IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 335PA16

Filed 6 April 2018

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

GYRELL SHAVONTA LEE

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision 

of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 789 S.E.2d 679 (2016), finding no error 

after appeal from a judgment entered on 12 July 2015 by Judge J. Carlton Cole in 

Superior Court, Pasquotank County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 6 November 

2017.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Amy Kunstling Irene, Special Deputy 

Attorney General, for the State.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Paul M. Green, Assistant Appellate 

Defender, for defendant-appellant.

Williams Mullen, by Camden R. Webb; and Ilya Shapiro, pro hac vice, for Cato 

Institute, amicus curiae.

NEWBY, Justice.

This case is about whether the trial court erroneously instructed the jury when 

it omitted the relevant stand-your-ground provision from its instructions on selfdefense, and, if so, whether such error was preserved. By omitting the relevant standyour-ground provision, the trial court’s jury instructions were an inaccurate and 
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Opinion of the Court

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misleading statement of the law. Such error is preserved when the trial court 

deviates from an agreed-upon pattern instruction. Defendant has shown a 

reasonable possibility that, had the trial court given the required stand-your-ground 

instruction, a different result would have been reached at trial. Accordingly, we 

reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Defendant is entitled to a new trial with 

proper self-defense and stand-your-ground instructions.

On 31 December 2012, defendant celebrated New Year’s Eve at a neighbor’s 

home in Elizabeth City. Shortly after midnight, defendant left his neighbor’s home

on foot and encountered several people convened around a car, including Quinton 

Epps (Epps) and defendant’s cousin, Jamieal Walker (Walker). Epps and Walker 

were engaged in a heated argument. Epps ultimately left in the car, and defendant 

went inside his home. About twenty minutes later, another car approached 

defendant’s home. Defendant and Walker were standing “beside the house and in the 

front yard.” Defendant saw Epps exit the car’s back passenger side. Walker and 

Epps began arguing, and Epps became verbally abusive and aggressive. Epps got 

back into the car and left the scene. Soon thereafter, another car drove alongside 

defendant’s backyard, stopping briefly. Defendant retrieved his pistol and concealed 

it on his person, “[out of] instinct,” though defendant believed “[Epps] wasn’t a threat 
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Opinion of the Court

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at th[at] time.” The car ultimately parked three houses down from defendant’s 

residence. Epps and several others exited the car. 

Defendant and Walker walked down the street to talk to Epps. Epps and 

Walker again argued in the street and sidewalk area as defendant watched from a 

short distance. Defendant saw that Epps had a gun behind his back. The argument

escalated, and Walker punched Epps in the face. Epps grabbed Walker’s hoodie, shot 

him twice in the stomach, and continued shooting as Walker turned to flee. Walker 

was later found dead nearby.

After Epps fired his last shot at Walker, Epps turned and pointed his gun at 

defendant. Before Epps could fire, defendant fatally shot Epps. Defendant stated 

that it happened quickly, lasting approximately four seconds, and added that he 

would have shot Epps to protect Walker but could not get a clear shot because Epps 

and Walker were too close together during the struggle. Defendant was ultimately 

indicted for first-degree murder. 

At trial defendant asserted that he fired the fatal shot in self-defense,

maintaining that he shot Epps only after Epps turned the gun on him and denying 

that he continued to shoot after Epps fell to the ground. Defendant introduced 

evidence supporting his version of events, including, inter alia, an eyewitness, his 

police interview, and taped telephone calls from the jail. The State argued defendant 
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did not shoot in self-defense and introduced, inter alia, a witness who testified that 

while Epps was “on the ground,” defendant “came out of nowhere” and “[ran] up and 

[kept] shooting [Epps].” During closing arguments, the State contended that 

defendant should have retreated because a reasonable person in defendant’s shoes 

would have “removed himself from the situation” and “run[ ] away.” 

At the trial court’s request, the parties agreed to the delivery of N.C.P.I.–Crim.

206.10, the pattern jury instruction on first-degree murder and self-defense. This 

instruction provides, in relevant part: “Furthermore, the defendant has no duty to 

retreat in a place where the defendant has a lawful right to be.” N.C.P.I.–Crim. 

206.10 (June 2014). In addition, N.C.P.I.–Crim. 308.10, which is incorporated by 

reference in footnote 7 of N.C.P.I.–Crim. 206.10 and is entitled “Self-Defense, 

Retreat,” states that “[i]f the defendant was not the aggressor and the defendant was 

. . . [at a place the defendant had a lawful right to be], the defendant could stand the 

defendant’s ground and repel force with force.” Id. 308.10 (June 2012) (brackets in 

original).

Though the trial court agreed to instruct the jury on self-defense according to 

N.C.P.I.–Crim. 206.10, it ultimately omitted the “no duty to retreat” language of 

N.C.P.I.–Crim. 206.10 from its actual instructions without prior notice to the parties

and did not give any part of the “stand-your-ground” instruction. Defense counsel did 
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not object to the instruction as given. Though the jury reported that it was 

deadlocked, it ultimately convicted defendant of second-degree murder, following

approximately nine hours of deliberation. Defendant appealed.

At the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that the trial court’s “omission of a 

jury instruction that a person confronted with deadly force has no duty to retreat but 

can stand his ground” was error, preserved by the trial court’s deviation from the 

agreed-upon pattern instruction, see State v. Withers, 179 N.C. App. 249, 255, 633 

S.E.2d 863, 867 (2006), or plain error, regardless, see State v. Wilson, 197 N.C. App. 

154, 164-65, 676 S.E.2d 512, 518-19, disc. rev. denied, 363 N.C. 589, 684 S.E.2d 158

(2009). The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction, reasoning that the law

limits a defendant’s right to stand his ground to “any place he or she has the lawful 

right to be,” State v. Lee, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 789 S.E.2d 679, 685 (2016) (emphasis 

omitted) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3(a) (2015)), which did not include the public 

street where the incident occurred. We allowed defendant’s petition for discretionary 

review. 

Defendant contends the trial court erroneously omitted the relevant standyour-ground provision and that such error is preserved by the trial court’s deviation 

from the pattern instruction. We conclude that, by omitting the relevant stand-your-
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ground provision from the agreed-upon instructions on self-defense, the trial court’s 

jury instructions constituted preserved error. 

“The jury charge is one of the most critical parts of a criminal trial.” State v. 

Walston, 367 N.C. 721, 730, 766 S.E.2d 312, 318 (2014). “[W]here competent evidence 

of self-defense is presented at trial, the defendant is entitled to an instruction on this 

defense, as it is a substantial and essential feature of the case . . . .” State v. Morgan, 

315 N.C. 626, 643, 340 S.E.2d 84, 95 (1986) (citations and emphasis omitted); see 

State v. Guss, 254 N.C. 349, 351, 118 S.E.2d 906, 907 (1961) (per curiam) (“The jury 

must not only consider the case in accordance with the State’s theory but also in 

accordance with defendant’s explanation.”).

Our statutes provide two circumstances in which individuals are justified in 

using deadly force, thus excusing them from criminal culpability. Section 14-51.3 of 

North Carolina’s General Statutes, entitled “Use of force in defense of person; relief 

from criminal or civil liability,” provides:

(a) A person is justified in using force, except 

deadly force, against another when and to the extent that 

the person reasonably believes that the conduct is 

necessary to defend himself or herself or another against 

the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. However, a 

person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not 

have a duty to retreat in any place he or she has the lawful 

right to be if either of the following applies:
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(1) He or she reasonably believes that such 

force is necessary to prevent imminent

death or great bodily harm to himself

or herself or another.

. . . .

(b) A person who uses force as permitted by this 

section is justified in using such force and is immune from 

civil or criminal liability for the use of such force . . . . 

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3 (2017) (emphases added). 

Section 14-51.2, entitled “Home, workplace, and motor vehicle protection; 

presumption of fear of death or serious bodily harm,” provides that “[a] lawful 

occupant within his . . . home, motor vehicle, or workplace does not have a duty to 

retreat from an intruder,” id. § 14-51.2(f) (2017), and “is presumed to have held a 

reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm to himself . . . or another

when using defensive force” in the case of “an unlawful and forcible entry,” id. § 14-

51.2(b) (2017). The relevant distinction between the two statutes is that a rebuttable 

presumption arises that the lawful occupant of a home, motor vehicle, or workplace 

reasonably fears imminent death or serious bodily harm when using deadly force at
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Opinion of the Court

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those locations under the circumstances in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b). This presumption 

does not arise in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3(a)(1).1 

Under either statutory provision, a person does not have a duty to retreat, but 

may stand his ground.

2 Accordingly, when, as here, the defendant presents 

competent evidence of self-defense at trial, the trial court must instruct the jury on a 

defendant’s right to stand his ground, as that instruction informs the determination 

of whether the defendant’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances, a 

critical component of self-defense. See State v. Blevins, 138 N.C. 668, 670-71, 50 S.E. 

763, 764 (1905) (“[The] necessity, real or apparent, [is] to be determined by the jury” 

and the defendant “can have that necessity determined in view of the fact that he has 

 

1 Contrary to the opinion below, the phrase “any place he or she has the lawful right 

to be” is not limited to one’s home, motor vehicle, or workplace, but includes any place the 

citizenry has a general right to be under the circumstances. See, e.g., Guss, 254 N.C. at 351, 

118 S.E.2d at 907; see also Research Div., N.C. Gen. Assembly, Summaries of Substantive 

Ratified Legislation 2011, at 48 (Dec. 2011) (“A person, wherever located, has no duty to 

retreat, and may use what force is necessary . . . .” (emphasis added)).

2 In 2011 the General Assembly amended the law of self-defense in North Carolina, 

Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 268, sec. 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1002, 1002-04, to clarify that one 

who is not the initial aggressor may stand his ground, regardless of whether he is in or 

outside the home. Compare State v. Godwin, 211 N.C. 419, 422, 190 S.E. 761, 763 (1937) 

(“When an attack is made with a murderous intent, the person attacked . . . may stand his 

ground and kill his adversary, if need be.”), with State v. Pennell, 231 N.C. 651, 654, 58 S.E.2d 

341, 342 (1950) (“[W]hen a person . . . is attacked in his own dwelling, or home, or place of 

business . . . the law imposes upon him no duty to retreat before he can justify his fighting in 

self-defense . . . .”).
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a right to stand his ground . . . .”); N.C.P.I.–Crim. 206.10 (A successful self-defense 

claim requires, inter alia, a showing that “the defendant believed it was necessary to 

kill the victim . . . to save [himself] from death or great bodily harm.”).

Though the trial court here agreed to instruct the jury on self-defense under

N.C.P.I.–Crim. 206.10, it omitted the “no duty to retreat” language of N.C.P.I.–Crim.

206.10 without notice to the parties and did not give any part of N.C.P.I.–Crim.

308.10, the “stand-your-ground” instruction. While defendant offered ample evidence 

at trial that he acted in self-defense while standing in a public street where he had a 

right to be when he shot Epps, the trial court did not instruct the jury that defendant 

could stand his ground. The State nonetheless contends that defendant did not object 

to the instruction as given, thereby failing to preserve the error below and rendering 

his appeal subject to plain error review only. 

When a trial court agrees to give a requested pattern instruction, an erroneous

deviation from that instruction is preserved for appellate review without further 

request or objection. 

[A] request for an instruction at the charge conference is 

sufficient compliance with the rule to warrant our full 

review on appeal where the requested instruction is 

subsequently promised but not given, notwithstanding any 

failure to bring the error to the trial judge’s attention at the 

end of the instructions.
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Opinion of the Court

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State v. Ross, 322 N.C. 261, 265, 367 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1988). Because the trial court 

here agreed to instruct the jury in accordance with N.C.P.I.–Crim. 206.10, its 

omission of the required stand-your-ground provision substantively deviated from the 

agreed-upon pattern jury instruction, thus preserving this issue for appellate review 

under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a). 

Moreover, the record reflects a reasonable possibility that, had the trial court 

given the required stand-your-ground instruction, a different result would have been 

reached at trial. See State v. Ramos, 363 N.C. 352, 355-56, 678 S.E.2d 224, 227 (2009) 

(applying “reasonable possibility” of “different result” standard to determine whether 

erroneous instruction was prejudicial). During closing argument the State contended 

that defendant’s failure to retreat was culpable. As such, the omission of the standyour-ground instruction permitted the jury to consider defendant’s failure to retreat 

as evidence that his use of force was unnecessary, excessive, or unreasonable. See 

State v. Smith, 360 N.C. 341, 346, 626 S.E.2d 258, 261 (2006) (The purpose of a jury 

instruction “is to give a clear instruction which applies the law to the evidence” and 

thus “assist the jury in understanding the case and in reaching a correct verdict.” 

(quoting State v. Williams, 280 N.C. 132, 136, 184 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1971))). 
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Opinion of the Court

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Accordingly, defendant is entitled to a new trial with proper instructions on selfdefense.3

In sum, we conclude that by omitting the stand-your-ground provision from the 

agreed-upon instructions on self-defense, the trial court’s jury instructions 

constituted preserved error. Defendant has shown a reasonable possibility that, had 

the trial court included the stand-your-ground provision in its instructions, a 

different result would have been reached at trial. Accordingly, we reverse the 

decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that court with instructions 

to vacate defendant’s conviction and further remand this case to the trial court for a 

new trial with proper instructions on self-defense and stand-your-ground. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED; NEW TRIAL.

Chief Justice MARTIN concurring.

This case is about what a man did in the few seconds after he saw his cousin 

get shot. We now have to consider that man’s response to this violent event in light 

 

3 Because we resolve defendant’s appeal on this issue, we do not address his remaining 

arguments. 
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MARTIN, C.J., concurring

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of the doctrines of self-defense and defense of another under our stand-your-ground 

statutes.

I agree with the majority’s ruling that the trial court erred by not instructing 

the jury on defendant’s ability to lawfully stand his ground in self-defense. I therefore 

fully join in the majority opinion. I write separately to note that defendant has also 

argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury on defense of another, and 

to observe that the trial court’s omission of an instruction on that defense also 

constituted error.

“[A] judge has an obligation to fully instruct the jury on all substantial and 

essential features of the case . . . arising on the evidence.” State v. Harris, 306 N.C. 

724, 727, 295 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1982). This obligation arises “[r]egardless of requests 

by the parties,” id., and a trial court commits error if it fails to meet this obligation, 

see State v. Todd, 264 N.C. 524, 531, 142 S.E.2d 154, 159 (1965). Our Court has 

applied this standard specifically to jury instructions on both self-defense and defense 

of another. See id.; State v. Montague, 298 N.C. 752, 755, 259 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1979). 

Articulating a principle that should apply equally to defense of another, this Court 

has stated that, “[w]here there is evidence that [a] defendant acted in self-defense, 

the court must charge on this aspect even though there is contradictory evidence by 

the State or discrepancies in [the] defendant’s evidence.” State v. Dooley, 285 N.C. 

158, 163, 203 S.E.2d 815, 818 (1974); see also State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 348, 372 

S.E.2d 532, 537 (1988) (citing State v. McCray, 312 N.C. 519, 529, 324 S.E.2d 606, 
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MARTIN, C.J., concurring

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614 (1985)) (“When determining whether the evidence is sufficient to entitle a 

defendant to jury instructions on a defense . . . , courts must consider the evidence in 

the light most favorable to [the] defendant.”).

Under our State’s common law, one could “kill in defense of another if one 

believe[d] it to be necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to the other ‘and 

ha[d] a reasonable ground for such belief.’ ” State v. Perry, 338 N.C. 457, 466, 450 

S.E.2d 471, 476 (1994) (quoting State v. Terry, 337 N.C. 615, 623, 447 S.E.2d 720, 724 

(1994)). The reasonableness of the defender’s belief was “to be judged by the jury in 

light of the facts and circumstances as they appeared to the defender at the time of 

the killing.” Id. (quoting Terry, 337 N.C. at 623, 447 S.E.2d at 724). 

Two additional common law rules limited the scope of this doctrine. This Court 

stated the first rule in State v. Gaddy: “[T]he right to defend another [could] be no 

greater than the latter’s right to defend himself.” See State v. Gaddy, 166 N.C. 341, 

346-47, 81 S.E. 608, 610 (1914). Under the second rule, which appeared in State v. 

McAvoy and other cases, the initial aggressor in a conflict could not claim perfect selfdefense. See, e.g., State v. McAvoy, 331 N.C. 583, 595-96, 417 S.E.2d 489, 497 (1992) 

(citing State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 530, 279 S.E.2d 570, 572-73 (1981)). An 

aggressor who started a fight without murderous intent, however, would still have 

been entitled to claim imperfect self-defense. Id. at 596, 417 S.E.2d at 497 (citing 

Norris, 303 N.C. at 530, 279 S.E.2d at 573). As a result, under the common law rules 

in Gaddy and McAvoy, a defendant who intervened to defend someone who had 
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MARTIN, C.J., concurring

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started a fight without murderous intent would have been entitled to a jury 

instruction only on imperfect defense of another. If a defendant established imperfect 

defense of another, a jury could not have acquitted him but could have convicted him 

of voluntary manslaughter instead of murder. See id. (citing Norris, 303 N.C. at 530, 

279 S.E.2d at 573).

In 2011, however, the General Assembly enacted N.C.G.S. §§ 14-51.3 and 

14-51.4, which at least partially abrogated—and may have completely replaced—our 

State’s common law concerning self-defense and defense of another.

Subsection 14-51.3(a) states that a person’s use of non-deadly force is justified 

“when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the conduct is 

necessary to defend himself or herself or another against [someone else’s] imminent 

use of unlawful force.” N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3(a) (2017). That subsection then establishes 

that a person is justified in using deadly force when that person is in a place that “he 

or she has the lawful right to be,” id., and “reasonably believes that such force is 

necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or 

another,” id. § 14-51.3(a)(1). 

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4 provides exceptions to the justifications for defensive force 

set forth in subsection 14-51.3(a), stating that “[t]he justification[s] described in . . . 

[section] 14-51.3 [are] not available to a person who used defensive force” in certain 

enumerated circumstances. Id. § 14-51.4 (2017). Subsection 14-51.4(2) then gives 
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MARTIN, C.J., concurring

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one of these circumstances; it states that a person’s use of defensive force is not 

justified when that person “[i]nitially provoke[d] the use of force against himself or 

herself.” Id. § 14-51.4(2). This subsection does not create an exception to section 

14-51.3, however, when a defendee—the person that a defendant acts to protect—

provokes a fight with non-deadly force and a defendant then intervenes to protect 

that defendee from deadly force. In other words, when a defendant uses deadly force 

to protect an initial aggressor who used non-deadly force against an attacker who 

responds with deadly force, that defendant’s actions are still fully justified under 

subsections 14-51.3(a)(1) and 14-51.4(2).

This statutory framework thus appears to contradict the common law rules in 

Gaddy and McAvoy when those rules are applied together, because it does not reduce 

a defendant’s justification to imperfect defense of another in this context. That 

defendant can rightly claim perfect defense of another. Nor does the only other 

exception in section 14-51.4 reduce a defendant’s justification for the use of deadly 

force stated in subsection 14-51.3(a)(1) from perfect to imperfect defense of another; 

that exception states only that a person is not justified in using defensive force under 

section 14-51.3 if the person “[w]as attempting to commit, committing, or escaping 

after the commission of a felony.” Id. § 14-51.4(1). So, under this statutory 

framework, a defendant who uses deadly force to protect an initial aggressor who 

used non-deadly force against an attacker who responds with deadly force should be 
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MARTIN, C.J., concurring

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entitled to perfect self-defense, as long as that defendant was not attempting to 

commit or committing a felony, or escaping after committing a felony, in the process.

It is important to note the statutory limits of the justification defense in 

subsection 14-51.3(a). At first glance, one might think that a defendant could defend 

another against deadly force even when that other had initially provoked a fight with

deadly force. But that is not so. Because the second sentence of subsection 14-51.3(a), 

in context, describes a heightened variant of the justification discussed by the first 

sentence—a justification sufficient to cover deadly as well as non-deadly force—the 

requirement from the first sentence that the hostile force being opposed be “unlawful” 

should be imputed to the second sentence. Thus, no justification is available for using 

deadly force to defend another against lawful force. If a defendee provokes a fight 

with deadly force, then the use of deadly force by the opposing combatant would be 

lawful. It follows that a defendant would not be justified under subsection 

14-51.3(a)(1) in using deadly force himself against that opposing combatant to protect 

the defendee, as the defendant in that scenario would not be defending another 

against unlawful force. The justification for deadly force set forth in subsection 

14-51.3(a)(1) is inherently limited in this way. Cf. State v. Holloman, 369 N.C. 615, 

628-29, 799 S.E.2d 824, 833 (2017) (concluding that, when an initial aggressor 

provokes a fight using deadly force and the opposing combatant responds with deadly 

force, that aggressor is not justified in using deadly force in response under N.C.G.S. 

§ 14-51.4(2)(a)).
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MARTIN, C.J., concurring

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Turning to the case at hand, defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on 

perfect defense of another. Based on the evidence at trial, a jury could reasonably 

conclude the following: Defendant saw his cousin, Jamieal Walker, being repeatedly 

shot by Quinton Epps, after Walker had punched Epps in the face. Walker began to 

run away, with Epps still shooting at him, and then Epps immediately turned his gun 

toward defendant. At that point, defendant shot Epps “to get him to drop his 

weapon.” The fact that Epps momentarily turned his gun away from Walker did not 

mean that Walker was instantly removed from mortal danger. Both Charles Bowser, 

an eyewitness, and defendant himself testified that the entire sequence of Epps’ 

turning his gun away from Walker and toward defendant and defendant’s shooting 

of Epps took, at most, “four seconds.” While the Court of Appeals leaned heavily on 

the fact that Walker was already fatally wounded before defendant shot Epps, State 

v. Lee, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 789 S.E.2d 679, 689 (2016), defendant could not have 

known at that moment whether Walker’s injuries were fatal or what chance Walker 

had of survival. Also, as the majority notes, defendant stated that he would have 

shot Epps sooner if Epps and Walker had not been so close together during their fight. 

I accept all of these facts as true for the purpose of deciding this issue.

Given these facts, Epps used deadly force against Walker after Walker had 

merely thrown a punch. That punch did not justify a reasonable belief on Epps’ part 

that shooting Walker was necessary to prevent Epps from suffering death or great 

bodily harm, so Epps himself did not act in lawful self-defense under subsection 
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MARTIN, C.J., concurring

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14-51.3(a)(1) when he shot Walker. This means that Epps’ use of deadly force was 

unlawful, and defendant therefore could have defended Walker from it with deadly 

force. Defendant was in a public street, where he had a lawful right to be, and, 

because Epps had already shot Walker multiple times, defendant could have 

reasonably believed that his own use of deadly force was necessary to save Walker 

from death or further serious bodily injury. This satisfies the standard for the use of 

deadly force in defense of another under subsection 14-51.3(a)(1). Thus, the trial 

court erred by omitting a jury instruction on defense of another.

In sum, the trial court did not instruct the jury on perfect defense of another, 

even though defense of another under N.C.G.S § 14-51.3(a)(1) was a “substantial and 

essential feature[ ] . . . arising on the evidence” in this case. See Harris, 306 N.C. at 

727, 295 S.E.2d at 393. The trial court erred by not instructing the jury on this 

defense. Defendant concedes that this issue was not properly preserved below, so this 

Court should review the issue only for plain error. I do not need to address whether 

the omission of this instruction rose to the level of plain error, however, as defendant 

will receive a new trial under the majority’s ruling regardless. If the same or 

substantially similar evidence is presented at a future trial of defendant, the trial 

court should instruct the jury on the law concerning perfect defense of another. The 

jury should not be precluded from considering any reasonable explanation of 

defendant’s actions right after he saw his cousin get shot.