Filed 4/27/22 Beierschmitt v. Grobet File Co. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

KARL BEIERSCHMITT et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

v.

GROBET FILE COMPANY OF 

AMERICA, LLC,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B310754

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

20STCV07688)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, David S. Cunningham III, Judge. Reversed and 

remanded.

Weitz & Luxenberg, Benno Ashrafi, and Josiah Parker; 

Bartlett Barrow and Brian P. Barrow; The Arkin Law Firm and 

Sharon Arkin for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Walsworth WFBM, Gabriel A. Jackson, Peter K. Renstrom, 

and Todd M. Thacker for Defendant and Respondent.
2

Karl Beierschmitt (Karl), a California resident, was 

allegedly exposed to asbestos products while working in dental 

offices, including in California, from 1955 to 1975. Many years 

later, he was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma. Karl and 

his wife, Margaret Beierschmitt (collectively, plaintiffs),1sued 

Grobet File Company of America, LLC (Grobet), successor in 

interest to William Dixon Company (Dixon),

2

as a manufacturer 

of asbestos products in California. In this appeal from the trial 

court’s order granting Grobet’s motion to quash service of 

summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, we consider whether 

plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated their claims arise out of or 

relate to Grobet’s forum-directed activities, which is necessary to

establish specific (case-linked) jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

In February 2020, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging Karl,

a California resident, was exposed to asbestos soldering blocks

sold by Grobet and others while working as a dental specialist

and dental supply salesperson “from 1955 through the 1970s” in

California and other “various locations.” As pertinent to Grobet,

plaintiffs asserted causes of action for negligence, breach of

express and implied warranties, strict liability in tort, and loss of

consortium.

1 Karl died during the pendency of this appeal, and his 

successor in interest was substituted as an appellant. For 

simplicity’s sake, we refer to plaintiffs, including Karl’s successor 

in interest, collectively as “plaintiffs.”

2 Except where otherwise indicated, we refer to Grobet and 

Dixon interchangeably.
3

Grobet moved to quash service of summons for lack of

personal jurisdiction.3 Grobet argued it was not subject to

general jurisdiction in California because it is not incorporated in

this state and does not maintain its principal place of business

here. As to specific jurisdiction, Grobet contested only one of the

elements necessary to show specific jurisdiction exists: the

company argued plaintiffs could not establish their lawsuit arises

out of or relates to Grobet’s activity in California. Specifically,

Grobet argued plaintiffs failed to show Grobet marketed “the

particular product that injured Karl[,] . . . not just that type of

product[,] to the California market.”

In opposition, Karl submitted a declaration stating he

encountered Dixon-branded asbestos soldering blocks while

working as a dental specialist in the United States Air Force

between 1955 and 1959 and while working as a traveling dental

supply salesperson—including in California—between 1960 and

1975.4 Plaintiffs also submitted Grobet’s responses to

interrogatories in another case that stated, among other things,

that Grobet produced catalogs in 1968 and 1973 featuring

asbestos soldering block products but disclaimed specific

knowledge “regarding the identity of the customers to whom the

products featured in the catalogs were sold, shipped, or otherwise

distributed . . . .” One of the interrogatory responses did

acknowledge, however, that “[a] reasonable list of potential

customers might consist of the major jewelry and dental

3 Grobet’s motion was styled as a “Motion to Quash 

Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.”

4 Karl does not allege he sold Grobet products.
4

equipment distributors located in major American cities during

the relevant time period.”

The trial court continued the hearing on Grobet’s motion to

quash the summons to permit jurisdictional discovery “as to

manufacture, sale, supplies, and marketing in California.” 

Plaintiffs deposed John Canzoneri (Canzoneri), an employee of

Grobet since 1967 and its president since 1991.

Canzoneri testified Grobet acquired Dixon in or around

1968 and continued selling Dixon’s products under the Dixon

brand in the jewelry, dental, and optical industries through the

1970s. Canzoneri testified Dixon had “a national catalog” during

this period that “covered the United States and the jewelry

industry” and included asbestos soldering blocks. Grobet did not

distribute a dental products catalog until 1973, but prior to that,

dental products were “sold from a price list with a description of

the product.”

Canzoneri testified Grobet employed a “jewelry

salesperson” in California between 1963 and 1978. Canzoneri did

not “know what all he [i.e., the salesperson] sold” because he did

not have the salesperson’s sales records, but the salesperson was

“tasked with selling [Grobet’s] products to the jewelry industry,

to jewelry stores, manufacturers of jewelers [sic], [and] jewelry

supply houses.”

Canzoneri testified he did not have “any information” as to

whether the salesperson was would have been prohibited from

selling in California any of the products Grobet made (which

would include dental asbestos soldering blocks). Canzoneri did

testify, however, that Grobet’s California jewelry salesperson was

“restricted from cross-selling to other industries because each

industry had its own distribution network and its own supply
5

houses.” Customers in the jewelry industry were the only ones

“able to buy direct” from Grobet and customers in other

industries would instead purchase products through

distributors.5 Canzoneri nonetheless conceded that “if a customer

in California was using a William Dixon soldering block, the

ultimate source of that product . . . between 1963 and

1978. . . . would have been either William Dixon, or once it was

acquired, Grobet . . . .”

The trial court granted Grobet’s motion to quash. At the

hearing, the trial court found that plaintiffs failed to make the

requisite showing “that [Karl] was injured by a product that

Grobet . . . ‘actually directed to California[.]’” The trial court

emphasized there was no evidence Grobet “directed its products

[to California] . . . for dental office use, much less the particular

soldering block that [Karl] used.” Grobet did not sell products

directly to dental offices, the court concluded, and the only known

contact with California was a salesperson who only engaged with

customers in the jewelry industry. The trial court recognized its

view of the showing plaintiffs were required to make regarding

the relationship between their claims and Grobet’s forumdirected activity rested on a “narrow reading” of the Supreme

Court’s opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court

(2017) ___ U.S. ___ [137 S.Ct. 1773] (Bristol-Myers) and

acknowledged “this may certainly be an area where we need to

get some clarity.”

5 The appellate record does not identify any dental

distributors to which Grobet sold asbestos products, or their

customers.
6

II. DISCUSSION

A few months after the trial court determined it had no

specific personal jurisdiction because plaintiffs were unable to

trace asbestos soldering blocks Karl encountered to any sale of

such blocks by Grobet in California, the United States Supreme

Court clarified that no “strict causal relationship” is necessary to

establish specific jurisdiction. (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana

Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (2021) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [141 S.Ct.

1017, 1026] (Ford).) At the same time, the high court cautioned

that its holding “does not mean anything goes” (id. at ___ [141

S.Ct. at 1026]), and Grobet continues to urge affirmance chiefly

by emphasizing the paucity of evidence that Grobet sold asbestoscontaining soldering blocks to California dental customers (as

opposed to jewelry industry customers) during the relevant time

period.

We hold, on the understanding of “arising from or related

to” as clarified in Ford, the trial court should have exercised

personal jurisdiction in this case. There is no question that

Grobet purposely availed itself of the California market for

soldering blocks; the only question is whether plaintiffs needed

better evidence to show their claims against Grobet are related to

(not directly caused by) Grobet’s sale of asbestos-containing

products in this state. While there is “room for reasonable

disagreement about what it means for one thing to arise out of or

relate to another” (Halyard Health, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.

(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1069), we believe the evidence

plaintiffs adduced adequately shows the requisite “‘relationship

among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation’” that is “the

‘essential foundation’ of specific jurisdiction.” (Ford, supra, ___

U.S. at ___ [141 S.Ct. at 1028]). Grobet employed a salesperson
7

to target the California market and the evidence was not clear as

to whether that salesperson was prohibited from selling to dental

customers. But Grobet conceded both that a “reasonable list of

potential customers” for its dental products catalog in 1973

“might consist of the major jewelry and dental equipment

distributors located in major American cities” and that the

ultimate source for any Grobet soldering block used by a

customer in California would have been Grobet. On these facts,

even if it were true that asbestos soldering blocks used in

California dental offices were sold only through intermediary

distributors, Grobet’s admitted promotion and sale of at least

some asbestos-containing soldering blocks in this state during the

relevant time period is enough to establish the requisite

connection and to make this state is a constitutionally acceptable

forum for a suit brought by a resident thereof seeking damages

for alleged harm that occurred here. We shall accordingly

reverse.

A. Principles of Personal Jurisdiction, and Our Review

of Motions to Quash for an Asserted Lack of Such

Jurisdiction

California’s long-arm statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10)

authorizes California courts to exercise jurisdiction on any basis

not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or the

Constitution of California. “The Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State’s authority to bind a

nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts. [Citation.] 

Although a nonresident’s physical presence within the territorial

jurisdiction of the court is not required, the nonresident generally

must have ‘certain minimum contacts . . . such that the
8

maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice.”’ [Citation.]” (Walden v. Fiore

(2014) 571 U.S. 277, 283, quoting International Shoe Co. v.

Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 (International Shoe).)

This constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction may be

established on either a general (all-purpose) or specific (caselinked) basis. (Ford, supra, ___ U.S. at ___ [141 S.Ct. at 1024].) 

The parties agree only specific personal jurisdiction is at issue

here.

Distilled to three commonly recited elements, “[a] court

may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

only if: (1) ‘the defendant has purposefully availed himself or

herself of forum benefits’ [citation]; (2) ‘the “controversy is related

to or ‘arises out of’ [the] defendant’s contacts with the forum”’

[citations]; and (3) ‘“the assertion of personal jurisdiction would

comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice’”’ [citations].” 

(Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269; accord,

Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 

Cal.App.5th 543, 553 (Jayone).) Acts by the defendant relied on

to give rise to specific jurisdiction “must be the defendant’s own

choice and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous,’” and they “must

show that the defendant deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its

home—by, for example, ‘exploi[ting] a market’ in the forum State

or entering a contractual relationship centered there.” (Ford,

supra, ___ U.S. at ___ [137 S.Ct. at 1025].) The defendant’s

contacts need not bear “a strict causal relationship” to the

litigation (Id. at ___ [141 S.Ct. at 1026]), but “there must be an

‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,

principally, [an] activity or occurrence that takes place in the
9

forum State.’ [Citation.]” (Bristol-Myers, supra, ___ U.S. at ___

[137 S.Ct. at 1781].)

“‘“When a defendant moves to quash service of process” [on 

jurisdictional grounds], “the plaintiff has the initial burden of 

demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.”’”

(Jayone, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at 553.) The plaintiff must prove 

jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re 

Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 

110.)

“‘When no conflict in the evidence exists, . . . the question of 

jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing court engages 

in an independent review of the record. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” 

(Jayone, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at 553.)

B. Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action Against Grobet Are

Related to the Company’s California-Directed

Conduct

Grobet, and later the trial court, relied heavily on the

Supreme Court’s discussion of the “arising out of or related to”

element of specific jurisdiction discussed in Bristol-Myers. In

that case, the high court held the defendant pharmaceutical

company’s extensive activities in California did not support

specific jurisdiction as to claims asserted by non-resident

plaintiffs who did not obtain an allegedly defective drug from a

California source, suffer injury in California, or receive treatment

in California. (Bristol-Myers, supra, ___ U.S. at ___ [137 S.Ct. at

1777-1778].) In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected

California’s “sliding scale” approach to specific jurisdiction, one in

which “the strength of the requisite connection between the

forum and the specific claims at issue is relaxed if the defendant
10

has extensive forum contacts that are unrelated to those claims.” 

(Id. at ___ [137 S.Ct. at 1781].)

Without the benefit of Ford, Grobet and the trial court

construed high court precedent—and Bristol-Myers specifically—

to require a showing that Karl’s asbestos exposure was the direct

result of Grobet’s California-directed activities. Ford, however,

clarifies this is a misreading of Bristol-Myers.

 At issue in Ford were two lawsuits arising from automobile

accidents. (Ford, supra, ___ U.S. at ___ [141 S.Ct. at 1023].) 

One, filed in Montana, involved a Ford Explorer; the other, filed

in Minnesota, involved a Crown Victoria. (Id. at ___ [141 S.Ct. at

1023].) Ford contended it was not subject to specific jurisdiction

in either state because the individual vehicles at issue were not

designed, manufactured, or originally sold in these states: “Only

later resales and relocations by consumers had brought the

vehicles to Montana and Minnesota.” (Id. at ___ [141 S.Ct. at

1023].) The Supreme Court rejected Ford’s position that “only a

strict causal relationship” would be sufficient to establish the

requisite connection between the lawsuits and Ford’s forumdirected activities. (Id. at ___ [141 S.Ct. at 1026].)

The high court explained that, unlike the non-resident

plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers, who were “engaged in forumshopping,” the Ford plaintiffs—residents of the forum states who

were injured in the forum states—“brought suit in the most

natural State[s]” despite having purchased the allegedly defective

vehicles in other states. (Ford, supra, ___ U.S. at ___ [141 S.Ct.

at 1031].) The Court emphasized that “Ford urges Montanans

and Minnesotans to buy its vehicles, including (at all relevant

times) Explorers and Crown Victorias,” by “billboards, TV and

radio spots, print ads, and direct mail.” (Id. at ___ [141 S.Ct. at
11

1028].) Moreover, dozens of Ford dealerships in both states

offered these models for sale and provided maintenance services,

“making it easier to own a Ford” and “encourag[ing] Montanans

and Minnesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.” (Id. at ___

[141 S.Ct. at 1028].) Because “Ford had systematically served a

market in Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the

plaintiffs allege[d] malfunctioned and injured them in those

States,” there was “a strong ‘relationship among the defendant,

the forum, and the litigation’—the ‘essential foundation’ of

specific jurisdiction.” (Id. at ___ [141 S.Ct. at 1028], quoting

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S.

408, 414.)

Ford not only undermines the narrow personal jurisdiction

position Grobet took in the trial court, but affirmatively

illustrates why plaintiffs’ evidence adequately establishes the

trial court should exercise specific personal jurisdiction over

Grobet. Like the plaintiffs in Ford, Karl was a forum resident

who was allegedly exposed to and harmed by Grobet’s products in

California. Plaintiffs were (perhaps unsurprisingly) unable to

definitively link these products to invoices prepared by Grobet’s

California salesperson more than 50 years ago, but they

demonstrated Grobet systematically served a market for its

products in California; inclusion of asbestos soldering blocks in

Grobet’s “national catalog” demonstrates they were available for

purchase in California and Grobet’s interrogatory responses

sensibly concede customers for its wares were likely to be found

in most major American cities—of which California has at least
12

two or three.

6

“[T]his is [accordingly] not a case where the

plaintiff claims harm in the forum from an allegedly defective

product and seeks to establish personal jurisdiction over the

defendant by showing the defendant’s extensive in-forum sales of

a different product.” (Bader v. Avon Products, Inc. (2020) 55

Cal.App.5th 186, 196.) Karl claims he was injured by a Grobet

asbestos soldering block, and it is undisputed Grobet marketed

such blocks for sale to customers in California.

Grobet maintains this is not enough because its California

salesperson sold only to the jewelry industry, not the dental

industry. We think the evidence is more muddled than that in

light of Grobet’s interrogatory responses that we have just

discussed. Even Canzoneri’s testimony, upon which Grobet

principally relies, is not definitively to the contrary. He testified

Grobet had a “jewelry salesperson” in California between 1963

6 Grobet’s suggestion that its dental soldering blocks and 

jewelry soldering blocks were different “line[s] of products” is 

belied by the generic descriptions of the soldering block products 

in its catalogs. Although Canzoneri described at least one of the 

catalogs as “cover[ing] the jewelry industry” (in which case one 

would not necessarily expect an industry designation in the 

product description), Grobet’s discovery responses indicate the 

catalogs were not industry-specific. Additionally, Canzoneri 

testified that Grobet produced dental catalogs beginning in 1973, 

and catalogs produced after this date refer to asbestos soldering 

blocks in the same generic terms. Most significantly, Canzoneri’s 

claim at one point in his deposition that its jewelry salesperson 

was not permitted to “cross-sell[ ]” to the dental industry was not 

predicated on an assertion that the company’s jewelry and dental 

products were somehow different, but rather that each industry 

had its own distribution network.
13

and 1978 who was “tasked with selling [Grobet’s] products to the

jewelry industry, to jewelry stores, manufacturers of jewelers

[sic], [and] jewelry supply houses.” When pressed on whether the

salesperson was prohibited from selling to customers outside the

jewelry industry, however, Canzoneri at one point testified the

salesperson was prohibited from “cross-selling” to other

industries yet at other points conceded he did not “know what all

[the salesperson] sold” and had no information on whether the

salesperson “was prohibited from selling any of Grobet’s products

into the state of California.”

Giving Grobet the benefit of the ambiguity for the sake of

argument, there is still adequate evidence Grobet marketed

asbestos soldering blocks for sale in California—and did so in a

manner related to this litigation. Karl alleges he was injured by

Grobet asbestos soldering blocks used in California, and

assuming the evidence shows Grobet focused its marketing and

sale of such blocks to jewelry customers, the marketing and

promotion of the specific blocks alleged to be the cause of injury

in this state is still sufficient evidence of relatedness to justify

specific jurisdiction. Entities may structure their business to

avoid exposure to litigation in a particular forum, but this is

generally understood to mean avoiding the forum entirely. (See,

e.g., Ford, supra, ___ U.S. at ___ [141 S.Ct. at 1027] [a company

may “‘act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by

procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers,

or, if the risks are [still] too great, severing its connection with the

State’”], emphasis added, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.

v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297.) The idea that a company

can instead slice the market for a product in a state into ever

thinner segments and thereby avoid suit by those who are known
14

or easily foreseeable product users but who fall outside a

particular segment targeted by the company for direct marketing

efforts overstrains the principle of reciprocity between a state and

a defendant that is at the heart of personal jurisdiction

jurisprudence; a company taking this approach does not “enjoy[ ]

the benefits and protection of the laws of that state” to a

proportionately lesser degree (International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S.

at 319; accord, Ford, supra, at ___ [141 S.Ct. at 1025

[“International Shoe founded specific jurisdiction on an idea of

reciprocity between a defendant and a State”].) Grobet enjoyed

the benefits and protections of California and the company is

accordingly subject to suit for harm here allegedly caused by its

asbestos-containing soldering blocks to a California resident.
15

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order is reversed and the matter is 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

MOOR, J.