United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 97-2091

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Danny D. Goodroad, *

 *

Appellant, *

 *

v. *

 *

Jeffrey Bloomberg, Secretary of * Appeal from the United States

Corrections, individually and in his * District Court for the

official capacity; Douglas Weber, * District of South Dakota.

Warden, South Dakota State *

Penitentiary, individually and in his * [UNPUBLISHED]

official capacity; Owen Spurrell, Major, *

Special Security, South Dakota State *

Penitentiary, individually and in his *

official capacity; Ben Dearduff, *

Executive Assistant, South Dakota *

State Penitentiary, individually and in *

his official capacity, *

 *

Appellees. *

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 Submitted: October 9, 1997

 Filed: October 15, 1997

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Before FAGG, BOWMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.
The Honorable John B. Jones, United States District Judge for the District of 1

South Dakota.

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South Dakota State Penitentiary inmate Danny D. Goodroad appeals from the

District Court&s 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e) (West Supp. 1997) dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1

§ 1983 (1994) action. We affirm.

Goodroad alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when his incoming

and outgoing mail was seized, returned, withheld, read, slowed, opened, photocopied,

and “censured,” and handled and delivered in a way that could cause a breach of

privacy and the loss of contents. He claimed this conduct also violated a liberty interest

conferred by a prison policy, and that a second prison policy was unconstitutional

because it violated the rights of outside parties. He also claimed his access to the

courts was impeded when he was placed in disciplinary segregation, and that the

aforementioned conduct was carried out in retaliation for his accessing the courts and

exercising his civil rights. He claimed defendant prison officials authorized the

unconstitutional conduct through policy and direct and tacit authorization. 

The District Court dismissed Goodroad&s action with prejudice for failure to state

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). We review a section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

dismissal de novo, and will affirm if construing the allegations in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set

of facts which would entitle him to relief. See Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,

1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard of review to section

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal); Carney v. Houston, 33 F.3d 893, 894 (8th Cir. 1994) (per

curiam) (Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review). 

We agree that Goodroad&s complaint failed to set forth sufficient facts to state a

claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) (a pro se complaint

must contain specific facts supporting its conclusions). We conclude that the
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District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to recuse, in refusing to transfer

Goodroad&s case from the Southern to the Central Division, or in refusing to appoint

counsel. Finally, we deny Goodroad&s second motion for preliminary injunction. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.