F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v.

J A S O N L E E ,

Defendant-Appellant. No. 13-10517

D.C. No. 3:09-cr-00193-CRB -1

OPI N I ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Charles R. B rey er, Senior District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted September 11, 2014 Submission Vacated J anuary 16, 2015 Resubmitted April 28, 2016 San F rancisco, California

F iled May

6, 2016

B efore: Carlos T. B ea, Sandra S. I kuta, and Andrew D. Hurwitz

, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e Hurwitz ; Dissent by

J udg e I k utaU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 2

SUMMARY *

Crim inal Law

Vacating a sentence and remanding for resentencing

, the panel held t h a t neither the defendant’s conviction under Calif. Penal Code § 243.1 nor his conviction under Calif. Penal Code § 69 was for a “crime of violence” as d e fined b y the residual clause of the career offender g uideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2(a)(2).

The panel wrote tha t b ecause neither of the convictions qualifies under the case law that predated Johnson v. United S t ates , 135 S. Ct. 2 551 (2015), it did not need to a d d re s s whether, in lig ht o f Johnson

, the res i d u al clause in § 4B 1.2(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vag ue.

J udg e I kuta dissented because the majority applies cases that the Supreme Court in Johnson has ex pressly overruled to decide the defendant’s claim that his p r ior o f fenses do not qualify as crimes of violence under § 4B 1.2.

COUNSEL

Ethan A. B a log h (arg

ued), Coleman & B alo gh L L P, San F rancisco, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 3

M e linda H aag , United States Attorney
, B arbara J

. Valliere

, Chief, Appellate Division, L aurie Kloster Gr a y (arg ued), Assistant United States Attorney , San F rancisco, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OP INION

HURW I TZ , Circuit J udg e:

J a son L ee was convicted of distributing crack cocain e. He appeals only the resulting sentence. B ecause we f ind that the district c ourt erred by imposing a career offender enhancement und er § 4B 1.1(a)(3) of the United States Sentencing Gui d e l i n e s ( “ G u i delines”), we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing

.

I.

L ee had two prior California drug c onvictions. I n lig ht o f those convictions, a f

ter t h e jury f

ound L ee g u ilty o f distributing crack c ocaine in violation of 21 U .S.C

. §§ 841(a)(1) and ( b)(1)(B ), the district c o urt applied the

career offender enhan c e m ent o f Guidelines § 4B 1 .1 in calculating the Guidelines rang e. Under the F a ir Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L . No. 111-220, § 2, 1 24 Stat. 2372, 2372 (a m e n d ing 21 U .S.C. § 841), the court calculated the Guidelines rang e as 2 62 to 237 months, but sentenced L ee to 180 months in custody

and ten y ears of supervised release.

On a ppeal, we he l d t h a t only one of L ee’s d rug convictions qualified as a predic a t e “controlled substance offense” u n d er the career offender e nhancement. United States v. Lee (

Lee I ), 704 F .3d 785, 79 0

– 9 2 (9th Cir. 2012).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 4

W e vacated L ee’s sentence, but because the drug convictions

w e r e not L ee’s only prior c onvictions, we remanded for t h e district court to “consider whe t h e r L ee’s convictions under California Penal Code §§ 69 and 243.1” were for “crimes of violence” under § 4B 1.1( a )( 3) o f the G uidelines, and thus

were “predicate offenses that, in conjunction with” t h e d r ug conviction, “wou l d q u alify L ee a s a career offender.” Id. at 792.

On r emand, t h e district court found that each conviction was for a “crime of violence.” Apply ing the career offender enhancement, the court calculat ed the G uidelines rang e a s 360 months to lif

e , b u t sentenced L ee to ten y ears in prison and ten y ears of supervised release. L ee timely appealed.

II.

“All sentencing proceeding s are to beg in by determining the a pplicable Guidelines rang e .” United States v. Carty
, 520 F .3d 9 84, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc )

. I n calculating a sentence, the district court is requi r e d by § 1 B 1.1 of the Guidelines first to determine the base offense level, and then make appropriate upward or d ownward adjustments. At issue in this case is Part B of Chapter F our of the Guidelines, which requires enhancement o f the o ffense level of a “career offender.” Section 4B 1 .1(a) defines a “career offender” as a defendant who “has at least two prior felony convictions o f either a crime of violence or a c ontrolled substance offense.” Section 4B 1 .2(a) in turn defines a “crime of violence” as:

an y offense under federal or state law, punishable b y imprisonment for a term

ex c eeding one y ear, that—(1) h a s as an element the use, attempted use, or threatenedU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 5

use of phy si c a l force ag ainst the person o f another, or (2) is b urg lary o f a dwe l l i ng , arson, or ex tortion

, i n volves use of ex plosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of p hy sical injury to another.

The final clause in § 4B 1.2(a), beg inning with the words “or otherwise,” is commonly r eferred to as the “residual clause.” See, e.g. , United States v. Crews
, 621 F

. 3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 2010).

“W e review de novo a district c ourt’s ‘interpretation o f the Sentenci ng Guidelines and its determination that a defendant q

ualifies a s a ca r e e r o ffender’ under U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.1.” United States v. Mitchel l

, 6 2 4 F .3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting U nited States v. Crawford

, 520 F .3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008)). “A mistake in ca l c u l ating the recommended Guidelines sentencing rang e is a sig nificant procedural error that requires us to remand for resentencing

. ” United S tates v. Munoz-Camarena
, 631 F .3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Molina-Martinez v. U nited States
, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345–46 (2016). 1

1 A f t er d eterm in in g th e ap p licab le of f en s e lev el, in clu d i n g a n y

en h an cem en ts, an d th e d ef en d an t’ s crim in al h isto ry categ o ry , th e d istrict

co u rt calcu lates th e co rresp o n d in g G u id elin es sen te n c i n g ran g e. U .S. Sen ten cin g Gu i d elin es Man u al § 1 B 1 .1 (a)(7 ) (U.S. Sen ten cin g Co m m ’ n 2 0 1 5 ). T h e co u rt th en co n sid ers t h e st a t u t o r y f

acto rs in 1 8 U.S.C. § 3 5 5 3 (a), an d ex ercises its d iscretio n to d eterm i n e an ap p ro p riate

sen ten ce, w

h eth er in sid e o r o u tsid e th e Gu id elin es ran g e. Ca r ty , 5 2 0 F.3 d at 9 9 1

– 9 2.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 6

III.

L ee contends that he is n ot a “career offender” because he does not have “at least two prior felony convictions of either

a crime of violence or a co n trolled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4 B 1.1(a). B ecause we h ave already held that L ee’s 1998 Alameda County Superior Co u rt c onviction for violating California Health & Safety Code § 11 3 5 2 (a) “qualifies as a predicate controlled substance offense,” Lee I
, 704 F .3d at 792, the issue for d ecision is whether either o f L ee’s convictio ns under California Penal Code § 2 4 3.1 o r § 69(a) are “crimes of violence” under Guidelines § 4B 1.1(a). The g overnment does not c ontend that either § 243.1 or § 69 is a controlled substance offense, “has as an element the u se, attempted use, or threatened use of phy sical force ag ainst the
person of another,” U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2(a)(1), or corresponds to

an enumerated crime in § 4B 1.2(a)(2)

. The only question, then, is whether, under the residual c l a u se, either crime “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of phy sical injury

to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2(a)(2).

A.

I n interpreting the r esidual claus e, our jurisprudence has been informed by cases interpreting an identical clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S

. C

. § 924(e)(2)(B )

. See United States v. S pencer , 7 24 F

. 3 d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013). W e vacated submission in this case pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United S t a t e s , w h i c h f

o u n d t h e A C C A r e s i d u a l c l a u s e unconstitutionally vag u e. 1 35 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). I n lig h t o f

a division among our sister circuits as to whether the residual clause in Guidelines § 4 B 1.2(a)(2) is also void f or v ag ueness,

we then requested supplemental b riefing

. Compare RamirezU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 7

v. United States
, 799 F .3d 8 4 5, 856 (7 t h C i r. 2015) (acting “on the assumption that the Supreme Court’s r easoning applies to section 4B 1.2 as well”); United S t a t e s v

. Maldonado

, — F

. App’x —, 2016 W L 229833, *3 & n.1 (2d Cir. J an. 20, 2016) (hold i n g t he Guidelines c lause void for
vag ueness and collecting cases) with United S tates v

. Matchett

, 802 F .3d 1185, 1193–95 (11th Cir. 2015) (rejecting

a vag ueness challeng e to § 4B 1.2(a)(2) of the G uid e l ines). B ecause we find that neither of L ee’s convictions would qualify as a “ crime of violence” under o u r pre- Johnson caselaw, we need not address this constitutional question. 2

2 A lth o u g h th e d issen t arg u e s th at w e sh o u ld d ecid e th is co n stitu tio n al issu e an d u ltim ately ad o pt a n ew test t o d eterm in e w h eth er L ee’ s

co n v ictio n s are “ crim es o f v io len ce” in a p o st- Jo h n so n w o rld

, it d eclin es to ad o p t su ch a test, u ltim ately co n clu d in g t h at th e o f f en s es eith er m ay or

m ay n o t b e “ crim es o f v io len ce,” d ep en d in g o n w h ich o f tw o altern ativ e ap p ro ach es is tak en

. B u t th e task b e fo r e u s i s n o t th eo ry , b u t decisio n

. W e m u st d ecid e w

h eth er th e resid u al clau se en h an cem en ts w ere p ro p erly
ap p lied to L ee’ s sen ten ce, n o t w h eth er th ey co u ld co n s t i t u tio n ally ap p ly
to so m e f u tu re h y p o th etical d ef

en d an t. We also n o te t

h at th e Sen ten cin g Co m m i ssio n in ten d s to rem o v e th e resid u al clau se f ro m § 4 B1 .2 (a)(2 ), ef f ectiv e A u g u st 1, 2 0 1 6

. S ee Amen d men t to th e S

en ten cin g Gu id

elin es ( Prelimin a ry)

, Un ited Stat e s Sen ten cin g Co m m ’ n (J an

. 8
, 2 0 1 6 ), h t t p : / / w w w

. u s s c

. g o v / s i t e s / d e fa ul t/f iles/p df /am e n d m e n t -p r o c e ss / r e a d e r

f rien d ly

- am en d m en ts/2 0 1 6 0 1 0 8

_ RF.p d f. B ecau se th e g ov ern m en t h as

ro u tin ely co n ced ed erro r i n p en d in g ap p eals in v olv in g th e resid u al clau se, th ere t h eref o re is little reaso n to sp ecu l ate ab o u t a test f o r ap p licatio n of th e clau se in

f u tu re cases.

A n d

, u n lik e o u r d issen tin g co lleag u e, w e f ail to see h o w Jo h nso n

co u ld h av e d isad v an tag ed L ee. Jo hn so n d i d n o t in v alid ate th e u se o f th e categ o rical ap p ro ach

. S

ee 13 5 S. C t. at 2 5 6 2 (“ d eclin [in g ] th e d i ssen t’ s in v itatio n ” to “

j ettiso n f o r th e resid u al clau se

. . . th e categ o rical ap p ro ach ad o p ted in T

a ylo r ”) (citin g Ta

ylo r v. Un ited S ta tes , 4 9 5 U.S. 5 7 5
, 5 9 9

– 6 0 2 (1 9 9 0 ). If L ee’ s co n v ictio n s did n o t categ o rically co n s t i t u t e crim es o f v io len ce b ef

ore Jo h n so n , it is im

p o ssib le to u n d erstan d h o w th at d ecisio n —w h ich f ou n d a statu te s im ilar to th e resid u al clau s eU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 8

California Penal Code § 243.1 provides:

W h en a battery is committed ag ainst the
person of a cu s t o d ial o f ficer as defined in Section 831 of the Penal Code, and the person committing the offense knows o r re asonably should know that the vi c t im is a custodial officer eng ag ed in the performance of his o r her duties, and the custodial officer is eng ag ed i n t h e performance of his or her duties, the offense shall be punished by imprisonment

. . . .

B e cause § 2 43.1 i s i n d i visible, w e apply the pure categ orical approach in analy z ing whether it qualifies as a “crime of violence.” See United States v. Descamps , 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). I n d etermini n g w hether an offense

u n co n stitu

tio n ally v ag u e—so m eh ow tran s f o rm ed th o se crim es in to o n es th at j u stif y ap p licatio n

o f th e Gu id elin es en h an cem en t.

W e declin e to d ecid e w

h eth er Jo h n so n ’ s reaso n in g ex ten d s to t h e Se n t e ncin g Gu id elin es, becau se ev en i f i t d o es n o t, w e are lef t w ith th e

sam e resu lt in th is case: W e m u st va c a t e an d rem an d f

o r resen ten cin g b ecau se L ee’ s crim es are n o t categ o rical crim es o f v io len ce. B earin g in

m in d t h e “ card i n al p rin cip le o f

j u d icial restrain t” th at “ if i t is n o t n ecessary to d ecid e m o r e , it is n ecessary n o t to d ecid e m o re,” PDK La b s., In c. v. DEA
, 3 6 2 F .3 d 7 8 6
, 7 9 9 (D.C. Cir. 2 0 04 ) (Ro berts, J
., co n cu rrin g in p art

an d co n cu rrin g in th e j u dg m en t), w e d eclin e th e d issen t’ s i n v i t a t i o n to

an sw er a co n s t i t u tio n al q u estio n u n n ecessary to th e d i sp o sitio n o f th is

case. In stead

, w e f

o l l o w th e g u id an ce o f th e Su p rem e Co u rt to av oid d ecid in g q u estio n s o n co n stitu tio n al g ro u n d s if th e c a s e is o th erw ise d eterm in ab l e. S

ee, e.g

. , Pea rso n v. Ca lla h an , 5 5 5 U.S. 2 2 3 , 2 4 1 (2 0 0 9) (citin g Ash wa n d

er v. TVA
, 2 9 7 U.S. 2 8 8
, 3 4 7 (1 9 3 6) (B ran d eis, J
., co n cu rrin g ) (“ T h e Co u rt w ill n o t p ass u p o n a co n stitu

tio n al q u es t i o n alth o u g h p ro p erly p r e s e n t e d by th e reco rd

, if th ere is also p resen t so m e

o th er g ro u n d u

po n w h i ch th e case m ay

b e d isp o sed o f

.”)).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 9

categ orically q

ualifies a s a crime of vio l e n c e under the residual c lause, “ we g e nerally ex amine two criteria.” United States v. Park

, 649 F .3d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir

. 2 0 1 1 )

. “F irst, the conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense

, in the ordinary case, must p r e sent a serious potential risk o f phy sical injury to another.” I d. at 1177–78 (altera t i o n and internal quotation omitted). “Second, the state offense must be ‘roug hly similar, in kind as well as in deg ree of risk posed’
to those offenses enumerated a t the beg inning of the residual clause—burg lary

of a dwelling , arson, ex tortion, and crimes involving e x plosives.” Id. at 1178 (quoting Begay v. United States
, 553 U.S. 1 37, 143 (2011 ))

. B oth criteria must be satisfied for a conviction to quali f y a s a crime of violence. S e e U nited States v. Spencer
, 724 F .3d 1133, 1138 (9th Ci r. 2013).

Under California Penal Code § 242, simple battery “need
not involve any real violence,” and “the leas t touching may constitute battery .” People v. Mesce
, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 756 (Ct. App. 1997) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). The parties ag ree that a violation o f C a l ifornia Penal Code § 243.1 requires n o more force than a simple b attery

. B ut, the
g overnment arg ues that because § 243.1 inv o l v es a battery
ag ainst a “custodia l o f

fi cer

. . . in the performance of his o r h er duties,” the “serious potential risk” requirement o f Guidelines § 4B 1.2(a)(2) is met.

The F ourth Circuit has persuasively rejected an identical

a r gu ment, holding that a conviction for violating a Virg i n i a statute prohibiting assault and battery on a police o f f i ce r, which “may be accomplished by the slig htest tou ch i ng o r without causing p hy sical injury to another,” did not qualify a s

a crime of violence under the Guidelines. United States v

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 10

Carthorne

, 7 26 F .3d 503, 514 (4th Cir. 2013). 3 The F ourth Circuit reasoned that “because this phy sical contact element

. . . may be satisfie d in a relatively inconsequential manner, th a t s t a t ute cannot, by reason of its elements, be viewed a s presenting a serious potential risk of phy sical injury .” I d

.

W e ag ree. I n doing so, we depart fro m the reasoning o f the F irst Circuit in United States v. Dancy
, which upheld the application o f the Armed Career Criminal A ct’s r e s i d ual clause based upon a Massachusetts conviction for battery on

a police officer. 640 F .3d 455, 470 (1st Cir. 2011). T h e F irst Circuit relied on its earlier decision in Unit e d S tates v

. W illiams

, which h e ld that “battery of an armed on-duty police officer is a powder keg

. . . w hich always h a s the serious potential” to “ex plode into violence and r esult in phy s i cal injury to someone.” 559 F

. 3d 1143, 1149 (1st Cir. 2 009) (citations a

nd quotation marks omitt e d ). L ike the F ourth Circuit, we reject the “powder k eg ” theory as a “disservice to law enforcement officers,” who “ can rel y o n their training and ex p erience to d etermine the best method o f responding ”
to a n on-violent touching

. Carthorne

, 726 F .3d a t 5 14. Under the categ orical a pproach, a crime which can be accomplished by “ minimal phy sical contact

. . . doe s not constitute an o ffense ‘ that o r d i narily induces an escalated
response f

rom the officer that puts the officer and others at a similar seri o u s risk of injury ’” w hen c ompared to arson or a crime involving ex plosives. I d

. a t 515 & n.12 (quoting United States v. Hampton
, 675 F .3d 720, 731 (7th Cir. 2012)). A conviction u nder § 2 43.1 is not for a categ orical crime o f violence under the career offender enhancement.

3 T h e Virg in i a statu te also co v ered b attery ag ain st co rrectio n s o f f icers. Ca rth o rn e , 7 2 6 F.3 d at 5 1 2 n .8

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 11

B.

California Penal Code § 69(a) punishes:

E v e ry p erson who a ttempts, by means of a n y threat or violence, to deter o r pr e v e nt an

ex e cutive o fficer from p e rforming any duty imposed upon the offi c e r by law, or who knowing ly resists, by the use of force o r violence, the o fficer, in the performance of his or her duty

.

The alternat i v e m e thods of violating § 69(a) “have been called the ‘attempting t o deter’ prong and the ‘ actually resisting an office r ’ prong .” Flores-Lopez v. H older

, 685 F .3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting People v. Lopez

, 29 Cal Rptr. 3d 586, 603 (Ct. Ap p

. 2 0 0 5 ) )

. B ecause the
statute is divisible, we apply the modified categ orical approach to determine which p rong of § 6 9(a) L ee violated. See Descamps , 133 S. Ct. at 2283–85.

L ee pleaded guilty to a criminal complaint alleg ing violation of both prong s of § 6 9 (a )

. B ut that plea did not establish that he violated both p rong s. “[ U] nder the modified categ orical approach, when a conjunctively phrased charg ing docum ent alleg es several theories of the crime, a g u ilty plea establishes conviction under at least one of those theories, but
not necessarily all o f them.” Y oung v. Holder

, 697 F

. 3d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[ W] hen either ‘ A’ or ‘B ’ could support

a conviction, a defendant who p leads g uilty to a c h a r g ing document alleg ing ‘A a

n d B ’ admits only ‘A’ or ‘B .’”), abrogated on other grounds by Moncrieffe v. Holder

, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013). Nor do t h e Shepard documents aid us in determining which prong of thi s d i v isible statute L eeU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 12

violated. See Shepard v. United States
, 5 4 4 U.S. 13, 16 (2005) (holding that courts may “g enerally ” consider “the statutory defini t i o n, charg ing document, written plea
ag reement, transcript of p lea colloquy

, and any ex p l i c i t factual finding by the t ri al j u dg e to which the defendant assented”). Thus, if violation o f either p rong of § 69(a) does
not constitute a categ orical crime of violence, L ee’s conviction under that statute cannot justify application of the career offender enhancement.

W e have not directly addressed in a p ublished opinion whether a violatio n o f the “actually resisting p rong ” o f § 6 9(a) c onstitutes a “crime of violence” under t h e § 4B 1.2(a)(2) residual clause. However, in Flores-Lopez

, we held that because the “ actually resisting prong ” of § 6 9 (a)
may be satisfied by “ de m inimis force” and “does no t b y its
nature create a substantial r isk that force will be used, ” a conviction under that prong is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). 685 F .3d at 865. Section 16(b) defines a “crime o f violence” a s a felony “ that, by its nature, involves

a substantial risk that phy sical forc e a g a i n st the person o r property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 4 The lang u ag e of the § 4B 1.2(a)(2) residual clause is remarkably similar; it defines a crime of violence a s “conduct that presents a s erious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” See United State s v

. Gomez-Leon
, 545 F .3d 777, 788–89 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the

4 In Dima

ya v. Lyn ch

, th is c o u r t c o n clu d ed th at § 1 6 (b ) is

u n co n stitu

tio n ally v ag u e. 8 0 3 F.3 d 11 10
, 1 1 2 0 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 5 ); see a l

so Un ited S ta tes v. Hern a n d

ez-La ra , — F.3 d —, 2 0 1 6 WL 1 23 9 1 9 9
, * 1 (9 th Cir. Mar. 2 9
, 2 0 1 6 ) (p er cu riam ) (ap p ly in g Dima ya to U.S.S.G. § 2 L 1.2 (b )(1 )(C), w

h ich in co rp o rated t

h e § 1 6(b ) d ef

in itio n o f “ crim e of

v io len ce”).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 13

§ 4B 1.2(a)(2) “serio u s r i s k o f injury test resembles” the § 16(b) “substantial risk/use of f orce test,” a

nd t h a t “it is unclear w hether there is any meaning ful difference betw een the two risk-based approaches”). Consistent w ith our

r e asoning in Flores-Lopez

, we conclude that a convict i o n

u n der the “actually resisting prong ” o f § 69(a) d oes not constitute a crime of violence u nder the residual clause. W e therefore need not consider whether a c onviction u n d er the “attempting to deter prong ” involves a residual-clause crime of violence.

IV.

Neither L ee’s § 243.1 n or his § 69 c onviction w as for a “crime of violence” as defi ned by the residual clause o f Guidelines § 4 B 1.2(a)(2). And

, b e c a u se L ee h as only o ne qualify i n g c onviction, see Lee I
, 704 F .3d at 792, the career offender enhancement is not warranted. W e therefore VACATE L ee’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing

. 5

5 A l th o u g h w e d if

f er in o u r ap p ro ach es, w e are g ratif i ed th at o ur

co lleag u e h as also co n clu d ed th at th e ap p ro p riate d isp o sitio n is to rem an d f o r resen ten cin g

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 14

I KUTA, Circuit J udg e, dissenting :

T h e Ninth Circuit has a knack for disreg arding t h e Supreme Court. Someti m es it simply ig nores the Supreme Court. See Harrington v. R i c hter

, 562 U.S. 86, 92 (2011) (“[ J ] udici a l d isreg a

r d [ for the Supreme Court’s h abeas jurisprudence] is inherent in the opinion of the Court o f Appeals for the Ninth Circuit here under review.”). Other times it reads the decisions of the Supreme Court in such a peculiar manner that no “fair-minded jurist” could ag r ee. See Nevada v. Jackson

, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1993 (2013) ( “ N o fairminded jurist could think that [ the Supreme Court case at issue] c learly establishes that the enforcement of the Nevada

r u l e in this case is inconsistent with the Constitution.” ). Occasionally it even thinks it is t he Supreme Court. See Lopez v. Smith

, 135 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2014) (sc o lding the Ninth Circuit for g ranting habeas relief based on its own precedent, where AEDPA requires that a state c o u r t d ecision violate clearly established federal law as established by the Supreme Court, “not b y the courts of appeals”). B ut this is t h e first time I ’ve seen the Ninth Circuit decide a criminal defendant’s direct a ppeal based on law that the S u p r e m e Court h as just overrul ed without even considering whether the new rule applies.

I n Johnson v. United States
, the Supreme Court h e ld that
t h e r esidual clause in the Armed Career Crimina l A ct (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 4(e), was void for vag ueness. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015). I n do i n g so, the Court overruled a long line of cases interpreting both the ACCA residual clause and identical lang uag e in the U nited States Sentencing Guidelines, U

. S.S.G. § 4B 1.2. Johnson

, 135 S. Ct. at 2558–60. I ndeed, we vaca t e d s u bmission of this case until the Supreme Court ruled becaus e i t was clear that theU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 15

S u p r eme Court’s d ecision in Johnson would control o u r interpretation of the Guidelines residual clause. B ut now that the Supreme Court has spoken, the majority simply covers its

ears and say s “never mind.” W ithout reason i n g o r

ex p lanation, the majority applies c a ses that the Supr eme Court h as ex pressly overruled to decide J ason L ee’s claim that his prior offenses do not q ualify as “crime(s) o f violence” under § 4B 1.2. B ecause we may not ig nore a Supreme Court decision that o verrules almost a decade of case law, I dissent.

I

B e fore J ohnson v

. United States
, we ex pressly relied on the Supreme Court ’ s i n terpretation of the ACCA residual clause to interpret the substantially identical residua l c l ause in § 4B 1.2. See United States v. S p e ncer , 724 F .3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013). A CCA requ i r e s courts to impose a sentence o f not less than 15 y ears on sp ecified defendants who have three previous convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense or both. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Section 924(e)(2)(B ) defines “violent f elony ” to include a specified crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of phy sical injury to a nother.” 1 The Supreme

1 1 8 U.S.C. § 9 24 (e)(2 )(B ) states:

[T ]h e term “ v io len t f elo n y ” m ean s an y crim e p u n i s ha b le b y im

priso n m en t f o r a term ex ceed in g on e y ear, o r an y act o f j u v en ile d elin q u en cy in v o lv in g th e

u se o r carry in g o f a f

irearm

, k n if e, o r d estru ctiv e d ev i ce t h at w ou ld b e p u n ish ab le b y im priso n m en t f

o r s uc h
term if co m m itted b y an ad u lt, th at—U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 16

Court interpreted this definition in fo u r key cases: Sykes v

. United S tates , 564 U.S. 1 (2011); Chambers v

. United States
, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); B e

g a y v. United S

tates , 553 U.S. 137 (2008); and J

ames v. United States , 550 U.S. 192 (2007).

Section 4B 1.1 of the Guidelines likewise en h a n c e s the
sentences of career offenders who hav e two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence. Using identical lang uag e to ACCA, the G uid elines define “crime of violence” to include an o f

f ense that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2(a)(2). B ecause the G uidelines and ACCA

use identical lang uag e, each of our cases interpreting § 4B 1.2 relied o n one or more of the four k e y Supreme Court cases interpreting ACCA’s residual clause. S ee, e.g. , Spencer
, 724 F .3d at 1137–39; United St a tes v. Park

, 649 F .3d 1175, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2011); United Stat e s v

. Crews
, 621 F .3d 849, 852–55 (9th Cir. 2010).

I n J ohnson

, the Supreme Court overruled its four cases interpreting the ACCA residual clause because it concluded that the clause was unconstituti o n a l l y v ag ue. 135 S. Ct. at 2557–60

. Johnson ex plained that the void-for-vag ueness d o c trine is based on the D ue Process Clause of the F if t h Amendment. Id. at 2556–57. According to Jo h nson , “[ t] he F ifth Amendment provides that ‘[ n] o p erson sh a l l

. . . be

(i) h as as an elem en t th e u se, attem p ted u se, o r th re a t en ed u s e of ph y sical f o rce ag ain s t th e p erso n of

an o t h er; o r

(ii) is bu rg lary

, arso n , o r ex to rtio n , in v o l v e s u se of

ex p l o siv es, o r o th erw ise in v o lv es co n d u ct th at p resen ts

a serio u s p o ten t ial risk o f p h y s ical in j u ry to an o th er

. . . .U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 17

deprived of life, liberty

, or property , w ithout due process o f law,’” and “the Government violates this g uarantee by taking
away someone’s life, liberty

, or property under a c riminal law

so vag ue that it fails to g ive o rdinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, o r so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcemen t

. ” I

d

. at 2556 (citing Kolender v

. Lawson
, 461 U .S. 352, 357–5 8 (1983)). Althoug h the Court initially framed the void for vag ueness doctrine as apply ing o n l y to substantive criminal laws, it later held the doct r ine also applied to m a n d a tory sentencing statutes, because “vag ue sentencing provisions may pose c onstitutional q u e s t ions if they do not state with sufficient clarity t h e c o n sequences o f

v i o l ating a g iven criminal statute.” United States v

. Batchelder , 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979).

Apply ing this doctrine, Johnson det e rmined that the ACCA residual clause was void for vag uene s s. F irst, Johnson ex plained that “try ing to der i v e m eaning from the residual clause” was a “failed e nterprise,” and interpretations of the cla u s e a mounted to little more than g uesswork. 1 3 5 S. Ct. a t 2560. Referencing the four Supreme Co u r t precedents interpreting the r esidual c l a u s e , Johnson described them as “repeated attempts and r ep e ated failures to craft a principled and objecti v e standard out of the residual clause that confirm its h opeless indetermi n a c y .” Id

. at 2558. According to Johnson

, courts have n o r eliable way to estimate the risks posed by the defendant’s predicate offense, id. at 2 557–58, or to determine “how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony ,” id. at 25 5 8

. This indeterminacy caused the two evils that trig g e r the void for
vag ueness doctrine: ( 1) it “denie[ d] f a ir n otice to defendants” and (2) it “invite[ d] arbitrary enforcement by

judg e s.” Id. at 2557. A ccording ly

, Johnson concluded that “imposing an i ncreased sentence u n der the residual clause of the A r m e dU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 18

Career Criminal Act violates the Constitution’s g uarantee o f due process.” Id. at 2 5 6 3. I n lig ht of this conclusion, Johnson ex p ressly overruled the Court’s prior interpretations of the residual clause i n Sykes

, 564 U.S. 1, and James
, 5 50 U.S. 1 92, 135 S. Ct. a t 2563, and implicitly o ver ru l e d Chambers

, 555 U.S. 122, and Begay
, 553 U.S. 137, 135 S. Ct. 2558–60.

I n overturning these cases, J o hnson n ecessarily overruled the Ninth Circuit cases that relied on them. As w e recog niz ed in Nunez-Reyes v. Holder

, a decision to overr ule long

standin g p recedent also n ecessarily overrules “the same holding in those cases that, bound by stare decisis , followed the [ previou s ] r ule.” 646 F .3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); see also Smith v. Sumner
, 9 9 4 F .2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993) ( “[ T ] h e [ d istrict] court relied on a case that was subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the principle announced [ by the overruled case] was n o long er g ood law at the time of Appellant’s law s u i t

. ” ) (internal citations omitted). And to the ex tent Johnson did not directly overrul e o u r cases, it “effectively overruled” them b y “undercut[ ting ] the[ ir] theory or reasoning

. . . in such a way that the c ases are clearly irreconc i l a b le.” S ee M iller v

. Gammie
, 335 F .3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

The c ases that the majority uses to interpret § 4B 1.2 have therefore been overruled, because each of them relied on the Supreme Court cases that J ohnson o v erturned. See S pencer , 724 F .3d at 1 1 3 7–39; Park

, 6 49 F .3d at 1177–78; United States v. Carthorne

, 7 26 F .3 d 503, 513–14 ( 4th Cir. 2013). “W h e re a leg a l doctrine is o v e r r u led by the Supreme Court, [ a court’s] error in apply ing that doctrine

. . . is ‘plain.’” United States v. R ecio
, 371 F .3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 19

The majority commits ex actly this pla i n error in rely ing on precedent overruled by Johnson.

The majority cannot ex plai n aw ay its reliance on overruled case law by claiming to eng ag e in constitut i o n al avoidance, Maj. op. at 7

– 8 n.2. I n order to avoid a constitutional q

u e stion, a court must have “some other g r ound
upon which the case may be disposed o f.” P ear s o n v. Callahan

, 555 U.S. 223, 2 4 1 (2009) (quoting Ashwander v

. TVA
, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (B r a n deis, J
., con cu r r i ng )). The maj o rity claims it can dispose of this case by a pply ing “pre- Johnson case law.” Maj. o p. at 7. B ut s i n ce Jo h nson has e liminated that prior case law, this “oth e r gr o u nd” no long er ex ists. The majority ’s approach is not constitutional avoidance, it is Supreme Court avoidance.

I I

B y declaring the A CCA r esidual clause u nconstitutional, Johnson created “a n ew rule for the conduct of c r i m inal prosecutions” applicable to sentencing procee d i n gs. See United States v. Jordan

, 2 56 F .3d 922, 928–29 (9th Cir. 2 001) (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky

, 479 U.S. 31 4
, 3 2 8 (1987)). Such rules must “be applied retroactively to all cases, state o r federal, pending on dire c t review or not y et final, with no

ex c e ption.” Griffith

, 479 U .S. at 3 2 8. B ecause L ee’s case

was pending on direct review at the time that J o h n s on was decided, we are bound to consider whether L ee is entitled to the benefit of Johnson ’s n ew rule. Se e D i m aya v. Lynch

, 803 F .3d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir

. 2 015) (considering h ow Johnson applies to 8 U .S.C. § 16); cf. W elch v. U nited States
, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (201 6 ) (holding that J ohnson applies retroactively

to ACCA cases on collateral review).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 20

I t is not immediately

obvious that L ee’s sentence should be vacated because the Supreme Court’s void for vag ueness doctrine—which holds that a statute is void for vag ueness if it fails to g ive fair notice of the c onduct it punishes or invites arbitrary enforcement—is no t directly applicable in the Sentencing Guidelines c o ntex t. A criminal statute violates the “fair n otice” requirement if it “fails to gi v e a p er son o f ordina r y i n t e l lig ence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is fo r b idden by the statute.” Colautti v. Franklin

, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). A statute violates the “arbitrary enforcement” requirement i f it is “so indefinite that it encour a ge s arbitrary and erratic arrests a nd convictions.” Id. (qu o t ing Papachristou v

. Jacksonville

, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). I n other words, “ordinary notions of fair p lay and settled rules of l a w , ” Johnson

, 135 S. Ct. at 2557, a re violated if police officers, p rosecutors, and judg es are e ssentiall y “defining crimes a nd fix ing penalties” by filling in g aps in s t a t u t es. United States v. E

vans , 333 U .S. 483, 486 (1948). However, the Due Process Clause is not violated w h e n o fficials make decisions that have been appropriately e n t rusted to their discretion. F or instance, in making charg ing de ci s i o ns, prosecutors may choose to charg e a de fe n d a n t with the offense that carries t h e m o s t onerous p e nalty

, rather than a substantially sim ilar offense with lesser penalties, without
g iving rise to due p r ocess concerns. B atchelder

, 4 42 U.S. at 123–24.

Unlike the mandatory sentencing schemes in Batchelder and Johnson

, the Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory and do not f

ix the p enalty for any o ffense. See United States

v. Booker

, 543 U.S. 220, 245 ( 2005). W hile courts must “beg in all sentencing proceeding s by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines rang e,” Gall v. U nited S tates , 552 U.S.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 21

3 8
, 49 (2007) (citing Rita v. United States
, 551 U.S. 338
, 347–48 ( 2007)), and while the Gu i delines p rovide a framework and anchor for the court’s ex ercise of discretion,

see Molina-Martinez v. U nited States
, 136 S. Ct. 1 338, 1345–46 (2016), a district court has broad discretion to impose a s e n tence inside or outside the recommended Guidelines rang e and there is no presumption that a sentence outside the r ang e is unreas o n able, Gall

, 552 U.S. at 49

. “Overall, this sy stem requires a court to g ive respectful consideration to the Guidelines, but it p ermits the court to tailor t h e sentence in lig ht of other statutory concerns a s well.” Peugh v. U

nited States
, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B e cause a district c ourt is not strictly b ound by the Gu idelines, but may ex ercise its discretion to impose a nonGuidelines sentence w ithin the statutory framewo r k

, neither the fair n otice c oncern nor the a rbitrary enforcement concern g iving rise to the void for vag ueness doctrine is applicable in the Sentencing Guidelines contex t.

F irst, the Supreme Court has made clear that t h e Due Process Clause does not require a district court to g ive notice
to a defendant before imposing a sentence outs i d e the recommended Guideline rang e. See Irizarry v. United States
, 553 U.S. 708, 713–14 (2008). As the Supre m e Court acknowledg ed, Irizarry marked a departure from the Court’s
pre- Booker analy sis. Id

. at 713. I n Burns v. Unite d S t a t e s , the Court had interpreted Rule 32 of the F ederal Rules o f Civil Procedure as requiring a district court to n o tify a defendant before sua sponte departing u p w a rd from an applicable Guidelines sent encing rang e. 501 U.S. 129, 138 (1991). According to the Court, reading Rule 32 “to dispense with notice” would require the Court “to confront the seriousU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 22

question whether notice in this setting is mandated by the Due Process Clause.” Id. B ut in Iriz a r r y , t he Court concluded that interpreting Rule 3 2 as allowing the imposition of a n above-Guidelines sentence without notice would no long er raise any D ue Process Clause concern. See Irizarry
, 5 53 U.S.
at 713. Rather, “[ a] ny ex pectation subject to due p r ocess protection at the time we d ecided Bur n s t h a t a criminal defendant would receive a sentence within the p resumptively applicable Gu i d elines rang e did not survive our decision in [ Booker ] .” Id

. Once the Guidelines became merely advisory

, the Court reasoned, “ n e i t her the Government n or the defendant may place the same deg r ee of reliance on the ty pe of ‘ex pectancy ’ that g ave rise to a special need f or no t ice in B u rns .” Id

. at 713–14; see also United States v. Ticheno r , 683 F .3d 358, 365 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Since the Guidelines a re merely advisory

, defendants cannot rely on them to communicate the sentence that the di s t r ict court will impose.”). According ly

, the Court concluded that a district court’s imposition of an above-Guidelin e s sentence without
g iving notice to the defendant did not raise constitutional

concerns. Irizarry , 553 U.S. at 714. 2

This re a s o ning is equally applicable here. B e cause the d e fendant no long er has a protected ex pectation of b ei n g sentenced within the rang e recommended by the Guidelines,

2 B ecau se Iriza rry d i d n o t ex pressly ov erru le Bu rn s , w e rem ain b o u n d b y its in terp retatio n o f Ru l e 3 2 as req u irin g a d istrict co u rt t o g iv e a d ef en d an t n o tice o f its d ecisio n o f a d ep artu re f ro m th e Gu i d elin es, w

h ere

“ ‘ d ep artu re’ is a term of

art u n der th e Gu id elin es an d ref ers o n ly to n o n

Gu i d elin es sen t en ces im p o s ed u n d er t

h e fr a m e w o rk set o u t in th e Gu i d elin es.” Un ited S ta tes v. Eva ns-Ma r tin ez , 5 3 0 F.3 d 1 1 6 4
, 1 1 6 9 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ). We n e v e r t he l e ss reco g n ized th at “ [i]n lig h t o f Iriza rry , it is
arg u ab le th at th e d ue p r o cess co n cern s t h at led to th e p ro m

u lg atio n of Ru le 3 2 (h ) are n o w

eq u ally in ap p licab le to sen t en cin g d ep artu res.” Id

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 23

and the Due Process C l a use does not r equire notice to the defendant that the district court intends to impose an aboveGuidelines sentence, a

ny vag ueness in the Guidelines that could result in a hig her recommended rang e does not g ive r ise to fair notice concerns under the Due Process Clause. 3

Nor is the a

rbitrary enforcement concern g iving rise to the constitutional void for vag ueness doctrine a p p licable in the Sentencing G uidelines contex t. B ecause Booker eliminated the statutory provision making the Guidelines ma n d atory , a distric t court is bound only by the sentencing rang e set b y Cong r ess. W hile the Guidelines provide advice reg arding the ty pes of sentences n ormally imposed by district c ourts “ based

on ex tensive empirical evidence derived from t h e review o f thousands of individual sentencing decisions,” Gall

, 552 U.S.
at 46, a district court must ultimately ex ercise its discretion in imposing the sentence; there is no “unrea sonableness presumption for sentences outside the Guidelines r ang e,” id.
at 38. I n deed, we do not even review whether a district court

c orrectly a

pplied the Guidelines’ d irection for when a departu r e f

r om a r ecommended rang e is appropriate, see U.S.S.G. § 5K2

. 0
, b e c ause the court “would b e free on

3 Fo r th i s reaso n , Bo o ker an d Iriza r r y s u p erced e o u r p re-Bo oker d ecisio n s i n Un ited Sta tes v. Ga lla g h er , 9 9 F.3 d 3 2 9
, 3 3 4 (9 th Cir. 19 9 6)

a n d Un ited S ta tes v. Jo h n so n , 1 3 0 F.3 d 1 3 5 2
, 1 3 5 4 (9 th Cir. 19 9 7 ). I n Ga l l a g h er an d Jo h nso n , w e relied o n Ba tch eld er ’ s d eterm in atio n th at

v ag u e sen t en cin g p ro v i sio n s th at d o n o t g i v e d ef en d an ts n o tice o f th e

co n seq u en ces of v io latin g a crim in al statu te m ay v io late t h e Du e P ro cess Clau se, an d h eld th at a d e fen d an t co u l d ch allen g e a p ro v isio n o f th e Gu i d elin es o n th e g ro u n d th at i t w as u n co n stitu tio n ally v ag u e. Ga lla g h er , 9 9 F.3 d at 3 3 4 ; Jo h n so n , 1 3 0 F.3 d at 1 3 5 4

. Su ch co n cern s are n o lo n g er ap p licab le af

t er Bo o ker

, as ex p lain e d i n I riza rry

. Bo o ker th eref

ore

“ u n d ercu t th e th eo ry o r reaso n in g u n derly in g ” o u r d ecisio n s in Ga lla g her

an d Jo hn so n “ i n s u c h a w ay th at th e cases are clearly irreco n cilab le.” Miller v. Ga mmie , 3 3 5 F.3 d 8 8 9, 9 0 0 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ) (en b an c).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 24

remand to impose ex actly the same sentence b y ex ercising his discretion u nder the now-advisory g uidelines,” United States

v. M ohamed

, 4 59 F .3d 979, 9 87 (9th Cir. 2006). G iven that

a district c o u rt’s interpretation of a Guidelines provision is
not “fix ing penalties” in a m a n n er that trenches on the

a u t h o r i ty g iven to Cong ress, Evans
, 333 U.S. at 4 86, a nd instead constitutes an ex ercise of the court’s p rope r discretion, a

ny v ag ueness in the Guidelines provisions does
not increase the due process r isk of arbitrary enforcement, see Batchelder

, 442 U.S. at 123; Cf

. M i s t retta v. United States
, 488 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (“I n deed, because the Guidelines have the effect of promoting sentencing within a n arrower rang e than was previously applied, the p ower of the J udicial B ranch is, if any

thing , somewhat diminished by the Act.”).

I n lig ht of the fact that t h e d i scretionary Sentencing Guidelines do not r aise the same constitutional c oncerns a s mandatory sentencing provisions, I would conclude that any
vag ueness in the § 4 B 1.2 r esidual clause does not violate the Due Process Clause. Therefore, the reasoning in Johnson is
not directly applicable to the Guidel i n e s and the Guidelines residual claus e i s n ot void for vag ueness, e ven thoug h Johnson o v e rrules our c ases that previously interpreted § 4B 1.2. This conclus i o n i s c onsistent with the holding s o f five sis t er circuits that the Guidelines are not susceptible to due process vag ueness challeng es. See United States v. E llis

,

— F .3d —, 2016 W L 859936, at *2–3 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Un i t e d S t a tes v. W

ivell

, 893 F .2d 156, 159 (8th Cir. 1 990)); United S tates v

. Matchett

, 802 F .3d 1185, 1193–95 ( 11th Cir. 2015); Tichenor

, 6 83 F .3d at 365; United States v

. S m i t h

,U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 25

73 F .3d 1414, 1418 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v

. Pearson
, 910 F .2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1990). 4

I I I

B e cause th e G u i delines residual clause is not v oid for
vag ueness, we must still address whether L ee’s conv ictions under s e c t i ons 69 and 243.1 of the California Penal Code constitute cr i mes o f violence under the Guidelines residual clause. Contrary to the majority

, see Maj. op. at 7–8 n.2, we need n ot decide this questi o n i n t h e first instance. As the Supreme Court did in W

elch

, w e may appropriately remand
to the district court to consider whether “ other g rounds” ex ist
to impose the Guidelines career o f fender enhancement that do
not rel y o n the Supreme Court’s prior residual clause cases. 136 S. Ct. a t 1268. I f we reached the issue, however, I would hold that g iven the residual clause’s inscrutabi l i t y i n the ACCA c ontex t, application of the residua l clause would violate the Supreme Court’s instruction that the district court “beg in all sentencing proceeding s by correctly calculating the

4 T h e reaso n in g o f circu its th at h av e in v alid ated th e Gu id elin es resid u al clau se u n d er Jo h n so n is u n p ersu asiv e becau se t h o s e circu its f ailed to

co n sid er th e p u rp o se o f th e d u e p ro cess v o id f o r v ag u en ess do ctrin e. S

ee Un ited S t a tes v. Ma d

rid

, 8 05 F

. 3 d 1 2 0 4
, 1 21 0

– 1 1 (1 0 th Cir. 2 0 1 5 ); see

a lso Un ited S ta tes v. Ma ld on a d o , 20 1 6 W L 2 2 9 83 3
, at * 3 & n .1 (2 d Cir. J an

. 2 0
, 2 0 1 6 ); Un ited Sta tes v. Go o d win
, 2 01 5 WL 5 1 6 77 8 9
, at * 3 (1 0 th Cir. Sep t.4
, 2 0 1 5 ). T h ese cases ap p lied J o h nso n ’ s v o i d f

o r v ag u en ess

an aly sis to th e G u id elin es w ith o u t ad eq u ately ex am in in g w h eth er s u ch du e p ro cess co n cern s ap p ly in t h is d if f er e n t c on tex t, an d w ith o u t g rap p lin g

w ith Iriza rry ’ s ru lin g th at a def en d an t do es n o t h a v e an “ ex p ectatio n

su b j ect to d ue p ro cess p ro tectio n th at h e w ill b e sen ten ced w ith i n th e Gu i d elin es ran g e.” Peu g h

, 1 33 S. Ct. a t 20 8 5 (So to m ay or, J
., p lu rality

o p in io n ). T h e o p i n io n s in Un ited S ta tes v. M a u rer , 6 39 F.3 d 7 2
, 7 7 (3 d Cir. 2 0 1 1) an d Un ited S ta tes v. S a vin
, 3 4 9 F.3 d 2 7
, 3 8

– 3 9 (2 d Cir. 2 0 0 3 ),

w h ich w ere d ecid ed b ef

o re Iriza rry , f

ail f o r th e sam e reaso n

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. L E E 26

applicable G uidelines rang e,” Gall

, 552 U.S. at 49 ( citin g Rita
, 5 51 U.S. at 347–48). I f Johnson so un d e rm i nes the residual clause that it cannot b e accurately interpreted, a district c ourt would commit a procedural error and abuse its discretion if it u sed the Guidelines residual clause to calculate the Guidelines rang e. Se e Mo l i na-Martinez
, 136 S. Ct. at 1349; see also United States v. M unoz-Camarena
, 631 F .3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2011).

The o n e thing th a t we cannot d o, however, is rely on precedent that has been overruled and effectively rendered

non-ex i s t ent by the Supreme Court. I ndeed, the Supreme Court has made clear t h a t pre- Johnson case law cannot be applied even in c a ses pending on habeas review. W elch

, 136 S. Ct. at 1265. B y r ely ing on o verrule d p r e cedent a nd failing to con s i d e r w h e ther L ee is entitled to the benefit o f Johnson ’s new rule, the majority fails to rise to the challeng e of deciding this case in a post- Johnson world. I

dissent.