UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 97-4712

CHAUNCY DONZELLOS MOUZONE,

B/M,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.

Charles E. Simons, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(CR-97-302)

Submitted: February 26, 1999

Decided: May 17, 1999

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

John D. Clark, HASKELL & CLARK, Sumter, South Carolina, for

Appellant. J. Rene Josey, United States Attorney, Cameron G. Chandler, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Chauncy Mouzone of conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana. On appeal, Mouzone

alleges that the district court should have directed a verdict in his

favor or reduced his indictment because the evidence was insufficient

to show that he intended to possess five or more kilograms of cocaine.

Mouzone also alleges that the district court erred in its calculation of

the amount of drugs attributable to him for sentencing purposes and

by allowing the Government to read the transcript of an audiotape to

the jury. Finding no error, we affirm.

As part of a reverse sting operation, a confidential informant

approached Antoine Thurman stating that he knew someone with a

large quantity of drugs to sell and asking whether Thurman could help

him find a buyer. Thurman agreed and engaged in numerous telephone conversations with the "seller," who was actually an undercover DEA agent. Thurman eventually negotiated the"sale" of ten

kilograms of cocaine and 500 pounds of marijuana. Thurman and

Mouzone arrived at the meeting place to complete the transaction, but

it was aborted after Thurman and Mouzone demanded to see the

drugs before showing agents the money. Thurman eventually set up

another buy, and he, Mouzone, and two unidentified co-conspirators

met the informant and another undercover DEA agent. The agent

observed sufficient cash to purchase at least half of the drugs, but not

the whole amount. The agent informed Mouzone of this fact, and

Mouzone stated that he would settle for five kilograms of cocaine.

The evidence also showed that Mouzone informed the agent that he

was looking for a steady source for cocaine. The agent then gave the

arrest signal, and Thurman and Mouzone were arrested.*

_________________________________________________________________

*The other two co-conspirators escaped with a majority of the purchase money and were never apprehended.

 2
Mouzone's first two issues center around his belief that he should

not have been convicted or sentenced for conspiring to possess five

or more kilograms of cocaine because the amount of money present

at the transaction was insufficient to purchase the agreed upon amount

of drugs. We review the district court's denial of Mouzone's motion

for judgment of acquittal de novo, employing the same standard used

to review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. See United

States v. Steed, 674 F.2d 284, 286 (4th Cir. 1982). As a result, we

must decide whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the Government, could have found

Mouzone guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v.

Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 856 (4th Cir. 1992).

Contrary to Mouzone's conclusory allegations, the amount of drugs

involved is purely a sentencing matter and not a substantive element

of the offense. See United States v. Dorlouis , 107 F.3d 248, 252 (4th

Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 65 U.S.L.W. 3861 (U.S. June 27,

1997) (No. 96-9103). Therefore, his claim, standing alone, provided

an insufficient basis upon which to grant his motion. More importantly, the evidence was clearly sufficient to support his conspiracy

conviction. The original deal negotiated was for the sale of ten kilograms of cocaine and 500 pounds of marijuana. Moreover, Mouzone

told the undercover agent that he was looking for a steady supplier of

drugs. In the end, he negotiated for the purchase of five kilograms of

cocaine when the agent informed him that he did not have enough

money to complete the original deal.

We review the district court's factual determination concerning the

amount of drugs attributable to Mouzone for sentencing for clear error

and find none here. See United States v. Lamarr , 75 F.3d 964, 972

(4th Cir. 1996). As a member of a conspiracy, Mouzone was accountable for all of the drugs reasonably foreseeable to him. See United

States v. Irvin, 2 F.3d 72, 78 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gilliam,

987 F.2d 1009, 1012-13 (4th Cir. 1993). The evidence clearly showed

that Mouzone conspired with Thurman and others to purchase ten

kilograms of cocaine and 500 pounds of marijuana, and when there

was insufficient cash to complete that purchase, Mouzone attempted

to salvage the deal by offering to pay for five kilograms of cocaine.

As a result, the district court's finding that Mouzone was accountable

for five or more kilograms of cocaine was not clearly erroneous.

 3
Finally, it is well settled that the decision "to allow the use of transcripts to aid in the presentation of tape recorded evidence is within

the district court's sound discretion." United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d

1100, 1107 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). We find no abuse of

that discretion here. Mouzone had the opportunity to challenge the

accuracy of the transcripts through cross-examination. In addition, the

court gave a proper limiting instruction.

Accordingly, we affirm Mouzone's conviction and sentence. The

Government's motion to decide the case on the briefs is granted. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 4