Filed 5/9/13 P. v. Harris CA2/3 

Opinion following order recalling remittitur and reinstating appeal 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

CHRISTOPHER HARRIS et al., 

 Defendants and Appellants. 

 B222583 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BA284216) 

 APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Charlaine F. Olmedo, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant Christopher Harris. 

 Mark Shapiro for Defendant and Appellant Kwana Harris. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie A. Miyoshi and 

Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

_________________________
2 

 Christopher Harris and Kwana Harris appeal the judgments entered following 

their convictions by jury of first degree murder of Eric Alexander. (Pen. Code, § 187.) 

Christopher Harris also appeals his conviction by jury of second degree murder of 

Kevin Decoud. The jury found Christopher Harris committed these offenses for the 

benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), personally and 

intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)), 

and committed multiple offenses of murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). 

The jury also convicted Christopher Harris of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 

§ 211) in which he personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (b)), and 

unlawful possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1); the jury found both 

of these offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, 

§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). 

 On appeal, Christopher Harris contends the trial court erred in admitting into 

evidence Kwana Harris’s hearsay statement identifying him as Alexander’s killer and 

in failing to instruct the jury that Kwana Harris’s statement required corroboration. 

Kwana Harris contends the trial court erred in admitting gang evidence as to her and 

her defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We reject appellants’ claims of 

error and affirm the judgments. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

1. The murder of Eric Alexander. 

a. The Shooting on September 17, 2004. 

On September 17, 2004, Khaled Fleming heard approximately 10 gunshots. 

Fleming stepped outside his home and walked toward Sixth Avenue where he saw the 

doors of a black SUV close and saw the vehicle leave the scene. 

At 2:34 a.m. on September 17, 2004, Los Angeles Police Officer Winston Lee 

received a radio call regarding a shooting in the 4300 block of Sixth Avenue. Upon 

arrival, Lee saw a man, later identified as Eric Alexander, lying unconscious. Lee 

found eight .22-caliber bullet casings near Alexander. While at the scene, Lee learned 

Alexander had died. 
3 

Los Angeles Police Detective Stanley Evans found approximately $200 in 

Alexander’s jacket and pants and $150 on the ground nearby. Evans found no cell 

phone at the scene. Evans inquired of Alexander’s relatives regarding a cell phone 

without success. 

A deputy medical examiner testified Alexander sustained nine gunshot wounds, 

including two fatal wounds. 

b. The family gathering in San Diego. 

One week after the shooting of Alexander, on or about September 24, 2004, 

members of the Harris family gathered in San Diego at the home of James Hardgraves, 

the brother-in-law of Christopher and Kwana Harris. The visitors included 

Christopher and Kwana Harris, their sister Shanea, Mericca Garner, who is the mother 

of a child by Christopher Harris, and Jamie Hardgraves, James Hardgraves’s twin 

sister. 

James Hardgraves recalled the visitors arrived in a black Ford Expedition 

driven by Kwana Harris. The day the visitors arrived, Kwana Harris told James 

Hardgraves there were rumors “going around” that she and Christopher Harris had 

killed Alexander, aka Stoney. Kwana Harris said she was present when Alexander 

was killed, she kicked him after he was shot and she took his cell phone. Kwana 

Harris said she had chirped Alexander to get him to the location and knew before he 

arrived he was going to be harmed. Kwana Harris said Christopher Harris killed 

Alexander. 

 During the visit, James Hardgraves also heard Kwana Harris talking on her cell 

phone in chirped phone calls. In one such call, James Hardgraves heard the caller say, 

“We know that you killed Stoney, and we know your brother killed Stoney, and we 

know you are in San Diego, and we’re coming out there.” Kwana Harris was nervous 

and called an individual known as L-Bone. 
4 

James Hardgraves admitted he was afraid to testify in this case and was 

concerned for the safety of his children and himself. Kwana Harris once told 

James Hardgraves not to come to court and he had been threatened by Jerry Anthony, 

aka L-Bone, who was carrying a gun at the time. James Hardgraves was relocated 

twice by the Los Angeles Police Department. 

James Hardgraves admitted that, at the time of trial, he was on probation for a 

misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. 

 On cross-examination by Kwana Harris’s counsel, James Hardgraves admitted 

he and Kwana Harris were not close. James Hardgraves had been married to 

Christopher and Kwana Harris’s sister, Alicia, for six years and they had three 

children. Alicia was in a car crash on August 25, 2004, while driving to Los Angeles 

to assist Christopher Harris. Alicia died on September 4, 2004, as a result of injuries 

sustained in the crash. Alicia had been unfaithful to James Hardgraves with a woman 

introduced to her by Kwana Harris. Also, before Alicia died, one of the Harris’s had 

been involved in a shooting outside the home of James Hardgraves’s mother. James 

Hardgraves conceded “the Harrises were bringing a lot of turmoil and trauma” into his 

life and he was not happy with them. 

 During the San Diego visit, Kwana Harris and her sister, Shanea, got into a 

fight in which Shanea “was throwing knives.” Shanea repeatedly told Kwana Harris, 

“You know what you did. You were wrong.” Kwana Harris denied Shanea’s 

accusations. 

Jamie Hardgraves, James’s twin sister, was present in her brother’s apartment 

when Kwana Harris received chirped phone calls. One call from a woman involved 

how much money Kwana Harris had obtained from “Stoney.” Kwana Harris stated it 

was not as much money as the caller claimed. The caller also said there was a witness 

but Kwana Harris said no one was around when Alexander was killed. The caller also 

asked about Alexander’s cell phone and Kwana Harris said she had it. 
5 

In a second chirped phone call, Jamie Hardgraves heard a male say he knew 

Kwana Harris was in San Diego and he was going to kill her and her mother. 

On cross-examination by Kwana Harris’s counsel, Jamie Hardgraves testified 

Kwana Harris regularly drove a silver car and, to her knowledge, the black truck 

belonged to Shanea. 

c. Telephone Evidence.

Sprint Nextel cell phone and direct connection or “chirp” records for 

subscribers Eric Alexander and Kwana Harris showed that, on September 17, 2004, 

there were several brief telephone calls between them commencing at 1:37 a.m. 

The last of these calls was made at 2:27 a.m. The records also showed numerous 

direct connect calls were made by Kwana Harris between September 24 and 26, 2004. 

Los Angeles Police Detective Sean Hansen analyzed the telephone records for 

the cell phone numbers assigned to Alexander and Kwana Harris for September 17, 

2004. With the assistance of a computer program, Hansen plotted the distance 

between the cell sites through which the calls had been routed and the scene of the 

Alexander shooting. 

2. The shooting of Kevin Decoud. 

a. The shooting; Eddie Gilbert’s identification of Christopher Harris.

Eddie Gilbert testified that, on January 15, 2004, he and Kevin Decoud were 

walking toward 41st Street and Van Ness Avenue when a black Nissan Maxima driven 

by Christopher Harris stopped a few feet from them.1

 When Christopher Harris asked 

where they were from, Gilbert and Decoud yelled, “40 Neighborhood Crip[s].” 

As Decoud approached the Nissan to fight, Christopher Harris said he was not there to 

fight and fired two shots at Decoud. Christopher Harris also fired twice at Gilbert but 

missed. 

 

1

 Eddie Gilbert was declared unavailable due to mental incompetence and his 

preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. 
6 

 Decoud died as the result of a gunshot wound to the chest. During an autopsy, 

a deputy medical examiner recovered a bullet from Decoud’s body. 

Gilbert recognized Christopher Harris because, in December of 2004, 

Christopher Harris robbed Gilbert in the backyard of a residence on Second Avenue. 

On that occasion, Christopher Harris approached Gilbert from behind, said, “C.J. This 

is 58 Neighborhood,” “fuck 40’s . . . phonies” (disrespecting Rolling 40’s), and “break 

yourself,” and placed a gun to Gilbert’s throat. Gilbert surrendered a Yankees cap and 

a blue jacket with a dragon on the sleeve and the back. 

b. Arrest of Christopher Harris; recovery of Decoud murder weapon. 

On January 1, 2005, a sheriff’s deputy impounded a vehicle being driven by 

Christopher Harris. During an inventory of the contents of the vehicle, the deputy 

recovered a nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistol. 

A criminalist testified the bullet recovered during the autopsy of Decoud had 

been fired from the firearm found in Christopher Harris’s car. 

3. Investigation.

 a. Search warrant served at the home of Merrica Garner. 

On February 23, 2005, Detective Jason Delacova applied for a search warrant 

for the home of Mericca Garner. The items sought in the warrant included a baseball 

cap, a jacket with a dragon on it, a handgun and ammunition. The warrant was served 

on February 25, 2005. 

 b. Garner’s statement to detectives. 

Following service of the warrant, Garner was interviewed at the police station, 

first by Detectives Lee and Delacova and then by Detective Evans. Tape recordings of 

the interviews were played for the jury. Detective Evans testified that, after he read 

Garner her rights, she made a statement and Evans asked her to put it in writing. 

While Garner wrote the statement, Evans discovered the tape had run out and put in a 

new one. The missing portion of the interview included the reading of Garner’s rights 

and the statement in which Garner provided information. After Evans restarted the 

tape recorder, he went over Garner’s written statement with her. Garner was not aware 
7 

the interview was being recorded. Garner was at the police station for approximately 

five hours, commencing at 10:00 a.m. She was interviewed for approximately three 

and a half hours. 

 In the initial interview conducted by Detectives Lee and Delacova, Garner said 

Christopher Harris was a member of 48 Neighborhood, which was a small gang 

associated with the “40’s,” but indicated the police had him on file as a member of the 

60’s. Garner denied Christopher Harris ever told her that he had killed someone. 

Delacova advised Garner he had a pretty good case against Christopher Harris for a 

crime he committed with a female. Garner denied she was the female and stated the 

black Expedition was Shanea’s car. Garner claimed Christopher Harris told her only 

that people thought he was responsible for the murder. 

After Detective Evans took over the interview, Evans suggested Garner might 

have unwittingly driven Christopher Harris to the scene of a crime and asked if she 

knew Eric Alexander, aka “Stoney.” Garner identified a photograph of Alexander as 

someone she had seen with Christopher Harris. Garner also identified a picture of 

Jerry Anthony, aka “L-Bone.” Garner admitted she had been very friendly with 

Kwana Harris, who was also known as “Lady L-Bone,” which suggested “L-Bone” 

had brought Kwana Harris into his gang. 

 Garner agreed that on September 17, 2004, Kwana Harris and Shanea had a 

black SUV and that Kwana Harris was the primary driver of the vehicle. Evans told 

Garner he wanted to know if Garner were an accomplice, an accessory or merely a 

witness. Evans indicated he was going to present the case to the district attorney for 

filing and, if Garner lied to Evans, it would suggest she had been involved in the 

crime. Garner denied Christopher Harris spoke to her about what happened to 

Alexander. However, he did tell her the “40’s” were after him because they thought 

he had killed Alexander. Evans indicated that, at some point, Garner’s lies would 

force Evans to read Garner her rights. 
8 

The second audiotape commences with Evans suggesting they read over 

Garner’s written statement. Evans then reads a statement which indicates that, on the 

night of September 18, 2004, Christopher Harris told Garner that he killed Alexander 

because of some things Alexander had said about him. The statement also indicated 

Christopher Harris “felt bad about the situation . . . .” Christopher Harris did not 

provide details but said, “I did it.” 

 c. Recorded telephone conversation.

On the evening of February 25, 2005, Christopher Harris placed a telephone 

call from jail to Loretta Brown, his girlfriend at the time. A tape recording of the call 

was played for the jury. During the call, Christopher Harris asked Loretta Brown to 

telephone Mericca Garner. After Garner entered the conversation, Christopher Harris 

told her to “be careful what you say” and asked what had happened. Garner said 

numerous police officers, including Detective Evans, came to her house with guns. 

Garner and her baby were taken to the police station from 10:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. 

because she “wasn’t cooperating.” Garner said the officers advised her of her rights 

and threatened to arrest her and put her child in “the system.” Garner told the officers 

Christopher Harris did not murder Alexander but the officers accused her of lying. 

When Garner told Christopher Harris the search warrant involved a gun, a hat and a 

leather coat, he responded, “Oh for real?” 

After the conversation with Garner ended, Christopher Harris told Brown he 

needed her “to really think . . . .” Brown said she had heard what Garner had said 

and indicated, “I know. I know already.” After further discussion, Christopher Harris 

told Brown to “go to Aneisha’s house. I need you to go to Sean’s room and get the 

dragon thing out of there. It’s a dragon. Remember, remember? . . .” When 

Christopher Harris asked if Brown “got it,” she replied, “I already thought of that a 

long time ago . . . .” 
9 

4. Garner’s trial testimony. 

At trial, Garner denied that on September 18, 2004, she had a conversation with 

Christopher Harris in which he said he had killed Alexander and felt bad about it. 

Garner also denied that Kwana Harris ever told her she took a cell phone or money 

from Alexander. However, written statements signed by Garner, exhibits 15 and 16, 

indicate she made these statements to Evans. Exhibit 15 states: “Night of 

September 18, 2004, CJ [Christopher Harris] spoke with me and told me that he had 

killed Stone because of something he [said] about him. . . . He cried and told me he 

felt bad about it.” Exhibit 16 states: “Kwana also told me that she didn’t find any 

money and that she drove the truck over there to Stone. . . . Her main concern to me 

was that she wanted no part of the murder. The cell phone would have made it look 

like a setup because her name was the last name on the phone.” 

Garner admitted she did not want to testify in this case because the defendants 

were her son’s father and aunt. 

 On cross-examination by Christopher Harris’s counsel, Garner testified the 

detectives indicated they thought Garner was involved in the killing of Alexander. 

Garner thought she was going to be arrested for murder and Detective Evans “guided” 

her through the written statement and told her she had to sign it. 

 On cross-examination by Kwana Harris’s counsel, Garner testified the written 

statements were not true and Garner wrote them because she believed she had no 

choice. Garner thought her child would be taken from her if she did not cooperate. 

Further, Garner told the detectives the fight between Shanea and Kwana Harris in 

San Diego was over a SIM card. 

 Kwana Harris’s counsel called Garner as a defense witness and elicited that 

James Hardgraves has a reputation in the community for lying. Garner also testified 

Shanea used Kwana Harris’s cell phone. Further, everyone in San Diego used her cell 

phone because it was a chirp phone and everyone had their own code they could use 

on her cell phone. In September of 2004, Kwana Harris lived with her mother. 
10 

5. Testimony of the gang expert. 

Los Angeles Police Officer Aron Algren testified as a gang expert. In the 

1980s, the Crips gang split into numerous subsets including the Rolling 40’s and the 

Rolling 60’s. Algren estimated that in 2004 and 2005, the Rolling 60’s had between 

2,000 and 3,000 members, and the Rolling 40’s had approximately 1,000 members. 

Both gangs have rather large territories. In 2005, the 48 Neighborhood Crips had 15 to 

20 members. The 48 Neighborhood Crips was aligned with the Rolling 40’s and the 

Rolling 60’s and its territory was between the territory claimed by the Rolling 40’s and 

the Rolling 60’s. The primary activities of these gangs included the sale of narcotics, 

robbery, attempted murder and murder. At times there were violent rivalries between 

the Rolling 40’s and the Rolling 60’s. Gangs wield power based on the threat of 

violence which prevents citizens from reporting crimes committed by gang members. 

In Algren’s opinion, in 2004 and 2005, Christopher Harris was a member of the 

48 Neighborhood Crips and an associate of the Rolling 60’s. Christopher Harris had 

extensive gang tattoos. Also, during a traffic stop in 2003, Christopher Harris 

admitted to a Los Angeles police officer that he was a member of the 48 

Neighborhood Crips and an associate of the Rolling 60’s. Algren also testified Kwana 

Harris was an associate of the Rolling 60’s. 

Based on hypothetical questions, Algren opined the shooting of Eric Alexander, 

the robbery of Eddie Gilbert, and the shooting of Kevin Decoud, each of whom was a 

member of the Rolling 40’s, had been committed for the benefit of the 48 

Neighborhood Crips and the Rolling 60’s. 

6. Defense evidence presented by Christopher Harris. 

 With regards to Eddie Gilbert’s competence, a forensic psychiatrist testified 

Gilbert was admitted to Patton State Hospital in February of 2009. At that time, 

Gilbert was severely disabled and was diagnosed as having disorganized schizophrenia 

and polysubstance abuse. 
11 

A second forensic psychiatrist testified that, in a videotaped interview, Gilbert 

displayed signs of schizophrenia and a rhythmic motor tremor which is a side effect of 

medications commonly prescribed for schizophrenia. The use of PCP can cause 

aggressive outbursts, hallucinations and extreme emotional volatility. 

 The parties stipulated PCP was found in Decoud’s blood. 

CONTENTIONS 

Christopher Harris contends the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence 

Kwana Harris’s hearsay statement identifying him as Alexander’s killer and 

committed instructional error in failing to instruct the jury the statement required 

corroboration. He further contends the cumulative prejudice attributable to these 

errors requires reversal of his convictions even if either error, considered alone, would 

be insufficient to warrant that result. 

Kwana Harris contends the trial court erred in admitting gang evidence as to her 

and defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance.2

 

DISCUSSION 

 1. The trial court properly admitted Kwana Harris’s hearsay statement 

incriminating Christopher Harris as a statement against her penal interest.

Prior to trial, the prosecutor filed a motion seeking to admit into evidence 

statements made by Kwana Harris to James Hardgraves and Mericca Garner, and 

statements overheard by James Hardgraves, Jamie Hardgraves and Mericca Garner 

during Kwana Harris’s chirped telephone calls. The trial court conducted a hearing on 

the motion and concluded these statements were admissible as declarations against 

Kwana Harris’s penal interest. 

 

2

 Each appellant also joins in all arguments raised by the other which may 

inure to his or her benefit. However, the claims raised are either personal to the 

appellant asserting them or so plainly meritless when considered in the context of the 

co-appellant’s situation that we have no occasion to consider whether a contention 

raised by one appellant might accrue to the benefit of the other. 
12 

On appeal, Christopher Harris contends the statement in which Kwana Harris 

identified Christopher Harris as the individual who shot Alexander was not 

“specifically disserving” of Kwana Harris’s interests and thus was not admissible 

under the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule. (People v. Lawley

(2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 153-154; People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 612; 

People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 289.) Christopher Harris notes 

People v. Lawley, supra, at pp. 153-154 and People v. Garcia, supra, at pp. 289-290, 

held the portion of an aider and abettor’s statement identifying a confederate was not 

admissible as a statement against interest. He reasons that, similarly, the portion of 

Kwana Harris’s statements identifying Christopher Harris as the shooter did not 

incriminate Kwana Harris and should have been excluded. 

Christopher Harris claims the only other evidence implicating him in the 

murder of Alexander was Garner’s written statement to Detective Evans which was 

unreliable in that Garner initially told the detectives Christopher Harris did not admit 

the killing and she testified at trial that she attributed incriminating statements to 

Christopher Harris only because the detectives threatened her with arrest, prosecution 

and the loss of her child. Christopher Harris notes Detective Evans accused Garner of 

driving the shooter to the crime scene and said he would assume she was “a player” 

unless she told him the truth. Garner’s statement also was suspect because the portion 

of the interview in which Garner was advised of her rights and initially incriminated 

Christopher Harris was not recorded. 

 Christopher Harris concludes that, absent Kwana Harris’s improperly admitted 

hearsay statement, it is reasonably probable he would have been acquitted of count 

one. Thus, the conviction and the multiple murder special circumstance finding must 

be reversed. Further, because the error likely had an adverse effect on the jury’s 

evaluation of his self defense claim as to count four, the murder of Decoud, that 

conviction should also be reversed. 
13 

We conclude the trial court correctly found the statement admissible as a 

declaration against Kwana Harris’s penal interest. Under that exception to the hearsay 

rule, “Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the 

subject is not made inadmissible . . . if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the 

statement, when made, was so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary 

interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, . . . that a 

reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed 

it to be true.” (Evid. Code, § 1230.) 

 In order for a statement to be admissible as a declaration against penal interest, 

“ ‘[t]he proponent of such evidence must show “that the declarant is unavailable, that 

the declaration was against the declarant’s penal interest, and that the declaration was 

sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character.” ’ [Citation.] 

‘The focus of the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule is the basic 

trustworthiness of the declaration. [Citations.] In determining whether a statement is 

truly against interest within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is 

sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take into account not just the 

words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the possible motivation of 

the declarant, and the declarant’s relationship to the defendant.’ [Citation.]” 

(People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 584.) 

 Because of concerns that declarations against penal interest may contain selfserving and unreliable information, the exception generally does not “apply to 

collateral assertions within declarations against penal interest.” (People v. Campa

(1984) 36 Cal.3d 870, 882.) Further, “[e]ven a hearsay statement that is facially 

inculpatory of the declarant may, when considered in context, also be exculpatory 

or have a net exculpatory effect. [Citation.] Ultimately, . . . ‘whether a statement is 

self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing it in context.’ [Citation.]” 

(People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 612.) Only those portions of the declaration 

that are “specifically disserving” to the declarant’s penal interests are admissible under 

Evidence Code section 1230. (People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 441) 
14 

 “Courts applying [Evidence Code] section 1230 to determine the basic 

trustworthiness of a proffered declaration are . . . to ‘consider all the surrounding 

circumstances to determine if a reasonable person in [the declarant’s] position would 

have made the statements if they weren’t true.’ ” (People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th 

at p. 618.) 

We review a trial court’s determination under Evidence Code section 1230 for 

an abuse of discretion. (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 536; People v. 

Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 153-154.) 

Here, there is no dispute that codefendant Kwana Harris was unavailable as a 

witness at trial. This leaves us to consider whether the statement was against Kwana 

Harris’s penal interests when made and whether it was reliable.3

 With respect to the 

first issue, Christopher Harris agrees the trial court properly admitted evidence of 

many of Kwana Harris’s statements to James Hardgraves as contrary to her penal 

interest, such as her statement she lured Alexander to the scene of the shooting and 

took his cell phone. Christopher Harris focuses on Kwana Harris’s statement that 

Christopher Harris shot Alexander and appears to argue a statement implicating a 

codefendant, by definition, cannot be specifically disserving of the declarant’s penal 

interest. 

However, the law does not require blanket exclusion of such statements. 

Rather, whether such a statement is admissible as against the declarant’s penal interest 

depends on the circumstances under which the statement was made, the declarant’s 

possible motivation and the declarant’s relationship to the defendant. (People v. 

Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 584.) The distinction to be drawn is between statements 

which are truly self-inculpatory, and therefore admissible, and those which are 

partially self-serving and exculpatory, and therefore inadmissible. 

 

3

 Christopher Harris concedes Kwana Harris’s statement was not testimonial and 

thus does not implicate the Confrontation Clause. (Davis v. Washington (2006) 

547 U.S. 813, 821-823 [165 L.Ed.2d 224].) 
15 

Review of the case law reveals the statements at issue in the cases cited by 

Christopher Harris were excluded not because they incriminated individuals other than 

the declarant, but because they were exculpatory, self-serving, or collateral to the 

declaration against interest. This point is illustrated by a review of relevant cases. 

 For example, in People v. Leach, supra, 15 Cal.3d 419, several defendants were 

charged with conspiracy to commit murder. Prior to trial, some of the defendants 

made statements that described the conspiracy and inculpated themselves and other 

defendants. (Id. at pp. 438-442.) Leach held the statements should not have been 

admitted at trial, noting the exception for admissions against penal interest was 

“inapplicable to evidence of any statement or portion of a statement not itself 

specifically disserving to the interests of the declarant.” (Id. at pp. 441-442, 

fn. omitted.) People v. Duarte explained the holding in Leach rested on considerations 

of reliability, noting a facially inculpatory statement, when viewed in context, may 

actually be exculpatory or self-serving, and thus untrustworthy. 

In Duarte, the defendant and another man were charged with shooting at a 

dwelling. (People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 607-609.) Prior to trial, the 

defendant’s accomplice gave the police a statement acknowledging participation in the 

crime, but minimizing his role. A redacted version of the statement was admitted at 

the defendant’s trial as an admission against penal interest. (Id. at p. 609.) Duarte

reviewed case authority and stated: “Under the rule of Leach, a hearsay statement 

‘which is in part inculpatory and in part exculpatory (e.g., one which admits some 

complicity but places the major responsibility on others) does not meet the test of 

trustworthiness and is thus inadmissible.’ ” (People v. Duarte, supra, at p. 612, 

quoting In re Larry C. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 62, 69.) Applying this rule, Duarte

concluded the redacted statement, viewed in context, was self-serving and thus should 

have been excluded from evidence. (People v. Duarte, supra, at pp. 612-613.) 

 However, People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, clarified that Leach and 

Duarte do not exclude a statement that inculpates the declarant and other individuals, 

provided the declarant’s facially inculpatory statements are not, in fact, exculpatory, 
16 

self-serving, or collateral. In Samuels, the defendant asked one Bernstein to murder 

her husband and, once Bernstein had done so, she successfully solicited two other 

men to murder Bernstein. At trial, a witness testified Bernstein said, “ ‘He had done it 

and . . . [the defendant] had paid him.’ ” (Id. at p. 120.) On appeal, the defendant 

contended Bernstein’s statement the defendant had paid him to commit the murder was 

inadmissible as it constituted an attempt to shift blame to her. (Ibid.) Samuels held the 

entire statement was properly admitted as against the declarant’s penal interest, 

notwithstanding the reference to the defendant. Samuels stated, “This admission, 

volunteered to an acquaintance, was specifically disserving to Bernstein’s interests in 

that it intimated he had participated in a contract killing – a particularly heinous type 

of murder – and in a conspiracy to commit murder. Under the totality of the 

circumstances presented here, we do not regard the reference to [the] defendant 

incorporated within this admission as itself constituting a collateral assertion that 

should have been purged from [the witness’s] recollection of Bernstein’s precise 

comments to him. Instead, the reference was inextricably tied to and part of a specific 

statement against penal interest.” (Id. at p. 121.) 

Here, as in Samuels, Kwana Harris’s statement that Christopher Harris shot 

Alexander was not an attempt to mitigate her involvement in the offense, deflect 

responsibility for the crime or shift blame to others. Rather, the statement explained 

her involvement in the murder, namely, luring Alexander to the location where her 

brother, Christopher Harris, shot him and thereafter taking Alexander’s cell phone in 

an attempt to eliminate evidence connecting her to the offense. Because the entire 

statement was against Kwana Harris’s penal interest, it fell within the exception and 

properly was admitted at trial as substantive evidence of Christopher Harris’s guilt. 

We reached a similar conclusion in People v. Cervantes (2004) 

118 Cal.App.4th 162. In that case, a nontestifying codefendant, Morales, inculpated 

himself and two codefendants in a murder and an attempted murder while speaking 

to a friend of all three defendants. (Id. at pp. 166-167.) On appeal, the two 

codefendants contended Morales’s statement to the friend should have been excluded. 
17 

(Id. at p. 169.) Cervantes found the trial court properly admitted evidence of 

the statement at the defendants’ joint trial as a declaration against penal interest. 

(Id. at p. 177.) Cervantes noted Morales did not attribute blame to the codefendants 

but accepted an active role in the crimes and described how he had directed the 

activities of one of the codefendants. (Id. at p. 175.) Further, because the declarant 

was acting in concert with the codefendants, a statement incriminating a codefendant 

also incriminated the declarant. (Id. at p. 176.) 

Cervantes relied heavily on an earlier case, People v. Greenberger (1997) 

58 Cal.App.4th 298, which involved a kidnapping and murder committed by several 

defendants. Greenberger held the trial court properly admitted evidence of a 

codefendant’s statement in which the codefendant admitted planning the kidnapping 

and acting as an aider and abettor while a codefendant held a gun on the kidnapped 

victim. (Id. at pp. 339-340 & p. 340, fn. 16.) Greenberger held the reference to the 

codefendant was “an integral part of the statement in which [the declarant] 

implicated himself in planning and participating in the kidnapping and murder . . . .” 

(Id. at p. 340.) 

Lawley and Garcia, the cases cited by Christopher Harris, excluded portions of 

statements not because the statements inculpated individuals other than the declarant, 

but because the circumstances under which the statements were made suggested the 

statements were not reliable. 

In People v. Lawley, a statement by the actual killer that he was hired to kill the 

victim was properly admitted as a declaration against penal interest. (People v. 

Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 154.) However, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in excluding the killer’s statement he had been hired by the Aryan 

Brotherhood, rather than the defendant, because that portion of the statement was not 

“specifically disserving” of the declarant’s interest. (Ibid.) Lawley found the portion 

of the declarant’s statement indicating the identity of the entity that paid for the murder 

did not make the declarant more culpable. (Id. at pp. 153-154.) Rather, the declarant’s 

reference to the Aryan Brotherhood could only be understood as an attempt to 
18 

exculpate the defendant. Thus, it was collateral to the declarant’s inculpatory 

statements. (See People v. Samuels, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 120-121.) 

People v. Garcia, addressed the admissibility of a note sent by the cellmate of a 

defendant. Garcia rejected the argument the note was admissible as a declaration 

against penal interest because, while one statement in the note asserted the author had 

written the note, another said he had done so as a favor to the defendant. (People v. 

Garcia, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 286-290.) Thus, the statements were not wholly 

inculpatory. Here, Kwana Harris’s statement that her brother shot Alexander was not 

collateral, exculpatory or self-serving. Rather, it implicated her in the murder of 

Alexander and thus qualified as a declaration against Kwana Harris’s penal interest. 

Kwana Harris’s statement also was reliable. “[A]ssessing trustworthiness 

‘ “requires the court to apply to the peculiar facts of the individual case a broad and 

deep acquaintance with the ways human beings actually conduct themselves in the 

circumstances material under the exception.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Duarte, supra,

24 Cal.4th at p. 614.) Generally, the least reliable circumstance is when the declarant 

has been arrested and makes his statement to police in an attempt to improve his 

situation. The most reliable situation is one in which the conversation occurs between 

friends in a non-coercive setting. (People v. Greenberger, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 335; People v. Cervantes, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 175.) 

Kwana Harris made the statement at issue to James Hardgraves, Kwana 

Harris’s brother in law, one week after the shooting during a family gathering long 

before police had focused their investigation on the Harris family. Further, the 

statement incriminating Christopher Harris as the shooter in the murder of Alexander 

was not made for self-serving motives or under circumstances that rendered it suspect 

or unreliable. Kwana Harris was not trying to deflect responsibility for the crime. 

Rather, the statement was part of her admission she had taken an active role in causing 

Alexander’s death. In sum, the circumstances under which the statement was made 

indicate it was reliable. 
19 

We therefore conclude the Kwana Harris statement was against her penal 

interest and bore a particular guarantee of trustworthiness such that the trial court did 

not err in admitting evidence of the statement against Christopher Harris. 

Moreover, even assuming the statement should have been excluded, any error 

in its admission was harmless in light of Garner’s written statement in which she told 

Detective Evans that, on September 18, 2004, the day after Alexander was killed, 

Christopher Harris told her that he killed Alexander because Alexander was saying 

things about him. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see People v. 

Samuels, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 120 [applying Watson standard of review to error in 

admitting hearsay under Evid. Code, § 1230]; People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th 

at pp. 618-619 [same].)4

 

Although Christopher Harris denigrates Garner’s statement as the likely product 

of coercion, it appears the detectives did no more than urge Garner to tell the truth. 

It is settled that, “ ‘ “[w]hen the benefit pointed out by the police to a suspect is merely 

that which flows naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct,” the 

subsequent statement will not be considered involuntarily made. [Citation.]” ’ ” 

(People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115.) Given that Garner’s written 

statement incriminating Christopher Harris properly was admitted at trial, any error in 

the admission of Kwana Harris’s statement must be seen as harmless. 

2. Accomplice instructions unnecessary. 

Christopher Harris contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, 

sua sponte, to determine whether Kwana Harris was an accomplice, and, if so, that her 

statement incriminating him required corroboration. CALCRIM No. 334 would have 

advised the jury it could use Kwana Harris’s statements to convict Christopher Harris 

only if: “The accomplice’s statement is supported by other evidence that you believe,” 

 

4

 Our harmless error analysis ignores the chirped telephone calls overheard by 

James Hardgraves in which some unidentified male said he knew Kwana and 

Christopher Harris had killed Alexander. As Christopher Harris correctly notes, this 

evidence was not offered for its truth and was not offered against Christopher Harris. 
20 

the “supporting evidence is independent of the accomplice’s statement,” and the 

“supporting evidence tends to connect the defendant to the commission of the crime.” 

(CALCRIM No. 334.) Although Kwana Harris’s self-incriminating statements were 

corroborated by the phone records and the fact Alexander’s phone was never found, 

this evidence did not connect Christopher Harris to the crime. Rather, the only 

supporting evidence that tended to connect him to the crime was Garner’s written 

statement, which Garner retracted at trial and was the product of at least some 

coercion. Christopher Harris concludes that, had the accomplice instruction been 

given, it is reasonably probable the jury would have determined Kwana Harris’s 

statement incriminating Christopher Harris was not sufficiently corroborated and 

acquitted him on count one. (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 371.) 

Based on our conclusion in the foregoing discussion section that Kwana 

Harris’s statement incriminating herself and Christopher Harris properly was admitted 

as a declaration against Kwana Harris’s penal interest, accomplice instructions were 

not required. 

Penal Code section 1111 provides: “A conviction cannot be had upon the 

testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall 

tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the 

corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the 

circumstances thereof.” The purpose of Penal Code section 1111 is “[t]o ensure that a 

defendant will not be convicted solely upon the testimony of an accomplice because an 

accomplice is likely to have self-serving motives.” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 

510, 547.) “Testimony,” as used in Penal Code section 1111, includes “all out-ofcourt statements of accomplices . . . used as substantive evidence of guilt which are 

made under suspect circumstances.” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 245; 

People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 555; People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 

524-525.) 
21 

However, as explained in People v. Brown, the corroboration requirement does 

not apply where the accomplice’s statement bears sufficient indicia of reliability to 

permit admission under the declaration against the penal interest exception to the 

hearsay rule. “ ‘The usual problem with accomplice testimony – that it is consciously 

self-interested and calculated – is not present in an out-of-court statement that is itself 

sufficiently reliable to be allowed in evidence.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Brown, supra, 

31 Cal.4th at pp. 555-556; see also People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 682 

[instructional duty not triggered where accomplice statements “made in the course of 

and in furtherance of the conspiracy were not made under suspect circumstances and 

therefore were sufficiently reliable to require no corroboration”].) 

 Here, Kwana Harris’s statement to James Hardgraves that Christopher Harris 

shot Alexander was made under conditions sufficiently trustworthy to permit 

admission of the statement into evidence as a declaration against penal interest. 

Therefore, although Kwana Harris was an accomplice in the murder of Alexander, 

corroboration was not necessary and the trial court was not required to instruct the 

jury her statement required corroboration. (People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 

pp. 555-556.) 

 Christopher Harris attempts to distinguish Brown on the ground the defendant 

in that case did not identify a codefendant by name. However, as previously 

discussed, the fact a statement inculpates individuals other than the declarant does not 

render the statement suspect where an examination of the surrounding circumstances 

indicates the statement was reliable when made. 

In any event any error was harmless. As Christopher Harris concedes, the trial 

court instructed the jury to view out of court statements with caution. (CALCRIM 

No. 358.) Further, the “failure to instruct on accomplice liability under [Penal Code] 

section 1111 is harmless if there is sufficient corroborating evidence in the record. 

[Citation.] ‘Corroborating evidence may be slight, may be entirely circumstantial, 

and need not be sufficient to establish every element of the charged offense. 

[Citations.]’ . . . The evidence ‘is sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant with the 
22 

crime in such a way as to satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth.’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 370.) 

Here, Kwana Harris’s statement was corroborated by Garner’s written 

statement in which she indicated that on September 18, 2004, Christopher Harris told 

her he had killed Alexander. Thus, an instruction requiring corroboration of Kwana 

Harris’s out-of-court statement, had it been given, would not have resulted in a more 

favorable outcome for Christopher Harris. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.3d at 

p. 836.) 

3. The trial court properly admitted gang evidence against Kwana Harris. 

Prior to trial, Kwana Harris moved to exclude gang evidence as to her because 

she was not alleged to have committed the murder of Alexander for the benefit of a 

criminal street gang. The trial court ruled the prosecution could introduce gang 

evidence as to Kwana Harris, but that its use would be limited. 

Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury on the uses of gang evidence in 

accordance with CALCRIM No. 1403, as follows: “You may consider evidence of 

gang activity only for the limited purpose of deciding whether: [¶] The defendant 

acted with the intent, purpose, and knowledge that are required to prove the gangrelated enhancements charged; OR [¶] The defendant had a motive to commit the 

crime charged. [¶] You may also consider this evidence when you evaluate the 

credibility or believability of a witness and when you consider the facts and 

information relied on by an expert witness in reaching his or her opinion. [¶] You 

may not consider this evidence for any other purpose. You may not conclude from 

this evidence that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition 

to commit crime.” 

On appeal, Kwana Harris contends the trial court should have excluded the 

gang expert’s testimony as to her, claiming it amounted to evidence of bad character, 

which is inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), and it 

encouraged the jury to make negative inferences about her character which were not 

relevant to her guilt or innocence. (People v. Archer (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1380, 
23 

1392.) Further, the prejudicial effect of the evidence far outweighed any probative 

value the evidence possessed. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Kwana Harris concludes the 

admission of this evidence rendered the trial fundamentally unfair and requires 

reversal of her conviction. 

Despite its potential for prejudice, gang evidence “is not insulated from the 

general rule that all relevant evidence is admissible if it is relevant to a material issue 

in the case other than character, is not more prejudicial than probative, and is not 

cumulative. [Citations.]” (People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1167.) 

Here, in order to explain the circumstances leading to the murder of Alexander, 

the prosecution was entitled to demonstrate the relationship of Christopher and Kwana 

Harris to the gangs involved in this case because this evidence was relevant to the 

issues of intent, motive and witness credibility. The gang expert testified Christopher 

Harris was a member of the 48 Neighborhood Crips and an associate of the Rolling 

60’s, and that Kwana Harris was an associate of the Rolling 60’s. This evidence was 

significant because Alexander, the victim in count one, was a member of the Rolling 

40’s, a gang that sometimes feuded with the Rolling 60’s. Because Kwana Harris’s 

gang association tended to provide a motive for her involvement in the murder of 

Alexander, evidence about gang culture and her gang association was relevant to the 

charge against her. (People v. Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1167-1168; 

People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 223-224.) 

Additionally, evidence of intimidation by gangs was relevant to assist the jury 

in determining the credibility of witnesses who were reluctant to testify or who 

recanted earlier statements. 

Regarding the assertion the gang evidence amounted to evidence of bad 

character, the gang expert did not testify Kwana Harris committed any prior bad acts 

and indicated only that she was an “associate” of the Rolling 60’s. 
24 

With respect to Kwana Harris’s claim the evidence should have been excluded 

under Evidence Code section 352 as inflammatory and unduly prejudicial, no abuse of 

the trial court’s discretion appears. “ ‘[B]ecause a motive is ordinarily the incentive 

for criminal behavior, its probative value generally exceeds its prejudicial effect, and 

wide latitude is permitted in admitting evidence of its existence.’ [Citations.]” 

(People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1550; People v. Garcia, supra,

168 Cal.App.4th at p. 275; People v. Martinez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 400, 413.) 

In any event, the testimony as to Kwana Harris’s involvement in gangs, as 

differentiated from the testimony regarding Christopher Harris, was minimal. 

Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury to limit its consideration of gang evidence 

to proof of the gang enhancement, which was not applicable to Kwana Harris, and to 

issues of motive and credibility, and not to consider the evidence for any other 

purpose. The trial court specifically told the jury not to “conclude from this evidence 

that the defendant is a person of bad character or that [s]he has a disposition to commit 

crime.” We presume the jury acted in accordance with the instructions given. 

(People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 

662; People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 331.) 

Finally, any abuse of discretion in admitting gang evidence as to Kwana Harris 

was harmless in light of her incriminating statements that indicated she lured 

Alexander to the scene of his demise knowing he would be harmed and, after 

Alexander was killed by Christopher Harris, she took his cell phone to eliminate 

evidence of her involvement in the crime. These statements were corroborated by 

telephone records that showed numerous calls between Kwana Harris and Alexander 

in the hour preceding his death and the fact Alexander’s cell phone was never 

recovered. 

In light of this evidence, under any standard of review, the outcome would not 

have been more favorable had the trial court excluded the gang expert’s testimony as 

to Kwana Harris. (Chapman v.California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705]; 

People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) 
25 

4. No ineffective assistance of counsel appears. 

Kwana Harris contends her counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 

present an opening statement, written motions or witnesses on her behalf. She further 

asserts “there appears to have been no investigation of James Hardgraves or any other 

witness involved in this matter.” Kwana Harris claims her main defense, that she was 

at home at the time of the shooting of Alexander, was not presented even though 

several witnesses confirmed they were with her and overheard Alexander’s final phone 

call in which he claimed he was being followed and was frightened. Kwana Harris 

asserts there is no reasonable explanation for counsel’s failure to call these witnesses. 

She claims defense counsel failed to investigate and failed to present witnesses who 

would have contradicted James Hardgraves’s account of her statements. Finally, she 

asserts defense counsel also failed to present James Hardgraves’s preliminary hearing 

testimony, which contradicted his trial testimony he bore Kwana Harris no animosity. 

The law to be applied is well settled. “In assessing claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, we consider whether counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and whether 

the defendant suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that is, a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (People v. Gray (2005) 

37 Cal.4th 168, 206-207, citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 

[80 L.Ed.2d 674] and People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 217.) A reviewing 

court defers to “ ‘ “counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions in examining claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a ‘strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’ ” 

[Citation.]’ ” (People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 876.) If the record on appeal 

sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, an 

appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected unless counsel 

was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no 

satisfactory explanation. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266.) 

Otherwise, the claim is more appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas 
26 

corpus, which permits the opportunity to present additional evidence regarding trial 

counsel’s reasons for acting or omitting to act. (People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 

15 Cal.4th at pp. 266-267.) 

Taking Kwana Harris’s complaints in turn, our Supreme Court has recognized 

that the decision to waive an opening statement can be a reasonable trial strategy. 

(People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1189; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 

1027, 1059 [“The decisions whether to waive opening statement and whether to put on 

witnesses are matters of trial tactics and strategy which a reviewing court generally 

may not second-guess”].) 

 With respect to the assertion defense counsel failed to file written motions or 

call witnesses, Kwana Harris does not specify what motions should have been filed or 

identify witnesses counsel should have called. Regarding the claim defense counsel 

should have called witnesses to establish an alibi, the record contains no evidence of 

any witnesses who could have provided an alibi defense. Further, Kwana Harris 

makes no attempt to show what the omitted witness’s testimony would have been or 

that the testimony would have been sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to her 

guilt. Therefore, this argument is more appropriately presented in a habeas corpus 

proceeding. 

Moreover, defense counsel called prosecution witness, Mericca Garner, as a 

witness for the defense and elicited that James Hardgraves had a reputation in the 

community as a liar. Defense counsel also elicited from Garner that other individuals 

regularly used Kwana Harris’s cell phone. 

The record also contradicts Kwana Harris’s assertion defense counsel 

apparently failed to investigate James Hardgraves. On cross-examination by Kwana 

Harris’s counsel, James Hardgraves admitted he and Kwana Harris were not close, his 

wife had been unfaithful to him with a woman introduced to her by Kwana Harris, and 

his wife died a week after a car crash that occurred while she was traveling to Los 

Angeles to assist Christopher Harris. Also, before his wife died, one of the Harris’s 

had been involved in a shooting outside the home of James Hardgraves’s mother. 
27 

James Hardgraves conceded “the Harrises were bringing a lot of turmoil and trauma” 

into his life and he was not happy with them. Kwana Harris’s counsel also asked 

James Hardgraves about the fight between Kwana Harris and her sister, Shanea, during 

which Shanea produced a knife and Kwana Harris repeatedly denied Shanea’s 

accusation that Kwana Harris had been involved in wrongdoing. Defense counsel also 

cross-examined James Hardgraves at length as to his memory of incriminating 

statements made by Kwana Harris. 

During cross-examination of Jamie Hardgraves, defense counsel established 

that she, unlike James Hardgraves, did not recall any specifics in the statements made 

by Kwana Harris during the weekend in San Diego. Jamie Hardgraves admitted she 

never heard the name Alexander in the chirped phone conversations and never heard 

“anything concerning a killing or murder . . . .” Counsel also attempted to show, 

through the testimony of Jamie Hardgraves, that Kwana Harris regularly drove a silver 

car, Shanea was the driver of the black SUV and Shanea’s behavior was unstable. 

Defense counsel also elicited Mericca Garner’s testimony that she felt her 

child would be placed in foster care if she did not give the police a statement. 

On cross-examination, Garner testified the written statements implicating Christopher 

and Kwana Harris were false. Further, when Shanea accused Kwana Harris of killing 

someone, Kwana Harris denied the accusation. Also, Garner did not hear Kwana 

Harris admit involvement in any killing while they were in San Diego. 

The record also indicates defense counsel vigorously cross-examined Detective 

Evans regarding Garner’s written statement and Detective Hansen regarding his 

analysis of the cell phone records. 

Defense counsel thereafter utilized the evidence adduced at trial to urge the jury 

to acquit Kwana Harris. Defense counsel argued the People’s evidence consisted of 

“word on the street [and] rumors flying around” which were uncorroborated and 

insufficient for a conviction. Counsel asserted there was no proof Kwana Harris took 

Alexander’s cell phone and there were calls made on the phone after he died which the 

prosecution had failed to explain. The black SUV was not driven exclusively by 
28 

Kwana Harris and her cell phone was used by other people. Also, there was evidence 

indicating Kwana Harris and Shanea fought over a SIM card. Thus, someone might 

have taken Kwana Harris’s SIM card on the night Alexander was shot. Counsel 

argued Shanea, Garner, Christopher Harris or some other person could have been 

calling Alexander. Thus, there was an “absence of evidence.” Counsel noted James 

Hardgraves had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and his testimony could 

not be trusted. Further, James Hardgraves did not like Kwana Harris and, according to 

Garner, a prosecution witness, James Hardgraves had a reputation in the community as 

a liar. Counsel explained the other people present in San Diego were not called as 

witnesses because they did not overhear the allegedly incriminating statements and 

even Jamie Hardgraves, who did testify, did not hear Kwana Harris confess. 

Counsel noted only James Hardgraves heard the callers claim Kwana Harris had 

killed Alexander and, where the testimony of James Hardgraves and Jamie Hardgraves 

differed, the jury should believe Jamie Hardgraves. Counsel argued Garner’s 

statement had to be discounted because of the threats made to take her child from her. 

In the recorded phone conversation, Garner indicated she frequently stayed at the 

home of Christopher Harris’s mother and Kwana Harris also lived there. Thus, Garner 

had access to the black SUV and Kwana Harris’s cell phone. This explained why 

Garner would put blame on Kwana Harris. Counsel claimed the cell phone records 

proved nothing in that the two cell phones were not always together the day after 

Alexander’s death and Kwana Harris’s cell phone made calls through one tower and 

Alexander’s phone made calls through two different towers. Counsel closed by 

arguing the standard of proof and concluded the People had not shown Kwana Harris’s 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
29 

In sum, review of the record leads us to conclude Kwana Harris has failed to 

demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 

466 U.S. at p. 688.) 

5. There was no cumulative error. 

Christopher Harris contends cumulative error requires reversal. However, 

there can be no cumulative error if the challenged rulings were not erroneous. 

(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1382.) Because none of Christopher 

Harris’s contentions involve error, there is no issue of cumulative error. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgments are affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 KLEIN, P. J. 

We concur: 

 CROSKEY, J. 

 ALDRICH, J.