* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 10/18/96

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ALVIN L. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DONICE NEAL, individually;

GERALD GASKO, individually;

FRANK GUNTER, individually;

WILLIAM BOKROS; HENRY

BOOTH, individually,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

ARISTEDES W. ZAVARAS, in his

official capacity; GEORGE

SULLIVAN, individually;

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

State of Colorado,

Defendants.

No. 95-1474

(D.C. No. 94-Z-420)

(D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
-2-

Before PORFILIO, LOGAN, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Plaintiff Alvin L. Williams, a black man, filed this employment

discrimination suit after he was discharged from his job with the Denver

Reception and Diagnostic Center, which is governed by the Colorado Department

of Corrections. Plaintiff claims his termination was improperly based on race

rather than any legitimate reason. Defendants, the Department of Corrections and

current or former corrections officials, filed motions for summary judgment,

arguing they were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s claims against

them under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,

1983 and 1985(3). Judge Zita Weinshienk held a hearing on the motions, stating

near its conclusion that 

plaintiff has given me sufficient facts and allegations that I think we

at least have to give the plaintiff a chance to prove his allegations,

which is that there was a chain of command; that [defendants]

Sullivan and Gunter and others were apprised of disciplinary actions;

that they acquiesced; that they knew and condoned this particular

alleged atmosphere of racial animus.
-3-

Appellants’ Br., Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing at 34-35. Judge

Weinshienk therefore denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment. 

Defendants Donice Neal, Gerald Gasko, Frank Gunter, William Bokros, and

Henry Booth, all sued in their personal capacity, appeal from the district court’s

order denying their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. 

Appellants argue that Judge Weinshienk applied the wrong legal standard for

supervisor liability in deciding their motion for summary judgment, in that she

erroneously failed to conclude that the undisputed facts demonstrate that these

appellants did not deliberately violate plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional

rights. We hold that Judge Weinshienk applied the correct standard for supervisor

liability in an employment discrimination suit, and that we lack jurisdiction to

review her finding that material issues of disputed fact exist to be tried.

In an employment discrimination suit, “supervisor liability requires

‘allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.’” 

Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1400 (10th Cir. 1992)(quoting

Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990)), cert.

denied, 509 U.S. 923 (1993). Judge Weinshienk’s comment at the hearing, quoted

above, indicates that she determined the correct legal standard to apply to

appellants’ motion. Appellants are really asking us to review Judge Weinshienk’s

finding that genuine issues of material fact on plaintiff’s claims exist to be tried. 
-4-

This we cannot do, because the Supreme Court has determined that appellate

courts lack jurisdiction to review fact-based determinations concerning qualified

immunity in an interlocutory appeal. See Johnson v. Jones, 115 S. Ct. 2151,

2156, 2159 (1995); Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60 F.3d 695, 700 (10th Cir.

1995).

The district court’s determination of clearly established law is AFFIRMED; 

otherwise, the appeal is DISMISSED.

Entered for the Court

John C. Porfilio 

Circuit Judge