17-1869 

Wang v. Whitaker 

BIA 

Loprest, IJ 

A205 817 404

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic 

database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve 

a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

24th day of January, two thousand nineteen. 

Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 

 Chief Judge,

JON O. NEWMAN, 

SUSAN L. CARNEY,

 Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

YALAN WANG, 

 

 Petitioner, 

v. No. 17-1869 

 NAC 

MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, ACTING UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

For Petitioner: JOSHUA BARDAVID, ESQ., New York, NY. 

For Respondent: CHAD A. READLER, Acting Assistant Attorney General, SONG 

PARK, Senior Litigation Counsel, KIMBERLY A.BURDGE, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. 
2 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the 

petition for review is DENIED. 

 Petitioner Yalan Wang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks 

review of a May 23, 2017, decision of the BIA affirming an August 26, 2016, decision of an 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Yalan Wang, No. A205 817 404 (B.I.A. May 23, 

2017), aff’g No. A205-817-404 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Aug. 26, 2016). We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

 We assess the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the findings the BIA 

rejected. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We review 

factual findings for substantial evidence, affording “particular deference” to the IJ’s credibility 

determinations. Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Zhou Yun 

Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2004)). We must treat the agency’s factual findings as 

“conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 

Id. at 165 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). When adjudicating an asylum application, an IJ 

“may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant 

or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency 

between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of 

each such statement,” and the consistency of any statements with the rest of the record, “without 

regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s 

claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. 

 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Wang was not credible in 

claiming that family planning officials in China forced her to have an abortion. The agency 
3 

reasonably relied in part on Wang’s demeanor, noting that she was evasive when testifying about 

whether she decided to come to the United States before or after her purportedly forced abortion. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005) 

(recognizing that particular deference is given to the trier of fact’s assessment of demeanor). That 

finding and the overall credibility determination are bolstered by Wang’s inconsistent testimony 

regarding whether she sought to apply for a student visa before the abortion or only afterward. See 

Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006). 

 The agency also reasonably relied on Wang’s evasive testimony when first asked whether 

she lied to U.S. consular officials in China and when asked about her ability to speak English 

during her interview with those officials. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Majidi, 430 F.3d 77, 

81 n.1. Although the agency must take care not to “penalize an applicant for lying to escape a 

country where . . . she faces persecution,” Rui Ying Lin v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 

2006), the IJ reasonably relied on Wang’s evasive testimony before the IJ about her visa interview 

and her failure to timely and openly disclose her false statements at her immigration court hearing 

in the United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 

 Having questioned Wang’s credibility, the agency reasonably relied further on her failure 

to rehabilitate her testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. “An applicant’s failure to 

corroborate . . . her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in 

general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into 

question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The agency reasonably 

questioned whether Wang’s abortion certificate denoted an involuntary abortion rather than a 

voluntary one, given U.S. State Department reports that such certificates are only issued after 

voluntary procedures. See Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2007); Tu Lin v. 

Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 2006). Further, even if those reports are outdated as Wang 
4 

suggests,1 the 2012 report in the record of her case states that the Chinese government prohibits 

the use of force and punishes officials who use force in carrying out abortions. This newer report 

thus continues to support the implausibility of Wang’s position that officials would issue such 

certificates for forced abortions. See Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 66-68 (2d Cir. 2007) 

(recognizing that adverse credibility determination may be based on inherent implausibility in 

applicant’s story if the “finding is tethered to record evidence” or based on common sense). The 

IJ also reasonably declined to afford weight to the unsworn letter from Wang’s ex-boyfriend in 

China. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to agency’s decision to 

afford little weight to husband’s letter because it was unsworn and from an interested witness). 

 Given the IJ’s demeanor, inconsistency, and corroboration findings, the agency’s adverse 

credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and was dispositive of asylum, 

withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 

2006). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe 

Clerk of Court 

 1 More recent State Department reports have reaffirmed that abortion certificates are provided for voluntary, 

not involuntary, abortions in China. See Xiu Ying Wu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 712 F.3d 486, 490 (11th Cir. 2013) (discussing 

the 2007 China Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions).