NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-286

M.B.

vs.

A.G.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

On December 30, 2020, M.B. applied for an abuse prevention 

order against her estranged husband, A.G., pursuant to G. L. 

c. 209A, § 3. In her application, M.B. alleged that A.G. had on 

multiple occasions sexually assaulted her and had bitten her and 

their son. A District Court judge issued a temporary ex parte 

order that day and then -- following a two-party virtual hearing 

-- the judge issued a one-year order due to expire on January 

13, 2022. The order subsequently was extended on two occasions, 

most recently for an additional two years by an order issued 

after an evidentiary hearing held on February 8, 2023. A.B. now 

challenges the order allowing that extension, arguing 

principally that M.B. failed to provide sufficient evidence to 

show that she had an objectively reasonable fear of imminent 

serious physical harm. A.G. additionally argues that the judge 
2

should not have considered evidence that A.G. allegedly violated 

the order, because his actions constituted protected speech. We 

affirm.

Background. We summarize the evidence before the judge. 

The parties met in May 2015 and began dating. A few weeks into 

their relationship, A.G. sent the plaintiff a photograph of the 

two of them taken while M.B. was asleep. The caption read, "I'm 

going to kill you . . . ." A.G. testified that he intended the 

message as a joke.

The parties married in 2018, and their son was born in 

2019. In 2020, tensions began to escalate between the parties.

Two primary issues in the marriage were A.G.'s "sexual 

aggression" toward the plaintiff and his alcohol use. In June 

2020, A.G. attended an alcohol rehabilitation program in 

Arizona. During that month, the parties exchanged a series of 

email messages in which A.G. acknowledged -- in the context of 

his asking M.B. for forgiveness -- that he was "sexually 

abusive" to her, which he attributed to his "screwed up history 

with sex." M.B. had listed specific instances of A.G.'s sexual 

aggression, which she referenced as "sexual abuse" and a 

"violation of [her] body." Although M.B. noted that A.G.'s 

behavior had "gotten a lot better," she expressed that she still

felt "immediate anxiety" when A.G. initiated sex. Her fear of 

A.G. rose to the point where she was afraid to even hug him.
3

In July of 2020, M.B. found a bite mark on their son's arm. 

She took him to see a doctor, who could not determine if the 

bite was caused by a human but nevertheless reported the matter 

to the Department of Children and Families (DCF). A DCF social 

worker contacted the parties regularly over the following weeks 

in an effort to ensure the boy's safety. Both parties told the 

social worker that A.G. regularly bit the son. According to 

A.G., he bit the child as a joke but unintentionally may have 

bitten him too hard on that occasion. A.G. later claimed that 

he had not acknowledged such biting to the social worker and 

attempted to suggest that the bite may have occurred at the 

son's day care. The social worker concluded that A.G. was not 

able to provide for the child's safety and that the child was 

safest with M.B.

In spite of this, the parties remained in a relationship 

through September 2020. According to M.B., "sometimes things 

were good, and sometimes things weren't." The parties were 

considering having another baby.

In December 2020, the relationship took a turn for the 

worse. When M.B. told A.G. in early December that she wanted a 

divorce, he threatened to leave with their son. Before leaving 

their home, M.B. called the police, telling them that A.G. was 

suicidal. A.G. voluntarily admitted himself to the hospital, 

and while he was there, M.B. left the home with their son. 
4

After returning home from the hospital, A.G. filed a police 

report alleging that M.B. had "cleaned out their bank accounts."

M.B. filed her application for an abuse prevention order in 

District Court shortly after A.G. returned from the hospital. 

On the preprinted application form, M.G. checked a box stating 

that A.G. had "[p]laced [her] in fear of imminent serious 

physical harm." She added that she was afraid of A.G. because 

he had threatened to kill himself and "becomes violent and 

suicidal when he is angry." M.B. did not check the boxes

stating that A.G. had "[c]aused [her] physical harm" or 

"[c]aused [her] to engage in sexual relations by force, threat, 

or duress." However, in the affidavit supporting her 

application, she swore to several instances of past physical and 

sexual abuse. For instance, she said that when A.G. wanted to 

have sex and she said no, he "grab[bed] [her] breasts and [her] 

butt," restrained her, and "pushe[d] [her] towards the bed and 

floor." She also stated that A.G. would continue to have sex 

with her even after she told him it hurt and asked him to stop. 

In addition to the violence during sexual intercourse, M.B. 

described times that A.G. hit her breasts to the point where she 

cried, hit her on the buttocks hard enough to leave a welt, and 

bit her hard enough to leave a bruise.

A District Court judge issued a temporary abuse prevention 

order prohibiting A.G. from contacting M.B., and it ordered him 
5

to maintain a one hundred foot distance from her. Following a 

two-party hearing, the judge issued a one-year order, which was 

extended for an additional year. In a parallel divorce 

proceeding, a Probate and Family Court judge issued a temporary 

order that granted M.B. physical custody of the son, while 

maintaining joint legal custody. That same order prohibited 

disclosure to A.G. of the addresses where M.B. lived and worked, 

as well as the location of the son's daycare.

In April of 2021, A.G. posted a photo on Facebook of their 

son as an infant, with a caption consisting of a quote without 

attribution that read, "The wicked are ensnared by the works of 

their hands." A.G. testified that this was a biblical reference 

meant to convey that "justice [had] prevail[e]d" in their 

divorce proceedings with respect to custody.1 M.B. found the 

post "disturbing," and she viewed it as a threat. In March of 

2022, the judge in the divorce proceeding issued a temporary 

order under which "[a]ll communications between the parties are 

limited to [the subject of] the child and shall be done through 

[an application known as] Our Family Wizard" (OFW).

A.G. claimed that as of April 2022, he believed that he and

M.B. "had turned a corner" in their communications. According 

1 A.G. also said he believed M.B. would understand the 

biblical reference because she had a master's degree in 

theology.
6

to him, the parties were "sending pictures [of their son] back 

and forth," and having light-hearted discussions about him. The 

next month, A.G. sent M.B. a message through OFW which he ended 

by saying, "I like the glasses!" (in apparent reference to 

M.B.'s new eyeglasses). The day after that message, the parties 

met at a police station, the required location for exchanging 

custody of the son for his visits with A.G. During that 

encounter, A.G., while crying and standing between M.B. and the 

exit, addressed M.B. by telling her that he wanted to make her 

happy.2 M.B. testified that this incident scared her. Shortly 

thereafter, A.G. sent a message to M.B. through OFW, ending with 

"Happy May 16th, . . . sigh." (in apparent reference to the 

anniversary of their first date). M.B. testified that this made 

her "feel sick."3

Tensions between the parties continued to escalate and 

culminated in a series of messages sent between November 2022 

and January 2023. According to the most recent temporary order

issued in the divorce proceeding, M.B. was allowed to cancel 

visits between A.G. and the son for nonemergency reasons, with 

2 A.G. contested this version of events and testified at the 

February 2023 hearing that he said he wanted to make "everybody"

happy, not M.B. specifically.

3 M.B. reported the messages and the incident at the police 

station as a violation of the abuse prevention order. A 

complaint issued, but the charges eventually were dismissed.
7

the provision that she reschedule them within sixty days. On 

November 11, 2022, A.G. sent M.B. a message asking her to 

explain why she had canceled one of his visits with their son on 

August 23, 2022. On January 5, 2023, A.G. sent another message, 

demanding a reason for the cancellations and asking if M.B. had 

taken their son out of the State. Seven minutes later, he sent 

another message, saying, "[W]e have joint legal custody, and 

this information you can't withhold." Later that month, M.B. 

again canceled A.G.'s time with their son. Suspecting that M.B. 

had gone to out of State with the son to visit her parents, A.G. 

sent M.B. a message on January 13, 2023, saying he hoped they 

"both make it home safely." According to A.G., he was merely 

expressing concern for M.B.'s safety, in part because he 

surmised that M.B. had taken the son to visit her parents even 

though she previously had told him she was sexually abused by 

her grandfather and physically abused by her mother. After

sending the message, A.G. confirmed that M.B. had gone out of 

State to visit her family by looking at M.B.'s Google calendar. 

M.B. had taken steps to block A.G.'s access to her Google 

calendar, but those steps apparently were not successful.

M.B. viewed the message from A.G. not in the light he 

claims it was intended, but as a threat. She was especially 

concerned to think that A.G. seemed to be tracking her 
8

whereabouts, which he was not supposed to know.4 This made her 

"deeply disturbed and scared," and she filed a report with the 

local police department on January 18, 2023.5 As she explained 

during her testimony at the February 2023 hearing, she 

interpreted the message from A.G. as communicating: "I know

what you're doing and where you are, and when you're doing it 

. . . he was saying he's watching me, and I didn't know how."

By order docketed on February 10, 2023, a District Court 

judge extended the abuse prevention order for another two years. 

The judge found that "plaintiff [] met her burden," without 

providing further explanation.

Discussion. In the current appeal, A.G. challenges only 

the February 2023 order extending the abuse prevention order for 

an additional two years. We review the trial court judge's 

decision for abuse of discretion or other error of law. E.C.O.

v. Compton, 464 Mass 558, 562 (2013). Where an extension of an 

abuse prevention order has been granted, in reviewing the 

4 At this point, M.B. had taken numerous steps to ensure 

that A.G. did not know her location. Shortly before her trip 

out of State, she bought a house and worked with the 

Massachusetts Address Confidentiality Program to ensure that her 

name would not be associated with her address. However, her new 

address was listed in her Google calendar, which she did not 

know A.G. still could access.

5 The police in fact sought a criminal complaint charging 

the defendant with another violation of the abuse prevention 

order. Although a complaint issued, it was subsequently 

dismissed on A.G.'s motion, without explanation.
9

sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 57 

Mass. App. Ct. 284, 285 n.4 (2003). This means, among other 

things, that we disregard A.G.'s denials and his claims that his 

actions were intended as a joke. Where a reviewing court is 

"able to discern a reasonable basis for the order [. . .] no 

specific findings [from the issuing judge] are required." G.B. 

v. C.A., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 389, 396 (2018). A.G. makes two 

arguments, which we address in turn.

1. Sufficiency. We begin by noting that where applicants

can demonstrate that they suffered actual or attempted physical 

or sexual harm, their burden is somewhat lessened than for those 

who are claiming a reasonable fear of imminent serious physical 

harm. See Callahan v. Callahan, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 369, 373 

(2014), quoting Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 734, 740 n.3 (2005) 

("[i]f a plaintiff were suffering from attempted or actual 

physical abuse or involuntary sexual relations, there is no 

question that an extension should be granted"). See also G. L. 

c. 209A, § 1 (defining "abuse" as "attempting to cause or 

causing physical harm," "placing another in fear of imminent 

serious physical harm," or "causing another to engage 

involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat or duress"). 

Although there plainly was evidence before the judge that M.B. 

suffered "actual physical abuse or involuntary sexual relations" 
10

at the hands of A.G., Iamele, supra, A.G. suggests that our 

review is confined to whether she can prove continued fear of 

imminent serious physical harm, because that was the only stated 

basis of her initial request (based on which box she checked on 

the preprinted form). We are not persuaded.

There was nothing hidden about the nature of M.B.'s factual 

allegations. Her supporting affidavit contained information 

about both her fear of future harm and the past physical harm 

she and their son suffered at the hands of A.G. It described in 

detail the various forms of unwanted physical and sexual 

touching to which A.G. subjected her, including forcibly 

grabbing intimate areas of her body and continuing to have sex 

with her when she refused. At least where, as here, a defendant 

is unable to claim unfair surprise, we do not view a party's

failure to check the applicable boxes as limiting our review.

Moreover, even if the judge's review had been limited to 

whether M.B. had demonstrated that she had an objectively 

reasonable, subjective fear that A.G. would cause her imminent 

serious bodily harm, there was ample evidence to support that

finding, including the evidence of the past physical and sexual 

abuse she suffered. Contrary to A.G.'s arguments, the judge not 

only could consider the factual record previously established in 

weighing whether to extend the order, he was required to do so. 

See Iamele, 444 Mass. at 740 ("In evaluating whether a plaintiff 
11

has met her burden, a judge must consider the totality of the 

circumstances of the parties' relationship"). The evidence that 

M.B. had suffered past physical and sexual abuse by A.G. was 

ample. Indeed, A.G. acknowledged in his June 2020 email message 

that he was "sexually abusive" to her. This included the 

forcible sex referenced above, as well as acts such as hitting 

M.B.'s breasts with enough force to make her cry and biting her 

"hard enough to leave a bruise." Given the severity of the 

abuse she suffered, M.B.'s statements that she felt "scared" and 

"on edge" when A.G. blocked her exit in the police station in 

May 2022, and that she was "deeply disturbed and scared" when 

A.G. sent her the January 2023 message suggesting he knew that 

she was out of State, were sufficient to show her subjective 

fear.

A.G.'s history of abuse toward M.B. also made her fear 

objectively reasonable. See Vittone v. Clairmont, 64 Mass. App. 

Ct. 479, 487 (2005) ("[T]he nature and duration of a 

relationship, as well as any prior history of violence, threats, 

or hostility within it" are necessary contexts "for assessing 

the reasonableness of an applicant's fear of imminent serious 

physical harm"). There was ample record evidence on which the 

judge could conclude that it was reasonable for M.B. to continue 

to fear imminent serious physical harm from A.G. when he blocked

her exit at the police station and when he suggested he knew how 
12

to find her. He in fact acknowledged the actions he took to 

track down where she was living.

2. First Amendment. A.G. separately argues that the judge 

could not consider statements that he had made to M.B. that she 

claimed had placed her in fear, because those statements 

encompassed speech protected by the First Amendment to the 

United States Constitution.6 There is no merit to this argument. 

"While an abuser has a right to speak his mind freely in any 

number of forums, he has no right to seek out and contact the 

victim of his abuse, forcing that victim to endure his unwanted 

and destructive presence in her life." Commonwealth v. 

Thompson, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 523, 525 (1998).

Extension order entered 

February 10, 2023,

affirmed.

By the Court (Milkey, Henry & 

Desmond, JJ.7),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: April 26, 2024.

6 In fact, A.G. argues that the dismissal of the criminal 

charges that he had faced for allegedly violating the abuse 

prevention order somehow conclusively establish the protected 

nature of the actions he had taken. Putting aside that the 

reason why the charges were dismissed is not apparent on the 

record before us, any determination made by the judge in that 

proceeding would not be binding on M.B., who was not a party to 

the criminal case.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.