Filed 6/24/24 Chang v. Fire Insurance Exchange CA2 /7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

WILD CHANG et al.

,

Plaintiff s and Appellant s ,

v.

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE
et al.

,

Defendant s and Respondent s

. B 326896

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC650876 )

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County

, Teresa A. Beaudet , Judge. Affirmed

. Wild Chang, in pro. per., Kenneth Lo, in pro. per.,
Wild Chang, Jr., in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Woolls Peer Dollinger & Scher, Gregory B. Scher and
H. Douglas Galt for Defendant s and Respondents

.

____ _______ _____________2 INTRODUCTION

Wild Chang and Kenneth Lo were insured under a policy issued by defendant Fire Insurance Exchange. They submitted a claim under the policy, which they allege d was handled in bad faith. Chang, Lo, and Chang’s son, Wild Chang, Jr. (Chang Jr.),
sued Farmers Insurance Company, Inc. (Farmers), Fire Insurance Exchange, and agent Stacy Chern for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fai r dealing, fraud, and other related causes of action. In their operative third amended complaint, filed in propria persona

, Chang, Lo, and Chang Jr. also sued the law firm of Woolls Peer Dollinger & Scher (Woolls Peer), alleging it engaged in fraud
while representing other defendants in this consolidated litigation. The trial court sustained Farmers ’ demurrer to the third amended complaint without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in Farmers ’ favor, which this court affirmed on appeal. ( See Chang v. Farmers Insurance Company,
Inc. (June 16, 2023, B321411) [nonpub. opn.]

. ) Woolls Peer filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, which the trial court granted and this court also affirm ed on appeal

. ( See Chang v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc. (June 14, 2023, B317518) [nonpub. opn.] .) While the previous two appeals were pending, the trial

court issu ed several discovery orders with which Chang and Lo (the remaining plaintiffs) did not comply

. The tria l court subsequently granted a motion for terminating sanctions filed by Fire Insurance Exchange and Chern (the only remaining defendants) and entered judgment against Chang and Lo

. We affirm.3 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiffs ’ Insurance Claim and Consolidated Action s These consolidated actions arise out of an insurance claim that plaintiffs submitted for losses caused by a fire in their home
in December 2014. In February 2017, plaintiffs Chang and Lo filed their original compla int against Farmers, Fire Insurance Exchange, Stacy Chern Insurance Agency, and Chern. In August 2017, Chang and Lo filed a second amended complaint that substituted Farmers Insurance Group of Companies for Farmers. In January 2018, plaintiffs voluntaril y dismissed the action with prejudice as to Farmers Insurance Group of Companies. In January 2021, plaintiffs Chang, Lo, and Chang Jr. filed a second action against Farmers, Fire Insurance Exchange, Stacy Chern, and Woolls Peer. The actions were consolida ted and the operative third amended complaint deemed filed in July 2021. In the third amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged causes of action for fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, unfair business practices, pr ofessional negligence, and emotional distress against all defendants. Plaintiffs alleged Farmers and Fire Insurance Exchange, acting in bad faith, made a grossly deficient settlement offer for the
claim plaintiffs submitted for their fire loss. Plaintiff s also alleged Farmers, Fire Insurance Exchange, and Chern engaged in a fraudulent scheme to “convert the ‘ insurance ’ ” plaintiffs allegedly purchased from Farmers “into a mere ‘ self

- owned membership ’ in an unincorporated association, i.e., [Fire
Insurance Exchange] . . . in order to insulate [Farmers] and its agents from all of the legal liabilities arising from the deceptive
and non

- conforming insurance sold to [p]laintiffs.”4 Plaintiffs alleged that Farmers acted as the “principal/agent” of other defendan ts, including Fire Insurance Exchange, and that Fire Insurance Exchange “act[ed] as a ‘ veil ’ ” so that Farmers could limit its liability. Plaintiffs also alleged Chern acted as an agent of Farmers, not Fire Insurance Exchange. Plaintiffs alleged that, afte r the fire, defendants failed to properly investigate the damage caused by the fire, failed to provide temporary housing as required by the policy, and failed to provide adequate compensation for the claim. Plaintiffs also alleged defendants threatened to terminate the policy at a time they knew plaintiffs could not obtain coverage elsewhere. Defendants took more than a year to complete their investigation and finally issued a check for the allegedly grossly deficient amount of $19,925.91, even though esti mates for repairs exceeded $150,000. Plaintiffs alleged the offer to pay $19,925.91 was made in bad faith. Plaintiffs rejected the offer and sued

. Plaintiffs also alleged that stress from the experience caused Chang to suffer a stroke, the aftermath of w hich his minor son, Chang Jr., witnessed. Plaintiffs alleged defendants ’ counsel Woolls Peer participated in the alleged fraud through actions taken in the litigation, including by representing Fire Insurance Exchange, which plaintiffs characterize as a “non

- party”; moving to dismiss Farmers on the ground that Farmers was not the insur er; and filing various other motions. Plaintiffs alleged that Woolls Peer made false representations in court filings and in communications with opposing counsel and that Woolls Peer failed to conduct sufficient due diligence before agreeing to represent Farmers and Fire Insurance Exchange. P laintiffs alleged Woolls Peer ’ s litigation activities constituted a “form of malicious prosecution.”5 Woolls Peer filed a special motion to strike (anti

- SLAPP motion) under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, which the trial court granted in October 2 021
, and this court affirm ed on appeal

. ( Chang v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc. , supra, B317518 .) Farmers demurred to the third amended complaint on

numerous grounds

, including that Farmers was not a party to the insurance contract and did not owe plain tiffs any duty. The trial

court sustained Farmers ’ demurrer without leave to amend in October 2021
, and entered a judgment of dismissal in Farmers ’ favor in May 2022 , which this court affirmed on appeal. ( Chang v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc.

, supra, B321411.) The trial court also sustained demurrers by Fire Insurance Exchange and Cher n to the fraud and emotional distress causes of action

, including those of Chang Jr

. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the tria l court’s order sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend, which this court denied. ( Chang v. Superior Court (January 5, 2022, B317135).) That left Chang and Lo as the only remaining plaintiffs. At the time of the motion for terminating sanctions at issue in this appeal, the remaining defendants were Fire Insurance Exchange and Chern, and the remaining causes of action were breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing , breach of contract, and unfair business practices against Fire Insuran ce Exchange, and professional negligence against Chern.6

B. Relevant Discovery History and Events Leading to the Terminating Sanctions A gainst Chang and Lo

1. Written discovery requests

, and orders to compel

responses and sanctions In May and August 2019, defendants served Chang and Lo
each with sets of special interrogatories, requests for production
of documents

, and requests for admission. Defendants propounded additional written discovery requests on Chang and
Lo in May 2020 , including form interrogato ries, additional sets of special interrogatories, and additional requests for production

. Chang and Lo did not provide substantive responses n or did they respond at all to the May and August 2019 discovery requests

. In June 2020, defendants filed motions to compel responses or supplemental responses to these discovery requests

, with requests for monetary sanctions in conjunction with each
motion

. On October 28, 2020, the trial court granted defendants ’
motions to compel f

urther r esponses to s pecial interrogatories (Set 2) to Chang , f

urther r esponses to requests for production (Set 2) to Chang , r esponses to s pecial interrogatories (Set 3) each to Chang and Lo, and r esponses to requests for production (Set 3)
each to Chang and Lo

. 1 The trial court ordered plaintiffs to provide verified responses and supplemental responses within
30 days , and further ordered Chang and Lo to pay sanctions totaling $2,748 within 60 days

. At plaintiffs’ request

, the court
extended the deadline to pay the sanctions to March 2021.

1 The court initially stated its intent to grant defendants’ motions to deem admitted requests for admission served on Chang and Lo, but ultimately denied these motions as moot because Chang and Lo each filed responses on October 27, 2020.7 P laintiffs did not comply with the October 28, 2020 order to provide verified and supplemental responses within 30 days and instead served objections to the discovery requests in January
2021. Cont emporaneously, plaintiffs served their initial responses to the discovery propounded in May 2020 ; these

responses were six months late and consisted solely of objections.
Defendants filed several motions to compel responses from Chang and Lo to the discovery propounded in May 2020 and to compel supplemental responses to the discovery propounded in May and August 2019, with requests for monetary sanctions

. The trial court granted these motions in four separate orders

. First, o n F ebruary 25, 2021
, the court ordered Chang and
Lo each to provide verified supplemental responses, without objections, to form interrogatories (Set 1) ; it further ordered each
of them to pay sanctions in the amount of $669.65. Next, o n February 26, 2021
, th e court ordered Chang and
Lo each to provide verified supplemental responses, without objections, to special interrogatories (Set 4) ; it further ordered
each of them to pay sanctions in the amount of $479.65. Third, o n March 1, 2021, the court ordered Chang and Lo to produce responsive documents and provide verified supplemental responses, without objections, to requests for production of
documents (Set 4) ; it further ordered each of them to pay sanctions in the amount of $517.65. Finally, o n March 4, 2 021
, the court ordered Chang to produce responsive documents and to provide verified supplemental responses, without objections

, to special interrogatories (Set 2) and further responses to requests for production of documents (Set 2) ; it further ordered Ch ang to pay additional sanctions in the amount of $ 1
, 301.30

. T he court8

admonished both plaintiffs th at “ [f] urther failure to provide code compliant responses and document production may result in further sanctions, including exclusion orders.”
One year later

, plaintiffs still had not complied with any of
the court’s discovery and sanctions orders

. 2
I n March 2022

, Fire Insurance Exchange and Chern moved for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidentiary
sanctions precluding plaintiffs from introducing at trial evidence they failed to produce . They also sought monetary sanctions in the amount of fees and costs incurred to bring the motion

. On April 20, 2022, the court granted defendants’ motion in part by imposing evidentiary and monetary sanctions against plaintiffs. The c ourt granted evidentiary sanctions precluding : (1) evidence that Fire Insurance Exchange or Chern breached
their duties to p laintiffs, (2) evidence of tort damages, and (3)

e vidence regarding any work that ha d been done or need ed to be completed on the property. The court noted that “[n]otwithstanding the court orders dated February 25, 2021, February 26, 2021, March 1, 2021, and March 4, 2021 requiring
Plaintiffs to serve su pplemental responses to discovery within
30 days, no additional responses have been served, nor have any sanctions been paid

. ” The court declined to impose terminating

2 Unrelated to this appeal, in March 2022, the trial court denied several motions to compel by plaintiffs, and it ordered plaintiffs to redraft certain of their discovery requests, granted in part a motion for protective order filed by defendants, and further ordered plaintiffs to pay $1,030.65 in sanctions for unsuccessfully opposing the motion for protective order. ( Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2019.030 , subd. (c), 2017.020 , subd. (b).)

. Plaintiffs did not comply with this order either , but it was not a basis for defendants’ motion for terminating sanctions.9

sanctions but stated that “ it is appropriate to issue evidentiary
sanctions at this tim e in order to produce Plaintiffs ’ compliance with the discovery rules. ” The court also determined “monetary
sanctions are warranted for Plaintiff ’ s [ sic ] failure to comply with
the Court ’ s October 28, 2020, February 25, 2021, February 26, 2021, March 1, 2021, and March 4, 2021 orders

, ” and ordered plaintiffs to pay $2,279 for misuse of the discovery process. (See
Code Civ

. Proc

., § 2023.030, subd

. (a) .) In June 2022, plaintiffs filed several petitions for writ of mandate seeking to vacate the trial court ’s orders of October 28, 2020, February 25, 2021, February 26, 2021, March 1, 2021, March 4, 2021, March 8, 2022 , and April 20, 2022, all of which this court denied. ( Chang v. Superior Court (June 8, 2022,
B320676

, B320682, B320683, B320684, B320685 , B320 686,
B320687

. )
2. Attempts to d epose Chang and Lo

, and f urther c ourt

o rders and s anctions In March 2022, Fire Insurance Exchange and Chern sought to depose plaintiffs in advance of trial but Chang and Lo did no t respond to requests for available dates

. D efendants noticed

p laintiffs ’ depositions for April 6 and 7, offering that d efendants

w ould re

- notice them for different dates if p laintiffs provided
alternative deposition dates. P laintiffs did not r espon d or a ppear for their noticed depositions

. Defendants moved to compel the deposition s of Chang and
Lo

. Plaintiffs opposed , arguing that defendants “ have exhausted all the legitimate questions ” about the fire incident and “Plaintiffs will not oblige to Defendants ’ manipulations designed to trap Plaintiff Lo ” through discovery requests , depositions , and “wrongful sanctions by the court.” D efendants argued that10

plaintiffs ’ opposition provided no justification for not app earing at their noticed depositions o r for not providing alternative deposition dates

. On October 14, 2022, the trial court granted the motion to compel the deposition s , ordering Chang to appear remotely for deposition on October 27 and Lo on November 1 ; it further
ordered each to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,466.15. Chang cancel led his court

- ordered October 27 deposition by
email on October 26 stating

, “ ‘ I have had a flare

- up of my poststroke m edical condition, causing severe numbness and impairing my already limited ability to speak, ’ ” and asking to reschedule the deposition to November 7. Given the
November 14 trial date, d efendants ’ counsel requested an earlier
date ; Chang suggested November 4, and d efendants ’ counsel re

noticed Chang ’ s deposition for November 4

. On October 28, plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the trial

court proceedings arguing their then

- pending appeals in this

court required an automatic stay

. P laintiffs filed an ex parte application to advance the hearing on their motion for stay,
which the court denied. On October 31, plaintiffs notified the defendants that Lo would not be appearing at his court

- ordered deposition on
November 1 because Lo would be appear ing at the ex parte hearing on the application that plaintiffs had just filed. On November 2, plaintiffs filed an amended motion for stay
, and once again applied ex parte to advance the hearing on their amended motion for stay, which the court denied “for lack of good cause.”11 On November 3, plaintiffs notified the d efendants that Chang would not be appearing at his rescheduled deposition on
November 4 because he had “ ‘ not recovered well enough. ’ ”

3. Plaintiffs’ f

ailure to f

ile p retrial d ocuments Defendants also attempted to confer with plaintiffs about
whether plaintiffs would participate in filing joint pre

- trial
documents , as required by local rule, but received no response. 3
Defendants thereafter filed their own pre

- trial documents

. Plaintif fs filed only an exhibit list. On November 4, 2022 , the trial court ordered that because plaintiffs had not filed a witness list or jury instructions before
the final status conference , they were precluded from calling any
witnesses at trial

, and the trial would be a court trial.

C. The Trial Court Grants Terminating Sanctions Fire Insurance Exchange and Chern again moved for terminating sanctions against Chang and Lo. Plaintiffs opposed

, arguing that the ir rescheduling of depositions was for “medical
and conflicts reasons” and that they had offered to be deposed
N ovember 10 or 11 ; no orders specif ied they had to supply pretrial documents such as jury instructions or witness lists by a

3 Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 3.25(f)(1) provides in relevant part : “ At least five days prior to the final status conference, counsel must serve and file lists of pre

- marked exhibits to be used at trial (Local Rules 3.151, 3.53, and 3.149), jury instruction requests, trial witness lists, and a proposed short statement of the case to be read to the jury panel explaining the

case. Failure to exchange and file these items may result in not being able to call witnesses, present exhibits at trial, or have a jury trial. ”12

certain date before tr ial ; and

, they had complied with discovery
orders “until discovery of fraud ” alleged ly perpetrated by Farmers, Wools Peer, Fire Insurance Exchange, and Chern

. D efendants argued in their reply brief that plaintiffs provided no support for Chang ’ s claim of medical inability to attend the court

ordered depositions ; plaintiffs suggested the November 10 and 11
dates only after the motion for terminating sanctions was filed ; and t he court had issued an order sp ecifying the requisite pretrial documents and identifying the applicable local rules

. O n November 14, 2022

, the first day of trial

, t he trial court heard argument on the terminating sanctions motion. P laintiffs did not appear

. T he trial court granted the motion for terminating sanctions and struck the third amended complaint

. The court ruled that “terminating sanctions are warranted here”
due to “ Chang and Lo ’ s failures to answer discovery, to appear for
Court

- ordered depositions, and to pay m onetary sanctions as
ordered

. ”
The court found that Chang’s and Lo’s failure to appear for their depositions was “ willful ” because : Lo set an ex parte hearing on the date of his court

- ordered deposition ; Chang fail ed to appear at his rescheduled depositio n on a date he suggested ; and Chang fail ed to provide a medical note attesting to his medical inability to appear remotely for deposition

. The court
also noted that lesser sanctions

— in the form of its prior discovery
and sanctions orders

— were “ineffective in mandating Chang and Lo’s compliance with discovery rules.” The court determined the

current violations were “ preceded by a history of abuse, and the Court agrees with Defendants that the evidence shows that less
severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the13

discovery rules. ” The court also ordered Chang and Lo to pay
defendants $ 2
, 314.15 in monetary sanctions.
The court entered judgment against Chang and Lo and in
favor of Fire Insurance Exchange and Chern on November 30,
2022.
Pl aintiffs timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
To enforce discovery obligations and curtail misuse of the discovery process

, Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 provides that court s may impose monetary sanction s, issue
sanction s, evidence sanction s, contempt sanctions, or terminating
sanction s (including by dismissing the offending party ’ s action or rendering judgment by default against that party). ( See Code Civ. Proc, § 2023.030, subds. (a)

- (e) ; New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1422 [ “ Section 2023.030 describes the types of sanctions that a court may impose, including monetary, issue, evidence, terminating, and contempt sanctions. ”] .) “If a monet ary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a) ; accord, Manlin v. Milner (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1004,
1023 .) Courts may issue monetary sanctions for misuse of the discovery process against parties, counsel, or both, in the amount of “ the reasonable expenses, including attorney ’ s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.30,14

subd. (a); see City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 466, 502 .) “ An issue sanction is an order that designated facts are deemed established in favor of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process, or an order prohibiting the sanctioned party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defens es. ( [ Code Civ. Proc, § 2023.030 ] , subd. (b).) An evidence sanction is an order prohibiting designated matters from being introduced in
evidence. ( Id. , subd. (c).) ” ( New Albertsons , Inc.

, at p. 1422 .) Misuse of the discovery process includes , among o ther things, f ailing to respond or submit to discovery

, disobeying a court order to provide discovery

, and making an unmeritorious objection or evasive response to discovery

. ( See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd s

. (d)

- (g) ; Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 390 ( Los Defensores ) .) “ Notwithstanding the outcome of the particular discovery motion,” m onetary sanctions shall also be imposed for failure to confer as required

on a discovery motion , in the amount of the “ reasonable expenses, including attorney ’ s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that
conduct. ” ( Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.020 ; see Safechuck v. MJJ Productions, Inc. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 675, 700

, fn. 4.) “ The
trial court should consider both the conduc t being sanctioned and its effect on the party seeking discovery and, in choosing a sanction, should ‘ “ attempt[ ] to tailor the sanction to the harm caused by the withheld discovery. ” ’ ” ( Doppes v. Bentley Motors
Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992 ( Doppes )

. ) “The discovery statutes evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination.” ( Doppes, supra,
174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992. ) “ If a lesser sanction fails to curb15

misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions

un til the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse.” ( Ibid. )
“T he trial court may order a terminating sanction for disco very abuse ‘ after considering the totality of the circumstances: [the] conduct of the party to determine if the actions were willful; the detriment to the propounding party; and the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain the discovery. ’ ” ( Los D efensores,

supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 390 .)

“ We review a trial court ’ s decision to impose terminating sanctions for abuse of discretion, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the court ’ s ruling. ” ( Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 749 .) “ ‘ The power to impose discovery sanctions is a broad discretion subject to reversal only for arbitrary, capricious

, or whimsical action. ’ A decision to impose the ultimate sanctio n

— a judgment in the opposing party ’ s favor

— should not be made lightly. ‘ But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial co urt is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. ’ ” ( Parker v. Wolters Kluwer United States, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 285, 297 ( Parker ) .) “The appellant bears the burden on appeal of demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a discovery sanction.” ( Rutledge v. Hewlett

- Packard Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1191.) Likewise, on appeal “[t] he burden of proving ‘ su bstantial justification ’ for failing to comply with a discovery order ” is on the losing party

. ( Doe v. United States Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1435 ;16

accord, Padron v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York,
Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5 th 1246, 1269 ( Padron ) .)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Imposing Terminating Sanction s Although it is plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in imposing terminating sanctions ( s ee Rutledge v. Hewlett

- Packard Co., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at

p. 1191) , p laintiffs’ opening brief makes virtually no mention of the parties’ discovery history ; does not address the court’s

numerous discovery and deposition order s ; and provides no discernible argument why the trial court abused its discretion in imposing terminating sanctions

. Plaintiffs also do not challenge the underlying discovery orders that led t o terminating sanctions

. Instead, plaintiffs reargu e the merits of this court’s prior two appeals

. We conclud e t he trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing terminating sanctions because the record reflects plaintiffs ’ repeated willful failure to comply with discovery requests and several court orders

. 4 As detailed above, t he record demonstrates that despite the trial court’s orders : plaintiffs failed to provide responsive or timely written discovery ; failed to appear at their noticed depositions; violated the trial court’s orders to provide verified responses, supplemental responses, responsive documents, and other written discovery ; violated the

4 Although the trial court based its terminating sanctions order in part on plaintiffs’ failure to pay monetary sanc tions and to file certain pretrial documents, we do not affirm the trial court’s order on the basis of plaintiffs’ failure to pay monetary sanctions or their failure to file pretrial documents.17

court’s orders to submit to deposition; and failed to confer with opposing counsel regarding discovery requests and deposition

sc heduling

. (See Los Defensores, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at

p. 390 ; Parker , supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 297 .)
The trial court ’s orders were appropriately tailore d, and it imposed orders of increasing severity designed to obtain plaintiffs’ compliance

. “ If a lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until
the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse .” ( Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 99 2 .) When plaintiffs did not comply with
orders directing compliance with discovery obligations

, the trial imposed lesser sanctions in the form of monetary sanctions and
then turned to the greater sanction o f three evidentiary
sanctions . These orders of i ncreasing severity , however, did not appear to change plaintiffs ’ un willingness to cooperate in the discovery process. Indeed, o nly the threat of terminating
sanctions appeared to prompt any respons e from plaintiffs. Here, “ t he record is replete with evidence of [plaintiffs ’ ] failures to answer discovery requests

. . . . Time and again, [they] refused to respond despite the issuance of court orders and monetary sanctions. ” ( Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4 th 262, 28 0 ( Milei kowsky ) .) When the trial court was considering terminating sanctions

, plaintiffs had not complied with the court’s prior discovery orders and lesser sanctions had been ineffective to induce plaintiffs to comply with their discovery obligations. Further, the trial court found this
refusal was willful , a finding plaintiffs do not challenge

. The

reco rd before us supports the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs’ noncompliance was wil lful. A mong other things

, p laintiffs18

repeatedly fa iled to provide answers to several discovery requests despite court orders directing them to respond, Chang
rescheduled his court

- ordered deposition and then fail ed to

appear , and Lo did not appear for a deposition because it conflicted with a hearing on a n ex parte application he set. This refusal to respond to discovery

, to follow discovery orders, or to appear for depositions over three years of litigation a m ply supports the trial court’s imposition of terminating sanctions.

“ [ T ] he sanctioned party ’ s history as a repeat offender is not only
relevant but also significant, in deciding whether to impose terminating sanctions.” ( Liberty Mut ual Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL Administrators, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App. 4th 1093, 1106.) “ The court was not require d to allow this pattern of abuse to continue ad infinitum.” ( Mileikowsky , supra , 128 Cal.App.4 th at p. 28 0 .) For the first time on reply, plaintiffs argue that they “complied with the court order [s] , providing all responses without objection

, ” until January 2021 when they discovered the alleged fraudulent conspiracy among the defendants that became the central focus of their complaint

. T hereafter , plaintiffs objected to discovery requests they believed were designed to trap them into agreement with fraudulent factual assertions by defendants

. Plaintiffs further argue that “ [a]s a matter of fact on the record

, it is Respondents/D efendant s that have consistently refused to respond to all of discovery requests by Appella n ts/ Plaintiffs .”
Plaintiffs have forfeited these arguments because they did

not support them with record citations or legal authority

, let
alone e xplain how their assertions demonstrate the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing terminating sanctions

. ( See
United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App. 5th 142, 158 [ “ ‘ We will not ordinarily consider issues19

raised for the first time in a reply brief.

. . . Fairness militates against allowing an appellant to raise an issue for the first time in a reply br ief because consideration of the issue deprives the respondent of the opportunity to counter the appellant by raising opposing arguments about the new issue. ’ ” ]; Los Angeles Unified School District v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020)
57 Cal.App. 5th 480, 49 7 ( Torres ) [ “‘ “ to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the
record ” ’” ; “failure to supply record citations or a fully developed argument” forfeits claim of error ] ; Hernandez v. First Student,
Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App. 5th 270, 277 [courts may disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant
reached the c onclusions he wants court to adopt ].)
Plaintiffs present no separate argument regarding the terminating sanctions order imposing $ 2,314.15 in monetary sanctions beyond attacking the order itself

. “ Because we do not agree the underlying order was invalid, we affirm the monetary
sanctions assessed. ” ( Mileikowsky , supra, 128 Cal.App. 4th at

p. 280 .)

C. A Stay of Trial Court Proceedings Was Not Warranted During the Pendency of the Two Prior Appeals Involving Different Defendants
Plaintiffs also contend the trial court erred in not automatically staying all trial court proceedings under Code of
Civil Procedure section 916 while their appeals involving Farmers and Woolls Peers were pending

. Plaintiffs argue that upon the perfecting of these appeals , the t rial court lost subject20

matter jurisdiction

, all proceedings should have been stayed, and subsequent trial court rulings

— including the terminating
sanctions order

— were void.
D efects in subject matter jurisdiction “‘“ may be raised at any point in a proceeding, including for the first time on appeal ”’ [ c itation] , and may be raised through any available procedural
vehicle .” ( Corrales v. California Gambling Control Com. (2023) 93 Cal.App. 5th 286, 300 .) We review de novo whether a ruling is
void for la ck of subject matter jurisdiction. ( See LAOSD Asbestos
Cases (2018) 28 Cal.App. 5th 862, 871 .) Generally, “‘the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon
the matters embraced therein or af fected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order.’” ( Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 180, 189 ( Varian ) ; Code Civ. Proc, § 916, subd. (a).) A stay pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 916 divests the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the affected matters

. ( See Varian , at p. 198 .)
But “ t he automatic stay does not suspend trial court proceedings on the remaining components of the litigation, for example, claims against other parties [,] . . . not resolved by the judgment or order under appeal. ” ( Hedwall v. PCMV, LLC (2018)

22 Cal.App. 5th 564, 580
, fn. 11 ( Hedwall )

. )
To de termine if a proceeding is “embraced in” or “affected by” an appeal, we “consider the appeal and its possible outcomes in relation to the proceeding and its possible results.” ( Varian

, supra , 35 Cal. 4th at p. 189; see Elsea v. Saberi (1992)

4 Cal.App. 4th 625, 629 [“[W]hether a matter is ‘embraced’ in or21

‘affected’ by a judgment within the meaning of section 916 depends upon whether postjudgment trial court proceedings on the particular matter would have any impact on the ‘effectiveness’ of the appeal. If so, the proceedings are stayed; if not, the proceedings are permitted.”].) The purpose of an automatic stay is to preserve the appellate court ’ s jurisdiction
and “ ‘ prevent [] the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appea led judgment or order by conducting other proceedings that may affect it.’” ( Varian , at p. 189 ; accord, Young v. Tri

- City Healthcare Dist . (2012) 210 Cal.App. 4th 35, 51 .)
The prior pending appeals dealt only with Woolls Peer and
Farmers. By contrast, the proceedings before the trial court here
dealt with t he remaining causes of action against Fire Insurance Exchange and Chern

, constituting “claims against other parties[,]

. . . not resolved by the judgment or order under appeal

. ” ( Hedwall , supra , 22 Cal.App. 5th at p. 580
, fn. 11

. ) T rial court proceedings involving Fire Insurance Exchange and Chern would not have any impact on the appeals involving Woolls Peer
and Farmers and thus did not “ embrace ” the issues presented in
those a ppeals or necessitate a stay

. Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the discovery orders and the terminating
sanctions. 5

5 We deny plaintiffs’ “request that any of the justices or judges that have adjudicated on the other two appeals (B317518 and B321411) be recused from this appeal and from any discussion with the justices and judges to be assigned to this appeal ,” in order “[t]o avoid

. . . any potential, predisposition or bias th at is unfair and prejudicial to this appeal .” A party ’ s “subjective, unilateral perception of bias” is not a recognized ground for disqualification

. ( Haas v. County of San Bernardino22 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed, and the order granting terminating sanctions is also affirmed. Fire Insurance Exchange
and Chern are entitled to recover their costs on appeal.

MARTINEZ

, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER , J.

(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1017, 1034.) And to the extent plaintiffs’ request i s based on rulings against them, it has long been the law that “ r ulings against a litigant

. . . do not [support] a charge of bias and prejudice

. ” ( Dietrich v. Litton Industries, Inc. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 704, 719.)