J-S13026-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

WILLIAM R. METCALF 

 Appellant No. 1174 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 10, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-04-CR-0001055-2012 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED APRIL 1, 2015 

 

 Appellant, William R. Metcalf, appeals from the aggregate judgment of 

sentence of one year, less one day, to two years, less one day, of 

imprisonment followed by 42 months’ probation imposed after a jury 

convicted Appellant of indecent assault, endangering the welfare of children, 

and corruption of minors.1 After careful review, we affirm. 

 We recount the relevant factual and procedural history of this case as 

follows. On February 9, 2012, Appellant was living with his fiancé, N.T., her 

eight-year-old daughter, D.T., and the couple’s two, young daughters. See 

N.T., 11/13/13, at 62-63. That evening, D.T. went into the bedroom that 

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1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(7), 4304(a)(1), and 6301(a)(1), respectively. 

 
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Appellant shared with N.T. and laid down next to her mother, who was 

asleep. See id. at 52, 65. Appellant then told D.T. to come to where he 

was in the bedroom and touched D.T. “inside” her “private.” Id. at 51-53. 

D.T. related that her “private” is “where you go to the bathroom at[]” and 

specifically, “peeing.” Id. at 51. 

 Appellant then left the room, and D.T. left and went into her sisters’ 

room. Id. at 53. N.T. awoke and noticed D.T. was acting “funny” and that 

D.T.’s underwear was “crooked, sideways” and “twisted.” Id. 66-67. N.T. 

then “pulled [D.T.’s] underwear down” and observed that “her private area 

was deep red.” Id. at 67. N.T. then called a friend who called the police. 

Id. at 68. Police Officer David Tresky of the White Township Police 

Department received the complaint at approximately 9:07 p.m. that evening 

and reported to the residence. Id. at 89-90. After speaking with N.T. and 

D.T., Officer Tresky transported N.T. and her children to Heritage Valley 

Medical Center where the emergency room physician, Dr. Matthew Wheeler, 

examined D.T. Id. at 93, 109. Thereafter, on February 21, 2012, D.T. was 

interviewed by Dr. Kevin Rau, a forensic interviewer, and examined by Dr. 

Mary Carrasco, a pediatrician who specializes in child abuse, at A Child’s 

Place at Mercy. Id. at 115, 161-163. 
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On May 7, 2012, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with the 

aforementioned offenses as well as aggravated indecent assault.2 Appellant 

entered a plea of nolo contendere to aggravated indecent assault on May 7, 

2013. The trial court held a hearing to determine if Appellant was a 

sexually violent predator on August 28, 2013. At that time, counsel for 

Appellant informed the trial court that Appellant wished to withdraw his plea, 

and the trial court heard testimony and argument on the request. N.T., 

8/28/13, at 3-46. On August 29, 2013, the trial court granted Appellant’s 

motion to withdraw his plea, and the case proceeded to a three-day jury trial 

on November 13, 2013. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found 

Appellant guilty of indecent assault, endangering the welfare of children and 

corruption of minors and not guilty of aggravated indecent assault. 

On March 10, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to one year, 

less one day, to two years, less one day, of imprisonment followed by 42 

months’ probation3 and to comply with the registration requirements 

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2

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(b). 

3

 Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of imprisonment 

of one year, less one day, to two years, less one day, of imprisonment 

followed by three years’ probation for indecent assault. On the conviction 

for endangering the welfare of children, the trial court sentenced Appellant 

to a term of imprisonment of one year, less one day, to two years, less one 

day, of imprisonment followed by three years’ probation. On the conviction 

for corruption of minors, the trial court sentenced Appellant to nine to 18 

months’ imprisonment followed by 42 months’ probation. The sentences 

were imposed to run concurrently. 
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pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9799.10-9799.41. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on 

March 11, 2014, wherein he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence at 

trial and requested bond and credit for time-served. Post-Sentence Motion, 

3/11/14, at 1-4 (unnumbered). He also requested an extension to file an 

amended post-sentence motion upon receipt of transcripts. Id. On April 17, 

2014, the trial court dismissed his request for bond as moot because 

Appellant was released under the supervision of parole on that date and 

denied his request for credit for time-served. Trial Court Order, 4/17/14. 

By separate order on April 17, 2014, the trial court ordered Appellant to file 

an amended post-sentence motion, if desired, by May 19, 2014. Appellant 

filed an amended post-sentence motion on May 14, 2014, wherein he raised 

challenges to the weight and sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence. 

See Brief in Support of Amended Post-Trial Motion, 5/14/14, at 1-5 

(unnumbered). The trial court denied Appellant’s motion on July 2, 2014, 

and Appellant filed the instant timely appeal on July 18, 2014.4

On appeal, Appellant raises the following two issues for our review. 

I. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient 

evidence to convict [] Appellant of indecent assault, 

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4

 The trial court ordered Appellant to file a statement of errors complained of 

on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), 

and Appellant timely filed his statement. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the 

trial court directs this Court to its July 2, 2014 opinion, denying Appellant’s 

post-sentence motion. Trial Court Opinion, 8/19/2014. 
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endangering welfare of children and corruption of 

minors? 

II. Whether the conviction of []Appellant on the 

charges of indecent assault, endangering welfare of

children and corruption of minors goes against the 

weight of the evidence? 

Appellant’s Brief at 6. 

 We employ a well-settled standard of review over claims challenging 

the sufficiency of the evidence. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence, we consider whether the evidence presented at trial, and all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, support the jury’s verdict beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 66 (Pa. 

2014) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Patterson v. Pennsylvania, 2015 

WL 731963 (U.S. 2015). “The Commonwealth can meet its burden by 

wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is 

to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn 

from the combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 

108, 113 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2014). As an appellate court, we 

must review “the entire record ... and all evidence actually received[.]” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he trier of fact while 

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence 
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produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 99 A.3d 925 (Pa. 2014). “Because evidentiary 

sufficiency is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 

126 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Diamond v. Pennsylvania, 

135 S. Ct. 145 (2014). 

Appellant argues, “[t]he Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to 

enable the finder of fact to find that all the elements of the offenses were 

established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant’s Brief at 9-10. 

However, before we may address the merits of Appellant’s claim, we must 

first address whether Appellant has preserved this issue for our review. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) requires Rule 1925(b) 

statements to “concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant 

intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for 

the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(ii). Any issue not raised in accordance with 

Rule 1925(b) is waived. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(vii). Our Supreme Court has 

clarified that Rule 1925(b) is a bright-line rule. Commonwealth v. Hill, 16 

A.3d 484, 494 (Pa. 2011). Additionally, with regard to claims pertaining to 

the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence, we have stated as follows. 

In order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence on appeal, an appellant’s Rule 

1925(b) statement must state with specificity 

the element or elements upon which the 
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appellant alleges that the evidence was 

insufficient. Such specificity is of particular 

importance in cases where, as here, the appellant 

was convicted of multiple crimes each of which 

contains numerous elements that the Commonwealth 

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added). 

In the instant case, Appellant was convicted of three, separate 

offenses, yet Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence in his Rule 

1925(b) statement baldly asserted, “[t]he Commonwealth failed to present 

sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of 

the offenses for which [] Appellant was convicted[.]” Rule 1925(b) 

Statement, 8/18/2014, at 2. 

Based on our cases, we are constrained to conclude that Appellant has 

not complied with Rule 1925(b) because his concise statement fails to 

specify which elements of the listed offenses the Commonwealth did not 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Garland, supra (concluding that 

Garland’s bald Rule 1925(b) statement that “[t]he evidence was legally 

insufficient to support the convictions[]” was non-compliant with Rule 

1925(b)); Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1256 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (concluding that Williams’ bald Rule 1925(b) statement that “[t]here 

was insufficient evidence to sustain the charges of Murder, Robbery, VUFA 

no license, and VUFA on the streets ... [t]hus [Appellant] was denied due 
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process of law[]” was non-compliant with Rule 1925(b)). Accordingly, this 

claim is waived.5 

Next, Appellant argues, “[t]he [] Appellant’s conviction goes against 

the weight of the evidence.” Id. at 10. We begin by acknowledging that 

“[a] true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient evidence 

exists to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be believed.” 

Commonwealth v. Thompson, --- A.3d ---, 2014 WL 6948150, at *10 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has clarified that, 

“[a] motion for a new trial alleging that the verdict was against the weight of 

the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” 

Commonwealth v. Weathers, 95 A.3d 908, 910-911 (Pa. Super. 2014), 

citing Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879 (Pa. 2008). Therefore, 

on appeal, the reviewing court “reviews the exercise of discretion, not the 

underlying question whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence.” Id. Indeed, it is well established that it is for the factfinder to 

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5

 We observe Appellant’s argument in support of this issue is also woefully 

underdeveloped. Aside from outlining our standard of review, Appellant’s 

argument section with regard to his sufficiency claim contains no citations to 

legal authority nor does Appellant provide any discussion at all on the crimes 

for which Appellant was convicted or any subsumed element. See 

Appellant’s Brief at 9-10. Accordingly, we could also find waiver on this 

basis. See Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1005 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (concluding appellant waived his issue on appeal when he failed to 

develop his argument with discussion of pertinent facts and authority.); 

accord Pa.R.A.P. 2119, 2101. 
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determine the weight given to the evidence produced at trial. 

Commonwealth v. Ferguson, --- A.3d ---, 2015 WL 49438, at *4-5 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Because it is the role of the factfinder to 

weigh the evidence, an appellant seeking to challenge the weight of the 

evidence carries a heavy burden. 

If the factfinder returns a guilty verdict, and if a 

criminal defendant then files a motion for a new trial 

on the basis that the verdict was against the weight 

of the evidence, a trial court is not to grant relief 

unless the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as 

to shock one’s sense of justice. 

Id. We also highlight that “[a] new trial is not warranted because of a mere 

conflict in the testimony and must have a stronger foundation than a 

reassessment of the credibility of witnesses.” Commonwealth v. 

Gonzalez, --- A.3d ---, 2015 WL 252446, at *8 (Pa. Super. 2015). “[O]nly 

where the facts and inferences disclose a palpable abuse of discretion will 

the denial of a motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence be 

upset on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Morales, 91 A.3d 80, 91 (Pa. 2014) 

(emphasis in original; citation omitted). 

 Instantly, Appellant argues the verdict is contrary to the weight of the 

evidence because “[t]he evidence against [Appellant] is suspect at best.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 10. Specifically, Appellant challenges that “[t]he 

Commonwealth attempted to bolster [its] case by the utilization of [Special 

Agent] Ambrosini[]” and the admission of a statement he took from 

Appellant. Id. However, Appellant argues that Special Agent Ambrosini 
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“clearly stated that [] Appellant did not see what he had typed onto his 

computer[]” before signing the statement. Id. Further, Appellant asserts 

that “[t]he Commonwealth presented two expert witnesses who both stated 

that there was no clear evidence of trauma.” Id. Upon review, we 

disagree. 

In denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion, the trial court 

summarized the testimony relevant to this weight challenge as follows. 

 Dr. Matthew Wheeler, an assistant medical 

director at Heritage Valley Health System, testified 

that on February 9, 2012, he was working in the 

emergency room department of the Heritage Valley 

Medical Center and examined D.T. Dr. Wheeler 

performed an external examination and did not find 

any injuries. He did not perform [an] internal 

examination as he believed it would be too intrusive 

for the child and unlikely to yield evidence. 

 Dr. Kevin Rua, a forensic interviewer at “A 

Child’s Place at Mercy”, testified that he interviewed 

D.T. on February 21, 2012. In the course of the 

interview, D.T. told him that on the date of the 

incident[,] she awoke and went to lie down next to 

her mother; [Appellant] told her not to “mess with”

the dogs and moved her next to him; [Appellant] 

then put his finger in her “second hole” and it hurt. 

 Special Agent Robert Ambrosini, of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, testified that he initially 

explained the allegations, which [Appellant] denied. 

Agent Ambrosini told [Appellant] that he did not 

believe [Appellant’s] denial and suggested the 

possibility that [Appellant] had gotten “turned 

around” in bed and mistook [N.T.] for D.T. 

[Appellant] agreed that was possible and he believed 

that was what happened. Agent Ambrosini traced 

[Appellant’s] hand on a piece of paper and asked 

[Appellant] to draw a line to indicate the length of 
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his penetration into D.T.’s vagina, which [Appellant] 

did. Agent Ambrosini prepared a written 

statement[.] ... [Appellant] and Agent Ambrosini 

signed the statement.... 

 Dr. Mary Carrasco, the director of “A Child’s 

Place at Mercy”, testified that she examined D.T. on 

February 21, 2014. Her examination disclosed a 

“notch depression of her [D.T.’s] hymen.” Dr. 

Carrasco testified that this physical condition could 

have been caused by trauma or penetration but is 

not clear evidence of sexual abuse. 

 Appellant testified he had lived with [N.T.] for 

six and one half years. On February 9, 2012, he 

heard D.T. making noise and attempting to wake up 

her sisters. He instructed her to lie next to [N.T.] on 

the floor of their bedroom. D.T. then began to play 

with their dog and [Appellant] instructed her to lie on 

the floor next to him. D.T. would not lie still and 

[Appellant] “smacked her” and instructed her to go 

back to sleep. 

 Appellant further testified that during his 

interview with Agent Ambrosini[,] he refused to sign 

the proposed statement; [Appellant] signed the 

digital signature pad believing that he was signing a 

waiver for release of information. [Appellant] further 

testified that the outline of his hand was referring to 

a different incident when he was playing with D.T. 

and his two children at a pool, his hand slipped 

picking up D.T. and the pad of his finger touched her 

vagina.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/14, at 5-7. The trial court explicitly noted, “[t]he 

[trial c]ourt does not find that the [j]ury’s verdict was so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Id. at 10. 

 In the instant case, D.T. testified Appellant touched her with his finger 

inside her private area, where she goes to the bathroom. N.T., 11/13/13, at 
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51-53. N.T. testified that following the incident, D.T. acted “funny,” D.T.’s 

underwear was twisted, and her genital area appeared red. Id. at 66-67. 

The jury, as fact-finder, was free to believe D.T.’s account of the incident 

and determine the weight given to all of the evidence produced at trial. See 

Ferguson, supra. Moreover, Appellant is not entitled to a new trial based 

on a reassessment of the credibility of witnesses. See Gonzalez, supra. 

Therefore, we conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 

denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial based on the weight of the 

evidence. See Weathers, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the March 10, 

2014 judgment of sentence. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/1/2015