In re: Adoption/Guardianship of J.T., Nos. 2811 & 3098, September Term, 2018, Opinion 

by Adkins, J.

FAMILY LAW – TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS – BEST INTERESTS 

OF THE CHILD – WITHDRAWAL OF FOSTER FAMILY: The juvenile court knew 

about the withdrawal of the child’s foster family before it released the decision to terminate 

parental rights of the mother. When a court’s assessment of a child’s best interests was 

affected by consideration of the apparent stability and safety a former foster family 

provided, it errs in failing to fully discover and address how the withdrawal of the foster 

family might affect the child emotionally or a new placement. These considerations are 

especially crucial when the child’s only remaining permanent attachments are her 

biological mother and father. 

FAMILY LAW – TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS – FAMILY LAW 

ARTICLE § 5-323 – PARENT’S MENTAL ILLNESS: The juvenile court abuses its 

discretion when it terminates a mother’s parental rights without taking into consideration 

her marked improvement through medicine and therapy. This consideration is especially 

important where the mother acknowledges that she suffers from mental illness, there is no 

history of abuse or neglect of the child, and the mother’s poverty substantially contributes 

to her inability to maintain a home for the child. The court’s inquiry should have 

considered the mother’s progress in her therapeutic and medical regimen in deciding 

whether her constitutional rights were impaired by the proposed termination order. 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Petition No. 06-Z-17-33

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Nos. 2811 & 3098

September Term, 2018

______________________________________

CONSOLIDATED CASES

______________________________________

IN RE: ADOPTION/GUARDIANSHIP OF J.T.

______________________________________

Kehoe,

Leahy,

Adkins, Sally D.

 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

 

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Adkins, Sally D., J.

____________________________________

Filed: July 31, 2019
Although mental illness may play a role in many termination of parental rights 

cases, it is uncommon in an appellate court that the illness presents itself as the centerpiece

issue—without the concomitant issues of child abuse or abandonment. In this case, we are 

called upon to address a parent’s mental illness, the best interests of a child, and a mother’s 

ability to parent given her progress made through therapy and medication. These issues

are all the more essential and poignant given the foster parents’ sudden withdrawal from 

adoption plans.

FACTUAL OVERVIEW AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Legal Proceedings

Appellant T.N. (“Mother” or “T.N.”) gave birth to J.T., a healthy daughter, on April 

1, 2016. On May 26, 2016, after petition by the Department of Social Services for 

Montgomery County, Maryland (“the Department” or “DSS”), J.T. was determined by the 

juvenile court to be a child in need of assistance (“CINA”) and committed to the care and 

custody of the Department. DSS alleged that Mother was unfit to parent J.T. It also 

asserted that the parental rights of J.M., the child’s father (“Father”), should be terminated 

due to exceptional circumstances. In August 2018, following the CINA proceedings, a 

termination of parental rights (“TPR”) trial was held (Case No. 2811). The Circuit Court 

for Montgomery County terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights pursuant to its

November 2018 Order. Both Mother and Father appeal from this Order. In a parallel 

proceeding, the juvenile court ordered that Mother’s visitation with J.T. be reduced.

Mother appealed the change in the visitation schedule to this Court (Case No. 3098), and 

the two appeals have been consolidated, without objection.
2

Questions Presented by Mother

1. Did the juvenile court err in terminating Appellant T.N.’s parental rights 

to J.T.?

2. Did the juvenile court err in reducing visitation?

3. Did the juvenile court err in terminating Appellant J.M.’s parental rights 

to J.T.?

As to the first and third questions, we hold that the juvenile court erred in terminating the 

rights of Mother and Father, and we reverse and remand to the juvenile court for further 

proceedings. Because we remand to the juvenile court to reconsider the parental rights of 

both Mother and Father, and J.T.’s best interests, we also direct that Mother’s visitation 

schedule return to two times per week, the frequency Mother earlier enjoyed before it was 

reduced at the request of DSS (to correlate with the expected termination).

In this appeal we focus on the arguments made by Mother and the Department’s 

response thereto. Father, who lives in Cameroon, also contests termination of his parental 

rights. He challenges the juvenile court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him and 

argues, inter alia, that exceptional circumstances were not shown, and the court should not 

have drawn a negative inference from his failure to testify. Throughout most of this 

process, Father has supported Mother’s right to the care and custody of J.T., with the 

understanding that Mother and child would live in the United States. While he, at one 

point—fearing Mother’s parental rights would be terminated—asserted his own right to 

custody of J.T. in Cameroon, Father’s final word, expressed by counsel at oral argument, 

was that he preferred that Mother retain her parental rights and eventually be given custody 

of J.T. Because of Father’s deferral to Mother and her parental rights, and because 
3

ultimately, we reverse the juvenile court and ask that court to reconsider the determination 

of both parents’ rights, we do not address Father’s arguments on his own behalf. On 

remand, however, Father is still free to protect his own parental rights, or to argue on behalf 

of Mother.

Facts1 and Procedures 

In April 2016, shortly after Mother gave birth to J.T., Mother experienced a mental 

health crisis while still in the hospital and showed signs of postpartum psychosis. Hospital 

staff removed J.T. from Mother’s care, and Mother was transferred to a psychiatric unit. 

J.T. was placed in kinship care with a licensed foster parent who was a friend of Mother’s. 

Father has been unable to secure a U.S. visa to travel to this country. While both parents 

resided in Cameroon, they agreed that Mother, a college graduate who had a Green Card 

allowing her to work and live in the United States, would travel to this county so that J.T. 

would be born here. In September 2016, Father sent an email to the Department saying 

that he wanted J.T. reunified with Mother.

Mother’s bout with postpartum psychosis was not the first time she had suffered 

serious mental health problems. She was hospitalized in 2013 and 2015 and attempted 

suicide in 2014. According to a psychological evaluation, Mother suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder and recurrent major depressive disorder with psychotic features. 

During depressive episodes, Mother experiences insomnia, psychomotor agitation, fatigue, 

and mood instability. During these episodes she sometimes has auditory hallucinations, 

 

1 We draw the facts from testimony at trial and the Department of Social Services 

(“the Department” or “DSS”) reports that were entered into evidence. 
4

wherein she hears voices telling her she is going to die. Major stressors in her life may 

trigger a depressive episode. At one low point in May 2016, Mother is reported to have 

stated that “the voices have taken over her body and she is concerned ‘that they might hurt 

me.’” 

According to social workers and psychologists who have dealt with Mother, she can 

successfully manage her illness with therapy and medication. They also cautioned that her 

symptoms will return if medication is interrupted. The psychologist who evaluated Mother 

in June and July of 2016 recommended that she receive “case management support to assist 

her in accessing resources, including but not limited to,” subsidized and transitional 

housing, where her daughter could reside with her. During the months leading up to the 

TPR hearing, Mother lived in a transitional housing facility operated by Catholic Charities, 

known as “Dorothy Day.” Mother stayed in regular contact with the Department, and 

regularly attended scheduled visits with J.T. 

Mother’s social worker at Dorothy Day has described her as “extremely reliable” 

and said that “[she hadn’t] had any problems with [her] in her reliability and her punctuality 

and her completing tasks . . . and her communication . . . .” Her first DSS social worker, 

Jillian Kelly (“Kelly”), testified that “[w]hen [Mother] is on the right medication and being 

properly monitored she can do well.” Her second DSS social worker, Marwan Castellani

(“Castellani”), testified that she was “very cooperative” with the Department, reliably 

participated in visits, and had positive interactions with J.T. Castellani concurred that, with 

housing and mental health support, including therapy and medication, Mother functioned 

well in the community. The psychologist who conducted Mother’s mental health 
5

evaluation testified that she was “completely cooperative” and “insightful” about her 

mental health issues.

The Department facilitated Mother’s visits with J.T. while J.T. was in foster care.

When healthy, Mother had positive, affectionate visits with J.T. They grew an increasingly 

strong bond, but they would need to reestablish their bond after periods when Mother was 

hospitalized and visits were put on hold. Visits changed from supervised to unsupervised 

in September 2016 and occurred once each week for one hour. The psychologist who 

evaluated Mother testified that her “face lit up” when talking about J.T., and she was “eager 

to share photos.” Mother “expressed a realistic understanding of what caring for a baby 

full time entails” and was “cognizant of the responsibilities inherent in that.” 

Periodic review hearings are required for all CINA children. See Md. Code Ann.

(2005, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 5-326 of the Family Law Article (“FL”). The Department 

prepares reports for the juvenile court shortly before every review hearing, and these 

reports are admitted into evidence at the merits hearing. At the September 14, 2016 review 

hearing, the Department reported that Mother had “shown significant progress in 

maintaining her mental health and working toward reunification with her daughter. She 

had attended every visit with [J.T.] and consistently demonstrates skills learned from 

parenting education.” It also expressed that mother and daughter were developing a strong 

bond, and that the Department wished for Mother to be able to spend more time with J.T., 

progressing to overnight visits. It reported that Mother had not needed hospitalization since 

May 2, 2016 and had not reported any psychotic symptoms to the Department or her 

therapist.
6

Around December 2016, Mother became pregnant again and this appeared to affect 

her mental health adversely. Kelly, Mother’s initial DSS social worker, filed a February 

22, 2017 report stating that Mother told her that she had been advised to discontinue all 

medications due to her pregnancy. Kelly estimated that she had stopped taking her 

medication in November or December 2016, around the time Mother suffered a panic 

attack that resulted in her hospitalization. 

While Mother was residing with a friend in Southeast Washington, District of 

Columbia, the Department arranged for J.T. to stay with Mother for a few days over 

Christmas. Arrangements were made for the Department to pick J.T. up on December 27, 

2016 and take J.T. back to her foster home. Mother was to meet the Department 

representative in Silver Spring, Maryland to facilitate this. But, on that day, Mother called 

the Department and asked for J.T. to be picked up at the apartment, as Mother was not 

feeling well and did not want to travel to Silver Spring. When the social worker picked up 

J.T., Mother was acting oddly, with symptoms of a panic attack. Two days later, on 

December 29, 2016, police observed Mother screaming and dancing in the road. An officer 

found a DSS business card in Mother’s purse and called the Department. 

Mother was taken to the emergency room and was stabilized and released after a 

48-hour stay. She then went to Progress Place, a shelter in Silver Spring, seeking a place 

to stay. While there, she became upset at having to sleep in the same room with other 

women, was loud, aggressive, and argued with staff members and even attempted to spit 

on a staff member. Police were called, and she was banned from Progress Place for a year.
7

During early January 2017, Mother was brought to Washington Adventist Hospital 

by police and admitted. After her admission, hospital staff described her as being agitated 

and fixated on her scheduled visit with J.T. Mother repeatedly called the Department 

asking that a social worker either pick her up from the hospital or bring J.T. to her. Her 

hospital-assigned counselor said that Mother was refusing to take medication.2 Mother 

remained at Washington Adventist Hospital until January 13, 2017, gradually responding 

to treatment.

3 She was released, after taking her medication, with a diagnosis of Bipolar I 

with psychotic features. Because the Montgomery County Crisis Center did not have any 

open shelter beds, social workers arranged for her to go to Harriet Tubman Emergency 

Women’s Shelter, but the security guard refused her entry, despite her begging to be 

admitted. She then was admitted to the psychiatric unit of Howard University Hospital, 

where she remained from January 17–24, 2017. 

At about this time, Mother met with the Department and reported that she had 

stopped taking her Seroquel, a prescribed medication, as it was making her sleepy and she 

did not want to be tired or inattentive when caring for J.T. during her extended,

unsupervised, and overnight visits. She also told the Department that she felt overwhelmed 

with her overall situation. She identified the father of her unborn (second) child and 

explained that when she informed him of the pregnancy, he denied being the father. This 

 

2 As discussed, Mother was pregnant with her second child at this time and was 

advised not to take any medication. 

3 Mother initially exhibited paranoia about the staff and other residents, such as 

accusing residents of trying to kill her.
8

was greatly upsetting to her, she explained, because he had promised to marry her and take 

care of her and the child. 

Mother also informed the Department that she found a different shelter, Winter 

Haven Emergency Shelter in Silver Spring, and she intended to resume her job as a home 

health aide, while continuing to see her therapist and psychiatrist. The social worker 

observed Mother to be more sluggish than usual around this time, which Mother owed to 

her pregnancy. During this same period, Mother had supervised visitation with J.T. on 

January 25, February 1, and February 8, 2017. 

Another depressive episode occurred around mid-February 2017. The Director of 

the Winter Haven Emergency Shelter, Dr. Donna Robinson, stated that she became 

concerned because Mother appeared depressed and anxious, and exhibited involuntary 

motions causing her to hit herself. The Director transported Mother to Holy Cross 

Hospital, but when Robinson tried to visit with her two days later, she was informed that 

Mother was not in the hospital. The Department learned that on February 11, 2017, Mother 

was transferred to Brook Lane, a mental health hospital. At this point, the permanency 

plan for J.T. was reunification with her mother, and the Department, noting that Mother’s 

decompensation was very recent, did not ask to change the plan. Still, DSS planned to 

return to juvenile court in three months to possibly revise the permanency plan to “adoption 

by a relative or a non-relative.” 

The Department also advised the court, in its above-discussed report for the March 

3, 2017 Permanency Plan Hearing, that it was
9

important to note that [J.T.] [had] been with the same foster 

family since May 26, 2016 and is attached to them. Given the 

significance of attachment and bonding during infancy, the 

Department and Court also need to consider [J.T.’s] attachment 

to her foster parents in considering a permanent resource for 

her. 

Castellani, her second DSS social worker, formally assigned to J.T.’s case on April 28, 

2018, also testified about the strength of her bond with her foster family. He opined that it 

was contrary to J.T.’s best interest to be removed from foster placement for any reason, 

including to be placed with a biological parent. Castellani also said that, during the most 

recent two visits, J.T. did not cry upon leaving her foster parents to visit Mother. 

Our next snapshot of Mother is derived from the August 18, 2017 report by the 

Department to the juvenile court. After a week at Brook Lane, Mother was still exhibiting 

symptoms of anxiety and depression, and her pregnancy limited the medications she was

able to take. In March 2017, Mother received electroconvulsive therapy at University of 

Maryland Medical Center and was discharged on March 23, 2017. Her physician reported 

that, on discharge, Mother denied any auditory hallucinations or other psychotic symptoms, 

that she had improved mood and wider affective range, and was more responsive, including

laughing and smiling. She had also “resolv[ed]” her suicidal ideations. She still, however, 

remained anxious and spoke very little. 

Mother then went to live in an assisted living facility in a residential rowhouse in 

Baltimore, where she received medication, monitoring, and assistance with meals, laundry, 

and other basic personal needs, by on-site staff. This residential program was operated by

Chesapeake Connections, a mental health services provider. Her case manager at this 
10

program reported that Mother was working “on strengthening her independent skills by 

encouraging and allowing her to complete medical appointments on her own, regularly 

taking public transportation on her own and shopping on her own.” The psychiatric nurse 

practitioner reported that Mother was “in compliance with treatment and ‘appears to be 

doing well psychiatrically and mentally’” and “her prognosis appears to be fairly good if 

she continues to comply with medications, participate in psychotherapy and receive 

supportive services.” While she lived in this residential facility, Mother had visits with her 

daughter, and, after an initial period of uneasiness, J.T. settled down and visits became 

better, with mother and daughter engaging in reciprocal play, reading stories, and changing 

the child’s diaper. 

In this same August 18, 2017 report, the Department stated that J.T. was doing well, 

and that Mother “is able to sustain brief periods of stability when she is taking her 

medication as prescribed, [but] any deviation from her medical regimen or exposure to 

stressors has shown to lead to a reoccurrence of her psychiatric symptoms.” The 

Department expressed concern about the proposed plan by Chesapeake Connections to 

transfer Mother to a less restrictive environment when she gives birth, as she “currently is 

not demonstrating independent living skills in her current residence.” DSS acknowledged 

that “[J.T.] does exhibit a connection to her mother” and they “engage in play and are 

affectionate with each other,” but maintained that J.T. “cannot be safe in her care.” The 

Department emphasized that J.T.’s “strongest attachment is to her foster parents,” along 

with “the potential emotional, developmental, and educational harm to the child if moved 

from the current placement . . . .” 
11

After this hearing, the juvenile court changed the permanency plan from 

“Reunification” to “Adoption by a Non-Relative.” The court found that “[J.T.’s] 

mother . . . still struggle[d] with her mental health and stability. She [currently lived] in a 

treatment facility and [was] still unable to care for [J.T.]” The court also found she had 

“made minimal progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating the 

commitment. While there was some progress, that has been followed by multiple 

additional hospitalizations.” It also noted that J.T. was “safe in meeting her developmental 

milestones in her foster care placement.”

In its January 22, 2018 report to the juvenile court, the Department stated that 

Mother’s second daughter (“G.N.”) was born on September 3, 2017. Mother and G.N. 

were moved into an apartment managed by a mental health care organization, Uplift 

Individuals in Christ. But, it explained, two weeks later, Mother was admitted to Johns 

Hopkins University Hospital on an emergency basis. In this report, the Department 

recommended that J.T. remain in foster care, with a permanency plan of adoption by a nonrelative. DSS maintained that J.T. was in a loving and stable foster home and the foster 

parents were committed to adopting her. 

Another review hearing was set for June 6, 2018. The Department’s May 25 report 

for this hearing described the favorable conditions with J.T.’s foster family and 

characterized J.T. as a two-year-old toddler who is happy, well-adjusted and meeting 

developmental milestones. DSS reported that the foster family had embraced J.T. into their 

family and integrated her into their lives, including extended family, and that “the family 

is strongly committed.” 
12

As to Mother, the Department had become pessimistic about her ability to parent.

It reported that Mother’s 

history with Child Welfare Services has demonstrated 

concerning behaviors related to her anxiety and hallucinations 

resulting in an inability to meet the needs of her daughter [J.T.], 

now two years old, as well as her daughter [G.N.], now 8

months old.

During this reporting period [Mother] has been able to 

maintain her stability by attending regular therapy and 

medication management. There have been no psychiatric 

hospitalizations. 

At the time of this report, Mother lived at Dorothy Day Transitional Housing Program 

through Catholic Charities in Rockville, Maryland. Despite its pessimistic view, the 

Department recounted a positive report from a social worker, saying that 

[Mother] is motivated to better herself, is currently medication 

compliant and will be working with DORS to explore 

obtaining part-time work. The worker further noted that 

[Mother] would like to eventually be able to leave the “shelter 

system” and get her own apartment; the current program allows 

[Mother] to remain there for up to one year.[4]

The Department acknowledged that “[Mother] was relatively consistent with her 

weekly visitation schedule” but sprinkled its report with small negative notes about Mother. 

 

4 This quote is from Castellani, a DSS social worker. He took over when Kelly left 

the Department in March 2018. He testified that Mother had been cooperative and 

continued to have physical, in-person visits with J.T. He observed that she had been 

mentally stable; he did not have any concerns about leaving mother unsupervised with her 

child for short periods of time (e.g., to change a diaper, etc.), and increased Mother’s visit 

with child to two hours in length. Castellani testified that J.T. had deepened her bond with 

Mother and kissed and cuddled her during visits. He also testified that Mother is 

cooperative and regularly visits with J.T., and that she continues to attend therapy, seek 

independent living arrangements, and attempts to obtain employment. 
13

For example, it noted that two-year old J.T. was distressed whenever the Department staff 

picked her up from her foster home to go anywhere, including to Mother’s. Also, the 

Department reported that although Mother was very affectionate with J.T. during their

visits, J.T. “appeared to tolerate her mother’s affections” and usually played independently

from her mother. In contrast, it emphasized that “[J.T.’s] energy and engagement with her 

foster family indicates that she has a secure and trusting relationship with her current 

caregivers.” The Department concluded that it was “currently not in [J.T.’s] best interest 

to return to the care of her mother as her mental health remains unpredictable; thus her 

ability to provide a safe and stable environment.”5

Sadly, the foster parents did not prove to be a stable long-term resource for J.T.

Significantly, the court was notified after the close of the evidentiary hearings, that on 

October 1, 2018, the foster parents, with whom J.T. had lived for over two years and to 

whom she was attached, had asked the Department to remove J.T. from their home. The 

Department gave no reasons for the foster parents’ decision. J.T. was placed with another 

foster family immediately. 

Despite this setback in the long-term plans for J.T.’s future, the Department did not 

change its recommendation and the Circuit Court followed the Department’s lead. In its 

November 15, 2018 Amended Final Order, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights. The court found:

 

5

In considering Father’s request that J.T. be returned to his custody, the Department 

points out poverty and other features of life in Cameroon, and that “she does however have 

strong ties to Maryland, her current foster family, and their extended family in the 

community she lives in.”
14

[T]here is clear and convincing evidence that [Mother] is unfit 

and unable to care for [J.T.] [Mother] cannot provide a safe 

and stable home for [J.T.] and many of the issues that [Mother]

present[ed] in 2016, prompting [J.T.]’s removal from her care, 

were still present at the trial. [Mother] has not stabilized her 

mental health, has not established an ability to care for [J.T.] in 

a safe environment, and has not secured appropriate housing.

It also noted that Appellant has had difficulty obtaining “employment” and “a stable 

income.” 

In its opinion, the juvenile court recited that J.T. had been removed from the home 

of her foster parents and placed in another foster home. It said nothing about how this 

impacted the best interests of J.T. This might be because the court was given insufficient 

information, as it stated that “[n]o supplemental information was provided to the Court on 

this factor.” 

The juvenile court determined that the Department’s efforts “satisfied what was 

required to provide reunification services to both parents.” It concluded that after weighing 

the “statutory factors in light of the requisite legal presumption, [there was] clear and 

convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of this Child that the parental rights of 

Mother and Father be terminated.” Mother and Father both appealed from this decision.

In a December 2018 motion to reconsider filed in the juvenile court, Mother stated 

that on October 1, after the TPR trial finished but before the court’s decision was made, 

the Department informed all counsel that “[J.T.’s] foster parents have requested her 

removal from their home.” Mother’s trial counsel also proffered that Mother had continued 

to be stable on medication and recently found part-time employment. Recent reports from 

the Department, as well as letters from mental health professionals treating Mother, also 
15

indicate that she has been stable on medication and reliably participating in therapy. In her

motion, Mother also objected to her decreased visitation from two hours per week to one 

hour per month. The motion to reconsider was denied on December 21, and Mother timely 

appealed both the December 6, 2018 closing order and the December 21, 2018 orders

denying her motion for reconsideration.

DISCUSSION

Mother readily concedes that she suffers from mental illness and that, “in the past, 

[her] illness made it difficult for her to maintain housing and employment.”6 But she 

maintains that “she has been compliant with therapy and medication, and mentally stable, 

for over a year.”7 Mother makes this assertion partly based on alleged facts occurring after 

the Amended Final Order on November 15, 2018. Because we are limited in our review 

 

6 The parties seriously dispute what should be included in the record for purposes 

of this appeal. In her opening brief, Mother made references to the transcript of a 

guardianship review hearing that occurred on February 14, 2019, after the conclusion of 

the guardianship merits hearing, and Mother included the transcript of that hearing in her 

appendix. Before oral argument, the Department filed a Motion to Strike this appendix on 

grounds that the information contained therein is not before this Court and should not be 

considered. Mother continued to argue based on this post-termination evidence at oral 

argument but filed no written response to the Department’s Motion to Strike. The parties 

do not dispute that the November 2018 termination order was a final judgment, and 

Appellants appealed from that order. Mother has no right to introduce new evidence on 

appeal, and to the extent we might have discretion to allow such new evidence, we decline 

to exercise it here. To allow that would undermine the finality of a termination proceeding

and be an unfair burden on the Department, as well as on the trial and appellate courts. See

Maryland Rule 8-131. We therefore grant the Department’s Motion to Strike and consider 

only evidence introduced before the November order terminating parental rights. 

7 As earlier indicated, for purposes of our review of the termination order, we do not 

consider facts occurring after November 15, 2018, the date of the juvenile court’s amended 

final order.
16

to the record from which this appeal was taken, we consider only those facts presented to 

the juvenile court before the Amended Final Order. See Maryland Rule 8-131.

The most recent snapshot of Mother presented to the court by DSS is found in its 

report to the court covering a period ending May 25, 2018. In its words, “[Mother] has 

been able to maintain her stability by attending regular therapy and medication 

management; there have been no psychiatric hospitalizations.” It reported that she lives at 

Dorothy Day Transitional Housing Program, and that her social worker reported that 

Mother “is motivated to better herself, is currently medication compliant and will be 

working with DORS to explore part-time work.” The testimony at trial revealed that by 

the time of the merits hearing, Mother had maintained residence at Dorothy Day since April 

2018, while saving money to obtain permanent housing, had found employment and 

maintained it for about seven months, and continued to build a bond with J.T. Nicole 

Wooden (“Wooden”), a licensed social worker at Dorothy Day, testified that Mother would 

be able to secure independent housing and part-time employment.8 Wooden also explained 

that although Dorothy Day tracks the residents’ compliance in taking their prescribed 

medication, it does not force residents to do so. According to Wooden, Mother was fully 

compliant. Wooden also testified that Mother is on a waiting list for a program that would 

allow her to be placed in an apartment and have housing for her daughter. It is uncertain 

when there would be an opening in this program. Wooden also stated that she “looked at 

 

8 Wooden initially expressed “no doubt” of Mother’s ability to meet these goals, but 

on cross-examination softened this certainty, saying “I believe she can live independently.”
17

[Mother’s] acuity scale”

9

and determined, “through [their] conversation and through 

[Mother’s] background,” that “she would be able to procure housing and part time 

employment . . . .” Wooden considered that Mother has a bachelor’s degree from a college 

in Cameroon and had worked as an administrative assistant and home healthcare worker. 

As a centerpiece of her argument, Mother asserts her fundamental constitutional 

rights and points out the instability of foster care life. In her words, “Given that [J.T.] has 

been moved from foster home to foster home without any permanent adoptive placement 

on the horizon, and that Appellant has fought to maintain a bond with her child, termination 

of parental rights is not justified or in [J.T.’s] best interests.” Mother also maintains that 

the court’s “focus must be on the continued parental relationship, not custody.” In re 

Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 402 Md. 477, 499 (2007). She avers that “even if, 

as a custody matter, [she] cannot presently provide a home for J.T., that does not require 

that her legal rights to J.T. be permanently severed.” She further draws upon the 

declaration of the Court of Appeals in Rashawn H. that “poverty, of itself, can never justify 

the termination of parental rights. The fundamental right of parents to raise their children 

is in no way dependent on their affluence and therefore is not diminished by their lack 

thereof.” Id. Mother highlights that she and Father are the only people seeking a permanent 

relationship with J.T., and, because the foster parents asked that J.T. be removed from their 

home, J.T. has no permanent relationship to rely on except her parents. 

 

9 An “acuity scale” is a measure the Catholic Charities program uses to determine 

the “vulnerability” of a client. 
18

The Department, responding, reminds us that the court’s primary considerations in 

decisions to terminate parental rights are the health and safety of the child, which are to be 

considered along with the factors set forth in FL § 5-323(d), and that a reviewing court 

must be mindful that “[q]uestions within the discretion of the trial court are ‘much better 

decided by the trial judges than by appellate courts.’” In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 583

(2003) (citation omitted). DSS further maintains that the juvenile court made findings with 

respect to each of the statutory factors, “which include the provision of reunification 

services; the results of the parent’s efforts to change so that the child can return to the 

home; the existence and severity of aggravating circumstances; and the child’s feelings, 

adjustment, and well-being.” See also FL § 5-323(d). It emphasizes that the statute looks 

to “whether the parent is, or within a reasonable time will be, able to care for the child in a 

way that does not endanger the child’s welfare.” Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 500.

The Department points out that Mother has been psychiatrically hospitalized several 

times, that she has experienced auditory hallucinations, and that she attempted suicide in 

2014. It asserts that it entered into several service agreements with Mother, and that she 

had made progress towards reunification by stabilizing her mental health and living 

situation, but she has been unable, over a two-and-a-half-year period, to “maintain her 

mental health for more than seven months.” It explains that Mother “had maintained her 

mental health only with the intensive assistance of the medication management services 

and other supportive services provided through her residential program,” and asserts that 

“there was no evidence that she would be able to maintain her mental health without such 

services.” Given her mental instability, the Department maintains, she is unfit to parent 
19

J.T., and the juvenile court did not err or abuse its discretion when it determined that she 

was unfit.

Standard of Review

In In re Adoption of Ta’Niya C., 417 Md. 90, 100 (2010), the Court of Appeals laid 

out the three tenets that guide our review of a juvenile court’s decision to terminate parental 

rights. 

[First,] when the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, 

the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 8-131(c) applies. 

Second, if it appears that the court erred as to matters of law, 

further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required 

unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when 

the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the court

founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual 

findings that are not clearly erroneous, the court’s decision 

should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of 

discretion.

Id. (cleaned up). See also In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003) (citation omitted). Yet, 

notwithstanding our deferential review, “[l]egal conclusions of unfitness and exceptional 

circumstances are reviewed without deference.” In re Adoption/

Guardianship of C.E., 2019 WL 2384797, at *9 (Md. 2019).

Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights to J.T.

We bear in mind the “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, 

custody, and management of their child . . . .” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753

(1982). And “fundamental interests are no less involved in mental-illness-based 

severances than in others . . . .” Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dept. of Econ. Sec., 971 P.2d 1046, 

1053 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). Indeed, our Court of Appeals has recently pronounced that 
20

“[m]any cases of mental illness can be treated and managed and need not be cause for 

termination of parental rights.” C.E., 2019 WL 2384797, at *16 n.18. In cases involving 

mental illness, a court should carefully assess whether, at the time of the merits hearing, 

the parent’s efforts to rehabilitate her mental illness “were beginning to bear some 

fruit . . . .” Mary Ellen C., 971 P.2d at 1054.

Most TPR cases present tragic and complex situations and judges have limited 

choices in resolving them. This case is no exception. Two features of this case are 

uncommon. First, the mother suffers from a mental illness—not itself unusual. But 

Mother’s demonstrated insight into her mental illness, her willingness to follow a regimen

of medication and therapy, and the success of that regimen, albeit interrupted, is quite rare

in a TPR case.10 In this regard, Mother sharply contrasts with, for example, the mother in 

C.E., who said: “I don’t have a mental illness, I have PTSD from legal abuse syndrome.”11

 

10 In In re Adoption/Guardianship of C.E., 2019 WL 2384797, at *2 (Md. 2019), the 

juvenile court determined the mother to be unfit, and she did not appeal that finding. The 

pertinent appellate issue involved the DSS’s appeal from the trial court’s refusal to 

terminate the parental rights of the father, who, due to his own personality disorder, lacked 

the capacity to care for C.E. consistently, but had generally positive interactions with C.E. 

Id. at *1. Like the mother, the father in C.E. refused to acknowledge the mother’s mental

illness, and the Court of Appeals held that the father’s refusal to sever his relationship with 

the mother, and his “nearly total reliance” on her for providing childcare while he worked, 

constituted exceptional circumstances warranting termination, even assuming he was 

otherwise fit, because he refused to acknowledge the mother’s mental health conditions 

and the adverse effect she had on C.E. Id. at *6. Mother’s conduct in this case can also be 

contrasted with the mother in a Nebraska case whose parental rights were terminated 

because she refused to acknowledge her mental illness, refused to engage in services 

offered to assist with reunification, and only at the last minute did she make some effort to 

comply with her goals. See In re Interest of Alec S., 884 N.W.2d 701, 708–09 (Neb. 2016).

11 C.E.’s mother was diagnosed as having “paranoia, adjustment disorder, major 

depression, somatization disorder, borderline personality disorder, mania, and bipolar 
21

The second unusual feature of this case is that Mother has demonstrated, time and 

again, J.T. is a priority in her life. Unlike so many TPR cases, nothing in the record reflects 

that Mother was irresponsible with regard to J.T. or willingly neglected the child. Her 

consistent and appropriate commitment to her child has only been interrupted by her bouts 

of depression and anxiety.

Title 5 of the Family Law Article governs guardianship and adoption of children in 

need of assistance. See FL § 5-303(b). As Judge Joseph M. Getty wrote in C.E., 2019 WL 

2384797, at *10, “[t]hese express purposes illustrate the inherent tension in any termination 

of parental rights matter—to provide a child with permanency yet protect the parents from 

a hasty termination of their rights.” Like the juvenile court, the Department has limited 

choices and limited resources in providing services to assist a parent in being reunited with 

a child who has been adjudged a CINA. And legislation dictates that a juvenile court must 

consider the services that DSS has provided to the parent before parental rights are 

terminated. See FL § 5-323(d)(1)(i). 

The Maryland Code also sets forth the “unfit or exceptional circumstances” standard 

a court must apply before it: 

finds by clear and convincing evidence that a parent is unfit to 

remain in a parental relationship with the child or that 

 

affective disorder.” C.E., 2019 WL 2384797, at *2. Such cluster of mental illnesses 

“caus[ed] her to lash out against her children,” demonstrate “fits of rage,” and be unable or 

unwilling to communicate with the Department. Id. The juvenile court found that,

“[r]epeatedly, Mother decomposes into stress induced rage behaviors whenever a third 

party challenges the smallest aspect of her parenting conduct” and that C.E. “can not and 

should not be subjected to this well established pattern of psychological abuse by Mother.”

Id. at *6.
22

exceptional circumstances exist that would make a 

continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the best 

interests of the child such that terminating the rights of the 

parent is in a child’s best interests, the juvenile court may grant 

guardianship of the child without consent otherwise required 

under this subtitle and over the child’s objection.

Id. § 5-323(b). The statutory factors a court must consider are extensive and detailed in FL 

§ 5-323(d):

Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, in ruling 

on a petition for guardianship of a child, a juvenile court shall 

give primary consideration to the health and safety of the child 

and consideration to all other factors needed to determine 

whether terminating a parent’s rights is in the child’s best 

interests, including:

(1)(i) all services offered to the parent before the child’s 

placement, whether offered by a local department, another 

agency, or a professional;

(ii) the extent, nature, and timeliness of services offered 

by a local department to facilitate reunion of the child and 

parent; and

(iii) the extent to which a local department and parent 

have fulfilled their obligations under a social services 

agreement, if any;

(2) the results of the parent’s effort to adjust the parent’s 

circumstances, condition, or conduct to make it in the child’s 

best interests for the child to be returned to the parent’s home, 

including:

(i) the extent to which the parent has maintained regular 

contact with:

1. the child;

2. the local department to which the child is 

committed; and

3. if feasible, the child’s caregiver;

(ii) the parent’s contribution to a reasonable part of the 

child’s care and support, if the parent is financially able to do 

so;

(iii) the existence of a parental disability that makes the 

parent consistently unable to care for the child’s immediate and 
23

ongoing physical or psychological needs for long periods of 

time; and 

(iv) whether additional services would be likely to bring 

about a lasting parental adjustment so that the child could be 

returned to the parent within an ascertainable time not to 

exceed 18 months from the date of placement unless the 

juvenile court makes a specific finding that it is in the child’s 

best interests to extend the time for a specified period;

(3) whether:

(i) the parent has abused or neglected the child or a 

minor and the seriousness of the abuse or neglect;

(ii) [findings regarding illegal use of controlled 

dangerous substances]; 

(iii) the parent subjected the child to:

1. chronic abuse;

2. chronic and life-threatening neglect;

3. sexual abuse; or

4. torture;

(iv) the parent has been convicted, in any state or any 

court of the United States, of:

1. a crime of violence against:

A. a minor offspring of the parent;

B. the child; or

C. another parent of the child; or

2. aiding or abetting, conspiring, or soliciting to 

commit a crime described in item 1 of this item; 

and

(v) the parent has involuntarily lost parental rights to a 

sibling of the child; and

(4)(i) the child’s emotional ties with and feelings toward 

the child’s parents, the child’s siblings, and others who may 

affect the child’s best interests significantly; 

(ii) the child’s adjustment to:

1. community;

2. home;

3. placement; and

4. school;

(iii) the child’s feelings about severance of the parentchild relationship; and
24

(iv) the likely impact of terminating parental rights on 

the child’s well-being.12

The juvenile court diligently addressed most of these rigorous statutory factors. It 

did so facing the statutory directive that a decision be issued within 45 days after trial on 

the merits, FL § 5-319(a)(2),13 a tight deadline it missed by only a few days. The 45-day 

post-trial deadline may have played a part in the third, somewhat uncommon, feature of 

this case: that the judge and both parents were notified by the Department on October 1, 

2018—twelve days after the last day of trial, but before the court’s decision—that J.T.’s 

foster parents requested that J.T. be removed from their home. This fact might be 

unremarkable, except that J.T. had lived with the foster parents for over two years, adoption 

by the foster parents was anticipated, and the Department, in its presentation to the juvenile 

court, emphasized repeatedly that the strong bond between J.T. and the foster parents 

bolstered the case for terminating the parents’ rights. Indeed, it introduced testimony that 

J.T. would be harmed if she were removed from the custody of her foster parents.

14

 

12

“If a juvenile court finds that an act or circumstance listed in subsection (d)(3)(iii), 

(iv), or (v) of this section exists, the juvenile court shall make a specific finding, based on 

facts in the record, whether return of the child to a parent’s custody poses an unacceptable 

risk to the child’s future safety.” Md. Code Ann. (2005, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 5-323(f) of 

the Family Law Article. 

13 The statutory deadline is not mandatory on the court, and the judge’s “paramount 

consideration is the child’s best interest.” In re Adoption of Jayden G., 433 Md. 50, 67

(2013).

14 For example, in an earlier report to the juvenile court, the Department reported: 

J.T.’s “first strongest attachment is to her foster parents. In consideration of the fifth factor, 

the potential emotional, developmental, and educational harm to the child if moved from 

the current placement, there would be harm if [J.T.] was moved from her current 

caregivers.” As earlier indicated, during the merits hearing, the Department offered 
25

The Department offered no information as to the reasons underlying the requested 

removal of J.T. from her foster parents or about how that sudden change affected her

emotionally or her new placement. We consider these inquires crucial because, as Mother 

asserts, as of October 1, 2018, J.T.’s relationship with Mother, and her limited, video-only

relationship with Father, were her only permanent attachments. Equally important, it is 

highly likely that the juvenile court’s assessment of J.T.’s best interests was affected by 

consideration of the apparent stability and safety the former foster family provided.

Finally, and no less important, Mother’s mental health was improving—becoming 

stable—although the record we review only demonstrates that improvement for about six

months at the time of the last day of the hearing on September 18, 2018. Both her social 

worker and psychiatrist opined that the medicines enabled her to remain emotionally stable

and avoid the anxiety and major depression, including auditory hallucinations, that had 

caused her earlier hospitalizations.15 Neither the Department nor juvenile court should 

ignore evidence, including expert testimony, about a parent’s ability to manage a mental 

illness with medicine or psychotherapy. See Matter of Shantelle W., 587 N.Y.S.2d 393 

(N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (even where one psychiatrist opined that a parent’s illness could not 

be adequately treated, the court reversed a family court termination order on grounds that 

the expert’s diagnosis was based largely on a one-hour interview and directed the social 

 

testimony that J.T.’s “energy and engagement with her foster family indicates that she has 

a secure and trusting relationship with her current caregivers.” 

15 The record suggests that she also improved after receiving electroconvulsive 

therapy. 
26

services agency to refer the mother for psychiatric therapy and evaluate her recovery 

progress). 

This case is unlike others involving a mental illness that a parent refuses to 

acknowledge or treat. As we indicated, professionals working with Mother reported that 

she was insightful about her mental illness and faithful about taking her medications. She 

also readily reported to medical professionals her history of mental illness. The record 

reflects that she stopped her medication when she was pregnant with her second child 

because she was concerned about the risk to her unborn child. She also stopped one 

medication, Seroquel, because she thought it made her sleepy and wanted to be alert for 

visits with J.T. A parent’s awareness of her illness, and her willingness to seek help to 

remedy the illness and take steps to protect her children, should be considered as a factor 

supporting her claim to a continued parental relationship with her child. See In re D.L.M., 

31 S.W.3d 64, 68–71 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (juvenile court’s termination of parental rights 

of a mother with schizophrenia reversed based on, inter alia, the mother’s voluntary 

admission to hospital and good history regarding taking medications, as well as taking steps 

to ask for help when needed). 

Nor does this case involve a parent whose mental illness caused her to be abusive 

to the child at any time or exhibit any violent behavior towards other people. We do not 

fully agree with the Department’s argument that Mother’s “long-standing and poorly 

managed mental health issues have prompted ten hospitalizations over the course of J.T.’s 

short life, and there is no indication that she will ever be able to manage her mental health 

with long-term consistency.” We recognize that, of these ten hospitalizations, several 
27

occurred within days of each other because Mother was quickly released after initial 

evaluation and administration of stabilizing medication. Her rapid releases and re-entries 

may reflect financial considerations by the hospitals, as she was unable to pay for her 

treatment. If she had been able to stay longer in a mental health hospital, her road to 

stability may have been less rocky. We also note that most of her severe anxiety and 

depression after December 31, 2015 occurred while she was pregnant with her first and 

second children or shortly after their births. At least once, she was diagnosed with 

postpartum psychosis. Thus, some of her acute episodes of depression and anxiety appear 

to have been childbirth-related. As to her history before 2015, we have no information 

about her access to psychiatric care and medications and cannot know how well she 

managed her mental health. We do know, however, that her recent psychological history

of using medicine and therapy shows improvement in her mental stability.

“[D]eficiencies may be temporary and correctable—sufficiently severe to warrant 

denying custody or visitation at a particular point in time, but with the understanding that 

the custody or visitation decision is subject to reconsideration upon a showing of changed 

circumstances.” Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 498. In considering the best interests of the child, 

a court should bear in mind the words of Shurupoff v. Vockroth that “[m]any of [these]

cases reveal a situation in which the child’s best interest lies in maintaining the parental 

relationship but having a third party assume responsibility for the child’s immediate and 

short-term needs.” 372 Md. 639, 658 (2003). As the Supreme Court of Missouri 

recognized: “Parenting is frequently a group effort. Children are often raised with 

extensive help from grandparents, siblings, extended family, neighbors, day care, baby 
28

sitters, a nanny, or an array of public and private service organizations.” In re A.S.W., 137 

S.W.3d 448, 453 (Mo. 2004). Moreover, as an Arizona court articulated: “It is not a 

parent’s burden to prove she will be capable of parenting effectively in the near future, but 

[the State’s] burden to prove there is a substantial likelihood she will not.” Jordan C., 219 

P.3d at 307. 

We also agree with the Jordan C. court that “[t]he mere passage of time during 

which a child is in [foster] care, without more, is not a ground for terminating the parent’s 

rights . . . .” Id. at 308. See also In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., 460 Md. 201, 234 

(2018) (time a father spent incarcerated while his child was in foster care, in itself, did not 

justify termination of parental rights; for exceptional circumstances to exist, the court must 

also find that the period of time made continuation of parental relationship detrimental to 

child’s best interests); In re Adoption/Guardianship of Alonza D., 412 Md. 442, 462 (2010)

(passage of time parent and child are apart is insufficient in itself to terminate parental 

rights).

We return to the dilemma faced by the juvenile court when it received notification 

that the foster home parents who had been described to the court as highly worthy, and 

strongly bonded with J.T., had simply requested—without any reason disclosed—that J.T. 

be removed from their home. The court had inadequate information at that point to make 

a decision; yet, it was facing a statutory deadline to do so. In the Amended Final Order, 

addressing the statutory criteria of FL § 5-323(d)(4), the court recognized the increasingly 

positive relationship with Mother during supervised visits, and regarding factors (ii) and 

(iii), made the following findings:
29

(ii) the child’s adjustment to:

1. [C]ommunity[:] 

[J.T.] was part of the community through the foster home

where she resided at the time of the trial. She has since been 

moved to another foster home. 

2. [H]ome[:] 

[J.T.] had lived with Mr. and Mrs. M since May 26, 2016. On 

October 1, 2018, the Department informed the Court that Mr. 

and Mrs. M requested [J.T.’s] removal from their home. The 

Department located a new pre-adopted placement for [J.T.] and 

held a Legal Sufficiency Staffing meeting regarding the change 

of placement on October 3, 2018. Docket No. 158. On October 

11, 2018 [J.T.] was placed in a new foster home. Docket no. 

159.

3. [P]lacement[:] 

[J.T.] was placed in a new foster home after the trial. No 

supplemental information was provided to the Court on this 

factor.

4. [S]chool[:] 

This factor is not applicable.

(iii) Due to [J.T.’s] age, there is no evidence of her feelings 

about severance of the relationship with her mother and father.

(iv) [T]he likely impact of terminating parental rights on the 

child’s well-being[:] 

The evidence clearly and convincingly indicates that [J.T.’s] 

well-being will be best-served by terminating [both parents’] 

parental rights.

In light of J.T.’s unexpected removal from the care of her foster parents, and 

considering the progress Mother was making in managing her mental illness at the time of 
30

the merits hearing, we conclude that the juvenile court’s assessment falls short. It simply 

failed to adequately take into account the foster parents’ unexplained decision to return J.T. 

to the care of the Department. The juvenile court should have held an additional hearing 

to reevaluate the best interests of the child after it received notification of the foster parents’

decision on October 1, 2018. That inquiry should have included further consideration of 

whether, after suffering the trauma of being removed from the care of her foster parents, it 

was still in J.T.’s best interests to also terminate her relationship with Mother—who

consistently demonstrated a loving relationship with J.T., even if she was not ready to 

maintain a home in which she could raise her. 

Because the best interest of the child standard must always be harmonized with the 

fundamental right of parents in the care and custody of their children, see Rashawn H., 402 

Md. at 495, the court’s inquiry should have considered Mother’s progress in her therapy 

and medical regimen in deciding whether her constitutional rights were impaired by the 

proposed termination order. We are instructed by Rashawn H. that the state may rebut the 

presumption that a child’s interests are best served by maintaining a relationship with a 

parent “only by showing that the parent is either unfit or that exceptional circumstances 

exist that would make the continued relationship detrimental to the child’s best interest.” 

Id. at 498.16

 

16 The Court of Appeals has clearly declared: “[P]overty, of itself, can never justify 

the termination of parental rights. The fundamental right of parents to raise their children 

is in no way dependent on their affluence and therefore is not diminished by their lack 

thereof.” Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 499. “Under our Constitutions, the poor and the disabled 

are no less citizens entitled to the full range of constitutional protections. The Constitutions 

apply in the social welfare area as in any other area of American life.” In re 
31

Because the juvenile court erred in not holding another hearing—not fully 

evaluating Mother’s mental health progress in light of her fundamental right to parent or

J.T.’s best interests in light of the trauma of losing her home with her foster parents—we 

reverse the order terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father. We remand to the 

juvenile court to hold a new evidentiary hearing, at which evidence about J.T., Mother, 

Father, and any other relevant evidence shall be considered, including evidence relating to 

time periods up until the time of the new evidentiary hearing. 

ORDER TERMINATING PARENTAL 

RIGHTS OF MOTHER AND FATHER 

REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO 

CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY 

COUNTY FOR NEW EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING CONSISTENT WITH THIS 

OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY 

APPELLEE.

 

Adoption/Guardianship Nos. J9610436 and J9711031, 368 Md. 666, 669 (2002) (internal 

citations omitted). Clearly, Mother’s poverty played a role in this termination decision 

because of her dependence on subsidized programs.