* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-10899

Summary Calendar

TSEPHANYAH Y HAWKINS; YAHCHANAN Y HAWKINS

Plaintiffs–Appellants

v.

CLAUDIA M HUTCHISON; NORMAN M OSTER; STENOSCRIBE, INC;

VOCEDIT, INC

Defendants–Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:05-CV-184

Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The essence of Appellants’ complaint is that Appellees wrongfully obtained

a series of state court orders that allegedly subjected them to involuntary

servitude, limited their First Amendment rights, and deprived them of

intellectual and real property. The “slavery” to which Appellants were

purportedly subjected resulted from Appellees’ alleged threats to report nonUnited States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

May 9, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-10899

1 Appellants’ remaining federal law claims consist of: violation of the Thirteenth

Amendment’s prohibition of slavery; violation of the First Amendment’s right to freedom of

expression; violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments’ rights to privacy; deprivation of

property and liberty without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment; conspiracy to

interfere with Appellants’ civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; negligence in failing to

prevent a conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and civil remedy pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 1595 for the criminal violation of the prohibition against forced labor found in 18 U.S.C. §

1589. 

2 Appellants’ state law claims consist of: unjust enrichment; intentional infliction of

emotional distress; and breach of fiduciary duty.

2

compliance with the state court orders to the state court, which could have

resulted in contempt proceedings. Appellants assert numerous civil rights

claims, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

(“RICO”), and state law claims. The district court dismissed without prejudice

Appellants’ RICO claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b),

granted summary judgment to Appellees on Appellants’ remaining federal law

claims,1 and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellants’ state

law claims.2 Appellants now appeal.

With respect to Appellants’ RICO claims, Appellants complain that the

district court improperly applied the heightened-pleading standard under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) because their RICO claims were not solely

based upon allegations of fraud. However, regardless of whether a heightenedpleading standard applies, the district court found that Appellants’ complaint

and RICO Case Statement consisted of only “bald assertions and allegations

unsupported by facts” and lacked sufficient intelligibility for it to understand

whether a valid claim was alleged. See Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278,

281 (5th Cir. 1992) (conclusory pleadings not sufficientto state a claim for relief).

On appeal, Appellants do not make legal arguments but only conclusory

assertions that their pleadings were sufficient to state RICO violations.

Appellants have, therefore, abandoned this argument. See Yohey v. Collins, 985

F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding thatissues not argued are abandoned).
No. 07-10899

3 The district court dismissed Appellants’ claims for conspiracy and failure to prevent

conspiracy for separate reasons, and Appellants, on appeal, do not argue that such dismissal

was erroneous.

3

Furthermore, contrary to Appellants’ assertions, the district court’s sua

sponte requirement of a RICO case statement and dismissal of Appellants’ RICO

claims were not unwarranted interventions into the litigation process. A district

court may “consider the sufficiency of [a] complaint on its own initiative,” and it

may dismiss the complaint “as long as the procedure employed is fair.” Lozano

v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 642 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations

omitted). Because the RICO Standing Order specifically instructed Appellants

to “include the facts the [Appellants are] relying upon to initiate this RICO

complaint,” Appellants cannot now contend that they did not have notice and a

fair opportunity to make their case. See id. at 642-43. 

With respect to the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

Appellees on the remaining federal claims, we find that the district court

correctly dismissed these claims for want of jurisdiction pursuant to the RookerFeldman doctrine.3 As the district court stated: “Stripped to their essentials,

Appellants’ claims in the present case merely seek review of the state court’s

orders. This Court is powerless to engage itself in such a review.” 

Appellant Yahchanan Hawkins argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

does not apply to him because he was not a party to the state suit. Even if this

is correct, Appellant Yahchanan Hawkins’s only remaining federal claim is for

“forced labor” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589. Because Hawkins failed to create

a genuine issue of material fact regarding Appellees’ alleged violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1589, Appellees were entitled to summary judgment on this claim as

well. 

Finally, with respect to Appellants’ state law claims, Appellants contend

that diversity jurisdiction existed and the district court improperly dismissed
No. 07-10899

4

these claims. We agree that diversity jurisdiction did in fact exist, and the

district court should have granted Appellants leave to amend their complaint.

See Whitmire v. Victus Ltd., 212 F.3d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 2000) (“In general, a

motion for leave to amend should be granted if it would do nothing more than

state an alternative jurisdictional basis for recovery upon the facts previously

alleged.”) (internal quotations omitted). However, in light of judicial economy,

we will not remand these state law claims to the district court. Having

examined the arguments of the parties, the record, and the district court

proceedings, we find thatthere did not exist a genuine issue of material fact, and

Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We, therefore, dismiss

Appellants’ state law claims with prejudice.

AFFIRMED.