16392 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 61 / Thursday, March 30, 1995 / Proposed Rules

based on assumptions that no operator

has yet accomplished any of the

proposed requirements of this AD

action, and that no operator would

accomplish those actions in the future if

this AD were not adopted.

The regulations proposed herein

would not have substantial direct effects

on the States, on the relationship

between the national government and

the States, or on the distribution of

power and responsibilities among the

various levels of government. Therefore,

in accordance with Executive Order

12612, it is determined that this

proposal would not have sufficient

federalism implications to warrant the

preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this proposed regulation (1)

is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’

under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not

a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if

promulgated, will not have a significant

economic impact, positive or negative,

on a substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft

regulatory evaluation prepared for this

action is contained in the Rules Docket.

A copy of it may be obtained by

contacting the Rules Docket at the

location provided under the caption

ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration proposes to amend part

39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations

(14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421

and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 106(g); and 14 CFR

11.89.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness

directive:

Fokker: Docket 94–NM–116–AD.

Applicability: Model F28 Mk 0100 series

airplanes having serial numbers 11244

through 11437, inclusive; and equipped with

Grimes Aerospace Passenger Service Units

having part number (P/N) 10–1178–( )

through P/N 10–1571–( ), inclusive;

certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must use the authority

provided in paragraph (d) to request approval

from the FAA. This approval may address

either no action, if the current configuration

eliminates the unsafe condition; or different

actions necessary to address the unsafe

condition described in this AD. Such a

request should include an assessment of the

effect of the changed configuration on the

unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no

case does the presence of any modification,

alteration, or repair remove any airplane from

the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To ensure that warning signs are readable

to passengers and flight attendants, and to

eliminate a potential fire hazard, accomplish

the following:

(a) Within 9 months after the effective date

of this AD, install modified Passenger Service

Unit (PSU) panel lenses in accordance with

Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100–25–061,

dated March 8, 1994 (as corrected by Fokker

Service Bulletin Change Notification

SBF100–25–061/02, dated June 20, 1994).

(b) Prior to further flight after

accomplishing the installation required by

paragraph (a) of this AD, perform a one-time

post-installation inspection to detect

corrosion and/or deterioration of the PSU

connector, in accordance with Fokker Service

Bulletin SBF100–25–068, dated March 31,

1994. Prior to further flight, correct any

discrepancies detected and apply sealant in

accordance with the service bulletin.

(c) As of the effective date of this AD, no

person shall install on any airplane a Grimes

Aerospace Passenger Service Unit having

part number (P/N) 10–1178–( ) through P/N

10–1571–( ), inclusive.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager,

Standardization Branch, ANM–113, FAA,

Transport Aircraft Directorate. Operators

shall submit their requests through an

appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Standardization

Branch, ANM–113.

Note 2: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Standardization Branch,

ANM–113.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March

24, 1995.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 95–7780 Filed 3–29–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 95–NM–06–AD]

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing

Model 747 SP, SR, –100, –200, and

–300 Series Airplanes Equipped With

Pratt & Whitney Model JT9D Series

Engines (Excluding Model JT9D–70

Engines)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the

adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to

certain Boeing Model 747 SP, SR, –100,

–200, and –300 series airplanes. This

proposal would require repetitive

operational tests of the reversible

gearbox pneumatic drive unit (PDU) or

the reversing air motor PDU to ensure

that the unit can restrain the thrust

reverser sleeve, and correction of any

discrepancy found. This proposal is

prompted by the results of an

investigation, which revealed that, in

the event of thrust reverser deployment

during high-speed climb or during

cruise, these airplanes could experience

control problems. The actions specified

by the proposed AD are intended to

ensure the integrity of the fail safe

features of the thrust reverser system by

preventing possible failure modes in the

thrust reverser control system that can

result in inadvertent deployment of a

thrust reverser during flight.

DATES: Comments must be received by

May 24, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–103,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 95–NM–

06–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00

p.m., Monday through Friday, except

Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in

the proposed rule may be obtained from

Boeing Commercial Airplane Group,

P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington

98124–2207. This information may be

examined at the FAA, Transport
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 61 / Thursday, March 30, 1995 / Proposed Rules 16393

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: G.

Michael Collins, Aerospace Engineer,

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington

98055–4056; telephone (206) 227–2689;

fax (206) 227–1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications shall

identify the Rules Docket number and

be submitted in triplicate to the address

specified above. All communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments, specified above, will be

considered before taking action on the

proposed rule. The proposals contained

in this notice may be changed in light

of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report

summarizing each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket Number 95–NM–06–AD.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

ANM–103, Attention: Rules Docket No.

95–NM–06–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue,

SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Discussion

In May 1991, a Boeing Model 767

series airplane was involved in an

accident in which a thrust reverser

deployed inadvertently during flight.

While the investigation of the accident

has not revealed the cause of that

deployment, it has identified a number

of possible failure modes in the thrust

reverser control system. Inadvertent

deployment of a thrust reverser during

flight could result in reduced

controllability of the airplane.

The FAA and the aviation industry

are conducting an in-depth investigation

of the thrust reverser systems installed

on various types of large transport

airplanes. In particular, this

investigation has focused on airplane

controllability in the event of an inflight deployment of a thrust reverser,

and thrust reverser reliability in general.

Based on the data gathered from this

ongoing investigation, the FAA issued

several airworthiness directives (AD) to

require periodic inspections and tests of

the thrust reverser systems on certain

Boeing Model 757 and 767 series

airplanes [for example, reference AD

91–20–09, amendment 39–8043 (56 FR

46725, September 16, 1991) for certain

Model 757 series airplanes; and AD 92–

24–03, amendment 39–8408 (57 FR

53258, November 9, 1992) for certain

Model 767 series airplanes]. In addition,

the FAA has issued or proposed several

AD’s to require an additional locking

device on thrust reversers that are

installed on Model 737–300/–400/–500,

757, and 767 series airplanes [for

example, reference AD 94–14–02,

amendment 39–8954 (59 FR 33646, June

30, 1994) for certain Model 757 series

airplanes; and AD 94–16–03,

amendment 39–8993 (59 FR 41229,

August 11, 1994) for certain Model 767

series airplanes]. These actions were

taken to enhance the level of reliability

on airplane models that were

determined to have unacceptable flight

characteristics following an in-flight

deployment of a thrust reverser.

Until now, the investigation of thrust

reverser system reliability on Boeing

Model 747 series airplanes has not been

given as high a priority as the other

Boeing models because Model 747

series airplanes have never experienced

control problems as a result of an inflight thrust reverser deployment. Based

on this long safety record and the

available evidence up to this time, it has

been accepted generally that all Model

747 series airplanes would be shown to

be controllable throughout the flight

envelope following an in-flight thrust

reverser deployment.

Boeing has responded to an FAA

request for further investigation to

determine the controllability of Model

747 series airplanes following an inflight thrust reverser deployment. The

investigation results indicate that Model

747 SP, SR, –100, –200, –300, and -400

series airplanes could experience

certain control problems in the event of

a thrust reverser deployment occurring

during high-speed climb or during

cruise.

In light of that information, the FAA

determined that certain inspections and

functional tests of the thrust reverser

control and indication system on all

Model 747 series airplanes, similar to

those required previously for Model 757

and 767 series airplanes, are necessary

as precautionary actions to provide an

acceptable level of safety for Model 747

series airplanes. Subsequently, on July

13, 1994, the FAA issued AD 94–15–05,

amendment 39–8976 (59 FR 37655, July

25, 1994), to require inspections and

functional tests of the thrust reverser

control and indication system on all

Model 747–400 series airplanes.

In the preamble to the notice of AD

94–15–05, the FAA indicated that it was

considering similar rulemaking action

for other Model 747 series airplanes.

The FAA now has determined that such

rulemaking action is indeed necessary,

and this proposed AD follows from that

determination. The FAA has determined

that inspections and functional tests of

the thrust reverser control and

indication system, similar to those

currently required by AD 94–15–05 for

Model 747–400 series airplanes, are

necessary for Model 747 SP, SR, -100,

-200, and -300 series airplanes in order

to reduce the exposure of these

airplanes to potential undetected single

failures in the thrust reverser control

system. The presence of an undetected

failure in the thrust reverser control

system, in some cases, can increase the

likelihood of an uncommanded thrust

reverser deployment in the event of an

additional thrust reverser control system

failure.

The FAA has reviewed and approved

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–

78A2131, dated September 15, 1994,

which describes procedures for

repetitive operational tests of the

reversible gearbox pneumatic drive unit

(PDU) or the reversing air motor PDU to

ensure that the unit can restrain the

thrust reverser sleeve, and correction of

any discrepancy found. The alert service

bulletin recommends that these initial

tests be accomplished no later than

1,300 flight hours after release of the

alert service bulletin. The alert service

bulletin also recommends a repetitive

test interval of 2,000 flight hours.

Since an unsafe condition has been

identified that is likely to exist or

develop on other products of this same

type design, the proposed AD would

require repetitive operational tests of the

reversible gearbox pneumatic drive unit

(PDU) or the reversing air motor PDU to

ensure that the unit can restrain the

thrust reverser sleeve, and correction of

any discrepancy found during the test.

The actions would be required to be

accomplished in accordance with the
16394 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 61 / Thursday, March 30, 1995 / Proposed Rules

alert service bulletin described

previously.

In developing appropriate compliance

times for the initial test contained in

this proposed AD, the FAA considered

the safety implications and normal

maintenance schedules for timely

accomplishment of the proposed

actions. In consideration of these items,

the FAA determined that 90 days (for

the initial test of the PDU) represents

the maximum interval of time allowable

wherein that test can reasonably be

accomplished and an acceptable level of

safety can be maintained. Further, the

FAA has determined that the proposed

repetitive interval of 2,000 flight hours

is appropriate, based on the service

history of similar components and on an

analysis of the system design to predict

the reliability of the system during the

service life of the aircraft.

The thrust reverser control and

indication system on Model 747–400

series airplanes is similar to the system

installed on the airplanes addressed in

this proposed AD. The compliance time

for the initial test proposed in this AD

corresponds to that specified in AD 94–

15–05 for Model 747–400 series

airplanes. The repetitive test interval

specified in this proposed AD should

allow operators to perform the test

during regularly scheduled

maintenance.

This proposed AD also would require

that operators submit a report of initial

test results to the FAA.

This AD is considered to be interim

action until final action is identified, at

which time the FAA may consider

additional rulemaking.

As a result of recent communications

with the Air Transport Association

(ATA) of America, the FAA has learned

that, in general, some operators may

misunderstand the legal effect of AD’s

on airplanes that are identified in the

applicability provision of the AD, but

that have been altered or repaired in the

area addressed by the AD. The FAA

points out that all airplanes identified in

the applicability provision of an AD are

legally subject to the AD. If an airplane

has been altered or repaired in the

affected area in such a way as to affect

compliance with the AD, the owner or

operator is required to obtain FAA

approval for an alternative method of

compliance with the AD, in accordance

with the paragraph of each AD that

provides for such approvals. A note has

been included in this notice to clarify

this long-standing requirement.

There are approximately 456 Model

747 SP, SR, –100, –200, and –300 series

airplanes of the affected design in the

worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that

173 airplanes of U.S. registry would be

affected by this proposed AD, that it

would take approximately 16 work

hours per airplane to accomplish the

proposed actions, and that the average

labor rate is $60 per work hour. Based

on these figures, the total cost impact of

the proposed AD on U.S. operators is

estimated to be $166,080, or $960 per

airplane.

The total cost impact figure discussed

above is based on assumptions that no

operator has yet accomplished any of

the proposed requirements of this AD

action, and that no operator would

accomplish those actions in the future if

this AD were not adopted.

The regulations proposed herein

would not have substantial direct effects

on the States, on the relationship

between the national government and

the States, or on the distribution of

power and responsibilities among the

various levels of government. Therefore,

in accordance with Executive Order

12612, it is determined that this

proposal would not have sufficient

federalism implications to warrant the

preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this proposed regulation (1)

is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’

under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not

a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if

promulgated, will not have a significant

economic impact, positive or negative,

on a substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft

regulatory evaluation prepared for this

action is contained in the Rules Docket.

A copy of it may be obtained by

contacting the Rules Docket at the

location provided under the caption

ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration proposes to amend part

39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations

(14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421

and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 106(g); and 14 CFR

11.89.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness

directive:

Boeing: Docket 95–NM–06–AD.

Applicability: Model 747 SP, SR, –100,

–200, and –300 series airplanes equipped

with Pratt & Whitney Model JT9D series

engines (excluding Model JT9D–70 engines),

certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must use the authority

provided in paragraph (d) to request approval

from the FAA. This approval may address

either no action, if the current configuration

eliminates the unsafe condition; or different

actions necessary to address the unsafe

condition described in this AD. Such a

request should include an assessment of the

effect of the changed configuration on the

unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no

case does the presence of any modification,

alteration, or repair remove any airplane from

the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To ensure the integrity of the fail safe

features of the thrust reverser system,

accomplish the following:

(a) Within 90 days after the effective date

of this AD, perform an operational test of the

reversible gearbox pneumatic drive unit

(PDU) or the reversing air motor PDU to

ensure that the unit can restrain the thrust

reverser sleeve, in accordance with Boeing

Alert Service Bulletin 747–78A2131, dated

September 15, 1994. Repeat the test thereafter

at intervals not to exceed 2,000 flight hours.

(b) If any of the tests required by this AD

cannot be successfully performed, or if any

discrepancy is found during those tests,

accomplish either paragraph (b)(1) or (b)(2) of

this AD.

(1) Prior to further flight, correct the

discrepancy found, in accordance with

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–78A2131,

dated September 15, 1994. Or

(2) The airplane may be operated in

accordance with the provisions and

limitations specified in an operator’s FAAapproved Minimum Equipment List (MEL),

provided that no more than one thrust

reverser on the airplane is inoperative.

(c) Within 30 days after performing each

initial test required by this AD, submit a

report of the test results, both positive and

negative, to the FAA, Seattle Aircraft

Certification Office (ACO), ANM–100S, 1601

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington

98055–4056; fax (206) 227–1181. Information

collection requirements contained in this

regulation have been approved by the Office

of Management and Budget (OMB) under the

provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of

1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and have been

assigned OMB Control Number 2120–0056.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 61 / Thursday, March 30, 1995 / Proposed Rules 16395

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Seattle

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators

shall submit their requests through an

appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Seattle ACO.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 24,

1995.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 95–7781 Filed 3–29–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 94–CE–32–AD]

Airworthiness Directives; Stemme S10

Gliders

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes to

adopt a new airworthiness directive

(AD) that would apply to certain

Stemme S10 gliders. The proposed

action would require modifying the

rudder control cable system. Rupture of

a turnbuckle eye bolt in the rudder

control cable system on one of the

affected gliders prompted the proposed

action. The actions specified by the

proposed AD are intended to prevent

rudder control cable system failure

caused by rupture of the turnbuckle eye

bolt, which, if not detected and

corrected, could result in loss of rudder

control.

DATES: Comments must be received on

or before June 16, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Central Region,

Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 94–CE–32–

AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street,

Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Comments

may be inspected at this location

between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday

through Friday, holidays excepted.

Service information that applies to the

proposed AD may be obtained from

Stemme GmbH & Co. KG, Flugplatz

Gebaude 47, D–15344 Staussberg,

Germany. This information also may be

examined at the Rules Docket at the

address above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

Herman C. Belderok, Project Officer,

Gliders, Small Airplane Directorate,

Aircraft Certification Service, FAA,

1201 Walnut, suite 900, Kansas City,

Missouri 64106; telephone (816) 426–

6932; facsimile (816) 426–2169.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications

should identify the Rules Docket

number and be submitted in triplicate to

the address specified above. All

communications received on or before

the closing date for comments, specified

above, will be considered before taking

action on the proposed rule. The

proposals contained in this notice may

be changed in light of the comments

received.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report that

summarizes each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket No. 94–CE–32–AD.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Central Region, Office of the

Assistant Chief Counsel, Attention:

Rules Docket No. 94–CE–32–AD, Room

1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City,

Missouri 64106.

Discussion

The Luftfarht-Bundesant (LBA),

which is the airworthiness authority for

Germany, recently notified the FAA that

an unsafe condition may exist on

Stemme S10 gliders. The LBA reports

that the rudder control cable turnbuckle

eye bolt ruptured on one of the affected

gliders, which resulted in loss of rudder

control. Under the current

configuration, the rudder control cables

from the right and left pedals meet at

the turnbuckle in the tailboom in a way

that subjects the turnbuckle eye bolt to

resistant forces (tensile and bending)

that could pull the bolt from the rudder

assembly. If not detected and corrected,

rudder control cable turnbuckle eye bolt

rupture could result in rudder control

cable system failure and subsequent loss

of rudder control.

Stemme has issued Service Bulletin

(SB) A31–10–018, dated June 3, 1994,

which specifies procedures for

modifying the rudder control cable

system on these S10 gliders. Pages 1–3

of this service bulletin are written in

German and pages 4–6 are English

translations. The LBA classified this

service bulletin as mandatory and

issued LBA AD 94–260, dated August

25, 1994, in order to assure the

continued airworthiness of these gliders

in Germany.

This glider model is manufactured in

Germany and is type certificated for

operation in the United States under the

provisions of section 21.29 of the

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.29) and the applicable bilateral

airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to

this bilateral airworthiness agreement,

the LBA has kept the FAA informed of

the situation described above. The FAA

has examined the findings of the LBA,

reviewed all available information, and

determined that AD action is necessary

for products of this type design that are

certificated for operation in the United

States.

Since an unsafe condition has been

identified that is likely to exist or

develop in other Stemme S10 gliders of

the same type design, the proposed AD

would require modifying the rudder

control cable system. The proposed

action would be accomplished in

accordance with the instructions to

Stemme SB A31–10–018 (pages 4–6),

dated June 3, 1994.

The FAA estimates that 3 gliders in

the U.S. registry would be affected by

the proposed AD, that it would take

approximately 4 workhours per glider to

accomplish the proposed action, and

that the average labor rate is

approximately $60 an hour. Parts cost

approximately $56 per glider. Based on

these figures, the total cost impact of the

proposed AD on U.S. operators is

estimated to be $888 ($296 per

airplane). This figure is based on the

assumption that no affected owner/

operator of the affected gliders has

incorporated the proposed modification.

The regulations proposed herein

would not have substantial direct effects

on the States, on the relationship