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******************************************************STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSE R. ROSADO (AC 34533)
Alvord, Bear and Harper, Js. Argued October 15, 2013—officially released January 21, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Schuman, J.)
Jeanne M. Zulick, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant). Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attorney, and John F. Fahey, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).Opinion ALVORD, J. The defendant, Jose R. Rosado, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after ajury trial, of conspiracy to commit home invasion in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-100aa (a) (2), conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-101 (a) (1), and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134 (a) (4).1 On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions as to all three offenses, and (2) the court improperlyfailedtorespondtothejury’srequestforaclarifying instructiononthe crime ofconspiracy. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At approximately 10 p.m. on November 12, 2009, Jose Guerrero was standing outside of an apartment
on Cannon Road in East Hartford talking on his cell phone. Jose Guerrero was intheprocess ofmovinginto the apartment, whichwas shared byhis brother, Carlos Guerrero, and his cousin, Urias Abrego Vasques. He
saw two Hispanic men, who had been walking back and forth in front ofthe apartment, enter the building. Carlos Guerrero and Vasques were home at that time. They each had separate bedrooms, and the two Hispanic men forced theirway into Carlos Guerrero’s bedroom. One ofthe men was wearing a whitejacket with stripes, awhite and red mask, awhite baseball cap and
an orange wig. The other man was dressed in black and was wearing ablack ski mask with a large opening around the eyes. Both men had weapons; the man in white was carrying a knife, and the man in black was armedwith agun. During astruggle withthe assailants, Carlos Guerrero was hit on the head with the gun, cut
on his neck by the knife and thrown to the floor. The
men took his wallet, which contained his money, some receipts and his brother’s identification card. Vasques heardnoise coming fromthe otherbedroom and a voice saying that he didn’t have any money. Vasques opened his bedroom door and saw the man with the gun coming toward him. He recognized the eyes of the person behind the black ski mask because that person was his neighbor and the brother of his friend. Vasques shut the door and locked it, and then he jumped out of his bedroom window and ran down the street. A police officer happened to be in the area investigating an unrelated incident, andVasques ran up to him and reported the incident.
When the two assailants left the apartment, Carlos Guerrero ran out of the apartment and followed them. Jose Guerrero, still outside, saw his brother chasing the men and also ran after them. At one point, one of the men pointed a gun at Carlos Guerrero, but he thenput it away and kept running. Jose Guerrero pursued the men until the police stopped him. Carlos Guerrero continued the pursuit until one ofthe men dropped his white baseball cap, and Carlos Guererro stopped to retrieve it. He then located a police officer and gave him the cap. Vasques wentto the East Hartfordpolice stationthat eveningtogive astatement. Onthebasis oftheinformation he provided, the police prepared a photographic arrayofpossible suspects. Vasquesidentifiedthe defendant as the assailant who wore the black ski mask. When Carlos Guerrero was interviewed by the police that evening, he drew a map showing the path taken by the assailants as he chased them.
Thatsame evening, Sergeant Steven Syme ofthe East Hartford Police Department was dispatched to another apartment complex on Cannon Road after receiving information that one of the suspects might live at that location. As Syme approached the building, he heard a
woman in one of the apartments arguing on the telephone by an open window. He discovered that she was inthe apartmentthoughtto be occupiedbythe suspect. Syme approached her and determined that she was Vicky Rosado, who is the defendant’s sister. Vicky Rosado told Syme that she lived in the apartment with her brother, but she said that her brother’s name was ‘‘Rueben Robot.’’ The defendant was not in the apartment at that time.
Detective EllenStoldtalsowas dispatchedto Cannon Roadthat eveningforthe purpose ofsearchingthe area surrounding the crime scene for evidence connected with the armed invasion. It was after midnight when she located along sleevedblack shirt, ablack skimask,
a white sweatshirt with printing on it and a wig along the route taken by the assailants as they fled. Stoldt made the decision to return to that location the following day during daylight hours to search for additional evidence that she might have overlooked during the initial search. Whenshe returned, she discovered awallet, an identification card and several receipts. Stoldt continued her investigation by interviewing Vasques, Vicky Rosado and Kevin Saninocencio, a person who supposedly had been at Vicky Rosado’s apartment on the night of the incident.
From the physical evidence and the interviews, the police developed a list of potential suspects that included the defendant, Saninocencio and Jose Flores. Jose Flores, also known as Chaio, was never interviewed because he left for Puerto Rico shortly after the incident. The defendant was arrested in December, 2009, and transported to the East Hartford Police Department. He voluntarily gave a statement to Stoldt about the evening in question. He told her that he had been living with his sister and that he was at her apartment when Chaio arrived carrying a book bag. Chaiopulled a gun from the bag and said that he wanted to rob ‘‘the Mexican dudes up the street.’’2 The defendant told Stoldt that he left the apartment while Chaio was still there and that he spent the rest of the evening at
a friend’s house. He said that he learned the next day that ‘‘the Mexican dudes up the street’’ were robbed the night before. The defendant also told Stoldt that the details of that night were ‘‘vague’’ because he had been ‘‘drunk’’ when everythinghappened. Inhis written statement, the defendant stated: ‘‘I drink a lot, and I
am usually drunk. IfI did do this robbery, it was during
a time that I was very drunk, and I can’t remember it.’’
The case was tried on October 31, November 1 and 2, 2011. During the trial, the state’s witnesses included Jose Guerrero, Carlos Guerrero, Vasques, Vicky Rosado, Saninocencio,policeofficers, investigatorsand forensic experts. VickyRosadotestifiedthatatapproximately 6 p.m. on November 12, 2009, Chaio, the defendant and two other men were at her apartment as she
was getting ready to go out for the evening. Before she left, she saw the defendant and Chaio having a conversation: ‘‘[T]hey were just whispering

. . . .’’ Laterthat evening, after she returned to the apartment, the police arrived, and she let them search the apartment. Subsequently, she was asked to come to the police station to give a statement. While there, she was shown a ski mask, a white sweatshirt with print on it,
a wig, a black T-shirt and a white hat. She told the police that she recognized the items as items from her home. She said that the Halloween wig had been in her daughter’s playbox, the T-shirt looked like the defendant’s T-shirt, and the white sweatshirt looked like her friend’s sweatshirt.
Attrial, CarlosGuerreroidentifiedthewallet,receipts andhisbrother’sidentificationcardthathadbeenfound by Stoldt. Saninocencio testified that he had been at Vicky Rosado’s apartment on the night of the incident and that he heard the defendant and Chaio ‘‘talking about doing some kind of harm.’’ When pressed for details, he saidthattheywere ‘‘planning ondoing something’’ and ‘‘[t]hattheywere goingto rob those people.’’ He further testified that Chaio was wearing a white sweater and a wig.
The state’s final witness was Eric Carita, a forensic science examinerinthe DNAunit atthe state’s forensic science laboratory. Carita testified that the defendant
was a contributorto the DNAprofile obtained from the swabbing of the inside rim of the white baseball cap that had been retrieved by Carlos Guerrero from one ofthe assailants. Further, the defendantwas acontributor to the DNA profile obtained from the swabbing of the inside of the black ski mask. Following the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty ofconspiracyto commit home invasion, conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree and conspir-acy to commit robbery in the first degree. The court accepted the verdict and rendered judgment accordingly. The defendant was sentenced to eight years of incarceration, followed by six years of special parole.3 This appeal followed.
I
The defendant’s first claim is that the evidence produced attrialwas insufficientto sustainhis convictions of conspiracy to commit home invasion, conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. The defendant argues that ‘‘his convictions on the conspiracy counts
were based on inconsistent testimony and circumstantial evidence that failed to link him to these crimes and couldnotpossiblyleadtothedrawingofanyreasonable inference that he entered [into] a conspiracyto commit any crime.’’ Specifically, he claims thatthere was insufficient evidence that (1) he was one ofthe two masked
menwho enteredthevictims’ apartment, (2) he entered intoanagreementwiththespecificintentofcommitting
a crime, and (3) he or a coconspirator engaged in an overt act in furtherance of a home invasion, burglary
or robbery. ‘‘We apply a two part test in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determinewhetheruponthefacts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

. . . . While

. . . every element [must be] proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, each ofthe basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions neednotbeprovedbeyond areasonable doubt.

. . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jennings, 125 Conn. App. 801, 805–806, 9 A.3d 446 (2011). ‘‘[T]he probative force of the evidence is not diminishedbecause it consists, inwhole orinpart, ofcircumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence.

. . . It hasbeen repeatedlystatedthatthere is no legal distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence so far
as probative force is concerned.

. . . It is not one fact, butthe cumulative impact ofamultitude offacts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Riser, 70 Conn. App. 543, 552, 800 A.2d 564(2002). ‘‘[I]n viewing evidence which could yield contrary inferences, the [trieroffact] is notbarredfrom drawing those inferences consistent with guilt and is not required to draw only those inferences consistent with innocence. The rule is that the [trier offact’s] function is to draw whatever inferences from evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Jagat, 111 Conn. App. 173, 177, 958 A.2d 206 (2008).
We first note that the defendant’s claims of insufficiency ofthe evidence are directedto possible conflicting testimony at trial. In other words, the defendant is challenging the credibility of the state’s witnesses. ‘‘[E]vidence is not insufficient

. . . because it is conflicting or inconsistent.

. . . It is the [jury’s] exclusive provincetoweighthe conflicting evidence andto determine the credibility of witnesses.

. . . The [jury] can

. . . decide what—all, none, or some—of a witness’ testimony to accept or reject.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vega, 128 Conn. App. 20, 27, 17 A.3d 1060, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 919, 21 A.3d 463 (2011).
With these principles in mind, we turn to the specific elements ofthe offenses atissue. To establishthe crime of conspiracy under § 53a-48,4 the state was required to prove that there was an agreement between two or
morepersonsto engage in conduct constituting acrime and that one of the conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the crime agreed upon. Proof of
aconspiracytocommitaspecificoffenserequiresproof that the conspirators intended to bring about the elements of the conspired offense. See State v. Douglas, 126 Conn. App. 192, 202–203, 11 A.3d 699, cert. denied, 300 Conn. 926, 15 A.3d 628 (2011). The conspired offenses in this case were home invasion,5 burglary in the first degree6 and robbery in the first degree.7
We have carefully reviewed the record, including the transcripts of the trial, and we have set forth in detail the evidence that the state presented to the jury in support of the charges of conspiracy. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we conclude that the evidence adduced at trial
wasmorethansufficienttoallowthejurytofindbeyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant conspired to commit home invasion, burglary in the first degree and robbery in the first degree. The testimony of the witnesses demonstrated that he agreed to commit these crimes, as defined by statute, and that overt acts were committed by him or a coconspirator in furtherance of those crimes. The defendant’s insufficiency of the evidence claim merits no further discussion.
II
The defendant’s next claim is that the trial courtimproperly failed to respond to thejury’s request for a clarifying instruction on the elements of the crime of conspiracy. The defendant argues that the court’s failuretofollowthemandatoryprovisionsofPracticeBook § 42-278 deprived him ofa fair trial. The following additional facts and procedural history are necessary for the resolution of this claim. Duringthe course ofdeliberations, the courtreceived twelve notes from the jury that were marked as court exhibits. Severalinquiries dealtwithrequestsforcopies of the jury instructions, supplies or breaks for food. A few ofthe notes requested a review oftestimony from certain witnesses. The final note, received at 4:25 p.m.
on November 7, 2011, stated that the jury had reached
a verdict on all six charges. It is the note immediately precedingthe final note that is at issue here, whichwas the note that the court received at 4:10 p.m. that day. In that note, the jury asked the court to clarify the last sentence at page sixteen ofits written instructions pertaining to the crime of conspiracy.9
In its charge, the court instructed the jury that all communications withthe courtneededto be inwriting, signed and dated by the foreperson. The court also instructedthejurythatbecause it couldtake some time to assemble the parties and to agree upon a response to a request, thejury ‘‘may continue deliberating ifyou can.’’ The courtwas discussingwith counsel aresponse tothepenultimatenoteregardingthe conspiracycharge when it received the jury’s final note stating that it had reached a verdict. In accordance with the court’s instructions, the jury had continued to deliberate and had reached a verdict before the court could address the jury’s note requesting clarification of the language pertaining to the conspiracy charge.
The court, after receiving the final note and before bringingthejuryintothe courtroom, addressedcounsel
as follows: ‘‘The Court: Counsel, we’vereceivedsomenotesfrom the jury that will be marked as court exhibits. Earlier today, we received notes in which thejurors asked for copies of the court’s instructions and magic markers, andweprovidedthose. Then at4:10 [p.m.], we received
a note from thejury asking for clarification ofthe conspiracy discussions. While I was discussing that with counsel, at 4:25 p.m., we received a note from the jury saying we have a verdict on all six charges. So, absent objection, I propose that we proceed directlyto receiving the verdict. ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Yes, Your Honor. ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. ‘‘The Court: Mark these and we’ll call the jury.’’ Now, on appeal, the defendant raises for the first time his claim that the trial court was obligated torespond to the jury’s note requesting clarification of the conspiracy charge before it could proceed to averdict. The defendantacknowledgesthathe didnotobject to the court’s proposal to proceed to a verdict at the time oftrial, but he argues that the provisions of Practice Book § 42-27 are mandatory and cannot be waived by defense counsel. He seeks review pursuant to State

v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567A.2d823 (1989),10

or to prevail under the plain error doctrine. The state arguesthatdefense counselwaivedanyclaimregarding the handling of the note at issue when he expressly assented to the court’s proposed course of action. We agree with the state. ‘‘A defendant in a criminal prosecution may waive
one or more ofhis or her fundamental rights.

. . . [I]n theusualGoldingsituation,the defendantraisesaclaim
on appeal [that], while not preserved at trial, at least
was not waived at trial.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447, 467, 10 A.3d 942 (2011). ‘‘Both our Supreme Court and this court have stated the principle that, when a party abandons a claim or argument before the trial court, that party waives the right to appellate review of such claim because a contrary conclusion would result in an ambush of the trial court

. . . . [W]aiver is [t]he voluntary relinquishment or abandonment— express or implied—of a legal right or notice.

. . . In determining waiver, the conduct of the parties is of great importance.

. . . [W]aiver may be effected by action of counsel.

. . . When a party consents to or expresses satisfactionwith an issue attrial, claims arising from that issue are deemed waived and may not be reviewed on appeal.

. . . Thus, [w]aiver

. . . involves the idea of assent, and assent is an act of understanding.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McLaughlin, 135 Conn. App. 193, 198, 41 A.3d694, cert. denied, 307Conn. 904, 53A.3d219 (2012). ‘‘The rule is applicable thatno one shallbe permitted to deny that he intended the natural consequences of his acts and conduct.

. . . In order to waive a claim of law it is not necessary

. . . that a party be certain ofthe correctness ofthe claim and its legal efficacy. It is enough ifhe knows ofthe existence ofthe claim and of its reasonably possible efficacy.

. . . Connecticut courts have consistently held that when aparty fails to raiseinthetrialcourttheconstitutionalclaimpresented
on appeal and affirmatively acquiesces to the trial court’s order, thatpartywaives any such claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Velez, 113 Conn. App. 347, 357–58, 966 A.2d 743, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 917, 970 A.2d 729 (2009).
Thereasonthatthe objectionmustberaisedattrialis toaffordthecourtanopportunitytocorrectanallegedly improper ruling or procedure. ‘‘When we speak of correcting the claimed error, we mean when it is possibleduring that trial, not by ordering a new trial. We do not look with favor on parties requesting, or agreeing to,
an instruction or a procedure to be followed, and later claiming that that act was improper.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 358. ‘‘[A] defendant may not pursue one course ofaction at trial for tactical reasons and later on appeal argue that the path he rejected should now be open to him

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Thompson, 146 Conn. App. 249, 260–61, 76 A.3d 273, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 956, A.3d (2013).
‘‘A defendant who has waived a claim at trial

. . . is not entitled to Golding review.

. . . [A] constitutional claim that has been waived does not satisfy the thirdprong ofthe Goldingtestbecause, insuch circumstances, we simply cannot conclude that injustice [has been] done to either party

. . . or that the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internalquotationmarksomitted.)Statev.McLaughlin, supra, 135 Conn. App. 198. Furthermore, ‘‘[a] valid waiver

. . . thwarts plain error review ofa claim. [The] Plain Error Rule may only be invoked in instances of forfeited-but-reversible error

. . . and cannot be used for the purpose ofrevoking an otherwise valid waiver. This is so because if there has been a valid waiver, there is no error for us to correct.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Velez, supra, 113 Conn. App. 361 n.8.
In the present case, the trial court, after stating on the record that it had received thejury note requesting
a clarification ofthe conspiracy charge and the subsequent jury note indicating that the jury had reached a verdict, made the following suggestion to counsel: ‘‘So, absent objection, I propose that we proceed directly to receivingtheverdict.’’Ifdefense counseldisagreedwith the court’s proposal and preferred that the jury note requesting clarification be addressed, the court had given him the opportunity to express his thoughts on the matter. Defense counsel, however, raised no objection to proceeding to verdict without addressing the penultimatejury note and, in fact, affirmatively agreed to the court’s proposal. Permitting the defendant now to seek reversal ofhis conviction due to the procedure followed by the court, to which defense counsel expressly assented at trial, would result in an ambuscade of the trial court.
The defendant argues, however, that Practice Book § 42-27 is mandatory; see State v. Fletcher, 10 Conn. App. 697, 702, 525 A.2d 535 (1987), aff’d, 207 Conn. 191, 540 A.2d 370 (1988); and cannot be waived by defense counsel. He cites no persuasive authority in support of the claim that the rule cannot be waived, and our case law indicates to the contrary. ‘‘Although a defendant will not be deemed to have waived certain constitu-tional rights unless the state can demonstrate that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and intelligent; see, e.g., State v. T.R.D., 286 Conn. 191, 202–203, 942 A.2d 1000 (2008) (defendant’s waiver of counsel must be knowing and intelligent); State v. Reid, 277 Conn. 764, 780, 894 A.2d 963 (2006) (defendant’s guilty plea must be knowing andvoluntary); that requirement is inapplicable when

. . . counsel has waived a potential constitutional claim in the exercise ofhis or her professional judgment.

. . . In our adversary system, the trial court
was entitledtopresumethatdefense counselwasfamiliar with [case law] and had acted competently

. . . . To conclude otherwise would require the trial court to canvass defense counsel with respect to counsel’s understanding ofthe relevant constitutional principles before accepting counsel’s agreement on how to proceed. For good reason, there is nothing in our criminal lawthatsupportssucharequirement.’’Statev.Holness, 289 Conn. 535, 544, 958 A.2d 754 (2008).
In summary, defense counsel agreed to the court’s proposal to proceed to a verdict instead ofresponding to the jury’s penultimate note requesting clarification of the conspiracy charge. The defendant waived any claim to have the court issue additional instructions in response to that note pursuant to Practice Book § 42- 27, and the defendant therefore waived any appellate issues connected to the court’s decision to proceed to
a verdict. Accordingly, we decline to review the defendant’s claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the otherjudges concurred.

1 Thejury found the defendant not guilty ofthe charges ofhome invasion in violation of § 53a-100aa (a) (2), burglary in the first degree in violation of § 53a-101 (a) (1), and robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134 (a) (4).

2 Jose Guerrero, Carlos Guerrero and Vasques are originally from El Salvador.

3 The court imposed sentence on the conviction of conspiracy to commit home invasion. The counts for conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree were merged into the conviction of conspiracy to commit home invasion. Thedefendantdidnotraisetheissue, beforeoratthetimeoforalargument before this court, ofwhetherthe trial court should have vacated the convictions on two ofthe conspiracy charges and sentenced the defendant on the remaining conspiracy conviction instead of merging two of the conspiracy convictions into the conviction on the conspiracy to commit home invasion charge. See State v. Polanco, 308 Conn. 242, 245, 61 A.3d 1084 (2013); State

v. Wright, 144 Conn. App. 731, 748, 73 A.3d 828, cert. granted, 310 Conn. 945, A.3d (2013). Because he had the opportunity but failed to do so, this court declines to rule on this issue in this appeal.

4 General Statutes § 53a-48 (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of conspiracy when, with intentthat conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, andanyone ofthemcommits anovertactinpursuance ofsuchconspiracy.’’

5 General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty of home invasion when such person enters or remains unlawfully in

a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime is actually present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein, and, in the

course ofcommitting the offense

. . . (2) such person is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.’’6 General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty ofburglary in the first degree when (1) such person enters orremains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument

. . . .’’

7 General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course ofthe commission ofthe crime ofrobbery as defined in section 53a-133 or ofimmediate flight therefrom, he or anotherparticipant in the crime

. . . (4) displays orthreatens the use of what he represents by his words or conduct to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-133 provides: ‘‘A person commits robbery when, in the course of committing a larceny, he uses or threatens the immediate

use ofphysical force upon anotherperson forthe purpose of: (1) Preventing

or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to the retention thereof immediately after the taking; or (2) compelling the owner of such property or another person to deliver up the property or to engage in other conduct which aids in the commission of the larceny.’’
8 Practice Book § 42-27 provides: ‘‘If the jury, after retiring for deliberations, requests additional instructions, thejudicial authority, afterproviding notice to the parties and an opportunity for suggestions by counsel, shall recall the jury to the courtroom and give additional instructions necessary to respond properly to the request or to direct the jury’s attention to a portion of the original instructions.’’
9 The subject sentence in the court’s jury instructions provided: ‘‘It is enough if he knows that a conspiracy exists or that he is creating one and that he intends to join with at least one other person in an agreement to commit a crime.’’ The defendant claims that the inquiry indicated that the jury believed that the defendant’s mere knowledge of the existence of a conspiracy was sufficient to convict him of the conspiracy charges. We note that this court upheld an identical conspiracy instruction when challenged in State v. Taylor, 132 Conn. App. 357, 361–67, 31 A.3d 872 (2011), appeal dismissed, 309 Conn. 83, 71 A.3d 464 (2013) (certification improvidently granted). In Taylor, the trial court also gave the following instruction with respectto conspiracy: ‘‘The mere knowledge, acquiescence

orapproval ofthe objectoftheagreementwithoutcooperationoragreement to cooperate, however, is not sufficient to make one aparty to a conspiracy to commit the criminal act.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 363. An identically worded instruction was given by the court in the present case, and, significantly, that instruction immediatelyfollowed the language questioned by the jury in its note to the court. The fact that itreacheditsverdictlessthantwentyminutes afterhavingmadethatinquiry suggests that the jury continued to review the written jury instructions during its deliberations and discovered the answer to its inquiry on its own.
10 Under Golding, ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional

error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim oferror; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, thestatehasfailedto demonstrateharmlessnessoftheallegedconstitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the defendant’s claim will fail.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 239–40.