J-S11028-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TYREEK WORDSLEY

Appellant No. 1375 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 31, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at Nos: CP-51-CR-0000804-2010, CP-51-CR-0007358-

2009, CP-51-CR-0010398-2009

BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 17, 2018

Appellant, Tyreek Wordsley, appeals pro se from the March 31, 2017 

order dismissing his petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm. 

The PCRA court recited the pertinent facts and procedural history: 

On March 27, 2009, [Appellant] was arrested and charged 

with Possession With Intent to Deliver (PWID) on docket CP-51-

CR-001160-2009 [this charge is not presently at issue]. On April 

2, 2009, [Appellant] was arrested and charged with PWID on 

docket CP-51-CR-0007358-2009. On May 7, 2009, [Appellant]

was arrested and charged with PWID on docket CP-51-CR0010398-2009. On September 25, 2009, [Appellant] was 

arrested and charged with PWID on docket CP-51-CR-0000804-

2010. On July 20, 2011, [Appellant] appeared before this Court 

and pled guilty to PWID on all four of his dockets. On that same 

day, this Court sentenced [Appellant] to a negotiated sentence of 

111⁄2 to 23 months’ county incarceration plus three years reporting 
J-S11028-18

- 2 -

probation with immediate parole on each docket, to run 

concurrent with one another. 

On September 20, 2011, [Appellant] was arrested and 

charged with Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA) 

§ 6105 and 6106. These charges were subsequently adopted by 

the United States Attorney’s Office after the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania withdrew them on December 8, 2011. On November 

20, 2012, [Appellant] pled guilty to these charges and was 

sentenced to 8 years’ federal incarceration. 

On April 17, 2013, this court held a violation of probation 

(VOP) hearing for [Appellant]. [Appellant] was represented at the 

hearing by Liam Riley, Esquire. After this court reviewed 

[Appellant’s] criminal history and incorporated the report 

prepared by the probation officer on April 17, 2013 into the record, 

Mr. Riley asked that this court sentence [Appellant] to a period of 

five years’ probation on each of his dockets, to run concurrent to 

one another but consecutive to the federal sentence. Mr. Riley

argued that [Appellant] was a young man with rehabilitative 

potential and that he was already serving a significant sentence in 

federal custody. Mr. Riley further argued that a probationary 

sentence following [Appellant’s] incarceration would adequately 

address the Commonwealth’s concerns while allowing [Appellant] 

the opportunity to set himself on the right path. [...] 

This court then found [Appellant] to be in direct violation of 

his probation/parole, terminated parole and revoked probation. 

This court then sentenced him to 5 to 10 years’ state 

incarceration, to run concurrent on all four of his [state] dockets 

but consecutive to the federal sentence. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/27/17, at 1-3. 

Appellant did not take a direct appeal from the April 17, 2013 violation 

of probation (VOP) sentence. On July 6, 2016, he filed a facially untimely pro 
J-S11028-18

- 3 -

se PCRA petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.1 Appellant pled 

that the untimeliness of the petition stemmed from governmental 

interference, inasmuch as the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) discarded 

certain of Appellant’s legal documents.2 On March 2, 2017, appointed counsel 

filed a petition to withdraw and a no merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth 

v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 

A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). One day later, the PCRA court entered 

its notice of intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing, pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On March 31, 2017, the PCRA court entered an order 

granting counsel’s petition to withdraw and dismissing Appellant’s petition. 

This timely appeal followed. 

Appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve for 

direct appellate review Appellant’s claim that his state sentence was supposed 

to run concurrently with his federal sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 4. Appellant 

also argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely. 

Id. We have considered only the latter issue, which we find to be dispositive. 

____________________________________________

1

 The PCRA requires that any petition thereunder be filed within one year of 

the finality of the judgment of sentence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on May 17, 2013, when the 

direct appeal period expired. He therefore had until May 17, 2014 to file a 

timely petition. 

2

 A petitioner may overcome the PCRA’s timeliness requirement if he pleads 

and proves that the untimeliness was the result of governmental interference. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i). 
J-S11028-18

- 4 -

We will disturb the PCRA court’s decision only if the record does not 

support the court’s findings or if the court committed legal error. The PCRA’s 

time limits are jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 

468 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 934 A.2d 72 (Pa. 2007). The PCRA 

court has no jurisdiction to entertain an untimely petition unless the petitioner 

pleads and proves one of the statutory timeliness exceptions. Id. The 

governmental interference exception applies where “the failure to raise the 

claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with 

the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States[.]” 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i). 

As noted above, Appellant claims that the DOC destroyed documents 

relevant to his claim. He also argues that he was without access to the prison 

law library while he was confined in the Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”). 

Appellant’s pro se brief is largely incoherent, and it fails to develop a 

substantive argument regarding his petition’s timeliness. The PCRA court 

noted the following: 

[A]ccording to [Appellant’s] own documents, he was held in 

the [RHU] for [...] 7 months following his VOP hearing, thus until 

approximately November 2013, and he learned of the 

misplacement of his legal documents no later than May 2014. 

[Appellant] offers no further evidence why it then took him until 

July 2016 to file the instant petition. Therefore, even by the most 

generous standard, [Appellant] had until July 2014 to file a timely 

petition based upon the governmental interference exception. He 

failed to do so and his petition is consequently untimely. 
J-S11028-18

- 5 -

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/27/17, at 7. 

We have reviewed the record, the parties’ briefs, the applicable law, and 

the PCRA court opinion. We conclude that the PCRA court’s opinion, at pages 

5 through 8, accurately addresses the untimeliness of Appellant’s petition. We 

affirm the order based upon the analysis set forth on those pages. We also 

direct that a copy of the PCRA court’s July 27, 2017 opinion be filed along with 

this memorandum. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/17/18
Circulated 04/30/2018 10:16 AM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION 

COMMONWEALTH 

vs. 

TYREEK WORDSLEY 

BRINKLEY, J. 

FILED 

JUL 2 7 2017 

Office of Judicial Records 

Appeals/post Trial 

OPINION 

CP-51-CR-0007358-2009 

CP-51-CR-0010398-2009 

CP-51-CR-0011160-2009 

CP-51-CR-0000804-2010 

CP-5TCR.0007358-2009 Comm v Worderey. Tyreek 

Opinion 

Hill 11111111 1111 1111 

7980894441 

SUPERIOR COURT 

1375 EDA 2017 

JULY 27, 2017 

Defendant Tyreek Wordsley filed a petition for relief pursuant to the Post -Conviction 

Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. (eff. Jan. 16, 1996), raising claims based upon ineffective 

assistance of counsel. After independent review of Defendant's pro se petitions, PCRA counsel's 

Finley letter, and 907 Notice having been sent and a reply received from Defendant, this Court 

dismissed Defendant's petition without a hearing based upon the Finley letter and untimeliness. 

Defendant appealed the dismissal of his petition to the Superior Court. The sole issue addressed 

in this Opinion is whether this Court properly dismissed Defendant's petition without a hearing 

based upon counsel's Finley letter and untimeliness. This Court's decision should be affirmed. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS 

On March 27, 2009, Defendant was arrested and charged with Possession with Intent to 

Deliver (PWID) on docket CP-51-CR-0011160-2009. On April 3, 2009, Defendant was arrested 

and charged with PWID on docket CP-51-CR-0007358-2009. On May 7, 2009, Defendant was 
arrested and charged with PWID on docket CP-51-CR-0010398-2009. On September 25, 2009, 

Defendant was arrested and charged with PWID on docket CP-51-CR-0000804-2010. On July 

20, 2011, Defendant appeared before this Court and pled guilty to PWID on all four of his 

dockets. On that same day, this Court sentenced Defendant to a negotiated sentence of 111/2 to 23 

months county incarceration plus 3 years reporting probation with immediate parole on each 

docket, to run concurrent with one another. 

On September 20, 2011, Defendant was arrested and charged with Violations of the 

Uniform Firearm Arms Act (VUFA) § 6105 and 6106. These charges were subsequently adopted 

by the United States Attorney's Office after the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania withdrew them 

on December 8, 2011. On November 20, 2012, Defendant pled guilty to these charges and was 

sentenced to 8 years federal incarceration. 

On April 17, 2013, this Court held a violation of probation (VOP) hearing for Defendant. 

Defendant was represented at the hearing by Liam Riley, Esquire. After this Court reviewed 

Defendant's criminal history and incorporated the report prepared by the probation officer on 

April 17, 2013 into the record, Mr. Riley asked that this Court sentence Defendant to a period of 

5 years' probation on each of his dockets, to run concurrent to one another but consecutive to the 

federal sentence. Mr. Riley argued that Defendant was a young man with rehabilitative potential 

and that he was already serving a significant sentence in federal custody. Mr. Riley further 

argued that a probationary sentence following Defendant's federal incarceration would 

adequately address the Commonwealth's concerns while allowing Defendant the opportunity to 

set himself on the right path. The Commonwealth then asked that this Court impose a sentence of 

3 to 6 years state incarceration plus 4 years probation, to run concurrent with Defendant's federal 

2 
sentence. Defendant then spoke on his own behalf and asked this Court for a second chance. 

(N.T. 4/17/2013 p. 5-7). 

This Court then found Defendant to be in direct violation of his probation/parole, 

terminated parole and revoked probation. This Court then sentenced him to 5 to 10 years state 

incarceration, to run concurrent on all four of his dockets but consecutive to his federal sentence, 

with credit for time served while in county prison. In imposing this sentence, this Court stated 

that Defendant had chosen the life of a drug dealer and that it hoped that this sentence would 

allow Defendant enough time to reassess his life and receive job training so that he could live a drug and crime -free life once he left prison. This Court further stated that it could have sentenced 

Defendant consecutively on each of his four dockets but chose not to based upon the argument of 

Mr. Riley. Furthermore, this Court stated that the sentence imposed was absolutely necessary to 

vindicate the authority of this Court, as Defendant originally had been arrested with a large 

amount of PCP and other drugs and had been given an extraordinary opportunity to get himself 

together when he first pled guilty and received immediate parole. Id. at 7-9. On April 25, 2013, 

Defendant, through counsel, filed a post -sentence motion for reconsideration, which was denied 

by operation of law. Defendant did not file a direct appeal of the sentence imposed at his VOP 

hearing. 

On July 6, 2016, Defendant filed a pro se petition for relief pursuant to the PCRA, in 

which he raised a bald claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant further argued that 

his petition met the governmental interference exception to the PCRA's time -bar, as his legal 

documents had been discarded by the Department of Corrections prior to his placement at SCI - Camp Hill. On December 13, 2016, Thomas P. Ferrant, Esquire, was appointed as PCRA 

counsel. 

3 
On January 4, 2017, Defendant filed a pro se amended petition, raising further claims 

based upon ineffective assistance of counsel and an illegal sentence. Specifically, Defendant 

argued that counsel was ineffective for inducing him to plead guilty when he was innocent, for 

failing to file post -sentence motions, and for informing him that this Court would impose a 

sentence that ran concurrent to his federal sentence at his VOP hearing. Defendant further argued 

that his petition met the governmental interference exception to the PCRA's time -bar, as he had 

been housed in his institution's Restrictive Housing Unit and had been denied access to its law 

library. 

On March 2, 2017, Mr. Ferrant filed a letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 

A.2d 213 (1988), stating that Defendant's petition was untimely, that he failed to properly plead 

and prove the governmental interference exception to the time -bar and, even if his petition was 

timely, the claims raised therein were without merit. In his Finley letter, Mr. Ferrant argued that 

Defendant was able to correspond with prison officials and defense counsel during the period 

when he was in the Restrictive Housing Unit and therefore he would have been able to file a 

timely PCRA petition. Mr. Ferrant further argued that Defendant failed to prove that he had filed 

his petition with 60 days of his release from the Restrictive Housing Unit. Furthermore, Mr. 

Ferrant argued that, even if Defendant's petition was timely, his ineffectiveness claims would 

still fail as they were supported only by boilerplate language, that any post -sentence motion filed 

by plea counsel would have been meritless, and that Defendant would not be able to show 

prejudice or his claim that defense counsel told him that his VOP sentence would run concurrent 

with his federal sentence. 

On March 3, 2017, this Court sent Defendant a 907 Notice, indicating that his petition 

would be dismissed based upon counsel's Finley letter and untimeliness. On March 24, 2017, 

4 
Defendant sent a pro se reply to the 907 Notice, alleging that Mr. Ferrant was ineffective for 

failing to litigate his petition. On March 31, 2017, following independent review of Defendant's 

pro se petitions, PCRA counsel's Finley letter, and 907 Notice having been sent and a reply 

received from Defendant, this Court dismissed Defendant's petition without a hearing based 

upon the Finley letter and untimeliness. On April 19, 2017, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal 

with the Superior Court. This Court received all Notes of Testimony on July 19, 2017. 

ISSUES 

I. WHETHER THIS COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEFENDANT'S 

PETITION WITHOUT A HEARING BASED UPON COUNSEL'S FINLEY 

LETTER AND UNTIMELINESS. 

DISCUSSION 

I. THIS COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEFENDANT'S PETITION 

WITHOUT A HEARING BASED UPON COUNSEL'S FINLEY LETTER 

AND UNTIMELINESS. 

When reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, the appellate court's review is limited to 

determining whether the PCRA court's findings are supported by the record and without legal 

error. Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 619 Pa. 549, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (2013) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 781 A.2d 94, 97 n. 4 (2001)). The court's scope of 

review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the PCRA 

court's hearing, viewed in light most favorable to the prevailing party. Commonwealth v. Fahy, 

598 Pa. 584, 959 A.2d 312, 316 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Duffey, 585 Pa. 493, 889 A.2d 

56, 61 (2005)). The burden is on the petitioner in the PCRA petition to demonstrate by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he or she is eligible for PCRA relief. 42 Pa.C.S.A § 9543. 

1. Defendant's petition was untimely. 

It is well -settled in Pennsylvania that all petitions under the PCRA, including subsequent 

5 
petitions, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the 

petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, an exception to the one-year time period. 

Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 606 Pa. 64, 994 A.2d 1091, 1094 (2010) (citing Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 598 Pa. 85, 953 A.2d 1248, 1252 (2008)). The exceptions apply where the petition 

successfully alleges and proves one or more of the following: 

(i) the failure to raise this claim previously was the result of interference by 

government officials with presentation of the claim in violation of the 

Constitution of laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the 

United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and 

could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme 

Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time 

period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S.A § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed 

within 60 days of the date the claim could first have been presented. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9545(6)(2). 

The petitioner must plead and prove specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised within 

the 60 day time frame. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651-52 (2013). The time 

"limitations are mandatory and are interpreted literally; thus, a court has no authority to extend 

filing periods except as statute permits." Commonwealth v. Seskey, 2014 PA Super 27, 86 A.3d 

237, 242 (2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (1999)). "If 

the petition is determined to be untimely, and no exception has been pled and proven, the petition 

must be dismissed without hearing because Pennsylvania courts are without jurisdiction to 

consider the merits of the petition." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 518-19 

(Pa. Super. 2011); Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1285 (2008)). A defendant claiming 

that their incarceration status limits their ability to file pro se PCRA petitions must show that any 

of the conditions of his incarceration were illegal, as required to meet the governmental 

6 
interference exception to PCRA's timeliness requirement. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 606 Pa. 

64, 994 A.2d 1091, 1095 (2010) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)). 

In the case at bar, Defendant's judgment of sentence became final on May 17, 2013, 

when his ability to file a direct appeal of his VOP sentence expired. Defendant thus had until 

May 17, 2014 to file a timely petition pursuant to the PCRA. Defendant did not file the instant 

petition until July 6, 2016, more than two years after his deadline to file a timely petition had 

passed. In order to avoid the time -bar, Defendant attempts to plead and prove the governmental 

interference exception based upon his placement in his facility's Restrictive Housing Unit, denial 

of access to his institution's law library, and the misplacement of his legal documents by the 

Department of Corrections. However, Defendant has failed to plead and prove that he filed his 

petition within 60 days of the date that his claims first could have been presented. On the 

contrary, according to Defendant's own documents, he was held in the Restrictive Housing Unit 

for only 7 months following his VOP hearing, thus until approximately November 2013, and he 

learned of the misplacement of his legal documents no later than May 2014. Defendant offers no 

further evidence why it then took him until July 2016 to file the instant petition. Therefore, even 

by the most generous standard, Defendant had until July 2014 to file a timely petition based upon 

the governmental interference exception. He failed to do so and his petition is consequently 

untimely. 

Moreover, even if Defendant had filed his petition in July 2014, his claim still would 

have been untimely because he failed to properly plead and prove the governmental interference 

exception. As PCRA counsel noted in his Finley letter, Defendant was able to write multiple 

letters to prison officials and to defense counsel during the relevant period. Thus, there is no 

indication that his placement in the Restrictive Housing Unit, restricted access to the law library 

7 
or the loss of his legal materials in any way would have prevented him from filing a PCRA 

petition. Moreover, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the conditions of his incarceration 

were in any manner illegal, as required to meet the governmental interference exception. On the 

contrary, Defendant's own documents show that he was placed in the Restrictive Housing Unit 

and his access to the law library was restricted based upon his own violations of prison 

regulations. Furthermore, there is no indication at all that Defendant's legal materials were 

intentionally or maliciously withheld or destroyed. Thus, even if Defendant had filed his PCRA 

petition in July 2014, his petition still would have been untimely as he failed to properly plead 

and prove the governmental interference exception to the time -bar. 

2. Even if Defendant's petition was timely, Plea Counsel was not 

ineffective. 

To prevail on a claim alleging counsel's ineffectiveness under the PCRA, Appellant must 

demonstrate (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel's course of 

conduct was without a reasonable basis; and (3) that he was prejudiced by counsel's 

ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Timchak, 2013 PA Super 157, 69 A.3d 765, 769 (2013) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa.Super.2012)). Allegations of 

ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if 

the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. 

Commonwealth v. Lippert, 2014 PA Super 25, 85 A.3d 1095, 1100 (2014) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa.Super.2013)). Where the defendant enters 

his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's 

advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Barndt, 74 

A.3d at 192 (citing Wah, 42 A.3d at 338-39). Thus, to establish prejudice, "the defendant must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 

8 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 

2006 PA Super 106, 899 A.2d 365, 269-70 (2006)). Central to the question of whether a 

defendants plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly is that the defendant know and 

understand the nature of the offenses charged in as plain a fashion as possible. Id. (citing 

Commonwealth v. Frometa, 520 Pa. 552, 555 A.2d 92, 93 (1989)). A defendant is bound by the 

statements made during the plea colloquy, and a defendant may not later offer reasons for 

withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he pled. Commonwealth v. Brown, 

2012 PA Super 140, 48 A.3d 1275, 1277 (2012) (citing Commonwealth v. McCauley, 797 A.2d 

920, 922 (Pa.Super.2001)). 

While a defendants declaration of innocence is a factor that the PCRA court may 

consider, it is not determinative. Commonwealth v. Steckley, 2015 PA Super 250, 128 A.3d 826, 

834 (2015). A defendant's assertion of innocence does not necessarily belie his later claim that he 

would have accepted a guilty plea offer. A criminal defendant might maintain his innocence up 

until the point of pleading guilty in order to strengthen his bargaining position. Indeed, a 

defendant may enter a guilty plea while continuing to maintain that he is factually innocent. Id. 

(citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 33, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)). 

A PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel 

which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth -determining process 

that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. Commonwealth v. Freeland, 2014 PA Super 274, 106 A.3d 768, 775 (2014) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii)). In 

accord with these well -established criteria for review, a petitioner must set forth and individually 

discuss substantively each prong of the Pierce test. Commonwealth v. Steele, 599 Pa. 341, 961 

9 
A.2d 786, 797 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. James Jones, 583 Pa. 130, 876 A.2d 380, 386 

(2005)). Thus, where a defendant has failed to set forth all three prongs of the ineffectiveness test 

and meaningfully discuss them, he is not entitled to relief, and the court is constrained to find 

such claims waived for lack of development. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 

795 A.2d 935, 940 n. 4 (2001)). 

In the case at bar, Defendant baldly claims that plea counsel pressured him to plead guilty 

when he was, in fact, innocent. Aside from this bald statement, Defendant failed to set forth or 

meaningfully discuss each prong of the ineffectiveness test. As such, this Court is constrained to 

find that he waived his ineffectiveness claim for a lack of development. Even if Defendant had 

not waived this claim, however, it still would be without merit. Defendant's claims that he was 

pressured into pleading guilty and that he was, in fact, innocent directly contradict the statements 

he made in his written and oral guilty plea colloquies in which he stated that he was pleading 

guilty of his free will and because he was guilty of the crimes charged. Furthermore, Defendant 

stated that he was pleased with the representation of counsel. These facts are reflected in the 

following exchange: 

THE COURT: Mr. Wordsley, I have to ask you some questions, and I ask these 

questions of everyone who decides to plead guilty. I have to be sure your plea is 

knowingly and voluntarily given. 

How old are you? 

THE DEFENDANT: Twenty-two. 

THE COURT: How far did you go in school? 

THE DEFENDANT: High school diploma. 

THE COURT: So do you read, write, and understand the English Language? 

10 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 

THE COURT: Right now are you under the influence of drugs or alcohol? 

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

THE COURT: Have you ever been a patient in a mental institution or treated for 

mental illness? 

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the representation of your lawyers, both 

lawyers, up to this point? 

THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me? 

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the representation of both your lawyers up 

to this point? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 

THE COURT: I have in front of me four written guilty plea colloquies, which are 

incorporated into the record by reference, which indicate you wish to plead guilty 

to four counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Is that 

correct? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 

THE COURT: Did you have any opportunity to go over these forms with your 

lawyer before you signed them? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 

THE COURT: Did your lawyer explain these charges to which you are pleading 

guilty and the maximum possible sentence to which you could be imprisoned? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 

11 
THE COURT: Did your lawyer explain that you are presumed innocent and have 

the right to have a trial by judge or jury if you wanted? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 

THE COURT: Did your lawyer explain the definition of the crime, what the DA 

would have to prove if you were to go to trial? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 

THE COURT: Did your lawyer explain to you that by pleading guilty, you are 

giving up all your rights to a trial and almost all rights on appeal? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 

THE COURT: Did anyone threaten you or force you to make you plead guilty to 

these charges? 

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. 

THE COURT: Are you doing so of your own free will? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 

THE COURT: At this time, will the Commonwealth please read what they would 

have proven if they had gone to trial. 

Please listen. 

[The Commonwealth reads the description of the facts underlying each charge] 

*** 

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wordsley, is that basically what happened in each 

case? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 

THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty? 

12 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 

N.T. 7/20/2011, p. 3-5, 14. 

Thus, even if Defendant had not waived this claim due to lack of development, it would 

still be without merit as it directly contradicts the statements he made in his written and oral 

guilty plea colloquies. 

3. Even if Defendant's petition was timely, Plea Counsel and VOP 

Counsel were not ineffective for failing to file post -sentence motions 

for reconsideration. 

To establish counsel's ineffectiveness, a petitioner must demonstrate: (1) the underlying 

claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for the course of action or inaction 

chosen; and (3) counsel's action or inaction prejudiced the petitioner. Commonwealth v. Freeland, 2014 PA Super 274, 106 A.3d 768, 775 (2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 

Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987)). Counsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once the 

court determines that the defendant has not established any one of the prongs of the 

ineffectiveness test. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Rolan, 964 A.2d 398, 406 (Pa.Super.2008)). 

To establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the 

outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel's action or inaction. 

Commonwealth v. Davido, 106 A.3d 611, 621 (Pa. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 

587 Pa. 304, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (2006)). If counsel fails to raise an issue in post -verdict 

motions or on appeal, he is deemed to be ineffective only if the issue is of arguable merit. 

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 2003 PA Super 165, 823 A.2d 906, 908 (2003) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 490 Pa. 296, 416 A.2d 477 (1980)). This is so because an accused 

has no absolute right to raise baseless claims and counsel cannot be faulted for not advancing 

issues which will not at least arguably obtain some relief for the accused. Id. 

13 
As a general rule, "upon revocation, the sentencing alternatives available to the court 

shall be the same as the alternatives available at the time of initial sentencing." Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 595 (Pa.Super.2007). Normally, "the trial court is limited only by the 

maximum sentence that it could have imposed originally at the time of the probationary 

sentence." Coolbaugh, 770 at 792. Once probation or parole has been revoked, a sentence of total 

confinement may be imposed if any of the following conditions exist: the defendant has been 

convicted of another crime; the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that he will 

commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or, such a sentence is essential to vindicate the 

authority of court. Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d at 792. 

When a trial court imposes a sentence that is within the statutory limits, 'there is no abuse 

of discretion unless the sentence is manifestly excessive so as to inflict too severe a 

punishment'." Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 624-25 (2002) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Person, 450 Pa. 1, 297 A.2d 460 (1972)). In addition, a sentence will not be 

disturbed unless the appellate court determines that the sentence is "unreasonable." 

Reasonableness is determined by examining the four statutory factors set forth in 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 

9781(d) as well as the general sentencing standards outlined in 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9721(b). 

Commonwealth v. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 571, 926 A.2d 957, 965 (2007). 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9781(d) 

requires that the appellate court consider: "(1) [t]he nature and circumstances of the offense and 

the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the opportunity of the sentencing court to 

observe the defendant, including any presentence investigation; (3) the findings upon which the 

sentence was based; and (4) the guidelines promulgated by the commission." 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 

9721(b) requires consideration of the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense in 

relation to the impact on the victim and the community and the rehabilitative needs of the 

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defendant. There is no requirement that a sentencing court's imposition of sentence be the 

"minimum possible confinement." Walls, 592 Pa. at 571, 926 A.2d at 965. 

In the case at bar, Defendant claims that plea counsel and VOP counsel were ineffective 

for failing to file and litigate a post -sentence motion for reconsideration. As any post -sentence 

motion for reconsideration would have been baseless in either instance, defense counsel could 

not have been ineffective for failing to file a post -sentence motion. With regard to Defendant's 

plea counsel, it is beyond incredible for Defendant to claim that he would have received a more 

favorable outcome had plea counsel filed and litigated a post -sentence motion for 

reconsideration. In that instance, Defendant received an aggregate sentence 111/4 to 23 months 

county incarceration plus 3 years reporting probation with immediate parole when he could 

have received an aggregate sentence of 20 to 40 years state incarceration across his four felony 

charges. As this Court later acknowledged at Defendant's VOP hearing, Defendant's original 

negotiated sentence was "basically a slap on the wrist", and "an extraordinary opportunity to get 

himself together." (N.T. 4/17/2013 p. 9). In light of the significant penalties Defendant was 

facing and the leniency of his negotiated sentence, it is almost impossible to see how Defendant 

could have received a more favorable outcome had plea counsel filed a post -sentence motion for 

reconsideration. Thus, Defendant's claim that plea counsel was ineffective for doing so is 

without merit. 

With regard to VOP counsel, this Court notes that counsel did in fact file a post -sentence 

motion on April 25, 2013, which was denied by operation of law. Moreover, VOP counsel could 

not have been ineffective for failing to litigate this motion as the motion was meritless. On the 

contrary, the sentence imposed at Defendant's VOP hearing was reasonable in light of the 

severity of Defendant's original charges and his new conviction on a federal firearms offense for 

15 
which he was arrested only two months after his guilty plea. As this Court noted, Defendant had 

received an extraordinary opportunity when he was sentenced to immediate parole on four PWID 

charges when he could have been sentenced to up to 40 years' state incarceration. However, 

instead of furthering his rehabilitation, Defendant chose to continue living the life of a drug 

dealer and carry firearms illegally. Moreover, this Court fashioned its sentence to allow 

Defendant enough time to reassess his priorities, learn new skills and receive job training so that 

he could choose to live a crime free life when he was released. As such, the sentence imposed 

was absolutely necessary to vindicate the authority of this Court, to protect the public from 

Defendant's insistence on living a life of crime, and to further his rehabilitation in a more 

effective manner than the immediate parole sentence he received previously. Therefore, as any 

post -sentence motion for reconsideration would have been meritless, VOP counsel could not 

have been ineffective for failing to litigate any post -sentence motion. 

4. PCRA Counsel was not ineffective. 

Defendants have a general rule -based right to the assistance of counsel for their first 

PCRA Petition. Commonwealth v. Cherry, 2017 PA Super 28, --- A.3d ---, 2 (2017) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 970 A.2d 455, 457 (Pa. Super. 2009)). The indigent petitioner's 

right to counsel must be honored regardless of the merits of his underlying claims, even where 

those claims were previously addressed on direct appeal, so long as the petition in question is his 

first. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Powell, 787 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2001)). Moreover, 

once counsel is appointed, he [or she] must take affirmative steps to discharge his [or her] duties. 

Id. When appointed, counsel's duty is to either (1) amend the petitioner's pro se Petition and 

present the petitioner's claims in acceptable legal terms, or (2) certify that the claims lack merit 

by complying with the mandates of Turner/Finley. Id. at 3. 

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To plead and prove ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel a petitioner must establish: 

(1) that the underlying issue has arguable merit; (2) counsel's actions lacked an objective 

reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice resulted from counsel's act or failure to act. 

Commonwealth v. Rykard, 2012 PA Super 199, 55 A.3d 1177, 1189-90 (2012) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (2011)). Where the defendant 

asserts a layered ineffectiveness claim he must properly argue each prong of the three -prong 

ineffectiveness test for each separate attorney. Id. at 1190. Layered claims of ineffectiveness "are 

not wholly distinct from the underlying claims[,]" because "proof of the underlying claim is an 

essential element of the derivative ineffectiveness claim[.]" Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 888 A.2d 564, 584 (2005)). "In determining a layered claim of 

ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts was 

ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of counsel. If that attorney was effective, 

then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise the underlying issue." 

Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.Super.2010)). 

In the case at bar, Defendant, in his response to this Court's 907 Notice, claimed that 

PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate, raise and address the claims 

made in his pro se petitions. However, as previously discussed, Defendant's petition was 

untimely and the claims raised therein were without merit. As PCRA counsel has no obligation 

to raise claims that they find meritless in an amended petition, Mr. Ferrant could not have been 

ineffective for failing to raise Defendant's untimely and meritless claims in an amended petition. 

Moreover, this Court notes that Mr. Ferrant properly complied with the procedures outlined in 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (1988) for withdrawing from a meritless petition. Thus, 

17 
Defendant's claim that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate, address 

and raise the issues in his pro se petitions was without merit. 

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CONCLUSION 

After review of the applicable case law, testimony and statutes, this Court committed no 

error. Defendant's PCRA petition was properly dismissed based upon PCRA counsel's Finley 

letter and untimeliness. Accordingly, this Court's decision should be affirmed. 

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