15-2030 Neroni v. Zayas 

## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

# SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JA NUARY 1, 2007, IS PE RMITTED AND IS GOVERNE D BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (W ITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 2 New York, on the 29 th day of September, two thousand sixteen. 3 4 PRESENT: 5 DENNIS JACOBS, 6 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 8 Circuit Judges. 9

_____________________________________ 10 11 Frederick J. Neroni, 12 13 Plaintiff-Appellant , 14 15 v. 15-2030 16 17 Steven D. Zayas, Attorney, Committee of 18 Professional Standards, New York State 19 Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 3rd 20 Judicial Department, In his official and 21 individual capacity, et al., 22 23 Defendants-Appellees . 24 25

_____________________________________ 26 27 28 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Frederick J. Neroni, pr o se, Pawleys Island, SC. 29 30 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Andrew B. Ayers, Senior Assistant Solicitor General 31 of Counsel, Andrea Oser, Deputy Solicitor General, 32Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Eric T. 1 Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New 2 York, Albany, NY. 3 4 Porter L. Kirkwood, County Attorney, Delaware 5 County Attorney’s Office, Delhi, NY. 6 7 Appeal from a judgment of the United States Di strict Court for the Northern District of 8 New York (Kahn, J .). 9
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 10 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. 11
Appellant Frederick Neroni, a disbarred lawyer appearing pro se, appeals from the district 12 court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 co mplaint, which challenged the proceedings 13 surrounding his disbarment, the state laws that prohibit him from engaging in the unauthorized 14 practice of law, and the denial of access to his disciplinary file. We assume the parties’ 15 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedur al history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 16 We review the dismissal of a complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, 17 as well as a grant of judg ment on the pleadings, de novo. L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy , 647 F.3d 18 419, 429 (2d Cir. 2011) (judgment on the pleadings); Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ. , 131 19 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1997) (lack of jurisdiction a nd failure to state a claim). We review the 20 denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion. United States v. Amico , 486 F.3d 764, 773 21 (2d Cir. 2007). 22
I. Rooker-Feldman 23 “Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over cases 24 that essentially amount to appeals of state court judgments.” Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home 25 Lenders, Inc. , 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applied if: “(1) 263 the federal-court plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff comp lains of injuries caused by a state 1 court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites review a nd rejection of that judgment; and (4) the state 2 judgment was rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Id. (internal quotation 3 marks and alterations omitted). Rooker-Feldman does not preclude federal court review of 4 “executive . . . determinations made by a state administrative agency.” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. 5 Pub. Serv. Comm’n , 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002). It does , however, preclude federal court 6 review of decisions by “agencies that are appropriat ely characterized as arms of the state judiciary 7

qua judiciary, either because they exercise powers th at are inherent to the judiciary, or because the 8 state has provided mechanisms for judicial review of their determinations that distinguish those 9 determinations from other types of state administrative action.” Mitchell v. Fishbein , 377 F.3d 10 157, 166 (2d Cir. 2004). 11 Upon review, we agree with the district court th at Neroni’s challenges to his disbarment are 12 barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The record shows that Neroni lost in state court, the 13 underlying injury complained of was his disbarme nt, he invited federal court review of his 14 disbarment order, and he filed his complaint afte r the state court order was entered. Neroni’s 15 argument that his disbarment was an administra tive decision is meritless because attorney 16 discipline is a power inhe rent to the judiciary. See id. (observing that Rooker-Feldman precluded 17 federal court review of “determination by a stat e bar committee that an insurance company had 18 engaged in the unauthori zed practice of law”); Zimmerman v. Grievance Comm. of the Fifth 19 Judicial Dist. of th e State of New York , 726 F.2d 85, 86 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that 20 Rooker-Feldman “clearly applies to federal di strict court challenges to at torney disciplinary orders 21 rendered by state courts in judicial proceedings”). 224 II. Unauthorized Practice of Law 1 2 Neroni challenges New York’s law governing th e unauthorized practice of law. These 3 claims are non-justiciable. “To be justiciable, a cause of action must be ripe—it must present a 4 real, substantial controversy, not a mere hypothetical question.” Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. 5 Walsh , 714 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitt ed). A litigant is not 6 required “to expose himself to liabil ity before bringing suit to challenge the basis” of a threat of 7 prosecution. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. , 549 U.S. 118, 128-29 (2007). However, “[a] 8 plaintiff bringing a pre-enforcement facial challenge against a statute” must show that he “has an 9 actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against” him. Vermont Right to Life 10 Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell , 221 F.3d 376, 382 (2d Cir. 2000) (int ernal quotation marks omitted). 11 Even if a plaintiff shows that he has a well-founde d fear of prosecution, he must also establish 12 “prudential ripeness,” which requires “both the f itness of the issues for judicial decision and the 13 hardship to the parties of w ithholding court consideration.” Walsh , 714 F.3d at 691 (internal 14 quotation marks omitted). “The ‘fitness’ analysis is concerned with whether the issues sought to 15 be adjudicated are contingent on future events or may never occur,” and “[i] n assessing this 16 possibility of hardship, we as k whether the challenged action cr eates a direct and immediate 17 dilemma for the parties.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Here, the district court conc luded that a litany of Neroni ’s challenges to New York’s 19 unauthorized practice of law provisions (e.g., his argument that they prevented him from writing 20 about or teaching the law) were non-justiciable because he did not plead a well-founded fear of 21 prosecution. Neroni cannot articulate a well-f ounded fear of prosecution because he has not 22 “established a basis for concluding that enforcemen t [of these provisions] against [him] is even 235 remotely likely.” Hedges v. Obama , 724 F.3d 170, 202 (2d Cir. 2013). Moreover, even 1 assuming that Neroni could show a well-founded f ear of prosecution, he has failed to establish 2 “prudential ripeness” because his claims “are conti ngent on future events or may never occur” and 3 there is no “direct and immediate dilemma for the parties.” Walsh , 714 F.3d at 691 (internal 4 quotation marks omitted). 5
III. Recusal 6 The district court did not abuse its discre tion by denying Neroni’s recusal motion because 7 he failed to show that the distri ct judge was biased against him. Notwithstanding the fact that 8 Neroni’s wife previously sued th e district judge and seven other judges on the Northern District, 9 the “evidence establishes no more than that the court ruled against” him. See In re Basciano , 542 10 F.3d 950, 956 (2d Cir. 2008). 11
* * * 12 We have considered all of Neroni’s rema ining arguments and find them to be without 13 merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 14 15 FOR THE COURT: 16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 17