PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 08-4834

 

WALTER HOLMES; LISA HOLMES, Husband and Wife,

 Appellants

v.

KIMCO REALTY CORPORATION;

and

LOWE’S HOME CENTER INCORPORATED, A 

corporation of the State of North Carolina, Authorized 

to do business in New Jersey;

 Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff,

v.

PRICE LEGACY CORPORATION, as landlord 

successor by merger to Price Enterprises, Inc., 

a Maryland Corporation,

 Third Party Defendant/Forth Party Plaintiff,

v.
2

DAVID FLACK, doing business as BOUNTIFUL 

ACRES; GENERAL CASUALTY INSURANCE 

COMPANIES,

 Fourth Party Defendants.

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Number: 07-cv-00961)

District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler

 

Argued December 16, 2009

Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN,

Circuit Judges.

(Filed: March 17, 2010)

Robert G. Devine (Argued)

White & Williams

457 Haddonfield Road

Suite 400, Liberty View

Cherry Hill, NJ 08034-0000

Attorneys for Appellees Kimco Realty Corp

and Lowe’s Home Ctr, Inc.

Benjamin Goldstein (Argued)

Stanley N. Drinkwater

Drinkwater & Goldstein
3

277 White Horse Pike

Suite 200

Atco, NJ 08004

Attorneys for Appellants Walter Holmes and Lisa

Holmes

F. Herbert Owens, III

Sweeney & Sheehan

216 Haddon Avenue

Sentry Office Plaza, Suite 701

Westmont, NJ 08108-0000

Attorneys for Third Party-Appellee Price Legacy Corp.

Mauro C. Casci

Law Offices of Mauro C. Casci

739 Leonardville Road

P.O. Box 90

Leonardo, NJ 07737-0000

Attorneys for Not Party - Appellee David Flack, DBA

Bountiful Acres

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

This diversity action requires us to predict whether the

State of New Jersey would impose a common law duty on a
 The record suggests that Sports Authority was part of 1

the Shopping Center, but it is unclear whether it was in business

at the time of Holmes’s accident.

4

tenant in a multi-tenant shopping center to maintain the parking

lot owned by the landlord.

I.

On January 20, 2005, Walter Holmes drove to a shopping

center near Route 73 in Maple Shade, New Jersey (the Shopping

Center), consisting of a parking lot and several businesses in

stand-alone buildings, including Lowe’s Home Center, Bally’s

Total Fitness, and Mattress Giant. The businesses were some 1

distance apart, with the entrance to Bally’s located several

hundred feet from the main entrance of Lowe’s, and the

entrance to Mattress Giant even farther away. Holmes parked

in the area of the parking lot closest to Lowe’s. This area

contained shopping cart corrals displaying signs stating: “Please

keep our parking lots safe by returning your cart. Thank you for

shopping at Lowe’s.”

After making a purchase at Lowe’s, Holmes was pushing

his shopping cart to his car when he fell on “ice and/or snow” in

the parking lot. Another customer came to Holmes’s aid and

helped him return to Lowe’s to report the accident and obtain

medical assistance. Shortly after the accident, Lowe’s third

party insurance administrator, Specialty Risk Services (SRS),

contacted Holmes and his attorney, seeking information about

the accident and Holmes’s theory of Lowe’s liability. There was
 Holmes’s wife, Lisa Holmes, is also a plaintiff in the 2

case, alleging a claim for loss of consortium.

5

some additional correspondence between SRS and Holmes and

his attorney during the eighteen months following the accident.

On January 10, 2007, Holmes sued Lowe’s for negligent

maintenance of the parking lot. After the statute of limitations 2

had expired, Lowe’s informed Holmes that it was a tenant of the

Shopping Center, not the owner of the real estate where Holmes

slipped and fell.

Almost four years before Holmes slipped and fell,

Lowe’s had entered into a lease agreement (Lease) with Price

Legacy Corporation for the use of a retail facility within the

Shopping Center. Under the terms of the Lease, all tenants in

the Shopping Center were demised the interior space of their

individual buildings and enjoyed a non-exclusive right to use the

parking lot and other common areas. Under the Lease,

“Common Area” was defined as “the Primary Parking Area, the

remainder of the parking areas in the Shopping Center, service

drives, access roads . . . the entrances and exits of the Shopping

Center, and all other areas that may be provided by Landlord for

the general use in common of the tenants of the Shopping Center

and their . . . invitees.” Lease § 8(a)(iii). The Lease also

provided that “Tenant, its . . . invitees and customers shall have

the right to use, in common with all other occupants of the

Shopping Center and their respective . . . invitees and customers,

without charge, all Common Areas and Common Facilities of

the Shopping Center.” Lease § 8(f).
 Price Legacy apparently sold the property to PL 3

Mapleshade LLC c/o DRA Advisors LLC shortly before January

2005. In December 2008, during argument before the District

Court on the motions for summary judgment, the parties still had

6

Section 8(i) of the Lease required the landlord to

maintain the Common Areas, including snow removal. In turn,

each tenant was required to pay a pro rata share of common area

maintenance costs. Lease § 8(j). Finally, the Lease required the

landlord to “carry or cause to be carried commercial general

liability insurance . . . upon all Common Areas and Common

Facilities (not including the Demised Premises), naming Tenant

as an additional insured . . . .” Lease § 10(c).

In October 2004, Price Legacy contracted with Bountiful

Acres to remove snow from the Common Areas of the Shopping

Center. The agreement provided for “monitor[ing of] the site 24

hours a day, 7 days a week during the snow season for snow

and/or ice conditions,” and for dispatch of equipment to the site

to “control these conditions.” During the winter season,

Bountiful Acres kept equipment at the site, and dedicated a fulltime foreman to the Shopping Center, with responsibility for all

snow maintenance activities. On January 19, 2005, the day

before Holmes’s accident, Bountiful Acres had plowed and

salted the parking lot and shoveled the sidewalks.

When Holmes learned that Lowe’s did not own the real

estate upon which he fell, he amended his complaint to add two

entities suspected of owning the parking lot: Price Legacy and

Kimco Realty Corporation. This amendment came too late, 3
not identified conclusively the owner of the property at the time

of Holmes’s accident.

7

however, so the District Court granted summary judgment for

both entities because the statute of limitations had expired. The

District Court also granted summary judgment for Lowe’s,

finding that New Jersey would not impose a duty on a tenant for

maintenance of a multi-tenant parking lot. The District Court

ruled from the bench:

In this situation under the Erie doctrine I have to

predict what the New Jersey Supreme Court

would do with this. And although the Supreme

Court of New Jersey has extended liability in

some very specific situations beyond the actual

premises, I don’t think they would do so in this

case because of the multi-tenant use of this lot

and, therefore, I’m going to grant the motion for

summary judgment for Lowe’s. I do not find that

Lowe’s had any duty whatsoever.

I further don’t find under the facts presented to

the Court that Lowe’s assumed any duty over this

parking lot to maintain it free of ice and snow.

(Mot. Hr’g Tr. 53, Dec. 5, 2008.)
8

Holmes appeals only the grant of summary judgment to

Lowe’s. The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have appellate jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

We exercise de novo review over the District Court’s

summary judgment and view the facts in the light most

favorable to Holmes, the nonmoving party. See Kopec v. Tate,

361 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2004). The existence of a duty is

generally a matter of law. Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Developers,

675 A.2d 209, 212 (N.J. 1996). Because the question of a

tenant’s common law duty to maintain a multi-tenant parking lot

has not been addressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, we

must “predict how the New Jersey Supreme Court would rule if

presented with this case.” Repola v. Morbark Indus., Inc., 934

F.2d 483, 489 (3d Cir. 1991). In predicting how the highest

state court would decide an issue, we look to analogous state

court cases and “[i]n the absence of an authoritative

pronouncement by a state’s highest court, we may give serious

consideration to the opinion of an intermediate appellate court.”

Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Farrell, 855 F.2d 146, 148 (3d Cir.

1988) (citations omitted). We may also look to “scholarly

treatises, the Restatement of Law, and germane law review

articles.” McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662-

63 (3d Cir. 1980) (footnotes omitted). “[R]elevant state

precedents must be scrutinized with an eye toward the broad

policies that informed those adjudications, and to the doctrinal

trends which they evince.” Id. at 662.
9

A.

The threshold inquiry in a negligence action is whether

the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care. Under New

Jersey law, “whether a person owes a duty of reasonable care

toward another turns on whether the imposition of such a duty

satisfies an abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the

circumstances in light of considerations of public policy.”

Monaco v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 840 A.2d 822, 833 (N.J.

2004) (quoting Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110

(N.J. 1993)). This inquiry requires the balancing of several

factors including “the relationship of the parties, the nature of

the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care,

and the public interest in the proposed solution.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted).

Holmes correctly notes that New Jersey places a

relatively broad duty on commercial landowners to ensure the

safe ingress and egress of their patrons. In the landmark case of

Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, Inc., 432 A.2d 881, 887 (N.J.

1981), New Jersey reversed its “no liability” rule and extended

a commercial landowner’s duty of care to include the sidewalk

abutting its property, even when the sidewalk is neither owned

nor controlled by the landowner. The court identified a number

of public policy considerations supporting the imposition of

liability, including: (1) commercial landowners receive

considerable benefits from and rights to use the sidewalks, over

and above those of the public; (2) the “no liability” rule

undermines the goals of tort law by “le[aving] without recourse

many innocent parties who suffered serious injuries because of

sidewalk defects”; (3) the “no liability” rule provides no
10

incentive to abutting property owners to repair deteriorated

sidewalks and prevent injuries; (4) landowners are in an ideal

position to inspect and repair sidewalks abutting their property;

and (5) a New Jersey statute authorizes municipalities to make

abutting landowners responsible for sidewalk repair. Stewart,

432 A.2d at 884, 886-88. Two years after Stewart, the New

Jersey Supreme Court held that the duty to maintain sidewalks

in a reasonably safe condition includes a duty to remove

accumulations of snow and ice. Mirza v. Filmore Corp., 456

A.2d 518, 521 (N.J. 1983) (“The many innocent plaintiffs that

suffer injury because of unreasonable accumulations should not

be left without recourse.”). In the years since Stewart,

New Jersey courts have applied the case to broaden the duty of

care owed by landowners and tenants in exclusive possession for

the ingress and egress of their customers. In these cases, courts

have rejected lack of control over the premises as a defense to

imposition of a duty of care. See Monaco, 840 A.2d at 831

(“[I]n a long line of cases, our courts have extended a

commercial landowner’s duty, when warranted by the facts, to

cases in which the landowner had no control over the dangerous

condition and the condition was not located on its property.”).

For example, in Warrington v. Bird, the New Jersey Appellate

Division applied Stewart to impose a duty on a restaurant owner

whose customers were hit by a speeding car while crossing a

public road at night as they returned to the restaurant’s parking

lot. 499 A.2d 1026, 1030 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985)

(“[W]hen a business provides a parking lot across the roadway

from its establishment, the duty of the proprietor to exercise

reasonable care for the safety of its patrons extends to conditions

obtaining at the parking lot and requires that the patrons not be

subjected to an unreasonable risk of harm in traversing the
11

expected route between the two locations.”), cert. denied, 511

A.2d 653 (N.J. 1986).

Similarly, in Antenucci v. Mr. Nick’s Mens Sportswear,

the Appellate Division applied Stewart to impose a duty for

sidewalk maintenance on commercial tenants in exclusive

possession of the premises, reasoning that “the policy

considerations underlying the holding in Stewart have equal

applicability . . . to a lessee who is in exclusive possession of

commercial premises abutting a sidewalk.” 514 A.2d 75, 76-77

(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); see also Jackson v. K-Mart

Corp., 442 A.2d 1087, 1090-91 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981)

(tenant had same sidewalk duty as owner, otherwise “[b]usiness

tenants, knowing that their customers were traveling a defined

route to reach their premises, could ignore the unsafe condition

of that route with impunity”). The Antenucci court was careful

to limit its holding to tenants in exclusive possession, however,

and expressly declined to opine whether the same rule applied

to multi-tenant facilities. Id. at 77-78.

Although the New Jersey Supreme Court has not

addressed the question left open by Antenucci, subsequent cases

from lower courts have refused to impose a duty on tenants for

common areas of a multi-tenant facility. We now turn to those

cases.

B.

In Barrows v. Trustees of Princeton University, the New

Jersey trial court refused to apply Stewart and Antenucci to

commercial tenants in a “multi-tenant shopping complex.” 581
12

A.2d 913, 914 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990). After arriving

at a shopping complex, Barrows visited three stores before

falling on a patch of ice on the sidewalk in front of a fourth store

called Lavake’s. Barrows sued all four of the stores he had

visited, as well as the owner of the complex. The Barrows court

reviewed the expansive rules established by Stewart and

Antenucci but held that the duties they imposed “do not extend

to tenants in multi-tenant shopping complexes” because such

tenants “will not, absent a contractual obligation, have control

or maintenance responsibilities for common walkways or

sidewalks.” Barrows, 581 A.2d at 915. The court dismissed all

of the tenant stores except Lavake’s, whose potential liability

“d[id] not rest upon the holdings of Stewart and Antenucci but

upon common law principles of negligence,” i.e., Lavake’s had

control over the awning which created the icy patch on the

sidewalk and it could have foreseen the danger. Id. (citations

omitted).

The United States District Court for the District of New

Jersey subsequently applied Barrows to a negligence action

arising from a fall on a moving walkway at an airport in

Kantonides v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 802 F. Supp. 1203

(D.N.J. 1992). The court held that the airline’s duty to provide

its passengers with a reasonably safe means of ingress and

egress “did not and does not encompass the common areas of

the airport terminal.” Id. at 1215. Extension of a duty of care

to areas beyond the airline’s control would “violate principles of

foreseeability and fairness,” id. at 1216, with “no logical end to

th[e] duty,” id. at 1215.
13

The New Jersey Appellate Division also has considered

the issue of multi-tenant facilities in two unpublished decisions,

and has followed the reasoning of Barrows and Kantonides. In

a negligence action by a ferry customer who slipped on ice in a

parking lot, the court refused to impose a duty of care on the

ferry operator, which licensed its terminal from the County, for

snow removal in the adjacent County-owned parking lot, even

though the ferry operator had some responsibility with respect

to the lot which was used by its customers. Siegel v. County of

Monmouth, No. L-57-04, 2007 WL 1628141 (N.J. Super. Ct.

App. Div. June 7, 2007), certification denied, 932 A.2d 28 (N.J.

2007). Pursuant to the agreement between the ferry operator

and the County, passengers were permitted to park in the lot free

of charge, with the ferry operator providing a shuttle bus from

various areas of the parking lot to the terminal. Id. at *1. The

passengers did not have exclusive rights to the lot, however, as

it was also used by “[b]eachgoers, fishermen, sightseers, and any

other member of the public wishing to use the lot.” Id. at *1.

The agreement also provided that the County would be

responsible for snow removal from the lot, while the ferry

operator would be responsible for routine maintenance and daily

cleaning. Id. at *2.

The Siegel court concluded that the agreement did not

constitute a lease of the parking facility, and further held that the

ferry operator “lacked the necessary control over the parking lot

to give rise to a duty of care to plaintiff.” Id. at *5. Among

other reasons, the Appellate Division declined to impose a duty

for snow removal on the ferry operator because it was not

contractually required or authorized to remove snow from the

parking lot. Rather, the County retained responsibility for snow
14

removal and was exercising that duty. Finally, the court

distinguished Siegel from Jackson v. K-Mart Corp., noting that

(1) the ferry operator was a licensee, not a lessee of the County,

and (2) the ferry operator was not in exclusive possession of the

parking lot, so there was no “defined route” the ferry operator

knew its patrons would cross, unlike the tenant in Jackson. Id.

at *5.

Like Siegel, in McCann v. Borough of Washington, the

Appellate Division refused to impose a duty of care on Weight

Watchers, which rented a room inside a municipal building for

weekly meetings. No. L-294-04, 2006 WL 2726818 (N.J.

Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 26, 2006). A participant at a Weight

Watchers meeting slipped on ice on the front steps of the

Borough building and sued Weight Watchers and the Borough

for negligence. In refusing to impose a duty on Weight

Watchers, the court noted that the extension of liability to

commercial tenants in Antenucci had been limited to tenants in

exclusive possession of the premises. The court discounted the

plaintiff’s reliance on Warrington on the ground that the

restaurant was the sole occupant of the building and the parking

lot whereas Weight Watchers was one of many tenants of the

Borough building. Id. at *1-2. The Appellate Division

acknowledged that the New Jersey Supreme Court had

previously “eschewed ‘control’” over the premises as the

determinative factor in imposing a duty and instead looked to

basic fairness under all the circumstances. Id. at *2. The

McCann court reasoned: “it would not comport with basic

principles of fairness to impose a duty on the weekly renter of

a single meeting room, in a building occupied on a regular basis

by others.” Id.
See Berry v. Houchens Mkt. of Tenn., Inc., 253 S.W.3d 4

141, 146 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (shopping center tenant had no

duty to patron who slipped in oil in parking lot where parking lot

served multiple tenants and landlord was responsible for its

maintenance); Marrone v. S. Shore Props., 816 N.Y.S.2d 530,

532 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (lessee had no duty to maintain strip

mall sidewalk it neither owned nor possessed exclusively);

Durm v. Heck’s, Inc., 401 S.E.2d 908, 911 (W. Va. 1991)

(“[W]here a lease agreement clearly sets forth that the lessor has

the duty to maintain the non-leased common areas, thereby

retaining the lessor’s control over such areas, the lessee of a

store located in a shopping center is not liable when a patron

sustains injuries as a result of an accident which occurs on the

non-leased common area.”); Johnson v. Tom Thumb Stores, Inc.,

771 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (shopping center tenant

not liable to customer who fell in common area of shopping

center ten feet from entrance to tenant’s store where landlord

was responsible for and had control over common areas);

Dopico-Fernandez v. Grand Union Supermarket, 841 F.2d 11,

14-15 (1st Cir. 1988) (under Puerto Rico law, tenant served by

common areas in mini-mall not responsible for maintaining

those areas) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 864 (1988); Raspilair v.

Bruno’s Food Stores, Inc., 514 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Ala. 1987)

(shopping center tenants Wal-Mart and Bruno’s did not owe

15

The approach taken by Barrows and Kantonides is in

accord with the rule adopted by the great majority of other

jurisdictions to have considered the question which hold that a

lessee in a multi-tenant shopping center does not have a duty to

maintain common areas controlled by the landlord. See Frank 4
duty to customer who fell on plastic bag in parking lot where,

under the lease, shopping center owner was responsible for

cleaning and maintenance of parking lot); Hall v. Quivira

Square Dev. Co., Inc., 675 P.2d 931, 932-33 (Kan. App. 1984)

(tenant had no duty to warn customer who fell in multi-tenant lot

because shopping center owner solely responsible for making all

repairs and conducting maintenance for common areas including

sidewalks and parking spaces); Torres v. Piggly Wiggly Shop

Rite Foods, Inc., 600 P.2d 1198, 1200 (N.M. App. 1979)

(shopping center tenant not liable for customer’s fall on grease

in parking lot where, though lease silent as to responsibility for

maintenance, parking lot was for common use of all tenants and

tenant did not exercise control over parking lot), cert. denied,

604 P.2d 821 (N.M. 1979); Leary v. Lawrence Sales Corp., 275

A.2d 32, 34 (Pa. 1971) (“In Pennsylvania, it has long been

established as a principle of landlord-tenant law that where the

owner of real estate leases various parts thereof to several

tenants, but retains possession and control of the common

passageways and aisles which are to be used by business

invitees of the various tenants, the obligation of keeping the

common aisles safe for the business invitees is imposed upon

the landlord and not upon the tenants, in the absence of a

contrary provision in the lease or leases.”); Underhill v.

Shactman, 151 N.E.2d 287, 290 (Mass. 1958) (shopping center

tenant not liable to customer who fell in parking lot landlord was

obliged to maintain notwithstanding fact that tenant could

provide parking attendants). But see, e.g., Levy v. Home Depot,

Inc., 518 So. 2d 941 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (Home Depot not

absolved from liability for gap in elevated sidewalk in common

16
parking lot of shopping mall simply because mall owner

contractually responsible for common area maintenance);

Wilson v. Allday, 487 So. 2d 793, 798 (Miss. 1986) (lessee had

duty of care with respect to shopping center parking lot if its use

constituted possession and control); Hopkins v. F.W. Woolworth

Co., 419 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981) (lessee in

shopping mall had duty to patron who fell on common area

sidewalk near lessee’s store, “[e]ven if a finding were warranted

that Woolworth had no control over the sidewalk on which the

plaintiff fell, it would not be relieved from its duty to warn

invitees of danger” of which it was aware).

 We reject Lowe’s argument that it should not be held 5

liable because the Lease obliged the landlord to remove snow

and the contracting parties are in the best position to allocate

such risks. The allocation of risk made by the lease may define

indemnity rights between Lowe’s and the landlord, but it cannot

17

D. Wagner, Annotation, Liability of Lessee of Particular

Premises in Shopping Center for Injury to Patron from

Condition on Portion of Premises Not Included in His

Leasehold, 48 A.L.R.3d 1163 (2009).

C.

In light of the cases we have discussed, Holmes argues

that Lowe’s is more similar to a stand-alone facility with

responsibility for its parking lot like the K-Mart in Jackson,

while Lowe’s urges us to apply the rule for multi-tenant

shopping complexes. Holmes relies heavily on the following 5
conclusively determine Lowe’s common law tort duties to third

party invitees. See Jackson v. K-Mart Corp., 442 A.2d at 1091

(“The effect of the covenant to maintain is only to allocate costs

between the tenant and the property owner. . . . [T]he covenant

absolves neither landlord nor tenant from liability to innocent

third parties.”); O’Connell v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition

Auth., 766 A.2d 786 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (tenant not

absolved of liability where lease placed maintenance

responsibility on landlord because tenant exercised some control

over interior of stadium where plaintiff fell) (citations omitted).

Of course, the converse of this proposition is true as well. If

New Jersey were to adopt the dissent’s rule of law, tenants

would be jointly and severally liable and would have no

common law right of complete indemnification. See New Jersey

Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-3

(providing that a joint tortfeasor who “pays [a] judgment in

whole or in part, . . . shall be entitled to recover contribution

from the other joint tortfeasor . . . for the excess so paid over his

pro rata share”). 

18

language from Warrington for the proposition that imposition of

a duty is determined by the reasonable expectation of an invitee:

[T]he critical element should not be the question

of the proprietor’s control over the area to be

traversed but rather the expectation of the invitee

that safe passage will be afforded from the

parking facility to the establishment to which they

are invited. Commercial entrepreneurs know in
19

providing the parking facility that their customers

will travel a definite route to reach their premises.

The benefitting proprietor should not be permitted

to cause or ignore an unsafe condition in that

route which it might reasonably remedy, whether

the path leads along a sidewalk or across a

roadway.

Warrington, 499 A.2d at 1029-30 (emphasis added). Under

Holmes’s approach, Barrows and Kantonides do not apply here

because Lowe’s did not look or act like a multi-tenant facility;

it was located in a stand-alone building, with essentially its own

parking area designated by Lowe’s cart corrals and signs.

Therefore, a “reasonable invitee” would expect Lowe’s to have

a duty to maintain the parking area where Holmes fell.

As a preliminary matter, we note that it is unclear that the

expectation of an invitee is relevant in the context of a multitenant facility, as Warrington involved a proprietor in exclusive

possession, and neither Barrows nor Kantonides considered

invitee expectation as part of their multi-tenant analyses. See

Kantonides, 802 F. Supp. at 1214 (refusing to apply reasoning

of Antenucci/Warrington because “[t]his line of cases . . . deals

only with tenants in exclusive control of the premises”).

Regardless, even when invitee expectation is considered,

Holmes’s argument fails because the Shopping Center parking

lot looked like a multi-tenant facility. The signs at the entrance

to the lot identify multiple tenants, not just Lowe’s. While a

Lowe’s customer will undoubtedly park as close as possible to

that store, he could park anywhere in the lot. Unlike in

Warrington and Jackson—and contrary to the dissent’s
The record demonstrates that some of the parking 6

spaces in front of Bally’s are closer to Lowe’s than many of the

parking spaces in front of Lowe’s. This is especially true if one

patronizes Lowe’s lumber center. This fact highlights the

uncertainty inherent in the rule of law proposed by the dissent,

which would vary from store to store and from shopping center

to shopping center depending on the tenant mix and the

configuration of the parking lot.

20

characterization—there is not one “defined route” from the lot

to the store. Therefore, while a reasonable invitee to the 6

Shopping Center would expect safe passage from the parking lot

to any of the stores benefitting from the lot, the invitee would

not reasonably expect one tenant to be responsible for

maintaining the entire lot. See Puterman v. City of Long

Branch, 859 A.2d 1246 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2004)

(refusing to impose duty on owner of strip mall for icy

conditions in an adjacent municipal lot even though owner

advertised that patrons could park in the lot where there were

numerous routes an invitee could take from the lot to the mall).

While our dissenting colleague correctly notes that Lowe’s and

the other tenants are located in stand-alone buildings instead of

interconnected stores, this fact does not negate the shared nature

of the parking lot.

Although Barrows, Siegel, McCann, and Kantonides are

not decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court, and are not

binding on our interpretation of New Jersey law, we find them

persuasive because they are consonant with the public policy

considerations underlying Stewart and the basic fairness
21

principle of Monaco. It is true both that Lowe’s derives a

benefit from the parking lot and that the imposition of a duty

would incentivize Lowe’s to prevent dangerous conditions. But

countervailing policy considerations weigh more heavily against

imposition of a duty. To oblige tenants to maintain common

areas would result in substantially increased costs with little

added benefit. Landlords already have great incentive to keep

the parking areas of their shopping centers free of snow, ice, and

other hazards. A well-maintained parking lot induces shoppers

to patronize the center and motivates tenants to pay their

common area maintenance fees. Given the landlord’s snow

removal program here, the risk of not imposing a duty on

Lowe’s is minimal. Moreover, the imposition of a duty on the

tenants would result in duplicative effort and interference with

the landlord’s maintenance program. It is not hard to imagine

the confusion, and perhaps danger, that could ensue if snow

plows and salt trucks hired by the landlord, Lowe’s, Bally’s

Total Fitness, and Mattress Giant all attempted to maintain the

parking lot at the same time. The thought of the same occurring

in a shopping center with twenty or more tenants highlights the

absurdity of such a shared duty.

Imposition of a duty on tenants in a multi-tenant facility

also would lead to uncertainty with respect to the areas of the

parking lot for which each tenant is responsible. See

Kantonides, 802 F. Supp. at 1215 (“If KLM were found to owe

passengers a duty of care with regard to distant premises that it

does not own, lease, control or maintain, there would be no

logical end to that duty.”). This uncertainty would encourage

“shotgun” litigation of the type seen in Barrows, where the
 Holmes also argues that Lowe’s owed him a duty 7

because it exercised some control over the parking lot, primarily

with respect to the placement and maintenance of cart corrals.

This argument is factually inapt because Holmes was not injured

in a cart corral or by a shopping cart.

We also reject Holmes’s argument that Lowe’s should 8

be estopped from denying liability because it misled him into

believing that it was the responsible party. Holmes’s evidence

is insufficient to establish estoppel because he has not presented

any affirmative statements by Lowe’s that it was the owner of

the parking lot. Moreover, because estoppel is an equitable

22

customer sued every store at which he had browsed or purchased

an item prior to his fall.

Finally, one of the driving factors behind Stewart’s

abandonment of the “no liability” rule is not implicated in the

multi-tenant situation. The Stewart court expressed concern for

injured customers who would be left without a remedy if

landowners were not held responsible for abutting public

sidewalks. Here, it is undisputed that the landlord—who owned,

controlled, and was responsible for maintenance of the parking

lot—had a duty to Holmes. That Holmes failed to file suit

against the landlord within the limitations period leaves him

without a remedy in this case, but counsel’s error here should

not result in the imposition of an unfair and unworkable duty

upon the tenant. The burden of identifying the owner of a 7

multi-tenant property is not an onerous one and can be

determined simply by examining public records.8
doctrine, the party requesting such a remedy must demonstrate

“good faith . . . and reasonable diligence.” Gluck v. Rynda

Dev. Co., 134 A. 363, 367-68 (N.J. 1926) (emphasis added).

Neither Holmes nor his counsel (whom Holmes retained shortly

after the accident) undertook to determine ownership of the lot

in a timely manner.

23

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we predict that New Jersey

would not impose a duty on an individual tenant for snow

removal from the common areas of a multi-tenant parking lot

when the landlord has retained and exercised that responsibility.

Therefore, we will affirm Lowe’s summary judgment.
FISHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The New Jersey courts have placed a broad duty of care

on proprietors to ensure the safe ingress and egress of their

patrons. Because I believe that the New Jersey Supreme Court

would find that Lowe’s owes Holmes a duty of care in the

circumstances presented here, I respectfully dissent.

The landmark decision imposing a broad duty of care on

store proprietors is Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street Inc., 432 A.2d

881 (N.J. 1981). In Stewart, the New Jersey Supreme Court

rejected a traditional “no liability” rule and held that

“commercial landowners are responsible for maintaining in

reasonably good condition the [public] sidewalks abutting their

property and are liable to pedestrians injured as a result of their

negligent failure to do so.” Id. at 887. In explaining its

rationale, the court articulated some of New Jersey’s public

policy considerations. According to the court, the liability rule

would (1) “provide a remedy to many innocent plaintiffs,”

(2) “give owners of abutting commercial property an incentive

to keep their sidewalks in proper repair,” and (3) “eliminate . . .

arbitrariness.” Id. The court also noted that owners are in the

best position to inspect and discover sidewalk defects: “Logic

and common sense also support the imposition of this duty,

inasmuch as owners of abutting property are in an ideal position

to inspect sidewalks and to take prompt action to cure defects.”

Id. at 888. See also Mirza v. Filmore Corp., 456 A.2d 518, 521

(N.J. 1983) (extending Stewart to cover snow and ice removal).

The lower New Jersey courts have also placed a broad

duty of care on store proprietors. See, e.g., Nelson v. Great Atl.

& Pac. Tea Co., 137 A.2d 599, 603 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2

1958) (extending a proprietor’s duty of care to the supermarket

parking lot); Merkel v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 187 A.2d 52, 55

(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1962) (extending a proprietor’s duty

of care to the public sidewalk connecting the parking area to the

store entrance). But see, e.g., Chimiente v. Adam Corp., 535

A.2d 528, 529-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (declining to

extend the duty of care to a pathway created by the trespassing

public on a grassy slope adjacent to a shopping center but held

by a separate owner). In particular, in Warrington v. Bird, 499

A.2d 1026 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), the New Jersey

Appellate Division held that a proprietor’s duty of care to its

patrons extended to a roadway when patrons were required to

cross the roadway to reach the proprietor’s parking lot. The

court explained, “the critical element should not be the question

of the proprietor’s control over the area to be traversed but

rather the expectation of the invitee that safe passage will be

afforded from the parking facility to the establishment to which

they are invited.” Id. at 1029-30.

Against this backdrop of proprietor liability, we are

presented with a discrete sub-issue: we must determine whether

the Lowe’s store’s status as a tenant affects any duty of care it

might otherwise have owed to its customers. Since the New

Jersey Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this question, we are

obliged to predict how it would resolve the issue. See Hunt v.

U.S. Tobacco Co., 538 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 2008). As the

majority states, “[i]n the absence of an authoritative

pronouncement by a state’s highest court, we may give serious

consideration to the opinion of an intermediate appellate court.”

Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Farrell, 855 F.2d 146, 148 (3d Cir.

1988). Fortunately, several New Jersey superior court cases are
3

illustrative. A New Jersey trial court, Jackson v. K-Mart Corp.,

442 A.2d 1087 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981), and appellate

court, Antenucci v. Mr. Nick’s Mens Sportswear, 514 A.2d 75

(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), have extended the Stewart

liability rule to cover commercial tenants. However, another

New Jersey trial court, Barrows v. Trustees of Princeton

University, 581 A.2d 913 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990), and

a federal district court applying New Jersey law, Kantonides v.

KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 802 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1992),

have since carved out an exception to the liability rule for multitenant facilities.

In Jackson, the plaintiff slipped and fell on a sidewalk

connecting a K-mart store, of which she was a patron, to a

parking lot. 442 A.2d at 1088. K-mart, a lessee, filed a motion

for summary judgment on the grounds that it did not own the

sidewalk and held no responsibility for its maintenance. Id. The

New Jersey Law Division disagreed, holding that K-mart’s

liability was concurrent with that of the property owner. Id. at

1091. Looking to Stewart for guidance, the court made three

“conclusions of law and policy”:

“(1) The operator of a commercial establishment

must provide reasonably safe premises for

business invitees.

(2) No distinction should be made between the

operator-owner and the operator-tenant, since in

either case it is the operator who is in the best

position to discover any dangerous condition.
4

(3) The duty to provide reasonably safe premises

includes a duty to provide a safe path of egress

from the premises.”

Id. at 1090. The court explained that to hold otherwise “would

discourage commercial operators from undertaking necessary

corrective measures even though a transient hazard, such as a

snow and ice accumulation, would often be easily discovered by

an operator.” Id.

The New Jersey Appellate Division followed suit in

Antenucci. As in Jackson, the plaintiff in Antenucci fell on a

sidewalk in front of a proprietor-tenant, a sporting goods store.

514 A.2d at 75-76. Finding that Stewart “did not make a

distinction between the owner and a tenant in exclusive

possession of the commercial premises” and that the Stewart

public policy considerations applied in both instances, the court

held, “we find sufficient direction in Stewart to impose upon a

lessee in exclusive possession of premises abutting a public

sidewalk[] a duty to keep the walkway in good repair for the

benefit of pedestrians.” Id. at 77. The court emphasized that the

rule “applies only to a commercial tenant who is in exclusive

possession of the premises abutting the sidewalk.” Id.

Four years later, the New Jersey Law Division in

Barrows carved out a logical exception to the tenant liability

rule. Unlike Jackson and Antenucci, where the plaintiffs each

fell in front of a single store, the plaintiff in Barrows slipped and

fell on a patch of ice on a mall sidewalk. 581 A.2d at 914.

Although the plaintiff was in front of a particular store when he

fell, he had shopped in several of the mall’s stores during the
5

course of his trip. Id. Under these circumstances, the Barrows

court cited Antenucci with approval but declined to apply its

holding in the mall context:

“Because tenants in a multi-tenant shopping mall

will not, absent a contractual obligation, have

control or maintenance responsibilities for

common walkways or sidewalks, this court

concludes that the duties imposed by Stewart and

Antenucci do not extend to tenants in multi-tenant

shopping complexes.”

Id. at 915. Accordingly, the court granted the defendants’

motions for summary judgment. Id.

The only other court to apply a multi-tenant exception in

a published opinion is the federal district court in Kantonides, a

case involving a very unique set of facts. In Kantonides, the

plaintiffs filed suit against an airline company, which was to

provide them with round-trip air transportation, after the

plaintiffs fell on a moving walkway while proceeding to a

connecting flight. 802 F. Supp. at 1205. The moving walkway

was in the common area of a terminal building that was owned,

maintained, and controlled by the airport, not the specific airline

company. Id. at 1206. Citing both Antenucci and Barrows with

approval, the district court held that “[the airline] is a

commercial tenant and does not ‘exclusively possess’ the

common area of [the airport] where the moving walkway is

located” and granted the airline’s motion for summary judgment.

Id. at 1214-16. The court explained that the opposite conclusion

would be “impractical”: “If [the airline] were found to owe
6

passengers a duty of care with regard to distant premises that it

does not own, lease, control or maintain, there would be no

logical end to that duty.” Id. at 1215.

Examining these opinions against the backdrop of New

Jersey case law, I would hold that the New Jersey Supreme

Court would find Lowe’s liable and not apply the multi-tenant

exception articulated in Barrows and applied in Kantonides.

Although Lowe’s may technically be a part of a multi-tenant

complex, the Maple Shade Shopping Center does not resemble

the Barrows or Kantonides facilities: Lowe’s was in “exclusive

possession” of its building – albeit in a larger, shared shopping

area – while the tenants in Barrows shared possession of one

mall building, and the airlines in Kantonides shared possession

of one airport terminal. See Antenucci, 514 A.2d at 77. The

Barrows and Kantonides facilities also housed a much larger

number of tenants in much closer proximity than the Maple

Shade Shopping Center.

The facts of the instant case are much more similar to

those presented in Jackson. Like most K-mart and Lowe’s

stores, Lowe’s occupies a separate building thatsits at a distance

from the three other tenants in the Maple Shade Shopping

Center. Its parking lot is defined and set apart by “cart corrals”

that house Lowe’s carts and are marked by Lowe’s signs, which

demonstrates that the tenants have jointly inspected and

exercised control over separate sections of the parking area.

The cart corrals also signal to the customer that Lowe’s is a

separate entity with its own responsibilities, leading Lowe’s

patrons to “expect[] . . . that safe passage will be afforded from

the parking facility to the [Lowe’s] to which they are invited.”
7

Warrington, 499 A.2d at 1029. In these circumstances, a New

Jersey court would likely hold that there is no distinction

between proprietor-owners and proprietor-tenants. A contrary

holding could lead to an absurd result, as a K-mart or Lowe’s

store’s duty of care would depend on whether the store stood

alone on a highway or within a few hundred feet of another

tenant in a “shopping center.”

The majority states that “a Lowe’s customer . . . could

park anywhere in the lot” and that “there is not one ‘defined

route’ from the lot to the store.” I disagree. Since the Maple

Shade Shopping Center has only three distinct stores – a

Lowe’s, a fitness center, and a mattress store – its customers

most likely park directly in front of the single store they plan to

visit and do not meander through the parking lot on an extended

shopping trip that encompasses multiple stops. Therefore, the

“defined route” extends from the parking lot in front of Lowe’s

to the Lowe’s store entrance.

The public policy considerations articulated by the New

Jersey Supreme Court in Stewart also support a finding of

liability in the present case. First, the imposition of a duty of

care will provide a remedy to Holmes, who, other than his

failure to examine the public records to determine the owner of

the Maple Shade Shopping Center, is an “innocent plaintiff.”

Stewart, 432 A.2d at 887. More importantly, allowing plaintiffs

like Holmes to pursue their claims gives Lowe’s “an incentive

to keep [its parking lot] in proper repair.” Id. This makes sense.

Even beyond owners, who may or may not keep watch over their

property, tenants “are in an ideal position to inspect [parking

lots] and to take prompt action to cure defects.” Id. at 888. To
8

hold otherwise would allow tenants to turn a blind eye to

dangerous parking lot or sidewalk conditions with the assurance

that they will not be held responsible. Finally, liability will

“eliminate . . . arbitrariness” by placing plaintiffs who file suit

against proprietor-owners and those who file suit against

proprietor-tenants in the same position. Id. at 887.

The majority expresses a legitimate concern that “the

imposition of a duty on the tenants would result in duplicative

effort and interfere with the landlord’s maintenance program.”

Keeping in mind that we are charged with predicting New Jersey

Supreme Court decisions, not with fashioning a preferable rule,

I disagree that this concern outweighs those I have just

expressed. The imposition of a duty of care will probably not

incite tenants to engage in their own competing maintenance

programs. Rather, tenants will be encouraged to keep a

watchful eye over leased premises and give prompt notification

to landlords when problems arise. In the event that a tenant is

held liable for its patrons’ injuries, the tenant will have the

option of pursuing an indemnification action against the

responsible landlord, a point that the majority opinion fails to

stress.

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, I respectfully

dissent.