IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA 

September 2014 Term 

_______________ 

No. 13-1086 

_______________ 

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF WEBSTER COUNTY; 

RUSSELL FRY, Acting Executive Director, WorkForce West Virginia; 

JACK CANFIELD, Chairman, Board of Review; 

GINO COLUMBO, Member, Board of Review; 

LES FACEMYER, Member, Board of Review, 

Respondents Below, Petitioners 

v. 

DAWN J. HANNA, 

Petitioner Below, Respondent 

____________________________________________________________ 

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County 

The Honorable Tod J. Kaufman, Judge 

Civil Action No. 13-AA-64 

REVERSED 

____________________________________________________________ 

Submitted: September 17, 2014 

Filed: October 2, 2014 

Jill E. Hall, Esq. 

Bowles Rice, LLP 

Charleston, West Virginia 

Counsel for the Petitioners 

Dan L. Hardway, Esq. 

Dan Hardway Law Office 

Cowen, West Virginia 

Counsel for the Respondent 

JUSTICE KETCHUM delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

FILED 

October 2, 2014 

released at 3:00 p.m. 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA
i 

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 

1. “The findings of fact of the [Board of Review of WorkForce West 

Virginia] are entitled to substantial deference unless a reviewing court believes the 

findings are clearly wrong. If the question on review is one purely of law, no deference 

is given and the standard of judicial review by the court is de novo.” Syl. Pt. 3, Adkins v. 

Gatson, 192 W.Va. 561, 453 S.E.2d 395 (1994). 

2. “The word voluntarily as used in W.Va. Code, 21A–6–3(1) means 

the free exercise of the will.” Syl. Pt. 3, Childress v. Muzzle, 222 W.Va. 129, 663 S.E.2d 

583 (2008). 

3. “The term ‘good cause’ as used in W.Va. Code, 21A–6–3(1) means 

cause involving fault on the part of the employer sufficient to justify an employee’s 

voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.” 

Syl. Pt. 4, Childress v. Muzzle, 222 W.Va. 129, 663 S.E.2d 583 (2008). 
1 

Justice Ketchum: 

This is an appeal by the Board of Education of Webster County (“School 

Board”) from an order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The circuit court 

reversed the Board of Review of WorkForce West Virginia (“WorkForce”) and ruled that 

Dawn J. Hanna (“Hanna”) was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits under 

W.Va. Code § 21A-6-3(1) [2012]. The School Board appeals the circuit court’s order, 

contending that Hanna is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation 

benefits because she voluntarily quit her job. Upon review of the record, we reverse the 

circuit court’s order and reinstate WorkForce’s determination that Hanna is disqualified 

from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. 

I. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A. Hanna’s Employment with the School Board 

Hanna worked for the School Board as a teacher from August 1989 until 

she resigned in December 2012. During the 2011-2012 school-year, she supervised a 

student cookbook fundraiser. As supervisor, Hanna was to submit the fundraiser 

proceeds to the school. 

At the beginning of the 2012-2013 school-year, it was discovered that 

$1,005 of the fundraiser proceeds were missing. The School Board conducted an 

investigation into the matter and alerted the prosecuting attorney’s office. An assistant 

prosecutor conducted a separate investigation into the missing funds. 
2 

Upon Hanna’s return from a two-month sick-leave, on December 10, 2012, 

the principal at Hanna’s school called her to his office where a state trooper was waiting 

to speak with her. The state trooper questioned her about the missing money, and Hanna 

responded by denying that she took the money. 

Four days later, the assistant prosecutor requested that Hanna meet with 

her. At the meeting, Hanna learned that she would be charged with felony 

embezzlement, but that she could avoid prosecution by resigning from her position and 

paying back the missing funds. The assistant prosecutor stated that she gave Hanna these 

options because the School Board preferred that Hanna not be prosecuted, but rather, that 

she resign. The assistant prosecutor gave Hanna four days to decide whether or not to 

resign. 

Pursuant to her discussion with the assistant prosecutor, Hanna resigned 

from her position four days later. She described her decision to resign as follows: “I was 

given this option by [the assistant prosecutor] . . . I chose to quit.” Hanna thereafter 

applied for unemployment benefits. 

B. Procedural History 

On January 10, 2013, a deputy with WorkForce’s Unemployment 

Compensation Division determined that Hanna was disqualified from receiving 

unemployment compensation benefits under W.Va. Code § 21A-6-3(1). The statute 

states, in pertinent part, that employees are disqualified from receiving unemployment 

compensation benefits when they leave work “voluntarily without good cause involving 

fault on the part of the employer[.]” 
3 

Hanna appealed the disqualification. Thereafter, an administrative law 

judge took Hanna’s testimony at a telephonic hearing. The administrative law judge 

affirmed the deputy’s decision on the ground that: “If the claimant had not resigned her 

employment, [she] could have remained employed as a teacher.” The administrative law 

judge also determined that instead of contesting the charges against her, she voluntarily 

chose to resign in order to avoid felony prosecution. The WorkForce Board of Review 

adopted the administrative law judge’s decision. 

Hanna appealed WorkForce’s decision to the Circuit Court of Kanawha 

County. The circuit court reversed WorkForce’s determination that Hanna resigned 

voluntarily. Instead, it found that Hanna acted under duress and that her decision to 

resign was not voluntary. The circuit court’s discussion on the issue of voluntariness is 

as follows: “[Hanna] was under duress with only four days to make a decision without 

counsel.” The circuit court also found that the School Board’s involvement in Hanna’s 

duress constituted good cause involving fault on the part of her employer. 

The School Board now appeals the circuit court’s order, asserting that the 

court failed to give substantial deference to its finding that Hanna’s resignation was 

voluntary. 

II. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

This Court has held: “The findings of fact of the [Board of Review of 

WorkForce West Virginia] are entitled to substantial deference unless a reviewing court 
4 

believes the findings are clearly wrong. If the question on review is one purely of law, no 

deference is given and the standard of judicial review by the court is de novo.” Syl. Pt. 3, 

Adkins v. Gatson, 192 W.Va. 561, 453 S.E.2d 395 (1994). 

Unemployment compensation claims are to be liberally construed in favor 

of employees due to the remedial nature of the unemployment compensation statutes. 

Childress v. Muzzle, 222 W.Va. 129, 133, 663 S.E.2d 538, 587 (2008). However, “[I]t is 

also important for the Court to protect the unemployment compensation fund against 

claims by those not entitled to the benefits of the Act.” Id., 222 W.Va. at 133, 663 S.E.2d 

at 587. Likewise, “[W]e believe that the basic policy and purpose of the Act is advanced 

. . . when benefits are denied to those for whom the Act is not intended to benefit[.]” Id., 

222 W.Va. at 133, 663 S.E.2d at 587. 

III. 

ANALYSIS 

Hanna argues that she did not voluntarily resign from her position at the 

School Board because she was acting under duress. “Voluntarily” as used in the context 

of qualification for unemployment benefits means “the free exercise of the will.” Syl. Pt. 

3, Childress, 222 W.Va. 129, 663 S.E.2d 583. 

The administrative law judge noted in his opinion that, “[I]f the claimant 

had not resigned her employment, the claimant could have remained employed as a 

teacher.” The administrative law judge also noted that Hanna resigned in order to avoid 

felony prosecution, instead of contesting the charges against her. WorkForce’s finding as 
5 

to Hanna’s voluntariness is supported by Hanna’s testimony stating, “I was given the 

option to quit or be discharged. . . . I chose to quit.” 

Hanna argues that WorkForce was clearly wrong because she was acting 

under duress when she resigned. A person is under duress when he or she is “prevented 

from exercising his free will by reason of threats made by the other, and that the contract 

is obtained by reason of such fact.” Mach. Hauling, Inc. v. Steel of W. Va., 181 W.Va. 

694, 698-99, 384 S.E. 2d 139, 143-44 (1989). Hanna therefore asserts that the circuit 

court was correct to substitute its own factual findings for WorkForce’s. 

Our law is clear that the issue of whether a decision was made under duress 

is a question of fact, not law. Mach. Hauling, 181 W.Va. at 698, 384 S.E. 2d at 143 

(“[T]he question of duress is one of fact[.]”); Syl. Pt. 2, Bank of Clinchburg v. Carter, 

101 W.Va. 669, 133 S.E. 370 (1926) (“The defense of duress is ordinarily a question for 

the jury, to be determined from all the facts and circumstances in the particular case.”); 

Syl. Pt. 3, Carroll v. Fetty, 121 W.Va. 215, 2 S.E.2d 521 (1939) (“[D]uress . . . generally 

presents a question of fact for the jury.”); Arnold v. Turek, 185 W.Va. 400, 407-08, 407 

S.E.2d 706, 713-14 (1991) (quoting Syl. Pt. 3, Carroll, 121 W.Va. 215, 2 S.E.2d 521). 

Therefore, the circuit court’s order substituting its judgment for WorkForce’s cannot 

stand unless WorkForce was clearly wrong. See Syl. Pt. 1, Childress, 222 W.Va. 129, 

663 S.E.2d 583. 

We cannot say that WorkForce was clearly wrong in finding that Hanna 

resigned without duress. In fact, the record directly contradicts the circuit court’s claim 

that Hanna had only four days to seek counsel, which was based on the fact that the 
6 

assistant prosecutor gave her four days to decide whether to resign. Hanna already knew 

about the potential charges against her when she met with the assistant prosecutor due to 

her prior encounter with the state trooper in the principal’s office. 

Due to the accusations against her, Hanna could have been charged with 

felony embezzlement. Instead, the assistant prosecutor gave her an opportunity to avoid 

felony prosecution. The School Board was under no duty to provide this opportunity, and 

Hanna accepted it.1

 Hanna is arguably in a better position now due to the assistant 

prosecutor’s offer.2

 

Based on the record, we cannot say that WorkForce was clearly wrong in 

finding that Hanna resigned voluntarily and without duress, and we find that the circuit 

court erred by substituting its judgment for that of the fact finder. See Syl. Pt. 1, Darby v. 

Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 227 W.Va. 525, 711 S.E.2d 595 (2011) (“Since a reviewing 

court is obligated to give deference to factual findings rendered by an administrative law 

judge, a circuit court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing 

 1 See e.g., Seacrist v. City of Cottage Grove, 344 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Minn. 

Ct. App. 1984) (“[W]hen an employee, in the face of allegations of misconduct, chooses 

to leave his employment rather than exercise his right to have the allegations determined, 

such action supports a finding that the employee voluntarily left his job without good 

cause.”). 

2

 For example, a felony conviction would have rendered Hanna ineligible 

for retirement benefits. See W.Va. Code § 5-10A-1 [1976] (“[H]onorable service is a 

condition to receiving any . . . benefit under a retirement plan.”); W.Va. Code § 5-10A2(f) [2008] (“‘Less than honorable service’ means: . . . (2) Conviction of a participant or 

former participant of a felony for conduct related to his or her office or employment[.]”). 
7 

examiner with regard to factual determinations.”). Therefore, we affirm WorkForce in its 

finding that Hanna resigned voluntarily.3

 

IV. 

CONCLUSION

We cannot say that WorkForce was clearly wrong when it found that Hanna 

resigned voluntarily. Therefore, the circuit court erred in reversing WorkForce’s 

findings. We reverse the circuit court’s order and reinstate WorkForce’s decision, 

determining that Hanna is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation 

benefits. 

Reversed. 

 

 3

 Hanna also argues that the School Board’s involvement in her decision to 

resign constitutes good cause involving fault on the part of her employer. Because the 

Board was not clearly wrong in finding that Hanna made her decision without duress, we 

decline to consider that argument. See Syl. Pt. 1, Amherst Coal Co. v. Hix, 128 W.Va. 

119, 35 S.E.2d 733 (1945) (“Customary working conditions not involving deceit or other 

wrongful conduct on the part of the employer are not a sufficient reason for an employee 

to leave his most recent work voluntarily[.]”).