A ffirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 30 , 2021.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 19

- 00247

- CV

LEFT GATE PROPERTY HOLDING , LLC D/B/A TEXAS DIRECT AUTO , Appellant
V.
DANYE L NELSON , Appellee

On Appeal from the 113th District Court

H ar r i s Coun ty, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2018

- 79084

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this interloc utory appeal, a ppellant Left Gat e Property Holding , LLC d/b/a Tex as Direct Au to ( “ D irect Auto ”) challenges the trial court ’ s order denying its First Amended Motion t o C om pel Arbitrat ion

. 1 For the rea sons set forth belo w, we aff irm.

1 See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Re m. Code § 51.06; C otton Comm ’ l U

SA , Inc. v. Clear Creek Ind ep. Sch. Dist. , 397 S.W.3d 99, 103 n.3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) ( “ The2 I. B ACKGROUND
A. F ACTUAL B AC KGROUND
Direct Auto is a retailer of used cars in Houston , Texas

. On August 1, 201 7, Danyel Nelson ( “ Nelson ” ) signed a buyer ’ s purchase order for a 2016 Nissan Max im a from Direct Auto

. T he buyer ’s purchase order shows that the car was sold by Chr istopher Willi ams ; the delivery date of the vehicle as August 1, 2017, at 4:00 p .m. ; and a b alance due of $22,405.68. It also contain s a “ D i sclai m er o f W a rrant ie s ” and i nc l u de s the language “ THIS ORDER IS NOT BINDING UNTIL ACCEPTED BY THE SELLER. ” N elson signed the document as “purchas er, ” but the sp ace beside the wor d “ accepted ” is blank. O n that same day, Nel son and a

re presenta ti v e of Dir ect Auto signed an “Odometer Di sc lo sure Statement,” in whi ch Direct Auto c ertif

ied th e odometer reading as correct.

I n m id

- August 2017, Nelson secured her own financing for the car wit h
I nova Federal Credit Union ( “ I nova ” )

. On August 15, 2 01 7, N elson si gne d a

“ Loan and Security Agre ement s and Disclosure Statement , ” indicating monthly
pay ments would be gin t wo months later

. O n August 24, 2017, Inova i ssued a

c ashier’s c heck in the amount of $22,405.68, which was made payab l e to Di rect Auto. Nel son alleges that she received a paper l ice nse p late and registration papers from Direct Au to immediately there after

. The cashier ’ s ch eck was delivered to Direct Auto on August 31, 2017

. 2

Texas Civil Practice and Reme dies Cod e now provides for the inte rl ocutory appeal of a trial
co urt ’ s denia l of a motion to comp el arbitr a t io n under the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act]

. ” ).

2 T h e cashier’s check cleared the Inova Federal Credit Union account on September 14, 2017

.3

Nel son alleges that sh e ca lled Dir ect Auto to inquire about the status of her permanent li cense plates a t which t ime, a ccording to Nelson, Direct Auto informed her that it had misplaced her paperwork and Direct Auto would have to recreate it.
O n Se ptember 13, 201 7, N elso n allege s that Direct Auto instructed her to sign the buyer’s purchase order again with a ll the o t her necessary paperwork

. On S eptember 13, 2017, Nelson s igned an “Application for Texas Title , ” a “ Dealer’s Reassignment o f T itle for a M otor Ve hicl e , ” and a “ Texas Direct Auto CPO Limited Warranty

. ” Lynn Waddell signed these documents on behalf of Dir e c t Auto

. Inova placed a l ien on the vehicle on September 13, 2017.
After waitin g a gain and not rece iv ing her perm anent license plates , Nelson called Direct Auto again regarding the ir status. According to N elson, Direct Auto instructed her to co me back a nd fil l out all of the paperwork again in December 201 7.
Nels on alleges that she su bseq uently c ame to learn that Direct Auto sold her a car that did not have a “ clean titl e , ” but a salvaged and “ dirty title

. ” Nelson alleges that a Carfax vehicl e repor t revealed that the car Direct Auto sold h er was declared a tot al loss on August 2 7, 2 017, due to flood damage. Additionally, Nelson alleged the car was reported as stolen. The car was not reported with a new owner until December 27, 2017.

B. P R OCEDUR

A L H ISTORY In October 2018, Nelso n b roug ht this suit ag ains t Direct Auto , asserting t he fol lowing causes of action: negligence ; gross negligence ; negligent misrepresentation ; negligent hiring , supervision, and/or manageme nt ; fraud, breach of contract ; and v i o lation s of Texas Deceptive Trade Prac tice Ac t

. Nelson seeks a vari ety of damages as well as pre
- and post

- judgment interest, attorney ’ s fees , and4

costs. Subject to arb itration, Direct Auto asserted a general denial , affirmative defenses, and spe cial ex c e p tions.
On Febr uary 25, 2019, D i rect Auto filed its First Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration , asserting that on De cember 19, 2017, Nelson and Direct Auto signed an “ Arbi tration Agreement ” and that this d ispute fall s within the scop e of the arb itrati o n agreeme nt

. 3 In her response, N elson mainta in ed she purchased a car from Direct Au to i n August 2017 , and not in December 2017. Nelso n also argue d that n o arbitration agree ment exists and that the purpo rted “Arbitration Ag ree ment” filed by Direct Au to d i d not contain her signature. 4 In a supplementa l brief in sup port of its motion , D irect Auto argued the sale of the automobile was not complete in August 2017 ; instead , Direct Auto assert ed that on December 19, 201 7, both p arties e xecuted all docume nts nec e s sary to finalize th e s ale , including an arbitr ation agreement

. W ithout holding an evidentiary hearing , 5 the trial court denied Direct Auto relief ( i.e. , its amended motion to compel arb itration) on Marc h 8, 2019

. 6 This appeal timely fo llowe d.

3 Direct Auto contends it filed a n am ended motion to comp el because i ts origina l motion did not include a cer tificate of conferenc e.

4 Although Nels on attached an affidavit, she did not verify under oath that the signature
on the Ar bitration Agreement is not her s and/ or genuin e.
5 It is undisputed b y the parties in th ei r briefs that the trial court h eld a hearing on March 4, 2 0 19

. H owever , the record before us does not contain a notice of hearing and there is no entry in the tria l court ’ s docket sheet of a notice of he aring being filed . Further, th e re is no r eport er ’ s record

. 6 The trial court ’ s order prov ide d: “ After c onsidering Plaintiffs (sic) Response to Defendants (sic) Motion to Compel Arbitration (si c) the pleading, the affi davits, and arguments of counsel, the court GR ANTS P laintiffs (sic) Motion a n d denies De f endants (sic) relief sought. ”5 I I. A NA LYSIS In a single issue, D i rect Auto challenges t he trial court ’ s den ial of its amended motion to comp el arbitr ation :
The t rial c ourt e rred b y d enying a rbitration b ecause Ne lson and Tex as Direc t Auto a g r e ed to s ubmit d isputes to a rbitr ation a nd the c la im s a sserted a gainst [Texas Direct Aut o] are w ithin the s cope of the
a rbitr ation a greement. A. S TAND ARD OF R E VIEW AND A PPLICABLE L AW
We review a trial court ’ s ruling on a motion to compel arbi tration under an ab use o f discretion standard. See Henr y v. Cash B iz

, L.P. , 551 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. ) , cert. denied , ––– U.S.

––– , 139 S. Ct. 184, 202 L. Ed. 2d 40 (2018) ; In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P. , 279 S.W.3d 640, 642

– 43 (Tex. 2009); B uilding Homes for Her oes, Inc. v . Ell i s , No. 14

- 19

- 00203

- CV, 2020 WL 7 394 017, at * 3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] De c. 17, 2 020, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) ; Nationwide Coin & Bullion R e

ser ve , Inc.

. v. Thomas , No. 14

- 19

- 00632

- CV,

–– – S .W.3d

––– , 2020 WL 67416 94 , at * 2 (T ex. App.

— Houston [1 4th D is t.] Nov. 17, 2020 , no pet. h.)

. Un der th i s standard, we defer to a trial court ’ s factual findings when they are supported by evidence , but we review de n ov o the trial court ’ s legal determinations

. See Labatt Food Se rv. , 279 S.W.3 d at 642

– 43; see also In re D

. Wilson Constr. Co. , 196 S.W.3 d 774, 78 1 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (existence of a vali d arbitration agreement is a legal question).
A trial court “has no discretion in determining what the law is or applyin g the law to the facts.” D . Wilson Con st r ., 196 S.W.3d at 781 (internal c itation s omitted)

. In evalu ating a motion t o compel arbitration, a court must determine first whether a valid arbitration agr eement exists, and then whether the agreement
encomp asses the claims raised. See R achal v. Rei tz , 403 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. 2 013 )

. Arbi tr ation cannot be ord ered in the abse nce of an agreement to arbitrate,6

and thus, despite strong presumptions favoring a rbitration, the existence of a valid agreement to ar

bitrate is a settled, threshold requirem ent to compel arbitration

. Morgan v. Bronze Qu een Mgmt. Co. , 474 S.W.3d 701, 705 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ; accord In re Estate of Guerrero , 4 65 S.W.3d 693, 699 (Tex. App.

—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2 015, pet. denied) ( “[D]espite s trong
pre sum ptions that favor arbitration, a va lid agr ee ment to arbitrate i s a settled, threshold requirement to compel arbitration.” )

.

“ A party seeking to compel arbitratio n must establish the existence of a valid arbitratio n agreement and that the claims at issue fa ll within the scope of that
agreeme nt.” S

ee He nry , 551 S.W.3d at 115

. Motions to compel arbitration are ordinarily decided in summary proc eedings “on the basis of affidavits, pleadings, discovery, and stipulatio ns.” Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps , 84 2 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex. 1992) ; In r e Jim W al ter Homes, Inc. , 207 S.W.3d 888, 897 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding) ; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.021 (b) ( “ If a party opposing an application made under Subsection (a) den ie s t he existence of the agreement, t he cour t shall summarily determine that issue. ” )

. In such summary proceedings, the movant mu st present proof that an
agreem ent to arbitrate requires arb itration of the d ispute . See In re Jebbia , 26 S.W.3d 7 53, 757 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, or ig. pro ce eding) ; see also In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. , 987 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding ) ( party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden to establish that an arbitrat i on agree ment exists ) , abrogated on other grounds , In re H alliburto n Co. , 80 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding). The party resisting arbitration must raise an issue of material fac t about a necessary element th e movant was required to prove , or pre s ent some evid ence supporting every element of a defens iv e claim that there is no enforceable7

agreement to arbitrate. See In re Jebbia , 26 S.W.3d at 757

. If there is confl icting evidence as to the material facts neces sary to determine the issue, the tria l co urt i s to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolv e t h e dispute. In re Poly

- Am., L.P. , 262 S.W.3d 3 37, 354 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding); Tipps , 842 S.W.2d at 269

. Whe n , as here, no findings of fact or conclusions of law are requested or filed, the t r ial cour

t is presumed to have made all necessary findi ng s of fact to
sup port its ruling. In re Estate of Guerrero , 465 S.W.3d at 701 . Similarly, because the trial court did not state a basis for its r u lin g in the o rder denying the motion to compel arbitration , we must upho ld the trial court ’ s ruling on any le ga l theory supported by the evidence. Id

. B. E XISTENCE OF A N E NFOR CEABLE A RBITRATION A GREEMENT As set forth a b ove, Direct Auto, as the movant, bore t he burde n of establish ing that the December 19, 2017 arbitration agreement is a valid a gree ment that bind s N el son. See He nry , 551 S.W.3d at 115 ; In re Jim Walter H omes, Inc ., 207 S.W.3d at 897

. Whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate is d e te rmine d wit h reference to ordinary principles of state contract law. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc ., 166 S.W. 3d 7 32, 738 (Tex. 2005). T he elements needed to form a val id and b inding contract are (1) an offer; (2 ) acceptance in strict compliance with t he offe r's t erms; (3) a meeting of the minds; (4) consent by both parties; (5) execution and deliv ery; and (6) co ns id eration. Advantage Physical Therapy, Inc. v. Cruse , 16 5 S.W.3d 21, 24 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dis t.] 2005, no pet.). Accordingly, the f irs t ana ly tic al step requires the part y moving to compel arbitration “ must show th e agreement meets all requi site co nt ract elements. ” J.M. Davidson , Inc. v. Webster , 12 8 S.W.3d 223, 228 ( Tex. 2003)

.8

1. A UTOM OBILE - S ALE T RANSACTION C OMPLETION D ATE
Direct Auto a rgues that the trial court abused its discretion in de nying its amended motion to c ompel arbitra tion because on D ec ember 19, 2017, Nelson and a representative of Dire ct Auto signed an “Arbitration Agreement,” provi ding for arbitration under the Federal Arb itrat ion A ct 7 of “any claim, dispute or controversy . . . that eit her party has arising from Cus tomer(s)/Dealer sh ip Deal ings

. ” Direct Auto claims that , in addition to the arbitration agreement, on De cember 19, 2017, the parties executed othe r doc ument s finalizing the transaction, including a buyer ’ s purchase order ; an Odometer Disclosure Statement ; a Waiver Manufa ct ur er Recall ; and a r eceipt for title. Direct A uto a sserts tha t the parties executed multi ple i nst r u ments on multiple dates to complete a single automobile

- sale transaction i n Decem ber 2017

. Direct Auto maintains that the transact ion cul minated on D ecem be r 19, 201 7, when both parties execute d all documents necessary to finalize the automobile sale

. I n her sworn affidavit, Nelson maintains that she did not purchase a vehicle in December 2017. Nelson contends that she purchased the vehi cle and Direct A u t o received payment before D ecember 201 7. Ac cor ding to Nelson, no arbitration ag reeme nt w a s presented or signed during that time

. Nelson argue s that she purchased the vehicle i n August 2017, as evidenced by the b uyer ’ s purchase order an d the Odometer Di sc lo sure S tatement

. Nelson secure d her own financing on August 15 , 201 7, fr om I nova , with a cashier ’ s check payable to Direct Auto in the amount of $22,405

. 68 on August 24, 2017

. Nels on contends that on August 31, 2017, Direct Auto rec eived the cashi er ’ s c he ck

. Nelson asserts t hat I nova p laced a li en on the vehicle on September 13, 2017 , as shown on the Texas Certificate of Titl e

. The cashier ’ s check cleared the I nova account on September

7 See 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq

.9

14, 2017. Thus, accordin g to Nelson , she purc hased the vehicle p ri or to Decem ber 2 0 17.

I t is undis puted that the trial court has broad discretion to cons true multiple documents together. The Texas Supreme Co urt has held that it is “well

established” tha t :

. . . instruments per taining to the same t ransaction may be r ea d together to as ce rta in the parties ’ intent, even if the parties executed the instruments at different times and the instruments do not expressly refer to each other, and that a court may determine, as a matter of law, that multiple do cuments comprise a wr it ten contr act. I n a ppropriate instances, courts may construe all the docu ments as if they were part of a single, unified instrument. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth , 22 S.W.3d 831, 840 (Tex. 20 00) ; see City of Hous ton v. Clear Channe l Ou tdoor, In c. , 2 33 S. W.3d 441, 445 (Tex. App.

—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)

. T his rule , however , is “ simply a device for ascertaining and giving e ffect to the intention of the parties and can not be applied a rbitrarily.” DeWitt Cnty. Elec. Co

- op., I nc . v. Park

s , 1 S. W.3 d 96, 102 (Tex. 1999) (citing Miles v. Martin , 159 Tex. 336, 321 S.W.2d 62, 65 (19 59)). The Court must ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the written instruments. We bster , 128 S.W.3d at 229

. Direct Auto ma ke s severa l arg um ents in support of its contention that the
autom obil e
- sal e transaction was no t final ized u ntil December 2017

. We address each in turn. First, Direct Auto asserts that unlike the buyer’s purchase order dated Decembe r 19, 2017, the Augus t 1 , 2017 b uyer’ s purc hase order was only signed by Nelson and not by any dealer representative. Direct A uto contends that the document expressly states under disclaimer of warranties that “ TH IS ORDER IS NOT BINDING UNTIL ACCEPTED BY DEALER. ” Despi te thi s l angu a ge, the Au gust 1, 2017, buyer ’ s purchase order lists the “ delivery date ” as “ 08/01/201710

04:00 :00 PM ” ; however, the delivery date on the buyer ’ s purchase orde r date d December 1 9 , 2017, is blank. Additionally, a represe ntati v e of Direct Auto ,

“ Tanya s F oster, ” si gned as t ransferor, and Nelson signed as transfer ee, the Odometer Disclosure S t ate ment dated August 1, 2017 , representing the odo meter reading a s 28 , 849 miles

. O ver four months later, after having taken po ssess io n of
t he vehicle, the December 1 , 201 7, Odometer Disclosure Statement continued to list the mi leage at 2 8 , 8 4 9

. Moreover, the August 1, 2017 buyer ’ s purchase order sho w s a bal ance due of $22,405.68; the December 1 9 , 2017, buyer ’ s purchase

o rder s hows the balanc e due as zero. Next, Di re c t Auto maintains the vehicle sale was not com pleted in August because of p ending title issues and the lack of a bailment a greement

. Direct Auto , however, does not dispute that Nelson secured p ri vate f in ancing from Inova on Augu st 1 5, 2017 , that Inova c ut a ca shier ’ s check in the amount of $ 22,405.68 payable to Direct Auto on A ugust 24, 2017, and that Direct Auto received th e cash ier ’ s check as paym ent in full on August 31, 2017. A dditionally, Direct Auto and Nelson signed the a pplication for Texas Titl e a nd Dealership’s Reassig nment of Title for a Motor Ve hicle, a Texas Direct Auto Certified Pre

- Owned ( “ CPO ” ) Limited Warrant y , and a Title Application Receipt, all having an effectiv e date of September 13, 2 017. Also, on Septembe r 13, 2017, Inova placed a l ien on the vehicle

. There is no dispute that the check to Direct Auto cleared the Inova
account on S eptember 14, 2017. Further, i t is undi sputed that prior to Dec em ber 2 017 , Nelson had possession of the car. And, according to her loan paperwork with In o va, Nelson ’ s first mont hly payment was due “ 10/15 /2017. ”
To the extent Direct A uto contends that arbitration provisions need not be supported by indepen de nt co nsideration as lo ng as the underlying contract is supported by cons ideration , th is argument is unav ailing

. The trial c ourt could have11

found that the automobile sale transaction was completed prior to December 2017

. Thus, the court could ha ve de termined that documents executed in December 2017 were not part of a single, uni fied instrument

. Based o n t h e record be fore us, even construing multiple documents together , t he trial court could have found that Nelson ’ s vehic le wa s purchase d and pai d for b efo re December 2017 , there were no additional documents required to “ finalize ” the automobile s ale tra ns a ction , and ther efore , Direct Auto failed to prove the elements neces sary to establi sh the exist ence of a va lid cont ract in December 2017.
2. T EXAS C ERTIFICATE OF T ITLE A CT
Direct Auto argues that the sale of the vehicle was completed in D ec ember under th e T exas Certificate of Ti tle Act. See Tex. Transp. Code §§ 5 01. 001 , et seq

. Direct Auto maintains that title t o the v ehicle did not pass f rom D irect Auto to Nelson until, at the earliest, Decembe r 19, 2017 , because that is the date Direct Auto submitted t he Application for Texas Title to Fort Bend County. As an initial matter, we have not located , and Direct Auto has not poi nt ed us
to , any pl ace in the recor d before us where Direct Auto raised its contenti on to the trial court that the sale of the vehicle w a s completed in December 2017 under the Texas Certi ficate of Title Act. To preserve a com plaint for re view, a party must have presented to the t ri al co urt a timely request, objection, or motion that sta t es the specific grounds for the desired ruling, if i t i s n ot apparent from the context of the request, objection, or motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1 ). When a party fails to do so, error is no t pre served, and the complaint is waived. See Bushell v

. Dean , 803 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex. 1991).
Even abse nt Di rec t Auto ’ s failure to raise it s contention s in the trial court under the Texas Certificate of Title Act , the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion12

in denying Dir ect Au to ’ s am ende d motion for arbitration based upon the Texas Certificate of Title Ac t

. The Act provides that a sale made in violation of this provision is void and title does not p ass until the requireme nt s of the chapter are
met. See Transp. Code Ann. § 501.07 3

. Direct Auto does not con tend that Nelson ’ s title is voi d u nder the Act

. I n fact, Direct Auto concedes that when it executed a Dealer’s Reassignment of Title for a Motor Vehicle on September 13 , 2017, “equitable title” passed to Nelson. Instead, without c itation to au t hority, Direct Auto argues the sale was not finali zed un til D ecember 2017 when Direct Auto submitted the Application for Texas Title to Fort Bend County. D ir ec t Auto ’ s argument conflicts with our prior in terpretation of the Act: The legisla tive intent of the Certificate of T itle Act was to lessen and prevent the ft of motor vehicles, traffic in stolen vehicles, and sale of
encu mbered v ehicle s without disclos ur e of existing liens, not to prevent sales and t ransfers of interest in motor vehicle s. Non

compliance with the act doe s not override t he clear showing of a va lid and complete transfer of ownership of an automobile

. Even i n the fa ce of non

- compliance , t he s ale of a vehicle without the transfer of a ti tle certificate is valid as between t he parties , when the purposes of th e Certificate of Title Act are not def ea ted, although the Act declares that the non

- transfer of s uch cer tificate s renders the sale void

. Gr amercy Ins. Co. v. Arcadia Fin. Ltd., 32 S.W. 3d 402, 408 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (internal cit ations and quota tions omitted) (emp has is added ). Additionally, the transfer of title receipt relied on by Direc t Auto shows the vehicl e sa le occur

ring on September 13, 2017

. As such , Direct Auto ’ s rel iance on the Act to demonstrate when the sale was compl ete is misplaced. The trial

co urt co ul d have found that the sale of the vehicle without the trans fer of title was valid prio r to December 201 7.13

3. S WORN P LEA AND E STOPPEL Next, Direct Auto argues t ha t Nelson did not spec ifically deny si gnin g the arbitration agreement

. 8 Direct Auto argues tha t Nelson ’ s affidavit only generally

averr ed that all fact s state d in the Response were within her personal knowledge and were true and correct

. In her affi dav it, Nelson was clear that she did not en ter into any c ontract with Dire ct Auto in December 2017. N elso n attested she executed a valid and enfor ceable written co nt ra ct in August 2017 , not December 201 7. Add itional ly, she swore that she did not purchase a vehicle from Direct Auto in December 20 1 7.
Di rect Auto further mainta ins e ven if the trial cour t believed that Nelson was

a non
- signa tory to the Arbitr at io n Agreement, Ne lson is estopped from bringing a breach of contract action on the written contract t o purchase the vehicle while den ying she signed the arbitration agreeme nt. Direct Auto ’s argumen t is inapp licable

. As se t forth above, the trial court co u l d have found based on the evidence s ubmitted that the automobil e
- sale transaction was complet ed bef ore December 2017. Mo reover, review of t he las t par agr aph of the one
- p age portion of the arbitra ti on agreement relied up on by Dir ect Auto demonstrate s i ts i napplicab ility to this transaction a s it references that the arbitration agreement is

“ entered into contemporaneously with y ou (sic) Retail Instal lment Sale Contract or
L ease Contract as applicabl e (such R etail Install ment Sale C ontract or Lease Contra ct h ereinafter to as the “ Contract ” ). ” The re is nothing in the record before

us concerning a R etail In stallme nt Sale Contract or Lease Contract. I nstead, the record demonst rates Nelson secured priva te financing for the ve hicle with Inova.

8 To the extent Direct Auto cites Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 93(7) and argues that “ in t he absen ce of such a sworn p lea , the in strument shall be received in evide nce as fully proved , ”
w e n ee d not reach this issu e or whether that question was preserved for review

.14

Ba sed on the record before us , we cann ot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the mo tion t o compel arbitration. Because t here is evidence that the sale of the c ar was complete d prior to De cember 2 01 7 , the trial court could have d ec ide d the issue summarily, without ho lding an evidentiary hearing , 9 conclud ing that no valid arbitratio n agreement existed between the parties

. 10 Accordingly , we overrule Direct Auto ’ s i ssue on appeal

. III. C ONCL US ION
W e affirm the trial court ’ s order de ny ing Direct Auto ’ s motion to com pel arbitration.

/s/ Mar garet “ Meg ” Poiss ant Justi ce

Panel consists of Ju stices B o u r l iot, Ha ssan, a nd Poissant.

9 Direct Auto does not argue the trial court erred by not hol ding an evidentiary hearin g.
10 In light of this de termination, we need not address wheth e r Nelson ’ s claims are wi t h in the scop e of the arb itration agreement.