SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3659-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANTWIONE A. PARSLEY, a/k/a

ANTOINE A. PARSLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted February 27, 2019 – Decided May 8, 2019

Before Judges Alvarez and Nugent.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Salem County, Indictment No. 11-04-0229.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Suzannah Brown, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent (David M. Galemba, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Antwione Parsley appeals the June 13, 2017 order denying his 

petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). For the reasons stated by Judge Linda 

L. Lawhun in her comprehensive written decision, we affirm.

Defendant was convicted of fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 

2C:12-1(b)(4); second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 

2C:39-5(b); and second-degree possession of a weapon by a certain person, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). The jury was unable to reach a verdict on three other 

counts, including first-degree attempted murder; those charges were 

subsequently dismissed. On March 20, 2012, defendant was sentenced to an 

aggregate of nine years subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. 

Defendant was subsequently resentenced on May 15, 2015, on a remand for

merger. 

The underlying facts are as follows. Defendant had accused the victim of 

having provided the authorities with information regarding his illegal activities. 

Defendant ended the argument by throwing a bicycle and a stroller at the victim, 

and telling him he was "about to clear the street." The victim heard defendant

make a phone call during which he told someone to "bring Roscoe," which he

understood to be a reference to defendant's handgun. Later on, the victim saw 
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defendant's car, was told to "watch out," and saw defendant standing behind a 

school bus between two houses and pointing a gun in his direction. The victim 

and another person fled the area when they heard gunshots. 

When the incident occurred, the Salem County Prosecutor's Office had 

coincidentally been intercepting defendant's cell phone communications 

pursuant to a warrant, related to an ongoing narcotics investigation as well as an 

investigation related to another shooting. Approximately half an hour after the 

shooting, the victim called defendant. Defendant was recorded making 

reference to the fact that the person defendant had been shooting at was not the 

victim, but someone else. Some of the intercepted conversations were played to 

the jury. All had been obtained pursuant to an electronic wiretap warrant. 

Now on appeal, defendant raises the following two points:

POINT I

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

[DEFENDANT'S] PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF BECAUSE HE 

ESTABLISHED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL WITH RESPECT TO HIS CLAIM THAT 

HE WAS PREJUDICED BY TRIAL COUNSEL'S 

FAILURE TO MOVE FOR A STAY OF HIS TRIAL 

PENDING THE OUTCOME OF HIS 

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF 

HIS MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE.
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POINT II

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

[DEFENDANT'S] PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE HE 

ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WITH 

RESPECT TO HIS CLAIM THAT HE WAS 

PREJUDICED BY TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 

MOVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED 

THROUGH THE WIRETAP OF [DEFENDANT'S]

PHONE BASED ON FAILURE OF LAW 

ENFORCEMENT TO MINIMIZE NON-PERTINENT 

CALLS.

In determining whether an attorney's representation is effective, we ask 

whether (1) "counsel's performance was deficient" and he or she made errors so 

egregious "that counsel was not functioning" effectively as guaranteed by the 

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (2) if the error in the 

representation prejudiced the outcome of defendant's trial such that there exists 

a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984). 

We agree with Judge Lawhun that defendant's bare allegations were 

simply insufficient to have made out a prima facie case for PCR that would have 

warranted an evidentiary hearing, much less relief. See State v. Cummings, 321 

N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). 
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Defendant's first point alleges he was substantially prejudiced by trial 

counsel's failure to seek a stay of the trial pending the outcome of his application 

for leave to take an interlocutory appeal of the denial of his change of venue 

motion. Judge Lawhun reviewed the documentation counsel provided in support 

of the original motion, four articles regarding defendant's criminal activities. 

We agree that they do not mention these charges and are not stories likely to 

have influenced potential jurors. Furthermore, the trial judge who denied 

defendant's motion for a change of venue, although he concluded defendant 

failed to establish "presumptively prejudicial publicity" or a "realistic likelihood 

of prejudice," also stated in the order that he would revisit the issue should "voir 

dire establish[] sufficient juror bias due to pretrial publicity" or that "a change 

of location is 'necessary to overcome the realistic likelihood of prejudice 

resulting from pretrial publicity.'" If defendant's application for leave to take an 

interlocutory appeal was denied because the application for change of venue 

lacked merit, certainly a request for a stay would have been denied as well. This 

issue falls short of meeting Strickland's requirements. 

Defendant's second point also lacks merit. The admission of wiretap 

evidence in this case did not violate the statutory requirement that, in order to 

protect the privacy of our citizens, authorities executing a wiretap warrant must 
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minimize the hours of interception and attempt to terminate interception of nonrelevant calls. See State v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418, 422-23 (1981). The remedy 

for failure to minimize hours of coverage, and to terminate surveillance of nonrelevant phone calls, is the suppression of the items. See Wiretap Act, N.J.S.A. 

2A:156A-1. 

The conversations about which defendant complains relate to his request 

for a ride out of the area where the shooting took place. Nothing would lead us 

to conclude they were not relevant to the charges, or otherwise require 

suppression. In the absence of even minimal facts that would have supported a 

suppression motion, counsel did not err by failing to file one.

Affirmed.