J-A18007-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JAMES D. BARTOLOVICH 

Appellant

v.

GRACE J. BARTOLOVICH

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 549 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Order March 28, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at 

No(s): FD15-00213-005

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 3, 2020

James D. Bartolovich (“Husband”) appeals from the March 28, 2018 

order that adopted the master’s report and recommendation as to equitable 

division of the parties’ property and awarded alimony to Grace J. Bartolovich 

(“Wife”).1 Finding merit in several of Husband’s claims of error, we vacate the 

order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum.

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1 Husband’s appeal was interlocutory at the time it was filed, as pre-divorce 

equitable distribution orders are not final and appealable. See, e.g., Wilson 

v. Wilson, 828 A.2d 376, 378 (Pa.Super. 2003). However, because the order 

was finalized by the subsequent entry of the divorce decree, the appeal is 

properly before us at this time. See Schenk v. Schenk, 880 A.2d 633, 638 

n.2 (Pa.Super. 2005) (“[A]n award of equitable distribution is appealable 

where a divorce Decree is entered while an appeal is pending.”). 
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Husband and Wife, born in 1950 and 1951, respectively, cohabited for 

several years before marrying in February 2002.2 They each had children 

from prior relationships, but had none together. The marital residence was a 

house that Wife purchased in 1998 for $39,000. See N.T. Hearing, 6/6/17, 

at 144. The parties undertook improvements to the home, such as the 

addition of a deck, new kitchen cabinets, and new toilets. 

Wife held no employment during the marriage, having begun receiving 

Social Security Disability in 2001. See N.T. Hearing, 6/6/17, at 169. Husband 

was employed as a steelworker from 1973 until he retired in 2004. His 

employment provided both a defined benefit pension, as well as a whollyemployer-financed defined contribution plan, which Husband rolled over into 

a Thrivent account during the marriage. Funds withdrawn from the Thrivent 

account were used to pay for things such as vehicles, a camper the couple

kept at Rose Point, Pennsylvania, and the parties’ vacations. 

The parties separated in February 2015. In May 2015, Husband filed a 

complaint seeking a no-fault divorce and equitable distribution. In response, 

Wife raised claims of alimony pendente lite (“APL”) and permanent alimony. 

Wife was awarded $900 per month in APL, and the matter proceeded to a 

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2 Wife attempted, but failed, to establish that the parties had entered into a 

common law marriage in 1997 or 1998. Although she challenged the propriety 

of the master’s determination on that issue, she ultimately withdrew her 

exception. Thus, the date that the marriage commenced is not at issue in this 

appeal.
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hearing before a master on June 6, 2017, at which Husband and Wife were 

the only witnesses. Scant documentary evidence was offered, and neither 

side put forth expert valuations of any property. Instead, Husband and Wife 

testified as to their recollections of the acquisition prices and opined as to the 

present values of the property at issue.

From the evidence offered, the master determined that the total value 

of the marital estate was $24,660.46, and that it should be divided equally 

between Husband and Wife. Notably, the master included in the marital estate

both the $6,733.97 that it found to be the marital portion of Husband’s 

Thrivent account and the Rose Point camper that had been purchased with 

$10,000 of Thrivent funds, but excluded the increase in value of the marital 

residence based upon a lack of evidence of its value. The master also 

recommended, based upon his determination that Husband had $3,790 in 

monthly income while Wife had only $646, that Husband pay Wife $900 per 

month in alimony for three years following the divorce. 

On August 17, 2017, Husband filed exceptions alleging, inter alia, that 

the master improperly (1) refused to assign a value to the marital residence 

based upon Wife’s testimony; (2) failed to assign certain assets per the 

parties’ on-the-record agreements; (3) awarded Wife a portion of the Thrivent 

funds when the marital portion had fully been spent on marital items; and (4) 
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awarded alimony based upon a miscalculation of Wife’s income. On April 5, 

2018, the trial court dismissed Husband’s exceptions.3 

Husband filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court did not order 

Husband to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal, and none was 

filed. On March 28, 2019, the trial court filed an opinion, relying in large part 

upon the master’s report and recommendation, to fulfill its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

obligation.

Husband presents this Court with the following questions, which we have 

renumbered for ease of disposition:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not correcting the 

master’s failure to assign a value to the marital residence as 

testified to by [Wife]?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by affirming the 

master’s decision [to] include both the Thrivent account and the 

Rose Point Camper in the equitable distribution award?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by adopting the 

master’s report and not reimbursing [Husband] for a tax debt that 

was solely caused by [Wife] in regard to non-marital property, yet 

solely paid off by [Husband]?

4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not overruling the 

master’s failure to assign [to Wife] certain marital items despite 

[Wife]’s testimony that she desired such items?

5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by affirming the 

master’s decision to not award [Husband] certain items of marital 

property?

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3 The order also indicated that Wife had withdrawn her cross-exceptions.
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6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not correcting the 

master’s failure to properly calculate [Wife]’s income and 

overruling the master’s order that [Husband] pay alimony?

Husband’s brief at 5-6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

We consider Husband’s issues mindful of the following standard of 

review:

[A] trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of 

equitable distribution. Our standard of review when assessing the 

propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution of 

marital property is whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal 

procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of discretion, which 

requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence. This Court 

will not find an abuse of discretion unless the law has been 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record. 

In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award, 

courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We 

measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of 

effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a 

just determination of their property rights.

Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to weigh the 

evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not reverse 

those determinations so long as they are supported by the 

evidence. We are also aware that a master’s report and 

recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the fullest 

consideration, particularly on the question of credibility of 

witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to observe and 

assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.

Carney v. Carney, 167 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa.Super. 2017) (cleaned up).

We consider Husband’s arguments concerning the trial court’s inclusion 

or exclusion of certain assets from the marital estate mindful of the following 

legal principles. All property acquired during a marriage, along with increases 
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in value of nonmarital property, is presumed to be marital property with 

certain statutory exceptions. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3501(a), (b). Those exceptions, 

which a party may prove to overcome the presumption, include, inter alia, 

property acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired in exchange for 

property acquired prior to the marriage, and property acquired after the date 

of separation. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3501(a)(1), (4), and (b). Increases in value of 

nonmarital property are “measured from the date of marriage or later 

acquisition date to either the date of final separation or the date as close to 

the hearing on equitable distribution as possible, whichever date results in a 

lesser increase.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3501(a.1). 

Husband first faults the trial court for not correcting the master’s failure 

to include any portion of the value of the marital residence in the marital 

estate. Although Husband does not dispute that the marital residence is Wife’s 

separate property acquired prior to the marriage, he contends that the record 

demonstrated that the asset increased in value during the marriage, and that 

testimony of Wife was sufficient to allow the master to determine the value of 

that increase. Husband’s brief at 15-19. 

The master indicated that the entire value of the marital residence was 

treated as Wife’s separate property because he “was not provided with any 

values regarding the real estate as of the date the parties were married and 

the date they separated,” rendering him unable to calculate the marital 

portion. See Report and Recommendation, 7/28/17, at 4. The trial court did 
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not squarely address the issue in denying Husband’s exception, but generally 

opined that the evidence was vague, and that the master committed no 

material error or omission. Trial Court Opinion, 3/28/19, at 2-3. 

Our review of the record reveals that Husband originally maintained that 

the marital residence was part of the marital estate. In his preliminary asset 

and liability summary, Husband listed the residence as the primary marital 

asset and proposed that it was worth $90,000. See Plaintiff’s Preliminary 

Marital Asset Summary, 3/11/16, at unnumbered 2. In an updated listing, 

Husband indicated a value of $65,000. N.T. Hearing, 6/6/17, at 104. Wife, 

on the other hand, consistently excluded the real estate from her lists of 

marital property, and did not deign to enumerate a value for it. See Wife’s 

Marital Asset and Liability Summary, 3/11/16, at 3; Wife’s Pretrial Statement, 

8/10/16, at 4. 

At the hearing, Wife testified that she purchased the house for $39,000 

in 1998 to serve as a residence for the two of them, rather than pay increased 

rent at their mutual apartment, but that they opted to put it in her name only 

because Husband was still in the process of divorcing his first wife. N.T. 

Hearing, 6/6/17, at 144. Husband began making some of the mortgage 

payments on the house in 1999, when Wife went on disability and Husband 

was still working. Id. at 5. Wife testified that the current value of the home 

was “probably in the high 60s.” Id. at 13. 
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We agree with Husband that the record contained sufficient evidence of 

the marital nature of the asset and its historic values to allow the master to 

reasonably calculate its marital value. Wife, the purchaser of the real estate, 

testified to its values approximately four years prior to the marriage, and two 

years after they separated. This Court has held in similar circumstances that 

the master’s exclusion of the increased value of the separate asset in the 

marital estate warranted reversal. See Anderson v. Anderson, 822 A.2d 

824 (Pa.Super. 2003) (holding trial court properly adjusted the master’s 

recommendation by including in the marital estate $30,000 related to wife’s 

antique collection, where the parties married in 1983 and separated in 1999, 

and wife testified to the values of the collection being $10,000 in 1979 and 

$40,000 in 1998). Accordingly, we conclude that excluding the entire value 

of the marital residence from the marital estate constituted an abuse of 

discretion.

Next, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

including both the marital portion of his Thrivent account and the parties’ Rose 

Point camper in the marital estate. Husband contends that the master 

correctly determined that his Thrivent account included a marital portion 

valued at $6,733.97. See Husband’s brief at 26. Husband also accepts that 

the parties both testified that the Rose Point camper, valued at $6,700 at the 

time of separation, was purchased with $10,000 of Thrivent funds. Id. 

Husband’s complaint is that including both the camper and the marital 
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Thrivent funds as separate marital assets “is essentially a double-dip” 

amounting to “counting the same marital funds twice.” Id. at 26-27.

Again, we agree with Husband. Both Husband and Wife testified that 

the Rose Point camper was purchased with $10,000 of Thrivent funds. See 

N.T. Hearing, 6/6/17, at 40-41, 166-67. Unlike other purchases Husband 

made with money withdrawn from the Thrivent account, title to the Rose Point 

camper was acquired in both Husband’s and Wife’s names. Hence, there is a 

clear conversion of one marital asset into another, such that only one may be 

included in the marital estate. Cf. Williamson v. Williamson, 586 A.2d 967, 

972 (Pa.Super. 1991) (concluding that no improper double-counting occurred 

from awarding husband both the marital portion of his business and an 

airplane allegedly purchased with assets of the sale of that business because 

the record did not establish that the funds from the business, as opposed to 

other marital funds such as the cash that husband squirreled away in a 

refrigerator, were used to purchase the airplane). Thus, the master’s inclusion 

of both the Rose Point camper and the marital portion of the Thrivent account 

in the marital estate was erroneous, and the trial court erred in denying 

Husband’s exception. 

Husband’s next claim is that the trial court abused its discretion in failing 

to rule that he is entitled to reimbursement for a marital debt that he paid 

with non-marital funds. Specifically, Husband contends that the record 

“clearly indicates” that the couple incurred a joint tax debt in the amount of 
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$4,000 as a result of Wife’s decision to withdraw cash from her pre-marital 

retirement account to pay off her mortgage. Husband’s brief at 29. He posits 

that, since he was the only party with income at the time, “this tax debt was 

then solely paid by” Husband. Id. Husband argues that he is “entitled to a 

reimbursement sufficient to offset an equitable portion of the tax debt[.]” Id. 

at 30.

The only evidence Husband cites in support of this claim of error is the 

following testimony from Wife, detailing the circumstances of their separation

in February 2015:

What happened around that time was he came home from 

getting our taxes done from his friend that does taxes. He was 

drunk, and he was irate because we owed $4,000 because -- his 

statement to me was because I took the $15,000 and paid the

house off. But in retrospect, after having my taxes done --

And he left when the PFA was -- When the cops came and 

got him, he left.

N.T. Hearing, 6/6/17, at 136. 

We cannot agree with Husband’s contention that it was “an 

unreasonable error in judgment” on the part of the master or the trial court 

to decline to reimburse him based upon this record. Husband’s brief at 30. 

Husband does not direct this Court to a tax return or other evidence 

establishing what the couple’s tax liability was in the year at issue and what 

it would have been absent Wife’s withdrawal. He does not even cite an 

admission by Wife that her withdrawal was the cause of the couple’s tax debt, 

as she appeared to dispute the accuracy of Husband’s position with her 
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unfinished thought. As Husband fails to direct us to record evidence that 

warrants disturbing the judgment of the master and trial court on this issue, 

no relief is due.

Husband’s next two issues concern the scheme for dividing the property. 

We consider them mindful of the following principles:

A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of 

equitable distribution. . . . [T]here is no standard formula guiding 

the division of marital property and the method of distribution 

derives from the facts of the individual case. . . . Accordingly, 

the court has flexibility of method and concomitantly assumes 

responsibility in rendering its decisions.

Hess v. Hess, 212 A.3d 520, 523-24 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up). 

Husband’s arguments are that the trial court erred in (1) adopting the 

master’s decision to award Husband the camper in which his son resides in 

Butler because the parties agreed that Wife would receive that asset, 

Appellant’s brief at 22-23; and (2) “affirming the master’s failure to award 

[Husband] certain personal effects, namely tools and an antique cradle.” Id. 

at 31 (explaining that the cradle is what was meant by the “bedroom furniture” 

discussed during the hearing). 

The record does indicate that Wife agreed to (1) accept the marital 

interest in the camper, see N.T. Hearing, 6/6/17, at 201-02; and (2) allow 

Husband to have his tools and bedroom furniture, subject to their valuation. 

See id. at 78-79, 170-73. However, the master’s recommendation awards 

the interest in the Butler camper to Husband, and does not mention the tools 

or furniture. See Report and Recommendation, 7/28/17, at 8-10. As we have 
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determined that the distribution order must be vacated, we leave it to the 

parties to address these assets in the new distribution scheme developed on 

remand.

In his final issue, Husband challenges the trial court’s decision to adopt 

the master’s recommendation as to the award of alimony to Wife. The 

following precepts apply to our consideration of his arguments. “Where a 

divorce decree has been entered, the court may allow alimony, as it deems 

reasonable, to either party only if it finds that alimony is necessary.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 3701(a). 

Our standard of review regarding questions pertaining to the 

award of alimony is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 

We previously have explained that the purpose of alimony is not 

to reward one party and to punish the other, but rather to ensure 

that the reasonable needs of the person who is unable to support 

himself or herself through appropriate employment, are met. 

Alimony is based upon reasonable needs in accordance with the 

lifestyle and standard of living established by the parties during 

the marriage, as well as the payor’s ability to pay. Moreover, 

alimony following a divorce is a secondary remedy and is available 

only where economic justice and the reasonable needs of the 

parties cannot be achieved by way of an equitable distribution 

award and development of an appropriate employable skill.

Conner v. Conner, 217 A.3d 301, 315-16 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

The master determined that Wife’s monthly income is $646. Although 

the master indicated that “Wife is entitled to receive $751.10 per month from 

Social Security,” it declined to use that number in the absence of “any 

additional information” about that entitlement. Report and Recommendation, 
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7/28/17, at 7. The master further found that Wife’s unmet needs, after 

subtracting from her budget her income ($646.00) and her marital portion of 

Husband’s pension ($126.05), was $1,171 per month. Id. 

Having determined that Husband’s monthly income includes $2,109 

from Social Security and $1,680.63 from his pension, the master concluded 

that alimony is appropriate and recommended that Husband pay Wife $900 

per month. Id. at 2, 8. As Wife owns the marital residence, and thus has the 

ability to mortgage or sell it to meet her future needs, the master suggested 

“a relatively short duration” of three years of payments. Id. at 8. 

Husband’s challenge to the master’s determination is two-pronged. He 

contends both that the master erred in calculating Wife’s monthly income, and 

that, once the master’s error is corrected, no alimony is warranted. 

Specifically, Husband points to the following testimony given by Wife on crossexamination:

Q. You’re 66 now; correct?

A. Yeah.

Q. Are you drawing down on regular Social Security?

A. Yes.

Q. So, in addition to SSD, you’re getting regular Social 

Security?

A. Not in addition to. This amount went up to 900, the gross, 

$978.

[Master]: That’s your gross now, $978?
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[Wife]: Yes.

[Wife’s counsel]: Beginning July of ’17.

[Husband’s counsel]: No, ’16.

A. My birthday, when I turned 66.

Q. What is the total amount you’re receiving?

A. $966.

Q. So when you said you were only receiving 600-something 

that was wrong?

A . Yes, I guess it was. Yes.

Q. What else have you been wrong about in your testimony?

A. Nothing.

[Wife’s counsel]: When did the $966 begin?

[Wife]: March.

[Wife’s counsel]: Of what year?

[Wife]: This year. As soon as I turned 66 in 

February.

[Master]: Let me just ask you, had [Husband’s 

counsel] not asked you, because I was going to 

hit you with the $751 because that’s what it 

says, at what point were we going to learn it 

was $978?

[Husband’s counsel]: We weren’t is my point. 

[Master]: I understand. [Wife’s counsel], wait 

a minute. We’ve been going around and around 

and around about documents and lack thereof, 

but it’s 300 bucks a month. I get it. It’s 

nobody’s fault, but I’m just saying --
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[Wife’s counsel]: No, no, no. I pulled this off of a 

pretrial that was filed with exhibits last summer. 

The continuance is --

[Master]: Nobody gave me an updated -- I 

understand.

[Wife’s counsel]: I’m sorry.

[Wife]: My apologies.

[Wife’s counsel]: No, my apologies.

N.T. Hearing, 6/6/17, at 206-08.

Despite these clear admissions on the record that Wife’s income was 

actually 50% higher than what she had previously indicated to the master, 

the master found Wife’s income to be only $646 per month, and Wife

represents to this Court that there was “nothing erroneous in this finding.” 

Wife’s brief at 2. Contrary to the trial court’s generic observation that the 

master’s “conclusions and applications of discretion were reasonable and were 

supported by the evidence in the record,” Trial Court Opinion, 3/28/19, at 3, 

we agree with Husband that the master abused his discretion in ignoring the 

updated income information. 

However, we decline to address Husband’s claim that alimony is not 

warranted at all based upon Wife’s actual income. As noted above, alimony 

is based not only upon an examination of the parties’ needs and incomes, but 

upon a determination that the parties’ needs cannot be met through equitable 

distribution. See Conner, supra at 315-16. We have already held that a 

new equitable distribution must occur based upon errors concerning the value 
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of the marital portion of Wife’s house and the double-counting of the marital 

portion of Husband’s Thrivent funds. After that new distribution scheme is 

devised, another examination of Wife’s alimony claim, in light of the 

subsequent equitable distribution and Wife’s correct income information, shall 

be conducted. 

In summary, the trial court adopted a recommendation that, between 

the improper omission of the marital portion of Wife’s real estate and the 

erroneous double-counting of $6,700 in marital assets, reflects a substantially 

incorrect calculation of the value of the marital estate. Additionally, the trial 

court ordered alimony based upon significant miscalculations as to Wife’s

income. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s equitable distribution order in 

its entirety, including the determination that the marital estate should be 

divided equally, and remand for a resolution of the parties’ economic claims 

that is consistent with this memorandum. 

Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction 

relinquished. 

Judge Musmanno joins the memorandum.

Judge Nichols concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/3/2020