IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-30856

LAURIE ANNE FUTRAL,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

PAUL T. CHASTANT, individually and as Trustee on behalf of Robert B 

Chastant D D S Defined Benefit & Profit Sharing Plans,

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 6:12-CV-2653

Before JONES, SMITH, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The widow of Dr. Robert Chastant sued to recover attorney’s fees that 

were allegedly illegally deducted from the dentist’s ERISA plans to contest her 

status as beneficiary. The district court entered summary judgment against 

Futral and awarded Defendant Paul Chastant additional legal fees. We affirm 

the district court’s summary judgment against Futral, and reverse the award 

of additional legal fees.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 18, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 13-30856

Dr. Robert Chastant was murdered on December 13, 2010. Prior to his 

death, he established an ERISA qualified defined benefit plan and profit 

sharing plan through his dental practice, which was the plans’ sponsor. He 

also purchased several life insurance policies. The sole remaining beneficiary 

under the plans and insurance policies was Laurie Futral, Dr. Chastant’s 

widow. Dr. Chastant’s brother, Paul Chastant (“Chastant”), was named 

executor of Dr. Chastant’s will and also the trustee of the ERISA plans. Shortly 

after her husband’s death, Futral filed a suit against the insurance companies 

and Chastant to recover the insurance proceeds and plan benefits. By the time 

the suit was filed, Chastant and the insurance companies had become aware 

of allegations that Futral had a hand in her husband’s death, which would have

disqualified her from receiving benefits under the Louisiana Slayer Statute. 

LA. R. S. 22:901(D). In light of the allegations, the insurance companies 

interpled the insurance proceeds, and Chastant answered Futral’s complaint 

and asserted the Slayer Statute as an affirmative defense. On May 21, 2012, 

a jury found that Futral had not participated in the murder. The verdict was 

not appealed, and both the insurance proceeds and the ERISA plan benefits 

were released to Futral. 

During the course of the litigation, and allegedly in accord with the 

provisions of the ERISA plans, Chastant paid the majority of his attorney’s 

fees from their corpus. Futral brought this suit to recover the funds – over 

$80,000 – Chastant expended on attorney’s fees in the previous action. She 

alleged that using plan funds in this way was a breach of the fiduciary duty 

that Chastant owed her as the plans’ trustee. On cross motions for summary 

judgment, the district court denied Futral’s motion and granted Chastant’s 

motion for additional attorney’s fees relating to the previous suit and expenses

and attorney’s fees defending the instant suit. The court held that Chastant 

did not breach his fiduciary duty. 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same standards as the district court. Greater Houston Small Taxicab Co. 

Owners Ass’n v. City of Houston, Tex., 660 F.3d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 2011). 1 

DISCUSSION

Futral contends that Chastant violated his fiduciary duty by defending 

against her suit to determine benefits and by paying his attorney’s fees out of 

the corpus of the plans. She asserts that he had a conflict of interest because 

he acted as both the trustee of the plans and the executor under the will.

Futral first argues that this case is governed by Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210 F.3d 

491 (5th Cir. 2000). In Gibbs, we reversed the district court, which held under 

similar circumstances that an insurer who defended against a claim for 

benefits was entitled to attorney’s fees under the ERISA attorney’s fees 

provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). Gibbs is distinguishable. Here, Chastant did 

not seek attorney’s fees under § 1132(g)(1) but rather withheld attorney’s fees 

from the corpus of the plans pursuant to provisions in the plans. Accordingly, 

Gibbs is not relevant.

Futral next contends that Chastant’s decision to defend Futral’s suit and 

to pay his attorney’s fees from the corpus of the plans violated his fiduciary 

duties under ERISA. In support of this argument before the district court and 

on appeal, Futral cites the general description of a trustee’s fiduciary duties 

under ERISA: “the proper management, administration, and investment of 

1 Chastant maintains that when he paid the attorney’s fees he was construing the 

terms of the plan and that under Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 

109 S. Ct. 948, 956-57 (1989) his actions should be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. 

See also Vega v. Nat’l Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 297 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 

Firestone held that an abuse of discretion standard governs challenges to a denial of benefits 

under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Because this is a suit for a breach of fiduciary duty rather 

than a suit for denial of benefits, Firestone does not apply and the proper standard of review 

is de novo. 

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[plan] assets, the maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified 

information, and the avoidance of conflicts of interest.” Laborers Nat. Pension 

Fund v. N. Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc., 173 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999) 

(citation omitted). She also cites 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) to reiterate the 

proposition that trustees have a fiduciary duty to discharge their duties 

“solely” in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries. Finally, she notes 

that transfers of plan benefits to the fiduciary are “prohibited transactions” 

under 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(D). 

Other than these citations, Futral provides no authority for the 

proposition that Chastant’s actions breached his fiduciary duties. Futral has 

provided no evidence that Chastant was actually conflicted, but relies instead 

on his dual roles as trustee of the plans and executor under the will. While it 

is undisputed that Chastant was wearing two hats, in this context, having dual 

roles, without more, is not a breach of fiduciary duty. 

It should be noted that ERISA approves a similar arrangement where 

employers operate as both plan sponsors and administrators, even though 

there is a potential conflict of interest. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 

526-27, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1084-85 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). This 

structural arrangement would not have been permitted under the traditional 

law of trusts, but it is a common feature under ERISA plans. Id. 

Chastant confronted a serious question regarding the eligibility of the 

beneficiary under Louisiana law. It is undisputed that Chastant owed a duty 

of loyalty to the beneficiary of the plans, but only several weeks after his 

brother’s murder, the allegations against Futral made it unclear whether 

Chastant could pay her claims without violating state law. Consequently, 

Chastant used plan funds to defend against a suit seeking to compel 

disbursement to a potentially ineligible beneficiary. When the issue was 

resolved, he released the balance of the funds after paying most of his 

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attorney’s fees and costs. We agree with the district court that Chastant did 

not breach his fiduciary duty. 

Futral also asserts that Chastant should have deposited the plan monies

in the court’s registry and notes that this court has approved of interpleader in 

a prior case. See Tittle v. Enron Corp., 463 F.3d 410, 423 (5th Cir. 2006). But 

Futral has not shown that the plans require interpleader under these 

circumstances, and she has cited no authority for the argument that failure to 

interplead the funds is a per se breach of a trustee’s fiduciary duty. 

Interpleader is common in insurance cases where there is a dispute among 

potential beneficiaries because it is a relatively straightforward matter to 

deposit a sum certain in the court’s registry. Here, however, Chastant had a 

continuing duty as trustee to maintain the corpus to pay ongoing 

administrative fees associated with the plans. Because of the recurring 

financial obligations, which existed independent of the cost of defending 

Futral’s suit, it would be impossible to require interpleader at the outset of the 

litigation. 

In his cross-motion for summary judgment, Chastant sought any 

remaining balance of attorney’s fees and costs from both of Futral’s lawsuits. 

The court awarded him these expenses. The only basis for Chastant’s claim 

for additional attorney’s fees is the terms of the plans. While these documents 

authorize payment of legal expenses from the corpus of the plans in some 

situations, Chastant has not explained how they authorize recovery from a 

beneficiary after the plans’ funds have been dispersed. Neither has he 

attempted to demonstrate that any trusts associated with the plans are still 

extant or that the plans have assets to meet his additional requests for fees. 

Given these facts, there was no basis to award Chastant attorney’s fees from 

Futral above those already paid from the corpus of the plans. 

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For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment exonerating 

Chastant from any breach of fiduciary duty but REVERSE the award of his 

legal costs.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part.

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