UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4031

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff – Appellee, 

v. 

RICHARD LEE STEVENS, a/k/a Stump, 

Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston, 

District Judge. (2:09-cr-00222-12) 

Submitted: September 12, 2011 Decided: September 27, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Gregory J. Campbell, CAMPBELL LAW OFFICE, Charleston, West 

Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States 

Attorney, Michael B. Hissam, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

Richard Lee Stevens pled guilty, pursuant to a written 

plea agreement, to one count of transporting a stolen vehicle in 

interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (2006). 

The district court sentenced Stevens to two years’ probation. 

On appeal, Stevens argues that the district court erred in 

finding that a sufficient factual basis supported his guilty 

plea. We affirm. 

The district court is required to satisfy itself that 

there is a factual basis for a defendant’s guilty plea prior to 

entering judgment on the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). “The 

rule is intended to ensure that the [district] court make[s] 

clear exactly what a defendant admits to, and whether those 

admissions are factually sufficient to constitute the alleged 

crime.” United States v. Ketchum, 550 F.3d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 

2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Stevens did 

not challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis supporting 

his guilty plea in the district court, we review his challenge 

for plain error. United States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 656-

57 (4th Cir. 2007). To prevail under this standard, Stevens 

must establish that a clear or obvious error by the district 

court affected his substantial rights. United States v. King, 

628 F.3d 693, 699 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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We conclude that Stevens fails to show error by the 

district court. A defendant’s guilt on a charge of violating 

§ 2312 is established by showing that the defendant: 

(1) transported a stolen vehicle interstate commerce and (2) 

“knew while so transporting” that the vehicle was stolen. 

United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441, 445 (4th Cir. 1968). 

As used in § 2312, the term “stolen” encompasses “all felonious 

takings of motor vehicles with intent to deprive the owner of 

the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether or 

not the theft constitutes common-law larceny.” United States v. 

Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 417 (1957). Where a defendant takes a 

vehicle across state lines with the intent to deprive a creditor 

of a security interest in the vehicle, the vehicle may be deemed 

“stolen” for purposes of § 2312. United States v. Bunch, 

542 F.2d 629, 630 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). 

Stevens contends that the factual basis was 

insufficient to show that the vehicle he transported in 

interstate commerce was stolen.*

 * Stevens also appears to suggest that the district court 

erred in finding that the factual basis was sufficient to 

support his guilty plea because his conduct in this case most 

closely resembles aiding and abetting mail fraud. We conclude, 

however, that Stevens’ argument does not undercut the district 

court’s sufficiency finding. 

 We disagree. In this case, the 

record makes clear that Stevens transported a vehicle — a Honda 
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motorcycle — in interstate commerce and did so knowing he was 

depriving the lien holder of its security interest in the 

motorcycle and with the intent to dispose of the motorcycle by 

selling it to a third party. This evidence is sufficient to 

establish that the motorcycle was “stolen” under § 2312. 

Accordingly, we discern no error, plain or otherwise, by the 

district court. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED