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### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OFWASHINGTON

GEORGIANA ARNOLD, ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) CITY OF SEATTLE, d/b/a HUMAN ) SERVICES DEPARTMENT, ) ) Petitioner. ) 

## _________________________) No. 91742-6 ENBANC

Filed 

### MAY 05 2016
FAIRHURST, J.-RCW 49.48.030 provides that employees are entitled to reasonable attorney fees from their employer or former employer "[i]n any action in which any person is successful in recoveringjudgment for wages or salary owed to him or her." This case concerns whether a city of Seattle (City) employee who recovered wages from a Seattle Civil Service Commission (Commission) hearing is entitledto attorney fees underRCW49.48.030 whenthe city code provides she may be represented in those proceedings only at her own expense. See SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE (SMC) 4.04.260(E). After Georgiana Arnold recovered wages from the civil serviceproceeding, she initiated an action in superior courtrequesting attorney fees. Thetrial court denied attorney fees, butthe Court ofAppealsreversedArnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 and granted her attorney fees. We affirm and hold that the commission proceedings at issue here constitute an "action" for which RCW49.48.030 provides attorney fees whenrequested in a separate court action. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Arnold was employed as a manager for the City's Human Services Department in the Aging and Disability Services Division. In 2011, the City discharged Arnoldfrom hermanagementposition and demotedherto a significantly lower paying entry-level position for failing to adequately supervise one of her employees who the City ultimately discovered had embezzled city funds. Seattle's civil service code provides a mechanism for aggrieved civil service employees to appeal adverse employment decisions (including demotion, suspension, andtermination). SMC 4.04.260(A). After an employee exhausts certain grievanceremedies, she may appeal herdisciplinary decisionto the Commission. !d. The Commission may refer the matter to ahearing examiner, and an employee may appeal the hearing examiner's decision to the Commission. SMC 4.04.250(L)(7). The Commission conducts hearings where it has the authority to "administer oaths, issue subpoenas, receive evidence, compel the production of documents for such purposes, and

... question witnesses." SMC 4.04.250(L)(3). Employees have the "right to cross-examine witnesses and to produce relevant evidence at hearings." SMC 4.04.260(0). The Commissionhas authorityto issue remedial orders including 2Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 reinstatement, SMC 4.04.250(L)(5), and must issue its decision within 90 days after

a hearing, SMC 4.04.260(H). Although an employee has the right to be represented by a person ofher choice, the code provides that she must do so "at his/her own expense." SMC 4.04.260(E). Arnold utilized this process when she appealed her demotion to the Commission. She hired counsel to representher. 1The Commission consolidatedher

case with another employee's and assigned the case to a hearing examiner. The hearing lasted eight days and includedwritten discovery and depositions, significant briefing, witness testimony and cross-examination, thousands ofpages ofexhibits and record, evidentiary rulings, and an audio recording of the proceedings. The hearing examiner issued a 25-page decision that analyzed the two employees' discipline in detail and comparedittothat ofotheremployees. Thehearingexaminer concluded that their discipline was too harsh and, therefore, reversed Arnold's demotion andreducedher disciplineto atwo weeksuspension. The decision ordered Arnold's employerto reinstateherto her former managerpositionand awardedback pay and other employee benefits.

1The parties dispute Arnold's rationale for hiring counsel to represent her in the commission proceedings. Arnold maintains that it was necessary to combat the City's representation from the City Attorney's Office, see, e.g., Clerk's Papers (CP) at 35, 68, while the City asserts it does not utilize its own counsel unless the employee first retains counsel, CP at 48, 158. 

### 3Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 Arnoldthenrequested attorney fees pursuantto RCW 49.48.030. The hearing examinerdeniedherrequest for attorney fees, andthe Commission affirmed, stating, "[T]here is no statutory authority inthe SeattleMunicipal Code for the Civil Service Commission to award attorney's fees." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 7. After the Commission denied attorney fees, Arnold instituted an action in King County Superior Court requesting attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030.2 The trial court dismissed the case. Arnold sought direct review, and we transferred the

case to the Court ofAppeals. Division One ofthe Court ofAppeals reversed the trial court and held that Arnoldwas entitledto attorneyfees underRCW49.48.030.Arnoldv. City of Seattle, 186 Wn. App. 653, 345 P.3d 1285 (2015). Division One recognized some disagreement among the Court ofAppeals divisions over the application ofRCW 49.48.030 in similar proceedings. After reexamining these conflicting cases in light ofourprecedent,the CourtofAppeals concludedthatcivil service appeals constitute "'action[s]"' and their decisions awarding back pay constitute '"judgment[s]"' for which attorney fees are available under RCW 49.48.030. Id. at 664. According to the Court ofAppeals' interpretation ofRCW 49.48.030, "[a] person may seek an award ofattorney fees from the superior court under this statute upon winning an

2Arnold initially filed this case both as an appeal from the Commission and as an original action for an award of attorney fees. However, she later abandoned the appeal and instead proceeded with only the original action for attorney fees. 4Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 appeal to a city civil service commissionthat results in an order for backpay."Id. at 655. We granted review. Arnoldv. City of Seattle, 184 Wn.2d 1001, 357 P.3d 665 (2015). II. ANALYSIS We must determine whether an employee who recovers wages from a commission proceeding is entitled to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030 when requested in a separate superior court action. We conclude that Arnold is entitled to

recover these attorney fees. RCW 49.48.030 provides that any person who is successful in recovering a judgmentfor wages "[i]nany action" is entitledto attorney fees from her employer. (Emphasis added.) This case primarily concerns whether the City's civil service proceedings are "actions" within the meaning ofRCW 49.48.030. We must also address whether the City's statutory authority, including a provision explicitly providing that individuals may be represented only at their own expense m commission hearings, prohibits attorney fee awards under RCW 49.48.030. A. Relevant authority Arnold relies heavily on our interpretation of this statute in International Ass 'n of Fire Fighters, Local 46 v. City of Everett, 146 Wn.2d 29, 42 P.3d 1265 (2002), which held that an arbitration proceeding awarding backpay constitutes an "action" for which aunion could recover attorney fees whenrequested in a separate 

### 5Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 superior court action. Arnold asserts the administrative proceeding at issue here shouldbe considered an "action" as we definedthatterm inFire Fighters. However, Fire Fighters expressly declined to address whether its holding would extend to administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings outside ofarbitration. !d. at 42 n.ll. The City relies more on Court ofAppeals decisions assessing the availability of attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030. Although lower courts have analyzed proceedings similar to the one at issue, these cases rest on premises that arguably conflict with our decision inFire Fighters and the general policy ofthe statute. In Fire Fighters, we held that RCW 49.48.030 provides attorney fees for successful grievance arbitrationproceedings.!d. at 32. The arbitrationproceeding in Fire Fighters arose after the city ofEverett suspended two firefighters without pay for 24 hours. !d. The employees' union brought a grievance proceeding challenging the suspension, and the matter was submitted to arbitration pursuantto the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the union and Everett. !d. The union retained counsel for the two day arbitrationproceeding. !d. The arbiterruled in favor ofthe union and awarded the employees back pay. !d. Everett paid the wages as ordered butrefused the union's request for attorney fees. !d. at 32-33. The union and two employees then filed a separate lawsuit in Snohomish County Superior Court seeking attorney fees. !d. at 33. The trial court granted Everett's motion for summaryjudgment, butthe Court ofAppeals reversed, holding 6Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 the union was entitled to attorney fees for both the arbitration proceedings and the courtproceedings seeking attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030. We affirmed.Jd. at 51-52.Our opinion in Fire Fighters rested on three rationales that are relevant here. First, we cited the strong remedial purpose ofthe statute favoring employees' wage rights and emphasizedthat we should interpretthe statute in light ofthis purpose.Jd. at 34-36. Second, we determined that grievance arbitration constitutes an "action" for purposes ofRCW 49.48.030.Jd. at 36-41. Third, we concluded that employees

or their representatives need not recover wages in the same action in which they

recover attorney fees-it is permissible to initiate a separate lawsuit in court to

recover fees from the successful arbitrationproceeding. 

### Id. at 41-44. The legislature has not substantively amendedRCW49.48.030 since our decision inFire Fighters. 3 Although Fire Fighters expands the scope of what constitutes an "action" under RCW 49.48.030 by including grievance arbitration proceedings, we declined to address "whetherRCW49.48.030would apply to othertypes ofadministrative or quasi-judicial proceedings." 

### Id. at 42 n.11. The City seizes on this distinction and relies on CourtofAppeals casesthatdeny attorneyfee awardsunderRCW49.48.030 in administrative proceedings that resemble commission hearings. Similar to

3The 2010 amendments to this statute made technical corrections to gender-based terms but did not substantively change the provision. SUBSTITUTE S.B. 6239, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010). 7Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 Seattle's system at issue here, the State provides an administrative forum in which civil serviceemployees can challengedisciplinarydecisions and appeal to the State's Personnel Resources Board (Board). See ch. 41.06 RCW; ch. 357-52 WAC. The City relies on two cases that denied attorney fees to state civil service employees in board hearings-onepriorto Fire Fighters and one following it-and distinguishes

a third case that granted attorneyfees to a state employee who was not subjectto the state civil service laws. Prior to our decision in Fire Fighters, the Court ofAppeals held in Cohn v. Department ofCorrections, 78 Wn. App. 63, 895 P.2d 857 (1995) that RCW 49.48.030 does not apply to state civil service proceedings for three reasons. First, Cohn noted that agencies may only exercise functions that are expressly delegated

or that are necessarily implied from statutory authority and concluded that the state civil service law does not provide the agency the authority to award attorney fees. Id. at 67-68. Second, Cohn held that when the agency lacks authority to award attorney fees, the courts acting in an appellate capacity reviewing that decision (there, the superior court) likewise lack authorityto grant attorneyfees. Id. at 69-70. Third, Cohn stated that the superior court did not enter a "'judgmentfor wages or salary owed'" because it "merely affirmed the Board's award, it did not award any amounts greaterthan thebackpayalreadyawardedbytheBoard."!d. at 71 (quoting RCW49.48.030). 8Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 Following our decision in Fire Fighters, Division One also concluded that RCW49.48.030 does not applyto boardproceedings awardingwagesunderthe state civil service laws. Trachtenberg v. Dep 't ofCorr., 122 Wn. App. 491, 93 P.3d 217 (2004). Trachtenbergreliedheavilyonthe reasoning in Cohn, notingthatwemerely distinguished, but did not expressly overrule, Cohn in Fire Fighters. Id. at 494-95. Tracking Cohn'srationale, Trachtenberg analyzedthe state civil service laws, which do not expressly list attorney fees among the enumerated remedies, and concluded, "[T]he legislature did not intend RCW49.48.030 to applyto disciplinarychallenges before the Board."Id. at 497. Onthe otherhand, DivisionTwo granted attorneyfees underRCW49.48.030 to a non-civil-service state employee who recovered back wages in Mcintyre v. Washington State Patrol, 135 Wn. App. 594, 141 P.3d 75 (2006). Mcintyre, a state patrol officer, challenged her termination through the Washington State Patrol's administrative board, which denied her challenge. Id. at 597. She appealed to Thurston County Superior Court, which affirmed, and then to Division Two ofthe Court ofAppeals, whichreversed, reinstatingherto herformer position and granting her wages. ld. She then brought a separate action in Pierce County Superior Court requesting attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030, which the court denied, and Division Two reversed. Id. at 597-98. In awarding her attorney fees, the Mcintyre court distinguished Cohn and Trachtenberg because those cases rested on the state 9Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 civil service laws with limited authority to provide relief, while here the administrative body was not limited to awarding a single statutory remedy. 

### Id. at 600-02. The court also distinguished Mcintyre's attorney fee award because the court, not the administrative body, ordered herremedy. Id. at 602. The City asserts these cases confirm that RCW 49.48.030 does not apply to commissionhearings. Like the state civil service law in Cohn and Trachtenberg, the City points out that there is no express or implied statutory authority for the Commission to grant attorney fees-in fact, there is an express prohibition in SMC 4.04.260(E)-and claims both the Commission and the court therefore lack the authority to award attorney fees. The City distinguishes the attorney fee award permittedinMcintyrebecausethe administrativeproceedinginthat case was outside ofthe civil service context (which is constrained bylimited statutory authority) and because the court, not the administrative body, awarded wages in that case. Arnold points out that the City ignores a crucial first step in the analysis: determining whether the administrative proceeding at issue constitutes an "action" within the meaning ofRCW49.48.030. Ifso, Arnold argues, she is entitled to back pay for the wages she recovered in this "action" based on the plain meaning ofthe statute. Moreover, Arnold claims the distinctions onwhichthe Cityrelies-statutory authorityand separaterecoveryin court-arenot sustainableinlight ofFireFighters and the broadremedial purpose ofthe statute. We agree. 10Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 B. Action RCW 49.48.030 requires an employerto pay reasonable attorney fees in "any action" in which a person recovers a "judgment for wages or salary owed." (Emphasis added.) At issue is whether Arnold's proceedings before the City's Commission constitutes an "action" for purposes ofthe statute.4 InFireFighters, we recognizedthatthe term "action" in the statute is broader than a traditional court of law proceeding and held that a grievance arbitration proceeding constitutes an action. We beganby citingthe strong remedialpurpose of RCW 49.48.030, explaining that the statute is meant to be construed liberally in order to effectuate the purpose ofprotecting employees' rights. Fire Fighters, 146 Wn.2d at 34 (collecting cases). We recognized that arbitration proceedings have been characterized as both "judicial" and "nonjudicial" in prior cases but that the plain meaning of the statute does not foreclose including grievance arbitration proceedings within the definition of an "action." Id. at 38, 41. While some definitions of "action" are restricted to proceedings within a court of law, we emphasized that others define the term more broadly to include other types of judicial proceedings. Id. at 40-41 ("Black's Law Dictionary defines 'action' as a

4We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Commission's order awarding back pay constitutes a "judgment for wages." RCW 49.48.030. Contrary to the City's assertions, a tribunal otherthan a courtoflawmay issue a "judgment" awarding wages for purposes ofRCW49.48.030. See Fire Fighters, 146 Wn.2d at 36 n.8 (noting that '"a court or other tribunal"' may issue a judgment and applying that definition to arbitration proceedings (emphasis added) (quoting 49 C.J.S. Judgments §2, at 51, 52 (1997))). 11Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 'civil orcriminaljudicialproceeding,' 'an ordinaryproceeding in a court of justice,' and 'anyjudicialproceeding, which, ifconducted to a determination, will result in a judgment or decree.' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 28-29 (7th ed. 1999). American [.!Jurisprudence defines 'action' as 'ajudicialproceedinginwhichoneasserts aright

or seeks redress for a wrong.' 1 AM. JUR. 2DActions § 4, at 725-26 (1994)." (italics added)). In light ofthe strong remedial purpose ofthe statute, we concluded that grievance arbitration proceedings constitute an "action" for purposes of RCW 49.48.030: It is clear that had this case been brought in superior court, attorney fees wouldhave been available. BecauseRCW49.48.030 is a remedial statute, whichmust be construed to effectuate its purpose, we find no reason to not interpret "action" to include arbitration proceedings. A restrictive interpretation of "action" would preclude recoveryofattorney fees in cases involving arbitration even thoughthe employee is successful in recovering wages or salary owed. Thus, it wouldbeinconsistentwiththe legislativepolicyin favor ofpayment of wages due employees. See Schilling [v. Radio Holdings, Inc.], 136 Wn.2d [152,] 157[, 961 P.2d 371 (1998)]. Therefore, we hold that "action" as used in RCW 49.48.030 includes grievance arbitration proceedings in which wages or salary owed are recovered. Id. at 41. 5

5Legislativehistorymayalso supportreading "action"to bebroaderthan atraditional court oflaw proceeding. This statute dates back to 1888, and it has been substantively amended only once since thattime. S.B. 261, 42nd Leg., 1stEx. Sess. (Wash. 1971). The 1888 statute provided, "[T]he court shall tax an attorney's fee" whenever an employee orcompany is "compelled to sue

... for thepayment ofwages for labor

...if judgment shouldbe grantedthe plaintiff' (along with certain exceptions not relevant here). Former RCW 49.48.030 (1888). When the legislature amended this statute in 1971, it eliminated references to "the court," "plaintiff," and "sue," which all insinuate traditional courtroom litigation, and instead broadly allowed attorney fees for wages recovered "[i]n any action." S.B. 261 (emphasis added). 12Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 Arnold's administrative proceeding before the Commission appears to fit withinthis definition ofan "action." The hearing resembled ajudicialproceeding in many ways. All parties were representedby counsel. Priorto the hearing, the parties conducted discovery and exchanged lists ofwitnesses and exhibits. Although the hearing examiner was not bound by the Rules ofEvidence, she issued evidentiary rulings pursuantto the Commission'sRules ofPractice and Procedure (Commission Rules) and ruled on motions. See Commission Rule 5.13(A) (witnesses are subject to cross-examination), 5.14 (authorizing the parties to file and the presiding officer to rule onmotions and allowing oral argument on motions), 5.15 (evidentiaryrules). The hearing spanned multiple months, including eight days of testimony during which the parties exercised their rights to examine and cross-examine the 15 witnesses called in the case. See Commission Rule 5.12(A) (requiring all testimony to be taken under oath). Following the hearing, the parties submitted closing arguments in written briefing. The hearing examiner issued a 25-page order, including 84 findings offact and 41 conclusions along with a "Decision and Order" reversing the employees' discipline and awarding back pay and benefits. The extensive record for this proceeding is 2,997 pages. The City does not dispute these judicial-like features ofthe proceeding. The commission proceedings may not qualify as an "action" under some of the more limited definitions ofthat term because the proceedings do not involve 13

### Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 traditional civil litigation in a court oflaw.However, similarlyrestrictive definitions of "action" did not prevail in 

### Fire Fighters. See 146 Wn.2d at 54 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (defining an 

### "'action"' as "'aprosecution 

### in a court for the enforcement

or protection of private rights and the redress of private wrongs"' (quoting 

### Thorgaard Plumbing & 

### Heating Co. v. King County, 71 Wn.2d 126, 130-32, 426 P.2d 828 (1967))), 55 (stating RCW 49.48.030 does not apply to arbitrationbecause it applies only "when a 

### lawsuit is brought and the plaintiff successfully recovers judgmentfor wages or salary owed" (emphasis added)). Moreover, we have applied RCW 49.48.030 to another city's civil service appeals process. 

### See Hanson v. City ofTacoma, 105 Wn.2d 864, 872, 719 P.2d 104 (1986). Other statutory provisions within chapter 49.48 RCW support a broader definition ofthe term "action" as used in that statute. We interpret statutes relating to the same subjectmattertogetherthroughtheprinciple ofin pari materia. 

### Hallauer

v. Spectrum Props., Inc., 143 Wn.2d 126, 146, 18 P.3d 540 (2001). In 2006, the legislature amended portions ofchapter 49.48 RCW relating to the Department of Labor and Industries' enforcement of employees' wage rights. RCW 49.48.085 describes various types ofactions in a way that suggests the term "action" includes administrative proceedings: (3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or affect: (a) The right ofany employee to pursue 

### any judicial, administrative, or other action available with respect to an employer; (b) the right ofthe department to pursue 

### any judicial, administrative, or other 14Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 action available withrespectto an employeethatis identified as aresult of a wage complaint; or (c) the right of the department to pursue any judicial, administrative, orotheraction available withrespectto an employer in the absence ofa wage complaint. RCW 49.48.085 (emphasis added). The emphasized language suggests that the legislature views administrative proceedings as a type of "action" under chapter 49.48 RCW. Notably, this statute was enacted in 2006, four years after we decided Fire Fighters. Reading this provision in pari materia with RCW 49.48.030, it is apparent that the phrase "any action" can include administrative proceedings. Based on our broader definition of "action" in Fire Fighters that includes judicialproceedings outside acourt oflaw,we holdthatthe civil serviceproceedings at issue sufficiently resemble ajudicial proceeding to constitute an "action" under RCW 49.48.030. When viewed in light of the statute's remedial purpose and protection ofemployee wage recovery, an employee who recovers ajudgment for wages in a proceeding that permits this level ofpretrial discovery, written briefing, exhibits, witnesses, cross-examination, evidentiary rulings, and detailed findings and decision is permitted to recover attorney fees for an "action" under RCW 49.48.030. C. Statutory authority The City contends that Arnold is not entitled to attorney fees because the Commissionhas no authority to award attorney fees. As discussed above, Cohn and Trachtenberg both held that RCW 49.48.030 does not apply to state civil service 15Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 proceedings because the Boardhas only limited statutory authority, which does not includethe ability to grant attorney fees to prevailing employees. Similarly, we have recognized that the Commission "is created by, and derives its authority from, the city charter. Ithas only suchpowers as are there enumerated." State ex rel. Worsham

v. Brown, 126 Wash. 175, 177, 218 P. 9 (1923). Although the City admits that the city code does not identify an exclusive list ofremedies like the state civil service law, it argues the provision statingthat employees may obtainrepresentation only at their own expense serves a similar (and stronger) purpose to the limited statutory authority described in Cohn and reiterated in Trachtenberg. But a careful analysis of the procedural posture reveals that this case Is distinct. The plaintiffin Cohn requested attorney fees from an administrative body that apparently had no statutory authority to provide attorney fees because it was limited to awarding employees only certain types ofremedies. In turn, the superior courtand CourtofAppealsreviewingthe agency'srefusal to grant attorneyfees held they could not order that body to exercise a power that it did not possess. Here, in contrast, even ifwe were to accept Cohn, the case on which Trachtenbergrelies, and

even assuming the Commission similarly has no authority to award attorney fees, Arnold is not asking the Commission to exceed its authority and grant her attorney

16Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 fees. 6 Instead, Arnold instituted a separateproceeding in superior court, filing anew complaint solely for that court to award her attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030. Therefore, we consider only Arnold's right to receive attorney fees from a separate superior court action. In Fire Fighters, we plainly permitted employees (or their representatives) who recovered ajudgment for wages in aproceedingto initiate a separate lawsuit in superior court solely for the recovery of attorney fees. In that case, the plaintiff recovered back pay during an arbitration proceeding against Everett, then filed a complaint in superior court against Everett, seeking attorney fees. Everett claimed that RCW 49.48.030 did not allow a separate action for attorney fees. We rejected Everett's restrictive reading ofthe statute, explaining thatRCW 49.48.030 provides attorney fees for '"any action"' in which ajudgment for wages is recovered, and is not limited to "the same action" in which the wages or salary are recovered. Fire Fighters, 146 Wn.2d at 43-44 (quoting RCW 49.48.030). Here, the City seeks to distinguish this analysis in Fire Fighters, emphasizing thatFire Fighters applied onlyto arbitration, not administrative proceedings. See id. at 42-43. The City claims that agencies are distinguishable because they are

6Arnold initially filed this case both as a challenge to the Commission's denial ofattorney fees and as an original action for an award ofattorney fees, but she later abandoned her challenge to the Commission's order and proceeded solely withthe original action for attorney fees. 17Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 constrained by their limited statutory authority and points out we discussed and did not overrule thatprinciple when we cited Cohn inFire Fighters. !d. However, as noted above, the statutory authority ofthe agency is notrelevant in cases such as this where the employee is not asking the agency to award attorney fees, butratherinitiated a separate actionincourtto recover attorney fees. Moreover, in Fire Fighters we cited Hanson, 105 Wn.2d at 872 for the proposition that "the nature of the proceeding did not affect the availability of attorney fees to an employee who is successful in recovering wages or salary owed," and explainedthe attorney fees need not be recovered inthat same action. Id. at 43. Fire Fighters confirms that attorney fees are available in a separate court action under RCW 49.48.030 even when the tribunal awarding the wages lacks authority to issue attorney fees in the first instance. Because the arbiter in that case lacked authority to grant attorney fees under the parties' collective bargaining agreement, after recovering fees in arbitration the union and employees instituted a separate court action seeking to recover attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030. Int'l Ass 'n of Fire Fighters, Local 46 v. City of Everett, 101 Wn. App. 743, 749-50, 6 P.3d 50 (2000). Inawarding attorney fees, the CourtofAppeals concludedthat "[t]he right to fees arose outside the terms ofthe labor agreement, and a court action was therefore necessary to recover them." Id. at 750. We affirmed, agreeing that the union was entitled to recover attorney fees through the separate court action and 18Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 explaining that the nature ofthe initial action awarding wages did not impact that outcome. Fire Fighters, 146 Wn.2d at 42. Thus, according to Fire Fighters, an employee who successfully recovers wages in an actionmay institute a separatecourt actionto recoverattorney fees, even when the body issuing the wages has no authority to grant attorney fees. To the extent lower court opinions conflict with this principle, they are overruled. This is in keeping with the broad remedial purpose ofRCW 49.48.030 that is designed to

ensure employees receive payment for wages and meant to provide incentives for employees to asserttheir wage rights. SeeFire Fighters, id. at 35 (collecting cases). Therefore, even if the Commission can properly decline to award attorney fees, Arnold was entitledto institute a separate courtproceedingto recoverher fees under RCW 49.48.030.7 D. Preemption The City argues that Arnold is not entitled to attorney fees because the SMC explicitly prohibits such fees in commission hearings: "An employee may be represented at ahearingbeforethe Commissionby aperson ofhis/her ownchoosing at his/her own expense." SMC 4.04.260(E). The City claims that this provision is

7Some cases seem to suggestthat attorney fees are available only ifthe court awards more reliefthan the administrative body. See, e.g., Mcintyre, 135 Wn. App. at 602 (citing Hanson, 105 Wn.2d 864). However, this is contrary to the facts ofFire Fighters. There, the arbiter awarded wages, then the union sought a separate court action solely for the recovery ofattorney fees. We upheld the fee award despite the fact that the court provided no further reliefbeyond what the arbiter originally granted. 19Arnoldv. CityofSeattle, No. 91742-6 valid and should govern here because the reach ofRCW 49.48.030 is not absolute, and states that an exception is warranted when a city voluntarily adopts a civil service scheme to benefit employees. Arnoldcountersthatthe state lawpreempts SMC 4.04.260(E), citingMosebar

v. Moore, 41 Wn.2d 216, 248 P.2d 385 (1952). Inthat case, we held that a state law preventing employers from firing civil service employees for moving outside ofthe city limits preempted a local law to the contrary. Arnold also disputes the City's policy arguments and reiterates that the main policy under RCW 49.48.030 of vindicating employees' wagerights and providing attorney fees for successful wage recovery should govern. We agree. Article XI, section 11 ofour state constitution permits local governments to make "all

... local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws." "Alocalregulation conflicts withstatelawwhere itpermitswhat state law forbids or forbids what state lawpermits." State v. Kirwin, 165 Wn.2d 818, 825, 203 P.3d 1044 (2009) (citingParklandLight & Water Co. v. Tacoma-Pierce County Bd. of Health, 151 Wn.2d 428,433,90 P.3d 37 (2004); City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wn.2d 22, 33, 759 P.2d 366 (1988)). The Cityclaims thatRCW49.48.030 does notunconstitutionally conflictwith the City's civil service code fortwo reasons. First, the Cityclaimsthere is no conflict because RCW 49.48.030 is not absolute and the City's civil service laws constitute 20Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6

a valid exception. The Citypoints outthatwe have suggested employees may waive attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030 through collective bargaining agreements, see Fire Fighters, 146 Wn.2d at 49, and asserts that employees entering civil service employment similarly waive their rights to fees under RCW 49.48.030 when they acceptthe benefits ofthis employmentrelationship. Second, the City claims that any apparent conflict between the two laws is not specific enough for preemption to apply. The City distinguishes Mosebar, asserting it was much clearer in that case thatthe legislature designed the state lawto specificallypreemptthe particular local lawatissue. 41 Wn.2d at 220 ("Wethink [the state law] is clearin its intentto protect civil service employees, as a class, from the operation of any city charter or ordinance requiring continuedresidence, as arequisite ofcontinued employment."). We disagree with both ofthe City's rationales. First, even if an employee could waive a right to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030, waiving that right in a collective bargaining agreement is distinct from the City specifically denying that right through its civil service code. While an employee might be able to knowingly decide to give up such a right either personally or with her interests represented through a collective bargaining process, the City's unilateral denial ofattorney fees under SMC 4.04.260(E) does not similarly account for the employee's understanding and consent inthe same way as a contract.

21Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 Second, SMC 4.04.260(E) directly conflicts withRCW49.48.030 becausethe state statute requires an employer to pay the employee's attorney fees in any action in which the employee recovers wages, while the city code provides that an individual may be represented by counsel in civil service hearings at only the employee's own expense. Thus, the local regulation "forbids what state law permits." Kirwin, 165 Wn.2d at 825. RCW 49.48.030 therefore preempts the City's attempt to deny attorney fees to employees who recover wages in commission proceedings. E. Policy The City finally urges severalpolicyreasons in assertingthatRCW 49.48.030 should not apply in the civil service context. The City explains that civil service codes are designed to benefit employees and the public by providing additional protections beyond those that are generally afforded to at-will employees and by helping ensure services are rendered efficiently. Suppl. Br. ofPet'rat 18 (citing City ofYakimav.Int'lAss 'n of FireFighters, AFL-CIO, Local469, 117 Wn.2d 655, 665, 818 P.2d 1076 (1991); Herriott v. City of Seattle, 81 Wn.2d 48, 61, 500 P.2d 101 (1972)). The City fears that allowing attorney fees in civil service proceedings will create a disincentive for local governments to voluntarily adoptthese codes andmay result in limiting or eliminating the reach ofemployee protections in civil service

22Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 codes. The City also suggests that public employers may be more hesitant to discipline employees ifattorney fee awards are available to employees. The City fails to persuade us that RCW 49.48.030 shouldnot apply to its civil service proceedings. Even ifthe City means to protect employees through its civil service system, ifby doing so it creates an "action" that allows payment ofwages, the City cannot avoid a legislative directive allowing prevailing employees to

recover attorney fees. We find nothing to indicate that the legislature meant to exemptthe City's civil service law from RCW 49.48.030. The legislature has shown itknows howto exemptpublic employees,particularlylocal governmentemployees, in the context ofother wage laws but has not done so here. See RCW 49.48.080 (exemptingcertain state and local governmentemployees from DepartmentofLabor and Industries wage enforcement laws). In addition, the consequences may not be as significant as the City suggests. Applying RCW 49.48.030 to commission proceedings will not necessarily result in expensive attorney fee awards or discourage employers from disciplining employees because the statute allows for attorney fees only in circumstances when the employer's discipline was wrongful and the employee is successful in recovering wages. Moreover, inFire Fighters we recognizedthatRCW49.48.030'spurpose ofallowing aggrieved employees ortheir representatives "to pursue wage claims that they may not have otherwise been able

23Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 to pursue" prevailed over the employers' economic interests and expectations that each side would bear its own costs. 146 Wn.2d at 50. Finally, our decision does not necessarily extend attorney fee awards under RCW 49.48.030 to all quasi-judicial proceedings. RCW 49.48.030 is limited to "actions" in which an employee recovers wages, and we have considered only the court's authority to award attorney fees requested in a separate action. We hold that when an employeerecovers wages in aproceedingwith sufficientjudicialhallmarks to constitute an "action" and seeks attorney fees in a separate court action, she is entitled to recover attorney fees in that separate proceeding under RCW 49.48.030. III. CONCLUSION We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that an employee who recovers wages from a commission proceeding is entitled to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030 when requested in a separate superior court action. We remand this case to the superior court to determine the amount ofreasonable attorney fees to award for the proceedings leading to Arnold's recovery of wages and her proceedings seeking attorney fees.

24Arnoldv. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6

WE CONCUR:**~·~** 

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