Filed 3/6/13 In re A.C. CA2/6 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION SIX 

In re A.C., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

2d Juv. No. B242014 

(Super. Ct. No. J065689) 

(Ventura County) 

VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN 

SERVICES AGENCY, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

C.W. et al., 

 Defendants and Appellants. 

 Parents appeal an order terminating parental rights and designating 

adoption as the permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)1

 We affirm. 

FACTS 

 Chantel W. (Mother) and Terry C. (Father) are the parents of A.C.2

 Mother 

has a long history with the HSA. Her parental rights to four other children had been 

terminated. 

 1

 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2

 The trial court also terminated Father's parental rights. Father does not 

contest the termination of his rights. He filed a brief, however, joining Mother in 

contesting the termination of her rights. For convenience, we refer to both parents 

collectively as Mother. 
2 

 A.C. was born in 2004. Based on the previous terminations of parental 

rights, HSA brought a dependency action for A.C. Mother complied with the service 

plan, and the dependency action was terminated in 2005. 

 On March 21, 2010, five-year-old A.C. awoke to find Mother was not 

home. Frightened, she called 911 and reported Mother missing. When a police officer 

arrived, he searched the apartment and found no one else there. 

 At about 9:00 a.m., police officers saw Mother and a male companion, 

Father, walking up the stairs to her apartment. The officers detained Father. Father said 

that Mother had picked him up in her car at about 4:00 a.m. They went to a friend's 

house, drank alcohol and played cards. 

 One of the officers heard Mother berating A.C. for calling 911. The officer 

reassured A.C. that she had done the right thing. 

 Mother told the police that she had been in the garage the entire time, and 

that A.C.'s adult half-brother, C., had been in the apartment with A.C. The police told 

Mother she was lying. They had searched the area and had found no one. Mother 

became argumentative. The police arrested Mother and Father for being under the 

influence of a controlled substance. Mother tested positive for cocaine. 

 HSA took A.C. into protective custody and filed a section 300 petition on 

March 23, 2010. The juvenile court temporarily removed A.C. from parental custody. 

 Initially, HSA recommended that reunification services not be provided. 

The recommendation was based on Mother's prior history with HSA and her extensive 

history of criminal convictions. Ultimately, however, HSA changed its recommendation 

because A.C. was so well behaved. The court ordered reunification services. The court 

set an interim review for August 2010 and a six-month review for November 2010. 

 At the interim review, HSA reported that Mother was progressing slowly. 

She dropped out of an outpatient drug treatment program and had just recently enrolled in 

another program. Her counselor expressed concern about her ability to benefit from 

treatment because she minimized the factors that led to her dependency. She was not 
3 

participating in anger management or parenting education. The urine sample for a 

random drug test was diluted and positive for alcohol. 

 At the six-month review on November 8, 2010, HSA reported that Mother 

continues to visit with A.C. consistently and regularly speaks with her on the telephone. 

Mother is "loving and appropriate" with A.C. A.C. enthusiastically looks forward to the 

visits. Mother and A.C. have a significant bond that benefits the child's continued 

"emotional development and best interest." 

 Mother participated in counseling sessions, but failed to disclose her history 

of substance abuse and domestic violence. She refused to sign a release that would 

permit HSA to discuss her services. She was not in a domestic violence or anger 

management class. She was, however, generally compliant with random drug tests. The 

court continued reunification services and set a 12-month review for April 2011. 

 At the April 2011 hearing, HSA reported Mother completed parenting 

classes and, after resisting, ultimately attended anger management classes. She did well 

on her drug tests, but missed a test in February. She gave inconsistent explanations for 

missing the test. 

 Matters took a turn for the worse in January 2011. Mother lost her 

apartment. HSA arranged for her to enter the Lighthouse Program where she could have 

overnight visits with A.C. Mother lied about a required tuberculosis test, refused to 

observe the rules limiting the use of her car, and left the program after a week. 

Thereafter, Mother's visits with A.C. took place at HSA's office. She continued to have a 

positive relationship with A.C. 

 After Mother left the Lighthouse Program, she became evasive about where 

she was living and what she was doing with her time. On February 21, 2011, Mother was 

staying with her sister, A.D. Mother often fights with the father of A.D.'s daughters 

when he is in their home. One of the daughters reported that Mother drinks at times in 

their home. One night, when Mother had been drinking, she got into a fight with her 

sister's boyfriend and threatened him with a knife. 
4 

 Mother would neither confirm nor deny that she had been drinking at the 

time of the domestic violence. She also denied she had an anger problem. 

 Mother told a social worker that she had been attending 12-step meetings, 

and that her sponsor was named, "Lana." When contacted, Lana denied she had ever 

been Mother's sponsor. Mother admitted she lied. 

 The trial court expressed doubt about HSA's recommendation that services 

to Mother be continued. But the court accepted HSA's recommendation because 

Mother's relationship with A.C. was good. The court set a review for October 11, 2012. 

The report for the October 11, 2012 hearing recommended a termination of reunification 

services and that the court set a section 366.26 hearing for a plan of adoption. 

 HSA reported that Mother missed about one-third of her random drug tests. 

She had a different excuse for each missed test. She also failed to respond to telephone 

calls from HSA requiring her to participate in "on demand" drug tests. 

 Mother failed to attend a 12-step program for at least three months. She 

told a social worker her sponsor was Mary. When the social worker called the number 

Mother gave her, no one at the location had heard of Mary. 

 HSA referred Mother to a number of housing programs. When she 

obtained housing in a program that would have allowed A.C. to live with her, she was 

discharged from the program for failure to follow the program's rules and policies. 

Mother was also evasive when HSA questioned her about applying for employment. 

 A.C. told a social worker that she blamed herself for being in foster care 

because she called the police on Mother. Mother told A.C. that A.C. was to blame. 

 The trial court found that Mother had not followed her case plan and 

terminated reunification services. The court set a section 366.26 hearing for March 26, 

2012. 

 At the section 366.26 hearing, HSA recommended that the court terminate 

parental rights and implement a permanent plan for adoption. HSA reported that A.C.'s 

paternal aunt is interested in adopting her. The aunt lives in Texas. Texas authorities 

will not conduct a home study until the court terminates parental rights. HSA's 
5 

assessment of the aunt concluded, however, that there is reason to believe the adoption 

would be successful. If the aunt cannot adopt A.C., her foster parents would like to adopt 

her. 

 Mother claimed that termination of her parental rights would be detrimental 

to A.C. Mother testified she had an excellent relationship with A.C. and they have a very 

close bond. She pointed out that she attended every scheduled visit with A.C. except 

two. Mother, with the permission of HSA, was involved in A.C.'s school activities. 

 A.C. told a social worker that she wanted to live with her aunt but she also 

wanted to maintain contact with Mother, siblings and foster family. A.C. said it would be 

okay to live with her foster parents, too. The social worker recommended that if A.C. is 

placed with her aunt, Mother could arrange for visits. But if A.C. is adopted by her foster 

parents, the visits should be discontinued. 

 An HSA report described the quality of Mother's visits with A.C. as 

"acceptable to detrimental for the child." Mother argued with the case aid about 

visitation rules. 

Sibling Relationships 

 A.C. has two adult half-siblings, C. and B. Both siblings had been subject 

to prior dependency proceedings. 

 C. lived with A.C. until the dependency proceedings when A.C. was five 

years old. During the dependency proceedings, C. had only one telephone call and two 

visits with A.C. 

 B. saw A.C. mainly at church or other functions in the first year of her 

dependency. In the second year of A.C.'s dependency, B. did not contact her at all. B. 

said she wanted A.C. placed with her in six months to a year. The social worker did not 

believe this was a viable option due to the very high demand on B.'s time, resources and 

educational goals. 

 HSA reported B.'s and C.'s contacts with A.C. had been minimal, and do 

not support the conclusion that a substantial relationship exists between A.C. and her 

siblings. 
6 

 The trial court terminated parental rights and designated adoption as the 

permanent plan.

DISCUSSION 

I. 

 Mother contends she satisfied her burden of proof to show that termination 

of her parental rights will be detrimental to A.C. 

 Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the 

Legislature. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573.) The Legislature has 

provided an exception to adoption as the permanent plan where the court finds 

termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because "[t]he parents 

have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit 

from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In order to qualify for 

the exception, a parent must show that the beneficial relationship with the child 

"promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the 

child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." (In re Autumn H., 

supra, at p. 575.) 

 Mother claims courts have used two different standards of review. 

Historically, courts have applied the substantial evidence standard. (Citing In re Autumn 

H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 575-576.) Recently, In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 

Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315, applied the substantial evidence standard to the trial 

court's determination whether a beneficial relationship exists, and the abuse of discretion 

standard to the court's determination whether the relationship is so important that it 

compels a plan other than adoption. Here we affirm under either standard. 

 Mother concedes she bears the burden of proving the exception to adoption 

applies. 

 "In viewing the evidence, we look only to the evidence supporting the 

prevailing party. [Citation.] We discard evidence unfavorable to the prevailing party as 

not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact. [Citation.] Where the trial 

court or jury has drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence, we have no power to 
7 

draw different inferences, even though different inferences may also be reasonable. 

[Citation.] The trier of fact is not required to believe even uncontradicted testimony. 

[Citation.]" (Rodney F. v. Karen M. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 233, 241.) 

 Here the evidence shows Mother left A.C. alone in her apartment and 

returned under the influence of a controlled substance; blamed A.C. for calling the police; 

became homeless; refused to cooperate with HSA in finding suitable housing where A.C. 

could visit overnight; abused alcohol; threatened her sister's boyfriend with a knife; 

missed numerous drug tests; and lied to HSA about obtaining a 12-step sponsor. In short, 

the evidence shows Mother is unwilling or unable to provide a stable home for her 

daughter. Assuming A.C. had a beneficial relationship with Mother, the benefit of that 

relationship falls far short of the benefits A.C. would obtain in a stable home with 

adoptive parents. 

II. 

 Mother contends she satisfied her burden of proving termination of her 

parental rights would be detrimental to A.C. based on her sibling relationships. 

 Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) provides an exception to adoption 

as the permanent plan where the court finds termination of parental rights would be 

detrimental to the child because "[t]here would be substantial interference with a child's 

sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, 

including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same 

home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and 

strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child's best interest, 

including the child's long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal 

permanence through adoption." 

 Here contact between A.C. and her siblings had been minimal during the 

two years of her dependency. C. called her once and visited her twice. B. initially saw 

A.C. at church and other functions, but had no contact with her during the second year of 

the dependency. 
8 

 Mother simply failed to carry her burden of proving the relationship 

between A.C. and her siblings was so substantial that it outweighs the benefits of 

adoption. 

 Mother asserts there is no assurance that A.C.'s aunt will be able to adopt 

her. If A.C.'s foster parents adopt her, Mother and A.C.'s siblings may lose all contact 

with her. But even if A.C. looses all contact with her mother and siblings, the detriment 

will not outweigh the benefits of adoption. 

III. 

 Mother contends the trial court failed to comply with the Indian Child 

Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) 

 ICWA requires that where a court knows or has reason to know that a 

Native American child is involved, the party seeking termination of parental rights must 

notify the child's tribe of the pending proceedings and its right to intervene. (In re 

Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 469.) 

 Here the record shows HSA complied with ICWA.3

 Members of A.C.'s 

family reported that A.C. may have Indian heritage, possibly with the Blackfeet Tribe. 

HSA sent notice on form ICWA-030 to the Blackfeet Tribe. The Tribe responded that 

A.C. is not an "'Indian Child'" as defined by ICWA. The trial court found ICWA does 

not apply. 

 It is true HSA did not send notice to the Blackfeet Tribe until after 

Mother raised the issue in her opening brief. But HSA may comply with the ICWA 

notice requirements while the appeal is pending. (In re C.D. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 

214, 224-226.) 

 3

 We grant HSA's motion to supplement the record. 
9 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

 GILBERT, P. J. 

We concur: 

 YEGAN, J. 

 PERREN, J. 
Ellen Gay Conroy, Judge 

Superior Court County of Ventura 

______________________________ 

 Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant C.W. 

 Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant T.C. 

 Leroy Smith, Ventura County Counsel, Oliver G. Hess, Assistant County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.