. . 

THE L~TITORNEY GE,I'ERAJ. 

OFTEXAS 

Honorable Preston Smith Opinion No. M-869 

Governor of Texas 

Capitol Building 

Austin, Texas 78711 

Re : 

Dear Governor Smith: 

Whether certain provisions of 

Section 51-a, Article III of 

the Constitution of Texas 

authorize the Legislature to 

specify limitations in excess 

of the Eighty Million Dollar 

($80,000,000.00) ceiling when 

federal matching funds are 

available for assistance 

and/or medical care for or 

on behalf of needy persons? 

You have requested the opinion of this office as to 

whether the following provision contained in Section 51-a of 

Article III of the Constitution of Texas: 

“Provided further, that if the limitations 

and restrictions herein conta’iiied are found to 

be in conflict with the provisions of approas they now are or as 

he extent that federal 

matching money is not available to the state 

for these purposes, then and in that event 

the Legislature is specifically authorized and 

empowered to prescribe such limitations and 

restrictions and enact such laws as may be 

necessary in order that such federal matching 

money will be available for assistance and/or 

medical care for or on behalf of needy persons.” 

(Emphasis added.), 

would authorize the Legislature to specify limitations in excess 

of the Eighty Million Dollar ($80,000,000.00) ceiling when federal 

matching funds are available for assistance and/or medical care 

for or on behalf of needy persons. 

In addition to the above quoted provision, Section 51-a 

-4221- 
Hon. Preston Smith, page 2 (M-869) 

of Article III of the Constitution of Texas, which was adopted 

by the voters on August 5, 1969, also provides that: 

“The Legislature shall have the power, by 

General Law,-to provide, subject to limitations 

herein contained, and such other limitations, 

restrictions and reeulations as mav bv the 

Legislature be deemed expedient, for assistance 

grants to and/or medical care for . . . 

“(1) Needy aged persons who are citizens 

of the United States or noncitizens who shall 

have resided within the boundaries of the United 

States for at least twenty-five (25) years; 

“(2) Needy individuals who are totally and 

permanently disabled by reason of a mental or 

physical handicap or a combination of physical 

and mental handicaps; 

“(3) Needy blind persons; 

“(4) Needy dependent children and the caretakers of such children; 

I, 

. . . 

II 

. . . provided that the maximum amount paid 

out of state funds to or on behalf of anv needv 

person shall not exceed the amount that is matchable out of federal funds; provided that the total 

amount of such assistance payments only out of 

state funds on behalf of such individuals shall 

not exceed the amount of Eighty Million Dollars 

($80.000.000) during any fiscal year . . .” 

(Emphasis added.) 

It may prove helpful at this point to provide a historical background regarding the adoption of constitutional provisions in the State of Texas relating to financial assistance 

authorized to be paid by the State of Texas to certain needy individuals. 

Section 51 of Article III of the Constitution of Texas 

-&222- 
Hon. Preston Smith, page 3 (M-869) 

in its original form as placed in the Constitution of 1876 was 

a prohibition placed upon the Legislature that it: 

II 

. . . shall have no power to make any grant 

or authorize the making of any grant of public 

moneys to any individual, association of individuals, 

municipal or other corporations whatsoever . . .ll 

The above prohibition has been retained in Section 51 of Article 

III of the Constitution of Texas from the date of the adoption of 

the Constitution of 1876 to the present time. It has not been 

repealed. Exceptions to such prohibition have been made from 

time to time rather than repealing the prohibition. Therefore, 

in order to provide the payment of assistance to needy individuals, 

various constitutional amendments permitting such assistance have 

from time to time been adopted by the people of Texas. 

In 1933, Section 51-a of Article III of the Constitution 

of Texas was adopted which authorized the issuance and sale of 

bonds of the State of Texas not to exceed the sum of $20,000,000.00, 

II 

. . . the proceeds of the sale of such bonds to be used in 

financing relief and work relief to needy and distressed people 

and in relieving the hardships resulting from unemployment . . .'I 

S.J.R. No. 30 of the 43rd Legislature, 1933. 

In 1935, the Constitution was again amended so as to 

authorize Old Age Assistance to "actual bona fide citizens of 

Texas who are over the age of sixty-five (65) years , . .I' H.J.R. 

-4223- 
Hon. Preston Smith, page 4 (M-869) 

No. 19 of the 44th Legislature, 1935. Article III, Section 51-b, 

Constitution of Texas. The maximum grant out of State funds was 

$15.00 per month per recipient. 

In 1937,the Constitution was amended to provide for assistance “to destitute children under the age of fourteen (14) 

years . . .‘I H.J.R. No. 26-a of the 44th Legislature, 1937. 

Article III, Section 51-d of the Constitution of Texas. The 

maximum grant out of State funds was not to exceed $8.00 per 

month for one child, nor more than $12.00 per month for children 

in one family, with a maximum overall limit out of State funds 

not to exceed $1,500,000.00 per year. 

In 1945, the above referred to amendments were consolidated into Section 51-a of Article III of the Constitution of 

Texas, as well as broadening the class of citizens eligible to 

receive grants of public moneys by the State of Texas. H.J.R. 

No; 13 of the 49th Legislature, 1945. The foregoing limited 

payments out of State funds per individual to $20.00 for Old 

Age Assistance; provided no individual limit for Aid to the 

Blind; and removed the maximum for Aid to Dependent Children; 

and placed a $35,000,000.00 per year limit on State funds for 

the three programs combined. 

In 1951, the Legislature submitted to the voters 

H.J.R. No. 6 of the 52nd Legislature, but such constitutional 

provision was defeated. It would have eliminated citizenship 

and have reworded the residence requirements on all three 

-4224- 
Hon. Preston Smith, page 5 (M-869) 

programs. It provided a maximum per individual Old Age Assistance 

recipeint of $30.00 out of State funds and raised the overall 

maximum out of State funds from $35,000,000.00 to $42,000,000.00. 

In 1954, an amendment was made to Section 51-a of Article 

III of the Constitution of Texas. S.J.R. No. 7 of the 53rd Legislature. This provision provided a maximum of $20.00 out of State 

funds for Old Age Assistance per individual and raised the ceiling of total expenditures on the part of the State from $35,000,000.00 

to $42,000,000.00. 

In 1956, amendments to Article III, Section 51-b-1 were 

adopted. H.J.R. No. 30 of the 54th Legislature. This provided 

for Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled and placed a limit 

not to exceed $20.00 per month per individual, and a total overall maximum out of State funds not to exceed $1,500,000.00 per 

year. 

In 1958, Section 51-a-1, Article III of the Constitution 

of Texas was added. H.J.R. No. 36 of the 55th Legislature. This 

provided for vendor medical care on behalf of Old Age Assistance, 

Aid to the Blind, Aid to Dependent Children and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. The only limit as to amounts was that the 

expenditure of State funds could not exceed payments out of Federal 

funds. 

In 1957, an amendment was adopted to Section 51-a of 

-4225- 
Hon. Preston Smith, page 6 (M-869) 

In 1962, an amendment was enacted to Section 51-a of 

Article III of the Constitution of Texas. S.J.R. No. 9 of the 

57th Legislature. This constitutional amendment raised the ceiling from $47,000,000.00 to $52,000,000 .OO for Old Age Assistance, 

Aid to the Blind, and Aid to Dependent Children. This provision 

retained the maximum of $25.00 per ind ,ividual Old Age Assistance 

recipient. 

Article III of the Constitution of Texas. H.J.R. No. 2 of the 

55th Legislature. This amendment placed a maximum of $25.00 per 

Old Age Assistance recipient, or $21.00 until additional amounts 

were matched by the Federal Government. This provision raised 

the ceiling from $42,000,000.00 to $47,000,000.00 payable from 

State funds. 

In 1962, an amendment was made to Section 51-b of Article 

III of the Constitution of Texas. S.J.R. No. 7 of the 57th Legislature. It raised the ceiling in connection with the Aid to the 

Permanently and Totally Disabled from $1,500,000.00 to $2,500,000.00. 

In 1963, an amendment was made combining Sections 51-a 

and 51-b-1 of Article III of the Constitution of Texas to be known 

as Article 51-a. It dealt with Old Age Assistance, Aid to the 

Blind, Aid to Dependent Children and Aid to the Permanently and 

Totally Disabled. This provision raised the ceiling from 

$52,000,000.00 to $60,000,000.00 and changed residence requirements 

-4226- 
Hon. Preston Smith, page 7 (M-869) 

on all programs. The dollar maximum on individual Old Age Assistance cases was deleted. S.J.R. 21 of the 58th Legislature. 

In 1965, an amendment combined Section 51-a and Subsections 51-a-l and 51-a-2 of Article III of the Constitution of 

Texas to be known as Section 51-a of Article III of the Constitution of Texas. It provided for assistance grants for Old Age 

Assistance, Aid to the Blind, Aid to Families with Dependent 

Children and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, and 

medical assistance for all categories, and medical assistance 

for all non-categories. A $60,000,000.00 maximum on grants only 

was retained. H.J.R. No. 81 of the 59th Legislature. 

In 1968, S.J.R. No. 41 of the 60th Legislature was submitted tothe voters. This proposed constitutional amendment 

which would have raised the ceiling on State expenditures for the 

various programs from $60,000,000.00 to $75,000,000.00 was defeated by the voters. 

S.J.R. No. 8 of the 61st Legislature, which was adopted 

on August 5, 1969, constitutes the present Section 51-a of Article 

III of the Constitution of Texas. The ceiling was raised from 

$60,000,000.00 to $80,000,000.00 on assistance grants which could 

be made to the four categories of recipients -- the aged (OAA), 

the blind (AB), the totally and permanently disabled (APTD) and 

dependent children (AFDC). Out of the additional $20,000,000.00, 

-4227- 
Hon. Preston Smith, page 8 (M-869) 

the sum of $15,000,000.00 was appropriated for each fiscal year 

beginning on September 1, 1969, and ending on August 31, 1971. 

See also the case of Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F.Supp. 

1332 (N.D. Texas, 1969) for a further historical background of 

the constitutional amendments pertaining to public welfare assistance. 

On May 18, 1971, the voters of Texas defeated a proposed constitutional amendment, S.J.R. 5 of the 62nd Legislature, 

Regular Session, 1971, which would have removed the limitation or 

ceiling upon State expenditure for assistance grants to the needy 

aged, needy disabled, and needy blind, but would have retained a 

limitation or ceiling upon assistance grants for needy children 

and the caretakers of such children, 

On May 20, 1971, S.J.R. 57 and S.J.R. 58 were introduced in the Legislature. Each of such proposed amendments to 

Section 51-a of Article III of the Constitution of Texas would 

remove the ceiling or limitation upon assistance grants to the 

four categories of welfare recipients. 

The foregoing historical review of the constitutional 

amendments, concerning State expenditures for assistance grants 

to welfare recipients, discloses that for over thirty-five (35) 

years the Legislature has consistently followed a pattern of submitting constitutional amendments to the voters of the State of 

-4228- 
Hon. Preston Smith, page 9 (M-869) 

Texas which would limit the increase in expenditures of State 

funds for welfare assistance grants to a specified amount or 

ceiling. The only proposed constitutional amendment submitted 

to the voters by the Legislature which would have removed the 

ce i ling or limitation as to assistance grants to some recipients 

of public welfare was S.J.R. 5 which was defeated by the voters 

on May 18, 1971. 

It is also enlightening to note at this point that 

S.J.R. 9, adopted by the voters on November 6, 1962, and which 

raised the limitation or ceiling upon welfare assistance grants 

from $47,000,000 to $52,000,000, was initially introduced in a 

form which would have completely removed the limitation or ceiling . See the Senate Journal for the 57th Legislature, Regular 

Session, 1961, pp. 1330-1333. In addition, S.J.R. 21, adopted 

ised the welfare 

,ooo,ooo to 

by the voters on November 9, 1963, and which ra 

assistance grant ceiling or limitation from $52 

$60,000,000, was also initially introduced in a form which would 

have completely removed such limitation or ceiling. See the 

Senate Journal for the 58th Legislature, Regular Session, 1963, 

PP. 144, 397, 1259, and House Journal for the 58th Legislature, 

Regular Session, 1963, pp. 1968-1971. 

In this same vein, numerous proposed constitutional 

amendments have been introduced in the Legislature which had 

as their purpose the removal of the ceiling or limitation upon 

expenditure of State funds for welfare assistance grants. See 

-422g- 
Hon. Preston Smith, page 10 (M-869) 

islature, 1947, Regular 

Session (House Journal p. 206); H.J.R. 37 of the 54th Legislature, 

1955, Regular Session (House Journal p. 603); H.J.R. 11 of the 55th 

Legislature, 1957, Regular Session (House Journal p. 133). 

In light of the foregoing historical background, it 

for example H.J.R. 16 of the 50th Leg 

is evident that the Legislature had not departed from some 

thirty-five (35) years of custom or practice when it submitted 

S.J.R. 8 of the 61st Legislature, Regular Session, 1969, the 

present Section 51a of Article III of the Constitution of Texas, 

to the voters. The present constitutional amendment authorizing 

assistance grants to welfare recipients once again raised the 

ceiling but did not remove it. 

In determining the meaning of a constitutional provision the court will give weight to a construction given it by 

the legislative or executive branch of government. American 

Indemnity Co. v. Austin, 112 Tex. 239, 246 S.W . 1019 (1922); 

Hill County v. Sheppard, 142 Tex. 358, 178 S.W '.2d 261 (1944); 

Walker v. Baker, 145 Tex. 321, 196 S.W.2d 324 (1946); Koy v. 

Schneider, 110 Tex. 369, 218 S.W. 479 (1920). A constitutional 

provision is to be construed with a view of understanding the 

intention of the voters, and their purpose should be ascertained 

and followed. Cox v. Robinson, 105 Tex. 426 (1912); Williams v. 

Castleman, 112 Tex. 193, 247 S.W. 263 (1922); Collingsworth County 

-4230- 
. 

Hon. Preston Smith, page 11 (M-869) 

v. Allrcd, 120 Tex. 473, 40 S.W.2d 13 (1331); Deason v. Orange 

County Water Control & Improvement District, 151 Tex. 29, 244 

S.W.2d 981 (1.952). No part of the constitution may be allowed 

to defeat another part of the constitution if by any rea~sona~ble 

construction the two can be made to stand together. Lastro v. 

State, 3 Crim.Rep. 363 (1878). An interpretation that would 

produce conflict between provisions of the constitution will 

be avoi.ded ,and the provisions will be so construed, if possible, 

so as to reconcile apparent repugnancies and give effect to 

every part. Holman v. Broadway Improv. Co., 300 S.W. 15 

(Tex.Comm.App. 1927); Collingsworth County v. Allred, supra; 

Jones v. Williams, 121 Tex. 94, 45 S.W.2d 130 (1931); Texas 

National Guard Armory Board v. McGraw, 132 Tex. 613, 126 S.W.2d 

627 (1939); Hanson v. Jordan, 145 Tex. 320, 198 S.W.2d 262 (1946). 

Applying the foregoing gneeral provisions of law 

concerning the construction and Interpretation of the provisions 

of our state constitution to the historical background of Section 51-a 

of Article III of the Constitution of Texas can lead to but one 

conclusion. The Legislature for over thirty-five (35) years has 

treated the limitation or ceiling contained in our Constitution 

as to welfare assistance grants as just that--a limitation or 

restriction upon the amount of state funds which could be appropriated 3n-l s,.cnL. Whenever It was sought to increase this 

celling or limitation, it was done by submitting a constitutional 

-4231- 
Hon. Preston Smith, page 12 (M-869) 

. 

assistance grants as just that --a limitation or restriction 

upon the amount of state funds which could be appropriated and 

spent. Whenever it was sought to Increase this celling or 

limitation, it was done by submitting a constitutional amendment 

for action by the voters. (See the recommendation of the Report 

of the Senate Interim Committee on Welfare 'Reform --Breaking 

the Poverty Cycle in Texas-p. 52). All attempts by the 

Legislature to remove such celling or limitation have met with 

no success In the Legislature with the exception of S.J.R. 5 

of the 62nd Legislature, Regular Session, 1971, which was 

submitted to the voters on May 18, 1971, and which was defeated. 

Certainly, no more striking example could be given to disclose 

the intention of the voters as well as the Legislature. Once 

the will of the voter has spoken, It Is not for the courts or 

this office to supplant or thwart this decision of the electorate 

but to follow their mandate. See authorities previously cited. 

Also, if a change Is to be effected Into the Constitution, only 

the people can make it --the courts cannot and will not. Carpenter 

v. Sheppard, 135 Tex. 413, 145 S.W.2d 562 (1940). 

Also, to construe one portion of Section 51-a of 

Article III of the Constitution of Texas in such a manner as to 

negate another portion of the Constitution is completely repugnant 

to the rules of construction previously cited. The initial provisions 

of Section 51-a of Article III of the Constitution clearly places a 

llmltatlon or ceiling of $80,000,000 on the expenditure of state funds 

for welfare assistance grants. To construe the remaining portions of 

Section 51-a of Article III so as to completely remove such limitation 

would defeat the clear intent of both the voter and Legislature. 

-b232- 
. . 

Hon. Preston Smith, page 13 (M-869) 

Consequently, we are of the opinion that none of 

the provisions of Section 51-a of Article III of the Constitution of Texas have the effect of removing the $8O,OOO,OOO limltatlon upon the expenditure of state funds for assistance grants 

to recipients of public welfare in the absence of any showing 

that such ceiling or limitation is in conflict with the provisions of appropriate federal statutes. 

The authority granted to the Legislature in that 

portion of Section 51-a of Article III of the Constitution of 

Texas, to which you have referred in your opinion request, 

is a conditional authority. The Legislature is authorized 

to act only if: 

"(1) the limitations and restrictions 

herein contal;ed /Section 51-a of Article IIITare 

found to be in coiiflict with the provisions ?if 

appropriate federal statutes . . ., and, to the 

extent that 

"(2) . . . federal matching money is not 

available to the state for these purposes. . .' 1 

r The provisions of Section 51-a, Article III in question was 

initially proposed by H.J.R. 81 in 1965 and was approved by the 

voters on November 2, 1965, and has remained a portion of Section 

51-a of Article III since such date being, once again incorporated 

into the amendment made to Section 51-a of Article III in 1969. 

A study of the Medical Assistance Act of 1967, Article 6953-1, 

V.C.S., enacted to implement the provisions and requirements of 

Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Social Security Amendments 

of 1965 - Public Law 89-97) and the programs which will ultimately 

have to be implemented by the states to comply with the provisions 

of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, lead to the conclusion 

that the Legislature undoubtedly inserted the provision in question 

in Section 51-a of Article III to gain authorization to ultimately 

Implement these programs at a future date or as r 

law. See in this connection Atty. Gen. Op. M-20 t~~~~e”&“~-~f”tf~~7). 

-'4233- 
. 

. 

Hon. Prest3 n Smith, page 14 (M-869) 

This then raises the question of whether the present 

limitations or ceilings upon state expenditure of funds for 

welfare assistance grants are In conflict with existing federal 

statutes. 

In the case of King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 

2128, 2'3 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968) the court had before It certain 

questions pertaining to the operation of the AFDC programs 

(aid to needy children) In Alabama. The Court In Its opinion 

made the following observation: 

II 

. . . There is no question that States have 

considerable latitude In allocating their AFDC 

resources, since each State Is free to set its 

own standard of need and to determine the level 

of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to 

the program. . . .- (Emphasis added.) 

In addition, at page 319, footnote 15 provides that: 

"The rather complicated formula for federal 

funding Is contained in 42 U.S.C. $603. The 

level of benefits Is within the State's discretion, 

but the Federal Government's contribution is a 

varying percentage of the total AFDC expenditures 

within each State. . . .' (Emphasis added.) 

In the case of Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 90 

S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970) the court stated In its opinion 

that: 

'We begin with a brief review of the 

general structure of the Federal Aid to Families 

With Dependent Children (AFDC) program, one of 

the four 'categorical assistance' programs established by the Social Security Act of lYj5 . 

-4234- 
. 

. 

. 

Hon. Preston Smith, page lj (M-869) 

'lne general topography of the AFDC program 

was mapped in part by this Court in King v. Smith, 

392 U.S. 309 (19681, and several lower court 

opinions, in addition to the opinion below, have 

surveyed the pertinent statutory and regulatory 

provisions. While participating states must 

comply with the terms of the federal legislation, 

see King v. Smith, supra, the program is basically 

voluntary and states have traditionally been at 

liberty to pay as little or as much as they choose, 

. . . (Emphasis added.) 

In the case of Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 

90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) the court stated that: 

"In King v. Smith, supra, we stressed the 

states' 'undisputed power' under these provisions 

of the Social Security Act, 'to set the level of 

benefits and the standard of need.' Id., at 334. 

We described the AFDC enterprise as 'a scheme of 

cooperative federalism 'Id., at 316, and noted 

carefully that ' rt7here Is no question that 

states have consiTeFable latitude in allocating 

their AFDC resources, since each state is free 

to set Its own standard of need and to determine 

the level of benefits by the amount of funds 

It devotes to the program. 'Id., at 318-319.' 

"Congress was Itself cognizant of the 

limitations on state resources from the very 

outset of the federal welfare program. The 

first section of the Act, 42 U.S.C. $601 (1964 

ed., Supp. IV), provides that the Act is 

'For the purpose of encouraging the care 

of dependent children In their own homes or in 

the homes of relatives by enabling each state 

to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as practicable 

under the conditions in such state, to needy 

dependent children. . . .I" [Em 

Court.) 

phasis by the 

-4235- 
, 

Hon. Preston Smith , page 16 (M-869) 

These recent decisions by the United States Supreme 

Court completely negate the possibility that there presently 

exists any conflict between the monetary limitation or celling 

that Section 51-a of Article III of the Constitution of Texas 

places upon the expenditure of state funds for assistance 

grants to welfare recipients and federal legislation In this 

area. 

Consequently, as there exists no conflict between 

the monetary limitations of Section 51-a of Article III of the 

Constitution of Texas and the Social Security Act of 1935, 

as amended, the conditional authorization given to the Leglslature in that portion of Section 51-a of Article III which 

is the subject of this opinion remains Inoperative, and does 

not authorize the Legislature to appropriate funds in excess 

of $80,000,000 for assistance grants to the four categories 

of welfare assistance. 

It should be noted at this point that expenditures 

of state funds for medical assistance to welfare recipients 

has no celling or limitation placed upon it by the provisions 

of Section 51-a of Article III of the Constitution of Texas. 

SUMMARY 

None of the provisions of Section 51-a of 

Article III of the Constitution of Texas have the 

effect of removing the $80,000,000 limitation or 

-4236- 
. 

. . 

. . 

Hon. Preston Smith, page 17 (M-869) 

celling upon the expenditure of State funds 

for assistance grants to recipients of public 

welfare in the absence of any showing that 

such ceiling or limitation is in conflict with 

the provisions of appropriate federal statutes. 

The authority granted to the Legislature In 

the penultimate paragraph of Section 51-a of 

Article III of the Constitution of Texas is a 

conditional authority which would only become 

operative in the event that the limitations or 

restrictions contained in Section 51-a of 

Article III are found to be In conflict with 

federal statutes. 

The monetarg restrictions or limitations 

upon the expenditure of state funds for assistance 

grants to recipients of welfare assistance found 

in Section 51-a of Article III of the Constitution 

of Texas are not In conflict with the corresponding 

orovislons of the Social Securlts Act of 1915. as 

&ef;dezO ting v. Smith, 392 U.S."309, 88 S:ct: 

Ed 2d 1118 (1968); Rosado v. Wyman, 

97 6.s. 397;90 s.ct. 

1970); 

1207, 25 L Ed 2 442 

Dandridge v. Williams, 39: U1.S:' 471, 90 

S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (199). 

Attor&y General of Texas 

Prepared by Pat Bailey 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Kerns Taylor, Chairman 

W. E. Allen, Co-Chairman 

James H. Broadhurst 

Bob Flowers 

Dyer Moore, Jr. 

J. C. Davis 

-4237- 
. . 

Hon. Preston Smith, page 18 

MEADE F. GRIFFIN 

Staff Legal Assistant 

ALFRED WALKER 

Exeoltive Assistant 

NOLA WHITE 

First Assistant 

(M-869) 

-4238-