Filed 11/18/20 Dow v. Mousa CA2/4

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

TONY DOW et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

MAISSAA MOUSA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B293094

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC606901)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Ruth Ann Kwan, Judge. Affirmed. 

Law Offices of Vip Bhola and Vip Bhola for Defendant

and Appellant.

Morris & Stone and Aaron P. Morris for Plaintiffs and 

Respondents.
2

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Maissaa Mousa told others that respondent 

Tony Dow had abused her during a business trip by, inter 

alia, holding her as a prisoner, providing her insufficient 

food, and sexually harassing her. Dow and his company, 

respondent International Patients Network (IPN), sued 

appellant for defamation. Following trial, a jury found for 

respondents and awarded them over $130,000 in damages. 

On appeal, appellant raises numerous claims. As 

discussed below, her claims are either unpreserved, 

undeveloped, meritless, or some combination of the above. 

We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

A. The Parties, Their Prior Lawsuits, and Respondents’

Defamation Action

Dow is the president and chief executive officer of IPN, 

a medical-tourism company, which provides international 

medical referrals and placement services for medical

treatment. Appellant immigrated with her family to the 

United States from Syria in 2009, and was referred to Dow 

by Ikhlas Akra,1 a mutual friend, after appellant had 

difficulty finding meaningful employment. In late 2012, Dow 

and appellant agreed that she would travel to Beirut, 

Lebanon, where Dow was then on business, so he could 

1 Because multiple members of the Akra family were 

involved in this case, we refer to them by the first names.
3

evaluate her qualifications to serve as his assistant. 

Appellant travelled to Beirut and spent three weeks at Dow’s 

apartment there. Appellant then travelled to France, where 

she was to await Dow’s arrival. However, after spending a 

week in Paris, she decided to return to the United States 

before Dow arrived. 

After appellant’s departure, a financial dispute arose 

between the parties, and finally, on January 5, 2015, IPN 

sued appellant, seeking $4,000 in reimbursements. In 

February 2015, appellant responded with a cross-complaint, 

alleging Dow had subjected her to all manner of abuse and 

sexual misconduct while she was staying at his Beirut 

apartment. Less than a year later, on January 13, 2016, 

respondents filed this defamation action against appellant, 

and the matter proceeded to trial.

B. The Trial

1. Respondents’ Case

At trial, respondents claimed appellant had defamed 

them by telling others that during her trip to Lebanon, Dow 

sexually harassed her (including by remaining nude at all 

times), held her as a prisoner (including by holding her 

passport), and did not provide her sufficient food.2 

Respondents presented the testimony of Ikhlas, Hayat, 

Ilham, and Mountaha Akra, sisters who had been close 

2 Dow represented himself at trial, while IPN was 

represented by counsel.
4

friends of appellant and her family.

3 The four provided 

largely consistent testimony supporting the following version 

of events. When appellant returned from her trip to Beirut 

and Paris, she was very happy and described it as the trip of 

a lifetime. She reported that while she was in Lebanon, Dow 

assigned a driver to take her anywhere she wanted, and she 

was able to visit her brother-in-law multiple times. She 

further reported that Dow provided a lot of food. Appellant 

told the Akra sisters about Liza Shigute, who had worked for 

Dow as a maid and stayed at his Beirut apartment during 

part of the time appellant was there until Dow fired her for 

stealing. Appellant recounted keeping her passport with her 

at all times because she feared that Shigute would steal it. 

Appellant thanked Ikhlas for referring her to Dow, and said 

nothing bad about him until 2015. After respondents filed 

their original suit seeking reimbursement in early 2015, 

appellant started saying bad things about Dow, including 

that he kept her passport from her, that he did not provide 

her sufficient food, that he was always naked,4 and that he 

sexually harassed her, adding new claims over time. 

Appellant would make these claims to members of the Akra 

family and to anyone who happened to be present where the 

family gathered. Appellant later told Ilham and Hayat that 

3 Hayat was not present at trial, but a video of her deposition 

testimony, which included her cross-examination by appellant’s 

counsel, was played to the jury. 

4 Ikhlas noted at trial that she had previously worked for 

Dow, and had never seen him work in the nude. 
5

her then-lawyer, Motaz Gerges, had fabricated the 

allegations to use as leverage in the litigation against Dow. 

Respondents also presented the deposition testimony of 

three witnesses who had observed appellant at Dow’s 

apartment in Beirut: Ali Rahel and Nehme Shreim, who 

worked for Dow as drivers, and Yasen Olbi, a patient who 

stayed at Dow’s apartment at the time. All three witnesses 

testified that Dow had treated appellant well, had provided 

ample food, and had never been unclothed in their presence. 

Rahel further stated that Dow had instructed him to take 

appellant wherever she wanted, and that he indeed drove 

her to many locations around the city. He recounted that 

appellant would present her passport for identification 

whenever they passed through security checkpoints, of 

which Beirut had many. Other witnesses familiar with 

Beirut confirmed there were many checkpoints in the area of 

Dow’s apartment. 

Dow himself testified, denying all of appellant’s 

allegations. Finally, respondents presented the deposition 

testimony of Patrick Rosa, who owned and operated a 

medical-tourism company in Belgium. Rosa testified his 

company had a longstanding business relationship with IPN 

until 2015. In 2015, he began hearing about appellant’s 

accusations against Dow during professional conventions. 

Rosa described calling either Ikhlas or Ilham, both of whom 

he knew through Dow, to ask about the allegations, and was 

told there were indeed “talks” about the claims. He

explained that given the sensitive nature of his business, he 
6

could take no chances and was forced to stop his business 

relationship with IPN. Rosa testified that in the years 

preceding 2015, his company paid IPN an average of 150,000

to 180,000 euros per year for various services. He further 

testified that before he stopped doing business with Dow, 

they had been working on a certain project that Rosa 

estimated could have generated 50 million euros in revenue 

over ten years.5 

2. Appellant’s Case

Appellant’s defenses at trial were that the statute of 

limitations barred Dow’s claims, and that her allegations 

against him were true. Appellant testified on her own 

behalf, asserting that Dow had abused and mistreated her, 

in accord with the allegations previously discussed. She 

denied having had a driver to take her where she pleased 

and claimed there were no security checkpoints in the area 

of Dow’s apartment. Appellant claimed that in early 2013, 

she told Hayat “what happened” in Beirut, and asked her to 

tell Ikhlas about it. 

Appellant also presented Shigute’s deposition 

testimony. Shigute supported appellant’s claims that Dow 

had been constantly naked, had sexually harassed appellant, 

and had not provided enough food. 

5 Respondents also called appellant’s husband, Yaser Ajib, 

and Dow’s wife, May, but the content of their testimony is not 

pertinent to the issues on appeal. 
7

C. The Jury’s Verdict

Following trial, the jury returned a special verdict,

finding that appellant’s allegations against Dow were all 

false, that she did not make them before January 13, 2015 

(one year before respondents filed this action), and that her 

conduct had caused respondents substantial harm. The jury 

awarded respondents $75,000 for economic harm, and 

further awarded Dow $60,000 for noneconomic harm. The 

trial court entered judgment on the verdict, and this appeal 

followed. 

DISCUSSION

A. The Lack of an Interpreter

1. Background

At trial, several witnesses, including appellant, 

testified with the assistance of an Arabic interpreter. 

However, appellant’s testimony took longer than expected, 

and the interpreter could not remain to assist her. The 

following colloquy ensued between the trial court and 

appellant’s counsel: 

“The court: my question is . . . does your client 

wish to testify in English? I know that she 

speaks English. . . .

“Mr. Bhola: Yeah, we could try English.
8

“The court: Are you sure that’s something that 

you want to do? Do you want to talk to her about 

it?

“Mr. Bhola: Sure.

“The court: I don’t want to deprive her of an 

interpreter.” 

Appellant then stated she would try to testify in 

English, and the interpreter left the courtroom. The court 

reiterated to appellant’s counsel: “It’s up to you. It’s up to 

you, whether you want to waive the interpreter or not,” to 

which counsel replied, “I’d like to try it, just to keep going, if 

we can.” Appellant then proceeded to testify without the aid 

of an interpreter, raising no objection or concern.6

2. Analysis

Appellant claims she was forced to testify without the 

assistance of an interpreter. She also complains the 

interpreter did not aid her in listening to the testimony of

other witnesses. Appellant failed to preserve these claims 

for appeal. Appellant and her counsel affirmatively “waived” 

her right to enlist the assistance of an interpreter, following 

the court’s emphasis that the choice was theirs and that it 

6 While it was clear that appellant was not a native English 

speaker, her testimony was intelligible and responsive to the 

questions she was asked. 
9

“did not wish to deprive [appellant] of an interpreter.” (See 

People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1182 

[party who expressly agrees to action in trial proceedings 

may not challenge it on appeal].) Moreover, appellant 

forfeited any contention relating to the interpreter’s services 

during other witnesses’ testimony by failing to object below. 

(See Dumas v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors (2020) 

45 Cal.App.5th 348, 356, fn. 5 (Dumas) [failure to object 

below forfeits issue on appeal].)

B. The Statute of Limitations

Offering no legal framework or standard, appellant 

asserts respondents’ claims were barred by the one-year 

statute of limitations. She has forfeited any claim in this 

regard by failing to present a reasoned argument. (See In re 

Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 

(Falcone) [absence of cogent legal argument or citation to 

authority forfeits the contention; “[w]e are not bound to 

develop appellants’ arguments for them”].)

Moreover, to the extent appellant seeks to challenge 

the jury’s finding that she had not made the defamatory 

statement about Dow before January 13, 2015 (one year 

before respondents filed this action), her claim lacks merit. 

“[W]e review a jury’s factual findings for substantial 

evidence.” (Mathews v. Happy Valley Conference Center, Inc.

(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 236, 251.) Because “a defendant must 

prove the facts necessary to enjoy the benefit of a statute of 

limitations” (Samuels v. Mix (1999) 22 Cal.4th 1, 10), 
10

appellant must show the evidence “‘compels a finding in 

[her] favor . . . as a matter of law.’” (In re R.V. (2015) 61 

Cal.4th 181, 218.) 

Rather than compel a finding in appellant’s favor, the 

evidence amply supports the jury’s finding that appellant did 

not make her defamatory statements before January 13, 

2015. Ikhlas, Hayat, Ilham, and Mountaha testified that 

appellant began making the defamatory statements in 2015, 

and only after respondents filed their suit for reimbursement 

against her (on January 5, 2015). Their testimony further 

established that appellant had made the allegations against 

Dow on multiple occasions, adding to them over time. 

Consistent with the Akra sisters’ testimony, Rosa testified 

he began hearing about appellant’s claims against Dow in 

2015. While appellant suggested she told Hayat about Dow’s 

alleged misconduct in 2013, the jury was entitled to, and did, 

reject her testimony. 

C. The Litigation Privilege

Appellant contends respondents’ claims were based on 

allegations in her February 2015 cross-complaint, and were 

thus barred by the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. 

(b)).

7 Here, too, appellant presents no reasoned legal 

7 The litigation privilege bars liability for “any 

communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; 

(2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to 

achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some 

(Fn. is continued on the next page.)
11

argument and has thus forfeited any contention on the issue. 

(See Falcone, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at 830.) She further 

forfeited the issue by failing to raise the litigation privilege 

as a defense at trial. (See Rubinstein v. Fakheri (2020) 49 

Cal.App.5th 797, 808 [defense not asserted at trial is 

forfeited].)

Moreover, to the extent appellant suggests there was 

insufficient evidence she made defamatory statements 

beyond the inclusion of allegations in her cross-complaint, 

she is mistaken. Respondents presented testimony that 

appellant had made the defamatory statements against Dow

to members of the Akra family and to anyone who happened 

to be present where they would gather. Appellant herself 

suggested she made those statements to Hayat, and asked 

her to relay them to Ikhlas, before she even filed her crosscomplaint (though the jury rejected her assertion she had 

done so in 2013). Regardless of the timing of her defamatory 

statements to unrelated parties outside the litigation, 

appellant’s cross-complaint cannot shield her from liability. 

(See Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at 219 [“republications to 

nonparticipants in the action are generally not privileged 

under [the litigation privilege], and are thus actionable 

unless privileged on some other basis”].)

connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson

(1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 (Silberg).)
12

D. Exclusion of Testimony that Dow was Once Found 

Nude in His Office

1. Background

In June 2015, Karie Hirons, a process server, signed a 

declaration describing her efforts serve appellant’s crosscomplaint on Dow at his offices. According to Hirons, she 

rang the doorbell at Dow’s offices, but there was no answer. 

She then opened the unlocked door and called out several 

times, but no one came to the front. Hirons proceeded down 

the hallway, and noticing a lighted office, “started to enter” 

it. She then noticed Dow, sitting naked behind a desk. 

When Hirons asked who he was, Dow replied he was not 

appropriately dressed. 

Before trial, respondents moved to exclude Hirons’s

testimony as unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 

352. In opposition, appellant’s counsel argued the testimony 

was relevant to show that Dow had been naked in 

appellant’s presence in his Beirut apartment. Counsel 

further argued the testimony was relevant for impeachment 

purposes because according to counsel, Dow had denied the 

incident with Hirons at his deposition. The trial court 

concluded Hirons’s testimony was unduly prejudicial. The 

court observed that while appellant alleged Dow knowingly 

chose to be naked in her presence, in the alleged incident 

with Hirons, “he was in his own office behind a desk, . . . and 

wasn’t expecting anybody to go in . . . .” As to counsel’s 

argument that the testimony was relevant for impeachment 

purposes, the court stated that Dow’s denial of the incident 
13

was itself inadmissible, and that counsel could not “set it up 

as impeachment to be admissible.” The court thus granted 

respondents’ motion to exclude Hirons’s testimony. 

2. Analysis

Appellant challenges the trial court’s exclusion of 

Hirons’s testimony as unduly prejudicial. Evidence Code 

section 352 grants courts discretion to exclude evidence “if 

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

probability that its admission will,” among other things, 

“create substantial danger of undue prejudice.” (Ibid.) We 

review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of 

discretion. (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266.) 

“Specifically, we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling 

‘except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in 

an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that 

resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” (Ibid.) A 

miscarriage of justice results only if “it is reasonably 

probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party 

would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People 

v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)

Appellant maintains the probative value of Hirons’s 

testimony required its admission. Initially, she asserts the 

incident involving Hirons was sufficiently similar to, and 

thus probative of, appellant’s allegations. We disagree. The 

trial court was well within its discretion in concluding that 

Dow’s alleged nudity while sitting alone in his office was 

insufficiently probative of his alleged constant nudity in the 
14

presence of others in his Beirut apartment. (See People v. 

King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1303 [evidence of prior 

bad act was unduly prejudicial under Evid. Code, § 352 

because it was too dissimilar to charged offense].)

Next, appellant contends the court should have allowed 

Hirons’s testimony to impeach Dow’s denial of the incident 

at deposition. But as the trial court suggested, Dow’s denial 

of the incident had no independent relevance to any issue at 

trial, and was thus itself inadmissible. While any 

contradiction could theoretically bear on a witness’s 

credibility, “the trial court has wide latitude under state law 

to exclude evidence offered for impeachment that is 

collateral and has no relevance to the action.” (People v. 

Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 152; see also People v. 

Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 374-375 [Evid. Code, § 352 

gives trial court broad power to prevent “‘“nitpicking”’” over 

“‘“collateral credibility issues”’”].) Accordingly, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Hirons’s 

testimony. 

E. Admission of Rosa’s Testimony on Damages

1. Background

Before trial, appellant filed motions in limine seeking 

exclusion of evidence of damages that was not produced in 

discovery. At the hearing on the motion, appellant’s counsel 

sought to recalibrate the motions to seek exclusion of Rosa’s 

testimony about the new project he had been working on 

with Dow, arguing this testimony was speculative. The trial 
15

court declined to exclude Rosa’s testimony without knowing 

what it would be. At trial, respondents presented Rosa’s 

deposition testimony without objection.

2. Analysis

Appellant challenges the trial court’s failure to exclude 

Rosa’s testimony, arguing his testimony about the amount 

his company had been paying IPN in the years before 2015 

was speculative. At the hearing before the trial court, 

however, appellant argued only that Rosa’s testimony about 

the new project was speculative. She may not now shift the 

focus of her argument to a different aspect of Rosa’s 

testimony. (See Dumas, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at 356, fn. 5.) 

In any event, Rosa testified about a consistent range of 

amounts his company had paid IPN in the years before 2015, 

explained that he had stopped doing business with IPN 

because of appellant’s allegations against Dow, and 

indicated he had intended to continue to work with IPN in 

the future. We see nothing speculative about his testimony.8 

8 Appellant also appears to challenge the sufficiency of 

Rosa’s testimony to support the jury’s damages award, noting it 

was not supported by documentary evidence. We are aware of no 

authority requiring documentary evidence in support of a 

damages award. (See Evid. Code, § 411 [direct evidence from one 

witness “is sufficient for proof of any fact”].)
16

F. Failure to Exclude the Deposition Testimony of 

Witnesses Who Were Deposed in Appellant’s 

Counsel’s Absence 

1. Background

Before trial, appellant moved to exclude the deposition 

testimony of Rosa, Ikhlas, and Mountaha on the ground that 

respondents deposed them while her former counsel, Gerges, 

was suspended by the State Bar. At the hearing on the 

motion, IPN’s counsel informed the court that appellant’s 

former counsel had attended Ikhlas’s deposition. As to Rosa 

and Mountaha, the trial court declined to exclude their 

deposition testimony. However, believing it was 

discourteous of respondents to depose them during Gerges’s 

suspension, the court ruled that appellant would be 

permitted to depose those witnesses before trial. It appears 

appellant did not avail herself of this opportunity. 

2. Analysis

Appellant argues the trial court should have excluded

the deposition testimony of Rosa, Ikhlas, and Mountaha, 

because they were deposed during Gerges’s suspension. She 

has forfeited any contention in this regard, however, by 

offering neither argument nor authority in support. (See 

Falcone, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at 830.) Moreover, we 

observe that appellant does not dispute respondents’ 

assertion that Gerges actually attended Ikhlas’s deposition,

and respondents did not introduce the deposition of 

Mountaha, who testified at trial. Finally, the trial court 
17

permitted appellant to depose both Rosa and Mountaha 

before trial, yet appellant apparently chose not to do so. We 

discern no error by the trial court.

G. References to Appellant’s Former Muslim Religion

1. Background

At the beginning of trial, the court advised the jurors 

they were “not allowed to make judgment on the case based 

on anybody’s religious association, race, ethnicity, [or] 

origin.” During trial, respondents elicited testimony from 

multiple witnesses about appellant’s former affiliation with 

a sect of Shia Islam. Respondents generally sought to show 

appellant would not have felt helpless in the area of Dow’s 

apartment in Beirut, a Shiite neighborhood, especially given 

that Dow was a Christian. 

On two occasions, appellant’s counsel objected to 

questions about her religion on relevance grounds, and the 

trial court sustained the objections. Other testimony about 

appellant’s religion was elicited without objection. 

2. Analysis

Appellant argues the trial court erred in allowing the 

testimony about her former religion. She suggests the 

testimony contravened a ruling by the court prohibiting 

reference to any person’s religion. 

Preliminarily, appellant offers no meaningful analysis 

or citation to authority in support of her contentions. She 

has therefore forfeited the issue on appeal. (See Falcone, 
18

supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at 830.) Moreover, the trial court 

sustained appellant’s counsel’s only objections to testimony 

about her former religion. By failing to object to other 

references, appellant again forfeited her contentions. (See 

Dumas, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at 356, fn. 5.) Finally, 

contrary to appellant’s suggestion, the trial court did not 

prohibit all references to a person’s religion at the outset of 

trial. Instead, it properly advised the jury it was not to 

make any biased judgment based on protected categories, 

including religion.

H. Exclusion of Shigute’s Testimony That Dow Had 

Sexually Harassed Her

1. Background

Shigute, Dow’s former maid, testified at her deposition 

that Dow had sexually harassed both appellant and her in 

similar ways. She also stated that Dow had been constantly 

nude and had provided insufficient food. On IPN’s motion in 

limine, the trial court excluded Shigute’s testimony that Dow 

had sexually harassed her, but allowed appellant to 

introduce the rest of Shigute’s testimony, including that Dow 

had sexually harassed appellant. The court reasoned that 

Dow’s alleged conduct toward Shigute was not a defense to 

respondents’ defamation claims, which concerned Dow’s 

alleged conduct toward appellant. 
19

2. Analysis

Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion 

in excluding a portion of Shigute’s deposition testimony. We 

need not decide whether the court erred in partially 

excluding Shigute’s testimony, however, as any error could 

not have prejudiced appellant. The jury heard, and 

disbelieved, Shigute’s testimony that Dow sexually harassed 

appellant, remained unclothed at all times, and provided 

insufficient food. Appellant offers no explanation how the 

addition of Shigute’s testimony that Dow had also harassed 

Shigute herself might have made her claims more credible in 

the jury’s eyes. Accordingly, we find no reversible error in 

the partial exclusion of Shigute’s deposition testimony. (See

Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at 836.)

I. Admission of Depositions Taken Abroad

1. Background

Prior to trial, appellant moved to exclude the 

deposition testimony of three witnesses respondents had 

deposed abroad: Rahel, Shreim, and Olbi. Appellant’s 

counsel objected that respondents had not obtained 

commissions for the depositions under Code of Civil 

Procedure section 2027.010, subdivision (e).9 After the trial 

9 Commissions or “letters rogatory” “are basically letters of 

request to the foreign government, asking it to appoint a 

deposition officer and to order the witness to appear and testify 

before such officer.” (Weil et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Civil 

(Fn. is continued on the next page.)
20

court informed counsel that commissions were not 

mandatory, counsel replied, “All right, then. That was the 

basis of my opposition.” The court then denied appellant’s 

motion, stating, “[I]f that’s the only ground, then it will be 

denied on that ground.” 

2. Analysis

Appellant challenges the admission of the depositions

taken abroad, complaining respondents (1) failed to obtain 

necessary commissions; (2) did not allow her counsel to 

attend; (3) did not comply with applicable foreign law; and 

(4) failed to elicit identifying and other information from the 

deponents. 

As the trial court told appellant’s counsel, the Code of 

Civil Procedure does not require commissions to conduct 

depositions in foreign countries; rather, it permits the court 

to issue a commission on a party’s motion, “if it determines 

that one is necessary or convenient.” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 2027.010, subd. (e).) Appellant did not raise her remaining 

objections in the trial court, and the parties therefore did not 

litigate them below. Thus, appellant forfeited those 

Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 8:647.) Under 

Code of Civil Procedure section 2027.010, subdivision (e), “[o]n 

motion of the party seeking to take an oral deposition in a foreign 

nation, the court in which the action is pending shall issue a 

commission, letters rogatory, or a letter of request, if it 

determines that one is necessary or convenient.” 
21

contentions. (See Dumas, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at 356, fn. 

5.)

J. Denial of Appellant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude 

Ikhlas’s Testimony Based on the Physician-Patient 

Privilege 

1. Background

Ikhlas was a psychiatrist. Before trial, appellant 

moved to exclude Ikhlas’s testimony based on the physicianpatient privilege, claiming Ikhlas had been appellant’s 

husband’s doctor and suggesting she was expected to testify 

about matters she had learned through privileged 

communications with him. The trial court denied the motion 

based on IPN’s counsel’s representation that Ikhlas would be 

testifying about appellant’s statements, not those of her 

husband.

At trial, Ikhlas testified that appellant’s husband, Ajib,

was her good friend. She stated, without objection, that 

though she had written him three prescriptions over the 

years when his doctor was unavailable, she was not his 

doctor. Later, in testifying about appellant’s interactions 

with Dow, Ikhlas also mentioned communications she had 

exchanged with Ajib, again without objection. For instance, 

she testified that Ajib had asked her to tell Dow not to send 

appellant a 1099 tax form. 

On cross-examination, in seeking to establish that 

Ikhlas was Ajib’s doctor, rather than a close friend, 

appellant’s counsel asked for details about the prescriptions 
22

she had written Ajib. Ikhlas initially answered, but later 

sought guidance from the court whether she should be 

providing this information about Ajib. In response, 

appellant’s counsel called Ajib into the courtroom, and Ajib 

confirmed he was willing to allow Ikhlas to testify about his 

medical information. 

2. Analysis

Appellant claims the trial court should have excluded 

Ikhlas’s testimony, asserting it was all based on privileged 

communications with Ajib. Initially, appellant has not 

preserved this claim for appeal. The trial court correctly 

denied appellant’s motion in limine to exclude Ikhlas’s 

testimony based on the representation of IPN’s counsel that 

she would testify only about appellant’s statements. At trial, 

appellant raised no privilege objection to Ikhlas’s testimony. 

The only privilege-related concern was raised by Ikhlas

herself, and the response of appellant’s counsel was to seek 

and obtain Ajib’s waiver. Accordingly, appellant forfeited 

her challenge to Ikhlas’s testimony. (See Dumas, supra, 45 

Cal.App.5th at 356, fn. 5.)

Moreover, Ikhlas testified extensively about appellant’s 

own statements to her regarding appellant’s trip to Beirut 

and her interactions with Dow. Nothing in the record 

suggests Ikhlas derived any of her testimony on this subject 

from privileged communications with Ajib. As to Ikhlas’s

testimony that she had written Ajib prescriptions in the 

past, appellant offers no meaningful argument that it was 
23

prejudicial and has therefore forfeited any contention in this 

regard. (See People v. Reardon (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 727, 

740 (Reardon) [“It is an appellant’s duty to spell out in the 

briefing exactly how a claimed error caused prejudice; put 

another way, we do not presume prejudice”].)

K. The Alleged Submission of a Forged Document

1. Background

At trial, Dow submitted Exhibit No. 362. This 

document contained three paragraphs. The first two stated 

that IPN had paid appellant’s expenses on her business trip 

and advanced her 2,000 euros for a personal trip to Paris. 

Following those paragraphs was Dow’s signature. The final 

paragraph of this exhibit stated, “I have received the original 

of this document and agree to its contents,” and was followed 

by appellant’s name and signature. The parties stipulated 

this signature belonged to appellant, but she claimed she 

had not placed it there. Respondents called an expert 

witness, who opined appellant’s signature was handwritten. 

On cross-examination, appellant’s counsel showed the 

expert another document, Exhibit No. 287-001, which was 

similar to Exhibit No. 362 but omitted the last paragraph

and appellant’s name and signature. When shown this 

document, the expert opined that Exhibit No. 287-001 was 

an original, and that Exhibit No. 362 contained a copy of 

that document, but that the last paragraph on the latter was 

handwritten, as was appellant’s signature. 
24

2. Analysis

Appellant now claims Exhibit No. 362 was a forgery. 

She offers no explanation of the legal significance of this 

assertion, and makes no effort to establish reversible error. 

She has therefore forfeited any contention in this regard. 

(See Falcone, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at 830; Reardon, supra, 

26 Cal.App.5th at 740.) Moreover, we observe that the 

record establishes no forgery; rather, it suggests that Dow 

first signed a statement about IPN’s payments to appellant, 

photocopied that document, added the final paragraph, and 

presented that document to appellant for signature.

L. Admission of Testimony about Appellant’s 

Communications with Her Former Counsel 

Appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting 

testimony about her statements concerning her 

communications with her former counsel, Gerges. She 

claims this testimony violated the attorney-client privilege. 

This contention is frivolous. By revealing to others the 

content of her communications with former counsel, 

appellant waived the attorney-client privilege. (See Zurich 

American Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 

1485, 1496 [client waives privilege by disclosing 

communications with counsel to unrelated parties].)
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M. Admission of Testimony about the Suspension of 

Appellant’s Former Counsel 

1. Background

The State Bar suspended appellant’s former counsel,

Gerges, while discovery was ongoing in this action. Prior to 

trial, the trial court and the parties discussed Gerges’s 

suspension, and the court instructed respondents not to 

bring up the issue during trial. Nevertheless, Dow 

mentioned the suspension during his testimony, without 

objection or motion to strike. 

2. Analysis

Appellant argues the court erred in allowing Dow’s 

testimony about Gerges’s suspension. However, she forfeited 

her challenge to the admission of the testimony by failing to 

object to it at trial. (See Dumas, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at 

356, fn. 5.) Appellant has also forfeited her contentions by 

failing to explain how the claimed error prejudiced her. (See 

Reardon, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at 740.)

N. Dow’s Opening Statement

1. Background

In his opening statement, Dow told the jury the 

evidence would show that when he issued appellant a 1099 

tax form, she was upset because she did not want to pay 

taxes and was afraid of losing her eligibility for Medi-Cal. 

He further stated that the jury would see an email he 
26

received from appellant’s husband, Ajib, saying, “Thank you 

for everything you have done for my wife.” 

At trial, Ilham testified that appellant and Ajib were 

afraid they would lose eligibility for Medi-Cal because of the 

1099 form Dow had issued, and that Ajib thought they 

should not be required to pay taxes on income appellant had 

earned abroad. During his cross-examination of Ajib, Dow 

introduced an email Ajib had sent him after appellant 

returned from Paris, stating, “Thank you for everything.” 

2. Analysis

Appellant claims Dow’s opening statement 

misrepresented the evidence. She asserts there was no 

evidence that she was concerned about losing Medi-Cal or 

intended to avoid paying taxes. She also notes that Ajib’s 

email did not state, “Thank you for everything you have done 

for my wife,” as Dow claimed. 

Initially, we observe that appellant forfeited any 

contention regarding Dow’s opening statement by failing to 

object to it below. (See Dumas, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at 

356, fn. 5.) Moreover, appellant presents no legal argument 

in support of her challenge, and has forfeited her contentions 

for that reason as well. (See Falcone, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 

at 830.) Finally, were we to overlook appellant’s double 

forfeiture of the issue, we would conclude Dow’s opening 

statement fairly characterized the anticipated evidence. 

Consistent with Dow’s statement about appellant’s response 

to the 1099 form, Ilham testified that appellant was 
27

concerned about losing Medi-Cal eligibility, and that Ajib --

and by reasonable inference, appellant as well -- did not 

think they should pay taxes on her income from IPN. 

Additionally, consistent with Dow’s statement about Ajib’s 

email, upon appellant’s return from Paris, Ajib sent him an 

email thanking him for everything he had done. It is hardly 

a stretch to conclude Ajib was thanking Dow for what Dow 

had done for appellant. 

O. The Empaneling of Juror No. 12 

1. Background

During jury selection, after all parties accepted the 

panel, Juror No. 12 addressed the court, stating she had 

limited understanding of English. In response to the trial 

court’s questioning, she reported she had been in the United 

States for 38 years and had attended the first level of an 

English language class in adult school. She further reported 

she worked at a university cafeteria, and spoke English with 

students, though most of her communications were with 

kitchen workers, who spoke Spanish. She confirmed that 

she was able to understand the court during their colloquy. 

The trial court told the juror the trial was not going to 

involve technical terms, and instructed her to raise her hand 

if she had trouble understanding anything during trial. The 

court proceeded to seat Juror No. 12, without objection. 
28

2. Analysis

Appellant now seeks to challenge the empaneling of 

Juror No. 12, asserting conclusorily that “[i]n light of her 

inability to understand the proceedings, she should not have 

been allowed to serve as a juror.” Appellant’s failure to 

develop a meaningful argument forfeits her claim on appeal. 

(See Falcone, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at 830.) Appellant 

further forfeited any challenge to the seating of Juror No. 12 

by failing to object below. (See People v. Moreno (2011) 192 

Cal.App.4th 692, 706 [party may not challenge juror’s 

qualifications for first time on appeal].) 

P. Dow’s Ownership of IPN

1. Background

Dow testified at trial that he had been IPN’s chief 

executive officer, chief financial officer, and secretary, 

beginning shortly after the company’s formation. When 

asked on cross examination, if he was aware of any 

document in the trial exhibits attesting to his ownership of 

IPN, Dow responded that IPN was “not General Motors” and 

was not required to disclose its ownership in official filings. 

2. Analysis

Appellant now asserts that Dow did not own IPN. In 

her opening brief, she makes no attempt to explain the legal 

significance of this assertion. She has therefore forfeited any 

contention in this regard. (See Falcone, supra, 164 
29

Cal.App.4th at 830.) In her reply brief, appellant appears to 

suggest that IPN did not authorize this action against her. 

She has forfeited any such claim, however, by failing to raise 

it in her opening brief (see Browne v. County of Tehama

(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 726 (Browne) [failure to raise 

argument in opening brief constitutes forfeiture]), and by 

failing to raise it below (see Dumas, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at 

356, fn. 5).

Q. Admission of Hayat’s Video Deposition

Appellant contends the trial court erred in allowing 

respondents to present Hayat’s videotaped deposition in lieu 

of live testimony because there had been no showing she was 

unavailable to testify at trial. Once again, appellant 

forfeited this issue by failing to object on this ground below.10 

(See Dumas, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at 356, fn. 5.)

R. Allowing Dow’s Wife to be Present During Witness

Testimony

According to the parties, Dow’s wife, May, was allowed 

to observe the testimony of one witness (Mountaha) before 

testifying herself. Appellant now claims, without 

meaningful analysis or citation to authority, that this was 

10 Forfeiture aside, to the extent appellant complains her 

counsel was unable to cross-examine Hayat at trial, we observe 

that counsel cross-examined Hayat at the deposition, and the

cross-examination testimony was presented to the jury. 
30

prejudicial error. She has forfeited her claim by failing to 

develop any argument. (See Falcone, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th 

at 830.) Moreover, the record reveals no objection by 

appellant to May’s presence below, a prerequisite to 

preserving her challenge for appeal. (See Dumas, supra, 45 

Cal.App.5th at 356, fn. 5.)

S. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Show Appellant’s 

Allegations Were False 

In her reply brief, appellant asserts the evidence was 

insufficient to support the jury’s findings that her allegations 

against Dow were false. She has forfeited this contention by 

failing to raise it in her opening brief. (See Browne, supra, 

213 Cal.App.4th at 726.) 

Moreover, there was ample evidence to support the 

jury’s verdict. The testimony of appellant and Shigute about 

Dow’s conduct toward appellant conflicted with the 

testimony of multiple witnesses who had been with 

appellant and Dow in Beirut. Multiple other witnesses -- all 

former friends of appellant -- testified about appellant’s own 

statements, which contradicted her allegations and 

suggested she and her former attorney contrived them as 

leverage in litigation against Dow. The jury rejected 

appellant’s version, as it was entitled to do. 
31

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded 

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL

REPORTS

MANELLA, P. J.

We concur:

WILLHITE, J.

CURREY, J.