22-6084

Singh Kaur v. Garland

BIA

Palmer, IJ

A202 130 011

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY 

COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 

Square, in the City of New York, on the 1st day of October, two thousand 

twenty-four. 

PRESENT: 

JON O. NEWMAN,

JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

ALISON J. NATHAN,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

SARABJIT SINGH KAUR, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 22-6084 

 NAC 

 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 
2 

FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Law Office of Jaspreet Singh, 

Richmond Hill, NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General; Anthony C. Payne, 

Assistant Director; Abigail E. Leach, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 

United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. 

Petitioner Sarabjit Singh Kaur (“Singh”), a native and citizen of India, seeks 

review of a January 25, 2022 decision of the BIA, affirming a March 14, 2019 

decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied his application for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”). In re Sarabjit Singh Kaur, No. A202 130 011 (B.I.A. Jan. 25, 2022), aff’g No. 

A202 130 011 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 14, 2019). We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. 

Under the circumstances, we have reviewed both the BIA’s and the IJ’s 

decisions “for the sake of completeness.” See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review factual findings for substantial 

evidence and questions of law de novo. See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 
3 

513 (2d Cir. 2009). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless 

any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 

 I. Due Process 

“To establish a violation of due process, [a petitioner] must show that []he 

was denied a full and fair opportunity to present h[is] claims or that the IJ or BIA 

otherwise deprived h[im] of fundamental fairness.” Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 

131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Parties 

claiming denial of due process in immigration cases must, in order to prevail, 

allege some cognizable prejudice fairly attributable to the challenged process.” 

Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). 

Singh alleges that he was deprived of due process when the IJ allowed the 

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to file a 2018 report from the Law 

Library of Congress at the merits hearing. “The Immigration Judge may set and 

extend time limits for the filing of applications and related documents and 

responses thereto, if any.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(h). “For individual calendar 

hearings involving represented, non-detained respondents, amendments to 

applications for relief, additional supporting documents, updates to witness lists, 
4 

and other such documents must be submitted at least fifteen (15) days in advance 

of the individual calendar hearing.” Immigr. Court Practice Manual, Chap. 

3.1(b)(2)(B). “This provision does not apply to exhibits of witnesses offered solely 

to rebut and/or impeach.” Id. Accordingly, because DHS submitted the report 

as rebuttal evidence, it was not subject to the 15-day deadline. Moreover, IJs have 

discretion to accept untimely filings. See Immigr. Court Practice Manual, Chap. 

3.1(d)(2) (“The immigration judge retains the authority to determine how to treat 

an untimely filing.”); see also Dedji v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2008) 

(concluding that IJs have “inherent discretion to depart from the letter of the Local 

Rules in certain circumstances where fairness demands that noncompliance be 

excused”). 

Further, contrary to Singh’s arguments that he was denied an opportunity 

to respond, his counsel objected to the admission of the report as untimely and 

containing dated information. And Singh has also failed to show what evidence 

he could or would have presented to undercut the report if given more time to 

respond. Accordingly, Singh has not demonstrated that he was denied an

opportunity to present his claim or shown prejudice, and his due process claim 

therefore fails. See Garcia-Villeda, 531 F.3d at 149; Burger, 498 F.3d at 134. 

 II. Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Relief 
5 

An applicant for asylum and withholding of removal has the burden to 

establish past persecution or a fear of future persecution. See 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(a)–(b), 1208.16(b). A CAT 

applicant must establish that it is “more likely than not that he . . . would be 

tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).

An applicant who has suffered past persecution is presumed to have the 

well-founded fear of future persecution required for asylum and withholding of 

removal. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1), 1208.16(b)(1)(i).1 The presumption may be 

rebutted where a preponderance of the evidence establishes that “[t]he applicant 

could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s 

country . . . and under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the 

applicant to do so.” Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B); see also id. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B). DHS 

has the burden to rebut the presumption of future persecution. 

1 Citations are to the regulations prior to 2021 amendments. The amendments

include a presumption that internal relocation is reasonable when the past 

persecution was by a private actor, and the amended regulations place the burden 

on the applicant to prove otherwise. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii), (3)(iii) (2021). 

But that change is not retroactively applicable to applications, like Singh’s, filed 

before the January 11, 2021, effective date of the new rule. See Procedures for 

Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 

85 Fed. Reg. 80274, 80281–80282, 80380 (Dec. 11, 2020). 
6 

Id. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(ii), 1208.16(b)(1)(ii). Factors affecting the reasonableness of 

relocation include, but are not limited to, “whether the applicant would face other 

serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within 

the country; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical 

limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and 

social and familial ties.” Id. §§ 1208.13(b)(3), 1208.16(b)(3).2 Internal relocation 

is relevant to CAT relief in that the agency considers the ability to safely relocate 

in determining the likelihood of torture. Id. § 1208.16(c)(3)(ii). 

The agency found that Singh “could avoid persecution in India through 

internal relocation.” Certified Administrative Record 48. Substantial evidence 

supports the agency’s internal relocation finding. See Surinder Singh v. BIA, 435 

F.3d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (reviewing relocation finding for substantial evidence). 

Singh testified that Shiromani Akali Dal Badal Party (“Badal Party”) members 

attacked him twice between 2013 and 2014 in his home state of Punjab, and that 

2 These factors have been amended to “the size of the country of nationality or last 

habitual residence, the geographic locus of the alleged persecution, the size, 

numerosity, and reach of the alleged persecutor, and the applicant’s demonstrated 

ability to relocate to the United States in order to apply for asylum.” 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1208.13(b)(3), 1208.16(b)(3) (2021). This change is also not retroactively 

applicable to Singh’s application. See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of 

Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 80274, 80281, 

80380 (Dec. 11, 2020). 
7 

the local police detained and tortured him because of his membership in the 

Shiromani Akali Dal Mann Party (“Mann Party”). The IJ, relying principally on 

the 2018 report from the Law Library of Congress, identified the following 

evidence to support relocation: (1) there are no legal obstacles to Sikhs moving 

within India so long as they are not of interest to national authorities, and they 

regularly do so; (2) there are significant populations of Sikhs living in India outside 

of Punjab; (3) Singh did not have national notoriety as he testified only to local 

activities supporting the Mann Party, such as hanging posters, recruiting people 

for rallies, and arranging tents; (4) individuals with pro-Khalistan views and Mann 

Party supporters generally are not subject to persecution, especially outside of 

Punjab; and (5) Singh was not so unskilled or uneducated as to prevent his 

relocation because he had a seventh grade education, had worked in the United 

States for several years in construction, and his language (Punjabi) was spoken in 

other areas of India. 

The IJ did not err in relying on the Law Library of Congress report. See

Surinder Singh, 435 F.3d at 219 (noting that “country condition reports may in some 

circumstances be sufficient, in and of themselves, to support a finding of no clear 

probability of persecution”). And we have upheld a relocation determination for 

a Sikh Mann Party member based on similar evidence. See Jagdeep Singh v. 
8 

Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 117 (2d Cir. 2021) (upholding relocation finding where “[t]he 

record contained evidence that there are 1.2 billion people, including 19 million 

Sikhs, living in India and that Indian citizens—Sikhs in particular—do not face 

difficulties relocating within the country,” that “there is no central countrywide 

registration system or nationwide police database that members of the . . . Badal 

[Party] could use to track rivals and that only high-profile militants—not local 

party organizers . . . are of interest to national authorities,” and that “there have 

been no recent reports of persecution against [Mann Party] members”). Singh 

also does not identify evidence that undermines the agency’s conclusion that he 

could relocate; rather, he cites the Law Library of Congress report for the 

proposition that Mann party members, or Sikhs who advocate for Khalistan, have 

been falsely implicated as terrorists and taken into preventative detention in 

advance of demonstrations. He also cites news reports of an attack in New Delhi 

by police that resulted in injuries to two dozen Sikh protesters. However, the 

Law Library of Congress report also notes that Mann Party members are not 

targeted by the police unless they are suspected of terrorism, i.e., not for simply 

demonstrating for Khalistan. And the report of police violence in New Delhi was 

from 2013, and does not establish that Singh will be persecuted, or that the Badal 

Party or Hindus generally persecute those with pro-Khalistan views. As a result, 
9 

Singh fails to adequately challenge the IJ’s internal relocation determination.

 We do not reach the agency’s alternative fundamental change finding

because the relocation finding is dispositive.3 See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 

25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings 

on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

Clerk of Court 

3 The relocation finding is dispositive of all forms of relief. See 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B), (c)(3)(ii); Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–

20 (2d Cir. 2010).