IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs January 24, 2018

JOSE A. RIVAS v. RANDY LEE, WARDEN

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Johnson County

No. CC-17-CR-57 Lisa N. Rice, Judge

No. E2017-01597-CCA-R3-HC

The petitioner, Jose A. Rivas, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, which challenged his 2005 Hancock County Criminal Court guiltypleaded convictions of facilitation of first degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. KELLY 

THOMAS, JR., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY,JR., JJ., joined.

Jose A. Rivas, Mountain City, Tennessee, pro se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; and Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The petitioner, originally charged with six counts of first degree felony 

murder, pleaded guilty as a career offender on September 16, 2005, to two counts of 

facilitation of first degree murder in exchange for concurrent 60-year sentences. It 

appears that the petitioner neither perfected a direct appeal nor sought post-conviction 

relief. On May 22, 2015, the petitioner filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because his crimes were committed in

Hancock County but his guilty pleas were entered in Greene County. The habeas corpus 

court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that the petitioner had waived venue 

upon entry of his guilty pleas, thus vesting the trial court with jurisdiction to convict him, 

and that accordingly the petitioner had failed to state a cognizable ground for habeas 

corpus relief. This court affirmed the dismissal on appeal. See Jose A. Rivas v. Gerald 

McAllister, Warden, No. E2015-01506-CCA-R3-HC, slip op. at 1 (Tenn. Crim. App., 

Knoxville, Mar. 4, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

02/13/2018
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On May 9, 2017, the petitioner again sought habeas corpus relief in a nearly 

identical petition in which he once again challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court. 

The habeas corpus court again summarily dismissed the petition.

In this appeal, the petitioner reiterates his claim that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction. The State responds that the habeas corpus court’s dismissal was appropriate 

because the petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. 

“The determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be granted is a 

question of law.” Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Hart v. 

State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)). Our review of the habeas corpus court’s 

decision is, therefore, “de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded to the 

[habeas corpus] court.” Id. (citing Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc., 205 S.W.3d 

406, 408 (Tenn. 2006)). The writ of habeas corpus is constitutionally guaranteed, see

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15, but has been regulated by statute for 

more than a century, see Ussery v. Avery, 432 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tenn. 1968). Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 29-21-101 provides that “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained 

of liberty, under any pretense whatsoever, except in cases specified in § 29-21-102, may 

prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and 

restraint.” T.C.A. § 29-21-101. Despite the broad wording of the statute, a writ of 

habeas corpus may be granted only when the petitioner has established a lack of 

jurisdiction for the order of confinement or that he is otherwise entitled to immediate 

release because of the expiration of his sentence. See Ussery, 432 S.W.2d at 658; State v. 

Galloway, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326 (1868). The purpose of the state habeas corpus 

petition is to contest a void, not merely a voidable, judgment. State ex rel. Newsom v. 

Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tenn. 1968). A void conviction is one which strikes at 

the jurisdictional integrity of the trial court. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn.

1993); see State ex rel. Anglin v. Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tenn. 1979); Passarella 

v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

In our view, the petitioner has failed to establish entitlement to habeas 

corpus relief. Although the petitioner asserts that he is raising the trial court’s lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction for the first time in this petition, a careful reading of his 

petition reveals that he has simply repackaged his prior arguments regarding venue, 

which arguments were fully addressed by this court in the petitioner’s prior appeal 

affirming the habeas corpus court’s dismissal. See Jose A. Rivas, slip op. at 3-4. As we 

stated in that appeal, a guilty plea “waives the requirement that the State prove venue by 

a preponderance of the evidence.” Ellis v. Carlton, 986 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1987). 
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The crux of the petitioner’s argument in this appeal hinges on the State’s 

alleged failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-214, which 

states, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) A defendant arrested, held or present in a county, other 

than that in which an indictment or information is pending 

against the defendant, may state in writing that the 

defendant wishes to plead guilty, to waive trial in the 

county in which the indictment or information is pending 

and to consent to the disposition of the case in the county 

in which the defendant was arrested, held or present, 

subject to the approval of the district attorney general and 

the court having criminal jurisdiction for each county. 

Upon receipt of the defendant’s statement and of the 

written approval of the appropriate district attorneys 

general and courts, the clerk of the court in which the 

indictment or information is pending shall transmit the 

papers in the proceeding or certified copies of the papers 

to the clerk of the court for the county in which the 

defendant was arrested, held or present, and the 

prosecution shall continue in that county.

T.C.A. § 40-35-214(a). The petitioner posits that, because his guilty-plea submission

hearing transcript shows that he entered his guilty plea in Greene County rather than in 

Hancock County and because he never executed a written waiver of venue as required by 

Code section 40-35-214(a), his guilty plea was rendered void. 

The petitioner’s reliance on this statute, however, avails him nothing. This 

court has previously stated that Code section 40-35-214(a) “does not confer any rights on 

the accused” and that the statute “is directory rather than mandatory, designed to establish 

the provisions by which the district attorneys general and judges exercise authority over 

the prosecution and disposition of criminal charges within their district.” Kenneth Stomm 

v. State, No. E1999-00392-CCA-R3-PC, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Aug. 

2, 2001), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 10, 2001). In any event, the guilty-plea 

submission hearing transcript, as noted by this court in the prior appeal, “reflects that the 

proceedings took place in the Criminal Court for Hancock County,” albeit, located in 

Greeneville on the date of the hearing, “that the court was addressing ‘the matters in 

Hancock County,’ and the court informed the [petitioner] he was ‘charged and pleading 

guilty in two counts . . . in Hancock County.’” Rivas, slip op. at 3, n.1. Thus, the 

petitioner cannot establish that his judgments were void.
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The petitioner has, once again, failed to establish a cognizable ground for 

habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

_________________________________ 

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE