1 STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT
A 14

- 1 810 Court of Appeals Hudson , J. Took no part, Chutich, J.

In the Matter of the Welfare of: C.J.H., Child , Filed: April 27 , 2016 Office of Appellate Courts

________________________ Lori Swanson, Attor ney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and John J. Muhar, Itasca County Attorney, Mary J. Evenhouse, Assistant Itasca County Attorney, Grand Rapids, Minnesota, for appellant

. Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Susan J. Andrews, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________ S Y L L A B U S
T he juvenile court did not continue this case without adjudication under Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05 because that court never found that the allegations in the charging
document were proven , and therefore the court of appeals erred when it concluded that
the juvenile court ’s jurisdiction expired before respondent was adjudicated delinquent.
Reversed.2 O P I N I O N
HUDSON , Justice. This case presents the q uestion of whether the proceeding s at respondent C.J.H.’s first appearance constituted a “ continuance for dismissal ” under Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P.
14.01 or a “ continuance without adjudication ” under Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05 , subd. 4. The answer to t his question is significant because it controls the length of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction

. 1
T he State filed a juvenile delinquency petition against C.J.H. At the first appearance, defense counsel tol d the juvenile court that the parties had agree d to a
“continuance for dismissal

. ” The record of the proceedings at times suggest s that C.J.H. was stipulating to facts that would only be used against him if the continuance was
terminated and at other times suggest s C.J.H. was unconditionally admitting the charged
offense of attempted criminal sexual conduct in the third degree

. Without finding that the allegations in the charging document had been proved , the juvenile court continued the delinquency proceeding

. Approximately n ine months later, the ju venile court terminat ed
the continuance . Thereafter, the juvenile court adjudicated C.J.H. delinquent.

1 Minnesota Statutes sec tion 260B.193, subdivision 5(a) (2014) provides that “the jurisdiction of the court shall continue until the individual becomes 19 years of age if the court determines it is in the best interest of the individual to do so. ” Minn. Stat. § 260B.193, subd. 5(a). Rule 14.01 , subdivision 3 provides that a continuance

- for

dismissal agreement “may not specify a period of suspension longer than the juvenile court has jurisdiction over the child

. ” Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 14.01, subd. 3. Rule 15.05 permits the court to continue the proceedings without adjudication, but the period of continuance may not exceed 180 days in length when the child is not in detention

. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4(B).3 On appeal, C.J.H. argued that the proceedings at the first appearance constituted a

“ continuance without adjudication ” because h e unconditionally admi tted the charged
offense , and therefore, under Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P 15.05 , the juvenile court ’s jurisdiction expired before he was adjudicate d delinquent

. Persuaded by C.J.H.’ s
argu ment, t he court of appeals vacated the delinquency adjudication. We ne ed not decide whether C.J.H. conditionally or unconditionally admitted the charged offense because the plain language of Rule 15.05 requires a juvenile court to find the allegations in the charging document to have been prove n before continuin g the case wi thout adjudication

. Because no such finding was made in this c ase, t he proceedings at C.J.H.’s first
appearance did not constitute a continuance without adjudication . T he refore, the court of appeals erred when it concluded that the juvenile court’s juris di ction expired before
C.J.H. was adjudicated delinquent. W e reverse.
I.
In October 2013, the State filed a juvenile delinquency petition against 17

- year
- old
C.J .H., alleging three counts. Count 1 alleged the offense of third

- degree criminal sexual
conduct , Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2014) . Count 2 alleged the offense of attempt , Minn. Stat. § 609.17, subd. 1 (20 14) , where the underlying crime was third

degree criminal sexual conduct. Count 3 alleged the offense of consumption of alcohol by a pers on under 21 , Minn. Stat. § 340A.503, subd. 1(a)(2) (2014)

. At C.J.H.’s first appearance in November 2013 , defense counsel tol d the juvenile court the parties had agreed to a “continuance for dismissal.” Under the rule authorizing
a continuance for dismi ssal in juvenile cases , the parties must memorialize their4 agreement “on the record or in writing and signed by the prosecuting attorney, the child , and the child’s counsel, if any.” Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 14.01 , subd. 1. The parties chose to put the a greement “on the record

. ” According to defense counsel, t he State would continue the matter until C.J.H. ’s 19th birthday . If C.J.H

. successfully complied with the agreed

- upon conditions, the State
would dismiss the matter at the end of the continuance. T he agree ment included the following c ondi tions

. First , C.J.H. had to give “a factual basis [on Count 2] 2 and if he’s not successful with the continuance for dismissal, this basis would be submitted to the

court without further foundation and it would like ly prove the charge [ s ] against him.” 3 (Emphasis added .) Second, C.J.H. “would complete a psychosexual evaluation and
follow the recommendations of that evaluation

. ”
After C.J.H. was duly sworn , defense counsel asked him a series of questions in an
effo rt to establish the factual basis required by the parties’ agreement. C.J.H. waived his right s to a speedy trial, to remain silent, and to confront the witnesses against him. The prosecutor also asked C.J.H. a number of questions. T he prosecutor asked, “[Y]ou’re pleading guilty today to this offense because you are guilty?” The juvenile court then interrupted, saying “Well, he’s not pleading guilty.” The prosecutor acknowledged her misstatement, responding, “I’m sorry. I’m sorry. You’re not pleading guilty.” In the

2 The State declined to prosecute the charges of third

- degree criminal sexual conduct and consumption of alcohol by a person under 21

.
3 See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 14.01, subd. 1 , which provides that “[t]he agreement may include stipulations concerning the existence of specified facts . . . if the suspens ion of prosecution is terminated and there is a trial on the alleg ations.”5 end, C.J.H. admitted to all of the elements of the charged offense. During the proceeding, the judge asked C.J.H. if he “[knew] why [ he was ] guilty?” Finally, a s part of the proceeding, C.J.H. was told that if he failed to comply with th e conditions of the
continuance , the State would be able to “hand the [J] udge” his statements and he would be found guilty of third

- degree attempted sexual conduct and face the consequences
associated with conviction.
I n August 2014 , C.J.H. appeared befo re the juvenile court on allegations that he
had materially vio lated the terms of the continuance. 4 A fter considering all of the relevant facts, the juvenile court granted the State ’s motion to terminate the continuance

. When the juvenile court asked the prosecutor whether she was “planning to pursue the original charge,” she replied:
Your H onor, I think he has pled to second degree assault. I mean

- - sorry, second

- - Count 2, criminal sexual conduct in the third degree, and we are simply asking the court to accept into evidence his testimony that was given on November 27, 2013. . . . [T]he child has already pled guilty

- - or admitted in a factual basis before the court

. (Emphasis added.) Although d efense counsel disagreed , the juvenile court comm enced a hearing on the original charge. After C.J.H .’s testimony from the November , 2013 hearing was entered into evidence, and the victim testified, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that because C.J.H.’s factual basi s was akin t o a

4 T he alleged probation violations included the following: (1) C.J.H. researched countermeasures on how to cheat a p olygraph and later attempted to use such countermeasur es during a June 2014 polygraph; (2) when the countermeasures failed, he surreptitiously telephoned his mother’s boyfriend and directed him to delet e several files on C.J.H’s computer; and (3) C.J.H. had been viewing pornography approximately twice a week since Mar ch 2014.6 confession it needed to be corroborated under Minn. Stat. § 634.0 3 (2014) . After the
bench trial, the juvenile court found C.J.H. guilty of attempted criminal sexual conduct in the third degree and adjudicated him delinquent. On appeal, C.J.H. asser ted for the first time that he had not been granted a
continua nce for dismissal pursuant to Rule 14.01, but rather had been granted a continua nce without adjudication pursuant to Rule 15.01. T herefore , C.J.H. argued that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expired before he was adjudicated delinquent. The court of appeals agreed, explaining that: [ T ] he juvenile court’s continuance of the delinquency proceeding against C.J.H. constituted a continuance without adjudication because it followed his waiver of trial rights and admission of attempted third

- degree criminal sexual conduct, a charged offense. Under Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7 [ ( 2014 ) ] , and Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subds. 1(B), 4, the juvenile court’s subject

- matter jurisdiction terminate d no later than 180 days after the November 27, 2013 continuance order. The juvenile court did not commence new proceedings against C.J.H. until August 6, 2014, over 250 days after the continuance order. As a result, the court did not have jurisdiction t o adjudicate C.J.H. delinquent . . . .
In re Welfare of C.J.H. , 864 N.W.2d 194, 202 (Minn. App. 2015 ). We subsequently granted the State’s petition for review.
II. The State argues that the court of appeals erred when it concluded that C.J.H.’s
admissio ns at the first appearance transformed the proceeding into a continuance for adjudication under Minn. R. Juv. Del inq . P. 15.05. To support its argument, the State highlights the fact that Minn. R. Juv. Del inq . P. 14.01 , subd. 1 allows the parties to stipu late to “ t he existence of specified facts or the admissibility into evidence of specified7 te stimony, evidence , or deposition s if the suspension of prosecution is terminated and there is a trial on the allegations.” C.J.H. contends that the admissions he m ade at the first appearance were akin to a guilty plea , and therefore the court of appeals did not err
when it concluded that his admissions transformed the proceeding into a continuance for adjudication under Minn. R. Juv. Del inq . P. 15.05

. We ha ve never interpreted Rule 14.01 or Rule 15.05 . T he interpretation of a rule of court is a question of law; therefore, a de novo standard of review applies

. See, e.g. , Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 851 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. 2014)

. “ When construing procedural rules, we look to the plain language of the rule and its purpose. ” In re Welfare of S.M.E. , 725 N.W.2d 740, 742 (Minn. 2007).
Rule 14.01 states in relevant part: After consideration of the victim’s views and subject to the court’s approval, the prosecuting a ttorney and the child’s counsel may agree that the juvenile proceeding will be suspended for a specified period without a finding that the allegations of the charging document have been proved after which it will be dismissed as provided in Rule 14.07 on c ondition that the child not commit a delinquency or juvenile petty or juvenile traffic offense during the period of the continuance. The agreement shall be on the record or in writing and signed by the prosecuting attorney, the child, and the child’s coun sel, if any. The agreement shall contain a waiver by the child of the right to a speedy trial under Rule 13.02, subdivisions 1 and 2. The agreement may include stipulations concerning the existence of specified facts or the admissibility into evidence of specified testimony, evidence, or depositions if the suspension of prosecution is terminated and there is a trial on the allegations. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 14.01 , subd. 1 (e mphasis added). Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure 15.05, subd ivision 1 states: “[o]n each of the charges found by the court to be proved , the court shall either: (A)8 adjudicate the child delinquent . . . ; or (B) continue the case without adjudicating the child delinquent . . . .” (E mphasis added

. )
A.
The State cor rectly argues that Minn. R. Juv. Del inq . P. 14.01 , subd. 1 allows the parties to stipulate to “ t he existence of specified facts or the admissibility into evidence of specified testimony, evidence , or depositions if the suspension of prosecution is
terminat ed and there is a trial o n the allegations.” T he record in this case, however, is not

as “ clear” as the State claims. G iven the prosecution’s repeated statements that C.J.H. was pleading guilty to the charged offense, and the juvenile court’s inquiry int o C.J.H.’s
und erstanding of why he was guilty, the record is quite muddy. Although R ule 14.01 , subdivision 1 allows the parties to memorialize the ir agreement “ on the record ” or “ in writing, ” much of the confusion in this case would likely have been avoi ded had the parties memorialize d their agreement in writing. The process of drafting a written document is less pro ne to the type of misspoken, self

contradictory statement s that punctuate the record in this case. T he distinction between a

“ conditional ” and an “ unconditional ” admission of the el ements of the charged offense might be legally significant , and therefore the precise nature of the admission should be clearly articulate d by the parties. 5 W e are not suggesting that parties m ust memorialize a

co nditional admission of the elements of the charged offense in writing, rather than on

5 As discussed below, the distinction is not significant in C.J.H.’s case because the juvenile court fail e d to find that the allegations in the charging document had been proved

.9 the record. Instead, we observe that when the parties use the on

- the

- record process to
memorialize a “ conditional ” admission, they should proceed with caution and use pr ecise language , especially when the on

- the

- record process is routinely utilized to memorialize

an “unconditional” admission of the elements of the charged offense

. B. Having concluded that the record is not as “clear” as the State claims, we consider
C.J.H .’s contention that the juvenile court’s order following his 2013 appearance contains language that is the equivalent of a finding of guilt. In its 2013 order, the juvenile court determined that “[t]he child has ente red a
factual basis before the C ourt w hich supports the Court finding the child guilty of ” attempted criminal sexual conduct in the third degree, a felony. (Emphasis added.) The juvenile court went on to state , “ [ t ] he [child] agrees that if the suspension for prosecution
should be terminated , a transcript of his factual basis will be submitted to the Court
without further foundation and would be able to prove the child guilty of this offense.”
We conclude that t he language in the order does not constitute a finding that the allegations in t he charging document had been proved. Instead, the language reflects the juvenile court’s effort to satisfy Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 14.01, subd. 2, which requires, in part, “a showing of substantial likelihood that the allegations could be proved.” (Emp hasis added.) Although not controlling, t he comment to Rule 14 supports our
conclusion. The comment indicates that Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.05 6 was incorporated into

6 Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.05 , subd. 1 states: (Footnote continued on next page.)10 the juvenile rules in part to “ allow juvenile court practitioners the benefits of continuanc e for dismissal.” Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 14 cmt. A continuance for dismissal is advantageous to juveniles because “there is no finding that the allegations of the charging document have been proved in a continuance for dismissal,” thus, the offense doe s not
“count toward s a juvenile’s future criminal history score under the sentencing

(Footnote continued from previous page.) (1) A prosecution ma y be suspended for a specified time and then dismissed under subdivision 6 if: (a) the agreement is in writing and signed by the parties; (b) the victim’ s views are considered; (c) the court consents; (d) the court finds a substantial likelihood of con v iction and that the benefits of rehabilitation outweigh the harm to society from suspending prosecution. (2) The agreement must provide that the defendant not commit a new crime or petty misdemeanor and that the defendant waive the right to a speedy tr ial. In addition, the agreement may: (a) include stipulations of fact or of the admissibility of specified testimony, other evidence, and depositions if the divers ion agreement is terminated and the case is tried; (b) provide for any term a court co uld impose as a condition of probation except the defendant may not be incarcerated as a condition of diversion. (3) Limitations. The agreement cannot suspend prosecution longer than the period of probation the court could impose if the defendant were c onvicted. The agreement cannot include a condition the court could not impose as a condition of probation.11 guidelines.” 7 Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 14 cmt. Consistent with the purpose of Rule 14,

t he language of the juvenile court ’s order indicates that a transcript of C.J.H.’s factual basis would only be submitted to the court if the continuance was terminated. In sum, Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05 requires a finding that the allegations in the charging document have been proved

. Because t he juvenile c ourt’s order did not c ontain
such a finding, the continuance of the juvenile delinquency proceeding did not constitute a continuance without adjudication within the meaning of Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, even though C.J.H. waived his trial rights and entered an admission to all of the elements
of the charged offense

. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred when it concluded that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expired before C.J.H. was adjudicated delinquent.
III

. Even if the 2013 order did constitute the acceptance of a guilty plea, as C.J.H.
argues, it is not clear under the Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure that such an acceptance renders Rule 14 inapplicable . Rule 8.04 , subdivision 5 states: “ [i] f the court accepts a plea of guilty and makes a finding that th e allegations in the charging document are proved, the court shall schedule further proceedings pursuant to Rules 14 and 15. ” Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 8.04, subd. 5 ( e mphasis added). We must apply the plain meaning of a rule when the language of the rule is clear and unambiguous. See State v.

7 In addition, upon successful completion of a continuation of dismissal, the child may seek expungement under Minn. Stat. § 299C.11 (2014), beca use the matter has been decided in the child’s favor.12 Borg , 834 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Minn. 2013) ( “When construing the procedural rules, we look to the plain language of the rule and its purpose.” )

. Despite the court of appeals’ conclusion to the contrary, t he juvenile cou rt’s continuance of the juvenile delinquency proceeding did not constitute a continuan ce without adjudication under Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05 because the juvenile court did not find that the allegations in the charging document had been proved . Thus, the court of appeals erred when it vacated C.J.H.’s delinquency adjudication

. Reversed

. CHUTICH, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.