### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Ja nua ry 25, 200 8 S es sio n
ALE NAWHA RTO N v. RO BER T WHA RTO N

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Croc kett County

No. 8167 G eorge R. Ellis, Ch ancellor

No. W2007-01972-C OA-R9-C V - F iled Fe bruary 6, 2008

This interlocutory ap peal a rises fr om a petition for conte mpt to enforce a child support orde r. Although it is undisputed that neither the pare nts nor the c hild who is the subject of the support orde r in this case re sided in Crockett County for at least six mont h s p ri o r t o the filingof the c urre nt pe ti t i o n , t h e t r i a l c o u rt d e n i e d M o t h e r ’ s r e qu e s t u n d e r T e n n e s s e e C o d e A n n o t a t e d § 3 6

- 5 -3 00 3 to transfe r the matter

to Dy er County , wher e the child resides with Fathe r. We reve rse, r emand, a nd order the matter tra

nsfer red. Tenn. R. App . P . 9 Interlocutor y Appeal by Per m ission ; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Reve rsed; and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

Gre g ory W. Mi nton, Medina, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Alena

Wharton.

Sam J . Watridge , Humboldt, Tennessee , for the a ppellee, Robe rt Wharton.
Robert E. C ooper, J r., Att orney Gene ral and Reporter and L aure n S. L amber

th, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for

the Interve nor.
OP IN ION
Th e fa c ts r e le va

nt t o o ur dis po sit ion

of thi s in te rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l are un dis pu te d. Th e pa rt ie s, Al e na Whart on (“ Mo the r” ) a

nd Robe rt Wha

rt on (“ F a the r” ) w e re div or c e d in Cr oc ke tt Co un ty Chance ry Court in 2002. At the time of the divorc e, howe ver, the parties r esided in Dy er County and their child wa s born in Dy er County

. Pursuant to the decr ee of divorce , the parties share d custody of the ir min or c hil d a nd ne ith e r p are nt w a s o rd e re d to pa y c hil d s up po rt

. The pa rties’ post-divorc e relationship has be en somewhat fluid with respec t to child custody
and c hil d s up po rt , a

nd the y have a pp e are d in

the Cr oc ke tt Co un ty

Cha nc e ry Court fo r s e ve ra l po st-W e gr a n te d the A tto rn e y G e n e ra l’s m o tio n to inte rv e n e to a d d re ss F a the r’s c o n stitutio n a l ch a llen g e s. 1

-2- divorce proce eding s. I n September 2005, the chanc ellor ente red a revised pa

rentingplan desig n a

ting Father a s primary residential pare nt a nd order ing Mother to pay child support. I t is from this 2005 order that the cur

rent dispute ar ises.

I n Fe bruar

y 2007, Father filed a petition for contempt in the Crocke tt Count y Chance ry Court
se e kin g e nf

or c e me nt o f t

he c ourt ’s 20 05 or de r. Whe n F a the r fi le d h is p e tit ion , h e and the c hil d
c o n t i nu e d t o r e s i d e i nD y e r

C o u n t y an d M o t h e r h a d r e l o c a t e d f

r o m D y e r C o u n t y t o K e n tu c ky
. In Marc h 2007, Mother filed a reque st for transf

er of the matter to Dy er County Chance ry Court; Father objected to the tr ansfe r. The tr ial court de nied Mother’ s reque st for transf er on the basis that Mother had no standing to use the applica ble transf er statutes be cause she is a reside nt of Kentuc ky and not Dy er County ; that the custodial pare nt (Father) a nd the child ar e residents of D y er County and F ather objects to the transfe r; that Mother waived her rig ht to transfer by submitt ing to the jur isdiction of the cour t. The trial cour

t gr anted pe rmission for interlocutory appea l, a nd in Aug ust 2007 Mother filed an a pplication for permission to appea l to this Court pursuant to Rule 9 of the Te nnessee Rules of Appe llate Proce dure. We g rante d permission to appea l and now re verse the trial cour t, remand, and orde r the matter

transfe rre d to the Dy er County Chance ry

Court.

Issues Presented

We c e rt if ie d th e fo llo wi ngiss ue s f or int e rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l: (1 ) Whe the r t

he tr ia l c ourt erre d in

ho ldi ngthat Mo the r h a d n o s tand ingto u se the applica

ble transf er of venue statutes since she is a resident of the State of Ke ntu c ky and no t a Dy e r C ounty , T e nn e sse e re sid e nt. (2) Whether Mother w aived he r rig ht to transfer v en u e by submitt ing to the jurisdiction of the Crocke tt Count y Chance ry

Court in this matter. (3) Whether i t is mandatory that the C hance ry Court of C rocke tt Count y transfe r thi s matte r t o th e Cha

nc e ry Court of Dy e r County purs ua

nt to the a pp lic a ble transfe r statutes, more spe cifica lly T.C.A. 36-5-3001, et seq.

I n his brief to this Court, Father raises the additio nal issue of whe ther Te nnessee Code Annotated §§§ 36-5 -3 0 03, 36-5-3007, a nd 36-5-3008 unc onstitut ionally violate the sepa

ration of power s require ment of the Te nnessee Constit ution. 1

Stan dard of Revie w
Th e iss ue s r a ise d h e re re qu ir e us to c on str ue the a pp lic a ble tr ans fe r s tatut e s c on ta ine d in tit le 36, chapte r five. The construction of a statute is a question of law whic h we r eview de novo , w ith-3-

no pr e sumpt ion

of c or re c tne ss atta c he d to the det erm in a tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt

. Hill v. City of Ge rm an tow n , 31 S.W .3d 234, 237 (Tenn. 2000)

. The rule s g overningstatutory construction ar e we ll-established. W hen int erpr eting a statute, the co u rt i s t o “asc erta in and g ive ef fec t to the leg islative intent without undul y restric ting or expanding a

statute’s cove rag e beyond its int ended sc ope.” Hathaway v. First Family Fin. Serv s., Inc. , 1 S.W .3d 634, 640 (Tenn. 1 9 9 9 ) (c i tations omit ted). We must asce rtain the intent of the leg islature fr om the natura l and ordinar y meaningof the statutory lang uag e and in co n text of the entire statute, without f

orcing a construction that would limit or expand its scope

. JJ & TK Corp. v . B d. of C

om m’ rs , 149 S.W .3d 62 8 , 6 3 0 -3 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) ( citations omitt ed). When the lang uag e of a

statute is clea

r, we must utiliz e the plain, a cce pted meaningof the wor ds used by the leg islature to ascertain the statute’s purpose a nd application. I f the wor ding is ambiguous, howe ver, we must look to the entire statutory scheme and at the le g islative history to asce rtain the leg islature’s int e nt a nd purp os e

. We mus t con str ue statut e s in th e ir

e nti re ty , a ssumin g that th e le g isl a tur e c ho se the wo rd s o f the statute purpose ly , and that the wor ds chosen “ convey some intent and have a meaningand a purpose” when conside red w ithin the context of the e ntire statute. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson , 151 S.W .3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004) (citations omitted). Wit h these rules in mind, we turn to the issues pr esente d.

Anal y sis We beg in with Father ’s constitutional challeng e to the applica ble transf er statutes. A s the Attorney Gene ral a sserts, Fa

ther did not raise his constituti onal cha lleng e in the trial c o u rt . Our
su pr e me c ourt

ha s n ote d:

I t ha s lo ngbe e n th e g e ne ra l r ule that qu e sti on s n ot ra ise d in the tr ia l c ourt wi ll
n o t b e e n tertaine d on appea l a nd this rule applies to a n attempt to make a
c on sti tut ion a l atta c k u

po n th e va lid ity of a sta

tut e fo r the fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l un le ss t h e s t atut e involved is so obviously unconstitutional on it s fac e as to obviate the
nece ssity for a ny discussion.

Lawr e nc e v . S

tan for d , 655 S.W .2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983) . The tra nsfer statutes in this m atter a

re not obviously

unconstitutional on their fac e. F urther, the issues that may be ra ised in interlocutory
a pp e a ls b ro ug ht to thi s Court purs ua nt t o Ru le 9 o f t

he Rul e s o f A

pp e llate Pr oc e dure are lim ite d to the iss ue s c e rt if

ie d in the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r g ra nti ng pe rm iss ion

fo r i nte rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l and in t his Court’s order

g rantingit. Heatherly

v. Me rrimack M

ut. Fire Ins. Co. , 43 S.W .3d 911, 914 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 20 00 )( c itatio ns omi tte d)

. Al tho ug h our or de r g ra nti ng pe rm iss ion fo r a

pp e a l in thi s c a se did not delineate the issues to be addre ssed on appe al, Father ne ither soug ht nor rec eived pe rmission from this Court to raise his challeng e to the constitutionality of the statutes in this interlocutory appea l. Acc ording ly , the issue raised by Father reg arding the constitutionalit y of the transfe r statutes is n ot p ro pe rl y

be fo re thi s Co ur

t.-4-

We n e xt tur

n to wh e the r t

he tr ia l cour t er

re d b y de nyingMo the r’ s r e qu e st t o tr ans fe r t his
ma tte r t o D y e r C ounty

purs ua nt t o T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d § 36 -5 -3 00 3. Th e se c tio n p ro vid e s:
Transf er of supp ort orcustody cases. - - (a ) Except as provided in § 36- 5-3001(b) , a case that includes child support or custody provisions may

be tra nsfer red be tween counties in this state without the ne ed for any additional filing by

the par ty seeking transfe r, and without service of proc ess upon the non-r equestingparty , by the filing of a r equest by

the re questing party

as set for th here in. (b) Upon r ece ipt of a re quest, the ca se must be transf err ed by the cler k of the issuing cour

t, without orde r of the court, to a court of competent jurisdiction in the
c ounty wh e re the c hil d o r c hil dr e n r e sid e if e a c h o f t he fo llo wi nga

pp lie s: (1) Ne ither t h e child or children, custodial pa rent/oblig ee, nor

the non-custodial par ent/obligor curr ently reside in the issuing county ; and (2) The child or childre n who ar e subjec t to the support or custody order
curr ently reside in the c ounty

to which the case is to be tra nsfer red a nd have r esided the re fo r at le a st s ix (6 ) m on ths

. (c ) Ac a se may

a lso be tr ans fe rr e d f

or mod if ic a tio n o f s up po rt

or c us tod y to any court of c ompetent jurisdict i on in the county in which the non-c ustodial pare nt/obligor re sides in this st ate with no six -month residenc y period if both the child or childr en s u bject to the support or c ustody order and the c ustodial pare nt/obligee reside o u t s i de this state and the c ustodial parent/oblig ee doe s not object afte r the provision of notice pursuant to § 36-5-3004. I f objec tion is m ade, or if the re quest ingpa

rt y do e s n ot s e e k im me diate tr ans fe r w ith ou t th e six ( 6) mon th residenc y period, the r equestingparty may obtai n t ransfer f

or modification of the
o rder by demonstratingthat the custodial par ent/oblige e and the child or childre n have re sid e d ou tsi de thi s state fo r a t le a st s ix (6 ) m on ths . Atr ans fe r p ur su ant t o th is subs ec t i o n (c) shall be initiated by written re quest of the r equestingparty or de pa rtme nt p ur su ant t o th e pr ov isi on s o f t his pa rt

. (d) I f the case has been transfe rre d pursuant to this part, the f act that one of the par ties or the child re turns to the transfe ror c ounty do es n o t , b y

that fac t alone, confe r jurisdiction upon the previous tra nsfer or court

. A transf

er to the or igina l iss uin g c ou

rt re qu ir e s c omp lia

nc e wi th t he pr oc e dure s o f t

his pa rt

. (e )( 1) " Cus tod ia l pa

re nt" fo r p ur

po ses o f t

his pa rt me ans the pe rs on

wi th whom the child resides a majority of t he ti me i n a situation where there is an order of joint custody

or whe re the re e x ist parenting plans pursuant to cha pter 6, pa rt 4 of t h i s t i t l e t h a ta d dr e s s i s s u e s o f c u s t o dy. (2 ) " Cus tod ia l pa

re nt" fo r p ur

po se s o f t his pa rt a lso inc lud e s, in a dd iti on to a biolog ical or le g al par ent havingleg al custody of a c hild, an indiv i dual to whom leg al cus to dy

o f th e c h il d

o r c h il dr e nh a s b e e ng iv e nb y a c o u rt o f c o mp e te nt jurisdiction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-3003(2005)

.-5-

Father’s a rg ument as pre sented in his brief, as we understand it , is that Mother does not have standing under subse ction (c) of the statute be cause she re sides in Kentucky and not in Tenne ssee. Howeve r, alt houg h we a g ree that transfe r under subsection (c ) would not be prope r in this case, wher e the non- custodial pare nt is not a Tennessee resident a nd wher e the custodial pare nt and the child are residents of this state, subsec tion (b) is the subsection applica ble to th is case. U nder subsection (b), upon r ece ipt of a re quest, t he ca se mu st be tra nsfer red to the c ourt of compe tent jurisdiction in the county

wher e the c hild resides if neither the custodial nor non-c ustodial parent nor the c hil d r e sid e in the iss uin g c ounty and if the c hil d ha s r e sid e d in the tr ans fe re e c ounty

fo r at le a st six months. I t is undisput ed that both conditions are met in this case. The statute, more over, doe s not lim it standing to re quest a transfer to the custodi al parent or to residents of Tenne ssee. Rather, subsection (a) provides that the m atter may be tra nsfer red upon reque st of “the r equestingparty” as se t forth in the statute. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 36-5- 3002 (10) de fines “r eq uesting party” to mean “ custodial pare nt, non-custodial par ent or, in Title I V-D
c hil d sup po rt

c a se s, the de pa

rtme nt o r i ts c on tr a c tor .” Ac c or din g ly , th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in its d e t e r m i n a t i o nt h a tM o t h e r

l a c k e d s t an d i n g t o r e qu e s tt r an s f e r o f t h i s m a t t e r

t o D ye r C o u n t y.
We ne x t turn to whether Mothe r wa ived her rig ht to transfer

under the statute by

submitt ing t o t h e j u ri s d i ct i o no f t h e C ro ck et tC o u n t y C h an ce ry C o u rt i nt h i s m at t er

. T h e t ri al co u rt ’s re as o n i n g, a s we un de rs tand it, is that be c a us e Mo the r su

bmi tte d to the jur isd ic tio n of the Cr ock ett Co un ty Chance ry Court, w aiving venue, when the divor ce a ction was he ard in 2002, wa iving a ny objection based on ve nue in the divorce action, she has waived foreve r her rig ht to request a tr ansfe r under the statute. We must aga in disag ree

. The plain languag e of se ction 36-5-3003 unambigu o u sly provides for

mandatory

transfe r upon reque st when the provisions of the rema inder of the statute are met. The statute c ontains no limit ation for c ases whe re the orig inal order was e ntere d despite the waiver of venue . I n subsections (a) and (b), the Genera l Assembly has m andate d that, upon reque st, a ca se including child support
or c hil d c us tod

y pr ov isi on s “ mus t be tr ans fe rr e d” to a c ourt of c omp e te nt j ur isd ic tio n in the c ounty wh e re the c hil d r e sid e s in ca se s whe re ne ith e r t he pa re nts no r t

he c hil d r e sid e in t

he iss uin g c ounty
and wh e re the c hil d h a s r e sid e d in the c ounty

to whic h th e c a se is t o b e tr a ns fe rr e d f or at least s ix months. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-5- 3003(2005); see als o Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 36-5- 30 04 (1 )( A) (2 00 5) ; In Re C.A.R. , 215 S.W .3d 376, 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). I n this c ase, the ref

ore, transf er of the matter to the D y er County Chance ry

Court, as reque sted by

Mother, is mandatory

. Hol din g
I n light of the forg oing, w e re verse and remand t his matter to the trial c ourt with instructions to transfe r the ma t t er t o t h e Dy er County Chance ry

Court. Costs of this appea l are taxed to the Appellee , Robert Wharton.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER, J UDGE