* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicataand collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

1 We construe pro sepleadings liberally. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003). 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 2, 2006
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM A. SHIPLEY, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendant - Appellee. No. 05-3273 (D. Kansas) (D.Ct. No. 04-CV-2573-JWL)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , O’BRIEN , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. William A. Shipley, appearing pro se , 1 filed suit against the Internal226 U.S.C. § 7433(a) provides:

If, in connection with any collection of Federal tax with respect to a taxpayer, any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service recklessly or intentionally, or by reason of negligence disregards any provision of this title, or any regulation promulgated under this title, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages against the United States in a district court of the United States. Except as provided in section 7432, such civil action shall be the exclusive remedy for recovering damages resulting from such actions. -2- Revenue Service (IRS) under 26 U.S.C. § 7433 2 for imposing a levy against his social security payments. The district court dismi ssed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U. S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM. Background In July 1995, the IRS assessed federal taxes and pe nalties against Shipley for the 1990 tax year. Shipley failed to pay the t axes and penalties. The IRS issued Shipley a notice of intent to levy in April 1999. Shipley unsuccessfully challenged the levy in federal district court. See Shipley v. IRS , 2000 WL 575019 (D. Kan. Mar. 30, 2000). From January 2, 2000, unt il November 4, 2002, the IRS collected 100 percent of Shipley’s social security payments. Following several unsuccessful attempts to obtain an administrative h earing from the IRS, Shipley filed suit in federal court on November 29, 2004, a lleging the IRS fraudulently collected all of his social security checks pursuan t to the levy. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction p ursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because Shipley filed suit more than two years after the co mmencement of the levy in-3-

January, 2000.
Discussion The district court’s dismissal of a taxpayer’s clai m for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Colo. Envtl. Coalition v. Wenker , 353 F.3d 1221, 1227 (10th Cir. 2004). Section 7433 con ditionally waives the United States’ sovereign immunity from tax refund suits, b ut limits taxpayer suits to “within 2 years after the date the right of action accrues.” 26 U.S.C. § 7433(d)(3). See Allied/Royal Parking L.P. v. United States , 166 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[S]ection 7433’s limited waiver t o the government’s sovereign immunity must be read narrowly.”). The right of ac tion accrues “when the taxpayer has had a reasonable opportunity to discov er all essential elements of a possible cause of action.” 26 C.F.R. §301.7433-1(g )(2). Because the “time-bar qualifies [as] a waiver of sovereign immunity,” it is jurisdictional in nature. Dahn v. United States , 127 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1997). According to Shipley, the statute of limitations sh ould not be triggered until February 23, 2004; the date he discovered by letterthat the IRS was only allowed to issue levies up to fifteen percent of his social security payments. He errs. Shipley is charged with knowledge of the law. Dziura v. United States , 168 F.3d 581, 583 (1st Cir. 1999). Assuming the IRS did vio late a fifteen percent limit on social security checks, ignorance of the law does n ot toll a statute of limitations.-4-

See Venture Coal Sales Co. v. United States , 370 F.3d 1102, 1107 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1020 (2004). Ordinarily, a right of actio n accrues when the levy commences; here January 2, 2000, when the IRS made its first allegedly wrongful seizure of Shipley’s social security check

. See Gandy Nursery, Inc. v. United States , 318 F.3d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 2003). The district court allowed for the possibility that Shipley might acquire addition al facts essential to his claim during the pendency of the levy and generously set the starting date at November 4, 2002; the date the levy ended. In either event, Shipley’s suit is time-barred as it was filed more than two years after both dates. The district court properly dismissed Shipley’s complaint. AFFIRMED. Entered by the Court: Terrence L. O’Brien United States Circuit Judge