UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT PAUL THORPE; MARIA ELIZABETH THORPE, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. STANLEY ANCELL; JULIA STOGSDILL; ROBERT RUSSELL; CRAIG TYER; LISSAH NORCROSS; DAVID WOOLEY, also known as Jesse David Wooley; RI ECKE CLAUSSEN; JOHN C. JACKSON; ROBERT M. CULVER; MARTYN CURRIE; WILLIAM “BILL” GARDNER, Defendants - Appellees. No. 06-1404 (D. Colo.) (D.C. No. 03-cv-01181-LTB-BNB)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before MURPHY , HOLLOWAY , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.
Robert and Maria Thorpe (together “the Thorpes”) filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit claiming individuals from the Mesa Co unty Sheriff’s Department and the Grand

* This order and judgment is an unpublis hed decision, not binding precedent. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Citation to unpublished decisions is not prohibited. Fed. R. App. 32.1. It is appropriate as it relates to law of th e case, issue preclusion and claim preclusion. Unpublished decisions may also be cited for their persuasive value. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Citation to an order and judgment must be accompanied by an appropriate parenthetical notation

B (unpublished). Id

. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit February 26, 2010
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - Junction Police Department (collectively “D efendants”) violated their constitutional rights during an investigation and malici ous prosecution. After granting summary judgment in favor of the Defe ndants, the court ordered the Thorpes to pay attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b ). The Thorpes appeal from the district court’s order awarding fees. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The facts of this case are well-known to the parties and do not bear lengthy reiteration. In December 1998, a bank robb ery investigation by Sh eriff Deputies Lissah
Norcross 1 and Craig Tyer led to information that a suspect may have paid for his bail bond with some of the robbery proceeds . A-1 Bail Bonds, a company owned and operated by the Thorpes, s upplied the suspect’s bond. Several informants claimed Heather Fish, an A-1 employee, knowingly a ccepted the bank robbery proceeds with permission from the Thorpes. Because the alle ged transaction occurred in the city rather than the county, Tyer passed the informati on to the Grand Juncti on Police Department. On October 27, 1999, Gran d Junction Police Department Officers Stanley Ancell and Robert Culver interviewe d Fish and two other A-1 empl oyees, Sherri and Joe Green. 2 The three employees reported numerous crimin al activities perpetrated by the Thorpes at

1 In 1997, the Thorpes filed a separate § 1983 action against members of the Sheriff’s Department including Norcross. The case was eventually dismissed but was pending during the bank robbery investigation.

2 Shortly after November 1, 1999, e ither the Thorpes terminated Fish’s employment with A-1 or Fish vol untarily resigned. Fish and Joe Green then started their own bail bond business which wa s operating at the time the T horpes filed their complaint against Fish.- 3 - A-1, including forgery and th e knowing receipt of a portion of the bank robbery money. While investigation of these allegations wa s proceeding, the Thorpes lodged a complaint against Fish for allegedly forging documen ts and stealing money from A-1. Police Officer Julie Stogsdill was assigned to cond uct an investigation of these charges. 3 After interviewing the Thorpes and Fish, Stogsdill conducted a brief follo w-up investigation and submitted her investig ation report to the district attorney’s office. The district attorney’s office declin ed to prosecute Fish. However, the investigation of the Thorpes resulted in search and arrest warrants issued on June 7, 2 000, and criminal charges filed on June 15, 2000. 4 A second set of search warra nts issued on June 23, 2000. In August 2000, the district attorney’s office asked Gilbert Stone, its lead investigator, to review and comment on the T horpes’ investigation file to determine the likelihood of conviction. Stone issued a re port (“the Stone Report”) criticizing the investigation. Special Prosecutor David Waite was a ssigned to the case in October 2000. 5 He was given the voluminous investigation file. In January 2001, Waite decided to dismiss

3 Officers Ancell and Culver were not a pa rt of Stogsdill’s investigation, although each knew of the other’s investigation.

4 The Thorpes were charged with, inter alia , motor vehicle theft, theft over $15,000, attempt to influence a public serv ant, theft by receiving (the bank robbery money) and conspiracy to commit these offens es. Maria Thorpe wa s also charged with burglary.

5 The Thorpes had filed a motion to appoint a special prosecutor and to recuse the Mesa County District Attorney’s Office becau se some of its employees were potential witnesses.- 4 - the Thorpes’ case without prej udice because he needed more time to review the police reports and conduct his own inve stigation. Waite refiled th e charges in June 2001, but the charging document for Robert Thorpe, attested to by Culve r, mistakenly included charges intended only for Maria Thorpe. Th ose charges were dropped as soon as the error was discovered. Shortly after the crim inal charges were refiled, the state court ordered the charges be tried separately. Due to that decision and his concern over having to prove each of the charges beyond a reason able doubt in separate trials (although he believed probable cause existed for the Thor pes’ arrests on each of the charges filed against them), Waite decided to dismiss the charges with prejud ice. They were dismissed on June 27, 2002.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND One year later, the Thorpes filed the curre nt lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Mesa County Sheri ff Riecke Claussen, Undersheri ff David Wooley, and Deputies Tyer, Norcross and William Gardner (Sheri ff Defendants) and the City of Grand Junction, the Grand Junction Po lice Department, Police Chie f Martyn Currie and Officers Ancell, Culver, Stogsdill, Robert Russell and John Jackson (Police Defendants). 6 The Thorpes alleged Defendants denied them numerous cons titutional rights and claimed several state law violations. The factual ba sis of their complaint covered miscellaneous events from 1999 through 2002, but was pr imarily based on the investigation and

6 The complaint also named the Mesa County Sheriff’s Department and the Mesa County Board of Commissioners. Sheriff Defendants filed a motion to dismiss these defendants; the Thorpes did not object. The district court granted the motion.- 5 - prosecution of the criminal charges against them. Police Defendants filed a motion for a more de finite statement. Attached to their motion were the Thorpes’ arrest and search warrants and supporting affidavits. Sheriff Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the stat e law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Thorpes’ failure to comply with the requirements of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. They attached the a ffidavits of Sheriff Claussen, Undersheriff Wooley and Depu ties Gardner, Norcross and Tyer. Claussen, Wooley and Gardner stated they had no connection with the police investigation of the Thorpes or their prosecution; Deputies Norcross and Tyer testified they ended their involvement in the bank robbery investigation in 1999 or 2000 when they turned the case over to the Grand Junction Police Department. The Sheri ff Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim for failure to st ate a claim or in the alternative for a more definite statement. The district court gran ted the motions for a mo re definite statement but denied, without prejudice, Sheriff Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The Thorpes filed their First Amended Complaint on March 29, 2004, alleging Defendants “unlawfully caused [them] to be wrongly investigated, charged, arrested and prosecuted based upon information known to be false . . . . Defendants failed to investigate the veracity of [the] allegations against [them], subjected [them] to illegal searches and seizures, harassed [t hem] and falsified evidence ag ainst them.” (R. Vol. I at 34-35.) Some of the factual allegations we re astounding. For example, the Thorpes alleged Fish was a known prostitu te and known to have made fa lse allegations in the past. The Thorpes claimed the Defend ants enlisted Fish to seduce their sixteen–year-old son- 6 - for the purpose of obtaining A-1’s business re cords without a warrant. They also claimed the actions of law enforcement caused thei r son’s suicide in May 2000. The Thorpes alleged Defendants manufactured, altered and destroyed evidence, affirmatively sought out parties to assert false complaints against them and continued to prosecute them despite knowing the charges were false. They further alleged Defendants illegally searched their home after their son’s death, communicated false information to state agencies to destroy the Thorpes’ business and intentionally misstated facts to the media. A second round of motions to dismiss ensu ed. On February 11, 2005, the district court dismissed the state law claims against Defe ndants in their official capacities. It also dismissed the claims against the City of Grand Junction and its police department. Therefore, only the federal claims agains t Defendants in their individual capacities remained.
A. Summary Judgment After completing discovery, Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted these motions on May 1, 2006 . It noted the Thorpes were relentless in their “spurious assertions” which were su pported only by “misrepresentations and exaggerations” of the record. (R. Vol. 5 at 725.) It determined th e undisputed evidence revealed the Sheriff Defendants had no connec tion to the Thorpes’ prosecution and were involved only in the bank robbery investigation (as attest ed to in their affidavits). It also concluded the Thorpes had failed to presen t any evidence demonstrating the Police Defendants altered or falsified evidence duri ng the investigation and prosecution. The court found the affidavits supporting the arrest and search warrants demonstrated- 7 - probable cause for the issuance of the warrants. There wa s no evidence Ancell or Culver included in the affidavits any false information or that any omissions were intentionally or recklessly made. While the court acknowl edged the 2002 charging document against Robert Thorpe contained erroneous charges, the mistake was clearly inadvertent and immediately remedied upon its discovery . There was no factual support for the allegations that Fish was “a known prostitute” or that the investigation was connected in any way to the suicide of the Thorpes’ s on. Nonetheless, the Thorpes had never withdrawn any of these sensa tional accusations even though there was no factual basis to support them. The district court sua sponte ordered the Thorpes’ counsel to show cause why it should not order him or the Thorpes to pay De fendants’ attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
B. Motions for Attorneys’ Fees The Thorpes’ attorney filed a motion to w ithdraw as counsel and a response to the order to show cause on his own behalf, allegi ng the Thorpes had assured him of the verity of their claims and he only intended to zeal ously represent his clients. The Thorpes retained different counsel, who filed a res ponse to the order to show cause on their behalf. In their response to the order to show cause, the Thorpes asserted the summary judgment result was not due to the lack of evidence but solely to their attorney’s mishandling of the case. They averred their lawyer had not presente d critical evidence in the summary judgment response but, had he d one so, the result of Defendants’ motions for summary judgment would have been differe nt. They argued they had not seen the- 8 - pleadings before the order to show cause but relied on their attorney to handle their claims. Nonetheless, the Thorpes di d not disavow any of the allegations. Sheriff Defendants filed a motion seeking $65,060 in attorney s’ fees for their defense of the Thorpes’ federal claims comm encing on August 11, 2 003, the day after the Thorpes received the affidavits attached to the Sheriff Defendants’ first motion to dismiss. Police Defendants also moved for $88,392.50 in attorneys’ fees commencing on February 11, 2005, the day the district cour t dismissed the Thorpes’ state law claims. In response to the Defendants’ specific requests for attorneys’ fees, the Thorpes again blamed their former at torney for failing to present evidence. Atta ched to the response were more than one hundred pages of exhibits primarily attacking the veracity of the individual Defendants. 7 The Thorpes relied on the Stone Report to demonstrate their lawsuit was not frivolous. They also con tinued to insist deliberate fabrications and omissions in the affidavits supporting the a rrest and search warrants vitiated probable

cause. Unconvinced, the district court ordered th e Thorpes to pay the fees requested by Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 8

7 The exhibits included material from th e personnel files of Tyer, Ancell, and Culver. They also included a letter from Currie to Waite inquiring whether Waite was going forward with the prosecution.

8 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the court held the Th orpes’ original attorney jointly liable for the fees incurred after Defendants file d their motions for summary judgment. The attorney filed a separate appeal (No. 06-1405) but the appeal was withdrawn following an agreement with Defendants.- 9 - III. DISCUSSION “[T]he decision to award or deny attorney’s fees lies within the sound discretion of the court, and, on appeal, re view is subject to an abuse of discretion standard.” Goichman v. City of Aspen , 859 F.2d 1466, 1471 (10th Ci r. 1988). “This standard of review applies to both the court’s decision to award fees in the first place and the court’s determination of the amount of fees to be awarded.” Robinson v. City of Edmond , 160 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 1 998). An abuse of discretion standard “is appropriate in view of the district court’s superior unders tanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of wh at essentially are factual matters.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs” in an action to enforce civil rights. While courts apply this provision lib erally to prevailing plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has imposed a di fferent standard for awarding attorneys’ fees to prevailing defendants in civil rights cases. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC , 434 U.S. 412, 417, 421 (1978). 9 “[A] plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a court find s that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff contin ued to litigate after it clearly became so.” Id. at

9 Christiansburg addressed the standard applicable to the attorneys’ fee provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). However, that provision is virtually identical to § 1988 (b) and the Supreme Court has applied the Christianburg standard to cases in which a de fendant seeks fees under § 1988(b). See Hensley , 461 U.S. at 429 n.2; Hughes v. Rowe , 449 U.S. 5, 14-15 (1980).- 10 - 422; see also Hensley , 461 U.S. at 429 n. 2 (“A prevailing defendant may recover an attorney’s fee only where the suit was vexa tious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.”). A frivolous suit is one “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, . . . [or] whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). However, the cour t need not find the lawsuit was “brought in subjective bad faith” to award fees to a prevailing defendant. Christianburg , 434 U.S. at 421. “A defendant can recover if th e plaintiff violates this standard at any point during the litigation , not just at its inception.” Galen v. County of Los Angeles , 477 F.3d 652, 666 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added); see also Munson v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs. , 969 F.2d 266, 271 (7th Cir. 19 92) (“It is possible for an in itially nonfrivolous action to become frivolous when, for example, the factual basis supporting the complaint is shown to be groundless during discovery.”). Rarely will a case be sufficiently frivolous to justify imposing attorneys’ fees on the plaintiff. See Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera , 70 F.3d 1566, 1581 (10th Cir. 1995) (only in “rare circumstances” w ill “a suit [be] truly frivolous so as to warrant an award of attorneys’ fees to the defe ndant”). In determining wh ether a claim is frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, a district court must avoid “ post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plain tiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation.” Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22. Dismissal of claims at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage does not automatically warrant a fee award. See Jane L. v. Bangerter , 61 F.3d 1505, 1513-14 (10th Cir. 1995).- 11 - A. Statute of Limitations Section 1983 provides a federa l civil cause of action against state officials for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. St ate law governs statute of li mitations issues in § 1983 actions and “that limitation period is set by the personal injury statut e in the state where the cause of action accrues.” See Roberts v. Barreras , 484 F.3d 1236, 1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2007). The limitations period for a personal injury action in Colorado is two years.
See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102; Workman v. Jordan , 32 F.3d 475, 482 (10th Cir. 1994). Federal law governs when a civil rights clai m accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations. Fratus v. DeLand , 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995). “A civil rights action accrues when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent.” Id. (quotations omitted). The Thorpes filed their origin al complaint on June 26, 2003. Therefore, the statute of limitations would have run on all of their claims occurring prior to June 26, 2001. The only activity after June 26, 2001, was the final dismissal of criminal charges. Thus, the only claim not barred by the stat ute of limitations was based on allegations of malicious prosecution. See Mondragon v. Thompson , 519 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[A] due process claim for malicious prosecutio n arises only once the original action, whatever form it has taken, has been terminat ed in favor of the plaintiff. Because the statute of limitations does not start running be fore the elements of a claim are satisfied, the statute of limitations for this due proc ess claim cannot start until the plaintiff has achieved a favorable result in the original action.”) (citati on and quotations omitted).- 12 - Even so, the Thorpes’ First Amended Compla int continued to clai m Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violati ons for unreasonable search and seizure. These claims were obviously without merit and should have been withdrawn.
B. Malicious Prosecution A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim re quires the following elements: “(1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued c onfinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) there was no probable cause to support the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages.” Novitsky v. City of Aurora , 491 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007). The district court held that the affidav its attached to the Sheriff Defendants’ motion to dismiss the orig inal complaint negated any factual basis to allege the Sheriff Defendants caused the Thorpe s’ prosecution. Similarly, the affidavits in support of the requests for the search and arrest warrants established probable cause. As the district court noted, the Sheriff Defendants’ supporting affidavits to their first motion to dismiss re futed any involvement with the police department’s investigation of the Thorpes or the district attorney’s decision to pursue a criminal prosecution. The Thorpes disagree, relying on the following statement in Stone’s report to support their contention that the claims against the Sheriff’s Defendants were not frivolous: Might there not be some history between the Thorpes, the Mesa County Sheriff’s Department (who the Thorpes were suing for violations of their civil rights) and Heather Fish that mi ght cause Robert Thorpe to distrust Fish (a former Sheriff’s Department’s “booking tech.” in the jail), Patton and Tyer?? In reality, Fi sh was a police snitch, Patton was a bank robber . .- 13 - . and [t]he Mesa County Sheriff’s De partment was being sued by the Thorpes for two million dollars for an a lleged bad search warrant on A-1. Would you trust these players?! Would a logical person not ask themselves, “Wait a minute! This sti nks! Could the Sheriff’s Department be trying to set me up?” (R. Vol. IV at 507.) To be sure, Stone’s sp eculations provide supp ort for the Thorpe’s original suspicions of wrongdoing. But th e disclosure of these speculations did not motivate the Thorpes to depose any of the Sheriff Defendants in order to provide a factual basis for Stone’s flights of fancy. While Stone reiterated some of the same suspicions at his deposition, he did not tes tify he believed any of the Sheriff Defendants had violated the Thorpes’ rights nor did he refute the Sheriff Defendants’ sworn affidavits provided to the Thorpes in resp onse to their origin al complaint. The district court also held the affidav its in support of the Police Defendants’ requests for search and arrest warrants esta blished probable caus e, thus negating any claim for malicious prosecution. The law is well-settled: a constituti onal violation exists only when an affidavit contains information that is deliberately false or in reckless disregard for the truth and the remaining material contains insufficient content to support a finding of probable cause. See Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978). The Thorpes’ steadfast refusal to accept the district court’ s conclusion is notable in the absence of any appeal of the court’s gran t of summary judgment. Instead, they argue attorneys’ fees are unwarranted because An cell and Culver deliberately presented false statements when they averred the informatio n in the affidavits was given by “reliable” citizens (Fish, the Greens and the bank robber). (R. Supp. Vol. I at 25, 40.) The Thorpes claim because Ancell and Culver knew these witnesses had a motivation to falsely accuse- 14 - the Thorpes, the officers did not rely on in formation from “reliable” citizens. Rather, they knowingly relied on material misreprese ntations by unreliable witnesses. The Thorpes maintain a judicial officer would no t find probable cause for their arrests had the officers revealed the known motivations of these witne sses to fabricate evidence. The district court correctly rejected this argument beca use the relationship of these witnesses to the Thorpes was set forth in the officers’ affidavits. Moreover, contrary to the Thorpes’ repeated asserti ons, the affidavits do not premise probable cause solely on these witnesses’ credibility. 10 Allegations concerning the bank robbery money ( i.e. , the theft by receiving charges) were corroborated by another witness and the Thorpes’ own statements made while Fish was wearing a wire; the motor vehicle theft charges were corroborated by computer ch ecks regarding property owners hip, interviews with the victim and his girlfriend, and copies of the towing charges. The theft of over $15,000 charges were instigated by a telephone call from the Colorado Depa rtment of Insurance followed by interviews with A-1’s insurance company and th e victims; the attempt to influence a public servant charges were al so initiated by the Colo rado Department of Insurance and followed up by telephone calls to agencies the Thorpes listed as former employers on their resumes to obtain a license to instruct a bondsman class. Burglary charges against Maria Thorpe were corrobo rated by an interview with the homeowner

10 This is not to say their credibility would be unimportant to a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But “[p]robable cau se for an arrest warrant is established by demonstrating a substantial probability that a crime has been committed and that a specific individual committed the crime.” See Bruner v. Baker , 506 F.3d 1021, 1026 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted).- 15 - and a witness, as well as the homeowner’s identification of the allegedly stolen documents. The Thorpes do not a llege any of this supporting information was false; they merely claim the investigation was not thorough enough. Thus, even if all the statements by Fish and the Greens are eliminated, the Thorpes could not reasonably believe the remaining information in the affi davits failed to establish prob able cause for their arrests. The Thorpes also complain Culver knowingly misreprese nted or showed reckless disregard for the truth when he attested to the June 2001 charging document for Robert Thorpe which contained erroneous charges. Culver admitte d he probably did not read the charges written by the prosecutor before he signed the document. However, there was no evidence inferring the oversight was deliberate. “Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient” to sustain a claim for a constitutional violation; misrepresentations must be deliberate or in reckless disregard of the facts. Franks , 438 U.S. at 171. Finally, the Thorpes argue the Stone Report justified the lawsuit against the Police Defendants because Stone conc luded a logical pe rson could believe the Thorpes were being “set . . . up” by law enforcement. (R. Vo l. IV at 507.) They rely on our decision in Anthony v. Baker , 767 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1985), wherein Anthony was charged for insurance fraud following a fire at the motel where he was a manager. He was subsequently tried and found not guilty. Anthony then file d suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution and de privation of his constitutional rights. Anthony alleged, inter alia, that two investigators, Baker and Ne wton, “conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights by making him the target of their investigation, giving false- 16 - information to the Grand Jury and cove ring up exculpatory information.” Id. at 660. The case against the investigators went to trial. After Baker had presented his case and rested, Baker and Newton moved for and were gr anted a directed verdict. The court subsequently awarded them thei r attorneys’ fees. We reversed, finding the court erred in granting a directed verdict based on the following evidence: Detective Green, a deputy in the Sher iff’s office and a personal friend of Baker, testified . . . Baker seized the wrong piano under [a] warrant . . . even after he was notified that it was th e wrong piano [and] . . . that he did not care if it was the wrong piano . . .; Baker stated words to the effect that he was going to get Anthony whatever it took; . . . Baker reached a point of subjectivity where he could not tell the difference between Anthony’s guilt or innocence; Baker became almo st frantic about the Anthony case and was frantically pursuing Anthon y; and in his ten years as an investigator he had never seen anyt hing like Baker’s investigation of Anthony. Arnold Miller, an expert in law en forcement investigation administration and a criminal justice specialist, testif ied . . . Baker’s investigation was a continual, blatant, unrelenting effort both to accuse Anth ony and ultimately to have him found guilty of a crime or crimes that he c ould not have been involved in; and Baker’s efforts we re made at virtually any cost. Robert Isham, a former sergeant in th e Sheriff’s office, testified . . . Baker had submitted an interdepartmental repor t to the Sheriff and other officers about his investigation into the fire and theft at the Inn which contained a lot of falsehoods; and Baker’s report falsely stated that Isham and other officers conspired to have Anth ony pass a polygraph examination. Id. at 665 (footnotes omitted). The testimony in Anthony is easily distinguished from Stone’s second-hand ruminations. Even assuming it was somehow ad missible and recognizing that it is critical of Defendants’ investigations, the Stone repo rt did not state anyone knowingly violated the law, misrepresented inform ation or that the officers arrested the Thorpes without- 17 - probable cause. Where probab le cause exists, the subjectiv e intent of the officer in effectuating an arrest is irrelevant. Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). The fact Ancell and Culver conducted a vigorous inves tigation or that law enforcement hoped for a successful prosecution is not a constitutional violation. The Thorpes also argue they should not be punished for their attorney’s decisions and, in any event, th ey should not be sanctioned more severely. While the Thorpes may wish to blame their attorney for continuing the suit after it was pr oven to be without merit, “there is certainly no thing novel about holding client s responsible for the conduct of their attorneys, even conduc t they did not know about.” Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co. , 497 F.3d 1135, 1245 n.12 (10th Ci r. 2007) (quotations omitted) (affirming dismissal under Rule 41(b) of th e Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Moreover, the Thorpes’ unsupported and sensa tional factual allegations were certainly not created out of whole cl oth by their attorney. In sum, there was no evidence supporting the Thorpes’ claims that Defendants fabricated evidence; no evid ence they “use[d] as their ag ents, persons of questionable veracity” and “known moral t[u] rpitude” to “ seduce or solicit[ ] minor children to violate the constitutional rights of others” causing th e suicide of a minor child; no evidence of the knowing falsification of any document; no ev idence any Defendan t “cultivat[ed] false testimony” in exchange for a reduction of se ntence; no evidence of threats; no evidence any Defendant supplied false informati on to a state agency; no evidence of “conspiratorial meetings”; and no eviden ce any Defendant “pla ced anonymous false entries . . . into the [Thorpes’] criminal file[s]” to be viewed by the press. (R. Vol. I at- 18 - 36, 46-47, 49.) Despite the fact that the stat ute of limitations had run on their claims for false arrest, unconstitutional se arches, unconstitutional seizures , defamation, intentional interference with business and intentional inf liction of emotional distress, none of these claims were omitted from the amended complaint nor were these allegations voluntarily removed or withdrawn prior to the time summar y judgment issued. The Thorpes failed to take any depositions of the Sheriff Defendants after r eceiving their sworn affidavits stating they did not participate in the investiga tion leading to the Thorpes’ arrests. Rather than seeking the facts, the Th orpes obviously intended to re ly on Stone’s speculations to support their own view of events. Similarly, despite the fact the affidavits in support of the search and arrest warrants contained sufficient statements of probable cause supported and corroborated by several avenue s of evidence, the Thorpes do not budge from their conviction that An cell and Culver somehow did something to violate their rights. The district court noted th at throughout the proceedings the Thorpes played fast and loose with the record in supporting their arguments to th e point some assertions were flatly contradicted by the undisputed facts. At the time of the Thorpes’ response to the order to show cause, they still did not conced e their claims were fr ivolous but, instead, submitted pages of documents irrelevant to th is case in an atte mpt to challenge the credibility of opposing parties. Christiansburg did not provide precise guidanc e on the amount of evidence the plaintiff must produce to avoid an adverse aw ard of fees. However, the district court found not only that the Thorpe s’ claims were frivolous but that “courts are not proper- 19 - fora for publication of fantastic allegations of the sort that the Thorpes concocted in their complaint.” (R. Vol. IX at 1 146.) These findings are more th an sufficient to justify the award of fees to Defendants. The Thorpes argue the district court a bused its discretion because it awarded attorney’s fees to compensate Defendants rath er than award the least amount necessary to deter the filing of frivolous la wsuits. They claim because their “reasonable belief they were treated unlawfully by Defend ants . . . justified . . .their complaint” and, in any event, “a much smaller amount . . .would suffice as a deterrent.” (Appellants’ Br. at 44-45.) While Christiansburg makes clear the award of attorney ’s fees to a defendant are not routine, this is not a case where the Thorpe s are being “punished for [their] failure to recognize subtle factual or legal de ficiencies in [their] claims.” Hughes , 449 U.S. at 15. “[T]he same judge who presided over all proc eedings also determined the fee award. Thus, that judge was particularly well qualifie d to make the partially subjective findings necessary for an award of attorney’s fees.” Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc. , 934 F.2d 497, 503 (3d Cir. 1991) (quotations and alterations omitted). The award of fees in a § 1983 case does not merely provide so me compensation to the defendants for cost s incurred in defending a suit but al so deters a plaintiff from filing patently frivolous and groundless suits. The court “consider[ed] the . . . plaintiff[s’] ability to recognize the objectiv e merit” of their allegations and “provide[d] a concise [and] clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” Houston v. Norton , 215 F.3d 1172, 1175 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitte d). The district court concluded the Thorpes’ claims were not onl y frivolous but the “fantastic” factual allegations contained- 20 - in the complaint were improperl y “concocted” to be publicized in judicial proceedings. Indeed, the Thorpes have yet to retract the alle gations or even address this transgression. What will deter any particular plaintiff is uni quely within the trial court’s expertise after becoming familiar with the par ties through the course of th e proceedings. Because the district court offered sound reasons to concl ude the Thorpes’ action was frivolous and to substantiate its decision on fees, we will affirm. AFFIRMED. Entered by the Court: Terrence L. O’Brien United States Circuit Judge