NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 15, 2013*

Decided August 19, 2013

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 12-3121

PRINCE ATUM-RA UHURU MUTAWAKKIL,

also known as NORMAN C. GREEN, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PETER HUIBREGTSE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United 

States District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 11-cv-471-bbc

Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.

Order

This order covers issues omitted from today’s precedential opinion. The district 

court resolved all of these claims summarily, on screening under 28 U.S.C. §1915A.

1. Mutawakkil contends that some of the defendants gave false testimony in his proceeding to change the name on his judgment of conviction. He says that the district 

court overlooked this contention. It did not. The judge dismissed this aspect of the 

complaint because 42 U.S.C. §1983 does not permit a court to hold a witness liable for 

earlier testimony. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 

325 (1983). Witnesses have absolute immunity from liability in damages.

 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).
No. 12-3121 Page 2

2. Defendants declined to pay for a transcript of the state proceeding in which 

Mutawakkil sought to change the name on his judgment of conviction. He contends 

that state law requires the state to pay for the transcript. But the federal Constitution 

does not oblige states to follow their own laws. In other words, §1983 cannot be used to 

enforce state law. See, e.g., Archie v. Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1216–17 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1988) 

(en banc).

Mutawakkil is free to pursue his state-law claim in state court. He filed this suit in 

state court; defendants removed it on the basis of the complaint’s federal claims. With 

those claims resolved, the state-law claims return to state court. 28 U.S.C. §1367(c). The 

district court’s judgment was not clear on this, but we modify it to provide explicitly 

that the court relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over all claims under state law and 

remands these claims to the court in which suit began.

3. Mutawakkil contends that some defendants violated the eighth amendment by 

withholding blood-pressure medication from him after becoming confused about who 

the medication was for. The district court correctly dismissed this claim, because 

Mutawakkil does not allege intentional infliction of harm or its equivalent, deliberate 

indifference to a known risk of serious harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 

Nor does he allege injury. Indeed, the complaint suggests to us that the medication was 

not prescribed for Mutawakkil in the first place.

4. Mutawakkil contends that some defendants violated the due process clause of the 

fourteenth amendment by not responding adequately to his grievances. But the Constitution does not require prisons to have administrative systems for the redress of grievances. Absence of an effective grievance system might affect whether a prisoner needs 

to exhaust intra-prison remedies before filing a §1983 suit but is not an independent violation of the Constitution. See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953–54 (7th Cir. 2011); 

Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 n.3 (7th Cir. 2008).

5. Mutawakkil contends that prison officials sometimes opened his mail outside of 

his presence, in violation of Wisconsin law. This claim is outside §1983 but can be pursued on remand to state court. Mutawakkil may find it difficult to prevail unless he can 

show injury, which his complaint does not allege. See Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 671 

(7th Cir. 2009).

6. Mutawakkil maintains that the prison wrongly confiscated some of his documents. To prevail on a claim that lack of documents deprived him of access to the 

courts, he must demonstrate prejudice in a particular suit. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

343 (1996). His complaint does not allege any adverse consequence, so this claim was 

properly dismissed.

The district court’s judgment is modified to provide that claims under state law are 

remanded to state court and, as so modified, is affirmed.