FILED 


APRIL 17,2014 


In the Office of the Clerk of Court 


W A State Court of Appeals, Division III 


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 


DIVISION THREE 


STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) 

) No. 32151-7-111 

Respondent, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

RANDY MICHAEL ANDERSON, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

) 

Appellant. ) 

KORSMO, J. -In 2012, a Thurston County jury found Randy Anderson guilty of 

one count offelony violation ofa domestic violence no contact order. On appeal, Mr. 

Anderson argues that his trial date violated CrR 3.3 and that his offender score is 

erroneous. We affirm the conviction, but remand for resentencing. 

FACTS 

A court order prevented Mr. Anderson from having any contact with his mother. 

On March 25, 2012, Mr. Anderson went to his mother's home and requested to speak 

with her. His mother's caretaker called the police. Officers arrested Mr. Anderson. He 

was charged with one count offelony violation of a post-conviction domestic violence no 

contact order. Mr. Anderson was maintained in custody throughout these proceedings. 
No. 32151-7-111 

State v. Anderson 

The case initially went to trial on June 7, 2012, but a mistrial was declared the 

following day. The parties agreed at that time to a new trial start date during the week of 

July 30. On July 9, the State asked for a continuance because the deputy prosecutor had 

not realized until recently that the new trial date conflicted with her pre scheduled 

vacation. Defense counsel opposed the continuance. The court granted the motion and 

rescheduled the trial start date to the week ofAugust 13. 

On July 19, the deputy prosecutor sought another continuance because the lead 

investigator was not available during the week that trial was scheduled to start. Defense 

counsel again opposed the motion. The court granted the motion and reset the trial start 

date to the week of September 4. 

On July 24, Mr. Anderson filed a pro se motion to exercise his 60 day speedy trial 

rights under erR 3.3. On August 14, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss for 

violation of erR 3.3. The court denied the motion, stating that it would not second guess 

the earlier continuance rulings and noting that the defense had failed to file a written 

objection and motion within 10 days ofthe original ruling as required by 

erR 3.3(d)(3). 

Following a second trial that began September 4, the jury found Mr. Anderson 

guilty as charged. At sentencing, the prosecutor proved Mr. Anderson's prior criminal 

history for offender score purposes through a mix of certified and noncertified 

documents. The prosecutor provided certified copies of Mr. Anderson's six prior felony 

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No. 32151-7-II1 

State v. Anderson 

convictions from Washington. Those documents showed that five ofthe prior offenses 

had the same offense date and same sentencing date in June 2008. The prosecutor also 

provided noncertified copies of several government documents establishing that Mr. 

Anderson had been convicted of a felony drug-related offense in California. Based on 

this criminal history, the court determined that Mr. Anderson had an offender score of 

seven and ordered a standard range sentence. Mr. Anderson appealed. 

ANALYSIS 

Mr. Anderson raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends that his retrial 

occurred outside the limits set by CrR 3.3. Second, he argues that the sentencing court 

erred by relying on the noncertified documents to prove his prior California conviction. 

Third, he argues that the sentencing court erred by refusing to determine whether his five 

felony convictions from June 2008 constituted the same criminal conduct for offender 

score purposes. We affirm on the first two issues, but remand for resentencing on the 

third issue.' 

Time for Trial 

Review of Mr. Anderson's first argument is barred by his failure to preserve the 

issue for review. A party that objects to a continuance under CrR 3.3(f) "must, within 10 

days after the notice is mailed or otherwise given, move that the court set a trial within 

1 Mr. Anderson has also filed a pro se statement of addition grounds. We find his 

three claims without merit and will not discuss them further. 

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No. 32151-7-III 

State v. Anderson 

those time limits." CrR 3.3(d)(3). "A party who fails, for any reason, to make such a 

motion shall lose the right to object that a trial commenced on such a date is not within 

the time limits prescribed by this rule." Id.; Accord State v. Farnsworth, 133 Wn. App. 1, 

12-13,130 P.3d 389 (2006); State v. Bobenhouse, 143 Wn. App. 315, 322, 177 P.3d 209 

(2008), aff'd, 166 Wn.2d 881, 214 P.3d 907 (2009). Because Mr. Anderson failed to 

move the court for a trial within the original time limits, he waived any objection to the 

new trial date. 

The timeliness argument also was without merit. The decision to grant a 

continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Selam, 97 Wn. App. 140, 142, 

982 P.2d 679 (1999). Attorney or police officer vacations have long been recognized as 

valid reasons for continuing a case. Id. at 143 (citing cases). The effect of a continuance 

is to extend the time for trial by excluding the period of the continuance from the time to 

bring the case to trial. CrR 3.3(e)(3). Thus, under well-settled precedent, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in granting either continuance. 

ProofofPrior Convictions 

Mr. Anderson's second argument is that the trial court should not have accepted 

noncertified documents from the State in establishing his prior felony conviction in 

California. We review this challenge to Mr. Anderson's offender score de novo. State v. 

Bergstrom, 162 Wn.2d 87, 92, 169 P.3d 816 (2007). 

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No. 32151-7-111 

State v. Anderson 

At sentencing, the State bears the burden of establishing the defendant's criminal 

history for offender score calculations. State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472.480,973 P.2d 452 

(1999). "[U]se of a prior conviction as a basis for sentencing under the SRA is 

constitutionally permissible ifthe State proves the existence ofthe prior conviction by a 

preponderance ofthe evidence." Id. at 479-80. "Absent a sufficient record. the 

sentencing court is without the necessary evidence to reach a proper decision, and it is 

impossible to determine whether the convictions are properly included in the offender 

score." Id. at 480-81. 

Here, the prosecutor met this burden by providing numerous documents from the 

state of California showing that Mr. Anderson had a prior felony drug conviction. Citing 

to Ford, Mr. Anderson argues that the State needed to provide certified copies ofthese 

documents. Ford did state that a certified copy of a prior judgment is "[t]he best 

evidence of a prior conviction." Id. at 480. However, Ford did not state that a certified 

copy was mandatory in all cases. To the contrary, Ford also stated that "the State may 

introduce other comparable documents of record or transcripts ofprior proceedings to 

establish criminal history." Id. 

Mr. Anderson contends that the Supreme Court later modified the holding in Ford 

to make a certified copy mandatory. The Supreme Court appeared to do so in State v. 

Lopez, 147 Wn.2d 515,519,55 P.3d 609 (2002). However, the Supreme Court later 

abrogated this part ofLopez. In re Pers. Restraint ofAdolph, 170 Wn.2d 556, 243 P.3d 

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No. 32151-7-III 

State v. Anderson 

540 (20 10) (holding that a noncertified driving record abstract, when combined with a 

criminal history printout, was sufficient to prove the existence of a prior DUI conviction). 

In Adolph, the Supreme Court explicitly held that "the Lopez language ... is, in fact, the 

product ofa misapplication ofthe so-called best evidence rule." ld. at 567. The Supreme 

Court then went on to hold that Ford remains the rule with regard to proving a prior 

conviction at sentencing. ld. at 568-69. Because the official documents submitted by the 

State carried the necessary minimum indicia ofreliability when put together, we conclude 

that the State carried its burden of proving Mr. Anderson's prior conviction from 

California. 

Scoring ofPrior Convictions 

Mr. Anderson's third argument is that the sentencing court erred when it refused to 

determine whether his June 2008 convictions constituted same criminal conduct for 

offender score purposes. RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a)(i) requires sentencing courts to 

determine whether the defendant's prior concurrent sentences should be treated as the 

same criminal conduct when calculating his current offender score. The court did not do 

so despite the defense request. Accordingly, we must vacate the judgment and sentence 

and remand for resentencing. 

Mr. Anderson also argues that upon remand, the State should be held to the record 

as it existed below and not have the opportunity to provide evidence that his prior 

convictions should not be counted as the same criminal conduct. We disagree. The State 

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No. 32151-7-111 

State v. Anderson 

only bears the burden of establishing the existence of the prior convictions. The 

defendant bears the burden ofproving that prior crimes should be counted as the same 

criminal conduct. State v. Graciano, 176 Wn.2d 531, 539,295 P.3d 219 (2013). Thus, 

on remand Mr. Anderson has the burden of establishing that the five offenses constituted 

the same criminal conduct. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. 

A majority ofthe panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 


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