Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Melinda Maldonado, Misc. Docket AG 

No. 11, September Term, 2017. Opinion by Getty, J.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE — SANCTIONS—DISBARMENT

The Court of Appeals disbarred an attorney who called her client’s doctor, held herself out 

as a medical doctor, and sought the alteration of her client’s medical records. When the 

attorney was unable to reach the doctor, the attorney continued to repeatedly call the 

doctor’s office over the course of two days. Further, while only barred in the District of 

Columbia, and without a pro hac vice sponsor, this attorney drafted and submitted various 

pleadings on behalf of her client in Maryland. Finally, this attorney failed to obtain the 

trial transcripts required for her client’s appeal in the Maryland Court of Special Appeals

which resulted in the dismissal of her client’s appeal. These actions violated the Maryland 

Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct Rules: 1.1 (Competence); 4.1 (Truthfulness in 

Statements to Others); 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of 

Law); 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters); and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct). 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. 433322-V

Argued: November 5, 2018

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Misc. Docket AG No. 11

September Term, 2017

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 

OF MARYLAND

v.

MELINDA MALDONADO

Barbera, C.J.

Greene,

McDonald,

Watts,

Hotten,

Getty,

Adkins, Sally D.,

(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)

JJ.

Opinion by Getty, J.

Filed: March 6, 2019
This attorney discipline case involves conduct of an out-of-state attorney during her 

representation of a Maryland resident in a toxic mold case. While representing her client, 

the attorney called her client’s doctor, held herself out as a medical doctor, and sought the 

alteration of her client’s medical records. When the attorney was unable to reach the 

doctor, the attorney repeatedly called the doctor’s office over the course of two days and

eventually made unprofessional comments about the doctor. Furthermore, while only 

barred in the District of Columbia, and without a pro hac vice sponsor, the attorney drafted 

and filed various pleadings on behalf of her client before Maryland courts. Finally, this 

attorney failed to obtain the trial transcripts required for her client’s appeal in the Maryland 

Court of Special Appeals which resulted in the dismissal of that appeal. For the reasons 

explained below, we hold that this attorney’s conduct merits disbarment.

BACKGROUND

Procedural Context

On May 23, 2017, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through 

Bar Counsel filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition”) with the Court 

of Appeals alleging that Melinda Maldonado (“Ms. Maldonado”) had violated the 

Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC” or “Rules”).1 See Md. Rule 

 

1 Effective July 1, 2016, the MLRPC were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 

Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and recodified in Title 19 of the Maryland Rules. Since 

Ms. Maldonado’s misconduct occurred before and after the effective date of the 

recodification of the rules of professional conduct, she committed violations of the same 

rules of professional conduct under both the MLRPC and the MARPC. For simplicity, and 

because there is no substantive difference in the two codifications of the rules, we shall use 

the shorter designations of the MLRPC, e.g., “Rule 1.1.”
2

19-721. Although not admitted to practice in Maryland, Ms. Maldonado is subject to the 

disciplinary authority of Maryland pursuant to Rule 8.5(a)(2). The Petition alleged that 

Ms. Maldonado, during her representation of Gladys Duren (“Ms. Duren”), violated the 

following Rules: 1.1 (Competence); 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others); 4.4 

(Respect for Rights of Third Persons); 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law; 

Multijurisdictional Practice of Law); 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters); and 

8.4 (Misconduct).2

We designated Judge Deborah L. Dwyer (“the hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court 

for Montgomery County by Order dated June 1, 2017 to conduct a hearing concerning the 

alleged violations and to provide findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law.

See Md. Rule 19-722(a). The Clerk of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (“Clerk”)

issued a summons to be served upon Ms. Maldonado, and on June 19, 2017, Bar Counsel 

emailed the petition, transmittal order, and summons to Ms. Maldonado and asked if she 

would consent to electronic service of process. Ms. Maldonado never responded. 

Bar Counsel retained a process server to serve Ms. Maldonado. The process server

was unsuccessful. As a result, the Clerk reissued the summons. Bar Counsel again emailed

the petition, transmittal order, and summons on August 29, 2017 to Ms. Maldonado to 

request electronic service of process. Ms. Maldonado responded to Bar Counsel’s request 

two days later and stated that she refused to accept electronic service of process. The 

process server also attempted service upon Ms. Maldonado again in person and failed. 

 

2 Bar Counsel later withdrew its Rule 8.1 violation allegation. 
3

As a result of these interactions, Bar Counsel filed a Motion to Permit Service Upon 

Employee Designated by the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland pursuant to 

Maryland Rule 19-723(b). Bar Counsel was successful in serving the Executive Director 

of the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland. 

Ms. Maldonado failed to file a timely answer, causing Bar Counsel to file a request 

for an order of default. Eventually, Ms. Maldonado retained Joseph A. Rillotta, Esquire 

and Margaret E. Matavich, Esquire who filed an opposition to the motion for order of 

default. In response, Bar Counsel consented to an extension of time for Ms. Maldonado to 

file an answer. Ms. Maldonado filed her answer on December 19, 2017, and Bar Counsel 

withdrew its motion. 

The hearing judge issued a scheduling order setting forth deadlines to propound and

to complete discovery. Bar Counsel promptly served discovery within the times set forth 

in the scheduling order. During this time, Ms. Maldonado sought to continue the discovery 

deadlines because she wished to proceed with new counsel. Bar Counsel opposed any

continuation of this matter noting that Ms. Maldonado had already delayed the proceeding

by evading service of process and failing to file a timely answer. Ms. Maldonado’s motion 

was ultimately denied.

Mr. Rillotta and Ms. Matavich filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel pursuant to 

Maryland Rule 2-132(b). Mark G. Chalpin, Esquire entered his appearance on behalf of 

Ms. Maldonado. A few weeks later, Mr. Chalpin moved to withdraw his appearance due 

to “irreconcilable differences” with Ms. Maldonado. Ms. Maldonado, now proceeding pro 
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se, filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court’s Order regarding the scheduling order. This 

motion was also denied.

On March 22, 2018, Bar Counsel filed a Motion for Sanctions based on Ms. 

Maldonado’s failure to provide responses to Bar Counsel’s Interrogatories, Requests for 

Production of Documents, and Requests for Admissions of Fact and Genuineness of 

Documents. Ms. Maldonado, now represented by William C. Brennan, Esquire, and 

Nicolas G. Madiou, Esquire, filed an Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Sanctions. Ms. 

Maldonado stated that her failure to timely answer discovery was due to illness and issues 

stemming from changes in representation. The hearing judge held the motion sub curia to

give the parties additional time to resolve their discovery dispute. On April 1, Ms. 

Maldonado provided Answers to Petitioner’s Interrogatories; on April 10, she provided

responses to Bar Counsel’s Requests for Admissions of Fact and Genuineness of Law; and 

on April 20, Ms. Maldonado provided a partial response to Bar Counsel’s Request for 

Production of Documents. As a result of her incomplete discovery responses, the hearing 

judge granted in part and denied in part Bar Counsel’s Motion for Sanctions. The hearing 

judge precluded Ms. Maldonado from introducing any documents at trial which were not 

produced to Bar Counsel during discovery. 

The evidentiary hearing took place over the course of two days on April 30 and May 

1. At the evidentiary hearing, Bar Counsel and Ms. Maldonado presented evidence and 

several witnesses testified. The hearing judge submitted her findings of fact and 

conclusions of law by a written opinion to this Court. In her recommended conclusions of 
5

law, the hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Maldonado 

violated Rule 1.1, Rule 4.1, Rule 4.4, Rule 5.5, and Rule 8.4 (a), (c), and (d). 

On August 7, 2018, Ms. Maldonado filed a motion in this Court titled as follows:

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss this Prolonged (Almost Three Years) 

Unethical and Immoral Defamation, Harassment & Interference with 

Underlying Toxic Mold Litigation by Petitioner, Attorney Grievance 

Commission (AGC) of Maryland. Alternatively, Respondent Motion for a 

Rehearing due to Egregious, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel by William 

C. Brennan & Nicholas Madiou & Due to Bias of Judge Debra Dwyer, 

Motions for a Change of Venue to Anne Arundel County, Judge Ronald 

Silkworth (due to County of Original Jurisdiction of Underlying Toxic Mold 

Case, Judge Silkworth’s Familiarity w/Issue of Petitioner’s, AGC’s, Pattern 

& Practice of Defaming & Harassing Respondents while Aiding & Abetting 

Defense Law Firms Representing Real Estate Companies who File 

Grievances Against Opposing, Plaintiffs’ Counsel (Respondents) to Disrupt 

Underlying Litigation all in the Name of Money.

(“First Motion”). Two days later, Ms. Maldonado filed a second motion entitled:

Pending this Honorable Court’s Review of Respondent’s Definitive 

Submissions on 8-7-18: Motion to Dismiss, and, Alternatively, Request for 

a Rehearing due to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel & Biased/Legal 

Errors/Incorrect Findings of Facts Based on False Hearsay by Judge Dwyer; 

Motion for Change of Venue to Anne Arundel County Before Judge Ronald 

Silkworth Given Original Jurisdiction of Underlying Toxic Mold Case and 

Judge Silkworth’s Experience with AGC-Respondent Hereby Inherently 

Submits this Motion to Extend Time to File Exceptions Document & 

Opposition to Motion for Sanctions & Will be Submitting in Turn 

Respondent’s Motion for Sanctions Against the AGC/Bar Counsel & a 

Supplement to Motion to Dismiss. 

(“Second Motion”). As to her First Motion, this Court ordered action deferred pending 

oral argument. This Court granted her Second Motion to the extent that this Court 

permitted Ms. Maldonado to file any exceptions on or before September 5, 2018. 

Bar Counsel took no exceptions and Ms. Maldonado filed numerous exceptions to 

the hearing judge’s findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. Ms. Maldonado 
6

filed another motion to dismiss, entitled Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Part 2: (“Third 

Motion”) on October 5, 2018 and filed an amended motion to dismiss, also entitled 

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Part 2: (“Fourth Motion”) two days later. We heard oral 

argument in this matter on November 5, 2018. 

Facts

We begin with a summary of the hearing judge’s factual findings. Ms. Maldonado 

has never been barred in Maryland. She was admitted to the Bar of the District of Columbia 

on November 14, 2003. Since then, she has maintained a law office in Arlington, Virginia

and has focused on representing personal injury clients, specifically the practice of toxic 

mold litigation. This matter involves multiple instances of misconduct stemming from a 

toxic tort action filed in Maryland in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.

Ms. Maldonado’s Unauthorized Practice of Law 

In the summer of 2013, David Haynes, Esquire, referred Ms. Duren, a Maryland 

resident, to Ms. Maldonado. Ms. Duren sought to sue her former landlord, Home 

Properties Resident Services, Inc. (“Home Properties”), because she alleged she became ill 

from toxic mold infestation in her rental townhome in Glen Burnie, Maryland. After 

meeting with Ms. Duren, Ms. Maldonado drafted a complaint. With Ms. Maldonado’s 

assistance, Ms. Duren signed the complaint, indicated she was proceeding pro se, and filed 

the complaint with the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on April 24, 2014. The 

case was assigned case number 02-C-14-187157. Ms. Maldonado also filled out the case 

information report for Ms. Duren which Ms. Duren also signed and filed pro se. Ms. 
7

Maldonado drafted an amended complaint that Ms. Duren signed and filed. The amended 

complaint continued to indicate that Ms. Duren was proceeding pro se. 

Ms. Duren and Ms. Maldonado retained Christopher T. Nace, Esquire, and Paulson 

& Nace, PPLC to assist in the lawsuit. The retainer agreement between Ms. Maldonado, 

Ms. Duren, and Mr. Nace stated:

This retainer agreement does not cover any appeals which may need to be 

filed on behalf of us as a consequence of an adverse event in my case. If

Paulson & Nace, PPLC agrees to prosecute such an appeal on my behalf, 

then a new retainer agreement may be drawn up. 

The retainer agreement stated further, “[i]f Paulson & Nace, PPLC comes to the conclusion 

that the case is non-meritorious or that it would be economically unsound to proceed, 

Paulson & Nace, PPLC reserves the right to seek its withdrawal.” 

Mr. Nace filed a motion for special admission pro hac vice on Ms. Maldonado’s 

behalf. The motion was granted and the order granting the motion specifically stated, “the 

presence of Maryland counsel, Christopher T. Nace, Esquire, is not waived, and Maryland 

counsel must appear at all proceedings and co-sign all pleadings and motions.” 

James S. Liskow, Esquire, and Emily F. Belanger, Esquire, of DeCaro, Doran, 

Siciliano, Gallagher & DeBlasis, LLP represented Home Properties. A jury trial took place 

between July 28–30, 2015. At the end of Ms. Duren’s case, Mr. Liskow moved for a 

directed verdict. The circuit court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of 

Home Properties. 

After the circuit court trial, Mr. Nace filed a notice of appeal with the circuit court 

pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-201(a) to preserve Ms. Duren’s right of appeal. Shortly after 
8

the notice of appeal, Mr. Nace informed Ms. Duren that he and his firm would not be 

entering into a new agreement for services related to the appeal and would be withdrawing 

as counsel of record. Ms. Duren consented. 

Mr. Nace informed Ms. Maldonado about his withdrawal from the appeal through 

email and stated: “I don’t believe that you can appear at the Court of Special Appeals, but 

I am not certain.” Ms. Maldonado responded and stated, “Yes, agreed. Maryland [c]ounsel 

is required.” However, after Mr. Nace withdrew, Ms. Maldonado continued to work on 

the case without a pro hac vice sponsor. Ms. Maldonado drafted pleadings and briefs for 

Ms. Duren to sign pro se and filed those pleadings in the Court of Special Appeals on 

behalf of Ms. Duren. 

Eventually, Home Properties moved to dismiss the appeal pursuant to Maryland

Rule 8-602 based on Ms. Duren’s failure to obtain the trial transcript pursuant to Maryland 

Rule 8-413(a)(2). The Court of Special Appeals denied the motion without prejudice and 

ordered Ms. Duren to “take all steps necessary to cause all transcripts necessary for this 

Appeal to be filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on or before February 1, 

2016.” The transcripts were never filed. Home Properties filed a second Motion to Dismiss

which the Court of Special Appeals granted. 

Ms. Maldonado drafted Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of: Dismissal, 

Automatic Retrial, Extension of Time as Court Deems Reasonable & Waiver of Fees Given 

Severe Disability (“Motion for Reconsideration”). Ms. Maldonado typed Ms. Duren’s 

electronic signature with Ms. Duren’s consent and electronically filed the document with 
9

Ms. Duren’s email address. The Court of Special Appeals denied the Motion for 

Reconsideration and issued a Mandate. 

Next, Ms. Maldonado drafted a Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Ms. Duren. Ms. 

Maldonado typed Ms. Duren’s electronic signature and electronically filed the Petition for 

Writ of Certiorari using Ms. Duren’s email address on April 27, 2016 with this Court. The 

Petition stated Ms. Duren was proceeding pro se. Ms. Maldonado also drafted the

Certificate of Word Count and Compliance for Ms. Duren, typed Ms. Duren’s electronic 

signature, and electronically filed the document using Ms. Duren’s email address. Again, 

on June 14 and June 19, Ms. Maldonado drafted, typed Ms. Duren’s electronic signature, 

and electronically filed two documents entitled Pro Se Petitioner’s Reply-Part 1-to 

Respondents’ Answer to Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Pro Se Petitioner’s Reply-Part 

2-to Respondent’s Answer to Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 

This Court denied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari as untimely filed. Ms. 

Maldonado then drafted Pro Se & Severely Disabled Petitioner’s Motion for 

Reconsideration of Dismissal & Demand to Reinstate Case due to Early Not Late Filing, 

typed Ms. Duren’s electronic signature, and electronically filed the document using Ms. 

Duren’s email address. We denied the motion. 

After the denial, Ms. Maldonado drafted a Petition for Writ of Certiorari (“Petition”)

to the Supreme Court of the United States. Again, the Petition stated Ms. Duren was 

proceeding pro se and Ms. Duren signed the Petition. Ms. Duren consented to the entry of 

appearances of Ms. Maldonado and Relinda Louisy, Esquire, as her attorneys before the 
10

Supreme Court. Ultimately, the Supreme Court issued an Order denying the Petition for 

Writ of Certiorari. 

Ms. Maldonado’s Communications with the Office of John Wiley, M.D. 

On February 9, 2015, Emily Belanger, Esquire, an attorney for Home Properties, 

issued a subpoena to Dr. John Wiley, a pulmonologist who treated Ms. Duren at Baltimore 

Washington Medical Center (“BWMC”). Ms. Maldonado called Dr. Wiley’s office on 

July 21, 2015 at 10:13 a.m. Dr. Wiley’s medical assistant, Keisha Lipscomb, answered. 

Ms. Maldonado identified herself to Ms. Lipscomb as “Doctor Maldonado” and asked to 

speak with Dr. Wiley. Ms. Maldonado further stated she had information that Ms. Duren 

was exposed to toxic mold and that she needed to tell Dr. Wiley about the toxic mold 

exposure so it could be added to Ms. Duren’s records. Ms. Lipscomb stated that Dr. Wiley 

was unavailable to speak but that she would take a message for Dr. Wiley.

Ms. Maldonado called Dr. Wiley’s office four more times that day, at 10:48 a.m., 

10:55 a.m., 11:31 a.m., and 11:38 a.m. Ms. Maldonado was unable to reach Dr. Wiley and 

grew increasingly frustrated. Eventually, Ms. Maldonado revealed that she was Ms. 

Duren’s attorney and that she needed documentation from Dr. Wiley immediately for a 

court filing. 

At 11:01 a.m., Ms. Lipscomb made the following entry in Ms. Duren’s patient log: 

DR MELINDA MALDONADO called. . . . She would like to you [sic] call 

her, because she needs you to change your hospital note since you noted that 

the patient has allergies when in fact she was exposed to mold and needs to 

educate you on this. 

[S]he would like you to call asap since she has to file paperwork within 15

min. [S]tates she is a physician and a lawyer? 
11

Ms. Lipscomb testified she was confused by Ms. Maldonado’s phone calls and was 

unsure how to answer them. Ms. Lipscomb’s supervisor eventually instructed her not to 

speak with Ms. Maldonado. The calls were transferred to the office manager, Michelle 

Andrade. Ms. Lipscomb reviewed Ms. Duren’s medical chart to determine if she could 

determine why Ms. Maldonado was repeatedly calling. Ms. Lipscomb found the subpoena 

from Ms. Belanger, whom she believed was Ms. Duren’s attorney, in the file. 

At 11:18 a.m., Dr. Elizabeth McIlmoyle made the following entry in Ms. Duren’s 

patient log: 

This person called 4 x so far today, asking the above [as described in Ms. 

Lipscomb’s note]. She spoke w/ [M]ichelle, [K]esha and [A]ndrea. Kesha 

called the [patient’s] lawyer (who we have sent records to before w/signed 

release and whose info is in the chart) and spoke w/paralegal Joan-they stated 

they do not know who she is. 

We do not have releases to speak w/her or give any information. 

Ms. Lipscomb googled Ms. Maldonado’s name and discovered that she was not a 

physician, but instead was a toxic torts attorney. Dr. McIlmoyle wrote an addendum in the 

patient log:

ADDENDUM: 1159AM

As addendum to above, think lawyers we spoke w/(and have documentation 

of in chart: [D]ecaro/[D]oran) are defendant counsel, not patient’s lawyer. In 

any case, we do not have [a] release for speaking with the above person. 

Dr. Wiley wrote “Noted. JW” in the patient’s log at 1:53 p.m.

The next day, Ms. Maldonado called Dr. Wiley’s office at least two more times. At 

12:18 p.m., Dr. Wiley’s employee wrote a note in the patient log that “Dr. MELINDA

MALDONADO called again today asking for Dr. Wiley. . . she wanted me to page Dr. 
12

Wiley and I told her I cannot do that and she hung up.” Dr. Wiley’s employee notified the 

answering service that if someone named Dr. Maldonado attempted to page Dr. Wiley, that 

the answering service should forward those calls to the office and should not page Dr. 

Wiley. 

At 12:23 p.m., the office manager made the following note in the patient log:

[A]nswering service called and [p]ut Dr. [M]aldonado through again since 

she was trying to reach [D]r. [W]iley at the hospital. I explained to her I am 

not paging the physician and that he has the message. [S]he stated it was 

urgent and I explained that again I am not paging him. She then stated how 

rude he is and that he has not returned the call. I told her that he is not going 

to since there is nothing on file from the patient that we can talk to her. 

[S]he stated that all she wants him to do is change his hospital note, again I 

told her he is not going to do that. [S]he stated she will go through medical 

records at [BWMC] and she will track him down and make him change the 

note and she hung up. 

At one point, Ms. Maldonado questioned Dr. Wiley’s competence and intelligence and 

called him a “backwoods” physician. In addition to referring to herself as Dr. Maldonado, 

she also told Dr. Wiley’s staff that she went to medical school.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error a hearing 

judge’s findings of fact and reviews without deference a hearing judge’s conclusions of 

law. See Md. Rule 19-741(b)(2)(B) (“The Court [of Appeals] shall give due regard to the 

opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”); Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Chanthunya, 446 Md. 576, 588 (2016) (“This Court reviews for 

clear error a hearing judge’s findings of fact.” (citations omitted)); Md. Rule 19-741(b)(1) 

(“The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the [hearing] judge’s conclusions of law.”).
13

This Court determines whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that a lawyer 

violated an MLRPC. See Md. Rule 19-727(c) (“Bar Counsel has the burden of proving the 

averments of the petition [for disciplinary or remedial action] by clear and convincing

evidence.”). If exceptions to the findings of fact are filed, the Court “shall determine 

whether the findings of fact have been proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in 

Rule 19-727(c).” Md. Rule 19-741(b)(2)(B).

DISCUSSION

The authority to discipline an out-of-state attorney who provides legal services in 

Maryland is provided in Maryland Rule 8.5(a)(2). “Under that rule, an attorney who is not 

admitted in Maryland is subject to the disciplinary authority of this Court if the attorney, 

among other things: (1) provides or offers to provide any legal services in Maryland.” 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ndi, 459 Md. 42, 54 (2018). As a result, Ms. Maldonado 

is subject to discipline in Maryland. Bar Counsel did not except to any of the hearing 

judge’s findings of fact or recommended conclusions of law. Ms. Maldonado takes 

numerous exceptions to the hearing judge’s factual findings and recommended conclusions 

of law. Additionally, Ms. Maldonado excepts to the hearing judge’s evaluation of the

aggravating and mitigating factors found in this matter, contending that the finding of 

certain aggravating factors was not appropriate and that additional mitigating factors 

should have been found. Finally, as a preliminary matter, all of Ms. Maldonado’s motions 

to dismiss are denied. We have reviewed the motions and Ms. Maldonado’s contentions 

lack any merit.
14

Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact

Findings of Fact About the Unauthorized Practice of Law 

First, as to the unauthorized practice of law, Ms. Maldonado contends the hearing 

judge should have made additional findings of fact surrounding what Ms. Maldonado 

believes was a conspiracy between the Complainant Mr. Liskow, who represented Home 

Properties in the underlying mold litigation, Mr. Nace, her Maryland pro hac vice sponsor,

and Bar Counsel to thwart the underlying litigation between Home Properties and Ms. 

Duren. Ms. Maldonado did not present any evidence to the hearing judge of this alleged 

conspiracy. In fact, Mr. Liskow specifically testified he waited until the conclusion of the 

underlying litigation to write a letter to notify Bar Counsel of Ms. Maldonado’s 

misconduct. Furthermore, these allegations have no bearing on Ms. Maldonado’s 

disciplinary hearing as Bar Counsel has conducted its own independent investigation into 

these allegations and has brought forth these charges against Ms. Maldonado. See Md. 

Rule 19-711(b). There is no evidence this disciplinary proceeding was instigated as a tactic 

in the underlying toxic tort litigation. Rather, the Complainant complied with Maryland’s 

Rules and reported Ms. Maldonado’s misconduct after interacting with her as opposing 

counsel in the tort litigation. Accordingly, we overrule Ms. Maldonado’s exception. 

Second, Ms. Maldonado contends the hearing judge should have made additional 

findings of fact surrounding her efforts to obtain Maryland counsel and find a pro hac vice

sponsor while she was drafting the complaints and pursuing the appeal. She claims her

pursuit of Maryland counsel permitted her to move forward with her representation of Ms. 

Duren without a pro hac vice sponsor in Maryland. Alternatively, Ms. Maldonado 
15

contends the hearing judge should have made additional findings of fact that she informed 

Ms. Duren and her family that they would need to obtain new Maryland counsel for the 

appeal and that Ms. Maldonado was not available for the appellate work because she had 

to go out-of-state in order to care for her mother.

We conclude that the omission of these facts was not clearly erroneous. These 

omitted facts have no bearing on this Court’s consideration of violations of Rule 5.5. See 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Moore, 451 Md. 55, 75 (2017) (citing Attorney Grievance 

Comm’n v. Sheinbein, 372 Md. 224, 241 (2002) (A “hearing judge’s omission of a factual 

finding is not clearly erroneous when the fact has ‘little bearing on the outcome of [the]

proceeding and is irrelevant.’”). As to her initial contention, Ms. Maldonado is correct that 

an attorney may render services in Maryland on a temporary basis if the attorney anticipates 

admission pro hac vice. Rule 5.5(c)(2) states: 

An attorney admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred 

or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on 

a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that: are in or reasonably related to a 

pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another 

jurisdiction, if the attorney, or a person the attorney is assisting, is authorized 

by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so 

authorized[.]

However, Ms. Maldonado ignores Comment 10 to Rule 5.5 which expands on the 

proper application of Rule 5.5(c)(2) and states, “[e]xamples of such conduct include 

meetings with the client, interviews of potential witnesses, and the review of documents.” 

Drafting the complaint and preparing multiple appellate filings clearly extends beyond the 

scope of rendering services on a temporary basis. Therefore, the additional fact that Ms. 
16

Maldonado searched for Maryland counsel does not excuse her conduct and the hearing 

judge’s omission was not clearly erroneous. 

As to the alternative findings of fact Ms. Maldonado requested from the hearing 

judge, specifically that Ms. Maldonado informed Ms. Duren that she would need to find 

new counsel for her appeal and that Ms. Maldonado was not acting as counsel because her 

mother was sick, either of those findings would be contrary to the factual findings of the 

hearing judge. We conclude the hearing judge did not clearly err in finding that Ms. 

Maldonado continued to represent Ms. Duren in the appeal. “A hearing judge does not 

clearly err in finding a fact where ‘there is any competent evidence to support the’ finding 

of fact.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Donnelly, 458 Md. 237, 276 (2018) (quoting

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Merkle, 440 Md. 609, 633 (2014)). The hearing judge is 

in the best position to make these types of credibility evaluations and we cannot find that 

the hearing judge was clearly erroneous. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hodes, 441 

Md. 136, 181 (2014) (“We generally ‘defer to the credibility findings of the hearing 

judge.’”) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Agbaje, 438 Md. 695, 722 (2014)). Ms. 

Duren testified that Ms. Maldonado drafted and filed the appellate documents with Ms. 

Duren’s consent. Further, Ms. Duren stated she did not know how to file any of the 

documents herself and that they drafted and filed the documents together. The hearing 

judge evaluated the evidence and weighed Ms. Duren’s testimony and Ms. Maldonado’s 

testimony. We will not overrule the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Maldonado 

continued to represent Ms. Duren throughout the appellate proceedings.
17

As to Ms. Maldonado’s allegations that she was unavailable due to her mother’s 

illness, that evidence is more properly suited for mitigation. In any event, Ms. Maldonado 

provided no documentation, beyond her own testimony, of her time out-of-state.

Therefore, the hearing judge did not clearly err in her findings and Ms. Maldonado’s 

exceptions are overruled.

Findings of Fact About Ms. Maldonado’s Communications with Dr. Wiley’s Office 

Ms. Maldonado believed the hearing judge should have found that Ms. Maldonado 

introduced herself as “Dr. Maldonado” and immediately clarified that she was an 

environmental attorney and toxic tort legal specialist. As evidence of this fact, Ms. 

Maldonado cites to the call log. Ms. Maldonado contends that she clearly disclosed that 

she was representing Ms. Duren in a legal matter and that she clearly stated she was an 

environmental attorney. She also contends that the hearing judge was incorrect that she 

sought alteration of her client’s medical records. Further, she states that Ms. Duren’s 

medical records already reflected that Ms. Duren was exposed to toxic mold for three years 

and that she was allergic to penicillin so alteration of the records would not have been 

necessary. Ms. Maldonado contends that the reason that she called Dr. Wiley’s office was 

for two distinct reasons: (1) that she wanted to discuss the severity of Ms. Duren’s condition 

due to toxic mold and (2) to try to obtain a letter from Dr. Wiley regarding Ms. Duren’s 

condition to include in support of a motion for new trial. Ms. Maldonado claims she did 

not state she went to medical school and only wanted Dr. Wiley’s staff to know she had 
18

knowledge and a background in medical science to support her legal experience with toxic 

mold. 

The hearing judge is in the best position to make these types of credibility 

evaluations. See Hodes, 441 Md. at 181. The hearing judge reviewed the evidence and 

testimony to reach the conclusion that Ms. Maldonado held herself out as a medical doctor 

to Dr. Wiley’s office. Testimony from those working at Dr. Wiley’s office and the patient 

log admitted into evidence support the hearing judge’s conclusion. We cannot say the 

hearing judge’s findings of fact involving Ms. Maldonado’s interactions with Dr. Wiley’s 

office staff were clearly erroneous. Therefore, Ms. Maldonado’s exceptions are overruled. 

Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law 

As a general statement supporting her exceptions, Ms. Maldonado contends that

throughout the proceedings her intentions were altruistic and that she was always seeking 

to protect Ms. Duren and her legal rights. As described below, she also provided a more

specific basis for the following exceptions as to each conclusion of law.

Rule 1.1 

Rule 1.1 requires that an attorney “shall provide competent representation to a 

client.” “Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 

preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” R. 1.1. An attorney violates Rule 

1.1 if she “fails to act or acts in an untimely manner, resulting in harm to his or her client.” 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brown, 426 Md. 298, 319 (2012). Failure to take 

“necessary, fundamental steps to further the client’s case” violates Rule 1.1. Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Garrett, 427 Md. 209, 223 (2012). The hearing judge found Ms. 
19

Maldonado violated Rule 1.1 when she failed to obtain the trial transcripts pursuant to 

Maryland Rule 8-413(a)(2) in order to proceed with Ms. Duren’s appeal in the Court of 

Special Appeals. Ms. Maldonado’s failure to obtain the transcripts caused Ms. Duren’s 

appeal to be dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-602. 

Ms. Maldonado contends that she was never Ms. Duren’s counsel for the appeal and 

thus was not required to ensure that the transcript was filed. We overrule Ms. Maldonado’s 

exception to Rule 1.1. We affirmed the hearing judge’s finding of fact that Ms. Maldonado 

represented Ms. Duren without a pro hac vice sponsor throughout the appellate process. 

The evidence clearly illustrates that Ms. Maldonado was not simply assisting Ms. Duren in 

her appeal but instead was directly representing Ms. Duren. Moreover, under this 

unauthorized practice of law, Ms. Duren was relying on Ms. Maldonado as her appellate

counsel. As a result, Ms. Maldonado was responsible for obtaining the appropriate 

transcripts or terminating her representation of Ms. Duren. 

Further supporting this violation by Ms. Maldonado is the fact that the Court of 

Special Appeals initially denied Home Properties’ Motion to Dismiss so that Ms. Duren

could “take all steps necessary to cause all transcripts necessary for this Appeal to be filed 

in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on or before February 1, 2016.” Despite this 

directive, Ms. Maldonado took no further action in the Court of Special Appeals and her 

failure eventually caused Ms. Duren to forfeit her right of appeal. Ms. Maldonado’s failure 

to order the proper transcripts reflects a lack of competence and her exception is overruled. 

Therefore, we affirm the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Maldonado’s failure to file a 
20

transcript in the Court of Special Appeals to preserve her client’s appeal provided clear and 

convincing evidence of a lack of competence in violation of Rule 1.1. 

Rule 4.1

Rule 4.1(a) requires in part that “[i]n the course of representing a client an attorney 

shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person[.]” 

Comment [1] to the Rule provides: 

An attorney is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client’s 

behalf. . . . A misrepresentation can occur if the attorney incorporates or 

affirms a statement of another person that the attorney knows is false. 

Misrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading statements 

or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements.

The hearing judge determined Ms. Maldonado twisted the truth and deliberately 

intended to mislead Dr. Wiley’s office to obtain something on behalf of Ms. Duren. 

Specifically, in her dealings with Dr. Wiley’s office, Ms. Maldonado did not clearly 

disclose that she was representing Ms. Duren in a legal matter and that her requests related 

to a pending trial. Further, Ms. Maldonado used the title “Doctor” which was a deliberate

and calculated move that Ms. Maldonado intended to be misleading. Ms. Maldonado 

wanted Dr. Wiley’s staff to think that she was a medical doctor and she further misled them 

when she informed them that “I went to med[ical] school.” The hearing judge concluded 

Ms. Maldonado was in violation of Rule 4.1 as a result of these factual findings.

In excepting to the hearing judge’s conclusion of law, Ms. Maldonado states that 

she clearly identified herself as Ms. Duren’s environmental attorney and never identified 

herself as a physician. She stated she immediately clarified that she was an attorney 

representing Ms. Duren. Further, she states she never misled anyone or attempted to 
21

mislead anyone. Rather, she wanted to speak with Dr. Wiley to discuss Ms. Duren’s 

condition in order to convince him to support her motion for a new trial. 

Ms. Maldonado’s exception is inconsistent with her testimony. In fact, she testified

that she identified herself as “Doctor Maldonado” so that she could “baby step her way in” 

because she often found doctors’ office staff rude to her when she identifies herself as an 

attorney. Further, Ms. Maldonado’s claim that she clearly identified herself as Ms. Duren’s 

attorney is inconsistent with the fact that Dr. Wiley’s staff was confused as to her identity 

and the purpose of her phone calls. The entries in the patient log illustrate the office’s 

confusion as to Ms. Maldonado’s identity.

The factual findings allow us to conclude that Ms. Maldonado held herself out as a 

medical doctor in an attempt to confuse Dr. Wiley’s staff and gain access to Dr. Wiley.

Ms. Maldonado knew she could not gain the same access if she identified herself as an 

attorney. We doubt that Ms. Maldonado would have used the title “Doctor” if she was 

calling any other professional office. Rule 4.1 encompasses misrepresentations that are 

“partially true but misleading statements or omissions.” We are persuaded that there was 

clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Maldonado held herself out as a medical doctor to

mislead the staff as to her identity. Accordingly, we agree with the hearing judge that clear 

and convincing evidence exists to conclude Ms. Maldonado violated Rule 4.1 and we 

overrule Ms. Maldonado’s exception. 

Rule 4.4

Rule 4.4(a) provides that “[i]n representing a client, an attorney shall not use means 

that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, 
22

or use methods of obtaining evidence that the lawyer knows violate the legal rights of such 

a person.” Comment [1] to the Rule states:

Responsibility to a client requires an attorney to subordinate the interests of 

others to those of the clients, but that responsibility does not imply that an 

attorney may disregard the rights of third persons. . . . It is impractical to 

catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of 

obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into 

privileged relationships, such as the client-attorney relationship.

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Maldonado’s numerous phone calls over the course 

of two days harassed Dr. Wiley’s staff and violated Ms. Duren’s rights in violation of Rule 

4.4. In her exception to the finding of a Rule 4.4 violation, Ms. Maldonado contends that 

she did not intentionally burden Dr. Wiley’s office with the phone calls over the course of 

two days. She states the reason for the phone calls was legitimate and not to embarrass, 

delay, or burden anyone; rather the severity of Ms. Duren’s condition warranted her 

conduct as a zealous advocate for her client.

Ms. Maldonado called Dr. Wiley’s office and the hospital’s answering service at 

least nine times over the course of two days. Her calls over those two days required the 

attention of multiple employees in Dr. Wiley’s office and eventually involved the larger 

hospital answering system. As an experienced attorney in toxic tort litigation, Ms. 

Maldonado should have known that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 

Act (“HIPAA”) Privacy Rule barred a doctor from discussing the information she was 

calling about. We do not condone Ms. Maldonado’s tactic, yet, we do not believe there is 

clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Maldonado conduct arose to a violation of Rule 

4.4. 
23

This case is distinguishable from those in which we have found a violation of Rule 

4.4. For example, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cocco, the attorney presented invalid 

subpoenas to Walmart employees in order to obtain a copy of a surveillance video. 442 

Md. 1, 5 (2015). When the employees did not comply, the attorney threatened the 

employees with personal lawsuits. Id. We found facts supportive of a finding of a violation

of Rule 4.4. Id. at 10. Likewise in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mixter, we held an 

attorney violated Rule 4.4 when he “intentionally pursued the defendants’ driving records 

without basis, causing his opposition to use time and resources to obtain protective orders 

as to their driving records, and delaying litigation, thereby violating Rule 4.4(a).” 441 Md. 

416, 522 (2015). Here, while Ms. Maldonado’s numerous calls required the attention of

Dr. Wiley’s office for two days, she never threatened the office with litigation or filed any 

motions. Further, while ill-advised, we believe that in Ms. Maldonado’s mind she had a 

“purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden” Dr. Wiley’s office. As a result, we do 

not find there was sufficient clear and convincing evidence of a violation of Rule 4.4(a)

presented to the hearing judge. 

Rule 5.5 

Rule 5.5(a) provides that “a lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in 

violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in 

doing so.” Ms. Maldonado claims special circumstances exist in which the complainant,

Mr. Liskow, threatened her sponsoring attorney during the underlying litigation, causing 

her sponsoring attorney to withdraw as appellate counsel. Further, according to Ms. 

Maldonado this alleged threat caused her sponsoring attorney to lie when he testified during 
24

the disciplinary hearing that he told Ms. Maldonado that he was withdrawing as counsel.

She contends this evidence absolves her of wrongdoing especially because of the “life and 

death circumstances of Ms. Duren.” She also contends she was always motivated by her 

desire to assist Ms. Duren and protect her legal rights.

As to the first contention, there is no evidence in the record to support Ms. 

Maldonado’s bald assertion that Mr. Liskow or Mr. Nace engaged in any misconduct. The 

evidence does not suggest, and we do not accept, that Mr. Liskow or Mr. Nace acted 

unethically by informing Bar Counsel of Ms. Maldonado’s conduct during the underlying 

lawsuit. Furthermore, none of Ms. Maldonado’s exceptions excuse her unauthorized 

practice of law in Maryland. 

The hearing judge concluded Ms. Maldonado engaged in the unauthorized practice 

of law during multiple time periods during her representation of Ms. Duren. “To determine 

whether an individual has engaged in the practice of law, the focus of the inquiry should 

‘be on whether the activity in question required legal knowledge and skill in order to apply 

legal principles and precedent.’” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hallmon, 343 Md. 390, 

397 (1996) (citations omitted). “[T]he unauthorized practice of law includes utilizing legal 

education, training, and experience to apply the special analysis of the profession to a 

client’s problem.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barneys, 370 Md. 566, 580 (2002)

(cleaned up) (citations omitted). “Where trial work is not involved but the preparation of 

legal documents, their interpretation, the giving of legal advice, or the application of legal 

principles to problems of any complexity, is involved, these activities are still the practice 

of law.” Hallmon, 343 Md. at 397 (citations omitted). 
25

Here, Ms. Maldonado was not licensed to practice law in Maryland during the entire 

time that she represented Ms. Duren.

3 While unlicensed in Maryland and without a pro 

hac vice sponsor, Ms. Maldonado drafted and filed numerous pleadings in the underlying

action. The fact that she signed them on Ms. Duren’s behalf as “pro se” does not absolve 

Ms. Maldonado from the unauthorized practice of law. In fact, we find her conduct more 

culpable because she was deceiving the court. Ms. Duren was never proceeding pro se, 

but instead Ms. Maldonado was using that description to hide the fact that she was 

practicing in Maryland without a license. Out-of-state counsel is not permitted to hide his 

or her representation of a client through the use of pro se filings when, as was present in 

this case, the out-of-state attorney is drafting all of the pleadings, conducting all of the

research for the pleadings, placing their client’s signature on the pleadings, placing the 

statement that the client was proceeding pro se on the pleadings, and personally filing the 

pleadings on his or her client’s behalf.4 The evidence shows that Ms. Maldonado, without 

 

3 We do recognize that she was authorized to practice law in Maryland during the pro hac 

vice admission period.

4 We also note this behavior is different from what has been coined “ghostwriting” across 

various jurisdictions. “Ghost-writing is best described as when a member of the bar 

represents a pro se litigant informally or otherwise, and prepares pleadings, motions, or 

briefs for the pro se litigant which the assisting lawyer does not sign, and thus escapes the 

professional, ethical, and substantive obligations imposed on members of the bar.” In re 

Dreamplay, Inc., 534 B.R. 106, 120 (Bankr.D.Md.2015) (quoting In re Mungo, 305 B.R.

762, 767 (Bankr.D.S.C.2003)). This Court has not been presented with an attorney 

discipline case specific to ghost-writing. In 2015, Rule 1.2 was amended to permit 

Maryland attorneys to agree to limit the scope of the representation to clearly defined 

specific tasks or objectives, such as the drafting of document. However, in this matter, 

Rule 1.2 or any argument of ghostwriting is inapplicable. Ms. Maldonado was practicing 

in Maryland without a license or pro hac vice admission. Furthermore, there was no limited 

scope representation agreement and Ms. Maldonado was responsible for all pleadings filed 
26

a license in Maryland or a pro hac vice sponsor, was acting as counsel for Ms. Duren. 

There is no evidence that Ms. Duren acted without Ms. Maldonado at any point during the 

action. We agree with the hearing judge that there is clear and convincing evidence that 

Ms. Maldonado violated Rule 5.5(a) and we overrule Ms. Maldonado’s exceptions. 

Rule 8.4

Rule 8.4 provides, in relevant part, that: “[i]t is professional misconduct for an 

attorney to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional 

Conduct; . . . (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation; [and] (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 

justice.” The hearing judge determined, and we affirmed, that Ms. Maldonado violated 

Rules 1.1, 4.1(a), 5.5(a) and 8.4(c)–(d), then she also violated Rule 8.4(a).5 A finding as 

to each one of these violations on its own could serve as a basis for a violation of 8.4(a). 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Nelson, 425 Md. 344, 363 (2012) (“Rule 8.4(a) is violated 

when other Rules of Professional Conduct are breached.”). Ms. Maldonado filed no 

 

before the Maryland courts. Ms. Maldonado’s conduct does not qualify as ghostwriting

nor does it fall under the scope of Rule 1.2.

5 The hearing judge also found sufficient evidence for a Rule 4.4(a) violation, however, as 

described earlier, we concluded that there was insufficient clear and convincing evidence 

of a violation of Rule 4.4(a). 
27

exception to 8.4(a). Therefore, this Court agrees with the hearing judge’s conclusion that 

there is clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Maldonado violated 8.4(a). 

The hearing judge found Ms. Maldonado violated 8.4(c) by misrepresenting herself 

in her communications with Dr. Wiley’s office. 

A broad universe of misbehavior is encompassed by MLRPC 8.4(c). 

Dishonesty is the broadest of the four terms, and encompasses, inter alia, 

conduct evincing a lack of honesty, probity or integrity of principle; [a] lack 

of fairness and straightforwardness. . . . Thus, what may not legally be 

characterized as an act of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation may still evince 

dishonesty. 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 555 (2014) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). “A violation of 8.4(c) must be the result of intentional misconduct.” 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Moore, 451 Md. 55, 86 (2017) (citing Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Mungin, 439 Md. 290, 310 (2014) (“It is well settled that this Court will not 

find a violation of [Rule] 8.4(c) when the attorney’s misconduct is the product of negligent 

rather than intentional misconduct.”) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. DiCicco, 

369 Md. 662, 684 (2002)). 

Ms. Maldonado maintains she did not engage in conduct that involved dishonesty, 

fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. She states she introduced herself as Dr. Maldonado but 

immediately clarified that she was an environmental attorney and that she represented Ms. 

Duren. She contends the record in this case supports the opposite conclusion reached by 

the hearing judge. Ms. Maldonado also contends that the hearing judge was incorrect that 

the use of “Doctor” was deliberately and intentionally misleading. She stated that pursuant 

to Rule 7.1 and the American Bar Association (“ABA”), lawyers who earned a juris doctor 
28

degree may refer to themselves as doctors.

6

 She states it is an accurate title because she 

has received her juris doctor degree. 

This Court has not established in an opinion or within the Rules specific guidance 

whether there are instances when an attorney may refer to himself or herself as a doctor.7

However, we require adherence to Rule 7.1, that states: 

An attorney shall not make a false or misleading communication about the 

attorney or the attorney’s services. A communication is false or misleading 

if it:

(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact 

necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially 

misleading;

(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the attorney can 

achieve, or states or implies that the attorney can achieve results by means 

that violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other 

law; or

 

6

In response to Ms. Maldonado’s contention that the ABA permits her to refer to herself 

as a doctor, we note that the ABA is not binding on this Court. Further, the ABA’s stance 

on this issue is more nuanced than Ms. Maldonado’s contentions. The ABA’s guidance on 

this issue states that the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which superseded the 

Model Code in 1983, does not directly address this issue. As a result, state ethics opinions 

are the best guidance on this issue. See Kathleen Maher, Lawyers Are Doctors, Too, 92 

A.B.A.J. 24 (2006). 

7

In evaluating this issue, we reviewed an opinion from the Committee on Ethics from the 

Maryland State Bar Ass’n, Inc., Ethics Docket No. 2013-02. In the opinion, the Committee 

was asked to advise whether it is ethically permissible for an attorney to use esquire after 

his or her name, even when acting in a nonlegal capacity. Id. The opinion stated, “[w]e 

agree . . . that there is no per se rule that would prohibit an attorney from attaching “Esq.” 

to his or her name when not practicing as a lawyer . . . the attorney must ensure that he or 

she does not use that term in a context in which a person could reasonably believe that the 

attorney is acting as a lawyer when the attorney is not doing so.” Id. Likewise, when Ms. 

Maldonado referred to herself as a doctor, she needed to ensure that she was not using the 

term in a way in which a reasonable person could believe she was representing herself as 

a medical doctor. 
29

(c) compares the attorney’s services with other attorney’s services, unless the 

comparison can be factually substantiated. 

Thus, under the restrictions on attorney communications proscribed by Rule 7.1, we do not 

need to decide in this case whether there is any appropriate instance when an attorney may 

refer to themselves as a doctor. It is clear that “an attorney shall not make a false or 

misleading communication about the attorney or the attorney’s services.” Rule 7.1. 

In this instance, we are persuaded that Ms. Maldonado’s conduct was a violation of 

this Rule. Ms. Maldonado made a material misrepresentation when she intentionally 

referred to herself as a doctor while calling a medical doctor’s office in order to bypass the

medical doctor’s office staff to speak to the medical doctor about her client. The record 

contains clear and convincing evidence that her misrepresentations to Dr. Wiley’s office 

were intentional. Ms. Maldonado testified that she sometimes uses the title of “Doctor” to 

hide the fact that she is an attorney because she has found doctor’s offices are hesitant to 

speak with an attorney. The record supports that Ms. Maldonado misrepresented herself 

as a medical doctor and failed to adequately identify herself as an attorney. As a result, we 

find there is clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Maldonado violated Rule 8.4(c) and 

we overrule her exceptions.

In addition, the hearing judge concluded that Ms. Maldonado violated Rule 8.4(d). 

Conduct which is “likely to impair public confidence in the profession, impact the image 

of the legal profession and engender disrespect for the court” is conduct prejudicial to the 

administration of justice. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Childress, 360 Md. 373, 381–82 

(2000). Courts apply an objective standard to determine if Ms. Maldonado’s misconduct 
30

would “negatively impact a reasonable member of the public’s perception of the legal 

profession.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Basinger, 441 Md. 703, 720 (2015) (cleaned 

up). 

Ms. Maldonado contends she has not negatively impacted the public’s perception 

of the legal profession. She cites to Ms. Duren’s testimony that “there is no lawyer like 

[her]” and to the fact that she did not charge any fees to Ms. Duren. Further, she cites to 

her strong reputation for competency in toxic torts and mold litigation. She states that she 

is in the top one percent of attorneys8and that she has been awarded this distinction year 

after year. She contends that she is respected by clients and colleagues. Finally, in her 

interactions with Dr. Wiley’s office, she contends that while she was frustrated, she never 

raised her voice at the office staff. 

We agree with the hearing judge that Ms. Maldonado’s interactions with Dr. 

Wiley’s office would negatively affect a reasonable person’s perception of the legal 

profession in violation of Rule 8.4(d). While Ms. Maldonado never raised her voice, she 

called Dr. Wiley’s office numerous times over the course of two days. She also made 

disparaging remarks about Dr. Wiley. We are persuaded that there is clear and convincing 

evidence that Ms. Maldonado’s misconduct would negatively impact a reasonable member 

of the public’s perception of the legal profession in violation of Rule 8.4(d) and we overrule 

Ms. Maldonado’s exception. 

 

8 Ms. Maldonado held up a letter during oral argument and has filed exhibits which show 

that this recognition was from the National Association of Distinguished Counsel. 
31

SANCTION

In weighing the appropriate sanction for an attorney disciplinary proceeding, this 

Court is “guided by our interest in protecting the public and the public’s confidence in the 

legal profession.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 595 (2005)

(citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 474 (2002)). “As we have 

often stated, the purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public and 

deter other lawyers from engaging in misconduct rather than simply to punish the lawyer.” 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 461 Md. 189, 226 (2018) (citing Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Mollock, 450 Md. 133, 158 (2016)). “In addition to the nature of 

the violations and the intent with which they were committed, we also consider any 

mitigating or aggravating circumstances.”

9

 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Woolery, 456 

 

9 We have recognized the following aggravating factors: 

(1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; 

(4) multiple offenses; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney disciplinary proceeding by 

intentionally failing to comply with the rules or the order of the disciplinary agency; (6) 

submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the 

disciplinary process; (7) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct; (8) 

vulnerability of the victim; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10) whether 

he or she displayed indifference to making restitution (11) illegal conduct, including that 

involving the use of controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the 

misconduct. 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Allenbaugh, 450 Md. 250, 277–78 (2016) (cleaned up). 

We have recognized the following mitigating factors: 

(1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 

(3) personal or emotional problems; (4) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to 

rectify the misconduct’s consequences; (5) full and free disclosure to Bar Counsel or a 
32

Md. 483, 499–500 (2017). The Court considers any aggravating factors that are proven by 

clear and convincing evidence and mitigating factors that are proven by a preponderance 

of the evidence. Md. Rule 19-727(c). 

The hearing judge found the following aggravating factors: a dishonest or selfish 

motive; multiple offenses; bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by 

intentionally failing to comply with the rules or order of the disciplinary agency;

submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practice during the 

disciplinary process; refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct; substantial 

experience in the practice of law; illegal conduct; and likelihood of repetition of 

misconduct in this case. Ms. Maldonado filed an exception to each aggravating factor

except substantial experience and illegal conduct. 

In considering a dishonest or selfish motive, the hearing judge found Ms. 

Maldonado’s motive dishonest. The hearing judge determined Ms. Maldonado knew that 

 

cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (6) inexperience in the 

practice of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) a physical disability; (9) a mental disability 

or chemical dependency, including alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there is medical 

evidence that the lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (b) the 

chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (c) the lawyer’s recovery 

from the chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and 

sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, 

and the misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline 

proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse; (13) 

remoteness of prior violations of the MLRPC; and (14) unlikelihood of repetition of the 

misconduct. 

Id. 
33

she could not represent Ms. Duren in Maryland without a pro hac vice sponsor. Evidence 

was presented that Ms. Maldonado informed Ms. Duren when they first met and in the 

emails between Ms. Maldonado and Mr. Nace that Ms. Maldonado could not practice law 

in Maryland. Further, Ms. Maldonado concealed her representation of Ms. Duren from the 

Courts by having Ms. Duren sign her name, using Ms. Duren’s email address, and having 

Ms. Duren state in the pleadings that she was proceeding pro se. Ms. Maldonado countered

the hearing judge’s conclusions, by stating that she knew that she needed a Maryland pro 

hac vice sponsor and that she only sought to protect the rights of an extremely ill individual 

who was in dire need. We agree with the hearing judge. Ms. Maldonado’s contentions do 

not rebut the hearing judge’s findings. Her statements, regardless of the validity, do not 

excuse the fact that she concealed from the courts that she drafted and filed pleadings in 

Maryland on behalf of her client when she was not a licensed attorney in this State.

The hearing judge also found as an aggravating factor that Ms. Maldonado was in 

violation of multiple rules. Ms. Maldonado contends this finding was not proper because 

of her outstanding record as an attorney and that she has been consistently nominated by a 

judicial review board to the nation’s top one percent of attorneys. Nonetheless, while Ms. 

Maldonado’s high reputation and previous awards may be true, they do not absolve Ms. 

Maldonado from the finding of multiple violations in this matter. See Attorney Grievance 

Comm’n v. Mixter, 441 Md. 416, 530 (2015) (“Factor (d), ‘multiple offenses,’ is implicated 

when an attorney violates multiple disciplinary rules.”) (citation omitted). 

The hearing judge found an additional aggravating factor of bad faith obstruction of 

the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or order of the 
34

disciplinary agency. Ms. Maldonado evaded service for four months and forced the 

Petitioner to serve the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland. Ms. Maldonado 

initially failed to file an answer in this action causing Bar Counsel to file a request for an 

order for default. Even after eventually filing an answer, Ms. Maldonado failed to timely 

respond to Bar Counsel’s discovery and forced Bar Counsel to file for sanctions. Finally, 

when Bar Counsel propounded discovery on January 26, 2018, Ms. Maldonado waited 

until April, past the deadline, to file incomplete responses. As to this factor, Ms. 

Maldonado claims she did not evade service. She states Bar Counsel acted unethically. 

She states she had responded in good-faith to all requests and responses during this entire 

proceeding. Ms. Maldonado’s contentions are without merit. Ms. Maldonado evaded 

service, failed to accept service electronically, and failed to provide sufficient discovery. 

We agree with the hearing judge that Bar Counsel proved this aggravating factor by clear 

and convincing evidence.

Ms. Maldonado’s inconsistent testimony concerning her bar admissions in other 

states supports the aggravating factor of submission of false evidence, false statements, or 

other deceptive practice during the disciplinary process. The hearing judge found that 

during trial, Ms. Maldonado testified that she was a member of the Bars of the District of 

Columbia and Texas. Later, she attempted to clarify that she was only licensed in the 

District of Columbia but that she could obtain reciprocity in Texas. During crossexamination, Ms. Maldonado changed her story again, stating that she just needed to pay 

her dues in Texas. Further, Ms. Maldonado testified that she graduated from law school in 

December 1996 and took the Texas bar in February 1997 but did not pass. In her 
35

deposition, Ms. Maldonado stated she did not take the bar exam after graduating from law 

school because she wanted to focus on working full-time. Ms. Maldonado contends that 

her testimony was not deceptive or false and that her testimony clarified her admission 

status. She also believed the Texas bar exam question during deposition was irrelevant and 

prejudicial. We agree with the hearing judge that Bar Counsel proved this aggravating 

factor by clear and convincing evidence.

The hearing judge found that Ms. Maldonado refused to acknowledge the wrongful 

nature of her conduct which is an additional aggravating factor. She has continued to blame 

Dr. Wiley’s staff calling them rude and disrespectful. Moreover, Ms. Maldonado filed a 

Complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against the 

Attorney Grievance Commission and an Assistant Bar Counsel alleging defamation and 

seeking damages. In this Complaint, Ms. Maldonado claimed that Bar Counsel’s charges 

were false. The hearing judge concluded this conduct, along with her testimony, provided 

ample evidence that Ms. Maldonado does not recognize her conduct as wrongful. In 

response, Ms. Maldonado stated that she is personally hurt by this matter and that she has 

dismissed the good-faith complaint in the District Court. 

We agree with the hearing judge that Bar Counsel proved the aggravating factor of 

refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct. See Mixter, 441 Md. at 530.

Ms. Maldonado has yet to acknowledge any wrongdoing. At oral argument, Ms. 

Maldonado did not show remorse for her actions and instead blamed everyone but herself 
36

for this disciplinary action.10 Ms. Maldonado appears not to understand that she is before 

us not because of some conspiracy between Home Properties, Bar Counsel, and her 

sponsoring attorney, but instead because of her own wrongdoing. We are concerned that 

she does not appear to understand the wrongful nature of her conduct. 

The hearing judge found substantial experience in the practice of law as an 

aggravating factor. We agree that Ms. Maldonado has substantial experience as an attorney 

in the District of Columbia in toxic tort litigation. Ms. Maldonado does not except to this 

aggravating factor.

The hearing judge found the aggravating factor of illegal conduct because Ms. 

Maldonado engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, in violation of § 10-601(a) of the 

Business Occupations & Professions of the Maryland Code, when she drafted Ms. Duren’s 

complaint, amended complaint, and any other appellate pleadings that she drafted without 

a pro hac vice sponsor. Md. Code (1989, 2018 Repl. Vol.), Business Occupations & 

Professions § 10-601(a). Ms. Maldonado does not except to this aggravating factor. We 

agree that Bar Counsel has proven this aggravating factor by clear and convincing

evidence. 

The final aggravating factor the hearing judge found was the likelihood of a 

repetition of the misconduct because Ms. Maldonado refuses to acknowledge that her 

conduct was wrong. The hearing judge believed this refusal makes it highly likely that she 

 

10 For example, at oral argument, Ms. Maldonado begins by stating, “[a]nd I’d like to start 

out . . . to say that I do believe that this was a political hit against me. . . .”
37

will repeat the actions again. In response, Ms. Maldonado states there is no chance of 

repetition. She states that this proceeding was started from the “unethical and evil foul 

play” by the Complainant.11 This Court agrees with the hearing judge. Rather than accept 

responsibility, Ms. Maldonado sees herself as the sole advocate left for Ms. Duren and 

others in Ms. Duren’s situation. We are persuaded that if a case with similar facts as Ms. 

Duren’s case appeared, that Ms. Maldonado might well take the case and engage in similar 

conduct, to the detriment of her client. Accordingly, we affirm the hearing judge’s finding 

of the aggravating factor that such misconduct is likely to occur again.

Among the factors for mitigation, the hearing judge found that Ms. Maldonado had 

no public disciplinary record in any jurisdiction. Further, that she had an outstanding 

reputation as an experienced practitioner of toxic torts and mold litigation. Bar Counsel 

does not except to these findings. Ms. Maldonado claims the hearing judge should have 

found twenty additional mitigating factors, most of which tout her own merits or denigrate 

the character or conduct of her sponsoring counsel, opposing counsel in the toxic mold 

litigation, Bar Counsel, and the Commission.

12 The majority of Ms. Maldonado’s 

 

11 We reiterate that we do not find there was any misconduct on the part of the Complainant. 

12 These additional mitigating factors include some that are recognized by this Court and 

others that are not recognized by this Court. In total the list includes: (1) absence of prior 

attorney discipline; (2) “excellent legal talents, character, and integrity”; (3) “witnesses in 

the hearing testified that [she] is the Number 1 Toxic Mold Attorney in the Nation”; (4) 

“100% Win Record when serving as Lead Counsel”; (5) “unethical sabotage by 

complainant”; (6) “James Liskow unethically bullied and threatened Chris Nace, 

Respondent’s Maryland supervising attorney, behind my back”; (7) “Complainant, James 

Liskow, unethically filed this defamatory grievance against me, the Respondent, as an 

unethical litigation tactic”; (8) “James Liskow, unethically filed this defamatory grievance 

against me, the Respondent, as an unethical litigation tactic”; (9) “Complainant, James 
38

mitigating factors are factual findings or matters irrelevant to this proceeding. We do not 

believe there are additional relevant mitigating factors in this matter. 

Bar Counsel recommended that we disbar Ms. Maldonado for her multiple 

violations of the Rules and the numerous aggravating factors found in this case. Bar 

Counsel considers Ms. Maldonado’s core violations that support disbarment are Rules 

4.1(a), 5.5(a), and 8.4(c) and (d) because they demonstrate that Ms. Maldonado’s 

misconduct was dishonest, deceitful, and prejudicial to the administration of justice. See 

Attorney Grievance. Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418 (2001) (“Unlike matters 

relating to competency, diligence and the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely 

entwined with the most important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make 

intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse. Honesty and dishonesty 

are, or are not, present in any attorney’s character. Disbarment ordinarily should be the 

 

Liskow, never called Respondent to get the truth/facts”; (10) “the Attorney Grievance 

Commission of Maryland unethically aided and abetted Complainant. . .”; (11) “The AGC 

of Maryland horrifically and illegally never called Respondent nor Ms. Duren to get the 

facts.”; (12) “Improper withdrawal by Christopher Nace, the Maryland sponsoring attorney 

of Respondent, Ms. Maldonado”; (13) “Complainant, James Liskow, and Chris Nace, 

sabotaged the mold tester, Jeff Pace.”; (14) “Legal error by Judges at all three levels in 

Maryland due to lack of mathematical and scientific knowledge”; (15) “Legal errors by 

Respondent’s lawyers. Ineffective assistance of counsel and price gauging by all lawyers.”; 

(16) “Heroic efforts by Respondent, Ms. Maldonado, to save Ms. Duren’s case including 

finding second Maryland and United States Supreme Court barred attorney, Relinda 

Louisy, to petition the U.S. Supreme Court”; (17) “Thus, unethical Complainant’s 

defamatory grievance interfered with the underlying toxic mold case from beginning to 

end. This is a disgusting, illegal litigation tactic.”; (18) “The AGC of Maryland as 

mentioned, unethically interfered throughout the underlying toxic mold litigation”; (19) 

absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (20) “Sudden Stage IV diagnosis of Respondent’s 

Ms. Maldonado’s mother on December 8th, 2015, and her impending death in February 

2016.” 
39

sanction for intentional dishonest conduct.”). Bar Counsel also relies on Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Barneys, 370 Md. 566 (2002), a case where we disbarred an attorney 

who engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and other intentional misconduct. Finally, 

Bar Counsel notes the multiple aggravating factors in this case and that none of the 

mitigating factors present compelling extenuating circumstances warranting a lesser 

sanction. 

Ms. Maldonado recommends that this Court dismiss the petition and take no 

remedial action. She maintains she was simply protecting the rights of her client and 

contends this proceeding was initiated due to the Complainant’s impure motives that then 

were improperly pursued by Bar Counsel. She provides no authority to support this 

recommendation. 

In this matter, the hearing judge found and we affirmed violations of both

unauthorized practice of law and intentionally dishonest misconduct. For either of these 

violations individually, “this Court has repeatedly ordered disbarment absent compelling 

extenuating circumstances.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ghatt, 461 Md. 228, 277 

(2018). “Conduct ‘involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, carries the risk of the ultimate 

sanction by this Court.’” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Keiner, 421 Md. 492, 523 (2011) 

(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 354 Md. 346, 366 (1999)). “In 

unauthorized practice of law cases, ‘we primarily consider[ ] factors of deterrence, whether 

the respondent’s conduct was willful and deliberate, and whether the respondent 

cooperated with Bar Counsel’s investigations.”’ Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shephard, 
40

444 Md. 299, 339 (2015) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shryock, 408 Md. 105, 

126 (2009)).

For a prior case where both unauthorized practice of law and intentionally dishonest 

misconduct were found, Bar Counsel directed us to Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Barneys, 370 Md. 566 (2002) in support of disbarment. In Barneys, the attorney was barred 

in several state and federal jurisdictions. 370 Md. at 571–72. The attorney was not barred 

in Maryland, but opened a law office and entered his appearance in five cases in Maryland 

state court. Id. The hearing judge also found the attorney engaged in multiple instances of 

dishonest and deceitful misconduct. Id. at 574. We concluded:

Based on the Court’s trend of disbarring attorneys for unauthorized practice 

violations under [Rule] 5.5(a) violations, Respondent’s multiple 

representation of clients in Maryland state courts, his deceptive conduct 

regarding the Sanchez/Gates Bail Bonds incident, the misrepresentations to 

Bar Counsel’s investigator and on his Petition for admission, and the relative 

insubstantiality of any possibly mitigating circumstances, disbarment is the 

appropriate sanction. 

Id. at 592.

Likewise, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Alsafty, 379 Md. 1 (2003) we held that 

disbarment was an appropriate sanction when, among other things, the attorney who was 

not authorized to practice law in Maryland represented multiple clients in civil cases, filed 

twenty pleadings in Maryland courts, and failed to inform clients of his limitations. Id. at 

7–8. 

More recently, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shephard, this Court disbarred an 

attorney unlicensed to practice in Maryland who became managing attorney of a Maryland 

law firm and met with clients. 444 Md. 299, 343 (2015). In determining the appropriate 
41

sanction, this Court evaluated the attorney’s conduct in Shephard in relation to Barneys 

and Alsafty. While the Court noted that the conduct in Shephard did not amount to that of 

Barneys and Alsafty, the Court ultimately concluded that disbarment was an appropriate 

sanction in Shephard as well. We stated:

We note that both [Barneys and Alsafty] involved an unlicensed attorney’s 

appearance in state court actions and intentional deceitful or dishonest 

conduct in violation of 8.4(b) and (c). By contrast, in this case, Respondent 

did not appear in state court on behalf of any client, nor has Respondent been 

found to have violated [Rule] 8.4(b) or (c). In addition, though the facts of 

this case demonstrate neither a failure to cooperate with Bar Counsel nor 

willful and deliberate dishonest or deceitful behavior, it is clear that 

Respondent willfully and deliberately assumed responsibilities as a 

“Managing Attorney” in a law firm in Maryland, met with clients in 

Maryland, and undertook the representation of those clients in Maryland. In 

doing so, she misled clients and the general public by failing to disclose the 

fact that she was not licensed to practice law in Maryland. Further, during 

Respondent’s tenure as “Managing Attorney,” several clients paid fees to 

Gilmore and did not receive the same services that they were promised. As 

an attorney with 18 years of experience, albeit practicing in other states, we 

would expect Respondent to understand the nature of her actions and the 

responsibilities related thereto. Moreover, as Petitioner pointed out, 

Respondent applied for admission to the Maryland Bar at some point during 

her tenure at Glenmore, indicating her awareness that she was required to 

practice in this State. 

Id. at 341–42 (cleaned up).

We acknowledge that the facts of this proceeding are unique in that Ms. 

Maldonado’s conduct was not as egregious as some of these prior cases concerning

unauthorized practice of law in Maryland. Ms. Duren was Ms. Maldonado’s only 

Maryland client and Ms. Maldonado did not collect any fees from Ms. Duren. Ms. 

Maldonado acknowledged that she could not practice in Maryland without a pro hac vice

sponsor and at times during this litigation had a pro hac vice sponsor. Unlike many of the 
42

cases before this Court when Rule 5.5 is violated, Ms. Maldonado has not established an 

office in Maryland, produced any letterhead inferring a Maryland license, or advertised to 

the public that she is authorized to practice in Maryland. 

However, while the facts in this proceeding are unique, we still find our prior cases 

on the unauthorized practice of law instructive. We find similarities between this case and 

Barneys, Alsafty, and Shephard. First, Ms. Maldonado represented Ms. Duren in active 

litigation. In fact, Ms. Maldonado is more culpable because she used the guise of “pro se”

filings to work around the absence of a pro hac vice sponsor. We also have concluded that 

Ms. Maldonado violated Rule 8.4(c), and the record is filled with instances of Ms. 

Maldonado failing to respond to bar counsel and failing to accept responsibility for her 

actions. Finally, as in Shephard, Ms. Maldonado has been practicing for many years and 

we expect Ms. Maldonado to understand the wrongful nature of her action. Also impacting 

our conclusion is the fact that Ms. Maldonado’s conduct in failing to order the transcripts 

caused Ms. Duren to lose her right of appeal in the mold litigation case. 

Based upon our review of the record, we agree with Bar Counsel that disbarment is 

the appropriate sanction. Under the circumstances of this case, and given the numerous 

aggravating factors, disbarment is appropriate “to protect the public and the public’s 

confidence in the legal profession.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Allenbaugh, 450 Md. 

250, 277 (2016) (citation omitted). Ms. Maldonado’s unauthorized practice of law, refusal 

to accept any responsibility for her actions, and avoidance of this disciplinary action reflect 
43

adversely on her honesty and trustworthiness. Without any compelling extenuating 

circumstances, we conclude disbarment is the only appropriate sanction. 

IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 

SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED 

BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, 

INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL 

TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO 

MARYLAND RULE 19-709(d), FOR 

WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS 

ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE 

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 

COMMISSION AGAINST MELINDA 

MALDONADO.