2005 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
8-25-2005 

# F ount ain v . K y le r P r e c e de nt i al or N on-P r e c e de nt i al : P r e c e de nt i al D ocke t N o . 03-4777

F o llow thi s and a dd it ion al work s at : http://d i git alc ommon s .l a w . vi ll anova . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2005

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou ght t o you for f r e e and ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i ll anova U nive r sity S choo l of L a

w Di git al Reposit ory

. It h as be e n a c c ept e d for inclusion in 2005 D e c i sion s b y an author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i ll anova U nive r sity S choo l of L a

w Di git al Reposit ory

. F or mor e inform at ion, p le as e c ont a ct Be n j amin . C arl s on@l a

w . vi ll anova . e du
. Re c omme nde d C it at ion

" F ount ain v

. K y le r " (2005). 2005 D e cisio n s . P ape r 589. http://d i git alc ommon s .l a

w . vi ll anova . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2005/589P RE CE DE NT I AL UN I TED STATES CO UR T OF A PP EALS F O R T H E T H IR D C IR C U IT

N o. 03- 4777
CH AR L E S VI NC E NT F OUNT AI N, A ppel l ant

v. KENNET H D. KYLER; AT T OR NE Y GE NE RA L F OR T H E C O M M O N W E A L T H O F P E N N S Y L V A N IA
O n A p p ea l from the U n it ed S tat es D istri ct C o u rt f o r th e M id d le D istric t o f P e n n sy lv a n ia ( D
. C
. C i vi l N o. 02- cv- 00897) D i s t r i ctJ udge: H onor abl e J ames M
. M unl ey

A r gued J ul y11, 2005 B efore: S L O V ITE R and M cK E E , C i rcui tJudg es,

and FU L L A M , D i s t r i ctJ udge * ( Fi l ed: A ugus t25, 2005)

R
. D ami en Schorr , E s q. ( A r gued) 1015 I r w i n D r i ve Pi t t s bur gh, PA 15236 A t t or neyforA ppel l ant

* H on. J ohn P. Ful l am, Seni orJ udge, U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ct C our tforthe East ern D i s t r i ctof Penns y l vani a, s i t t i ng by des i gnat i on.Th e Di s t r i c t Co u r th a d j u r i s d i c t i o n p u r s u a n tt o 2 8 U. S
. C. 1 §§ 1331, 2254; t hi s court has j ur i s di ct i on pur s uant t o 28 U
. S. C
. §§ 1291, 2253, 2254. 2 J ames P. B arker , E s q. ( A r gued) O ffi ce of D i s t r i ctA t t orney F ro n t & M a rk e t S tre e ts D aup hin C ou ntyC ou rtho use H arr i s bur g, PA 17101 A t t or neyforA ppel l ee

OPI NI ON O F THE COURT
SL O V I T E R , C i r cui tJ udge. I n t hi s cas e, w e ar e as ked t o ext end the j ur i s prudence re g a rd in g in e f

f e c tiv e a ss ista n c e o f

c o u n se l to c o u n se l’s f

a ilu re to pr edi ctt he Penns y l vani a Supr eme C our t ’ s l at errul i ng r egar di ng th e n o n -r e tr o a c tiv ity o f

a n a m e n d e d d e a th p e n a lty sta tu te . W e d ec li n e to e x tend the law that fa r. C har l es V i ncentFount ai n, w ho i s curr ent l ys ervi ng a l i fe s ent ence fora 1976 homi ci de, appea l s fr om the deni al bythe U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ctC our tforthe M i ddl e D i s t r i ctof P e n n s y lv a n ia o f

h is a p p lic a tio n f

o r a w ri t o f

h a b e a s c o rp u s . A ft ert he D i s t r i ctC our t ’ s deni al , w e i s s ued a c ert i fi cat e of appea l abi l i t y( “C O A ”) on the s ol e i s s ue of w hetherhi s “r emand couns el w as i neff

ect i ve foradvi s i ng hi m nott o appea l
. . . . ” A pp. at5. T he r es ol ut i on of thi s ques t i on turns on w hether Fount ai n’ s r emand couns el pr ovi ded i neff ect i ve as s i s t ance for advi s i ng hi m nott o t ake a n appea l fol l ow i ng hi s r emand pr ocee di ngs due t o herbel i ef – thatl at erpr oved t o be err oneous – t hatt he Penns y l vani a court s w oul d gi ve r etr oact i ve ef fec tt o a death penal t ys t atut e ena ct ed af t erFount ai n’ s al l eged c r i m e. 1 I. I n o r d e rt o r e s o l v e th i s ma t t e r , we mu s ts e tf o r t h i n s o me3 det ai l t he pr ocedur al pos tur e of Fount ai n’ s cas e, as w el l as the var i ous devel opm ent s i n Penns y l vani a ca pi t al puni s hm entl aw t hat occurr ed in the lat e 19 70 ’s
. I n l at e Sept ember1976, a j urys i t t i ng i n t he C our tof C om m on Pl eas forD auphi n C ount yfound Fount ai n gui l t yon one countof m ur deri n t he fi r s tdegr ee a nd on t w o count s of r obberyfort he 1976 r obberyand murde rof J os eph G el l er . See gener al l yC om m onw eal t h v. Fount ai n, 402 A
. 2d 1014 ( Pa. 1979)
. A ts ent enci ng, the j uryr ecomm ended a puni s hm entof death fort he murde rconvi ct i on. I n r eturni ng i t s r ecomm ended se n ten c e , the ju ryu til ize d th e th e n -a p p lica b le d e a th -p e n a lty pr ovi s i ons of Penns y l vani a’ s Sent enci ng C ode. I d. at1015. A ft ert hi s bi fur cat ed tr i al , Fount ai n’ s tr i al couns el r eques t ed l eave t o w i t hdr aw . T he courtgr ant ed thi s r eques tand t her eupon appoi nt ed M ar i l yn Z i l l i , w ho w as then s ervi ng as A s s i s t antPubl i c D efe nderforD auphi n C ount y , t o r epr es ent Fount ai n. 402 A
. 2d at1015. Z i l l i r epr es ent ed Fount ai n i n t he pos t
- ver di ctpr ocee di ngs befor e the C our tof C om m on Pl eas , on Fount ai n’ s di r ectappea l t o t he Supr eme C our tof Penns y l vani a, and on t he sub sequen trem and t o the C ou rtof C om m on P l eas. T he tr i al cour tfol l ow ed the j ury ’ s r ecomm endat i on and i m pos ed the dea t h penal t yon Fount ai n forthe murde r c o n v ictio n ; itf

u rth e r im p o se d tw o se n ten c e s o f ten to tw e n ty y e a rs f o r th e ro b b e ryc o n v ictio n s. 4 0 2 A .2 d a t 1 0 1 5 . F o u n tain t h e r e a f t e rf i l e d a d i r e c ta p p e a l t o th e P e n n s y l v a n i a S u p r e me C o u rt in w h ich h e a rg u e d , inte r a lia, th a t P e n n sy lv a n ia’ s d e a th penal t ys cheme w as uncons t i tut i onal and thathi s tr i al couns el had pr ovi ded i neff

ect i ve as s i s t ance atboth s t ages of the bi fur cat ed tr i al
. I d. at1015- 16. M eanw hil e, i n N ov em ber 197 7, w hil e F ou ntai n’s cas e w as pendi ng on di r ectappea l , the Supr eme C our tof Penns y l vani a hel d i n C om m onw eal t h v. M oody , 382 A
. 2d 442 ( Pa. 1977) , t hatt he pr ovi s i ons of the Penns y l vani a Sent enci ng C o d e p ertaining to the im p o sit ion o f th e d ea th p en altyw ere uncons t i tut i onal
. Speci fi cal l y , the M oodyC our tfound thatthe Sent enci ng C ode di d notal l ow a j uryt o cons i ders uffi ci ent l ythe p arti cu lar cir cu m stan ce s o f th e c ri m e o r th e c h ara cter an d rec o rd4 of the i ndi vi dual offe nder
. 382 A
. 2d at444- 49. O f cour s e, the p rov isi o n s h eld u n co n sti tuti o n al i n M o o d yw ere the v ery pr ovi s i ons t hatt he j ur yand j udge had ut i l i zed i n det erm i ni ng and i m pos i ng Fount ai n’ s puni s hm ent
. O n Sept ember13, 1978, in d ire c t re sp o n se to th e M o o d yd e c isio n , the P e n n sy lv a n ia G e n e ra l A ss e m b lyp a ss e d a n e w d e a th p e n a ltyse n ten c in g sta tu te t o rem edyt he p revi ou s l aw ’s con st i tuti on al short com i ng s. O n J ul y5, 1979, the Supr eme C our tof Penns y l vani a, r el y i ng on i t s hol di ng i n M oody , rul ed on Fount ai n’ s di r ect appea l and vac at ed hi s death s ent ence . Fount ai n, 402 A
. 2d at 1 0 1 5 (“ M o o d y. . . req u ire s th e v a c a tio n o f th e d e a th p e n a lty im p o se d in th is c a se a n d a re m a n d f o r re se n ten c in g .”). W ith r es pect , how ever , t o Fount ai n’ s cl ai m s of i neff ect i ve as s i s t ance of tr i al couns el , t he C our tdet erm i ned thatther e w as “an i ns uffi ci entr ecor d” t o r es ol ve thos e i s s ues and thus r emanded t he ca s e “t o t he tr i al cour tt o conductan evi dent i aryhear i ng on a ll p re s e rv e d c la im s o f

in e f f e c tiv e a s s is ta n c e o f

tr ia l c o u n s e l.” Fount ai n, 402 A
. 2d at1015- 16. Pur s uantt o t hi s di r ect i ve, the C our tof C om m on Pl eas co n d u cted an ev iden ti aryh ea ri n g reg ard ing F o u n tai n ’s i neff ect i venes s cl ai m s . O n D ece m ber20, 1979, the courti s s ued an opi ni on hol di ng t hatFount ai n’ s tr i al couns el had pr ovi ded cons t i tut i onal l y - eff

ect i ve r epr es ent at i on. T he fol l ow i ng daythe cour ts ent ence d Fount ai n t o a t erm of l i fe i m pr i s onm entforthe m u rd e r c o n v ictio n a n d a c o n se c u tiv e se n ten c e o f ten to tw e n ty y ears for the robb erycon vict i on s. F o l l o wi n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s r e j e c t i o n o f

F o u n t a i n ’ s c l a i ms of i neff ect i ve as s i s t ance of tr i al couns el , A t t orneyZ i l l i w r ot e her cl i enta l et t eri n J anuary1980, the att orney - cl i entcomm uni cat i on u p o n w h ich F o u n tain g ro u n d s h is c a se . In th is le tter, Z ill i advi s ed Fount ai n nott o appea l fr om the court ’ s deci s i ons on r emand becaus e, i n herpr ofes s i onal opi ni on, the r i s ks i nvol ved w er e t oo gr eat
. I n per t i nentpart , the l ett er , dat ed J anuary7, 19 80 , read as fol l ow s: A s I i ndi cat ed t o y ou w hen y ou w er e her e for r es ent enci ng, w e mustnow m ake a deci s i on w h ethe r t o ap p ea l [th e C o u rto f C o m m o n P leas’]5 fi ndi ng t hatcouns el r ender ed ef fec t i ve as s i s t ance i n y ourcas e. I h a v e d o n e m o re re se a rc h in th e a re a a n d m u st te ll y o u I d o n o t f

e e l a n a p p e a l s h o u ld b e ta k e n . M y r eas ons ar e as fol l ow s . Fi r s t , I do notbel i eve that w e w oul d geta fa vor abl e dec i s i on fr om the Supr eme C our t
. T he C our tw i l l m os tl i kel ynot o v e rt u rn [ th e C o u rt o f

C o m m o n P le a s ’] d e c is io n .... S e c o n d ly , ev e n if

th e S u p re m e C o u rt w e re to [r ever s e]
. . . t he r es ul tw oul d notr eal l ybe favor abl e. Such a dec i s i on w oul d m ean thaty ou w oul d be gr ant ed a ne w tr i al
. I m us tbe hones tand s ayt hati f y ou ar e tr i ed aga i n, I have a bs ol ut el yno doubtt haty ou w i l l be found gui l t yagai n. A tthat poi nt , w e w oul d have r eal pr obl ems. A s I ’ ve expl ai ned t o y ou, the l aw now appea r s t o pr ovi de th a t y o u c o u ld b e su b

jec t to th e d e a th p e n a lty a g a in . I’ll ad m it th e law is n o t cle a r b u t th e “ if ” is notr eal l yon y ours i de. I bel i eve i t ’ s s i m pl yt oo r i s k y. Pl eas e cons i deral l thi s and ca l l m e w i t h y our deci s i on. Supp. A pp. at1. O n Janu ary16 , 19 80 , F ou ntai n w rot e Z i l l i a res po nse l et t eri n w hi ch he w r ot e thatther e w as “no nee d i n gi vi ng [the C om m onw eal t h] anothers hotatm e as faras the dea t h s ent ence g o e s. . . .” S u p p . A p p . at 3 . H e th u s to ld Z ill i th a t sh e c o u ld
“ d r o p t h e [ a ] p p e a l , o n l yu n d e rth e [ u ] n d e r s t a n d i n g [ ] th a twe know t hatI w oul d be [s ] ubj ectt o t he [d] eath [s ] ent ence , s houl d I be gr ant ed a ne w t r i al
. . . . ” I d. A s l at erfound bythe Super i or C our tof Penns y l vani a, Fount ai n abi ded bycouns el ’ s advi ce a nd t hus “as k[ed] Z i l l i nott o pur s ue appe l l at e pr ocee di ngs s o t hathe w oul d notbe s ubj ectt o the dea t h penal t yagai n. ” A pp. at46. S ho rt l yaft er Zil l i and F ou ntai n ex chan ged these comm uni cat i ons , and af t erthe t i m e forFount ai n t o fi l e an a ppeal had pas s ed, t he Supr eme C our tof Penns y l vani a dec i dedJ us t i ce L ar s en, j oi ned byJ us t i ces Fl ahert yand K auff m an, 2 di s s ent ed fr om t he m aj or i t y ’ s deci s i on i n St ory I I
. R el y i ng on, i nt er al i a, D obber tv. Fl or i da, 432 U
. S. 282 ( 1977) , thos e J us t i ces concl uded thatt he 1978 l egi slat i on s houl d be gi ven r etr oact i ve ef fe ct. S toryII, 4 4 0 A
. 2 d at 49 3 -50 9 (L arse n , J. , d issen ti n g ). 6 C o m m o n w ea lth v . S tory , 4 4 0 A
. 2 d 4 8 8 (P a. 19 8 1 ) (“S toryII”), w hi ch hel d t hatt he r evi s ed dea t h penal t ys t atut e coul d notbe a p p lied re tro a c tiv e ly , a h o ld in g c o n tra ryto Z ill i’s im p licit p red ict ion
. In th at ca se, a juryh ad co n v ict ed S tanto n S toryfo r a 1974 m ur der ; St or yr ece i ved a de ath s ent ence forthi s cr i m e. S toryII, 4 4 0 A
. 2 d at 48 9
. O n d ir ec t app ea l, the S u p rem e C o u rt of Penns y l vani a hel d t hatthe murde rconvi ct i on had bee n im p ro p e rlyo b tain e d , an d th u s g ra n ted h im a n e w trial. C o m m o n w e a lth v . S to ry, 3 8 3 A .2 d 1 5 5 (P a . 1 9 8 1 ) ( “ S to ry I” ). In th e interim b etw ee n the 1 9 7 4 m u rde r an d the d ec isi o n in S tory I, th e P e n n sy lv a n ia S u p re m e C o u rt h a d d e c id e d M o o d ya n d , in tur n, t he G ener al A s s embl yhad pr om ul gat ed the 1978 r evamped death pen al t yprovis i on s. A tSt or y ’ s r etr i al , a j uryagai n found hi m gui l t yof m ur der a n d th e C o m m o n w e a lth , rely in g o n th e p o st-M o o d y1 9 7 8 d e a th penal t ypr ovi s i ons , s oughtand obt ai ned anotherdeath s ent ence . S t o r yI I , 4 4 0 A. 2 d a t4 8 9
. On a p p e a l , h o we v e r , th e S u p r e me C our tof Penns y l vani a hel d t hatthe 1978 pr ovi s i ons di d nothave retroac ti v e f

o rce an d thu s w ere o n lyap p li ca b le t o m u rde rs comm i t t ed on oraft ert he s t atut e’ s dat e of e nactm ent , Sept ember 1 3 , 1 9 7 8 . Id . at 4 9 0 . B e c a u se th e d e a th p e n a ltyp ro v isio n s in eff ectatt he t i m e of St or y ’ s cr i m e had be en found uncons t i tut i onal , s ee M oody , 382 A
. 2d at444, the C our tvaca t ed St or y ’ s s ent ence of dea t h and i m pos ed a s ent ence of l i fe i m pr i s onm ent
. 440 A
. 2d at492. 2 I n D ece m ber1996, s om e fi ft een y ear s aft erhe w as r es ent ence d, Fount ai n fi l ed a pe t i t i on forcol l at er al r el i ef pur s uantt o t he Penns y l vani a Pos t
- C onvi ct i on R el i ef A ct (“P C R A ”), 42 P a. C o n s. S tat
. A n n . § 9 5 4 1 et seq
. , in the C o u rt of C om m on Pl eas forD auphi n C ount y . T hi s pet i t i on r ai s ed m a n yc laim s, in c lu d in g F o u n tain ’s c laim th a t, by ad v isin g h im no tt o p ursue a dir ectapp eal foll ow i ng the rem and proceed i ng s, Z i l l i had fa i l ed t o pr ovi de ef fec t i ve as s i s t ance i n der el i ct i on ofN ot abl y , Fount ai n di d notfi l e hi s fede ral habea s 3 a p p l i c a t i o n w i t h i n t h e a p p l i c a b l e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d
. S p e c i f i c a l l y, beca us e hi s convi ct i on beca m e “fi nal ” pri or t o the ef fec t i ve dat e of t he A nt i t err or i s m and Effec t i ve D eath Penal t yA ctof 1996 ( “A E D PA ”) , Fount ai n neede d t o fi l e hi s appl i cat i on w i t hi n a y ear of t hat s t atut e’ s enac t m ent , l es s t he t i m e any pr oper lyfil ed c o l l a t e r a l p e t i t i o n was p e n d i n g i n s t a t e c o u r t
. M e r r i t tv . Bl ai ne, 3 2 6 F
. 3 d 1 5 7 , 1 6 1 ( 3 d Ci r . 2 0 0 3 )
. Al t h o u g h F o u n t a i n ’ s f i r s tP CRA peti t i on t oll ed the fi l i ng peri od , his second did not; rather, becau se t he Super i orC our tfound the s econd pe t i t i on unt i m el y , i tw as not “pr o p e r l y f

i l e d ” a n d t h u s d i d n o t s e r v e t o t o l l t h e ru n n i n g of t he s t atut e of l i m i t at i ons . See P ace v. D i G ugl i el m o, U
. S. , 125 S. C t. 1 807, 1814 ( 2005) ( “B eca us e the s t at e courtr ej ect ed p e titio n e r’ s P C R A p e titio n a s u n tim e ly, it w a s n o t ‘ p ro p e rl yf ile d ,’ an d h e is n o t entit led t o s ta tu to rytoll ing u n d er [ 2 8 U
. S
. C
. ] § 22 44 (d) (2)
. ”). T hat bei ng sa id, t he C om m on w eal t h d i d n ot r ai se t he s t atut e of l i m i t at i ons i s s ue i n the D i s t r i ctC our t ; l i kew i s e, t he D i s t r i ct Cou r t d i d n o t i t s e l f s u a s p o n t e r a i s e th e i s s u e e i t h e r . C f. 7 hi s r i ght s undert he Si xth A m endmentt o t he U ni t ed St at es C o n sti tuti o n . O n Ju n e 5 , 1 9 9 8 , the c o u rtd en ied F o u n tai n ’s peti t i on i n all res pects
. I n an opi ni on and or derdat ed A ugus t24, 1999, the S u p erior C o u rto f P en n sy lvan ia af firm ed the d en ial o f F o u n tai n ’s P C R A p eti ti o n an d , in so d o ing , rejected , inter ali a, F o u n tai n ’s c l a i m th a tZ i l l i ’ s p e r f

o r ma n c e o n r e ma n d f

e l l b e l o w a cons t i tut i onal l yacc ept abl e l evel
. T he Supr eme C our tof Penns y l vani a deni ed al l ocaturon J anuary20, 2000. In M a rc h 2 0 0 0 , F o u n tain f iled a se c o n d P C R A p e tit io n in s t at e court
. O n A pr i l 9, 2001, the courtrul ed thatthe pet i t i on w as unt i m el yand thus deni ed r el i ef; al t hough Fount ai n appea l ed this de cisi o n to the S u p erior C o u rto f P en n sy lvan ia, that co u rt al s o deni ed r el i ef. Fount ai n di d nots eek a l l ocaturw i t h t he Supr eme C our tof Penns y l vani a. I n M ay2002, Fount ai n fi l ed a 28 U
. S. C
. § 2254 appl i cat i on fora w r i tof habe as corpus i n t he U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ctC our tfort he M i ddl e D i s t r i ctof Penns y l vani a r ai s i ng m ul t i pl e i s s ues . T he D i s t r i ctC our tdi d nothol d a hea r i ng and 3U ni t ed St at es v. B endol ph, 409 F. 3d 155, 166 ( 3d C i r . 2005) ( en banc)
. M or eover , i n addi t i on t o i t s fai l ur e r ai s e the i s s ue bel ow , t he C om m onw eal t h’ s appel l at e br i ef a l s o fai l ed t o addr es s the l i m i t at i ons i s s ue. U ndert hes e ci r cumst ance s , w e w i l l deem t he s t atut e of l i m i t at i ons defe ns e w ai ved. See gene r all yR obi ns on v. J ohns on, 313 F. 3d 128, 13 4 ( 3d C i r . 2002) ( hol di ng that“the A E D P A l i m i t at i on s peri od i s subj ectt o . . . w ai v e r”) ; L abo rer s’ Int’l U n io n v . F o ster W h ee ler C o rp., 2 6 F
. 3 d 3 7 5 , 3 9 8 (3d C ir
. 1994) ( “A n i s s ue i s w ai ved unl es s a pa rtyr ai s es i ti n i t s openi ng b ri ef
. . . . ”). 8 rejected all o f F o u n tai n ’s claim s (A p p . 6 , 2 8 ). In its M e m o ra n d u m a n d O rd e r d a te d N o v e m b e r 1 8 , 2 0 0 3 , t he D i s t r i ctC our tfound thatFount ai n had pr ocedur al l ydefa ul t ed t he vas tm aj or i t yof hi s cl ai m s ; i tdi d, how ever , addr es s on t he m e rits w h e th e r Z ill i “w a s in e f f e c tiv e f o r f a ili n g to p ro p e rly advi s e [Fount ai n] of the cons equenc es of hi s r i ghtt o appea l
. . . . ” A pp. at21. A ppl y i ng t he s t andar ds cont ai ned i n t he A nt i t err or i s m and Effec t i ve D eath Penal t yA ctof 1996 ( “A E D PA ”) 

### , the Distri ct

Co urt hel d that the Superi or Co urt’ s re soluti onof

that is sue had no t “ ‘r es ulte d in a deci si onthat was co ntrary to , o r inv o lv edanunreaso n ab le ap p licatio no f , clearly e s t abl i s he d Fe de r a ll aw. . . . ’ ” App. at 24 ( quot i ng 2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 5 4 (d )(1 )). T h e D istric t C o u rt f u rth e r sta ted th a t “[ t]h e re e x ists no bas i s fort he i s s uance of a [ C O A ]
. ” A pp. at25. N o n ethe less, this co u rtg ran ted F o u n tai n ’s req u est fo r a CO A. S p e c i f

i c a l l y , we g r a n t e d F o u n t a i n ’ s r e q u e s tf o ra CO A “w i t h r egar d t o t he appe l l ant ’ s cl ai m thatr emand couns el w as i neff ect i ve foradvi s i ng hi m nott o appea l and fa i l i ng t o fi l e a not i ce of appea l fol l ow i ng r es ent enci ng. ” A pp. at5. T hati s the so le is su e b e f

o re th is c o u rt. II. D ue t o t he fa ctt hatthe D i s t r i ctC our tdi d notconductan e v id e n tiary he a rin g o n F o u n tain ’s § 2 2 5 4 a p p lica tio n , this cour t ’ s r evi ew i s pl enary . Sl ut zkerv. J ohns on, 393 F. 3d 373, 3 7 8 (3d C ir
. 2 0 0 4 ); E v ere ttv . B ea rd, 29 0 F
. 3 d 5 0 0 , 5 0 7 (3d C ir
. 2 0 0 2 ). O u r d e n o v o re v iew o f th e D istric t C o u rt’s d e c isio n is governed byt he pr ovi s i ons of A E D PA w hi ch pr ovi de the fe der al co u rt s w ith sp ec ifi c stan d ard s fo r rev iew o f state c o u rt9 adj udi cat i ons . U nderA E D PA , fede r al habea s r el i ef on a ny c laim d e c id e d in a sta te c o u rt is p re c lu d e d u n les s th e sta te cour t ’ s adj udi cat i on “r es ul t ed i n a dec i s i on thatw as contr aryt o, ori nvol ved an unr eas onabl e appl i cat i on of, cl ear l yes t abl i s hed Feder al l aw , as det erm i ned bythe Supr eme C our tof the U ni t ed S tat es.” 2 8 U
. S
. C
. § 2 2 5 4 (d)(1 ) (em p h asis ad d ed ). A s t at e- cour tdeci s i on i s “contr aryt o” cl ear l yes t abl i s hed f e d e ra l law if

(1 ) th e sta te c o u rt a p p lied a ru le th a t co n tra d icts t he governi ng l aw as s etfor t h i n t he Supr eme C our t ’ s cas es , or (2 ) th e sta te c o u rt c o n f

ro n ted a se t o f

f a c ts th a t ar e m a ter ially i ndi s t i ngui s habl e fr om a Supr eme C our tdeci s i on and n ev erthe less arrived at a resu ltd iffe ren t from the C o u rt ’s pr ece dent
. W i l l i ams v. T ay l or , 529 U
. S. 362, 405- 06 ( 2000) (O ’C o n n o r, J. ); L ew is v. Joh n so n , 3 5 9 F
. 3 d 6 4 6 , 6 5 7 -58 (3d C ir
. 2004) ; M at t eo v. Super i nt endent , SC I A l bi on, 171 F. 3d 877, 888 ( 3d C i r . 1999) ( en banc )
. I n turn, s at i s fac t i on of the “unr eas onabl e appl i cat i on” pr ong of 28 U
. S. C
. § 2254( d) ( 1) req u ir es a h ab ea s p eti ti o n er to sh o w that the s tat e c o u rt ’s a p p lica tio n o f

S u p re m e C o u rt p re c e d e n t w a s “ o b jec tiv e ly unr eas onabl e. ” R i co v. L eftr i dge- B yr d, 340 F. 3d 178, 181 ( 3d C i r . 2003)
. T hus , a fe der al cour t ’ s m er e di s agr eementw i t h t he s t at e court ’ s appl i cat i on of Supr eme C our tpr ece denti s not s uffi ci ent ; r ather , a s t at e courtadj udi cat i on fai l s the “unr eas onabl e appl i cat i on” t es tonl yi f the s t at e courti dent i fi ed th e c o rre c t g o v e rn in g leg a l ru le b u t u n re a so n a b lya p p lied it t o th e p a rticu lar c a se o r if

th e sta te c o u rt e ith e r u n re a so n a b ly ext ended a l egal pr i nci pl e fr om Supr eme C our tpr ece dentt o a n e w c o n tex t in w h ich it sh o u ld n o t ap p lyo r w h e re it unr eas onabl yr efus ed t o ext end s uch a pr i nci pl e t o a new cont ext i n w hi ch i ts houl d appl y . G at t i s v. Sny der , 278 F. 3d 222, 234 (3d C ir
. 2 0 0 2 ). W e d ig re ss f

ro m c o n sid e ra tio n o f

th e su b sta n tiv e m e rits o f F o u n tai n ’s pe ti ti o n to ad d ress the C o m m o n w ea lth ’s cont ent i on t hatFount ai n has w ai ved r evi ew of the i s s ue denot ed i n t he C O A beca us e he f ai l ed t o r ai s e a c l ai m of i neff ect i ve as s i s t ance per t ai ni ng t o Z i l l i ’ s advi ce i n t he D i s t r i ctC our t
. See gener al l yB ai l eyv. U ni t ed A i r l i nes , 279 F. 3d 194, 203- 04 ( 3d C i r . 2002) ( “B eca us e B ai l eyhas notpoi nt ed t o anyt hi ng i n t he r ecor d t o demonstr at e thathe r ai s ed thi s i s s ue w i t h t he D i s t r i ctFort he r eas ons ex p lai n ed byt hi s cour ti n L ew i s v. 4 Jo h n so n , 3 5 9 F
. 3 d 6 4 6 (3d C ir
. 2 0 0 4 ), the S u p erior C o u rt ’s 10 C o u rt
. . . w e w il l no t con side r th is i ssu e.”). T he C om m onw eal t h i s corr ectthatFount ai n’ s or i gi nal M ay2002 pr o s e appl i cat i on fora w r i tof habe as corpus di d not expl i ci t l ys eek r el i ef f

r om the D i s tr i ctC our tw i t h r es pectt o t he a d v ic e th a t Z illi p ro v id e d f o llo w in g th e re m a n d p ro c e e d in g s . B uts ee U ni t ed St at es v. G art h, 188 F. 3d 99, 108 ( 3d C i r . 1999) (“ W h e n p ro p e rlyv iew e d th ro u g h th e m o re f o rg iv in g len s u se d to c o n s tru e p ro s e h a b e a s p e titio n s , w e c o n c lu d e th a t th e c la im
. . . w as pr oper l ybefor e the D i s t r i ctC our t
. ”)
. N onethel es s , aft er f ili n g h is o rig in a l ap p lica tio n w ith th e D istric t C o u rt, F o u n tain fi l ed a mot i on forl eave t o amend. T he C om m onw eal t h di d not o p p o se th is m o ti o n an d , o n A u g u st 28 , 2 0 0 2 , the D istri ct C o u rt g ra n ted it. A s a r es ul t , on Sept ember17, 2002, Fount ai n fi l ed an amendm entt o hi s habea s corpus appl i cat i on i n w hi ch he speci fi cal l yrai sed t he is sue of Z i l l i ’s pu rport ed ineffecti ven ess. Fount ai n fur t heras ked the D i s t r i ctC our tt o i ncorpor at e by r e f e r e n c e i n t o h i s § 2 2 5 4 a p p l i c a t i o n a l l o f h i s p r e v i o u s P CRA fil ing s ad d ressing Z il li ’s ad v ice a n d ac ti o n s. T h e D istri ct C o u rt gr ant ed thi s r eques t
. I n s um , Fount ai n pr oper l ypr es ent ed the iss u e o f Z ill i’s in e f

f e c tiv e n e ss to th e D istric t C o u rt. A s a re su lt, w e r ej ectt he C om m onw eal t h’ s w ai verar gum entand hol d t he i ssue i s properl ybefo re us. W e turn no w t o the m eri t s. In cond ucti ng ou r anal y si s, w e mustappl yt he A E D PA s t andar ds t o t he A ugus t1999 opi ni on of the Penns y l vani a Super i orC our t– t he hi ghes ts ubs t ant i ve stat e c o u rtd ec isi o n ad d ressing the issu e. In rejec ti n g F o u n tai n ’s i neff ect i ve assi st ance o f cou nsel cl ai m , the S up eri or C ou rtfi rs t appl i ed i t s deci s i ons i n, i nt eral i a, C om m onw eal t h v. B r onaugh, 670 A
. 2d 147 ( Pa. Super
. C t
. 1995) , and C om m onw eal t h v. Fanas e, 667 A
. 2d 1166 ( Pa. Super
. C t
. 1995) , and det erm i ned th a t, “ b ya s k in g Z illi n o t to p u rs u e a p p e lla te p ro c e e d in g s ,” F o u n tain h a d “ w a iv e d ” h is rig h t to se e k a p p e llate re v iew . D u e to t hi s w ai ver , t he courtconcl uded thathi s cl ai m of i neff ect i ve as s i s t ance w as unt enabl e. A pp. at45- 46. 4a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e wa i v e rru l e wa s i n d e e d “ c o n t r a r y t o ” f e d e r a l l a w. A c c o rd in g to th is s tate -la w w a iv e r ru le, w h ich P e n n sy lv a n ia c o u rts have tr adi t i onal l yappl i ed i n i neff ect i ve as s i s t ance of couns el cas es i nvol vi ng couns el ’ s fai l ur e t o fi l e an a ppeal , “tr i al couns el cannot be hel d i neff

ect i ve for fai l i ng t o fi l e an appea l w hen hi s cl i enthas notas ked hi m t o do so
. ” L ew i s , 359 F. 3d at658 ( di s cus s i ng C o m m o n w ea lth v . D o ck ins, 4 7 1 A
. 2 d 8 5 1 (P a. S u p er. C t. 1 9 8 4 )); s ee a l s o Fanas e, 667 A
. 2d at1169. I n L ew i s , w e hel d thatt hi s per s e w a iv e r r u le w a s “ ‘c o n tr a ry to ’ c le a rl ye s ta b lis h e d la w ,” s peci fi cal l y , St r i ckl and v. W as hi ngt on, 466 U
. S. 6 6 8 (1984). 359 F
. 3 d at 65 9
. In th e ins tant ca se, altho u g h the S u p erior C o u rt ap p li ed the F an ase /D o ck ins w aive r rule in rejec ti n g F o u n tai n ’s cl ai m of i neff

ect i ve as s i s t ance of couns el , i tal s o r ender ed an a ltern a tiv e h o ld in g in w h ic h it ad d re ss e d th e m e rits o f th e c laim i r r es pect i ve of the purpor t ed w ai ver . A nd, as expl ai ned above , the Super i orC our t ’ s on- t he- m er i t s r es ol ut i on of F ount ai n’ s cl ai m w as n o tc o n t r a r yt o o ra n u n r e a s o n a b l e a p p l i c a t i o n o f f e d e r a l l a w. T herefore, du e t o it s subst anti ve resol uti on of the i neff ect i ven ess i s s u e , t h e Su p e r i o rCo u r t ’ s a l t e r n a t i v e h o l d i n g b a s e d o n th e n o wd e b u n k e d w a iv e r ru le a s a n n o u n c e d in D o c k in s a n d F a n a se is irre lev a n t. 11 T he co urtfurther noted, ho w ever, even apartfrom F anase and the w ai verrul e, “the s ubs t ance of [Fount ai n’ s ] cl ai m of i neff ect i ve as s i s t ance of couns el i s w i t houtm er i t
. ” A pp. at46. T he courts t at ed:

T h e law c o n c e rn in g re tro a c tiv ityo f d e a th p en altystatu tes w as u n ce rt ain a t th e ti m e Z il li ’s a d v ice w a s re n d e re d a n d f o llo w e d . P e n n sy lv a n ia l aw s eemed t o s ugges ta fa vor abl e out come for [F ou ntai n], w hil e a U
. S
. S up rem e C ou rtcase [ D o b b e rtv . F lo ri d a , 4 3 2 U .S . 2 8 2 (1 9 7 7 ),] su g g e ste d th a t th e n e w lye n a c ted d e a th p e n a lty m ig h t h a v e a p p lied . Z ill i ad v ise d [ F o u n tain ] o f h is o p tio n s, a n d g a v e h e r p ro f e ss io n a l o p in io n n o t to p u rsu e a n a p p e a l. [Fount ai n] ar gues the couns el ’ s advi ce w as n o t r ea so n ab le.
. . . A rev iew o f th e re co rd su p p o rts th e f

in d in g b yth e P C R A c o u rt th a t Z ill iW e ac know l edge that , beca us e the Supr eme C our ti s s ued 5 its d e c isio n in S trick lan d a f ter F o u n tain ’s c o n v ictio n b e c a m e f in a l, Fount ai n’ s cas e pr es ent s a pot ent i al non- r etr oact i vi t ypr obl em. See gener al l y28 U
. S. C
. 2254( d) ( 1 ); T eague v. L ane, 489 U
. S. 288 ( 1989) ( pl ur al i t y opi ni on) ( hol di ng t hat new rul es of l aw s houl d not o rdin aril yb e a p p li ed retroac ti v elyto ca ses o n co lla teral r ev iew ); L l oy d v. U ni t ed St at es , 407 F. 3d 608, 611 ( 3d C i r. 2 0 0 5) ( “G ener al l y , a ne w rul e of c r i m i nal pr ocedur e w i l l notbe appl i cabl e t o t hos e ca s es w hi ch have becom e fi nal befor e the new rule i s announce d. ”) ( i nt ernal ci t at i on, quot at i ons , and al t er at i ons om i t t ed)
. T he Supr eme C our t , how ever , has not ed that“a c ourt need notent er t ai n t he [non- r etr oact i vi t y i s s ue]
. . . i f the St at e has notr ai s ed i t
. . . . ” G oeke v. B r anch, 514 U
. S. 115, 117 ( 1995) ( per cur i am); s ee al s o H or n v. B anks , 536 U
. S. 266, 271 ( 2002) ( per c u ria m ); L e w is, 3 5 9 F .3 d a t 6 5 3 n .4 . T h u s, a lth o u g h w e a re f re e to 12 h a d a re a so n a b le b a sis f o r h e r a c tio n s. It is r eas onabl e thati n t he fa ce of uncert ai ntyas t o t he a p p lica b ili tyo f

th e d e a th p e n a lty , w h e n c o u n se l is c o n v in c e d th a t h e r c lien t w ill b e c o n v icte d if r etr i ed, al l ow i ng t he l i fe s ent ence t o s t and maybe mo r e p ru d e n tt h a n t a k i n g [ a n ] a p p e a l
. Th e P CRA cou rtfou nd Z i l l i ’s act i on s had a “ reas on able basi s” a n d w e f in d n o e rr o r o n th is p o in t. [F o u n tai n ] fu rth er a rgu es th at co u n sel’s fai l ur e t o t ake a ppeal w as pr edi cat ed on i ncorr ect i nt erpr et at i on of the l aw , and ther efor e pr oof of i neff ect i venes s . T he fa ctthatthe l aw pr ohi bi t i ng r etr oact i ve appl i cat i on of dea t h penal t ys t atut es b e c a m e c o d if

ied a f ter Z ill i ad v ise d [ F o u n tain ] is n o t e v id e n c e o f

in e f f e c tiv e a s s is ta n c e o f

c o u n s e l. C o u n se l ca n n o t b e h e ld in e f f e c tiv e f o r f a ili n g to p r e d i c tf u tu r e d e v e l o p me n t s i n th e l a w. A p p . at 47 -49 (i n terna l ci tat ion s an d fo o tno tes o m itted). The t e s ta nn ou nc e d i n Str i c kl a nd v. W a s hi ng t on , 46 6 U. S. 668 ( 1984) , appl i es t o t he ques t i on of w hetherZ i l l i w as cons t i tut i onal l yi neff

ect i ve i n r ender i ng heradvi ce r egar di ng Fount ai n’ s appea l
. R oe v. Fl or es - O r t ega, 528 U
. S. 470, 476- 77 (20 0 0 ). U n d er the tw o -pro n g testo f S tr icklan d , a p ri so n er b ea rs

5r ai s e s ua spont e t he non-r etr oact i vi t yi s s ue, w e ar e notbound t o do s o and decl i ne t o t ake s uch a c our s e of a ct i on i n thi s cas e. C f. Schi r o v. Far l ey , 510 U
. S. 222, 229 ( 1994) ( “[A ] St at e ca n w ai ve th e T e a g u e b a r b yn o t ra isin g it.
. . . A lth o u g h w e u n d o u b ted ly h a v e th e d isc re tio n to re a c h th e S tate ’s T e a g u e a rg u m e n t, w e w ill notdo s o i n t hes e ci r cumst ances . ”); W i l m erv. J ohns on, 30 F. 3d 451, 455 ( 3d C i r . 1994) ( “A l t hough w e have t he di s cr et i on t o r eac h t he .
. . [no n-r et roact i vityi ssue] sua spon t e . . . w e decli ne to do so in this ca se.”).

W e n o te i n pas s i ng t hat , i n as cert ai ni ng pr ej udi ce i n a 6 fai l ur e t o appea l cas e, the foc us or di nar i l ys houl d notbe on the s ubs t ant i ve mer i t s of the hypot het i cal appea l butr atheron w hether couns el ’ s cons t i tut i onal l ydef ic i entper form ance depr i ved the defe nd ant of an app eal t hat he otherw i se w ou l d hav e t aken
. F l oresO rte g a , 5 2 8 U .S . at 4 8 4 . A s n o ted b yth e S u p re m e C o u rt, “it is u n f a ir to re q u ire
. . . [a ] d e f e n d a n t to d e m o n s tr a te th a t h is h yp o thetical ap p ea l m igh t hav e h ad m erit
. . . . R athe r, w e re q u ir e t he def endantt o demonstr at e that , butforcouns el ’ s defi ci ent conduct , he w oul d have a ppeal ed. ” I d. at486. 13 th e b u rd e n o f

sh o w in g : (1 ) th a t co u n se l’s re p re se n tatio n f e ll bel ow an “obj ect i ve s t andar d of r eas onabl enes s ”; and ( 2) that t here i s a “r easona ble pr ob abil i t y ” t hat this i neff ect i ven ess pr ej udi ced the out come. 466 U
. S. at688, 693. 6 A s the ab o v e-q u o ted e x ce rpts fro m the S u p erior C o u rt ’s A ugus t1999 opi ni on m ake pa t ent , the courtanal y zed w hether Z i l l i ’ s advi ce a nd act i ons w er e obj ect i vel yr eas onabl e; ther efor e, t he courtappl i ed the corr ectrul e as s etfor t h i n t he r el evant S u p re m e C o u rt c a s e s – i.e ., S tr ic k la n d a n d its p ro g e n y . M or eover , t he Super i orC our tdi d notconfr onta s etof fa ct s that w er e mat er i al l yi ndi s t i ngui s habl e fr om a Supr eme C our tdeci s i on a n d n e v e r t h e l e s s a r r i v e a ta r e s u l td i f f e r e n tf r o m th e S u p r e me C our t ’ s pr ece dent
. L ew i s , 359 F. 3d at657- 58. T hus , the S u p e rio r C o u rt’s d e c isio n w a s n o t “c o n tra ryto ” c lea rly es t abl i s hed fe der al l aw . I d. Fur t herm or e, t he Super i orC our t ’ s det erm i nat i on that Z i l l i ’ s advi ce a nd act i ons w er e obj ect i vel yr eas onabl e w as notan “ u n re a s o n a b le a p p lic a tio n o f ” f e d e ra l la w . U n d e r S tr ic k la n d , a r evi ew i ng cour tm us t“eva l uat e the [r eas onabl enes s of the14 chal l enged] conductfr om couns el ’ s per s pect i ve atthe t i m e, ” 466 U
. S. at689; t hus , t hi s cour tm us tj udge the r eas onabl enes s of Z il li ’s co n d u ct ba sed o n the law an d the f ac ts as theyw ere know n i n J anuary1980. A s not ed byt he Super i orC our ti n i t s A ugus t1999 o p inion , the U n it ed S tat es S u p rem e C o u rth ad d ec ided D o b b ert v. Fl or i da, 432 U
. S. 282 ( 1977) , s hor t l ybefor e Zi l l i r ender ed her advi ce t o Fount ai n. I n t hatcas e, the St at e of Fl or i da cha r ged E r nes tD obber tw i t h s ever al m ur der s al l eged t o have oc curr ed betw een D ece m ber1971 and A pr i l 1972. I n J ul y1972, h o w e v e r, th e F lo rid a ju d icia rystru c k d o w n F lo rid a ’s d e a th penal t ys t atut e. Subse quent l y , the Fl or i da l egi s l atur e pas s ed a new death penal t ys t atut e, w hi ch corr ect ed the cons t i tut i onal pr obl ems of the pr i orl aw . D obbertw as tr i ed, convi ct ed, and s ent ence d t o death underthi s r evi s ed s t atut e. 432 U
. S. at288- 90. I n r ej ect i ng D obber t ’ s E x PostFact o C l aus e cha l l enge, t he Supr eme C our tfound no cons t i tut i onal pr obl em w i t h t he ap p li ca ti o n o f th e n ew d ea th p en altyp roc ed u res to h is case
. It concl uded that“the cha nges i n t he l aw ar e pr ocedur al , and on the w h o le am eli o rati v e . . . . ” D o b b ert, 4 3 2 U
. S
. at 29 2
. T h e C o u rt found di s pos i t i ve the fa ctthatthe new s t atut e “s i m pl yal t er ed the m ethods empl oy ed i n det erm i ni ng w hetherthe dea t h penal t yw as t o be i m pos ed .
. . [and thus m ade] no change i n the quantum of pu nis hm ent att ached t o the cr i m e. ” Id. at29 3-94. Th e C ou rtal so r ej ect ed D obber t ’ s ar gum entthatther e w as , forcons t i tut i onal p u rpo ses, no d ea th p en alty“in e ff ec t” at th e ti m e h is cri m es w ere all eg ed to h av e o cc u rred
. Id. at 29 7 -98
. N o ti n g that F lori d a’s pr i ordeath penal t ys t atut e had noty etbeen f ound u n co n sti tuti o n al at th e ti m e o f D o b b ert’s kil li n g s, the C o u rt o p in e d th a t, i rre sp e c tiv e o f w h e th e r o r n o t th e o ld sta tu te w o u ld i n t he futur e w i t hs t and cons t i tut i onal at t ack, i tcl ear l yi ndi cat ed Fl or i da’ s vi ew r egar di ng t he s ever i t yof m ur derand of the deg ree of pu nis hm ent w hich the legi sl ature w i shed to i m po se upon m ur der er s . T he C our tfound that“[t ] he s t atut e w as i nt ended t o pr ovi de maxi m um det err ence , and i t s exi s t ence on t he s t atut e books pr ovi ded fa i rw arni ng as t o t he degr ee of cul pabi l i t yw hi ch the St at e as cr i bed t o t he ac tof m ur der
. ” 432 U
. S. at297.15 C o n side red in p ersp ec ti v e o f th e S u p rem e C o u rt ’s a n a ly sis in D o b b e rt, a p ru d e n t d e f e n se law y e r o p e ra tin g in J anuary1980 coul d have r eas onabl yconcl uded that Penns y l vani a’ s pos t
- M oodydeath penal t ypr ovi s i ons m i ghthave re tro a c tiv e e f

f e c t. S p e c if

ica lly , co u n se l co u ld h a v e re a so n a b ly concl uded that , l i ke the s t atut e ati s s ue i n D obbert , the 1978 Penns y l vani a pr ovi s i ons m er el yeff ect ed pr ocedur al , as oppos ed t o s ubs t ant i ve, change s i n t he l aw . I ndeed, l i ke the Fl or i da s t atut e ati s s ue i n D obber t , the 1978 Penns y l vani a pr ovi s i ons “s i m pl yal t er ed the met hods empl oy ed i n det erm i ni ng w hether t he dea t h penal t yw as t o be i m pos ed .
. . [and di d noteff ecta] change i n t he quantum of puni s hm entat t ache d t o t he cr i m e. ” D o b b e rt, 4 3 2 U .S . at 2 9 3 -9 4 . C o n sid e rin g th a t P e n n sy lv a n ia had a then- pr es um abl yval i d death penal t ys t atut e on the books at t he ti m e of F ou ntai n’s al l eged cri m e, cou nsel cou l d li kew i se have a nal ogi zed Fount ai n’ s s i tuat i on t o t hatof D obbert ’ s and r eas onabl yconcl uded thatthe Penns y l vani a court s w oul d fi nd th a t th e p rio r la w ’s “ e x iste n c e o n th e sta tu te b o o k s p ro v id e d f a ir w arni ng as t o t he degr ee of cul pabi l i t yw hi ch the St at e as cr i bed t o t he ac tof m ur der
. ” D obbert , 432 U
. S. at297. T o be s ur e, s ever al Penns y l vani a s t at e courtdeci s i ons ci r ca 1980 s ugges t ed thatPenns y l vani a’ s 1978 pos t
- M oody death penal t ys t atut e maynothave ha d r etr oact i ve ef fec t
. See, e. g. , C om m onw eal t h v. C r ow s on, 412 A
. 2d 1363, 1366 ( Pa. 1 9 7 9 ) (“ A t th e tim e o f

th is p ro se c u tio n , the o n lyv a lid p e n a lty f o r m u rd e r o f

th e f ir s t d e g re e w a s lif

e im p ri s o n m e n t. . . . A ccor di ngl y , w e vac at e the j udgm entof s ent ence of dea t h and i m pos e a s ent ence of l i fe i m pr i s onm ent
. ”) ; C om m onw eal t h v. E d w a rd s, 4 1 1 A .2 d 4 9 3 , 4 9 4 (P a . 1 9 7 9 ) (“ T h e se n ten c e o f d e a th i m pos ed fort he murde rof the fi r s tdegr ee c onvi ct i on i s vaca t ed and a s ent ence of l i fe i m pr i s onm enti s s ubs t i tut ed ther efor e. T he s t atut e author i zi ng t he dea t h s ent ence w as decl ar ed uncons t i tut i onal byt hi s C our ti n [M oody ]
. ”)
. B uts ee C om m onw eal t h v. K al ck, 87 A
. 61, 64 ( Pa. 1913) ( “[S] t atut es w hich r el at e t o p rocedu re . . . are nott o b e con si dered ex po st fac t o, even though t he ef fec tm aybe t o enhanc e the s ever i t yof t he puni s hm ent
. ”)
. M or eover , Penns y l vani a has a l ong- s t andi ng and codi fi ed rul e of s t atut orycons t ruct i on thatpr es um es the non- r etr oact i vi t yof s t atut es . See C om m onw eal t h v. M cK enna, 38 3 A
. 2d 17 4, 18 1 n
. 13 (Pa. 19 78 ) ( “In Pen nsy l van i a t here i s aA s s ugges t ed byJ udge M cK ee dur i ng or al ar gum ent , t he 7 obj ect ive rea s onabl enes s of Zi l l i ’ s advi ce i s fur t herbut t r es s ed by t he fac tt hatt hr ee Penns y l vani a Supr eme C our tJ us t i ces di s s ent ed fr om t he maj or i t y ’ s hol di ng i n St oryI I t hatPenn sy lva ni a’ s 1978 death penal t y pr ovi s i ons di d not appl y r etr oact i vel y . St oryI I , 440 A
. 2d at493- 509 ( L ar s en, J. , d i s s ent i ng)
. I ndeed, t hos e J us t i ces opi ned thatD obber thad “ i mpl i c i t l yoverrul e[d] ” the pr evi ous s t at el aw cas es r el i ed on byt he St orym aj or i t y . St oryI I , 440 A
. 2d at493 (L a rse n , J., d iss e n tin g ). Z ill i’s a d v ice a n d p e rf o rm a n c e c a n h a rd ly be cons i der ed “obj ect i vel y unr eas onabl e” cons i der i ng t hatJ us t i ces Fl ahert y , K auff

m an, and L ar s en al l r eac hed the s ame concl us i on as th e o n e sh e f

e a r e d

– th a t th e 1 9 7 8 sta tu te a p p lied re tro a c tiv e lyto p re -1 9 7 8 c rim e s. A t th e v e rylea st, th e Ju st ic e s’ d iss e n t ce rta in ly i ndi cat es t hat r eas onabl e l egal m i nds oper at i ng i n 1980 coul d have di ffe r ed on the ques t i on. 16 p re su m p tio n th a t sta tu tes a re n o t to h a v e re tro a c tiv e e f f e c t.”); 1 Pa. C on. St at
. A nn. § 1926 ( “N o s t atut e s hal l be cons t rued t o be r etr oact i ve unl es s cl ear l yand mani fes t l ys o i nt ended bythe G ener al A s s embl y . ”)
. N onethel es s , cons i der ed i n per s pect i ve of D obber t , t he s t at e of the l aw r egar di ng the r etr oact i vi t y( orl ack t her eof) of Penns y l vani a’ s pos t
- M oodydeath penal t ypr ovi s i ons w as c ertainlyan o p en q u esti o n in Ja n u ary1 9 8 0
. T h u s, Z il li ’s 7 advi ce, s ee Supp. A pp. at1 ( “I ’ l l admi tthe l aw i s notcl earbut t he ‘ i f’ i s notr eal l yon y ours i de. I bel i eve i t ’ s s i m pl yt oo r i s ky
. ”) , w as r eas onabl e, notw i t hs t andi ng the fa ctthatherfea r ed o u tcom e d id n o t occ u r. W e not e thatt he r ecor d demonstr at es thatZ i l l i r ender ed heradvi ce onl yaft erundert aki ng w hatappea r s t o have be en a cons ci ent i ous exami nat i on of the l aw . D ur i ng the PC R A hear i ng befor e the C our tof C om m on Pl eas , s he t es t i fi ed thats he r es ear ched the i s s ue thor oughl y , di s cus s ed the mat t erw i t h her col l eague s att he D auphi n C ount yPubl i c D efe nder ’ s O ffi ce, and w as i n co ntactw i t h the death pena l t yexp ert s throug ho ut the case befor e r ecomm endi ng t o Fount ai n t hathe notpr ocee d. I n s um , i n advi s i ng Fount ai n nott o appea l , Z i l l i ’ s conduct d id n o t f a ll b e lo w a n “ o b

je c tiv e s ta n d a rd ” o f

re a s o n a b le n e s s . St r i ckl and, 466 U
. S. at688. T hus , i n fi ndi ng thatZ i l l i had ac t ed “r eas onabl y , ” A pp. at48- 49, the Super i orC our tdi d notr eac h an17 out come “contr aryt o, ori nvol v[i ng] an unr eas onabl e appl i cat i on o f ,” c le a rl ye s ta b lis h e d f

e d e ra l la w . 2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 5 4 (d )( 1 ). T hi s cour t , t her efor e, w i l l decl i ne t o gr antFount ai n’ s pet i t i on for a w r i tof habe as corpus . C f. U ni t ed St at es v. G onzal ez- L erm a, 7 1 F .3 d 1 5 3 7 , 1 5 4 2 (1 0 th C ir. 1 9 9 5 ) (“ C lairv o y a n c e is n o t a r equi r ed att r i but e of e ffe ct i ve r epr es ent at i on. ”) ; W aj da v. U ni t ed S tat es, 64 F
. 3 d 3 8 5 , 3 8 8 (8th C ir
. 1 9 9 5 ) (“[C ]ou n sel’s p erf o rm an ce is no t def

ici en t byfa il ing to p red ictfu ture devel opm ent s i n t he l aw . ”) ; E l l edge v. D ugger , 823 F. 2d 1439, 1443 ( 11t h C i r . 1987) ( “R eas onabl yeff ect i ve r epr es ent at i on c a n n o t an d d o e s n o t in c lu d e a re q u ire m e n t to m a k e a rg u m e n ts b ase d o n p red ict ion s o f h o w the law m ayd ev elop
. ”).18 III . F o r th e a b o v e re aso n s, w e w il l aff irm the D istri ct C o u rt ’s order deny i ng F ou ntai n’s appl i cat i on for a w ri tof h abeas co rpus.

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