NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA
, Appellee
,

v.

RICHAR D FELIX BARRIGA, II
, Appellant

.

N o . 1 CA

- CR 14

- 0348

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. C R2009

- 150342

- 001 The Honorable M. Scott McCoy
, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General’s Office , Phoenix By Terry M. Crist, III Counsel for Appellee

DeBrigida Law Offices, P

. L

. L

. C

. , Glendale By Ronald M. DeBrigida, Jr. C ounsel for AppellantSTATE v. BARRIGA Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

W I N T H R O P
, Judge:

¶1 Richard Felix Barriga, II (“Appellant”) appeals his conviction f or intentional or knowing child abu se under circumstances other than those likely to produce death or serious injury

. Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict 1 because the State presented insufficient evidence that he acted “intentionally or knowingly .” For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2

¶2 In October 2010, a grand jury issued an indict ment , charging Appellant with intentionally or knowingly causing his infant son, C.B., to suffer physical injury or abus e under circumstances other than those likely to produce death or serious physical injury, a class four felony and domestic violence offense

. See A riz

. R ev

. S tat

. (“A.R.S.”) §§ 13

- 3601,

- 3623(B)(1 )

. 3 The case proceeded to trial, and at the conclusion of the State’s case

- in

- chief, Appellant moved for a directed verdict

. T he trial court denied the motion

. F ollowing a seven

- day bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty and placed Appellant on probati on for a term of three years

. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12

- 120.21(A)(1), 13

- 4031, and 13

- 4033(A).

ANALYSIS

¶3 We review de novo the den ial of a Rule 20 motion. State v. Parker , 2 31 Ariz. 391, 407, ¶ 69, 296 P.3d 54, 70 (2013)

. A judgment of

1 See Ariz. R. Crim. P. (“Rule”) 20 (“Judgment of Acquittal”).

2 In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we view the facts and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. See State v. Girdler, 138 Ariz. 482, 4 88, 675 P.2d 1301, 1307 (1983).

3 We cite the current version of the statute s because no revisions material to our decision have occurred since the date of the offense.STATE v. BARRIGA Decision of the Court

3 acquittal is appropriate only when there is no substantial evidence to support the conviction. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a); State v. Scott , 1 77 Ariz. 131, 138, 865 P.2d 792, 799 (1993). Evidence is substantial if it could be accept ed by any rat ional trier of fact as sufficient to suppor t the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. West , 2 26 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 16, 250 P.3d 1188, 1191 (2011) (citations omitted)

. ¶4 To convict Appellant of child abuse under A.R.S. § 13

- 3623 (B) (1), the State was required to prove that, (1) under circumstances other than those likely to produce death or serious physical injury, (2) Appellant intentionally or knowingly (3) caused C.B. to suffer physical injury or abuse. Appellant concedes the State met its burden with regard to parts (1) and (3)
, but argues the S tate’s evidenc e as to part (2) is

“ unsubstantial” because the State presented “no direct evidence that [App ellant] inflicted the injury.”

¶5 Appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in relying on circumstantial evidence is unavailing. “ Both direct and circumstantial evidence should be considered in determining whether substantial evidence supports a conviction. ” West , 2 26 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 16, 250 P.3d at 1191 (citation omitted). Th e mere existence of plausible alternatives is insufficient to overturn a trier of fact ’ s findings. See generally Parker , 2 31 Ariz. at 407

- 08
, ¶¶ 70

- 73, 29 6 P.3d at 70

- 71 ; West
, 226 Ariz. at 563, ¶ 18, 250 P.3d at 1192. If reasonable minds could disagree as to the inferences that could be drawn from the facts, a directed verdict of acquittal is improper. West , 2 26 Ariz. at 563, ¶ 18, 250 P.3d at 1192 (citations omitted).

¶6 At trial, the State presented the testimony of se veral witnesses , including C.B.’s treating medical providers, indicating the injuries sustained by C.B. were non

- accidental. T he State also presented a medical professional who had evaluated C.B. and testified to a degre e of medical certainty that C.B.’s injuries were the result of acute “ abusive
trauma. ” C.B.’s mother and half

- sibling each testified that Appellant had care and custody of C.B. during the time the injur ies likely occurred

- – the evening when C.B. displayed intense crying, chest popping, and vomiting

. In his defense, Appellant argued the testimony provided was inconclusive as to the time the actual injuries occurred , and other potential perpetrators had motive and opportuni ty to inflict C.B.’s injuries. The court rejected Appellant’s defense. See State v. Clemons , 1 10 Ariz. 555, 556

- 57, 521 P.2d 987, 988

- 89 (1974) (recognizing it is the trier of fact’s exclusive role to weigh the credibility of testimony). V iewing the evi dence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we conclude the State presented substantial evidence to survive a motion for a directed verdict.STATE v. BARRIGA Decision of the Court

4 CONCLUSION

¶7 We affirm Appellant’s conviction

.