FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

December 20, 2011

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 10-6240

KEITH ALLEN HENDRIX,

Defendant - Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

(D.C. NO. 5:09-CR-00189-D-1)

C. Merle Gile (Fred L. Staggs, with him on the briefs), Oklahoma City,

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant.

Suzanne Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorney (Sanford C. Coats, United

States Attorney, and Virginia L. Hines, Assistant United States Attorney, with her

on the briefs), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before MURPHY, HOLLOWAY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

I. Introduction

Keith Allen Hendrix entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of

Possession with Intent to Distribute in Excess of 50 Grams of Methamphetamine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of Possession of a Firearm in

Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). 

Pursuant to his plea agreement, Hendrix reserved the right to appeal the district

court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a search of

his motel room on December 5, 2008. The district court concluded the search was

supported by probable cause, and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless

entry into the motel room. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

this court affirms. 

II. Background

On December 5, 2008, Oklahoma City Police Officers David Hanes, Ryan

Robertson, and Yancy Forbes were investigating methamphetamine activity at an

Oklahoma City residence. During their investigation, they encountered an

individual with methamphetamine residue on his hands who was in possession of

methamphetamine paraphernalia. The individual approached Officer Hanes and

told him he purchased the methamphetamine from a man named Keith who was

staying in Room 327 of the Extended Stay America motel at 4811 N.W.

Expressway in Oklahoma City. He also gave a physical description of

Keith—approximately 5’6”, short brown hair, and somewhat overweight. The

informant stated Keith had approximately one to two pounds of methamphetamine

in the room and a surveillance camera and video monitor with which he could

view the motel’s north parking lot. He also stated Keith kept the

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methamphetamine in ziplock bags next to the door so it could be accessible for

purchases. 

The officers proceeded to the Extended Stay America and parked their cars

in a nearby restaurant parking lot. Proceeding along the south side of the motel to

its west entrance so as to avoid detection by the video monitor, Officers Hanes

and Robertson entered the motel and made contact with the manager.1

 The

manager confirmed there was a Room 327 on the north side of the motel and

accompanied them to the room, which was accessible through an inside hallway. 

After arriving at the door to Room 327, Officer Hanes knocked on the door. A

female asked who was there, and Officer Hanes gave a false name. When the

female responded she did not know anyone by that name, Hanes identified

himself as an Oklahoma City Police Officer and turned up the volume on his

police radio to confirm his identity as a police officer. Thereupon, Officers

Hanes and Robertson heard people moving inside the room, doors opening and

closing, and a toilet flushing. These sounds, based upon the officers’ training and

experience, indicated the occupants of the room were attempting to destroy

evidence. 

After the occupants of the room refused to open the door, the manager

opened it with his electronic key. While Officer Robertson testified he believed

1

Officer Forbes transported the informant, who did not want his identity

disclosed, and stayed with the informant in the parking lot. 

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Officer Hanes ordered the manager to open the door, Officer Hanes testified the

manager did so of his own accord. Before the door was opened, the officers drew

their weapons. The door only opened five or six inches because it was latched

with a chain. Through the gap in the doorway, officers could see a female

flushing the toilet. They also saw a male who matched the informant’s

description of Keith. The officers ordered the male to open the door, and he

complied.

The officers then entered the room, where they saw in plain view several

incriminating items, including ziplock bags filled with methamphetamine on a

table near the door, empty ziplock bags, and a scale. The officers also saw a

video monitor which displayed the motel’s north parking lot. Although it was a

cold night, the window was open and the screen had been removed. Just outside

the window were a bag and coat containing additional evidence of illegal drugs. 

The officers arrested both occupants of the room, secured the room, and obtained

a search warrant. The next day, officers conducted a search of the room pursuant

to the warrant. During the search they seized additional drugs and paraphernalia,

$32,160.00 in currency, two revolvers, a box of ammunition, and items of

dominion and control reflecting the name Keith Hendrix. 

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III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court “view[s] the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, accept[s] the district

court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, and review[s] de novo the

ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” United

States v. Polly, 630 F.3d 991, 996 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). 

B. Probable Cause and Exigent Circumstances

Absent a specific exception to the warrant requirement, police violate the

Fourth Amendment by entering a residence without a warrant. See Payton v. New

York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Guests in a motel room are similarly protected

from warrantless entries. United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1064 (10th Cir.

1993). One such exception is the exigent circumstances doctrine: police may

enter a residence without a warrant where such entry is required to prevent the

imminent destruction of evidence. Brigham City v. Stewart, 547 U.S. 398, 403

(2006). Warrantless entries justified on this basis must be 

(1) pursuant to clear evidence of probable cause, (2) available only

for serious crimes and in circumstances where the destruction of the

evidence is likely, (3) limited in scope to the minimum intrusion

necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence, and (4) supported

by clearly defined indicators of exigency that are not subject to

police manipulation or abuse.

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United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 1988). On appeal,

Hendrix does not contest that the government satisfied the second and third of

these requirements, but argues the first and fourth requirements were lacking.

1. Probable Cause

Probable cause to search requires “a fair probability that contraband or

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. Cooper,

654 F.3d 1104, 1124 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). Where, as here,

probable cause is based on an informant’s tip, the court makes a probable cause

determination based on the totality of the circumstances, including the

informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge. Illinois v. Gates, 462

U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983); United States v. Quezada-Enriquez, 567 F.3d 1228,

1233 (10th Cir. 2009). “These factors are not absolute, independent requirements

that must be satisfied in order for probable cause to exist . . . . [A] deficiency in

one factor may be compensated for by a strong showing of another or by other

indicia of reliability.” Quezada-Enriquez, 567 F.3d at 1233 (citation omitted). 

An informant’s tip which provides “highly specific or personal details from which

one could reasonably infer that the informant had firsthand knowledge about the

claimed criminal activity” is more likely to be found sufficient to support

probable cause. Id. (quotations omitted). Further, an informant’s tip is more

reliable if it is confirmed by officers’ independent observations. See United

States v. Artez, 389 F.3d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 2004) (informant’s tip that

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narcotics are being distributed at a particular location can be corroborated through

“controlled buy” at that location). 

Here, the relevant probable cause inquiry encompasses all of the

information available to Officers Hanes and Robertson immediately prior to their

first opening the door to Hendrix’s motel room.2

 Before that, the following

information was available to the officers: an informant gave a self-inculpatory

statement indicating he purchased methamphetamine the previous day from a

person in a specific room of a specific motel. The informant provided a physical

description and first name of the person who sold him the methamphetamine. The

informant gave specific details as to the contents of the room, the amount of

methamphetamine kept there, and the room’s location in the motel. The

informant was found with methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on his person

at the time he gave the information, and was willing to accompany the officers to

the motel. 

Upon arrival at the motel, the officers were able to confirm the motel was

located at the address the informant provided. The motel had a room 327 located

on its north side which was occupied. In response to Officer Hanes’s

identification of himself as a police officer, the officers heard considerable

2

The officers needed neither probable cause nor even reasonable suspicion

to speak with the occupants while standing outside the closed door to the motel

room. United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260, 1264–65 (10th Cir. 2006)

(approving “knock and talk” procedure). 

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movement, opening and closing of doors, and a toilet flushing. All of this

information provided sufficient independent corroboration of the informant’s tip

that methamphetamine-related activity was likely occurring in the motel room. 

Hendrix’s challenge to the search of the motel room on the basis that it lacked

probable cause must therefore fail. 

2. Creation of the Exigency 

The officers were justified in believing the commotion in the motel room

indicated its occupants were attempting to destroy evidence. See United States v.

Carr, 939 F.2d 1442, 1447–48 (10th Cir. 1991). On appeal, Hendrix does not

contend there were no exigent circumstances justifying entry. Rather, he

contends the officers impermissibly “created the exigency” through bad-faith

avoidance of the warrant requirement. The officers’ bad faith, Hendrix argues, is

shown by their decision to go directly to the motel room at night without first

seeking a warrant or further corroboration of the informant’s tip, giving a false

name, and continually demanding entry after initially being refused. The court

need not consider whether these actions are sufficiently indicative of bad faith

because the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849

(2011), obviates the need for such an analysis. 

In King, the Court held “Where . . . the police did not create the exigency

by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth

Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is

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reasonable and thus allowed.” 131 S. Ct. at 1858. In a footnote, the Court also

described the limits of its holding: “There is a strong argument to be made that, at

least in most circumstances, the exigent circumstances rule should not apply

where the police, without a warrant or any legally sound basis for a warrantless

entry, threaten that they will enter without permission unless admitted.” Id. at

1858 n.4. The Court explicitly rejected an approach, previously relied upon by

some courts, that determined whether police impermissibly create the exigency by

looking to whether officers acted in bad faith. Id. at 1859. Hendrix makes no

argument that Officers Hanes or Robertson created the exigency by “engaging or

threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at

1858. He also makes no showing that Officers Hanes or Robertson threatened to

enter the motel without permission unless admitted. The record before the court

also does not suggest any factual basis for such an argument. The district court

therefore properly determined the warrantless entry and subsequent search of

Hendrix’s motel room was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to

the warrant requirement. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court AFFIRMS the decision of the district

court. 

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