United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-2703

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Derrick Darryl Trawick, also known as KG

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa

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Submitted: June 16, 2023

Filed: October 6, 2023

[Unpublished]

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Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

In January 2022, Derrick Trawick was convicted of aiding and abetting the 

distribution of a controlled substance near a protected location. The district court1

sentenced Trawick to 400 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Trawick challenges

1

The Honorable C.J. Williams, United States District Judge for the Northern 

District of Iowa. 
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his conviction, arguing the district court should have declared a mistrial for juror 

misconduct, or alternatively granted a motion for a new trial because the evidence 

was insufficient to convict. He also appeals his sentence, arguing the district court 

procedurally erred when calculating his base offense level. We affirm. 

I. Background

In May 2019, first responders responded to a 911 call from a motel room in 

Dubuque, Iowa. There, they found a woman on a bed unconscious and not breathing. 

The woman regained consciousness after a medic began performing CPR. A sample 

of her blood showed evidence of numerous controlled substances in her system. 

Syringes and traces of heroin were found in the motel room. The woman had

purchased heroin she used that evening in a transaction Trawick arranged. 

In May 2021, a grand jury indicted Trawick with aiding and abetting the 

distribution of heroin and fentanyl near a protected location resulting in serious 

bodily injury, and a four-day trial ensued. See 18 U.S.C. § 2; 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 

841(b)(1)(C), and 860(a). After the second day of trial, a juror spoke with court 

officials, stating she overheard another juror making unsettling comments. This

juror was alleged to have used foul language in the jury box when complaining under 

his breath about the length of the trial, and to have done so specifically when defense 

counsel spoke. In addition, it was reported that the juror made a comment stating, 

“I’m not a racist, but . . .” and followed it up with an additional comment perceived 

to be about race. The district court subsequently excused the juror from the case, 

replacing him with an alternate juror. 

After excusing the juror, the district court interviewed each juror individually, 

asking about what they had heard from the excused juror and, if necessary, whether 

any of those statements could impact his or her ability to be impartial. Over the 

course of the inquiry, several of the jury members informed the court they heard a 

variety of comments from the excused juror, both in the jury box and outside the 

courtroom. These included comments about the slow pace of trial. In addition, the 
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jurors stated that the excused juror made comments about people from Chicago, 

Dubuque becoming a different city than when the excused juror grew up, and race 

in general. No juror stated he or she believed the comments would impact his or her

ability to remain impartial. Trawick moved for a mistrial. The court denied the 

motion, citing the jurors’ statements and the court’s confidence the jury was 

impartial and would rule based on the law and evidence. 

The trial continued, and the jury found Trawick guilty of aiding and abetting 

the distribution of a controlled substance near a protected location.

2

 Trawick moved 

for a new trial, based in part on the weight of the evidence. More specifically, 

Trawick argued he chose to walk away from the drug transaction before it was 

complete. The district court denied the motion, citing the credibility of the 

government’s witnesses, evidence he was a regular dealer of heroin, and evidence 

he intentionally sold drugs on that evening in May 2019. 

At sentencing, the district court determined Trawick was involved in the 

dealing of at least 90,000 kilograms of converted drug weight, with a PSR estimate 

of 446,868.6 kilograms from five different drugs. Based on a total offense level of 

39 and his criminal history category of VI, the district court calculated an advisory 

range of 360 to 480 months under the United States Sentencing Guidelines 

(“Guidelines”). The district court then sentenced Trawick to 400 months of

imprisonment. 

II. Analysis

 

Trawick appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial after the

juror was dismissed, stating the juror’s comments polluted his right to an impartial 

jury. He also appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing

the weight of the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. Finally, he 

2

The jury, however, concluded the government did not prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the heroin and fentanyl resulted in serious bodily injury. 
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appeals his sentence, challenging the district court’s drug quantity calculation. We 

address these arguments in turn. 

A. Denial of a Motion for a Mistrial

Trawick argues the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial 

after the court’s inquisition concerning the excused juror’s comments. Specifically, 

he contends the court should have given little to no credit to the jurors’ claimed 

impartiality. Further, Trawick argues the discharged juror’s allegedly racist 

comments tainted his right to an impartial jury because he is black and the purchaser

was white. 

“We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion.” United 

States v. Spotted Horse, 916 F.3d 686, 693 (8th Cir. 2019). We have explained that 

“[i]mpartiality is presumed so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly 

carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case.” United 

States v. Nosley, 62 F.4th 1120, 1126 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. 

Wright, 340 F.3d 724, 733 (8th Cir. 2003)). District courts are provided broad 

discretion in addressing juror bias. See United States v. Young, 6 F.4th 804, 809 (8th 

Cir. 2021) (noting that how to best remove the possibility of racial bias is subject to 

the broad discretion of the district court); see also Munt v. Grandlienard, 829 F.3d 

610, 615 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining, in the habeas corpus context, “we afford trial 

courts substantial deference in determining juror bias”). 

Mistrials are not necessitated by minor imperfections. See United States v. 

Smith, 383 F.3d 700, 707 (8th Cir. 2004) (“We do not live in a perfect world, and a 

criminal defendant is not guaranteed a perfect trial, just a fair one.”). And, “[i]t 

seems doubtful that our judicial system would have the resources to provide litigants 

with perfect trials, were they possible[.]” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. 

Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984). In our cases, for example, when considering 

whether a district court abused its discretion, we have looked to whether jurors “were 
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exposed to any prejudicial extrinsic information related to a substantive issue at 

trial[.]” United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1087–88 (8th Cir. 2001). 

Trawick’s argument implies some or all of the jurors concealed their bias 

against him since each juror stated they would remain fair and impartial. But 

Trawick must prove his point with more than speculation:

 

Pursuant to McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, . . . a 

party seeking a new trial on the basis of concealed juror bias must prove 

three things: (1) that the juror answered dishonestly, not just 

inaccurately; (2) that the juror was motivated by partiality; and (3) that 

the true facts, if known, would have supported striking the juror for 

cause. 

United States v. Ruiz, 446 F.3d 762, 770 (8th Cir. 2006). Trawick fails to point to

evidence meeting this standard. Without such evidence, we conclude the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Trawick’s motion for a mistrial. 

B. Denial of a Motion for a New Trial

Trawick also argues the district court erred in denying his motion for a new 

trial. “We review denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.” United 

States v. Griggs, 54 F.4th 531, 536 (8th Cir. 2022). In reviewing “the district court’s 

denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion . . . [we] reverse ‘only if the 

evidence weighs heavily enough against the verdict that a miscarriage of justice may 

have occurred.’” United States v. Maxwell, 61 F.4th 549, 558 (8th Cir. 2023)

(quoting United States v. Walker, 393 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2005)); see Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 33(a). “It is the function of the jury, not an appellate court, to resolve 

conflicts in testimony or judge the credibility of witnesses.” United States v. 

Hernandez, 569 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Harrison, 

671 F.2d 1159, 1162 (8th Cir. 1982)). 
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Jury Instruction 14 directed the jury that in order to convict Trawick, it must 

find he did not choose to “walk away from the crime before all elements of the 

distribution of a controlled substance were complete[.]” Trawick argues the 

evidence of his withdrawal from the crime before its completion was so one-sided 

that the jury’s contrary decision was not permissible. He also vaguely claims his 

conviction must be overturned because it was obtained using compromised 

witnesses lacking credibility. We disagree. 

To begin, a witness’s self-interest is relevant in assessing his or her credibility. 

See United States v. Cabrera, 116 F.3d 1243, 1245 (8th Cir. 1997). However, as in 

Cabrera, the witnesses’ testimony in this case “is substantially consistent and 

corroborated by other evidence.” Id. at 1247. For example, witness testimony 

identified Trawick as the person who facilitated the transaction involving heroin. 

This was corroborated by messages, camera footage, and other physical evidence. 

Next, it is well established that “[t]he jury . . . is always the ultimate arbiter of 

a witness’s credibility, and this Court will not disturb the jury’s findings in this 

regard.” United States v. Espino, 317 F.3d 788, 794 (8th Cir. 2003). Because the

witnesses’ testimony here is consistent and corroborated by other evidence, we have 

no basis for concluding the evidence weighs heavily against the verdict. Trawick 

also fails to show a miscarriage of justice has occurred. Thus, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial. 

C. Sentencing

Trawick argues the district court’s drug quantity calculation was imprecise, 

causing his base offense level to be wrongly inflated. “This court reviews sentencing 

determinations under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, first ensuring that 

the district court committed no significant procedural error.” United States v. Wood, 

587 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2009). And, “[w]e review for clear error a district court’s 

drug quantity calculation.” Maxwell, 61 F.4th at 560 (quoting United States v. 

Payton, 636 F.3d 1027, 1046 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
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Assuming without deciding the district court incorrectly calculated the drug 

quantity, any error would be harmless. We have said that “even if the district court 

miscalculated [a defendant’s] Guidelines sentence,” it “is harmless error ‘when the 

district court indicates it would have alternatively imposed the same sentence even 

if a lower guideline range applied.’” United States v. Hamilton, 929 F.3d 943, 948 

(8th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Dace, 842 F.3d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 2016)). 

“We will not reverse a harmless error.” United States v. Aungie, 4 F.4th 638, 644 

(8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 860 F.3d 1133, 1139 (8th Cir. 

2017)). Here, after calculating the advisory Guidelines range, the district court 

explained that even if its drug quantity calculation was incorrect, it would have 

imposed the same 400-month sentence in light of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). Trawick advances no other argument that warrants second-guessing the 

district court’s exercise of its discretion. Therefore, any error is harmless and 

Trawick’s challenge to his drug quantity calculation and base offense level

necessarily fails. See United States v. Stanberg, 509 F. App’x 552, 554 (8th Cir. 

2013) (unpublished per curiam) (holding there was no reversible error where the 

district court stated it would have given the defendant the same sentence regardless 

of the drug quantity); United States v. Staples, 410 F.3d 484, 492 (8th Cir. 2005) 

(“An error is harmless if it is clear from the record that the district court would have 

given the defendant the same sentence regardless of which guidelines range 

applied.”). 

III. Conclusion

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I concur in the judgment affirming Trawick’s conviction and sentence because 

he has not shown reversible error as to either. I see no error in the district court’s 

discharging of the offending juror, its polling of the remaining jurors, or its findings 

about the impartiality of the remaining jurors. I write separately, however, because 
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the facts underlying the motion for mistrial are concerning and worthy of closer 

attention.

A criminal defendant is not “guaranteed a perfect trial.” But a defendant is 

entitled to a fair one. Here, Trawick’s petit jury included a person who made racist 

remarks—even if thinly veiled—in earshot of his fellow jurors during the course of 

the trial. That is not a minor imperfection of the sort we have learned to expect and 

accept in criminal trials. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 383 F.3d 700, 707 (2004) 

(addressing government’s failure to disclose rebuttal witness prior to trial). It is a 

significant problem. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in 

a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an 

absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always 

endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.”).

Consequently, I would not so casually dismiss Trawick’s concerns about 

unconscious or implicit bias. See United States v. Young, 6 F.4th 804, 812 (8th Cir. 

2021) (Kelly, J., concurring). In this case, seven jurors told the district court that 

they heard the discharged juror make comments about race. Yet, when asked, the 

discharged juror denied it. Maybe he did so because he knew the comments were 

inappropriate, or maybe because he did not believe that what he said did, in fact, 

reflect racial bias. Either way, at least one juror in this case was unable to appreciate 

the reality that even the appearance of racial bias and discrimination mars the jury 

trial process. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 206, 224 (2017) (“[R]acial 

bias [is] a familiar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic 

injury to the administration of justice.”).

Perhaps the jurors who ultimately decided Trawick’s case were more vigilant 

in their efforts to remain fair and impartial than a jury whose attention had not been 

focused on the issue of race. We cannot know the answer to that question. But we 

can expect courts to be vigilant in their efforts to eliminate bias of all varieties from 

a criminal trial. And we can hope that there are more citizens like the juror who 
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brought this matter to the attention of the district court—citizens who also recognize 

the problem and are willing to be part of the solution.

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