UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) Theresa James, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil N o. 14-cv-02147 (APM) ) District of Columbia, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Theresa James, acti ng on behalf of her minor granddau ghter, V.J., brought this action alleging that Defendant Dis trict of Columbia violated th e Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). At an administrative hearing, a Hearing Officer ruled that Defendant fulfilled its obligations under the Act. Plaintiff now challen ges that ruling, asserting that Defendant: (1) failed to imple ment V.J.’s individualized education program until at least March 14, 2013; (2) failed to conduct a required comprehensive psycho logical evaluation of V.J.; and (3) failed to conduct a required speech-language evaluation of V.J. Defendant counters that its actions were appropriate under the IDEA and that Plaintiff fail ed to meet her burden of proof to show a violation. Before the court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment an d Defendant’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment. Aft er considering the parties’ su bmissions and the relevant law, the court concludes that Defendant violated the IDEA by failing to implement V.J.’s individualized education program and by failing to p rovide V.J. with a compreh ensive psychological evaluation.2 The court remands this matter to the Hearing Officer to fashion an appropriate remedy. As for Plaintiff’s contention that V.J . was denied a speech-language e valuation, because the record does not contain sufficient findings of fact to decide that question , the court will remand it to the Hearing Officer for further fact-finding. Accordingly, the court grant s Plaintiff’s Motion in part and denies it in part; denies Defendant’s Cro ss-Motion; and remands the ca se back to the Hearing Officer for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff’s granddaughter , V.J., was a student either in the District of Columbia Public School (“DCPS”) system or in a charter school for which DCPS was the overseeing local government agency. V.J. is intellectu ally disabled, making it difficult for her to learn with other students her age or participate in a no rmal classroom setting. See, e.g. , Administrative Record, ECF No. 10 [hereinafter AR], at 53-54 (V .J. has “[s]ignificant deficits” in math and writing skills that “impact [her] ability to perform a t grade level” and “interfere with her ability to participate in grade level class work.”). As far ba ck as 2007, when V.J. was just nine years old, she received a Speech and Language Evaluation which determined that she had a “severe disorder in overall language skills” and “will experience diffi culty in class with language comprehension and expression tasks.” AR at 12-13. Three years later, V.J. underwent more tests which found that she “demonstrated very low visual motor integr ation skills that are equivalent to a child who is 6-years, 3-months old.” AR at 23-24. Other eva luations found V.J. to be significantly behind her peers in development markers like verbal comprehensi on (3 rd percentile); perceptual reasoning (1 st percentile); working memory (4 th percentile); and processing s peed (0.1 percentile).
AR at 30-31.3 1. The February 2012 and February 2013 IEPs V.J. attended the Richard Wright Public Charter School (“Richar d Wright”) for the 2011- 2012 and 2012-2013 school years, when she was in the eighth and ninth grades, respectively. Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. and Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., E CF. No. 12 [hereinafter Def.’s Mot.], at 4. On February 22, 2012, DCPS convened a meeting to review V.J.’s individualized education program (“IEP”) and to set her annual goals for the u pcoming school year. Id. ; see also AR at 52. The IEP that resulted from the meeting (the “Februar y 2012 IEP”) provided that, beginning on February 23, 2012, V.J. should receive 23 hours pe r week of “Specialized Education” from special education teachers outside of the general educatio n classroom, 60 minutes per week of occupational therapy outside of the classroom, and 3 hours p er week of reading instruction in a general education setting. AR at 57-58. The February 2012 IEP was in effect for almost a full year. On February 5, 2013, while V.J. was still a student at Richard Wright, an IEP team met to review and revise the February 2012
IEP. Id . at 69. The resulting IEP (the “February 2013 IEP”) found that V.J. had an “[i]ntellectual disability,” functioned “at or near a 1st grade level” in math, could “read very basic words,” and “ha[d] significant difficulty expressing herself effectively in independent writing.” Id . at 70-73. The February 2013 IEP required that V.J.’s specialized instruct ion be increased to 26.5 hours outside the general education setting per week. Id . at 78. In addition, V.J.’s IEP team determined that she required the assistance of a “dedicated aide” to help with her educational goals. Id

. 2. Plaintiff’s Request for a Comp rehensive Psychological Evaluation At the IEP meeting held on February 5, 2013, Plaintiff requeste d that the school conduct evaluations of V.J., including a comprehensive psychological ev aluation. Id . at 66. V.J.’s school agreed to conduct the psychological evaluation, and in late Feb ruary 2013, an employee of Richard4 Wright emailed Plaintiff a “consent to evaluate form” and confi rmed in the email that “we are all in agreement on a comprehensive psychological evaluation” of V. J. Id . at 98. Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed a few days later that Plaintiff “agree[d] to a compre hensive psychological evaluation” but expressed concern that the consent form sent by Richard Wri ght did not specify which evaluations were to be administered. Id

. On March 5, 2013, Richard Wright apparently changed course and informed Plaintiff that no evaluations of V.J. would be conducted “ outside of the trien nial testing period” until a “Student Evaluation Planning meeting” could be held where data would be evaluated to confirm the need for testing. Id . at 100. Also on Ma rch 5, 2013, a DCPS empl oyee conducted a c lassroom observation of V.J. at Richard Wright. Id. at 102. The resulting written report described V.J.’s trouble s focusing in class and completing her school work, observed that the temp orary dedicated aide assigned to her was not effective, and recommended that the aide be removed

. Id . at 102-07. It also noted that the Richard Wright staff had said that “they are unable to full y implement this IEP” for V.J. Id . at 106-07. Nine days later, on March 14, 201 3, Richard Wright informed Pla intiff in writing of DCPS’ recommendation that V.J. leave Richard Wright and enroll at “he r neighborhood school . . . in the ID classroom” because her “IEP can be fully implemented there.” Id . at 113. That notice stated that, because Richard Wright “is a full inclusion school, they are unable to fully implement [V.J.’s]
current IEP.” Id . Plaintiff’s counsel objected to the recommendation to move V .J. from Richard Wright to another school and invoked “the parent’s stay-put pro tections,” keeping V.J. enrolled at Richard Wright through the end of the school year. Id . at 115.5 3. Testing and Assessment of V.J. in 2013 V.J. attended St. Coletta Public Charter School (“St. Coletta”) for the 2013-2014 school year. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., E CF No. 11 [hereinafter Pl.’s M ot.], at 4. On October 31, 2013, Plaintiff signed a consent form to have V.J. evaluated to determine whether she “[wa]s eligible or continue[d] to be eligible for special education and to determi ne educational needs.” AR at 172. Although Plaintiff signed the consent in late October 2013, ass essments and evaluations of V.J. occurred both before and after, including: a Vocational Assess ment Report on September 18, 2013, Def.’s Mot. at 6; AR at 129; a TEACCH Transition Assessment Pro file (“TTAP”) on October 2, 2013, AR at 133; a Psychological Triennial Reevaluation on Octo ber 23, 2013, id . at 145; and an Occupational Therapy Evaluation Report on December 11, 2013, id . at 175. Of particular importance to this lawsuit is the Psychological T riennial Reevaluation. Id . at 145. The document is described in its header as a “Summary of Existing Data” and lists, among other things: the sources of information reviewed; a descripti on of V.J.’s educational profile; and the author’s recommendations for V.J.’s future. Id . at 145-47. The Triennial Reevaluation stated that V.J.’s “last psychological assessment was completed in Jan uary of 2011” and reviewed the results of that assessment. Id . at 146. Notably, the Triennial Reevaluation did not reflect any new testing or evaluation of V.J. The same day that the Psychological Triennial Reevaluation occu rred, DCPS convened another meeting to review V.J.’s existing IEP and revise it if necessary. Id . at 148. Notes from the meeting taken by a representative of St. Coletta state that V.J .’s “[l]ast psychological evaluation was completed in 2010” and, despite certain scores “in the extr emely low range [,] . . . [n]o updated evaluation is recommended at this time.” Id. at 142. The IEP team di d recommend, however, that the time spent by V.J. in specialized education outside of the general education classroom should6 be increased to 29 hours per week, noting that the “[s]everity of disability and frequency/intensity of services require that student be removed from general educat ion classroom to receive services as prescribed on the current IEP.” Id . at 157. For the first time, the IEP also determined that V.J

. should be enrolled in a program aimed at allowing her to acquir e a high school certificate—rather than a high school diploma—by the age of 21. Id . at 167. A final IEP meeting was held on January 14, 2014, at which the participants concluded that V.J. continued to meet the criteria of “a student with an Intel lectual Disability as defined in IDEA” and should continue receiving “special education services at th e current rate.” Id . at 184.
B. Procedural History On July 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed an administrative due process complaint with DCPS’ Office of Dispute Resolution. Id . at 207. The complaint alleged that DCPS failed to (1) provid e assessments of V.J. upon request o f a parent or, in the alterna tive, (2) comprehens ively reevaluate V.J. in all areas of suspected di sability and/or upon parental request; and (3) implement V.J.’s IEP.
Id . Plaintiff requested relief in the form of (1) a declaration that DCPS denied V.J. a free and appropriate public education (“FA PE”) due to its failure to pro vide assessments; (2) an order that DCPS fund the requested evaluations, convene an IEP meeting to review the evaluations, and then review and revise V.J.’s IEP, as well as pay reasonable attorne y’s fees; and (3) an order that V.J. receive appropriate compensatory education. Id . at 210. In its response to Plaintiff’s administrative complaint, DCPS denied that it failed to provide V.J. with a FAPE, denied that it failed to implement V.J.’s IEP, and asserted that it completed all required assessments of V.J. Id

. at 225-26. An administrative due process hearing occurred on August 19, 2 014. Id . at 318. At the hearing, four witnesses testified: Dr. Natasha Nelson, an expe rt in clinical psychology and7 vocational assessments; Nancy Gr egerson, the Center Director at Lindamood-Bell, a program that provides services to children a nd adults with learning disabili ties; Plaintiff; and V.J. Id . at 4; Def.’s Mot. at 8-9. Dr. Nelson explained that a comprehensive psychol ogical evaluation entails, among other things, (1) interviews with the student, her parents and teachers, and (2) a battery of tests and evaluations designed to measure the subject’s IQ, her achieveme nts in reading, math, writing, and oral language skills, and her “s ocial-emotional functioning” an d “personality functioning.” Id. at 371, 374-75 (testifying that a comprehensive psychological evaluation invol ves reviewing “the scores of the tests that are administered . . . [and] maybe som e further testing.”). These tests are designed to measure how the stude nt compares to a normal personher age. Id . at 376. Ms. Gregerson, who previously met with and evaluated V.J. on A ugust 8, 2014, testified at the hearing that V.J. scored i n the first percentile range o r below in the tests that were administered during her evaluation. Id . at 426. She recommended that V.J. receive 200-240 hours of instruction at Lindamood-Bell “t o get her where she needs to be.” Id . at 426-27. Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she first heard that R ichard Wright was unable to provide the services to V.J. outlined in her February 2012 IEP at the meeting held almost a year later on February 5, 2013. Id . at 450-51. Finally, V.J. testified that she did not have a s pecial education teacher while e nrolled at Richard Wright. Id . at 492. On September 22, 2014, the Heari ng Officer issued her opinion. Id. at 3. Desp ite finding that Richard Wright “was not able to implement [V.J.’s] 2012 IE P or 2013 IEP,” the Hearing Officer denied Plaintiff all relief sought. Id . at 3-9. The Hearing Officer found that because Plaintiff “willingly” allowed her granddaughter to remain at th e school “even though it could not implement the Student’s IEP, DCPS could not be said to have den ied Student a FAPE on this basis.” Id . at 9. The Hearing Officer also found that the length of time between Plaintiff’s request8 for evaluations in February 2013 and the initiation of certain assessments of V.J. in September 2013 did not constitute “unreasonable delay” and, even if it di d, such a delay was merely a procedural—rather than a substantive—violation of the IDEA. Id . at 8. With respect to Plaintiff’s request for a speech-language evaluation, the Hearing Officer f ound that “[n]o evidence was offered” to show that V.J. required a follow-up to the evaluati on conducted in 2007. Id . at 7. The Hearing Officer did not rule spec ifically on whether V.J. was e ntitled to a comprehensive psychological evaluation. Id

. III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment A court should grant a motion fo r summary judgment “if the mova nt shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any mater ial fact and the movant is entit led to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[A] mate rial fact is ‘genuine’ . . . i f the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” on an elem ent of the claim. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The plain language of Rule 56(c) m andates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery an d upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing suffi cient to establish the existen ce of an element essential to that party's case, on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogato ries, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id

.9 B. The IDEA The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) mandat es that states, including the District of Columbia, which receive federal educational ass istance must establish “policies and procedures to ensure,” among other things, that a “free appropr iate public education” is available to disabled children. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); see also Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia , 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The statute was enacted “t o ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a [FAPE] that emphasizes sp ecial education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for furthe r education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). A FAPE requir es that each child with a disability receive “special education and re lated services that” are “prov ided at public expense” and “in conformity with the [child’s IEP].” Id. § 1401(9). School districts may not ignore disabled students’ needs, nor m ay they await parental demands before providing special education services; instead, they must proactively identify, locate, and evaluate children w ith disabilities who are in need of special education, and then develop an IEP for each such child. Reid , 401 F.3d at 518-19. As recognized by the Supreme Court, the IEP is the “primary vehicle” for implementing the go als of the IDEA. Honig v. Doe , 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988). An IEP is prepared at meetings betwe en a representative of the local school district, the child’s teacher, the child’s parents or gu ardians, and when appropriate, the child. Id . The IEP “sets out the child’s present educational performanc e, establishes annual and short-term objectives for improve ments in that performance, and describes the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet tho se objectives.” Id .; 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19).10 The IDEA requires an initial evaluation to determine if a child is eligible for special education, and if so, what services the child’s IEP should incl ude. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (a)(1). The evaluation must utilize “a variety of assessment tools and stra tegies.” Id . § 1414(b)(2). After the initial evaluation, each child must be reevaluated if the local education agency determines it is necessary or if the child’s parents or teacher requests a reeva luation. Id . § 1414 (a)(2)(A). The reevaluation shall take place “not more frequently than once a year, unless the parent and the local educational agency agree otherwise” and must be done “at least once every three years” unless the parent and local educational agency agree it is unnecessary. Id . § 1414(a)(2)(B). A reevaluation must employ the assessment tools and strategies required by § 1 414(b)(2) and consider any existing data for the child. Id . § 1414(c)(1). If the IEP team determines that a reevaluation is not necessary because no additional data is needed to determine eit her the child’s disability status or the child’s educational needs, the local educational agency sha ll notify the child’s parents of that determination and the reasons for it, as well as the parent’s r ight to request a reevaluation anyway.
Id . § 1414(c)(4)(A). The local educational agency must conduct a reevaluation if the child’s parents request one. Id. § 1414(c)(4)(B). The IDEA is violated when a school district deviates materially from a student’s IEP. Wilson v. District of Columbia , 770 F. Supp. 2d 270, 275 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation omitted). A material failure occurs when there is more than a minor discr epancy between the services a school provides to a disabled child and the services required b y that child’s IEP. Holman v. District of Columbia , No. 14-1836, 2016 WL 355066, at *2 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J , 502 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2007)). In other words, for the court to find a failure to implement an IEP, the school board or local a uthorities must have “failed to implement substantial or signifi cant provisions of the IEP.” Wilson , 770 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (citing11 Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R. , 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000)). There is no requirement that the child suffer educational harm in order to find a violation; rather, the proportion of services mandated compared with those provided is “the crucial measure f or purposes of determining whether there has been a material failure to implement” an IEP. Holman, 2016 WL 355066 at *2 (citations omitted). When a parent or guardian believ es that a school district is de nying a student a FAPE, the IDEA permits the individual to file a due process complaint and participate in an administrative hearing conducted by a hearing officer. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)-( c). When such administrative review proves unsatisfactory, eith er the guardian or the local educational agency may file a civil action in any state or federal court. Honig , 484 U.S. at 312. Courts shall review the administrative record and, should either party r equest it, any additional evid ence, and—using a preponderance of evidence standard—shall “grant su ch relief as the court determi nes is appropriate.” Reid , 401 F.3d at 521 (citation omitted). The party challenging the heari ng officer’s ruling must “at lea st take on the burden of persuading the court that the hearing officer was wrong,” and a court “upsetting the officer’s decision must at least explain its basis for doing so.” Kerkam v. McKenzie , 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Accordingly, th e court must give “due weight ” to the hearing officer’s decision and “may not substitute its own notions of sound educational po licy for those of the school authorities.” Turner v. District of Columbia , 952 F. Supp. 2d 31, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2013) (citations and internal quotations omitted). With that said, the fact tha t a court may hear additional evidence at the request of a party and base its decision on the preponde rance of the evidence “plainly suggest[s] less deference than is conventional” should be givento the hearing officer’s determination. Kerkam , 862 F.2d at 887. And a decision “without reasoned and specif ic findings12 deserves little deference.” Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Pub. Schs. , 931 F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted). Where, as here, neither party has presented additional evidence , a motion for summary judgment operates as a motion for judgment based on the evidenc e comprising the record. S.S. ex
rel. Shank v. Howard Rd. Acad. , 585 F. Supp. 2d 56, 64 (D.D.C. 2008) (citation and internal quotation omitted). If the administrative record lacks “pertin ent findings” and neither party enters additional evidence, the “court ma y determine that the appropri ate relief is a remand to the hearing officer for further proceedings.” Reid , 401 F.3d at 526 (internal quotations omitted). A district court has “broad discretion to fashion an appropriat e remedy” when a school district has failed to provide a student with a FAPE. Boose v. District of Columbia , 786 F.3d 1054, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2015). One such potential remedy is compensato ry education. Reid , 401 F.3d at 522 (citations omitted). Compensatory education is an “equitab le remedy” and must be based on “individualized assessments” of the child. Id . at 523-24. Any award of compensatory education must emanate from a “fact-specific” inquiry and must be “reason ably calculated to provide the educational benefits that likely would have accrued from specia l education serv ices the school district should have supplied in the first place.” Id . at 524.
IV. DISCUSSION Plaintiff argues that her grandd aughter was denied a FAPE in three distinct ways: (1) DCPS failed to implement V.J.’s IEP until at least March 14 , 2013; (2) DCPS failed to conduct a required comprehensive psychol ogical evaluation; and (3) DCPS failed to conduct a required speech-language evaluation. The court considers each of these claims in turn.13 A. Whether DCPS Failed to Implement Plaintiff’s IEP The first issue is whether DCPS failed to implement V.J.’s IEP during the 2012-2013 school year. There are two relev ant IEPs: the February 2012 I EP, AR at 57, and the February 2013 IEP, AR at 78. The court finds that DCPS did not comply w ith either one. The February 2012 IEP states that V.J. had an “Intellectual Dis ability (also known as Mental Retardation),” and that V .J. had “[s]ignificant deficits ” in math, reading, and written expression. Id . at 52-54. It calle d for V.J. to receive 23 hours per week of specialized instruction and one hour per week of occupational therapy outside of the ge neral education classroom, along with three hours per week of reading inside the general educati on classroom. Id . at 57. The February 2013 IEP called for an i ncrease in the number of hours of specialized instruction. Id . at 78. The Hearing Officer in this case found that Richard Wright “wa s not able to implement Student’s 2012” IEP. Id . at 6. Nevertheless, the Hearing Officer found that DCPS did not violate the IDEA because Plaintiff—V.J.’s grandmother—“allowed [V.J.] t o remain enrolled at [Richard Wright] throughout the 2012-2013 school year, despite the fact that [Richard Wright] was not able to implement” V.J.’s IEP. Id . at 8-9. That conclusion, of c ourse, presupposes that Plainti ff actually knew that V.J. was not receiving services, but chose to do noth ing about it. Plaintiff challenges that critical evidentiary link, and points out that the Hearing Officer’s finding was unsupported by any record evidence. Pl.’s Mot. at 11. The court agrees. The Hearing Officer cited no evidence— and neither does Defendant in its briefing in this case—establi shing that Plaintiff knew of Richard Wright’s failure to carry out V .J.’s IEP between February 2012 and February 2013.14 There is, however, record evidence to the contrary. Plaintiff’ s unimpeached testimony was that she only learned about the lack of services being provided to V.J. at the February 2013 IEP Meeting: Q: Okay, and I’m going to get that in a second Ms. James, but prior to that meeting that we had last February [2013] did anyone at Richard Wright e ver tell you that they were not or could not provi de [V.J.] with all those servic es on her IEP? A: Of my knowledge, the y said they couldn’t. Q: Okay, but did they – A: (Inaudible), no. Q: Right, and my question is di d anyone tell yo u that before the meeting though? A: No.
AR at 450-51. The Hearing Officer correctly n oted that Plaintiff invoked her “stay put” rights in March 2013 so that V.J. could remain at Richard Wright after DCPS sug gested moving her to another school. Id . at 6. And the court agrees that once Plaintiff requested tha t her granddaughter stay at Richard Wright despite knowing th at her IEP could not be implem ented there, DCPS was relieved of any liability for a failure to implement it going forward. But that does not absolve DCPS of responsibility for its failure to implement V.J.’s IEP from Feb ruary 2012 until March 2013. Defendant does not seek to defe nd the Hearing Officer’s determ ination that Plaintiff, through her acquiescence, somehow forfeited her right to compel performance of the February
2012 IEP. See Def.’s Mot. at 16-17. Instead, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not met her burden of proof to show that the February 2012 IEP was not impl emented. Id . at 17. In particular, Defendant points out that no one t estified at the administrativ e hearing as to the services V.J. did not receive. Id. Defendant’s argument is odd because, in essence, it asks the co urt to reject the Hearing Officer’s finding that Richard Wright “was not able to implemen t Student’s 2012” IEP. AR at 6. And although it may be true that no one testified that Richard Wright failed to carry out V.J.’s IEP15 from February 2012 through February 2013, the record contains ample documentary evidence to support that finding. For example, in an email to Plaintiff’s counsel in February 2013, a Richard Wright employee inquired whether V.J. was to be moved to anothe r school given that “we can not fully implement [V.J.’s] current IEP.” Id . at 89. An evaluation of V.J. by a DCPS employee on March 5, 2013, indicated that she is “being educated in inclusi ve classroom settings and her IEP is not being fully implemented” and that “Richard Wright PCS st aff indicates they are unable to fully implement this IEP according to DCPS LEA compliance.” Id . at 104, 106. Similarly, a document dated March 14, 2013, sent by Richard Wright to Plaint iff, informed Plaintiff that DCPS recommended moving V.J. to another school because “Richard Wrig ht PCS is a full inclusion school, they are unable to fully implement the school’s current IEP.” Id . at 113. And V.J. testified at the administrative hearing that she did not have a special e ducation teacher at Richard Wright.
Id . at 492. The foregoing establishes a “complete failure” by Richard Wrigh t to implement both the February 2012 IEP and the February 2013 IEP up to and until Mar ch 14, 2013. See Wilson , 770 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (the school’s “co mplete failure” to provide the services provided for in an IEP constituted a material failure to implement the IEP). In terms of this specific failure, this case is nearly on all fours with Lofton v. District of Columbia , 7 F. Supp. 3d 117 (D.D.C. 2013). There, the student was supposed to receive 30 minutes of occupational therapy per week, but a school official testified that “the school is currently unable to prov ide occupational therapy.” Id. at 124. Finding that “the services mandated in [the student’s] IEP cannot currently be provided at [his assigned school],” the court held that there had been a violati on of the IDEA. 1 Likewise here,

1 To be precise, the court actually found a likelihood of succes s on the merits, as the case was presented on a motion for temporary restraining orde r and preliminary injunction. Id.16 Richard Wright officials and others repeatedly admitted that th e school did not have the capacity to implement V.J.’s IEP. A vi olation of the IDEA could not be any clearer.
B. Whether DCPS Failed to Conduct a Comprehensive Psychological Ev aluation The court next considers whether DCPS was obligated under the I DEA to conduct a comprehensive psychological evaluation of V.J. and failed to do so. V.J. received an initial psychological evaluation in late 2010. AR at 26. That evaluat ion involved multiple interviews of V.J. and those close to her, as well as testing “conducted over several days and several months.”
Id . at 26-29. V.J. was found to hav e an IQ of 58, a score which “meets the criterion of significant limitations in intellectual functioning needed for a classifica tion of Mental Retardation.” Id . at 37. The results of her testing in reading, writing, and math were d escribed almost uniformly as “Extremely Low.” Id . at 38. Plaintiff argues that, despite multiple requests since the 201 0 evaluation, V.J. never received another comprehensive psychological evaluation. Pl.’s Mot. at 12. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that she requested an ev aluation both at the IEP meeti ng held on February 5, 2013, and again at a meeting with DCPS o fficials held on March 12, 2013. Id. According to Pla intiff, these requests triggered an obligati on under the IDEA for DCPS to con duct a comprehensive psychological evaluatio n—one which never occurred. Id . (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414( c)(4)(B)). The Hearing Officer agreed that Plaintiff’s demand for a compr ehensive psychological evaluation triggered DCPS’ obligation to provide one under the IDEA. See AR at 8; Def.’s Mot. at 13. She concluded, however, th at DCPS’ initial failure to p rovide such an evaluation did not violate the IDEA because, at most, Plaintiff had shown no more than a time delay in the testing. AR at 8. Pointing out that “DCPS began conducting assessments in September 2013,” the Hearing Officer found that the seven-month delay between Plaintiff’s de mand for testing and its17 implementation was reasonable under the circumstances and that, in any event, it was at most a procedural violation that did not rise to the level of a denial of a FAPE. Id. (citing Smith v. District of Columbia , 2010 WL 4861757, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2010), for the propos ition that “[p]rocedural violations of IDEA do not, in themselves, inexorably lead a court to find a child was denied a FAPE”). Defendant concedes that DCPS had agreed to conduct a comprehens ive psychological evaluation. Nevertheless, it defends the Hearing Officer’s det ermination that DCPS’ error, at most, was one of timing. Def.’s Mot. at 13-14. Defendant also argue s—even though the Hearing Officer made no such finding—that DCPS met its obligation to provide a comprehensive psychological evaluation when it conducted a P sychological Tr iennial Reevalua tion of V.J. on October 23, 2013.
Id . at 13-14. And, finally, Defendant argues that even if the Oc tober 2013 reevaluation did not constitute a comprehensive psychological evaluation, it was mer ely a “procedural error” that did not violate V.J.’s substantive rights. Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s O pp’n to Def.’s Cross Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 16 [hereinafter Def.’s Reply], at 3. The Hearing Officer’s determination, and Defendant’s effort to defend it, are misplaced. The IDEA distinguishes between a n initial evaluation of a stude nt and a “reevaluation.” See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a). An “initial evaluation,” as the name impl ies, is an opening evaluation “to determine if the child is a child with a disabil ity.” Id. § 1414(a)(1)(B). A “reevaluation” refers to subsequent evaluations of a child deem ed to have a disability. Id. § 1414(a)(2)(A). The IDEA provides that a reevaluation shall b e conducted if a local education agency determines that one is warranted, a teacher requests one , or—as occurred here—if the child’s parent or guardian requests one. Id. § 1414(a)(2)(A)(i ), (ii).18 The IDEA also sets out detailed requirements for a reevaluation

. Id. § 1414(b), (c). As pertinent here, a reevaluation re quires the local education age ncy to review not only existing information about the child, id. § 1414(c), but also to conduct addi tional testing to determine the child’s abilities and needs, see id. § 1414(a)(2)(A)(ii) (pr oviding that, if the child’s parents or teacher requests an evaluation, it must be conducted in accordance with § 1414(b), which directs the local education agency to use “a variety of assessment tool s and strategies” and “not use any single measure or assessment as the sole criterion for determin ing whether a child” has a disability). Among other testing requirements, the local educa tion agency must “use technically sound instruments that may assess the relative contribution of cognitive and behavior factors, in addition to physical or developmental factors.” Id. § 1414(b)(2)(C). In other words, a reevaluation requires a new round of tests and a nalysis to evaluate the chil d. The Psychological Triennial Reevaluation of V.J. administered i n October 2013 fell well short of the IDEA’s reevaluation requirements and did not, as D efendant contends, rise to the level of a “comprehensive psychological evaluation.” AR at 145. A s ubheading that appears on the Reevaluation itself confirms that it is merely a “Summary of Ex isting Data.” Id . The Reevaluation notes that V.J.’s “last psychological assessment was completed in January of 2011,” describes those results, and recommends tha t she continue to receive spec ial education services. Id . at 146- 47. Most importantly, the Psycho logical Triennial Reevaluation did not involve any new testing or assessment of V.J. Further, Plaintiff’s psychology expert, Dr. Natasha Nelson, tes tified at the administrative hearing that a comprehensive p sychological eval uation includes testing that evaluates, among other things, the child’s IQ; achievements in reading, math, wr iting, oral language skills; and, social-emotional and personality functioning. AR at 371, 374-7 5. She testified that for children—19 like V.J.—with intellectual disa bilities, it would be “routine” to order an “adaptive evaluation,” which would include an “adaptive behavior assessment system,” s uch as “a Vineland or an ABASII.” AR at 375. It is apparent from the face of the Psycholog ical Triennial Reevaluation that none of this was done for V.J. in October 2013. Ultimately, DCPS ev en conceded at the administrative hearing that, despite admitting that it had to do a comprehensi ve psychological evaluation, it had not yet conducted one. AR at 522 (stating in closing: “DCPS o ffered to do [a comprehensive psychological evaluation]. DCPS has not had an opportunity to complete a comprehensive psychological assessment for the student.”). Because it involv ed no new testing or analysis, the October 2013 Reevaluation did not constitute a comprehensive ps ychological evaluation Defendant’s contention that its failure to provide a comprehen sive psychological evaluation was only a procedural error and not a denial of a FA PE is, to say the least, confounding. The role of an evaluation “is to contribute to the development of a sound IEP.” Harris v. District of Columbia , 561 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. 2008). “[C]ontinual evaluatio ns [a]re necessary, and parents must have th e ability to seek red ress for a school’s fa ilure to sufficiently monitor a child’s progress under the IEP . . . .” Id . at 68 ( citing Honig , 484 U.S. at 311-12). The court in Harris found that a failure to act on a request for an evaluation of a child “is certainly not a mere procedural inadequacy; indeed, such inaction jeopardizes the wh ole of Congress’ objectives in enacting the IDEA.” Id . at 69. The same is true here. The failure to conduct a new comprehensive psychological evaluation of V.J. means that her IEP might not b e sufficiently tailored to her special and evolving needs. This potentia lly compromises the effective ness of the IDEA’s protections as they pertain to V.J. Accordingly, Defendant DCPS is ordered to provide and fund a full comprehensive psychological evaluation of V.J.20 C. Whether DCPS Failed to Conduct a Speech-Language Evaluation Finally, the court considers wh ether DCPS failed to provide V.J . with a speech-language evaluation. V.J. last received a speech-language evaluation in2007. AR at 12. Although she recognized that V.J.’s last evaluation had occurred seven years earlier, the Hearing Officer determined that “[n]o evidence was offered . . . from which the hearing officer can conclude that Student requires an additional speech-language assessment.” Id . at 6. Plaintiff argues that V.J. is entitled to a speech-language eva luation because her disability extends to the areas of speech and language. Pl.’s Mot. at 15. Plaintiff points to the findings of her 2007 evaluation, which conclude d that V.J. had a “severe re ceptive and expressive language disorder” with “severe weaknesses in receptive vocabulary and m oderate weaknesses in expressive vocabulary.” Id .; AR at 15. Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that because she asked DCPS to perform a speech-language evaluation, DCPS was obligated to per form one. Pl.’s Mot. at 15. Defendant disagrees, and argues that Plaintiff never requested a speech-language evaluation during the relevant time period, and instead only asked for one in the administrative due process complaint more than a year later. Def .’s Mot. at 13, n.2. Defendant als o contends that ther e has not “been a showing that speech/language is an area of suspected disability .” Def.’s Reply at 3. Based on this record, it is unclear to the court whether V.J. has a disability in the area of speech and language. The Hearing Officer referenced the 2007 s peech-language evaluation, but her ruling made no reference to its findings. And, while the f indings from the 2007 evaluation quoted above would seem to support a speech-language disability , the court is i ll-equipped, based on the scant record, to dr aw a firm conclusion. If Plaintiff does have a speech-language disability, it would a ppear that she was entitled to a reevaluation by DCPS as early as 2010. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B) (mandating that a21 reevaluation take place “not more frequently than once a year, unless the parent and the local educational agency agree otherwise” and must be done “at least once every three years” unless the parent and local educational agen cy agree it is unnecessary). Because the IDEA mandates a reevaluation every three years, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff is not entitled to a speechlanguage evaluation because she didn’t ask for one appears to b e foreclosed. Ultimately, however, there are not enough factual findi ngs for the court to determin e if V.J. has a speech and language disability. Accordingly, the court will remand this issue to the Hearing Officer for further factfinding to determine whether, in fact, V.J. does have such a di sability. If she does, the court thinks it obvious that she would be ent itled to a speech-language eval uation now almost 10 years after her last one.

V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judge ment is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Ju dgment is denied. This case is remanded to the Hearing Officer for further procee dings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. The Hearing O fficer shall hol d a hearing w ithin 30 days (1) to determine an appropriate remedy, including the proper amount of compensat ory education, for Defendant’s failure to implement V.J.’s IEP during the 2012-2013 school year; (2) to require DCPS to perform a comprehensive psychological evaluation of V.J.; and (3) to de termine whether V.J. has a disability in the area of speech and language and, if so, wheth er DCPS failed to provide a timely speech-language evaluation as required by the IDEA, and to dete rmine an appropriate remedy, if any, for that failure. This court shall retain jurisdiction ov er this matter to adjudicate any dispute that might arise with respect to an award of attorney’s fees. The parties shall submit a status report22 to the court no later than August 22, 2016, advising whether any further litigation will be required in this court. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: June 21, 2016 Amit P. Mehta United States District Judge