The first factor is a triggering factor, and a defendant must 

show that any delay is of sufficient duration to be considered 

‘`presumptively prejudicial" in order to trigger a speedy trial analysis. 

Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-32. Although there is no bright line rule, courts 

have generally found post-accusation delays to be presumptively 

prejudicial as they approach the one-year mark. Doggett v. United States, 

505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992). Here, if trial commences as scheduled on 

February 29, 2016, the delay will have been more than 18 months since 

Lowe was arrested. This delay is sufficiently lengthy to warrant further 

inquiry into the other Barker factors.' 

As to the second factor, the original trial date was continued 

due to health issues with the co-defendant's prior counsel. The district 

court found good cause to continue the subsequent trial date, concluding 

that there was no conscious or willful disregard or indifference of Lowe's 

rights by the State. The district court denied Lowe's motion to dismiss, 

granted his motion for release on his own recognizance, and set the 

current trial date to accommodate the pregnancy of the out-of-state victim. 

This factor weighs slightly in Lowe's favor. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 

(holding that "a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to 

justify appropriate delay," but that it is ultimately the responsibility of the 

government to bring a defendant to trial). 

Regarding the third factor, Lowe invoked his right to a speedy 

trial and appears to have consistently asserted this right without waiver. 

Therefore, this factor weighs in his favor. 

'Lowe argues that the delay far exceeds 60 days, but the 60-day rule 

relates to the statutory speedy-trial right, see NRS 178.556. 

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Lastly, as to the prejudice factor, Lowe argues that he is not 

required to prove actual prejudice but may rely on the presumption of 

prejudice or that the State has the burden of proving the delay left him 

unimpaired to defend himself. 2However, so long as the State pursues 

Lowe with reasonable diligence, his speedy-trial claim fails unless he 

demonstrates a specific prejudice to his defense. See Doggett, 505 U.S. 

647, 656 ("[I]f the Government had pursued Doggett with reasonable 

diligence from his• indictment to his arrest, his speedy trial claim would 

fail. Indeed that conclusion would generally follow as a matter of course 

however great the delay, so long as Doggett could not show specific 

prejudice to his defense."). The district court made clear findings that the 

State was not in any way dilatory or that it had any motive of delay in 

asking for its continuance, and we give deference to the district court's 

findings of fact. See Williams v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev., 

Adv. Op. 45, 262 P.3d 360, 365 (2011) ("In the context of a writ petition, 

this court gives deference to the district court's findings of fact, but 

reviews questions of law de novo."). 

Alternatively, Lowe argues that he is prejudiced by the fact 

that one of his witnesses is ill and may not be available to testify at a later 

trial date and that he may lose witnesses who would advance his theory of 

defense. This argument is merely speculation. See United States v. Loud 

2To the extent Lowe argues that he is prejudiced because he has 

exhausted an underlying sentence during the pendency of this case and 

may lose the time he has already served, we will not consider this 

argument because Lowe fails to provide necessary cogent arguments or 

supporting documents. See Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 

222, 229, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004). 

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Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986) (holding that the possibility of prejudice is 

insufficient to establish a violation of speedy trial rights). Thus, this 

factor weighs against Lowe. See State v. Fain, 105 Nev. 567, 570, 779 P.2d 

965, 967 (1989) (concluding that a showing of prejudice is not essential but 

that this court may weigh its absence more heavily than other factors). 

Having balanced all of the Barker factors, we conclude Lowe 

has failed to demonstrate that there has been a speedy-trial violation and 

that extraordinary relief is warranted. Winkle v. Foster, 127 Nev., Adv. 

Op. 42, 269 P.3d 898, 899 (2011). 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

J. 

J. 

Saitta 

Gibbons 

Pickering 

cc: Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Judge 

Law Office of Lisa Rasmussen 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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