Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 48 / Monday, March 13, 1995 / Notices 13477

[Docket No. 72–10]

Northern States Power Co.;

Independent Spent Fuel Storage

Installation; Environmental

Assessment and Finding of No

Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC or the Commission)

is considering issuance of an exemption

from certain requirements of its

regulations, to Northern States Power

Company (NSP), located in

Minneapolis, Minnesota. The requested

exemption would allow NSP to submit

the report of preoperational test

acceptance criteria and test results at

least three days (instead of 30 days)

prior to the receipt of fuel at its

independent spent fuel storage

installation (ISFSI) at the Prairie Island

plant (Docket Nos. 50–282/306) located

near Red Wing, Minnesota.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed Action: The

request, proposed by NSP letter dated

January 4, 1995, would exempt NSP

from the requirements of 10 CFR

72.82(e), which states that ‘‘A report of

the preoperational test acceptance

criteria and test results must be

submitted * * * at least 30 days prior

to the receipt of spent fuel or high-level

radioactive waste.’’ NSP proposed to

submit this report three days prior to the

receipt of spent fuel at its ISFSI.

Granting the exemption at this time

would enable NSP to proceed with

activities to support its scheduled Unit

2 refueling outage.

The Need for the Proposed Action:

NSP request for exemption is to ensure

the availability of adequate storage

space in the spent fuel pool in order to

support NSP’s scheduled Unit 2

refueling outage. A fuller discussion of

the need for the exemption follows.

In July 1993, NSP suspended cask

fabrication and site construction

activities until the Minnesota State

Legislature authorized the Prairie Island

ISFSI on May 10, 1994. After

authorization, the ISFSI construction

resumed and the facility was completed

in November 1994, and the first cask

was received on January 26, 1995.

NSP plans to receive new fuel, in

March 1995, for the refueling outage

which is scheduled to begin May 13,

1995. Subsequent to receipt, new fuel is

transferred from the new fuel storage

racks into the spent fuel pool in

preparation for refueling activities.

Because the Prairie Island spent fuel

pool is nearly full, and because there is

limited space in the spent fuel pool

area, the multiple activities, associated

with storage cask loading and the

refueling outage, cannot be conducted at

the same time. Therefore, the first

storage cask must be loaded and

transported to the ISFSI prior to receipt

of new fuel.

NSP estimates that approximately 30

days will be required for the

preoperational testing of the first cask

and the associated equipment, and

about two weeks will be required to

load the cask and transport it to the

ISFSI. Including the 30-day waiting

period required in 10 CFR 72.82(e), it

will take about two and one-half months

from cask receipt until it is placed on

the storage pad. Even if cask loading

started before the end of the waiting

period (which is allowed under 10 CFR

72.82(e)— there would not be enough

time to complete the activities prior to

receipt of new fuel, assuming the full

30-day waiting period.

The purpose of the 30-day period, for

the licensee to submit a report of the

preoperational test acceptance criteria

and test results, is to establish a

sufficient hold point so as to ensure that

the NRC has enough time to inspect a

new licensee’s preparations and, if

necessary, exercise its regulatory

authority before fuel is received at an

ISFSI. For example, an ISFSI located at

an away-from-reactor site may not have

a resident inspector; therefore, the full

30-day period might be necessary to

provide enough time for the NRC to

review the licensee’s records and

preoperational test results and, if

needed, send inspectors to the site. The

Prairie Island ISFSI is located on a

reactor site that has resident inspectors,

and the resident and other NRC

inspectors will both be present at the

ISFSI to observe portions of the

preoperational testing activities while

they are being conducted. The NRC

inspectors will also have ongoing access

to the licensee’s test procedures and test

results in order to be able to conduct the

appropriate review. Thus, in view of the

NRC’s oversight presence during the

preoperational testing phase at Prairie

Island, as well as the NRC’s immediate

access to the licensee’s procedures and

test results, the Commission concludes

that the full 30 days, provided for in the

rule, will not be needed in order for

NRC to complete its inspection

activities and determine whether any

further regulatory action is needed

before spent fuel is received at the

Prairie Island ISFSI. Therefore, the

licensee’s submission of the required

report in less time than the required 30-

day period, before fuel receipt at the

ISFSI, is acceptable. However, based on

the ongoing observations of

preoperational tests by inspectors, NRC

may determine that more time than the

three-day period, requested by the

licensee, is needed to review additional

licensee records and preoperational test

results. Therefore, in granting the

requested exemption, NRC reserves the

right to require additional time, if

necessary, to complete its activities.

Environmental Impacts of the

Proposed Action: The Commission has

evaluated the environmental impacts of

the proposed action. The NRC reviewed

the Prairie Island Safety Analysis Report

(SAR), and in July 1933, issued a Safety

Evaluation Report (SER) approving the

SAR. On July 28, 1992, the NRC issued

an Environmental Assessment and

Finding of no Significant Impact for the

ISFSI (57 FR 34319, dated August 4,

1992). On the basis of these reviews

NRC concluded that spent fuel could be

stored in the ISFSI at Prairie Island

without significant environmental

impact.

The proposed exemption will not

alter or affect the impacts of operation

of the ISFSI previously evaluated by

NRC. Rather, it merely allows NSP to

submit the report of preoperational test

acceptance criteria and test results three

days prior to receipt of fuel at the ISFSI

instead of the required 30-day period.

As previously noted the 30-day period

is to provide the NRC sufficient

opportunity to review the licensee’s

submittals. With inspectors of site, a

shorter period will, in this case, provide

the same, sufficient opportunity. In

addition, the proposed exemption does

not involve any change that increases

the probability or consequences of

accidents, that changes the types of any

effluents that may be released offsite, or

that would significantly increase the

allowable individual or cumulative

occupational radiation exposure. The

Commission accordingly concludes that

this proposed exemption will have no

significant radiological or

nonradiological environmental impacts.

Alternative to the Proposed Action:

Since the Commission has concluded

there is no measurable environmental

impact associated with the proposed

action, any alternatives with equal or

greater environmental impact need not

be evaluated. The staff considered the

alternative of denying the requested

exemption. Denial could result in the

delay of the plant refueling outage

planned for May 13, 1995, and would

not reduce or change the environmental

impacts that currently exist.

Agencies and Persons Consulted: The

Commission’s staff reviewed NSP’s

request and did not consult other

agencies or persons.

Finding of No Significant Impact:

Based upon the foregoing environmental
13478 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 48 / Monday, March 13, 1995 / Notices

assessment, the Commission concludes

that the proposed action would not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment. Accordingly, the

Commission has determined not to

prepare an environmental impact

statement for the proposed exemption.

For further details with respect to this

action, the request for exemption dated

January 4, 1995, and other documents

are available for public inspection and

for copying (for a fee) at the NRC Public

Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW,

Washington, DC 20555, and at the Local

Public Document Room located in the

Minneapolis Public Library, 300

Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, MN 55401.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day

of March, 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Donald A. Cool,

Director, Division of Industrial and Medical

Nuclear Safety, Office of Nuclear Material

Safety and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 95–6062 Filed 3–10–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket 70–364]

Babcock and Wilcox Co., Receipt of

Petition for Director’s Decision Under

10 CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that by Petition

dated January 5, 1994, Citizens’ Action

for a Safe Environment (CASE) and the

Kiski Valley Coalition to Save Our

Children (The Coalition) (together

referred to as Intervenors) filed a joint

request for an informal hearing pursuant

to 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart L, with

regard to Babcock & Wilcox Company’s

(Licensee) application for renewal of

Special Nuclear Materials License

SNM–414 issued to the Licensee by the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(Commission) for the Pennsylvania

Nuclear Service Operation facility

located in Parks Township, Armstrong

County, Pennsylvania (Parks Township

facility). In its Initial Decision, dated

January 3, 1995, authorizing the renewal

of the materials license, the Atomic

Safety and Licensing Board, consistent

with 10 C.F.R. 2.1205(k)(2), referred to

the Commission’s Executive Director for

Operations for consideration as requests

for action under 10 CFR 2.206, twelve

areas of concern (see Sections B, H, I, M,

P, Q, S, T, U, W, X, and Y, Initial

Decision at pages 63 to 70) raised in that

proceeding by the Intervenors. These

concerns were referred to the Director of

the Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards. Each of these concerns

has been reviewed with respect to the

requirements of 10 CFR 2.206. Sections

B, H, I, M, P, S, T, U, W and Y have

failed to satisfy the requirement of

Section 2.206 that a request pursuant to

section 2.206 must ‘‘specify the action

requested and set forth the facts that

constitute the basis for the request.’’

However, Section B, H, M, P, S, T, U,

W, and Y were addressed by the

Commission staff in Michael A.

Lamastra’s affidavit dated September 22,

1994, and Section I was addressed by

the Commission staff in Heather M.

Astwood’s affidavit dated September 22,

1994, filed in the Parks Township

proceeding.

Section Q has been interpreted as a

request for the Commission to test for

radioactive contamination in the general

vicinity of Kepple Hill and Riverview in

Parks Township. The apparent concern

is that this area is downwind of the

Apollo facility which the Intervenors

assert had been releasing radioactivity at

a rate above regulatory limits. The

Intervenors rely on letters dated April

20, 1966, and May 26, 1969, concerning

the need for experimental data for an air

surveillance program at the Apollo plant

and authorization by the Commission’s

predecessor, the Atomic Energy

Commission, for the discharge of

radioactive materials in concentrations

exceeding 10 CFR Part 20 limits.

Section X has been interpreted as a

request for the Commission to

investigate radiological contamination

on the Farmers Delight Dairy Farm

(apparently located in Parks Township).

The apparent concern is that past

operations of the Parks Townships

facility caused radioactive

contamination of the farm. As basis for

this request, Intervenors assert that there

is information in a 1966 U.S.

Department of Agriculture (USDA)

study that indicates that the cattle on

the farm were having thyroid problems

and that radionuclides were show-up in

the cow’s milk.

As provided by Section 2.206,

appropriate action will be taken on

these two requests within a reasonable

period of time.

A copy of the Petition and Initial

Decision is available for inspection in

the Commission’s Public Document

Room, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington,

DC 20555.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 3rd day

of March 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Robert M. Bernero,

Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 95–6065 Filed 3–10–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket No. 50–498]

Houston Lighting and Power Co., City

Public Service Board of San Antonio,

Central Power and Light Co., City of

Austin, TX; Notice of Consideration of

Issuance of Amendment to Facility

Operating License, Proposed No

Significant Hazards Consideration

Determination, and Opportunity for a

Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. NPF–

6, issued to Houston Lighting & Power

Company, et al., (the licensee) for

operation of the South Texas Project

(STP), Unit 1, located in Matagorda

County, Texas.

The proposed amendment would

modify the steam generator tube

plugging criteria in Technical

Specification 3/4.4.5, Steam Generators,

and the allowable leakage for Unit 1 in

Technical Specification 3/4.4.6.2,

Operational Leakage, and the associated

Bases.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act), and the Commission’s

regulations.

The Commission has made a

proposed determination that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration. Under

the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR

50.92, this means that operation of the

facility in accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration, which is

presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated?

Structural Considerations

Industry testing of model boiler and

operating plant tube specimens for free span

tubing at room temperature conditions shows

typical burst pressures in excess of 5000 psi

for indications of outer diameter stress

corrosion cracking with voltage

measurements at or below the structural limit

of 4.0 volts. One model boiler specimen with

a voltage amplitude of 19 volts also exhibited

a burst pressure greater than 5000 psi. Burst

testing performed on one intersection pulled