## In t he Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 23

- 00080

- CV

193 DORIS TRUST, ANDREW HUDSON, AND ERIN HUDSON , Appellant s V. AARON HANSEN, JUANITA HANSEN, WILLIAM B . PATTERSON, IV, BEN PURCELL, CANDACE POOLE, JOHN C A R S O N, LIZ CARSON, TERRY HAINLE N,

THOMAS L. TERRELL, AND PAMELA A. TERRELL , Appellee s

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Kerr County, Texas Trial Court No. 20684C

Before Stevens , C.J., van Cleef and Rambin , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justi c e St evens2 

### ME MORANDUM OPINION

T his is an appeal from the trial court’s final judgment , which reinsta ted a prior summary judgment and denied all remaining relief requested. On appeal, the 193 Doris Trust and its trustees, Andrew Hudson and Erin Hu d s on , argue that the trial court err ed by reinstating the prior summary judgment. 1 They also argue that the trial court’s summary judgment order is void for
vagueness and is overbroad. We find that the trial court’s reinstat em ent o f the prior summary ju d gm en t order was proper. We also find that the order is not void for vagueness or ambiguity. Even so, we find that a portion of the order is overbroad, reverse that portion of the order, and remand the matter to the
trial cou rt for redr afting. W e affirm th e remainder of the trial court’s ju dgment.
I. Factual and Procedural History In 2017, t he 193 Doris Trust and its trustees , Andrew Hudson and Erin Hudson (collectively Appellants ) , purchased a five

- acre property locate d at 1 93 Doris Drive in Kerr
Coun t y, T exas (the Property ). According to neighboring property owners, Aaron Hansen, Juanita Hansen, William B . Patterson, IV, 2 Ben Purcell, Candace Poole, John Carson, Liz Carson, Terry Hainle n, Thomas L. Terrell, and Pamel a A. T errell (c ollectively Resident s ) , the Property was subject to a covenant req uiring the Property to be “used solely for residential

1 Origin ally appealed to the Fourth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supre me Court pursuant t o its d ocket equalization ef forts. S e e T E X

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 73.001 (Sup p.) . We follow the precedent o f the Four th Court of Appeal s in deciding this case. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 41.3.

2 Patterson ’ s middle initial is “ B. ” in the vast majority of the pleadings in this case. While the initial appe ars to have inadvertently b een changed to “ V. ” on some pleadings, including the judgment on appeal, we use the init ial “ B. ”3

purposes
. ” The covenant also specified that “ all structures used or designed for use as a dwelling ” had t o b e at least 1,000 square fe et and “ permanentl y a t t a ched to the land. ” After purchasing the Property, the Appellants advertised that the public could rent it for wedding parties. In September 2020, the Appellants also placed a shippi ng container on the
Pr operty that wa s converted into a living s pace b u t was less than 350 square feet

. In October, the
Residents se nt a written notice to the Appellants informing them that their “short

- term rentals and special events” and the use of the shippi ng cont ain er s vi olate d restrictive covenan ts and had produced “ e x ce ssive late

- night noise

. ” In December , the Appellants moved two more shipping
container living spaces “ less than 200 square feet ” onto th e Property.
T he Residents , wh o se propertie s w ere all subject to the same restrictive cov en ants, sued
the Appell a n ts to enforce t he covenants and to obtain injunction s requiring the removal of the shipping containers and “ prohibiting future non
- residenti al rentals and the addition of f u rth er

non
- co nfo rming residences

. ” In their December 2020 re sponse, the Appella nt s ra ised defenses
of waiver and abandonment

. The Residents filed a traditional motion for summary jud gment on their claims. In support, they at tached (1) the Property’s deed , (2) th e r estrictive covenants , (3) invoices for the shipping contai ners showin g th eir sizes , (4) listings from VRBO , AirBnB , and Expedia showing the Property available for rent , and (5) the affidavit of re sident Aaron Hansen. 3 Hansen’s

3 The specific language of the restrictiv e covenant s tate d that the “ [P] ro perty s hall be restricted in the f o l l owi ng fa s hion ” :4

affidavit stated that he “personally observed the use of the [P]roperty by v arious groups for sho r t
t erms beginning in 2017 ” and that “guests staying at the Property were regul arly loud and
d isruptive ,” which led to disturban ces that were responded to by the Kerr County Sherif f’s Department “on multiple occasions.” Hansen’s affi davit also said th at ( 1 ) “ a 40

- foot shipping
container . . . was delivered and placed on the [P]roperty” on September 27, 2020 , (2) “an
additi on al 20

- foot shipping container . . . was deli vered to the [P] roperty” on December 6; and (3 ) “a third shipping con tainer

. . . was d eli v e re d

. . . to [ the P ] roperty ” on December 22. The
Residents also attached the Appellants ’ responses to requests for admissio ns
. Th ose responses showed that Appell ants ad mitted th at the shipping containers were “ used or intended for use a s short term ren t a ls ” but were “less than one thousand square feet

. ” The Ap pellants also admitted
that Erin Hudson said that “she ha d five containers coming to the [P] roperty.”
T he App ellants admitted in their summary judgment response that the Property was

su bject to t h e restr ictive covenants but was adverti sed for short

- term rental. They also admitted
that a forty

- foot s hipping container and two twenty

- foot conta iners w ere place d on the property

. Even so, the Appellants argued that the shipping conta iners were not “ ‘ d w e llings’ or ‘design ed as dwellings’ as contemplated by the restrictive covenants , ” because they we r e “ not designed as permanent living structures or singl e
- family d wellings,” but were instead to be used as short

term rentals “appurtenant to the rights o f De fendants’ to use an d enjoy their proper ty. ” As a

1. The same sha l l be used solely for residential pur poses. 2. All structures used or designed for use as a dwelling shall be permanently attached to the land, and shall contain not less than One Thousand (1, 000) sq uare feet of floor space, e x c l usi ve of garage and p orches. 3. Every such dwelling shall be equippe d with sanit ary indoor plumb ing, and provided with underground sewage disposal.5

result, the Appellants argued tha t the unambiguous language of the covenants did not restrict
the m from renting out t he Property

. After a hearing , the trial court , on September 2, 2021, rejected the A p p el lants ’ arguments
and granted the Residents’ motion for summary judgment ( Summ a r y Judgment Order )

. A ccordingly, the trial court ord ered the shipping con tainers removed from the Property , prohibited the Appellants from using or adve rtising the P roperty f o r special e vents or other non

residential uses,” and awarded attorney fees to the Residents. On October 1, 2021, the Appellants fil ed a motion for ne w trial and motion for
clarification and reformation because the terms “dwelling, ” “special events , ” “ a d v e r tising,” “residential uses , ” and “non

- residential uses” were too vague to be enforced and were broad enough to encompass private ga therings hosted by the Appellants , whi ch they had the right to enjoy as property owners

. After a hea ring, the trial cour t pa rtially granted the motion for new
trial “but onl y to the extent necessary to determine the applicability of waiver or abandonment as to the Restricti ve Covenants.” Spe cifically, the order vacated the Sum mary Judgment Order and
stated , The Court will a ll ow the reopening of discovery for the De f endants to conduct discovery and investigate the structures and their uses through out the properties burd ened by the Re stric tive Covenants, to ascertain if and to wha t extent other properties b u rdened by the Res t r ic tive Covenants have str uctures thereon that are 1,000 square feet or less which are being “used or designed for use as a dwelli ng” or not used “so lely for residentia l purposes” such that those particular restrictions would no longer b e e nforceable agai n s t the Defendants’ structure s and use of the pro p erty.
In sum, it appeared that the motion for new trial was granted to allow t he Appellants to

co nduct discovery on their affirmative defense. By January 2022 , Aaron Hansen, Ju anita6

Han sen , William B. P a t t e rson, IV, Ben Purcell, Candace Poo l e, Liz Carson, Thomas L. Terrell , and Pamela A. Terrell nonsuited their claims against the A ppellants , leaving John Carson and
Terry Hainlen ( Appellees ) as pla intiffs

. Beca use over a year had pas sed without activity , th e trial court s et the case on the
dismissal docket and noticed a hearing for May 19, 2023. At the hearing, the Appellants ’

cou nsel apologized tha t , since he had taken ov er the case in October 2021, he “ha d four deaths in the family ” and had “just gott e n w ay beh ind.” After t he trial court learned that counsel had asked to inspect several properties on the day of the hearing , it decided to “retain [the] case f or 30 days.” After that time had passed, on June 15 , 2023, Appellees’ counsel inform e d t he tri a l

c ourt t hat “ [s] ince the hearing, the re [had] been no follow up and no discovery conducted or requested .” Counsel further stated in its letter ,

If the cas e is simply dismis sed for want of prosecution, I believe there could be some confusio n abo ut the f i n al st atus of the case. In order to c larify the record, I am submitting a draft Order that Vacate s the Order Granting a New Trial (in par t), a nd confirms th e Order Granting S ummary Judgment, for your consideration. The next day , App ell ees’ counsel res po n d ed th at he could not do any thing to schedule property inspections of properties belonging to the Residents and that it was his expec tatio n that Appellees’ “ counsel would contact his clients (and their neighbors) to arrange for potential da te s during wh ic h th e p roperties could be inspected

. ”
On June 16, the trial court entered an order reinstating th e Summary Judgment Orde r ( Reinstatement Orde r )

. The Reinst atement Order stated ,

Having found that Defendants have not timel y, or diligently, pur sued the li m i te d iss ue of alleged waiver of, or abandonment of, the Restrictive Covenants,7

the Court hereb y vacates the Order of the Court Grantin g Defendant s’ Motio n for New Trial (in part) and Order Granting Defendants’ Motion f or Cl arification and Refor mation of O r d er Gran ting Plaintiffs’ Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment.
II. Reinstatement of the Summary J udgment Order Was Proper
In th e ir first point err or, the Appellants argue that the trial court erred by enter ing the
Reinstatement Order for three r ea s o ns
. The y complain of the procedure used by the trial court to reinstate the Summary Judgment Order, co ntend that the lack of a he arin g violated their du e
process rights , and believe that the Reinstatement Order const ituted death

- penalty sanctions. O u r

r e vie w of the procedural history shows that the trial court employed the proper procedural

mec hanisms, that A ppellants were afforded their da y in court , and that no death

- pen alty sanctions were imposed. The proce dural mechanism employed by the tria l co ur t to reinstate the Summary Judgment Order is explained in In re Baylor Me dical Center at Garl and , 280 S.W.3d 227 (Tex.
2008 ) (ori g. proce edin g) . There, the Texas Supreme Court reiterated , “ A trial court ’ s plenary jurisdiction gives it not only the autho ri t y bu t t he responsibility to review any pre

- trial order upon proper motion .” Id. at 231 (quoting D owner v. Aquamarine Operators, I nc . , 701 S.W.2d
2 38, 241 (Tex. 1985) )

. As a result, the trial court can reconsider a ruling granting a new trial at any ti me w hil e t he case is pending. Id. at 230

– 31, 232; see Guerrero v. Cardenas , No. 01

- 20

- 00045

- CV, 2022 WL 210152, at *6 (Tex. App.

— H ou ston [1st Dist.] Jan. 25, 2022, pet

. denied) ( mem. op. )

. Should it choose to do so, the trial court is free to e nter an “ o rd e r gr ant ing
reinstatement ” of a prior judgment. In re Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland , 2 80 S.W.3d at 231; see G uerrero , 2022 WL 2101 52, at *6 (“ [T] he t rial court had the authority to recons ider and vacate8

the new trial order and to reinstate the f i nal judgm en t at any time before judgment was
entered. ”). Because the trial court emplo yed the p rocedural me chanism bl ess ed by the Texas Sup reme Court, we over rule the Appellants ’ complaint about i t. As for Appellants ’ due

- process complaint, while the trial court h a s th e “power to con trol
its docket , ” “ [b] efore a trial court may dismiss pursuant t o either Rule 165a or its inherent

aut hority , the party subject to dismissa l must be provided with notice and an opportunity to be
heard. ” Saldana v. Hinojosa , 517 S.W.3 d 2 3 9, 241 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2017 , no pet.).
The record shows that , on November 5, 2021, the trial court initially set aside its Summary Judgment Order to a llow the Appellants to conduct limited discovery on their affirmative
defenses of waiver or ab an d o nme nt. After a considerable amount of time passed without activity
on its docke t, the trial cour t sent not ice of a May 19, 2023, dismissal hearing. The A pp ellants appeared at the hearing and argued that they needed more time for disc overy. The trial c o u rt ruled , “ I ’ m going to retain your case for 30 days. Okay? So e verything needs to be done in 3 0
d ays.” Because t he discovery was not completed within t he thirty da ys, the trial court found that
the Appellants had “not time ly, or diligently, pursued ” t h eir affirmative defenses. As a result,
the trial court denied the relief sought by the Appellants , vaca ted prior ord e rs granting their
motion s for new tria l and for clarification and reformation , and reinstated the Summary Judgment Order.
We find t h at t he Appellants h ad the opportunity to be heard during the Ma y 19 hea ring
and w e re given a deadline of thirty days to s h ow diligent prosecution of their affir mative defense but failed to do so. Although they now com plain that they should have been aff or de d ano ther9

hearin g, they have provided no authority holding that anot her hearin g w as required before dismissing their a f

firmative defenses and entering the Re instatement Order

. 4 Further, although they would have been automatically entitled to a hearing h ad t hey filed a mo tio n to reinstate the case under Rule 165a, they fai led to do so. S ee T EX
. R. C IV
. P

. 165a (3); Thordson v . City of
Houston , 815 S.W.2d 550, 550 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam)

. As a result , we find no due

- pro cess violation

. As for their comp l a i n t t hat the trial court imposed death

- penalty sanctions, we find the

c omplaint m eri tless. Nothing indicates that the tri al court sanction ed the Appellants ; it dismissed their defenses for want of prosecution. See Her nandez v. ISE, Inc

. , No. 04

- 06

- 0088 8

- C V , 2 008
WL 80005 , at *4 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio Jan. 9, 2008 , no p et. ) (mem. op. ) (explaining that a dismissal for want of prosecution is not a sanction) ; see also Patton v. Ru ssel l , No. 04

- 99

- 00221

- CV, 2000 WL 330315, at *2 (Tex. App

. — San Antonio Mar. 2 9 , 2 000 , pet

. denie d ) (not designate d for publication) (citing MacGregor v. Rich , 941 S .W.2d 74, 75 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) ) ( finding that the trial cou rt’s dismissal for want of pr osecution was not a sanc tion)

. We have overru led the challenges raised by t h e Ap pellants to th e R ein statement Order

. As a result, we overrul e their first point of error. 5

4 Appellants argue that the tr ial court was required to enter a new judgment. Here, the new judgm ent was t he Re in s tatement Order.

5 In t heir reply brief, Appellants raise a d ditional argumen ts not presented in their opening brief . Appellees were not able to respond to these new argu ments , and as a result, we will not co nsider them. See Diamond Env ’ t Mgmt., L. P. v. City of San Ant onio , No

. 04

- 2 1

- 00058

- CV, 2022 WL 4359085, a t *5 ( Tex. App.

— San An tonio Sept. 21, 2022 , pet. denied) (mem. op.)

.10

III. The T rial Cour t’s Judgment Is Not Void
In their second point, the Appell ants arg ue that the Summary Judgment Order was vo id because it was “overbroad, a m b igu ous and/ or vag ue.” 6 “ [ W ] e enforce unambiguous orde rs literally. ” Kouros h Hemyari v. Stephens , 355 S.W.3d 623, 626 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (citi ng Reiss v . Reiss , 118 S .W.3d 439 , 441

– 42 (Tex. 2003 ) ). But “ even a ‘ literal ’ interpretation of an

una mb i g uou s order requi res us to lo ok at the order as a whole

. ” Id. (citing Reiss , 118 S.W.3d at 441). “ If possible, we construe an order in a way that gi ves each provision meani ng. ” Id. (citi ng Gulf Ins. Co. v. Burns Motors, Inc

. , 2 2 S.W.3d 417, 422 (Tex. 2 0 0 0) )

. The complain ed

- of portio n of the Summary Judgment Order reads:
It is further
ORDE RED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Defendants must remo ve the shipping containers insta lled o n the property located at 193 Doris Drive, Ke rrville, Texas, 78028 within 1 5 day s of this orde r bec ause the containers viola te the restrictive covenants. It is furth er ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Defendants a re p rohibited from installing on the p roperty located at 193 Doris Drive, Kerrvill e, Texas, 78028 any shipping c o n t ain ers , or other dwell ings under 1,000 square f eet , because these s tructures violate the restrictive covenants. It is fur ther ORDERED, ADJU DGED, and DECREED that Defendant s are p rohibited from us ing or advertising the pro perty located at 193 Doris Dr i v e , Ke rrville, Texas , 780 28 for special events or other non

- residential uses.

. . . In particular, the Appellants ar gue that the ter ms “dwelling,” “residential use,” “non

- res idential ”
rentals , “non

- residential use,” “advertisin g , ” and “special events” w er e nev er defined. As a resul t, they claim , “the Order is too vague and ambi guou s to be enforceable.”

6 The Appellants do not argue in their opening brief that the t rial court erred by granting the summ a ry judgment.11

I t is true t hat “for a person to be held in contem pt for disobeying a court decree, the
decree must spell out the details of compliance in clear, spe ci fi c and unambi guou s terms so that such person will readily know e xactly what duties or obligations are imp osed upon h im.” In re
J.J.R.S

. , 627 S.W.3d 2 1 1, 22 3 (Tex. 2021) ( quoting Ex parte Slavin , 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Te x. 1967) (orig. proceeding)). Even so , “ w hil e an order must be ‘clear, specific, and unambiguous’

to be enforceabl e by contempt, it does not follow that ever y order les s than that is invalid.” Id

. (quoting Ex pa rte Slavin , 412 S.W.2d at 44). That is because “whe re an order ’ s terms are amb ig uo u s

— th at is , susc eptible of more than one reasonable interpret ation

— . . . w e look to the surrounding circumstances to discern their meanin g. ” Kourosh Hemyari , 355 S.W.3d at 62 6 (citing Lone Star Cement Corp. v. Fair , 467 S.W.2d 4 02, 404

– 05 (Tex. 1971) ( or i g
. p rocee ding) )

. Here, even though the Su mmary Judgment Ord er does not de fine six terms, “the ordinary meaning o f the unambiguous language used in the decr ee controls.” Ex parte Acker , 949 S.W .2d 314, 318 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (Owen, J., co nc urr i ng in pa rt, di ssenting in part)

. The first paragraph of t he complained

- of portion of the Summary Judgment Ord e r requires that the Appellants “ must remove the shippi ng containers installed on [ the P roperty ] within 15 days.” We find nothing vague or a mb i g uou s about this port ion of the Summary Judgment Order. Turning to the se cond paragraph, the Appellants suggest that “ dwellings ” “ encompass [es] any structure on a n encumbered property that is permanently attached to the land.” Yet, the use
of th e term “ d w e ll ing” in the Summar y Judgment Order is n ot so b road. To “dwell” means “to12

remain for a time.” Dwell , M ERRIAM

- W EBSTER ’ S C OLLEGIATE D ICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003 )

. T he ord inary meaning of the term “dwelling” is “a shelter ( such as a house) in which peop le
l ive ” or “a buildin g or place of shelter to live in.” Turner v. State , 65 0 S.W.3 d 803, 808 (T ex. App.

— Houston [ 14th Dist.] 2022 , no pet. ) (quoting Dwelling , h ttps: //www. merriam

webster.com/dictionary/dwelling; https:// www .dictionary.com/ browse / dwelling ( l a st visited
Mar

. 2 8, 2022) )

. Be cause the Summary Judgment Order used the phrase “shipping container s , or other dwellings under 1,0 00 square feet ,” the langua ge categorized the Appellants ’ shipping container s

as dwelling s , or shelter s where pe o ple co u ld l i v e or dwell , under 1,000 square feet. (Emphas is added). This was consistent wit h restrictive covenant language requiring that “[a]ll structure s used or de signed for use as a dwellin g” be at least 1,000 square feet. The Appellants a rgue that
the langua g e o f t he first parag raph might prevent “outbui ldings, storage sheds and barns . . . so long as they are permanently attached to the land,” but such a reading is incongr uent with the Summary Judgment Order’s language prohibit ing only dwellings un der 1,000 sq u a re feet,
includin g the shipping containers , which the A ppellan ts admitted were used as short

- term rentals

. 7
As for the third paragraph of the complaine d

- of portio n of the Summary Judgment Order , the Appellants argue th at the paragraph i s v oid for va gu e n ess and is overbr oad. As explained

7 Nex t , r e fe r ring to the third compl a ined

- of pa ragra ph , the Appell ants argue that , because the terms “ residenc e ,”

“ ‘ resid ential use ’ and ‘ non
- residential use ’ are not defi ned, ” “it would appear that if the propert y has a dwelling tha t is us ed in some man ne r as a sh el t ering fea ture by humans f rom the ele ment s, then that would qualify as a residential purpose under the Restr ic tive Covenants.” Yet, the plain and ord inary definitions of the terms used in th e Summary Judgment O rder demonstrate o therwise becau se somethin g m ore is re quired other th a n “a shelte ring feature” to qualify a building as havin g a residential pu rpose.13

below, while we do not fi nd that the paragraph renders the judgment void, we find the langu age overbroad. 8
T he third paragraph states that the Appellants are “prohibited from using or ad vertising
the prop er ty

. . . fo r spe cial events or o ther non

- residential uses

. ” T he ter m “residence” is “the place where one actually lives or has his h ome as distinguished from his technica l domicile , ” and

“ residential ” means “used, serving, or designed as a resi dence or for occup at io n by residen ts. ”
Mav ex Shops of Corinth, L.P. v. City of Corinth , No. 2

- 02

- 274

- CV, 2003 WL 21357597, at *2 (Tex. App.

— For t Worth June 12, 2003 , no pet

. ) (mem

. op. ) (quoting W EBSTER ’ S T HIRD N EW
I NT ’ L D ICTIONARY 19 31 (1981) ). As a result, beca use the t er m “ n onr esidential” mean s “not used as a residence or by resi dent s , ” Nonresidential , M ERRIAM W EBSTER ’ S C OLL EGIATE D ICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) , the third paragraph prohibits only non

- resident use of the property whi le allowing residential use of the pro pe rt y b y t he Appellants

. 9
W e find t hat the Summary Judgmen t Order states “ in clea r and unambiguous terms what is required for the [ Appellant s ] to comply.” In re J.J.R.S

. , 627 S.W.3d at 224 ( quoting Hale v.
Hale , No. 04

- 0 5

- 00314

- CV, 2006 WL 166518, at *3 ( Te x . Ap p
. — S an Antonio Jan. 25, 2 006, pet. denied) ( mem. op.) ). As a result, we c onclude that the Summary Judgment Order i s not void.

8 “While an injunction order may not be too vague, it need not specifical ly identify every ac t that might const itute the p rohibited acti on .” GL L o gi s tics Co., LLC v. Flores , No. 04

- 21

- 0 0125

- CV, 2021 WL 3862232, at *5 ( Tex. App.

— San An to nio Aug. 31, 2021, n o pet.) (mem. op.)

.
9 It is not clear whether the Appellants are claiming not to understan d the terms “advertising” or “event.” In a ny case, a d ve r tising me ans “ the action of calling some thing to the attention of the public esp eciall y by pai d announcements.” Advertising , M ERRIAM

- W EBSTER ’ S C OLLEGIATE D ICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) . An “ event ” is “a social occasion or activity.” Event , M ER RI AM

- W EB STE R ’ S C OLLEGIA TE D ICTIONARY ( 1 1th ed. 2 003)

.14

IV. The Third Pa ragraph Is Overbroad Even so, we find that the plain meaning of the third parag raph renders the pa ragra ph

o v er b roa d. S ee Tarr v. Tim berwood Park Ow ners Ass ’ n, Inc

. , 556 S.W.3d 274, 28 8 (Tex. 2018). “[A]n injunction must no t be so broad as to enjoin a defendant from activities that are a lawful and proper exercise of his rights.” GL Logistics Co ., LLC , 20 21 WL 386 2232 , at *6 (altera tion in original) (quoting Computek Compu ter & Offi ce Supplies, Inc. v . Walton , 156 S.W.3d 217, 221 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2005, no pet.) )

. In response to the Appellants ’ argumen t that the thir d pa ragraph is overbroad, App el lees

a rg ue th a t t he third paragraph prohibits only rentals of the shipping co ntainers, which violate the
1 ,000

- s quare
- foot requirement under the restrictive covenant. However, that is not what the third paragraph say s. Instead, it pro hibits using or a dvert isi n g th e P r ope rty, including the main

re sidence, for special events or nonresiden tial purposes. As a result, the Appellants argue that this language is “too broad and . . . can be interprete d as precluding Appella nts’ property r ight s.” We agree. S ee JBric e H ol d in g s, L.L.C. v. Wilcrest Walk To wnhomes Ass ’ n, Inc. , 644 S.W.3 d 179, 185 (Tex. 2022) ; Tarr , 556 S.W.3d at 2 91

– 92 ; see also Stephenson v. Perlitz , 532 S.W.2d 954, 955

– 56 (Te x. 1976)

. We hold tha t the third par agraph of the complained

- of port ion of t h e Su m ma r y J udgment Order is overly br oad. As a result, we must rev erse t hat portion of th e Summary Judgment
Order.15

V. Conclusion We reverse the trial court’s Summary Judgm ent Order in part, diss olve the langua ge
p rohibiting the Appellants fr om using o r a d ve r tis ing the Property for speci al events or other non

residen tial u ses, and remand the case for the trial court to reconsider that paragraph and to redraft
it in accordanc e with Tarr and JBrice Holdings. See Paul i v. Hayes , No. 04

- 17

- 00026

- CV, 2018
W L 3 4 40 7 67, at *14 (Tex. App.

— San Ant onio July 18, 2018, no pet.) (m em. op.) ( remanding
the case for the trial court to reconsider and redraft lan guage providing for injunctive relief). I n all other respects, we affirm the Re instatement Order.

Scott E. S t ev e ns Ch ief Justice
Date Submitt ed: February 21 , 202 4 Date Deci ded: Marc h 25 , 2024