### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT May 7 , 2 004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ _ N o. 03- 1336 6

____ ____ ____ _ D . C. D oc ke t N o. 02- 0020 0- CR -J -2 0 UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee,

ve rs us PATRICE DALIBERTI HURN, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ (M ay 7 , 200 4) Be fo re T JO FL A T , RO N E Y and F A Y , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e:2 I. The def endant, Patrice H urn, w as an em ploy ee of the United States Postal Se rv ic e w ho p ai nte d a s ahob by . S he ha d aw eb sit e adve rt isi ng h er pa int ing services. O n Dec em

ber 4, 2000 , she subm itted a claim for disability

due to carpal tunn el syndrom e that she alleged w as caused by her j ob. A lthou gh her claim wa s ini tia lly a cc ep te d, in May , 200 1, pos ta l i nspe ct or s op en ed an in ve sti ga tio n to exam ine the poss ibilitythat she had comm itted workers’ com pensation fra

ud. In A u g u s t , th e P o s t a l S e rv i c e o f f e r e dh e r an e wjo b t o a c c o mm o d a t e h e r d i s ab i l i ty, but she se nt the m

ale tte r statin g th at

she did not have the phy sic al c ap ac ity to pe rfo rm th e dut ie s o f th atjob , andth atitwas t oo far awa y forhe r to dri ve to . As part of the ongo ing in vestigatio n of Hurn, two undercover postal in sp ect or s s ep arat el y

hi redhe r atdi ffer en t t im es to pa in t p ic tu res of t he ir p et s. T he y pa id h er atot al of appr oxi m at el y

$50 0; s he gave one of

the a ge nts a professionallyprinted receipt. Shortly after each tr ansaction, the postal service se nt h er a“ 1032 F orm ” in c onne ct ionw ithhe r w orke rs ’ c om pe nsatio n be ne fi ts, w hic h r equir ed

he r to r ep ort any

out sid e inc om e she ha d r ec ei ve d. B othti m es , she fai le d t o re po rt h er i nc om e fro m he r pa in ti ng s o n t he form s. O n S ep te m

be r 18, 200 2, af

ed er al gr an d j ur

y ind ic te d H ur

n f or thr ee c ount s of vio la tin g 18 U . S. C. § 19 20, w hic h pr ohi bit s m ak ing f al se state m en ts i n3

co nne ct ionw ithf

ed er al w orke r’ s c om

pe nsatio n pr ogr am s. C ount I w as ba se d on he r le tte r to the pos ta l se rv ic e cl ai m ing she w as una ble to pe rf

orm the dut ie s of

the ne wj ob whic h sh e ha d be enof fe re d. C ount s I I an d I II w er e fo r the tw o 10 32 Fo rm s onw hic h sh e ne gle ct ed to re port he r inc om e fr om pa int ing . H ur

n pl ed not gui lty . S he w as tr ie d be fo re aj ur y , c onvi ct ed

on a ll co unt s, and s en te nc ed to fi ve m on th s’ im

pr is on m en t. Part I I of thi s op ini on c onsi de rs H ur n’ s c ha lle nge to the a de qua cy of the district court’ s jur

y instruction s. P art II I turns to her claim that the district court v i o l a t e dh e r

r i g h tt o af

a i r tr i a l b y e x c l u d i n g ac r i t i c a l d e f e n s e wi tn e s s . F i n a l l y, Part I V c onsid ers the sufficie ncy of the evidence to suppo rt her c onvi ctions un der Co un ts II an d II I. II. Hurn fir st contends that the district court erred in fa iling to instruct th e j ury to d et er m ine w he the r he r fa lse state m en ts a ct ua lly le d to he r re ce ivi ng o ve r $1, 000 in workers’ com

pensation benefits. 18 U. S. C. § 192 0 provid es, “ Whoever know ing ly

and w ill fu lly

. . . m ak es af

al se , f ic tit iou s, or

f ra udul en t st at em en t or re pr es en ta tio n . . . in co nne ct ionw iththe appl ic at ionf or or r ec ei pt o f co m pe nsatio n or

oth er be ne fi t or

paym en t [ unde r a fe de ra l pr ogr am ] sha ll be gui lty of pe rjury.” The st atut e g oe s o n t o s ta te ,4

[O ] n c onvi ct ionthe re of

[ the de fe ndant] sha ll be pun ish ed by af ine unde r thi s ti tle , or

by im pr iso nm en t f

or not m or e than 5 y ears , or

both; but if the am ountof the benefits falsely obtained do es not exceed $1, 000, suc h pe rs on s ha ll be pun ish ed by af ine und er thi s ti tle , or

by im pr iso nm en t f

or not m or e than 1 y ear, or

both. Id . T he m ax im

um se nte nc e to whic h a§ 19 20 d ef en dant i s su

bj ec t de pe nds on the a m ount

of be ne fi ts s he “ fa lse ly

obt ai ne d. ” I n Appr en di v . N ew Je rs ey , 530 U. S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 , 2362-63, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), the Suprem e Court he ld tha t “ [o ] the r than th e fa ct of apr ior c onvi ct ion , any

f ac t tha t i nc re as es the pe na lty f or ac ri m e be y ond the pr es cr ibe d st at uto ry m ax im um m ust be sub m itt ed

to a j ur y , and p ro ve d be y ond a re as ona ble doubt. ” U nde r Appr en di, f or ade fe ndant to b e subj ec t t o a5- y ear rathe r than a1- y ear m ax im um se nte nc e unde r § 19 20, the j ur y m ust de te rm ine that the a m ount of be ne fi ts s he “ fa lse ly

obt ai ne d” e xc ee ds $1,000. In the instant case, the court instructed the jury that it could n ot convi ct unl es s “ the a m ount

of be ne fi ts f

al se ly obt ai ne d [ by

H ur n] e xc ee de d $1 , 000. ” T his in st ru ct io n s at is fie s Ap pr en di ’s du e p ro ces s re qu ire m en ts . H ur n m ai nta ins that this ins tr uc tio n w as ins uf

fi ci en t, how ev er , be ca

use it did not r equir e the j ur

y to fi nd tha t a

c au sa l l ink

e xis te d be tw ee n he r fa lse st at em en t an d h er re cei ptof m or e th an $1 ,00 0 i n wo rk ers ’ co m pe ns at io n b en efi ts . Sh e ar gue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d have a ske d th e j ur y w he the r, “be ca

use of5

th e f al s e s t at emen to r r ep o rt , [ Hu rn ] ob t ai n edm o re th an $ 1 ,0 0 0 i nfe d er al wo rk er ’s co m pe nsatio n f

unds . ” W e ag re e w ithH ur n th at the pla in m eanin g of

the statut e re qui re s th at

the j ur y f ind suc h ac au sa l l ink

f or ade fe ndant t o be sub

j ec t t o th e statut e’ s e nhanc ed

pe na lty r eg im e. W e be lie ve that the ins tr uc tio ns g ive n, how ev er , satis fy

thi s r equir em en t. T he c ourt a ske d th e j ur y w he the r the a m ount

of be ne fi ts “ fa lse ly

obt ai ne d” e xc ee de d $1 , 000. Ar ea sona ble j ur or w oul d be li ke ly to conclud e that a benefit is obtained “ falsely ” if it is obtained as a result of a fraudulent or m isleading s tatem ent or om issio n. T herefor e, the instruction as gi ve n fa irl y

in cl ud es th e cau sa ti on requi rem en t t o wh ic h t he de fen da ntpo in ts . Mor eo ve r, be ca

use the ins tr

uc tio n w as e sse nti al ly

li ft ed f ro m the te xt o f the statut e, it w oul d be a lm ost

im poss ibl e fo r us t o c onc lud e that i t di d no t c onve y the statute’ s requirem ents. Consequently , w e re j ect H urn’ s challenge to the jury in st ru ct io ns . III. H ur n’ s ne xt c la im

is that the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e xc lus ionof A tto rn ey P au l Felser as a defe nse witness violated her constit ution al right to a fair trial. Hurn soug ht t o have F el se r te sti fy that, und er

the “ co nc ur

re nt d iss im ilar em

plo ym en t” doctrine, her benefits would not h ave been re duced if she had truthfullyreported her incom e fr om

painting on the 103 2 Form s. H urn claim s that, beca use her6

benefits would have rem ained the sam e w hether she lied or told the truth abo ut her pa int ing inc om e, she ha d no r ea son to d el ibe rate ly or w ill fu lly de fr au d th e governm ent. H ad the j ury heard this doctrine, it w ouldlikely have concluded that the om iss ionof

thi s in fo rm at ionf

ro m the f orm w as the r es ult

of e ith er an ov er sig ht orm is un de rs ta nd in g o f th e fo rm s. The S ixth Am endm ent to the United States Constituti on gu arantee s de fe ndants the r igh t t o have “ co m pul sor y pr oc es s f or obt ai nin g w itn es se s inhis favor . ” U . S. Co nst . a m en d. V I. I m pli ci t i n th is r igh t— as w el l a s inthe ba sic notio n of “ due process of law” in general, see U .S . C onst. am end V—is the idea that c ri m ina l de fe ndants m ust be a ff or de d th e oppo rt

uni ty to pr es en t e vid en ce in th ei r fav or . See Sp ech t v . Pat te rs on , 38 6 U.S. 6 05 , 61 0, 8 7 S . Ct 1 20 9, 1 21 2, 1 8 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1967) (“ Due proce ss . . . requires that [the defe ndant] . . . have an oppo rt uni ty to be he ar d . . . and t o of fe r ev ide nc e of

his own. ”) ; Unit ed

S ta te s v. Ram os, 933 F . 2d 9 68, 974 ( 11th C ir . 199 1) ( “ Ac ri m ina l de fe ndant’ s r igh t t o pr es en t w itn es se s inhis own de fe nse dur ing ac ri m ina l tri al li es a t the c or e of the fif th an d fo ur te en th am en dm en t g ua ran te es of due pro ces s.”) . Ina sse ssi ng a

de fe ndant’ s c la im s un de r the F if th and S ixth A m en dm en ts t o ca ll w itn es se s inhe r de fe nse , w e en ga ge in a tw o- ste p ana ly sis . W e fi rs t e xam ine whether this righ t wa s actually violated, then turn to whether this error wa sWe do not address the c losely related question of whe n a district cour t’s restric tions on 1 a def endant’ s cross-e x amination of a pr osecution witness violates the Six th Amendment Confrontation Clause. See U .S. Const . amend VI (“I n all criminal prose cutions, the ac cused shall enjoy

the right . . . to be confr onted with the witnesses a g ainst him . . . .”). The modifier

“g ener ally” is used bec ause othe rwise r eleva nt evidencemay

sometimes 2 validly be excluded under

the Rules of Evidenc e. Ne verthe less, the fa ct that a pa rticular r ule of evidenc e re quires the e x clusion of ce rtain evide nce is not dispositive, as particula r applications of a g ener ally

valid rule may

unconstitutionally

deny a def endant his rights under the Compulsory Process or D ue Proce ss Clauses. See Knight v. Dug g er, 863 F .2d 705, 729 (11th Cir. 1988) (n oti ngthat a

c onvic tio n mu st b e re ve rs e d whe re the re is “ e ith e r c le ar e rr or by the tr ia l c ourt s in their evide ntiary

ruling s or compellingrea sons for exceptions to state evidentiar y or proc edura l rules”) . 7 “ harm le ss b ey ond a re as ona ble doubt” und er

Ch ap m anv. Ca lif

or nia , 386 U . S. 18, 24, 87 S . Ct . 824 , 828 , 17 L . E d. 2d 7 05 ( 1967 ). B ec au se w e co nc lud e that the district court did n ot vio late H urn’ s constit ution al right to call witnesses on her be ha lf, we n eedno t re ach th e se co ndst ep of t hi s an al y si s. Adis tr ic t c ourt’ s e xc lus ionof ade fe ndant’ s e vid en ce vio la te s th es e Co m pu ls ory Pro ces s an d Du e Pro ces s g ua ran te es in fou r ci rcu m st an ces . Firs t, a 1 de fe ndant m

ust ge ne ra lly be pe rm itt ed

to intro duc e ev ide nc e dir ec tly pe rt ai nin g to any of the actual e lem ents of the charged offe nse or an aff irm ative defense. 2 Se co nd, ade fe ndant m

ust ge ne ra lly be pe rm itt ed

to intro duc e ev ide nc e pe rt ai nin g to c oll at er al m atte rs that, thr oughar ea sona ble c ha in o f inf

er en ce s, c oul d m ak e the ex ist en ce of

one or m or e of the e le m en ts o f the c harg ed of fe nse or an a ff irm at ive de fe nse m or e or

le ss c er ta in. T hir d, ade fe ndant g en er al ly ha s th e ri ght

to intro duc e ev ide nc e that i s no t i tse lf ti ed to any of the e le m en ts o f a cr im e orIt is easier f or a de fenda

nt to obtain a reve rsal on dire ct appe al on the basis of 3 improperly

excluded evidenc e than it is for a defe ndant to obtain a wr it of habea s corpus on the same ground. “It is fundamental that fe dera l courts possess only limit ed author ity

to consider state evide ntiary

ruling s in a habe as proc eedingby a state pr isoner. Our

inquiry must be limi ted to determiningwhether

the evidentiar

y rulingwas so pre

judicial . . . as to deny

fundame ntal fairne ss to the criminal trial, thus violating the due proce ss clause.” Phill ips v. W ainwright, 624 F.2d 585, 588 ( 5th Cir. 1980) (quotation marks and c itation omit ted). 8 af fi rm at ive de fe nse , but

that c oul d have asub stanti al im pa ct on the c re dib ili ty

of anim portant g ove rn m en t w itn es s. F ina lly , ade fe ndant m ust ge ne ra lly be pe rm itt ed to intro duc e ev ide nc e that, w hil e not dir ec tly or ind ir ec tly

r el ev an t t o any of the elem ents of the charged events, nevertheless tends to place the story pr es en te d by

the pr ose cu tio n inasig nif ic an tly dif fe re nt l igh t, suc h th at

a re as ona ble j ur y m igh t r ec ei ve it

dif fe re ntl y . W e re vie we ac h of the se standard s in tur n. 3 A. T he m ost obv iou s c om

pone nt o f a de fe ndant’ s F if th and S ixth A m en dm en t right to present evid ence in his favor is to present evidence that has a direct be ar ing on a

f orm al e le m en t of

the c harg ed

of fe nse . “ Ade fe ndant’ s r igh t t o af ai r tr ia l i s vi olate d whe n th e ev ide nc e ex cl ude d is m at er ia l i n th e se nse of ac ru ci al , cr iti ca l, hig hly

sig nif ic an t f ac tor . ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ram os, 933 F . 2d 9 68, 974 (1 1thCi r. 199 1) ; se e al so W as hin gto n v. T ex as , 388 U . S. 14, 23, 87 S . Ct . 192 0, 1925 , 18 L . E d. 2d 1 019 (1 967) ( “ [T ] he pe tit ion er in thi s c as e w as de nie d hi s r igh tDe c isi on s o f t he F if th C ir c uit ha nd e d d own p ri or

to S e pte mbe r 3 0, 19 81 , a re bin din gin 1 the Eleve nth Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 ( 11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) . 9 to h av e co m

pul sor y pr oc es s f or obt ai nin g w itn es se s inhis f av or be ca use the S ta te ar bitrari ly de nie d hi m

the r igh t t o pu t onthe stand a w itn es s . . . w hose te sti m ony would have been relevant and m aterial to the defe nse.”) . This rea sonin g applies w ithe qua l f

or ce to dir ec tly

pr ovi ng the e xis te nc e of

an e le m en t of

an a ff irm at ive de fe nse . S ee Bo ykin s v. W ai nw ri ght , 737 F . 2d 1 539, 154 5 ( 11th C ir . 198 4) (h old ing that e xpe rt

te sti m ony

dir ec tly r el ev an t t o e sta

bli shi ng an in sanity

de fe nse

“ cl earl y m ee ts the c onst itutio na l st an dard of m at er ia lity

in the se nse of

a‘ cr uc ia l, cr iti ca l, hig hly

sig nif ic an t f ac tor . ’ ”) ; se e al so Unit ed S ta te s v. T ill , 609 F . 2d 2 28, 229 (5th Cir. 1980 ) (re versing conv iction where e vidence was e xcluded th at w as 1

“ hig hly r el ev an t and m at er ia l t o th e en tr ap m en t de fe nse ”) ; Unit ed S ta te s v. H er re ra , 600 F . 2d 5 02, 505 ( 5thCi r. 197 9) ( re ve rs ing dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e xc lus ionof evidence that the defendant had been threatened because such evidence w as dir ec tly r el ev an t t o th e de fe ndant’ s a ff irm at ive de fe nse of

dur es s) . I n a

ppl y ing thi s ru le , w e have r ec ogni ze d th at “ if the re is sim

ply no o the r pr ac tic al m eans t o pr ove the poin t, then the need fa ctor points stronglytowar d rece ipt of such evid ence. ” U nit ed S ta te s v. Co he n, 888 F . 2d 7 70, 776 ( 11th C ir . 198 9) ( quot at ion s and ci ta ti on om it te d) .10

H ur n is una ble to ar tic ulate ac onst itutio na l vi olatio n un de r thi s th eo ry . S he co nte nds that F el se r w as goi ng t o te sti fy about he r co nti nue d e lig ibi lity

f or be ne fi ts unde r the “ co nc ur re nt d iss im ilar em

plo ym en t” doc tr ine . N one of the el em en ts o f 18 U . S. C. § 19 20 d ir ec tly a ddr es s ade fe ndant’ s c ont inu ed e lig ibi lity fo r be ne fi ts. Mo re ove r, H ur n di d no t of

fe r ana ff irm at ive de fe nse to w hic h th is testim ony would be directly

m aterial. Consequently , H urn m ust advance a di ffer en t t he ory

un de r whi ch th e co ur t wro ng fu ll y ex cl ud edth is tes ti m on y . B. Ade fe ndant a lso ha s th e ri ght to intro duc e ev ide nc e that i s no t di re ct ly re le vant t o an e le m en t of the of fe nse , but that m ak es the e xis te nc e or non existence of som e collatera l m atter som ew hat m ore or less likely , where that co llate ra l m atte r be ar s asuf fi ci en tly c los e re la tio nshi p to an e le m en t of the of fe nse . I n U nit ed

S ta te s v. S he ff

ie ld, 992 F . 2d 1 164 (1 1thCi r. 199 3) , f or exam ple, the def

endant was an A ir Forc e em ploy ee convicted of em

bezzling U. S. Governm ent property

because he order ed his sub ordinates to produce fishing lures for his personal use. H e attem pted to dem onstrate that this was part of a le git im at e, auth or iz ed

c ust om on the ba se of

m ak ing r et ir em en t pr es en ts f or hig hranking civili an and m ilitary officials. T he district court excluded all evidence c o n c e rn i n g th e e x i s t e n c e o f s u c h ac u s t o m.11

E vid en ce pr ovi ng tha t su chac ust om e xis te d w as not

dir ec tly r el ev an t t o any of the e le m en ts o f em

be zz le m en t. N ev er

the le ss, the e xis te nc e of

the c ust om

w as a co ll at eral m at te r th atwas i ts el f rel ev an t t o t he m en s re a el em en t o f th e o ffen se . T h a ti s , i f th e d e f e n d an tw a s a c t i n g p u r s u an tt o ane s t ab l i s h e d , au th o r i z e dc u s t o m, the n he w as not

int en tio na lly

doi ng anythi ng wro ng. I d. a t 11 70 ( “ E vid en ce of the gif t- m ak ing c ust om

w as r el ev an t t o [ the de fe ndant’ s] state of m ind w he n he or de re d th e pr oduc tio n of f ish ing lur e m old s. ”) . C onse que ntl y , e xc lus ionof the ev ide nc e vio la te d th e de fe ndant’ s r igh ts. I d. Si m ilarl y , in U nit ed

S ta te s v. L an kf

or d, 955 F . 2d 1 545 (1 1thCi r. 199 2) , the defendant was c onvi cted of filing false tax re turns. W e re versed, how ever, be ca use the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d pr ev en te d ade fe nse e xpe rt f ro m te sti fy ing that the de fe ndant’ s be lie f in the le ga lity of his a ct s w as r ea sona

ble . T o be c onvi ct ed

of filing false tax returns, the governm ent had to prov e that the defendant acted

“ wil lfu l[l y ];” th atis , th athe kn ew he was b reak in g t he law. Id . at 1 55 0. W e re cognized, however , that it w ouldbe difficult if not im poss ible for a de fen da ntto in tro du ce d ire ctev id en ce s pe ci fic al ly abo uthi s m en ta l s ta te . Co nse que ntl y , he ha d to f oc us o n pr ovi din g c ir cum stanti al e vid en ce c onc er nin g collateral m atters, such as the reasonableness of his beliefs, fr om which the j ury could in fer what his m ental state w as. The m ore untenable his belief that he was12

ac tin g le ga lly , the le ss l ike ly he a ct ua lly he ld i t. I d. a t 15 50- 51. B ec au se pr oof dem onstrating the “ reasonableness” of the defendant’ s beliefs wa s therefore ind ir ec tly r el ev an t t o an a ct

ua l e le m en t of

the of fe nse ( “ w ill fu lne ss” ) thr ougha shor t c ha in o f inf

er en tia l r ea soni ng, the de fe ndant h ad the c onst itutio na l r igh t t o i n tr o du c e i t . I d . a t1 5 5 1 ( “B y d i s a l l o w i n g e x p e rt t e s t i mo n y o nth e g i f

t/ i n c o me issue, the trial court deprived [the def endant] of evidence showing that his asserted state of m ind was rea sonable. A ccordingly , w e hold that th e exclusion of expert te st im on y on th is is su e was erro r.”). A def endant also has th e constituti onal right un der this theory to introdu ce evidence concerning a collatera l m atter where the governm ent attem pts to u se that co llate ra l m atte r as the ba sis f or se curi ng a

c onvi ct ion . I n U nit ed

S ta te s v. W or d, 129 F.3d 120 9 (11th Cir. 1997), f or exam ple, the governm ent had introduced evidence that the defendant and her husbandhad a close re lationsh ip (a collatera l m atte r) . I t i nvi te d th e j ur y to inf er , f ro m the e xis te nc e of

thi s c los e re la tio nshi p, that the defendant’ s husb and had shared with her inform ation abou t his crim inal ac tiv iti es , c au sin g he r to h av e ac tua l kn ow le dge about the m ( ane le m en t of

the of fe nse w ithw hic h sh e w as c harg ed ). I d. a t 12 12. T he de fe ndant w ish ed to re but that inference by

testify ing th at her husband “ phy sically and em otion ally

abused he r an d . . . that [ he ] did

not share m uc h in fo rm at ionw ithhe r. ” I d. W e he ld,13

“ W ith the dis trict court’ s exclusion of the proposed testim ony of abuse (or sim ilar ev ide nc e ab out

ale ss- than- sto ry

book r el at ion shi p) [ the de fe ndant] ha d no m eans to d ef en d a ga ins t the gov er

nm en t’ s c ont en tio ns; and the j ur y did not he ar the w hol e sto ry

about the r el at ion shi p. ” I d. W e co nc lud ed : D ur ing tr ia l, the gov er

nm en t w as able to ar gue inf er en ce s f av or ab le to th e p ro se cu ti on ba se d upo n t he romanti c rel at io ns hi p b et ween th e two co -d ef en dants w hil e the de fe ndant . . . w as pr ohi bit ed f ro m intro duc ing e vid en ce that t old adif fe re nt s tor

y about the r el at ion shi p an d t ha t m ig htha ve co nt rad ic te d o r un de rcu t t ho se in fere nc es . Id. at 1213 . Consequent ly , w e vacate d the convictio n and ordered a newtrial ba se d o n t he ex cl us io n o f ev id en ce co nc ern in g t hi s co ll at eral m at te r. Conversely , where the proff ered e vidence does no t bear a logical relationship to an elem ent of the offense or an affir m ative defense, whether

direct or indirect, a

defendant has no right to introduce that evidence and a district court m ay pr ope rl y e xc lud e it. S ee Ram os, 933 F . 2d 9 68, 974 ( 11th C ir . 199 1) (uphold ing di strict court’ s refusal to allow def endant to in troduce evidence of a co nve rs at ionbe tw ee n ac onf ide nti al inf

orm an t and a lle ge dly

c or ru pt D E Aa ge nts in N ewY ork be ca

use that t es tim ony

“ did not li nk any im pr opr ie tie s be tw ee n th e [in fo rm an t] andNew YorkDEA agen ts to th e [d efen da nt ] orth e Mi am i DEA agents” who conducted the inv estigation of the defendant). Moreover, a district co urt m ay e xc lud e ev ide nc e w he re the r el at ion shi p be tw ee n th e ev ide nc e an d th e14

el em en t o f th e o ffen se or a ffi rm at iv e d efen se at i ss ue is si m pl y to o a tt en ua te d. T ha t i s, the re c om es apoi nt— an d adis tr ic t c ourt i s pe rh ap s inthe be st p osi tio n to j udge thi s—whe n th e ch ai n of inf er en ce s li nki ng e vid en ce and the le ga lly r el ev an t poi nt t o be pr ove n is sim ply too lon g, dub iou s, or

a tte nuate d to r equir e that the ev ide nc e be intro duc ed . S ee U nit ed S ta te s v. G onz al ez , 71 F . 3d 8 19, 836 ( 11th Ci r. 199 6) ( upho ldi ng d istri ct c ourt’ s de ci sio n to e xc lud e te sti m ony of an a cc ide nt reconstruction expert because “ whether appellant ram m ed the officer s’ car , or vice ve rs a, w as sim

ply not a de quate ly

m at er ia l t o th e cr im es f

or w hic h a ppe llant s too d ch arg edat t ria l” ). Hurn is unable to prevail under this th eory because there is a crucia l break in her proposed chain o f re asoning . The e xistence of the “ concurrent dissim ilar em plo ym en t” doc tr ine ( a co llate ra l m atte r) c oul d on ly have r ed uc ed he r m oti ve to lie w he n f

ill ing out the doc um en ts ( a fa ct or

w hic h go es to the m en s r ea e le m en t of the offense) if

she knew about it. Hurn does no t argue on appeal that she had consult ed with Fe lser prior to filling out the form s, and did not offer any other evidence to sugg est that she was aware of the doctrine. Indeed, if it w ouldtake an expert’ s testim ony

to m ake a j ury

aw are of the “ concurrent dissim ilar em plo ym en t” doc tr ine , it

is hig hly unl ike ly that sh e kne wof

it a t the ti m e she fi lle d ou t the f

orm s. C onse que ntl y , she f ai le d to of

fe r the vit al li nk i n th e ch ai n15

that would have m ade that collateral m atter r elevant to an elem ent of the charged de fen se . C. A third fa cet of the def

endant’ s right to p resent evidence is to introdu ce ev ide nc e that, w hil e not

dir ec tly or ind ir ec tly

r el ev an t t o an e le m en t of an of fe nse oraffi rm at iv e d efen se , att ack s t he cred ib il it y of i m po rta ntgo ve rn m en t wi tn es se s. In United State s v. D avis, for exam ple, w e re versed a conviction because the trial court had excluded eviden ce, wher e [t] he purpose of the proffere d evidence wa s to dis credit the key gove rn m en t w itn es s . . . w ith out whom the gov er

nm en t w oul d have ha d no c as e ag ai nst

[ the de fe ndant] . . . . N o othe r im pe ac hm en t ev ide nc e, e xc ep t f

or [ the ke y gov er nm en t w itn es s’ ] a dm iss ionof pr ior fe lony c onvi ct ion s and the c ir cum stanc es sur ro undi ng h is c oope ratio n with the prosecution, wa s adm itted. . . . T he excluded evidence here would have gone further than charac ter evidence. T he two w itnesses w oul d have te sti fi ed

to [the w itn es s’ ] r ep utatio n f or la ck ing tr

uthand ve ra ci ty and tha t the y

w oul d no t be lie ve him

und er oa th. 639 F. 2d 2 39, 244 -4 5 ( 5thCi r. 198 1) . S im ilarl y , in Mi lls v. E ste lle , 552 F . 2d 1 19, 122 (5 th C ir . 197 7) , w e he ld tha t a c ourt sh oul d have pe rm itt ed the de fe ndant t o intro duc ed

c er ta in i m pe ac hm en t e vid en ce be ca use it “ co uld have le d th e j ur

y to dra w a ni n fe re n ce o f b i as ” c o n ce rn i n g th e g o v ern m en t ’s wi tn es s . B ec au s e H u rn ’s pr of fe re d te sti m ony

did not c onc er n th e cr ed ibi lity

of agov er nm en t w itn es s, thi s do ct rin e is in ap pl ic ab le .16 D. Insom e ca se s, the gov er

nm en t’ s se le ct ive pr es en ta tio n of e nti re ly tr uth fu l ev ide nc e can c as t a

de fe ndant i n an in ac curate , unf av or ab le li ght , or

m ak e en tir el y le git im at e, nor

m al , or a cc ep te d a ct s a

ppe ar unu sua l or

sus pic iou s. I n th es e situatio ns, the defendant has the right to introd uce additional evid ence to dispel thi s un j ust if ie d ta int , e ve n if

that e vid en ce doe s no t di re ct ly or ind ir ec tly

be ar on a pa rti cu la r el em en t o f an off en se . Fo r ex am ple , in U nit ed

S ta te s v. T odd, 108 F . 3d 1 329 (1 1thCi r. 199 7) , the de fen da ntwas c on vi ct edof e m be zzl in g fr om

an em pl oyee ret ire m en t fu ndpl an . The governm ent dem onstrated that the defendant, along with his fam ily m em bers w ho w orke d f

or the c om pany , r ec ei ve d e xtr em el y hig h sa lari es . I t r el ie d onthi s ev ide nc e to s howthat the de fe ndant “ w as m oti va te d by gr ee d and s el fi shne ss t o f r au du l e n t l y d e p r i v e th e e mp l o ye e s o f th e P l an ’s f

u n d s . ” I d . a t1 3 3 3 . Te c h n i c a l l y, a de fe ndant’ s m oti ve s or

c hara ct er are ir re le vant t o aj ur

y ’ s de te rm inatio ns; ne ve rth el es s, as a pr act ic al m at te r, th ey can no t h el p b utco lo r th e jury’ s v erd ic t. Be ca use the gov er

nm en t ha d c al le d th es e co nsi de ratio ns i nto que sti on thr oughthe use of accurate, y et nonetheless po tentially m isleading evid ence, the defendant had the r igh t t o “ co m

ple te the pic tur e. ” W e re ve rs ed the de fe ndant’ s c onvi ct ion be ca use if he ha d be enpe rm itt ed

“ to i ntr oduc e ev ide nc e of larg e em plo y ee s’17

sa lari es and b en ef

its [ fo r al l e m

plo y ee s, not

j ust his f am ily m em be rs ] , the ev ide nc e . . . c oul d have put qui te adif

fe re nt s pinon the que sti on o f [the defendant’ s] intent and actions .” Id. at 1324. T his rightis also im plicated wher e the governm ent’ s evidence, in itself, tends to m ake the defendant’ s acts appear unus ua l or

sus pic iou s, w he n inf

ac t the y are part of anor m al , e ve n a cc ep te d, routine. Se e Shef

field, 992 F. 2d at 117 0 (“ W ithou t this evid ence of the gift m ak ing c ust om , pr oduc tio n of f ish ing lur e m old s onaU . S. A ir F or ce Ba se m

ust ha ve see m edto th e jury lik e th e o ddba ll pro ject o f a ren eg ad e fi sh erm an . . . . [T ] his de fe ndant s houl d be a llo w ed to pr es en t the gif

t- m ak ing e vid en ce to put his act io ns in co nt ex t . . . .”). T he r igh t t o pl ac e the gov er nm en t’ s e vid en ce in co nte xt i s no t un lim ite d, however. In U nited States v. F unches, w e af firm ed a conviction desp ite the fac t that so m e co nte xtu al e vid en ce w as e xc lud ed be ca use “ [h ] ad

the j ur y he ar d [ the ex cl ude d e vid en ce ] , the j ur y non ethe le ss w oul d have la ck ed ar ea son in l awnot

to convict.” 135 F. 3d 14 05, 1408 (11t h Cir. 1998 ). Consequently , e vidence intro duc ed

to “ co m ple te ” a pot en tia lly

m isl ea din g st or

y of fe re d by the gov er

nm en t is p er tin en t on ly

w he n it m igh t c olo r a j ur

y ’ s a sse ssm en t of

the m at er ia l f

ac ts o f th e cas e.18

Inthi s c as e, F el se r’ s te sti m ony w as not ne ce ssary

to co rr ec t any

m isl ea din g im pr es si on s t ha t m ay

ha ve be en crea te d b y

th e g ov ern m en t’s ev id en ce. As discuss ed ear lier, because neither F elser nor any one else can testify that Hurn w as aw ar e of thi s do ctri ne , his te sti m ony c annot be w ove n in to a

larg er de fe nse narr at ive . Mo re ove r, non e of the gov er

nm en t’ s e vid en ce f

oc use d onw he the r or not Hurn’ s benefits would actually have been reduced had she truthfully reported he r inc om e fr om

pa int ing . C onse que ntl y , she c annot arg ue that the gov er

nm en t was un fai rly att em

pt in g t o u se th is co ll at eral m at te r to he r di sa dv an ta ge . In short, there is no th eory under which H urn’ s constit ution al rights wer e vio la te d by

the e xc lus ionof

thi s e vid en ce . F ur

the r unde rm ini ng H ur

n’ s arg um en t on this poi nt i s th e fa ct

that the dis tr ic t c ourt of

fe re d to ins tr

uc t the j ur

y on the

“ concurrent dissim ilar em ploym ent” doctrine as a m atter of law, but Hurn de cl ine d. S inc e thi s th eo ry w as the onl y

m atte r to whic h F el se r w as goi ng t o te sti fy , the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s of fe r pr ec lud ed

any ne ed f or him to be c al le d a s a w itn es s. B y

m ak ing thi s of

fe r, the dis tr ic t c ourt r en de re d any e rr or in ex cl udi ng Fe lse r ir re le vant. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. Bu ck le y , 586 F . 2d 4 98, 503 ( 5thCi r. 197 8) (r ej ec tin g S ixth A m en dm en t c ha lle nge to dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e xc lus ionof c er ta in te sti m ony due to la ck

of pr ej udi ce be ca

use oth er e vid en ce c onc er

nin g th ose f

ac ts w as br ough t be fo re the j ur y );Ha d th is b e e n a be nc h tr ia l, a

mot ion fo r a c qu itt a l w ou ld n ot h ave be e n n e c e ssa ry to 4 pr e se rv e Hurn ’s “ su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e ” argume nt f or a pp e a l. S e e Ha ll v . Unit e d St ate s, 286 F.2d 676, 677 ( 5th Cir. 1960) (“[T]here ca n be little or no nee d for a formal motion for a judgme nt of ac quittal in a criminal ca se tried to a c ourt without a jury upon the def

endant’ s plea of not guilty . The plea

of not guilty

asks the cour

t for a judgment of ac quittal . . . .”).

19 IV. T he de fe ndant’ s f

ina l c la im is that the e vid en ce w as not suf fi ci en t t o pr ove Counts II and III of the indictm ent. T hese counts claim ed that Hurn had perj ured he rs el f by f ai lin g to r ep ort i nc om e fr om a“busi ne ss e nte rp ri se ” on the 103 2 Fo rm s. H ur

n arg ue s onappe al that pa int ing w as ahob by ; the f ac t tha t sh e oc ca sio na lly

sol d af ewpa int ing s in fo rm al ly

f or af ewhun dr ed

dol lars did

not m ak e he r ar

t an e nte rp ri se . W e ar e qui te sy m pa the tic to thi s arg um en t, and m igh t be inclined to reverse her c onvi ctions on these counts had th is argum ent been ra ise d a t tri al . A s th e gove rn m en t po int s ou t i n it s br ie f, how ev er , H ur n f ai le d to m ov e attri al fora di rect edve rd ic t o f acq ui tt al on th is ba si s. Co ns eque nt ly, we re vie wthi s c onvi ct iononl y f or pla in e rr or . S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. H une rl ac h, 197 F. 3d 1 059, 106 8 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) ( “ Si nc e the r ec or d do es not sho wthat Appe llant ra ise d th is i ssu e to the dis tr ic t c ourt, our r ev ie wof

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to deny the m otion for j udgm ent of acquittal on that basis is onlyfor ‘ plain error. ’ ”). 420

T o ob ta in a

r ev er sa l un de r the pla in e rr or standard , ade fe ndant m

ust dem onstrate, am ong o ther things , not only that the error

violated her subs tantial ri ght s ( w hic h th is e rr or

arg uably did ), but that i t “ se ri ousl y

a ff ec t[ s] the f

ai rn es s, int eg ri ty or pub lic r ep utatio n of

j udi ci al pr oc ee din gs. ” U nit ed S ta te s v. O lano, 507 U . S. 725 , 732 , 113 S . Ct . 177 0, 177 6, 123 L . E d. 2d 5 08 ( 1993 ) (quot at ionm ar ks and citation om itted; alteration in origi nal). While the indi ctm ent alleged specifically

that she lied abouther incom e fr om “busin ess enterprises,” the form sh e fi ll edou t ac tu al ly ask edab ou t i nc om e fro m a m uc h b ro ad er ra ng e o f so ur ces . A r easonable j ury

would have been fully

j ustified in con cluding that Hurn af fi rm at ive ly

li ed on h er f orm s, thu s vi olatin g § 1 920, e ve n th oughhe r co nduc t di d not actually

fall w ithin the narrowconfines of the indictm ent. T he form s asked w he the r she w as “ se lf

-e m plo y ed or inv olv ed in any bus ine ss e nte rp ri se in the pa st 15 m onth s.” Moreover, they expressly

directed her to “ [r] eport AL L se lfem ploym ent or involv em ent in bus iness enterprises.” The f orm s further specifie d that the em

ploym ent to which they

we re r efer

ring “ include[d] but [was] not lim ited to . . . pr ovi din g se rv ic es in ex ch an ge f or m one y , goo ds, or

oth er se rv ic es . T he kin ds o f se rv ic es w hic h y ou m ust r ep ort i nc lud e . . . pa int ing , c ontra ct ing , c hil d care , odd j obs, etc. ” Finally , the f orm s specifically

stated, “ Even if y our activities we re p ar t -t i m e o r i n t erm i t t en t , you m u s tre p o rtth em.” Up h o l d i n g Hu rn ’s21

co nvi ct ionf

or ly ing on this f

orm is hard ly unf ai r; to the c ontrary , a llo w ing he r to es cap e p un is hm en t o n am in ortec hn ic al it y in th e in di ct m en t wo ul d b e u nju st . The def endant’ s convictio ns are AFFIR MED.