### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 22

- 00017

- CV

Gilbert Estrada, Jr. , Appellant

v.
Dana Deann Garrett

- Estrada, Appellee

FROM THE 419TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1- FM -20-000953, THE HONORABLE TIM SULAK , JUDGE PRESID I NG

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

G ilbert Estrada, Jr. appeals from t he trial court ’ s final decree of divorce. 1 In two issues, Gilbert challenges provisions of t he decree that r eq uire him to pa y portions of the cred it
card debt and retroactive ch ild support. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court ’ s
final decree of d ivorce.

B ACKGROUN D
T he parties married in 2000 and have four children

. The parties ceased l iving together in January 2020, G ilbert petition ed for divo rce in Februa r y 2 020, and Dana

counter- petition ed in April 2020. One of their c hildren was not addressed in their petitions because he had reached the age of emancipation . The other children a re Nathan (born in 2002) , Anna (born in 2006), and Ingrid (born in 2008).

1 Because the p ar ties have similar last names, we refer to them by their first names. To protect the children’s privacy, w e refer t o them by pseudonyms.2 Bef ore the final hearing in Ju ne 2021, t he parties entered into a Rule 11

a greement that s ettled the ir d isputes , e xcept as t o retroactive child support and credit card debt. 2
The y agreed that “ the part y with lesser in come per either agree ment or the Cour t ’ s d etermination

as to statutory net resources shall have t he right to off

- setting child support ” but t hat “ t he issue of retroactive support will be tried ” and that “ [h]ow the credit card debt is d ivide d will be tried. ” At
th e begin ning of the final hear ing , t he parties read the R ule 11 a gre em ent int o the record , and the trial court appro ved it

. During the final hearing, the trial court took ju dicial not ice of its file , and the parties stipulated that Dana was seeking r et ro acti ve ch ild support beginn ing in
S e p tem ber 2020

. The parties at the final hearing tes tified about their finances and possession an d
care of the ir children

. The e vidence show ed that a fter the parties separ at ed , Nathan lived

w ith G ilber t, Anna primarily lived w i th Dana, and Ingrid a lterna ted staying at the parties ’
ho mes ; Nathan turned 18 and then gr aduated from high school the mo nth bef ore the final hearing ; Dana was employed during the case but struggl ed financiall y; Gilbert was une mpl oyed
from March 3 1, 2020 , until “ towards the en d of S eptember of 2020 ” 3 ; the parties ’ debts
exceeded th eir assets; and n o child support was paid during the case

. 4

2 T he R ule 11 a g re eme nt al so did not r esolve the parties ’ dispute concerning the
c h ildren ’ s health insurance , bu t on appeal , Gilber t has not challenged t he trial cou rt ’ s ruling on th is issue

.
3 The reco rd reflects that Gil bert re ceived une mployment benefit s f ro m March 2 9 to September 12, 2 020

. Dana testified that she was not r equesting retro active c hild support w hen Gilbert was un employed and answered , “ Yes, ” when asked , “ So just from the time that he was employed on a contr act b asis in Se ptem ber until now. ”

4 Dana tes tified that Gilber t occasionally would gi ve her $50 or $100 if she asked

“ repeatedly , and over day s ” an d t hat he initially pro vided fas t food lunch e s “ almost every day ” when Dana “ was at wor k ” for A nna and occasio nally f o r I ngrid when she was at Dana ’ s h ome.3 Dana testi fied that s he wa s empl oyed as a n elementary school teacher earning $4,635 per month and that her incom e “ w ent to taking car e of the ch ildren ’ s needs predomina ntly
and [her] car payment

. ” She test ified t hat she was “ struggling finan cially just t o pay rent and
medical and buy groceries ” ; she was going to food pant ries ; she was “ selling [ her ] plasm a to g et money for fo od ” ; a nd her ve h icle was repossessed in F ebruary be cause she “ was choosing to spend that money on some food and med ications f or the kids

. ” Concerning possession and care
of the children, Dana testified that after the separat ion, A nna moved with her t o an apartment , and Dana ’ s mother also moved in with them temporarily for several months because A nna
needed 24

- hour care and attention and Dana needed to work

. A nna stayed with Dana

“ 100 percent ” of the time e x cept for sev eral week s o n two diff eren t occasions when she staye d
with Gilbert , and I ngrid lived a “ week on/week off ” between the parties ’ homes. Conce rning her
credit card debt , Dana testified t hat “ easily 90 percent ” of th e debt was spen t on the chi ldren ’ s
needs a nd that t he debt “ wa s al ready in place ” when the part ies s e parated except for debt on her Macy ’ s card for some “ very inexpensive f latware fo r t h e kitchen because [she] left everything at
home when [she] moved out

. ” She testified that the de bt “ goes toward p rovidin g clo thes f or t he
four children ” ; expenses t o help their oldest child move to college and a college fee of “ over $5,000 ” 5 ; medicati ons for A nna and herself ; and “ the children ’ s needs, whatever the y may have been, medica l , clothing, ac tivities pr io r to CO VID

. ”
Sub stan tially consistent with Dana ’ s t estimo ny, G ilbert testified that N athan lived with him during the parties ’ separation, that Anna h ad stayed with him for some weeks starting

5 Dana tes tified that Gilbert asked her to charge the fee of over $5,000 on her credit card and “ ensu red [her] that [they] , tog ether, would pay that off. ”4 in Oc tober 2020 and o n another occasion , and that Ingrid a l t ernated betwee n th e pa r ties ’ homes.
Gilbert , who i s an engin eer, testified th at from September to Dec ember 2020 , he earned $ 600 a day and wo rked seven days a week in a contract ca pacity

. Be ginning in January 2021 , he earned $5 5 0 a day and worked five da ys a we ek in a contrac t capacity until he obtained a pos ition in May 2021 with an annualized salary of $90,000

. As to the credit card debt , Gilbert testified that
he should no t be ordered to pay the debt that was inc urred by Dana because “ a large p ortio n ” was
f or “ just it ems ” t hat Dana “ p urchased on Amazon ” th at the y “ received

. . . almost every sin gle day ” d uring their m arriage a nd that she cont inue d to purchase. He agreed that he was aware that
th e ch arges were “ i ncurred for [his] household ” and that the cre d it card de bt included the payment of college tuiti on for their oldest child but testified that the oldest c hild borrowed

mon ey and gav e it to Dana “ to pay the majority of that bac k. ”
Th e parties submitted po st

- trial briefing , providing the tria l court w ith pro pos ed
divisions of their assets and debts i nclu di n g the division of their credit card debt and cal culations to support thei r competing proposals for the a mo unt of retroactive child support

. In thei r
pro posed d ivision s of their assets and d ebts , the part ies repres ented to the trial cour t that the ir
debts were greater than their assets.

I n August 2021, the t rial court informed the parties by letter o f its rulings on the amount of retroactive child sup po rt an d the division of the credit car d de bt, a nd in
De c ember 2021, the trial court si gn ed its fi nal de cr e e consistent with its letter ruling

. In the f inal decree, t he trial cour t ordered Gilber t to pay monthly child support of $486.97 , beginning on July 1 , 2021

. 6 B ecause Nathan had reached the age o f emanc ipation at the time of the final

6 The a mount of child support g oing fo rward was bas ed on the part ies ’ agr eement t o a shared possession schedul e for A nna and I ngrid and offse tting child support arrived at by5 he aring, t he tri al court did not make order s concerning him in the final dec r ee. In addition to

aw ar ding child support going forward, t h e trial court awarded retroactive child support of $1 0,549.46 , which w as the am ount th at Dana had proposed

. 7 The trial c ourt ord er ed G il bert to

pay this amount over two year s , “ if necessary, be ginni ng on Jan uary 1, 2 022 , ” but “ as soon

as p ossible

. ”
In i ts division of the parties ’ marit al estate , the trial court ordered Gi lbert to pay
app roxima tely 6 0% and Dana to pay appr oximatel y 40% of their combined credit card debt

. Dana was ordered to pay $12,604 on seven credit cards in her name , a nd G i lbert was ordered to

pay $19,345 , which was toward a cre dit card in Dana ’ s name that was in the amount of $14,259
and the remainder toward t he deb t on credit c ard s in hi s name
. 8
Af ter t he trial court signed the final decree of di vorce, Gil bert requested findings
of fact and conclusions of law but did not file a n otice of past du e r equest for findings of fact and

co nclus io ns of law , and the t rial c ou rt di d not file findings or concl usions

. S ee Tex. R. Civ.
P. 296 , 297

. This appeal followed.

calculating the o bligation s of each parent with Gi lbert , the parent having the higher obligation , paying the difference to Dana, the paren t with the lower obli g ation

.

7 Dana ’ s calculati on of retroactive child support w as based on three children , Gilbert ’ s mo nthly in come of $9,200 from August 2020 to Apr il 2021 and $7,50 0 for May 20 21, and Dana ’ s monthly i n com e of $4, 076.16

. Based on t hese numbers, Dana calculate d $1,0 20.98 as the month ly offse t t ing child support from Au gust 2020 to April 2021 and $737.21 for May 2021 for a total of fsetting amount of re tro active child su pp ort of $10,549.46

.
8 The tr ial court also provided tha t Gilbert cou ld try to negotiate a le sser amount with the credit card comp any on the balance owed.6 ANALYSI S
Credit C ard Debt
In h is first issue, G il bert challenges the tr ial court ’ s ru ling that he “ be ordere d t o
pay credit card de bt in th e name of [Dana]

. ” Sp eci fically, he argue s that the trial court abus ed its
discretion when it order ed him to pay $14,259 of debt on Dan a ’ s credit card

. He argues that the
eviden ce “ was l egally and factually insuffi cient to impose an y liab i lity on [ him ] for a c ontr actual
lia bi lity of [ Dan a ] , ” that ther e was no evidence or testimon y as to the nature of the d ebt, tha t it

was uncontroverted that t he cred it card was in her name , that “ she did not act a s an agent for [him] in in cu rring sai d debt , ” and that th e re is n o st atutor y ba si s for orderi ng him to pay Da na ’ s

con t ractual liabilities.

Sta ndard of Revi ew
We review a trial court ’ s division of the marital estate for abuse of discretion, and
the trial court has broad discre tion in m aking t his division. See Pe nick v. Pe nick , 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. 1988); O ’ Ca rolan v. Hopper , 71 S.W. 3d 529, 532 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2002, no pet.)

.

“ On appeal, we pre sume that the trial court exercised this discretion properly and will reverse the

caus e only where there is a clear ab use of discr eti on. ” Ashraf v. Ashraf , No. 03

- 11

- 0046 7

- CV,
20 12 T ex. App. LEXIS 4345, at * 21 (Tex. App.

— Austin May 24 , 2012, no pet.) (mem. o p.) (citing Bell v. Bell , 513 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1974)) ; see , e.g. , Murff v. Murff , 61 5 S.W.2 d 696,
700 (Tex. 1981 ) (obs erving th a t “ [m] athematical precision in dividing property in a divorce is usually not possibl e ” and that “ [w]ide latitude and discretion rests in these trial co urts and that
d iscretion s hould only be disturbed in the case of cle ar abuse ” ).7 “ Under the ab use of di s cretion standard, a lack of legally or factually sufficient
evidence does no t constitute an independent ground for asserting error; instead, it is a re levant
factor i n determini ng whether the trial court abused i ts disc retion. ” Mathis v. M athis , No. 01

- 1 7

- 00449

- CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 10432, at *7 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.]
Dec. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Pickens v. Pickens , 62 S.W. 3d 212, 214 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2001 , pet. denied)); accord O ’ C arolan , 71 S.W. 3d at 5 32. “ When a suff iciency r evie w overlaps the abuse

- of

- discretion standard, we engage in a two

- pronged inqu iry: (1) whether the
trial court had sufficient information to ex ercise i ts discretion and (2) whet her the trial court
erred i n its appl ication of dis cretion. ” Mathis , 2018 Te x. A pp. LEXIS 10432, at *7 (citing
Sandone v. Miller

- Sandone , 116 S.W.3d 204, 206 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2003, no pet.)). “ The
traditional sufficien cy revie w comes into play under the first prong. ” Id.
Furth er, b ecau se find ings of fact and c onclu s ions of l aw w ere not filed, it is implied that the tri al court made all findings necessary to support its judgment

. See Worford

v. Stamper , 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) ; In re J.H. , 2 64 S.W.3d 91 9, 923 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2008, no pet .) ; In re R.G. G. , No . 03

- 04

- 0 0445

- CV, 2005 Tex. App . LEXIS 2373, at * 3 (Tex. App.

— Austin Mar. 31, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.). In this con text, t he ju dgment must be
affirmed if it can be upheld on any le gal theory supported by the eviden ce. See Worf ord , 80 1 S.W.2d at 10 9

. An d w e view the evid ence in the l ight most favorable to the trial court ’ s
decision

. Id.8 Did t he trial court abuse its discretion in its division of the parties’ credit ca rd debt?
A s support for his conten ti on that the trial court ab used its dis cretio n in awarding
the disputed credit card de bt to hi m, Gilbe r t relies on section s 2.501 and 3.201 (a) of the Texas
Fami ly Code. Section 3.201 (a) states that

A person is person ally liable for the act s of t he perso n’ s spouse on ly if: (1) the spouse acts as an agent for the person ; or (2) the spouse incurs a debt for necessaries as provid ed by Subchapter F, Chapter 2

.

Tex. Fam. Code § 3.201(a) . Section 2.501 states that “[e]ach spouse has the duty to support the

o ther spo use ” and tha t “[a] spouse who fa ils to discharge the duty of su pport is liable to any

p erson who provides necessaries to the spouse to whom support is owed.” Id. § 2.501. The s e

st atut o ry p rovisions, however, c oncern a spouse ’ s liability to third pa rt i es
. See , e.g. , Tedder

v. Gar dner A ldrich , L LP , 421 S.W.3d 651, 655 (Tex. 2013) (obse rving that marriage does not create joint and several liability and discussing sections 3.201(a) and 2.501 of Texas Family
Code i n context of dispute between law f irm and husband o ver whether husband was li able

to la w firm for l egal services it rendered t o wife ) ; Envision Realty Grp., LLC v. Chen , No. 05-18-00613- CV, 2020 Tex. App. L EXIS 195 9, at * 4–5 (Tex. App .— Dallas Mar. 5, 202 0, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that se ctio n 3.201 o f Texas Family Code preclud ed ex

- wi fe ’s liability for ex -husband’ s ac tions and determining that ex - wi fe was not liable for third party ’s judgment against ex -husband).
G ilbert ha s not cited , and we have no t found, authority that would suppo rt the applic atio n of these statutory provisions to the trial co urt ’s division of the par ties ’ credit card
debt in the context of its divisio n of the parties ’ marital estate

. See Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001 (requiring trial c ourt to “ order a division of the es tate of the p arti es in a manner that the court9 deems just and ri ght , having d ue regard for the rights of each party a nd any children of the marriage ” ) ; see Bradshaw v. Bradshaw , 555 S.W.3d 539, 54 3 (Tex. 2018) (defining “ just, ”

“ right, ” and “ due regard ” ). The parties ’ pro posed division s of t hei r esta te included addres sing
th e ir combined credit car d debt s , 9 and t he trial court divided th at debt rough ly 60% to Gilber t
and 40 % to Dana.
The evidence supports the tr ial court ’ s impl ied finding that th e di vision of t he

c re dit card debt in the conte xt of its division o f the ma rital estate was just and r ight. S ee Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001

. In weigh ing the rights of the part ies and the ch ildren , t he trial court cou ld
have cr edit ed the evidence of the parties ’ disparity in earning capac ities and income , Gilber t ’ s testimony that h e was aware that charges were “ incu r red for [his] house hold , ” and Dan a ’ s testimony that “ easily 90 percent ” of her credit card debt was spen t on the childre n ’ s needs and

“ already in pl a ce ” whe n the parties s epara ted , including pay ment o f college tuition fo r their
oldest child

. See Brad shaw , 555 S.W.3d at 54 3 ( explaining that “ the court is to do complete equity as between the husband and wife and the children , having due regard to all ob ligations of the spouses an d to the probable future necessities of all concerned ” ) ; Murff , 615 S.W.2d at 699 (stating that it was proper for trial court to consider disparity of earning capacities or of income
in divisi on of ma rital estate)

.

9 To the extent that Gilbert complains about the l ack of do cument ary evidence t o su pport the balan ce owed on the credit card , Gilbert listed the outs tan ding balance o f $12 ,32 0 o n his proposed p roperty div ision , and D ana listed the amount of $14,259 on her proposed pro perty division

. The trial court, howe ver, tied Gilbert ’ s a ssigned deb t to the actual cr edit card acc ount and authorized Gilbert to negotiate with the cr edit card company to lessen the balance owed. Thus, it follows that Gilbe rt ’ s liability is limited to the actual balance owed up to but not m ore than $14,259

.10 On this re cord, w e conc lude t hat the trial court had su fficie nt evidence on which

t o exer cise its discretion and t hat it d id not abuse that discretion by ordering Gilber t to pay $14,259 of the debt on the credi t card in Dana ’s name. See Murff , 61 5 S.W.2d at 7 00; Mathis , 2018 Tex . App. LEXIS 10432, at *7; Ashr af , 20 12 T ex. App. LEXIS 434 5, at * 21

. We overrul e
Gilbert ’ s first issue. 10

Retro active Child Suppor t
In his second issue, Gilber t challenges the trial court ’ s r uling that ordered

“ retr oact ive chi ld support in an amount that requi res payment of child suppor t for [N athan ] a
ch ild in the possession solely of [Gil bert] for the duration of the case and for a perio d that

e xtended beyond the period stipulated to by th e partie s. ” Specifically, Gilbert ch allenges the
amount of the award

— $ 1 0,5 49.46

— because it “ refle cts support for three chi l dren before the
Court and covered a cal culated duration of support from A ugust 2020 thr ough May 2021. ” Gilbert argues t hat Dana sho uld not have been awarded support for N athan becau se h e resided solely with Gilbert after th e part ies ’ separation until his graduation from high school and that the
part ies agreed that the retroactive child support w ould begin in September 2 0 20

.

S

tandard of Rev i e w
We also review a trial court ’s awar d of r etroactive child support fo r abus e of
d isc retion. Worford , 801 S.W.2 d at 109 ; In re J.H. , 2 64 S.W.3d at 923 ; see In re J.M.W. ,

10 To the exten t that Gilber t complains about the trial court ’ s “ refu sal to consider testimony an d evidence concerning the va lue of the property includ ed in the agreement incident to divorce, ” he has not preserved this complai nt for our review. See Tex. R. Evi d. 103(a)( 2) (re quiring p arty to in form trial court of substance of excluded eviden ce by o ff er of proof unless it was ap par ent from cont ext). Th is compl aint also has been inadequately brief ed

. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1( i) (re quiring brief to “ contain a c lear and conc is e argumen t fo r the contentions made, with appropriate citations to auth orities a nd to the record ” ).11 470 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Tex. App

. — Houston [14 th Dist

. ] 20 14, no pet.) ( s tating that trial court

“ enj oys broad dis cretion in determining the amount of retroactive ch ild su ppo rt, if any, to be
ordered ” )

. Further , b ecause no findings of fact and con clusions of law were filed , it is implied
that the tri al court m ade all findings necessary to support the awa rd o f retroac tive child support , the award must be affirmed if i t can be upheld on any le gal theory supported by the evidence , and w e view the evid ence in the light most favorable to the trial court ’ s decision

. See Wor ford , 801 S.W.2d at 109

.

Did the trial court abuse its discret ion as to the amount of retroactiv e chil d support? Gilbert does not disp ute that retroactive child support was appro priate

. The
evidence showed that no child support was paid during the case. S ee Tex. Fam. Code § 154.009 (a ) ( authorizing trial court to “ ord er a paren t to pay ret roacti v e chil d support ” if among
other things, p ar ent “ had not previously be en ordered to pay support for the child ” ). Gilbert ’ s challenge is to the amount , co ntend ing t hat the tri al c ourt shoul d have awarded $4,746.3 2, th e

amount that he propo sed to the trial c ourt

. 11

“ In o rde r i ng retroactive child s upport, the court shall apply the chil d support guidelines provided by [ cha pter 154 ]

. ” S ee Tex. Fam. Code § 154 .009(b). “ T he ch il d support guidelines ar e intended to guide the cou rt in determining the amount of retroa ctive child support,
if any, to be or dered. ” Id. § 154.131(a)

. In determining the amount of retroactive child support,
the c ourt also “ shall consider th e net resource s of the o bligor during the r e levant time period ”

11 In h is post

- tri al bri efing to the tr ial court , Gilber t argued : The total support amount for retroactive support, wit hin the f ramework of the parties ’ agreement a n d co nsidering each month ’ s obli gation from October through the date o f trial would total $4,746 .3 2.12 and whether , r ele vant here, “ the order of retroactive child support will im pose an undue fina ncial hardship on the obligor or the obligor ’ s family ” and “ the obligor ha s p rovided actual support or
other nece ssar ies be fore the filing o f t he acti on. ” Id

. § 1 5 4 .131 (b ) (3), (4). However, the liste d
factors in section 154.131 do not b ind the trial c ourt but are “ merely intended to guide the trial
court in de termining the amount of retr oactive child sup port. ” In re J.H. , 264 S.W.3d at 924 (citing Garza v. Blanton , 55 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Tex. App.

— Corpu s Christi

– Edin burgh 2001, no pet.) ) ; see also In re Sanders , 159 S. W.3d 797, 800

– 01 (Tex . App.

— Am arillo 2005, no pet.) (stating that compliance with guidel ines is not manda tory when deci ding amou n t of retroact ive
chil d supp ort )

. Furt he r, a trial cou rt may order child support in an amount oth er than that established by the guidelines , see Tex. Fam. C ode § 154.123 ( author i zin g court to order support
in amount not est ablished b y guidelines if “ evid ence reb uts presumption that application o f the guidelin es is in the best interest of the child and justifies a variance from the guidelines ” ), and i s not bound by t he parties ’ a greement concernin g child support if the court find s that the agreed

a mount is not in the best interest of the child , s e e id. § 154.12 4 (add ressing agree ment s between partie s fo r child support and stating that “ [i]f the court finds the agreement is not in the child’s best interest,

. . . the court may render an order for the support of the child ” )

. Gil bert a rgues that it was uncontrov er ted that N athan d id n ot reside with Dana , that she did not pro vi de financial or medical suppor t to N athan th roughout th e case , that she on ly supported the other two children d uring her perio ds of possession , and that she agreed to limit
the award o f retr oactiv e child suppo rt f rom Septem ber 2020 t o the date of the final hearing

. We,
h owever, must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court ’ s implied findings that support the awarded amount

. See Worford , 801 S.W.2d at 10 9

. The trial court re asonably
could have found that the p arties ’ agreement to limit retroactive child support from13 September 2020 to the final hearing was not in the best interest of the children. See Tex . Fam. Code § 154.124(d) ; see Worford , 801 S.W.2d at 109 (statin g that judgment must be affirmed if it
can b e uphel d on any legal theory supporte d by evidence )

. Further, assuming without deciding
that the amount awarded varied from the guid eli nes, the trial cou rt reasonably coul d h ave found
that the ev idence justified that varian ce and that it was in the childr en ’ s best interest

. A lth ough
N athan resided in Gilbert ’ s house du ring the case , Dana testified about expenditures f o r the children, which the trial court reasonably could have found included N athan

. T he e videnc e also
showed : (i ) except for a few weeks o n two di fferent occasions , A nna , who neede d significant

care , resided with Dana during the ca se ; (ii) the parties shar ed possession of I ngrid ; (iii) despi te earning signi ficantly mo re than Dana , Gilbert provided m inimal financial ass istance to Dana
after t he parties c eased living together in January 2020 ; and (iv) Dana was st ruggling finan cially,
inclu ding sellin g her “ pl asma to get mo ney for food, ” going t o food pantries, an d having her
vehicle repossessed be cause she “ was choosing to spend that money on s ome food and
med icati ons f or the kids

. ” See Tex. Fam. Code § 154 .123 (b) ( listing needs of children and
f inancial reso urces available for support of child ren amo ng r elevant factors for court to consider
in determi ning a mount of child support ).
The eviden ce also supported an imp lied fi nding that t he amount of retroactive child support w ould no t “ i mpose an undue fina ncia l hardship ” on Gilbert or his family

. See id. § 154.131 (b)(3) ; Bunts v. Willia ms , No. 01

- 17

- 00 64 3

- CV , 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 4267, at * 24

– 25 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 1st Dist.] May 23, 2 01 9, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( concluding that evidence
was sufficient f or trial court to determine that retroactive child suppo rt would not be “ u ndue
hardsh ip ” when father “ di d no t s peci fically testify how paying retroa ctive child support would be
a hard ship for him ” ); In re J.H. , 264 S.W.3d at 925 ( listing among evidence tha t support ed14 implied findings for retroactive child , evid ence of “ a lack of sup port in the past ” and of p ar e nt

ma king approximately $60,000 per year)

. A lthough he was unemployed for five to si x months during the case, Gilbert was empl oyed for the firs t few months after the partie s cease d living

to geth er , re ceived un employment benefits when he was not employe d, and then earned signi ficant income on a c ontract basis be fore he be came employed in a salar ied position , earning $90,000 a nnually

. He also w as given two years from Jan uary 2 022 to pay the retroactive
child support

. On t his record, we conclude that th e tria l court had sufficient information

on which to exercis e its discretion and t hat it d id not abuse that discret ion in t he

am ou nt of retroacti ve chi ld support awarded. See Worford , 801 S.W.2d at 109 ; In re R.G.G. , 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 2373, at * 3 ( “ We may no t subs titute our judgment for that of the
trial court on matters committed to the trial court ’ s disc retion. ” ( citing Walker v. Packer , 827 S.W.2d 833 , 839 ( Tex. 1 992) ) )

. We over rule Gilbert ’ s second issue.

CONCLUS ION For these reasons, we affir m the fi nal dec ree of divorce

.

________ _

_____ ____________________________ Rosa Lopez Theofanis , Ju stice
Before Justices Baker, Th eofanis, an d J on es*
Af firmed
Filed: April 28, 2023
*Before J . Woodfin Jones, Chief Justi ce (Reti red), Thi rd Court of Appeals, s itting by assign ment. See T ex. Gov ’ t Cod e § 74.003(b)

.