Filed 6/7/23 P. v. Corrales CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GEORGE CORRALES,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B324793

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA179619)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, George Gonzalez Lomeli, Judge. Affirmed.

Lenore De Vita, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Jason Tran and Kristen J. Inberg, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________
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The resentencing court denied petitioner George Corrales’s 

petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code former section 

1170.95 renumbered in 2023 as section 1172.6.1 Corrales argues 

the trial court made several errors but does not dispute 

respondent’s argument that, as a matter of law, he is not entitled 

to resentencing. We agree with respondent that as a matter of 

law, Corrales is not entitled to resentencing because he was not 

convicted based on a felony murder theory, the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed 

malice. Because Corrales is not eligible for resentencing relief as 

a matter of law, the errors he alleges could not have prejudiced 

him. 

BACKGROUND

1. Amended information

In an amended information filed March 15, 2000, the 

People alleged one count of willful, deliberate, premeditated 

attempted murder. The People further alleged that Corrales 

personally used a firearm within the meaning of sections 12022.5, 

subdivision (a)(1) and 12022.53, subdivision (c).

2. Jury instructions

With respect to the attempted murder, the jury was 

instructed: “In order to prove attempted murder, each of the 

following elements must be proved[:] [¶] 1. A direct but

ineffectual act was done by one person towards killing another 

human being; and [¶] 2. The person committing the act 

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code. 
3

harbored express malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent 

to kill unlawfully another human being.”

The court further instructed the jury on the meaning of 

willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder as follows in 

pertinent part: “If you find the defendant guilty of attempted 

murder you must determine whether this allegation is true or not 

true. [¶] ‘Willful’ means intentional. ‘Deliberate’ means formed

or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought 

and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed 

course of action. ‘Premeditated’ means considered beforehand. 

[¶] If you find that the attempted murder was preceded and 

accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent to kill, which was the 

result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have 

been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden 

heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of 

deliberation, it is attempt to commit willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated murder.”

The court also instructed the jury that if it found defendant 

guilty of attempted murder, the jury “must determine whether 

the defendant intentionally and personally discharged a firearm 

in the commission” of the attempted murder. “The term 

‘intentionally and personally discharged a firearm,’ as used in 

this instruction, means that the defendant [himself] must have 

intentionally discharged it.”

The court did not instruct the jury on felony murder, the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory 

of imputed malice. 

3. Jury verdict

The jury found true the allegation that defendant 

committed an attempted murder willfully, deliberately, and with 
4

premeditation. The jury also found true that Corrales personally 

and intentionally discharged a firearm. 

4. 2019 petition for resentencing

On March 26, 2019, Corrales petitioned for resentencing 

pursuant to former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. Without 

appointing counsel for Corrales and without his presence, the 

resentencing court denied his resentencing petition. The court 

stated: “Having reviewed the overall court record in this matter, 

including the Court of Appeal decision affirming the defendant’s 

conviction (B144143), this court rules that the petitioner is not 

eligible for relief pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 as he 

was the actual killer and/or shooter which caused the death of the 

underlying victim in the case. The section [former § 1170.95] 

specifically provides that no relief shall be extended to any 

individual who was the actual killer in a given scenario. [¶] The 

record reflects that in 2000, the petitioner was convicted of 

premeditated murder with the jury also finding true the various 

alleged firearm allegations associated with the charge in the case. 

The trial court sentenced the petitioner to a term of 20 years to 

life in state prison. The conviction arises as a result of an 

incident that occurred in 1998 wherein the petitioner personally 

shot and killed a perceived rival gang member. [¶] In his 

petition filed pursuant to P.C. 1170.95, the petitioner 

Mr. Corrales, claims that he is entitled to relief for resentencing. 

However, as reflected by the overall evidence surrounding the 

incident the petitioner herein was the actual shooter who was 

responsible for the victim’s death. Thus, as the actual killer 

Mr. Corrales is not eligible for sentencing relief pursuant to P.C. 

1170.95. See P.C. sections 189(a)(1) and 1170.95(a)(3). The 

section fails to provide relief under circumstances where an 
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individual was the actual killer in a given scenario.” The court 

also found section 1170.95 unconstitutional, a claim that 

appellate courts have since rejected. (People v. Cruz (2020) 

46 Cal.App.5th 740, 747.)

As Corrales points out, the resentencing court incorrectly 

stated that he was convicted of premeditated murder when 

instead he was convicted of premeditated attempted murder. 

5. 2022 resentencing petition

Corrales filed a second petition for resentencing pursuant 

to section 1172.6 in 2022. The resentencing court held a hearing

at which Corrales was represented by counsel but did not 

personally attend. The resentencing court indicated it was 

“standing by” its prior order. The court referred to Corrales as 

the “actual killer and/or shooter who caused the death of the 

underlying victim in the case.” The court also incorrectly referred 

to Corrales as having been convicted of premeditated murder

when Corrales was convicted of premeditated attempted murder.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Corrales argues: (1) the resentencing judge 

“mistakenly believes appellant was the actual killer convicted of 

premeditated murder” and the error shows the judge did not 

carefully review the record or was “confused” or “mixed up the 

facts of two separate cases, or something else”; (2) the 

resentencing court erred in “standing by” its prior opinion and 

failing to reconsider the constitutionality of section 1172.6; and 

(3) the resentencing court erred in relying on facts in the 

appellate opinion considering Corrales’s direct appeal from the 

judgment of conviction. With respect to prejudice Corrales 

argues: “The error in considering the facts from the prior opinion 
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is not harmless. As the State relied on the facts in the opinion 

and the trial court did as well, the harm to appellant is clear.” 

Respondent argues, among other things, that the 

resentencing court properly denied the petition because, as a 

matter of law, Corrales is ineligible for relief. Corrales offers no 

retort having not filed a reply brief, and we agree with 

respondent.

A. In 2019, the Legislature Changed the Law With 

Respect to Murder and Allowed Eligible Persons To 

Petition for Resentencing

“Senate Bill 1437 ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to 

murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a

person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to 

kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who 

acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, 

ch. 1015, § l, subd. (f).)” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 

842 (Gentile).) 

“To further that purpose, Senate Bill 1437 added three 

separate provisions to the Penal Code. First, to amend the 

felony-murder rule, Senate Bill 1437 added section 189, 

subdivision (e): ‘A participant in the perpetration or attempted 

perpetration of [qualifying felonies] in which a death occurs is 

liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] 

(1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not 

the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, 

counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted 

the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. 

[¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying 

felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as 
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described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.’ ” (Gentile, supra, 

10 Cal.5th at p. 842.) 

“Second, to amend the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine, Senate Bill 1437 added section 188, subdivision (a)(3) 

(section 188(a)(3)): ‘Except [for felony-murder liability] as stated 

in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of 

murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. 

Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or 

her participation in a crime.’ ” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at 

pp. 842–843.) 

“Third, Senate Bill 1437 added section 1170.95 to provide a 

procedure for those convicted of felony murder or murder under 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek relief 

under the two ameliorative provisions above.” (Gentile, supra, 

10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) The Legislature subsequently amended 

section 1170.95 to include attempted murder and manslaughter 

and then renumbered it as section 1172.6. (People v. Delgadillo

(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3.) 

“Under newly enacted section 1172.6, the process begins 

with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all 

requirements for eligibility are met [citation], including that 

‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or 

attempted murder because of changes to [Penal Code] 

Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’ the effective 

date of Senate Bill 1437 [citation].” (People v. Strong (2022) 

13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).)

“When the trial court receives a petition containing the 

necessary declaration and other required information, the court 

must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner 

has made a prima facie case for relief.’ [Citations.] If the petition 
8

and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is 

ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition. 

[Citations.] If, instead, the defendant has made a prima facie 

showing of entitlement to relief, ‘the court shall issue an order to 

show cause.’ [Citation.]” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) 

B. Corrales Is Not Eligible for Resentencing Relief

Here the record in the case establishes conclusively that 

Corrales is ineligible for relief. The jury was not instructed on 

felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, 

or any other theory of imputed malice. The amendments to 

sections 188 and 189 do not apply to Corrales. Therefore, as a 

matter of law, Corrales cannot show that he “ ‘could not presently 

be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes 

to [Penal Code] Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 

2019,’ the effective date of Senate Bill 1437 (§ 1172.6, 

subd. (a)(3)).” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) 

Even if we assume the resentencing court committed all the 

errors Corrales identifies, there is no basis to reverse the court’s 

order. None of the errors Corrales identifies prejudiced him. 

(See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973 [applying People 

v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 standard of prejudice to 

denial of counsel to represent petitioner in section 1170.95 

proceeding].) Corrales’s terse statement that the “harm to 

appellant is clear” does not demonstrate that it is reasonably 

probable absent any error he would have obtained a more 

favorable result. Corrales could not have obtained a more 

favorable result on his section 1172.6 petition because the jury 

was not instructed on felony murder, the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed malice. As

a matter of law, Corrales is thus ineligible for resentencing under 
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section 1172.6, and cannot show prejudice from purported error 

by the trial court. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a) [“A person convicted of 

felony murder or murder under the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is 

imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in 

a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a petition with 

the court” to have the conviction vacated].) 

DISPOSITION

The order denying George Corrales’s petition for 

resentencing is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

WEINGART, J.