ATTORNEY GENERALOFTEXAS 

GREG ABBOTT 

December 13.2004 

Mr. Lowry Mays, Chair 

Board of Regents 

The Texas A&M University System 

Post Office Box C-l 

College Station, Texas 77843 

Opinion No. GA-0281 

Re: Whether the Texas Workforce Commission 

Civil Rights Division is properly interpreting the 

equal employment opportunity training requirement 

of Labor Code section 21.556(a) (RQ-0240-GA) 

Dear Mr. Mays: 

The Texas A&M University System (“TAMU”) asks whether the Texas Workforce 

Commission Civil Rights Division (the “Commission”) is properly interpreting the equal 

employment opportunity training requirement ofLabor Code section 21.556(a).’ 

I. Backmound 

Chapter 21 of the Labor Code prohibits employment discrimination in Texas. Its general 

purposes include providing for the execution of federal antidiscrimination laws and identifying and 

creating a state authority to enforce federal antidiscrimination policies. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. 

$$ 21,001(l)-(2) (Vernon 1996). To this end, chapter 21 establishes the Texas Workforce 

Commission Civil Rights Division, formerly the Texas Commission on Human Rights: as the 

agency that may enforce the chapter and adopt procedural rules to carry out its purposes and policies. 

See id. $21.003(a)(Z), (7) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). 

‘See Letter from Delmar L. Cain, General Counsel, The Texas A&M University System, to Honorable Greg 

Abbon,Texas Attorney General (June 14,2004) [hereinaAerRequest Letter]; LetterattachedtoRequestLetterfromJohn 

D. Moore, General Counsel, Texas Workforce Commission, to Delmar L. Cain, General Counsel, The Texas A&M 

University System (June 7, 2004) [h ereinat?er Exhibit 11; Letter attached to Request Letter from Katherine A. Antwi, 

General Counsel, Texas Commission on Human Rights, to W. Jan Faber, Assistant General Counsel, Tbe Texas A&M 

University System (Aug. 20,2003) [hereinafter Exhibit 21 (Request Letter and Exhibits on file with Opinion Committee, 

also available af http:Nuww.oag.state.tx.us). 

2SeeT~~. LAB. CODEANN. 3 21.0015 (“The powers and duties exercised by the Commission onHummRights 

under this chapter are transferred to the Texas Workforce Commission civil rights division. A reference in this chapter 

to the ‘commission’ means the Texas Workforce Commission civil rights division.“); see also id 5s 301.151-,153 

(Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (establishing the Civil Rights Division as an independent division in the Texas Workforce 

Commission governed by the “human rights commission”). 
Mr. Lowry Mays - Page 2 (GA-0281) 

Relevant to TAMU’s inquiry, chapter 21 outlines a formal process by which a person 

claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice may tile a complaint with the 

Commission and have that complaint reviewed to determine if there is reasonable cause to believe 

that the employment practice was discriminatory. Seegenerally id. 5s 21.201-,211 (Vernon 1996) 

(subchapter E). Before the Commission will review a complaint, the complaint must meet certain 

statutory requirements, which include providing the facts that establish the basis of the complaint. 

See id. 5 21.201. If the Commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that 

discrimination has likely occurred, then the Commission will endeavor to eliminate the alleged 

unlawful employment practice by informal dispute resolution methods. See id. 5 21.207. Should 

that fail, the Commission may tile a civil suit against the respondent, see id. 3 21.25 1, or provide the 

complainant with written notice of the complainant’s right to file a civil action, see id. 5 21.252. 

TAMU asks about section 21.556 of the Labor Code, which prescribes equal employment 

opportunity training for state agencies that have received three or more employment discrimination 

complaints within a fiscal year. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1; see also TEX. LAB. CODE 

ANN. 5 21.556 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). The Commission is charged with adopting minimum 

standards for a training program and must approve a person, entity, or state agency to provide 

training so long as the program complies with the Commission’s standards. See TEX. LAB. CODE 

ANN. 5 21.556(d) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Agencies required to participate in the training program 

must pay the program’s costs or reimburse the Commission or state agency that provides the training 

through interagency contract, See id. 5 21.556(e). Ifthe Commission does not conduct the training 

for a state agency, that state agency must provide the Commission with documentation of the 

training. See id. 4 21.556(c). 

Specifically, TAMU inquires about section 21.556(a), which establishes the circumstances 

under which a state agency must receive the required equal employment opportunity training: 

A state agency that receives three or more complaints of employment 

discrimination in a fiscal year, other than complaints determined to 

be without merit, shall provide a comprehensive equal employment 

opportunity training program to appropriate supervisory and 

managerial employees. 

Id. 5 21.556(a) (emphasis added). Chapter 21 does not define the term “merit,“nor does it establish 

a process for assessing whether a complaint is “without merit.” However, a Commission rule 

establishes a process for assessing a complaint’s merit for this purpose, which provides in part: 

(a) The Commission will make a determination if a complaint of 

employment discrimination is with or without merit by analyzing 

complaints filed by employees of state agencies or applicants for 

employment with state agencies, with either the Commission or the 

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”), to ascertain whether the complainant has met his or her 

burden of providing sufficient factual evidence to establish the 

elements of a prima facie case of employment discrimination as 
Mr. Lowry Mays - Page 3 (GA-0281) 

delineated by the United States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”). 

If a complaint is determined to have met the elements of a prima facie 

case, then the complaint will be administratively processed [through] 

the Commission’s or EEOC’s investigation procedures. If the 

Commission makes a determination that a complaint has met both a 

Supreme Court [prima facie] test. and an administrative processing 

test of merit, a state agency will be determined to have a complaint of 

merit assessed against them. 

(b) If a complainant. fails to meet his or her burden of establishing 

the elements of aprima facie case as outlined by the Supreme Court, 

is prevented from filing a complaint for jurisdictional reasons, or 

provides self-defeating evidence on the face of his or her complaint 

that shows the complaint is defective, then the complaint will not be 

administratively processed nor determined to be with merit. 

29 TEX. REG. 3653 (2004) (to be codified at 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 5 819,18(a)-(b)) (the “Rule”).3 

TAMU informs us that it has been notified by the Commission that it must provide equal 

employment opportunity training because three or more complaints of employment discrimination 

were tiled against TAMU during the 2004 fiscal year. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1; see 

also TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. 5 21.556(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).4 TAMU contends, however, 

that the Commission’s notification is baseless because the Commission’s test for determining 

merit contravenes chapter 21. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. TAMU suggests that a 

discrimination complaint triggers the section 21.556(a) trainingrequirement onlyifthe Commission 

has determined in the complaint review process outlined in chapter 21 that there is “reasonable 

cause” to believe that discrimination has occurred. See id. at 6; see also TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. 

$9 21.204-,206 (Vernon 1996). By contrast, the Commission maintains that the process for 

determining a complaint’s merit for purposes of the training requirement is distinct from a finding 

of reasonable cause.’ TAMU asks, essentially, which of the two interpretations is correct. See 

Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. TAMU also questions the Commission’s interpretation of the 

Rule. See id. at 5-6. 

‘In its letter, TAMU refers to section 323.8 as the rule in question. Section 323.8 was renumbered as section 

819.18. See 29 TEX. REG. 3653 (2004) (to be codified at 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE $819.18). We will refer to the rule by 

its most recent codification. 

?AMU notes: “The letter from the commission did not identify or provide any details concerning the 

complaints.” Request Letter, supra note 1, at 8. Instead, the letter only identified the complaints as having been “tiled.” 

See id We were not provided with a copy of this March letter, but we assume for the purposes of this opinion that the 

Commission used “filed” as shorthand to describe complaints that had been filed and deemed meritorious by the 

Commissionaccording to section21,556(a) and the Rule. Neither& Commissionnor TAMU suggests that the training 

requirement may be triggered merely by filing a complaint. We agree. See Tut. LAB. CODE ANN. 5 21.556 (Vernon 

Supp. 2004-05); 29 TEX. REG. 3653 (2004) (to be codified at 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 5 819.18(a)-(b)). 

‘see Brief from Don Ballard, Deputy General Counsel, Texas Workforce Commission, to Honorable Greg 

Abbott, Texas Attorney General, at 4 (Aug. 2,2004) (on file with Opinion Committee) [hereinafter Commission Brief]. 
Mr. Lowry Mays - Page 4 (GA-0281) 

II. Analysis 

TAMU suggests that the Rule exceeds the Commission’s statutory authority. To address its 

concerns, we must interpret the relevant Labor Code provisions and determine whether the Rule 

comports with the Commission’s statutory authority. 

In construing section 21.556 and chapter 21, we must give effect to the legislature’s intent. 

See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. $5 311.021, .023 (Vernon 1998); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Sinclair, 984 

S.W.2d 958,960 (Tex. 1999). To do so, we must first attempt to construe statutes according to their 

plain language, see In ye Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. 2001), and must consider section 

21.556in thecontext ofchapter 21 as awhole,see Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W,3d486,494 

(Tex. 2001); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 5 311 .Ol l(a) (Vernon 1998) (words and phrases to 

be read in context). We may also consider, among other things, a statute’s objectives, the legislative 

history, the consequences of a particular construction, and its administrative construction. SeeTEX. 

GOV’T CODE ANN. 5 311.023 (Vernon 1998); see also id. 5 311.021(2)-(4) (“In enacting a statute, 

it is presumed that the entire statute is intended to be effectivet,] a just and reasonable result is 

intended[, and] a result feasible of execution is intended .“). 

In deciding whether the Commission, an administrative agency, has exceeded its rulemaking 

powers, the determinative factor is whether the rule’s provisions are “in harmony” with the general 

objectives of the statute. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. Y. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 750 (Tex. 

1995). In determining whether a rule is in harmony with an act’s general objectives, courts look to 

all applicable provisions of that act, rather than one particular section. See Gerst v. Oak CL~Sav. 

&Loan Ass’n, 432 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. 1968). Moreover, construction of a statute in the rules 

of the administrative agency charged with the statute’s enforcement “is entitled to ‘serious 

consideration,’ so long as the construction is reasonable and does not contradict the plain language 

of the statute.” Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Moore, 845 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. 1993) (quoting 

Standford v. Butler, 181 S.W.2d 269,273 (Tex. 1944)); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0233 

(2004) at 4 (stating that so long as an agency’s interpretation of a statute is a reasonable one that does 

not do violence to the statutory language, this office will defer to it). 

A. Whether the Rule Is Invalid for Failing to Equate Merit with Reasonable Cause 

First we address TAMU’s contention that the Commission has exceeded its 

rulemaking authority under section 21.556 because the Rule does not equate the statutory phrase 

“complaints determined to be without merit” with complaints for which the Commission has found 

no reasonable cause. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 2-3; see also TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. 

5 21.556(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). 

Section 21.204 of the Labor Code requires the Commission’s executive director, or the 

director’s designee, to investigate an employment discrimination complaint filed pursuant to chapter 

21 and to “determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that the respondent engaged in an 

unlawful employment practice as alleged in the complaint.” TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. 5 21.204(a) 

(Vernon 1996). Though chapter 21 does not describe what form an investigation is to take, its plain 

language indicates that the investigation is to go beyond the allegations stated in the complaint and 
Mr. Lowry Mays - Page 5 (GA-0281) 

will consist of a review of the evidence supporting the allegations. See id. $5 21.205 (requiring the 

executive director or fhe director’s designee on a finding that a complaint does not show reasonable 

cause to issue a written determination “that the evidence does not support the complaint”), ,206 

(requiring the executive director or the director’s designee on a finding that a complaint does show 

reasonable cause to review with a panel of three commissioners “the evidence in the record”) 

(emphasis added). Therefore, a determination of reasonable cause necessarily means that a 

complainant has met the threshold burden of facially stating a legitimate claim and has offered some 

proof to support a finding by the Commission that discrimination has likely occurred. 

The Commission contends that the legislature intended to create two thresholds: when met, 

the first establishes a complaint as meritorious for purposes of the training requirement, and the 

second supports a finding of reasonable cause. See Commission Brief, supra note 5, at 5. The 

statute’s plain language validates this position. Section 21.556(a) does not use the term “reasonable 

cause”; rather, it uses the term “merit.” See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. $2 1.556(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004- 

05) (“complaints other than complaints determined to be without merit”). We presume that every 

word in a statute is used for a purpose. See Jessen Assocs., Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593, 600 

(Tex. 1975). Given the statutory language, it is reasonable for the Commission to distinguish an 

assessment of “merit” from an assessment of “reasonable cause.” 

The legislative history also supports the Commission’s position. Section 21.556 was adopted 

in 1999 following the Sunset Commission’s review of the Texas Commission on Human Rights. 

See Act ofMay 17,1999,76th Leg., R.S., ch. 872,s 15, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3556,3565; HOUSE 

COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 1976, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999) (enrolled 

version, “Background and Purpose”) (“After reviewing the commission, the Sunset Advisory 

Commission had recommended its continuation and other statutory modifications.“). According to 

the Sunset Advisory Commission Staff Report, the state has an interest in preventing and resolving 

discriminatory activity before it results in costly litigation. See SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION 

STAFF REPORT, TEXAS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, at 7 (October 1998). To this end, fhe 

Sunset Advisory Commission advised the legislature to adopt the language of section 21.556(a), 

which had formerly been contained in an appropriations rider,6 to “ensure that the Commission 

continues to provide comprehensive training to familiarize all state agencies and public institutions 

of higher education with [equal employment opportunity] laws and to prevent employment 

discrimination from occurring.” Id. at 26. Thus, section 21.556(a)‘s purpose is not to remedy 

particular instances of discrimination or penalize state agencies after the fact. Rather, its purpose 

is to require training of state agency personnel in order to prevent employment discrimination. When 

viewed in the context of this purpose, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature did not intend 

“merit” to rise to the level of“reasonable cause.” The Commission’s construction of“without merit” 

not to require a “reasonable cause” finding gives substance to and is consistent with section 

21.556(a)‘s broad preventative purpose. 

Finally, the Commission’s interpretation of “without merit” is consistent with the 

legislature’s use of the phrase in another statute. Section 1071.402 of the Occupations Code 

%ke Tex. Att’y Gen. op. No. DM-497 (1998) at 6 ( concluding that an appropriations act rider, similar to what 

is now section 2 1.556, attempted to amend general law in violation of article III, section 35 of the Texas Constitution). 
Mr. Lowry Mays - Page 6 (GA-0281) 

authorizes the Texas Board of Professional Land Surveying to investigate formal complaints tiled 

against licensed land surveyors for alleged violations of the Professional Land Surveying Practices 

Act. See TEX. Oct. CODE ANN. 9 1071.402 (Vernon 2004). Section 1071.402 requires the board 

to assign an employee or to contract with an investigator to investigate each alleged violation. See 

id. 5 1071.402(b). The person investigating the alleged violation may dismiss a complaint that is 

without merit, or determine whether a licensed land surveyor has committed the violation and 

recommend sanctions to the board. See id. § 1071.402(c)(l)-(2) (emphasis added). In this instance, 

the legislature has used “merit” to indicate a complaint that facially states a claim, which if proven 

would constitute a violation of that act. Where the same or similar word is used “in the same 

connection in different statutes,” it will be given the same meaning in one as it has in the other, 

unless there is something to indicate that a different meaning was intended. L&WSurco Mfg., Inc. 

Y. Winn Tile Co., 580 S.W.2d 920, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ dism’d). 

In sum, because it is consistent with the statute’s plain language, comports with the statute’s 

legislative purpose, and is consistent with the legislature’s use of the phrase “without merit” in a 

similar statutory context, we conclude that the Commission’s interpretation of section 21.556 to 

distinguish between an assessment of“merit” and an assessment of “reasonable cause” is reasonable. 

B. Whether the Rule Misapplies the United States Supreme Court Test 

TAMU also argues that the Rule fails to incorporate legal principles for resolving 

discrimination complaints that are required by the United States Supreme Court. See Request Letter, 

supra note 1, at 4. Specifically, TAMU argues that the Commission misapplies the McDonnell 

Douglas test. See id.; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 

The McDonnell Douglas test outlines a burden-shifting scheme by which the parties’ 

evidence is evaluated. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801-03. The scheme requires the 

plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit first to establish a prima facie case. See id. If that 

burden is satisfied, the defendant then must articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 

taking the employment action; if the defendant satisfies that burden, the plaintiff must then prove 

that the defendant’s stated reason is a pretext for discrimination. See id. 

The Rule requires the Commission, in assessing whether a claim is with or without merit, “to 

ascertain whether the complainant has met [the complainant’s] burden ofproviding sufficient factual 

evidence to establish the elements of aprima facie case of employment discrimination as delineated 

by the United States Supreme Court.” 29 TEX. REG. 3653 (2004) (to be codified at 40 TEX. ADMIN. 

CODE 3 819.18(a)) (emphasis added). TAMU suggests that the Rule is invalid because the 

Commission has selectively picked the first part of the McDonnell Douglas test, which the 

Commission favors, while ignoring the remainder of the test. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 

4-5. 

We have already established that the Commission has reasonably construed the term “merit” 

in section 21.556(a) to be distinct from the term “reasonable cause.” The McDonnell Douglas test 

establishes the burden of proof in the context of a trial on the merits to determine whether 

discrimination has occurred. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US. at 801.03 (requiring the plaintiff 
Mr. Lowry Mays - Page 7 (GA-0281) 

and defendant to come forward with evidence). Section 21.556(a) does not require the Commission 

to use the McDonneN Douglas test to determine whether a complaint triggers the training 

requirement, and the Rule reasonably incorporates only the test’s first part. 

C. Whether the Commission is Misinterpreting the Rule 

Finally, TAMU argues that even if the Commission is authorized to adopt the Rule, 

the Commission is misinterpreting it. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 5-6. In particular, TAMU 

notes that the Rule also includes a second part, an “administrative processing test” of merit, which 

the Rule fails to define. See id. at 5. The Rule’s section 819.18(a) reads in relevant part: 

If a complaint is determined to have met the elements of a prima facie 

case, then the complaint will be administrativelyprocessed [through] 

the Commission’s or EEOC’s investigation procedures. If the 

Commission makes a determination that a complaint has met both a 

Supreme Court [prima facie] test . and an administrative 

processing test ofmerit, a state agency will be determined to have a 

complaint of merit assessed against them. 

29 TEX. REG. 3653 (2004) (to be codified at 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 819.18(a)) (emphasis added). 

In a letter to TAMU, Commission staff clarified this part ofthe Rule by stating that it addresses the 

Commission’s jurisdiction over a complaint. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 5; Exhibit 2, supra 

note 1. That is, if the complaint falls within the Commission’s jurisdiction, then the complaint 

passes the administrative processing test of merit. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 5-6; Exhibit 

2, supra note 1. TAMU counters that this explanation is inconsistent with the Rule. See Request 

Letter, supra note 1, at 6. Instead, TAMU asserts that this language in the Rule should tie the 

“administrative processing” test of merit to formal investigation procedures outlined in chapter 21 

of the Labor Code. See id, see also TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. 5 21.204(a) (Vernon 1996) (directing the 

Commission to investigate an employment discrimination complaint for reasonable cause). Thus, 

TAMU argues that the Rule itself necessarily requires a finding of reasonable cause before a 

complaint can be counted as meritorious. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 6. 

We construe administrative rules in the same way as statutes, and an agency’s interpretation 

of its own rule is entitled to deference. See Pub. Util. Comm ‘n v. GulfStates Utils. Co., 809 S.W.2d 

201,207 (Tex. 1991). However, ifan agency fails to follow the clear, unambiguous language ofits 

own regulation, it exceeds its authority. See id. 

Here, we question the Commission’s assertion that the administrative processing test ofmcrit 

is nothing more than a finding that the Commission has jurisdiction over a complaint. See Request 

Letter, supra note I, at 5-6; Exhibit 2, supra note I.’ The Rule’s subsection @) reads: 

‘We rely on the Commission’s letter attached to the TAMU request letter as Exhibit 2. See Exhibit 2, supra 

note 1. The Commission did not address the meaning of “administrative processing test of merit” in its brief to this 

office. See Commission Brief, supra note 5. 
Mr. Lowry Mays - Page 8 (GA-0281) 

If a complainant. fails to meet his or her burden of establishing the 

elements of a prima facie case as outlined by the Supreme Court, is 

prevented from filing a complaint for jurisdictional reasons, or 

provides self-defeating evidence on the face of his or her complaint 

that shows the complaint is defective, then the complaint will not be 

administratively processed nor determined to be with merit. 

29 TEX. REG. 3653 (2004) (to be codified at 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 5 819.18(b) (emphasis added)). 

By its plain language, subsection (b) suggests that when the Commission lacks jurisdiction over a 

complaint, the complaint will not be administratively processed. Because subsection (b) suggests 

that establishing jurisdiction is a prerequisite to a complaint being administratively processed, the 

Rule’s language does not appear to support the Commission’s construction that administrative 

processing is merely a determination ofjurisdiction. Nevertheless, we disagree that this part of the 

Rule necessarily requires a finding of reasonable cause before an employment discrimination 

complaint can be counted as meritorious. Nothing in the Rule supports the construction that meeting 

the “administrative processing test of merit” is equivalent to a reasonable cause finding. 

In sum, the Commission does not appear to have given a meaning to the “administrative 

processing test of merit” that is consistent with the Rule as a whole. However, we cannot agree with 

TAMU that this part of the Rule limits the Commission to counting only those complaints for which 

it has found reasonable cause in determining that an agency must provide equal employment 

opportunity training under section 21.556(a). 
Mr. Lowry Mays - Page 9 (GA-0281) 

SUMMARY 

Section 21.556(a) of the Labor Code requires a state agency 

to provide equal employment opportunity training after three 

employment discrimination complaints have been filed against the 

agency other than complaints determined to be without merit. 

Section 21.556 does not require that the Texas Workforce 

Commission Civil Rights Division find reasonable cause that 

discrimination has likely occurred in order to determine that a 

complaint counts toward the training requirement. The Texas 

Workforce Commission Civil Rights Division rule establishing a 

procedure to determine whether a complaint is without merit 

reasonably construes section 21.556(a). However, the Commission’s 

interpretation of the rule must be consistent with the rule’s plain 

language. 

Very truly yours, 

BARRY R. MCBEE 

First Assistant Attorney General 

DON R. WILLETT 

Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel 

NANCY S. FULLER 

Chair, Opinion Committee 

Daniel C. Bradford 

Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee