Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 

Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 

WILLIAM D. RIDGWELL, ET AL. 

v. Record No. 961978 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 October 31, 1997 

BRASCO BAY CORPORATION 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 

Joseph F. Spinella, Judge Designate 

 The primary issue in this appeal is whether an owner of land 

burdened by an easement is barred from placing a gate across the 

right of way. 

 In 1994, William and Mary Ellen Ridgwell purchased about 30 

acres of land bordering U.S. Route 250 in Albemarle County that 

is subject to an easement held by Brasco Bay Corporation 

(Brasco). The easement extends from Brasco's property, across 

the Ridgwells' property, to U.S. Route 250. The easement was 

created by a deed establishing a "right of way for ingress and 

egress" which "shall be 50 feet in width and shall follow the 

route as designated on plat of R.O. Snow and Associates dated 

July 25, 1974, a copy of which plat is attached hereto and made a 

part of this deed." 

 A paved road on the Ridgwells' property leading from U.S. 

Route 250 is partially located on the right of way. This paved 

road provides the only means of access to the building in which 

the Ridgwells conduct their garden and nursery business. As a 

security measure, the Ridgwells placed a 36-foot-wide gate across 

the paved road to limit vehicular access from U.S. Route 250 when 

their business is closed. However, the gate also blocks Brasco's 

right of way to U.S. Route 250. 
 The Ridgwells lock the gate at all times when their business 

is closed. They offered Brasco a key to the lock, but Brasco 

declined the offer and demanded removal of the gate. The 

Ridgwells refused to remove the gate. 

 Brasco filed a bill of complaint seeking, among other 

things, a permanent injunction restraining the Ridgwells from 

interfering with Brasco's use of the right of way and requiring 

them to remove the gate. Since Brasco intended to develop its 

property at a future date, Brasco also requested the trial court 

to declare that the right of way "was intended to provide an 

unobstructed right of way and a right of way upon which a road 

way could be built to State Department of Highway standards to be 

included as a part of the State Highway System of Virginia." 

 At a bench trial, the court held that the Ridgwells were 

required to remove the gate because the plat showed an 

unobstructed right of way. The trial court also enjoined the 

Ridgwells from interfering with Brasco's use of the way. 

However, the trial court declined to rule that the right of way 

was intended to allow construction of a road that could be 

adopted as part of the state highway system. The trial court 

held that such a ruling would be premature because Brasco had not 

taken action to develop the property and there was insufficient 

evidence regarding the future use of the property. 

 On appeal, the Ridgwells concede that, since the present 

gate is 36 feet wide, it obstructs Brasco's full use of its 50-

foot right of way. However, the Ridgwells argue that Code 

§ 33.1-202 allows them to place a gate greater than 50 feet wide 
across the right of way, and that the trial court erred in 

permanently enjoining them from erecting such a gate. 

 In response, Brasco contends that the documents creating the 

right of way establish that it was intended to be free from any 

obstruction, including the 50-foot-wide gate proposed by the 

Ridgwells. Brasco further asserts that, since the Ridgwells do 

not have fences extending to each side of the right of way, they 

cannot rely on Code § 33.1-202 to erect a gate. 

 Brasco also assigns cross-error to the trial court's refusal 

to declare that the easement was intended to allow construction 

of a road that could be adopted as part of the state highway 

system. Brasco notes that the deed to the Ridgwell property 

includes a road maintenance agreement which declares that Brasco, 

as owner of the right of way, "shall have the right to upgrade 

and dedicate the road to the State Highway System of Virginia." 

Thus, Brasco argues, the trial court should have confirmed 

Brasco's right to build such a road to accommodate future 

subdivision of its property. 

 We first consider the Ridgwells' contention that Code 

§ 33.1-202 gives them the right to place a 50-foot-wide gate 

across Brasco's right of way. That section provides, in relevant 

part, that 

 [a]ny person owning land over which another or others 

have a private road or right-of-way may, except when it 

is otherwise provided by contract, erect and maintain 

gates across such roads or right-of-way at all points 

at which fences extend to such roads on each side 

thereof. 

Under this portion of the statute, the Ridgwells are barred as a 
matter of law from placing a gate across Brasco's right of way 

only if they are subject to a contractual provision prohibiting 

the installation of a gate. 

 We conclude that there is no such contractual restriction. 

In examining the Ridgwells' deed, we give effect to the plain 

meaning of the language used by the parties. Amos v. Coffey, 228 

Va. 88, 92, 320 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1984); Arbern Realty Co. v. 

Swicegood, 201 Va. 30, 34, 109 S.E.2d 108, 111 (1959). The only 

mention of the easement in the deed is that a right of way is 

provided "for ingress and egress" and "shall be 50 feet in width 

and shall follow the route as designated on [the attached] plat." 

 The plat appended to the deed shows the route of the easement 

and does not indicate any restrictions that would prohibit the 

placement of a gate across the easement. In addition, there is 

no evidence that the Ridgwells and Brasco executed any agreement 

limiting the Ridgwells' right to place a gate over the easement. 

 Although the Ridgwells are not prohibited by contract from 

placing a gate across the easement, they have failed to comply 

with the requirement in Code § 33.1-202 that any gate placed 

across an easement be attached to a fence on each side of the 

right of way. Since the Ridgwells do not have fences that extend 

to each side of the right of way, they have not established a 

right under the statute to erect a gate. Therefore, we will 

uphold the portion of the trial court's injunction requiring the 

Ridgwells to remove the existing gate because the trial court 

reached the correct result, despite its use of the wrong reason 

in obtaining that result. See Mathy v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 
356, 362, 483 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1997); Doswell Ltd. Partnership v. 

Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 251 Va. 215, 225, 468 S.E.2d 84, 90 

(1996); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Metropolitan 

Washington Airports Auth., 251 Va. 201, 214, 468 S.E.2d 90, 98 

(1996). 

 We next conclude that the trial court erred in permanently 

enjoining the Ridgwells from building a gate across the right of 

way. This portion of the trial court's decree improperly denies 

the Ridgwells the opportunity to build a fence that complies with 

the requirements of Code § 33.1-202.*

 Finally, we find no merit in the cross-error assigned by 

Brasco. Brasco did not present sufficient evidence from which 

the trial court could determine whether Brasco has a right to 

build a roadway to accommodate a subdivision of its property. A 

trial court cannot enter a declaratory judgment based on future 

or speculative facts, because to do so would constitute the 

rendering of an advisory opinion. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 

Va. v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Richmond, Inc., 245 Va. 24, 35, 426 

S.E.2d 117, 123 (1993); Mosher Steel-Virginia, Inc. v. Teig, 229 

Va. 95, 100, 327 S.E.2d 87, 91 (1985); City of Fairfax v. 

Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 229, 135 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1964). 

 For these reasons, we will uphold the portion of the trial 

court's injunction requiring the Ridgwells to remove the 36-foot-

 

 *The Ridgwells do not have a right to maintain a locked gate 

once they can demonstrate they have complied with the terms of 

the statute. Nothing in Code § 33.1-202 provides such a right. 

See Craig v. Kennedy, 202 Va. 654, 660, 119 S.E.2d 320, 324 

(1961). 
wide gate, dissolve the permanent injunction preventing them from 

erecting a gate in compliance with Code § 33.1-202, and enter 

final judgment in favor of Brasco. 

 Affirmed in part,

reversed in part,

and final judgment.