No. 89-369 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1989 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsBRIJCE JAMES CHASSE, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Missoula, 

The Honorable John S. Henson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Terry A. Wallace, Missoula, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Marc Racicot, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Patti Powell, Asst. Atty. General, Helena 

Robert Deschamps, 111, County Attorney; Betty Wing, 

Deputy, Missoula, Montana 

I- 

. - L; . lil Submitted on Briefs: Nov. 21, 1989 

L3 CL -c 

Filed 

Decided: December 20, 1989 

U 

Y Clerk 
Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Defendant Bruce James Chasse appeals his conviction and 

sentence in District Court, Missoula County, for Driving Under the 

Influence, Second Offense, contending that such conviction violates 

the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. We affirm. 

The District Court's opinion and order in this case were based 

on the Stipulated Facts filed by both parties. A brief summary of 

those facts follows. 

Chasse was first arrested for Driving while Under the 

Influence on June 1, 1984 and three days later he pleaded guilty 

to that offense. At the time Chasse, only seventeen years old, was 

not represented by counsel. Chasse was not advised of his right 

as a juvenile to have his parents present or of the consequences 

of enhanced punishment for subsequent DUIs. He was fined $50. 

By the time of his second offense DUI on September 15, 1984, 

Chasse was eighteen years old. Chasse appeared before a justice 

of the peace, whom Chasse claims did not advise him of his rights. 

Again, Chasse pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to six months in 

jail and fined $400. After spending seven days in jail, Chasse 

was released with the condition that he enter an in-treatment 

center for alcoholism. Chasse admitted himself to treatment in 

Great Falls, and after release from treatment, he attended ACT 

school. 

As the result of an October 25, 1986 motorcycle-pickup truck 

collision, Chasse was arrested a third time for DUI. A blood 

sample drawn at the hospital where he was taken after the accident 

showed Chasse's blood alcohol concentration to be .177. 

Originally, Chasse was charged with third-offense DUI and the 

matter was filed in district court. When it was learned that 

Chasse's first DUI conviction was as a juvenile, the cause was 

remanded to justice court as a second offense DUI, pursuant to 
State v. Gee (1986), 222 Mont. 498, 723 P.2d 934. 

At the justice court trial Chasse was convicted of second 

offense DUI as well as operating a vehicle without proper 

registration and driving without a valid driver's license. 

Appealing only the DUI conviction to the District Court, Chasse 

reasserted his argument that charging him with second offense DUI 

violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 

Because he had already suffered one conviction for second offense 

DUI, Chasse argued that it would be double jeopardy to try him 

again for second offense DUI. The District Court rejected this 

argument and found Chasse guilty of DUI, second offense. 

On appeal to this Court Chasse presents the same issue: 

Can a person in Montana be convicted of DUI, 

second offense, twice within a period of five 

years under Montana's DUI statutory scheme? 

Chasse makes exactly the same argument to this Court as he did 

to the justice and District Courts. Like the justice and District 

Courts, we also reject his double jeopardy argument. 

Chasse was charged under section 61-8-401, MCA, for driving 

under the influence of alcohol. After he was tried and convicted, 

he was sentenced under the provisions of section 61-8-714, MCA. 

The gist of Chasse's argument is that, according to the 

sentencing scheme of section 61-8-714, MCA, two convictions for 

second offense DUI within a five-year period is not permitted by 

the statute. Thus, he argues, his twice being convicted for the 

crime of second offense DUI constitutes double jeopardy. This, 

Chasse avers, amounts to a denial of procedural and substantive due 

process because he is now charged, convicted and sentenced for 

a crime undefined by the law--the crime of "second DUI, second 
offense. 

Our Double Jeopardy Clause simply states that Ifno person shall 

be again put in jeopardy for the same offense previously tried in 

any juri~diction.~~ Art. 11, sec. 25, Mont. Const. (1972). The 

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that no 

person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 

jeopardy of life or limb.I1 

In a recent criminal case this Court explored the operation 

of the Double Jeopardy Clause: 

The basic design of the Double Jeopardy Clause 

is the prevention of successive prosecutions 

and the attendant threat of multiple 

punishments. (Citations omitted.) The appeal 

of a sentence imposed upon conviction does not 

expose a defendant to successive prosecutions 

nor multiple punishments for the same crime. 

A defendant remains subject to a single 

determination of guilt or innocence and a 

single, albeit potentially more severe, 

punishment. 

State v. Wirtala (Mont. 1988), 752 P.2d 177, 181, 45 St.Rep. 596, 

In Wirtala, the nature and purpose of the Double Jeopardy 

Clause was also discussed: 

That guarantee [against double jeopardy] has 

been said to consist of three separate 

constitutional protections. It protects 

against a second prosecution for the same 

offense after acquittal. It protects against 

a second prosecution for the same offense 

after conviction. And it protects against 

multiple punishments for the same offense. 

Wirtala, 752 P.2d at 181 (citing United States v. Di Francesco 
(1980), 449 U.S. 117, 129, 101 S.Ct. 426, 433, 66 L.Ed.2d 328, 

340). 

None of the three above-listed protections applies to the case 

at bar. This is not a second prosecution for the same offense 

after acquittal or conviction. Nor is Chasse's sentence for the 

1986 DUI multiple punishment for the same offense. 

Montana's statutory bar to double jeopardy, found at section 

46-11-503, MCA, prohibits ''a prosecution based upon the same 

transaction as a former prosecutiontt under certain circumstances. 

It is obvious that Chasse's prosecution for the October 1986 DUI 

was not based upon the same transaction as his September 1984 

prosecution. Thus, no double jeopardy attaches. The problem is 

not with Chasse's present DUI conviction but with the prior 

convictions. While the two previous convictions were not 

erroneous, the penalties Chasse received in 1984 may have been 

improper. Nonetheless, the sentence Chasse received in 1989 was 

proper and fair. When the error was discovered, the State moved 

to remand the case to justice court and charged Chasse with DUI, 

second offense. He was then properly prosecuted, convicted and 

sentenced in accordance with the laws of the State of Montana for 

a second offense DUI. 

We affirm the District Court's holding. 
We concur: