Filed 8/21/20 P. v. Garcia CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ADAN LEONARDO GARCIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B294014

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. KA118631)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed and remanded.

Lori A. Quick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael C. Keller and Nicholas J. Webster, Deputy Attorneys 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Defendant Adan Leonardo Garcia appeals from a judgment of 

conviction after a jury found him guilty of discharging a firearm with 

gross negligence (Pen. Code, § 246.3, subd. (a)),1 felon in possession of a 

firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), unlawful possession of ammunition

(§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)), driving under the influence of an alcoholic 

beverage causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), and driving 

with a .08 percent blood alcohol content causing injury (id., § 23153, 

subd. (b)). As to both Vehicle Code violations, the jury found true the 

allegation that defendant had a blood alcohol level content of .15

percent or higher. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that 

defendant had suffered a prior strike under the Three Strikes law 

(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), a prior serious felony 

conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. 

(b)). 

On appeal, defendant contends his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance of counsel by (1) failing to object to the 

admissibility of defendant’s prior felony conviction; and (2) failing to 

request an ability to pay hearing before the court imposed various fines, 

fees, and assessments. Defendant also contends he is entitled to a 

remand based on the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1393, which now 

affords the trial court the discretion, which it previously did not have, to 

strike defendant’s five-year serious felony enhancement pursuant to 

section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

1 Unspecified references to statutes are to the Penal Code.
3

The People request that we strike the prior prison term 

enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), which the trial court imposed but 

stayed, pursuant to recently enacted Senate Bill No. 136. 

We conclude that defendant’s trial counsel did not render 

ineffective assistance of counsel. We strike the section 667.5, 

subdivision (b) enhancement, and remand the matter with directions for 

the trial court to exercise its discretion to impose or strike the prior 

serious felony enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). 

On remand, defendant may request a hearing on his ability to pay the 

fines, fees, and assessments imposed. Otherwise, we affirm the 

judgment.

BACKGROUND

1. Prosecution Evidence

Around 4:00 p.m. on July 16, 2018, Christina Ducoing was driving 

home with her daughters in the city of Pomona, when she saw 

defendant driving a car in her direction. Ducoing testified that she 

watched defendant stick his hand out of the driver’s side window of the 

car and fire a gun into the air multiple times. Ducoing did not see any 

other person in defendant’s car. 

Approximately 15 minutes later in a different area in Pomona, 

Arthur Brown Jr. was sitting in his car behind another car driven by 

Esteban Zarates; both cars were waiting for the intersection light to 

turn green. Suddenly, a car turned the corner and crashed into both 

cars. Zarates sustained injuries from the collision. At trial, Zarates 
4

and Brown identified defendant as the driver who had caused the 

collision. 

After the collision, Brown watched defendant get out of his car

and walk away from the accident. Brown followed defendant to a 

shrubbed area near the intersection, where defendant threw something 

away before walking back to the cluster of cars. 

Police officers and a K-9 unit responded to the intersection and

located a .45 caliber magazine and .45 automatic handgun scattered 

approximately 30 feet apart in the shrubbed area. Officers also located 

a spent .45 casing on the windshield of defendant’s car, another .45 

casing under the passenger’s side seat, and live rounds on the 

floorboard.2 A criminalist testified that all of the casings—including 

those recovered from the area where Ducoing had witnessed defendant 

fire a handgun—were fired from the recovered .45 handgun. A swab of 

defendant’s hands positively identified the presence of gunshot residue, 

which, according to a criminalist, meant that defendant had either fired 

a gun or had been within three feet of a discharged firearm. 

When an officer interviewed defendant at the scene of the 

collision, the officer noticed defendant smelled of alcohol and slurred his 

speech; defendant admitted he had recently consumed two 24-ounce 

beers. After refusing a field sobriety examination, defendant was 

arrested and taken to the police station, where he submitted to a 

breathalyzer test. The test results yielded .18 percent and .17 percent

2 The officer located three live rounds capable of being fired. Two of the 

rounds were to a .45 firearm; one round was to a .357-magnum firearm. 
5

blood alcohol levels. A criminalist testified that an adult male the size 

of defendant with such high blood alcohol levels could not safely operate 

a vehicle. 

2. Defense Evidence

Defendant testified on his own behalf. He denied driving the car 

and denied firing or touching the firearm and ammunition.

3

3. Information, Verdict, and Sentencing

Defendant was charged with discharging a firearm with gross 

negligence (§ 246.3, subd. (a), count 1), possession of a firearm by a 

felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), count 2), unlawful possession of ammunition

(§ 30305, subd. (a)(1), count 3), driving under the influence of an 

alcoholic beverage causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a), count 

4), and driving with a .08 percent blood alcohol content causing injury 

(id., § 23153, subd. (b), count 5). As to counts 4 and 5, the information 

alleged that defendant had a blood alcohol level content of .15 percent

or higher. 

The information further alleged that defendant had been 

convicted of and served a prison term in 2013 for unlawful possession of 

a firearm with a gang enhancement (former § 29805, § 186.22, subd. 

3 Defendant testified that his friend “Spooky,” whose real name 

defendant did not know, drove the car and fired the handgun while defendant 

continued to sleep in the passenger’s seat. After the collision, Spooky “took 

off,” never to be seen by defendant again. 
6

(b)(1)(A)), which constituted a prior strike (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, 

subd. (b)), prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and prior 

prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). 

The jury found defendant guilty as charged and found the elevated 

blood alcohol content allegation on counts 4 and 5 true. 

In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that defendant 

had suffered a prior strike within the meaning of the Three Strikes law

(§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)), had been convicted of a prior 

serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and had served a prior prison term 

(§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court elected not to strike defendant’s prior 

conviction and sentenced him to an overall determinate term of nine 

years, comprised of the middle term of two years on count 1, doubled for 

the prior strike, plus five years for the prior seriously felony conviction. 

The court stayed the sentences on counts 2 and 5, and ran the sentences 

on counts 3 and 4 concurrently to count 1. 

DISCUSSION

1. Defendant Did Not Receive Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

When defendant indicated he would be testifying in his defense, 

the court inquired if there was evidence of defendant’s moral turpitude. 

The People identified defendant’s 2013 felony conviction for unlawful 

possession of a firearm with a gang enhancement (former § 29805, 

§ 186.22, subd. (B)(1)(A)). The court found the conviction to be a crime 

of moral turpitude, but it excluded any reference to the gang 

enhancement as unduly prejudicial and not probative on any issue. 
7

During cross-examination, the People asked, and defendant admitted 

that he had been convicted of felony possession of a firearm in 2013. 

Defendant contends that his trial counsel’s failure to object to the 

admissibility of his 2013 felony conviction constituted ineffective 

assistance of counsel. He asserts the prior conviction could not be used 

for impeachment because the crime on which the conviction was based 

(unlawful possession of a firearm by a person convicted of an 

enumerated misdemeanor) did not involve moral turpitude. He also 

contends that the use of the prior conviction was unduly prejudicial. 

We disagree.

A. Governing Law on the Right to Effective Assistance of 

Counsel

The Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel includes the 

right to the effective assistance of counsel. (Strickland v. Washington

(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686–694.) “‘In assessing claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, we consider whether counsel’s representation 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 

professional norms and whether the defendant suffered prejudice to a 

reasonable probability, that is, a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome. [Citations.]’” (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 

Cal.4th 347, 391 (Gamache).) 

Defendant bears the burden of establishing ineffective assistance 

of counsel. (Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 391.) We indulge every 

“presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of 

professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be 
8

explained as a matter of sound trial strategy. . . . If the record on 

appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the 

manner challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation 

and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory 

explanation. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; accord, People v. Thompson

(2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122 [“[c]ounsel is not ineffective for failing to make 

frivolous or futile motions”].)

B. Admission of Defendant’s Prior Felony Conviction

Subject to a trial court’s exercise of discretion under Evidence 

Code section 352, evidence of a felony conviction for an offense involving 

moral turpitude is admissible for impeaching any witness in a criminal 

proceeding. (People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 407; People v.

Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 313, 315–317; see Evid. Code, § 788; Cal. 

Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(4).) 

In determining whether an offense involves moral turpitude,

courts utilize “‘“[t]he ‘least adjudicated elements’ test[, which] means 

that ‘from the elements of the offense alone—without regard to the facts 

of the particular violation—one can reasonably infer the presence of 

moral turpitude.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.] “Crimes involve moral 

turpitude when they reveal dishonesty, a ‘“general readiness to do 

evil,”’” [citation], or “moral laxity of some kind” [citation].’ ([People v.]

Aguilar [(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1010,] 1017 [(Aguilar)].)” (People v.

Bedolla (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 535, 551 (Bedolla).) 
9

Here, the trial court admitted defendant’s 2013 conviction for 

violating former section 29805, which provides: “Except as provided in 

Section 29855 or subdivision (a) of Section 29800, any person who has 

been convicted of a misdemeanor violation of Section 71, 76, 136.1, 

136.5, or 140, subdivision (d) of Section 148, Section 171b, 171c, 171d, 

186.28, 240, 241, 242, 243, 243.4, 244.5, 245, 245.5, 246.3, 247, 273.5, 

273.6, 417, 417.6, 422, 626.9, 646.9, or 830.95, subdivision (a) of former 

Section 12100, as that section read at any time from when it was 

enacted by Section 3 of Chapter 1386 of the Statutes of 1988 to when it 

was repealed by Section 18 of Chapter 23 of the Statutes of 1994, 

Section 17500, 17510, 25300, 25800, 30315, or 32625, subdivision (b) or 

(d) of Section 26100, or Section 27510, or Section 8100, 8101, or 8103 of 

the Welfare and Institutions Code, any firearm-related offense pursuant 

to Sections 871.5 and 1001.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or of 

the conduct punished in subdivision (c) of Section 27590, and who, 

within 10 years of the conviction, owns, purchases, receives, or has in 

possession or under custody or control, any firearm is guilty of a public 

offense, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one 

year or in the state prison, by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars 

($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine.” (Former § 29805.)

4 

4 The statute has been amended to cover persons with a conviction of or 

outstanding warrant for the enumerated misdemeanor violations. The 

amendment also added to the list of violations sections 148.5, subdivision (f), 

422.6, and section 487 if the property taken was a firearm; and omitted from 

the list of violations former section 12100, subdivision (a). (§ 29805, subd. 

(a).)
10

The elements of the offense include: (1) defendant owned, 

purchased, received, or possessed a firearm; (2) defendant knew that he 

owned, purchased, received, or possessed the firearm; (3) defendant had 

previously been convicted of an enumerated misdemeanor(s); and (4) 

the previous conviction was within 10 years of defendant’s possession of 

the firearm. (CALCRIM No. 2511.)

Based on these elements, we conclude that defendant’s violation of

former section 29805 constituted a crime of moral turpitude. We reach 

this conclusion for two reasons. First, former section 29805 falls into 

the class of crimes involving the possession of a firearm. That class of 

crimes has consistently been found to involve moral turpitude given the 

increased risk of violence attending to possessing a firearm. (See 

Aguilar, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017 [carrying concealed firearm 

in a vehicle in violation of § 25400, subd. (a)(1)]; People v. Robinson

(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 707, 715 (Robinson) [unlawful possession of a 

firearm by a felon in violation of former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)]; People v. 

Feaster (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1093 [discharge of firearm in 

grossly negligent manner in violation of § 246.3]; People v. Garrett

(1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 795, 800 [possession of an unregistered firearm 

in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861, subd. (d)].)

Second, the statute proscribes possession of a firearm by persons 

“who have been proven unable to control violent criminal impulses.” 

(People v. Flores (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 568, 575 (Flores) [discussing 

constitutionality of former § 12021, subd. (c)]; see Law Rev. Com. 

comments to § 29805 [former § 12021, subd. (c) has been continued 
11

“without substantive change” by the enactment of former section 

29805].) Certainly, those who cannot control violent criminal impulse 

are more readily able to do evil. (See Bedolla, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 551.)

Defendant contends former section 29805 does not constitute a 

crime of moral turpitude because it proscribes conduct from 

misdemeanants, a class of recidivists he contends are generally “less 

dangerous than recidivist felons.” 

Former (and current) section 29805 does not apply generally to 

misdemeanants; it applies instead to a specific class of misdemeanants

who have committed crimes involving threats, intimidation and

impersonation;5 violence and/or use of firearms;

6 or the unlawful sale, 

possession, or reporting of deadly weapons or ammunition.7 By 

violating one or more of these crimes, prohibited persons under former 

section 29805 have demonstrated a propensity for violence and 

willingness to use a firearm for dangerous purposes. (See Flores, supra, 

169 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; accord, Robinson, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 714 [“[t]he purpose of [former] section 12021 is to protect the public 

5 See sections 71, 76, 136.1, 136.5, 140, 422, 422.6, 646.9, and 830.95.

6 See sections 240, 241, 242, 243, 243.4, 244.5, 245, 245.5, 246.3, 247, 

273.5, 273.6, 417, 417.6, 626.9, 17500, 17510, 25300, 25800, and 26100, 

subdivisions (b) and (d).

7 See section 148, subdivision (d), 148.5, subdivision (f), 171b, 171c, 

subdivision (a)(1), 171d, 186.28, 487 if theft was a firearm, 27590, subdivision 

(c), 30315, 32625, 27510; and Welfare and Institutions Code sections 8100, 

8101, 8103, 871.5, and 1001.5.
12

welfare by precluding the possession of guns by those who are more 

likely to use them for improper purposes”].) Thus, because defendant’s

violation of former section 29805 constituted a crime of moral turpitude, 

his prior felony conviction was admissible for purposes of impeachment. 

His counsel was not ineffective for objecting to its admission on this 

ground.

Anticipating this result, defendant contends trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to the use of the prior conviction, which 

he contends was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. 

Despite the record’s silence on why counsel abstained from objecting, 

the objection would have been futile. (See Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th 

at p. 391.) 

A trial court may exclude evidence if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will 

create a substantial danger of undue prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352; see 

People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 296 [trial courts have broad 

discretion to rule under Evid. Code, § 352].)

Defendant’s prior conviction was clearly probative on his

credibility, an issue defendant concedes “was of paramount importance”

because his testimony was the only support for his defense that he had 

not driven the car or touched the firearm or ammunition. (See People v. 

Mendoza (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 918, 925 [“defendant’s convictions were 

clearly probative on the issue of his credibility . . . . This is particularly 

true in light of the fact that defendant’s line of defense at trial was an 

outright denial of guilt, i.e., his credibility was directly at issue”].)
13

Despite the prior conviction’s similarity with the crimes on which 

defendant was tried, use of the prior conviction was not unduly 

prejudicial. Similarity between a prior conviction and the charged 

offenses is but one factor a court may consider when balancing 

probative value against prejudice. (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 

658, 722; People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 888 [excluding similar 

prior felony convictions “would have given defendant a ‘“false aura of 

veracity”’”]; People v. Gutierrez (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 85, 91 (Gutierrez); 

see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f).) The trial court instructed the 

jury that it could consider the prior felony conviction only in evaluating 

defendant’s credibility. “‘Any prejudice that the challenged information 

may have threatened must be deemed to have been prevented by the 

court’s limiting instruction to the jury. We presume that jurors 

comprehend and accept the court’s directions. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” 

(Gutierrez, supra, at p. 91.) 

In short, defendant’s prior felony conviction was admissible 

impeachment evidence, the use of which did not unduly prejudice 

defendant. Moreover, even if the court had excluded the prior 

conviction, defense counsel’s failure to object was not prejudicial. 

Defendant was identified as the lone perpetrator by three different 

witnesses, whose testimony was supported by the physical evidence, 

including the location of the firearm, ammunition, and gunshot residue 

traceable to defendant’s hands. Thus, had defense counsel objected and 

had the prior conviction been excluded, it is not reasonably probable 

that a different result would have been reached. (Gamache, supra, 48 

Cal.4th at p. 391.) 
14

2. Senate Bill No. 1393

On count 1 for discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent 

manner, the court imposed one consecutive five-year enhancement 

pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Defendant contends he is 

entitled to a remand based on the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1393, 

effective January 1, 2019, which amended section 1385 so as to give the 

trial court the discretion (which it previously did not have) to strike 

section 667 enhancements. The People contend remand is futile 

because the trial court’s statements demonstrate that it clearly 

intended to impose the enhancement, and would not have dismissed the 

enhancement. We conclude remand is appropriate.

“We are not required to remand to allow the court to exercise its 

discretion if ‘the record shows that the trial court clearly indicated when 

it originally sentenced the defendant that it would not in any event 

have stricken [the] . . . enhancement’ even if it had the discretion.

[Citation.]” (People v. Jones (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 267, 272–273 

(Jones).) “In reviewing whether the trial court made such an 

unequivocal indication, we consider the trial court’s statements and 

sentencing decisions.” (People v. Franks (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 883, 

892; see id. at p. 893 [trial court elected to impose upper term and 

stated it would not have dismissed the enhancement if it had the 

discretion to do so]; Jones, supra, at pp. 274–275 [trial court denied 

defendant’s motion for new trial, noted defendant had been released a 

few months prior to arrest, sentenced defendant to upper term, and 
15

“made clear its intention to impose the most stringent sentence it could 

justifiably impose”].)

Here, the trial court did not affirmatively indicate that it would 

refrain from striking the five-year enhancement if it had the discretion

to do so. Despite finding the factors in aggravation to be overwhelming 

and in favor of a high-term sentence, the court imposed the middle term

of two years imprisonment on count 1. The court also imposed a 

concurrent middle term of two years on count 3, even though it could 

have imposed the term consecutively.8 Thus, we remand the matter for 

the court to exercise its discretion to impose or strike the five-year 

enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

3. Senate Bill No. 136 

Defendant contends the trial court imposed an unauthorized 

sentence by staying rather than striking the prior prison term 

enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The People agree 

that, due to the recent enactment of Senate Bill No. 136, the court 

should have stricken the enhancement. 

While this appeal was pending, Senate Bill No. 136 amended 

section 667.5, subdivision (b), to restrict the circumstances under which 

a one-year sentence enhancement may be imposed for a prior prison 

term. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2020.) The court imposed 

and stayed a one-year prior prison term enhancement based on 

defendant’s 2013 conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm. 

8 The court also elected to run the sentence on count 4 concurrently. 
16

Section 667.5, subdivision (b) now allows for the imposition of a oneyear prior prison term enhancement only if the prior prison term was 

served for a sexually violent offense.

The People acknowledge that Senate Bill No. 136 applies 

retroactively to those like defendant whose sentences were not final at 

the time that Senate Bill No. 136 became effective. (People v. Chubbuck

(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1, 13–14.) We agree, and strike the one-year 

prior prison term enhancement.

4. Ability to Pay

At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a $300 restitution 

fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) a criminal conviction assessment of $150 (Gov. 

Code, § 70373), and a court operations assessment of $200 (§ 1465.8, 

subd. (a)(1)). Defendant contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance because counsel failed to request an ability to pay hearing 

(see People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1168 (Dueñas), which 

was decided after the sentencing hearing). We decline to address the 

issue. Given that we must remand the case for additional proceedings 

on the section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement, as part of that 

remand defendant may request a hearing to present evidence 

demonstrating whether he is unable to pay the fines, fees, and 

assessments imposed.

//

//
17

DISPOSITION

The one-year enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b) is 

stricken. The matter is remanded for the court to exercise its discretion 

whether to strike the five-year enhancement under section 667, 

subdivision (a)(1). On remand, defendant may also request a hearing 

on his ability to pay the fines, fees, and assessments. In all other 

respects, the judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

WILLHITE, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J.

COLLINS, J.