### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Fe brua ry 17, 200 5 S es sio n IN TH E MA TTEROF : TH E EST ATE OF EMO RY B. PE GRA M, DECEASED v . GREGO RY BAXTER PEGRAM, ET AL 

### . A Dire ct A ppeal f

romthe P robate C ourt for Shelb y County No. C-9109 The Honorable Robert S. Benh am , Judge

No. W2004-01179-C OA-R3-C V - F iled April 12, 2005
Appellant, the widow of

dece dent, appea ls from probate court judg ment that dece dent died int e state . D e c e de nt h a d e xec ute d a n in div idu a l w ill , a s w e ll a s a joi nt mutu a l w ill wi th A pp e lla nt, on the same day

. Both wills e x ecute d by dece dent contained r evocation clauses purporting to re voke all prior wills. Neither Appellant, nor the w itnesses to the execution of the wills, could rec all the order in which Dec edent e x ecute d the wills. Probate court he ld that, sinc e eac h of De cede nt’s two wills purported to revoke all prior wills an d t h e o rder in which they wer e executed c ould not be e sta bli sh e d, De c e de nt d ie d in te state . F ind ing no e rr or , w e a ff ir m the jud g me nt of the pr ob a te c ou rt

.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e P robate C ourt Aff irm ed
W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J . and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
Br uce D . Br ooke of Me mphis for Appellant, Car oly ne Park- Peg ram J ames E. Bing ham of Memphis f or Appellee s, Gre g ory Ba x ter Peg ram a nd Tere sa Peg ram Hostetler

OP IN ION
I. P ROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 31, 2003, Appellant C arolyne P ark- Peg ram filed he r Petition for Admission o f L a s t Wi ll a n d T e s tame n t o f E mo r y B a xte r Pe g r a m in So le mn F o r m a n d f o r A p p o in tm ent of Ex ecutrix in the Probate Court of Shelby County , Tenne ssee. A hearing was held on March 24, 2004 befor e the pr obate c ourt. The pr obate c ourt held that the de cea sed died intestate. The probate court gr anted Ms. Peg ram’s moti on for interlocutory appea l pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil P roce dure. Ms. Peg ram filed an Application for Interlocutory Appea l-2-

Pursuant to Rule 9, which thi s Court reje cted on the ground that the probate court’s O rder Finding I nte sta c y c on sti tut e d a

fi na l ju dg me nt. Ms. Pe g ram ti me ly fi le d h e r n oti c e of

app e a l.
II. F AC TS Appellant, Caro ly

nPa r k

- Pe g r am ( “ M s
. Pe g r am” ) , an d Emory Ba x ter Peg ram (“ Mr. Peg ram” ) wer e mar ried for eig ht y ear s prior to Mr. Peg ram’s de ath, at six ty y ear s of ag e, on June 17, 2003. No child re n wer e born of

their marriag e. Ms. Peg ram ha d one adult child by a pre vious marriag e, Christopher P ark. Mr. Peg ram had two adult children by a previous marria g e, the Appellees Gr eg ory Peg ram a nd Tere sa Peg ram Hostetler . Mr. Peg ram’s hig hest educ ational attainment wa s a GED.
On No v ember 3, 1997, Ms. Pegr am and Mr. Peg ram e ach e x ecute d individual wills and e xec ute d a

joi nt w ill in th e pres ence of L ila M. Wel ls, the ma na g e r o f theWillo w E state s Mo bil e Hom e P ark w here th e P egrams res id ed. Two ot her w it nes ses , Bi ll ie J ean Be t t i s a n d Ch ri s B. Whit lock, wer e also present when the wil ls wer e ex ecute d. Eac h of the two wills executed by Mr. Pe g ram on No ve mbe r 3 c on ta ined a revo cat ionc laus e pu rp ortin g to r e vo ke a ll p ri or wi lls . M s. Peg ram’s individual will did not contain such a pr ovision.
At the Ma rc h 24, 20 04 he ari ng , the tr ia l cou rt he ard te sti mon y fr om Ms. Pe g ram, M s. Wel ls, and M r. W h i t l ock. Ms. Peg ram testified that she and Mr. Peg ram pre pare d the wills without t he assistance of an attorney

. Ms. Peg ram, Ms. Wells, and Mr. Whit lock testified as to t h e p roper execution of the wills but could not reca ll the order in which the wills wer e ex ecute d. (The pa rties sti pu la te d th a t Ms . B e tti s, the oth e r wit ne ss to the e xec uti on of the wi lls , wou ld te sti fy that sh e a lso could not rec all the orde r in which the w ills we re executed.) Howeve r, Ms. Pegr am testified that she and Mr. Peg ram ha d a distinct purpose in executing the j oint will: “the joint will was if something happene d to both of us, then it would be equal f or the c hil d re n , s o may

be ther e would be no confu s io n a mo n g th e c h il d r e n
. ” M s
. Pe g r a m e xp lain e d th a t u n d e r th e jo in t w il l, o n e - th ir d of her e state wo uldg o to he r c hil d a ndon e -thir d w ou ld g o to e a c h of Mr

. Pe g ram’ s tw o c hil dr e n b e c aus e “we considere d them all family , all equal.”
At the conc lusion of the Marc h 24, 2004 hearing, the trial court state d from the be nch:
Whil e the Court pr efe rs to a void intesta cy , the Court f inds r eg retfully in this instance that there are such inconsistencies that no will should be admitted to pr obate a nd that his estate nee ds to be distributed unde r the statute of intestate suc cession. The Court re g re ts that de c isi on , b ut w e try to u ph oldthe wi lls. Pe op le ha ve a ri g ht t o d o th e ir ow n wi ll witho ut p ro fe ssi on a l he lp. Som e tim e s th a t pr od uc e s n ot the be st r e su lt. That’s not the iss ue on which the c ase is dec ided her e. The Court can’ t rec oncile two documents. So the Court is not g oing to a dmit the document offe red f or probate .... The probate court held that Mr. Peg ram died intestate . I t is thi s holding fr om which Ms. Peg ram app e a ls.-3- III. ISS UE Ap pe lla nt, Caro ly ne Park -P e g ram, p re se nts the fo llo wi ng iss ue fo r r e vie w i n th is a pp e a l:
Whether the trial c ourt err ed as a m at t er of law and fac t by finding Emory

Peg ram die d in te state bec a us e his pr op e rl y e xec ute d in div idu a l w ill wa s si mul ta ne ou sly e xec ute d w he n h e e xec ute d a Joint Mu tua l Will wi th h is w if e , w ith bo th d oc ume nts containing a revoc ation provision and the witnesses could not e stablis h which do c ume nt w a s e xec ute d f ir st o r l a st.
IV . STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW
I n a will construction ca se, the Te nnessee Supreme Court has stated t hat “‘when ther e is no conflict in the e vidence as to any materia l fac t, as in this c ase, the question on appea l is one of la w, and our sc ope of r eview is de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss acc ompany ing the Chance llor’s conc lusions of law.’” In re Est ate of V inc e nt , 98 S.W .3d 146, 148 (Tenn. 2003) (q u o t i n g Union C

arbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) .)

V. AN AL YSI S This appea l involves a question of will construction. We must deter m i n e whether the trial court err ed in c oncluding that, beca use Mr. Peg ram executed two wills with revocation clauses and the re is n o e vid e nc e a s to wh ic h w ill wa s e xec ute d f ir st, Mr . Pe g ram di e d in te state . A t tria l Ms

. Peg ram, the A ppellant, maint ai n ed t h at t he joint will ex ecute d by Mr. Peg ram a nd herse lf was i n t e n d e d t o b e e f

f e c t u a t e d o n l y

i n t h e e v e n t o f t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s d e a t h o f h e r s e l f a n d M r
. P e g r a m
. If the y die d at di ff

e re nt t ime s, sh e state d, the ir se pa rate wi lls wo uldbe g ive n e ff e c t.
I t is a g ener al rule of

will construction t h at wh en a will has been e x ecute d, “ther e is no presumption of an intention to die intestate.” 80 Am.J ur.2d W ill s § 1037 (2002). In will construction,

“ [t]he c ard ina l rule

.. . is the a sc e rt a inm e nt of the int e nt o f the te stator . T hat in te nt, wh e n kno wn , w ill be g iven ef

fec t unless prohibited by

some rule of law or public policy .” In re Walker , 849 S.W .2d 766, 768 (Tenn. 1993) . I n will construction,
the t estator’ s intention must be ascerta ined from “that which he has written” in the wi ll, a ndno t f

ro m what he “m a y be su pp os e d to hav e int e nd e d to do,” a nde xtri ns ic evidenc e of the condition, situation and surrounding s of the testator himself may be considere d only

as aids in the interpr etation of the la ng uag e used by the testator, a nd “the t es t ator’s intention must ultim ately be dete rmined fr om the lang uag e of the instrument weig hed in the lig ht of the t estator’ s surrounding s, and no proof , howeve r conclusive in its nature , can be ad m i t t ed with a view of setting up an intention not justified by

the lang uag e of the writing itself.”
Nichols v. Todd , 101 S.W .2d 486, 490 (1936) (quoting Siz er’ s Pritchard on Wil ls §§ 384, 387, 388, and 409 (2nd. Ed.) ).-4-

I n her a ppeal brief, Ms. Peg ram arg ues that the joint mutual will that Mr. Peg ram e x ecute d wi th h e r is a c on dit ion a l w ill , w hic h c ou ld o nly be e nf or c e d inthe e ve nt o f the simult a ne ou s d e a th of Mr . a ndMs. Pe g ram. S he state s: [T] he fa cts of this case clea rly demonstrate that on November 3, 1997, Emory Peg ram executed his individual will a nd his joint mutual will with hi s wife, r equire d the condition prec edent of the joint death of both spouse s in or der to be enfor cea ble. Since Caroly ne Park- Peg ram is not dead, the nece ssary condition prec edent f

or enfor ceme nt of the joint will has never be en satisfied.
Given that the conditi on prec edent for t he joi nt will did not occur , she conte nds that Mr. Peg ram’s individual will m ust be enfor ced instea d. The pa rties have not cited, nor ha s our re sear ch re veale d, any Tenne ssee c ases a ddressing the iss ue pr e se nte d. Ho we ve r, tr e a tis e a uth or s h a ve e xami ne d th is q ue sti on , a s h a ve c ou rt s in a re la tiv e ly small number of other

states, and these authorities g uide us in r esolving this c ase of first impression in Tennesse e law. T hese authorities hold that courts should construe multipl e wills toge ther a s one will, where ver possible. As the a uthors of the Corpus Juris S ecundum sta t e, “[W ]here a te stator leave s two wills ex ecute d at diffe rent times, they will be construed toge ther as one w ill, and where the sec ond will disclaims any intention of rev o k i n g the prior will.” 96 C.J.S

. W ill s §878, at 294 (2001). How ever , when the multipl e documents are irrec oncilable a nd it is i mpossible to determine which wa s executed last, the docume nts will be void to t he extent th at they are irrec oncilable. Pr itc ha rd ’s tr e a tis e on the Te nn e sse e la w o f w ill s a nde state s, state s: Where two inconsistent wills of the s ame date, or without any date, a ppear , the court will look to every

intrinsic and ex trinsic fac t and circ umstance to a scertain which of the two is the later. I f, fr om the absenc e of diff ere nt dates and e very

o t h er k i n d of e vid e nc e , it

is i mpo ssi ble to a sc e rt a in the ir re lati ve c hr on olo g ic a l po sit ion , b oth nec es s ar ily

are held to be void, and the e state is distributed under the statute of int e state su c c e ssi on . B ut this un satis fa c tory e xpe die nt i s n e ve r r e so rt e d to un til a ll a tte mpt s to e du c e fr om the se ve ral pa pe rs a sc he me of

dis po sit ion c on sis te nt w ith both have be en tried in va in.
1 J ack W. Robinson, S r. & J eff Mobley , Pritchard on the Law of W ills and Adminis tration of

Estates Embracing the Law and Practice in Tenne ssee , § 26 5, a t 42 8 ( 5the d. 19 94 ). Con sis te nt w ith Pr itc ha rd ’s vie w, the Vi rg ini a

Sup re me Cou rt

of Ap pe a ls s ta te d in Whit

tle v. Roper , 157 S.E. 827 (Va . 1931):
Of whatever

number of executed documents the will consists, they must all be proved toge ther as constituting one will. But if it is imposs ible to determine w hich of seve ral documents that ca nnot stand toge ther is the last will, they will all be void so far a s the ir re c on c ila bil ity e xten ds

.-5-

Id . at 829 (c iting Woerne r, American Law of Admi n i s t ration , 3 Ed ., 13 9) . Si mil arl y , inAshley v . Usher , 384 S.W .2d 696 (Texas 1964), the Supre me Court of Texas wrote:
I f two or more inconsistent w ills ar e shown to e x ist a nd it is impossible to show by evidenc e which of them was e x ecute d last, no eff ect c an be g iven to any

of such wi lls

. Id . at 699 (quoting 2 Wil liam J . Bow e & Doug las H. Parke r, Pa ge on W ill s § 21.34 at 395 (1960))

. These a uthorities pe rsuade us that the probate court did not err in conc luding that Mr. Peg ram died intestate. The fac t that one of the wills ex ecute d by Mr. Peg ram wa s a joint will, and the other an individual will, is not conclusive that he intended for one will to be executed only in the event of the simultaneous death of himself and Ms. P egram; as Appellee s corr ectly point out, under Tenne ssee law “[a] joi nt will is nothin g m o re than the sepa rate wills of more than one person contained in the same instrument.” Ro ger s v. R uss e ll , 733 S.W .2d 79, 83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). We need not addr ess the question of whether the joint will is a conditional will, because we conclude th a t th is ap p e a l mu s t b e r e s o lv e d b y th e p lain lan g u a g e o f

th e tw o w il ls e xe c u te d b y M r
. Pe g r a m. We note (a s did the trial court) that the simult aneous de ath of Mr. Peg ram a nd Ms. Pegr am is mentioned no wh e re in the joi nt wil l. Altho ug h the te sti mon y of Ms. Pe g ram and the oth e r w itn e sse s te nd e d to sug g es t t hat Mr. Peg ram intende d the joint will t o be enf orce d only

in the event that he died simult aneously

with Ms. Pegr am, evidenc e of the circ umstances in which the will was executed c a nn ot o ve rride t he pri nc ipl e e mbo die d inTe nn e sse e la w, that “ no pr oo f, ho we ve r c on c lus ive in nature , can be admitted with a vi ew of setting up an intention not justi fied by the lang uag e of the writing itself.” The plain lang uag e of Mr . Peg ram’s two wills permits us to draw no c onclusion other than that he intende d eac h will to revoke a ll prior wills. I n the abse nce of any evidenc e as to whic h will was executed last in time, we must conc lude that the probate court did not err in concluding that Mr. Peg ram died intestate

. VI . C ON CL USI ON
For all the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the judgme nt of the trial court. Costs of this appea l ar e a s s e s s e d t o t h e A p p e l l a n t , C ar o l yn e P ark

- P e g r a m , a n dh e r s u r e t y.

__________________________________________ W. F RA NK C RA W FOR D, P RE S I DI NG JUDG E, W.S.