J-S82043-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DANIEL R. WITUCKI,

Appellant No. 838 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered April 25, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County

Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-59-CR-0000033-1998

CP-59-CR-0000568-1998

BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2016

Appellant, Daniel R. Witucki, appeals pro se from the denial of his third 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546, as untimely. We affirm.

On June 24, 1998,1a jury convicted Appellant of first degree murder 

for fatally shooting the victim with a rifle. The trial court sentenced 

Appellant to a term of life imprisonment the same day. This Court affirmed 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence on July 15, 1999. (See Commonwealth 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court docket reflects that the verdict was entered on June 26, 

1998. However, the jury announced the verdict in open court on June 24, 

1998. (See N.T. Trial, 6/24/98, at 731-32).
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v. Witucki, 742 A.2d 1154 (Pa. Super. 1999)). The Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on November 24, 

1999. (See Commonwealth v. Witucki, 747 A.2d 368 (Pa. 1999)).

On November 29, 2000, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition pro se. 

Appointed counsel filed an amended petition on June 25, 2001, which the 

court denied on October 5, 2001. This Court affirmed the court’s order on 

December 24, 2002, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for 

allowance of appeal on August 27, 2003. (See Commonwealth v. Witucki, 

817 A.2d 1187 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, 829 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 

2003)).

On May 15, 2012, Appellant filed his second PCRA petition. On 

January 18, 2013, the court appointed PCRA counsel and scheduled a 

hearing, after which it denied the petition. On December 24, 2013, a panel 

of this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s order. (See Commonwealth v. 

Witucki, 93 A.3d 519 (Pa. Super. 2013)). Appellant did not seek review 

with our Supreme Court.

Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the PCRA 

court denied on September 30, 2014. A panel of this Court affirmed the 

PCRA court’s denial on November 10, 2015. (See Commonwealth v. 

Witucki, 134 A.3d 486 (Pa. Super. 2015)).
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On February 25, 2016, Appellant filed the instant petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, which the PCRA court properly treated as a PCRA petition.2 

(See PCRA Court Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 3/31/16, at unnumbered page 

1). On March 31, 2016, the court sent Appellant notice of its intent to 

dismiss the petition as untimely, with none of the timeliness exceptions 

pleaded or proven. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). Appellant responded on April 

11, 2016, and the court dismissed the petition on April 25, 2016. Appellant 

timely appealed.3

Appellant raises two questions for this Court’s review:

A. Whether the [PCRA] court abused its discretion in 

dismissing Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus ad 

subjiciendum where the verdict announced by the court of guilty 

on the first degree murder offense was in error in that the court 

did not have jurisdiction of the matter, where the criminal 

information filed in this action were [sic] fatally defective since if 

[sic] failed to recite all of the essential elements of the offense 

and failed to inform Appellant of the precise charge he was 

required to defend against at trial?

B. Whether Appellant is illegally confined based on the verdict 

and sentence being vitiated and non-existent as a result of the 

fatally defective criminal information and eliminates all questions 

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2

“Unless the PCRA could not provide for a potential remedy, the PCRA 

statute subsumes the writ of habeas corpus.” Taylor, infra, at 465-66 

(citations omitted). Here, Appellant challenged the legality of his sentence 

and the jurisdiction of the trial court. (See Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus, 2/25/16, at 4-5). These claims are cognizable under the PCRA. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9542, 9543(a)(2)(viii). 

3

Pursuant to the PCRA court’s order, Appellant filed a timely statement of 

errors complained of on appeal on July 1, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

The court filed an opinion on July 22, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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of waiver, timeliness[,] and due diligence as bars to the relief 

sought?

(Appellant’s Brief, at 3) (unnecessary capitalization and emphasis omitted).

Before we reach the merits of Appellant’s questions, we must 

determine whether the PCRA court properly determined that his petition was 

untimely, and that therefore it lacked jurisdiction to decide its merits.

We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA 

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA 

level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court 

and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s 

ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal 

error. This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any 

grounds if the record supports it. We grant great deference to 

the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those 

findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we 

afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Further, where 

the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is 

de novo and our scope of review is plenary.

Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 64 A.3d 631 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).

Here, the PCRA court found that Appellant’s instant PCRA petition was 

untimely and that he failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA 

time-bar. (See PCRA Ct. Notice of Intent to Dismiss, at unnumbered page 

2). We agree.

It is well-settled that:

A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be 

filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of 

sentence became final, unless he pleads and proves one of the 

three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A 

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this 

Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration 
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of the time for seeking such review. 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are 

jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not address the merits of 

the issues raised if the petition was not timely filed. The 

timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA petitions, regardless of 

the nature of the individual claims raised therein. The PCRA 

squarely places upon the petitioner the burden of proving an 

untimely petition fits within one of the three exceptions. . . .

Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (case citations 

and footnote omitted).

In the case sub judice, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final 

on February 23, 2000, at the expiration of the time for him to seek review of 

his judgment of sentence in the United States Supreme Court. See U.S. 

Sup.Ct. R. 13, 28 U.S.C.A.; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, he had 

one year from that date, until February 23, 2001, to file a petition for 

collateral relief unless he pleaded and proved that a timing exception 

applied. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Hence, Appellant’s current 

petition, filed on February 25, 2016, is untimely on its face unless he pleads 

and proves one of the statutory exceptions to the time-bar.

Section 9545 of the PCRA provides only three exceptions that allow for 

review of an untimely PCRA petition: (1) the petitioner’s inability to raise a 

claim because of governmental interference; (2) the discovery of previously 

unknown facts that would have supported a claim; and (3) a newlyrecognized constitutional right. See id. When a petition is filed outside the 

one-year time limit, petitioners must plead and prove the applicability of one 

of the three exceptions to the PCRA timing requirements. See 
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Commonwealth v. Johnston, 42 A.3d 1120, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“If 

the petition is determined to be untimely, and no exception has been pled 

and proven, the petition must be dismissed without a hearing because 

Pennsylvania courts are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the 

petition.”) (citation omitted). Also, a PCRA petition invoking one of these 

statutory exceptions must “be filed within [sixty] days of the date the claim 

could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

In the case before us, Appellant acknowledges that his petition is 

untimely. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 11). However, he fails even to attempt 

to plead any of the exceptions to the timeliness requirements. (See id. at 

7-15). Instead, he maintains that his petition is not time-barred because he 

was illegally sentenced and confined. (See id.). This claim fails.

It is well-settled that, “although illegal sentencing issues cannot be 

waived, they still must be presented in a timely PCRA petition.” 

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). Therefore, Appellant’s argument lacks merit.4 Hence, because 

Appellant utterly fails to meet his burden of pleading and proving the 

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4 Moreover, Appellant’s argument that he properly sought relief in a habeas 

corpus petition because he is time-barred by the PCRA, (see Appellant’s 

Brief, at 11), is equally specious. See Taylor, supra at 466 (“Issues that 

are cognizable under the PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and 

cannot be raised in a habeas corpus petition. Phrased differently, a 

defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion 

as a writ of habeas corpus.”) (citations and footnote omitted).
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applicability of a timeliness exception, the PCRA court properly dismissed his 

petition as untimely. See Jones, supra at 16-17; Rykard, supra at 1183; 

Johnston, supra at 1126. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/14/2016