[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-10452

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D.C. Docket No. 8:15-cr-00250-RAL-MAP-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

DEANTE DIXON, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(January 9, 2018)

Before ROSENBAUM and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and BARTLE,* District 

Judge.

 *

 Honorable Harvey Bartle III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

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PER CURIAM: 

In 2015, Deante Dixon pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a 

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). At sentencing, the district court 

enhanced his base offense level after concluding that two prior Florida robbery 

offenses of which he had been convicted were “crimes of violence” under the 

United States Sentencing Guidelines. Dixon now appeals, arguing that Florida 

robbery is not a crime of violence. He also asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is 

unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce 

Clause.1

I.

On June 16, 2015, in Pinellas County, Florida, Dixon was found in 

possession of a firearm and ammunition manufactured outside of Florida. Dixon 

was already a convicted felon—he had two Florida robbery convictions in 2008—

so a grand jury indicted him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for being a felon who 

“knowingly possess[ed], in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, a 

firearm and ammunition . . . .” Dixon pled guilty to the charge on November 12, 

2015. 

In the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the United States Probation 

 1

 Dixon acknowledges that this argument is foreclosed by binding precedent but seeks to 

preserve the issue so he can raise it before the Supreme Court.

2

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Office recommended that Dixon’s base offense level be enhanced to 20 because of 

his past robbery convictions, which it characterized as crimes of violence under the

Guidelines.

2

 Dixon objected to the characterization of Florida robbery as a crime 

of violence, but the district court adopted Probation’s recommendation and 

enhanced the base offense level. The court also adopted Probation’s 

recommendation for a three-level decrease because Dixon accepted responsibility. 

With a base offense level of 17 and a criminal history category of VI, the 

Guidelines range was 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment. The district court ultimately 

sentenced Dixon to 60 months of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. 

II.

The United States Sentencing Guidelines provide for a sentence 

enhancement if a defendant has previously sustained a felony conviction for a 

crime of violence. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. § 2K2.1(a)(4) (U.S. 

Sentencing Comm’n 2015). The Guidelines define “crime of violence,” in turn, as

follows:

any offense under federal or state law, punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that—

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person of 

another, or 

 2

 In this opinion, we refer exclusively to the 2015 Guidelines Manual, which was in 

effect when Dixon was sentenced.

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(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involved 

use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that 

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 

another.

Id. § 4B1.2(a). In addition to this definition, the Guidelines commentary lists

several offenses that constitute crimes of violence, including robbery. Id. § 4B1.2 

cmt. n.1. Thus, a prior conviction constitutes a crime of violence if it (1) has as an 

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force (commonly referred to as 

the elements clause), (2) involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 

physical injury to another (commonly referred to as the residual clause), or (3) is 

enumerated as a crime of violence in the Guidelines or its commentary. United 

States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2011).

Dixon argues that Florida robbery3 is not a crime of violence under any of 

these three definitions. He recognizes that this court held the opposite in Lockley, 

632 F.3d at 1246, but asserts the Lockley has been undermined to the point of 

abrogation by three Supreme Court cases: Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. __, 

133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), and 

 3

 Florida’s robbery statute at the time of Dixon’s convictions provided:

Robbery means the taking of money or other property which may 

be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, 

with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person 

or the owner of the money or other property, which in the course of 

the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in 

fear.

Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1) (2008). This is the same version of the statute at issue in Lockley.

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Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 

Dixon’s argument is foreclosed by precedent. First, Johnson cannot save 

Dixon from the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Just this year, in 

Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017),4 the Supreme Court concluded that 

Johnson’s holding does not apply to the residual clause of the Guidelines because 

the Guidelines cannot be unconstitutionally vague. 

As for Mathis and Descamps, we have reaffirmed the viability of Lockley in 

the aftermath of those cases. In United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 938-42 (11th 

Cir. 2016), this Court relied on Lockley to conclude that a defendant’s robbery 

conviction qualified as a violent felony under the elements clause of the Armed 

Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), which uses language identical to 

that in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). See also United States v. Burke, 863 F.3d 1355, 

1360 (11th Cir. 2017) (appellant’s argument that Florida robbery is not crime of 

violence foreclosed by Fritts and Lockley). So we continue to be bound by 

Lockley’s conclusion that Florida robbery is a crime of violence under the 

Guidelines. See United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) 

(“[A] prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is 

overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by 

this court sitting en banc.”).

 4 Beckles was issued in March 2017, after the parties submitted their briefs in this case.

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III.

In the proceedings below, Dixon was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) 

because he was found in Florida to be in possession of a firearm that was 

manufactured outside of Florida. Under Section 922(g), it is unlawful for any 

person with a felony conviction to possess a firearm or ammunition “in or affecting 

commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Congress’s authority to establish this law is 

grounded in the Commerce Clause, which allows Congress to regulate the channels 

of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and any 

activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 514 

U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).

On appeal, Dixon argues that Section 922(g) exceeds Congress’s Commerce 

Clause power both facially and as-applied because “possession—a non-economic 

activity—. . . does not ensure that this activity ‘substantially affects’ interstate 

commerce.” This is not the first time we have considered this argument. On the 

contrary, it is well-settled that Section 922(g) “is not constitutionally invalid under 

the Commerce Clause.” United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 

2010); see also United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 391 (11th Cir. 1996)

(Section 922(g) “is not an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power under the 

Commerce Clause.”). Noting this precedent, the court below did not err by 

entering Dixon’s conviction under Section 922(g).

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IV.

Because binding precedent precludes Dixon’s challenge to the district 

court’s crime-of-violence determination and his challenge to the constitutionality 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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