### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A pr il 24, 200 7 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . THOMAS HARVIL LE, J R. Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty No. S49,750 P hylli s H. Miller, Judge

No. E2005-02108-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Fe bruary 15, 2008

I n October

2004, a Sullivan County

g rand jury

indicted the def

endant, Thoma s Harville, J r., on one count of violating his status as a habitual motor vehicle offe nder, a Class E felony . Followinga June 2005 jury trial in Sull ivan County

Criminal Court, the defenda nt was convic ted on t he sol e count of the ind ic tme nt a

nd se nte nc e d to tw o y e ars a s a Rang e I , st and ard

of fe nd e r, wi th t

he de fe nd ant t o serve eig hty

day s in jail and the balanc e of his sentenc e on community corr ections. The de fenda nt appea ls, alleg ing that the trial court: (1) improperly admitted the pre liminary hear ing te stimony

of
a po lic e of fi c e r whe n th e state fa ile d to sh owtha t the wi tne ss w a s unava ila ble a t tr ia l; ( 2) imp ro pe rl y deter mined that the state c ould impeach the def en d an t with a prior fe lony conviction for e vading
arr est; and (3) improperly

sentenc ed the de fenda

nt. After revie wing the record, we conc lude that the defe ndant has wa ived the first issue on appea l a nd that the trial court committed no err or as to the other two issues. Ac cording ly , we a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt Affir m e d.

D. K EL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., joined. J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J., f ile d a se pa ra te op ini on

c on c ur ri ngin p art

and dis se nti ngin p art

. Geor g e Todd Ea st, Kingspor t, Tennesse e, for

the appe llant, Thomas Har ville, J r. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a

nd Reporte r; J en n ifer L . Ble dsoe, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; H. Gr eele y

Wells, J r., District Attorney Gene ral; Will iam Har

per, Assistant Dist rict Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION
At trial, Fr itz Fa llin testi fied that on De ce m b er 27, 2003, he was drivingon Stone Drive toward Ly

nn Gar den Dr ive in King sport, Ten n es s ee

. Around 11:00 p.m., he notice d a tan truc k-2-

sp e e din g and

tr ave lin g in t

he wr on g dir e c tio n on L y

nn Ga rd e n Dr ive

. F a lli n co nta c te d poli c e on his cellular phone and turned around to f ollow the speedingtruck. The truck turne d into a Shell ga soline statio n, and the tr

uc k’ s d ri ve r t he n e xite d th e ve hic le . T he po lic e arr ive d o n th e sc e ne a sh or t ti me later.

Ov e r t

he de fe nd ant’ s o bje c tio n, the tr ans c ri pt o f t he pr e lim ina

ry he a ri ngwa s e nte re d into evidenc e as the testimony of Off icer Matt Cousins of the Kingspor t Poli ce D epar

tment beca

use the trial court de termined that Of fice r Cousins was unava ilable at trial due to his being on active military duty in I raq. A t the preliminary hear ing, Offic er Cousins testified that he responde d to the call at the She ll s tatio n. Whe n O ff

ic e r Cou sin s arr ive d in the are a of L y nn Ga rd e n D ri ve and

Vi rg ini a Str e e t, he saw a tan Chevrolet truck turning rig ht onto Virg inia Street fr om L y nn Gar den Dr ive. He the n saw the truc k enter

the par king lot of a

Shell station. After

the truck pulled into a pa

rking space , the defe ndant exited the driver’ s side and wa lked into the store. Offi ce r Cousins questioned both the defe ndant and a

passeng er in the ve hicle. The defe ndant denied dr iving the truck, and the pa sseng er did not tell Officer

Cousins t hat the def

endant ha d been dr iving the tr uck.

Cor po ra l T od d H arr iso n w iththe Ki ng sp or t Po lic e De pa

rtme nt t e sti fied th at he a lso responde d to the call at the S hell station the evening of Dec ember 27, 2003. When he ar rived at the
sc e ne , h e ob se rv e d O ff

ic e r C ou sin s st and ingoutsi de a tan tr uc k, ta lki ngwi th t

he de fe nd ant. Corporal Ha

rrison spoke br iefly

with Fallin about what he had se en that night. Corpor al Har rison the n r e lay e d th is i nf

or matio n to Of

fi c e r C ou sin s. Ray mond Wi nters, the Sul livan County Clerk of Circuit Court, testified that on F ebrua ry 28, 1994, a judg ment was e ntere d decla ring the def

endant to be a

habitual motor vehicle offe nder.

Rick Br ooks, testify i n g for the de fenda nt, said that he owne d the truck in que stion. He testified that on the eve ning of Dec embe r 2 7 , he and the defe ndant wer e “ha ng ing out” at the defe ndant’s house, with the defe ndant drinking three beer s during the evening

. The defe ndant then
rec eived a

call fr om his wife, askingthat the two men pick he r up fr om her parents’ house. The two men then lef

t the defe ndant’s house. Brooks testified that althoug h the defendant wanted t o drive the truck, he actua lly

drove the t ruck that evening . Br ooks said that he made a wr ong turn at the intersec tion of L y

nn Gar den Dr ive and Stone Dr ive which resulted in the truck traveling in the wrong direc tion on L y

nn Gar den Drive. Br ooks then turned a round and spe d up to at least six ty -five miles pe r h our b e c a

us e he wa nte d to se e ho w f

a st the tr uc k w ou ld ru n. Broo ks the n s top pe d at a She ll statio n b e c a

us e the de fe nd ant wan ted s ome c ig are tte s. Ac c or din g to B ro ok s, he did no t turn on to Virg inia Street to g et to t h e gas o l i n e station. Once Br ooks pulled into the parking lot, he let the defe ndant out of his truck on the driver’ s side beca use the pa sseng er- side door wa s difficult to open. Br ooks testified t h at h e told more than one of the offic ers, includingOffic er Cousins, that he wa s driving the truck.

At the conc lusion of t he case, the jury convicted the defe ndant. The trial court sente nced the de fe nd ant t o tw o y e ars o n com mun ity c or re c tio ns , w iththe de fe nd ant t o s e rv e e ig hty da y s in ja il. The trial c ourt later a

mended the defe ndant’s sente nces, g rantingthe def endant g ood time cre dit for-3-

twenty -five pe rce nt of the eig hty day s. This appea l follows.

A N A LY S IS

Un av ail ab le W itn ess

Th e d ef en dant first ar g ues that the trial c ourt improperly admitted the pre liminary hear ing testimony of Off icer Cousins at trial because the s t at e fa i led to establish that the witness was unavailable . The state c ounters that the r ecor d does not suppor t the defe ndant’s claim and that the preliminary

hear ing tr anscr ipt was proper ly admitted into evidence . T he def endant did not object to the admission of the transc ript on the basis that the s tate did not prove that Of fice r Cousins was
un ava ila ble . A s a re su lt, we c on c lud e that th e de fe nd ant h a s w a ive d th e iss ue on a pp e a l.

The Te nnessee Rules of Evidence define hear say as “a statement, ot her than one made by the decla rant while testify ing at the t rial or hear ing, offer ed in evidenc e to prove the truth of the matter
a sse rt e d. ” Te nn . R. Ev id. 80 1( c ). He ars ay is n ot a dmi ssi ble un le ss an e xce pti on to t he he ars ay

ru le applies. Tenn. R. Evid. 802.

On e su c h e xce pti on

to t he he ars ay ru le s is the “ fo rm e r te sti mony ” e xce pti on

. Ac c or din g to the Rul e s o f E vid e nc e , the for mer te sti mony of a de c lara nt who is unava ila

ble a s a wi tne ss i s ad m i s s i ble. Tenn. R. Evid. 804. Unavailability can be satisfied in sever al way s, including if the decla rant “is absent from the hear ing and the proponent of a statement has be en unable to procure the decla rant’s attendanc e by proce ss.” Tenn. R. Evid. 804(a) (5). As rele vant to this case, the Rules of Evidenc e def

ine forme r testimony

as “[t] estimony

g iven as a

witness at another

hear in g o f t he
same or dif fe re nt p ro ceedi ng

. . . if

the pa rt y a g a ins t w ho m th e te sti mony is n owof

fe re d h a d b oth an opportunity

and a similar motive to deve l o p t h e testimony by direc t, cross, or r edire ct examination.” Tenn. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) . A pre liminary hear ing transcr ipt “ is pr ecise ly the ty pe of former testimony

contemplated unde r [R u l e 8 0 4 (b )(1) ].” St ate v. Micha el Dwa y ne Hatfield, No. 03C01-9307-CR-00233, 1994 WL 102072, at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App., at K nox ville, Ma

r. 29, 1994); see Te nn. R. Evid. 804(b)(1), A dvisory Comm’n Cm ts.

A d d i t i o n a l l y , b o t ht h e S i x t hA m e n dm e n tt o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i tu t i o nan d

art i c l e I,
se c tio n 9 of the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion g ive the de fe nd ant t

he ri g ht t o c on fr on t a ll w itn e sse s a g a ins t him. Rega

rding the Confrontation Clause, the Te nnessee Supreme Court has de termined:

When the prosec ution seeks to introduce a dec lara nt’s out-of-c ourt statement, and a defe ndant ra ises a Confrontation Cl ause obje ction, the initial det er m i n ati on under Crawf ord[v. W ashing ton, 541 U .S. 36, 68, 124 S. C t. 1354, 1374 (2004)] is whether the statement is testimonial or nontestimonial. I f t he st atement is testimonial, then the trial cour

t must determine whethe r the de clar ant is a vailable to testify . . . . I f the-4-

decla rant is unava ilable, the trial co u rt m ust determine whe ther the a ccuse d had a pr ior op po rt un ity to c ro ss- e xami ne the de c lara nt a bo ut t he su bs tanc e of

thi s statement. I d. at 68, 124 S. Ct. at 1354. I f t he ac cused ha d such an oppor tunity , the statement may

be admissible if it is not otherwise excludable hea rsay . I f the a ccuse d did not have this opportunity , then the stateme nt must be ex cluded.

State v. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d 335, 351 (Tenn. 2006). See also S tate v. Summers, 159 S.W.3d 586, 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (“[T]he State must show that the declar ant is truly unavailable afte r g ood faith ef

forts to obtain his presenc e” a nd that “the e vidence car ries its own indicia of reliability .”).

I n this case , the def

endant c ross-examined Off icer Cousins during the pr etrial he aring , so the de fe nd ant’ s r ig ht t o c on fr on t th e wi tne ss w a s satis fi e d. Th e de fe nd ant ar g ue s on a pp e a l th a t th e state did not establish that the w itness was in fac t unavailable, a s is required unde r Craw ford, Ma clin, and Summers, but the defendant did not raise this argument at trial. Instead, the r ecor d ref lects that at tr ia l, the pr os e c uto r ind ic a te d that Off ic e r C ou sin s w a s se rv ingin I ra q a nd wo uld be un a va ila

ble to testify at t rial. The prosecutor stated that he was in possession of an e-ma il from Officer Cousins’s commandingoffice r, which indicated that the earl i est Off icer Cousins would return to Tennesse e would be five months from the trial date. T he prosecutor inqui red whether to f ile the copy

of the e

mail from the commandingoffice r as a n exhibi t. Defe nse counse l did not que s t i o n whether the wi tne ss w a s in

I ra q a nd the re fo re un ava ila

ble ; f ur the rm or e , d e fe ns e c ouns e l di d no t a sk to e xhibi t the e- mail or eve n view it, acc ording to the rec ord. Rather, the defe ndant based his objection to the pretria l statement on the fa ct that the witness’s “ demea nor wouldn’t be here for the jury to follow,” and that he w ould be unable to c ross-examine the witness in light of “some que stion s that may develop throug h t h e course of the trial.” Such c oncer ns have be en addr essed by the Tenne ssee Sup re me Court

in a do pti ng and int e rp re tin g the Rul e s of Ev ide nc e , inc lud ing the he ars ay e xce pti on s, and ther efor e the tria l court prope rly ruled that the pr e tr ial statement wa s admissible under the f ormer testimony h e ar s ay e xc e p ti o n

. I ns h o rt, b e c a u s e th e d e f

e n d an t d id

n o t d is p u te th e f

a c t t h a t O ffice r Cousins was unavailable at trial, he may not raise the issue on appea l. See Te nn. R. App. P. 36(a) (explaining that a

party ’s fa ilu re to raise an obje ction at trial wa ives the issue on appe al). The defe ndant is theref

ore de nied re lief on this issue.

Impe achme nt of Appellant wi th Prior Conviction

The de fenda

nt next contends that the tria l court er red by ruling that the s tate could impea ch him with his 2000 felony conviction for e vadingarr est if he took the stand. The defe ndant ar g ues that th is r

uli ngpr e jud ic e d h im b e c a

us e it “ pr e ve nte d” him

fr om t e sti fy

inga t trial. T he state disag ree s, arguing that the rec ord supports the trial c ourt’s dec ision. W e agree with the state.

Rul e 60 9 o f t

he Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Evi de nc e pe rm its the state to i mpe a c h a de fe nd ant w ith-5-

his prior convictions i f certain conditions are met. First, the prior conviction must be for a felony
or a misdemeanor involving “dishonesty or false statement.” Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a) (2 ); S t at e v. Mix on, 983 S.W .2d 661, 674 (Tenn. 1999) . Fe wer than ten y ea rs m u s t have e lapsed be tween the defe ndant’s re lease from conf inement for the prior convic tion and the commenc ement of the prese nt pr os e c uti on . T e nn . R. Ev id. 60 9( b) . Addi ti on a lly , th e state mus t g ive the de fe nd ant r e a so na ble pr e tr ia l no tic e of

the imp e a c hin g c on vic tio ns . T e nn . R. Ev id. 60 9( a )( 3) . F ina lly , the tr ia l c ourt mus t find that the i mpeac hing conviction’s probative value on cre dibilit y outweig hs its unfair pre judicial eff ect on the substantive issues. This fina l condition is t he one at issue here

.

I n de te rm ini ng wh e the r the pr ob a tiv e va lue of a pr ior c on vic tio n o n th e iss ue of c re dib ili ty
outw e ig hs its un fa ir

pr e jud ic ia l e ff

e c t, a tr ia l c ourt

sh ou ld c on sid e r t

he sim ila ri ty be tw e e n th e c ri me in question and the under ly ing impea chingconviction, as we ll as the rele vance of th e impeac hing conviction with respe ct to cre dibilit y . Mix on, 983 S.W .2d at 674; State v. Fa rmer, 841 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

. “To determine how probative a felony conviction is to the issue of
c re dib ili ty , th e tr ia l c ourt mus t a sse ss whe the r t

he fel on y off

e ns e inv olv e s d ish on e sty or fa lse statement.” State v. Waller, 118 S.W .3d 368, 371 (Tenn. 2003) . I f “the prior convic tion and instant offe nse ar e similar in nature th e p o s s i b l e pre judicial eff

ect incr ease s g reatly

and should be more
car efully scrutinized.” L ong v. State, 607 S.W .2d 482, 486 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) . A trial cour t’s decision to admit a prior conviction under Rule 609 will not be reve rsed on appea l unle ss the trial court a bused its discretion. State v. B lanton, 926 S.W .2d 953, 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

.

I n th is c a se , we no te that thi s c ourt ha s p re vio us ly de te rm ine d th a t f

e lony e va din g arr e st i s n o t a c r im e o f d is h o n e s ty

. St a te v

. B r

u c e M ar v in V an n , N o

. W2 0 0 2

- 0 0 1 6 1

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 3 WL 1702277, at *7 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Ma r. 31, 2003). How ever , as wa s the ca se in Bruc e Marvin Va

nn, we c onclude that the trial court proper ly ruled that the state could use the conviction for impeachme nt pur

poses. The trial involved a “swe aringmatch” a mong w itnesses, in which the jury had to a ssess the cre dibilit y of the state’s witnesses, who testified that the defe ndant drove the truck, a s well as that of the defe ndant’s witness, who c laimed that the def endant did not drive that evening . The c redibility

of the witnesse s was the pa ramount i ssue. Thus, had the defe ndant taken t h e s t an d , t h i s f

e l o n y c o n v i c t i o nw o u l d

h a v e h a d p r o b a t i v e v a l u e a s t o h i s c r e d i b i l i t y. A d d i t i o n a l l y, as the trial c ourt noted, t here is no simil arity betwee n the prior offe nse and the offe nse for which the defe ndant was be ing t ri ed. The ref ore, w e conc lude that the trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion in r uling that the state could use the defe ndant’s felony evading arr est conviction for impea chment purposes. Thus, the de fenda nt is not entit led to relief

on this iss ue.

Sentenc ing

F ina lly , the de fe nd ant c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt imp ro pe rl y

de nie d f ull pr ob a tio n o r a

fu llA ltho u g h th e M o to r V e h ic le H a b itua l O ff e n d e rs A c t, T en n es s ee Code Ann ot at ed §§ 55- 10- 601- 618 ( 2004) , 1

s t at es t hat a t r i al cour t may not s us pend a s ent enc e or f i ne un der t he Act , t hi s co ur t has rul ed t hat al t er nat i ve s ent enc es are ap p rop ri at e f

o r persons s ent enced unde r t he A ct

. St at e v. M art i n, 14 6 S.W

. 3 d 64 , 70 (T enn. C ri m

. A p p

. 20 0 4 ).

W e n ot e t h at on J u n e 7, 2005, t h e G en er al As s embl y a men ded T en n es s ee C ode Ann ot at ed s ec t i on s 40- 35- 2
1 0 2 (6), - 1 1 4 , - 2 1 0 , - 4 0 1

. See 2 0 0 5 T enn. P ub

. A ct s ch. 35 3 , §§ 1, 5, 6, 8

. H o w e v e r, t he am end ed co d e sect i o ns are i nap p l i cab l e t o t he d ef end ant ’ s ap p eal be cause t he d e fenda nt , who was ar res t ed and i nd i ct ed be f o re t he Se nt enci ng G ui del i nes wer e a mended, di d not el ect t o be s ent enc ed un der t he r evi s ed l aw. -6- alternative sentenc e. As stated above , the trial cour t sentence d the def

endant a s a Rang e I , standard 1 offe nder, to two y ear s, with the defendant to serve eig hty day s in jail and the balanc e of the sentenc e on community

corr ections. A late r orde r of the tr ial court re duced the jail term by twenty -f ive perc e nt, or

tw e nty da y s. Th e de fe nd ant a

rgue s th a t se rv ing“ 60 da

y s in c arc e ratio n w ou ld s e rv e to eliminate the positive work history that he has established,” and t hat t he sente nce is “ improper g iven the work history

and the testimony

prese nted bef

ore the Court.” We disag ree

.
An appe llate cour

t’s revie w of sente ncingis de novo on the record with a pre sumption t hat the trial cour

t’s deter minations are c orre ct. T en n

. C ode Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) (2003). 2 As the SentencingCommi ssion C o m m en t s to this s ection note, on a ppeal the bur den is on the def endant to show that the sentenc e is improper

. This means that if the tria l court followed the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, made finding s of fa ct that ar e ade q u at el y supported in the re cord, a nd g ave due conside ration and pr oper w eig ht to the fac tors and princ iples that are rele v ant t o sentenc ing under the 1989 SentencingAct, the court may not disturb the sentence even if a diffe rent re sult were pref err ed. State v. F letcher , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

.

Ho we v e r , “ t h e p r e s u mp t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s w h i c h a c c o mp an i e s t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s a c t ionis conditioned upon the af

firmative showingin the rec ord t hat the trial c ourt consider ed the se ntencing principles and a ll r eleva

nt f acts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). In this respec t, for the pur pose of mea

ningf ul appellate r eview,

[T] he trial c ourt must p l ac e o n t he re cord its re asons for a rrivingat the fina l sentenc ing de cision, identify the mitigatingand enha

nceme nt fac tors found, st ate the specific fac ts supporting e ach e nhance ment fac tor found, an d articulate how the mit ig a ti n g a n d e nh a n ceme nt fac tors have be en eva luated and ba lance d in determining the sentenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(f) (1990).

State v. J ones, 883 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tenn. 1994).

In c o n d u c t i n g i t s d e n o v o r e v i e w , t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u rtm u s tc o n s i d e r ( 1 ) t h e e v i d e n c e , i f

an y, rec eived at the trial and s en t en ci n g hear ing, ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port, (3) the principles of-7-

sentenc ing a

nd arguments as to sent en ci n g alternatives, (4) the nature a nd char acte ristics of the criminal conduc t, (5) any mitigatingor statutory

enhance m ent factors, (6) any statement that the defe ndant made on his own be half, a nd (7) the pote ntial for r ehabilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, - 103, -210 (2006) ; see Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 168; State v. Moss, 727 S.W .2d 229, 236-37 (Te nn. 1986)

.
Length of Sentence

Although not r aised by

either pa rty , we m u s t first addre ss whether the trial cour

t erre d by imposing a two- y ear

sentenc e. At the se ntencinghear ing, the trial court noted the exis tence of the fo llo wi nge nh anc e me nt f

a c tor s:

(1) The defe ndant has a previous history of cr iminal convictions or criminal beha vior in addition to thos e nec essar y to establish the appropr iate ra ng e; (9) The defe ndant has a previous history o f u n wi l l i ng ness to comply with the conditions of a sente nce involvingrele ase in the c ommunity ; and (1 1) Th e de fe nd ant h a d n o h e sit a tio n a bo ut c omm itt inga

c ri me wh e n th e ri sk to human life wa s high.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 2), (9), and (11) (2003). The trial court also applied the defenda nt’s work history

as a mitig ating fac tor but ultim ately imposed a two-y ea r s en tence , the maxim um allowed f or a pe rson convicte d of a Class E felony as a Rang e I , standard offe nder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112( a)( 5) (2003)

.

Under the law a s it ex isted befor e the 2005 amendment, unless enha n ce m ent fa ctors we re p r e s e n t , t h e p r e s u mp t i v e s e n t e n c e t o b e i mp o s e d w a s t h e m i n i m u m i n t h e r an g e f o r a C l a s s E f

e l o n y. Ten n. Co de Ann. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (c ) ( 20 03 ). Te nn e sse e ’s pr e -2 00 5 s e nte nc inga c t pr ov ide d th a t, proce durally , the trial court was to inc rea se the sentenc e within the r ang e base d on the exist ence of enhanc ement fa ctors and, the n, reduc e the se ntence as appr opriate f or any mitigating fac tors. I d. at (d), ( e). H oweve r, the Te nnessee Supreme Court recently held that this sy stem, which allowe d the trial court to enha

nce a defe ndant’s sente nce ba sed on fa ct o rs that had not bee n found by a jury bey ond a re a s o n a

b le d o u b t, v io late d

a d e f e n d an t’ s Si xth

A me n dme n t r igh ts a s inte r p r e te d b y the Supreme Court. State v. Gomez , 239 S.W .3d 733, 740-41 (Te nn. 2007) (“ Gomez I I ”) ( citing Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 856, 8 6 0 (2 0 0 7 )); See a lso Blake ly v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536 (2004) (quoting A pprendi v. Ne w J erse y , 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000)) (“‘ Other than the fac t of a prior conviction, any fac t that incre ases the pe nalty

for a crime beyond the statutory maxi mum must be submitted to a jury , and proved be y ond a reasonable doubt.’”). Thus, the t rial court’s application of enhanc ement fa ctors (9) and (11) to the defe ndant’s sente nce w as improper

.-8-

Howeve r, in this case the prese ntence repor t details, and the trial c ourt noted at the se ntencing hear ing, that the defe ndant had a rec ord of ove r twenty convictions, including a fe lony conviction for a previous habitual motor vehicle off ender violation, a felony

conviction for r esisting a

rre st, and numerous misdemea

nor convic tions for such off enses a s assault, vanda lism, publ ic i ntoxication, and dri v i n g o na re v o k ed l i ce n s e. I ni mp o s i n g an en h an ce d s en t en ce , t h e t ri al co u rt s t at ed , “i f I ju s tgo on y our cr iminal hist ory

[y our sentenc e] should be enhance d to two y ear s.” We ag ree with the trial court’s r easoningand conc lude that the def endant’ s ext ensive history of criminal convic tions was enoug h to justi fy

the trial cour

t’s imposing the maximum sentenc e in this case.

Alternative Sente nce

We next consider the defe ndant’s st ated issue, whe ther the tria l court er red in orde ring the de fe nd ant t o s e rv e a

sixty -d ay

ja il s e nte nc e be fo re se rv ingthe re st o f h is t e rm on c omm unity
corr ections. The defe ndant was convicted of a Class E fe lony

and sente nced a s a standar d offe nder; thus, he was “ presumed to be a fa vorable candidate for alternative sentenc ing options in t he abse nce of evide nce to the contrary .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102( 6) (2003) . Howeve r, this presumption does not entitle an off

ender who meets this standard t o re l i ef ; rathe r, sentenc ing issues must be deter mined by the fa cts and c ircumstance s prese nted in eac h case

. See State v. Ta ylor, 744 S.W .2d 91 9, 92 2 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 87 ) ( c iti ngMo ss, 72 7 S. W.2 d at 23 5) . E ve n if a d e fe nd ant i s presumed to be a fa

vorable candidate for alternative sentenc ing, the statutory presumption may

be
overc ome if (1) confine ment is neede d to protec t society by restra ining a defe ndant who has a long history of cr iminal conduct, (2) confine ment is ne eded to a void de prec iating the seriousness of the of fe ns e or c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula

rl y su ite d to pr ov ide an effect iv e de te rr e nc e to p e op le lik e ly to
c omm it s imi la

r o ffenses , o r (3 ) l ess res tr ict iv e me asu res th an co nfi nem ent hav e freq uen tl y or re c e ntl y been a pplied unsucce ssfully

to the defe ndant. Ashby

, 823 S.W .2d at 169 (c iting Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103( 1)(A) -(C)) . A trial cour t should also consider a de fenda nt’s potential or l ack of potential for r ehabilitation when de termining if an alternative sentenc e would be a ppropriate . Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40- 35- 1 0 3 (5 ); State v. Boston
, 938 S.W .2d 435, 438 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

. Fur thermore , t h e t rial cour

t may consider a

defe ndant’s untruthfulness a nd lack of

candor as they relate to the potential for reha bilitation. See State v. Nunle y , 22 S.W .3d 282, 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999); State v. Z eolia, 928 S.W.2d 457, 463 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); Sta t e v. Wil liamson, 919 S.W .2d 69, 84 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

.
The pre sentenc e re port containe d a st atement from the defendant in which he claimed that he wa s a passe ng er in the truc k the nig ht he was a rre sted, and he also claimed that he exit ed the truc k by sli din g out th e dr ive r’ s side do or be c a us e the pa sse ng e r- sid e do or “ wo uld no t shut g oo d unle ss y ou wer e outside the truc k.” The defe ndant also st at ed that he told police that he w as not driving that night a

nd had done nothing wr ong . The trial c ourt noted that this statement went a g ainst the evidenc e produc ed at trial; there fore , the t rial court found t hat t he defenda nt was not beingtruthful and did not take r esponsibility for his ac tions. B ased on these finding s, as we ll as the fac t that the defe ndant had pr eviously serve d time on community corr ections, t he trial court c oncluded that the-9-

defe ndant’s potential for

reha bilitation was “extremely

low.” I n light of this e vidence , we c onclude that the trial cour

t properly sentenc ed the de fenda

nt to a period of c onfinement be fore servingthe
re st of his se nte nc e on

c omm un ity c or re c tio ns . T hu s, the de fe nd ant i s n ot e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is issue.

CONCL USI ON

I n consideration of the fore g oing a nd the re cord a s a whole, the judgme nt of t he trial c ourt is affirme d.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____________ D. KEL L Y THOMAS, JR ., J UDGE