12578 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 44 / Tuesday, March 7, 1995 / Notices

supervisor for their apparent violations

of 10 CFR 50.7; (2) institute sanctions

against his first line supervisor, NU, and

the Millstone Unit 1 organization for

engaging in deliberate misconduct in

violation of 10 CFR 50.5; and (3) remove

his first line supervisor from his

position until a ‘‘satisfactory solution to

the falsifying of nuclear documents’’ by

this individual can be achieved. As

grounds for these requests, the

Petitioner asserts that (1) his first line

supervisor willfully falsified nuclear

documents in that he signed off on a

surveillance of the gas turbine battery as

having met acceptance criteria when the

requirements had not been met; (2) he

was ‘‘unjustly chastised’’ by his first

line supervisor and department manager

about absenteeism, and his department

manager threatened him in a

memorandum; and (3) the Unit 1

organization failed to enter into a fourday limiting condition for operation as

required by technical specifications

when the operations department was

notified of the failed surveillance, in

violation of 10 CFR 50.5. In addition,

the Petitioner asserts that a number of

violations occurred in 1992 and 1993

with regard to the emergency gas

turbine battery, which have not been

handled appropriately by the NRC and

NU, and that the utility and NRC are

engaged in an apparent ‘‘cover-up’’ of

the problems.

By Petition dated January 5, 1995, the

Petitioner requests that the NRC

institute sanctions against his

department manager, first line

supervisor, and two coworkers for

engaging in deliberate misconduct in

violation of 10 CFR 50.5. The Petitioner

also asserts that the NRC ‘‘desperately

needs to conduct an investigation’’ of

the procedure violations, and to audit

the Unit 1 maintenance department

measuring and test equipment (M&TE)

folders to reveal widespread problems

regarding noncompliance with this

procedure. As grounds for this request,

the Petitioner describes several

examples of what he alleges have been

violations of procedure WC–8, which

requires that M&TE be signed out from

and returned to a custodian.

By Petition dated January 8, 1995, the

Petitioner requests that the NRC

institute at least three sanctions against

his department manager, and institute

sanctions against his coworker and

maintenance first line supervisor for

engaging in deliberate misconduct in

violation of 10 CFR 50.5. As grounds for

this request, the Petitioner alleges that

on numerous occasions since January

1994, his department manager

instructed his coworkers to shut off or

turn down the volume on the site paging

system and site siren evacuation alarm

in the Unit 1 maintenance shop, and his

first line supervisor and coworker

complied with this request, in violation

of Technical Specification 6.8.1 and

NUREG–0654.

The requests are being treated

pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the

Commission’s regulations. The requests

have been referred to the Director of the

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Copies of the Petitions are available

for inspection at the Commission’s

Public Document Room at 2120 L Street,

NW, Washington, DC, and at the local

public document room for Millstone

Unit 1 located at the Learning Resource

Center, Three Rivers CommunityTechnical College, Thames Valley

Campus, 574 New London Turnpike,

Norwich, CT 06360.

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 23rd day of

February 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William T. Russell,

Director, Office of the Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–5494 Filed 3–6–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket No. 70–27 and License No. SNM–

42 EA 94–169]

Babcock and Wilcox Company,

Lynchburg, Virginia; Order Imposing

Civil Monetary Penalty

I

Babcock and Wilcox Company

(Licensee) is the holder of Special

Nuclear Material (SNM) License No.

SNM–42 issued by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC or

Commission) on May 31, 1984. The

license authorizes the Licensee to

possess and use Special Nuclear

Material in accordance with the

conditions specified therein.

II

Inspections of the Licensee’s activities

were conducted on June 1–July 1, 1994,

July 1–8, 1994, and July 1—August 9,

1994. The results of these inspections

indicated that the Licensee had not

conducted its activities in full

compliance with NRC requirements. A

written Notice of Violation and

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty

(Notice) was served upon the Licensee

by letter dated October 21, 1994. The

Notice states the nature of the

violations, the provisions of the NRC’s

requirements that the Licensee had

violated, and the amount of the civil

penalty proposed for Violations I.A and

I.B.

The Licensee responded to the Notice

in two letters, both dated November 20,

1994. In its responses, the Licensee

protested the proposed imposition of

the civil penalty, disagreed with NRC

statements concluding that the

violations represented a Severity Level

III problem, denied Violations I.B.1,

I.B.2, and II.C, and disagreed with the

application of the escalation and

mitigation factors.

III

After consideration of the Licensee’s

responses and the statements of fact,

explanation, and argument for

mitigation contained therein, the NRC

staff has determined, as set forth in the

Appendix to this Order, that the

violations occurred as stated and that

the penalty proposed for the violations

designated in the Notice should be

imposed.

IV

In view of the foregoing and pursuant

to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C.

2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, it is hereby

ordered that:

The Licensee pay a civil penalty in the

amount of $37,500 within 30 days of the date

of this order, by check, draft, money order,

or electronic transfer, payable to the

Treasurer of the United States and mailed to

Mr. James Lieberman, Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, One White Flint North, 11555

Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852–2738.

V

The Licensee may request a hearing

within 30 days of the date of this Order.

A request for a hearing should be clearly

marked as a ‘‘Request for an

Enforcement Hearing’’ and shall be

addressed to the Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555,

with a copy to the Commission’s

Document Control Desk, Washington,

DC 20555. Copies also shall be sent to

the Assistant General Counsel for

Hearings and Enforcement at the same

address and to the Regional

Administrator, NRC Region II, 101

Marietta Street, NW., Suite 2900,

Atlanta, GA 30323.

If a hearing is requested, the

Commission will issue an Order

designating the time and place of the

hearing. If the Licensee fails to request

a hearing within 30 days of the date of

the order, the provisions of this Order

shall be effective without further

proceedings. If payment has not been

made by that time, the matter may be

referred to the Attorney General for

collection.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 44 / Tuesday, March 7, 1995 / Notices 12579

In the event the Licensee requests a

hearing as provided above, the issues to

be considered at such hearing shall be:

(a) Whether the Licensee was in violation

of the Commission’s requirements set forth in

Violations I.B.1 and I.B.2, as set forth in the

Notice, and

(b) Whether, on the basis of such violations

and the additional violations set forth in

Section I of the Notice that the Licensee

admitted, this Order should be sustained.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 27th day

of February 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Hugh L. Thompson, Jr.,

Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear

Materials Safety, Safeguards and Operations

Support.

Appendix—Evaluations and Conclusion

On October 21, 1994, a Notice of Violation

and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty

(Notice) was issued for violations identified

during NRC inspections conducted on June

1–July 1, 1994, July 1–8, 1994, and July 1–

August 9, 1994. Babcock and Wilcox Naval

Nuclear Fuel Division (Licensee) responded

to the Notice with a reply and an answer,

both dated November 20, 1994. The Licensee

admitted Violations I.A.1, I.A.2, II.A, and

II.B, denied Violations I.B.1, I.B.2, and II.C,

protested the proposed imposition of the

civil penalty, disagreed with NRC statements

concluding that the violations represented a

Severity Level III problem, and disagreed

with the application of the escalation and

mitigation factors. The NRC’s evaluations

and conclusion regarding the Licensee’s

requests are as follows:

I. Evaluation of Violations Assessed a Civil

Penalty

Restatement of Violation I.B.1

License Condition No. S–1 of SNM–42

requires that licensed material be used in

accordance with statements, representations,

and conditions contained in Sections I

through IV of the application dated February

22, 1982, and supplements thereto.

Section III, Paragraph 2.0, of the

application requires that the design of

equipment and establishment of operating

safety limits consider the pertinent process

conditions and known modes of failure.

Certain conditions may be deemed incredible

if specifically excluded by experimental

evidence or design considerations.

Section II, Paragraph 3.1, of the application

states that the Change Review Board (CRB)

reviews the effect on nuclear criticality

safety, radiation protection, and other

regulatory requirements of new and revised

facilities, equipment and processes involving

special nuclear material and ensures

appropriate safety controls are considered.

Contrary to the above, pertinent process

conditions and known modes of failure were

not adequately considered in establishing

operating safety controls or limits in that:

1. On June 7, 1990, the CRB reviewed and

approved License Evaluation Request 89–155

based on a nuclear criticality safety analysis

of acceptable material types, but failed to

consider pertinent process conditions related

to the operation of the drum counter system

that were not excluded by experimental

evidence or design considerations. This

resulted in a failure to accurately measure

quantities of U–235 in 2-liter bottles.

Summary of Licensee’s Response to Violation

I.B.1

In its reply to the Notice, the Licensee

denies that a violation occurred as stated.

The Licensee states that its nuclear criticality

safety (NCS) evaluation did consider

pertinent process conditions and known

modes of failure in establishing operating

safety limits for the low-level dissolution

process in Uranium Recovery, and that the

Nuclear Licensing Board (NLB), now CRB,

did review the effect on NCS from processing

materials measured by the drum counter in

low-level dissolution and did ensure that

appropriate safety controls were considered.

The Licensee states that its Licensee

Evaluation Request 89–155 was submitted,

evaluated, and approved only because of the

drum counter measurement problem which

resulted in the low-level dissolution NCS

limit being exceeded in 1989 and that the

purpose of the NCS evaluation and NLB

review and approval was to consider the

pertinent process conditions and known

modes of failure identified by the 1989

problem. The Licensee also states that the

violation statement that pertinent process

conditions and known modes of failure were

not considered cannot be true since these

were the only issues that were considered.

The Licensee further suggests that the

evaluation was adequate in that the LER

requested approval of processing only certain

material types in low-level dissolution based

on drum count measurements and only those

types were approved for processing based

upon the information in the LER. Further, the

Licensee states that none of these material

types were inaccurately measured by the

drum counter subsequent to the approval,

and the processing of these material types

did not result in NCS limit violations.

The Licensee states that the scope of the

LER was the use of drum counter

measurements to comply with NCS limits for

low-level dissolution and that no restraints

were placed on the measurement of materials

when the LER was approved; rather,

restraints were placed only on the use of the

measurements. The Licensee states that

restraints on measuring materials by drum

counting would be inappropriate. The

Licensee adds that the primary purpose of

the drum counter is to measure materials for

material control and accountability and that

the accuracy of the drum counter

measurements is not a safety issue unless the

measurements are used to meet safety limits.

The Licensee adds that the NLB

appropriately prohibited the use of the

measurements of certain material types to

meet safety limits for low-level dissolution,

but also appropriately did not prohibit the

measurement of any materials using the

drum counter.

NRC Evaluation of Licensee’s Response to

Violation I.B.1

The NRC does not agree with the

Licensee’s statements that the Licensee

considered pertinent process conditions and

known modes of failure in establishing

operating safety limits for the low-level

dissolution process in Uranium Recovery and

that the NLB reviewed the effect on NCS of

the approval of processing materials

measured by the drum counter in low-level

dissolution. The Licensee was presented with

a known mode of failure regarding a system

that was used to demonstrate compliance

with NCS limits. The known mode of failure

was that the drum counter measurements

could underestimate the amount of U–235 in

a container.

The Licensee failed to consider pertinent

process conditions such as scrap/waste

generation, packaging, labeling, and storage

that could affect the drum counter system’s

U–235 measurement accuracy and, therefore,

did not ensure that pertinent and appropriate

operating safety controls were considered to

prevent the known failure. Thus, the review

and approval of LER 89–155 was not

considered adequate in establishing

operating NCS controls or limits.

With respect to the Licensee’s statement

regarding the adequacy of its review of LER

89–155, the NRC notes that the review of the

specific items in the single LER as presented

may have been adequate for the very narrow

and limited conditions of the LER presented;

however, the license requires the Licensee to

consider pertinent process conditions and

known modes of failure in establishing NCS

safety controls and limits and the Licensee

failed to consider such conditions and

known modes of failure.

The NRC agrees with the Licensee’s

statement that the primary purpose of using

the drum counter is to measure materials for

material control and accountability.

However, in this case the Licensee was

relying on the drum counter measurements to

ensure that NCS limits were not exceeded.

Given the nature of the Licensee’s use of the

measurements, the Licensee did fail to

consider all failure modes that were not

specifically excluded by experimental

evidence or design considerations because,

despite the Licensee’s knowledge that drum

counter mesaurements were inaccurate, such

measurements were used for estimating

quantities of U–235 in 2-liter bottles.

The NRC concludes that the Licensee did

not provide bases to withdraw the violation;

therefore, the violation occurred as stated.

Restatement of Violation I.B.2

License Condition No. S–1 of SNM–42

requires that licensed material be used in

accordance with statements, representations,

and conditions contained in Sections I

through IV of the application dated February

22, 1982, and supplements thereto.

Section III, Paragraph 2.0, of the

application requires that the design of

equipment and establishment of operating

safety limits consider the pertinent process

conditions and known modes of failure.

Certain conditions may be deemed incredible

if specifically excluded by experimental

evidence or design considerations.

Section II, Paragraph 3.1, of the application

states that the Change Review Board (CRB)

reviews the effect on nuclear criticality

safety, radiation protection, and other
12580 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 44 / Tuesday, March 7, 1995 / Notices

regulatory requirements of new and revised

facilities, equipment and processes involving

special nuclear material and ensures

appropriate safety controls are considered.

Contrary to the above, pertinent process

conditions and known modes of failure were

not adequately considered in establishing

operating safety controls or limits in that:

2. From March 1989 through November

1990, the CRB reviewed drum counter

evaluations that revealed measurement

problems associated with material type and

container fill level, but failed to establish

requirements for remeasurement of materials

previously measured by the drum counter

and stored at the facility.

Summary of Licensee’s Response to Violation

I.B.2

In its reply to the Notice, the Licensee does

not agree that this violation relates to the

stated requirements. The Licensee further

states that the need for remeasurement of

materials in 1990 was neither a part of

equipment design or the establishment of

safety limits nor a part of the consideration

of safety controls for low-level dissolution.

The Licensee further states that the NLB is

chartered to review and approve new or

modified facilities, equipment, and processes

and that it is not chartered to investigate

safety problems or require actions to resolve

safety problems. The Licensee maintains that

the review and approval of changes to the

low-level dissolution process did not impact

the safety of material storage and, therefore,

the need for remeasurement of material was

not within the charter of the NLB.

The Licensee states that no information

was presented to the NLB which indicated a

need for remeasurement of scrap materials in

storage. The Licensee states that the materials

which were in storage and had not been

acceptably measured were never identified

during the evaluation, review, and approval

process, and, therefore, there appeared to be

no need for remeasurement.

The Licensee acknowledges that there were

deficiencies related to the problems

discussed, including the inaccurate

measurements. However, the Licensee

indicates that these deficiencies did not

constitute the violation as stated.

NRC Evaluation of Licensee’s Response to

Violation I.B.2

The Licensee appears to take the wording

of the violation out of context in that the

Licensee has argued that the NLB is only

responsible for considering information

contained in LERs. The NLB, or another body

of the Licensee’s organization, should have

established requirements for remeasurement

of materials previously measured by the

drum counter and stored at the facility. The

Licensee’s argument further heightens the

NRC’s concern as to whether the Licensee

has an oversight organization that is charged

with this responsibility. In addition, the

argument points out that such narrow views

are, in part, the reason for the Licensee’s

continued NCS problems (i.e., exceeding

NCS limits). The license requires the

Licensee to review the effect on NCS of new

and revised processes involving special

nuclear material (SNM) and to ensure that

appropriate safety controls are considered.

During a review of revised drum counting

processes, the NLB was presented with

evidence that demonstrated problems existed

which were associated with drum counter

measurement accuracy. The NLB was,

therefore, required to review the effect on

NCS of items or processes that were using

drum counter measurement results to

deomonstrate compliance with NCS limits.

Such a review should have included drum

counter measurement results or materials

stored in 55-gallon drums used to

demonstrate compliance with the NCS limit

of 350 grams of U–235 per drum.

The NRC concludes that the Licensee did

not provide bases to withdraw the violation;

therefore, the violation occurred as stated.

II. Evaluation of Violation not assessed a

Civil Penalty, Restatement of Violation II.C

License Condition No. S–1 of SNM–42

requires that licensed material be used in

accordance with statements, representations,

and conditions contained in Sections I

through IV of the application dated February

22, 1982 and supplements thereto.

Section II, Paragraph 10.4 of the

application requires the retention of records

of Change Review Board (CRB) actions for the

longer of either two years or six months after

termination of the operation.

Contrary to the above, as of June 29, 1994,

records associated with License Evaluation

Request (LER) 89–124, which provided the

basis for a CRB action on LER 89–155,

approving the counting of partially-filled

bottles on the drum counter (an operation

that was currently being performed), were

not retained and the operation had not been

terminated.

Summary of Licensee’s Response to Violation

II.C

In its reply, the Licensee denies that the

violation occurred as stated. The Licensee

states that the NLB (now CRB) took no action

with regard to LER 89–124 because it was

withdrawn and no information associated

with LER 89–124 formed a basis for any NLB

action on LER 89–155.

NRC Evaluation of Licensee’s Response to

Violation II.C

The Licensee’s license requires the

retention of records of NLB actions. The LER

89–155 file contains a document which

reads: ‘‘Subject: Low-Level Dissolving of

Partial Containers, Reference: LER 89–124.’’

This document states that the subject LER

contained a description of all types of

material normally processed in the low-level

dissolvers and the means used to ensure

nuclear safety while processing the various

types of material. The document also states:

‘‘After a thorough review of all the material

presented in the LER [89–124] it was

concluded [emphasis added] by the Nuclear

Licensing Board that processing of partial

containers was not the main area of

concern.’’ Therefore, the NLB did consider

information from LER 89–124 in its review of

LER 89–155. However, the LER 89–155 file

does not contain any of the material that was

thoroughly reviewed and used as the basis

for the NLB to conclude that processing of

partial bottles was not the main area of

concern in the approval of LER 89–155.

The NRC concludes that the Licensee did

not provide bases to withdraw the violation;

therefore, the violation occurred as stated.

III. Summary of Licensee’s Request for

Mitigation

In its answer to the Notice, the Licensee

states that a civil penalty was proposed based

on Violations I.A and I.B constituting, in the

aggregate, a Severity Level III problem. The

Licensee argues that since Violation I.B is not

a violation, only Violation I.A. remains and

no aggregation can occur; therefore, there is

no basis for a civil penalty. The Licensee

maintains that even if Violation I.B were a

violation, sufficient basis does not exist for

a civil penalty and that the statements in

Violation I.B, if accurate, would be causes of

Violation I.A and should be written as part

of Violation I.A. In addition, the Licensee

believes aggregating a violation which may

have occurred in 1990 with one which

occurred in 1994 is inappropriate.

As to certain statements made in the

Notice, the Licensee disagrees that there have

been many examples of inadequate

evaluations relating to known modes of

failure, that it has had continued poor

performance in the area of NCS, and that

extensive management attention has not been

directed toward identifying and correcting

NCS problems. The Licensee indicates that

the issues for which the civil penalty is being

proposed were primarily caused by problems

which predate most of its efforts and that it

is applying significant attention and

resources to strengthen its NCS program.

With respect to the application of

escalation and mitigation factors the Licensee

states that Violation I.A was not a selfdisclosing event because if the operators had

not compared the output values from the

dissolvers to the mass limit and reported the

limit violation, Violation I.A. would not have

been known since there was no requirement

to make such comparison. Further, the

Licensee requests full mitigation because it

showed enormous initiative in identifying

the root causes, contrary to the NRC’s Notice,

which stated that the Licensee did not

demonstrate initiative in identifying the root

causes of the Violations I.A. and I.B, and

because it developed long-term corrective

actions in a timely manner. The Licensee also

states that it suspended or severely restricted

activities involving scrap and waste to

prevent recurrence. The Licensee states that

the September 23, 1994 report to the NRC

addressed in detail why procedures, controls,

and implementation were inadequate and did

address corrective actions for the underlying

problems revealed by the event. Additional

information regarding other causes and

corrective actions was provided to the NRC

on November 16, 1994. Thus, based on all of

its corrective actions, the Licensee indicates

that a civil penalty is unwarranted. The

Licensee also states that escalation of 100

percent for prior opportunity to identify is

not warranted since it demonstrated that the

February 1994 event did not provide

opportunities for identification and that the

March 1989 problem provided limited

opportunities for this identification.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 44 / Tuesday, March 7, 1995 / Notices 12581

NRC Evaluation of Licensee’s Request for

Mitigation

With respect to the Licensee’s argument

that aggregating Violations I.A and I.B is

inappropriate, the NRC concluded, as

described above, that Violation I.B occurred

as stated. The NRC determined that

Violations I.A and I.B were related in that

they have the same fundamental underlying

cause and similar programmatic deficiencies,

namely, the lack of management attention to

NCS controls. Violation I.A involved

exceeding a NCS limit. Violation I.B was

issued for failure to consider process

conditions and known modes of failure in the

NCS analysis. These are two different issues

in NCS controls and two different license

requirements. Therefore, the NRC concludes

both that aggregating Violations I.A and I.B

as a Severity Level III was appropriate

regardless of the time period between the two

violations and that an escalated enforcement

action was warranted.

With regard to the Licensee’s disagreement

with NRC statements, the NRC notes that

there are 17 documented Licensee violations

of NRC requirements involving NCS controls

over the past two years. Despite these noted

numerous weaknesses, the Licensee’s NCS

evaluations and analyses have not been

adequately strengthened as evidenced by the

failures described in NRC inspection reports

70–27/94–12, 94–15, and 94–16. These

violations and other weaknesses clearly

represent continued poor performance and

inadequate management attention because

the Licensee has not sufficiently improved its

performance over the past two years to

prevent recurring problems in the area of

NCS. Furthermore, the Licensee’s argument

regarding the function of the NLB is narrow

and does not support the Licensee’s

statements that extensive management

attention has been placed in this area to

ensure identification and correction of NCS

problems. While the NRC acknowledges that

some management attention has been

directed toward identifying and correcting

NCS problems, Licensee management must

ensure that proper NCS controls and

oversight are in place and are adhered to, and

that NCS problems are thoroughly

investigated to ensure that effective

corrective actions are in place to prevent

such problems from recurring or leading to

other problems.

The NRC neither escalated nor mitigated

for the identification factor because while the

NRC recognizes that the Licensee identified

Violation I.A, the Licensee should note that

the NRC identified Violation I.B. In addition,

Section VI of the Enforcement Policy states,

in part, that a ‘‘self-disclosing’ event as used

in this policy statement means an event that

is readily obvious by human observation

* * *’’ The Licensee’s Chemical Processing

operating procedures required operators to:

compare the amount of U–235 added to the

low-level dissolvers with the amount

removed, determine if the difference between

the two exceeded 40 percent and, if so, report

such excessive differences to management.

Also, the Licensee’s NCS limits required the

amount of U–235 in each low-level dissolver

zone be limited to 350 grams. Because the

license requires procedures and postings to

be followed and because doing so made the

350 gram limit violation readily obvious to

human observation, the event was correctly

categorized as self-disclosing.

Furthermore, Section VI of the

Enforcement Policy also states, in part, that

‘‘The base civil penalty may also be mitigated

up to 25% when the licensee identifies a

violation resulting from a self-disclosing

event where the licensee demonstrates

initiative in identifying the root cause of the

violation.’’ While the NRC acknowledged

that the Licensee identified inadequacies in

procedures, controls, and implementation

systems, the NRC maintains that the Licensee

did not demonstrate initiative in identifying

the root cause of the violations because its

analysis did not ask or answer why these

procedures, controls, and systems were

inadequate and what should be done to

prevent such recurrence. Specifically, NRC

involvement was needed before acceptable

corrective action was taken in that it was not

until NRC requested and conducted a

management meeting with the Licensee on

August 3, 1994, that the Licensee agreed to

evaluate the series of incidents that had been

occurring in an attempt to uncover the

underlying generic root cause(s).

With regard to the corrective action factor,

the NRC acknowledged that the Licensee

took some immediate corrective actions to

stop operations of the low-level dissolver and

formed an incident review team to review the

event in detail and determine appropriate

corrective actions. The NRC did give the

Licensee credit for these corrective actions in

that escalation for this factor was not applied.

However, the NRC affirms that full mitigation

for this factor is not warranted because: (1)

The Licensee did not demonstrate initiative

in identifying the root cause of the violations

because NRC involvement was needed before

adequate actions were taken; (2) the

Licensee’s initial long term corrective actions

were not comprehensive; and (3) the

Licensee’s development of long term

corrective actions was not timely.

As noted earlier, it was not until NRC

requested and conducted a management

meeting that the Licensee agreed to evaluate

the series of incidents in an attempt to

identify the root cause. The results of that

evaluation were discussed in a management

meeting on November 16, 1994, and were

submitted by the Licensee on November 20,

1994, as an attachment to the Licensee’s

reply to the Notice. Furthermore, on July 8,

1994, as the NRC’s Augmented Inspection

Team discussed its findings with Licensee

management, the Licensee was requested to

submit a copy of its investigation team

findings, including corrective actions, to the

NRC. The Licensee stated that the report

would be completed and made available to

the NRC on or about August 5, 1994.

However, the report was not completed and

made available to the NRC until September

23, 1994, after the enforcement conference.

During the enforcement conference, NRC

asked the Licensee for a time schedule for

implementing the corrective actions

discussed by the Licensee at the conference.

More than two months after the low-level

dissolver event, the Licensee did not have

long-term corrective action time schedules

firmly in place.

Regarding the prior opportunity to identify

factor, the NRC believes that effective

corrective action, if taken, for events

occurring in March 1989 and February 1994,

which revealed weaknesses in the drum

counter measurement system, could have

prevented the June 1994 event. Specifically,

if the Licensee had adequately reviewed the

effect on NCS of items or processes that were

using drum counter measurement results and

implemented effective corrective actions, the

June 1994 event could have been prevented.

Following the March 1989 and February 1994

events, a formal incident review and root

cause analysis were not performed and

corrective actions were not taken. The NRC

expects licensees to learn from their mistakes

and implement adequate and effective

corrective actions to prevent recurrence. In

its answer to the Notice, the Licensee

acknowledges that its corrective actions

would have prevented the low-level

dissolution violation had they been followed.

The NRC concludes that the escalation and

mitigation factors were applied appropriately

and in accordance with the Enforcement

Policy.

NRC Conclusion

The NRC concludes that Violations I.B.1,

I.B.2, and II.C occurred as stated, that

Violations I.A and I.B were appropriately

categorized as a Severity Level III problem,

and that an adequate basis for mitigation of

the proposed civil penalty was not provided

by the Licensee. Consequently, the proposed

civil penalty in the amount of $37,500 should

be imposed by Order.

[FR Doc. 95–5495 Filed 3–6–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND

BUDGET

Office of Federal Financial

Management

Proposed Rescission of OMB Circular

A–73

AGENCY: Office of Management and

Budget, Office of Federal Financial

Management.

ACTION: Notice of Proposed Rescission of

OMB Circular A–73.

SUMMARY: Publication of OMB’s

intention to rescind Circular A–73.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Suzanne Murrin, OMB, Office of Federal

Financial Management, (202) 395–6911.

Dated: February 28, 1995.

John B. Arthur,

Associate Director for Administration.

Office of Management and Budget

Rescission of OMB Circulars

AGENCY: Office of Management and

Budget.

ACTION: Notice of Proposed Rescission of

OMB Circular A–73.