# FILED July 8, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT JA CKSON MAY 1998 SESSION
STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) C.C.A. NO. 02C 01-9710-CR-00384 Appellee, ) ) SHELBY COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. ARTHUR T. BENNETT, ADRIAN WHITE, ) JUDGE ) Appellant. ) (First-Degree Murder) FOR THE APPE LLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: BRETT B. STEIN JOHN KNOX WALKUP 236 Adams Ave. Attorney General & Repor ter Memphis, TN 38103 ELI ZABE TH T. RYAN WAYNE CHA

STAIN Asst. Attorney General 66 Monroe, Suite 804 John Sevier Bldg. Memphis, TN 338103 425 Fifth Ave., North (Trial Only) Nashville, TN 37243-0493 WILLIAM L. GIBBONS District Attorney General THOMAS D. H ENDERSON JENNIFER NICHOLS Asst. District Attor

neys General 201 Poplar St., Suite 301 Memphis, TN 38103
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED JOHN H. PEAY, Judge1 The defenda nt appealed only as to his conviction for first-degree murder. 2 

### O P I N I O N
The defendant was convicted of firs t-degree murder and two counts of aggravatedrobbery. 1 In this appeal as of right, he argues that the trial court erred in allowingthe State to read the indictment t o the jury and in instr ucti n g the jury on “reasonabl e doubt.” Fi nding no mer it in either

of these arg uments, we a ffirm.
The defendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to read the indictment

to the jury. The defendant has faile d to include a transcription of the reading of the indictment in the record on appeal. Consequently, we cannot determine whether the State merely read the indictment verbatim, which is “an appropri ate and proper procedure,” State v. Bane , 8 53 S.W.2d 483, 484 (Tenn. 1993), or whether the State made the sort of improper comments rega rding an indictment admonished in State v. Onidas , 635 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1982). As s uch, meaningful review of this issue is precluded. Next, the defendant argues that the trial court impr

operly instructed

the jury on the meaning of “reasonable doubt.” The jury instruction in question reads as follows:

Areasonable doubt

i s a doubt based upon reason and common sense after careful and impartial consideration of a ll the evid ence in t his case. It is not necessary that the defendant’ s guilt be proved beyond all possible doubt, as absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convictof any criminal charge . A reasona ble doubt is just that -- a doubt thatis reasonable after an examination of all the facts i n this case. If you find the state has not proven every el ement of the offense beyond a reasona ble doub t, then yo u should find the defend ant not gu ilty. This instruction is identic al to T.P.I. (Crim.) 2.03( a) (4th ed. 199 7), th e pattern jury instruction on “reasonable doubt” t hat wa s written when the c onstitutionality of T.P.I.3

(Crim.) 2.03 (4th e d. 1997 ), was questioned. See T.P.I. (Crim.) 2.03 cmt. 2 ( 4th ed. 1997). We find no indi cation in th e record that the defendant request ed a different instruction defining “r

easonable doubt” or that the defendantobjected to the instruction as given, rendering the defendant’s argument waived in the absence of plain error. State v. Cravens , 764 S .W. 2d 754, 757 (Tenn. 1989). Here, w e find no error at all, let alone plain error, as thi s Court has already determined that T.P.I. (Crim.) 2.03(a) is constitutionally adequate. State v. Jose Holmes , 02C01-9505-CR-00154, Shelby County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed December 10, 1997, at Jackso n).

We find no merit to either of the defendant’s arguments. Accordin gly, we affirm his conviction and sent ence.

_______________________________

JOHN H. PEAY, Judge CONCUR:

______________________________ PAUL G. SUMMERS, Ju dge

______________________________ THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge