UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-7510

DONALD JOHN SCANLON,

Petitioner – Appellant,

v.

SID HARKLEROAD,

Respondent – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, 

District Judge. (1:07-cv-00498-TDS-WWD)

Argued: December 6, 2011 Decided: February 23, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

ARGUED: Janet Moore, JANET MOORE, ATTORNEY AT LAW LLC, Wyoming, 

Ohio, for Appellant. Mary Carla Hollis, NORTH CAROLINA 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

ON BRIEF: Roy Cooper, Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

A North Carolina jury convicted Donald John Scanlon of 

murdering Claudine Harris, who had employed him as a handyman. 

After exhausting his state remedies, Scanlon filed this 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 action, raising eight claims of error. The 

district court ultimately awarded summary judgment to the State 

of North Carolina and dismissed Scanlon’s petition. The 

district court also granted Scanlon a certificate of 

appealability (COA) on a single claim: whether his attorneys 

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), by failing to review and use 

Harris’ medical records at trial. Cognizant of the Supreme 

Court’s recent reminder that a habeas petitioner’s burden for 

meeting Strickland is sufficiently high that “even a strong case 

for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable,” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 

(2011), we affirm the district court. 

I.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals (the “Court of 

Appeals”) summarized the trial evidence as follows:

[Donald Scanlon] worked for Claudine Wilson Harris as 

a handyman from October 1995 through January 1996 [in 

Durham, North Carolina]. [Scanlon] lived at Ms. 

Harris’ residence until she discovered that he had 

been misusing her credit cards and forging checks on 
3

her checking account. After Ms. Harris evicted 

[Scanlon] from her home and sought to take out 

warrants against him, [Scanlon] threatened to kill 

her. Ms. Harris told her sister, Barbara Breeden, 

that she feared that [Scanlon] had a key to her home 

and she felt that she should have the locks changed. 

Ms. Harris never changed the locks to her residence; 

however, as a result of her fears for her own safety, 

Ms. Harris’ nephew, Carlos Breeden, and his girlfriend 

came to live with her at the end of January 1996.

At around 9:00 p.m. on 27 February 1996, Carlos 

Breeden found Ms. Harris’ body in her bed with a 

plastic bag wrapped around her head and tied in a 

knot. Ms. Harris’ sweatshirt was pushed up, revealing 

her underclothes, and her sweat pants and under pants 

were partially pulled down. Near her bed was a soup 

can punched with holes, described as a pipe for 

smoking controlled substances, and a torn-up letter to 

[Scanlon] expressing her feelings for him. A 

toxicology report revealed that she had cocaine 

metabolites in her blood.

On 10 March 1996, authorities arrested [Scanlon] in 

Syracuse, New York (on unrelated charges) and found in 

his possession several of Ms. Harris’ credit cards, as 

well as a blank check from Ms. Harris’ business 

checking account. The arresting officers also seized 

pieces of paper containing Ms. Harris’ address, date 

of birth, social security number, and her First Union 

checking account number. Meanwhile, in New Orleans, 

where [Scanlon] admittedly abandoned Ms. Harris’ car a 

few days before, police officers found three keys in 

the car, none of which fit the lock to Ms. Harris’ 

home.

State v. Scanlon, 626 S.E.2d 770, 775 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) 

(Wynn, J.). Based on the foregoing, a grand jury indicted 

Scanlon on March 18, 1996, charging him with the first-degree 

murder of Harris, felonious breaking and entering of her 

residence, and felonious larceny and possession of her car and 

her credit cards.
4

At trial, the State introduced forensic evidence indicating 

that Scanlon was in Harris’ home near the time of her death:

A cigarette butt in Harris’ house, not present two 

days before her death, contained saliva that matched 

Scanlon’s saliva. Scanlon’s head hairs and one pubic 

hair were found on Harris’ bed. Further, on the day 

of Harris’ death Scanlon pawned a gold ring similar to 

one that Carlos Breeden owned and which went missing 

following Harris’ death.

Scanlon v. Harkleroad, 740 F.Supp.2d 706, 709 (M.D.N.C. 2010). 

The State also put forth evidence that Scanlon told his

arresting agents that he was abducted from his motel room in 

Durham the weekend before Harris’ murder and, after being held 

for several days, was released, given Harris’ car and credit 

cards, and told to leave the area. 

Scanlon’s trial counsel, Brian Aus and Lee Castle, pursued 

a two-track defense by contending that Harris’ death was not a 

homicide—but rather a suicide or an accidental death due to 

cocaine-induced coronary blockage during attempted sexual 

asphyxiation—and that Scanlon was not in Durham at the time of 

Harris’ death. To support the theory of accidental death, 

Scanlon’s expert, Dr. Lawrence Harris, testified that, based on 

“the plastic bag, cocaine metabolites, ‘new clots’ blocking the 

bypass artery in Ms. Harris’ heart, her disarranged clothing, 

and the round bed where her body was discovered,” Harris died 

during attempted sexual asphyxiation. State v. Scanlon, 626 

S.E.2d at 776. On cross-examination, however, Dr. Harris 
5

admitted that he never reviewed Harris’ medical records and 

conceded that it was likely someone else put the bedcovers over 

her and tied the knot in the plastic bag. 

To counter this defense, the State elicited testimony from 

Dr. Robert Thompson, a forensic pathologist who supervised

Harris’ autopsy. Dr. Thompson testified that Harris’ cause of 

death was asphyxiation and that the manner of death was 

homicide. Consistent with this view, Dr. Thompson testified 

that Harris had bruising around her eye that could have been 

caused by a fist and marks on her arms that could have been 

caused by someone grabbing her.

Also at trial, Scanlon put forth evidence that Harris was 

hospitalized in December 1995, had severe coronary artery 

disease, had likely suffered a heart attack in the past, and had 

undergone coronary bypass surgery. The State, however, 

represented that Harris’ surgery had helped her regain some 

functionality and corrected her heart problems.

The jury convicted Scanlon of all charges and, following a 

penalty phase, he was sentenced to death. On May 5, 2000, 

Scanlon filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief (MAR) arguing, 

inter alia, that his counsel was ineffective under Strickland

for failing to use Harris’ medical records at trial to show that 

her heart condition was extremely serious and to establish that 

she had a history of clinical depression, making suicide a 
6

possible cause of death. The MAR court held an evidentiary 

hearing, during which Scanlon’s trial attorneys both testified. 

In addition, Scanlon presented testimony from multiple expert 

witnesses opining on Harris’ medical records, including a 

cardiologist, two forensic pathologists, a clinical 

psychologist, and a psychiatrist. These experts testified, 

generally, that Harris was a good candidate for “sudden death” 

given her heart condition, particularly if she ingested cocaine. 

Regarding her mental health records, Scanlon’s experts testified 

that Harris had significant risk factors for suicide and that 

her death was consistent with a successful suicide attempt. 

However, only one expert would affirmatively testify that 

suicide was the cause of death, but even that expert allowed 

that he “[did not] have any problem with undetermined” as the 

cause of death because “[t]here are features of virtually every 

single manner of death in this case.” (J.A. 2445).

Dr. Thompson also testified at the MAR hearing, and he 

concluded that although the medical records would have led him 

to consider suicide or undetermined as the cause of death, 

ultimately the records did not alter his trial testimony that 

Harris’ cause of death was asphyxiation and that the manner of 

death was homicide. Dr. Thompson testified that he based this 

conclusion in part on the scene of the death—including the 

bedcovers placed over Harris and the plastic bag around her 
7

head. In addition, Dr. Daniel Gianturco, Harris’ treating 

psychiatrist, testified that he did not believe Harris was 

suicidal and that he did not see signs of suicidal ideation.

The MAR court issued its ruling on February 25, 2004, 

concluding that counsel was not constitutionally ineffective in 

its representation as to the guilt phase of Scanlon’s trial, but 

that counsel was ineffective regarding the sentencing phase.1

 

The State declined to pursue the death penalty at the new 

sentencing hearing, and Harris was sentenced to life 

imprisonment without parole. Relevant here, Scanlon appealed 

the MAR court’s denial of relief as to the guilt phase, and the 

Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Scanlon, 626 S.E.2d 789-91. 

The Court of Appeals recognized that Scanlon’s claim arose under 

Strickland, and that Scanlon had the burden of establishing that 

counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency 

caused him prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the MAR 

court’s ruling denying Scanlon relief, concluding that “even if 

 1 The MAR court based its determination regarding the 

sentencing phase on the State’s use of the aggravating factor 

that the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” 

The MAR court concluded that the medical records could have 

disputed the State’s position that the murder was cruel and 

heinous because Harris suffered “air hunger” before her death. 

In the MAR court’s view, the medical records could have shown 

that, given Harris’ heart condition, her death would have 

occurred quickly. (J.A. 4311-4317).
8

trial counsel’s actions were objectively unreasonable, [Scanlon] 

was not prejudiced.” Id. at 791.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina denied Scanlon’s 

request for discretionary review and dismissed his appeal, and 

this § 2254 petition followed. After Scanlon filed his 

petition, both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. 

The petition was referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended 

granting the State’s motion and dismissing Scanlon’s petition. 

The magistrate judge concluded that trial counsel’s performance 

was deficient within the meaning of Strickland but that Scanlon 

could not establish prejudice. Scanlon timely filed objections 

and, relevant here, the district court concluded that the Court 

of Appeals’ decision was an unreasonable application of 

Strickland as to the deficient-performance prong. Scanlon v. 

Harkleroad, 740 F.Supp.2d at 728-30. The district court also 

found, however, that the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the 

prejudice prong was not an unreasonable application of 

Strickland. Id. at 730. In reaching this conclusion, the court 

noted “significant evidence of Scanlon’s guilt that would not 

have been controverted by the use of the Records at trial,” 

including the physical evidence tending to place Scanlon in 

Harris’ residence around the time of the murder, the evidence of 

Scanlon’s prior threats against Harris, and the evidence that 
9

Harris had a “potential altercation” at or near the time of her 

death. Id. 

The district court therefore granted the State’s motion for 

summary judgment and dismissed Scanlon’s petition. The court 

granted Scanlon a COA on his Strickland claim. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2). 

II

A.

On appeal, Scanlon agrees with the district court that the 

Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Strickland’s deficientperformance prong. Scanlon argues, however, that the district 

court erred in concluding that the Court of Appeals reasonably 

applied Strickland’s prejudice prong. “We review de novo the 

district court’s decision to deny [Scanlon’s] § 2254 petition 

based on the record before the [state court], applying the same 

standards as did the district court.” Golphin v. Branker, 519 

F.3d 168, 178 (4th Cir. 2008). “Pursuant to the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (‘AEDPA’), the scope of 

our review in cases on collateral review from a state court 

proceeding that adjudicated a claim on the merits is both 

deferential and highly constrained.” Id. That is, under § 

2254, federal habeas relief may not be granted unless a 

petitioner shows that the earlier state court’s decision “was 
10

contrary to” clearly established federal law, § 2254(d)(1); 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)2; or that it

“involved an unreasonable application of” such law, § 

2254(d)(1); or that it “was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts” in light of the record before the 

state court, § 2254(d)(2).

Recently, the Supreme Court reiterated the scope of federal 

habeas review of Strickland claims. Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 

786. The Court began by explaining that a showing of error is 

insufficient under § 2254, because “[f]or purposes of § 

2254(d)(1), ‘an unreasonable application of federal law is 

different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Id.

at 785 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). “[E]ven a strong 

case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary 

conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. at 786. As the Court 

 2 Scanlon also contends that the Court of Appeals’ decision 

is “contrary to” “clearly established federal law” under 

2254(d)(1). That prong of § 2254 applies when the state court 

failed to recognize the clearly established federal law or 

applied the incorrect clearly established law. See Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (noting “contrary to” clause 

applied “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to 

that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] 

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”). In 

this case, however, the Court of Appeals applied the correct 

federal law (Strickland) and the “contrary to” clause is not 

implicated. 
11

succinctly stated, “[i]f this standard is difficult to meet, 

that is because it was meant to be.” Id.

In the Strickland context, a federal habeas court “must 

determine what arguments or theories supported or, [if none were 

stated], could have supported, the state court’s decision; and

then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could 

disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with 

the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. 

Habeas relief is appropriate only if “there is no possibility 

fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s 

decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court’s precedents.” Id. 

The Court reminded lower courts that, even without § 2254’s 

deference, the Strickland standard “is a most deferential one.” 

Id. at 788. Moreover, “[w]hen combined with the extra layer of 

deference that § 2254 provides, the result is double deference 

and the question becomes whether ‘there is any reasonable 

argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential 

standard.’” Johnson v. Sec’y, DOC, 643 F.3d 907, 910-11 (11th 

Cir. 2011) (quoting Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788). “Double 

deference is doubly difficult for a petitioner to overcome, and 

it will be a rare case in which an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim that was denied on the merits in state court is 

found to merit relief in a federal habeas proceeding.” Id. at 

911.
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B.

In this case, the district court properly performed the 

role of a federal habeas court. It recognized the deferential 

Strickland standard and applied that standard correctly and in 

“tandem” with § 2254(d) to determine that the Court of Appeals’ 

application of Strickland was not unreasonable. Harrington, 131 

S.Ct. at 788. In so doing, the district court heeded the 

Harrington Court’s admonition that an “unreasonable application 

. . . is different from an incorrect application of federal 

law,” id. at 785 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in 

original), and “guard[ed] against the danger of equating 

unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under 

§ 2254(d),” id. at 788. Accordingly, having reviewed the 

voluminous record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm 

substantially on the reasoning of the district court. See

Scanlon, 740 F.Supp.2d at 728-30.3

 3 Because we affirm the district court’s conclusion that the 

Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Strickland’s

prejudice prong, we do not address the State’s alternate 

argument that the Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply 

the deficient-performance prong. 
13

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment 

denying and dismissing Scanlon’s § 2254 petition is 

AFFIRMED.