If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

FOR PUBLICATION

December 22, 2020

9:00 a.m.

v No. 347369

Oakland Circuit Court

JEREMIAH DEJUAN ABCUMBY-BLAIR, LC No. 2018-266896-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and BECKERING and GLEICHER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This case arises from police surveillance of a suspected drug house. Defendant, Jeremiah 

Dejuan Abcumby-Blair, appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of possession with intent to 

deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession with intent to deliver 

less than 50 grams of heroin, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession with intent to deliver less than 

5 kilograms of marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii), possession of less than 25 grams of fentanyl, 

MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v), carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227(2), being a felon in 

possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f, five counts of possession of a 

firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b, and operating a motor 

vehicle with a suspended license, second offense, MCL 257.904(3)(b). The trial court sentenced

defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 9 to 30 years’ imprisonment for 

his convictions of possession with intent to deliver cocaine, possession with intent to deliver 

heroin, carrying a concealed weapon, and felon-in-possession, 9 to 15 years’ imprisonment for his 

convictions of possession with intent to deliver marijuana and possession of fentanyl, two years’

imprisonment for each felony-firearm conviction, and 278 days in jail, time served, for operating 

with a suspended license. Finding no reversible errors, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 13, 2018, Oakland County Sheriff’s Deputy Reuben Garcia was participating in 

a surveillance of a suspected drug house at 163 Seward Street in Pontiac. Garcia observed

defendant pull up in a car, approach the porch and pause briefly as if using a key for entry, enter 

the house for a few minutes, and then leave. Garcia observed defendant drive to a nearby party 
-2-

store parking lot known for drug trafficking. Defendant maneuvered his car alongside another car 

and engaged in a hand-to-hand transaction with the occupant, which Garcia believed was a drug 

sale. As Garcia watched from his surveillance location, Oakland Sheriff’s Deputy Charles 

Janczarek was summoned to confront defendant in the parking lot and advise him of their 

investigation, at which time defendant admitted he was in possession of marijuana.1 Janczarek 

searched defendant’s pockets and found among other things a baggie of marijuana, a baggie of 

what appeared to be crack cocaine—which Garcia field tested and found to be positive—two cell 

phones, and a house key that turned out to be for 163 Seward Street. Deputies arrested defendant. 

Garcia opened defendant’s driver’s side car door and found in the side pocket a Ruger firearm with 

a bullet in the chamber. Deputies obtained a search warrant for the house and seized marijuana, 

cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, ammunition, cash, equipment commonly used in drug manufacturing, 

and mail in a bedroom that was addressed to defendant at the Oakland County Jail. The jury 

convicted defendant of all charges. Defendant now appeals.

II. BRADY VIOLATION/NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

Defendant argues that the prosecution violated his right to due process by failing to disclose 

that Janczarek had, according to defendant, “a documented history of making false statements 

pertaining to his investigations, and specifically pertaining to his affidavits for search warrants 

involving drug investigations.” Defendant contends that the prosecution had a duty under Brady 

v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963), to disclose this information and 

that failure to do so undermines confidence in the jury’s verdict. While impeachment evidence

should have been disclosed, for the reasons explained below we conclude that reversal of 

defendant’s convictions is not required.

Defendant did not preserve this issue for appellate review by moving in the trial court for 

a new trial or for relief from judgment. People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 448; 709 NW2d 152 

(2005). Therefore, our review is for plain, i.e., clear or obvious, error affecting defendant’s 

substantial rights. People v. Dickinson, 321 Mich App 1, 15; 909 NW2d 24 (2017). A defendant’s 

substantial rights are affected if the plain error “affected the outcome of the lower court 

proceedings.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). “Reversal is 

warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent 

defendant or when an error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings’ independent of the defendant’s innocence.” Id. at 763-764 (quotations marks 

and citation omitted; alteration in original).

To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that “(1) the prosecution has 

suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) that is material.” People v 

Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 150; 845 NW2d 731 (2014). The Michigan Supreme Court has explained 

each of these requirements as follows:

The government is held responsible for evidence within its control, even evidence 

unknown to the prosecution, Kyles v Whitley, 514 US 419, 437; 115 S Ct 1555; 131 

 

1 The event occurred before Michigan legalized recreational marijuana use.
-3-

L Ed 2d 490 (1995), without regard to the prosecution’s good or bad faith, United 

States v Agurs, 427 US 97, 110; 96 S Ct 2392; 49 L Ed 2d 342 (1976) (“If the 

suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character 

of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.”). Evidence is favorable to the 

defense when it is either exculpatory or impeaching. Giglio v United States, 405 

US 150, 154; 92 S Ct 763; 31 L Ed 2d 104 (1972) (“When the ‘reliability of a given 

witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of 

evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule [of Brady].”), quoting 

Napue v Illinois, 360 US 264, 269; 79 S Ct 1173; 3 L Ed 2d 1217 (1959). To 

establish materiality, a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability 

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v Bagley, 473 US 667, 682; 

105 S Ct 3375; 87 L Ed 2d 481 (1985). This standard “does not require 

demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would 

have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal . . . .” Kyles, 514 US at 434; 

115 S Ct 1555. The question is whether, in the absence of the suppressed evidence, 

the defendant “received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy 

of confidence.” Id. In assessing the materiality of the evidence, courts are to 

consider the suppressed evidence collectively, rather than piecemeal. Id. at 436;

115 S Ct 1555. [Chenault, 495 Mich at 150-151.]

Before turning directly to our analysis of defendant’s Brady claim, some background 

information is required. Defendant’s claim arises primarily from a prosecutor’s statement made 

during a hearing in a case we remanded to the trial court, People v Williamson, unpublished order 

of the Court of Appeals, issued September 27, 2017 (Docket No. 331075). Our remand was based 

on what had transpired in another case, People v Dukes, Oakland Circuit Court (15-255948-FH). 

It came to light in Dukes that Janczarek had made false statements relative to a search warrant. As 

this Court explained:

Janczarek testified that he had placed a GPS tracking device on Duke’s [sic] vehicle 

pursuant to a warrant and that the device provided inculpatory information. 

Defense counsel advised the court that he had never been informed about the use 

of a GPS device and had never been provided a copy of the warrant permitting the 

tracking. After argument, the Dukes trial court declared a mistrial and scheduled 

an evidentiary hearing to determine, inter alia, whether the warrant Janczarek 

testified existed had in fact ever been issued and to thereafter consider whether the 

mistrial would be with prejudice [People v Williamson, unpublished per curiam 

opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 5, 2019 (Docket No. 331075), 

p 3.]

While Dukes was unfolding, Williamson’s appeal from a 2015 conviction was pending in 

this Court. When evidence of Janczarek’s conduct in Dukes came out, Williamson filed a motion 

in this Court seeking remand to the trial court. Williamson argued that had the trial court 

considered the Dukes evidence, there was a reasonable probability that it would have upheld the 

challenge he lodged to the search warrant obtained by Janczarek in his case. Williamson had 

challenged subsection 7(E) of Janczarek’s sworn search warrant affidavit, which stated, “During 
-4-

a period of time covering over the past thirty days the informant has provided information that has 

led to the issuance of one search warrant by a judge of the 50th District Court.” Williamson, unpub

op at 2. This Court remanded the matter for the trial court to consider the challenged statement in 

light of the Dukes evidence. On remand, the prosecutor conceded in the trial court that Janczarek’s

statement in subsection 7(E) “was an ‘inaccurate statement’ and that actually the confidential 

informant had never previously provided information that led to the issuance of a search warrant.” 

Id. at 3. It appears to be this statement that the present defendant asserts the prosecutor in his case 

had a duty to disclose under Brady.

Meanwhile, the Dukes case reached its end. By the time Williamson returned to the circuit 

court on remand,

the trial court in Dukes had held a hearing and determined that Janczarek’s 

testimony at the evidentiary hearing in that case was not credible and found that no 

warrant had been issued despite Janczarek’s testimony that one had been issued. 

At the hearing in Dukes, Janczarek testified that he had obtained a search warrant 

for the tracking device, but he could not produce the signed warrant or a copy of it. 

At one point he testified that he had saved it on a computer “thumb drive” but that 

he could not locate the device. He also testified that the warrant was in the “arrest 

packet” he provided to the prosecutor’s office and further that he discussed the 

warrant with an assistant prosecutor whom he named. The assistant prosecutor 

testified to the contrary, stating that the warrant was not in the arrest packet and that 

she had not had any discussion with Janczarek regarding such a warrant. The court 

found that the prosecutor’s testimony was credible, that Janczarek’s testimony was 

not credible and that the search warrant he testified he obtained had in fact never 

existed. [Id. at 3-4.]

The present defendant argues on appeal that the prosecutor in his case should have 

disclosed the concession made on remand by the prosecutor in Williamson that Janczarek had made 

a false statement in his search warrant affidavit. However, it is not clear to us that the prosecutor’s 

statement in Williamson was necessarily Brady material, especially since the trial court, after 

taking testimony from Janczarek, determined that subsection 7(E) of the affidavit was inaccurate, 

but that the deputy had not intended to make a false statement. Id. The significance of the 

prosecutor’s statement emerged only two years later, when this Court found the trial court’s factual 

determination to be clear error and held that the search warrant affidavit statement challenged in 

Williamson was “objectively untrue” and that Janczarek had “knowingly and intentionally made a 

false statement in the search warrant affidavit.” Id. at 6.

Defendant is on more solid ground when he implies that the prosecutor also had a duty 

under Brady to reveal that the trial court had found Janczarek’s testimony in Dukes not credible. 

That Janczarek had testified untruthfully in Dukes, as determined by an Oakland Circuit Court

judge, was evidence favorable to defendant that was within the prosecution’s control, Chenault, 

495 Mich at 150, and defendant was not required to exercise due diligence to obtain the 

information from another source, id. at 152. Accordingly, the prosecution had a duty to disclose 

this evidence to defendant. Nevertheless, although the prosecution violated its duty to disclose 

this evidence, we find no Brady violation because defendant has not established the materiality of 

the evidence with respect to the instant case. See id. at 150-151.
-5-

As previously indicated, “[t]o establish materiality, a defendant must show there is a 

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Chenault, 495 Mich at 150 (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The question with regard to materiality is “whether, in the absence of the suppressed 

evidence, the defendant ‘received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 

confidence.’ ” Id., quoting Kyles, 514 US at 434; 115 S Ct 1555. Defendant contends that had the 

prosecutor informed him of Janczarek’s untruthfulness, he could have used the information to 

successfully challenge the search warrant issued for 163 Seward Street and impeach Janczarek’s 

credibility. We are unpersuaded that, in the absence of the suppressed evidence, defendant’s trial 

verdict was unworthy of confidence.

Defendant did not identify in the trial court, nor does he identify in his appellate brief, any 

factual challenges to the search warrant affidavit in this case. In a motion filed in the trial court to 

suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, defendant did not attack any specific portions 

of the affidavit; rather, he argued that, taken as a whole, the affidavit did not support a finding of 

probable cause. In denying defendant’s motion, the trial court stated that the information in the 

affidavit was “specific, [and] had multiple layers . . . providing information to a neutral arbiter, the 

district court judge, that would give rise to the standard that needs to be met, which is that there is 

a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause.” On appeal, defendant attempts to undermine 

the reliability of the affidavit by stating that, although Oakland County Sheriff’s Deputy Brandon 

Scruggs drafted the search warrant affidavit, he based it on Janczarek’s investigation. Contrary to 

defendant’s assertion, however, the affidavit indicates that Garcia played an equally, if not more, 

important role in collecting the information that led to defendant’s arrest and the discovery of drugs 

in his pockets. It was Garcia who observed defendant appear to use a key to enter the house on 

Seward Street and who saw him engage in a hand-to-hand suspected drug transaction in the parking 

lot of the nearby party store. Whereas the defendant in Williamson challenged a specific factual 

statement in the search warrant affidavit sworn to by Janczarek in that case, the present defendant 

does not identify any specific infirmity in the search warrant affidavit potentially traceable to 

Janczarek.2 In light of this, we find unconvincing defendant’s assertion that information regarding 

 

2

In the search warrant affidavit, Scruggs avers that he learned from Janczarek that he and another 

officer surveilled 163 Seward Street within 30 days of the incident at issue. In a motion to remand 

filed in this Court, defendant’s appellate counsel attests in an affidavit that FOIA requests produced 

no reports of previous surveillance at the Seward Street house. This is not surprising. Janczarek 

testified at trial that he and Sergeant Hix had surveilled the house within the last 30 days as part of 

their general observation of the area, but did not write any reports of their activity. Further, the 

testimony of all three deputies indicated that they understood “surveillance” to encompass 

everything from “sitting in a scout car with a pair of binoculars all the way to sitting on houses . . . 

.” Defendant’s appellate counsel also notes that the report of the incident written by Janczarek 

states that the person to whom Janczarek spoke when he answered defendant’s cell phone (which 

will be discussed later in this opinion) was “detained,” but his FOIA request produces no record 

indicating that the person had been arrested. Janczarek testified at trial that after the caller arrived 

at 163 Seward Street, he told him “to walk down to the party store because I was trying to get him 

away.” The caller then walked an estimated 70 yards to the party store, where he was “detained.” 
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Janczarek’s untruthfulness in Williamson and Dukes would have resulted in a finding of no 

probable cause to issue the warrant or in the suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to the 

warrant. Defendant implies that a different outcome would have been probable because the alleged 

Brady information would have “alerted the defense to scrutinize aspects of the investigation that 

may otherwise have been taken for granted, such as the validity of the prior surveillance or the 

legitimacy of the alleged call.” Presumably, defendant alludes to his appellate counsel’s discovery 

that no reports of prior surveillance had been filed and no record of the caller’s arrest existed. As

discussed in footnote 2, however, neither of these facts is alarming in light of the record, nor do 

they support a reasonable probability that, had Janczarek’s untruthfulness been disclosed to 

defendant, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Chenault, 495 Mich at 150.

Regarding the trial, the most important factual issue the jury had to decide was whether 

defendant had connections to 163 Seward Street sufficient to establish his constructive possession 

of the drugs and drug paraphernalia recovered from the house. Constructive possession of 

narcotics may “be proven by the defendant’s participation in a ‘joint’ venture to possess controlled 

substances.” People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 521; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). Evidence that a 

residence appears to be solely used for the manufacture and distribution of crack cocaine, and that 

a defendant possesses a key that opens the lock to the apartment, has been deemed sufficient to 

establish the defendant’s constructive possession of the drugs found therein. See Wolfe, 440 Mich 

at 518-519.

As already noted, Garcia testified that he observed defendant briefly enter 163 Seward 

Street, where he appeared to open the door with a key, before proceeding to a nearby parking lot 

where he made a hand-to-hand exchange with the driver of another car. Janczarek placed 

defendant under arrest, searched his pockets, and found 26.5 grams of marijuana, 2.7 grams of 

crack cocaine, and a house key, all of which was entered into evidence at trial. Upon executing 

the search warrant for 163 Seward Street, deputies determined that the key found in defendant’s 

pocket opened the handle lock and the deadbolt. Scruggs testified that, in one of the bedrooms, he 

found a case for a laptop computer that contained two cards addressed to defendant, a piece of 

mail addressed to defendant, and receipts and a “certificate of completion” that contained 

defendant’s name. This evidence, if believed, was sufficient to establish defendant’s constructive 

possession of the drugs at 163 Seward Street. Id.

Defendant contends that the alleged Brady evidence could have been used to impeach 

Janczarek at trial. However, the trial transcripts show that the bulk of Janczarek’s testimony 

concerned his identification for the jury of the physical evidence seized from 163 Seward Street 

and of photographs taken at the house, and his expert testimony regarding street-level drug 

 

While “detained” can mean “arrested,” there is nothing in Janczarek’s testimony to suggest that 

officers intended to or did arrest the caller. So, again, the fact that there are no arrest records is 

not surprising. Defendant’s appellate counsel challenged none of the other information the affiant 

attributed to Janczarek.
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trafficking.

3 Defendant’s connection to the house on Seward Street was established through the 

testimony of Garcia and Scruggs and physical evidence, including a key to the house found in

defendant’s pocket and items in the house linked to him. Evidence that Janczarek made false 

statements regarding search warrants in prior cases generally impeaches his credibility, but it does 

not undermine the physical evidence connecting defendant to 163 Seward Street or the testimony 

of Garcia and Scruggs. Given the physical items, photographs, and the testimony of multiple 

witnesses that constituted case-specific evidence of defendant’s guilt, we cannot say that 

suppression of evidence regarding Janczarek’s untruthfulness in other cases undermines 

confidence in the verdict in this case. Thus, even though the prosecutor suppressed impeachment 

evidence within her control, defendant’s claim of a Brady violation fails because he has not 

established the materiality of the suppressed evidence. See Chenault, 495 Mich at 150.

In the alternative, defendant argues that this Court’s unpublished opinion in Williamson

constitutes newly discovered evidence. To establish that newly discovered evidence requires a 

new trial, a defendant must show that “(1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly 

discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not, using 

reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence 

makes a different result probable on retrial.” People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 692; 664 NW2d 174 

(2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

As previously indicated, this Court held in Williamson that Janczarek’s statement in 

subsection 7(E) of his search warrant affidavit was “objectively untrue” and that Janczarek had 

offered no “credible explanation from which to conclude that he did not intentionally place false 

information in the affidavit.” Id. at 5. In light of this newly discovered evidence, defendant urges 

this Court to at least remand the case to the trial court to allow the court to reassess defendant’s 

motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the search warrant. However, defendant fails to make 

any connection between this Court’s holding regarding Janczarek’s untruthfulness in Williamson 

and the search warrant affidavit or trial testimony in this case. Neither in the trial court nor in this 

Court has defendant pointed to any specific portion of the affidavit potentially tainted by 

Janczarek’s input, nor has he offered either evidence or argumentation that would lead us to believe 

that this Court’s holding in Williamson makes it probable that the trial court would find the warrant 

invalid and suppress the evidence collected pursuant to the warrant. Nor, in light of the evidence 

presented at trial, are we persuaded that the Williamson holding would make a different outcome 

in defendant’s trial probable. For these reasons, we conclude that defendant has failed to establish 

that he is entitled to a new trial based on this newly discovered evidence. See Cress, 468 Mich at 

692.

 

3

In his brief on appeal defendant admits that there “is no dispute that the house at 163 Seward 

contained drugs and items consistent with delivering drugs.” In other words, he does not claim 

that Janczarek could have been impeached about evidence found in the house when searched. 
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III. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Defendant raises several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. He preserved this 

issue for appellate review by filing in this Court a motion for remand to the trial court for a Ginther4

hearing. We denied defendant’s motion. People v Abcumby-Blair, unpublished order of the Court 

of Appeals, entered February 7, 2020 (Docket No. 347369). Therefore, our review is for errors 

apparent on the record. People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 68; 862 NW2d 446 (2014).

“Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of 

fact and constitutional law.” People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). 

Findings of fact “are reviewed for clear error,” while “constitutional determinations are reviewed 

de novo.” Id. A finding is clearly erroneous if this Court is “left with a definite and firm conviction 

that the trial court made a mistake.” People v Franklin, 500 Mich 92, 100; 894 NW2d 561 (2017)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). 

In order to establish the right to a new trial premised on ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a defendant must show: (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and, (2) that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. See Smith v 

Spisak, 558 US 139, 149; 130 S Ct 676; 175 L Ed 2d 595 (2010); People v Trakhtenberg, 493 

Mich 38, 51; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” People v Randolph, 502 Mich 1, 9; 917 NW2d 249 (2018), 

quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).

Defendant’s first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel pertains to testimony from 

Janczarek that when a “flip-style” cell phone he seized from defendant’s pocket began to ring, he 

answered it. Janczarek further testified that it was “a common practice for us to monitor those 

cell[]phones for text and/or phone calls . . . .” He explained:

I spoke to the person on the other line and he asked for 20 of dog, which is common 

street slang for heroin. . . . I kind of played a game with him on the phone for a 

little bit, and he showed up over at [163] Seward. . . . Initially, he went to the back

door and knocked. We called him back and told him to go to the front door. He 

knocked there. Then I told him to walk down to the party store because I was trying 

to get him away. It kind of helped us out knowing that there wasn’t anybody else 

in the house. He walked away. We detained him, and then we were able to 

determine [that] the phone number that he called on was the phone in his 

possession.[5]

Defendant asserts that Janczarek violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures when he opened defendant’s cell phone, answered it, and 

 

4 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).

5

It is apparent from Janczarek’s testimony that he opened defendant’s cell phone and either 

answered a call from or used it to call one of defendant’s connections three times.
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impersonated defendant to arrange a heroin transaction with the caller, and that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to move to suppress or to object to Janczarek’s testimony regarding the 

phone call. Defendant relies for authority on Riley v California, 573 US 373; 134 S Ct 2473; 189 

L Ed 2d 430 (2014). In Riley, the United States Supreme Court held that, in the context of searches 

of cell phone data, officer safety and the need to prevent destruction of evidence do not justify 

applying the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. 

The prosecution argues, contrariwise, that Riley does not apply to this case because Janczarek did 

not scroll through the contents of defendant’s flip phone, he merely answered an incoming call 

and spoke to the caller. In light of the Supreme Court’s assessment in Riley of the balancing of 

interests between an individual’s right to privacy and the need for the promotion of legitimate 

governmental interests when it comes to cellular telephones and the search incident to arrest

doctrine6, we believe defendant has the better argument.

“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’ ” Riley, 573 US 

at 381(quotation marks and citations omitted). A search occurs under the Fourth Amendment 

when “the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as 

reasonable.” Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27, 31-33, 121 S Ct 2038, 150 LEd2d 94 (2001). 

Neither party provides authority directly addressing whether, after the Supreme Court’s 

analysis of the unique nature of cell phones in Riley, answering an arrestee’s cell phone without 

the arrestee’s consent constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.7 Defendant analogizes 

 

6 See Riley, 573 US at 385.

7

In Riley, the Supreme court analyzed two cases when ascertaining whether the search incident to 

arrest doctrine applies to searching digital content on a cell phone. Riley, 573 US at 378. Although 

it concluded that absent exigent circumstances “the search incident to arrest exception does not 

apply to cell phones,” it was focused on accessing digital content as compared to answering a 

defendant’s cell phone. Id. at 402. 

David Riley was arrested following a routine traffic stop for driving with expired 

registration plates, and it was discovered that his license had been suspended. Id. The police 

officer searched Riley incident to his arrest and seized a “smart phone” from Riley’s pants pocket. 

The officer accessed information on the phone, presumably from Riley’stext messages or contacts,

that led to his being suspected of gang involvement. Id. at 379. Two hours after Riley’s arrest, an 

officer who specialized in gangs searched Riley’s phone again, and among the data he viewed, he 

looked at Riley’s photos and videos. Id. Riley was ultimately charged with and convicted of

multiple counts associated with gang involvement and a prior shooting, and testimony and 

evidence at trial included information gleaned from Riley’s phone. Id. at 379.

The companion case involved defendant Brima Wurie. A police officer performing routine 

surveillance observed Wurie make an apparent drug sale from a car. Id. at 380. Officers arrested 

Wurie and took him to the police station, where they seized two cell phones from Wurie’s person. 

One phone, a “flip phone,” kept receiving calls, and the front display noted that the calls were 

coming from “my house.” Id. When they opened the phone, they saw a picture of a woman and 

a baby. By pressing one button, they accessed the phone’s call log and obtained a phone number
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the act to conducting a search of the phone’s contents, and the prosecution invokes Commonwealth 

v Santana, 92 Mass App Ct 1107; 94 NE3d 435 (2017). In Santana, the Massachusetts appeals 

court seemed to suggest that the mere answering of an incoming phone call (initiated by another 

officer) did not constitute a search, but ultimately declined to resolve the question, concluding that 

even if the police officer’s answering the defendant’s cell phone constituted a search, any error in 

admitting evidence obtained from the call was harmless. However, in a recently published 

decision, the same court observed that a police officer’s authority to seize an arrestee’s cell phone 

“does not extend to manipulating the phone[,]” and that “[a]nswering a ringing phone constitutes 

a search.” Commonwealth v Barrett, 97 Mass App Ct 437, 440; 148 NE3d 1217 (2020). In 

addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that accessing any information from a cell

phone without a warrant contravenes the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Riley. 

Commonwealth v Fulton, 645 Pa 296, 302; 179 A3d 475 (2018); see also id. at 316-317 (observing

that the Riley Court held “that in the absence of an applicable exception, any search of a cell phone 

requires a warrant. This is because, like one’s home, an individual’s expectation of privacy is in 

the cell phone itself, not in each and every piece of information stored therein.).

8

 “While the 

decisions of lower federal courts and other state courts are not binding on this Court, they may be 

considered as persuasive authority.” People v Walker, 328 Mich App 429, 444-45; 938 NW2d 31 

(2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

In Riley, the Supreme Court rejected the idea of government agency protocols as a way to 

balance privacy interests with what information on a person’s cell phone would be considered 

within the proper scope of a search incident to arrest. Riley, 573 US at 398. Instead, it held that 

“our general preference [is] to provide clear guidance to law enforcement through categorical 

rules. If police are to have workable rules, the balancing of competing interests must in large part 

be done on a categorical basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police 

officers.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). With that clean-line approach in mind, in 

the present case, we are persuaded that an arrestee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 

or her cell phone, and that the government’s act of answering the phone without the arrestee’s 

consent and without a warrant constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.

 

associated with “my house,” which they entered into an online phone directory to discover the 

associated address, ultimately leading them to defendant’s home. Id. A search warrant was 

obtained and defendant’s apartment was searched, leading to drug charges and subsequent 

convictions. Id. In other words, the Supreme Court did not directly address in either Riley’s or 

Wurie’s case whether answering and using a cellular telephone seized from someone’s person 

constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.

8

In Fulton, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the investigating detective conducted 

three distinct searches of the defendant’s cell phone without a warrant by engaging in the following 

actions: 1) powering on the defendant’s flip phone, which the court likened to opening the door 

to a home; 2) obtaining the phone’s assigned number; and 3) monitoring incoming calls and text 

messages, including answering one of the calls. Fulton, 645 PA at 318-319. The court concluded, 

“[t]he rule created by Riley/Wurie is exceedingly simple: if a member of law enforcement wishes 

to obtain information from a cell phone, get a warrant.” Id. at 319.
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Prior to Riley, various courts that had concluded that “a person does not have a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in incoming calls on his telephone . . . rested that conclusion on the ground 

that a person does not have a privacy interest in conversations to which he is not a party.” United 

States v De La Paz, 43 F Supp 2d 370, 372 (SDNY, 1999). This is true for one of the cases on 

which the prosecution relies, People v Lucas, 188 Mich App 554; 470 NW2d 460 (1991). In 

Lucas, this Court held that an officer did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights 

when he answered the defendant’s car phone without a search warrant because the defendant “has 

no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to conversations in which he did not participate.” 

Lucas, 188 Mich App at 577. However, as one district court has pointed out, this reasoning 

“confuses the privacy interest invaded by a search alone with the interest in whatever is uncovered 

by a search.” De La Paz, 43 F Supp 2d at 372. Related to this is the pervasiveness of cell phones 

in contemporary society, their intimate association with their users, and their technological 

capabilities.

Regarding a person’s privacy interest in the fact of a call, a federal district court explained

in De La Paz:

[A]sserting that a defendant has no privacy interest in the substance of a 

conversation between a law enforcement agent and a caller does not resolve 

whether the defendant has a privacy interest in whether that conversation should 

occur in the first place. The relevant question is not whether a search necessarily 

uncovers something of a personal or private nature, but rather whether it might—

and whether one must invade a legitimate privacy interest in order even to find out. 

[Id.]

In the case at bar, regardless of the privacy interest defendant may or may not have had in 

the conversation that ensued when Janczarek answered the cell phone, he had a legitimate privacy 

interest in the fact that he received a call on his phone and in the identity of the caller. See id. at 

372. This is particularly true given the intimate association of cell phones with individual users, 

who can keep track of a significant range and amount of private information on even the most 

basic of cell phones. See, e.g., Riley, 573 US at 395 (noting that “[a]ccording to one poll, nearly 

three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, 

with 12% admitting that they even use their phones in the shower.”). Just monitoring and

answering a “flip-style” phone like defendant’s reveals not only the defendant’s contacts, but also 

information that a defendant might have added to his contacts, including a photograph, name, or 

other identifying information. See Fulton, 645 Pa at 319. Thus, simply answering defendant’s 

phone gave Janczarek access to more than the caller, it provided him with private information that 

he did not have before.

9

 

9 Acknowledging that its decision would impact law enforcement’s ability to combat crime, the 

Supreme Court noted in Riley that “[p]rivacy comes at a cost.” Riley, 573 US at 401. But it also 

pointed out that information on a cell phone is not immune from a search, just that “a warrant is 

generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest.” Id. 

“Our cases have historically recognized that the warrant requirement is an important working part 
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In light of the personal nature and significant capabilities of today’s cell phones, we find 

persuasive the foregoing arguments of federal courts and the courts of sister states and conclude 

that Janczarek’s answering defendant’s ringing cell phone constituted a search under the Fourth 

Amendment. Consequently, we also conclude that Janczarek’s testimony regarding the phone call 

was inadmissible, and no strategic motive can explain trial counsel’s failure to object to that

testimony. Accordingly, trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress the evidence or to object to it 

constituted objectively deficient performance. See Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 51.

However, even if defendant has proved the first prong of this claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel, he has not proved the second. Defendant has not demonstrated prejudice from trial 

counsel’s deficient performance. Given the other evidence presented at trial, Janczarek’s 

testimony regarding the telephone call was unnecessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

defendant was involved in the drug-trafficking operation at 163 Seward Street. Thus, defendant 

has failed to show that, but for his attorney’s failure to object to Janczarek’s testimony about the 

cell phone call, there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome. See id. Having failed to 

meet his burden to establish both prongs of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant’s 

claim must fail. See id.

Defendant next argues that he received ineffective assistance from his trial attorney when 

she erroneously advised him that his prior convictions could be used to impeach him, and thus

deprived him of his right to testify in his own defense by trial. Defendant has failed to establish 

the factual predicate of his claim. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). 

He has produced no evidence that trial counsel made such statements, and the existing record 

provides no reason to infer that she did. In addition, defendant has not identified any exculpatory 

evidence that he would have introduced through his testimony. Therefore, assuming arguendo that

trial counsel gave defendant objectively deficient advice about the wisdom of testifying in his own 

defense, defendant has failed to show that, but for counsel’s advice, there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Accordingly, this claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.

For his final claim of ineffective assistance, defendant argues that his trial counsel

performed deficiently by failing to object when deputies testified that mail found at 163 Seward 

Street was addressed to defendant at the Oakland County jail. One of the jury questions submitted 

to Scruggs after his testimony was how he knew that defendant resided at the house on Seward 

Street. The deputy noted, among other things, that mail addressed to defendant was found at the 

house. Following up on the deputy’s reply, the court asked, “Do you recall how the Defendant’s 

mail was addressed?” Scruggs replied, “It was addressed to Mr. Abcumby-Blair and I believe the 

address was – I believe the Oakland County Jail.” Later, Janczarek was called on to explain why 

documents addressed to defendant at an address other than Seward Street were significant enough 

to be taken into evidence. The deputy’s explanation implied that letters addressed and delivered 

to defendant “in the jail” but found at 163 Seward Street likely were brought there by defendant. 

 

of our machinery of government, not merely an inconvenience to be somehow weighed against the 

claims of police efficiency. Recent technological advances . . . have . . . made the process of 

obtaining a warrant itself more efficient.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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Defendant contends that this testimony was inadmissible and highly prejudicial because it 

informed the jury that defendant had been incarcerated prior to the instant allegations, and argues 

that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object, or at the very least, to request 

a limiting instruction.

Under the objective reasonableness prong of the Strickland test, “[t]here is a presumption 

that counsel was effective, and a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s 

challenged actions were sound trial strategy.” People v Cooper, 309 Mich App 74, 80; 867 NW2d 

452 (2015); see also Strickland, 466 US at 689; 104 S Ct 2052 (“[A] court must indulge in a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the range of reasonable assistance.”). This 

standard requires a reviewing court “to affirmatively entertain the range of possible ‘reasons . . . 

counsel may have had for proceeding as they did.’ ” People v Vaughn, 491 Mich 642, 670; 821 

NW2d 288 (2012) quoting Cullen v Pinholster, 563 US 170, 196; 131 S Ct 1388; 179 L Ed 2d 557 

(2011). In the instant case, the theory of defense was that defendant was insufficiently connected 

to 163 Seward Street to establish his constructive possession of the narcotics found there during 

the search. Scruggs’s testimony that defendant’s mail was addressed to him at the Oakland County 

Jail, rather than 163 Seward Street, arguably supported that theory. In addition, the defense

stipulated that defendant had been convicted of a specified felony that rendered him ineligible to 

possess a firearm. Given the defense strategy of dissociating defendant from 163 Seward Street, 

and the likelihood that the jury would have inferred that defendant had previously been 

incarcerated based on defendant’s stipulation, trial counsel’s failure to object to Scruggs’s

testimony may reasonably have been a strategic choice to get on the record testimony suggesting

that defendant did not reside at the Seward Street address. “This Court will not substitute its 

judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s 

competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 

887 (1999). Even if trial counsel did render deficient performance by failing to object, defendant 

has not shown prejudice in light of his stipulation that he previously had been convicted of a felony. 

Accordingly, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel also fails.

IV. HEARSAY

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by excluding as inadmissible hearsay 

Janczarek’s testimony regarding whether defendant’s name was on the lease for 163 Seward Street. 

We find any error to have been harmless.

This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of 

discretion. Peope v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 251; 934 NW2d 693 (2019). A trial court abuses its 

discretion only when “that decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes.” Id. at 251-

252 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Preserved nonconstitutional errors are subject to 

harmless error review under MCL 769.26[.]” Id. at 252. Under harmless error review, a defendant 

has the burden of establishing a miscarriage of justice under a more probable than not standard.” 

Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

On the second day of trial, after establishing that investigators obtained a copy of the lease 

for 163 Seward Street, defense counsel asked Janczarek whether defendant’s name was on the 

lease. When asked by the trial court if what was on the lease “was being offered to assert a matter 

for the truth,” counsel agreed that she was offering the deputy’s testimony for the truth of the 
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matter asserted regarding whether defendant’s name was on the lease. The prosecution objected, 

arguing that the tenant-status of a given individual constitutes “specific content of the lease 

agreement” and is a matter asserted by the lease. The prosecution opined that counsel should have 

called the landlord as a witness and sought to admit the lease as a business record. The trial court 

sustained the prosecution’s objection.

As an initial matter, we note that neither the prosecution’s argument, the trial court’s ruling, 

nor defendant’s argument on appeal seem to align completely with defense counsel’s argument in 

the trial court. At trial, counsel stated that she was not seeking to admit the lease into evidence. 

Rather, she was seeking testimony from Janczarek regarding his personal knowledge of the lease; 

specifically, did he, during the course of his investigation, see defendant’s name on the lease. On 

appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by excluding the lease. To the extent the trial 

court deemed the lease inadmissible hearsay, defendant is correct. Contractual documents with

legal effect independent of the truth of any statements contained in the documents are admissible. 

31A CJS Evidence § 378; see also 2 McCormick, Evidence (6th ed), § 249, p. 133 (“When a suit 

is brought for breach of a written contract, no one would think to object that a writing offered as 

evidence of the contract is hearsay[.]”).

Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court’s exclusion of Janczarek’s testimony

was error,10 our review of the record convinces us that the error was harmless. The testimony 

defense counsel sought was minimally probative of whether defendant had an actual connection 

with the property and constructive possession of the drugs found in the kitchen. Janczarek had 

testified the previous day that defendant’s registered address was in Detroit, not at the 163 Seward 

Street, and that it was common for people involved in the manufacture and sale of drugs to register 

at an address different from the one where the drug activity occurred. Further, as already 

recounted, there was ample testimony and evidence linking defendant to 163 Seward Street. In 

light of the deputy’s testimony that defendant’s registered address was in Detroit and the physical 

and testimonial evidence linking him to 163 Seward Street, defendant has failed to establish that 

omission of Janczarek’s testimony regarding whether defendant’s name was on the lease for 163 

Seward Street more probably than not resulted in a miscarriage of justice. See Thorpe, 504 Mich 

at 252.11

V. SENTENCING

Lastly, defendant argues that resentencing is required because the trial court unreasonably 

departed from the advisory guidelines minimum sentencing range. He contends that, because he 

 

10 It is not even clear that Janczarek could have answered the question put to him from personal 

knowledge. He testified that his partner was the one who obtained the lease, but said nothing about 

whether he actually saw it.

11 Defendant argues in the alternative that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective 

assistance by failing to lay the foundation for admission of the lease as a business record in 

accordance with MRE 803(6). Even if we assumed for the sake of argument that defense counsel 

rendered deficient performance, for the reasons explained above, defendant has not established 

that he was prejudiced thereby.
-15-

had never been sentenced to more than one year in jail, a sentence within the calculated minimum 

guidelines range of 19 to 76 months would have provided sufficient punishment and that his 

criminal record did not justify an upward departure of 32 months. We disagree.

We review a trial court’s departure from the advisory sentencing guidelines for an abuse 

of discretion. People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 471; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). When reviewing 

a departure sentence for reasonableness, we examine whether the trial court adequately explained 

“why the sentence imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different 

sentence would have been.” People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App 490, 525; 909 NW2d 458 (2017)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Factors to consider when determining “whether a 

departure sentence is more proportionate than a sentence within the guidelines range . . . include 

(1) whether the guidelines accurately reflect the seriousness of the crime; (2) factors not considered 

by the guidelines; and (3) factors considered by the guidelines but given inadequate weight.” Id.

(citations omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion when it imposes a sentence that is not “

‘proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.’ 

” Id. at 474, quoting People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), abrogated on 

other grounds as recognized in People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453; 902 NW2d 327 (2017).

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court summarized the context for its sentencing decision

as follows:

I have reviewed the Presentence Investigative Report. I’m familiar with the facts 

and circumstances of the case where those surround the Defendant. Be advised the 

guideline range in this case is 19 to 76 months. He is 28 years of age. He was 

convicted at trial. He has seven prior felonies, 17 misdemeanors. It takes a lot of 

effort to get that many when you’re only 28.

The drugs in this case were valued at approximately 14 to $15,000. The firearm 

that was recovered had a round in the chamber. I do have the authority to sentence 

him consecutively for the major controlled substance offense one and three. I guess 

I could double and make consecutive. I don’t intend to do that, but I do think that’s 

important that I do have that discretion.

The court next provided an overview of defendant’s substantial criminal history:

His criminal history begins in 2008 with a minor . . . no valid operator’s license, 

some disorderly conducts, things like that, and then a drug crime in 2012. Then it 

really escalates in 2011 for a controlled substance possession, cocaine, heroin, or 

another narcotic less than 25 grams, and controlled substance possession of 

marijuana and driver’s license suspended. He received one year of [Holmes 

Youthful Trainee Act (HYTA)] probation, which is about as easy as you can get. 

Unfortunately, he violated that . . . and HYTA [probation] was revoked. Quickly 

thereafter, in 2012, another controlled substance possession case, another lenient 

sentence of probation and jail. He violated that, [and was] sentenced to 300 days 

in jail. Then in 2014, failure to stop at scene of personal injury accident and 

operating [with] a license suspended, revoked, denied, second offense, another one 

year in jail. Then in 2017, [he was] convicted of controlled substance, 
-16-

delivery/manufacture less than 50 grams, habitual third; another controlled 

substance, delivery/manufacture less than 50 grams, habitual third; controlled 

substance possession of analogs, habitual third; controlled substance possession of 

analogs, another habitual third; and controlled substance second double penalty, 

habitual third, as well as driver’s license suspended. He was given a very lenient 

[sentence] there, one year in the jail. With the Cognitive Behavior Program, he was 

released [November 13, 2017].

Lastly, the court explained why it thought an upward departure was reasonable:

The Court finds that the mild upward deviation is reasonable and 

proportional in light of the following: His PRVs, as the People have noted, are off 

the charts. They were 110 with a maximum of 75. He has had similar crimes in 

the past that the Court has elaborated. He was released from Oakland County Jail 

approximately five months before for similar offenses, and here we are again.

Thus, the court concluded that an upward departure of 32 months was reasonable and 

proportional to the offense and the offender considering that the advisory sentencing guidelines 

did not adequately account for the extensiveness of defendant’s criminal record, the frequency and 

rate of defendant’s recidivism, and defendant’s apparent resistance to rehabilitation. This Court 

has affirmed upward departure sentences where the minimum sentencing guidelines did not 

adequately account for a defendant’s prolific criminal history, recidivism, and poor prospects for 

rehabilitation. See People v Odom, 327 Mich App 297, 315-316; 933 NW2d 719 (2019).

Defendant argues that even if the trial court explained its reasons for an upward departure, 

it did not justify the 32-month magnitude of the departure it imposed. This argument has some 

merit. The trial court did not expressly explain why a 32-month departure sentence was more 

fitting than a departure of some greater or lesser amount. However, the court found it important 

to note that it had discretion under MCL 333.7401(3) to impose a consecutive sentence for both of 

defendant’s convictions under MCL 333.7401(2)(a). Had the court exercised its discretion and 

imposed consecutive sentences, defendant could have received consecutive within-guidelines 

minimum sentences of 76 months for possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of 

cocaine and possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of heroin, effectively resulting in 

a minimum term of 152 months’ imprisonment, rather than the 108 months to which he was 

sentenced. In light of the trial court’s decision not to exercise its authority to impose consecutive 

sentences, and considering the court’s stated reasons for departing upward from the sentencing 

minimum guidelines range, we conclude that the court’s imposition of a sentence less than midway 

between the maximum of the minimum guidelines range and what it could have imposed through

consecutive sentencing was not unwarranted.

Affirmed.

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle

/s/ Jane M. Beckering

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher