2008 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-25-2008

Rossell v. County Bank

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 06-2299

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Rossell v. County Bank" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1394.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1394
Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, Senior United Sates District Judge for the District of New *

Jersey, sitting by designation.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________________________

No.06-2299

___________________________

KATHY S. ROSSELL,

v.

COUNTY BANK, 

a Banking Institution of the State of Delaware

On Appeal from the United States District Court

For the District of Delaware

Honorable Sue L. Robinson

Civil Action No. 05-cv-00195 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 (a)

February 4, 2008

BEFORE McKEE, AMBRO, Circuit Judges and

IRENAS, Senior District Judge*

(Filed: March 25, 2008)

_____________________________

OPINION
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s decision 1

to dismiss the complaint is plenary. Beers-Capital v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 130 n.6 (3d Cir.

2001)

2

______________________________

McKee, Circuit Judge

Kathy Rossell appeals the district court’s dismissal of her Title VII claim against

County Bank. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 1

Inasmuch as we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we

need not set forth the factual or historical background except insofar as may be helpful to

our brief discussion. 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. §2000e et seq., provides a

remedy for employees who are discharged by their employer for engaging in activity that

is protected under the statute. To prevail on a claim of retaliatory discharge under Title

VII, Rossell must demonstrate (1) that she engaged in protected activity, (2) that her

employer discharged her, and (3) that the discharge was in retaliation for the protected

activity she engaged in. Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir.

1999). 

However, a retaliatory discharge claim must be based on retaliation for an

employee’s opposition to a Title VII violation. See Lowrey v. Texas A&M Univ. Sys.,

117 F.3d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 1997). Therefore, the actions underlying the employee’s

conduct must be activity that Title VII was intended to protect. See generally, Slagle v.
3

County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2006). Rossell’s claim is based upon alleged

discrimination against the bank’s customers, not its employees. She claims that she was

fired because she opposed the bank’s treatment of certain Black customers. Whether or

not there is a grain of truth in her allegation, it is clear that Congress never intended Title

VII to be stretched to cover it. See Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir.

1995). 

The district court recognized that and correctly granted the Bank’s motion to

dismiss. We will affirm that order.