* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

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No. 96-40612

(Summary Calendar)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAVID GEORGE CROCKER,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Texas

(4:96-CR-2-1)

_______________________________________________

March 12, 1997

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

David George Crocker appeals his sentence for interstate

transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314.

Crocker's court-appointed counsel alleges that there are no

meritorious issues for appeal and has submitted a motion to

withdraw. Finding no meritorious issues for appeal, we grant

defense counsel's motion and dismiss Crocker's appeal.
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Crocker moved a stolen Caterpillar front end loader with

backhoe and a Honda water pump from a construction site in Sadler,

Texas to a site in Oklahoma. It is undisputed that the loader was

worth more than $40,000 and that Crocker knew it was stolen.

Crocker cased the site several days prior to the theft. In

preparation and furtherance of the offense, Crocker solicited one

Joseph Carrell to assist him, stole a goose-necked trailer to

transport the loader, attempted to paint over the loader’s serial

number, and arranged to store the backhoe on a farm in Oklahoma.

A grand jury in the Eastern District of Texas indicted Crocker

on charges of interstate transportation of stolen property in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 and aiding and abetting in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2. Crocker entered into a plea agreement. The

district court sentenced him to an eighteen-month prison term,

ordered him to serve a three-year term of supervised release, pay

a $3,000 fine, and pay a $50 mandatory assessment. Crocker appeals

his sentence, but does not specify any grounds for this appeal.

Crocker's court-appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw

from this appeal pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87

S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). Anders provides appointed

counsel the opportunity to withdraw from an appeal when he or she

finds that no nonfrivolous issues remain. Id. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at

1400. Counsel must request permission from the appellate court to

withdraw and supply a brief referring to anything in the record
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that might support an appeal. Id. Moreover, the appellant

independently may brief any issues to the court that arguably

support his appeal. Id. Following these actions, the court must

fully examine all proceedings to determine whether meritorious

issues remain for appeal. If there are none, the court may grant

counsel's motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. Id.

Accordingly, under Anders we must examine the record to determine

the propriety of each stage of trial, including any pretrial

proceedings, the indictment, the plea hearing, and the sentencing

hearing, to ensure that there are no meritorious issues for appeal.

The record points to no issues in the pretrial proceeding or

the indictment that might arguably support the appeal. Id. at 744,

87 S. Ct. at 1400. Crocker filed no pretrial motions, so there

were no pretrial proceedings. Further, the indictment suffers from

no appealable defects. Under the law of this circuit, an

indictment is sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the

offense charged; (2) fairly informs the defendant of the charge

against him; and (3) enables him to plead acquittal or conviction

in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. United States

v. Hagmann, 950 F.2d 175, 183 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506

U.S. 835, 113 S. Ct. 108, 121 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1992). The indictment

in this case charged Crocker with unlawfully transporting a stolen

backhoe and water pump with a value of $5,000 or more in interstate

commerce with knowledge that the equipment was stolen. The
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indictment contains the elements of the offense. See United States

v. Perry, 638 F.2d 862, 864-65 (5th Cir. 1981) (listing elements of

interstate transportation of stolen property as knowingly and

willingly moving items of stolen property, worth at least $5,000,

in interstate commerce). Additionally, the indictment states the

specific code section violated and includes a description of the

loader and pump. Therefore we find that the indictment fairly

informs Crocker of the charges against him. Hagmann, 950 F.2d at

183.

The indictment is also sufficient as to the charge of aiding

and abetting. Aiding and abetting is not listed separately, but is

included in Count 1 of Crocker’s indictment. Aiding and abetting

is not a separate offense, but it is an alternative charge in every

indictment, even if implicit. United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d 630,

633 (5th Cir. 1992). A charge of aiding and abetting, implicit in

the indictment, is generally sufficient if the indictment lists the

elements of the offense, informs the defendant, and enables him to

make subsequent pleas. See id. (finding no abuse of discretion in

jury instruction on aiding and abetting, when indictment lacked

elements of offense but referenced 18 U.S.C. § 2). Therefore, we

find that the indictment is sufficient under the law of this

circuit.

Next we must look to the plea hearing to determine whether any

issues merit appeal. Because Crocker pled guilty, we must ensure
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that his constitutional rights were waived voluntarily and

knowingly. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709,

1711, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). Before accepting a plea of guilty,

the trial court must address the defendant personally in open court

and determine that the defendant understands the mandatory minimum

penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty

provided by law. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1). “This Court has long

analyzed Rule 11 as addressing three ‘core concerns’: (1) whether

the guilty plea was coerced; (2) whether the defendant understands

the nature of the charges; and (3) whether the defendant

understands the consequences of his plea.” United States v.

Johnson, 1 F.3d 296, 300 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Further, the

district court must inform the defendant about the use of the

sentencing guidelines to determine punishment and inform him that

the court may depart from these guidelines. United States v.

Hekimain, 975 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th Cir. 1992). Finally, the

district court must describe to the defendant the terms and

conditions of supervised release. Id. 

During the plea hearing, the court verified Crocker's reason

for pleading guilty. Crocker admitted that his plea was voluntary

and that he was neither coerced nor promised anything in exchange

for his guilty plea. The court informed Crocker of the

consequences of his plea, described supervised release, and

explained the use of the sentencing guidelines. Therefore, we find
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that Crocker’s plea was completely proper under Rule 11 and the law

of this circuit.

Finally, we must review the record of the sentencing hearing

for any issues that might arguably support the appeal. During

sentencing, Crocker filed two objections to the Presentence Report

(PSR). Crocker first objected to the PSR’s failure to recommend a

two-level decrease in offense level for acceptance of

responsibility under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1.

The district court agreed with Crocker and granted the two-level

decrease. Crocker also objected to the PSR recommendation of a

two-level increase of the offense level for "more than minimal

planning." See U.S.S.G. Manual § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) (1995). The

district court held that the crime involved more than minimal

planning and adopted the two-level increase over Crocker’s

objection.

Were we reviewing this two-level increase on the merits, we

would review for clear error the district court's determination

that the crime involved "more than minimal planning." United

States v. Clements, 73 F.3d 1330, 1341 (5th Cir. 1996). The

Sentencing Guidelines define "more than minimal planning" as "more

planning than is typical for the commission of the offense in a

simple form." U.S.S.G. Manual § 1B1.1, commentary, n.1(f) (1995)

The record clearly indicates planning on Crocker's part. For

example, Crocker observed the backhoe in Texas several days prior
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to the theft and thereafter recruited a confederate to help him

steal it across state lines. He acquired a trailer, which he used

to transport the backhoe, and he made arrangements to stash the

backhoe in Oklahoma. Therefore, the district court could

reasonably have found that Crocker committed the offense with more

planning than is typical for the commission of this offense in a

simple form. See United States v. Barndt, 913 F.2d 201, 204 (5th

Cir. 1990) (upholding district court's finding of more than minimal

planning when defendant formed intent, in advance, to steal copper

wire from hanging telephone line, collected cutting tool, cut

wire, loaded wire into vehicle, sought buyer, transported it to

buyer, and made sale).

Crocker made no other objections at sentencing. The record

reveals no clear error committed by the district court in relation

to Crocker's sentencing. Accordingly, we find nothing in the

sentencing record that might arguably support the appeal. See

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400.

Crocker was provided with a copy of counsel's brief and given

an opportunity to raise any issues he chose. However, Crocker did

not submit a brief. After a full examination of all the

proceedings, we find no meritorious issues to support Crocker’s

appeal. Therefore, we GRANT counsel's request to withdraw, and we

DISMISS this appeal.