COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00096-CV

JASON E. HADDOCK APPELLANT

V.

TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION 

AND ADECCO USA INC.

APPELLEES

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FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1 ON REHEARING EN BANC

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I. Introduction

Appellant Jason E. Haddock filed a motion for rehearing en banc. We 

deny the motion for rehearing en banc, but we withdraw our opinion of October 

17, 2013, and substitute the following in its place.

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

In two issues, Haddock appeals pro se the trial court’s summary judgment 

for Appellees Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) and Adecco USA, Inc. We 

affirm.

II. Background

On February 27, 2010, TWC qualified Haddock for $329 per week in 

unemployment compensation. To retain these benefits, Haddock provided a biweekly report to TWC that stated, among other things, whether he earned money 

during the two week period, whether he was able to work, and whether he turned 

down any job offers. In July 2010, Haddock turned down a placement, and TWC 

subsequently notified him that he had been disqualified from receiving further 

unemployment benefits because he had refused a suitable job offer. After 

TWC’s appeals tribunal upheld the disqualification, Haddock sought judicial 

review.2The trial court granted TWC and Adecco’s joint motion for summary 

judgment and affirmed TWC’s administrative decision. This appeal followed.

III. Summary Judgment

In his first issue, Haddock argues that the trial court erred by granting a 

traditional summary judgment because the appellees failed to conclusively prove 

their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. He further argues that TWC 

violated the provisions of the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act “by not 

 

2Haddock states in his appellate brief that he subsequently found work 

similar to his previous job at $15.00 per hour and that he is only seeking to 

receive payment for the twenty-seven weeks of denied benefits while he was 

unemployed.
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following either the letter of the law or the spirit of the law, and in fact, making its 

own law.”

A. Standard of Review

In a summary judgment case, the issue on appeal is whether the movant 

met the summary judgment burden by establishing that no genuine issue of 

material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 

289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). We review a summary judgment de novo. 

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010).

Trial courts may grant summary judgments in cases tried under the 

substantial evidence rule, and appeals under substantial evidence review are 

uniquely suited to summary judgment because the only issue before the court is 

a question of law. Blanchard v. Brazos Forest Prods., L.P., 353 S.W.3d 569, 573 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied) (citing Arellano v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 

810 S.W.2d 767, 771 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied)); see also Tex. 

Lab. Code Ann. § 212.202(a) (West 2006) (“Judicial review under this subchapter 

is by trial de novo based on the substantial evidence rule.”); Mercer v. Ross, 701 

S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986). We review the trial court’s judgment by comparing 

the TWC decision with the evidence presented to the trial court and the 

governing law. Blanchard, 353 S.W.3d at 573. And we determine whether the 

summary judgment evidence established as a matter of law that substantial 

evidence existed to support the TWC decision. Id.
4

In Blanchard, we explained the following:

Judicial review of a TWC determination is by “trial de novo based on 

the substantial evidence rule.” The trial court conducts an 

evidentiary trial to “determine whether the agency’s ruling is free of 

the taint of any illegality and is reasonably supported by substantial 

evidence.” In making this determination, the issue is not whether 

TWC made the correct decision; it is instead “whether the evidence 

introduced before the trial court shows facts in existence at the time 

of the [agency’s] decision that reasonably support the decision,” that 

is, whether reasonable minds could have reached the same 

conclusion. Because substantial evidence is more than a mere 

scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance of evidence, the 

evidence may preponderate against the TWC decision but still 

amount to substantial evidence. TWC remains the primary 

factfinding body, and the reviewing court may not substitute its 

judgment for TWC’s on controverted fact issues; the question before

the trial court is one of law.

Id. at 572 (citations omitted). The trial court here was required to determine 

whether Adecco and TWC proved as a matter of law that substantial evidence 

reasonably supported TWC’s decision to disqualify Haddock for unemployment 

benefits—that is, whether reasonable minds could have reached the same 

conclusion. See id. at 573–74.

B. Applicable Law

Under labor code section 207.047, an individual can be disqualified from 

receiving unemployment benefits for failing, without good cause, to “accept 

suitable work offered to the individual.” Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 207.047(a)(2)

(West 2006). TWC considers the following factors to determine whether work is 

“suitable” for an individual: (1) the degree of risk involved to the individual’s 

health, safety, and morals at the place of performance of the work; (2) the 
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individual’s physical fitness and previous training; (3) the individual’s experience 

and previous earnings; (4) the individual’s length of unemployment and prospects 

for securing local work in the individual’s customary occupation; and (5) the 

distance of the work from the individual’s residence. Id. § 207.008(a)(1)–(5)

(West 2006). Additionally, the labor code states that work is not suitable and 

benefits may not be denied if “the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work 

offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for 

similar work in the locality.” Id. § 207.008(b)(2) (West 2006).

C. Summary Judgment Evidence

TWC and Adecco attached to their joint motion for summary judgment an 

affidavit by Tracie Wankowicz and a copy of TWC’s “Unemployment Benefits 

Handbook.”3They also attached a certified copy of the administrative record, 

which included a copy of the appeals tribunal’s final decision, including its 

findings of fact and conclusions of law, and a copy of the TWC’s adoption of 

these findings and conclusions.

In her affidavit, Wankowicz averred that Haddock had been making $13.80 

an hour as a cell phone tester before he voluntarily left his job in January 2010; 

 

3Haddock argues that TWC’s “Unemployment Benefits Handbook” 

submitted into evidence by TWC and Adecco should have been excluded 

because it was a 2012 edition that included a different standard for reviewing 

“suitable” work than the 2010 edition, which was the most up-to-date version 

available at the time Haddock’s benefits were denied. We decline to address 

Haddock’s evidentiary objection because the record contains substantial 

evidence to support TWC’s decision without considering the handbook or its

disputed “25% rule.”
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that on July 16, 2010, she offered Haddock work as a cell phone tester, paying 

$10.25 an hour for the day shift and $10.75 an hour for the night shift ; that the 

job carried the same job responsibilities as Haddock’s previous job, was a 

“contract-to-hire” position with the possibility of permanent placement, and was 

located approximately a quarter mile from Haddock’s previous job ; that Haddock 

declined both shift offers, telling Wankowicz that the pay was too low ; and that 

Haddock subsequently contacted her and said he would accept the position only 

if it paid $12.00 an hour, and that she explained that no positions at that wage 

were available.

Haddock filed his response to the motion four days before the summary 

judgment hearing. To his response, Haddock attached what he asserted was 

“some evidence that [he] submitted to TWC” during his hearings, including 

advertisements for job openings in the area during his period of unemployment to 

show that $10.50 was not the prevailing wage.4 He included a copy of the page 

in the 2010 TWC handbook, which states:

What Happens If I Refuse a Job?

If you refuse to apply for or accept a suitable job, we will not be able 

to pay you UI benefits. Some of the factors TWC considers in 

determining whether work is suitable are:

 Your experience, qualifications, and training

 

4Haddock’s evidence is not in the form of traditional summary judgment 

evidence. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(f). Nonetheless, it does not appear that 

TWC and Adecco ever objected in the trial court to the form of Haddock’s 

summary judgment evidence or argued that considering his late-filed evidence 

surprised or prejudiced them.
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 The working conditions and pay for similar work in your area

 Any risks to your health, safety, or morals

 The distance to work from your home and local commuting 

patterns

 The length of your unemployment.

He also included his letter requesting a motion for rehearing stating that when 

Wankowicz called, “[He] was surprised to hear from her because ADECCO had 

contested [his] unemployment claim without success, and [they] were not on the 

best of terms.” Haddock alleged that Adecco had tried to have his 

unemployment benefits denied before. He said that although he could not prove 

that Adecco was trying to end his unemployment benefits in another way by 

calling to offer him “a low paying job which they knew [he] probably wouldn’t 

accept, . . . the $10.50 they offered was exactly 25 percent lower than 

[Haddock’s] pay with them,” and he noted a TWC rule (of which he alleges he 

had no notice) that allowed for the loss of benefits for refusing a position that paid 

seventy-five percent of his previous wage.

When Haddock appealed TWC’s disqualification determination, the appeal 

tribunal provided the following reasoning for its decision:

Here, since the work which was offered to the claimant on July 16, 

2010 was similar to his previous work with this employer and was in 

the same area, the work offered to him on that date was suitable. I 

understand why the claimant declined the offer at that time, but 

given the length of his prior unemployment and the fact that part of 

the reason for doing this was concern regarding the hearing for his 

claim for unemployment benefits, this is not considered good cause 
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. . . [and] claimant is subject to disqualification under [section 

207.047].

D. Analysis

Haddock argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment 

because TWC did not present any evidence showing that a $10.50-per-hour 

wage was the prevailing wage for similar work in the area. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. 

§ 207.008(b)(2). However, whether $10.50 was the “prevailing wage for similar 

work” in the area was a question for the TWC, the primary fact-finding body, not 

the trial court. See Blanchard, 353 S.W.3d at 572; Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 

956. Further, although Haddock presented TWC with a list of jobs in the area 

paying more than $10.50 per hour, an agency ruling may not be set aside merely 

because there was conflicting or disputed testimony. See Blanchard, 353 

S.W.3d at 572. Here, the issue before the trial court was a question of law: 

whether substantial evidence supported TWC’s decision to disqualify Haddock’s 

benefits. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 207.047(a)(2); Mercer, 701 S.W.2d at 831.

TWC and Adecco’s summary judgment evidence presents more than a 

scintilla supporting TWC’s determination that Haddock violated section 207.047 

by declining a suitable job offer without good cause. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. 

§ 207.047(a)(2). Haddock’s offer to accept the position at $12.00 per hour 

demonstrates that he was not concerned about the job posing a risk to his health, 

safety, or morals, nor was he concerned about the job’s difficulty or his over 

qualification based on prior training and experience; rather, his sole concern was 
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the pay rate. See id. § 207.008(a)(1)–(3). Additionally, Haddock refused the job, 

which was located a quarter of a mile from his previous job, in his eighteenth 

week of unemployment. See id. § 207.008(a)(4)–(5).

Accordingly, TWC’s finding that Haddock was disqualified from receiving 

unemployment compensation benefits is reasonably supported under the 

substantial evidence rule. See Collingsworth Gen. Hosp. v. Hunnicutt, 988 

S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. 1998); City of Houston v. Tippy, 991 S.W.2d 330, 334 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Based on the record before us, 

Haddock failed to demonstrate that TWC’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, 

or capricious. See Mercer, 701 S.W.2d at 831; Tippy, 991 S.W.2d at 334; see 

also McKinley Iron Works, Inc. v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 917 S.W.2d 468, 470 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no pet.) (stating that trial court need only 

determine whether evidence heard by agency was incredible, perjured, or 

unreasonable because that evidence is deemed not substantial). Therefore, we 

overrule Haddock’s first issue, which is dispositive of this appeal.5

 

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In his second issue, Haddock argues that the trial court admitted 

inadmissible evidence, that his due process rights were violated by TWC altering 

its internal benefit guidelines without giving him notice, and that the trial court 

erred by granting a no-evidence summary judgment. However, TWC and 

Adecco did not file a no-evidence summary judgment. And to the extent that 

Haddock preserved his complaints in the trial court about TWC’s evidence and 

his due process rights, we need not reach them based on our resolution above 

because there is no indication that the appeal tribunal relied on the “25% rule” in 

making its decision, and TWC and Adecco demonstrated in the trial court that 

substantial evidence supported its decision. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

On rehearing, Haddock notified us that the court reporter had located the 

record of the summary judgment hearing, and he filed it with this court. The 
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IV. Conclusion

Having overruled Haddock’s dispositive issue, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

/s/ Bob McCoy

BOB MCCOY

JUSTICE

EN BANC

DELIVERED: February 6, 2014

 

reporter’s record reflects that at the hearing, Haddock stated that TWC’s decision 

to deny his benefits was based on the “25% rule”; however, civil procedure rule 

166a(c) states that no oral testimony shall be received at the hearing, and the 

trial court explained to Haddock that although his argument was helpful to 

understanding the situation, it was compelled to rule in favor of Adecco and TWC 

based on the standard of review and the pleadings. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c);

see also Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. 

1998) (explaining that although summary judgment hearings may be helpful to 

the parties or the court, just as oral argument is often helpful on appeal, no oral 

testimony can be adduced in support of or opposition to a motion for summary 

judgment). In denying Haddock’s motion for rehearing en banc, we reiterate that 

we are limited to the evidence contained in the record, which contains a copy of 

the appeal tribunal’s decision that does not reference the “25% rule” and finds

that Haddock turned down suitable work without good cause and Wankowicz’s 

affidavit summarized above. Although Haddock disputed Wankowicz’s claim that

the new position was essentially the same as his previous position, because her

affidavit provides substantial evidence to support TWC’s termination of

Haddock’s benefits, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in 

favor of Adecco and TWC.