alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

869 

KA 12-01954 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V ORDER

HARLEY D. DUBOIS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

WYOMING COUNTY-ATTICA LEGAL AID BUREAU, WARSAW (LEAH R. NOWOTARSKI OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

DONALD G. O’GEEN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, WARSAW (VINCENT A. HEMMING OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Wyoming County Court (Mark H. Dadd,

J.), rendered July 26, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant, upon

his plea of guilty, of burglary in the second degree (two counts),

grand larceny in the fourth degree (two counts), criminal mischief in

the third degree and endangering the welfare of a child. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Entered: September 27, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
Exhibit 12.2  CONFORMED COPY   I, Juergen von Schwerin, certify that:  1.I have reviewed
this annual report on Form 20-F of SBS Broadcasting S.A.;  2.Based on my
knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3.Based on my
knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for,
the periods presented in this report;  4.The Companys
other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining
disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15 (e)) for the Company and have:  (a)Designed
such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this report is being prepared;  (b)Evaluated
the effectiveness of the Companys disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and  (c)Disclosed
in this report any change in the Companys internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
Companys internal control over financial reporting; and  5.The Companys
other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Companys
auditors and the audit committee of the Companys Board of Directors (or
persons performing the equivalent functions):  (a)All
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the Companys ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and  (b)Any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the Companys internal control over financial
reporting.   Date: May 14, 2004By:
  /s/ Juergen von SchwerinJuergen von SchwerinChief Financial Officer  Certification by J. von
Schwerin, Chief Financial Officer, pursuant to Section 302 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-1996
<CASH>                                       3,303,822
<SECURITIES>                                   129,788
<RECEIVABLES>                               14,561,102
<ALLOWANCES>                                 2,908,083
<INVENTORY>                                 56,387,842
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            77,886,953
<PP&E>                                      36,376,959
<DEPRECIATION>                              13,746,265
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             119,033,551
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       62,062,477
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       556,691
<OTHER-SE>                                  33,572,716
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               119,033,551
<SALES>                                    294,967,168
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           294,967,168
<CGS>                                      232,182,625
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              232,182,625
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            61,990,999
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               835,015
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,100,590
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,142,061)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (754,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,388,061)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.25)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.25)
        

</TABLE>
#### Thomas John Nicholas Mikos NICOLOPULOS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 6-92-123-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Sept. 22, 1992.

William K. Goode, Goode & Goode, Houston, for appellant.

John B. Holmes, Dist. Atty., Houston, for appellee.

Before CORNELIUS, C.J., and BLEIL and GRANT, JJ.

*328OPINION

CORNELIUS, Chief Justice.

Thomas Nicolopulos pleaded no contest to a charge of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Punishment was submitted to the court and was set at sixty years in prison and a fine of $200,000.00. In this appeal, Nicolopulos argues that the trial court erred in allowing, at the punishment phase of the trial, evidence of extraneous acts. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Nicolopulos complains about statements included in a presentence investigation report made by probation officer George Barrett. In the report, Robert Krichke, the chief of police in Hamburg Township, Michigan, was said to have reported that Nicolopulos had repeatedly rented out a house that he did not own. Krichke said he believed Nicolopulos used the rental money to purchase the cocaine found in his possession. At the punishment hearing, defense counsel objected to the admission of the statements from the report. The trial judge overruled the objection, stating, “For whatever it is worth, it will be allowed to stay in the report.”

Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 42.12, § 9 (Vernon Supp.1992) provides, in relevant part, that

> Before the imposition of sentence by the court in a felony case ... the court shall direct a probation officer to report to the court in writing on the circumstances of the offense with which the defendant is charged ... the criminal and social history of the defendant, and any other information relating to the defendant or the offense requested by the court.

Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(d) (Vernon Supp.1992) provides that,

> When the judge assesses the punishment, he may order an investigative report as contemplated in Section 4 of Article 42.12 ... and after considering the report ... he shall forthwith announce his decision ... as to the punishment to be assessed.

Thus, the trial judge is specifically-authorized by statute to consider the contents of the presentence report. That the investigative report contains hearsay information does not preclude its use by the sentencing judge. *Brown v. State,*478 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).1

The information Nicolopulos challenges here related to his criminal and social history and thus was properly considered pursuant to the provisions of Article 37.07, § 3(d).

For the reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed.

1

. *Brown v. State*was decided when Article 37.-07, § 3(d) allowed the use of a presentence report only in cases where the judge was considering whether the defendant should receive probation. The statute was amended effective September 1, 1981, to allow the use of such report in determining punishment. *See Jackson v. State,*680 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Crim.App.1984).
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-6566
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus KENTLEY H. THOMAS, a/k/a Thomas Kentley, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem. Richard C. Erwin, Senior District Judge. (CR-92-268, CA-96-810) Submitted: February 12, 1998 Decided: February 26, 1998 Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Kentley H. Thomas, Appellant Pro Se. Benjamin H. White, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find noreversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. United States v. Thomas , Nos. CR-92-268; CA-96-810 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 14, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Valery Foster, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Marasco, J.), rendered April 4, 1984, convicting him of assault in the second degree, resisting arrest, menacing, disorderly conduct (two counts), harassment, and unlawful possession of marihuana, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

*704Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by reversing the conviction of assault in the second degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to establish physical injury within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00 (9). The complainant police officer sustained several cuts to the nose when the defendant, handcuffed from behind, snapped at the police officer’s face and struck his teeth into the police officer’s nose. The police officer received medical attention shortly thereafter, including a tetanus shot and a prescription for penicillin, and testified that he experienced tenderness and swelling of the injured areas. While the officer stated that the pain was "more than minor pain” and felt it hampered him in his work, the injury nevertheless did not prevent him from working. Further, although the officer testified that he had a headache the next day, which he attributed to the bite, he also added that "it could have been from something else”. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the level of pain reached beyond an objective level so as to constitute "substantial pain” within the purview of the statute *(see, Matter of Philip A.,*49 NY2d 198, 200; *People v Goins,*129 AD2d 733, 734). Moreover, the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion that the injuries caused physical impairment. While the police officer testified that there were lacerations on his nose, and some bleeding in that area, there was no scar, and he did not require stitches. Accordingly, the conviction of assault in the second degree must be reversed *(see,*Penal Law § 120.05 [3]).

We have examined the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Mangano, P. J., Kunzeman, Rubin and Balletta, JJ., concur.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

January 4, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-2661

Primex Family of Companies:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20. 

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request failed to show that the imposition of additional duties on 

the particular product would cause severe economic harm to you or other U.S. interests.

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn
#### KIRKSVILLE MANOR, INC., d/b/a Kirksville Manor Care Center, Respondent, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF MEDICAL SERVICES, Appellant.

No. WD 47807.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Jan. 11, 1994.

*232Richard Beaver, Div. of Legal Services, Jefferson City, for appellant.

Mark G. Arnold, Huseh *&*Eppenberg, St. Louis, Harvey M. Tettlebaum, Barbara Mil-tenberger, Jefferson City, for respondent.

Before HANNA, P.J., and LOWENSTEIN and FENNER, JJ.

LOWENSTEIN, Judge.

The facts and issues presented in this case are the same as those in *State of Missouri, Department of Social Services, Division of Medical Services v. Willow Health Care, Inc. Willow Care Nursing Center,*868 S.W.2d 229, handed down this day. The only difference between the cases is that Kirksville Manor, Inc., d/b/a Kirksville Manor Care Center, had a fiscal year which ended August 31st, 1988, and a rebased rate of $44.10.

The circuit court judgment is reversed and the case remanded with directions to reinstate the Commission’s decision to the extent it affirmed the Department’s rebased rate.

All cQncur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John O’Rama, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Harrington, J.), rendered May 15, 1989, convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol as a felony, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50 (5).

On the instant appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court should have suppressed evidence of his refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test because at the time he was asked to take that test he was deprived of his right to counsel. The defendant did not have a constitutional right to counsel before taking a breathalyzer test *(see, People v Shaw,*72 NY2d 1032). A defendant who has been arrested for driving while intoxicated, but not yet formally charged in court, generally has the right to consult with a lawyer before deciding whether to consent to a sobriety test, if he requests the assistance of counsel and no danger of delay is posed *(see, People v Shaw, supra; People v Gursey,*22 NY2d 224, 229). However, a defendant does not have an absolute right to refuse the test until a lawyer reaches the scene *(People v Gursey, supra).*We find that, under the facts of this case, although the defendant requested the assistance of counsel, he was not entitled to wait for an attorney before deciding to take the test since he indicated to the police that he could not get in touch with his attorney because it was too late at night.

*728The defendant also argues that the so-called *"Allen”*instructions given to the jury were unbalanced, coercive and impermissibly singled out one juror. Such instructions are proper provided they do not (1) urge that a dissenting juror abandon his or her own conviction and join in the opinion of other jurors, (2) attempt to coerce or compel the jury to agree upon a particular verdict, or (3) shame the jury into reaching a verdict *(see, People v Hardy,*109 AD2d 802). In the instant case, the instructions to the jury were free of these errors.

We have examined the defendant’s remaining contentions and have found them to be unpreserved for our review, or without merit, and any errors are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (CPL 470.05 [2]; *People*v *Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230). Thompson, J. P., Sullivan, Harwood and Miller, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 60 (Wednesday, March 29, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16125-16126]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-7666]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Docket No. RP95-209-000]


Southern Natural Gas Co.; Notice of Tariff Filing

March 23, 1995.
    On March 15, 1995, Southern Natural Gas Company (Southern), 
tendered for filing in the above-captioned proceedings a Stipulation 
and Agreement. Take notice that simultaneously with the filing of the 
Stipulation, and filed under the same transmittal letter, Southern 
filed revised tariff sheets which Southern requested to become 
effective March 1 and April 1, 1995. The tariff sheets proposed to be 
effective March 1, 1995, seek to place the settlement rates into effect 
on an interim basis as provided in the Stipulation. The tariff sheets 
proposed to be effective April 1, 1995, seek to implement the Account 
858 and Southern Energy surcharges, also as provided in the 
Stipulation.
    As required by the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, a 
copy of the filing has been served by regular mail on all parties to 
this proceeding, and by overnight mail to all parties which have 
participated actively in the settlement conference, and is being served 
on all of Southern's shippers and interested state commissions.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should 
file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 
20426, in accordance with 18 CFR 385.214 and 385.211 of the 
Commission's Rules and Regulations. All such motions or protests should 
be filed on or before March 30, 1995. Protests will be considered by 
the Commission in determining the appropriate action to be taken, but 
will not serve to make protestants parties to the proceeding. Any 
person wishing to become a party must file a motion to intervene. 
Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and are available 
for public inspection in the public reference room.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.

Attachment A

I. Proposed Tariff Sheets To Be Effective March 1, 1995

Southern Natural Gas Company, FERC Gas Tariff

Seventh Revised Volume No. 1:

Original Sheet Nos. 14a, 15a, 16a, 17a, 18a, 19a, 20a, 21a, 53b
First Revised Sheet Nos. 38, 40, 50, 51, 52, 71, 79, 85
Second Revised Sheet Nos. 37, 49, 60, 61, 62, 72, 80, 86, 195 
[[Page 16126]] 
Third Revised Sheet No. 42
Fourth Revised Sheet Nos. 41, 53

First Revised Volume No. 2A:

Twentieth Revised Sheet No. 94

II. Proposed Tariff Sheets To Be Effective April 1, 1995

Southern Natural Gas Company, FERC Gas Tariff

Seventh Revised Volume No. 1:

First Revised Sheet No. 15a
First Revised Sheet No. 17a
Original Sheet Nos. 34B-D
Original Sheet No. 41a
Original Sheet No. 53a

[FR Doc. 95-7666 Filed 3-28-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
Exhibit
      32.2








**Certification
      of Acting Co-CFOs Pursuant to**


**18
      U.S.C. Section 1350,**


**as
      Adopted Pursuant to**


**Section
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A of GAMCO Investors, Inc.
      (the “Company”) for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2007 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Diane
      M.
      LaPointe and Kieran Caterina, as Acting Co-Chief Financial Officers of the
      Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
§ 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of their
      knowledge:





(1)           The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/
                Diane M. LaPointe
            /s/
                Kieran CaterinaName:
                Diane M. LaPointe
            Name:
                Kieran CaterinaTitle:   Acting
                Co-Chief Financial Officer
            Title:   Acting
                Co-Chief Financial OfficerDate:   November
                9, 2007
            Date:   November
                9, 2007





This
      certification accompanies the Report pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
      of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act
      of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of §18 of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 51 (Thursday, March 16, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 14305]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-6543]



=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION


Special Emphasis Panel in Mathematical Sciences; Notice Of 
Meeting

    In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-
463, as amended), the National Science Foundation announces the 
following meeting:

    Name: Special Emphasis Panel in Mathematical Sciences (1204).
    Date and Time: April 3-4, 1995; 8:30 a.m., til 5:00 p.m.
    Place: National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Rm 
1020, Arlington, VA 22230.
    Type of Meeting: Closed.
    Contact Person: Dr. Joe Jenkins, National Science Foundation, 
4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230 Telephone: (703) 306-
1870.
    Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and recommendations 
concerning proposals submitted to National Science Foundation for 
financial support.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate proposals for the Classical 
Analysis Program as part of the selection process for awards.
    Reason for Closing: The proposals being reviewed include 
information of a proprietary or confidential nature, including 
technical information; financial data, such as salaries; and 
personal information concerning individuals associated with the 
proposals. These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552b(c), (4) and 
(6) of the government in the Sunshine Act.

    Dated: March 13, 1995.
M. Rebecca Winkler,
Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 95-6543 Filed 3-15-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 75555-01-M