1 No. 11-2391-cv Halica v. Singer UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LO CAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4 th day of February, two thousand thirteen.

Present: CHESTER J. STRAUB, PETER W. HALL, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

____________________________________________________ Lorraine Halica, Lawyers Title Insurance Corp., Third-Party-Plaintiffs–Appellees , Finance California Inc., Plaintiff , v. No. 11-2391-cv Mark Singer, Third-Party-Defendant–Appellant , David Shrair, Cooley, Shrair P.C., Third-Party-Defendants

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____________________________________________________2 FOR APPELLANT: L OUIS B. B LUMENFELD (Lorinda S. Coon, on the brief ), Cooney, Scully and Dowling, Hartford, Connecticut.

FOR APPELLEE: J ONATHAN S. B OWMAN (Ari J. Hoffman, Barbara M. Schellenberg, on the brief ), Cohen and Wolf, P.C., Bridgeport, Connecticut, Da vid M. Satnick, Loeb & Loeb LLP, New York, New York.

____________________________________________________ Appeal from a judgment of the United Stat es District Court for the District of Connecticut (Kravitz, J .). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of th e district court is AFFIRMED. Third-Party-Defendant–Appellant Mark Singer (“Singer”) appeals from the jury verdict, rendered February 10, 2011, finding in favor of Third-Party-Plainti ffs–Appellees, Lorraine Halica (“Halica”) and Lawyers Title Insurance Co., and the district court’s May, 16, 2011 ruling and order denying his Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 motions . We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural histor y, and the issues presented for review.

We review de novo the district court's denial of a Ru le 50(b) motion for judgment as a

matter of law. Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 2008). A grant of judgment as a matter of law following a jury verdic t “may only be granted if there exists such a complete absence of evidence suppo rting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or the evidence in favor of the movant is so overwhelming that reasonable and fair minded [p ersons] could not arrive at a verdict against [it].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “In revi ewing such a motion, this Court must give deference to all credibility determinations and reasonable inferences of the jury, and may not3 weigh the credibility of witnesses or otherw ise consider the weight of the evidence.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The district court properly de termined that Singer failed to satisfy the high standards required to overturn a jury verdict. Quite simp ly, the record contains ample evidence in support of Halica’s position advanced at trial that she wa s a passive tortfeasor deserving of common law indemnification from the active tortfeasor, Singe r, who committed fraud. Halica testified that she had no knowledge that the consulting agreement was illuso ry, and that she “had no knowledge that there was anything being hidden” from Finance California, Inc. (“Finance California”). Singer, on the ot her hand, testified that he was aware of Finance California’s requirement that the buyer contri bute cash at closing, and that he nonetheless instructed Halica to keep confidential the undisclose d “credit” provided by the buye r from the valueless consulting agreement between the buyer and the seller. This direct testimony permit s a reasonable jury to conclude, based on the evidence of Singer’s frau d and manipulation of Halica and the charge given to the jury, 1 that Singer had the requis ite control of the transac tion sufficient to support the jury’s award of indemnificati on under Connecticut law.

We have considered all of Si nger’s other arguments and found each of them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of th e district court is hereby AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

1 While Singer challenged th e propriety of the district court’s ch arge to the jury on the element of control, our de novo review concludes that “ considered as a whole, th e instructions adequately communicated the essential ideas to the jury.” United States v. Sabhnani , 599 F.3d 215, 237 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).