### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT May 2 8, 2004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ _ N o. 01- 1386 4

____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 00-01855 -CV -A R-J MIC HAEL HO LLOMAN, on b eh al f of

and a s N ex t F ri en d of

his son , Michael H ollom an P la int if f- Appe llant, ve rs us GEORGE HARLAN D, FAW N ALLRED, D ef en dants -Appe lle es ,

____ ____ ____ N o. 01- 1509 4

____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 00-01855 -CV -A R-J MIC HAEL HO LLOMAN, Jr., P la int if f- Appe llant, ve rs usHonora ble Robert E. Cowen, United States Circuit J udg e for the Third Circuit, sitting by * desig nation. 2 WALKER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, D efendant-Appellee.

____ ____ ____ Appeals fr om

the United State s District Court f o r th e N o rth e rnD i s tr i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ (M ay 2 8, 200 4) Be fo re T JO FL A T , W IL SO N and C O W EN , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. * TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e: I. Michael H ollom an, a

form er student at Par

rish High School in W alker Co unty , A la

bam a, f ile d a§ 19 83 s uit

a ga ins t F awn A llr ed , his e co nom ic s and gove rn m en t t ea ch er ; G eo rg e H ar land, the sc hool pr inc ipa l; an d th e W al ke r Co unty Board of E ducation (“ School Board”), which oversawthe school. He claim ed that his right s under the First Am endm ent’ s Speech Clause wer e violated when A llred an d H ar land p uni she d hi m f or sil en tly r ai sin g hi s f

ist dur ing the da ily

f la g sa lut e instead of reciting the Pledge of A llegiance with the re st of his class. H e further cl ai m s th at

his E sta bli shm en t C lause r igh ts w er e vio la te d by A llr ed ’ s da ily

“ ri tua l”3

of c ondu ct ing asil en t m om en t of pr ay er . H e soug ht b othle ga l and e qui ta ble rel ie f. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d sum m ar y j udgm en t onboth c la im s to A llr ed and Harland on qu alified im

m unitygrounds . In a separ ate opinion , it granted summ ary j udgm ent to the School Board, concluding th at H ollom an failed to articulate a vio la tio n of

his c onst itutio na l r igh ts o r de m onstrate aw ay in w hic h th e Bo ar d ( as a m un ic ip al go ve rn in g e nt it y ) co ul d b e h el d l iabl e fo r th e act s at is su e h ere. Hol lo m an ap pe al s b ot h ru li ng s. Subpart A of

this Part exam ines the facts supportin g Hollom an’ s Speech Cl au se c la im . S ubpart

B expla ins his E sta

bli shm en t C lause a lle ga tio ns. S ubpart C sets forth the fram ew ork of state statutes and School Board regulations im plicated by H oll om an ’ s c la im s, and S ubpart D de lve s in to the pr oc ed ur al his tor

y of thi s ca se in gr eate r de ta il. T hr ough out thi s di sc uss ion , be ca

use w e ar e re vie w ing gr an ts o f sum

m ar y j udgm en t t o th e de fe ndants , w e vie wthe e vid en ce in the li ght m ost f av or ab le to the pla int if

f. S ee Joh nsonv. G ove rn or of F lor ida , N o. 02- 1446 9, 2003 U. S. App. LE XI S 25859 , at *3 (11th Cir. De c. 19, 2003). A.We use the terms “ Pledge of Alleg iance ” and “ flagsalute” inter chang eably . 1 4 H oll om anc ont en ds tha t A llr ed and H ar land v iol at ed

his F ir st Am en dm en t ri ght to fr ee spe ec h ( as inc or

por at ed a ga ins t the state s th ro ugh the F ourte en th A m en dm en t’ s D ue P ro ce ss C lause ) by tr eatin g hi m

a dve rs el y

be ca use he sil en tly raised his fist during the flag salute instead of rec iting the Pledge of A llegiance. 1 T o un de rs tand wha t ha

ppe ne d, it is ne ce ssary

to co nsi de r the ir

tr eatm en t of an oth er stu de nt, Joh n M ic ha el H utt o, the day be fo re the ir

c onf ro ntatio n w ith Hol lo m an . 1. A llr ed taught he r E co nom ic s and G ove rn m en t c la ss i n th e fi rs t pe ri od o f ea chday , dur ing w hic h ti m e the P le dge of A lle gianc e w as r ec ite d ov er the sc hool int er co m sy ste m . I t w as c ust om ar y f or stu de nts to stand b y

the ir de sks , w iththe ir hands ov er their hearts, and recite the pledge. D ur ing the f

la g sa lut e on M ay

16, 200 0, H utt o r em ai ne d si le nt w ithhis hands in h is p oc ke ts, w ith out c au sin g adis tur

banc e. Whe n A llr ed

a ske d hi m

w hy he w as not

part ic ipatin g inthe f

la g sa lut e, H utt o r es pond ed that he “ didn’ t w an t t o say it , he didn’ t have to say

it , and h e ha dn’ t sa id i t f or am onth. ” A llr ed

state d,5

“ You don’t w ant to say

the pledge and the United States A ir Forc e A cadem y has gi ve n youa sc ho la rs hi p? ,” th en co nt in ue d c la ss . At l un ch th atda y , All redto ldHarl an d o f Hut to ’s refu sa l t o s ay th e p le dg e. H ar land b ec am e ve ry

angr y and m et w ithA llr ed , H utt o, and V ic e Pr inc ipa l Ja son Ad k i n s i nh i s o ff

i ce . Ha rl an dt o l dHu t t o th at h e w as d i s ap p o i n t edi nHu t t o ’s re fu s al t o s al u t e t h e f

l ag , a n dth re at en edt o re p o rtth e i n ci d en tt o b o th Hu t t o ’s recr uiter at the A ir Forc e A cadem y as w ell as the Congressm an who had re co m m en de d H utt o to the A ca de m y . H ar land a lso or de re d H utt o to apol ogi ze to All redan d h er cl as s fo r refu si ng to sal ut e th e fl ag . Later that day , H arland w ent to Hutto’ s phy sics class (in which H ollom an w as astu de nt) and d ec lare d th at “ any one w ho j oin ed

in [H utt o’ s] pr ote st and re fu se d to say

the ple dge or

c om m itt ed sim ilar ac tio n w oul d be pun ish ed . ” T he fo llo w ing day , H utt o r ec ite d th e Pl ed ge of A lle gianc e w iththe r es t of the c la ss, an d t he da y

aft er t ha t h e ap ol og iz edto All redan d h er s tu de nt s. 2. D ur ing the f

la g sa lut e on the day

a ft er the H utt o in ci de nt, H oll om ansto od w iththe oth er

stu de nts in A llr ed ’ s c la ss, but did not r ec ite the P le dge of A lle gianc e. I nst ea d, he sil en tly r ai se d hi s f

ist in the a ir w hil e the r es t of

the c la ss6

reci te d t he pl ed ge ; o nc e th e p le dg e was ov er, h e sa t d own li ke ev eryone els e. He did no t say

anything , touch any

other students , disrupt the class, or obstruct any one ’ s vi ewof

the f la g. A llr ed , how ev er , im m ed ia te ly c ha sti se d hi m

in fr ont of the class, say ing th at he had acted inappropriately and “ disrespectful[ly ] ,” and that sh e was “ di sapp oi nt ed .” Sh e th en st art edcla ss in he r no rm al fas hi on . L at er that day , A llr ed

inf orm ed H ar land o f w ha t ha

ppe ne d, and H ar land summ oned Allred and H ollom an into th e principal’ s office. H ollom an explained that he ha d r ai se d hi s f

ist “ in p ro te st o f w ha t ha

ppe ne d to [ H utt o] . ” H ar land t old H oll om an“ howdis ap poi nte d he w as , and tha t he f el t tha t he ha d f

ai le d te ac hin g Michael H ollom an responsib ility , m orals and values.” H e also inform ed H oll om anthat he w oul d have to se rv e thr ee day s’ de te nti on and c oul d no t r ec ei ve his dip lom a until after he c om pleted his pu nishm ent. I n additio n, H arland required Hollom an to apolog ize to A llred’ s class. W hen Hollom an left H arland’ s office, H ar land c al le d H oll om an ’ s m oth er , e xpl ai nin g “ that he w as too m ad and u pse t t o puni sh Michael at the tim e because he m ay hurt Michael.” Si nc e gr ad

ua tio n w as that F ri day , the re w as not e noug h ti m e le ft

in the sc hool y ear fo r H oll om anto se rv e his de te nti ons w hil e sti ll be ing able to re ce ive his dip lom a on g ra duatio n day . H ar land c onse que ntl y of fe re d H oll om anthe7

oppo rtunity

to rece ive a paddling instead. H ollom an agreed and, w ith Allred watc hi ng , was p ad dl edby H arl an d. B. A llr ed be gan he r E co nom ic s and G ove rn m en t c la ss a lm ost e ve ry day by asking, “ Does any one have any pray er r equests? ” A fter her students offer ed vari ous de dic at ion s, A llr ed w oul d ho ld a

m om ent of

sil en ce . A llr ed

f re que ntl y ope ne d th is m om en t of

sil en ce by

say ing “ L et

us p ray , ” an d of

te n e nde d it

by say ing “ A m en . ” A llr ed

e xpl ic itl y

state s th at

ove r the 199 9- 2000 sc hool y ear, thi s pr ac tic e be cam e a da ily

“ ri tua l. ” S he ne ve r tol d he r stu de nts that the y w er e fr ee to le av e the r oom

dur ing e ith er

he r pr ay er

r eq ue sts or the sub se que nt m om en t of si le ntpra y er. One day , V ice Pr inciple Adkins sat in on her class and personally observed thi s ph en om en on. Whe n A llr ed a tte m pte d to be ginhe r ec onom ic s le sso n, one of he r stu de nts r ai se d he r hand and r em ind ed A llr ed that sh e ha d f

or gotte n to e lic it he r cu sto m ar

y pr ay er r eque sts . A t tha t po int , A llr ed too k pr ay er

r eque sts f

ro m the class, then com

m enced a m om ent of silence by say ing, “ Le t us pray .” O n another occasion, at the c onclusi on of the m om ent of silence, Allre d perm itted one of her st ud en ts to readalo uda pa ss ag e fro m th e Bi bl e.8 C. T h e e v e n t s i nth i s c a s e d i dn o to c c u r i nav a c uu m. I n1 9 9 5 , th e A l ab a ma state le gis la tur e en ac te d astatut e w hic h r equir ed the S ta te Bo ar d of

E duc at ionand al l l oc al sc hool board s to de ve lop and i m

ple m en t . . . ac om

pr eh en siv e ch ar ac te r ed

uc at ion pr ogr am f or a ll gr ad es to co nsi st o f not le ss than te n m inu te s of ins tr uc tio n pe r day

f oc usi ng u pon the stu de nts ’ de ve lop m en t of the f o l l o w i n g c h ar a c t e r

tr a i t s : c o u r a g e , p a tr i o t i s m, c i t i z e n s h i p , h o n e s ty, fairness, respect f

or others, kindness, cooperation, self- respect, selfc o n tr o l , c o u rt e s y, c o mp a s s i o n , t o l e r an c e , d i l i g e n c e , g e n e r o s i ty, punc tua lity , c le an lin es s, c he er fu lne ss, sc hool pr ide , r es pe ct f or the en vir onm en t, pa tie nc e, c re at ivi ty , spo rt sm an shi p, loy al ty , and pe rs ev er an ce . E ac h pl anof ins tr uc tio n sh al l i nc lud e the P le dge of A lle gianc e to the A m er ic anf la g. A la . Co de § 16 -6 B- 2( h) . T his lawm ad e da ily r ec itatio n of

the P le dge of Allegiance a

part of the char acter

education program

the Le gislature required local school b oards to im

plem ent. Aseparate statute, however , e m phasized that stu de nts sho uld

not be f or ce d to r ec ite the ple dge . S ee A la . Co de § 16 -4 3- 5 ( “ T he St at e Bo ar d of

E duc at ionsha ll af

fo rd a ll stu de nts a tte ndi ng p ubl ic kin de rg ar te n, pr im ar y and s ec ondary

sc hool s th e oppo rt

uni ty ea chsc hool day

to vol unt ar ily reci te th e p le dg e o f al le gi an ce t o t he Uni te d S ta te s fl ag .” (em ph as is ad de d) ). T o im ple m en t the se r equir em en ts, L ar ry Banks, the S upe ri nte nde nt o f the W alker County

School District, sent a letter on behalf of the W alker County Board9

of E ducation to all the principals in the dis trict, stating, “ [E ] ach school sy stem m ust inc or por at e a Ch ar ac te r E duc at ionP lan whic h w ill c onsi st o f 10 m inu te s of instructio n per day

in various areas, such as, the P ledge of Allegiance . . . . E ach day m ust inclu de the Pledge of A llegiance and then other areas a s m entioned as y ou determ ine at y our school .” Banks also sent each principal a form to com plete to specify

how eac h sc hool int en de d to inc or

por at e int o it s c ur

ri cu lum the c hara ct er -e duc at ion re qui re m en ts s et

f orth a bove . T he m em o di re ct ed , “ Pl ea se be ginto m ak e plans an d be pr ep ar ed

to subm it y our

loc al Ch ar ac te r E duc at ionP lan [ to the c ounty sc hool board ] w hic h m

ust be f or w ar de d to the S ta te S upe ri nte nde nt’ s O ff ic e. ” T he Co u n ty Sc h o o l Bo ar dap p ar en t l y h adt o ei th erre v i ew o r ap p ro v e e ac h s ch o o l ’s charac ter education plan before it w as forw arded to the State. A llred contends th at he r da ily m om en t of

sil en t pr ay er

w as c ondu ct ed

in part ia l f

ulf ill m en t of the se ch ar ac te r ed

uc at ionr equir em en ts— it w as int en de d to te ac h c om pa ssi on. D. O n Ju ly 3, 200 0, H oll om anand H utt o f ile d ac la ss a ct ionsui t un de r 42 U . S. C. § 19 83 i n th e N orthe rnD istri ct of A la bam a ag ai nst

the W al ke r Co unty Bo ar d of E duc at ion , H ar land, A dki ns, and A llr ed . T he y a lle ge d th at

the ir F ir st10

A m en dm en t r igh ts h ad

be envio la te d be ca

use the y ha d be enc ha sti se d, thr eate ne d, and pun ished for ref

using to say

the Pledge of A llegiance. They also claim ed that A llr ed ’ s pr ac tic e of

sol ic iti ng p ray er

r eque sts and s ettin g a sid e a m om en t of sil en ce f or pr ay er vio la te d th e E sta

bli shm en t C lause . T he c om pla int sou ght co m pe ns at ory an d p un it iv e d am ag es , as wel l as de cl arat ory an d i nju nc ti ve rel ie f. Af ewm onths l at er , an am en de d c om pla int w as f ile d; i t w as sub stanti al ly identical to the origin al except H utto was no long er a party . The district court dis m iss ed Ja son A dki ns a s ade fe ndant ( w ithH oll om an ’ s c onse nt) , and d ec lin ed to cert ify the cla ss act io n. Ho ll om an do es no t ap pe al eit he r of th es e ru li ng s. In their answe r to Hollom an’ s am ended com plaint, Allre d and Har land cited qua lif ie d im m uni ty a s an a ff irm at ive de fe nse . T he y

late r m ove d th e co urt f

or sum m ar y j udgm en t onqua lif

ie d im m uni ty gr ound s. T he c ourt gr an te d th ei r m otion and dism issed them from the case. It concluded that Hollom an’ s Speech Cl au se a lle ga tio ns d id n ot c onst itute aF ir st Am en dm en t vi olatio n, and c er ta inl y no t a v io la ti on of arig htth atwas “ cl earl y est ab li sh ed ” atth e ti m e o f th e in ci de nt s. The c ourt also rej ected H ollom an’ s Establishm ent Clause claim s, stating there w as no E le ve nthCi rc uit

pr ec ed en t duri ng the 199 9- 2000 sc hool y ear that “ cl earl y established” a m om ent of silence for pray er a s being un constitu tional. H ollom anTh e c ourt ’s op ini on dis mis se d a ll o f H oll oma n’ s c on sti tut ion a l c la ims a g a ins t bo th 2 de fe nd ants wi th p re

jud ic e . It e nte re d a

fi na l ju dg me nt i n f

avo r o f A llr e d a

nd Ha rl and purs ua nt t o F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 4( b) , r e nd e ri ng its or de r i mme diate ly

a pp e a la ble . T he a

pp e a l w a s d oc ke te d in this court as No. 01-13864. This appea l was docke ted as No. 01- 15094. 3 11 ap pe al ed the c ourt’ s de ci sio n to gr an t A llr ed and H ar land s um

m ar y j udgm en t on qua lif ie d im m uni ty gr ound s. 2 Following the dis trict court’ s dism issal of Hollom an’ s claim s against Allred and Har land, the Board of Education also sou ght su m m ary j udgm ent. T he court gr an te d th e Bo ar d’ s m oti on, c onc lud ing that H oll om anha d no t a lle ge d f ac ts sufficient to holdthe Board liable under § 1983. Hollom an appeals this rulin g as w el l, arg uin g th at

he state d va lid

c la im s a ga ins t the S ch ool Bo ar d. 3 Inthe se c onso lid at ed

appe al s, w e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt or de rs gr an tin g the defendants summ ary

j udgm ent. P art II of this opi nion explains why the district court err ed in granting Allre d and Har land summ ary j udgm ent on qu alified im m unitygrounds against Hollom an’ s Speech Clause claim s. P art II I shows that A llr ed is not e ve n po te nti al ly

e nti tle d to sum

m ar y j udgm en t onqua lif

ie d im m uni ty gr ound s a ga ins t H oll om an ’ s E sta bli shm en t C lause c la im s be ca use she ha s no t established as a m atter of law that, in hold ing her daily m om ent of silent pray er, she was e ngaged in a dis cretionary function of her j ob. Part IVassesses Hollom an’ s underly ing Establishm ent Clause claim , c onclud ing th at he hasWe i nc lud e thi s d isc us sio n b e c a us e a le g a l de te rm inatio n th at hi s c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts 4 wer e violated is a ne cessa ry predic ate to allowinghis suit aga inst the School Boar d to proce ed. A supervisor, of

course , may

be held r esponsible under either or both theories. See 5 Br own v. Crawf

ord, 906 F .2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990) (“ Supervisory liability occur s either w h e nth e s u

p e r v i s o r p e r s o n a l l y p art i c i p at e s i nth e a l l e g e d c o n s t i tu t i o n a l v i o l at i o n[ d i r e c tl i a b i l i ty] or whe n there is a ca

usal conne ction betwee n actions of the supe rvising of ficial a nd the alleg ed constitutional deprivation [supervisoral liability ].”). 12 introdu ced evidence sufficie nt to support a determ ination that a clearly established ri ght ha s be envio la te d. P ar

t Vdis cu sse s ho wH oll om anha s su cc es sf ull y 4 ar tic ulate d se ve ra l the or ie s un de r w hic h th e Sc hool Bo ar d m ay be he ld l ia

ble f or th e Sp eech an d Es tabl is hm en t Cl au se vi ol at io ns , whi le PartVI bri efl y co nc lu de s. II. Se ct ion198 3 pr ovi de s: E ve ry pe rs on who, und er

c olo r of any statut e, or din an ce , r eg ulatio n, cu sto m , or

usa ge of any S ta te . . . sub

j ec ts, or c au se s to be sub

j ec te d, any c iti ze n of

the U nit ed

S ta te s . . . to the de pr ivatio n of any r igh ts, pr ivi le ge s, or

im m uni tie s se cure d by

the Co nst itutio n and l aw s, sha ll be li ab le to th e p art y

in jure d i n a n a ct io n a t l aw [o r] sui t i n e qu it y . . . . 42 U . S. C. § 19 83. T he re are tw o w ay s inw hic h an in div idu al m ay be he ld l ia

ble under § 198 3—he m ay

be sued for his own personal actions (“ direct liability ”), or, under certain lim ited circum stances, f or the actions of his subordinates (“ superviso ral liability ”), see, e. g., Le wis v. Sm ith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988 ). 5The g overnme nt official may also seek to have the c omplaint dism issed on qualified 6 immunit y g rounds prior to discove ry , based solely on the alleg ations in the pleading s. 13 When a governm ent official is sued under a theory of direct liability , he m ay se ek sum m ar y j udgm en t onqua lif

ie d im m uni ty gr ound s. T o e ve n be pot en tia lly

6 el igi ble f or sum m ar y j udgm en t du e to qua lif

ie d im m uni ty , the of

fi ci al m ust have been engaged in a “ discretionary function” when he perf

orm ed the acts of which the pla int if

f co m pla ins . H ar lowv. F itz ge ra ld, 457 U . S. 800 , 818 , 102 S . Ct . 272 7, 2738 , 73 L . E d. 2d 3 96 ( 1982 ) (h old ing that qu al if ie d im m uni ty e xte nds to

“ gove rn m en t of

fi ci al s pe rf

orm ing dis cr et ion ar

y f unc tio ns” ). I t i s th e bur de n of the gove rn m en ta l of

fi ci al to m ak e thi s sh ow ing . S tor ck v. Ci ty of Co ra l S pr ing s, N o. 02-169 56, 2003 U.S . App. L EX IS 26415, at *16 (De c. 30, 2003) (“ Under qualified im m unityanaly sis, the public official m ust f ir st p ro ve that he w as a ct ing w ith in the sc ope of

his dis cr et ion ar

y auth or ity w he n th e al le ge dly

unc onst itutio na l a ct s too k pl ac e. ” (e m

pha sis a dde d) ). Ade fe ndant unable to m ee t this bur de n m ay not re ce ive sum

m ar y j udgm en t onqua lif

ie d im m uni ty gr ound s. L um le y

v. Ci ty of D ad e Ci ty , 327 F . 3d 1 186, 119 4 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) ( “ If the de fe ndants w er e not ac tin g w ith in the ir

dis cr et ion ar

y auth or ity , the y

are ine lig ibl e fo r the be ne fi t of qualified imm

unity .” ); see a lso Lee v. Fe rrar o, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002 ). Whil e a num

be r of our c as es om it thi s st ep of

the ana ly sis , se e, e . g. , D ennoOur r uli ng s o n th e se tw o q

ue sti on s a re le g a l c on c lus ion s th at are bin din glaw o f t he c a se 7 and may not be re visited in later proc eeding s. Consequently , once w e deny defe ndants summary jud g me nt o n q

ua lif ie d immun ity

g ro un ds be c a

us e the pla int if

f h a s a lle g e d v iol atio ns of c le arl y e sta bli sh e d r ig hts , th e de fe nd ants may no t late r a

tte mpt to r e -a sse rt

qu a lif ie d immun ity

a g a ins t tho se c la ims on

pure ly le g a l ba se s ( e .g . b y

arguin gthat th e ri g hts do no t e xist o r a re no t c le arl y established). The only

rema ining issues a

re que stions of fact—i.e., whether the plaintiff ca

n actua lly prove at trial that the alleg ed violations occur red. 14 v. Sc h. Bd ., 21 8 F .3d12 67 (11 th Cir . 20 00 ); Ha ll v. Tal la de gaCit y Bd . of Educ ., 115 F. 3d 8 21 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) , bin din g S upr em e Co urt and E le ve nthCi rc uit p re ce d en t s re qu i re u s t o co n s i d erex p re s s l y th i s cr i t i ca l th re s h o l dm at t er . We ex pl ai n t hi s “ di sc ret io na ry fun ct io n” tes t i n g reat er d et ai l i n S ub pa rt I I.A. If , int er pr et ing the e vid en ce in the li ght m ost f av or ab le to the pla int if

f, the court concludes that th e defe ndant was engaged in a discretionary function, then the bur de n sh if

ts t o th e pla int if

f to s howthat the de fe ndant i s no t e nti tle d to qua lif ie d im m uni ty . C ott one v. Je nne , 326 F . 3d 1 352, 135 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) (“ Once a defe ndant establis hes that he was a cting within hi s discretionary au tho ri ty , the bur de n sh if ts t o th e pla int if

f to s howthat the de fe ndant i s no t entitled to q ualified im

m unity .” ). T o overcom e qualified im m unity , the plaintiff m ust satis fy atw o pr ong te st; he m

ust sho wthat: (1 ) the de fe ndant v iol at ed a co nst itutio na l r igh t, and ( 2) thi s r igh t w as c le ar ly e sta bli she d a t the ti m e of

the al le ge d vi olatio n. W ils on v . L ay ne , 526 U . S. 603 , 609 , 119 S . Ct . 169 2, 169 7, 7 143 L . E d. 2d 8 18 ( 1999 ) (“ Ac ourt e va luatin g ac la im of qua lif ie d im m uni ty m ust15

first determ ine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an ac tual constitu tional right at all, and if so, proce ed to determ ine whether that right was cl earl y e sta bli she d a t the ti m e of

the a lle ge d vi olatio n. ”) ( quot at ion s and c itatio ns om itt ed ). I f the pla int if

f pr ev ai ls o n bo th p ro ngs of thi s te st, the n th e de fe ndant i s un ab le to ob ta in su m

m ary jud gm en t o n q ua li fie d i m m un it y gro un ds . Apply ing th is test, the district court aw arded A llred and Harland summ ary j udgm en t a ga ins t H oll om an ’ s S pe ec h C lause c la im s. T he S pe ec h C lause of the Fi rs t A m en dm en t pr ote ct s at l ea st tw o se parate , y et r el at ed , r igh ts: ( 1) the r igh t t o free do m of e xp res si on , and(2) th e ri gh t t o b e fre e fro m co m pe ll edex pr es si on . U nit ed S ta te s v. U nit ed

F oods , I nc . , 533 U . S. 405 , 410 , 121 S . Ct . 233 4, 233 8, 150 L. Ed. 2d 438 (2001). T hese rights un questio nably exist in pu blic school s. S ee T ink er v. D es Mo ine s I nde p. Co m m . S ch . D ist . , 393 U . S. 503 , 506 , 89 S . Ct . 733 , 736, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969). H oll om anarg ue s th at

A llr ed and H ar land are dir ec tly li ab le f or vio la tin g both c onst itutio na l r igh ts g uarante ed by the S pe ec h C lause . F ir st, he m ai nta ins , the y vio la te d hi s r igh t t o be f

re e fr om c om pe lle d e xpr es sio n by

c ha sti sin g, thr eate nin g, and u lti m at el y pun ish ing him

f or f ai lin g to r ec ite the P le dge of A lle gianc e. S ec ond, to the e xte nt tha t he w as pun ish ed f or sil en tly r ai sin g hi s f

ist in the a ir dur ing the P le dge of

A lle gianc e (r athe r than f or sim ply f ai lin g to r ec ite16

the ple dge ), H oll om anc ont en ds tha t A llr ed and H ar land v iol at ed

his r igh t t o en g ag e i naf

fi rmat i v e e x p re s s i o n . F i n al l y, re g ar d l es s o f w h et h erHo l l o m an ’s expr es sio n w as c onst itutio na lly pr ote ct ed

in its el f, he ha s th e Fi rs t A m en dm en t ri ght to be f re e of vie wpoi nt- ba se d di sc ri m inatio n and p uni shm en t. W e co nc lud e that A llr ed

nor H ar land are not

e nti tle d to sum

m ar y j udgm en t on qu alified im

m unitygrounds against any of these First A m endm ent claim s. I n Su bpart I I. A , w e co nc lud e that bo th A llr ed and H ar land w er e en ga ge d ina dis cr et ion ar

y f unc tio n a t the ti m e the y

dis ci pli ne d H oll om anin co nne ct ionw ith the f la g sa lut e inc ide nt, and s o are pot en tia lly e nti tle d to sum

m ar y j udgm en t on qua lif ie d im m uni ty gr ound s. I n S ubpart

I I. B, w e dis cu ss h owthe ev ide nc e— int er

pr et ed in the li ght

m ost f av or ab le to H oll om an

—su ppor ts the conclusio n that his clearly -established right to be fre e fr om com pelled speech was vio la te d. S ubpart

I I. C m ak es asim ilar fi ndi ng r eg ar din g hi s r igh t t o e nga ge in af fi rm at ive e xpr es sio n. S ubpart I I. D c onc lud es that, e ve n if —a s th e dis se nt co nt en ds —Ho ll om an ’s exp res si on was n otit se lf c on st itut io na ll y pro te ct ed , a A llr ed ’ s be havio r ne ve rthe le ss v iol at ed the F ir st Am en dm en t be ca use she puni she d hi m

f or e xpr es sin g avie wpoi nt s he f ound r ep ugnant, r athe r than f

or any disrupt ion he pu rportedly caused (which, interpreting the evidence in his favor, wa s entirely

negligib le). Consequently , H ollom an has m ade the necessar yIn Bonne r v. City of Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 11th Cir. 1981) (en ba nc), this cour

t 8 a do pte d a s b ind ingpr e c e de nt a ll d e c isi on s o f t he fo rm e r F if

th C ir c uit ha nd e d d own p ri or

to October 1, 1981. 17 show ing s w ithr eg ar d to his thr ee S pe ec h C lause c la im s to ove rc om e A llr ed ’ s and Harl an d’s as se rti on s o f qu al ifi edimm un it y at t hi s s ta ge . A. Inm any are as oth er

than qu al if

ie d im m uni ty , a“ dis cr et ion ar

y f unc tio n” is de fi ne d a s an a ct ivi ty

r equir ing the e xe rc ise of ind ep en de nt j udgm en t, and i s th e oppo sit e of

a“ m ini ste ri al ta sk. ” S ee , e . g. , W ill iam s v. W ood, 612 F . 2d 9 82, 985 (5 th C ir . 198 0) . I n th e qua lif ie d im m uni ty c ont ex t, how ev er , w e ap pe ar to have 8 ab an done d th is “ dis cr et ion ar y f unc tio n / m ini ste ri al ta sk” dic hot om y . I n M cC oy

v. W ebster, 47 F.3d 404, 407 (11th Cir. 1995 ), we interpreted “ the term

‘ discretionary

authority ’ to includ e actions that do no t necessarily invol ve an el em en t o f ch oi ce,” a ndem ph as iz edth at , forpu rp os es of q ua li fie d i m m un it y , a gove rn m en ta l a ct or

e nga ge d inpur el y

m ini ste ri al a ct ivi tie s c anne ve rthe le ss b e pe rfo rm in g adi sc ret io na ry fun ct io n. In ste ad of f oc usi ng o n whe the r the a ct s inque sti on i nvol ve d th e ex er ci se of ac tua l di sc re tio n, w e as se ss whe the r the y are of aty pe that f el l w ith in the em plo y ee ’ s j ob r es pons ibi lit ie s. O ur inquir y is tw o- fo ld. W e as k whe the r the18

gove rn m en t e m

plo y ee w as ( a) pe rf

orm ing ale git im at e j ob- re la te d f unc tio n ( that i s, pur sui ng a

j ob- re la te d go al ), ( b) thr oughm eans tha t w er e w ith in h is p ow er to uti liz e. S ee H ill v. D ek al b R eg ’ l Y outh D et . Ctr. , 40 F . 3d 1 176, 118 5 n. 17 ( 11th Ci r. 199 4) ( “ Agov er

nm en t of fi ci al a ct s w ith in h is o r he r dis cr et ion ar y auth or ity if obj ec tiv e ci rc um stanc es c om pe l the c onc lus ionthat c ha lle nge d a ct ion s oc curr ed in the pe rf orm an ce of

the of fi ci al ’ s du tie s and wit hi n t he sco pe of t hi s au th or it y .” (em ph as is ad de d) ). O ne m igh t r ea sona

bly be lie ve that vi olatin g so m eo ne ’ s c onst itutio na l r igh ts is n ev er ale git im at e j ob- re la te d f unc tio n or

w ith in the sc ope of

agov er nm en t of fi ci al ’ s auth or ity

or pow er . A s w e expla ine d inH ar be rt I nt’ l, I nc . v. Jam es , 157 F. 3d 12 71, 1282 (11t h Cir. 1998 ) (quotation m arks and citation om itted), howe ver,

“ the inquir

y is not w he the r it w as w ith in the de fe ndant’ s auth or ity to co m m it the al le ge dly il le ga l a ct . F ram ed

that w ay , the inq

uir y is no m or e than an un te nable tauto log y . ” I n a

ppl y ing e ac h pr ong of

thi s te st, w e loo k to the ge ne ra l natur e of the defendant’ s action, tem porarily puttin g aside the fact that it m ay have been com m itted for an unconsti tutio nal purpos e, in an uncons titutio nal m anner, to an un co ns ti tu ti on al ex te nt , or u nd er co ns ti tu ti on al ly inapp ro pr ia te cir cu m st an ces . Co nsi de r the f

ir st p ro ng o f the te st—

w he the r the of

fi ci al is en ga ge d ina le git im at e j ob- re la te d f

unc tio n. I n S im s v. Me tr opol itan D ad e Co unty , 972 F . 2d19

1 2 3 0 (1 1 th Ci r. 1 9 9 2 ), “ we d i dn o tas kwh et h eri twa s wi th i nth e d ef en d an t ’s authorityto susp end an em ploy ee f or an im proper rea son; in stead, w e asked w he the r [the de fe ndant’ s] dis cr et ion ar y dut ie s in cl ude d th e adm ini str at ionof discipli ne.” Harbert, 157 F.3d at 1282. Sim ilarly , in assessing whether a police of fi ce r m ay a sse rt qua lif ie d im m uni ty a ga ins t a F ourth A m en dm en t c la im , w e do not ask whether he has the right to engage in un constitu tional se ar ch es and seizures, but whether engaging in searches and seizures in general is a part of his j ob- re la te d po w er s and r es pons ibi lit ie s. S ee , e . g. , Ma diw al e v. S av ai ko, 117 F . 3d 1321 , 132 4 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) . P ut anothe r w ay , to pa ss the f ir st s te p of

the discretionary

function test for qualified imm unity , the def

endant m ust have been pe rf orm ing af

unc tio n th at , but

f or the a lle ge d c onst itutio na l i nf irm ity , w oul d have fal le n wi th hi s l eg it im at e job de sc rip ti on . Of co u rs e, we m

u s tb e s u re n o tt o ch ar ac t er i ze an das s es s th e d ef en d an t ’s ac t at t oo h ighale ve l of

ge ne ra lity . N ea

rl y e ve ry a ct pe rf orm ed by agov er nm en t em plo y ee c anbe de sc ri be d, in ge ne ra l t er m s, a s os te nsi bly

“ furthe ri ng the pub lic int er es t. ” I f w e j um

p to suc h ahig h le ve l of

abstra ct ion , it

be co m es im

poss ibl e to de te rm ine w he the r the e m plo y ee w as tr

uly a ct ing w ith in the pr ope r sc ope of his j ob- re la te d a ct ivi tie s. C onse que ntl y , w e co nsi de r a gove rn m en t of fi ci al ’ s a ct ion s at the m inim

um level of genera lity

necessary

to rem ove the consti tutio nal taint. In20

considering whether

an act of allegedly

excessive force fell w ithin a police of fi ce r’ s du tie s, f

or e xam ple , w e do n ot a sk whe the r pol ic e have the r igh t t o us e ex ce ssi ve fo rc e. W e al so d o no t i m m ed ia te ly j um p to ahig h le ve l of

ge ne ra lity an d a sk whe the r pol ic e ar e re spon sib le f or e nf or ci ng the lawor

pr om oti ng the publ ic int er es t. W e ins te ad a sk whe the r the y

have the pow er

to atte m pt t o ef fe ct ua te arr es ts. S ee , e . g. , F er raro , 284 F . 3d at 11 94 ( hol din g, in ane xc es siv e fo rc e sui t, “ the re c an

be no d oubt

that [ the pol ic e of

fi ce r de fe ndant] w as a ct ing in hi s d is cret io na ry

cap aci ty whe n h e arr es te d [p la in ti ff]”). Af ter deter m ining that an official is engaged in a legitim ate j ob-related func tio n, it

is the n ne ce ssary

to tur n to the se co nd p ro ng o f the te st and d et er m ine whether he is executing th at j ob-related function—that is, pursuin g his job-relate d goa ls— in an auth or iz ed

m anne r. T he pr im ar

y pur pose of the qua lif

ie d im m uni ty doc tr ine is to a llo wgov er nm en t e m plo y ee s to e nj oy

ade gr ee of

pr ote ct iononl y whe n e xe rci si ng po wers th atleg it im at el y form a pa rt o f th ei r job s. See , e.g., H ar low , 457 U . S. a t 81 9 & n. 34, 102 S . Ct . a t 27 39 & n. 34 ( lim iti ng the availability

of qualified im

m unityto situatio ns where “ an official’ s duties l eg i t i m at el y re qu i re ac t i o n ” a n dt o “ ac t i o n s wi th i nth e s co p e o f a no ff i ci al ’s duties”). E ach governm ent em ploy ee is given onlya ce rtain “ arsenal” of powers wi th wh i ch t o ac co m

p l i s h h erg o al s . F o r e x amp l e, i ti s n o twi th i na t ea ch er ’s21

of fi ci al pow er s to sig n he r stu de nts up f or the A rm y to pr om ote pa tr iot ism

or c ivi c virtue , or to co m pe l the m to br ing the ir

pr ope rty to sc hool to re dis tr ibu te the ir weal th to th e p oo r so th atth ey can ha ve fir st ha ndex pe rie nc e wit h a lt ru is m . E m plo ym en t by

aloc al , c ounty , state , or

f ed er al gov er

nm en t i s no t a

c ar te blanc he inv itatio n to pus h th e en ve lop e an d ta ck le m atte rs f ar be y ond one ’ s j ob de sc ri pti on o r ac hie ve one ’ s of fi ci al goa ls thr oughuna

uth or iz ed m eans. P ur sui ng a j ob-related goal through m eans that fall outside the range of discretion that c o mes wi th ane mp l o ye e ’s jo b i s n o tp r o t e c t e db y qu a l i f i e di mm u n i ty. Under this standard, A llred—as a m atter of law—w as undou btedly engaged in a dis cr et ion ar

y f unc tio n inc ha sti sin g H oll om anf or r ai sin g hi s f

ist dur ing the Pl ed ge of A lle gianc e an d late r re fe rr ing him to H ar land f

or pun ish m en t. T houg h Allre d is not em

powere d to vio late constituti onal rights as part of her official du ti es , sh e d idha ve th e res po ns ib il it y of m ai nt ai ni ng de co ru m

in th e cl as sr oo m . The f act that she m ay

have attem

pted to keep order in the classroom in an unc onst itutio na l m anne r doe s no t c hange the f ac t tha t sh e w as f

ulf ill ing a le git im at e j ob- re la te d f

unc tio n. Mo re ove r, the w ay s inw hic h sh e atte m pte d to pur sue thi s j ob- re la te d go al ( ch as tis ing H oll om anand r ep ortin g hi m to the pr inc ipa l) —e xam ine d onage ne ra l l ev el r athe r than inthi s sp ec if ic ap pli catio n—w er e le git im at e pr er ogativ es of he r j ob. F ro m

an a lte rn at e22

pe rs pe ct ive , puttin g a sid e H oll om an ’ s F ir st Am en dm en t c la im , A llr ed ’ s a ct ion s would und oubt edly

be considered part of her duties and leg itim ate exer cises of her authority . Consequent ly , under the tw o-prong test articulated above, her a ctivities in relation to the flag salute incident we re discre tionary acts for which she m ay se ekqu al ifi edimm

un it y . For sim ilar re asons, Harland is also pot entially entitled to qu alified im m uni ty a ga ins t H oll om an ’ s S pe ec h C lause c la im s. D isc ipl ini ng s tud en ts i s a le git im at e dis cr et ion ar

y f unc tio n pe rf

orm ed by pr inc ipa ls, S ee K irkland v . G re en e Co unty Bd . of E duc . , 347 F . 3d 9 03, 903 n. 1 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) , and i n th e St at e of A la bam a, spanki ng s tud en ts i s ale git im at e part of apr inc ipa l’ s “ ar se na l” f

or en fo rc ing suc h di sc ipl ine . C onse que ntl y , the bur de n sh if ts t o H oll om anto de m onstrate that A llr ed

and H ar land are not

e nti tle d to sum

m ar y j udgm en t on qu al ifi edimm

un it y gro un ds . B. A s di sc uss ed

e ar lie r, onc e a de fe ndant e sta bli she s th at

he w as e nga ge d ina dis cr et ion ar

y f unc tio n a t the ti m e of

the a ct s inque sti on, the bur de n sh if ts t o th e pla int if f to s howthat the de fe ndant i s no t e nti tle d to sum m ar y j udgm en t on qua lif ie d im m uni ty gr ound s. T o do so, the pla int if f m ust de m onstrate that a23

re as ona ble j ur y c oul d in te rp re t the e vid en ce in the r ec or d a s sh ow ing that the de fe ndant v iol at ed

ac onst itutio na l r igh t tha t w as c le ar ly e sta bli she d a t the ti m e of th e act s i n q ue st io n. W e begin by

exam ining Hollom an’ s claim that Allre d and Har land vio lated his First Am endm ent right to be free f rom com pelled speech. S ection 1 consi ders w he the r H oll om anha s su cc es sf ull y art ic ulate d avio la tio n of ac onst itutio na l r igh t, w h i l e S e c t i o n2 an a l yz e s w h e th e r s u c h ar i g h tw a s c l e ar l y e s t ab l i s h e da tth e t i me of the inc ide nts . B as ed

on the se dis cu ssi ons, w e co nc lud e that, int er pr et ing the ev ide nc e in the li ght

m ost f av or ab le to H oll om an , both A llr ed and H ar land en ga ge d ina ct s am ount ing to vio la tio ns o f H oll om an ’ s r igh t t o be f re e fr om com pelled speech. C onsequ ently , neither defendant is entitled to summ ary jud gm en t o n q ua li fie d i m m un it y gro un ds ag ai ns t t hi s Sp eech Cla us e cl ai m . 1. T he S pe ec h C lause of

the F ir st Am en dm en t st at es , “ Co ngr es s sh al l m ak e no law. . . abr idg ing the f

re ed om of spe ec h . . . . ” U . S. Co nst . a m en d I . T he F ir st A m en dm en t, a s in co rp or at ed thr oughthe D ue P ro ce ss C lause of the F ir st A m en dm en t, N ear v. Mi nne sot a, 283 U . S. 697 , 707 , 51 S . Ct . 625 , 628 , 75 L . E d. 1357 ( 1931 ), appl ie s to state and m uni ci pa l go ve rn m en ts, state -c re at ed e nti tie s,24

and state and m

unicipal em

ploy ees, W est Vir ginia State Bd. of E duc. v. Bar nette, 31 9 U.S. 6 24 , 63 7, 6 3 S . Ct. 1 17 8, 1 18 5, 8 7 L. Ed. 1 62 8 (1 94 3) . In Bar nette, the C ourt held that th e right to be free from com pelled speech pr ot ect s p ub li c sc ho ol stud en ts fro m be in g fo rcedto pa rti ci pa te in th e fl ag sal ut e. It state d, “ [T ] he a ct ionof

the loc al auth or iti es in co m pe lli ng the f

la g sa lut e an d pledge transcends cons titutio nal lim itations on their power and inv ades the sphere of int el le ct and s pir it w hic h it

is the pur

pose of the F ir st Am en dm en t t o our Co ns ti tu ti on to res erv e fro m all off ic ia l co nt ro l.” Id . at 6 42 , 63 S. Ct. at 11 87 . Severa l pieces of evidence in the re cord suppo rt H ollom an’ s contentio n that he wa s discipl ined for failing to recite the P ledge of Allegiance. First, the day be fo re the H oll om aninc ide nt, Joh n M ic ha el H utt o w as c ha sti se d inf ro nt o f the cl as s, se nt t o th e Pr inc ipa l’ s of fi ce , thr eate ne d th at

his r ec om

m en da tio n to the A ir Fo rc e A ca de m

y w oul d be r ev oke d, and f or ce d to apol ogi ze to his te ac he r an d classm ates, sim

ply because he r em ained silent du ring the Pledge of Allegiance (w i th o u ten g ag i n g i nan y af fi rmat i v el y ex p re s s i v e a ct i v i ty). Se co n d , Al l re d ’s de posi tio n is r ep le te w ithr ef er en ce s to he r “pa tr iot ism ” an d de sir e to s ee the Am erican flag saluted in the “ proper” or “ norm al” w ay ; she was dee ply offended by the no ti on of Am eri can s n otwant in g t o s al ut e th e fl ag .25

Th i rd , a cc o rd i n g t o Ho l l o m an ’s af fi d av i t , Ha rl an di n t errup t edHo l l o m an ’s phy sic s c la ss t o e xpl ic itl y thr eate n th at

any stu de nts w ho r ef

use d to say

the P le dge of A lle gianc e w oul d be pun ish ed . F ourth, the a ff idavit s of both H oll om anand h is m ot he r st at e th athe was t ol d h e was be in g p un is he d fo r fai li ng to sal ut e th e fl ag . In de ed , H ar land t old

H oll om an ’ s m oth er

dur ing the ir

pho ne c onve rs at ionthat he ha d to w ai t be fo re dis ci pli nin g H oll om anbe ca use he w as a fr ai d th at

he ( H ar land) would hurt him . Consequent ly , ther e is m ore than enough evidence in the recor d to all ow a r eas on ab le jury to ad op t t hi s i nt erp ret at io n o f ev en ts . Al l re d ’s ac t s (i f p ro v en attri al ), as a mat t ero f l aw , v i o l at edHo l l o m an ’s constitu tional right s. F irst, a ccording to Allred’ s own testim ony , she instructed him that the re w er e onl y

tw o“pe rm iss ibl e” w ay s of say ing the ple dge , and tha t any oth er w ay of doi ng s o w as pr ohi bit ed . S ec ond, she ve rb al ly c ha sti se d hi m

in fr ont of the c la ss f

or his c onst itutio na lly

pr ote ct ed

a ct ion s ( ei the r fa ili ng t o sa lut e the fla g o r ex pr es si ng hi s o pi ni on in a no n- di srup ti ve fas hi on ). V er ba l c en sur e is a

f orm of pun ish m en t, a lbe it a m ild one . T he int en t be hin d th is a ct

w as to dis sua de him

f ro m e xe rc isi ng a

c onst itutio na l r igh t. S he sin gle d ou t H oll om anin fr ont of his e nti re c la ss, sub

j ec tin g hi m

to em barr as sm en t an d hum ili at ion . G ive n th e gr oss dis pari ty in pow er be tw ee n ate ac he r an d a stu de nt, suc h c om

m en ts— part ic ularl y

in fr ont of the stu de nt’ s pe er s—c om ing26

fr om an auth or ity

f igure w ithtr em en dous dis cr et ion ar y auth or ity , w hose w or ds carr y apr es um pti on o f le git im ac y , c annot he lp b ut h av e a tr em en dous c hil lin g ef fe ct on the e xe rc ise of

F ir st Am en dm en t r igh ts. S ee Ri le y v. N at ’ l F ed ’ n of

the Bl ind , 487 U . S. 781 , 794 , 108 S . Ct . 266 7, 267 6, 101 L . E d. 2d 6 69 ( 1988 ) (i nva lid ing a“ sc he m e” that “ m ust ne ce ssari ly

c hil l sp ee chin dir ec t c ontrave nti on of the F ir st A m en dm en t’ s di ct at es ”) ; D ic ke rs on v . U nit ed S ta te s, 530 U . S. 428 , 459, 120 S . Ct . 232 6, 234 4, 147 L . E d. 2d 4 05 ( 2000 ) (S ca lia , J. , dis se nti ng) (“ [T ] he Co urt ha s vi ew ed the im porta tio n of

‘ ch ill ’ a s it se lf

avio la tio n of

the F ir st A m en dm en t. ”) ( em

pha sis in or igi na l) . A s inthe E sta bli shm en t C lause c ont ex t, suc h “publ ic pr es sur e . . . c anbe a s r ea l a s any ove rt c om pul sio n, ” part ic ularl y

in a

“ classroom

setting, wher e . . . the r isk of com pulsi on is especially

high”; su ch m ea sur es m ay

not be use d to de te r, e ve n if

“ subt l[ y ] or

ind ir ec t[ ly ] , ” the e xe rc ise of c onst itutio na l r igh ts. L ee v. W ei sm an , 505 U . S. 577 , 593 , 596 , 112 S . Ct . 264 9, 2658 , 2660, 120 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1992). Fi n al l y, Al l re dp l ayeda majo r r o l e i nth e a d m i n i s tra t i o no f H o l l o m an ’s m ore form al punish m ent, his paddling . She re ported the incidentto the principal w iththe int en t and h ope that H oll om anbe dis ci pli ne d, w as pr es en t duri ng H oll om an ’ s qu es tio nin g by H ar land, did

not obj ec t or a tte m pt t o di ssu ad e H ar land in any w ay , w as pr es en t f

or the pa ddl ing , and m an if

es te d he r ap pr ova l of

it27

through out th e entire proce ss. For sim ilar re asons, Hollom an has also adduced suf fi ci en t e vid en ce to supp ort hi s c la im a ga ins t H ar land, the one w ho a ct ua lly sp an ke d h im . H av ing de m onstrate d th at the r ec or d am

ply sup ports H oll om an ’ s c ont en tio n that the defendants vio lated his const itutio nal right to be free f rom com pelled spe ec h, w e nowc onsi de r w he the r thi s r igh t w as c le ar ly e sta bli she d a t the ti m e of th e ev en ts in qu es ti on . 2. Barn ette , 319 U . S. a t 64 2, 63 S . Ct . a t 11 87, c le ar ly and s pe ci fi ca lly es ta bli she d th at

sc hool ch ildre n have the r igh t t o r ef use to say the P le dge of Allegiance. U nder Bar

nette, any “ reasonable person would have known” that dis ci pli nin g H oll om anf

or r ef usi ng t o r ec ite the ple dge im pe rm iss ibl y

c hil ls h is First A m endm ent rights. T hom as v. R oberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1170 (11th Cir. 2001 ) (c itatio n om itt ed ). C onse que ntl y , on the se a lle ge d f ac ts, A llr ed

and H ar land ar e not e nti tle d to qua lif

ie d im m uni ty a ga ins t H oll om an ’ s c la im s r el at ed to co m pe ll edsp eech . W e rev ers e th e d is tri ctco ur t’s h ol di ng to th e co nt rary.28

H av ing a sse sse d th e via

bil ity of H oll om an ’ s F ir st Am en dm en t c la im to be fr ee f ro m c om pe lle d sp ee ch , w e nowtur n to H oll om an ’ s F ir st Am en dm en t c la im to en ga ge in affi rm at iv e ex pr es si on . C. O ne of H oll om an ’ s a lte rn at e ba se s f or r ec ove ry und er the F ir st Am en dm en t is that the defendants pu nished h im for engaging in cons titutio nally protected spe ec h. H e m ai nta ins , in oth er w or ds, that e ve n if

the de fe ndants pun ish ed him f or sil en tly r ai sin g hi s f

ist dur ing the P le dge of

A lle gianc e—

rathe r than f

or m er el y re m ai nin g si le nt d

ur ing the ple dge —hi s r igh ts unde r the S pe ec h C lause w er e sti ll vio la te d. T he dis tr ic t c ourt de dic at ed the ove rwhe lm ing m aj or ity of it s op ini on re gard ing A llr ed

and H ar land t o th is arg um en t, c onc lud ing that “ [n ] o j ur y c oul d reasonably

conclude that ‘ every

like-situated, re asonable’ teacher or principal w oul d ne ce ssari ly

kno wthat punis hin g H oll om anf or his uno rthodo x and d e l i b e r a t e l y p r o v o c a t i v e an dd i s r up t i v e g e s tu r e v i o l a t e df

e d e r a l l aw. . . . ” ( M e m. Op., J un e 4 , 20 01 , at 1 0) . W e ar e again forc ed to reverse. Sec tion 1 shows that the evidence (interpreted in H ollom an’ s favor) dem onstrates the existence of a lim ited co nst itutio na l r igh t t o e nga ge in non- dis ru pti ve e xpr es sio n inac la ssr oom29

environm ent, while Section 2 dem onstrates that this right was cle arly established w he n th e de fe ndants c ha sti se d and p uni she d hi m . C onse que ntl y , A llr ed and H ar land are not

e nti tle d to sum

m ar y j udgm en t onqua lif

ie d im m uni ty gr ound s ag ai ns t Ho ll om an ’s Spe ech Cla us e cl ai m reg ard in g h is rig htto ex pr es s h im se lf. 1. T he Co nst itutio n gu ar an te es stu de nts ( an d a ll pe opl e) the r igh t t o e nga ge not onl y in “pur e spe ec h, ” but

“ expr es siv e co nduc t, ” as w el l. S ee U nit ed S ta te s v. O’ Bri en , 39 1 U.S. 3 67 , 37 6- 77 , 88 S. Ct. 1 67 3, 1 67 8- 79 , 20 L. Ed. 2d67 2 (1 96 8) . In Spence v. W ashingt on, 418 U. S. 405, 94 S. C t. 2727, 41 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1974), the Suprem e Court held that, to determ ine whether a particular act counts as e x p r e s s i v e c o n du c t , ac o u rtmu s td e t e rmi n e wh e th e r “ [ a ]n i n t e n tt o c o n v e y a part ic ulari ze d m es sa ge w as pr es en t, and i n th e sur ro undi ng c ir cum stanc es the likeliho od was great that the m essage would be understoo d by those who viewed it.” Id. at 410-11 , 94 S. Ct. at 2730. T he Court later libera lized this test, however, em pha siz ing that “ a narr ow , suc ci nc tly art ic ula ble m es sa ge is not

ac ondi tio n of co nst itutio na l pr ote ct ion , w hic h if c onf ine d to e xpr es sio ns c onve y ing a

‘ part ic ulari ze d m es sa ge , ’ w oul d ne ve r re ac h th e unqu es tio nably shi el de d pa int ing of Ja ck son Po llo ck , m

usi c of A rn old S ch onbe rg , or

Ja bbe rw oc ky

ve rs e of L ew is30

Carr ol l.” Hu rle y

v. Iri sh -Am ., Gay , Lesb ia n & Bis ex ua l Gro up of B os to n, In c., 515 U . S. 557 , 569 , 115 S . Ct . 233 8, 234 5, 132 L . E d. 2d 4 87 ( 1995 ). T hus, in de te rm ini ng whe the r co nduc t i s e xpr es siv e, w e as k whe the r the r ea sona ble pe rs on w oul d in te rp re t i t a s so m e sort of m es sa ge , not

w he the r anobs er

ve r w oul d ne ce ssari ly

inf er aspe ci fi c m es sa ge . A t the ve ry

le as t, H oll om an ’ s ge sture w as e xpr es siv e co nduc t. I t i s qu ite re as ona ble to inf er that at l ea st s om e stu de nts w oul d have r ec ogni ze d hi s a ct f or w ha t i t w as —apr ote st o ve r A llr ed ’ s tr eatm en t of H utt o. E ve n if

stu de nts w er e not aw ar e of the spe ci fi c m es sa ge H oll om anw as a tte m pti ng t o c onve y , his f

ist c le ar ly expressed a generalize d m essage of disagreem ent or protest directed towar d All red , th e sc ho ol , or t he co un try in g en eral . It is quite pos sible, however , that H ollom an’ s act constituted “ pure speech.” A s th e Co urt su gge ste d inO ’ Br ie n, 391 U . S. a t 37 6, 88 S . Ct . a t 16 78, e xpr es siv e co nduc t i s an a ct

w ithsig nif

ic an t “ ‘ non- spe ec h’ e le m en ts, ” that i s be ing use d ina part ic ular sit

ua tio n to c onve y

am es sa ge . H oll om an ’ s a ct doe s no t c ont ai n any

of the sub stanti ve “ non- spe ec h” e le m en ts tha t are ne ce ssary to re m ove som ethin g from the rea lm

of “pure speech” into the realm of expressive conduct. It see m s as pur el y c om m uni cativ e as asig n- langua ge ge sture or the a ct of hol din g up asig n, and in thi s respect is sim ilar to the we aring of a black ar m band, w hich the Tinker31

Co urt f ound to be a“pr im ar

y F ir st Am en dm en t r igh t[ ] a kinto ‘ pur e spe ec h. ’ ” 393 U.S. at 5 08 , 89 S. Ct. at 73 7. It does not ul tim ately

m atter whether H ollom an’ s act is chara cterize d as

“pur e spe ec h” or

“ expr es siv e co nduc t” be ca use th is c ir cu it ap pe ar s to appl y the sam e te st i n a sse ssi ng s ch ool r es tr ic tio ns o n e ith er kin d of e xpr es sio n. T his Sect io n s umm ari zes th es e p rin ci pl es an d app li es th em to th e in st an t ca se . a. As wi th all rig ht s, t he sco pe of t he Fir stAm en dm en t h as bo un da rie s. On m any oc ca sio ns, w e have a ff

irm ed the r igh t of

pub lic e duc at ion al ins tit

uti ons “ to adopt and enforce rea sonable, non-dis crim inatory regulations as to th e tim e, place an d m anne r of

stu de nt e xpr es sio ns and d em onstratio ns. ” Bay le ss v . Mart ine , 430 F. 2d 8 73, 878 ( 5thCi r. 197 0) . T his “ re as ona ble ne ss” te st i s no t the ane m ic sim ula cr um of ac onstra int

on g ove rn m en ta l po w er

f ound in the D ue P ro ce ss Cl au se ’ s “ ratio na l ba sis ” te st, se e, e . g. , W ill iam son v. L ee O pti ca l, 348 U . S. 483 , 487- 88, 75 S . Ct . 461 , 464 , 99 L . E d. 563 ( 1955 ), but r athe r a m or e ro bust

not ion of “ reasonableness” such as that applied in the Fourth Am endm ent context, see U.S. Con st . am en d IV (p ro hi bi ti ng “ un reas on ab le sea rch es an d s ei zu res ”). InBurn sid e v. By ar s, w e ar tic ulate d th e w ay

to de te rm ine w he the r a publ ic sc hool r eg ulatio n th at

c urta ile d e xpr es sio n w as r ea sona ble :32

[S] chool officials cannot ign ore expressions of feelings with which the y do n ot w ishto co nte nd. T he y c annot inf ri nge on the ir

stu de nts ’ right to free and un restricted e xpression as guaranteed to them under the First A m endm ent to the Const itutio n, where the e xercise of such ri ght s inthe sc hool bui ldi ngs an d sc hool ro om s do [e s] not m at er ia lly an d su bst an tia lly

int er fe re w iththe r equir em en ts o f ap pr opr ia te dis ci pli ne in the ope ratio n of the sc hool . 363 F.2d at 749. U nder the Burnside standard, student expressio n m ay unqu es tio nably

be r eg ulate d whe n do ing so “ co ntr ibu te s to the m ai nte nanc e of or de r an d de co rum

w ith in the e duc at ion al sy ste m . ” I d. a t 74 8; a cc or d T ink er , 393 U . S. a t 51 4, 89 S . Ct . a t 74 0 ( hol din g th at asc hool m ay

not pr ohi bit e xpr es siv e activity unless th ere are “ facts which m ight reasonablyhave led school auth orities to f or ec as t su bst an tia l di sr

upt ionof or m at er ia l i nte rf

er en ce w ithsc hool ac tiv iti es ”) ; S hanle y , 462 F . 2d at 96 9 ( “ T he te st f or c urta ili ng i n- sc hool e xe rc ise of e xpr es sio n is w he the r or not the e xpr es sio n or

it s m ethod of

e xe rc ise ‘ m at er ia lly an d su bst an tia lly ’ int er fe re s w iththe a ct ivi tie s or dis ci pli ne of

the sc hool . ”) . T his doc tr ine a llo w s sc hool auth or iti es to pr ohi bit , a m ong oth er thi ngs, “ le w d, ind ec en t, or of fe nsi ve spe ec h . . . . T he F ir st Am en dm en t do es not pr ev en t the sc hool officials fr om

determ ining that to perm it a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s w ouldunderm ine the school ’ s basic educational m issio n.” Bethel Sc h. D ist . v. F ra se r, 478 U . S. 675 , 683 , 685 , 106 S . Ct . 315 9, 316 4- 65, 92 L . E d. 2d 5 49 ( 1986 ); se e al so H ea ly v. Jam es , 408 U . S. 169 , 189 , 92 S . Ct . 233 8, 235 0,33

33 L . E d. 2d 2 66 ( 1972 ) (“ [F ir st Am en dm en t] [ a] sso ci at ion al a ct ivi tie s ne ed not be tol er at ed w he re the y

inf ri nge r ea sona

ble c am pus ru le s, int er

ru pt c la sse s, or subs tantially

interfer e w ith the op portuni ty of other students to obtain an educ at io n.” ). H ow ev er , in as se ssi ng the r ea sona ble ne ss o f re gul at ion s th at tr ea d up on expression, we cannot sim ply defer to the specter of disruption or the m ere theoretical possib ility

of discord, or e ven som e de m inim is, insubst antial im pact on classroom

decorum . Particular ly

given the fact that y oung people are r equired by lawto spe nd a

sub stanti al portio n of

the ir li ve s inc la ssr oom s, stu de nt expr es sio n m ay

not be sup pr es se d si m

ply be ca use it giv es r ise to som e sli ght , ea sil y ove rl ooke d di sr

upt ion , inc lud ing but

not li m ite d to “ a show ing of m ild curi osi ty ” by

oth er stu de nts , se e Burn sid e, 363 F . 2d at 74 8, “ dis cu ssi on and co m m en t” a m ong stu de nts , Re ine ke v. Co bb C ty . S ch . D ist . , 484 F . S upp. 125 2, 1261 (N . D . G a. 198 0) , or e ve n so m e “ host ile r em ar ks” or “ dis cu ssi on o uts ide of the c la ssr oom s” by

oth er stu de nts , T ink er , 393 U . S. a t 50 8, 514 , 89 S . Ct . a t 73 7, 740. For exam

ple, one district court corre ctly found that a teacher w as unjustified in censoring an article in the school newspaper because it w as “ inconceivable that the use of the word ‘ dam n’ one tim e in the newspaper would have caused m aterial34

and subs tantial interfere nce w ith schoo l activities.” R eineke, 484 F. Supp. at 12 58 . T he dis se nt c onc lud es that H oll om an ’ s ge sture w as unp ro te ct ed be ca use

“ [t ] he stu de nts ’ c om

m en ts [ to A llr ed

a ft er c la ss] de m onstrate that the y a t l ea st fo cu se d th ei r atte nti on d

ur ing aportio n of

the r ec itatio n of

the P le dge on Hollom an’ s fist . . . rather than on the planned curriculum of say ing th e Pledge. ” T his appr oa chappe ar s to ign or e the pr inc ipl e dis cu sse d a bove that st

ude nt ex p re s s i o nm

u s t ca u s e ( o r b e l i k el y t o ca u s e) a “m at er i al [] a n ds ub s t an t i al []” dis ru pti on, Burn sid e, 363 F . 2d at 74 9, and m or e than abr ie f, e as ily ove rl ooke d, de m i n i m u m i m p ac t , b ef o re i tm ay b e c u rt ai l ed . Th e d i s s en tar g u es th at Ho l l o m an ’s ac t w as “ m eant t o c om

pe te f or stu de nts ’ a tte nti on. ” T he sam e can be sa id o f any of the f orm s of stu de nt e xpr es sio n th at

have be enf

ound to be pr ote ct ed , inc lud ing the w eari ng o f ar

m bands or button s inc la ss. Astu de nt e xpr es sin g hi m se lf in tho se way s clearly

intends to attrac t the other student s’ attention and h ave them consider, however

briefly , the m eaning behin d the sym bolis m . Indeed, if

a stu de nt’ s atte nti on i s ne ve r fo cu se d, if e ve n f or am om en t, on the e xpr es sio n, it be co m es poi ntl es s. U nde r the dis se nt’ s a ppr oa ch , w he re sc hool s m ay pr ohi bit any spe ec h or a ct s th at do a nythi ng t o di str ac t a

stu de nt’ s m ind

—ho w ev er

br ie fl y or35

ins ubst an tia lly

—f ro m the planne d c ur

ri cu lum , c onst itutio na l pr ote ct ionf or stu de nt ex pr es si on by defi ni ti on wou ldbe eli m in at ed . T his poi nt w as m ad e qui te c le ar ly in Pard uc ci v. Rutland, 316 F . S upp. 352 (M. D. Ala . 1970), where a teacher wa s term inated because she assigned a sho rt story that school adm inistrators foundoffensive. The district court recognized that Fi rs t A m en dm en t f

re ed om s inpub lic sc hool s, inc lud ing ate ac he r’ s r igh t t o ac ad em ic f

re ed om , c oul d be c onst itutio na lly abr idg ed und er T ink er and B ur nsi de onl y if the re w as ar ea lis tic thr eat tha t the c ondu ct a t i ssu e w oul d “ m at er ia lly and subs tanti al ly

int er fe re w iththe r equir em en ts o f ap pr opr ia te dis ci pli ne in the ope ratio n of

the sc hool . ” I d. a t 35 5. T he c ourt, c or re ct ly appl y ing our

pr ec ed en ts, he ld: Rathe r than th er e be ing athr eate ne d or a ct ua l su bst an tia l di sr

upt ionto the e duc at ion al pr oc es se s of the sc hool , the e vid en ce r ef le ct s th at the as sig nin g of

the sto ry w as gr ee te d w ithapa thy by m ost of the stu de nts . O nly

thr ee of pla int if f' s st ude nts a ske d to be e xc use d f ro m the a ssi gnm en t. O n th is que sti on o f w he the r the re w as am at er ia l and subs tanti al thr eat of

dis ru pti on, the P ri nc ipa l t es tif ie d a t the S ch ool Board hear ing th at there w as no indi cation that any of plaintiff’ s other 87 s tud en ts w er e planni ng t o di sr upt the nor m al r out ine of

the sc hool . T his Co urt no wspe ci fi ca lly f ind s and c onc lud es that the c ondu ct f or w hic h pl ai nti ff

w as dis m iss ed

w as not suc h th at “ w oul d m at er ia lly an d su bst an tia lly

int er fe re w ith ” re as ona

ble r equir em en ts o f dis ci pli ne in the sc hool .36

Id. at 356. Ther e is no evidence in the record to suggestthat Hollom an’ s gesture ca use d any m or e dis tur

banc e or unr es t than P ar duc ci ’ s a ssi gnm en t. B y f oc usi ng entirely on whether students m ay have been m om entarily

“ distracted,” rather than on whe the r the dis tr ac tio n or dis ru pti on w as “ m at er ia l” or

“ subs tanti al , ” the dis se nt g ive s in suf

fi ci en t pr ote ct ionto stu de nts ’ F ir st Am en dm en t r igh ts and in co rrec tl y

ap pl ie s o urpre ced en ts . While certain ty

pes of expression un questio nably cause enough of a threat of disruptio n to warr ant supp ression even before negative consequences occur, “u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e df

e ar o r ap p r e h e n s i o no f

d i s tu r b an c e i s n o te n o u g h t o o v e r c o me the r igh t t o f

re ed om of e xpr es sio n, ” ev enin sc hool s. T ink er , 393 U . S. a t 50 8, 89 S. Ct . a t 73 7. “ [T ] he re m ust be de m onstra

ble f ac tor s th at

w oul d gi ve r ise to any re as ona ble f or ec as t by

the sc hool a dm ini str at ionof ‘ subs tanti al and m at er ia l’ dis ru pti on o f sc hool a ct ivi tie s be fo re e xpr es sio n m ay be c onst itutio na lly re str ai ne d. ” S hanle y , 462 F . 2d at 97 4; a cc or d M ar sha ll, 337 F . S upp. a t 13 5 (s ugge sti ng tha t a

“ spe cu la tiv e fe ar ” is i nsuf fi ci en t t o j ust if

y r es tr ic tio ns o n st

ude nt expr es sio n, but

a“ re al and i m

m ed ia te f ear of c ondu ct pot en tia lly

dis ru pti ve of the un iv ers it y

rou ti ne ” is en ou gh ). W e re co gni ze that this te st i s m or e re str ic tiv e than th e pars im oni ous interpretation of student s’ First A m endm ent free dom s offere d in Ferre ll v. D allas37

Indep. Sc h. D ist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968 ). In Fe rrell, a high schoo l principal sus pe nde d st

ude nts in a ro ck -and- ro ll band f or gr ow ing the ir

ha ir too lon g. T his co urt up he ld the pr inc ipa l’ s r eg ulatio n be ca use the pr inc ipa l f

el t “ that the le ngth an d sty le of

the boy s’ ha ir

w oul d c au se c om

m oti on, tr oubl e, dis tr ac tio n, and a dis tur banc e in the sc hool . . . . ” I d. a t 69 9. T o th e de gr ee thi s r uli ng i s ba se d on the pr inc ipa l’ s a

bstra ct c onc er ns, it is pa te ntl y

inc onsi ste nt w iththe pr inc ipl e ar tic ulate d inT ink er , Burn sid e, and num er ous oth er c as es dis cu sse d th ro ugho ut this Subs ection, that there m ust be a real or

subst antial threat of ac tual diso rder, as oppo sed to the m ere poss ibilityof one. W e ar e boundto follow Burnside rather than Ferre ll because it is the earlier case. See Loca l Union 48 Sheet Metal W orke rs v. S.L. Pap pa s & Co ., 10 6 F .3d97 0, 9 75 (11 th Cir . 19 97 ). Sim il arl y , we m ust f oll owT ink er

r athe r than F er

re ll be ca use it is anint er

ve nin g, inc onsi ste nt Su pr em e Co urt de ci sio n. S ee L uf kinv. Mc Ca llum , 956 F . 2d 1 104, 110 7 ( 11th Ci r. 19 92 ). Co ns eque nt ly, we ap pl y th e Tin ke r-Bu rn si de do ct rin e in th is cas e. T his T ink er -B ur

nsi de standard

w e re af fi rm tod ay w as appl ie d inBanks v. Bd . of P ubl ic I nstr. , 314 F . S upp. 285 ( S. D . F la . 197 0) , va cate d by 401 U . S. 988 , 91 S . Ct . 122 3, 28 L . E d. 2d 5 26 ( 1971 ), r ei nst at ed w ith out pub lis he d op ini on b y dist. ct. and aff’ d, 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971), a case sim ilar to this on e, wher e a stu de nt w as sus pe nde d f or f ai lin g to stand d

ur ing the P le dge of

A lle gianc e. T he38

dis tr ic t c ourt he ld, “ T he c ondu ct of A ndr ewBanks in r ef

usi ng t o st an d duri ng the pledge cerem ony

constitu ted an expression of his religious beliefs and po litical opi nio ns. H is r ef

usa l t o st an d w as no l es s af orm of e xpr es sio n th anthe w eari ng of the bla ck arm band w as to Mary

Be th T ink er . H e w as e xe rc isi ng a r igh t ‘ ak in t o pur e spe ec h. ’ ” I d. a t 29 5. Whil e at f ir st g lanc e it m igh t se em

li ke Banks’ s r igh t t o be f re e fr om c om pe lle d sp ee chw as a t i ssu e in tha t c as e, the above quo te f ro m the dis tr ic t c ourt m ak es c le ar that i ts r uli ng w as not

ba se d onBanks’ s F ir st A m en dm en t r igh t t o r em ai n si le nt, but his F ir st Am en dm en t r igh t t o a ff irm at ive ly expr es s hi m se lf

. B oththe sc hool a dm ini str at ionand the c ourt i n th at c as e perceived Banks’s ac t of rem aining seated while every one else wa s standin g as an expr es siv e ac t, r athe r than am er e re fu sa l t o sp eak. I n up hol din g hi s r igh t t o a ct in suc h aw ay , the dis tr ic t c ourt ob se rv ed , “ T he unr ef ute d te sti m ony

c le ar ly r ef le ct s that the plainti ff’ s refusal to stand has not caused anydisrupti on in th e educational process.” Id.; c f. Jenkins v. L ouisi ana State Bd. of Educ. , 506 F. 2d 99 2 (5th Cir. 1975 ) (u phol din g r es tr ic tio ns o n c oll eg e stu de nts ’ a ct ivi tie s be ca use “ [t ] he a ct ion s of appe llants r es ult ed

in a m at er ia l di sr

upt ionof the c am pus an d of

the r igh ts o f oth er s. T he y

w er e not pr ote ct ed

by the F ir st Am en dm en t. ”) . W e the re fo re f ind Banks to be fully

consistentwith the approach m andated by Burnside and Tinker, an d c onc lud e that H oll om an ’ s ge sture w as suf fi ci en tly akinto Banks’ s r ef

usa l t o39

stand ( in tha t ne ith er

ha d any r ea l i m pa ct on c la ss d isc ipl ine ) as to be e nti tle d to Fi rs t Am en dm en t p ro te ct io n. Ourcas es in vo lv in g “ free do m bu tt on s” are p erh ap s ev en m or e in st ru ct iv e. In Blackw ell v. I ssaquena Cty . B d. of E duc., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966 ), black el em en tary

sc hool stu de nts w or e “ fr ee dom button s” to cl as s insup port of the c ivi l rig ht s m ov em en t. [S ] om e of the se stu de nts w er e cr eatin g adis tur banc e by noi sil y ta lk in g i n t he ha ll when th ey were s ch edul edto be in cla ss . . . . [S om e stu de nts ] a cc ost ed oth er stu de nts by

pinnin g th e button s on them even thoug h they

did no t ask for one. One of the students tried to p ut a buttonon a

y oung er c hil d who b eg anc ry ing . T his a ct ivi ty created a state of c onfusio n, disrupted class instructio n, and re sulted in a general bre akdown of orderly disciplin e. Id . a t 75 0- 52 ( fo otn ote om itt ed ). W e he ld tha t the pr inc ipa l di d no t vi olate the student s’ constitu tional right s by punis hing them

for their behavior and, under tho se c ir cum stanc es , banni ng the button s f ro m the sc hool . S uc h ar es tr ic tio n on stu de nt e xpr es sio n w as j ust if ie d, notw ith standi ng the F ir st Am en dm en t, be ca use the “ stu de nts c ondu ct ed

the m se lve s inadis or de rl y m anne r, dis ru

pte d c la ssr oom pr oc ed ur e, int er fe re d w iththe pr ope r de co rum and d isc ipl ine of

the sc hool and dis tur be d othe r stu de nts w ho d id n ot w ishto part ic ipate in the w eari ng o f the bu tt on s.” Id . at 7 53 .40

I nB u rn s i d e , h o w e v e r , th e s a me p an e l o f th i s c o u rt , o nth e s a me d ay, e mp h a s i z e dth a tth e mer e p o s s i b i l i ty o f s u c h c o n s e qu e n c e s d i dn o tju s t i f y a dif fe re nt s ch ool in banni ng f re ed om button s. 363 F . 2d at 74 8 ( ove rt ur nin g sc hool ’ s ban onf

re ed om button s be ca

use “ af fi davit s and t es tim ony

be fo re the D istri ct Co urt r ev ea l no int er fe re nc e w ithe duc at ion al a ct ivi ty and d o no t su

ppor t a co nc lus ionthat the re w as ac om m oti on o r that the button s te nde d to dis tr ac t the m ind s of the stu de nts aw ay

f ro m the ir te ac he rs ”) ( em

pha sis om itt ed ). T he Burn sid e- Bl ac kw el l dy ad de m onstrate s th at

the pe rm iss ibi lity

of ar es tr ic tio n on stu de nt e xpr es sio n c annot be de te rm ine d inthe abstra ct , but m ust be a sse sse d w ith at least one ey e towar d the actual or likely (not m erely

potential) im

pact of that expr es sio n onthe le ar

nin g e nvi ro nm en t. C ondu ct that m ay be c onst itutio na lly pr ote ct ed in one sc hool or

und er one se t of

c ir cum stanc es m ay

te nd t o in ci te disrupt ion or dis order—and so be constitu tionallyproscribable—in oth ers. Where student s’ expressive activity does not m aterially

interfer e w ith a school’s vital ed uc at ion al m iss ion , and d oe s no t r ai se ar ea lis tic c hanc e of doi ng s o, it

m ay not be pr ohi bit ed

sim ply be ca use it c onc ei vably

m igh t ha ve su ch an effe ct . b. Allre d m aintains that it was appropriate for her to discipl ine Hollom an be ca use the oth er

stu de nts w er e dis tur

be d by his de m onstratio n. S he c la im s a41

n u m b ero f t h em ca m e up t o h eraf t ercl as s an dt o l dh erth at wh at h e d i dwa s n ’t

“ right.” S he also expressed concern that his behavio r w ouldlead to further di srup ti on s b y

ot he r st ud en ts . The f act that other students m ay have disagreed w ith either Hollom an’ s act or the m essage it convey ed is irrelevant to our analy sis. Se e T inker, 393 U. S. at 509, 89 S . Ct . a t 73 8 ( “ Inor de r fo r the S ta te in the pe rs on o f sc hool of fi ci al s to j ust if y pr ohi bit ionof

apart ic ular expr es sio n of opi nio n, it

m ust be able to show that i ts a ct ionw as c au se d by som ethin g m or e than am er e de sir e to avoi d th e discom fort and unpleasantness that alway s accom pany an unpop ular viewpoint.”) ; N ear v. Mi nne sot a, 283 U . S. 697 , 722 , 51 S . Ct . 625 , 633 , 75 L . E d. 2d 1 357 (1 931) ( “ If

the townshi p m ay

pr ev en t the c ir cu la tio n of ane w spa pe r fo r no r ea son oth er than th at som e of it s inhabit an ts m ay

vio le ntl y dis ag re e w ithit , and r es en t i ts ci rc ulatio n by

r es ortin g to phy sic al vio le nc e, the re is no l im it to wha t m ay be prohibi ted.”) (quotation and citation om itted). Nor is H ollom an’ s expression rem oved from the rea lm

of constitut ional pr ote ct ionsim

ply be ca use the stu de nts c loake d th ei r dis ag re em en t i n th e gui se of of fe nse or dis gust . H oll om an ’ s be havio r w as not dir ec te d “ tow ar d” any one or any gr oup an d c oul d no t be c onstru ed by ar ea sona

ble pe rs on ( inc lud ing ahig h sc hool st ud en t) a s a p ers on al off en se or i ns ul t.42

Ferr ell v. D allas Indep. S ch. D ist. ar guably suppo rts Allre d’ s posi tion. In Fe rr el l, thi s c ourt he ld tha t a sc hool c oul d pr ohi bit

stu de nts f

ro m w eari ng l ong ha ir sim ply be ca use the ir c hoi ce of ha ir sty le “pr ovok ed ” oth er stu de nts int o br eakin g school rules andthe lawby respondin g viol ently . The c ourt justified the hairle ngth r eg ulatio n by

poi nti ng t o su chc onsi de ratio ns: O n on e oc ca sio n agr oup of boy s inhis sc hool ha d de ci de d th at a cl as sm at e' s ha ir

w as too lon g and tha t the y w er e goi ng t o take the m atter in their ow n hands andtrim it them selves. Mr . L anham stated th atbo y s wi th lo ng ha ir we re s ub jecte d t o s ub st an ti al ha ras sm en t. O bsc en e langua ge ha d be enuse d by som e stu de nts in re fe re nc e to oth er s w ithlon g ha ir

and g ir ls h ad

c om e to h is o ff

ic e co m pla ini ng about th e language being us ed. The long hair boy s had also been ch al le nge d to af

igh t by oth er boy s who d id n ot l ike lon g ha ir . A lso , long hair boy s had been toldby others that the girl's restroom wa s rig htdo wn t he ha ll . 39 2 F .2dat 7 00 -0 1. A llo w ing asc hool to curt ai l a stu de nt’ s f

re ed om of e xpr es sio n ba se d on suc h f ac tor s turn s r ea son on i ts h ea d. I f ce rt ai n bu lli es are li ke ly to ac t vi ole ntl y w he n astu de nt w ears lon g ha ir , it is unqu es tio nably

e as y f or apr inc ipa l t o pr ec lud e the out

bur st b y pr ev en tin g th e stu de nt f

ro m w eari ng l ong ha ir . T o do so, how ev er , is to s ac ri fi ce f

re ed om upo n th e al te r of

or de r, and a llo wthe sc ope of our liberty to be dictated by

the inclination s of the unlawful m ob. If bullies di srupted classes and beat up a student who refused to join the football team , the proper43

solut ion would n ot be to force the student to join the football team , but to protect the stu de nt and p uni sh the bul lie s. I f bul lie s di sr upt ed c la sse s and b eat up a stu de nt b ec au se he w as n’ t w eari ng f an cy e noug h c lothe s, the pr ope r sol uti on would not b e to force the student to we ar Abercrom bie & Fitch or J. Cre w attire, but to pr ote ct

the stu de nt and p uni sh the bul lie s. T he sam e an al y sis appl ie s to a stu de nt w ithlon g ha ir , w ho i s do ing nothin g th at the r ea sona

ble pe rs on w oul d conclude is ob

j ectively wr ong o r directly

offensive to any one. T he fac t that other stu de nts m igh t t ak e suc h aha ir sty le a s an in ci te m en t t o vi ole nc e is an in dic tm en t of those oth er st ud en ts , no t l on g h ai r. Su chr ea soni ng i s part

of the ba sis f

or S tr ee t v. N ewY or

k, 394 U . S. 576 , 592, 89 S . Ct . 135 4, 136 5, 22 L . E d. 2d 5 72 ( 1969 ), w he re the S upr em e Co urt he ld that “ the pos sib le te nde nc y of appe llant’ s w or ds t o pr ovok e vio le nt r et al ia tio n” is n o ta b as i s fo r b an n i n g th o s e w o rd s u n l es s th ey ar e “fi g h t i n g wo rd s .” St re et ’s convictio n was r eversed because “ [t] houg h it is conceivable that so m e listeners m igh t have be enm ove d to r et al ia te upo n he ar ing appe llant’ s di sr es pe ct fu l w or ds, w e cannot

say that a ppe llant’ s r em ar

ks w er e so i nhe re ntl y

inf lam m at or y a s to co m e w ith in tha t sm al l c la ss o f ‘ fi ght ing w or ds’ w hic h are ‘ lik el y to pr ovok e the av er ag e pe rs on t o r et al ia tio n, and the re by c au se abr ea chof

the pe ac e. ’ ” I d. (quot ing Ch ap lin sky

v. N ewH am

pshi re , 315 U . S. 568 , 574 , 62 S . Ct . 766 , 770 , 8644

L . E d. 103 1 ( 1942 )) ; se e al so C an tw el l v. Co nne ct ic ut, 310 U . S. 296 , 308 -1 0, 60 S. Ct . 900 , 905 -0 6, 84 L . E d. 121 3 ( 1940 ) (r ev er sin g c onvi ct ionf or br ea ch ing the pe ac e in a

c as e w he re the re w as “ no a ssa ult or thr eate nin g of

bod ily harm , no tru cu le ntbe ari ng , no in te nt io na l d is co ur te sy, no p ers on al ab us e”). Whil e the sam e co nst itutio na l st an dard s do not a lw ay s a ppl y in publ ic schools as on publ ic streets, we cannot afford students less cons titutio nal pr ote ct ionsim

ply be ca use the ir pe er s m igh t i lle ga lly

e xpr es s di sa gr ee m en t thr ough v i o l e n c e i n s t e a do f

r e a s o n . I f

th e p e o p l e , a c t i n g th r o u g h al e g i s l a t i v e a s s e mb l y, m ay not proscribe certain speech, neither m ay they do so acting in dividually as crim inals. Pr incipals have the du ty to m aintain order in publ ic schools, but th ey m ay no t d o s o wh il e tu rn in g abl in d e y e to ba si c n ot io ns of r ig htan d wro ng . T hus, und er

the T ink er -B ur

nsi de doc tr ine , w e ar e re qui re d to r ej ec t this portion of Fer

rell, as w ell. Even if Allre d wer e corr ect in fearing that oth er student s m ay

rea ct inappropriately

or illegally , such re actions do n ot justify supp ression of Hollom an’ s expression. Hollom an’ s expression was co nst itutio na lly

pr ote ct ed

be ca use the r ec or d r ev ea ls n o w ay in w hic h he

“ m at er ia lly

and s ubst an tia lly

int er fe re [d ] w iththe r equir em en ts o f ap pr opr ia te di sc ip li ne in th e o pe rat io n o f th e sc ho ol .” Bu rn si de , 36 3 F .2dat 7 49 .45 c. O n a ppe al , A llr ed

r ep eate dly

e m pha siz es that H oll om anw as pun ish ed not fo r his a ct , but

f or dis obe y ing dir ec tio ns f

ro m he r an d H ar land a s to the onl y p e rmi s s i b l e wa ys t o s a l u t e th e f l a g . B y ra i s i n g h i s f

i s ti nth e a i r

th e n e x td ay, Hollom an contravened these instruction s. C onsequ ently , A llred argues, Hollom an w as pun ish ed

f or ins ubor din at ionf

or vio la tin g th es e or de rs , r athe r than f or ex erci si ng a Fi rs t Am en dm en t ri gh t. A lth oughH oll om anf

ai le d to sa lut e the f

la g inam anne r am en ab le to A llr ed ,

“ the protections o f the Fir st Am endm ent do no t extend solelyto speech which is w el l- m anne re d and atte nti ve to the pr ef er en ce s of

oth er s. ” S ab el v. Stync hc om

be , 746 F . 2d 7 28, 731 ( 11th C ir . 198 4) . A s di sc uss ed thr ough out

thi s Su bse ct ion , H oll om anha d th e co nst itutio na l r igh t t o r ai se his f ist dur ing the Pl ed ge of A lle gianc e so l ong as he did not dis ru pt the e duc at ion al pr oc es s or the cl as s i n a ny real way. A llr ed c oul d no t pr ev en t H oll om anf ro m e xe rc isi ng a

c onst itutio na l r igh t s i mp l y b y t e l l i n g h i m n o tt o d o s o . S c h o o l o f f i c i a l s may n o tp u n i s h i n d i r e c t l y, through the guise of insu bordinatio n, what they m ay not pu nish d irectly . See Rutland, 316 F. S upp. at 358 (ordering reinstatem ent of public hig h school teacher who w as dism issed in v iolation of the First A m endm ent for assigning a short story46

adm ini str at or s f

ound obj ec tio nable be ca

use “pla int if

f’ s ‘ ins ubor din at ion ’ w as not ins ubor din at ionin any

se nse and w as not , in re al ity , ar ea son fo r the S ch ool Bo ar d' s a ct ion ”) ; D ic ke y

v. A la bam a St at e Bd . of

E duc . , 273 F . S upp. 613 , 618 (M . D . A la . 196 7) ( “ T he a tte m pt t o c hara ct er iz e D ic ke y ' s c ondu ct , and the ba sis f or their action in expellin g him , a s ‘ insub ordination ’ requiring rather sever e dis ci pli nary

a ct ion , doe s no t di sgui se the ba sic f ac t tha t D ic ke y

w as e xpe lle d f

ro m T ro y S tate Co lle ge f

or e xe rc isi ng h is c onst itutio na lly guarante ed

r igh t of a ca de m ic an d/o r pol iti ca l e xpr es sio n. ”) , va cate d a s m oot sub nom . T ro y

S ta te U niv . v. D ic ke y , 402 F . 2d 5 15 ( 5thCi r. 196 8) . A llr ed la ck ed the r igh t t o pr osc ri be his be havio r in the f

ir st p la ce ; ne ith er

she nor H ar land c oul d punis h H oll om anf or vi ol at in g adi rect iv e th atwas aco ns ti tu ti on al nu ll it y . Consequent ly , w e have no choice but to conclu de as a m atter of law that H oll om ansuc ce ssf

ull y art ic ulate d avio la tio n of his F ir st Am en dm en t r igh t t o fr ee dom of e xpr es sio n by

H ar land and A llr ed . W e nowm ust a sse ss whe the r the se rig ht s wer e “ cl earl y

est ab li sh ed ” atth e ti m e o f th e in ci de nt s.

2. This circ uit was re cently

chastised by

the Suprem e Court for taking an unw ar rante dly narr owvie wof

the c ir cum stanc es in w hic h publi c of fi ci al s c anbe47

held respons ible for their constitutio nal violatio ns. Se e V au ghan v. Co x, 343 F . 3d 13 23 , 13 32 (11 th Cir . 20 03 ) (“ [T]he Supr em e Co ur t i n Ho pe cau ti on edth atwe shou ld n ot b e undu ly

r igi d inr equir ing f

ac tua l si m ilari ty

be tw ee n pr ior

c as es and the c as e unde r co nsi de ratio n. ”) . T he lawof thi s c ir cu it use d to be that a gove rn m en t a ct or

c oul d be de nie d qu al if

ie d im m uni ty onl y f or a ct s th at are “ so obvi ousl y w ro ng, in lig ht o f the pr e- ex ist ing law , that on ly apla inl y inc om pe te nt of fi ce r or one w ho w as kno w ing ly vio la tin g th e laww oul d have don e suc h a thi ng. ” L as sit er

v. A la bam a A . & M. U niv . , 28 F . 3d 1 146, 114 9 ( 11th C ir . 199 4) (e n banc ). T he S upr em e Co urt, spe ci fi ca lly c iti ng L as sit er

( al ong w ithahandf

ul of other E leventh Circuit cases), held that “ [t] his rigidgloss in the qualified im m uni ty standard . . . is not c onsi ste nt w ith[ the S upr em e Co urt’ s] c as es . ” H ope v. P el ze r, 536 U . S. 730 , 739 & n. 9, 122 S . Ct . 250 8, 251 5 & n. 9, 153 L . E d. 2d 66 6 (2 00 2) . Whil e of fi ci al s m ust have f ai r w ar nin g th at the ir a ct s are unc onst itutio na l, th ere n eedno t b e a ca se “ on all fou rs ,” wit h m at eri al ly ide nt ic al fact s, b efo re we w ill a llo wsui ts a ga ins t the m . Apr inc ipl e of c onst itutio na l l awc anbe “ cl earl y es ta bli she d” e ve n if

the re are “ not ab le f

ac tua l di sti nc tio ns b etw ee n th e pr ec ed en ts re lie d onand the c as es the n be fo re the Co urt, so l ong as the pr ior de ci sio ns g av e reasonable w arning that the conduct at issue viol ated constitut ional rights .”48

U nit ed S ta te s v. L an ie r, 520 U . S. 259 , 269 , 117 S . Ct . 121 9, 122 7, 137 L . E d. 2d 432 (1 997) ; H ope , 538 U . S. a t 74 1, 122 S . Ct . a t 25 16 ( “ [O ] ff ic ia ls c ansti ll be on notice that their condu ct violates establish ed law even in nov el fac tual circum stances. I ndeed, in L anier, we expressly rej ected a r equirem ent that pr ev io us cas es be ‘ fu nd am en ta ll y si m il ar.’”). In our pre-H ope jurisprudence, we held that [g ] en er al r

ule s, pr opos iti ons, or

abstra ct ion s . . . do n ot d et er m ine qua lif ie d im m uni ty . I nst ea d, the c ir cum stanc es that c onf ro nte d th e gove rn m en t a ct or

m ust have be enm at er ia lly

sim ilar to p ri or pr ec ed en t t o c onst itute c le ar ly e sta bli she d lawbe ca

use pub lic of fi ci al s are not

obl igate d to be c re at ive or im ag inativ e in draw ing an al ogi es f

ro m pr ev iou sly

de ci de d c as es . F or

qua lif ie d im m uni ty to be surrendered, pre-e xistin g law m ust dictate, that is, tr

uly com pel (n ot j ust sug ge st o r al lowor

r ai se aque sti on a

bout ), the c onc lus ion for ever y like-situated, re asonable gov ernm ent agent that what de fen da ntis do in g v io la te s fe de ral law i n t he cir cu m st an ces . W ood v. Ci ty

of L ak el an d, 203 F . 3d 1 288, 129 1- 92 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) ( ci ta tio ns and qu ot at io ns om it te d) . A s di sc uss ed

above , H ope r em ind s us that w e ne ed no l onge r fo cu s on whether the facts of a

case are “ m aterially

sim ilar to prior prece dent.” More over, H ope e m pha siz ed that “ ge ne ra l st at em en ts o f the laware not inh er en tly

inc ap ab le of giv ing f ai r an d c le ar

w ar nin g . . . [ A ] c onst itutio na l r ule a lr ea dy

ide nti fi ed

in the de ci sio na l l awm ay

appl y w ithobv iou s c lari ty

to the spe ci fi c co nduc t i n qu es tio n,49

even thoug h the very

action in questi on has [not] pre viou sly been held unlawful.” 536 U . S. a t 74 1, 122 S . Ct . a t 25 16 ( quot at ion s om itt ed ). T hus, w e do n ot j ust co m pare the f ac ts o f anins tant c as e to p ri or c as es to de te rm ine if

ar igh t i s “ cl earl y es ta bli she d;” w e al so a sse ss whe the r the f ac ts o f the ins tant c as e fa ll w ith in state m en ts o f ge ne ra l pr inc ipl e fr om our pr ec ed en ts. S ee V iny ar d v. W ils on, 311 F. 3d 13 40, 1351 (11t h Cir. 2002 ) (“ When look ing at case law , som e broad statem ents of principle in case laware not tied to particularize d facts and can cl earl y est ab li sh law ap pl ic ab le in th e fu tu re t o d iff eren t s et s o f de ta il edfact s.”) . H ope se em s to have a

br ogate d m any

of the oth er standard s art ic ulate d in W ood, a s w el l. F or

e xam ple , W ood’ s r equir em en t tha t a part ic ular co nc lus ion m ust be “ dic ta te [d ] , that i s, tr

uly c om pe l[ le d] ” int im at es ale ve l of absol ute c ry sta lcl ear ce rt ai nty

about pr ec ed en t tha t f

orm s no part

of H ope ’ s r equir em en ts. T o th e de gr ee the re e xis ts a

c onf lic t be tw ee n H ope and o ur e ar lie r ca se s, w e ar e, of co ur se , bound t o f

oll owthe S upr em e Co urt’ s in te rv en ing r uli ng. S ee L uf

kinv. McCallum , 956 F. 2d 11 04, 1107 (11t h Cir. 2000 ). Since H ope, m any of our cases have applied its st andard to the exclusion of our ear lier, m ore rigorous doctrinal tests. Se e, e. g., Holm es v. K ucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1077 -78 (11th Cir. 2003); D ah l v. H oll ey , 312 F . 3d 1 228, 123 3 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) ; W eave r v. Bo nne r, 309 F. 3d 13 12, 1324 (11t h Cir. 2002 ). H ope em phasizes that, notwithstandin g m ore50

str ing en t st an dard s art ic ulate d insom e of our e ar lie r ca se s, “ the sa lie nt que sti on . . . is w he the r the state of the law[ at

the ti m e of

the e ve nts in que sti on] gave respondents fair warning that th eir alleged tre atm ent of [the plaintiff] wa s un co ns ti tu ti on al .” 53 6 U.S. at74 1, 1 22 S. Ct. at 25 16 . Turning to Hollom an’ s claim s, w e find that, a s of May16, 2000, the TinkerBurn sid e standard

w as c le ar ly

e sta bli she d and s uf

fi ci en tly spe ci fi c as to giv e the d ef en d an t s “ fa i r w arn i n g ” t h at th ei r c o n du ct wa s co n s t i tu t i o n al l y p ro h i b i t ed . We do no t find it unreasonabl e to expect the defendants—who holds th em selves out as ed uc at or s—t o be able to ap ply suc h astandard , notw ith standi ng the la ck of ac as e w ithm at er ia l f

ac tua l si m ilari tie s. Whil e w e have not tr ad iti ona lly

c al le d up on gove rn m en t of

fi ci al s to be “ cr eativ e or

im ag inativ e” in de te rm ini ng the sc ope of co nst itutio na l r igh ts, se e A dam s v. S t. L uc ie Cty . S he ri ff ’ s D ep ’ t, 962 F . 2d 1 563, 1575 ( 11th C ir . 199 2) ( E dm onds on, J. , dis se nti ng) , ne ith er are the y f re e of the re spon sib ili ty

to put f orth at l ea st s om e m en ta l e ff ort i n a ppl y ing ar ea sona

bly w el l- de fi ne d do ctri na l t es t t o apart ic ular sit ua tio n. O ur

pr ec ed en ts w oul d be of little va lue if

gov er nm en t of fi ci al s w er e fr ee to dis re gard f ai rl y spe ci fi c state m en ts of principle they

contain and focus their attention solely on the particular fac tual sc en ari os in whi ch th ey

aro se .51

T he T ink er -B ur

nsi de te st c al ls f

or te ac he rs to as se ss tw o f

ac tor s: ( 1) w he the r a stu de nt i s e nga ge d ine xpr es sio n ( ei the r pur e spe ec h or e xpr es siv e co nduc t) and ( 2) w he the r the e xpr es sio n is havin g anon -n eg lig ibl e dis ru pti ve effe ct, or is likely

to have such an effec t, on classroom order or the e ducational process. T he first fa ctor is quite easy to apply ; the test for determ ining whether an ac t c onst itute s e xpr es siv e co nduc t i s whe the r the “ re as ona ble pe rs on” w oul d pe rcei ve itas s uc h. Se e Sp en ce, 4 18 U.S. at 4 10 -1 1, 9 4 S . Ct. at27 30 . Consequent ly , a

teacher or principal shou ld have no prob lem determ ining whether a stu de nt i s e nga ge d ine xpr es sio n. I nde ed , giv enthe m yri ad f orm s of e xpr es sio n, w e shou ld b e he sit an t a

bout r equir ing that a

m eans o f expr es sio n be the sub j ec t of a p rev io us cas e b efo re o ffer in g t he sp eak er fu ll § 1 98 3 p ro te ct io n. The sec on d fa ct orsh ou ldals o b e qui te effo rtl es s fo r an educ at orto ap pl y . A te ac he r or pr inc ipa l sh oul d be able to ins tantl y r ec ogni ze w he the r a stu de nt i s d i s rup t i n g cl as s , a n di ts h o u l dn o tb e t o o h ar dt o d et erm i n e w h et h era s tu d en t ’s ac tiv iti es are li ke ly

to have suc h an e ff

ec t. C onse que ntl y , w e do n ot f ind the Tinker- Burnside test to be of such an un reasonable level of genera lity that Allre d an d H ar land c oul d no t have be ene xpe ct ed to ap ply it in thi s c as e. C f. T hom as v. Ro be rt s, 323 F . 3d 9 50 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) ( “ [W ] he re the appl ic ab le le ga l st an dard is a highlygeneral one, such as ‘ reasonableness,’ preexisting caselaw that has52

ap pli ed ge ne ra l l awto spe ci fi c ci rc um stanc es w ill a lm ost a lw ay s be ne ce ssary

to drawa line that is capable of giving fair and clear notice that an official' s conduct will violate feder al law .” ). Bec ause this stand ard is “ clear ly established,” is not at anunr ea sona

ble hig h le ve l of

ge ne ra lity , and whe n a

ppl ie d to the f

ac ts o f Hollom an’ s case y ields a fairly determ inate result that shou ld have been clear, A llr ed and H ar land are not

e nti tle d to sum

m ar y j udgm en t onqua lif

ie d im m uni ty gr ound s a ga ins t H oll om an ’ s S pe ec h C lause c la im c onc er nin g hi s r igh t t o affir m ative expression. T he Tinker- Burnside principle gave them “ clear notice” th atth ei r co nduc t v io la te d Ho ll om an ’s con st itut io na l ri gh ts ; u nl ik e th e d is se nt , we be lie ve that t ea ch er s are w el l e qui ppe d to “ re ad ily de te rm ine w ha t c ondu ct

f al ls wit hi n” th e Tin ke r-Bu rn si de st an da rd . In de ed , H oll om an ’ s r igh t t o si le ntl y r ai se his f

ist dur ing the P le dge of All eg ia nc e wou ldev en be co ns id ered“ cl earl y est ab li sh ed ” u nd er Ba rn et te . As dis cu sse d e ar lie r, he c le ar ly ha d th e ri ght

to re m ai n si le nt d

ur ing the P le dge of Allegiance; w e w ouldbe very reluctant to conclude that Hollom an som ehow shed the pr ote ct ionof

the F ir st Am en dm en t si m ply by li ft ing his f

ist int o th e ai r w hil e ex er ci sin g th is r igh t. A llr ed and H ar land are e sse nti al ly a ski ng u s to dis tin gui sh, on c onst itutio na l gr ound s, be tw ee n astu de nt w ithhis hands in h is p oc ke ts o r at his53

sid es ( lik e H utt o) and a

stu de nt w ithhis hand i n th e ai r. T his is a ha ir w e w ill not sp li t; Fir stAm en dm en t p ro te ct io ns are n otlo stth ateas il y . D. The dissent takes issue with the analy sis in Subp art C, contendin g that Hollom an’ s expression is unprotected because it “ is the sort of activity that com petes with the teac her for the student s’ attention.” For the reasons discuss ed in the previou s Subpart, w e do not believe that Hollom an’ s activity , which had virtua lly no i m pa ct on the c la ss, w as suf

fi ci en t un de r T ink er

and B ur nsi de to fa ll o u t s i d e th e r e a l m o f

c o n s t i tu t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n . Ho w e v e r , e v e ni f we ( o r aju ry, ba se d onthe f

ac ts a s th ey

unf old a t tri al ) w er e to f

ind that H oll om an ’ s e xpr es sio n did “ m at er ia lly

and s ubst an tia lly

int er fe re w iththe r equir em en ts o f ap pr opr ia te dis ci pli ne , ” H oll om anw oul d st ill be able to ar tic ulate avio la tio n of

his F ir st A m en dm en t r igh ts. O ne of the m ost e gr eg iou s ty

pe s of F ir st Am en dm en t vi olatio ns i s vie wpoi nt- ba se d di sc ri m inatio n. S ee Ch an dle r v. Jam es , 180 F . 3d 1 254, 126 5 (1 1thCi r. 199 9) ( not ing that “ vie wpoi nt d isc ri m inatio n[ ] [ is] the m ost e gr eg iou s fo rm of c ont en t- ba se d c en sor shi p” ); S earc ey v. H ar ri s, 888 F . 2d 1 314, 132 4 ( 11th Cir. 1989 ) (“ The prohibition against viewpoint di scrim ination is firm ly em bedded54

in f ir st am en dm en t ana ly sis . ”) . G ove rn m en t a ct or s m ay not dis cr im inate a ga ins t spe ak er s ba se d onvie wpoi nt, e ve n inpla ce s or und er c ir cum stanc es w he re pe opl e do n ot h av e a co nst itutio na l r igh t t o sp eak inthe f ir st p la ce . S ee Upto w n P awn & Je w el ry , I nc . v. Ci ty

of H oll yw ood, 337 F . 3d 1 275, 127 7 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) (“ [R ] es tr ic tio ns o n no npub lic f or um s ne ed onl y be r ea sona

ble and n ot v ie wpoi nt discrim inatory .” ); A dler v. D uval Count y Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070 , 1081 (11th Cir. 2002 ) (“ T he S upr em e Co urt ha s c onsi ste ntl y he ld tha t i n no npub lic f

or a the gove rn m en t m ay

not e nga ge in vie wpoi nt d isc ri m inatio n. ”) . W e have e xpr es sly recognized that this fund am ental prohibit ion against viewpoint-based dis cr im inatio n e xte nds to p ubl ic sc hool ch ildre n, a s w el l, statin g, “ [W ] e do n ot be lie ve [ that S upr em e Co urt pr ec ed en t] of fe rs any j ust if ic at ionf or a llo w ing ed uc at or s to dis cr im inate ba se d onvie wpoi nt. . . . W ith out m or e expli ci t di re ct ion , we will continue to require school officials to m ake decisions relating to sp eech w hic h are vie wpoi nt n eu tr al . ” S earc ey , 888 F . 2d at 13 25. C onse que ntl y , e ve n if H oll om andid

not have the r igh t t o e xpr es s hi m se lf in the m anne r he did , his r igh ts w er e sti ll vio la te d if

he w as pun ish ed

be ca use A llr ed

dis ag re ed

or w as of fe nde d by wha t h e sa id . T his the or

y w as m ost

c le ar ly appl ie d inR. A . V . v. S t. P au l, 505 U . S. 377 , 112 S. Ct. 2538 , 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992). T hat case involved an ordin ance55

w hic h m ad e it a cr im e to p la ce a“bur nin g c ro ss o r N az i sw as tik a, w hic h on e know s or ha s r ea sona

ble gr ound s to kno waro use s ange r, a larm or r es en tm en t i n oth er s onthe ba sis of

r ac e, c olo r, c re ed , r el igi on o r ge nde r. ” I d. a t 38 0, 112 S . Ct . at 2 5 4 1 . Th e S up re m e C o u rtac ce p t edth e M i n n es o t a S up re m e C o u rt ’s co nstru ct ionof

the statut e as pr ohi bit ing onl y “ fi ght ing w or ds, ” a co nst itutio na lly proscribable category

of expression. Id. at 380-31, 112 S. Ct. at 2541. T he Court nevertheless invalid ated the statute because, in the course of prohibiti ng conduct th e st at e h adth e ri gh t t o c riminal iz e, itm ad e a v ie wpo in t-b as eddi st in ct io n. T he Co urt a cknow le dge d th at pe opl e do n ot h av e the F ir st Am en dm en t r igh t to u se f igh tin g w or ds. I d. a t 38 2, 112 S . Ct . a t 25 42- 43. T he Co urt e m pha siz ed , how ev er , “ Wha t [ that] m eans i s th at the se are as of

spe ec h c an , c onsi ste ntl y

w ith the F ir st Am en dm en t, be r eg ulate d be ca use of the ir c onst itutio na lly

pr osc ri bable content (obscenity , def

am ation, etc. )—not . . . that they can be m ade the vehicles for content discrim ination unrelated to their distin ctively proscribable content.” Id . at 3 83 , 11 2 S . Ct. at25 43 . Thu s, a part ic ular ins tanc e of

spe ec h c anbe pr osc ri bable on the ba sis of one fe at ur e (e . g. obs ce nity ) but

not on the ba sis of

anothe r (e . g. opp osi tio n to the c ity

gov er nm en t) . . . . [ Mor eo ve r, ] the pow er to pr osc ri be particular speech on the basis of a noncontentelem ent (e. g. noise) doe s no t e nta il the pow er to pr osc ri be the sam e spe ec h onthe ba sis of a co nt en t el em en t . . . .56

Id . a t 38 5- 86, 112 S . Ct . a t 25 44. Appl y ing thi s st an dard , the Co urt he ld tha t the ordinance was unconstitut ional because “ [d] isplay s containin g abusiv e invective, no m atte r howvic iou s or se ve re , are pe rmiss ibl e unl es s th ey are a ddr es se d to one of the spe ci fi ed

dis favor ed

top ic s. ” I d. a t 39 1, 112 S . Ct . a t 25 47. Mo re ove r, the or din an ce w en t be y ond ge ne ra l c ont en t di sc ri m inatio n “ to a ct ua l vi ew poi nt discrim ination . . . . ‘ [F] ighti ng words’ that do no t them selves invo ke rac e, color, cr ee d, r el igi on, or

ge nde r . . . w oul d se em ing ly be usa ble a d li bit

um in the pla card s of tho se arg uin g inf

av or of r ac ia l, c olo r, e tc . , tol er an ce and e qua lity , but c oul d no t be us edby tho se sp eak ers ’ op po ne nt s.” Id . at 3 91 , 11 2 S . Ct. at25 47 -4 8. T hus, e ve n th oughMi nne ap oli s ha d th e unqu es tio ne d po w er to pr ohi bit fi ght ing w or ds, it

c oul d no t dr awvie wpoi nt b as ed dis tin ct ion s by

targ et ing c er

ta in fi ght ing w or ds b ec au se of the r ep ugnant m es sa ge the y c onve y ed . Appl y ing thi s pr inc ipl e to the ins tant c as e, it be co m es c le ar

w hy A llr ed m ay pot en tia lly

be he ld lia ble und er the F ir st Am en dm en t e ve n if H oll om anw as not

e nga gin g in co nst itutio na lly

pr ote ct ed

spe ec h. A lth oughA llr ed ha s th e au tho ri ty

und er the T ink er -B ur

nsi de standard

to pr osc ri be stu de nt e xpr es sio n th at m at er ia lly

and subs tanti al ly

dis ru pts the c la ss, she m ay

not pun ishsuc h e xpr es sio n ba se d onthe fa ct that sh e dis ag re es w ithit . E ve n whe n e nga gin g inspe ec h th at is not dir ec tly57

constitu tionallyprotected, Hollom an still has th e First A m endm ent right to be free fr om vie wpoi nt d isc ri m inatio n. The r ecord, interpreted in the light m ost favorable to Hollom an, m ore than am ply sup ports h is arg um en t tha t he w as pun ish ed f or the sub stanc e of

his unpatrioti c views r ather than an alleged disruption of class. A llred adm itted in her de posi tio n th at

w he n H utt o si m

ply r ef use d to r ec ite the ple dge of a lle gianc e, she w as “ hurt” and “ [v ] er

y dis ap poi nte d inhim ” be ca use “ [h ] e w as ale ad er

of the cl as s . . . . [ an d] loo ke d up to a gr eat de al . ” Mo re ove r, she be ca use of “ the fr ee d o m s we en

jo y i nth i s co u n try,” s h e c o u l dn ’t u n d er s t an dh o w h e w o u l dn ’t want to pl edge. S he em

phasized, “ It broke m

y heart, y ou kn ow. ” G iven that H utt o w as c ha sti se d and u lti m at el y f or ce d by H ar land t o a

pol ogi ze sim

ply f or rem aining si lent during the flag salute, a j ury could reasonably

conclude that All red ’s pu ni sh m en t o f Hol lo m an was b as edon si m il ar m ot iv at io ns . Whe n H oll om ana lle ge dly a ske d A llr ed

about the w ay s inw hic h st

ude nts w er e pe rm itt ed

to sa lut e the f

la g, she tol d hi m

that he c oul d e ith er

do s o w ithhis hand o ve r his he ar

t or in a m ili tary -ty

pe sa lut e. S he e xpl ai ne d, “ Inour c ountry , the nor m al w ay is puttin g y our

hand o ve r y our

he ar t. T ha t’ s th e w ay

y ou s ee e ve ry one do i t, the ba ll play er s onT V . ” A ny oth er w ay is pr ohi bit ed

be ca use it “ is n ot the norm al acc eptance [sic] of say ing th e pledge in our count ry .” She c onsid ered what58

he did “ dis re spe ct fu l” be ca

use “ [i ] t’ s go ing a ga ins t the nor m al pr oc ed

ur e be havio r [s ic ] of ple dgi ng t o our A m er ic anf la g. ” H oll om an ’ s ge sture is “ not an a cc ep ta

ble be havio r in this c ountry . ” S he e m pha siz ed , “ Y ou j ust

sa lut e the w ay

A m er ic an s salute and pledg e. T hat’ s a given.” A lthou gh she m aintained that thi s disrespect to the f la g w as n’ t the r ea son she a ct ua lly pun ish ed H oll om an , the se state m en ts would allow a j ury

to conclude that her actions were m otivated byher d i s ag re emen twi th an do ff en s e a tth e u np at ri o t i c v i ew s ex p re s s edb y Ho l l o m an ’s ge st ur e. H ar land e xpr es se d asim ilar attit ude . A cc or din g to V ic e Pr inc ipa l Ja son A dki ns, H ar land w as “ an gr y and d isa ppoi nte d and u

pse t” that H utt o de cl ine d to sa lut e the A m er ic anf

la g. H ar land thr eate ne d to r es ci nd h is r ec om m en da tio n of H utt o to the A ir

F or ce A ca de m

y . A ga in, suc h vi ew s to w ar d th e Pl ed ge of A lle gianc e supp ort H oll om an ’ s c la im that he w as pun ish ed

f or the of fe nsi ve vi ewp oi nthe ex pr es se d. Especially

when considered in light of the virtuallynonexis tent evidence that Hollom an disrupted th e class in any way (discussed in th e previous Subpart), the record virtually

com pels the conclusi on (for sum m ary j udgm ent purpos es) that both th e fa ct

and e xte nt o f his pun ish m en t st em m ed f ro m the f ac t tha t A llr ed

and H ar land f ound his ost en sib ly

unp atri oti c vie w s r ep ugnant and o ff en siv e. I nde ed ,59

m any of our c as es have use d e vid en ce suc h a s th is t o su ppor t a f ind ing that a part ic ular gove rn m en ta l a ct w as m oti va te d by

unc onst itutio na l vi ew

poi nt dis cr im inatio n. S ee , e . g. , Ch an dle r v. G eo rg iaP ubl ic T el ec om m . Co m m ’ n, 917 F. 2d 48 6, 491-92 (“ The tr anscript of the evidentiary hearing held by

the district co urt i s r ep le te w ithstate m en ts b y D r. Co ope r, the e xe cu tiv e dir ec tor of [ the state ag en cy ] , that [ the a ge nc y ] de ci de d th at the vie wpoi nts of

the L ibe rt ar ians w er e le ss valuable than tho se of the D em ocrats and Republicans.”). A s e m pha siz ed e ar lie r, the e vid en ce a t tri al m ay pr ove that A llr ed

did not di sc ip li ne Hol lo m an be cau se of h is vi ewp oi nt , bu t fo r a l eg it im at e rea so n. In te rp re tin g th e ev ide nc e in H oll om an ’ s f av or f or sum m ar y j udgm en t purp ose s, how ev er , w e m

ust c onc lud e that he r m oti ve w as dis cr im inator y . B ec au se H oll om anha d th e ri ght

to be f re e fr om vie wpoi nt d isc ri m inatio n, and tha t r igh t w as c le ar ly

e sta bli she d ( both inge ne ra l a s w el l a s inthe pub lic sc hool c ont ex t) under the precedents discussed abo ve, w e m ust denyAllre d qualified imm unityat this stag e. A s Justi ce Bla ckm un rem inds u s, “ [I] f educators intentionallym ay el im inate a ll div er sity

of tho ught , the sc hool w ill str an gle the f re e m ind a t i ts source and teach y outh to discou nt im portant principl es of our governm ent as m ere pl at itud es .” Bd . of Educ . v. Pi co , 45 7 U.S. 8 53 , 87 9, 1 02 S. Ct. 2 79 9, 2 81 4, 7 3 L. E d. 2d 4 35 ( 1982 ) (B la ckm un, J. , c onc ur

ri ng i n part ). C onse que ntl y , e ve n if the60

dissent ’ s contentio n (that Hollom an’ s conduct is not protected und er the T inkerBurnside standard) is correct, Hollom an’ s puni shm ent would still h ave violated the F ir st Am en dm en t. V ie wpoi nt d isc ri m inatio n is anothe r Fi rs t- A m en dm en t av enue f or r ec ove ry that H oll om anis en tit le d to pur sue a t tri al . Having concluded that Allred and Harland are not entit led to summ ary j udgm ent on qu alified im m unitygrounds against any of the three w ay s in which H oll om anc anart ic ulate S pe ec h C lause c la im s a ga ins t the m , w e nowtur n to his Est ab li sh m en t Cl au se cla im ag ai ns t t he m .

III . Hollom an claim s that his righ ts und er the E stablish m ent Clause w ere vio la te d by

A llr ed ’ s da ily

m om en t of

sil en t pr ay er . T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d bo th Allre d and Har land summ ary j udgm ent against this claim . While Hollom an’ s brief on appeal vigo rously

contests thi s ruling as it appl ies to Allred, he does not even m en ti on whet he r Harl an d was en ti tl edto qu al ifi edimm un it y on th is cla im . Consequent ly , w e ar e forc ed to conclude that Hollom an has abandoned h is appeal re gard ing H ar land’ s sum m ar y j udgm en t onqua lif

ie d im m uni ty gr ound s a ga ins tBa sed on the re cord be fore us, it appear s as if Holloman would be a ble to articulate a 9 number of w ay s in which Har land could be he ld liable under a supervisora l theory

of liability . As discussed ea

rlier, qua lified immunit y

is not a defe nse to a § 1983 suit premised on supervisora l liabilit y . Be cause Holloman failed to a rticulate suc h a ca

use of a ction at any

point befor e the district cour

t, we nee d not consider the via bility of such c laims here. 61 H oll om an ’ s E sta

bli shm en t C lause c la im . W e re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of 9 su m m ary jud gm en t o n t hi s cl ai m to All red , ho wev er. As noted in Part I I, the first step in assessing the viabilityof a qualified im m unitydefense is to determ ine whether the governm ent official def endant was engaged in a “ discretionary function” in perform ing th e acts of which the plaint iff co m pla ins . T his e nta ils atw o- ste p ana ly sis : w e be ginby a sc er ta ini ng whe the r the de fe ndant w as pur sui ng a j ob- re la te d go al , and the n e xam ine w he the r the ty pe of act io n i n wh ic h s he was e ng ag in g t o fu rth er t hi s g oa l was au th or iz ed . W e ar e w ill ing to as sum e that A llr ed satis fi es the f

ir st p ro ng o f thi s te st be ca use she w as a tte m

pti ng t o purs ue the le git im at e j ob- re la te d f unc tio n of fo ste ri ng h er

stu de nts ’ c hara ct er

e duc at ionby

te ac hin g c om

pa ssi on. S he ne ve rthe le ss f

ai ls the se co nd p ro ng o f the “ dis cr et ion ar y f unc tio n” te st b ec au se she wa s not pu rsuing th is job-re lated goal throug h legitim ate m eans that fell w ithin her powers. While fostering character developm ent and m oral education wer e undo ubt ed ly

part s of A llr ed ’ s of

fi ci al r es pons ibi lit ie s, thi s do es not auto m at ic al lyWe emphasize that students were not studying the Bible a s part of a course on 10 literature , or sing ing a

relig ious hy

mn in a music class, or a

naly zing a pr ayer a s a poem, but instead we re a ctually

encour ag ed to pra

y . Cf. Stone v. Graha

m, 449 U.S. 39, 42, 101 S. C t. 192, 194, 66 L . Ed. 2d 199 (1980) ( “This is not a ca se in which the Te n Commandments are integrate d into the school curr iculum, where the B ible may constitutionally

be used in a

n appropr iate study of history , civiliz ation, ethics, compa rative r elig ion, or the like.”) .

62 em pow er he r to d o anythi ng w ith in h er j udgm en t tha t f

urthe rs tho se goa ls; she can no t ed uc at e st ud en ts at a ll co st s. Pray ing go es sufficiently bey ond th e range of activities norm ally perform ed by hig h sc hool te ac he rs and c om m onl y a cc ep te d a s part

of the ir j ob a s to f

al l out sid e the sc ope of

A llr ed ’ s of

fi ci al dut ie s, e ve n if

she w er e usi ng p ray er

a s a m eans o f ac hie vin g aj ob- re la te d go al . I t i s no t w ith in the r an ge of too ls am ong which teac hers are em

powere d to select in furtherance of their pedagogical dut ie s. P ray er

is a re la tiv el y

sui ge ne ri s a ct ivi ty . P ut anothe r w ay , e ve n ig nor ing 10 Hollom an’ s Establishm ent Clause claim s, pray ing sti ll would notbe part of a pu bl ic sch oo l t each er’s res po ns ib il it ie s o r du ti es . W e em phasize that, at this j uncture, w e ar e not deny ing Allred sum m ary j udgm ent on qu alified im m unitygrounds against this claim because w e fe el her ac ts v iol at ed

the E sta bli shm en t C lause . I nst ea d, w e ar e hol din g he r ine lig ibl e fo r qualified imm

unity as a m atter of law bec ause she failed to establish that her act—this ty

pe of act— f

ell within her duties or powers a s a teac her. The fact that Allre d is a teacher

does not m ean that anything she say s or does in front of a63

cl as sr oom

ne ce ssari ly

c onst itute s an e xe rc ise of he r dis cr et ion ar

y pow er s or

is a j ob-related function. P ray er is distinct from the ty pe of civil virtue and secular m or al is m Alab am a so ug htto pro m ot e th ro ug h i ts ch arac te r educ at io n p ro gr am . Co nse que ntl y , A llr ed

is not e ve n po te nti al ly

e nti tle d to sum

m ar y j udgm en t on qu al ifi edimm

un it y gro un ds ag ai ns t Ho ll om an ’s Est ab li sh m en t Cl au se cla im . The dissent takes issue with this con clusion , c onclud ing th at school pray er is a ty pe of act that f

alls within the scope of a public schoo l teacher ’ s discretionary au tho ri ty . I t arg ue s, “ It

w as c er ta inl y w ith in the sc ope of

apub lic hig h sc hool teacher ’ s authorityto lead students in pray er prior to 1962, w hen the Court ruled that t ea ch er

le d pr ay er

in publ ic sc hool s is avio la tio n of the E sta bli shm en t Cl au se . ” T his ana ly sis is be sid e the poi nt. I n de te rm ini ng whe the r a publ ic of fi ci al is au tho ri ze d to pe rf orm ac er ta in ty pe of a ct ( ab str ac tin g aw ay

f ro m it s u n c o n s t i tu t i o n a l a s p e c t s ) , we l o o kt o th e s c o p e o f th e i r au th o r i ty a s i te x i s t s t o d ay, and do no t inqu ire as to what the forty -y ear old root causes of the present-day sit ua tio n m ay

have be en . P ray er

is not aty pe of a ct that f al ls w ith in a

r ea sona bly spe ci fi c cate gor

y of a ct ion s th at

te ac he rs are auth or iz ed

to pe rf orm ; the re is no ea sy w ay of abstra ct ing aw ay

it s un co nst itutio na l a spe ct s to arr ive a t a ty pe of be ha vi orth atfal ls wit hi n t each ers ’ di sc ret io na ry au th or it y .64

Moreover, we decline to em bark on a sociolog ical inquiry —one for w hich thi s c ourt i s si ngul ar ly

une qui ppe d—i n whic h w e w ei gh S upr em e Co urt r uli ngs ag ai nst oth er im portant s tim

uli that ha s le d to the gr ad ua l se cu lari zatio n of

thi s country over the past half century to determ ine why

pray er is not a ty

pe of act that publ ic school teachers ar e em powere d to perform . Consequent ly , A llred acted out sid e he r dis cr et ion ar

y auth or ity and i s no t e ve n po te nti al ly e lig ibl e to i nvok e qu al ifi edimm

un it y ag ai ns t Ho ll om an ’s Est ab li sh m en t Cl au se cla im s.

IV. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d A llr ed sum m ar y j udgm en t onqua lif

ie d im m uni ty ground s against Hollom an’ s Establishm ent Clause claim s because it concluded that her daily

m om ent of silent pray er did not vio late H ollom an’ s constit ution al r i g h t s , an dth a te v e ni f

i td i d , th o s e r i g h t s w e r e n o tc l e ar l y e s t ab l i s h e da tth e t i me of the inc ide nt. I n P ar

t I II , w e re ve rs ed

the c ourt’ s gr an t of

qua lif ie d im m uni ty because A llred had failed to establish that sh e had been perf orm ing a discretionary function in conductin g this m om ent of silent pray er. In this Part, we conclude that Hollom an dem onstrated sufficient evidence to sup port the conclusi on that Allred h adv i o l at edcl ea rl y es t ab l i s h edri g h t s u n d erth e E s t ab l i s h m en tCl au s e. We inc lud e thi s di sc uss iona s apr ef ac e to P ar t V , w he re w e as se ss the li ab ili ty of theWe also note that, eve n putting aside questions of qualified immunity , the district 11 court’s le g al conc lusion—that Hollom an’s r ights unde r the Establishment Clause had not be en violated—would have require d that the cour t dismi ss his § 1983 claims under the Establishment Clause for f

ailure to state a

claim. Given that the issue ha s been thoroughly briefe d and ar gued by bo th s ide s b e fo re us , w e ne e d n ot w a it f or a su bs e qu e nt a

pp e a l f ro m th is l e g a lly

ine vit a ble rulingto consider this matter. 65 Sc hool Bo ar d. L ogi ca lly e noug h, the onl y

w ay H oll om anc anm ai nta in h is E sta bli shm en t C lause sui t a ga ins t the S ch ool Bo ar d is if he de m onstrate s, a s a thr es hol d m atte r, that hi s E sta bli shm en t C lause r igh ts w er e vio la te d. 11

A. T he E sta bli shm en t C lause of

the F ir st Am en dm en t st at es , “ Co ngr es s sh al l m ak e n o l aw res pe ct in g a n e st ab li sh m en t o f rel ig io n . . . .” U.S. Con st . am en d I. This restric tion h as been m ade applicable to states, a s well a s state-cre ated entities an d th ei r em

plo y ee s, thr oughthe D ue P ro ce ss C lause of the F ourte en th A m en dm en t. C an tw el l v. Co nne ct ic ut, 310 U . S. 296 , 303 , 60 S . Ct . 900 , 903 , 84 L . E d. 121 3 ( 1940 ). T he E sta bli shm en t C lause appl ie s no t on ly to state statut es , but a ct s and d ec isi ons of

ind ivi dua l go ve rn m en ta l a ct or s, suc h a s te ac he rs and sc hool a dm ini str at or s. L ee v. W ei sm an , 505 U . S. 577 , 587 , 112 S . Ct . 264 9, 265 5, 12 0 L. Ed. 2 d 4 67 (19 92 ). InL em on v . K

urtz m an , 403 U . S. 602 , 91 S . Ct . 210 5, 29 L . E d. 2d 7 45 (1 971) , the S upr em e Co urt se t f orth i ts f am ous thr ee -p ro ng t es t f

or a sse ssi ng the66

pe rm iss ibi lity

of statut es und er

the E sta bli shm en t C lause . “ Fi rs t, the statut e m ust have ase cu lar le gis la tiv e pur pose ; se co nd, it s pr inc ipa l or pr im ar y e ff ec t m ust be one that neither advances nor inhib its religion ; finally , the statute m ust no t foster an excessive governm ent entanglem ent with religion.” I d. at 612-13, 91 S. Ct. at 2111 ( int er

na l c itatio ns and quot at ion s om itt ed ). A gost ini v. F el ton , 521 U . S. 203 , 233, 117 S . Ct . 199 7, 201 5, 138 L . E d. 2d 3 91 ( 1997 ), how ev er , r ef ine d th is t es t, stating, “ [T ] he fac tors we use to assess whether an entanglem ent is ‘ excessive’ are sim ilar to the fac tors we use to exam ine ‘ effe ct.’ . . . [I] t is sim plest to recognize w hy e ntangl em en t i s si gni fi cant and tre at it . . . a s an a spe ct

of the inquir

y int o a statut e’ s e ff

ec t. ” T hus, w hil e the Co urt ha s f old ed it s tr ad iti ona l “ ex ce ssi ve en tangl em en t” inquir

y int o it s “pr im ar

y e ff ec t” ana ly sis , the sub stanc e of it s Est ab li sh m en t Cl au se juri sp ru de nc e rem ai ns fun da m en ta ll y un al te red . See, e.g ., Zelm anv. Si m

m on s- Harri s, 5 36 U.S. 63 9, 6 48 -4 9, 1 22 S. Ct. 2 46 0, 2 46 5, 1 53 L. E d. 2d 6 04 ( 2002 ). T his S ec tio n de m onstrate s th at A llr ed ’ s pr ac tic e of

sol ic iti ng pr ay er r eque sts f

ro m he r stu de nts and e nf

or ci ng a m om en t of

sil en ce r uns af oul of the L em on- A gost ini standard . S ubse ct ion( a) loo ks t o th e pur pose of he r ac ts, whi le Subs ect io n (b ) ex am in es th ei r pr im ary effe ct . 1.Compassion was not the only char acte r trait Allre d attempted to instill in her students. 12 She testified, “I f you are talking a bout cleanliness, we talk about litter. You know, a nd Ihave discussed that with students, beingfined if you throw out litter. Cleanliness as fa r as pe rsonal hyg iene, I have a ctually

mentioned that when I

had a pr oblem in class. You know, ‘ Every body don’t forg et to, you know, bathe.’ ” 67 Agov er nm en t of fi ci al vio la te s th e E sta

bli shm en t C lause if

she la ck s a

“ se cu lar le gis la tiv e pur

pose ” fo r he r ac tio ns. C om m . f or P ub. E duc . & Re lig iou s Lib ert y v. Re ga n, 4 44 U.S. 64 6, 6 52 , 10 0 S . Ct. 8 40 , 84 6, 6 3 L. Ed. 2 d 9 4 (1 98 0) . Allre d attem

pts to d efend her daily

m om ent of silent pray er by arguing that it was intended to teach students com passion , pursuant to the chara cter e ducation p lan

12 m andated by

the State L egislature. S ee supra Se ction I.C; see also Ala. Code § 16 -6 B-2 . T his e xpl an at iondoe s no t c onst itute ava lid se cu lar le gis la tiv e pur

pose f or Allre d’ s actions. First, Allre d’ s m ost basic int ent unqu estionablywa s to offer her stu de nts an op portun ity

to pr ay in a publ ic sc hool dur ing the sc hool day , and ef fe ct ive ly e nc our ag e the m

to do s o. B y

c oll ec tin g pr ay er

r eque sts , and u sin g th e phr as es “ le t us pr ay ” an d “ am en , ” she gave the pr ac tic e of pr ay ing dur ing the m om en t o f si le nc e h er i m pl ic itim pr im atur . Whil e she m ay

a lso have ha d ahig he r- or de r ult im at e goa l of pr om oti ng co m pa ssi on, w e loo k no t on ly to the ult im at e goa l or

obj ec tiv e of

the be havio r, but al so the m or e im

m ed ia te , tangi ble , or

low er -o rd er

c onse que nc es a

gov er nm en tI t is ins tr uc tiv e , th ou g h b y

no me ans ne c e ssa

ry to o ur ho ldi ng , th at A llr e d a lso 13 considere d rea dings f

rom the B ible to be par

t of her stude nts’ char acte r educ ation. 68 act orin te nd s t o b rin g abo ut . Allr ed ’s m ere “ te st im on ia l av owa l o f se cu la r . . . purpos e is not sufficient to avoidconflict with the E stablish m ent Clause.” K aren B. v. Tre en , 65 3 F .2d89 7, 9 00 (11 th Cir . 19 81 ). T his r ea soni ng c los el y

f oll ow s th at

e m plo y ed by the S upr em e Co urt i n Stone v. G raham , wherein it held that, notwithstandin g supp osedlysecular j ust if ic at ion s of

fe re d by the sc hool dis tr ic t, “ [t ] he pr e- em ine nt p ur pose f or pos tin g the T enCo m

m an dm en ts o n sc hool ro om w al ls i s pl ai nly

r el igi ous in n at

ur e. T he Te n Com m andm ents are undeniably a sacr ed text in the Jewish and Christian fa ith s, and n o le gis la tiv e re ci ta tio n of asup pose dly

se cu lar pur

pose c anbli nd u s to that f ac t. ” 449 U . S. 39, 41, 101 S . Ct . 192 , 194 , 66 L . E d. 2d 1 99 ( 1980 ). B ec au se pr ay er i s “ a p rimary

rel ig io us act iv it y

in it se lf,” see Treen , 65 3 F .2dat 9 01 , a te ac he r or a dm ini str at or ’ s in te nt t o f ac ili ta te or

e nc our ag e pr ay er

in a publ ic sc hool is pe r se an un co ns ti tu ti on al in te ntto fur th er a re li gi ou s g oa l. Se co nd, e ve n a cc ep tin g A llr ed ’ s te sti m ony that sh e hope d to use pr ay er a s a w ay of te ac hin g c om

pa ssi on, our

ana ly sis doe s no t e nd the re . Whil e pr om oti ng co m pa ssi on m ay

be ava lid

se cu lar pur

pose , te ac hin g st

ude nts that pr ay ing is ne ces sa ry or h el pf ul to pro m ot in g c om

pa ss io n i s n ot . As we h el d i n Tre en , 1369

E ve n if the a vow ed

obj ec tiv e of

the le gis la tur e an d sc hool board is not it se lf str ic tly r el igi ous, it

is soug ht t o be a ch ie ve d th ro ugh the obse rv an ce of

an in tr ins ic al ly

r el igi ous pr ac tic e. T he unm ist ak ab le m es sa ge of

the S upr em e Co urt' s te ac hin gs i s th at the state c annot em ploya re ligio us m eans to serve otherw ise legitim ate secular in te res ts . Id . at 9 01 . T he S upr em e Co urt w as f ac ed w ithsimilar fa ct s inS ch ool D istri ct v. Sc he m pp, 374 U . S. 203 , 83 S . Ct . 156 0, 10 L . E d. 2d 8 44 ( 1963 ), w he re in i t re fu se d to c onc lud e that da ily r ea din gs f

ro m the Bi ble in publ ic sc hool s ha d a va lid se cu lar pur

pose . T he S ta te arg ue d th at the pur pose s of the statut e re qui ri ng the Bi ble r ea din gs w er e “ the pr om oti on o f m or al va lue s, the c ontra dic tio n to the m at er ia lis tic tr en ds o f our ti m es , the pe rp et

ua tio n of our ins tit uti ons an d th e te ac hin g of

li te ratur e. ” I d. a t 22 3, 83 S . Ct . a t 15 72. T he Co urt stru ck down th e statut e, a sse rt ing that “ ev enif it s purp ose is not

str ic tly r el igi ous, [ its pur

pose ] is so ug htto be acco m

pl is he d t hr ou gh read in gs , wit ho utco m m en t, fro m

th e Bi bl e. Surely the place of the B ible as an instrum ent of religion cannot be gain said . . . .” Id . a t 22 4, 83 S . Ct . a t 15 72. E lse w he re , thi s c ourt ha s e m pha siz ed , “ Re co gni zi ng that pr ay er

is the qui nte sse nti al r el igi ous pr ac tic e im pli es that no se cu lar pur

pose can be satis fi ed . . . . ” Ja ff re e v. W al la ce , 705 F . 2d 1 526, 153 4- 35 ( 11th C ir . 198 3)70

[J affr ee I], aff’d su b n om . W al la ce v . Jaf free , 47 2 U.S. 3 8, 1 05 S. Ct. 2 47 9, 8 6 L. Ed. 2 d 2 9 (1 98 5) [Ja ffre e II]. Under these pr ecedents, a person attem pting to further an ostensiblysecular pur pose thr ougha vow ed ly

r el igi ous m eans i s c onsi de re d to have ac onst itutio na lly im pe rm iss ibl e pur

pose . S ee Ja ge r v. D ougl as Cty . S ch . D ist . , 862 F . 2d 8 24, 830 (11th Cir. 1989) (“ [A ] n intrins ically religious practice cannot m eet the secular purpos e prong of the Le m on test . . . .” ). T he pointof A llred’ s daily “ ritual” w as to sho w that pray ing is a com passion ate ac t; such an endo rsem ent of an intri nsi ca lly

r el igi ous ac tiv ity

is inc onsi ste nt w iththe E sta bli shm en t C lause . F or these reasons, w e find that Allre d viol ated the E stablish m ent Clause because her acts w ere m otivated, at least in part, by a desire to inculcate “ religiosity .” 2. A llr ed ’ s be havio r al so f

ai ls the “ ef

fe ct s” pr ong of

the L em on- A gost ini te st be ca use the e ff

ec t of he r be havio r w as c le ar ly to pr om ote pr ay ing , ar el igi ous ac tiv ity . P ray ing is pe rh ap s th e “ qui nte sse nti al r el igi ous pr ac tic e, ” se e T re en , 653 F. 2d at 901 , and to exp licitly call for pray er r equests, invok e a m om ent of silence for pray er w ith the ph rase “ let us pray ,” actually hold su ch a m om ent of silence,71

an d so m et im es c onc lud e w ith“ A m en ” ha s th e ef fe ct of both e ndor sin g r el igi ous act iv it y , as wel l as en co ur ag in g o r fac il it at in g i ts pra ct ic e. T his be havio r is c le ar ly

the ty pe of “ inv oc at ionof

G od’ s bl es sin gs” of which the Suprem e Court disapproved in Engel v. Vitale , 370 U. S. 421, 422, 82 S. Ct . 126 1, 126 2, 8 L . E d. 2d 6 01 ( 1962 ). A llr ed ’ s us e of the c onc ep t of

sil en t pr ay er c oul d qu ite r ea sona

bly appe ar to be an “ en dor se m en t [ of r el igi on tha t] is not cons istent with the establish ed principle that the gov ernm ent m ust pu rsue a course of com

plete neutrality

towar d religion.” Jaff

ree II, 472 U.S . at 60, 105 S. Ct . a t 24 91 ( hol din g th at

astatut e al low ing pub lic sc hool te ac he rs to expr es sly de dic at e a m om en t of

sil en ce to pr ay er

vio la te s th e E sta

bli shm en t C lause ); se e al so Sc he m pp, 374 U . S. a t 22 5, 83 S . Ct . a t 15 73 ( “ [T ] he G ove rn m en t [ m ust ] m ai nta in str ic t ne utr al ity , ne ith er

a idi ng n or

opp osi ng r el igi on. ”) . Whil e A llr ed did not prom ote any

particular pray er, or even com pel pray er in genera l, her policy undeni ably

“ encourage[d] rec itation o f . . . pray er. ” E ngle, 370 U. S. at 424, 82 S. Ct . a t 12 63. C onse que ntl y , w e co nc lud e that A llr ed ’ s a ct s vi olate d th e Est ab li sh m en t Cl au se . A llr ed arg ue s th at

he r be havio r doe s no t have the e ff ec t of f urthe ri ng rel ig io n b ecau se he r st ud en ts freq ue nt ly ask edhe r to ho ldth e m om en ts of s il en ce. W e he ld i n C handl er

v. S ie ge lm an , “ So lon g a s th e pr ay er is ge nui ne ly

stu de nt-72

ini tiate d, and n ot the pr oduc t of any sc hool pol ic y

w hic h a ct ive ly

or sur re pti tio usl y en co ur ag es it , the spe ec h is pr ivate and i t i s pr ote ct ed . ” 230 F . 3d 1 313, 131 7 (11th Cir. 2000) (Chandler I I). A llred takes an excee ding ly broad view of the phr as e “ stu de nt- ini tiate d, ” int er pr et ing it to be w oe fu lly

inc onsi ste nt w iththe r es t of ou r op in io n i n t ha t ca se . Under C handler II , re ad

a s aw hol e, apr ay er

is not “ stu de nt- ini tiate d, ” an d he nc e co nst itutio na l, sim ply be ca use the ini tia l i de a fo r the pr ay er w as astu de nt’ s. Fo r ex am ple , the f ac t tha t a stu de nt m ay

c om e up w iththe ide a of havin g th e L or d’ s P ray er

r ec ite d ov er

his sc hool ’ s lo udsp eake rs e ac h day doe s no t m ean th e pr ay er is “ stu de nt i nit ia te d, ” an d so c onst itutio na l, und er Ch an dle r II . I nde ed , in the S upr em e Co urt’ s S an taF e ru lin g ( w hic h C handl er I I ap pli ed ), the stu de nt b ody had condu cted an elec tion andaff irm atively

voted to h ave pray ers re cited at fo otb al l gam es , but

the Co urt ne ve rthe le ss i nva lid at ed the pr ac tic e. S ch ool pe rs on ne l m ay

no t fa ci li ta te pra y er s im

pl y be cau se a st ud en t re qu es ts or l ead s i t. T he tr ue te st o f co nst itutio na lity is w he the r the sc hool e nc our ag ed , fa ci lit at ed , or

in any w ay c ondu ct ed

the pr ay er . C handl er

I I use d th e phr as e

“ student -initiated” to m ean “ independ ently student o rganized and conducted,” as oppo sed to “ school s pons ored” or “ school con ducted.” I n fact, in the actual hol din g of

the c as e, w e uphe ld a

portio n of

an in j unc tio n e nj oin ing the sc hool73

dis tr ic t f ro m “ ‘ ai din g, abe tti ng, c om

m an din g, c ouns el ing , ind uc ing , or de ri ng, or procuring’ school o rganized or offic ially sanctioned religiou s activity .” Id. at 1317 . While purely

private pray er by

students is constit ution ally protected, pray er that i s le d, e nc our ag ed , or f ac ili ta te d by

sc hool pe rs onne l i s c onst itutio na lly pr ohi bit ed . “ [E ] ve n ge nui ne ly stu de nt- ini tiate d sp ee chm ay c onst itute state a ct ion if the State participates in or supervises the sp eech. . . . [S] tudent religio us speech mu s tb e w i th o u to v e r s i g h t , w i th o u ts up e rv i s i o n , s ub j e c to n l y t o th e s a me re as ona ble ti m e, pla ce , and m anne r re str ic tio ns a s a ll oth er stu de nt s pe ec h in school.” Chandler v. Jam es [Chandler I ] , 180 F. 3d 12 54, 1264-65 (11th Cir. 1999 ). I n th is c as e, the pr ay er r eque sts and m om en ts o f sil en ce f or pr ay er c annot be considered purely

student s peech because they we re c oordinated andconducted by a teac he r (i n acla ss ro om du rin g s ch oo l h ou rs , no les s) . That students were not actually force d to pray

during th e m om ent of silence, and m ay have been fr ee to leave the r oom , does not alleviate the constitut ional infirm ities of Allre d’ s m om ent of silence. The Engel Court declar ed, “ [T ] he fac t that the pr ogr am

. . . doe s no t r equir e al l pu pil s to r ec ite the pr ay er

but pe rm its tho se w ho w ishto do s o to r em ai n si le nt o r be e xc use d f ro m the r oom , ign or es the essential nature of the program ’ s constit ution al defec ts.” 370 U. S. at 430, 82 S. Ct . a t 12 66. T he Co urt f

urthe r expla ine d, “ T he E sta bli shm en t C lause , unl ike the74

Free Exer cise Clause, does not d epend upo n any showing of direct governm ental com pulsi on and is v iolated by the enactm ent of law s which establish an official re lig ionw he the r tho se law s op er at e dir ec tly to co er ce non obse rv ing ind ivi dua ls o r not . ” I d. , 82 S . Ct . a t 12 67. T he S ch em pp C ourt l at er

r ea ff irm ed that the uncons titutio nality

of school-spo nsored pray er is not “ m itigated bythe fac t that indiv idual stu dents m ay

absent them selves upo n parental request, for that fa ct furn ish es no d ef

en se to a cl ai m

of unc onst itutio na lity

und er the E sta bli shm en t Cl au se . ” S ch em

pp, 374 U . S. a t 22 3, 83 S . Ct . a t 15 72. T he “ nond en om inatio na l” na tur e of the m om en t of

sil en ce is sim ilarl y

of no avail. W eism an, 505 U. S. at 594, 112 S. C t. at 2659 (stating that the no nsectarian na tur e of asc hool -s pons or ed

pr ay er “ doe s no t l es se n th e of

fe nse or iso la tio n to the obj ec tor s. A t be st i t narr ow s th ei r num be r, a t w or st i nc re as es the ir se nse of iso la tio n and a ff

ro nt. ”) . “ [G ] ove rn m en t i s r equir ed to be ane utr al a m ong re lig ion s an d be tw ee n r el igi on and n onr el igi on. ” Mi tc he ll v. H el m s, 530 U . S. 793 , 878 , 120 S. Ct . 253 0, 257 8, 147 L . E d. 2d 6 60 ( 2000 ) (e m pha sis a dde d) ( quot at ionand ci ta tio n om itt ed ). “ It

is nowf irm ly e sta bli she d th at

alawm ay

be one ‘ re spe ct ing an establishm ent of religion’ even thoug h its cons equence is not to p rom ote a

‘ state r el igi on’ and e ve n th oughit doe s no t a id o ne r el igi on m or e than anothe r but m erely benefits all religions alike.” C omm . f or Pub. E duc. v. Ny quist , 413 U. S.75

756, 771 , 93 S . Ct . 295 5, 296 4- 65, 37 L . E d. 2d 9 48 ( 1973 ). E nc our ag ing or fa ci lit at ing any

pr ay er c le ar ly f ost er s and e ndor se s r el igi on o ve r nonr el igi on, and so r uns af oul of the F ir st Am en dm en t. The bre vity

of A llred’ s m om ent of silent pray er does not alleviate her constitu tional vi olation , e ither. It is “ no defense to urge that the religious practice s he re m ay be r el at ive ly

m ino r en cr oa ch m en ts o n th e Fi rs t A m en dm en t. ” S ch em pp, 374 U . S. a t 22 5, 83 S . Ct . a t 15 73. O ur own pr ec ed en ts c le ar ly

state that “ [t ] he E sta bli shm en t C lause doe s no t f oc us o n th e am ount

of ti m e ana ct ivi ty

take s, but rat he r ex am in es th e rel ig io us ch arac te r of th e act iv it y .” Ja ge r, 86 2 F .2dat 8 32 . It is instructive to com

pare the c ase before us with another m om ent-ofsilence case in which we f oundthat the Establishm ent Clause w as not vio lated. In Bo w n v. G w ine tt Co unty S ch ool D istri ct , 112 F . 3d 1 464 (1 1thCi r. 199 7) , w e he ld that a G eo rg iastatut e re qui ri ng p ubl ic sc hool te ac he rs to obse rv e a m om en t of sil en ce e ac h day

in the ir c la ssr oom s di d no t vi olate the L em on t es t. T he statut e had a secular purpose because it expressly declare d that the “ m om ent of quiet re fl ec tio n . . . is not

int en de d to be and s ha ll not be c ondu ct ed

a s ar el igi ous se rv ic e or e xe rc ise but

sha ll be c ondu ct ed

a s an op portun ity

f or am om en t of

sil en t refl ect io n o n t he an ti ci pa te d a ct iv it ie s o f th e d ay .” Id . at 1 46 9 (quo ti ng O.C.G.A. § 20-2-105 0(b)). Moreover, the statute’ s spon sor stated that he “ viewed the A ct76

not a s pr ovi din g f

or sc hool pr ay er , but

r athe r as pr ovi din g f

or am om en t f

or stu de nts to co lle ct

the ir tho ught s, f

oc us o n th e upc om ing day , and b eg in t o de ve lo p s el f-re sp ectan d d is ci pl in e.” Id . at 1 47 1. Be ca use the statut e, a s a ct

ua lly im ple m en te d, did

not have the e ff

ec t of pr om oti ng o r inh ibi tin g r el igi on, it a lso satis fi ed

the se co nd p ro ng o f the L em on te st. T he announc em en t m ad e ove r the sc hool lou dspe ak er that c om m en ce d th e m om en t of

sil en ce e ac h day

“ ind ic at ed

onl y that the re w oul d be am om en t of silence to refle ct on the day ’ s activities. . . . [ and] in no way suggest ed that student s shou ld or shou ld notpray silently during th e m om ent of quiet refle ction . . . .” Id. at 1472. Moreover, “ [t] he Adm inistrative Bulletin circulated to a ll sc hool pr inc ipa ls i nstru ct ed that t ea ch er s sh oul d no t su gge st tha t st ude nts use the m om en t of

qui et r ef le ct ionf or pr ay er , ” an d w e fo und no i ndi catio n “ that any te ac he r en co ur ag ed

pr ay er in vio la tio n of

the gui de lin es state d inthe Adm in is tra ti ve Bu ll et in .” Id . T he ins tant c as e is e as ily

dis tin gui sha

ble f ro m Bo w n inthat A llr ed , f

ar f ro m takin g st ep s to e nsur e that he r m om en t of sil en ce w as not

r eg ar de d a s ar el igi ous ac tiv ity , a ff

irm at ive ly

and r ep eate dly

la be le d it a s su ch . H er

c hara ct er iz at ionof the m om en t of

sil en ce is im

portant; in A dle r v. D uva l C ty . S ch . Bd . , 250 F . 3d 1330 , 134 2 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) , w e uphe ld a sc hool ’ s po lic y

of havin g st ude nt77

gr ad ua tio n sp eake rs in part

be ca use of “ the c om ple te a bse nc e . . . of

c ode w or ds suc h a s ‘ inv oc at ion ’ une qui voc al ly c onno tin g r el igi on. ” T he dis tr ic t c ourt i n th is ca se w as w ill ing to ove rl ook the f ac t tha t A llr ed

w oul d f re que ntl y “ ‘ sli p[ ] up’ by usi ng the w or d ‘ pr ay ’ ins te ad of the w or ds ‘ m om en t of

sil en ce , ’ . . . and b y ind ic at ing the e nd o f the m om en t of sil en ce by

voi ci ng the w or d ‘ am en ’ , apoo r subs titute, perhaps, for the w ords ‘ let’ s get to work.’ ” (M em . O p. June 4, 2001, at 6) . S uc h la

be ls, how ev er , are qui te im portant i n de te rm ini ng n ot o nly the pur pose be hin d th e ac tio ns at i ssu e (d isc uss ed in the pr ior

S ubse ct ion ), but

a lso the ir nature, likely

eff ects, and the degree to which they are likely

to be perceived as st at e en do rs em en t, fa ci li ta ti on , or p ro m ot io n o f rel ig io n. Fo r the se r ea sons , w e have no tro ubl e in c onc lud ing that the se f ac ts am ount to bl at an t an d re pe at edvi ol at io ns of t he Est ab li sh m en t Cl au se . B. H av ing e sta

bli she d th at

A llr ed inf ri nge d H oll om an ’ s r igh ts unde r the E sta bli shm en t C lause , w e nowm ust a sse ss whe the r the se r igh ts w er e “ cl earl y es ta bli she d” a t the ti m e of

he r ac tio ns. T he dis tr ic t c ourt he ld, w ith out explana tio n, that “ [n ] o j ur y c oul d r ea sona

bly c onc lud e that ‘ ev er

y li ke -s itu at ed , reasonable’ teacher

or principal would necessarily know . . . that using the word78

‘ pr ay er ’ a s ae uphe m ism

f or ‘ m om en t of

sil en ce , ’ vio la te d f

re ed om of r el igi on o r fr ee dom f ro m r el igi on. ” ( Me m . O p. , Jun e 4, 200 1, a t 10 ). W e ar e ag ai n f or ce d to di sa gr ee. By now it shouldgo without say ing th at it is uncons titutio nal for a te acher or a dm ini str at or

( or som eo ne a ct ing a t the ir

be he st) to le ad

stu de nts a lou d in vol unt ar y pr ay er . S ee E nge l, 370 U . S. a t 42 2, 82 S . Ct . a t 12 62 ( pr ohi bit ing recitation of nondeno m ination al pray er); S chem pp, 374 U. S. at 216, 83 S. Ct. at 1568 ( inv al idatin g sc hool board pr ac tic e of

r ec iti ng the L or d’ s P ray er ove r the sc ho ol lo ud sp eak ers each da y ). In Jaffr ee I I, another case f rom Ala bam a involv ing un constitu tional E sta bli shm en t C lause pr ac tic es , the S upr em e Co urt w en t a ste p f urthe r an d co nde m ne d th e use of

am om en t of

sil en ce w he n on e of

the pur pose s f or w hic h it w a s e x p r e s s l y i n s t i tu t e dw a s p r aye r . 4 7 2 U . S . 3 8 , 1 0 5 S . C t . 2 4 7 9 . T h e A l ab a ma state le gis la tur e ha d e na ct ed astatut e, A la . Co de § 16 -1 -2 0, r equir ing that pu bli c sc hool te ac he rs in the f

ir st thr oughsix th g ra de s e sta bli sh a da ily m om en t of silence “ for m editation.” Id. at 40, 105 S. Ct. at 2481. T hree y ears late r, it enacted § 16 -1 -2 0. 1, w hic h pe rm itt ed ( tho ugh not

r equir ed ) al l pu

bli c sc hool te ac he rs to holda m om ent of silence “ for m editation o r voluntary pray er. ” T he parties agree d that the or igi na l st at

ute , pr ovi din g on ly

f or am om en t of

sil en ce f or m ed itatio n,79

wa s constit ution ally

perm issib le. The Court held that the later enactm ent, which expr es sly spe ci fi ed “ vol unt ar

y pr ay er ” as an a ddi tio na l purp ose f or , or pe rm iss ibl e ac tiv ity to pe rf orm dur ing , the m om en t of

sil en ce , w as unc onst itutio na l. I t f ound that the enactm ent of § 16-1-20.1 “ wa s not m otivated byany clear ly secular pur pose –in de ed , the statut e ha d no se cu lar pur pose . ” I d. a t 56 , 105 S . Ct . a t 24 89- 90. I t f urthe r not ed

that, notw ith standi ng the ge ne ra l pe rm iss ibi lity of am om en t o f s i l en ce , e x p re s s l y d es i g n at i n g i tas an o p p o rt u n i ty fo r p ra yer “co n v ey[s ] a m essage of state endorsem ent and prom otion of pray er. ” Id. at 59, 105 S. Ct. at 2491 . T he Co urt c onc lud ed , “ Su chan e ndor se m en t i s no t c onsi ste nt w iththe es ta bli she d pr inc ipl e that the gov er nm en t m ust pur sue ac our se of

c om ple te ne ut ral it y to wardrel ig io n.” Id. at60 , 10 5 S . Ct. at24 91 . W e see no w ay

of disting uishi ng Jaffree II from the instant case. I f a law that a llo w ed

te ac he rs to ins tit

ute am om en t of

sil en ce e xpr es sly

f or pr ay er is unc onst itutio na l, the n it

sur el y a lso unc onst itutio na l f

or ate ac he r to a ct

ua lly instit ute a m om ent of silence expressly for pray er. T he law cannot get m uch m ore

“ cl earl y est ab li sh ed ” th an th at .80

H av ing c onc lud ed

that H oll om ansuc ce ssf

ull y a lle ge d avio la tio n of

the E sta bli shm en t C lause , w e nowtur n to the via

bil ity of both hi s S pe ec h and Est ab li sh m en t Cl au se cla im s ag ai ns t t he Sch oo l Bo ard . V. T he S ch ool Bo ar d m ay

not be he ld l ia

ble f or the unc onst itutio na l a ct s of it s em plo y ee s un de r a re spon de at sup er ior the or y . I n c as es suc h a s M one ll v. D ep ar tm en t of S oc ia l S er

vic es , 436 U . S. 658 , 690 -9 1, 98 S . Ct . 201 8, 203 5- 36, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978), the Suprem e Court articulated the circum stances in which

“ local governing bodies” are subje ct to § 198 3 liability . This Par t exam ines each of the w ay s inw hic h H oll om anc ont en ds tha t the S ch ool Bo ar d m ay be sue d. A. Mon el l st at es that “ w he n e xe cu tio n of agov er nm en t’ s po lic y

. . . inf lic ts the injury . . . [then] the governm ent as an entity is responsib le under § 1983 .” Id. at 694, 98 S. C t. at 2037 -38. T o holdthe School Board liable for H ollom an’ s Speech Clause claim

under this th eory , w e m

ust locate som e af

firm ative official policy that a rea sonable jury

could un derstand as calling upo n teachers to com pel stu de nts to sa lut e the f

la g. A la . Co de § 1 6- 43- 5 pr ovi de s, “ T he S ta te Bo ar d of E duc at ionsha ll af

fo rd a ll stu de nts a tte ndi ng p ubl ic kin de rg ar te n, pr im ar

y andInh is d e p o s it io n , H ar la n d b r ie f ly d is c u s s e d

th e me mo . H e te s ti f

ie d , “ We [h av e ] a 14 memo from whe n Mr. L arr y Ba nks was the supe rintendent. I think the Pledge of Alleg iance was spelled out as beingone of the things that took plac e in the morning . . . . [The] Pledge of Al le g ianc e wa s p art

of the c ha ra c te r e du c atio n, and

the te a c he rs did

va ri ou s th ing s in

the re to teac h char acte r and pr omote g ood citizenship, butthe pledg e wa s part of it.” 81 se co ndary

sc hool s th e oppo rt

uni ty e ac h sc hool day

to vol unt ar ily re ci te the ple dge of allegiance to the U nited States flag. ” (e m phasis add ed). State law clear ly does not a llo wstu de nts to be f

or ce d to sa lut e the f

la g. T he S upe ri nte nde nt o f the W al ke r Co unty

P ubl ic S ch ool S y ste m

iss ue d am em or an dum

on t he Bo ar d of Education’ s letterhead, stating, “ [E ] ach school sy stem m ust incorpo rate a Charac ter E ducation Plan which will consist of ten m inutes of ins truction per day in v ar iou s are as , suc h a s, the P le dge of A lle gianc e . . . . E ac h day m ust inc lud e the Pl ed ge of A lle gianc e, and the n othe r ar ea s m en tio ne d a s y ou d et er m ine a t y our sc hool . ” T his of

fi ci al pol ic y

dir ec tiv e la ck s th e langua ge of vol unt ar ine ss f

ound in the statut e. I t a lso m an da te s th at e ac h day inc lud e the ple dge , r athe r than in cl ude the opp ortun ity to r ec ite the ple dge . Ar ea sona ble j ur y c oul d c onc lud e that this m em or an dum

r equir ed te ac he rs to en sur e that the ir stu de nts a ct

ua lly r ec ite d th e ple dge . C onse que ntl y , the Bo ar d m ay be he ld l ia

be l f or H oll om an ’ s c om

pe lle d- 14 s p e e c h F i r s tA me n d me n tc l a i m To h o l dth e B o ar dl i ab l e u n d erth e E s t ab l i s h m en tCl au s e c l ai m fo r A l l re d ’s da ily m om en t of

sil en t pr ay er

und er an “ of fi ci al pol ic y ” the or

y , w e m ust f ind a82

pol ic y m an da tin g, auth or iz ing , or pe rm itt ing te ac he rs to take pr ay er r eque sts or hol d m om en ts o f sil en ce f or pr ay er . T he onl y

te sti m ony

in the r ec or d c onc er

nin g whether or not these pray ers w ere conducted pu rsuant to School Board pol icy cam e fr om

A llr ed . S he te sti fi ed

dur ing he r de posi tio n th at he r pr ac tic e of

a ski ng for pray er r equests was “ actually included in com

passion in the characte r ed uc at ionplan. F or

m e to r ef use stu de nts to expr es s c om pa ssi on f or som eo ne e lse w oul d be c ontrary

to our c hara ct er e duc at ionplan th at

w e im ple m en t thr oughour curriculum .” Based on the uncontrov erted testim ony from the teacher

charged with im plem enting Schoo l Board policies (includin g the characte r education plan the Board re quired schoo ls in the dis trict to im plem ent) that her unconstitu tional acts w ere required by

a Boar d poli cy , w e cannot help but con clude that Hollom an ha s in tr oduc ed

suf fi ci en t e vid en ce to showthat the Bo ar d c anbe he ld l ia ble be cau se All redwas a ct in g p ur su an t t o aBo ardpo li cy . In fu rt h ers up p o rto f t h i s th eo ry, we al s o n o t e t h at ea ch h i g h s ch o o l ’s ch ar ac te r ed

uc at ionplan ha d to be appr ove d by the S ch ool D istri ct

be fo re be ing fo rw ar de d on to the S ta te D ep ar tm en t of E duc at ion . F or

r ea sons that are unc le ar

to us, it appears that neither party actually entered P arrish H igh School ’ s charac ter ed uc at ionplan in to the r ec or d. C onse que ntl y , w e can on ly a tte m pt t o de te rm ine w ha t i nf er en ce s ar ea sona

ble j ur y c oul d m ak e. W e knowthat the plan ha d to beEa rl ie r, we he ld t

hat ( ba se d o n th e fa c ts b e fo re us int e rp re te d in the light m os t f

avo ra ble 15 to the plaintiff) Allre d had fa iled to establish as a matter of law that she was e ng ag ed in a discretionar

y function of he r job when she held her daily moment of silent prayer. I f a jury wer e to m ake thi s d e te rm inatio n b a se d o n th e e vid e nc e at tr ia l, i t w ou ld b e imp os sib le fo r t he jur y to lik e wi se c on c lud e that sh e wa s a c tin gpurs ua nt t o a n o ff ic ia l bo ard

po lic y . E ve n und e r t

ho se circ umstances, howe ver, the Boa rd could still be held liable under any of the other

theories discussed in this Part. 83 approved bythe School Board, and that Allred cla im s that her daily pray er r itual w as part of it . I t i s a lso not ew orthy

that V ic e Pr inc ipa l A dki ns w as aw ar e of A l l r e d ’s p r a c t i c e , h a v i n g e x p e r i e n c e di tf i r s th an ddu r i n g h i s v i s i tt o h e r c l a s s r o o m; based on hi s lack of surprise or disapproval, a j ury could infer that Adkins knew th atpra y er was pa rt o f All red ’s con tri bu ti on to th e ch arac te r de ve lo pm en t p la n. Interpreting these fac ts in the lig ht m ost favorable to Hollom an, a rea sonable jury co uld dr awthe inf

er en ce that pr ay er

w as inc lud ed

in the w ri tte n pl anappr ove d by the S ch ool Bo ar d, f

orm ing anothe r, m or e dir ec t w ay in w hic h th e Bo ar d m ay

be h e l dl i ab l e a s h a v i n g p r o mu l g a t e danu n c o n s t i tu t i o n a l p o l i c y. 15 B. Am uni ci pa l go ve rn ing body

m ay be he ld l ia

ble f or a ct s or pol ic ie s of indiv iduals to whom

it delegated final decisionm aking auth ority in a particular area . Matthews v. Colum bia Cty ., 294 F.3d 1294 , 1297 (11th Cir. 2002) (“ Loca l gove rn m en t l ia

bil ity c ane xis t whe n so m eo ne w ithf ina l po lic ym ak ing auth or ity de le ga te s th at

auth or ity to som eo ne e lse . B ut, the de le ga tio n m ust be suc h th at

the84

decision is not sub

j ect to reviewby

the policym aking auth ority .” ); G attis v. Bric e, 136 F. 3d 7 24, 725 ( 11th C ir . 199 8) ( “ If ac ounty of fi ci al hol ds f

ina l po lic ym ak ing au tho ri ty f or the c ounty

in the sub

j ec t are a of

the a lle ge d c onst itutio na l vi olatio n, that official’ s decisions m ay constitu te county

policy .” ). Am em

ber or em ploy ee of a governing bo dy

is a final policy

m aker only

if his decisions have legal eff ect w ith out f urthe r ac tio n by

the gov er

nin g bo dy , se e Matth ew s, 294 F . 3d at 12 97 (“ [E ] ven if [m em

ber of governing entity ] wa s given th e power to select w hich p o s i t i o n s wo u l db e e l i mi n a t e d. . . h i s s e l e c t i o n s s t i l l h a dt o b e a c c e p t e db y a m aj or ity of the board . A s su ch , [ that m em be r] ne ve r poss es se d f

ina l po lic ym ak ing pow er him se lf . . . . ”) , and i f the gov er

nin g bo dy

la ck s th e pow er

to re ve rs e the m em be r or e m plo y ee ’ s de ci sio n, se e Q uin n v. Mo nr oe Cty . , 330 F . 3d 1 320, 132 6 (1 1thCi r. 200 3) ( “ Be ca

use the [ gove rn m en ta l e nti ty ] ha s th e pow er to re ve rs e any term ination decision m ade by [individual governm ent official] , he is not a final pol ic ym ak er

w ithr eg ar d to te rm inatio n de ci sio ns at the li br ar y . ”) . T o de te rm ine if so m eo ne is a fi na l p ol ic y m ak er, we l oo k n oton ly to “ st at e an d l oc al po si ti ve law,” but a lso “ cu sto m

and u sa ge havin g th e fo rc e of law . ” Mc Mi lli anv. Joh nson , 88 F. 3d 1 573, 157 7 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) ; se e al so J ett v. D al la s I nde p. S ch . D ist . , 491 U. S. 701, 109 S. Ct. 2702 , 2723, 105 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1989) (holdi ng that an indiv idual can be a “ final policym aker” either by operation of “ state and local85

posi tiv e law ” or

by “ cu sto m or usa ge havin g th e fo rc e of law ”) . W e re vie wde no vo a di st ric t co ur t’s ru li ng ab ou t wh et he r an in di vi du al is a fi na l p ol ic y m ak er. Scal a v . Cit y

of Win te r Park , 11 6 F .3d13 96 , 14 01 (11 th Cir . 19 97 ). In De nno v . S chool Bd., 218 F. 3d 12 67, 1277 (11t h Cir. 2000 ), we held that th e e x i s t en ce o f ath re e- s t ep p ro ce s s al l o wi n g p ar en t s t o ap p ea l a p ri n ci p al ’s decision to an are a assistant sup erintendent and ult im ately to the School Board w as suf fi ci en t t o stri p th e pr inc ipa l of f ina l po lic ym ak ing auth or ity . Whil e the pr in ci pa l’s d eci si on s cl earl y ha d i m m ed ia te leg al effe ct , th e fac t t ha t atlea sttwo other entities couldrever se those decision s was inconsistent with the not ion th at th e p rin ci pa l was a fi na l d eci si on m ak er. T he S ch ool Bo ar d w oul d have us r es t this c as e on D enno b ec au se the Parr ishH ighS ch ool stu de nt h an dboo k sp ec if ie s th at stu de nts have “ the r igh t and the responsib ility

to express school -related concerns and grievances to the teacher s and schoo l adm inistrator(s). . . . [I] n the event that the grievance cannot be settled by thi s pr oc ed

ur e, the n th e stu de nt . . . m ay pur sue the gr ie vanc e to the Su pe ri nte nde nt o f Sc hool s and the n to the Bo ar d. ” I n D enno, how ev er , the stu de nt wa s susp ended, and w e found that, under the circum stances, the policies outlin ed in the stud ent handbo ok “ allowed for m eaningful review of De nno’s suspensio n.” Den no , 21 8 F .3dat 1 27 7.86

O ur r uli ng i n D enno w as ba se d onathe m e re ite rate d th ro ugh m uc h of our caselaw —in assessin g whether a governm ental decision m aker is a f inal poli cy m ak er , w e loo k to w he the r the re is ana ct ua l “ oppo rt

uni ty ” fo r “ m eanin gf

ul” review . See Ola deinde v. City of Birm ingh am , 230 F. 3d 12 75, 1295 (11t h Cir. 2000 ) (e m

pha siz ing that the re m

ust be an a ct ua l “ oppo rt

uni ty ” fo r “ m eanin gf

ul adm inistrative review” before w e conclude that a governm ental decision m aker la ck s f ina l po lic ym ak ing auth or ity ); S ca la , 116 F . 3d at 14 01 ( “ Fi na l po lic ym ak ing au tho ri ty ove r a part ic ular subj ec t are a doe s no t ve st i n an of fi ci al w hose de ci sio ns in the are a ar e subj ec t t o m eanin gf ul adm inistrative review. ”) ( em phasis add ed); se e al so Grech v. Cl ayto n C ty., 33 5 F .3d13 26 , 13 51 (11 th Cir . 20 03 ) (Ba rk et t, J ., concurring) (“ An offic ial m ust have dis cretion in a particular area of lawin order to e xe rc ise f

ina l po lic ym ak ing auth or ity in that are a an d m ay

not be sub j ec t t o sig nif ic an t review .” ) (e m

phasis add ed); Bow en v. W atkins, 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982 ) (“ If a

higher official has the power to overrule a decision but as a practical m atter never

does so, the decision m aker m ay repre sent the effe ctive final authorityon the questi on.”). Inthe ins tant c as e, the re w as no oppo rt uni ty f or m eanin gf

ul r ev ie wby

the Sc hool Bo ar d. Whil e the stu de nt h an dboo k se t out an f orm al m ult i- ste p a

ppe llate pr oc es s th at

w as the or et ic al ly

a va ila ble on p ap er , H oll om anc oul d no t, a s a87

pr ac tic al m atte r, take a dvanta ge of it . G ra duatio n w as bare ly af ewday s aw ay , and Harland did no t offer

to “ stay ” H ollom an’ s puni shm ent while he sought Board review . Indeed, the r ecord is silent as to whether there would even be an in te rv en in g m eet in g o f th e Bo ardor o th er o pp or tu ni ty to i nv ok e it s o ve rs ig ht . E ve n if the S ch ool Bo ar d w er e to e nga ge in ane x po st re vie wof the pun ish m en t, the f ac t r em ai ns tha t the pa ddl ing c oul d no t be und one . D ue to the im pe ndi ng e nd of the sc hool y ear, the pun ish m en t— unl ike the sus pe nsi on i n D enno— co uld not be postp oned to p otentiallyallow f or Board re view; H arland had m ade it clear that if H oll om andid

not sub m it to p uni shm en t, he w oul d no t r ec ei ve his dip lom a on gr ad ua tio n day . C f. W ei sm an , 505 U . S. a t 59 5, 112 S . Ct . a t 26 59 ( “ E ve ry one kn o ws th at i no u r s o ci et y an di no u r c u l tu re h i g h s ch o o l g ra du at i o ni s o n e o f l i fe ’s m os t s ig ni fic an t o ccas io ns .”). N ee dle ss t o say , our

hol din g th at

H ar land a ct ed

a s af ina l de ci sio n m ak er

in thi s c ont ex t do es not

m ea n th at he a lw ay s a ct s a s su ch . A s w e not ed in Mc Mi lli an ,

“ [a ] n of fi ci al or e nti ty m ay be af ina l po lic ym ak er

w ithr es pe ct

to som e ac tio ns b ut not oth er s. ” 88 F . 3d at 15 78. O n othe r oc ca sio ns, w he re the re is a m eanin gf ul oppo rt uni ty f or sub stanti ve Bo ar d r ev ie w , or w he re apun ish m en t i s no t a f ai t ac co m pli or oth er w ise ir re ve rs ibl e, the “ ap pe llate ” pr oc ed ur es out lin ed

in the88

stu de nt h an dboo k m ay

be pur sue d, and H ar land w oul d a ct a s m er el y

the in it ia l—rat he r th an fin al —p ol ic y m ak er. W e co uld a lso int er pr et the “ Co rp or al P uni shm en t” se ct ionof the stu de nt handbo ok a s ade le ga tio n to H ar land o f fi na l de ci sio nm ak ing auth or ity r eg ar din g the a dm ini str at ionof

c or por al pun ish m en t. I t r ea ds: Inor de r to e sta

bli sh and m ai nta in an e duc at ion al c lim at e co nduc ive to le ar nin g, the Bo ar d pe rm its r ea sona ble c or por al pun ish m en t of stu de nts in the sc hool s of the S ch ool D istri ct . I f suc h punis hm en t i s re qui re d, it

sha ll be a dm ini ste re d w ithc ar e, ta ct , and c au tio n by the pr in ci pa l o r hi s/ he r de si gn ee i n a cco rd an ce wi th Bo ardpo li ci es . Vice Principal A dkin s testified in his depositi on that th ere we re no other Board po li ci es reg ard in g c or

po ral pu ni sh m en t. Astu de nt’ s pa in and hum ili at ionf ro m thi s a ct of phy sic al vio le nc e cannot be und one ; H oll om anc annot be un- spanke d. I n th e ab se nc e of any m eanin gf

ul Bo ardov ers ig htm ech an is m pri orto th e ad m in is tra ti on of c or po ral pu ni sh m en t, we cannot he lp b ut c onc lud e that H ar land h ad be ende le ga te d f

ina l po lic ym ak ing authorityin determ ining when to spank a student. In granting him this po we r without integ rating itself into th e pre- spankin g reviewprocess, the B oard ne ce ssari ly

bound i tse lf

to his de ci sio ns. T hus, the S ch ool Bo ar d’ s de le ga tio n of effe ctively

unreviewa

ble corporal punish m ent authorityconstitu tes a re lated y et al te rn at e b as is up on whi ch we fin d t ha t Har la ndwas afin al de ci si on m ak er.89

Consequent ly , depending on h ow the fa cts ultim ately develop at trial, the B oard m ay be he ld l ia

ble und er the F ir st Am en dm en t f

or e ith er his de ci sio n to pun ish H oll om anf

or e nga gin g inc onst itutio na lly pr ote ct ed

e xpr es sio n, or

to puni sh H oll om anf

or e nga gin g inunp ro te ct ed e xpr es sio n onim

pe rm iss ibl e vie wpoi ntba se d g ro un ds . Re gard ing the E sta

bli shm en t C lause iss ue , w e fi nd tha t A llr ed w as not a fi na l po lic y

m ak er . T he pr ay er s w er e re ci te d a s part of the c hara ct er

e duc at ion program , which as discus sed earlier wa s expressly

subject to Sc hool Board ap pr ova l. C onse que ntl y , A llr ed c oul d no t have be enthe f ina l po lic y

m ak er in thi s area , and Hollom an’ s Establishm ent Clause claim s against the School Board can no t b e su pp or te d o n t hi s b as is . C. The S uprem e Court has rec ogni zed that m unicipal go verning entiti es m ay be he ld l ia

ble f or unc onst itutio na l a ct s of

e m plo y ee s th at

oc cur pur suant t o a m unicipal “ custom .” See Monell, 436 U. S. at 690-91, 98 S. C t. at 2036 . W e ar e una ble to co nc lud e, ba se d onthe inc ide nts inv olv ing H oll om anand H utt o, that a

“ cu sto m ” or

“pr ac tic e” of

dis ci pli nin g st

ude nts f or f ai lin g to r ec ite the P le dge of Allegiance ( or for e ngagin g in a non-dis ruptive protest during the pled ge) existed90

in the sc hool dis tr ic t. C onse que ntl y , H oll om anm ay not pur sue his S pe ec h C lause cl ai m ag ai ns t t he Bo ardun de r th is th eo ry . Inc ontra st, A llr ed ’ s pr ac tic e of c ondu ct ing ada ily

m om en t f

or sil en t pr ay er —whic h sh e ac tua lly

r ef er re d to a s a“ ri tua l” —w as suf fi ci en tly sy ste m at ic to be co ns id ereda pa tt ern or c us to m forwhi ch th e Bo ardm ay be he ldacco un tabl e. O ur pr ec ed en ts are c le ar

that, f or c onst itutio na l vi olatio ns t o be suf fi ci en tly

“ w ide spr ea d” f

or agov er nm en ta l su

pe rv iso r to b e he ld l ia

ble , the y ne ed oc cur w ith fr eque nc y , se e Br ow n, 906 F . 2d at 67 1 ( hol din g th at vio la tio ns m

ust be “ obvi ous, fl ag rant, r am

pant, and o f co nti nue d duratio n” to hol d asup er vis or li ab le ); se e al so G re as on v . K em

p, 891 F . 2d 8 29, 837 ( 11th C ir . 199 0) ( not ing that the “ sit ua tio n of m uni ci pa l l ia

bil ity ” is “ an al ogou s” to the que sti on o f supe rv iso ra l l ia bil ity ), and ne ed not ne ce ssari ly

be c om m itt ed by se ve ra l pe opl e w ith in a

de partm en t or agency . When rights are sy stem atically violated on a near -daily

basis, such abuses are sufficiently

egregious to warr ant superviso ry liability , e ven if it is a single “ bad ap ple ” en ga gin g inthe r ep eate d patte rnof unc onst itutio na l be havio r. S ee S t. L oui s v. P ra

pr otn ik, 485 U . S. 112 , 130 , 108 S . Ct . 915 , 928 , 99 L . E d. 2d 1 07 (1 988) ( not ing that vi cari ous lia bil ity und er § 19 83 i s a

ppr opr ia te “ if

ase ri es of d e c i s i o n s b y a subo rd inate of fi ci al [ sin gul ar ] m an if

es te d a‘ cu sto m

or usa ge ’ of w h i c h th e s up e rv i s o r

mu s th a v e b e e naw ar e ” ) ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d ) . C o n s e qu e n t l y,91

based on th e sy stem atic fr equency of these violation s, a j ury could conclud e that th e Bo ardkn ew of

th e p ract ic e y etne ve rth el es s p erm it te d i t t o fe st er u naba te d.

VI . A llr ed is not e nti tle d to sum

m ar y j udgm en t onqua lif

ie d im m uni ty gr ound s ag ai nst H oll om an ’ s S pe ec h C lause c la im to be f re e fr om c om pe lle d sp ee ch , his Sp ee chCl au se c la im

to af fi rm at ive f

re ed om of e xpr es sio n, his S pe ec h C lause cl ai m to be free of v ie wpo in t d is cri m in at io n, o r hi s Es tabl is hm en t Cl au se cla im . H ar land i s no t e nti tle d to sum m ar y j udgm en t onqua lif

ie d im m uni ty gr ound s ag ai nst H oll om an ’ s S pe ec h C lause c la im to be f re e fr om c om pe lle d sp ee ch , his Sp ee chCl au se c la im

to af fi rm at ive f

re ed om of e xpr es sio n, or

his S pe ec h C lause cl ai m to be f re e fr om vie wpoi nt d isc ri m inatio n. W e do n ot c onsi de r the que sti on of H ar land’ s e nti tle m en t t o sum m ar y j udgm ent a ga ins t H oll om an ’ s E sta bli shm en t Cl au se cla im

be cau se Hol lo m an ab an do ne d t hi s i ss ue on ap pe al . H oll om anha s su cc es sf

ull y art ic ulate d c la im s a ga ins t the S ch ool Bo ar d f or violatio ns of his Speech Clause right to be free from com pelled speech (under an

“ of fi ci al pol ic y ” the or

y ), his S pe ec h C lause r igh t t o e nga ge in af fi rm at ive expr es sio n ( unde r a “ de le ga tio n to af ina l po lic ym ak er ” the or

y ), his S pe ec h C lause claim to be free from

viewpoint discrim ination (also under a “ delegation to a final92

policym aker” theory ), and his Establishm ent Clause rights (under either an

“ of fi ci al pol ic y ” or

a“ cu sto m ” the or

y ). W e re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of su m m ary jud gm en t, an d re in st at e Hol lo m an ’s cla im s ag ai ns t t he Bo ard . REVERSED AND REMANDED.We are not called upon to dec ide the propr iety of the ty pe of punishment inflicted he re. 1 93 W IL SO N , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , c onc ur

ri ng i n part

and d iss en tin g inpart : I j oin Parts I, II- A, and II- B of the m aj ority ’ s opin ion, which hold that there is an issue of m aterial f

act as to whether H ollom an wa s puni shed for failing to say th e P l ed g e o f A l l eg i an ce (“th e P l ed g e” ), wh i ch i f t ru e, wo u l dv i o l at e H o l l o m an ’s cl earl y est ab li sh edco ns ti tu ti on al rig htno t t o s ay th e Pl ed ge . Howev er, I re spe ct fu lly

dis se nt f ro m P ar t I I- C. I n P ar

t I I- C, the m aj or ity

hol ds tha t e ve n if H oll om anw as in fa ct

pun ish ed f or r ai sin g hi s f

ist in the a ir dur ing the r ec itatio n of the P le dge r athe r than f

or m er el y f ai lin g to say

the P le dge , the n th er e is an is sue of m at er ia l f ac t a s to w he the r his F ir st Am en dm en t r igh t w as vio la te d. I n a ddi tio n, the m aj or ity

hol ds tha t su chaF ir st Am en dm en t r igh t i s c le ar ly e sta bli she d inour ca se law . I dis ag re e. I c ont en d, r athe r, that H oll om andoe s no t have aF ir st A m en dm en t r igh t t o r ai se his c le nc he d f ist in the a ir dur ing the sc hool ’ s r ec itatio n of the P le dge any

m or e than he w oul d have aF ir st Am en dm en t r igh t t o r ai se his fist in the air during m ath class. Such an act is inherently disrupti ve, and a teacher ha s e ve ry r igh t t o pr ev en t su chc ondu ct in his or he r cl as sr oom

in or de r to p re ve nt any pot en tia l di sr

upt ion . I a lso be lie ve that e ve n if H oll om anha d aF ir st 1 Am endm ent right to raise his fist in th e air during th e re citation of the Pledge, su ch a ri gh t ce rta in ly w as no t cl earl y est ab li sh edin ou r cas e la w.94

I ag re e w iththe m aj or ity ’ s c onc lus ion , tho ugh, w ithr es pe ct to Part I I- D of its opi nio n. Whil e H oll om an ’ s e xpr es sio n w as not c onst itutio na lly

pr ote ct ed

in the classroom

because it is inherently

disrupti ve, he still has a cle arly established Fi rs t A m en dm en t r igh t t o no t be dis cr im inate d a ga ins t onthe ba sis of the vi ewp oi nthe is co m

m un ic at in g. Se e Co rne liu s v . NAA CP L egal D ef

en se and Educ. Fund, I

nc. , 473 U . S. 788 , 812 ( “ Whil e w e ac ce pt the va lid ity and re as ona ble ne ss o f the j ust if

ic at ion s of

fe re d by pe tit ion er

f or e xc lud ing [ the relevant speech] , those j ustifications cannot save an exclusion that is in fact based on the de sir e to s uppr es s apart ic ular poi nt o f vie w . ”) . T he re is a ge nui ne iss ue of m at er ia l f ac t a s to w he the r A llr ed

and H ar land w er e m oti va te d by ade sir e to supp re ss H oll om an ’ s a

ppare nt unpatr iot ic vie wpoi nt, w hic h if tr ue , w oul d vi olate H oll om an ’ s F ir st A m en dm en t r igh t. T hus, I c onc ur w iththe m aj or ity ’ s c onc lus ion wit h re sp ectto PartII-D o f it s o pi ni on . Ina ddi tio n, I j oinP ar

t I V of the m aj or ity ’ s op ini on, w hic h ho lds that the re is aniss ue of

m at er ia l f

ac t a s to w he the r A llr ed

vio la te d c le ar ly

e sta bli she d r igh ts unde r the E sta

bli shm en t C lause by

le ad ing he r cl as s inapr ay er fu l m om en t of sil en ce . H ow ev er , w hil e I co nc ur in the r es ult

of P ar t I II ( fo r the r ea sons state d in Part I V of the m aj ority ’ s opin ion), I cannot join the m aj ority ’ s hold ing th at A llred did not a ct w ith in h er

“ dis cr et ion ar

y f unc tio n” w he n sh e le d th e cl as s inam om en t95

of silent pray er. I w ouldhold, rather, that Allre d acted w ithin her discretionary func tio n whe n le ad ing he r cl as s insil en t pr ay er , but that sh e vio la te d th e Est ab li sh m en t Cl au se by so d oi ng . Fi na lly , I a lso j oinP ar

t Vof the m aj or ity ’ s op ini on o nly to the e xte nt tha t i t hol ds tha t the re is aniss ue of m at er ia l f

ac t a s to w he the r the S ch ool Bo ar d m ay be lia ble f or pun ish ing H oll om anf

or r em ai nin g si le nt d

ur ing the P le dge ( if

the fa ct fi nde r fi nds that i s th e re as on f or his pun ish m en t) and f

or A llr ed ’ s pr ac tic e of leading the class in a pray erful m om ent of silence. I. Th e majo ri ty n o to n l y h o l d s th at th e e v i d en ce , r ev i ew edi nHo l l o m an ’s favor , de m onstrate s th at

H oll om anha d aF ir st Am en dm en t r igh t t o r ai se his clenched fist in the air during the recitation of the Pledge in school, but also th at such a right was cle arly

established. Bec ause the m aj ority ’ s hold ing in this regard is ne it he r co ns is te ntwit h S up rem e Co ur t p rece de ntno r Elev en th Cir cu itcas e la w, I re spectfully

dissent. I w ouldhold th at the First A m endm ent does no t give a stu de nt i n H oll om an ’ s c ir cum stanc es the r igh t t o a ct ive ly part ak e in c ondu ct

that i s inh er en tly

dis ru pti ve dur ing the c ur

ri cu lum por tio n of the sc hool day . Y et , e ve n if the F ir st Am en dm en t do es gr an t su char igh t, that r igh t c er ta inl y w as not c le ar ly es tabl is he d fo r qu al ifi edimm un it y pu rp os es .In Bo nn e r v . Ci ty of Pritc ha rd, 6 61 F .2 d 1 20 6, 12 09 (1 1th Cir . 1 98 1) (e n b anc ), thi s 2 c ourt a do pte d a s b ind ingpr e c e de nt a ll d e c isi on s o f t he fo rm e r F if

th C ir c uit ha nd e d d own p ri or

to October 1, 1981. 96 A. I ag re e w iththe m aj or ity

that H oll om an ’ s a ct

of r ai sin g hi s f

ist in the a ir during th e Pledge is a f

orm of expression, or indeed, m ay very we ll be “pure spe ec h. ” I t i s an a ct

that i s, a s th e m aj or ity

put s it , “pur el y

c om m uni cativ e as a sign-lang uage gesture or the act of hold ing up a sign . . . .” Maj ority Opinion at 30. I a gr ee that H oll om an ’ s F ir st Am en dm en t r igh t t o F re e Sp ee chis im pli cate d, but w e m ust be m ind fu l tha t “ the c onst itutio na l r igh ts o f stu de nts in publ ic sc hool are not auto m atically

coextensive with the rights of adults in other setting s.” Be thel Sch. D ist. v. Fraser , 478 U . S. 675 , 682 ( 1986 ). “ It is al w ay s w ith in the pr ovi nc e of

sc hool auth or iti es to pr ovi de by r eg ulatio n th e pr ohi bit ionand puni shm ent of acts ca lculated to und erm ine the school routine.” Blackw ell v. Issaquen a County Bd. of E duc. , 363 F. 2d 74 9, 753 (5th Cir. 1966). When 2 balancing the First Am endm ent right of stud ents at school, we m ust no t forget that the state ’ s in te re st t o m ai nta in “ anor de rl y pr ogr am of c la ssr oom

le ar nin g” is a

“ co m pe ll in g” on e. B urns idev . B ya rs , 363 F . 2d 7 44, 748 ( 5thCi r. 196 6) . T hus, publ ic sc hool s have a“ w ide latit ude of dis cr et ion ” to f

orm ulate r eg ulatio ns

“pertaining to th e discipline of schoo l children.” Id .97

Pu bli c sc hool s are a llo w ed

“ to a dopt and e nf or ce r ea sona

ble , non dis cr im inator

y r eg ulatio ns a s to the ti m e, pla ce and m anne r of stu de nt e xpr es sio ns and dem onstration s.” B ay less v . M art ine , 43 0 F .2d87 3, 8 78 (5t h C ir. 1 97 0) . Such a re gulatio n m ay

infringe upon a student’ s right to free speech only “ wher e the e xe rc ise of

suc h r igh ts i n th e sc hool bui ldi ngs an d sc hool ro om s do [e s] not m at er ia lly

and s ubst an tia lly

int er fe re w iththe r equir em en ts o f ap pr opr ia te discipli ne in the operation of the schoo l.” B urns ide , 363 F . 2d at 74 9. K ee pin g in m ind that sc hool s are giv ena“ w ide latit ude of dis cr et ion , ” the c ri tic al iss ue in thi s ca se be co m es whe the r H oll om an ’ s a ct of hol din g hi s c le nc he d f

ist in the a ir dur ing the r ec itatio n of

the P le dge “ m at er ia lly

and s ubst an tia lly

int er fe re [d ] w iththe requirem ents of appropriate disciplin e . . . . ” Id . a t 74 8, 749 . The m aj ority

cites severa l cases supportin g its view that Hollom an’ s act w as not a sufficient interfer ence to j ustify a punishm ent. Y et, som e of these ca ses inv olv e stu de nt e xpr es sio n oc curr ing out sid e th e cl as sr oo m . See, e. g., Shan ley v. No rth ea st I

nde p. Sc h. D ist . , 462 F . 2d 9 60, 964 ( 5thCi r. 197 2) ( inv olv ing the dis tr ibu tio n of

ne w spa pe rs be fo re and a ft er

sc hool hours ); R ei ne kev . Co bb C ount y Sc h. D ist . , 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N. D. Ga . 1980) (involvi ng the censorshi p of a stu de nt n ew spa

pe r) . C er ta inl y , the ty

pe and am ount

of e xpr es sio n oc curr ing out sid e cl as s th at

w oul d “ int er fe re w iththe r equir em en ts o f ap pr opr ia te98

discipli ne,” B urns ide , 363 F . 2d at 74 9, w ill be dif fe re nt than th e ty

pe and am ount of e xpr es sio n th at

int er fe re s w ithappr opr ia te dis ci pli ne in the c la ssr oom . T he sc hool ha s am or e co m

pe lli ng i nte re st t o e sta

bli sh o rd er

and d isc ipl ine in the cl as sr oo m

be cau se th atis wher e th e cu rri cu lu m po rti on of t he sch oo l d ay oc cu rs . Ina ddi tio n, tho se c as es c ite d by the m aj or ity

that pr ote ct

stu de nt e xpr es sio n w ith in the c la ssr oom

are e as ily

dis tin gui sha

ble f ro m H oll om an ’ s e xpr es sio n. F or ins tanc e, the m aj or ity

r el ie s on B urns ide , w hic h he ld tha t st ude nts w eari ng

“ free dom butto ns” to class did n ot cause a sufficie nt interruptio n to justify pr oh ib it in g s tu de nt s fr om weari ng th e b ut to ns at s ch oo l. Id . W e ba se d our hol din g in B urns ideon the la ck of e vid en ce de m onstratin g th at “ the button s te nde d to distr act

the m inds o f the students away from their teac hers.” Id

. a t 74 8 (e m pha sis a dde d) . W e he ld tha t “ [w ] eari ng b utt ons on c oll ar s or shi rt f ro nts is ce rt ai nly not in the c la ss o f tho se a ct ivi tie s whic h inh er en tly distr act stu de nts and br eak do w n th e re gim en ta tio n of the c la ssr oom

suc h a s c ar

ry ing banne rs , sc atte ri ng l ea fl et s, and s pe ec h m ak ing , a ll of w hic h are pr ote ct ed

m ethods of expressions , but all of which have no pl ace in an order ly classroom .” Id

. (e m pha sis a dde d) . I n a ddi tio n, w e sa id, Re gul at ion s whic h are e sse nti al in m ai nta ini ng o rd er and d isc ipl ine on s ch ool pr ope rty

are r ea sona

ble . T hus sc hool r

ule s whic h a ssi gn stu de nts to a part ic ular cl as s, f or bid unn ec es sary

dis cu ssi on i n th e99

classroom

and prohib it the exchange of conversation between stu de nts are r ea sona

ble e ve n th oughthe se r eg ulatio ns i nf ri nge on such basic rights as fr eedom of speech and association, because they ar e ne ce ssary

f or the or de rl y

pr es en ta tio n of

c la ssr oom

a ct ivi tie s. Id . O ur inquir y sho uld f oc us u pon, the re fo re , w he the r a stu de nt h old ing his f ist in the a ir dur ing ac ur

ri cu lum portio n of

the sc hool day

is m or e ak in t o astu de nt

“ carr y ing bann ers” and “ exchang[ing] c onversation ” during class, rather than weari ng a bu tt on on th e fro ntof o ne ’s sh irt . Id . Ac tivitythat can be re gulated bya public schoo l, like “unnecessary di sc us si on in th e cl as sr oo m ,” “ th e ex ch an ge of c on ve rs at io n b et ween stud en ts ,”

“ carr y ing banne rs , ” “ sc atte ri ng l ea fl et s, ” an d “ spe ec h m ak ing , ” al l have in com m on the fact that they

inherently

com pete with the teac her for the other stu de nts ’ a tte nti on. W eari ng a buttonon the f

ro nt o f one ’ s sh irt, tho ugh, doe s no t co m pe te w iththe te ac he r fo r the stu de nts ’ a tte nti on anym or e than astu de nt w eari ng a shi rt a dve rt isi ng a

part ic ular spor

ts t eam . T hus, w e m

ust de te rm ine w he the r a stu de nt r ai sin g hi s f ist in the a ir dur ing c la ss i nhe re ntl y

is the sor t of ac tiv ity that c om pe te s w iththe te ac he r fo r the stu de nts ’ a tte nti on, or w he the r it is a m ore passive expression lik e a w earing a shirt or a butto n convey ing a particular m es sa ge .100

I thi nk i t i s qu ite c le ar

that a stu de nt r ai sin g hi s c le nc he d f ist in the a ir dur ing ac ur

ri cu lum portio n of

the sc hool day

is the sor t of a ct ivi ty that i nhe re ntl y co m pe te s w iththe te ac he r fo r the oth er stu de nts ’ a tte nti on and thus can be pr ohi bit ed

by the sc hool auth or iti es . H oll om an ’ s a ct of hol din g hi s f

ist in the a ir dur ing the r ec itatio n of

the P le dge is, a s th e m aj or ity say s, a kinto “ the a ct

of hol din g up asig n. ” Ma

j or ity O pin iona t 30 . S uc h e xpr es sio n, unl ike abutton pin ne d to one ’ s sh irt, is m eant t o c om pe te f or stu de nts ’ a tte nti on, and thus inh er en tlydis tr ac ts s tud en ts f ro m ale git im at e portio n of

the c ur ri cu lum . H old ing one ’ s f ist in the a ir is m or e lik e “ carr

y ing banne rs ” w hic h “ inh er en tly dis tr ac t[ s] student s,” B urns ide , 363 F . 2d at 74 8, than w eari ng a buttonon a

shi rt . W oul d a student have a r ight to hold up a sign du ring the recitation of the Pledge, as long as the stu de nt d oe s no t ob str uc t othe rs ’ vie wof

the f la g? T he answ er

to that qu es tio n is plainly“ no.” H oldin g one’ s fist in the air is the sam e sort of com m unication as hol din g up asig n, a s th e m aj or ity e ve n a dm its . I t i s m eant t o c om pe te f or stu de nts ’ a tte nti on and unne ce ssari ly dis tr ac t st

ude nts f ro m the r ec itatio n of

the Pl ed g e. Iti s n o ta p as s i v e e x p re s s i o n , l i k e w ea ri n g a b u t t o no nth e f ro n to f o n e’s shi rt . L ike hol din g up asig n, it inh er en tly

is the sor t of a ct ivi ty that di str ac ts stu de nts dur ing c la ss. Whil e a stu de nt m ay have m or e fr ee dom

to expr es s hi m se lf outsi de of class, students in the classroom are lim ited to passi ve expressions th at101

do n ot i nhe re ntl y

dis tr ac t st

ude nts . Apub lic sc hool te ac he r is w el l w ith in h is o r he r au tho ri ty

to pr ohi bit

a ct ivi ty , li ke astu de nt h old ing his f ist in the a ir dur ing cl as s, that i nhe re ntl y

dis tr ac ts s tud en ts. E ve n if w e w er e to a ssum e, tho ugh, that a stu de nt h old ing his f

ist in the a ir dur ing c la ss i s no t a ct ivi ty that i nhe re ntl y

dis tr ac ts s tud en ts, the re is ev ide nc e on the r ec or d th at

H oll om anin fa ct

dis tr ac te d st

ude nts w ithhis ge sture , w hic h w oul d f u rth e r d i s t i n g u i s h th e i n s t an ta c t i o nf r o m B urns ide . A ft er

H oll om an ’ s a ct

of ra isi ng h is f

ist dur ing the P le dge , stu de nts appr oa ch ed the ir te ac he r to c om

pla in that Hollom an’ s expression was not “ right.” T he m aj ority rea sons that this fact alone is not s ufficient to show a m aterial disruption. While the m aj ority is correc t that sc hool s c annot

pr ohi bit e xpr es sio n onthe ba sis that othe rs m ay dis ag re e w ith the c ont en t of

the e xpr es sio n, the stu de nts ’ c om m en ts n ot o nly

de m onstrate d i s ag re emen twi th th e c o n t en to f H o l l o m an ’s ex p re s s i o n , b u tal s o th at Ho l l o m an ’s ge st ur e “ di st ract [ed ] th e[i r] m in ds ” dur in g acu rri cu lu m po rti on of t he sch oo l d ay . Id . T he stu de nts ’ c om

m en ts d em onstrate that the y a t l ea st f oc use d th ei r atte nti on during a po rtion of the recitation of the Pledge on Hollom an’ s fist – whichThe majority claims that this approac h “appe ars to ig nore the principle . . . that student 3 e xpre ssi on

mus t c a us e (o r b e lik e ly

to c a us e ) a ‘m ate ri a l and

su bs tanti a l’ dis ru

pti on . . . b e fo re it may be cur tailed.” Ma

jority Opinion at 34. Ido not ignor e this principle, but rather disagree with the majority

by what we meant in Burnside wh e n w e sa id t hat pu bli c sc ho ols c an o nly infring e on a stude nt’s speec h when it “mate rially and substantially

interfe re[s] wit h the require ments of appr opriate discipline in the ope ration of the sc hool.” Burnside , 363 F.2d at 749. One of the “r equire ments of appr opriate discipline” is preventingstudents from competingwith the teac her or with the curr iculum for other students’ attention. For

instance, w e said in Burnside that a

sc ho ol m ay

pr oh ibi t “ the e xch ang e of c onve rs atio n b e tw e e n s tud e nts ” duringclass. Id. at 74 8. Thus , a te a c he r m ay

pr oh ibi t and

punis h a stu de nt f or wh isp e ri ngto h is classmate dur ing c lass, even if it causes a

“brie f, ea sily

overlooke d, de minimum impact.” Ma jor ity Op ini on at 34 . O ne stu de nt whis pe ri ngto a no the r s tud e nt d

ur ingc la ss c omp e te s w ith th e te a c h e r

f o r th e att e n ti o no f

o th e r s tu d e n ts , an d

th u s “ mate r ia ll y

an d s u b s ta n ti a ll y inte r f e r e [s ]” with one of the f

undamental “ require ments of appr opriate discipline.” Burnside , 363 F.2d at 749. Simi larly , Holloman’s ac t of raisinghis fist in t he air duringthe Pledg e compe ted for the students’ attention duringa leg itimate curric ulum portion of the school day . Indeed, some of the students’ rea ction afte r cla ss indicated that he suc cessf ully distracted stude nts from the re citation of the Pledg e. Thus, Holloman’s a ct “substantially and mater ially

interfe re[d] wit h the re qu ir e me nts of

a pp ro pr iate dis c ipl ine ” be c a us e it “ te nd e d to dis tr a c t th e min ds of the stu de nts awa y from” the rec itation Pl edg e. Id. at 749, 748. 102 precisely is what is intended by

such expression – rather than on the planned curriculum

of say ing th e Pledge. 3 If we d o n otin te rp retth e st ud en ts ’ co m m en ts as e vi de nc e o f di st ract io n, we ne ce ssi ta te absur d r es ult s insim ilar stu de nt e xpr es sio ns i n th e futur e. T he m aj or ity ’ s ho ldi ng w oul d im ply , f or e xam ple , that a stu de nt w oul d be j ust if

ie d in hol din g up his f

ist in pr ote st o f the V ie tnam c onf lic t duri ng a

his tor y le sso n a bout V ie tnam . A ssum e that the onl y e vid en ce of

dis ru pti on, li ke in the ins tant a ct ion , is that of student s com

plainin g that such a gesture during a class about the Vietnam co nf lic t i s no t “ ri ght . ” D oe s su chac ir cum stanc e ne ce ssari ly ind ic at e that the te ac he r doe s no t have e noug h e vid en ce of adis tur banc e to p ro hib it the stu de nt103

fr om hol din g hi s c le nc he d f

ist in the a ir dur ing his tor

y c la ss? I t w oul d be dif

fi cu lt to c onc lud e oth er

w ise f oll ow ing the r ea soni ng o f the m aj or ity ’ s op ini on. S uc h a co nc lus ion , tho ugh, w oul d pl ai nly go w el l be y ond w ha t w as int en de d by the F ir st Am en dm en t ri gh t t o F ree S pe ech as i t ap pl ie s t o s tu de nt s i n t he cla ss ro om . A publ ic sch oo l i s g iv en “ wid e la ti tu de ” in di sc ip li ni ng it s s tu de nt s. Id . T he de fe ndants in the ins tant c as e ha d e ve ry r igh t t o pr ev en t H oll om anf ro m distracting th e students during a legitim ate, curriculum portion o f the school day be ca use astu de nt h old ing his f ist in the a ir is the sor t of a ct ivi ty that “ inh er en tly di st ract [s ] th e m in ds of s tu de nt s,” a ndth atis ex act ly wha t Ho ll om an di d h ere. Id . Inthe ve ry

le as t, suc h a ct ivi ty

is dis tin gui sha

ble f ro m astu de nt w eari ng a

button on h is s hirt duri ng c la ss. T he r es ult in B urns idedoe s no t de m an d th e sam e re sul t here. T he m aj or ity

a lso r el ie s on Ti nk

er v . D es M oin es I nde p. Cm ty . Sc h. D ist . , 393 U.S . 503 (1969), which held th at students had a constituti onal right to we ar a bl ackarm ba nddu rin g c la ss in pro te stof t he Viet na m co nf li ct . Id . a t 51 4. T he Co urt i n Tinker , r el y ing he av ily on o ur r ea soni ng i n B urns ide , said that w earing an arm band was not “ disrupt ive action,” nor w as there any evidence of “ interfer ence, actual or nascent, with the school’ s work. ” Id . a t 50 8.104

T h e i n s t an tc a s e i s d i s t i n g u i s h ab l e f r o m Tinker

f or the sam e re as on i t i s d i s t i n g u i s h ab l e f

r o m B urns ide . W eari ng a buttonor an arm band i s pa ssi ve ac tiv ity that do es not

inh er en tly

dis tr ac t st

ude nts dur ing the c ur

ri cu lum portio n of the sc hool day , unl ike r ai sin g on e’ s f ist in the a ir . A lso , in Tinker the re w as no evidence of any

interfer ence or distraction during class. In the instant case, however, we have evidence of students, at the very least, being di stracted for a portio n of

the P le dge due to H oll om an ’ s ge sture . I f ai l t o se e howit

f oll ow s th at

a ri ght to w ear a buttonor

an arm band d ur ing c la ss m eans tha t a

stu de nt h as ar igh t to r ai se his f

ist dur ing c la ss. T he r es ult

in Tinker , like B urns ide , is ina ppos ite to the ins tant a ct ion . Finally , the district court re lies on the reasoning and hold ing of B ank s v . B d. of Pub. I nstruc tio n , 31 4 F . Sup p. 2 85 (S.D. Fla . 19 70 ), va ca te d by401 U . S. 988 (1 97 1) , reinsta ted without published opi nion by dist. ct. and af f’d , 450 F . 2d 1 103 (5 th C ir . 197 1) . I n Ban ks , the S outhe rnD istri ct of F lor ida he ld tha t a

stu de nt h as a co ns ti tu ti on al rig htto rem ai n s eat eddu rin g t he reci ta ti on of t he Ple dg e in cla ss . T he dis tr ic t c ourt i n Banks , a ccording to th e m aj ority ’ s interpretation, held that re fu sin g to stand w as af

orm of e xpr es sio n th at

w as pr ote ct ed

by the F ir st Am endm ent, and that th e “ district court m akes clear that its ruling wa s not based on B an ks’ s F ir st Am en dm en t r igh t t o r em ai n si le nt. ” Ma j or ity O pin iona t 38 . T he105

m aj or ity c onc lud es that the e xpr es sio n of r em ai nin g se at ed

dur ing the P le dge is ak in t o H oll om an ’ s ho ldi ng h is f ist in the a ir dur ing the P le dge , and thus H oll om an ’ s e xpr es sio n is e nti tle d to F ir st Am en dm en t pr ote ct ion . Ina ddi tio n to the f

ac t tha t a dis tr ic t c ourt ho ldi ng i s no t bi ndi ng a uth or ity on thi s C ourt, it

is not a t a ll “ cl ear that [ the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s] r uli ng w as not

ba se d on Banks’ s F ir st A m en dm en t r igh t t o r em ai n si le nt. ” Ma j or ity O pin iona t 38 . T he co urt i n Banks discussed ext ensively the rea sonin g of W

es t V irg ini a St . B d. of E duc . v . B arne tte , 319 U . S. 624 ( 1943 ), w hic h he ld tha t a pub lic sc hool c annot co m pe l a stu de nt t o part ic ipate in the P le dge . A ft er dis cu ssi ng B arne tte , the dis tr ic t c ourt i n Banks sa id, W ithou t m ore B arne ttew oul d be dis posi tiv e of thi s m atte r fo r [the pla int if f] w as sus pe nde d f

or his r ef usa l t o a ct

in ac co rd an ce w itha re gul at ion , the ope ratio n of w hic h pr ev en te d hi m

f ro m e xe rc isi ng h is Fi rs t A m en dm en t r igh ts. Banks , 31 4 F . Sup p. at 29 5. Th e co ur t co nt in ue d l at er i n t he op in io n, H er e, a s in B arne tte , the r eg ulatio n r equir ed the ind ivi dua l t o com m unicate, by

standing , his acc eptance of and re spect for all that fo r w hic h our fl ag is but

asy m bol . Id . a t 29 6. I n othe r w or ds, the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s ho ldi ng w as ba se d onthe r ea soni ng of B arne tte . T he sc hool ’ s po lic y of f or ci ng a stu de nt t o st an d duri ng the P le dge vio la te d th e stu de nt’ s F ir st A m en dm en t r igh t not to be c om

pe lle d to spe ak

or106

expr es s apart ic ular be lie f. Any dis cu ssi on b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt i n a ddi tio n to thi s mo r e l i mi t e dh o l d i n g i s ar g u ab l y d i c tu m. A s th e m aj or ity

poi nts out , the c ourt i n Banks a lso sa id t ha t r em ai nin g se at ed dur ing the P le dge “ w as no l es s af orm of e xpr es sio n th anthe w eari ng o f the black arm -band was to Mar y Beth T inker. H e w as exerc ising a right ‘ akin to pu re speech.’ ” Id

. a t 29 5. I a gr ee that a

stu de nt m ay

int en d to e xpr es s hi m se lf by rem aining seated – y et I do not agree that it follows that the Ti nk er-B urns ide st an da rdap pl ie s t o astud en t wh o m erel y rem ai ns sea te d dur in g t he Ple dg e. Re m ai nin g se at ed

dur ing the P le dge is a w ay f or astu de nt not

to part ic ipate in the Pl ed ge . T hus, suc h ade ci sio n is a ff or de d th e m or e ab sol ute pr ote ct ionof B arne tte , in w hic h th e Su pr em e Co urt sa id, If ther e is any

fixed star in our constitu tional cons tellation, it is that no o ff ic ia l, hig h or

pe tty , c anpr es cr ibe w ha t sh al l be ortho dox in polit ics, nationalism , r eligion , or other m atters of opinion or forc e citizens to confess by

word or act

th ei r fai th th erei n. B arne tte , 319 U . S. a t 64 2 ( em pha sis a dde d) . F or ci ng a stu de nt t o st an d duri ng the Pl ed ge wou ldbe co m

pe ll in g t ha t s tu de ntto “ co nf es s b y . . . ac t [h is] f

ai th” in the co nt en t o f th e Pl ed ge an d a ll th atitsym bo li zes . Id. (e m

pha sis a dde d) . S uc h a regulation would v iolate the central principle of B arne tte . Se e Li pp v . M orr is , 579 F. 2d 8 34, 836 ( 3r d C ir . 197 8) ( pe r curi am) (h old ing that f or ci ng a stu de nt t o st an d107

is unc onst itutio na l be ca

use it r equir es astu de nt “ to e nga ge in w ha t am ount s to im pli ci t e xpr es sio n by

standi ng at r es pe ct fu l atte nti on whil e the f la g sa lut e is b ei ng ad m in is te red ”). Whil e it is tru e that r em ai nin g se at ed dur ing the P le dge m ay

a lso be co nstru ed a s aw ay of spe ak ing , r em ai nin g se at ed is al re ady

in the c la ss o f tho se activities that are af

forded the m ore absolute protections of B arne tte– i . e. , the right not to participate in the Pledge. To hold that the Ti nk er-B urns idestandard ap p l i es t o a s tu d en twh o re m ai n s s ea t eddu ri n g th e P l ed g e w o u l dl i m i ta s tu d en t ’s ri ght not to part ic ipate in the P le dge . I f it can be sho w n th at astu de nt, or

agr oup of stu de nts , w ho d o no t part ic ipate in the P le dge by r em ai nin g se at ed

c au se s a m at er ia l di sr

upt ion , w e w oul d be f

or ce d to de fe r to the sc hool ’ s de ci sio n to compel stu de nts to stand d

ur ing the P le dge . S uc h ar uli ng w oul d a llo wapub lic of fi ci al to

“ fo rc e ci tiz en s to c onf

es s by . . . a ct the ir f ai th” in the c ont en t of

the P le dge and a ll itsym bo li zes . B arne tte , 319 U . S. a t 64 2. A s ar es ult , the “ fi xe d st ar in our co nst itutio na l c onst el la tio n” w oul d be co m e co nti nge nt u pon the de gr ee of dis ru pti on j udge s de ci de is too m uc h inapart ic ular cl as sr oom . L im iti ng the ce ntr al r igh t of

be ing f re e to a bst ai n f ro m part ic ipatin g inthe P le dge sho uld not be lim ited by

apply ing th e Ti nk

er-B urns idestandard

to a de ci sio n m or e ab sol ute ly p r o t e c t e db y B arne tte .108

Astu de nt m ay

de ci de not

to part ic ipate in the r ec itatio n of the P le dge by re m ai nin g si le nt and s eate d. I n su chc ir cum stanc es , the hol din g in B arne tte ap pli es . O n th e oth er

hand, r ai sin g on e’ s f

ist in the a ir dur ing the P le dge is not

a w ay in w hic h astu de nt a

bst ai ns f ro m part ic ipatin g inthe P le dge . I t c anonl y be co ns tru edas e xp res si on . Thu s, B arne tteand Banks are not appl ic ab le to Hollom an’ s act, but rather Tinker and B urns ideap pl y . As I in di cat edab ov e, I be lie ve H oll om an ’ s a ct

of r ai sin g hi s f

ist in the a ir dur ing c la ss i s e as ily dis tin gui she d f

ro m the a ct of w eari ng a

buttonor an arm band d ur ing c la ss b ec au se raising one’s f

ist in th e air during th e curr iculum portion o f the school day inh er en tly

dis tr ac ts s tud en ts, and thus m at er ia lly dis ru pts the r equir em en ts o f appropriate disciplin e. Re ci tin g th e Pl ed ge of

A lle gianc e dur ing the sc hool day is a le git im at e act iv it y of t he curri cu lu m , just as l eg it im at e as co nduc ti ng m at h o r hi st ory cla ss . Whil e a stu de nt i s no t r equir ed to part ic ipate in the P le dge , astu de nt c annot en ga ge in expr es siv e co nduc t tha t i nhe re ntl y dis tr ac ts the m ind s of

the stu de nts fr om ale git im at e portio n of

the sc hool day . I w oul d ho ld tha t the re is no i ssu e of m at eri al factas t o wh et he r th e sc ho ol was ju st ifi edin pu ni sh in g Ho ll om an , if that puni shm en t w as ba se d onhis a ct of r ai sin g hi s f

ist in the a ir dur ing the r ec itatio n109

of the P le dge of

A lle gianc e an d w as not

m oti va te d by

ade sir e to s uppr es s Hol lo m an ’s po in t o f vi ew. B. E ve n if H oll om anha s aF ir st Am en dm en t r igh t t o ho ld h is f ist in the a ir dur ing the r ec itatio n of

the P le dge in cl as s, suc h ar igh t w as not “ cl earl y established.” Hope v. Pe lzer , 536 U . S. 730 , 739 ( 2002 ) (quot ing Harlow v. F itz ge rald , 457 U . S. 800 , 818 ( 1982 )) . I n or de r fo r a ri ght to be c le ar ly established, the publ ic official m ust be giv en “ fair w arning” that his or her conduct vi ol at es a st atut ory

or c on st itut io na l ri gh t. Se e id. a t7 4 1 . R e c e n t l y, th e S up r e me Co urt i n H

ope held that we im

properly used a “ rigid glo ss” when dem anding that the f ac ts o f pr ev iou s c as es be “ m at er ia lly sim ilar” to the f

ac ts o f the appl ic ab le cas e in ord er fo r th e la w to be cle arl y est ab li sh ed . Id

. at 739. T here are other w ay s, tho ugh, be sid es c om pari ng the f

ac ts o f the ins tant c as e w iththe f ac ts o f pr ev iou s c as es , to de te rm ine if apub lic of

fi ci al w as giv en“ fa ir

w ar nin g” that a ce rt ai n a ct

vio la te d astatut or

y or c onst itutio na l pr ovi sio n. T he re are som e ca se s in w hic h th e lawpr ovi de s “ obvi ous cl ar ity , ” ev enin the abse nc e of ins tanc es in whi ch co ur ts ha ve ap pl ie d age ne ral pri nc ip le to pa rti cu la r fac ts . See V inyard v. W ils on , 311 F. 3d 13 40, 1351 (11t h Cir. 2002 ). T he m aj ority holds that H oll om an ’ s c onst itutio na l r igh t t o pu t hi s f ist in the a ir dur ing the r ec itatio n of

the110

Pledge is clear ly

established because the Ti nk er-B urns idestandard was

“ su ffi ci en tl y

sp eci fic ” to gi ve th e d efen da nt s fa ir wa rn in g. See Ma j or ity O pin ion at 50. I r es pe ct fu lly

dis ag re e w ithboth th e m aj or ity ’ s ana ly sis and c onc lus ion . Ther e ar e three way s in which we can find that the lawis clearly established so as to giv e public officials fair warning that a particular act violates a statutory or constitu tional right . First, the words of a statute or constitu tional prov ision can be spe ci fi c en oughto cl earl y e sta bli sh the lawappl ic ab le to part ic ular co nduc t and ci rcu m st an ces , eve n i n t he ab se nc e o f an y cas e la w. V

iny ard , 31 1 F .3dat 1 35 0. No one alleges that such a ca se is present here. Sec ond, som etim es “broad statem ents of principle in case law[that] are not tied to particularize d facts . . . c an clear ly establish law applicable in the future to differ ent sets of detailed facts. ” Id . at13 51 . The m ajor it y

be li ev es th atsu ch a cas e is pre se nthe re, wh il e I d o n ot . I w ill a ddr es s m

y dis ag re em en t be low . F ina lly , and this is tr ue in the va st m aj or ity of our qualified imm

unitycases, we inqui re whether fac t-specific pre cedents are

“ fai rly dis ti ng ui sh ab le ” fro m th e fac ts faci ng a go ve rn m en t o ffi ci al . Id . at 1 35 2. I thi nk this is the pr ope r inquir y in the ins tant c as e. U sin g th is i nqui ry , I w oul d co nc lud e that the pr ec ed en t i s f ai rl y dis tin gui sha

ble f ro m the c ir cum stanc es in thi s ca se , and thus the de fe ndants w er e not giv enf ai r w ar nin g th at dis ci pli nin g a stu de nt f or r ai sin g hi s f

ist in the a ir dur ing the P le dge w as unc onst itutio na l.111

The m ajor it y

co ns id ers whet he r th e te st , byit se lf , art ic ulate d in Tinker

and B urns idecle arl y

est ab li sh es th atHol lo m an ’s actwas c on st itut io na ll y pro te ct ed . The Ti nk er-B urns idete st i s whe the r the stu de nt e xpr es sio n “ m at er ia lly and subs tanti al ly

int er fe re [s ] w iththe r equir em en ts o f ap pr opr ia te dis ci pli ne in the operation of the schoo l.” B urns ide , 363 F . 2d at 74 9. T he m aj or ity c la im s th is t es t i s “ s u ff i ci en t l y s p ec i fi c” t o g i v e t h e d ef en d an t s fa i r w arn i n g th at Ho l l o m an ’s expr es sio n w as c onst itutio na lly pr ote ct ed

be ca use it is re as ona

ble “ to e xpe ct

the de fe ndants – who h old

the m se lve s ou t a s e duc at or s – t o be able to ap ply suc h a standard, notwithstandin g the lack of a ca se with m aterial f actual sim ilarities.” Ma j or ity O pin iona t 50 . I n a ddi tio n, the m aj or ity say s a ppl y ing thi s te st w oul d be

“ effortless,” a s “ [a] teacher or principal shou ld be able to instan tly rec ogni ze w he the r a stu de nt i s di sr

upt ing c la ss, and i t sh oul d no t be too hard to de te rm ine w he the r a stu de nt’ s a ct ivi tie s are li ke ly to have suc h an e ff

ec t. ” Ma j or ity O pin ion at51 . T he se r ea sons art ic ulate d by the m aj or ity

are ir re le vant t o our an al y sis . T he de fe ndants tho ught

that H oll om an ’ s a ct

w as not constitu tionallyprotected – that is, the y be lie ve d th at

his a ct “ m at er ia lly

and s ubst an tia lly

int er fe re [d ] w iththe requirem ent of appropriate discipline.” B urns ide , 363 F. 2d at 749 . It sim ply does not f oll owthat be ca

use it is “ not too hard ” fo r te ac he rs to de te rm ine w he n a112

stu de nt d isr

upt s c la ss, that i t i s th en obv iou s to ev er y r ea sona ble te ac he r that a ce rt ai n di sr

upt ionw ill sur

viv e j udi ci al sc rutiny . I n othe r w or ds, te ac he rs c annot be e xpe ct ed

to re ad ily

de te rm ine w ha t c ondu ct

f al ls w ith in the Co urt’ s de fi nit ion of “ m aterial and sub stantial interference with appropriate discipline.” Id . Re as ona ble pe opl e ce rt ai nly

c andis ag re e ab out

howthe Co urt w ill appl y suc h a ge ne ral st an da rd , esp eci al ly to t he fact s o f th e in st an t ac ti on . Se e V iny ard , 311 F. 3d at 135 1 (“ [I] f a broad principle in case law is to establis h clearly the law ap pli ca ble to a spe ci fi c se t of

f ac ts f ac ing agov er

nm en ta l of

fi ci al , it m ust do s o

‘ w ithobv iou s c lari ty ’ to the poi nt tha t e ve ry obj ec tiv el y

r ea sona ble gov er nm en t of fi ci al f ac ing the c ir cum stanc es w oul d kn owthat the of fi ci al ’ s c ondu ct

did violate federal law when the official ac ted.). I do not thi nk that th e balancing test we use in our Free S peech cases es ta bli she d w ith“ obvi ous cl ar ity ” that a stu de nt c anr ai se his f

ist in the a ir dur ing the c ur ri cu lum portio n of

the sc hool day . W e de fi ne our br oa d st an dard

of

“ m at er ia lly

and s ubst an tia lly

int er fe r[ ing ] w iththe r equir em en ts o f ap pr opr ia te dis ci pli ne ” as inc lud ing “ tho se a ct ivi tie s whic h inhe re ntl y dis tr ac t st

ude nts ” dur ing cl as s. B urns ide , 363 F . 2d at 74 9, 748 . Ar ea sona ble te ac he r co uld

c onc lud e that a stu de nt r ai sin g hi s f

ist in the a ir dur ing ac ur

ri cu lum portio n of

the sc hool day

is the sort of activity

that “ inherently

distract[s] students .” Id

. a t 74 8. T hus, the113

defendants wer e not given fair warning byour case lawthat they we re prohibited fr om pun ish ing H oll om anf

or his e xpr es siv e ac t. Inthe a lte rn at ive , the m aj or ity state s th at

H oll om an ’ s r igh t t o r ai se his f ist in the air during the Pledge is clearly established un der B arne tte . I n B arne tte , the Su pr em e Co urt he ld tha t a

pub lic sc hool c annot

c om pe l a stu de nt t o part ic ipate in the P le dge . 319 U . S. a t 64 2. T he m aj or ity say s th at it is “ ve ry r el uc tant” to co nc lud e that H oll om anshe d hi s F ir st Am en dm en t pr ote ct ionto re m ai n si le nt du rin g t he Ple dg e b y

si m pl y li fti ng hi s fi stin to th e ai r. Majo rit y Opi ni on at 5 2.

“ This is a hair w e w ill not s plit,” ac cording to th e m aj ority because, I assum e,

“ Fi rs t Am en dm en t p ro te ct io ns are n otlo stth ateas il y .” Majo rit y Opi ni on at 5 3. Yet, t hi s i s p reci se ly the “ ha ir” th e m ajor it y “ sp li t” earl ie r in it s o wn opin ion. For instance, the m aj ority in Part I I-B- 1 persuasively establishes that the re is aniss ue of

m at er ia l f

ac t a s to w he the r H oll om anw as pun ish ed f or f ai lin g to s ay the P le dge or

f or r ai sin g hi s f

ist in the a ir . T his w as apr ope r dis tin ct ionto m ake, because the answe r to that questio n determ ines whether B arne tteappl ie s or whether B urns ideand Tinker ap pl y . B arne ttep r o h i b i t s as c h o o l f r o m co m pe lli ng a st ud en t t o s ay

th e Pl ed ge . Burnside an d Tinker pr ohi bit s asc hool f

ro m p r e v e n t i n g as tu d e n tf

r o m vo lun tar ilyengaging in expression, as long as that ex pr es si on do es no t s uf

fic ie nt ly int erfe re wi th pro pe r di sc ip li ne in th e cl as sr oo m .114

H oll om an ’ s a ct

of r ai sin g hi s f

ist in the a ir , a s th e m aj or ity aptl y poi nte d ou t, is w ha t m ad e his a ct ex

pressi on , rat he r th an jus t a f ai lu re t o p art ic ip at e in th e Pl ed ge . Inoth er w or ds, H oll om an ’ s a ct

of r ai sin g hi s f

ist is ex ac tly

w ha t a llo w s us to ap ply B urns ideand Tinker . To conclude later, when considering whether B arne tte cl earl y e sta bli she s H oll om an ’ s r igh t t o r ai se his f ist , that i t i s no lon ge r le ga lly si gn ifi can t t ha t Ho ll om anrai se d h is fis t, i s i nc on si st en t. B arne tteholds that a student cannotbe compelled to sp eak . B arne ttes ays nothin g a bout a stu de nt’ s rig

ht to sp eak . Hol lo m an “ sp ok e” b y rai si ng hi s fi st . Thu s, B arne ttei s n o tr e l e v an tt o th i s i n qu i ry. Fo r t h e r ea s o n s th at I a rt i cu l at edab o v e f o r w h y I b el i ev e H o l l o m an ’s expr es sio n is dis tin gui sha ble f ro m the e xpr es sio n in Tinker

and B urns ide , I w oul d hol d th at the laww as not

c le ar ly e sta bli she d th at

H oll om anha d ar igh t t o r ai se his fi st i n th e ai r dur ing the r ec itatio n of the P le dge in cl as s. II. I agre e w ith the m aj ority ’ s conclusio n that Allred is not entitled to qualified im m uni ty f or le ad ing the c la ss i n am om en t of sil en t pr ay er . S uc h a ct ion , a s a ptl y po in te d o utin PartIV of t he m ajor it y ’s op in io n, v io la te s t he Est ab li sh m en t Cl au se . Se e E nge l v . V ita le , 3 7 0 U.S . 4 2 1 (1 9 6 2 ). Th u s , I jo i nPa rtIV o f t h e majo ri ty’ s opin ion. H owever , the m aj ority also held, in Part III , that A llred is not even115

pot en tia lly

e nti tle d to sum

m ar y j udgm en t onqua lif

ie d im m uni ty gr ound s a ga ins t H oll om an ’ s E sta

bli shm en t C lause c la im

be ca use le ad ing the c la ss i n am om en t of pray erful silence is not within her “ discretionary function.” I thinkthat such an int er pr et at ionstr et ch es our

inquir y of “ dis cr et ion ar

y f unc tio n” be y ond w ha t i s articulated in our case law . Thus, I would find that (1) Allre d’ s act of lea ding her cl as s inapr ay er fu l m om en t of sil en ce w as w ith in h er

dis cr et ion ar

y auth or ity , but (2 ) suc h an a ct

w as unc onst itutio na l un de r the S upr em e Co urt’ s in te rp re ta tio n of the Establishm ent Clause. Agov er nm en t of fi ci al a ct s w ith in h is d isc re tio nary auth or ity w he n hi s ac tio ns “ w er e unde rt ak enpur suant t o th e pe rf orm an ce of

his dut ie s and w ith in the scope of his autho rity .” Sim s v . M etro. D ade Co unt

y , 972 F . 2d 1 230, 123 6 ( 11th Cir. 1992 ) (internal quotations o m itted). W e m ust keep in m ind th at our “ inqu iry is n ot whe the r it w as w ith in the de fe ndant’ s auth or ity to co m m it the a lle ge dly illegal act. Fram ed that way , the inquiry is no m ore than an untenable tautolo gy .” Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James , 157 F. 3d 12 71, 1282 (11t h Cir. 1998 ) (internal quot ation om itted). T hus, j ust because a defendant’ s act m ay be unconst itutio nal d o e s n o tmea nth a tth e a c twa s n o twi th i nth e d e f e n d an t ’s d i s c r e t i o n ary au th o r i ty. Inthe ins tant a ct ion , the A la bam a state le gis la tur e en ac te d astatut e requiring local schoo l boards to “ im plem ent . . . a com

prehensive characte r116

educ at io n p ro gr am

. . . fo cu si ng up on th e st ud en ts ’ de ve lo pm en t o f . . . com passion .” A LA . C OD E § 16 -6 B- 2( h) . A llr ed c la im s sh e pr om ote d c om pa ssi on by ask in g t he stud en ts forpra y er re qu es ts be fo re o bs erv in g am om en t o f si le nc e. Whil e suc h an a ct

w oul d no t pa ss m

ust er und er the S upr em e Co urt’ s in te rp re ta tio n of the E sta bli shm en t C lause , it

is a le git im at e w ay

to pr om ote c om

pa ssi on. A ski ng student s to offer pray ers for other people m ay habituate stud ents to thi nk of others by pr ay ing f or the m . T hus, I a gr ee w iththe m aj or ity that A llr ed ’ s a ct

w as pur suant to h er j ob r el at ed

goa l of pr om oti ng c om

pa ssi on. T he m aj or ity

be lie ve s, tho ugh, that whil e A llr ed ’ s a ct of le ad ing he r cl as s in a pr ay er fu l m om en t of

sil en ce w as pur suant t o aj ob r el at ed f unc tio n, it

w as not within the scope of her authority . The m aj ority states that “ [p] ray ing go es suf fi ci en tly be y ond the r an ge of

a ct ivi tie s no rm al ly

pe rf orm ed by hig h sc hool t e a c h e r s , ” b e c au s e “ [ p ]r aye r i s ar e l a t i v e l y suige ne ris a ct ivi ty . ” Ma j or ity O pin ion at 62. Y et, the “suige ne ris a ct ivi ty ” of pr ay ing in publ ic sc hool s wa s “ nor m al ly pe rf orm ed ” pr ior

to the S upr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio n in Engel . I n d e e d , e v e nt o d ay, m any te ac he rs in pr ivate hig h sc hool s th ro ugho ut A m er ic a, w he the r the y be religious o r secular , le ad their students in pray er. Public school teachers no long er have the auth or ity

to le ad the ir c la sse s inpr ay er

by vir tue of the f ac t tha t the Suprem e Court ruled it unconsti tutio nal. I t wa s certainly within the scope of a117

publ ic hig h sc hool te ac he r’ s auth or ity to le ad stu de nts in pr ay er

pr ior to 1962 , w he n th e Co urt r

ule d th at te ac he r le d pr ay er

in publ ic sc hool s is a

vio la tio n of

the Establishm ent Clause. The fact that a particular a ct m ay

now be deem ed unc onst itutio na l do es not m ean th at

suc h an a ct

is out sid e the sc ope of

apub lic of fic ia l’s d is cret io na ry

au th or it y . Se e H

arbe rt , 157 F . 3d at 12 82. T he re m ust be som e oth er

r ea son, be sid es the f

ac t tha t a part ic ular ac tiv ity

is unc onst itutio na l, f

or that activity

not to b e w ithin a public authority ’ s scope of authority . I do not see ana ddi tio na l r ea son, be sid es the unc onst itutio na lity of sc hool pr ay er , in the m aj ority ’ s opin ion gi ving m e re ason to believ e that A llred’ s act w as not within her discretionary

authority . And neither can I think of on e. T hus, I cannotj oin Part I I I o f th e maj o r i ty’s o p i n i o n . I t s ap p l i c a t i o no f th e “ d i s c r e t i o n ary au th o r i ty” req ui rem en t t o Al lre d’s ac t o f le ad in g h er cl as s i n s il en t p rayer is to o s tri ng en t. H ow ev er , I a gr ee that A llr ed is none the le ss n ot e nti tle d to qua lif ie d im m uni ty f or the r ea sons the m aj or ity

state s inP ar

t I V of it s op ini on. III . Astu de nt r ai sin g hi s f

ist in the a ir dur ing ac ur

ri cu lum portio n of

the sc hool day engages in an act that inherently distracts student during class. Ateacher , the re fo re , m ay

pr ohi bit astu de nt f

ro m e nga gin g insuc h a ct ivi ty . T hus, I c annot j oinP ar t I I- C o f the m aj or ity

opi nio n’ s inw hic h it

hol ds tha t the re is aniss ue of118

m aterial f act as to whether H ollom an’ s First A m endm ent right to free speec h was vio la te d if

he w as pun ish ed

f or hol din g hi s f

ist in the a ir dur ing the r ec itatio n of the P le dge and i f that punis hm en t w as not m oti va te d by

ade sir e to s uppr es s a p ar t i cu l arv i ew p o i n t . I a l s o d i s s en tfr o m th e majo ri ty’ s h o l d i n g th at Ho l l o m an ’s ri ght to hol d hi s f

ist in the a ir w as c le ar ly

e sta bli she d f or qua lif ie d im m uni ty pu rp os es . In addition , while I agree with the m aj ority ’ s conclusio n that there is an issue of m aterial f

act as to whether A llred violated Hollom an’ s clearly established ri ght und er the E sta bli shm en t C lause w he n A llr ed le d th e cl as s inam om en t of silent pray er, I cannotj oin Part II I of the m aj ority ’ s opin ion. In m y view, Allre d acted w ithin her discretionary function when leading her class in pray er. Fi na lly , I j oinP ar

t Vof the m aj or ity ’ s op ini on, but onl y to the e xte nt tha t i t hol ds tha t the S ch ool Bo ar d m ay be he ld l ia

ble if H oll om anw as pun ish ed

f or re m ai nin g si le nt d

ur ing the P le dge and f

or A llr ed ’ s a ct

of le ad ing he r stu de nts in s i l en tp ra yer. Th u s , I co n cu r i np ar tan dd i s s en ti np ar twi th th e majo ri ty’ s opi nio n.