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14-2162 

Mejia v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY 

CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY 

COUNSEL. 

 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held 

at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 9th day of December, two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 

Chief Judge, 

RALPH K. WINTER, 

JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

ANGELA MEJIA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 14-2162 

NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND 

HOSPITALS CORPORATION, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 

 Defendant. 

_____________________________________ 
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FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Angela Mejia, pro se, New York, 

NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE N.Y.C. 

HEALTH & HOSPITALS CORP.: Richard Dearing, Diana Lawless, 

Assistant Corporation Counsels, for

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation 

Counsel of the City of New York, 

New York, NY.

 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (Pauley, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

 Angela Mejia, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal, on collateral 

estoppel grounds, of her action alleging that her former employer, the New York City Health and 

Hospitals Corporation (“HHC”), terminated her because of her disability in violation of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. 

On February 9, 2012, Mejia filed a complaint with the New York State Division of 

Human Rights (“DHR”) alleging that HHC had fired her because she was disabled in violation of 

the New York State Human Rights Law. Mejia alleged that she had worked as a clerical 

associate at HHC for nearly twenty-one years before she injured herself while commuting to 

work in May 2011. According to the investigation conducted by the DHR, HHC granted Mejia 

medical leave after Mejia sustained her injury. With supporting letters from her doctor, she 

later sought and received three extensions of that leave. HHC refused, however, to grant her a 

fourth extension—which Mejia claims was also supported by letters from her doctor—and, 

instead, terminated her employment. HHC did not provide notice of its decision to Mejia, who 
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learned she lost her job only after she inquired into the status of her request. On August 3, 

2012, the DHR issued a decision finding that “its investigation did not reveal sufficient evidence 

to establish a nexus between [Mejia’s] disability and [HHC’s] decision to terminate” Mejia. 

Record on Appeal doc. 23-2 at 2. The DHR reasoned that Mejia was a provisional employee 

not entitled to leave extensions and that her termination was therefore justified as a “business 

necessity.” 

On October 3, 2012, Mejia filed an Article 78 petition in the New York Supreme Court 

for New York County, seeking reversal of the DHR’s decision. The Supreme Court denied 

Mejia’s petition, reasoning that she had a full and fair opportunity to present her claim to the 

DHR and that the DHR’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious. 

Mejia then filed this action in federal court, alleging that HHC had violated her rights 

under the ADA. The district court, on HHC’s motion, determined that Mejia was collaterally 

estopped from asserting such a claim and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed. 

“We review the district court’s dismissal of [an] action on collateral estoppel grounds de 

novo.” Johnston v. Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG, 198 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1999). 

“[A] federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be 

given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Migra v. 

Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). “Under New York law, the 

doctrine of issue preclusion only applies if (1) the issue in question was actually and necessarily 

decided in a prior proceeding, and (2) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and 

fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first proceeding.” Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 869 

(2d Cir. 1995) (footnote omitted). 
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Although we share the district court’s sympathy for Mejia, we also agree with its 

conclusion that Mejia is collaterally estopped from litigating her claim under the ADA. First, to 

prevail on her ADA claim, Mejia would have to establish that HHC terminated Mejia because of 

her disability. See Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir. 2000). This 

same issue, however, was presented to the Supreme Court in Mejia’s Article 78 petition when she 

challenged the merits of the DHR’s decision, and the Supreme Court ruled against Mejia when it 

found that the DHR’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Supreme Court’s 

decision that an agency’s determination of an issue was not arbitrary and capricious is sufficient 

to constitute an “actual[] and necessar[y] deci[sion]” of that issue. Cf. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. 

Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 484 (1982); Maira v. Stamm, 488 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915 (4th Dep’t 1985). 

Second, the Supreme Court also found that Mejia had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in front 

of the DHR the issue of whether HHC terminated her position because of her disability, and 

nothing in the record suggests that she lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate her Article 78 

petition. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk