UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-4536

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DAVID ELIJAH SMITH, a/k/a Miami Dave,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Wilmington. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (7:16-cr-00120-D-11)

Submitted: May 31, 2019 Decided: June 6, 2019

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David Elijah Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

David Elijah Smith appeals his convictions and 120-month sentence imposed 

following his guilty plea to transfer of a firearm to a prohibited person, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(d) (2012), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). On appeal, Smith challenges the factual basis supporting 

his guilty plea and the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. Finding no reversible 

error, we affirm.

“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the [district] court must determine that 

there is a factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). “The district court 

possesses wide discretion in finding a factual basis, and it need only be subjectively 

satisfied that there is a sufficient factual basis for a conclusion that the defendant 

committed all of the elements of the offense.” United States v. Stitz, 877 F.3d 533, 536 

(4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1572 (2018). 

In addition, “the district court may conclude that a factual basis exists from anything that 

appears on the record.” United States v. Ketchum, 550 F.3d 363, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Because Smith did not move to withdraw his guilty 

plea or otherwise preserve any error in the plea proceedings, we review the challenge to

the plea for plain error. United States v. Lockhart, 917 F.3d 259, 262 (4th Cir. 2019). 

In its factual basis proffer, the Government alleged that Smith, a convicted felon, 

unlawfully possessed a firearm, which he then sold to his step-grandson, another known 

felon. And during the plea colloquy, Smith acknowledged both possessing and 

transferring the firearm at issue—admissions that “carry a strong presumption of verity.” 
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United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 221 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Thus, we discern no plain error in the district court’s finding that a factual basis 

supported Smith’s guilty plea.

Turning to the sentencing challenges, we review for procedural reasonableness, 

applying a deferential abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 

517 (4th Cir. 2017). In addition, when assessing issues relating to the Sentencing 

Guidelines, “we review questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error.” 

United States v. Hawley, 919 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2019). 

First, Smith contests the district court’s application of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6) (2016), which requires a four-level enhancement if the defendant 

“possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to 

believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.” 

Based on testimony provided at the sentencing hearing, the district court determined that 

Smith knew that his step-grandson held a leadership role in a violent gang. Because 

Smith had reason to believe that his step-grandson would use the firearm for felonious 

purposes, we agree that this evidence was sufficient to sustain the § 2K2.1(b)(6) 

enhancement.

Next, Smith complains that, at sentencing, the district court prevented him from 

orally objecting to various allegations in the presentence report. Even assuming the court 

procedurally erred, our review of the record and the myriad objections Smith raises in his 

informal brief confirms that such error was harmless. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); United 

States v. Martinovich, 810 F.3d 232, 242 (4th Cir. 2016). Indeed, none of Smith’s minor 
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quibbles with the presentence report undermines the district court’s thorough sentencing 

explanation, which justified Smith’s sentence based on the seriousness of the offenses, 

Smith’s extensive criminal history, and the need to protect the public from Smith’s 

criminal acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A), (C) (2012). Thus, we conclude that 

any procedural error did not result in a longer sentence. Martinovich, 810 F.3d at 243.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED