### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 164 -CR
Aug ust ine Sal az ar , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 368TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 07- 531- K3 68 , HO NORAB LE B URT CARNES , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Aug ustine Salazar was c onvicted of posse ssion of four g rams or more, but less than 200 g rams, of coca ine. See Tex. He alth & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(d) (West 2003). After he pleade d true to alleg ations that he had three prior felonies, Salazar was classified as a habitual fe lon and subjec ted to an ele vated punishment ra ng e. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 12.42(d) ( West S upp. 2008). The jur

y assessed punishment at f

ifty y ear s in prison, and the trial cour t ordere d the sentenc e to run consec utively

wi t h a t welve- y ear

sentenc e imposed in a sepa rate case . On appe al, Salazar
c on te n d s t h a tt h e t r i a l c o u rte r r e d b y o v e r r u l i n g h i s m o t i o nt o s u

p p r e s s t h e c o c a i n e u n d e r l yi n g his conviction. We aff

irm the judg ment of convic tion.

BACK GR OUND Duringa routine r eport to his parole o ff icer , Salazar wa s arr ested on outstanding
wa rr a nts. Sa la zar

wa s th e n e sc or

te d o uts ide , w he re the arr e sti ngof fi c e r, Ki rb y

Sho e make , a sk e d h imSee M iranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 1
2 how he ha d g otten to the parole office . When Salazar responde d that he had dr iven himself, Shoemake a sked him to identify his vehicle. Salaz ar re s p onded by pointing to his vehicle, w hich
wa s p ark e d in

the pa ro le of fi c e pa rk inglot . I t is un dis pu te d th a t Sa la zar had no t be e n r e a d h is Miranda rig hts at the time he pointed out his vehicle to Shoemake
. 1

Asserting that the parole office is loc ated in a high- crime are a, the G eorg etown Police arr ang ed to im p o u n d S al az ar’ s vehicle a nd conducte d an inventory of the ve hicle bef

ore tow ingit. Duri ngthi s inve nto ry , a n o ffice r d isc ov e re d a

pa c ka g e c on ta ini nga

pp ro xima te ly ten g rams of c ocaine underne ath the drive r’s floor mat, leadingto the curr ent prosec utio n for possession of coc aine.

Prior to tr ial, Salazar filed a motion to s uppress the c ocaine . After a hea ring , the trial court de nied the motion. On appea l, Salazar contends that the c ocaine should have be en suppre ssed bec a us e it w a s o bta ine d ( 1) in v iol a tio n o f h is Miranda r ig h ts an d ( 2 ) in c id e n t t o anu n la

w f ul i mp o u n dm e n tan d

i n v e n t o r y.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW The a ppropriate standard of

revie w for a

suppression r u l i n g is a bifurc ated r eview, g iving a lmost t otal defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s finding s of fa ct, but conducting a de novo re view of its application of law to those fac ts. Ma

x we ll v . S

tate , 7 3 S .W .3 d 2 78 , 2 81 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Sta te v . R os s , 3 2 S. W.3 d 8 53 , 8 56 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Guz man v. S ta te , 95 5 S. W.2 d 8 5, 88 -8 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). Th e de nia l of a mot ion to s up pr e ss s ho uld be up he ld3

if the ru lin g is r e a so na

bly su pp or te d b y the re c or d a

nd c orre c t on

any the or y of the law a pp lic a ble to the case
. Lan e

yv . S tate , 117 S.W .3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

DI SCU SSIO N As an initial matter, the State contends that Salazar wa ived any err or in the trial court’s ove rruling of his motion to s uppress by aff irmatively

stating, “No objection, y our honor,” wh e n th e State of

fe re d th e c oc a ine int o e vid e nc e . Wh e n a pr e tr ia l mo tio n to su

pp re ss e vid e nc e is
overr uled, the def

endant ne ed not object at trial to the same e vidence in order to pr eser ve er ror on appea l. Mo ragu e

z v . S tate , 70 1 S.W. 2d 90 2, 90 4 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ); Fi gu e ro a v . S

tate , 250 S.W .3d 490, 514 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref’d ). Howe ver, w hen the de fenda nt aff irmatively

asser ts du ring trial that he ha s “no objec tion” to the admission of the complained- of evid ence , he wa ives any

err or in the admission of the evide nce de spite the pretr ial ruling
. Swa in
v . S tat e , 181 S.W .3d 359, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

He re , de fe ns e c ouns e l so ug ht to pr e se rv e e rr or by fi lin g a pr e tr ia l mot ion to s up pr e ss and ag ain at trial by

reque sting a

nd rec eiving a runningobjection to the admission of the coc aine. Courts have he ld that ev en if defe nse counse l files a motion to suppress and re quests a running objection, er

ror may still be wa ived by

an af firmative state ment of “no obje ction” whe n the evidenc e is introduced. S

e e V a ld e z v . Stat e , No. 07-03-0014-CR, 2003 Tex . App. L EXI S 7835, at *5-6 (Tex. A p p . — Am arill o Sept. 5, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not desig nated f or publication); W i lso n v . Stat e , N o. 08 -0 1- 00 31 9- CR, 20 02 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 93 36 , at *9 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so Mar. 27 , 2 00 2, no pe t.) (n ot d e sig nate d f or pu bli c a tio n) . So me c ourt s h a ve fo un d an e xce pti on to thi s r ule , h ow e ve r, wh e n th e tr ia l c ourt e xpre ssl y

state s o n t he re c or d th a t it c on sid e rs the iss ue toWithre g ard to t he arr e sti ngof

fi c e r’ s in iti a l que sti on , ask ing Sa la zar ho w he ha d g ott e n to 2 the par ole offic e, we note that acc ording to Sala zar’s own testimony at the suppression hea ring , he vo lu n ta r il y to ld h is p ar o le o f

f ic e r , in th e p r e s e n c e o f p o li c e , th a t h e h a d dr iv e n there in his own vehicle. See M

iranda , 384 U.S. at 478 (“V olunteere d statements of a ny kind are not barre d by

the Fifth Ame ndment and their a dmissibi lity is not affe cted by

our holding today .”). 4 be pre serve d for a

ppeal. Se e Sh e dd

e n v . S tate , 2 68 S .W .3 d 717 , 7 30 (T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 2008, pet. ref

’d) (holding that aff

irmative statement of “no objection” by counsel did not waive e rror wh e re mot ion

to supp ress w a s d e nie d, ru nn ingob je c tio n w a s o bta ine d, and tr ia l c ourt

“ e xpre ssl y repr esente d to [ appellant’ s] counsel that it considered the suppr ession issue prese rved f or appe al”) ; Bo uy e r v . S

tate , 2 64 S.W. 3d 26 5, 26 8 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n An ton io 20 08 , no pe t.) (h old ingthat de sp ite statement of “ no objection” to evidenc e sought to be suppressed, error was not waived beca use “the tr ia l c ourt

c le arl y did no t c on str

ue [ap pel lan t’ s] ‘ no ob

je c tio n’ a s a

wa ive r o f h is m oti on

to suppress”)
. But see W

ilson , 2002 Tex. App. L EXI S 9336, at *8-9. The recor d in this case does not ref lect any indication by the trial cour t that it considered the suppr ession issue to be pre serve d for
a pp e a l in sp ite of the “ no ob je c tio n” state me nt. Th e re fo re , th e lim ite d e xce pti on to t he wa ive r r

ule does not apply , and any

err or in the denia l of the motion to suppress was wa ived. Fur thermore , even if

err or had been preser

ved, the trial court did not er r in denying Salazar’s motion to s up p re s s . First, Salazar c ontends that the ar resting office r’s re quest that he i d en t i fy h i s vehicle w as a c ustodial interrog ation in violation of Miranda , and that bec ause the
c oc a ine wa s d isc ov e re d a s a re su lt o f t

his Miranda violation, it s hould have be en suppre ssed. 2 A def e n d a nt’ s s ta te me nts ma de duringa “c ustodial interrog ation” must be suppre ssed if the de fe nd ant w a s n ot r e a d h is Miranda ri g hts prio r to givi ng the state me nts
. See W illiams

v . S tat e , 2 70 S.W. 3d

11 2, 136 (Tex
. Cr im . App . 2 00 8) ; see also Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn.Whil e Salazar takes the positio n t h at p o l ice c oerc ion is not necessar y to suppress the 3 coca ine under

the “f ruit of the poisonous tree ” doctrine, “both the United States Supreme Court and the C ourt o f

Cr im in a l A

p p e a ls h a v e r e

je c te d th is d o c tr in e in

th e F if th A me n dme n t c o n te xt of phy sical evidenc e obtained afte r failing to g ive Miranda w arning s.” In re H.V

. , 252 S.W .3d 319, 327 (Tex. 2008) (citing United States v. Patane , 54 2 U. S. 63 0, 63 4 (2 00 4) (p lur a lity op ini on ); id. at 645 (K e nn e dy , J., c on c ur

ri ng ); Ba k

e r v . S tate , 956 S.W .2d 19, 23-24 (Te x . Crim. App. 1997)).

5 art . 3 8. 22 (We st 2 005). A cus tod ia l in te rr og a tio n o c c ur s w he n a de fe nd ant i s in

c us tod y and is
e xpos e d to wo rd s o r a c tio ns on the pa rt of the poli ce th at the po lic e sh ou ld k no w a re re a so na

bly likely to elicit an incriminating response . Ro qu e mo re v . S tate , 60 S.W .3d 862, 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Phy sical evide nce disc overe d as a r esult of a statement made in violation of Miranda , o r “ fr uit of the poisonous tree ,” see W ong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963), ne ed only be suppressed if

the statement wa s made throug h ac t u al police coe rcion. Se e Ba k e r v . S tate , 956 S.W .2d 19, 22 (Tex. 1997). 3

I n the pr e se nt c a se , the arr e sti ng of fi c e r’ s qu e sti on to Sa la zar re g ard ingwh ic h v e hic le belong ed to him could not be consider ed re as o n ab ly likely to elicit an incriminating response . Rather, the a

rre sting off

icer ’s question wa s o f the ty pe norma lly

attendant to ar

rest, custody , or administrative booking proce dures. Such questions are not considere d custodial interrog ations for purposes of Miranda beca use they do not normally

elicit incriminating response s. Se e Cro ss v . S tate , 144 S.W .3d 521, 524-25 n.5 (Te x . Crim. App. 2004). Fur thermore , even if

Salazar’s c onversation with the arr esting office r could be considere d a custodial interrog ation, the “f ruit of the poisonous tr e e ” do c tr ine is ina

pp lic a ble be c a us e the re is n o in dic a tio n th a t Sa la zar ’s state me nt w a s th e re su lt of ac tual police coe rcion. See B aker , 956 S.W .2d at 22. Under these circumstance s, the trial cour t d i d n o te r r i nr e f u s i n g t o s u

p p r e s s t h e c o c a i n e b a s e d

o nan y Miranda violation.Th e c ourt of c ri min a l a

pp e a ls f ur the r e xpla ine d th a t “ [t]he purp os e of an inven tor

y is t o 4 pr ote c t the ow ne r’ s p ro pe rt y wh ile it r e ma ins in p oli c e c us tod y , to pr ote c t th e po lic e a g a ins t c la ims or disputes ove r lost or stolen proper ty , and to pr otect the police from poten t i al d an gers.” De lga do v . S

tate , 718 S.W .2d 718, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 6 Salazar also conte nds that the coca ine s hould have been suppressed because it was discovere d during an unlawf ul inventory

of his vehicle in violation of the F ourth Amendment. See U. S. Co ns t. a

me nd . I V. Pol ic e may take inv e nto ry of the c on te nts of a lawf ull y imp ound e d v e hic le wi tho ut v iol a tin g the F ourt h A me ndme nt, pr ov ide d th e inv e nto ry is condu c te d p ur su ant t o
rea sonable, standa

rdized police proc edure s that are administered in good fa ith. So uth Da k ota v. Oppe rman , 4 28 U. S. 3 64 , 3 75 -7 6 ( 19 76 ); see also Colorado v. Bertine , 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987).

I nco n s t ru i n g Opperman , the Texas Court of Criminal A p p ea l s has held that whe n the driver of a ve hicle is arr ested, police may lawfully impound a nd inventory the vehicle acc ording to s tand ard

op e ratin g pr oc e dure if

the re are no a lte rn a tiv e s o the r t han im po un dme nt a

va ila ble to insure the protect i o n o f t h e vehicle. De lga do v . S tate , 718 S.W .2d 718, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 4 1986). The G eorg etown Police De partment’s standa rd oper ating pro cedur es for impounding vehicles, w hich wer e ente red into evidenc e, include the foll owing lang uag e: “I f the owne r/operator of a ve hicle has be en ar

rested but the ve hicle is not neede d for e videntiary p u rp o ses, the ar resting office r will impound the ve h ic le u n le s s the owner

/operator reque sts the vehicle be rele ased to a nother responsible pe rson who is prese nt.” While Salazar asserts that his vehicle c ould have be en re lease d to h is b ro the r, it i s und isp ute d that Sala zar ’s br oth e r wa s not pr e se nt at the pa ro le of fi c e a t th e tim e of the arr est. Thus, the evidenc e re flec ts that the police depa rtment followed its standar d proce dures in impounding Salazar’s ve hicle. F urth er m o re , the supervisingoffice r on the sce ne of7

Sal az ar ’s ar rest testi fied that the pa role off ice is located nea

r a hig h-cr ime are a, that vehic les left there afte r business hours wer e a “prime targ et for bur g laries,” and that it was ne cessa ry to impound the vehicle in order to insure its protec tion. Viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the trial court’ s ruling, w e conc lude that the trial c ourt did not err in de termining that the impoundment and inventory

of Salazar’ s vehicle w as lawf ul.
CO NC LU SION Havingfound no er

ror in the tria l court’s rulingon Salazar’s motion to suppress, we aff irm the judg ment of convic tion.

________________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Waldrop and H enson; ConcurringOpinion by J ustice Waldrop Affir med Filed: Oc tober 29, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh