[Cite as State v. Cowan, 2024-Ohio-2028.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

ALLEN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

CASE NO. 1-23-20

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

 v.

DAVID A. COWAN, III, O P I N I O N

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court

Trial Court No. CR 2022 0101

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: May 28, 2024

APPEARANCES:

F. Stephen Chamberlain for Appellant

John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee
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GWIN, J.,

{¶1} Defendant-appellant David A. Cowan, III [“Cowan”] appeals his conviction 

and sentence after a jury trial in the Allen County Court of Common Pleas.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On April 14, 2022, the Grand Jury issued an indictment against Cowan 

charging him with Rape, Attempted Rape and two counts of Sexual Imposition. On August 

11, 2022, a Superseding Indictment was filed with the following charges:

Count One: Rape, from on or about Sept. 1, 2021 through December 

11, 2021, by force or threat of force, a felony of the first degree in violation 

of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) / 2907.02(B);

Count Two: Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor, from on or about 

Sept. 1, 2021 through December 11, 2021, minor thirteen but less than 

sixteen years old and defendant ten or more years older, a felony of the third 

degree in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A) / 2907.04(B)(3);

Count Three: Attempted Rape, from on or about Sept. 1, 2021 through 

December 11, 2021, by force or threat of force, a felony of the second degree 

in violation of R.C. 2923.02 / 2907.02(A)(2) / 2907.02(B);
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Count Four: Rape, from on or about December 12, 2012, by force or 

threat of force, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2)/ 

2907.02(B);

Count Five: Rape, from on or about December 12, 2012, substantially 

impaired victim, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(1)(c) / 2907.02(B);

Count Six: Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor, from on or about 

December 12, 2012, minor thirteen but less than sixteen years old and 

defendant ten or more years older, a felony of the third degree in violation of 

R.C. 2907.04(A) / 2907.04(B)(3);

Count Seven: Gross Sexual Imposition, from on or about December 

12, 2012, substantially impaired victim, a felony of the fourth degree in 

violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(5) / 2907.05(C)(1);

Count Eight: Sexual Imposition, from on or about December 12, 2012, 

defendant eighteen or older and more than four years older than victim and 

victim thirteen but less than sixteen years old.

{¶3} Trial before a jury was held on March 7, 2023 through March 9, 2023. Count

8 was dismissed by the state prior to the commencement of the trial. 1T. at 1-2.1

1 For clarity, the transcript of Cowan’s jury trial will be referred to as “__T.__” signifying the volume and page 

number.
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C.K., the minor N.W.’s guardian

{¶4} C.K.2 was called as a witness by the court. 2T. at 203-204. C.K. who is not 

related, has been the guardian of N.W. (b. Aug. 22, 2007)3since the child was two years 

old. 2T. at 205; 243. C.K. and Cowan began a relationship in 2020. Id. at 206. By late 

summer of 2021, C.K., N.W. and C.K.’s four children moved in with Cowan. Id. In the fall 

of 2021, C.K. and Cowan gave birth to a son. C.K. testified that Cowan is a smoker. Id. at 

210.

September 1, 2021 through December 11, 2021

N.W.’s testimony

{¶5} N.W. testified that there were several times at night when she would

wake up and Cowan would be standing in her bedroom in the dark. 2T. at 256. 

Neither N.W. or Cowan spoke during these occurrences. Id. at 257. N.W. would 

pretend to be asleep and Cowan would leave after five to ten minutes. Id.

{¶6} However, in October 2021, N.W. testified that she woke up to find Cowan 

on top of her in her bed. 2T. at 261. N.W. heard the jingle of his belt buckle as Cowan 

removed his pants. Id. at 262. N.W. froze as she felt Cowan’s hands near her shoulder and 

his legs by hers. N.W. began to feel a poking below her belly button that hurt. Id. at 263. 

2 See, Sup.R 45(E)(3) which provides that “[w]hen restricting public access to a case document or information in a 

case document pursuant to this division, the court shall use the least restrictive means available, including * * * (e) 

[u]sing initials or other identifier for the parties’ proper names.”

3 Recognizing the heightened privacy interests of minors, we identify N.W. only by her initials in accord with Sup.R. 

1(A), 44(C), 44(H) and 45(D).
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N.W. described the pain as a ten on a scale of one to ten. N.W. described the pain as located 

in her vagina. Id. at 264. N.W. described feeling Cowan’s penis in her vagina. Id. at 264-

265. She testified that it hurt. She said Cowan remained on top of her for what seemed like 

thirty minutes. N.W. testified that her pajama bottoms and her underwear were pulled down 

around her ankles. Id. at 266. N.W. did not tell anyone what had occurred because she was 

scared. Id. at 267.

{¶7} In October 2021, Cowan again entered N.W.’s bedroom during the 

nighttime. 2T. at 268. Cowan stood near the head of her bed as she pretended to sleep. 

N.W. heard Cowan’s belt unbuckle and felt her head being pulled toward him. Id. at 269. 

Cowan was moving her head with his hands. N.W. turned her head away; however, Cowan 

attempted several more times to pull her head toward him. 2T. at 271. After hearing a noise 

coming from outside the room, Cowan hurriedly left her bedroom. Id. at 272-273. N.W. 

told no one about this incident claiming she was scared to tell anyone. Id. at 273. N.W. 

testified that she does not smoke. Id. at 282.

December 12, 2021

{¶8} In the early morning hours of December 12, 2021, C.K. woke up and 

noticed that Cowan was not in their bed. 2T. at 211. C.K. got out of bed and began to 

look for Cowan. Id. at 211-213. Upon opening N.W.’s bedroom door, C.K. saw Cowan 

inside the room facing the closet while fixing his pants. Id. at 214-215. C.K. flipped on 

the lights and saw that N.W.’s pajama pants and underwear were pulled down and she 
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was exposed. Id. at 215-216, 276. C.K. also found Cowan’s belt on the bed. Id. at 216. 

C.K. called 9-1-1 and told the operator that she had caught Cowan in her fourteen-yearold daughter’s room. Id. at 219; State’s Exhibit 1.

{¶9} N.W. testified that around 3:00 a.m. she heard the closet door in her 

bedroom open. She woke up to the light on and C.K. screaming at Cowan. 2T. at 275. 

N.W. testified that her pajama bottoms and her underwear were pulled down to below 

her knees. Id. at 276. She saw Cowan pulling up his pants. Id. at 277. She heard Cowan 

tell C.K. that he was in N.W.’s bedroom checking the heating vents. Id at 278.

{¶10} After the police arrived C.K. and others accompanied N.W. to the

hospital for a sexual assault examination. 2T. at 280-281, 344. At the hospital, N.W. 

told the Pediatric Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner [“PSANE”] that she felt pain in her 

vagina and that it hurt to urinate. 2T. at 280-281.

{¶11} The samples taken during the examination by the PSANE were positive 

for acid phosphatase, an enzyme found in semen, vaginal secretions and saliva. 2T. at 

383; 3T. at 412. There was no indication of any sperm cells present in the samples. Id. 

at 413. The swabs showed that Cowan’s STR DNA (him individually) was found on 

the skin swab taken from N.W.’s face and Cowan’s Y-STR DNA (Cowan’s paternal 

male lineage) was found in the vaginal samples, anal samples, and facial skin swabs 

taken from N.W. 3T. at 402-412; State’s Exhibit 24. 
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{¶12} A cigarette was recovered by N.W.’s pillow that was the same kind that 

Cowan smoked. 2T. at 216, 332; 3T. at 436, 461-462; State’s Exhibits 17,18,19.

Cowan testifies at trial

{¶13} Cowan testified that his son was born on November 22, 2021. 3T. at 449. 

It was undisputed that the only other male line relative in the home would have been 

the infant son of Cowan and C.K. Cowan further testified that he smokes Marlboro 

menthol cigarettes, the same brand found in N.W.’s bed on December 12, 2012. Id. at 

456; 462. 

{¶14} Cowan denied the incidents prior to December 12, 2021. Id. at 453. 

Cowan testified that on December 12, 2021 he and C.K. had argued about his box of 

trinkets from other relationships. 3T. at 454. He and a friend stayed up drinking and 

playing video games and cards after the others had gone to bed. At some point, Cowan 

went to the garage to smoke a cigarette. Id. at 456. 

{¶15} Cowan explained that on that night, he went around the home making 

sure the doors and windows were locked. Id. at 457. He testified he was in N.W.’s 

bedroom making sure the furnace was blowing out heat to that part of the house. Id. 

Cowan further testified that he was fussing with his pants when C.K. came into the 

bedroom because he fluctuates in weight and his pants were too big. Id. at 458.
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The jury’s verdicts

{¶16} The jury found Cowan “Not Guilty” with respect to the events alleged to 

have occurred September 1, 2021 through December 11, 2021, Counts One, Two and 

Three.

{¶17} The jury found Cowan “Guilty” with respect to the events occurring on 

December 12, 2021, Count 4, Rape, a felony of the 1st degree; Count 5, Rape, a felony 

of the 1st degree; Count 6, Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor, a felony of the 3rd 

degree; and Count 7, Gross Sexual Imposition, a felony of the 4th degree. 

The sentence

{¶18} A sentencing hearing was held on April 13, 2023. The parties agreed that 

Counts 4, 5, 6, and 7 merged pursuant to R.C. 2941.25 and the state elected to proceed 

on Count 4, Rape. Sent. T., Apr 13, 2023 at 10-15. The trial judge sentenced Cowan 

to 10 to 15 years in prison with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.

Assignments of Error

{¶19} Cowan raises three Assignments of Error,

“I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED [sic.] IN CONVICTIONS 

BECAUSE THE STATE'S CASE FAILED TO MEET THE 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TEST. FURTHERMORE, 

THE STATE'S CASE FAILED TO MEET THE MANIFEST 

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE TEST.

“II. COWAN WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE OF 

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
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“III. JUROR MISCONDUCT DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT OF 

A FAIR TRIAL BY A NEUTRAL TRIER OF FACT.”

{¶20} In his First Assignment of Error, Cowan maintains that his convictions are 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Cowan further argues that there is insufficient 

evidence to support his convictions.

Standard of Appellate Review – Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶21} The Sixth Amendment provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury....” This right, in 

conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each of the material elements of a

crime be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 

99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013); Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 136 S.Ct. 

616, 621, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). The test for the sufficiency of the evidence involves a 

question of law for resolution by the appellate court. State v. Walker, 150 Ohio St.3d 409, 

2016-Ohio-8295, 82 N.E.3d 1124, ¶30; State v. Jordan, Slip Op. No. 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶13. 

“This naturally entails a review of the elements of the charged offense and a review of the 

state's evidence.” State v. Richardson, 150 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84 N.E.3d 

993, ¶13.

{¶22} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court does not 

ask whether the evidence should be believed. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 

492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by State constitutional amendment 
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on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 at n.4, 684 N.E.2d 668 

(1997); Walker, 150 Ohio St.3d at ¶30. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jenks at 

paragraph two of the syllabus. State v. Poutney, 153 Ohio St.3d 474, 2018-Ohio-22, 97 

N.E.3d 478, ¶19. Thus, “on review for evidentiary sufficiency we do not second-guess the 

jury's credibility determinations; rather, we ask whether, ‘if believed, [the evidence] would 

convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. 

Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543, 747 N.E.2d 765 (2001), quoting Jenks at paragraph two 

of the syllabus; Walker 150 Ohio St.3d at ¶31. We will not “disturb a verdict on appeal on 

sufficiency grounds unless ‘reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by 

the trier-of-fact.’” State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, 

¶ 94, quoting State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997); State v. 

Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶74.

Issue for Appellate Review: Whether, after viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence, if believed, would convince the 

average mind that Cowan was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Rape

{¶23} Cowan was convicted of force / threat of force rape in violation of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(2). R.C. 2097.02 provides,
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(A)(2) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another when 

the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat 

of force.

{¶24} “Sexual conduct” means vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal 

intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and, without 

privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument, 

apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of another. Penetration, however 

slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse. R.C. 2907.01(A).

{¶25} “Force” is defined as “any violence, compulsion, or constraint physically 

exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(1).

{¶26} We need not address the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence 

supporting the jury’s findings of guilt as to Rape, substantially impaired victim [Count 5], 

Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor [Count 6] and Gross Sexual Imposition [Count 7] 

because those offenses were allied offenses and were merged into Count 4. State v. 

Sheldon, 3rd Dist. Hardin No. 6-18-07, 2019-Ohio-4123, ¶11; State v. Crawford, 3rd Dist. 

Crawford No. 3-18-16, 2019-Ohio-2959, ¶38. Accord, State v. Henderson, 7

th Dist. 

Mahoning No. 15 MA 0137, 2018-Ohio-5123, ¶9; State v. Ramos, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

103596, 2016-Ohio-7685, ¶ 14; State v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 08AP–736, 2009–Ohio–

2166, ¶ 27; State v. Mugrage, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2020-P-0066, 2021-Ohio-4136, ¶133. 

See also, State v. Powell, 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 263, 552 N.E.2d 191 (1990) (since the trial 
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court merged convictions with one another, the appellant received only one sentence, and 

an erroneous verdict on the merged count would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

{¶27} The evidence presented during Cowan’s jury trial established that N.W. is 

not and never was Cowan’s spouse. Cowan dated N.W.’s guardian and N.W.’s family 

moved into Cowan’s home. Cowan and N.W.’s guardian C.K. had a child born November 

22, 2021. N.W. was fourteen years old when the events forming the charges in Count Four 

of the Indictment occurred.

{¶28} C.K. testified that she found Cowan in N.W.’s bedroom in the middle of the 

night, and when C.K. surprised him by turning on the bedroom light Cowan was facing 

the closet while fixing his pants. 2T. at 214-215. C.K. observed that N.W.’s pajama 

pants and her underwear were pulled down around her knees. Evidence was presented 

that N.W. awoke to find her pajama bottoms and her underwear had been pulled down 

below her knees, leaving her exposed. Both N.W. and C.K. observed Cowan in the 

bedroom pulling his pants up. Cowan admitted he was in N.W.’s bedroom and that he was 

fussing with his pants. N.W. complained of pain in her vagina and was taken to the hospital. 

The swabs showed that Cowan’s STR DNA (him individually) was found on the skin 

swab taken from N.W.’s face and Cowan’s Y-STR DNA (Cowan’s paternal male 

lineage) was found in the vaginal samples, anal samples, and facial skin swabs. 3T. at 

402-412; State’s Exhibit 24. A cigarette was recovered by N.W.’s pillow that was the 
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same kind that Cowan smoked. 2T. at 216, 332; 3T. at 436, 461-462 State’s Exhibits 

17 18, and19. Cowan’s belt was recovered from N.W.’s bed. Id. at 216.

{¶29} R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) requires the victim's submission to sexual contact to be 

obtained by force or threat of force. State v. Biggs, 2022-Ohio-2481, 192 N.E.3d 1306 (5th 

Dist.), ¶16. In State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 58-59, 526 N.E.2d 304 (1988), the 

Supreme Court of Ohio found the amount of force required to meet this requirement varies 

depending on the age of the victim and the relationship between the victim and the 

defendant. Id. at ¶ 58. However, some amount of force must be proven beyond the force 

inherent in the crime itself. State v. Dye, 82 Ohio St.3d 323, 327, 695 N.E.2d 763, 766 

(1998).

{¶30} Here, the victim was not an adult when she was sexually assaulted. She was 

a minor and still considered a child. The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “it is nearly 

impossible to imagine the rape of a child without force involved,” State v. Dye, 82 Ohio 

St.3d 323, 327, 695 N.E.2d 763 (1998), and the Court has noted “the coercion inherent in 

parental authority when a father sexually abuses his child,” State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio 

St.3d 56, 58, 526 N.E.2d 304 (1988). “‘The youth and vulnerability of children, coupled 

with the power inherent in a parent’s position of authority, creates a unique situation of 

dominance and control in which explicit threats and displays of force are not necessary to 

effect the abuser’s purpose.’” Id. at 59, 526 N.E.2d 304, quoting State v. Etheridge, 319 
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N.C. 34, 47, 352 S.E.2d 673 (1987); Disciplinary Counsel v. Goodman, Slip Op. 2024-

Ohio-952, 2024 WL 1055288 (Mar. 12, 2024), ¶24.

{¶31} At trial, N.W. testified the assault took place without her consent while she 

slept. In order to accomplish this, Cowan had to pull down N.W.’s pajama bottoms and 

underwear and manipulate her body and her legs. We find these facts sufficient to 

demonstrate Cowan used force against his minor sleeping victim in order to compel her 

submission. State v. Lauderdale, 2

nd Dist. Montgomery No. 29753, 2024-Ohio-481, ¶35; 

State v. Stevens, 3

rd Dist. Allen No. 1-14-58, 2016-Ohio-446, 58 N.E.3d 584, ¶27-28; State 

v. Burton, 4

th Dist. Gallia No. 05CA3, 2007-Ohio-1660, ¶42; State v. Green, 5th Dist. 

Delaware No. 01CA-A-12-067, 2002-Ohio-3949, ¶61; State v. Artis, 6

th Dist. Lucas No. 

L-19-1267, 2021-Ohio-2965, ¶95; State v. Walker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96662, 2011-

Ohio-6645, ¶20; State v. H.H., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-1126, 2011-Ohio-6660, ¶12.

{¶32} Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we 

conclude that a reasonable person could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Cowan 

did commit the crime of rape by force or threat of force. We find, therefore, that the state 

met its burden of production regarding each element of the crime of Rape for which Cowan 

was indicted and, accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to submit the charge to the 

jury and to support Cowan’s conviction.
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Standard of Appellate Review – Manifest Weight

{¶33} As to the weight of the evidence, the issue is whether the jury created a 

manifest miscarriage of justice in resolving conflicting evidence, even though the evidence 

of guilt was legally sufficient. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387, 678 N.E.2d 

541 (1997), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated by State 

v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668, 1997–Ohio–355; State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 

49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001). 

{¶34} Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief. 

State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541(1997), State v. 

Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶83. When a court of 

appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight 

of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the fact 

finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. State v. Jordan, Slip Op. No. 2023-Ohio3800; Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 

S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652(1982) (quotation marks omitted); State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio 

St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1244, ¶25, citing Thompkins.

{¶35} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, an appellate court may not 

merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that “‘the jury clearly lost its 

way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed 

and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State 
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v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721(1st Dist. 1983). The Ohio 

Supreme Court has emphasized: “‘[I]n determining whether the judgment below is 

manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every 

reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts. * 

* *.’” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 334, 972 N.E.2d 517, 2012-Ohio-2179, 

quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 

(1984), fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 603, at 191–

192 (1978). As one Court has explained,

When faced with a manifest weight of the evidence challenge, we 

must consider whether the state “carried its burden of persuasion” before the 

trial court. State v. Messenger, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26; see 

State v. Martin, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26. Unlike the burden 

of production, which concerns a party’s duty to introduce enough evidence 

on an issue, the burden of persuasion represents a party’s duty to convince 

the factfinder to view the facts in his or her favor. Messenger at ¶ 17. 

Therefore, in order for us to conclude that the factfinder’s adjudication of 

conflicting evidence ran counter to the manifest weight of the evidence—

which we reserve for only the most exceptional circumstances—we must 

find that the factfinder disregarded or overlooked compelling evidence that 

weighed against conviction. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387-388, 
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678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). We accordingly sit as a “thirteenth juror” in this 

respect. Id.

State v. Gibson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220283, 2023-Ohio-1640, ¶ 8. 

{¶36} Further, to reverse a jury verdict as being against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, a unanimous concurrence of all three judges on the court of appeals panel 

reviewing the case is required pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(3) of the Ohio 

Constitution. Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 115 Ohio St.3d 291, 2007-Ohio-4918, ¶ 2-4, 

citing Thompkins at paragraph four of the syllabus.

Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the jury clearly lost their way and created 

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new 

trial ordered

{¶37} When there is conflicting testimony presented at trial, a defendant “is not 

entitled to a reversal on manifest weight grounds merely because inconsistent evidence was 

presented.” State v. Rankin, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1118, 2011-Ohio-5131, ¶ 29. See also 

State v. J.E.C., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-584, 2013-Ohio-1909, ¶ 42. The jury may consider 

conflicting testimony from a witness in determining credibility and the persuasiveness of 

the account by either discounting or otherwise resolving the discrepancies. State v. Taylor, 

10th Dist. No. 14AP-254, 2015-Ohio-2490, ¶ 34, citing Midstate Educators Credit Union, 

Inc. v. Werner, 175 Ohio App.3d 288, 2008-Ohio-641, ¶ 28 (10th Dist.). “‘The finder of 

fact can accept all, part or none of the testimony offered by a witness, whether it is expert 
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opinion or eyewitness fact, and whether it is merely evidential or tends to prove the ultimate 

fact.’” State v. Petty, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-950, 2017-Ohio-1062, ¶ 63, quoting 

State v. Mullins, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-236, 2016-Ohio-8347, ¶ 39. 

{¶38} A reviewing court must bear in mind that credibility generally is an issue for 

the trier of fact to resolve. State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001); State 

v. Murphy, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2953, 2008–Ohio–1744, ¶ 31. Because the trier of fact 

sees and hears the witnesses and is particularly competent to decide whether, and to what 

extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses, the appellate court must afford 

substantial deference to its determinations of credibility. Barberton v. Jenney, 126 Ohio 

St.3d 5, 2010–Ohio–2420, 929 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 20. In other words, “[w]hen there exist two 

fairly reasonable views of the evidence or two conflicting versions of events, neither of 

which is unbelievable, it is not our province to choose which one we believe.” State v. 

Dyke, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 99 CA 149, 2002–Ohio–1152, at ¶ 13, citing State v. Gore, 

131 Ohio App.3d 197, 201, 722 N.E.2d 125 (7th Dist. 1999). Thus, an appellate court will 

leave the issues of weight and credibility of the evidence to the fact finder, as long as a 

rational basis exists in the record for its decision. State v. Picklesimer, 4th Dist. Pickaway 

No. 11CA9, 2012–Ohio–1282, ¶ 24.

{¶39} We find that this is not an “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs 

heavily against the conviction.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387, 678 

N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717. To the 
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contrary, the jury appears to have fairly and impartially decided the matters before them. 

The jury heard the witnesses, evaluated the evidence, and was convinced of Cowan’s guilt.

{¶40} Upon review of the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences as a thirteenth juror, including considering the credibility of witnesses, we 

cannot reach the conclusion that the trier of facts lost its way and created a manifest 

miscarriage of justice. While Cowan is certainly free to argue that the witnesses were either 

mistaken or lying, on a full review of the record we cannot say that the jury clearly lost its 

way or created a manifest injustice by choosing to believe the testimony of the state’s 

witnesses. The jury was able to observe the witnesses, including N.W., C.K. and Cowan, 

subject to cross-examination. The jury found Cowan “Not Guilty” of Counts One through 

Three of the Indictment. Thus, a rational basis exists in the record for the jury’s decision. 

{¶41} Finally, upon careful consideration of the record in its entirety, we find that 

there is substantial evidence presented which if believed, proves all the elements of the 

crime for which Cowan was convicted. We do not find that the jury disregarded or 

overlooked compelling evidence that weighed against conviction on the charge. 

{¶42} Cowan’s First Assignment of Error is overruled.

II.

{¶43} In his Second Assignment of Error, Cowan contends the prosecutor 

committed plain error during closing argument by improperly bolstering a state's witness 

and asking the jury to draw improper inferences regarding the investigation procedures.
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{¶44} Cowan did not object to the comments he now assigns as error. Therefore, 

he concedes that he has forfeited all but plain error.

Standard of Appellate Review – Plain Error

{¶45} Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed claims of plain error and stated,

To prevail under the plain-error standard, the defendant must show 

that an error occurred, that it was obvious, and that it affected his substantial 

rights. Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 

1240 (2002) (an error affects substantial rights only when it affects the 

outcome of the trial). “Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be 

taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to 

prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 

372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

State v. Nicholson, Slip Op. No. 2024-Ohio-604, 2024 WL 716018 (Feb. 22, 2024), ¶114. 

See also, State v. Knuff, Slip Op. No. 2024-Ohio-902, 2024 WL 1097397 (Mar. 14, 2024), 

¶117.

{¶46} In Knuff, the Supreme Court addressed the appropriate standard of review 

for addressing claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument,

We assess prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments by asking 

“‘whether the remarks were improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially 

affected [the] substantial rights of the defendant.’” State v. Hessler, 90 Ohio 
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St.3d 108, 125, 734 N.E.2d 1237 (2000), quoting State v. Smith, 14 Ohio 

St.3d 13, 14, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984). A conviction may be upheld in the face 

of a prosecutor’s improper remarks when it is “clear beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty” regardless of the 

comments. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 511-512, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 

76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (new trial unwarranted despite prosecutor’s improper 

argument because of “overwhelming evidence of guilt and the inconsistency 

of the scanty evidence tendered by the defendants”). 

State v. Knuff, Slip Op. No. 2024-Ohio-902, 2024 WL 1097397 (Mar. 14, 2024), ¶238. 

Issue for Appellate Review: Whether but for the prosecutor’s remarks during 

closing arguments the jury would have acquitted Cowan.

{¶47} Cowan cites the following remarks made by the prosecutor during closing 

argument,

Think about why [N.W.], why would [N.W.] do all of this, right? We 

talked about, again, putting reason to action, right? Or motive to lie. Why 

would [N.W.] - ·why would [N.W.] go through all this? What does [N.W.] 

benefit? What - - what's the game? Going back to the twelfth, right? Having 

her mom come into her room, scream, right? Which again that’s [C.K.’s], 

that’s [C.K.] doing all those things, right? But then in that moment, if this 

was some plan to get David Cowan, well [C.K.] woulda had to come up with 
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it and [N.W.] would have to join in all of a sudden randomly, right? And they 

have this perfect plan to get David Cowan. Alright, but why would [N.W.] 

do this?

Endure this or - - ordeal, right? Watch what's going on in her room, 

then go to the hospital, submit to a sexual assault examination, right, lay on 

a table, have a stranger take a swab, run it through her vagina and around her 

anus and put it in an envelope to be tested? Take her clothes, take her 

underwear, have the nurse take a comb just like this, this is out of the sample 

kit. Take a comb just like this and comb her pubic hair. That doesn't sound 

like fun. This doesn't sound like something somebody wants to go through 

just to come up with some story. This is real life folks. Fourteen-year olds 

don't want to do this. They don't want to sit in a doctor's office to endure all 

that, to make up some story because they're not happy or (inaudible).

3T. at 487-488. [Appellant’s brief at 16-17].

{¶48} Courts afford prosecutors wide latitude in closing arguments, and 

prosecutors may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence at trial, commenting on 

those inferences during closing arguments. State v. Hunt, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-1037, 2013-

Ohio-5326, 2013 WL 6406316, ¶ 18. As a general rule “[i]t is improper for an attorney to 

express his or her own personal belief or opinion as to the credibility of a witness.” State 

v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 12, 679 N.E.2d 646 (1997). A prosecutor improperly vouches 
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for the credibility of a witness “‘when the prosecutor implies knowledge of facts outside 

the record or places his or her personal credibility in issue.’” State v. Thompson, 141 Ohio 

St.3d 254, 2014-Ohio-4751, 23 N.E.3d 1096, ¶ 200, quoting State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 

404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 232. 

{¶49} We find the prosecutor’s statements to be based upon the evidence presented 

during the trial and do not find the prosecutor improperly expressed a personal opinion on 

the truthfulness of the witnesses. In the case at bar, credibility of Cowan and N.W. was the 

main argument advanced by Cowan at trial. The prosecutor did no more than invite the 

jury to consider the plausibility of the defense theory that N.W. and C.K. conspired to 

frame Cowan. 

{¶50} Even if we were to assume arguendo that the prosecutor’s statements were 

improper, Cowan is unable to demonstrate the type of prejudice necessary to require 

reversal based on plain error from prosecutorial misconduct. See State v. Guade, 10th Dist. 

No. 11AP-718, 2012-Ohio-1423, ¶ 20. “An improper comment does not affect a substantial 

right of the accused if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found 

the defendant guilty even without the improper comments.” State v. McAlpin, 169 Ohio 

St.3d 279, 2022-Ohio-1567, 204 N.E.3d 459, ¶168, citing State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 

460, 464, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001). 

{¶51} Cowan was not deprived of a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. The 

evidence against Cowan was overwhelming, and there is little chance that absent the 
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improper comments, the result of his trial would have been different. Any potential 

prejudice was mitigated by the trial court’s instruction to the jury that closing arguments 

are not evidence. McAlpin, 169 Ohio St.3d 279, ¶ 188, citing State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 

at 353, 744 N.E.2d 1163 (2001). 

{¶52} Cowan has not demonstrated that the jury abandoned their oaths, their 

integrity or the trial court’s instructions and found him guilty based upon the prosecutor’s 

statements. It is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict

of “guilty” regardless of the comments.

{¶53} Cowan’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled.

III.

{¶54} In his Third Assignment of Error, Cowan argues the trial judge erred by not 

sua sponte declaring a mistrial because of juror misconduct. Specifically, the trial judge 

was made aware by the foreperson that the foreperson and other members of the jury were 

concerned about the objectivity of one juror following her disclosure while deliberating 

that she was molested as a child. 3T. at 531. The trial judge inquired of the juror and the 

juror was replaced. Thus, the court ordered for deliberations to begin anew. Id. at 536-539.

{¶55} Because Cowan did not move for a mistrial, he has forfeited all but plain 

error.
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Standard of Appellate Review

{¶56} The granting of a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court 

as it is in the best position to determine whether the situation at hand warrants such action. 

State v. Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d 18, 517 N.E.2d 900(1988); State v. Hessler, 90 Ohio St.3d 

108, 115–116, 734 N.E.2d 1237 (2000).

{¶57} An abuse of discretion can be found where the reasons given by the court for 

its action are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice, or where 

the judgment reaches an end or purpose not justified by reason and the evidence. Tennant 

v. Gallick, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26827, 2014-Ohio-477, ¶35; In re Guardianship of S.H., 

9th Dist. Medina No. 13CA0066–M, 2013–Ohio–4380, ¶ 9; State v. Firouzmandi, 5th Dist. 

Licking No. 2006–CA–41, 2006–Ohio–5823, ¶54. 

Issue for appellate review: Whether the trial judge’s failure to sua sponte declare 

a mistrial is clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amounts to a denial of justice, or 

reaches an end or purpose not justified by reason and the evidence.

{¶58} The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution requires that a defendant accused of a state criminal violation shall be tried 

before a panel of fair and impartial jurors. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 

1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491(1968), and State v. King, 10 Ohio App.3d 161, 460 N.E.2d 1383(1st

Dist. 1983). See, also, Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10.
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{¶59} The conclusions reached in a case should be generated only by evidence and 

argument in open court, and not by any outside influence. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 

454, 27 S.Ct. 556, 51 L.Ed. 879(1907). Further, when a juror refuses to consider the 

evidence or forms an opinion as to guilt or innocence before all the evidence is presented, 

such activity constitutes misconduct. State v. Taylor, 73 Ohio App.3d 827, 831, 598 N.E.2d 

818(4th Dist. 1991). See also, Carr v. State, 22 Ohio App. 78, 153 N.E. 233(1st Dist. 1926); 

Busick v. State, 19 Ohio 198, 1850 WL 78(1850); and State v. Carter, 11 Ohio Dec. Rep. 

123, 1890 WL 419(C.P.1890); State v. McMillen, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008–CA–0122, 

2009–Ohio–210, ¶ 122. However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized:

[D]ue process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been 

placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials 

would be constitutionally acceptable.... [I]t is virtually impossible to shield 

jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their 

vote. Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely 

on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent 

prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when 

they happen. 

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 102 S.Ct. 940, 946 (1982); United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 738, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1780, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).
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{¶60} In the case at bar, the trial judge questioned the juror on the record in the 

presence of Cowan, his attorney and the prosecutor. 3T. at 531-533. The prosecutor 

objected to removing the juror claiming there are no “do overs in jury selection” and since 

the potential bias of the juror was not uncovered by defense counsel during voir dire the 

juror should not be removed. Id. at 533-534. The trial judge was not persuaded. Id. at 536-

537. The trial judge stated, 

The Court, the Court has made its decision, I made the decision I'm in 

- - I'm in my effort is to pro -- to avoid even an appearance of unfairness. 

And again, I think the way the note was phrased to the Court, the juror, the 

foreperson speaking, in terms of "we" the fact that "we are concerned as to 

her objectivity" that's really more so than [the juror] said. I take [the juror] at 

her word if she said she couldn't let it - - it wouldn't affect her ability to be 

fair and impartial but the other jurors were concerned so the Court, in the 

abundance of caution, to make sure that its completely fair. Had that been 

revealed, obviously the defense would have a - - had an opportunity for a 

preemptory, they didn't use all their peremptories so. All of that's the reason 

I did that, so. It is what it is.

3T. at 536-537. The trial judge then instructed the jury as follows,

Alright, we got eleven of the original jurors and the first alternate are 

in the courtroom now and the record reflects that the court has excused one 
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of the original jurors based upon a note that was given to the Court. And uh, 

as the rules states ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that if an alternate 

replaces a juror during deliberations, I must instruct you to start your 

deliberations anew. So I have a couple questions for the eleven folks that 

were a part of the original jury and um, obviously there had to been some 

revelation from the juror that I excused and prompted the note, is there any 

juror from the original eleven that was privy to - - to that discussion that 

prompted the note, that feels like that discussion with the juror that's been 

excused or anything about that is going to prevent you from being fair and 

impartial? Is there any juror in that situation?

Is there any juror from the original eleven who doesn't feel like, now 

im [sic.] going to ask you to start from the beginning because now you'll have 

an alternate juror, a new juror, and so you gotta kinda start - - forget what 

you guys talked about already and kind of start from the beginning, is there 

any juror that can't do that?

Alright, and then [alternate juror] then you'll be an alternate so we're 

going to start from the beginning just like you were there from the beginning, 

okay? And has anything now, you uh left after the jurors went to deliberate, 

does anything happen that would prevent you from being fair and impartial?

JUROR: No.
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3T. at 537-538.

{¶61} Under the circumstances, we must defer to the trial judge who had the 

opportunity to hear the potential jurors and observe their demeanor. See State v. Eskridge, 

38 Ohio St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304(1988); State v. Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 528 N.E.2d 

523(1988); State v. Thomas, 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 434 N.E.2d 1356(1982). We are not inclined 

to substitute our judgment for the trial judge’s judgment concerning the credibility of the 

jurors. State v. Taylor, 73 Ohio App.3d 827, 833, 598 N.E.2d 818 (4th Dist. 1991).

{¶62} Looking at the above incident, we cannot find the trial judge abused his 

discretion. As required, the court conducted a hearing to inquire into whether there had 

been any effect upon the remaining potential jurors because of the potential misconduct on 

the part of the juror excused. The court determined that the incident had no effect upon the 

remaining potential jurors. The trial judge also instructed the jurors to begin their 

deliberations anew. Upon review, the judge’s actions clearly satisfied his duty to inquire 

and his decision was not clearly untenable, legally incorrect, a denial of justice, nor did it 

reach an end or purpose not justified by reason and the evidence.

{¶63} Accordingly, we find no plain error affecting Johnson’s substantial rights.

{¶64} Cowan’s Third Assignment of Error is overruled.

Judgment Affirmed

ZIMMERMAN and MILLER, J.J, concur.

**Judge W. Scott Gwin of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, sitting by Assignment

of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.