### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ugus t 3, 200 4 S es sio n

STA TE OF TENNES SEE v . JO HN MARK BURNS

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Car roll County No. 02CR- 1868 C. Cre ed McG inley, Jud ge

No. W2003-01464-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Septem ber 21, 2004

Whil e initially

indicted on three counts of attempted first deg ree murder, the def endant, John Mark Burns, was convic ted on three counts of attempted se cond deg ree murder. The trial court imposed
sentenc es of e leven y ear s for e ach of fense , all of which a

re to be serve d concur

rently . I n this appeal of rig ht, the defe ndant cha lleng es the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e, he arg ues that the trial court erre d in severa l of its instructions to the jury , and he c ontends that the sentenc e is excessive. B eca use the trial court e rre d in it s ap plication of ce rtain enha nceme nt fac tors, the def endant’ s sentence s are modifie d t o three concur rent nine- y ear

terms. Other wise, the judg ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nts of the Trial Court Affi rm ed as Modif ied

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in w hich T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

B e nja min S. D e mps e y , H un tin g do n, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, John Ma

rk B urns

.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l Ma rk ha m, A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ral; and Elea nor Cahill, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

On J anuary

5, 2002, Dea ndre Walker , who had been ac quainted with the def endant f or approximately

nine y ear s and who ha d purcha sed marijuana from him reg ularly

during that time, telephoned the defe ndant to arr ang e a me eting to purcha se marijuana . Acc ording to Walker, he wa s

acc ompany ing two f

riends, Melvin B osley

and B elton Luter, who w ere unawa re of the planned dr

ug sale, to see a tattoo artist. When they approa ched Clar

ke’s Gr ocery , the pre -ar

rang ed mee ting site, he aske d Luter, who w as driving , to stop so that he could purcha se a sof t drink. Walker was se ated in th e fr o n t p as s en ger se at of the ve hicle and B osley was in the ba ck. A da

rk colore d Chevrolet pickup truck e merg ed fr om the side of the store and stopped next to the L uter ve hicle, passe ng er side
to pa sse ng e r sid e

. Ac c or din g to Wal ke r, he ro lle d do wn his wi nd ow a s th e de fe nd a nt, arm e d w ith-2-

“a long g un,” steppe d out of his vehicle a nd fired at least three g unshots. W alker was shot in the rig h t w r is t, le f

t mi d d le f

in g e r , a n d s h o u ld e r

. Lu te r , w h o w a s ab le to d r iv e a w a y despite being followed by

the truck, stopped f

or help a t a nea

rby residenc e.
Walker, hospitalized for more tha n a month, had six surg erie s but, at the time of trial, wa s still unable to use his w rist. Whil e conce ding that he may have origina lly told police that he did not know the identity

of his assailant, Walker ne verthe l es s m ad e a positive identification of the defe ndant at trial. During c ross-examination, he denied ha ving use d cocaine or he roin on the day of the off ense a nd further

denied that ther e wa s a crock pot containing methamphetamine in the back of the L uter ve hicle.

Whil e in his residenc e on the nig ht of the shooting, T imothy Gene Pill ow hea rd a g unshot followed by

“some ve hicles ra cing up the road.” L ater , a blac k man knocke d at his front door a nd informed him that his “buddy ha[d] been shot. The victim was ly ing on the porch. A fter te lephoning 911, Pill ow wra

pped Walker’ s shoulder in a towe l. He re called that t h e v i ctim repe ated ove r and over, “ ‘I can’ t believe he shot me.’”

Pill ow’s neig hbor, Kenne th Wayne Ba rtholomew, hear d three g unshots on the night of the shooting followe d by a pause and then three more gunshots. When he looked outside, he obse rved Luter’s sport-utilit y

vehicle in f

ront of the Pillow residenc e and then saw a dark c olored, full-sized Chevrolet pickup truc k turn next t o his residenc e, bac k up, and then d ri ve by his residenc e. Ba rtholomew hea

rd someone in the tr

uck y ell, “‘I

don’t g ive a [g .d.] I want to g o back.’ ” B ased on the tim ing of

the g un sh ots , B artho lom e w be lie ve d that the sh ots ha d b e e n f ir e d b y a se mi- a uto ma tic

wea pon.
Carroll County

Sheriff’ s Deputy

Timothy Meg g s, who assis ted i n the investig ation, did not question Walker, explaining that the victim was in too much pa in; howe ver, the deputy did r eca ll that wh e n h e a sk e d th e vic tim wh e the r h e kn e w w ho fi re d th e sh ots , he repl ied
, “‘No .’ ” Ac c or din g to Deputy Meg g s, no illega l drug s or wea pons were found in the Luter Ex plorer, which was da mag ed by bu lle t ho les
, and none of the thr e e oc c up a nts we re in the po sse ssi on of ill e g a l dr ug s. Whil e acknow ledg ing that there w as a c rock pot in the ve hicle, the deputy rec alled that it wa s empty . He

a lso re me mbe re d fi nd ing pa rt of the vic tim ’s mid dle fi ng e r in the fl oo rb oa rd . Du ri ng c ro ssexamina ti o n , h e a c k n o w le d g e d th a t n e ith e r th e v ic ti m n o r h is tw o c o mp a n io n s h a d id e n ti f ie d the defe ndant as their as s ai lant on the eve ning of the crime. Deputy

Meg g s also acknow ledg ed that B os le y ha d in iti a lly

pr ov ide d h im w ith a n in c or re c t name a nda dd re ss.

Deputy David L ee B unn testified that Walker a nd h i s co m panions provided a phy sical description of the shooter. He confirme d that none of the three men identi fi ed t h ei r as s ailant by

name.

Be lton Luter, a

capta in in the M i l an Fi re D epartment, testified that on the nig ht of the of fe ns e , Wa lke r an d Bo sle y joi ne d h im i n h is F or d E xplor e r w ith the int e nti on of g e tti ng ta tto os in Cedar Grove

. Luter rec alled that afte r missing a turn and entering the parki n g l o t o f C larke ’s-3-

Gr oc e ry to tur n a ro un d, he sa w a

da rk c olo re d p ic ku p tr

uc k wit h a sk ull -and -b on e s li c e ns e plate being driven to the front of t he st ore. He testified that a white man ste pped out of the pa sseng er side of the truc k and that he sa w a “ white cloud of smoke” but he ard no g unshots. Luter, who spe d awa y at B osley ’s urg ing a nd then saw the truck wa s in pursuit, stopped at the Pill ow re s i d ence . Bosley went to the door to a sk for help. At trial, Luter, who was struck in his shoulder by a small pie ce of

m et al d u ri n g t h e s h o o t i n g, co u l d n o ti d en t i fyt h e a s s ai l an t

. T h e b u l l et s h ad d o n e $ 4
, 0 0 0 i n d am age to his vehicle. L

uter de nied that there wer e drug s or g uns in his vehicle and testified that the croc k
p o t , w h i c h b e l o n g e d t o h i s m o t h e r , h a d b e e n u s e d f o r s a u s a g e b a l l s a ta

f i r e d e p ar t m e n tp ar t y.

Anita Marie Nutt, who lived approx i mately one-f ourth of a mile f

rom the def

endant’ s residenc e, testified that late r in the eve ning a fter the shooting, the de fenda nt telephoned a sking he r to contact the vic tim. W hen she called the Luter re sidence , she discover ed that the victim had be en in an “acc ident.” Acc ording to Ms. Nutt, when she tele phoned the de fenda nt, informing him of the “ac cident,” he responded, “‘Acc ident. He ain’t been in no a ccide nt. He’s de ad, and I killed him.’”

Charles Eddy

Young , who had a

residenc e across the stre et from the Pillow house, wa s

awa k e n e d b y th e d e f

e n d a n t a t ap p r o xim a te ly 4 :0 0 a

. m. o n th e mo r n in g a f te r th e s h o o ti n g

. He described the def

endant a s “a little excited, beside hi[m] self.” A ccor ding to Y oung , the def endant admitted that he had “ been in c onflict with some people a nd he shot and thoug ht he had killed one.”

Nanc y Potts , a par amedic w ho transporte d th e v i ct i m from the Pi llow residenc e to the hospital, testified on behalf of the def ense. She r eca lled that the victim smelled of alcohol a nd admitted having rec ently

smoked marijuana

.

Jame s Pr e nti ss B ull ing ton , Jr. , te sti fi e d th a t he ha d pu rc ha se d c ra c k c oc a ine fr om Ms. Nu tt

on se ve ra l oc c a sio ns . He c la ime d tha t she e ve ntu a lly taug ht him ho w to “c oo k” c ra c k s o th a t he on ly neede d to purcha se the c ocaine base. B ullington contende d that sever al y ear s ear lier, h e had ob se rv e d th e vic tim

Wal ke r s e ll M s. Nu tt a

pa pe r b a g c on ta ini ng crack cocai ne . T he re wa s a lso testimonythat Walker had pr eviously sold marijuana.

Gl e nd a Kay e B olt on , th e de fe nda nt’ s aun t, t e sti fi e d th a t a t app ro xima te ly 5:0 0 p .m. , o nly hours bef ore t h e s h o o t i n g , she re ceive d a telephone call fr om a male, who ide ntified himself as Walker, asking to spe ak with “ J ohnny ,” the de fenda nt’s fathe r. Ms. Bolton re called that when she infor me d th e c a lle r tha t John ny wa s n ot the re , h e a sk e d th a t sh e g ive Ms. Nu tt a me ssa g e to te le ph on e him . Sh e c la ime d th a t Wa lke r c a lle d a g a in a t app ro xima te ly 10 :00 p. m. a sk ing fo r M s. Nutt. Ms. Bolton also contende d that prior to the trial she had hear d Eddy Young
, who testified that
t h e d ef en d an tad m i t t ed h i s gu i l t , s ayt h at h e “ d i d n ’t k n o w a n y t h i n g” a b o u tt h e s h o o t i n g.

Rhe tt Roc ky Coo k tes tif

ie d as an a lib i witn e ss fo r the de fe nd a nt. He c la ime d tha t he a ndhis sister, Denise L ay , watche d movies toge ther with the de fenda nt and his wife, Cry stal, from 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. on the night of the shooting until 1:00 a.m. the next morning . Denise L ay corr oborate d he r b ro the r’ s te sti mon y , a c kn ow le dg ing that sh e ha d n ot t oldpo lic e of he r c la ims

.-4-

Th e fo rt y -y e ar- oldde fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t hewa s n ot i nv olv e d in the sh oo tin g. Whil e

rec alling his c onversation with Young , he cla imed that he had only been joking when he said that there had bee n a “shooting or conf lict” and spe culated that “they ’ll probably think me or y ou, one, didit. ” Th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd e d that he ha d no ill wi ll t ow ardWal ke r andins ist e d th a t Ms . N utt had lied during her t estimony . He a lso denied having confe ssed his crimes to Young , who, he

a lle g e d, wa s c on fu se d and“ a lw a y s o n m edic a tio n. ” Th e de fe nd a nt d e nie d e ve r h a vin g so ld

m ar i j u a n a a n d m a i n t a i n e d t h a tW a l k e r h a d “ m a d e u p ” h i s t e s t i m o n y.

I Th e de fe nd a nt f

ir st as se rt s th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

his thr e e c on vic tio ns

. Th e state dis a g re e s.
On appe al, of c ourse, the sta te is entitled to the strong est leg itimate vie w of the e vidence and all rea sonable infe renc es which mig ht be drawn there from. S tate v. Cabba g e, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978) . The c redibility of the witnesse s, the weig ht to be gi v en t heir testimony , and the

rec onciliation of conflicts in the proof are matters entrusted to the jury as the trier of fa ct. B yrg e v. Sta te , 5 75 S.W. 2d

29 2, 29 5 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 78 ). When th e su ffi c ie nc y of the e vid e nc e is

c ha lle ng e d, the re le va nt q ue sti on is w he the r, a ft e r r e vie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to the state, any

rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime bey ond a

rea sonable doubt. Tenn . R. App. P. 13(e); State v. Will iams, 657 S.W .2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983)

. Qu e sti on s c on c e rn ing the c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, the we ig ht an d v a lue of the e vid e nc e , a s w e ll as all factual is sues raised by the evidence are resolved by the t rier of fac t. L iakas v. State, 199 Te nn. 298, 286 S.W .2d 856, 859 (1956). Be cause a verdic t of g uilt re moves the pre sumption of innocence and ra ises a pre sumption of g uilt, the convicted criminal defe ndant bear s the burden of showing that the evidenc e wa s leg ally

insufficient to sustain a guilty verdic t. State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992)

.

Second deg ree murder is de fined as “[a] knowing killing of anothe r.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-210(a )(1) . “A pe rson ac ts knowingly with respe ct t o a result of the person’ s conduct whe n the
person is a war e that the conduct is r easona bly certain to c ause the result.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11- 30 2( b) . O ur

Cod e de fi ne s c ri min a l a tte mpt a s f oll ow s:

A p e rs on c omm its c ri min a l a tte mpt wh o, a c tin g wi th the kin d of c ulp abil ity otherwise r equire d for the of fense : (1) Intentionally

eng ag es in a ction or cause s a result that would constitute an offe nse if the c ircumstance s surrounding the c o n d u ct were a s the person be lieves them to be; (2) Ac ts with int ent to cause a re sult t hat is an ele ment of the off ense, a nd b el i ev es t h e c o n d u ct wi l l ca u s e t h e r es u l twi t h o u tfu rt h erco n d u ct o n t h e p er s o n 's part; or (3 ) A c ts w ith int e nt t o co mpl e te a c ou rs e of a c tio n or caus e a re su lt tha t w ou ld constitute the offe nse, under the circ umstances surr ounding the conduct a s the person-5-

believes the m to be, and the c onduct co n stitut es a substantial step towa rd the commission of the offe nse.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 12-101(a ).

The de fenda nt arg ues that there was no dire ct evidenc e of his g uilt and that the testimonyof the state’s w itnesses was not cr edible. I n fac t, the evidenc e was larg ely direc t. The victim Walker testified that the def

endant steppe d from the pa sseng er side of a pickup truc k in the parking lot of Clarke’ s Groce ry

and fire d at t h e p as s en ger s ide of the L uter ve hicle. That qualifies as dire ct evidenc e of g uilt. S ee N eil P

. C ohen, et a l., Tennesse e L aw of Evidence § 4.01[5] (4 ed. 2000) th (“[A]n ey ewitness who sa w the def endant stab the victim provides direc t evidence . . . .”). Additionally , both Eddy Young and Anita Nutt te stified that the def endant c onfesse d to shooting the victim. This was likewise direc t evidence of g uilt. S ee Monts v. State, 214 Tenn. 171, 379 S.W.2d 34, 40 (1964) ( observing that confe ssion to fellow inmate was dire ct evidenc e of g uilt).

I n our view, the defe ndant’s primary cha l l en ge is to the ade quacy of the identification. I dentity , of cour se, is an indispensable e lement of a ny crime. See g ener ally

W h ite v. State, 533 S.W .2d 735, 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975) . Our law provides that identification of the perpe trator of a c rime may

be ac complished by

ei ther dire ct or c ircumstantial evidenc e, or both. State v. Thompson, 519 S.W .2d 789, 793 (Tenn. 1975). The determination of identity is a question of fa ct for the jury

afte r consider ation of all compe tent evidenc e. See Big g ers v. State, 219 Tenn. 553, 411 S.W .2d 696, 697 (1967); Mar able v. State, 203 Te nn. 440, 313 S.W .2d 451 (1958) ; S t at e v. Crawf ord, 635 S.W.2d 704 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).

Her e, the identity

of the de fenda nt was established by at l east three witnesses. The jury acte d within its prer og ative by

acc rediting the wit n esses for the state a nd reje cting the def ense c laim of

a lib i. T his c ou rt

ma y no t r e so lve qu e sti on s o f w itn e ss c re dib ili ty on app e a l. T hat f un c tio n is so le ly wi thi n th e pr ov inc e of

the tr ie r o f f

a c t. S e e , e .g ., Sta te v. Care y , 9 14 S.W. 2d 93
, 95 (Te nn . Crim. App. 1995).

II Next, the defenda nt arg ues that the trial court err ed by failing to char g e the jury

on the lesser included off

enses of attempted re ckless homicide a nd attempted criminally neg lige nt homicide and by failing to provide a spe cial instruction on re asonable doubt. The state a rg ues otherw ise.

The question of whether a g iven offe nse should be submitted to the jury as a le sser include d offe nse is a mi x ed question of l aw and fac t. State v. Rush, 50 S.W .3d 424, 427 (Tenn. 2001) (citing State v. Smil ey , 38 S.W .3d 521 (Tenn. 2001) ). The sta ndard of revie w for mix ed questions of law and fa ct is de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. I d.; se e also State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) . The trial c ourt has a duty “to give a complete charg e of the law a pplicable to the fa c ts o f a c a se .” Sta te v. Ha

rb iso n, 70 4 S. W.2 d 314 , 3 19 (T e nn . 1 98 6) ; se e a lso Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 30.-6-

I n Burns, our supreme court adopted a modi fied ve rsion of the Model Pena l Code in order to determine w hat constitutes a lesser included off

ense:

An offe nse is a lesser

included off

ense if:

(a) all of its statutory

elements a

re inc luded within the s t at u tory elements of the offe nse cha

rg ed; or (b ) i t f a ils to m e e t th e de fi nit ion in p art (a ) o nly in the res pect that it

c on ta ins a statutory element or

elements e stablishing (1) a differ ent mental state indicating a lesser kind of c ulpability ; and/or (2 ) a le ss se ri ou s harm or ris k of harm to the sa me pe rs on , p ro pe rt y or pu bli c int e re st,

or (c) it consists of (1) f ac il it a ti o n o f th e o f

f e n s e c h ar g e d o r o f a n o f f e n s e th a t o th e r w is e me ets the definition of lesser

included off

ense in pa rt (a) or (b) ; or (2) a n attempt to commit the offense char g ed or an offense that otherwise me ets the definition of lesser

included off

ense in pa rt (a) or (b) ; or (3) solicitation to commit the offense char g ed or a n offe nse t hat ot herw ise meets the definition of lesser

included off

ense in pa rt (a) or (b)

.

6 S.W .3d at 466-67.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt ha s a du ty to ins truc t the jury a s to a le sse r i nc lud e d o ff

e ns e if : ( 1) re a so na

ble minds could acc ept the off ense a s lesser include d; and (2) the evidenc e is leg ally sufficie nt to support a convic tion for the lesser included offe nse. Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 469; see a lso St ate v. L ang ford, 994 S.W .2d 126, 128 (Tenn. 1999)

. Moreove r, our supre me court has held that trial courts “must provide an instruction on a lesse r-include d offe nse supported by the evidenc e eve n if such instruction is not

c on sis te nt w ith the the ory of the [s] tate or

of the de fe ns e . T he e vid e nc e , n ot the pa rt ie s, c on tr ols wh ether an instruction is require d.” State v. Allen, 69 S.W .3d 181, 188 (Tenn. 2002). Ou r h i gh

c ou rt ob se rv e d th a t th e “

jury is n ot r e qu ir e d to be lie ve a ny e vid e nc e of fe re d by the [s]ta te ,” a ndhe ld that the authority

of the jury

to co n v i ct on a lesser-include d offe nse may not be taken a way , even wh e n p ro of

supportin g the e le me nt d ist ing uis hin g the g re a te r o ff e ns e fr om the le sse r o ff

e ns e is
uncontrove rted. I d. at 189.

Her e, the tria l court charg ed the jury on the i ndicted offense of attempted first de g ree murder, attempt e d s e c o n d d e g r e e mu r d e r , a n d a tt e mp te d v o lu n ta r y man s la u g h te r

. N e ith e r

o f th e le sser included offenses advance d by the defendant on appea l, attempted reckless homi cide a nd attempted criminally neg lige nt homicide
, is a rec og nized c rime in T ennesse e. See State v. Ve rn o n L amar Bry ant, No. E2002-01234- CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvil le, Oct. 21, 2003) ; State v. Dale N olan, No. 01C01-9511-CC-00387 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 26, 1997).

Although the defe ndant makes no arg ument with r eg ard to the trial court’ s failure to instruct the jury on rec kless endang erme nt as a lesse r included of fense , the state c oncede s that the omission-7-

was e rror . See Statev. Hora ce D emon Pulliam, No. M2000-00417-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 23, 2002) (holding that rec kless endang erme nt is a l es s er i ncluded of fense of attempted first de g ree murder)

. I t is our view, howeve r, that the e rror for the f ailure to instruct

rec kless endang erme nt under the c ircumstance s o f t h i s case qualifies a s harmless bey ond a

rea sonable doubt. S ee State v. Richmond, 90 S.W .3d 648 (Tenn. 2002) . By finding the def

endant
g uilty of attempted second deg ree murder, the jury implicitl y reje cted the le sser include d offe nse of attempted voluntary

manslaug hter. More over, the main issue in t his case w as one of identity , not

mens rea . There is lit tle indication that t h e d ef en d an t had mer ely

acte d in a re ckless manne r. He either f ired the shots purpose ly

in the direc tion of the victims or, by his ow n defe nse, wa s not there at all. The de fenda nt is not entit led to relief on this iss ue. See A llen, 69 S.W .3d at 191.

Finally , the def

endant a lso asserts that the t ri al co u rt erred by failing to give a spec ial instruction on rea sonable doubt. “[The] defe ndant has a constitutional right to a co rre ct and complete c harg e of the law.” State v. Tee l, 793 S.W .2d 236, 249 (Tenn. 1990) . J ury instructions must, however, be revie wed in the co n t ex t of the over all char g e rather than in isolation. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); see also State v. Phipps, 883 S.W .2d 138, 142 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ). A c ha rg e is pr e jud ic ia l e rr or “ if it f

a ils to f a ir ly su bmi t th e le g a l is su e s o r i f i t misleads the jury

as to the applica

bl e l aw.” State v. Hodg es, 944 S.W.2d 346, 352 (Tenn. 1997). Whil e the de fenda nt may re q u es t special instructions, jury instructions are suf

ficient whe re the y adequately

state the law . See, e.g ., State v. Ty son, 603 S.W .2d 748 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) . When a trial c ourt’s cha

rg e to the jury is c omplete, it need not g ive additional spec ial instructions requeste d by the def endant. See State v. Story , 608 S.W .2d 599, 603 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)

.

The de fenda nt asserts only that the failure to pr ovide the reque sted instruction w as err or. He provides no arg ument as t o either why the i nstruction was warra nted or how i ts omission affec ted the tr ia l. Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts tha t th e tr ia l c ou rt a de qu a te ly

ins truc te d th e jury

on re a so na

ble do ub t. Acc ording ly , this iss ue is without merit.

III Ne xt, th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t be c a us e Mel vi n B os le y didno t te sti fy

a t tria l, h is conviction for the attempted second deg ree murder of Bosley is in viol ation of his constitutional right to confrontation. He also ar g ues that the trial court err ed by excluding Bosley ’s statement to police. The state a sserts that there was no c onstitut ional or evide ntiary err or.

The Six th Amendment g uara ntees an acc used the rig ht to be “conf ronted with the witnesses
ag ainst him.” U.S. Const . amend VI . I n State v. Ng uy on Ba o, No. 02C01-9801-CR-00004 (Te nn. Cr im. Ap p. , a t Jac ks on , A ug . 2 5, 19 99 ), the de fe nd a nt wa s c on vic te d of tw o c ou nts of a tte mpt e d f

ir st de g re e mur de r a ndon e c ou nt of a tte mpt e d sec on d de g re e mur de r. On app e a l, h e c on te nd e d th a t hi s

r i g h to f c o n f r o n t a t i o n h a d b e e n v i o l a t e d b e c a u s e o n e o f t h e v i c t i m s h a d n o tt e s t i f i e d a tt r i a l

. In

a ff ir min g the jud g me nts , th is c ou rt state d a s f

oll ow s:

[T]he c la im i s w ith ou t me ri t. Ce rt a inl y , the de fe nd a nt wo uldha ve be e n e nti tle d to

c on f r o n t [th e v i c t i m ] h a d h e b e e n u t i l i z e d b y t h e s t a t e a s a w i t n e s s

. Th e Sixth-8-

Am e nd me nt t o th e Un ite d St a te s Co ns tituti on do e s n ot, ho wev er, app ly in the se circ umstances. The fa ct that the state did not ca ll [ the victim] as a w itness does not violate t he right t o confr ontation. State ex rel. By rd v. B omar, 214 Te nn. 476, 381 S.W .2d 280, 281-82 (1964)

.

I d., slip op. at 5-6. I n our view, this ca se ca n n o t b e d i s tinguished f rom Ba o. I t is our conclusion, the re fo re , that the re wa s no vio la tio n of the de fe nd a nt’ s c on fr on ta tio n ri g hts by B os le y ’s failu re to t e s t i f y.

I n a re lated issue, the de fenda nt also contends that the t ri al court’s exclusion of Bosley ’s
statemen t to po lic e vio la te d h is Si xth A me nd me nt rig ht t o c on fr on t w itn e sse s a ndhis F ou rt e e nth Amendment due pr ocess rights. The state asse rts that the statement wa s proper ly excluded as hear say

.

Th e state me nt, g ive n a t 11 :13 p. m. o n th e da y of the of fe ns e , p ro vid e s a s f

oll ow s:

At 10:20 me

. . . and friend[s] B elton Luther, De e Andr e Walker w here [si c] heade d

no rth b ou ndon 10 4 w he n d ri ve r B e lto n L uth e r m iss e d h is turn [a nd ] en de d u p in front of a store[.] Friend Dee Andre said let me g et a Coke Cola at the machine[.] Next thi ng I

knew wa s a full size Chevy ext[ ended] ca

b pull up on the pa sseng er side and one shot wa s fired[.] Itold myfriend B elton to g o so we heade d south bound and stop[ ped] at the first house with lig ht[ .]

The de fenda nt arg ues that the stateme nt would have b ee n re levant to contra dict some of the testimonyby

the victim Walker.

Th e Rul e s o f E vid e nc e pr ov ide that “[h]e ars a y is not a dmi ssi ble e xce pt a s p ro vid e d b y the se rules or othe rwise by

law.” T enn. R. Evid. 802. Hea rsay is define d as “a statement, other than one

ma de by the de c lara nt w hil e te sti fying a t th e tr ia l or he ari ng , o ff

e re d in e vid e nc e to p ro ve the truth of the matter as s er t ed

. ” Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). In our view, B osley ’s statement would qua lify as hear say . I t was made out of court a nd, beca use the de fenda nt intended to use it as s u b s t an tive evidenc e in contra diction of the victim’s testimony
, it would have be en off ere d to prove the truth of the matter a sserted. I t does not fall under any of t he recog nized exceptions. See Tenn. R. Evid. 803. In c o n s e q u e n c e , th e tr i a l c o u r tc o rr e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d t h e s t a t e m e n ta s i n a d m i s s i b l e h e ar s a y.

Under the Due Proc ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendme nt, criminal defe ndants must be

a ff or de d a me a nin g fu l op po rtun ity to pr e se nt a co mpl e te de fe ns e

. Ca lif ornia v. Tr omb e tta , 4 67 U. S. 479, 485 (1984). In State v. Br own, which conce rned the application of Tennessee ’s ra pe shield law,

ou r s up re me c ou rt

state d a s f

oll ow s:

Th e c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o p re se nt a de fe ns e ha s bee n h e ld t o “ trump ” the ru le
ag ainst hear say

in at least two United States Supreme Court decisions. . . .-9- The fa cts of ea ch ca se must be consider ed ca ref ully to determine whether

the constitutional right to pre sent a de fense has bee n vio l at ed b y the exclusion of evidenc e. Ge nera lly , the ana ly sis should consi d e r w h ether : (1) the e x cluded e vidence is critical to the def

ense; (2) the evidenc e bear s sufficie nt indicia of re liability ; and (3) the inter est supporting exclusion of the evidence is substantiallyimportant. . . .

29 S.W .3d 427, 433 (Tenn. 2000) (citations and f ootnotes omitt ed).

I n o ur vie w, the e xclu sio n o f B os le y ’s state me nt did no t wor k to dep ri ve the de fe nd a nt o f h is rig ht to present a de fense . The stateme nt was not critica l to the defe nse. As alr eady noted, the defe n s e wa s o ne of mistaken ide ntity . Moreove r, the information contained in the state ment was included in the di rec t testimony of Belton Luter. Be cause of L uter’s te stimony , the content of the statement would have been c umulative of other evidenc e. The trial did not abuse its discretion by

e x c l u d i n g t h e w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n to f M e l v i n B o s l e y.

IV The de fenda nt also asserts in hi s statement of the i ssues that the t rial court err ed by deny ing his pretrial motions, motions in limine, and motions during trial. He does not ide ntify any particula r motions or provide any

ar gu m en t , au t h ority , or citations to the re cord in support of his swe eping

assertion. Essentially , the def endant invites this court to scrutinize t h e re co rd and consider any motion-related issues w orthy of ra ising. In the absence of any specific arg ument, howeve r, this court must treat issues as wa ived. See Te nn. Ct. Crim . App. R. 10(b) (“ I ssues which a re not supporte d by
arg ument, citation to authorities, or appropriate r efe renc es to the re cord w ill be treate d as wa ived by the court.”); Jackie Will iam Crowe v. State, No. E 199 8 -0 0 016-CCA-R3-PC, sli p op. at 6 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knox ville, June 20, 2000). Thus, the waive r doctrine prec ludes any consideration of

“ hid de n” iss ue s.

V As his fi na l c la im, the de fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t the se nte nc e is e xce ssi ve . Wh e n th e re is a

c ha lle ng e to the le ng th, rang e , o r m a nn e r o f s e rv ic e of a se nte nc e , it

is the du ty

of thi s c ou rt

to conduct a de novo re view with a pr esumption that the determinations made by the trial court are

corr ect. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). This presumption is “conditioned upon the a ffirma tive sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll r e le va nt f a c ts and cir cumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) ; see State v. Jones, 883 S.W. 2d59 7, 60 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) . “ I f the tr ia l c ou rt app lie s ina

pp ro pria te fa c tor s o r o the rw ise fails to follow the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct, the pre sumption of corre ctness fa lls.” State v. Shelton, 854 S.W .2d 116, 123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). The S entenc ing Comm ission Comments provide that the burden is o n th e d e f

e n d a n t t o s h o w th e imp r o p r ie ty o f th e s e n te n c e

. T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 40-35-401, Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts

.

Our re view re quires an analy sis of (1) the evidence, if any , rec eived at the t rial and se ntencing hearing; ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port; (3) the principles o f s en t en ci n g and the a rg uments of counse l relative to sentenc ing alternatives; (4) the nature and cha rac teristics of the of

fense ; (5) any

mitigating-10-

or enha ncing fac tors; (6) any statements made by

the def endant in his own beha lf; and (7) the defe ndant' s potential for re habilitation or treatment. T en n. Code Ann. §§ 40-35- 102, -103, -210; State v. Smit h, 735 S.W .2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

.

I n calcu l at i ng the sentenc e for a Class B, C, D, or

E felony conviction, the pre sumptive
sentenc e is the minimum i n the ra ng e if ther e ar e no enhanceme nt or mitigating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( c). I f t here are enhanc ement but no mitigating fac tors, the t rial court may set the
sentenc e above the minimum, b u t stil l within the rang e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(d). A
sentence involving both enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors require s an assig nment of re lative weig ht for the e nhance ment fac tors as a means of incre asing the sentenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(e) . The senten ce s h o u l d then be r educe d within the rang e by any weig ht assigne d to the mitigating fac tors prese nt. I d.

At the se nte nc ing he ari ng , th e vic tim te sti fi e d th a t he wa s e mpl oy e d a s a c arp e nte r p ri or to the sh oo tin g bu t is no lon g e r ab le to do that type of wo rk du e to his inj urie s. He state d tha t he wi ll

never be able to bend his rig ht wrist ag ain. His medica l bills totaled $165,909.43.

Car r o ll Co u n ty Sh e r if

f ’ s D e p u ty We b s te r L e r o y B a te s te s ti f ie d th a t w h e n h e arr e s te d the white def endant, he observe d a cross burning in his back y ard. A phot og raph was i ncluded in the

rec ord. Eac h of the victims was blac k.

The trial court applied three enhanc ement fac tors: ( 2) that the defe ndant has a previous his tory of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns or be ha vio r in ad dit ion to tho se ne c e ssa ry to es ta bli sh the app ro pr ia te rang e; (4) t h at t he off

ense involved more than one victim; and (11) that the def endant ha d no hesitation about committing a c rime whe n the risk to human life wa s high. See Tenn. C o d e Ann. § 40-35-114( 2), (4) , (11). The trial court, whic h considere d the def endant ’s claim of mit igating fac tors, that he had c omplied with the te rms of his bond and was a Carroll Countynative with strong fa mil y tie s, se e Te nn . Co de An n. 40 -3 5- 11 3( 13 ), a ssi g ne d th e m li ttl e we ig ht.

I n i t i al l y , the def

endant ha s failed to addr ess any particula r er ror in the a

pplication of enhanc ement or mitig ating fac tors, arg uing only that the sentenc es we re too hig h. Gene rally , the weig ht give n eac h enhanc ement and mitig ating fac tor is left to the discre tion of the trial court as long as the trial c ourt complies with the purposes and principles of the sentenc ing a ct and its finding s are

su pp orte d b y the re c or d. Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 , Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts ; State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tenn. 1986) ; State v. Kelley , 34 S.W .3d 471, 479 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). N e v e r th e le s s , th e s tate c o n c e d e s th a t u n d e r o u r tr a d it io n a l la w , th e tria l c o u r t err ed by

app ly ing e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor s ( 4) a nd(1 1) . B e c a us e the re wa s a se pa rate c on vic tio n f

or e a c h v ic tim
, enhanc ement fa ctor (4) , that the offe nse involved m o re t h an one vic tim, shoul d not have be en

app lie d. Se e Sta te v. F re e ma n, 94 3 S. W.2 d 2 5, 31 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ). Ad dit ion a lly , b e c a us e enhanc ement fa ctor (11)
, that the defendant had no hesitation about commi tting a crime when the risk to human life wa s high, w as inhere nt in the of fense
, that fac tor should not have bee n applied. See State v. Jones, 883 S.W .2d 597, 602 (Tenn. 1994) ; State v. Nix , 922 S.W .2d 894, 903 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); see also State v. J erry B. Crow , No. 01C01-9310-CR-00348 (Te nn. Crim. App.,-11-

at Nashville, Nov. 6, 1995). Thus, the onl y enhanc ement factor remaining is (2), that the defe ndant has a pr evious history

of criminal convictions or behavior

. A Rang e I sentenc e for a C lass B felony is eig ht to twelve y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 1 12(a) (2). The state conte nds that enhanc ement fa ctor (2) , to which the trial c ourt assig ned considera ble weig ht, is it self suff

icient to support the eleve n-y ear sentenc es. The presentenc e re port

re fl e c ts that the de fe nd a nt ha s a le ng thy re c or d o f c ri min a l c on vic tio ns , in c lud ing a g g ra vate d a ssa ult
, as s au l t, driving unde r the influenc e, re ckless driving , driving on revoke d, resisting stop and frisk, disorderly conduct, a nd public intox ication. Neve rtheless, m an y o f th e crimes are misdemeanors a nd had oc cu rr ed m o re than fiftee n y ear s previous to the shooting. In our view, tha t would justi fy an

e nh a nc e me nt o f o nly

on e y e ar a

bo ve the min imu m.
Finally , the state urg es this court to apply enhanc ement fa ctor (10) , t h at t h e def endant employ ed a f

irea rm during the commission of the crime, on appea l. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114(10). The United States Supreme Court’s rec ent opinion in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct . 2531 (2004), howeve r, calls into que stion the continuing va lidityof our c urre nt sentencing scheme . I n that case, the Court, apply ing the rule in Appre ndi v. New Jersey , 566 U.S. 466, 490 (2 0 0 0 ), s t ru ckd o wn a p ro v i s i o n o f t h e W as h i n gt o n s en t en ci n g gu i d el i n es t h at p er m i t t ed a t ri al j u d ge to impose an “exceptional sentenc e” upon the findi ng of certain st atutorily enumer ated e nhance ment fac tors. I d. The Court obser ved that “the ‘statutory maxi mum’ for Appr endi purp o s es i s the maxi mum sentence a judg e may impose solely

on the basis of the f

acts re flec ted in the j ury

verdic t or admitted by

the def endant.” I d. at **13-14 (empha sis in orig inal). Finally , the Court conclude d that “eve ry

defe ndant has a rig ht to insi st that the prosec utor prove to a jury all fac ts leg ally

essential
to the pu nis hme nt. ” I d. a t *3 1 (em ph asi s in orig ina l) . T his c ou rt de c lin e s, the re fo re , to app ly enhanc ement fa ctor (10)

.

I n summary , enhanc ement factor (2) i s applicable to eac h of the de fenda nt’s convictions for

a tte mpt e d s e c on d d e g re e mur de r a ndwa rr a nts a se nte nc ing inc re a se of

on e y e ar a

bo ve the min imu m. There are no other e nhance ment fac tors. The sente nces are , there fore , modified to nine y ear s eac h, to b e se rv e d c on c ur

re ntl y a s sp e c if ie d b y the tr ia l c ou rt

.

Eac h sentenc e is modified to nine y ear s. Otherwise , the j u d g ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE