UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

RAUL RODRIGUEZ,

Appellant,

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 

MANAGEMENT,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

DA-0845-19-0284-I-1

DATE: July 16, 2024

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Alfredo Morales, Esquire, McAllen, Texas, for the appellant.

Carla Robinson, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

sustained the final decision of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)

regarding a Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) annuity overpayment.

Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following

1

 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision

were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,

and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material

evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,

which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). 

BACKGROUND

On December 31, 2014, the appellant retired from the Department of

Homeland Security under FERS. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 40. In his

retirement application, the appellant indicated that he was unmarried and had no

former living spouse. Id. at 36. He elected an unreduced annuity payable only

during his lifetime and commencing January 1, 2015. Id. at 20, 36. However, at

the time of his retirement, the appellant was involved in litigation with a woman

claiming to be his common law wife and suing for divorce. IAF, Tab 1 at 4;

Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) at 31:20 (testimony of the appellant). 

On May 14, 2015, a jury in the District Court of El Paso County, Texas

issued a verdict finding that the appellant had entered into common law marriage

as of July 6, 1996. IAF, Tab 8 at 22-23. On September 25, 2015, the court issued

a divorce decree, effective August 20, 2015, which included a division of marital

property. Id. at 22-30. As relevant here, the court ordered that the appellant’s

former spouse be awarded an interest in his FERS basic annuity, as well as a

2
former spouse survivor annuity “as more particularly set forth in the Qualifying

Retirement Benefits Order filed with the Court contemporaneously with this

decree.” Id. at 26. That order, captioned “Order Dividing Federal Employees’

Retirement System Benefits,” was issued in compliance with the requirements of

5 C.F.R. part 838, subpart C. Id. at 31-33. The order specified that the

appellant’s former spouse was to receive 31.265% of the appellant’s gross

monthly annuity, commencing September 1, 2015, as well as a former spouse

survivor annuity in the maximum amount. Id. at 32.

On April 29, 2017, OPM issued the appellant a notice stating that, effective

June 1, 2017, it would begin directly paying the appellant’s former spouse the

31.265% of his basic annuity, as contemplated in the court order, and that the

appellant’s former spouse was due a retroactive apportionment payment of

$5,912.80, which OPM would recover by withholding $125 per month from the

appellant’s annuity. Id. at 21. It does not appear that the appellant contested this

action.2 OPM’s letter also acknowledged the court-ordered survivor annuity,

but there was no mention of any deductions or overpayments that would be

assessed against the appellant’s basic annuity to pay for it. Id.

Subsequently, on March 12, 2018, OPM issued the appellant another

notice, this time stating that it had determined that his former spouse was eligible

for maximum survivor benefits effective January 1, 2015, and that adding the cost

of the survivor benefits retroactive to that date had caused an overpayment of

$15,406. Id. at 15. OPM proposed to collect the overpayment by withholding

36 monthly installments of $427.94 from the appellant’s annuity, with a final

installment of $0.16. Id. The appellant requested reconsideration. Id. at 8-14.

On March 13, 2019, OPM issued a reconsideration decision affirming the

existence of the overpayment and the collection schedule. Id. at 5-7.

2

 At this point, evidence concerning the former spouse’s share of the basic annuity, the

retroactive apportionment payment, and the $125 monthly withholding vanishes from

the record. It is not clear what ever became of this matter, but it is not at issue in the

instant appeal, and we find that it is ultimately immaterial to the outcome.

3
The appellant filed the instant Board appeal, challenging the existence of

the overpayment and requesting a waiver. IAF, Tab 1. After a telephonic

hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision, affirming the

existence of the overpayment and denying the appellant’s request for waiver, but

adjusting the collection schedule to $300 per month. IAF, Tab 17,

Initial Decision (ID).

The appellant has filed a petition for review, contesting the existence of the

overpayment, requesting waiver of collection, and alleging bias by the

administrative judge. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. OPM has filed a

response. PFR File, Tab 3.

ANALYSIS

OPM has proven the existence and the amount of the overpayment.

OPM bears the burden of proving the existence and amount of an annuity

overpayment by preponderant evidence. Vojas v. Office of Personnel

Management, 115 M.S.P.R. 502, ¶ 10 (2011); see 5 C.F.R. § 845.307(a). In this

case, the administrative judge found that, according to the court order, the

appellant’s former spouse was entitled to a maximum survivor annuity, and that a

maximum survivor annuity entails a 10% reduction in the basic annuity. ID at 2,

5. She further found that OPM provided sufficient evidence to prove the

mathematical accuracy of the stated overpayment amount. ID at 5.

On petition for review, the appellant renews his argument that OPM should

not have honored the court order because he had elected no survivor annuity at

the time of his retirement, and that his election controls over the court order.

PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-8. We disagree. Under FERS, an employee who was

married at the time of retirement will receive a fully reduced annuity in order to

provide an annuity for his current spouse unless the employee and his spouse

jointly waive the survivor annuity in writing. 3 5 U.S.C. § 8416(a)(1); 5 C.F.R.

3

 The amount of such a reduction is 10% of the retiree’s annuity. 5 U.S.C. § 8419(a)

(1); 5 C.F.R. § 842.603(c). 

4
§ 842.603(a). Because the appellant was, in fact, married at the time of his

retirement, it would appear that his election of an unreduced annuity was invalid

for lack of spousal consent and waiver. 

However, as the appellant points out, there is an exception to the general

rule requiring spousal consent and waiver if the employee establishes to OPM’s

satisfaction that his spouse’s whereabouts cannot be determined, or “that, due to

exceptional circumstances, requiring the employee . . . to seek the spouse’s

consent would otherwise be inappropriate.” 5 U.S.C. § 8416(a)(2). The appellant

asserts that his case “falls squarely” under the latter category because he alerted

the OPM official preparing his retirement documents of the pending divorce

proceedings, and the official allowed him to elect an unreduced annuity anyway. 4

PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7. We disagree. The existence of such “exceptional

circumstances” must, under 5 C.F.R. § 842.607(b), be established by a judicial

determination, and the appellant has presented no such judicial determination to

the Board. 

Because the appellant elected an unreduced annuity without obtaining a

written waiver from his then-current spouse, and the statutory waiver exception

does not apply, we find that his initial election was invalid. Because the waiver

exception does not apply, we do not reach the appellant’s argument that the

waiver exception operates under 5 U.S.C. § 8445(e) to make the court order

ineffective. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-8. We find that the court order is valid and

enforceable against the appellant retroactive to the date of his retirement, and that

the appellant’s receipt of an unreduced annuity from January 2015 through

February 2018 resulted in an overpayment.

4

 Given the unusual circumstances in this case, it is not clear to us that the advice from

this OPM official was wrong. We are unaware of any established protocol for handling

annuity elections during the pendency of litigation concerning the existence of a current

marriage. Because annuity election options are contingent on marital status, any option

that the appellant might have selected would have been potentially invalid, depending

on the outcome of the litigation. 

5
Regarding the amount of the overpayment, the appellant does not directly

challenge the administrative judge’s finding that OPM’s calculation of the

overpayment amount was correct, and we find that her conclusion is supported by

the record. ID at 5. During the 38-month period in question, the appellant

received a gross monthly annuity of $4,036 for 23 months, $4,048 for 12 months,

and $4,128 for 3 months, for a total of $153,788 (($4,036 × 23) + ($4,048 × 12) +

($4,128 × 3)). IAF, Tab 8 at 20. Had the appellant been receiving a fully

reduced annuity to pay for the survivor annuity, he would have received $3,632

for 23 months, $3,642 for 12 months, and $3,714 for 3 months, for a total of

$138,382 (($3,632 × 23) + ($3,642 × 12) + ($3,714 × 3)). Id. at 19.

The difference between these two figures is OPM’s claimed overpayment amount

of $15,406 ($153,788 – $138,382). Id. at 5.

For these reasons, we agree with the administrative judge that OPM proved

the existence and amount of the overpayment by preponderant evidence. 

The appellant has not established his right to a waiver.

Recovery of an overpayment may not be made from an individual when, in

the judgment of the OPM, the individual is without fault and recovery would be

against equity and good conscience. 5 U.S.C. § 8470(b); 5 C.F.R. § 845.301. 5

The pertinent considerations in finding fault are as follows: (1) whether payment

resulted from the individual’s incorrect, but not necessarily fraudulent, statement,

which he should have known to be incorrect; (2) whether payment resulted from

the individual’s failure to disclose material facts in his possession which he

should have known to be material; or (3) whether he accepted a payment which he

knew or should have known to be erroneous. Maseuli v. Office of Personnel

Management, 111 M.S.P.R. 439, ¶ 7 (2009); 5 C.F.R. § 845.302(a). The

5

 The regulatory standards for waiver of overpayments under FERS are substantially

similar, and indeed almost identical, to those under the Civil Service Retirement System

(CSRS). Compare 5 C.F.R. part 831, subpart N, with 5 C.F.R. part 845, subpart C.

We find the case law interpreting the CSRS regulations to be instructive in interpreting

the FERS regulations.

6
appellant bears the burden of establishing his entitlement to a waiver by

substantial evidence. 5 C.F.R. §§ 845.307(b), 1201.56(b)(2)(ii).

In this case, the administrative judge found that the appellant was at least

partly at fault for creating the overpayment because he neglected to inform OPM

of the court order, and he failed to question the correctness of his annuity

payments, which did not reflect a 10% reduction. ID at 6-8. On petition for

review, the appellant argues that OPM was at fault for creating the overpayment

because it failed to notify him of his annuity election rights post-divorce so that

he could elect an unreduced annuity. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-12. Like the

administrative judge, we are unpersuaded by this argument. ID at 7-8. The law

makes no provision for an annuitant to unilaterally cancel a court-ordered

survivor annuity.

Applying the considerations of 5 C.F.R. § 845.302(a) to the facts of this

appeal, we find that the appellant was not without fault in causing the

overpayment. First, we find that the overpayment resulted from incorrect

information that the appellant supplied on his retirement application, i.e., that he

was unmarried at the time of his retirement. IAF, Tab 8 at 36; see Uresti v.

Office of Personnel Management, 108 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 9 (2008) (finding that the

appellant was not without fault in creating an overpayment which was caused by

inaccurate information that he provided on his retirement application). We find

that this statement was not fraudulent to the extent that the appellant genuinely

believed that he was unmarried and had not yet received a judicial determination

stating otherwise. Furthermore, there are mitigating circumstances involved

because the appellant discussed the pending state district court proceedings with

an OPM official, who allowed him to select an unreduced annuity regardless.

HCD at 4:55 (testimony of the appellant). Nevertheless, the information that the

appellant supplied on his retirement application was still incorrect, and although

it was not fraudulent in nature, it remains a relevant consideration in the overall

analysis. See 5 C.F.R. § 845.302(a)(1). 

7
Second, we find that the overpayment, at least initially, resulted from the

appellant’s failure to disclose material facts to OPM, i.e., the court order

directing the payment of a survivor annuity. See Plewinski v. Office of Personnel

Management, 44 M.S.P.R. 20, 22-23 (1990) (finding that the appellant was not

without fault in causing an overpayment because she failed to inform OPM

promptly of her remarriage, a material fact affecting her entitlement to a survivor

annuity). The record does not reflect the date that OPM actually received the

court order at issue. OPM has not provided any such evidence, and the appellant

testified that he had no information on the matter, although he supposed that

either his or his former spouse’s attorney must have submitted the order to OPM

at some point. HCD at 29:50 (testimony of the appellant). What is clear is that

somebody submitted the order to OPM at least by April 29, 2017, the date that

OPM first notified the appellant that it had processed the order. 6 IAF, Tab 8

at 21. We find that the appellant knew or should have known that the court’s

decree was material information, and that it was incumbent upon him to notify

OPM of the fact of his common law marriage, subsequent divorce, and

court-ordered survivor annuity promptly after he received the court’s order, on or

about September 25, 2015.7 Id. at 22-30. Nevertheless, we agree with the

6

 On petition for review, the appellant asserts that “OPM was aware of the court order

as of late 2015,” citing “documents on file with the [administrative judge].” PFR File,

Tab 1 at 10. The appellant’s generic citation to the entire record does not approach the

degree of specificity required by the Board’s regulations. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(b)

(stating that a petition for review “must be supported by specific references to the

record). Our review of the record has uncovered no indication that OPM was aware of

the court order prior to April 2017. To the extent that the appellant believes that the

record contains a particular piece of evidence showing something different, he has

failed to provide us with sufficient information to locate that evidence. In any event,

even if OPM were aware of the court order in late 2015, we would still find that the

appellant was partly at fault for the overpayment. 

7

 Our finding is supported by the appellant’s testimony that he discussed the pending

district court proceedings with an OPM official at the time of his retirement.

HCD at 4:55 (testimony of the appellant). This testimony tends to show that the

appellant knew that his marital status was material to the annuity election issue because

otherwise he would not have brought it up.

8
appellant that OPM’s mishandling of his case from April 29, 2017 onward

contributed to the overpayment problem. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10. OPM was

clearly in possession of the court order on this date, yet it waited an additional

11 months before taking any action to reduce the appellant’s annuity. Id. at 17.

OPM has provided no explanation for this delay, which we find was unwarranted

and directly contributed to the overpayment. However, as discussed below, even

after this time the appellant remained at least partly at fault for the overpayment’s

continued accrual.

Third, we find that the appellant accepted payments that he knew or should

have known to be erroneous. See Dela Casa v. Office of Personnel Management,

60 M.S.P.R. 287, 291-92 (1994) (finding that the appellant was not without fault

in causing the overpayment because she accepted payments that she knew or

should have known to be in error). The appellant was twice notified, in his initial

retirement application and in OPM’s April 29, 2017 letter, that the survivor

annuity would result in a reduction in his basic annuity, yet he took no action to

rectify the matter when he continued to receive an unreduced annuity. IAF, Tab 8

at 21, 36. We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant knew or

should have known that he was receiving too much annuity during this time, and

that he was therefore partly responsible for the overpayment. ID at 7. 

Conceptually, the 38-month overpayment window can be divided into three

time periods. The first period, from January through September 2015, predates

the divorce decree and survivor annuity order. The second period, from

October 2015 through April 2017, covers the time between the issuance of the

court order and the earliest date on record that OPM had received it. The third

period, from May 2017 through February 2018, covers the period between OPM’s

processing of the order and the beginning of the survivor annuity reductions. The

appellant was more or less at fault for the overpayment that accrued during each

of these periods. The overpayment during the first period was the result of the

appellant’s invalid annuity election based on incorrect information that he

9
supplied on his retirement application. Although the appellant may not have

known for certain at the time that this information was incorrect, he had reason to

believe that subsequent events might prove otherwise. During the second period,

the appellant’s responsibility for the overpayment was compounded by his failure

to notify OPM of the results of the divorce proceedings and his continued receipt

of an unreduced annuity, which he knew or should have known was incorrect.

During the third period, OPM itself incurs some fault for failing to begin annuity

reductions promptly upon its processing of the order, but the appellant is not

entirely relieved of his responsibility during this period because he continued to

receive an unreduced annuity, which he knew or should have known was

incorrect, without attempting to rectify the matter.

Because the appellant failed to show by substantial evidence that he was

without fault in causing the overpayment, we have not considered his argument

that recovery would be against equity and good conscience. PFR File, Tab 1

at 9-12; see Gott v. Office of Personnel Management, 97 M.S.P.R. 538, ¶ 8

(2004); Conway v. Office of Personnel Management, 56 M.S.P.R. 82, 85-86

(1992).

The appellant has not shown that the administrative judge was biased.

A party claiming bias or prejudgment by an administrative judge must

overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that accompanies

administrative adjudicators. Higgins v. U.S. Postal Service, 43 M.S.P.R. 66,

68 (1989). An administrative judge’s conduct during the course of a Board

proceeding warrants a new adjudication only if her comments or actions evidence

“a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment

impossible.” Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1362-63

(Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).

In this case, the appellant argues that, during prehearing settlement

discussions, the administrative judge stated that she was “leaning” toward finding

in favor of OPM. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. However, it is well-settled that an

10
administrative judge’s honest appraisal of an appeal does not constitute

extrajudicial conduct and is generally insufficient to establish prejudgment or

bias. See Gensburg v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 85 M.S.P.R. 198, ¶¶ 6, 8

(2000). Administrative judges are permitted to engage in frank settlement

discussions with the parties, and although the appellant might not have liked the

administrative judge’s assessment of his case, the administrative judge did not

exhibit bias by informing him of that assessment. See Herman v. Department of

Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 642, ¶ 11 (2013).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS8

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information. 

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

8

 Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

11
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A). 

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

12
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision. 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

P.O. Box 77960 

Washington, D.C. 20013 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

131 M Street, N.E. 

Suite 5SW12G 

Washington, D.C. 20507 

13
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)

(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either

with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction.9 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B). 

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

9

 The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,

132 Stat. 1510. 

14
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

 

 

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

Gina K. Grippando

Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

15