[Cite as Meminger v. Ohio State Univ., 2017-Ohio-9290.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Sherri Meminger, : 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 17AP-489 

 (Ct. of Cl. No. 2016-00808) 

v. : 

 (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

Ohio State University, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on December 28, 2017 

 

On brief: Rosenberg & Ball Co., LPA, and David T. Ball, for 

appellant. Argued: David T. Ball. 

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Lee Ann Rabe, 

and Howard H. Harcha, IV, for appellee. Argued: Lee Ann 

Rabe. 

 

APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio 

BROWN, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal by plaintiff-appellant, Sherri Meminger, from a judgment 

of the Court of Claims of Ohio dismissing her claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). 

{¶ 2} On November 2, 2016, appellant filed a complaint against defendantappellee, The Ohio State University. In the complaint, appellant alleged she had been 

employed by appellee as an emergency room secretary at The Ohio State University 

Hospital East ("OSU East"), and that appellee had wrongfully terminated her for allegedly 

engaging in inappropriate, threatening, and retaliatory behavior toward staff members of 

the hospital. The complaint alleged causes of action for wrongful termination in violation 

of public policy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
No. 17AP-489 2 

{¶ 3} On December 29, 2016, appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). On 

January 9, 2017, appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to appellee's motion to 

dismiss. By entry filed April 17, 2017, the Court of Claims granted appellee's motion to 

dismiss as to appellant's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but denied 

appellee's motion to dismiss appellant's claim for wrongful termination in violation of 

public policy. 

{¶ 4} On April 20, 2017, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing 

appellant could not pursue a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy 

because she was not an at-will employee. On May 17, 2017, appellant filed a 

memorandum in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment, asserting there 

were genuine issues of material fact as to her employment status. By decision filed 

June 7, 2017, the Court of Claims granted summary judgment in favor of appellee, finding 

appellant was not an employee-at-will and, therefore, could not state a claim for wrongful 

termination in violation of public policy as a matter of law. 

{¶ 5} On appeal, appellant sets forth the following assignment of error for this 

court's review: 

The trial court erred in granting Appellee's Motion to Dismiss 

Appellant's claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. 

{¶ 6} At the outset, we note appellant does not challenge on appeal the Court of 

Claims' grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee as to her claim for wrongful 

termination in violation of public policy. Rather, appellant only challenges the Court of 

Claims' entry of partial dismissal, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), of her claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. 

{¶ 7} Under Ohio law, "[a] motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), tests the sufficiency 

of a complaint." Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 2d Dist. No. 26432, 2015-Ohio3268, ¶ 5. In order for a defendant to prevail, "it must appear beyond doubt from the 

complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief." Id., citing 

O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 245 (1975). A court 

is required to construe the complaint "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, presume 
No. 17AP-489 3 

all of the factual allegations to be true, and make all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's 

favor." Id., citing Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192 (1988). This court 

conducts a de novo review of a trial court's dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Id., citing 

Grover v. Bartsch, 170 Ohio App.3d 188, 2006-Ohio-6115, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). Further, "[a] 

trial court may dismiss a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, pursuant to 

Civ.R. 12(B)(6), where the alleged conduct does not, as a matter of law, reach the level of 

'extreme and outrageous' conduct." Morrow v. Reminger & Reminger Co. LPA, 183 Ohio 

App.3d 40, 2009-Ohio-2665, ¶ 48 (1oth Dist.). 

{¶ 8} In support of her argument that the Court of Claims erred in dismissing her 

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, appellant points to the following 

allegations in the complaint. In August or September 2014, Dr. Thomas Terndrup was 

working a shift at OSU East while appellant was working as the emergency room 

secretary. During his shift, Dr. Terndrup "repeatedly threw paperwork on [appellant's] 

work area rather than hand it to her." (Compl. at ¶ 7.) After several such incidents, 

appellant "asked Dr. Terndrup to stop throwing paperwork at her, stating it was rude." 

(Compl. at ¶ 8.) In response, Dr. Terndrup "became very angry at [appellant] and 

stormed into the office of the OSU East Nurse Manager, Ken Groves, to whom he angrily 

complained about [appellant]." (Compl. at ¶ 9.) Dr. Terndrup "also complained to 

another doctor, Dr. Michael Dick," the head of the "OSU East doctor's group." (Compl. at 

¶ 10.) According to appellant, "[f]rom that time on, [appellee] was waiting for an 

opportunity to terminate [appellant] in retaliation for standing up to Dr. Terndrup." 

(Compl. at ¶ 11.) 

{¶ 9} It was further alleged on September 26, 2014, appellant and "ER Social 

Worker Sylvia Clarkson were having a typical, casual conversation about current events in 

the news." On that date, appellant and Clarkson "had discussed an incident of workplace 

violence that had been in the news." (Compl. at ¶ 12.) Clarkson "reported [appellant] for 

that conversation to Nurse Manager Ken Groves," despite the fact that Clarkson "stated 

that she did not feel threatened by [appellant]." (Compl. at ¶ 13.) Groves reported 

appellant's conversation with Clarkson "to Human Resources Administrative Director 

Thomas Ramey and OSU Wexner Medical Center Security, Lt. Wertz." (Compl. at ¶ 14.) 
No. 17AP-489 4 

{¶ 10} According to the complaint, Groves and Ramey "seized upon what Ms. 

Clarkson had reported as an opportunity to terminate [appellant], despite [appellant's] 

satisfactory job performance record at that time." (Compl. at ¶ 15.) OSU security officers 

interviewed appellant, "who stated that she had just been talking about the news with Ms. 

Clarkson, and that she preferred not to state anything further." (Compl. at ¶ 16.) 

Appellant "was permitted to complete her shift that day and to work the next." (Compl. at 

¶ 17.) On October 6, 2014, appellant was placed on administrative leave. On October 31, 

2014, appellant "was charged with engaging in inappropriate, threatening and retaliatory 

behavior toward staff members." (Compl. at ¶ 19.) 

{¶ 11} Appellant's complaint alleged appellee "had no legitimate basis to charge 

[appellant] with such conduct, or to terminate her on that basis." (Compl. at ¶ 20.) 

Further, that "claimed safety concerns about [appellant] were a pretext for its intent to 

terminate her for her prior interaction with Dr. Terndrup." (Compl. at ¶ 21.) 

{¶ 12} In its entry of dismissal as to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, the Court of Claims held in part: 

Making all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, Dr. 

Terndrup's actions of throwing paperwork at her; his 

complaining about plaintiff's behavior to her supervisor; a 

coworker's complaints about plaintiff's conversation about 

workplace violence; and, termination of plaintiff's 

employment, does not rise to the level of extreme and 

outrageous conduct necessary to state a claim of intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, it appears 

beyond doubt that the assertions in plaintiff's complaint do 

not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. 

{¶ 13} Appellant contends the trial court's decision omits reference to several 

significant allegations she made in support of her claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, including allegations that: (1) after appellant asked Dr. Terndrup to 

stop throwing paperwork at her, he complained to appellant's supervisor and, from that 

time on, appellee was waiting for an opportunity to terminate her in retaliation for 

standing up to Dr. Terndrup, (2) appellant's co-worker did not feel threatened by a 

conversation with appellant regarding workplace violence, and (3) appellee brought 

baseless and pre-textual charges against appellant and used those as the basis for her 
No. 17AP-489 5 

termination. According to appellant, had the Court of Claims taken these allegations as 

true, it could not have found that the conduct alleged was insufficiently extreme and 

outrageous. 

{¶ 14} In order to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a 

plaintiff must prove "(1) that the defendant intended to cause the plaintiff serious 

emotional distress, (2) that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, and 

(3) that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of plaintiff's serious emotional 

distress." Phung v. Waste Mgt., 71 Ohio St.3d 408, 410 (1994). The issue of whether 

conduct "rises to the level of 'extreme and outrageous' conduct constitutes a question of 

law." Jones v. Wheelersburg Local School Dist., 4th Dist. No. 12CA3513, 2013-Ohio3685, ¶ 41. 

{¶ 15} In order to recover for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 

under Ohio law, "it is not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is 

tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that 

his conduct has been characterized by malice, or a degree of aggravation that would 

entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort." Mendlovic v. Life Line 

Screening of Am., Ltd., 173 Ohio App.3d 46, 2007-Ohio-4674, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.). Rather, 

"[l]iability is found only where the conduct is so outrageous in character, and so extreme 

in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious 

and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id., citing Yeager v. Local Union 20, 

Teamsters, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 374-75 (1983). In general, "it must be conduct that would 

lead an average member of the community to exclaim, 'Outrageous!' " Perkins v. Lavin, 

98 Ohio App.3d 378, 383 (9th Dist.1994), citing Yeager at 374-75, citing Restatement of 

the Law 2d, Torts, Section 46(1) (1965). 

{¶ 16} An employer's termination of employment, "without more, does not 

constitute the outrageous conduct required to establish a claim of intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, even when the employer knew that the decision was likely to upset the 

employee." Craddock v. Flood Co., 9th Dist. No. 23882, 2008-Ohio-112, ¶ 20. Further, 

"an employer is not liable for a plaintiff's emotional distress if the employer does no more 

than 'insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though he is well aware that 
No. 17AP-489 6 

such insistence is certain to cause emotional distress.' " Wheelersburg Local School Dist.

at ¶ 42, quoting Foster v. McDevitt, 31 Ohio App.3d 237, 239 (2d Dist.1986). 

{¶ 17} Ohio courts, including this court, have reviewed claims for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress in the context of an employee's termination following an 

investigation into purported workplace wrongdoing. In Branan v. Mac Tools, 10th Dist. 

No. 03AP-1096, 2004-Ohio-5574, the appellant was terminated by his employer following 

an investigation into confidential information leaks. The appellant brought an action 

against his employer alleging various claims, including wrongful discharge and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. In asserting his claim for intentional infliction 

of emotional distress, the appellant presented evidence that: (1) his employer 

"interrogated [him] for several hours," (2) that his employer "twice refused" his requests 

to leave, (3) that the employer's "Asset Protection Team members exhibited some degree 

of physical intimidation, and repeatedly called him a liar and a corporate spy," (4) that the 

employer "threatened appellant by telling him that he would never get another job in the 

industry and would be unable to feed his child," and that (5) the employer or the Asset 

Protection Team "went through appellant's personal belongings in his office and 

briefcase, and observed appellant's home and took pictures of the home and vehicles 

parked in front of the home." Id. at ¶ 30. 

{¶ 18} In considering the evidence alleged, this court held in part: "Without 

characterizing these actions with respect to the other torts that they may constitute, while 

they are perhaps reprehensible if believed, they are not 'so outrageous in character, and so 

extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency' and be regarded as 

'atrocious' or 'utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' " Id. at ¶ 31. This court further 

noted that "[a] lawfully conducted investigation where wrongdoing is suspected, even if 

vigorously or oppressively undertaken, will not be characterized as extreme or 

outrageous." Id. 

{¶ 19} In Wheelersburg Local School Dist., the appellant, a school teacher, was 

terminated due to allegations of misappropriated funds associated with a school latchkey 

program. The appellant brought an action against the board of education, superintendent, 

and treasurer of the school district alleging in part appellees had interfered with 

contractual relations and caused her severe emotional distress. In asserting a claim for 
No. 17AP-489 7 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, the appellant alleged: (1) the appellees failed to 

act in a professional manner when terminating her; (2) the conduct of the appellees was 

" 'designed to embarrass, humiliate and degrade [her] and/or to make [her] a 'scapegoat' 

for their own misfeasance and/or malfeasance'; (3) appellees 'badgered [her] for over four 

hours'; (4) appellees denied her request for an attorney and 'sarcastically' informed her 

that she 'did not need a lawyer if [she] was innocent'; (5) appellees denied appellant's 

request to permit her husband to be present during the four-hour questioning; and 

(6) appellees falsely accused her of theft." Id. at ¶ 49. 

{¶ 20} In addressing the appellant's claim, the reviewing court held that, even if 

appellees' "conduct was inconsiderate, unkind, unjustified or unprofessional, their 

conduct was not so extreme and outrageous as to be utterly intolerable in a civilized 

society." Id. The court concluded: "We cannot state, as a matter of law that [appellees'] 

conduct when investigating the discrepancy in funds would make one exclaim, 

'Outrageous.' Indeed, appellees' actions show, at most, that they subjected appellant to 

'mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities,' 

which are not sufficient to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress." Id. 

{¶ 21} In the Wheelersburg Local School Dist. decision, the court discussed this 

court's decision in Branan, as well as two other decisions, Shepard v. Griffin Servs., Inc., 

2d Dist. No. 19032, 2002-Ohio-2283, and Smith v. Lebanon City Schools, 12th Dist. No. 

CA99-02-024 (Nov. 8, 1999), in which those courts evaluated claims for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress resulting from conduct arising from an employment 

relationship. In reviewing those latter two decisions, the court in Wheelersburg Local 

School Dist., at ¶ 46-47, observed the following: 

In Shepard v. Griffin Services, Inc., * * * the court determined 

that the following conduct was not extreme and outrageous: 

(1) purposefully discriminating against the employee based on 

her sex by treating her less favorably than other similarly 

situated male employees and denying her the opportunity to 

upgrade her position and increase her pay level; 

(2) maliciously and recklessly defaming the employee's 

reputation and character by accusing her of fraud, falsification 

of records and deception, without properly ascertaining the 

truth of the accusations; (3) publishing private and 

confidential information about the employee; (4) retaliating 
No. 17AP-489 8 

against the employee for making complaints of 

discrimination; (5) terminating the employee's employment 

based upon false accusations and an incomplete investigation 

of events; and (6) breaching the contract with the employee. 

The court did not believe that any of the foregoing conduct 

would "caus[e] an average member of society to exclaim, 

'Outrageous!' " 

In Smith v. Lebanon City Schools, * * * the court concluded 

that the following conduct failed to rise to the level of extreme 

and outrageous conduct: (1) the employer screamed and 

yelled at the employee; (2) the employer falsely accused the 

employee of causing problems in the treasurer's office and of 

stealing money; (3) the employer "repeatedly" berated the 

employee in front of other people; (4) the employer called the 

employee "moronic and uneducated"; and (5) the employer 

berated the employee for being a woman. 

{¶ 22} In the instant case, taking as true all the allegations in the complaint, 

including facts pertaining to the investigation and eventual termination of appellant's 

employment, the conduct alleged is simply not "so outrageous in character, and so 

extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 

atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Mendlovic at ¶ 47. Based on 

this court's de novo review, we agree with the Court of Claims that the conduct alleged in 

the complaint does not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of extreme and outrageous 

necessary for a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Accordingly, the Court of Claims did not err in granting appellee's motion to dismiss 

appellant's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

{¶ 23} Based on the foregoing, appellant's single assignment of error is overruled, 

and the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

TYACK, P.J., and LUPER SCHUSTER, J., concur. 

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