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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 123,645

 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

CHAUNCEY L. BROWNFIELD,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Reno District Court; JOSEPH L. MCCARVILLE III, judge. Opinion filed May 13, 

2022. Affirmed.

Kasper Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Thomas R. Stanton, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee. 

Before ATCHESON, P.J., HILL and GARDNER, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Under Kansas law, after a prisoner properly begins the disposition 

of pending charges, the State's failure to bring those charges to trial within 180 days 

deprives the district court of jurisdiction and to hear the matter, and any charges must be 

dismissed. This appeal asks us to decide whether a prison inmate complied with the 

Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, K.S.A. 22-4301 et seq., to the extent 

that the charges pending against him must be dismissed because his detainer was not 

timely adjudicated. The district court ruled that the prisoner did not substantially comply 

with the Detainers Act. The prisoner argues that actions of the prison officials misled him 
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and the court should have dismissed the pending charges. Our review of the record 

persuades us that the district court is correct. We affirm. 

This case has been appealed before.

Chauncy Brownfield pleaded guilty to aggravated battery. His crime was 

committed in December 2015 while he was incarcerated at Reno County Correctional 

Facility. But before he was sentenced he moved to withdraw his plea. The district court 

denied his motion and sentenced him to prison for 23 months. He appealed the denial of 

his motion to withdraw his plea. 

A panel of this court in State v. Brownfield, No. 119,853, 2020 WL 499711, at *3

(Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion), held that the district court had properly 

exercised its discretion in denying Brownfield's motion to withdraw his plea. 

The panel also ruled that the record on appeal was insufficient to determine 

whether Brownfield had sufficiently complied with the Detainers Act to the extent that 

the charges should be dismissed. 2020 WL 499711, at *4. Brownfield claimed he had 

tried to initiate action on his detainer caused by this pending charge while he was 

incarcerated at the Norton Correctional Facility in March 2016. The panel remanded that 

question to the district court for further consideration. 2020 WL 499711, at *4.

On remand, the district court heard testimony of two witnesses. 

Brownfield and the Norton Correctional Facility's detainer clerk who handled 

Brownfield's request both testified at the remand hearing. Brownfield testified that he 

filed a Form-9 with the Norton Correctional Facility and expected that it would forward 

the request to be brought to court on his detainer within 180 days. He testified that he was 

asked to fill out two account withdrawal request (AWR) forms for mailing costs in the 
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amount of $6.74 each, but he did not do so. Brownfield testified if he filled out the AWR 

forms, Norton Correctional Facility either would have withdrawn funds from his account 

or, if he did not have funds, charged his account and withdrawn them when he got funds.

Brownfield said he believed the detainer clerk's request that he fill out AWR forms 

was unlawful based on his research. Brownfield testified that a Kansas case—State v. 

Lomon, No. 116,497, 2017 WL 1535229 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion)—says 

that the prison has no authority to make him pay for mailing his Detainers Act request 

and that once he wrote his request and provided the necessary information, the burden 

shifted to the prison officials to mail his request. We note that Lomon was decided about 

a year after Brownfield had filed his Form-9. 

The State called Anna Laura Laws, the detainer clerk at Norton Correctional 

Facility, to testify. Laws explained that when an inmate submits a Form-9 request for the 

disposition of a detainer, she reviews the request to see if it is legitimate. If the inmate's

request is legitimate, Laws returns the Form-9 with instructions for the inmate to fill out 

an AWR so that she can mail a detainer request to the county attorney and county court 

clerk informing them that the inmate wants to file for a 180-day writ under the Detainers

Act.

Laws testified that Brownfield sent her a Form-9 in early March 2016 requesting a 

180-day writ. She responded with instructions for filling out the AWRs but Brownfield 

never filled them out or contacted her with questions about payment of the mailing costs. 

Laws testified that if Brownfield had filled out the AWRs she would have filed the 180-

day writ for him. Laws explained that she would still file a 180-day writ for an inmate 

even if they do not have funds in their account because indigent inmates also need to fill 

out an AWR. She explained that if Brownfield had funds in his account, he would have 

been charged for the mailing costs. If Brownfield did not have funds in his account, the 
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facility would pay for the mailing costs, but Brownfield would be charged if he ever 

received funds.

The district court admitted four documents into evidence: 

(1) a copy of Brownfield's Form-9 with Laws' instructions on filling out an AWR; 

(2) Laws' notes about her communication with Brownfield; 

(3) a document explaining how to request a 180-day writ; and 

(4) a portion of the Kansas Department of Corrections' Inmate Policy Procedure 

05-108A relating to the mandatory disposition of detainers. A portion of IMPP 

05-108A was highlighted, which provided that any request for the disposition 

of a detainer shall be sent by certified mail at the offender's expense unless the 

offender is indigent or the classification administrator approves an exception 

that is consistent with public safety and the offender's reentry into society.

Brownfield argued before the district court that he had substantially complied with 

the Detainers Act by simply sending a request to prison officials with his case number 

and the name of the county where the charges were pending. He maintained the prison 

officials had misled him by saying he had to file an AWR instead of telling him he could 

file the writ by addressing a written request to the district court and the county attorney. 

Brownfield contended the prison officials were placing a burden on him that is not 

authorized by the Detainers Act by requiring payment to file the writ. He asked the court 

to set aside his conviction and dismiss the case. 

Unconvinced by Brownfield's arguments, the district court held that he had not 

substantially complied with the Detainers Act. Thus, the court had jurisdiction to accept 

his plea and to sentence him accordingly. There was no legal reason to dismiss this case. 
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In its opinion, the district court cited two regulations: (1) K.A.R. 44-12-601, which 

requires that inmates pay the cost of "legal" or "official" mail unless they are indigent;

and (2) IMPP 05-108A, which specifies the procedure for handling detainer requests 

under the Detainers Act and requires that an inmate sign an AWR for each item of mail 

sent to the district court and prosecutor. The court held that these regulations, along with 

the Detainers Act, provided the procedure for Brownfield to have his case promptly 

disposed of. 

The district court reasoned that this process of filing a request under the Detainers 

Act is analogous with filing a habeas corpus petition. The court noted that inmates filing 

habeas corpus petitions are not excused from complying with K.A.R. 44-12-601 or the 

relevant IMPP that addresses mailing costs. Brownfield was thus not excused from 

complying with the rules. 

The district court distinguished this case from the Lomon decision. In Lomon, 

prison officials misled the defendant into believing his detainer request could not be 

processed until he paid filing fees. The district court noted that the Lomon court found 

that Lomon substantially complied because the prison authorities misled him, not because 

he could not be required to pay the cost of mailing his request as Brownfield argued. 

The district court ruled that Brownfield was not misled; Laws told him that he 

needed to fill out the AWR forms, not that he had to pay before his request could be filed. 

The court noted that if Brownfield had signed the AWRs, Law could have completed all 

of the other steps and sent a "Written Request" to the district court and prosecutor. 

Instead, Brownfield refused to sign the AWRs, and the court and prosecutor received 

nothing. 

In this appeal, Brownfield maintains that the district court erred when it held that 

he had not complied with the Detainers Act and that it should have dismissed the charge 
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against him because the court no longer had jurisdiction to decide the matter. This is a 

question of law. 

The law that guides us

The Detainers Act provides the procedure for Kansas prisoners to request the 

disposition of pending charges within the state. "Once the prisoner properly initiates 

disposition of other pending charges under [the Detainers Act], the State's failure to bring 

those charges to trial within 180 days deprives the district court of jurisdiction. K.S.A. 

22-4303." State v. Burnett, 297 Kan. 477, 448, 301 P.3d 698 (2013). Its purpose is "to 

prevent indefinite suspension of pending criminal charges while a prisoner is incarcerated 

on other charges" and "to prevent delays in the administration of justice by placing an 

obligation on the courts to hear cases within a reasonable amount of time." Burnett, 297 

Kan. at 453.

Two statutes are pertinent here. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-4301 provides: 

"(a) Any inmate in the custody of the secretary of corrections may request final 

disposition of any untried indictment, information, motion to revoke probation or 

complaint pending against such person in this state. The request shall be in writing, 

addressed and delivered to the court in which the indictment, information, motion to 

revoke probation or complaint is pending, to the county attorney charged with the duty of 

prosecuting it and to the secretary of corrections. Such request shall set forth the pace of 

imprisonment."

K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-4302 provides: 

"Upon receipt of a request made pursuant to K.S.A. 22-4301, and amendments 

thereto, the secretary of corrections shall promptly:
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"(a) Certify the term of commitment under which the inmate is being held, the 

time already served on the sentence, the time remaining to be served, the good time 

earned, the time of parole eligibility of the inmate, and any decisions of the prisoner 

review board relating to the inmate;

. . . .

"(c) send by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, one copy of the 

request and certificate to the court and one copy to the county attorney to whom it is 

addressed."

"[S]ubstantial compliance with the Act is sufficient to invoke its protections." 

Burnett, 297 Kan. at 453. The burden to send the certification and request to the court and 

county attorney shifts to prison officials once the inmate properly invokes the Detainers 

Act. Burnett, 297 Kan. at 454. When something the Detainers Act requires from the 

inmate is incorrectly performed by prison officials, compliance is not excused unless 

there is evidence of affirmative wrongdoing by the officials. That is because it is an 

inmate's duty to ensure prison officials perform correctly in addressing the inmate's

detainer request. "Without clear proof of wrongdoing by the . . . [prison] officials, the 

[inmate] has not effectively shifted the . . . burden of substantial compliance away from

[the inmate]." Sweat v. Darr, 235 Kan. 570, 578-79, 684 P.2d 347 (1984). 

We find that Brownfield did not substantially comply with the Detainers Act.

There is much irrelevant discussion in the briefs about the cost of postage and the 

various rules and regulations adopted by the Secretary of Corrections. The facts reflected 

in this record demonstrate that Brownfield has not complied with the Detainers Act. 

Here is what Brownfield sent to Law: 
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"I got a felony Detainer out of reno county 2016CR14 I would like 180 writ filed

on my Behalf please per K.S.A. 22-4301 Thank you." Brownfield provided no other 

information on the form.

Here is what Laws, the detainers clerk, wrote to Brownfield in response: 

"You will need to fill out 2 AWR's or $6.74 each as Attached Memo States. 

Return to me via your Unit Team Counselor. Once I receive them I will send you your 

paper work to sign." 

She never heard from Brownfield again. 

The money requested of Brownfield was for mailing copies of his detainer request 

to Reno County District Court and the Reno County Attorney. Laws' response to 

Brownfield also included the addresses of the Reno County Attorney and Reno County 

District Court Clerk. Brownfield never filled out the AWRs or contacted Laws again. In 

late March 2016 Brownfield left the Norton Correctional Facility. It is not clear in the 

record where he was transferred. 

In the two statutes set out above, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-4301 imposes on the 

prisoner the obligation of making a written request to the court in which criminal charges 

are pending to dispose of those charges. The prisoner is also required to notify the 

appropriate prosecutor of the prisoner's request. The second statute, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 

22-4302, requires the Secretary of Corrections to certify to the court where the charges 

are pending and the prisoner's terms of commitment, among other things. A copy of this 

certificate is to be sent to the appropriate county attorney, as well. 

The law sets out a two-step procedure. The prisoner makes a written request to the 

appropriate court and prosecutor, and the Secretary of Corrections certifies to that court 
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and prosecutor the status of the prisoner. But no written detainer request has been made 

by Brownfield to any court or prosecutor in this case. 

Brownfield contends the response from the clerk misled him and cites Lomon for 

support. He asks us to reverse the district court's order to the contrary. We are not sure that 

Lomon helps Brownfield that much. 

The panel in Lomon recounted what had happened in that case: 

"In this case, it is clear that Lomon was not in full compliance with the UMDDA. 

He filed a notice with officials at the prison where he was located but it was not 

addressed to the county attorney or the district court where the charges Lomon wanted 

addressed were filed. Apparently, the prison officials took no action on the request made 

by Lomon. However, when Lomon inquired why no action had been taken on his request, 

he was not told that his filing was inadequate. He was told that the filing was not being 

processed because Lomon was responsible for paying fees as a precursor to the 

processing of the request. 

"The problem with this response is that there is no statutory authority in the 

UMDDA requiring the payment of any fee to pursue a 180-day writ. Furthermore, there 

is no reference made in the written response from the prison officials to any authority 

Lomon could refer to in order address the problem as outlined by the prison officials. 

Lomon made a subsequent inquiry on how to proceed and was given information that did 

not answer the inquiry. This led to apparent confusion on Lomon's part on how to 

proceed in that he felt the only way to move forward was to contact Morris County 

directly. There is some logic in Lomon's perception in that he had contacted Douglas 

County directly in regard to a 180-day writ and received a response." Lomon, 2017 WL 

153229, at *4. 

In contrast, we see no misleading words or actions by the prison officials here. 

Everything Laws wrote was accurate and no further inquiry was made by Brownfield. He 
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let the matter drop. We see no action in this record where Brownfield sought to resolve 

this detainer until he filed his motion to withdraw his plea. 

What happened here is far different than what occurred in Lomon, when the court 

held: 

"Lomon took action to attempt to pursue a 180-day writ and was misled on how to pursue 

that legal right. When he perceived that prison officials were not going to take action, he 

took unilateral action to pursue his right. In this case, Lomon took sufficient action to 

purse his right to a 180-day writ and the State impeded those efforts. Consistent with the

reasoning in Burnett, Lomon's efforts should not be burdened with the State's actions. 

Lomon took sufficient steps to invoke the UMDDA." 2017 WL 1535229, at *4. 

It is clear from Laws' reply to Brownfield's Form-9 that Brownfield knew more 

was required for a request to be sent on his behalf. Laws' instructions to Brownfield said 

that once he returned the AWRs she would send them back to him to sign. Even if 

Brownfield believed he did not lawfully have to sign the AWRs, he knew that no 

Detainers Act request was going to be sent on his behalf because Laws needed the 

completed AWRs before proceeding further. 

Brownfield did not ask Laws any questions about the AWRs, how to get his 

Detainers Act request sent, or whether he had to pay for postage. Brownfield also did not 

contact Laws to tell her that he would not be filling out an AWR but still expected his 

request to be sent to the court and county attorney. Laws had no way to know whether 

Brownfield still wanted to make a Detainers Act request, was delayed for some reason, or 

had abandoned his request altogether. Instead, Brownfield waited until 180 days passed 

since he sent the Form-9 and tried to use his inaction to have the case against him 

dismissed. Although Brownfield says Laws had all the necessary information to send a 

Detainers Act request on his behalf, Brownfield did not provide her with that 

information. 
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Brownfield did not substantially comply with the requirements of the Detainers 

Act, which would have triggered the prison officials' duty to mail the required copies of 

the request and certification on his behalf. The district court, therefore, did not err by 

finding that Brownfield failed to substantially comply with the Detainers Act and denying 

his motion to dismiss. 

Affirmed.