Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

Nos. 16-1067, 16-1211 

CAROL DIANE COOPER and JOHN SCOTT COOPER, as Personal 

Representative of the Estate of Peter M. Cooper, Jr., Deceased, 

Plaintiffs, Appellants, 

v. 

ALYSSA JANE D'AMORE, f/k/a Alyssa J. Cooper, 

Defendant, Appellee. 

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Torruella, Lynch, and Barron, 

Circuit Judges. 

Keith P. Carroll, with whom Andrew Nathanson and Mintz, Levin, 

Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. were on brief, for 

appellants. 

Robert J. O'Regan, with whom Burns & Levinson LLP was on 

brief, for appellee. 

October 5, 2016 
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Per Curiam. This is a dispute over the distributions 

from the assets of one Peter M. Cooper, Jr., who died in July 2012. 

The suit was brought by John S. Cooper, the executor of Peter 

Cooper's estate, and Carol Cooper, the mother of Peter Cooper and 

a primary beneficiary of the estate. They have sued Alyssa J. 

D'Amore, Peter Cooper's ex-wife, claiming that her receipt of a 

distribution in the sum of $228,495 from an Individual Retirement 

Account ("IRA") was wrongful. 

Three primary issues are presented on appeal: 

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion when 

it sanctioned plaintiffs' then-counsel for misleading the court 

during summary judgment proceedings by failing to produce or 

discuss a document, the Delaware Charter IRA Trust Agreement, that 

the court thought was material to the issues as they had been 

framed by the parties. We find no abuse of discretion and explain 

more fully below. We thus affirm the sanctions order. 

2. Whether the district court erred by entering summary 

judgment in favor of D'Amore. The court's entry of summary 

judgment appears largely to have been based on the application of 

Delaware law. It also appears to have been based on the court's 

rejection on reconsideration of three of plaintiffs' ancillary 

arguments, which they say would justify entry of summary judgment 

in their favor. The parties agree that summary judgment for 
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D'Amore cannot be justified on the basis that Delaware law applied 

through the Delaware Charter IRA Trust Agreement. 

That raises the question of whether a different argument 

-- that D'Amore was not the proper party for certain claims -- 

provides an alternative basis for at least partial affirmance. 

The district court reasoned that plaintiffs could not assert two 

claims against D'Amore, but only against a non-party, Mesirow 

Financial. For the reasons discussed below, we cannot affirm 

judgment for D'Amore on that basis. We remand to the district 

court for further limited proceedings. Nor have plaintiffs 

convinced us they are entitled to judgment on their arguments on 

which the court actually ruled. 

However, we agree with the district court's conclusion 

that the Marital Settlement Agreement did not, under Florida law, 

waive D'Amore's right to the IRA, and so we affirm dismissal of 

that claim by plaintiffs. 

3. The third purported appellate issue, whether the 

district court erred in denying reconsideration, is rendered moot 

by our remand and need not be discussed further. 

I. 

We eschew discussion of the facts, which are well known 

to the parties, and cut to the chase. 
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A. Sanctions Order 

We cannot usurp the role of the trial judge in sanction 

matters and can reverse only if there is an abuse of discretion. 

See Young v. Gordon, 330 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2003). There cannot 

be an abuse of discretion if a trial judge reasonably could have 

concluded that plaintiffs misled the court into adopting an 

erroneous legal conclusion during the summary judgment 

proceedings. See id. (abuse of discretion standard for reviewing 

sanctions order "is not appellant-friendly -- and a sanctioned 

litigant bears a weighty burden in attempting to show that an abuse 

occurred"). Further, trial judges must have some leeway in 

controlling the conduct of proceedings in their courts. See 

Barreto v. Citibank, N.A., 907 F.2d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1990) (per 

curiam) ("Trial judges have considerable discretion in the 

selection and imposition of sanctions."). There was a reasonable 

basis for the trial judge to have taken the position he did, and 

so we affirm. 

B. Summary Judgment Ruling 

To the extent summary judgment was entered on the basis 

that Delaware law applied throughout, as evidenced by the choiceof-law provision in the Delaware Charter IRA Trust Agreement, we 

do not think that document is dispositive, and no party suggests 

that it is. Even if that document controlled, the period of 

control of the Delaware Charter IRA Trust Agreement ended, at the 
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latest, on October 1, 2010, when Delaware Charter resigned as 

trustee of the IRA. As such, that document could not have 

controlled a distribution of the IRA assets in 2012. 

We turn to the district court's December 8, 2015 denial 

of plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration disposing of three other 

issues, to see if other grounds exist on which an affirmance or 

partial affirmance can be based. See, e.g., Second Generation 

Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 624 (1st Cir. 2002) 

(disagreeing with district court's rule, but affirming on other 

grounds). We also look at plaintiffs' argument to the district 

court that judgment must be entered in their favor. 

1. Status of Mesirow As a Non-Party 

If, as the district court held, plaintiffs should have 

sued Mesirow, not D'Amore, on plaintiffs' conversion and 

restitution claims, that might be an alternative basis to affirm 

dismissal of those claims. The district court ruled that any 

claims arising out of the proper execution of the Mesirow IRA 

cannot stand against D'Amore as the sole defendant. 

Plaintiffs' summary judgment papers asserted theories 

concerning breach of the Mesirow Custodial Account Agreement and 

transfer of assets to TD Ameritrade, and their complaint brought 

conversion and restitution claims against D'Amore. The district 

court sua sponte held that these claims could solely be asserted 

in a suit against Mesirow, which has not been made a defendant in 
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this action. With respect, we disagree with the district court's 

adoption of that theory. D'Amore now holds funds from the IRA and 

was a proper defendant against whom plaintiffs could assert the 

claim of wrongful distribution. We cannot affirm entry of summary 

judgment as to those theories on the grounds utilized by the 

district court. 

2. Rejection of Marital Settlement Agreement Argument by 

 Plaintiffs 

In the interest of expediting further proceedings, we do 

agree with the entry of summary judgment against one of plaintiffs' 

theories under Florida law. For the reasons it stated, the 

district court correctly rejected the plaintiffs' argument that 

D'Amore waived her rights under Florida law to the IRA account 

when she entered into the Marital Settlement Agreement. See, 

e.g., Crawford v. Barker, 64 So. 3d 1246, 1248 (Fla. 2011) 

("General language in a marital settlement agreement, such as 

language stating who is to receive ownership, is not specific 

enough to override the plain language of the beneficiary 

designation in the separate document."); Cooper v. Muccitelli, 682 

So. 2d 77, 79 (Fla. 1996) (same). We affirm that ruling. 

II. 

We reject the invitation from both parties to decide 

certain issues of Illinois and Florida law ab initio. The district 

court should decide them in the first instance. 
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We vacate the entry of summary judgment, except as noted, 

and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 

We also urge the parties to utilize again the services 

of this court's CAMP settlement program, in light of this ruling. 

No costs are awarded.