United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 5, 2022*

Decided January 6, 2022 

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 21-1641 

DONALD E. WEAVER, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CORIZON HEALTH, INC., et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:19-cv-00799-TWP-DLP

Tanya Walton Pratt,

Chief Judge. 

O R D E R

Donald Weaver, an Indiana inmate, asserts that two prison doctors and the 

Indiana Department of Correction’s healthcare contractors violated his Eighth 

Amendment rights by failing for four years to provide him with adequate testing and 

treatment for throat problems that ultimately required surgery. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 21-1641 Page 2 

Because Weaver’s claims against the doctors are untimely, and there is no basis for the 

contractors’ liability, we affirm the entry of summary judgment for all defendants. 

 

 Corizon Health, Inc., was the healthcare contractor for the Department of 

Correction until April 2017, when Wexford of Indiana, LLC, took over. We recount the 

facts about Weaver’s treatment in the light most favorable to him. See Thomas v. Martija, 

991 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2021). 

In November 2013, while incarcerated at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, 

Weaver began experiencing dizziness, difficulty breathing, fainting, swelling in his 

throat, chest pains, stones in his mouth (allegedly), and coating and lumps on his 

tongue. Weaver went to the infirmary multiple times and reported these symptoms to 

doctors Frances Dwyer and Naveen Rajoli. He made many written and oral requests for 

treatment and asked repeatedly to see a specialist. Although both doctors prescribed 

medications and performed various tests, neither sent Weaver to a specialist or 

accurately diagnosed his conditions. Dr. Dwyer last examined Weaver in April 2014, 

and Dr. Rajoli in April 2016. 

 Weaver was transferred to Pendleton Correctional Facility in March 2017. His 

symptoms persisted, and he saw an ear, nose, and throat specialist, who diagnosed 

ptotic epiglottis, chronic tonsilitis, and dysphasia. Based on the specialist’s 

recommendation, Weaver had throat surgery in 2018. 

 In February 2019, Weaver sued prison officials, doctors, and healthcare 

contractors at both the Wabash Valley and Pendleton facilities for constitutional and 

statutory violations related to his medical treatment. The district court severed the suit 

and limited this case to the events that occurred at Wabash Valley. It then screened the 

complaint and allowed Weaver to proceed on deliberate-indifference claims against 

doctors Dwyer and Rajoli; Monell claims against Corizon and Wexford; and, on a thirdparty-beneficiary theory, claims against Corizon and Wexford for breach of contract. (A 

claim against a third doctor, who was never served with process, is not at issue here.) 

At the start of discovery, Weaver twice moved for the recruitment of counsel; he 

explained that he lacked knowledge of the subject matter at issue and that his facility 

was frequently on lockdown. The court denied the first motion because Weaver had not 

submitted the form containing the information it needed. In denying the subsequent 

motion, the court explained that the issues were straightforward and that Weaver had 

demonstrated competence to litigate at that stage. 
No. 21-1641 Page 3 

The parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the court

granted the defendants’ motions. First, the court determined that Weaver’s claims 

against Dr. Dwyer and Dr. Rajoli were untimely. With respect to Corizon, Weaver did 

not support his contention that it had a policy of failing to properly train its doctors. 

Further, he was not a third-party beneficiary to Corizon’s contract with the Department 

of Correction, and therefore he could not sue for an alleged breach. Finally, the court 

concluded that Wexford could not be liable because it did not become the healthcare 

contractor for Indiana prisoners until after the events giving rise to this suit. 

On appeal, Weaver challenges the entry of summary judgment, which we review 

de novo. Walker v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 915 F.3d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 2019). He does 

not mention the Monell claim against Wexford or the breach-of-contract claims, so we 

do not address them. See id. 

First, Weaver challenges the ruling on his claims that the two doctors at Wabash 

Valley, with deliberate indifference to his serious health concerns, failed to accurately 

diagnose and treat his condition. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

He does not squarely address the timeliness of these claims, but he refers to having a 

“continuing injury,” which we construe as a challenge to the district court’s 

determination of when his claims accrued. 

Accepting that Weaver is still experiencing harm from the doctors’ actions before 

February 2017, as he asserts, his claims are still untimely. The limitations period for 

Weaver’s claims is two years. See IND. CODE § 34-11-2-4; Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 

280 (1985) (suits under § 1983 borrow state statute of limitations for personal-injury 

claims). A claim generally begins to accrue when the plaintiff knows of his physical 

injury and its cause. See Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2013). But where 

there is a continuing violation, as here, the accrual of a claim is delayed. See id at 770. In 

that case, the clock begins to run “when the course of illegal conduct is complete,” even 

if the harm persists. See United States v. Spectrum Brands, Inc., 924 F.3d 337, 350 (7th Cir. 

2019). Once the doctors were no longer responsible for Weaver’s treatment, the 

limitations period began to run. See Devbrow, 705 F.3d at 770. Dr. Dwyer and Dr. Rajoli 

last attended to Weaver in April 2014 and 2016, respectively, but Weaver did not file his 

complaint until February 2019—well beyond the statute of limitations. 

 Weaver also contends that a reasonable jury could find that Corizon had a policy 

or practice of not properly training its doctors. There is no respondeat superior liability 

under § 1983—which answers Weaver’s suggestion that Corizon should be liable for 

harms its employee-doctors caused—but Weaver could proceed if he had evidence that 

Corizon itself caused a constitutional violation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 
No. 21-1641 Page 4 

658 (1978). Assuming failure to train is a valid theory under § 1983, Weaver would have 

to show that Corizon knew its doctors to be providing insufficient treatment and, by 

failing to train them, demonstrated deliberate indifference to that known risk. Flores v. 

City of S. Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 

378, 388 (1989)). But—to the extent this claim is timely—the record contains no evidence 

of Corizon’s knowledge of how the two Wabash Valley doctors were treating (or 

mistreating) Weaver. Therefore, summary judgment for Corizon was appropriate. 

Finally, Weaver argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to 

recruit a pro bono attorney for him. When asked to take this step, the district court must 

assess whether the indigent plaintiff reasonably attempted to obtain counsel, and, if so, 

whether he appears competent to litigate the case on his own, considering its difficulty. 

Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). And to demonstrate a 

reversible error on appeal, the movant must also show prejudice. See id. at 659. 

Here, the district court determined that Weaver demonstrated reasonable 

attempts to obtain his own counsel but that he was competent to litigate the case on his 

own because "[t]he overall factual allegations and legal claims regarding the defendants 

are straightforward" and Weaver "has a GED and has no medical or mental health 

issues that affect his ability to litigate these claims." Thus, the district court applied the 

correct legal standard and used the facts in the record to make a reasonable decision. Id. 

at 658; see also Perry v. Sims, 990 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 2021). And Weaver does not 

attempt to explain how having a lawyer could have affected the result, which is largely 

attributable to the timing of his claims.

AFFIRMED