1

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. ) Cr. ID. No. 2205009689

)

LARON PHILMORE, )

)

Defendant. )

Submitted: July 24, 2023

Decided: July 31, 2023

COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

Mark Petrucci, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, 

Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.

LaRon Philmore, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, 

Delaware. 

O’CONNOR, Commissioner
2

This 31st day of July, 2023, upon consideration of the Defendant’s Motion for 

Postconviction Relief and the record in this matter, the following is my Report and 

Recommendation.

Defendant LaRon Philmore was arrested on May 20, 2022 and charged with 

Assault Second Degree in violation of 11 Del. C. § 612(a)(6). On June 10, 2022, the 

State filed an Information charging the Defendant for the same felony offense.

1

 On 

June 15, 2022, after executing a waiver of Indictment,2the Defendant pled guilty to 

Assault Second Degree.

3

 At that time, the Court deferred sentencing and ordered a 

Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”).

4

 

In addition to ordering a PSI, on August 23, 2022, the Court ordered the 

Delaware Psychiatric Center (“DPC”) to complete a psychological evaluation of 

Defendant prior to sentencing.

5

 On January 31, 2023, the Court received a Forensic 

Mental Health Examination Report from DPC.

6

 On February 14, 2023, the Court 

provided counsel for the State and Defendant copies of the completed forensic 

psychiatric evaluation.7 

1 Docket Item (“D.I.”) 2, Information. 

2

 D.I. 4. 

3

 D.I. 3. 

4 D.I. 19, June 15, 2022 Plea Tr. at 15:14-15. 

5 D.I. 6. The purpose of the examination was to determine Defendant’s need for psychiatric or 

psychological treatment. 

6

 D.I. 7. 

7 D.I. 8. 
3

On March 17, 2023, the Court sentenced Defendant. At sentencing, the State 

recommended, among other things, that Defendant should receive a sentence of eight 

years level V, suspended after serving two years Level V, followed by descending 

levels of probation. The State also noted that the DPC psychiatric evaluation 

indicated a need for mental health treatment and a medication compliance plan.8

Defendant’s counsel then requested the Court impose a time-served plea, followed 

by declining levels of probation, mental health counseling and treatment as 

recommended, and a medication compliance regimen.9 Defendant’s counsel noted 

that Defendant took “responsibility for this [assault] at the absolute earliest time that 

he could have,”

10 and acknowledged Defendant’s lack of diligence in maintaining 

his psychiatric medication likely contributed to his assaultive behavior.11

After considering counsel’s presentations, the Court sentenced Defendant to 

eight years level V, suspended after serving two years, followed by decreasing levels 

of probation.

12

 Defendant was also ordered to have no contact with the victim, 

undergo a mental health evaluation and follow any recommended course of 

8

 D.I. 15, Sentencing Tr. at 5-6.

9

 Id. at 9:16 – 10:4. 

10

 Id. at 7-8. 

11 Id. at 8:6-13. Defendant also conceded that his lack of medication compliance contributed to 

the assault for which he was being sentenced. Id. at 11:1-8. 

12 D.I. 11, Sentence Order. 
4

counseling/treatment, complete an anger management program, and take all 

medication as prescribed.13

Defendant did not file a direct appeal. On April 17, 2023, Defendant filed a 

Motion for Postconviction Relief, claiming that his guilty plea should not have been 

accepted by the Court without first subjecting him to a mental health evaluation and 

ensuring he was taking prescribed medication(s).14 As is noted below, Defendant’s 

claim is procedurally barred as he did not raise it in the proceedings leading up to 

his conviction, or on direct appeal, and even if he did, his claim is meritless and 

unsupported by the record. 

(a) Rule 61’s Procedural Bars

In any motion for postconviction relief, this Court must first determine 

whether a defendant has satisfied the procedural requirements of Superior Court 

Criminal Rule 61 before giving consideration to the merits of the underlying 

claims.

15

 Specifically, Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3) provides:

(3) Procedural default. Any ground for relief that was not asserted in 

the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by 

the rules of this Court, is thereafter barred, unless the movant shows:

(A) Cause for relief from the procedural default and,

(B) Prejudice from violation of the movant's rights.

13 D.I. 15, Sentencing Tr. at 13:12-23. 

14 D.I. 12, Def’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3. 

15

 Taylor v. State, 32 A.3d 374, 388 (Del. 2011) (citing Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 474 (Del. 

1999)).
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Here, Defendant’s first postconviction motion is procedurally defaulted because 

Defendant did not assert this claim in the proceedings leading to the judgment of 

conviction. Stated differently, Defendant failed to raise this issue either during the 

prosecution of his case or on direct appeal, and he cannot overcome the procedural 

hurdle which required him to do so before seeking postconviction relief. And, 

Defendant has failed to sufficiently explain why his claim was not asserted in the 

proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, from arrest through the plea and 

sentencing, nor on direct appeal. His claim is procedurally barred. 

Assuming, for argument’s sake, that Defendant’s claim is not procedurally 

barred and the Court were to consider it on its merit, Defendant fails to state a valid 

postconviction claim. 

Defendant’s claim reads as follows:

Ground One: No mental health evaluation was done before the guilty 

plea.

Supporting Facts: The Affidavit of Probable Cause states I was in a 

mental episode. So [the] guilty plea shouldn’t [have] been accepted 

without mental [health] evaluation and medication.16 

Defendant does not claim that trial counsel was ineffective in representing him. 

Defendant does not assert his plea was involuntarily entered, nor does he claim he 

did not comprehend any part of the plea process, whether it be the content of the 

Truth In Sentencing Guilty Plea form, the Plea Agreement, or the colloquy with the 

16

 D.I. 12, Def’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3. 
6

Court. He also does not suggest the entry of his plea was not an intelligent act. In 

fact, a brief review of the transcript of the plea colloquy demonstrates otherwise.17

Finally, Defendant fails to articulate why or how a mental health evaluation was 

either appropriate or necessary prior to entering his plea, and he does not explain 

why failing to take medication prior to the entry of the guilty plea caused a defect 

which substantiates a valid postconviction claim. 

During the plea colloquy, Defendant’s responses to the Court’s questions were 

appropriate, and he denied having a mental condition that prevented him from 

understanding the plea proceeding. At no point did he exhibit confusion or lack of 

understanding as to the proceeding or the questions posed. After agreeing to tell the 

truth,18 the following colloquy ensued:

The Court: Now, do you understand why you are here today?

Defendant: Yes, sir.

The Court: It is my understanding that what you want to do is plead 

guilty. Is that right?

Defendant: Yes, Sir. 

The Court: Do you have any mental or physical condition today that 

prevents you from understanding what is going on?

Defendant: No. 

The Court: How far did you go in school?

Defendant: College.

17

 A defendant’s statements to the Superior Court during a guilty plea colloquy are presumed to 

be truthful. Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. Oct. 23, 1997)(citing Bramlett v. A.L.

Lockhart, 8th Cir., 876 F.2d 644, 648 (1989)). Those contemporaneous representations by a 

defendant pose a “formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” Id. (citing Voytik

v. United States, 778 F.2d 1306, 1308 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,

74 (1977))).

18

 D.I. 19, Plea Tr. at 7:15-17. 
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The Court: On the table in front of you is a document called the Truth 

in Sentencing Guilty Plea Form. Do you see that document on the table 

in front of you?

Defendant: Yes, sir.

The Court: The right-hand corner of that document has a signature. 

Is that your signature? 

Defendant: Yes, sir.

The Court: Did you sign this document?

Defendant: Yes, sir.

The Court: Before you signed this document, did you have an 

opportunity to review the contents of the document with your attorney? 

Defendant: Yes, sir.

The Court: Did you have an opportunity to get any questions you had 

about what that form meant, or what it said, answered before you signed 

it?

Defendant: Yes, sir. 

The Court: Before you signed it, did you understand what the form 

said? 

Defendant: Yes, sir.19

The Court reviewed the constitutional rights Defendant waived by entering a 

guilty plea, and Defendant confirmed he understood. Then, the following exchange 

occurred:

The Court: Has anyone promised you anything? 

Defendant: No sir.

The Court: Has anyone threatened you in any way so that you would 

enter this plea? 

Defendant: No sir.

The Court: Has anyone forced you to do this? 

Defendant: No sir.20 

19 Id. Plea Tr. at 8:8 – 10:11. On the Truth In Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, Defendant indicated 

he had never been a patient in a mental hospital and he “freely and voluntarily decided to plead 

guilty to the charges listed in [the] written plea agreement.” 

20 Id. Plea Tr. at 12:14 – 13:3.
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After reviewing the elements of Assault Second Degree with the Court, and 

admitting he was guilty of the offense, the Court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea.

21

 

The Court specifically concluded:

I find the plea to be intelligently given, knowingly given, voluntarily 

given, and have a basis in fact. We are going to order a presentence 

investigation report. And we will all be back after that.22 

The issue before this Court in considering Defendant’s capacity to enter a plea 

is at the time the plea is proffered in Court. As demonstrated by the plea colloquy 

transcript and the Truth in Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, the Court properly 

concluded, based on the presentation of the Defendant, that the plea was knowingly, 

intelligently and voluntary entered, with an understanding of the charge and 

penalties which Defendant faced.23 Defendant’s claim that the plea should have been 

deferred pending the administration or consumption of medication, or the 

completion of a mental health evaluation, is contrary to the record and unsupported 

by any authority. 

21 Id. Plea Tr. at 14:11-23 – 15:1-4. 

22 Id. Plea. Tr. at 15:11-16. 

23

 In fact, Defendant’s plea was fast-tracked prior to Indictment because, as defense counsel 

indicated, Defendant “wants to go forward and plead guilty, knowing that [sentencing] is open. 

We don’t know what the State is going to ask for, but he wants to take responsibility for this. We 

went over the trial rights that he waives and the maximum possible penalties. He is doing this 

knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.” Id. at 6:12-19. 
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CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, I recommend Defendant’s Motion for 

Postconviction Relief should be SUMMARILY DISMISSED as procedurally 

barred and meritless. 

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

/S/ Martin B. O’Connor

Commissioner Martin B. O’Connor

Oc: Prothonotary

Cc: Mark Petrucci, Deputy Attorney General

LaRon Philmore