United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 05-3252

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Rex Bernard Breitbach, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: February 16, 2006

Filed: May 10, 2006 

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Before WOLLMAN, ARNOLD, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Rex Bernard Breitbach was convicted of manufacturing or attempting to

manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B),

and 846; possession of pseudoephedrine for the purpose of manufacturing

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2); and being an unlawful user

of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

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922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2). On appeal, Breitbach argues that the district court1

 erred in

admitting certain evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). We affirm.

We review the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b) for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Voegtlin, 437 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 2006). The district

court has broad discretion to admit such evidence, and we will reverse only when

“such evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was introduced solely to prove

the defendant’s propensity to commit criminal acts.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of prior crimes or acts is inadmissible to prove

action in conformity therewith, but may be admissible to prove “motive, opportunity,

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”

Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible when it is relevant to a material issue, similar

in kind and close in time to the charged crime, and proven by a preponderance of the

evidence. Voegtlin, 437 F.3d at 745. The potential prejudice must not substantially

outweigh the probative value of the bad acts evidence. Id. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of

Breitbach’s Illinois guilty plea conviction for the unlawful manufacturing of a

controlled substance. At trial, Breitbach's defense was that he was not manufacturing

methamphetamine. This general denial placed his state of mind at issue, and the

offense required the government to prove that Breitbach knowingly or intentionally

manufactured a controlled substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Accordingly, the

government presented evidence that, one month after the discovery of his

methamphetamine lab in Iowa, Breitbach was arrested and thereafter convicted in

Illinois for the unlawful manufacturing of a controlled substance. This evidence was

admissible to show Breitbach’s intent or knowledge. Further, we disagree with

Breitbach’s assertion that his guilty plea conviction is insufficient to prove that he
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committed the Illinois offense. By pleading guilty, Breitbach admitted to the factual

allegations made in the formal charging document. See United States v. White, 408

F.3d 399, 402 (8th Cir. 2005); O’Leary v. United States, 856 F.2d 1142, 1143 (8th

Cir. 1988)(per curiam). His guilty plea, then, was sufficient to support a finding that

Breitbach committed the bad act. 

Finally, the potential unfair prejudice of Breitbach’s Illinois conviction did not

substantially outweigh its probative value. The evidence was probative of Breitbach’s

knowledge and intent, and the district court instructed the jurors that in this case the

evidence could only be used "on the issue of defendant's knowledge, motive, and

intent." Jury Instruction 8. This limiting instruction cured whatever unfair prejudice

the introduction of Breitbach's Illinois conviction may have occasioned. See United

States v. Lothridge, 332 F.3d 502, 504 (8th Cir. 2003). 

The district court’s judgment is affirmed. 

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