UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4398

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMAR ALI COVINGTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior

District Judge. (5:07-cr-00302-BR-1)

Submitted: January 27, 2011 Decided: March 1, 2011

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, 

Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

In 2008, Jamar Ali Covington pleaded guilty to 

possession of a firearm after having previously been convicted 

of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one 

year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), and the 

district court sentenced him to twenty-seven months of 

imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. 

Subsequently, Covington pleaded guilty to violating the terms of 

his supervised release, and the court sentenced him to 

twenty-four months of imprisonment. Covington now appeals, 

arguing that the revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable. 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

This court reviews a sentence imposed as a result of a 

supervised release violation to determine whether the sentence 

was plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 

433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). The first step in this analysis is a 

determination of whether the sentence was unreasonable. Id. at 

438. This court, in determining reasonableness, follows 

generally the procedural and substantive considerations employed 

in reviewing original sentences. Id. On review, we will assume 

a deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and 

the exercise of discretion. Id. at 439. 

Although a district court must consider the policy 

statements in Chapter Seven of the sentencing guidelines along 
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with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006) and 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), “‘the court ultimately has broad 

discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of 

imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.’” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 

439 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 

2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a sentence 

imposed after a revocation is not unreasonable, we will not 

proceed to the second prong of the analysis — whether the 

sentence was plainly unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39. 

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the 

sentence imposed by the district court is reasonable, and 

therefore we have no need to consider whether the sentence is 

plainly unreasonable.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED