Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-20547

Summary Calendar

MELVIN ALAN BOWEN

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN; DIANA D KUKUA; GROVER W GOODWELL,

JR; GLENDON E SCHUMACHER; JASON CLIVES

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:06-CV-4056

Before SMITH, STEWART, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Melvin Alan Bowen, Texas prisoner # 1125407, appeals the district court’s

dismissal of his Section 1983 lawsuit for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We AFFIRM.

We review the dismissal of Bowen’s claims de novo. See Harris v.

Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999). A suit may be dismissed for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if, assuming all well-pleaded

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 4, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-20547

2

facts are true, the plaintiff has not stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191,

205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation excluded), cert.

denied, 128 S. Ct. 1230, 1231 (2008).

For the first time on appeal, Bowen makes these allegations: that the

defendants violated the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement

Act; that even though inmates were told at safety meetings not to lift tables in

the dining hall by themselves, he was ordered to lift the tables by himself

because of a shortage of workers; and that one of the defendants ordered him to

lift 100-pound bags of potatoes after he injured his hand. As these claims were

not raised in the district court, these claims are not considered on appeal. See

Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999).

In addition to these improper new claims that we do not analyze, Bowen

argues that the district court erred by dismissing his claim of deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs. The basis of his claim is that the

medical defendants did not provide proper medical care and that he was forced

to perform work that caused and then exacerbated an injury to his hand. Bowen

allegedly injured his hand when lowering a table. This injury is alleged to be

permanent. He speculates that if he had been treated by an orthopedic hand

specialist, his injury would not have become permanent. 

Bowen’s allegations about his medical treatment establish that he was

examined by multiple doctors and physicians’ assistants and was treated for his

hand injury. Bowen himself states that he received seven days off from work,

and was restricted from lifting more than 50 pounds and from repetitive use of

his hands. Bowen also asserts that he was treated with steroids and painkillers.

 Thus, Bowen acknowledges that attention was given to his injury.

Bowen did not allege any facts showing that the medical defendants knew

that he had a serious medical need and refused to treat that need. While Bowen

alleged that one physician’s assistant once refused to see him and that a second
No. 08-20547

3

physician’s assistant refused to give him treatment that a doctor prescribed, in

both instances, Bowen was later treated by a doctor. Bowen does not allege that

he suffered any injury from any delay in treatment. 

At most, Bowen disagreed with the medical treatment he received and

found the medical treatment to be ineffective. This is insufficient to state a

viable claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Domino v.

Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001).

Bowen also claims that his hand injury occurred when he was ordered to

lift heavy tables. However, he did not allege that he had any injury or physical

limitations when he lifted the heavy tables or that the defendants had

knowledge that lifting the tables could cause him injury. While Bowen alleged

that he was required to work in the fields and in the kitchen at the Stringfellow

Unit in violation of his repetitive use of hands restriction, he did not allege that

this work was required by any of the named defendants or that he suffered any

injury from performing the work. 

Bowen’s allegations might support that the defendants negligently

assigned him to perform work that caused or exacerbated his injuries. That kind

of allegation does not state a viable claim for deliberate indifference. See

Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1246 (5th Cir. 1989). 

Bowen has not shown that the district court erred by dismissing his

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims. 

In addition to the medical-related claims, Bowen argues that the district

court erred by dismissing his challenges to his work assignments. He maintains

that the defendants forced him to perform labor in violation of the Thirteenth

Amendment. We reject that argument, because requiring an inmate to perform

labor is not involuntary servitude under the Amendment. Loving v. Johnson,

455 F.3d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 2006). The district court did not err by dismissing

Bowen’s claims challenging his work assignments. See Jackson, 864 F.2d at

1245.
No. 08-20547

4

Next, Bowen argues that the district court erred by dismissing his

challenges to the disciplinary proceedings brought against him. Bowen asserts

that inmates can bring due process challenges to disciplinary proceedings and

parole procedures in Section 1983 actions. He argues that the disciplinary

proceedings brought against him were improper. The district court dismissed

these challenges on the ground that the punishments Bowen received did not

affect a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. As Bowen has not

addressed the district court’s rationale for dismissing these claims, he has

waived the challenge to the dismissal of these claims. See Brinkmann v. Dallas

County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

Bowen’s claims regarding a conspiracy were dismissed. Bowen asserts

that the facts are complex, but he finds it within “reason and understandable

that all parties were part of a conspiracy.” Bowen contends that the district

court misconstrued the factual allegations he set forth, but he does not identify

the allegations that were misconstrued. Bowen does not point us to any facts

that tend to show an agreement between the defendants. He merely argues that

it is reasonable to believe that the defendants were part of a conspiracy.

Accordingly, Bowen’s allegations are insufficient to state a viable conspiracy

claim. See Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1986).

Bowen additionally notes that he raised claims under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA) in the district court, but he does not explain why he was

entitled to relief under the ADA. Because Bowen has failed to provide citations

to the record, authorities, or a coherent argument in support of these claims, he

has waived these claims. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9); United States v. Gourley,

168 F.3d 165, 172 n.11 (5th Cir. 1999); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25

(5th Cir. 1993).

Besides these specific claims on the merits, Bowen also argues that the

district court abused its discretion by refusing to appoint counsel or,

alternatively, appoint a special master. Bowen has filed two motions for
No. 08-20547

5

appointment of appellate counsel. Exceptional circumstances are necessary to

justify the appointment of counsel or a special master in a civil rights action. See

Sierra Club v. Clifford, 257 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir. 2001); Ulmer v. Chancellor,

691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). He has not shown that such circumstances

exist. The district court consequently committed no clear abuse of discretion by

denying his motions for appointment of counsel. See Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82,

86 (5th Cir. 1987). His motions for appointment of counsel on appeal are denied.

See Santana v. Chandler, 961 F.2d 514, 515-16 (5th Cir. 1992). 

While this appeal was pending, Bowen accumulated his second and third

strikes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Bowen v. Stewart, 294 F. App’x 987, 989

(5th Cir. 2008). Bowen is once again warned that he is barred from proceeding

in forma pauperis pursuant to Section 1915 while he is incarcerated or detained

in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

The district court’s dismissal is AFFIRMED. Bowen’s motions for

appointment of counsel are DENIED.