STIVISON, APPELLANT, v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY ET AL., APPELLEES. 

[Cite as Stivison v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1997), 80 Ohio St. 3d 498.] 

Workers’ compensation — Employee assaulted and injured by fellow employee at 

restaurant near workplace — Injury not compensable when not sustained 

“in the course of” employment. 

(No. 96-1411 — Submitted September 10, 1997 — Decided December 31, 1997.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hocking County, No. 95CA13. 

 After finishing a shift at the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (“Goodyear”) 

plant, appellant, Richard Stivison, stopped at a nearby restaurant where he was 

assaulted and injured by his fellow Goodyear employee Jeff McCormick. The 

impetus for the assault was a grudge McCormick bore against Stivison for 

informing their supervisor that McCormick had been leaving work early, an 

infraction of Goodyear’s rules. 

 Stivison filed a workers’ compensation claim for the injuries sustained in 

the assault. Goodyear opposed the allowance of the claim. Although the district 

hearing officer agreed with Goodyear, the regional board of review allowed the 

claim on appeal, and the Industrial Commission affirmed. Goodyear then 

appealed the commission’s order to common pleas court and both parties moved 

for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Goodyear 

and the appellate court affirmed. 

 The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 

discretionary appeal. 

__________________ 

Stewart Jaffy & Associates, Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, for appellant. 

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease and Joseph A. Brunetto, for appellee 

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.. 
 2

__________________ 

COOK, J. The issue in this case is whether Stivison’s broken nose and arm 

qualify as injuries “received in the course of, and arising out of,” his employment. 

 For the purposes of workers’ compensation, R.C. 4123.01(C) defines an 

“injury” as “any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental 

in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured 

employee’s employment.” 

 In Fisher v. Mayfield (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 275, 551 N.E.2d 1271, we 

reaffirmed our interpretation of “in the course of” as involving the time, place, and 

circumstances of the injury and “arising out of” as involving causal connection 

between the injury and the injured person’s employment. Id. at 277-278, 551 

N.E.2d at 1274. We also “expressly recognize[d] the conjunctive nature of the 

coverage formula of ‘in the course of and arising out of’ the employment. * * * 

[A]ll elements of the formula must be met before compensation will be allowed.” 

Id. at 277, 551 N.E.2d at 1274. Stivison argues that his injury is compensable 

solely because of a causal connection with his employment. This argument 

ignores half of the coverage formula recognized in Fisher by failing to 

acknowledge the necessity for temporal, spatial, and circumstantial connection. 

 The assault which injured Stivison occurred neither during his working 

hours, nor at his place of employment, nor while he was fulfilling his working 

duties. Stivison’s injuries were, therefore, not sustained “in the course of” his 

employment, as that phrase is interpreted by Ohio law. Accordingly, summary 

judgment in favor of Goodyear was properly granted on this element alone, 

because, construing the evidence most strongly in favor of Stivison, reasonable 

minds could only conclude that the claimant here could not show that he met all 

the elements of the Fisher coverage formula. 
 3

 Not only does Stivison’s claim fall outside the limits of “course of 

employment,” but also his claim is disqualified by the requirement of causal 

connection in the phrase “arising out of employment.” Many uncompensable 

injuries can be said to bear some causal relation to employment, but legal analysis 

must focus upon the nature and degree of causal connection. Prosser & Keeton, 

Law of Torts (5 Ed.1984) 266, Section 41. The totality of the circumstances test 

set forth in Lord v. Daugherty (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 441, 20 O.O.3d 376, 423 

N.E.2d 96, supplies the necessary standard for determining sufficiency of causal 

relation: 

 “Whether there is a sufficient ‘causal connection’ between an employee’s 

injury and his employment to justify the right to participate in the Workers’ 

Compensation Fund depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances 

surrounding the accident, including, (1) the proximity of the scene of the accident 

to the place of employment, (2) the degree of control the employer had over the 

scene of the accident, and (3) the benefit the employer received from the injured 

employee’s presence at the scene of the accident.” Id. at syllabus. 

 The restaurant where Stivison was injured is about a mile from the 

Goodyear plant. Goodyear has no control over the restaurant and received no 

benefit from Stivison’s presence there.1

 Therefore, the causal relation that existed 

between Stivison’s employment and his injury does not satisfy any of the 

enumerated elements of the Lord totality of the circumstances test. Because there 

are no additional facts or circumstances compelling a finding of causation, 

Stivison has failed to establish the requisite causal connection. 

 Noting cases where this court has allowed compensation for off-site 

injuries, Stivison argues that the court of appeals overemphasized the fact that he 

was not on Goodyear’s premises when his injury occurred. Although all 
 4

compensable injuries must both be received in the course of and arise out of 

employment, it is true that there are cases where compensation is allowed despite 

failure to comply with all the factors of the Fisher coverage formula. In Fisher, 

we noted that no single factor is controlling, that through the recurrence of similar 

fact patterns, rules have developed that define categories of exceptions. Id., 49 

Ohio St.3d at 280, 551 N.E.2d at 1276. Some of these exceptions allow recovery 

for off-site injuries (for example, the exception for employer-sponsored 

recreational activity cases and the “zone of employment” and “special hazard” 

exceptions to the “coming and going” cases), but Stivison does not attempt to 

argue that his injury falls within an established exception. Therefore, cases 

allowing recovery for off-site injuries based on established exceptions are 

inapposite here. 

 Stivison also argues that Ryan v. Connor (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 406, 28 

OBR 462, 503 N.E.2d 1379, which involves a heart attack suffered away from 

business premises, is an example of compensation for an off-site injury. This 

argument fails since the heart attack was compensable only because the stress 

which resulted in the attack was suffered at work, just as an injury resulting from 

workplace exposure to dangerous substances is compensable regardless of where 

the employee is when symptoms appear. See, e.g., State ex rel. Burnett v. Indus. 

Comm. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 266, 6 OBR 332, 452 N.E.2d 1341. Stivison’s injury 

is not analogous to the heart attack in Ryan because there was no workplace effect 

on Stivison comparable to the stress supporting the compensability of the heart 

attack. 

 Because, as a matter of law, Stivison’s injuries fall short of meeting the 

criteria for both “in the course of” and “arising out of” employment and fit no 
 5

exception, we hereby affirm the appellate court’s judgment affirming summary 

judgment. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON,JJ., concur. 

 DOUGLAS,J., dissents. 

 RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY,JJ., dissent. 

FOOTNOTE: 

1. Stivison argues that the third element of the totality of the circumstances 

test is primarily satisfied by the benefit to the employer from Stivison’s answering 

truthfully when questioned about McCormick’s absence from work. This 

argument arises from a misunderstanding of the benefit required; the test is 

whether there is a benefit to the employer from the employee’s presence at the 

scene of the accident. Stivison also claims an “additional” benefit to Goodyear 

was that he intended to take food from the restaurant back to employees on the 

night shift, as well as cashing his paycheck and eating a meal. Goodyear did not 

ask Stivison to purchase and deliver food, and there is no reason to suppose 

Stivison’s delivery of food was a benefit to Goodyear. 

__________________ 

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting. Appellee, Goodyear Tire & Rubber 

Company (“Goodyear”), had been experiencing attendance problems at its Logan, 

Ohio plant. On November 6, 1992, claimant-appellant, Richard Stivison, was 

approached by his supervisor, Bill Egger, who asked whether a co-worker, Jeffrey 

McCormick, had left work early the previous day. Believing it was his duty to 

answer truthfully, claimant told Egger that McCormick had been leaving work 

early. Because of this event, McCormick chose to assault claimant two weeks 

later at a time and place remote from claimant’s employment, leaving claimant 
 6

with two black eyes, a fractured nasal bone, and two broken bones in his left 

forearm requiring steel plates. 

 The message sent today by the majority to the Ohio worker is that if you 

suffer disabling injuries as a result of having truthfully answered your employer’s 

work-related inquiries, it is you alone who will bear the burden of economic loss. 

This is indeed a curious public policy in light of the fact that the theory upon 

which workers’ compensation is based is that the burden of economic loss 

attributable to the risks of employment should be borne by the industry rather than 

by the individual or society as a whole. State ex rel. Munding v. Indus. Comm.

(1915), 92 Ohio St. 434, 450, 111 N.E. 299, 303, overruled in part on other 

grounds, State ex rel. Crawford v. Indus. Comm. (1924), 110 Ohio St. 271, 143 

N.E. 574. 

 Moreover, the majority’s decision stands for the absurd proposition that 

compensability turns on whether the criminal perpetrating the assault is 

considerate enough of claimant’s compensation position to have assaulted him or 

her within the “zone of employment” or while claimant was performing some 

activity incidental to employment. I must, therefore, respectfully but strenuously 

dissent. 

 The majority begins its analysis by identifying the broad issue of whether 

claimant’s “broken nose and arm qualify as injuries ‘received in the course of, and 

arising out of,’ his employment.” Although Goodyear does not deny that the 

conversation between claimant and his supervisor regarding McCormick’s 

attendance at work satisfies the “arising out of” prong of the coverage formula, the 

majority takes it upon itself to conclude that “[n]ot only does Stivison’s claim fall 

outside the limits of ‘course of employment,’ but also his claim is disqualified by 

the requirement of causal connection in the phrase ‘arising out of employment.’ ” 
 7

 The majority’s application of the “arising out of” prong is so fundamentally 

flawed that it is impossible to refute on its own terms. Essentially, the majority 

applies the “totality of circumstances” test set forth in Lord v. Daugherty (1981), 

66 Ohio St.2d 441, 20 O.O.3d 376, 423 N.E.2d 96, at the syllabus, to the place and 

circumstances surrounding the assault itself, rather than to the event or incident 

which precipitated the assault. 

 “Assaults arise out of the employment * * * if the reason for the assault was 

a quarrel having its origin in the work.” 1 Larson Law of Workmen’s 

Compensation (1997) 3-200, Section 11.00. Thus, “[a]part from any 

environmental risk, causal connection with the employment may be shown by 

connecting with the employment the subject matter of the dispute leading to the 

assault.” Id. at 3-238, Section 11.12. It is mere tautology to suggest, as the 

majority does, that the assault itself is the cause to which the “arising” test is to be 

applied. This is as much as to say that the assault is the cause of the assault. The 

assault is the effect, not the cause, of something, and the question is whether that 

something arose out of employment. The cause — the reason, the subject matter 

— of the assault in this case was the work-related conversation between claimant 

and his supervisor regarding McCormick’s attendance at work. There is, 

therefore, a causal relationship between claimant’s injuries and his employment. 

 The majority, citing Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts (5 Ed.1984) 266, 

Section 41, seeks to justify its misapplication of the “arising” prong by explaining 

that “[m]any uncompensable injuries can be said to bear some causal relation to 

employment, but legal analysis must focus upon the nature and degree of causal 

connection.” However, if the majority had simply turned to Prosser & Keeton, 

Law of Torts, supra, at 568, Section 80, it would have discovered that “workers’ 
 8

compensation acts * * * do not rest upon any theory of tort liability.” Indeed, as 

Professor Larson explains: 

 “It is instantly apparent that ‘arising out of the employment’ does not mean 

exactly the same thing as ‘legally caused by the employment.’ It is true, as many 

courts and writers have said, that ‘arising’ has something to do with causal 

connection; but there are many shades and degrees of causal connection, of which 

‘legal’ or ‘proximate’ cause is only one. * * * [I]n the ‘arising’ phrase the function 

of the employment is passive while in the ‘caused by’ phrase it is active. When 

one speaks of an event ‘arising out of employment,’ the initiative, the moving 

force, is something other than the employment; the employment is thought of more 

as a condition out of which the event arises than as the force producing the event 

in an affirmative fashion. In tort law the beginning point is always a person’s act, 

and the act causes certain consequences. In workers’ compensation law the 

beginning point is not an act at all; it is a relation or condition or situation — 

namely, employment. * * * Thus, at the very outset, it is plain that the attempt to 

make ‘arising’ equivalent to ‘causation’ is blocked by the words themselves.” 

(Emphasis sic; footnote omitted.) 1 Larson, supra, at 3-10 to 3-11, Section 6.60. 

 It is mere sophistry to suggest, on the basis of misapplied tort theories and 

environmental factors, that a claimant who is beaten in retaliation for a workconnected conversation with his supervisor has failed to show that his injuries 

arose out of employment. Any layperson can see the connection between 

employment and injury. 

 The real question in this case, one which the majority has completely 

ignored, is whether “delayed-action” injuries are compensable. A delayed-action 

injury is an injury which has its originating or contributing cause in an incident or 

event that occurs entirely within the time and place limits of the employment, but 
 9

has its moment of physical impact or manifestation at a time and place remote 

from the employment. 

 The conceptual difficulty encountered by these kinds of injuries lies in too 

strict an application of the “in the course of” prong of the coverage formula. By 

virtue of its uncompromising insistence on independent satisfaction of the 

“course” prong, the majority ignores that particular times, places, and 

circumstances “in the course of” employment precipitated claimant’s injuries and 

recovery should be allowed. 

 In defining “injury,” R.C. 4123.01(C) sets forth the basic coverage 

requirement that, to be compensable, an injury must be “received in the course of, 

and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” This coverage formula 

“shall be liberally construed in favor of employees and the dependents of deceased 

employees.” R.C. 4123.95. This means that the phrase “received in the course of, 

and arising out of” must be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits. 

Fisher v. Mayfield (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 275, 278, 551 N.E.2d 1271, 1274. This 

is precisely the approach that the Industrial Commission took when it determined 

that considering R.C. 4123.95 and the totality of the sequence of events, the 

assault occurred “in the course of” and “arising out of” appellant’s employment. 

 In Fisher, supra, 49 Ohio St.3d at 277, 551 N.E.2d at 1274, the court 

announced: 

 “We now expressly recognize the conjunctive nature of the coverage 

formula of ‘in the course of and arising out of’ the employment. Therefore, all 

elements of the formula must be met before compensation will be allowed.” 

 As explained in Fulton, Ohio Workers’ Compensation Law (1991) 147, 

Section 7.5: 
 10

 “Although most discussions of the coverage formula analyze the ‘arising out 

of’ and the ‘in the course of’ tests independently, the factors actually merge into a 

single test of work-connectedness. [Bralley v. Daugherty (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 

302, 15 O.O.3d 359, 401 N.E.2d 448.] The Ohio Supreme Court expressly 

acknowledged the conjunctive nature of the coverage formula in Fisher v. 

Mayfield.” 

 Yet the majority insists on separately and strictly applying each “half of the 

coverage formula.” This approach echoes the appellate court’s view that “the two 

prongs [of the coverage formula] are distinct” and Goodyear’s argument that 

Fisher “acknowledged the dual nature of the test of compensability set forth in 

R.C. 4123.01(C).” Although the majority, the court of appeals, and Goodyear 

offer no insight into how that conclusion has been arrived at, their methods of 

analysis suggest that they drew support from the fact that Fisher continued to 

require that “all elements of the formula must be met before compensation will be 

allowed,” Fisher, 49 Ohio St.3d at 277, 551 N.E.2d at 1274, and then proceeded to 

apply each element in succession. 

 However, the view of the majority in Fisher, that the coverage formula is 

conjunctive in nature, stands in stark contrast to that of the dissenting justices, that 

there is a “dual statutory requirement for establishing a compensable injury.” Id., 

49 Ohio St.3d at 281, 551 N.E.2d at 1277. The fact that Fisher applied each prong 

of the coverage formula separately under the factual pattern before it does not 

mean that the court opted for a strict bifurcation of the coverage formula in all 

cases. To the contrary, the court specifically warned that “no one test or analysis 

can be said to apply to each and every factual possibility. Nor can any one factor 

be considered controlling. Rather, a flexible and analytically sound approach to 
 11

these cases is preferable. Otherwise, the application of hard and fast rules can lead 

to unsound and unfair results.” Id., 49 Ohio St.3d at 280, 551 N.E.2d at 1276. 

 In a particularly poignant analysis, the Court of Appeals for Williams 

County, in Fletcher v. Northwest Mechanical Contr., Inc. (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 

466, 470-471, 599 N.E.2d 822, 825, fn. 1, explained as follows: 

 “ ‘[I]t should never be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation 

coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the term “work connection” 

* * *. [A]n uncompromising insistence on independent application of the two 

portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries.’ 

1 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation (1989) 3-3, Section 6.10. We do 

not believe that the Supreme Court of Ohio opted for a strict application of the two 

prongs of the test. The Supreme Court of Ohio in Fisher, supra, 49 Ohio St.3d at 

277, 551 N.E.2d at 1274, made reference to Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria

(Fla.1980), 383 So. 2d 623, as having ‘* * * embarked on a well-reasoned analysis 

as to whether that court had developed inconsistent constructions of the basic 

coverage formula * * *.’ It was noted by the court in Strother, supra, at 625, that 

it had, in some decisions, bifurcated the elements of ‘arising out of’ and ‘in the 

course of’ and in other cases merged them. That court held in favor of bifurcation, 

but found no inconsistency. It found ‘* * * the construction of “arising out of and 

in the course of employment,” proposed by Larson * * * to be reasonable and 

conducive to the basic purposes of the workers' compensation act.’ Id. at 628. 

The Florida Supreme Court went on to state that Larson: 

 “ ‘* * * suggests that the more reasoned approach, consistent with the goals 

of workers' compensation acts, is not to apply these concepts entirely independent 

of each other but rather to view them as parts of a single test of work 

connectedness where deficiencies in the strength of one factor may, in some cases 
 12

be made up by the strength in the other.’ Id. at 624; see, also, 1 Larson, supra, 3-

3, Section 6.10 and 1A Larson, supra, 5-438, Sections 29.00 and 29.10. 

 “That this ‘quantum theory of work-connection’ or ‘sliding scale’ analysis is 

inescapable is evident by the analysis in Fisher, supra. In Fisher, the court stated 

that ‘* * * whether appellant’s injuries arose out of her employment is determined 

from the totality of circumstances, using the factors set forth in Lord, supra.’ Id.,

49 Ohio St.3d at 278-279, 551 N.E.2d at 1275. Lord involved a situation in which 

‘there was no fixed employment situs, due to the nature of decedent's occupation * 

* *.’ Id., 66 Ohio St.3d at 442, 20 O.O.3d at 377, 423 N.E.2d at 97. Implicitly, 

therefore, Lord dealt with the ‘arising out of’ aspect of the two-prong test. Yet 

Lord, in reciting the ‘totality of the facts and circumstances’ relied on Bralley, 

supra. Bralley, in turn, was a ‘zone of employment’ case, which would involve, 

according to Fisher, supra, an analysis as to whether the employee is ‘in the 

course of’ his employment. The ‘totality of circumstances’ test, therefore, arose 

by virtue of application to both prongs of the requirement that the injury be 

‘received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.’ 

As further illustration, both Bralley, supra, 61 Ohio St.2d at 303, 15 O.O.3d at 

360, 401 N.E.2d at 449, and Lord, supra, 66 Ohio St.2d at 444, 20 O.O.3d at 378, 

423 N.E.2d at [98], relying on the very same cases, stated the respective issue to 

be ‘* * * whether a “causal connection” existed between an employee’s injury and 

his employment either through the activities, the conditions, or the environment of 

the employment.’ It is apparent that the same factors have arisen with reference to 

both prongs of the test. In fact, although the court in Fisher relegated Lord to the 

‘arising out of’ prong of the test, it nevertheless employed some of the Lord

factors to its analysis of whether appellant was ‘in the course of’ her employment. 
 13

A strict application of the bifurcated prongs of ‘in the course of’ and ‘arising out 

of’ is, therefore, not only potentially unjust, but is clearly unworkable.” 

 It is precisely in the delayed-action case that a strict application of the 

coverage formula works its greatest injustice. See 2 Larson, Law of Workmen’s 

Compensation (1997) 5-483 to 5-485, Section 29.21(a). As Professor Larson 

explains, the total “quantum” of work-connection should amount to 

compensability, “in the case of a foreman who angers a subordinate during 

working hours by firing him and later, while asleep on the sand at a beach the 

following Sunday, is assaulted by the disgrunted [sic] employee. Yet insistence on 

independent satisfaction of the ‘course’ and ‘arising’ tests results in an almost 

insuperable barrier to compensation for this unquestionably work-connected 

injury.” Id. at 5-483, Section 29.21. 

 The usual off-premises course-of-employment rules were developed in 

those cases where the entire injurious event, both in cause and effect, occurs 

beyond the strict time, place, and activity limits of the employment. In such cases, 

the situs of employment or the activity at hand is crucial, since there is nothing 

else to connect the employment to the injury. Since no single unit of injury can be 

said to lie within the strict bounds of employment, other factors become critical. 

Thus, where the injurious incident from beginning to end occurs beyond the 

geographical boundaries of the employer’s premises, or while the employee is not 

in the actual performance of his or her duties, the inquiry becomes whether the 

employee was within the “zone of employment,” was exposed to a “special 

hazard,” or was engaged in activity incidental to the employment, as the case may 

be. See MTD Products, Inc. v. Robatin (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 66, 572 N.E.2d 661; 

Littlefield v. Pillsbury Co. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 389, 6 OBR 439, 453 N.E.2d 570; 
 14

Lord; Bralley, supra; Kohlmayer v. Keller (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 10, 53 O.O.2d 6, 

263 N.E.2d 231; Indus. Comm. v. Barber (1927), 117 Ohio St. 373, 159 N.E. 363. 

 The fact pattern presently before the court is not one in which the cause and 

manifestation of injury coincide. The entire injurious event cannot be said to have 

occurred entirely remote from the employment. While the moment of impact or 

manifestation of injury occurred beyond the employment setting, the cause of 

injury originated in a risk connected with the employment. As Professor Larson 

explains: 

 “In all the[se] cases * * *, the common element is the fact that [the] 

originating cause of the injury is something that occurs entirely within the time 

and place limits of the employment. The time bomb, so to speak, is constructed 

and started ticking during working hours; but it happens to go off at a time and 

place remote from the employment. The hazards of the employment, whether the 

animosity of a fired employee, a needle-like shaving in the eyebrow, or dynamite 

cap in the pocket, follow the claimant beyond the time and space limits of his 

work, and there injure him.” (Footnote omitted.) 2 Larson, supra, at 5-506 to 507, 

Section 29.22. 

 The usual course-of-employment rules were simply not designed for cases 

where the manifestation of an injury occurs later than the precipitating event. 

 Moreover, in the case of an off-premises assault, the strict view allows the 

vagaries of the attacker to emerge as the decisive factor in determining whether 

the injury was received in the course of employment. In the instant case, the 

majority denies compensation in part because claimant was assaulted at Jack’s 

Steakhouse under circumstances which, at that time, put him beyond the reach of 

the “zone of employment,” “special hazard,” and “incidental activity” exceptions. 

Following this reasoning, claimant’s injuries would be compensable had 
 15

McCormick been considerate enough of claimant’s compensation position to have 

assaulted him in Goodyear’s parking lot, Marlow v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

(1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 18, 39 O.O.2d 11, 225 N.E.2d 241, or while he was on his 

way to work on a street maintained by Goodyear, Indus. Comm. v. Barber, supra, 

or on a public street between the company parking lot and the plant, Baughman v. 

Eaton Corp. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 62, 16 O.O.3d 45, 402 N.E.2d 1201, or 

crossing a railroad track immediately adjacent to the plant’s entrance, Indus. 

Comm. v. Henry (1932), 124 Ohio St. 616, 180 N.E. 194, or while claimant was 

attending a company-sponsored picnic, Kohlmayer v. Keller (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 

10, 53 O.O.2d 6, 263 N.E.2d 231, or in some way promoting the employer’s 

interests, Indus. Comm. v. Davison (1928), 118 Ohio St. 180, 160 N.E. 693; 

Outland v. Indus. Comm. (1940), 136 Ohio St. 488, 17 O.O. 92, 26 N.E.2d 760. 

 The more reasoned view, as Professor Larson explains, is that “in 

Workmen’s Compensation the controlling event is something done to, not by, the 

employee, and since the real question is whether this something was an industrial 

accident, the origin of the accident is crucial, and the moment of manifestation 

should be immaterial.” (Emphasis sic.) 2 Larson, supra, at 5-504, Section 29.22. 

 In Indus. Comm. v. Pora (1919), 100 Ohio St. 218, 125 N.E. 662, Pora was 

employed as a molder’s helper and was directed by his supervisor to go to another 

part of the plant and obtain an electric riddle. The electric riddle was being used 

by another molder and his helper. Pora and the other helper argued over 

possession of the implement, and the second helper struck Pora over the head with 

a shovel. Pora died the following day, and his widow filed a claim with the 

Industrial Commission. 

 The commission argued that, at the time of the assault, Pora was not in the 

course of his employment, relying in part on Little Miami RR. Co. v. Wetmore
 16

(1869), 19 Ohio St. 110. In Wetmore, the plaintiff was a passenger on defendant’s 

train. The plaintiff apparently used some abusive language toward one of 

defendant’s employees, who thereupon assaulted and beat the plaintiff with a 

hatchet. Plaintiff sued the employer on the basis of respondeat superior, or 

vicarious liability. The court held that jury instructions had been misleading and 

that the defendant would not be liable if its employee had acted out of personal 

animosity and, therefore, not in the course of his employment. 

 The court in Pora held in claimant’s favor and distinguished Wetmore as 

follows: 

 “The outstanding difference is that in the Wetmore case the inquiry was one 

to ascertain whether the employee committing the assault was in the course of his 

employment; while here the inquiry is, Was the employee assaulted in the course 

of his employment? 

 “Without derogation in any sense to the rights of Pora it may be admitted 

without qualification that the employee who assaulted him was acting wholly 

outside the course of his employment.” (Emphasis sic.) Id., 100 Ohio St. at 221-

222, 125 N.E. at 663. 

 Thus, this court has fully embraced the concept that the controlling event in 

workers’ compensation is something done to, not by, the employee. It should 

logically follow that an off-premises assault is a compensable event where the 

originating cause is something that occurs within the time and place limits of the 

employment. 

 However, for many years, the court judicially limited the payment of 

workers’ compensation only to those employees whose physical injuries resulted 

from contemporaneous physical injury or physical trauma. The court allowed 

claims where the full extent of the injury became manifest later than the 
 17

precipitating event, but was compelled to identify some physical trauma, however 

slight, which coincided with the workplace cause. Thus, delayed injuries or death 

resulting from contact with poisonous gases or substances, forces of nature or 

artificial heat, eating contaminated food, or being vaccinated at work were held 

compensable on the basis that the injury-producing event caused some type of 

contemporaneous physical impact or harm, whether it be a derangement of bodily 

functions, degenerative changes in tissues, or simply a needle prick. Sebek v. 

Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co. (1947), 148 Ohio St. 693, 36 O.O. 282, 76 N.E.2d 

892, overruled in part, Johnson v. Indus. Comm. (1955), 164 Ohio St. 297, 58 O.O. 

90, 130 N.E.2d 807; Malone v. Indus. Comm. (1942), 140 Ohio St. 292, 23 O.O. 

496, 43 N.E.2d 266, overruled in part, Village v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1984), 15 

Ohio St.3d 129, 15 OBR 279, 472 N.E.2d 1079; Indus. Comm. v. Bartholome

(1934), 128 Ohio St. 13, 190 N.E. 193, overruled in part by Johnson, supra; Spicer 

Mfg. Co. v. Tucker (1934), 127 Ohio St. 421, 188 N.E. 870; Indus. Comm. v. 

Helriggle (1933), 126 Ohio St. 645, 186 N.E. 711; Indus. Comm. v. Palmer

(1933), 126 Ohio St. 251, 185 N.E. 66; Indus. Comm. v. Burckard (1924), 112 

Ohio St. 372, 147 N.E. 81; Indus. Comm. v. Roth (1918), 98 Ohio St. 34, 120 N.E. 

172. On the other hand, compensation had been denied for a heart condition and 

cerebral hemorrhage resulting from emotional distress, anxiety, or worry. 

Szymanski v. Halle’s Dept. Store (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 195, 17 O.O.3d 120, 407 

N.E.2d 502; Toth v. Std. Oil Co. (1953), 160 Ohio St. 1, 50 O.O. 476, 113 N.E.2d 

81. 

 This limitation was removed in Ryan v. Connor (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 406, 

28 OBR 462, 503 N.E.2d 1379. The court overruled Szymanski and Toth, supra, 

and held: 
 18

 “A physical injury occasioned solely by mental or emotional stress, received 

in the course of, and arising out of, an injured employee’s employment, is 

compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C).” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

 In so holding, the court found “no reasonable basis for continuing to 

judicially limit the payment of workers’ compensation only to those employees 

whose physical injuries resulted from ‘contemporaneous physical injury or 

physical trauma.’ ” Id., 28 Ohio St.3d at 408, 28 OBR at 464, 503 N.E.2d at 

1381.2

 The requirement of contemporaneous physical impact having been removed, 

there is no longer any lawful impediment to recognizing “delayed-action” injuries 

as compensable. Other courts have done so, and their reasoning is quite 

persuasive. In Daniello v. Machise Express Co. (1972), 119 N.J.Super. 20, 289 

A.2d 558, affirmed (1975), 122 N.J.Super. 144, 299 A.2d 423, claimant, a truck 

driver, was splashed by jet fuel during work, which permeated his uniform and 

body with fumes. After his workday was done, he drove home and lit a match to 

burn some trash, whereupon he caught fire. The employer argued that the accident 

did not arise in the course of employment, since the actual burn injuries occurred 

at claimant’s home. 

 The court held in favor of compensation, finding that a strict application of 

the “course” test “fail[s] to adhere to the fundamental objects of workmen’s 

compensation laws.” Id., 119 N.J.Super. at 27, 289 A.2d at 561. The court noted 

the case of Secor v. Penn Service Garage (1955), 35 N.J.Super. 59, 113 A.2d 177,

affirmed (1955), 19 N.J. 315, 117 A.2d 12, which presented similar facts, but 

where the match was struck at the place of employment. Compensation in that 

case was allowed. The court in Daniello declined to reach a different result on the 

basis of where the match was struck, explaining that “the recovery in one and the 
 19

lack of recovery in the other can only be distinguished on factitious or synthetic 

grounds which may only be considered as illusory and without substance.” Id., 

119 N.J.Super. at 28, 289 A.2d at 562. See, also, Lujan v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co.

(Tex.1988), 756 S.W.2d 295. 

 The difference between the facts in Secor and the facts in Daniello is the 

same difference that prevails between the facts in Pora and in the case sub judice. 

It is no less “factitious or synthetic” to allow recovery in Pora and deny recovery 

here, on the basis of where the assault was perpetrated, than it is to allow recovery 

in Secor and deny recovery in Daniello, on the basis of where the match was 

struck. 

 In Joy v. Florence Pipe Foundry Co. (1960), 64 N.J.Super. 13, 165 A.2d 

191, the facts were similar to those presented in Toth, supra, i.e., a cerebral 

hemorrhage resulting from workplace anxiety and stress. In finding the injury 

compensable, the court in Joy explained: 

 “Secondly, we deem it necessary to point out the error inherent in a too 

strict construction of the clause, ‘in the course of his employment.’ The primary 

inquiry should always be whether the injury for which compensation is sought is 

work-connected; the point in time at which that injury manifests itself should not 

be determinative. If the contributing or causative factors occur in the course of 

employment, it is not necessary that the consequent disability manifest itself at that 

time.” Id., 64 N.J.Super. at 22, 165 A.2d at 196. 

 In Graybeal v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Supervisors (1975), 216 Va. 77, 216 

S.E.2d 52, a prosecutor was injured by the explosion of a bomb left at his home by 

an individual whom the prosecutor had tried five years and eight months 

previously. The court held the injury compensable, pointing out that “[i]n the 

realities of the present case, the course from prosecution to desire-for-revenge to 
 20

injury was unbroken, constituting a single work-connected incident.” Id., 216 Va. 

at 80, 216 S.E.2d at 54-55. 

Bearshield v. Gregory (S.D.1979), 278 N.W.2d 166, involved a set of facts 

somewhat similar to Graybeal, but the target was a police officer. The decedent 

was murdered while on vacation in revenge for his actions undertaken in the 

course of his duties as a police officer. Much like the court of appeals in the case 

sub judice, the hearing examiner had concluded that, despite the patent inequity, 

he could not interpret South Dakota case law so as to conclude that decedent was 

in the course of his employment while on vacation and performing no task related 

to his employment. 

 The South Dakota Supreme Court, holding in claimant’s favor, explained as 

follows: 

 “We agree with the hearing examiner that the application of the rule as it is 

presented in this Court’s previous decisions would seem to preclude recovery by 

[claimant]. The cases cited and discussed above, however, are distinguishable 

from the instant case because in the above cases, the ‘occurrence’ of the injury 

coincides with the ‘arising’ of the injury, as is the case in nearly all worker’s 

compensation injuries. This prevalent coincidence tends to lull us into equating 

the two words. The instant case, however, brings them into sharp contrast. The 

actual injury ‘occurred’ on July 26, 1976, but it cannot be said that it ‘arose’ at that 

time. The actual occurrence was merely the culmination of something that had 

been ‘arising’ for quite some time in the course of decedent’s employment and was 

triggered by his performance of his duty in keeping [the murderer’s] mother in jail. 

Thus, it seems that the injury indeed ‘arose in the course of’ decedent’s 

employment.” Id., 278 N.W.2d at 169. 
 21

 The court analogized the murderer’s animosity to “a time bomb which was 

fueled by various arrests and contacts, ignited by the jailing of [the murderer’s] 

mother, and happened to explode while decedent was on vacation. Particular 

times, places and circumstances ‘in the course of employment’ precipitated the 

injury and recovery should be allowed.” Id., 278 N.W.2d at 170. 

 Not only is the reasoning employed by these various courts sound, but the 

facts of the cases are perhaps the most eloquent argument that can be made in 

support of Fisher’s warning that “the application of hard and fast rules can lead to 

unsound and unfair results.” Fisher, 49 Ohio St.3d at 280, 551 N.E.2d at 1276. 

The concept of workers’ compensation coverage, in its most basic and 

fundamental form, is unitary, not dual, and where inquiry is made as to the 

“course” or “arising” aspects of the injury, it is not for the purpose of determining 

those questions in the first instance, but only to ensure that compensation is 

limited to those employees whose injuries are truly work-connected. See, e.g., 

Rogers v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. (1949), 85 Ohio App. 421, 424-425, 40 O.O. 

293, 295, 88 N.E.2d 234, 236, affirmed (1950), 153 Ohio St. 513, 41 O.O. 514, 92 

N.E.2d 677; Anderson v. Falcon Drilling Co. (Okla.1985), 695 P.2d 521, 526-527. 

It is patently unjust and inconsistent with the beneficent purposes of workers’ 

compensation to bifurcate the injury into two separate events of cause and 

manifestation and then respectively apply each prong of the coverage formula 

thereto. “[T]he injurious incident (whether a quarrel or a work strain or a sliverin-the-eye episode) ‘from origin to ending must be taken to be one,’ [and] it should 

be sufficient that the origin of this single unit of injury lies within the bounds of 

employment, whether the ending, in the form of the actual impact, falls within 

those bounds or not.” (Citation omitted.) 2 Larson, supra, at 5-517, Section 

29.22. 
 22

 In light of all of the foregoing, it is my opinion that the holding in this case 

should be as follows: 

 “In the delayed-action case where the cause and manifestation of an injury 

fail to coincide, the injury is a compensable one under R.C. 4123.01(C) if its 

original or contributing cause is employment-related and occurs within the time 

and place limits of the employment, regardless of the time, place, and 

circumstances in which the injury manifests itself or the physical impact occurs.” 

 Applying this holding to the facts of the case sub judice, it is clear that the 

court of appeals erred in affirming summary judgment in favor of Goodyear. The 

precipitating event or original cause of the assault by McCormick and the 

attendant injuries to claimant was the conversation between claimant and his 

supervisor regarding McCormick’s attendance habits. Since this event was 

employment-related, it must be concluded that the original cause of claimant’s 

injuries arose out of his employment with Goodyear. Also, since the conversation 

took place entirely within the time, place, and circumstances of the employment, it 

must be concluded that the injury occurred in the course of claimant’s employment 

with Goodyear. 

 The fact that the assault occurred two weeks later than the precipitating 

event and approximately one mile away from the Goodyear plant is irrelevant not 

only for purposes of coverage under R.C. 4123.01(C), but for purposes of socalled legal causation as well. Physical or temporal remoteness does not itself 

eviscerate the causal connection, either under workers’ compensation law or tort 

law. 2 Larson, supra, at 5-501, Section 29.21(f); 1 Larson, supra, at 3-258 to 3-

266, Section 11.13. See, also, Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling 

Ctr. (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 312-313, 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1332. 
 23

 Accordingly, justice demands that the judgment of the court of appeals be 

reversed, and the cause be remanded to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of 

claimant. 

 F.E. Sweeney, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 

FOOTNOTE: 

2. At the time Ryan was decided, the General Assembly had recently amended 

the definition of “injury” contained in R.C. 4123.01(C). Am.Sub.S.B. No. 307, 

141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 718. That amendment, effective August 22, 1986, reads: 

 “(C) * * * ‘Injury’ does not include: 

 “(1) Psychiatric conditions except where the conditions have arisen from an 

injury or occupational disease.” 

 In his dissent, Justice Wright opined that this amendment accords with the 

Szymanski and Toth decisions. Id., 28 Ohio St.3d at 416, 28 OBR at 471, 503 

N.E.2d at 1387 (Wright, J., dissenting). He therefore predicted: “Happily, the 

effect of this decision will be short-lived in light of the recent action of the 

General Assembly noted above.” Id., 28 Ohio St.3d at 417, 28 OBR at 472, 503 

N.E.2d at 1388. 

 As Professor Larson observes: “He is wrong. The amendment will rule out 

the mental [cause]-mental [harm] category, which it obviously was designed to do. 

It will not rule out the mental-physical category, since there the ‘injury’ is the 

heart attack, not the psychiatric condition. That condition is the cause of the 

injury, not the injury itself.” 3 Larson, supra, at 7-821 to 7-822, fn. 39.1, Section 

42.21(a).