SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4335-18T1

ANTOINE ANDERSON,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE 

PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

______________________

Submitted September 14, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Rothstadt and Susswein.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.

Antoine Anderson, appellant pro se.

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa H. Raska, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 8, 2020
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Antoine Anderson is a State Prison inmate serving a life sentence imposed 

on his 1989 trial convictions for murder, armed robbery, and related weapons 

offenses. He appeals from a final agency decision of the New Jersey State Parole 

Board denying his application for parole and imposing a 120-month future 

eligibility term ("FET").1 We have considered Anderson's arguments in light of 

the record and applicable legal standards and affirm the Parole Board's final 

agency decision.

I.

This case arises from a robbery committed in August 1988. The victim 

resisted when Anderson reached into his pocket. Anderson pulled out a handgun 

and fatally shot the victim in the chest. In July 1989, defendant was convicted 

at trial of knowing/purposeful murder, felony murder, robbery, unlawful 

possession of a handgun, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. 

He was sentenced to an aggregate life term with a thirty-year term of parole 

ineligibility. 

Defendant became eligible for parole in August 2018, after serving the 

statutorily mandated period of parole ineligibility. A two-member Board panel

denied parole and referred the matter to a three-member panel to fix an FET 

1

 Anderson's new projected parole eligibility date is December 2024. 
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outside of the administrative guidelines, which provide for a standard FET of 

twenty-seven months. See N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)(1). The three-member 

panel imposed a 120-month FET. The panel issued a nine-page opinion 

explaining the reasons for its decision. 

Anderson pursued an administrative appeal to the full Board. After 

considering the entire record, the full Board agreed that there is a substantial 

likelihood that Anderson would commit another crime if released on parole. 

Upon that finding, the full Board affirmed the parole denial and also affirmed 

the 120-month FET. 

Anderson, appearing before us pro se, presents the following contentions 

for our consideration:

POINT I

THE DECISION TO DENY PAROLE AND IMPOSE 

AN EXTENDED [FET WAS] ARBITRARY, 

CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE, IN LIGHT 

OF THE RECORD, AND THOSE DECISIONS 

SHOULD BE REVERSED IN FAVOR OF A FULL 

BOARD HEARING.

II.

We begin our review by acknowledging the legal principles governing this 

appeal and the highly deferential standard of review we apply to the Parole 

Board’s decision-making authority. The scope of our review is guided by the 
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"arbitrary and capricious" standard that constrains other administrative action. 

Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 224 N.J. 213, 222-23 (2016). Parole decisions 

are "individualized discretionary appraisals." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 

166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001) (quoting Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 

348, 359 (1973)). Those decisions, moreover, are inherently subjective, and 

ultimately must be made by those with experience and expertise in this field. 

See Puchalski v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 104 N.J. Super. 294, 300 (App. Div. 

1969) ("Such predictions as to future behavior are necessarily quite subjective 

and leave the Board with a broad discretion in the grant or denial of parole."). 

Anderson committed the underlying crimes in 1988. The statute 

governing parole in effect at the time of his offense establishes a presumption 

of parole that is overcome only if the Board finds "by a preponderance of the 

evidence . . . there is a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime 

under the laws of this State if released on parole at such time." N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.53 (amended 1997). In making its determination, the Board must consider 

all pertinent factors, including those set forth in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b). 

With respect to mitigating factors, the Board in this case found (1) 

participation in programs specific to his behavior; (2) participation in 
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institutional programs; (3) institutional reports reflecting favorable institutional 

adjustments; and (4) attempts made to enroll in programs. 

The Board found the following aggravating factors: (1) the facts and 

circumstances of the offense; (2) his extensive prior criminal record; (3) the 

nature of his criminal record showing the crimes became more serious; (4) the 

prior opportunity of probation was revoked based on commission of a new 

offense; (5) commission of a new offense on probation that was not revoked; (6) 

prior opportunities of probation and parole and prior incarcerations failed to 

deter criminal behavior; (7) commission of numerous, persistent serious 

disciplinary infractions resulting in loss of commutation time and confinement 

in administrative segregation; and (8) insufficient problem resolution including 

lack of insight into criminal behavior and failure to address a substance abuse 

problem. 

The Board's findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors 

were supported by information presented in a panel interview, pre-parole report, 

a confidential psychological report, and the results of an objective risk 

assessment evaluation. The Board also considered the letters of mitigation 

Anderson submitted.
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The detailed reasons given by the Board in support of its decision amply 

demonstrate that it did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the aggravating 

factors qualitatively outweighed the mitigating factors. As previously noted, 

parole decisions are inherently subjective, and we are required to respect the 

Parole Board's experience and expertise. Puchalski, 104 N.J. Super. at 300. On 

this record, we have no reason to second-guess the Board's findings or 

conclusions and thus defer to the Board's expertise in these matters.

The Board was especially thorough in documenting the basis for its 

conclusion that Anderson has not sufficiently resolved the problems that give 

rise to his violence. The Board found that he lacks insight into his criminal 

behavior, lacks remorse for the murder victim's death, and has not sufficiently 

addressed a substance abuse problem. We recite the Board's explanation 

verbatim to demonstrate the level of detail undergirding the Board's conclusion: 

The Board panel assessed whether you possess an 

understanding [of] the motivations of your anti-social 

decision-making and your choice to gravitate to 

negative behavioral choices. The assessment was 

essential to evaluate if you will behave/react in a 

similar manner if released on parole. The Board panel 

finds that after [thirty] years of incarceration, you lack 

substantive insight into your anti-social thinking. You 

provided to the Board panel the details [of] your 

formative years, which included you choosing a life 

[of] the streets instead of education and school. 

Further, you detailed how you associated with same-
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minded peers, who sold drugs for profit. You claimed 

that you did not sell drugs and that your "forte" was 

robbing drug dealers, the same type of individuals 

whom you associated with. Your lifestyle led to a 

criminal offense record beginning as a juvenile and in 

fact you were on juvenile parole for an Armed Robbery 

offense when the murder occurred. You offered to the 

Board panel that the murder occurred purely as a 

reaction when the victim resisted your attempt to rob 

him, but then later countered that assertion when you 

agreed with the Board panel's assessment that you shot 

the victim to demonstrate that people should not resist 

when you attempt to rob them. You described a 

lifestyle choice to the Board panel wherein you carried 

a gun on your person in day[-]to[-]day life and that 

committing illegal acts to financially support yourself 

was chosen over obtaining legal employment.

. . . .

[Y]ou spoke of the infractions you committed during 

your incarceration. In several incidents, on one hand 

you defined [your] acts as "self-defense" against other 

inmates, but when pressed for further details you 

described events of harsh words with the prevalent 

theme of disrespect. This was the case when talking of 

your most recent asterisk infraction (fighting) in 2016. 

In total, the Board panel finds that you only possess a 

superficial understanding [of] your anti-social and at 

times, reactionary behavior when exposed to negative 

situations. You identified your choice to live a criminal 

life[]style beginning as an adolescent. However, you 

are unable to articulate the motivations for you to 

behave in such a manner for an extended time. Further, 

it appears lost on you the gravity of your actions. You 

spoke in a rather matter-of-fact manner when noting 

that you carried a weapon on your person daily, conduct 

on your part which played a significant role in the 
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circumstances of the victim's death. Similarly, you 

spoke of your use and abuse of alcohol and drugs, not 

articulating the role they played in your criminality. 

The Board panel finds that you do not fully grasp the 

gravity of your actions or effects of the consequences 

of your behavior. As a result, offerings of remorse on 

your part appear as being superficial. The Board panel 

finds more work needs to be done by you to address 

these issues.

We add that we previously have affirmed denial of parole in cases where 

the Board cited insufficient problem resolution and lack of insight as an 

aggravating factor. See, e.g., McGowan v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 347 

N.J. Super. 544, 558-59, 565 (App. Div. 2002) (affirming the Board's denial 

after the Board found "appellant's lack of insight into what caused him to commit 

this offense was 'extremely disconcerting'"). We believe the Board in this 

instance gave appropriate weight to the insufficient problem resolution 

circumstance in evaluating and balancing the pertinent aggravating and 

mitigating factors. 

In addition to finding that Anderson had only a superficial understanding 

of the underlying motivations for his criminal behavior, the Board also 

concluded that he had so far not made sufficient rehabilitative progress, does not 

understand the consequences of his actions, and has a propensity for negative 

behavior when faced with stressful or confrontational situations.
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In reaching these conclusions, the Board appropriately accounted for 

Anderson's troubling institutional record. During his incarceration, defendant 

accumulated twenty-three disciplinary infractions, including ten serious 

infractions. Defendant most recently committed a serious infraction in 2016, 

which involved fighting. It is noteworthy that Anderson has lost a total of 1180 

commutation credits as a result of these institutional infractions. 

The same circumstances that led the Board to deny parole also support its 

decision to impose a 120-month FET. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)(1), 

the standard FET would have been twenty-seven months. The regulations 

provide that the Board may impose an FET outside the standard guidelines if it 

determines that the standard FET is "clearly inappropriate due to the inmate’s 

lack of satisfactory progress in reducing the likelihood of future criminal 

behavior." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d). In this instance, the Board adequately 

explained the basis for its decision to go outside the standard FET guidelines 

and impose a 120-month FET, relying heavily on plaintiff’s continuing failure 

to gain an understanding of the reasons that impelled his violence. The full 

Board did not abuse its broad discretion when it determined that the additional 

prison time is needed in light of Anderson's superficial understanding of the 

underlying motivations for his criminal behavior. 
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III.

Aside from arguing that the Board's decision was arbitrary and an abuse 

of its discretion, Anderson contends that because he was convicted of murder, a 

majority of the full Board was required by law to conduct a hearing. Anderson's 

argument is based on a misreading of the applicable statute. N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.55(f) provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]otwithstanding the provision of 

any other law to the contrary, if an inmate incarcerated for murder is 

recommended for parole by the assigned board member or the appropriate board 

panel, parole shall not be certified until a majority of the full parole board, after 

conducting a hearing, concurs in that recommendation." See also N.J.A.C. 

10A:71-3.18(c). Under this statutory framework, a majority of the full Board 

is required to conduct the hearing only when an assigned Board member or 

Board panel recommends parole for a convicted murderer. Cf. Acoli, 224 N.J. 

at 231-32 (recognizing that the administrative scheme for parole envisions that 

a convicted murderer will undergo a full hearing before the Parole Board prior 

to securing release from incarceration). In this instance, the panel denied 

defendant's application for parole. In these circumstances, Anderson was not 

entitled to a hearing before a majority of the full Board. 
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Anderson further argues the Board misunderstood the nature of the 

offense by finding that he committed two homicides when in fact he murdered 

a single victim. This claim is belied by the record. The Board correctly noted 

that defendant was convicted of both knowing/purposeful murder and felony 

murder but recognized there was only one murder victim and that the two murder 

convictions had been merged at sentencing. 

Anderson also argues that his juvenile history and other circumstances 

relied on by the Board are too remote and thus irrelevant to whether he is likely 

to commit another crime if he were to be paroled. We disagree. His criminal 

and institutional record are static factors the Board may consider pursuant to 

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11(b)(2)-(7). We do not believe the Board placed 

inappropriate emphasis on these circumstances. Nor do we believe the Board 

viewed them out of context or without due regard to the elapsed time. 

To the extent we have not already addressed them, any other arguments 

raised by Anderson do not have sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.