COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judge Annunziata, Senior Judges Cole and Baker*

Argued in Richmond, Virginia 

DAVID GUY JONES 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION** BY 

v. Record No. 0863-97-2 JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE 

 DECEMBER 22, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

James E. Kulp, Judge 

 William K. Grogan (William W. Roberts; 

William K. Grogan & Associates, on briefs), 

for appellant. 

 Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Appellant, David Guy Jones, was convicted in a bench trial 

of failure to stop at the scene of an accident in which someone 

was injured in violation of Code § 46.2-894. On appeal, 

appellant contends the trial court: (1) erred in denying his 

renewed motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence on the 

ground that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to 

support the conviction; (2) erred in concluding he was not 

telling the truth about a collateral issue causing the court to 

speculate that he was not telling the truth when denying 

 

 *Judge Baker participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on July 

31, 1998 and thereafter by his designation as senior judge 

pursuant to Code § 17.1-400, recodifying Code § 17-116.01. 

 **Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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knowledge of the accident; (3) erred by disregarding testimony 

offered by an expert witness which supported appellant's theory 

of how the accident occurred and his lack of knowledge of the 

accident; and (4) erred by disallowing evidence of his lack of 

motive to knowingly fail to stop at the scene of the accident.1

 

We affirm the conviction. 

BACKGROUND

 This case arises from an accident between a car and a 

tractor pulling two separate trailers (referred to herein as a 

tractor unit or truck) which occurred around noon on June 9, 

1996. The evidence established that Whitney Rogers was driving a 

black Hyundai Elantra in the center lane of three eastbound lanes 

of Interstate 64 in Henrico County. 

 At trial, Rogers testified that he and his wife, Nancy, were 

en route to their home in Reidsville, North Carolina. He was 

forced to stop because of another accident in the center lane 

about one hundred yards ahead of him. At that time, Rogers' car 

was struck from behind, causing severe and extensive damage to 

his vehicle. He provided the following description of the damage 

to his vehicle from the accident: "the back trunk was pushed 

almost all the way in. There was fairly extensive damage on the 

back driver's side for the most part. And they couldn't . . . 

get the doors open to get me out . . . ." Rogers explained that 

 

 1By order, we denied that portion of appellant's petition 

for appeal that claimed the trial court erred in admitting 

photographs of the Rogers' car. 
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"they [rescue workers] cut the roof off and took me out." His 

injuries from the accident consisted of a cut on the head 

requiring twelve stitches and a cervical strain. He was taken to 

a hospital in an ambulance but was able to drive a rental vehicle 

to North Carolina later in the day. His wife, Nancy, was also 

injured. Rogers testified that the driver of the vehicle which 

hit him did not stop and report his name and address to him. 

 At the same time and place, Adrian Cudmore was traveling 

east on I-64 in the center lane. He testified at trial that "it 

was raining very hard at the time and I was doing about 50, 55" 

when a "big double truck" passed him on the outside or left hand 

lane. The truck was "going markedly fast for the [road] 

condition." 

 Cudmore testified that the tractor unit was between one and 

two hundred feet ahead of him when he saw brake lights come on in 

the lanes ahead of him. Cudmore slowed down. He then saw "the 

truck completely lock up and then begin to slide sideways." As 

the truck slid sideways it went into the center lane ahead of 

him. "Then it straightened up, and as it straightened up, I saw 

a car was damaged and obviously had been hit by the truck." 

Cudmore further stated that the truck did not stop but continued 

east on I-64. According to Cudmore, Rogers' car "slid . . . very 

slowly . . . to the right hand lane and then onto the hard 

shoulder." Cudmore parked behind Rogers' car to see if the 

occupants were all right. Finding other people around and 
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realizing he could do nothing more, Cudmore left his card and 

continued his trip east on I-64. About one mile or one and 

one-half miles up the road, Cudmore saw parked on the shoulder of 

I-64 what appeared to him to be the same tractor unit that was 

involved in the accident. He observed the driver come around the 

front of the truck and get into the cab. It was still raining 

hard, and Cudmore continued his trip. 

 Trooper A.J. Burton responded to the accident scene. He 

found Rogers' black Hyundai on the right shoulder of the highway 

with severe rear end damage. Rogers' wife, Nancy, was able to 

exit from the vehicle; however, Rogers could not free himself and 

was trapped behind the steering wheel. Rescue workers arrived 

about the same time as the trooper and using their "Jaws of 

Life," they cut the roof off the car and removed Rogers. 

 Burton photographed Rogers' damaged vehicle after Rogers was 

removed by emergency personnel. Photographs were introduced into 

evidence that showed extensive damage to the rear end and left 

side of the vehicle. There is no dispute that the damage caused 

by cutting off the car roof was not done in the accident. 

 Based upon information gained during his investigation, 

Burton went to Consolidated Freightways, located about six miles 

from the scene of the accident. He discovered that appellant had 

been driving the tractor unit that day. He examined the double 

trailers and noticed black paint scrub marks on the passenger 

side of the rear trailer and a large amount of glass particles on 
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the axle of the rear trailer. Burton opined that the black paint 

marks appeared to be "fresh scrape marks" because the "metal was 

still clean and wasn't dirty at all." Burton identified 

photographs showing the paint marks on the side of the trailer 

and the glass particles on the rear trailer and axle. 

 Appellant moved the court to strike the Commonwealth's 

evidence on the ground it had not proved that he had any 

knowledge he was involved in an accident or that any injury had 

occurred. The court overruled the motion. 

 Appellant testified on his own behalf. He admitted that he 

was driving the Consolidated Freightways tractor unit at the time 

and place in question. He testified that he was proceeding east 

on I-64 near the Staples Mill exit when he came upon the first 

accident described by Rogers. He first observed the accident 

when he was between three and four hundred yards away from it. 

The accident had stopped traffic in the center lane. Appellant 

"began to apply the brakes, knowing to slow down because of the 

accident." He further testified that he did not stop but came 

almost to a stop. He then proceeded with the traffic past the 

accident. He denied any knowledge that he had struck Rogers' 

vehicle. 

 Appellant testified that, after passing the accident, "he 

had to go to the bathroom pretty bad." He came to the top of a 

knoll about a mile from the accident and pulled onto the shoulder 

of the road to "relieve himself." He was out of sight of the 
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accident. He stepped out of the truck, went around the front of 

the truck to the middle of the trailers and relieved himself. He 

stated, "It was raining pretty hard." His ultimate destination 

was the trucking company's Richmond terminal which was almost six 

miles away. 

 On cross-examination, appellant stated his truck had 

"mirrors on both sides of the cab" enabling the driver to see 

"what's going on with the trailers that you're towing." He 

stated that rain could have an effect on one's ability to see 

through the mirrors. Appellant testified that to the best of his 

knowledge, no part of his tractor unit went into the center lane. 

 Appellant called Steven Chewning, the president of an 

accident reconstruction and highway safety consulting firm, to 

corroborate his position that he had no knowledge of the accident 

and resulting injuries. 

 At the conclusion of all the evidence, appellant renewed his 

motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence. The motion was 

overruled. 

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 Appellant contends that in denying his renewed motion to 

strike, the trial court erred as a matter of law because the 

evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. He argues 

that the Commonwealth presented no direct evidence that he had 

knowledge of the accident, an essential element of the crime. 

Appellant acknowledges that the Commonwealth proved an accident 
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and an injury, but he insists it failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he was involved in the accident or had 

knowledge that he had been involved in the accident or the 

injuries. To support his contention, he points to the testimony 

of his expert witness on accident reconstruction, Steve Chewning, 

as well as the absence of evidence that he had knowledge that the 

accident occurred. 

 The Commonwealth contends that knowledge may be inferred 

from the circumstances of the collision. It contends that the 

trial judge did not believe appellant when he testified that he 

had no knowledge of the accident. To prove appellant's 

knowledge, the Commonwealth points to the extensive damage done 

to Rogers' vehicle and to appellant's actions and conduct after 

the accident. The Commonwealth further argues that ample, 

credible evidence in the record exists from which the trial judge 

could infer that appellant had knowledge of both the accident and 

the injuries. 

 When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, 

our analysis is guided by well established principles. 

 On appeal, we review the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom. The judgment of 

a trial court sitting without a jury is 

entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict 

and will not be set aside unless it appears 

from the evidence that the judgment is 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it. 

Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 
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(1987). 

 This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the 

trier of fact. See Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 239, 415 

S.E.2d 218, 220 (1992). In a bench trial, it is within the trial 

judge's province as the fact finder to assess the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight to be given the testimony. See Servis 

v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 525, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988). 

As fact finder, the trial judge has a right to weigh the 

testimony of all the witnesses, expert and otherwise. See Hill 

v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 60, 64, 379 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1989) 

(en banc). "The credibility of [an] expert witness and the 

weight to be accorded the evidence [a]re matters within the 

province of the jury." Horsley v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 335, 

339, 343 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1986). 

 "Where the trier of fact believes a witness has knowingly 

testified falsely in any material fact, he has a right to give 

the testimony such weight and credit as in his opinion it was 

entitled." Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 469, 472, 339 

S.E.2d 905, 907 (1986). A trial court is able to observe the 

witnesses' demeanor and evaluate their testimony. If the trial 

court concludes that a defendant's testimony is not credible, it 

is entitled to infer that the defendant lied to conceal his or 

her guilt. See Speight v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 83, 88, 354 

S.E.2d 95, 98 (1987). See also Brown v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 

489, 493, 364 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1988). 
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 "'Circumstantial evidence is as acceptable to prove guilt as 

direct evidence, and in some cases, such as proof of intent or 

knowledge, it is practically the only method of proof.'" Cirios 

v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 292, 295, 373 S.E.2d 164, 165 (1988) 

(quoting Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 

759 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981)). 

 "In all cases based on circumstantial 

evidence of guilt the conduct of the accused 

is an important factor in the estimate of the 

weight of circumstances which point to his 

guilt. . . . In such cases the Virginia 

Supreme Court has said that relevant evidence 

is any evidence 'which may throw light upon 

the matter being investigated, and while a 

single circumstance, standing alone, may 

appear to be entirely immaterial or 

irrelevant, it frequently happens that the 

combined force of many concurrent and related 

circumstances, each insufficient in itself, 

may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a 

conclusion.'" 

Hope v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 381, 385-86, 392 S.E.2d 830, 

838 (1990) (en banc) (citations omitted). 

 "'"Where inferences are relied upon to establish guilt, they 

must point to guilt so clearly that any other conclusion won't be 

inconsistent therewith."' Inferences may be taken from proved 

circumstances only to the extent those inferences are reasonable 

and justified." Moran v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 310, 314, 757 

S.E.2d 551, 553 (1987) (citations omitted). 

 The version of Code § 46.2-894 in effect at the time of the 

incident provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 

 The driver of any vehicle involved in an 

accident in which a person is . . . injured 

or in which an attended vehicle or other 
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attended property is damaged shall 

immediately stop as close to the scene of the 

accident as possible without obstructing 

traffic and report his name, address, 

driver's license number, and vehicle 

registration number forthwith to the State 

Police or local law-enforcement agency, to 

the person struck and injured if such person 

appears to be capable of understanding and 

retaining the information, or to the driver 

or some other occupant of the vehicle 

collided with or to the custodian of other 

damaged property. 

Any person convicted of violating the provisions of Code 

§ 46.2-894 "shall, if such accident results in injury to 

. . . any person, be guilty of a Class 6 felony." Code 

§ 46.2-900. 

 In Herchenbach v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 217, 38 S.E.2d 328 

(1946), the Supreme Court examined the substantially similar 

predecessor to Code § 46.2-894. The Court discussed the "duty 

imposed upon the driver" and held that "[i]t requires positive, 

affirmative action, -- that is, to stop and give the aid and 

information specified." Id. at 220, 38 S.E.2d at 329. In 

interpreting the meaning of the statute, the Supreme Court 

stated: 

 How can a person perform these affirmative 

acts unless he knows that his vehicle has 

struck a person or an object? Knowledge 

necessarily is an essential element of the 

crime. This does not mean that the person 

should have positive knowledge of the extent 
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of the damage or injuries inflicted. It does 

mean that, in order to be guilty of violating 

the statute, "the driver must be aware that 

harm has been done; it must be present in his 

mind that there has been an injury; and then, 

with that in his mind, he must deliberately 

go away without making himself known. If an 

injury is inflicted under such circumstances 

as would ordinarily superinduce the belief in 

a reasonable person that injury would flow, 

or had flowed, from the accident or 

collision, then it is the duty of the 

operator to stop his vehicle." 

Id. (citations omitted). 

 We discussed Herchenbach in Kil v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 

802, 407 S.E.2d 674 (1991). There, we said: 

 We are not persuaded by the Commonwealth's 

argument that a reasonable person standard 

with regard to the occurrence of the accident 

is consistent with Herchenbach. Accordingly, 

we hold that the Commonwealth must prove that 

the defendant possessed actual knowledge of 

the occurrence of the accident, and such 

knowledge of injury which would be attributed 

to a reasonable person under the 

circumstances of the case. 

Id. at 810-11, 407 S.E.2d at 679. See also Johnson v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 769, 772, 418 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1992). 

 Based upon these authorities, the Commonwealth was required 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements 
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of the crime charged: (1) Appellant was the driver of a vehicle 

which he knew was involved in an accident; (2) the accident 

caused personal injury to another; (3) appellant knew, or should 

have known, that another person was injured by the accident; and 

(4) appellant failed to stop immediately as close to the scene as 

possible and do all of the things specified in the statute. 

 In determining whether the Commonwealth proved the 

above-listed elements, we consider Cudmore's testimony that the 

"truck completely locked up." We also consider the fact that the 

rear trailer slid from the far left lane into the center lane, 

straightened up and continued on its way rather than rolling over 

or jackknifing. 

 To determine what appellant knew and when he knew it, we 

review the sequence of events that was before the fact finder. 

Appellant testified that when he came upon the first accident in 

the center lane, he slowed down but did not stop for traffic. He 

testified the wheels did not lock up, and he described his 

deceleration as normal. The trial judge was entitled to reject 

all of this testimony or any part of it in view of the fact it 

was contradicted by Cudmore. See Barrett v. Commonwealth, 231 

Va. 102, 107, 341 S.E.2d 190, 193 (1986) (when weighing evidence, 

the fact finder is not required to accept entirely either party's 

account of the facts). Cudmore's eyewitness testimony, which was 

accepted by the trial judge, contradicted appellant's version of 

events. Cudmore stated that he noticed brake lights ahead, 
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slowed down, and "saw the truck completely lock up and then begin 

to slide sideways." The truck then "straightened up." Thus, the 

sequence of events, according to Cudmore, was: (1) The truck 

locked up; (2) then the rear trailer slid sideways across the 

middle lane; (3) the rear trailer struck Rogers' car; (4) the 

rear trailer straightened up; and (5) the tractor unit continued 

on its way. 

 Based on the evidence, the trial judge was entitled to infer 

that appellant applied his brakes to the extent that the truck 

"completely locked up" because of the accident ahead. The 

collision with and damage to Rogers' car was substantial. The 

trunk and body of the car were smashed. Glass was broken, and 

particles were left on the axle of the rear trailer. The 

trial judge noted that considering the evidence concerning the 

movement of appellant's truck and the extent of the damage, it is 

inconceivable that appellant did not have knowledge of the 

accident. 

 Other evidence supports the finding that appellant knew he 

had been involved in the accident. From the testimony of Cudmore 

and appellant, we know that about one mile to one and one-half 

miles down I-64 in a heavy rain, within six miles of his 

terminal, appellant pulled his tractor unit onto the shoulder of 

the road out of sight of the accident scene and parked. He 

claimed he did this to "relieve himself." He admitted that he 

inspected the rear trailer, according to his usual custom, but 
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did not see any damage. He then continued to the truck terminal, 

parked the tractor unit, and did not report any accident. The 

trial judge was entitled to infer from this evidence that 

appellant stopped to inspect the unit to see if the trailer 

incurred any observably significant damage before he reported to 

the terminal. Appellant claimed he saw no damage, but the police 

officer found fresh black scrub marks and glass particles. 

Appellant had just passed the Laburnum and the Staples Mill exits 

where he could have left I-64 safely if he desired to "relieve 

himself." Instead, he pulled off of I-64 as soon as he was out 

of sight of the accident scene and inspected the trailer. The 

trial judge was entitled to infer that appellant knew he had been 

involved in the accident, stopped his tractor unit to determine 

the extent of the damage, and, finding only minimal evidence of a 

collision, he decided not to report the accident to his employer. 

 The Commonwealth's evidence was competent, was not 

inherently incredible, and was sufficient to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that appellant was the driver of a vehicle 

involved in an accident and that this fact was known to the 

driver. From the facts as described herein, including the damage 

shown in the photographs of Rogers' vehicle and the fact that the 

rear trailer was loaded with 14,000 pounds of cargo, the evidence 

was also sufficient to prove that the defendant knew, or should 

have known, that a person was injured by the accident. 

 It is undisputed that the accident caused injury to Whitney 
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and Nancy Rogers and that appellant failed to stop and report the 

information required by the statute. Therefore, all of the 

essential elements of the crime have been proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. We find no error in the refusal of the trial 

court to grant the renewed motion to strike the Commonwealth's 

evidence. 

 II. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 

APPELLANT WAS NOT TRUTHFUL ABOUT A COLLATERAL 

ISSUE SO AS TO SPECULATE THAT APPELLANT WAS 

NOT TRUTHFUL IN DENYING KNOWLEDGE OF THE 

ACCIDENT 

 III. TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISREGARDING PERTINENT 

FACTS OFFERED BY THE EXPERT WITNESS 

 We will consider questions II. and III. together. Appellant 

presented these arguments in a post-judgment motion for 

reconsideration. As explained in Part I., above, the trier of 

fact ascertains witness credibility, determines the weight to be 

given to a witness' testimony, and has the discretion to accept 

or reject any of the witness' testimony. See Servis, 6 Va. App. 

at 525, 371 S.E.2d at 165. Further, the fact finder is not 

required to accept the testimony of an expert witness merely 

because he or she has qualified as an expert. See McLane v. 

Commonwealth, 202 Va. 197, 205-06, 116 S.E.2d 274, 281 (1960); 

see also Horsley, 2 Va. App. at 339, 343 S.E.2d at 391. 

 At sentencing, the trial judge explained why and how he made 

his credibility determinations. Our review of the record fails 

to show that the trial judge improperly rejected appellant's 

testimony or improperly rejected the expert's testimony. 
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Instead, the trial judge considered all of the evidence, and his 

rulings are supported by credible evidence in the record. 

 IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED BY DISALLOWING 

EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT'S LACK OF MOTIVE TO 

FAIL TO STOP AT THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT 

 Appellant attempted to admit evidence of lack of motive on 

his part to leave the scene of the accident had he been aware of 

its occurrence. He identifies four instances where such evidence 

was refused. 

 (A) Appellant asked Louis Veasey, his 

supervisor at Consolidated Freightways, 

whether the company had any procedure 

for a driver to follow when he had been 

involved in an accident. 

 Veasey responded that the driver had certain paperwork which 

he had to take care of when this occurred. At this point, the 

Commonwealth's attorney objected on the grounds that such 

evidence was irrelevant and that the procedure after the accident 

had nothing to do with it because appellant testified that he was 

unaware that an accident had occurred. Therefore, the procedure 

could have had no effect on appellant's actions. 

 The following colloquy took place between defense counsel 

and the trial judge: 

 THE COURT: Well what's the relevance, Mr. 

Grogan? 

 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, your Honor, if 

there is an accusation of an accident and if 

they have procedures for you to go through, 

obviously they want to check to see if the 

driver is okay and everything like that. I 

just wanted to get that in, but I'll let it 

go. 
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 This response constituted a waiver of the objection, and we 

find no error when the trial judge sustained the objection. 

 (B) Appellant attempted to admit evidence of 

his training as a driver to show his 

company had taught him what action to 

take in case of an accident, so if he 

had knowledge of the accident, his 

normal reaction would have been to stop 

rather than leave the scene of the 

accident. 

 At trial, appellant explained the company's policy with 

regard to accidents as follows: "Well you have to fill out an 

accident report and submit a drug screen." When asked "was that 

procedure followed in your case?," appellant replied, "it was." 

 Because appellant denied any knowledge that he was involved 

in an accident, the trial judge found such evidence irrelevant. 

We agree with this ruling because appellant's normal reaction was 

not a relevant issue; the appropriate inquiry would have explored 

what he did on this occasion. Moreover, because appellant denied 

knowledge of the accident, he could not have followed the 

procedures for reporting an accident. In fact, by failing to 

report the accident when he arrived at the terminal, he did not 

take the actions for which he was allegedly trained, thereby 

avoiding the responsibility of filing a report and submitting to 

a drug screen. It was not until the police investigated the 

accident, contacted the company and asked to speak with appellant 

that authorities were able to confront appellant. Moreover, 

appellant failed to proffer for the record the specific 

procedures to follow when reporting an accident. See Smith v. 
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Hylton, 14 Va. App. 354, 357-58, 416 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1992) (if a 

party's evidence is ruled inadmissible, the party must proffer 

the evidence for the record, "otherwise the appellate court has 

no basis to decide whether the evidence was admissible") (citing 

Whittaker v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 966, 968, 234 S.E.2d 79, 81 

(1977)). 

 Absent a proffer and based on the evidence presented at 

trial, we cannot say the trial judge erred. Accordingly, we find 

no merit to this objection. 

 (C) Appellant contended that he should have 

been permitted to solicit evidence from 

Veasey about company procedure to be 

taken after the accident. 

 Appellant claimed that such evidence would have shown he was 

not in violation of any company policy or regulatory agency 

policy, facts which would tend to support his lack of knowledge 

of the accident. Appellant asked Veasey the following question: 

 Besides a suspension for suspicion of an 

accident, is there any other action the 

company takes or that they expect their 

employees to take? 

 Upon objection of the Commonwealth's attorney on the ground 

of relevance, the trial judge sustained the objection. Appellant 

did not proffer for the record what the policies would have 

required appellant to do, if anything. Without such a proffer, 

this issue is not cognizable on appeal. See id. Moreover, we 

fail to see how such testimony would be relevant in light of 

appellant's failure to follow procedure and his denial of 
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knowledge. 

 (D) Appellant contends that the trial court 

erred when it refused to permit expert 

Steven Chewning to testify about 

customs, standards, and completion and 

training requirements adopted and 

enforced by the Department of 

Transportation. 

 At trial, the following exchange took place: 

 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Are you familiar with the 

customs and standards that have been adopted 

and enforced by the Department of 

Transportation with respect to tractor 

trailer drivers? 

 [CHEWNING]: I do. That's quite a bit of 

what we do, yes, DOT compliance and training. 

 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Have you had an 

occasion to examine the records in this 

particular case, that you could comment on 

whether procedures were followed or 

Department of Transportation guidelines were 

followed? 

 [CHEWNING]: The law - 

 [COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]: That's 

irrelevant, Your Honor. We're not suggesting 

that there was anything improper about the 

structure of the truck or the way that it was 

being operated. 

 THE COURT: Well why is that relevant? He's 

not contesting that. 

 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I would just 

go - our position has been if there was an 

accident in which Mr. Jones was involved, he 

didn't know about it. Now to decide whether 

somebody has knowledge, you need to know a 

lot about the person. You need to ask other 

things. I mean we don't have to ask this. 

We can leave it for the speculation on the 

part of the Commonwealth. We were just 

trying to go a little bit further and say 

there were no conditions that would have made 

this person - any condition so that he 
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wouldn't have known that, other than the mere 

fact of the action upon the trailer. 

 THE COURT: Well they're not saying that 

there was anything about the hookups or 

anything else that was not consistent with 

motor vehicle provisions. 

 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, then I have 

no further questions. 

 The effect of this discussion was to stipulate the evidence 

sought to be admitted by appellant. Therefore, appellant cannot 

complain about the refusal to admit the evidence when he agreed 

to the stipulation and did not proceed further with the matter. 

Moreover, appellant failed to proffer what Department of 

Transportation guidelines were followed and how such evidence was 

relevant. Accordingly, we find no error. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.