IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

C.M., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania State Police, : No. 47 M.D. 2021 

Respondent : Argued: December 15, 2021

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge1

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge (P.)2

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: January 28, 2022

Before this Court, in our original jurisdiction, is an application for 

summary relief by Petitioner, C.M.,3seeking removal from Pennsylvania’s sex 

1 This case was assigned to the opinion writer before January 7, 2022, when Judge Cohn 

Jubelirer became President Judge.

2 This matter was assigned to the panel before January 3, 2022, when President Judge 

Emerita Leavitt became a senior judge on the Court.

3

In response to C.M.’s application for summary relief, the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP)

denied that C.M. was entitled to relief and requested that this Court instead enter summary relief 

in favor of the PSP. However, that request is not properly before this Court, as the PSP filed no 

application for relief. See Bradley v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 132 M.D. 2019, 

filed June 23, 2021), slip op. at 19 n.20, 2021 WL 2580602, at *24 n.20 (unreported) (despite 

petitioner’s failure to present any claim on which he could recover, “[i]n the absence of an 
2

offender registry maintained by the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) and exclusion 

from any future registration requirement under the Sexual Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (SORNA II).

4 For the reasons discussed herein, C.M.’s application 

for summary relief is denied.

I. Background

C.M. participated in a rape and murder in 1987. See Pet. for Review, 

¶ 4; Com. v. [C.M.], 245 A.3d 1121, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2021) (C.M. I), appeal denied,

(Pa., No. 53 MAL 2021, filed Dec. 7, 2021), 2021 WL 5810455 (Table) (C.M. II). 

In 1995,5 he entered a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to rape, criminal 

conspiracy to commit rape, and third-degree murder. Pet. for Review, ¶ 4. He 

received a sentence of 15 to 30 years’ incarceration. Id. He was released from prison 

in late 2020. See id., ¶ 10.

According to C.M., the PSP informed him upon his release that he was 

required to register for life as a convicted sex offender under Subchapter I of 

SORNA II, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.52. He then commenced this action seeking removal 

application for summary relief filed by [respondent], the Court is without a procedural vehicle 

through which to dismiss the original jurisdiction . . . action”).

4 Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27, No. 10, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.75, as amended

by the Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140, No. 29.

5 C.M. was initially convicted in 1988, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court later vacated 

that conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. Com. v. [C.M.], 245 A.3d 1121, 1124 n.4 

(Pa. Super. 2021) (C.M. I), appeal denied, (Pa., No. 53 MAL 2021, filed Dec. 7, 2021) (C.M. II), 

2021 WL 5810455 (Table) (citing Com. v. [C.M.], 602 A.2d 1265 (Pa. 1992)).
3

from the sex offender registry and exclusion from any future registration 

requirement.6

C.M. sought a preliminary injunction seeking removal of his 

information from the sex offender registry pending this Court’s decision in the case. 

On May 6, 2021, this Court issued a single-judge opinion and order denying the 

injunction. C.M. v. Pa. State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 47 M.D. 2021, filed May 6, 

2021) (C.M. III). This Court found C.M. failed to show either irreparable harm from 

the presence of his information on the registry or a likelihood of prevailing on the 

merits of his claim. Id., slip op. at 5-6.

C.M. then filed the instant application for summary relief.7

6 C.M. has been attempting since at least 2014 to eliminate his lifetime registration 

obligation, which was first imposed under the statute known as Megan’s Law II, formerly 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.7. See Pet. for Review, ¶ 6; C.M. I, 245 A.3d at 1124. After several years 

of appeals, in an opinion and order dated January 4, 2021, the Superior Court remanded that matter 

for the trial court to consider the very issue C.M. raises here, i.e., whether he is subject to the 

registration requirement of Subchapter I of SORNA II. C.M. I, 245 A.3d at 1126 (“[C.M.] argues 

that Subchapter I [of SORNA II] does not apply to him, as ‘his triggering offenses occurred in 

1987’ and, because he has been incarcerated since his conviction, he was never required to register 

under a former version of the sex offender registration laws.”) & 1133-34 (remanding to the trial 

court to “determine whether [C.M.] is obligated to register as a sex offender under Subchapter I”).

C.M. filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which held the remand in abeyance. See Pet. for 

Review, ¶ 15. Our Supreme Court denied the petition for allowance of appeal on December 7, 

2021. C.M. II. As of the filing date of this opinion, the last entries on the trial court docket are 

notice on January 3, 2022, of the denial of the petition for allowance of appeal, and receipt of the 

Superior Court’s remand decision on January 4, 2022. The trial court docket is available at 

https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-67-CR-0000798-1988&

dnh=zVlsmkSOd94WjCZzBh%2Fkqw%3D%3D (last visited Jan. 27, 2022). See Court of 

Common Pleas of York County, No. CP-67-CR-0000798-1988.

7 Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1532(b) permits filing of an application for 

summary relief at any time after a petition for review has been filed in an original jurisdiction 

matter. Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). Like summary judgment, summary relief is appropriate when, viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Haveman v. Bureau 

of Prof. & Occupational Affairs, State Bd. of Cosmetology, 238 A.3d 567, 570-71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2020).
4

II. Issues

C.M. challenges the application of Subchapter I of SORNA II to him. 

He committed his crimes in 1987 and was not released from prison until late 2020. 

He argues that he was first “required to register” under Megan’s Law II “upon 

release” from prison in 2020. Pet. for Review, ¶ 22. Subchapter I, however, applies 

only to offenders who were “required to register . . . on or after April 22, 1996, but 

before December 20, 2012.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.52. C.M. reasons that as he was 

incarcerated throughout that time period, he was not “required to register” under 

Megan’s Law II because he had not been released. Pet. for Review, ¶ 21. Therefore, 

he contends he is not subject to any registration requirement under the plain language 

of Subchapter I of SORNA II. C.M. argues that in Smolsky v. Blocker (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 254 M.D. 2018, filed May 20, 2019), 2019 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 293

(unreported),8this Court construed the statutory language at issue in exactly the way 

C.M. seeks to have it construed in this case. In addition, C.M. asserts that the 

legislative findings and purpose behind the statutory framework creating the sex 

offender registry are inapplicable, as is any suggestion that C.M.’s reading of the 

statute yields an absurd result, because the language of the statute is clear and this 

Court should not ignore the letter of the law in favor of its spirit.

In response, the PSP observes that Megan’s Law II, which became 

effective in 2000, while C.M. was incarcerated, did not exclude incarcerated persons 

from the lifetime registration requirement. Br. of Respondent at 5-6 (quoting former

42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1). The PSP asserts that the obligation of lifetime registration

arose on the effective date of Megan’s Law II, even though the duty to begin 

8 Under Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, unreported decisions 

of this Court issued after January 15, 2008 may be cited for their persuasive value, but not as 

binding precedents. 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
5

providing residence information to the registry began only upon release because 

until that time, an incarcerated person’s address – i.e., in prison – was known. Br. 

of Respondent at 5-7 (citing former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.2).

III. Discussion

Subchapter I of SORNA II provides, in pertinent part: “This subchapter 

shall apply to individuals who were . . . required to register with the [PSP] under a 

former sexual offender registration law of this Commonwealth on or after April 22, 

1996, but before December 20, 2012, whose period of registration has not expired.” 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.52(2). Here, C.M. was convicted in 1995 of sex offenses 

committed in 1987, but he was incarcerated at the time Megan’s Law II was enacted 

and was, therefore, subject to its provisions. See former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1

(imposing registration requirement on individuals “convicted” of listed crimes and 

not excepting those already incarcerated for such crimes); Dunyan v. Pa. State Police

(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 75 M.D. 2014, filed Dec. 17, 2014), slip op. at 4-5, 2014 Pa. 

Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 722, at *4-5 (unreported) (upholding application of

lifetime registration requirements first applied under Megan’s Law II to individual

convicted before its enactment but still incarcerated on its effective date); accord 

Com. v. Gaffney, 733 A.2d 616, 622 (Pa. 1999) (upholding application of 

registration requirements of Section 9793 of Megan’s Law I,9formerly 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9793, to individual convicted of offense committed before its enactment).

9 Formerly 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.6. Megan’s Law II increased the registration period 

for some offenses from 10 years to lifetime registration.
6

Before this Court, C.M. does not assert any challenge to the retroactive 

application of Subchapter I as a constitutional violation.10 He raises solely an issue 

of pure statutory construction. As explained above, he contends that he was not 

“required to register” under a former statute, Megan’s Law II, which was in effect 

in various forms from 2000 until 2012, because he was incarcerated throughout that 

period and was not released from prison, thus triggering his registration requirement, 

until 2020. Subchapter I of SORNA applies to offenders who were “required to 

register . . . on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9799.52(2). C.M. reasons that he was not “required to register” during that period 

because he had not been released. Pet. for Review, ¶¶ 20-21. In other words, 

because C.M. was not released until 2020, he insists he was not required to register 

before December 20, 2012, and is, accordingly, not subject to registration under 

SORNA II. Id. We disagree.

Section 9795.1 of Megan’s Law II was titled “Registration.” Former

42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1. Section 9795.1(b)(2) of Megan’s Law II imposed a lifetime 

registration requirement on individuals convicted of listed offenses, including rape, 

one of the crimes of which C.M. was convicted. Formerly 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(b)(2). 

As the PSP observes, nothing in that provision excepted already-incarcerated 

individuals from its application. See Br. of Respondent at 5-6 (quoting former 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9795.1); Dunyan, slip op. at 4-5.

The point in time at which registration would begin, however, was 

contained in a separate section of Megan’s Law II, Section 9795.2, titled 

“Registration Procedures and Applicability.” Formerly 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.2. 

10 Notably, in Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2020), our Supreme Court 

held that Subchapter I of SORNA II is non-punitive and does not violate constitutional prohibitions 

against ex post facto laws. Id. at 626-27.
7

Section 9795.2(a)(1) provided: “Offenders and sexually violent predators shall be 

required to register all current residences or intended residences with the [PSP] upon 

release from incarceration, upon parole from a state or county correctional 

institution, or upon the commencement of a sentence of intermediate punishment[11]

or probation.” Formerly 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.2(a)(1) (2000). 

Reading Sections 9795.1 and 9795.2 together, it is apparent that the 

obligation to register arose under Section 9795.1 upon the enactment of Megan’s 

Law II with regard to individuals incarcerated for sex offenses on that date. 

Therefore, we agree with the PSP that C.M., who was incarcerated on the effective 

date of Megan’s Law II, became obligated for lifetime registration on that date. 

By contrast, Section 9795.2, which expressly related only to 

registration procedures, merely provided the timing and mechanism of when and 

how performance of the registration obligation would begin. Thus, only C.M.’s duty 

to begin performing that obligation, not the obligation itself, arose upon his 

subsequent release. The date of his release was irrelevant to his registration 

obligation.

As discussed above, Subchapter I of SORNA II applies to individuals 

who were “required to register with the [PSP] under a former sexual offender 

registration law . . . on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012, whose 

period of registration has not expired.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.52(2). C.M. incurred a 

lifetime registration requirement upon the effective date of Megan’s Law II in 2000, 

i.e., after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012. As a lifetime requirement, 

it has not expired. Accordingly, C.M. must register with the PSP for his lifetime.

11 “Intermediate punishment” includes statutorily authorized sentencing alternatives such 

as home confinement and electronic monitoring. Com. v. Wegley, 829 A.2d 1148, 1148 n.1 (Pa. 

2003) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9763(b)(16), (17); 37 Pa. Code § 451.51(a)(1)-(3)).
8

C.M.’s reliance on Smolsky is unavailing. In Smolsky, this Court issued

an unreported panel decision addressing the same issue in analogous circumstances. 

This Court found the petitioner was entitled to have his name removed from the sex 

offender registry and was not subject to future registration requirements. Id., slip 

op. at 5-6. C.M. therefore relies heavily on Smolsky as persuasive. However, this 

Court expressly distinguished Smolsky in its single-judge opinion in this case. The 

Court observed that the PSP did not raise in Smolsky the opposing arguments that it 

raises here, and further, that Smolsky is not precedential. C.M. III, slip op. at 5 n.3. 

A review of the Smolsky opinion reveals that this Court expressly directed 

supplemental briefing on the applicability of the registration requirement in that 

case, but neither party provided any analysis in its supplemental brief that was 

helpful to the Court. Smolsky, slip op. at 4 n.4 (stating that “[a]lthough they filed 

their supplemental briefs in a timely fashion, [the parties] failed to adequately 

address the question posed by this Court or to provide any meaningful legal analysis 

to assist this Court in deciding whether the provisions of [SORNA II] apply to Mr. 

Smolsky”). It was not this Court’s function to develop the parties’ arguments for 

them. See Com. v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 185 n.21 (Pa. 2018) (declining to analyze 

cited decisions where advocate failed to develop an accompanying argument; 

appellate courts are “neither obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an 

argument for a party. To do so places the Court in the conflicting roles of advocate 

and neutral arbiter.”) (citation omitted); Com. v. Williams, 782 A.2d 517, 532 (Pa. 

2001) (stating that “[t]he result [of a court’s development of argument for a party] is 

a decision on the issue without the benefit of helpful advocacy from either side. This 

is not a model for sound decision-making.”); Hohensee v. Luger, 412 A.2d 1111, 

1112 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980) (opining that the “judicial role must be to adjudicate 
9

coherent claims, not to assume the burdens of the advocate or litigant”). 

Accordingly, we conclude that our decision in Smolsky is not persuasive here.

Moreover, as the PSP aptly points out in its brief, the result of C.M.’s 

construction of Subchapter I would have absurd results. Br. of Respondent at 7-8. 

For example, if two persons committed sex offenses on the same day and were 

incarcerated at the same time, and one of them, who committed a less serious 

offense, was released before December 20, 2012, but the other, who committed the 

more serious crime, was not released until after December 20, 2012, C.M.’s reading 

of the statute would mean that the offender committing the less serious crime would 

have to register and the offender committing the more serious crime – and thus 

posing the more serious risk of harm to the public – would not. Id. Such a result 

would directly contravene the legislative policy underlying both Megan’s Law II and 

SORNA II to protect “the safety and general welfare” of Pennsylvania citizens. 

Formerly 42 Pa.C.S. § 9791(b); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(b)(1).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, C.M.’s application for summary relief is 

denied.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

C.M., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania State Police, : No. 47 M.D. 2021 

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 28th day of January, 2022, the application for 

summary relief filed by Petitioner, C.M., is DENIED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge