The Clerk of Court is directed to am end the official caption to c onform to the listing of the * parties state d above. 1 09-4025

- cr U S A v . E p s te in
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Augus t T er m, 201 0 (Submitted: Friday, August 27, 2010 Decided: Friday, Septem ber 3, 2010)
Docket No. 09-4025-cr U NI T ED S TATES OF A MERI CA ,

Appellee ,
v. M I TCHEL L R. E PS T E IN ,Defendant-Ap pellant, M ANDI E J O W IL L IS , D I ANA L. W IL L IS ,

Defendants
. *
Before: M I NER , C AB RANES , and S TR AUB , Circuit Judges : Appeal from a judgment ent ered Septem ber 17, 2009, by the United States Dist rict Court for th e N or th er n D is tr

ic t o f N ew

Yo rk ( Da vidN. Hur d, Ju dg

e ). Defendant argues that the District Court erred in failing to credit time served in prison under a prior revocat ion of supervised release toward the st atutory maximum t erm of imprisonment authorized for a subseque nt revocation under 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (e)(3) . We hold that prior terms of imprisonment for violations of supervised release do not limit the maximum sente nce a district c ourt may impose unde r § 3583(e)(3), asSe ct io n 3 583 pr ov

id es , inre le va nt

pa rt : 1 The court may , after considering [certain] fact ors . . . revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant t o serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised rele ase authorized by statute for the offense that re sult edin su ch te rm of s up er vis edre le as e w

itho ut cr edit for ti me pr ev io us ly served on postrelease supervision, if the court, pursuant to the Fede ral Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of probation or supervised release, finds by a preponderanc e of the evidence that the defendant violated a c on di ti onof s up er

vis edre le as e, ex ce pt

th at a d ef en da nt wh os e t er m i s revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve on any suc h re vo ca ti onmo re th an5 y ea rs inpr is onif the off

en se th at re su lt edinth e t er m of supervised release is a class A felony , more than 3 years in prison if such offense is a class B felony, more than 2 ye ars in prison if such offense is a cl as s C or D f el on y, or mo re th anon e y ea r inan y o th er ca se . 18 U .S. C. § 3 583 (e

)( 3) (2 006 ). 2 amended by the Prosecutorial Remedie s and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (“PROTECT Act”), Pub. L. 108-21, § 101, 117 Stat. 650, 651 (2003). Affirmed. Melissa A. Tuohey, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Alexander Bunin, Federal Public Defender, and Ja me s P. Eg an , on the brie

f ), Sy ra cu se , N Y, for defendan tappellant. El iz ab eth S . R

ike r, A ss is ta nt

Un it edSt at es At to rn ey

(R ic ha rd S. H ar tu ni an , Unit edSt at es At to rn ey , on the brie f , and Richard R. Southwick, Assistant Unite d States At to rn ey , of counsel

), United State s Attorney ’s Office for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, NY , for appellee
. P ER C URI AM : The question present ed is whethe r our holding in United States v. Merc ed , 26 3 F. 3d 34 (

2d Ci r. 2001)—establishing that prior terms of imprisonment for violations of supervised release count toward, and there fore limit, the maximum sente nce a district c ourt may impose for a subseque nt violation of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) —applies to a defendant whose 13

underlying offense was committ ed after the e nactment of the Prosecutorial Remedie s and Other To ol s t o e nd th e E xp lo it at io n o f Child re n T od ay

Ac t o f 20 03 ( “PR OT EC T A ct ”) , Pu b. L. 1 08- 21, § 101 , 11 7 St at . 65 0, 6 51 (

200 3)
. Defendant-appellant Mitc hell R. Epstein (“defendant” or “Epstein”) appe als from a September 17, 2009 judgment of the United Stat es District Court for the N orthern District of New Yo rk ( Da vidN. Hu rd , Ju dg

e ) sentenc ing him principally to 24 months’ imprisonment for violating the conditions of his supervised release . Epstein argues that the District Court e rred in failing to count his prior 12-month prison term for a violation of supervised release toward his sent ence for the subsequent

violation. Because 18 U.S.C. § 3583 permits a court to impose a m aximum sentenc e of two years for violations of conditions of supervised release for which the underlying offense was a Class C or D felony, Epstein cont ends that the 24-month sentenc e he rece ived after the sec ond

re vo ca ti onof his su pe rvi se d r el ea se ex ce ed s the le ga l m ax im um se nt en ce by 12 m on th s. We hold that prior sente nces for violations of the conditions of supervised release a re not
cr edit edto wa rd , a nd th er ef or e d o n ot

lim it , the st atut ory m ax im um a dis tr ic t c ou rt may i mp os e f

or a subsequent violation of supervised release pursuant to § 3583(e)( 3), as amended by the PROTECT Act. That is, ea ch violation is subject to the maximum sente nce notwithstanding time served pursuant to prior revocations. Our holding to the contrary in Merced does not control whe n a de fe nd an t’ s u nd erly

in g of fe ns e o cc ur re d a ft er

th e e na ctme nt

of the PRO TE CT Ac t. BA CKGRO UN D On January 19, 2007, Epstein pleaded guilty to tw o counts of a six-count indictment charging him and two others with ( 1) conspiracy to m ake false state ments in the a cquisition of fir ea rm s ( 18 U .S. C. § 3 71) , aCl as s D fe lo ny , a nd (2) p os se ss io n o f afir ea rm by a c onvic te d fe lo n ( 18 U.S .C . § § 9 22(

g) (1 ), 924 (a

)( 2) ), a C la ss C fe lo ny . H e w as se nt en ce d b y J ud ge Hu rd onOc to be r 15 ,4

200 7 p rin ci pally

to 27 m on th s’ im pr

is on me nt an d thr ee ye ar s o f su pe rvi se d r el ea se . O n J an ua ry 15, 200 8, E ps te inwa s r el ea se d fr om pr is onan d b eg anhi s fi rs t t er m o f su pe rvi se d r el ea se . O n J uly 9 , 200 8, a ft er

Ep st ei n t es te d p os it

ive for ma rij ua naan d o pi at es , the Di st ric t C ou rt re vo ke d E ps te in ’s supervised release and se ntenced him principally t o a 12-month term of imprisonment followed by
tw o m or e y ea rs of s up er

vis edre le as e. On June 26, 2009, Epstein was released from prison and began his second t erm of supervised release. OnAugus t 1 4, 2 009 , h e w as di sc ov er edat anun au th or

iz edlo ca ti onan d i n po ss es si onof a n u na utho riz edce ll p ho ne invio la ti onof the co nd it io ns of his su pe rvi se d r el ea se . On Septembe r 17, 2009, after Epstein admit ted to the se violations, the District Court again revoked his supervised release and sent enced him principally to 24 months’ imprisonment with no te rm of

su pe rvi se d r el ea se . Ep st ei n file d ati me ly ap pe al
. DISCUSSION Re vo ca ti onof a

de fe nd an t’ s s up er

vis edre le as e i s go ve rn edby 18 U .S. C. § 3 583 , whi ch , inter al ia , permits a court to impose a maximum sente nce of two ye ars for violations of conditions of supervised release for which the underlying offense was a Class C or Class D felony. Epstein argues th at , h av in g a lre ad y s er

ve d 1 2 m on th s fo r h is fir st vio la ti onof s up er

vis edre le as e, th e D is tr

ic t C ou rt could sentenc e him to no more tha n 12 months for his second violation. That is, he argues that the 12-month term of imprisonment he served for his first violation must be count ed toward the twoye ar ma xim um te rm au th or

iz edin 18 U .S. C. § 3 583 (e

)( 3)
. A. We review de

no vo th e dis tr ic t c ou rt ’s le ga l d et er mi na ti on s i n ase nt en ci ng d ec is io n. United St at es v. J oh ns on , 22 1 F. 3d 83, 94 (

2d Ci r. 2 000). B.Se na to r T hu rm on d p ro vid eda d et ai le d e xa mp le of w ha t the la ngu ag e i n § 358 3( e) (3 ) w ou ld 2 re quire : 5 Section 3583(e)(3) provides that “a defendant w hose term [of supervised relea se] is revoked . . . may not be required to se rve on an y s uc h r ev oc at ion more than . . . 2 years in prison if the offense [tha t r es ul te d i n the te rm of s up er vis edre le as e] is a c la ss C o r D fe lo ny . . . .” 1 8 U. S.C . § 358 3( e) (3 ) (2006) (emphasis added) . This language reflects a 2003 amendment include d in the PROTECT Act , in wh ic h C on gre ss ad de d the ph ra se “onan y s uc h r ev oc at io n” a ft er th e p hr as e “ re quire d t o s er ve .” Pub. L. 108 -21, § 101(1), 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006)). Th is was the only c hange made to § 3583(e)(3) by the PROTECT Act. Prior to the amendment , our Court, along with every other Court of Appe als to address the question, interprete d § 3583(e)(3) t o allow defendants to “ac cumulate” prison time se rved for

mult ip le re vo ca ti on s o f su pe rvi se d r el ea se ba se d o n the sa me un de rly in g of fe ns e, an d t o c re di t thi s ti me to wa rd th e m ax im um te rm of i mp ris on men t a utho riz edby th e s ta tu te . See Merce d

, 263 F.3d at 37; accord United States v. Tapia-Esca lera , 35 6 F. 3d 181 , 18 8 ( 1s t C ir. 200 4) ; Un it ed St at es v. J ac ks on , 32 9 F.3 d 4 06, 407 –0 8 ( 5th C ir. 200 3) ; Un it ed St at es v. Swe ns on , 28 9 F. 3d 676 , 67 7 ( 10th C ir. 200 2) ; United States v. Brings Plenty , 18 8 F. 3d 105 1, 1 053 –5 4 ( 8th C ir. 199 9) ; Un it ed St at es v. B ea ls , 87 F.3 d 8 54, 857 –5 8 ( 7t h C ir. 199 6) , overruled on other ground

s by United States

v. Withers , 128 F.3d 1 167, 1172 (7th Cir. 1997). This interpretation was based not only on the language of the statute, but also on its legislative history, which revealed that the sponsor of an earlier bill containing nearly ident ical provisions understood the statut ory limits to authorize “the imposition of an additional term of supervised release following the revocat ion of supervised release and re-imprisonment . . . only if the defendant had served le ss time in prison for previous supervised release violations than the

ma xim um au th or

iz edpe rio d o f re -im pr

is on me nt .” Merced

, 263 F.3d at 37–38 (citing 137 Cong. Rec. S7769-72 (daily ed. June 13, 1991) (state ment of Sen. Thurmond)). 2For example, in the case of a Class C felony for which the maximum supervised release te rm is three yea rs, a defendant who is revoked and re -im pr is on edfor 18 m on th s c ould be or de re d t o s er ve as mu ch as 18 additional months on supervised release (36-month maximum term of supervised release-18 months imprisonment = 18 months possible re-release su pe rvi si on

). If t he sa me de fe nd an t w as ag ai n r ev ok ed , h e c ould be re -i mp ri so ne d f or no t exceedin g six months (24-month cap -18 months previous ly-served impris onment = 6 months allowable impr

isonment) and if so imprisoned, could not thereafter be pl ac edonsu pe rvi si on(b ec au se th e t wo -y ea r im pr

is on me nt ca p w ould ha

ve been reache d). Thus, under [the ame ndments], a defenda nt would always be credited for incarcerat

ion time against both the cap on re-imprisonment and the maximum authorized period of supervised release. 137 Cong. Rec. S7772 (daily ed. June 13, 199 1) (emphasis adde d). 6 C. Sin ce th e 2 003 am en dm en t i n the PRO TE CT Ac t, ev ery C ou rt of A pp eals to ha

ve considered the issue has interpreted the amendme nt to § 3853(e)( 3) to eliminate the credit for terms of i mp ris on me nt

re sult in g fr om pr

io r re vo ca ti on s. See United State s v. Knight , 58 0 F. 3d 933 , 93 7– 38 (9 th Ci r. 2 009 ), Un it

ed St at es v. Lew is , 51 9 F. 3d 822 , 82 4– 25 ( 8th C ir. 200 8) ; United States v. Williams , 425 F.3 d 9 87, 989 (1 1th C ir. 200 5) (i n d ic ta ); United States v. Tapia-Esca lera , 35 6 F. 3d 181 , 18 8 ( 1s t C ir. 200 4) (i n d ic ta

). We jo in ou r s is te r c irc ui ts inho ld in g tha t the st atut ory m ax im um se nt en ce s i n § 3583(e)(3) apply

to each discre te revocat

ion of a defendant’s supervised release, irrespec tive of any ti me se rve d fo r p re vio us vio la ti on s. We lo ok fir st to th e p lain me anin g of

th e s ta tu to ry

te xt . Se e, e.

g. , In re World Trade

Ctr. Disaster Si te Li ti g. , 521 F.3d 1 69, 187-8 8 (2d Cir. 2008). The amended language of § 3583(e)(3), like the previous version of the statute , provides that a court may revoke a term of supervised rele ase, but the amende d version limits the maximum te rm of imprisonment (in Epstein’s case , 2 years) “on any such revocation.” The conse quence of adding these w ords is that the st atutory maximum now

re fe rs to ea ch su cc es si

ve re vo ca ti onse pa ra te ly
.7

Furthermore, the very ac t of inserting the phrase “on any such re vocation” suggests that, prior to 2003, Congr ess understood the statutory m aximum to apply to the total amount of time served for multiple violations, or at least that Congress was aware that the c ourts had interprete d the
st atut e i n thi s w ay . Epstein argues that

such an interpreta tion of the statut e would contradict the purpose of the PROTECT Act. He relies upon the title of Sect ion 101, “SU PERVISED RELEASE TERM FOR SEX OFFENDERS,” and the Act’s stat ed purpose “[t]o prevent child abduction and the sexual

ex pl oi ta ti onof c hi ld re n, an d fo r o th er pu rp os es ,” Pub. L. No. 108 -21, 117 S tat. 650, 650 (2003), for th e p ro po si ti onth at

Co ngr es s i nt en de d t o r ev

is e s en te nc in g fo r vi ol at

io ns of s up er

vis edre le as e o nly wi th re sp ec t t o s ex off

en de rs . Epstein’s arguments are una vailing. It is well established that “the t itle of a statute cannot lim it th e p lainme anin g of

it s t ex t. ” See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yes key , 52 4 U. S. 2 06, 212 (1 998 ) (internal quotation marks and alte rations omitted) ; see also Dra x v. Reno , 338 F.3d 9 8, 110 (2d Cir. 20 03). We

ac kn ow le dge th at , n ot

wi th st an di ng c er ta

inmi sc ella ne ou s p ro vis io ns , see Pub . L. No . 10 8-2 1, § 608 , 117 St at . 65 0, 6 91 (

mo di fy in g t he Co nt ro lle d S ub st an ce s A ct ), th e P RO TE CT Ac t a pp lie s p rim ar ily to child sex offenders. This arguably creates som e uncertaint y as to whe ther Congress intended the amendment

to § 3583(e)(3) to apply to all criminal defendant s, or to sex offenders alone. The statutory t ext, however, is unambiguous, and we w ill not stretch to c ontradict the text whe re, as here, the plain mea ning produces a result that is ne ither “absurd” nor “plainly at variance” with the po lic y o f t he le gis la ti on . Se e E .E. O. C. v. C om me rc ia l O ffi ce Pr od s. Co
. , 48 6 U. S. 1 07, 120 (1 988 ) (i nt er nal quo ta ti on s m ar ks om it te d) ; accord Yer don v. Henry , 91 F.3d 37 0, 376 (2d Cir. 19 96). Finally, Epstein argues that our interpret ation is undesirable as a mat ter of public policy. We admit, as we not ed in Merced , that applying the ma ximum sentence under § 3583(e)(3) t o each8

successive revoca tion “permit[s] an endless c ycle of consec utive terms of imprisonment and

su pe rvi se d r el ea se ba se d o n asi ngl e u nd erly in g of fe ns e . . . . ” Merced

, 263 F.3d at 37. But our poli cy views regarding this possible outcome do not c hange our responsibility to abide by the clear language of the amended st atute. Ac cordingly, our holding in Merced no longer applies to a de fe nd an t w

ho se un de rly

in g of fe ns e w as co mm it te d a ft er th e e na ctme nt

of the PRO TE CT Ac t. See Johnson v. United States

, 52 9 U. S. 6 94, 701 –0 2 (

200 0) (holding that absent c lear congressional intent to the contrary , statutes c hanging post-revocation penalties apply only t o defendants whose underlying off en se s a re co mm it te d a ft er

th e e ffe ct ive da te of the st atut e)
. CONCLUSION In sum, the District Court did not err when it sent enced Epst ein to two-ye ars’ imprisonment for a violation of the conditions of his supervised release—the m aximum sentenc e permitte d under § 3 583 (e )( 3) for a C la ss C o r D fe lo ny

—a ft er Ep st ei n h adal re ad y s er

ve d a12- mo nth t er m a s are su lt of a prior revocation. We have considered all of the defendant’s other argument s and find them to be w ithout merit. The judgment of the D istrict Court is therefore AF FI RM ED
.