United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-60610

____________

J.D. Abrams, L.P., 

Petitioner, 

versus

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission; 

Julie A. Su, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor, 

Respondents. 

______________________________

Petition from the Decision of the 

Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission

OSHRC Docket No. 20-0452

______________________________

Before Jones, Barksdale, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

J.D. Abrams, L.P. (Abrams), contests an administrative law judge’s 

(ALJ) affirming two citations by the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA) for worksite violations involving excavation of a 

trench: cave-in protection; and ladder-length standards. See 29 C.F.R. 

§§ 1926.652(a)(1), 1926.1053(b)(1). In doing so, the ALJ concluded, inter 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 15, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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alia, that Abrams failed to establish its unpreventable-employee-misconduct 

(UEM) affirmative defense. See J.D. Abrams, LP, 2022 WL 7517239, at *14–

16 (No. 20-0452, 2022) (ALJ). In response, Abrams petitioned the 

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission), which 

declined to review the ALJ’s decision, resulting in its finality. The petition 

for review is DENIED. 

I.

Abrams, a construction company operating in Texas, has

approximately 500 employees. In November 2019, an Abrams trenchexcavation crew, led by Rivera (an installation supervisor), began

pipe/waterline installation near Austin. On 2 December 2019, a trench 

box—metal reinforcement for a trench’s walls—crushed a water pipe in the 

trench, causing it to explode. The next day, Rivera’s crew performed 

excavation work for the trench at issue here. Because of the water-pipe 

incident the day before, Rivera deliberately did not use a trench box required 

for trenches deeper than five feet or when the excavation is not “made 

entirely [of] stable rock”. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(a)(1). 

Later that day, two OSHA Compliance Safety and Health Officers 

(CSHOs) inspected the worksite. They measured the trench’s depth at three 

points; each measurement was greater than the five-feet maximum: 

respectively, five feet, eight inches; six feet; and six feet, seven inches. 

Additionally, the ladder used in the trench extended two feet, eight inches 

above the landing surface, shorter than the required three feet. See 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1926.1053(b)(1) (requiring ladder to extend three feet above landing 

surface). Abrams’ (Rivera’s) crew had worked in this trench from between 

7:00 and 8:00 a.m. until the CSHOs arrived around 1:00 p.m. 

OSHA issued Abrams two citations for serious violations: failing to 

use cave-in protection, in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(a)(1), meriting

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serious classification because a resulting accident could cause an employee’s

“being crushed from a cave-in”; and using a ladder not extending at least 

three feet above the trench’s edge, in violation of 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1926.1053(b)(1), meriting serious classification because employees were 

exposed “to the hazard of falling from height”. J.D. Abrams, 2022 WL 

7517239, at *6, *10; 29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (explaining serious violation). 

Abrams contested the citations by asserting, inter alia, the abovereferenced UEM affirmative defense. Following a one-day hearing in

December 2021, at which three witnesses testified (one of the two abovereferenced CSHOs, Abrams’ vice president of operations, and Rivera) and 

29 exhibits were introduced, the ALJ in August 2022 affirmed the citations 

and assessed penalties of $7,711 for lack of cave-in protection and $5,783 for 

inadequate ladder height. Abrams petitioned the Commission for 

discretionary review, which declined to review the decision, resulting in its

finality. See 29 U.S.C. § 661(j) (“The report of the [ALJ] shall become the 

final order of the Commission . . . , unless . . . any Commission member has 

directed that such report shall be reviewed by the Commission.”); 29 C.F.R. 

§ 2200.90(f) (“If no Commissioner directs review of a report . . . , the 

decision of the Judge shall become a final order of the Commission.”).

II.

Regarding the below four elements of its UEM affirmative defense, 

Abrams primarily challenges the ALJ’s finding that, although it satisfied the 

first two, it failed to do so for the last two. As provided in Angel Bros. 

Enterprises v. Walsh:

To establish [the UEM] affirmative defense, the employer has 

the burden to prove that it: 1) has established work rules 

designed to prevent the violation, 2) has adequately 

communicated these rules to its employees, 3) has taken steps 

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to discover violations, and 4) has effectively enforced the rules 

when violations have been discovered. 

18 F.4th 827, 832 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Obviously, all four 

elements must be satisfied. 

Abrams also maintains the ALJ’s analysis: ignores Congress’ intent 

for the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act; destroys the UEM 

defense; and violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See 29 

U.S.C. §§ 654 (explaining “Duties of employers and employees” under 

OSH Act), 651(b) (outlining Congress’ “declaration of purpose and policy” 

for OSH Act); 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (“[Under the APA,] [a] sanction may not 

be imposed . . . except on consideration of the whole record . . . and supported 

by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial 

evidence”.). Finally, Abrams contests the violations’ being classified as 

serious and the imposed fines. 

All of Abrams’ contentions, except regarding the fines, are reviewed 

under the same standard. Because the Commission declined to review the 

decision (resulting in its finality), the ALJ’s factual findings are accepted “if 

they are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a 

whole, and if a reasonable person could have found what the [ALJ] found, 

even if the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion”. TNT 

Crane & Rigging, Inc. v. OSHRC, 74 F.4th 347, 353 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation 

omitted). In other words, if “the evidence does not compel a conclusion 

contrary to the one the Commission [or ALJ if the Commission declined 

review] reached, we must defer to its ruling that [Abrams] failed to establish 

the affirmative defense”. Angel Bros., 18 F.4th at 833 (emphasis added). 

Conclusions of law are upheld unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”. TNT Crane & 

Rigging, Inc., 74 F.4th at 353 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).

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Our review is largely controlled by our court’s above-cited decision in 

Angel Bros., which involved one of the same infractions: lack of cave-in 

protection. 18 F.4th at 829. There, “[t]he central issue [was] whether a 

supervisor’s involvement in a subordinate employee’s violation of workplace 

safety rules renders the employer liable”. Id. Our court held: “imputing the 

supervisor’s knowledge . . . to the employer [was] appropriate”. Id.

In Angel Bros., our court also addressed the fourth element of the 

UEM defense (effective enforcement) and deferred to the Commission’s 

rejecting that defense because “substantial evidence support[ed]” the 

conclusion. Id. at 832–33. Our court stated: “Angel Brothers is a large 

company that performs more than a thousand excavations annually” but had 

only “two [documented] instances of disciplining employees” that both 

“came after OSHA inspectors uncovered the violations”. Id. at 833. When 

addressing the contention that the company had a nearly perfect safety 

record, our court ruled: “the Commission did not have to accept the 

statistically implausible claim that although OSHA found violations during 

80% of its five inspections, the company committed no safety violations the 

other 6,000 or so times it performed excavations”. Id. 

As noted earlier, our court ultimately held: “Because the evidence 

does not compel a conclusion contrary to the one the Commission reached, 

we must defer to its ruling that Angel Brothers failed to establish the 

affirmative defense”. Id. Likewise, and for the following reasons, as well as 

essentially for the reasons provided in the ALJ’s extremely detailed decision, 

we are not compelled to reach a conclusion contrary to the ALJ’s.

A.

At issue regarding the UEM defense are whether Abrams has: “taken 

steps to discover violations, and . . . effectively enforced the rules when 

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violations have been discovered”. Id. at 832. First addressed is element four: 

effective enforcement.

1.

The ALJ concluded Abrams failed to show it did so for its safety rules

because Abrams “provided no evidence of any discipline or enforcement 

action that had been implemented as a result of its discovery of violations at 

a worksite”, and the two examples provided were post-inspection related 

discipline. J.D. Abrams, 2022 WL 7517239, at *16; see also Angel Bros., 18 

F.4th at 833. 

In reaching that conclusion, the ALJ rejected Abrams’ attempt to 

introduce, in a post-hearing brief, an exhibit outlining instances of preinspection discipline:

This attempt to shoehorn information, outside the hearing, 

into the record is improper. Because it was not presented 

during the hearing, there was no opportunity for Secretary to 

object or for either party to present witness testimony to 

explain or support the documents. The documents attached as 

Exhibit A to [Abrams’] post-hearing brief are not a part of the 

record of this proceeding and accordingly, are not considered 

here.

J.D. Abrams, 2022 WL 7517239, at *16 n.21.

In an attempt to circumvent this ruling, Abrams faults the Secretary 

for introducing only Abrams’ written responses to discovery requests, and 

not this requested exhibit. Abrams’ contention ignores that it was its burden, 

not the Secretary’s, to establish the UEM affirmative defense. See Angel 

Bros., 18 F.4th at 832. 

In the alternative, Abrams asserts this exhibit was incorporated in its 

above-referenced discovery responses that the Secretary did introduce. It, 

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however, fails to cite any precedent supporting this incorporated-byreference contention. See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.70(a)(“All exhibits offered 

in evidence by a party shall be marked for identification before or during the 

hearing.”), 2200.71 (applying Federal Rules of Evidence to OSHA hearings); 

Fed. R. Evid. 901 (requiring authentication). 

In short, Abrams fails to showthat the ALJ abused its “wide discretion 

to exclude irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible evidence”. UNF W., Inc. v. 

NLRB, 844 F.3d 451, 463 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Turner Commc’ns Corp. v. 

OSHRC, 612 F.2d 941, 945–46 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting petitioner’s 

contention that ALJ improperly excluded irrelevant evidence). Accordingly, 

Abrams fails to show evidence compelling “a conclusion contrary to the” 

ALJ’s. Angel Bros., 18 F.4th at 833.

2.

Because Abrams fails to succeed on the fourth element of the UEM 

defense, we need not reach the third: steps to discover violations. 

Nevertheless, in the alternative and regarding that third element, Abrams 

contests the ALJ’s finding it “failed to prove that it effectively took steps to 

detect violations of safety rules at its worksites”. J.D. Abrams, 2022 WL 

7517239, at *14. Substantial evidence, however, supports the ALJ’s finding 

that Abrams did not have “a meaningful program to detect and to discourage 

safety violations”. Id. at *15; see also TNT Crane & Rigging, Inc., 74 F.4th at 

360.

First, although Abrams’ vice president testified that worksite-safety 

audits were “documented, compiled, and presented monthly”, “no 

documentation of any audit was provided”. J.D. Abrams, 2022 WL 7517239, 

at *15. Second, the lack of response to the 2 December water-pipe incident

(the day before the events for which the two challenged citations were issued)

supported the inference that “safety coordinators did not consistently 

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respond to near misses”. Id. Third, Abrams failed to proffer evidence from 

a safety coordinator to “describe the frequency of site visits, the process for 

discovering violations at a worksite, how information was communicated to 

the employees during a safety audit, or the steps to remedy any compliance 

issues at a worksite”. Id. 

Abrams asserts certain documents (employee-safety manual, newhire video, trench plan, and training records) and its vice-president’s 

testimony (that unannounced audits occurred and at what frequency) were 

sufficient, but there is no corroborating evidence these worksite audits 

occurred. See P. Gioioso & Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC, 115 F.3d 100, 109–10 (1st 

Cir. 1997) (rejecting employer’s contention the ALJ “unnecessarily required 

repetitive documentary proof referable to the UEM defense” because “there 

is no reason why a factfinder must accept an employer’s anecdotal evidence 

uncritically” and “the absence of any vestige of documentary proof was not 

only a relevant datum but a telling one”); see also TNT Crane & Rigging, Inc., 

74 F.4th at 360 n.7 (“The Commission has previously found monitoring 

insufficient where no evidence showed that the employer monitored 

employee compliance with the rules pertaining to the specific conduct at 

issue in the citation during site visits.”). 

3.

Taking a different tack, Abrams asserts the ALJ’s decision: 

eviscerates the purpose of the OSH Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 654, 651(b)); and 

destroys the UEM defense. Regarding the Act’s purpose, Abrams’ assertion 

ignores § 654(a)’s requiring employers to: “furnish . . . a place of 

employment . . . free from recognized hazards”; and “comply with 

occupational safety and health standards”. Additionally, to the extent 

Abrams is challenging employer knowledge by citing W.G. Yates & Sons 

Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 459 F.3d 604 (5th Cir. 2006), it is unavailing. 

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See Angel Bros., 18 F.4th at 830–32 (rejecting contention “that a supervisor’s 

knowledge cannot be imputed to the employer when the supervisor 

authorizes, or takes some other active role in, a subordinate’s safety 

violation”). Finally, regarding the UEM defense, Abrams essentially 

contends: if it is not deserving of the protections provided by that defense, 

no company is. But, as discussed supra, the ALJ’s findings regarding lack of

monitoring and enforcement are supported by substantial evidence. 

4.

Abrams also asserts the ALJ’s decision violated § 556(d) of the APA. 

See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (requiring agency decisions be made “on consideration 

of the whole record . . . and supported by . . . substantial evidence”). This 

contention was not presented in Abrams’ petition for discretionary review by 

the Commission. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (“No objection that has not been 

urged before the Commission shall be considered by the court, unless the 

failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of 

extraordinary circumstances.”). This is not the requisite extraordinary 

circumstance. In addition, this belated contention is inadequately briefed; 

therefore, it is forfeited. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(8)(A) (“[T]he argument 

. . . must contain: (A) [petitioner]’s contentions and the reasons for them, 

with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which [petitioner]

relies”.).

B.

Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s classifying the two 

violations as serious. “Under the [OSH] Act, violations of a safety regulation 

are considered ‘serious’ if ‘there is a substantial probability that death or 

serious physical harm could result.’” Excel Modular Scaffold & Leasing Co. v. 

OSHRC, 943 F.3d 748, 757 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 666(k)). “A 

violation may be determined to be serious where, although the accident itself 

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is merely possible . . . there is a substantial probability of serious injury if it 

does occur.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

The ALJ’s finding “a trench cave-in and a fall from a ladder can each 

result in serious injury”, J.D. Abrams, 2022 WL 7517239, at *17, is “amply 

supported by the record”, Excel Modular Scaffold & Leasing Co., 943 F.3d at 

757. The ALJ classified the trench-wall violation as serious because a cavein could cause “serious injuries, such as contusions, fractures, suffocation, 

and death”. J.D. Abrams, 2022 WL 7517239, at *17. Abrams points to the

CSHO’s admitting error in including death as a justification; Rivera agreed, 

however, that an employee in the trench could get crushed and die. See, e.g.,

DiGioia Bros. Excavating, Inc., 17 BNA OSHC 1181, 1184 (No. 92-3024, 1995) 

(“If a cave-in occurred in an 8-foot deep trench, it is clear that there is a 

substantial probability that the likely result would be death or serious physical 

harm.”).

The ALJ’s finding the ladder violation was a fall hazard that could 

result in “contusions, fractures, and concussions” is also supported by 

substantial evidence. J.D. Abrams, 2022 WL 7517239, at *17; see, e.g., Sw. 

Bell Tel. Co. v. Chao, No. 00-60814, 2001 WL 1485847, at *8 (5th Cir. 15 Nov. 

2001) (refusing to disturb “[t]he Commission’s determination that a serious 

broken bone could result” from ladder violation because determination “was 

based on substantial evidence in the record as a whole”). 

C.

The two challenged fines are reviewed for abuse-of-discretion. See

Dan J. Sheehan Co. v. OSHRC, 520 F.2d 1036, 1041 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The 

court is empowered to review the appropriateness of the penalty using an 

‘abuse of discretion’ standard.”); Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 2001 WL 1485847, at *8 

(“This and other courts of appeals have a long history of according great 

deference to the Commission’s judgment as to the appropriate penalty when 

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. . . the Commission gives consideration to the statutory factors, and when 

the penalty amounts fall within the statutory mandate.”).

When assessing violations, the ALJ is to give “due consideration to 

the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the business of 

the employer being charged, the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the 

employer, and the history of previous violations”. 29 U.S.C. § 666(j). 

The statutory maximum for each serious violation was $13,494. 29 

C.F.R. § 1903.15(d)(3) (2020). As stated, the two penalties are below that 

amount: $7,711 and $5,783. 

Abrams contends the ALJ erred by: omitting any analysis of the 

CSHO’s testimony; failing to appreciate the absence of any prior citation on 

its record; failing to consider the low possibility of serious injury; and not 

affording it an adjustment based on good faith because Abrams 

communicated its rules to its employees. 

Regarding the lack of analysis of the CSHO’s testimony, Abrams’ bare 

assertion that the ALJ erred by omitting the analysis does not show abuse of 

discretion. For the absence of prior citations, the ALJ noted: “[t]he lack of 

penalty adjustment reflects this lack of inspection history”. J.D. Abrams, 

2022 WL 7517239, at *17 n.24. As discussed supra, the ALJ’s concluding 

Abrams did not adequately monitor its worksites is supported by substantial 

evidence. Likewise, Abrams fails to show abuse of discretion by the ALJ’s

rejecting a penalty adjustment based on Abrams’ perfect-record contention. 

Abrams’ likelihood-of-serious-injury contention is also discussed supra. 

Finally, regarding good faith, the ALJ rejected Abrams’ contention for 

a reduction because the “safety policy was incomplete”. Id. at *18 (citing 

Capform, Inc., 19 BNA OSHC 1374, 1378 (No. 99-0322, 2001)). Abrams 

again fails to show abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Gen. Motor Corp., 22 BNA 

OSHC 1019, 2007 WL 4350896, at *38 (Nos. 91-2834E & 91-2950, 2007) 

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(rejecting good-faith reduction when “managerial personnel knew of 

widespread noncompliance . . . and tolerated as well as encouraged such 

hazardous work practices”).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

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