Filed 4/14/15 P. v. Duran CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
LAEL C. DURAN,
Defendant and Appellant. B254205
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA415251)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supe rior Court of Los Angeles County. Laura F. Priver, Judge. Affirmed.

Susan Morrow Maxwell, under appoint ment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Ge rald E. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant A ttorney General, Stev en D. Matthews and Corey J. Robins, Deputy Attorneys Ge neral, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * * * * * *2 Defendant Lael C. Duran was charged by information with “unlawfully taking a vehicle with a prior” (Pen. Code, § 666.5 ). The information alleged three prior convictions for unlawfully taking a vehicl e under Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) and one prior conviction under Penal Code section 666.5. The information also included prior conviction a llegations under Penal Code sections 1203, subdivision (e)(4) and 667.5, su bdivision (b). The trial court informed defendant that if he admitted his prior convictions for purpos es of Penal Code section 666.5, the jury would not learn of any of his earlier convicti ons. Defendant did not admit his priors, or seek bifurcation of the trial of the priors, or elect to have the priors tried to the court. Instead, he elected to have the People prove them to the jury. De fendant was convicted, and four prior conviction alle gations were found to be tr ue, as were the other prior conviction allegations. Defe ndant was sentenced to four years in county jail. Relying on People v. Young (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 111, 113 ( Young ), defendant claims he was denied his right to due process and to a fair tr ial when the trial court ruled that his prior convictions were an “element” of Penal Code section 666.5 that had to be tried to the jury. He also contends that the People improperly cross-examined him regarding the underlying facts of a prior conviction.
The trial court did not rule that defendant’s prior conv ictions were an “element”
that had to be tried to th e jury within the meaning of Young . Defendant forfeited any claim of error as to the People’s cross- examination, and in any event, the crossexamination was within the scope of pe rmissible impeachment because defendant opened the door by disputi ng his guilt for the prior conv iction. Finding no merit in
either of defendant’s contentions, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND
A number of issues related to defendant ’s prior convictions were raised before
trial. The People wanted to introduce the fact s underlying a 2012 conviction under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), where defendant was caught in possession of a number of shaved keys in a stolen 1992 Nissan, and was invo lved in a high speed chase with police. The People argued the fa cts surrounding the prior case (except for3 the police chase) were nearly identical to the facts of this case, as defendant was caught in a Nissan with a number of shaved keys. The court found the evidence of the prior conviction to be relevant to motive, but took the matter un der submission, and admonished the prosecutor to not mention th e evidence in his open ing statement. Before opening statements, the pros ecutor notified the court there was a disagreement concerning the prosecution’s bu rden of proof as to the Penal Code section 666.5 charge. The prosecutor argued the People had to prove the present crime and also that defendant had previously been convicted of a felony violation of Vehicle
Code section 10851 or other vehicle theft. The prosecutor went on to explain that “unless there is some [type] of stipulation up front, that information would have to be conveyed to the jury and they would have to make that determination.” Defense
counsel stated “I th ought we already addressed th is with the [Evidence Code section] 1101(b). There would be a stipula tion. If 1101(b) evidence isn’t coming in then we provide that stipulation . . . if it is coming in then he will have to prove all the
elements.”
The court then ruled on the Eviden ce Code section 1101, subdivision (b) evidence, concluding that the arresting office r would not be permitted to testify about the car chase, but could testify that defenda nt was arrested in a stolen Nissan with shaved keys, as this evidence was relevant to knowledge and intent. 1 The court explained its ruling under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) “does not change the fact that he has to prove he was previously co nvicted [for purposes of Penal Code section 666.5] so I agree with the Pe ople on that. Don’t know how you want to address that. He either has to prove it to th e jury or you have to stipulate to it.” The court repeated, “with regard to the conviction that’s what he has to prove that he was
convicted of it. So I mean he either has to prove that by way of so me sort of certified records or some other way. If you don’t want all that to come before the jury your

1 Admission of the Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) evidence is not at issue on appeal.4 client can stipulate to it then I think there is a different instruction th en that attaches to – when there is a stipulation.” The prosecutor contended, “I think the wa y the information is charged is that he can stipulate to it. We don’t have to get into the facts of it but that information still
comes in front of the jury.” Defense counsel disagreed, arguing “[T]hat is incorrect. I’ll just read directly from the code. The annotated code on 666.5 says ‘If the defendant pleads not guilty and admits a prior convicti on the charge of the previous conviction cannot be read to the ju ry . . . .’ ” The court stated that it agreed with defendant’s view, and explained “[i]t’s how you gi ve the instructions at the e nd. They are told to accept certain things in the instructions rather than the People have to prove this and that. I
don’t remember how the instructions read bu t I will know that by tomorrow. Obviously because we will have to figure it out. . . .” Defense counsel said she would speak with her client, and the court again admonished the prosecutor no t to mention the prior c onviction during his opening
statement because it was unresolved how the prior conviction would be handled. The following testimony was adduced at trial: Alejandro Orozco testified that he
was the owner of a 1989 Nissan Sentra on A ugust 16, 2013. The car was stolen from a store parking lot in Lynwood, around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m., while M r. Orozco was inside shopping. Mr. Orozco did not give anyone pe rmission to drive his car that day. It was
locked when he left it in the parking lot, and no one el se had a key to the car. Mr. Orozco called the police and report ed the car had been stolen.
Carlos Cifuentes testified that he wa s the owner of a 1992 Nissan Maxima on October 4, 2011. His vehicle was stolen wh ile it was parked outside a residence he was visiting. He was the only pe rson who had keys for the car, and he had not given anyone permission to drive it. Mr. Cifuentes did not recognize defendant, and had not given him permission to drive the car. The car was never returned to him. Los Angeles Police Officer Patrick Fitzgera ld testified that he was patrolling the
area of 38th Place and Western Avenue on Au gust 16, 2013, with his partner Dana Oviatt, in an unmark ed police car. He saw defendant driving a 1989 Nissan Sentra.5 Defendant pulled over and pa rked the car, and stepped out of it. When Officer Fitzgerald pulled up alongside defendant as he was walking away from the vehicle, he
noticed defendant seemed nervous. Officer Oviatt checked the license plate of the Nissan and learned it had been reported stolen. Officer Fi tzgerald handcuffed defendant, and searched him. He found two shaved keys in defendant’s pocket. A shaved key is filed down so it can fit in any lock or ignition.
Officer Oviatt testified that he used one of the shaved keys recovered from defendant to open the door of the Nissan Sentra. Gardena Police Officer Michael Bergeron tes tified that he responded to a stolen vehicle call on October 5, 2011. Defendant was driving a stolen early 1990’s Nissan Maxima, and was arrested. In the ignition of the vehicle was a key ring with six shaved keys. Defense witness Ragini Patel was called to testify out of order. She testified that she worked as the manager at the Pine Tree Inn Motel on 38th Place and Western Avenue. She identified a hotel registration card on which defendant was identified as a “walk in” customer, meaning that he had told Ms. Patel that he did not have a car when he registered for the room. Defendant checke d in at 7:15 p.m. on August 16, 2013. During cross-examination, Ms. Patel stated th at she did not see defendant again after he registered for the room. Out of the presence of the jury, the trial court again addressed the Penal Code section 666.5 issue. The court explained to defendant, “[a]s part of the charges the People have to prove you were convicted of other underlying things, particularly
Vehicle Code section 10851 as well as they have one allege d as the 666.5 which is the 10851 or taking of a vehicle with a prior conv iction. [¶] They have to prove that one way or another. If you choose to admit it then all of those convictions would not come before the jury with the exception of the evidence th e court already allowed to be admitted. If you don’t admit them he’s going to put them on, all of them, all four of them, because he has a burden to prove that. It’s completely up to you what you want to6 do, but unless you want all of th ose to come before the jury – if he admits them that element is accepted as true.” Defendant interjected that “I don’t feel like I’m getting a fair trial period.” The court continued to patiently ex plain to defendant that the pr osecution had to prove all of defendant’s prior convictions to the jury unle ss he stipulated to them. The court then
took a recess so that defendant could consu lt with counsel. Following the recess, the prosecutor asked whether the jury would be informed of the stipulation. The court responded that the stipulation and prior convictions would be kept from the jury, except that the jury would be instru cted on how to consider th e Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) evidence. De fense counsel stated she had advised defendant, and he did
not wish to admit the prior convictions.
John Hernandez testified that he worked as a legal offi ce support assistant with the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office priors unit. He identified certified minute orders for four separate cases, including a March 21, 1994 conviction for
violation of Vehicle Code s ections 2800.2 and 10851 by no contest plea, an October 3,
1994 conviction under Vehicle Code sectio n 10851 by no contest pl ea, a November 30,
2011 conviction under Penal Code section 666.5 by no contest plea , and a January 12,
2012 conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851 by jury. 2
Defense counsel then informed the court th at defendant intended to testify. The
trial court told counsel it would allow th e People to impeach him with the four
convictions about which Mr. Hernandez had testified. The court admonished the prosecutor not to impeach defendant with the underlying facts of the cases, except for
the case introduced under Ev idence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). Defense

2 It was later agreed that bifurcation of the trial of defendant’s prison priors was not necessary, as they involved the same convictions that Mr. Hernandez had already testified to. Therefore, Mr. Hernandez testif ied that defendant had served prison terms for his October 3, 1994 and November 30, 2011 convictions.7 counsel acknowledged that “[h]e is capable of opening the door to underlying facts with his testimony.”
Defendant testified that he had been released from pris on on August 5, 2013. On August 16, 2013, he was going to work for a friend in Compton. He took a bus to Compton from downtown Los An geles, leaving at 11:30 a. m. Defendant worked until 5:30 p.m., and then took a bus to visit hi s girlfriend at her parents’ house near
Normandie Avenue and West Jefferson Boulev ard. They planned to go out on a date and stay at a hotel. They took a bus to a hotel on 38th Place and Western Avenue. Defendant and his girlfriend spen t a few hours in the hotel room before defendant left to get some beers. He noticed a bunch of pe ople congregated in the street, watching the police.
Defendant crossed the street in front of the officers and Offi cer Fitzgerald asked him, “Where you going man?” Defendant bi ckered with Officer Fitzgerald, and then his partner put defendant against the car a nd started searching hi m. Defendant calmed down because he did not want to go to jail. The officers only found his wallet, phone, and a hotel key when they se arched him. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the police car, and the officers went into the hotel. Defendant denied possessing any shaved keys. He never drove the Nissan, or any other car that day.
Defendant admitted he had plead no contest in three prior cases and that he was found guilty by a jury in another case on January 12 , 2012. Accordi ng to defendant, Officer Bergeron’s testimony about the 2012 ca se was not accurate. Defendant testified the testimony was “all wrong.” During cross-examination, the prosecut or asked defendant whether Carlos
Cifuentes was “the owner of the vehicle that [defendant was] driving in [the 2012] case?” Defendant denied ever driving the car in the 2012 case. The prosecutor asked defendant if he recognized photographs of the vehicle from the 2012 case, and whether six shaved keys were recovered from the ve hicle. Defendant denied that he was in possession of six shaved keys in that case, or that he knew what a shaved key was. Defendant volunteered that he was a passenger in the vehicle at issue in the 2012 case.8 The prosecutor then asked defendant “wer e the cops lying in the [2012] case?” Defendant responded, “Part of it was a lie. In Gardena it was partly a lie. I was in a vehicle but they said I was driving which I was not. I got convicted of evading and driving.” The prosecutor then asked, “Let’s ta lk about evading. That was really a high speed chase, correct?” No objection was interposed. Defendant responded, “Not really.” The prosecutor asked, “It wasn’t a high speed chase?” Again, no objection was interposed. Defendant responded, “No. It was traffic hours, just driving down the freeway.” The prosecutor asked, “You said you were a passenger?” Again, no objection was interposed. Defendant responde d, “I was a passenger.” The prosecutor asked, “Who else was in the vehicle?” At this point, defense counsel simply stated, “Objection,” without stating the grounds for the objection. The objection was overruled. Defendant responded, “I can’t mention no names.” The prosecutor then asked if there was a collision, and defendant responded “yes,” and that the “cops just spinned ‘em out.” Defense counsel stated, “Objection.” Her objection was overruled. The prosecutor asked whether the cops “spun you out” and defendant responded that the police pushed the car to the side of the road. When as ked if anyone was injured, defendant said that three people were hurt, including himself. Defendant denied knowing that the car was stolen. During redirect, defendant testified that he went to trial on the 2012 case because he was innocent, and was not driving the car.
DISCUSSION
1. Penal Code Section 666.5 Penal Code section 666.5, captioned “[p] unishment for second offense of felony theft of automobile,” provides that “[e] very person who, havi ng been previously convicted of a felony violation of Secti on 10851 of the Vehi cle Code . . . is subsequently convicted of a ny of these offenses shall be punished by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h ) of Section 1170 for two, three, or four years, or a fine of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both the fine and the imprisonment.” ( Id. , subd. (a).) It further provides that “[t]he existence of any fact whic h would bring a person under9 subdivision (a) shall be allege d in the information or indict ment and either admitted by the defendant in open court, or found to be true by the jury trying the issue of guilt or by the court where guilt is established by plea of guilty or nolo contende re or by trial by the court sitting without a jury.” ( Id. , subd. (c).)
Defendant contends that “t he trial court erred in ruling that the prior conviction was an element of [Penal Code] section 666.5.” Specifically, defendant relies on Young , supra , 234 Cal.App.3d 111, arguing that “ Young makes clear that the prosecution was not required to prove appella nt had a prior Vehicl e Code section 10851 conviction in order to prove he had violated [Penal Code] section 666.5.” Defendant’s
reliance on Young is misplaced.
In Young , the defendant was charged with illega lly taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, with a prio r conviction for the same offense. He stipulated to his prior conviction, but the jury was nevertheless informed of the prior conviction, over his objection. The jury wa s instructed not to consider the prior conviction for any reason but to satisfy the prior conviction “element” of Penal Code section 666.5. ( Young , supra , 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 114.) The appellate court found prejudicia l error, concluding that Penal Code section 666.5 was a sentence enhancing stat ute, and did not define a new substantive offense. Therefore, article I, section 28 , subdivision (f) of the California Constitution, which requires prior felony convictions which are an element of any felony offense to “ ‘be proven to the trier of fact in open court’ ” had no application to Penal Code section 666.5, and the jury s hould not have been informed “of a prior conviction which the defendant admit[ted] before the court and on the record, [because] that conviction is irrelevant to the issue of guilt.” ( Young , supra , 234 Cal.App.3d at pp. 114-115.) Young did not decide that the fact of a prior offense under Penal Code
section 666.5 should never be submitted to th e jury. Instead, the court merely decided that the defendant’s stipulation to the prio r offense effectively removed the issue from the jury’s consideration. ( Young , supra , 234 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1 14-115; see also Pen. Code, § 1025; Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f).)10 This case is distinguishable from Young . Here, the trial court advised defendant that he could either stipulate to his prior offe nses, or that they woul d have to be proven to the jury. 3 The trial court correctly admonished defendant that if he stipulated, the jury would not be made aware of the stipulation, or of his prior convictions. Because defendant refused to stipulate to his priors, they had to be pr oven to the trier of fact (in this case, the jury) un der the express terms of Penal Code section 666.5. (See § 666.5, subd. (c).)
2. Impeachment with Facts of De fendant’s 2012 Conviction
Defendant contends the tria l court “prejudicially erre d by allowing inadmissible
‘bad acts’ evidence to come in during the prosecu tion’s cross-examination” of defendant. Specifically, he complains that he was impeached with the underlying facts of his January 12, 2012 conviction, includ ing evading police which the trial court had excluded as prejudicial. The claimed error has not been preserved for appellate review. Only a general “objection” was made, without any legal basis. Trial counsel must generally state the specific grounds for an objection, and “counsel’ s failure to object to claimed evidentiary error on the same ground asserted on appeal results in a forfeiture of the issue on appeal.” ( People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 756; see also Evid. Code, § 353.) We disagree with defendant’s claim that any fu rther objection would ha ve been futile. The trial court plainly understood the potential prejudice of the evid ence, and would have entertained a reasoned objec tion in proper form. (Cf. People v. Carrillo (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 94, 101.) In any event, defendant’s claim fails on its merits. Generally , “[t]he scope of inquiry when a criminal defendant is im peached with evidence of a prior felony
conviction does not extend to the fact s of the underlying offense.” ( People v.
Heckathorne (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 4 58, 462.) However, Eviden ce Code section 780,

3 Defendant never moved for bifurcation or a court trial on the issue of his priors for purposes of Penal Code section 666.5.11 subdivision (i) allows a tr ial court to admit otherwis e inadmissible evidence for impeachment purposes to prove or disprove the existence or nonexistence of a fact about which a witness has testified. ( Andrews v. City and County of San Francisco (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 938, 946 [“[A] witn ess who makes a sweeping statement on direct or cross-examination may open th e door to use of otherwise inadmissible evidence of prior misconduct for the purpose of contradicting such testimony”]; Leader v. State of California (1986) 182 Cal.App. 3d 1079, 1089-1092; People v. Cooks (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 224, 324-325; People v. Reyes (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 53, 61-62.) The “open-the-door” rule is intended to prev ent witnesses from misl eading the jury or misrepresenting facts. ( People v. Robinson (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 270, 282-283.) Here, during his direct testimony, defe ndant stated that Officer Bergeron’s testimony about the 2012 case was “all wrong.” During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant “were the cops lying in the [2012] case?” Defendant responded, “Part of it was a lie. In Gardena it was partly a lie. I was in a vehicle but they said I was driving which I was not. I got convicted of evading and driving.” The prosecutor then asked defendant about th e facts underlying his evading conviction. 4
Defendant claimed he was not the driv er of the car. Moreover, defendant brought up his conviction for ev ading police, and claimed innoc ence of that crime too. The prosecutor was well within the permissibl e scope of impeachment to inquire further into the underlying facts of the 2012 case, as defendant’s statements could have misled the jury into believing he was wrongf ully convicted in that case. Defendant’s cited case, People v. Heckathorne
, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 458, is distinguishable. In that case, the defendant did not open the door to the prosecutor’s questions about the facts unde rlying his prior conviction; nothing in his testimony had the potential to mislead the jury. ( Id . at pp. 462-463.) Such is not the case here.

4 It is this line of inquiry that defendant challenges on appeal.12 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P. J.

FLIER, J.