SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2906-15T4

JACQUELINE JALIL, LUISA

ROJAS, and TANIA MENA,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

PILGRIM MEDICAL CENTER and 

DR. NICHOLAS CAMPANELLA,

Defendants-Appellants.

_________________________________

Submitted May 2, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Fasciale and Sapp-Peterson.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-7913-

13.

Crew Schielke, attorney for appellants. 

Deutsch Atkins, P.C., attorneys for 

respondents (Adam J. Kleinfeldt and Kathryn 

K. McClure, of counsel and on the brief; 

Michael Malatino, on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

Pilgrim Medical Center (PMC) and Nicholas V. Campanella, M.D.

(Dr. Campanella) (collectively defendants) appeal from a March 4, 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

May 9, 2017
2 A-2906-15T4

2016 order denying defendant's cross-motion to vacate default 

judgment, quash an information subpoena, reinstate an answer, and 

extend discovery. Judge Dennis F. Carey, who was thoroughly 

familiar with the case, entered the order and rendered an oral 

opinion. We affirm.

In October 2013, Jacqueline Jalil, Luisa Rojas, and Tania 

Mena (collectively plaintiffs), filed a complaint against 

defendants alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against 

Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. In February 2014, 

defendants filed an answer. Thereafter, the parties proceeded to 

pre-trial discovery. 

In April 2014, plaintiffs propounded interrogatories and a 

notice to produce documents. Defendants failed to respond. In 

September 2014, plaintiffs' counsel notified defendants' counsel 

about the deficiency. Defendants ignored the notice. Plaintiffs 

then filed a motion to suppress defendants' answer without 

prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(1) for failure to answer 

interrogatories. 

In November 2014, defendants served plaintiffs with

interrogatory answers and responses to plaintiffs' notice to 

produce. Plaintiffs' counsel withdrew the motion, but wrote

defendants' counsel a letter identifying the deficiencies in 

discovery.
3 A-2906-15T4

Defendants' counsel did not respond to the letter. In May 

2015, plaintiffs' counsel sent a sixteen-page deficiency letter

itemizing the inadequate responses that went to the foundation of 

the cause of action. The letter provided specifics as to the 

discovery problems and stated that defendants responded 

"ambiguously" to "nearly every [d]ocument [r]equest," and 

explained that many requests went unanswered. Once again, 

defendants' counsel did not respond. 

In May 2015, plaintiffs filed a second motion to suppress 

defendants' answer without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(1)

for failure to answer interrogatories. Plaintiffs also filed a 

motion to compel production of the outstanding documents pursuant 

to Rule 4:23-5(c). In June 2015, defendants' first counsel 

withdrew and a new attorney filed a substitution of attorney. Both 

lawyers received notice of the motions. 

On June 26, 2015, the judge granted both motions, which were 

unopposed. He suppressed defendants' answer without prejudice for 

failure to answer interrogatories pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(1)

and (2); and on the same date, he compelled defendants to provide 

by July 12, 2015, more specific responses to plaintiffs' document 

request pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(c). Plaintiffs' counsel properly 

served the orders on the new attorney, which defendants duly 

ignored.
4 A-2906-15T4

On July 21, 2015, plaintiffs moved to suppress defendants' 

answer pursuant to Rule 4:23-2(b), not Rule 4:23-5(a)(2), arguing 

that defendants failed to comply with the June 2015 order 

compelling production of documents by a date certain. Defendants 

did not oppose the motion. On August 7, 2015, the court suppressed 

defendants' answer with prejudice. The record reflects 

plaintiffs' counsel properly served that order on defendants' new 

attorney. 

In September 2015, and on notice to counsel, the court 

scheduled a proof hearing for October 15, 2015. At the proof 

hearing, which defendants and their counsel failed to appear, 

plaintiffs testified about their employment, termination, and 

economic and emotional distress damages. In November 2015, 

plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs. 

On the return date of that motion, defendants' counsel filed

opposition only to the fee application. On December 4, 2015, the 

court entered final judgment by default. Thereafter, plaintiffs 

recorded a lien on their default judgment under Docket No. J021645-16. 

Plaintiffs engaged in supplementary proceedings by serving 

several information subpoenas. Defendants failed to respond, 

which resulted in plaintiffs filing a motion to enforce litigants'

rights in January 2016. That month, a third attorney for 
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defendants filed a partial substitution of attorney and entered 

an appearance as defendants' co-counsel. In March 2016, co-counsel 

filed another substitution of attorney after defendants' second 

counsel withdrew.

On February 10, 2016, defendants filed a cross-motion to 

vacate default judgment, quash plaintiffs' subpoenas, reinstate 

defendants' answer and reopen discovery for a period of 120 days. 

On March 4, 2016, the court denied defendants' cross-motion, and 

in a separate order, the court granted plaintiffs' motion to 

enforce litigants' rights.

The judge denied defendants' motion to vacate default 

judgment and wrote on the order that defendants did not show a 

meritorious defense or excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 4:50-1. 

The judge stated in his oral opinion that defendants did not oppose 

the motion to suppress with prejudice and did not oppose the 

request to schedule a proof hearing. In denying defendants' crossmotion, Judge Carey considered the arguments and stated further 

that 

[a]s far as excusable neglect goes, it is 

clear to this court, without question, that 

the attorneys representing the -- the 

defendant throughout the course of this 

litigation ha[ve] been extremely neglectful, 

dilatory and has just basically ignored the 

file. But plaintiff[s'] counsel have gone out 

of their way to notice them, to try to contact 

them and despite all of the notices and 
6 A-2906-15T4

contact, no action was taken, and this court 

is satisfied without question that there is 

no excusable neglect here. 

On appeal, defendants argue generally that they are entitled 

to relief pursuant to Rule 4:50-1. Defendants also contend that 

the judge failed to follow the two-step process of suppressing an 

answer pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(1) and (2). They contend that 

plaintiffs circumvented this rule by prematurely moving to 

suppress the answer with prejudice.

We conclude that defendants' arguments as to the suppression 

of their answer with prejudice are untimely and without sufficient 

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E). 

Turning to defendants' Rule 4:50-1 contentions, we review the 

trial court's decision on a motion to vacate a default judgment 

for abuse of discretion. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Russo, 

429 N.J. Super. 91, 98 (App. Div. 2012). "'The trial court's 

determination under [Rule 4:50-1] warrants substantial deference,'

and the abuse of discretion must be clear to warrant reversal." 

Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. 

Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)). "[An] abuse of discretion 

only arises on demonstration of 'manifest error or injustice[,]'" 

Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 20 (2008) (quoting State v. Torres, 

183 N.J. 554, 572 (2005)), and occurs when the trial judge's 
7 A-2906-15T4

"decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably 

departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible 

basis." Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 

2012) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571

(2002)).

We will not disturb a default judgment unless the failure to 

appear or otherwise defend was excusable under the circumstances 

and unless the defendant has a meritorious defense to both the 

cause of action and damages. Guillaume, supra, 209 N.J. at 468-

69. Attorney carelessness or lack of proper diligence does not 

constitute excusable neglect unless "attributable to [an] honest 

mistake" that is compatible with due diligence or reasonable 

prudence. Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 394 (1984) (quoting 

In re T, 95 N.J. Super. 228, 235 (App. Div. 1967)); see also

Quagliato v. Bodner, 115 N.J. Super. 133, 138 (App. Div. 1971) 

(holding that excusable neglect under Rule 4:50-1(a) does not 

include an attorney's tardiness on the day a motion he was opposing 

was listed and consequently argued and disposed of in his absence). 

Even assuming that defendants have a meritorious defense,

which defendants have not established on this record, there exists 

no excusable neglect attributable to an honest mistake that was 

compatible with due diligence or reasonable prudence. We reject 

any suggestion that defendants' attorneys did not receive notices 
8 A-2906-15T4

on the various motions or proof hearing. Such an assertion is 

belied by the record. 

Defendants fare no better under Rule 4:50-1(f), which permits 

courts to vacate judgments for "any other reason justifying relief 

from the operation of the judgment or order." The Court has stated 

that "[b]ecause of the importance that we attach to the finality 

of judgments, relief under Rule 4:50-1(f) is available only when 

'truly exceptional circumstances are present.'" Hous. Auth. of 

Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 286 (1994) (quoting Baumann 

supra, 95 N.J. at 395); see also Guillaume, supra, 209 N.J. at 

484. The rule is limited to "situations in which, were it not 

applied, a grave injustice would occur." Little, supra, 135 N.J.

at 289. Defendant's inexcusable failure to repeatedly respond to 

ongoing discovery deficiencies and an order to compel production 

of documents does not qualify as exceptional circumstances 

warranting relief under this subsection. 

Affirmed.