alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

December 28, 2018

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-2735

New Beverage Ventures:

I am pleased to notify you that the United States Trade Representative has determined to 

grant the above-referenced exclusion request submitted pursuant to the notice published at 83 FR 

32181 (‘July 11 notice’). The exclusion determination is set out in a formal notice which has 

been submitted to Office of the Federal Register for publication (‘the exclusion notice’). A prepublication version of the exclusion notice has been posted on the USTR website, at 

https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/12.21.18_Notice_of_Product_E

xclusions.pdf.

The scope of the exclusion is governed by the formal HTSUS language in the annex to 

the product exclusion notice, and not by the product descriptions set out in any particular request 

for exclusion. An exclusion in response to your request has been granted by excluding from the 

additional tariffs the 10-digit HTSUS subheading under which your request was filed. 

In accordance with the July 11 notice, the exclusion applies as of the July 6, 2018 

effective date of the tariff action, and will extend for one year after the exclusion notice is 

published in the Federal Register. As stated in the exclusion notice, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection will issue additional instructions on entry guidance and implementation.

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn

General Counsel
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

HOANG AI LE, AKA Ah Hoang,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 22

- 10081

D.C. No.

4:96

- cr

- 00094

- JSW

- 7

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 19, 2023 * *

San Francisco, California

Before: VANDYKE and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK, ** * District

Judge

.

Ho a ng Ai Le (“Le”) appea l s Judge Jeffrey S. White’s order denying in part

his motion to correct his sentence for clerical error pursuant to Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 36 . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Washington, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

APR 21 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

for clear error the grant or denial of a Rule 36 motion, see United States v. Dickie

,

752 F. 2 d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) , and we affirm.

Le contends that Judge White erred by striking all references in the

judgment to his pending Eastern District of California case in which a sentence had

not yet been imposed. “The only sentence that is legally cognizable is the actual

oral pronouncement in the presence of the defendant.” Uni ted States v. Munoz

Dela Rosa , 49 5 F.2d 253

, 256 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (citations omitted) . “A

change made under Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 can do no more than conform the sentence

to the term which the record indicates was intended.” United States v. Ka ye , 739

F.2d 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1984).

Le’s s entence was orally pronounced by Judge Marilyn Hall Patel. Judge

White determined that Judge Patel never intended to decide whether the sentence

she imposed on Le would be served concurrently or consecutively to any future

sentence imposed in the Eastern District. Judge White did not clearly err in doing

so . Judge Patel noted that Le was not serving any other sentence at that time and

the court had no control over the proceedings in the Eastern District. Th is

unambiguous statement reflects established law in this circuit. See United States v.

Montes

- Ruiz , 745 F.3d 1286, 1291

– 93 (9th Cir. 2014). And, as the parties agree,

the amended judgement does not alter the term Le is currently serving. See 18

U.S.C. § 3584(a).3

AFFIRMED.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

July 3, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-2847

Speck Pumps-Pool Products, Inc: 

I am pleased to notify you that the United States Trade Representative has determined to 

grant the above-referenced exclusion request submitted pursuant to the notice published at 83 FR 

32181 (‘July 11 notice’). The exclusion determination is set out in a formal notice which has 

been submitted to Office of the Federal Register for publication (‘the exclusion notice’). A prepublication version of the exclusion notice has been posted on the USTR website, at 

https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/Notice_of_Product_Exclusions.

pdf. 

The scope of the exclusion is governed by the formal HTSUS language in the annex to 

the product exclusion notice, and not by the product descriptions set out in any particular request 

for exclusion. An exclusion in response to your request has been granted by excluding from the 

additional tariffs products covered by a specially drafted description contained in the annex to 

the product exclusion notice. 

In accordance with the July 11 notice, the exclusion applies as of the July 6, 2018 

effective date of the tariff action, and will extend for one year after the exclusion notice is 

published in the Federal Register. As stated in the exclusion notice, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection will issue additional instructions on entry guidance and implementation

Sincerely,

Joseph Barloon

General Counsel
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. G. D. STEWART.

(Filed 17 March, 1954.)

Appeal by State of North Carolina from *Hubbard, Special Judge,*7 September, 1953, Term, of Ctjemtuck.

Criminal action wherein the defendant, after preliminary proceedings in accordance with applicable statutes, demurred to the bill of information charging in substance that he willfully violated the general gambling statutes of North Carolina by participating with others in betting on dog races under the pari-mutuel system of betting operated in connection therewith by the Carolina-Yirginia Racing Association, Inc.

(Counsel representing Currituck County, and other counsel representing the Currituck County Racing Commission, were permitted to appear as *amici curiae*in the proceedings before Judge Hubbard and also by brief and oral argument in this Court.)

Before pleading, the defendant demurred to the bill of information for that “by reason of Oh. 541, Session Laws of 1949, the bill failed to charge the commission of any crime or misdemeanor.” Judge Hubbard sustained the demurrer, announcing at the time that he was “holding said Act of 1949 to be constitutional.” The State of North Carolina duly excepted to this ruling and appealed from the judgment predicated thereon as permitted by G.S. 15-179 (2).

*Attorney-General McMullan, Assistant Attorney-General Moody, and Gerald F. White, Member of Staff, for the State.*

*E. B. Woodard for defendant, appellee.*

*Lucas, Rand & Bose, John B. McMullan, Wilton F. Walker, Jr., and John G. Dawson as amici curiae.*

Bobbitt, J.

Is Ch. 541, Session Laws of 1949, void as being in violation of limitations upon legislative power imposed by the Constitution of North Carolina? This is the question presented for decision. Upon the authority of the decision in *S. v. Felton, ante,*575, the defendant’s *590demurrer should have been overruled. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is

Reversed.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 49 (Tuesday, March 14, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 13733]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-6194]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division


Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act 
of 1933--Laser Power Corporation

    Notice is hereby given that, on December 2, 1994, pursuant to 
Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), Laser Power Corporation has 
filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General 
and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing (1) the identities of the 
parties and (2) the nature and objectives of the venture. The 
notifications were filed for the purpose of invoking the Act's 
provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual 
damages under specified circumstances. Pursuant to Section 6(b) of the 
Act, the identities of the parties are Laser Power Corporation, San 
Diego CA, and Proxima Corporation, San Diego, CA.
    The nature and objectives of this joint venture is to conduct 
cooperative research and development on the ``High Resolution 
Multimedia Laser Projection Display'' (HRMLPD) (ATP #94-01-0133) 
program awarded by the Department of Commerce's NIST Advanced 
Technology Program.
Constance K. Robinson,
Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 95-6194 Filed 3-13-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-01-M
#### Frank GARVEY, Appellant, v. Lisa VAWTER, Appellee.

No. 09-88-222 CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Beaumont.

Feb. 28, 1991.

Richard G. Baker, Zbranek & Hight, Liberty, for appellant.

Phillip C. Summers, Lorance & Thompson, Houston, for appellee.

OPINION ON REMAND

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment on the pleadings. Appellant filed suit alleging that appellee negligently left the keys to her parked automobile in the ignition, that a thief then stole the automobile and drove it into appellant’s place of business to his damage. The trial court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the pleadings on the ground that, as a matter of law, appellee’s action cannot be the proximate cause of appellant’s damages. This court reversed and remanded for trial, 774 S.W.2d 86 (1989), on the grounds that the proper method for attacking the sufficiency of the pleadings is by special exceptions and that this should not *602be circumvented by a motion for summary judgment on failure to state a cause of action. *See Massey v. Armco Steel Co.,*652 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.1983). Because this ground was not raised by appellant, but by this court *sua sponte,*the supreme court reversed and remanded to this court for further consideration, 786 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. 1990). *See San Jacinto River Authority v. Duke,*783 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.1990). Upon remand, we affirmed, 790 S.W.2d 403, holding that appellant failed to plead foreseeability and thus there was no fact issue presented, therefore summary judgment was proper. The supreme court again reversed, 795 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.1990) holding that appellant’s pleading of proximate cause included the element of foreseeability and remanded for this court to consider “... the issue presented: namely, whether Garvey’s cause of action was precluded as a matter of law on the issue of proximate cause.” 795 S.W.2d at 742. We hold it does not and again reverse.

The general rule is that an owner of a vehicle is not liable to third parties as a result of negligent operation of the vehicle by a thief not authorized to drive the vehicle. *Parker and Parker Construction Co., Inc. v. Morris,*346 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In order for appellee to be held negligent, the injury to appellant must have been foreseeable. *McKinney v. Chambers,*347 S.W.2d 30 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1961, no writ).

Since foreseeability may be a genuine issue of fact, *Finnigan v. Blanco County,*670 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.App.—Austin 1984, no writ), Garvey’s cause of action is not precluded as a matter of law on the issue of proximate cause.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

October 18, 2018

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-2207

Maine Port Authority:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20. 

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request failed to show that this particular product is available 

only from China.

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David Mercado, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bourgeois, J.), rendered April 2, 1985, convicting him of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress statements made by him to the police.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Upon our review of the record, we find no basis upon which to disturb the determination of the hearing court that the defendant’s statements were voluntarily made after an intentional and knowing waiver of his *Miranda*rights *(see, People v*
      *723
      *Prochilo,*41 NY2d 759; *People v Yukl,*25 NY2d 585, *cert denied*400 US 851; *People v Davis,*129 AD2d 648).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the credible evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]).

Pursuant to CPL 60.35 (1), when the People call a witness who gives testimony at trial upon a material issue which tends to disprove the People’s position at trial, they may introduce prior written signed statements or oral sworn testimony made by that party which contradict his trial testimony. The testimony sought to be impeached must affirmatively damage the People’s position and must be elicited during direct examination rather than upon cross-examination *(see,*CPL 60.35 [1]; *People v Saez,*69 NY2d 802; *People v Fitzpatrick,*40 NY2d 44; *People v Comer,*146 AD2d 794; *People v Huber,*144 AD2d 583; *People v Magee,*128 AD2d 811; *People v Morales,*118 AD2d 663).

Immediately after the murder, an eyewitness, Martin Cubano, indicated in a signed statement that the shooter was "David”, known to him from the neighborhood, and identified the defendant as David at the precinct. Cubano also told the Grand Jury that the defendant was the perpetrator. At trial, however, Cubano recanted and testified that the defendant was not the shooter he had observed. It is apparent that Cubano’s trial testimony affirmatively damaged the People’s case and we conclude that his prior written statement was properly admitted to impeach his credibility. The trial court properly instructed the jury that these prior statements were to be considered for impeachment purposes only and not as direct proof of any facts. As such, we find that this impeachment evidence was properly admitted.

We have examined the defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental *pro se*brief, and conclude that they are either unpreserved for appellate review or are without merit. Thompson, J. P., Sullivan, Harwood and Miller, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in this Post-Effective Amendment
No. 10/Amendment No. 241 to Registration Statement Nos. 333-137969/811-08306 on
Form N-4 of our reports, dated February 24, 2011, relating to the consolidated
financial statements and financial statement schedules of MetLife, Inc. and
subsidiaries ("MetLife") (which report expresses an unqualified opinion and
includes an explanatory paragraph regarding changes in MetLife's method of
accounting for the recognition and presentation of other-than-temporary
impairment losses for certain investments as required by accounting guidance
adopted on April 1, 2009, and its method of accounting for certain assets and
liabilities to a fair value measurement approach as required by accounting
guidance adopted on January 1, 2008) and the effectiveness of MetLife's
internal control over financial reporting, both appearing in the Annual Report
on Form 10-K of MetLife for the year ended December 31, 2010, and incorporated
by reference into the Statement of Additional Information dated May 1, 2011
which is being modified by this Registration Statement, and to the reference to
us as Experts under the heading "Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm"
in such Statement of Additional Information.

/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

New York, New York
July 1, 2011
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF MURFREESBORO BANCORP FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 2000
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

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<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                           8,852
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<SHORT-TERM>                                     4,460
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<INTEREST-OTHER>                                    50
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 3,879
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               2,104
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,354
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            1,525
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       93
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  1,556
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     88
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<CHANGES>                                            0
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<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.10
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</TABLE>
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]



# United States Court of Appeals

**For the First Circuit**

No. 00-2221 UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. DARYL E. SINGLETERRY, Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE [Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge ] Before Boudin, Chief Judge , Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges .
Daryl E. Singleterryon brief pro se. Paula D. Silsby , United States Attorney, and Margaret D. McGaughey , Appellate Chief, on brief for appellee.
September 27,2001Per Curiam . Daryl E. Singleterry appeals the

district court's denial of his motion to dismiss Count III, a forfeiture count, in his 1993 indictment and to return the forfeited money to him. Unlike the original judgment of November 2, 1993, the amended judgment of July 30, 1998, ent ered after remand from this court, did not reference Count III. Singleterry argued that the amended judgment's failure to comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(2)'s requirement that "a final order of forfeiture shall be made part of the sentence and included in the judgment" revived his opportunity to challenge the forfeiture count. He claimed that, because the forfeiture count was not mentioned inthe amended judgment, that count must be dismissed. But, he offers no supporting case law for that proposition.

We find neither error of law nor abuse of discretionin the district court's denial of Singleterry's motionto dismiss Count III. Nothing about Count III was in dispute either before or after entry of the amended judgment. Neither party raised any issue regarding Count III onremand. And, there is no evidence that the district court intended on remand to effect any change regarding that count. From aught that appears, the failure to reference Count III in the amended judgment of July 1998 was simply a-3-

clerical oversight in the preparation of the amended judgment. Such an mistake is subject to correction pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 Cf. United States v. Loe , 248 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding nothing objectionable about a nunc pro tunc amendment to the judgment referencing the forfeiture).

The district court's denial of the motion to dismiss Count III is affirmed .