pleaded laches, appellant was required to overcome the rebuttable 

presumption of prejudice. NRS 34.800(2). 

First, appellant claimed he had good cause pursuant to Lafler 

v. Cooper, 566 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 566 

U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), because counsel was ineffective. 

Appellant failed to support this claim with specific facts that, if true, 

would entitle him to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 

P.2d 222, 225 (1984). Further, appellant's good cause argument was 

without merit because these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

were always available to be raised and appellant failed to demonstrate 

why he waited eight years to raise them. Further, because his case was 

final when Lafler and Frye were decided, he failed to demonstrate that the 

cases would apply retroactively to him. Even if Lafler and Frye announced 

new rules of constitutional law, he failed to allege facts that meet either 

exception to the general principle that such rules do not apply 

retroactively to cases which were already final when the new rules were 

announced. See Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 816-17, 59 P.3d 463, 469- 

70 (2002). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Second, relying in part on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. , 132 

S. Ct. 1309 (2012), appellant argued that he had good cause because he 

was not appointed counsel in the first post-conviction proceedings. We 

conclude that this argument lacked merit. The appointment of counsel 

was discretionary in the first post-conviction proceedings, see MRS 

34.750(1), and appellant failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. 

Further, this court has recently held that Martinez does not apply to 

Nevada's statutory post-conviction procedures. See Brown v. McDaniel, 

Nev. , 331 P.3d 867 (2014). Thus, the failure to appoint postSUPREME COURT 

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conviction counsel and the decision in Martinez would not provide good 

cause for this late and successive petition. 

Finally, appellant argued he could overcome the procedural 

defects because he was actually innocent. Appellant did not demonstrate 

actual innocence because he failed to show that "it is more likely than not 

that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of . . . new 

evidence." Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)); see also Pellegrini v. State, 117 

Nev. 860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001); Mazzan v. Warden, 112 Nev. 838, 

842, 921 P.2d 920, 922 (1996). We therefore conclude that the district 

court did not err in denying appellant's petition as procedurally barred, 

and we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 3 

Pickering 

, J. 

J. 

Pailraguirre 

SAITTA, J., concurring: 

Although I would extend the equitable rule recognized in 

Martinez to this case because appellant was convicted of murder and is 

3We have reviewed all documents that appellant has submitted in 

proper person to the clerk of this court in this matter, and we conclude 

that no relief based upon those submissions is warranted. To the extent 

that appellant has attempted to present claims or facts in those 

submissions which were not previously presented in the proceedings 

below, we have declined to consider them in the first instance. 

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J. 

facing a severe sentence, see Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev. . P.3d 

(Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014) (Cherry, J., dissenting), I concur in 

the judgment on appeal in this case because the State pleaded laches 

under NRS 34.800(2) and appellant failed to rebut the presumption of 

prejudice to the State. 

cc: Hon. James M. Bixler, District Judge 

Miguel Reyes-Carreon 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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(0) 1907A es.