2005 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

1-28-2005 

# B r e n t wo o d M ed As so c v

. UMW A

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al
D ocke t N o . 04-1955

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2005 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min

. C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du

. Re c omme nde d C it at ion

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. UM W A" (2005). 2005 D e cisio n s . P ape r 1525. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2005/15251 Ho nora ble M ilt on I. Shadur , Senior United States District Judge for the Nort

hern District

of Illinoi s, sitting by

designation. PRECEDENT IAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

NO. 04-1955

____________ BRENTWOO D MEDICAL ASSOCIATES Appellant
v.
UNITED MI NE WORKERS OF AMERICA

____________ On A ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt for the We stern D istrict of P enns ylvania (D.C. Civi l No. 03-cv- 1258) Distri ct Judge: Hon. Arthur J. Schwab

____________ Argued December 7, 2004

BE FO RE : AM BR O, a nd V AN AN TW ER PE N, Circu it Judges and SHADUR, 1 Senior Dist rict Judge2 (Fil ed January28, 2005 )
James A. Prozzi , Esq. ( Argued) Jac kson Lewis LLP One PPG P lace, 28 th Floor Pitt sburgh, Pennsyl vania 15222 Counsel for

Appellant
Michael J. Healey , Esq. ( Argued) Douglas B. McKechnie, Esq. Heal ey & Horn ack , P .C. 1100 Liberty Avenue The P ennsylvian, Suite C -2 Pitt sburgh, Pennsyl vania 15222 Counsel for

Appellee

____________

OPI NION

____________ VA N A NT W ER PE N, Circuit Judge
The F ederal A rbitration Act cod ifies Cong ress’ desire to uphold private arbit

rati on agreements that produce prompt and fair dispu te resolution w ithout involving the courts. In further ance of thi s int erest , a court must scrupul ouslyhonor the ba rgains implic it in such agree men ts and interfe re on ly wh en a n aw ard is sev erely p rob lem atic. See , e.g., Shearson/Ameri can Exp., I nc. v. McM ahon , 482 U.S. 220,3 223 (1987). This appealasks us t o determi ne whether or not an arbit rati on award should be uphel d where an arbi trator inexpli cablycite s language i n his deci sion that cannot be fou nd i n th e rele van t coll ectiv e ba rga inin g ag reem ent. Because we conclude that such a mi stake, while glaring, does not fa tally taint the b alanc e of th e arbitra tor’s de cision in this case, we affirm the deci sion of the District Court upholding the award.

I. Fac tual Background
Brentwood Medical Associ ates ( “BMA ”) and the United Mine Workers of America(“UMW A”) are parties t o a colle ctive bargaini ng agreement t hat cover s the terms and conditions o f emp loyment for a u nit of emp loyees at BM A’s facil ity in Brentwood, Pennsyl vania. This agree ment provide s a mandatorygrievanc e and arbi tration procedure for dis putes between the parties . Arbit rati on of grieva nces is conducted by an arbitrator chosen from a panel, and th at arbitrator’s decisi on “shallbe finaland binding upon t he employ ees, t

he Un ion and the E mp loyer.” Join t Ap pen dix (“J.A .”) at 4 8. Under the agre ement, an arbit rator is expl icitly prevente d from “add[ing] to, s ubtract [ing] fr om, or modify [ing] i n any way anyof the provi sions, terms [or ] conditions of [t he] Ag reem ent.” Id. The grievance that ga ve ris e to thi s appeal a llege d that BM A v iolated the co llective b argain ing ag reem ent w hen it refus ed to a llow a unio n m emb er to ex ercise h er sen iority rights under Articl e VIII. In February, 2001, Ms. D enise Cope (a member of UMW A) was offered the pos iti on of2 “Bump ing” is the pro cess bywhich an employ ee who had less seniority

than another is f

o rced out s o that a

more senior employe e can take j unior employ ee’s posi tion andavoid lay off himself. See Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co. , 541 F.2d 394, 396 (3d Cir. 1976 ).

3 The arbitrator found that Ms. Co pe ha d gre ater sen iority than twenty -eight

of the thirty- five employ ees in t he bargai ning uni t. J.A

. at 71

.

4 Article VIII (S eniority) rea ds, in rele vant p art:
Section 1. Seniori ty shallbe defined as the y ears, months and day s an em ployee has w orked w ith the Em ployer in the bargaini ng unit s ince the employe e’s l ast date of hire by the Em plo yer. . .
4 Charge Entry Associate, for which she left her position as a Phle boto mist. O n N ovem ber 1 1, 200 2, BM A a nno unce d it would be aboli shing the Charge EntryAssociat e class ific ation effecti ve November 15, 2002. Ms. Cope reque sted permissi on to “bump” 2 outsi de her cl assif ication of Charge Entry A ssocia te and return to her p osition as a P hlebo tomis t, thereby displ acing the least

senior person i n that class ific ation. This reques t was refus ed, and BMA instead offered Ms. Cope the pos iti on of Front Office Clerk. 3

On Novem ber 14, 2002, Ms. Cope filed a grievance with BM A p ursua nt to the collec tive ba rgainin g agr eem ent, clai ming that

BM A had violat ed Articl e VIII, Sections 1, 2, and 10. 4 On Feb rua ry 3, 20 03, B M A d enie d th is gri eva nce
.Section 2. The parti es recogni ze the principa l [si c] of senio rity as a fa ctor i n lay offs, recall s and cert ain types of promotionalopportuni ties providedthe employees is ot herwise fully qu ali fie d. S en io rity s ha ll, h ow ev er , ap pl y only as expr essly provided f

orin this A greem ent.
Section 10. Layof f and Rec alls . In t he event that the Employer

determi nes to r educe the work for ce in class ific ation covered by this A greem ent or to abolish a class ificatio n, the Employer

will, in it s sole di scretion, de termine which positions
are to b e affecte d and the number of empl oyee pos iti ons to be reduced, includ i ng the n umbe r o f fu llti me an d part ti me positions wh ich w ill be aff ected in eac h class ification and/o r depa rtmen t. The redu ct io n wi llbe a cco mp l ished in inverse orderof seniority in the c lassi fica tion s af fec ted, providedthat the employe es to be r etai ned have the s kill, q ualifica tions, ab ility and physical fitness to perform all of th e w ork re main ing in that class ific ation with ou t tr aining, and will a ssume the r emaining schedule. The Employer wil l send t he Union a lis t of employ ees laid off wit hin twe nty-fo ur (2 4) h our s of the la yoff

. T he Employer

may ex emp t emp loyees w ith spec ial skills or abili ties from any reducti on in force or lay off. (emph asis added ).
5 BM A and UM WA then proce eded to bi nding arbi tration pursuant to Arti cle XIV of the col lective bargaining agreement. Arbitr ator J ohn M. Felice was sel ected t o conduct the arbi tration, a nd on August 6, 2003, he issue d a decisi on sustaining the gri evance and ordering BM A to permit Ms.6 Cope to exerci se her se niori ty right s and bump the le ast se nior Phlebotomi st. J.A. at

68-75. I n that de cisi on, the arbit rator asked rhet orical ly why, i f bumping was not permi tted unde r the col lective barga ining agreement as BMA contended, was the fo llow ing lan guag e gov erning bum ping prese nt in A rticle VIII, S ection 10:

“. . . employees who exercise seniorityrights and bump must have the sk ill, qualifica tions, ab ility and ph ysical fitnes s to per for m a ll of t he w ork rem ainin g in that c lassi fica tion . . .”

J.A. at 7 3-4. T his lang uage does not ex ist in eithe r Artic le VIII, Sec tion 10, or any where else i n the col lective bargaining agree men t.

BM A filed a complaint wit h the Unite d States Distri ct Co urt for the W estern Distric t of P enns ylvania p ursua nt to Section 301 of

the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S. C. § 185 et seq , seeki ng to vacat e the
aw ard

. 

### The parties filed cross- motions for summa ry judgment, and the Dis trict Court grant

ed summ ary judgment in favor of UMWA on Ma rch 12, 2004. Adopt

ing the appropriate deferential st andard of review, the District Court concluded t

hat the pa rtieshad agreed that (1)an arbit ration award would be final and binding, and (2) the arbitrator’s decisi on reached a rati onal result consi stent with the te rms of the agreement. J.A. at 0 6-7.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

BM A f iled a time ly No tice o f A ppe al on Ap ril 5, 2 004

.7 We have juris dicti on to revi ew this fi nal dis tri ct court order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercis e plenary r eview over a dis tri ct court ’s deci sion re solvi ng cross moti ons for
sum ma ry judg me nt. Teamsters Local 312 v. Matlack, Inc. , 118 F.3d 985, 994 ( 3d Cir. 1997) , (quoting United Parcel Service , Inc. v. Int ’l Bhd. of TeamstersLocal No. 430 , 55 F.3d 138 , 140 (3d Cir . 199 5)). A collective bargaining agreement represents a contra ctual a ccord reach ed be twee n an e mp loyer and its emp loyees. If su ch a c ontrac t includ es an arbitratio n clau se, it is ass umed that t

he parti es bargai ned for a gri evance resol ution pr ocedure i n which an arbi trator would interpret the agreement. It i s thus not the rol e of a court

to correct fact

ual or le gal e rrors ma de b y an a rbitra tor. Major League Umpires Ass’n v. American League of Prof essional Baseball Cl ubs , 357 F.3d 272, 279 ( 3d Cir. 2004) . A dist rict court may determ ine on ly wheth er or n ot an a rbitrator’s aw ard “d raw s its
essen ce” f rom the pa rties’ colle ctive b argain ing ag reem ent, United PaperworkersInt’ l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc. , 484 U.S . 29, 36 (198 7), and we apply this s ame stand ard in
rev iew ing the a rbitra tion aw ard

. Pennsylvani a Power Co. v. LocalUnion No. 272 of the I nt’ l Bhd. of El ec. Workers, AFLCIO , 276 F .3d 17 4, 178 (3d C ir. 2001 ). On ce a c ourt is
sa ti sf ie d t hat an arb it ra to r’ s a war d dr aws i ts es se nce fr om a collec tive ba rgainin g agr eem ent, it is w ithout ju risdiction to consider the a ward f urther.
An award draws its e ssence fr om a collect ive bargaini ng agreement i f its inter pretat ion can in any rat ional way be de rived f rom the ag reem ent, view ed in lig ht of its8 language, its context , and any other i ndicia of the parti es’ inten tion

. United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp. , 51 F.3d 376, 379-80 (3d Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, we must enforce an ar bitr ation a ward if it

was based on an arguable interpret ation and/or appl ication of the collec tive ba rgainin g agr eem ent, an d m ay only vac ate it if there is n o sup port in th e reco rd fo r its determ ination or if it reflec ts man ifest disr egard of the agree men t, totally unsupporte d by principl es of contr act const ructi on.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union , 993 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1993) (i nternalquotati on marks omitted). Ther efore, we will not di sturb an arbit rati on award “even if we fi nd the basis f or it to be ambiguous or

disagr ee[] with [the arbit rator ’s] conc lusi ons under the law.” Citgo Asp halt Refini ng Co. v. Paper, Alli ed-Indus. , Chem. & Energy Workers Int ’l Union Local No. 2-991 , 385 F.3d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 2004) , (quoting Stroehmann Bakerie s, I nc. v. Local 776, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters , 969 F.2d 1436, 14 41 (3d C ir.1992)).

III. Discussi on
There is a

strong presumption under the Federa l Arbitr ation Act , 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. , in fa vor of enforci ng arb itratio n aw ard s. Moses H . Cone M em’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U .S. 1, 24-25 (19 83). As su ch, an aw ard is pre sumed valid unl ess it is affi rmative ly shown to be otherwis e, and the vali dity of an award is s ubject

to att ack5 9 U .S.C. § 10 sta tes, in rele vant p art: (a) In any of the follow ing ca ses the Un ited Sta tes cou rt in and for the distric t wh erein the aw ard was made may make an order vacati ng the award upon the appl i cati on of any par ty to the arbitration-- (1) where the award was procured by cor rupti on, fraud, or undue mean s; (2) wh ere the re w as ev ident p artiality or co rruptio n in the
arbi tr at or s, orei th erof t hem; (3) whe re the arbitra to rs we re gu ilty of misc ond uct in refusi ng to post

pone the h earin g, upon sufficient cause shown, or in r efusing t o hear evi dence pertinent and materi al to the controver sy; or of anyothermisbehavior by which the ri ghts of anypartyhave been prej udiced; or (4) where the arbi trators exceeded their powers, or so impe rfectly exe cute d th em that a mu tual, f ina l, a nd defin ite award upon the subj ect matter submitted was not made.
9 only on those gr ounds li sted i n 9 U.S.C. § 10, 5 or if enf orc em ent o f the aw ard is co ntra ry to pu blic p olicy. Exxon Shipping Co. , 993 F.2d at 360, (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 75 9, Int’l

Union of Rubb er Workers , 461 U. S. 757, 766 (1983)).

BM A c onten ds tha t the arb itrator ex ceed ed his authori ty when he added language t o the col lective bargaining agree men t supp orting h is con clusion that M s. Co pe co uld bump a less se nior employ ee in a di fferent class ific ation,10 wh ich sign als a vio lation o f 9 U .S.C. § 10(a )(4). If th is allege d ov erstep by the arb itrator is the only leg th at sup ports his d ecis ion , it is w ithin our disc retio n to vac ate th e aw ard

. Therefore, the narr ow issue befor e us is whether the arbit rator ’s concl usion i s supported, i n any way , bya rati onal i nt er pr et ati on of

t he co l l ec t i ve bar ga i ni ng ag r ee me nt

. We reiterate th at it is our d uty to resist the urge to con duct de
novo rev iew of th e aw ard on t he m erits. See United Paperworkers Union , 484 U.S. at 36 (we “are not authorized to recons ider t

he merit s of an award even though the part ies may al lege that the award rest s on error s of fact or on misin terpreta tion of the co ntract.”). R ather, w e ask mere ly whether the parti es to t

he coll ecti ve bargai ning agree ment got what they bargained for, namely an arbitrat or who w ould first prov ide an interpre tation o f the c ontrac t that w as ration ally base d on the lan guag e of th e agre eme nt, and seco nd w ould produc e a rational aw ard. BM A co ntends that the a rbitrator’s referenc e to the language not found in the colle ctive barg aining agree men t fatally taints th e aw ard, be caus e this referenc e is es senti al to t he arbit rator ’s ult

imate conclusion and is i nseparabl e from the r emainder of t he award. As such, our focus must

be on whether the arbit rator ’s dis cussion c an still su ppo rt the aw ard if w e ex cise the a nom alou s lan gua ge. We believ e that it do es pro vide s uch s upp ort.
The arbitrato r first stated that he wa s con fron ted w ith contrary i nterpr etations of Article VIII, Sec tion 10 off ered by BM A an d UM WA . As fram ed by the parties, the issue be fore the arbitrator was essentially whether use of the plural term “class ific ations ” in Arti cle VIII , Section 10 enabl es emp loyees af fecte d by layoff to exe rcise the ir senio rity rights6 We cannot and do not pass judgment on the wisdom of the arbitrator’s conclusi on. All we a re empo wered to det ermine here is whether or not his award draws its e ssen ce from the collec tive ba rgainin g agr eem ent.
11 by bumping i nto anothe r clas sifi cati on. After t aking noti ce of the fa ct that arb itrators g enera lly hold sen iority provis ions to be at the heart

of any col lective bargaining agreement, he set about revi ewing the agr eement’s various provisi ons. The arbit rator pronounced that a “conj unctive inter pretat ion of Article VIII o f the [ collec tive ba rgainin g agr eem ent] lea ds to the ine scap able c onclu sion th at the p arties ha ve co nsisten tly recognize d seniority preference. . .” J.A. at 73 . This is born out by a re view of th e co llectiv e ba rga inin g ag reem ent. Ar ticle V III, S ectio n 1, supra. , expre ssly identifie s senio rity in terms of the entire b arga ining u nit . Section 2 of that Articl e goes on to s ay t

hat seni ority rights applyonly as expressly provided for in the a greem ent. T his is a c lear ba sis upo n w hich th e arbitra tor cou ld hav e con clude d that se niority preferenc e existed unit- wide. 6 This alone prov ides am ple basis to uphold the a ward.
In additional s upport for his concl usion, the arbi trator cited se veral p rovisio ns of the ag reem ent:
For e xam ple, Se ction 1 defin es sen iority as “ba rgainin g un itwide” and not wit

hin cla ssifi cati on. Section 2 provi des that the pri nciple of seniority is a fac tor i n lay offs, recall s and certain types of promoti onal opport uniti es provi ded the employe e is ful ly qualif ied. Section 5 s pecifi es that in fil ling12 vacanc ies whe n the qua lifications of two (2) or mo re applic ants are relativel y equal , prefe rence wil l be based on seniority . Section 11, s pecifi es that when the Employer decides to affect a recallfrom lay off, i t will“consider employe es with r ecallright s fir st within the c lassi fication from wh ich they were lai d off, then by seniori ty, the most senior firs t, ba sed upon the pos iti on preferenc es on the designated forms.” Thi s provis o obviousl y entitl es seni or employe es to be r ecall ed in reve rse orde r of lay off to a positio n oth er than to the p osition from wh ich the y were laid off, provi ded theyare qual ifie d.
Id. Fu rtherm ore, he expla ined:
the language “in i nverse or der of seni ority i n the cl assif ication affected” in Arti cle VIII , Section 10 of the [coll ecti ve bargaini ng agreement] cannot be i nterpreted t o prohibi t seni or emp loyees af fecte d by a layof f from exerc ising th eir “bargai ning unit -wide” seni ority rights and bump less se nior employees o utside of their classification, pro vided they are qua lified

. J.A. at 74. The arbi trator conclude d his re view by noting that no provisi on in A rticle V III of th e agre eme nt w ould prev ent bu mp ing b argain ing u nitwide. J. A. at 75.
After rev iewing the totalityof the arbitrator’s dec ision, we are confident

that hi s award does not rest solel y upon the aberra nt langua ge added by t

he arbit rator . While i t is true t

hat the clear est suppor

t for t he7 Our learned c ollea gue rei terat es in his d issent th at it is undisput ed that the arbitrato r mo dified agree men t langu age in vio lati on o f Articl e XIV, Section 1, and that the arbi trator therefore exceeded his contrac tual authori ty . Had thi s been the only basis f or his c onclu sion, w e w ould agree th at va catur is appr opriat e. However, even if we were to ki ck out the “bum leg” of the ar

bitr ator’ s award, t

here are sti ll manyothers upon which this award can stand. We do not agree w ith the dissent’s
a sse rti on that, regardless of w hat other justifications there a re for his decision, t

he arbitrat or’s sing le error a lone a llow s us to void the a ward in toto

. 13 arbit rator ’s concl usion comes fr om the language he inter polate d, 7 there is suffici ent subst ance in the remainder of the di scussi on to pass t he minimum rationa lity threshold . Face d w ith w hat he perce ived a s an in cong ruity between BMA ’s posi tion and t he bargai ning unit -wide seni ority rights of employe es, t

he arbit rator atte mpted to const

rue toget her, and t

hen give effe ct to, all pro vision s of th e agre eme nt. W hile B M A m ay take issu e w ith his cont ractua l interpret ation, this is not suffici ent to j usti fy vacatur of t he
aw ard by this Co urt. See Major League Baseball Players Ass ’n v. Garvey , 532 U.S . 504, 5 09 (2 001 ) (per c uriam ) (“if an arbitrato r is eve n arg uably
cons truing o r app lying the c ontrac t and a cting w ithin the scop e of h is authori ty , the fact that a court is convinced he committed serious er ror does not suf fice to o ver turn his d ecis ion .”) (in tern al qu otati ons om itted ).

BM A’s e ntire arg um ent res ts on th e arbitra tor’s ine xplica ble quo tation o f lang uage that w as no t prese nt in the agree men t. Certain ly, this was a mistake. Moreover, thi s mist ake clearly violates Arti cle XIV, Section 1’s prohi biti on against

the arbi trator adding to, subt racti ng from, or modifyi ng the agre ement. Nonethe less, this error is i nsuffici ent to warr ant14 vacation o f the aw ard. “Full-blow n judicial review ” of the arb itrator’s decisi on would annul the bargain be tween BMA and UM WA for an arbit rator ’s const

ructi on of thei r agreement and repla ce it

with a judi cial interpretation that wa s not barga ined for. Stroehmann Bakerie s, I nc. , 969 F.2d at 1441. Only where t here is manifest

disre gard for t

he agreement c an we override a n arbit

rator . Because t

he remainder

of the j usti fication for t he award offered bythe arbi trator was capable of separation from the aberrant language, his deci sion re flect s an interpret ation of the contract t

hat is at least m inima lly rooted in the co llective b argain ing ag reem ent, an d no t his “ow n br and of in dus trial ju stice .” Un ited P ape rw ork ers I nter n. U nio n, 484 U.S. at 36. Consequently , the arbit rator ’s error was harmles s, si nce he would have arri ved at the conclusi on he reached here, even abs ent the discussion o f the aberran t language . As such , our inquiry into the aw ard has re ache d its jurisd ictiona l limit, and we mu st uph old it.
IV. Conclusion
For the for egoing rea sons, we affi rm the deci sion of the District Co urt.15 AM BR O, Circuit

Judge , Disse nting

I believ e this ca se pre sents th e rare s ituation in w hich it is app rop riate for our Co urt to vac ate a n ar bitra tion aw ard . Th eref ore , I respe ctfully disse nt.

Althou gh o urre vi ew of arbi tr at io n award s i s—as st at ed b y my colleagues in the majorit y—highly deferential , courts are nonetheles s “neither enti tled nor

encouraged t o simply‘rubber stamp’ t he inte rpret ations and decisi ons of arbi trators. ” Matteson v. Ryder Sys. I nc. , 99 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996). The feder al court s ret ain a si gnific ant rol e in the review of labor a rbitration aw ards a nd m ay vaca te aw ards u nder certain circu ms tanc es. Id. at 113–14. One such circumst ance occurs when the arbit rator shows “manifest

disre gard” for t

he terms of t

he coll ecti ve bar gain ing agr eem ent ( “C BA ” or “A gre em ent” ) at iss ue. See, e. g. , Major League Umpires Ass’n v. Am. League of Prof’ l Baseball Clubs , 357 F.3d 272 , 280 (3d Cir . 200 4), cert. denied , ___ S.Ct. ___, 2005 WL 45841 (“[A]n award m ay be vacated if the ar bitrator demonstrates manifest disregard fo r the CB A.”); Newa rk Morning Le dger Co. v. Newa rk Typographical

Union Local 103 , 797 F.2d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 198 6) (“[I]n that r arest

case of manifes t dis regard of t he [coll ecti ve bargai ning] agr eem ent, th e [c our t] mu st dra w th e line .”) (in tern al qu otati on o mitte d).

An ar bi tr at orderiv es her

/h is aut hority fr om the ter ms o f the CBA and the s cop e of the is sue s su bm itted by the par ties. Major League8 In fact, the Union had unsucc essful ly atte mpted to i nclude a bumping provision in the CBA when neg otiati ng its terms.
16 Um pires Ass’n , 357 F.3d at 279. In t

his cas e, the CBA provides that an arbit rator ’s deci sion i s finaland binding on t he parti es. CBA Art. XIV § 1 (Step 4) . Import antly , the CBA also expl icitly states that “[t]he arbit

rator shall no t add to, s ubtract from, or modif

y in any way any of the provisi ons, terms o[r ] conditions of this Agreement. ” Id. (emp hasis a dded ). Des pite this leave- no-doubt l anguage, i t is undisput ed that , in rendering an arbit rati on award in favor of the Union, the arbi trator modifie d the language in the CBA to incl ude a provis ion all owing for “bumping” where no s uch pr ovi si on e xi st s i n the ac tu al te xtof th e CBA. 8 In doing so, the arbi trator violate d the p rovisio n of the C BA that pro hibited him f rom mo difying its term s. H e thu s ex cee ded the s cop e of his c ont ractu ally de lega ted a uth ority. Cf

. Pennsylvani a Power Co. v. Local Union No. 272 , 276 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2001) (vacating an arbi tration award becaus e the ar bitr ator exc eeded his powers under

the CBA by alt ering t

he CBA “in direct vi olati on of [the CB A’s] prov ision th at he h ad no pow er to do so.”); see also 9 U. S. C. § 10(a)(4) (pro viding that a fe deral court m ay vacate an arbitration aw ard “where the ar

bitr ators exceeded the ir powers, or so imperfectl y exec uted them that

a mutual, final , and defi nite a ward upon the subj ect matter submitted was not made.”) . Because, “[s]i mply s tate d, an arbi trator may not venture be yond the bounds of his or her aut hority, ” Major League Umpires Ass’n , 357 F.2d at

279 (internal quot ation omi tted) , I would vacate the arbit rati on award on this ground alone.
My colleag ues in the m ajority recognize that the arbitrator’s “inexpl icabl e quotation” of l anguage not i n the CBA was a clear viol ation17 of Articl e IV § 1 of that Agreement. Theyneverthe less c onclude that the arbit rator ’s award cannot

be vacated be cause it

was rati onally

based on the language of t

he CBA. I agree, of c ourse, that an arbit rati on award must be upheld if it i s in “anyrati onal way” related to the language of t he agr eem ent. See, e. g. , id. at 280. But I do not agree that this standar d has bee n m et he re.

The arbit rator belie ved there was an incongrui ty between Brentwood Medical Associates’ (“BMA ”) posi tion t hat seni or employ ees had no ri ght to bump less senior

employe es in ot

her work clas sifi cati ons and the bargaining -unit seniority rights provided fo r in the CB A. J.A. at 74 . In resolving this pu rported incon gruity and finding tha t the employee h ere could exer cise her

seniority

right s and bump an employ ee in another class ific ation, the arbi trator twice c ited and discuss ed the l anguage regard ing the right to b um p that he w rote in to th e ve ryse ct io n of th e CBA und er re view

. Id. at 73–74. A comparison of the actuallanguage of t he CBA with the l anguage used bythe arbi trator (shown in bol d) highl ights the diff eren ces betw een the tw o.

Tex t Use d in Arbitrator’ s Decisi on Page Actual Text of Colle cti ve Bargai ning Agr eeme nt Section9 The arb itrator wro te: “[I] f, as [BMA] assert s, r educti ons apply onl y ‘

. . . in the i nverse or der of seni ority i n th e class ific ations affected. . .’ ”, why was the “fol lowing language [inserted] to govern bumping, to wit: ‘. . . employ ees who exercise seniority

right s and bum p m ust ha ve the skill, qualificati ons, abili ty and phys ical fitne ss to perform all of the
18 “ . ..e mployee s w h o exercise seniority rights and bump must have the skill, qu alif ica tions , abili ty and physi ca l fitness to perf orm all o f the wo rk rem aining in that c lassifica ti on... ” J. A. 73,74 “The reducti on will be accomplis hed in inverse
or der of seniority

in the class ific ations affected, provi ded that t h e emp loy ees to b e retai ned mu st h a ve the
s kill, qual ific ations , abi lity and ph ysi ca l fitness to perform al l of the work remaining in tha t classific atio n w i thouttrai ning, a nd wil l a ssum e th e rem ainin g sc hed ule.” Art. VIII, § 10

This added l anguage informed the arbi trator’s bel ief (i ndeed it tipped the bal ance) that the position BMA took in t he arbit rati on was inconsi stent with the terms of the CBA, causi ng the arbi trator to ques tion why language governing bumping was i ncluded i n the agre ement if, as BMA asserted, an employe e whose class ific ation was el iminat ed was not all owed to bump an employe e in another cla ssifi cati on. 9 There was but one pr oblem—thework remaining i n that c lassi fication . . . [?]” J .A. at 74.
19 language with which the ar bitr ator bel ieved BMA’s positi on was incon sistent was no t pa rt of t he CBA

. I do not ag ree with m y colleagues in the m ajority that the arbitrator’s referenc e, at

the end of hi s decis ion, to the “‘pl ant-wide s eniori ty ’ sy stem

. . . ingrai ned in Arti cle VIII , Section 1 of the CBA ”, J. A. at 75, is suff icie nt to support

a conclusi on that t

he arbit rator ’s award dra ws its es sence from the CBA notwithstanding his prior modification of the language of t he agree men t. The CB A d efine s senio rity as barga ining u nit-w ide on ly generic ally

as foll ows: “Seniority

shallbe defined as the y ears, months and days an employ ee has worked with t he Employer

in the barg aining unit since t he employ ee’s l ast date of hire by the Employer .” CBA Art. VIII § 2 (em pha sis ad ded ). The underly ing dis pute in t his cas e concerned whether an employ ee whose job clas sifi cati on had been aboli shed, and who was thus f acing bei ng laid of f, coul d bump a less se nior employ ee in another cla ssifi cati on. The CBA contai ns a speci fic provi sion for “Layoff and Recal ls, ” see CB A A rt. VIII § 10, and, as di scussed above , it is that sect

ion that the arbi trator misquoted. The arbit

rator ’s award shoul d not be uphel d on the basi s of the general language r egarding bargaini ng-unit seniority

in Arti cle VIII , Section 1, when the ar

bitr ator first rewrote the more specif ic language regar ding la yo ffs that he shou ld h ave b een appl yi ng t o re sol ve this dis put e. To forgive t he arbit rator ’s Humpty Dumptyapproach t o the speci fic provi sion in play by r eferri ng to a gener al st atement on s eniori ty is aki n to decre eing that the gene ral call fo r mer cy expia tes the s pecif ic com man dm ent no t to kill.20 Even assuming that the arbit rator ’s added l anguage could be sep arate d fr om the r est o f his dec ision , the a wa rd sh oul d still b e va cate d. When faced with the s upposed disc onnect between BM A’s position that bumping outsi de of one’s own clas sifi cati on should not be all owed and the bar gai ni ng- uni t s eni or ity ri ght s ou tl in ed i n t he CBA, th e ar bi tr at orcame down in favor of al lowing bumping acr oss cla ssifi cati ons. He noted t hat there w as no prov ision in Article VIII o f the C BA , the sec tion de aling w ith seniority , that would prohibit bumping. He also found that bumping across classific ations w as “co nsisten t with a rbitral au thority wh ich ho lds that, in the absenc e of any c ontract provisi on, it

is al most univer sall y r ecognized by arbit rator s that

senior employe es who are governed by a ‘plant -wide seniority ’ sy stem, s uch as is imagined i n Articl e VIII, Section 1 of the CB A[ ,] have the righ t to bum p jun ior em ployees f rom their job s in ord er to avoid the ir own lay off, provi ded theycan perform the work of the j unior employe es.” Id. at 75 (inte rna l qu otati on o mitte d).

Far fro m th ere b eing an “ abs enc e of any c ont ract p rov ision ,” ho w ev er , th e C B A sta tes th at “ [s ]e ni or ity s ha ll . . . ap pl y only as ex pressly provided for in this Ag reemen t.” CBA Art. VIII § 2 (emph asis added ). In imply ing a ri ght to bump becaus e no contra ct provi sion prohibited bumpi ng and because this result was consistent with general arbitr ation principl es, the arbi trat or again e xceeded the s cope of his powers by i gnoring t he CBA ’s ban on appl yi ng seniority “onlyas expres slyprovided” i n the Agreement it self. Ignori ng plain l anguage—least of al l langua ge that set the a rbitra tor’s auth ority— is a n o-n o of first r ank

. See United Paperworkers Int ’l Union v. Misco, Inc. , 484 U .S. 29, 38 (198 7); Pennsylvani a Power Co. , 276 F.3 d at 1 78.In sum , the arb itrator in th is case directly con tradicted the pla in language of t

he CBA and thus exceeded the s cope of his powers by: (1) al te ri ng the l ang uag e of th e Agr eeme ntto in cl ude an e xpr es s r ig htto bump
across c lassi fications i n defiance of t he CBA provision prohi biti ng any modi fi cat

io n of it s l ang uag e; and(2 ) r ead in g i nt o t he CBA ari ght to bump bec aus e no pr ovi si on o f the CBA p ro hi bi te d i t i n de fi anc e of th e CBA prov ision sta ting tha t senior ity rights ma y only be ap plied a s the C BA itself provides . To ignor e the pl ain language of the CBA, and to r elyon language not contained in i t in reaching hi s decis ion, are the oppos ite of issui ng an awa rd th at

dr ew i ts es se nc e f

ro m t he CBA.

Our deferenti al st andard of revi ew in labor arbit rati on cases may mean that we uphold arbit rati on awards but for

snow in August. But

when an arbitrator rew rites a collective bargaining agreem ent as he did here (making manifest an utter disregard for t he CB A’s actual words), or finds a
mea ning to exist b ecau se it is no t expre ssed, a nd w e uph old eith er sleigh tof-hand , “deferenc e” beco mes a “ru bber stam p.” If this arbitrator’s awa rd evad es va cating , wh at aw ard d oes n ot? I re spec tfully dissen t.