alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### MARIAH JORDAN and CLESIE JORDAN v. N. E. CHAPPEL.

(Filed 18 September, 1957.)

1. Mortgages § 301 (3)

This action for tbe recovery of certain real estate from the mortgagee in possession and for an accounting for rents *held*barred by the lapse of more than ten years. G.S. 1-47(4).

2. Equity § 2—

Judgment that plaintiffs were guilty of *laches*in failing to assert their rights, sustained under the facts of this case.

Appeal by plaintiff Mariah Jordan from *Parker, J.,*January Term 1957, of PerquimaNS.

This is a civil action for the recovery of certain real estate from the defendant as mortgagee, and for an accounting for rents.

*621The parties waived a jury trial and submitted the case to the trial judge upon an agreed statement of facts and authorized him to make his conclusions of law therefrom and to enter judgment accordingly.

The facts are as follows: (1) On 10 November 1913, Susan Thatch and Mariah Jordan owned in fee simple the land in controversy. (2) On the above date, Susan Thatch, Mariah Jordan and her husband Clesie Jordan, executed and delivered to the defendant, N. E. Chappel, for a consideration of $500.00, that certain mortgage filed in the office of the Register of Deeds of Perquimans County, on 11 November 1913, and recorded in Mortgage Book 10, page 299. (3) After the above date, Susan Thatch died intestate, leaving as'her only heir at law Mariah Jordan. Clesie Jordan is now deceased. (4) During the month of November 1913, the aforesaid mortgagors delivered the possession of the land in controversy to the defendant as mortgagee, and the defendant has been in exclusive and continuous possession thereof since that time, collecting the rents therefrom, paying the taxes thereon, making all repairs to the buildings located thereupon, and having renovated and rebuilt one building. No demand for possession or for an accounting for rents was made upon the defendant until the institution of this action on 2 February 1955. (5) The said indebtedness was due and

payable on 10 October 1915, but no payments have been made thereon. The defendant’s possession has been only as a mortgagee. The mortgage is uncanceled of record.

Upon the foregoing facts the court held the right of redemption is barred by the statute of limitations and that the plaintiffs were guilty of laches in failing to assert their rights in the land described in the complaint for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time.

Plaintiff Mariah Jordan appeals, assigning error.

*P. H. Bell and Chas. V. Bell for appellant.*

*LeRoy & Goodwin for appellee.*

PeR CuRiam.

The judgment of the court below is supported by the provisions of G.S. 1-47 (4) and the decisions of this Court construing said statute. *Anderson v. Moore,*233 N.C. 299, 63 S.E. 2d 641; *Hughes v. Oliver,*228 N.C. 680, 47 S.E. 2d 6; *Crews v. Crews,*192 N.C. 679, 135 S.E. 784.

Likewise, the conclusion of law with respect to laches is sustained. *Stell v. Trust Co.,*223 N.C. 550, 27 S.E. 2d 524; *Peedin v. Oliver,*222 N.C. 665, 24 S.E. 2d 519.

The judgment of the court below is

Affirmed.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

February 7, 2019

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-2803

Ornna Foods Corp:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20.

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request failed to show that this particular product is available 

only from China. 

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn

General Counsel
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

October 18, 2018

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-2002

Bridgestone Industrial Products America, Inc:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20. 

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request failed to show that this particular product is available 

only from China.

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn
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<PP&E>                                            197,070
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    201,684
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               5,034
<BONDS>                                           115,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                   0
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<COMMON>                                                0
<OTHER-SE>                                         81,650
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      201,684
<SALES>                                                 0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   15,950
<CGS>                                                   0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    6,845
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  4,370
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     4,735
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</TABLE>
#### STATE v. CHARLIE SHAW.

(Filed 18 March, 1942.)

Criminal Law § 80—

When defendant fails to serve his statement of case on appeal within the time allowed, the motion of the Attorney-General to docket and dismiss will be granted, but when the defendant has been convicted of a capital felony this will be done only after inspection of the record fails to disclose error.

MotioN by State to docket case, affirm judgment, and dismiss appeal.

*Attorney-General McMullan for the State.*

Per Curiam.

The defendant, Charlie Shaw, was tried at September Term, 1941, of the Superior Court of Currituck County, before J. Paul Frizzelle, Judge, and a jury, upon two bills of indictment, the first charging burglary in the first degree and the second charging rape, which were consolidated for the purpose of trial, and defendant was found guilty on both charges — that is, of burglary in the first degree and of rape. The defendant was sentenced to death by asphyxiation.

From this judgment defendant appealed and was given sixty days in which to serve his case on appeal.

Defendant failed to serve the case on appeal or otherwise to perfect his appeal, and the time therefor having expired, the Attorney-General caused the record proper to be docketed in this Court with certificate of the Clerk of the Superior Court of Currituck County, setting forth the failure of the defendant to perfect his appeal and that no case on appeal had been filed in that court and that the time therefor had expired. The said clerk further certifies that he “has inquired of counsel for the defendant and has been informed by him that he does not intend to perfect the appeal.”

Thereupon the Attorney-General moved that the defendant’s appeal be dismissed.

We have carefully examined the record in the case as filed here and find no error therein. The motion is therefore allowed and the appeal *131is dismissed, and the judgment of the court below is affirmed. *S. v. Watson,*208 N. C., 70, 179 S. E., 455.

Judgment affirmed. Appeal dismissed.
Exhibit 4.49





Exhibit 4.49




Agreement








This AGREEMENT is entered into on the day of September 18, 2010 at Shanghai by and between
the following parties:
:



Party A(): GIGAMEDIA (HK) LIMITED



Address



Party B: Mi Saiyu (Chinese name  )




Nationality: Chinese



ID Number: 33010319710109162X


: 33010319710109162X



WHEREAS, Party A is a company registered in Hong Kong Special Administration Region. Party A
wishes to incorporate a company with tentative company name as “Shanghai Ji Di Technology Co., Ltd”
and Chinese name  or any other similar names approved by company
registration office (“Company”) in PRC Shanghai Zhabei District, Party B may provide the above
service and act as one of the shareholders to incorporate the Company. Party A hereby agrees to pay
Party B a certain amount in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein.








NOW, THEREFORE, through mutual negotiations, both parties agree as follows:



Article 1 The parties agree to enter into this Agreement in a spirit of good will and cooperation
for the benefit of all parties. Party A agrees to provide all necessary assistance to Party B in
connection to the incorporation of the Company. Party A agrees to provide a payment to Party B in
amount of RMB 8,000,000 (in capital RMB eight millions only) in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth in this Agreement. Both parties agree any gains from the shares or the Company
shall belong to Party A.


 


 









 










Article 2 Party B agrees to accept such payment provided by Party A. Party B hereby agrees and
warrants that she/he will use such amount only for the investment in, together with other relevant
parties, the Company. Without the prior written consent of Party A, Party B will not use such
amount for the investment in any other domain and will not transfer or pledge the shares in the
Company to any third party. Party B further agrees that she/he will pledge the shares in the
Company to Party A to secure the payment at the request of Party A.








Article 3 If there are any questions or uncertainty about this Agreement, we will discuss it with
an arbitrator in Hong Kong and he will resolve it based on Hong Kong law.








Article 4 Assignment







Party B may not transfer any rights and duties under this Agreement to any other third party.








IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be duly executed on their
behalf by the duly authorized representative as of the date first written above.


 


2









 









	 	 	 
	Party A: GIGAMEDIA (HK) LIMITED
	 	Party B: Mi Saiyu
	 
	 	






Representative:


 


3









 





Appendix I





Confirmation of Draw down





I hereby confirm that I have received on date of November 20, 2010, RMB8,000,000 from GIGAMEDIA
(HK) LIMITED.








    
             
            
             
              
     ( _______ )




Mi Saiyu (Chinese name )





 


4
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 7 (Wednesday, January 11, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 2745]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-619]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. RP95-115-000]


CNG Transmission Corp.; Notice of Proposed Changes in FERC Gas 
Tariff

January 5, 1995.
    Take notice that on December 30, 1994, CNG Transmission Corporation 
(CNG), tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas Tariff, Second 
Revised Volume No. 1, the following revised tariff sheets, with a 
proposed effective date of February 1, 1995:

Sixth Revised Sheet No. 32
Sixth Revised Sheet No. 33

    CNG states that the purpose of this filing is to file CNG's initial 
surcharge under Section 18.2.B. of the General Terms of CNG's FERC Gas 
Tariff. Specifically, CNG has recalculated this surcharge to reflect 
the inclusion of $693,512.28 of stranded Account No. 858 charges 
incurred from implementation of restructured services on October 1, 
1993 to September 30, 1994. CNG is proposing to collect these costs 
over a three-month amortization period.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should 
file a protest or motion to intervene with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20426, in accordance with Rules 214 and 211 of the Commission's Rules 
of Practice and Procedure, 18 CFR 385.214 and 385.211. All motions or 
protests should be filed on or before January 12, 1995. Protests will 
be considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action 
to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a motion to 
intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and 
are available for public inspection.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 95-619 Filed 1-10-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
#### C. E. HOLDER and C. H. HOLDER v. HOME MORTGAGE COMPANY, V. S. BRYANT, Substitute Trustee, and FRED MOORE.

(Filed 20 September, 1933.)

Injunctions D b—

An injunction will ordinarily be continued to tbe bearing where serious controversy exists, and dissolution may cause great injury to plaintiff and continuance result in no barm to defendant.

Appeal by plaintiffs from *Clement, J.,*at June Term, 1933, of Cheeokee.

Beversed.

*B. L. Phillips for plaintiff.*

*W. A. Devin, Jr., and Gray & Christopher for defendants.*

*208Pee Oue-iaM.

This is an action brought by plaintiffs against defendants to enjoin defendants from foreclosing a certain deed of trust on a house and lot of plaintiffs’ in the town of Murphy, N. C. A restraining order was granted and on the hearing the defendants demurred *ore lenus*to the complaint and amended complaint on. the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court below sustained the demurrer and in this we think there was error. If defendants wanted the complaint made more definite or a bill of particulars, they should, on motion to the court below, have requested same. The complaint we think is sufficient to state a cause of action, though somewhat indefinite.

Injunction generally will be continued, where it will not harm defendant and may cause great injury to plaintiff, if dissolved. *Wentz v. Land Co.,*193 N. C., 32; *Brinkley v. Norman,*190 N. C., 851; *Cullins v. State College,*198 N. C., 337. Temporary restraining order will be continued until hearing, where serious controversy exists, and continuance cannot harm defendant, while dissolving might injure plaintiff. *Brown v. Aydlett,*193 N. C., 832.

We do not discuss the facts set forth in the pleadings, as the case goes back for a hearing on the merits. The judgment of the court below is

Reversed.
#### Bobby ROBERTS, Individually and on Behalf of Arkansans to Protect Police, Libraries, Education & Services (Apples) *v.*Sharon PRIEST, Secretary of State; JOHN HOYLE, Individually, and on Behalf of Arkansas Taypayers’ Rights Association, and as Representative of the Class of 98,896 Arkansans who Petitioned for Proposed Constitutional Amendment 4 of 1998, Individually, and Further as Representative of the Class of All Registered Voters of the State of Arkansas, Intervenors

98-1052

979 S.W.2d 93

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered November 19, 1998

*262*Friday, Eldredge & Clark,*by: *Elizabeth Robben Murray, Robert S. Shafer,*and *Ellen M. Owens,*for petitioner.

*Winston Bryant,*Att’y Gen., by: *Tim Humphries,*Ass’t Att’y Gen., for respondent.

*Oscar Stilley,*for intervenors.

Per Curiam.

Complainant requests costs as the prevaüing party in the amount of $5,732.88. Pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-7, the court awards complainant $210.00 in brief costs. Transcript costs have already been considered and awarded as set out in our earlier *per curiam*delivered on November 11, 1998.  *See Scott v. Priest,*326 Ark. 69, 928 S.W.2d 537 (1996). Each party will be responsible for expenses incurred but not awarded as costs in our two *per curiam*orders.
#### J. A. PEACE, R. A. PEACE and Wife, LONIE G. PEACE, v. CITY OF HIGH POINT.

(Filed 10 December, 1952.)

1. Appeal and Error § 2—

An appeal from the refusal of the court to dismiss the action is premature.

2. Appeal and Error § 1—

Where an appeal is dismissed, the Supreme Court in its discretion may nevertheless discuss the question sought to be presented.

3. Judgments § 4—

The unambiguous terms of a consent judgment must be given effect until such judgment is modified or set aside in a proper proceeding.

Appeal by defendant from *Patton, Special Judge,*June Term, 1952, of Guilfoed (High Point Division).

Plaintiffs instituted this action to recover damages resulting from noxious odors on their premises caused by the dumping and burning of dead carcasses, garbage, decayed fruit, etc., by the defendant on its premises near the plaintiffs’ property; thereby creating and maintaining a nuisance, allegedly in violation of the provisions of a consent judgment entered at the January Term, 1927, of the Superior Court of Guilford County, in an action by J. A. Peace *v.*City of High Point for permanent damages resulting from the dumping of garbage on the property of the city adjacent to that of the plaintiffs.

The present action involves 4% acres of the 15.13 acres involved in the previous action.

The defendant filed an answer and moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the judgment in the former action constitutes a bar to the present action; that while counsel for defendant city purported to consent to the insertion of the portion of the judgment in the former action, upon which the present action is bottomed, such counsel were wholly without *620authority on behalf of said city to consent to the insertion of such provisions, which read as follows:

“By AND "With the Consent oe the PaRties Hereto, It Is Ordered and Adjudged that the City of High Point shall not have the right hereafter to deposit or burn on the premises owned by it and described in the complaint animal matter such as dead carcasses; garbage, such as decayed fruit and vegetable matter, such as cabbage, potatoes, oranges, onions, etc., and automobile tires, with these exceptions, the City of High Point shall have a right to use the same as a general dumping ground as aforesaid and deposit or burn whatever it dumps thereon.”

The motion was denied and the defendant appeals and assigns error.

*James B. Lovelace and Frazier & Frazier for plaintiffs, appellees.*

*G. H. Jones for defendant, appellant.*

Per Curiam.

This appeal is premature and must be dismissed. *Bargain House v. Jefferson,*180 N.C. 32, 103 S.E. 922. Even so, in the exercise of our discretion, we will state that so long as the consent judgment in the previous action is not modified or set aside with respect to the above provisions, the fact that permanent damages were awarded therein will not constitute a bar to the present action. And a consent judgment may be modified or set aside only in the manner pointed out in *King v. King,*225 N.C. 639, 35 S.E. 2d 893, and authorities cited therein.

Appeal dismissed.