Honorable Yallace Shropahlre 

County Attorney 

Travis. County 

Austin, Texas 

Opinion No. M-29 

Re: Construction of Seotlon 

2(b) o$ Artlole 67olh, 

Vernonte Civil Statutes, 

Dear l&h?, Shropehire: 

relative’ to stag orders 

of the oourt . 

In a recent letter to this oiiice 

? 

ou requested an 

opinion in regard to the above refereno6d ma ter, lie quote 

from your letter a8 follows: 

“(1) Is it within the dieoretlon of the 

Court to stay an order of .the flexas Department /iif Pub&la Safet;ef based Upon TWitable 

gPOuncr8? 

“(2) Is ft within the discretion of the 

Court to stay an order of the Department if 

the appeal Is not predicated upon either the 

conditions enumerated in Seotion 5(c), or the 

exceptions under Section 6 of the Aot? 

,I n 0 0 a 

Section 

commonly known as 

as follovrs: ‘. 

2(b) of Article 6701h, Vernon’s CSvil Statutes, 

the Safety Responelblllty Law reads, in part, 

“Any,, order or act’of the /Texas7 Depart - 

ment fif Public Safet 7 und’er tie pFovi,sions 

of thrs Act, may be su % ject to review within 

thirty (30) days after notice thereof, or .‘I’ 

thereafter for good oatise shown, by appeal to 

the Co@-&y Court at Law at the inetanoe of any 

party in intereat and in the county wherein 

- 123 - 
, . 

.., 

Hon. Wall& ShPopshiJre, pages 2,(M-29). 

~'~ ~the person ,aggrleved by,auoh order, of &t 

,resfdes, UP if %here be no County,':Court ate 

Law thereln,.then in the County'CoWt of,'sa+d '~' ~. ',' 

county, or.lf3here be no County ~Court h,$vln& 

juPi8dlct~on, then such jurlsdlction~sh&ll,be' 

'In the Dlstriot~Court of ,sald ,county; and' such, 

C&rt;'l8:'hereby ve8t&d.'wlth. jurisdiction, and 

such ap$e&shall be:Jy'trlal.de novd;,. The 

Court sha.11 determine tihether.,the'flllngbf 

the,appeal .shall operate a8 a ~stay of any 

such. order or decision of the. Department, with., 

the excegtlon thatno stays OPdeF. shall be 

grantea.staylng an .order ,?f suspenslpn.by the,. 

: Dep&tm@nt,of ,Publlo~Safety'that,lI@ baaed ,?n:',~ 

. . "kflnal~judgment rendered agsinst any ,pePson '~1 ", 

~.'ln:thls estates by & :court o~f'competent. jus$s- . . . 

dl&ion,grow$ng otit ~of;-the use of.8 motor 

Vehicle ln~ 'this St,a~te rhen, said- judgment 18'. 

a ,sub&lstlkg fin@ judgment, and'un~satlefled.; 

~fWther, 'ti'appaal shall,n@ .oper@e~i+s a' etay ,' 

of 'any stich~dth@ orders'or decislotis, of the "., ,, 

~,Department ,of:Publlc S,arety where~ the,~aggrleved, ; 

paPty was involved Inan Bccidefft 'involving ~a 

motor'vehlole,which~ he was opei?a$lng elf he was 

charged ~wfth 'a vioiatibn'of aay'of the laws.~of 

the State'of Texas, or any of Its political 

:subdlvlslo~s, and, 8ald complaint or lndlctment~, 

fs pending at, thii time the. tippea,l fPom,an,order 

or declslon of ~the Department of Publlc~ Safety 

Is filed, unPess the aggrieved party shall file 

proof of f,lnsnclal ~e8pOnslblllty with the Depart-~ 

ment of Public Safety ae a ,condltlon precedent to ~' 

the obtalfiln&of said sta apd maletaln~ said, proof 

of.flnancfal~ Pes~dnslblll f y until dlsmlssal cif 

sa$d,,com$alnk or ln~lotmen$'.6r for 8uc.h period 

'of time, as,grovlded fork in Sdctlon 2(d),.of this, 

.Act. Alma (E3nphasls~ added.) ~,, ': .- 

S&f&5 of.~~tlcle'ti70ihp:.'Verns;n8s C$vl~~Statutes, ,, 

provides t&at the Texas~Dk$aPtment'.oP Pub119 Safety,shall,undeP 

certain 'eondlt.lor!s .r'equfre persons, Involved In motor,vehlc~e 

&cldents within this .Sta$e to &kt,.wlth th@,Department as 

: 'securltyp a~ sum of ,moni%y whlc~h in the ~Departmentss~judgment; 

would.be ~sufflelent to ~satlsfy any ~juci@&nt for damages result-. 

ing from stich accident, Section 5,'also provides that"the'De-, 

.' partment shall suspend the',dr$ver's llc'ense and, al& motbr yehicle' 

,reglstratlons of each operator and owner of,a~motor, vehicle Invol.ved in such accident unless such person post,s.the requfred. 

-124: 
HOA. Wallace Shropshlrej page 3 (M- 29) 

tiecurlty or otherwise complies with 

6701h. Subsection (c) of Section 5 

the provisions of.&lcle -' 

PPOVlde8, in part* a8 follows: 

"(c) This Section shall not apply under 

the conditions stated j.n Section 6 nor: 

"1 . To such operator or over If such 

owner had In effect at the time of such‘accldent 

a motor vehicle llablllty policy with respect, 

to the motor vehicle Involved In such accident; 

"2. To euch operator, If not the owner of 

such motor vehicle, If there was In efrect at 

the time of euch accident a motor vehiole llablllty 

policy or bond with reepect to hi8 operation of 

motor vehicle8 not owned by him; 

“3. To any pereon employed by the government 

of the United Statee, when such perron $8 acting 

within the ecope or office of his employment) 

"4, To 8uch operator or owner If the llablllty 

of such operator or owner for.::damaSes resulting 

from such accident Is, ln,.the judegnent of the I&- 

partment, covered by any other form OS llablllty 

Insurance policy or bond; nor 

"5 Q To any person quallfyln$ aeVa eelfd 

insurer under Section 34 of thle Act,ym to anyperson ogeratlng a motor vehlole for such selfinsurer. 

Section 6 of Article 6701h, Vernon's Civil Statutes, 

provides as tollowsn 

"The requirements a8 to 8ecurltys proof 

of financOa1 re6ponslblllty and suspension in 

Section 5 shall not apply0 

,_ I. 

"1. To the operator or the owner of a' l 

motor vehicle involved in an accident whf&eln 

no injury or damage wau caused to the person 

or pPOp8Pty of any one other than such oper8to-P 

or owner; 

"2, Tp the operator or the owner of a 

motor vehlale lemlly parked or legally atopped 

at a traffic sl@Ial at the time of the accident9 

* 12s - 
Hon. Wallace Shropshlre, page 4 (M-3) 

“3. To the owner of a motor vehicle If 

at the time of the accident the. vehicle was being 

operated without his permission, express or lmplied, or was parked by a pereon who had been 

operating such motor vehicle without such permission; nor 

"4. If, prior to the date that the pepart- - 

ment would otherwise suspend licenee and reglstratlon or nonresident's operating privilege under 

Section 5, there shall be flle~~svlth the Department 

evidence satisfactory to It that the person9 who 

would otherwise have to file security and proof, 

has been released from liability or been finally 

ad judlcated not to be. liable or has executed a 

duly acknowledged written agreement provldldg for 

the,payme# of an agreed amount In lnstallment8, 

with respect to all claims f2r Injuries or damages 

resulting from the accident. 

The questions involved In construing the provisions 

of A&lcl& 6701h, Vernon'8 Civil Statutea, may be etated a8 

follows: 

(1) What must a person, who, Is aggrleved 

by a Depar%ment of Public Safety suspenelon 

order/do In order to properly effect his appeal 

and to bring the appeal within the actual jurlsdiction of the court which has potential jurlsdiction of the appeal? 

(2) What Is the extent of the power of a 

coure which has jurlsdIctlon of such an app,eal 

to stay such a suspension order of the DepaPtment ? 

In oraer to confer ao@al jurisdl~tlon on a court, 

having potential jurladlctlon of an appeal from a Department 

order o suspending a driver's license or,motor vehicle registration, 

the aggrieved party must In his petition allege as rounds at 

least one of the conditions enumerated In Section 5 7 c) or at 

least one of the exceptions listed In Sec%fon 6 of the Act or 

other grounds for the appeal, which if accepted, as true, would 

be sufficient %o obtain a final judwlent In hls:behalf at a trial 

on the merits of the case 0 In tiie Ease of Ollv~lra v. Department 

of Public S&fe%y, 309 S.W,2d 557 (T.?x.Clv.l_. hODolY!+3. -_ ~_ n,w.h.). 

the court agreed with the appellant %hat his appeal, from a'ljepartment 

suspension ordep1, should not have been dismissed for want of jurlsdiction for the reasons given by the trial court. The court 

- 126- j 
Hon. Wallace Shropshlre, pa$e !j (M- 29) 

<. 

nevertheleea affirmed the.dlemiesal for want of jurisdiction on 

the ground that “If every allegation in appellant’s petition 

be accepted 88 true, he hae,,not stated leg&% grounds for a stay 

of the order of suspension. Ollveira v. Dkpartment of Public 

Saaonauuio;;~t;~;~ The court,:.quoted from appellant ‘a 

“Under the undisputed facta d?acloaed -1 

by the record appellant la subject to but h&s 

not complied with Art. 6?01h, sec. 5. He doea 

not claim that, he ccmee within any of the exceptlona named in Art. 6701h, sec. 6.” Ollvelra 

v. Department of F’qblic Safety, aupra, gags 

aa cited with proval in 

311 S.W.W 2% (Tex.Civ. 

If the appealinS ps3’ty 18 OtherWi88 subject to the 

provialons of the Act end does not ‘come within one of the conditlona named In Section 5 or one of the exceptions listed in Section 6 of the Act there are no allegations OS fact 8uffLcient tb 

establish a prima facie ca8e and confer juriad~ctlon.,on the trial 

court. 

.,.. 

Once jurladiotlon haa ittached, the provPaion8 of 

Section 2(b)~ of Article 6701h v&at comDlete dfacretion in the 

court to determine whether, the ap&eal ihall operate aa a’atay 

of a Department auapenslon order* except In thO88 caaea where 

the statute apeolflcally provides that no eta 

7 

order shall be 

granted a The applicable portion of Section .2 b) reads a8 

follows t 

0 *The Court ahall determlne whether 

the f&g of the appeal shall operate aa a 

stay of 8nyn8uch order or d8oialon of the Department, . . n 

It la therefore our opinion that, under the Safety 

Reapon8lblllty Law, Article 6701~1, it la not within the dlacretlon of” the trial court to stay 8n &der.of auapenalon of 

a driver Ia license or a motor vehiole reglsijratlon of the Texas 

Department of Public Safety upon equitable -&rounds. It Is also 

ouroplnlon that It is not within the discretion of the court to 

stay such order of auapenalon, if the sppeal la not predicated 

Upot’.at leaat or@ of the oondltlon8.enumerated in Section 5(c), 

or ut,l8ast one of the exceptions llated under Sectlon 6 of Article 

6701h, Vernon’6 Civil Statutea, or upon other ground8 for the 

app8a1, which If accepted aa true,~would be wfflclent to obtain 

- t27 - 
. . 

Hon. Wallace' Shropshlre, page 6 (M-29) 

a final judgment In his behalf at a trial on the merit8 of the 

case. 

The sufficiency of the petltlon to coifer actual. 

jurlsdl~tlon of the appeal upon the trial court may be’ teatied’ 

by summary judgment proceedings': Wood v. Department of Public' 

.W.2d 274 (TexiCiv.Al 

$$$$I~$' of Pubilc'Safety 3~!‘S%‘% ‘;;p’;di m!! 

. Slmmona v. Depaktment Af'Publlc Safei 

.idnik (&xxi T exaYi 

ment of Public Safet v.App, 19055, new.!.) 

SUMMARY 

It- is not within the discretion of the trial 

court to stay an order of suspension of a. driver's 

license or a motor vehicle registration of the 

Texae Department of Public Safety upoti equitable 

grounds. 

I$ Is not within the discretion of the court 

to stay such order of suspension, If the appeal 1s 

not predicated upon at least one of the condltlons 

enumerated In Section 5(c), or at least one of the' 

tixceptlons listed under Section 6 of Article 6701h, 

Vernon”s Civil Statutes, or other grounds for the 

appeal, which if accepted as true, would be sufficient to obtain a,flnal judgment ln his behalf 

at a trial on the merits of the case.' 

V&ti&y yours, 

ey O&era1 of Texas 

r. 

Prepared by Lewla E. Berry, Jr. 

Assistant Attorney General 

LEBjr:ra:mkh 

APPROVED: 

OPINION-COMMITTEE 
. I 

Han, Wallace Shropshlre, page 7 (M- 29) 

Hawthorne Phllllpr, Ch8m 

w. V. aeppert, Co-Chelmen 

John Reeve8 

Marietta Payne 

Pat Bailey 

Monroe Clulrton 

STAFF mm ASSISTANT 

A. J, Cambbl, Jr.