Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2833 | July 23, 2019 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Ronald Harris

Michigan City, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. Whitehead

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ronald Harris,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 23, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-PC-2833

Appeal from the Porter Superior 

Court

The Honorable Jeffrey Clymer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

64D02-9102-CF-19

Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2833 | July 23, 2019 Page 2 of 13

[1] Ronald Harris appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. We 

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The relevant facts as discussed in Harris’s 1993 direct appeal follow:

Portage police Sergeant Osberg found filling station attendant 

Harchand Dahliwahl dead in the Hudson Oil gas station in 

Portage. Dahliwahl had suffered a massive head wound 

determined to have been caused by a blast from a shotgun. 

Approximately $327 was missing from the station. During their 

investigation, police learned that Chris Peterson was involved in 

the robbery and killing. Police obtained a search warrant and 

recovered a sawed-off shotgun in Peterson’s automobile.

Following Peterson’s arrest, his girlfriend, Marpessa Chase, 

informed police that Ronald Harris . . . was a friend of Peterson. 

Police then interviewed [Harris] on two separate occasions. 

Harris denied having anything to do with the shooting. He also 

denied the shootings in a taped telephone conversation with 

Chase. During an interview with FBI agents, [Harris] told them 

that he and Peterson “were driving around drinking and snorting 

cocaine when Peterson went in and shot a man.”

Following approximately six hours of interrogation, [Harris] 

made a statement to the officers wherein he acknowledged that 

he had known Peterson for many years and that following 

Peterson’s service in the Marine Corps and his return home they 

renewed their friendship. He stated he knew that Peterson 

possessed a sawed-off shotgun and that he carried it with him.

Just prior to the killing, they were driving around using cocaine, 

marijuana and drinking beer and Peterson became very angry 

because another driver cut him off in traffic. Shortly thereafter, 

while Peterson was still quite angry, they stopped at the filling 

station and Peterson entered and shot the attendant.
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[Harris] claimed that after the shooting Peterson returned to the 

vehicle and that he yelled at him and asked him why he had done 

such a thing. [Harris] claimed he told Peterson he wanted 

nothing to do with the money Peterson obtained in the robbery 

and that he became frightened of Peterson fearing that he might 

kill him.

The police then investigated a very similar shooting which had 

occurred in Cedar Lake, Indiana. [Harris] admitted being with 

Peterson on the night of the Cedar Lake shooting and then made 

a statement that he and Peterson had been driving around in 

Peterson’s car and went to Cedar Lake. He said Peterson stated 

he wanted to buy some “Tops” rolling papers and parked in a 

dark area near a filling station in Cedar Lake.

[Harris] claims he remained in the automobile. Peterson took the 

shotgun and entered the station. Thereafter [Harris] stated that 

he heard a loud noise like an automobile backfire. Shortly 

thereafter Peterson returned to the vehicle, placed the shotgun in 

the back seat, and covered it with his coat or a small blanket. He 

was carrying a dark colored purse which he handed to [Harris]. 

Various items from the purse and the purse itself were thrown 

from the car as they proceeded down the road and later were 

recovered.

In his statement, [Harris] acknowledged that since the shooting 

in Cedar Lake he had changed his physical appearance in that he 

had grown a moustache and a short beard. In addition, he cut 

his hair. He stated that on the night of the shooting his hair was 

at least collar length and described it as stringy in appearance.

After giving the second statement to the police, Harris was 

arrested for the Hudson Oil station shooting. During his 

statements and at trial, [Harris] claimed he merely accompanied 

Peterson and did not participate in the robberies or the shootings.

Evidence concerning the Cedar Lake shooting was presented at 

the trial. Carrie Jillson testified that she and Rhonda 

Hammersley (the person killed at the Cedar Lake robbery) were 
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working from 2:30 to 10:30 p.m. at the Petro Mart gas station in 

Cedar Lake. As they were closing the station, they noticed a 

two-door car drive by slowly and the occupants looked at them.

Approximately three to five minutes later, a man ran from 

behind the car and shot Hammersley in the head with a shotgun.

Jillson testified that the gun then was placed against the back of 

her head but she heard someone say, “All right, that’s enough.

Let’s go.”

Harris v. State, 617 N.E.2d 912, 913-914 (Ind. 1993), reh’g denied, overruled by 

Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied.

[3] On December 13, 1990, the State charged Harris with assisting a criminal as a 

class C felony, murder (aiding, inducing, or causing an offense), and felony 

murder. At trial, 

Michael Lynn testified that he was incarcerated with [Harris]. 

During that time, [Harris] told Lynn that Peterson was his best 

friend, that they had been going out doing robberies and doing 

drugs and that they were shooting people during the robberies 

with a .12 gauge shotgun. He stated that he was nervous about 

this activity and that Peterson told him he could change his 

appearance with his haircut and his moustache. [Harris] told 

Lynn specifics concerning the robbery at the Hudson Oil station 

and also stated that he had been involved in the Cedar Lake 

shooting although he claimed that Peterson was the triggerman.

Id. at 914. After a trial, Harris was convicted as charged, and the court merged 

the count of aiding and inducing or causing murder into the felony murder 

conviction. Id. at 913. On direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed 

the convictions but held that the trial court erred in sentencing Harris on both 
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the assisting a criminal and the felony murder charges and remanded to merge 

the convictions of felony murder and assisting a criminal. See id. at 915-916.

[4] On remand, the trial court merged the assisting a criminal charge with the 

felony murder conviction and then found that the original felony murder 

sentence was appropriate, enhancing the forty-year sentence by twenty years for 

four aggravating circumstances. Harris v. State, 643 N.E.2d 309, 310 (Ind. 

1994). Harris appealed and argued that the sixty-year sentence was improper 

because the trial court failed to set forth any mitigating circumstances. Id. The 

Indiana Supreme Court held that Harris was precluded from relitigating the 

issue on either res judicata or waiver grounds and affirmed the trial court. Id.

[5] On January 24, 1995, Harris, pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief.1 

On March 2, 1995, Attorney John Pinnow filed an appearance on behalf of 

Harris. On May 3, 1995, Harris’s counsel filed a belated motion for an 

indefinite continuance, which the court granted. On December 2, 1996, 

Harris’s counsel filed a verified motion to withdraw, which the post-conviction 

court granted.2

 

 

1 The record does not contain a copy of Harris’s petition for post-conviction relief.

2 The record does not contain a copy of the motion to withdraw. Without citation to the record, Harris 

asserts that his counsel: stated that he had reviewed the record of proceedings from the trial, the direct appeal 

briefs, and opinions; spoke with trial and appellate counsel concerning the post-conviction allegations; spoke 

with him in person; withdrew his appearance because he had determined the petition was not meritorious;

and provided him with an explanation of the reasons for withdrawal. 
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[6] On August 28, 2003, Harris filed a motion for leave to amend petition and 

motion for appointment of counsel. On September 2, 2003, the court entered 

an order denying Harris’s motion for appointment of counsel, granting Harris’s 

motion to file an amended petition, and scheduling a hearing for November 21, 

2003 on the amended petition.

3

 On November 21, 2003, the court held a 

hearing. An entry in the chronological case summary dated November 21, 

2003, states in part: “Deft requests continuance. Court grants request for 

continuance. Cause to be re-set for hrg at such time as the deft notifies this 

Court that he is ready to proceed to hrg on his amended petition for PCR.” 

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 14. 

[7] On March 1, 2018, Harris filed a “2ND VERIFIED AMENDMENT TO 

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION” in which he argued ineffectiveness of 

trial and appellate counsel with respect to certain jury instructions, lineup

procedures, and the admission of evidence of other crimes.4

 Id. at 19. On May 

24, 2018, the State filed an answer to Harris’s second amended petition which 

denied all material allegations and asserted the defenses of res judicata and 

waiver. 

 

3 The record does not contain a copy of the 2003 amended petition. 

4 Without citation to the record, Harris asserts that he sought assistance from the Public Defender’s Office in 

October 2018, that the case was again referred to Attorney Pinnow, and that Attorney Pinnow made the 

claim that he had reviewed his prior case file as well as the petition filed on March 1, 2018, and that it was his 

opinion that the claim of newly discovered evidence held no merit and filed a notice of non-representation. 
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[8] On October 23, 2018, the court entered an order denying Harris’s March 2018 

filing. Specifically, the court’s order states:

On March 1, 2018, [Harris], pro-se, filed with the Court a 2nd

Verified Amendment to Petition for Post-Conviction. The State 

of Indiana filed an answer on May 24, 2018 with the Court. 

After review of the Petitioner’s Motion, the State’s answer and 

the Court files in this cause, the Court finds as follows:

1. On January 24, 1995, [Harris], pro-se, filed a Petition for PostConviction Relief.

2. The State of Indiana filed a Response to the first PCR Petition 

on February 2, 1995.

3. On February 24, 1995, the Public Defender of Indiana 

appointed counsel to represent the Petition for purposes of PostConviction Relief filed on January 24, 1995. 

4. On March 2, 1995, Attorney John Pinnow of the State’s 

Public Defender’s Office entered an appearance on behalf of 

[Harris].

5. On December 2, 1996, Attorney Pinnow filed a Motion to 

Withdraw his appearance.

6. On December 6, 1996, the Court granted Attorney Pinnow’s 

Motion to Withdraw.

7. On August 28, 2003, [Harris], pro-se, filed a Motion for Leave 

to Amend Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Amended Petition 

for Post-Conviction Relief and a Motion for Appointment of 

Counsel.

8. On August 28, 2003, the State of Indiana filed an Objection to 

[Harris’s] Motion for Appointment of Counsel and a Response to 

[Harris’s] Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
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9. On September 2, 2003, The Court Denied [Harris’s] Motion 

for Counsel and Granted [Harris’s] Motion and ordered the 

Amended Petition be filed of record. The Court also set the 

matter for Hearing on November 21, 2003 at 1:30 pm and 

[Harris] was ordered to be transported from the Indiana 

Department of Correction.

10. On November 21, 2003, a Hearing was held at which time 

[Harris] requested a continuance in order to present additional 

research and/or evidence on his amended petition. Court 

granted [Harris’s] request and hearing was to be re-set once 

[Harris] notified the Court he was ready to proceed.

11. On March 1, 2018, [Harris], pro-se, filed a 2nd Verified 

Amendment to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

12. On May 24, 2018, the State of Indiana filed an Answer to 

[Harris’s] Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

The Court finds this is a successive petition and the Petitioner has 

not complied with Post Conviction Relief section 12. The Court 

also finds that the Court does not have jurisdiction as this 

petition has not been authorized by the Court of Appeals to file. 

Therefore, the Court does now, without hearing, DENY, 

[Harris’s] 2nd Verified Amendment to Petition for PostConviction Relief.

Id. at 60-61.

Discussion

[9] Before addressing Harris’s allegations of error, we observe that Harris is 

proceeding pro se. Such litigants are held to the same standard as trained 

counsel. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. 

Harris asks that we examine the second amended petition filed on March 1, 
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2018. He argues that he had an absolute right to amend the petition prior to 

judgment. Without citation to the record, he asserts that his convictions should 

be overturned and his sentence vacated because “the principal (Christopher 

Peterson AKA Obadyah Ben-Yisrayl) was acquitted of (an) alleged murder in a 

separate jury trial, and had a writ of habeas corpus granted where the Porter 

County Prosecutor refused to retry the principal of the crimes that [he] is 

currently convicted of as an accomplice.” Appellant’s Brief at 20-21 

(underlining omitted).5

 The State asserts that the post-conviction court properly 

denied Harris’s petition because: it constituted a successive petition and this 

Court had not yet approved a successive petition; Harris no longer had, as a 

matter of right, leave to amend the petition; and his claims are precluded based 

upon res judicata.

[10] Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(12) governs successive petitions and provides:

(a) A petitioner may request a second, or successive, Petition for 

Post-Conviction Relief by completing a properly and legibly 

completed Successive Post-Conviction Relief Rule 1 Petition

Form in substantial compliance with the form appended to this 

Rule. Both the Successive Post-Conviction Relief Rule 1 Petition 

Form and the proposed successive petition for post-conviction 

 

5 Harris asserts elsewhere in his brief that Ben-Yisrayl’s conviction was overturned and reversed by the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and appears to cite Ben-Yisrayl v. Davis, 431 F.3d 1043, 

1053 (7th Cir. 2005), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, which held that the prosecutor improperly challenged BenYisrayl to explain his confession to the jury and invited the jury to infer guilt from his silence and to deem his 

confession reliable and accurate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of Ben-Yisrayl’s 

petition for writ of habeas corpus and remanded with instructions “to grant the writ unless the State of 

Indiana elects to retry him within 120 days from the issuance of this opinion.” 431 F.3d at 1053. We note 

that Ben-Yisrayl was convicted of other murders. See Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 531 (Ind. 1996), reh’g 

denied, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1078, 118 S. Ct. 858 (1998).
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relief shall be sent to the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court, 

Indiana Court of Appeals, and Tax Court.

(b) The court will authorize the filing of the petition if the 

petitioner establishes a reasonable possibility that the petitioner is 

entitled to post-conviction relief. In making this determination, 

the court may consider applicable law, the petition, and materials 

from the petitioner’s prior appellate and post-conviction 

proceedings including the record, briefs and court decisions, and 

any other material the court deems relevant.

(c) If the court authorizes the filing of the petition, it is to be (1) 

filed in the court where the petitioner’s first post-conviction relief 

petition was adjudicated for consideration pursuant to this rule 

by the same judge if that judge is available, and (2) referred to the 

State Public Defender, who may represent the petitioner as 

provided in Section 9(a) of this Rule. Authorization to file a 

successive petition is not a determination on the merits for any 

other purpose and does not preclude summary disposition 

pursuant to Section (4)(g) of this Rule.

[11] The “Form for Successive Post-Conviction Relief Petitions” under the 

Appendix to Post-Conviction Rule 1 references a decision on the merits. 

Specifically, it provides in part: 

INSTRUCTIONS--READ CAREFULLY

If you have previously filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

directed to this conviction or these convictions and the earlier 

petition was decided on the merits, you must fill out this form and 

file it along with your Petition. It must be legibly handwritten or 

typewritten, signed by the petitioner before a person authorized 

to take oaths and properly notarized. Since this must be signed 

under oath, any false statement of a material fact herein may 

serve as the basis of prosecution and conviction for perjury. 

Exercise care to be sure all answers are true and correct.
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You must mail the original and two copies of this form along 

with your petition to the Clerk of the Supreme Court and Court 

of Appeals . . . . The Clerk will refer your petition to the 

Supreme Court in death penalty cases and the Indiana Court of 

Appeals in all other cases. The court will then decide whether 

your petition may be filed in the trial court where your first PostConviction Remedy Rule 1 petition was adjudicated.

NOTE: The court will allow a second or successive petition for 

post-conviction relief to be filed if the petitioner establishes a 

reasonable possibility that the petitioner is entitled to postconviction relief. However, a petitioner does not establish a 

reasonable possibility that the petitioner is entitled to postconviction relief, for example, (1) if the petitioner only alleges 

grounds for relief that are not different from those which have 

already been decided on the merits, or (2) if the only grounds 

alleged, even if different, should have been alleged in an earlier 

proceeding.

Appendix to Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 (Emphases added). 

[12] Even assuming that Harris’s March 1, 2018 filing did not constitute a successive 

petition because a decision on the merits had not been previously rendered, we 

cannot say that reversal is warranted. 

[13] Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(c) provides in part that “[t]he petitioner shall be 

given leave to amend the petition as a matter of right no later than sixty [60] 

days prior to the date the petition has been set for trial” and that “[a]ny later 

amendment of the petition shall be by leave of the court.” “[T]he plain 

language of the Rule compels us to review the post-conviction court’s actions in 

this regard under an abuse of discretion standard.” Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 

581, 584 (Ind. 2001). “Outside of the plain language of the rule, two additional 
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arguments support an abuse of discretion review.” Id. “First, employing an 

abuse of discretion standard gives the post-conviction court the ability to curtail 

attempts by petitioners, including those in capital cases, to delay final judgment 

on their petitions.” Id. “Second, abuse of discretion is the well-established 

standard of review for voluntary motions to dismiss in the somewhat rare cases 

when such motions are subject to appeal.” Id.

[14] The record reveals that Harris, pro se, filed his petition for post-conviction relief 

on January 24, 1995, and that the court granted the filing of an amended 

petition on September 2, 2003, scheduled a hearing on the second amended 

petition for November 21, 2003, and held a hearing that day. Harris filed his 

March 1, 2018 second verified amendment to his petition more than fourteen 

years after November 21, 2003. Thus, the amendment required leave of the 

court. We cannot say the court abused its discretion.6

[15] We also observe that the record does not contain a copy of Harris’s initial 

January 24, 1995 petition for post-conviction relief or his amended petition filed 

in 2003. Harris does not refer to these petitions. Rather, he asks that we 

 

6 To support his assertion that he had an absolute right to amend the petition prior to judgment, Harris cites 

Neeley v. State, 269 Ind. 588, 382 N.E.2d 714 (1978), overruled on other grounds by German v. State, 428 N.E.2d 

234 (Ind. 1981). At the time Neeley was decided, Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(c) provided: “At any time 

prior to entry of judgment the court may grant leave to withdraw the petition, and the petitioner shall be 

given leave to amend the petition as a matter of right.” The Indiana Supreme Court in Neeley held that “[t]he 

second phrase of Ind. R. P.C. 1 § 4(c) grants the petitioner an absolute right to amend a present petition for 

post-conviction relief prior to judgment.” Neeley, 269 Ind. at 591, 382 N.E.2d at 716. In 1995, Ind. PostConviction Rule 1(4)(c) was amended to provide: “At any time prior to entry of judgment the court may 

grant leave to withdraw the petition. The petitioner shall be given leave to amend the petition as a matter of 

right no later than sixty [60] days prior to the date the petition has been set for trial. Any later amendment of 

the petition shall be by leave of the court.” 
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“examine the Amendment filed on March 01, 2018.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. 

Under the circumstances, we cannot say that reversal is warranted. 

[16] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court.

[17] Affirmed.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.