J-S02034-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.H., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: E.J., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2420 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered August 23, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000472-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.M.H., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: E.J., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2421 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 23, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000202-2023

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.H., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: E.J., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2422 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered August 23, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000580-2021
J-S02034-24

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IN THE INTEREST OF: D.W.H., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: E.J., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2423 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 23, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000203-2023

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 15, 2024

E.J. (“Mother”), appeals from the August 23, 2023 decrees involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights to her twin daughters, R.H. a/k/a R.M.H. and 

D.H. a/k/a D.W.H., born in March 2021 (collectively, “the Children”).1 Mother 

also appeals from the orders changing the Children’s respective permanency 

goals from reunification to adoption. Mother’s appointed counsel, Gary 

Server, Esquire, has filed a petition to withdraw and an accompanying brief, 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 602 Pa. 159, 978 A.2d 349 (2009). After 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 By separate decrees dated and entered June 20, 2023, the trial court 

involuntarily terminated the parental rights of any unknown father. Further, 

by separate decrees dated and entered August 23, 2023, the trial court 

involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Children’s father, A.M. Neither 

A.M. nor any unknown father filed notices of appeal or participated in the 

instant appeals.
J-S02034-24

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review, we grant Attorney Server’s petition to withdraw, affirm the termination 

decrees, and dismiss Mother’s appeals from the goal change orders as moot.

According to the certified record, the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (“DHS”) received a referral in March 2021 concerning, inter alia,

Mother and the Children testing positive for illegal substances at the Children’s 

birth. Specifically, the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) case manager 

assigned to this case, Omar Burgos, testified regarding the inception of this 

matter, as follows:

So, back in March of 2021, a GPS report came in stating that both 

children, [R.H.] and [D.H.] were found to be born positive, with 

marijuana and Suboxone[2]in their system. There was also a 

report that [M]other was unemployed at the time, that she was in 

an active domestic violent relationship with the [C]hildren’s 

father, and that she had a history of depression.

Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 6/20/23, at 9. Following their birth, the Children, 

who were prematurely born at 29 weeks gestation, were hospitalized in the 

neonatal intensive care unit. Petitions for Involuntary Termination of Parental 

Rights, 5/25/23, Exhibit “A,” Statement of Facts, at ¶ a. 

____________________________________________

2 Mother acknowledged an addiction to Percocet, following the birth of her 

oldest child in 2007, for which she had a prescription for Suboxone. She 

however failed to provide DHS with a valid prescription. Petitions for 

Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 5/25/23, Exhibit “A,” Statement 

of Facts, at ¶¶ b, c. 
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Upon discharge from the hospital, DHS obtained protective custody of 

R.H. on May 5, 2021,

3 and the court adjudicated her dependent on May 25, 

2021. DHS then obtained protective custody of D.H. on June 8, 2021, and 

the court adjudicated her dependent on July 19, 2021. The Children were 

placed together in a medical foster home, where they have remained 

throughout these proceedings.4 See N.T., 6/20/23, at 9-10. The court 

confirmed this placement, established respective permanency goals of 

reunification, and, inter alia, ordered Mother to participate in supervised 

visitations.

In furtherance of reunification, DHS and/or CUA established single case 

plans, the objectives of which were discussed with Mother and remained 

consistent. Corresponding to the terms set forth by the court at the time of 

adjudication, Mother was required to address, inter alia, her substance abuse, 

housing, employment, and domestic violence. See id. at 12-13.

Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court conducted 

regular review hearings at which it maintained the Children’s commitment and 

placement. The court characterized Mother’s compliance with the permanency 

____________________________________________

3 R.H. was ultimately discharged from the hospital on May 7, 2021. Petitions 

for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 5/25/23, Exhibit “A,” 

Statement of Facts, at ¶ n.

4 The nature of the Children’s medical issues is unspecified. Although engaged 

in early intervention services, these were completed at the time of the June 

2023 hearing. See N.T., 6/20/23, at 29.
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plan and progress towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated 

placement as moderate during 2022. However, at a permanency review 

hearing on January 3, 2023, the court characterized Mother’s compliance and 

progress as minimal. Her progress remained rated as minimal at the next 

permanency review hearing on March 21, 2023. 

On May 25, 2023, the Agency filed separate petitions to involuntary 

terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (4), (5), (8), and (b), as well as petitions to change the 

Children’s permanency goals to adoption. The court held a combined hearing 

on the petitions on June 20, 2023. Mother was present and represented by 

Attorney Server. The Children, who were then two years old, were 

represented by Adrienne Box, Esquire, of the Defender Association of 

Philadelphia Child Advocacy Unit.

5

 

____________________________________________

5 The Defender Association of Philadelphia, Child Advocacy Unit, was 

appointed as guardian ad litem/counsel for the Children at the outset of the 

dependency proceedings. Insomuch as the Children’s legal interests were 

incapable of ascertainment due to their young age, we find section 2313(a)

satisfied by the representation of Attorney Box. See In re T.S., 648 Pa. 236, 

257, 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-1093 (2018) (holding, “if the preferred outcome of 

a child is incapable of ascertainment because the child is very young and preverbal, there can be no conflict between the child’s legal interests and his or 

her best interests; as such, the mandate of section 2313(a) of the Adoption 

Act” is satisfied.). 

At the conclusion of the subject hearing, Attorney Box argued in favor of a 

goal change to adoption and termination of Mother’s parental rights. See

N.T., 8/23/23, at 10-11. Given the filing of an Anders brief, the Defender 

Association submitted a letter to this Court indicating that no brief would be 

filed on behalf of the Children. See No Brief Letter, 12/7/23.
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While Mother indicated her assent to the voluntary termination of her 

parental rights, the court proceeded with the hearing and held its decision in 

abeyance in order to allow Mother time to execute consents. See N.T., 

6/20/23, at 4-6, 36-37. (“I can hear testimony and hold it in abeyance. So, 

that’ll give her a chance to [sign consents for voluntary termination], but I 

don’t want to defer hearing the testimony if there’s no issues as to notice of 

today’s hearing, but I’m willing to hold a decision in abeyance. . . .”). Mother 

stipulated to the allegations set forth in the petitions. See id. at 5-6. In 

addition, the Agency presented the testimony of Mr. Burgos. At the conclusion 

of the hearing, the court relisted the matter for August 23, 2023, in order to 

allow time for maturation. See id. at 37-38.

Thereafter, it follows, Mother executed consents for the voluntary 

termination of her parental rights. DHS filed petitions for voluntary 

termination and to confirm Mother’s consent on July 5, 2023.

On August 23, 2023, Mother, however, revoked her consents,

6 see N.T., 

8/23/23, at 5, and DHS’s petitions with respect to the voluntary termination 

of her parental rights were withdrawn. As such, the trial court heard argument 

with regard to DHS’s goal change petitions and petitions to involuntarily 

terminate Mother’s parental rights. See id. at 8-12.

____________________________________________

6 The court accepted an offer of proof that Mother wished to revoke her 

consents for voluntary termination and would testify that she felt “compelled” 

to execute same, resulting in the inability to confirm same. See N.T., 

8/23/23, at 6-7.
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By decrees dated and entered August 23, 2023, the trial court 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Further, by orders also 

dated and entered August 23, 2023, the court changed the Children’s 

permanency goals from reunification to adoption. 

Mother, through Attorney Server, timely filed separate notices of appeal, 

along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), on September 20, 2023, which this Court 

consolidated sua sponte.

7

 On December 3, 2023, Attorney Server filed a 

petition to withdraw, as well as an Anders brief. Accordingly, we will begin 

our review by considering the validity and propriety of Attorney Server’s 

submissions pursuant to Anders. See In re Adoption of M.C.F., 230 A.3d 

1217, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999

A.2d 590, 593 (Pa. Super. 2010)) (“‘When presented with an Anders brief, 

this court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first 

passing on the request to withdraw.’”).

____________________________________________

7 On October 27, 2023, the trial court filed a Notice of Compliance with Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), in which it references its reasoning placed on 

the record. See N.T., 8/23/23, at 12-17.
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When counsel seeks to withdraw pursuant to Anders and its progeny,8

they must:

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy 

of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the 

[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel 

or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy 

of the court’s attention. 

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc) (citation omitted). Counsel must also “attach to their petition to 

withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their 

rights.” Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Additionally, our Supreme Court has set forth the following 

requirements for Anders briefs:

[W]e hold that in the Anders brief that accompanies courtappointed counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) 

provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion 

that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 78 A.2d at 361. 

____________________________________________

8 This Court extended the Anders procedure to appeals from decrees 

terminating parental rights involuntarily in In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 

(Pa. Super. 1992). This Court further extended the Anders principles to 

appeals involving goal change orders in In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d 903, 906 (Pa.

Super. 2017). 
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Instantly, Attorney Server filed a petition to withdraw certifying his 

conscientious review of the record and determination that Mother’s appeals 

are frivolous. He further attached copies of a Millisock letter informing 

Mother of her rights. Likewise, Attorney Server has filed an Anders brief that 

substantially complies with the requirements set forth in Santiago, supra.

9,

10

 

Having concluded that Attorney Server complied with the procedural 

requirements of Anders/Santiago, we must next “conduct a review of the 

record to ascertain if on its face, there are non-frivolous issues that counsel, 

intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 

A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc). 

Attorney Server’s Anders brief raises the following issue for our review: 

“Whether the trial court abused its discretion by involuntarily terminating the

Mother’s parental rights under sections 2511 (a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b)?” 

(cleaned up). Anders Brief at 6.

Our standard of review in this context is well-established:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, 

appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the 

decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

____________________________________________

9 While we observe Attorney Server’s failure to cite to the certified record, we 

remain cognizant that the framework of Anders and Santiago require 

substantial, not perfect performance. See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 

A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also Commonwealth v. Redmond, 

273 A.3d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2022).

10 Mother has not responded to Attorney Server’s petition to withdraw 

and Anders brief. 
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evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must 

accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility 

determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the 

orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, 

an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling 

unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the 

facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court 

may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration 

of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial 

courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple 

hearings.

In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’ 

court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make 

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her 

child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, 

protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has 

significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and 

child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving 

party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing 

evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and 

convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed at statute by 

section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. See 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The trial court must initially determine whether the 

conduct of the parent warrants termination under one of the eleven 

enumerated grounds set forth at section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the petitioner has established grounds for termination under 

section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under section 
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2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M., 

602 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). To involuntarily terminate 

parental rights, the petitioner must satisfy both section 2511(a) and (b) by 

clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct, 

weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021). 

In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (4), (5), (8), and (b). To affirm 

the underlying decrees, however, we need only agree with the court’s decision 

as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with section 2511(b). See 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). As such, we 

limit our discussion to section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 
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of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

To prove the applicability of subsection (a)(2), the party petitioning for 

termination must establish: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3)

that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot and will not 

be remedied. See In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 

2021). Subsection (a)(2) emphasizes the child’s present and future needs, 

not the parent’s refusal to perform their duties and thus “should not be read 

to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home and strong 

continuous parental ties. . . . This is particularly so where disruption of 

the family has already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect 

for reuniting it.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Section 2511(a)(2) grounds are not 

limited to affirmative misconduct; they may also include acts of refusal and 

incapacity to perform parental duties. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 

(Pa. Super. 2021), abrogated on other grounds by Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 
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1085, 1110 n.23 (Pa. 2023). We have long recognized that a parent is 

required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption 

of full parental responsibilities. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.

Super. 2017).

In concluding that DHS established the statutory grounds to terminate

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), the trial court

emphasized Mother’s persistent substance abuse and lack of completion of 

treatment. The court stated as follows:

The[ C]hildren were taken at the time that they were born. 

And they were born with drugs in their system. There has been 

no indication that Mom has been able to remedy the situation 

which led the [C]hildren coming into care.

She’s not successfully completed any drug and alcohol 

treatment. She’s not consistently provided this [c]ourt with 

negative screens or shown at any additional time would remedy 

that situation[, a]s this case has been more than two years since 

the adjudication. And Mom has not demonstrated an ability to 

correct the situation which led to the [C]hildren coming into care.

N.T., 8/23/23, at 14.

A review of the record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for 

termination under section 2511(a)(2). Significantly, the record reveals a 

history of substance abuse that persisted and remained untreated. At the 

time of the Children’s birth in March 2021, both Mother and the Children tested 

positive for illegal substances leading to the Children’s placement following 

their discharge from the hospital after an extended stay in the neonatal 

intensive care unit. Notwithstanding multiple court orders and/or permanency 
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objectives related to forthwith and random drug screening and substance 

abuse treatment, Mother tested positive for marijuana and amphetamines as 

recently as March 21, 2023, upon presentation to the Clinical Evaluation Unit 

(“CEU”)11 for a forthwith drug and alcohol screening following a court hearing. 

See N.T., 6/20/23, at 18; DHS Exhibit 7 (Urine Drug Testing Report). Mr. 

Burgos confirmed no prescription for amphetamines and indicated no 

knowledge of a medical marijuana card. See N.T., 6/20/23, at 31-32. He

testified that this was the first time Mother had presented to the CEU since 

July 2021, noting her lack of compliance with drug screening throughout the 

pendency of the Children’s dependency.

12

 See id. at 17; see also id. at 19, 

32. Notably, he expressed concern at this positive result “[b]ecause this is 

the reason that the case came in, . . . her substance abuse.” Id. at 18.

Mr. Burgos further acknowledged Mother’s lack of engagement in 

substance abuse treatment. While recognizing Mother’s past involvement in 

a Suboxone treatment program, he explained this was inadequate. Mr. Burgos

testified as follows:

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Does she actively engaged in any drug and 

alcohol program at this time?

____________________________________________

11 It appears that this unit is now known as the Substance Analysis Unit. See 

DHS Exhibit 7 (Urine Drug Testing Report).

12 Although random drug screens were likely performed in connection with 

Mother’s participation in a Suboxone program, Mr. Burgos stated that he had

no documentation related thereto. See N.T., 6/20/23, at 33.
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MR. BURGOS: Not to my knowledge.

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And she has previously been engaged -- or 

receiving Suboxone from Einstein; is that correct?

MR. BURGOS: Correct.

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And why is that not sufficient for drug and 

alcohol treatment?

MR. BURGOS: Because anybody can get Suboxone treatment. 

You don’t specifically need to have a drug and alcohol assessment.

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And, to your knowledge, has she had a drug 

and alcohol assessment?

MR. BURGOS: Not by any proof that’s been provided.

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And has she provided you any

documentation of successful engagement or treatment in a drug 

and alcohol program since you’ve been case manager?

MR. BURGOS: No.

Id. at 18-19. Mr. Burgos therefore confirmed that reunification posed the 

potential for risk to the Children. See id. at 19.

Moreover, Mr. Burgos testified that he had no documentation and was 

unable to verify Mother’s participation in domestic violence services. See id.

at 19-21. He stated that, based upon the one occasion he was able to assess 

Mother’s residence,13 she did not have housing appropriate for the Children as 

there was no place for Children to sleep. See id. at 22-23. She also failed to 

____________________________________________

13 Despite multiple attempts, Mr. Burgos was unable to assess Mother’s home 

again. He stated, “Either she wouldn’t be home or the times that I would try 

to (unintelligible) come do the assessment, she would not be available 

because of work.” Id. at 22.
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provide a copy of a lease. See id. at 31. Additionally, Mother had not 

provided proof of current employment. See id. at 23, 31. As such, Mr. Burgos 

opined that the Children could not be safely returned to Mother’s care, and

reunification was not possible. See id. at 24.

Given this enduring, unresolved behavior, it is entirely speculative when 

and if Mother will be in a position to care for the Children and provide them 

with safety and stability. This prospect is simply unacceptable for the Children, 

who at the time of the termination hearing, had been in care for two years, 

their entire lives. 

Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court 

in concluding that termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(2) is warranted. 

The record demonstrates that Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity due 

to ongoing substance abuse, unresolved domestic violence issues, and lack of 

appropriate housing and employment, has caused the Children to be without 

essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for their physical or 

mental well-being. Further, the conditions and causes of Mother’s incapacity

cannot or will not be remedied. See A.H., 247 A.3d at 443. As this Court has 

stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to 

attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court 

cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and 

stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re 

Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006). 
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Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to section 

2511(a)(2), we next must determine whether termination was proper under 

section 2511(b), which affords “primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(b). “[T]he determination of the child’s ‘needs and welfare’ requires 

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. The 

‘utmost attention’ should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond.” See T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628, 71 

A.3d at 267 (internal citations omitted). As our Supreme Court recently 

explained in Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1113 (Pa. 2023):

[A] court conducting a Section 2511(b) analysis must consider 

more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from 

severance of the parental bond. We emphasize analysis of the 

parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection (b) 

analysis, which includes a determination of whether the bond is 

necessary and beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the 

bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare. 

K.T., supra (emphasis added).

The evaluation of a child’s respective bonds is not always an easy task. 

“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond 

analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular 

case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). 
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In addition, the K.T. Court held that the “Section 2511(b) inquiry must 

also include consideration of other important factors.” Id. While not inventing 

an exhaustive list of considerations, the Court explained that the inquiry must 

consider and weigh certain evidence if it is present in the record, 

including, but not limited, “the child’s need for permanency and the length of 

time in foster care [. . .]; whether the child is in a pre[-]adoptive home and 

bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of 

love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” Id. (footnote omitted); see 

also id. at n.28 (emphasis in original).

Instantly, in determining that termination was additionally proper under 

section 2511(b), the trial court found that the Children did not share a parentchild bond with Mother, but instead shared such a bond with their foster 

mother. The court stated as follows:

With regards to [section 2511(b)], there is no parent/child 

bond between [the Children] and their mother. They may know 

their mother or recognize her through these supervised visits that 

occurred since their birth[,] but they do not know her as their 

mother. The only figure that they know as their mother has been 

their resource family in this case. And I don’t find that there is a 

parent[-]child bond and that these children would suffer 

irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were terminated.

N.T., 8/23/23, at 16-17. We discern no abuse of discretion. 

At the time of the subject proceeding, the Children, who were two years 

old, had resided in their medical foster home their entire lives. See N.T., 

6/20/23, at 9-10. Mr. Burgos testified that the Children look to their foster 
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mother, who was a pre-adoptive resource, for all of their needs, including 

medical and financial. He confirmed that it is their foster mother they seek 

when they are sick, hungry, or hurt. See id. at 28-29.

While Mother engaged in weekly visitation with the Children, Mr. Burgos 

confirmed that such visitation remained supervised. See id. at 13. He 

recounted instances of missed visits throughout the pendency of the case, 

noting that Mother’s visitation was cancelled on two occasions due to her 

missing three consecutive visitations. See id. at 14-16. He further reported 

a gap in visitation from January 17, 2023, when Mother had her last visitation 

with the Children through Family School, until late March when referred for 

supervised visitation at the agency.

14

 See id. at 33-34.

Notably, Mother had also missed several visits prior to the subject 

hearing. See id. at 14; see also DHS Exhibit 6 (CUA Supervised Visitation 

Program No Visit Notification Forms). Mr. Burgos described that at the last 

visit a month prior, “As soon and the foster mom dropped off both children, 

they began crying. They were actually screaming.” Id. at 15. And when she 

returns, “They run towards her and call her mom.” Id. Conversely, he 

observed no issues separating from Mother. Id.

____________________________________________

14 Mr. Burgos testified to Mother’s lack of outreach as to the Children’s wellbeing and failure to attend their medical appointments despite notification. 

See N.T., 6/20/23, at 16-17.
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As such, Mr. Burgos opined that a parent-child bond did not exist 

between Mother and the Children. He testified as follows:

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: All right. And how are the [C]hildren doing 

in the pla-- actually, do you believe there’s a parent-child 

relationship between [D.H.] and [Mother], such that [D.H.] looks 

to her to fulfill all of the daily parental needs?

MR. BURGOS: I believe that she’s familiar with who [Mother] is, 

but not for any paternal or maternal support.

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And, essentially, [Mother] is just a 

visitation resource for [D.H.]?

MR. BURGOS: Yes.

[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Would you say the same thing for [R.H.]?

MR. BURGOS: Yes.

Id. at 26.

Mr. Burgos further indicated that the Children would not suffer 

irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. He explained, 

“This case has been open for two years now, and the [C]hildren have been 

raised by the foster parents since they were born.” Id. at 24. In fact, as their 

foster mother provides the Children much needed stability, Mr. Burgos stated 

that the Children would suffer harm if removed from the foster home. See 

id. at 27-28.

Based on the foregoing independent analysis of the trial court’s 

termination of Mother’s parental rights, we agree with Attorney Server that 

the appeals from the decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 
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section 2511(a)(2) and (b) are wholly frivolous and our review of the record 

does not reveal any overlooked non-frivolous issues. 

Given our disposition concerning termination, Mother’s appeals from the 

goal change orders are moot.15 See Int. of A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1272-1273 

(Pa. Super. 2021) (finding issues regarding goal change moot in light of 

termination of parental rights); A.H., 247 A.3d at 446 (“the effect of our 

decision to affirm the orphans’ court’s termination decree necessarily 

renders moot the dependency court’s decision to change Child’s goal to 

adoption”); see also In re D.K.W., 415 A.2d 69, 73 (Pa. 1980) (stating that 

once parental rights are terminated, issues of custody and dependency under

the Juvenile Act are moot).

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Attorney Server’s petition to 

withdraw. We affirm the termination decrees and dismiss the goal change 

orders as moot.

Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted. Decrees affirmed. Appeals from 

goal change orders dismissed. 

____________________________________________

15 Even if not moot, for the reasons we have already discussed throughout 

this memorandum with respect to termination, the record confirms that 

changing the Children’s respective permanency goals to adoption is in their 

best interest. See In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-1089 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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Date: 3/15/2024