### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-14-00454- CR

Clif ton Cre ws Hoyt, Appellan t

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TO M GREEN CO UNTY, 391 ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 0-0 665- SA, H ONO RAB LE TH OM AS J. GO SSETT, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Clifton Crews Hoy

t was char g ed with the offe nse of driving while intox icated. See
Tex. Pena l Code § 49.04(a)

. The indictment a lso a lleg ed that Hoy t ha d previously been convicted of two counts of driving while intox icated, wh i ch el evated the sever ity of the char g e at issue to a third-deg ree felony

. See id. § 49.09(b). Fur ther, the indictment alleg ed that Hoy t wa s p re v i o usly convicted of a felony -lev el o ff en se for driving while intox icated, which eleva ted the permissible punishment rang e for the offe nse at issue to that of a second- deg re e fe lony

. See id. § 12.42(a) ; see also id. § 12.33 (setting out permissible punishment rang e for second- deg ree felony

). Prior to trial, Hoy t filed a motion to suppress evidenc e perta ining to the traff ic stop as well as his arr est, and the district court denied the motion to suppress. At the co n cl u s i o n o f the trial, the district court
sentenc ed Hoy

t to twelve y ear s’ imprisonment. I n two issues on appea l, Hoy t asser ts that the districtcourt err ed by deny ing his motion to suppress and that the evidenc e supporting his conviction is

leg ally insufficient. We will aff irm the district court’s judg ment of convic tion.

DISCUSSIO N Motion to Supp ress

I n his first issue on appea l, Hoy t contends that the district court abused its discretion by deny ing his motion to suppress. I n particula r, Hoy t contends that t h e d istrict court abused its discretion whe n it made its ruling bec ause O ffice r B ruce Stewart did not have a suff icient basis to initiate a traf

fic stop or to deta in Hoy

t to conduct field-sobr iety tests. 1 “Appe ll at e courts revie w a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress by using a bifurca ted standard, g iving almost total defe renc e to the historical fac ts found by the trial court and analy zing de novo the trial court’s application of the law. ” State v. Cuong Phu Le , No. PD-0605-14,
2015 Tex. Crim. App. L EXI S 516, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2015). Under that standard, the

rec ord is “viewe d in the light most favor able to the trial court’s deter mination, and the judgme nt will be reve rsed only if it is arbitra ry , unrea sonable, or ‘outside the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment.’”

When challengin g the district court’s ruling , Hoy t primarily ref

ers to testimony from 1 Offic er Stewart indicating that he was dispatched to a local restaur ant to investiga te a complaint reg arding a potentially intox icated driver who was driving a car that matched Hoy t’s car but that the vehicle was not at the restaur ant when the office r arr ived. After noting this testimony , Hoy t contends that the S t ate did not prese nt any evidenc e reg arding the i nformation that the di spatche r had prior to sending Offic er Stewart to the restaur ant or reg arding the pers o n wh o made the complaint. For these rea sons, Hoy

t contends that the tip that the disp at ch er re ceive d could not establish probable cause or rea sonable suspicion to arr est or detain Hoy t. Howeve r, as set forth in the opinion, Offic er Stewart’s observa tions of Hoy t’s driving established rea sonable sus p i ci o n . Acc ording ly , we need not consider the informati o n o r lack of information that the dispatcher rec eived prior to Offic er Stewa

rt initiating a tra ffic stop. 2State v. Stor y , 445 S.W .3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting State v. Dixon , 206 S.W .3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)); see also id. (explaining that trial court’s ruling on motion to
suppress will be upheld if it is corr ect on theory of l aw applicable to case reg ardle ss of whether trial court ba sed its ruling on tha t theory ). “Routine traff

ic stops are analog ous to investiga tive detentions.” Martinez v. State , 236 S.W .3d 361, 369 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2007, pet. ref

’d, untimely filed); see also S t a t e v. W oodard , 341 S.W .3d 404, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (de scribing ty pes of inter actions betwe en citizens and law-e nforc ement p er s o n nel). I nvestig ative detentions are less intrusive than arr ests, Derichsweiler v. Stat e , 3 48 S.W .3d 906, 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), and must be supported by

rea sonable suspicion, which “exists if the office r has specific articula ble fac ts that, when combined with rational infere nce s fr o m those fac ts, would lead him to rea sonably suspect that a particula r
person has, or soon will be, eng ag ed in criminal activity ,” Neal v. State , 256 S.W .3d 264, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). I n addre ssing whether a stop was supported by rea sonable suspicion, revie wing

courts m u s t consider whether the office r’s actions wer e justified at the inception and whether the circ umstances justify ing the stop are rea sonably rela ted to the seizure’s scope. Kothe v. St ate , 152 S.W .3d 54, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). I n this context, rea sonablene ss is measure d objectively by considering the totality of the circ umstances. Id. ; see also id. at 6 2 (n o t ing that deter mination
reg arding rea sonablene ss of sear ch or seizure is revie wed de novo). Moreove r, “[i] f during a valid traff ic stop and detention, the office r develops rea sonable suspicion that the detainee is eng ag ed in criminal activity , prolong ed or continued detention is justified.” Haas v. State , 172 S.W .3d 42, 52 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref ’d); see Powell v. State , 5 S.W .3d 369, 377 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

31999, pet. ref ’d); see also W

oodard , 341 S.W .3d at 414 (explainin g t h at i nformation known to office r g ave him probable cause to arr est defe ndant or rea sonable suspicion to detain and administer field-sobrie ty

tests). During the trial, Offic er Stewart was the only witness. I n his testimony , he explained that while he was on patrol at approximately 2:30 a.m., he observ ed t h e v eh i cle that Hoy t was driving make “a wide rig ht turn.” Fur ther, Offic er Stewart explained that h e believed that the 2

manner in which the turn wa s made c onstitut ed a tr aff ic violation beca

use drivers are obliga ted t o stay as close as possible to the curb. Consist ent with Offic er Stewart’s testimony , the Transpor tation Code specifie s that a driver who is making “a rig ht turn at an intersec tion

. . . shall make both the
approa ch and the turn as closely as prac ticable to the rig ht-hand curb or edg e of the roadw ay .” See

On appeal, Ho y

t n o t es t hat although Officer Stewart had a video came ra in his car at t he 2 time, the came ra did not rec ord the turn at issue and did not activate until the emer g ency lights wer e turned on. Acc ording ly , Hoy t insists that this Court cannot adequately deter mine whether the rig ht turn constituted a traff

ic violation. Howeve r, the office r who observe d the turn did testify and was subject to cross-e x amination by Hoy t, and the office r’s testimony was uncontra dicted. See Pec ina v. State , 361 S.W .3d 68, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (e x plaining that when revie wing ruling on m otion to suppress, appellate courts extend almost total defe renc e to application of law to fac t question turning on c redibility and deme anor)

. 4Tex. T ra nsp. Code § 545.101(a)

. When ruling on Hoy t’s motion to suppress, the district court 3 expressly found that Off

icer Stewart obser

ved Hoy t make a w ide rig ht turn.
I n light of the district court’s de termination and of Offic er Stewart’s testimony , we
must conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deter mining that Offic er Stewart was authorize d t o i n i t i at e a traff ic s top of Hoy

t. See Bullock v. State , 426 S.W .3d 226, 229 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (providing that “[a] law enfor ceme nt office r may lawfully stop and detain a motorist who commits a traff ic violation”); Vasquez v. State , 324 S.W .3d 912, 919 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2010, pet. ref ’d) (explaining that office r may initiate traff ic stop if he ha s rea sonable ba sis to believe that individual has committed traff ic offe nse).

I n his reply

brief, H oy

t a sserts that a wide rig ht tur n does not c onstitut e a traff ic violation 3 if it is “done in a m an n er t hat is not unsafe or dang erous.” As support for this proposition, Hoy t ref ers to ca ses from va

rious courts, including one fr om this Court, pertaining to alleg ed violations of the provision of the Transpor tation Code requiring drivers to drive within a single lane of traff ic. Specifica lly , the statute provides that a driver “shal l d ri v e as near ly as prac tical entirely within a single lane” and “may not mov e fr o m the lane unless that move ment can be made safely .” Tex. Transp. Code § 545.060(a) (empha sis added)

. I n light of the phrase authorizing crossing a lane when it is safe to do so, this Court deter mined that crossing a lane marke r does not constitut e a traff ic offe nse unless the movement was not sa fe at that time or was not made safe ly and that observing a driver cross a lane marke r when i t i s s afe to do so does not establish rea sonable suspicion to conclude that a traff

ic violation has occur

red. See Hernande

z v. State , 983 S.W .2d 867, 870-72 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref ’d) (dete rmining that crossing lane marke r under circ umstances of case when it was safe to do so did not provide rea sonable suspicion that driver was into x icated or that traff ic offe nse had occur

red) ; see also Fowler v. State , 266 S.W .3d 498, 499 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2008, pet. ref

’d) (holding that office r does not have rea sonable suspicion for traff ic stop when office r observe s “the tires of the defe ndant’s vehicle cross into a n adjac ent same- direc tion lane by a tire’s width a single time” and “whe n there is no other traf fic in the a

rea ”); Eichler v. State , 117 S.W .3d 897, 901 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Di st.] 2003, no pet.) (conc luding that single instance of crossing l ane marker into lane traveling in same direction when no showing was made that it wa s unsafe to do so at that time was insufficient to establish rea sonable suspicion). Howeve r, unlike the statute requiring drivers to rema in within a single lane of traff ic, the statute at issue in this case does not contain any lang uag e potentially excusing the prohibited conduct i f t h e t u rn is done in a safe manner . Compare Tex. Transp. Code § 545.060(a ), with i d. § 545.101(a)

. 5Reg arding the events that occur red afte r he observe d the traff ic violation, Offic er Stewart explained that when he turned on his emer g ency lights, Hoy t’s “vehic le veer ed to the north side of t he [ road], struck the curb, and then i t started pulli n g t o t h e s outh side, and as it came to a stop, it struck the s o u t h side curb.” Reg arding the first contac t with the curb, Offic er Stewart

e xp la in e d th a

t H o y t “ h it th e c u

r b p r e tt y h a r d

. ” I n h is te s ti mo ny , O f

f ic e r St e w a

r t a ls o s ta te d th a t w h e n he approa ched Hoy

t’s v eh i cl e an d beg an talking to Hoy t, he noticed the odor of alcohol coming from Hoy t and observe d that Hoy

t’s “ey es wer e red, bloodshot ey es.” Fur thermore , Offic er Stewart rela ted that based on these indicators of intox ication as we l l as Ho y t’s driving , he asked Hoy t to perf orm field-sobrie ty tests. When d en y i n g Hoy t’s motion to suppress, the district court enter ed finding s that were consistent with Stewart’s testimony

.

I n challeng ing the district court’s ruling , Hoy t contends that bloodshot ey es and the smell of alcohol are insufficient to establish intox ication because red ey es can be cause d by any number of conditions and beca use an individual can smell like alcohol afte r consuming an amount

o f alcohol well below the amount that would rende r someone leg ally intox icated. Fur ther, Hoy t points to testimony from Of fice r Stewar

t in which he admitted that re d ey es, without more , do not establish that someone is intox icated, that the smell of alcohol cannot be used to asce rtain how much

an individual has had to drink, and that it is common for individuals who are not impaired to commit the traf fic off ense of making a wide r ight turn.
Howeve r, the exis tence of rea sonable suspicion is made afte r considering the totality of the circ umstances, State v. Nelson , 228 S.W .3d 899, 904-05 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.), and the court of criminal appea ls has explained that evidenc e that would logic ally raise an infere nce

6that an individual is intox icated includes, among other things, “er ratic driving ” and “bloodshot
ey es,” K i r s ch v. State , 306 S.W .3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). See also Tex. Penal Code § 49.0 1(2)( A) (def

ining term intox icated as meaning “not having the normal use of mental or phy sical fac ulties by rea son of the introduction of alcohol

. . . into the body ”). Consist ent with these indicators, as set out above, Offic er Stewart testified that he observe d Hoy t commit a traff

ic violation at approx imately 2:30 a.m., t hat Hoy t exhibi ted erratic driving when the pol ice lights wer e turned on, and that Hoy

t had re d ey es and smelled like a lcohol.
I n light of the district court’s deter minations and of Offic er Stewart’s testimony , we
must conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Offic er Stewart

was authorized to detain Hoy t in order to ask him to perf orm field-sobrie ty tests beca use rea sonable suspicion exi sted that Hoy t had committed the offe nse of dr iving while intoxicated.
For all of these rea sons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deny ing H oy

t’s motion to s uppress a

nd, there fore , overr

ule Hoy t’s first issue on appe al.

Legal Su ff

iciency of the Evid ence I n his second issue on appea l , Ho y t as serts that the evidenc e prese nted during the trial is leg ally insufficient to support his conviction for driving while intox icated. As set out above, 4

On appea l, Hoy

t also contends that t h e ev i d en ce is fac tually insufficient. Howeve r, the 4 court of criminal appea ls ha s clar ified that the “leg al-suff iciency standard is the only

standard tha t a revie wing court should apply in deter mining whether the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support eac h element of a cr iminal of

fense .” Brooks v. State , 323 S.W .3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); cf. Lucio v. State , 351 S.W .3d 878, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (explaining that “[w]e do not review the fac tual sufficie ncy of the evi d ence to support a jury ’s finding on the elements of a criminal offe nse that the State is re quired to prove bey ond a re asonable doubt”). 7the Penal Code specifie s that an individual commits that offe nse if he “is intox icated while opera ting

a motor vehicle in a public place ,” Tex. Pena l Code § 49.04(a) , and def ines intox icated, in pa

rt, as “not having the normal use of mental or phy sical fac ulties by rea son of the introduction of alcohol,

a controlled substance, a drug , a dang erous drug , a combination of two or more of those substances,

or any other substance into the body ,” id. § 49.01(2). When challeng ing his conviction, Hoy t limit s his arg uments to whether the re w as suffic ient evidenc e to show that he w as intox icated.

Under a leg al-suff

iciency revie w, appellate courts view the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the verdic t and deter mine whether “ any ration al trier of fac t could have found the essential elements of the crime bey ond a rea sonable doubt.” Jack son v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). When perf

orming this revie w, an appellate court must bear in mind that it is the fac tfinder’ s duty to weig h the evidenc e, to resolve conflicts in the testimony , and to make rea sonable infere nces “fr om basic facts t o ul t i m ate fac ts.” Id. Moreove r, appellate courts must “dete rmine whether the

nece ssary infere nces are rea sonable based upon the combined and cumulative forc e of all the evidenc e whe n viewed in the lig ht most favorable to the verdic t.” Hooper v. State , 214 S.W .3d 9, 16-17 (Tex

. Crim. App. 2007). Fur thermore , appellate courts presume t hat conflicting inferenc es

wer e resolved in favor of the conviction and defe r to that resolution. Clayton v. State , 235 S.W .3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

I n addition to Offic er Stewart’s testimony reg arding Hoy t committing a traff

ic violation by making a wide rig ht turn, veer ing from one side of the road to the other and striking the curb on both sides, having bloodshot ey es, and smelling like alcohol, Offic er Stewart also descr ibed

8the results of Hoy t ’s field-sobrie ty testing. See Kirsch , 306 S.W .3d at 745 (listing “inability to 5 perf orm field-sobrie ty tests or follow direc tions” as “evide nce that would logic ally raise an infere nce that the defe ndant was intox icated” ). I n particula r, Offic er Stewart explained that he perf ormed the horizontal g aze ny stag mus test on Hoy t and that he observe d the maxi mum number of cl u es of intox ication during the testing. Next, Of fice r Stewart explained tha t he asked Hoy t to perf orm the walk-a nd-turn test and that Hoy

t started the test befor e being told to beg in, “missed heel- to-toe steps, used his arms for balanc e, stepped off line, and made an improper turn.” When summarizing Hoy t’s perf ormanc e, Offic er Stewart testified that Hoy t display ed six of eig ht possible clues of intox ication.
I n addition, Offic er Stewart also rela ted that he asked Hoy

t to perf orm the one-le g -stand test and that d u r in g th e te s t, H o y

t u s e d h is a

r ms f o r b a la n c e , p u t h is f

o o t d o w n , a

n d s w a y e d

. Wh e n d e s c r ib in g th e results, Offic er Stewart reve aled that Hoy t exhibi ted three of four possible indicators of intox ication.
Fur thermore , Offic er Stewart stated that afte r assessing the results and afte r considering his prior ob s er v at i ons, he formed an opinion that Hoy t was intox icated and arr ested him for driving while intox i ca t ed

. See Kif

fe v. State , 361 S.W .3d 104, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. 6
ref ’d) (providing that, in g ener al, office r’s testimony that individual is intox icate d p r o v id e s s u f f ic ient evidenc e to establish element of intox ication). Finally , Offic er Stewart rela ted that afte r he arr ested
Ho y t , h e asked Hoy

t to submit a sample of his brea th or blood for alcohol testing but that Ho y t ref used to provide a sample. See Bartlett v. S t ate , 270 S.W .3d 147, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
During the trial, Offic er Stewart explained that h e re ceive d specia l training on how to 5 administer field -s o b ri et y tests, that he has been cer tified to perf

orm those tests, and that he administers those tests as a r eg ular pa rt of his job. I n his te stimony , Offic er Stewart also rela ted that when he perf ormed a sear ch incident to 6 arr est, he found le ss than two ounces of marijuana

inside the pocke t of Hoy t’s pants. 9(noting that defe ndant’s ref usal to submit to brea th test “tends to show a consciousness of
g uilt”); see also D errick v. State , No. 05-14-00802- CR, 2015 Tex. App. L EXI S 4723, at * 7 (Tex. App.—Dallas May

8, 2015, no pet. h.) (me m. op., not designa ted for publication) (explaining that individual’s ref

usal to submit to brea th test “ca n support the infere nce that he believed he would fail the test bec ause he thought he was intox icated” ).

When challeng ing the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e, Hoy t points to t he portions of Offic er Stewar t ’s testimony discussed in the previous issue in which he admitted that the

o b serva tions forming the basis for his decision to ask Hoy t to perf orm field-sobrie ty tes t i n g, including the observat i o n s o f Hoy t’s driving , of Hoy

t’s smelling like alcohol, and of Hoy t’s bloodshot ey es, would not nec essar ily indicate that someone was int ox icated if those fac tors wer e considere d individually

. Fur thermore , Hoy

t se ems to sugg est that the portion of Offic er Stewart’s testimony in which he d i s cu s s ed the results of the field-sobrie ty testing should not be considere d beca use the tests w ere not done in compliance with “standa rdized protocols” and are , acc ording to Hoy t, unreliable

. See Plouff v. State , 192 S.W .3d 213, 219 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2006,

no pet.) (noting that ny stag mus test has been rec og nized as valid scientific test and that it is proper ly applied when office r complies with standardized proce dures)

. As support for his asser tion that the testing was done improperly , Hoy t points to the portion of Offic er Stewart’s testimony in which he
ag ree d that befor e perf

orming a ny stag mus te st, of fice rs should turn a suspect awa y from potential distractions but admitted that the testing that he per fo rm ed could have been done in “a better environment” beca

use his emer g ency lights wer e on for part of the test, beca use Hoy t was fac ing the headlig hts of passing traff ic when perf

orming the test, and beca use there wer e officers wa l k i n g

10ar o u n d the are a of the test. I n addition, Hoy t ref ers to Offic er Stewart’s testimony i n wh i ch h e rela ted that during the walk-a nd-turn and one- leg -stand tests, the testing office r is not supposed to make any comments but that he contin u ed t o p rovide inst ructions during t he tests. Finally , Hoy t 7 highlig hts the portion of Offic er Stewart’s testimony in which he admitted that the failure to comply

w it h th e s ta n d a r d iz e d p r o to c o ls c o u ld a f

f e c t th e r e s u lt s o f a f

ie ld

- s o b r ie ty te s t a

n d c o u ld b e d is tr a c ti n g . Howeve r, Hoy

t did not c halleng e the admissibili ty of the results of any of the fieldsobriety tests on t h ese g rounds befor e or during the trial, nor did he object to Offic er Stewart’s testimony reg arding the testing that he perf ormed. See Tex. R

. Ap p . P

. 3 3.1(a) (setting out require ments for prese rving complaint for appea l); Tex. R. Evid. 103 (providing that err or may not be based on admis s i o n o f ev i d ence unless timely objection i s made or motion to strike appears in

rec ord); Rey es v. State , 361 S.W .3d 222, 233 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2012, pet. ref

’d) (noting that failure to object “for feits complaints about the admissibili ty of evidenc e”) ; see also Gowin v. State , No. 12-07-00233- CR, 2008 Tex. App. L EXI S 6873, at *3-6 (Tex. App.—Ty ler Sept. 17, 2008, no
p e t

. ) ( m e m . o p . , n o t d e s ig

n a te d f o r p u b li c a ti o n ) ( c o n c lu d in g th a

t d e f e n d a n t w a iv e d o b

j e c t i o n s r e g a

r d i n g

n y s tag mus test by failing to proper ly object). Moreove r, in revie wing the leg al sufficie ncy of t h e evidenc e supporting a conviction, appellate courts consider “ all evidenc e that the trie r of f act wa s

I n his op ening brief and in his reply brief, Hoy t seems to sug g est that the evidenc e was 7 insufficient in this case , in part, beca use Offic er Stewart admitted that he could not reme mber how many field-sobrie ty tests he conducte d. Howeve r, afte r revie wing the office r’s statement in light of his surrounding testimony , we believe that his statement is more proper ly interpre ted as rela ting that the officer could not specify how m any times in his car eer as a p o l i ce office r t hat he has asked an individual to submit to field-sobrie ty testing and then rele ased the individual without arr esting him. Reg ardle ss, we do not believe that this portion of the office r’s testimony could rende r the rema ining evidenc e leg ally

insufficient. 11permitted to consider, reg ardle ss of whether it was rig htly or wrong ly admitted.” Demond v. State ,

452 S.W .3d 435, 445 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. ref ’d) (empha sis a dded). Fur thermore , when deciding what weig ht, if any , to g ive to the evidenc e reg arding the results of the field-sobrie ty tests, the district court was aided by the addit i o n al t es t i m ony from Offic er Stewart explaining that he believed that the results of the ny stag mus testing wer e reliable ; that any of the potential distractions did not have an i mpact on the results of t he ny stag mus test; that he was very cl ose t o Hoy t during the ny stag mus test, was able to see Hoy t’s ey es, and was able to observe that Hoy t’s ey es wer e fix ed on the testing instrument; that when he talked to Hoy t during the walk- and-turn a nd one-le g -stand tests, h e wa s at t empt ing to “dire ct [Hoy t] in the rig ht way ” beca

use Hoy t was not following the instructions; and that when he talked to Hoy t during the one-le g -stand test, he was just asking Hoy t
to point his toes. Cf. Plouff , 192 S.W .3d at 219 (explaining that slight varia tions in administration

o f n y s t agm u s test do not rende r testimony reg arding results unreliable or inadmissible but may aff ect we ight to be g iven to testimony ).

I n light o f al l of the evidenc e previously summarized as well as the rea sonable
i n fe re n ce s t hat the district court could have made from that evidenc e and g iven our standard o f revie w for leg al-suff

iciency challeng es, we conclude that the evidenc e is leg ally sufficie nt to support the district court’s deter

mination that Hoy

t was intox icated. Acc ordi n g ly , w e o v e r r ule Hoy t’s second issue on appea l.

CONCLUSION

Having overr

uled Hoy t’s issues on appea l, we aff irm t h e d istrict court’s judgme nt of convic tion.

12David Pury ear , J ustice

Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton, and B ourland
Affir med Filed: June 4, 2015 Do Not Publish

13