This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2019 UT 67

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TAMARA MONICA GALINDO,

Appellant,

v.

CITY OF FLAGSTAFF, ARIZONA and JEROLYN BYRNE,

Appellees.

No. 20180346

Heard September 18, 2019

Filed November 1, 2019

On Direct Appeal

Fourth District, Provo

The Honorable James R. Taylor

No. 170401281

Attorneys:

Shane D. Gosdis, Murray, for appellant

Terry M. Plant, Stewart B. Harman, Matthew D. Church, 

Salt Lake City, for appellees

JUSTICE HIMONAS authored the opinion of the Court in which 

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE,

JUSTICE PEARCE, and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.

JUSTICE HIMONAS, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Can a Utah resident, injured in Utah by an Arizona 

municipal employee, file a claim against that employee and the 

municipality after the time to do so has expired under Arizona law

but not under Utah law? The answer lies in principles of comity, 

which create a rebuttable presumption that in circumstances like 

these, our courts enforce our sister states’ laws unless they violate

Utah public policy. 
GALINDO v. CITY OF FLAGSTAFF, AZ

Opinion of the Court

2

¶2 Arizona’s law is not so violative. Therefore, we agree with

the district court that comity should be extended and hold that the 

district court properly dismissed Galindo’s claim for failure to timely 

file a notice of claim.

BACKGROUND

¶3 On September 9, 2016, Tamara Galindo, a Utah resident, and 

Jerolyn Byrne were involved in a motor vehicle accident in Orem, 

Utah. The parties stipulated that at the time of the accident, Byrne 

was acting in the course and scope of her employment with the City 

of Flagstaff, Arizona (City).

¶4 Three hundred and sixty-four days after the accident, on 

September 8, 2017, Galindo served a notice of claim on the City, 

complying with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah’s one-year 

notice of claim period that applies in suits against Utah 

municipalities. UTAH CODE § 63G-7-402. The City and Byrne moved 

to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction because Galindo did not serve her notice of claim within 

six months as required by Arizona’s Actions Against Public Entities 

or Public Employees Statute (Statute or Arizona Statute)—Arizona’s

governmental immunity statute. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-821.01. The 

City argued that the district court should apply the Statute as a 

matter of comity. The district court agreed, applying the Arizona 

Statute and ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because

Galindo failed to comply with the Statute’s six-month notice of claim 

requirement. Galindo appealed.

¶5 We exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code section 

78A-3-102(3)(j).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 Generally, “we review a motion to dismiss for correctness. 

However, in applying principles of comity,” we have traditionally

afforded the district court “broad discretion.” See Trillium USA, Inc. 

v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 2001 UT 101, ¶ 18, 37 P.3d 1093 (internal 

citations omitted).

¶7 We recognize, however, that courts around the country differ 

on what standard of review applies in comity decisions. Most courts 

review comity decisions for abuse of discretion, as we have done. 

See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 932 F.3d 915, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Derr v. 

Swarek, 766 F.3d 430, 436 (5th Cir. 2014); Univ. of Iowa Press v. Urrea, 

440 S.E.2d 203, 204 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); First Midwest Corp. v. Corp.

Fin. Assocs., 663 N.W.2d 888, 890–91 (Iowa 2003). But others apply 
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Opinion of the Court

3

mixed standards or review such decisions de novo. See Quaak v. 

Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 16 (1st 

Cir. 2004) (“This is an intermediate level of scrutiny, more rigorous 

than the abuse-of-discretion or clear-error standards, but stopping 

short of plenary or de novo review.” (internal quotation marks

omitted) (emphasis omitted)); Montaño v. Frezza, 393 P.3d 700, 704

(N.M. 2017) (“We apply a mixed standard of review to questions of

comity. While a district court’s decision to extend comity in a given 

case is subject to de novo review, we also analyze any fact-intensive 

aspects of the district court’s comity analysis under a more 

deferential abuse of discretion standard.” (internal citation omitted));

Gesinger v. Gesinger, 531 N.W.2d 17, 19 (S.D. 1995) (“Comity is a 

question of jurisdiction which is reviewed de novo.”).

¶8 The arguments for a stricter standard of review are far from

meritless, chiefly because comity involves issues of law and is not 

merely a fact-driven decision. See Montaño, 393 P.3d at 704. However, 

as the parties have not briefed this issue, and because we would 

reach the same outcome regardless of the standard applied, we leave 

this matter for a future, appropriate case. See Mobley v. Arkansas, No. 

W2017-02356-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 117585, at *24 n.6 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Jan. 7, 2019) (surveying the different approaches but deciding 

not to reach the issue).

ANALYSIS

¶9 The only issue presented in the district court and currently 

before us is whether we should extend comity to apply the Arizona 

Statute.1 The parties dispute whether extending comity here—which 

will bar Galindo’s claim as untimely—violates Utah’s public policy. 

1 Another relevant framework for analysis of the underlying issue

is choice of law. We previously suggested that comity, a 

discretionary doctrine, could supersede a choice-of-law analysis. See

Trillium USA, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 2001 UT 101, ¶¶ 14–16, 37 

P.3d 1093. Other courts also seem to follow suit. See, e.g., Coleman v.

Clark, 322 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 n.1 (D.D.C. 2018); Montaño v. Frezza, 393 

P.3d 700, 703 n.2 (N.M. 2017); Hansen v. Scott, 687 N.W.2d 247, 251

(N.D. 2004). But as with the standard of review, we see no reason to 

affirmatively determine this issue as the parties did not address it, 

and therefore it does not impact the outcome of this case.
GALINDO v. CITY OF FLAGSTAFF, AZ

Opinion of the Court

4

We hold that it does not. Therefore, comity was properly extended, 

and Galindo’s claim was rightfully dismissed for its untimeliness.2

2 While this case was pending on direct review before this court, 

the United States Supreme Court issued Franchise Tax Board of 

California v. Hyatt, which held, “States retain their sovereign 

immunity from private suits brought in the courts of other States.” 

139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492 (2019) (overruling Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,

426 (1979), which held that states were not required to recognize the 

sovereign immunity of their sister states). We requested

supplemental briefing from the parties as to the effect of Hyatt on 

this case.

Despite our request and the parties’ appreciated briefings, we 

need not address that sea change in sovereign immunity practice 

because “municipalities, unlike States, do not enjoy a constitutionally 

protected immunity from suit” under the Eleventh Amendment of 

the United States Constitution. Jinks v. Richland Cty., 538 U.S. 456, 466 

(2003); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999). 

It is important to clarify that sovereign immunity does not flow 

from the Eleventh Amendment. Sovereign immunity is a concept the 

founders “took as given.” Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1493–94. At first, courts 

held that sovereign immunity extended to political subdivisions. 

However, courts found ways to chip away at its scope, until it 

became a rarity. In response, legislatures enacted governmental 

immunity statutes. Some scholars explain these statutes as waivers 

of an immunity that was traditionally understood to exist. See John 

W. Creer, The Utah Governmental Immunity Act: An Analysis, 1967 

UTAH L. REV. 120, 121–22; Adam Goldstein, Recent Legislative 

Development: IV. Tort Law: A. Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, 2005 

UTAH L. REV. 380, 380. This court, prior to the enactment of the 

Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, viewed the matter similarly. 

See, e.g., Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 111 P.2d 800, 801 (Utah 1941) (“It is 

generally recognized throughout this country and in England that in 

the absence of a statute a municipality is not liable for the negligent 

acts of its servants while they are engaged in performing a 

governmental function or duty.”). Yet other scholars argue that 

courts abandoned the view that sovereign immunity extends to 

political subdivisions, and the governmental immunity acts establish 

such immunity and do not simply waive it. See Fred Smith, Local 

Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 424–29 (2016).

Under either of these interpretations of the development of 

political subdivision immunity, Hyatt—which addressed 

(continued...)
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Opinion of the Court

5

¶10 Comity is “a principle under which the courts of one state 

give effect to the laws of another state . . . not as a rule of law, but 

rather out of deference or respect.” Trillium USA, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty.

Comm’rs, 2001 UT 101, ¶ 19, 37 P.3d 1093 (alteration in original) 

(quoting Hawsey v. La. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 934 S.W.2d 723, 726 (Tex. 

Ct. App. 1996)); see also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979).

¶11 We initially presume comity should be extended to our 

sister states’ governmental immunity acts.3 Other courts have taken 

a similar approach. See, e.g., Sam v. Sam, 134 P.3d 761, 767 (N.M. 

2006) (“As a general rule, comity should be extended. Only if doing 

so would undermine New Mexico’s own public policy will comity 

not be extended.”); Hyde v. Hyde, 562 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tenn. 1978)

(“The rule of comity to be gleaned from these cases is that, where the 

law of another jurisdiction is applicable, Tennessee will enforce the 

substantive rights which litigants have under the laws of the other 

jurisdiction if such rights are not contrary to the policy of 

Tennessee.”). The goals of this presumption include fostering 

cooperation, promoting harmony, and building goodwill among the 

states. Trillium, 2001 UT 101, ¶ 19; see also Lee v. Miller Cty., 800 F.2d 

1372, 1375 (5th Cir. 1986).

¶12 The party seeking to rebut this presumption must show that 

the extension of comity “contravene[s]” or “undermines” Utah’s 

public policy.4 Trillium, 2001 UT 101, ¶¶ 19–20. And it must be

“sufficiently offensive” to our public policy “to outweigh the 

principles of comity.” Sam, 134 P.3d at 766.

 

constitutionally protected sovereign immunity—does not apply to 

political subdivisions. The principles set forth in Hall continue to 

govern a state’s governmental immunity grant to its political 

subdivisions and the respect that should be attributed to it by other 

states.

3 With this statement, we make explicit what has been implicit in

our jurisprudence. See Trillium, 2001 UT 101, ¶ 19; Jackett v. L.A. Dep’t 

of Water & Power, 771 P.2d 1074, 1075–76 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

4 When, as here, the legislature has not directly answered the 

public policy question before us we are left with a gap in our 

legislation. In order to fill that gap, we engage in common-law 

reasoning—inferring whatever public policy we can glean from 

legislation in the general field, and filling in the gap with our best 

assessment of likely policies that the legislature would embrace, or 

that we find to be prudent public policy in that context. 
GALINDO v. CITY OF FLAGSTAFF, AZ

Opinion of the Court

6

¶13 Galindo offers two arguments in an attempt to rebut this 

presumption. First, she argues that the notice of claim time bar under 

the Arizona Statute, which is six months shorter than Utah’s 

respective time bar, violates Utah’s public policy. Second, she argues 

that applying comity to effectively bar a Utah plaintiff from recovery 

also violates our public policy. We are unpersuaded by either 

argument. We address them below in turn.5

¶14 First, in general, statutes do not reflect different policies 

merely because they have different time constraints on filing.6 Both 

Utah and Arizona have conditioned suits against the state and its 

political subdivisions by requiring timely filing of a notice of claim

within a relatively short period.7 By doing so, they balanced

5 Other states, like New Mexico, have outlined factors for district

courts to consider when determining whether comity is violative of 

public policy, based on decisions from around the country. See Sam, 

134 P.3d at 767. These factors are reflected in a decision by our court 

of appeals. See Jackett, 771 P.2d at 1076. 

In past cases we followed the parties’ attempts at rebutting the 

presumption that comity extends. Trillium, 2001 UT 101, ¶¶ 20–21. 

But even so, these factors were guiding our analysis, not as elements 

to consider or not, but rather as examples of public policies we might 

infer from legislation in the general field and from our gap-filling, 

common-law analysis. For example, we might determine that the 

legislative scheme is designed “to give primary regard to the rights 

of [our] own citizens.” Jackett, 771 P.2d at 1076. This would mean that 

comity would be inappropriate. We might, on the other hand, find 

that legislation in the general field aimed to minimize forum 

shopping. See id. In that case, comity extension might be viewed as 

far more suitable. Our analysis of Galindo’s arguments below is 

informed by these examples.

6 There may be, of course, limits to this general statement. For 

example, where there is a significant difference, as between a very 

short statute of limitations and a very lengthy one or none at all, 

extending comity may contravene public policy. This is not the case 

here.

7 The limitations posed by the two states only govern suits 

against their own governmental entities. The Utah and Arizona

legislatures have not expressed their views as to applicability of 

these limitations on a foreign governmental entity. In addition, it is 

(continued...)
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Opinion of the Court

7

competing policies. On the one hand, they allow residents to recover 

for injuries, even when those are committed by governmental 

entities. On the other hand, they permit government entities an 

opportunity to investigate claims, avoid payment of false claims, and 

protect the public treasury. See Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 134 P. 1167, 

1171 (Utah 1913) (“One of the principal objects of the statute is to 

prevent spurious claims from being paid, and, in order to fully 

accomplish that purpose, to give the city officials ample opportunity 

to examine into both the cause and extent of the injury and also to 

test the good faith of the claimant in presenting the claim.”); Hall v. 

Dep’t of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶¶ 14, 23, 24 P.3d 938; Lee v. Arizona, 182 

P.3d 1169, 1173 (Ariz. 2008) (“A notice of claim serves to give the 

government notice of potential liability, an opportunity to 

investigate claims, the chance to avoid costly litigation through 

settlement, and assistance in budgeting.”).

¶15 Although both states waive governmental immunity to an

extent, they differ in the time limit posed for notice of claim filing.

Utah limits the time to submit a notice of claim against governmental 

entities to one year. UTAH CODE § 63G-7-402. Our courts treat this 

time restriction strictly and view the failure to timely file a notice of 

claim as a jurisdictional bar to a suit.8 See, e.g., Wheeler v. McPherson, 

2002 UT 16, ¶ 11, 40 P.3d 632; Hall, 2001 UT 34, ¶ 23. Arizona

mandates a shorter period—six months (180 days). ARIZ. REV. STAT.

§ 12–821.01(A). But the Arizona courts view the period as more 

flexible, allowing for its waiver, forfeiture, and equitable tolling, 

 

not clear that a state legislature can regulate extraterritorial litigation. 

This statutory void is exactly where the doctrine of comity comes 

into our jurisprudence. See Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1146 

(Utah 1991) (“[T]he Legislature has removed this issue from the 

realm of comity and judicial discretion by directing that foreign 

judgments shall be treated the same as local judgments once they 

have been filed in this state.”).

8 Galindo asks us to follow Utah law regarding the notice of claim 

requirement because it is procedural, like any other statute of 

limitations. See Fin. Bancorp, Inc. v. Pingree & Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 

16 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). We decline the invitation. First, this 

argument is one of choice of law and not comity. Second, it ignores 

that in Utah we view the notice of claim requirement in Utah Code 

section 63G-7-402 as a substantive requirement. Davis v. Cent. Utah 

Counseling Ctr., 2006 UT 52, ¶¶ 42–44, 147 P.3d 390.
GALINDO v. CITY OF FLAGSTAFF, AZ

Opinion of the Court

8

when appropriate. See Pritchard v. State, 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Ariz. 

1990) (en banc) (“[T]he time element with respect to filing is 

essentially procedural in nature . . . [and] is subject to waiver, 

estoppel and equitable tolling.”).9 As a result, the Arizona notice of

claim period may extend beyond six months, closing the gap 

between the two states’ time limitations.

¶16 This possibility, together with the small difference in the 

time restrictions to begin with, leads us to hold that the difference in 

the notice of claim periods does not violate Utah’s public policy.

¶17 Second, Galindo argues that other courts have declined to 

extend comity when the outcome of such an extension would 

deprive a forum state litigant of recovery. She offers four cases to 

support this argument. None are instructive.

¶18 Two of the cases address a complete bar from suit in the 

jurisdiction that would receive comity. See Biscoe v. Arlington Cty., 

738 F.2d 1352, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. 

Court, 658 P.2d 422, 424 (Nev. 1983). This is not the case here. 

Galindo never claimed she was completely barred from suit 

according to the Arizona Statute. If she had filed within the 

six-month period, her claim would not be time-barred. Additionally, 

Galindo does not dispute that her counsel contacted the City well 

before the six months to file a notice of claim expired. Under these 

circumstances, ruling that comity does not extend would encourage 

forum-shopping—something that comity is meant to prevent. See

Jackett v. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power, 771 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Utah Ct. 

App. 1989); see also Montaño v. Frezza, 393 P.3d 700, 710 (N.M. 2017).

¶19 The two other cases are also unhelpful for Galindo for 

several reasons. First, they both address sovereign immunity and not 

governmental immunity. These are distinct immunities and should

not be conflated. See supra ¶ 9 n.2. Second, the court in Schoeberlein v. 

Purdue University, actually extended comity after finding that both 

Illinois and Indiana had similar sovereign immunity protection and 

such extension was not “inconsistent” with Illinois public policy. 544 

N.E.2d 283, 287–88 (Ill. 1989). Third, Peterson v. Texas offers virtually

nothing but a conclusory statement of comity that is antithetical to 

9 Galindo did not argue below, and has not argued on appeal, 

that waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling prevents the application of 

Arizona Revised Statutes section 12-821.01(A) in this case. We do not 

opine whether she could still make such claims in an Arizona court.
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Opinion of the Court

9

our comity jurisprudence: anytime “a citizen of this state” is “injured 

in this state and sues in the courts of this state, there is no immunity, 

by law or as a matter of comity.” 635 P.2d 241, 243 (Colo. App. 1981). 

Carried to its logical conclusion, this view would largely eviscerate 

the doctrine of comity, which we are not interested in doing.

¶20 In sum, Galindo has failed to rebut the presumption of 

comity.

CONCLUSION

¶21 Comity was rightfully extended, and the district court

correctly applied the Arizona Statute. Galindo failed to comply with 

the Statute’s notice of claim requirement. Accordingly, Galindo’s 

action is untimely and must be dismissed.