i i i i i i



### OPIN ION No
. 04 -0 9- 00 41 0- CV J amie CRENSHAW , Appellant/Cross-Appe llee

v . KENN EDY WIRE ROP E & SLING COMP ANY and Ne wco Ma nufac turing Company , I nc., Ap pe lle e s/C ro ss- Ap pe lla nts Fr om the 229th J udicial District Court, Duval County , Texas

Trial Court No. DC-07-172 Honora ble Alex W illiam Gabert, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Sitt ing: Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: J une 30, 2010 AF F I RME D I

N PA RT; REV ERS ED AN D R EM AN DE D I N PA RT J amie Crensha

w appe als a take -nothin g

ju d g me nt r ender ed ag ainst her, a rg uing the trial court
err ed in submitti ng its jury instruction on common law marr iag e, and that such instruction was harmful. In a cr oss-appe al, Kenne dy Wire Rope & Sling Company and Ne wco Ma

n u fa ct u ri ng Company , I nc. complain the tr ial court e rre d in denying the ir motions f o r direc ted ver dict on the issues of common law mar riag e and pr oducts liability . We must decide whe ther the jury instruction on common law mar

riag e wa s an improper comment on the weight of the evidenc e and, if improper,04

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- 2- whether it was harmless be cause the def endants we re entitled to dir ecte d verdic ts on the holding out
e l e m e n to f

c o m m o nl aw m ar

r i a g e an d o nt h e i s s u e o f

l i a b i l i t y. B ACKG ROUND David Goe hring was fatally injured while wor

king as a floorhand on a drilling rigoperated by his employ er H elmeric h & Pay ne International Drilling Company (“H &P”) . Goehr ing w as
mov ingtw o c a sin g ba ils wi th the us e of a br a ide d wi re ro pe sli ng . Th e sli ng wa s a tta c he d to t he ba il by a sliding c hoker hook w hile the other e n d wa s co n n ected to the hoist on the rig. T he ac cident
occur red w hen the ba ils disenga g ed fr om the sling a nd struck Goehr ing. Goehr ing’ s pare nts filed
a wr ong ful dea

th suit aga inst the ma

nufac turer of

the sling, K ennedy

Wire Rope & SlingCompany (“K ennedy”) as well as the manufa cture r of the sliding choker hook, Newc o M an u fa ct u ri ng Com pa ny , Inc . ( “ Ne wc o” ), a lle g ingthat th e sli ngand ho ok we re defe cti ve ly

de sig ne d. Jami e Crenshawintervene d in the dea t h ac tion, alleg ing she was Goe hring ’s common law wif e. Go e hr ing ’s pa

re nts su bs e qu e ntl y

se tt led wi th Ke nn e dy

and Ne wc o, le a vin g Cr e ns ha w’ s c la ims to proce ed to trial. At trial, the issue of whe ther a comm on law mar riag e existed betwee n Crenshawand Goehr ing w as strong ly

contested. A t the close of the evidenc e, Ne wc o and Ke nnedy moved for direc ted verdict on the i ssues of common law marriag e and products li ability
. The trial court denied the motions for direc ted ver dict and submitted the ca se to the jury . The fir st question in the court’s
c ha rg e re la te d to the iss ue of c omm on law m arr ia g e and

wa s su bmi tte d a s f

oll ow s: Were Jamie Crenshaw a

nd David Goehring marrie d at the time of Da vid Goehring ’s death? A man and a woman ar e mar ried if they

ag ree d to be marr ied and a fter the ag ree ment they lived toge ther in Texas as husband a nd wife a nd repr esente d to others that they wer e mar ried.04

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- 3- Repr es e n te d

to o th e r s m e a n s th a t b o th J

a m ieCr e n s h a w a n d

D a v id G oehring represe nted to other people that they were married. Mere isolated referenc es to eac h other as husband and wife doe s not am ount to adequate evide nce to prov e that they represe nted to others that they were married. (Emphasis adde d). Crensha w objecte d to the italicized portion of the char g e on the gr ounds that the instruction: (1) submitted lang uag e that does not a ppear in the statutory

definition of common law marria g e; (2) imprope rly

embellished a statutory

claim with unnece ssary lang uag e despite the Te x as Supreme Court havingrepe atedly held that trial cour

ts should subm it statutory claims in the statutory lang uag e; (3) c ontained incor rec t statements of law; (4) improperly char acte rized cer tain evidenc e as only amounting to “ mere isolated ref ere nces;” (5) ha d not been approve d as a pr oper submission by any Texas court or th e P at tern Jury Charg e Committ ee of

the State B ar of

Texas; and (6) constituted a direc t comment on the weig ht of the evide nce. The jury answe red “No” to the question of whethe r Crensha w and Goe hring wer e mar ried,
an d t h e r e f o r e d i d n o tan s w e r

t h e r e m a i n i n g qu e s t i o n s r e l a t e d t o l i a b i l i t y, p r o p o rt i o n a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y,
and dama g e s. Th e tr ia l c ourt e nte re d a take -n oth ingjud g me nt a g a inst Cre ns ha w, and sh e tim e ly appea led. I. J URY C HARG E ON C OM M ON L A W M ARRI AGE On a pp e a l, Crenshaw contends the trial court err ed in submitti ng the instruction on common law mar riag e, and that such instruction w as harmful beca use it impermissibly

tilted or nudg ed the jury toward a finding ag ainst Crenshaw on the exis tence of a c ommon law marria g e. A . Applicable Law and Standard of Review Rul e 27 7 o f t

he Te xas R

ule s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure state s: I n all jury case s the court sha ll, wheneve r fe asible, submit the cause upon broad- form questions. The court shall submit such instructions a nd definitions as shall be prope r to e na ble the jur

y to r e nd e r a

ve rd ic t.04

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- 4- . . . The c ourt shall not in its charg e comment dire ctly on the weig ht of the evide nce or advis e t h e j u ry

of the e ffe ct of their a

nswers, but the c ourt’s cha rg e shall not be objectionable on the g round that it incide ntally constitutes a comment on the we ight of the e vid e nc e or a dv ise s the jur y of the e ff

e c t of the ir ans we rs wh e n it

is p ro pe rl y a par t of an instruction or de finition. T EX . R. C IV . P. 2 7 7
. A ju r y in s tr u c ti o nis p r o p e r

if it : ( 1 ) a s s is ts th e ju

r y ; ( 2 ) a c c u r a te ly

s tate s the applicable law; and ( 3) is supported by the pleading s and ev i d ence . Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare

, L.P. v. Hawley , 284 S.W .3d 851, 855-56 (Te x . 2009). Rule 277 af fords the tria l court considera ble discre tion in deciding what instructions a re ne cessa

ry and prope r. State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau , 951 S.W. 2d 44 4, 45 1- 52 (T e x. 19 97 ); GuideOne Lloyds I ns. Co. v

. First Baptist Church of B e dfo rd , 2 68 S.W. 3d

82 2, 83 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 00 8, no pe t.) . In f

a c t, a tr ia l c ourt

is
a ff or de d e ve n mor e dis c re tio n w he n submitt ingins tr uc tio ns tha

n w he n s ub mittin g jur

y qu e sti on s. GuideOneLloyds , 268 S.W .3d at 836-37; W al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Middleton , 982 S.W .2d 468, 470 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied)
. We revie w t h e t rial cour

t’s decision to submit a particular jury instruction for an a buse of discretion. Shupe v. Lingafelter , 1 92 S.W. 3d 57 7, 57 9 (T e x. 20 06 ) (p e r c ur iam) ; Star Enterprise v. Ma rze , 6 1 S. W.3 d 449 , 456 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n Ant on io 200 1, pe t. de nie d)
. A tri a l c ourt a bu se s it s dis c re tio n w he n it

a c ts arbi tr ari ly , unr e a so na bly , o r w ith ou t r e fe re nc e to a ny g uid ingpr inc ipl e s. Middleton , 9 82 S.W. 2d

a t 46 9- 70 ; Bocque t v. Herri ng , 972 S.W .2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998). An
err oneous instruction, howeve r, does not re quire re versa l if i t d i d n o t ca u se the re ndition of an improper judg ment. T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.1(a) ( “No judg ment may be reverse d on appea l on the g round that the trial cour

t made an e rror

of law unle s s t h e co u rt of appe als conc ludes that the er ror
c omp la ine d o f .
. . pr ob a

bly c a us e d th e re nd iti on

of an im pr op e r j ud g me nt. ” ); Sta r E nte rp rise , 6104

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- 5- S.W .3d at 456. Charg e error is g ener ally considere d harmful if it relates to a contested, critica l issue. Colum bia , 284 S.W .3d at 856. We revie w the entire rec ord t o d et ermine w hether the submission
or re fusal to s u bmit an instruction probably resulted in an imprope r judg ment. Tim be rwa lk Ap ar tm e nts , P ar tne rs, In c . v . Ca in , 972 S.W .2d 749, 756 (Tex. 1998). B. Discussion I n T ex as , a common law marria g e has thre e re quirements: (1) the parties a g ree d to be marrie d; (2) the pa

rties lived toge ther in T exas a s husband and wif e af ter they ag ree d to be marr ied; and (3) the par

ties repr esente d to others that they wer e mar ried. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 2.401(a) (2) (V e rn on 20 06 ); Ru sse ll v . R us se ll , 865 S.W. 2d 92 9, 93 2 ( Te x. 19 93 ); Palacios v. Robbins , No. 04- 02 -0 03 38 -C V, 20 03 WL21 50 23 71 , at *3 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio Jul. 2, 20 03 , pe t. de nie d) (m e m. op.) C re n s h aw fi rs tar gu es t h e t ri al co u rt erre d i n fa i l i n g t o s u b m i ta s t at u t o ry

cl ai m i nl an gu age trac king the statute; in other words, he asser ts the submissi on on common law marriag e did not trac k section 2.401 of the F amily Code “a s closely

as possible.” T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 2.401(a) (2); Spence r v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am. , 876 S.W .2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1994) (“When liability is asserted based upon a

provision of a statut e o r regulation, a jury char g e should trac k the languag e of the pr ov isi on a s c los e ly a s po ssi ble .” ). Se c on d, Cr e ns ha w c on te nd s th e “ me re iso late d r e fe re nc e s” instruction amounted t o an im proper comment on the weight of the evidenc e. See A cord v. G eneral Mo tor s Co rp ., 669 S.W .2d 111, 116 (Tex. 1984) (cha rg e should not be embe l l ished with surplus instructions that tend to le ad the jury toward a particula r answe r or sug g est the trial court’s opinion
on the ma tte r) ; Lemos v. Monte z , 680 S.W .2d 798, 801 (Tex. 1984) (eve n a cor rec t statement of the law should not be submitted if the instruction comm en t s o n t he we ight of the evidenc e or04

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1 ... K enn edy ar gu es Cren s haw f ai l ed t o pres er ve he r jur y ch ar ge com pl ai nt s f or a pp el l at e r evi ew. W e di s agr ee. Cr en s h aw ma de t h e t r i al cou r t aw ar e of h er compl ai n t s by obj ec t i n g t o t h e ch al l en g ed l an g u ag e as a di r ec t c ommen t on the w e igh t o f the e v id e n c e , a n inc o rr e c t sta te m e n t o f the la w , a n d a n im p ro p e r em b e lli sh m e n t t h a t wa s inc o n siste n t with t he pat t er n j ur y ch ar ge; s he al s o re ques t ed a pr op ose d i ns t r uct i on t hat t r ack ed t he s t at ut e an d p at t er n j ur y ch ar ge. A c c o rd ing ly, C re n sh a w p re se rv e d e rr o r. See T EX . R. C IV . P . 2 7 8 ; T EX . R. A PP . P . 3 3 .1 (a ); s ee al s o St at e D ept
. of H i ghways v . Payne , 8 3 8 S .W .2 d 2 3 5 , 2 4 1 (T e x . 1 9 9 2 ); G re e n T re e F in . C o rp . v. G a rc ia , 98 8 S.W
. 2 d 77 6 , 78 0

- 8 1 (T ex. A p p .— S a n A n to n io 1 9 9 9 , no p e t.).

- 6- imp e rm iss ibl y til ts or nu dg e s the jur y on e wa y or the oth e r)
. Cr e ns ha

w take s pa

rt ic ula r o ff e ns e to the a dd iti on

of the wo rd “ me re ” to m od if

y the ph ra se “ iso late d r e fe re nc e s, ” wh ic h s he c on te nd s is alre ady an inappropriate embellishment. See Lem os , 680 S.W .2d at 801 (instruction advising jury that “mer e happe ning of a collis ion is not evidence of neg lige nce” was a n impermissible comment that tilted or nudg ed the jury one wa y or the other ). 1 I n re sp on se , Ke nn e dy and Ne wc o in iti a lly c on te nd that th e ins tr

uc tio n d id t

ra c k th e F a mil y Code and that there was no e rror in deviating from the pattern jury char g e by

adding a def

inition or instruction. See F

ord Motor Co. v. Ledesma , 2 42 S.W. 3d 32 , 4 5- 46 (T e x. 20 07 ); se e als o H .E . B utt Gr oc e ry Co. v . B ilo tto , 985 S.W .2d 22, 23 (Tex. 1998) (trial c o u rt s have br oad discre tion to add definitions to a pattern jury char g e that has not been declar ed the exclusive method of charg ing a jury in T e xas) ; W

hiteside v. W

atson , 12 S.W .3d 614, 623-24 (Te x . App.—Eastland 2000, pe t. denied) (same)
. Ad dit ion a lly , b oth de fe nd ants a sse rt

the pa rt ic ula r p ara g ra pha t is su e wa s p ro pe r b e c a us e it (1) a s s is te d th e ju

r y , ( 2 ) a c c u r a te ly s tate d th e la w , an d ( 3 ) w a s s u

p p o r te d b y th e p le a d in g s and evidenc e. S

ee T EX . R. C IV . P. 27 7, 27 8; Colum bia , 2 8 4 S. W. 3 d a t 8 5 5
- 5 6
. K e n n e dy

ar g u e s that b e c a u s e t h e i n s t r

u c t i o nw a s ana c c u r a t e s t a t e m e n to f t h e l aw , i tn e c e s s ar i l y

h e l p e d t h e j u r y . In supp o rt o f t h i s argument, Kenne dy cites nine Te x as ca ses for the proposition that isol ated or
occa sional ref

ere nces to “ husband” or

“wife ,” without more, a

re no e vidence o f hol ding out. See Es tat e of C

lav e ria v . Clav e ria , 615 S.W .2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1981) (whe n t wo p er s o n s not livi ng04

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- 7- toge ther oc casiona lly

ref er to e ach othe r as a “spouse,” these isolated ref ere nces do not e stablish a common-law ma

rriag e); Ex parte Three t , 160 Tex. 482, 333 S .W.2d 361, 364 (1960) (introduction of def endan t as h er “husband” to two c lose frie nds, and telling three others they wer e mar

ried, constituted no evidenc e of holding out to the public as man and w ife whe re c o u p l e did not live tog e the r, and sh e pu

bli c ly re pr e se nte d h e rs e lf

a s si ng le ); Drummond v . Benson , 133 S.W .2d 154, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.—S an Antonio 1939, writ ref ’d) ( isolated ref

ere nces to e ach othe r as “ husband” a nd “wife ” did not establish a common law marria g e wher e couple lived toge ther only intermittently

and did no t us e the same la st n a me ); Nic ho ls v . Li gh tle , 1 53 S.W. 3d

56 3, 57 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —A mari llo 2004, pet. denied) (summary judgme nt aff idavits showing , at most, only isolated ref

ere nces to e ach other a s husband and wif e, did not raise a

g enuine que stion of fac t on t he holding out element of
c omm on law m arr ia g e ); Lee v. Lee , 981 S.W .2d 903, 907 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (w oman’s introduction o f man a s her “ husband” to two c lose frie nds, and telling a fe w
c us tom e rs and

fr ie nd s th e y

we re se c re tly

marr ied, con stitut e d n o e vid e nc e that bo th pe rs on s h e ld th ems elv es ou t to the pu bli c a s ma

n a nd wi fe ); Flores v. Flores , 8 4 7 S. W. 2 d 6 4 8 , 6 5 3 ( T e x. Ap p . —W ac o 1 9 9 3 , wr i td en i ed ) ( wh er e c o u p l e h adb ee nm arri edan d

d i v o rc ed , m an ’s re fe re nce a fter divorce to his “wife” and stateme nt that he was “ living with my wife a nd helping her out” was ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a fi nd ing of ho ldi ng ou t and a g re e me nt t o r e -m arr y ); W inf ie ld v . R e nfr o , 821 S.W .2d 640, 651 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [1st ] Dist . 1991, writ denied) (occ asional introductions as hu sb and and wi fe , w ith ou t ha

vin g re pu tatio n in the c omm un ity of be ing marr ie d, did no t e sta bli sh element of holding out); In re Estate of Giesse l , 73 4 S.W. 2d 27 , 31 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st ] Dis t. 1987, writ ref

’d n.r.e .) (r efe renc es to ea ch other as “husband” and “wife ” were not the only evidenc e of ho ldi ngou t w he re record wa s r e ple te wi th e vid e nc e of c ou ple ’s c on du c t and

re pu tatio n in04

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- 8- c o m m u n i t y

r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e y

w e r e m ar

r ie d) ; Gar

y v. G ar y , 490 S.W .2d 929, 934 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1973, wr it ref ’d n.r.e.) (occasiona l refe renc es to “husband” and “w ife” did not support finding of holding out where couple we re not sure they wer e divorc ed fr om previous marr iag e). Ke nn e dy and Ne wc o f

ur the r a rgue tha t if the instruction was a

comment on the we ight of the evidenc e, it was only

incidental. To c onstitut e a c omme n t o n t h e weig ht of the evidenc e, the instruction must i ndicate the trial judg e’s opinion on the t ruth of t he matter in question. Harris v. Ge ne ra l M

oto rs C or p ., 924 S.W .2 d 1 8 7 , 1 88 n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied); Maddo x v. De nka Chem. Corp. , 930 S.W .2d 668, 671 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1996, no writ). An incidental comment on the evidenc e is not err or. T EX . R. C IV . P. 2 77 ; Ha rri s , 924 S.W .2d
a t 18 8 n .1 . H e re , K e nn e dy a sse rt s th e ins tr

uc tio n me re ly tr a c ke d the ho ldi ng s in ca se law, and did
no t te ll the jur

y to g ive mor e we ig ht to part ic ula r ev ide nc e ov e r oth e r ev ide nc e . K e nn e dy po int s to Lewis v. Anderson , 1 73 S.W. 3d 55 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 5, pe t. d e nie d) , a s an anal ogou s c a se
o n the issue of the e x istence of an informa l marriag e. In Le wis , th e a p p e ll an t o b

je c te d to the following jury

instruction: You ar e instructed that proof o f an ag ree ment to be marr ied may be esta blished by circ umstantial evidence or the c onduct of the pa rties. Proof of c ohabitation and repr esentation to others that the couple a re ma rried ma y constitute circumstantial evidenc e of a

n ag ree ment to be marr ied. Id. a t 56 4. Th e Da lla s c ourt no te d th e ins tr

uc tio n quo ted dire c tly

fr om Ru sse ll v . R us se ll , 865 S.W .2d 929, 933 (Tex. 1993), and wa s a cor rec t statement of the law
. Id. at 565. The c ourt furthe r held that, “[t] o the extent the instruction commented on the evide nce, it did so only incidentally

and did not sugg est the trial cou rt ’s o p i n ion conce rning the issue.” Id. Moreove r, the Da llas court conclude d the instruction was “ helpful” to the jury
. Id. (c i t i n g Louisi ana-Pacific Corp. v. Knighten , 976 S.W .2d 674, 676 (Tex. 1998)).04

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2 ... W e n eed n ot det er mi ne whe t her t he cha l l eng ed l ang uag e wa s i n f act a c orr ect s t at ement of t he l aw.

- 9- We rejec t eac h of the a

rg uments m ad e b y Kenne dy and Ne wco. F irst, contrar y to the impression cre ated by

the cha lleng ed languag e “me re isolated r efe renc es,” the re is no brig ht-line quantitative test for w hat constitutes sufficie nt e vidence of holding out to others. All of the ca ses relied on by

the def endants, a nd ref ere nced su

pra , apply a very fac t-specif ic analy sis to determine whether the holding out e lement of a common law mar

riag e has be en prove n under the particula r fac ts and circ umstances of the ca se. See , e.g. , Threet , 3 33 S.W. 2d a t 36 4; Drummond , 133 S.W .2d
a t16 0; W

inf ie ld , 8 21 S.W. 2d

a t 65 1; Giessel , 734 S.W .2d at 31. Fur ther, the me re f

act that a n instruction is a corr ect statement of t he law doe s not mean it should be included in the jury char g e, and does not pre vent it from beingan improper comment on the we ight of the evidenc e. Se e Ac or

d , 669 S.W .2d at 116 (in closely contested case , instruction that sing led out for the jur y that Gene ral Mo tor s w a s n e i t h e r

ani n s u r e r

n o r a g u ar an t o r

o f ana c c i d e n t
- p r o o f

p r o d u c tw a s ani mp e r

m i s s i ble
c omm e nt o n th e c a se a s a

wh ole ); Maddox , 930 S.W .2d at 671 (noti ng ever y corr ect state ment of the law does not be long in the jur y char g e, and holdingsurplus i n s t ru ct i o n on duty tended to lea d the jury to a par ticular a nswer a nd sug g ested judg e’s opinion on the issue). Her e, the c halleng ed portion of the instruction on common law mar riag e, eve n if a c orre ct statement of the la

w, 2 nudg ed the jury

in a spec ific direc tion, and was more t h an an incidenta l comment on the we ight of the evidenc e. The l an g uag e used, “ [m ]ere isolated re fer ence s to eac h oth e r a s hus ba

nd and wi fe do e s n ot a

mou nt t o a de qu a te e vid e nc e to p ro ve that th e y re pr e se nte d to others that they

wer e ma rr i ed,” c onstitut es a dire ct comment on one a spect of one element of the statutory claim of c ommon law marria g e on which the plaintiff had the burden of proof. Se e Ru sse ll , 865 S.W .2d at 932 (ele ments of common law mar riag e ar e ag ree ment to marry , living tog ether afte r04

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- 10- a g re e me nt, and

ho ldi ngou t) . B y

statin g that a

c e rt a in c a te g or

y of evi den ce “do es no t” c on sti tut e sufficie nt e vidence , the instruction f avore d the defe nsive theory that there was no e vidence on the element of

holding out, and imper

missibl y indicated the tr ial judge ’s opinion on the is sue. See Lemos , 680 S.W .2d at 801 (explicit instruction that particula r evide nce, “ the mere happeningof a
c o ll is io n ,” is not evidenc e of ne g lige nce w as mater ially differ ent from instruction that par ticular evidenc e do es not n e c essa ril yim ply ne g lig e nc e , and wa s e rr or ). Th e ins tr uc tio n in the ins tant c a se differ s signific antly

from the instruction in Le wis , relied on by Kenne dy , which made the per missive statement that ce rtain categ ories of pr oof “ma y ” constitute circ umstantial e vidence of an a g ree ment to be marr ied. Se e Le wis , 173 S.W .3d at 564-65 (holding instruction was not a dire ct comment on weig ht of the evide nce) . I n contra st , t h e challeng ed languag e her e instructed the jury that “mer e isolated ref

ere nces” to eac h other a s husband and wif e “ does not

amount to adequate evidenc e” of holding out, and thus di rec tly commented on the w eig ht of the evide nce on that element of Crenshaw ’s claim in violation of Rule 277. Be cause it amounted to a direc t comment on the weig ht of the evidence on one element of the c on te ste d is su e of

c omm on law m arr ia g e , w e ho ld the tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in submitt ing the challeng ed portion of the jur y instruction. C. Har m Analy sis Ha vin g de te rm ine d th a t th e ins tr uc tio n w a s er ron eou s, we mus t no w d e c ide wh e the r i t probably cause d the re ndition of an improper judg ment. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.1(a). Cre nshaw maintains the err oneous instruction was ha rmful bec ause whether a common law ma rriag e existed
was a contested, c ritical issue at trial. Se e Colum bia , 284 S.W. 3d a t 85 6 ( c ha

rg e e rr or is g e ne ra lly harmful if it re lates to a “ contested, c ritical issue”)
. The exis tence of a c ommon law marria g e wa s04

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- 11- the only question answer ed b y t h e j u ry , and wa s ext ensively addre ssed in voir dire, in opening statements, by

trial witnesses, and in c losing arg uments. I n addition, Crenshaw a sserts the following
c los ingargume nt b y

de fe ns e c ouns e l c omp ound e d th e ha rm : I f y ou look at t he ins truction on question one the very last sentence say s mere isolate d ref ere nces to e ach othe r as husband and wife does not amount to adequate evidenc e. That’s the J udg e telli ng y ou that. Mere isolated ref ere nces. O ne time, two times, ten tim e s o ve r t

he c ours e of

se ve ra l y e ars that ju st d oe sn ’t g e t it
. Crenshaw notes that in Tim be rwa lk, the court held that an er roneous instruction constituted har mful
err or whe re “ there was a

vigor ous dispute at trial” re lated to the instruction an d co unsel’s closing argument “foc used t he jury ’s attention on t he instruction and plainly misstated it.” Tim be rwa lk, 972 S.W. 2d a t 75 5- 56 . We c on c lud e the e rro neo us ins tr uc tio n w a s h arm fu l be c a us e it d e fi nit ive ly instructed the jury that a ce rtain categ ory of evide nce on a

contested, c ritical ele ment of common law marria g e was flatly inadequate, and therefor e impermissibly sug g ested the tria l judge ’s opinion on the matter and nudg ed the jury toward a defe nsive theory . Moreove r, the de fenda nt’s closing argument to the jury

quoted above stressed the err oneous instruction and hig hlighted the idea that the instruction reve aled the judg e’s opinion on the matter. The ref ore, w e conc lude the submission of the err oneous instruction pr obably cause d the rendition of an improper verdic t. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.1(a). Kenne dy and Ne wco a

rg ue that any

err or in the cha

rg e on common law ma

rriag e wa s
ne c e ssa ri ly ha rm le ss b e c a

us e the ir mot ion s f

or dir e c te d v e rd ic t on

c omm on law marri age sh ou ld have be en g rante d. That ar g ument is addresse d below.

II. C R O SS -A P P E AL : M OT I ONS F OR D I RE CT E D V E RDI CT Bo t h Ke n n ed y

an d Ne wc o m o v edfo r d i re ct ed v er d i ct o n t h e is s u es o f co m m o nl aw m arri age and produc ts liabili ty . The trial c ourt denied the motions and submit ted the ca s e t o the jury . On04

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- 12- cross-a ppeal, both defe ndants argue the trial court erre d in failing to gr ant their motions for dire cted verdic t on common law marria g e beca use there is no evidenc e that Crenshaw was the c ommon law wi fe of Goehring . A s to lia

bil ity , N e wc o a

rgue s th e e vid e nc e c on c lus ive ly e sta bli sh e d th a t it s component hook did not fail, an d t h at Newco wa s not in any way involved in the desig n of the integ rate d wire rope sling; there fore , it wa s entitled to a direc ted verdic t. Kenne dy ar gu es i t was entitled to a directed verdict on liability beca use t here was no evidence that the integ rate d sling wa s defe ctively

desig ned. A. Stan dard of Revie w A d ir e c te d v e rd ic t f

or a de fe nd ant m ay be pr op e r in two sit uatio ns : (1) wh e n a p la int if f f a ils to present evidence raising a fact i ssue essential to the pl aintiff’s right to rec over; and (2) whe n the plaintiff either

admits or the evidenc e conc lusively establishes a defe nse to the plaintiff’s ca use of action. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Rev iew Servs., Inc

. , 29 S.W .3d 74, 77 (Tex. 2000). We revie w a c halleng e to a tria l court’s denial of a motion for direc ted verdic t the same a s
we would revie w a challeng e to the leg al sufficie ncy of the e vidence
. City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005). Under a leg al sufficie ncy

standard of

revie w, we vie w the evide nce in the light most favor able to the f inding a nd indulge ever

y rea sonable infe renc e that supports it. Id. at 8 2 2
. We c r e d it f

a v o r a b le e v id e n c e if a r e a s o n a b le f a c t- f in d e r c o u ld , an d d is r e g ard c ontrary
e v id e n c e u n le s s a

r e a s o n a b le f a c t- f in d e r c o u ld n o t. Id. at 8 2 7. I f there is more than a sc intill a of evidenc e to support the finding , the leg al sufficie ncy challeng e fa ils. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs &Contractors, Inc. , 960 S.W .2d 41, 48 (Tex. 199 8 ). More than a scintilla of
e vid e nc e e xists “ if the e vid e nc e ‘r ise s to a le ve l th a t w ou ld e na

ble re a so na

ble and fa ir -m ind e d p e op le04

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- 13- to differ in their conc lusions.’” Ford Mo t o r Co . v. Ridgw ay , 135 S.W .3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004) (q u o t i n g Merre ll Dow Pharm., Inc. v. H avner , 953 S.W .2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)). B . Com m on Law Marr iage To deter mine whether

Kenne dy and Ne wco we re e ntitled to a dir ecte d verdic t on common law marria g e, we examine eac h require d element in turn. See T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 2.401(a) (2). (1) Agreement

to Be Married To e sta bli shan a g re e me nt t o b e mar ri ed, the e vid e nc e mus t sh owthe pa rt ie s “ int e nd e d to have a prese nt, immediate, and per manent mar ital relationship and that they did in fact a g ree to be husband and w ife.” Eris v. Phares , 3 9 S. W.3 d 7 08 , 7 14 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st Dis t.] 2 00 1, pe t. denied)
. The ag ree ment to be marrie d may be established by direc t or circ umstantia l evidence. Ru sse ll , 8 6 5 S
. W
. 2 d at 9 3 3
. T h e un ch al l en ged t es t i m o n y o f on e of t h e pa rt i e s t o t h e m a r r i age constitutes direct e v i d en ce t h e parties ag ree d to be marr ied and amounts to m ore tha n a scintilla. Er is , 3 9 S
. W
. 3 d

at 7 1 4 (c i t i n g Col lora v . Na v arro , 5 74 S.W. 2d 65 , 7 0 ( Te x. 19 78 )) ; Giessel , 734 S.W. 2d a t 32 . T he c on du c t of

the pa rt ie s a s well as proof

of c oh a bit a tio n a nd re pr e se ntatio ns to others may

constitute circumstantial e vid en ce of an a g ree ment to be marr ied depe nding upon the fac ts of the ca se. Se e Ru sse ll , 8 65 S.W. 2d a t 93 3; se e als o E

ris , 39 S.W .3d at 714. Her e, Crensha

w testified that thre e or f

our months after

they started dating, she and Goe hring ag ree d that they

would be mar

ried. Ke nnedy

ar gu es t h at t his testimony is self-ser

ving a nd
uncorr oborate d. Although Cre nshaw’s te stimony was c halleng ed by

the def ense, a nd contra dicted by Goehr ing’ s family , friends, a nd cowor kers, who te stified t h at t h ey believed Cre nshaw to be G o e h r in g ’ s g ir lf

r ie n d , it is mo r e th ana

s c in ti lla of ev id e n c e o f

ana g r e e me n t t o b e ma

r r ie d
. We04

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- 14- conclude the evidenc e wa s leg ally sufficie nt to establish that Crenshaw and Goehring ag ree d to be marrie d. (2) Cohabi tation There was e x tensive evide nce presente d at t rial t hat C rensha w and Goehr ing lived tog ether fo r a lmo st two y e ars pr ior to his de a th. Go e hr ingmov e d in to C re ns ha w’ s d up le x in V ic tor ia

in September 2005, a

nd lived there until his death on J une 18, 2007. Goe hring worke d seven da y s on and seve n day s off; on his day s off, he liv ed at the duplex with C rensha w. Cohabitation need not be continuous. Se e Bo las h v . H e id , 7 33 S.W. 2d

69 8, 69 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 19 87 , n o w ri t) (holding evidenc e suff

icient to establish cohabitation whe re hus b an d worke d in Nige ria but lived wi t h wi fe ea ch t i m e he re tu rn ed t o T ex as ). Go eh ri n g k ep t h i s p o s s es s i o n s , i n cl u d i n g c l o t h i n g,
v e h ic le s , to o ls , f

u r n it u r e , g u n s , d is h e s , f

is h in g g e ar , an d

o th e r p e r s o n a l p roperty at t h e d u p le x. Severa l w itnesses, including Goehr ing’ s pare nts, testified that Crenshaw a nd Goehr ing w ere living toge ther at the t ime of hi s death. The evidence was leg ally sufficie nt to establish that Crenshaw a nd Goehr ing lived tog ether

in Texas after the y

ag ree d to be marr ied. (3) Hol din g O ut Finally , to meet the third ele ment of common law ma rriag e, the parties must have re prese nted to others in T exas that the y wer e mar ried. W inf ie ld , 821 S.W .2d at 648. The statutory require ment of “r epre sented to others” is sy nony mous with the judi ci al requirement of “ holding out to the public.” Id. ; Giessel , 734 S.W .2d at 30. Holding out ma y be proven by evidenc e of the conduc t and actions of the pa

rties. Er is , 3 9 S. W.3 d at 71 5; Giessel , 734 S.W .2d at 31. “Spoken wor ds are not
nece ssary to establish repre sentation as husband a nd wife.” W

inf ie ld , 821 S.W .2d at 648.04

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- 15- He re , Cr e ns ha

w a nd tw o w itn e sse s tes tif

ie d re g ard ing the e le me nt of ho ldi ng ou t. Sar a Pa g il, Crenshaw ’s close f

riend, fr equently

stay ed at the duplex and testi fied that the couple often r efe rre d to e a c h o the r a s “ hu sb and and wi fe ,” and

Pa g il c on sid e re d th e m to be marr ie d. Whe n p e op le wo uld
a sk wh e re Go e hr ingwa s, Cr e ns ha w w ou ld a

ns we r, “ Oh[ ,] my

hu sb and is o ve r t he re .” Pa g il
reme mbere d one occ asion when Cre nshaw tol d Goehr ing to g et out of t he kit chen so she could c ook dinner, a nd Goehr ing r eplied, “Ma n[,] my wife is mea

n.” Monty Hoffma n, who l i v ed ac ro ss the street f rom the couple , testified that Crensha w regularly ref err ed to Goehr ing a s her “ husband” a nd he thoug ht the couple wa s marr i ed
. On one
occa sion, Goehringconfr ont ed h i m ab out a bar beque pit Hof

fman ha d borrowe d from Crensha w wi tho ut p e rm iss ion . G oe hrin g to ld h im, “ Jami e [Cre ns ha w] is my wi fe and , w hate ve r i s h e rs is mine.” Cr e ns ha

w h e rs e lf te sti fi e d th a t on c e the y

de c ide d to be marr ie d, sh e and Goe hri ngbo th repr esente d to others t hat t hey wer e husband a

nd wife. B efor e makingplans with others, Crensha w
wo uld say , “ Iwo uld

have to s pe a k w ithmy hu sb and .” L ike wi se , G oe hr ingwo uld sa y , “ he wo uld have to spe ak to his wife,” or that he would “nee d to g et it a pproved with his wife first.” Cre nshaw
a lso re fe rr e d to a sp e c if

ic oc c a sio n in De c e mbe r 20 05 or Janu ary 20 06 wh e n sh e and Go e hr ingtol d his friends, John and Randy Be cker , that they

wer e mar ried. J ohn Be cker , howeve r, re futed that stateme nt, and testified there was no doubt in his mind that Crenshawand Goe hring wer e no t marrie d. I n fac t, all of the def ense w itnesses, including Go e hr ing ’s fa

mil y , f ri e nd s, and c ow or

ke rs , te sti fi e d th a t Cr e ns ha w a nd Go e hr ingdid

no t ho ld themselves out as husband a nd wife. A dditionally , Pag il testified that Crenshaw told h er that she and Goe hring planned to g et marr ied. Kennedy and Newco assert that such a statement neg ates the04

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- 16- exis tence of a pr esent infor mal marria g e, bec ause a couple c annot pre sently be mar ried a nd also plan to marry in the future. K ennedy an d Ne wco a rg ue ther e is no evidenc e to show that Goe hring believed he was mar

ried to Crensha

w, and that the c ouple’s isolated re fer ence s to eac h other a s “husband” and “wife” wer e insuffic ient as a matter of law to establish that they

held themselves out
as marr ied. See Three t , 333 S.W .2d at 364. Crenshaw responds that e ven if the r efe renc es we re isolated, the y wer e cor roborated by

the uncontrove rted e vidence that they ag ree d to be marr ied and the o v er wh el ming e vidence of cohabitation. Se e Ru sse ll , 8 65 S.W. 2d a t 93 2- 33 ; se e als o Clav e ria , 615 S.W .2d at 166. Considering the evidenc e in the lig ht most favor able to Crenshaw , we c onclude that r easona ble and fa ir -m ind e d p e op le c ou ld dif fe r in the ir de te rm inatio ns a s to w he the r C re ns ha w a nd Go e hr inghe ld themselves out as husband a nd wife. See City of Keller , 1 68 S.W. 3d a t 82 7- 28 . T he re is c e rt a inl y more than a

scintilla of evidenc e—base d on the t estimony of P ag il, Hoffma n, and Crensha

w—that the couple r epre sented to others that they wer e married. According ly , we hold the tria l court did not
err in denying the defe ndants’ motions for dire cted ve rdict, and c orre ctly submitt ed the issue of
c o m m o nl aw m ar

r i a g e t o t h e j u r

y. C. Pr od uc ts L iab ili

ty To rec over on he r produc ts liabili ty claim alleg ing the integ rate d wire r ope sling was de fe c tiv e ly

de sig ne d, Cr e ns ha

w h a d to pr ov e that: (1) the pr oduct was de fec tively desig ned so as to be unr easona bly dang erous, taking into consideration the utility of the produc t and the risk involved in its use; (2) ther e wa s a saf

er a lternative de sign; a

nd (3) the de fec t was a pr oducing cause of the injury or death in question. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 82 .0 05 (a ) ( Ve rn on 20 05 ); Hernande

z v. Tokai Corp. , 2 S.W .3d 251, 256-57 (Tex. 1999)
. Kenne dy and Ne wco moved f

or direc ted ver dict on the issue of04

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- 17- liability , alleg ing that Crenshaw f ailed to pre sent more than a scintilla of probative e vidence on the first eleme nt of her c laim for a de fec tively desig ned produc t. We addre ss eac h motion for direc ted verdic t in turn. (1) Newco’

s Motion Newc o moved for dir ecte d verdic t on the basis that the e v id e n c e conc lusively established that its componen t h o o k d i d n o t fail, and that it was not in any way involved in the desig n of the integ r a te d w ir e r o p e s li n g . N e w c o ar g u e s th a t, a s a c o mp o n e n t- p art m anu f

a c tu r e r w h o d id n ot pa rt ic ipate in t

he int e g ratio n o f t

he ho ok int o th e sli ng , it

is n ot l ia ble fo r any de fe c ts i n th e sli ngif the hook itself was not de fec tive. See Bostrom Seating, Inc. v . Crane Carrier Co. , 140 S.W .3d 681, 683 (Tex. 2004) (“if

the component- part manufactur er does not participate in the integ ration of the component into the finished produc t, it is not liable for de fec ts in the final product if the c omponent itself is no t de fe c tiv e .” ); W illow brook Foods, Inc . v. Grinnell Corp. , 1 4 7 S. W. 3 d 4 9 2 , 5 0 4 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (com ponent par t manufac turer that supplies a product
acc ording to purcha ser’ s specific ations is free from liability if com p o n en t i t self is not defe ctive). Cr e ns ha w c on te nd s th e re wa s su ff ic ie nt e vi den ce to e sta

bli shthat N e wc o’ s h oo k w a s d e fe c tiv e ly desig ned, or at least to raise a fac t i s sue on the matter . Crenshawrelies on the te stimony of Eric a Ry les, New co’s m an age r, an d the testimony of an e x pert witness Randy McClay , a petr oleum eng ineer ing e x pert. I n deter min i n g wh et h er the re cord c ontains any probative e vidence to raise a fac t issue on whether the hook itself was defe ctive, we must look closely at the trial testimony

cited by Crenshaw , viewing it in the lig ht most favorable to her a s the non-movant. Bostrom , 140 S.W .3d at 684 (c iting04

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- 18- Do w Ch e mi c al C

o. v . F ra nc is , 4 6 S. W.3 d 2 37 , 24 2 (Tex . 2 00 1) ). Th e re le va nt p or tio n o f R y le s’ testimony is set forth below: Q. And would y ou ag ree that i fs [ s i c] i t i s p o ssible to use a saf ety latch on a hook that it should be used on a hook. A. Ye s. Q. All rig ht I mean it makes common sense to–that increa ses the saf ety of the hook do e sn ’t it? A. Ye s, it d oe s. Q. Uh now y o u
–

Ne wco r ealizes that this hook without a latch is stil l goingto be us e d in sli ng s th a t li ft

ob je c ts o ve r p e op le ’s he a ds
. A. We can a ssume that that’s what they are g oing to be used for , we don’ t know. Q. You don’t know but y ou want–y ou can a ssume it’s goingto happen a nd so as the manu fa c tur e r you

ne e d to pla

n f or that. A. Cor re c t. Q And the wa

y y ou plan for that is to m ake it saf e as possible. A. Ye s. Q. An d f or it t o b e sa fe as po ss ib le whe n it s’ s li ft ingloa ds ov e r p e op le ’s he a ds , it ne e ds to h a ve a

sa fe ty latc h o n it

do e sn ’t it. A. Uh, y eah. A. An d it do e sn ’t , d oe s it ? A. No it d oe s n ot. Q A nd y ou a s N e wc o h a ve kn ow n th a t y ou kn e w i t be fo re y ou

e ve r s old it. A. Th a t’ s c or

re c t. Q T hat in or de r t o tr

uly be sa fe it n e e de d to have a sa fe ty latc h o n it
. A. Ye s. Q A nd y ou did n’ t do it. A. Yea h.

. . . Q. An d w he n th is h oo k w ith ou t a sa fe ty latc h is u sed on a cab le a s an a sse mbl y without a safe ty

latch, y ou wouldn’t rec ommend that this cable and asse mbly be used for wor k overhe ad would y ou? A. No Q. An d th a t make s th is w ho le thi ngde fe c tiv e do e sn ’t it? A. I don’t know if it does or doe sn’t Q. Well it’s unreasonably dang erous isn’t it beca

use – A. I f s la c k b e c ome s in

the lin e , y e s. Q. An d it c ou ld b e – an d it is unr e a so na bly da ng e ro us if sla c k g e ts i n th e lin e be c a us e it doesn’t have a

safe ty latch. A. That c orre ct. Q. And if that’s the definition the jury answe rs – is a sked about def ective, that makes that w ho le thi ngde fe c tiv e do e sn ’t it? A. I would assume so.04

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- 19- Crenshawargu es t h at R y les’ testimony set forth a

bove conc lusively

established that the Ne wc o h oo k b y

its e lf wa s d e fe c tiv e ly

de sig ne d. We dis a g re e . Re a din g Ryle s’ te sti mony a s a wh ole and in context shows that she was stating that th e whole a ssembled produc t (“this cable and assembly ”), i.e. , the br a ide d wi re ro pe sli ng wi th the Ne wc o ho ok a tta c he d, wa s u nrea so na bly dang erous f

or lifting loads overhe ad if slack g ot in the line. Ry les testified the Ne wco hook use d by Kenne dy was not equippe d with a safe ty latch, and that a hook with a safe ty latch should have been used for lifting loads over people’s heads in order for the whole integ rate d product (slingwith the hook attache d) to be a s safe as possible. Ry les stated she w ould not recommend usingthe New co hook without a safe ty

latch “on a cable as an assembly ” for work ove rhea d. She further stated that “this whole thing ” ca

n be unre asonably

dang erous if slac k g ets in the line. We r ead Ryles’ testimony that the “whole thing” was defe ctive under c erta in conditions, i.e. , s la c k in the lin e , a s r e fe rr ingto the whole integ rate d product, not the Ne wco hook by itself. I n addition, Ry les testified that New co does sell the same siz e hook with a sa fe ty latc h f or us e wi th a

sin g le wi re ro pe , b ut n ot f or us e wi th the br a ide d w ir e ro pe us e d by Ke nn e dy
. F ina lly , Ryle s te sti fi e d that on e of Ne wc o’ s c omp e tit or s, Crosby , sells a hook equipped w ith a safe ty latch for use with braide d wire r ope. I n addition, Crensh aw relies on McClay ’s expert testimony explaining that bec ause the Newc o hook lacke d a saf ety latch, the sling incorporat i ng the hook was unr easona bly dang erous wh e n u se d w ithbr a ide d w ir e c a ble to l if t lo ads ov erh e a d. Cr e ns ha w m a int a ins thi s e vid e nc e is sufficie nt to raise a f

act issue on the first element of he r desig n defe ct claim ag ainst Newc o. Howeve r, McClay

also testified that the Ne wco hook did not bre ak or othe rwise f ail, and that the most li kely cause of the acc ident was slack in the sling line which cause d the thimble to come out04

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- 20- of the hook a

nd the load t o re l ea s e. Specifica lly , when que stioned about the Ne wco hook
c omp on e nt, Mc Cla

y te sti fi e d in

re le va nt p art : Q. Do y ou have a

n opinion whe ther or not the Newc o number 3 sliding choke r hook that w a s in sta lle d o n e xhibi t numbe r 8 a t th e time of th e accide nt, wi tho ut a sa fe ty latch, wa s an appr opriate pie ce of equipment for the job that was beingdone? A. I believe it wa s totally

inappropriate for that particular job. [Ex pert testified ab o ut desig n defe cts and de finition of “desig n defe ct,” a nd “saf er alternative desig n.”] Q. Do y o uh av e a n o p i n i o n wh et h er o r n o t p er t h at d ef i n i t i o n , t h e– t h er e w as a d es i gn defe ct, uh, in the New co number 3 choker hook that was a

producingcause of the occur renc e in question? A. Yes, sir. Q. And what is that opini on? A. I believe that there was a better desig n, a saf

er de sign of

that particula

r sling, uh, we’ ve hea

rd t es t i m o n y and I ag ree d with the testimony that if the hook had ha d a la tc h you wo uld have pr e ve nte d th e sla c k c on dit ion fr om a llo wi ngit t o c ome unhooked and I

believe that is what cause d this accide nt. Ag ain, re ading McClay ’s testimony in co n text it is apparent that he was re fer ring to the defe ctive desig n of “that particular sling,” the integ rate d product, not to the N ewc o hook by itself. I nd e e d, Mc Cla

y te sti fi e d th a t th e hook

its e lf wa s n ot per se defe ctive, and did not fa il. Further , Mc Cla y did no t op ine that the int e g rate d wir e ro pe sli ng wa s def e c tiv e ly de sig ne d for

a ll p ur po se s, but rather “wa s totally

inappropriate for that particular job.” McClay

stressed that “there was a

better desig n, a saf

er de sign of

that particula

r sling,” and that the integr ated slingwas misused in an ina pp ro priat e app li cat io n. McC lay con ceded , h owe ver, th at b ot h t he h oo k an d s li ng were app ro pria te for c erta in applications. As noted in Bostrom , a com po ne nt part wh ic h is not itse lf de fe c tiv e and is appropr iate for cer

tain other applications does not be come “def ective” simply

beca use it was used in an inappropr iate application. Id. at 683-84 (compone nt seat which w as not itself defe ctive, and which “in a

nother a pplication, not the one o n t h i s v ehicle, could work a nd perf orm under ma

ny04

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- 21- conditions well,” wa s not defec tive as i nteg rate d into vehicle restra int sy stem where manufa cture r had no contr ol over de sign of restra int sy stem). Viewingthe above -quoted testim o n y i n t he lig ht most favorable to Crenshaw, w e do not ag ree that the testimony

of Ry les and McClay

raised a fac t issue as to whether

the Newco hook wa s defe ctive in and of itself. Rather, both witnesses testified that the hook, as integrated into the wire rope sling by

Kenne dy , was pa

rt of a de fec tively

desig ned “a ssembly ,” i. e. , the integ rate d product
as a whole. As in Bostrom , Ke n n ed y ch o s e wh i ch h o o k i t wo u l d u s e an d i n t egr at ed i ti n t o t h e d es i gn of the bra ided wire rope sling–Ke nnedy was “in total c ontrol” of the desig n of the sling, a nd Newc o play ed no role in desig ning the sling. See id. at 684-85. We re ad Ryles’ and Mc Clay ’s testimony much like New co does, meaning that both witnesses t estified the issue was more one of misuse or inappropriate application of the hook than def ective de sign of

the hook itsel f. We conclude the re is no evidence that the hook itself was de fec tive, or that Ne wco participated in the integ ration of the hook into the final product; ther efor e, as a component-pa

rt m an u fa ct u rer, it is not liable for a ny desig n defe cts in the wire r ope sling
. See id. at 683. B e c a us e the e vid e nc e do e s no t ra ise a fa c t iss ue a s to wh e the r the Ne wco ho ok was its e lf defe ctive, and be cause there is no evidence that Newc o participated in the integ ration of the hook into the f inal product, we hold that N ewc o cannot be held liable for the alleg ed def ective de sign of the sling. See id. at 684. We there fore sustain Newc o’s complaint reg arding its motion for dire cted verdic t on liabilit y , and re nder a take- nothing judg ment in favor of Newc o. (2) Kennedy’s Motion Kenne dy asser

ts the trial court err ed in de nying its motion for direc ted verdic t beca use there
wa s n o e vid e nc e tha

t it s inte g rate d wir e ro pe sli ng wa s def e c tiv e ly de sig ne d s o a s to be unre a so na bly04

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3 ... K en n edy c on ce des t h at t h e ev i den ce e s t abl i s h ed t h e s ec on d of t h e f i v e r i s k

- u t i l i t y f

ac t or s –t h e e x i s t en ce of an al t er nat i ve hook des i gn wh i ch woul d not be un s af e or un r eas onabl y ex pens i ve.

- 22- dang erous, taking into c onsideration the utilit y of the produc t and the risk involved in its use. See Hernande z , 2 S.W .3d at 257. Specific ally , Ke n n ed y m ai ntains the evidenc e fa iled to raise a fac t issue on the following five risk-utility fac tors 3 that are u s ed t o d et ermine whether the defe ctive de sig n o f a

pr od uc t r e nd e re d it

unre a so na

bly da ng e ro us : (1 ) the uti lity of the pr od

uc t to the us e r a

nd to t he pu bli c a s a wh ole we ig he d a g a ins t the g ra vi ty and lik e lih oo d o f i nju

ry fr om i ts u se ; ( 2) the a va ila bil ity of a su bs tit ute pr od uc t w hic h would

me e t th e same ne e d a

nd no t be un sa fe or

unre a so na

bly expensive; (3) the manuf actur er’ s ability

to eliminate the unsafe char ac t er of the pr od uc t w ith ou t se ri ou sly im pai ri ngits us e fu lne ss o r s ig nif ic antl y inc re a sin g its costs; (4) the use r’s a

nticipated awa

rene ss of the dang ers inher ent in the produc t and their avoida

bility beca use of the ge nera l public knowledg e of the obvious condition of the product , o r o f the e x istence of suitable war

nings or instructions; and (5) the expectations of the ordina ry consumer.
Hernande z , 2 S
. W
. 3 d

at 2 5 6 (c i t i n g American Tob ac c o Co . v . G rin ne ll , 9 5 1 S. W. 2 d 4 2 0 , 4 3 2 ( T e x. 19 97 )) . We c on du c t th e ri sk -util ity ana ly sis wi thi n th e c on te xt of the pr od uc t’ s in te nd e d u se and

its intended user s. Tim

pteIn du s. , I

nc . v . G ish , 286 S.W .3d 306, 312 (Tex. 2009). Crenshaw responds that the evidenc e was sufficie nt to raise a fac t issue as to whether Kenne dy defe ctively desig ned an integ rate d wire r ope sling that was unre asonably dang erous. See T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 82.001(4) ( Ver non 2005) (de fining a “ma nufac turer” as any one who de signs or

assembles a product or any component part there of and places the pr oduct
or c omp on e nt part in to the str e a m of c omm e rc e ); see also MCI Sale s & Serv., I

nc. v. H inton , 272 S. W. 3 d 1 7 , 3 1 ( T e x. A p p . —Wa c o 2 0 0 8 , p e t. g r an te d ) ( “ [a ] d e s ig n d e f e c t r e n d e r s a produc t
unre a so na

bly da ng e ro us a s d e sig ne d, takin g int o co ns ide ratio n the uti lity of the pr od uc t and the ri sk i n v o l v e d i ni t s u s e . ” )
. S p e c i f

i c a l l y , C r e n s h aw c o n t e n d s t h e t e s t i m o n y o f R yl e s an d M c C l ay,04

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- 23- summa ri zed a bo ve , a s w e ll a s th e te sti mony of War re n H uble r, H& P’ s V ic e Pr e sid e nt f or He a lth Safety Environment, and Ga

rland Ke nnedy , Vice Pre sident and co- owne r o f Ke n n edy Wire Rope & Sling , raises a

fac t issue on eac h of the five risk-utility fac tors. We briefly

summarize the testimony of Hubler

and Ke nnedy
. Warren H ubler testified that, due to H& P’s prior experienc e with fa iled chain sling s, he
c on ta c te d K e nn e dy

a bo ut a lte rn a tiv e s. He tr

us te d K e nn edy ’s ex pertis e and a dv ic e wi th r e g ard

to
s l i n gs , wi re rope, a

nd equipment selec tion. Hubler stated that H& P looked to Kennedy for

“ re pu ta ble ins tr uc ti on on wh a t to watc h o ut f

or and ho w t o o pe ra

te our r igsa fe ly

wi th r e g ard

to slings, rig g ing, a

nd wire r ope.” Ga rl and Ke nn e dy te sti fi e d th a t hi s co mp any pu bli c ly re pr e se nts that it

ha s e xpe ri e nc e in heavy lifting, a nd offe rs consulting service s on the use and sa fety of wire rope slings. He stated that matching the sling to the pa rticular job is “c ritical” in terms of safety , beca use i f the wr ong piece of
e qu ipm e nt is pro vid e d a c c ide nts c an o c c ur . K e nn e dy state d h e is f

a mil iar w ithH& P’ s o pe ratio ns , havin g do ne bu sin e ss wit

h the m for 27 y e ars . Ke nn e dy a g re e d th a t H ub le r a nd H& P a pp ro a c he d h is company about their proble m with broken slings and dr opped objec ts, and soug ht Kennedy ’s advice on the “ultimate safe st w ay” to do the job. I n response , Kenne dy

analy zed H&P’s lifting proce dures and conduc ted a va

riety of t ests. Ba sed on Kenne dy ’s advice, H&P decide d to purcha se a br aided wire r ope sling equipped with the Ne wco sliding choker hook. We a g re e wi th C re ns ha

w that th e re wa s mo re tha n a sci nti lla

of e vid e nc e su ff

ic ie nt t o r a ise a fa ct issue on ea ch of the risk-utility fac tors. The e vidence established that the particula r desig n of the bra ided wire rope sling with a New co hook was chosen by Kenne dy
. Be fore rec ommending the “improved” sling produc t to H&P, Kenne dy made the de cision to use braide d wire rope, rather than04

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- 24- single wire r ope, and the n chose the Newco n u m b er 3 choker hook for a ssembly

with the braide d rope, know ing it did not ha ve a safe ty latch. Ry les testified that not only does Ne wco se ll a simil ar ho ok wi th a sa fe ty latc h, a lth ou g h o nly

fo r u se wi th s ing le wi re ro pe , bu t a c omp e tit or , Cr os by , a lso sells a hook with a saf

ety latch that ca

n be used with braide d wire rope. I n addition, Ry les testified that the sli ng sh ou ld have inc or po rate d a ho ok wi th a sa fe ty latc h in or de r f or the wh ole pr od

uc t to be as sa fe as possible f

or lifting overhe ad loads–in case slack g ot in the line. McClay testified that the hook without a safe ty latch wa s “inappro p riate f or that par

ticular job;” spec ifically , McClay stated that, althoug h the hook itself was not def ective a nd did not fail, the sling de sign inc orporating a hook without a saf

ety latch allowe d the load to c ome unhooked when slack g ot in the line, ca using the ac cident. In addition, there is evidenc e that Kenne dy had the ability to make the integr ated sling product saf

er f or lifting ove rhea d loads without impairing its usef ulness or sig nificantly

incre asing costs. Fur

ther, the te stimony

of Hubler

and Ga rland Kenne dy shows that Kenne dy was we ll awar e of H& P’ s p ri or

pr ob le ms w ith

c ha in s lin g s th a t br ok e or fa ile d a nd its ne e d f or a sa fe r s lin g fo r u se
on it rig s, an d

y e t r e c o mm e n d e d

a s li n g th a t i n c o r

p o r a te d a h o o k w it h o u t a s a f e ty latc h
. Hubler testified he would have liked to know about the option of using a hook with a safe ty latch, and that the additional cost would not ha ve been an issue. Kenne dy testified that incorpor ating a choke r hook
w i t h a s a f e t y l a t c h w a s f

e a s i b l e an d

w o u l d n o th a v e r e d

u c e d t h e s l i n g ’ s u t i l i t y. Considering the evidenc e i n the light most favor able to Crensha w, we c onclude that
rea sonable minds c ould dif fer on consideration of the five risk-utility fac tors, and thus th e m att er cannot be deter

mined as a matter of law
. Se e Tim pte , 286 S.W .3d at 312 (issue of whe ther a product is defec tively

desig ned is g ener ally

a question of f

act f or the jury , althoug h it may be dete rmined as
a matte r of law i n a

n a pp ro pr iate c a se ); Hernande z , 2 S.W .3d at 260-61 (dete rmination of whethe r04

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- 25- product is unre asonably dang erous as desig ned may be a leg al question if re asonable minds cannot differ on the risk-utility analy sis). Be cause the issue of a desig n defe ct was a question of fa ct for the jury in this case , we hold the t rial court did not err in denying K ennedy ’s motion for direc ted ver dict on liability , and in submitti ng the issue to the jury
. C ONCL US I ON Ba sed on the fore g oing analy sis, we conc lude the cha lleng ed portion of the jur y instruction on common law mar

riag e wa s a direc t comment on the w eig ht of the evide nce. T he er roneous instruction was harmful to Crenshaw be cause it inst ructe d the jury that a ce rtain categ ory

of evide nce on a conte sted, critica l element of c ommon law marria g e wa s inadequate, and ther efor e sug g ested the trial judg e’s opinion and nudg ed the jury toward a defe nsive theory . Howeve r, b ecause we conclude that Newc o was e ntitled to a directe d verdic t on the issue of liability , we a ffirm the takenothing judgment entered by the t rial court in favor of Newco. By contra st, we do not conc lude that K e n n e dy w a s e n t i t l e d

t o a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c to n t h e i s s u e s o f c o m m o nl aw m ar

r i a g e o r l i a b i l i t y. Acc o rdi ng ly , we r ever se the re maining por tion of the trial cour

t’s judgme nt as to Kenne dy and
re mand the c a us e of a c tio n a s to Ke nn e dy

to t he tr ia l c ourt

fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.
Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice