UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

________________________________ 

 ) 

DAVID W. NOBLE, JR., ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

v. ) Civil Action No. 94-302 (EGS) 

 ) 

VINCENT R. SOMBROTTO, et al., ) 

 ) 

Defendants. ) 

________________________________) 

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

David Noble, a member of the National Association of Letter 

Carriers (“NALC”), brought this lawsuit in 1994 against Vincent 

Sombrotto, the NALC’s then-president, as well as nine other 

officers of the NALC, an officer of the union’s Mutual Benefit 

Association, and an officer of the union’s Health Benefit Plan.1

Mr. Noble accused the individual defendants of violating their 

fiduciary duties to the NALC under Section 501 of the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. § 

401, et seq., by accepting: (1) an in-town allowance of $500 per 

month to cover costs incurred in the performance of their 

 

1 Over the course of this litigation, five of the individual 

defendants—Vincent Sombrotto, Francis Conners, Walter Couillard, 

George Davis, and Richard O’Connell—have died. As to each 

individual, the defendants filed a suggestion of death pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1) and no motion to 

substitute was filed. The Court accordingly dismissed those 

individuals from this case. See Order, ECF No. 173; Minute Order 

of August 30, 2013; Minute Order of December 2, 2013. 
2 

duties; (2) reimbursement for the employee portion of their 

Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes; and (3) per-diem 

payments during the union’s national conventions. Mr. Noble also 

alleged that the defendants violated their obligations under 

Section 201 of the LMRDA by refusing his requests to inspect 

certain documents in order to verify the contents of financial 

reports that the NALC filed with the Department of Labor. 

On April 28, 2003, this Court denied the parties’ cross 

motions for summary judgment. See Noble v. Sombrotto (“Noble 

I”), 260 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2003). The Court subsequently 

held a trial and received proposed findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. On September 30, 2005, the Court adopted the 

defendants’ proposed findings, and dismissed Mr. Noble’s claims. 

See Order, ECF No. 239. The Court denied Mr. Noble’s motion to 

reconsider on September 20, 2006. See Noble v. Sombrotto (“Noble 

II”), No. 94-302, 2006 WL 2708796 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2006). 

Mr. Noble appealed to the D.C. Circuit, which affirmed in part 

and reversed in part. See Noble v. Sombrotto (“Noble III”), 525 

F.3d 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The D.C. Circuit affirmed this 

Court’s dismissal of Mr. Noble’s Section 501 claims with respect 

to the tax reimbursements and per-diem payments. Id. at 1237–39. 

As for the in-town allowances, the Circuit disagreed with this 

Court’s finding that Mr. Noble had failed to produce evidence 

that the allowances had been used for personal gain. See id. at 
3 

1236. The Circuit also vacated this Court’s conclusion that Mr. 

Noble’s Section 201 claim was moot. Id. at 1241–42. 

After the case was remanded, the Court held a status hearing, 

decided to proceed with the existing record, and directed the 

parties to submit proposed supplemental findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, containing citation to evidence in the 

record, and addressing the issues before the Court on remand. 

See Minute Order of January 7, 2010. The parties have now 

submitted proposed supplemental findings of fact and conclusions 

of law. See Pl.’s Suppl. Proposals (“Pl.’s Proposals”), ECF No. 

270; Defs.’ Suppl. Proposals (“Defs.’ Proposals”), ECF No. 272; 

Individual Defs.’ Additional Suppl. Proposals (“Individual 

Defs.’ Proposals”), ECF No. 274; Pls.’ Objs. to Defs.’ Suppl. 

Proposals (“Pl.’s Objs.”), ECF No. 284. 

The Court subsequently “determined that the trial exhibits 

that were introduced during the April 2004 bench trial are not 

available on the docket in this case and that any hard copies 

were returned to the parties sometime after the trial 

concluded.” Minute Order of December 2, 2013. For that reason, 

the Court directed the parties to file copies of their trial 

exhibits “by no later than December 16, 2013.” Id. The 

defendants filed their exhibits on December 16, 2013, but Mr. 

Noble repeatedly requested an extension of this deadline. The 

defendants did not oppose his first three extension requests, 
4 

but noted that they might oppose future requests. See Defs.’ 

Response to Third Extension Mot., ECF No. 292 at 1. 

On January 20, 2014, Mr. Noble made a fourth request, 

asserting that “I located all of my trial exhibits except six by 

January 9, 2014.” Fourth Extension Mot., ECF No. 293 at 2. The 

remaining six exhibits, he said, were lost by him, and located 

and provided by the NALC, but without sufficient time for Mr. 

Noble to review them for accuracy. See id. at 2. The defendants 

proposed a shorter extension, Opp. to Fourth Extension Mot., ECF 

No. 294 at 2, but the Court granted Mr. Noble the full extension 

to February 3, 2014, stating that “[f]urther requests for 

extensions of time will be viewed with disfavor.” Minute Order 

of January 24, 2014. 

Mr. Noble nonetheless sought a fifth extension of the deadline 

for filing his exhibits, even though he had found “all of my 

trial exhibits except six by January 9, 2014” and obtained the 

remaining six by January 21, 2014. See Fifth Extension Mot., ECF 

No. 295 at 1–2. He claimed that on January 28, 2014, he 

discovered that one of the exhibits provided by the NALC was 

incomplete, and that he did not receive a complete copy of that 

exhibit until January 31, 2014. Id. at 2. Mr. Noble did not 

explain how this prevented him from filing copies of the other 

exhibits, which he had located by January 9, 2014. The Court 

granted Mr. Noble’s motion in part, directing him to file by no 
5 

later than February 5, 2014 copies of all of the trial exhibits 

except for Exhibit 1—the one he received on January 31, 2014. 

See Minute Order of February 4, 2014. The Court gave Mr. Noble 

until February 17, 2014 to file Exhibit 1. See id. On February 

5, 2014, Mr. Noble filed only a small number of his trial 

exhibits. See Exhibits, ECF No. 296 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit Nos. 2–

8, 13–14, 31, 38, 75, 76, 79, 89, and 91). He filed Exhibit 1 on 

February 17, 2014. See Exhibit One, ECF No. 297. 

Notwithstanding Mr. Noble’s failure to comply with Courtimposed deadlines, the Court granted Mr. Noble another chance in 

July 2014, directing him to file a complete set of his trial 

exhibits by August 18, 2014. See Minute Order of July 14, 2014. 

Mr. Noble again failed to comply. On August 18, 2014, he filed a 

motion “to vacate the July 14, 2014 Minute Order,” which 

requested an additional one-month extension and asked that the 

Court stay the case pending an election for the office of NALC 

President. See Noble Declaration, ECF No. 298-1 at 1–2. The 

Court denied both requests. See Minute Order of October 9, 2014.

The Court therefore relies on the existing record, including 

documents in the summary-judgment record that correspond to some 

of Mr. Noble’s trial exhibits. Upon consideration of that 

record, as well as the parties’ proposed supplemental findings 

and the applicable law, the Court finds that (1) the Mutual 

Benefit Association and the Health Benefit Plan are sufficiently 
6 

separate from the NALC that defendants Dunn and Vincenzi are 

outside the scope of Section 501; (2) the remaining individual 

defendants reasonably interpreted the NALC Constitution to 

permit the in-town allowances and they used the money for union 

business; and (3) the existing record is insufficient to resolve 

Mr. Noble’s Section 201 claim. Accordingly, the Court enters 

judgment in favor of the defendants on Mr. Noble’s Section 501 

claims, and will direct the filing of additional pleadings 

regarding his Section 201 claim.

I. Findings of Fact 

The NALC is governed by a Constitution, which creates two 

bodies for the governance of the union. See Noble III, 525 F.3d 

at 1233. The national convention of union members meets 

biennially, is empowered to amend the Constitution, and is the 

union’s supreme body. Id. The Executive Council, which is made 

up of twenty-eight officers, ten of whom are resident officers 

who work in Washington, D.C., is charged with running the 

union’s day-to-day operations. Id.

A. History of the In-Town Allowances. 

The Constitution charges the Executive Council to “‘act 

between Conventions on all matters related to the welfare of the 

Union not specifically prohibited by the membership,’” and to 

“‘authorize and/or ratify the payment of salaries, wages, 

expenses, allowances, and other disbursements which it deems 
7 

necessary and appropriate to the purpose and functioning of this 

Union, other than provided for.’” Id. (quoting NALC Const. art. 

9, § 11(e) (1992)). Pursuant to these powers, the Executive 

Council has, since the 1950s, authorized the payment of a $500 

per month in-town allowance to its resident officers. Id. at 

1234. The Executive Council reauthorized the same payments in 

resolutions passed in 1975, 1977, and 1980. Id. at 1235. 

The in-town allowances are intended “to cover the expenses 

NALC officers residing in Washington, D.C. incurred in the 

performance of their official duties.” Id. These expenses 

include costs for “transportation, entertainment, and other 

expenses for the benefit of the Association in the Washington, 

D.C., Metropolitan Area,” which were estimated to “approximate, 

on the average” $500 per month. 1980 Resolution, Defs.’ Ex. 2, 

ECF No. 288-3 at 5; see also Noble II, 2006 WL 2708796, at *2. 

The NALC President was authorized to receive an in-town 

allowance in excess of $500 per month for “all official 

expenditures made by him, both in town and out of town.” Noble 

III, 525 F.3d at 1235. The $500 per month limit on in-town 

expenditures has remained constant since the 1950s. Id. at 1234. 

An officer was required to request the in-town allowance each 

month the officer wished to receive it, and any officer seeking 

reimbursement for over $500 was required to provide a receipt 

and the express authorization of the NALC President to incur the 
8 

extra expense. See Noble II, 2006 WL 2708796, at *2; 1980 

Resolution, Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF No. 288-3 at 6. Officers were not 

required to submit receipts to receive an in-town allowance of 

up to $500 per month; rather, the Resolution stated, 

“[a]pplication for allowances pursuant to this Resolution 

constitute[s] a representation by the applying officer or 

employee that the sum requested was expended on behalf of the 

Association in the course of performance of official duties.” 

1980 Resolution, Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF No. 288-3 at 5; see also 

Noble III, 525 F.3d at 1235; Transcript of April 13, 2004 Bench 

Trial, ECF No. 224 at 98:22–24 (Mr. Sombrotto: “It’s assumed 

that you’re using it for the Union activities. That’s what the 

resolution is there for.”). Officers were, however, required to 

“personally keep their receipts for a ‘reasonable period’ of up 

to five years.” Noble III, 525 F.3d at 1235 (quoting 1980 

Resolution, Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF No. 288-3 at 5). 

B. Evidence of How the In-Town Allowances Were Used. 

NALC officers testified that no officer would have incurred 

less than $500 per month in expenses. President Sombrotto 

testified that “I don’t know any officer” who claimed the $500 

each month despite not having incurred at least $500 in 

expenses. Transcript of April 13, 2004 Bench Trial, ECF No. 224 

at 100:14-19. Indeed, testimony of NALC officials indicated that 

it would be difficult for an officer to spend less than $500 in 
9 

a given month. President Young stated: “[s]ince I’ve been here 

in 1990, I’m not aware of a single resident officer that doesn’t 

spend in excess of $500 a month for all these various things 

we’re talking about.” Id. at 176:24-177:12. 

It nonetheless appears that NALC officers understood the 

resolution to permit a hypothetical officer who incurred less 

than $500 per month in expenses to claim the full $500 

allowance. For example, when asked whether “Chuck Overby [who] 

suffered a stroke and was in the hospital for several months” 

could “draw[] $500 a month in in-town expenses,” Mr. Sombrotto 

answered “Yeah. If he applied for it, he received it. Whether he 

did it or not . . . . I can’t testify to that. But if he had, he 

would have received it.” Id. at 103:21-104:1; see also id. at 

96:14-19 (Mr. Sombrotto agreed that an officer could claim $500 

without incurring as much in expenses, “[b]ut if you do and you 

don’t receipt it, then you have to pay taxes”); id. at 179:5-10 

(when asked whether “a hypothetical officer spent $100 on intown expenses” was “entitled to $500 for the month, 

notwithstanding the fact that she or he spent only $100,” Mr. 

Young responded “you get $500”). These general assertions about 

the in-town allowances are supplemented by additional testimony 
10 

from Presidents Sombrotto and Young, as well as receipts that 

were submitted by NALC officials.2

President William Young submitted receipts for nearly all of 

the expenses he incurred between December 1990 and July 1993. 

Defs. Ex. 8, ECF No. 288-9 at A-12 (Mr. Young incurred $16,358 

in expenses during this period, received $16,000 in in-town 

expense allowances, and submitted receipts for $15,798 of those 

expenditures); Transcript of April 13, 2004 Bench Trial, ECF No. 

224 at 177:16-17 (President Young: “My initial history in the 

Union from 1990 until about 1994 or 5 was to receipt 

everything”); Young Receipts, Pl.’s Ex. 7, ECF No. 296-6. Mr. 

Young stopped submitting receipts “because it wasn’t worth the 

aggravation.” Id. at 177:17-18. He explained: 

So I just decided [for] my own benefit that I wasn’t 

going to receipt much. And now I’m somewhere in between 

the two. Every now and then I’ll throw in a receipt if 

it’s easy, especially the ones where I use credit cards. 

 

2 Mr. Noble objects generally to the Court’s consideration of the 

trial testimony of Mr. Sombrotto and Mr. Young. See Pl.’s Objs. 

at 2–3. According to plaintiff, “[t]o the extent that they 

testified about what they were told by INDs other than 

themselves[,] their testimony was hearsay,” and “[w]hen they 

testified about themselves[,] their testimony was wholly 

conclusory.” Id. The Court largely relies on testimony by Mr. 

Sombrotto and Mr. Young about their own practices. Mr. Noble 

does not explain why this evidence is so conclusory that the 

Court cannot consider it. See id. To the extent that Mr. Noble 

intended to object to the Court’s consideration of statements 

regarding Mr. Sombrotto’s and Mr. Young’s perceptions of other 

individual’s practices, the testimony relied upon by the Court 

relates to their own understanding, not to what any other 

officer told them. Mr. Noble does not explain why he believes 

this testimony is hearsay or conclusory. 
11 

But if I just pay cash money, I’m not going to receipt 

it because it isn’t worth the hassle in the long run. 

Id. at 177:24-178:4. 

Mr. Young’s receipts reflect, for example, expenditures on 

meals with visiting union officials to discuss a potential 

“prescription co-pay that could benefit [the] members,” id. at 

164:18-165:2, Christmas gifts to union secretaries, drivers, and 

cooks, and expenses for mailing Christmas cards to union 

officials. Id. at 165:3-166:3; see also Young Receipts, Pl.’s 

Ex. 7, ECF No. 296-6. Ultimately, Mr. Young used the in-town 

allowance “for any legitimate expenses that I incurred while intown not on an assignment from the president.” Transcript of 

April 13, 2004 Bench Trial, ECF No. 224 at 166:6-20. 

President Sombrotto kept some receipts during the course of 

his tenure as an NALC officer, ranging from some months in which 

he submitted no receipts, to others in which he submitted over 

$100 worth of receipts. See Sombrotto Receipts, Pl.’s Ex. 1, ECF 

No. 297. Many of the receipts were for restaurants in 

Washington, D.C., and President Sombrotto testified that these 

expenses were often incurred while having dinner with Richie 

O’Connell, a union officer. See id. at 112:8-115:13. 

President Sombrotto testified that he regularly incurred 

union-related expenses in excess of $500 per month. See 

Transcript of April 13, 2004 Bench Trial, ECF No. 224 at 96:9–13 
12 

(Sombrotto: ”I spent more than $500 a month, I guarantee you 

that.”); Sombrotto Decl. (“2001 Sombrotto Decl.”), Ex. to ECF 

No. 128 ¶ 15; see also Young Decl. (“2001 Young Decl.”), Ex. to 

ECF No. 128 ¶ 4.3 As President, he and President Young could have 

claimed an amount in excess of $500, Noble II, 2006 WL 2708796, 

at *3, but neither did. See Sombrotto Decl. ¶ 15; Young Decl. ¶

4. Instead, each paid for any additional expenses out of their 

own pocket. See Sombrotto Decl. ¶ 15; Young Decl. ¶ 4. 

Defendant Lawrence Hutchins submitted receipts for a large 

portion of his in-town expenses. See Investigative Committee 

Report, Defs.’ Ex. 8, ECF No. 288-9 at A-10 (reflecting that Mr. 

Hutchins provided receipts for approximately $12,700 of the 

 

3 Mr. Noble objects to the Court’s consideration of the November 

19, 2001 declarations of defendants Sombrotto, Young, Vincenzi, 

and Dunn because “[e]ach of the declarations concludes with a 

statement that ‘the foregoing is true and correct to the best of 

my knowledge and belief.” Pl.’s Objs. at 2. Plaintiff argues 

that, because the declarations do not make clear “which parts 

were statements of knowledge and which were statements of 

belief,” they are inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 

602 and 28 U.S.C. § 1746. These provisions, which seek to ensure 

that evidence admitted—and specifically, evidence admitted via 

affidavit—is within the personal knowledge of the declarant, 

would require a sufficient foundation for a finding that the 

matters discussed were within the declarants’ personal 

knowledge. See, e.g., Lux v. Great N. Ins. Co., No. 12-cv-2632, 

2013 WL 6076157, at *4 (D. Colo. Nov. 19, 2013) (“although the 

qualifier ‘to the best of my knowledge’ is a limitation that 

raises significant concern,” the Court relied on the challenged 

affidavits where the declarant “adequately described facts which 

show that he has personal knowledge”). The Court accordingly 

relies on these declarations only for propositions that are 

clearly supported by such a foundation. 
13 

$18,000 he received between 1988 and 1990, and for nearly all of 

the $16,000 he received between 1991 and July 1993); Hutchins 

Receipts, ECF Nos. 296-7, 296-8, 296-9. Mr. Hutchins’s receipts 

largely reflect expenditures at restaurants, as well as taxi and 

parking charges. See Hutchins Receipts, ECF Nos. 296-7, 296-8, 

296-9. Defendant Michael O’Connor appears only to have received 

an in-town allowance during 1994, but the record contains 

receipts for over $400 of the $500 he received each month. See 

O’Connor Receipts, Pl.’s Ex. 6, ECF No. 296-5. Mr. O’Connor’s 

receipts related to restaurants, taxis, and parking. See id. 

The record contains no evidence regarding defendants Souza and 

Worsham, who appear never to have received an in-town allowance 

because they did not reside in Washington, D.C. See 2001 

Sombrotto Decl. ¶ 6 (noting that Souza and Worsham “while not 

‘Resident Officers,’ were members of the Executive Council”). 

The remaining individual defendants, Francis Connors, Richard 

O’Connell, George Davis, and Walter Couillard have died during 

the course of this litigation. See supra at 1 n.1.4

 

4 The record contains minimal evidence regarding these 

defendants’ use of in-town expenses, with the exception of 

Francis Conners. See Transcript of April 13, 2004 Bench Trial, 

ECF No. 224 at 119:10-24; Frank Conners Receipts, Pl.’s Ex. 5, 

ECF No. 296-4. President Young testified that Mr. Conners “made 

the decision for his own reasons, and I don’t know what they 

were, not to receipt anything. Just to go ahead and pay the 

taxes rather than go through the hassle of writing on the 

receipts who he’s entertaining, what it was about, where he was, 
14 

C. The In-Town Allowances Provided by the Mutual Benefit 

Association and the Health Benefit Plan. 

The Mutual Benefit Association and the Health Benefit Plan are 

“separate and distinct” from the NALC. See Noble II, 2006 WL 

2708796, at *7; see also Noble III, 525 F.3d at 1237 (noting 

that this factual finding is “conclusive on remand”). Indeed, 

the plans each have their own constitution, separate from the 

NALC constitution. Transcript of April 14, 2004 Bench Trial, ECF 

No. 225 at 73:1-11. They are governed separately, and have 

separate offices and staff. See id. at 72:19–22, 75:2–4; 

Vincenzi Decl. (“2001 Vincenzi Decl.”), Ex. to ECF No. 128 ¶ 4; 

Dunn Decl. (“2001 Dunn Decl.”), Ex. to ECF No. 128 ¶ 3. 

The Mutual Benefit Association is incorporated in Tennessee. 

Transcript of April 14, 2004 Bench Trial, ECF No. 225 at 72:19-

25; Dunn Decl. Ex. A. It is a fraternal benefit corporation that 

offers life and disability insurance, and receives its funds 

through the sale of those insurance policies, as well as through 

investment income earned through investing the premiums. 

Transcript of April 14, 2004 Bench Trial, ECF No. 225 at 72:19-

73:19; Dunn Decl. ¶ 4. 

Defendant William Dunn served as the NALC’s Director of 

Insurance, which made him Director of the Mutual Benefit 

 

all of that.” Transcript of April 13, 2004 Bench Trial, ECF No. 

224 at 176:20-177:9. 
15 

Association, until 1994. Dunn Decl. ¶ 2. Mr. Dunn’s role was 

governed by the Mutual Benefit Association’s Constitution. Id. ¶

5. His salary, benefits, business expenses, and $500 per month 

in-town allowance were all paid by the Mutual Benefit 

Association, not the NALC. Dunn Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6; Transcript of 

April 14, 2004 Bench Trial, ECF No. 225 at 73:25-74:6. Mr. Dunn 

used his in-town allowance on various business-related 

expenditures, including transportation and meals with union 

officials. Dunn Decl. ¶ 9. 

The Health Benefit Plan is “part of the federal employee 

health benefit plan operated under rules promulgated by the 

Office of Personnel Management” and makes its money by selling 

insurance policies “to members of [the NALC] and other federal 

employees.” Transcript of April 14, 2004 Bench Trial, ECF No. 

225 at 74:13-19. Mr. Vincenzi served as the Health Benefit 

Plan’s director from 1986 until 1994. Vincenzi Decl. ¶ 2. His 

duties were governed by the Plan’s Constitution. Id. ¶ 5. Mr. 

Vincenzi’s salary, benefits, and in-town allowances were paid by 

the Health Benefit Plan from its funds. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7; Transcript 

of April 14, 2004 Bench Trial, ECF No. 225 at 75:5–24. Mr. 

Vincenzi spent the allowance on union-related business at 

restaurants, as well as for transportation and the costs of 

hosting colleagues at his home to discuss union business. Id. ¶

9. 
16 

D. Discussion and Authorization of the In-Town Allowances at 

NALC National Conventions. 

The in-town allowances were discussed during a number of NALC 

National Conventions. See Noble III, 525 F.3d at 1234, 1237. 

First, during the 1976 National Convention, when James 

Rademacher was President, a delegate named John Bourlon informed 

the Convention that “I am advised that sometime in 1975 the 

Executive Council approved the expenditure for the National 

Officers for in-town expenses” and that “they will be allowed 

$500 and it does not say if they list it on an expense account. 

It says they will be given $500.” Minutes of 1976 NALC 

Convention, Pl.’s Ex. 13, ECF No. 296-10 at 1–2. President 

Rademacher responded “[w]ell, your information is incorrect. The 

Chair stands here in front of 5,000 delegates and says your 

information is incorrect.” Id. at 2. The Resolution in existence 

at that time permitted resident officers “to draw up to $500.00 

each month as an allowance for official in-town expenses,” 

stated that “[a]pplication for allowances pursuant to this 

Resolution constitute[s] a representation . . . that the sum 

requested was expended on behalf of the Association in the 

course of performance of official duties,” and made it “the 

responsibility of each officer . . . to make and preserve for a 

reasonable period, not exceeding five years, records and 

receipts.” 1975 Resolution, ECF No. 288-9 at 32–33. 
17 

In 1980, soon after Vincent Sombrotto became President, the 

Executive Council reauthorized the in-town allowances. See 1980 

Resolution, Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF No. 288-3. That resolution 

recognized that “resident officers . . . in the performance of 

their official duties are expected to and regularly do incur and 

pay transportation, entertainment, and other expenses for the 

benefit of the Association in the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan 

Area, in amounts which are estimated to approximate, on the 

average [$500].” Id. at 5. Just like the prior resolutions, the 

1980 Resolution made any application for an in-town allowance “a 

representation by the applying officer or employee that the sum 

requested was expended on behalf of the Association in the 

course of performance of official duties” and required officers 

“to make and preserve for a reasonable period, not exceeding 

five years, records and receipts of expenditures covered by 

allowance for examination by the Fiscal Committee and by any 

other legally authorized authority.” Id. at 5–6. 

The in-town expenditures were not discussed again until the 

1986 National Convention, when the following discussion occurred 

in connection with a debate over a proposal to increase the 

salaries of NALC officers: 

DELEGATE LIPPE: . . . I personally believe that all the 

national officers deserve a salary increase. However, I 

want to take a look at what it is that we are going to 

decide today. You have always said that you want the 

membership to be completely informed, and I have some 
18 

information that I would like them to know. Based on the 

figure of $65,038, which is currently in the 

Constitution, there are some unseen salary increases 

that the membership needs to be made aware of. In 

addition to the salary of $65,038, the Constitution 

provides for the membership to pay for the 

noncontributory retirement program. Based on that 

figure, the number is $14,959. Additionally, the NALC 

pays 7 percent of all national officers’ salary into 

their civil service retirement fund based on the $65,000 

figure. That cost is approximately $3,500. Additionally, 

the NALC pays both sides of the Social Security taxes, 

7.15 percent, which is approximately $3,003. 

Additionally, all resident national officers receive a 

sum of $6,000 per annum unaccountable expense money. If 

you add to the salary of $65,038, the $14,000 as well as 

the other benefits that are paid by the Union, the salary 

is $90,750. . . . 

PRESIDENT SOMBROTTO: Thank, you Sister. (Applause.) 

Microphone No. 1 on privilege. 

DELEGATE MCNULTY: Gene McNulty, Branch 9, Minneapolis. 

I would like to correct the Sister. As a National 

Business Agent and one of your employees, you do not pay 

for the 7 percent of the retirement contribution. That 

is taken out of my check just like it is taken out of 

yours. Also, another piece of misinformation by the 

Sister, there is not for the resident national officers 

$6,000 unaccountable. They have to account for that. If 

you don’t believe me, check with the IRS. 

PRESIDENT SOMBROTTO: Microphone No. 2, against. 

Minutes of 1986 NALC Convention, Defs.’ Ex. 11, ECF No. 288-

12 at 2. 

In 1994, the NALC Convention rejected proposed amendments that 

would have limited the Executive Council’s ability to authorize 

salaries, wages, expenses, allowances, and other disbursements 

for itself. See Noble II, 2006 WL 2708796, at *6; Minutes of 

1994 NALC Convention, Defs.’ Ex. 12, ECF No. 288-13 at 4–5. The 
19 

1996 Convention rejected similar amendments. See Minutes of 1996 

NALC Convention, Defs.’ Ex. 13, ECF No. 288-14 at 3–5. The 1996 

Convention also adopted a resolution—by a vote of 3,952 to 541—

that specifically confirmed that the payment of the in-town 

allowances comported with the NALC Constitution. See id. at 6 

(resolution stating “[t]hat the following NALC past practice 

payments are hereby approved and confirmed: 1. Up to $500 per 

month allowance to Resident Officers for in-town expenses”).

E. Mr. Noble’s Internal Charges Against the NALC and 

Requests for Documents. 

 

Mr. Noble sent a letter on August 16, 1993, asking the NALC to 

permit him to inspect “any and all documents, receipts, records, 

bills, checks, ledgers, account books, petty cash receipts, 

charge slips, minutes, and resolutions that relate to the 

violations set forth in the enclosed charges and described 

above.” August 16, 1993 Letter from David Noble to Vincent 

Sombrotto, Pl.’s Ex. 31, ECF No. 296-12 at 3. He justified this 

request as based on his concerns regarding “discrepancies 

between the constitutionally authorized amounts of compensation 

and expenses payable to [NALC officers] . . . and the amounts 

disclosed under oath to the Department of Labor on the NALC’s 

LM-2 Reports for the years 1984 through the present.” Id. at 1. 

President Sombrotto responded to Mr. Noble on August 31, 1993.

See August 31, 1993 Letter from Vincent Sombrotto to David 
20 

Noble, Ex. Q to NALC’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 126.5 While he 

maintained the NALC’s right to object that Mr. Noble “ha[d] not 

established just cause for such review within the meaning of . 

. . 29 U.S.C. 431(c),” President Sombrotto stated: 

[T]here will be made available for your examination, at 

NALC Headquarters on or after September 13, 1993, copies 

of NALC records which are relevant to your charges and 

necessary to verify the NALC’s LM-2 reports for 1988-

1993. Please telephone Jerry Gutshall to arrange an 

appointment to examine these records. 

Id. 

Before taking President Sombrotto up on this offer, Mr. Noble 

wrote to Jerry Gutshall on September 14, 1993. See September 14, 

1993 Letter from David Noble to Jerry Gutshall, Pl.’s Ex. 38, 

ECF No. 296-13 at 1. Mr. Noble’s September 14, 1993 letter 

vastly expanded the scope of documents he sought to review. Mr. 

Noble listed eighteen categories of documents in total. See 

September 14, 1993 Letter from David Noble to Jerry Gutshall, 

Pl.’s Ex. 38, ECF No. 296-13 at 1-3. Some related to the salary 

issues Mr. Noble had previously raised, while others raised 

entirely new issues. See id. On October 7, 1993, Mr. Noble 

reviewed NALC records in person. See Noble Decl., ECF No. 215 ¶ 

58. 

 

5 This letter appears to have been Mr. Noble’s Exhibit No. 34. 

See Pl.’s Post-Trial Proposed Findings, ECF No. 241-3 at 29 

n.102. 
21 

The Investigating Committee convened by President Sombrotto 

ultimately “confirmed that Noble’s complaints were based in 

fact” and “presented its findings to the special [NALC] 

convention on October 13, 1993.” Noble III, 525 F.3d at 1234; 

see also Investigating Committee Report, Defs.’ Ex. 8, ECF No. 

288-9. “Delegates to the special convention roundly rejected 

each of Noble’s charges of wrongdoing by an average margin of 25 

to 1.” Noble III, 525 F.3d at 1234. Mr. Noble then wrote to 

President Sombrotto on November 7, 1993 to request “the 

videotape and a copy of the transcript of the October 13th 

Special Meeting of the Convention,” as well as “copies of 

payroll registers for several officers for the years 1988 

through 1993.” November 7, 1993 Letter from David Noble to 

Vincent Sombrotto, Ex. V. to NALC’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 

126.6 President Sombrotto denied both requests on November 30, 

1993. See November 30, 1993 Letter from Vincent Sombrotto to 

David Noble, Ex. W to NALC’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 126.7

F. Mr. Noble’s Discovery Requests During this Case. 

 

6 This letter appears to have been Mr. Noble’s Exhibit No. 28. 

See Pl.’s Post-Trial Proposed Findings, ECF No. 241-3 at 29 

n.104. 

7 This letter appears to have been Mr. Noble’s Exhibit No. 39. 

See Pl.’s Post-Trial Proposed Findings, ECF No. 241-3 at 30 

n.105. 
22 

In his February 26, 2002 declaration in support of his motion 

for summary judgment, Mr. Noble asserted that “NALC has not yet 

provided me with all of the material it indicated in discovery 

that it would furnish.” February 26, 2002 Noble Decl., ECF No. 

139 ¶ 16. He elaborated: “For example, NALC has not yet provided 

me with: a) videotapes of the 1986 convention debate concerning 

officers’ salaries, b) videotapes of the 1993 special 

convention, c) transcripts or tape recordings of all of the 

witnesses who appeared before the investigating committee, d) 

copies of Bill Young’s in-town expense applications.” Id. Mr. 

Noble also stated that he had “attempted to use discovery to 

develop information about the Minneapolis regional office’s 

unauthorized bank account,” and that “[w]hen and if the court 

orders NALC to permit me to inspect records in order to verify 

NALC’s LM-2 reports I will use that opportunity to develop more 

information.” Id. ¶ 52.

Shortly thereafter, the Court denied the parties’ cross 

motions for summary judgment and issued an Order directing the 

parties “to file a single, concise, specific, and final 

statement of each party’s outstanding requests for documents or 

other tangible evidence, as well as efforts made to date to 

obtain them, by no later than October 31, 2002, and responses 

thereto by no later than November 15, 2002.” Order, ECF No. 151. 

On October 31, 2002, Mr. Noble asserted that he had “no 
23 

outstanding discovery requests to the individually named 

defendants” and only “four outstanding discovery requests to 

defendant NALC.” Pl.’s Discovery Statement, ECF No. 152 at 1. 

Those four requests were for: (1) “transcripts and audio tapes 

of witnesses who testified before an internal NALC committee”; 

(2) “video tapes of the October 1993 special convention”; (3) 

“video tapes of the third session of the 1986 convention”; and 

(4) “in-town expense applications for the individually named 

defendants.” Id. at 2. Mr. Noble listed no other documents. 

On November 15, 2002, the defendants jointly responded to Mr. 

Noble’s statement. See Defs.’ Second Joint Discovery Statement, 

ECF No. 154. They indicated that they had given Mr. Noble the 

opportunity to inspect all responsive documents in 1996 and that 

Mr. Noble “requested and received copies of the produced 

documents.” Id. at 3. After a 1999 hearing before Magistrate 

Judge Kay, defendants claimed, they offered to let Mr. Noble 

inspect documents again, he “reviewed the documents between 

March 5 and 8, stated that he would like to continue reviewing 

the files on March 29,” but “did not appear on March 29 . . . 

and cancelled another date arranged for April 6” and then “never 

reappeared to continue his review of documents.” Id. at 5. 

On March 31, 2003, the Court issued an Order regarding these 

discovery matters. See Order, ECF No. 155. The Court ordered the 

defendants to “make the documents, videotapes and transcripts 
24 

identified as the subject of outstanding discovery requests by 

Mr. Noble in his October 15, 2002 submission to the Court 

available to Mr. Noble for viewing by no later than April 28, 

2003, for a period of five business days ending on May 2, 2003.” 

Id. at 2. The Court further directed Mr. Noble to “provide 

defendants with a specific list of documents, tapes and 

videotapes he wishes to obtain copies of by no later than May 

15, 2003, along with reasonable payment as agreed to by the 

parties for those copies.” Id. Finally, the Court directed the 

defendants to “provide plaintiff with all copies of documents, 

tapes and videotapes requested and paid for by plaintiff by no 

later than May 30, 2003.” Id. The NALC asserts that it “fully 

complied with that Order; [Mr.] Noble has never claimed 

otherwise.” Defs.’ Proposals at 9. Mr. Noble does not contest 

this assertion. See generally Pl.’s Objs. 

II. Conclusions of Law 

A. Mr. Noble’s Section 501 Claims 

Mr. Noble’s remaining Section 501 claim relates to the in-town 

expenditures. Before addressing the merits of the claim, the 

Court must assess which defendants remain subject to it. 

First, the claim cannot be made against the NALC directly 

because “claims made pursuant to Section 501 of the LMRDA cannot 

be brought against labor organizations . . . but rather can be 

made only against officers acting in their official capacities.” 
25 

Saunders v. Hankerson, 312 F. Supp. 2d 46, 58 (D.D.C. 2004); see 

also Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245, 1249 (3d Cir. 1972); 

Pignotti v. Local No. 3 Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 477 

F.2d 825, 832 (8th Cir. 1973); Commer v. McEntee, 145 F. Supp. 

2d 333, 339–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. 

Commer v. Giuliani, 34 F. App’x 802, 805 (2d Cir. 2002). Nor 

does Mr. Noble appear to press this claim as to the NALC. 

Compare First Am. Compl., ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 115–19 (bringing the 

Section 501 claims against the NALC), with Pl.’s Proposals at 3 

(discussing only the individual defendants in connection with 

the claim).

Second, five of the twelve individual defendants have died 

during the course of this litigation and were dismissed, without 

objection by Mr. Noble or any attempt to file a motion to 

substitute. See supra at 1 n.1. In light of that, Mr. Noble’s 

Section 501 claims against those individuals—Vincent Sombrotto, 

Francis Conners, Walter Couillard, George Davis, and Richard 

O’Connell—are no longer part of the case.8 

 

8 See, e.g., Cowger v. Rohrbach, 734 F. Supp. 914, 916 (C.D. Cal. 

1990) (“The goals which underlie the LMRDA and the 

practicalities of a trial necessarily involving uniquely 

individual actions lead [the court] to the conclusion that 

justice is best served by abatement of this [Section 501] cause 

of action.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) (“If a party dies and the 

claim is not extinguished, the court may order substitution of 

the proper parties,” but “[i]f the motion [for substitution] is 

not made within 90 days after service of a statement noting the 
26 

Third, Mr. Noble never raised a Section 501 claim against 

defendants Souza and Worsham related to in-town expenses. See 

1993 Investigation Report, Defs.’ Ex. 8, ECF No. 288-9 at 3 

(list of officials Mr. Noble had charged internally with 

accepting the in-town allowances, which does not include 

defendants Souza or Worsham); First Am. Compl., ECF No. 25 ¶ 8 

(Souza and Worsham were not listed as NALC “resident officers”); 

id. ¶¶ 115–19 (Souza and Worsham were omitted from Count II, 

which raises a Section 501 claim regarding the in-town 

expenses). They are therefore not subject to this claim. 

Accordingly, Mr. Noble’s Section 501 claim relates only to 

William Dunn, Lawrence Hutchins, Michael O’Connor, Robert 

Vincenzi, and William Young. Defendants Dunn and Vincenzi argue 

that they cannot be subject to a Section 501 claim because they 

are not union officials, and the Court addresses this argument 

first. After finding that defendants Dunn and Vincenzi are 

correct, the Court analyzes Mr. Noble’s Section 501 claims 

against defendants Hutchins, O’Connor, and Young. 

1. Officers of the Mutual Benefit Association and Health 

Benefit Plan Are Outside the Scope of Section 501. 

Section 501(a) of the LMRDA defines the duty owed by “[t]he 

officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a 

 

death, the action . . . against the decedent must be 

dismissed.”). 
27 

labor organization” to “such organization and its members as a 

group.” 29 U.S.C. § 501(a). The Act therefore requires covered 

individuals, “taking into account the special problems and 

functions of a labor organization, to hold its money and 

property solely for the benefit of the organization and its 

members and to manage, invest, and expend the same in accordance 

with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the 

governing bodies adopted thereunder.” Id. The D.C. Circuit 

directed this Court to consider on remand whether defendants 

Dunn and Vincenzi, as officers of the Mutual Benefit Association 

and Health Benefit Plan, are subject to Section 501. See Noble 

III, 525 F.3d at 1237. This Court had previously found the 

Mutual Benefit Association and Health Benefit Plan to be 

“separate and distinct” from the NALC, Noble II, 2006 WL 

2708796, at *7, a finding the D.C. Circuit noted was “conclusive 

on remand.” Noble III, 525 F.3d at 1237. Nonetheless, the 

Circuit stated that “the degree of separation necessary to avoid 

§ 501’s application is itself uncertain.” Id.

Mr. Dunn and Mr. Vincenzi argue that they are not covered by 

Section 501 because their in-town expenditures were paid using 

funds of the Mutual Benefit Association and Health Benefit Plan, 

not the NALC. See Individual Defs.’ Proposals at 6–8. Although 

the D.C. Circuit remanded for this Court to consider this issue, 

Mr. Noble did not mention it in his proposed supplemental 
28 

findings. See generally Pl.’s Proposals. Nor did he respond in 

his opposition brief to the defendants’ arguments on this point. 

See generally Pl.’s Objs. For this reason, Mr. Noble has 

conceded that defendants Dunn and Vincenzi are outside the scope 

of Section 501. See, e.g., McGinnis v. District of Columbia, No. 

13-1254, 2014 WL 4243542, at *15 (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2014) (when a 

party “fails to address [an argument] in its motion and fails to 

respond to [an opposing party’s] point in its reply, the Court 

will deem it abandoned”). 

In any event, the Court finds that the Mutual Benefit 

Association and Health Benefit Plan are sufficiently distinct 

from the NALC that their officers are not covered by Section 

501(a) with respect to their in-town allowances. Claims under 

Section 501(a) “may only relate to the misuse of union funds.” 

Hearn v. McKay, No. 07-60209, 2008 WL 2694005, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 

July 1, 2008), aff’d 603 F.3d 897 (11th Cir. 2010). For that 

reason, a Section 501(a) claim may not be made in connection 

with allegations of misuse of funds in benefit plans that “are 

not union funds.” Id. As another Judge of this Court has held, 

“Section 501 only applies to activities affecting union money,” 

so such a claim may not be brought with respect to “money in the 

Plan [that] was no longer property of the union.” Yager v. 

Carey, 910 F. Supp. 704, 728 (D.D.C. 1995). This conclusion 

flows from the plain language of the statute, which applies only 
29 

to “officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives 

of a labor organization” and dictates that, with respect to that 

labor organization, the officers must use “its money and 

property solely for the benefit of the organization and its 

members and to manage, invest, and expend the same in accordance 

with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the 

governing bodies adopted thereunder.” 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) 

(emphasis added). 

Trustees of employee-benefit plans that are related to unions 

will therefore be outside the scope of Section 501(a) when “the 

funds in these plans are not union money or property but rather 

the property of the plans or trusts.” Hearn, 2008 WL 2694005, at 

*4 (documents establishing the plan “state[d] that the union 

does not ‘have any right, title or interest in or to the Fund, 

or any part thereof,” and that “[o]nce funds are transferred 

into these plans they are part of an ‘irrevocable trust’ and 

‘assets of the Plan.’”); see also Yager, 910 F. Supp. at 728 

(“the Plan is funded by the [union] on behalf of its 

affiliates,” but “once the [union] makes a payment to the plan, 

‘that money belongs to the . . . Plan and is no longer [union] 

property”). Both the Mutual Benefit Association and Health 

Benefit Plan receive their funds through their own activities, 

rather than from the union. See Transcript of April 14, 2004 

Bench Trial, ECF No. 225 at 72:19-73:19, 74:13-19; Dunn Decl. ¶
30 

4. The in-town allowances of Mr. Dunn and Mr. Vincenzi, 

moreover, were paid entirely by their respective plans, not by 

the NALC. See Dunn Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6; Vincenzi Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7; 

Transcript of April 14, 2004 Bench Trial, ECF No. 225 at 73:25-

74:6, 75:5-24. Accordingly, the in-town allowances of defendants 

Dunn and Vincenzi were not paid for using union funds and 

therefore any claim against them alleging the misuse of those 

funds cannot be brought under Section 501. 

This conclusion is bolstered by the possibility that trustees 

of such plans may be “subject to their own fiduciary 

requirements under the Employment Retirement Income Security 

Act, [29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq.]” Hearn, 2008 WL 2694005, at *4. 

If so, ERISA makes such plans “distinct legal entities separate 

from the union . . . controlled exclusively by the trustees for 

the benefit of the plan participants and beneficiaries.” Hearn, 

603 F.3d at 902 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1), 1132(d)). “When 

a plan’s assets are misused, the breach of duty is one between 

the trustees and the plan’s beneficiaries (a separate 

constituency from the union and its members as a group).” Id. 

Nor would the fact that a plan trustee is also a union officer 

affect the analysis. “[A]n employee benefit fund trustee is a 

fiduciary whose duty to the trust beneficiaries must overcome 

any loyalty to the interest of the party that appointed him.” 

NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 334 (1981); see also Hearn, 
31 

603 F.3d at 902–03 (“when a union official is acting in his role 

as an ERISA benefit plan trustee, he does so exclusively for the 

benefit (or to the detriment) of the plan participants and 

beneficiaries, not the union or its members as a group”).9

2. Mr. Noble’s Section 501 Claims Against Defendants 

Hutchins, O’Connor, and Young Fail. 

Mr. Noble’s in-town-expense claim thus remains only as to 

three individuals: Lawrence Hutchins, Michael O’Connor, and 

William Young. Mr. Noble’s claim that their in-town allowances 

were not properly authorized cannot stand if the in-town 

allowances were made “in accordance with [the union’s] 

constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing 

bodies adopted thereunder.” 29 U.S.C. § 501(a). The D.C. Circuit 

has affirmed that, in evaluating whether an action comports with 

 

9 The Court is not persuaded by pre-ERISA cases involving plans 

that “were an exclusively union undertaking.” Hearn II, 603 F.3d 

at 903 n.8 (describing Hood v. Journeyman Barbers, Hairdressers, 

Cosmetologists & Proprietors Int’l Union, 454 F.2d 1347 (7th 

Cir. 1972) and Morrissey v. Curran, 423 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 

1970)). Pre-ERISA decisions are especially unpersuasive because 

“ERISA obviated the need for federal courts to strain to imply a 

cause of action in favor of employee benefit fund participants 

and beneficiaries.” Hearn, 2008 WL 2694005, at *5 (quotation 

marks omitted). Nor is the Court persuaded by Morrissey v. 

Curran, 650 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1981), where allegedly improper 

payments from a pension fund jointly run by a union and its 

members’ employers fell within the scope of Section 501 because 

the pension fund’s assets “belong to union members.” Id. at 

1284. By contrast, the Mutual Benefit Association and Health 

Benefit Plan both sell to non-members, and their funds come not 

from union or member contributions, but from the payment of 

insurance premiums and investments of those premiums.
32 

a union’s constitution and bylaws, the Court must “defer to an 

interpretation of a union constitution rendered by officials of 

a labor organization . . . unless the court finds the 

interpretation was unreasonable or made in bad faith.” Noble 

III, 525 F.3d at 1235 (quotation marks omitted; alteration in 

original). This deference is even greater “when, as here, a 

union convention has approved the officers’ interpretation of 

the union constitution because such approval undermines a 

finding that the officers’ interpretation was unreasonable and 

made in bad faith.” Id. (quotation marks and alteration 

omitted); see also Monzillo v. Biller, 735 F.2d 1456, 1458 (D.C. 

Cir. 1984). This deference takes into account “whether there was 

arguable authority for the officer’s act from the officer’s 

viewpoint at the time, not from a court’s more sophisticated 

hindsight.” Stelling v. Int’l B’hood of Elec. Workers, 587 F.2d 

1379, 1389 n.10 (9th Cir. 1978). 

This Court previously concluded that Article 9, § 11(e) of the 

NALC Constitution could reasonably be viewed as authorizing the 

individual defendants’ actions. See Noble II, 2006 WL 2708796, 

at *8–9. This holding was based on the following provisions: 

 “Second only to the Convention in legislative and policymaking authority, [the Executive Council] shall act between 

Conventions on all matters related to the welfare of the 

Union not specifically prohibited by the membership.” 

 “[The Executive Council may] authorize and/or ratify the 

payment of salaries, wages, expenses, allowances, and other 
33 

disbursements which it deems necessary and appropriate to 

the purpose and functioning of this Union, other than 

provided for.” 

Id. Because the NALC Constitution does not “specifically 

prohibit or otherwise provide for the payment of either an intown expense allowance or the reimbursement of un-itemized 

expenses,” this Court agreed with the defendants that the above 

provisions had been “reasonably interpreted . . . to permit a 

$500 per month in-town expense allowance resolution for Resident 

Officers” and that “the Council’s determinations for many years 

that it would not require Resident Officers to submit receipts 

for in-town expenses were reasonable and made in good faith.” 

Id. at *9.

The D.C. Circuit “agree[d] . . . that the NALC constitution 

was ambiguous.” Noble III, 525 F.3d at 1236. It held that 

“[t]hough NALC Const. art. 6 § 1 expressly entitles all elected 

union officers to obtain reimbursement of itemized expenses, 

that minimum entitlement does not unambiguously prohibit the 

council from providing additional payment for expenses or 

allowances” and that other provisions relied upon by Mr. Noble 

do not “unambiguously require[] a contrary interpretation.” Id. 

Accordingly, the Circuit agreed with this Court’s application of 

a “more deferential standard of review in evaluating the 

reasonableness of the NALC Executive Council’s interpretation of 

their authority to authorize the expenses.” Id. The individual 
34 

defendants’ interpretation of the NALC Constitution to permit 

the in-town expense allowance was therefore reasonable under the 

deferential standard applicable to this case, giving them 

arguable authority for accepting $500 per month pursuant to the 

resolution for use in connection with union-related business in 

Washington, D.C. 

The D.C. Circuit reversed this Court’s dismissal of Mr. 

Noble’s claim because it disagreed with the factual finding that 

Mr. Noble “produced no evidence that officers had used the 

allowance for purely personal reasons, unrelated to union 

business.” Id. at 1236 (quotation marks omitted). Although no 

direct evidence of misuse had been provided, the Circuit held 

that personal use may be proven by indirect evidence. See id. at 

1236–37. Mr. Noble, the Circuit found, had produced two relevant 

forms of circumstantial evidence: (1) the evidence of bad faith 

provided by two misleading statements by NALC officers regarding 

the in-town allowances, and (2) defendants’ failure to submit 

receipts despite the resolution’s requirement that they retain 

receipts for a reasonable period and their “direct financial 

incentive” to do so. See id. The Circuit directed this Court on 

remand to “weigh[] Noble’s circumstantial evidence of misuse 

against any evidence the officers present to the contrary.” Id. 

at 1237. 

a. The Statements at the 1976 and 1986 NALC Conventions 
35 

This Court’s analysis is framed by two statements made during 

NALC National Conventions held a decade apart, which arguably 

support an inference of “bad faith regarding the in-town expense 

allowance.” Id. As the Circuit summarized it: “The evidence 

Noble presented showing that NALC presidents twice misleadingly 

denied the allowance’s existence when challenged on the issue at 

National Conventions is troubling.” Id. The Circuit therefore 

directed this Court to apply United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 

1293 (D.C. Cir. 1997), “which suggests that courts should 

closely scrutinize self-serving courses of conduct when union 

officers conceal vital information from union members.” Noble 

III, 525 F.3d at 1237. 

DeFries arose in connection with criminal proceedings against 

individuals who had been officers of a union that subsequently 

merged with another union. See 129 F.3d at 1297. Those officers, 

pursuant to the merger agreement, became officers in the new 

union. Id. Despite this, the officers received severance 

payments totaling $2,000,000 upon consummation of the merger, as 

a result of a severance plan adopted by the former union’s 

leadership committee. Id. In assessing the officers’ contention 

that the severance plan was permitted by the union’s bylaws, the 

D.C. Circuit noted that the officers had “t[aken] steps to 

conceal from the union membership the adoption, terms, and 
36 

triggering event of the plan.” Id. The officers “failed to 

mention the plan in the minutes of the meeting at which they 

adopted it, direct[ed] the union’s controller not to reveal any 

details of the plan,” and “failed to disclose the plan’s 

existence to the union’s independent auditor until more than a 

year after its adoption.” Id. Moreover, the Circuit noted, “the 

membership was kept completely in the dark as to any of [the 

severance plan’s] details until after the unions were merged and 

the payments were made.” Id. at 1307. Accordingly, the D.C. 

Circuit held, “the membership was prevented through [the 

officers’] subterfuge from exercising its ultimate authority to 

prevent this looting of the union treasury, and authorization 

secured without disclosure of material information is a 

nullity.” Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted). The 

situation in this case is not as clear as DeFries. 

The first statement at issue here is indeed troubling. In 

1976, then-President Rademacher appeared to deny the existence 

of “in-town expenses” for which officers were “allowed $500,” 

without needing to “list it on an expense account” while 

speaking to the National Convention. Minutes of 1976 NALC 

Convention, Pl.’s Ex. 13, ECF No. 296-10 at 1–2; see id. at 2 

(President Rademacher’s response: “Well, your information is 

incorrect. The Chair stands here in front of 5,000 delegates and 

says your information is incorrect.”). No reading of the in-
37 

town-expense resolution in existence at the time can be squared 

with this statement. See 1975 Resolution, ECF No. 288-9 at 32–

33. 

President Rademacher’s statement, then, bears some resemblance 

to the concealment found in DeFries. To be sure, there is no 

evidence that President Rademacher or his officers engaged in 

additional conduct that was also present in DeFries: There is no 

evidence that the in-town allowances were omitted from any 

meeting minutes or other official records, and no evidence 

exists that auditors or other officials were kept in the dark or 

instructed to keep the allowances quiet. Nonetheless, President 

Rademacher’s statement denies the existence of the payments. 

The key difference between this statement and the defendants’ 

actions in DeFries is that President Rademacher is not a 

defendant in this case, and the individuals who are defendants 

in this case were officers during the administration of 

President Sombrotto, which occurred five years later and after 

the intervening administration of President Vaca. The in-town 

allowances authorized by President Sombrotto and at issue in 

this case were made pursuant to a 1980 Resolution, which 

superseded President Vaca’s 1977 Resolution, which itself 

superseded the 1975 Resolution in effect when President 

Rademacher spoke in 1976. President Rademacher’s statement 

surely sets the stage for concern, especially in light of the 
38 

similarity between the 1975, 1977, and 1980 Resolutions, but 

unlike the actions in DeFries, it is not probative of the intent 

of the defendants in this case and therefore makes it difficult 

to infer, as the D.C. Circuit could in DeFries, that the 

defendants sought to conceal the payments. 

The statements during the 1986 National Convention are less 

clear. A delegate, Karen Lippe, was speaking in favor of 

providing a more modest salary increase to NALC officers than 

had been proposed. She sought to make clear the additional nonsalary compensation that NALC officers were receiving, and in 

the process mentioned: (1) “pay for the noncontributory 

retirement program”; (2) “7 percent of all national officers’ 

salary into their civil service retirement fund”; (3) “both 

sides of the Social Security taxes”; and (4) “a sum of $6,000 

per annum unaccountable expense money.” Minutes of 1986 NALC 

Convention, Defs.’ Ex. 11, ECF No. 288-12 at 2. President 

Sombrotto at this time was essentially moderating the debate on 

the proposed salary increase, by alternately calling on 

individuals in favor of and against the proposal based upon 

which microphone they were standing at. See id. After Delegate 

Lippe spoke, President Sombrotto stated “[t]hank, you Sister,” 

the audience applauded, and President Sombrotto recognized 

“Microphone No. 1 on privilege.” Id. Another delegate, Gene 

McNulty, stated: 
39 

I would like to correct the Sister. As a National 

Business Agent and one of your employees, you do not pay 

for the 7 percent of the retirement contribution. That 

is taken out of my check just like it is taken out of 

yours. Also, another piece of misinformation by the 

Sister, there is not for the resident national officers 

$6,000 unaccountable. They have to account for that. If 

you don’t believe me, check with the IRS. 

Id. President Sombrotto then recognized “Microphone No. 2, 

against.” Id. 

The effect of this dialogue is much less clear than President 

Rademacher’s 1976 denial of the existence of the payments. No 

one in 1986 disputed that the payments existed or that they 

amounted to $500 per month. The dialogue thus cannot be read as 

evidence that anyone sought to hide the payments or their 

amounts. The misstatement was Delegate McNulty’s when he stated 

that NALC officers “have to account for” the in-town allowances. 

Delegate McNulty is not a defendant in this case, so it is 

difficult to attribute his statement to the remaining individual 

defendants. President Sombrotto did not step in to correct 

Delegate McNulty’s statement, but neither did he ratify it.10

At most, then, the in-town allowances had been concealed by a 

prior administration, and described by the administration with 

which the individual defendants are affiliated as if they 

 

10 The Court notes, moreover, that President Sombrotto is no 

longer a defendant in this case, further attenuating the 

connection between the 1986 dialogue and the intent of the 

remaining individual defendants. 
40 

required “accounting,” when in fact they did not. This differs 

enough from DeFries that the Court cannot say that these 

individual defendants—Lawrence Hutchins, Michael O’Connor, and 

William Young—sought to conceal the existence of the challenged 

payments. At the same time, the history of prior concealment and 

the confusion about accounting in 1986 paint a picture that 

counsels in favor of a more careful review of how the individual 

defendants used their in-town allowances. 

b. Direct Evidence of How Defendants Hutchins, 

O’Connor, and Young Used the In-Town Allowances 

With this framework in mind, the Court reviews Mr. Noble’s 

additional circumstantial evidence of misuse. This evidence 

stems from the incentive officers faced to keep receipts, based 

in the Resolution itself, which tasked them with “mak[ing] and 

preserv[ing] for a reasonable period, not exceeding five years, 

records and receipts of expenditures covered by allowance for 

examination by the Fiscal Committee and by any other legally 

authorized authority.” 1980 Resolution, ECF No. 288-3 at 5–6. So 

tasked, an officer had a financial incentive to submit such 

receipts because any portion of the in-town expense for which a 

business-related receipt was provided would be exempt from 

income taxation. See Noble III, 525 F.3d at 1236. 

Against this circumstantial case, the Court must weigh the 

evidence presented by the individual defendants in support of 
41 

their contention that they did not misuse the in-town 

allowances. At least with respect to defendants Hutchins, 

O’Connor, and Young, direct evidence rebuts this circumstantial 

evidence and shows that these three defendants used their intown allowances for union-related business. 

Of the three remaining defendants, the record is most 

illuminating as to the practices of President William Young. 

President Young submitted receipts—largely reflecting meals and 

transportation expenses—for nearly all of the expenses he 

incurred between December 1990 and July 1993. Defs. Ex. 8, ECF 

No. 288-9 at A-12 (Mr. Young incurred $16,358 in expenses during 

this period, received $16,000 in in-town expense allowances, and 

submitted receipts for $15,798); Transcript of April 13, 2004 

Bench Trial, ECF No. 224 at 177:16-17 (President Young: “[My] 

initial history in the Union from 1990 until about 1994 or 5 was 

to receipt everything”); Young Receipts, Pl.’s Ex. 7, ECF No. 

296-6. Mr. Young later chose to stop submitting receipts 

“because it wasn’t worth the aggravation.” Id. at 177:17-18. 

Thus, although there was a financial incentive to submit 

receipts for the $500 or more President Young incurred in the 

course of his official duties—and President Young had for years 

been incurring that amount and saving receipts in response to 

that incentive—he decided “[for] my own benefit that I wasn’t 

going to receipt much. . . . [B]ecause it isn’t worth the hassle 
42 

in the long run.” Id. at 177:24-178:4. President Young’s prior 

practice over the course of several years of providing receipts 

for nearly every dollar he received strongly supports the 

inference that he stopped submitting receipts for the reason he 

gave: the inconvenience of preparing them, not because he was 

suddenly able to do his job while incurring fewer expenses and 

decided to pocket the difference. 

Defendant Lawrence Hutchins similarly submitted receipts for a 

substantial portion of his in-town expenses. See Investigative 

Committee Report, Defs.’ Ex. 8, ECF No. 288-9 at A-10 

(reflecting that Mr. Hutchins provided receipts for 

approximately $12,700 of the $18,000 he received between 1988 

and 1990, and for nearly all of the $16,000 he received between 

1991 and July 1993); Hutchins Receipts, ECF Nos. 296-7, 296-8, 

296-9. Mr. Hutchins’s receipts largely reflect expenditures at 

restaurants, as well as taxi and parking receipts. See Hutchins 

Receipts, ECF Nos. 296-7, 296-8, 296-9. Defendant Michael 

O’Connor appears only to have received an in-town allowance 

during 1994, but the record contains receipts for over $400 of 

the $500 he received each month. See O’Connor Receipts, Pl.’s 

Ex. 6, ECF No. 296-5. Mr. O’Connor’s receipts included charges 

for restaurants, taxis, and parking. See id. 

Accordingly, all three individual defendants provided receipts 

for a substantial portion of the in-town allowances they 
43 

received, and President Young’s testimony explains why they 

might not have provided every single receipt: Although an 

income-tax benefit could be realized by providing receipts for 

everything, even an officer who kept receipts for essentially 

all of his expenses for years might decide that continuing to do 

so was not worth the administrative burden. In light of this 

record, the Court finds that direct evidence of how the 

remaining individual defendants actually used the in-town 

allowances demonstrates that these three individual defendants 

largely accounted for their expenses. To the extent they did not 

account for them, the record reflects that the financial 

incentive for submitting receipts that the Resolution required 

be kept for a “reasonable period” of time was outweighed by the 

administrative burden experienced by those, like President 

Young, who once sought to submit receipts for every expense. 

Finally, the existence of a significant record of receipts 

describing the types of union-related expenses contemplated by 

the Resolution supports testimony that $500 per month was a 

reasonable amount that a resident officer could expect to have 

to spend in order to perform the job. See supra at 9. This 

bolsters the conclusion that any unreceipted portion of these 

defendants’ allowances was not used for personal gain. 

Mr. Noble challenges the receipts themselves, calling them 

“worthless as evidence.” Pl.’s Objs. at 3–4. Although phrased as 
44 

an evidentiary objection, Mr. Noble does not appear to dispute 

their admissibility. Instead, he appears to argue that the 

receipts cannot form the requisite evidence “of how the union’s 

money was actually used,” Noble III, 525 F.3d at 1237, because 

they do not contain a written notation of the purpose for which 

the expense was incurred. This argument relies on an alleged 

requirement that receipts contain such a notation. See Pl.’s 

Objs. at 3-4. 

Even if Mr. Noble were correct about the existence of an 

independent requirement that receipts contain such a notation, 

that does not render the receipts useless for the narrow purpose 

to which the Circuit has directed this Court’s focus: Weighing 

against Mr. Noble’s circumstantial evidence of misuse any 

evidence put forth by the defendants of how they actually used 

the in-town allowances. The defendants claim to have used the 

allowances for union-related expenses at restaurants and for 

transportation expenses. The receipts support this claim by 

reflecting the contemporaneous submission by the individual 

defendants of receipts for such expenses in connection with 

applications for the monthly in-town allowance. Thus, even if 

the failure to provide a written notation violated some other 
45 

legal requirement, not before the Court, the receipts would 

still bear on the narrow question that is before the Court.11

B. Mr. Noble’s Section 201 Claim 

In addition to his breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims under 

Section 501, Mr. Noble brought a claim pursuant to Section 201 

of the LMRDA. That provision requires labor unions to “file 

annually with the Secretary [of Labor] a financial report,” 

known as an LM-2 Report. 29 U.S.C. § 431(b). “The primary 

purpose of § 201 is to make full information related to the 

financial affairs of unions available to union members to 

 

11 Indeed, Mr. Noble’s various citations do not bear on whether 

the receipts are useful evidence regarding the Section 501 claim 

that is before this Court. Mr. Noble’s argument that NALC policy 

or the NALC Constitution requires such notations is belied by 

this Court’s finding that the individual defendants had arguable 

authority for accepting the in-town allowances without 

accounting for them, pursuant to a distinct section of the NALC 

Constitution that did not require itemized receipts. See supra 

at 33-34; Noble III, 525 F.3d at 1235-36. Mr. Noble’s reliance 

on a December 9, 2004 letter from the Department of Labor is 

unhelpful because that letter is not part of the record of this 

case—it was created after discovery closed and the trial had 

been held. See Pl.’s Objs. at 4. Moreover, the letter, which was 

attached to a status report Mr. Noble filed in 2009, addressed 

the Department of Labor’s findings with respect to an entirely 

distinct section of the LMRDA. See December 9, 2004 Letter, ECF 

No. 257-2. Finally, Mr. Noble’s assertion that IRS Regulations 

require such notations is based solely on a 1985 letter from 

Richard O’Connell to NALC officers, which directs officers to 

supply certain information “which is required by I.R.S. 

regulation when entertaining,” including the purpose for the 

expense. February 27, 1985 Letter, Pl.’s Ex. 76, ECF No. 296-15. 

Even assuming the truth of this assertion, that does not make 

the receipts irrelevant to the Court’s assessment of Mr. Noble’s 

Section 501 claim. 
46 

strengthen their efforts to rid their unions of unworthy or 

corrupt officers.” McGinnis v. Local Union No. 710, Int’l B’hood 

of Teamsters, 664 F. Supp. 1212, 1213 (N.D. Ill. 1987). The 

report must include specified information related to the union’s 

finances, including assets, receipts, salaries, and similar 

matters. See 29 U.S.C. § 431(b). Section 201(c) creates a right 

of action for union members who (1) made a request to inspect 

documents “to verify” an LM-2 Report, (2) that was supported by 

“just cause,” and (3) was denied by the union. See 29 U.S.C. § 

431(c). 

“The burden of proof in demonstrating just cause is on the 

union member, and he may not inquire into union records out of 

idle curiosity.” Mallick v. Int’l B’hood of Elec. Workers, 749 

F.2d 771, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). The 

demonstration of just cause, moreover, is keyed to the 

particular information on an LM-2 report that the union member 

seeks to verify. See Krokosky v. United Staff Union, 291 F. 

Supp. 2d 835, 843 (W.D. Wisc. 2003) (“The statute’s structure 

indicates that just cause ought to relate to the LM-2.”). 

“Establishing ‘just cause’ requires the union member to state 

what he wishes to verify in the LM Reports and how the 

particular records he is requesting are expected to assist him 

in doing so.” Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 

278, 285 (5th Cir. 1993). 
47 

The precise scope of Mr. Noble’s Section 201 claim has 

remained vague throughout this case. What is clear is that Mr. 

Noble sent the NALC three letters in 1993 that contained 

requests for the inspection of documents. See supra Part I.E. 

His August 16 and September 14 letters included requests for 

inspection of a variety of documents related both to his 

internal charges regarding payments to members of the Executive 

Committee, as well as other issues. See supra at 19-21. The NALC 

appeared to grant the August 16 request, did not respond to the 

September 14 request, and permitted Mr. Noble to inspect an 

unspecified set of records on October 7, 1993. See id. It is not 

clear whether that inspection granted access to everything Mr. 

Noble had requested. 

Mr. Noble’s third request was rejected by the NALC. His 

November 7, 1993 letter sought “a videotape and a copy of the 

transcript of the October 13th Special Meeting of the 

Convention,” as well as “copies of payroll registers for several 

officers for the years 1988 through 1993.” November 7, 1993 

Letter from David Noble to Vincent Sombrotto, Ex. V. to NALC’s 

Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 126. President Sombrotto rejected the 

requests in full on November 30, 1993. See November 30, 1993 
48 

Letter from Vincent Sombrotto to David Noble, Ex. W to NALC’s 

Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 126.12 

In his post-trial proposed findings of fact regarding the 

Section 201 claim, Mr. Noble recited the chronology of this 

correspondence, but did not explain which, if any of the 

requests made in his August 16 and September 14 letters had been 

refused. See Pl.’s Post-Trial Proposed Findings, ECF No. 241-3 

¶¶ 77–81. Rather, Mr. Noble made the general and conclusory 

statement that “[w]hile plaintiff has been furnished with some 

financial information while conducting discovery in the instant 

case, and a smaller amount after filing the charges, the 

material he has been permitted to review has been insufficient 

for him to verify even one of the NALC’s annual LM-2 reports,” 

id. ¶ 83, which was itself a verbatim quotation from Mr. Noble’s 

pre-trial affidavit. See April 2, 2004 Noble Decl., ECF No. 215 

¶ 57. 

This Court previously found that during the course of 

proceedings in this case—and in the lead up to the filing of 

this case—Mr. Noble had been given “access to all of the 

pertinent NALC records,” rendering his Section 201 claim moot. 

 

12 Although it is clear from the record that Mr. Noble received 

in discovery copies of the videotape and transcript of the 

October 1993 Special Meeting, rendering that portion of the 

request moot, April 2, 2004 Noble Decl., ECF No. 215 ¶¶ 82, 84, 

it is not clear whether the other request has been satisfied. 
49 

Noble II, 2006 WL 2708796, at *11. The D.C. Circuit disagreed 

that a factual record existed to find that Mr. Noble had been 

permitted to inspect all documents he had requested to view, and 

therefore vacated this finding. See Noble III, 525 F.3d at 1241. 

It left for this Court to address the merits of the claim, “as 

well as the factual determination of what (if any) records Noble 

has requested but not yet received.” Id. at 1242. 

The existing record and the parties’ post-remand pleadings do 

not permit the Court to make this determination. Mr. Noble’s 

post-remand proposed findings made only a conclusory assertion 

that he has not been provided sufficient documents. See Pl.’s 

Proposals at 2, 4. The defendants’ proposals reiterated that Mr. 

Noble has been provided access to a significant amount of 

documents, and noted that the limited set of discovery disputes 

he raised in 2002 had been fully complied with, but did not 

explain precisely what he has been given access to. See Defs.’ 

Proposals at 8-9. 

Nor can the Court rule in favor of either party’s legal 

argument without a clearer explanation of which requests are at 

issue. The defendants’ argument that Mr. Noble has not 

demonstrated just cause to inspect “any financial records other 

than those to which NALC has already given him access,” Defs.’ 

Proposals at 16, neither explains what Mr. Noble has been given 

access to, nor establishes why every single request Mr. Noble 
50 

made was entirely unsupported by just cause. At the same time, 

Mr. Noble’s argument that his discovery of the challenged 

payments entitles him to a “broad review” of the NALC’s finances 

cannot be evaluated without explanation of how that discovery 

provides just cause for specific requests that were rejected by 

the NALC.13 Accordingly, the Court will direct the filing of 

supplemental briefs, which shall include citation to the trial 

record and any additional evidence the parties feel is necessary 

to resolve the Section 201 claim. 

The Court notes that the burden is on Mr. Noble to explain to 

the Court why he is entitled to relief on his Section 201 claim. 

He must explain which inspection requests the NALC rejected, how 

the requests relate to the verification of the union’s LM-2 

Report, and the basis for a finding that the requests were 

supported by just cause. Mr. Noble’s past unsupported and 

conclusory statements were insufficient and the Court may treat 

another failure by Mr. Noble to explain or provide evidentiary 

support for his claim as a forfeiture of the claim. Cf. Jackson 

v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 

 

13 Mr. Noble’s other argument, that the defendants waived their 

ability to contest his Section 201 claim because they raised no 

defense to it other than mootness, Pl.’s Proposals at 4, is 

incorrect: The D.C. Circuit referred to the defendants’ 

arguments regarding the merits of the Section 201 claim, and 

suggested that this Court reach those arguments on remand. Noble 

III, 525 F.3d at 1242. 
51 

153 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (refusing, in connection with summaryjudgment rule requiring clear and concise statements of material 

facts, to “plac[e] the burden on the court, rather than on the 

opposing party or his counsel, ‘to winnow the wheat from the 

chaff’”). 

* * * 

Mr. Noble shall therefore file a pleading setting forth in 

precise detail, with corresponding evidentiary citations, which 

requests for the inspection of documents he claims were refused 

by the NALC, and why his Section 201 claim should succeed as to 

each individual request. 

The defendants shall file a response to these arguments, which 

shall include, among whatever other arguments the defendants 

deem appropriate, an explanation, with corresponding evidentiary 

citations, whether any requests still pursued by Mr. Noble have 

been fully complied with. 

Mr. Noble may file a reply brief, which shall respond to the 

defendants’ arguments but may not raise new arguments. See

Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 

1992) (noting the general rule that courts “refuse[] to 

entertain arguments raised for the first time in an appellant’s 

reply brief”). 

III. Conclusion 
52 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court enters judgment in favor 

of the defendants on Mr. Noble’s Section 501 claims and requests 

supplemental briefing regarding Mr. Noble’s Section 201 claim. 

An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

 United States District Judge 

 March 27, 2015