Filed 2/27/24 Ortiz v. Related Management Co. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MARCO ORTIZ,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

RELATED MANAGEMENT 

COMPANY, L.P.,

Defendant and 

 Respondent.

 B327016

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC718443)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Randolph M. Hammock, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Ramin R. Younessi, Ramin R. Younessi, 

Samantha L. Ortiz, and Christopher S. Afgani for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Greenberg Traurig, Karin L. Bomholdt, Lindsay E. Hutner, 

and Tayanah C. Miller for Defendant and Respondent.

__________________________________
2

Appellant Marco Ortiz contends the trial court erred in 

denying his request to vacate an arbitration award that 

dismissed his claims against respondent Related Management 

Company, L.P. (Related). We find that because Ortiz failed to 

respond to Related’s petition to confirm the arbitration award 

within the 10-day time limit specified in Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1290.6,1 and no circumstances justify the equitable tolling 

of that deadline or equitably estop Related from asserting that 

deadline, the trial court did not err in confirming the award. We 

therefore affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

A. The Arbitrator Dismisses All Claims Subject to 

Arbitration

In August 2018, Ortiz filed a complaint against Related as 

well as The Related Companies of California, LLC (collectively, 

the Related Parties), alleging multiple employment causes of 

action, including a claim under the Private Attorneys General 

Act (PAGA). In October 2018, the Related Parties moved to 

compel arbitration; Ortiz opposed the motion. In March 2019, the 

court granted the motion as to all causes of action except for the 

PAGA claim, which the court ordered stayed pending arbitration. 

The parties proceeded to arbitrate before the Honorable Carlos R. 

Moreno (ret.) at JAMS. 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure.

2 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history 

relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
3

In December 2019, Related moved for summary judgment 

in the arbitration.

3 Ortiz opposed the motion, Related replied,

and the arbitrator heard oral argument in December 2019. On 

February 3, 2020, the arbitrator entered a final award, finding no 

triable issues of material fact, granting Related’s motion, and 

dismissing all of Ortiz’s claims with prejudice. The award was 

served on all parties on February 6, 2020. 

B. The Related Parties Seek to Confirm the Award; 

Ortiz Seeks to Vacate It

On February 26, 2020, the Related Parties petitioned to 

confirm the arbitration award. The petition was served on Ortiz

that same day. Two days later, the Related Parties gave notice 

that their petition was to be heard on May 11, 2020. 

On February 27, 2020, Ortiz’s counsel submitted a 

declaration informing the court that it had reserved a hearing 

date of April 21, 2020, for a motion to vacate the arbitration 

award. On March 4, 2020, the parties stipulated to reschedule 

the hearing date to May 11, 2020, the same date the Related 

Parties’ petition was to be heard. On April 17, 2020, the court 

vacated the May 11, 2020 hearing dates and continued them to 

July 15, 2020. 

3 It is unclear from the record why The Related Companies 

of California, LLC did not also move for summary judgment, or 

(as described below) why sometimes a pleading would be filed on 

behalf of only Related, and other times a pleading would be filed 

on behalf of both Related Parties. However, because no party 

attributes any significance to these details, we do not address 

them.
4

On May 14, 2020, Ortiz filed a petition to vacate the 

arbitration award. On May 27, 2020, Related opposed Ortiz’s 

motion. Among its arguments was that the trial court “has no 

power to vacate the Arbitrator’s award. Mr. Ortiz deprived this 

Court of its jurisdiction to vacate the award when he failed to 

respond to Related’s February 26, 2020 petition to confirm the 

arbitration award within the 10-day filing and service deadline 

set forth under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1290.6.” 

On July 1, 2020, Ortiz opposed the Related Parties’ petition 

to confirm the arbitration award. In Related’s reply, it again 

argued that Ortiz’s opposition was “simply too late” and that the 

court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the award because Ortiz failed 

to respond to the Related Parties’ petition within the 10-day 

filing and service deadline.

On July 8, 2020, Ortiz replied to Related’s opposition to his 

motion to vacate. In response to Related’s untimeliness 

argument, Ortiz did not dispute he had missed a jurisdictional 

deadline but argued that “in anticipation that this Court might 

agree that Plaintiff’s petition was untimely, Plaintiff 

preemptively seeks relief under section 473(b).” Ortiz explained

that the timing of his petition to vacate was based on his 

counsel’s reliance on section 1288, which provided a petition to 

vacate an award was to be filed within 100 days of service of the 

award. The reply further admitted that “Plaintiff’s counsel . . . 

was unaware that if a party petitions the court to confirm an 

arbitration award, a response seeking to vacate the award must 

be filed within 10 days of the date the petition to confirm is 

served, per Code Civ. Proc., § 1290.6.” 
5

C. The Court Confirms the Award

On July 15, 2020, the trial court granted the Related 

Parties’ petition and denied Ortiz’s petition. Citing section 

1290.6, the court agreed that when a petition to confirm an 

arbitration award had been filed, “any response seeking to vacate 

the award must be filed within 10 days after service of the 

petition.” The court found that while it “could excuse Plaintiff 

from the failure to file” his request to vacate the award within 

the 10-day deadline, it declined to do so here because Ortiz’s 

counsel had “not provided any basis on which to excuse her 

ignorance of the deadline in CCP § 1290.6.” The court also 

explained that, even were it to overlook the procedural 

deficiencies, Ortiz had “shown no basis on which to vacate the 

award.”

In September 2020, Ortiz filed a notice of appeal, stating he 

was appealing “An Order Confirming Arbitration Award 

pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1285 et seq.” In 

February 2022, we dismissed the appeal, finding the record 

contained neither an appealable order nor judgment. (Ortiz v. 

Related Mgmt. Co., L.P. (Feb. 23, 2022, B307902), 1–2.) We 

issued a remittitur in April 2022.

D. The Court Enters Judgment

In May 2022, the Related Parties moved for summary 

judgment on the remaining PAGA claim, arguing that the 

confirmed arbitrator’s award meant Ortiz was not an “aggrieved 

employee,” and only an aggrieved employee could bring a PAGA 

claim. In August 2022, Ortiz filed a notice of non-opposition, 

agreeing that “if the arbitration award and court judgment on 

other causes of action are confirmed on appeal, then [Ortiz’s 

cause of action based on the] Private Attorney[s] General Act will 
6

fail on appeal.” In September 2022, the court granted the 

Related Parties’ motion. In January 2023, the court entered 

judgment in favor of “Defendants.” Ortiz timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

“Any party to an arbitration in which an award has been 

made may petition the court to confirm . . . the award.” (§ 1285.) 

Should such a petition be filed, “[a] response shall be served and 

filed within 10 days after service of the petition . . . .” (§ 1290.6.) 

The court may not vacate an award unless a petition or response 

requesting that the award be vacated or corrected “has been duly 

served and filed.” (§ 1286.4, subds. (a) & (b).) A response is not 

“duly served and filed” if not served and filed within 10 days of 

service of the petition to confirm the award. (Rivera v. Shivers

(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 82, 94 (Rivera).) It is undisputed that 

Ortiz did not file a response to the Related Parties’ petition 

within 10 days of service of the petition (instead, 78 days had 

elapsed between the filing of the Related Parties’ petition and 

Ortiz’s petition to vacate, and 124 days had elapsed between the 

Related Parties’ petition and Ortiz’s response), and that the trial 

court denied his request to vacate the award in part due to this 

failure.

Ortiz wholly failed to address this basis for the court’s 

order in his opening brief, arguing instead that the arbitrator’s 

award “violated Appellant’s unwaivable statutory rights and

contravened explicit legislative expression of public policy.” After 

Related raised the timeliness issue in its opening brief, Ortiz 

responded in his reply brief, arguing that: (a) his “case is distinct 

from the Rivera case as the lower court in this case retained its 

authority”; and (b) our Supreme Court held in Law Finance 
7

Group, LLC v. Key (2023) 14 Cal.5th 932 (Law Finance Group) 

that “a lower court may retain its authority, thereby not barring 

it from hearing an appeal on jurisdictional grounds.” 

Preliminarily, we find Ortiz has forfeited these arguments 

for two reasons. First, Ortiz did not contend in the trial court 

that the 10-day deadline was not jurisdictional—he argued only 

that the court should grant him relief under section 473 for 

missing the deadline. Generally, “ ‘issues not raised in the trial 

court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.’ ” (Johnson v. 

Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 603.) Ortiz does not contend 

that the court erred in denying his request for relief under section 

473. Second, Ortiz failed to raise these arguments until his reply 

brief in this court.

4 (California Building Industry Assn. v. State 

Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1050 

[argument not raised until appellate reply brief forfeited].) Even 

were we to consider his arguments, we would be unconvinced.

A. Ortiz Fails to Distinguish Rivera

In Rivera, the respondent did not respond to the appellants’ 

petition to confirm an arbitration award until two months after it 

was filed. (Rivera, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 88.) The appellate 

court found that, because the respondent failed to respond within 

the 10-day period specified in section 1290.6, the trial court could 

not consider the response. (Id. at p. 94.)

In his reply brief, Ortiz argued that Rivera is 

distinguishable because “the lower court in this case retained its 

authority.” To the extent we understand this argument, Ortiz 

4 Though our Supreme Court did not issue its opinion in 

Law Finance Group until June 2023, Ortiz’s opening brief was 

not filed until September 2023.
8

appears to contend that we should not follow Rivera because, in 

Rivera, confirming the arbitration award would have disposed of 

all claims before the superior court whereas, in the instant case, 

even if the court confirmed the arbitration award, the court still 

had jurisdiction because of Ortiz’s PAGA claim. Ortiz fails to 

explain, and we do not see, why this should make any difference 

as to whether the trial court could or should have entertained an 

opposition filed outside the section 1290.6 deadline. Ortiz has 

therefore forfeited this argument. (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 [“In order 

to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing 

court with some cogent argument supported by legal 

analysis . . . . Similarly, we may disregard conclusory arguments 

that are not supported by pertinent legal authority”].)

B. Equitable Tolling and Equitable Estoppel Do 

Not Apply

We are also unconvinced by Ortiz’s second argument. In 

Law Finance Group, nine days after the plaintiff had filed a 

petition to confirm an arbitration award, counsel for both parties 

acknowledged the defendant’s response was due the next day but 

“agreed to extend the time for response.” (Law Finance Group, 

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 943.) “The attorneys further agreed to 

coordinate a hearing date so that the trial court could consider 

both [plaintiff]’s petition to confirm and [defendant]’s petition to 

vacate at the same time, and to set a briefing schedule for both 

petitions corresponding to that date.” (Id. at pp. 943–944.) The 

defendant ended up filing her petition to vacate, as well as her 

response to the plaintiff’s petition to confirm, well outside section 
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1288.2’s 100-day time limit.

5 (Id. at p. 944.) While the trial court 

deemed the petition to vacate untimely under section 1288.2, it 

found the response to the petition to confirm timely under section 

1290.6 in light of the attorneys’ agreement to extend the deadline 

to respond. (Id. at pp. 944–945.) The appellate court reversed, 

holding that section 1288.2’s 100-day time limit was 

jurisdictional and could not be extended by the parties. (Id. at p. 

945.) Our Supreme Court disagreed, holding that section 1288.2 

was “a nonjurisdictional statute of limitations that is subject to

equitable tolling and equitable estoppel.” (Id. at pp. 959–960.) 

Our high court remanded the case to the appellate court to 

consider “whether equitable considerations should excuse 

[defendant]’s failure to comply with the statutory deadline.” (Id.

at p. 960.)

Though not entirely clear, Ortiz appears to be arguing that 

we should analogously hold that section 1290.6’s 10-day limit is 

also not jurisdictional, and thus the court could have considered 

his request to vacate the arbitration award despite his untimely 

filing. We disagree.

Ortiz has provided, and we have found, no cases applying 

Law Finance Group’s holding to section 1290.6. But we need not 

decide whether the time limit provided in section 1290.6 is 

jurisdictional. Assuming, without deciding, that it is not, Law 

Finance Group dictates we must then consider whether the 

deadline was equitably tolled, or whether equitable estoppel

5 (§ 1288.2 [“A response requesting that an award be 

vacated or that an award be corrected shall be served and filed 

not later than 100 days after the date of service of a signed copy 

of the award”].)
10

prevented the Related Parties from asserting it. Neither 

equitable doctrine applies.

Unlike in Law Finance Group, Ortiz and the Related 

Parties did not agree to extend the deadline to file a response to 

the petition to confirm. Indeed, Ortiz admitted that he failed to 

file a timely response to the Related Parties’ petition because his 

counsel “was unaware that if a party petitions the court to 

confirm an arbitration award, a response seeking to vacate the 

award must be filed within 10 days of the date the petition to 

confirm is served, per Code Civ. Proc., § 1290.6.” The trial court 

found this to be an invalid excuse and Ortiz has not argued it 

erred in doing so.

Instead, Ortiz argues that, within ten days of the Related 

Parties’ petition, he reserved a hearing date for his petition to 

vacate the award, then submitted an oral stipulation to the court 

to reschedule the petition to vacate to the same day as the 

hearing for the Related Parties’ petition to confirm the award, 

and finally filed the petition to vacate within the 100-day limit 

set forth in section 1288.2. We are unpersuaded.

While Ortiz did file his petition to vacate within the 100-

day deadline, “[i]f a petition to confirm the award is filed fewer 

than 90 days after an award is served, a competing request to 

vacate or correct the award—whether styled as a response to the 

petition to confirm or as a standalone petition—must be filed and 

served within 10 days of service of the petition to confirm, even if 

that due date is less than 100 days after service of the award.” 

(Darby v. Sisyphian, LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1110, 

italics in original, fn. omitted.) To hold otherwise “would 

effectively negate the 10-day deadline since any party who 
11

missed the 10-day deadline could simply restyle their untimely 

response as a standalone petition . . . .” (Id. at p. 1110, fn. 7.)6

Nor does Ortiz explain why informing the Related Parties 

that he had reserved a hearing date for his petition to vacate, or 

stipulating to move that hearing date to the same day as the 

Related Parties’ petition to confirm, would either equitably toll 

section 1290.6’s 10-day deadline or equitably estop the Related 

Parties from asserting that his failure to comply with that 

deadline rendered his untimely response fatally deficient. 

Neither action hindered Ortiz from filing his opposition in a 

timely manner, nor reasonably led him into thinking he need not 

do so.

Because we find the trial court did not err in denying 

Ortiz’s request to vacate the arbitration award due to the 

untimeliness of his response filing, we need not and do not 

consider his other contentions of error on appeal.

6 Our Supreme Court explicitly declined to address this 

issue in Law Finance Group. (Law Finance Group, supra, 14 

Cal.5th at p. 947, fn. 2 [“We need not and do not decide whether a 

party that fails to file a timely response under section 1290.6 may 

nevertheless request vacatur in a petition to vacate filed within 

the limitations period of section 1288”].)
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs 

on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

WEINGART, J.