In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17-1701

ANGELA RILEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF KOKOMO, INDIANA HOUSING AUTHORITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana.

No. 1:15-cv-00391-WTL-DML — William T. Lawrence, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2018 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 20, 2018

____________________

Before SYKES and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and LEE, District Judge.∗

LEE, District Judge. Angela Riley worked for the Kokomo 

Housing Authority for eight years before she was terminated 

in May 2014. During her employment, Riley suffered from sei-

 ∗ Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2 No. 17-1701

zures, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and depression, which required her to take various leaves of absence. She now claims that the housing authority improperly denied her requests for medical leave and 

retaliated against her for these requests by disciplining and 

terminating her, all in violation of the Family and Medical 

Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. She also asserts that the 

housing authority failed to make reasonable accommodations 

and discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of 

the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

Finally, Riley claims that she was subjected to retaliation for 

engaging in protected activity in violation of Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Fair

Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3617.

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of 

the housing authority on all claims. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Riley began working for the Kokomo Housing Authority 

(“KHA”) as a front desk clerk in November 2008. KHA provides vouchers to low-income individuals and families to 

subsidize rent in privately owned rental properties throughout Kokomo, Indiana. 

Prior to working at KHA, Riley had been diagnosed with 

bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, depression, post-traumatic 

stress disorder, and frontal lobe seizures. Her physician’s assistant certified that, due to these medical conditions, Riley 

required periodic breaks between one to eight hours per day,

for up to two days per week. Beginning in March 2010, Riley 

requested, and KHA granted her, intermittent leave under the 

Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). 
No. 17-1701 3

KHA laterally transferred Riley to another position in 

April 2010, requiring her to split her time between two offices.

When working in the second office, Riley was assigned to 

work in a closet. Riley felt that she was being punished for 

taking medical leave and repeatedly asked her superiors why 

she was being punished. 

Eight months later, in December 2010, KHA promoted Riley to the position of low-rent-application processing clerk. 

As a result, she received a pay raise and was moved to a different workspace. Her duties in the new position included 

processing applications for public housing, interviewing applicants, maintaining a wait list and applicant files, and communicating with approved applicants when units became 

available. 

Because her medical bills were mounting, Riley applied 

for social security disability benefits in 2011. Cheryl Morrow, 

KHA’s Director of Human Resources, had suggested that Riley apply so that she would be eligible for Medicare and Medicaid benefits. But when a representative from the social security office informed Riley that she would have to quit her job

to qualify for the benefits, Riley decided not to pursue it. As 

Riley sees it, Morrow’s suggestion that Riley apply for benefits reveals an intent to discriminate against her on the basis 

of her disability.

In 2012, Riley submitted written complaints about several 

of her coworkers to Debra Cook, KHA’s Chief Operating Officer. In them, Riley complained that a male coworker had a 

habit of wearing jeans that exposed his upper buttocks, that 

another coworker was treating clients rudely and disrespectfully without receiving any correction or discipline, and that
4 No. 17-1701

her female supervisor had poor personal hygiene and routinely hugged Riley and kissed her cheek. Cook addressed 

these concerns with the employees, and the issues were resolved.

During this same period, other KHA employees regularly 

complained to Cook about Riley. In short, they reported numerous incidents when Riley had treated them in a negative 

and demeaning manner. 

In September and October 2013, Riley requested and received 43 days of FMLA leave from KHA. Riley sought additional medical leave for doctor appointments in February 

2014. And, although she had exhausted her available leave

time, KHA gave Riley time off to attend them.

In March 2014, KHA issued Riley a written warning for 

insubordination for allowing a KHA tenant to transfer from 

one housing unit to another without obtaining the necessary 

approvals. What happened is not in dispute.

When a KHA tenant wishes to transfer from one unit to 

another, KHA requires the tenant to submit a written transfer 

request. The request is reviewed by KHA, and if approved, 

the tenant’s information is provided to someone in Riley’s position so that arrangements can be made for the tenant to see 

the new unit. 

On March 6, 2014, Riley arranged for a friend, a KHA tenant who wanted to move to another housing unit, to visit a 

new unit. However, the friend had not submitted a transfer 

application to KHA, nor had the friend been approved for a 

transfer. That same day, Riley provided the tenant’s name to 

Margaret King, a KHA leasing specialist, and explained that 

her friend would be transferring from one unit to another.
No. 17-1701 5

King requested the tenant’s file, and Riley assured herthat the 

file would be forthcoming. Based on Riley’s representations, 

King assumed that the transfer had already been approved

and leased the new unit to Riley’s friend. 

Because KHA had not approved the transfer, it issued a 

verbal warning to King and a written warning to Riley for intentionally circumventing the transfer policy and for insubordination. According to Riley, she was falsely blamed for the 

unapproved transfer because her only involvement in the 

process was to schedule appointments for prospective tenants 

to view units.

Riley was involved in another incident a couple of months 

later. On Wednesday, May 7, 2014, Riley discovered that new 

tenants were moving into a housing unit that she believed 

was on administrative hold and unavailable to rent. She immediately contacted two KHA property managers, Tina Bellis

and Carol Kindlesparker, and objected to the unauthorized

move. To investigate whether the move was unauthorized, 

Bellis spoke to Cook, who explained that the move involved 

special circumstances. 

When Bellis relayed this explanation to Riley, Riley became upset because she believed that Cook had circumvented

KHA procedures with impunity, whereas she had received a 

written warning. Riley called Cook’s office to discuss the matter, but was informed that Cook was busy. Riley then called 

the Indianapolis office of the United States Department of 

Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) to report the incident. The HUD representative told Riley that he would forward the information to his boss and that Riley should call 

HUD’s civil-rights department. 
6 No. 17-1701

Later that day, Bellis complained to Cook that Riley had 

been extremely confrontational and disrespectful when 

broaching the matter with her and Kindlesparker. In response, Cook directed Kindlesparker to tell Riley that Cook

wanted to see her. 

Although she disputes that Kindlesparker relayed this request to her, Riley admits that she called Cook later that day 

to say that she did not need to speak with her because she had 

already reported the matter to HUD. When Cook informed 

Riley that the people moving into the unit were cooperating 

with the Kokomo Police Department in an undercover operation, Riley retorted, “[I]f you have nothing to worry about and 

it’s legit, then we don’t have a problem.” According to Riley,

Cook also stated that whenever Riley reported anything to 

HUD, it costs KHA money (although Cook disputes this). 

That same day, Cook decided to terminate Riley’s employment based upon her refusal to come to Cook’s office, her aggressive and unprofessional behavior toward Bellis and 

Kindlesparker, her history of misconduct, and her mistreatment of her coworkers.1 Cook prepared a written notice of 

 

1 Cook attests that she alone decided to terminate Riley’s employment, and Morrow states that she was not involved in the decision. Riley 

nonetheless contends that Morrow was involved in the decision because 

she was the Director of Human Resources. But this is pure speculation. See 

Houlihan v. City of Chi., 871 F.3d 540, 554 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[S]peculation 

cannot defeat summary judgment.”). Beyond Morrow’s title, Riley offers 

nothing to establish Morrow’s participation in the termination decision. 

See R. 524 (“Q: Okay. Do you have any reason to dispute that Ms. Cook is 

the person that made the decision to terminate your employment? A: 

No.”).
No. 17-1701 7

termination at 4:20 p.m. It was modified the following afternoon, and Cook signed the notice on Friday, May 9, 2014. 

Riley did not come to work on Thursday, May 8, 2014. Nor 

did she come to work on Friday, May 9, 2014. Instead, on Friday, she called Morrow and left a voicemail message asking 

that two vacation or sick days be applied to her absences. And 

so Bellis and Morrow presented Riley with the termination 

notice on Monday, May 12, 2014.

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment and draw all reasonable factual inferences from the 

record in the nonmovant’s favor. Valenti v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 

427, 429 (7th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate 

only if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a).

A. FMLA Claim

Riley claims that KHA improperly interfered with her 

ability to take FMLA leave and disciplined and fired her in 

retaliation for seeking FMLA leave. To establish FMLA interference, an employee must prove that: (1) she was eligible for 

the FMLA’s protections; (2) her employer was covered by the 

FMLA; (3) she was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) she 

provided sufficient notice of her intent to take leave; and (5) 

her employer denied FMLA benefits to which she was entitled. Ridings v. Riverside Med. Ctr., 537 F.3d 755, 761 (7th Cir. 

2008). Retaliation claims under the FMLA require that: (1) the 

employee engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) the 
8 No. 17-1701

employer subjected her to an adverse action; and (3) the protected activity caused the adverse action. Freelain v. Vill. of Oak 

Park, 888 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2018).

The district court entered summary judgment in KHA’s

favor on Riley’s FMLA claims, finding that the housing authority was not a covered employer because it did not have 

the necessary number of employees. The court also held that 

Riley had forfeited any argument that KHA was estopped 

from asserting that she was not an eligible employee given 

that it had approved her prior FMLA leave requests. 

But we need not address either of those issues here because, even if Riley were correct on both counts, we may affirm on any basis appearing in the record, see Skiba v. Ill. Cent. 

R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 718 n.4 (7th Cir. 2018), and Riley has

failed to present evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to 

find in her favor as to these claims.

First, Riley asserts that, on May 9, 2014, she asked for leave

and was fired on account of her request. However, the undisputed facts show that Cook had already decided to terminate 

Riley on May 7, 2014, before Riley requested leave. Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that Riley was terminated 

because of her FMLA leave request on May 9 or that KHA acted 

to interfere with her FMLA leave on that date. See Ennin v. 

CNH Indus. Am., LLC, 878 F.3d 590, 597 (7th Cir. 2017) (district 

court properly entered summary judgment in employer’s favor on FMLA interference and retaliation claims where employer decided to terminate employment before employee

had requested FMLA leave); see also Guzman v. Brown Cty., 884 

F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 2018) (FMLA retaliation); Nicholson v. 

Pulte Homes Corp., 690 F.3d 819, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2012) (FMLA 

interference). 
No. 17-1701 9

Riley also claims that KHA retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the FMLA prior to May 9, 2014. In support, Riley relies on the following facts. She had requested 

(and was granted) FMLA leave from September 18 through

October 31, 2013. She also sought medical leave days in February 2014, but was told that her leave time had been exhausted. Then, in March 2014, KHA issued Riley a written 

warning arising from the incident involving her friend, which 

Riley contends was in retaliation for her prior FMLA leave requests. 

We have repeatedly held that “‘[s]uspicious timing alone 

rarely is sufficient to create a triable issue,’ and on a motion 

for summary judgment, ‘mere temporal proximity is not 

enough to establish a genuine issue of material fact.’” Cole v. 

Illinois, 562 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andonissamy 

v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 547 F.3d 841, 851 (7th Cir. 2008). Rather, 

a “plaintiff must ordinarily present other evidence that the 

employer’s explanation ... was pretext for retaliation.” Tibbs 

v. Admin. Office of the Ill. Cts., 860 F.3d 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2017).

Here, it is undisputed that five months elapsed between

the end of Riley’s FMLA leave in October 2013 and the written 

warning. Furthermore, although Riley had requested leave in 

February 2014 for medical appointments and was told that 

her leave had been exhausted, she was allowed time off for 

her appointments nonetheless. Without more, these events, in 

and of themselves, are insufficient to establish a genuine issue 

of material fact to survive summary judgment. And Riley has 

not presented any other evidence from which a reasonable 

trier of fact could find that KHA’s reason for issuing the written warning to Riley, i.e., herinvolvement in the unauthorized 

transfer, was a pretext for FMLA retaliation. See Harden v. 
10 No. 17-1701

Marion Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 799 F.3d 857, 864 (7th Cir. 2015) 

(pretext “involves more than just faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the employer; it is [a] lie, specifically a phony reason for some action”) (quoting Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 736 (7th Cir. 2008)).

For her part, Riley points out that another employee involved in the unauthorized transfer received only a verbal

warning, while others received no discipline of any kind. But 

it is undisputed that it was Riley who instigated the unauthorized transfer by arranging for her friend to see a new unit and 

notifying other employees that her friend’s transfer would be 

approved even though her friend had not even filed a transfer 

application. In the face of this, Riley has presented no facts 

that call into question KHA’s assessment that Riley’s role 

made her more culpable than others. 

Riley also claims that KHA improperly denied her leave 

for her medical appointments in February 2014, because it incorrectly calculated her leave time. But Riley concedes that 

KHA allowed her to take time off anyway. Given this admission, no reasonable jury could conclude that Riley was denied 

any FMLA benefits in February 2014, regardless of KHA’s position that she had used up her leave. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly entered summary judgment as to Riley’s FMLA claims. 

B. ADA & Title VII Claims

Riley also argues that the district court erred by entering 

summary judgment with respect to her reasonable accommodation, discrimination, and retaliation claims under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), as well as her retaliation claim under Title VII.
No. 17-1701 11

1. ADA Reasonable Accommodation 

First, Riley challenges the district court’s determination 

that her ADA reasonable accommodation claim was beyond 

the scope of her EEOC charge. “An ADA plaintiff must file a 

charge with the EEOC before bringing a court action against 

an employer.” Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cty., 772 F.3d 802, 812 

(7th Cir. 2014) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)). “[A] plaintiff is 

barred from raising a claim in the district court that had not 

been raised in his or her EEOC charge unless the claim is reasonably related to one of the EEOC charges and can be expected to develop from an investigation into the charges actually raised.” Green v. Nat’l Steel Corp., 197 F.3d 894, 898 (7th 

Cir. 1999). 

Riley asserted the following in her EEOC charge: (1) “The 

stress from work caused my disability to be aggravated for 

four days at the end of April and beginning of May, 2014, 

causing me to go to the hospital and to the doctor”; (2) “I requested FMLA leave for May 8, 2014, and vacation leave for 

May 9, 2014”; (3) “On Monday, May 12, 2014, I returned to 

work and was terminated for a reason that was not true”; and 

(4) “I believe that I am being discriminated against due to ...

my disability ... .” 

Our decision in Green v. Nat’l Steel Corp. is helpful here. In

that case, the plaintiff alleged in her EEOC charge that her employer had fired her because of her disability. 197 F.3d at 897. 

Green then filed a lawsuit against her employer claiming, 

among other things, that her employer had terminated her 

employment and failed to accommodate her disability in violation of the ADA. Id. In determining that the failure to accommodate claim was outside the scope of the charge, we emphasized that “a failure to accommodate claim is separate and 
12 No. 17-1701

distinct from a claim of discriminatory treatment under the 

ADA.” Id. at 898. “In fact, the two types of claims are analyzed 

differently under the law.” Id. “Therefore, they are not like or 

reasonably related to one another, and one cannot expect a 

failure to accommodate claim to develop from an investigation into a claim that an employee was terminated because of 

a disability.” Id.

Similarly, Riley alleged in her EEOC charge that she had 

been terminated from her job because of her disability, but she 

omitted any allegation that KHA had denied her a reasonable 

accommodation under the ADA. Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court’s ruling on this ground.

2. ADA Discrimination & ADA & Title VII Retaliation 

Next, we turn to Riley’s appeal from the district court’s 

ruling entering summary judgment as to her disability and 

retaliation claims under the ADA and on her retaliation 

claims under Title VII. In response to KHA’s summary judgment motion, Riley merely listed twenty-five facts to support 

her discrimination and retaliation claims, leaving it up to the 

district court to surmise which facts supported which claim 

and how those facts operated to defeat summary judgment as 

to each claim. Riley faults the district court for entering summary judgment on the ground that she failed to develop coherent arguments, claiming that “facts usually speak for 

themselves ... without arguments from counsel ... .”

To the contrary, a party opposing a summary judgment 

motion must inform the district court of the reasons why summary judgment should not be entered. Domka v. Portage Cty., 

523 F.3d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “If it does not do so, and loses the motion, it cannot 
No. 17-1701 13

raise such reasons on appeal.” Id.; see Econ. Folding Box Corp. 

v. Anchor Frozen Foods Corp., 515 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2008)

(“[I]t is axiomatic that an issue not first presented to the district court may not be raised before the appellate court as a 

ground for reversal.”). “It is not the obligation of th[e] court 

to research and construct the legal arguments open to parties, 

especially when they are represented by counsel.” Beard v. 

Whitley Cty. REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 408–09 (7th Cir. 1988); see 

Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding & Equip., LLC, 839 F.3d 599, 607 

(7th Cir. 2016) (“Perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are 

waived, as are arguments unsupported by legal authority.”). 

The district court was understandably flummoxed by Riley’s response to KHA’s summary judgment motion. Riley’s

brief darted from topic to topic with no frame of reference to 

guide the district court in its analysis of the claims. Her scattershot approach also ignored significant issues raised by

KHA. Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of Riley’s response 

brief was the conflation of her discrimination and retaliation 

claims. We cannot fault the district court for refusing to expend its limited judicial resources to unknot this impenetrable 

tangle.

As it stands, even after considerable effort, we cannot 

glean from Riley’s filings or the record any evidence that 

would support a claim that KHA acted with discriminatory 

or retaliatory intent. For example, to the extent that Riley bases any claim on her designation to a closet-sized office in 

2010, such a claim is untimely. In her EEOC charge, Riley 

stated that she immediately complained to her supervisors 

that the assignment was in retaliation for requesting time off 

for her disability. Accordingly, a reasonable person in her position would have known at the time that she had a claim, and
14 No. 17-1701

filing a charge four years later came too late. See Garrison v. 

Burke, 165 F.3d 565, 569–70 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Acts that fall outside the statute of limitations may be joined to an act within 

the statute only if a reasonable person in the position of the 

plaintiff would not have known, at the time the untimely acts 

occurred, that she had a claim.”). 

By way of another illustration, Riley claims that KHA discriminated and retaliated against her by issuing the written 

warning and later terminating her. But, as we have discussed, 

the five-month span between her request for disability leave

and the written warning, as well as the undisputed fact that

the decision to terminate her employment occurred before she 

requested time off in May 2014, are insufficient to create an 

inference that her requests caused the adverse employment 

action. Furthermore, Riley cannot point to a single similarlysituated employee of KHA who received more favorable 

treatment but was not in her protected class or had not engaged in the protected activity. And, insofar as Riley posits

that Morrow harbored animus against her because of her disability, there is no evidence that Morrow took part in the termination decision. What is more, Riley has offered no evidence to undermine KHA’s proffered reasons for the warning 

and termination.

Lastly, as far as we can decipher, Riley (who was a tenant 

of KHA) also contends that KHA further retaliated against 

her after she was fired by issuing eviction notices to her for 

failing to pay a sewage bill and sending her a warning letter

when she refused to allow a prearranged contractor into her 

unit. But Riley admits that her sewage bill was overdue and 

that, after she paid it, she was permitted to remain in her unit. 

It also is undisputed that Riley suffered no ill consequences as 
No. 17-1701 15

a result of the warning letter and continued to reside in her 

unit until she voluntarily vacated it. 

These are a few examples that we have been able to deduce from Riley’s submissions. And they do nothing to support Riley’s attempts to forestall summary judgment. 

In the end, our adversary system relies on parties to raise 

issues and present them in the appropriate manner. SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 356 (2006). Because the district 

judge was not required to do Riley’s work for her, we affirm 

the entry of summary judgment in KHA’s favor on Riley’s 

disability and retaliation claims under the ADA and retaliation claims under Title VII.

C. FHA Retaliation Claim

Finally, Riley challenges the district court’s decision entering summary judgment as to her retaliation claim under the 

Fair Housing Act (“FHA”). To withstand summary judgment, 

Riley needed to show, among other things, that KHA “coerced, threatened, intimidated, or interfered with [her] on account of [her] protected activity under the FHA.” East-Miller 

v. Lake Cty. Highway Dep’t, 421 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2005); see 

Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009); White v. 

U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 475 F.3d 898, 907 (7th Cir. 

2007). 

The FHA prohibits any housing practice that “discriminate[s] against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, 

color, religion, sex, familial status, ... national origin ... . [, or 

handicap.]” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b), (f)(2). And, to ensure that 
16 No. 17-1701

its statutory mandate is enforced, the FHA protects an individual’s ability to report a discriminatory housing practice to 

a housing provider or other appropriate authority. See 24 

C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(6). 

As Riley sees it, she has created a genuine dispute of material fact as to this issue by presenting evidence that she 

called HUD to report what she believed to be fraudulent activity and was told to contact HUD’s civil-rights department. 

In her view, this is enough to demonstrate (at least at the summary judgment stage) that she had engaged in protected activity and was fired as a result. 

But there is no evidence that she called HUD to report a 

discriminatory housing practice. In fact, Riley admitted during her deposition that she called HUD to report Cook’s failure to adhere to KHA procedures, conduct that Riley considered fraudulent, stating “When my CEO didn’t follow directions, and she expects everyone else to, yes, that’s when I 

called and reported her.” Suffice it to say that reporting apparent mismanagement is not equivalent to reporting a discriminatory housing practice. And Riley herself concedes that

she did not know whether the people moving into the unit in 

question were treated differently because of their race, color, 

religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability. 

Given this record, no rational jury could find that Riley reasonably believed she was reporting a discriminatory housing 

practice. Cf. Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 

563 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that a Title VII retaliation claim requires that a plaintiff have a “sincere and reasonable belief” 

that “the complained-of conduct entailed a motive that Title 

VII prohibits”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1115 (2017). 
No. 17-1701 17

Riley makes much of the fact that the HUD representative 

told her to contact HUD’s civil-rights department. But, given 

her undisputed account of what she told him—which had 

nothing to do with housing discrimination—it is unreasonable to infer from this statement alone that Riley reasonably

believed she was reporting a discriminatory housing practice. 

See Roger Whitmore's Auto. Servs., Inc. v. Lake Cty., 424 F.3d 659, 

669 (7th Cir. 2005) (to defeat summary judgment, plaintiff 

must present something beyond “bare speculation or a scintilla of evidence”). Because Riley does not present facts from 

which a rational jury could find that she had engaged in protected activity when she called HUD, summary judgment was 

appropriately entered as to her FHA retaliation claim.

As a final note, we agree with the district court that Riley’s 

other arguments in support of her retaliation claim under the 

FHA were undeveloped. Having failed to first present these 

arguments to the district court, she may not raise them now 

as a ground for reversal. See In re Veluchamy, 879 F.3d 808, 821 

(7th Cir. 2018). 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.