Gen. 13] 13

1 A“contribution” is “the gift, transfer or promise of gift or transfer of money or other thing of value to any candidate, or the ca ndidate’s representative, or a representative of any po l itical party or partisan organization

to promote

or assist in the promotion of the success or defeat of any candidat e, poli tical party, principal or proposition submitted to a vote at any election.” Article 33, §1-1(a)(5) (i).

CONSTI TUTI ONAL LAW
F REEDOM OF S PEECH AN D A S SOCIATION

) P OLITIC AL S PEECH

) E QUAL P ROTECTION

) L AW B ARRING P OL ITICA L C ONTRIB UTO RS F ROM B ECOMING C ASI NO G AMIN G L ICENSEES I S C ONSTITUTIONAL

February 21, 1996

The Honorable Christ

opher J. McCabe Maryla nd S enate
You have request ed o ur opini on on the const itutionali ty of Sen ate Bill 555, “Campaign Contributions

)Casino Gaming.” Our opi nio n is th at S ena te B ill 55 5 is c ons titutio nal.

I Scope of Senate Bil l 555
Sen ate Bil l 55 5 woul d amendthe El ecti on C ode to add the fo llowing new prohibit ion: “A pers on who makes a contribut ion , eithe r directly or indirec tly, is not e ligible to r eceiv e from the S tate any form of li cense or per mit to conduct

casino gaming f

or a peri od 3 ye ars fr om the d ate th e pe rson m ade the c ont ribu tion .” 1

We beg in by acknowledgi ng some uncertai nty about t he intende d scope of

Senate Bil l 555. The term “casi no gaming” is not define d. Under one possibl e inte rpret ation, the te rm refers to any venue where casino games are lice nsed to be pl ayed. For example, coun ty-lic ensed “casin o nights ” are l egal i n Prince George’ s County. Article 27, § 258 B(c ). A “ casino nigh t,” und ertake n for th e ben efit of certa in chari table and civi c organ izat ions, is an event “at which14 [81 O p. Att’y

2 “Ca sino gaming” of this kind was the subject of this office’s detailed report to the Joint Exec utive-L egislative Task Force to Study Commerci a l Gami ng Activities in Maryland. SeeJ. Joseph Curran, Jr., TheHouse Never

Loses and Maryland

Cannot Win: Why Casino Gaming is a Bad Idea (October 16, 1995) (hereafter ci ted as “ Casino Gaming Report ”). If thebill is intended to have a broader scope, we suggest that the term “casino gamin

g” be de fined. I f the sc ope of the bill were enlarged, the issue s discusse d in this opin ion would require reasse ssment.

3 Article 27, §241 prohibits the keeping of “any gaming table or other place of gambling in this State....” A “gaming table,” under

Article 27, §244, inc ludes “[ a]ll game s, devices and contrivances at which money or any other thing shall be bet or wagered ....” Slot machinesare separa tely banned. Artic le 27, §26 4B. card games, wheels of

chance, or

roulet te are played a nd m oney win nin gs o r tok ens red eem able and m one y ar e aw ard ed a s priz es.” Article 27, §25 8B (c)(1)(ii). W hile these eve nts ar e sporadi c, rat her th an co ntinuous , each suc h event i ncludes gambli ng acti vity t hat might be thought

to fal l withi n the te rm “casino gaming. ”
Yet your let

ter r equesti ng this opinion des cribes the bil l, of which you are a co- sponsor, as one rendering con tributors “inelig ible to recei ve a lic ense to oper ate a cas ino in Maryland within t hree years of the da te of the cont

ribut ion.” You also ref er to t he increa sing populari ty nati onally of casino gambli ng in venues l ike “riverboats, or [other] f ree st anding fac ili ties

... .” H ence , we s hall as su me that Senate Bil l 555 m ea ns “casi no gaming” of the kind offer ed by fu ll-scale c asino s of the Las V egas or A tlantic C ity type: venues dedicat ed to a var iet y of gambling activities, open to the pub lic nearly c ontinuous ly, and aimed atdrawing large crowds from a wide market ar ea. 2
There is pre sentl y no such “casi no g aming” in Maryland. 3 Under this constr

uctionof Se nate B ill 555, th e bill w ould affect o nly hypotheti cal futu re em plo ym ent p oss ibilitie s. If casino gaming of this kind were le galiz ed in the fut ure, t hen those who made political contributions woul d b e barred f rom obtaini ng a lic ense for three yea rs aft er m akin g th e co ntrib utio n.Gen. 13] 15

II Future Employm ent Restri ction
Under Sena te Bill 555, someone who m akes a poli tica l co ntri bu tionwo uld the reby lose fo r three y ears a p articular , albeit hy po thetical, futur e employment opportuni ty

)casino gaming licen see
. In AttorneyGeneral v. Waldron , 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d929 (1981), the C ourt o f Ap peals h eld un cons ti tuti onal, on equal protection grounds, a law that prohibi ted ce r tain j udicia l ret irees from practi cing law. This res tri ction was variousl y charact erize d by the Co urt in the se str ong te rms : It imp osed a “pe rma nen[ t] preclu[ sion] from the practice of [a judg e’s] chosen profe ssion” ; it “fla tly denie d on e the rig ht to en gage in the p ractice o f th e profess ion for which he i s other wise quali fied”; it “impinged on “impor tantprivat e right s”; i t “depri ved .. . retired j udges .. . of t he right to pursue their

call ing in l ife”; it “i mposed a severe bur den”; and it “de nied pers ons a basi c and important right .” 289 Md. at 716, 717, 722, 727, and 727-28.
The Co urt w ould , we b elieve , take a v ery d if fe rent vi ew of Sen ate Bill 555. Far from being a “chosen prof

ession” for which someone could be “ot

herwise qual ifi ed,” the occ upatio n sub ject to the res tri ction, casino gaming lice nsee, does not presen tly exist. If it came into bei ng, the ban on lic ensing of political cont ribut ors wo uld am oun t to a reg ulati on of entry e xpre ssly pre serve d in Waldron

. 289 M d. at 71 7. Fu rtherm ore, the State in te rest in averting the pote ntialeffect of casi no money on politi cs, di scussed in m ore d etail in Part III below, would j usti fy the r estr icti on in any even t.16 [81 O p. Att’y

4 Some passages in Buckley suggest a lesser First Amendment status for political contributions, compared to other political activities. See 424 U.S. at 20-21. Because Senate Bill 555 is constituti onal eve n if contributions are accorded undiluted First Amendment stat us, w e need not further explore the case law touch

ing on thei

r preci se status. III
First Am endm ent Considerations
If the GeneralAss em bly leg alized casino gam ing, Se nate Bill 555 wo uld p ut a license e to a choice: forgo pol iti cal cont ribut ions or lose one’s l icense. In pract ical effect , the billwould then be a prohibi tionon c ont

ributio ns . A n y ca sino g am ing lice nsee wo uld decli ne to mak e contri but ions so as not to j eopardiz e this form of li velihood. H ence, we shal l anal yze the bi ll as if i t were a fl at prohibi tionon contributions by lice nsees i n this industry, f or that is its pr actic al effect.
The making of a poli tica l contributi on involves the ri ght of fre e expressi on and free a ssoc iati on protected under the First Am endm ent. Citiz ens Against Rent Control

v. Berkel

ey , 454 U.S

. 290, 299 -300 (198 1); Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U .S. 1, 5 (1976). 4 Mo reover, a ban on contributions

)o r, her e, a penalt y for making contributions that i s tant amount to a ban

)is a hea vy b urde n on this par ticul ar m anifesta tion of F irst A m end m ent r igh ts.
Ye t, “[n]eith er the rig ht to associ ate nor t he right to p articipate in pol itic al act ivities i s absolut e .. ..” United Stat es Civil Service Com m’n v. Nati onal Ass’n o f Letter Carriers , 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973) (upholdi ng Hatch Ac t restr ictio n on pol itical a ctivi ties). As the Supreme Court obs erved in i ts deci sion uphol ding contributi on limits, “[e]ven asigni ficant inter ference with p rotec ted ri ghts of political association may be sustained if the Stat e demon strates a sufficien tly imp ortant in terest an d em ploy s m eans closely draw n to avoid u nnecessar

y abridgement of

associ ationa l fr eedoms.” Buckl e y v. Valeo , 424 U.S. at 25 (inte rna l qu otati on m ark s om itted ). See also Eu v. San Fra ncisco Co unty D em ocra tic Ce ntral C om mitte e, 4 89 U.S. 214 , 222 ( 198 9); FEC v. National Conse rva ti ve PAC , 470 U.S. 480, 496 (1985).Gen. 13] 17

5 Further discussion of this danger may be found in Casino Gaming Report at 46-47. In Petition of So to , 565 A.2 d 10 88 ( N.J . Su per . 198 9), cert. denied , 583 A .2d 310 (N .J.) ce r t. de nied , 496 U.S. 937 ( 1990), t he Ap pellate Div is io n of

th e Ne w JerseySuperior Court upheld t

he cons titutionality of a stat ute barring cert ain casino employees fr om making politi cal contributi ons. The Ne w Je rsey c ourt n oted th at, in Buckley , t he Su pr eme Cou rt had identified t he governm ental inter est in preventing corrup tion o r its appearance as sufficient to justify limit ations on campaign contr ibuti ons. As st rong as this int erestis general ly, it is all the st

ronger when the industry t hat is the source of potenti al contrib utio n s is “‘ rif e with evi l .. ..’ ” 565 A.2d at 1094 (quoti ng tri al court). The appellate court al so quoted a re port about casino gambling to the effect that “contributions by casino li censees, both corporat e and indivi dual, give the appe aranc e of atte mp ting to ‘buy’ political influence and favor iti sm and in fact have the ver

y real potenti al forcausing s uch favori tis m to occur.” 565 A. 2d at 1096. 5 Further, the Ne w Jers ey c ourt hel d, no remedy short of an outri ght proh ibition w ould be su fficient to furthe r this state in terest: “Given the acknowled ged vuln erability of the c asino indu stry to organize d crime and the compelling interes t in maint aining t he pub lic trust , not only in the c asino i ndustry but al s o the governmental proc ess w hic h so close ly regul ates i t, . .. t here is no viable alterna tive av ailable to prev ent the appe aranc e of, or a ctual, co rrup tionof the pol iti cal proc ess in New Jers ey.” 565 A.2d at 1098. Cf. Kentuck

y Regist ry of Ele ction v . Louis vill e Bar Ass’n, 579 S.W.2d 622 (Ky . Ap p. 197 9) (w hile strikin g do wn corp orate contribution ban a s appli ed to publi cati on of pollresul ts i n judici al elections, court r ecognizedrisks of “corr uption of candidat es” and “u nwh ol es ome influen ce ov er po litical affairs” ); Advisory Opini on on Constit

utionality of

1975 PA 227 , 242 N.W.2d 3, 13 (Mich. 1976) (in uphold ing corp orate contribution ban in candidate el ections, court poin ted to “ attem pts at inf luence or importuni ty which might be e xer ted upon a succ essful ly ele cted candi date by a cont ribut ing cor por ation ”).
Cas in o g am ing is an indu stry tha t gene rates ex traord inarily large sums of

mo ney. W hen le galize d at all, the ind ustry is h eavily regulat ed. For much the same reason, the liquor industr y is likewise heav ily regu late d. Thus, it is si gnifi cant that a complet e ban on political contributions by liquor licensees has a lso been u pheld. In18 [81 O p. Att’y

6 Nor are cont

ributio ns bans unheard of in other contexts. For example, federallaw prohibits a federal contractor from making political contributions. See2 U.S.C. §441c.

7 The bill’s line-drawing might be thought to raise an equal protection

problem. That is, the bill ef fectively bar s political contributions from one segment of thegambling industry

)casino gaming lic ensees

) whileimposing no comparable restriction on persons engaged in other commercialgambling activities thatare authorized by law. These include parimutuel w agering licensees, see§11-302 of the Business Regulation Article; commercial bingo licensees, see Article 16, Title 2, Subtitle 3 of the Anne Arundel County Code; and commercial tip jar licensee s, see Ar tic le 27, 255C. However, the General Ass embly cou ld reasonably conclude that the volume of money generated bycasino gaming and the historyof criminal activi

tyassociated with this industry pose a special risk of corruption. This distinct ion would suffice for purposes of equal protection review. Schill erPark Colonial

Inn, I nc. v. Berz , 349 N .E.2d 61 (Ill. 1976 ), the Ill inois Supreme Court held t hat the state int erestin avoiding the corrupt ing effect

of liquo r interests on the poli tica l proces s justifi ed a statute prohibiting po litical contributions by liquor lice ns ees. Noting that pol iti cians “may have i nfluence or pow er wh ich co uld be used to affect

various acti ons concerni ng the liquor industry,” t

he Illinois court uph eld the le gisl ative atte mpt to “prevent liquor lice nsees from obtai ning inf luence i n the are a of li quor regul ation

... [by] proscribing the giving of cam pa ign contributi ons by li quor lice nsees t o any candidat e.” 349 N.E.2d at 66-67. 6
Sen ate Bill 555 av oids unn ecessary ab ri dg eme nt of First Amendm ent rights. It do es no t affect lice nsee s’ right to enga ge in direct political speech or t o make independent expe ndi tures. Nor, under the co nstruc tion ad opted in this o pinio n , does t he billreach ga mb lin g lice nsees beyond t he uniquel y dangerous cat egory of casinos. 7Gen. 20] 19

8 For purposes of assessing the bill’s facial constitutiona li ty, we need not resolve whether the b ill coul d constitu tionally be

applied t

o contributions in refe

rendum e lections,rath er than can didate e lections. Compare Austin v. Michigan C

hamber of Commerce , 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding prohibition of corpor a te expenditures in candidate election) with First Nation al Bank of Boston v. B ellotti , 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down prohibition of cor porate expenditures in referendum election). See also Citizen s Against Rent Control v. Berkeley , 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (striking down $250 indivi dual c ontribution limit in ballot measure campaign). IV
Conclusion
In sum m ary , i t is our opin ion tha t Sen ate B ill 555 is consti tuti onal on it s face. 8

J. Joseph C urran, Jr. AttorneyGeneral
Jack Sch wa rtz Chief Counsel Opinions and Advic e