Rel: September 27, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 

Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 

may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

SPECIAL TERM, 2024

_________________________

CL-2023-0855

_________________________

Ron's Bonds, Inc. 

v.

Tracy Pritchett-Owens, as administratrix of the Estate of 

Pharlanphas Pritchett, deceased, and Dorothy Cook

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court

(CV-23-106)

FRIDY, Judge.

Ron's Bonds, Inc. ("RBI"), appeals from a summary judgment that 

the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the circuit court") entered against it in its 

capacity as the surety for Dalton Harris, the defendant in a negligence 
CL-2023-0855

2

action involving an automobile accident. For the reasons discussed 

herein, we dismiss the appeal.

Background

On November 21, 2019, Pharlanphas Pritchett and Dorothy Cook 

commenced a negligence action against Harris in the Jefferson District 

Court ("the district court") alleging that, on the evening of January 6, 

2019, Harris's vehicle collided with the rear end of Pritchett's vehicle 

while the vehicles were traveling on Interstate 59 in Jefferson County. 

According to the complaint, Pritchett and Cook were injured in the 

accident, and Pritchett's vehicle was damaged.

In May 2019, Harris, who apparently did not have automobileliability insurance, obtained two corporate surety bonds for the Alabama 

Department of Public Safety (now known as the Alabama Law 

Enforcement Agency ("ALEA")), as required by § 32-7-6, Ala. Code 1975, 

a part of the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act, § 32-7-1 et seq., 

Ala. Code 1975. That section provides, in relevant part:

"(a) If 20 days after the receipt of a report of a motor 

vehicle accident within this state which has resulted in bodily 

injury or death, or damage to the property of any one person 

in excess of five hundred dollars ($500), the director does not 

have on file evidence satisfactory that the person who would 

otherwise be required to file security under subsection (b) of 
CL-2023-0855

3

this section has been released from liability, or has been 

finally adjudicated not to be liable, or has executed a duly 

acknowledged written agreement or conditional release 

providing for the payment of an agreed amount in 

installments with respect to all claims for injuries or damages 

resulting from the accident, which agreement or conditional 

release may include reasonable interest as set out in Section 

32-7-7, [Ala. Code 1975,] the director shall determine the 

amount of security which shall be sufficient in his or her 

judgment to satisfy any judgment or judgments for damages 

resulting from the accident as may be recovered against each 

operator or owner.

"(b) The director shall, within 60 days after the receipt 

of the report of a motor vehicle accident, suspend the license 

of each operator and all registrations of each owner of a motor 

vehicle in any manner involved in the accident, and if the 

operator is a nonresident the privilege of operating a motor 

vehicle within this state, and if the owner is a nonresident the 

privilege of the use within this state of any motor vehicle 

personally owned, unless the operator or owner or both shall 

deposit security in the sum so determined by the director. ..."

RBI furnished the bonds in the amount of $10,000 each. Each bond 

contained the following provision:

"This bond is to be automatically terminated at the end 

of two (2) years from the date of the accident, if no action at 

Law is pending and no judgment is outstanding against [RBI] 

in connection with the aforementioned accident, provided 

satisfactory evidence is filed with the Director of Alabama 

Department of Public Safety [now ALEA] that no such action 

at Law is pending, and no judgment is outstanding against 

[RBI] in connection with the aforementioned accident, 

otherwise this bond is to remain in full force and effect until 

such action at Law is final."
CL-2023-0855

4

The bonds were signed and sealed on May 14, 2019.

It appears from the record that several unsuccessful attempts were 

made to serve Harris, and, in September 2020, the district court entered 

an order extending the time for service. A copy of the service return 

contained in the record indicates that on October 15, 2020, a special 

process server was eventually able to personally serve Harris in West 

Sussex, England. Meanwhile, on July 21, 2020, Pritchett and Cook 

sought to have RBI served with a copy of the summons and complaint

despite the fact that RBI was not named as a party in their complaint. A 

signed receipt indicates that RBI was served by certified mail on July 29, 

2020.

On November 5, 2020, Pritchett and Cook filed a motion for a 

default judgment in the district court, stating that more than fourteen 

days had passed since Harris had been served and that he had failed to 

answer the complaint. It appears that no immediate action was taken on 

the motion. On September 23, 2021, Pritchett's attorney filed a 

suggestion of death, advising the district court that Pritchett had died on 

December 12, 2019, and moved to substitute his daughter, Tracy 

Pritchett-Owens, as the administrator of his estate, as a party in the 
CL-2023-0855

5

action. On October 25, 2021, the district court entered an order 

substituting Pritchett-Owens, in her capacity as the estate 

administrator, as a plaintiff. 

On November 1, 2021, nearly a year after the filing of the motion 

for default judgment, the district court entered an order directing the 

entry of a default and a judgment of default, with leave for PritchettOwens and Cook to prove monetary damages. On December 15, 2021, 

after an evidentiary hearing on the issue of damages, the district court 

entered a final default judgment against Harris and awarded PritchettOwens damages in the amount of $10,000 and Cook damages in the 

amount of $6,500. Two days later, the district court entered an amended 

final default judgment increasing Pritchett-Owens's damages to $13,500 

and taxing costs to Harris. The amount of damages awarded to Cook 

remained $6,500.

On August 31, 2022, Pritchett-Owens and Cook filed what they 

called an amended complaint in which they purported to add RBI as a 

defendant and to add a claim against it that they called "action of surety 

bond." Pritchett-Owens and Cook alleged that RBI had furnished Harris 

with a corporate surety bond agreeing to pay them if they obtained a 
CL-2023-0855

6

judgment against Harris, but, they said, RBI had failed or refused to 

issue payment on the judgment. They asked the district court to enter an 

order directing RBI to honor the bond issued to Harris. 

A process server personally served RBI with the amended 

complaint on September 15, 2022. On October 11, 2022, Pritchett-Owens 

and Cook filed a motion for a default judgment against RBI, asserting 

that RBI had not answered the amended complaint. The district court 

granted the motion, ordered entry of default, and entered a default 

judgment against RBI on October 17, 2022. In the order, the district court 

gave Pritchett-Owens and Cook leave to prove monetary damages. 

On November 16, 2022, RBI filed a motion to set aside the entry of 

default against it. On December 1, 2022, the district court entered an 

order setting aside the default judgment against RBI and ordered it to 

answer the amended complaint by December 8, 2022. Also on December 

1, 2022, Pritchett-Owens and Cook filed what they called a second 

amended complaint alleging that RBI had furnished Harris with two 

corporate surety bonds totaling $20,000, rather than just the one bond 

mentioned in the first amended complaint. Both bonds were attached as 

exhibits to the second amended complaint.
CL-2023-0855

7

RBI answered the complaints within the time the district court 

ordered. On February 16, 2023, it filed a motion for a summary judgment, 

arguing that Pritchett-Owens and Cook's claim against it was untimely 

and was due to be dismissed. Specifically, RBI wrote, the corporate surety 

bonds had automatically terminated on January 6, 2021-- two years after 

the date of the accident.

On March 2, 2023, after receiving leave of court, Pritchett-Owens 

and Cook filed a third amended complaint reasserting their negligence 

claim against Harris, which had not been mentioned in the previous 

amended complaints, and reiterating the same claim for action on the 

corporate surety bonds that it had made against RBI. The same day, 

Pritchett-Owens and Cook filed their opposition to RBI's motion for a 

summary judgment and moved for their own summary judgment, 

arguing that RBI was required to issue payment on the corporate surety 

bonds.

On April 24, 2023, the district court entered a summary judgment 

against RBI, finding that the corporate surety bonds remained in full 

force and effect. It also denied RBI's motion for a summary judgment. 

RBI filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, attaching the 
CL-2023-0855

8

affidavit of Lakesha Kemp, a driver-license supervisor in the driverlicense division of ALEA. In the affidavit, dated May 5, 2023, Kemp said 

that the corporate surety bonds issued on behalf of Harris "automatically 

terminated on January 6, 2021, because the plaintiff had not obtained a 

judgment against Dalton Russell Harris prior to that time." The district 

court denied RBI's postjudgment motion, and RBI timely appealed to the 

circuit court for a trial de novo. See § 12-12-71, Ala. Code 1975.

On June 25, 2023, RBI filed a motion for a summary judgment in 

the circuit court arguing, as it did in the district court, that any obligation 

owed under the corporate surety bonds had expired on January 6, 2021, 

and, therefore, Pritchett-Owens and Cook's claim against it was untimely 

and due to be dismissed. On July 24, 2023, Pritchett-Owens and Cook 

filed their own motion for a summary judgment arguing that RBI was 

obligated to issue payment on the corporate surety bonds. 

On October 6, 2023, the circuit court entered an order in which it 

found that the corporate surety bonds remained in full force and effect 

and denied RBI's motion for a summary judgment. On October 18, 2023, 

the circuit court entered a judgment finding that Pritchett-Owens and 

Cook were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and ordered RBI to 
CL-2023-0855

9

issue payment to them in the amount of $20,000, the amount of the 

corporate surety bonds at issue. RBI then filed an appeal with this court.

Analysis

RBI challenges the subject-matter jurisdiction affecting both the 

district court and the circuit court. Specifically, RBI contends that the 

"trial court," by which we presume it means the district court, did not 

have jurisdiction to consider the amended complaints that PritchettOwens and Cook filed. It contends that the amended final judgment 

entered on December 17, 2021, disposed of all claims against Harris, and, 

therefore, the case was over as of that date. RBI was not named as a 

defendant until eight months later, August 31, 2022, when PritchettOwens and Cook filed the amended complaint adding RBI as a party. 

Because a final judgment had already been entered, RBI says, the trial 

court erred in permitting the amended complaints. Therefore, it 

continues, the district court's judgment against it was void, and the 

circuit court could not consider an appeal from that judgment. To enforce 

the bonds, RBI says, Pritchett-Owens and Cook must file an independent 

action.
CL-2023-0855

10

RBI is correct that a complaint cannot be amended to add a new 

defendant after entry of a final judgment. As this court has recently held, 

once a final judgment has been entered, a trial court does not have 

jurisdiction to consider a motion to amend a complaint to add new claims 

or new parties unless the judgment is first set aside. Board of Trs. of 

Univ. of Alabama for Div. Univ. of Alabama Hosp. in Birmingham v. 

Richards, [Ms. CL-2023-0849, June 7, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 

2024).

The parties do not cite any authority regarding the applicable 

procedure for seeking the enforcement of bonds required under the Motor 

Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act, and our own research revealed no 

relevant authority. However, we note that seeking to enforce a corporate 

surety bond like the one at issue is similar to seeking coverage under an 

insurance policy. In Wiggins v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 686 So.

2d 218 (Ala. 1996), a case with a similar procedural history as the instant 

case, Melissa Wiggins obtained a default judgment against Chris 

Sanders on a complaint charging Sanders with assault and battery. After 

the trial court entered the default judgment, Wiggins attempted to add 

Sanders's insurance company as a defendant and force the insurance 
CL-2023-0855

11

company to satisfy the default judgment pursuant to §§ 27-23-1 and -2, 

Ala. Code 1975. Id. at 219. Our supreme court held that Wiggins could 

not recover against the insurance company in the action against Sanders 

and that to recover she would have to bring a separate action against the 

insurance company. Id. at 219-20.

In this case, on August 31, 2022, eight months after the district 

court entered its amended final judgment determining the amount of 

damages Harris owed to them, Pritchett-Owens and Cook filed an 

amended complaint purporting to add RBI as a defendant and alleged a 

claim of "action on surety bond" against RBI. Because the final judgment 

had been entered against Harris in the original tort action, however, 

Pritchett-Owens and Cook could not recover against RBI in that action 

and, as in Wiggins, they were required to bring an independent action 

against it to enforce payment of the bonds. Because the complaint against 

RBI was not properly before the district court, that court did not have 

subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the amended complaints, and its 

judgment against RBI is void.

Pritchett-Owens and Cook contend that their attempt to enforce the 

payment of the corporate surety bonds was governed by Rule 65.1, Ala. 
CL-2023-0855

12

R. Civ. P., which provides that a "surety's liability may be enforced on 

motion without the necessity of an independent action." That rule, which 

applies in district courts, provides:

"Whenever these rules require or permit the giving of 

security by a party, and security is given in the form of a bond 

or stipulation or other undertaking with one or more sureties, 

each surety submits to the jurisdiction of the court and 

irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as the surety's 

agent upon whom any papers affecting the surety's liability 

on the bond or undertaking may be served. The surety's 

liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of 

an independent action. The motion and such notice of the 

motion as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk of 

the court, who shall forthwith mail copies to the sureties if 

their addresses are known."

Rule 65.1 (emphasis added). In this case, however, the bonds were 

required pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act and not 

the Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, Rule 65.1 is not applicable.

Conclusion

Pritchett-Owens and Cook were not entitled to add RBI as a 

defendant in their action against Harris after the district court had 

entered a final judgment against Harris. Therefore, the district court did 

not have jurisdiction to consider their claim against RBI, and the 

judgment it entered against it is void. Noll v. Noll, 47 So. 3d 275, 279 

(Ala. Civ. App. 2010). Because a void judgment will not support an 
CL-2023-0855

13

appeal, the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction over RBI's appeal of 

the district court's judgment, and the only action available to the circuit 

court was to dismiss RBI's appeal. Hilgers v. Jefferson Cnty., 70 So. 3d 

357, 361 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010). Therefore, the circuit court's judgment is 

also void, and this court lacks jurisdiction over the current appeal. Id. We 

dismiss RBI's appeal and instruct the circuit court and the district court 

to vacate their respective judgments against RBI in this case. The district 

court's judgment against Harris remains in full force and effect.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Lewis, JJ., concur.