NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

REHCO LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

SPIN MASTER, LTD.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2017-2589

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois in No. 1:13-cv-02245, Judge 

John Robert Blakey.

______________________ 

Decided: February 4, 2019

______________________ 

TIMOTHY EDWARD GROCHOCINSKI, Nelson Bumgardner 

Albritton P.C., Orland Park, IL, argued for plaintiffappellant. Also represented by JOSEPH P. OLDAKER. 

 MEGAN JOANNA REDMOND, Erise IP, P.A., Overland 

Park, KS, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by CAROLINE A. BADER, ERIC ALLAN BURESH. 

______________________ 
2 REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK and MOORE,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge PROST. 

Opinion dissenting-in-part filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 

PROST, Chief Judge. 

Plaintiff-appellant Rehco, LLC (“Rehco”) sued defendant-appellee Spin Master, Ltd. (“Spin Master”) for breach 

of contract and infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,100,866 

(the “’866 patent”).1 The district court granted summary 

judgment for Spin Master on both claims. Rehco appeals. 

We vacate the district court’s summary judgment and 

remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

I 

Rehco and Spin Master executed a “Radio-Controlled 

Helicopter Agreement” in 2001. J.A. 1316–31 (the “Helicopter Agreement”). Under this agreement, Rehco would 

develop a toy, and Spin Master would have an exclusive 

license to that toy. Spin Master would pay Rehco royalties on sales of the toy. Rehco terminated the Helicopter 

Agreement in 2008.

An auditor conducted an audit of Spin Master’s royalty payments to Rehco, and on October 8, 2010, the parties 

executed a “Settlement and Release Agreement” concerning the audit. J.A. 1495–97 (the “Settlement”). The 

Settlement defines certain terms as follows: 

1 Rehco’s Second Amended Complaint raised two 

breach-of-contract claims—one for each of two contracts. 

In accordance with a stipulated dismissal and the district 

court’s final judgment, only one of those claims is before 

us on appeal. 

 
REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 3

A. In January of 2009, at the request of Rehco

[the auditor] conducted an audit of Spin Master’s 

royalty accounting records related to the licenses 

listed below as referenced by the product SKUs 

identified in [the auditor’s] January 2009 report

(“Audit”) for the selling periods of Q1 2006 

through Q1 2008 (“Audit Period’ [sic]); and

B. The Parties wish to settle any disputes relating 

to the Audit, and further wish to settle any disputes relating to the Audit for selling periods outside the Audit Period through Q2 2010 

(“Additional Selling Periods”) on the terms and 

conditions set forth in this Agreement.

J.A. 1495. The Settlement also states: 

Subject to the representations and warranties below, Rehco hereby releases and forever discharges 

Spin Master . . . from any and all claims, counterclaims, demands, damages, debts, liabilities, accounts, actions and causes of action, known or 

unknown, liquidated or contingent, which are related to the Audit and Additional Selling Periods, 

and any claims for royalties thereunder (other 

than the Spin Master obligations under this 

Agreement) which arose, existed, or could have 

been asserted prior to the Effective Date.

J.A. 1496.

II

The ’866 patent is directed to a control system for a 

flying vehicle. Rehco defines claims 1, 2, and 3 of the ’866 
4 REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 

patent as the “Asserted Claims.”2 Appellant’s Br. 11. 

Claim 1 is reproduced below:

1. A vehicle having a means for propelling in a 

vertical direction, further comprising:

a transmitter positioned on the bottom of said vehicle for transmitting a signal from the vehicle 

downwardly away from said vehicle;

a receiver positioned on the bottom of said vehicle 

for receiving said signal as it is bounced off of a 

surface, defined as a bounced signal; and

a control system that automatically sets a speed 

of the propelling means in response to the receiver, said control system having a first means 

to set the speed of the propelling means to a 

first speed when the receiver receives the 

bounced signal and the control system having a 

second means to set the speed of the propelling 

means to a second speed when the receiver 

does not receive the bounced signal, the first 

speed being predefined as a speed that causes 

the vehicle to gain altitude and the second 

speed being predefined as a speed that causes 

the vehicle to lose altitude.

’866 patent claim 1 (emphasis added).

III

The district court granted summary judgment for 

Spin Master on Rehco’s claims for breach of the Helicopter 

Agreement and infringement of the ’866 patent. 

2 Rehco agreed that these claims rise and fall together for purposes of this appeal. Oral Arg. at 10:49–55, 

No. 2017-2589, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oralargument-recordings (“Oral Arg.”). 

 
REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 5

Rehco claimed that Spin Master breached the Helicopter Agreement by failing to pay the required royalties. 

Relevant here, the parties disputed whether the Settlement precluded Rehco’s claim for royalties on the Havoc 

Heli product. The district court found that because the 

Havoc Heli was on the market before the audit was initiated, claims on the Havoc Heli “could have been[] asserted” before the Settlement’s Effective Date. J.A. 50. The 

court therefore concluded that the Settlement precluded 

any claim for royalties on the Havoc Heli. Id.

As to Rehco’s patent-infringement claim, the district 

court found it necessary to construe “a signal” to resolve 

the parties’ dispute. The court acknowledged the general 

rule that use of the indefinite article “a” means “one or 

more” and that exceptions to this rule are “extremely 

limited.” J.A. 57–58. But it concluded that the ’866 

patent presented such an exception and construed “a 

signal” to mean “a single signal being emitted from the 

transmitter, and not multiple signals.” J.A. 61. With this 

construction, the court concluded that Spin Master’s 

products cannot infringe the ’866 patent because all of 

those products employ multiple signals. Id. 

The district court also considered another potential 

basis for granting summary judgment of noninfringement—one based on the “predefined speed” limitation of claim 1. The court noted Spin Master’s argument that the accused products “never set a predefined 

speed that causes the vehicle to either gain or lose altitude.” J.A. 62. Although the district court’s opinion is 

unclear on whether it adopted this argument as an alternative basis for granting summary judgment of noninfringement3—independent of its construction of “a 

3 Confusion on this point was evident at oral argument. Rehco’s counsel at times seemed to concede that 

the district court found that summary judgment was 

 
6 REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 

signal”—Spin Master advances the same argument on 

appeal, which we address below.4

Rehco appeals the district court’s summary judgment. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

DISCUSSION

We review a grant of summary judgment under the 

regional circuit’s law. BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 

899 F.3d 1281, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The Seventh Circuit 

reviews summary judgments de novo, asking “whether, if 

the record of the summary judgment proceeding were the 

record of a trial, a reasonable factfinder, whether judge or 

jury, could find in favor of the party opposing the motion.” 

Reales v. Consol. Rail Corp., 84 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 

1996) (quoting Johnson v. Gudmundsson, 35 F.3d 1104, 

1112 (7th Cir. 1994)). 

appropriate because the accused products did not satisfy 

the “control system/predefined speed” limitation. Oral 

Arg. at 4:40–50; id. at 6:15–30. But cf. id. at 5:38–6:01; 

id. at 6:31–59. Spin Master’s counsel, however, conceded

that the opinion does not contain a clear statement to that 

effect. Oral Arg. at 20:30–21:23. 4 The district court also noted Spin Master’s argument that claim 1 is limited to a “binary control system,” 

under which the vehicle is always moving up or down 

(unlike Spin Master’s characterization of its own products 

as maintaining the vehicles at a specific height). J.A. 62. 

In response to a clarifying question from this court, Spin 

Master’s counsel agreed that the issue regarding the 

control-system limitation is whether the accused products 

satisfy the predefined-speed limitation of claim 1. Oral 

Arg. at 21:50–22:15; id. at 23:01–23:20 (agreeing that the 

accused products go up and down based on the receipt or 

non-receipt of signals, but not based on setting a predefined speed that causes the vehicles to go up or down).

 
REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 7

We review the district court’s contract interpretation 

here de novo. See Platinum Tech., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 

282 F.3d 927, 931 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the district 

court’s interpretation of an unambiguous contract is 

reviewed de novo). We also review claim construction de 

novo where, as here, the district court considered only 

evidence intrinsic to the patent. E.g., Poly-Am., L.P. v. 

API Indus, Inc., 839 F.3d 1131, 1135–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 

(citing Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 

831, 840–42 (2015)). 

Determining infringement requires two steps: 

(1) properly construing the claim; and (2) comparing the 

properly construed claim to the accused product. Absolute 

Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc., 659 F.3d 1121, 1129 

(Fed. Cir. 2011). Infringement is a question of fact. Id. at 

1129–30. “On appeal from a grant of summary judgment 

of non-infringement, we determine whether, after resolving reasonable factual inferences in favor of the patentee, 

the district court correctly concluded that no reasonable 

jury could find infringement.” Id. at 1130.

We discuss Rehco’s breach-of-contract and patentinfringement claims in turn.

I 

Rehco argues that the district court misinterpreted 

the Settlement’s release language in concluding that the 

release precluded Rehco’s claim for royalties on the Havoc 

Heli. Rehco’s argument relies on the Settlement’s definition of Audit and the release language itself. The Settlement defines “Audit” as follows:

A. In January of 2009, at the request of Rehco

[the auditor] conducted an audit of Spin Master’s 

royalty accounting records related to the licenses 

listed below as referenced by the product SKUs 

identified in [the auditor’s] January 2009 report

(“Audit”) . . . .
8 REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 

J.A. 1495 (emphasis added). And the pertinent release 

language states:

Subject to the representations and warranties below, Rehco hereby releases and forever discharges 

Spin Master . . . from any and all claims, counterclaims, demands, damages, debts, liabilities, accounts, actions and causes of action, known or 

unknown, liquidated or contingent, which are related to the Audit and Additional Selling Periods, 

and any claims for royalties thereunder (other 

than the Spin Master obligations under this 

Agreement) which arose, existed, or could have 

been asserted prior to the Effective Date. 

J.A. 1496 (emphasis added).

Rehco’s argument is straightforward. According to 

Rehco, the above-quoted release language did not release 

Rehco’s claims for royalties on the Havoc Heli because 

(1) the release language only released claims “related to 

the Audit and Additional Selling Periods, and any claims 

for royalties thereunder”; (2) “Audit” is a defined term

limited to the product SKUs identified in the auditor’s 

January 2009 report; and (3) there is no dispute that the 

Havoc Heli was not included in the January 2009 report. 

In other words, Rehco argues that while it released Spin 

Master from claims “related to the Audit,” the Havoc 

Heli’s absence from the auditor’s January 2009 report 

rendered that product not within the scope of how the 

parties defined “Audit.”5 Therefore, Rehco contends, it 

did not release any claim for royalties on the Havoc Heli 

in the Settlement. We agree with Rehco’s interpretation.

5 The definition of “Additional Selling Periods” refers to the definition of “Audit Period,” which is defined in 

the same passage as “Audit.” J.A. 1495.

 
REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 9

Spin Master argues that Rehco “elected to remove its 

claims for royalties on the Havoc Heli, and then granted 

Spin Master a broad release of its claims ‘related to’ the 

audit.” Appellee’s Br. 8. But Rehco did not release its 

claims related to the audit; it released its claims related 

to the “Audit”—a defined term in the Settlement. Claims 

“related to” the “Audit,” as defined, must necessarily 

relate to the product SKUs identified in the auditor’s 

January 2009 report. 

Spin Master also argues, in line with the district 

court’s conclusion, that Rehco knew about the Havoc Heli 

before the Settlement’s Effective Date and therefore could 

have asserted royalty claims before then. Appellee’s Br. 

12–13 (referencing the Settlement’s release language). 

But again, Spin Master’s problem is the definition of 

“Audit.” Rehco released Spin Master from claims “related 

to the Audit and Additional Selling Periods” and “any 

claims for royalties thereunder . . . which arose, existed, or 

could have been asserted prior to the Effective Date.” 

J.A. 1496 (emphasis added). The “thereunder” in this last 

clause references the “Audit and Additional Selling Periods,” and it is undisputed that the Havoc Heli was not 

included in the “Audit” as the parties chose to define that 

term.

Rehco has appealed the district court’s summary 

judgment on its claim for breach of the Helicopter Agreement only as to the Havoc Heli product. Because we 

conclude that the Settlement did not release Rehco’s 

claims for royalties on the Havoc Heli, we vacate the 

district court’s summary judgment, which was based on a 

contrary interpretation of the Settlement. 
10 REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 

II

A 

The district court construed “a signal” to mean “a single signal being emitted from the transmitter, and not 

multiple signals.” J.A. 61. This was error.

We have held that “[a]s a general rule, the words ‘a’ or 

‘an’ in a patent claim carry the meaning of ‘one or more.’” 

E.g., 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. LogMeIn, Inc., 687 F.3d 

1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 516 F.3d 1290, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 

2008)). “The exceptions to this rule are extremely limited: 

a patentee must evince a clear intent to limit ‘a’ or ‘an’ to 

‘one.’” Id. (quoting Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, 

Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). “That ‘a’ or 

‘an’ can mean ‘one or more’ is best described as a rule, 

rather than merely as a presumption or even a convention.” Baldwin Graphic, 512 F.3d at 1342. Importantly 

here, “[t]he subsequent use of definite articles ‘the’ or 

‘said’ in a claim to refer back to the same claim term does 

not change the general plural rule, but simply reinvokes 

that non-singular meaning.” O1 Communique, 687 F.3d 

at 1297 (quoting Baldwin Graphic, 512 F.3d at 1342). 

Spin Master suggests that a later reference to “a 

signal” in claim 1—namely, “a receiver positioned on the 

bottom of said vehicle for receiving said signal as it is 

bounced off of a surface”—shows a clear intent to limit “a” 

to “one.” See Appellee’s Br. 33 (emphasis altered) (quoting ’866 patent claim 1). Spin Master further suggests 

that if the claim had said “they” instead of “it,” this would 

have allowed for a plural interpretation. Id. But if the 

definite article “a” can—indeed, usually does—refer to 

“one or more,” so would the pronoun “it” when referring 

back to the term that was used with the definite article. 

See O1 Communique, 687 F.3d at 1297 (observing that 

“[t]he subsequent use of definite articles ‘the’ or ‘said’ in a 

claim to refer back to the same claim term does not 
REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 11

change the general plural rule, but simply reinvokes that 

non-singular meaning”); id. (“The patent’s use of words 

such as ‘a,’ ‘its,’ and ‘the’ in the claims is insufficient to 

limit the meaning of ‘locator server computer’ to a single 

physical computer.”). Using the pronoun “it,” which is 

entirely consistent with using the term “a signal,” hardly 

demonstrates a clear intent to depart from the general 

rule. 

In construing “a signal” to mean a single signal, the 

district court likewise relied on later references to “a 

signal” in claim 1. For example, the court noted that 

“[t]he claim language specifies that the bounced signal . . . 

is the same signal that is transmitted downwardly away 

from the vehicle.” J.A. 59. Claim 1 does recite “receiving 

said signal as it is bounced off of a surface, defined as a 

bounced signal” and later refers to receiving or not receiving “the bounced signal.” ’866 patent claim 1. But this 

observation is irrelevant to whether “a signal” should be 

limited to a single signal, given that using definite articles “the” or “said” to refer back to the same claim term 

simply reinvokes the term’s non-singular meaning. O1 

Communique, 687 F.3d at 1297. 

We have considered Spin Master’s other claimconstruction arguments and find them unpersuasive. 

Consistent with the general rule governing the words “a” 

or “an,” we construe “a signal” to mean “one or more 

signals.”

B 

The district court based its summary judgment largely, if not entirely, on its construction of “a signal” as 

meaning “a single signal being emitted from the transmitter, and not multiple signals.” Our modification of the 

court’s construction necessitates vacating the district 

court’s summary judgment of non-infringement. 
12 REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 

In doing so, however, we note that the briefing and 

oral argument in this case has revealed a disagreement 

between the parties as to what would be required to 

satisfy claim 1’s predefined-speed limitation, which reads: 

“the first speed being predefined as a speed that causes 

the vehicle to gain altitude and the second speed being 

predefined as a speed that causes the vehicle to lose 

altitude.” ’866 patent claim 1. For example, Spin Master 

cites record evidence indicating that in response to the 

receipt or non-receipt of signals, its accused products 

adjust power delivered to the motor by a predefined 

percentage—and that the adjustment is proportional to 

the current battery power, which itself is subject to 

change as the battery drains. Appellee’s Br. 6–7. Thus, 

Spin Master concludes that “the accused products do not 

set predefined speeds that cause the vehicle to gain or 

lose altitude.” Appellee’s Br. 7. Rehco, for its part, argues 

that claim 1 “does not require that the first and second 

speeds be specific numerical speed values. Rather, they 

simply have to be speeds that will cause the vehicle to 

gain (first speed), or lose (second speed), altitude.” Appellant’s Br. 49 (citations omitted). Replying to Spin Master’s battery-drain argument, Rehco argues that “at least 

sometimes (e.g., when the batteries are fully charged), the 

accused products are set to a speed that will cause them 

to gain altitude (first predefined speed), or a speed that 

will cause them to lose altitude (second predefined 

speed).” Appellant’s Reply Br. 23.

On remand, the district court should consider in the 

first instance whether the parties’ disagreement reflects 

an actual dispute over claim construction and, if so, how 

to resolve that dispute.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district 

court’s summary judgment and remand for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.
REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 13

VACATED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to Rehco.
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

REHCO LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

SPIN MASTER, LTD.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2017-2589

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois in No. 1:13-cv-02245, Judge 

John Robert Blakey.

______________________ 

DYK, Circuit Judge, dissenting-in-part. 

Although I agree with the majority as to Rehco’s patent infringement claim, I respectfully dissent from the

majority’s resolution of Recho’s breach of contract claim. 

The question is whether Rehco’s breach claim is 

barred by a 2010 Settlement Agreement (“Settlement 

Agreement”) between the parties. The background of that 

agreement is as follows. In 2001, Rehco and Spin Master 

executed the Helicopter Agreement, pursuant to which 

Rehco agreed to develop toy helicopters and license both 

the toys and “the subject matter of all patents and patent 
2 REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 

applications filed or to be filed on the” toys to Spin Master. J.A. 1319. Spin Master agreed to pay Rehco a royalty

fee based on the number of toys sold. The parties now 

disagree as to the amount of royalties due under the 

Helicopter Agreement. Rehco’s breach claim in this action 

is for unpaid royalties under the Helicopter Agreement. 

Spin Master’s defense is that Rehco’s claim is barred 

by the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement provides: 

Rehco hereby releases and forever discharges Spin 

Master . . . from any and all claims, counterclaims, demands, damages, debts, liabilities, accounts, actions and causes of action, known or 

unknown, liquidated or contingent, which are related to the Audit . . . and any claims for royalties 

thereunder . . . which arose, existed, or could have 

been asserted prior to the Effective Date.

J.A. 1496 (emphasis added). The definition of “Audit” 

appears earlier in the Settlement Agreement: 

A. In January of 2009, at the request of Rehco 

[the auditor] conducted an audit of Spin Master’s 

royalty accounting records related to the licenses 

listed below as referenced by the product SKUs 

identified in [the auditor’s] January 2009 report 

(“Audit”) for the selling periods of Q1 2006 

through Q1 2008 (“Audit Period’ [sic]); and

B. The Parties wish to settle any disputes relating to the Audit . . . on the terms and conditions 

set forth in this Agreement.

J.A. 1495 (emphasis added). 

The majority concludes that “[c]laims ‘related to’ the 

‘Audit,’ as defined, must necessarily relate to the product[s] . . . identified in the auditor’s January 2009 report,” 

and since the Havoc Heli is not one of the products identi-
REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 3

fied in the January 2009 report, “the Settlement did not 

release Rehco’s claims for royalties on the Havoc Heli.” 

Majority Op. at 9. I think the majority’s construction of 

the agreement is incorrect. 

First, the term “Audit” is not limited to items appearing in the January 2009 report. If the parties had intended the term “Audit” to be limited to the audit report, they 

would have used the term “Audit Report” instead of 

“Audit.” On its face, the term “Audit” refers to the described “audit of Spin Master’s royalty accounting records.” J.A. 1495. And so the term “Audit” covers claims 

for unpaid royalties on the Havoc Heli because those 

claims were part of the audit process. 

The Helicopter Agreement gave Rehco the right to 

hire an independent auditor “to examine and copy [Spin 

Master’s] books and records respecting [sic] the manufacture and sales of the Licensed Products.” J.A. 1321. In 

2008, Rehco exercised its right under the Helicopter 

Agreement to hire an independent auditor “to conduct an 

audit of royalties paid and owed by Spin Master” under 

the Helicopter Agreement, among other licenses. J.A. 48. 

A draft audit report dated July 11, 2008, included claims 

for unpaid royalties on the Havoc Heli. Some time thereafter during the course of the audit, Rehco told the auditor to remove the claims for royalties on the Havoc Heli 

from the draft report. Consequently, claims for royalties 

on sales of the Havoc Heli were not listed in the auditor’s 

final January 2009 report. I think that the term “Audit” 

on its face encompasses any claim that was part of the

audit, even if it was later removed from the final report. 

Second, even if Rehco had effectively removed its 

claims for Havoc Heli royalties from the audit, the Havoc 

Heli claims are still “related to the Audit.” The “related 

to” language of the Settlement Agreement “itself is a term 

of substantial breadth.” Todd Constr., L.P. v. United 
4 REHCO LLC v. SPIN MASTER, LTD. 

States, 656 F.3d 1306, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “The 

Supreme Court has interpreted the term ‘related to’ 

broadly.” Id. at 1312 (collecting cases). Our court and 

other courts have similarly interpreted contractual provisions containing the terms “related to” or “relating to”

broadly. See, e.g., Tyco Healthcare Grp. L.P. v. Ethicon 

Endo-Surgery, Inc., 587 F.3d 1375, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 

2009); see also Kiefer Specialty Flooring, Inc. v. Tarkett, 

Inc., 174 F.3d 907, 909–10 (7th Cir. 1999); Taracorp, Inc. 

v. NL Indus., Inc., 73 F.3d 738, 745–46 (7th Cir. 1996); 

Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Minstar, Inc., 41 F.3d 341, 344 

(7th Cir. 1994). 

For example, in Tyco Healthcare, we declined to read 

the contractual language “[a]ny and all patents and 

patent applications relating to any pending litigation” as 

limited to “patents asserted in a pending litigation or 

patent applications in the same family as an asserted 

patent.” 587 F.3d at 1377–78 (emphasis added). Rather, 

we read the contractual phrase to cover patents or patent 

applications that “could have been reasonably asserted in 

or affected by litigation pending at the time.” Id. at 1379. 

The Settlement Agreement is at least ambiguous as to 

whether it covers the Havoc Heli claims. At a minimum, I 

would vacate the district court’s decision in this respect

and remand to allow the parties to present extrinsic

evidence as to the parties’ understanding of the scope of

the Settlement Agreement.