NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 21a0152n.06
No. 2 0

- 1 2 76
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v.
JAMES JUNIOR MILLER , Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: CLAY , Mc K EAGUE , and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. MURPHY, Circuit Judge. T o obtain a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment , the police must have “probable cause” that the “place” t hey seek to search contain s the “things” they
seek to seize. U.S. Const. amend. IV

. Applying this test, w e have repeatedly held that probable

cause exist s to search a residence for drug

- related evidence when a drug dealer travel s directly
from that residence to the site of a drug deal

. See , e.g. , United S tates v. Coleman , 923 F.3d 450,
457

– 58 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Ellison , 632 F.3d 347, 349 (6th Cir. 2011). The fact s of
this case fit that profile : Just before his arrest, t he police watched James Miller leave an apartment
with a grocery bag , drive to a nearby parking lot , and sell drugs. T he district court thus correctly
held that probable cause supported a warrant to search the apartment. W e affirm Miller’s
conviction

.No. 20

- 1276, United States v. Miller

2 I In September 2017, police officers in Lansing, Michiga n, stopped a car that Miller was driving because t h e car had illegally tinted windows and Miller had fail ed to use a turn signal . T he
officer s smelled marijuana during th e stop, searched the car, and discovered cocaine and marijuana
inside . Miller was ar rested and released on bond.
Fast forward ten months to July 2018. Officers arranged for a confidential informant to buy 1.5 ounces of cocaine from Miller for $1,800

. The officers monitored th e controlled buy

. Not wanting to blow the informant’s cover, the y next had a uniformed officer pull Miller over for a
traffic violation. T h is office r asked Miller to exit the car after noticing three bag gie s of what appeared to be cocaine in the center console

. Miller ref used

. When backup arrived, several
officers physically extricated him . A search of the car revealed a large amount of cocaine

. Miller

was again arrested and released on bond.
Fast forward a few more weeks

. Miller failed to appear on state drug charge s for his
offenses . A judge issued a bench warrant for his arrest. On the early afternoon of August 17,

o fficers were surveill ing the apartment at which they suspected Miller had been staying

. A n officer’s affidavit seeking a warrant to search t hi s apartment described what happened

next. O fficers watched Miller exit and reenter t h e apartment talking on his phone. He later left

t h e apartment carrying a white plastic grocery bag and stopped to check the bag ’s contents as he
walked to his car

. Miller got into his car and dr o ve to a nearby store’s parking lo t

. Miller parked
in th e lot but remained in the car. O fficers looked on as an individual got into Miller’s car and left

a minute l ater. They next saw a second person enter his car
. At this point, several o fficers approach ed the vehicle both on foot and in a patrol car

. An on

- foot officer saw cocaine in Miller’s hand and plastic baggies with more cocaine and cash next to him

. Miller attempt ed to hide theNo. 20

- 1276, United States v. Miller

3

cocaine. He then put his car in revers e and hit the patrol car behind him . Officers arrested Miller

. A search of his car uncovered large amounts of suspected cocaine and marijuana , packaging
materials , and a digital scale. The search also uncovered a firearm and cash i n the white plastic bag that Miller had been carrying from the apartment

. Aside from these events , t he affidavit noted that a bench warrant had been issued for Miller’s arrest “on a previous drug case

. ” It also explained that officers had continued to surveil
the apartment at which they had found Miller and that no other person had been seen enter ing or l eaving it

. The officer who signed the affidavit opined that the drugs recovered from Miller’s car likely originated from t his apartment . The officer added that , in her experience, drug dealers often keep firearms , drugs, and drug proceeds in their homes. She sought a warrant to search th e apartment f

or evidence of Miller’s drug dealing.
A magistrate judge issued the warrant

. O fficers conducted the search the same day. They
recovered two handguns (one of which had been reported stolen), ammunition, and 403.54 grams
of cocaine.
Miller was indicted on several counts. He moved to suppress th e evidence seized from the apartment on the ground that the officer’s affidavit did not establish probable cause to search it

. The district court denied his motion.
After th at denial, Miller entered into a conditional plea a greement . He plead ed guilty to possessing with the i ntent to d istribute c ocaine , in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) , and possessing a f

irearm in f

urtherance of a d rug - t rafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Mi ller reserved the right to challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress on appeal

. The district court subsequently sentenced him to 190 months’ imprisonment.No. 20

- 1276, United States v. Miller

4

Miller now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. We give de novo revi ew to a district court’s denial of such a motion when it is based on the legal conclusion that probable cause
existed for a search

. See United States v. Brown , 732 F.3d 569, 572

– 73 (6th Cir. 2013).
II The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has long interpreted
this la nguage to prohibit the issuance of a search warrant unless there is probable cause to believe that the place to be searched contain s the things to be seized. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily , 436 U.S. 547, 555

– 56 (1978). Or, as our precedent puts it , there must be a probable

- cause “nexus”
between a defendant’s alleged illegal activity and the relevant locatio n
. See Ellison , 632 F.3d at 349

. This nexus requires a “fair probability” that the location will contain evidence of the illegal activity. United States v. Carpenter , 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Illinois
v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Miller argues that the police failed to es tablish th e required nexus between his drug dealing
in the store ’s parking lot and the apartment that the y sought to search . When considering whether
a nexus exist s to search a particular place , we may look only to the evidence presented under oath
to the magistrate who issued the warrant ( h e re , the testimony provided by the officer in the affidavit). See United States v. Berry , 565 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir. 2009). Although we review the district court’s decision de novo, we “give great deference” to the magistrate’s conclusion that probable cause existed to issu e the warrant. Brown , 732 F.3d at 57 2

– 7 3. Our job “ is simply to ensure that th e magistrate had a substantial basis for ” this conclusion

. Ca rpenter , 360 F.3d at 594 ( quoting Gates , 462 U.S. at 238

– 39).No. 20

- 1276, United States v. Miller

5

This “nexus” question arises often in the drug

- trafficking context

. See, e.g. , United States
v. Sumlin , 956 F.3d 879, 885

– 87 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Crawford , 943 F.3d 297, 308

– 09 (6th Cir. 2019); Coleman , 923 F.3d at 457

– 58; United States v. Houser , 752 F. App’x 223, 226

– 27 (6th Cir. 2018) ; United States v. Jenkins , 743 F. App’x 636, 642

– 44 (6th Cir. 2018); United
States v. Brown , 828 F.3d 375, 381

– 85 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. McPhearson , 469 F.3d 518, 524

– 25 (6th Cir. 2006)

. I n some circumstances , we have “struggled to identify the quantum of evidence” required for probable cause to search a drug dealer’s home

. United States v. Ardd , 911 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir. 2018) . Yet our cases leave no dou bt that probable cause may exist if
the evidence provided to a magistrate “ directly connect [s] the residence with the suspected drug dealing activity [.] ” Brown , 828 F.3d at 384. The police often establish this type of direct connection to a residence with evidence that a drug dealer took drugs from t h at residence to a drug deal

. See i d. at 383. Consider Houser

. There,

an affidavit “a verred that officers witnessed Houser leave from and then return to his apartment
immediatel y before and after selling crack cocaine, thus establishing a sufficient nexus to search
the residence ” for drug

- related evidence. 752 F. App’x at 227. Or consider Ellison

. There , “[t] he affidavit explained that a confidential informant had observed som eone come out of Ellison’s residence, engage in a drug transaction, and then return into the residence. ” 632 F.3d at 349. We
likewise held that these facts created “ a fair probability that drugs were being stored in the residence or that drug trafficking was taking place from the residence [

. ] ” Id. Admittedly , the drug transactions in Houser and Ellison occurred just outside the residence

. But we have invoked the same principle when the defendant traveled farther away from th e residence to a drug deal. Take Crawford

. P olice officers in that case received information from a
credible informant that Crawford was selling cocaine. 943 F.3d at 302. T hey thus worked withNo. 20

- 1276, United States v. Miller

6

the informant to set up a controlled buy at a gym

. Id

. at 303

. The officers watched Crawford exit his apartment for the gym with a small duffle bag and later confirmed with the confidential
informant that the buy had gone through

. Id. We held that this evidence sufficed to connect Crawford’s drug dealing with t his a partment. Id. at 308

– 09

. Or take Coleman

. Police officers in
that case had arranged for several controlled buys from Coleman. 923 F.3d at 457. Before the last
controlled buy, the officers “observed [Coleman] drive directly from his condo to the” desig nated
site. Id. We held that this evidence established a sufficient nexus to the condo because it allowed for “ a reasonable inference that he transported narcotics from his residence to the location of the
cocaine sale. ” Id. ; see also Sumlin , 956 F.3d a t 887; Jenkins , 743 F. App’x at 644. Miller’s case resembles these cases in all the ways that matter

. Police o fficers established Miller’s connection to the apartment when they watched him exit and reenter the apartment and eventually leave it carrying a white plastic grocery bag. Cf. Crawford , 943 F.3d at 308

– 09. The y
next saw Miller get in to his car and drive directly to a parking lot where he engaged in suspected drug sales. Cf. Coleman , 923 F.3d at 457. They then found a large quantity o f drugs in the car at the site of the se sales and a firearm and cash in the bag that he had been carrying from the apartment

. As in our other cases, t his direct line from the apartment to the drug deals sufficed to create a fair probability that evidence would be found in the apartment

. And Miller should not be able to avoid that conclusion simply by undertaking his drug deals at a nearby parking lot rather than at the apartment

. See Jenkins , 743 F. App’x at 644. Probable cause thus supported t he

warrant. Miller’s contrary arguments are un convincing

. Miller initially argues that the affidavit
lacked sufficient evidence to indicate that he lived at this apartment

. Yet such a connection was

un necessary on this case’s facts. S earch warrants are dir ected at places, not people

. Zurcher , 436No. 20

- 1276, United States v. Miller

7

U.S. at 555

. To search a property , therefore, the police need not establish probable cause that the property’s “ owner or occupant ” is engaged in criminal activity. See id. at 556. I n Ellison , for example, the confidential informan t who saw a drug deal occur outside a home identif ied the man who exited the home and sold the drugs only by his nickname (“Short”) . 632 F.3d at 348, 350. The affidavit did not indicate that “Short” lived at th is ho me or otherwise explai n his connection
to it. Id. at 350. That did not matte r
. “ [A] n affidavit in support of a search warrant does not need to name or describe the person who sold the drugs or name the owner of the property [.] ” Id. (quoting United States v. Pinson , 321 F.3d 558, 564 (6th Cir. 2003)). Here, too, the evidence that
Miller carried a white grocery bag out of this apartment and traveled straight to the site of drug
deals created a fair probability that th e apartment contain ed evid ence of Miller’s drug dealing

. Cf.
United States v. Christian , 925 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 2019 ) (en banc); United States v. Burney , 778 F.3d 536 , 539

– 40 (6th Cir. 2015). Miller next argues that he engaged in only “innocuous activity” (such as talking on his phone) while at the apartment and that no drug activity occurred there. “But such a level of involvement is not required for a finding of probable cause.” Jenkins , 743 F. App’x at 644. Contrary to Miller’s claim, moreover, the affidavit provided mor e than a “mere belief” that drugs would be found at his apartment. His direct path from the apartment to the drug deals (carrying a white bag) w as objective evidence connecting the apartment to th at drug dealing under our

case law

. See Crawford , 943 F.3d at 308

– 09; Coleman , 923 F.3d at 457. Th i s case law make s good
sense. “ D rug dealers cannot immunize themselves from [a] search of a residence used to store their supply simply by ensuring that all drug deals take place in parking lots. ” Jenkins , 743
F. App’x at 644. That principle reaches Miller’s drug deals in the parking lot in this case too

. W e affirm.