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PRINZ V. OMAHA OPERATIONS

Cite as 317 Neb. 744

Jennifer Prinz, appellee, v. Omaha Operations LLC, 

doing business as Emerald Nursing & 

Rehab Omaha, appellant.

___ N.W.3d ___

Filed September 27, 2024. No. S-23-994.

1. Appeal and Error. As a threshold matter, an appellate court must 

determine what assignments of error were properly raised and argued 

on appeal.

2. Rules of the Supreme Court: Appeal and Error. The cross-appeal 

section of an appellate brief must set forth a separate title page, a table 

of contents, a statement of the case, assigned errors, propositions of law, 

and a statement of the facts.

3. ____: ____. When a brief of an appellee fails to present a proper crossappeal pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109 (rev. 2023), an appellate 

court declines to consider its merits.

4. Workers’ Compensation: Appeal and Error. An appellate court may 

modify, reverse, or set aside a Workers’ Compensation Court decision 

only when (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its 

powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) 

there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the 

making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by 

the compensation court do not support the order or award.

5. ____: ____. On appellate review, the factual findings made by the trial 

judge of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court have the effect of 

a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.

6. Workers’ Compensation: Judgments: Appeal and Error. In testing 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of fact in a workers’ compensation case, an appellate court considers the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the successful party, every controverted fact must 

be resolved in favor of the successful party, and the appellate court gives 

the successful party the benefit of every inference reasonably deducible 

from the evidence.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

09/27/2024 09:14 AM CDT
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7. Workers’ Compensation: Proof. In order to recover under the Nebraska 

Workers’ Compensation Act, a claimant has the burden of proving by the 

greater weight of the evidence that an accident or occupational disease 

arising out of and occurring in the course of employment proximately 

caused an injury which resulted in disability compensable under the act.

8. Workers’ Compensation: Evidence: Appeal and Error. Admission of 

evidence is within the discretion of the Workers’ Compensation Court, 

whose determination in this regard will not be reversed upon appeal 

absent an abuse of discretion.

9. Expert Witnesses. Expert testimony should not be received if it appears 

the witness is not in possession of such facts as will enable him or her to 

express a reasonably accurate conclusion, as distinguished from a mere 

guess or conjecture.

10. Trial: Expert Witnesses. It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether there is sufficient foundation for an expert witness to give 

his or her opinion about an issue in question.

11. Expert Witnesses: Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not a 

superexpert and will not lay down categorically which factors and principles an expert may or may not consider; such matters go to the weight 

and credibility of the opinion itself and not to its admissibility.

12. Workers’ Compensation: Expert Witnesses: Physicians and 

Surgeons. The Workers’ Compensation Court is the sole judge of the 

credibility and weight to be given medical opinions, even when the 

health care providers do not give live testimony.

13. Trial: Expert Witnesses. An objection to the opinion of an expert based 

upon the lack of certainty in the opinion is an objection based upon relevance and not upon foundation.

14. Workers’ Compensation: Expert Witnesses. If the nature and effect 

of a claimant’s injury are not plainly apparent, then the claimant must 

provide expert medical testimony showing a causal connection between 

the injury and the claimed disability.

15. ____: ____. Although a claimant’s medical expert does not have to couch 

his or her opinion in the magic words “reasonable medical certainty” or 

“reasonable probability,” the opinion must be sufficient to establish 

the crucial causal link between the claimant’s injuries and the accident 

occurring in the course and scope of the claimant’s employment.

16. Workers’ Compensation: Evidence: Expert Witnesses. Expert medical testimony based upon “could,” “may,” or “possibly” lacks the definiteness required to support an award from the Workers’ Compensation 

Court.

17. Trial: Proximate Cause. The determination of causation is ordinarily a 

matter for the trier of fact.
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18. Workers’ Compensation: Expert Witnesses. It is the role of the 

Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court as the trier of fact to determine 

which, if any, expert witnesses to believe.

19. Expert Witnesses: Physicians and Surgeons: Appeal and Error. An 

appellate court examines the sufficiency of a medical expert’s statements 

from the expert’s entire opinion and the record as a whole.

20. Workers’ Compensation: Evidence: Appeal and Error. If the record 

contains evidence to substantiate the factual conclusions reached by the 

trial judge in workers’ compensation cases, an appellate court is precluded from substituting its view of the facts for that of the compensation court.

21. Workers’ Compensation. A workers’ compensation award cannot be 

based on mere possibility or speculation.

Appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Court: Daniel R. 

Fridrich, Judge. Affirmed.

Kaitlyn J. Coenen, of Prentiss Grant, L.L.C., for appellant.

Staci Hartman-Nelson, of Hartman-Nelson Law Office, for 

appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Cassel, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

An employer appeals from a workers’ compensation award, 

in which the compensation court made detailed factual findings 

and awarded Jennifer Prinz indemnity benefits, past medical 

expenses, and future medical care. As a matter of first impression, we consider Prinz’ medical expert’s use of the word 

“associated” when opining on the causal connection between 

the alleged work accident and her injury. On this record, we 

see no clear error in the compensation court’s finding that 

Prinz suffered from an injury proximately caused by a work 

accident. We affirm the compensation court’s judgment.
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Cite as 317 Neb. 744

II. BACKGROUND

1. Work Accident and Prinz’ Injury

These facts are generally recited from the compensation 

court’s award. Prinz was hired as a housekeeper for Omaha 

Operations LLC, doing business as Emerald Nursing & Rehab 

Omaha (Emerald), in late February 2020, shortly before the 

onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. At some point, Emerald 

put in place safety protocols to help control the spread of 

COVID-19.

On July 17, 2020, Prinz learned that she was required to 

wear an “N95 mask” during her shift and that Emerald had 

acquired an ultraviolet “sterilizer machine” that cleaned used 

N95 masks so they could be reused by Emerald’s employees. 

When Prinz retrieved an N95 mask from the sterilizer machine 

and placed it on her face, she felt a “burning sensation” and 

then had difficulty breathing. Another employee called an 

ambulance, which transported Prinz to a hospital. Prinz worked 

her final shift for Emerald the next day.

Three days later, Prinz sought treatment from a family 

care physician, Dr. Derek Marshall. She continued to see 

Marshall at followup appointments for persistent respiratory 

issues. Prinz also sought treatment from a pulmonologist, who 

ultimately diagnosed her with “moderate persistent asthma.”

2. Petition

Prinz filed a petition in the Workers’ Compensation Court 

against Emerald, claiming she suffered an injury from an accident on July 17, 2020, arising out of and in the course of her 

employment. Prinz requested payment of medical expenses 

and of temporary total disability benefits, a determination of 

loss of earning capacity, and entitlement to permanent partial 

disability benefits, vocational rehabilitation benefits, and penalties, interest, and attorney fees.

Emerald filed an answer admitting that it employed Prinz 

on July 17, 2020, but it denied that the alleged work accident 
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or injury occurred, that Prinz suffered an injury related to her 

work, and that Prinz was disabled to the extent she claimed.

3. Trial Evidence

More than 3 years after the mask incident, the compensation court held a 2-day trial. The only witnesses to testify were 

Prinz and her former supervisor at Emerald. The court also 

received medical evidence. Pursuant to our standard of review, 

this summary is recited in the light most favorable to Prinz.

Prinz presented evidence that her persistent respiratory 

issues were caused by the alleged work accident. The court 

received the medical records of both of Prinz’ treating physicians, which described numerous objective tests performed on 

her. Marshall first examined Prinz 3 days after the incident. He 

then saw her for several followup appointments regarding her 

respiratory problems.

Pursuant to a request from Prinz’ counsel, Marshall authored 

a report summarizing his evaluations of Prinz and providing 

his opinion in this case. Marshall opined, in pertinent part:

[Prinz] did not have any known or documented respiratory conditions prior to the onset of her symptoms [on] 

July 17, 2020. Therefore, it was not an aggravation of 

any known previous respiratory issues. She reported to 

me that her respiratory issues (now known to be asthma) 

started immediately after putting on a reused UV-treated 

N95 mask. There is no readily available test that can 

show causality between the exposure and her respiratory 

issues. However, I think there is reasonable degree of 

medical certainty that the two are associated as there were 

no other triggers identified.

The pulmonologist first evaluated Prinz approximately 6 

weeks after the incident on a referral from Marshall. Because 

of the time that had passed since the incident, the pulmonologist declined to opine on the cause of her respiratory issues. 

But the pulmonologist opined “there was a change in [Prinz’] 

condition” on July 17, 2020, and he generally agreed with 

Marshall that her symptoms started on that day.
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Prinz testified that she had suffered from respiratory issues 

since the incident on July 17, 2020. She also testified that prior 

to the incident, she had no respiratory problems. Other than 

a handful of unrelated doctor visits, there is no evidence that 

Prinz received medical treatment from 2017 to 2020.

Although Emerald denied any causal connection between the 

incident and Prinz’ respiratory issues, it did not present expert 

opinion evidence identifying a different source of Prinz’ symptoms or stating that her respiratory issues were not caused by 

the alleged work accident. Instead, Emerald posited that Prinz 

had a history of “breathing problems” and that her account of 

the events on July 17, 2020, was inaccurate.

4. Compensation Court’s Award

The compensation court entered a written award finding that 

on July 17, 2020, Prinz suffered an injury to her respiratory 

system in an accident arising out of and in the course of her 

employment with Emerald. The court awarded Prinz temporary 

total and permanent partial disability benefits, past medical 

expenses, and future medical care.

In the award, the compensation court expressly acknowledged the parties’ disagreement regarding whether Prinz’ respiratory issues were caused by the July 17, 2020, incident. But, 

after stating that it had carefully reviewed all of the evidence, 

it concluded the evidence supported a finding of causation. In 

particular, the compensation court found Prinz had no preexisting history of respiratory problems before the July 17 work 

accident. Moreover, it found Marshall’s opinion “both legally 

sufficient and persuasive given the timing of the events and the 

objective evidence that something happened to [Prinz] on July 

17, 2020.” In making that finding, the court rejected Emerald’s 

contention that Marshall’s opinion lacked foundation. The 

court also noted consistencies in the pulmonologist’s statements and the absence of a contrary medical opinion. Finally, 

the compensation court found Prinz’ testimony credible and 

supported by the objective tests in evidence.
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In determining the amount of the award, the compensation 

court found that Prinz sustained a 30-percent loss of earning 

capacity. In analyzing the issue, the court “reviewed in detail 

[Prinz’] testimony regarding her abilities and limitations, . . . 

Marshall’s restrictions, and the four factors used to determine 

a loss of earning capacity” as set forth in our case law.

Emerald filed a timely appeal, which we moved to our 

docket, 1 and Prinz filed a purported cross-appeal.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Emerald assigns, consolidated and renumbered, that the 

compensation court erred in (1) finding Prinz suffered an injury 

to her respiratory system in an accident arising out of and in 

the course of her employment and (2) finding Prinz sustained a 

30-percent loss of earning capacity.

[1-3] Prinz attempted to raise a cross-appeal challenging 

certain determinations of the compensation court, but she 

failed to separately assign errors as the basis for the purported 

cross-appeal. As a threshold matter, an appellate court must 

determine what assignments of error were properly raised 

and argued on appeal. 2 Pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. App. P. 

§ 2-109(D)(4) (rev. 2023), the cross-appeal section of an 

appellate brief must set forth a separate title page, a table of 

contents, a statement of the case, assigned errors, propositions 

of law, and a statement of the facts. 3 Although Prinz’ brief contains at least one subheading purporting to assign error, such 

subheadings do not satisfy the requirements of our appellate 

rules. 4 When a brief of an appellee fails to present a proper 

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2022).

2 Fentress v. Westin, Inc., 304 Neb. 619, 935 N.W.2d 911 (2019).

3 Id.

4 See § 2-109(D)(1). See, also, Fentress v. Westin, Inc., supra note 2, 304 

Neb. at 627, 935 N.W.2d at 920 (subheading in brief on cross-appeal was 

“not an acceptable substitute for a proper assignment of error”).
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cross-appeal pursuant to § 2-109, an appellate court declines to 

consider its merits. 5 We do not address it further.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[4] An appellate court may modify, reverse, or set aside a 

Workers’ Compensation Court decision only when (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) 

the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there 

is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant 

the making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not support the order 

or award. 6

[5,6] On appellate review, the factual findings made by the 

trial judge of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court have 

the effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless 

clearly wrong. 7 In testing the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the findings of fact in a workers’ compensation case, 

an appellate court considers the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the successful party, every controverted fact must 

be resolved in favor of the successful party, and the appellate 

court gives the successful party the benefit of every inference 

reasonably deducible from the evidence. 8

V. ANALYSIS

1. Proof of Causation

[7] Emerald’s primary contention is that the compensation 

court erred in finding that Marshall’s opinion as to causation had sufficient foundation and in relying on it to find that 

Prinz’ injury was causally connected to her employment. The 

causal connection is important because it is an element of 

5 Fentress v. Westin, Inc., supra note 2.

6 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-185 (Reissue 2021). See, also, Mosher v. Whole 

Foods Market, ante p. 26, 8 N.W.3d 733 (2024).

7 Spratt v. Crete Carrier Corp., 311 Neb. 262, 971 N.W.2d 335 (2022).

8 Parks v. Hy-Vee, 307 Neb. 927, 951 N.W.2d 504 (2020).
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Prinz’ claim. In order to recover under the Nebraska Workers’ 

Compensation Act, a claimant has the burden of proving by 

the greater weight of the evidence that an accident or occupational disease arising out of and occurring in the course of 

employment proximately caused an injury which resulted in 

disability compensable under the act. 9

In the next sections, we first address Emerald’s arguments 

attacking the foundation for Marshall’s opinion. We then consider the sufficiency of the evidence to support the compensation court’s finding of causation.

(a) Purported Lack of Foundation 

for Marshall’s Opinion

[8-10] Admission of evidence is within the discretion of 

the Workers’ Compensation Court, whose determination in 

this regard will not be reversed upon appeal absent an abuse 

of discretion. 10 Expert testimony should not be received if it 

appears the witness is not in possession of such facts as will 

enable him or her to express a reasonably accurate conclusion, as distinguished from a mere guess or conjecture. 11 It is 

within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether there is 

sufficient foundation for an expert witness to give his or her 

opinion about an issue in question. 12

In the first of three arguments, Emerald contends that 

Marshall’s opinion lacked foundation because he disregarded 

Prinz’ previous history of “breathing problems.” 13 Emerald 

highlights medical records pertaining to a single doctor visit 

in November 2017 and an unrelated doctor visit in January 

2020 that were received in evidence. The appellate record 

9 See Hintz v. Farmers Co-op Assn., 297 Neb. 903, 902 N.W.2d 131 (2017).

10 Fentress v. Westin, Inc., supra note 2.

11 Hynes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 291 Neb. 757, 869 N.W.2d 78 (2015).

12 McGill Restoration v. Lion Place Condo. Assn., 309 Neb. 202, 959 N.W.2d 

251 (2021); Hynes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., supra note 11.

13 Brief for appellant at 13.
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provides no indication that Marshall possessed or considered 

those records in forming his opinion. Nonetheless, this argument lacks merit.

We have previously recognized that there may be instances 

where a medical expert is not aware of the claimant’s entire 

history, yet there is foundation for the expert’s opinion. In one 

case, 14 the claimant asserted she suffered a work-related injury 

and offered into evidence a report from an expert witness 

who opined as to the causation and extent of the claimant’s 

psychological injuries. The employer sought to exclude the 

expert’s opinions for lack of foundation because the claimant 

was allegedly untruthful about her personal and psychological 

history during her interview with the expert.

[11] On appeal in that case, we concluded that the compensation court had not abused its discretion in finding the claimant’s expert’s opinions had sufficient foundation. We reasoned 

that whether the expert possessed or considered the entirety 

of the claimant’s personal or psychological history in forming 

her opinion “ultimately concern[ed] the weight to be given to 

[the expert’s] opinions by a trier of fact, rather than the admissibility of the opinions.” 15 We recalled, “An appellate court is 

not a superexpert and will not lay down categorically which 

factors and principles an expert may or may not consider; such 

matters go to the weight and credibility of the opinion itself 

and not to its admissibility.” 16

[12] Applying that precedent here, we cannot agree with 

Emerald that Marshall’s opinion lacked foundation. Whether 

Marshall possessed or considered the entirety of Prinz’ medical history concerned the weight to be given his opinion by 

the trier of fact, rather than the admissibility of his opinion. 

As we have said previously, the Workers’ Compensation Court 

14 Hynes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., supra note 11.

15 Id. at 768, 869 N.W.2d at 88.

16 Id.
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is the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be given 

medical opinions, even when the health care providers do not 

give live testimony. 17

Turning to its second argument, Emerald highlights a specific finding by the compensation court that Prinz’ N95 mask 

was not sprayed with chemicals before she attempted to wear 

it. Emerald contends that this factual finding “render[ed]” 18

Marshall’s opinion to be without foundation because Marshall 

“clearly was under the impression that a chemical was 

sprayed onto [Prinz’] mask before being placed in the sterilizer machine.” 19

This argument is premised on speculation, and we reject the 

notion that the court’s factual finding somehow affected the 

foundation for Marshall’s opinion. The evidence shows that 

Marshall was one of Prinz’ treating physicians, and his opinion 

was based on his in-person evaluations of Prinz and his review 

of her medical records following the mask incident. Here, 

Marshall was in possession of such facts as would enable him 

to express a reasonably accurate conclusion, as distinguished 

from a mere guess or conjecture. 20

[13] Finally, Emerald argues that Marshall’s opinion lacked 

foundation because he used the word “associated” when opining on the causal connection between the work accident 

and Prinz’ injury. We will consider the level of certainty in 

Marshall’s opinion in the next section, when addressing the 

sufficiency of the evidence to prove causation. But for purposes of resolving Emerald’s foundation argument, we recall 

that an objection to the opinion of an expert based upon the 

lack of certainty in the opinion is an objection based upon 

17 Damme v. Pike Enters., 289 Neb. 620, 856 N.W.2d 422 (2014).

18 Brief for appellant at 14.

19 Id. at 15.

20 See Hynes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., supra note 11.
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relevance 21 and not upon foundation. 22 Seeing no merit to 

Emerald’s foundation arguments, we conclude that the compensation court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 

Marshall’s opinion had sufficient foundation to be admitted in 

evidence to prove causation.

(b) Sufficiency of Evidence

The next question is the sufficiency of Prinz’ evidence to 

prove causation. On this issue, Emerald essentially argues that 

Marshall’s use of the word “associated” was insufficient as a 

matter of law to establish the causal connection between the 

work accident and Prinz’ injury.

Marshall’s opinion is set forth in the background section 

above, but we repeat part of it here for the reader’s convenience:

[Prinz] reported to me that her respiratory issues (now 

known to be asthma) started immediately after putting 

on a reused UV-treated N95 mask. There is no readily 

available test that can show causality between the exposure and her respiratory issues. However, I think there is 

reasonable degree of medical certainty that the two are 

associated as there were no other triggers identified.

[14-16] The law on causation in workers’ compensation 

cases is well settled. If the nature and effect of a claimant’s 

injury are not plainly apparent, then the claimant must provide 

expert medical testimony showing a causal connection between 

the injury and the claimed disability. 23 Although a claimant’s 

medical expert does not have to couch his or her opinion in 

the magic words “reasonable medical certainty” or “reasonable 

21 Richardson v. Children’s Hosp., 280 Neb. 396, 787 N.W.2d 235 (2010); 

Paulsen v. State, 249 Neb. 112, 541 N.W.2d 636 (1996). See, also, Salem 

Grain Co. v. City of Falls City, 302 Neb. 548, 924 N.W.2d 678 (2019) 

(relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make existence 

of any fact that is of consequence to determination of action more probable 

or less probable than it would be without evidence).

22 See, e.g., Paulsen v. State, supra note 21.

23 Hintz v. Farmers Co-op Assn., supra note 9.
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probability,” the opinion must be sufficient to establish the 

crucial causal link between the claimant’s injuries and the 

accident occurring in the course and scope of the claimant’s 

employment. 24 Expert medical testimony based upon “could,” 

“may,” or “possibly” lacks the definiteness required to support 

an award from the Workers’ Compensation Court. 25

[17-19] We have said that the determination of causation is 

ordinarily a matter for the trier of fact. 26 Moreover, it is the role 

of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court as the trier of 

fact to determine which, if any, expert witnesses to believe. 27

Importantly, an appellate court examines the sufficiency of a 

medical expert’s statements from the expert’s entire opinion 

and the record as a whole. 28

Having considered the entire evidentiary record, we cannot 

say that the compensation court was clearly wrong in finding 

that Prinz met her burden to prove causation. The question 

here is posed in a workers’ compensation case, where the act 

should be construed liberally to carry out its spirit and beneficent purpose of providing compensation to employees injured 

on the job. 29 Marshall articulated that his opinion was based 

on a reasonable degree of medical certainty. His opinion of 

the “associat[ion]” was not based on a mere possibility. The 

court, in turn, characterized Marshall’s opinion as “certainly 

more definite than the words ‘could,’ ‘may,’ or ‘possibly.’” 

The court made an explicit finding that Marshall’s opinion was 

“sufficient and persuasive” in light of the timing of the events 

and the objective evidence that something happened to Prinz 

on July 17, 2020. The evidence in the record, including the 

24 Damme v. Pike Enters., supra note 17.

25 Bernhardt v. County of Scotts Bluff, 240 Neb. 423, 482 N.W.2d 262 

(1992); Edmonds v. IBP, inc., 239 Neb. 899, 479 N.W.2d 754 (1992).

26 Hynes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., supra note 11.

27 Hintz v. Farmers Co-op Assn., supra note 9.

28 Damme v. Pike Enters., supra note 17.

29 See Mosher v. Whole Foods Market, supra note 6.
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pulmonologist’s opinion, Prinz’ testimony, and Prinz’ medical records and evaluations, was sufficient to substantiate the 

court’s determination that Marshall’s opinion was credible. 

And that court was the sole judge of the credibility and weight 

to be given Marshall’s opinion. 30

[20] If the record contains evidence to substantiate the 

factual conclusions reached by the trial judge in workers’ 

compensation cases, an appellate court is precluded from 

substituting its view of the facts for that of the compensation 

court. 31 Because the record contains evidence to substantiate 

the compensation court’s finding of causation, we find no clear 

error in this regard.

2. Loss of Earning Capacity

Emerald argues that the compensation court erred in determining the amount of its award for loss of earning capacity. We 

find no clear error.

When determining a loss of earning capacity for an injured 

worker, the four factors to consider under Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 48-121 (Reissue 2021) are the worker’s (1) eligibility to 

procure employment generally, (2) ability to earn wages, (3) 

ability to hold a job obtained, and (4) capacity to perform the 

work in the job in which the worker is engaged. 32

[21] In its award, the compensation court specifically stated 

that it considered the applicable factors. Emerald fails to 

explain how the court’s determination was clearly wrong. And 

while Emerald speculates that Prinz’ earning capacity may have 

been impaired by a lesser amount than that awarded, a workers’ 

compensation award cannot be based on mere possibility or 

speculation. 33 There was sufficient competent evidence in the 

record to warrant the compensation court’s award.

30 See Damme v. Pike Enters., supra note 17.

31 Krause v. Five Star Quality Care, 301 Neb. 612, 919 N.W.2d 514 (2018).

32 See Martinez v. CMR Constr. & Roofing of Texas, 302 Neb. 618, 924 

N.W.2d 326 (2019).

33 Melton v. City of Holdrege, 309 Neb. 385, 960 N.W.2d 298 (2021).
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VI. CONCLUSION

We find no clear error in the compensation court’s determination that Prinz proved an alleged injury was caused by an 

accident arising out of and in the course of her employment. 

Nor can we say that the compensation court’s determination 

regarding loss of earning capacity was clearly wrong. We 

affirm the judgment.

Affirmed.