Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT : ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE : VALERIE K. BOOTS GREGORY F. ZOELLER Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana JODI KATHRYN STEIN Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana 

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
V.R., ) ) Appellant

- Respondent, ) ) vs. ) No. 49A04

- 1204

- JS

- 187 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee

- Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores , Judge The Honorable Roseanne T. Ang, Magistrate Cause No. 49D09

- 1101

- JS

- 19 October 26, 2012 MEMORANDUM DECISION

– NOT FOR PUBLICATION RILEY, Judge2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant

- Respondent, V.R., appeals h er adjudication as a delinquent child for truancy , Ind. Code § 31

- 37

- 2

- 3

. We affirm. ISSUE V.R. raises one issue on app eal, which we restate as the following: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain V.R. ’s adjudication as a delinquent child

.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY V.R. attended Indianapolis Public School No. 346 as an eighth grader in the fall

sem ester of 2010

. Between August and December 2010, she a ccumulated nineteen full

day unexcused absences and five excused absences. Also d uring the fall semester, V.R. passed a kidney stone and experienced complications fr om a hernia repair surgery she had undergone in February 2010

. Further, V.R. suffers from chronic hives and hereditary angio e dema. In September and October 2010, V.R.’s mother ( Mother ) was contacted by a teacher at the school regarding the unexcused absences but further unexcused absence s occurred. On October 13 and November 4, 2010, the school sent letters to Mother about the absences

. The November 4, 2010 letter demanded a certificate of V.R.’s illness or3

physical incapacity to attend school

. 1 On November 7, 2010, the school social w orker , Barbara Woods (Woods) , contacted Mother to set up a meeting for November 9, 2010 to discuss V.R.’s absences. On November 17, 2010, the school sent Mother another letter regarding further absences. Finally, on December 2, 2010, Woods contacted Moth er , who reported she was not aware of V.R.’s “ latest absences. ” (Appellant’s App. p. 20). On December 14, 2010, Woods referr ed V.R. to the juvenile court for truancy . On January 25, 2011, V.R. was given an informal adjustment for three months. After a t hree month extension on the informal adjustment, V.R. was determined to not be in compliance. On September 13, 2011, the juvenile court terminated the informal adjustment. On September 21, 2011, the State filed a petition for delinquency against V.R. Th ereafter, Mother provided a certificate of in capacity dated November 14, 2011 from one of V.R.’s doctors , which stated that V.R. may suffer from an outbreak of hives every few months, with the condition lasting three or four days

. On February 27, 2012, the juvenile court held a hearing on the petition. Woods testified about the numb er of V.R.’s unexcused absences and her meeting with Mother on November 9, 2010 . Mother testified about V.R.’s medical condition, incl uding her prior hospitalization and chroni c hives

. Mother denied that the school had demanded that she

1 Ind. Code § 20

- 33

- 2

- 18(a) provides that “[i]f a parent of a student does not send the student t o school because of the student’ s illness or mental or physical incapacity, it is unlawful for the parent to fail or refuse to produce a certificate of the illn ess or incapacity for an attendance officer not later than six (6) days after the certificate is demanded. ” The certificate must be signed by an Indiana licensed physician, osteopath, chiropractor, or a Christian Science practitioner residing in Indiana a nd listed in the Christian Science Journal. See I.C. § 20

- 33

- 2

- 18(b).4

provide a certificate of in capacity prior to initiating informal adjustment proceedings. Mother also testified that a lthough V.R. continued to have medical issues arise during the 2011

- 2012 sch ool year, her absences were excused. T aking judicial notice of the schoo l calendar, the juvenile court found th at the school had demanded a c ertificate of in capacity on November 4, 2010 but Mother had not provide d it to the school within six days thereaft er. It also found that the certificate of in capacity pr ovided by Mother, while indicating irregular attendance due to V.R.’s medical condition, did not establish that such medical condition existed at the time of her unexcused absences in 2010. T he juven ile court also considered the certificate of in capacity against the dates of V.R.’s absences. It concluded that the dates were not grouped together in a manner to infer that V.R

. ’s absences coincided with outbreaks of chronic hives diagnosed by her doctor

. Consequently, based on these findings, the juvenile court entered a true finding that V.R. was a delinquent child. On March 26, 2011, it entered its D isposition al Order, 2 placing V.R. on four months of probation and issuing a parental participation ord er for Mother

. V.R. now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

D ISCUSSION AND DECISION

2 We direct V.R.’s attention to Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(10), which provides in part that the appellant’s brief “shall include any written opinion, memorandum of decision or finding s of fact and conclusions thereon relating to the issues raised on appeal.” Here, V.R.’s brief included an excerpt of the transcript from the February 27, 2012 hearing, rather than the March 26, 2012 Dispositional Order.5

V.R. argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her delinquency adjudication for truancy. When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence r egarding juvenile delinquency adjudications, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, and we only consider the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment. R.B. v. State , 839 N.E.2d 1282 , 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment. Id

. Under I .C

. § 31

- 37

- 4

- 1, a finding by a juvenile court adjudicating a child to be a delinquent for violation of the compulsory school attendance law must be ba sed upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id

. Juvenile delinquency adjudications under Indiana law depend on whether the juvenile has committed a n act constituting a ‘criminal offense ’ or a ‘ status offense. ’ Id

. Adjudications for c riminal offenses are g overned by I.C. § 31

- 37

- 1

- 1 and consist of those
acts committed by a juvenile that would be criminal offense s if comm it ted by an adult. See i d

. at 1283

- 84. Adjudications for s tatus offenses are governed by I.C. § 31

- 37

- 2

- 1 and consist of those acts commi tted by a juvenile that would not be a c rime if committed by an adult

. See id . at 1284. At issue here is the status offense of truancy, i.e. , the violation of Indiana’s compulsory school attendance law s, I.C. § 20

- 33

- 2

- 1, et seq
. See I.C. § 31

- 37

- 2

- 3. I nd. Code § 31

- 37

- 2

- 1 provides the following two

- prong inquiry to adjudicate juvenile deli n q u ency for status offenses : A child is a delinquent child if, before becoming eighteen (18) years of age, the child:6 (1) commits a delinquent act described in this c hapter; and (2) needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that: (A) the child is not receiving; (B) the child is unlikely to accept voluntarily; and (C) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. R.B. , 839 N.E.2d at 1284. J uveniles may only be adjudicated delinquent if they committed a status offense and the court finds that the child is in need of care, treatment, or rehabilitation. Id

. Here, the juvenile court entered a true finding in which it adjudicated V .R. a delinquent child for truancy. V.R. a sserts on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding under the second prong that V.R. “was in need of care, treatment or rehabilitation that she was not receiving, was unlikely to accept volunt arily, and that was unlikely to be provided without the coercive intervention of the court.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 5 )

. In support, V.R. argues that her medical condition and failure to obtain written medical excuses along with evidence that attendance was not an issue during the following (2011

- 2012) school year is inadequate proof of her need for care, treatment or rehabilitation under I.C. § 31

- 37

- 2

- 1(2)

. We note that the juvenile court is not required to make a finding under the second prong and that p roof of an excessive amount of absences allows an inference of the child’s need of care, treatment, and rehabilitation

. R.B. , 839 N.E.2d at 1284. Furth e r, t he need to be in school on a regular basis is the very care, treatment, or rehabilitation contempl ated. Id

. In R.B. , the delinquent child had twenty

- three full

- day , unexcused absences. Id . In another case, fifteen full

- day, unexcused absences sufficed to establish7

delinquency

. See G.N. v. State , 833 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). More

re cently, however, we concluded that a child with only one full

- day, unexcused absence along with evidence that the child incurred no further unexcused absences during the same semester did not permit an inference of the child’s need for care, treatment or

r ehabilitation. See C.S. v. State , 953 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). W e conclude that the evidence here was sufficient to establish V.R.’s need for care, treatment and rehabilitation beyond a reasonable doubt

. T he State presented evidence that V.R. missed nineteen full days of classes without an excuse. V.R. points to her medical condition and failure to obtain doctor’s notes to justif y the se unexcused absences. While we sympathize with the challenges she faces because of her medical condition , her argument is essentially an invitation to conclude that her absences resulted from her medical condition. T he juvenile court determined differently and for us to conclude otherwise would require us to reweigh the evidence , which we will not do. See R.B. v. State , 839 N.E.2d at 1283. Finally, despite V.R.’ s argument that th ere is no evidence that she woul d not accep t care, treat ment or reh abilitation volu n tarily, the record presents a contrary view. Following her referral to the juvenile court, V.R. was given an informal adjustment, yet failed to meet its terms, resulting in her discharge from informal adjustment and the filing of a petition for delinquency. As a result, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s de termination of V.R.’s delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt. CONCLUSION8

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that V.R.’s delinquency adjudication was supported by sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Affirmed. BAILEY, J. and CRONE, J. concur