PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 21-1592

______

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 

v.

CHARLES J. WEISS,

Appellant ____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00502)

District Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky ____________

Argued: May 3, 2022

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER, and PHIPPS, Circuit 

Judges.

(Filed: November 2, 2022)

____________
2

Michael J. Haungs

John Schumann [ARGUED]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TAX DIVISION

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

P.O. Box 502

Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for United States of America

James R. Malone, Jr. [ARGUED]

POST & SCHELL

1600 John F. Kennedy Boulevard

Four Penn Center, 14th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Charles J. Weiss

_______________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________________

PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.

After assessing delinquent taxes, the United States has ten 

years to collect them, see 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1), and this case 

comes down to a matter of days within that decade. 

Importantly, that limitations period does not necessarily run 

continuously; it may be tolled for several increments of time, 

including for the period during which a specific administrative 

hearing before the Internal Revenue Service “and appeals 

therein” are pending. Id. § 6330(e)(1). Here, the taxpayer 

requested an administrative hearing, and that began tolling the 

limitations period. After a series of unfavorable rulings – at 
3

the hearing, in the Tax Court, and before the D.C. Circuit – the 

taxpayer filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the 

Supreme Court denied. But the United States waited until after 

the denial of that petition to commence this action. By that 

time, even with tolling, much, if not all, of the limitations 

period had elapsed. Yet in interpreting the statute, petitions for 

writs of certiorari are ‘appeals therein,’ and also an appeal 

remains ‘pending’ until the time to file such a petition expires. 

Due to that additional tolling of the statute of limitations for 

those increments, this collection action is timely. Id.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

(UNDISPUTED BY THE PARTIES)

For the six-year period from 1986 through 1991, Charles 

Weiss did not pay federal income taxes. In October 1994, 

Weiss late-filed his tax returns for those years, self-reporting a 

liability of $299,202. Later that month, the Internal Revenue 

Service made tax assessments against him for each of those 

years. 

By assessing those taxes, the IRS triggered a ten-year 

limitations period for collecting the unpaid taxes through a

court proceeding or a levy, which is a legal seizure of property 

or a right to property. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6331(b), 6502(a)(1). 

Weiss’s subsequent bankruptcies tolled that limitations period 

three times between 1994 and 2009, yielding a new expiration 

date for the statute of limitations: July 21, 2009. 

In anticipation of that deadline, the IRS began the process 

of collecting the unpaid taxes through a levy. It mailed a Final 

Notice – Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a

Hearing letter to Weiss on or about February 13, 2009. That 

notice, also referred to as a Letter 1058A, informed Weiss that 

the IRS intended to levy his unpaid taxes for the years 1986 to 

1991, and that he had an opportunity to request a Collection 

Due Process hearing. A Collection Due Process hearing is an 

administrative proceeding before an appeals officer with the 
4

IRS Independent Office of Appeals in which a taxpayer may 

raise “any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the 

proposed levy.” Id. § 6330(c)(2)(A); see id. § 6330(b); cf. id.

§ 6330(c)(4) (precluding certain previously resolved issues 

from being raised at a Collection Due Process hearing). The 

notice, although expressing an intent to levy Weiss’s property, 

was not sufficient to make a levy – that requires a notice of 

seizure – and thus, the statute of limitations continued to run. 

See id. § 6502(b) (stating that a levy is considered made on the 

date that notice of seizure is given); see also id. § 6335(a) 

(providing for notice of seizure).

In response to that notice, Weiss timely requested a 

Collection Due Process hearing through a Form 12153. See id.

§ 6330(a)(3)(B); see also Weiss v. Comm’r, 2018 WL 

2759389, at *2–3 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 2018) (per curiam) 

(concluding that Weiss’s request was timely), cert. denied, 

139 S. Ct. 612 (2018). That request suspended the statute of 

limitations for the period during which the hearing “and 

appeals therein” were “pending.” 26 U.S.C. § 6330(e)(1). On 

the date that Weiss requested the hearing, no less than 129 days 

remained in the limitations period. 

Weiss did not prevail at the hearing or in any of his review- as-of-right challenges in federal court. The IRS Independent 

Office of Appeals ruled against him at the Collection Due 

Process hearing. Weiss sought review of that determination by 

timely filing a petition with the United States Tax Court. See 

id. § 6330(d)(1). Over five years later, the Tax Court affirmed

that determination. See Weiss v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. 179, 181

(2016). Weiss then timely appealed the Tax Court’s ruling to 

the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 

Circuit, but he fared no better there. See 26 U.S.C. § 7483.

The D.C. Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s judgment, and 

Weiss petitioned for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. 

See Weiss v. Comm’r, 2018 WL 2759389 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 

2018). After denying those petitions, the D.C. Circuit issued a 

mandate on August 23, 2018. 
5

As a last resort, Weiss timely filed a petition for a writ of

certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States on 

October 24, 2018. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (allowing for 

review of court of appeals decisions by writ of certiorari). 

Through an order on December 3, 2018, the Supreme Court 

denied that petition. See Weiss v. Comm’r, 139 S. Ct. 612 

(2018). 

At that point, instead of proceeding to levy Weiss’s 

property, the government initiated a collection action in the 

District Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340, 1345; see also

26 U.S.C. § 7402(a). Through a complaint filed on February 

5, 2019, the government sought to collect from Weiss his 

delinquent taxes plus accrued interest, which together totaled 

$773,899.84. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The issue before the District Court was the timeliness of 

this action. The parties stipulated to the material facts and 

cross-moved for summary judgment. They disagreed as to the 

meaning of two terms in the tolling provision of § 6330(e)(1): 

whether the phrase ‘appeals therein’ includes petitions for 

writs of certiorari and whether a denial of a petition for a writ 

of certiorari constitutes a ‘final determination’ in a Collection 

Due Process hearing. 

The District Court resolved both of those issues in favor of 

the government. It concluded that a petition for a writ of 

certiorari falls within the ‘appeals therein’ clause. It also held 

that the Supreme Court’s denial of such a petition constitutes a ‘final determination’ in a Collection Due Process hearing. On 

those grounds, the District Court entered summary judgment 

for the government. 

Through a timely appeal, Weiss invokes this Court’s 

appellate jurisdiction and challenges both bases for the District 
6

Court’s finding of timeliness. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Fed. R. 

App. P. 4(a). 

III. DISCUSSION

This case lends itself well to de novo review of the 

summary-judgment record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see 

Cranbury Brick Yard, LLC v. United States, 943 F.3d 701, 708 

(3d Cir. 2019). The material facts are undisputed. After the 

D.C. Circuit issued the mandate, no less than 129 days 

remained of the ten-year statute of limitations. Weiss filed a 

petition for a writ of certiorari 62 days later, and 40 days after 

that, the Supreme Court denied his petition. The date on which 

government commenced this action was 64 days after the 

Supreme Court’s denial of Weiss’s petition for a writ certiorari 

and 166 days after the D.C. Circuit’s mandate. 

Using those dates, the timeliness of this case turns on 

questions of law. If the statute of limitations, which had no 

less than 129 days remaining, is tolled for either the time 

between the D.C. Circuit’s mandate and Weiss’s petition (62

days) or the time from Weiss’s filing of that petition to its 

denial (40 days), then the government’s filing of this case 166 

days after the D.C. Circuit’s mandate would be timely. But if 

both of those increments associated with Weiss’s petition fail 

to suspend the statute of limitations, then the government’s 

filing would be too late. As elaborated below, the time 

associated with Weiss’s petition (a combined total of 102 days) 

tolls the statute of limitations, and that renders this action 

timely – without the need to address the applicability of the 

‘final determination’ provision relied upon by the District 

Court. 

Under the statute of limitations, once a tax is assessed, the 

government has ten years to collect it “by levy or by a 

proceeding in court.” 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1). But 

§ 6330(e)(1) operates as a tolling statute by suspending the 
7

statute of limitations for the period during which Collection 

Due Process hearings and appeals therein are pending:

Except as provided in paragraph (2), if a hearing 

is requested under subsection (a)(3)(B), the levy 

actions which are the subject of the requested 

hearing and the running of any period of 

limitations under section 6502 (relating to

collection after assessment), section 6531 

(relating to criminal prosecutions), or section 

6532 (relating to other suits) shall be suspended 

for the period during which such hearing, and 

appeals therein, are pending.

Id. § 6330(e)(1) (emphasis added). 

In allowing tolling for that period, Congress did not define 

two relevant terms – ‘appeals therein’ and ‘pending.’ Without 

a controlling statutory definition, those terms take on their 

“ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Perrin v. United 

States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); see also Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. 

United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2070 (2018) (quoting Perrin, 

444 U.S. at 42); Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947) 

(“[T]he words of statutes – including revenue acts – should be 

interpreted where possible in their ordinary, everyday 

senses.”); United States v. Jabateh, 974 F.3d 281, 296 (3d Cir. 

2020) (“[U]nder the fixed-meaning canon ‘[w]ords must be 

given the meaning they had when the text was adopted.’” 

(quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts 78 (2012)) (alteration in 

original)). Yet, from sources near in time to the statute’s 

enactment, including contemporaneous dictionaries,1 both 

1 See generally Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 

2067, 2070–71 (2018) (using contemporaneous dictionaries to 

ascertain the meaning of an undefined statutory term); see also 

Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220, 227 (2014) (same); 

Delaware Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 747 F.3d 215, 221 
8

terms are capable of multiple meanings, and this case depends 

on which of those meanings apply to the tolling provision. 

A. As Used in the Tolling Statute, the Phrase 

‘Appeals Therein’ Includes a Petition for a 

Writ of Certiorari.

To interpret the phase ‘appeals therein’ requires an analysis 

of its two component words, each of which is capable of 

multiple meanings.

The first of those, ‘appeal,’ had two common meanings

when § 6330 was enacted in 1998. Contemporary dictionaries 

reveal that it could be used, in a general sense, to mean a 

“[r]esort to a superior (i.e. appellate) court to review the 

decision of an inferior (i.e. trial) court.” Appeal, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). Under that general meaning, the 

term ‘appeal’ would include both appeals and petitions – those 

filed in court and those filed administratively. See id. But as 

evidenced by a number of federal statutes and court rules, the 

term ‘appeal’ could also refer to a narrower class within that 

larger class: it could mean a method of seeking review of an 

order that is distinct from other such methods, such as a 

petition. As used more narrowly, appeals are typically initiated 

in the court that issued the order,2 while petitions are often 

(3d Cir. 2014) (“When words are left undefined, we have 

turned to ‘standard reference works such as legal and general 

dictionaries in order to ascertain their ordinary meaning.’” 

(quoting Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2014))).

2 See, e.g., Sup. Ct. R. 18(1) (1997) (stating that appeals from 

three-judge district court panels are commenced by filing a 

notice of appeal with the district court clerk); Fed. R. App. P. 

3(a) (1994) (stating that appeals as of right from district courts 

are taken by filing a notice of appeal with the district court 

clerk); Fed. R. App. P. 13(a) (1994) (stating that appeals as of 

right from the Tax Court are taken by filing a notice of appeal 

with the Tax Court clerk); Tax Ct. R. 190(a) (1994) (same); 
9

commenced through a filing with the reviewing body.3

 Cf.

Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1677–78 (2021) 

Bankr. R. 8003(a)(1) (1994) (stating that bankruptcy appeals 

as of right are taken by filing a notice of appeal with the 

bankruptcy clerk); 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1)–(2) (1994) (stating 

that appeals from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board are 

taken by filing a notice of appeal in the U.S. Patent and 

Trademark Office); 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994) (stating that 

appeals of sentences imposed by district courts are taken by 

filing a notice of appeal in the district court); 26 U.S.C. § 7483

(1994) (stating that review of Tax Court decision is taken by 

filing a notice of appeal with the Tax Court clerk); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2522 (1994) (stating that review of decisions of the Court of 

Federal Claims is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the 

clerk of that court); 28 U.S.C. § 2645(c) (1994) (stating that 

review of decisions of the Court of International Trade is taken 

by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of that court); 

35 U.S.C. § 142 (1994) (stating that patent appeals from Patent 

and Trademark Office decisions are taken by filing a notice of 

appeal with that office); 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) (1994) (stating 

that review of decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims is taken by filing a notice of appeal with that 

court).

3 See, e.g., Sup. Ct. R. 12 (1997) (stating that review on 

certiorari is sought by filing a petition with the Supreme Court 

clerk); Fed. R. App. P. 5(a) (1994) (stating that permissive 

appeals to the courts of appeals are sought by filing a petition 

with the circuit clerk); Fed. R. App. P. 15(a) (1994) (stating 

that review of agency orders is commenced by filing a petition 

with the circuit clerk); Tax Ct. R. 20 (1994) (stating that a case 

in the Tax Court is commenced by filing a petition with that 

court); 3 U.S.C. § 425(c)(5) (1997) (stating that persons 

aggrieved by decisions of the Occupational Safety and Health 

Review Commission or the Secretary of Labor may seek 

review by filing a petition with the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit); 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) (1994) (stating that 

decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board are reviewed 
10

(explaining that appeals typically provide for direct review 

while petitions typically allow for collateral review). Also,

under that narrower meaning, appeals tend to be provided as of 

right, while petitions more frequently depend on the discretion

of the reviewing body. Compare Sup. Ct. R. 10 (1997)

(explaining that “[r]eview on a writ of certiorari is not a matter 

of right, but of judicial discretion” that “will be granted only 

for compelling reasons”), and 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1994), 

with Sup. Ct. R. 18 (1997) (explaining that a party invokes the 

Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction “by filing a notice of 

appeal”), and 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1994).

4

by filing a petition in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit); 7 U.S.C. § 21(i)(4) (1994) (stating that decisions of 

the Commodity Futures Trading Commission are reviewed by 

filing a petition in a court of appeals); 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2) 

(1994) (stating that review of orders of removal by the Board 

of Immigration Appeals is taken by filing a petition in a court 

of appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1994) (permitting review of 

agency orders by filing a petition in a court of appeals); 

29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1994) (permitting review of orders of the 

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission by filing 

a petition in a court of appeals); 42 U.S.C. § 4915(a) (1994)

(permitting review of actions of the Administrator of the 

Environmental Protection Agency by filing a petition in the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit); cf. Fed. R. App. P. 

35(b) (1994) (providing for petitions for rehearing en banc to 

be filed with the court of appeals); Fed. R. App. P. 40(a) (1994) 

(providing for petitions for panel rehearing to be filed with the 

court of appeals). 

4 Because the general meaning of ‘appeal’ fully encompasses 

its narrower meaning, that word is known as an autohyponym. 

See Laurence R. Horn, Ambiguity, Negation, and the London 

School of Parsimony, 14 N.E. Linguistics Soc’y 108, 110–18

(1984) (discussing a number of common autohyponyms). A 

common autohyponym is the word ‘finger,’ which can refer 

generally to all the digits on one’s hand, but it can also refer to 

only the non-thumb digits. See Anu Koskela, Inclusion 
11

At the time of the tolling statute’s enactment, the word 

‘therein’ also had two ordinary, common meanings. It could 

mean “[i]n that place.” Therein, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th 

ed. 1990); see also Webster’s New International Dictionary

(‘Webster’s Third’) 2372 (3d ed. 1993). In context, under that 

meaning, the phrase ‘appeals therein’ would refer to appeals 

pending in the same place as the Collection Due Process 

hearing, which would be within the IRS, not in a federal court. 

But under the other definition, ‘therein’ could mean “in such 

matter.” Webster’s Third 2372 (defining ‘therein’ as “in that 

particular[;] in that respect[;] in such matter”). Under that 

meaning, the phrase ‘appeals therein’ in context would refer to 

appeals of a Collection Due Process hearing determination. 

Because the terms ‘appeals’ and ‘therein’ each had two 

meanings, there are four possible combinations for the 

meaning of the phrase ‘appeals therein.’ But three of those 

combinations would render the expression ‘appeals therein’ 

meaningless because they reference processes that do not exist, 

such as administrative appeals of Collection Due Process 

hearings within the IRS. By contrast, the fourth combination 

– ‘appeals’ in the general sense and ‘therein’ as ‘in such matter’ 

– produces a reasonable outcome that is consistent with 

multiple canons of construction. 

Contrast and Polysemy in Dictionaries: The Relationship 

Between Theory, Language Use & Lexiographic Practice, 

12:4 Rsch. in Language 319, 320–22 (2014). A common legal 

term that is an autohyponym is ‘res judicata’: it has a general 

meaning that encompasses both claim preclusion and issue 

preclusion, but it also has a narrower meaning that refers only 

to claim preclusion. See United States v. 5 Unlabeled Boxes, 572 F.3d 169, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Kaspar Wire 

Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng’g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535–

36 (5th Cir. 1978); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, 

Federal Practice & Procedure § 4402 (3d ed. Apr. 2022 

update).
12

Three combinations of the terms ‘appeals’ and ‘therein’ 

yield meanings that nullify the phrase’s effect in contravention 

of the canon against superfluity, which holds that every word 

in a statute should be given effect. See generally Nat’l Ass’n 

of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 632 (2018) (“[T]he 

Court is ‘obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word 

Congress used.’” (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 

330, 339 (1979))). First, if the term ‘appeals’ is read narrowly 

(to exclude petitions for review) and the term ‘therein’ is used 

locationally (to mean only administrative appeals within the 

IRS), then the phrase describes nothing. The IRS does not 

provide for an administrative appeal process, see 26 U.S.C. 

§ 6330(b)–(d); see also 26 C.F.R. § 301.6330-1(b)(2), so if 

‘appeals therein’ referred to only administrative appeals within 

the IRS, it would be superfluous. Second, for essentially the 

same reasons, the broad meaning of the term ‘appeals’ coupled 

with the locational definition of ‘therein’ would also render the 

combined expression useless: the IRS does not permit 

administrative appeals or administrative petitions, see

26 U.S.C. § 6330(b)–(d); see also 26 C.F.R. § 301.6330-

1(b)(2), so again the phrase would have no effect. Third, if 

‘appeals’ is read narrowly, and ‘therein’ is read as ‘in such 

matter,’ then that too would produce a meaningless result. 

Seeking review of a Collection Due Process hearing requires 

filing a petition in the Tax Court, not an appeal, see 26 U.S.C. 

§ 6330(d)(1); see also 26 C.F.R. § 6330-1(b)(2), (f)(1), and if 

the phrase ‘appeals therein’ excludes petitions, then it does no 

work. 

The fourth combination, however, does not offend the

canon against superfluity. If the term ‘appeals’ receives its

broader meaning (to include petitions) and the word ‘therein’ 

means ‘in such matter,’ then the phrase ‘appeals therein’ refers 

to any appeals or petitions from a Collection Due Process 

hearing. That understanding accounts for the entire judicial 

review process: the Tax Court reviews petitions from the 

Collection Due Process hearing, see 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1); 
13

see also 26 C.F.R. § 301.6330-1(b)(2), (f)(1); the appellate 

courts review appeals from the Tax Court as well as petitions 

for panel rehearing and en banc rehearing, see 26 U.S.C. 

§ 7482(a)(1); Fed. R. App. P. 35, 40; and petitions for certiorari 

from the appellate courts may be filed with the Supreme Court, 

see 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 

Also, with respect to the meaning of the term ‘appeal,’ the 

fourth combination comports with the general-terms canon, which holds that general terms should be interpreted generally.

See Arizona v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 818 F.3d 549, 557 & 

n.4 (9th Cir. 2016) (“General words are to be understood in a 

general sense.”); see also Gov’t Emps. Ret. Sys. of V.I. v. Gov’t 

of V.I., 995 F.3d 66, 107 (3d Cir. 2021) (Matey, J., concurring 

in part) (“[G]eneral terms ‘are to be accorded their full and fair 

scope’ and ‘are not to be arbitrarily limited.’” (quoting Scalia 

& Garner, supra, at 101)); 3A J.G. Sutherland, Statutes and 

Statutory Construction § 66:6 (8th ed. 2018) (“Courts 

construing tax collection statutes employ the usual maxims of 

construction.”). And here, the tolling statute contains no 

suggestion that the term ‘appeals’ should be given its narrow 

meaning. See 26 U.S.C. § 6330. Although in other sections of 

the tax code, Congress distinguished between notices of appeal 

and petitions for certiorari, see, e.g., id. § 7481(a), it did not do 

so here. Thus, under the general-terms canon, the term 

‘appeals’ as used in § 6330 should receive its general meaning.

Altogether, these considerations remove any uncertainty as 

to the meaning of the phrase ‘appeals therein’: it applies to any 

appeals and petitions seeking review of a Collection Due 

Process hearing, including a petition for a writ of certiorari. 
14

B. Under the Tolling Statute, a Collection Due 

Process Hearing or Appeal Therein Is 

‘Pending’ from Its Commencement Until the 

Date When It Can No Longer Be Challenged.

Even with clarity on the meaning of ‘appeals therein,’ the 

calculation of the tolling period depends on the term ‘pending.’ 

Section 6330(e)(1) suspends the statute of limitations “for the 

period during which such hearing, and appeals therein, are 

pending.” 26 U.S.C. § 6330(e)(1). In this context, the term 

‘pending’ functions as a predicate adjective, modifying ‘such 

hearing, and appeals therein.’ And when Congress enacted 

§ 6330(e)(1), the term ‘pending’ had two common ordinary 

meanings as an adjective. 

Under one definition, ‘pending’ could mean “[b]egun, but 

not yet completed.” Pending, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 

1990); see also Webster’s Third 1669 (defining “pending” as 

“not yet decided,” “in continuance,” and “in suspense”). With 

that meaning for ‘pending,’ the hearing and the ‘appeals 

therein’ would be pending until the agency resolved the 

hearing or a court decided the appeal, but after resolution,

neither the hearing nor an ‘appeal therein’ would remain 

pending. In the context of § 6330(e)(1), that would result in 

intermittent tolling such that the statute of limitations would be 

suspended for potentially several distinct periods. Tolling 

would occur while the hearing was active, but it would cease 

for the interval between resolution of the initial hearing and the 

filing of an appeal. Similarly, the statute of limitations would 

be suspended while the ‘appeals therein’ were active, but the 

tolling would stop for the time between resolution of an appeal 

and the filing of any successive appeal permitted by law. 

Alternatively, the term ‘pending’ had the common ordinary 

meaning of “[a]waiting an occurrence of conclusion of an 

action,” such that it described “a period of continuance or 

indeterminacy.” Pending, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 

1990); see also Webster’s Third 1669 (defining ‘pending’ as 
15

“impending” or “imminent”). Under that meaning, a hearing 

or an appeal therein would be pending after its resolution for 

the period while the ruling remained indeterminate due to the 

possibility of an impending or imminent appeal. Under this 

definition, the tolling under § 6330(e)(1) would be continuous

– from the date of the commencement of the hearing through 

to the date on which the possibility of future appellate review 

expired. 

For purposes of § 6330(e)(1), only the second definition 

works. The tolling clause identifies a singular ‘period’ of 

suspension. The first definition of ‘pending,’ however, would 

involve several distinct periods of piecemeal tolling. The 

statute of limitations would be suspended for the hearing and 

every appeal, but not for the interim periods between resolution 

and appeal. If Congress had intended to account for such 

intermittent tolling, it could have used the word ‘periods.’ But 

by instead using the singular term, ‘period,’ the statute allows 

only the second meaning of ‘pending,’ such that it describes a 

continuous period inclusive of not only the hearing and 

‘appeals therein’ but also any intervening periods of 

indeterminacy during which an appeal or petition could be 

filed. 

Applying the second definition here, the statute of 

limitations remained tolled for the 62 days between the D.C. 

Circuit’s mandate and Weiss’s petition for a writ of certiorari.

C. This Action Is Timely Because the Statute of 

Limitations Tolled for the Time Associated 

with Weiss’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. 

With that understanding, this action is timely. At least 129 

days remained on the statute of limitations when the D.C. 

Circuit issued its mandate. Due to the meanings of the terms 

‘appeals therein’ and ‘pending,’ that period is not reduced 

either by the time that Weiss took to file his petition for a writ 

of certiorari (62 days) or by the time that the Supreme Court 
16

took to deny the petition (40 days). Thus, the government had 

129 days after the Supreme Court’s denial of Weiss’s petition 

to commence this action, and it did so within 64 days – leaving 

at least 65 days of the ten-year statute of limitations to spare.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s judgment

will be affirmed.