The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District

1

Judge for the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri, sitting by

designation.

The Honorable Ross A. Walters, United States Magistrate Judge 2

for the Southern District of Iowa, presiding by consent of the

parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 96-2910

___________

Steve Ragan, *

*

Appellant, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Southern District of Iowa.

D. Lynch; Charles Harper; *

Ronald Welder; Debbie Nichols; *

Sally Chandler Halford, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: March 11, 1997

 Filed: May 15, 1997

___________

Before WOLLMAN, and BEAM, Circuit Judges and LAUGHREY, District Judge. 1

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Steve Ragan appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment 2

against him in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We affirm. 
The card was not produced at Ragan’s prison disciplinary

3

hearing nor is it part of the record before us. Given the

procedural posture of this case, we accept Ragan’s representations

about the contents of the correspondence.

The district court determined that the maximum security

4

restriction was not at issue in this case. That finding was not

appealed and need not concern us here. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Steve Ragan is serving time in the Iowa State Penitentiary (ISP) for

his robbery of a convenience store by threatening the cashier with a gun.

Ragan sent a Christmas card to the cashier in which he offered an apology

and asked for forgiveness. This contact upset the victim. The

3

administrator of the Victim Witness Assistance Program wrote a letter to

the Iowa Department of Corrections complaining on the victim’s behalf. 

Ragan was served with a disciplinary notice charging that the

correspondence violated prison rules. A disciplinary hearing was held, at

which neither the victim nor the person who complained on her behalf

testified. The disciplinary committee relied on the complaint and on an

investigator’s written report to find that Ragan violated Institutional

Rule 40, “Misuse of Mail, Telephone, and Other Communications.” Ragan was

sanctioned with fifteen days of disciplinary detention, restriction to the

maximum security cellhouse for six months, and loss of 180 days good4

conduct time. 

Ragan filed three internal appeals of the disciplinary committee’s

determination, all of which were denied. After serving his disciplinary

detention, Ragan filed an application for postconviction relief in state

court. The state court found that Rule 40 did not prohibit Ragan’s

conduct. The court then reasoned that without Rule 40, the disciplinary

committee’s decision lacked 
Ragan also alleged a First Amendment violation. The district 5

court found that the state’s legitimate interest in preventing the

harassment of crime victims justified restriction of Ragan’s right

of free expression. That ruling is not contested on appeal. 

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any support in the evidence. Ragan’s disciplinary record was therefore

expunged and his good-conduct time returned.

Ragan filed this section 1983 action in federal district court

seeking damages from the ISP employee who investigated the victim’s

complaint, the administrative law judge who chaired the disciplinary

committee, and the three ISP officials who denied his administrative

appeals. He claims that the defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment

right to due process. The district court granted the defendants’ motion 5

for summary judgment, reasoning that since Ragan’s good-conduct time had

been returned, his only damage was the fifteen days of disciplinary

segregation, which is not protected by the Due Process Clause. Ragan

appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A due process claim is cognizable only if there is a recognized

liberty or property interest at stake. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.

564, 569 (1972). Because Ragan concedes that the Due Process Clause itself

was not violated here, he must establish that the disciplinary committee

interfered with some constitutionally-protected liberty interest. 

Ragan was subjected to two sanctions: segregation and loss of goodtime credits. He acknowledges that no liberty interest was implicated by

the segregation. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995). Ragan

asserts, however, that the additional loss of his good-conduct time

implicates a constitutionally-protected liberty 
The retention of good-time credits does not automatically

6

qualify as a constitutionally-protected liberty interest. Wolff

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974). Further, we have

previously expressed doubt as to whether Iowa’s statutory scheme is

sufficiently mandatory to create a liberty interest in good time.

See Moorman v. Thalacker, 83 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1996). 

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interest. For purposes of this case, we will assume without deciding that

Ragan faced the loss of a liberty interest. 

6

When inmates are entitled to due process before being disciplined,

they must receive: (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) an

opportunity to present evidence in their defense; (3) a written statement

by the fact finder of the reasons for the action; and (4) a decision

supported by some evidence in the record. Superintendent, Mass.

Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (citing Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974)). Ragan concedes he was provided

the first three elements. His claim centers around the evidentiary

requirement. 

Ragan argues that the state court’s determination that Rule 40 did

not prohibit his conduct is equivalent to a finding that due process was

violated, which, in turn, entitles him to damages. As an initial matter,

we are not convinced that a disciplinary committee’s erroneous

interpretation of a prison rule constitutes a due process violation under

Hill. Regardless, Ragan has suffered no injury or, if he did, any harm

suffered has already been remedied--his good-time credits have been

returned and his disciplinary record expunged. Because there was a

procedure available to remedy the disciplinary committee’s mistake, that

error alone does not amount to a denial of due process. Wycoff v. Nichols,

94 F.3d 1187, 1189 (8th Cir. 1996) (no due process violation in sanctioning

inmate for conduct not prohibited by prison rules when appeal of discipline

restored good-time credits 
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because appeal procedure “constituted part of the due process [and] cured

the alleged due process violation”). 

Ragan attempts to distinguish Wycoff on the grounds that in his case

it was a state court, not prison administrators, who restored his goodconduct time. However, the Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to

provide him adequate procedures. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,

838 (1982) (Due Process Clause applies to acts of states). The Iowa state

court is just as much an arm of the state as ISP administrators. Thus, the

process afforded Ragan by the state included a full-blown evidentiary

hearing at which Ragan was represented by counsel. Those proceedings were

effective in vindicating any liberty interest Ragan might have had. In

short, the system worked for Steve Ragan. Any defect in the committee’s

process has been remedied, and Ragan has suffered no deprivation without

due process. It follows that he is not entitled to damages. 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s decision granting the defendants’

motion for summary judgment. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.