T h e H on or abl e Ja mes S. G wi n , U n i t ed St at es D i st ri ct J u dg e f or t h e N or t h er n D i s t r i ct of O h i o, s i t t i n g by * d esi gnat i o n. NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0398n.06 F iled: Jun e 14, 2007 No. 06-2039 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
NE L SONED WARD RO B ERT S, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. CORPORAL

MANI GOLD, et al., De fe nd ants ; OFF I CE R STRI CKL EN; CI TY OF B I RMI NG HA M, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts
. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED ST A T E S D I ST RI CT CO U RT F O R TH E EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Be fore : SUTTON and COOK , Circuit J udg es; and GWI N, District J udg e. *
CO OK , Ci rc uit

Judg e . O ff

ic e r K ate Str ic klen a nd her e mpl oye r, the City

of B ir min g ham, Mic hig an, br in g th is Johnson v. J ones , 515 U.S. 304 (1995), interloc utory appea l following the district court’s denial of qualified immunit y from Nelson Roberts’s excessive forc e cla im. Agr eeing wi th t he dis tr ic t c ourt

tha t w het her Stric kle n v iol ate d Ro be rt s’ s c le a rl y e sta bli sh e d F ourt

h Amendment right to be fre e fr om excessive forc e turns on a disputed que stion of fac t, we af firm and
re mand the c a se fo r f

ur the r p ro c e e din g s.No. 06-2039

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T he veraci t y of t hi s vers i o n of t he f act s i s, of co urs e, a jur y que st i o n. 1 - 2 - I
Be cause this case c omes to us after a denia l of qualified imm u n i ty , we must construe the fa c ts i n th e light mos t favo ra ble to Rob e rt s. Af

te r s pe nd ingthe we e ke nd

wi th h is c hil dr e n, Rob e rt s 1 brought them back to the house of his estrang ed wife , Corryl Parr, on a Sun d ay af t ern o on. Parr asked Rober

ts to make some re pairs ar ound the house, but Roberts re fused a nd t o l d h er t h at he would help her

another day

. Parr became angry , and R oberts attempted to calm her by hug g ing he r. She re sis te d, sp it i n h is f a c e , an d h it h im. She the n p ic ke d u p a ph on e to d ia l 91 1, but Ro be rt s
un plu g g e d th e ph on e fr om t he wa ll, so Parr

hit him wi th t he ph on e . Ro be rt s w e nt do wnstai rs to leave , and Parr

used the downstair s phone to ca ll the police as Rober ts left the house.
After Roberts retur

ned to his car , h e attempted to call his divorce attorney , but could not reach him . L ate r t

hat da y , Ro be rt s c a lle d Pa

rr to m ake sure sh e wa s o ka y , b ut O ff ic e r G ina Potts
ans we re d th e ph on e . Ro be rt s to ld P ott s th at he wa nte d to ma

ke a state me nt, and Potts as ke d h im t o
re tur n to the ho us e to d o s o. Rob e rt s re tur ne d to the ho us e to fi nd Potts wi th tw o o the r o ff ic e rs , K ate Stricklen and Phillip W ebb, wa iting for him. Roberts felt thre atene d by the offic ers a

nd attempted to keep his distance from them. Roberts then fe lt his cell phone ring , and, thinking his lawyer might be ca lling, re trieved it fr om his coat pocke t and answe red it. As he a nswere d his p hone, he kept walkingbackw ard until, fea ringfor his saf

ety , he turne d and ra

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A t as er i s an el ect r osh ock we apon. I t ha s t wo met al l i c pr ongs at t ach ed t o t wo 22

- f oo t ca bl es , wh i ch t he of f i cer 2 shoo t s at t he sus p ect t o i m m o b i l i ze hi m . O nce t he cab l es have been d i scharged, t he o f f i cer can s t i l l us e t he t aser t o dri ve st un t he sus p ect
. D ri ve st unni ng a s uspect t em p o rari l y dis rupts hi s m uscl e co nt rol b y g ivin g h i m a bri ef but st rong el ect ri cal s ho ck.

R o b e rts m a k e s m u c h o f this ac q u itt a l, a rg u ing tha t t h e ju ry “h e ld ” tha t “R o b e rts d id no t as sa u lt h is w ife.” A ll 3 w e g le a n fro m his a c q u itt a l, h o w e v e r, is tha t t h e p ro se c u tio n d id no t p ro v e the e le m e n ts o f ass a u lt b e yo n d a re a so n a b le d o u b t. - 3 - T h e o f f ic e r s c h a s e d

h im , an d Str ic k le np u ll e d

o ut h e r ta s e r an d

att e mp te d

to u s e it on 2 Rob e rt s. Rob e rt s f

e lt the ini tia l sh oc k, pu lle d a pr on gof the ta se r out of his ba c k, and c ontin ue d to run. Afte r Roberts fe ll face -down into a snow bank, Webb, a 225-pound for

mer runningback at the University o f M i ch i g an, pinned him by holding his legon top of Roberts’s bac k. Webb gr abbed Roberts’s ar

m to try to handcuf

f hi m, and Roberts c ontinually crie d out for help. Although Webb had Roberts c ompletely

pinned, Stricklen re peate dly used her taser on Robe rt s . Stricklen did not wait for Webb to g et Roberts under control befor e she used her taser on him, and Webb admits that he would have been able to subdue Roberts without St ricklen’ s assistance. T he off icer s then took R o b e rt s i nt o c u s t o dy.
Roberts was trie d on a domesti c viol ence charg e, but t he jury acquitted him. Roberts then 3 sued the City

and Offic ers Stricklen, Webb, a nd Potts for e x cessive f

orce under 42 U .S.C. § 1983 and seve ral state- law ca

uses of a ction. The district cour t ordere d Offic ers Webb and Potts dismis sed from the c ase w ith prejudice a nd dismiss ed one of

the stat e- law cla ims—conspiracy —but did not
ru le on the oth e r c la ims

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- 4 - T h e d is tric t c o urt a ls o d e n ie d th e d e f e n d ants ’ s umm ar

y ju d g me nt m o ti o n“ f

o r th e r e a s o ns set forth on the r ecor d.” On the r eco rd , t h e d i s trict judg e stated that he found “ that [the
rea sonablene ss of the forc e used is] a question of fa ct; that there ’s a we ll-rec ognized constitut ional ri ght t o b e fr e e fr om e xce ssi ve fo rc e ; th at th e Pla int if f’s tes ti mony , whe n ta

ke n in the light m os t favor able to the Plaintiff, pre sents a question of fac t for the jury as t o whether or not the sec ond taser
was a ppropriate or excessive.” Stricklen and the City of B irmingha

m appea led.
I I The Supreme Court char acte rizes a district court’s de nial of qualified immunity as a f inal appea lable order to the ex tent that order turns on leg al i ssues. Johnson v. J ones , 515 U.S. at 310-12. A “de nial of qualified immunity on purely

leg al grounds is immediately appea lable. A de nial of qualified immunity that turns on evidentiar y issues is not.” Tur

ne r v . S c ott , 1 19 F .3 d 4 25 , 4 27 (6 th Cir. 1997) (interna l citation omitt ed). Adistrict court’s statement that there exis ts a g enuine issue of material fac t for trial doe s not, however , divest this court of jurisdi ct i o nto enterta in an interlocutory

appea l of t he denial of t he qualified immunit y aspec t of that dec ision. See Liv e rm ore v. Lubelan , 4 7 6 F. 3 d

3 9 7 , 4 0 2 -0 3 (6 th C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g W ill iam s v . M

e hra , 186 F.3d 685, 689- 90 (6th Cir. 1999) (e n banc) ). W e h ave jurisdiction to review de novo the district court’s de cision,
cre diting Roberts’s acc ount of the incident, that qualified immunity does not shield Stricklen from trial. I f we agree with the di strict court that under Rober ts’s version of the f

acts, Stricklen c ould be denied qua lified immunity , our i nterlocutory jurisdiction ends and a jury must decide which ver sion of the fa c ts p re va ils

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- 5 - Whe n r e vie wi nga

mot ion fo r s umm ary

ju dgmen t, w e ne ith e r “ make c re dib ili ty deter minations [ nor] weigh the evidenc e.” Adams v. M etiva , 31 F.3d 375, 384 ( 6th Cir. 1994) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S . 242, 255 (1986)) . We instead “viewthe evidenc e and draw all rea sonable infe renc es there from in the light most favorable to the non -m o v ing pa rty .” Bake r v. City of Hamilton , 471 F.3d 601, 603 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (quoti n g L i t t le v. BP E xploration & Oil Co. , 265 F.3d 357, 361 ( 6th Cir. 2001)).
III The Supreme Court instructs courts to use a two-step inquiry to decide whether

a def endant is entitled to qualified immunit y . See Sc ott v . H arris , 1 27 S. Ct
. 17 69 , 17 74 (2 00 7) ; Hudson v. Hudson , 475 F.3d 741, 745 ( 6th Cir. 2007). First, did the def endants’ c onduct v iolate a
c o n s t i tut i o n a l r i g h t h e l d

b y th e p l a i nt i f

f ? Sa uc ie r v . Ka tz , 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Second, if so,
w a s th e v i o l at e d

r i g h tc l e ar l y e s t a

b l i s h e d at th e t i m e o f th e v i o l at i o n ? Brosseau v. Hauge n , 5 43 U. S. 194, 198 (2004).
J udg ing Robe rts’s excessive for ce c laims “under the Fo u rt h Amendment’s ‘ objective
reas o n ableness’ standar d,” Brosseau , 5 43 U. S. at 19 7, and vie wi ngthe fa c ts i n th e light m os t fa vo ra ble to h im, we de c ide wh e the r S tr ic kle n’ s r e pe ate d u se of her tas e r o n h im w a s o bje c tiv e ly
unrea sonable. Our

assessment of Four

th Amendment unre asonable ness “r equire s car eful attention to the fac ts and circ umstances of ea ch particular c ase, inc luding the se verity of the c rime at issue, whether the suspect pose s an immediate thre at to t h e s afe ty of the off

icer s or others, a

nd whetherNo. 06-2039

Ro be rts v . M

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- 6 - he is actively resisting arr est or attemptingto evade arr est by flig ht.” Graham v. Connor , 4 90 U. S. 386, 396 (1989). We allow “ for the f act that police office rs are often for ced to make split-second judgme nts—in circumstance s that are tense, unc erta in, and ra pidly evolving—about t he amount of forc e that is nec essar

y in a par ticular situation.” Id. at 397.
The fa cts and circ umstances of other rec ent excessive forc e ca ses guide our inquiry . “[T] he gratui tou s u se of

fo rc e on a su sp e c t who ha s a lr e a dy be e n s ub du ed and pla c e d in ha nd c uf fs is

u n co n s t i tu t i o nal.” Bu lte ma v . B e nz ieCou nty , 1 46 F . App ’x 28 , 3 5 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 5) ; see also, e.g. , Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc. , 380 F.3d 893, 900- 01 (6th Cir. 2004) (agree ing with the police office rs’ c oncession that it was e x cessive f or them to “lay

on top of C hampion, a mentally reta rded individual who had stopped re sisting ar rest a n d posed no flight risk, and spray [] him with pepper sp ra y e ve n a ft e r h e wa s immob ili zed by ha nd c uf fs and a ho bb lin gde vic e ” ); Gree ne v. Barber , 310 F.3d 889, 898 ( 6th C i r. 2002) ( conce ding f or ana ly tical purposes that an offic er’ s “use of pepper spray [on a suspect actively resistingarr est] mi ght be . . . excessive for ce unde r Graham ” ); Adams , 31 F .3 d at 38 4 ( 6th

Cir . 1 99 4) (h old ing that e ve n if the “ pla int if f pu sh e d or str

uc k [th e de fe nd ant] as allege d by the pol ice, there is still a contested issue of m aterial fac t in reg ard to whe ther spra ying
ma c e in d e fe nd ant’ s f

a c e aft e r h e re tur

ne d to the c ar c on sti tut e d e xce ssi ve fo rc e ” ); McD owell v. Roge rs , 863 F.2 d 1 3 0 2, 1307 (6th Cir. 1988) (“ [A] totally gratuitous blow with a policeman’ s nightstick may

cross the c onstitut ional line . . . .”).
In this c a se , Robe rt s cla ims that Stric kle n ne e dle ssl y us e d an e le c tr os ho c k we a po n o n h im. Though the eve nts Roberts describe d took place ove r a ve ry short period of time, a

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T h e d e fen d a n ts c ite th re e c a se s to sh o w tha t t h e u s e o f t h e tas e r in this c a se w a s re a so n a b le

. See D r ap er v. 4 Rey nol ds , 3 6 9 F .3 d 1 2 7 0 , 1 2 7 8 (1 1 th C ir. 2 0 0 4 ); H i nt on v . Ci t y of El wood , 9 9 7 F .2 d 7 7 4 , 7 8 1 (1 0 th C ir. 1 9 9 3 ); F ra n c is v . P ik e C o u n ty , 875 F. 2d 863 ( 6t h Ci r . 198 9) ( un publ i s hed)

. N one of t hes e c as es conc er n t as er i ng as gr at ui t ous f orce , b ut rat her onl y t he use of t asers i n t ense s i t uat i o ns. T he t y p e o f weap o n us ed i s no t t he i ss ue; t he excessi veness of t he fo rc e is t h e F o u rth A m e n d m e n t i n q u iry. - 7 - could find that Stricklen used unnece ssary and gratuitous (and thus ex cessive) forc e in violation of Roberts’s cle arly es t ablished F ourth Amendment right. Havingreje cted Stricklen’ s qualified 4 immunit y appea l, w e do not r etain jurisdiction ove r the pende nt nonappea lable issues ra ised by the defe ndants. McKenna v . City of Royal Oak, 469 F.3d 559, 562- 63 (6th Cir. 2006).
IV Viewingthe fa cts in the light most fa vorable to Robe rts, a re asonable jury might conc lude that Stricklen used excessive for ce. She is not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law

at thi s p oint in

the pr oc e e din g s. We a ff ir m and re mand the c a se fo r f

ur the r p ro c e e din g s.