NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE BAR OF ARIZONA, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees, 

v.

GRANT H. GOODMAN, Defendant/Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0152 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2016-016709 

The Honorable Sherry K. Stephens, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

State Bar of Arizona, Phoenix

By James D. Lee, Lisa M. Panahi 

Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee State Bar of Arizona

Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint P.C., Phoenix

By William G. Fairbourn, Lisa T. Hauser 

Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee State Bar of Arizona

Grant H. Goodman, Phoenix

Defendant/Appellant

FILED 12-27-2018
STATE BAR v. GOODMAN

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Acting Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the 

Court, in which Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani

joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Grant H. Goodman appeals the summary judgment entered 

in favor of the State Bar of Arizona (the “State Bar”) and the dismissal of his 

counterclaims. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Goodman, a lawyer, was disbarred in 2014. That same year, 

the superior court entered Administrative Order No. 2014-029 (the 

“Administrative Order”) declaring Goodman a vexatious litigant and 

prohibiting him from filing any new causes of action without leave of the 

civil presiding judge. Goodman did not seek special action review of the 

Administrative Order.

¶3 Two months after his disbarment, Goodman obtained an 

assignment (the “Assignment”) from Karen Mothershead granting him all 

right, title, and interest in certain legal claims belonging to Mothershead, 

which arose out of the administration of her deceased husband’s estate. 

Goodman and Mothershead later executed an addendum to the 

Assignment (the “Addendum”), which broadly defined the causes of action 

that could be brought in either state or federal court. The Assignment and 

Addendum gave Goodman thirty percent of the proceeds for such causes 

of action, while Mothershead retained a seventy percent interest in any 

recovery achieved by “settlement, judgment, collection efforts, arbitration,

mediation, trial, [or] appeal,” both net of payment of costs and expenses. 

Mothershead also retained the right to appear on her own behalf if any 

court deemed her claims to be non-assignable. Mothershead later revoked 

the Assignment.

¶4 Pursuant to the Assignment and Addendum, Goodman made 

filings in both state and federal courts in furtherance of the assigned legal 

claims. He also made court appearances in furtherance of the claims. 
STATE BAR v. GOODMAN

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3 

¶5 In 2016, the State Bar filed a complaint in superior court

seeking to enjoin Goodman from engaging in the unauthorized practice of 

law and from enforcing any legal claim based on an assignment in which 

the assignor retained an interest in the claim. In response, Goodman filed a 

“Counterclaim and Independent Action” against the State Bar, 

Mothershead, and Superior Court Judge Randall Warner as the presiding 

civil judge (collectively, “Counter-Defendants”). Goodman’s counterclaim 

alleged that (1) there was no basis for the Administrative Order, (2) his 

constitutional rights were violated by the Administrative Order, and (3) the 

Counter-Defendants engaged in a “fraudulent subterfuge” to eliminate his 

right to self-representation.

¶6 The Counter-Defendants separately moved to dismiss 

Goodman’s counterclaims. While their motions were pending, Goodman 

and the State Bar cross-moved for summary judgment. Ultimately, the 

superior court granted each Counter-Defendant’s motion to dismiss and 

entered summary judgment in favor of the State Bar. Goodman timely 

appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Goodman appeals the entry of summary judgment in favor of 

the State Bar on its claim that Goodman engaged in the unauthorized 

practice of law. Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review the superior court’s 

grant of summary judgment de novo, determining whether any issue of 

material fact exists and whether the court properly applied the law. See 

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Pheasant Grove LLC, 245 Ariz. 325, ¶ 15 (App. 

2018). Goodman also challenges the superior court’s dismissal of his 

counterclaims. We review the court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. 

See Pivotal Colo. II, L.L.C. v. Ariz. Pub. Safety Pers. Ret. Sys., 234 Ariz. 369, 370, 

¶ 4 (App. 2014). We will affirm the dismissal if correct for any reason. See 

Sw. Non-Profit Hous. Corp. v. Nowak, 234 Ariz. 387, 391, ¶ 10 (App. 2014).

A. Goodman May Not Challenge the Administrative Order by Way of 

Appeal.

¶8 The superior court has authority to exercise “such powers as 

are necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction.” Acker v. 

CSO Chevira, 188 Ariz. 252, 254 (App. 1997) (citation omitted). Included 

among those powers is the court’s inherent authority to curtail the right of 
STATE BAR v. GOODMAN

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4 

vexatious litigants to initiate new lawsuits asserting new causes of action. 

See Madison v. Groseth, 230 Ariz. 8, 14, ¶ 17 (App. 2012). 

¶9 Nearly one month after Goodman was disbarred, the 

presiding judge of the superior court entered the Administrative Order 

designating Goodman as a vexatious litigant. The court found that 

Goodman had filed cases for “delay or harassment” and had filed 

numerous civil actions routinely naming the same defendants. The 

Administrative Order limited Goodman’s ability to “file future lawsuits, 

motions, and requests for relief” and expressly prohibited him from filing 

any “new causes of action” without leave of the civil presiding judge. It also 

prohibited Goodman from making any new filings in a civil case “in which 

judgment concluding the case ha[d] been entered” without leave of court.

¶10 On appeal, Goodman seeks to challenge the merits of the 

Administrative Order. An administrative order designating an individual 

as a vexatious litigant is not an appealable order. See Madison, 230 Ariz. at 

14, ¶ 16, n.8 (explaining that this court does not have appellate jurisdiction 

over administrative orders, and, therefore, review of such orders must 

proceed by special action). Therefore, Goodman may not challenge the 

merits the Administrative Order in this appeal.

B. The Court Correctly Found Goodman was Engaged in the 

Unauthorized Practice of Law and Enjoined Him from Doing so in the 

Future.

¶11 Under article III of our constitution “the practice of law is a 

matter exclusively within the authority of the Judiciary.” In re Creasy, 198 

Ariz. 539, 541, ¶ 6 (2000); Ariz. Const. art. III. Included in this authority is 

the ability to define the practice of law. See State Bar of Ariz. v. Ariz. Land 

Title & Tr. Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 87 (1961) (“[T]hose acts, whether performed in 

court or in the law office, which lawyers customarily have carried on from 

day to day through the centuries must constitute ‘the practice of law.’”). 

Arizona Supreme Court Rule (“Rule”) 31 provides a non-exhaustive list of

conduct that when performed by a person who is not authorized constitutes 

the unauthorized practice of law. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 31(a)(2)(A)–(B)(1). 

Specific acts include: preparing a document intended to affect or secure 

legal rights for a specific person; representing another in a judicial 

proceeding; and preparing a document to be filed in any court for a specific 

person or entity. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 31(a)(2)(A). 

¶12 Pursuant to Rule 31, a disbarred member of the State Bar shall 

not practice law or in any way represent that he has authority to practice 
STATE BAR v. GOODMAN

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law. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 31(c). The State Bar is authorized to investigate, 

prosecute, and obtain judgments in superior court against individuals who 

have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 

75–80; State v. Lang, 234 Ariz. 457, 461, ¶ 15 (App. 2014). 

¶13 Two months after Goodman was disbarred, he obtained the 

Assignment from Mothershead, which purportedly assigned to Goodman 

“all right, title, and interest” in certain “causes of actions and claims.”

However, the Assignment and Addendum clearly reflect that Mothershead 

retained a seventy percent financial interest in the proceeds derived from 

any settlement, judgment, collection efforts, arbitration, mediation, trial, or 

appeal arising from the claims. In addition, Mothershead reserved the right 

to represent herself in litigation as a party-plaintiff if a court determined the

claims were non-assignable. Relying on the Assignment and Addendum, 

Goodman prepared and filed court documents that affected or secured 

Mothershead’s legal rights. He also appeared in court in connection with 

those filings.

¶14 Goodman argues that he is not providing legal advice or 

services to Mothershead but is simply acting as an assignee under an 

absolute assignment. He relies on the United States Supreme Court’s 

decision in Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008), 

which held that assignees of payphone operators’ claims had standing to 

bring a collection action against long-distance carriers. 554 U.S. at 271. The 

State Bar here, however, has not challenged Goodman’s standing to file suit 

on behalf of Mothershead under the Assignment. Accord Cruz v. Lusk 

Collection Agency, 119 Ariz. 356, 360 (App. 1978). Rather, the State Bar has 

brought an action to enjoin Goodman, a disbarred attorney, from practicing 

law.

¶15 “Public policy is derived from the collective rules, principles, 

or approaches to problems that affect the commonwealth or promote the 

general good; specifically, principles and standards regarded by the 

legislature or by the courts as being of fundamental concern to the state and 

the whole of society.” Levine v. Haralson, Miller, Pitt, Feldman & McAnally, 

P.L.C., 244 Ariz. 234, 237, ¶ 10 (App. 2018) (quotation omitted) (court denied 

the recovery of fees to an attorney for work performed pursuant to an oral 

contract when such an agreement violated the Arizona Rules of 

Professional Conduct and was thus void as against public policy). Our 

supreme court rules clearly prohibit a disbarred lawyer, such as Goodman,

from practicing law in Arizona. Goodman cannot evade these rules by 

obtaining an assignment of claims from a third party and asserting those 

claims as a pro se plaintiff, particularly when the assignor has clearly 
STATE BAR v. GOODMAN

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retained an interest in the claims. State v. Stewart, 21 Ariz. App. 123, 124 

(1973) (“It is axiomatic that a person who is not a member of the Bar of the 

State of Arizona cannot practice or represent another in any of the State’s 

courts.”).

¶16 This conclusion is supported by the decisions of other 

jurisdictions. See Iowa Supreme Court Comm’n on the Unauthorized Practice of 

Law v. Sullins, 893 N.W.2d 864, 874 (Iowa 2017) (citing cases). In Sullins, the 

Iowa Supreme Court affirmed an injunction prohibiting a disbarred 

attorney from self-representation on a claim arising out of an assignment 

where the assignor retained an interest in the claims. The assignor assigned 

three years’ worth her child support claim—which was valued in full at 

approximately $300,000—to a disbarred attorney as repayment for a debt 

of approximately $28,000. Id. at 869. However, the court took issue with the 

amount of the assignment, which after interest would exceed the amount 

the assignor owed the disbarred attorney, and because “[t]he assignment 

was silent as to the consideration paid and included no language 

extinguishing [the assignor’s] debt to [the disbarred attorney].” Id. at 873 

(“Their arrangement was akin to a lawyer working a collection case on a 

contingent, percentage fee.”). The Court held that “[w]hen an individual 

uses an assignment and pro se litigant status to represent another, the 

individual renders legal services and engages in the unauthorized practice 

of law.” Id. at 874. 

¶17 Like Iowa, Arizona also “allows pro se litigants to represent 

their own claims, [but] it does not authorize pro se litigants to prosecute the 

claims of others.” Yulin Li ex rel. Lee v. Rizzio, 801 N.W.2d 351, 360 (Iowa Ct. 

App. 2011); accord Byers-Watts v. Parker, 199 Ariz. 466, 470, ¶ 19 (App. 2001) 

(rule recognizing a parent’s right to sue on behalf of a child does not entitle 

the parent to provide legal representation for the child).

¶18 This is not to say that all assignments where the assignee 

brings a claim and the assignor retains an interest are void. See Cruz, 119 

Ariz. at 360. But when a disbarred attorney acquires an interest through an 

assignment, and consideration for that interest appears to be—at least in 

part—for an act that the disbarred attorney would otherwise be prohibited 

from performing if not for the assignment, that assignment is void as 

against public policy. Accordingly, any action taken by the disbarred 

attorney with respect to that invalid interest is subject to the rules 

prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law. See In re Creasy, 198 Ariz. at 

543, ¶ 16. (“[S]ome actions which may be taken with impunity by persons 

who have never been admitted to the practice of law, will be found to be in 
STATE BAR v. GOODMAN

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contempt if undertaken by a suspended or disbarred attorney.” (quoting 

State v. Schumacher, 519 P.2d 1116, 1125 (Kan. 1974))).

¶19 The undisputed facts of this case reflect that Goodman used 

the Assignment to circumvent the effect of his disbarment and to practice 

law. Goodman’s conduct falls under Rule 31’s definition of “practicing 

law,” and because he was disbarred, Goodman’s actions constitute the 

“unauthorized practice of law.” There is no genuine issue of any material 

fact regarding the legal determination that Goodman engaged in the 

unauthorized practice of law. Thus, we affirm the superior court’s entry of 

summary judgment in favor of the State Bar. 

C. The Court Properly Dismissed Goodman’s Counterclaims. 

¶20 Goodman also challenges the superior court’s dismissal of his 

counterclaims. In response to the State Bar’s complaint, Goodman filed a 

pleading titled “Counterclaim(s) and Independent Action,” naming the 

Counter-Defendants as parties. Goodman’s counterclaim did not address 

Rule 31 and the unauthorized practice of law, other than to argue that the 

Supreme Court Rules shall not “affect the rights granted in the Arizona or 

United States Constitutions.” Rather, Goodman’s counterclaim alleged the 

court improperly designated him a vexatious litigant. He asserted claims 

for racketeering, impairment of contract, and violation of his constitutional 

rights. He also asserted an “Independent Action,” requesting relief from 

judgment based on fraud pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 

60(b). Presumably, Goodman was attempting to seek relief from the 

Administrative Order, but it is unclear.

¶21 As addressed above, Goodman did not file a special action 

challenging the Administrative Order, and Goodman’s remaining 

counterclaims arise out of the invalid assignment, thus they were properly 

dismissed. 

CONCLUSION

¶22 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the entry of summary 

judgment in favor of the State Bar and the dismissal of Goodman’s 

counterclaims.