REVISED SEPTEMBER 12, 2002

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-51007

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

GILBERT ARREOLA GRANADO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Texas

August 14, 2002

Before JOLLY, DUHÉ, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal of the district court’s denial of a motion

to suppress evidence obtained during a vehicle stop. Because we

find the vehicle stop violated the Fourth Amendment, and the

government did not show t hat the seizure was not the product of

that Fourth Amendment violation, we REVE RSE the denial of the

suppress ion motion, VACATE the convictions, and REMAND with

instructions to suppress.1 The frame did not block the letters or numbers on the plate.

2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Texa s Department of Public Safety trooper Jimmy Schroeder

(“Schroeder”) was driving south on Interstate 35 in Williamson

County, Texas when he noticed a minivan traveling in the opposite

direction. The minivan lac ked a front license plate, which is

required o f vehicles registered in Texas, but not of vehicles

registered in m any other states. Schroeder made a u-turn and

followed the van to determine whether it was registered in Texas,

and thus in violation of the law.

Schroeder was unable to read the name of the state that had

issued the plate, because a license plate frame partially blocked

its name. 1 He stopped the vehicle because if it wa s registered in

Texas, the lack of a front license plate would be a vio lation of

Texas law; and because he thought that the license plate frame

obstructed the license plate, constituting a violation of Texas

law. As he approached the van, Schroeder determined that the plate

was issued in Coahuila, a Mexican state.

Nonet heless, he proceeded to the driver’s side door of the

van, opened it, and asked Appellant Gilbert Arreola Granado, the

driver for his driver’s license. This began a lengthy stop that

included extensive questioning, a frisking, and a search of the

van. That search revealed methamphetamine and cocaine, and

Schroeder arrested Appellant. Appellant later admitted he was being3

paid to transport contraband.

A two-count indictment charged that Appellant possessed

cocaine and methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), § 841(b)(1)(A), and § 841(b)(1)(B).

Appellant moved to suppress the drugs and his statements to

Schroeder, arguing they were the product of an illegal search and

seizure, because the vehicle stop violated the Fourth Amendment.

After a heari ng, the district court denied the motion and

Appellant’s motion to reconsider. Appellant entered a conditional

guilty plea to both counts, expressly reserving in writing the

right to appeal the district court’s denial of the suppression

motion. After sentencing, Appellant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review

factual findings for clear error and legal conc lusions d e novo

.

United States v. Kelley , 140 F.3d 596, 601 (5th Cir. 1998).

The decision to stop an automobile is co nstitutional “where

the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation

has occurred.” Whren v. United States

, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct.

1769, 1772, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996). A trooper’s incorrect belief

that a motorist is in violation of state traffic laws is

insufficient to justify a vehicle st op. United States v. LopezValdez , 178 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 1999).

Schroeder stopped Appellant because he believed the lack of a4

front license plate or the “obscured” rear license plate violated

Texas law. However, he determined before reaching the van that it

was not registered in Texas, so the lack of a front license plate

was not an objective reason to continue the stop. Therefore, the

only potential justification for the continued stop is that the

license plate was obscured in violation of Texas law.

The Texas statute governing license plate display makes it an

offense to display a license plate that, among other things:

(5) has letters, numbers, or other identification marks

that because of blurring matter are not plainly visible

at all times during daylight;

(6) is a sticker, decal, or other insignia that is not

authorized by law and that i nterferes with the

readability of the letters or numbers on the plate; or

(7) has a coating, covering, or protective material that

distorts angular visibility or detectability.

T EX

. T RANSP

. C ODE A NN

. § 502.4 09 (Vernon Supp. 2002). Unless

Appellant’s license plate violated that statute, the stop was

unlawful.

Appellant’s license plate does not violate the Texas statute.

We strictly construe the Texas Transportation Code. United States

v. Miller , 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998). A photograph of the

“obscured” plate is in evidence. Visibility of identifying marks on

Appellant’s plate is not obscured by “blurring matter”. There is no

“stick er, decal, or other insignia” that interferes with2 We decline to s tretch the meaning of the word “insignia” to

include a license plate frame.

3 The government cites an unpublished Texas case, Rivera v.

Texas

, 200 1 WL 1249994 (Tex. App. – Houston (1 Dist.)), for the

proposition that it is illegal to cover a licens e plate with a

clear plastic coating. That case is factually distinc t from the

case at bar, which involves no such covering. Moreover, unpublished

opinions do not constitute authority.

5 readability. 2 Nor i s there a “coating, covering, or protective

material” disturbing angular v isibility. 3 There is only a license

plate frame, and that alone does not violate Texas law, under the

facts of this case. The statute is specific in what it prohibits

and the district court erred in construing it more liberally.

The government’s comparison to United States v. Casas

, 1999 WL

33290609 (W.D. Tex. 1999), where a district court upheld a vehicle

stop, fails. There

, the vehicle was stopped pursuant to a United

States Customs Office-issued request to stop all vehicles matching

a certain description, because of suspected drug activity. No such

suspicion of unlawful activity existed here. Moreover, the vehicle

in Casas had no license plate at all, a clear violation of the law.

Because the stop was un reasonable, the resulting search and

seizure were also illegal. United States v. Frisbie

, 550 F.2d 335,

338 (5th Cir. 1977). All evidence derived from an illegal search or

seizure must be suppressed, unless the government shows there was

a break in the chain of events sufficient to refute the inference

that the evidence was the product of the Fourth Amendment

violation. Brown v. Illinois

, 422 U.S. 590, 602-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254,6

2261-62, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975). We examine the totality of the

circumstances, focusing especially on (1) the temporal proximity of

the violation and the discovery of the evidence or statement; (2)

the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and

flagrancy of the initial misconduct. Id.

The drugs found in the van and Appellant’s statements derived

d irectly and immediately from the unlawful stop. They wer e

temporally related to the illegal stop, as they occurred within

minutes. Any po ssible intervening circumstances came so close on

the heels of the stop as to remain tainted with that illegality.

Finally, the violation of Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights was

unmistakable. Therefore, the drugs and statements must be

suppressed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REV ERSE the denial of the

suppression motion, VACATE the convictions, an d REMAND with

instructions to suppress.