### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 20

- 00552

- CR

The State of Texas , Appellant

v.
Samantha Leann Lamb , Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF HAYS COUNTY NO. 19

- 0974CR

- 2 , THE HONORABLE CHRIS JOHNSON , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Raising two issues, t he Sta te of Texas appeals from the trial court ’ s order g ran ting appell ee Samantha Leann Lamb ’ s motion to sup press evidence. Because we conclude tha t the
trial court did not abus e its d iscretion i n g ranting the motion , we affirm the order

.

B A CKGROUND

Ar ound midnight o n November 15, 2018, Lamb was sitting in the driver ’ s seat of
her car with her headlights off in the driveway of a parking lot of a CVS store t hat was closed for
business . Her car was parked parallel to the cu rb and facing in the dire ction of a traffic stop that

was in progress across a multiple lan e road. The traffic stop involved a d riving wh ile intoxicated (DWI) investigation of L amb ’ s friend

. After driving their pa trol car t o th e in

- progress traffic stop and sp eaki ng wit h
Officer Tureaud w ho was involved in that stop , Officer s Morenz and Duckworth drove their2 pa trol car without activating its emergency l ights acr oss the roa d to where Lamb ’ s car was parked . The offic ers parke d th ei r patr ol car wit h its hea dlights and ov erhead lights on close to
and facing Lamb ’ s car

. After t he officers got out of their car , Offi cer Duckworth approached on
the driver ’ s side , and Officer Mor enz approached on the pa ssenger ’ s side

. B ot h off icers shi ned
their fla shlights on Lamb

. As they approached , Officer Duckworth asked Lamb to disp lay her
hands. Shortly a fter that , he a sk ed for her identification and keys and for her to exit her car.
Neither off icer told Lamb that she was free t o lea ve

. As a r esult of this encounter , Lamb was charg e d with DWI with a n alc ohol con centration level over 0 .15

. Lamb filed a m otion to suppress the evidence that was obtained during this
encounter, asserti ng that she had bee n “ involunt arily sei zed , arre sted , res trai ne d , detained, and
taken into custo dy b y the officer ( s ) , ” “ who a t the moment of such se izure, did n ot have reasonable suspicion no r probabl e cause authorizing such seiz ure of her person. ” The t wo
witnesses at the hearin g on the motion to suppress were Of fic er s Morenz and Duckworth, and
the ex hibits included video recordings from Officer Duckworth ’ s b od y cam era and
Of ficer Tureaud ’ s body and in

- car dash cam era s

. Office r Morenz testified that sitting in a parked ve hicle in a parking lot with the

v ehi cle ’ s he adlights o ff was not a traff ic o ffen s e and that it was not a crime to watch a traffic
stop but that Lamb ’ s car w as suspicious be cause of “ [ t ] he time of night and combination of

. . . not having headlights on an d watching a traff ic stop

. ” Sh e testi fied t ha t her “ report n otes that the vehicle was driving aroun d without headlights on ” in the parking lot and that the info rmation
abo ut a “ suspicious vehicle in the CVS pa rking lot ” wa s rep orte d by “ the officers init iating the

fir st tr affic sto p

. ” S he di d not kn ow when she was notified about this vehicle or “ e xactl y what
time that occurred , ” and she “ [ could not ] say for certai n ” that Lamb ’ s car was “ the exact vehic le3 that the other officers identified

. ” She a lso t estified that she turned her microph o ne o ff on he r body ca m era when they wer e speaking with Office r Tureaud and faile d to turn it back on

. 1

Officer Duckworth testified that all that he could recall was that after they arrived at the in

progress traffic stop , the offic er invo lved in that sto p “ ca lled o ut something abo ut another
vehicle ” that was “ [j]us t driving an d it was no w parked ac ross the street in the CVS parking lot

. ”
When asked about the positioning o f that car, he testified that the “ vehicle was sitting with i ts lights o ff in the dr ivewa y .
. . to CVS fa c ing the traffic stop. ” Nei ther office r testified that they
observed Lamb operating her car without its headlights , n or could they remember be ing told that
her car was being operat ed with out headlights

. The video recording s are unclear wh ethe r Lam b drove her car with her headlights off in the CVS parking lot , but they show the officers crossing the road in their pa trol car and parking close to and facing Lamb ’ s parked car , a nd Officers Morenz and Duckworth exiting the ir
vehicle and appr oach in g L amb ’ s car on foot

. In th e video recording from Officer Duckworth ’ s
bod y cam era , Lamb holds her hands up as th e offic er s app roach her car from both sides with
their f la shlights and the pa trol car ’ s head light s a nd overhea d lights shining on her and her ca r

. Officer Duckworth quest ion ed her about “ what [ she] was doing over here , ” and s he explain ed
that she was trying to fol low her f riend home and th ought he wa s in trouble

. She answered

“ Y es, ” when O fficer Duckworth a sked her if she was comi ng from “ where he was

. ”
Officer Duc kworth the n ask ed for her ide ntification and keys and to s tep out of her car

. 2

1 Officer Mo renz testified , “ It ’ s policy whene ver w e break off to discuss somet hing on scene, we mute our body cameras

. ”

2 The C o urt limited its consideration of the video reco rding from Officer Duckworth ’ s body camera to be fo re Lamb exits her car

.4 Follo wing the hearing , the tr ial cour t signed the order granti ng Lamb ’s mot io n to

suppress evidence and made findings of fact and a conclusion of law that t he court ’ s decision

to g rant the motion was “ in the interest of justice in a ccordance with the law

. ” This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In two issues, the State a rgues that the trial court abused its discretion w hen it granted Lamb ’ s motion to suppress ev id ence

.

Standard of Review
We review a trial c ourt ’ s ruling on a mot ion to suppress evidence for an abuse of
discretion

. State v . Story , 445 S.W.3d 729, 7 3 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing State v. Dixon , 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)) . We vi ew the recor d in the light most fav orable

to th e trial court ’ s deter mination, and “ the judgment will be reversed only if it is ar bitrary, unreasonable, or ‘ outside the zone of reasonable disagre ement. ’ ” Id. (quoting Dixon , 206 S.W.3d at 590); see State v. Garcia

- Can tu , 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In ge ne ral , we apply a bifur cated standard of review

. State v. Le, 463 S.W.3d 872 , 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Gu zman v. State , 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App.

199 7)) ; A mador v. Stat e , 22 1 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Cr im. App. 2007) (citing Ford v. State , 158 S.W.3d 4 88, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005))

. We g ive “ almost total deferenc e to a tria l court ’ s
determination of t he historical facts that the record supports especial ly when the trial c ou rt ’ s fact findings are based on an evaluation of credibi lity and demeanor. ” Amador , 221 S.W.3d at 673 (quoting Guzma n , 955 S.W.2d at 89 ). We also ap ply t his “ deferential standard o f review ” to “ a
trial court ’ s determinati on of histor ical fa cts when tha t determination is based on a videotape5 recording admitted into evidence at a suppression hearing. ” Id. (quoting Mo nta nez v. State , 195 S.W.3d 1 01, 109 (Te x. Crim. App. 2006)). Moreo ver , w e “ afford t he same level of
deferen ce to a tria l court ’ s ru lin g on ‘ application of law to fact questions, ’ or ‘ mixed questio ns of law and fact, ’ if the resolution of those questions tur ns on an evaluation of cre dibility an d
demeanor. ” Id. (quoting M ontanez , 195 S.W. 3d at 10 7 )

. We “ review d e novo ‘ mix ed questions
of law a nd fact ’ that do not depend upon credibility and demeano r. ” I d

.

When did the encounter between the officers and Lam b become a dete ntion ?
In its firs t issue, the State argues th at the trial court abused its discretion when it
fo un d that a d etention occ u r red w hen Offi cers Morenz and Duckworth simultaneously approached Lamb “ to in quire wh at [she was] doing in a closed busines s ’ s parking lot at midnight

. ” The State contends that at that po int , the encounter between the officers an d L amb

was conse nsual and n ot a detention

. B ecause there is a “ wide diversit y of police

- citizen interaction, not every

encounter between the two is subject to Fourth Amendmen t scrutiny. ” Garcia

- Can tu , 253 S.W.3d at 24 2. “ It i s only when an officer , ‘ by means of physical force o r show of authority, has in some way restrained the liber ty of a citizen, ’ will courts conclude that a Fourth

Ame ndment ‘ seizure ’ has occurred. ” Id. (quoting Terry v. O hio , 3 92 U.S. 1, 19 n .16 (1 968) )

.

“ Such a seizure occu rs when , ‘ taking into account a l l of the circumstances s urrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have ‘ comm un icated to a reasonable person that he was not

at liberty to ignore the police presence a nd go about his busine ss. ’ ” Id. (quoting Kaupp v. Texas , 538 U.S. 626, 629 (200 3) ) ; see Florida v. Bosti ck , 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (explaining that in
order to de term i n e whether particular encounter c onstitute s seizure , court “ must consider all of6 the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whet her the police conduct w ou ld
have comm uni cated to a r easonable per son that the person was not free to decline the officers ’ requests or otherwise t ermina te the encounter ” ) ; State v . Woodard , 3 41 S.W.3 d 404 , 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 201 1 ) ( ex plaining that c ourt s consider totality of c i r cumstances of c iti zen
- po li c e

encount er “ to det ermine whe ther a reasonable pe rson in the defendant ’ s sho es wo uld have felt free to ignore the request or terminat e the interaction ” )

. In contrast to a detention , a co nsensual encou nter “ takes place when an o fficer

approac hes a citizen in a public place to ask questions, and the cit izen is willing to listen and voluntarily ans wer. ” Cr ain v. State , 315 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Tex. Crim. App . 2010 )

. “ Determining
whether specific fa cts am ount t o a d etention under the Fo urth Amendment or a conse nsual police

- citizen encounter ‘ is subject to de n ovo review because that is an is sue of law

— th e applicatio n o f le gal pri nciples to a specific set of fa cts. ’ ” State v . Woodard , 314 S.W.3 d 86 , 93 (Tex. Ap p.

— For t Worth 2010) (q uot in g Garcia

- Can tu , 253 S.W.3d at 241 ) , aff ’ d , 341 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 201 1 )

. “ N o bright

- line rule gover ns when a c onse nsu al encounter becomes a

se izure ” but generally an encounter is no longer consensual “ when an officer th rough fo rce or a showing of authority rest rains a citizen ’ s liber t y
. ” Woodard , 3 41 S.W.3 d at 411

. Circumstances that may support a determination that a police

- citizen e ncounter was a s ei zure “ in clu d e the threatening presence of s everal officers, the offi ce r ’ s display of a weapon , physical t ouch ing of
the citizen by the officer , the o fficer ’ s words or to ne of vo ice indicating that compliance with th e
officer ’ s request s mi ght be compelled , or flashing lights or blocking a suspect ’ s vehic le

. ”
Woodard , 314 S .W.3 d at 94 (citin g Unite d Sta tes v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ) ; see
Cr ain , 315 S.W.3d at 49

– 50 (e xplaining that “ [w] hen the court is co nducting its determinat ion of
whether the interaction constituted an encounter or a detentio n, the court focu ses on wh ether the7 office r conveyed a message th at compliance with the officer ’ s request was required ” and li sting examples of circumstances that m ight support that seizure occurred ).

T he State ar gues that a dete ntion did not occur when the officer s appr oached
Lamb , con tending t ha t her car “ was not ‘ b oxe d

- in ’ a nd unable to leave ” and characteriz ing “ the

man euver ” that Lamb w ould have need ed to make to leave as “ at most , an in conv en i e n ce

. ” The

St ate a lso argues that the officers did not seize her b y walki ng up to her parked car , th at
O ff icer Duckworth ’ s “ simple request ” fo r Lamb to show her ha nds “ was n ot an exertion of
government authority sufficient to suggest a se izure , ” and that no othe r commo n circums ta nces
existed to support a finding that a dete ntio n occurred. As sup port, t h e State re lies on case
law that presumes citizens know their rights

. See , e.g. , Wa de v. State , 422 S .W.3d 661,

667 n. 19 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2013) (stating that “ t h e ‘ re asonable person ’ is assumed to have

cons iderable fortitude ” )

. Rel evant to this issue, th e trial court ’ s find ings of fact included :

5. In their marked patrol unit, Officers Morenz and Duckworth pul led directly in fro nt of the vehic le occupied by Samantha La m b.
6. Officers Morenz and Duckworth approached the driver an d passenger sides, respec ti vely, of the vehicle occupied by Samantha La mb.
7. Officer Duckworth verball y commanded Samant ha Lamb to dis pla y her hands to Officers Morenz and Duckworth

. 8. Officers Morenz and Duckworth then detained and b egan question ing Sam antha Lamb.

. . . . 34. C on trary to Officer Morenz ’ test imony, the v id eos clearly sh ow that Officers Morenz and Duckworth did not have to p ark directly in f ront of Lamb ’ s vehicle , that there was more th an ample s pace to the sid e of Lamb ’ s v ehicle for said officers to par k.8 35. The o fficers ’ exhibition of auth ority, including parking direct ly in front of Lamb ’s vehicle leaving her no reasonabl e means of egress, approac hing both sides of Lamb ’ s vehicle, b o th officers clo the d in distinctive police uniforms wit h service weapons visi ble , and Officer Duckwor th commanding Lamb to display her hands to officers, would lead a reasonable person to feel t hey were not free to leave.

These findings are supported by Offic er Duckw orth ’ s testimony and the v ideo recording s

. The video recordings sh ow that the o fficers were in uniform ; they par ked the p atrol

c ar close to and directly facing the front of Lamb ’ s car , which was parked par allel to the c u rb ;
and although it i s not entirely clear from the recordings , Officer Morenz ’ s service weapon

appe ars t o be visible

. 3 Further , although O ff icer Moren z testified that she “ truly did n ot have

any other place to go ” a nd that it was “ not practical ” “ to try to drive behind [Lamb ’ s] vehicle , ”
the reco rding s show that the officers could have parked in a differ e nt location in the parking lot , inclu ding on the other side of the drive way from where Lamb ’ s car was parked

. The video recording from Offic er Du ckworth ’ s body camera also shows t he patrol

car ’ s head l ights and overhead lights s hining on Lamb ’ s car , and t he offi cer s shining t heir

f lashlights on Lamb as they app roached

. See Crain , 3 15 S.W.3d at 53 ( con sidering evid ence t hat

pa trol car ’ s overhea d l ights were pointed in appell ant ’ s dir ection when officer “ de ma n ded that h e

‘ come ove r here and talk to me ’ ” in de ter mination that appellant was illegally detai ned)

. And the

re cording shows Lamb rais in g her ope n hands as th e officers approa c h ed

. In his testimony describing the video recordin g , Offi cer Duckworth testified that Lamb “ has h er hands visible and

open ” be cause “ [ p]robably ” he “ a s ke d her to, because just bef ore this yo u ca n see her ha nds dipped to whe re [he could] no longer see them ” and so he “ believe [ d ] ” he “ told her to s how her

3 The Sta te conc edes that the officers “ were probably w ea ring hol stered we apons as p art of their n ormal uniform w hen they approached [ Lamb ’ s] vehicle ” but ar gues that “ t he record do es not so evi nce. ”9 hands. ” He also answered , “ Yes, ” when asked if that was “ the standard for an y kind of
interacti on [he had] with anybody that [he was] stopp ing. ”

G ive n t h i s evid ence , the trial court r easonably found that th e offic ers ’ conduct as they approached Lamb “ would lead a reasonable person to feel they were not free to leave

. ” See
id. ; Garcia

- Can tu , 253 S.W.3d at 24 2 (explaining that s eizure has occur red when of ficer , by show of authority, has in som e way restrained li ber ty of citizen ). T hus, we conclude that the record supports the trial court ’ s findin gs c oncerning when the detention b egan

. We overrule t he

State ’ s f irst issue. 4

Did the officers have r easonable suspicion to detain app ellee? In its second issue, the State ar gues that th e t ria l court abused its discretion when
it found that the “ offi c ers lacked reasonable suspi cion in c ontradic tion to both un controver ted testimony and indisput able visual ev id ence , which shows a vehicl e o peratin g at night without

h eadlights, at mi dnight, in the parking lot of a clo se d business , specific ally positioning its elf
twice to wa tch an ongoing c ri minal investigation fro m close distance. ”

Because Lamb was detained with out a warrant , it was th e S ta te ’ s burden to

es tablish reasonable suspicion

. S ee Deri chsweiler v. State , 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim.

A pp. 2 01 1) ( “ Under the Fourth Amendment, a wa rr antless detention of the person that amounts
to less than a full

- blown custodial arrest must b e justified by a reasonable susp icion. ” ) ; Ford ,

4 As support for its positi on that a detention did not occur when the of fice r s were approa ching Lamb , the S tat e r elies on Matthews v. State , 431 S.W.3d 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) , but that case was no t about when a de tention began but whether the detention was supported by reasonable grounds at all

. T hat case concerned whethe r th e officers had reasonable suspicio n to detain the appellant who was sitting in the driver ’ s seat of a park ed van late at night based on an anonymou s tip that he “ was selling ‘ crack ’ out of a white van pa rked in front of the store ” in a “ high

- crime area , kn own for drug and weapons arrests

. ” Id

. at 600 , 604

– 05.10 158 S.W.3d at 4 92 (stating that when defendant establishes that seizure o cc ur red without warrant, burden shift s to State to esta blish that seizure was reasonable )

. “ A police o fficer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, ar ticulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him re as onably to conclude that the per so n de tained i s, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activ ity. ” Derichsweiler , 348 S.W.3d a t 914. This
standard “ l ooks t o the totality of the circumsta nces ” and “ the cumulative information known to
the co opera ti ng officers at the time of the st op , ” a sks “ whe ther there was an objectively justifiable basis for th e detention, ” and “ disregards the actual subjective intent of th e arresting
officer. ” Id

. “ [T ]he relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is in no cent or criminal,
but the degree of s uspicion that attaches to particular non
- criminal acts. ” Id

. (q uoting Woods

v. State , 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997 )).
Relev ant to this issue, t h e trial court ’ s findings of fact included :

9. Officer Mor en z described the vehicle occupied b y S ama ntha Lamb as suspicious due to the time of night, driving wit hout headlights on, and watching a traffic stop.
10. Officer Mor enz agreed that sitting in a par ked vehicle in a parking lot without headlights illumina t ed i s no t a traffic offense.

. . . . 12

. Off icer Morenz admit ted that she cannot say with any certainty that the vehicle occupied by Samanth a Lamb was the same v ehicle identified by other officers.
13. Officer Morenz has no recollection of the substance of he r conversation with Officer Tureau d.
14. Officer Morenz had no recolle ction when she saw Lamb ’ s vehicle with or without headlights.
1 5. Officer Morenz had no recoll ection of when she was told Lamb ’ s vehicle was being operated without headlig hts.11 16. Off icer Morenz had no recollection of wh o may have told her Lamb ’ s vehicle was be ing operated wit hout headlights

. 17. Officer Duckworth never testified who may ha ve said that Lamb ’ s vehicle was being ope rated without hea dlights.
18. Of ficer Duckworth never te stif ied when he may have been told th at Lam b ’ s vehicle was being operated without headlights.
19. Officer Duckworth thinks that his conver s ation with Offi cer Tureaud was j ust a brief update about the (unrelated) traffic stop.
20. Offi cer Duckworth did no t rem em ber if he and Officer More nz we re cal led to the scene of the unrelated traffic stop or just happened across it.
21. Officer Duckworth could remember only t hat a different off icer made the (unrel ated) traffic stop and then called out some thing about a noth er v ehicle.
22. All that Officer Du ckwo rth could recall about the other vehicle (Lamb ’ s vehicle) was that it was j ust driving and now i t was park ed across the stre et in the CVS p arking lot.
23. Of ficer Duckworth had no recol lection of bein g told by any one that L amb ’ s vehicle wa s being ope ra ted without headlights.
24. Officer Duckworth remembers t he moment in time when he and Officer Moren z ma de contact with Officer Tureaud, but he does not remember any details of that c onvers ation.
25

. At the moment in time when Off icer Tureaud directed hi s atte ntion to Lamb ’ s ve hicle, Officer Du ckworth does not remember if the headlights in Lamb ’ s vehicle were illu minated.
26. Neith er Officer Morenz nor Officer Duc kwor th wer e able to rem ember if they w e re act ually told by a ny officer(s) that Lamb ’ s vehicle w as o perated wit hout headlights.
27

. Neither Officer Morenz nor Officer Duckwor th witnessed Lamb ’ s ve hicle being operated without he adlight s.

. . . . 29. The vide os show w hat was stipulated by both parties to be Lamb ’ s veh ic le parking with headlights illu mi nated.
30. The videos show what was s tipulated by both parties to be Lamb ’ s veh icle headligh ts cease t o illuminate only when Lam b ’ s vehicle was not be ing operated.12 31. The videos sho w so me other vehicle , possibly Lam b ’ s v ehicle, move through the parking l o t with requi red lights illuminated.
32. On exhi bit 4, Offi cer Tureaud ’ s body cam, at 13:52, Lamb ’ s veh icle can be seen pu lling u p in the parkin g lot with he adlight s illuminated.
33. The headlights in Lamb ’ s vehicl e we re t urne d of f after Lamb ’ s vehicle
ca me to a stop i n the position where it was ap proached from the front by Officer s Morenz and Duckworth.

The State expressly challe nges findings 29 to 33 “ as internal ly inconsistent and

contra dicted by undisputed vide o e v id e nce ” “ re g arding whether headlight s were turned o n or off during portions of the admitted exhibits. ” The State argues that the video reco rding is

“ indisputable vis u al evidence ” that Lamb “ entered th e parking lot of a close d business around midnight, ma neuv ered her vehicle to observe a n on go ing criminal investigation, turned off her headlights w hi l e maneuvering her vehicle, left her pa rked p osition when noticed by of ficers , and
the n returned, a gain un lit , to a position where she could observe the ongoing inv estigati on. ” See

State v. Duran , 3 96 S.W.3d 56 3, 570

– 71 ( Tex. Crim. App. 201 3) (ex plaining that appell ate

courts may revi ew de novo “ ind isputable visual evidence ” contained in video tape but that

ap pellate courts defer t o trial court ’ s factual findings on whether witness actu ally saw what w as depi cted on videotape ) ; Miller v . State , 393 S.W.3d 255, 263 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ( ex plaining
tha t trial court ’ s findings m ay be disregarded as unsupp orted b y record when the y are
incon sistent with “ indis putable vi su al e vid ence ” )

. T he State als o re li es on O f ficer Morenz ’ s testimony th a t officers in the unrelat ed tr affic stop had called out a susp icious vehicle in the C V S parking lot a nd t hat Lamb ’s car was suspicious because it was midnight, the vehicle ’ s hea dlig hts

were not on, and the driver was w at ching the traffic s top. 5

5 At tr ial, Officer Morenz testified that operatin g a ve hicle wit hout headlights aft er da r k i s a criminal offense , but the State acknowledges in i ts briefing that the applicable pr ov is i on of13 Based on its view of the evidence , t he St ate contends that Lamb ’ s “ driving
behavi or , ” driving wi thout headlights on ; the time of the encounter , m i d night ; and the location of
the en counter , the parking lot of a cl osed business a cr oss t he street fro m “ an ong oing criminal investigation ” es tablis h reaso nable suspicion

— that the officers had viewed “ unusua l ac tivity, ”
that Lamb was connected to this a ctivity, and that the “ unusu al act ivity was re l ated to crime , ” the ong oing criminal in vestigation acr oss the street

. But Officer s Duckworth and Morenz did not
testif y that they wi tnessed Lamb o perating her ca r without its headlights , and neither

cou ld rem ember be ing told that Lamb ’ s car was being ope rat e d with out headlights

. Further,
Of fi cer Morenz testified that it was not a traffic offense to sit in a parked vehicle wit hout the headlights on i n a closed busi ness ’ s parking lot and that it was not a crime to watch a traffic stop

. Fu rt her, b ased on o ur r eview of the admitted v ideo record in gs, we ca nnot concl ude that they provide “ indisp utable vis ual evidence ” that would support di s regarding the t rial court ’ s
ch allenged fi n dings. Although the trial court i ncorrectly refe rs to Officer Ture aud ’ s body

c a mera recording as Exhibit 4, the trial c ourt i dentifie d the specific tim e on the video where the
court found th at Lamb ’ s car was driving w ith he adlig hts on shortly before parking the car and
Officers Morenz and Duckworth dr iving across the street and appro ach i ng her

. Moreover , Officer Turea ud d id not testif y about th e video rec ording s from his body and in

- car camera s,
Officer Morenz was una ble to reme mber the substa nce of her conversation with Offi cer Tureaud,

the Transportation Code applies to the ope ra tion of a ve hicle “ on a hig h way unless the provision specifically applied t o a d ifferent place. ” See Tex. T ran sp. Code § § 542.001 (stating that provis ion of subti tle relating to veh icle ’ s operation “ applie s only to the operation o f a vehicle on a highwa y unless the p ro vision specif i cally applies to a different place ” ) , 547.302 ( addre ssing dut y to display l ights at nig httime )

. On appeal, the State does not seem to contend that operating
a vehicle without headligh ts i n a parking lot i s a traffic offense b ut urges that it wou ld be operat ing “ in an unusual manner

. ”14 a nd O fficer Duckwor th believed his conversatio n wi th Officer Tureaud was about the u nr elated traffic stop

. 6 Viewing the evidence in the light most fav orable to the trial court ’ s findings , we

co nclude that the eviden ce support s the tr ial court ’ s findings and its implicit conclusion that the
officers lack ed reasonable suspicion to detain La mb

. See F ord , 158 S.W.3d at 492 ; see also
State v. Calzada

- Rodri guez , No. 03

- 18

- 00495

- CR, 2019 Tex. App. LEX IS 1614, at * 7

– 8 , * 11

–
12 (Tex. App.

— Austin Mar. 5, 2019, no pe t.) (mem. op., not designated for pu blication ) (a ffirming trial court ’ s order grant in g motion to sup press and co ncluding that record , including
vid e o r ec ordings, did not support State ’ s contentio n that appell ee ’ s driving was factor supporting

re asonable su spicion to initiate traffic stop )

. 7 We overr ule the State ’ s second issue.

C ONCLUS IO N Having overruled the Sta te ’ s issues , we affirm the trial cou rt ’ s order granting
Lamb ’ s motion to suppres s evidence.

6 To the extent that the State argues that the parties agreed that “ some other vehicle ” refer e nced in the trial court ’ s fin dings was Lamb ’ s car , we obser ve t hat t he video recordings from O fficer Tu reaud were admitte d into evidence after O fficers Mo renz and Duckworth had
com pl eted their testimony and without accompanying testimony about w hat was being seen on the recordings

.

7 We find the p recedential cas e ci ted by the State to suppo rt t hat the o ff icers had reasonable suspicion to detain Lam b to be factually distin guishab le. See Tanner v. State , 228 S.W.3d 852, 856 , 858

– 59 (Tex. App.

— A ust in 2007, no pet.) (upholding finding of lawful de tention when offi ce r ob served de f endant and another i n d ividua l coming from be hind darken ed
a nd close d place of business at 3:00 a.m. and defenda nt did not stop walking wh en office r f las hed pa trol car ’ s light s and called out to him )

.15 __ ________________________________________ Melissa Goodwin , Justice
Before Justices Goodw i n, Triana, and Kelly

Affi rmed
Filed: March 24, 2022

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