Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 49 / Tuesday, March 14, 1995 / Notices 13739

will continue to effectively detect

containment leakage resulting from the

degradation of active containment isolation

components, as well as containment

penetrations. Administrative limits have

been established for each Type B or C

component at a fraction of the allowable leak

rate, such that any leakage detected in excess

of the administrative limit will indicate a

potential valve or penetration degradation. In

instances in which a component’s leakage

exceeds its administrative limit,

proceduralized controls in the test program

require that a work order be written to repair

the component.

IV

Section III.D.1.(a) of Appendix J to 10

CFR Part 50 states that a set of three

Type A leakage rate tests shall be

performed at approximately equal

intervals during each 10-year service

period.

The licensee proposes an exemption

to this section which would provide a

one-time interval extension for the Type

A test by approximately 16 months. The

Commission has determined that,

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1), this

exemption is authorized by law, will not

present an undue risk to the public

health and safety, and is consistent with

the common defense and security. The

Commission further determined, for the

reasons discussed below, that special

circumstances, as provided in 10 CFR

50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present justifying the

exemption; namely, that application of

the regulation in the particular

circumstances is not necessary to

achieve the underlying purpose of the

rule. The underlying purpose of the

requirement to perform Type A

containment leak rate tests at intervals

during the 10-year service period, is to

ensure that any potential leakage

pathways through the containment

boundary are identified within a time

span that prevents significant

degradation from continuing or

becoming unknown. The NRC staff has

reviewed the basis and supporting

information provided by the licensee in

the exemption request. The NRC staff

has noted that the licensee has a good

record of ensuring a leak tight

containment. All Type A tests have

passed with significant margin and the

licensee has noted that the results of the

Type A testing have been confirmatory

of the Type B and C tests which will

continue to be performed. The licenses

has stated that it will continue to

perform the general containment civil

inspection although it is only required

by Appendix J (Section V.A.) to be

performed in conjunction with Type A

tests. The NRC staff considers that these

inspections, though limited in scope,

provide an important added level of

confidence in the continued integrity of

the containment boundary.

The NRC staff has also made use of a

draft staff report, NUREG–1493, which

provides the technical justification for

the present Appendix J rulemaking

effort which also includes a 10-year test

interval for Type A tests. The integrated

leakage rate test, or Type A test,

measures overall containment leakage.

However, operating experience with all

types of containments used in this

country demonstrates that essentially all

containment leakage can be detected by

local leakage rate tests (Type B and C).

According to results given in NUREG–

1493, out of 180 ILRT reports covering

110 individual reactors and

approximately 770 years of operating

history, only 5 ILRT failures were found

which local leakage rate testing could

not detect. This is 3% of all failures

This study agrees with previous NRC

staff studies which show that Type B

and C testing can detect a very large

percentage of containment leaks. the

Catawba Unit 1 experience has also

been consistent with this.

The Nuclear Management and

Resources Council (NUMARC), now the

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), collected

and provided the NRC staff with

summaries of data to assist in the

Appendix J rulemaking effort. NUMARC

collected results of 144 ILRTs from 33

units; 23 ILRTs exceeded 1.0La. Of

these, only nine were not due to Type

B or C leakage penalties. The NEI data

also added another perspective. The NEI

data show that in about one-third of the

cases exceeding allowable leakage, the

as-found leakage was less than 2La; in

one case the leakage was found to be

approximately 2La; in one case the asfound leakage was less than 3La; one

case approached 10La; and in one case

the leakage was found to be

approximately 21La. For about half of

the failed ILRTs, the as-found leakage

was not quantified. These data show

that, for those ILRTs for which the

leakage was quantified, the leakage

values are small in comparison to the

leakage value at which the risk to the

public starts to increase over the value

of risk corresponding to La

(approximately 200La, as discussed in

NUREG–1493).

Based on generic and plant-specific

data, the NRC staff finds the licensee’s

proposed one-time exemption to permit

a schedular extension of one cycle for

the performance of the Appendix Type

A test to be acceptable.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that

granting this exemption will not have a

significant impact on the human

environment (60 CFR 11125).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance and shall expire at the

completion of the 1996 refueling outage.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day

of March 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John A. Zwolinski,

Acting Director, Division of Reactor Projects

— I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–6205 Filed 3–13–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

Forrest L. Roudebush, Kansas City,

Missouri; Order Prohibiting

Involvement in NRC-Licensed

Activities and Requiring Certain

Notification to NRC

I

Mr. Forrest L. Roudebush has been,

from its inception, the owner and

president of Piping Specialists

Incorporated (PSI or Licensee), also

known as PSI Inspection, which was the

holder of Byproduct Material License

No. 24–24826–01 issued by the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC

or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR

Parts 30 and 34 on March 6, 1987. The

license authorized the use of byproduct

material (iridium-192 and cobalt-60) for

industrial radiography in devices

approved by the NRC or an Agreement

State. The facility where licensed

materials were authorized for storage

was located at 1010 East 10th Street,

Kansas City, Missouri. The use of

licensed materials was authorized at

temporary job sites anywhere in the

United States that the NRC maintains

jurisdiction for regulating the use of

licensed materials. On October 17, 1991,

the NRC staff issued an Order

Suspending License (Effective

Immediately) to PSI. On April 22, 1992,

the NRC staff issued to PSI an Order

Modifying Order Suspending License

(Effective Immediately) and Order

Revoking License. The revocation of the

license was upheld by a decision of the

NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

(ASLB), Piping Specialists, Inc. and

Forrest L. Roudebush, LBP 92–25, 36

NRC 156 (1992), which the Commission

declined to review, CLI–92–16, 36 NRC

351 (1992).

II

NRC Region III initiated an inspection

of the Licensee on September 4, 1991,

and on September 24, 1991, the NRC

Office of Investigations (OI) commenced

an investigation based on information

received on August 29, 1991, that the

PSI radiation safety program was not

being conducted in compliance with

NRC rules, regulations, and license
13740 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 49 / Tuesday, March 14, 1995 / Notices

conditions. The inspection and

investigation focused on the Licensee’s

compliance with NRC regulations,

including possible willful violations

involving: (1) False statements to NRC

inspectors and investigators; (2) use of

unauthorized and/or unqualified

radiographer’s assistants while

conducting radiography; (3) preparation

of false, inaccurate, and incomplete

records; (4) failure to provide or use

personnel dosimetry devices while

conducting radiography; and (5) failure

to survey and post radiation area

boundaries to provide notice of

radiation hazards to the public while

performing radiography.

The OI investigation was completed

on February 21, 1992, and identified the

following deliberate violations of NRC

requirements attributable to Mr.

Roudebush:

A. In violation of 10 CFR 30.9, the PSI

Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), with the

prior knowledge of Mr. Roudebush,

deliberately provided incomplete and

inaccurate information to NRC

inspectors during inspections

conducted on March 21 and September

17–18, 1991. Specifically, the RSO

presented to the inspectors the

Licensee’s utilization log, records of

pocket dosimeter readings, and records

of surveys of radiographic exposure

devices performed at the time of the

storage of the device at the end of the

work day. Those records were neither

complete nor accurate because: (1) The

records did not document the Licensee’s

uses of the radiographic exposure

devices which occurred during periods

when the Licensee’s personnel

dosimetry service was interrupted due

to the nonpayment of service fees; and

(2) the information in the records had

not been recorded daily as required, but

instead, had been fabricated en masse

shortly before the inspections. Further,

the RSO and Mr. Roudebush knew that

the records were inaccurate and that the

records had been fabricated by the RSO

immediately before the inspections.

B. In violation of 10 CFR 30.9, during

an interview with OI on October 16,

1991, Mr. Roudebush, under oath, after

defining a radiographer’s assistant as

one who ‘‘* * * handles and operates

the enclosure, handle [sic] and operates

the device, handles and operates the

survey meter, takes charge of that

dosimeter’’, denied to an OI investigator

that he had performed work as a

radiographer’s assistant. This statement

was deliberately false because during

the NRC inspection conducted on

September 17–18, 1991, Mr. Roudebush

acknowledged that he had attached the

control cable and guide tube to a

radiographic exposure device and had

exposed and retracted the source during

radiographic operations. Mr. Roudebush

was not qualified as a radiographer or

assistant radiographer.

The investigation found other

deliberate violations of NRC

requirements, as well as a number of

violations that in the aggregate

represented a breakdown in the

management of the PSI radiation safety

program. Those violations are discussed

in the October 17, 1991 Order

Suspending License (Effective

Immediately), EA 91–136; and the April

22, 1992 Order Modifying Order

Suspending License (Effective

Immediately) and Order Revoking

License, EA 92–054. Those orders

discuss why the staff does not have

reasonable assurance that the licensee or

Mr. Roudebush would comply with

NRC requirements in the future.

The ASLB conducted a hearing from

April 28 to May 1, 1992 on the October

17, 1991 Order Suspending License

(Effective Immediately) and the April

22, 1992 Order Modifying Order

Suspending License (Effective

Immediately) and Order Revoking

License.

The ASLB, in its Final Initial Decision

(Revoking License), LBP–92–25, 36 NRC

156 (1992), stated:

We conclude that there have been

extensive failures on the part of PSI and Mr.

Roudebush to comply with NRC regulations.

The Board finds that the Licensee has failed

to act as a reasonable manager of licensed

activities; failed to detect and correct

violations caused by an employee; willfully

attempted to conceal violations from NRC

Staff, and given untruthful information to the

Staff during its inspections and

investigations. Moreover, we find that Mr.

Roudebush was untruthful in some aspects of

his testimony both during a formal

investigation and this Licensing Board. Id., at

186.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, on

August 18, 1994, Mr. Roudebush pled

guilty in the U.S. District Court for the

Western District of Missouri to one

criminal count of violating Title 42,

United States Code, Sections 2273 and

2201 (b) and (i) (§§ 161b, 161i, and 223

of the Atomic Energy Act). Specifically,

the agreement describes the nature of

the offense as the failure to provide

dosimetry devices to employees. As a

result, on December 12, 1994, an

amended judgment was filed whereby

Mr. Roudebush was sentenced to two

years probation. The terms of the

probation, in part, provide that Mr.

Roudebush shall not apply for or obtain

a license for radiography during the

probation period.

III

Based on the above, the NRC

concludes that Forrest L. Roudebush,

the owner and president of PSI, engaged

in deliberate misconduct that caused the

Licensee to be in violation of 10 CFR

30.9, 30.10, and 34.33. Mr. Roudebush

deliberately provided information to

NRC inspectors and investigators that he

knew to be incomplete or inaccurate in

some material respect to the NRC, and

Mr. Roudebush was deliberately

untruthful during portions of his

testimony to the ASLB, in violation of

10 CFR 30.9 and 30.10. Further, Mr.

Roudebush deliberately failed to

provide dosimetry devices to his

employees, in violation of 10 CFR 34.33

and 30.10. The NRC must be able to rely

on its licensees, including their officers

and employees, to comply with NRC

requirements, including the requirement

to provide information and to maintain

records that are complete and accurate

in all respects material to the NRC. The

deliberate actions of Forrest L.

Roudebush in causing the Licensee to

violate 10 CFR 30.9, 30.10, and 34.33,

and his misrepresentations to the NRC

have raised serious doubt as to whether

he can be relied on to comply with NRC

requirements and to provide complete

and accurate information to the NRC.

Consequently, I lack the requisite

reasonable assurance that Forrest L.

Roudebush will conduct licensed

activities in compliance with the

Commission’s requirements or that the

health and safety of the public will be

protected if Forrest L. Roudebush were

permitted at this time to be involved in

NRC-licensed activities. Therefore, the

public health, safety and interest require

that, for a period of five years from

October 17, 1991, the date that the PSI

license was suspended by Immediately

Effective Order, Forrest L. Roudebush be

prohibited from any involvement in

NRC-licensed activities for either: (1) An

NRC licensee, or (2) an Agreement State

licensee performing licensed activities

in areas of NRC jurisdiction in

accordance with 10 CFR 150.20. In

addition, for a period of five years

commencing after completion of the five

year period of prohibition, Mr.

Roudebush must notify the NRC of his

employment or involvement in NRClicensed activities to ensure that the

NRC can monitor the status of Mr.

Roudebush’s compliance with the

Commission’s requirements and his

understanding of his commitment to

compliance. If Mr. Roudebush is

currently involved with another

licensee in NRC-licensed activities, Mr.

Roudebush must immediately cease

such activities, and inform the NRC of
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 49 / Tuesday, March 14, 1995 / Notices 13741

the name, address and telephone

number of the employer, and provide a

copy of this order to the employer.

IV

Accordingly, pursuant to sections 81,

161b, 161i, 182 and 186 of the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and

the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR

2.202, 10 CFR 30.10, and 10 CFR 150.20,

it is hereby ordered that:

1. Forrest L. Roudebush is prohibited

until October 17, 1996 from engaging in

any NRC-licensed activities. NRClicensed activities are those activities

that are conducted pursuant to a

specific or general license issued by the

NRC, including, but not limited to,

those activities of Agreement State

licensees conducted pursuant to the

authority granted by 10 CFR 150.20.

2. For a period of five years, beginning

October 17, 1996, after the five-year

period of prohibition has expired,

Forrest L. Roudebush shall, within 20

days of his acceptance of each

employment offer involving NRClicensed activities or his becoming

involved in NRC-licensed activities, as

defined in Paragraph IV.1 above,

provide notice to the Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555,

of the name, address, and telephone

number of the employer or the entity

where he is, or will be, involved in the

NRC-licensed activities. In the first such

notification, Forrest L. Roudebush shall

include a statement of his commitment

to compliance with regulatory

requirements and the basis why the

Commission should have confidence

that he will now comply with

applicable NRC requirements.

3. If Forrest L. Roudebush is currently

involved with any NRC licensee or

Agreement State licensee engaging in

NRC-licensed activities, then Forrest L.

Roudebush must, as of the effective date

of this Order, cease such activities and

inform the NRC of the name, address

and telephone number of the licensee,

and provide a copy of this Order to the

licensee.

The Director, Office of Enforcement,

may, in writing, relax or rescind any of

the above conditions upon

demonstration by Mr. Roudebush of

good cause.

V

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202,

Forrest L. Roudebush must, and any

other person adversely affected by this

Order may, submit an answer to this

Order, and may request a hearing on

this Order, within 20 days of the date of

this Order. The answer may consent to

this Order. Unless the answer consents

to this Order, the answer shall, in

writing and under oath or affirmation,

specifically admit or deny each

allegation or charge made in this Order

and shall set forth the matters of fact

and law on which Mr. Roudebush or

other person adversely affected relies

and the reasons as to why the Order

should not have been issued. Any

answer or request for a hearing shall be

submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Attn: Chief,

Docketing and Service Section,

Washington, DC 20555. Copies also

shall be sent to the Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to

the Assistant General Counsel for

Hearings and Enforcement at the same

address, and to the Regional

Administrator, NRC Region III, 801

Warrenville Road, Lisle, Illinois 60532–

4531 if the answer or hearing request is

by a person other than Mr. Roudebush.

If a person other then Mr. Roudebush

requests a hearing, that person shall set

forth with particularity the manner in

which his or her interest is adversely

affected by this Order and shall address

the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.714(d).

If a hearing is requested by Mr.

Roudebush or a person whose interest is

adversely affected, the Commission will

issue an Order designating the time and

place of any hearing. If a hearing is held,

the issue to be considered at such

hearing shall be whether, on the basis of

the matters described in: (1) this Order;

(2) EA 91–136; (3) EA 92–054; and (4)

LBP–92–25, 36 NRC 156 (1992), this

Order should be sustained.

In the absence of any request for

hearing, the provisions specified in

Section IV above shall be final 20 days

from the date of this Order without

further order or proceedings.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 3rd day

of March 1995.

From the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Hugh L. Thompson, Jr.,

Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear

Materials Safety, Safeguards and Operations

Support.

[FR Doc. 95–6206 Filed 3–13–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL

REVIEW BOARD

Board Meeting: Waste Isolation

Strategy, Thermal Management

Strategy, The Engineered Barrier

System

Pursuant to its authority under

section 5051 of Public Law 100–203, the

Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act

of 1987, the Nuclear Waste Technical

Review Board will hold its spring

meeting on April 19–20, 1995, in Las

Vegas, Nevada. The meeting will be

held at the Holiday Inn Crowne Plaza,

4255 S. Paradise Road, Las Vegas,

Nevada 89109; Tel. (702) 369–4400; Fax

(702) 369–3770. The meeting is open to

the public and will begin at 8:30 a.m.

both days. Presentations during the

meeting will address three main topics:

The Department of Energy’s (DOE)

emerging waste isolation strategy; the

DOE’s thermal management strategy,

including thermal testing planned or

being conducted for the Yucca

Mountain project; and engineered

barrier system research, development,

design, and analysis. Additional

presentations also will provide updates

on the DOE’s perspectives concerning

current legislative issues (fiscal year

1996 budget and initiatives to amend or

replace the Nuclear Waste Policy Act).

Topics that will be covered on

Wednesday, April 19, include the

current status of the DOE’s waste

management program and its evolving

waste isolation strategy, the linkage

between the waste isolation strategy and

site suitability, the fiscal year 1996 DOE

budget, and thermal management

strategy. An afternoon panel discussion

will explore the integration of these

topics. Prior to recessing for the day,

those attending the meeting will be

invited to direct questions or comments

to the Board and the discussion panel

members.

On Thursday, April 20, the meeting

will focus on the engineered barrier

system and include repository

subsurface operations concepts,

multipurpose container (MPC) interface

with a potential repository, waste

package design, engineered barrier

system performance assessment,

corrosion research, in-repository

criticality, potential use of backfill, and

in-repository shielding. Following a

time for public questions and

comments, a panel discussion will

address the compatibility of waste

package and engineered barrier designs

with the DOE’s concept of repository

operations and thermal management

strategies. A final period for public

comment will end the meeting’s

activities.

The Nuclear Waste Technical Review

Board was created by Congress in the

Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act

of 1987 to evaluate the technical and

scientific validity of activities

undertaken by the DOE in its program

to manage the disposal of the nation’s

spent nuclear fuel and defense highlevel waste. In that same legislation,

Congress directed the DOE to

characterize a site at Yucca Mountain,