In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3070

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Surya Prasad L. Davuluri,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 98 CR 50033--Philip G. Reinhard, Judge.

Argued January 16, 2001--Decided February 7, 2001

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Posner and Coffey,

Circuit Judges.

 Flaum, Chief Judge. Surya Prasad L. Davuluri

appeals his convictions for wire fraud, mail

fraud, and interstate transportation of a

security taken by fraud, as well as his sentence.

He claims that the evidence was insufficient to

demonstrate his intent to defraud, that he

obtained the security by fraud, or that the

security was worth the minimum statutory

requirement. He appeals his sentence on the

grounds that he does not qualify for an abuse of

a position of trust enhancement. For the reasons

stated herein, we affirm the defendant’s

convictions and sentence.

I. Background

 Davuluri, burdened by loans and promises to

repay people whose money he had previously lost

investing in the markets, approached Dr. Namburu

Ramanajaru ("Dr. Raju"), a cardiologist living in

Illinois, with an offer to engage in commodities

trading on the doctor’s behalf. Dr. Raju

initially rebuffed this proposal, but accepted

after Davuluri stressed his commodities expertise

(including falsely claiming to have studied

"financial engineering" at the University of

Michigan) and emphasized that no more than ten

percent of the $50,000 he was urging Dr. Raju to

invest would be at risk. In his testimony, other
factors that Dr. Raju listed that induced him to

agree to Davuluri’s proposal were their shared

cultural heritage (both are from the Andrha

Pradesh region of India) and Davuluri’s claim

that a Hindu priest had recommended that he talk

to the cardiologist. Dr. Raju agreed to provide

$50,000 for Davuluri to begin trading on the

doctor’s behalf. What Davuluri was to receive for

his services was a disputed issue at trial. Dr.

Raju testified that the two had an agreement to

split any profits fifty-fifty and additionally

that Davuluri could obtain a loan from the

doctor’s fifty percent. Davuluri claims that the

only agreement was that he could obtain a loan

from the profits, all of which would go to Dr.

Raju.

 Davuluri opened an account at the Detroit,

Michigan office of Merrill Lynch and impersonated

Dr. Raju without the latter’s knowledge in all of

Davuluri’s dealings with Merrill Lynch employees.

By claiming to be Dr. Raju, Davuluri instructed

Merrill Lynch to increase the net worth and risk

capital amounts listed on the doctor’s financial

forms without the real Dr. Raju’s consent or

knowledge, eventually reaching numbers twentyfive to thirty times greater than those that the

cardiologist had actually written. Such

adjustments permitted Davuluri to trade a larger

number of contracts. Davuluri also forged Dr.

Raju’s signature on one of these forms.

 Davuluri’s first day of trading exposed Dr.

Raju to a risk of losing $21,000, far greater

than $5,000, the maximum amount Davuluri had told

Dr. Raju that he could lose. The trading went

well at first, with the account increasing in

value to over $200,000. During these times, Dr.

Raju received statements from both Davuluri and

Merrill Lynch, which he did not fully understand.

Davuluri and the doctor also talked over the

phone about the profits being generated and

Davuluri’s family back in India. Dr. Raju

apparently exercised no control over Davuluri’s

activities and had no input in the latter’s

trading decisions.

 The account began to sour when Davuluri began

selling Japanese Yen contracts. Unfortunately for

Davuluri, the value of the Yen started to

increase to unprecedented highs. Because of the

inflated numbers on Dr. Raju’s financial forms,

Davuluri had been able to sell a large number of

these contracts. Thus, he took a huge hit with

the Yen climbing upward, and the account went

$400,000 into the negative. Davuluri initially

hid these losses from Dr. Raju and continued to

tell him that his account was performing

excellently. However, when Merrill Lynch issued

a margin call, Davuluri returned to Dr. Raju,
told him about the losses, and informed the

doctor that if he did not transfer $400,000 to

Merrill Lynch the account would be liquidated. By

emphasizing that the additional funds would be

safe and not at risk, Davuluri cajoled Dr. Raju

into writing a $400,000 check on an account at

Fidelity Investments ("Fidelity") that was in the

name of the cardiologist’s wife. The check had

two signature lines but Dr. Raju signed only one.

The doctor testified that others had previously

accepted checks with only his signature and that

Fidelity always honored such checks. Davuluri

took the check from the doctor in Illinois and

hand-delivered it to Detroit, but Merrill Lynch,

which had already liquidated the account without

informing Davuluri or Dr. Raju, refused the

doctor’s check. The account sustained a loss of

$785,907, which was apportioned between Merrill

Lynch and Dr. Raju in arbitration.

 One of Dr. Raju’s friends urged him to notify

law enforcement authorities about Davuluri’s

conduct. He did and the ensuing FBI investigation

led to a five count indictment against Davuluri.

Count I alleged mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1341,

Counts II-IV alleged wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. sec.

1343, and Count V alleged transporting in

interstate commerce a fraudulently taken security

worth $5,000 or more, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2314. The

prosecution presented the evidence described

above, and the jury found Davuluri guilty of all

five counts. At sentencing, the district court

imposed a two level enhancement for abuse of a

position of trust. The district court cited

Davuluri’s discretionary authority over Dr.

Raju’s account, Davuluri’s claims of financial

expertise, and Davuluri’s exploitation of

cultural ties to Dr. Raju to justify the

enhancement.

II. Discussion

 Davuluri appeals both his convictions and his

sentence. He attacks Counts I-IV by claiming that

the evidence was insufficient to prove that he

formed the specific intent to defraud Dr. Raju.

He contends that the Count V conviction is

invalid because he did not obtain Dr. Raju’s

check by fraud and the check was valueless. In

the alternative, Davuluri claims the district

court erred in imposing the abuse of a position

of trust sentencing enhancement because he did

not have a formal position of trust, like a

broker, nor did he form close personal ties with

Dr. Raju.

A. Intent to Defraud

 Under the standard formulation of the elements

of wire or mail fraud, the government must prove:
(1) the defendant’s participation in a scheme to

defraud; (2) the defendant’s intent to defraud;

and (3) the defendant’s use of the mail (for 18

U.S.C. sec. 1341) or wires (for 18 U.S.C. sec.

1343) in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme.

See United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1542

(7th Cir. 1996). Davuluri argues that the

government failed to prove the second element,

intent to defraud, beyond a reasonable doubt. In

evaluating his claim, we view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution and

vacate the conviction only if no rational trier

of fact could have found the elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See United

States v. Swan, 224 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir.

2000).

 This circuit’s cases have defined intent to

defraud as "acting willfully and with specific

intent to deceive or cheat, usually for the

purpose of getting financial gain for one’s self

or causing financial loss to another." United

States v. Moede, 48 F.3d 238, 241 (7th Cir.

1995), quoted in, e.g., United States v. Paneras,

222 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2000). Davuluri

argues that the evidence is uncontested that he

always intended only to earn profits for Dr.

Raju, rather than imposing any kind of loss on

him. He also claims that he sought no benefit for

himself, contending that Dr. Raju’s testimony

regarding the fifty-fifty split of profits is

inherently unbelievable and that their only

agreement was that Davuluri could obtain a

temporary loan from the profits.

 Davuluri’s arguments are unavailing, since a

rational jury could find beyond a reasonable

doubt that he imposed a large risk of loss on Dr.

Raju. Exposing the victim to a substantial risk

of loss of which the victim is unaware can

satisfy the intent requirement. See United States

v. Catalfo, 64 F.3d 1070, 1077 (7th Cir. 1995);

Moede, 48 F.3d at 242. That Davuluri sincerely

intended his scheme to generate a profit is

irrelevant. See United States v. Masquelier, 210

F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Cosentino, 869 F.2d 301, 307 (7th Cir. 1989). The

evidence shows that Davuluri told Dr. Raju that

no more than $5,000 of the money in the account

would ever be at risk, yet Davuluri’s trading

immediately put Dr. Raju at risk of losing over

$21,000 and the total loss caused by Davuluri was

over $785,000. Davuluri was a knowledgeable

trader and the jury could have inferred that he

knew the high levels of risk to which he was

subjecting the account. On this basis, a

reasonable jury could infer that Davuluri

deceived Dr. Raju and exposed Dr. Raju to a much

greater risk than what he had promised the

cardiologist.
 Davuluri also relies on United States v.

Walters, 997 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1993), but this

argument is similarly unconvincing. The section

of Walters on which Davuluri relies stands for

the proposition that the government must prove

that money or property was transferred from the

victim to the defendant as part of a fraudulent

scheme in order to convict under the mail or wire

fraud statutes. Id. at 1227. In the instant case,

a transfer occurred when Davuluri fraudulently

obtained $50,000 of Dr. Raju’s funds by promising

him that this money would not be exposed to the

level of risk that Davuluri’s trading entailed;

thus, Walters does not bar Davuluri’s conviction.

 A reasonable jury could have found that

Davuluri subjected Dr. Raju to a substantial risk

of potential loss. When combined with the

voluminous evidence regarding Davuluri’s

deception and impersonation of Dr. Raju, a

reasonable jury could have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that Davuluri possessed the

intent to defraud required to support a

conviction under the mail and wire fraud

statutes. Therefore, we affirm Davuluri’s

convictions on Counts I-IV.

B. 18 U.S.C. sec. 2314

 In order to convict a defendant of an offense

relating to a security under 18 U.S.C. sec. 2314,

the government must prove that: (1) the defendant

caused the security to be transported in

interstate commerce; (2) the value of the

security exceeded $5,000; (3) the security was

taken by fraud; and (4) the defendant knew the

security had been obtained by fraud. See United

States v. Bond, 231 F.3d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir.

2000). Davuluri argues that he did not obtain the

security by fraud and also claims that the

security did not have a value of $5,000. These

are challenges to the sufficiency of the

evidence, and so we again view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the government and

reverse only if no reasonable jury could have

found the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Swan, 224 F.3d at 636. Because we reject

Davuluri’s arguments, we affirm his Count V

conviction. 

 1. Obtained by fraud.

 Davuluri claims that he did not take Dr. Raju’s

$400,000 check drawn on his account at Fidelity

by fraud. Davuluri told Dr. Raju that the money

was collateral that would never be touched. He

claims that all of the witnesses agree that if

the Yen had taken a sharp turn downward, this
statement would have been correct. Unfortunately

for Davuluri, he did not include this

qualification when he spoke to Dr. Raju. He told

Dr. Raju only that the collateral would be

completely safe; this kind of absolute statement

indicates that the $400,000 would be returned to

Dr. Raju regardless of any contingencies. This

was, of course, incorrect, since the Yen

continued to move upward and Dr. Raju’s account

was liquidated by Merrill Lynch, causing a loss

of the $400,000 and more. A reasonable jury could

have concluded that Davuluri knew that his

unconditional statement to Dr. Raju was false

because of the defendant’s previous trading

experiences and thus Davuluri obtained the

$400,000 check by fraud.

 2. Value of the security.

 Davuluri claims that Dr. Raju’s check was

worthless because of the absence of Dr. Raju’s

wife’s signature. He cites United States v.

Jackson, 576 F.2d 749, 755-56 (8th Cir. 1978) and

United States v. Teresa, 420 F.2d 13, 17-18 (4th

Cir. 1969) which hold that facially invalid

securities cannot be the basis for a conviction

under 18 U.S.C. sec. 2314. He also argues that

the value of stolen items is measured by the

price a willing buyer would pay and that the only

relevant buyer here, Merrill Lynch, was not

willing to pay anything for Dr. Raju’s check. The

government counters with cases from the Ninth

Circuit, United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108,

1114 (9th Cir. 1986) and United States v.

Urciuoli, 575 F.2d 768, 769 (9th Cir. 1978),

which hold that an actually invalid instrument is

still a security for purposes of 18 U.S.C. sec.

2314 as long as it appears to be valid, or could

be made to appear valid with minor additions. The

government claims that with the minor addition of

Dr. Raju’s wife’s signature, the check would have

appeared to be valid and thus is a security

sufficient to support a conviction under 18

U.S.C. sec. 2314.

 We need not decide into which line of cases Dr.

Raju’s check would fall because the evidence

produced at the trial permits a different

approach. 18 U.S.C. sec. 2311 defines the word

"value" as used in 18 U.S.C. sec. 2314 and

provides that value "means the face, par, or

market value, whichever is the greatest." Dr.

Raju testified that Fidelity had previously

honored checks with only his signature and that

others had accepted these checks as payment. From

this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude

that the market value of the check was the amount

for which it was written, since similar checks

had been given that value by market participants.
 Davuluri’s argument that the check was worthless

because Merrill Lynch refused to accept it fails

because this circuit’s case law establishes that

the market value of fraudulently taken or stolen

goods is the price "a willing buyer will pay,"

United States v. Brookins, 52 F.3d 615, 619 (7th

Cir. 1995) (emphasis added), not what any

particular idiosyncratic buyer will pay. For

example, some businesses will not accept any

checks but demand to be paid only in cash, but

this hardly means that a check presented to and

rejected by such a business becomes worthless.

Likewise, the fact that Merrill Lynch’s

particular policies were apparently more

stringent than most other market participants Dr.

Raju dealt with does not mean that his check

becomes valueless because Merrill Lynch rejected

it.

C. Abuse of a Position of Trust

 Davuluri’s final argument is that the district

court misinterpreted the statutory standard under

U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.3 in imposing a two level

enhancement for abuse of a position of trust. In

order for this increase to be appropriate, the

government must show that (1) the defendant

occupied a position of trust; and (2) the

defendant’s abuse of the position of trust

significantly facilitated the commission of the

offense. United States v. Bailey, 227 F.3d 792,

801 (7th Cir. 2000). Davuluri admits the facts

regarding his trading on behalf of Dr. Raju, but

claims that his activities are not a position of

trust as that phrase is used in the Guidelines

and thus the first prong of the enhancement test

is not satisfied. We review the district court’s

interpretation of what constitutes a "position of

trust" de novo. See Paneras, 222 F.3d at 412 (7th

Cir. 2000).

 Davuluri claims that under this circuit’s case

law the enhancement applies only where the

defendant already occupied a formal position of

trust, such as being a licensed broker, or where

a close personal relationship exists between the

defendant and his victim which gives rise to a

position of trust. Davuluri argues that he did

not occupy any other formal position of trust and

that holding himself out as an experienced

commodities trader is not considered to be a

position of trust as a matter of law. He claims

that he had only a standard commercial

relationship with Dr. Raju, citing cases such as

United States v. Dorsey, 27 F.3d 285, 289 (7th

Cir. 1994). Thus, the first prong does not apply.

Regarding the second prong, he contends that his

conversations with Dr. Raju about their cultural

heritage do not rise to the level of close
personal attachment but simply indicate an

ordinary social relationship. For example, his

discussions with Dr. Raju about his family in

India were a much more distant connection than

the romantic involvement in United States v.

Strang, 80 F.3d 1214, 1220 (7th Cir. 1996).

Davuluri relies heavily on United States v.

Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1995),

which reversed an abuse of a position of trust

enhancement where the defendant developed

relationships with his victims at a country club

and had represented himself as a gifted investor,

and also cites United States v. Koehn, 74 F.3d

199, 201-02 (10th Cir. 1996), which holds that

sec. 3B1.3 applies only where an employee steals

from his employer or the defendant is a fiduciary

occupying or pretending to occupy a formal

position of trust. The government responds that

Davuluri held himself out as an experienced

investor and exploited his shared cultural

heritage to gain Dr. Raju’s trust.

 The district court properly applied the

enhancement. First, a formal position of trust is

not required for an increase under sec. 3B1.3.

The sentencing court must look beyond formal

labels to the relationship between the victim and

the defendant and the responsibility entrusted by

the victim to the defendant. See United States v.

Stewart, 33 F.3d 764, 768 (7th Cir. 1994); United

States v. Boyle, 10 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir.

1993). Particularly relevant to this case and

contrary to the defendant’s argument, Davuluri

can qualify for the enhancement on the basis of

his trading on behalf of Dr. Raju even though the

defendant was not a licensed broker. See Strang,

80 F.3d at 1219-20. To the extent that Koehn, 74

F.3d at 201-02, requires a formal position of

trust for the sec. 3B1.3 enhancement to apply, it

is in opposition to the law of this circuit and

we respectfully decline to follow it. 

 Second, the discretion exercised by Davuluri

shows that he occupies a position of trust. While

the range of activities that may constitute a

position of trust under our prior precedents is

not entirely pellucid, we have frequently

emphasized that a defendant who has wide

discretion to act on behalf of his victim

satisfies the first prong of the enhancement

test. See United States v. Hernandez, 231 F.3d

1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Hoogenboom, 209 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2000);

United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578, 596 (7th

Cir. 1999); see generally U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.3,

Application Note 1 (A position of trust is

"characterized by professional or managerial

discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary

judgment that is ordinarily given considerable

deference)."). The evidence produced at trial
demonstrates that Davuluri was given complete

discretion in using the money given to him by Dr.

Raju to engage in commodities trading to earn a

profit for the cardiologist. Dr. Raju apparently

had little understanding of the investments and

did not supervise Davuluri or otherwise have

input regarding the trades. Dr. Raju’s conferring

of this unsupervised discretion to Davuluri in

the belief that Davuluri would act for Dr. Raju’s

benefit shows that Davuluri did in fact occupy a

position of trust. See, e.g., Gellene, 182 F.3d

at 596. To the extent that Mullens, 65 F.3d 1566-

67, holds that a financial advisor with total

control over investors’ funds does not occupy a

position of trust, we respectfully decline to

follow that decision as inconsistent with our own

case law. Because the abuse of this position

obviously aided Davuluri in committing the

offense, the district court did not err in

applying sec. 3B1.3./1

 Davuluri contends that applying the enhancement

to him would mean that sec. 3B1.3 automatically

applies to all defendants convicted of fraud

because the relationship between himself and Dr.

Raju was purely commercial and all frauds imply

a degree of trust. Davuluri’s slippery slope

argument fails because what distinguishes frauds

based on commercial relationships where sec.

3B1.3 should apply to those where it should not

is whether the defendant has broad discretion to

act on behalf of the victim and the victim

believes that the defendant will act in the

victim’s best interest. If not, then the

enhancement should not be applied solely on the

basis of a commercial arrangement (though the

increase might still be appropriate for some

other reason like a close personal relationship,

see, e.g., Strang, 80 F.3d at 1220). For example,

in Dorsey, the defendant and victim had only a

lender-borrower relationship, 27 F.3d at 287, and

there is no expectation in such an arrangement

that the borrower is using his or her discretion

to further the interests of the lender; thus,

because no other kind of relationship existed

between the parties, sec. 3B1.3 was inapplicable.

However, as explained above, Davuluri wielded

great discretion on behalf of Dr. Raju, making

enhancement under sec. 3B1.3 appropriate in his

case.

III. Conclusion

 Sufficient evidence was presented for a

reasonable jury to conclude that Davuluri

intended to defraud Dr. Raju, that he obtained

Dr. Raju’s check by fraud, and that the check had

a value of more than $5,000. Davuluri’s

relationship with Dr. Raju involved a high degree

of discretion that Davuluri should have exercised
to benefit Dr. Raju, and thus an enhancement for

abuse of a position of trust is proper.

Therefore, Davuluri’s convictions and sentence

are Affirmed.

/1 Given that the discretion that Dr. Raju conferred

on Davuluri to act on the doctor’s behalf

justifies the abuse of a position of trust

enhancement, we need not decide whether the

exploitation of cultural ties or holding one’s

self out as an experienced trader standing alone

could be the basis for such an increase.