[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-14396

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cv-00554-JDW-TGW

ARNOLD MAURICE MATHIS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

ZULAIKA ZOE VIZCARRONDO, 

 Defendant-Appellee,

JAMES MICHAEL EVANS,

 Defendant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(December 2, 2019)

Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Arnold Mathis, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 action for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments. First, Mathis asserts the district court erred in dismissing his 

unlawful arrest claims as barred by the statute of limitations. Second, he contends

the district court erred in dismissing his illegal search claim on the basis of 

qualified immunity. After review, we affirm the district court. 

I. DISCUSSION

A. Unlawful Arrest Claims

A § 1983 claim is governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury 

statute of limitations. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th 

Cir. 1999). In Florida, “a plaintiff must commence a § 1983 claim . . . within four 

years of the allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.” Id.; see also Fla. 

Stat. § 95.11(3)(p). The statute of limitations “does not begin to run until the facts 

which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a 

person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 

556, 561–62 (11th Cir. 1996). When an allegedly false arrest is followed by 

criminal proceedings, the statute of limitations for the false arrest begins to run 

once the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process. Wallace v. Kato, 

549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007).

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The district court did not err in dismissing Mathis’s unlawful arrest claims as 

barred by the statute of limitations. See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 

(11th Cir. 2003) (reviewing de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a 

claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and viewing the allegations in the 

complaint as true). Accepting Mathis’s version of the facts as true, he learned 

there was no probable cause supporting his December 2011 arrest on February 4, 

2013. Thus, the facts supporting his unlawful arrest action were apparent on

February 4, 2013, making that date the latest possible accrual date for the statute of 

limitations. Even using this date, the four-year statute of limitations would have 

run out on February 4, 2017, almost one month before Mathis filed his complaint 

on March 1, 2017. 

Mathis also contends the statute of limitations was equitably tolled because 

he was prevented from asserting his rights because he was in Polk County jail until 

February 2015. However, equitable tolling does not apply. Mathis was not 

prevented in any way from asserting his rights as he would have been able to file 

this suit from jail. See Williams v. Albertson's, Inc., 879 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 2004) (explaining Florida law allows for equitable tolling where “the 

plaintiff has been misled or lulled into inaction, has in some extraordinary way 

been prevented from asserting his rights, or has timely asserted his rights 

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mistakenly in the wrong forum”). Therefore, the district court did not err in 

dismissing his unlawful arrest claims as barred by the statute of limitations. 

B. Unlawful Search Claim

The doctrine of “[q]ualified immunity shields public officials from suits 

against them in their individual capacities for torts committed while performing 

discretionary duties unless the tortious act violates a clearly established statutory or 

constitutional right.” Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1071 (11th Cir. 

2008). If the official was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, the 

burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the official is not entitled to qualified 

immunity. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136–37 (11th Cir. 2007). 

Overcoming the official’s qualified immunity defense ordinarily involves a 

two-part inquiry considering (1) whether facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff 

make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right violated 

was clearly established at the time of the official’s alleged misconduct. Roberts v. 

Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 904 (11th Cir. 2011). Both elements must be satisfied to 

overcome qualified immunity. Id.

The district court did not err in dismissing Mathis’s unlawful search claim 

because Vizcarrondo is entitled to qualified immunity. See Griffin Indus., Inc. v. 

Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating when reviewing a motion to 

dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, we determine whether a complaint sets 

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forth a violation of a clearly established constitutional right de novo). First, 

Vizcarrondo was acting within her discretionary authority when she conducted the 

warrantless search of Mathis’s cell phone because she was performing routine

investigatory monitoring of Mathis and his jail visits when the search occurred. 

Second, while Mathis alleged a constitutional violation—the warrantless search of 

his cell phone—that right was not clearly established in 2011 when the alleged 

unlawful search took place. It was not until 2013 and 2014, two to three years 

after the search of Mathis’s cell phone, that both the Florida Supreme Court and 

the United States Supreme Court conclusively determined that warrantless searches 

of cell phones were unconstitutional. See Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 732-

33 (Fla. 2013) (holding the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth 

Amendment warrant requirement does not permit an officer to search an arrestee’s 

cellphone without a warrant); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) 

(holding the police may not search digital information on a cellphone seized from 

an arrested individual without a warrant). In Smallwood, the Florida Supreme 

Court noted that prior to its decision in 2013, “such searches [had] been held both 

valid and invalid by various state and federal courts.” Smallwood, 113 So. 3d at 

728. Therefore, the constitutional right could not have been clearly established 

when Vizcarrondo searched Mathis’s phone almost two years prior to the 

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Smallwood decision. Because the right was not clearly established at the time she 

searched Mathis’s cell phone, Vizcarrondo is entitled to qualified immunity. 

II. CONCLUSION

The district court did not err in dismissing Mathis’s complaint because 

Mathis’s unlawful arrest claims were barred by the statute of limitations and 

Vizcarrondo’s search of Mathis’s cell phone was protected by qualified immunity.1

 

AFFIRMED.

1

 As we affirm the district court’s holding on these issues, we need not address the 

district court’s alternate holding that Mathis was not entitled to punitive damages under 42 

U.S.C. § 1997e(e). 

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