_____________ No. 95-1771EM

_____________ Ronald Troupe, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Eastern * District of Missouri. Michael T. Groose, * * Appellee. *

_____________ Submitted: November 15, 1995 Filed: December 11, 1995

_____________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, and BRIGHT and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

_____________ FAGG, Circuit Judge.
Ronald Tr oupe was convicted by a Missouri state jury of kidnapping, sodo my, and assault of a twelve-year-old boy. The Missouri Court o f App eals affirmed Troupe's convictions. State v. Troupe , 863 S.W.2d 63 3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). Troupe then brought this federal habeas petitio n under 28 U.S.C. § 225 4. The district court denied Troupe's petition, and we affirm. Troup e asserts the State improperly used peremptory challenges t o remove black jurors from the venire panel based on their race, in violatio n of Bats on v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986). We disagree. Under Batson , after a defendant makes a prima facie case of ra cial discrimination in the govern ment's use of peremptory challenges, the burden shifts to th e gover nment to offer a race-neutral reason for the strikes. Purkett v . Elem , 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1770 (1995); United States v. Carr , 67 F.3d 171, 17 5 (8th Cir.

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1995). If the government gives a race-neutral reason, the trial court mus t decide whether the defendant has proven purposeful racial discrimination by evaluating the reason's persuasiveness. Purkett , 115 S. Ct. at 1770-71 . We reverse a trial court's ultimate finding on the discrimination issu e only if the finding is "`not fairly supported by the record.'" Id. at 177 1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8)). During voir dire, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove a black juror, Harris, and a black alternate juror, Dougherty, ove r Troupe's objections. At a belated Batson hearin g, the prosecutor referred to the notes she took during voir dire and expla ined that she struck juror Harris because he had an offensive demeanor, was "disagreeable and amused at the whole process," and was uncommunicative. After the prosecuto r expl ained her reasons for striking Harris, the trial court found th e prosecutor was not motivated by discriminatory intent.
The record supports the trial court's finding. Becaus e discri minatory intent is not inherent in the prosecutor's reasons fo r striking Harris, the reasons are race neutral. Id. Although a trial cour t might be less incline d to believe subjective reasons than objective ones, see id. , the trial court chose to believe the prosecutor's race-neutra l justifications, and we defer to the trial court's assessment of th e prosecutor's credibility in this habeas proceedi ng, Batson , 476 U.S. at 98 n.21; Marshall v. Lonberger , 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983).
As for th e removal of the alternate black juror, Dougherty, Troupe failed to challenge D ougherty's removal in his direct state court appeal, and thus procedurally defaulted the claim. Turner v. Delo , No. 95-1231, 1995 WL 653836, at *1 -2 (8th Cir. Nov. 8, 1995). Troupe has not asserted cause or prejudice to excuse the default, or that our failure to review th e claim would result ina fundamental miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, Troupe's

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procedural default prevents us from considering his claim that Dougherty's removal violated Batson . Id. at *2.
Last, Troupe contends the Missouri trial court's admission of hi s earl ier deviate sexual intercourse conviction violates his due proces s rights. In a federal habeas proceeding, we narrowly review alleged du e pro cess violations stemming from a state court conviction. Anderson v . Goeke , 44 F.3d 675, 6 79 (8th Cir. 1995). We grant habeas relief based on a state court evidentiary ruling only if the alleged error was s o cons picuously bad that it fatally infected the trial and rendered i t fundamentally unfair. Id. To meet this standar d, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the error affected the trial's outcome. Id. Having reviewed the record, we find no constitutional violation. Given the other evidence at trial, see 863 S.W.2d at 636, we cannot say th e admission of Troupe's earlier conviction affected the trial's outcome. We affirm the dismissal of Troupe's habeas petition. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.