NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 17-1713

_____________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. TELLAS KENYATTA DOCKERY Tellas Dockery, Appellant

______________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern Distri ct of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-15-cr-00269-001) District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond

______________ Submitted Under Third Ci rcuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) June 19, 2018

______________ Before: GREENAWAY, JR., RESTREPO, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

. (Filed: June 20, 2018)

______________ OPINION *

______________

* This disposition is not an opinion of th e full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent.2 RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. Appellant Tellas Dockery appeals from an order of the District Court denying his motion to suppress physical evidence. We will affirm.
I A As we write solely for the parties, we recite only the facts necessary for this opinion. On February 24, 2015 at approximate ly 12:00 p.m., Sergeant Adam Schwartz of the Bensalem Township Police Department , and a partner, Officer Kevin Howard, patrolled the Lincoln Motel in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Schwartz had previously conducted “numerous” crim inal investigations at the motel. App. 37. The Lincoln Motel has an internal hallw ay, from which guests access their rooms. The hallway is also open to members of th e public, who enter the motel to buy alcohol, sold at the front desk. In this hallway, Schwartz saw Appe llant and a female companion leave their motel room , carrying bags and personal belong ings. They had checked into the motel the night before. As the door to Appellant’s motel room “opened and closed,” App. 107, Schwartz smelled “an overwhelming odor of raw mariju ana” emanating from the room, App. 39. After smelling the marijuana, Schwartz and Howard stopped Appellant and his companion. Appellant was visibly nervous an d appeared to the offi cer to be under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substa nce. Schwartz also smelled marijuana on Appellant himself.3 Appellant and the woman both told Schwartz that they had already checked out of their motel room and had left the key inside the room. Indeed, neither was found to have a room key when they were later arrested and searched. Check-out time had passed at 11:00 a.m. and there was no evidence that Ap pellant or his companion paid for late check-out. Two back-up police officers arrived. Howard then went to the front desk. When he returned, he told Schwartz that the motel room had been rented in the woman’s name, she had already checked out, and th e key had been left in the room. 1 The front desk gave Howard another key to Appellant’s motel room. Howard and Schwartz searched the room, as back-up officers continued to detain Appellant and his companion. Inside the motel room, Schwartz found burnt marijuana cigarettes. The room contained no personal belongings, and, as expected, the room key was inside. The police arrested Appellant and his co mpanion for the mar ijuana found in the motel room. The police subsequently search ed Appellant’s car a nd recovered a gun and cocaine.
B Appellant filed a motion to suppress physical evidence. 2 The District Court held an evidentiary hearing at which Schwartz testified. The District Court denied the motion.

1 Somewhat inconsistently, a motel reco rd was later produced that contained a “timestamp” of 12:12 p.m. Officer Schwartz agreed that this ti mestamp related to a check-out time. However, he also testif ied that at 12:12 p.m., Appellant and his companion could not possibly have been checking out as they were de tained by the police from approximately 12:00 p.m. through their custodial arrest.4 Appellant pled guilty to possession with in tent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession of a firearm in furthera nce of a drug traffick ing crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and possession of a firearm by a conv icted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to 240 months’ incarceration a nd 5 years’ supervised relief. Appellant preserved the right to appeal th e denial of his suppression motion. This timely appeal followed.
II 3 Appellant challenges the denial of his mo tion to suppress on two grounds: (1) that the police lacked reasonable su spicion to stop him in the mo tel hallway, and (2) that the police unconstitutionally searched his motel r oom without probable cause or a warrant. We address each issue in turn. 4
A Under the Fourth Ame ndment, to conduct a Terry stop the police must possess reasonable, articulable susp icion that the defendant committed criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000).

2 Appellant also moved to suppress his conf ession, but that issue is not before us on appeal.

3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review the District Court’s factfindings for clear error and exercise plenary re view over the applicat ion of the law to the facts. See United States v. Mosley , 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006).

4 Appellant’s brief could also be read to assert that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to patrol the motel hallway. To the extent that Appella nt raises this claim, it fails because Appellant had no reasonable expectation of priv acy in this common area of the motel, which was open to guests and the public alike. See United States v. Acosta , 965 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3d Cir. 1992).5 The reasonable suspicion analys is turns on what the office rs knew before the stop. See Florida v. J.L. , 529 U.S. 266, 271 (20 00). That is, “[i]nforma tion acquired after the initial seizure is not relevant to the reasonable suspicion analysis.” United States v.
Foster , Nos. 16-3650 & 16-4225, 2018 WL 2423277, at *5 (3d Cir. May 30, 2018); see also United States v. Lewis , 672 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2012). Appellant was subject to a Terry stop in a motel hallway. He contends that this stop was unconstitutional because its justification arose only after the stop. Specifically, Appellant claims that the basis for the stop was the odor of marijuana, which the police smelled after stopping him. Appellant misstates the facts. As the District Court properly found, the police smelled raw marijuana coming from the open door of Appellant’s motel room before the stop. This odor of marijuan a, particularized to Appellant’s motel room, is grounds for a Terry stop, as Appellant concedes. See United States v. Ramos , 443 F.3d 304, 309 (3d Cir. 2006). Ther efore, this argument fails.
B Under the Fourth Amendment, a hotel guest is entitled to the same expectation of privacy to his hotel room as one is to his own home. See Stoner v. California , 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964); see also Minnesota v. Olson , 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990); United States v. Coles , 437 F.3d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 2006). However, a guest has no such expectation of privacy after he “vacate[s] the room,” “[t]he hotel . . . ha[s] the exclusive right to its possession, and the hotel manageme nt freely g[ives] its consent th at the search be made.” Abel v. United States , 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960).6 Here, as in Abel , Appellant had no expectation of pr ivacy in his motel room at the time of the police search becaus e he had already checked out. The District Court’s factfinding on this point is not clearly erroneou s. To the contrary, there was substantial evidence to support it. Appellant, his compan ion, and the front-desk staff all told the officers that check-out oc curred before the initial Terry stop. Appellant’s room key was locked inside the room, which contained no pe rsonal belongings. Fina lly, the search took place after the motel’s check-out time and th ere was no evidence that Appellant or his companion had paid for late check-out. In the face of this evidence, Appellant points to the motel record time-stamped 12:12 p.m., which the arresting officer agreed was related to check- out. From this timestamp, Appellant argues that he and his co mpanion had not yet checked out when they were detained and their motel room searched. However, the District Court rejected such a finding in light of the extensive contra dictory evidence establishing that Appellant checked out befo re the initial Terry stop. We cannot conclude that this finding was clear error. Indeed, the arresting officer testifie d that Appellant and his companion could not possibly have checked out at 12:12 p.m. as they were detained by the police from approximately 12:00 p.m. through their custodial arrest.
III The District Court’s denial of th e motion to suppress will be affirmed.