alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Fifth Season International Inc.: Exhibit 10.12- Filed by newsfilecorp.com






Exhibit 10.12

Loan Agreement


	Main contents: 



	Contract No.: nil
  
	Borrower: Fifth Season General Merchandise Investment Management
  Co., Ltd.
  
	Lender: Lishuang Lu
  
	Loan Amount (RMB): 24 million RMB Yuan
  
	Purpose of the Loan: working capital of the Company
  
	Contract Term: from February 18, 2011 to April 17, 2011
  
	Interest Rate: 


  
	The monthly interest rate is 1.62%;
  
	Liquidated damages for delayed repayment: monthly interest rate plus 20%
  of the loan; 


  

	Rights and Obligations of the Lender: 


  
	Lender shall disburse the loan in a timely manner pursuant to the
  agreement.
  
	Lender shall execute the mortgage or security right in case of breach of
  contract of the Company. 


  

  	
 Rights and obligations of the borrower 

    


  
    	Borrower is entitled to obtain and use the loan pursuant to the agreement.

  
	Borrower shall return the principal and interests timely. Borrower can
  extend the term of the loan when getting the consent of Lender pursuant to the
  agreement.
  
	Consent of Lender should be obtained when any of the Borrower’s guaranties
  or mortgages on his (her) major assets for a third party is possible to be
  detrimental to Borrower’s capability of repayment under the agreement.
  
	Borrower guarantee all of its statement is true and accurate
  
	Borrower bears the relevant fees under the agreement. 


  

	Prepayment of the Loan:


  
    Lender’s consent should be obtained if
  Borrower is willing to prepay the loan. The interest rate of prepayment shall
  accord with the agreement. 

  

  	Liabilities of Breach of Contract:


  
    Liquidated damages for
  delayed repayment: monthly interest rate plus 20% of the loan shall be imposed
  on the Company and the guarantor and mortgagor in case of the Company ’s
  breach of contract etc. 

  

	Guarantee of the loan:


  
    The loan is secured by Guarantee Contract
  by Lianmo Wu and Zhumin Zhang and Mortgage Contract by .the Company. 

  



	Headlines of the articles omitted 



	Dispute settlement
  
	Miscellaneous
  
	Effectiveness
  
	Mortgage and Guarantee Clause
  
	Attention 










Signature page 

Party A (Lender): Lishuang Lu 

By: /s/ Lishuang Lu Date: 

February 18, 2011 

Party B (Borrower): The Fifth Season General Merchandise Investment
Management Co., Ltd. 

Representative: Lide Zhu 

By: /seal/ the Fifth Season General Merchandise Investment Management Co.,
Ltd. 

/s/ Lide Zhu 

Date: February 18, 2011 

Party C (Mortgager): The Fifth Season General Merchandise Investment
Management Co., Ltd. 

Representative: Lide Zhu 

By: /seal/ the Fifth Season General Merchandise Investment Management Co.,
Ltd. 

/s/ Lide Zhu 

Date: February 18, 2011
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

November 13, 2018

RE: Product Exclusion Request Number: USTR-2018-0025-2114

Agri-Fab, Inc:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you that the product exclusion request referenced 

above has been denied. As you are aware, USTR published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 

28710) on June 20, 2018, that announced the Trade Representative’s determination to impose an 

additional duty of 25 percent on certain products from China. On July 11, 2018, the Trade 

Representative published a Federal Register notice (83 FR 32181) which announced that a 

process had been established under which interested persons could request that products falling 

within a covered HTSUS subheading be excluded from the additional duties announced on June 

20. 

Your request was reviewed in accordance with the factors and procedures set forth in 

Section B(1) of the July 11 notice. Based on that review, and after careful consideration, your 

request was denied because the request failed to show that this particular product is available 

only from China.

Because USTR will grant exclusion requests on a product specific basis, you may still 

benefit from a product exclusion if a similar product is granted an exclusion. Products for which 

an exclusion has been granted will be periodically announced on the USTR website. Product 

exclusions will become legally effective once published in the Federal Register. 

Sincerely,

Stephen P. Vaughn
Exhibit
10.1


 


FIRST
AMENDMENT TO THIRD AMENDED AND RESTATED LOAN AGREEMENT


 


Reference
is made to that certain Third Amended and Restated Loan Agreement executed by Tronco Energy Corporation, a Delaware corporation (“Borrower”)
and Superior Drilling Products, Inc., a Utah corporation or its assigns (“Lender”) dated July 6, 2020 (the “Existing
Loan Agreement”). All defined terms contained herein shall have the same meaning as contained in the Existing Loan Agreement.
This First Amendment to Third Amended and Restated Loan Agreement is made as of this 31st day of December, 2022 (the “First
Amendment”) and makes the following revision to the Existing Loan Agreement:


 


		1.	The
                                            defined term “Maturity Date” contained in Section 1.4 of the Existing
                                            Loan Agreement shall be deleted in its entirety and Section 1.4 shall be rewritten to read
                                            as follows: “Section
                                            1.4 Term. The Note and any and all obligations of Borrower under this Agreement shall
                                            mature on January 31, 2023.”



 


		2.	All
                                            other terms and conditions contained in the Existing Loan Agreement shall remain in full
                                            force and effect except as specifically amended hereby.



 


EXECUTED
AS OF THIS 31st DAY OF DECEMBER, 2022.


 


	 	BORROWER:
	 	 	 
	 	TRONCO ENERGY CORPORATION
	 	 	 
	 	By:
    	/s/
    G. Troy Meier           
	 	 	G.
    Troy Meier, President


 


	 	LENDER:
	 	 	 
	 	SUPERIOR DRILLING PRODUCTS, INC.
	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/ Chris Cashion
	 	 	Chris
    Cashion
	 	 	Chief
    Financial Officer
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 37 (Friday, February 24, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 10406]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-4579]



=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

[Ex Parte No. 290 (Sub-No. 4)]


Railroad Cost Recovery Procedures-Productivity Adjustment

AGENCY: Interstate Commerce Commission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed action.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Commission proposes to adopt its estimate of railroad 
productivity change for 1993 and incorporate it, along with previously 
calculated data, into a 1989-1993 (5-year) average. Estimated average 
productivity growth is 1.097 for 1993. Estimated annual productivity 
for the 5-year 1989-1993 period is 1.059 or 5.9% per year. Because the 
methodology for calculating the productivity adjustment and the length 
of the averaging period have already been adopted, comments are limited 
to data and computational errors.

DATES: Comments are due March 6, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert C. Hasek, (202) 927-6239 or H. 
Jeff Warren, (202) 927-6243. (TDD for the hearing impaired: (202) 927-
5721).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Rail Cost Adjustment Factor is a 
quarterly index that measures changes in railroad expenses. A 
productivity adjustment is used to adjust the quarterly Rail Cost 
Adjustment Factor for productivity improvements.
    Additional information is contained in the Commission's decision. 
To purchase a copy of the full decision write to, call or pick up in 
person from: Dynamic Concepts, Inc., Room 2229, Interstate Commerce 
Commission Building, 1201 Constitution Ave., NW., Washington DC 20423, 
or telephone (202) 289-4357/4359. (Assistance for the hearing impaired 
is available through TDD Services at (202) 275-1721).

    Decided: February 9, 1995.

    By the Commission, Chairman McDonald, Vice Chairman Morgan, and 
Commissioners Simmons and Owen.
Vernon A. Williams,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 95-4579 Filed 2-23-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7035-01-P
Exhibit 4.1




 


THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON


NEW YORK’S FIRST BANK-FOUNDED 1784 BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON


 


 


240 Greenwich
Street, 22W Floor, New York, NY 10286


 





 


December 21, 2022


Hennion & Walsh, Inc.


2001 Route 46, Waterview Plaza


Parsippany, New Jersey 07054


 


SmartTrust 595 (the “Fund”)


 


Dear Sirs:


The Bank of New York Mellon
is acting as trustee for the Fund, consisting of the unit investment trusts (the “Trusts”) included in the Registration
Statement relating to the Fund. We enclosed a list of the securities to be deposited in the Trusts on the date hereof. The prices indicated
therein reflect our evaluation of such securities as of close of business on December 20, 2022, in accordance with the valuation method
set forth in the applicable Standard Terms and Conditions of Trust and Trust Agreements. We consent to the reference to The Bank of New
York Mellon as the party performing the evaluations of the Trust securities in the Registration Statement (No. 333-267533) filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to the registration of the sale of the Units of the Trusts and to the filing of this
consent as an exhibit thereto.


 


Very truly yours,


 


/s/ Margarita
Kalantarova  


Margarita Kalantarova


Vice President
#### J. R. CLARK, Trading as J. R. CLARK MOTOR COMPANY, v. HOOD SYSTEM INDUSTRIAL BANK OF REIDSVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA.

(Filed 15 April, 1931.)

Usury C a — Complaint in this action to recover statutory penalty for usury held insufficient and demuiTer was properly allowed.

A complaint in an action to recover twice the amount of an usurious rate of interest is demurrable if there is no allegation that such interest had been actually paid, and in this ease held that allegations that defendant charged and received usury on a note discounted by plaintiff with defendant is insufficient to sustain the action for the statutory penalty.

Appeal by plaintiff from *Finley, J.,*at November Term, 1930, of RociciNghaM.

Affirmed.

Tbis is an action to recover tbe statutory penalty for usury paid by plaintiff to defendant, to wit, twice tbe amount of interest paid on loans of money made by defendant to plaintiff.

Tbe action was beard on defendant’s demurrer to tbe complaint, for tbat tbe facts stated therein are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

From judgment sustaining tbe demurrer, and allowing plaintiff time witbin wbicb to amend bis complaint, plaintiff appealed to tbe Supreme Court.

P. *T. Stiers for plaintiff.*

*Manly, Hendren & Womble and Brown & Trotter for defendant.*

Per Curiam.

In tbe absence of allegations in tbe complaint tbat plaintiff paid to defendant as interest on loans of money made by defendant to plaintiff, sums in excess of six per centum per annum, tbe demurrer of defendant to tbe complaint was properly sustained. Allegations tbat defendant charged and received usury, on notes discounted by plaintiff with defendant, are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action on wbicb plaintiff is entitled to recover tbe statutory penalty for usury paid by plaintiff to defendant. Nor are allegations tbat defendant charged plaintiff interest in excess of six per cent on loans of money made by defendant to plaintiff, sufficient, without tbe further allegation tbat plaintiff has paid to defendant such interest.

Tbe statutory penalty for charging usury is tbe forfeiture of all interest on tbe loan; it is only when tbe borrower has paid usury to tbe lender of money, tbat be can recover in a civil action as tbe statm tory penalty for taking and receiving usury, twice tbe amount paid. C. S., 2306. *McNeill v. Suggs,*199 N. C., 477, 154 S. E., 720; *Briggs v.*
      *636
      *Bank,*197 N. C., 120, 147 S. E., 815; *McKinney v. Sutphin,*196 N. C., 318, 145 S. E., 621; *Pratt v. Mortgage Co.,*196 N. C., 294, 145 S. E., 396; *Ripple v. Mortgage Co.,*193 N. C., 422, 137 S. E., 156; *Sloan v. Insurance Co.,*189 N. C., 690, 128 S. E., 2; *Miller v. Dunn,*188 N. C., 397, 124 S. E., 746; *Waters v. Garris,*188 N. C., 305, 124 S. E., 334.

It is significant that in the instant case plaintiff did not amend his complaint as he was allowed to do by the judgment, and thus cure the specific defect therein to which his attention was directed by the demurrer. The judgment is

Affirmed.
i i i i i i

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-09-00255-CR

Barbara Estrada ISUNZA,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2007-CR-10344A

Honorable Catherine Torres-Stahl, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 1, 2009

DISMISSED

Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, appellant Barbara Estrada Isunza pled nolo contendere

to the offense of forgery. The trial court imposed sentence and signed a certificate stating that this

“is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2).

After appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, the clerk sent copies of the certification and notice
04-09-00255-CR

-2-

of appeal to this court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(e). The clerk’s record, which includes the plea

bargain agreement and the trial court’s Rule 25.2(a)(2) certification, has been filed. See TEX.R.APP.

P. 25.2(d). 

The clerk’s record establishes the punishment assessed by the court does not exceed the

punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant and that the trial court

denied permission to appeal. See TEX.R.APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). After reviewing the clerk’s record, the

trial court’s certification therefore appears to accurately reflect that this is a plea bargain case and

Rodriguez does not have a right to appeal. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005) (holding that court of appeals should review clerk’s record to determine whether trial court’s

certification is accurate). This court must dismiss an appeal “if a certification that shows the

defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d).

On May 20, 2009, we gave appellant notice that the appeal would be dismissed unless an

amended trial court certification showing she has the right to appeal has been made part of the

appellate record by June 19, 2009. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); 37.1; Daniels v. State, 110 S.W.3d

174 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2003, order), disp. on merits, No. 04-03-00176-CR, 2003 WL

21508347 (July 2, 2003, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication). An amended certification

showing appellant has the right to appeal has not been filed. We therefore dismiss this appeal. TEX.

R. APP. P. 25.2(d).

PER CURIAM

Do not publish
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A16A1329. JOHNNIE BROWN v. CLAY COUNTY et al.

Johnnie Brown sought payment of workers’ compensation benefits from both

Bobby Wills d/b/a Wills Construction as his immediate employer and Clay County,

Georgia as hisstatutory employer. The State Board of Workers’Compensation found

Wills liable for payment of benefits, but not Clay County. The superior court

affirmed. Brown and Wills both filed applications for discretionary appeal in this

Court. We denied Brown’s application (see Case No. A16D0207, denied January 29,

2016), but granted Wills’s application (see Case No. A16D0211, granted February

2, 2016). Following our grant of his application, Willsfiled a direct appeal (see Case

No. A16A1328), and Brown then filed this cross-appeal. We lack jurisdiction over

this cross-appeal.

“[A]pplications for leave to appeal a final judgment in cases subject to appeal

under OCGA § 5-6-35 shall be granted only when reversible error appears to exist. 

Thus, in reviewing discretionary applicationsfor appeals, our rulesrequire usto grant

the application when the trial court appears to have committed reversible error. PHF

II Buckhead LLC v. Dinku, 315 Ga. App. 76, 79 (1) (726 SE2d 569) (2012)

(punctuation and footnotes omitted). “[W]hen this Court examines a request for a

discretionary appeal, it acts in an error-correcting mode such that a denial of the

application is on the merits, and the order denying the application is res judicata with

respect to the substance of the requested review.” Elrod v. Sunflower Meadows Dev.,

LLC, 322 Ga. App. 666, 670 (4) (745 SE2d 846) (2013); see also Northwest Social

& Civic Club v. Franklin, 276 Ga. 859, 860 (583 SE2d 858) (2003) (holding that

denial of discretionary appeal acts as res judicata on the merits). Our denial of

April 07, 2016
Brown’s application for discretionary review of the superior court’s order was a

decision on the merits, and Brown “has no right to file a direct appeal and obtain a

second review.” Northwest Social & Civic Club, 276 Ga. at 860 (citation and

punctuation omitted). 

This appeal is therefore DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

04/07/2016
PRIME RETAIL, L.P.

                 EXHIBIT 12.1: COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS
   TO COMBINED FIXED CHARGES AND PREFERRED UNIT DISTRIBUTIONS AND DIVIDENDS

              (AMOUNT IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT FOR RATIO INFORMATION)

                                                       Six Months Ended June 30
                                                       ------------------------
                                                           1998            1997
                                                           ----           ----
Income before minority interests                        $    378        $ 7,681
Loss on sale of real estate                               15,461              -
Interest incurred                                         21,621         20,215
Amortization of capitalized interest                         207            157
Amortization of debt issuance costs                          648          1,230
Amortization of interest rate protection contracts           681            695
Less interest earned on interest rate
   protection contracts                                      (23)           (63)
Less capitalization interest                              (2,778)        (2,003)
                                                       ---------        -------
   Earnings                                               36,195         27,912
                                                       ---------        -------

Interest incurred                                         21,621         20,215
Amortization of debt issuance costs                          648          1,230
Amortization of interest rate protection     
   contracts                                                 681            695
Preferred unit distributions                              11,335          6,186
                                                       ---------        -------
  Combined Fixed Charges and
     Preferred Unit Distributions                         34,285         28,326
                                                       ---------        -------
Excess of Combined Fixed Charges
   and Preferred Unit Distributions
   over Earnings                                                       $   (414)
                                                                      =========
Ratio of Earnings to Combined Fixed
   Charges and Preferred Unit
   Distributions                                            1.06   x        
                                                       ===========
#### DONALD WILLIAM KIMSEY, by Next Friend, BETTY JANE KIMSEY, v. CARL E. REAVES and BERTIE G. REAVES.

(Filed 21 March, 1956.)

Appeal and Error § 42—

Exceptions to disconnected portions of the charge will not be sustained when no prejudicial error is made to appear upon a contextual reading of the charge in the light of the allegations and evidence.

Appeal by plaintiff from *Clarkson, J., at*14 November, 1956 Regular Civil Term, of Mecklenburg. (Former appeal 242 N.C. 721, 89 S.E. 2d 386.)

Civil action to recover for personal injury sustained by plaintiff, about 2:30 p.m. on 27 November, 1953, in collision of an automobile driven by Trady Johnston, Jr., in which plaintiff was riding as a passenger, and an automobile owned by male defendant for family purposes, operated by *feme*defendant, allegedly resulting from actionable negligence of defendants in manner specifically set forth in the complaint.

Defendants, answering, deny such allegations of negligence, and aver that the collision and consequent injury of which plaintiff complains were proximately caused by the negligent operation by Trady Johnston, Jr., of his automobile in manner specifically set forth.

The collision occurred on a four-lane highway, two lanes for northbound traffic, and two for southbound. Both cars involved were traveling north, — that of defendant some distance ahead of and at a lower rate of speed than the Johnston car.

Plaintiff contended that car of defendants was traveling in the right-hand lane, and the Johnston car in the left-hand lane, preparing to pass *691the car of defendants, when the latter was turned suddenly and without signal across the left lane directly in front of the Johnston car, and momentarily came to a stop, causing the collision.

On the other hand, defendants contend that their car had been standing in left lane waiting for southbound traffic to pass, when the Johnston car ran into it from the rear.

Both parties offered evidence tending to support their respective contentions. The case was submitted to the jury upon two issues, the first of which is: “Was the minor plaintiff injured by the negligence of the defendants, as alleged in the complaint?”, and the second as to damages. The jury for its verdict answered the first issue “No,” and to judgment for defendants in accordance therewith plaintiff excepted and appeals to Supreme Court, and assigns error.

*William H. Booe and Henry L. Strickland for Plaintiff, Appellant.*

*John H. Small for Defendants, Appellees.*

Per Curiam.

The only assignments of error, other than formal ones, brought up for consideration are based upon exceptions to various portions of the charge as given to the jury. The charge, as set forth in the case on appeal, covers forty-eight printed pages, and when read disconnectedly there are portions which are not free from error. However, when read contextually in the light of the allegations in the pleadings, and of evidence offered by the respective parties, the Court holds that prejudicial error is not made to appear.

Hence, in the judgment below there is

No error.