The State did not file a br ief re sponding to this contention. 1 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 385 -CR

Ada m C. Bog gs , A ppe lla nt

v . The State of Texas, App ellee

FR OM T HE C OU N T Y C OU R T A T L A W N O. 2 OF HA YS C OU N T Y NO. 74,1 25 , HO NORAB LE HO WARD S. WARNER II , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Adam C. Bog g s was adjudge d gu i l t y afte r he ple aded no c ontest to an information ac cusing him of driving while i n t o x i cated. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 49.04 (West 2003). Pursuant to a plea ba rg ain, the cour

t sentence d appellant to six months in j ail and a $750 fine, suspende d imposit ion of sentenc e, and pla ced a ppellant on community

supervision for two y ear s. I n his only point of err or, appe llant contends that the c ourt err ed by overr uling his pre trial motion to s uppress e vidence
. We will sust ain the point and re verse the judg ment of convic tion. 1 Appellant’s motion to suppress cha lleng ed the va lidity of the traffic stop that ultimately l ed t o his DWI arr est. A wa rra ntless automobile stop is a Fourth Amendme nt seizure ana logous to a

temporar

y detention, and it m u s t b e j ustified by rea sonable suspicion.Al tho ug h th e State ha d th e burd e n to pro ve th a t a pp e lla nt’ s d e te nti on

wa s la wf ul, de fe ns e 2 counsel wa s permitted to conduc t the direc t examination of the office r. Se e Ru sse ll v . S tat e , 717 S.W .2d 7, 9-10 (Te x . Crim. App. 1986) (discussing burden of proof at s u p pression hea ring ). Nee dless to say , appellant’ s counsel did not seek to a dduce f acts tendingto uphold the stop. The prosec utor’s cross-e x amination of the off icer only briefly touched on the tr aff

ic stop, and he did not e l i c i tan y o t h e r

m a t e r i a l t e s t i m o n y. 2 Be rk e me r v . M

c Car ty , 4 68 U. S. 4 20 , 4 39 (1 98 4) ; He rn an de z v . S tat e , 98 3 S
. W
. 2d 867, 869 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 98 , pe t. re f’ d)
. A de ta ini ng of fi c e r m us t ha ve sp e c if ic art ic ula ble fa c ts that, take n t o get h er w ith rational infer ence s from those fa cts, lead him to conc lude that the person de tained is, has bee n, or soon wi l l be eng ag ed in cr iminal activity
. W oo ds v . S tat e , 95 6 S. W.2 d 3 3, 35 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); Hernande z , 983 S.W .2d at 869. I t is the St ate’ s burden to prove that a

war rantless de tention was lawf ul. State v. Huddleston , 164 S
. W
. 3 d 7 1 1, 716 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.).

The circ umstances leading to a ppellant’s stop w ere not well develope d at the hea ring on appellant’ s motion to suppress. The only witness was Ky

le Police Off

icer Anastac io Cruz. Cruz 2 testified that he wa s patrolling I nterstate 35 on the night of May 2, 2004, trave ling nor

th at 55 miles per hour in the outside, or fa

r rig ht, lane of the highw ay . T h e hig hway at that point had three northbound lanes and the s peed limi t was 65 miles per hour. Cruz noticed a nother ve hicle following him about one hundre d fee t behind in the same lane and maintaining the same speed. Cruz said that
as he “appr oache d the Depa rtment of Public Safety

Trooper ’s ca

r I did move into the middle lane.” I n h is m ir

ro r, Cr uz n oti c e d th a t th e ve hic le be hind h im n e ith e r s low e d n or c ha ng e d la ne s a s it “passe d the other of

fice r’s car .” Cruz testified, “When I vacated that lane I specific ally looked at that vehicle to se e if it was g oing to slow or vacate the lane and it did neither.” Cruz testified that he then3

stopped the driver

of the ve hicle that had be en behind him, who wa s ap p el l an t, for violating transportation code sec tion 545.157, which provides that whe n “appr oachinga stationary authorized
e me rg e nc y

ve hic le us ingvis ua l [e me rg e nc y ] sig na ls, ” an o pe rator mus t ( 1) va c a te the lane c los e st to th e e me r g e n c y v e h ic le w h e n dr iv in g o n a h ig h w ay w it h tw o o r mo r e la

n e s tr a v e li n g in the direc tion of t he emerg ency vehicle or (2) slow to a speed not to exceed 20 miles per hour less than the po ste d s pe e d li mit . T e x. Tr ans p. Cod e Ann
. § 54 5. 15 7 ( Wes t Su pp . 2 00 6) ; see also id. § 541.201(1) ( defining “author ized emerg ency vehicle” ). F ollowing the s t o p , Cruz made the observations that resulted in appellant’s a rre st for driving while intox icated. Th e qu e sti on

pr e se nte d is wh e the r th is te sti mony sh ow s th a t Cr

uz r e a so na

bly suspected a

ppellant of violating section 5 4 5 .157. I n assessing whether a dete ntion is reasonable , an objec tive standard is utiliz ed: would the fa cts ava ilable to the offic er at the moment of the seizure
war rant a person of

rea sonable c autio n i n the belief that the ac tion taken was a ppropriate
. Hernande z , 9 8 3 S
. W
. 2 d

at 8 6 9 (q u o t i n g Da v is v . S tat e , 947 S.W .2d 240, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 97 )) . B e c ause C ru z’s te sti mony is unc on tr a dic te d a

nd the re is n o q

ue sti on re g ard inghis
c re dib ili ty , w e make a de no vo de te rm inatio n whe the r the fa c ts ad du c e d at the he ari ngg ive ri se to
a r e a s o n a b le s u s p ic io n th a t s e c ti o n 5 4 5
. 1 5 7 w a s v io late d. Guz man v. Sta te , 955 S.W .2d 85, 89 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); Hernande z , 983 S.W .2d at 869. Cruz testi fied that he and appe llant were driving in the outside lane of the highw ay
and that a pp e lla nt n e ith e r m ov e d to the c e nte r lane no r slo we d as he a pp ro a c he d an d p a sse d th e DPS trooper’ s patrol car . This g ave Cruz a rea sonable basis for suspecting that appellant h ad v i o lated
s e c t i o n5 4 5
. 1 5 7 o n l y i f

t h e D P S v e h i c l e w a s ( 1 ) s t o p p e d , ( 2 ) o nt h e r i g h ts i d e o f t h e h i g h w a y,Appellant’s c ounsel, howeve r, questioned the of fice r re g ardingappellant’ s actions as “ he wa s 3 approa ching that office r with his lights on.” Appe llant does not assert that the State f ailed to satisfy its burden of proof

in this reg ard. 4 (3 ) w i t h i t s e m e r g e n c y l i g h t s o p e r a t i n g . C r u z d i d n o t t e s t i f

y t o an y o f t h e s e f

a c t s . Ev e n w ith 3 appellant’ s conce ssion that the DPS t rooper ’s emer gency lights we re ope rating , the State did not meet its burden of

proving that the detention wa s objectively rea sonable. I t w as the State’s burde n to s ho w that Cr

uz’ s b e lie f t

hat sec tio n 545 .1 57 ha d b e e n v iol a te d w a s b a se d o n s pe c if ic , a rt ic ula ble fac ts. Given Cruz’s failure to testify that the DPS trooper w as s t o p p ed on the right side of the hig hw ay , th a t bu

rd e n w a s n ot m e t. The judg ment of convic tion is reverse d and t h e ca use is rema nded for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

__________________________________________ W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pury ear and He nson Reverse d and Remande d Filed: May

23, 2007 Do No t Pu

bli sh