Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 45 / Wednesday, March 8, 1995 / Notices 12813

1 The Warsaw Convention, to which the United

States became a party in 1934, established a number

of uniform rules regarding international air

transportation, including in Article 22 an air carrier

liability limit of approximately $10,000 for each

passenger injury or death, absent a finding of

willful misconduct. The Hague Protocol of 1955,

which doubled the liability limit, was not ratified

by the United States. Rather, in 1966, the carriers

serving the United States agreed to adopt a special

contract under Article 22, establishing what

remains the current regime (Agreement CAB 18900,

approved by Order E–23680, May 13, 1966) (Docket

17325). Under the Agreement’s terms, these carriers

also agreed not to avail themselves of the defense

of non-negligence under Article 20(1) of the

Convention for claims under that amount.

2 We assume for the purposes of our decision

here that the proposed discussions could reduce

competition among carriers.

[Public Notice 2173]

Shipping Coordinating Committee

Subcommittee on Standards of

Training and Watchkeeping; Notice of

Meeting

The Shipping Coordinating

Committee (SHC) will conduct an open

meeting at 10 am on Monday, April 10,

1995, in Room 2415 of the United States

Coast Guard Headquarters Building,

2100 2nd Street SW., Washington DC

20593–0001. The purpose of the

meeting is to review the outcome of the

twenty-seventh session of the

International Maritime Organization

(IMO) Sub-Committee on Standards of

Training and Watchkeeping (STW),

particularly as it relates to the revision

of the International Convention of

Standards of Training, Certification and

Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978

(STCW) and preparations for 1995

STCW Conference to be held at IMO

from June 26 to July 7, 1995.

Members of the public may attend the

meeting up to the seating capacity of the

room. Interested persons may seek

information by writing: Mr. Christopher

Young, U.S. Coast Guard (G–MVP–4),

Room 1210, 2100 Second Street SW.,

Washington, DC 20593–0001 or by

calling: (202) 267–0229.

Dated: February 21, 1995.

Charles A. Mast,

Chairman, Shipping Coordinating Committee.

[FR Doc. 95–5564 Filed 3–7–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4710–07–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary

[Docket 49152 and Order 95–2–44]

Order on Discussion Authority

Regarding Limits and Conditions of

Passenger Liability Established by the

Warsaw Convention

SUMMARY: We are publishing the entire

order as an appendix to this document.

DATES: Issued in Washington, D.C.,

February 22, 1995.

EFFECTIVE DATE: February 28, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Peter Bloch, U.S. Department of

Transportation, Office of the Assistant

General Counsel for International Law,

Room 10105, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20590. (202) 366–

9183.

Patrick V. Murphy,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Aviation and

International Affairs.

Order

On September 24, 1993, the International

Air Transport Association (IATA) filed an

application requesting approval of, and

antitrust immunity for, intercarrier

discussions concerning the limits and

conditions of passenger liability established

by the Warsaw Convention (Convention).

IATA states that pending ratification and

entry into force of Montreal Protocols

Numbers 3 and 4 to the Convention, there is

a need for interim passenger liability rules

that are adequate to current day standards of

compensation. The current regime, as

embodied in the Montreal intercarrier

agreement of 1966 (Agreement) and which

covers all carriers serving the United States,

establishes a liability limit of $75,000 for

personal injury and death.1 Adjusted for

inflation, IATA notes that this amount would

be over $300,000 in today’s dollars. Despite

this, adherence to the Agreement’s $75,000

limit continues to be a condition for all

carriers to operate to the Untied States.

Against this background, IATA states that air

carrier parties to the Agreement need the

authority to discuss bringing the Agreement

up to date. It states that such discussions may

include possible amendments to, or

replacements for, this Agreement. IATA

states that its request for discussion authority

and antitrust immunity is consistent with

Department precedent.

No answers were filed in response to the

IATA application.

Decision

The Department has decided to grant the

requested discussion immunity subject to the

conditions described below. The United

States has a firmly-established policy that

liability limits should be adequate to

contemporary standards of compensation and

that the current regime needs to be updated

to provide sufficient protection to the

traveling public. We are granting the

application because the discussions proposed

by IATA may bring about an interim solution

that will serve either until Montreal Protocols

3 and 4 are ratified and enter into force, or

until negotiation and entry into force of a

new Convention meeting all U.S.

requirements.

We may authorize intercarrier discussions

and grant them antitrust immunity where we

find that the discussions are necessary to

meet a serious transportation need or to

achieve important public benefits and that

such benefits or need cannot be secured by

reasonably available alternatives that are

materially less anticompetitive.2 49 U.S.C.

41308, 41309.

The purpose of the discussions in this case

is to secure the important public benefit of

a liability regime that reflects contemporary

standards of compensation. The discussions

are consistent with a strong and longstanding Department policy of seeking a

uniform set of passenger liability rules that

meet today’s needs.

We find that there are no reasonably

available alternatives to the requested

discussions having a materially less

anticompetitive effect. The best alternative,

of course, is an international agreement such

as the Montreal Protocols and Supplemental

Compensation Plan, but it is because that

approach has proven to be such a complex

and lengthy one, and given the pressing need

to have an updated liability regime, that we

are entertaining this discussion authority

request. Another alternative would be to

allow individual carriers to apply to the

Department for modifications to their tariffs

and conditions of carriage to implement

individual new special contracts under

Article 22 of the Convention. We do not

believe that approach is workable. Some

carriers would probably attempt this, while

others would not. Those that did would

likely offer contracts with different terms

from one another. One clear and

unacceptable result of such an approach

would be that portions of the traveling public

would not be adequately protected. A final

alternative would be for the United States to

unilaterally establish a regime that all

carriers operating to the United States would

have to abide by. This approach, however,

could engender such significant opposition

from our trading partners that our ability to

implement the plan unilaterally could very

well be jeopardized.

We also find that the requested approval

and grant of antitrust immunity to discuss an

interim liability regime is appropriately

limited in nature and well-calculated to

achieve a result consistent with our objective

of having in place a liability regime that

reflects contemporary standards of

compensation. IATA seeks discussions

geared toward producing a temporary

arrangement, recognizing the immediate need

to increase the liability limits through a

uniform system of rules. This is fully

consistent with our objectives. IATA would

announce a place and date for such

discussions and has said that it would invite

all its member carriers.

IATA requests that we not impose

conditions on such discussions that would

restrict the ability of the participant carriers

to consider all options in structuring a

liability regime. We will not impose

conditions other than those that we consider

standard and which we have set out below.

However, we believe that in constructing any

intercarrier agreement, the participants

should seek to reflect the basic objectives

which we have pursued in our efforts to

secure ratification of the Montreal Protocols

and creation of a supplemental compensation