[Cite as State v. Greene, 2019-Ohio-4010.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 17AP-238 

 (C.P.C. No. 15CR-1206) 

v. : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Charles J. Greene, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on September 30, 2019 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Kimberly 

Bond, for appellee. Argued: Kimberly Bond. 

On brief: Carpenter Lipps and Leland LLP, Kort 

Gatterdam, and David F. Hanson, for appellant. Argued: 

David F. Hanson. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

BROWN, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal by defendant-appellant, Charles J. Greene, from a 

judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Franklin County Court of Common 

Pleas following a jury trial in which he was found guilty of murder, aggravated robbery, 

and kidnapping. 

{¶ 2} On March 12, 2015, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated 

murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01, one count of murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02, 

one count of aggravated robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.01, and two counts of 

kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01. The indictment arose out of the death of Alyce 

Seff, age 81, in July 2008. 
No. 17AP-238 2 

{¶ 3} The matter came for trial before a jury beginning January 18, 2017. Charles 

Lyder testified on behalf of plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio. In 2008, Lyder, age 46, 

resided on South Pearl Street. His landlady was Alyce Seff, who he began renting from in 

March 2007. Seff owned several rental properties in the area. Lyder always paid his rent 

to Seff in cash. Seff would then hand him "a paper receipt out of a cash receipt book." 

(Tr. Vol. I at 84.) Seff regularly wore a "green army jacket," and she kept money in the 

"right chest pocket" of the jacket. (Tr. Vol. I at 84.) According to Lyder, Seff kept a 

"pretty thick wad of cash" in her pocket. (Tr. Vol. I at 85.) When repairs were necessary, 

Seff "hired people that * * * needed money." (Tr. Vol. I at 86.) 

{¶ 4} On June 23, 2008, Lyder and his two daughters departed Columbus to 

spend two weeks in New Hampshire. Lyder returned to Columbus on July 9, 2008. Later 

that evening, Lyder and one of his daughters went to the back of his residence, and Lyder 

"smelled death." (Tr. Vol. I at 91.) Lyder thought he smelled a dead animal. His daughter 

then said, "Hey, I found some money." (Tr. Vol. I at 91.) She found the money near "a 

little wishing well" off the side of Seff's house. Lyder walked toward his daughter and 

observed a wig and credit cards scattered on the ground. Lyder picked up one of the cards 

and "saw the name of Alyce Seff." (Tr. Vol. I at 92.) He then walked to a nearby 

neighbor's apartment building and told the neighbor's roommate "something was wrong." 

(Tr. Vol. I at 93.) 

{¶ 5} Lyder phoned Seff's cell phone "and it went to voicemail." (Tr. Vol. I at 94.) 

He then called Seff's home phone but there was no response. Lyder and the neighbor 

returned to the area of the wishing well. Lyder observed blood on the wig and also 

noticed blood splatter marks on a nearby fence. He recognized the wig as "the same color 

and length of my landlord's wig, Alyce Seff." (Tr. Vol. I at 96.) Lyder then noticed 

cushions on top of the wishing well. He pulled up one of the cushions and "saw some 

fingers." (Tr. Vol. I at 95.) Lyder and the neighbor then returned to the apartment and 

dialed 911. 

{¶ 6} Seff drove a dark blue Ford Escort, which Lyder described as a "late 90's 

model." (Tr. Vol. I at 101.) The vehicle "was not well-kept, and in the inside it had a lot of 

junk, * * * sometimes a rake, bags." (Tr. Vol. I at 100-01.) Lyder never observed anyone 

else drive the vehicle. Seff usually parked the vehicle on High Street, but sometimes on 
No. 17AP-238 3 

Pearl Alley. After discovering Seff's body, Lyder did not observe Seff's vehicle in the area. 

Lyder gave police a description of the vehicle. 

{¶ 7} On July 9, 2008, at approximately 8:40 p.m., Columbus Police Officer 

Stephen Mason received a dispatch regarding "a neighbor who * * * thought he had 

discovered his landlady, the property owner, either deceased or ill." (Tr. Vol. I at 60.) 

Officer Mason arrived at the scene and spoke with Lyder. The officer "could immediately 

smell an odor of * * * decay." (Tr. Vol. I at 61.) 

{¶ 8} Officer Mason walked to the back of the residence and "initially saw what 

looked like the contents of a purse that had been dumped out, just random cards." (Tr. 

Vol. I at 62.) The officer then observed a decorative wishing well. He walked over to the 

well and "noted there [were] cushions sort of stacked around, and on top of it, * * * the 

cushions that have kind of a plastic vinyl covering on them." (Tr. Vol. I at 63.) Several 

medics had also arrived at the scene. 

{¶ 9} When Officer Mason initially moved one of the cushions, he observed "a 

human foot." (Tr. Vol. I at 64.) The officer then shined his flashlight and observed "the 

victim." (Tr. Vol. I at 64.) The body, which was in an "upside down position," was 

"discolored." (Tr. Vol. I at 65.) It was clear to the officer and medics that the individual 

was deceased, and the medics pronounced Seff dead at that time. 

{¶ 10} The victim was identified as Alyce Seff. Officer Mason was familiar with Seff 

from patrolling that neighborhood. Officer Mason described Seff as "a well-known 

property owner in the area. She had a number of properties all around her in the village." 

(Tr. Vol. I at 68.) According to the officer, Seff "would walk to each tenant and specifically 

collect rent, sort of * * * an old school way of doing business." (Tr. Vol. I at 69.) Seff 

drove a blue Ford Escort and, although it was well know that she "was somewhat 

wealthy," it seemed "odd to everyone that she drove that sort of a down-trodden vehicle 

that was always kind of in disrepair." (Tr. Vol. I at 69.) The officer never observed anyone 

but Seff driving the vehicle. 

{¶ 11} On July 9, 2008, Columbus Police Detective Richard Bair, a member of the 

department's crime scene search unit, photographed and collected evidence in the area of 

the 800 block of South High Street. On July 16, 2008, Detective Bair collected items from 

Seff's vehicle. DNA swabs were taken and submitted to the police property room. During 
No. 17AP-238 4 

his testimony, Detective Bair identified photographs taken of the crime scene; he also 

identified the items collected at the scene, including a roll of duct tape. 

{¶ 12} In July 2008, Marc Green worked as a crime scene search unit detective for 

the Columbus Police Department. On July 10, 2008, Green collected evidence and 

photographed Seff's body at the Franklin County morgue. Green described Seff's body as 

"very badly decomposed, very bad stage of decomposition." (Tr. Vol. I at 161.) At trial, 

Green identified the photographs he took of Seff, as well as items collected. Seff had duct 

tape "bound around both wrists." (Tr. Vol. I at 165.) Green identified items of clothing 

worn by Seff. A cell phone case was found on Seff's body, and a shirt had been wrapped 

and tied around her head and neck. 

{¶ 13} Edward Babcock is an employee of Murray's Tool Rental, a small equipment 

rental and repair business. Babcock was acquainted with Seff, who would regularly come 

into the tool rental store; Babcock considered her to be "a friend, not a customer." (Tr. 

Vol. II at 183.) Seff "always wore the same outfit * * * it was always a dark heavy canvass, 

long skirt, black * * * boots, a green -- everybody calls it an army shirt, but it actually said 

U.S. Air Force on it." (Tr. Vol. II at 191.) Seff also wore a wig. 

{¶ 14} The tool rental store had a video surveillance system. On Saturday, July 5, 

2008, Seff entered the store and her visit was captured on video. Seff brought a hedge 

trimmer to the store for sharpening. At trial, the state played a portion of the surveillance 

video taken at the store on July 5, 2008. Babcock identified Seff on the video; she entered 

the store shortly before noon, wearing the "[s]ame outfit she always wore." (Tr. Vol. II at 

194.) Seff left the store at 12:04 p.m. Babcock never saw her after that day. 

{¶ 15} Babcock testified that Seff always paid in cash. She kept the money "in her 

pocket, a big old wad. She kept a lot of money on her." (Tr. Vol. II at 201.) Seff is 

depicted on the video taking money out of her shirt pocket. Babcock subsequently 

learned Seff had died and spoke with a police officer he knew; Babcock told the officer she 

had recently been to the store. The officer was interested in obtaining "a picture of her 

car." (Tr. Vol. II at 189.) 

{¶ 16} Barbara Carmen Fisher was a family friend of Seff's, and Fisher's mother 

and Seff were best friends for approximately 40 years. Fisher was aware that Seff "was 

quite wealthy." (Tr. Vol. II at 215.) Seff "carried wads of cash," and earned her money 
No. 17AP-238 5 

through real estate and as a landlord; she owned approximately 15 properties, as well as 

her own home. (Tr. Vol. II at 216.) In July 2008, Seff was living at her residence in 

German Village. Seff wore a wig, and "she often shopped at the army/navy store and she 

wore * * * combat fatigues." (Tr. Vol. II at 231.) 

{¶ 17} Seff had a cell phone as well as a home phone, and Fisher's mother usually 

talked to Seff on a daily basis. Over the 2008 Fourth of July weekend, Fisher and her 

mother made various calls to Seff's cell and home phones after not hearing from her. On 

July 9, 2008, Fisher drove to one of Seff's residences and observed numerous police 

vehicles. 

{¶ 18} Fisher assisted police in obtaining Seff's bank records; it was discovered 

that Seff's credit cards "had been used within a recent day or two." (Tr. Vol. II at 229.) 

The bank president informed Fisher "these are from Walmart. They have cameras. Go 

talk to the detective immediately, and handed me the report, which is what I did." (Tr. 

Vol. II at 229.) 

{¶ 19} Seff had a blue Ford Escort, which Fisher described as "very old," and 

"stuffed full of things that she had either cleaned out of her property, or that she had 

found at the thrift store, or tools and materials that she used for working on the 

properties." (Tr. Vol. II at 229-30.) Fisher never observed anyone except Seff drive the 

vehicle. 

{¶ 20} Norma Jenkins, age 50, has been a Columbus resident most of her life. 

Jenkins knows appellant, and testified his friends call him "Jerome." (Tr. Vol. II at 242.) 

In July 2008, Jenkins resided with her mother and a friend, Jane Benvenutti. At that 

time, appellant was living with a "lady named Valorie" on Fabron Avenue. Appellant's 

residence was close to where Jenkins lived on Atcheson Street. In July 2008, Jenkins and 

appellant were "fooling around." (Tr. Vol. II at 244.) Jenkins described herself as "just 

one of" appellant's girlfriends at the time. (Tr. Vol. II at 245.) 

{¶ 21} In July 2008, appellant "worked for a lot of people in the neighborhood," 

including Seff. (Tr. Vol. II at 246.) Appellant performed "[h]andy work," and his duties 

for Seff included yard work and painting. (Tr. Vol. II at 246.) Seff would drive by and 

pick up appellant. Appellant worked for Seff "two, three times a week." (Tr. Vol. II at 

248.) 
No. 17AP-238 6 

{¶ 22} On July 5, 2008, Jenkins observed Seff pick appellant up on Fabron 

Avenue. A few days later, Jenkins learned from the news that something had happened to 

Seff. Jenkins was concerned because, approximately two weeks prior to that, appellant 

"asked me to act like I was paying rent and push her down and rob her." (Tr. Vol. II at 

252.) Jenkins told appellant "[n]o." (Tr. Vol. II at 253.) 

{¶ 23} On July 5, 2008, appellant phoned Jenkins at her mother's residence. 

Appellant had obtained Seff's phone, and he gave Jenkins "several different stories" 

regarding why he had her phone. (Tr. Vol. II at 257.) At first, appellant stated the phone 

"was given to him, and then Alyce gave it to him." (Tr. Vol. II at 259.) At one point, 

appellant stated "he broke in the house after he found out she was dead and robbed her." 

(Tr. Vol. II at 260.) Jenkins subsequently observed appellant with credit cards belonging 

to Seff, including a "Lowe's card." (Tr. Vol. II at 260.) Appellant asked Jenkins to use the 

Lowe's card but she refused. 

{¶ 24} After Seff's death, police investigators questioned Jenkins and asked her if 

she had used a Lowe's card for purchases. Jenkins told investigators she did not make 

any purchases with the card. Jenkins told police that appellant "had asked me to act like I 

was going to pay my rent and push her down and rob her, but I didn't." (Tr. Vol. II at 

263.) 

{¶ 25} On cross-examination, Jenkins acknowledged she had a prior theft 

conviction, and she was using crack cocaine and marijuana in 2008. When asked if she 

used cocaine powder or crack cocaine more often, Jenkins responded: "Cocaine with 

Charles Greene." (Tr. Vol. II at 278.) 

{¶ 26} On re-direct examination, Jenkins stated she was using crack cocaine with 

appellant around July 5, 2008. After Seff's death was reported, Jenkins did not see 

appellant "for a while." Jenkins stated appellant acted paranoid, as if "somebody was 

trying to get him." (Tr. Vol. II at 313.) 

{¶ 27} Daniel Davison, a forensic scientist with the Bureau of Criminal 

Investigation, examined several pieces of duct tape as well as several rolls of duct tape 

recovered as part of the investigation. Four rolls of duct tape were recovered from Seff's 

vehicle, while another roll of duct tape, identified as state's exhibit No. J8, was recovered 

in the backyard. Pieces of duct tape, identified as state's exhibit Nos. K5 and K6, were 
No. 17AP-238 7 

obtained from Seff's left wrist. Exhibit Nos. K5 and K6 "had the same physical 

characteristics." Further, "[o]ne of the edges from K5 formed a physical break match with 

the end of the roll of tape that was * * * Exhibit J8." (Tr. Vol. II at 352.) Davison 

concluded the duct tape recovered from Seff's wrist came from the duct tape roll found in 

the backyard. 

{¶ 28} At trial, the state played the video deposition of Raman Tejwani, formerly 

an employee of the Columbus Police Crime Lab. Tejwani has a Ph.D. in physiological 

chemistry, and her duties with the crime lab included "analysis of biological fluid and 

DNA for the evidence that was submitted to the crime lab forensic biology section." (Tr. 

Vol. III at 375.) Tejwani was asked to review items from the investigation, including duct 

tape, a plaid flannel shirt, and fingernail clippings. 

{¶ 29} Tejwani testified that the duct tape and shirt were "not suitable for DNA 

analysis." (Tr. Vol. III at 384.) Fingernail clipping samples were obtained from both of 

Seff's hands, and Tejwani was able to conduct DNA analysis for the fingernail clippings, 

identified as state's exhibit No. K11. Tejwani testified there were "five nail clippings, and 

traces of red stains were seen on all the five tested. They all tested positive for blood." 

(Tr. Vol. III at 385.) One of the clippings "matched the DNA types obtained from the 

blood standard of Alyce Seff." (Tr. Vol. III at 386.) 

{¶ 30} DNA samples were obtained from Seff's vehicle, including "the steering 

wheel, the gear shifter, rearview mirror, nail on driver's door, nail on driver's side door 

arm rest, and driver's side door handle." (Tr. Vol. III at 390.) Some of the DNA samples 

from the vehicle were not suitable to make any conclusions. With respect to the sample 

from the gearshift, state's exhibit No. L2, Tejwani concluded that appellant "cannot be 

excluded as a contributor." (Tr. Vol. III at 397.) With respect to state's exhibit Nos. L1 

and L6, swabs obtained from the steering wheel and a nail on the driver's side arm rest 

"matched the DNA types obtained from oral swab standard of Charles Greene." (Tr. Vol. 

III at 399.) 

{¶ 31} Tejwani also examined a cell phone cover but there was an insufficient 

amount of DNA to obtain information as to a contributor. DNA samples of blood 

recovered from a fence near the scene matched the DNA types obtained from the blood 

standard of Seff. 
No. 17AP-238 8 

{¶ 32} Brenda Greathouse, age 59, has lived in Columbus most of her life. 

Greathouse has known appellant for approximately 25-30 years, and calls him "Jerome." 

(Tr. Vol. III at 451.) In 2008, appellant was living with a woman named "Valorie." (Tr. 

Vol. III at 452.) Appellant was "doing odd jobs for * * * different people" at the time. (Tr. 

Vol. III at 454.) 

{¶ 33} In 2008, a detective spoke with Greathouse about phone calls appellant 

made to her on July 6, 2008. The calls began in the early morning hours on that date; 

Greathouse did not recognize the phone number, but eventually realized appellant was 

calling from that number. Appellant told Greathouse "he had found the phone." (Tr. Vol. 

III at 458.) Appellant told her he found the phone "[e]ither at the store or going to the 

store." (Tr. Vol. III at 458.) 

{¶ 34} Later in the day on July 6, 2008, appellant arrived at Greathouse's 

residence with several credit cards. Appellant gave her the cards; Greathouse informed 

appellant she was "going to give them to my friend to use, and he just said to make sure he 

got some stuff too." Her friend was "Norita Sams." (Tr. Vol. III at 461.) Greathouse 

picked up Sams and gave her the cards; they then drove to "a gas station, to a CVS, a 

Kroger's, Meijer's and Walmart." (Tr. Vol. III at 462.) The stores were located in the 

"Morse Road, Cleveland Avenue area." (Tr. Vol. III at 462.) Greathouse and Sams bought 

items for themselves as well as for appellant. After purchasing the items, Greathouse gave 

the credit cards to appellant "[b]ecause he asked for them back." (Tr. Vol. III at 465.) 

{¶ 35} Later, Greathouse learned from the news "that a lady had been murdered. 

We had used the cards, me and a friend of mine, and the name just popped in my mind as 

soon as I seen it on TV." (Tr. Vol. III at 460.) Appellant told Greathouse "he had got them 

from, I guess, * * * the person they belonged to, to go purchase some materials. But I 

knew that wasn't so." (Tr. Vol. III at 460.) Greathouse "knew they was probably stolen." 

(Tr. Vol. III at 461.) 

{¶ 36} Dr. Patrick Fardal, retired, was formerly chief forensic pathologist and 

deputy coroner for Franklin County. Fardal reviewed the coroner's report, including 

photographs of the victim, Seff; the photographs "showed levels of decomposition." (Tr. 

Vol. III at 493.) The autopsy was performed on July 10, 2008. Dr. Fardal opined Seff had 
No. 17AP-238 9 

been dead for "four to five days prior" to the autopsy. (Tr. Vol. III at 504.) He further 

stated, based on the signs of decomposition, Seff could have died on July 5, 2008. 

{¶ 37} Dr. Fardal noted "ligature around her neck." (Tr. Vol. III at 505-06.) The 

ligature "was knotted on the right side of her neck. It was tied around her neck." (Tr. Vol. 

III at 506.) Dr. Fardal concluded the cause of death was "ligature strangulation." (Tr. 

Vol. III at 509.) 

{¶ 38} Dr. Fardal was questioned about the presence of blood on a nearby fence at 

the crime scene. He stated the blood "came off either [Seff] or an object" that could have 

been used to strike Seff. (Tr. Vol. III at 515.) While noting the difficulty in assessing the 

location of a wound due to the state of decomposition of the body, Dr. Fardal theorized 

Seff likely sustained an injury involving the face and head, and that blood from this 

wound "was thrown in space against the fence." (Tr. Vol. III at 520.) 

{¶ 39} Feather Johnson, age 39, has lived in Columbus 15 years. In 2008, Johnson 

resided in a duplex on South High Street. Lyder lived in a nearby residence on Pearl 

Street. Johnson also knew Seff, who owned the property next to her duplex. Seff would 

hire individuals to work for her that were "probably not employed, people that definitely 

appear to me that have some type of issues, drinking, drug issues, who knows what it may 

be." (Tr. Vol. III at 550.) 

{¶ 40} Approximately one week before July 5, 2008, Johnson observed Seff 

speaking with an individual who was "planning to do work for her." (Tr. Vol. III at 550.) 

At trial, Johnson identified appellant as the individual she observed at Seff's house. 

{¶ 41} In July 2008, Lyder was on vacation with his daughters, and Johnson was 

watching Lyder's dog. On July 9, 2008, Lyder returned home from his vacation. That 

evening, Lyder and one of his daughter went over to Johnson's duplex; Lyder seemed 

alarmed, and asked Johnson about the last time she saw Seff. Johnson indicated she had 

seen Seff "less than a week prior to that date." (Tr. Vol. III at 556.) 

{¶ 42} Lyder then asked Johnson to "walk back to the house with him." (Tr. Vol. 

III at 556.) They walked to the back of the house and "found Alyce's -- one of her shoes, 

her wig, and numerous credit cards laying on the ground." Lyder also "found * * * blood 

splatter on the fence, and he asked [Johnson] to take his daughter back to [her] front 

porch." (Tr. Vol. III at 557.) Lyder then dialed 911. 
No. 17AP-238 10 

{¶ 43} Several years later, police officers showed Johnson a photo array and asked 

her if she recognized any of the individuals as "being at Alyce's house." (Tr. Vol. III at 

558.) Johnson identified the individual depicted in photograph No. 4 as looking "like the 

person at the house days before." (Tr. Vol. III at 559.) During her testimony, Johnson 

identified a photograph of Seff's vehicle. Johnson testified that Seff would normally park 

her vehicle "on High Street." (Tr. Vol. III at 561.) Johnson never observed anyone but 

Seff drive her vehicle. 

{¶ 44} Columbus Police Detective Robert Moledor analyzes "cellular call detail 

records." (Tr. Vol. IV at 587.) Detective Moledor analyzed the records for Seff's cell 

phone beginning July 5, 2008. At 1:28 p.m., a call was placed to Seff's phone by a number 

belonging to appellant. At 2:46 p.m., a call from a number belonging to Jenkins was 

placed to Seff's phone number. Between the times of 10:52 p.m. on July 5, 2008, and 

12:01 a.m. on July 6, 2008, "the target phone placed 16 outbound calls to six different 

numbers." (Tr. Vol. IV at 606.) 

{¶ 45} As a result of the data collected, Detective Moledor concluded that Seff "was 

no longer in possession of her AT&T cellular phone" after 2:45 p.m. on July 5, 2008. The 

detective "based that conclusion on the calls that were being made to the phone as well as 

calls that were being made from the phone." (Tr. Vol. IV at 609.) Further, "[t]he majority 

of the tower usage by * * *, the target phone, between 2:45 p.m. on July 5th, 2008 and 

10:18 p.m. July 8th, 2008 is consistent with the vicinity of Charles J. Greene's listed 

address [on] Fabron Avenue." (Tr. Vol. IV at 609-10.) The detective further testified the 

location at which Seff's vehicle was recovered was "consistent with the vicinity of the 

majority of tower usage between 2:45 p.m. on July 5th and 10:18 [p.m.] on July 8th; and, 

finally, at the location of Norma Jenkins' residence [on] Atcheson Street, Columbus, Ohio, 

it is consistent with the vicinity of the majority tower usage between 2:45 p.m. July 5th, 

2008 and 10:18 [p.m.] July 8[th], 2008." (Tr. Vol. IV at 610.) 

{¶ 46} Appellant testified on his own behalf. Appellant denied killing Seff, and 

denied asking anyone to rob or kill Seff. Appellant testified he learned of Seff's death 

through "Brenda Greathouse, who bought the credit cards." (Tr. Vol. IV at 678.) He 

denied breaking into Seff's home, and denied ever meeting Johnson. He also denied ever 

driving Seff's vehicle. 
No. 17AP-238 11 

{¶ 47} In 2008, appellant worked as a "handyman." (Tr. Vol. IV at 679.) Appellant 

had worked for Seff "[o]ff and on about a year." (Tr. Vol. IV at 680.) When Seff needed 

work done, she would call him on "my girlfriend's phone." (Tr. Vol. IV at 681.) Appellant 

could not recall the last time he performed work for Seff. 

{¶ 48} Appellant acknowledged coming into possession of Seff's cell phone and 

credit cards. Appellant provided the following account of how he obtained those items: 

Well, I was working for Ms. Seff. I don't know exactly what 

day it was, but I was cutting down some bushes of hers, and I 

noticed a guy working on her roof. I don't go mingling with 

the guy or nothing, you know. They do their work; I do my 

work. 

This guy comes to me, asked me what side of town I was from. 

I said, I'm from Mount Vernon and 20th area. 

He said, Well, I'm from the south end. 

You know, I never think of nothing of that. He say that's 

where he going to get his medicine from, on Mount Vernon 

and 20th. 

Me, I'm going to the store one day on Mount Vernon and 

20th, and I see the guy, you know what I'm saying? He don't 

know my name; I don't know his. He's just saying, Hey, come 

here. 

I noticed him from Ms. Seff's, you know what I'm saying? 

Working for Ms. Seff. He said, Do you know a way I can get 

rid of some credit cards? 

I said, Yeah, I know somebody who buys credit cards. 

(Tr. Vol. IV at 682-83.) 

{¶ 49} When questioned as to why he interacted with this individual in obtaining 

Seff's items, appellant responded: "The reason I did it, because I seen the guy at Ms. Seff's. 

I know he worked for Ms. Seff. So I thought he might be cool to do that, help him out." 

(Tr. Vol. IV at 686.) When asked if he believed the items had been stolen, appellant 

responded: "I knew they were stolen." (Tr. Vol. IV at 686.) Appellant testified that he 

asked the individual "to let me use his phone so I can call my [contact]. I know the person 

that was going to buy them." (Tr. Vol. IV at 688.) Appellant testified he phoned 
No. 17AP-238 12 

Greathouse and that he walked with the man to the residence of Greathouse; appellant 

handed the phone back and took the credit cards into the house. 

{¶ 50} When asked what he was to receive in return, appellant testified: "He going 

to pay me for getting the cards sold; and she going to pay me for getting her the deal." (Tr. 

Vol. IV at 690.) Appellant eventually kept the phone, explaining: "After I come out of the 

house and gave the guy his money, he gave me money, and then I asked to use his phone 

so I can call Ms. Norma Jean. She wanted me to do some work too." (Tr. Vol. IV at 690.) 

Appellant further stated that he "ended up going in the house to tell Brenda she owes me 

now because she got a deal and I got the cell phone. When I come back out of the house, 

the guy was gone. So I kept the phone." (Tr. Vol. IV at 691.) 

{¶ 51} According to appellant, the man gave him two credit cards. Appellant 

denied looking at the cards at the time, stating he first learned the credit cards belonged 

to Seff "[a]fter the detectives then talked to Brenda about using the credit cards. She told 

them she got the credit cards from me." (Tr. Vol. IV at 692.) 

{¶ 52} On cross-examination, appellant acknowledged having signed a receipt, 

dated July 1, 2008, indicating Seff paid him $50. Appellant denied ever seeing Seff "with 

a wad of money." (Tr. Vol. IV at 699.) Appellant told detectives he received "[t]wenty 

dollars and a piece of crack" for the credit cards. (Tr. Vol. IV at 707.) Appellant denied 

that Greathouse gave the credit cards back to him. When asked about a call placed from 

his phone at 1:28 p.m. on July 5, 2008, appellant responded: "I don't know about that 

call. I guess I was probably calling Alyce for work or something. I don't know." (Tr. Vol. 

IV at 721.) Appellant did not recall whether he told detectives in 2012 about sitting in the 

driver's seat of Seff's vehicle. Appellant told detectives in 2012 and 2015 that he did not 

have Seff's cell phone. When asked whether he lied about using the phone, appellant 

stated: "I guess it was. Yes it was." (Tr. Vol. IV at 729.) 

{¶ 53} The state called Columbus Police Detective Anne Pennington as a rebuttal 

witness. Detective Pennington participated in an interview of appellant in April 2012. 

Appellant told Detective Pennington he obtained the credit cards from a white male who 

was shorter than him; appellant indicated the man was "5'8" or so." (Tr. Vol. V at 803.) 

Detective Pennington identified the individual during trial and measured him; that 

individual's height was "5'11 1⁄2." (Tr. Vol. V at 804.) 
No. 17AP-238 13 

{¶ 54} Following deliberations, the jury returned verdicts finding appellant guilty 

of murder, aggravated robbery, and two counts of kidnapping. The jury found appellant 

not guilty of aggravated murder. For purposes of sentencing, the trial court merged the 

kidnapping counts. By entry filed February 27, 2017, the trial court sentenced appellant 

to 15 years to life as to the murder count, to be served concurrently to a 10-year sentence 

for aggravated robbery, and a 10-year sentence for kidnapping. 

{¶ 55} On appeal, appellant sets forth the following six assignments of error for 

this court's review: 

[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND 

DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS 

OF LAW CONTRARY TO THE OHIO AND UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTIONS BY ADMITTING REPETITIVE, 

GRUESOME PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE DECEASED. 

[II.] THE ADMISSION OF OTHER ACTS TESTIMONY 

VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND 

TO A FAIR TRIAL AS GUARANTEED BY THE UNITED 

STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS. 

[III.] APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO A FAIR 

TRIAL, TO COUNSEL, TO PRESENT A DEFENSE, AND TO 

DUE PROCESS CONTRARY TO THE OHIO AND UNITED 

STATES CONSTITUTIONS WHEN THE TRIAL COURT 

ORDERED APPELLANT TO WEAR RESTRAINTS 

WITHOUT ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION. 

[IV.] APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO A 

FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE 

INTRODUCTION OF INADMISSIBLE COMMUNITY AND 

VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE. 

[V.] APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF THE EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF 

APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH AND 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION, AND SECTION 10 AND 16, ARTICLE I OF 

THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. 

[VI.] THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S 

RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL WHEN IT 

ENTERED A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION 
No. 17AP-238 14 

OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES 

AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS. 

{¶ 56} Under the first assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred by 

admitting repetitive, gruesome photographs of Seff, thereby denying him a fair trial and 

due process of law. Appellant notes Detective Bair authenticated photographs he took of 

the crime scene, including a group of 15 pictures shown to the jury depicting Seff either 

inside the well or laying on the grass after being removed from the well. Further, 

appellant notes, Detective Green authenticated pictures he took of Seff at the morgue, and 

an additional 40 pictures were shown to the jury and admitted into evidence. Appellant 

maintains only a few photographs were necessary, and that the number of photographs 

admitted before the jury prejudiced him. 

{¶ 57} In response, the state argues the prosecutor worked with defense counsel to 

limit the number of photographs admitted at trial, and several photographs were 

withdrawn at defense counsel's request. The state further argues defense counsel did not 

object to the admission of photographs of Seff's body at the crime scene or the morgue 

and, therefore, plain error is the appropriate review on appeal. 

{¶ 58} In general, "[d]ecisions on the admissibility of photographs are 'left to the 

sound discretion of the trial court.' " State v. Gonzalez, 7th Dist. No. 06 MA 58, 2008-

Ohio-2749, ¶ 34, quoting State v. Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 601 (1992). In this respect, 

"[t]he test for exclusion of evidence under Evid.R. 403 is that relevant evidence, including 

photographic evidence, should only be excluded when, 'its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading 

the jury.' " Id. See also State v. Jones, 7th Dist. No. 12 MA 181, 2013-Ohio-5915, ¶ 77 ("in 

a noncapital case * * * the admission of potentially prejudicial photographs is determined 

under a discretionary balancing test that requires exclusion only if the probative value of 

the photographs is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice"). 

{¶ 59} A review of the record indicates defense counsel raised "no objection" to 

state's exhibit Nos. B1 through B63, including the 15 photographs of Seff, nor did defense 

counsel object to state's exhibit Nos. C1 through C47, the morgue photographs. (Tr. Vol. 

IV at 646.) However, before the photographs were submitted to the jury, defense counsel 

requested the court to limit "the more gruesome photographs" with respect to state's 
No. 17AP-238 15 

exhibit Nos. C1 through C47 (an issue initially the subject of a pre-trial motion in limine). 

(Tr. Vol. V at 905.) In response, the prosecutor stated, based on defense counsel's 

"request with our agreement and at the court's discretion, we will withdraw State's 

Exhibits C32, C43, C44, C45, C46, and C47." (Tr. Vol. V at 907.) The prosecutor noted 

that the withdrawn exhibits "are photographs taken at the morgue by the crime scene 

unit." (Tr. Vol. V at 907.) Finally, we note the coroner's autopsy photographs (state's 

exhibit Nos. E1 through E15) were not admitted into evidence. 

{¶ 60} Based on the record presented, appellant has arguably waived all but plain 

error with respect to the admission of the photographs. In accordance with Evid.R. 

103(A), "a party's failure to object to the admission of evidence at trial constitutes a waiver 

of all but plain error on appeal." State v. Mills, 5th Dist. No. 2007 AP 07 0039, 2009-

Ohio-1849, ¶ 131. Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), "[p]lain errors or defects affecting 

substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the 

court." Under Ohio law, "[p]lain error must be obvious as well as outcomedeterminative." State v. Frazier, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1323, 2007-Ohio-11, ¶ 37. Thus, 

"plain error occurs only when, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would 

have been different." Id. 

{¶ 61} As observed by the state, appellant does not specifically identify which 

photographs he contends should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial. The 

Supreme Court of Ohio "has held that ' "the mere fact that [a photograph] is gruesome or 

horrendous is not sufficient to render it inadmissible if the trial court, in the exercise of its 

discretion, feels that it would prove useful to the jury." ' " State v. Williams, 2d Dist. No. 

24548, 2012-Ohio-4179, ¶ 46, quoting State v. Frazier, 61 Ohio St.3d 247, 252 (1991), 

quoting State v. Woodards, 6 Ohio St.2d 14, 25 (1966). In this respect, "[s]uch 

photographs may help illustrate witness testimony and forensic evidence, or show the 

nature and circumstances of the crime." Williams. See also State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 

426, 445 (1997) (although gruesome, photographs of the victim's body were probative "of 

contested issues of intent, purpose, motive, and the cause, manner and circumstances of 

the victim's death"). 

{¶ 62} In the present case, the photographs were relevant to the issues of intent, 

and to supplement the testimony of Dr. Fardal, who utilized the photographs to reach a 
No. 17AP-238 16 

determination as to cause and time of death. As noted under the facts, Seff's body was 

first discovered (and Seff pronounced dead) on July 9, 2008. Dr. Fardal testified, 

however, that in his estimation, Seff "had been dead four to five days prior." Dr. Fardal 

based his estimate on factors including "discoloration of her face," and "skin slippage on 

her hand." (Tr. Vol. III at 504.) 

{¶ 63} As to the issue of cause of death, Dr. Fardal observed "ligature around her 

neck." (Tr. Vol. III at 505-06.) Specifically, he stated, "[f]rom the photographs among 

those views, it was knotted on the right side of her neck. It was tied around her neck." 

(Tr. Vol. III at 506.) The state argues, and we agree, that the photographs had particular 

probative value to the issue of cause of death given the state of decomposition. On this 

point, Dr. Fardal noted, due to decomposition of Seff's body, he was unable to observe 

petechial hemorrhages (common in instances of strangulation), "so all we have is this 

cloth about her neck that's knotted on the right side, and it looks as a ligature 

strangulation type of death." (Tr. at Vol. III at 506-07.) 

{¶ 64} As indicated above, prior to jury deliberations, defense counsel expressed 

his "understanding" to the trial court that "the more gruesome photographs" would be 

excluded. (Tr. Vol. V at 905.) The state then withdrew six of the photographs taken at the 

morgue. On review, we find the remaining photographs had probative value. At trial, 

defense counsel emphasized the lack of physical evidence at the crime scene. Given the 

decomposed condition of the body, the photographs were relevant to the state's case and 

they assisted the jury in understanding the testimony of the coroner as to the cause of 

death (ligature strangulation) and date of death. See State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53, 

2005-Ohio-5981, ¶ 83 (although gruesome, autopsy photos "illustrated the coroner's 

testimony on cause of death and were probative of issues of intent"). See also State v. 

Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 159 (1998) (photographs of body admissible as "they illustrate 

the testimony of the coroner"). The photographs also provided context for the testimony 

of other witnesses, including police investigators, and we do not find them unnecessarily 

repetitive or cumulative. Here, the trial court could have reasonably concluded the 

photographs were relevant, and that their probative value was not substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Accordingly, appellant has failed to 
No. 17AP-238 17 

demonstrate the trial court committed an abuse of discretion, let alone plain error, with 

respect to the admission of the photographs. 

{¶ 65} Based on the foregoing, appellant's first assignment of error is not welltaken and is overruled. 

{¶ 66} Under the second assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred 

in admitting other acts evidence during the testimony of Jenkins. Specifically, appellant 

cites testimony by Jenkins, initially elicited during cross-examination, that she used 

cocaine with appellant. Appellant contends the state improperly explored that issue on 

redirect examination. 

{¶ 67} In response, the state argues that defense counsel, during crossexamination of Jenkins, did not move to strike her statement that she used cocaine with 

appellant; rather, counsel continued to question Jenkins about her drug usage. The state 

further argues that defense counsel did not object to the prosecution's initial line of 

questioning on redirect examination regarding drug use, and only raised an objection 

after Jenkins testified appellant preferred crack and that he was jumpy when he used that 

drug. 

{¶ 68} The record indicates defense counsel inquired of Jenkins on crossexamination: "Ms. Jenkins, back in 2008, you were using crack cocaine, am I correct." 

(Tr. Vol. II at 276.) Jenkins acknowledged she had used cocaine. When asked if she used 

cocaine powder or crack cocaine more often, Jenkins responded: "Cocaine with Charles 

Greene." (Tr. Vol. II at 278.) Defense counsel also questioned Jenkins as to whether she 

was "high" on July 5, 2008, and Jenkins responded: "No, I was trying - - me and Charles 

Greene was trying that day for sure, I know. * * * But we couldn't come up with no money 

or no drugs." (Tr. Vol. II at 293.) 

{¶ 69} On redirect examination, the prosecutor inquired of Jenkins: "[R]ight 

around July 5, 2008, who were you using crack cocaine or powder cocaine with back 

then?" Jenkins responded: "Charles Greene." (Tr. Vol. II at 308.) When asked, over 

objection, whether appellant preferred powder or crack cocaine, Jenkins responded that 

"[c]rack" was "all we did together." When asked if appellant appeared to be more alert 

when he used crack cocaine, Jenkins responded: "He was jumpy, like spaced out 

sometimes." (Tr. Vol. II at 310.) 
No. 17AP-238 18 

{¶ 70} Following Jenkins' testimony, defense counsel moved for a mistrial as to 

"the testimony that was elicited on recross concerning allegations of Mr. Greene's drug 

use." (Tr. Vol. II at 328.) Defense counsel argued the state "did not give notice of its 

intent to use any allegations of any bad act." (Tr. Vol. II at 329.) 

{¶ 71} In response, the prosecutor argued that defense counsel "raised the door to 

it. We did not raise that subject. Not once in her direct testimony did she say anything 

about the defendant's drug use, nor were there any questions asked that alluded to that or 

would have elicited that. It was [defense counsel's] question that brought it out." (Tr. Vol. 

II at 329-30.) 

{¶ 72} The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, but noted it would provide a 

jury instruction indicating the jury "cannot consider any other acts of the defendant." (Tr. 

Vol. II at 333.) The court subsequently provided an instruction on that issue. The trial 

court also ruled the state was precluded from arguing that appellant's drug usage was a 

motivation for the crime. 

{¶ 73} In general, "[t]he admission and exclusion of evidence are within the broad 

discretion of the trial court." State v. Hammons, 12th Dist. No. CA2004-01-008, 2005-

Ohio-1409, ¶ 8, citing State v. Mays, 108 Ohio App.3d 598, 617 (8th Dist.1996). Evid.R. 

404(B) states in part: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 

the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 

however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 

{¶ 74} Under Ohio law, "[e]vidence of a defendant's prior bad acts is inadmissible 

to show that the defendant has a propensity or inclination to commit the offense in 

question." Hammons at ¶ 9, citing Evid.R. 404(B). However, "[p]rejudicial error will not 

be found * * * when the defense 'opens the door' to this evidence." State v. Moore, 8th 

Dist. No. 80416, 2003-Ohio-1154, ¶ 23, citing State v. Greer, 39 Ohio St.3d 236, 243 

(1988). See also Hammons at ¶ 9, citing State v. Hartford, 21 Ohio App.3d 29, 30-31 (8th 

Dist.1984) ("where evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts is first introduced or brought 

out by the defense, objection to such evidence is waived and there is no reversible error"); 

State v. Brooks, 9th Dist. No. 07 CA 0111-M, 2008-Ohio-3723, ¶ 53 (while introduction of 
No. 17AP-238 19 

other acts testimony is generally prohibited, "courts will not find prejudicial error when 

the defense 'opens the door' to such evidence"). 

{¶ 75} In the present case, information regarding appellant's drug use first arose 

during defense counsel's questioning of Jenkins on cross-examination, and the trial court 

could have reasonably concluded the defense opened the door to the testimony at issue. 

See State v. Dennis, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1290, 2006-Ohio-5777, ¶ 34 ("Because 

defendant initially elicited the prejudicial evidence, he effectively waived his right to 

contest its admissibility, and thus the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting such 

evidence."); State v. Herron, 8th Dist. No. 99110, 2013-Ohio-3139, ¶ 25 (Where the 

record demonstrates defense counsel's "questions of the witnesses 'opened the door' to 

the evidence he now challenges, neither Evid.R. 403(A) nor 404(B) avail him."). 

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting the testimony at 

issue. 

{¶ 76} However, even assuming the evidence was inadmissible, we note the trial 

court "minimized any potential prejudice" by providing a limiting instruction to the jury. 

State v. Powih, 12th Dist. No. CA2016-11-023, 2017-Ohio-7208, ¶ 27-28. Specifically, the 

trial court instructed the jury that it could not consider evidence of other crimes "to prove 

the character of the defendant in order to show that he acted in accordance with that 

character." (Tr. Vol. V at 878.) It is "presumed the jury followed those instructions." 

State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, ¶ 23. As also noted, the trial court 

precluded the state from arguing that drug use was a motivation for the crime, and we 

further note the jury acquitted appellant of the most serious offense (aggravated murder). 

{¶ 77} Appellant's second assignment of error is not well-taken and is overruled. 

{¶ 78} Under the third assignment of error, appellant argues he was denied the 

right to a fair trial and due process when the court ordered him to wear leg restraints 

throughout the trial without adequate justification. Appellant argues the trial court never 

made any findings justifying the use of leg irons, nor did the court conduct a hearing to 

consider evidence on the need for such restraints. 

{¶ 79} A criminal defendant in a jury trial "has the right to remain free of physical 

restraints that are visible to the jurors." State v. Jackson, 141 Ohio St.3d 171, 2014-Ohio3707, ¶ 153, citing Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 628-29 (2005). That right, however, 
No. 17AP-238 20 

"may be overcome in a particular instance by the need for physical security, escape 

prevention, or courtroom decorum." Id., citing State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-

Ohio-5304, ¶ 79. Further, "[t]he decision to impose such a restraint is left to the sound 

discretion of the trial court." Id., citing State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 358 (1992). 

{¶ 80} In the present case, prior to voir dire and outside the presence of the jury, 

the following colloquy took place between defense counsel and the trial court: 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Your Honor, please, I would 

ask permission to have the handcuffs removed from Mr. 

Greene. He does have leg irons on. So, I think that's 

sufficient security for these proceedings. 

THE COURT: Okay. They can be removed. 

(Tr. Vol. I at 28.) 

{¶ 81} Thus, the record indicates defense counsel did not object to the use of leg 

restraints (i.e., only requesting the handcuffs be removed and stating that the use of leg 

irons was "sufficient security for these proceedings"). (Tr. Vol. I at 28.) We therefore 

apply plain error review. 

{¶ 82} As indicated, appellant challenges the trial court's decision to permit leg 

restraints without first conducting a hearing. We note, however, while "the Supreme 

Court of Ohio encourages trial courts to hold a hearing on the matter * * * the court has 

never required a hearing." State v. Boone, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-87, 2015-Ohio-2648, ¶ 17, 

citing State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio St.3d 353, 2014-Ohio-1914. See also Jackson 2014-

Ohio-3707 at ¶ 153, quoting Franklin at ¶ 82 ("while 'the preferred and encouraged 

practice prior to handcuffing a defendant during any phase of trial is to hold a hearing on 

the matter, we do not find this to be an absolute rule' "). Rather, " '[w]here the facts and 

circumstances surrounding a defendant illustrate a compelling need to impose 

exceptional security procedures, the trial court's exercise of discretion in this regard 

should not be disturbed unless its actions are not supported by the evidence before it.' " 

Boone at ¶ 17, quoting Franklin at ¶ 82. Accordingly, "there is no per se error because the 

trial court did not hold a hearing to address its security concerns." Boone at ¶ 17. 

{¶ 83} In the present case, appellant does not identify anything in the record 

indicating the shackles were visible to the jury, and this court's review has found nothing 
No. 17AP-238 21 

to suggest the jury was aware of the leg restraints. Under Ohio law, "a defendant, tried in 

restraints, 'cannot establish any resulting prejudice, [where] nothing shows that the leg 

restraints were visible to the jury.' " State v. Locke, 11th Dist. No. 2014-L-053, 2015-Ohio1067, ¶ 121, quoting Neyland at ¶ 114. Further, the record contains no indication the use 

of leg restraints interfered with appellant's ability to communicate with defense counsel or 

to testify on his own behalf. Thus, even accepting the trial court erred in its decision, 

appellant cannot show such error affected the outcome of the proceedings. 

{¶ 84} Appellant's third assignment of error is not well-taken and is overruled. 

{¶ 85} Under the fourth assignment of error, appellant asserts it was error for the 

trial court to introduce victim-impact evidence. Specifically, appellant argues the state 

introduced such evidence through the testimony of Fisher, who testified that Seff was a 

close friend of her family, and Seff treated her tenants like family. Appellant maintains 

there was no proper purpose for the introduction of this testimony, the clear import of 

which was to gain sympathy for Seff and prejudice to appellant. 

{¶ 86} We have previously noted that the admission of evidence lies within the 

discretion of the trial court. Hammons at ¶ 8. Further, "a reviewing court should not 

disturb evidentiary decisions in the absence of an abuse of discretion that has created 

material prejudice." State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, ¶ 62. 

{¶ 87} The Supreme Court has held "[v]ictim-impact evidence that relates only 'to 

the personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crimes on the 

victim's family' * * * is generally inadmissible at the trial phase, but such evidence can be 

admissible if it also 'relat[es] to the facts attendant to the offense.' " State v. Clinton, 153 

Ohio St.3d 422, 2017-Ohio-9423, ¶ 126, quoting State v. Fautenberry, 72 Ohio St.3d 435, 

440 (1995). 

{¶ 88} At trial, Fisher testified she and her mother were close friends of Seff. 

Fisher related that Seff "carried wads of cash," and earned her living as a landlord of 

approximately 15 rental properties. (Tr. Vol. II at 216.) Fisher explained Seff had two 

personal residences, including her home in German Village. Fisher testified as to calls she 

and her mother made to Seff's cell and home phones over the 2008 Fourth of July 

weekend after not hearing from her. After Seff's death, Fisher's mother was appointed the 

executor of Seff's estate, and Fisher assisted her mother in handling estate matters. 
No. 17AP-238 22 

Fisher testified as to assisting police in obtaining Seff's bank records, in which it was 

discovered Seff's credit cards had been used at a local Walmart. 

{¶ 89} Here, Fisher's testimony as to her relationship with Seff provided 

background information about Seff, including details about her personal property, real 

estate, and proclivity to carry large amounts of cash with her. Fisher's "preliminary 

testimony" also "laid the foundation" for her testimony as to her ability to assist police 

investigators in obtaining Seff's bank and credit card records. See State v. Hartman, 93 

Ohio St.3d 274, 293 (2001). Thus, we find no error by the trial court in admitting such 

evidence as relevant in "relating to the facts attendant" to the offense. Fautenberry at 

440. 

{¶ 90} We do note the questionable relevancy of the prosecutor's inquiry, during 

the direct examination of Fisher, as to the demeanor of Seff's tenants on learning of her 

death. We further note, however, the trial court limited this line of inquiry to "one 

question." (Tr. Vol. II at 221.) On review, we find "no reasonable probability" that this 

single inquiry and response affected the outcome of the trial. See State v. F.R., 10th Dist. 

No. 14AP-440, 2015-Ohio-1914, ¶ 48 (finding "no reasonable possibility that the limited 

victim impact testimony contributed to appellant's conviction"). 

{¶ 91} Appellant's fourth assignment of error is not well-taken and is overruled. 

{¶ 92} Under the fifth assignment of error, appellant contends he was denied 

effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, appellant argues his counsel was deficient 

based on: (1) introduction of crime scene and morgue photographs of Seff's body, 

(2) failure to object or request a hearing on the use of leg irons, (3) failure to object when 

evidence of appellant's status as a suspect in other crimes was elicited, and (4) the 

cumulative effect of counsel's errors. 

{¶ 93} In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant 

must satisfy the "two-prong test" under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984). State v. Carter, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-778, 2005-Ohio-291, ¶ 26. First, appellant 

must demonstrate that counsel's performance was "deficient," requiring a showing that 

"counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. Under the second prong of the 

Strickland test, appellant must demonstrate that counsel's deficient performance 
No. 17AP-238 23 

"prejudiced the defense," which requires a "showing that but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, a reasonable probability existed that the result of the trial would have been 

different." Id. at ¶ 27. 

{¶ 94} Appellant first contends his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to 

introduction of the crime scene and morgue photographs. Appellant contends (as he did 

under the first assignment of error) the number of photographs admitted was prejudicial. 

{¶ 95} On review, we do not find deficient performance by counsel as to this issue. 

The record indicates defense counsel filed a motion in limine prior to trial seeking to 

exclude the more gruesome photographs taken at the crime scene and morgue. The 

record also supports the state's contention that defense counsel worked with the 

prosecution to limit the number of photographs at trial, and the prosecution agreed to 

withdraw six of the morgue photographs during the proceedings. The record also reflects 

the coroner's autopsy photographs were not provided to the jury. Further, in addressing 

appellant's first assignment of error, we found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in 

admitting the photographs at issue based on their probative value. Accordingly, appellant 

has shown neither deficient performance nor resulting prejudice. 

{¶ 96} Appellant next contends trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to or 

request a hearing on the use of leg irons. We have previously determined, however, in 

addressing appellant's third assignment of error, nothing in the record indicates the jury 

was aware of the leg restraints. Accordingly, even if he could show deficient performance, 

appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice under the second prong of Strickland.

{¶ 97} Appellant's final claim of ineffective assistance involves the deposition 

testimony of DNA expert Tejwani. Appellant argues that, during that testimony, Tejwani 

stated appellant's DNA was matched with a swab of DNA taken from Seff's vehicle due to 

a match to appellant found in "CODIS." (Tr. Vol. III at 395.) Appellant cites testimony by 

Tejwani that "CODIS stands for Combined DNA Index System," which contains profiles 

from "known suspects." (Tr. Vol. III at 395.) Appellant contends the introduction of this 

testimony permitted the jury to know appellant was already in the system due to a prior 

felony conviction "of some kind." (Appellant's Brief at 30.) 

{¶ 98} In response, the state argues there was no basis for an objection. The state 

maintains the use of the terminology "known suspect" means only a suspicion of a crime, 
No. 17AP-238 24 

not an actual conviction, and that any facts regarding convictions were not before the jury. 

The state further argues that Tejwani's description of CODIS was relevant and accurate, 

reflecting the generally accepted purpose of the database, which is to identify unknown 

profiles obtained from evidence. 

{¶ 99} At the outset, we agree with the state that the source of the DNA match was 

relevant to explain the timeline in the case, including how investigators, subsequent to 

2008, obtained appellant's DNA profile and matched it to samples from Seff's vehicle. 

More significantly, we agree with the state that the reference to "known suspects" did not 

necessarily imply to the jury appellant was a convicted offender, especially in the absence 

of any facts as to how his profile may have been entered into the database. See, e.g., 

People v. Harland, 251 P.3d 515, 517-18 (Colo.2010) (trial court did not err in permitting 

agent to testify that defendant's DNA profile was in database where agent did not testify 

as to how defendant's DNA came to be in database and no evidence was presented that 

defendant engaged in any prior criminal activity). Thus, while we find unpersuasive 

appellant's claim that trial counsel was deficient in failing to raise an objection, we find no 

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had 

counsel objected. 

{¶ 100} Appellant also argues that the cumulative effect of counsel's errors resulted 

in a denial of due process. However, in order to show cumulative error, there must be a 

showing of multiple errors to cumulate, and "[w]here no individual, prejudicial error has 

been shown, there can be no cumulative error." State v. Jones, 2d Dist. No. 20349, 2005-

Ohio-1208, ¶ 66. 

{¶ 101} Based on the foregoing, appellant's fifth assignment of error is not welltaken and is overruled. 

{¶ 102} Under the sixth assignment of error, appellant challenges his convictions 

as against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant contends the jury obviously did 

not believe all of the testimony of Jenkins and Johnson, as it acquitted him of aggravated 

murder, i.e., the jury did not believe appellant purposely caused the death of Seff while 

committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery or kidnapping. Appellant 

further argues there were no witnesses to the killing and no physical evidence placing him 

at the scene. 
No. 17AP-238 25 

{¶ 103} In considering whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, an appellate court is required to "review the entire record, weigh the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences, and consider the credibility of witnesses." State v. Bandy, 

1st Dist. No. C-160402, 2017-Ohio-5593, ¶ 55, citing State v. Thompson, 78 Ohio St.3d 

380, 387 (1997). The issue in "reviewing such a claim is whether in resolving conflicts in 

the evidence, and in rejecting [a defendant's] defenses, the jury clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed." Id., 

citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). 

{¶ 104} At the outset, appellant's contention that the jury's acquittal on aggravated 

murder indicates his convictions on other counts are against the manifest weight of the 

evidence is not persuasive, as reviewing courts generally "decline to speculate that a 

mixed verdict is 'attributed solely to the jury's insecurity, confusion, or doubts as to the 

adequacy of evidence.' " State v. Washington, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-424, 2009-Ohio-6665, 

¶ 24, quoting State v. Trewartha, 165 Ohio App.3d 91, 2005-Ohio-5697, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.). 

See also State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, ¶ 291 ("it is not for an 

appellate court to speculate about why a jury decided as it did"). 

{¶ 105} As noted, the jury returned verdicts finding appellant guilty of murder, 

aggravated robbery, and kidnapping. R.C. 2903.02(B) defines the offense of murder in 

part as follows: "No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the 

offender's committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of 

the first or second degree." R.C. 2911.01(A) sets forth the offense of aggravated robbery, 

and states in part: "No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in 

section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or 

offense, shall * * * [i]nflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm on another." 

{¶ 106} The offense of kidnapping is defined under R.C. 2905.01 in part as follows: 

(A) No person, by force, threat, or deception * * * shall remove 

another from the place where the other person is found or 

restrain the liberty of the other person, for any of the 

following purposes: 

* * * 

(2) To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight 

thereafter; 
No. 17AP-238 26 

(3) To terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on the 

victim or another; 

* * * 

(B) No person, by force, threat, or deception * * * shall 

knowingly do any of the following, under circumstances that 

create a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the victim 

* * *: 

(1) Remove another from the place where the other person is 

found; 

(2) Restrain another of the other person's liberty. 

{¶ 107} The state's general theory of the case, as articulated during closing 

argument, was that Seff, upon leaving the tool rental store with hedge trimmers around 

noon on July 5, 2008, received a call from appellant at 1:28 p.m., presumably to arrange 

for work. The prosecutor, citing testimony by Jenkins that she observed Seff pick 

appellant up that afternoon, theorized appellant used the hedge trimmers (never 

recovered as evidence) to strike Seff, causing the blood splatter on the fence; appellant 

then bound Seff's wrists, wrapped a shirt around her head, knotted a ligature around her 

throat, and forced her body inside the decorative well. A short time later, appellant was in 

possession of Seff's cell phone and credit cards. 

{¶ 108} At trial, the state presented testimony that Seff was known to carry large 

amounts of cash on her person. Approximately two weeks before Seff's death, appellant 

contacted Jenkins and asked her to "act like [she] was paying [Seff] rent and push her 

down and rob her." (Tr. Vol. II at 252.) Jenkins refused appellant's request. 

Approximately one week before Seff's death, Johnson observed appellant at Seff's 

residence on South High Street, the location where Seff's body was found on July 9, 2008. 

The state introduced a receipt prepared by Seff indicating she paid appellant $50 on 

July 1, 2008. 

{¶ 109} On July 5, 2008, the last day Seff was observed alive, Seff took hedge 

trimmers to a tool rental store for sharpening. She left the store at 12:04 p.m. The state 

presented phone records indicating appellant phoned Seff a short time later, at 12:29 p.m. 

Appellant again phoned Seff at 1:28 p.m. Appellant acknowledged making the calls. 
No. 17AP-238 27 

Jenkins testified she observed Seff pick appellant up that day in her vehicle. By 2:46 p.m. 

that same afternoon, appellant was in possession of Seff's cell phone. 

{¶ 110} Appellant placed calls to Jenkins that day from Seff's phone. During the 

evening of July 5, 2008, appellant was also placing calls on Seff's phone to Greathouse. 

Over a three-day period, from the afternoon of July 5 through the evening of July 8, 2008, 

at least 47 calls were made from Seff's cell phone to either Jenkins or Greathouse. The 

jury heard testimony indicating appellant provided varying accounts of how he came into 

possession of Seff's phone. Appellant initially told Jenkins that Seff gave him the phone, 

but later told Jenkins he obtained the phone by breaking into Seff's home after learning 

she had died. Appellant told Greathouse he had found Seff's phone. 

{¶ 111} On July 6, 2008, Greathouse and another individual were utilizing Seff's 

credit cards to make purchases at various stores. Greathouse testified she obtained the 

cards from appellant. Jenkins testified appellant asked her to use Seff's "Lowe's card," but 

she refused. (Tr. Vol. II at 260.) Appellant's DNA was present inside Seff's vehicle on the 

steering wheel and the driver's side arm rest. 

{¶ 112} On July 9, 2008, Seff's body was discovered upside down in a decorative 

wishing well outside her residence on South High Street. Dr. Fardal opined Seff had been 

dead four to five days prior to the autopsy (on July 10, 2008). Seff's hands were tied with 

duct tape, and Dr. Fardal concluded the cause of death was ligature strangulation. 

{¶ 113} Appellant testified on his own behalf, denying any involvement in Seff's 

death. Appellant stated he obtained Seff's cell phone and credit cards from a "white guy." 

(Tr. Vol. IV at 683.) Appellant claimed he did not look at the cards to know they belonged 

to Seff. Appellant denied ever driving Seff's vehicle, and also denied asking Jenkins to set 

up a robbery for him. 

{¶ 114} Appellant acknowledged signing Seff's receipt book on July 1, 2008 

indicating he performed work for her. He also acknowledged that he lied to detectives 

when he told them Seff never paid him more than $30 at a time. Despite numerous 

witnesses testifying about Seff's habit of carrying large amounts of cash, appellant 

testified he "never" observed Seff "with a wad of money." (Tr. Vol. IV at 699.) Appellant 

acknowledged calling Seff on July 5, 2008 at 1:28 p.m., explaining: "I guess I was 

probably calling Alyce for work or something. I don't know." (Tr. Vol. IV at 721.) When 
No. 17AP-238 28 

asked if he lied to detectives by denying he possessed Seff's phone, appellant stated: "I 

guess it was. Yes it was." (Tr. Vol. IV at 729.) In contrast to the testimony of Johnson, 

who stated she observed appellant at Seff's residence on South High Street approximately 

one week prior to Seff's death, appellant denied he had ever been to that location. 

{¶ 115} While appellant challenges the credibility of Jenkins and Johnson, the 

jury was "free to believe or disbelieve all or any of the testimony." State v. Sevilla, 10th 

Dist. No. 06AP-954, 2007-Ohio-2789, ¶ 13. In this respect, the trier of fact was "in the 

best position to take into account inconsistencies, along with the witnesses' manner and 

demeanor, and determine whether the witnesses' testimony is credible." Id. The jury was 

also in the best position to consider the credibility of appellant's testimony, and was free 

to reject his version of the events. Under Ohio law, a conviction is not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence "because the trier of fact believed the state's version of 

events over the defendant's version." State v. Rankin, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1118, 2011-

Ohio-5131, ¶ 29. Ultimately, "inconsistencies between defendant's testimony and that of 

the state's witnesses, were the jury's to resolve." Id. at ¶ 32. 

{¶ 116} Appellant's claim that the lack of physical evidence at the crime scene 

undermines the jury's verdict is not persuasive. This court has previously noted that "a 

lack of physical evidence alone does [not] render a conviction against the manifest weight 

of the evidence." State v. Shedwick, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-709, 2012-Ohio-2270, ¶ 32, 

citing State v. Berry, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1187, 2011-Ohio-6452, ¶ 20. See also State v. 

Henderson, 9th Dist. No. 27078, 2014-Ohio-5782, ¶ 31 ("lack of physical evidence is not 

dispositive, but merely a factor for the jury to weigh"). At trial, counsel for appellant 

emphasized to the jury the lack of physical evidence from the crime scene. The absence of 

physical evidence in this case was addressed by the state's witnesses, attributed in large 

part to the fact Seff's decomposed body was not discovered until at least four days after 

the homicide. Despite the lack of physical evidence from the scene, the state presented 

other sufficient evidence which, if believed, supported the convictions. 

{¶ 117} Based on this court's review of the testimony and evidence presented, we 

conclude the jury did not clearly lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice 

in finding appellant guilty of the offenses. Accordingly, we find appellant's convictions for 
No. 17AP-238 29 

murder, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping were not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

{¶ 118} Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sixth assignment of error. 

{¶ 119} Based on the foregoing, appellant's six assignments of error are overruled, 

and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

SADLER and DORRIAN, JJ., concur. 

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