IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30864

OFFICER JOHN DOE, Police Officer, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

DERAY MCKESSON; BLACK LIVES MATTER; BLACK LIVES MATTER 

NETWORK, INCORPORATED, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

Before JOLLY, ELROD, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

We WITHDRAW the court’s prior opinion of August 8, 2019, and 

substitute the following opinion.

During a public protest against police misconduct in Baton Rouge, 

Louisiana, an unidentified individual hit Officer John Doe with a heavy object, 

causing him serious physical injuries. Following this incident, Officer Doe 

brought suit against “Black Lives Matter,” the group associated with the 

protest, and DeRay Mckesson, one of the leaders of Black Lives Matter and the 

organizer of the protest. Officer Doe later sought to amend his complaint to 

add Black Lives Matter Network, Inc. and #BlackLivesMatter as defendants. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 16, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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The district court dismissed Officer Doe’s claims on the pleadings under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and denied his motion to amend his 

complaint as futile. Because we conclude that the district court erred in 

dismissing the case against Mckesson on the basis of the pleadings, we 

REMAND for further proceedings relative to Mckesson. We further hold that 

the district court properly dismissed the claims against Black Lives Matter.

We thus REVERSE in part, AFFIRM in part, and REMAND for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

On July 9, 2016, a protest illegally blocked a public highway in front of 

the Baton Rouge Police Department headquarters.1 This demonstration was 

one in a string of protests across the country, often associated with Black Lives 

Matter, concerning police practices. The Baton Rouge Police Department

prepared by organizing a front line of officers in riot gear. These officers were 

ordered to stand in front of other officers prepared to make arrests. Officer 

Doe was one of the officers ordered to make arrests. DeRay Mckesson, 

associated with Black Lives Matter, was the prime leader and an organizer of 

the protest.

In the presence of Mckesson, some protesters began throwing objects at 

the police officers. Specifically, protestors began to throw full water bottles, 

which had been stolen from a nearby convenience store. The dismissed 

complaint further alleges that Mckesson did nothing to prevent the violence or 

to calm the crowd, and, indeed, alleges that Mckesson “incited the violence on 

behalf of [Black Lives Matter].” The complaint specifically alleges that 

Mckesson led the protestors to block the public highway. The police officers

 

1 This case comes to us on a motion to dismiss, so we treat all well-pleaded facts as 

true.

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began making arrests of those blocking the highway and participating in the 

violence. 

At some point, an unidentified individual picked up a piece of concrete 

or a similar rock-like object and threw it at the officers making arrests. The 

object struck Officer Doe’s face. Officer Doe was knocked to the ground and 

incapacitated. Officer Doe’s injuries included loss of teeth, a jaw injury, a brain 

injury, a head injury, lost wages, “and other compensable losses.” 

Following the Baton Rouge protest, Officer Doe brought suit, naming 

Mckesson and Black Lives Matter as defendants. According to his complaint, 

the defendants are liable on theories of negligence, respondeat superior, and 

civil conspiracy. Mckesson subsequently filed two motions: (1) a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, asserting that Officer Doe failed to state a plausible claim for relief 

against Mckesson; and (2) a Rule 9(a)(2) motion, asserting that Black Lives 

Matter is not an entity with the capacity to be sued. 

Officer Doe responded by filing a motion to amend. He sought leave to 

amend his complaint to add factual allegations to his complaint and Black 

Lives Matter Network, Inc. and #BlackLivesMatter as defendants. 

II.

The district court granted both of Mckesson’s motions, treating the Rule 

9(a)(2) motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and denied Officer Doe’s motion for 

leave to amend, concluding that his proposed amendment would be futile. 

With respect to Officer Doe’s claims against #BlackLivesMatter, the district 

court took judicial notice that it is a “hashtag” and therefore an “expression” 

that lacks the capacity to be sued. With respect to Officer Doe’s claims against 

Black Lives Matter Network, Inc., the district court held that Officer Doe’s 

allegations were insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief against this 

entity. Emphasizing the fact that Officer Doe attempted to add a social 

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movement and a “hashtag” as defendants, the district court dismissed his case 

with prejudice. Officer Doe timely appealed. 

III.

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we will not 

affirm dismissal of a claim unless the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 

support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Alexander v. Verizon 

Wireless Servs., L.L.C., 875 F.3d 243, 249 (5th Cir. 2017). “We take all factual 

allegations as true and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.” Id. (citing Kelly v. Nichamoff, 868 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2017)). To 

survive, a complaint must consist of more than “labels and conclusions” or 

“naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557

(2007) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Instead, “the 

plaintiff must plead enough facts to nudge the claims across the line from 

conceivable to plausible.” Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 684 (5th Cir. 

2015) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted) (quoting 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680).2

 

2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 9(a)(2) states that, if a party wishes to raise an 

issue regarding lack of capacity to be sued, “a party must do so by a specific denial.” Rule 

12(b) does not specifically authorize a motion to dismiss based on a lack of capacity. 

Nonetheless, we have permitted Rule 12(b) motions arguing lack of capacity. See, e.g., Darby 

v. Pasadena Police Dep’t, 939 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1992). Where the issue appears on the face 

of the complaint, other courts have done the same and treated it as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 

See, e.g., Klebanow v. N.Y. Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 296 n.1 (2d Cir. 1965) (“Although the 

defense of lack of capacity is not expressly mentioned in [R]ule 12(b), the practice has grown 

up of examining it by a 12(b)(6) motion when the defect appears upon the face of the 

complaint.”); Coates v. Brazoria Cty. Tex., 894 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“Whether 

a party has the capacity to sue or be sued is a legal question that may be decided at the Rule 

12 stage.”); see also 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 

Procedure § 1294 (3d ed. 2018) (“An effective denial of capacity . . . creates an issue of fact. 

Such a denial may be made in the responsive pleading or, if the lack of capacity . . . appears 

on the face of the pleadings or is discernible there from, the issue can be raised by a motion 

to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief.” (footnotes omitted)). Thus, we review the 

district court’s dismissal for lack of capacity de novo and apply the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.

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A district court’s denial of a motion to amend is generally reviewed for 

abuse of discretion. Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d 586, 590 (5th 

Cir. 2016). However, where the district court’s denial of leave to amend was 

based solely on futility, we instead apply a de novo standard of review identical 

in practice to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Id. When a party seeks leave from 

the court to amend and justice requires it, the district court should freely give 

it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

IV.

We start with whether we have jurisdiction to hear this case, raising sua 

sponte its potential absence. Neither the district court nor any party addressed 

this issue in prior proceedings or on appeal. Officer Doe sued Mckesson and 

Black Lives Matter.3 The complaint alleges that Black Lives Matter is a 

national unincorporated association, Doe v. Mckesson, 272 F. Supp. 3d 841, 849 

(M.D. La. 2017), which, for diversity purposes, is a citizen of every state where 

a member is a citizen, Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1258 

(5th Cir. 1988). Officer Doe, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bore the 

burden of establishing jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). But the complaint fails to allege with sufficiency the 

membership of Black Lives Matter.4 Such failure to establish diversity 

jurisdiction normally warrants remand—if there was some reason to believe 

that jurisdiction exists, i.e., some reason to believe both that Black Lives 

 

3 We are addressing here Officer Doe’s claims against Black Lives Matter Network, 

Inc., the potential unincorporated association, not against #BlackLivesMatter, the hashtag. 

4 In his Proposed Amended Complaint, Officer Doe did allege that Black Lives Matter 

is a “chapter-based national unincorporated association that is organized under the laws of 

the State of California, though it allegedly is also a partnership that is a citizen of California 

and Delaware.” Doe, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 851 (internal quotations omitted). But since an 

association, or a partnership for that matter, is considered a citizen of every state in which 

its constituent members/partners are citizens, Officer Doe still failed to allege Black Lives 

Matter’s citizenship by omitting the citizenship of its constituent members. 

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Matter’s citizenship could be demonstrated with a supplemented record and

that it is diverse from the plaintiff—or dismissal of the case. See MidCap 

Media Fin., LLC v. Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 2019). 

Yet we need not resort to either here. Even assuming arguendo that 

Black Lives Matter were nondiverse and thus that the parties were nondiverse 

at the time of filing this lawsuit, such “lack of [diversity] jurisdiction can be 

cured when the non-diverse party is dismissed in federal court.” 16 Front 

Street, L.L.C. v. Miss. Silicon, L.L.C., 886 F.3d 549, 556 (5th Cir. 2018). This 

“method of curing a jurisdictional defect ha[s] long been an exception to the 

time-of-filing rule.” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 572 

(2004); see, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 73 (1996) (holding that 

“diversity became complete” when a nondiverse party settled and was 

dismissed from the case and that therefore “[t]he jurisdictional defect was 

cured”) (emphasis removed); McGlothin v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 925 F.3d 

741, 744 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that the dismissal of nondiverse defendants 

for failure of service of process “created complete diversity; and, therefore, the 

district court had jurisdiction”) (citations omitted). 

Here, the district court took judicial notice that Black Lives Matter was 

a social movement and therefore a non-juridical entity lacking the capacity to 

be sued. Doe, 272 F. Supp. 3d at 850; see infra Part V.C. The court 

subsequently dismissed Black Lives Matter as a defendant. Doe, 272 F. Supp. 

3d at 850. If complete diversity did not exist before, this dismissal created the

complete diversity (since Officer Doe and Mckesson are citizens of different 

states) necessary for jurisdiction in this case. For that reason, we have 

jurisdiction to hear this case.5

 

5 All three judges on this panel agree with this conclusion.

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V.

A.

We next address Officer Doe’s claims against DeRay Mckesson. The 

district court did not reach the merits of Officer Doe’s underlying state tort 

claims, but instead found that Officer Doe failed to plead facts that took 

Mckesson’s conduct outside of the bounds of First Amendment protected 

speech and association. Because we ultimately find that Mckesson’s conduct 

at this pleading stage was not necessarily protected by the First Amendment, 

we will begin by addressing the plausibility of Officer Doe’s state tort claims. 

We will address each of Officer Doe’s specific theories of liability in turn—

vicarious liability, negligence, and civil conspiracy, beginning with vicarious 

liability. 

1.

Louisiana Civil Code article 2320 provides that “[m]asters and 

employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and 

overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.” A 

“servant,” as used in the Civil Code, “includes anyone who performs continuous 

service for another and whose physical movements are subject to the control or 

right to control of the other as to the manner of performing the service.” Ermert 

v. Hartford Ins. Co., 559 So. 2d 467, 476 (La. 1990). Officer Doe’s vicarious 

liability theory fails at the point of our beginning because he does not allege

facts that support an inference that the unknown assailant “perform[ed] a 

continuous service” for, or that the assailant’s “physical movements [were] 

subject to the control or right to control” of, Mckesson. Therefore, under the 

pleadings, Mckesson cannot be held liable under a vicarious liability theory. 

2.

We now move on to address Officer Doe’s civil conspiracy theory. Civil 

conspiracy is not itself an actionable tort. Ross v. Conoco, Inc., 828 So. 2d 546, 

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552 (La. 2002). Instead, it assigns liability arising from the existence of an 

underlying unlawful act. Id. In order to impose liability for civil conspiracy in 

Louisiana, a plaintiff must prove that (1) an agreement existed with one or 

more persons to commit an illegal or tortious act; (2) the act was actually 

committed; (3) the act resulted in plaintiff’s injury; and (4) there was an 

agreement as to the intended outcome or result. Crutcher-Tufts Res., Inc. v. 

Tufts, 992 So. 2d 1091, 1094 (La. Ct. App. 2008); see also La. Civ. Code art. 

2324. “Evidence of . . . a conspiracy can be actual knowledge, overt actions 

with another, such as arming oneself in anticipation of apprehension, or 

inferred from the knowledge of the alleged co-conspirator of the impropriety of 

the actions taken by the other co-conspirator.” Stephens v. Bail Enf’t, 690 So. 

2d 124, 131 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 

Officer Doe’s complaint is vague about the underlying conspiracy to 

which Mckesson agreed, or with whom such an agreement was made. In his 

complaint, Officer Doe refers to a conspiracy “to incite a riot/protest.” 

Disregarding Officer Doe’s conclusory allegations, we find that Officer Doe has 

not alleged facts that would support a plausible claim that Mckesson can be 

held liable for his injuries on a theory of civil conspiracy. Although Officer Doe 

has alleged facts that support an inference that Mckesson agreed with 

unnamed others to demonstrate illegally on a public highway, he has not pled

facts that would allow a jury to conclude that Mckesson colluded with the 

unknown assailant to attack Officer Doe or knew of the attack and specifically 

ratified it. The closest that Officer Doe comes to such an allegation is when he 

states that Mckesson was “giving orders” throughout the demonstration. But 

we cannot infer from this quite unspecific allegation that Mckesson ordered 

the unknown assailant to attack Officer Doe. Lacking an allegation of this 

pleading quality, Officer Doe’s conspiracy claim must and does fail.

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3.

Finally, we turn to Officer Doe’s negligence theory. Officer Doe alleges 

that Mckesson was negligent for organizing and leading the Baton Rouge 

demonstration because he “knew or should have known” that the 

demonstration would turn violent. We agree as follows. 

Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 provides that “[e]very act whatever of 

man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to 

repair it.” The Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted a “duty-risk” analysis 

for assigning tort liability under a negligence theory. This theory requires a 

plaintiff to establish that (1) the plaintiff suffered an injury; (2) the defendant 

owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (3) the duty was breached by the defendant;

(4) the conduct in question was the cause-in-fact of the resulting harm; and (5) 

the risk of harm was within the scope of protection afforded by the duty 

breached. Lazard v. Foti, 859 So. 2d 656, 659 (La. 2003). Whether a defendant 

owes a plaintiff a duty is a question of law. Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

752 So. 2d 762, 766 (La. 1999); see Bursztajn v. United States, 367 F.3d 485, 

489 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Under Louisiana law, the existence of a duty presents a 

question of law that ‘varies depending on the facts, circumstances, and context 

of each case and is limited by the particular risk, harm, and plaintiff involved.’” 

(quoting Dupre v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 20 F.3d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 1994))). 

There is a “universal duty on the part of the defendant in negligence cases to 

use reasonable care so as to avoid injury to another.” Boykin v. La. Transit 

Co., 707 So. 2d 1225, 1231 (La. 1998). Louisiana courts elucidate specific duties 

of care based on consideration of

various moral, social, and economic factors, including the fairness 

of imposing liability; the economic impact on the defendant and on 

similarly situated parties; the need for an incentive to prevent 

future harm; the nature of defendant’s activity; the potential for 

an unmanageable flow of litigation; the historical development of 

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precedent; and the direction in which society and its institutions 

are evolving. 

Posecai, 752 So. 2d at 766. 

We first note that this case comes before us from a dismissal on the 

pleadings alone. In this context, we find that Officer Doe has plausibly alleged 

that Mckesson breached his duty of reasonable care in the course of organizing 

and leading the Baton Rouge demonstration. The complaint alleges that 

Mckesson planned to block a public highway as part of the protest. And the 

complaint specifically alleges that Mckesson was in charge of the protests and 

was seen and heard giving orders throughout the day and night of the protests.

Blocking a public highway is a criminal act under Louisiana law. See La. Rev. 

Stat. Ann. § 14:97. Indeed, the complaint alleges that Mckesson himself was 

arrested during the demonstration. It was patently foreseeable that the Baton 

Rouge police would be required to respond to the demonstration by clearing 

the highway and, when necessary, making arrests. Given the intentional 

lawlessness of this aspect of the demonstration, Mckesson should have known 

that leading the demonstrators onto a busy highway was likely to provoke a 

confrontation between police and the mass of demonstrators, yet he ignored 

the foreseeable danger to officers, bystanders, and demonstrators, and 

notwithstanding, did so anyway. 

By ignoring the foreseeable risk of violence that his actions created, 

Mckesson failed to exercise reasonable care in conducting his demonstration. 

This is not, as the dissenting opinion contends, a “duty to protect others from 

the criminal activities of third persons.” See Posecai, 752 So. 2d at 766. 

Louisiana does not recognize such a duty. It does, however, recognize a duty 

not to negligently cause a third party to commit a crime that is a foreseeable 

consequence of negligence. See Brown v. Tesack, 566 So. 2d 955 (La. 1990). 

The former means a business owner has no duty to provide security guards in 

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its parking lot if there is a very low risk of crime. See Posecai, 752 So. 2d at 

770. The latter means a school can be liable when it negligently disposes of 

flammable material in an unsecured dumpster and local children use the liquid 

to burn another child. See Brown, 566 So. 2d at 957. That latter rule applies 

here too: Mckesson owed Doe a duty not to negligently precipitate the crime of 

a third party. And a jury could plausibly find that a violent confrontation with 

a police officer was a foreseeable effect of negligently directing a protest.6 

Officer Doe has also plausibly alleged that Mckesson’s breach of duty was 

the cause-in-fact of Officer Doe’s injury and that the injury was within the 

scope of the duty breached by Mckesson. It may have been an unknown 

demonstrator who threw the hard object at Officer Doe, but by leading the 

demonstrators onto the public highway and provoking a violent confrontation 

with the police, Mckesson’s negligent actions were the “but for” causes of 

Officer Doe’s injuries. See Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1052 (La. 1992) 

(“To meet the cause-in-fact element, a plaintiff must prove only that the 

conduct was a necessary antecedent of the accident, that is, but for the 

defendant’s conduct, the incident probably would not have occurred.”). 

Furthermore, as the purpose of imposing a duty on Mckesson in this situation

is to prevent foreseeable violence to the police and bystanders, Officer Doe’s 

injury, as alleged in the pleadings, was within the scope of the duty of care

allegedly breached by Mckesson.

The amended complaint only bolsters these conclusions. It specifically 

alleges that Mckesson led protestors down a public highway in an attempt to 

block the interstate. The protestors followed. During this unlawful act, 

 

6 The dissenting opinion attempts to distinguish Brown by pointing out that “we are 

dealing with the criminal acts of an adult, not a child.” But the dissenting opinion does not 

explain why the child/adult distinction should matter. The potential for future violent actions 

by adults can be just as foreseeable as the potential for future violent actions by children.

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Mckesson knew he was in violation of law and livestreamed his arrest. Finally, 

the plaintiff’s injury was suffered during this unlawful action. The amended 

complaint alleges that it was during this struggle of the protestors to reach the 

interstate that Officer Doe was struck by a piece of concrete or rock-like object. 

It is an uncontroversial proposition of tort law that intentionally breaking, and 

encouraging others to break, the law is relevant to the reasonableness of one’s 

actions.

We iterate what we have previously noted: Our ruling at this point is not 

to say that a finding of liability will ultimately be appropriate. At the motion 

to dismiss stage, however, we are simply required to decide whether Officer 

Doe’s claim for relief is sufficiently plausible to allow him to proceed to 

discovery. We find that it is.

B.

Having concluded that Officer Doe has stated a plausible claim for relief 

against Mckesson under state tort law, we will now take a step back and 

address the district court’s determination that Officer Doe’s complaint should 

be dismissed based on the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has made 

clear that “[t]he First Amendment does not protect violence.” N.A.A.C.P. v. 

Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982). Nonetheless, the district 

court dismissed the complaint on First Amendment grounds, reasoning that

“[i]n order to state a claim against Mckesson to hold him liable for the tortious 

act of another with whom he was associating during the demonstration, 

Plaintiff would have to allege facts that tend to demonstrate that Mckesson 

‘authorized, directed, or ratified specific tortious activity.’” Doe, 272 F. Supp. 

3d at 847 (quoting Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 927). The district court 

then went on to find that there were no plausible allegations that Mckesson 

had done so in his complaint. 

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The district court appears to have assumed that in order to state a claim 

that Mckesson was liable for his injuries, Officer Doe was required to allege

facts that created an inference that Mckesson directed, authorized, or ratified 

the unknown assailant’s specific conduct in attacking Officer Doe. This

assumption, however, does not fit the situation we address today. Even if we

assume that Officer Doe seeks to hold Mckesson “liable for the unlawful 

conduct of others” within the meaning of Claiborne Hardware, the First 

Amendment would not require dismissal of Officer Doe’s complaint. 458 U.S. 

at 927. In order to counter Mckesson’s First Amendment defense at the 

pleading stage, Officer Doe simply needed to plausibly allege that his injuries 

were one of the “consequences” of “tortious activity,” which itself was 

“authorized, directed, or ratified” by Mckesson in violation of his duty of care. 

See id. (“[A] finding that [the defendant] authorized, directed, or ratified 

specific tortious activity would justify holding him responsible for the 

consequences of that activity.”). Our discussion above makes clear that Officer 

Doe’s complaint does allege that Mckesson directed the demonstrators to 

engage in the criminal act of occupying the public highway, which quite 

consequentially provoked a confrontation between the Baton Rouge police and 

the protesters, and that Officer Doe’s injuries were the foreseeable result of the 

tortious and illegal conduct of blocking a busy highway. 

We focus here on the fact that Mckesson “directed . . . specific tortious 

activity” because we hold that Officer Doe has adequately alleged that his 

injuries were the result of Mckesson’s own tortious conduct in directing an 

illegal and foreseeably violent protest. In Mckesson’s petition for rehearing, 

he expresses concern that the panel opinion permits Officer Doe to hold him 

liable for the tortious conduct of others even though Officer Doe merely alleged 

that he was negligent, and not that he specifically intended that violence would 

result. We think that Mckesson’s criticisms are misplaced. We perceive no 

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constitutional issue with Mckesson being held liable for injuries caused by a 

combination of his own negligent conduct and the violent actions of another

that were foreseeable as a result of that negligent conduct. The permissibility 

of such liability is a standard aspect of state law. See Restatement (Third) of 

Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 19 (2010) (“The conduct of 

a defendant can lack reasonable care insofar as it foreseeably combines with 

or permits the improper conduct of the plaintiff or a third party.”). There is no 

indication in Claiborne Hardware or subsequent decisions that the Supreme 

Court intended to restructure state tort law by eliminating this principle of 

negligence liability.

A close reading of Claiborne Hardware makes this clear. In that case, 

the Mississippi Supreme Court had found defendants liable for malicious 

interference with plaintiff’s business when they executed a sustained boycott 

against white-owned businesses for the purpose of securing “equal rights and 

opportunities for Negro citizens.” See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 899

(internal quotations omitted). That holding depended on the conclusion that 

“force, violence, or threats” were present. See id. at 895 (citing 393 So. 2d 1290, 

1301 (Miss. 1980)). This was a departure from the holding of the state 

chancery court. As the United States Supreme Court clarified, “[t]he 

Mississippi Supreme Court did not sustain the chancellor’s imposition of 

liability on a theory that state law prohibited a nonviolent, politically 

motivated boycott.” Id. at 915. This distinction is key: Before the United 

States Supreme Court, the only unlawful activities at issue involved “force, 

violence, or threats.” If the “force, violence, [and] threats” had been removed 

from the boycott, the remaining conduct would not have been tortious at all.

This posture is central to understanding what Claiborne Hardware did, 

and more importantly, did not, hold. When Claiborne Hardware speaks of 

violence, it speaks of the only unlawful activity at issue in the case. Consider 

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its observation that “[w]hile the State legitimately may impose damages for 

the consequences of violent conduct, it may not award compensation for the 

consequences of nonviolent, protected activity.” Id. at 918. It could not award 

compensation for the consequences of nonviolent activity because the only 

potentially tortious conduct at issue was violent. Indeed, the court expressly 

declined to reach the question of how it would have ruled if the nonviolent 

aspects of the boycott had been found to be tortious violations of an 

appropriately tailored state law. See id. at 915 n.49. 

Yet the dissenting opinion reads Claiborne Hardware as creating a broad 

categorical rule: “Claiborne Hardware . . . insulates nonviolent protestors from 

liability for others’ conduct when engaging in political expression, even 

intentionally tortious conduct, not intended to incite immediate violence.” How 

does it reach this conclusion? It relies on the Claiborne Hardware chancery 

court opinion that grounded liability in nonviolent protest. But the Mississippi 

Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court grounded liability solely 

in the presence of “force, violence or threats.” Id. at 895. The United States 

Supreme Court did not invent a “violence/nonviolence distinction” when it 

explained that “[w]hile the State legitimately may impose damages for the 

consequences of violent conduct, it may not award compensation for the 

consequences of nonviolent, protected activity.” Id. at 918. It merely applied

black-letter tort law: Because the only tortious conduct in Claiborne Hardware 

was violent, no nonviolent conduct could have proximately caused the 

plaintiff’s injury. See id. (“Only those losses proximately caused by unlawful 

conduct may be recovered.”). 

For the same reason, the Claiborne Hardware opinion makes frequent 

reference to unlawful conduct when, under the dissenting opinion’s view, it 

should have spoken of violence. See, e.g., id. at 920 (“For liability to be imposed 

by reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group itself 

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possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to 

further those illegal aims.”); id. at 925 (“There is nothing unlawful in standing 

outside a store and recording names.”); id. at 926 (“Unquestionably, these 

individuals may be held responsible for the injuries that they caused; a 

judgment tailored to the consequences of their unlawful conduct may be 

sustained.”); id. at 927 (“There are three separate theories that might justify 

holding Evers liable for the unlawful conduct of others.”); id. at 933 (“At times 

the difference between lawful and unlawful collective action may be identified 

easily by reference to its purpose.”). In every instance, if the Court were 

creating a violence/nonviolence distinction it would have replaced “unlawful”

with “violent.” It did not, because it created no such demarcation. Rather, it 

addressed the case before it, where the only tortious conduct was violent.7

This supposed violence/nonviolence distinction also does not square with 

the case law. Take New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). That 

case held that a public officer cannot “recover[] damages for a defamatory 

falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement 

was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or 

with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. at 279–80. But 

defamation is a nonviolent tort, and statements made about public officers are 

often shouted during political protests. If the dissenting opinion’s 

 

7 The dissenting opinion concedes that the First Amendment does not “protect[] 

individuals from all liability as long as their speech was nonviolent.” Rather, the dissenting 

opinion contends, “Claiborne Hardware supports the proposition that an individual cannot 

be held liable for violence if his speech did not ‘authorize[], direct[], or ratif[y]’ violence.” But 

the basis of potential liability in this case is Mckesson’s actions and conduct in directing the 

illegal demonstration, not his speech and advocacy. Elsewhere, the dissenting opinion 

describes its thesis this way: “encouraging [] unlawful activity cannot expose Mckesson to 

liability for violence because he didn’t instruct anyone to commit violence.” But that still 

overreads Claiborne Hardware; if this were the rule, then a protest leader who directs 

protesters to occupy an empty business could not be held liable for a violent confrontation 

that foreseeably follows between a protester and a business owner or police officer.

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interpretation is correct, then it would seem that even the narrow “actual 

malice” exception to immunity was eliminated by Claiborne Hardware, at least 

for statements made during a protest. 

Neither do recent cases vindicate this understanding. The Seventh 

Circuit examined a boycott similar to the one in Claiborne Hardware, this time 

a boycott by a union of a hotel and those doing business with the hotel. See 

520 S. Mich. Ave. Assocs., Ltd. v. Unite Here Local 1, 760 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 

2014). The court found that it was “undisputed that the Union delegations all 

attempted to communicate a message on a topic of public concern.” Id. at 723. 

But the court nonetheless held that the boycotters could be found liable if they 

had crossed the line into illegal coercion, because “prohibiting some of the 

Union’s conduct under the federal labor laws would pose no greater obstacle to 

free speech than that posed by ordinary trespass and harassment laws.” Id. 

The court’s benchmark for liability was illegality, not violence. The court 

concluded that if “the Union’s conduct in this case is equivalent to secondary 

picketing, and inflicts the same type of economic harm, it too may be prohibited 

without doing any harm to First Amendment liberties.” Id. The dissenting 

opinion cannot be squared with this outcome.

Finally, the violence/nonviolence distinction does not make sense. 

Imagine protesters speaking out on a heated political issue are marching in a 

downtown district. As they march through the city, a protester jaywalks. To 

avoid the jaywalker, a car swerves off the street, and the driver is seriously 

injured. If the dissenting opinion’s interpretation of Claiborne Hardware is 

correct, the First Amendment provides an absolute defense to liability for the 

jaywalker in a suit by the driver. The dissenting opinion says that “preventing 

tortious interference is not a proper justification for restricting free speech 

(unlike preventing violence)” because Claiborne Hardware cemented a 

“violence/nonviolence distinction.” The theory seems to be that because

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tortious interference is nonviolent, it cannot be tortious if done for a political 

reason. So too with every nonviolent tort? What about nonviolent criminal

offenses done for a political reason? The dissenting opinion does not seem to 

believe that engaging in a protest provides a protestor immunity for violating 

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:97. What is the logic behind immunizing protestors

from nonviolent civil liability while retaining their nonviolent criminal

liability?8

We of course acknowledge that Mckesson’s negligent conduct took place 

in the context of a political protest. It is certainly true that “the presence of 

activity protected by the First Amendment imposes restraints on the grounds 

that may give rise to damages liability and on the persons who may be held 

accountable for those damages.” Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916–17. But 

Claiborne Hardware does not insulate the petitioner from liability for his own 

negligent conduct simply because he, and those he associated with, also 

intended to communicate a message. See id. at 916 (“[T]he use of weapons, 

gunpowder, and gasoline may not constitutionally masquerade under the guise 

of advocacy.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Furthermore, 

although we do not understand the petitioner to be arguing that the Baton 

Rouge police violated the demonstrators’ First Amendment rights by 

attempting to remove them from the highway, we note that the criminal 

conduct allegedly ordered by Mckesson was not itself protected by the First 

Amendment, as Mckesson ordered the demonstrators to violate a reasonable 

time, place, and manner restriction by blocking the public highway. See Clark 

v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (reasonable time, 

place, and manner restrictions do not violate the First Amendment). As such, 

 

8 The dissenting opinion does not engage with our reading of Claiborne Hardware, nor 

does it grapple with the staggering consequences of its approach. 

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no First Amendment protected activity is suppressed by allowing the 

consequences of Mckesson’s conduct to be addressed by state tort law. 

Thus, on the pleadings, which must be read in a light most favorable to 

Officer Doe, the First Amendment is not a bar to Officer Doe’s negligence 

theory. The district court erred by dismissing Officer Doe’s complaint—at the 

pleading stage—as barred by the First Amendment.9 We emphasize that this 

means only that, given the facts that Doe alleges, he could plausibly succeed 

on this claim. We make no statement (and we cannot know) whether he will.

C.

Now we turn our attention to whether Officer Doe has stated a claim 

against Black Lives Matter. The district court took judicial notice that “‘Black 

Lives Matter,’ as that term is used in the Complaint, is a social movement that 

was catalyzed on social media by the persons listed in the Complaint in 

response to the perceived mistreatment of African-American citizens by law 

enforcement officers.” Based on this conclusion, the district court held that 

Black Lives Matter is not a “juridical person” capable of being sued. See 

Ermert, 559 So. 2d at 474. We first address the district court’s taking of judicial 

notice, then Black Lives Matter’s alleged capacity to be sued.

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides that a court may take judicial 

notice of an “adjudicative fact” if the fact is “not subject to reasonable dispute”

 

9 We emphasize, however, that our opinion does not suggest that the First Amendment 

allows a person to be punished, or held civilly liable, simply because of his associations with 

others, unless it is established that the group that the person associated with “itself possessed 

unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims.”

Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920. But we also observe that, in any event, Officer Doe’s 

allegations are sufficient to state a claim that Black Lives Matter “possessed unlawful goals” 

and that Mckesson “held a specific intent to further those illegal aims.” See id. Officer Doe 

alleges that Black Lives Matter “plann[ed] to block a public highway,” and, in his amended 

complaint, that Mckesson and Black Lives Matter traveled to Baton Rouge “for the purpose

of . . . rioting.” (emphasis added).

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in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the 

trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 

sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). “Rule 201 

authorizes the court to take notice only of ‘adjudicative facts,’ not legal 

determinations.” Taylor v. Charter Med. Corp., 162 F.3d 827, 831 (5th Cir. 

1998). In Taylor, we held that another court’s state-actor determination was 

not an “adjudicative fact” within the meaning of Rule 201 because “[w]hether 

a private party is a state actor for the purposes of § 1983 is a mixed question 

of fact and law and is thus subject to our de novo review.” Id. at 830–31. We 

further held that the state-actor determination was not beyond reasonable 

dispute where it “was, in fact, disputed by the parties” in the related case. Id.

at 830.

We think that the district court was incorrect to take judicial notice of a 

mixed question of fact and law when it concluded that Black Lives Matter is a 

“social movement, rather than an organization or entity of any sort.” The legal 

status of Black Lives Matter is not immune from reasonable dispute; and, 

indeed, it is disputed by the parties—Doe claiming that Black Lives Matter is 

a national unincorporated association, and Mckesson claiming that it is a 

movement or at best a community of interest. This difference is sufficient 

under our case law to preclude judicial notice.

We should further say that we see the cases relied on by the district court 

as distinguishable. Each deals with judicial notice of an aspect of an entity, 

not its legal form. See United States v. Parise, 159 F.3d 790, 801 (3d Cir. 1998) 

(holding that the court could take judicial notice of the aims and goals of a 

movement); Atty. Gen. of U.S. v. Irish N. Aid. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 241, 259–

60 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating the court could take “notice that the IRA is a 

‘Republican movement,’ at least insofar as it advocates a united Ireland” 

(emphasis added)); see also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 376 n.13 (1964) 

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(noting that “[t]he lower court took judicial notice of the fact that the 

Communist Party of the United States . . . was a part of the world Communist 

movement” (emphasis added)).

Now, we move on to discuss the merits of Officer Doe’s contention that 

Black Lives Matter is a suable entity. He alleges that Black Lives Matter “is 

a national unincorporated association with chapter [sic] in many states.” 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), the capacity of an entity “to sue 

or be sued is determined . . . by the law of the state where the court is located.” 

Under Article 738 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, “an unincorporated 

association has the procedural capacity to be sued in its own name.” The 

Louisiana Supreme Court has held that “an unincorporated association is 

created in the same manner as a partnership, by a contract between two or 

more persons to combine their efforts, resources, knowledge or activities for a 

purpose other than profit or commercial benefit.” Ermert, 559 So. 2d at 473. 

“Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the 

parties.” La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2045. To show intent, “the object of the 

contract of association must necessarily be the creation of an entity whose 

personality ‘is distinct from that of its members.’” Ermert, 559 So. 2d at 474

(quoting La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 24). Louisiana law does not provide for a 

public display of the parties’ intent. Id.

Louisiana courts have looked to various factors as indicative of an intent

to create an unincorporated association, including requiring dues, having 

insurance, ownership of property, governing agreements, or the presence of a 

formal membership structure. See Bogue Lusa Waterworks Dist. v. La. Dep’t 

of Envtl. Quality, 897 So. 2d 726, 728–729 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (relying on 

organization’s unfiled articles of incorporation); Friendship Hunting Club v. 

Lejeune, 999 So. 2d 216, 223 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (relying on organization’s 

required dues and possession of an insurance policy); see also Concerned 

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Citizens Around Murphy v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 663, 675 

(E.D. La. 2010) (relying on organization’s formal and determinate membership 

structure). Lacking at least some of these indicators, Louisiana courts have 

been unwilling to find an intent to create an unincorporated association. See,

e.g., Ermert, 559 So. 2d at 474–475 (finding that hunting group was not an 

unincorporated association because it did not own or lease the property that it 

was based on, required the permission of one of its alleged members to use the 

property, and lacked formal rules or bylaws).

Officer Doe has not shown in his complaint a plausible inference that 

Black Lives Matter is an unincorporated association. His only allegations are 

that Black Lives Matter: (1) was created by three women; (2) has several 

leaders, including Mckesson; (3) has chapters in many states; and (4) was 

involved in numerous protests in response to police practices. He does not 

allege that it possesses property, has a formal membership, requires dues, or 

possesses a governing agreement. As such, the complaint lacks any indication 

that Black Lives Matter possesses the traits that Louisiana courts have 

regarded as indicative of an intent to establish a juridical entity. We have no

doubt that Black Lives Matter involves a number of people working in concert, 

but “an unincorporated association . . . . does not come into existence or 

commence merely by virtue of the fortuitous creation of a community of 

interest or the fact that a number of individuals have simply acted together.” 

Id. at 474. Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in concluding 

that Officer Doe’s complaint has failed plausibly to allege that Black Lives 

Matter is an entity capable of being sued.10

 

10 We do not address whether Officer Doe could state a claim against an entity whose 

capacity to be sued was plausibly alleged, nor do we address whether Mckesson could be held 

liable for the actions of that entity under state law.

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VI.

In sum, we hold that Officer Doe has not adequately alleged that 

Mckesson was vicariously liable for the conduct of the unknown assailant or 

that Mckesson entered into a civil conspiracy with the purpose of injuring 

Officer Doe. We do find, however, that Officer Doe adequately alleged that 

Mckesson is liable in negligence for organizing and leading the Baton Rouge 

demonstration to illegally occupy a highway. We further find that in this 

context the district court erred in dismissing the suit on First Amendment 

grounds. As such, Officer Doe has pleaded a claim for relief against DeRay 

Mckesson in his active complaint.11 The district court therefore erred by 

concluding that it would be futile for Doe to amend his complaint. We also hold 

that the district court erred by taking judicial notice of the legal status of 

“Black Lives Matter,” but nonetheless find that Officer Doe did not plead facts 

that would allow us to conclude that Black Lives Matter is an entity capable of 

being sued. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, 

REVERSED in part, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.12

 

11 Officer Doe has complained of the lack of discovery in this case, particularly related 

to his claims against the corporate defendants. Officer Doe is free to argue before the district 

court that he is entitled to discovery. The district court may then decide whether, in the light 

of our remand, discovery would be appropriate. 

12 On appeal, Officer Doe also argues that the district court erred in denying his 

request to proceed anonymously as John Doe. He argues that the public nature of his job 

puts him and his family in danger of additional violence. At the district court, he listed a 

number of examples of acts of violence against police officers by individuals who may have 

some connection with Black Lives Matter. In its order, the district court walked through 

three factors common to anonymous-party suits that we have said “deserve considerable 

weight.” Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981). These are: (1) whether the plaintiff 

is “challeng[ing] governmental activity”; (2) whether the plaintiff will be required to disclose 

information “of the utmost intimacy”; and (3) whether the plaintiff will be “compelled to admit 

[his] intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution.” Id. at 185.

The district court concluded that none of these factors applied to the facts of this case. In 

response to Officer Doe’s argument regarding potential future violence, the district court 

noted that the incidents Officer Doe listed did not involve Officer Doe and were not related 

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AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

 

to this lawsuit. In fact, at oral argument before the district court regarding his motion, 

Officer Doe conceded that he had received no particularized threats of violence since filing 

his lawsuit. The district court instead saw the incidents Officer Doe listed as evidence of “the 

generalized threat of violence that all police officers face.” As a result, the district found that 

Doe had not demonstrated a privacy interest that outweighs the “customary and 

constitutionally embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.” Id. at 186. We 

agree with the district court and affirm the denial of Doe’s motion to proceed anonymously. 

In so holding, we emphasize what the Supreme Court said decades ago: “What transpires in 

the court room is public property.” Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).

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DON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part:

I originally agreed with denying Mckesson’s First Amendment defense.1

But I have had a judicial change of heart. Further reflection has led me to see 

this case differently, as explained below. Admittedly, judges aren’t naturals at 

backtracking or about-facing. But I do so forthrightly. Consistency is a cardinal 

judicial virtue, but not the only virtue. In my judgment, earnest rethinking 

should underscore, rather than undermine, faith in the judicial process. As 

Justice Frankfurter elegantly put it 70 years ago, “Wisdom too often never 

comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.”2

* * *

Officer John Doe was honoring his oath to serve and protect the people 

of Baton Rouge when an unidentified violent protestor hurled a rock-like object 

at his face. Officer Doe risked his life to keep his community safe that day—

same as every other day he put on the uniform. He deserves justice. 

Unquestionably, Officer Doe can sue the rock thrower. But I am 

unconvinced he can sue the protest leader. First, it is unclear whether DeRay 

Mckesson owed Officer Doe a duty under Louisiana law to protect him from 

the criminal acts of others. I would certify that threshold—and potentially 

dispositive—issue to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. Second, the Constitution 

that Officer Doe swore to protect itself protects Mckesson’s rights to speak, 

assemble, associate, and petition. First Amendment freedoms, of course, are 

not absolute—and there’s the rub: Did Mckesson stray from lawfully exercising 

his own rights to unlawfully exorcising Doe’s. I don’t believe he did.3

 

1 Doe v. Mckesson, 922 F.3d 604 (5th Cir.), superseded on panel rehearing, 935 F.3d 

253 (5th Cir. 2019) (Mckesson II).

2 Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) 

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

3 Although I now dissent on the First Amendment issue, I still agree with the majority 

opinion that: (1) we have jurisdiction over this appeal; (2) Mckesson cannot be held 

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I

Respectfully, the majority opinion is too quick to conclude that 

Mckesson’s organization and leadership of the Black Lives Matter protest 

amounted to negligence. Under Louisiana law, a person generally has “no duty 

to protect others from the criminal activities of third persons.”4 And to 

determine whether to impose such a duty, “the court must make a policy 

decision in light of the unique facts and circumstances presented.”5 This case 

raises consequential questions of Federal constitutional law—but only 

potential questions. If Louisiana law does not impose a duty on protest 

organizers to protect officers from the criminal violence of individual 

protestors, then the First Amendment issues, however important, are moot.

The majority opinion concludes that Mckesson, as protest organizer, can 

be held liable for Officer Doe’s injuries because the Constitution “does not 

insulate [Mckesson] from liability for his own negligent conduct simply because 

he, and those he associated with, also intended to communicate a message.”6

Putting aside whether the Constitution, in fact, supports precisely that,7 the 

starting-point question is whether Mckesson’s conduct was negligent at all. 

 

vicariously liable for the assailant’s actions; (3) Officer Doe failed to state a civil conspiracy 

claim; (4) Officer Doe failed to adequately allege that Black Lives Matter is an unincorporated 

association capable of being sued under Louisiana law; and (5) Officer Doe is not entitled to 

proceed anonymously.

4 Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762, 766 (La. 1999).

5 Id.

6 Maj. Op. at 18.

7 See N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982) (“The right to 

associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely because some members of the 

group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not protected.”). 

Claiborne Hardware, in part, addresses what protest conduct can give rise to tort liability 

consistent with the First Amendment, something that requires “precision of regulation” even 

when holding someone liable for his own actions in connection with protected speech. Id. at 

916.

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And step one of that inquiry is determining whether a duty exists—a pure 

question of law.8

The majority concludes that the foreseeable risk of violence alone 

imposed a duty on Mckesson to exercise reasonable care to avoid that violence. 

But I am unaware of any Louisiana case imposing a duty to protect against the 

criminal acts of a third party absent a special relationship that entails an 

independent duty.9 The majority, as it must, accepts that Louisiana does not 

 

8 Lazard v. Foti, 859 So. 2d 656, 659 (La. 2003).

9 See Carriere v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 893 F.2d 98, 101 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Ordinarily, 

Louisiana law imposes no duty to protect against the criminal acts of third persons. However, 

a duty to protect against foreseeable criminal misconduct may arise from a special 

relationship.” (internal citations omitted)); Wellons v. Grayson, 583 So. 2d 1166, 1168–69 (La. 

App. 1 Cir. 1991) (explaining that, for a party to have an obligation to protect against the 

criminal acts of others, “some special relationship must exist in order for that duty to arise”). 

For instance, in Posecai, the Supreme Court of Louisiana examined whether a business owed 

a duty to its customers to protect against criminal acts that were reasonably foreseeable to 

occur in the business’s parking lot. 752 So. 2d at 766. Importantly, the business 

unquestionably owed some duty to the customer because the customer was an invitee on the 

property; the question was how far that duty extended. And because, on balance, the risk of 

criminal activity was reasonably foreseeable and the burden of imposing a duty to protect 

against that risk was minimal, the court chose to impose a duty on the business. Id. at 768.

Consider also Brown v. Tesack, relied upon by the majority. 566 So. 2d 955 (La. 1990). 

In Brown, there was no question that the school had a duty to properly dispose of hazardous 

materials. Id. at 957. The school “specifically recognized” that certain flammable liquids 

created an unreasonable risk to the children who played on the school’s property. Id. As in 

Posecai, the question before the Supreme Court of Louisiana was whether this pre-existing 

duty extended to protecting against the acts of third parties (i.e., one child abusing the 

flammable liquids and burning another child). Id. The court concluded that because the harm 

that occurred was not only a foreseeable consequence of a breach of the school’s already

existing duty, but was a “foreseen” harm, protecting against the risk of children taking and 

misusing the hazardous liquids was within the scope of the school’s underlying duty to 

properly dispose of the liquids. Id. at 957–58. Further, the underlying duty in Brown was tied 

to the heightened standard of care involving children, which is not an issue in our case. See 

id. at 957 (“A duty was owed both to these children and to their potential victims. . . . We 

agree . . . that ‘children who possess a flammable substance can be expected to light it, to 

attract other children to join in the play and to commit criminal acts or engage in other 

misadventures.’”(quoting Brown, 556 So.2d at 89. (Plotkin, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no 

difference between the recognizable risk of a minor’s misuse of an inherently dangerous object 

and the likelihood that the minor will cause personal or property damages to others[.]”))). 

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recognize such a duty. Instead, it argues, Louisiana law imposes a “duty not to 

negligently cause a third party to commit a crime that is a foreseeable 

consequence of negligence.”10 Respectfully, this is a semantic distinction 

without an analytic difference. And it is a distinction unsupported by 

Louisiana law.11 Doe asserts that Mckesson “did nothing to calm the crowd,” 

but under Claiborne Hardware, a duty to repudiate “cannot arise unless, 

absent repudiation, an individual could be found liable for those acts.”12 Duty 

is the first inquiry. And possibly the last.

Recently, in another Louisiana tort case, we stressed, “If guidance from 

state cases is lacking, ‘it is not for us to adopt innovative theories of recovery 

 

Here, the harm to Officer Doe was not within the scope of the highway-obstruction 

statute that the majority alleges Doe violated, and Mckesson owed no pre-existing duty to 

Doe because of a special relationship between them. Finally, the majority opinion, while 

quoting the multi-factor balancing analysis required by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 

Posecai, never gets around to actually applying it. Rather, the majority simply assumes that 

because the harm was foreseeable, a duty necessarily exists. Louisiana law requires more.

10 Maj. Op. at 10.

11 The majority opinion attempts to distinguish between a duty to protect against a 

crime and a duty not to precipitate one. But I have certainly not found any case that describes 

such a difference or recognizes the majority’s proposed duty. See, e.g., Harris v. Pizza Hut of 

La., Inc., 45 So.2d 1364, 1369–70 (La. 1984) (“Louisiana has for some time employed the dutyrisk analysis to determine legal responsibility in tort claims. The pertinent inquiries are: . . . 

II. Whether there was a duty on the part of the defendant which was imposed to protect

against the risk involved . . . . (emphasis added)). And, despite the majority’s contention 

otherwise, both Posecai and Brown concern a duty to protect against the criminal acts of 

others, which exists only where there is a pre-existing special relationship that itself imposes 

a duty. See Posecai, 752 So. 2d at 766; Brown, 566 So.2d at 957 (“[A]ll rules of conduct . . . 

exist for purposes. They are designed to protect some persons under some circumstances 

against some risks . . . (quoting Wex Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 

60, 73 (1956)) (emphasis and ellipses in original)). The majority opinion never grapples with

Louisiana’s unequivocal expression that for a person to be held liable for the consequences of 

others’ actions, there must be a pre-existing duty between the acting and the liable parties. 

This necessity does not go away simply because the majority has rephrased the duty at issue.

12 458 U.S. at 925 n.69.

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under state law.’”13 Wise words. I would be chary of making policy decisions 

that create or expand Louisiana tort duties. Given the fateful First 

Amendment issues, and the dearth of on-point guidance from Louisiana courts, 

I would certify this res nova negligence question to the Supreme Court of 

Louisiana: Does a protest’s foreseeable risk of violence impose a duty upon the 

protest organizer, such that he can be held personally liable for injuries 

inflicted by an unknown assailant? Because if there’s no duty, there’s no 

negligence. And if there’s no negligence, there’s no case. And if there’s no case, 

there’s no need to fret about the First Amendment.

This is not a federal constitutional case unless it is first a state tort case. 

As such, certification is counseled, if not compelled, by the twin doctrines of 

constitutional avoidance and abstention. We recently remarked that “the 

doctrine of constitutional avoidance is rooted in basic considerations of 

federalism,”14 adding that where a ruling on constitutionality “could be avoided 

by interpretation of Louisiana law, we must give due consideration to this nonconstitutional ground for decision.”15 This caution is less prudish than prudent, 

and has a venerable, generations-long pedigree. The Supreme Court, almost 

80 years ago, held that “where uncertain questions of state law must be 

resolved before a federal constitutional question can be decided, federal courts 

should abstain until a state court has addressed the state questions.”16

After all, state judiciaries are equal partners in our shared duty “to say 

 

13 Meador v. Apple, Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Mayo v. Hyatt 

Corp., 898 F.2d 47, 49 (5th Cir. 1990)).

14 St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 700 F.3d 154, 168 (5th Cir. 2012).

15 Id. at 167.

16 Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 667 (2006) (citing Railroad 

Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941)).

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what the law is.”17 Bombshell federal cases dominate most headlines. But as 

this same panel recently emphasized, “American justice is dispensed—

overwhelmingly—in state, not federal, judiciaries.”18 How much? “[A] 

whopping 96 percent of all cases.”19 As Justice Scalia self-deprecatingly 

observed, state law (and state courts) matter far more to citizens’ everyday 

lives: “If you ask which court is of the greatest importance to an American 

citizen, it is not my court.”20

State judiciaries are fundamental, not ornamental, and have been since 

the Founding, when Hamilton lauded them as “the immediate and visible 

guardian of life and property.”21 (Indeed, the federal judiciary didn’t even exist

for the first several years after independence.) Hamilton’s reassurance has 

endured for 232 years. Earlier this year, we again extolled the front-and-center 

role of state judiciaries: “For most Americans, Lady Justice lives in the halls of 

state courts.”22

In this case, Louisiana law poses a threshold, potentially decisive 

question. Only the Supreme Court of Louisiana can adjudicate it 

authoritatively. Certification—inviting the state high court’s definitive word—

 

17 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

18 Thompson v. Dallas City Attorney’s Office, 913 F.3d 464, 470–71 (5th Cir. 2019) 

(citing Jennifer W. Elrod, Don't Mess with Texas Judges: In Praise of the State Judiciary, 37 

HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 629 (2013)).

19 New NCSC Video Explains That State Courts Are Where the Action Is, NAT. CTR.

FOR STATE COURTS (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.ncsc.org/Newsroom/at-the-Center/2018/Nov28.aspx.

20 Thompson, 913 F.3d at 471 (quoting Justice Scalia Honors U.S. Constitution, GEO. 

WASH. TODAY (Sept. 18, 2013), https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/justice-scalia-honors-usconstitution).

21 THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).

22 Thompson, 913 F.3d at 470 (citing John Schwartz, Critics Say Budget Cuts for 

Courts Risk Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2011, at A18 (quoting a former justice of the 

Colorado Supreme Court)).

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serves the dual goals of abstention and avoidance by obviating (perhaps) the 

need to confront the First Amendment at all. Avoiding unnecessary federal 

constitutional rulings honors our bedrock commitment to federalism. On this 

point, we have not minced words: “[T]he Supreme Court has long recognized

that concerns for comity and federalism may require federal courts to either

abstain from deciding federal constitutional issues that are entwined with the

interpretation of state law or certify the questions of state law to the state’s

highest court for an authoritative interpretation of them before reaching the

merits of the cases.”23 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has itself stressed, our

carefully wrought system of federalism is best served by avoiding “the friction

of a premature constitutional adjudication.”24 And certification of state-law

questions may be particularly important in First Amendment cases.25

To my mind, there is no need for Erie guesses or crystal balls. Federalto-state certification is a remarkable device: workable, efficient, and

guaranteed to yield a doubt-free answer. Zero guesswork, Erie or otherwise.

And this case, by any traditional measure, hits the certification bull’s-eye: The

state-law answer is uncertain, and the federal-law question is (maybe)

unnecessary. The first adjudication of this unresolved issue, one that portends

far-reaching impact given the ubiquity of “negligent protests,” should be

decisive and authoritative, one on which the people of Louisiana can rely.

True, certification is entirely discretionary, not obligatory. And the

tipping point for certification-worthiness eludes mathematical precision; it’s

 

23 Carmouche, 449 F.3d at 667.

24 Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500.

25 See Clay Calvert, Certifying Questions in First Amendment Cases: Free Speech, 

Statutory Ambiguity, and Definitive Interpretations, 60 B.C.L. REV. 1349, 1352 (2019).

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wholly subjective, with a patent, eye-of-the-beholder flavor.26 But this case

seems a Certification 101 exemplar that calls for cooperative judicial

federalism. If consequential state-law ground is to be plowed, I believe the

Supreme Court of Louisiana should do the plowing.

It is principally the role of state judges to define and delimit state causes

of action. And state supreme courts have an irreplaceable duty: to be supreme

and to speak supremely. We should let them do so, particularly when doing so 

may obviate a knotty federal question. I would leave this ruling on Louisiana 

negligence law to those elected to rule on Louisiana negligence law. I would 

seek conclusive word from the conclusive court as to what state law prescribes 

and proscribes. I would not guess, predict, or speculate. I would certify.

II

Even assuming that Mckesson could be sued under Louisiana law for 

“negligently” leading a protest at which someone became violent, the First 

Amendment “imposes restraints” on what (and whom) state tort law 

may punish.27 Just as there is no “hate speech” exception to the First 

 

26 Disclosure: My dozen years as a state high court jurist likely make me more inclined

to certify (as does my judgment that the majority reaches the wrong constitutional result).

As this is a federal constitutional case only if it is first a viable state negligence case, a state

supreme court justice would reasonably think it her job to decide an unsettled state-law issue

of far-reaching significance.

27 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916–17 (“Specifically, the presence of activity 

protected by the First Amendment imposes restraints on the grounds that may give rise to 

damages liability and on the person who may be held accountable for those damages.”). As to 

what activity may be subject to liability, the Court held: “While the State legitimately may 

impose damages for the consequences of violent conduct, it may not award compensation for 

the consequences of nonviolent, protected activity. Only those losses proximately caused by 

unlawful conduct may be recovered.” Id. at 918. As to who can be held liable for that violent 

conduct, the Court held: “Civil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual 

belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence. For liability to be 

imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group itself 

possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal 

aims.” Id. at 920.

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Amendment,28 “negligent” speech is also constitutionally protected.29 And 

under Claiborne Hardware (and a wealth of precedent since), raucous public 

protest—even “impassioned” and “emotionally charged” appeals for the use of 

force—is protected unless clearly intended to, and likely to, spark immediate 

violence.30

In Claiborne Hardware, involving a years-long and sometimes violent 

boycott that tortiously interfered with white-owned businesses, the Court 

unanimously held that the “highly charged political rhetoric” of Charles 

Evers—who “unquestionably played the primary leadership role in the 

organization of the boycott”—was constitutionally protected even though Evers 

vilified and urged violence against boycott breakers, warning, “if we catch any 

of you going in any of them racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”31

The Court made clear that the First Amendment does not protect words “that 

provoke immediate violence”32 or “that create an immediate panic.”33 But 

“mere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove speech from the 

protection of the First Amendment.”34 Because Evers only advocated for 

 

28 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (making clear that viewpoint discrimination—

including against hateful speech that demeans—is unconstitutional).

29 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278–80 (1964) (prohibiting 

public officials from recovering damages for negligently made “defamatory falsehoods” 

because permitting liability for such negligence would impose a “pall of fear and timidity . . . 

upon those who would give voice to public criticism,” creating “an atmosphere in which the 

First Amendment freedoms cannot survive”).

30 458 U.S. at 927–28 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (protecting 

speech of Ku Klux Klan leader who threatened “revengeance” if “suppression” of the white 

race continued, and defining “incitement” to mean speech that is “directed to inciting or 

producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”)).

31 Id. at 926–28.

32 Id. at 927. 

33 Id. 

34 Id. (emphasis in original). 

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violence, but did not provoke or incite imminent acts of violence, the Court said 

his fiery words “did not exceed the bounds of protected speech.”35 The Court 

noted there was “no evidence—apart from the speeches themselves—that 

Evers authorized, ratified, or directly threatened acts of violence.”36 In this 

case, there is not even a competent allegation of such behavior. 

Officer Doe does not assert that Mckesson perpetrated violence himself. 

Rather, he asserts that Mckesson “incited the violence.” But Doe’s barebones 

complaint specifies no words or actions by Mckesson that may have done so. 

For Rule 12(b)(6) purposes, we accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.37 But “a legal conclusion couched as 

a factual allegation” need not be accepted as true.38 Gauzy allegations that 

offer only “labels and conclusions” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further 

factual enhancement” do not suffice.39 Doe’s allegations—“[t]hreadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

 

35 Id. at 929.

36 Id.

37 SGK Props., L.L.C. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 881 F.3d 933, 943 (5th Cir. 2018).

Confusingly, the majority opinion relies on Officer Doe’s proposed amended complaint even 

though the district court denied Doe’s request to file an amended complaint. The controlling 

complaint for the purposes of our analysis should be Doe’s original complaint. See Matter of 

Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 926 F.3d 103, 112 n.2 (5th Cir. 2019) (accepting facts as alleged 

in Third Amended Complaint, even where district court improperly denied plaintiff’s request 

to file its Proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, because the Third Amended Complaint was 

“the live pleading at the time of dismissal”); Stem v. Gomez, 813 F.3d 205, 209, 215–17 (5th 

Cir. 2016) (relying on facts as alleged in original complaint where district court denied leave 

to amend); Leal v. McHugh, 731 F.3d 405, 407 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2013) (same). But even if I 

accepted the facts alleged in Doe’s Amended Complaint as true, the First Amendment would 

still prohibit imposing liability against Mckesson for the violent acts of others because, as the 

majority agrees, Mckesson did not authorize, direct, or ratify any violent conduct. 

38 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

39 Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The majority opinion rightly disregards Doe’s “conclusory allegations” 

against Black Lives Matter. See Maj. Op. at 8. 

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statements”—fail the 12(b)(6) plausibility standard.40

Doe strings together various unadorned contentions—that Mckesson 

was “present during the protest,” “did nothing to calm the crowd,” “directed” 

protestors to gather on the public street in front of police headquarters, and 

“knew or should have known . . . that violence would result” from the protest 

that Mckesson “staged.” Even taking these impermissibly conclusory 

allegations as true, the complaint lacks sufficient factual detail to state a claim 

for negligence, much less to overcome Mckesson’s First Amendment defense. 

For example, Doe does not allege:

• What orders Mckesson allegedly gave, how he led the protest, 

or what he said or did to incite violence.

• How Mckesson “controlled” or “directed” the unidentified 

assailant who injured Officer Doe.

• How statements that Mckesson made to the media after the 

protest amount to a ratification of violence.

Without these and other fleshed-out facts, the complaint utterly fails to link 

Mckesson’s role as leader of the protest demonstration to the mystery

attacker’s violent act. In short, Doe’s skimpy complaint is heavy on well-worn 

conclusions but light on well-pleaded facts.

Indeed, the lone “inciteful” speech quoted in Doe’s complaint is 

something Mckesson said not to a fired-up protestor but to a mic’ed-up 

reporter—the day following the protest: “The police want protestors to be too 

afraid to protest.” Tellingly, not a single word even obliquely references 

violence, much less advocates it. Temporally, words spoken after the protest 

cannot possibly have incited violence during the protest. And tacitly, the 

majority opinion seems to discard the suggestion that Mckesson uttered 

anything to incite violence against Officer Doe.

 

40 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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With “speech” off the table, the majority seems to endorse an alternative 

liability theory—that Mckesson “authorized, directed, or ratified specific 

tortious activity”41 by leading others to block a public highway. The majority 

credits Doe’s abstract, one-sentence contention that Mckesson “knew or should 

have known that violence would result.”42 Mind you, Doe’s complaint contains 

no specific allegations that Mckesson advocated imminent violence, just this 

bald, conclusory assertion that he negligently allowed violence to occur. 

This novel “negligent protest” theory of liability seems incompatible with 

the First Amendment and foreclosed—squarely—by controlling Supreme 

Court precedent. Even assuming, for argument’s sake, that Mckesson directed 

others to stand in the highway43 and that violating this criminal law 

constitutes a tort,44 I disagree with the suggestion that directing any tort would 

strip a protest organizer of First Amendment protection. Even Evers of 

Claiborne Hardware would be liable under the majority’s analysis. After all, 

the economic harm inflicted in Claiborne Hardware was “the result of [Evers’s] 

own tortious conduct in organizing a foreseeably violent protest.”45 Evers 

 

41 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 927 (“[A] finding that [Evers] authorized, directed, 

or ratified specific tortious activity would justify holding him responsible for the 

consequences of that activity.”).

42 See Maj. Op. at 18 (“But Claiborne Hardware does not insulate the petitioner from 

liability for his own negligent conduct simply because he, and those he associated with, also 

intended to communicate a message.” (emphasis in original)).

43 The majority opinion states that “Officer Doe’s complaint does allege that Mckesson 

directed the demonstrators to engage in the criminal act of occupying the public highway,” 

adding that Doe “specifically alleges that Mckesson led protestors down a public highway in 

an attempt to block the interstate.” But the lone assertion of purposeful highway-blocking in 

Doe’s scanty complaint is this sentence: “DEFENDANTS conspired to violate the law by 

planning to block a public highway.” Even if “planning” equates to directing, the majority 

properly holds that Doe failed to state a claim that Mckesson engaged in any conspiracy. Id.

at 260.

44 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:97.

45 Maj. Op. at 13 (emphasis in original). Similarly, in Eastern Railroad Presidents 

Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., the Supreme Court held that a campaign with an 

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engaged in the tort of “malicious interference with the plaintiff’s business.”46

He even threatened during a meeting that “any ‘uncle toms’ who broke the 

boycott would ‘have their necks broken’ by their own people.”47 And violence 

was not just foreseeable; “several” clashes had already occurred.48 Despite all 

that, the Supreme Court ruled Evers to be constitutionally protected. Because 

Evers did not specifically direct violence, the Supreme Court was unwilling to 

find him liable for violence.49 And because preventing tortious interference is 

not a proper justification for restricting free speech (unlike preventing 

violence), it refused to hold Evers liable for the economic harms resulting from 

the boycott he led.50

 

anticompetitive purpose and effect was permissible under the First Amendment, even though 

the Sherman Act prohibits individuals from restraining trade or creating monopolies, 

because “[t]he right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we 

cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.” 365 U.S. 

127, 138 (1961).

46 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 891.

47 Id. at 900 n.28.

48 Id. at 903.

49 Id. at 927.

50 Id. at 914–15 (“[T]he petitioners certainly foresaw—and directly intended—that the 

merchants would sustain economic injury as a result of their campaign[;] . . . however . . . 

[t]he right of the States to regulate economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition 

against a nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and 

economic change and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself. . . . We hold 

that the nonviolent elements of petitioners’ activities are entitled to the protection of the First 

Amendment.”). The majority opinion overlooks these statements by the Supreme Court and 

instead points to proceedings that occurred in the state chancery and supreme courts to argue 

that the tortious conduct that Evers unequivocally led was not at issue before the Claiborne 

Hardware Court. But the Court never made such an assertion. To the contrary, the Supreme 

Court observed that it was not deciding “the extent to which a narrowly tailored statute 

designed to prohibit certain forms of anticompetitive conduct or certain types of secondary 

pressure may restrict protected First Amendment activity. No such statute is involved in this 

case. Nor are we presented with a boycott designed to secure aims that are themselves 

prohibited by a valid state law.” Id. at 915 n.49. The Supreme Court did not here say that no 

one committed tortious conduct; the Court affirmed that a generic statute against tortious 

interference is not the type of narrowly tailored law that can restrict protected First 

Amendment speech. And because it is not such a narrowly tailored law, directing others to 

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In other words, when the Supreme Court observed that Evers could be 

held liable if he “authorized, directed, or ratified specific tortious activity,” it 

was clarifying that Evers could be held liable for violence he directly incited 

because violence is a tortious activity that unequivocally falls outside First 

Amendment protection.51 This violence/nonviolence distinction52 is cemented 

later in Claiborne Hardware when the Court restates the same three-verb 

standard to explain why Evers could not be liable despite his intentionally 

 

violate it could not impose liability on Evers generally, and it certainly could not impose 

liability on him for the violence of others. Id. at 914–15; see also Bradenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 

(“A statute which fails to draw [a] distinction [between teaching about the need for violence 

and “steeling” a group to commit violence] impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms 

guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation 

speech which our Constitution has immunized from governmental control.”).

51 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 927. This is not to say the First Amendment 

protects individuals from all liability as long as their speech was nonviolent. Instead, 

Claiborne Hardware supports the proposition that an individual cannot be held liable for 

violence if his speech did not “authorize[], direct[], or ratif[y]” violence. Id. (“[A] finding that 

[Evers] authorized, directed, or ratified specific tortious activity would justify holding him 

responsible for the consequences of that activity.” (emphasis added)).

52 The majority opinion latches onto the phrase “violence/nonviolence distinction” and 

appears to oversimplify it. As reiterated throughout this dissent, see, e.g., supra note 51, I do 

not contend that the First Amendment protects individuals from all tortious activity as long 

as it is nonviolent. Instead, I affirm the Supreme Court’s holding that a person cannot be 

held liable for violent conduct that he did not intentionally incite or commit. And it is violent 

conduct that is at issue here. Certainly, a libeler can be held liable for the reputational harms

caused by his libelous speech, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348–50 (1974), 

because defamation statutes are proper, narrowly tailored restrictions on the First 

Amendment. But a libeler may not be held liable for the violent acts of others that the libeler 

did not intend to incite with his libelous speech. See Bradenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48; Herceg 

v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1024 (5th Cir. 1987) (refusing to impose civil 

liability against Hustler for “inciting” accidental asphyxiation, observing that “[m]ere 

negligence . . . cannot form the basis of liability under the incitement doctrine”); see also 

Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 798 (2011) (holding that even if violent video 

games make people more aggressive, California could not prohibit their sale to children). And 

even if the libeler could be held so responsible, generic negligence statutes do not meet the 

first necessary condition of being narrowly tailored restrictions on free speech. See infra, note 

56. Without a doubt, Evers defamed certain targets of his speech, yet the Court still refused 

to hold him liable for violence. See, e.g., Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 935–36 (describing 

specific local store owners as “racists” and “bigots” and implying they were murderers, 

rapists, and liars). 

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tortious activity, including speech that advocated violence: “[A]ny such theory 

fails for the simple reason that there is no evidence—apart from the speeches 

themselves—that Evers authorized, ratified, or directly threatened acts of 

violence.”53 The takeaway seems clear: The First Amendment only allows civil 

liability for violent conduct that “occurs in the context of constitutionally 

protected activity” when that activity involves violence or threats of violence.54

The majority opinion avers (though, notably, the complaint does not) 

that Mckesson directed protestors to block a public highway.55 But encouraging 

that unlawful activity cannot expose Mckesson to liability for violence because 

he didn’t instruct anyone to commit violence.56 The Supreme Court requires 

“extreme care” when attaching liability to protest-related activity.57 The 

majority’s “tortious conduct + foreseeable violence = liability for violence”

 

53 Id. at 929.

54 Id. at 916.

55 See supra note 43.

56 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916, 921, 927. The majority opinion summarily 

concludes that Louisiana’s road-blocking statute is a proper time, place, manner restriction,

Maj. Op. at 18. But absent briefing from the parties, I am uncomfortable reaching such a 

consequential constitutional conclusion. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 553–58 

(1965) (invalidating a Baton Rouge ordinance that criminalized blocking public streets and 

only allowed parades or meetings with prior permission of an official who had unfettered 

discretion). 

Also, to the extent that a tort duty can arise from the violation of statutes against 

obstructing highways, “recovery will be allowed only if a rule of law on which plaintiff relied 

included within its limits protections against the particular risk that plaintiff’s interests 

encountered.” Lazard, 859 So. 2d at 661. And Louisiana’s prohibitions on highway-blocking 

“have as their focus the protection of other motorists.” State v. Winnon, 681 So. 2d 463, 466 

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1996). More attenuated harm is likely outside the scope of a defendant’s duty 

under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:97. See, e.g., Thomas v. Ballard, 577 So. 2d 149, 151 (La. App. 

1 Cir. 1991). I could find no Louisiana case extending the scope of the negligence duty created 

by La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:97 beyond the traffic-accident context. And I thus doubt that an 

intentional assault on a police officer is the “particular risk” addressed by the statute. Lazard, 

859 So. 2d at 661.

57 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 927.

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formula—with no parsing between violent tortious conduct (actionable) and 

nonviolent tortious conduct (nonactionable)—is at odds with the “precision of 

regulation” required to overcome the First Amendment.58 Indeed, if it were 

that easy to plead around Claiborne Hardware and hold protest leaders 

personally liable for the violence of an individual protestor, there would be 

cases galore holding as much. The majority opinion cites none.

The bar set by Claiborne Hardware is much higher than the majority 

opinion gives it credit for. For example, plaintiffs may only recover “losses 

proximately caused by unlawful conduct.”59 This requires naming “specific 

parties who agreed to use unlawful means” and “identifying the impact of such 

unlawful conduct.”60 Doe’s complaint does not allege specific facts indicating 

an agreement or any kind of agency relationship between Mckesson and the 

unidentified protestor, or that Mckesson encouraged or incited violent acts. 

Officer Doe does not allege facts supporting that Mckesson had an affirmative 

duty to intervene, and under Claiborne Hardware, protest organizers cannot 

be held strictly liable for the violent actions of rogue individuals.61

To reconcile the majority opinion (negligently disregarding potential 

violence is not protected) with Claiborne Hardware (intentionally advocating 

violence is protected), we must accept that one who expressly and purposely 

calls for violence is somehow not behaving negligently to the risk that violence 

may result. But “[m]ere negligence . . . cannot form the basis of liability under 

the incitement doctrine[.]”62 To hold otherwise seems fanciful, as does allowing 

 

58 Id. at 916, 921.

59 Id. at 918.

60 Id. at 933–34.

61 Id. at 920 (“Civil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged 

to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence.”).

62 Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d at 1024.

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common-law tort principles to trump constitutional free-speech principles.63

Claiborne Hardware held that Evers’s leadership of an intentionally tortious 

and foreseeably violent boycott did not forfeit his First Amendment defense. 

Reading Claiborne Hardware as authorizing liability for violence on the basis 

of urging any unlawful activity—no matter how attenuated from the violence 

that ultimately occurred—paints with startlingly broad strokes. 

Holding Mckesson responsible for the violent acts of others because he 

“negligently” led a protest that carried the risk of potential violence or urged 

the blocking of a road is impossible to square with Supreme Court precedent 

holding that only tortious activity meant to incite imminent violence, and likely 

to do so, forfeits constitutional protection against liability for violent acts 

committed by others.64 With greatest respect, I disagree with the majority 

opinion’s First Amendment analysis—both its substance and its necessity.

III

In Hong Kong, millions of defiant pro-democracy protesters have taken 

to the streets, with demonstrations growing increasingly violent. In America, 

political uprisings, from peaceful picketing to lawless riots, have marked our 

history from the beginning—indeed, from before the beginning. The Sons of 

Liberty were dumping tea into Boston Harbor almost two centuries before Dr. 

King’s Selma-to-Montgomery march (which, of course, occupied public 

roadways, including the full width of the bloodied Edmund Pettus Bridge).

* * *

Officer Doe put himself in harm’s way to protect his community 

(including the violent protestor who injured him). And states have undeniable

 

63 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“For 

the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary 

to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. . . .”).

64 See, supra, note 52.

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authority to punish protest leaders and participants who themselves commit 

violence. The rock-hurler’s personal liability is obvious, but I do not believe 

that Mckesson’s is—for at least two reasons. 

First, this is a negligence case, and I would not take it as a given that 

Mckesson owed an identifiable legal duty under Louisiana law. If no duty was 

owed, then no First Amendment analysis is necessary. Before weighing United 

States Supreme Court precedent on a fateful Federal question, I would invite 

the Louisiana Supreme Court to issue precedent on a fundamental State 

question. The tort analysis may well obviate the constitutional analysis.

Second, even assuming that Mckesson owed a duty, Doe’s skeletal 

complaint does not plausibly assert that Mckesson forfeited First Amendment 

protection by inciting violence. Not one of the three elements of “incitement”—

intent, imminence, likelihood—is competently pleaded here.65 Nor does the 

complaint competently assert that Mckesson directed, intended, or authorized 

this attack. Our Constitution explicitly protects nonviolent political protest. 

And Claiborne Hardware, among “our most significant First Amendment” 

cases,66 insulates nonviolent protestors from liability for others’ conduct when 

engaging in political expression, even intentionally tortious conduct, not 

intended to incite immediate violence. The Constitution does not insulate 

violence, but it does insulate citizens from responsibility for others’ violence.

“Negligent protest” liability against a protest leader for the violent act of 

a rogue assailant is a dodge of Claiborne Hardware and clashes head-on with 

constitutional fundamentals. Such an exotic theory would have enfeebled 

 

65 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free 

speech . . . do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law 

violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 

action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).

66 Cloer v. Gynecology Clinic, Inc., 528 U.S. 1099 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting from 

denial of petition for a writ of certiorari).

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No. 17-30864

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America’s street-blocking civil rights movement, imposing ruinous financial 

liability against citizens for exercising core First Amendment freedoms.67

Dr. King’s last protest march was in March 1968, in support of striking 

Memphis sanitation workers. It was prelude to his assassination a week later, 

the day after his “I’ve Been to the Mountaintop” speech. Dr. King’s hallmark 

was nonviolent protest, but as he led marchers down Beale Street, some young 

men began breaking storefront windows. The police moved in, and violence 

erupted, harming peaceful demonstrators and youthful looters alike. Had Dr. 

King been sued, either by injured police or injured protestors, I cannot fathom 

that the Constitution he praised as “magnificent”—“a promissory note to which 

every American was to fall heir”68—would countenance his personal liability.

Summing up: I would certify the threshold negligence question to the 

Supreme Court of Louisiana. Failing that, and given the flimsiness of Doe’s 

complaint, I would hold that the First Amendment shields Mckesson from tort 

liability for the rock thrower’s criminal act. In all other respects, I concur.

 

67 The march from Selma to Montgomery—54 miles, 54 years ago—was no sidewalk 

stroll.

68 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), in I HAVE A DREAM:

WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 101 (James M. Washington ed., 1992).

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