alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Mario MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. Richard THALER, Anthony J. Collins, Tina M. Carmona, et al., Appellees.

No. 14-95-00875-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Sept. 26, 1996.

Rehearing Overruled Oct. 17, 1996.

Mario C. Martinez, pro se.

Don Morales, Austin, for appellees.

YATES, HUDSON and FOWLER, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Appellant appeals the dismissal of his pro se *in forma pauperis*action on the grounds that (1) the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his application for writ of mandamus because the court had a legal obligation to protect him, and (2) appellees transferred him to another prison as retaliation for his legal activities. We affirm.

Appellant, a prisoner at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Institutional Division, claimed to have physical disabilities that prevented him from performing his assigned work tasks. Appellant received disciplinary reports because of his refusal to work. Appellant requested that appellees place him in administrative segregation, but appellees refused. After appellant exhausted all of his administrative remedies, he filed an *46application for writ of mandamus in the trial court requesting that the trial court order appellees to place him in administrative segregation and to give him protective custody status. Appellant was transferred to another prison facility after the application was filed. On June 2, 1995, the trial court dismissed appellant’s cause of action, without a hearing, and cited Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 13.001(b)(2), which states that the claim had no arguable basis in law or in fact and was frivolous. Appellant perfected this appeal.

Trial courts have broad discretion in dismissing *in forma pauperis*actions they find to be frivolous. *Thomas v. Texas Dept, of Criminal Justice, Institut. Div.,*848 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court acts arbitrarily, capriciously, and without reference to any guiding rules or principles. *Id.*Both state and federal courts have approved dismissal of lawsuits filed *in forma pauperis*when those suits have no basis in law or fact. *See, e.g., Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany,*875 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir.1989); *Johnson v. Lynaugh,*796 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex.1990).

A district court has mandamus jurisdiction only to enforce its own jurisdiction. Tex Const. art. V, § 8; Tex Gov’t Code Ann. § 24.011 (Vernon 1988). A district court has no constitutional or statutory jurisdiction to exercise supervisory control over prison officials. Furthermore, the purpose of appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus in the district court was not to protect the district court’s jurisdiction. *See Winfrey v. Chandler,*159 Tex. 220, 318 S.W.2d 59 (1958)(a court must have actual jurisdiction of a matter if it seeks to enforce its jurisdiction by its writ power).

Because the district court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus, it appropriately dismissed appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus.

We affirm the trial court’s ruling and deny appellant’s pending motion in this court for “summary judgment.”
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

February 4, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-3996

II-VI Incorporated:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20.

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request concerns a product strategically important or related to 

“Made in China 2025” or other Chinese industrial programs.

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn

General Counsel
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE LUIS RODRIGUEZ-MERIDA,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 07-74579

Agency No. A098-762-789

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 19, 2010** 

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

Jose Luis Rodriguez-Merida, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal

from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

FILED

NOV 01 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 07-74579

(“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for

substantial evidence, Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006),

and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The IJ denied Rodriguez-Merida’s asylum application as time-barred. 

Rodriguez-Merida does not challenge this finding in his opening brief.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that RodriguezMerida did not establish past persecution or a clear probability of future

persecution based on the mistreatment he and other family members suffered when

Rodriguez-Merida was a child. See Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339-40 (9th Cir.

1995); see also Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (9th Cir.

2002). We reject Rodriguez-Merida’s contention that the agency erred in failing to

take into consideration Rodriguez-Merida’s age at the time the events occurred

because the agency properly considered the harm to Rodriguez-Merida’s family

and Rodriguez-Merida’s age at the time. See Hernandez-Ortiz, 496 F.3d at 1045-

46.

We lack jurisdiction to review Rodriguez-Merida’s contentions that he

suffered persecution as a member of a family-based social group and that he has a

derivative fear of future persecution through his daughter, because he failed to

exhaust these issue before the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78
3 07-74579

(9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Rodriguez-Merida’s withholding of removal claim

fails.

Finally, Rodriguez-Merida failed to set forth any substantive argument

regarding the BIA’s denial of his CAT claim. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94

F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (issues not supported by argument are deemed

waived). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
#### IN RE MUNICIPAL ANNEXATIONS

1917

RESOLUTION No. 23

RESOLUTION REQUESTING THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA.

*Resolved by the Senate, the Souse of Representatives concurring:*

That tbe Supreme Court of North Carolina be requested, if it can conveniently and properly do so, to advise tbe General Assembly as to tbe court’s interpretation of tbe recent amendments to tbe Constitution with especial reference to tbe question as to whether or not there is any provision of tbe amendments to tbe Constitution recently adopted which would require tbe General Assembly to provide by general law tbe machinery for annexation by cities and towns of outlying and adjacent territory; or whether or not tbe General Assembly could make these annexations by special act, as tbe circumstances of each city or town might, in tbe judgment of tbe General Assembly, require.

Ratified this tbe 26th day of February, A.D. 1917.

—Public Laws, 1917, p. 627.

Under S. R. 1241, H. R. 1493, a joint resolution requesting tbe opinion of tbe Supreme Court of North Carolina, tbe following opinion is received from tbe Chief Justice :

*To the General Assembly:*

Owing to tbe public importance of tbe matter tbe Supreme Court has decided to respond to tbe annexed resolution as requested. After due *717consideration tbe Court is unanimously of opinion that the amendments to the Constitution do not take from the General Assembly jurisdiction and power to exact special laws relating- to annexation by a city or toivn of adjacent territory.

For the Court:

Waltee ClaeK, *Chief Justice.*

—February 26, 1917, *Sen. Journal,*1917, p. 427.
#### SCALE JOHNSON v. MISSOURI STATE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

(Filed 1 January, 1935.)

Insurance R c — Held: under provisions of policy, liability under disability clause attached only after such disability had existed six months.

Where a disability clause in a policy of insurance provides for benefits to insured upon proof of total and permanent disability and that such disability had continued for six months, under plain terms of the policy, disability as defined by the policy must exist for the six-months period before liability attaches to insurer, and where the insurance is not kept in force by the payment of premiums for six months after insured sustained such disability, insured’s action on the disability clause is properly nonsuited.

Clakkson, J., dissents.

*513Appeal by plaintiff from *Moore, Special Judge,*at June Term, 1934, of Dukham.

Civil action to recover on a $1,000 certificate of group insurance issued by defendant to plaintiff, an employee of the B. 0. Eemedy Company and/or Five Points Drug Company of Durham, N. C.

The certificate in suit contains the following provision:

“If the employee shall furnish the company with due proof that, before having attained the age of sixty years, he or she has become totally and permanently disabled by bodily injury or disease, and that he or she is then, and will be at all times thereafter, wholly prevented thereby from engaging in any gainful occupation, and that he or she has been so permanently and totally disabled for a period of six months, the company will immediately pay to the employee in full settlement of all obligations hereunder, the amount of insurance in force hereunder on the employee at the time of the approval by the company of the proofs as aforesaid.”

Plaintiff’s total disability began on 1 January, 1931, when he left the employ of the Five Points Drug Company. His brother continued to pay his premiums until 1 March, 1931, when the insurance coverage was canceled, as no further premiums were paid to continue it in force after that date.

Suit was instituted 1 March, 1933.

From a judgment of nonsuit the plaintiff appeals, assigning error.

*A. A. McDonald and W. S. Lockhart for plaintiff.*

*Smith, Wharton & Hudgins for defendant.*

Stacy, C. J.

Must the plaintiff’s total and permanent disability have existed for a period of six months before liability attaches therefor under the certificate in suit? The answer is, Yes. *Kingsland v. Ins. Co.*(Mo.), 66 S. *W.*(2d), 959; *Baker v. Ins. Co.,*202 N. C., 432, 163 S. E., 110.

The same question in principle was presented in the case of *Hundley v. Ins. Co.,*205 N. C., 780, 172 S. E., 361, where *Brogden, J.,*delivering the opinion of the Court, observed: “It is not deemed relevant to discuss the meaning of the six months’ clause or for what reason it was inserted in the contract. It is there in plain English.” See, also, *Wyche v. Ins. Co., ante,*45, 175 S. E., 697; *Ammons v. Assur. Society,*205 N. C., 23, 169 S. E., 807.

The evidence rendered it proper to dismiss the action as in case of nonsuit.

Affirmed.

ClarksoN, J., dissents.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

May 29, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-4320

Elo Touch Solutions, Inc.:

I am pleased to notify you that the United States Trade Representative has determined to 

grant the above-referenced exclusion request submitted pursuant to the notice published at 83 FR 

32181 (‘July 11 notice’). The exclusion determination is set out in a formal notice which has 

been submitted to Office of the Federal Register for publication (‘the exclusion notice’). A prepublication version of the exclusion notice has been posted on the USTR website, at 

https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/Notice_of_Product_Exclusions

_5-30-2019.pdf.

The scope of the exclusion is governed by the formal HTSUS language in the annex to 

the product exclusion notice, and not by the product descriptions set out in any particular request 

for exclusion. An exclusion in response to your request has been granted by excluding from the 

additional tariffs the 10-digit HTSUS subheading under which your request was filed. 

In accordance with the July 11 notice, the exclusion applies as of the July 6, 2018 

effective date of the tariff action, and will extend for one year after the exclusion notice is 

published in the Federal Register. As stated in the exclusion notice, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection will issue additional instructions on entry guidance and implementation.

Sincerely,

Joseph Barloon

General Counsel
#### STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Alonzo FORD, Defendant/Appellant. Alonzo FORD, Movant/Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent/Respondent.

Nos. 66669, 68899.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

May 14, 1996.

John M. Schilmoeller, Asst. Public Defender, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Breck K. Burgess, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before REINHARD, P.J., and KAROHL and GRIMM, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

A jury found defendant guilty of an attempt to commit second degree burglary. Sections 564.011 and 569.170, RSMo 1994. The trial court sentenced him as a prior and persistent offender to six years.

In his direct appeal, defendant alleges the trial court erred in overruling his *Batson*challenge. In his Rule 29.15 motion, he alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make and preserve adequate *Bat-son*objections.

*57No jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion. Rule 30.25(b). The judgment of the motion court on the Rule 29.15 motion is based on findings that are not clearly erroneous. An opinion would have no precedential value. Rule 84.16(b).

The judgments of the trial court and motion court are affirmed.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Killbuck Bancshares, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Luther E. Proper, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as enacted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,; and
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|    |  |                        
|--- |  | -----------------------
|By: |  | /s/ Luther E. Proper   
|    |  | Luther E. Proper       
|    |  | Chief Executive Officer
|    |  | August 10, 2005        



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Killbuck Bancshares, Inc. and will be retained by Killbuck Bancshares, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4411 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 5302 Galveston Road in Houston, Texas, as 

the ‘‘Vanessa Guille ́n Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

†S 4411 ES

1 SECTION 1. VANESSA GUILLE ́ N POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

2 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

3 Postal Service located at 5302 Galveston Road in Hous4 ton, Texas, shall be known and designated as the 

5 ‘‘Vanessa Guille ́n Post Office Building’’. 

6 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg7 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

8 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

9 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Vanessa Guille ́n Post 

10 Office Building’’. 

Passed the Senate December 19, 2022. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4411 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States PostHouston, Texas, as the ‘‘Vanessa Guille al Service located at 5302 Galveston Road in  ́n Post 

Office Building’’.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Killbuck Bancshares, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the
period ending March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Luther E. Proper, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as enacted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,; and
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|    |  |                        
|--- |  | -----------------------
|By: |  | /s/ Luther E. Proper   
|    |  | Luther E. Proper       
|    |  | Chief Executive Officer
|    |  | May 12, 2006           

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Killbuck Bancshares,
Inc. and will be retained by Killbuck Bancshares, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 7 (Wednesday, January 11, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2745-2746]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-628]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Docket No. RP95-45-001]


Colorado Interstate Gas Company; Tariff Compliance Filing

January 5, 1995.
    Take notice that on December 29, 1994, Colorado Interstate Gas 
Company (CIG), tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas Tariff, 
First Revised Volume No. 1, the following revised tariff sheets, with 
an effective date of December 14, 1994:


[[Page 2746]]


Substitute First Revised Sheet No. 259
Substitute Second Revised Sheet No. 359
First Revised Sheet No. 360

    CIG states that the new tariff sheets are being filed in accordance 
with the December 14, 1994, order in this proceeding. In the December 
14 order, the commission conditioned acceptance of CIG's November 14, 
1994, filing on a compliance filing by CIG to revise the tariff to: (1) 
include provisions for the proration of monthly charges for releasing 
shippers and replacement shippers when service is for less than a month 
at points where different rates apply because of discounting, (2) 
clarify that the new provisions relating to capacity release proposed 
in this proceeding shall be effective for replacement capacity 
contracts executed on or after January 1, 1995, (3) reflect the 
information Order No. 566-A requires to be posted on the electronic 
bulletin board with respect to affiliate discounts.
    CIG states that a copy of this filing was served upon all parties 
in this proceeding.
    Any person desiring to protest said filing should file a protest 
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol 
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Section 385.211 
of the commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211). 
All such protests should be filed on or before January 12, 1995. 
Protests will be considered by the Commission in determining the 
appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants 
parties to the proceeding. Copies of this filing are on file with the 
Commission and are available for public inspection in the Public 
Reference Room.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 95-628 Filed 1-10-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
#### GUNTER EXTERMINATING CO., Respondent, v. L. Fay OVERFIELD, Appellant.

No. WD 42331.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

June 26, 1990.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied July 31, 1990.

Application to Transfer Denied Sept. 11, 1990.

Fay Overfield, Kansas City, pro se.

Charles W. Fairchild of Fairchild Stang Beal Barber & Sanders, P.C., Kansas City, for respondent.

Before MANFORD, P.J., and KENNEDY and ULRICH, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM:

Direct appeal from a judgment awarding payment for services pursuant to a contract and denial of a counterclaim.

Judgment affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

December 28, 2018

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-3231

CW Bearing USA, Inc:

I am pleased to notify you that the United States Trade Representative has determined to 

grant the above-referenced exclusion request submitted pursuant to the notice published at 83 FR 

32181 (‘July 11 notice’). The exclusion determination is set out in a formal notice which has 

been submitted to Office of the Federal Register for publication (‘the exclusion notice’). A prepublication version of the exclusion notice has been posted on the USTR website, at 

https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/12.21.18_Notice_of_Product_E

xclusions.pdf.

The scope of the exclusion is governed by the formal HTSUS language in the annex to 

the product exclusion notice, and not by the product descriptions set out in any particular request 

for exclusion. An exclusion in response to your request has been granted by excluding from the 

additional tariffs the 10-digit HTSUS subheading under which your request was filed. 

In accordance with the July 11 notice, the exclusion applies as of the July 6, 2018 

effective date of the tariff action, and will extend for one year after the exclusion notice is 

published in the Federal Register. As stated in the exclusion notice, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection will issue additional instructions on entry guidance and implementation.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn

General Counsel