COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Fitzpatrick and 

 Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

STEPHON P. FAUNTLEROY 

v. Record No. 1085-94-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA OCTOBER 31, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY 

James W. Haley, Jr., Judge 

 R. Scott Pugh for appellant. 

 H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced 

to life imprisonment. On appeal, he alleges the trial court 

erred in admitting into evidence a handwritten message and the 

testimony of a handwriting expert, in restricting his crossexamination of a witness, and in instructing the jury. Finding 

no error, we affirm appellant's conviction. 

 I. 

 "On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 

4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). 

 On the morning of August 1, 1993, appellant told an 

acquaintance he knew his wife Gloria Fauntleroy had "been 

fucking," called her a "bitch," and said if he could not "have 

her, nobody else will." Between 12:00 and 1:00 p.m., Daymon 
 2 

Coleman saw Gloria crying as she walked on the path through the 

woods from her townhouse to Forbes Market. Coleman later saw 

appellant on the path, and asked him why Gloria had been crying. 

 Appellant said, "[W]hen I catch up with the fucking bitch, she's 

going to do more than cry." 

 That afternoon, witnesses saw Gloria talking on a telephone 

outside Forbes Market. Appellant was arguing with her and trying 

to hang up the phone. Gloria dropped the phone and walked 

quickly up the path into the woods. Appellant followed her. 

Gloria was not seen alive again. 

 On August 4, Gloria's body was found in the woods between 

her home and Forbes Market. Gloria had died from strangulation 

with a ligature. 

 Two days after Gloria disappeared, appellant told Jeffrey 

Armstead he had hit Gloria with a knife. Armstead jokingly asked 

appellant, "[Y]ou sure you didn't kill your wife and bury her in 

your back yard?" Appellant said, "I didn't mean to hurt her. I 

mean, I didn't hurt her. Don't put that on me . . . ." 

Appellant reported his wife missing that evening. On August 5, 

before police officers advised him that they had found Gloria's 

body, appellant told the police that he did not kill his wife. 

 II. 

 On a metal panel of a soda machine outside Forbes Street 

Market, the police found the written message, "Bitch you will 

die! Like the bloody whore you are." The soda machine was near 

the telephone witnesses saw Gloria using while arguing with 

appellant on August 1. The message had not been present on July 
 3 

31, when the store manager cleaned the outside of the machine. 

He noticed the writing for the first time on August 3. 

 Thomas Goyne, an expert in the field of handwriting 

analysis, testified that by comparing the message written on the 

metal panel with known exemplars of appellant's writing, there 

were "indications" appellant had written the first sentence of 

the message. There were "limited indications" appellant wrote 

the portion of the note ending with "you are." On appeal, 

appellant argues that the message and the testimony concerning it 

were inadmissible. 

 "The admission of evidence is left to the broad discretion 

of the trial judge. However, if evidence has probative value, it 

is normally admissible and should be excluded only when its 

probative value is outweighed by policy considerations which make 

its use undesirable in the particular case." Farley v. 

Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 495, 498, 458 S.E.2d 310, 311 (1995). 

 "The standard of review on appeal where the admissibility of 

expert testimony is challenged is whether the trial court abused 

its discretion." Kern v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 84, 86, 341 

S.E.2d 397, 398 (1986). "Relevant scientific evidence is 

admissible if the expert is qualified to give testimony and the 

science upon which he testifies is reliable. There also must be 

a connection between the evidence and the factual dispute in the 

case." Farley, 20 Va. App. at 498-99, 458 S.E.2d at 312. 

"Expert testimony is appropriate to assist triers of fact in 

those areas where a person of normal intelligence and experience 

cannot make a competent decision." Swiney v. Overby, 237 Va. 
 4 

231, 233, 377 S.E.2d 372, 374 (1989). 

 Appellant challenged neither Goyne's qualifications as an 

expert nor the reliability of the science in his area of 

expertise. Appellant's sole objection was that Goyne was not 

able to conclude to a reasonable degree of certainty that the 

writing on the panel was appellant's. The trial judge found that 

appellant's objection went to the weight, not the admissibility, 

of the evidence. 

 "[A]n expert opinion 'based on a "possibility" is 

irrelevant, purely speculative and, hence, inadmissible.'" 

Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 1, 13, 413 S.E.2d 875, 881 

(1992) (quoting Spruill v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 475, 479, 271 

S.E.2d 419, 421 (1980)). Goyne's testimony about the writing on 

the panel, however, was not based upon a "possibility." Rather, 

it was founded upon Goyne's scientific study of the writing on 

the metal panel and the known exemplars of appellant's writing, a 

comparison Goyne was qualified to perform. Goyne's opinion was 

not inadmissible merely because he could not specifically 

conclude that appellant wrote the message on the panel. The 

expert carefully described the range of conclusions which could 

be reached as a result of his scientific examination. His range 

of conclusions began with the ability to identify the writer to 

the exclusion of all others to categorically eliminating a 

writer. From absolute identification the steps drop to strong 

indications, indications, limited indications, cannot be 

eliminated and then the reverse. Goyne's qualifications of his 

findings affected only the weight to be given the evidence, not 
 5 

the admissibility, as the trial judge properly ruled. See

Hetmeyer v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 103, 110, 448 S.E.2d 894, 

899 (1994). See also Seneca Falls Greenhouse & Nursery v. 

Layton, 9 Va. App. 482, 487, 389 S.E.2d 184, 187 (1990) (the 

manner in which a jury may weigh the opinion of an expert "has 

nothing to do with its admissibility"). Thus, the trial judge 

did not abuse his discretion in admitting Goyne's testimony. 

 III. 

 While incarcerated awaiting trial, appellant told Keith 

Willis, another inmate, "Yeah, I did it. They'll never get any 

evidence to convict me. They're dumb as hell." 

 On voir dire, Willis revealed his prior criminal charges and 

the disposition of those charges. While serving time in the 

Chesterfield County jail for a conviction of grand larceny, 

Willis gave the police information about an individual in Florida 

to retaliate against that person, but the police did not act upon 

the information. Also while in the Chesterfield jail, Willis was 

arrested for grand larceny and making a false report to the 

police in Spotsylvania County. Willis pled guilty to petit 

larceny, and the false report charge was dropped. 

 In Stafford County, Willis pled guilty to grand larceny, 

receiving a three-year reduction in his suspended sentence in 

exchange for his truthful testimony against appellant. While 

incarcerated in the Stafford County jail, Willis told the FBI 

that Michael Green, another inmate, had discussed planting a car 

bomb. Green subsequently was charged with attempting to kill a 

prosecutor, but Willis was offered nothing by the federal 
 6 

authorities for the information he provided. 

 Before appellant's trial, Willis had never testified in 

court against anyone. At the time of trial, Willis was 

incarcerated, but had no charges against him pending disposition. 

 Appellant argued at trial that he should be able to ask 

Willis about the "deals" he had made with the prosecution 

concerning his other past convictions. Appellant conceded he had 

no evidence Willis had made any such deal or ever had "any slack 

cut" in a prior case. In fact, Willis stated that none of the 

dismissals of any of the charges against him resulted from any 

agreement he had made with the prosecuting authorities. The 

trial judge refused to allow appellant to ask Willis the proposed 

question, but permitted appellant to ask Willis about the number 

and nature of prior convictions and the terms of his plea 

agreement in Stafford County, including his agreement to testify 

against appellant. The court also did not permit appellant to 

ask Willis about the two instances where he had offered 

information to the police. 

 Cross-examination is fundamental to the 

truth-finding process and is an absolute 

right guaranteed to the defendant by the 

confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. 

 While the trial court has the discretion to 

see that the right of cross-examination is 

not abused, this discretion is to be employed 

only after the right "has been substantially 

and fairly exercised." In exercising the 

right, the defendant can elicit "any evidence 

. . . which tends to affect the credibility 

of [witnesses] or the weight of their 

testimony by showing what influences, if any, 

were brought to bear upon them." 

Shanklin v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 862, 864, 284 S.E.2d 611, 612 

(1981) (citations omitted). 
 7 

 The trial judge permitted appellant great latitude in his 

cross-examination of Willis. In fact, the terms of Willis' 

Stafford County plea agreement, including the condition that he 

testify against appellant, were revealed to the jury. See

Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 374, 378-79, 429 S.E.2d 

881, 884 (1993). Appellant produced no evidence to demonstrate 

that Willis, by offering information to law enforcement 

authorities on two occasions and receiving nothing in return, was 

motivated by self-interest to testify untruthfully at appellant's 

trial. In this regard, Willis was in a position no different 

than an ordinary citizen who reported suspected criminal activity 

to the police. The trial judge did not prevent appellant from 

presenting matters to the jury tending to demonstrate that Willis 

was biased, and did not abuse his discretion in limiting the 

cross-examination of Willis. 

 Appellant further contends the court should have allowed him 

to question Willis about the false report charge, of which 

appellant was never convicted. Where it is not relevant to 

demonstrate a witness' bias or motive to fabricate, "[e]vidence 

of specific acts of misconduct is generally not admissible in 

Virginia to impeach a witness' credibility." Banks v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 959, 963, 434 S.E.2d 681, 683 (1993). 

 Furthermore, that a witness has merely been charged with a 

crime is inadmissible for purposes of impeachment. Dowell v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1145, 1147, 408 S.E.2d 263, 264-65 

(1991), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 14 Va. App. 58, 414 S.E.2d 440 

(1992). For these reasons, the trial judge did not err in 
 8 

refusing to permit cross-examination of Willis on the matter. 

 IV. 

 The following language was appended to instruction 3, 

concerning circumstantial evidence: "[T]he theories of innocence 

which must be excluded are only those which flow from the 

evidence itself. The Commonwealth has no duty to negate the 

theories which flow only from the imagination of the defendant's 

counsel." Conceding that the instruction correctly stated the 

law, see Saunders v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 825, 830, 447 

S.E.2d 526, 529 (1994), appellant argues that the appended 

language was inappropriate upon the facts of the case. 

 "A reviewing court's responsibility in reviewing jury 

instructions is to 'see that the law has been clearly stated and 

that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly 

raises.'" Darnell v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 485, 488, 370 

S.E.2d 717, 719 (1988) (quoting Swisher v. Swisher, 223 Va. 499, 

503, 290 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1982)). The instruction in question 

provided the jury with the proper framework to weigh the 

evidence, which was largely circumstantial. Considering that 

appellant's theory of defense was to show that someone else 

murdered his wife, the instruction was applicable to the facts 

and circumstances of the case. 

 Furthermore, "[a] proposed jury instruction submitted by a 

party, which constitutes an accurate statement of the law 

applicable to the case, shall not be withheld from the jury 

solely for its nonconformance with model jury instructions." 

Code § 19.2-263.2. Thus, we cannot say that the trial judge 
 9 

erred in granting the circumstantial evidence instruction.1

 

 For these reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction. 

 Affirmed. 

 

 1Appellant further contends that the prosecutor was 

permitted during closing argument to "launch an attack on the 

credibility of [his] . . . counsel." However, "errors assigned 

because of a prosecutor's improper comments or conduct during 

closing argument will not be considered on appeal unless the 

accused timely moves for a cautionary instruction or for a 

mistrial." Morris v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 283, 286-87, 416 

S.E.2d 462, 464 (1992) (en banc). Appellant did neither in this 

case, and our consideration of this argument is barred.