Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 22, 1995 / Rules and Regulations 15035 Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421

and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 106(g); and 14 CFR

11.89. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness directive: 95–06–04 McDonnell Douglas: Amendment 39–9174. Docket 94–NM–149–AD. Applicability: Model DC–9–80 series airplanes; as listed in McDonnell Douglas MD–80 Alert Service Bulletin A27–342, dated August 4, 1994; certificated in any

category. Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (b) to request approval

from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration

eliminates the unsafe condition; or different actions necessary to address the unsafe

condition described in this AD. Such a

request should include an assessment of the

effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no

case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any airplane from

the applicability of this AD. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent failure of the horizontal stabilizer primary trim motor, accomplish the

following: (a) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, conduct a visual inspection of the horizontal stabilizer primary trim motor to determine if the motor is identified with one of the suspect serial numbers listed in McDonnell Douglas MD–80 Alert Service Bulletin A27–342, dated August 4, 1994. Conduct this inspection in accordance with

the procedures specified in that service bulletin. (1) If the horizontal stabilizer primary trim

motor is not identified with a suspect serial number, no further action is required by this AD. (2) If the horizontal stabilizer primary trim

motor is identified with a suspect serial number, prior to further flight, replace the motor in accordance with the service bulletin. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through

an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. Note 2: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished. (d) The inspection and replacement shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD–80 Alert Service Bulletin A27–

342, dated August 4, 1994. This

incorporation by reference was approved by

the Director of the Federal Register in

accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR

part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box

1771, Long Beach, California 90801–1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Administrative Support, Dept. L51, M.C. 2–

98. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, Transport Airplane Directorate, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective on April 21, 1995. Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 8, 1995. Darrell M. Pederson, Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 95–6238 Filed 3–21–95; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 94–NM–172–AD; Amendment 39–9176; AD 95–06–06] Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC–9, DC–9–80, and C–

9 (Military) Series Airplanes and Model MD–88 Airplanes AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT. ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC–9, DC–9–80, and C–

9 (military) series airplanes and Model MD–88 airplanes, that requires a visual

inspection to verify proper installation

of the wire termination lugs on the

ignition selector switch, and removal and correct installation of any

improperly installed wire termination

lugs. This amendment also requires application of sealant to the wire

termination lugs and the attachment screws. This amendment is prompted by

a report that, during the manufacturer’s production flight testing, an abnormal engine start valve open annunciation for engine No. 2 occurred and resulted in

an uncontained failure of the engine

starter. The actions specified by this AD

are intended to prevent damage to the

engine cowling, damage to adjacent engine components, and possible fire in

the cowling, due to an uncontained

failure of the engine starter. DATES: Effective April 21, 1995. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of April 21, 1995. ADDRESSES: The service information

referenced in this AD may be obtained

from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90801–1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Administrative Support, Dept. LS1, M.C. 2–98. This

information may be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Baitoo, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140L , FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712; telephone (310) 627–

5245; fax (310) 627–5210. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A

proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to

include an airworthiness directive (AD)

that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC–9, DC–9–80, and–– C–9 (military) series airplanes and Model MD–88 airplanes, was published

in the Federal Register on November 22, 1994 (59 FR 60097). That action

proposed to require a visual inspection

to verify proper installation of the wire

termination lugs on the ignition selector switch, and removal and correct

installation of any improperly installed wire termination lugs. That action also proposed to require application of sealant to the wire termination lugs and

the attachment screws. Interested persons have been afforded

an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. Due

consideration has been given to the

comments received. One commenter states that it plans to

incorporate the service bulletin

referenced in the proposed rule into its

‘‘heavy check’’ maintenance visits, which occur approximately every 18 months. The FAA infers from this comment that the commenter would
15036 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 22, 1995 / Rules and Regulations

like the compliance time for the visual

inspection of the wire termination lugs on the ignition selector switch to be

extended from the proposed 8 months to

18 months. The FAA concurs. The FAA’s intent was that the inspection be

accomplished during a regularly

scheduled maintenance for the majority

of the affected fleet, when the airplanes would be located at a base where special equipment and trained personnel would

be readily available, if necessary. Based

on the information supplied by the

commenter, the FAA now recognizes

that 18 months corresponds more

closely to the interval representative of

the commenter’s normal maintenance

schedules. Paragraph (a) of the final rule has been revised to reflect a compliance

time of 18 months. The FAA does not consider that this extension will adversely affect safety. Another commenter questions the

applicability of the proposed rule. The

commenter states that the service bulletin referenced in the proposed AD

is effective for Model DC–9 series airplanes that are equipped with a 20/4 Joule Ignition System. The

commenter’s Model DC–9 series airplanes are equipped with Dual 20

Joule Ignition System and, therefore, the

commenter states that this should

exclude its airplanes from the

applicability of the AD. The FAA

concurs that clarification is necessary. The applicability statement of this AD

indicates that only those airplanes listed

in McDonnell Douglas DC–9 Service Bulletin 24–121, dated February 24, 1992, are applicable to its requirements. As the commenter points out, the

service bulletin applies only to

airplanes equipped with a 20/4 Joule

Ignition System. The FAA’s intent is to

limit the applicability of this AD only to

those airplanes that have been identified

as subject to the addressed unsafe

condition. In light of this, the

applicability of the final rule has been

revised to clarify that only those Model DC–9 series airplanes listed in the

referenced service bulletin and

equipped with 20/4 Joule Ignition

Systems (and) are subject to the

requirements of the AD. After careful review of the available data, including the comments noted

above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the

adoption of the rule with the changes previously described. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither increase the economic burden

on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD. There are approximately 1,954 Model DC–9, DC–9–80, and C–9 series airplanes and Model MD–88 airplanes

of the affected design in the worldwide

fleet. The FAA estimates that 1,097

airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected

by this AD, that it will take

approximately 2 work hours per airplane to accomplish the required

actions, and that the average labor rate

is $60 per work hour. The costs of required parts would be nominal. Based

on these figures, the total cost impact of

the AD on U.S. operators is estimated to

be $131,640, or $120 per airplane. The total cost impact figure discussed

above is based on assumptions that no

operator has yet accomplished any of

the requirements of this AD action, and

that no operator would accomplish

those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted. The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Therefore, in

accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism

implications to warrant the preparation

of a Federalism Assessment. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is not a

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a

‘‘significant rule’’ under DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic

impact, positive or negative, on a

substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy

of it may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under

the caption ADDRESSES. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. Adoption of the Amendment Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

part 39) as follows: PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421

and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 106(g); and 14 CFR

11.89.

§ 39.13 [Amended] 2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness directive: 95–06–06 McDonnell Douglas: Amendment 39–9176. Docket 94–NM–172–AD. Applicability: Model DC–9, DC–9–80, and C–9 (Military) series airplanes, and Model MD–88 airplanes, equipped with a 20/4 Joule

ignition system; as listed in McDonnell Douglas DC–9 Service Bulletin 24–121, dated

February 24, 1992; certificated in any

category. Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (c) to request approval

from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration

eliminates the unsafe condition; or different actions necessary to address the unsafe

condition described in this AD. Such a

request should include an assessment of the

effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no

case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any airplane from

the applicability of this AD. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent an uncontained failure of the

engine starter, which could cause damage to

the engine cowling, damage to adjacent engine components, and possible fire in the

cowling, accomplish the following: (a) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD, perform a visual inspection

of the wire termination lugs on the ignition

selector switch located in the forward

overhead switch panel in the flight compartment to determine if the lugs are

installed in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC–9 Service Bulletin 24–121, dated

February 24, 1992. (1) If any wire termination lug is

improperly installed, prior to further flight, remove and reinstall wire terminations with

the barrel up, and encapsulate wire

termination lugs and attachment screws with

sealant, in accordance with the service bulletin. (2) If all wire termination lugs are properly

installed, prior to further flight, encapsulate

the termination lugs and attachment screws with sealant, in accordance with the service bulletin. (b) Within 10 days after removing and

reinstalling wire terminations with the barrel up, as required by paragraph (a)(1) of this AD, submit an accomplishment report of the modification, to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712, Attention: Robert Baitoo, ANM–140L, fax (310) 627–

5210. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been

approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 22, 1995 / Rules and Regulations 15037

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and have been assigned OMB

Control Number 2120–0056. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through

an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. Note 2: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished. (e) The inspection, removal, reinstallation, and encapsulation shall be done in

accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC–9 Service Bulletin 24–121, dated February 24, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained

from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90801–

1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Administrative Support, Dept. LS1, M.C. 2–98. Copies may be inspected at

the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (f) This amendment becomes effective on April 21, 1995. Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 9, 1995. Neil D. Schalekamp, Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 95–6320 Filed 3–21–95; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 95–NM–24–AD; Amendment 39–9179; AD 95–04–51] Airworthiness Directives; Dornier Model 328–100 Series Airplanes AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT. ACTION: Final rule; request for comments. SUMMARY: This document publishes in

the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) T95–04–51 that was sent previously to

all known U.S. owners and operators of all Dornier Model 328–100 series

airplanes by individual telegrams. This AD requires certain revisions to the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), replacement of certain de-icing boots in

the air intake duct assemblies of the

engine with re-designed units, and

inspections of the boots to detect discrepancies. This amendment is prompted by reports of failures of the

engine air inlet de-icing system, including debonding of the boots from

the engine air intake ducts, failure of the

air-tight chambers in the boots, and malfunction and subsequent shutdown

of an engine during flight. The actions

specified by this AD are intended to prevent engine malfunction due to

failure of the engine air inlet de-icing

system. DATES: Effective April 6, 1995, to all persons except those persons to whom

it was made immediately effective by

telegraphic AD T95–04–51, issued

February 21, 1995, which contained the

requirements of this amendment. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of April 6, 1995. Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before May 22, 1995. ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM–103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 95–NM–

24–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056. The applicable service information may be obtained from Dornier Deutsche Aerospace, P.O. Box 1103, D–82230 Wessling, Federal Republic of Germany. This information may be examined at

the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of

the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary Lium, Aerospace Engineer, Standardization Branch, ANM–113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056; telephone

(206) 227–1112; fax (206) 227–1320. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On

February 21, 1995, the FAA issued

telegraphic AD T95–04–51, which is applicable to all Model Dornier 328–100

series airplanes. That action was prompted by reports of failure of the

engine inlet de-icing system, including debonding of the boots from the engine

air intake ducts, failure of the airtight chambers in the boots, and malfunction

and subsequent shutdown of an engine

during flight. These conditions, if not corrected, could result in significant

loss of engine power. The Luftfahrt-Bundesamt (LBA), which is the airworthiness authority for

the Federal Republic of Germany, recently notified the FAA that an unsafe

condition may exist on all Dornier Model 328–100 series airplanes. The LBA advises that it has received

numerous reports of failures of the

engine inlet de-icing system, including

reports of debonding of the de-icing boots from the engine air intake ducts, and other reports of failure of the airtight chambers in these pneumatic deicing boots. In one case, debonding and

associated disruption of airflow into the

engine resulted in malfunction and

subsequent shutdown of the engine during flight. The causes of failure of

the engine inlet de-icing system have not yet been identified fully. Dornier has issued Service Bulletin

SB–328–30–020, dated March 17, 1994, which describes procedures for

repetitive detailed visual and tactile

inspections of the de-icing boots of the

air intake on the engines to detect flat spots, softness, or other discrepancies in

the de-icing boots, and to ensure that

the edges of the de-icing boots are

sealed properly. Dornier also has issued Alert Service Bulletin ASB–328–71–006, Revision 1, dated February 16, 1995, which

describes procedures for replacement of certain de-icing boots on the air intakes of the engines with de-icing boots that have been re-designed. The LBA classified these service bulletins as mandatory and issued German airworthiness directive 95–098/ 2, dated February 17, 1995, in order to

assure the continued airworthiness of

these airplanes in the Federal Republic of Germany. In light of the failure history of certain

engine intake de-icing systems on which

re-designed de-icing boots are not

installed, the FAA finds that the

existing de-icing boots must be replaced with re-designed units. In the interim, daily inspections, as described in the Dornier service bulletin, are required to determine the condition of the de-icing

system. In addition, because the causes of the failures have not been identified

fully, the FAA has determined that

functional tests also are necessary prior

to each flight to ensure proper operation

of the system. Finally, for the same

reason, this AD also requires that these

inspections and tests be continued at greater intervals following installation

of the re-designed boot to ensure that

installation of the re-designed unit has corrected the unsafe condition.