[ed] his hands underneath his body. I ordered him 

to . . . [s]top resisting . . . [and g]ive me [his] hands[.]" 

And he refused. After struggling with . . . Jeter we 

finally were able to grab his hands and place him under 

arrest. 

[(Emphasis added).]

Courter's administrative report mirrored his incident report, and he added: 

I had to reach over Mr. Jeter[] to remove his seatbelt, 

but as I was reaching over Mr. Jeter began grabbing 

onto my holster attempting to remove my handgun. I 

was scared from my life. I stated he is going for my 

gun. Officer Trinidad and Officer Sutterlin 
12 A-3029-15T3

immediately came to my aid and restrained Mr. Jeter's 

hands from removing my handgun. Mr. Jeter continued 

to resist our efforts to arrest him. We stated multiple 

times to stop resisting. Mr. Jeter continued to flail his 

arms and body in an attempt not to be removed from the 

vehicle.

[(Emphasis added).]

Sutterlin provided more details of the incident in his administrative report, 

and added the following:

At this time, Officer Courter stated that Mr. Jeter was 

attempting to take Officer Courter's weapon. At this 

time, this officer and Officer Trinidad reached in to 

assist Officer Courter and extricate Mr. Jeter during 

which time Mr. Jeter struck Officer Trinidad in the face. 

Mr. Jeter was ordered several times to stop resisting, 

but Mr. Jeter continued to fight with the officers. Mr. 

Jeter was brought to the ground and continued to resist 

by putting his hands underneath his body.

[(Emphasis added).]

Cofone found that Jeter's conduct and behavior precipitated the event, he 

lacked credibility, was uncooperative, actively resisted the officers' attempt to 

arrest him, attempted to grab Courter's weapon, and punched Trinidad in the 

face. Cofone exonerated the officers, concluding the incident occurred, but the 

officers' actions were justified, legal, and proper. On August 1, 2012, Cofone 

notified Jeter that the investigation indicate[d] that the officers followed the 

appropriate department policies and procedures. 
13 A-3029-15T3

On April 3, 2013, the case was reopened after Michael Morris of the ECPO 

notified Cofone of the existence of the video recording from Trinidad's patrol 

vehicle, which showed a very different account of the incident than what 

Trinidad, Courter and Sutterlin had reported. In his investigation report, Cofone 

stated:

Chief Goul, Sgt. Sierchio and I reviewed the 

recording; the recording provides an almost 

unobstructed view of the passenger compartment of Mr. 

Jeter's vehicle. Trinidad responds from the GSP north 

bound side, crosses the grass median and the south 

bound lanes of traffic and strikes Mr. Jeter's vehicle at 

appx. 10-12 mph, Jeter immediately raises his hands; 

Trinidad exits his vehicle and runs around the 

passenger side of Jeter's vehicle. P.O. Courter can be 

seen at the driver side of [Jeter's] vehicle striking his 

window with an object, the window appears to then 

explode, and Courter then clears the broken glass from 

the window area. Courter then leans into the passenger 

compartment and opens the driver side door. As this 

occurs Jeter's hands remain up, Courter then appears to 

grab Jeter's left hand/arm as Jeter's right arm is still 

raised and remains [raised]. Jeter then leans toward the 

passenger side and his left arm becomes free and he 

raises his left arm along with his right arm; both of his 

hands remain raised the entire time. Courter is in the 

passenger compartment of [Jeter's] vehicle. Even when 

Courter appears to grab Jeter in a bear hug both of 

[Jeter's] hands remain raised; at no time can Jeter be 

seen grabbing in any area of Courter[']s body as his 

hands remain raised at the vehicle[']s passenger 

compartment roof. At no time does either P.O. Trinidad 

or P.O. Sutterlin enter the passenger compartment; 

additionally Trinidad does not appear on camera after 
14 A-3029-15T3

he runs from his vehicle to Jeter's [vehicle] subsequent 

to his arrival at the scene. While Courter was leaning 

in the passenger compartment Sutterlin appears at the 

passenger side window and appears to strike the 

passenger side window but it does not break, he then 

walks to the rear of Jeter's vehicle and is not seen again. 

At no time does Jeter appear to punch Trinidad in the 

face.

Chief Goul, Sgt. Sierchio and I viewed the 

recording several more times and did not view any 

attempt by Jeter to grab Courter in any way and at no 

time can Jeter be seen punching Trinidad. At no time 

do Sutterlin and Trinidad appear in the passenger 

compartment of Jeter's vehicle. There is no struggle by 

Trinidad or Sutterlin to remove Jeter's "hands" from 

Courter's weapon. At no time during the recorded 

events of this incident does a Supervisor respond to the 

scene of Jeter's arrest.

[(Emphasis added).]

Cofone concluded from his review of the video that Courter lied in his two 

reports by falsely reporting: Jeter grabbed his gun; Trinidad and Sutterlin came 

to his aid and restrained Jeter's hands from removing the gun; Jeter flailed his 

arms and body "when in reality Jeter ha[d] his hands up in a gesture of surrender 

the entire time[;]" and Jeter struck Trinidad in the face with a closed fist. Cofone 

noted the video showed that Jeter's hands remained up as Courter pulled him 

from his vehicle, and Courter pulled him from the vehicle and threw him to the 

ground in one motion. 
15 A-3029-15T3

Cofone concluded that Trinidad lied in his administrative report about 

Jeter's actions and that Jeter physically assaulted him. Cofone noted the video 

showed that after Jeter was handcuffed and secured, Trinidad picked him up and 

threw him onto the front passenger hood of Trinidad's patrol vehicle so hard that 

Jeter's feet came off the ground. The video also showed that Trinidad punched 

Jeter so hard in the head that his punch careened off Jeter and struck Courter in 

the face. Cofone also concluded that Sutterlin lied in his two reports that: Jeter 

tried to take Courter's gun; he and Trinidad assisted Courter; Jeter punched 

Trinidad in the face; and Jeter struggled. 

Following an investigation by the ECPO, all charges against Jeter were 

dismissed. Specifically, the ECPO found from its review of the video recording 

from Trinidad's patrol vehicle "that [Jeter's] car was not in [the] sight line [of 

Courter's patrol vehicle] until shortly before [Jeter's] car was disabled and pulled 

to the shoulder of the [Garden State Parkway]. Therefore it would be impossible 

to impute to [Jeter] the knowledge that he was being pursued by police. For this 

reason the charge of [e]luding should be dismissed." 

The State's Evidence
16 A-3029-15T3

Trinidad, Courter and Sutterlin were criminally charged. Sutterlin pled 

guilty to fourth-degree falsifying or tampering with records and agreed to testify 

against Trinidad and Courter. 

Sutterlin testified that Trinidad and Courter were waiting for him at police 

headquarters when he returned there one or two hours after the incident. He 

asked them what happened in order to provide a correct sequence of events, they 

told him what happened and what to write, and he wrote what they said in his 

report. Courter told Sutterlin that Jeter grabbed for his gun, but Sutterlin 

admitted he did not see this or see Jeter strike Trinidad. He admitted that he 

spoke to Trinidad and Courter several times about the incident before writing 

his administrative report to make sure he had the correct sequence of events. He 

also admitted his two reports were false, he knew they were false, he did not 

write them himself, and he was aided or helped by Trinidad and Courter. 

Jeter testified that he did not elude the police, resist arrest, attempt to 

disarm Courter, or hit Trinidad. The video recording from Trinidad's patrol 

vehicle, which was played several times to the jury, corroborated Jeter's 

testimony and showed his hands were raised in a surrender gesture, and Trinidad 

assaulted him.

I.
17 A-3029-15T3

At trial, Jeter referenced the high profile police brutality cases involving 

Amadou Diallo, Rodney King, and Sean Bell to explain why he did not exit his 

vehicle when commanded to exit and kept his hands raised. Trinidad's counsel 

requested, and Judge Ravin gave, a limiting instruction that the jury could only 

use this testimony if it found it was relevant to Jeter's state of mind in acting the 

way he acted. Courter's counsel cross-examined Jeter on this testimony.

Trinidad does not argue on appeal that the testimony was not relevant 

under N.J.R.E. 401. Rather, he argues for the first time in Point I that the 

testimony should have been barred under N.J.R.E. 403 because it was highly

prejudicial and served no purpose other than to inflame the passions of the jury. 

Because defendant did not raise this argument below, we review this issue 

for plain error. State v. Ross, 229 N.J. 389, 407 (2017) (citing R. 2:10-2). Under 

this standard, we will only reverse the error if "there is a real possibility that the 

error led to an unjust result, that is, 'one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as 

to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.'" 

State v. Whitaker, 420 N.J. Super. 495, 512 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting State v. 

Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)). We discern no error, let alone plain error, in 

the admission of this testimony.
18 A-3029-15T3

"[T]he inquiry under . . . N.J.R.E. 403 is whether the probative value of 

the evidence 'is so significantly outweighed by [its] inherently inflammatory 

potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a 

reasonable and fair evaluation of the' issues." State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 448 

(2017) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421 

(1971)). "It is not enough for the opposing party to show that the evidence could 

be prejudicial; '[d]amaging evidence usually is very prejudicial but the question 

here is whether the risk of undue prejudice was too high.'" Ibid. (alteration in 

original) (quoting State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 453-54 (1998)). "To determine 

the admissibility of evidence under N.J.R.E. 401 and 403, the trial court 

conducts a fact-specific evaluation of the evidence in the setting of the 

individual case." Ibid. (citations omitted).

"In light of the broad discretion afforded to trial judges, an appellate court 

evaluates a trial court's evidentiary determinations with substantial deference." 

Id. at 449 (citing State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 385 (2015)). "On appellate 

review, '[c]onsiderable latitude is afforded' to the court's ruling, which is 

reversed 'only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion.'" Ibid. (alteration in 

original) (quoting Kuropchak, 221 N.J. at 385). "When a trial court weighs the 

probative value of evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to N.J.R.E. 
19 A-3029-15T3

403, its ruling should be overturned only if it constitutes 'a clear error of 

judgment.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 313 (1988)). "As 

[the] Court observed, applying the predecessor rule to N.J.R.E. 403, a trial 

court's weighing of probative value against prejudicial effect "must stand unless 

it can be shown that the trial court palpably abused its discretion, that is, that its 

finding was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'" Ibid.

(quoting State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982)).

Judge Ravin did not abuse his discretion in permitting Jeter's testimony. 

The probative value of Jeter's testimony was not substantially outweighed by 

any undue prejudice, as it did not distract jurors from reasonably and fairly 

evaluating Trinidad's and Courter's version of events. Rather, Jeter's testimony 

informed the jury's credibility assessment of the different versions of events 

advanced by Jeter and the officers. The references to the other high profile cases 

were used only to explain Jeter's own actions at the time of the incident, not to 

analogize the present case to those prior cases. Looking at his testimony on this 

issue as a whole, his references to other cases were not the focus, and were made 

only in relation to his own conduct and what motivated his behavior to help the 

jury determine which version of events was more likely. 
20 A-3029-15T3

Moreover, Judge Ravin mitigated any prejudicial effect by issuing 

limiting instructions. During Jeter's direct examination, Judge Ravin advised 

jurors that any references Jeter made to other cases should only be relied upon 

"insofar as . . . [they] find it is relevant to . . . [Jeter's] state of mind, why he did 

what it is that he said that he did or [did not] do." The judge again noted, prior 

to summations, that both parties have:

agreed, based on . . . Jeter's testimony, that, if either 

side wants to talk about his testimony [during 

summations] concerning Rodney King, or Mr. Diallo, 

or any of those cases, that each side may comment on it 

only insofar as his testimony went to his state of mind 

at the time in question, should the jury find that that is 

material, and all parties find that his state of mind is 

material.

Jurors are presumed to have followed the court's instructions in the absence of 

evidence demonstrating otherwise. State v. Martini, 187 N.J. 469, 477 (2006). 

There is no such evidence here. Furthermore, defense counsel mitigated any 

prejudicial effect by cross-examining Jeter regarding the differences between 

those high profile cases and this case. 

Thus, given the limited purpose for which it was introduced, the brief 

mention of those cases in relation to Jeter's entire testimony, Judge Ravin's two 

limiting instructions, and defense counsel's cross-examination of Jeter on these 

references, the probative value of Jeter's testimony was not substantially 
21 A-3029-15T3

outweighed by undue prejudice and, in turn, capable of resulting in a manifest 

denial of justice. 

II.

At trial, Cofone testified as a lay witness as follows: 

Q. And had you requested, from Detective Zachares, 

the second video; in other words, the video recording 

from [Trinidad's patrol vehicle].

A. When I first conducted my investigation, I 

requested from him all available evidence. That would 

have encompassed anything there may have been. 

Some things, he was aware of, as the evidence video 

tech.

Q. After the investigation, did you change your 

findings or have any other findings as to the conduct of 

these officers at the time?

A. Not immediately. I did a review of that second 

piece of evidence[, the dash cam video from Trinidad's 

patrol car] with the assistance of Sergeant Sierchio and 

Chief Gould.

Q. Did you then make any findings?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. What were those?

A. I changed the disposition from exonerated to 

sustained. 

. . . . 
22 A-3029-15T3

Q Sir, after watching this second video, the video 

from car number 4, did you -- did you conduct any 

further investigation?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q What did you do?

A Uh, well, I informed the chief -- we saw the video 

-- that it appeared that, based on the new evidence, the 

actions of the officers, umm, appeared to have been 

criminal, and we forwarded the case to the Essex 

County Prosecutor's Office for a criminal review. 

In Point II, Trinidad argues for the first time on appeal that this testimony 

was inadmissible lay opinion on his guilt under N.J.R.E. 701. We disagree.

"Lay witnesses may present relevant opinion testimony in accordance 

with [N.J.R.E.] 701, which permits 'testimony in the form of opinions or 

inferences . . . if it . . . is rationally based' on the witness' 'perception' and 'will 

assist in understanding the witness' testimony or in determining a fact in issue.'" 

State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 22 (2012) (alterations in original) (quoting N.J.R.E. 

701). In State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011), the Court described the boundary 

line that separates factual testimony by police officers from permissible expert 

opinion testimony as follows:

On one side of that line is fact testimony, through which 

an officer is permitted to set forth what he or she 

perceived through one or more of the senses. Fact 

testimony has always consisted of a description of what 
23 A-3029-15T3

the officer did and saw, including, for example, that 

defendant stood on a corner, engaged in a brief 

conversation, looked around, reached into a bag, 

handed another person an item, accepted paper 

currency in exchange, threw the bag aside as the officer 

approached, and that the officer found drugs in the bag. 

Testimony of that type includes no opinion, lay or 

expert, and does not convey information about what the 

officer "believed," "thought" or "suspected," but 

instead is an ordinary fact-based recitation by a witness 

with first-hand knowledge.

[Id. at 460 (citations omitted).]

The Court explicitly rejected the argument "that there is a category of 

testimony that lies between [expert and lay opinions] . . . that authorizes a police 

officer, after giving a factual recitation, to testify about a belief that the 

transaction he or she saw was a narcotics sale." Id. at 461. The Court reasoned 

that such an approach would "transform[] testimony about an individual's 

observations of a series of events . . . into an opportunity for police officers to 

offer opinions on defendants' guilt." Ibid.

The Court's explanation of why the testimony in McLean was 

impermissible has no resonance here. Cofone's testimony was not dispositive 

of whether Trinidad was guilty of the charges, and he did not testify as to the 

ultimate issue of whether Trinidad committed the offenses. Unlike the police 

officer in McLean, Cofone was not asked for his conclusion or observation about 
24 A-3029-15T3

the nature of Trinidad's conduct, and he did not express a belief regarding his 

guilt. Rather, his testimony only discussed whether Jeter's claim that the officers 

assaulted him was "sustained," not whether the officers committed the offenses. 

More importantly, Cofone's testimony did not lead the jury to reach a result it 

would not have otherwise reached when considering the overwhelming proofs 

that Trinidad assaulted Jeter.

Cofone's testimony relating what he told the Chief of Police regarding his 

review of the video and its depiction of Trinidad's and Courter's behavior did 

not exceed the bounds of permissible lay opinions. The testimony was rationally 

based on Cofone's perception and served to inform the jury how IAD conducted 

its internal investigation. The testimony consisted of what he saw on the video 

and what he did during a further investigation into the officers' behavior. 

Moreover, the testimony was the "product of reasoning processes" familiar to 

the jury, as they were later able to view the video several times, which 

highlighted the discrepancies between Trinidad's and Courter's behavior and 

what they said in their police reports. United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 210, 

215 (2d Cir. 2005). While Cofone testified that based on the video, Trinidad's 

and Courter's conduct appeared criminal, his testimony was not offered to 

provide an opinion on their guilt, but to explain the steps he took when 
25 A-3029-15T3

conducting the investigation. 

Nonetheless, even if Cofone's testimony constituted inadmissible lay 

opinion, its admission was not capable of causing an unjust result. The jury was 

able to see and evaluate the video numerous times during the trial. Moreover, 

the prosecutor did not only rely upon Cofone's lay testimony, but relied upon 

Sutterlin's testimony and played the video to demonstrate that the officers 

conspired to falsify their police reports and falsely swore that Jeter attempted to 

grab Courter's weapon and assaulted Trinidad. 

Sufficient credible evidence was presented to prove Trinidad's guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt that was untainted by Cofone's lay opinion and did 

not exacerbate any potential prejudice from its admission. Cofone's testimony 

was based on his perception of the video and served to advise the jury of the 

context in which he performed a further investigation. Even if Cofone's 

testimony included an inadmissible opinion regarding what he suspected, it was 

not capable of leading the jury to either an unjust result or one it otherwise would 

not have reached, as there was other sufficient evidence showing Trinidad 

assaulted Jeter without provocation and falsified his report. 

III.
26 A-3029-15T3

Judge Ravin sentenced Trinidad on count two (second-degree official 

misconduct) to a five-year term of imprisonment with five years of parole 

ineligibility. Trinidad contends in Point III that Judge Ravin erred in failing to 

sentence him one-degree lower to third-degree official misconduct and imposing 

a period of parole ineligibility. 

We review a judge's sentencing decision under an abuse of discretion 

standard. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). As directed by the Court, we 

must determine whether: 

(1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the 

aggravating and mitigating factors found by the 

sentencing court were not based upon competent and 

credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application 

of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the 

sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the 

judicial conscience." 

[Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 

N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).] 

We discern no abuse of discretion in Trinidad's sentence.

A.

Trinidad first argues that Judge Ravin erred by not sentencing him onedegree lower to third-degree official misconduct because the mitigating factors 

substantially outweighed the aggravating factors, he acted under provocation 

and stress and out of character, and he reasonably believed his life was in danger. 
27 A-3029-15T3

Sentencing a first- or second-degree offender to a sentence one degree 

lower is governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), which provides:

In cases of convictions for crimes of the first or 

second degree where the court is clearly convinced that 

the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the 

aggravating factors and where the interest of justice 

demands, the court may sentence the defendant to a 

term appropriate to a crime of one degree lower than 

that of the crime for which he was convicted.

The statute thus establishes a two-prong test. State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 

496 (1996). "The court must be 'clearly convinced that the mitigating factors 

substantially outweigh the aggravating ones and that the interest of justice 

demands a downgraded sentence.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2)). 

"[T]he standard governing downgrading is high." Id. at 500. First, "a 

court must apply the basic [sentencing] principles that are applicable to all 

sentencing decisions under the Code." Ibid. Paramount is the requirement that 

the severity of the crime is "the most single important factor in the sentencing 

process." Ibid. (citing State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 379 (1984)). As the Court 

stated:

In evaluating the severity of the crime, the trial 

court must consider the nature of and the relevant 

circumstances pertaining to the offense. . . . The 

surrounding circumstances of an offense may make it 

very similar to a lower degree offense, thus suggesting 

that a downgraded sentence may be appropriate.
28 A-3029-15T3

[Id. at 500.]

Nonetheless, "facts personal to the defendant may be considered in the 

sentencing process." Id. at 501 (citation omitted). Deterrence is "one of the most 

important factors in sentencing." Ibid. 

Courts should consider a defendant's role in the incident 

to determine the need to deter him from further crimes 

and the corresponding need to protect the public from 

him. Was the defendant the mastermind, a loyal 

follower, an accomplice whose shared intent is 

problematic, or an individual who is mentally incapable 

of forming the necessary criminal intent?

[Ibid.] 

Second, a sentencing judge must consider the interest of justice. A 

decision to downgrade "should be limited to those circumstances in which 

defendant can provide 'compelling' reasons for the downgrade." Id. at 502 

(citation omitted). Such "reasons must be in addition to, and separate from, the 

'mitigating factors which substantially outweigh the aggravating factors" as 

found "under the first prong." Ibid. Because the "interest of justice" focuses on 

the offense and not the offender, the "circumstances used as compelling reasons 

for a downgrade should arise from within the context of the offense itself." State 

v. Lake, 408 N.J. Super. 313, 326 (App. Div. 2009). 
29 A-3029-15T3

For example, in Lake, we reversed the judge's decision to impose a thirddegree sentence on a defendant convicted of second-degree official misconduct. 

408 N.J. Super. at 330. We noted that in justifying the downgrade, the trial 

judge improperly relied upon "circumstances such as a defendant's overall 

character or contributions to the community [which] should not be considered 

under the interest of justice prong in the determination of whether or not to 

downgrade a sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f(2)." Id. at 328.

Finally, after identifying the sentencing factors, the sentencing judge must 

describe how, in the exercise of discretion, he balanced those factors. Megargel, 

143 N.J. at 501-02.

Judge Ravin found that mitigating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), "[t]he 

defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a 

law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the 

present offense[,]" applied "based on [Trinidad's] lack of criminal history and 

on the letters submitted on his behalf demonstrating he has led an exemplary 

and law-abiding life up until the date of this offense." The judge found that 

mitigating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8), "[t]he defendant's conduct was the 

result of circumstances unlikely to recur[,]" applied because Trinidad was 
30 A-3029-15T3

required to forfeit his position as a police officer as a result of the official 

misconduct conviction.

The judge applied mitigating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9),"[t]he 

character and attitude of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to commit 

another offense[,]" based upon numerous letters of support which suggested that 

Trinidad was dedicated to his family, friends and community and extremely 

remorseful. The judge's findings on this mitigating factor is supported by 

sufficient credible evidence, consisting of twenty-eight character letters 

submitted by Trinidad's family members, friends, and employers, which the 

judge summarized on the record during the sentencing hearing. 

Contrary to Trinidad's argument, Judge Ravin properly rejected mitigating 

factors N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(1), "[t]he defendant's conduct neither caused nor 

threatened serious harm[,] and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2), "[t]he defendant did not 

contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm[,]" because 

Trinidad's conduct of punching Jeter and throwing him against his patrol vehicle 

threatened serious harm. 

Judge Ravin also properly rejected mitigating factors N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(b)(3), "[t]he defendant acted under a strong provocation[,]" and N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(b)(5), "[t]he victim of the defendant's conduct induced or facilitated its 
31 A-3029-15T3

commission." In finding Trinidad guilty on all counts, the jury evidently 

credited Jeter's version of events, that there was no provocation, over Trinidad's 

version. 

Judge Ravin applied aggravating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), "[t]he 

need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law[,]" finding

"imprisonment would further the goals of general deterrence for the serious 

crime of official misconduct." The Legislature's imposition of an enhanced 

penalty for the offense of second-degree official misconduct suggests it is a 

serious crime requiring general deterrence. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5. Accordingly, 

the judge found three mitigating factors and only one aggravating factor, 

warranting the imposition of a custodial term at the low end of the sentencing 

range for a second-degree crime. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a) (stating "[i]n the case 

of a crime of the second degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed 

by the court and shall be between five years and [ten] years").

However, "[t]he factors are not interchangeable on a one-to-one basis," 

thereby, "[t]he proper weight to be given to each is a function of its gravity in 

relation to the severity of the offense." State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 368 (1984). 

"The sentencing court does more than quantitatively compare the number of 

pertinent aggravating factors with the number of applicable mitigating factors; 
32 A-3029-15T3

the relevant factors are qualitatively assessed and assigned appropriate weight 

in a case-specific balancing process." Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 72-73 (citations 

omitted). Thus, Judge Ravin's finding of three mitigating factors and only one 

aggravating factor does not necessarily constitute a finding that mitigating 

factors substantially outweighed the aggravating factors; a review of the 

sentencing transcript reveals that he made no such finding.

Moreover, Judge Ravin properly found Trinidad was not entitled to a 

downgraded sentence because he failed to satisfy the interests of justice 

standard. The judge recognized the severity of the offense and the need for 

deterrence given the mandatory minimum prison term and mandatory five-year 

parole disqualifier for second-degree official misconduct under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

6.5. 

The judge also compared the second-degree official misconduct 

conviction to the elements of a third-degree official misconduct and properly 

found there was no similarity between Trinidad's conduct and third-degree 

official misconduct warranting a downgrade. A third-degree official misconduct 

offense occurs when "the benefit obtained or sought to be obtained, or of which 

another is deprived or sought to be deprived, is of a value of $200.00 or less[.]" 

N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2. Sufficient credible evidence in the record demonstrated that 
33 A-3029-15T3

the harm or benefit arising from the official misconduct was nonpecuniary. Jeter 

sustained various injuries, and he was indicted for various crimes he did not 

commit, including aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, based on 

Trinidad's false report of the incident. Trinidad benefited by initially receiving 

an exoneration by IAD and retaining his employment with the BPD. 

Judge Ravin properly found that Trinidad's role and the surrounding 

circumstances did not constitute compelling reasons to downgrade the sentence. 

The judge noted that Trinidad "smashed the front of Jeter's car, punched Jeter 

twice when he was outside the car on the ground, and then hit him again when 

he was up against the car, resulting in injuries to Jeter's arms, wrist, face[,] and 

ear." The judge also found that Trinidad "filled out his own report and swore 

under oath regarding the circumstances," which the jury found was untruthful 

when it convicted him of false swearing. 

Lastly, contrary to Trinidad's contention that he was acting under immense 

stress and provocation due to which the interests of justice warrant a downgrade, 

Judge Ravin found that in finding him guilty on all counts, the jury evidently 

found there was no provocation, and the video recording from Trinidad's patrol 

vehicle and Jeter's and Sutterlin's testimony supported these findings. Thus, 
34 A-3029-15T3

sufficient credible evidence supported Judge Ravin's finding that the interests of 

justice did not warrant a downgrade.

B.

Judge Ravin found that because Trinidad did not satisfy the severe 

hardship standard, he must serve both a prison sentence and parole ineligibility 

term. Trinidad argues that Judge Ravin erred by imposing a period of parole 

ineligibility because the mitigating factors substantially outweighed the 

aggravating factors, his character warranted waiver of the mandatory minimum 

sentence, and he acted on knowledge he gained from the other officers. He 

further argues that Judge Ravin erred by not considering Jeter's conduct and the 

need for general deterrence was low because he suffered sufficient repercussions 

to specifically deter him from committing an offense.

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5(a) requires the imposition of a mandatory five-year 

term of imprisonment without eligibility for parole for second-degree official 

misconduct. The court may waive or reduce the mandatory minimum term "[i]f 

the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that extraordinary 

circumstances exist such that imposition of a mandatory minimum term would 

be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct in others[.]" 
35 A-3029-15T3

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5(c)(2). When the court waives or reduces the mandatory 

minimum sentence, it "must state with specificity its reasons" for doing so. Ibid. 

In considering whether to waive or reduce a mandatory term under 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5(a), a court should engage in an analysis similar to the one 

required by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d), which allows the court to waive a mandatory 

term for a first- or second-degree offender if it finds that in light of defendant's 

"character and condition," imprisonment would result in a serious injustice 

overriding the need of general deterrence. State v. Rice, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 

386-87 (App. Div. 2012). The "serious injustice" standard contained in both 

statutes requires a showing of extraordinary and unanticipated circumstances. 

Id. at 386. "[Th]e reasons offered to dispel the presumption of imprisonment 

must be even more compelling than those that might warrant downgrading an 

offense." State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 389 (2003). 

In interpreting the "serious injustice" standard in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d), the 

Court has advised that "a trial court should determine whether there is clear and 

convincing evidence that there are relevant mitigating factors present to an 

extraordinary degree and, if so, whether cumulatively, they so greatly exceed 

any aggravating factors that imprisonment would constitute a serious injustice 

overriding the need for deterrence." Id. at 393-94. The Court warned that "it is 
36 A-3029-15T3

the quality of the factor or factors and their uniqueness in the particular setting 

that matters." Ibid. With respect to deterrence, the trial court should consider 

the severity of the offense, along with the circumstances of the case, defendant's 

role in the offense, and any presumption of imprisonment. Id. at 394-95. 

We have found that to apply the "serious injustice" standard in N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-6.5(c)(2), the trial court should similarly determine "whether the 

'extraordinary circumstances' presented by an individual defendant outweigh the 

legislative determination that the need to deter others from committing certain 

crimes 'involv[ing] or touch[ing] . . . [public] office or employment' requires 

imposition of the statutory mandatory minimum." Rice, 425 N.J. Super. at 389 

(alterations in the original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5). It will be "justified 

only in 'the extraordinary or extremely unusual case where the human cost of 

imprisoning a defendant [for the statutory mandatory minimum and] for the sake 

of deterrence constitutes a serious injustice.'" Ibid. (alteration in the original) 

(quoting Evers, 175 N.J. at 392).

Judge Ravin did not abuse his discretion in imposing the five-year prison 

term and five-year period of parole ineligibility. His decision did not violate the 

sentencing guidelines or shock the judicial conscience and was based on 

findings of aggravating and mitigating factors that were supported by sufficient 
37 A-3029-15T3

credible evidence in the record. The judge properly found that Jeter's conduct, 

the consequences Trinidad faced as a result of his conviction, and Trinidad's 

character did not constitute "extraordinary circumstances" sufficient to 

overcome the need to deter others from committing the same offenses. Trinidad 

fails to provide any extraordinary and unanticipated circumstances that would 

result in a serious injustice if the court imposed a lesser sentence that would 

outweigh the need to deter others. 

As previously stated, Judge Ravin found mitigating factors seven, eight, 

and nine, and aggravating factor nine, and made no finding that the mitigating 

factors substantially outweighed the aggravating factor. While Trinidad posed 

a low risk of re-offending because he is no longer a police officer, a risk that 

other police officers will commit the same offense still exists. Moreover, 

Trinidad played an active role in the incident, as Jeter's testimony and the video 

recording from Trinidad's patrol vehicle revealed that Trinidad rammed his 

patrol vehicle into the front of Jeter's vehicle, assaulted Jeter, and then later 

falsified his report by stating Jeter assaulted him, attempted to grab Courter's 

gun, and resisted arrest. Lastly, the Legislature's imposition of a mandatory 

minimum five-year term of imprisonment for a second-degree official 

misconduct conviction suggests it is a severe crime with a high need for 
38 A-3029-15T3

deterrence. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5; Megargel, 143 N.J. at 502; State v. Mirakaj, 

268 N.J. Super. 48, 50-51 (App. Div. 1993). 

The fact that Trinidad obtained knowledge of what occurred at Jeter's 

residence from other officers, that Sutterlin testified he did not pressure or direct 

him to include false information in his report, and there is a low need to deter 

him because he lost his job, do not amount to extraordinary circumstances 

resulting in serious injustice sufficient to outweigh the need to deter others from 

committing the same offense. Even if Trinidad learned of what transpired at 

Jeter's residence from other officers, a jury convicted him of falsely swearing to 

the events that occurred while Jeter was stopped on the Garden State Parkway 

South, not to what occurred at Jeter's residence. Even if Trinidad did not direct 

or pressure Sutterlin to falsify his report, he falsified his own report. 

The fact that as a result of his arrest and conviction, Trinidad lost his job, 

incurred substantial debt, and lost his car and apartment also do not constitute 

extraordinary and unanticipated circumstances. A conviction for second-degree 

official misconduct carries a presumption of imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5. 

Moreover, N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(a)(2) provides that

[a] person holding any public office, position, or 

employment . . . under the government of this State or 

any agency . . . thereof, who is convicted of an offense 

shall forfeit such office, position or employment if . . . 
39 A-3029-15T3

[h]e is convicted of an offense involving or touching 

such office, position or employment[.] 

As such, these are all natural, reasonable consequences of a conviction for 

second-degree official misconduct, not extraordinary or unanticipated 

circumstances. 

Because Trinidad failed to show extraordinary or unanticipated 

circumstances more compelling than those warranting a downgrade and 

sufficient to overcome the need to deter others, Judge Ravin properly imposed 

the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and the five-year period of parole 

ineligibility. 

Accordingly, we affirm Trinidad's sentence on count two. However, 

because we find the conviction on the underlying offenses should have merged 

with the official misconduct conviction, we remand for resentencing to merge 

counts one, three, four, and five with count two. 

IV.

In Point IV, Trinidad contends Judge Ravin erred in denying his motion 

for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.). He argues there 

was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdicts on the underlying 

charges of tampering with public records, falsifying or tampering with records, 
40 A-3029-15T3

false swearing, conspiracy to commit official misconduct, and official 

misconduct. 

We use the same standard as the trial judge in reviewing a motion for 

judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case. State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 

534, 548-49 (2004). We must determine

whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be 

that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the 

State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well 

as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably 

could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find 

guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 459 (1967).] 

Under Rule 3:18-1, the court "is not concerned with the worth, nature or 

extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence, but only with its existence, viewed 

most favorably to the State." State v. Muniz, 150 N.J. Super. 436, 440 (App. 

Div. 1977). "If the evidence satisfies that standard, the motion must be denied." 

State v. Spivey, 179 N.J. 229, 236 (2004). 

The standard for deciding a Rule 3:18-2 motion for judgment of acquittal 

n.o.v. is the same as that used to decide a motion for acquittal made at the end 

of the State's case. See State v. Brooks, 366 N.J. Super. 447, 453 (App. Div. 

2004). On appeal, we apply the same standard. State v. Kittrell, 145 N.J. 112, 
41 A-3029-15T3

130 (1996). Applying these standards, we discern no reason to reverse the denial 

of Trinidad's motion for judgment of acquittal n.o.v.

Tampering With Public Records or Information

N.J.S.A. 2C:28-7(a), provides in pertinent part:

A person commits an offense if he:

(1) Knowingly makes a false entry in, or false 

alteration of, any record, document or thing belonging 

to, or received or kept by, the government for 

information or record, or required by law to be kept by 

others for information of the government;

(2) Makes, presents, offers for filing, or uses any 

record, document or thing knowing it to be false, and 

with purpose that it be taken as a genuine part of 

information or records referred to in paragraph (1); or

(3) Purposely and unlawfully destroys, conceals, 

removes, mutilates, or otherwise impairs the verity or 

availability of any such record, document or thing.

Judge Ravin held the State presented sufficient evidence to enable a 

rational jury to find Trinidad and Courter guilty of this charge beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The judge found the third element was met because it was 

undisputed that the police reports and complaint warrants were public records 

required to be kept by the BPD. As to the first and second elements, the judge 

found it was within the jury's exclusive province to determine witness credibility 

and how much weight to give to the evidence. The judge pointed to Jeter's 
42 A-3029-15T3

testimony denying he eluded Courter, resisted arrest, attempted to disarm 

Courter, or assaulted Trinidad. The judge found the video recording from 

Courter's patrol vehicle corroborated Jeter's denial he eluded Courter, and based 

on the jury's viewing of this video recording, it could find Jeter's vehicle was 

not in Courter's line of vision, and therefore, Jeter was not aware he was being 

pursued until Courter activated his lights and sirens and Jeter immediately pulled 

over. The judge also found this video recording provided a basis for the jury to 

rationally find Jeter did not assault Trinidad in the manner Trinidad reported 

because neither Trinidad nor Sutterlin were seen entering the driver's 

compartment of Jeter's vehicle at the point where Jeter was being removed from 

the vehicle.

Judge Ravin found the video recording from Trinidad's patrol vehicle 

further corroborated Jeter's denials. The judge determined the jury could have 

found based on this video recording that Jeter's posture was submissive and his 

hands were up during the point when Courter was attempting to remove his 

seatbelt, despite the split second when one of Jeter's hands was down.

Judge Ravin also pointed to Sutterlin's testimony that: Trinidad and 

Courter together helped him write his incident report; his report was false; he 

did not see Jeter grab Courter's gun; he, Trinidad and Courter did not struggle 
43 A-3029-15T3

to remove Jeter's hands from Courter's gun; he did not see Jeter strike Trinidad; 

and he and Trinidad never entered the passenger compartment of Jeter's vehicle. 

Judge Ravin concluded a rational jury could have found Jeter's testimony 

credible and interpreted the two video recordings as corroborating his testimony. 

The judge determined based on this evidence, a rational jury could find Trinidad 

and Courter knowingly submitted false reports and complaint warrants regarding 

Jeter's actions during the incident giving rise to the criminal charges. The judge 

noted that Courter's false entries included that: Jeter eluded him, refused to show 

his hands and grabbed his holster to get his handgun; Trinidad and Sutterlin 

came to his aid by entering the driver's compartment of Jeter's vehicle and 

restraining Jeter's hands from removing his handgun; Jeter punched Trinidad in 

the face as they attempted to take Jeter to the ground; and Jeter committed the 

criminal offenses for which he was charged.

Judge Ravin noted that Trinidad's false entries included that: he saw Jeter 

grabbing Courter's handgun; he and Sutterlin grabbed Jeter's hands off Courter's 

gun; Jeter struck him with a closed fist while attempting to extract Jeter from 

his vehicle; and Jeter committed the offenses charged in the complaint warrants. 

Falsifying or Tampering with Records
44 A-3029-15T3

N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4(a), provides in pertinent part, that "a person commits a 

crime of the fourth degree if he falsifies, destroys, removes, conceals any writing 

or record, or utters any writing or record knowing that it contains a false 

statement or information, with purpose to deceive or injure anyone or to conceal 

any wrongdoing." 

For the same reasons Judge Ravin expressed for the tampering with public 

records or information charge, he held that the State presented sufficient 

evidence to allow a rational jury to conclude Trinidad and Courter submitted 

false statements in their documents pertaining to Jeter's arrest. As for the second 

element, the judge found that Jeter's and Sutterlin's testimony and the two video 

recordings were sufficient to allow a rational jury to infer Trinidad and Courter 

wanted to injure Jeter out of anger and deceive the BPD, or alternatively, sought 

to conceal their own wrongdoings in connection with Jeter's arrest.

False Swearing

N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] person who 

makes a false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or 

affirms the truth of such a statement previously made, when he does not believe 

the statement to be true, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree." "To establish 

a defendant's guilt under N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2a, the State must prove that a 
45 A-3029-15T3

particular statement was false and not believed by the defendant to be true." 

State v. Bzura, 261 N.J. Super. 602, 610 (App. Div. 1993). To be convicted 

under N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2(a), "the false swearing [must be] willful and 

intentional." State v. Angelo's Motor Sales, Inc., 125 N.J. Super. 200, 206 (App. 

Div. 1973) (holding that to be convicted under N.J.S.A. 2C:28-2(a), "the false 

swearing [must be] willful and intentional"). 

Judge Ravin found the State presented sufficient evidence to enable a 

rational jury to find Trinidad and Courter knowingly committed the act of false 

swearing. The judge found it was undisputed that they certified under oath that 

the charges against Jeter were true. The judge also found that a rational jury 

could have inferred from Jeter's testimony that he did not commit the offenses, 

from Sutterlin's testimony that Trinidad and Courter told him what to write in 

his reports, and that Trinidad and Courter knowingly made false statements 

under oath.

Official Misconduct 

N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 provides, in pertinent part:

A public servant is guilty of official misconduct when, 

with purpose to obtain a benefit for himself or another 

or to injure or to deprive another of a benefit:

a. He commits an act relating to his office but 

constituting an unauthorized exercise of his 
46 A-3029-15T3

official functions, knowing that such act is 

unauthorized or he is committing such act in an 

unauthorized manner[.] 

"Benefit means a gain or advantage, or anything regarded by the 

beneficiary as a gain or advantage, including a pecuniary benefit or a benefit to 

any other person or entity in whose welfare he/she is interested." Model Jury 

Charges (Criminal), "Official Misconduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2)" (2006); see also

N.J.S.A. 2C:27-1; State v. Quezada, 402 N.J. Super. 277, 285 (App. Div. 2008). 

The benefit does not have to be pecuniary, but could amount to enjoyment or 

self-gratification. Quezada, 402 N.J. Super. at 285.

Judge Ravin found it was undisputed Trinidad and Courter were public 

servants who were acting in their official capacity as police officers at the time 

of the incident. The judge found based on his analysis regarding the tampering 

with public records or information, falsifying or tampering with records and 

false swearing counts, each of which constituted the predicate unauthorized 

official act for official misconduct, that a rational jury could infer Trinidad and 

Courter knowingly committed a violation of official duty. 

Judge Ravin also found the State presented sufficient evidence that Jeter 

was injured and Trinidad's and Courter's reports were inconsistent with the two 

video recordings from which a rational jury could conclude Trinidad and Courter 
47 A-3029-15T3

sought the benefit of concealing their actions during the incident from 

departmental review in order to make their actions appear correct.

Conspiracy to Commit Official Misconduct

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 provides, in pertinent part:

A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or 

persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of 

promoting or facilitating its commission he:

(1) Agrees with such other person or persons that 

they or one or more of them will engage in conduct 

which constitutes such crime or an attempt or 

solicitation to commit such crime; or

(2) Agrees to aid such other person or persons in the 

planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt 

or solicitation to commit such crime.

"[T]he agreement to commit a specific crime is at the heart of a conspiracy 

charge." State v. Samuels, 189 N.J. 236, 245 (2007). "It is the agreement that is 

pivotal." Id. at 246. 

"A conspiracy conviction does not turn on 'doing the act, nor effecting the 

purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to do them, nor 

in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the scheme or agreement[.]" 

State v. Ball, 141 N.J. 142, 178 (1995) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 

Carbone, 10 N.J. 329, 337 (1952)). Likewise, "mere knowledge, acquiescence, 

or approval of the substantive offense without an agreement to cooperate, is not 
48 A-3029-15T3

enough to establish one as a participant in a conspiracy." State v. Abrams, 256 

N.J. Super. 390, 410 (App. Div. 1992). "It is the agreement that is pivotal." 

Samuels, 189 N.J. at 246.

In determining whether the scheme or agreement was formed, "[j]uries are 

routinely instructed that they may draw logical inferences from the evidence 

presented to them and that circumstantial evidence is of as equal weight as direct 

evidence. Courts have regularly held that conspiracy may be proven through 

circumstantial evidence." State v. Cagno, 211 N.J. 488, 512 (2012). However, 

"[t]here must be intentional participation with the purpose of furthering the goal 

of committing the crime." Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, cmt. 

5 on N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (2010). Further, the essential elements of conspiracy must 

be evaluated in terms of the underlying offense. Samuels, 189 N.J. at 246-47. 

Judge Ravin found the evidence established that Trinidad, Courter and 

Sutterlin were working together in close proximity to each other and Jeter at the 

scene of the incident, and the officers got together and spoke about what 

information to include in their reports. The judge noted the striking similarity 

of the facts in the officers' reports and the video recordings that contradicted the 

contents of those reports. The judge also noted that while Sutterlin testified that 

Trinidad and Courter did not orchestrate his report, he also testified they 
49 A-3029-15T3

refreshed his recollection as to the incident. The judge concluded that based on 

Trinidad's and Courter's communications with Sutterlin, the similarity of their 

reports, and the video evidence contradicting the reports, a rational jury could 

infer Trinidad and Courter knowingly prepared false reports and helped Sutterlin 

prepare a false report for the purpose of committing official misconduct.

We are satisfied that the overwhelming evidence in this case, viewed in 

its entirety and giving the State all favorable inferences therefrom, was more 

than sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find Trinidad guilty of tampering 

with public records, falsifying or tampering with records, false swearing, official 

misconduct, and conspiracy to commit official misconduct beyond a reasonable. 

We have considered Trinidad's arguments to the contrary in light of the record 

and applicable legal principles and conclude they are without sufficient merit to 

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm the denial 

of Trinidad's motion for judgment of acquittal n.o.v. substantially for the reasons 

Judge Ravin expressed in his comprehensive and cogent written opinion. 

Trinidad's conviction and sentence on count two are affirmed. This matter 

is remanded for resentencing to merge counts one, three, four, and five with 

count two.