09-4435-ag

Purba v. Holder

BIA

A096 423 812

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE

32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A

PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH

THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A

COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan

United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of

New York, on the 25th day of October, two thousand ten.

PRESENT:

GUIDO CALABRESI,

REENA RAGGI,

PETER W. HALL,

 Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________________

TUMBOR GOLDO ROY PURBA, A.K.A. TUMBOR 

G. R. PURBA,

Petitioner, 

 v. 09-4435-ag

 NAC 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

_________________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: H. Raymond Fasano, New York, New

York.

FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney

General; Daniel E. Goldman, Senior

Litigation Counsel; Jonathan
2

Robbins, Trial Attorney, Office of

Immigration Litigation, United

States Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review

is DENIED.

Petitioner Tumbor Goldo Roy Purba, a native and citizen

of Indonesia, seeks review of a September 29, 2009 order of

the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Tumbor Goldo

Roy Purba, No. A096 423 812 (B.I.A. Sept. 29, 2009). We

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts

and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for

abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d

Cir. 2005) (per curiam). When the BIA considers relevant

evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to

reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the

substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v.

Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008). An alien seeking

to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later

than 90 days after the date on which the final

administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. §

1003.2(c)(2). There is no time or numerical limit, however,

for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed

circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in

the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such

evidence is material and was not available and could not

have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 

8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 

In this case, the BIA did not exceed its discretion in

denying Purba’s untimely motion to reopen because Purba

failed to offer material evidence of changed country

conditions that would affect his eligibility for relief. 

Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169. The BIA noted that the

record indicates a possible resurgence of radical Islam in

Indonesia yet reasonably concluded that the evidence did not

reflect a meaningful change in country conditions since his

hearing before the IJ. Furthermore, as the BIA noted, the

State Department International Religious Freedom Report

indicates that the government of Indonesia generally

respected religious freedom. See Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446
3

F.3d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 2006). Thus, Purba’s evidence was

insufficient to establish either changed country conditions

or a pattern or practice of persecution against Christians. 

See Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2007)

finding reasonable the BIA’s interpretation that the alleged

persecution must be “so systemic or pervasive as to amount

to a pattern or practice of persecution.”); see also Santoso

v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2009). While Purba

asserts that the BIA erred by failing to consider his

evidence, we presume that the agency “has taken into account

all of the evidence before [it], unless the record

compellingly suggests otherwise.” Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006). In

fact, the BIA considered Purba’s evidence in some detail and

the record does not compel us to reach a contrary

conclusion. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its

discretion in denying Purba’s untimely motion to reopen. 

See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of

removal that the Court previously granted in this petition

is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in

this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for

oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second

Circuit Local Rule 34(b).

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk