Affirmed and Opinion filed May 20, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00221-CR

CHRISTOPHER ARTHUR TATUM, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 185th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1346138

O P I N I O N

A jury convicted appellant Christopher Arthur Tatum of failing to comply 

with a requirement of the sex-offender registration program. The trial court found 

the enhancement allegations to be true and sentenced appellant to confinement in 

the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for twentyfive years. We affirm.
2

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant was convicted of aggravated rape in 1978, requiring him to 

register as a sex offender for his lifetime. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 

62.101(a)(1) (West Supp. 2013); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.001(6)(A)(West 

Supp. 2013). After registering, appellant failed to report to the local 

law enforcement authority designated as the appellant’s primary registration 

authority within thirty days before or after his statutory-reporting date to verify the 

information in the registration form maintained by the authority for appellant. A 

jury found appellant guilty of failing to comply with this requirement of the sexoffender registration program.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first issue, appellant asserts the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction. Specifically, appellant argues the State did not prove he intentionally 

or knowingly failed to comply with the annual verification requirement of the sexoffender registration program. In a sufficiency review, we view all evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The jury, as the 

sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, is free to believe or disbelieve all or 

part of a witness’s testimony. Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1998). The jury reasonably may infer facts from the evidence presented, 

credit the witnesses it chooses to credit, disbelieve any or all of the evidence or 

testimony proffered, and weigh the evidence as it sees fit. Sharp v. State, 707 

S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Reconciliation of conflicts in the 

evidence is within the jury’s discretion. Losada v. State, 721 S.W.2d 305, 309 
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(Tex. Crim. App. 1986). An appellate court may not reevaluate the weight and 

credibility of the evidence produced at trial or substitute its judgment for that of the 

jury. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Inconsistencies 

in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 

406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We do not engage in a second evaluation of the 

weight and credibility of the evidence, but only ensure the jury reached a rational 

decision. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). When the 

indictment alleges that a defendant “intentionally and knowingly” failed to comply 

with a requirement of the sex-offender registration program, as in the present case, 

we review the record for evidence the defendant’s failure was intentional or 

knowing. See Harris v. State, 364 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Varnes v. State, 63 S.W.3d 824, 833 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

A person commits an offense if the person is required to register and fails to 

comply with any requirement of Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure, entitled “Sex Offender Registration Program.”1 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 

Ann. art. 62.102(a) (West Supp. 2013). In the indictment, appellant was charged 

with intentionally or knowingly failing to comply with the annual verification 

requirement in article 62.058(a). See id., art. 62.058(a) (West Supp. 2013). Under 

this requirement, a sex offender who has only once been convicted or received a 

deferred-adjudication order regarding a sexually violent offense, and who is 

subject to registration under Chapter 62, must report to the local law enforcement 

authority designated as the person’s primary registration authority once each year 

 

1 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references in this opinion are to the Texas Code of 

Criminal Procedure.
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not earlier than the 30th day before and not later than the 30th day after the 

anniversary of the person’s date of birth to verify the information in the registration 

form maintained by the authority for that person.2See id.

Officer Jorge Lucero, a police officer for the City of Houston, testified that 

he met appellant on December 12, 2011, at an appointment to conduct appellant’s 

initial sex offender registration. The record contains a Texas Department of Public 

Safety Sex Offender Update Form, signed by appellant. It reflects a “Next Annual 

Due Date” of “02/12/2012” and is initialed by appellant. The date is appellant’s 

birthday. 

Officer Lucero testified that he asked appellant if he understood when his 

next due date was and appellant said yes and initialed the form. The record also 

contains a “Houston Police Department Sex Offender Registration 

Acknowledgement Form” that is signed by appellant. The form provides appellant 

has to register with the Houston Police Department once a year within thirty days 

before or after his birthday.

Before that meeting, Sergeant Glenn Shepherd of the Houston Police 

Department met with a group of twenty-two to twenty-eight persons, including 

appellant, to go over the rules for sex-offender registration. Sergeant Shepherd 

testified that he spends two hours or more going over the rules to make sure that 

class members understand the requirements. A “Pre-release Notification Form” for 

the Texas Sex Offender Registration Program, dated November 28, 2011, contains 

the signature of both appellant and Sergeant Shepherd. It reflects that the 

 

2

There was evidence showing that appellant had been convicted once of a sexually violent 

offense and that he was subject to registration under Chapter 62. Appellant does not dispute 

these matters.
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verification requirement is “Annual (on birthday).” On the form appellant initialed

the placed indicated for “Periodic Verification of Registration: I must personally 

appear at my primary registration authority and verify my registration information 

annually, every 90 days, or every 30 days, as indicated above.” Sergeant Shepherd 

testified appellant was able to take a copy of his paperwork with him.

Rhonda Savage, who works for the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 

testified that she met with appellant on October 31, 2011. The record contains 

another “Pre-release Notification Form” signed by appellant. The form, dated 

November 7, 2011, was also signed by Savage. It reflects that the duty to register is 

“Lifetime” and the verification requirement is “Annual (on birthday).” Appellant 

initialed “Periodic Verification of Registration” on that form as well. Savage 

testified that appellant was given a copy when he was released from the custody of 

the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and that she believed appellant 

understood. According to Savage, she told appellant he had to register “lifetime 

annually on [his] birthday.”

Appellant testified that he was released from prison in November 2011, and 

that he registered as a sex offender in December. Appellant testified that Officer 

Shepherd told him what he was supposed to do to register. According to appellant, 

Officer Shepherd told him that he “was supposed to register 2013 [sic], because it 

was two months before my birthday.” Appellant said no one ever specifically 

pointed out to him “on those documents” that he was supposed to report “on 2012 

[sic] and not 2013.” Appellant began receiving letters in the mail from someone 

who wanted to represent him and he went to Mykawa Road3to inquire. When he 

 

3

The location where Officer Lucero and Sergeant Shepherd testified they met with appellant was 

on Mykawa Road. 
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arrived there, he gave someone his identification and waited. According to 

appellant, a man there registered him. Appellant did not remember meeting with 

Officer Lucero and did not know who he was.

Appellant’s claim of insufficient evidence that his failure to comply with the 

annual verification requirement was intentional or knowing is based upon his 

testimony that Sergeant Shepherd told him that he did not have to verify his 

information until 2013. Sergeant Shepherd testified that if appellant’s birthday 

was shortly after his appointment date for actual registration, appellant still would 

have to verify the information in 2012. According to Officer Lucero, and the 

forms appellant signed, appellant met with Officer Lucero after meeting with 

Sergeant Shepherd and initialed the requirement that his next annual due date was 

“02/12/2012.” From this evidence the jury reasonably could have found 

appellant’s failure to comply with the annual verification requirement in article 

62.058(a) was intentional and knowing. Accordingly, we conclude that the record 

contains evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Harris, 364 S.W.3d at 

335–36; Varnes, 63 S.W.3d at 832–33. Appellant’s first issue is overruled.

III. VOIR DIRE

In his second issue, appellant asserts the trial court failed to correct a 

mistaken impression that jurors may have received based on a venire member’s 

statement during voir dire that “You could always just claim ignorance of the law, 

but that’s no excuse.” According to appellant, because the trial court did not 

correct this statement, the jurors likely believed that appellant’s alleged ignorance 

regarding the requirement that he verify his registration within thirty days before or 

after February 12, 2012 was irrelevant. As a result, appellant asserts the jury may 
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have convicted appellant solely based on his failure to verify his registration within 

thirty days before or after February 12, 2012. The record reflects that appellant did 

not assert this complaint in the trial court by means of an objection, a request for an 

instruction to disregard, a motion for mistrial and that appellant did not otherwise 

voice this complaint in the trial court. 

Appellant contends that, because this complaint constitutes fundamental 

error, no preservation of error was required. Appellant does not allege that the 

alleged error in question tainted the presumption of innocence, that the trial court 

violated a right which must be implemented unless expressly waived, or that this 

complaint involves an absolute systemic requirement that may not be waived. 

Though appellant asserts that the venire member’s uncorrected statement violated 

his due process rights and likely tainted the jury, under applicable precedent, 

appellant’s complaint in the second issue does not constitute fundamental error. 

See Griggs v. State, 213 S.W.3d 923, 926–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Young v. 

State, 137 S.W.3d 65, 67–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Aldrich v. State, 104 S.W.3d 

890, 895–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Beltran v. State, 99 S.W.3d 807, 811–12 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). Therefore, appellant waived 

his second issue by failing to preserve error in the trial court. See Griggs, 213 

S.W.3d at 926–27; Beltran, 99 S.W.3d at 811–12. In any event, to the extent any 

juror had a mistaken impression regarding the applicable law based on the venire 

member’s statement, in the jury charge the trial court instructed the jury that, to 

find appellant guilty, the jury was required, among other things, to find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that appellant “intentionally or knowingly” failed to comply with 

the verification requirement. Appellant’s second issue is overruled.
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IV. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE

In his third issue, appellant asserts the trial court erred in admitting evidence 

that he did not report to authorities that he had moved to a new address within 

seven days of the move. Although appellant did object when he was questioned 

about it, Officer Lucero already had testified that appellant failed to notify 

authorities of his new address when appellant’s parole was complete and appellant 

was released from the halfway house. Because the same evidence was admitted 

without objection at other points in the trial, any error in the admission of 

appellant’s testimony does not present reversible error. See Lane v. State, 151 

S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s 

third issue.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

/s/ Kem Thompson Frost

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jamison and Wise.

Publish—Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).