Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 44 / Tuesday, March 7, 1995 / Notices 12581

NRC Evaluation of Licensee’s Request for

Mitigation

With respect to the Licensee’s argument

that aggregating Violations I.A and I.B is

inappropriate, the NRC concluded, as

described above, that Violation I.B occurred

as stated. The NRC determined that

Violations I.A and I.B were related in that

they have the same fundamental underlying

cause and similar programmatic deficiencies,

namely, the lack of management attention to

NCS controls. Violation I.A involved

exceeding a NCS limit. Violation I.B was

issued for failure to consider process

conditions and known modes of failure in the

NCS analysis. These are two different issues

in NCS controls and two different license

requirements. Therefore, the NRC concludes

both that aggregating Violations I.A and I.B

as a Severity Level III was appropriate

regardless of the time period between the two

violations and that an escalated enforcement

action was warranted.

With regard to the Licensee’s disagreement

with NRC statements, the NRC notes that

there are 17 documented Licensee violations

of NRC requirements involving NCS controls

over the past two years. Despite these noted

numerous weaknesses, the Licensee’s NCS

evaluations and analyses have not been

adequately strengthened as evidenced by the

failures described in NRC inspection reports

70–27/94–12, 94–15, and 94–16. These

violations and other weaknesses clearly

represent continued poor performance and

inadequate management attention because

the Licensee has not sufficiently improved its

performance over the past two years to

prevent recurring problems in the area of

NCS. Furthermore, the Licensee’s argument

regarding the function of the NLB is narrow

and does not support the Licensee’s

statements that extensive management

attention has been placed in this area to

ensure identification and correction of NCS

problems. While the NRC acknowledges that

some management attention has been

directed toward identifying and correcting

NCS problems, Licensee management must

ensure that proper NCS controls and

oversight are in place and are adhered to, and

that NCS problems are thoroughly

investigated to ensure that effective

corrective actions are in place to prevent

such problems from recurring or leading to

other problems.

The NRC neither escalated nor mitigated

for the identification factor because while the

NRC recognizes that the Licensee identified

Violation I.A, the Licensee should note that

the NRC identified Violation I.B. In addition,

Section VI of the Enforcement Policy states,

in part, that a ‘‘self-disclosing’ event as used

in this policy statement means an event that

is readily obvious by human observation

* * *’’ The Licensee’s Chemical Processing

operating procedures required operators to:

compare the amount of U–235 added to the

low-level dissolvers with the amount

removed, determine if the difference between

the two exceeded 40 percent and, if so, report

such excessive differences to management.

Also, the Licensee’s NCS limits required the

amount of U–235 in each low-level dissolver

zone be limited to 350 grams. Because the

license requires procedures and postings to

be followed and because doing so made the

350 gram limit violation readily obvious to

human observation, the event was correctly

categorized as self-disclosing.

Furthermore, Section VI of the

Enforcement Policy also states, in part, that

‘‘The base civil penalty may also be mitigated

up to 25% when the licensee identifies a

violation resulting from a self-disclosing

event where the licensee demonstrates

initiative in identifying the root cause of the

violation.’’ While the NRC acknowledged

that the Licensee identified inadequacies in

procedures, controls, and implementation

systems, the NRC maintains that the Licensee

did not demonstrate initiative in identifying

the root cause of the violations because its

analysis did not ask or answer why these

procedures, controls, and systems were

inadequate and what should be done to

prevent such recurrence. Specifically, NRC

involvement was needed before acceptable

corrective action was taken in that it was not

until NRC requested and conducted a

management meeting with the Licensee on

August 3, 1994, that the Licensee agreed to

evaluate the series of incidents that had been

occurring in an attempt to uncover the

underlying generic root cause(s).

With regard to the corrective action factor,

the NRC acknowledged that the Licensee

took some immediate corrective actions to

stop operations of the low-level dissolver and

formed an incident review team to review the

event in detail and determine appropriate

corrective actions. The NRC did give the

Licensee credit for these corrective actions in

that escalation for this factor was not applied.

However, the NRC affirms that full mitigation

for this factor is not warranted because: (1)

The Licensee did not demonstrate initiative

in identifying the root cause of the violations

because NRC involvement was needed before

adequate actions were taken; (2) the

Licensee’s initial long term corrective actions

were not comprehensive; and (3) the

Licensee’s development of long term

corrective actions was not timely.

As noted earlier, it was not until NRC

requested and conducted a management

meeting that the Licensee agreed to evaluate

the series of incidents in an attempt to

identify the root cause. The results of that

evaluation were discussed in a management

meeting on November 16, 1994, and were

submitted by the Licensee on November 20,

1994, as an attachment to the Licensee’s

reply to the Notice. Furthermore, on July 8,

1994, as the NRC’s Augmented Inspection

Team discussed its findings with Licensee

management, the Licensee was requested to

submit a copy of its investigation team

findings, including corrective actions, to the

NRC. The Licensee stated that the report

would be completed and made available to

the NRC on or about August 5, 1994.

However, the report was not completed and

made available to the NRC until September

23, 1994, after the enforcement conference.

During the enforcement conference, NRC

asked the Licensee for a time schedule for

implementing the corrective actions

discussed by the Licensee at the conference.

More than two months after the low-level

dissolver event, the Licensee did not have

long-term corrective action time schedules

firmly in place.

Regarding the prior opportunity to identify

factor, the NRC believes that effective

corrective action, if taken, for events

occurring in March 1989 and February 1994,

which revealed weaknesses in the drum

counter measurement system, could have

prevented the June 1994 event. Specifically,

if the Licensee had adequately reviewed the

effect on NCS of items or processes that were

using drum counter measurement results and

implemented effective corrective actions, the

June 1994 event could have been prevented.

Following the March 1989 and February 1994

events, a formal incident review and root

cause analysis were not performed and

corrective actions were not taken. The NRC

expects licensees to learn from their mistakes

and implement adequate and effective

corrective actions to prevent recurrence. In

its answer to the Notice, the Licensee

acknowledges that its corrective actions

would have prevented the low-level

dissolution violation had they been followed.

The NRC concludes that the escalation and

mitigation factors were applied appropriately

and in accordance with the Enforcement

Policy.

NRC Conclusion

The NRC concludes that Violations I.B.1,

I.B.2, and II.C occurred as stated, that

Violations I.A and I.B were appropriately

categorized as a Severity Level III problem,

and that an adequate basis for mitigation of

the proposed civil penalty was not provided

by the Licensee. Consequently, the proposed

civil penalty in the amount of $37,500 should

be imposed by Order.

[FR Doc. 95–5495 Filed 3–6–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND

BUDGET

Office of Federal Financial

Management

Proposed Rescission of OMB Circular

A–73

AGENCY: Office of Management and

Budget, Office of Federal Financial

Management.

ACTION: Notice of Proposed Rescission of

OMB Circular A–73.

SUMMARY: Publication of OMB’s

intention to rescind Circular A–73.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Suzanne Murrin, OMB, Office of Federal

Financial Management, (202) 395–6911.

Dated: February 28, 1995.

John B. Arthur,

Associate Director for Administration.

Office of Management and Budget

Rescission of OMB Circulars

AGENCY: Office of Management and

Budget.

ACTION: Notice of Proposed Rescission of

OMB Circular A–73.
12582 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 44 / Tuesday, March 7, 1995 / Notices

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that

OMB intends to rescind Circular No. A–

73, Audit of Federal Operations and

Programs. The current circular codifies

what are now common audit practices

throughout the Federal Government and

extends the application of certain

principles in the Inspector General Act

of 1978 (IG Act) to those agencies not

covered by the IG Act. Circular No. A–

73 is unnecessary because: (1) Its audit

policy direction is largely hortatory and

(2) the IG Act has been expanded in

1988 amendments to cover almost all

Federal entities of significant size.

DATES: Persons who wish to comment

on the proposed rescission of Circular

No. A–73 should submit their comments

no later than April 7, 1995. The

rescission will take place May 22, 1995,

unless the comments raise significant

concerns regarding the proposed

rescission.

ADDRESSES: Comments should be

addressed to: Suzanne Murrin, Office of

Federal Financial Management, Office

of Management and Budget, New

Executive Office Building, 725 17th

Street, NW, Room 6025, Washington,

DC 20503.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For

further information on the proposed

rescission of Circular No. A–73, contact

Suzanne Murrin on (202) 395–6911. For

further information on OMB’s overall

review of its circulars, contact Frank J.

Seidl, III, Staff Assistant, on (202) 395–

5146; or Rosalyn J. Rettman, Associate

General Counsel for Budget on (202)

395–5600.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

Director of the Office of Management

and Budget (OMB) has initiated a

systematic review of all OMB circulars,

as part of efforts to reduce unnecessary

Government directives. As part of this

initiative, each OMB circular is being

reviewed to see whether it should be

rescinded or whether its requirements

can be simplified.

[FR Doc. 95–5489 Filed 3–6–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3110–01–M

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

[Docket No. 301–92]

Termination of Section 301

Investigation and Action Regarding the

People’s Republic of China’s

Protection of Intellectual Property and

Provision and Market Access to

Persons Who Rely on Intellectual

Property Protection

AGENCY: Office of the United States

Trade Representative.

ACTION: Termination of investigation of

certain acts, policies and practices of the

Peoples’ Republic of China (China)

initiated under section 302 of the Trade

Act of 1974, as amended (Trade Act);

termination of action pursuant to

section 301 of the Trade Act; monitoring

of trade agreement under section 306 of

the Trade Act; revocation of priority

foreign country identification under

section 182(c)(1)(B) of the Trade Act;

and requests for public comment.

SUMMARY: On February 4, 1995, the

United States Trade Representative

(USTR) determined pursuant to section

304(a)(1)(A) of the Trade Act that

certain acts, policies and practices of

China with respect to the enforcement

of intellectual property rights and the

provision of market access to persons

who rely on intellectual property

protection are unreasonable and

constitute a burden or restriction on

U.S. commerce. The USTR also

determined pursuant to section

304(a)(1)(B) and 301(b) that action in the

form of increasing duties on certain

products of China to 100 percent ad

valorem was appropriate. 60 FR 7230

(February 7, 1995). Having reached a

satisfactory resolution of the issues

under investigation, the USTR has

determined to: (1) Terminate this

section 301 investigation; (2) monitor

implementation of the agreement under

section 306 of the Trade Act; (3)

terminate the action ordered pursuant to

section 301 with respect to raising tariffs

on certain products originating in

China; and (4) revoke China’s

identification as a priority foreign

country under section 182 of the Trade

Act. Public comments will be accepted

on the decision to terminate the action

ordered pursuant to section 301.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The modification of the

Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the

United States (HTS) described below is

effective with respect to imports

entered, or withdrawn from warehouse

for consumption, on or after February

26, 1995. The determinations to

terminate the action taken under section

301 and revoke China’s status as a

priority foreign country were made by

the USTR on February 26, 1995. Written

comments from interested persons are

due by noon on Friday, March 10, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Section 301 Committee,

Office of the United States Trade

Representative, Room 223, 600 17th

Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20506.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Deborah Lehr, Director for China and

Mongolian Affairs (202) 395–5050, or

Thomas Robertson, Assistant General

Counsel (202) 395–6800.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June

30, 1994, China was identified as a

priority foreign country under the

‘‘special 301’’ provisions of the Trade

Act for its failure to enforce intellectual

property rights or to provide fair and

equitable market access to persons who

rely on intellectual property protection.

On the same day, the USTR initiated an

investigation of those acts, policies and

practices of China that were the basis for

its identification as a priority foreign

country (PFC) under section 182(c)(1)(B)

of the Trade Act. 59 FR 35558 (July 12,

1994).

On December 31, 1994, the USTR

extended the investigation until

February 4, 1995, and sought public

comment on proposed determinations

under section 304(a)(1). 60 FR 1829

(January 5, 1995). On February 4, 1995,

the USTR determined that the acts,

policies and practices of the Chinese

government at issue in the investigation

are unreasonable and constitute a

burden or restriction on U.S. commerce.

The USTR also determined that the

appropriate action in response was to

impose duties of 100 percent ad valorem

on certain Chinese-origin products that

were entered, or withdrawn from

warehouse for consumption, on or after

February 26, 1995. 60 FR 7230

(February 7, 1995).

After extensive negotiations, the

United States and China entered into an

exchange of letters (including an Action

Plan for the Effective Protection and

Enforcement of Intellectual Property

Rights) by which China will address the

issues raised by the United States in the

negotiations. Under the agreement,

China will, among other things,

establish a system at the central,

provincial and local levels to provide

strong, transparent and responsive

enforcement of intellectual property

rights; initiate a special enforcement

period during which enhanced

resources will be allocated to the

enforcement of intellectual property

rights; establish an effective border

enforcement regime; ensure the

transparency of its legal regime,