## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 17

- 0003

_____________________________
L ISA V ENN , Appellant,

v.

K ENNETH M. F OWLKES , I II
, Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County

. Elizabeth A. Senterfitt , Judge

. October 31, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.

Lisa Venn appeals a final judgment granting a petition for a stalking injunction filed by Kenneth M. Fowlkes, III . We reverse b ecause it is not supported by competent, substantial evidence

.
In November 2016, Mr. Fowlkes filed a petition for protection against stalking against Ms. Venn with whom he had a 15

- year relationship and shared a minor child

. U pon separat ing in 2009
, they sought and obtained injunctions against each other . And since that time their relationship has remained turbulent

. In Mr. Fowlkes’s 2016 petition here
, he allege d that Ms. Venn stalk ed and harassed him at all hours at his work and home, and harassed him by filing a child support case. The allegations include that Ms. Venn called him many times without leaving a message ; has knocked on the door of his house and ran ; has created many2 problems at the restaurant where he work s ; has claimed to have
many pictures of him and his wife ; has called and bothered Mr. Fowlkes ’s brother ; has claimed to be in fear of Mr. Fowlkes ; and has told a third

- party that she would “get the crackers on [him]

. ” Claiming to be “tired of [Ms. Venn’s] games, [her] stalking, [ and her] harassment through the child support case
, ” Mr. Fowlkes asked the trial court to stop it immediately by granting an injunction.

The trial court held a hearing in which both parties appear ed
pro se

. By that time, the transcript ind icates that Ms. Venn had filed her own petition for a stalking injunction against Mr. Fowlkes

. At the hearing, Mr. Fowlkes testified that everything in his petition was true and correct and provided no additional substantive testimony. Ms. Venn objected to the injunction and
, in response to the trial court’s questions, testified to having legitimate reasons for visiting Mr. Fowlkes’s workplace and home. For instance, she testified that she came to the restaurant several times with the parties’ daughter , at the daughter’s request and after Mr. Fowlkes had invited the daughter to eat there . Ms. Venn also conceded plac ing something in Mr. Fowlkes’s mailbox related
to her child support case against him

. In Ms. Venn ’s view, Mr. Fowlkes’s petition was filed in retaliation for her having fil ed a child support case against him

. And s he asked the trial court to have her own stalking petition granted against Mr. Fowlkes

. In her view, Mr. Fowlkes and others were conspiring against her.

“ A person who willfully, malic iously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat . “Harass ” means “ to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotiona l distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat

. “Whet her the purpose for contact is ‘ legitimate ’ is evaluated on a case

- by

- case basis.

. . . However, courts have generally held that contact is legitimat e when there is a reason for the contact other than to harass the victim.” O’Neill v. Goodwin , 195 So. 3d 411, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) . To be entitled to a stalking injunction, a petitioner must allege and prove two separate instances of stalk ing, and that the incidents alleged objectively caused substantial emotional3 distress. Pickett v. Copeland

, 236 So. 3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 201 8 ).

In this case
, Mr. Fowlkes alleged numerous acts of harassment. But he did not sufficiently establish his case that Ms. Venn’s conduct caused him substantial emotional distress

. The

“ s ubstantial emotional distress” that is necessary to support a stalking injunction is greater than just an ordinary feeling of distress. Burroughs v. Corey , 92 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1205 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (“U nder Florida law, a reasonable person does not suffer substantial emotional distress easily.” )

, aff’d , 647 Fed. Appx. 967 (11th Cir. 2016). And here, n either t he petition , nor Ms. Venn’s testimony at the hearing
, support the conclu sion that her alleged conduct would have caused a reasonable person in Mr. Fowlkes’s situation to experience substantial emotional distress as required to obtain a permanent stalking injunction. See Mitchell v. Brogden

, 249 So. 3d 781, 782 (Fla. 1st DCA 20 18) (listing cases with similar facts where the statutory standard was not met). Certainly Mr. Fowlkes’s petition
, and its description of the years after his personal relationship ended with Ms. Venn
, shows that he is annoyed, frustrated, and feeling harassed in his dealings with Ms. Venn
, and with the pending child support issue relating to their daughter . B ut his petition and the se circumstances do not demonstrat e that Ms. Venn’s actions would have caused an objective, reasonable person in his situat ion to suffer substantial emotional distress

. Accordingly, the final judgment is reversed. *

R EVERSED

.

B.L. T HOMAS , C.J.

, and O STERHAUS and B ILBREY , J J
., concur

.

* We also reject Mr. Fowlkes’s preservation argument s, because Ms. Venn clearly expressed her objection s to the entry of the injunction at the hearing below

.4 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________

William S. Graessle and Jonathan W. Graessle, William S. Graessle, P.A.

, Jacksonville
, for Appellant.

Rebecca B. Creed and Thomas A. Burns, Creed & Gowdy, P.A.

, Jacksvonville
, for Appellee.