IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-50690

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

BRYAN SANCHEZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 4:12-CR-543-1

Before WIENER, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Bryan Sanchez appeals his conviction for aiding and abetting the 

attempted possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a 

mixture or substance containing cocaine. Sanchez filed a motion to suppress 

the results of a consensual search following an allegedly unlawful stop. The 

motion was denied, and Sanchez appeals that denial.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 16, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 13-50690

In our assessment of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review 

“factual findings for clear error and the ultimate constitutionality of law 

enforcement action de novo.” United States v. Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 594 (5th 

Cir. 2014). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party, which in this case is the Government. See United States v. Pack, 612 

F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2010).

The district court concluded that there was reasonable suspicion 

supporting the stop on two grounds: (1) because of Sanchez’s traffic violation; 

and (2) because of the “collective knowledge” of other officers who 

communicated with the officer making the stop. The legality of a traffic stop 

is analyzed initially to determine “whether the officer’s action was justified at 

its inception.” United States v. Grant, 349 F.3d 192, 196 (5th Cir. 2003). “For 

a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must have an objectively 

reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic 

violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle.” United 

States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005). Section 545.060(a) 

of the Texas Transportation Code provides that “[a]n operator on a roadway 

divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic: (1) shall drive as 

nearly as practical entirely within a single lane; and (2) may not move from 

the lane unless that movement can be made safely.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE 

ANN. § 545.060(a). 

Sanchez contends that the evidence does not show that his vehicle was 

moving in an unsafe manner and, as a result, he did not violate § 545.060. The 

record testimony showed that Deputy Kennedy stopped Sanchez’s vehicle 

because Sanchez drove over the center white line and then he crossed over the 

white line near the shoulder of a busy highway at dusk, in violation of 

§ 545.060. See Martinez v. State, 29 S.W.3d 609, 610 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st 

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No. 13-50690

Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). The record supports the district court’s determination 

that Deputy Kennedy had reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation for making 

the initial stop. See Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at 430.

Alternatively, Sanchez’s challenge to the alternative ruling of the district 

court also fails. He contends that no knowledge, collective or otherwise, was 

shared with Deputy Kennedy except for instructions to stop the vehicle and 

thus, the district court impermissibly applied the collective knowledge doctrine 

in denying his motion to suppress. Reasonable suspicion can vest through the 

collective knowledge of the officers involved in a search and seizure operation. 

United States v. Powell, 732 F.3d 361, 369 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 

Ct. 1326 (2014). The collective knowledge theory for reasonable suspicion 

applies so long as there is “some degree of communication” between the acting 

officer and the officer who has knowledge of the necessary facts. United States 

v. Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007). The record testimony established 

that the knowledge of Deputy Abel Sanchez and other officers possessing 

reasonable suspicion could be imputed properly to Deputy Kennedy, the acting 

officer, because there was some communication between Deputy Sanchez, the 

officers, and Deputy Kennedy. See id. at 530. As either ground supports the 

denial of the motion to suppress, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

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