ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

DAVID W. STONE, IV ANTHONY C. LAWRENCE

Stone Law Offices Anderson, Indiana

Anderson, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN RE: ADOPTION OF L.A.C. AND S.T.A., )

S.C. AND L.A., )

)

Appellants-Respondents, )

)

vs. ) No. 48A02-1305-AD-462

)

N.C. and K.R., )

)

Appellees-Petitioners. )

APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Dennis Carroll, Special Judge

Cause No. 48C01-1111-AD-62

February 7, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ROBB, Judge

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the 

case.
2

Case Summary and Issues

Appellants L.A. (“Father”) and S.C. (“Mother”) appeal the trial court’s decision to 

allow the adoption of their minor children, S.A. and L.C., without parental consent. 

Appellants raise the following issues for our review: (1) whether certain findings of fact 

made by the trial court are not supported by the evidence; (2) whether the conclusion that 

Mother and Father are unfit was clearly erroneous; and (3) whether adoption is in the 

children’s best interests. Concluding the evidence is sufficient to show Mother and Father 

are unfit and that adoption is in the children’s best interests, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

This case concerns a petition for adoption of S.A. and L.C. (the “children”) filed by 

N.C. and K.R. (“Prospective Adoptive Parents”). N.C. is the children’s maternal 

grandfather. Mother and Father are unmarried but have been a couple since 2007. 

N.C. gained custody of Mother after N.C. and Ni.C. (Mother’s mother) divorced. 

Mother had no contact with Ni.C. for a year after the divorce. During high school, Mother 

began spending time with Ni.C. and eventually dropped out of school. In February 2007, 

Mother and Ni.C. moved together from Indiana to Florida. Over the next two years, the 

two moved back and forth between Indiana and Florida, and Mother never enrolled in 

school while in Ni.C.’s care. 

Mother met Father while in Florida. At that time, Father had a history of juvenile 

offenses and had been incarcerated in a juvenile facility for a period of eight months. In 

late 2007, Mother became pregnant with S.A. Mother and Ni.C. moved back and forth 

between Indiana and Florida during her pregnancy, due in part to disputes with Father. 
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Mother eventually settled in Florida before the birth of S.A.

The Prospective Adoptive Parents visited Florida to lend support to Mother during 

the birth of S.A in August 2008. During their visit, the Prospective Adoptive Parents 

observed behavior that was consistent with drug use and drug trafficking by Mother and 

Father. Father always carried pain pills with him, and he would disappear for long periods 

of time without explanation. The Prospective Adoptive Parents also observed that there 

was constant foot traffic at Mother and Father’s residence, with many different people 

constantly coming and going. 

In July 2009, Mother and Father moved to Indiana, along with S.A., Lu.A (Father’s 

father), and Father’s school-age brothers, V.A. and E.A. The Prospective Adoptive Parents 

learned of a drug-related incident that occurred in Florida in which a person broke into 

Mother’s house and held her at gunpoint. The Prospective Adoptive Parents allowed the 

group to stay in their home upon arrival in Indiana and immediately observed signs of drug 

abuse. After seeing evidence of substance abuse, the Prospective Adoptive Parents 

informed Mother and Father that they and the rest of the group could no longer stay in their 

home. 

Between July and October 2009, Mother and Father moved several times. They 

lived with Ni.C., with other relatives, in a motel, and in three other residences in Anderson, 

Indiana. During this time, the Prospective Adoptive Parents became increasingly 

concerned with the drug use and residential instability of Mother and Father and the effect 

it was having on S.A.’s safety and welfare. The Prospective Adoptive Parents expressed 

these concerns to Mother and Father. They communicated with other family members 
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about the possibility of staging an intervention, but one was never held. Mother and Father 

eventually cut off communications with the Prospective Adoptive Parents and would not 

permit them to have contact with S.A. Due to growing concern, the Prospective Adoptive 

Parents contacted law enforcement and child protective services, and they filed a petition 

for guardianship in October 2009. Shortly after, Mother and Father moved to New York 

with S.A. and were accompanied by Lu.A., V.A., E.A., and A.T., an elderly neighbor. 

Mother and Father lived in New York for a period of six weeks. Father claimed 

they stayed with a friend, but he was unable to provide the friend’s name. During their 

time in New York, Father was investigated by New York Child Protective Services. They 

returned to Indiana shortly after. Mother and Father continued their drug use and unstable 

lifestyle. Their employment was intermittent or nonexistent. 

On May 27, 2010, Anderson police went to Mother and Father’s residence to 

investigate a request for a welfare check for an elderly woman. Upon searching the 

residence, an officer found sixty-five-year-old A.T., the neighbor who accompanied 

Mother and Father to New York. A.T. was locked in a utility closet. The windows in the 

closet were boarded shut, and the temperature inside was approximately 105 degrees. A 

bowl for water was on the floor, and a bag of feces hung on the door and was A.T.’s only 

restroom facility. The only piece of furniture was a urine-soaked mattress. A.T. was 

emaciated and had sustained severe injuries. Mother and Father were keeping A.T. locked 

in the utility closet in order to steal her social security benefits and prescription 

medications. Mother, Father, and Lu.A were immediately arrested. One police officer 

noted that the rest of Mother and Father’s residence was unfit for human habitation. 
5

Mother and Father were both charged with criminal confinement, a Class B felony; 

battery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Class C felony; exploitation of an adult, a Class 

D felony; financial exploitation of an endangered adult, a Class D felony; two counts of 

theft, Class D felonies; obtaining a controlled substance by fraud or deceit, a Class D 

felony; and two counts of possession of a controlled substance, Class D felonies. A jury 

found Father guilty on all counts except for one count of possession of a controlled 

substance. He is currently incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction and has a 

projected release date of July 10, 2032. Mother pled guilty to aiding, inducing, or causing 

battery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Class C felony, and two counts of possession 

of a controlled substance, Class D felonies.1

S.A. was placed with the Prospective Adoptive Parents immediately after Mother 

and Father were arrested, and S.A. has remained in their care since that time. On May 31, 

2010, Mother gave birth to L.C. while incarcerated. L.C. tested positive for opiates, and 

Mother admitted to abusing drugs during the time she was pregnant with L.C. L.C. was 

placed with the Prospective Adoptive Parents immediately after his birth. 

Father had four or five supervised visits with the children prior to his trial. After 

his conviction, he has had one supervised visit with S.A. Mother has had no contact with 

L.C. since his birth, and she had only one visit with S.A. while incarcerated, which occurred 

against the recommendation of child protective services. A Child in Need of Services 

(“CHINS”) case was opened, and case managers worked with the Prospective Adoptive 

 

1

 Mother’s projected release date was August 24, 2013. Presumably, she is no longer incarcerated. 
6

Parents and visited their home several times. During the CHINS case, the juvenile court 

issued a no contact order after it determined contact between the children and Mother or 

Father was not appropriate. 

The Prospective Adoptive Parents have maintained custody of the children and are 

the only parents known to the children. They have developed a stable and loving bond 

with the children. When the Prospective Adoptive Parents first gained custody of S.A., she 

was behind on her immunizations and had developmental delays in speech. She has since 

been enrolled in speech therapy sessions and in a pre-school with an academic curriculum. 

The children have also participated in other activities, including soccer, gymnastics, and 

Sunday school. Each of the children have their own furnished bedrooms in the Prospective 

Adoptive Parents’ home. Overall, the trial court found the Prospective Adoptive Parents 

are “providing a loving, safe, healthy and consistent environment in which the children are 

growing socially, physically, spiritually and emotionally.” Appellants’ Appendix at 23.

During her term of incarceration, Mother obtained a GED and completed a problem 

solving class and received a sentence reduction of six months for each. Mother also 

participated in a business technology class, a parenting class, and completed a packet on 

substance abuse. Mother and Father are engaged and plan to continue their relationship. 

At the hearing, Mother claimed that she intended to facilitate as much contact as possible 

between Father and the children while Father remains incarcerated. Mother has no 

meaningful work experience, and her minimal employment skills are derived from a single 

class taken while incarcerated. Mother has not worked since S.A.’s birth. 

Mother intended to live with Ni.C. upon her release from prison. Ni.C.’s husband 
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has a felony conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine, which has been reduced to a 

lesser included offense. And a minor child living with Ni.C. is the alleged victim of child 

molestation perpetrated by a relative. 

The Prospective Adoptive Parents were awarded guardianship on September 8, 

2011, and pending CHINS proceedings were dismissed on September 15, 2011. The 

Prospective Adoptive Parents filed their petition for adoption on November 1, 2011. 

Mother and Father contested the adoption. An evidentiary hearing was held over three 

days in February 2013. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions 

of law. On April 25, 2013, the trial court issued special findings of fact and conclusions 

of law. The trial court granted the Prospective Adoptive Parents’ petition for adoption, 

finding Mother and Father were unfit and adoption was in the best interests of the children. 

This appeal followed. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

The trial court issued special findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to 

Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). In this case, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: (1) we 

determine whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and (2) whether the findings 

support the judgment. In re Adoption of A.S., 912 N.E.2d 840, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), 

trans. denied. The trial court’s findings or judgment will be set aside only if they are clearly 

erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the record lacks evidence or 

reasonable inferences from the evidence to support it. Id. 
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II. Challenged Findings of Fact

First, Appellants challenge a number of the trial court’s findings of fact, arguing 

that they are clearly erroneous. We will address each challenged finding separately. 

Finding 14 states that Father “had a substantial juvenile history and was incarcerated 

in a juvenile facility for a period of eight (8) months.” Appellants’ App. at 15. Appellants 

take issue with the trial court’s description of Father’s history as “substantial.” This is a 

somewhat nitpicky criticism, as it is undisputed that Father’s juvenile history includes acts 

of battery, domestic battery, resisting law enforcement, aggravated assault, and fraud. 

Finding 14 is not clearly erroneous. 

Finding 21 provides that Mother was held at gunpoint during a drug-related 

altercation in Florida.2 At the hearing, Mother admitted the perpetrator was associated with 

the family through drug transactions but said the incident was not “necessarily” drugrelated. Transcript at 137. The evidence was sufficient to create an inference supporting 

the trial court’s finding.

Finding 27 states that the Prospective Adoptive Parents spoke to family members 

about an intervention and eventually held an intervention. To the extent the finding states 

that an intervention actually occurred, that statement is not supported by the evidence, and 

the finding is clearly erroneous. 

Finding 30 states Mother and Father moved to New York upon receipt of the 

Prospective Adoptive Parents’ petition for guardianship. Given the circumstances and 

 

2

 Appellants also challenge a portion of Finding 21 which states that Appellants hid their car after 

the incident and left Florida. This fact is irrelevant to the trial court’s decision. 
9

timing of the move, the Prospective Adoptive Parents argue the trial court could infer the 

move to New York was a reaction to the guardianship petition. We agree that the evidence 

was sufficient to allow this inference, although we do not believe the parents’ motivation 

for the move was a major factor in the trial court’s decision. Rather, the sudden move itself 

is more significant in that it is further proof of the instability created by Mother and Father 

while they had custody of S.A. 

Appellants also challenge the finding that Mother and Father lived in a van in a 

Burger King parking lot during their time in New York. This finding is not supported by 

the evidence, where the only mention of this fact was in a question by counsel for the 

Prospective Adoptive Parents and was denied by Mother. However, it is clear that the trial 

court did not credit Father’s assertion that they lived with a family friend whose name he 

could not recall. Thus, it is unclear where Appellants and S.A. lived during their six weeks 

in New York. 

Finally, Appellants challenge the statement in Finding 30 that Father was 

investigated by New York Child Protective Services during their brief time in New York. 

At the hearing, Father admitted that this investigation occurred. Thus the finding is not 

clearly erroneous. 

Finding 37 states that a police officer testified Mother “knew exactly what was 

going on” with respect to the inhumane treatment of A.T. Appellants’ App. at 18. Indeed, 

mere observations that a witness testified to certain facts are “not findings of basic fact in 

the spirit of the requirement.” In re Adoption of T.J.F., 798 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2003) (quoting Perez v. U.S. Steel Corp., 426 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ind. 1981)). That said, the 
10

treatment of A.T. occurred inside Mother’s own home over a substantial period of time. 

That, combined with the fact Mother pled guilty to criminal charges related to the treatment 

of A.T., is sufficient evidence to show Mother knew what was happening. 

Appellants challenge Findings 53 and 56, both of which state that there were 

recommendations made against visitation with Mother and Father in the jail setting. In 

fact, evidence was presented that the juvenile court issued a no contact order in the CHINS 

case that would have included visits to the jail by the children. Thus, these findings are 

supported by the evidence. 

Finding 62 states Mother “has had no meaningful work experience and no 

employment skills, and less than a high school education. She admits that she did not work 

during [S.A.’s] lifetime.” Appellants’ App. at 21. Appellants contend this finding is 

clearly erroneous because Mother took a class while incarcerated in which she learned 

about various Microsoft Office programs. Appellants argue that class constitutes an 

employment skill. In our view, this argument is dangerously close to a request to reweigh 

evidence, which we cannot do. At best, Mother’s employment skills are nominal, and it is 

undisputed that she has little education, no meaningful work experience, and has not 

worked since before S.A.’s birth. Finding 62 is not clearly erroneous. 

Finding 63 states in part that Ni.C. “has a history of marijuana use.” Appellants’ 

App. at 21. The Prospective Adoptive Parents contend such an inference could be made 

because, during a deposition, Ni.C. declined an invitation by counsel to take a voluntary 

drug screen. No request for a drug screen was ever submitted through the court, and Ni.C. 

had no obligation to submit to a drug test offered by counsel for the Prospective Adoptive 
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Parents. We conclude the portion of Finding 63 regarding Ni.C.’s supposed history of 

marijuana use is unsupported by the evidence. 

Finding 66 states that Mother provided an unstable home life while having custody 

of S.A. and moved several times and lived in several different places, including “motels.” 

Appellants’ App. at 21. Appellants disagree with the trial court’s insinuation that S.A. 

lived in multiple motels, and they claim there was evidence of staying in only one motel 

for a period of six weeks. Clearly, evidence exists to support a finding that S.A. lived in at 

least one motel. Moreover, the crux of the finding—that Mother and Father led an unstable, 

transient lifestyle while having custody of S.A.—is supported by the evidence. We 

conclude Finding 66 is not clearly erroneous. 

Finally, Appellants challenge Finding 85, which states that the Prospective 

Adoptive Parents have many friends and family members who support their efforts to adopt 

the children. The Prospective Adoptive Parents accurately point to testimony given by 

K.R. that supports the trial court’s finding. Therefore, Finding 85 is not clearly erroneous. 

III.Adoption

Ordinarily, a petition to adopt a minor child may be granted only if written consent 

to adopt has been provided by the biological parents. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1. However, 

there are a number of exceptions to the consent requirement. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8. 

Specific to this case, parental consent to an adoption is excused if “(A) a petitioner for 

adoption proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit to be a parent; 

and (B) the best interests of the child sought to be adopted would be served if the court 

dispensed with the parent’s consent.” Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(11). The term “unfit” is not 
12

statutorily defined. But this court has previously defined “unfit” as “[u]nsuitable; not 

adapted or qualified for a particular use or service” or “[m]orally unqualified; 

incompetent.” In re Adoption of M.L., 973 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) 

(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1564 (8th ed. 2004)). We have also noted that 

statutes concerning the termination of parental rights and adoption “strike a similar balance 

between the parent’s rights and the child’s best interests,” and thus, termination cases 

provide guidance in determining whether a parent is “unfit.” Id. 

The trial court found the Prospective Adoptive Parents proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parents were unfit and adoption was in the children’s best 

interests; therefore, parental consent to adoption was not required. When we review a trial 

court’s ruling in an adoption proceeding, the ruling will not be disturbed unless the 

evidence leads to only one conclusion and the trial court reached the opposite conclusion. 

Id. at 1222. We do not reweigh evidence, and we consider the evidence most favorable to 

the decision together with reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. Id. Further, 

we “recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness 

credibility, get a feel for the family dynamics, and get a sense of the parents and their 

relationship with their children.” Id.

A. Mother’s Unfitness

The trial court concluded there was clear and convincing evidence Mother was unfit. 

Factors to be considered in making this determination include “a parent’s substance abuse, 

mental health, willingness to follow recommended treatment, lack of insight, instability in 

housing and employment, and ability to care for a child’s special needs.” Id. at 1223. The 
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trial court found several of these factors present in this case. 

First, the trial court found Mother had a history of substance abuse. Her drug abuse 

was ongoing since S.A.’s birth, and that drug abuse occurred in the home and even in the 

presence of S.A. Further, Mother admitted to abusing drugs even during her pregnancy 

with L.C., and L.C. tested positive for opiates after he was born during Mother’s 

incarceration. 

The parents’ substance abuse and potential trafficking created additional safety 

issues for the children. The trial court found that while the parents lived in Florida, a person 

broke into their home and held Mother at gunpoint as part of a drug-related altercation. 

The trial court also found there was instability in both housing and employment. 

During the one and one-half years of S.A.’s life, the parents moved at least seven times 

across three different states. Among their residences were at least one motel and an 

unknown location during a seemingly unplanned six-week stay in New York. And one 

police officer described their last residence as unfit for human habitation. 

As to employment, Mother did not work during S.A.’s life; she has no meaningful 

work experience; and her employment skills are limited to a single class taken while 

incarcerated. The trial court also noted that Mother’s employment prospects would only 

be further hindered by her felony convictions.

Furthermore, the trial court noted a lack of insight on Mother’s part. Mother made 

no effort to provide a safe and stable environment for the children, despite a readily 

available support system from the Prospective Adoptive Parents. Rather, she continued 

her detrimental behavior from the time S.A. was born until she was arrested and 
14

incarcerated. 

This lack of insight is further evidenced by her commitment to continue a 

relationship with Father and facilitate frequent visitations between Father and the children 

while he is incarcerated. The trial court also questioned Mother’s willingness to live with 

Ni.C. after her release from prison and place the children in an unstable environment in 

which an alleged child molestation was recently committed by a relative and Ni.C.’s 

husband has a prior conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine. 

Last but not least, Mother willingly committed heinous crimes against an elderly 

woman inside Mother’s home and knowingly exposed S.A. to that conduct. Mother and 

Father locked A.T. in a utility closet—under deplorable conditions—for the purpose of 

stealing her social security benefits and prescription medication. These actions alone 

evince a moral compass that is unbecoming of a parent, to say the least. 

Despite the trial court’s findings, Appellants contend the trial court’s conclusion of 

unfitness was clearly erroneous, and they advance several arguments in that vein. First, 

Appellants note that parental rights should not be terminated “solely because there is a 

better home available for the children,” In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2001), and claim the trial court’s decision was incorrectly made for that reason. We cannot 

agree. The facts recounted above are sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of 

unfitness, and they are devoid of any reference to the children’s prospective home. 

Appellants compare this case to In re G.Y, in which our supreme court reversed a 

trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights. 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1258 (Ind. 2009). In 

that case, the parent was incarcerated with a scheduled release date eighteen months after 
15

the termination hearing; the parent committed her crimes before the child’s birth; the parent 

had bonded with the child through visitation; and the parent had made progress through 

drug treatment programs while incarcerated. In re G.Y. is distinguishable from this case. 

Mother committed her crimes not only during S.A.’s lifetime but in the presence of S.A., 

and the trial court found Mother did not have a strong bond with S.A. and that she had no 

bond whatsoever with L.C. 

Finally, Appellants argue the trial court did not give enough consideration to 

Mother’s obtainment of her GED and other classes taken during her term of incarceration. 

Our standard of review obligates us to decline Appellants’ request to reweigh the evidence. 

Even if Mother’s conduct has arguably improved since her arrest, the evidence favorable 

to the judgment reflects her unfitness. The trial court did not believe Mother had made 

sufficient improvements to be considered a fit parent nor did it believe such improvement 

was likely, noting that adoption should not be denied “on the speculative chance that 

[Mother] might someday be a fit parent.” Appellants’ App. at 32-33. This is a judgment 

call we are not in a position to question. 

B. Father’s Unfitness

The trial court likewise found there was clear and convincing evidence proving 

Father was unfit. Because Mother and Father lived together and shared responsibility for 

S.A. from the time she was born until their arrest, many of the facts relied on to find Mother 

unfit equally apply to Father. Those circumstances include Father’s unsafe and unstable 

living situations, continuous drug abuse, and criminal behavior. Father admitted he had a 

substantial drug problem which included the use of cocaine, heroin, crack cocaine, 
16

marijuana, prescription pain medication, and alcohol. 

Additional facts support the trial court’s finding that Father is unfit. As noted above, 

mental health is another factor that may be considered in determining whether a parent is 

unfit. See In re Adoption of M.L., 973 N.E.2d at 1223. Father has been diagnosed with 

bipolar disorder and has been previously treated with Zoloft, Prozac, and Seroquel. Father 

also admitted to attempting suicide three different times. 

Appellants argue the trial court improperly considered Father’s lengthy term of 

incarceration. We disagree. It is true in cases involving the issue of abandonment we have 

said “[i]mprisonment standing alone does not . . . allow an adoption to take place without 

obtaining the consent of an incarcerated parent.” In re Adoption of Herman, 406 N.E.2d 

277, 279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). However, the trial court’s order cannot fairly be read as 

having been based solely on Father’s incarceration, where his drug abuse, criminal 

behavior, mental health, and provision of an unstable environment for S.A. were all 

circumstances considered by the trial court. That said, we believe Father’s lengthy 

incarceration—which will continue after both children have reached the age of majority—

and consequential inability to support the children, is a factor the trial court may properly 

consider in its analysis.3

C. Best Interests of the Children

Finally, Appellants contest the trial court’s conclusion that adoption by the 

 

3 Appellants’ remaining arguments as to Father’s fitness are similar to those made with respect to 

Mother, and we are asked to consider alleged improvements made by Father since his incarceration. These 

arguments are unavailing because, again, we do not reweigh evidence. 
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Prospective Adoptive Parents is in the children’s best interests. “[T]he primary concern in 

every adoption proceeding is the best interest of the child.” In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 

N.E.2d 1253, 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted). At the time the hearings were 

held by the trial court, the Prospective Adoptive Parents had maintained physical custody 

over the children for nearly three years. As the trial court noted, the children consider the 

Prospective Adoptive Parents their true parents and have developed a close relationship 

with them. The Prospective Adoptive Parents are willing and able to provide a stable 

environment for the children and care for them emotionally and financially. Overall, the 

evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that adoption is in the children’s best 

interests. 

Arguing adoption is not in the children’s best interest, Appellants state that the 

Prospective Adoptive Parents “thwarted” efforts by Mother and Father to have contact with 

the children prior to the hearings. Brief of Appellants at 17. Appellants believe this 

conduct reflects poorly on the Prospective Adoptive Parents. We do not find this position 

persuasive, given that the juvenile court issued a no contact order during CHINS 

proceedings because it did not believe contact between the parents and children was 

appropriate. 

Finally, Appellants state that the Prospective Adoptive Parents’ ability to provide a 

higher standard of living for the children does not mean adoption is in the children’s best 

interests. We agree. That said, Appellants seem to concede the children’s standard of 

living will be better with the Prospective Adoptive Parents, and Appellants do not explain 

how that fact renders the trial court’s judgment clearly erroneous.
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Conclusion

Concluding the trial court’s decision to grant the petition for adoption was not 

clearly erroneous, we affirm.

Affirmed.

BARNES, J., and BROWN, J., concur.