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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.J.A.M., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.M.C., FATHER

No. 309 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2015-A0078

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.J.M., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.M.C., FATHER

No. 310 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2015-A0079

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.J.A.M., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.M.C., FATHER

No. 311 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2015
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In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2015-A0080

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.J.A.M., A 

MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.S., MOTHER

No. 302 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 15, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2015-A0078

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.J.M., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.S., MOTHER

No. 303 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 15, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2015-A0079

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.J.A.M., A 

MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.S., MOTHER
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No. 304 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 15, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2015-A0080

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.H.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.S., MOTHER

No. 305 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 15, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2015-A0081

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 29, 2016

In these consolidated appeals, A.M.C. (Father) and A.C. (Mother) 

appeal from the December 15, 2015 decrees involuntarily terminating their 

parental rights to their daughters, A.J.A.M.1, born in September of 2011, 

and A.J.M., born in December of 2010, and their son, A.J.A.M.2, born in April 

of 2010. In addition, Mother appeals from the December 15, 2015 decree 

involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her son, K.H.S., born in 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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March of 2008, who is not the natural child of Father.1 Upon careful review, 

we affirm.2

These appeals arise from the petitions for the involuntary termination 

of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights filed by A.F.S. (Maternal 

Grandmother) and A.G.S., Sr. (Maternal Grandfather) (collectively, Maternal 

Grandparents) on April 17, 2015, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), and (8). On the same date, Maternal Grandparents filed petitions 

for adoption of A.J.A.M.1, A.J.M., A.J.A.M.2, and K.H.S. (collectively, the 

Children).

We summarize the factual and procedural history as follows. The 

Children have lived since birth with Maternal Grandparents. N.T., 12/10/15, 

at 35-37, 45. In December of 2010, Chester County Children and Youth 

Services (CCCYS) became involved with the family due to A.J.M., the third 

oldest child involved in this appeal, being born prematurely with illegal drugs 

in her system. Id. at 25, 39, 42-43. A.J.M. was discharged from the 

____________________________________________

1 On December 15, 2015, the orphans’ court issued a decree granting the 

petition to confirm the consent of H.A.A., the putative father of K.H.S, filed 

by Maternal Grandparents. He did not appeal.

2 We note that the Guardian ad litem filed briefs in these appeals in support 

of the decrees involuntarily terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental 

rights.
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hospital into Maternal Grandparents’ care, and CCCYS established a safety 

plan that prohibited Mother from being alone with A.J.M.3Id. at 30. 

At that time, Mother and Father resided with Maternal Grandparents in 

Phoenixville, in Chester County. Id. at 18, 26. Maternal Grandmother 

implied in her testimony that, shortly after CCCYS became involved in 

December of 2010, Father moved out of her home. Id. at 44.

Thereafter, in April of 2011, Mother left Maternal Grandparents’ home 

with her sons, K.H.S. and A.J.A.M.2, and went to a hotel in Pottstown, in 

Montgomery County. Id. at 35-37, 39, 41-42. After approximately two

weeks, Mother returned K.H.S. and A.J.A.M.2 to Maternal Grandparents. Id.

at 37, 39-40. Mother never resided with Maternal Grandparents again.4 Id.

at 41-42. 

In September of 2011, A.J.A.M.1., like her sister, was born 

prematurely with illegal drugs in her system. At that time, the family safety 

plans were transferred from CCCYS to Montgomery County Children and 

Youth Services (MCCYS).5 N.T., 12/10/15, at 42-43. A.J.A.M.1 was 

____________________________________________

3

In June of 2011, CCCYS expanded the safety plan to include K.H.S. and 

A.J.A.M.2. N.T., 12/10/15, at 41.

4 By the time of the subject proceedings, Mother and Father resided together 

in a two-bedroom apartment in Pottstown. N.T., 12/15/15, at 9.

5 The record suggests by then Maternal Grandparents resided in Pottstown, 

where they continued to reside at the time of the subject proceedings. N.T., 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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discharged from the hospital into Maternal Grandparents’ care, and MCCYS 

established a safety plan for that child. Id. at 43-44.

On April 23, 2012, Maternal Grandmother filed an emergency 

complaint for custody with respect to the Children in the Montgomery 

County Court of Common Pleas. By order dated May 30, 2012, the court 

granted Maternal Grandmother sole physical and sole legal custody of 

A.J.A.M.2, A.J.M., and A.J.A.M.1. By separate order the same date, the 

court granted Maternal Grandmother sole physical and sole legal custody of 

K.H.S. 

Two years later, on April 17, 2015, Maternal Grandparents filed the 

above-described termination petitions. The hearing was held on December 

10, 2015, during which Maternal Grandmother and Maternal Grandfather 

testified on their own behalf. Mother testified on her own behalf, and she 

presented the testimony of N.F.-O., Father’s sister, and Charlene Williams, 

Mother’s friend. The hearing was continued and concluded on December 15, 

2015, during which Father testified on his own behalf.

At the conclusion of the testimonial evidence, the orphans’ court 

placed its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record in open court. 

See N.T., 12/15/15, at 109-135. By decrees dated December 15, 2015, the 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

12/10/15, at 18. Maternal Grandmother testified that, after Mother moved 

out, she and Maternal Grandfather moved with the Children to a larger home 

in Pottstown. Id. at 19-20.
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orphans’ court terminated Father’s and Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).

On January 13, 2016, Father timely filed notices of appeal and concise 

statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated 

sua sponte.

6

 In addition, on January 11, 2016, Mother timely filed notices of 

appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal, which 

were also consolidated.

Father presents two questions for our review:

I. Did the [orphans’] court commit an error in terminating the 

parental rights of Father to each of the Children, pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1), where the testimony at trial 

demonstrated that Father had essentially been prevented from 

having an opportunity to provide parental duties at all relevant 

times?

II. Did the [orphans’] court commit an error by involuntarily 

terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children where the 

facts did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that 

such termination was in the best interests of the Children as 

____________________________________________

6 We note that the orphans’ court entered separate decrees terminating 

Father’s parental rights to A.J.A.M.1, A.J.M., and A.J.A.M.2. Father 

improperly filed only one notice of appeal and one concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal from the decrees. See Pa.R.A.P. 341, Note 

(“Where, however, one or more orders resolves [sic] issues arising on more 

than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of 

appeal must be filed.”). However, because Father’s arguments on appeal 

are identical as to each child, we discern no prejudice arising from his 

procedural misstep. Therefore, we decline to quash Father’s appeal. 
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contemplated by 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b) but, to the contrary, 

confirmed that a loving and positive bond exists between Father 

and each of the Children[?]

Father’s brief at 2.

Mother presents one question for our review:

[Did] the [orphans’] court err[] when it terminated Mother’s 

parental rights where the evidence presented was insufficient to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate that 

the needs and welfare of the Children would be promoted by 

terminating parental rights[?]

Mother’s brief at 2.

We consider Father’s and Mother’s issues mindful of our well-settled 

standard of review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 
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Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The 

burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights 

are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

We conclude that the orphans’ court in this case properly terminated 

Father’s and Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and 

(b), which provide as follows:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 
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child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall 

not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).7

We have explained,

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the moving 

party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, 

sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the 

termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish 

parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform 

parental duties. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 510 

(Pa. Super. 2006). In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent 

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights 

may be terminated pursuant to [s]ection 2511(a)(1) 

if the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to 

perform parental duties.

In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 550 Pa. 595, 708 A.2d 88, 

91 (Pa. 1998).

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform 

parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing 

____________________________________________

7 Notably, Mother concedes in her brief that the testimonial evidence 

established that she failed to perform her parental duties during the sixmonth period prior to the filing of the termination petitions. Therefore, in 

this disposition, we review the decrees under Section 2511(a)(1) with 

respect to Father’s parental rights only.
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parental rights, the court must engage in three lines 

of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her 

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between 

parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect 

of termination of parental rights on the child 

pursuant to Section 2511(b).

Id. at 92 (citation omitted). 

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Parental duty is defined as follows:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental 

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A 

child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These 

needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely 

passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court 

has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which 

requires affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association with 

the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place 

of importance in the child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed 

in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while 

others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional 

needs.

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004). 
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Moreover,

It is incumbent upon a parent when separated from his child to 

maintain communication and association with the child. This 

requires an affirmative demonstration of parental devotion, 

imposing upon the parent the duty to exert himself, to take and 

maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.

In re G.P.−R., 851 A.2d 967, 976 (Pa. Super. 2004).

With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite 

analysis as follows: 

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a 

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no 

bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. 

Id. at 63.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Instantly, the orphans’ court concluded that, for a period in excess of 

six months preceding the filing of the termination petitions, Father and 

Mother failed to perform their parental duties to the Children pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(1). Further, the court concluded that terminating Father’s 

and Mother’s parental rights “will not sever any strong and existing bond 

between the [C]hildren and their biological parents. . . .” N.T., 12/15/15, at 
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134. The court concluded that terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental 

rights will serve the Children’s needs and welfare pursuant to Section 

2511(b).

Father argues on appeal that the court erred in terminating his 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) because Maternal 

Grandparents prevented him “from having the kind of relationship he would 

like to have with the Children.” Father’s brief at 11. Specifically, Father 

asserts that Maternal Grandparents do not allow the Children to sleep over 

at his apartment, and that his “ability to visit with the Children has 

historically ‘been up and down’ and only ‘[w]hen the time [is] good for 

them.’” Id.

The orphans’ court stated on the record in open court that it found 

Maternal Grandmother “to be a credible witness in virtually every regard.” 

N.T., 12/15/15, at 127. As such, the court found no “obstacle has been put 

in the path of [Mother] or [Father] in terms of their children. It may not 

have been as convenient as they would have liked it to be, but that doesn’t 

make it an obstacle. You had the opportunity to exercise parental duty if 

you had chosen to do it.” Id. at 127-128. The testimonial evidence 

supports the court’s findings.

Maternal Grandmother testified on direct examination as follows:

Q. Have you made any offers to [Mother] or [Father] about 

coming to the house and being involved with the children?
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A. The doors are open all the time. They know they can come 

and go as they want. Their problem is that they always want to 

come and take the kids, and I don’t trust them. Sometimes I let 

them go; sometimes I question their motives.

 They have an open invitation for Sunday dinner, and every 

time they come to the house, I let them see the kids. And 

[Father] has actually taken the kids to more things than 

[Mother] has.

N.T., 12/10/15, at 46-47. On re-direct examination, Maternal Grandmother 

testified that the Children are not a priority in Mother’s and Father’s lives. 

Id. at 130. She testified:

Q. Do [Mother and Father] see the children based upon the 

children’s schedule or what you would seem to think would be 

their schedule?

A. Their schedule.

Id. 

She continued on cross-examination by the Guardian ad litem:

Q. [A]s far as [Father] is concerned, he seeks out contact with 

the children from time to time; correct?

A. Yes, he does.

Q. Approximately how frequent[ly] would you say he seeks out 

this contact?

A. This year probably four or five times.

Q. And is there any regularity in that contact?

A. No. I just get a text from him, or I’ll get a call from [Mother] 

saying he wants to see the kids, or he stops by the house and 

asks if he can take them.
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N.T., 12/10/15, at 119. Maternal Grandmother testified on direct 

examination that Father “comes around holidays, like Memorial Day or July 

4th. He asks to take the kids to the Pottstown Parade, and I usually let 

them go with him.”8 Id. at 52. 

Father explained the reason for his infrequent visits this year in his 

cross-examination by Maternal Grandparents’ counsel.

Q. [Y]ou heard testimony from [Maternal Grandparents] that 

basically you’ve seen the kids, we’ll say, a handful of times in 

the past year or two.

A. I heard them say that, yeah.

Q. Was that inaccurate? 

A. Handful is like five. I seen [sic] them more than five times. 

But also I was going three of these classes a week, plus one-onone a week, plus I had a parole officer in Montgomery County 

that I had to go to twice a week, plus I had a parole officer in 

Berks County I had to go to twice a week.[9] My days were, kind 

of, heavy.

____________________________________________

8 Maternal Grandmother testified that the Pottstown Parade occurs on the 

July 4th holiday. N.T., 12/10/15, at 52-53.

9 On inquiry by the orphans’ court, Father testified that he had been 

released from prison in February of 2010, and he “was on the run” until 

being re-incarcerated in January of 2013. N.T., 12/15/15, at 70, 72. Father 

testified that he remained in prison until March 4, 2014, and that he served 

this time between the Berks County and Montgomery County prisons. N.T., 

12/15/15, at 67, 70. He testified that he presently has one year remaining 

on a probation sentence in Montgomery County for a crime involving the 

possession of drugs. Id. at 68. 
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 And, again, when I go over there, I don’t like to have 

somebody over me as well. . . . Like, I understand if they’re 

there, they have to listen to them, and we have to go by things 

they said, but there should be a little space for us. That’s what I 

believe.

. . .

Q. For you it was more difficult to see the kids under [Maternal 

Grandparents’] supervision, and you would have preferred that 

they just let you have the kids?

A. Yeah. I would prefer they let me have my kids, yeah. 

. . .

Q. So you described all the various appointments that you would 

have during the week. Did those include on the weekends?

A. No.

Q. You were eight blocks away.[10] Did you ever in the evenings 

just walk over to the house to see the kids?

A. Yes. Like, I walk by still all the time. If they’re not outside 

and stuff -- when they’re outside, I talk to them all the time. I 

just don’t go in and deal with them.

N.T., 12/15/15, at 28-30.

Father testified on cross-examination by the Guardian ad litem that he 

never tried to work out a visitation schedule with Maternal Grandparents. 

N.T., 12/15/15, at 51. Further, Father acknowledged that Maternal 

____________________________________________

10 Upon his release from prison in March of 2014, Father lived eight blocks 

away from Maternal Grandparents. N.T., 12/15/15, 30, 53-54. In 

September of 2015, Father moved to his current apartment. Id. at 60. 

Mother lives with Father and testified that their apartment is “[a] block or 

two” away from Maternal Grandparents’ home. N.T., 12/10/15, at 236-237. 
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Grandparents never told him not to contact them. Id. at 52-53. With 

respect to whether he ever telephoned the Children, Father testified:

Q. Did you ever call the children and speak with them on the 

phone?

A. Not lately.

Q. How often would you say that you have called them and 

spoken with them on the phone?

A. Pretty much when I would be with [Mother] if we were cool, 

and she would call because, again, I don’t really get along with 

[Maternal Grandparents].

Id. at 56. Father testified that he last saw the Children on November 26, 

2015, when he sent a text message to Maternal Grandmother and requested 

that the Children visit him at his home. Id. at 57-58. 

Based on the foregoing testimonial evidence, we discern no abuse of 

discretion by the orphans’ court in finding that Maternal Grandparents did 

not place obstacles in the path of Father’s performance of his parental 

duties. The testimonial evidence supports the court’s finding that Father 

chose not to exercise his parental duties soon after CCCYS became involved 

with this family in December of 2010, through Maternal Grandmother’s 

physical and legal custody award in May of 2012, and continuing to the time 

of the filing of the termination petitions. During all this time, Father 

displayed a “merely passive interest in the development” of the Children. 

See In re B.,N.M., supra. Therefore, we reject Father’s issue with respect 

to Section 2511(a)(1). 
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We next consider whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion in 

terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(b). Father argues the testimonial evidence does not support 

termination because it demonstrates that a bond exists between him and the 

Children. Mother argues the evidence was insufficient to support 

termination because Maternal Grandparents did not present evidence 

regarding whether a bond exists between her and the Children.

We have emphasized, in part:

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. 

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted)). In addition, in considering the affection a child may 

have for his or her natural parents, this Court has explained as follows:

[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent 

simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is 

not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s 

feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, 

the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics 

as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect 

and abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage 

and completely disavow a parent. . . . Nor are we of the 

opinion that the biological connection between [the parent] 
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and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when 

considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a 

parent, to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The 

psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in 

terms of the development of the child and its mental and 

emotional health than the coincidence of biological or 

natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). 

The testimony of Maternal Grandmother demonstrates that 

terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights will serve the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the Children. 

Maternal Grandmother testified that the Children see her “[a]s their mom[,]” 

and Maternal Grandfather“[a]s their dad.” N.T., 12/10/15, at 124. She 

testified that the oldest child, K.H.S., then age seven, is doing well both at 

home and in school. Id. at 59. She testified that A.J.M., nearly age five, 

who needed many health services after birth, no longer needs the services 

and is doing well. Id. at 64-68. She testified that Early Intervention 

Services monitored the youngest child, A.J.A.M.1, then age four, for the first 

year of her life, but that she never needed any services and is likewise doing 

well. Id. at 68. 

However, the second oldest child, A.J.A.M.2, then age five and in 

kindergarten, has learning disabilities and anger issues, and he is diagnosed 

with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. N.T., 12/10/15, at 61. Maternal 

Grandmother testified that he has an Individualized Education Program 
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involving speech and language. Id. She explained further that he receives 

wraparound services at school, and that he is under treatment with a 

psychologist. Id. Importantly, she testified that neither Mother nor Father 

has asked about A.J.A.M.2’s services or whether they can participate in his 

services. Id. at 115. In addition, Maternal Grandmother testified that 

A.J.A.M.2 has made significant improvement since the beginning of the 

school year. Id. at 63-64. 

With respect to the Children’s bond with Father, Maternal Grandmother 

testified that that they do not view him as a father figure, but more as a 

playmate. N.T., 12/10/15, at 119-120. She testified that his daughters, 

A.J.M. and A.J.A.M.1, call him by his first name. Id. at 112. She testified 

that his son, A.J.A.M.2, has a stronger bond with Father than do his 

daughters. Id.

With respect to the Children’s bond with Mother, Maternal 

Grandmother testified that the oldest child, K.H.S, loves her, and that he 

demonstrates this by sitting with her when she visits and being sad and 

withdrawn when she leaves. Id. at 69, 118. She testified that A.J.A.M.2 

has resentment towards Mother, and that he demonstrates this by kicking, 

hitting, and fighting with Mother while she visits. Id. Significantly, Maternal 

Grandmother testified that she observed Mother discipline her sons, K.H.S. 

and A.J.A.M.2, by punching them in the chest on ten separate occasions. 

Id. at 131, 136. With respect to Mother’s daughters, A.J.M. and A.J.A.M.1, 
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Maternal Grandmother testified that they “don’t even know” Mother, and 

that they call Mother by her first name. N.T., 12/10/15, at 69, 99. 

Finally, Mother testified that she has been in and out of prison since 

2012 for crimes related to drugs. N.T., 12/10/15, at 260, 282. She testified 

that she was most recently incarcerated on December 18, 2014, and that 

she was released on April 10, 2015. Id. at 214-215. Mother testified that, 

in May of 2015, she began living in a halfway house, and, on September 9, 

2015, she left the halfway house without permission. Id. at 222, 229-230. 

She testified that she turned herself in on November 8, 2015, and, as a 

result, she was re-incarcerated. Id. at 231. Mother remained incarcerated 

at the time of the subject proceedings, and she was awaiting her sentencing 

hearing. Id. at 243.

Based on the foregoing testimonial evidence, we reject Father’s and 

Mother’s arguments with respect to Section 2511(b). Indeed, the 

testimonial evidence demonstrates that the Children do not have a parentchild bond with Father. Likewise, the evidence demonstrates that the 

youngest three children do not have a parent-child bond with Mother. To 

the extent that the evidence reveals that K.H.S. may have a parent-child 

bond with Mother, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that it is not a 

beneficial bond. We conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its 

discretion in determining that involuntarily terminating Father’s and Mother’s 

parental rights will serve the physical, emotional, and developmental needs 
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and welfare of the Children. Accordingly, we affirm the decrees pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/29/2016