J. A11006/15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

D.Y.C. :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

J.S., : No. 1462 EDA 2014

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Order Entered April 4, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No. 04-09396, PACMS 00773690

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON AND WECHT, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 09, 2015

Appellant, J.S. (“Husband”), appeals from the order seizing assets 

from his bank account in order to satisfy his child support obligation. We 

affirm.

The case has an extensive nine-year history that began when appellee, 

D.Y.C. (“Wife”), filed a complaint for divorce in 2004. We adopt the trial 

court’s recitation of the procedural history.

On March 13, 2006, [Husband] and [Wife] 

reached an agreement on the amount of child 

support to be paid by [Husband]. In an Order dated 

March 13, 2006, the Honorable Toby Dickman 

ordered that the amount of arrears related to child 

support be addressed in equitable distribution. On 

March 23, 2011, [Husband] and [Wife] attended a 

hearing before an equitable distribution Master which 

resulted in a Report and Recommendation. 

Thereafter, [Husband] filed a Motion to remand the 

case back to the Master. On April 12, 2011, the 
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parties entered into an agreed support Order, 

wherein [Husband] pays $391 per month basic child 

support, and $50 toward arrears, for a total of $441 

per month (Agreed Support Order”). On August 22, 

2011, the Honorable Carolyn Carluccio entered an 

Agreed Order granting [Husband]’s Motion to 

remand the equitable distribution claim to the Master 

and containing a provision that “[t]he Master’s 

decision is binding upon the parties and shall be 

issued with a 236 Notice entered as a Judgment 

Lien.” On December 17, 2012, the parties again 

appeared before the equitable distribution Master. 

On February 6, 2013, a Master’s Report, Decision, 

and Judgment upon Equitable Distribution, Alimony, 

Counsel Fees and Costs (hereinafter “2013 Master’s 

Report”) was entered which recommended that 

judgment be entered in favor of [Wife] and against 

[Husband] in the amount of $30,382.50, 

recommended charging [Husband]’s account in the 

support action in the amount of $7,852.23 in 

arrearages, and further recommended denying 

[Husband]’s claim for attorney’s fees and costs. 

Thereafter, on February 8, 2013, [Husband] filed 

timely exceptions to the Master’s Report dated 

February 6, 2013.

On June 14, 2013, the Honorable Garrett Page 

issued an Order ruling that the parties’ August 22, 

2011 Agreed Order legally binds the parties to the 

2013 Master’s Report dated February 6, 2013 and 

that said Agreed Order was not modifiable by the 

Court. Subsequently on July 25, 2013, the 

Honorable Garrett Page issued a Divorce Decree and 

Order that divorced the parties from the bonds of 

matrimony and further ordered that judgment be 

entered in favor of [Wife] and against [Husband] in 

the amount of $30,382.50 and [Husband]’s account 

in the support action be charged in the amount of 

$7,852.23 in arrears. On August 19, 2013, 

[Husband] filed a fast track appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.C.P. 904(f) to the July 25, 2013 Divorce Decree 

and Order. That matter is still pending on appeal 

with the Superior Court.
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On January 17, 2014, pursuant to the 

Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Title 23 Section 

4304.1 and 4305 and Pa.R.C.P. 1910.23(a), the 

Honorable Kelly Wall, issued an “Order to Freeze 

Assets,” directing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. to freeze 

assets belonging to [Husband] up to $7,852.23, the 

outstanding balance of [Husband]’s support arrears. 

On January 27, 2014, the Domestic Relations Office 

provided notice of the Order to [Husband]. On 

February 7, 2014, [Husband] filed an Objection to 

Order to Freeze Assets. In [Husband]’s six (6) 

paragraph Objection to Order to Freeze Assets, 

[Husband] stated that the January 17, 2014 Order 

froze funds in his Wells Fargo Bank account in the 

amount of $7,852.23, and argued that because he 

filed a timely appeal to the July 25, 2013 Decree and 

Order that consolidated arrears with funds awarded 

in equitable distribution, “this Court lacks any and all 

jurisdiction to freeze any funds of [Husband].” On 

February 9, 2014, [Wife] filed a Motion to Overrule 

the Objection to Order to Freeze Assets arguing that 

[Husband]’s objection cannot form the basis of a 

valid objection to the Order to Freeze Assets. This 

Court received both petitions and scheduled oral 

argument on [Husband]’s objection, and [Wife]’s 

Motion to overrule said objection. On March 28, 

2014, both parties appeared and presented 

argument to the Court.

[Husband] argued that because the July 25, 

2013 Divorce Decree and Order directed that 

[Husband]’s account in the support action be 

charged in the amount of $7,852.23 and [Husband] 

appealed that Order to the Superior Court, DRO had 

no jurisdiction to freeze [Husband]’s assets for that 

amount of money. [Husband] argued that even 

though the Agreed Support Order was being 

enforced and [Husband] reportedly had been paying 

$50 per month toward the arrears amount, the total 

arrears amount (i.e. the $7,852.23) is pending 

before the Superior Court so to freeze assets based 

on that amount was error. Furthermore, [Husband] 

argued that if [Wife] wanted to continue the 

enforcement of the July 25, 2013 Decree and Order, 
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then [Wife]’s remedy would have been to try to 

quash the appeal.

In response, [Wife] argued that under 

Pa.R.A.P. § 1701(b)(2), this Court has continuing 

jurisdiction to enforce Orders unless [Husband] filed 

and requested a supersedeas from the court 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. § 1731(b). In addition, [Wife] 

argued that even if [Husband] had requested a 

supersedeas, it should have been denied pursuant to 

the August 22, 2011 Order, which states that 

[Husband] waived his right to stay enforcement 

during the appeal process.

This Court deliberated on [Husband]’s 

objection to the court’s authority to issue the 

January 17, 2014 Order enforcing the July 25, 2013 

Decree and Order during the pendency of appeal. 

Thereafter, on April 1, 2014, this Court issued an 

Order overruling [Husband]’s objection and granting 

[Wife]’s Motion to overrule said objection. On 

May 5, 2014, [Husband] filed a timely Notice of 

Appeal to the Superior Court.

Trial court opinion, 6/23/14 at 1-5 (references to footnotes omitted).

Husband presents a single issue for this court’s consideration:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it 

permitted the seizure of [Husband]’s bank account to 

satisfy child support arrears when [Husband] had 

been making $50.00 month payments on the arrears 

pursuant to a 2011 Agreed Support Order?

Husband’s brief at 3.

In reviewing Husband’s claim, we note that our standard of review in 

matters of support will allow us to reverse the trial court only when there 

has been an abuse of that court’s discretion. Ney v. Ney, 917 A.2d 863, 

866 (Pa.Super. 2007).
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The domestic relations section has the authority to “[i]ssue orders in 

cases where there is a support arrearage to secure assets to satisfy current 

support obligation and the arrearage by: . . . [a]ttaching and seizing assets 

of the obligor held in financial institutions.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4305(b)(10)(iii). 

The Rules of Civil Procedure implementing this provision are set forth in 

Pa.R.C.P., Rule 1910.20(b)(3), 42 Pa.C.S.A. and Rule 1910.23. 

Rule 1910.20 provides that “[u]pon the obligor’s failure to comply with a 

support order, the order may be enforced . . . pursuant to Rule 1910.23, 

attaching and seizing assets of the obligor held in financial institutions.” 

Rule 1910.20(b)(3). Rule 1910.23 provides, in relevant part as follows:

(a) Upon identification of an obligor’s assets held 

by a financial institution, the court shall, upon 

certification of the overdue support owed 

by the obligor, enter an immediate order 

prohibiting the release of those assets until 

further order of court. . . . Service of the order 

on the financial institution shall attach the 

asset up to the amount of the overdue support 

until further order of court.

(b) The domestic relations section shall provide 

written notification of the attachment to the 

obligor. The obligor and any joint owner of the 

account who has been notified by the financial 

institution may object to the attachment in 

writing or by personal appearance before the 

domestic relations section within 30 days after 

issuance of the notice. The grounds for an 

objection are limited to the following: 

(1) no overdue support exists under the 

support order or there is a mistake in the 

certified amount of overdue support; 

(2) there is a mistake in the identity of 
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the obligor; or (3) the account is not 

subject to attachment as a matter of law.

(c) If no objection is made within 30 days after 

notice was issued, the court shall, upon proof 

that obligor was properly served with notice of 

the attachment, enter an order seizing the 

assets up to the amount of overdue support 

owed. The order shall be served on the 

financial institution and a copy of the order 

provided to both parties.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.23(a)-(c) (emphasis added).1 “[T]he Rule implies, and 

common sense dictates, that the court should take some action to consider 

and dispose of the objections before proceeding further with a seizure 

order.” Cutlip v. Shugars, 815 A.2d 1060, 1062-1063 (Pa.Super. 2003).

Instantly, the premise of Husband’s argument is simple. Husband 

argues he was in full compliance with the April 12, 2011 support order and 

 

1 The support guidelines differentiate between “overdue support” and “past 

due support” as follows:

“Overdue support,” the amount of delinquent support 

equal to or greater than one month’s support 

obligation which accrues after entry or modification 

of a support order as the result of obligor’s 

nonpayment of that order.

“Past due support,” the amount of support which 

accrues prior to entry or modification of a support 

order as the result of retroactivity of that order. 

When nonpayment of the order causes overdue 

support to accrue, any and all amounts of past due 

support owing under the order shall convert 

immediately to overdue support and remain as such 

until paid in full.

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.1.
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there was no basis to seize his assets. However, we note that in his 

objection to the order freezing his assets, Husband claimed the trial court 

lacked jurisdiction to freeze any funds because Husband filed an appeal of 

the trial court’s July 25, 2013 order.2 

In response, Wife contends Husband’s argument is factually inaccurate 

and his statement that he was at all times in compliance with the child 

support order is disingenuous at best and completely belied by his history of 

support payment maintained by domestic relations. (Wlife’s brief at 7.)3 

The March 28, 2014 notes of testimony indicate counsel for Husband 

stated: “It is our contention that since the order is on appeal, that there is 

no standing, so to speak by DRO to take an order to freeze the assets. And 

Common Pleas and DRO has [sic] no jurisdiction at this time to address that 

particular amount of money.” (Notes of testimony, 3/28/14 at 3.) The trial 

court, in its June 23, 2014 opinion, stated, “the objections hearing focused 

 

2 We note that the appeal Husband claimed divested the trial court of 

jurisdiction was handed down as an opinion filed on September 2, 2014. 

Chen v. Saidi, 100 A.3d 587 (Pa.Super. 2014). In the appeal, there is no 

discussion regarding the sum of $7,852.23 that was added to Husband’s 

child support arrears.

3 Wife has supplemented her brief with copies of PACSES case financial 

summaries which appear to support her position. (See R16b-22b.) 

However, we are precluded from considering copies of these records. See

Kessler v. Broder, 851 A.2d 944 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 868 

A.2d 1201, (Pa. 2005) (on appeal, inclusion in the reproduced record is not 

an acceptable substitute for the original certified record);Warfield v. 

Warfield, 815 A.2d 1073, 1074 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2003) (this court must rely 

solely on the contents of the certified record). 
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on [Husband’s] objection as articulated, namely, that the trial court was 

divested of jurisdiction and lacked authority to enforce the arrears amount 

stated in the July 25, 2013 Decree and Order.” (Trial court opinion, 6/23/14 

at 6.) The trial court went on to state:

During the objections hearing, [Husband] did 

comment that he was paying $50 per month toward 

arrears, but argued this relative to the fact that he 

had no issue with Agreed Support Order being 

enforced, rather [Husband] took issue with the total 

arrears amount frozen (i.e., $7,852.23) because 

[Husband] believed that the accuracy of that arrears 

amount would be addressed on appeal to the 

Superior Court. As [Husband] failed to raise the 

issue in his Objection to Order to Freeze Assets 

and during the hearing, and also failed to 

submit any evidence to the court on the issue, 

this court had no reason to assume that the 

January 17, 2013 Freeze Asset Order that 

specifically states it was issued pursuant to 

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.23 did not comply with 

1910.23(a), where a representative from DRO 

certified that [Husband] owed overdue support 

prior to the court issuing the freeze order.

Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added) (reference to notes of testimony omitted).

We have reviewed the certified record. Husband was identified by the 

tactical enforcement unit of MCDRS as owing overdue support arrears. As 

stated in Rule 1910.23 there are three limited grounds for an objection; 

namely, no overdue support exists or there is a mistake in the certified 

amount of overdue support; there is a mistake in the identity of the obligor; 

or the account is not subject to attachment as a matter of law. Instantly, 

Husband did not pursue any of the permitted grounds for objection. 
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Based on the above, we affirm the order of the trial court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/9/2015