NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JUSTIN M., STEPHANIE R., Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, T.H., K.H., J.H., J.M., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 18-0120

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD529149

The Honorable Karen L. O’Connor, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Kathryn E. Harris

Counsel for Appellant Justin M.

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa

By Suzanne W. Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant Stephanie R.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Cathleen E. Fuller

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety

FILED 10-9-2018
JUSTIN M., STEPHANIE R. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 Stephanie R. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her four children. Justin M. (“Father”) 

appeals the superior court’s order terminating his parental rights to J.M.,

the daughter he has in common with Mother. 1

BACKGROUND

¶2 From 2008 to 2015, Mother and Father lived in Tennessee with 

the children: T.H., born in 2007, K.H., born in 2008, J.H., born in 2010, and 

J.M., born in 2013. The family had an extensive history with the Tennessee 

Department of Children’s Services (“Tennessee DCS”) based on allegations 

ranging from physical abuse to “environmental neglect.” In early 2015, 

Tennessee case workers recommended services for the parents, but they 

refused to participate. That August, the family moved from Tennessee to 

Arizona.

¶3 A week after moving, the family became homeless and 

Mother attempted suicide. Mother suffered from anxiety and bipolar 

disorder with depressive features. Because she could not meet the 

children’s needs, Mother asked the Arizona Department of Child Safety 

(the “Department”) to take custody of them. The Department did so and 

filed dependency petitions.

¶4 In November 2015, the court found the children dependent 

and set a case plan of family reunification. Over the next nine months the 

parents participated in multiple services designed to help reunify the 

family. Through her own provider, Mother also addressed her mental

health. The parents obtained jobs and secured an apartment with the help 

of a housing subsidy provided by the Department. In early 2016, the parents 

completed psychological evaluations with Dr. James Thal. Dr. Thal opined 

 

1 The alleged fathers of the three other children are not parties to this appeal.
JUSTIN M., STEPHANIE R. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

that the parents might be able to demonstrate minimally adequate 

parenting skills in the near future but noted that the children would remain 

“at risk for possible homelessness” if returned to the parents’ care. Because 

the parents were complying with the case plan, however, the Department

referred the family for family reunification services in August 2016, and the 

court returned the children to the parents’ physical custody.

¶5 Two months later, before completing reunification services,

the parents told the reunification team that they were moving to another 

apartment. Contrary to their claim, Mother and Father were evicted for 

failing to pay rent and moved into a motel. That same week, the parents 

told the case manager they were on their way to a team decision-making 

meeting with the Department, but they instead left for Tennessee with the 

children. Shortly afterward, the Department located the family in Texas, the 

court returned the children to Department custody in Arizona, and the 

parents completed their move to Tennessee.

¶6 In Tennessee, the parents obtained employment, but Mother 

did not obtain mental health services for several months. The parents lived 

with relatives before moving into a house owned by Mother’s grandfather.

The home needed a lot of work; initially, it had no running water or 

electricity. In February 2017, the Department initiated a placement

assessment under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children to 

investigate the parents’ Tennessee home. Two months later, police arrested 

the parents for assault, but eventually dropped the charges. The parents did 

not inform the Department about their encounter with law enforcement.

¶7 Around July, the parents set up utilities for the home, and 

Mother enrolled in mental health services. In August, although Tennessee 

case workers had found Mother’s home to be minimally adequate for the 

children, Tennessee DCS denied the placement assessment because of the 

parents’ assault arrest, the family’s history with Tennessee DCS, and 

Mother’s mental health issues.

¶8 The Arizona court changed the case plan to severance and 

adoption, and the next month, the Department moved to terminate the 

parents’ parental rights under the fifteen-month out-of-home placement 

ground. Around this time, the parents reported that they were no longer in 

a relationship, and Father moved to Virginia.2 The Department initiated a

 

2 Though across state lines, Father’s Virginia residence was located close to

Mother’s Tennessee residence. For various reasons, including the proximity 
JUSTIN M., STEPHANIE R. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

placement assessment for Father’s Virginia residence. Ultimately, Virginia

Child Protective Services did not recommend placing the children with 

Father because he failed to maintain contact with the Virginia caseworker 

and stopped paying his rent.

¶9 The superior court held a contested severance hearing in 

March 2018 and took the matter under advisement. The court then issued a 

ruling terminating the parents’ rights on the ground alleged.

DISCUSSION

¶10 To terminate a parent’s parental rights the juvenile court must 

find at least one statutory ground under Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) § 8-533 by clear and convincing evidence, A.R.S. § 8-537(B), and 

by a preponderance of evidence that termination is in the child’s best 

interests, Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41 (2005). 3 We will not 

reverse the juvenile court’s termination order “unless no reasonable 

evidence supports its factual findings.” Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 

Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 16 (App. 2016). We view the evidence and reasonable 

inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

juvenile court’s decision, and we will not reweigh the evidence. Jordan C. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009).

I. Fifteen Months in an Out-of-Home Placement

¶11 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), the superior court may 

terminate parental rights if it finds that: (1) “the child has been in an out-ofhome placement for a cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer”; 

(2) “the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances” that caused 

the out-of-home placement; and (3) “there is a substantial likelihood that 

the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental 

care and control in the near future.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). Relevant 

circumstances are those existing at the time of the severance that prevent a 

parent from being able to appropriately provide for his or her children. 

Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at 96, ¶ 31 n.14. The juvenile court must also find the 

Department has made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification 

services. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). The fifteen-month ground does not focus on 

 

of their homes, the Department case manager believed the parents 

remained in a relationship.

3 We cite to the current version of all applicable statutes because no 

revisions material to this decision have occurred.
JUSTIN M., STEPHANIE R. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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a parent’s efforts to cure the circumstances, but rather his or her ultimate 

ability to do so. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), (c).

¶12 Mother and Father argue insufficient evidence supports two 

of the court’s findings under the fifteen-month out-of-home placement 

ground: (1) that they were unable to remedy the circumstances causing the 

children to remain in an out-of-home placement; and (2) that there is a 

substantial likelihood that they would not be capable of exercising proper 

and effective parental care and control in the near future.

A. Mother

¶13 Mother argues the court’s findings are unsupported by the 

evidence because she obtained housing and employment and engaged in 

mental health treatment before the severance hearing. The superior court 

considered this evidence but determined that other reasonable evidence in 

the record supported severance under the fifteen-month ground. We agree.

¶14 The Department took custody of the children because the 

parents were unemployed and homeless and Mother was not addressing 

her mental illness. Although the parents participated in services in Arizona, 

they were unable to maintain stable housing even with the assistance of a 

Department subsidy. Indeed, while the parents awaited the subsidy 

distribution, they did not pay rent or save their money for future rent 

payments. Only two months after the children returned home, the subsidy 

expired and the parents paid nothing further toward their rent and faced

eviction.

¶15 Mother did not dispute this at the severance hearing but

testified that she stopped paying rent because their landlord would not

make needed repairs and because she “was moving anyway so it wasn’t 

something [she] needed to worry about.” Yet, she did not try any other 

avenue to obtain the needed repairs before withholding rent. Nor did the 

parents inform the Department of their situation or seek other housing 

resources before being evicted. Instead, they misled the family reunification 

team about obtaining another apartment and moved into a motel. 

Moreover, the parents knew that the dependency remained active during 

this time and that they could not remove the children from Arizona. 

Nevertheless, they told the case manager they were on their way to a child 

and family team meeting, but instead left the state with the children.

¶16 Mother also knew that failing to address her mental health 

would prevent reunification, but she did not engage in mental health 

treatment until approximately nine months after moving to Tennessee. 
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Additionally, she knew that failing to obtain safe and stable housing would 

prevent reunification. Yet, despite being employed in Tennessee, Mother 

was unable to obtain her own housing until about March 2017. The home 

she chose required significant work. Several months later, the home was

found to be “minimally adequate”; however, Tennessee still denied 

Mother’s Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children for other safety 

concerns. Thus, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that, 

despite receiving multiple services over two and a half years of Department

involvement, Mother was unable to remedy the circumstances causing the 

children’s out-of-home placement.

¶17 Likewise, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding 

that a substantial likelihood existed that Mother would not be capable of 

exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. 

By the time of the severance hearing, Mother had a 10-year pattern of 

instability, echoing Dr. Thal’s April 2016 opinion that the children would 

remain at risk for homelessness in her care. Accordingly, the case manager 

told the parents that they needed to demonstrate at least a year of safe and 

stable housing before the Department would recommend reunification. Yet, 

only six months before the severance hearing, Mother still had not

demonstrated to Arizona or Tennessee officials that she could consistently 

provide a safe and stable living environment for the children or otherwise 

meet the children’s daily needs. While Mother argues the court should have 

focused on the recent stability she achieved just before the severance 

hearing, the superior court was in the best position to weigh the evidence.

See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002) 

(“The juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, is in the 

best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings.”). On this record, 

reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s findings.

B. Father

¶18 Similarly, the record contains reasonable evidence supporting 

the superior court’s findings as to Father. Father similarly had an unstable 

housing history until October 2017. At that time, Father reported that he 

and Mother had separated; he then rented a home in Virginia for $50 per 

month. Although Father initially maintained this home, he stopped paying 

rent three months before the severance hearing. Moreover, he failed to keep 

in touch with the Virginia Child Protective Services representative.

¶19 Father argues the case manager’s testimony regarding his 

assessment’s pending placement denial in Virginia was based on hearsay.
JUSTIN M., STEPHANIE R. v. DCS, et al.

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At the hearing, the Department case manager testified that the Virginia

caseworker “indicated” she planned to deny Father’s assessment because 

she “had not had contact with [F]ather in a number of weeks. She also 

learned . . . through [the] housing authority for [F]ather that he had not paid 

his rent” in three months “and was in the middle of the eviction process.”

Father concedes that he did not object to this testimony at the hearing, but 

argues that “the juvenile court relied heavily on” this evidence in its 

severance determination.

4

¶20 However, reasonable evidence outside of the statements in 

question supports the juvenile court’s findings. The Department case 

manager testified that Father usually provided her with documentation 

showing his rental payments. Yet, he had not provided her any proof of

those payments between January and March 2018. Given this evidence, the 

superior court could have reasonably found that Father stopped paying his 

rent in Virginia. See Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 77, 82-

83, ¶ 19 (App. 2005) (“A trial court has broad discretion in admitting or 

excluding evidence, and we will not disturb its decision absent a clear abuse 

of its discretion and resulting prejudice.”). Thus, like Mother, Father had 

over 10 years of instability and faced another possible eviction just before 

the severance hearing. 

II. Best Interests

¶21 The parents also challenge the court’s finding that severance 

of their parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Severance is in 

the best interests of the child “if either: (1) the child will benefit from 

severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if severance is denied.” Alma S. v. 

Dep’t of Child Safety, 799 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 27, ¶ 13 (Sept. 14, 2018). “At the 

best-interests stage of the analysis, we can presume that the interests of the 

parents and child diverge because the court has already found the existence 

of one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing 

evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). 

¶22 The superior court found severance would benefit the 

children in many ways, and reasonable evidence supports those findings.

Although the children lived in many placements, each placement provided 

them with safe and stable housing and met their daily needs. Moreover, at 

the time of the severance hearing, the children were living together with 

 

4 Father also did not lodge a hearsay objection to Exhibit 20, the 

Department’s March 2018 court report, which contains the same 

statements.
JUSTIN M., STEPHANIE R. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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care providers who were meeting their needs and wanted to adopt them.

The case manager testified that they were doing well there, but if that 

placement could not adopt them for any reason, the children were 

otherwise adoptable. See Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 

373, 379, ¶ 30 (App. 2010) (affirmative benefits include availability of 

adoptive placement, whether placement is meeting child’s needs, and

whether children are adoptable).

¶23 Citing this court’s opinion Alma S. v. Department of Child 

Safety, Mother and Father argue that these findings are insufficient to 

support the court’s best interests determination. 244 Ariz. 152 (App. 2017).

The Arizona Supreme Court vacated this court’s opinion in Alma S. and 

affirmed the superior court’s finding that termination of mother’s parental

rights was in the children’s best interests. Alma S., 799 Ariz. Adv. Rep. at

¶ 21. The supreme court noted that factfinders must consider the totality of 

the circumstances existing at the time of severance to determine the best 

interests of the children and rejected “the proposition that adoptability 

alone can never support a best-interests finding.” Id. at ¶ 14. The supreme 

court articulated the correct standard, stating, “[w]hen a current placement 

meets the child’s needs and the child’s prospective adoption is otherwise 

legally possible and likely, a juvenile court may find that termination of 

parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child’s best interests.” Id.

(citing Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 12 (2016)). Here, the 

superior court determined the children were in a placement that wanted to 

adopt, and even if that placement could not adopt them, the children were 

otherwise adoptable. Based on the supreme court’s recent holding in 

Alma S. these findings are sufficient to support the superior court’s best

interests determination.

CONCLUSION

¶24 For the reasons stated, we affirm the superior court’s 

termination order.