NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2951-21

CAROLINE J. FRANCAVILLA, 

on behalf of herself and those 

similarly situated, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

ABSOLUTE RESOLUTIONS 

VI, LLC, ABSOLUTE 

RESOLUTIONS, LLC, 

ABSOLUTE RESOLUTIONS 

INVESTMENTS, LLC, and 

ABSOLUTE RESOLUTIONS 

CORPORATION, 

 Defendants-Respondents. 

____________________________ 

Argued on February 15, 2024 – Decided March 14, 2024 

Before Judges Currier, Firko and Vanek. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-0170-19.

Philip D. Stern argued cause for appellant (Kim Law

Firm, LLC, and Scott C. Borison (Borison Firm LLC) 

of the District of Columbia, Maryland, and California 

bars, admitted pro hac vice, attorneys; Yongmoon 

Kim, Muhammad Hasan Siddiqui, and Scott C. 

Borison, on the briefs). 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION 

March 14, 2024

APPELLATE DIVISION 
A-2951-21 2 

Mitchell L. Williamson argued the cause for 

respondents (Barron & Newburger, PC, attorneys; 

Mitchell L. Williamson, on the brief). 

 The opinion of the court was delivered by 

VANEK, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned) 

This appeal requires us to determine whether a putative class action 

complaint seeking to claw back funds paid by a debtor in full satisfaction of a 

final default judgment, entered in a prior lawsuit filed in a different court, is 

barred under the entire controversy doctrine. Because we conclude the 

doctrine is applicable and prevents the assertion of the current action, we 

affirm the April 13, 2022 Law Division order granting defendant 1 Absolute 

Resolutions' motion to dismiss plaintiff Caroline J. Francavilla's complaint 

with prejudice. 

I.

The factual predicate underpinning plaintiff's complaint dates back to 

2014. We derive the following salient facts from the motion record and Judge 

Keith E. Lynott's thorough written statement of reasons. 

1

 For clarity of the record and ease of the reader, we refer to defendants 

Absolute Resolutions VI, LLC; Absolute Resolutions, LLC; Absolute 

Resolutions Investments, LLC; and Absolute Resolutions Corporation, 

collectively as "Absolute Resolutions" throughout this decision. 
A-2951-21 3 

Plaintiff defaulted on paying a HSBC Bank USA/Sears (HSBC) credit 

card balance. As a result, during the spring of 2014, HSBC closed out 

plaintiff's credit card account and assigned the outstanding debt, along with 

other delinquent HSBC accounts. Ultimately, the debt was assigned to 

Absolute Resolutions. In 2014, Absolute Resolutions filed a one-count 

complaint for breach of contract in the Law Division, Special Civil Part (the 

Bergen County litigation) alleging plaintiff was the owner of the HSBC 

account which went into default. Absolute Resolutions sought a monetary 

judgment for the outstanding balance of $3,434.31 plus costs. Plaintiff did not 

answer the complaint. On February 2, 2015, that court entered a final 

judgment by default against plaintiff and in favor of Absolute Resolutions in 

the amount of $3,575 (the default judgment). Plaintiff did not move to vacate 

the default judgment or file an appeal. 

In March 2015, Absolute Resolutions moved for a wage garnishment to 

collect on the default judgment, which plaintiff opposed. On April 14, 2015, 

following a hearing, the court reduced the wage garnishment to five percent of 

plaintiff's net earnings. Plaintiff filed an additional objection to the wage 

garnishment on April 29, 2016, but it was subsequently withdrawn. As of 

March 1, 2017, plaintiff paid a total of $3,986.30 in full satisfaction of the 

default judgment. 
A-2951-21 4 

On January 7, 2019, plaintiff filed a three-count putative class action 

complaint against Absolute Resolutions in the Essex County, Law Division 

(the Essex County litigation) alleging it unlawfully purchased consumers' debt 

without first obtaining a business license to operate as a consumer lender or 

sales finance company, as required by the New Jersey Consumer Finance 

Licensing Act (CFLA), N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49. Plaintiff sought a 

declaratory judgment voiding the debts owed to Absolute Resolutions, as well 

as any final judgments enforcing that debt, pursuant to the CFLA and the New 

Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -228; monetary 

damages under the CFA; and disgorgement of amounts paid to Absolute 

Resolutions by plaintiff and the subclass she represents based on the theory of 

unjust enrichment. 

On February 4, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion for class certification, 

which Absolute Resolutions opposed. On April 9, 2020, after oral argument, 

Judge Lynott denied plaintiff's motion to certify the class, stating it was 

"premature" and that "the [e]ntire [c]ontroversy [d]octrine and related 

principles may bar this action." 

On July 29, 2021, Absolute Resolutions filed a motion to dismiss 

plaintiff's complaint with prejudice arguing the Essex County litigation was 
A-2951-21 5 

barred based upon res judicata and the entire controversy doctrine. Plaintiff 

opposed the motion. 

On April 13, 2022, Judge Lynott entered an order granting Absolute 

Resolutions' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. As 

explained in the accompanying written statement of reasons: 

The [c]ourt concludes that [plaintiff]'s individual

action against Absolute Resolutions . . . is barred by 

both res judicata and the [entire controversy doctrine]. 

The present action is irrefragably a collateral attack on 

the prior judgment entered against [plaintiff] in the 

Bergen County [litigation]. In order to obtain any

relief from that judgment, [plaintiff] was required to 

proceed by seeking the same [relief] in that action

itself and not by asserting an entirely new action in a 

different [c]ourt. 

Judge Lynott further found plaintiff presented "no basis to dispute . . . 

the present action arises from the same transactions or occurrences that gave 

rise to the [Bergen County litigation]" and plaintiff "could have raised and 

litigated her claims concerning the lack of licensure in the [Bergen County 

litigation] including via post-judgment application – but failed or even chose 

not to do so." Accordingly, Judge Lynott concluded to allow the instant matter 

to proceed "would be directly at odds with the principles of finality, fairness, 

consistency and judicial economy that underpin the [entire controversy 

doctrine] in the first instance." 
A-2951-21 6 

Judge Lynott's rationale for dismissing with prejudice was "not on the 

basis of a pleading deficiency, but the application of res judicata and the 

[entire controversy doctrine]." Therefore, Judge Lynott found "[t]here is no 

re-pleading of the [c]omplaint that would permit . . . [p]laintiff's [c]omplaint to 

avoid the bar of these doctrines." Because plaintiff was unfit to proceed as an 

individual, Judge Lynott found she was also precluded from litigating as a 

class representative. This appeal followed. 

II. 

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her 

complaint as barred by res judicata and the entire controversy doctrine since 

her claims are based on transactions voided by the Legislature through the 

CFLA and, therefore, may be adjudicated at any time in the interest of equity 

and fairness. Additionally, plaintiff contends that Absolute Resolutions has 

come to the court with "unclean hands" predicated on the CFLA violation. 

The trial court considered Absolute Resolutions' motion under Rule 4:6-

2(a), for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Subject matter 

jurisdiction is a threshold legal question and without it, "consideration of the 

cause is 'wholly and immediately foreclosed.'" Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 

275, 281 (1981) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962)). 
A-2951-21 7 

Our consideration of the trial court's application of the entire controversy 

doctrine requires a mixed standard of review. We review de novo the law 

guiding the trial court's determination as to the entire controversy doctrine. 

See Higgins v. Thurber, 413 N.J. Super. 1, 5-6 (App. Div. 2010). "[A] trial 

court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from 

established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Rowe v. Bell & 

Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. 

Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

However, the decision to apply the doctrine, as an equitable principle, 

"is left to judicial discretion." 700 Highway 33 LLC v. Pollio, 421 N.J. Super. 

231, 238 (App. Div. 2011). "'[T]he boundaries of the entire controversy 

doctrine are not limitless. It remains an equitable doctrine whose application 

is left to judicial discretion based on the factual circumstances of individual 

cases.'" Highland Lakes Country Club & Cmty. Ass'n v. Nicastro, 201 N.J. 

123, 125 (2009) (quoting Oliver v. Ambrose, 152 N.J. 383, 395 (1998)). Thus, 

an abuse of discretion standard applies to our review of the decision to apply 

the doctrine. See Mystic Isle Dev. Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310, 

322-23 (1995); see also Paradise Enters., Ltd. v. Sapir, 356 N.J. Super. 96, 102 

(App. Div. 2002). "When examining a trial court's exercise of discretionary 

authority, we reverse only when the exercise of discretion was 'manifestly 
A-2951-21 8 

unjust' under the circumstances." Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports 

& Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting 

Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141, 149 

(App. Div. 2007)). 

III. 

"The entire controversy doctrine 'generally requires parties to an action 

to raise all transactionally related claims in that same action.'" Largoza v. 

FKM Real Est. Holdings, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 61, 79 (App. Div. 2022) 

(quoting Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC v. Moore, 464 N.J. Super. 59, 67 

(App. Div. 2020)). "[The] mandate encompasses not only matters actually 

litigated but also other aspects of a controversy that might have been litigated 

and thereby decided in an earlier action." Higgins, 413 N.J. Super. at 12. 

Pursuant to Rule 4:30A, "[n]on-joinder of claims required to be joined by the 

entire controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims 

to the extent required by the entire controversy doctrine. . . ." 

"[B]ecause the entire controversy doctrine is an equitable principle, its 

applicability is left to judicial discretion based on the particular circumstances 

inherent in a given case." Mystic Isle Dev. Corp., 142 N.J. at 323. "The 

doctrine has three fundamental purposes: '(1) the need for complete and final 

disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to 
A-2951-21 9 

parties to the action and those with a material interest in the action; and (3) 

efficiency and the avoidance of waste and the reduction of delay.'" Bank 

Leumi USA v. Kloss, 243 N.J. 218, 227 (2020) (quoting DiTrolio v. Antiles, 

142 N.J. 253, 267 (1995)). 

Judge Lynott found plaintiff had the ability to litigate Absolute 

Resolutions' licensing status as a substantive defense in the Bergen County 

litigation but, instead, pursued this subsequent litigation in Essex County as a 

"conscious choice," concluding: 

[Plaintiff] contends that the validity of the assignment 

was not at issue in the prior case which concerned 

only the original debt itself. 

This assertion, while perhaps resourceful o[n] the 

part of her counsel, is ultimately unavailing. The

basis for the claim that the assignment was invalid is 

the lack of licensure under the [CFLA]. Thus, the 

claims concerning the infirmities of the debt and prior 

judgment are inextricably linked. 

. . . . 

[Plaintiff] could have raised the allegedly invalid

assignment as a defense to the action. Indeed, it is not 

at all unusual for defendants in such cases seeking to 

collect a debt allegedly owed . . . to assert that the 

[debtor] does not hold a valid assignment, even if such 

claim is not based on the [CFLA], but on other 

grounds. To permit a litigant to raise an issue 

concerning the validity of an assignment in a 

subsequent action, when the basis for raising such 

issue was known or reasonably ascertainable by the 

litigant in a prior action is to invite all similarly-
A-2951-21 10

situated litigants to re-cast their claims and thereby 

obtain a second bite at the apple. 

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the entire 

controversy doctrine to dismiss the Essex County litigation where the 

substantive defenses raised here could have been pursued in the Bergen 

County litigation. Plaintiff posits that because equity guides application of the 

entire controversy doctrine, we should conclude the trial court abused its 

discretion by affording Absolute Resolutions relief where it has "unclean 

hands" predicated upon violation of the debt collector licensing requirements 

under the CFLA. We reject this argument as a circular attempt to use 

belatedly raised substantive defenses to justify plaintiff's own violation of the 

principles of finality, fairness and judicial economy in proceeding with a 

second suit on the same debt. 

Plaintiff cites no binding precedent to support her demand for the 

disgorgement of funds paid in full satisfaction of the default judgment, even if 

Absolute Resolutions was an unlicensed debt collector. We find the decisional 

law plaintiff cites both distinguishable and unpersuasive. 

Plaintiff's reliance on a decision by the Maryland Court of Special 

Appeals reversing a trial court order dismissing the plaintiff's class action as 

an impermissible collateral attack on a prior judgment is misplaced. The 

decision in Finch v. LVNV Funding LLC, 71 A.3d 198-205 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
A-2951-21 11

App. 2013), was predicated on the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act 

(MCALA)2 and the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (MCDCA),3 not 

New Jersey law. The MCDCA also contains a private right of action, while 

New Jersey's CFLA does not. See Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-203; 

N.J.S.A. 17:11C-1 to -49.

We are similarly unpersuaded by plaintiff's reliance on Jackson v. 

Midland Funding LLC, 468 F. App'x 123 (3d Cir. 2012), to seek respite from 

the entire controversy doctrine bar in this instance. In Jackson, the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's 

decision and found the entire controversy doctrine did not preclude a cause of 

action where the first litigation was dismissed well before final judgment. Id. 

at 124-27. We are unpersuaded that the rationale in Jackson should be applied 

to this case since plaintiff here fully satisfied the final default judgment in the 

Bergen County litigation without raising the substantive issues now asserted in 

this second lawsuit on the same debt. Ibid. 

We reject plaintiff's suggestion that we expand upon a line of cases 

where the Court held the entire controversy doctrine inapplicable to certain 

2

 Md. Code Ann., Bus. Reg. §§ 7-101 to -502. 

3

 Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 14-201 to -204. 
A-2951-21 12

legal malpractice claims. See Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, 

Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 99 (2019) ("The entire 

controversy doctrine . . . is constrained by principles of equity. It 'does not 

apply to unknown or unaccrued claims.'" (quoting Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. 

Co., 220 N.J. 591, 606 (2015))). Plaintiff argues that she was not "damaged" 

until the final default judgment was entered in the Bergen County litigation 

and, therefore, her claim in this litigation should not be barred. 

To support this assertion, plaintiff cites to Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 

424 (1997). Based upon the unique nature of legal malpractice claims, the 

Court in Olds determined that the plaintiff's legal malpractice complaint 

against his former attorney was not barred by the entire controversy doctrine 

even though the claim was not raised in the underlying action. Id. at 437-43. 

The Court set forth that "[t]he entire controversy doctrine raises special 

concerns when invoked in the setting of legal malpractice," and "an attorney's 

collection action against his or her client is not an 'underlying action' for 

purposes" of negating the applicability of the entire controversy doctrine. 

Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 109, 114. 

We decline to extend the narrowly crafted exception to the entire 

controversy doctrine for legal malpractice claims to this book account 

litigation. Plaintiff does not posit an argument that the present collection 
A-2951-21 13

action is in any way analogous to a client's claim against an attorney for 

deviation from a standard of fiduciary care. Unlike a legal malpractice case, in 

which a client may only become aware of the attorney's actionable conduct 

through the judicial process, plaintiff's claim on appeal is directly tied to the 

precise monetary exposure that was the subject of the Bergen County 

litigation. Accordingly, we decline to erode the entire controversy doctrine by 

adopting the suggested expansion of Olds and Dimitrakopoulos to this 

collection dispute. 

Although we recognize the general preference for dismissal without 

prejudice, we agree with the trial court's determination that there are no 

amendments or further discovery that could make plaintiff's claim legally 

sustainable in this case. See Mac Prop. Grp. LLC v. Selective Fire & Cas. Ins. 

Co., 473 N.J. Super. 1, 17 (App. Div. 2022), certif. denied sub nom. MAC 

Prop. Grp. LLC v. Selective Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 252 N.J. 258 (2022). Thus, 

we affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. 

IV. 

Since we find that Judge Lynott did not abuse his discretion by 

dismissing plaintiff's putative class action complaint in the Essex County 

litigation based upon the entire controversy doctrine, we need not reach the 
A-2951-21 14

remainder of the arguments raised on appeal, including the application of res 

judicata to this case. 

We see no error in the trial court's determination that the non-viability of 

plaintiff's claims as an individual precludes her ability to be a class 

representative under Rule 4:32-1(a)(3), and, accordingly, we affirm the trial 

court's April 13, 2022 order dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. 

"It is well established that, in order to bring a class action lawsuit, the named 

representative must individually have standing to bring their claims." Rosen v. 

Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 430 N.J. Super. 97, 107 (App. Div. 2013); see R. 4:32-

1(a)(3). 

Although plaintiff also appealed the April 9, 2020 Law Division order 

denying her motion to grant class certification, plaintiff did not address this 

issue in her merits brief. Thus, that portion of plaintiff's appeal is deemed 

abandoned. Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011). 

Any disagreement with the April 9, 2020 order would also be rendered moot 

based upon our affirmance of the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint with 

prejudice. 

Affirmed.