Affirmed and Plurality Opinion and Two Concurring Opinions filed January 

30, 2020.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-18-00568-CR

EX PARTE DAVID WILLIAMS, Appellant

On Appeal from the 412th District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 89988-WR

PLURALITY OPINION

Appellant David Williams is currently an inmate in the Texas prison system 

serving time for a felony offense. He filed an application for writ of habeas corpus, 

also known as a “medical writ,” seeking to be released on bail because he suffers 

from congestive heart failure and wishes to seek a heart transplant outside the 

Texas prison system. Appellant receives treatment for his heart condition at the 

University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston (UTMB Galveston), where he 

was being evaluated for a heart transplant. Appellant wishes to seek a bloodless 

heart transplant on religious grounds.1 UTMB Galveston does not offer this 

1 As a Jehovah’s Witness, appellant is forbidden from receiving blood transfusions.
2

procedure.2

After a hearing, the habeas court denied the application. On appeal, 

appellant contends that the court erred in concluding it lacks authority to release 

appellant. Concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this appeal under 

controlling Court of Criminal Appeals’ precedent and thus correctly denied the 

application for writ, we affirm.

Appellant sought habeas relief under article 11.25 of the Code of Criminal 

procedure, which provides: 

When a judge or court authorized to grant writs of habeas 

corpus shall be satisfied, upon investigation, that a person 

in legal custody is afflicted with a disease which will

render a removal necessary for the preservation of life, an 

order may be made for the removal of the prisoner to 

some other place where his health will not be likely to 

suffer; or he may be admitted to bail when it appears that 

any species of confinement will endanger his life.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. § 11.25.

3

The Court of Criminal Appeals held in 1981 that the phrase “legal custody”

in article 11.25 “does not contemplate a release after conviction of a felony.” 

Ex parte Baltimore, 616 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (citing Ex parte 

Smith, 64 S.W. 1052 (Tex. Cr. App. 1901) and the predecessor statute to article 

2 The State contends that appellant has not shown that he can receive a bloodless heart 

transplant elsewhere without consenting to an emergency backup transfusion if needed. 

Appellant testified that three hospitals in the United States offer this procedure but conceded at 

the hearing that whether these hospitals “requir[e] blood if needed” was “outside the scope of 

[his] knowledge.” The State also argues that appellant is not eligible for a heart transplant 

because he is noncompliant in taking his prescribed medications. Appellant disputes this latter 

allegation and presented evidence to the contrary. Thus, the habeas court heard conflicting 

evidence on this issue.

3 Appellant does not seek removal to another place in the Texas prison system because he 

contends that he cannot get a bloodless heart transplant unless he goes to one of only three

hospitals in the United States that offer the procedure.
3

11.25 and holding “[w]e adhere to the Smith opinion as to the interpretation of the 

phrase ‘legal custody’ as it now appears in Article 11.25”)). The Court further held 

that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to release a felon under article 11.25 and thus the 

habeas court correctly denied the appellant’s medical writ. Id. The Court affirmed 

the habeas court’s judgment. Id. at 208.

Appellant contends that Baltimore was wrongly decided. We agree: the plain 

language of the statute does not contemplate an exception for felony offenders. But 

the language in article 11.25 is the same as when Baltimore was decided, and the 

Court of Criminal Appeals has never revisited the Baltimore decision. “[U]nder the 

doctrine of stare decisis[,] once ‘the highest court of the State having jurisdiction’

of a matter decides a ‘principle, rule or proposition of law,’ that court and all ‘other 

courts of lower rank’ must accept the decision as ‘binding precedent.’” Romero v. 

State, 331 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d)

(Seymore, J., concurring) (quoting Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex.

1964) (emphasis added)). The Court of Criminal Appeals has final appellate 

jurisdiction over questions of law in criminal cases. Tex. Const. art. V, § 5; 

Romero, 331 S.W.3d at 86. In accordance with the binding precedent of the high 

court, we must affirm the trial court’s order denying the writ.

/s/ Frances Bourliot

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Bourliot and Poissant. (Frost, 

C.J., concurring, and Poissant, J., concurring).

Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).