ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

Morris v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 2013 IL App (2d) 120760

Appellate Court

Caption

DENNIS R. MORRIS and DOROTHY J. MORRIS, PlaintiffsAppellants, v. INGERSOLL CUTTING TOOL COMPANY and D.I.

PROPERTIES, INC., Defendant-Appellees.

 District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-12-0760

Filed September 16, 2013

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

In an action for the injury plaintiff suffered when he tripped and fell in a

loading bay at defendants’ business while making a delivery, the trial

court properly entered summary judgment for defendants on the ground

that the 11⁄2-inch defect in the surface in the area where plaintiff fell was

de minimis and not actionable in the absence of any aggravating factors

that would be sufficient to negate the de minimis rule.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, No. 10-L-423; the

Hon. Eugene G. Doherty, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on

Appeal

Louis F. Pignatelli and Elizabeth Uhrich, both of Pignatelli & Associates,

P.C., of Rock Falls, for appellants.

William W. Ranard, Julie A. Teuscher, and Lea Ann C. Fracasso, all of

Cassiday Schade LLP, of Chicago, for appellees.

Panel JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Burke and Justice McLaren concurred in the judgment

and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiffs, Dennis Morris (Morris) and DorothyMorris, appeal from the trial court’s grant

of summary judgment to defendants, Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co. (Ingersoll) and D.I.

Properties, Inc. (D.I.). Plaintiffs brought a negligence suit against defendants after Morris

tripped and fell on defendants’ property. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to maintain

the premises in a reasonably safe condition. In granting defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, the trial court held that the defect on which plaintiff tripped, measuring 11⁄2 inches

high, was de minimis and thus not actionable. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the de minimis

rule should not be applied given the overall size of the defect and the applicability of other

aggravating factors. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On June 29, 2009, Morris, in his capacity as a truck driver for Con-way Freight (Conway), stopped at the premises owned by D.I. and leased by Ingersoll to receive goods, as he

had done three or four times previously. Morris backed his truck to the loading bay and

began to disembark from the vehicle, facing the inside of his vehicle, in accordance with

Con-waypolicy. Afterreaching the ground, while still facing the trailer, Morris stepped back

with his right foot in order to shut the trailer door. His foot caught on a difference in

elevation in the ground, which he estimated to be 11⁄2 inches, causing him to fall and sustain

injury. Morris was aware of the crack prior to June 29, 2009, and had informed defendants

of it.

¶ 4 Rick Davis testified in a deposition that he was the facilities manager of defendants’

premises. When asked whetherthe defect was located where a truck driver would be stepping

out of his truck, Davis stated that it was dependent on the length of the trailer and how far

a particular trailer was backed into the loading bay. Davis had taken classes covering tripand-fall prevention where he learned that a one-inch difference in elevation was a rough

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guideline for a trip hazard. He conducted weekly inspections for hazards on the premises, but

there were no written procedures for these inspections or for his job duties. There were

approximately 350 employees at the facility.

¶ 5 On October 25, 2011, plaintiffs’ expert, Gary Hutter, visited the site with Morris and

measured the defect. Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from Hutter stating:

“The defect on which Mr. Morris tripped on June 30, 2009[,] is as follows: the asphalt

and portions of the curb and associated curb gutter in the area of the fall had cracked in

several directions and through a combination of subsidence and erosion, and presented

an approximately: 1) 2.5 foot long, 1 foot wide, and 1.5 inches deep depression in the

asphalt; and 2) the associated curb and gutter section had an adjacent approximately one

foot long, 6 inch [sic], and 0.75 inch deep depression.”

Plaintiffs also submitted Morris’s own affidavit stating that the defect described by Hutter

was the defect on which he tripped.

¶ 6 Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on the basis that

the defect in question was de minimis and therefore not actionable. The trial court refused

to consider the measurements of the defect beyond the 11⁄2-inch height discrepancy, as

Morris’s deposition testimony did not indicate that anything beyond the height led him to

trip. The court also noted that Hutter’s testimony “concerning what the defect looks like now

is dubious when describing a condition which he himself suggests takes place over time.

Plaintiff did not describe such a depression, just a change in elevation” (emphases in

original).

¶ 7 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 8 On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in determining that the defect over

which Morris tripped was de minimis, thereby foreclosing their negligence claim.

Additionally, plaintiffs argue that the presence of aggravating factors removes the case from

the de minimis rule and that the trial court erred in ignoring or rejecting the aggravating

factors. Ultimately, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting summaryjudgment

in favor of defendants.

¶ 9 Plaintiffs argue that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the defect in the

asphalt in the area adjacent to defendants’ loading bay was de minimis and therefore the trial

court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. “Summary judgment is

appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file,when viewed

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue of

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Perez v.

Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 2012 IL App (2d) 110382, ¶ 7. We review de novo a grant of summary

judgment. Shannon v. Boise Cascade Corp., 208 Ill. 2d 517, 524 (2004).

¶ 10 We now turn to plaintiffs’ claim of negligence. To state a cause of action for negligence,

a plaintiff must allege facts establishing a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff,

a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by that breach. Marshall v. Burger

King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 430 (2006). “A duty is an obligation imposed by law which

requires one to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of another against

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an unreasonable risk.” Hartung v. Maple Investment & Development Corp., 243 Ill. App. 3d

811, 813 (1993). Whether the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff and the scope of that

duty are questions of law. Glass v. City of Chicago, 323 Ill. App. 3d 158, 165 (2001). In

determining whether a duty exists and the scope of that duty, we consider the foreseeability

of injury, the likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury,

and the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant. Simpkins v. CSX

Transportation, Inc., 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 18.

¶ 11 Here, there is no question that defendants, the owner and lessee of the premises, owed

Morris a duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition. See Choate v. Indiana

Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 2012 IL 112948, ¶ 24 (“an owner or occupier of land *** owes a duty

of reasonable care under the circumstances to all entrants upon the premises except to

trespassers”); Hartung, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 816 (an owner or occupier’s duty is of reasonable

care under the circumstances and is to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition).

The question, however, is whether the scope of defendants’ duty included repairing a 11⁄2-

inch crack located in the loading bay where Morris’s semitrailer was parked. Typically,

courts have applied a de minimis analysis to outdoor surface defects located on sidewalks or

parkways. Here, the trial court found that the de minimis rule applied. Thus, we determine

whether the de minimis rule applies here to the defect located in defendants’ loading bay.

¶ 12 If a defect is such that a reasonably prudent person would not anticipate some danger to

persons walking upon it, it is considered de minimis and is not actionable. See Arvidson v.

City of Elmhurst, 11 Ill. 2d 601, 605 (1957). The de minimis rule recognizes that minor

defects are outside the scope of a landowner’s duty to maintain the property in a reasonably

safe condition, for the purposes for which the property is intended. See Hartung, 243 Ill.

App. 3d at 814 (“[t]he de minimis rule *** is rooted in the scope of municipalities’ duty to

maintain their property in a reasonably safe condition”). The rule has been extended to

private landowners and recognizes that requiring that sidewalks be kept free of minor defects

would be unduly burdensome and impractical (id. at 817) and could be intolerably expensive

(Putman v. Village of Bensenville, 337 Ill. App. 3d 197, 202 (2003)). There is no

mathematical formula or bright-line rule as to what constitutes a slight defect, and each case

must be determined on its own facts. Hartung, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 814.

¶ 13 However, as the Fourth District has noted, liability generally attaches for sidewalk

defects approaching two inches in height. Birck v. City of Quincy, 241 Ill. App. 3d 119, 121,

124-25 (1993) (1f-inch elevation between two concrete slabs not actionable). The de

minimis rule generally precludes negligence claims on lesser defects, absent aggravating

circumstances. See, e.g., Hartung, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 816-17 (applying the de minimis rule

to three-quarter-inch sidewalk defect near a shopping center as it did not create a reasonably

foreseeable risk of harm, noting the burden on the shopping center and the extreme Illinois

weather conditions). Certainly here, a 11⁄2-inch defect, located in an area not intended for and

with little pedestrian traffic, is a minor defect, falling within the ambit of the de minimisrule.

However, as there is no mathematical formula in applying the de minimisrule (Hartung, 243

Ill. App. 3d at 814), we consider the scope of defendants’ duty with respect to the

foreseeability of injury, the likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding

against the injury, and the consequences of placing that burden on defendants. Simpkins,

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2012 IL 110662, ¶ 18.

¶ 14 Defendants’ duty of care toward Morris was not to maintain their premises in perfect

condition, but to avoid creating an unreasonable risk of harm to Morris. See Hartung, 243

Ill. App. 3d at 816 (a landowner’s duty is “to avoid creating an unreasonable risk of harm

to an invitee” (emphasis in original)). We do not conclude that the 11⁄2-inch defect here

created an unreasonable risk of harm to Morris. His injury was not reasonably foreseeable,

as it occurred in an industrial area used specifically for large semitrailers to be loaded with

goods. For the same reason, the likelihood of injury was minor, as the area was not for

pedestrian use, but was traversed by large, heavy trucks carrying heavy loads. We also

consider the burden of guarding against the injury and the consequences of placing that

burden on defendants. Plaintiffs argue that the cost to defendants in repairing a 11⁄2-inch

defect would be slight. However, requiring defendants to repair every 11⁄2-inch defect in the

loading bay area would create an economic burden similar to that of the shopping center in

Hartung. Id. at 816-17. We acknowledge that the total area of sidewalks surrounding the

shopping center in Hartung may have been greater than the total area of the loading bay here,

thus presenting a greater immediate economic burden. However, in refusing to apply the de

minimis rule, we would be placing a heavy economic burden on defendants over time. The

loading bay here is far more susceptible to defects than the shopping mall sidewalks in

Hartung, as it is trafficked by large trucks with heavy loads. Further, plaintiffs fail to support

their contention that the cost of repair would be minor. Even viewing the record in the light

most favorable to plaintiffs, as the trial court noted, defendants’ facility is staffed by 350

employees and has a separate entrance for the public. This does not support an inference that

the facility is small or that repairing the asphalt would not be burdensome to defendants,

especially over a number of years.

¶ 15 Furthermore, as the area in question is not used as a pedestrian area like a sidewalk, it is

helpful to compare the area to a parkway. When applied to parkways, the de minimisrule has

allowed for height variations that might be unacceptable in a sidewalk. E.g., Barnhisel v.

Village of Oak Park, 311 Ill. App. 3d 108, 115 (1999) (21⁄2-inch height differential between

sidewalk and parkway causing plaintiff to fall was not unreasonably dangerous). While we

acknowledge that courts have applied this dichotomy only in the context of the Local

Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort ImmunityAct (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq.

(West 2012); Mazin v. Chicago White Sox, Ltd., 358 Ill. App. 3d 856, 861 (2005)), we find

the logic behind the parkway/sidewalk distinction useful here.

¶ 16 Courts have noted that nonsidewalk areas, such as parkways, are held to a lesser standard,

in part due to the changing conditions inherent in a landscaped area. See, e.g., Marshall v.

City of Centralia, 143 Ill. 2d 1, 10-11 (1991) (“parkways are composed of sod and earth and

are therefore more susceptible to weather damage caused by rain and snow”). Here, the wear

and tear on a loading bay traversed by these vehicles is more akin to the changing conditions

of a parkway than to the light pedestrian use of a sidewalk. See id. at 10 (discussing the

limited pedestrian uses of parkways: accessing a vehicle, retrieving mail, reaching a

neighbor’s house, boarding a bus, allowing pedestrian traffic to pass, completing yard work).

Furthermore, just as a parkway has a far more limited pedestrian use than a sidewalk, here

the loading bay is explicitly for vehicular use, in an industrial environment. Just as a

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pedestrian cannot expect sidewalk conditions on a parkway, neither can he expect sidewalk

conditions in a loading bay used for large semitrailers. See id. (“[p]edestrians who leave the

sidewalk cannot assume that parkways are free of defects or undulations as they otherwise

could when traveling on the sidewalk”). Even so, it is not clear that the defect in question

here would be actionable even if it were located on a sidewalk. See, e.g., Birck, 241 Ill. App.

3d at 124-25 (holding a 1f-inch sidewalk defect to be de minimis).

¶ 17 Applying the de minimis rule to the 11⁄2-inch defect here is consistent with the

justifications behind the rule. We hold that, without more, the 11⁄2-inch crack in defendants’

property was de minimis.

¶ 18 Plaintiffs further argue that, even if the defect would be considered de minimis, the

aggravating factors of its dimensions and its location, specifically, in an area of ingress and

egress where Morris would be distracted, remove the defect from such classification. Courts

have found that the de minimis rule does not apply under certain aggravating circumstances

such as the location of the defect (e.g., Baker v. City of Granite City, 75 Ill. App. 3d 157, 160

(1979) (noting that an actionable defect 4 inches wide and 13⁄4 to 2 inches deep located on

a busy commercial sidewalk might not be actionable if it were located in a residential area)),

its width (see, e.g., Repinski v. Jubilee Oil Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 15, 20-21 (1980) (considering

the 11⁄2-foot diameter of a sidewalk defect 11⁄2 inches deep); West v. City of Hoopeston, 146

Ill. App. 3d 538, 542-43 (1986) (considering the two-inch width of a sidewalk defect a

quarter of an inch deep)), or a policy of repairing such defects (Martinkovic v. City of Aurora,

150 Ill. App. 3d 589, 594 (1986) (removing defect from de minimis analysis where defendant

had an express policy of repairing defects over one inch)).

¶ 19 Plaintiffs first argue that, even if the height of the defect alone is de minimis, the width

and breadth of the “depression in the asphalt and the associated curb and gutter section” must

be considered. Although in Morris’s deposition testimony he referred to catching the back

of his heel in “the crack,” which he estimated to be between 1 and 11⁄2 inches high, his

affidavit stated that the defect on which he tripped “is the same defect described in the report

of Gary Hutter.”

¶ 20 Defendants argue that we should not consider these dimensions of the defect, because

Hutter’s affidavit violates Illinois Supreme Court Rule 191 (eff. Jan. 4, 2013) and should not

have been considered by the trial court. Plaintiffs argue that defendants have raised this

argument for the first time on appeal and thus we should not consider it. We agree with

plaintiffs, as a partymay not attack the sufficiency of an affidavit for the first time on appeal.

Kolakowski v. Voris, 83 Ill. 2d 388, 398 (1980). Furthermore, defendants fail to specify the

reasons why the report violates Rule 191, and defendants themselves referenced the report

in their motion for summary judgment, such that they are estopped from changing their

position on appeal. See In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 172-73 (2005) (a party

is not allowed to adopt and benefit from one position in the trial court and then expediently

change its position in the appellate court).

¶ 21 Defendants also argue that the other dimensions did not cause Morris’s fall and thus we

should not consider them. However, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

plaintiffs, we accept the dimensions adopted in Morris’s affidavit, as describing the defect

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that caused his fall. Thus, we consider whetherthe added dimensions of 21⁄2 feet in length and

1 foot in width are aggravating factors that remove the defect from the de minimis rule.

¶ 22 While a 21⁄2-foot by 1-foot defect in a sidewalk may be a sufficient aggravating factor, the

question here is whether those dimensions are aggravating factors in defendants’ loading

bay. This defect on a sidewalk, which averages 5 feet in width (Illinois Department of

Transportation,Bureau of Design & Environment Manual, ch. 58.106 (2010)), would be over

40% of the sidewalk’s width. The chances that a pedestrian would encounter the defect, and

thus the foreseeability and likelihood of injury, would be increased by those added

dimensions. In contrast, those dimensions here, in relation to the total length of the loading

bay, have little effect on foreseeability. The photographs in the record show the loading bay

to be at least the length of a semitrailer. As the maximum length of a tractor-semitrailer

combination permitted in Illinoisis 65 feet from front to rear axle (625 ILCS 5/15-107 (West

2012)), we assume the loading bay to be at least that length, if not actually longer. Because 1

21⁄2 feet of the total 65 feet is less than 4% of the length of the loading bay, the chances that

the defect will be encountered are low, and far less than if the defect were located on a

sidewalk. Thus, the foreseeability and likelihood of injury are also low. Because the defect

is but a small crack in the entire loading bay area, its added dimensions do not preclude

application of the de minimis rule. We acknowledge that plaintiffs are concerned with an 2

area of the loading bay that is smaller than the full length of the loading bay. However, we

address below Morris’s argument with respect to ingress and egress to his vehicle, that is, the

smaller area of the loading bay where a driver might expect to encounter the defect.

¶ 23 Plaintiffs further argue that, because the defect is in an area of ingress and egress to

Morris’s truck, Morris had no choice but to encounter it, and, because he would be distracted

upon encountering the defect, the de minimis rule does not apply. In support, plaintiffs cite

Harris v. Old Kent Bank, 315 Ill. App. 3d 894 (2000).

¶ 24 In Harris, the plaintiff tripped on a one-inch defect on the sidewalk leading to

defendant’s bank. Id. at 895-96. The plaintiff had exited the building and was walking toward

her car, which was parked in the parking space nearest to the bank. Id. at 895. The sidewalk

consisted of a short portion leading from that parking space to the bank and a longer portion

running parallel to the length of the bank and adjacent to the other parking spaces for bank

Under ourstandard of review, we are to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 1

nonmoving party. Perez, 2012 IL App (2d) 110382, ¶ 7. In keeping with this standard, we assume

that the loading bay is at least the length of the longest permissible tractor-semitrailer combination.

The measurement from front to rear axle actually results in a shorter distance than the measurement

from the nose of the tractor to the tail of the semitrailer, and so probably somewhat understates the

length of the loading bay, which accrues to plaintiffs’ (the nonmoving parties’) favor.

Our calculation of the percentage of the sidewalk or loading bay occupied by a defect of 2

the given dimensionsisfor the purpose of concretizing an abstract discussion and providing a readily

comprehensible illustration. It should not be viewed as an attempt to formulate a bright-line rule.

Rather, it is to distinguish the defect here, using a concrete example, from the sidewalk cases that

have held defects of similar dimensions to be outside of the de minimis rule.

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patrons. Id. While recognizing that the defect was of similar dimensions to the defect in

Hartung, we distinguished the defect on the basis that it was located on a sidewalk used

exclusively for ingress and egress to the bank. We noted that a landowner has a duty to

provide safe ingress and egress to his premises. Id. at 901-02. In finding that a genuine issue

of material fact existed as to whether the defect was de minimis, we found that the risk of

harm was reasonably foreseeable as the sidewalk was the only means of ingress and egress

and an exiting patron “might be reviewing the receipts of her transactions, looking for her

car keys, or looking toward her car and, therefore, would not discover the sidewalk defect.”

Id. at 902. We further noted that the defendant’s economic burden of prevention, as

compared to that of a municipality or a shopping center, would be less substantial, as the

amount of sidewalk to be monitored and maintained was relatively slight. Id.

¶ 25 The facts here are distinguishable. While Harris concerned a sidewalk leading to the

entrance of a bank, the defect here was located in defendants’ loading bay. As previously

discussed, sidewalk conditions are not to be expected in an industrial parking lot used to load

semitrailers. Furthermore, as defendants note, the loading bay area was not a pedestrian

means of ingress and egress to the facility, but was meant for vehiculartraffic. Also, whereas

in Harris all customers entering or exiting the bank would traverse the sidewalk in question,

not all drivers parking at defendants’ facility would encounter the defect while entering or

exiting their vehicles. Whether the defect were encountered would depend on various factors,

such as the type of truck, the length of its trailer, and the position of the trailer with respect

to the loading bay. Even if Morris or other drivers could be distracted when exiting their

vehicles, there is nothing to suggest that they would encounter the defect on a regular basis,

and in fact the various sizes of different trailers indicate otherwise. Injury in Harris was

reasonably foreseeable as all bank customers would use the sidewalk for ingress and egress.

By contrast, here, the foreseeability of the harm is greatly diminished. The “imposition of a

legal duty requires more than a mere possibility of occurrence” and is based on the

foreseeability of harm, rather than what actually happened. Hartung, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 814.

¶ 26 Plaintiffs further argue that, as in Warner v. City of Chicago, 72 Ill. 2d 100 (1978), and

Alqadhi v. Standard Parking, Inc., 405 Ill. App. 3d 14 (2010), where a defect was obscured

by snow or dim lighting, it was foreseeable that Morris would fail to see the defect given his

manner of disembarking the vehicle. However, Warner addressed an obscured defect not in

the context of the de minimis rule, but in the context of whether the plaintiff exercised due

care. Warner, 72 Ill. 2d at 105 (“[w]ere the defect uncovered and apparent to those upon the

sidewalk, however, the question of [the] plaintiff’s due care would be less easily resolved,

but that is not the factual situation here”). Thus, the court’s de minimis analysis turned on the

fact that the jury could have inferred that the defect measured 2 inches when the incident

occurred, despite a 1c-inch measurement taken over five years after the incident. The court

did not suggest that the layer of snow covering the defect affected its de minimis analysis,

and it emphasized that its holding “should not be construed as diminishing the force of the

general rule that a municipality is not liable for minor sidewalk defects.” Id.

¶ 27 In Alqadhi, the plaintiff tripped and fell over a three-quarter-inch rise in the concrete of

a wheelchair-accessible ramp in the defendants’ parking garage. Alqadhi, 405 Ill. App. 3d

at 15. The rise was obscured by dim lighting and was not marked with paint, thus appearing

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to be a flat surface. Id. The court held that the impaired visibility of the defect removed it

from the application of the de minimis rule. Id. at 19.

¶ 28 Unlike in Alqadhi, the defect here can be seen by a driver before exiting his vehicle and

while approaching his vehicle to enter. It is not obscured by either dim lighting or an optical

illusion. Rather, as described by plaintiffs’ expert and from the photographs in the record,

the defect can be clearly seen from different angles. Although it is possible that a driver

exiting his vehicle, when aligned with the defect, would not see it as he disembarked, again

the various sizes of different trailers make this occurrence unlikely.

¶ 29 Plaintiffs next argue that, as in Martinkovic, Davis’s training, which indicated that one

inch constitutes a trip hazard, removes the defect from the de minimis rule. In Martinkovic,

150 Ill. App. 3d at 591, the plaintiff tripped on a 1d-inch defect on a sidewalk maintained

by the city of Aurora. The city had an express policy that deemed unsafe any defect over one

inch in height and that required prompt repair. In affirming the trial court’s denial of the

city’s motion for a directed verdict, we held that, based on the city’s policy, we could not say

that all reasonable minds would agree that the defect was de minimis. Id. at 594.

¶ 30 Here, there was no policy of repairing defects over an inch. The fact that Davis took

classes establishing a general guideline about trip hazards does not transform his knowledge

into an explicit companypolicy. Likewise, his weeklyinspections of the premises do not give

cause to remove the defect in question from the de minimis rule.

¶ 31 Because we find that there were no aggravating factors sufficient to remove the defect

from the de minimis rule, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

defendants.

¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of

Winnebago County.

¶ 34 Affirmed.

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