### The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States Distric t 1 

### Judge for the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri, sit ting by designation. The Honorable Ross A. Walters, United States M agistrate Judge 2 

### for the Southern District of Iowa, presiding by consent of th e parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 96-2910

___________ Steve Ragan, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa. D. Lynch; Charles Harper; * Ronald Welder; Debbie Nichols; * Sally Chandler Halford, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: March 11, 1997 Filed: May 15, 1997

___________ Before WOLLMAN, and BEAM, Circuit Judges and LAUGHREY, District Judge. 1

___________ BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Steve Ragan appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment 2 against him in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We affirm.

### The card was not produced at Ragan’s prison disciplinar y 3 

### hearin g nor is it part of the record before us. Given th e procedural posture of this cas e, we accept Ragan’s representations about the contents of the correspondence. The district court determined that the maximum securit y 4 

### restri ction was not at issue in this case. That finding was no t appealed and need not concern us here. -2- I. BACKGROUND Steve Ragan is serving time in the I owa State Penitentiary (ISP) for his robbery of a conv enience store by threatening the cashier with a gun. Ragan sent a Christma s card to the cashier in which he offered an apology an d asked for forgiveness. This contact upset the victim. Th e 3 administrator of the Victim Witness Assistance Program wrote a letter to the Iowa Department of Corrections complaining on the victim’s behalf.
Raganwas served with a disciplinary notice charging that th e correspondence violated prison rules. A discipl inary hearing was held, at whic hneither the victim nor the person who complained on her behal f testified. The disciplinary committee relied on the complaint and on an investigator’s written report to find that Ragan violated Institutiona l Rule 40, “Misuse of Mail, Telephone, and Other C ommunications.” Ragan was sanctioned with fifteen days of disciplinary det ention, restriction to the maxim umsecurity cellhouse for six months, and loss of 180 days good

4 conduct time. Ra gan filed three internal appeals of the disciplinary committee’ s determination, all of which were denied. After serving his disciplinary detention, Ragan filed an application for postconviction relief in state court. T he state court found that Rule 40 did not prohibit Ragan’ s conduct. The court then reasoned that without Rule 40, the disciplinary committee’s decision lacked

### Ragan also alleged a First Amendment violation . The district 5 

### court found that the state’s l egitimate interest in preventing the harassment of crime victims ju stified restriction of Ragan’s right of free expression. That ruling is not contested on appeal. -3- any support in the evidence. Ragan’s disciplinary record was therefor e expunged and his good-conduct time returned.
Raganfiled this section 1983 action in federal district cour t seekin g damages from the ISP employee who investigated the victim’ s co mplaint, the administrative law judge who chaired the disciplinar y commit tee, and the three ISP officials who denied his administrativ e appeals. He claims t hat the defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to d ue process. The district court granted the defendants’ motion 5 for summary judgment, reasoning that since Ragan’s good-conduct time had been returned, his only damage was the fifteen days of disciplinar y segregatio n, which is not protected by the Due Process Clause. Raga n appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

Adue process claim is cognizable only if there is a recognize d liberty or property interest at stake. Board of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Because Ragan concedes that the Due Process Clause itsel f was not violated here, he must establish that the disciplinary committee interfered with some constitutionally-protected liberty interest.
Ragan was subjected to two sanctions: segregation and loss of goodtime credits. He ack nowledges that no liberty interest was implicated by the segrega tion. Sandin v. Conner , 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995). Raga n assert s, however, that the additional loss of his good-conduct tim e implicates a constitutionally-protected liberty

### The retention of good-time credits does not automaticall y 6 

### qu alifyas a constitutionally-protected liberty interest. Wolf f v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974). Further, we hav e previously expressed doubt as to whether Iowa’s statutory sc heme is sufficiently mandatory to create a liberty interest in good time. See Moorman v. Thalacker , 83 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1996). -4- interest. For purposes of this case, we will as sume without deciding that Ragan faced the loss of a liberty interest. 6
Wheninmates are entitled to due process before being disciplined , they must receive: (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) a n opportunity to presen t evidence in their defense; (3) a written statement by the fac t finder of the reasons for the action; and (4) a decisio n suppor ted by some evidence in the record. Superintendent, Mass
. Correction al Inst. v. Hill , 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (citing Wolff v
. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974)). Ragan concedes he was provided the first three elements. His claim centers around the evidentiar y requirement.
Ragan ar gues that the state court’s determination that Rule 40 di d not prohibit his conduct is equivalent to a finding that due process was violated, which, in t urn, entitles him to damages. As an initial matter, we a re not convinced that a disciplinary committee’s erroneou s interpretation of a p rison rule constitutes a due process violation under Hill
. Regardless, Ragan has suffered no injury or, if he did, any har m suffe red has already been remedied--his good-time credits have bee n returned and his disciplinary record expunged. Because there was a procedure available to remedy the disciplinary committee’s mistake, that error alone does not amount to a denial of due process. Wycoff v. Nichols , 94 F.3d 1187, 1189 (8th Cir. 1996) (no due process violation in sanctionin g inmate for conduct not prohibited by prison rules when appeal of disciplin e restored good-time credits

### -5-

because appeal proced ure “constituted part of the due process [and] cured the alleged due process violation”). Ragan attempts to distinguish Wycoff on the grounds that in his case it was a state court, not prison administrators, who restored his good

conduct time. However, the Fourteenth Amendment requires the state t o provide him adequate procedures. See Rendell-Ba ker v. Kohn , 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (Due Process Clause applies to acts o f states). The Iowa state court is just as much an arm of the state as ISP administrators. Thus, th e proces s afforded Ragan by the state included a full-blown evidentiar y hearing at which Ragan was represented by counse l. Those proceedings were effective in vindicating any liberty interest Ragan might have had. I n short, the system worked for Steve Ragan. Any defect in the committee’ s process has been remedied, and Ragan has suffered no deprivation without due process. It follows that he is not entitled to damages.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s decision granting the defendants ’ motion for summary judgment.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.