[Cite as State v. White, 2024-Ohio-549.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

PICKAWAY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

:

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 22CA22

: 

v. : 

: DECISION AND

Bobby L. B. White, : JUDGMENT ENTRY

:

Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED 2/8/2024

_____________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Jerry L. McHenry, Pickerington, Ohio, for Appellant.

Judy C. Wolford, Pickaway County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jayme Hartley 

Fountain, Assistant Pickaway County Prosecuting Attorney, Circleville, Ohio, for 

Appellee.

_____________________________________________________________ 

Smith, P.J.

{¶1} Bobby L.B. White, Appellant, appeals from the judgment of the 

Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of one count of murder, 

an unclassified felony in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), one count of murder, an 

unclassified felony in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), and one count of felonious 

assault, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). On appeal, 

White contends: 1) that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the 

evidence and were not supported by sufficient evidence; and 2) that trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. However, because we find that White’s 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 2

convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, his first assignment of error is overruled. Further, 

because we find that White failed to demonstrate that the allegedly deficient 

performance by his trial counsel resulted in prejudice to him, he has not 

demonstrated that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Thus, his 

second assignment of error is also overruled. Accordingly, having found no merit 

in either of the assignments of error raised by White on appeal, the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

FACTS

{¶2} On the afternoon of December 25, 2019, at approximately 12:30 or 

1:00 p.m., Kenneth and Ruth Tennant left their Pickaway County home and 

traveled a short distance to their neighbor’s house for Christmas dinner. They 

returned home between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. to find two dogs with leashes running 

loose. After putting the dogs into their garage with a plan to try to locate the 

owner, Ruth saw something lying in the yard, realized it was a deceased person,

and she called 911. The deceased person was later identified as Douglas Buechler, 

the victim herein. White, who was in possession of Buechler’s vehicle, was 

arrested approximately two days later after being stopped by law enforcement 

while driving the vehicle. White was taken to the police station for questioning 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 3

and was arrested after an initial search of the vehicle revealed illegal drugs and 

drug paraphernalia. 

{¶3} Thereafter, on February 6, 2020, Bobby White was indicted on 

multiple felony counts as follows:

Count 1: Murder, an unclassified felony in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A);

Count 2: Murder, an unclassified felony in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B);

Count 3: Felonious Assault, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 

2903.11(A)(1);

Count 4: Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs, a third-degree felony in violation of 

R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(c); and 

Count 5: Aggravated Possession of Drugs, a third-degree felony in violation of 

R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(b).

The indictment specified that White had knowingly caused serious physical harm 

and ultimately had purposely caused the death of Douglas Buechler on December 

25, 2019. The indictment further alleged that White had both possessed and 

trafficked methamphetamine in an amount equal to or exceeding the bulk amount, 

but not exceeding five times the bulk amount.

{¶4} The matter proceeded to a two-day jury trial commencing on 

November 2, 2020. Although the record does not contain trial transcripts from that 

trial, it appears that the State voluntarily dismissed Count 4, aggravated trafficking 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 4

in drugs, prior to trial and that White was convicted of Count 5, aggravated 

possession of drugs. The record further indicates that the trial resulted in a hung 

jury as to Counts 1, 2, and 3. As a result, the trial court declared a mistrial as to 

those counts of the indictment and proceeded to sentence White to a 36-month 

prison term on Count 5. White did not appeal that conviction. 

{¶5} The prosecution of Counts 1, 2, and 3 resumed nearly one year later 

with the filing of the State’s supplemental discovery on October 25, 2021,

disclosing two new witnesses, Nicholas Tootle and Stephanie Adams. Additional 

discovery was conducted and the matter eventually proceeded to a second jury trial 

on September 21, 2022. The State presented 11 witnesses at trial and introduced 

41 exhibits. The defense presented one witness and introduced five exhibits. 

{¶6} A summary of the witness testimony essentially reveals that the victim 

had been arrested a few days prior to his death and had just been released from jail 

in Franklin County, Ohio on the morning of his murder. His friend Steven Hughes 

picked him up from jail and another friend, White (who was in possession of the 

victim’s vehicle since the time of his arrest), drove the victim’s car to Columbus at 

approximately 12:30 or 1:00 p.m. to pick him up from Hughes’ house. White and 

the victim, as well as the victim’s dogs, drove around the Columbus area for some 

time looking for drugs and then headed to Circleville, Ohio. 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 5

{¶7} White claimed that the two of them left the Columbus area sometime 

between 3:30 and 5:30 p.m. and that he dropped the victim off on the south side of 

Circleville with his dogs in order for the victim to go see his ex-girlfriend, Sarah 

Kinser (who White believed to be named Ann). White claimed he never saw the 

victim after that. However, the victim was found deceased in the Tennant’s yard, 

which was located in Ashville, Ohio, to the north of Circleville sometime between 

4:00 and 5:00 p.m. Items found at the scene of the murder were eventually linked 

to White.

{¶8} More specifically, the State’s witnesses included Ruth Tennant, 

Brooke Cano of the Pickaway County Sheriff’s Office, Robert Radcliffe, the 

Pickaway County Sheriff, Dr. John Ellis, the Pickaway County Coroner, Detective 

Sergeant Tracy Andrews of the Pickaway County Sheriff’s Office, Steven Hughes, 

Special Agent Chad Holcomb from the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation 

(hereafter “BCI”), Trent Banks, who was White’s former boss and friend, Sarah 

Kinser, Erica Jiminez, a forensic scientist from BCI, and Nicholas Tootle, a 

witness that was newly discovered after the conclusion of the first jury trial. 

{¶9} As stated, Ruth Tennant testified that she discovered the victim’s body 

lying in her front yard and covered in blood just as it was getting dark. She also 

discovered what was later determined to be the victim’s dogs running around with 

their leashes still attached. She testified that she observed a bloody handprint on 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 6

her garage door and that flower pots were knocked over. She testified that the 

victim’s throat had been slit. 

{¶10} Brooke Cano was the law enforcement officer initially dispatched to 

the scene at approximately 4:15 p.m. She arrived to find the victim not breathing, 

with trauma to this throat, several lacerations, and his clothing all displaced. She 

found a hat lying in the flower bed, a pool of blood by the hat, and also a pair of 

green glasses lying on the side of the garage near where the bloody handprint was 

on the garage door. On cross examination, defense counsel questioned Cano 

regarding the victim’s clothing and nail color, to which Cano responded that the 

victim appeared to be wearing women’s yellow lace underwear and that his 

fingernails were painted different colors. She testified that the detectives took over 

the scene when they arrived. 

{¶11} Robert Radcliffe, the Pickaway County Sheriff, testified that he 

responded to the scene and assisted Detective Rex Emrick in collecting items of 

evidence.1 He testified that they found a black baseball cap with the letters WTK 

on it near the broken flower pots. He testified that they also located a Marlboro 

cigarette butt with blood on it, as well as a pair of green-rimmed glasses. He 

further testified that they found court documents in the victim’s pocket with the 

1 Radcliffe testified that because Emrick later contracted COVID-19 and died as a result, he was not available for 

trial. 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 7

name Douglas Buechler, as well as a piece of paper with a phone number, which 

was later traced to White. 

{¶12} Radcliffe testified that several swabs of blood were collected and that 

the victim’s body was taken by the coroner, who identified the victim as Douglas 

Buechler the next day. As a result, Radcliffe contacted the victim’s mother, who 

provided him with the victim’s vehicle information. Radcliffe explained that law 

enforcement began looking for the vehicle and ultimately found the vehicle parked 

in Ashville, Ohio at approximately 9:00 a.m. on the morning of December 26, 

2019. Law enforcement watched the car until 5:00 a.m. the next morning when 

White was observed getting into the vehicle and driving away. The vehicle was 

stopped, White was read his rights and was taken in for questioning, and the 

vehicle was taken to the Pickaway County Sheriff’s Office to be searched by BCI.

{¶13} Dr. John Ellis, Pickaway County Coroner, also testified. He testified 

that the victim sustained multiple sharp point injuries, or stab wounds, some of 

which were defensive wounds. He testified that there was a great amount of blood 

present at the scene and that blood was scattered in the immediate area. Ellis 

testified that the victim’s body was sent to the Montgomery County Coroner’s 

office for an autopsy, where it was determined that the victim’s cause of death was 

massive acute blood loss caused by multiple sharp force injuries. Ellis stated that 

close to 40 stab wounds were noted in areas including the victim’s chest, abdomen, 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 8

back, flank, head, and a large injury on the victim’s neck. On cross examination, 

Ellis conceded that the type of knife used in the crime could not be determined and 

that there could have been more than one attacker.

{¶14} Detective Sergeant Tracy Andrews, who had been employed with the 

Pickaway County Sheriff’s Office for more than 20 years, also testified. He 

testified that he assisted in the investigation and learned from the victim’s mother 

that the victim had been in jail for four days prior to his murder and that the 

victim’s friend, Steven Hughes, had picked him up from jail the morning of the 

murder. Andrews also testified that the victim’s mother informed him the victim 

had an ex-girlfriend, Sarah Kinser, who had moved to Circleville with her mother, 

Pamela Caudill. He explained that Kinser’s mother apparently did not approve of 

the victim and Kinser’s relationship. Andrews also met with Steven Hughes, who 

informed him that White and the victim left his house in the victim’s black Honda 

Civic, with White driving the car. Andrews stated that per phone records, the last 

text sent from the victim’s phone was at 2:50 p.m. on December 25, 2019, but that 

it could not be determined what the text said.

{¶15} Andrews was recalled by the State later in the trial and during his 

testimony, the jailhouse video interview of White was played into evidence for the 

jury. White’s interview was lengthy and is summarized as follows. White had not 

known the victim that long and actually thought his name was Danny, not Douglas. 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 9

He knew about the victim’s ex-girlfriend, but believed her name to be Ann, not 

Sarah. He was with the victim at the victim’s residence the night the victim was 

arrested and taken to jail. He was given the keys to the victim’s car and the 

victim’s dogs by law enforcement at that time. He picked the victim up from 

Hughes’s house on Christmas day and then drove him to four different locations in 

Columbus looking for drugs before the two decided to head to Circleville to see 

“Ann” sometime between 3:30 and 5:30 p.m. White dropped the victim off on the 

south side of Circleville near Christy’s Pizza with his dogs so that he could go see 

“Ann.” White texted Hughes at that time and told him that the victim was 

supposed to text him when he wanted picked up. In his interview, White explained 

he was driving the car because the victim had no license. He stated that after 

dropping the victim off, he then went and returned some batteries to an individual 

by the name of Trent Banks, ended up going to Lancaster to pick up some mail 

from someone named Jessica, and then slept in the Walmart parking lot in 

Lancaster that night and never heard from the victim again. White affirmed during 

the interview that he had a drug addiction and that he had relapsed a month prior. 

The interview was abruptly stopped when White asked where the victim was and 

was informed the victim was deceased.

{¶16} Once White’s video interview was stopped, Andrews went on to 

testify that he checked surveillance videos from businesses in the area where White 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 10

allegedly dropped the victim, but he was unable to observe the victim or his two 

dogs in the area. He also testified that he spoke with both Sarah Kinser and Jessica

after the interview. Kinser informed Andrews she had not seen the victim since 

October of 2019. Jessica informed Andrews that she saw White on December 

23rd, not December 25th. Andrews also obtained the Ring doorbell video from 

Trent Banks’ residence, which will be discussed below. Andrews testified that it 

would have been a three to four hour walk from the south side of Circleville to 

where the victim’s body was found at the Tennant residence. 

{¶17} On cross-examination, Andrews conceded that people can make 

mistakes regarding timeframes, that sometimes certain events fall outside of 

surveillance camera range, that no blood was found on White’s clothes or rings, 

that White had no defensive wounds on his hands, and that several police reports 

had been made regarding the victim. More specifically, he testified that Sarah 

Kinser’s mother, Pamela Caudill, had obtained a temporary protection order 

against the victim. Although more will be discussed regarding the newly 

discovered witness, Nicholas Tootle, Andrews conceded on cross examination that 

although Tootle reported that White presented to his apartment on Christmas Day 

with blood on his hands, Tootle’s girlfriend at the time, Stephanie Adams, reported 

that she didn’t notice blood on White’s hands or clothes when he arrived at their 

apartment. 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 11

{¶18} The victim’s friend, Steven Hughes, also testified for the State. 

Hughes testified that he spoke to the victim several times while he was in jail in 

Franklin County and that during the calls, the victim was primarily concerned 

about his dogs and his car. He explained that the victim was concerned that White 

had his car in Circleville because the victim was not supposed to be near Kinser 

and Caudill. He testified that the victim had met White on a dating app known as 

KIK, but that the victim told him he hadn’t known White very long. He testified 

that he picked the victim up from jail on Christmas morning, and then White 

picked up the victim and his two dogs in the black Honda Civic at about 12:30 or 

1:00 p.m. on Christmas Day. Hughes testified that White was wearing a dark 

colored baseball hat when they drove away. He further testified that he 

communicated with White at 3:42 p.m. on Christmas Day and that White informed 

him at that time that the victim wanted to go see Sarah Kinser. Text messages by 

Hughes to White later that evening around 8:00 p.m. inquiring about the victim 

went unanswered.

{¶19} Special Agent Chad Holcomb with BCI also testified. He explained 

that he conducted the search of the victim’s vehicle, which he described as 

“extremely crowded,” or dirty, with a lot of trash. During the search, he collected 

a folding knife, some receipts, and an index card. He testified that there was blood 

throughout the vehicle. He explained that he used a chemical called Blue Star, 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 12

which illuminates blood that is not able to be seen by the naked eye. He testified 

that photos from the crime scene indicated that the there had been a “blood 

shedding event,” so he looked through the vehicle for blood, which he found. He 

testified that he collected blood samples from a green towel, the driver’s side floor 

board, the receipt, and the index card. He submitted those items, along with a 

pubic swab, fingernail swab, and clothing swab of White to BCI for DNA testing. 

He conceded on cross examination that he found no blood on the steering wheel, 

no blood on the driver’s seat, no blood on the gear shift, and that no areas of the 

vehicle appeared to have been cleaned. He also conceded on cross examination 

that suspected blood on the folding knife turned out to be rust, not blood, once it 

was tested.

{¶20} Trent Banks, White’s former employer, also testified for the State. 

He testified that White came to his job site on December 21, 2019 to return some 

tools. He testified that White had two dogs with him and was driving a black 

Honda, which he indicated he had purchased for $500.00. He testified that White 

later came to his house on the morning of December 24, 2019 to return some 

batteries. A video clip from Banks’ Ring doorbell was played for the jury and 

depicted White wearing a hat. Banks explained that White had had two or three 

hats made, but that White had them made for himself and not anyone else, and that 

if anyone else would have had one, it would have been himself because he was the 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 13

closest person to White. On cross examination, Banks testified that he thought 

White must have gotten a good deal on the car because he had never known him to 

lie. He also explained that the logo on White’s hat was “WTK,” which stood for 

“White Trash Kustomz.” On redirect, Banks testified that he had terminated 

contact with White because he found out White was living a “double life,” and that 

White had deceived him into thinking he was something that he was not. Then, on 

recross, defense counsel inquired as to whether the “double life” Banks had 

referenced had anything to do with stealing or being a “cross-dresser,” to which 

Banks responded in the affirmative to the first question and in the negative to the 

second question. 

{¶21} Sarah Kinser also briefly testified. She stated that she was pregnant 

with the victim’s child at the time of the murder, but that she had not seen him 

since October of 2019. She also testified that she had called the police on the 

victim when he came to her house in October. She stated that the victim did not 

come to her house on Christmas Day in 2019. 

{¶22} Erica Jiminez, a forensic scientist in the DNA section of BCI, also 

testified at trial. She provided expert testimony regarding the items of evidence 

that were sent to BCI for DNA testing. She testified that no blood was identified 

on the folding knife that was submitted for testing and, therefore, no DNA analysis 

was performed on that object. She also testified that a towel that was tested was 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 14

presumptive positive for blood and it was determined that the victim was the major 

contributor of DNA on the towel. Another person’s DNA was also identified on 

the towel, but because the amount was so low, it could not be determined whose 

DNA it was. She further testified that although swabs taken from an index card 

that was found inside the victim’s car were presumptive positive for blood, no 

DNA analysis was performed because confirmation that the victim’s DNA was on 

the card would not have been meaningful since they were found in his own car. 

Jiminez also testified that the cigarette butt that was found near the victim’s body 

was presumptive positive for blood and that DNA analysis revealed a mixture of 

DNA from two individuals. More specifically, she explained that DNA from both 

White and the victim were present on the cigarette butt, but that she could not 

determine whether the DNA was from blood or from saliva. With respect to the 

hat found at the scene of the crime, she testified that White was the major 

contributor of DNA on a swab taken from the inside rim of the hat. There was also 

a minor contributor of DNA on the hat, but it could not be determined to whom the 

DNA belonged. 

{¶23} On cross examination, Jiminez conceded that it was not unusual to 

find an individual’s blood in their own vehicle and that the blood could have been 

in the car from a previous incident. She also conceded that the mixture of DNA on 

the cigarette could have been the result of White and the victim having shared a 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 15

cigarette. She also conceded that the fact that blood was on the cigarette did not 

mean that the cigarette was shared at the crime scene. Jiminez also conceded that 

none of the victim’s DNA was found on White’s watch or rings and that none of 

White’s DNA was identified on the scrapings taken from under the victim’s 

fingernails. 

{¶24} Finally, Nicholas Tootle testified on behalf of the State. He testified 

that at the time of the murder, he was living with his now ex-girlfriend, Stephanie, 

in Ashville, Ohio. He testified that White arrived at his apartment at about 4:00 

p.m. on Christmas afternoon, just as it was starting to get dark. He testified that 

White’s hands were dripping with blood and that White asked for a bowl of bleach 

so he could clean his rings. He testified that after cleaning his rings in the kitchen 

sink, he then went to the bathroom and cleaned himself up. He stated that he and 

White then went to Columbus to find drugs and proceeded to hang 

around the apartment until 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. He testified that he had not seen 

White since the morning after Christmas. He explained that he heard about the 

murder on the news, but didn’t want to get involved. He stated that he was 

contacted by police about a year after the murder. On cross examination, Tootle 

maintained that White arrived just as the sun was going down, despite being 

confronted with his prior statement to police that White had arrived a few hours 

after it had gotten dark. Further, in response to questioning by defense counsel, 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 16

Tootle denied that White had asked to borrow a funnel so that he could add 

transmission fluid to his car. At that time, Tootle volunteered that he knew the 

difference between blood and transmission fluid. Tootle admitted on cross 

examination that he was taking Suboxone and Xanax and was using meth at the 

time of the event. When asked why his girlfriend, Stephanie, stated she didn’t see 

blood on White’s hands, Tootle stated that she was a “false liar.” 

{¶25} At that point, the State rested and admitted all of its exhibits without 

objection. Thereafter, the defense called one witness, Detective Tracy Andrews. 

Defense counsel primarily went over the surveillance camera footage obtained 

from the south of side of Circleville where the victim was allegedly dropped off. 

Despite defense counsel’s attempts to get Andrews to agree that various people on 

the video looked like they may have either been the victim with one of his dogs, or 

Sarah Kinser, Andrews maintained that he was unable to view anyone on the video 

fitting either description. The defense then rested.

{¶26} White was ultimately found guilty by a jury of all three counts in the 

indictment and once the offenses were merged for purposes of sentencing, he was 

sentenced to a term of 15 years to life in prison, along with a mandatory term of 

post-release control of 5 years. It is from that order that White now brings his 

timely appeal, setting forth two assignments of error for our review.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 17

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. THE APPELLANT’S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST 

THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND 

WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT 

EVIDENCE. HE WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO A 

FAIR TRIAL, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL 

PROTECTION OF THE LAW AS GUARANTEED HIM 

BY THE FIFTH, SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH 

AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF 

THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

II. TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO FILE 

ANY PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS, FAILING TO RAISE 

OBJECTIONS, ELICITING INFORMATION ON 

CROSS-EXAMINATION WHICH SHOWED HIS 

CLIENT IN A NEGATIVE LIGHT, AND FAILING TO 

MOVE FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL 

UNDER CRIMINAL R. 29. THIS DEPRIVED THE 

APPELLANT OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL, A FAIR TRIAL AND EQUAL 

PROTECTION OF THE LAW, AS GUARANTEED 

HIM BY THE FIFTH, SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH 

AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF 

THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 

{¶27} In his first assignment of error, White contends that his convictions 

were against the manifest weight of the evidence and were not supported by 

sufficient evidence. White argues that his convictions were based entirely upon 

circumstantial evidence and the jury had to engage in impermissible inference 

stacking to arrive at a guilty verdict. He also argues that the jury’s inferences 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 18

could just have easily been drawn in favor of innocence rather than guilt and that 

none of the evidence presented by the State was actual evidence of murder. He 

also appears to challenge the jury’s reliance on Tootle’s testimony that White 

arrived at his apartment with blood on his hands, as Tootle was not an expert 

witness. The State responds by arguing that considering the totality of the 

evidence, the jury did not lose its way and White’s convictions were not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence.

Standard of Review

{¶28} A claim of insufficient evidence invokes a due process concern and 

raises a question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict 

as a matter of law. See State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 

541 (1997). “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a 

question of law.” Id. “Therefore, our review is de novo.” State v. Groce, 163 

Ohio St.3d 387, 2020-Ohio-6671, 170 N.E.3d 813, ¶ 7, citing In re J.V., 134 Ohio 

St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961, 979 N.E.2d 1203, ¶ 3.

{¶29} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our inquiry focuses 

primarily upon the adequacy of the evidence; that is, whether the evidence, if 

believed, reasonably could support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Thompkins at syllabus. The standard of review is whether, after viewing the 

probative evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 19

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the 

essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. 

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991). Furthermore, a reviewing 

court is not to assess “whether the state's evidence is to be believed, but whether, if 

believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a conviction.” 

Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring).

{¶30} Thus, when reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, an 

appellate court must construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution. See State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 205, 661 N.E.2d 1068 (1996); 

State v. Grant, 67 Ohio St.3d 465, 477, 620 N.E.2d 50 (1993). A reviewing court 

will not overturn a conviction on a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim unless 

reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion that the trier of fact did. State v. 

Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 162, 749 N.E.2d 226 (2001); State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio 

St.3d 460, 484, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001).

{¶31} However, when an appellate court considers a claim that a conviction 

is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court must dutifully examine the 

entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and consider the 

witness credibility. See State v. Dean, 146 Ohio St.3d 106, 2015-Ohio-4347, 54 

N.E.3d 80, ¶ 151; citing State v. Thompkins, supra, at 387. A reviewing court must 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 20

bear in mind, however, that credibility generally is an issue for the trier of fact to 

resolve. See State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001); State v. 

Murphy, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2953, 2008-Ohio-1744, ¶ 31. “ ‘Because the 

trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is particularly competent to decide 

“whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses,” we 

must afford substantial deference to its determinations of credibility.’ ” Barberton 

v. Jenney, 126 Ohio St.3d 5, 2010-Ohio-2420, 929 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 20, quoting 

State v. Konya, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 21434, 2006-Ohio-6312, ¶ 6, in turn 

quoting State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684 (Aug. 

22, 1997). As the Court explained in Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 

2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517:

“ ‘[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly 

against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment 

must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts.

* * *

If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the 

reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is 

consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to 

sustaining the verdict and judgment.’ ”

Eastley, supra at ¶ 21, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 

77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273, FN. 3 (1984), in turn quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, 

Appellate Review, Section 60, 191-192 (1978).
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 21

{¶32} Thus, an appellate court will leave the issues of weight and 

credibility of the evidence to the fact-finder, as long as a rational basis exists in the 

record for its decision. See State v. Picklesimer, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 11CA9, 

2012-Ohio-1282, ¶ 24; see also State v. Howard, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2948, 

2007-Ohio-6331, ¶ 6 (“We will not intercede as long as the trier of fact has some 

factual and rational basis for its determination of credibility and weight”).

{¶33} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, the court may 

reverse the judgment of conviction only if it appears that the fact-finder, when 

resolving the conflicts in evidence, “clearly lost its way and created such a 

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial 

ordered.” State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist. 

1983). See also Thompkins, supra, at 387. If the prosecution presented substantial 

credible evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably could conclude, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that the essential elements of the offense had been established, 

the judgment of conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See 

State v. Eley, 56 Ohio St.2d 169, 383 N.E.2d 132 (1978), syllabus, superseded by 

state constitutional amendment on other grounds in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 

89, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997); see also Eastley at ¶ 12 and Thompkins at 387 

(explaining that a judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence 

when “the greater amount of credible evidence” supports it). Thus, “ ‘[w]hen 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 22

conflicting evidence is presented at trial, a conviction is not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence simply because the jury believed the prosecution 

testimony.’ ” State v. Cooper, 170 Ohio App.3d 418, 2007-Ohio-1186, 867 N.E.2d 

493, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Mason, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21397, 2003-

Ohio-5785, ¶ 17. Instead, a reviewing court should find a conviction against the 

manifest weight of the evidence only in the “ ‘ “exceptional case in which the 

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” ’ ” State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio 

St.3d 479, 483, 721 N.E.2d 995 (2000), quoting Thompkins at 387, in turn quoting 

Martin at 175.

Legal Analysis

{¶34} The record before us indicates that White was convicted of murder, 

felony murder, and felonious assault, as charged in the indictment. R.C. 2903.02 

states in section (A), in reference to the offense of murder, that “[n]o person shall 

purposely cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's 

pregnancy.” R.C. 2901.22(A) defines “purposeful” conduct as: 

[a] person acts purposely when it is the person's specific intention 

to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a 

prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what 

the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender's 

specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.

R.C. 2903.02 also states in section (B), in reference to the offense of felony 

murder, as follows:
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 23

No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result 

of the offender's committing or attempting to commit an offense 

of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree and that 

is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of the Revised 

Code.

{¶35} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the culpable mental state 

required to support a conviction under R.C. 2903.02(B) is the same one necessary 

to support a conviction for the underlying felony offense of violence. State v. 

Miller, 96 Ohio St.3d 384, 2002-Ohio-4931, 775 N.E.2d 498, ¶ 31-34. In this case, 

the underlying felony offense of violence was felonious assault, as charged in 

Count 3 of the indictment. R.C. 2903.11 defines the offense of felonious assault 

and provides in section (A)(1) that “[n]o person shall knowingly * * * cause 

serious physical harm to another * * *.” Further, R.C. 2901.22(B) provides as 

follows regarding the mental state of “knowingly”:

A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is 

aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will 

probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of 

circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances 

probably exist.

{¶36} Many of White’s arguments challenge the credibility of the evidence 

presented at trial. For instance, White challenges the veracity of Sarah Kinser’s 

testimony that she did not see the victim on the date of the murder. The defense 

theory at trial was that both Kinser and her mother hated the victim and were likely 

involved in his murder. White also challenges Tootle’s testimony that White 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 24

showed up at his apartment on Christmas Day with blood on his hands, asked for 

bleach to clean his rings, and used his bathroom to clean himself up. White 

essentially argues that because Tootle did not initially come forward with 

information, but instead, waited until he was contacted by law enforcement a year 

later, the testimony is suspect and should not be believed. 

{¶37} Other arguments raised by White challenge the weight to be afforded 

certain evidence. For instance, White contends that the jury could have drawn 

inferences of innocence from the blood and DNA evidence introduced by the State. 

White also argues that his convictions were based upon circumstantial evidence 

only and that there was no solid, direct evidence that he murdered the victim. He 

argues that the presence of the WTK hat and cigarette butt at the murder scene 

were not evidence of murder and that in order to find them to be evidence of 

murder, that the jury would have had to stack inference upon inference to arrive at 

that result. The defense theory at trial was that because White and the victim were 

riding around in the victim’s car all day, and that because the victim was an IV 

drug user, there should be no surprise that the victim’s blood was found on his car 

door, floor board, and a towel inside his car. The defense’s theory at trial also 

included arguments that the presence of White’s DNA on a cigarette butt and a 

WTK hat found at the scene had little significance as the two likely had shared 

cigarettes and because there was more than one of the WTK hats in existence. 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 25

{¶38} As set forth above, however, when reviewing whether a conviction is 

supported by sufficient evidence, it is not this Court's role to question whether the 

evidence is to be believed, but rather, we must consider whether the evidence, if 

believed, reasonably could support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Furthermore, in our consideration, we must view the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution. 

{¶39} Additionally, with respect to White’s arguments related to 

circumstantial evidence and inference stacking, we initially note that circumstantial 

evidence has equal probative value to direct evidence. See State v. Jenks, supra, at 

paragraph one of the syllabus. We are also mindful that 

“[a] trier of fact may not draw ‘[a]n inference based * * * entirely upon another 

inference, unsupported by any additional fact or another inference from other 

facts[.]’ ” State v. Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 78, 717 N.E.2d 298 (1999), quoting 

Hurt v. Charles J. Rogers Transp. Co., 164 Ohio St. 329, 130 N.E.2d 820 (1955), 

paragraph one of the syllabus. “When an inference, which forms the basis of a 

conviction, is drawn solely from another inference and that inference is not 

supported by any additional facts or inferences drawn from other established facts, 

the conviction is improper.” State v. Armstrong, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2015-P0075, 2016-Ohio-7841, ¶ 23, citing State v. Payne, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2014-
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 26

A-0001, 2014-Ohio-4304, ¶ 23. See also State v. Maynard, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

11AP-697, 2012-Ohio-2946, ¶ 27.

The rule against inference-stacking essentially forbids the 

drawing of an inference from evidence which is too uncertain or 

speculative or which raises merely a possibility or conjecture. 

While reasonable inferences may be drawn from the facts and 

conditions established, they cannot be drawn from facts or 

conditions merely assumed.

Armstrong at ¶ 23. See generally Ray v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 2013-Ohio-2684, 

993 N.E.2d 808, ¶ 35 (4th Dist.) (discussing improper inference stacking).

{¶40} “Though widely denounced by both courts and legal commentators, 

the rule prohibiting the stacking of one inference upon another is still recognized in 

Ohio.” Donaldson v. N. Trading Co., 82 Ohio App.3d 476, 481, 612 N.E.2d 754 

(10th Dist.1992), citing Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Twp. Trustees, 28 

Ohio St.3d 13, 502 N.E.2d 204 (1986). See also State ex rel. Verhovec v. Marietta, 

4th Dist. Washington Nos. 11CA29, 2013-Ohio-5414, ¶ 59. However, “the rule 

has very limited application. It prohibits only the drawing of one inference solely 

and entirely from another inference, where that inference is unsupported by any 

additional facts or inferences drawn from other facts.” Id., citing Hurt, supra, at 

paragraph one the syllabus. As the Court in Motorists warned: “the rule 

forbidding the stacking of an inference upon an inference is disfavored by scholars 

and many courts. If such a rule were uniformly enforced, ‘* * * hardly a single 

trial could be adequately prosecuted.’ ” Motorists at 207, quoting 1A Wigmore, 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 27

Evidence (Tillers Rev. 1983) 1106, 1111, Section 41; United States v. Eustace, 423 

F.2d 569, 571 (2nd Cir. 1970); see also Verhovec at ¶ 60.

{¶41} “An inference which is based solely and entirely upon another 

inference and which is unsupported by any additional fact or another inference 

from other facts is an inference upon an inference and is universally condemned.”

Hurt at paragraph two of the syllabus. However, there are two instances when the 

rule against inference stacking does not apply. The first is when “[a]n inference 

which is based in part upon another inference and in part upon factual support is 

called a parallel inference and is universally approved provided it is a reasonable 

conclusion for the jury to deduce.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. The 

second is when multiple inferences arise separately from the same set of facts. 

McDougall v. Glenn Cartage Co., 169 Ohio St. 522, 160 N.E.2d 266 (1959), 

paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶42} The evidence introduced by the State at trial established that White 

and the victim were friends who had only known each other a short time. Because 

White was with the victim at the victim’s apartment when he was arrested, White 

was given the keys to the victim’s car, as well as the victim’s dogs, by law 

enforcement. Although White subsequently dropped the dogs off at Steven 

Hughes’ house, he retained the victim’s vehicle and drove it around the Circleville, 

Ohio area, where he apparently had ties, despite the victim’s concern about his 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 28

vehicle being in the vicinity of his ex-girlfriend and her mother, who had 

protection orders against him. During the several days that White had the victim’s 

car while he was in jail in Franklin County, White made representations that he 

owned the car and was seen wearing one of the few “WTK” hats ever created, 

known to be designed and worn essentially only by him. 

{¶43} The evidence introduced by the State also established that once the 

victim was released from jail and initially picked up by his friend, Steven Hughes, 

White drove the victim’s vehicle to Columbus to pick up both the victim and his 

dogs on Christmas Day. Per Hughes, White was wearing a dark-colored baseball 

hat. White and victim left, per the interview of White himself at the police station, 

and drove around the Columbus area looking for drugs and then headed towards 

Circleville, Ohio sometime between 3:30 and 5:30 p.m. Although White claims to 

have let the victim and his dogs out of the car on the south side of Circleville to go 

find Sarah Kinser, Sarah Kinser testified that she never saw the victim that day and 

the victim and his dogs could not be identified on surveillance videos obtained 

from the businesses in the area. Moreover, the victim’s body was found at 4:15 

p.m. in the front yard of an Ashville residence, the location of which was estimated 

to be a three to four hour walk from where White claimed to have dropped the 

victim off.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 29

{¶44} Finally, the victim was found with over forty stab wounds. Near the 

body was a cigarette butt that ultimately was found to contain DNA from both the 

victim and White. A baseball hat with the letters WTK was also located near the 

victim’s body and it was later found to contain only the DNA of White on the 

inside rim. The area where the body was found contained evidence of a struggle, 

including broken and knocked over flower pots, large amounts of blood strewn 

about, and the victim was observed to have defensive wounds on his hands. 

Furthermore, White was found still in possession of the victim’s car in the Ashville 

area thirty-six hours later. The BCI investigation of the vehicle established that the 

victim’s blood was found on the inside drivers’ side door, the drivers’ side 

floormat, and on a towel located inside the vehicle. Most importantly, Nicholas 

Tootle testified that just as it was getting dark on Christmas Day of 2019, White 

showed up at his Ashville apartment with blood on his hands, asked to borrow 

bleach to clean his rings, and then used his bathroom to clean up. 

{¶45} As stated, White essentially challenges the weight and credibility 

determinations made by the jury. Further, White argues that Tootle, “in essence,” 

was permitted to testify as an expert to the extent he claimed that the substance on 

White’s hands was blood. White argues that “the jury was required to believe that 

what he claimed to have seen was in fact blood, to further infer that it was 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 30

Buechler’s blood, and then to infer that it was on Appellant’s hands because he 

killed Buechler.” 

{¶46} However, despite White’s arguments that the evidence introduced by 

the State was circumstantial, unreliable, or lacked credibility, the jury was free to 

accept or reject the testimony of the State’s witnesses and was also free to make 

credibility determinations favoring the State's witnesses. Therefore, it was within 

the province of the jury, as the finder of fact, to determine the weight to be 

afforded to the State’s evidence, including the testimony of both Kinser and 

Tootle, as well as the forensic testimony related to the DNA evidence, or lack 

thereof, found at the scene of the murder and subsequently found in the car at the 

time White was located. This is also true for Tootle’s testimony regarding White 

having blood on his hands. 

{¶47} Further, we reject White’s argument that the jury had to engage in 

inference stacking with respect to Tootle’s testimony about White having blood on 

his hands. White argues that “[b]ecause Tootle wasn’t an expert on what was 

blood, whatever Appellant may have had on his hands could have been 

transmission fluid, paint, or pop.” However, there was no evidence in the record 

tending toward the inference that the substance on White’s hands was transmission 

fluid, paint, or pop. The only reference to transmission fluid came from defense 

counsel’s suggestion that White asked Tootle if he could borrow a funnel to add 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 31

transmission fluid to his car. However, Tootle denied that this happened. He also 

denied that White was working on his car in the parking lot of the apartments. 

Thus, there were no facts in evidence to support such an inference. However, facts 

that were in evidence included that White had just been with the victim, that White 

was the last person to see the victim alive, that White’s DNA was found at the 

crime scene, that the victim was murdered in what was described as a “blood 

shedding” event, that White showed up at Tootle’s apartment at a timeframe 

consistent with when he likely had just left the crime scene, that White was in 

possession of the victim’s car after the victim was found deceased, and that the 

victim’s blood was found on items located inside the car. Moreover, as conceded 

by White, no objection was made to Tootle’s testimony.

{¶48} Based upon the record before us, we simply cannot conclude that the 

jury lost its way or that this case constitutes an exceptional case where the 

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Furthermore, we cannot conclude 

that the jury had to engage in impermissible inference stacking in order to reach a 

guilty verdict. As set forth above, circumstantial evidence has equal probative 

value to direct evidence and, as such, it does not appear the jury had to stack 

inferences to reach its verdict. Instead, we conclude that here, the evidence 

presented by the State at trial, if believed, could support a finding of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The jury was in the best position to hear the testimony, observe 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 32

the witnesses and evidence, and determine their reliability. Thus, we hold that the 

jury’s determinations that White was guilty of murder, felony murder, and 

felonious assault were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we find no merit to the arguments 

raised under White’s first assignment of error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

{¶49} In his second assignment of error, White contends that his trial 

counsel provided ineffective assistance by: 1) failing to file any pre-trial motions; 

2) failing to raise objections, 3) eliciting information on cross-examination which 

showed his client in a negative light; and 4) failing to move for a “directed verdict 

of acquittal under Criminal R. 29.” However, although he raises these four 

arguments in his assignment of error, the body of his brief does not specify what 

pre-trial motions should have been filed and it makes no argument regarding that 

issue. Further, the body of his brief contains no argument related to the failure to 

file a Crim.R. 29 motion. 

{¶50} The body of his brief does, however, additionally argue that counsel 

was ineffective for failing to procure the transcript from the first trial to the extent 

it contained the prior testimony of key witness, Nicholas Tootle. His brief 

additionally argues that trial counsel was ineffective as a result of statements he 

made during closing arguments. As such we will address White’s arguments 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 33

regarding trial counsel’s failure to obtain transcripts of prior testimony of Tootle,

trial counsel’s failure to object, trial counsel’s performance during crossexamination, and trial counsel’s statements during closing argument. We will not 

address issues related to the failure to file pre-trial motions or the failure to file a 

Crim.R. 29 motion. 

Standard of Review

{¶51} To establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

criminal defendant must show (1) that his or her counsel's performance was 

deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense and 

deprived him or her of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 

104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Accord State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 

(2001); State v. Goff, 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 139, 694 N.E.2d 916 (1998). “In order to 

show deficient performance, the defendant must prove that counsel's performance 

fell below an objective level of reasonable representation.” State v. Conway, 109 

Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 95. Further, “[t]o show 

prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. “Failure to 

establish either element is fatal to the claim.” State v. Jones, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 

06CA3116, 2008-Ohio-968, ¶ 14.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 34

{¶52} When considering whether trial counsel's representation amounts to 

deficient performance, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's 

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]” 

Strickland at 689. Thus, “the defendant must overcome the presumption that, 

under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 

strategy.” (Quotation omitted). Id. “ ‘A properly licensed attorney is presumed to 

execute his [or her] duties in an ethical and competent manner.’ ” State v. Taylor, 

4th Dist. Washington No. 07CA11, 2008-Ohio-482, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Smith, 

17 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 477 N.E.2d 1128 (1985). Therefore, a defendant bears the 

burden to show ineffectiveness by demonstrating that counsel's errors were so 

serious that he or she failed to function as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth 

Amendment. State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 

77, ¶ 61.

{¶53} “Furthermore, courts may not simply assume the existence of 

prejudice, but must require that prejudice be affirmatively demonstrated.” State v. 

Walters, 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 13CA33, 13CA36, 2014-Ohio-4966, ¶ 24; 

State v. Jones, 2018-Ohio-239, 104 N.E.3d 34, ¶ 21-24 (4th Dist.). We have 

repeatedly recognized that speculation is insufficient to establish the prejudice 

component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See, e.g., State v. Dailey, 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 35

4th Dist. Adams No. 18CA1059, 2018-Ohio-4315, ¶ 33 and cases cited therein; 

State v. Thacker, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 19CA18, 2021-Ohio-2726, ¶ 54-57.

Legal Analysis

{¶54} Generally, a defendant has no constitutional right to determine trial 

tactics and strategy of counsel. See State v. Groves, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 

20CA3904, 2022-Ohio-443, ¶ 58; State v. Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 72, 717 

N.E.2d 298 (1999); State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791, 842 

N.E.2d 996, ¶ 150. “ ‘When there is no demonstration counsel failed to research 

the facts or the law or counsel was ignorant of a crucial defense, a reviewing court 

defers to counsel's judgment in the matter.’ ” Crank at ¶ 18, quoting State v. 

Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 49, 402 N.E.2d 1189 (1980).

{¶55} At trial, witness presentation, questioning, and cross-examination 

usually falls within the ambit of trial strategy. Furthermore, debatable trial tactics 

do not generally establish ineffective assistance of counsel. See Groves, supra; 

State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-3430, 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 45. 

“[T]he failure to object to error, alone, is not enough to sustain a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on such a 

claim, a defendant must first show that there was a substantial 

violation of any of defense counsel's essential duties to [the 

defendant] and, second, that [the defendant] was materially 

prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness.” 

State v. Moore, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 20CA10, 2021-Ohio-4414, ¶ 15, quoting 

State v. Holloway, 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244, 527 N.E.2d 831 (1988). 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 36

Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio has observed as follows:

Experienced attorneys “learn that objections to each potentially 

objectionable event could actually act to their party's detriment. 

* * * In light of this, any single failure to object usually cannot 

be said to have been error unless the evidence sought is so 

prejudicial * * * that failure to object essentially defaults the case 

to the state. Otherwise, defense counsel must so consistently fail 

to use objections, despite numerous and clear reasons for doing 

so, that counsel's failure cannot reasonably have been said to 

have been part of a trial strategy or tactical choice.” (Omissions 

sic).

State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d 210, 2006-Ohio-6404, 858 N.E.2d 1144, ¶ 140, 

quoting Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 774 (6th Cir. 2006).

Failure to obtain prior transcript of Tootle’s testimony

{¶56} First, White represents to this Court that Nicholas Tootle “testified in 

the first trial.” He contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to attempt 

to procure a copy of the trial transcript containing Tootle’s prior testimony, arguing 

that Tootle’s “prior recorded testimony would have been invaluable to aid Defense 

counsel in Tootle’s cross-examination.” The State responds by asserting that 

Tootle did not testify during the first trial. The State contends that it was not 

discovered that Tootle had information about the case until after the first trial had 

resulted in a hung jury. 

{¶57} This Court has no way to determine this question in the absence of a 

copy of the transcript from the first trial. However, that case was never appealed 

and it does not appear a trial transcript was ever generated. Of importance, White 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 37

has not filed a reply brief or otherwise rebutted the State’s argument in any way. 

In fact, White appeared to concede during trial that law enforcement did not speak 

with Tootle until a year after the murder. The victim was murdered on Christmas 

Day in 2019 and White was brought to trial on November 2, 2020. Thus, it 

appears that White is simply mistaken regarding his belief that Tootle testified at 

the first trial. While we have a lack of evidence on this particular question in the 

record before us on appeal, the evidence that we do have is consistent with the 

State’s assertion that Tootle was not a witness in the first trial. Thus, we find no 

merit to this portion of White’s second assignment of error. 

Failure to Raise Objections and Eliciting Harmful

Responses on Cross Examination

{¶58} White first argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

testimony by Steven Hughes indicating that White and the victim met on a dating 

app named KIK, that the victim did not believe that White’s real name was Bobby, 

and also for eliciting testimony during the cross examination of Brooke Cano that 

the victim was found deceased and wearing women’s lace underwear with his 

fingernails painted different colors. White also argues that trial counsel was 

ineffective based upon his questioning of Trent Banks as to whether Banks had 

learned that White may be a cross-dresser. He contends that “[t]his set the stage 

for the jury to draw an inference that Decedent and Appellant were engaged in 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 38

some sort of romantic or sexual relationship[,]” which “more conservative jurors 

might have been likely to see such a relationship to be somehow deviant or 

perverted.” He also argues that “* * * it helped provide a motive for a homicide; 

the motive being ‘a lover’s quarrel gone awry.’ ” 

{¶59} However, it is clear, reading the trial transcript as a whole, that 

defense counsel intentionally and consistently tried to bring out facts related to the 

victim’s apparent sexual proclivities by drawing out testimony related to “crossdressing,” such as the fact that the victim was wearing women’s underwear and 

had his nails painted. Defense counsel insinuated to the jury several times that the 

victim clearly had other things going on in his life along these lines, that possibly 

had him engaging with different groups of people that may have endangered him in 

some way. The suggestion was also made that Sarah Kinser and her mother,

having filed prior police reports and having obtained a protection order against 

him, may have had a motive to kill the victim. 

{¶60} It appears that trial counsel, throughout the trial, was trying to 

establish that other known or unknown individuals may have had a motive to harm 

the victim. Defense counsel established that the victim was wearing women’s 

clothing and had his nails painted, not White. Defense counsel questioned Banks if 

he had heard that White was a “cross-dresser,” to which Banks responded he had 

not. All of this appears to have been trial strategy. Further, with respect to trial 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 39

counsel’s failure to object to Hughes’ testimony about White and the victim having 

met on a dating app, this testimony by Hughes was the only actual evidence 

introduced during trial indicating that White and the victim’s relationship was

anything other than a brief friendship. Trial counsel likely elected not to object to 

Hughes’ answer so as not to draw more attention to that information. Sound trial 

strategy often involves downplaying certain testimony, or in some cases, bringing

out harmful facts on one’s own terms and for one’s own purposes. Further, even if 

trial counsel had objected, it likely would have only called attention to this 

unfavorable testimony.

{¶61} “[I]t is well-established that ‘[c]ompetent counsel may reasonably 

hesitate to object [to errors] in the jury's presence because objections may be 

considered bothersome by the jury and may tend to interrupt the flow of a trial.’ ” 

State v. Miku, 2018-Ohio-1584, 111 N.E.3d 558, ¶ 65 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. 

Rogers, 9th Dist. Summit No. 19176, 1999 WL 239100, citing State v. Campbell, 

69 Ohio St.3d 38, 53, 630 N.E.2d 339 (1994). Furthermore, “ ‘ “ ‘[a] competent 

trial attorney might well eschew objecting * * * in order to minimize jury attention 

to the damaging material.’ ” ’ ” State v. Canterbury, 4th Dist. Athens No. 

13CA34, 2015-Ohio-1926, ¶ 70, quoting State v. Topping, 4th Dist. No. 11CA6, 

2012-Ohio-5617, at ¶ 80, quoting State v. Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22, 2007-Ohio4836, 873 N.E.2d 828, at ¶ 90, in turn quoting United States v. Payne, 741 F.2d 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 40

887, 891 (7th Cir. 1984). For these reasons, we find no merit to these particular 

arguments raised under White’s second assignment of error.

{¶62} White next argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

by failing to object to Trent Banks’ testimony that White claimed to have 

purchased the Honda Civic he was driving, which was the victim’s car, for $500. 

White claims that counsel should have objected to this testimony not only because 

it was hearsay, but because “[i]t only made Appellant to be a liar as to his 

ownership and the unbelievable purchase price.” White also challenges trial 

counsel’s decision to question Banks on cross-examination as to his prior comment 

that White was living a “double life.” More specifically, White argues that 

counsel’s decision to ask Banks if the “double life” involved White either 

“stealing,” drug use, or being a “cross-dresser” constituted deficient and prejudicial 

performance. 

{¶63} However, similar to our analysis above, electing not to object to 

Banks’ testimony regarding White’s claim of purchasing and owning the car was 

likely trial strategy and/or an attempt to minimize the focus on the testimony. 

Further, although we agree with White’s argument that trial counsel’s questions 

regarding theft, drug use, and cross-dressing put to Banks on cross-examination 

constituted deficient performance, we cannot conclude that these actions changed 

the outcome of trial and thus, they were not prejudicial. As set forth above, we 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 41

have already determined that White’s convictions were supported by sufficient 

evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial counsel’s 

posing of these questions did not change the result of the trial. 

Statements Made During Closing Arguments

{¶64} Finally, White contends that trial counsel was further deficient in 

closing argument, arguing that counsel emphasized a possible “dating relationship” 

between the victim and White and commented upon drug usage by both of the 

men. A review of the closing arguments reveals that defense counsel commented 

upon the fact that the victim was wearing women’s clothes at the time he was 

arrested, had “funny underwear” on, and had his nails painted. Counsel then 

commented upon “[d]rug usage probably by the both of them.” Counsel then 

commented that “lifestyle” is something that can be considered in terms of motive 

and that White had no reason to kill the victim. Defense counsel also brought up 

the animosity between the victim and Kinser and her mother, ultimately arguing as 

follows:

My colleague pointed out, you know, we’re home eating and 

having a family dinner. But look at that group of people that’s 

hanging out in that station down there and doing whatever. 

There’s other stuff going on Christmas day that we aren’t 

involved in. But certain groups of people, I don’t know whether 

it involved Sarah, involved cross dressing, it involved whatever, 

but why would Bobby do it? Bobby had the car. Bobby could 

get drugs. That’s just – they don’t have to prove motive, but 

you’ve got to look at why a person would do that.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 42

It was also argued in closing argument that “[s]omebody hated him, somebody 

hated him, it’s a hate killing. He slit his throat, and then he kept stabbing him. I 

think it was more than one person, because I don’t think one person could do that, I 

think.” Counsel went on to suggest this was a crime of passion.

{¶65} Generally, “[c]ounsel's decision on whether to give an opening 

statement or closing argument and how to formulate and deliver them are tactical 

decisions.” See State v. Guysinger, 4th Dist. Ross No. 15CA3514, 2017-Ohio1167, ¶ 34; State v. Fouts, 4th Dist. Washington No. 15CA25, 2016-Ohio-1104, ¶

69, citing State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 144, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989) 

(rejecting defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim that his counsel's 

closing argument was “too brief, passionless and themeless”). Normally “[t]he 

substance of closing argument falls within the realm of trial strategy.” State v. 

Cameron, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-56, 2009-Ohio-6479, ¶ 31. Further, it is 

well settled that statements of counsel are not to be considered as evidence. See 

State v. Clark, 4th Dist. Highland No. 15CA12, 2016-Ohio-2705, ¶ 45; State v. 

Canterbury, 4th Dist. Athens No. 13CA34, 2015-Ohio-1926, ¶ 23. 

{¶66} Here, the jury was instructed as follows:

Evidence does not include any statement of counsel made during 

the trial, unless such statement was an admission or agreement 

admitting certain facts. The opening statements and the closing 

arguments of counsel are designed to assist you, but they are not

evidence.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 43

Additionally, and importantly, “ ‘[a] presumption always exists that the jury has 

followed the instructions given to it by the trial court.’ ” State v. Murphy, 4th Dist. 

Scioto No. 09CA3311, 2010-Ohio-5031, ¶ 81, quoting Pang v. Minch, 53 Ohio 

St.3d 186, 559 N.E.2d 1313 (1990), paragraph four of the syllabus.

{¶67} After reviewing the closing argument in full, we do not believe 

counsel's performance during closing argument was deficient. The fact that White 

had a drug problem was already in evidence. Further, as set forth above, counsel’s

statements during closing argument related to “cross-dressing,” etc., were 

consistent with the defense theory throughout, being that the victim was entangled 

with some other groups of people, separate and apart from White, who may have 

sought to do him harm. This was a matter of trial strategy. Moreover, even if the 

statements could have been considered to have constituted deficient performance, 

the jury was instructed that statements of counsel made during closing arguments 

are not evidence, and we must presume the jury followed the instructions provided 

by the trial court. Thus, we find no merit to the arguments raised under this 

portion of White’s second assignment of error. Further, having found no merit to 

any of the arguments raised under White’s second assignment of error, we cannot 

conclude that White has established deficient performance on the part of his trial 

counsel that would have resulted in a different outcome at trial, or that he received 
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 44

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Thus, White’s second assignment of error is 

overruled.

{¶68} Accordingly, having found no merit to either of the assignments of 

error raised by White on appeal, both of his assignments of error have been 

overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA22 45

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to 

Appellant.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the 

Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON 

BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR 

THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon 

the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant 

to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the 

pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will 

terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the 

Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day 

appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme 

Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal 

prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such 

dismissal.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J., & Hess, J., Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

_____________________________

Jason P. Smith 

Presiding Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the 

date of filing with the clerk.