NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 

revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 

volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical 

error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 

Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 

Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-

1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

13-P-773 Appeals Court

COMMONWEALTH vs. ATREYO CROWLEY-CHESTER.

No. 13-P-773.

Hampden. September 8, 2014. - January 5, 2015.

Present: Berry, Kafker, & Hanlon, JJ.

Firearms. Evidence, Firearm. Practice, Criminal, Motion to 

suppress. Search and Seizure, Inventory, Impoundment of 

vehicle. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 

Impoundment order. Due Process of Law, Seizure of motor 

vehicle.

Complaint received and sworn to in the Springfield Division 

of the District Court Department on March 15, 2011.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Robert 

A. Gordon, J.

An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 

appeal was allowed by Margot Botsford, J., in the Supreme 

Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the case was 

reported by her to the Appeals Court.

Jane Davidson Montori, Assistant District Attorney, for the 

Commonwealth.

Patrick A. Michaud for the defendant.
2

BERRY, J. The defendant was charged with carrying a 

firearm without a license, in violation of G. L. c. 269, 

§ 10(a), and possession of a firearm or ammunition without a

firearm identification (FID) card, in violation of G. L. c. 269, 

§ 10(h). After an evidentiary hearing, a District Court judge 

allowed the defendant's motion to suppress the loaded firearm

recovered by police during an inventory search following the 

impoundment of the Honda automobile in which the defendant had 

been a passenger.

1

Suppression was based on the judge's finding that the 

impoundment and inventory of the Honda were not necessary.

However, the governing standard is not one of necessity; rather

the standard is whether the police actions in impounding and 

conducting an inventory search of a motor vehicle are reasonably 

undertaken based on the specific facts and circumstances 

presented. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the 

impoundment, towing, and inventory of the automobile were 

reasonable, constitutionally appropriate, and compliant with the 

written police impoundment policy. Accordingly, we reverse the

order allowing the motion to suppress.

1. Background. We summarize the findings of the motion 

judge, supplemented with undisputed facts adduced at the 

 

1 A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court granted the 

Commonwealth leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal.
3

suppression hearing. Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 

337 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008). On March 15, 2011, 

Springfield police Officers Longo and Canini were on routine 

patrol on William Street in Springfield. At approximately 3:00

A.M., the officers observed a dark-colored Honda automobile 

legally parked next to a vacant lot with its engine running and

its lights off. Given the late hour, the running engine, and an 

area known to the officers to have a high crime rate, the police 

officers shined the police cruiser's spotlight toward the inside

of the Honda and saw that it contained two occupants. As the 

officers illuminated the vehicle's interior, the defendant 

passenger slouched down in his seat.

The officers got out of their cruiser and approached the 

Honda, shining flashlights into the parked car as they 

approached. Officer Longo saw the defendant quickly move his 

left hand between the center console and his left leg in an 

apparent attempt to conceal a dark-colored object in his hand.

(Later, it was established that the dark object in the 

defendant's hand was a glove.)

Officer Canini ordered both the driver and the defendant to 

show their hands and remain still. The two did not comply with 

the show-hands command. As Officer Canini continued to approach

the driver's side of the Honda, he saw in plain view a silver 

folding-blade knife in the center cup holder. Officer Canini 
4

ordered the driver and the defendant to step out of the vehicle. 

As the driver did so, he put his right hand into his jacket

pocket. Officer Canini told him to remove his hand from the

pocket. As the driver did that, a white, rock-like substance 

fell to the ground. Based on his experience, Officer Canini 

recognized the substance to be "consistent with crack cocaine."

The driver was placed under arrest. The officers seized the 

knife.

Following his arrest, the driver requested that the 

officers allow the defendant to drive the Honda from the site. 

However, a computerized check revealed that the defendant did 

not have a driver's license. Given the foregoing state of 

affairs, the officers decided the car should be towed from the 

scene. Pursuant to the Springfield police department's written 

policy concerning the impoundment and towing of a motor vehicle,

an inventory search of the Honda and its contents was conducted. 

See generally Commonwealth v. Bishop, 402 Mass. 449, 451 (1988).

2

 

2 The written Springfield police towing and impoundment 

policy provides as follows.

"POLICY

"It shall be the policy of this department to 

inventory the contents of all motor vehicles that are towed 

by his department. The purposes of this inventory are to:

"1. Determine whether there is any personal property in the 

vehicle that needs to be protected from loss or damage.
5

On the floor behind the passenger's seat, Officer Longo

found gloves, a ski mask, a hooded sweatshirt, and a pair of 

sunglasses.

3 In the trunk, the police found a backpack with the 

defendant's name, "Atreyo," inscribed on it. Under the written 

police inventory policy, the backpack was opened by the police,

and within the backpack were found a loaded handgun, another

 

"2. To protect the department and its personnel from claims 

of a failure to protect such property.

"3. To protect the department and its personnel from false 

claims of loss of property that was never in the vehicle.

"4. To protect departmental personnel and the public 

against injury from dangerous substances or items that may 

be in the vehicle.

"PROCEDURE

"Whenever a motor vehicle is ordered towed by a 

department member, that member shall assume the 

responsibility for inventorying and safeguarding the 

contents of the vehicle. The scope of this inventory shall 

include any locked or closed containers within the vehicle 

that can be opened without damage as well as any locked 

portions of the vehicle itself that can be accessed without 

causing damage (e.g. glovebox, trunk, suitcases, boxes 

etc.) The department member ordering the tow shall list all 

items found within the vehicle in the remarks section of 

the tow sheet. Any monies or articles of value that may be 

subject to loss or damage shall be taken and submitted to 

the property division for safekeeping. A notation as to 

which items were so removed as well as the property tag 

numbers shall be made in the remarks section of the tow 

sheet. Anything believed to be dangerous, contraband, or 

evidence of a crime shall be seized and tagged and a report 

submitted to the proper bureau."

3 It is logical to extrapolate that the instrumentalities 

found in the backseat were potential burglarious tools. 

However, because these items were found during the inventory 

search, we do not add them to the calculus concerning the 

original decision to impound the Honda.
6

hooded sweatshirt, gloves, and a pay stub with the defendant's 

name on it.

On appeal, the Commonwealth's principal points in 

opposition to the suppression order are that (1) the motion 

judge applied the incorrect standard of legal necessity in

suppressing the firearm found following the Honda's impoundment

and the inventory search, and (2) the judge incorrectly relied 

on, and deferred to, the limited analysis of the police action 

entries in a six-month computerized dispatch log (CAD).

4 (The

CAD document itself was in evidence.) The motion judge's 

reliance, the Commonwealth submits, was misplaced because the

defense analyst's summary of the CAD was substantially 

incomplete and did not fully account for a number of crimerelated entries in the CAD -- which included a series of calls 

to the police station, with follow-ups of police dispatches and

police reports involving not only serious criminal activities

generally, but also, in particular, involving criminal and 

suspicious activities with motor vehicles.5

 

4 The computerized list is also referred to in the record as 

a police call activity report.

5 The defense analyst presented the following limited and 

inaccurate summary of the CAD exhibit.

"The bulk of what I saw from the incidents log that I 

was provided and that's been submitted to you were these 

calls for well-being checks, false alarms, domestic 

disturbances, traffic-related offenses, just general 
7

2. Propriety of the impoundment and inventory search. "On 

a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless 

search, such as an inventory search as was done here, it is the 

Commonwealth's burden to establish that the evidence was 

lawfully obtained." Commonwealth v. Eddington, 459 Mass. 102, 

108 (2011) (Eddington). "[T]he propriety of the impoundment of 

the vehicle is a threshold issue in determining the lawfulness 

of the inventory search." Commonwealth v. Garcia, 409 Mass. 

675, 678 (1991). With respect to the impoundment and inventory 

search, under a written police policy, "an officer's judgment in 

the matter is to be tested by what reasonably appeared to him at 

the time" (emphasis added). Eddington, supra at 110-111,

quoting from Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 415 

(1996). "The decisions demonstrate that our determinations are 

fact driven, with the overriding concern being the guiding 

touchstone of '[r]easonableness.'" Eddington, supra at 108,

quoting from Commonwealth v. Ellerbe, 430 Mass. 769, 776 (2000) 

(applying reasonableness standard). Commonwealth v. Bienvenu, 

 

callouts with a -- there was a sprinkling of what could be 

considered more serious offenses. My memory has it about 

maybe eight or so, a report of a robbery that type of 

thing."

But this "sprinkling" description diminishes what the CAD

document actually states and omits a lot of the persistent 

record of criminal activities in the area where the Honda was 

parked. A more accurate summary of the entries taken from the 

CAD appears infra.
8

63 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 634 (2005) (same). As these cases

establish, it is the reasonableness of the police action which 

is central. Contrary to the suppression ordered in this case, 

necessity is not the appropriate governing standard for 

evaluating the propriety of an impoundment and inventory.

With respect to the reasonableness of a vehicle 

impoundment, there are two rationales that may justify an

impoundment and subsequent inventory. One rationale for

impoundment and inventory of a motor vehicle involves public 

safety. The second rationale for impoundment and inventory 

involves the risk of property damage to a vehicle left parked on 

a street and possible claims against the police for potential 

damage to it if left unattended. "The impoundment of a vehicle 

for noninvestigatory reasons is generally justified if supported 

by public safety concerns or by the danger of theft or vandalism 

to a vehicle left unattended" (emphasis added). Commonwealth v. 

Brinson, 440 Mass. 609, 612 (2003) (Brinson), quoting from

Commonwealth v. Daley, 423 Mass. 747, 750 (1996). Both of these

justifications apply here.

First, we turn to the public safety rationale.6 The factual 

complex including the police sighting of the Honda parked with 

 

6 From all that appears of record, the judge did not 

consider the public safety issue, but instead merely focused on 

potential property damage claims. "I find that there was 

sufficient evidence to conclude that the Honda Accord could have 
9

the engine running in a high crime area; the defendant's

slouching down when the cruiser spotlight was directed at the 

Honda; the defendant's additional furtive movements in trying to 

hide a dark item (a glove) behind the center console; the 

occupants' refusal to comply with the police order to show 

hands; the plain sighting of the knife in the center cup holder;

the dropping of crack cocaine from the driver's pocket; and the 

driver's request to have the unlicensed defendant drive the 

Honda away, yielded a reasonable basis for the police to be 

concerned, as a matter of public safety, that weapons and drugs

(in addition to the discovered knife) might be contained within 

the Honda. See Commonwealth v. Dunn, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 702, 

703-704 (1993) (impoundment justifiable if supported by reason 

of public safety); Commonwealth v. Allen, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 21, 

24 (2009).7

 

been parked on William[] Street without a danger of damage or 

theft that would merit a tow pursuant to the Tow Policy."

7 The defendant argues that the Brinson case, in which an 

impoundment and inventory of a car were found improper, is 

controlling so that here the impoundment and inventory were also

not justified. But the Brinson case is distinguishable.

Brinson involved a lawfully parked car in a private lot that 

presented "no public safety risk, and . . . no evidence of 

threat of vandalism to justify impoundment." Brinson, supra at 

614. We sketch certain other distinguishing details. In 

Brinson, the defendant was not arrested within or near the 

subject car. Indeed, the subject car was left parked in the 

private lot, and the defendant was driven approximately a mile 

away in a different car where the defendant engaged in a drug 

transaction and was arrested. In short, in Brinson, there was 
10

The inventory of the Honda included opening the backpack

found in its trunk. This action was compliant with the 

Springfield police inventory policy which encompasses "locked or 

closed containers within the vehicle." See note 2, supra. The 

"protection of the public from the dangerous items which might 

be in the vehicle" includes the interior of a locked trunk that 

is "certainly not invulnerable to vandalism or theft." 

Commonwealth v. Garcia, 409 Mass. at 682.

We next turn to the second rationale for impoundment and 

inventory which pertains to the threat of potential vandalism or 

damage to a vehicle, such as this Honda, were it to be left 

vacant and parked on William Street in this high crime area. 

The CAD record, which was admitted in evidence as a documentary 

 

little nexus between the arrest and the car left in the private 

lot. This case is markedly different, including but not limited 

to, the following facts: the unusual/suspicious actions of the 

two occupants within the Honda (the crouching down in the seat;

the furtive movement toward the console by the defendant 

passenger, and the occupants' unwillingness to comply with a 

police order to show hands); the plain view presence of the 

knife in the console cup; and the crack cocaine falling from the 

driver's pocket. Beyond these, the record in Brinson did not 

suggest a risk of vandalism to the car. In contrast, at the 

suppression hearing here both the police testimony and the CAD 

provide evidence of potential risks to the Honda in a high crime 

area with incidents of car theft, burglary, other suspicious 

vehicles, and various crimes. So compiled, the record backdrop

in this case is closer to the Eddington case, which upheld the

impoundment and inventorying of an automobile, declining to 

follow and distinguishing Brinson. See Eddington, supra at 109-

111.
11

exhibit at the suppression hearing,

8 shows that, in just one sixmonth period of time, there were documented police reports of 

such offenses as vandalism, burglary, and suspicious vehicles

moving about. Indeed, a close examination of the CAD (contrary 

to the expert's characterization of a "sprinkling" of serious 

offenses9) reflects an area beset with burglaries, theft, and 

motor vehicle offenses. Indeed, in just the six-month period

covered by the CAD, the police responses and reports involve

general criminal offenses, including but not limited to seven 

incidents involving the breaking and entering of a residence;

four reports of larcenies; one armed robbery; and one incident 

of vandalism. Further and, in particular, as to motor vehicles, 

the CAD reflects two police responses involving the breaking and 

entering of motor vehicles, two reports of suspicious motor 

vehicles, and eight incidents called into the police station 

which are referred therein generically as traffic control, but 

which required, and received, a police response to the subject 

area.

In addition to a fuller review of the actual entries in the

CAD criminal activity report and police responses thereto, to be 

 

8 "We have consistently held that lower court findings based 

on documentary evidence available to an appellate court are not 

entitled to deference." Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 

266 (2004).

9 See note 5, supra.
12

factored is Officer Longo's testimony at the suppression hearing 

that, at the time of the Honda's impoundment, he was personally 

aware of a number of crimes that had taken place in the area, 

including car break-ins and stolen motor vehicles -- happenings

which the officer cited as providing a reasonable basis for 

impounding the Honda, rather than leaving it abandoned on 

William Street.

Thus, under the standard set forth in Commonwealth v. 

Ellerbe, 430 Mass. at 776, there were reasonable police concerns 

about potential theft or vandalism to the Honda if left 

unattended. See Brinson, supra at 617. Based on the foregoing,

we conclude that both the public safety and vandalism/property 

damage rationales supported the impoundment of the Honda and its

inventory search pursuant to the written Springfield police 

policy. Accordingly, the order allowing the motion to suppress 

is reversed. A new order shall enter denying the motion.

So ordered.