UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4633

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

KUNTA KENTA REDD,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, 

District Judge. (7:08-cr-00043-D-1)

Submitted: June 8, 2010 Decided: June 24, 2010

Before MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Marilyn G. Ozer, MASSENGALE & OZER, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

Kunta Kenta Redd pled guilty, pursuant to a written 

plea agreement, to one count of conspiracy to distribute and to 

possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and 50 grams or 

more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). 

The district court calculated Redd’s advisory imprisonment range 

under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2007) at 262 to 327 

months and sentenced Redd to 324 months’ imprisonment. On 

appeal, Redd’s counsel has filed an Anders*

A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that 

waiver is knowing and intelligent. United States v. Poindexter, 

492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007). Generally, if the district 

court fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his 

right to appeal during the plea colloquy performed in accordance 

with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, the waiver is both valid and 

enforceable. See United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 

brief stating that 

there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, but questioning 

whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing 

sentence. Redd has filed a pro se supplemental brief in which 

he, too, challenges his sentence. The Government has moved to 

dismiss the appeal of Redd’s sentence based on Redd’s waiver of 

appellate rights. We dismiss in part and affirm in part. 

 * Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
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(4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 

(4th Cir. 1991). The question of whether a defendant validly 

waived his right to appeal is a question of law that this court 

reviews de novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 

(4th Cir. 2005). 

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that 

Redd knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal his 

sentence. We therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss

in part and dismiss Redd’s appeal of his sentence. Although 

Redd’s appeal waiver insulates his sentence from appellate 

review, the waiver does not preclude our review of Redd’s 

conviction pursuant to Anders. 

Redd moved in the district court to withdraw his 

guilty plea, and, by so moving, preserved the issue of the 

adequacy of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing. See United States 

v. Hairston, 522 F.3d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 2008). Our review of 

the transcript of the Rule 11 hearing leads us to conclude that 

the district court did not commit reversible error in accepting 

Redd’s guilty plea. Although the district court failed to 

ensure that Redd understood its obligation in determining a 

sentence to consider possible departures under the Sentencing 

Guidelines, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(M), we 

conclude that this error did not affect Redd’s substantial 

rights and therefore disregard it as harmless. See Fed. R. 
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Crim. P. 11(h); Hairston, 522 F.3d at 341. The court otherwise 

complied with Rule 11 in accepting Redd’s guilty plea, ensuring 

that the plea was supported by an independent factual basis and 

that Redd entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily with an 

understanding of the consequences. See United States v. 

DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). 

With respect to the district court’s denial of Redd’s 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we review that decision for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Dyess, 478 F.3d 224, 237 

(4th Cir. 2007). In determining whether a defendant has met his 

burden, six factors must be considered: 

(1) whether the defendant has offered credible 

evidence that his plea was not knowing or otherwise 

involuntary; (2) whether the defendant has credibly 

asserted his legal innocence; (3) whether there has 

been a delay between entry of the plea and filing of 

the motion; (4) whether the defendant has had close 

assistance of counsel; (5) whether withdrawal will 

cause prejudice to the [G]overnment; and (6) whether 

withdrawal will inconvenience the court and waste 

judicial resources. 

United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). 

An appropriately conducted Rule 11 proceeding, however, 

“raise[s] a strong presumption that the plea is final and 

binding.” United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 

(4th Cir. 1992). Here, the Rule 11 proceeding was appropriately 

conducted, and Redd’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily 

made. We conclude that Redd did not credibly assert his legal 
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innocence and that the motion to withdraw, filed nearly a year 

after Redd entered his guilty plea, was untimely. It is 

undisputed that Redd had the close assistance of trial counsel. 

Finally, allowing Redd to withdraw his guilty plea would have 

prejudiced the Government and inconvenienced the district court. 

We are therefore satisfied that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Redd’s motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea. Dyess, 478 F.3d at 237. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues remaining for 

appeal. We therefore affirm Redd’s conviction. This court 

requires that counsel inform Redd, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Redd requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Redd. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

DISMISSED IN PART;

AFFIRMED IN PART