SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 

en banc 

STATE ex rel. AMY STRAUSER, ) 

 ) 

 Relator, ) 

v. ) No. SC93340 

 ) 

THE HONORABLE SANDY MARTINEZ, ) 

 ) 

 Respondent. ) 

 

(consolidated with) 

STATE ex rel. SHARON EDMONDS, ) 

 ) 

 Relator, ) 

v. ) No. SC93345 

 ) 

THE HONORABLE SANDY MARTINEZ, ) 

 ) 

 Respondent. ) 

 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION 

Opinion issued January 14, 2014 

 Amy Strauser and Sharon Edmonds (“Defendants”) each seek a writ of prohibition 

to prevent the trial court from holding probation revocation hearings after their probation 

terms ended. The Defendants argue in each case that the trial court did not have the 

authority to hold the revocation hearings because their probation terms had ended and the 

court did not make every reasonable effort to hold the hearings during their probation 

terms pursuant to section 559.036.8, RSMo Supp. 2012. Because they present identical 
legal issues, the cases are consolidated for opinion. 

In the separate underlying criminal actions, the Defendants each received a 

suspended imposition of sentence and were placed on five-year terms of probation with 

the condition they make either restitution payments or pay court costs. When each 

defendant failed to make the required payments, the trial court suspended probation and 

scheduled revocation hearings. Instead of issuing a ruling at the hearings, the court 

continued to conduct case reviews until after each defendant’s probation term ended. 

This Court makes its preliminary writs permanent because it finds that, in each 

case, the trial court did not have the authority to hold the revocation hearings after the 

Defendants’ probation terms ended because it did not make every reasonable effort to 

hold the hearings during the probation terms pursuant to section 559.036.8. 

Procedural and Factual History 

On June 4, 2007, Amy Strauser pleaded guilty to one count of theft/stealing, a 

class C felony. The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence, placed her on 

probation for five years and ordered her to pay $8,398.78 in restitution. On August 22, 

the State filed a motion to revoke and suspend probation. While the basis for this motion 

is unclear from the docket entries, the parties agreed during oral arguments that it was 

due to her failure to make restitution payments. 

The trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion on September 10. At that time, 

the trial court passed the cause to October 1 and ordered Strauser to pay $100 each month 

toward her restitution. It passed the cause again until November and ordered Strauser to 

continue her restitution payments. She appeared in person in the trial court 26 more 
times between November 2007 and September 12, 2011. For each appearance, the 

docket entries state that either a case review was held or the hearing was continued or 

rescheduled. 

On September 12, the trial court suspended Strauser’s probation and ordered her to 

continue making restitution payments. Strauser appeared five more times between 

September 2011 and March 5, 2012. Each appearance was again labeled as either a case 

review or a continuation of the hearing. On March 5, the trial court scheduled a 

probation violation hearing for April 2, 2012. However, the docket entry for April 2 is 

labeled as a case review, and the trial court passed the cause until May 7 and ordered 

Strauser to continue making restitution payments. 

From May 7, 2012, through February 4, 2013, Strauser appeared 10 more times in 

the trial court for case reviews. On February 4, the trial court appointed a public defender 

and scheduled a probation violation hearing for March 4. Strauser appeared a total of 37 

times between when the revocation hearing initially was scheduled and June 4, 2012, 

when her probation ended. She appeared eight times between June 4, 2012, and February 

4, 2013. Strauser now seeks this writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from 

holding a probation revocation hearing, arguing that the trial court is acting outside of its 

statutory authority because her probation ended on June 4, 2012.1

                                                           

1

 Defendants argue that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to hold the revocation hearings. In 

J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, this Court determined that there were only two types of 

jurisdiction in Missouri circuit courts: personal and subject matter. 275 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Mo. 

banc 2009). Defendants’ claims are characterized more precisely as the trial court exceeded its 

statutory authority. See State ex rel. Whittenhall v. Conklin, 294 S.W.3d 106, 108 n.2 (Mo. App. 

2009). 

3
The facts in Sharon Edmonds’ case are very similar. She pleaded guilty to two 

counts of manufacturing a controlled substance, a class B felony, and one count of 

possessing a controlled substance, a class C felony. On September 4, 2003, the trial court 

suspended the imposition of sentence, placed her on probation for five years and assessed 

court costs against her. 

On July 21, 2008, the trial court suspended Edmonds’ probation for failure to pay 

court costs. On September 4, 2008, the last day of her probation, the court held a 

probation violation hearing, ordered her to pay $55 per month. Between September 4, 

and January 7, 2013, the trial court continued the hearing and Edmonds appeared in court 

either in person or through counsel on 22 occasions. For each appearance, the docket 

entry is labeled as either a case review or a hearing to monitor payments. 

On January 9, 2013, Edmonds filed a motion to discharge probation in the trial 

court. She argued that the court lost authority to revoke her probation because her 

probation term ended and the court did not make every reasonable effort to conduct the 

hearing while she was still on probation. The court overruled the motion. Edmonds now 

seeks this writ of prohibition. 

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 

This Court has jurisdiction to issue original remedial writs. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 

4. A writ of prohibition is appropriate: (1) to prevent the usurpation of judicial power 

when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction; (2) to remedy an excess of authority, 

jurisdiction or abuse of discretion where the lower court lacks the power to act as 

4
intended; or (3) where a party may suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted. State 

ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 880 (Mo. banc 2009). 

Trial Court’s Authority to Revoke Probation 

At issue in these cases is whether the trial court made every reasonable effort to 

conduct hearings on pending probation revocation motions prior to the expiration of 

Defendants’ probation so as to have the authority to conduct the hearings after their 

probation terms ended under section 559.036.8. 

Section 559.0362

 governs the duration of probation terms and the power of a court 

to revoke a defendant’s probation. A term of probation begins the day it is imposed. 

Section 559.036.1. If a defendant violates his or her probation, the court may revoke it. 

Sections 559.036.3, 559.036.5. But the court’s authority to do so only extends through 

the duration of the probation term. Section 559.036.8. When the probation term ends, so 

does the court’s authority to revoke probation. State ex rel. Stimel v. White, 373 S.W.3d 

481, 484 (Mo. App. 2012). 

Section 559.036.8 allows the court to extend this authority if certain conditions are 

met. It states: 

The power of the court to revoke probation shall extend for 

the duration of the term of probation designated by the court 

and for any further period which is reasonably necessary for 

the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration, 

provided that some affirmative manifestation of an intent to 

conduct a revocation hearing occurs prior to the expiration of 

                                                           

2

 All references are to RSMo Supp. 2012. While section 559.036 has been amended multiple 

times since Defendants were placed on probation, the relevant statutory language has not 

changed. Before the amendments, the relevant language was in 559.036.6. See section 

559.036.6, RSMo 2000. It is now in 559.036.8. See section 559.036.8, RSMo Supp. 2012. 

5
the period and that every reasonable effort is made to notify 

the probationer and to conduct the hearing prior to the 

expiration of the period. 

In effect, this section sets out two conditions under which a court may revoke probation 

after a probation term has ended. First, the court must have manifested its intent to 

conduct a revocation hearing during the probation term. Second, it must make every 

reasonable effort to notify the probationer and hold the hearing before the term ends. See 

Stelljes v. State, 72 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Mo. App. 2002). Unless the court meets both of 

these conditions, it cannot hold a revocation hearing after probation expires.3

 In the 

present cases, the trial court manifested its intent to conduct the revocation hearings 

before the Defendants’ probation terms ended, and the Defendants were notified. At 

                                                           

3

 The State argues that the trial court also retains the authority to impose a sentence after a 

probation term ends by suspending the imposition of sentence, relying on State ex rel. Connett v. 

Dickerson, 833 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. App. 1992). This argument is misplaced. In Connett, the trial 

court revoked the defendant’s first probation term and placed him on a second five-year 

probation term, but did not impose a sentence. Id. at 472. The court of appeals determined that 

because the trial court did not impose a new sentence on the defendant, it “in effect” continued 

his probation pursuant to section 559.036.3, as opposed to discharging the defendant from 

probation. Id. at 475. Connett is not instructive as the trial court in the present cases did not 

revoke the Defendants’ probation. Nor does Connett stand for the proposition that a court may 

circumvent the requirements of section 559.036.8 by suspending the imposition of sentence. 

 Likewise, suspending probation without deciding whether probation should be revoked, 

as the trial court did in each of these cases, does not relieve a court from meeting both of the 

conditions provided by section 559.036.8. While a court may suspend probation upon a motion 

to revoke, the suspension cannot last indefinitely. See section 559.036.7; Starry v. State, 318 

S.W.3d 780, 784-85 (Mo. App. 2010); State ex rel. Limback v. Gum, 895 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Mo. 

App. 1995). Rather, probation will remain suspended only until the court rules on the revocation 

motion. Section 559.036.7 (emphasis added). This section makes it incumbent on the court to 

rule on a pending revocation motion. Further, statutory provisions are not read in isolation, but 

are construed together. See Bachtel v. Miller Cnty. Nursing Home Dist., 110 S.W.3d 799, 801 

(Mo. banc 2003). When sections 559.036.7 and 559.036.8 are read together, it is clear that a 

court must rule on the revocation motion before the probation term ends unless it meets the two 

conditions outlined in the statute. 

6
issue here is whether it made every reasonable effort to conduct the revocation hearings 

during the Defendants’ probation terms. 

Application to Strauser and Edmonds 

 Strauser’s five-year probation, which was imposed on June 4, 2007, ended on June 

4, 2012. During this period, the trial court manifested its intent to conduct the revocation 

hearing by suspending her probation after the State filed a motion to revoke and 

scheduling a revocation hearing for September 10, 2007. See State v. Roark, 877 S.W.2d 

678, 680 (Mo. App. 1994) (finding a manifestation of intent where trial court scheduled a 

revocation hearing for a date prior to the expiration of probation); White, 373 S.W.3d at 

485 (noting that “the issuance of a warrant, the filing of a motion to revoke probation, 

[or] the scheduling of a revocation hearing” will suffice as a manifestation of intent). 

 Instead of ruling on the motion, however, the trial court continued the hearing 37 

times in between when it scheduled the initial revocation hearing and when Stauser’s 

probation ended. Strauser always appeared and made the required restitution payments. 

She also appeared eight more times for case reviews after her probation ended. Because 

the trial court could have ruled on the revocation motion on any of these numerous 

occasions, but chose not to, it did not make every reasonable effort to hold the hearing 

during her probation term to satisfy section 559.036.8. 

Edmonds’ case follows a very similar analysis. She was first placed on a five-year 

probation term on September 4, 2003, which ended on September 4, 2008. The trial 

court manifested its intent to hold a revocation hearing when it suspended her probation 

on July 21, 2008, and scheduled a revocation hearing for September 4, 2008. Even 

7
though she appeared in court that day, the trial court did not issue a ruling. Instead, it 

held 23 continuations of the hearing or case reviews from September 4 until February 4, 

2013. The trial court did not make every reasonable effort to conduct the revocation 

hearing during Edmonds’ probation term because it had the opportunity to hold the 

hearing on September 4, 2008, but instead continued the case for more than four years 

after her probation ended. 

Relying on Petree v. State, 190 S.W.3d 641 (Mo. App. 2009), the State argues that 

the Defendants are not entitled to relief because they did not show they were ready to 

proceed with the hearing during their probation. In Petree, like the instant cases, the 

defendant was placed on a five-year probation term. Id. at 642. Prior to the expiration of 

the probation term, the court held a revocation hearing, but Petree requested a 

continuance to obtain counsel. Id. The court continued the hearing until five months 

after the probation expired, at which time it revoked his probation. Id. On appeal, Petree 

argued the trial court did not make every reasonable effort to hold the hearing before his 

probation expired. Id. The court of appeals noted, however, that Petree himself asked for 

the continuance and that the lower court held the hearing as soon as his counsel entered 

an appearance. Id. at 643. 

The instant cases are clearly distinguishable because the record does not indicate 

that either Strauser or Edmonds requested the continuances, nor was it their duty to 

ensure the trial court ruled on the pending revocation motions. Nothing in section 

559.036.8 suggests that the defendant must prove he or she is ready to proceed. Rather, 

8
the language clearly states that the “power of the court” to hold a revocation hearing only 

extends beyond a probation term if the two conditions listed in the statute are met.4

 

A more factually analogous case to the present cases is State ex rel. Whittenhall v. 

Conklin, 294 S.W.3d 106 (Mo. App. 2009). In that case, like in the instant cases, the 

defendant was placed on a five-year probation term with the condition he make 

restitution payments. Id. at 107. He failed to make all required payments and appeared 

at a revocation hearing one week prior to the end of his probation. Id. Instead of issuing 

a ruling, the trial court continued to reset the hearing date until approximately three years 

after the probation ended. Id. at 110. In reviewing the trial court’s action, the court of 

appeals found that the trial court exceeded its authority to revoke the defendant’s 

probation. Id. at 111. 

Likewise in these cases, the trial court could have held the revocation hearings 

when Strauser and Edmonds appeared during their probation terms, but instead it 

continued the hearings until well after their probation terms expired. The trial court did 

                                                           

4

 Section 559.036.8 also does not require the Defendants to show prejudice, as the State contends 

they must. The State relies on State ex rel. Carlton v. Haynes, 552 S.W.2d 710, 714-15 (Mo. 

banc 1977), which states that a court does not lose authority to hold a probation revocation 

hearing after a probation term expired “unless the resulting delay was unreasonable and 

prejudicial to the petitioner.” This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, Carlton was 

decided before section 559.036 was in effect. Second, it conflates “unreasonable delay” and 

“every reasonable effort.” If a defendant claims he was harmed by “an unreasonable delay” in 

holding a revocation hearing, then he would have to show he was prejudiced by that delay. See 

Ewing v. Wyrick, 535 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. banc 1976) (noting that, in a case in which the court held 

a revocation hearing within the defendant’s probation term, “petitioner is not entitled to relief by 

reason of . . . any delay in holding the final [probation] revocation hearing unless he was 

prejudiced thereby.”). At issue in the present cases, however, is not whether there were 

“unreasonable delays” in holding the revocation hearings, but whether the trial court made 

“every reasonable effort” to conduct the hearings before the Defendants’ probation terms ended 

pursuant to section 559.036.8, and nothing in that statute suggests the Defendants must show 

they suffered prejudice. 

9
10

                                                           

not make every reasonable effort to conduct the revocation hearings during their 

probation terms. See also State ex rel. Breeding v. Seay, 244 S.W.3d 791 (Mo. App. 

2008) (finding that the lower court did not make every reasonable effort to hold a 

probation revocation hearing when defendant appeared twice during his probation, but 

the court continued the hearing until one year after his probation ended). 

Conclusion

The trial court’s actions here were understandable. The court was attempting to 

ensure the maximum restitution payments while avoiding imprisonment for the 

Defendants. Unfortunately, the statute does not permit that.5

 In each case, the trial 

court’s failure to make every reasonable effort to rule on the pending probation 

revocation motion while the defendant was still on probation divested it of the authority 

to conduct revocation hearings beyond the five-year probation term. The preliminary 

writs of prohibition are made permanent. 

________________________ 

Mary R. Russell, Chief Justice 

Breckenridge, Stith, Draper, 

Wilson and Teitelman, JJ., 

concur; Fischer, J., concurs 

in separate opinion filed. 

5

 However, recent legislative changes to another statute, section 559.105, will give trial courts 

more flexibility in situations in which a defendant fails to make full restitution during the 

probation term. See 2013 Mo. Legis. Serv. 338 (West). Section 559.105.2 now provides that a 

probationer ordered to pay restitution shall not be released from probation until restitution is 

complete and “[i]f full restitution is not made within the original term of probation, the court 

shall order the maximum term of probation allowed for such offense.” Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 

en banc 

STATE ex rel. AMY STRAUSER ) 

 ) 

 Relator, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. SC93340 

 ) 

THE HONORABLE SANDY MARTINEZ, ) 

 ) 

 Respondent. ) 

 

(Consolidated with) 

STATE ex rel. SHARON EDMONDS, ) 

 ) 

 Relator, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. SC93345 

 ) 

THE HONORABLE SANDY MARTINEZ, ) 

 ) 

 Respondent. ) 

CONCURRING OPINION 

 I concur in the principal opinion. The circuit court involved here would not have 

anticipated that the generosity it extended to Amy Strauser and Sharon Edmonds—in the 

form of granting them another chance to complete probation without a conviction on their 

record and without incarceration even after they failed to comply with the terms of their 

probation—would be "rewarded" with the court losing the legal authority to revoke 
probation when these probationers once again violated the terms of their respective 

probation. 

 In light of the fact that § 559.036.8, RSMo Supp. 2012, requires that "every 

reasonable effort" be made to notify the probationer and to conduct the hearing prior to 

the expiration of the probationary period, future circuit courts in situations like those at 

issue here will undoubtedly—at a minimum—revoke probation, impose a sentence, and 

thereafter suspend the execution of the sentence so an additional term of probation can be 

ordered, resulting in a conviction on the probationer's criminal record. Alternatively, 

circuit courts faced with this dilemma will likely revoke probation, impose a sentence, 

and order the sentence to be executed. 

 This Court's authority to issue an extraordinary writ is always a matter of 

discretion, and a probationer who absconds near the end of a probationary term or 

otherwise contributes to the cause of the supervising court's failure to notify the 

probationer or conduct probation revocation proceedings prior to the expiration of the 

probation term should not necessarily expect this Court to view the situation to be so 

extraordinary as to justify the issuance of a writ of prohibition.1

 Further, the legislature amended § 559.105, effective August 28, 2013, which will 

make it rarer for a similar case regarding failure to satisfy restitution as a condition of 

probation to result in the loss of legal authority to revoke probation. Section 559.105.2, 

 

1

 The statutory requirement to use "every reasonable effort" to conduct a hearing within the term 

of probation, in my view, does not prevent a supervising court that has timely suspended 

probation pursuant to § 559.036.7 and manifested an intent to proceed with the revocation 

proceeding by issuing a warrant from conducting the revocation hearing whenever the 

probationer is returned to the supervising court for revocation proceedings. 

2
RSMo Supp. 2013, provides that a probationer ordered to pay restitution shall not be 

released from probation until restitution is complete, and "[i]f full restitution is not made 

within the original term of probation, the court shall order the maximum term of 

probation allowed for such offense." However, as most sentencing courts already give 

the maximum five-year probation term when ordering a probationer to pay a significant 

amount of restitution, the 2013 amendment to section 559.105.3 likely will result in the 

more significant change in sentencing practice. Section 559.105.3 now provides for 

restitution to be a condition of parole and requires the board of probation and parole not 

to "release any person from any term of parole ... until the person has completed such 

restitution, or until the maximum term of parole for such offense has been served." This 

amendment repeals the prior prohibition against requiring a prisoner both to serve a 

prison term and to pay restitution and, therefore, relieves sentencing courts from having 

to choose between a prison term and restitution—a choice that today's decision makes 

harder than ever. Instead, under the new section 559.105.3, anytime a sentencing court 

believes that a prison term is warranted—or does not believe that the defendant will make 

full restitution within the maximum five-year probation period—the court can remand the 

defendant to the department of corrections for a lengthy term and be assured that the 

defendant will be required to pay restitution during the portion of that term that the 

defendant is on parole. The fact that such an approach avoids the catch-22 created by 

today's decision, increases time to pay restitution while on parole, and reduces the circuit 

courts' already overburdened probation review dockets will make such an approach very 

difficult to resist. 

3
4

In conclusion, as defendants' counsel in these cases admitted in oral argument, this 

Court's decision will operate to the distinct disadvantage of many future defendants. 

However, this Court is obligated to adhere to the words of the statute, and any 

adjustments to the balance struck by section 559.036.8 (as now declared by this Court) 

and the 2013 amendments to section 559.105 must be made by the General Assembly. 

 __________________________ 

 Zel M. Fischer, Judge