### J-S11028-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. TYREEK WORDSLEY Appellant No. 1375 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 31, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at Nos: CP-51-CR-0000804-2010, CP-51-CR-0007358- 2009, CP-51-CR-0010398-2009 BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 17, 2018 Appellant, Tyreek Wordsley, appeals pro se from the March 31, 2017 order dismissing his petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm. The PCRA court recited the pertinent facts and procedural history: On March 27, 2009, [Appellant] was arrested and charged with Possession With Intent to Deliver (PWID) on docket CP-51- CR-001160-2009 [this charge is not presently at issue]. On April 2, 2009, [Appellant] was arrested and charged with PWID on docket CP-51-CR-0007358-2009. On May 7, 2009, [Appellant] was arrested and charged with PWID on docket CP-51-CR0010398-2009. On September 25, 2009, [Appellant] was arrested and charged with PWID on docket CP-51-CR-0000804- 2010. On July 20, 2011, [Appellant] appeared before this Court and pled guilty to PWID on all four of his dockets. On that same day, this Court sentenced [Appellant] to a negotiated sentence of 111⁄2 to 23 months’ county incarceration plus three years reporting

### J-S11028-18

- 2 -

probation with immediate parole on each docket, to run concurrent with one another. On September 20, 2011, [Appellant] was arrested and charged with Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA) § 6105 and 6106. These charges were subsequently adopted by the United States Attorney’s Office after the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania withdrew them on December 8, 2011. On November 20, 2012, [Appellant] pled guilty to these charges and was sentenced to 8 years’ federal incarceration. On April 17, 2013, this court held a violation of probation (VOP) hearing for [Appellant]. [Appellant] was represented at the hearing by Liam Riley, Esquire. After this court reviewed [Appellant’s] criminal history and incorporated the report prepared by the probation officer on April 17, 2013 into the record, Mr. Riley asked that this court sentence [Appellant] to a period of five years’ probation on each of his dockets, to run concurrent to one another but consecutive to the federal sentence. Mr. Riley argued that [Appellant] was a young man with rehabilitative potential and that he was already serving a significant sentence in federal custody. Mr. Riley further argued that a probationary sentence following [Appellant’s] incarceration would adequately address the Commonwealth’s concerns while allowing [Appellant] the opportunity to set himself on the right path. [...] This court then found [Appellant] to be in direct violation of his probation/parole, terminated parole and revoked probation. This court then sentenced him to 5 to 10 years’ state incarceration, to run concurrent on all four of his [state] dockets but consecutive to the federal sentence. PCRA Court Opinion, 7/27/17, at 1-3. Appellant did not take a direct appeal from the April 17, 2013 violation of probation (VOP) sentence. On July 6, 2016, he filed a facially untimely pro

### J-S11028-18

- 3 -

se PCRA petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. 1 

### Appellant pled that the untimeliness of the petition stemmed from governmental interference, inasmuch as the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) discarded certain of Appellant’s legal documents. 2 

### On March 2, 2017, appointed counsel filed a petition to withdraw and a no merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). One day later, the PCRA court entered its notice of intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On March 31, 2017, the PCRA court entered an order granting counsel’s petition to withdraw and dismissing Appellant’s petition. This timely appeal followed. Appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve for direct appellate review Appellant’s claim that his state sentence was supposed to run concurrently with his federal sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 4. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely. Id. We have considered only the latter issue, which we find to be dispositive.

_________________ ____________________ _______ 1 

### The PCRA requires that any petition thereunder be filed within one year of the finality of the judgment of sentence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on May 17, 2013, when the direct appeal period expired. He therefore had until May 17, 2014 to file a timely petition. 2 

### A petitioner may overcome the PCRA’s timeliness requirement if he pleads and proves that the untimeliness was the result of governmental interference. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i).

### J-S11028-18

- 4 -

We will disturb the PCRA court’s decision only if the record does not support the court’s findings or if the court committed legal error. The PCRA’s time limits are jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 934 A.2d 72 (Pa. 2007). The PCRA court has no jurisdiction to entertain an untimely petition unless the petitioner pleads and proves one of the statutory timeliness exceptions. Id. The governmental interference exception applies where “the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i). As noted above, Appellant claims that the DOC destroyed documents relevant to his claim. He also argues that he was without access to the prison law library while he was confined in the Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”). Appellant’s pro se brief is largely incoherent, and it fails to develop a substantive argument regarding his petition’s timeliness. The PCRA court noted the following:

[A]ccording to [Appellant’s] own documents, he was held in the [RHU] for [...] 7 months following his VOP hearing, thus until approximately November 2013, and he learned of the misplacement of his legal documents no later than May 2014. [Appellant] offers no further evidence why it then took him until July 2016 to file the instant petition. Therefore, even by the most generous standard, [Appellant] had until July 2014 to file a timely petition based upon the governmental interference exception. He failed to do so and his petition is consequently untimely.

### J-S11028-18

- 5 -

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/27/17, at 7. We have reviewed the record, the parties’ briefs, the applicable law, and the PCRA court opinion. We conclude that the PCRA court’s opinion, at pages 5 through 8, accurately addresses the untimeliness of Appellant’s petition. We affirm the order based upon the analysis set forth on those pages. We also direct that a copy of the PCRA court’s July 27, 2017 opinion be filed along with this memorandum. Order affirmed. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 5/17/18Circulated 04/30/2018 10:16 AM



### IN 

### THE COURT OF 

### COMMON PLEAS 

### FIRSTJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

### CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION COMMONWEALTH

vs.



### TYREEK WORDSLEY

BRINKLEY,

### J. FILED JUL 2 7 2017 Office ofJudicial Records 

### Appeals/postTrial



### OPINION CP-51-CR-0007358-2009 CP-51-CR-0010398-2009 CP-51-CR-0011160-2009 CP-51-CR-0000804-2010 CP-5TCR.0007358-2009 Comm v Worderey. Tyreek Opinion 

# Hill 11111111 1111 1111 7980894441 

### SUPERIOR COURT 1375 

### EDA 2017



### JULY 27, 2017

Defendant 

### Tyreek Wordsley filed a 

### petition for 

### reliefpursuant to the 

### Post-Conviction ReliefAct, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. (eff. Jan. 16, 1996), raising claims based upon ineffective assistance 

### ofcounsel. 

### After independent review 

### ofDefendant'spro se 

### petitions, PCRA counsel's Finley letter, and 907 

### Notice having been sent and a 

### reply received from 

### Defendant, this Court 

### dismissed 

### Defendant's petition without a hearing 

### based upon the Finley letter and 

### untimeliness. Defendant appealed the 

### dismissal 

### ofhis 

### petition to the 

### Superior Court. The sole issue addressed in this 

### Opinion is 

### whether this Court properly dismissed Defendant's petition without a hearing based 

### upon 

### counsel's Finley letter and 

### untimeliness. This 

### Court's decision should be affirmed. 

### PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND 

### FACTS On March 27, 

### 2009, Defendant was 

### arrested and charged with Possession with Intent to Deliver (PWID) on

### docket CP-51-CR-0011160-2009. On April 3, 2009, 

### Defendant was arrested and 

### charged with PWID on docket 

### CP-51-CR-0007358-2009. On May 7, 

### 2009, Defendant wasarrested and charged 

### with PWID on 

### docket CP-51-CR-0010398-2009. On 

### September 25, 2009, Defendant was 

### arrested and charged with PWID on 

### docket CP-51-CR-0000804-2010. On July 20, 2011, 

### Defendant appeared before this Court and 

### pled guilty to PWID on all 

### four 

### ofhis dockets. On that same day, this Court 

### sentenced Defendant to a 

### negotiated sentence 

### of 111/2 to 23 months county 

### incarceration plus 3 years reporting probation with immediate parole on each docket, to run 

### concurrent with one another. On 

### September 20, 2011, 

### Defendant was 

### arrested and charged with Violations 

### ofthe Uniform Firearm Arms Act (VUFA) § 6105 and 6106. 

### These charges were 

### subsequently adopted bythe United States 

### Attorney's Office after the 

### Commonwealth 

### ofPennsylvania withdrew them

on 

### December 8, 2011. On 

### November 20, 2012, 

### Defendant pled guilty to 

### these charges and was sentenced to 8 years 

### federal incarceration. On April 17, 2013, this Court held a 

### violation 

### ofprobation (VOP) hearing for Defendant. 

### Defendant was 

### represented at the 

### hearing by Liam Riley, Esquire. 

### After this Court reviewed 

### Defendant's criminal history and 

### incorporated the 

### reportprepared by the 

### probation officer on April 17, 2013 into the 

### record, Mr. Riley asked that 

### this Court sentence Defendant to a period 

### of

5 

### years' probation on 

### each 

### ofhis 

### dockets, to run 

### concurrent to one another but consecutive to the federal sentence. Mr. Riley argued that 

### Defendant was a 

### young man 

### with rehabilitative potential and that he was 

### already serving a 

### significant sentence in federal custody. Mr. Riley further argued that a 

### probationary sentence following 

### Defendant's federal 

### incarceration would adequately address the 

### Commonwealth's concerns while allowing Defendant the 

### opportunity to set 

### himselfon the right path. The 

### Commonwealth then asked thatthis 

### Court impose a sentence of

3 to 6 years state 

### incarceration plus 4 years probation, to run 

### concurrent with 

### Defendant's federal

2sentence. 

### Defendant then spoke on his own 

### behalfand asked this 

### Court for a second chance. (N.T. 4/17/2013 p. 5-7). This Court then found 

### Defendant to be in 

### direct violation 

### ofhis 

### probation/parole, terminated parole and 

### revoked probation. This Court then sentenced him to 5 to 10 years state incarceration, to run 

### concurrent on all four

### of his 

### dockets but 

### consecutive to his 

### federal sentence, with credit for time 

### served while in county prison. In 

### imposing this sentence, this Court stated that 

### Defendant had 

### chosen the life 

### ofa drugdealer and that it hoped that this sentence would allow 

### Defendant enough time to 

### reassess his life and receive

### job training so that he could live a drug and crime-free life once he left prison. This 

### Court further stated that it could have sentenced Defendant 

### consecutively on each 

### ofhis four dockets but chose not to based upon the argument of Mr. Riley. 

### Furthermore, this Court stated that the sentence imposedwas 

### absolutely necessary to vindicate the 

### authority 

### ofthis Court, as 

### Defendant originally had been 

### arrested with a large amount 

### ofPCP and 

### other drugs and had been given an 

### extraordinary opportunity to get 

### himself together when he first pled guilty and 

### received immediate parole. Id. at 7-9. On April 25, 2013, Defendant, through 

### counsel, filed a post

### -sentence motion for 

### reconsideration, which was denied by 

### operation 

### oflaw. 

### Defendant did not file a 

### direct appeal 

### ofthe sentence 

### imposed at his VOP hearing. On July 6, 2016, 

### Defendant filed a pro se 

### petition for 

### reliefpursuant to the PCRA, in which he raised a 

### bald claim 

### ofineffective assistance 

### ofcounsel. 

### Defendant further argued that his 

### petition met the 

### governmental interference exception to the 

### PCRA's time-bar, as his legal 

### documents had been 

### discarded by the 

### Department 

### ofCorrections prior to his 

### placement at SCI 

## - Camp Hill. On 

### December 13, 2016, Thomas P. Ferrant, Esquire, was 

### appointed as PCRA counsel.

3On 

### January 4, 2017, 

### Defendant filed a

### pro se 

### amended petition, 

### raising further claims based upon 

### ineffective assistance 

### ofcounsel and an illegal sentence. 

### Specifically, Defendant argued that counsel was 

### ineffective for 

### inducing him to plead guilty when he was innocent, for failing to file 

### post-sentence motions, and for 

### informing him 

### that this Court 

### would impose a sentence that ran 

### concurrent to his federal 

### sentence at his VOP hearing. 

### Defendant further argued that his 

### petition met the governmental interference exception to the 

### PCRA's time-bar, as he had been 

### housed in his 

### institution's Restrictive Housing Unit and had been 

### denied access to its law library. On March 2, 

### 2017, Mr. Ferrant filed a letter 

### pursuant to 

### Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (1988), stating 

### that 

### Defendant's petition was 

### untimely, that he 

### failed to 

### properly plead and prove 

### the governmental interference exception to the time-bar and, even 

### ifhis 

### petition was timely, the claims 

### raised therein were 

### without merit. In his Finley letter, Mr. 

### Ferrant argued that 

### Defendant was able to 

### correspond with 

### prison officials and defense counsel 

### during the period whenhe was in the 

### Restrictive Housing Unit and 

### therefore he would have 

### been able to file a timely PCRA 

### petition. Mr. 

### Ferrant further argued that Defendant failed to 

### prove that he had filed his 

### petitionwith 60 days 

### ofhis release from the 

### Restrictive Housing Unit. Furthermore, Mr. Ferrant argued that, even 

### ifDefendant's petition was timely, his 

### ineffectiveness claims would still fail as they were 

### supported only by 

### boilerplate language, that any post

### -sentence motion filed by

### plea counsel 

### would have been meritless, and 

### that Defendant would not be able to show 

### prejudice or his 

### claim that defense counsel told him that his VOP 

### sentence would run concurrent withhis federal sentence. On March 3, 

### 2017, this 

### Court sent 

### Defendant a 907 Notice, indicating that his petition would be 

### dismissed based upon 

### counsel's Finley letter and 

### untimeliness. On March 24, 2017,

4Defendant sent a

### pro se reply to the 907 Notice, alleging that Mr. 

### Ferrant was ineffective for failing to litigate his petition. On 

### March 31, 2017, 

### following independent review 

### ofDefendant's 

### pro se 

### petitions, PCRA 

### counsel's Finley letter, and 907 

### Notice having been sent and a reply received from 

### Defendant, this Court 

### dismissed 

### Defendant's petition without a hearing based upon the 

### Finley letter and untimeliness. OnApril 19, 2017, 

### Defendant filed a 

### Notice ofAppeal with the Superior Court. This Court received all Notes 

### ofTestimony on 

### July 19, 2017. 

### ISSUES I. 

### WHETHER THIS COURT PROPERLY DISMISSEDDEFENDANT'S 

### PETITION WITHOUT A 

### HEARING BASED 

### UPON 

### COUNSEL'S FINLEY 

### LETTER AND 

### UNTIMELINESS. DISCUSSION I. 

### THIS COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEFENDANT'S 

### PETITION WITHOUT A 

### HEARING BASED UPON 

### COUNSEL'S FINLEY LETTER AND 

### UNTIMELINESS. When 

### reviewing the denial 

### ofPCRA relief, the 

### appellate 

### court's review is limited to 

### determining 

### whether the 

### PCRA 

### court's findings are 

### supported by the 

### record and 

### without legal

error. 

### Commonwealth v. 

### Edmiston, 619 Pa. 549, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (2013) (citing 

### Commonwealth v. 

### Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 781 A.2d 94, 97 n. 4 (2001)). The 

### court's scope 

### of review is limited to the 

### findings 

### ofthe 

### PCRA court and the evidence on the record 

### ofthe PCRA 

### court's hearing, viewed in light 

### most favorable to the 

### prevailing party. 

### Commonwealth v. Fahy, 598 Pa. 584, 959 

### A.2d 312, 316 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Duffey, 585 Pa. 493, 889 A.2d 56, 61 (2005)). The 

### burden is on the

### petitioner in the PCRA petition to 

### demonstrate by a 

### preponderance 

### ofthe 

### evidencethat he or she is 

### eligible forPCRA relief. 42 

### Pa.C.S.A § 9543. 1. 

### Defendant's petition was 

### untimely. It is well

### -settled in 

### Pennsylvania that all 

### petitions under the 

### PCRA, including subsequent

5petitions, must be filed within one year 

### ofthe date the

### judgment becomes final, unless the 

### petition alleges, and the 

### petitioner proves, an exception to the one-year time period. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 606 Pa. 64, 994 A.2d 1091, 1094 (2010) (citing 

### Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 598 Pa. 85, 953 A.2d 1248, 1252 (2008)). The 

### exceptions apply where the 

### petition successfully alleges and proves one or more 

### ofthe following: (i) 

### the failureto raise this claim 

### previously was the result 

### ofinterference by 

### government officials with presentation 

### ofthe claim in 

### violation 

### ofthe 

### Constitution 

### oflaws 

### ofthis 

### Commonwealth or the 

### Constitution or laws 

### ofthe United States; (ii) the facts 

### upon which the claim is 

### predicated were 

### unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

### ascertained by the 

### exercise 

### ofdue diligence; or (iii) the right 

### asserted is a 

### constitutional right that was 

### recognized bythe Supreme Court 

### ofthe 

### United States or the Supreme Court of

### Pennsylvania after the time period 

### provided in this 

### section and has been 

### held by 

### that court to apply retroactively. 42 

### Pa.C.S.A § 

### 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A 

### petition invoking one 

### ofthese 

### exceptions must be filed 

### within 60 

### days 

### ofthe date 

### the claim could first have been 

### presented. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9545(6)(2). The 

### petitioner must plead and prove specific facts that demonstrate his 

### claim was raised within the 60 day 

### time frame. 

### Commonwealth v. 

### Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 

### 651-52 (2013). The time 

### "limitations are 

### mandatory and are interpreted literally; thus, a court has no 

### authority to extend filing periods except as 

### statute permits." Commonwealth v. Seskey, 2014 PA Super 27, 86 A.3d 237, 242 (2014) (quoting 

### Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 

### A.2d 214, 223 (1999)). 

### "If the 

### petition is 

### determined to be 

### untimely, and no 

### exception has been pled and 

### proven, the petition must be 

### dismissed without hearing because Pennsylvania courts are 

### without

### jurisdiction to 

### consider the merits 

### ofthe 

### petition." Id. 

### (quoting Commonwealth v. 

### Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 518-19 (Pa. Super. 2011); 

### Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1285 (2008)). A 

### defendant claiming that their 

### incarceration status limits their ability to file

### pro se PCRA petitions must show that any 

### ofthe 

### conditions 

### ofhis 

### incarceration were illegal, as 

### required to 

### meet the 

### governmental

6interference exception to 

### PCRA's timeliness requirement. Commonwealth v. 

### Albrecht, 606 Pa. 64, 994 

### A.2d 1091, 1095 (2010) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 

### 9545(b)(1)(i)). In the case at bar, 

### Defendant'sjudgment 

### ofsentence became final on May 17, 2013, when his ability to file a 

### direct appeal 

### ofhis VOP 

### sentence expired. 

### Defendant thus had until May 17, 2014 to file a 

### timely petition pursuant to the PCRA. Defendant did not file the instant petition untilJuly 6, 2016, more than two years after his deadline to file a 

### timely petition had passed. In 

### order to avoid the time-bar, 

### Defendant attempts to plead and 

### prove the 

### governmental interference exception based upon his 

### placement in his 

### facility's Restrictive Housing Unit, denial 

### ofaccess to his 

### institution's law library, and the 

### misplacement

### ofhis legal 

### documents by the 

### Department 

### ofCorrections. However, Defendant has 

### failed to plead and prove 

### that he filed his 

### petition within 60 days 

### ofthe date 

### that his claims first 

### could have been presented. On the contrary, according to 

### Defendant's own 

### documents, he was held in the 

### Restrictive Housing Unit for only 7 

### months following his 

### VOP hearing, thus until 

### approximately November 2013, and he learned 

### ofthe 

### misplacement 

### ofhis legal 

### documents no later than May 2014. Defendant offers no further 

### evidence why it then took him until July 2016 to file the instant petition. Therefore, even by the 

### most generous standard, 

### Defendant had until July 2014 to file a 

### timely petition based upon the 

### governmental interference exception. He failed to do so and his 

### petition is 

### consequently untimely. Moreover, even 

### ifDefendant had filed his 

### petition in July 

### 2014, his claim still would have 

### been untimelybecause he failed to 

### properly plead and prove the 

### governmental interference exception. As PCRA counsel noted in his Finley letter, 

### Defendant was able to write multiple letters to 

### prison officials and to 

### defense counsel during the relevant period. Thus, there is no 

### indication that his 

### placement in the 

### Restrictive Housing Unit, 

### restricted access to the law library

7or the loss 

### ofhis legal 

### materials in any way would have 

### prevented him from filing a PCRA petition. Moreover, 

### Defendant has failed to 

### demonstrate that the 

### conditions 

### ofhis 

### incarceration

were in any manner illegal, as 

### required to meet the 

### governmental interference exception. On the contrary, 

### Defendant's own 

### documents show that he was 

### placed in the 

### Restrictive Housing Unit and his access to the 

### law library was restricted based upon his own 

### violations 

### ofprison regulations. Furthermore, there is no 

### indication at all that 

### Defendant's legal 

### materials were intentionally or 

### maliciously withheld or destroyed. Thus, even 

### ifDefendant had filed his 

### PCRA petition in July 2014, his 

### petition still would have been 

### untimely as he failed to 

### properly plead and prove the 

### governmental interference exception to the time-bar. 2. 

### Even 

### if

### Defendant's petition was timely, 

### Plea Counsel was 

### not ineffective. To prevail on a 

### claim alleging counsel's ineffectiveness under the PCRA, Appellant must 

### demonstrate (1) 

### that the 

### underlying claim is

### ofarguablemerit; (2) 

### that counsel's course 

### of conduct was without a 

### reasonable basis; and (3) that he was 

### prejudiced by 

### counsel's ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Timchak, 2013 PA Super 157, 69 A.3d 765, 769 (2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 

### (Pa.Super.2012)). Allegations 

### of ineffectiveness in 

### connection with the entry 

### ofa guilty 

### plea will serve as a basis for 

### reliefonly if the ineffectiveness caused the 

### defendant to 

### enter an 

### involuntary or 

### unknowingplea. 

### Commonwealth v. 

### Lippert, 2014 PA Super 25, 85 A.3d 1095, 1100 (2014) (citing 

### Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 

### 191-92 (Pa.Super.2013)). Where the defendant enters his 

### plea on the advice 

### ofcounsel, the voluntariness 

### ofthe plea 

### depends on 

### whether counsel's advice was 

### within the range 

### ofcompetence demanded 

### ofattorneys in 

### criminal cases. Barndt, 74 A.3d at 192 (citing Wah, 42 

### A.3d at 338-39). Thus, to 

### establish prejudice, "the defendant must show thatthere is a 

### reasonableprobability that, but for 

### counsel's errors, he 

### would not have

8pleaded guilty and 

### would have insisted on 

### going to 

### trial." Id. (citing 

### Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 2006 PA Super 106, 899 

### A.2d 365, 269-70 (2006)). Central to the 

### question 

### ofwhether a 

### defendants plea was 

### entered voluntarily and 

### knowingly is 

### that the 

### defendant know and understand the nature 

### ofthe 

### offenses charged in as plain a fashion as possible. Id. 

### (citing Commonwealth v. 

### Frometa, 520 Pa. 552, 555 A.2d 92, 93 (1989)). A 

### defendant is 

### bound by the statements made 

### during the plea colloquy, and a 

### defendant may not later 

### offer reasons for withdrawing the plea that 

### contradict statements made when he pled. 

### Commonwealth v. Brown, 2012 PA Super 140, 48 

### A.3d 1275, 1277 (2012) (citing Commonwealth v. 

### McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922 

### (Pa.Super.2001)). While a 

### defendants declaration

### ofinnocence is a 

### factor that the 

### PCRA court may consider, it is not 

### determinative. Commonwealth v. 

### Steckley, 2015 PA Super 250, 128 

### A.3d 826, 834 (2015). A 

### defendant's assertion 

### ofinnocence does not 

### necessarily belie his later

### claim that he would have accepted a 

### guilty plea offer. A criminal 

### defendant might maintain his 

### innocence up until the point 

### ofpleading guilty in order to 

### strengthen his 

### bargaining position. Indeed, a 

### defendantmay enter a 

### guilty plea while 

### continuing to 

### maintain that he is 

### factually innocent. Id. (citing 

### North Carolina v. 

### Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 33, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)). A 

### PCRA petitioner will be granted 

### reliefonly 

### when he proves, by a 

### preponderance 

### ofthe evidence, that his 

### conviction or sentence resulted from the 

### ineffective assistance 

### ofcounsel which, in the 

### circumstances 

### ofthe 

### particular case, so 

### undermined the truth

### -determining process that no reliable 

### adjudication 

### of guilt or 

### innocence could have taken place. 

### Commonwealth v. Freeland, 2014 PA Super 274, 106 A.3d 768, 775 (2014) 

### (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 

### 9543(a)(2)(ii)). In accord with these well

### -established criteria for review, a 

### petitioner must set forth and 

### individually discuss substantively each prong 

### ofthe Pierce test. 

### Commonwealth v. Steele, 599 Pa. 341, 961

9A.2d 786, 797 (2008) (citing 

### Commonwealth v. James Jones, 583 Pa. 130, 876 

### A.2d 380, 386 (2005)). Thus, where a 

### defendant has failed to set 

### forth all three prongs 

### ofthe 

### ineffectiveness test and meaningfully discuss them, he is not 

### entitled to relief, and the court is 

### constrained to find such claims 

### waived for 

### lack 

### ofdevelopment. Id. 

### (citing Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 795 A.2d 935, 940 n. 4 (2001)). In 

### the case at bar, 

### Defendant baldly claims that plea counsel 

### pressured him to plead guilty when he was, in fact, 

### innocent. Aside from this bald 

### statement, Defendant failed to set forth or meaningfully discuss each prong 

### ofthe 

### ineffectiveness test. As such, this 

### Court is 

### constrained to find that he waived his 

### ineffectiveness claim for a lack 

### ofdevelopment. Even 

### ifDefendant had not waived this 

### claim, however, it still 

### would be 

### without merit. 

### Defendant's claims that he was pressured into 

### pleading guilty and that he was, in fact, 

### innocent directly 

### contradict the statements he made in his 

### written and oral guilty plea colloquies in 

### which he stated 

### that he was 

### pleading guilty 

### ofhis free will and 

### because he was guilty 

### ofthe crimes charged. 

### Furthermore, Defendant stated that he was 

### pleased with the 

### representation 

### ofcounsel. These facts are reflected in the following exchange: THE COURT: Mr. 

### Wordsley, I have to ask you 

### some questions, and I ask 

### these questions 

### ofeveryone who decides to plead guilty. I have to be sure your plea is 

### knowingly and 

### voluntarily given. How old are 

### you? THE 

### DEFENDANT: Twenty-two. THE COURT: How far did you go in 

### school? THE 

### DEFENDANT: High school diploma. THE COURT: So do you read, 

### write, and 

### understand the 

### English Language?

10THE 

### DEFENDANT: Yes, 

### ma'am. THE COURT: 

### Right now are you 

### under the 

### influence 

### ofdrugs or 

### alcohol? THE DEFENDANT: No. 

### THE COURT: Have you ever been a 

### patient in a mental 

### institution or treated for mental illness? THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: Are you 

### satisfied with the 

### representation 

### ofyour lawyers, both lawyers, up to 

### this point? THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me? 

### THE COURT: Are you satisfied with therepresentation 

### ofboth your lawyers up to this 

### point? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, 

### ma'am. THE COURT: I have in 

### front 

### ofme 

### four written guilty plea 

### colloquies, which are 

### incorporated into the 

### record by 

### reference, which indicate you wish to plead guilty to four counts 

### ofpossession with 

### intent to 

### deliver a 

### controlled substance. Is 

### that correct? THE 

### DEFENDANT: Yes, 

### ma'am. THE COURT: Did you have any

### opportunity to go over these forms with 

### your lawyerbefore you signed them? THE 

### DEFENDANT: Yes, 

### ma'am. THE COURT: Did your lawyer explain these charges to 

### which you are 

### pleading guilty and the 

### maximum possible sentence to which you could be 

### imprisoned? THE 

### DEFENDANT: Yes, 

### ma'am.

11THE COURT: Did your 

### lawyer explain that you are 

### presumed 

### innocent and have the right to have a trial by

### judge or

### jury 

### ifyou wanted? THE 

### DEFENDANT: Yes, 

### ma'am. THE COURT: Did 

### your lawyer explain the 

### definition 

### ofthe crime, 

### what the DA would have to 

### prove 

### ifyou were to go to trial? 

### THE DEFENDANT: Yes, 

### ma'am. THE COURT: Did your 

### lawyer explain to 

### you that by 

### pleading guilty, you are giving up all your rights to a trial and 

### almost all rights on 

### appeal? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, 

### ma'am. THE COURT: Did 

### anyone threaten you or force you to make you 

### plead guilty to 

### these charges? THE DEFENDANT: No, 

### ma'am. THE COURT: Are you doing so 

### ofyour own free will? THE 

### DEFENDANT: Yes, 

### ma'am. THE COURT: At this time, will the 

### Commonwealth please read what they would have proven 

### ifthey had gone to trial. Please listen. [The 

### Commonwealth reads the 

### description 

### ofthe facts 

### underlying each charge] *** THE COURT: All right. Mr. 

### Wordsley, is 

### that basically what happened in each case? 

### THE DEFENDANT: Yes, 

### ma'am. THE COURT: Are you 

### pleading guilty because you are guilty?

12

### THEDEFENDANT: Yes, 

### ma'am. N.T. 7/20/2011, p. 3-5, 14. Thus, even 

### ifDefendant had not 

### waived this claim due to 

### lack 

### ofdevelopment, it would still be 

### without merit as it 

### directly contradicts the statements he made in his 

### written and oral guilty plea 

### colloquies. 3. 

### Even if 

### Defendant's petition was timely, 

### Plea 

### Counsel and VOP Counsel 

### were not ineffective for 

### failing to file 

### post-sentence motions 

### for 

### reconsideration. To 

### establish counsel's ineffectiveness, a 

### petitioner must 

### demonstrate: (1) the underlying claim has 

### arguable merit; (2) 

### counsel had no 

### reasonable basis for the course 

### ofaction or inaction chosen; and (3) 

### counsel's action or inaction prejudiced the petitioner. 

### Commonwealth v. Freeland, 

### 2014 PA 

### Super 274, 106 A.3d 768, 775 (2014) (citing 

### Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987)). 

### Counsel's assistance is deemed 

### constitutionally effective once the court 

### determines that the 

### defendant has not 

### established any one 

### ofthe prongs 

### ofthe 

### ineffectiveness test. Id. 

### (citing Commonwealth v. Rolan, 964 A.2d 398, 406 (Pa.Super.2008)). To 

### establish prejudice, the 

### defendantmust show that there is a 

### reasonable probability thatthe outcome 

### ofthe 

### proceedings would havebeen different but for 

### counsel's action or inaction. 

### Commonwealth v. Davido, 106 

### A.3d 611, 621 (Pa. 2014) (citing 

### Commonwealth v. Williams, 587 Pa. 304, 899 

### A.2d 1060, 1064 (2006)). 

### Ifcounsel fails to raise an 

### issue in 

### post-verdict motions or on appeal, he is 

### deemed to be 

### ineffective only 

### ifthe issue is 

### ofarguable merit. 

### Commonwealth v. 

### Franklin, 2003 PA Super 165, 823 A.2d 906, 908 

### (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. 

### Wilkerson, 490 Pa. 

### 296, 416 A.2d 477 (1980)). 

### This is so 

### because an accused has no 

### absolute right to raise 

### baseless claims and counsel 

### cannot be 

### faulted for not advancing issues which will not at least 

### arguably obtain some 

### relieffor the accused. Id.

13As a general rule, 

### "upon revocation, the sentencing alternatives 

### available to the court shall be 

### the same as the 

### alternatives available at the time 

### ofinitial 

### sentencing." Commonwealth

v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 595 

### (Pa.Super.2007). Normally, "thetrial 

### court is 

### limited only by the maximum sentence that it 

### could have imposed originally at the time 

### ofthe 

### probationary sentence." Coolbaugh, 770 at 792. Once 

### probation or

### parole has 

### been revoked, a sentence 

### oftotal 

### confinement may be 

### imposed 

### ifany 

### ofthe following conditions exist: the 

### defendant has been convicted 

### ofanother crime; the conduct 

### ofthe defendant indicates 

### that it is likely that he will commit 

### another crime

### ifhe is not 

### imprisoned; or, such a sentence is 

### essential to vindicate the 

### authority

### ofcourt. 

### Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d at 792. When a trial court imposes a 

### sentence that is within the statutory limits, 'there is no abuse 

### ofdiscretion unless the sentence is 

### manifestly excessive so as to 

### inflict too severe a 

### punishment'." Commonwealth v. 

### Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 624-25 

### (2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

### Person, 450 Pa. 1, 297 

### A.2d 460 (1972)). In 

### addition, a sentence will not be disturbed 

### unless the 

### appellate court determines that the sentence is 

### "unreasonable." Reasonablenessis 

### determined by 

### examining the four statutory factors set forth in 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9781(d) as well as the general 

### sentencing standardsoutlined in 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9721(b). 

### Commonwealth v. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 571, 926 A.2d 957, 965 (2007). 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9781(d) requires 

### that the appellate court consider: "(1) [t]he nature and 

### circumstances 

### ofthe offense and the 

### history and characteristics 

### ofthe 

### defendant; (2) the 

### opportunity 

### ofthe 

### sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any 

### presentence investigation; (3) the 

### findings upon which the sentence was based; and (4) the guidelines 

### promulgated by the 

### commission." 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9721(b) 

### requires consideration 

### ofthe 

### protection ofthe public, the 

### gravity 

### ofthe offense in 

### relation to the 

### impact on

### the victim and 

### the community and the 

### rehabilitative needs 

### ofthe

14defendant. There is no 

### requirement that a 

### sentencing 

### court's imposition 

### ofsentence be the "minimum possible 

### confinement." Walls, 592 Pa. at 571, 926 A.2d at 965. In the case at bar, 

### Defendant claims thatplea counsel and 

### VOP counsel were ineffective for failingto file and 

### litigate a

### post-sentence motion for 

### reconsideration. As any 

### post-sentence motion for 

### reconsideration would have been 

### baseless in 

### either instance, defense counsel could not have been 

### ineffective for 

### failing to file a 

### post-sentence motion. 

### With regard to 

### Defendant's plea counsel, it is beyond incredible for 

### Defendant to claim 

### that he 

### would have received a more favorable outcome had 

### plea counsel filed and 

### litigated a post-sentence 

### motion for 

### reconsideration. In that instance, 

### Defendant received an aggregate 

### sentence 111/4 to 23 months county 

### incarcerationplus 3 years 

### reporting probation with 

### immediate 

### parole when he could have received an 

### aggregate sentence 

### of20 to 40 years state 

### incarceration across his four felony charges. As this Court later 

### acknowledged at 

### Defendant's VOP hearing, 

### Defendant's original negotiated sentence was 

### "basically a slap on the 

### wrist", and 

### "an extraordinary opportunity to get 

### himselftogether." (N.T. 4/17/2013 p. 9). In light 

### ofthe significant 

### penalties Defendant was facing and the 

### leniency 

### ofhis 

### negotiated sentence, it is 

### almost impossible to see how 

### Defendant could have 

### received a 

### more favorable outcome had 

### plea counsel filed a 

### post-sentence motion for 

### reconsideration. Thus, 

### Defendant's claim that plea counsel was 

### ineffective for doing so is 

### without merit. With regard to VOP 

### counsel, this Court notes that counsel 

### did in fact file a post-sentence 

### motion onApril 25, 2013, which was denied by 

### operation 

### oflaw. 

### Moreover, VOP counsel could not have been ineffective for 

### failing to 

### litigate this 

### motion as the 

### motion was meritless. On the 

### contrary, the 

### sentence imposed at 

### Defendant's VOP 

### hearing was 

### reasonable in light 

### ofthe severity 

### ofDefendant's original charges and his 

### new conviction on a 

### federal firearms offense for

15which he was arrested only two 

### months after his guilty plea. As 

### this Court noted, Defendant had 

### received an 

### extraordinary opportunity when he was sentenced to 

### immediate parole on 

### four PWID charges when he could have been 

### sentenced to up to 40 

### years' state 

### incarceration. However, instead

### offurthering his 

### rehabilitation, Defendant chose to 

### continue living the life 

### ofa drug dealer and carry firearms illegally. Moreover, this 

### Court fashioned its sentence to 

### allow Defendant enough time to 

### reassess his priorities, learn 

### new skills and receive

### job training so that he could 

### choose to live a 

### crime free life when he was released. As such, the sentence 

### imposed

was 

### absolutely necessary to 

### vindicate the 

### authority 

### ofthis Court, to 

### protect the 

### public from 

### Defendant's insistence on living a life 

### ofcrime, and to further his 

### rehabilitation in a more effective manner 

### than the 

### immediate parole sentence he 

### receivedpreviously. Therefore, as any 

### post-sentence motion for 

### reconsideration would have been 

### meritless, VOP counsel could not have been 

### ineffective for 

### failing to litigate any 

### post-sentence motion. 4. 

### PCRA Counsel was 

### not ineffective. Defendantshave a 

### general rule

### -based right to the 

### assistance 

### ofcounsel for their first PCRA Petition. 

### Commonwealth v. 

### Cherry, 2017 PA Super 28, --- 

### A.3d ---, 2 (2017) (citing Commonwealth v. 

### Robinson, 970 A.2d 455, 457 (Pa. Super. 

### 2009)). The indigent 

### petitioner's right to counsel must be 

### honored regardless 

### ofthe merits 

### ofhis 

### underlying claims, even 

### where those claims were 

### previously addressed on 

### direct appeal, so long as the 

### petition in 

### question is his first. Id. (citing 

### Commonwealth v. 

### Powell, 787 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2001)). 

### Moreover,

once 

### counsel is 

### appointed, he [or she] must take 

### affirmative steps to 

### discharge his [or her] duties. Id. 

### When appointed, counsel's duty is to either (1) amend the 

### petitioner's

### pro se 

### Petition and 

### present the 

### petitioner's claims in 

### acceptable legal terms, or (2) 

### certify that the claims lack

### merit by 

### complying with the 

### mandates 

### ofTurner/Finley. Id. at 3.

16To plead and 

### prove ineffective assistance 

### ofPCRA 

### counsel a 

### petitionermust establish: (1) that the 

### underlying issue has 

### arguable merit; (2) counsel's actions lacked an 

### objective reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice resulted from 

### counsel's act or failure to act. 

### Commonwealth v. 

### Rykard, 2012 PA Super 199, 55 A.3d 1177, 1189-90 (2012) (citing Commonwealth v. 

### Chmiel, 612 Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (2011)). Where the 

### defendant asserts a layered 

### ineffectiveness claimhe mustproperly argue eachprong 

### ofthe 

### three-prong ineffectiveness test for 

### each separate attorney. Id. at 1190. Layered claims 

### ofineffectiveness "are not wholly distinct from the 

### underlying claims[,]" because 

### "proofofthe 

### underlying claim is an essential element 

### ofthe 

### derivative ineffectivenessclaim[.]" Id. (quoting 

### Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 888 

### A.2d 564, 584 (2005)). "In 

### determining a layered claim 

### of ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry is 

### whether the first 

### attorney that the 

### defendant asserts was ineffective did, in fact, 

### render ineffective assistance 

### ofcounsel. 

### Ifthat 

### attorney was 

### effective, then 

### subsequent counsel cannot be 

### deemed ineffective for 

### failing to raise the 

### underlying issue." Id. (citing 

### Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 

### (Pa.Super.2010)). In 

### the case at bar, 

### Defendant, in his response to this 

### Court's 907 

### Notice, claimed that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to 

### properly investigate, raise and address the claims made in his

### pro se

### petitions. However, as 

### previously discussed, 

### Defendant's petition was untimely and the 

### claims raised therein were without merit. As PCRA counsel has no 

### obligation to raise 

### claims that they find 

### meritless in an amended 

### petition, Mr. 

### Ferrant could not have 

### been ineffective for 

### failing to raise 

### Defendant's untimely and 

### meritless claims in an amended petition. Moreover, this Court notes that Mr. 

### Ferrant properly complied with the 

### procedures outlined in 

### Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (1988) for 

### withdrawing from a 

### meritless petition. Thus,

17

### Defendant's claim that PCRA counsel was 

### ineffective for failing to 

### properly investigate, address and raise the issues in his

### pro se 

### petitions was without merit.

18

### CONCLUSION After review 

### ofthe applicable case law, 

### testimony and statutes, this Court 

### committed no

error. 

### Defendant's PCRA petition was 

### properly dismissed based upon 

### PCRA 

### counsel's Finley letter and 

### untimeliness. Accordingly, this 

### Court's decision should be affirmed.

19