1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 123,100

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

RONALD LEVON BUCHANAN,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Johnson District Court; JAMES CHARLES DROEGE, judge. Opinion filed August 26, 

2022. Affirmed.

Jennifer C. Bates, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant, and Ronald Buchanan, 

appellant pro se.

Jacob M. Gontesky, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek 

Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before HILL, P.J., COBLE, J., and PATRICK D. MCANANY, S.J.

PER CURIAM: A jury convicted Ronald Levon Buchanan of multiple charges 

including three counts of attempted first-degree murder and six counts of aggravated 

arson after an early-morning fire in the apartment complex where his daughter lived.

Buchanan appeals his convictions. He contends the aggravated arson convictions were 

multiplicitous, the State presented insufficient evidence to show he intended to kill three 

victims, and the district court violated his right to conflict-free counsel. And in a 
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supplemental pro se brief, Buchanan makes additional claims challenging the evidence 

and alleging prosecutorial error.

Although the ignition of the fire was a single act, we find Buchanan's aggravated 

arson convictions do not improperly charge him with multiple offenses for that sole 

action because the applicable statute permits prosecution for each occupied apartment 

within the complex. The State presented sufficient evidence to support the attempted 

first-degree murder convictions. The district court did not violate Buchanan's right to 

conflict-free counsel where his pro se motions for new trial were untimely and did not 

abuse its discretion in summarily denying relief. Buchanan's remaining supplemental

issues are unpersuasive because they are either not preserved for appeal or are 

unsupported by the record. We affirm his convictions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 13, 2018, Buchanan's daughter, Maraya Buchanan, graduated from high 

school. Maraya and her father previously had an argument that led to her uninviting 

Buchanan to the graduation ceremony, although he attended against her wishes. Maraya

did not speak to her father at the ceremony. After the contentious event, Buchanan posted 

to his social media account about his discontent with the graduation, his hurt feelings, and 

the disrespect he felt from his daughter and her mother, Dena Rendon.

Maraya, her mother, and Maraya's younger brother, K.J., lived together in an 

upper-floor unit of the Springhill Apartments complex in Overland Park, Kansas. After 

the graduation ceremony, Maraya returned to the apartment with her mother and brother. 

Later that night, Buchanan texted Maraya requesting she leave the key to his own 

apartment outside of her apartment so he could retrieve it. Maraya placed the key under 

the doormat outside her front door at the top of the apartment stairs. Mother moved her 

car to give Buchanan the appearance she was not at home to avoid any confrontation.
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After seeing Buchanan's social media post on Facebook about Maraya's 

graduation, Theresa Griswold, one of Maraya's neighbors in the apartment complex, 

contacted him. Buchanan told Griswold that he was upset about how he had been treated 

and asked Griswold to retrieve some of his property from Maraya's apartment. She 

initially agreed, but when she could not reach Maraya's mother, and because it was so late 

(around midnight), Griswold feel asleep. Griswold woke a few hours later to find her 

apartment was on fire.

Around the same time, K.J. opened the front door to their apartment and saw a 

"doorway full of fire" that would not permit the family access to the stairs to escape the 

fire. Having no other options, the family tied blankets together and Mother lowered her 

children out the window to the ground before climbing out herself.

Just after 4 a.m. on May 14, 2018, the Overland Park Fire Department responded 

to the fire at the apartment complex. The severity of the fire, combined with the 

apartment complex's numerous occupants, required the help of 10 fire companies and 

multiple ancillary units. Multiple occupants were trapped inside the building when the 

fire companies arrived, but rescue was difficult because the fire caused some of the 

external walls to collapse. All occupants managed to evacuate, except for a dog 

belonging to Maraya and her family.

Once the fire was extinguished, fire investigators combed through the remains and 

determined the origin of the fire was the exterior doorway to Maraya's apartment. The 

lead fire investigator testified the southeast exterior stairway landing—the doorway to 

Maraya's apartment—was the origin of the fire based on the fire patterns and because the 

landing was "totally burned out and consumed by the fire."

Investigators determined the fire was intentionally set after ruling out other 

possible sources. The investigators considered and eliminated electrical sources, natural 
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causes, and equipment malfunction. Similarly, the investigators concluded a cigarette, or 

other carelessly discarding smoking materials, could not have caused the fire because the 

stairwell was "very well kept and clean" with no material to fuel such a fire. 

While scanning for evidence, a canine trained in detecting accelerants alerted to a 

glass lemonade bottle lying in a grassy area next to the apartment building. The bottle 

contained a small amount of a clear liquid. After taking the bottle and its contents into 

evidence, a forensic scientist at the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) later confirmed 

the liquid was acetone. 

Maraya told fire investigators at the scene that she believed her father, Buchanan, 

started the fire. Mother reiterated this claim. After escaping the apartment, Maraya texted 

Buchanan and conveyed she believed he was responsible. Buchanan responded saying he 

had "no clue" what she was talking about and that he had "been sitting here getting [his] 

thoughts together on how [he] was treated at the graduation." A couple of hours later, 

Buchanan messaged Maraya's friend, Kourtney Snype: "Maraya treated me like shit at 

her graduation refuse to take a pic with me and gave the 50 dollars in [r]oses away when I 

gave them to her, then I wake up this morning and [mother]'s house on [sic] fire and my 

dog is dead." Buchanan then denied responsibility for the fire and shared he did not care 

what losses Maraya and her mother had suffered as a result of the fire. Buchanan also 

posted to social media a picture of the fire alongside this statement: 

"Wow Pray for Daughter and her mom, but Hot Damn Karma moves with the speed of 

lighting [sic], their house burned down last night. Lost everything they have my 

compassion but they have no support from me. I have 2extra rooms and I'll rather use 

them [sic] rooms as piss pads before they're welcome [ . . .] they Got What God sent to 

em. Damn I wish they [sic] house didn't burn down but I'll be a lie [sic] if I said I 

cared . . . ."
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About one month later, police detectives interviewed Buchanan. He spoke with the 

detectives about his argument with Maraya and the alleged events at the graduation 

ceremony that caused him to become upset and feel disrespected. Buchanan told the 

detectives he became ill after the graduation, and he took himself to the hospital 

emergency room at Research Medical Center in Kansas City. Buchanan stated he went to 

the hospital at about 11:30 p.m. on May 13, but left a couple of hours later, around 2 a.m. 

But when detectives contacted the hospital, the hospital did not have a record of 

Buchanan being at the hospital on May 13 or 14, however, their records did show 

Buchanan receiving care on May 24, 2018.

The detectives collected DNA samples from Buchanan, which were evaluated

against the DNA gathered from the glass lemonade bottle found at the apartment 

complex. A detective later testified the DNA samples analyzed from the lemonade bottle 

and Buchanan, in layman's terms, provided "strong support for Ronald Buchanan being 

the source of that DNA" found on the bottle. The lab report analyzing the DNA swabs 

showed: "Assuming a single male source, it is 394 million times more likely to see this 

partial DNA profile if Ronald Buchanan is the source than if an unknown individual is 

the source."

Detectives also testified they determined Buchanan's cell phone movements using 

his cell phone records. The detectives determined Buchanan's cell phone traveled from 

Missouri into Johnson County, Kansas, near the apartment complex, at about 3:33 a.m. 

on May 14, 2018, the morning of the fire. Buchanan's cell phone crossed back into 

Missouri at approximate 3:55 a.m. the same morning. Detectives were also able to use 

traffic cameras and located a car matching the description of Buchanan's traveling near 

the apartment complex at that time frame, and leaving 10 minutes later.

In July 2018, the State charged Buchanan with 10 counts of aggravated arson and 

one count of cruelty to animals. The State later amended the complaint to include 
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alternative counts of attempted first-degree murder of Maraya, her mother, and K.J. The 

case proceeded to a three-day trial in January 2020. Buchanan testified and denied 

starting the fire. Throughout his testimony, Buchanan explained the State's evidence 

against him. For example, Buchanan did not dispute his DNA was on the lemonade 

bottle, but claimed he used the bottle and the acetone within it to remove excess paint off 

a bicycle he was working on at the apartment complex.

Ultimately, the jury convicted Buchanan of three counts of attempted first-degree 

murder, six counts of aggravated arson, and one count of cruelty to animals. Two days 

before sentencing, Buchanan filed a pro se motion for new trial alleging, among other 

things, ineffective assistance of counsel. Buchanan's defense counsel filed a motion for

new trial the next day that did not contain any argument but stated the motion was filed

"pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3501 . . . ."

The district court addressed both motions at the sentencing hearing. Relevant to 

this appeal, the district court refused to consider Buchanan's pro se motion because 

Buchanan was represented by counsel and Buchanan did not have a right to "hybrid 

representation." The district court did, however, consider the motion filed by counsel. 

Even so, the district court denied the motion because it did not provide a reason to grant a 

new trial.

The district court sentenced Buchanan to 272 months' imprisonment on the first 

attempted murder count, and 155 months' imprisonment for each of the two remaining 

attempted murder counts—each to run concurrent to the first count. The district court 

sentenced Buchanan to 59 months' imprisonment for each of the 6 aggravated arson 

counts and 1 year imprisonment on the cruelty to animals conviction. In total, the district 

court sentenced Buchanan to a controlling sentence of 331 months' imprisonment.

Buchanan appeals.
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BUCHANAN'S CONVICTIONS WERE NOT MULTIPLICITOUS

In this appeal, Buchanan first contends his six aggravated arson convictions are 

multiplicitous because they were based on singular conduct—the setting of a single fire. 

Multiplicity is the charging of a single offense in several counts. State v. Weber, 297 Kan. 

805, 808, 304 P.3d 1262, 1266 (2013). A multiplicitous conviction violates the Double 

Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 

10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights because it establishes multiple punishments 

for a single crime and thus violates a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial. Weber, 

297 Kan. at 808; State v. Gomez, 36 Kan. App. 2d 664, 668, 143 P.3d 92 (2006).

Although Buchanan admits he did not raise this issue before the district court, our 

Kansas Supreme Court has considered multiplicity challenges for the first time on appeal 

to serve the ends of justice or prevent a denial of fundamental rights. Weber, 297 Kan. at 

809; State v. Colston, 290 Kan. 952, 971, 235 P.3d 1234 (2010), overruled on other 

grounds by State v. Dunn, 304 Kan. 773, 375 P.3d 332 (2016). Other panels of this court 

have likewise addressed a multiplicity claim under the same exception. See State v. 

Moore, No. 116,275, 2017 WL 5016039, at *8 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion); 

State v. Brooks, No. 113,636, 2017 WL 839793, at *5 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished 

opinion). Despite the State's assertion to the contrary, it has not presented an argument 

that overcomes addressing the issue under this exception. The State simply states the 

record could benefit from more facts without providing an argument on why the new 

facts are necessary for the analysis. We find additional facts are unnecessary and reach 

the issue as our Supreme Court did in Weber and Colston.

Appellate courts exercise unlimited review over questions of law involving 

multiplicity and statutory interpretation. State v. Harris, 284 Kan. 560, Syl. ¶ 3, 162 P.3d 

28 (2007); State v. Fisher, 283 Kan. 272, 312, 154 P.3d 455 (2007); State v. Bryan, 281 

Kan. 157, 159, 130 P.3d 85 (2006).
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The Kansas Supreme Court has outlined the analytical framework for determining 

whether multiple convictions subject a defendant to double jeopardy by imposing 

cumulative punishments in one case. "[T]he overarching inquiry is whether the 

convictions are for the same offense." State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 496, 133 P.3d 

48 (2006). This review is broken into two components, both of which must be met to find 

a double jeopardy violation. First, the court must ask whether the convictions arise from 

the same—or unitary—conduct. If not, there is no multiplicity concern. But if there is 

unitary conduct, the court then examines whether the conduct, by statutory definition, 

constitutes one offense or two. Weber, 297 Kan. at 809; Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 496.

To first determine whether the convictions arise from the same conduct, the 

Schoonover court provided some factors to consider:

"(1) whether the acts occur at or near the same time; (2) whether the acts occur at the 

same location; (3) whether there is a causal relationship between the acts, in particular 

whether there was an intervening event; and (4) whether there is a fresh impulse 

motivating some of the conduct." 281 Kan. at 497.

The State concedes, and Buchanan similarly argues, that his aggravated arson 

convictions arise from the unitary conduct involving the ignition of a single fire in the 

stairwell of the apartment complex. This conclusion is supported by the record, which 

shows the lead fire investigator testified that the fire originated on the complex's 

southeast exterior stairway landing leading directly to Maraya's apartment unit, and the 

fire was intentionally set in that location. Having met the first component of the analysis, 

we must determine whether the statutory provision provides for two offenses or only one. 

281 Kan. at 496.

When a double jeopardy issue arises from convictions for multiple violations of a 

single statute, as happened here, appellate courts apply the "'unit of prosecution'" test. 281 
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Kan. at 497. In a unit of prosecution case, the court asks how the Legislature has defined 

the scope of conduct composing one violation of a statute. Under this test, the statutory 

definition of the crime determines what the Legislature intended as the allowable unit of 

prosecution. There can be only one conviction for each unit of prosecution. 281 Kan. at 

497-98. "The determination of the appropriate unit of prosecution is not necessarily 

dependent upon whether there is a single physical action or a single victim. Rather, the 

key is the nature of the conduct proscribed." 281 Kan. at 472.

Interpretation of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5812

A jury convicted Buchanan under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5812(b)(1), which 

defines aggravated arson as "arson, as defined in subsection (a): (1) Committed upon a 

building or property in which there is a human being." Arson, under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 

21-5812(a)(1)(A), is defined as: "Knowingly, by means of fire or explosive damaging 

any building or property which: (A) Is a dwelling in which another person has any 

interest without the consent of such person."

The statute for arson and aggravated arson is contained within Article 58, "Crimes 

Involving Property," of the Kansas Criminal Code. See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5812. 

Although Article 58 does not define the terms used in the arson statute, the Legislature 

did provide definitions in the Kansas Criminal Code which "shall apply when the words 

and phrases defined are used in this code . . . ." K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5111. An appellate 

court must consider various provisions of an act in pari materia with a view of 

reconciling and bringing the provisions into workable harmony if possible. See State v. 

Keel, 302 Kan. 560, 573-74, 357 P.3d 251 (2015).

The Kansas Criminal Code defines "[d]welling" as "a building or portion thereof, 

a tent, a vehicle or other enclosed space which is used or intended for use as a human 

habitation, home or residence." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5111(k).
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"Property" is defined as "anything of value, tangible or intangible, real or personal."

K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5111(w).

As noted, the applicable subsection of the arson statute requires the damaging of 

"any building or property" which "[i]s a dwelling in which another person has any interest 

without the consent" of another person. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-

5812(a)(1)(A). Using the definitions provided in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5111 an 

apartment unit within a larger building must be considered a "[d]welling" under the arson 

statute because an apartment is "a building or portion thereof," or at a minimum, an 

apartment is an "enclosed space which is used or intended for use as a human habitation, 

home or residence." K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5111(k).

To meet the applicable definition of arson here, the fire must have also damaged a 

dwelling "in which another person has any interest without the consent of such other 

person." K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5812(a)(1)(A). An apartment tenant holds an interest in 

their leased property to the exclusion of others. K.S.A. 58-2543(o). Consequently, an

apartment is a dwelling under the Kansas Criminal Code's definitions. As noted, the 

definition of property includes real property. And the code defines "'[r]eal property'" as 

"every estate, interest, and right in lands, tenements and hereditaments." K.S.A. 2017 

Supp. 21-5111(bb).

Thus, the plain language of the arson statute, when considered with definitions 

outlined in the Kansas Criminal Code, shows that the Legislature intended for the 

definition of arson to encompass an apartment within a larger building. And, the plain 

language of the aggravated arson statute in question—K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-

5812(b)(1)—is simple. Aggravated arson is arson committed upon a building or property 

in which there is a human being. If the plain language of the statute solely used the term 

"building," then Buchanan's interpretation would hold more weight. But the plain 
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language also employs the term "property," which as explained above, includes an 

apartment located within a larger building complex.

Consider the same situation—a single fire damaging multiple occupied

residences—outside the context of an apartment building. If the unitary conduct of 

igniting a single fire was committed upon one occupied home and the same fire spread to 

another occupied home, the distinction is more obvious, yet the result is the same under 

the statute. While the conduct was still unitary, arson was committed upon a "building or 

property in which there is a human being" with the first home, together with the second 

home that was also "a building or property in which there is a human being." K.S.A. 2017 

Supp. 21-5812(b)(1).

Although this court has not previously addressed multiplicity in the context of the 

Kansas arson statutes, it has addressed multiplicity in multiple other criminal statutes, 

including aggravated robbery. In the appellate court's interpretation of the aggravated 

robbery statute, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5420, the multiplicity analysis hinged on the 

presence of victims at the time of the robbery. See State v. Dale, 312 Kan. 174, Syl. ¶ 2, 

474 P.3d 291 (2020) (holding that despite the defendants' aggravated robbery convictions 

arising from one transaction that constituted unitary conduct, the convictions were not 

multiplicitous because the unitary conduct involved two victims, each of whom had a 

claim to the control and possession of their property that the defendant stole from them at 

gunpoint). But here, whether multiple convictions for aggravated arsons are 

multiplicitous turns on the arson being committed upon a property in which there is a 

human being. Unlike the aggravated robbery statute (delineated a "person crime" by the 

Legislature [K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5420(c)(2)]), the number of persons present at the 

time of the arson (a crime against property) does not necessarily control the unit of 

prosecution and is not our focus under these facts. If this were the unit of prosecution, the 

State could have charged Buchanan with a count of aggravated arson for each person that 

was present when the arson was committed.
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Instead, the unit of prosecution should be determined by the "nature of the conduct 

proscribed," which includes arson being committed upon a single property in which there 

was a human being. Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 472. The aggravated arson charge regarding 

the apartment in which Maraya, her mother and K.J. lived was in the alternative to the 

attempted murder charges, so the jury convicted on the attempted murder of the three

occupants rather than the arson on that apartment. But six other apartment units in the 

building in which Maraya lived—each its own dwelling—were occupied at the time of 

Buchanan's alleged arson, so Buchanan's six convictions for aggravated arson were not 

multiplicitous.

THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT

BUCHANAN'S CONVICTIONS FOR ATTEMPTED FIRST-DEGREE MURDER

Next, Buchanan contends the State presented insufficient evidence of his intent to 

kill Maraya, her mother, and K.J. He does not challenge the State's evidence as 

insufficient to support any of the remaining elements of the crime.

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, appellate 

courts "'review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a 

rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'"

State v. Aguirre, 313 Kan. 189, 209, 485 P.3d 576 (2021). "This is a high burden, and 

only when the testimony is so incredible that no reasonable fact-finder could find guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt should we reverse a guilty verdict." State v. Meggerson, 312 

Kan. 238, 247, 474 P.3d 761 (2020).

For the evidence below to have been sufficient, "there must be evidence 

supporting each element of a crime." State v. Kettler, 299 Kan. 448, 471, 325 P.3d 1075 

(2014). Buchanan argues there was insufficient evidence to prove the intent element of 

the attempted first-degree murder convictions.
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A jury convicted Buchanan of three counts of attempted first-degree murder under 

K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5402(a)(1) and K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5301(a). Under K.S.A. 2017 

Supp. 21-5402(a)(1), first-degree murder is defined as "the killing of a human being 

committed: . . . [i]ntentionally, and with premeditation." And under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 

21-5301(a): "An attempt is any overt act toward the perpetration of a crime done by a 

person who intends to commit such crime but fails in the perpetration thereof or is 

prevented or intercepted in executing such crime."

To prove attempted first-degree murder, the State had to show Buchanan (1) 

attempted to commit an intentional, premeditated murder of a human being; (2) took an 

overt act toward perpetrating that murder; and (3) failed to complete the crime. State v. 

Wilson, 30 Kan. App. 2d 498, 499-500, 43 P.3d 851 (2002). Buchanan claims there was 

insufficient evidence to convict him of this offense, arguing neither direct proof nor 

circumstantial evidence of his intent to kill exists to sustain this element of his 

convictions.

Buchanan contends the State did not prove he intended to kill any of the three 

victims because if he had set the fire, "he would have had no way of knowing that anyone 

was home at the time." To support his argument, Buchanan argues Mother had "moved 

her car before the fire so as to appear not home" and as such, "[h]e could not have had the 

intent to kill the occupants by setting fire to an empty apartment." This is Buchanan's sole 

argument challenging the sufficiency of the State's evidence.

But appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or 

pass on the credibility of witnesses. Aguirre, 313 Kan. at 209. This rule is particularly 

relevant to Buchanan's claim because an attempt crime requires specific intent to commit 

the attempted crime. See State v. Robinson, 256 Kan. 133, 137, 883 P.2d 764 (1994). And 

"[s]pecific intent is a question of fact for the jury which may be established by acts, 
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circumstances, and inferences and need not be shown by direct proof." State v. Mitchell, 

262 Kan. 434, 437, 939 P.2d 879 (1997).

In this vein, Buchanan's attempt to argue the evidence was insufficient to prove 

intent is the precise argument he made to the district court. During his testimony, 

Buchanan stated he was unaware Mother had moved her car to avoid him the night of the 

fire, until he heard the testimony at trial. During closing arguments, Buchanan's defense 

counsel argued that because Mother moved her car, it "would suggest that even if Mr. 

Buchanan had come by, he would have assumed they weren't even home." His defense 

counsel added, "She intentionally hid the car so that it would appear that no one would be 

home and there is no reason that the State has shown that Mr. Buchanan would have even 

known they were at home."

Despite Buchanan's attempt to point out conflicting evidence, the jury was not 

persuaded. And while the absence of Mother's car from the apartment's parking lot may 

be one piece of evidence that could weigh in Buchanan's favor, his argument ignores this 

court's rule against reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in the evidence, or passing 

on the credibility of witnesses. Aguirre, 313 Kan. at 209. Buchanan's argument also 

ignores the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, that supports 

the finding that a rational fact-finder could have found Buchanan guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See Aguirre, 313 Kan. at 209.

Jurors heard testimony from many witnesses during Buchanan's three-day trial and 

the State presented circumstantial evidence to establish Buchanan intentionally set the 

fire with the intent to kill his daughter and her two family members. To support the 

convictions, the State presented evidence that Buchanan intentionally set the fire in the 

stairwell landing directly in front of the apartment door. This stairwell was the only 

means of exit for Maraya and her family, and Buchanan was aware this was the only exit 

because he once lived in the apartment with the family.
15

The State also presented evidence that the fire was set around 4 a.m., when 

families and individuals within the apartment complex were asleep. To that end, the State 

presented testimony from at least one individual who lived in each apartment unit that 

had occupants. They all testified their families were asleep when the fire started around 4 

a.m. Additionally, each member of Maraya's family was asleep when they awoke to 

discover fire engulfing their only means of escape.

Additionally, the State presented Buchanan's Facebook posts to argue he had

intended to set the fire and kill his daughter, her mother, and younger brother because he 

was angry and showed a lack of remorse. At 11 p.m. the night before the fire, Buchanan 

posted he felt hurt and disrespected by Maraya and her mother at the graduation 

ceremony. A couple of hours after the fire was set Buchanan posted about the fire and 

stated he had "compassion" for the family, but the family had no support from him and it 

would "be a lie if I said I cared." Buchanan's text message to his daughter's friend, Snype,

similarly stated he did not care about the losses Maraya and her mother had suffered 

because of the fire.

When viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational 

fact-finder could have found Buchanan guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Aguirre, 313 

Kan. at 209. While the evidence may be circumstantial, a verdict may be supported by 

circumstantial evidence if such evidence provides a basis for a reasonable inference by 

the fact-finder about the fact in issue. And to be sufficient, circumstantial evidence need 

not exclude every other reasonable conclusion. State v. Colson, 312 Kan. 739, 750, 480 

P.3d 167 (2021). As a result, we find the State presented sufficient evidence to prove 

intent and affirm Buchanan's attempted first-degree murder convictions.
16

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT VIOLATE

BUCHANAN'S RIGHT TO CONFLICT-FREE COUNSEL

In his third issue on appeal, Buchanan argues the district court violated his right to 

effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights because it did not 

appoint conflict-free counsel to litigate his pro se motion for a new trial. The State argues 

that although the district court dismissed Buchanan's motion without inquiry, the court 

did not err because it had dispensed of Buchanan's complaints against his trial counsel

after sufficient inquiry before trial.

As the State extensively details, Buchanan repeatedly lodged complaints against 

his court-appointed counsel while filing many pro se motions. Within a few weeks of 

being appointed his first counsel, Buchanan requested that the attorney be removed. The 

district court addressed the motion during a hearing and informed Buchanan that his 

counsel may make strategic decisions that he does not agree with. Ultimately, however, 

the district court found the relationship was sufficiently strained and appointed another 

attorney.

The district court appointed Buchanan a second attorney, but he continued to file 

numerous pro se motions. A couple of weeks after the majority of Buchanan's pro se 

motions were filed, Buchanan's second appointed attorney requested to withdraw as 

counsel after Buchanan apparently lodged a disciplinary complaint against him. It seems

the disciplinary complaint was summarily denied, but in any event, during a hearing on 

the motion, the district court allowed the second appointed counsel to withdraw and 

appointed a third court-appointed attorney.

At a pretrial conference held less than a week before his trial, while appearing 

with his third court-appointed attorney, Buchanan immediately interjected and stated he 
17

was not ready for trial. Buchanan claimed his defense counsel did not secure a fire expert 

or a phone technology expert, and counsel did not complete the DNA analysis that 

Buchanan requested. The district court inquired into Buchanan's complaints and defense 

counsel explained those decisions were strategic. Buchanan's defense counsel stated that 

"through conversations [he] had [with a fire reconstruction expert], . . . with the building 

not currently there, they can do very little or nothing related to testifying on how the fire 

started or it did not start." Defense counsel explained:

"I did look into getting a fire expert. I spoke to someone who does that. They said they 

would need to see the building or the reports of any chemicals that were found. They did 

not find any chemicals on here. I believe the State's theory is that acetone completely 

burns and doesn't have it. So that—but they can't look at a scene that doesn't exist and 

determine it was or was not an arson."

As for Buchanan's request to pursue a DNA expert, defense counsel explained that 

two DNA examinations confirmed the presence of Buchanan's DNA on the lemonade 

bottle found at the scene. Buchanan did not deny his DNA was on the bottle, but he told 

his defense counsel that he did not trust the people who conducted the DNA 

examinations. Defense counsel explained, "[Buchanan] gave me an explanation on why 

his DNA would have been on there so he's not arguing that it is incorrect that he didn't 

touch it. He's just saying he just doesn't trust those people. . . so I told him we weren't 

getting an expert on that." Buchanan stated he wanted a DNA expert to make a chain of 

custody argument. In response, defense counsel stated that he told Buchanan he planned 

to make this argument without another DNA analysis.

Defense counsel also addressed Buchanan's request for a cell phone technology 

expert and stated he did not need such expert under the circumstances. Defense counsel 

said, "[T]here is no issue there related to what the phone is or isn't. I have the phone 

records. I know how to look at the phone records on what they determined . . . there."

Defense counsel advised the district court that he could "attempt to get someone that 
18

might dispute what I understand about phones, and, I agree, I'm not an expert related to 

cell phones and what [Buchanan] believes could happen to explain this cell phone—why 

his cell phone was pinging off this tower when he was not there." But he could not have 

an expert prepared by the start of trial the following week.

The district court told Buchanan that if he wanted a continuance to obtain a phone 

expert, he should expect a long continuance. Buchanan responded by stating he "might as 

well get new counsel also" because he was "just not confident in proceeding to trial with 

[defense counsel]." To this, the district judge stated that he did not think any attorney 

would satisfy Buchanan's requirements because Buchanan was not listening to his 

attorney, and said, "It sounds to me like [defense counsel] has run down all of these 

issues that you have raised, but he's not giving you the answer that you want to hear."

After informing Buchanan that it may be a year before another appointed attorney 

could be prepared for trial, Buchanan and his defense counsel spoke privately. After a 

recess, Buchanan and his counsel returned and stated they were ready to proceed to trial 

as scheduled the following week. Defense counsel stated that he explained his decisions 

not to secure a fire or cell phone expert to Buchanan and Buchanan understood "those 

experts would not help or hurt us in any way and change anything." The district court 

inquired into whether they discussed Buchanan's request for a new counsel and Buchanan 

"apologize[d] to the Court and [his] counsel", stating he was "a little frustrated and . . . 

kind of reacted over that." The district court concluded the inquiry by stating it "just 

want[ed] to make sure we get these issues out here on the table and we resolve them all."

The district court held a jury trial the next week, and on January 15, 2020, the jury 

convicted Buchanan on all counts. He filed a pro se motion for new trial nearly two 

months later, on March 10, 2020. Under the statement of facts section, Buchanan lodged 

many allegations against his defense counsel. Along with the same complaints about

securing experts, Buchannan alleged his defense counsel failed to list alibi witnesses and 
19

failed to obtain a private investigator at the State's expense to track alibi witnesses. He 

also alleged his defense counsel "withheld scientific production regarding fire [debris] 

results" and refused "to file or argue any motions on the behalf of the defense, forcing 

[him] to file motions pro-se."

Buchanan also stated he "contacted the honorable judge by mail with [an]

articulated statement of attorney dissatisfaction outlining reasons" and confirmed he 

stated his dissatisfaction with his attorney at the pretrial hearing where he asked the 

district court "to remove counsel and to reschedule [the] trial date." Buchanan added: 

"This should of [sic] trigger[ed] the district judge to inquire into potential conflict of 

interest, complete breakdown of communication between counsel and defendant."

Defense counsel also filed a motion for new trial one day after the pro se motion, 

stating only that Buchanan was moving for a new trial "pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3501 . . . ."

The district judge addressed the motions for new trial at the sentencing hearing the next 

day, and refused to hear Buchanan's pro se motion:

"All right. Now, . . . I just want to take up some things because Mr. Buchanan has 

filed his own pleadings in this case, and I think we've talked about this, Mr. Buchanan. 

You can represent yourself. You can have counsel represent you but you can't have both. 

You can't have what is called a hybrid representation. So I've read your motions, and 

some of it is included in what [defense counsel] has filed on your behalf, but because 

you're represented by counsel, I'm not going to hear your motions that you filed that we 

would call pro se or you filed on your own."

The district court then denied the motion filed by Buchanan's counsel, stating, 

"[T]he issues raised in the motion for new trial do not constitute a reason for the Court as 

a matter of law to grant a new trial."
20

Preservation

Buchanan concedes that he is raising this argument for the first time on appeal. As 

a general rule, constitutional violations cannot be newly raised on appeal. State v. 

Godfrey, 301 Kan. 1041, 1043, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015). That said, appellate courts may 

consider newly raised constitutional issues if the party making the claim shows the issue 

meets one of the following recognized exceptions:

"'"[T]he newly asserted claim involves only a question of law arising on proved or 

admitted facts and is finally determinative of the case; (2) the claim's consideration is 

necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights; or (3) 

the district court's judgment may be upheld on appeal despite its reliance on the wrong 

ground or reason for its decision."'" State v. Allen, 314 Kan. 280, 283, 497 P.3d 566 

(2021) (quoting State v. Harris, 311 Kan. 371, 375, 461 P.3d 48 (2020)]).

The right to counsel is a fundamental right. State v. Loggins, 40 Kan. App. 2d 585, 

595, 194 P.3d 31 (2008). Moreover, deciding the merits of Buchanan's claim does not 

require this court to make factual findings. As a result, in our discretion we review

Buchanan's Sixth Amendment claim although he makes it for the first time on appeal.

Buchanan's motions for new trial were untimely and the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in summarily denying relief.

When a criminal defendant files a timely pro se posttrial motion for new trial, this 

becomes a critical stage of the proceedings during which the defendant is entitled to the 

representation of counsel, which includes the correlative right of conflict-free counsel. 

State v. Sharkey, 299 Kan. 87, 95-96, 322 P.3d 325 (2014) (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 

U.S. 261, 271, 101 S. Ct. 1097, 67 L. Ed. 2d 220 [1981]). A district court has a duty to 

determine whether the pro se motion raises a potential conflict of interest between the 

defendant and counsel. If a potential conflict is apparent, the court has a duty to make a 

full inquiry into the allegations to determine whether they warrant the appointment of a 
21

new attorney. If the district court fails to make an adequate inquiry into the potential 

conflict, prejudice will be presumed. Sharkey, 299 Kan. at 96-101.

Buchanan relies on Sharkey to argue the district court constructively denied his 

right to counsel by failing to appoint conflict-free counsel to litigate the ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim lodged in his pro se motion for new trial. But the defendant in 

Sharkey timely filed his motions. Buchanan did not—he filed his motion nearly two 

months later. See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3501 (requiring a motion for new trial not based 

on newly discovered evidence to be made within 14 days after the verdict).

Our Supreme Court distinguishes timely and untimely motions for a new trial. See 

Sharkey, 299 Kan. at 94-95; State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761, 766-67, 851 P.2d 370 

(1993). A timely motion for a new trial is considered a critical stage of the criminal 

proceeding, while an untimely one is not. Because an untimely pre-appeal motion for a 

new trial is considered a collateral proceeding, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 

does not apply, and the right to counsel is determined instead by statute. See Sharkey, 299 

Kan. at 95-96 (citing Kingsley, 252 Kan. at 766-67).

The district court had to consider Buchanan's untimely pro se motion as a 

postconviction, collateral proceeding and apply K.S.A. 22-4506, governing entitlement to 

counsel of persons in custody after felony convictions, to determine whether he was 

entitled to appointment of substitute counsel. The Sharkey court explained district courts 

may summarily deny untimely, postconviction collateral attacks without appointing 

counsel. "In such a case, a trial judge 'may determine that the motion, files, and records of 

the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, in which case [the 

judge may] summarily deny the motion without appointing counsel.'" 299 Kan. at 95

(quoting Albright v. State, 292 Kan. 193, 196, 251 P.3d 52 [2011]). It is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court to determine whether the motion presents "substantial 

questions of law justifying the appointment of counsel." Sharkey, 299 Kan. at 95.
22

"'Judicial discretion is abused if the judicial action is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or 

unreasonable, i.e., no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court; 

(2) based on an error of law, i.e., the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal 

conclusion; or (3) based on an error of fact, i.e., substantial competent evidence does not 

support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of 

discretion is based. . . . The defendant bears the burden of showing the court abused its 

discretion.' [Citation omitted.]" State v. McDaniel, 306 Kan. 595, 606, 395 P.3d 429 

(2017).

Buchanan's argument on appeal seems to assume his constitutional right to 

conflict-free counsel was extended to his pro se motion for new trial. Buchanan does not 

acknowledge his motion was untimely or consider whether the district court abused its 

discretion under K.S.A. 22-4506. Instead, he narrowly focuses on whether the district 

court erred by failing to appoint counsel to argue his pro se motion for a new trial 

because the district court did not inquire into his complaints lodged against his trial 

counsel. But this argument ignores the procedural posture of this issue—the summary 

denial of Buchanan's untimely motion.

A review of the district court's decision leads us to conclude the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in summarily denying either motion, so it did not abuse its 

discretion when it did not appoint conflict-free counsel to represent Buchanan in his 

complaints against his trial counsel. Our Supreme Court has reviewed a comparable

situation in Kingsley. 252 Kan. at 765-67.

In Kingsley, although defense counsel timely moved for a new trial, Kingsley filed 

an untimely pro se motion mostly alleging grievances against trial counsel. The district 

court heard an argument from defense counsel on his motion for new trial, but the 

defendant represented himself on his pro se motion that alleged complaints against his 

still-appointed trial counsel. On appeal, the defendant contended it was his "trial counsel's 
23

duty to request permission to withdraw because his success on the motion would have 

been her downfall." 252 Kan. at 765-66.

Ultimately, the Kingsley court agreed with the State's argument that Kingsley was 

not entitled to the appointment of counsel on his untimely pro se motion that alleged 

complaints against his trial counsel "because there were no 'substantial issues' raised."

252 Kan. at 766. The court reasoned Kingsley "did not have an absolute right to 

appointment of counsel other than trial counsel to represent him on his pro se motion," in 

part because his motion was untimely and did not contain a "'realistic basis'" for a new 

trial. 252 Kan. at 767.

"[K.S.A. 22-4506] provides in pertinent part: '(b) If the court finds that the 

petition or motion presents substantial questions of law . . . the court shall appoint 

counsel . . . to assist such person.'" Kingsley, 252 Kan. at 766. If it appears the motion 

may have some merit, "'then the trial court in the exercise of its discretion should set the 

matter for hearing and appoint counsel to represent the defendant.'" 252 Kan. at 767. See 

State v. Buckland, 245 Kan. 132, 142, 777 P.2d 745 (1989).

Here, the district court neither acknowledged the motions were untimely, nor 

stated it was summarily denying Buchanan's pro se motion without appointing substitute 

counsel under K.S.A. 22-4506. Even so, it did deny the motions because "the issues 

raised in the motion for new trial do not constitute a reason for the Court as a matter of 

law to grant a new trial." Summary denial of the untimely posttrial motions for new trial 

was proper because Buchanan did not present a substantial question of law that justified 

the appointment of substitute counsel to argue his pro se motion. See Sharkey, 299 Kan. 

at 95.

During the pretrial conference, the district court addressed and resolved most of 

the complaints against trial counsel that Buchanan lodged in his pro se motion. To this 
24

extent, the district court met its burden of inquiring into the alleged conflict between 

Buchanan and his trial counsel. See Sharkey, 299 Kan. at 96 (holding that trial court has a 

duty to make full inquiry into potential conflict allegations to determine whether they 

warrant appointment of a new counsel). And, although Buchanan's pro se motion 

included new complaints against his trial counsel, which he labeled as facts, he provided 

no evidentiary support for the conclusory claims. Likewise, no support is evident from 

the record.

Buchanan's remaining claims in his pro se motion about prosecutorial misconduct 

and jury instructions similarly did not present a substantial question of law that warranted 

a new trial or justified the appointment of substitute counsel. Much of Buchanan's pro se 

motion presents conclusory claims without supporting authority and which rely on factual 

allegations made without support from the record.

For example, Buchanan claims the prosecutor "withheld witness from defense 

until the first day of trial" which violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. But Buchanan did not specify which witness was allegedly withheld until 

the first day of trial. He simply states it happened and alleges he was denied his due 

process rights. Buchanan's remaining prosecutorial misconduct claims were similarly 

unsupported by the record or the law.

Buchanan also claimed jury instruction errors in his pro se motion. He argued that 

he requested "pattern instruction from the honorable judge in letter and attorney, [but he] 

hasn't received the instruction." He claimed the pattern instruction did not properly 

instruct the jury on the definition of "'overt act'" for attempt crimes and requested a 

reversal because the "jury may have been misled into believing that mere preparations 

constitutes [sic] an overt act." Buchanan relies on State v. Calvin, 279 Kan. 193, 105 P.3d 

710 (2005), to make his argument, but he mischaracterizes the holding. The Calvin court 

held: "While the better practice would have been to include the definition of 'overt act' as 
25

provided in the pattern instruction, this error was harmless as the instruction properly and 

fairly stated the law as applied to the facts of this case." 279 Kan. at 204. The same is true 

for Buchanan's jury instruction, which stated: "An overt act necessarily must extend 

beyond mere preparations made by the accused . . . ." Buchanan's claim that the 

instruction may have misled the jury into believing that mere preparations constitute an 

overt act is not supported by the actual jury instruction given that says it "necessarily 

must extend beyond mere preparations made."

In sum, Buchanan's claim was denied because his pro se motions did not present a 

claim that shows he would have a right to relief, and the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in determining that the motions did not present substantial questions of law 

justifying the appointment of conflict-free counsel under Sharkey. 299 Kan. at 95.

BUCHANAN'S PRO SE SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUES

The State presented sufficient evidence to support Buchanan's convictions.

Buchanan filed a pro se supplemental appellate brief raising multiple issues on top 

of those raised by his counsel. In his first supplemental issue, Buchanan makes several 

challenges to the sufficiency of the State's evidence. First, he repeats an issue addressed 

by his counsel, contending the State presented insufficient evidence to show Buchanan

intended to kill his daughter, her brother, and their mother. As discussed above, a rational 

fact-finder could have found Buchanan guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the 

evidence presented at trial. Aguirre, 313 Kan. at 209.

Second, Buchanan argues the district court erred by admitting the testimony of the 

State's fire investigator, Bob Eddy. Buchanan claims Eddy failed to follow the Guidelines 

of the National Fire Protection Association. As a result, he contends the evidence was 

"scientifically unreliable and inadmissible absent confirmation through lab testing."
26

Buchanan also briefly argues the trial court erred in admitting the opinion testimony of 

the State's KBI forensic scientist, Somiyeh Zalekian.

Buchanan's claims challenging the admissibility of evidence are not sufficiency of 

the evidence challenges, despite his framing of the issue. And, as the State argues, 

Buchanan did not preserve these claims for appellate review because he did not make a 

specific and timely objection to the admission of this evidence at trial.

"'The contemporaneous objection rule requires each party to make a specific and 

timely objection at trial in order to preserve evidentiary issues for appeal. K.S.A. 60-404. 

The purpose of the rule is to avoid the use of tainted evidence and thereby avoid possible 

reversal and a new trial.'" State v. Brown, 307 Kan. 641, 645, 413 P.3d 783 (2018)

(quoting State v. Dukes, 290 Kan. 485, 488, 231 P.3d 558 [2010]). And our Supreme 

Court has refused to apply the three recognized exceptions for appellate review of issues 

not raised below to absolve a party of K.S.A. 60-404 violations. Brown, 307 Kan. at 645. 

See Dukes, 290 Kan. at 488 (identifying the exceptions and "expressing concern that the 

contemporaneous objection rule 'case law exceptions would soon swallow the general 

statutory rule'"). As a result, Buchanan's issue challenging the admission of the State's 

evidence is not preserved for appellate review.

Prosecutorial error or misconduct claims were not preserved.

In his second issue on appeal, Buchanan makes several challenges that he frames 

as prosecutorial error or misconduct. As a threshold issue, we decline to consider his

argument that the State "used expert witnesses to misrepresent material facts to the court 

and the jury to convict [him]" because Buchanan did not preserve this admissibility 

challenge under the contemporaneous objection rule. See K.S.A. 60-404; Brown, 307 

Kan. at 645.
27

Similarly, Buchanan also did not preserve his claim that the State removed 

confidential trial strategy notes from him while he was on the stand. Appellate courts will

review claims of prosecutorial error based on comments made during voir dire, opening 

statement, or closing argument without a timely objection. State v. Bodine, 313 Kan. 378, 

406, 486 P.3d 551 (2021). But Buchanan must have lodged a contemporaneous objection 

to all evidentiary claims to preserve the issue of prosecutorial error on appellate review. 

State v. Lowery, 308 Kan. 1183, 1195-96, 427 P.3d 865 (2018). This alleged error

occurred while Buchanan was testifying and an objection was required to preserve this 

issue for appellate review. Buchanan made no such objection.

But even if he had made the objection, Buchanan does not designate a record to 

support his claim. As the party claiming an error occurred, Buchanan has the burden of 

designating a record that affirmatively shows prejudicial error. Without such a record, an 

appellate court presumes the district court's action was proper. Meggerson, 312 Kan. at 

249. And the record shows that while the State did seek to confirm the document 

Buchanan was holding during his testimony was an admitted exhibit, none of the actions 

were error. Once the State confirmed the identity of the document, the document was 

returned to Buchanan and questioning continued. This was also not a legal error because 

Kansas courts have "long recognized the principle that generally the opposing party or his 

counsel has the right to inspect papers used by a witness for the purpose of refreshing his 

memory upon matters as to which he is testifying." State v. Mans, 213 Kan. 36, 39, 515 

P.2d 810 (1973).

Buchanan shows no error in defining reasonable doubt for the jury.

Buchanan appears to have preserved his remaining pro se arguments. He begins by 

arguing the State and the district court erred by failing to provide a "more defined 

definition of [r]easonable doubt" upon the jury's question seeking a definition of 

reasonable doubt. But as the State argues, the district court and both parties agreed that 
28

defining reasonable doubt was improper. This conclusion is supported by Kansas case

law, which has "long held that 'a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt is 

unnecessary . . . .'" State v. Garcia-Garcia, 309 Kan. 801, 816, 441 P.3d 52 (2019)

(quoting State v. Banks, 260 Kan. 918, 927, 927 P.2d 456 [1996]). In State v. Wilson, 281 

Kan. 277, 287, 130 P.3d 48 (2006), our Supreme Court reiterated the courts holding that

"'"no definition or explanation can make any clearer what is meant by the phrase 

'reasonable doubt' than that which is imparted by the words themselves."' [Citations 

omitted.]" As such, Buchanan has not shown the district court or the State committed an 

error in refusing to further define reasonable doubt upon the jury's request.

Buchanan did not show the State withheld DNA evidence.

Next, Buchanan claims the prosecutor "withheld necessary and required 

exculpatory D.N.A. evidence" when the State offered the glass lemonade bottle into 

evidence. Buchanan claims the bottle revealed three DNA profiles, but Buchanan's DNA 

"was the only D.N.A. the State chose to single out." He also alleges the State chose to 

leave the remaining DNA profiles unidentified, claiming this was "selective prosecution."

The State presented evidence that the DNA recovered the from the mouth of the 

lemonade bottle was a mixture of three individuals. Bethany Stone, a forensic scientist 

with the DNA section of the Johnson County Crime Lab, testified the mixture contained 

the presence of male DNA. She testified, "And assuming that there are three contributors 

to this mixture, it was 88.1 trillion times more likely to see that DNA mixture if Ronald 

Buchanan and two unknown individuals are the contributors than if three unknown 

individuals are the contributors." Stone put it more simply, "The evidence is it's strong 

support for Ronald Buchanan being one of the contributors to the mixture."

On cross-examination, Buchanan's defense counsel questioned Stone on the 

presence of the two remaining DNA profiles. Stone conceded that "there are a number of 
29

things that can leave DNA," and stated there was a potential that "three people had either 

touched [the bottle] or drank out of it." Stone also conceded that she could not say how 

long the DNA had been on the lemonade bottle.

The State also presented evidence of a DNA profile taken from a swab from a 

different portion of the bottle. Stone testified this DNA profile was "a partial single 

source profile from a male," which signifies the DNA came from "one person, so one 

source." Based on the analysis of this swab, which also revealed the source was male, "it 

was 394 million times more likely to see that partial DNA profile if Mr. Buchanan was 

the source than if an unknown individual would be the source." In layman's terms, Stone 

testified "it's strong support for Ronald Buchanan being the source of that DNA."

Buchanan claims the State left the remaining DNA profiles "unidentified" and 

withheld the identities. It is unclear how the State could withhold the identity of what 

were explained to be unidentified DNA profiles. But in any event, Buchanan does not 

support his allegations of withholding the unidentified DNA profiles with a citation to the 

record. Without such a record, an appellate court presumes the district court's action was 

proper. Meggerson, 312 Kan. at 249.

As a result, Buchanan has not shown the State withheld evidence which 

affirmatively shows prejudicial error. The record shows the jury was aware of the 

presence of the two remaining DNA profiles and still found Buchanan guilty. And 

Buchanan has not met his burden of designating a record to support his claim of withheld 

evidence.

The prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial misconduct.

Buchanan argues the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct in various 

arguments she made to the jury. The appellate court uses a two-step process to evaluate 
30

claims of prosecutorial error: error and prejudice. To determine whether prosecutorial 

error occurred, appellate courts must first decide whether the prosecutorial acts 

complained of fall outside the wide latitude afforded to prosecutors. State v. Sherman, 

305 Kan. 88, 109, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016). If error is found, appellate courts must 

determine whether the error prejudiced the defendant's due process rights to a fair trial 

under the traditional constitutional harmless inquiry demanded by Chapman v. 

California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d. 705 (1967). See Sherman, 305 Kan 

at 109.

"In other words, prosecutorial error is harmless if the State can demonstrate 'beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the 

trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the 

error contributed to the verdict.' [Citation omitted.]" 305 Kan. at 109.

See State v. Fraire, 312 Kan. 786, 791-92, 481 P.3d 129 (2021).

Buchanan claims the prosecutor made multiple statements that fall outside the 

wide latitude afforded to prosecutors because the "emotionally charged and inflammatory 

comments . . . [inflamed] the passions of the jurors . . . ." He complains of multiple 

statements, all of which the prosecutor made during closing arguments.

Because the disputed statements occurred during closing arguments, this court can 

consider review of the claims without a timely objection to preserve the issue for appeal. 

Even so, this court may figure the presence or absence of an objection into its analysis of 

the alleged error. Bodine, 313 Kan. at 406.

Buchanan challenges the prosecutor's final statement at closing, where the 

prosecutor stated:
31

"This was not an act of God. This was the act of one man and I ask you to find him guilty 

on all the counts because it wasn't God that is responsible for the events that night. It's 

that man. It's Ronald Buchanan and you should find him guilty as he's charged."

Buchanan also challenges the prosecutor's statements during closing that 

suggested he lacked remorse and made hate filled comments to "women that he claims to 

care about."

"'[I]t is the duty of the prosecutor in a criminal matter to see that the State's case is 

properly presented with earnestness and vigor and to use every legitimate means to bring 

about a just conviction, . . .'" and prosecutors are given wide latitude in arguing the cases 

before them. State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 351, 204 P.3d 585 (2009) (quoting State v. 

Ruff, 252 Kan. 625, 634, 847 P.2d 1258 [1993]). "'Inherent in this wide latitude is the 

freedom to craft an argument that includes reasonable inferences based on the evidence.'"

King, 288 Kan. at 351.

Here, the prosecutor's statements fall under the prosecutor's wide latitude to craft 

an argument that includes reasonable inferences based on the evidence. As the State 

argues, the prosecutor's "was not an act of God" comment responded to Buchanan's 

testimony and Facebook post in which Buchanan stated Maraya and her family "Got 

What God sent to em." Before concluding that the fire "was not an act of God," the 

prosecutor extensively detailed the evidence presented at trial. Referencing the Facebook 

post where Buchanan stated his daughter and her family "Got What God sent to em," the 

prosecutor stated Buchanan "describes karma and God as the reasons for this fire . . . ."

This statement is a reasonable inference based on the evidence.

Buchanan's Facebook post, along with other evidence, also supports the State's 

argument that it properly stated Buchanan lacked remorse when it discussed the words he

used. The State made reasonable inferences from the evidence that Buchanan lacked 
32

remorse. Along with the Facebook post above, for example, Maraya's friend, Snype,

testified Buchanan sent her a private message on Facebook soon after the fire. Part of the 

message was read into the record and a screenshot of the following message was admitted 

into evidence at trial:

"Maraya and [Mother] tryna [sic] to say I did it . . . which I didn't, and after the way she 

treated me I don't care what them Bitches lossed [sic] over there especially [Mother] 

maybe it was one of her escort clients she keeps . . . I'm doing very well myself I have 

2extra fully furnished rooms upstairs,, [sic] AND THEM BITCHES STILL AINT 

WELCOME ILL [sic] USE THE ROOM AS A PISS PAD B4 [sic] I MOVE HER AND 

HER TRASHY CHEAP WHORE OF A MOTHER . . . AHHHHHHHH

HAHAHAHAAA LOW BUDGET OVERMILEAGE BOTCHED 50 YEAR OLD FACE 

[MOTHER] BETTER LEAVE ME ALONE PRAY FOR LOPSIDED FACE AND 

THAT FAL [sic] INFECTED VAGINA THAT RUNS EVERY MAN AWAY . . . ."

The State charged Buchanan with three counts of attempted first-degree murder, 

which requires premeditation. Evidence of lack of remorse by the defendant is admissible 

to support an inference of premeditation. See State v. Carter, 305 Kan. 139, 153, 380 

P.3d 189 (2016) (holding that the defendant's behavior and statements "that show lack of 

remorse . . . could be considered by the jury for whatever weight they would bear"). So,

the State did not make a comment outside the wide latitude afforded when it reasonably 

drew an inference about Buchanan's lack of remorse to support an inference of 

premeditation.

The State did not introduce inadmissible evidence of an unknown car.

In his final argument, Buchanan contends the State "introduced inadmissible 

evidence of [an] unknown car near [the] scene of [the] fire" which amounted to "a 

misstatement of facts from [the] State witness [Detective Charles] Wimsatt." This is not a 

prosecutorial misconduct claim, but an admissibility of evidence claim. But as Buchanan 
33

notes, his defense counsel objected to the State's attempt to elicit testimony from 

Detective Wimsatt about what he believed was the make and model of the car seen on the 

traffic camera imagery. The district court sustained the objection, and the prosecutor 

changed her line of questioning.

The next day, Detective Wimsatt returned to the stand and testified he had viewed 

the video footage of the car driving near the apartment complex. The detective confirmed 

the car in the footage had characteristics "consistent with the Pontiac G6 that had been 

noted in this case," such as the car's body size, number of doors, and the distinct shape of 

the taillights. Defense counsel then cross-examined Detective Wimsatt and the detective 

conceded the Pontiac G6 car is similar to the Chevy Cobalt and the Saturn Ion. Detective 

Wimsatt also conceded the cars have the same basic length and style.

The State did not improperly introduce inadmissible evidence into the record. The 

jury heard testimony that the type of car seen in the video was similar to the Pontiac G6 

that Buchanan owned, but it also heard testimony that the car appears much like other 

styles of similarly sized cars. This testimony from Detective Wimsatt was admissible and 

Buchanan has not shown otherwise.

Because the State presented sufficient evidence to support Buchanan's convictions, 

and he either failed to preserve his prosecutorial error claims or failed to show error in 

prosecutor statements or admission of evidence, Buchanan's supplemental pro se issues 

are unconvincing.

Affirmed.