COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Annunziata and 

 Bumgardner 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

CLIFTON A. FRANKLIN 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1045-97-4 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 APRIL 14, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 

 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 

 DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 

ex rel. MARIE CATHERINE FRANKLIN 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

Paul F. Sheridan, Judge 

 Ted Kavrukov (Kavrukov, Mehrotra & DiJoseph, 

on briefs), for appellant. 

 William K. Wetzonis, Special Counsel 

(Nancy J. Crawford, Regional Special Counsel; 

Keith H. Warren, Special Counsel; Richard 

Cullen, Attorney General; William H. Hurd, 

Deputy Attorney General; Robert J. Cousins, 

Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General; 

Craig M. Burshem, Regional Special Counsel, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Clifton A. Franklin (husband) appeals the circuit court's 

order to pay child and spousal support. Husband argues the trial 

court erred in: (1) finding that the service of process for the 

juvenile and domestic relations district court proceedings was 

sufficient; (2) finding that the trial court and the Division of 

Child Support Enforcement have jurisdiction over the person of 

husband; and (3) reversing the administrative hearing officer's 

finding vacating the Administrative Support Order (ASO). For the 

following reasons, we affirm the trial court's order. 
 2 

I. Background 

 Husband and Marie Catherine Franklin (wife) were married in 

California in 1981. They have two children: Lloyd, born 

December 14, 1981, and Armelle, born September 15, 1985. Wife 

testified the parties moved to Virginia in January 1991 and lived 

here for three months, their last domicile prior to their move 

overseas. Husband denied ever having resided in Virginia. 

Husband obtained employment with John Snow, Inc. (JSI), a 

Boston-based company, and he signed his employment contract at 

the JSI field office in Arlington, Virginia in the fall of 1990. 

 Husband's job took the family to Africa, where they lived from 

March 1991 until January 1994. 

 While the parties lived in Africa, their relationship 

deteriorated and resulted in several physical altercations. 

Eventually, husband ordered wife and the children to leave their 

home. Wife went to the American Embassy for assistance in 

returning to the United States. JSI, husband's employer, paid 

travel expenses for the three family members, and they arrived at 

Dulles Airport in Virginia in January 1994. Wife stayed with the 

children in a Washington, D.C., hotel for a week and then moved 

to Arlington, Virginia. They have remained residents of Virginia 

since that time. After wife and the children returned to 

Virginia, the parties orally agreed that husband would pay child 

support, and he did so. 

 On April 22, 1994, wife applied for assistance from the 
 3 

Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE) to establish a child 

support order against husband. On January 11, 1995, DCSE issued 

an ASO that required husband to pay $1,111 per month in child 

support and established a debt of $2,622 owed to the Commonwealth 

for the public assistance received by wife. Husband was served 

with the ASO by certified mail, return receipt, pursuant to Code 

§ 63.1-252.1.1

 Meanwhile, on October 19, 1994, wife appeared before the 

juvenile and domestic relations (JDR) district court and obtained 

an ex parte emergency custody order preventing either parent from 

removing the children from Virginia. The JDR court scheduled a 

hearing for the following day, at which time husband, by counsel, 

entered a special appearance to contest the jurisdiction of the 

court to enter any orders. Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody 

Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Code § 20-126,2 the JDR court assumed 

 

 1"The Commissioner shall initiate proceedings by issuing 

notice containing the administrative support order which shall 

become effective unless timely contested. The notice shall be 

served upon the debtor (i) in accordance with the provisions of 

§§ 8.01-296, 8.01-327 or § 8.01-329 or (ii) by certified mail, 

return receipt requested, or service may be waived." Code 

§ 63.1-252.1. 

 2"A court of this Commonwealth which is competent to decide 

child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody 

determination by initial or modification decree if: 

1. This Commonwealth (i) is the home state of the child at the 

time of commencement of the proceeding . . . or 

2. It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this 

Commonwealth assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his 

parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a 

significant connection with this Commonwealth, and (ii) there is 

available in this Commonwealth substantial evidence concerning 

the child's present or future care, protection, training, and 

personal relationships . . . ." Code § 20-126(A). 
 4 

jurisdiction to decide custody and issued an emergency order. 

 On November 16, 1994, wife filed a notice for an additional 

hearing in the JDR court to determine temporary custody. In her 

affidavit, wife stated that copies of the notice had been sent by 

registered mail to the JSI corporate office in Boston, to JSI 

field offices in Arlington, Virginia, and Bamako, Mali, to 

husband's work station in Bamako, Mali, and to husband's counsel 

in Arlington, Virginia. Neither husband nor his counsel appeared 

to contest custody, and the JDR court granted temporary custody 

to wife. 

 On February 8, 1995, husband's counsel filed a "limited 

appearance" praecipe in the JDR court. In an order entered 

February 14, 1995, the court, upon husband's oral motion 

requesting relief, ordered telephone access to and summer 

visitation with the children. In addition, upon wife's oral 

motion to join the issues of child and spousal support, the JDR 

court ordered the parties to submit points and authorities 

regarding the court's jurisdiction over husband to hear issues 

other than custody and visitation. The question of jurisdiction 

was continued to March 8, 1995. 

 After the March 8, 1995 hearing, the JDR court entered an 

order on May 10, 1995, which granted custody to wife, granted 

visitation to husband, and stated "that the parties recognize 

that all child support issues are currently being handled by DCSE 

administratively." 
 5 

 Meanwhile, on February 23, 1995, DCSE ordered JSI to 

withhold child support from husband's earnings. Husband appealed 

the withholding-from-earnings order to an administrative hearing 

officer, contending the underlying ASO was invalid for lack of 

jurisdiction over husband. The ASO's administrative 

determination itself was never appealed. On June 13, 1995, the 

hearing officer reversed the ASO, finding that DCSE had "no 

jurisdiction administratively." 

 On July 18, 1995, wife appealed the hearing officer's 

decision to the JDR court and also filed a motion for spousal 

support. The JDR court notified husband of the appeal pursuant 

to Code § 63.1-268.1. On July 25, 1995, husband's counsel again 

entered a praecipe for a special appearance. The appeal was 

scheduled for August 1, 1995, but was dismissed without prejudice 

due to wife's failure to appear. 

 On August 3, 1995, husband filed a petition for a rule to 

show cause against wife for violations of the JDR court's 

visitation order of May 10, 1995. Wife agreed that she would not 

interfere with husband's telephone contact with the children, and 

husband withdrew his petition. 

 On December 20, 1995, after a hearing on wife's petition for 

pendente lite support, the JDR court awarded temporary child 

support, finding that: (1) husband's "request for visitation 

. . . coupled with [his] request for a Show Cause Rule on this 

issue of visitation, constitutes a waiver of [his] objection to 
 6 

this Court's jurisdiction over his person;" (2) "the issue of 

child support is now ripe for adjudication, the administrative 

process of the [DCSE] having been exhausted;" and (3) "over 

[husband's] objection, this court has personal and subject matter 

jurisdiction." On July 1, 1996, the JDR court awarded spousal 

support of $500 per month for eighteen months and $1,230 per 

month child support. Husband appealed this order to the circuit 

court on the issue of jurisdiction. 

 The circuit court heard the case de novo on December 17, 

1996. At the hearing, husband testified that he did not demand, 

suggest, urge, advise, or insist that wife and the children move 

to Virginia. Husband claimed his only connection with Virginia 

was that his former employer, JSI, (he had since been terminated) 

had a branch office in Arlington which arranged the family's 

travel to Africa in 1990 and forwarded their mail to Africa while 

they were there. Additionally, husband testified that he never 

resided, owned property, paid taxes, or obtained a driver's 

license in Virginia and that he has only been physically present 

in Virginia three times in the last five years. 

 The circuit court found that husband caused wife and the 

children to leave their home in Africa, and, although "he did not 

direct [wife and the children] to go anywhere," wife's decision 

to reside in Virginia was "completely logical because it provided 

the nexus to the employer's office . . . . It provided a conduit 

for communication, whether or not it was used, between the 
 7 

company, the mother, and the father of these two children." The 

circuit court found that wife's decision to leave Africa and 

reside in Virginia with the children was "the result of the acts 

of the father" and that exercise of personal jurisdiction was 

proper under Code § 20-88.35(5).3

 Additionally, the circuit 

court reversed the hearing officer's decision, finding that the 

ASO was valid under Code § 20-88.35(5). Husband filed a motion 

for reconsideration which the circuit court denied on May 9, 

1997. 

II. Standard Of Review 

 "In its deliberation concerning a child's welfare, including 

its determination of jurisdictional and enforcement issues, the 

trial court must make the child's best interests its primary 

concern." Johnson v. Johnson, 26 Va. App. 135, 144, 493 S.E.2d 

668, 672 (1997). "[T]rial courts are vested with broad 

discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to 

foster a child's best interests." Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 

326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). "'A trial court's 

determination of matters within its discretion is reversible on 

appeal only for an abuse of that discretion.'" Commonwealth ex 

rel. Ewing v. Ewing, 22 Va. App. 466, 473, 470 S.E.2d 608, 612 

(1996) (quoting Farley, 9 Va. App. at 328, 387 S.E.2d at 795). 

 

 3"In a proceeding to establish, enforce, or modify a support 

order or to determine parentage, a tribunal of this Commonwealth 

may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual 

. . . [if the] child resides in this Commonwealth as a result of 

the acts or directives of the individual." Code § 20-88.35(5). 
 8 

"[W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 

prevailing below, giving it all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom." Winfield v. Urquhart, 25 Va. App. 688, 

690, 492 S.E.2d 464, 465 (1997). "'Where a trial court makes a 

determination which is adequately supported by the record, the 

determination must be affirmed.'" Haase v. Haase, 20 Va. App. 

671, 684, 460 S.E.2d 585, 591 (1995) (citation omitted). 

III. Jurisdiction Over Husband 

 Husband first argues that service upon him under the Uniform 

Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) did not give the trial 

court the authority to enter a support award against him. We 

agree. The language of the UCCJA is clear: "'Custody 

determination' means a court decision and court orders and 

decrees providing for the custody of a child, including 

visitation rights; it does not include a decision relating to 

child support or any other monetary obligation of any person." 

Code § 20-125(2). "[T]his section limits the application of Code 

§ 20-126 to child custody matters only, not child support." 

Johns v. Johns, 5 Va. App. 494, 496, 364 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1988). 

 However, this conclusion does not end our inquiry. Although 

personal jurisdiction under the UCCJA was limited to issues of 

custody and visitation, the trial court found jurisdiction over 

husband for support issues under the Uniform Interstate Family 

Support Act (UIFSA).4

 "In a proceeding to establish . . . a 

 

 4Code § 20-88.32 et seq. 
 9 

support order . . . a tribunal of this Commonwealth may exercise 

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual . . . [if 

the] child resides in this Commonwealth as a result of the acts 

or directives of the individual." Code § 20-88.35(5). 

 The scope of Code § 20-88.35(5) is an issue of first 

impression in Virginia. Although the UIFSA has been widely 

adopted, our sister states also have yet to rule specifically on 

this provision. Husband contends the plain meaning of this 

provision confers jurisdiction over an individual who has done an 

affirmative act, exerted power or influence, or given 

instructions, orders, or commands to his children and spouse to 

go and reside in a particular geographical location. Since 

husband never specifically directed wife to move to Virginia, he 

argues that Virginia courts failed to obtain jurisdiction over 

him under Code § 20-88.35(5). We disagree. 

 In support of his position, husband cites several cases 

decided under a similar provision predating the UIFSA in Texas in 

which courts declined to exercise jurisdiction over fathers of 

resident children. See Miles v. Perroncel, 598 So.2d 662 (La. 

App. 1992) (interpreting the Texas statute and declining to 

exercise jurisdiction over father who failed to object when 

mother moved child out of state); Ford v. Durham, 624 S.W.2d 737 

(Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (no jurisdiction over father who acquiesced 

to mother's move with child); Bergdoll v. Whitley, 598 S.W.2d 932 

(Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (father's continued court-ordered support 
 10 

payments after ex-wife moved to Texas with children did not 

confer personal jurisdiction). However, in each of these cases, 

the children resided in Texas after their mother chose to move 

out of state without any urging from their fathers. 

 In the instant case, wife made no such choice. After 

several physical altercations, husband ordered wife and the 

children from their home in Africa. They had to go somewhere. 

Wife sought emergency assistance from the American embassy and 

husband's employer. As a result of this assistance, she and the 

children returned to the United States. Wife established a 

permanent home for herself and the children in Virginia, the 

family's home immediately prior to their departure for Africa, 

the point of entry for her return to this country, and the 

location of husband's employer's field office in charge of 

distributing his mail. We hold that husband's children became 

residents of this Commonwealth as a result of his acts, and 

Virginia properly exercised jurisdiction over his person. 

 Husband's contention that unless he directed wife to this 

Commonwealth, Virginia courts may not exercise personal 

jurisdiction in support matters, is overly restrictive. If 

widely adopted, such a construction would leave spouses similarly 

situated without a forum in which to request child and spousal 

support. "'It is the legal and moral duty of a [spouse] to 

support his [or her] . . . family consistent with his [or her] 

financial ability.'" L.C.S. v. S.A.S., 19 Va. App. 709, 715, 453 
 11 

S.E.2d 580, 583 (1995) (citation omitted). To allow husband to 

escape his support obligations merely because he failed to 

dictate the specific destination when he ordered his family to 

leave the marital home would frustrate the purpose of the 

legislature in enacting the Uniform Interstate Family Support 

Act. See Johns, 5 Va. App. at 495, 364 S.E.2d at 776 ("The 

purpose of RURESA [the predecessor statute to UIFSA] is to create 

an economical and expedient means of enforcing support orders for 

parties located in different states. The act is remedial in 

nature and should be liberally construed so that its purpose is 

achieved."). 

 Additionally, the JDR court found personal jurisdiction on 

alternative grounds. Code § 20-88.35(2) provides that courts may 

exercise personal jurisdiction over an individual for support 

purposes if "[t]he individual submits to the jurisdiction of this 

Commonwealth . . . by entering a general appearance, or by filing 

a responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest to 

personal jurisdiction." "An appearance for any other purpose 

than questioning the jurisdiction of the court . . . is general, 

although accompanied by the claim that the appearance is only 

special." 2A Michie's Jurisprudence of Virginia and West 

Virginia, Appearances, § 4 (1997). Several states have held that 

a request for affirmative relief constitutes a general appearance 

and waives all objections to defects in service, process or 

personal jurisdiction. See Weierman v. Wood Landscaping, 630 
 12 

N.E.2d 1298 (Ill. App. 1994) (pleading to vacate default 

judgments was general appearance which waived objection to 

process defects and submitted defendant to jurisdiction); In re 

Marriage of Stafeil, 523 N.E.2d 1003 (Ill. App. 1988) (motion to 

vacate temporary custody order waived special appearance); 

Norwood v. Craig, 658 So.2d 212 (La. App. 1995) (motion for 

continuance in child support action submitted father to 

jurisdiction of court); Bullard v. Bader, 450 S.E.2d 757 (N.C. 

App. 1994) (father's submission of visitation and income 

information waived his special appearance and his defense of lack 

of personal jurisdiction). 

 In the instant case, husband filed a petition for a rule to 

show cause on August 3, 1995, at a time when the issues of 

custody and support were properly before the JDR court. At the 

subsequent pendente lite hearing in December 1995, the JDR court 

found that husband's request for relief waived his special 

appearance and his jurisdiction defense. We agree and hold that 

by making a request for affirmative relief, husband entered a 

general appearance and submitted himself to the authority of the 

court.5

 

 5Husband further contends he lacks the minimum contacts with 

Virginia necessary for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 

"'[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which 

the defendant purposefully avails [him]self of the privilege of 

conducting activities within'" Virginia. Kulko v. Superior 

Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) (citation omitted). We have held 

that husband's acts resulted in the children's residence in 

Virginia. These contacts, combined with husband's motion for 

visitation and petition for a rule to show cause, each a request 

for affirmative relief from a Virginia court, satisfy this 
 13 

IV. Administrative Support Order 

 Husband also contends the circuit court erred in reversing 

the hearing officer's determination that the ASO was invalid. He 

claims DCSE lacked jurisdiction over him and that service under 

Code § 63.1-252.1 was improper. We disagree.6

 Code § 63.1-252.1 provides: 

 In the absence of [a court order for support 

of a child], the Commissioner may, pursuant 

to this chapter, proceed against a person 

whose support debt has accrued or is accruing 

based upon payment of public assistance or 

who has a responsibility for the support of 

any dependent child or children and their 

caretaker. 

In the case of out-of-state obligors and in the absence of a 

court order, DCSE "may establish an administrative support order 

. . . if the obligor and the obligee maintained a matrimonial 

domicile within the Commonwealth." Code § 63.1-250.1(G). In 

these circumstances, notice containing the ASO may be served upon 

the debtor by certified mail, return receipt requested. See Code 

§§ 63.1-250.1(G), -252.1. 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to wife, 

 

standard. 

 6We note that husband appeals the withholding-from-earnings 

order on the ground that the underlying ASO is invalid for want 

of jurisdiction. The grounds for appeal of a 

withholding-from-earnings order are limited to a mistake of fact. 

See Code § 63.1-250.3(B). The proper avenue to contest 

jurisdiction is to appeal the initial ASO pursuant to Code 

§ 63.1-252.1. 

Consequently, we reject husband's formulation and instead address 

the jurisdictional validity of the ASO directly. 
 14 

the party prevailing below, the record establishes that the 

parties lived in Virginia immediately before they departed for 

Africa. The record further reveals that DCSE served notice of 

the ASO on husband in Africa by certified mail, return receipt 

requested, and that husband signed for the letter, acknowledging 

receipt. Therefore, we hold that DCSE had jurisdiction to issue 

the ASO, that husband was properly served, and that he had actual 

notice of the support order. For the foregoing reasons, the 

judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.