Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 2 / Wednesday, January 4, 1995 / Proposed Rules 389

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 94–NM–114–AD]

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell

Douglas Model DC–10 Series Airplanes

and Model KC–10A (Military) Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the

adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to

certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC–

10 series airplanes and Model KC–10A

(military) airplanes. This proposal

would require various modifications of

the flight controls, hydraulic power

systems, and landing gear. This

proposal is prompted by a

recommendation by the Systems Review

Task Force (SRTF) for accomplishment

of certain modifications that will

enhance the controllability of these

airplanes in the unlikely event of

catastrophic damage to all hydraulics

systems. The actions specified by the

proposed AD are intended to ensure

airplane survivability in the event of

damage to fully powered flight control

systems.

DATES: Comments must be received by

March 1, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–103,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 94–NM–

114–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00

p.m., Monday through Friday, except

Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in

the proposed rule may be obtained from

McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O.

Box 1771, Long Beach, California

90801–1771, Attention: Business Unit

Manager, Technical Administrative

Support, Dept. L51, Mail Code 2–98.

This information may be examined at

the FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington; or at the FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate, Los

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office,

3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood,

California.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mauricio J. Kuttler, Aerospace Engineer,

Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM–

131L, FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft

Certification Office, 3960 Paramount

Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712;

telephone (310) 627–5355; fax (310)

627–5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications shall

identify the Rules Docket number and

be submitted in triplicate to the address

specified above. All communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments, specified above, will be

considered before taking action on the

proposed rule. The proposals contained

in this notice may be changed in light

of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report

summarizing each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket. –

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket Number 94–NM–114–AD.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs–

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

ANM–103, Attention: Rules Docket No.

94–NM–114–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue,

SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Discussion–

In July 1989, a McDonnell Douglas

Model DC–10–30 series airplane was

involved in an accident in Sioux City,

Iowa, resulting in the deaths of 110

passengers and one crewmember. The

National Transportation Safety Board

(NTSB) identified the catastrophic

disintegration of the stage 1 fan disk of

one of the engines as a probable cause

of the accident. The resulting debris

damaged the hydraulic systems that

power the flight controls, resulting in

the loss of virtually all control

capability.–

Following the accident, the

Administrator of the Federal Aviation

Administration convened a Systems

Review Task Force (SRTF) to investigate

means for enhancing airplane

survivability following damage to fully

powered flight control systems. The

SRTF formed working groups to perform

these investigations for specific airplane

models to determine what actions could

be effective in protecting other transport

category airplanes with powered flight

control systems from similar engine or

systems failures.–

The SRTF working group assigned to

review Model DC–10 series airplanes

completed its review of the Model DC–

10 design, including existing service

bulletins, and issued a report

recommending accomplishment of

certain modifications described in 12

Model DC–10 service bulletins. A copy

of the report is contained in the Rules

Docket for this AD action.

Explanation of Relevant Service

Documents–

The FAA has reviewed and approved

the 12 McDonnell Douglas DC–10

Service Bulletins recommended for

accomplishment by the SRTF working

group. Accomplishment of the

modifications specified in these service

bulletins will enhance the

controllability of the airplane in the

unlikely event of catastrophic damage to

all three hydraulic systems in the tail

area of the airplane.

Seven of the 12 service bulletins

discussed previously describe

procedures for various modifications of

the flight controls:–

1. McDonnell Douglas DC–10 Service

Bulletin 27–71, Revision 1, dated

February 14, 1973, was issued in

response to reports of failures of the

piping of the hydraulic system of the

horizontal stabilizer on Model DC–10

series airplanes that had accumulated as

few as 70 flight hours. The failures were

attributed to rapid release of the trim

control handles of the stabilizer, which

resulted in pressure surges that were

abnormally high in the hydraulic system

of the stabilizer. Continued high

pressure surges and externally induced

vibrations could result in fatigue failure

of the hydraulic piping. These

conditions, if not corrected, could result

in the loss of fluid, which could render

the affected system inoperative.–

The service bulletin describes

procedures for installation of surge

damper assemblies and new piping

assemblies in hydraulic systems 1 and

3 of the horizontal stabilizer.

Installation of the dampers and piping

will ensure that high pressure surges are

absorbed and will prevent pipe

failures.–

2. McDonnell Douglas DC–10 Service

Bulletin 27–120, dated February 10,

1975, describes procedures for

modification and reidentification of the
390 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 2 / Wednesday, January 4, 1995 / Proposed Rules

trim hydraulic motor assembly of the

horizontal stabilizer. Accomplishment

of the modification will minimize the

possibility of fatigue failure of the motor

case screws and shuttle valve screws.

(The service bulletin references Sperry

Rand Corporation, Vickers Division,

Service Bulletin 390017–27–2, dated

December 2, 1974, as an additional

source of service information.) Failure

of the motor case screws and/or failure

of the shuttle valve screws, if not

corrected, could result in loss of

hydraulic system fluid. Failure of two

shuttle valve screws could cause the

shuttle valve to separate from the trim

motor.–

3. McDonnell Douglas DC–10 Service

Bulletin 27–152, dated August 9, 1976,

was issued in response to a report of

inoperative horizontal stabilizer trim

due to disengagement of the torsional

coupling of the drive system on Model

DC–10 series airplanes that had

accumulated approximately 4,100 flight

hours. In addition, during fleet

inspections, loose retaining nuts and

locking clips were found on these

airplanes; the torsional nut did not

engage adequately to provide locking

action. The inoperative horizontal

stabilizer trim was attributed to failure

of the locking clip to prevent the

retaining nut of the torsional coupling

from rotating and becoming loose. This

condition could result in the retaining

nut becoming loose and allowing

disengagement of the torsional coupling.

This condition, if not corrected, could

result in the loss of horizontal stabilizer

trim capability.

The service bulletin describes

procedures for replacing the existing

locking clip on the torsional coupling of

the horizontal stabilizer with a new nut

retainer of an improved design.

Accomplishment of this modification

will minimize the possibility of the

torsional nut becoming loose.–

4. McDonnell Douglas DC–10 Service

Bulletin 27–181, Revision 1, dated May

28, 1981, was issued in response to

reports of failure of the differential drive

shear pin in the horizontal stabilizer

drive system. These failures occurred

during takeoff climb on Model DC–10

series airplanes that had accumulated

between 4 and 4,201 flight hours.

Investigation revealed that these failures

were caused by bending fatigue of the

shear pin due to a loose fit. Failure of

the shear pin could result in an

inoperative horizontal stabilizer drive

system. This condition, if not corrected,

could result in reduced controllability

of the airplane.–

The service bulletin describes

procedures for installation of a modified

chain drive unit on the horizontal

stabilizer. The new unit incorporates a

larger shear pin with a single shear

point having a larger diameter with less

constraint. Accomplishment of this

modification will increase the reliability

of the drive assembly.–

5. McDonnell Douglas DC–10 Service

Bulletin 27–201, dated December 30,

1985, was issued in response to a report

of in-flight loss of hydraulic systems 1

and 2 shortly after takeoff of a Model

DC–10 series airplane. Investigation

revealed that the loss of hydraulic

systems was caused by blowout of the

number 6 tire after gear retraction. The

blowout deflected the keel web

structure, which ruptured hydraulic

pipes to the flap lock valves and caused

rapid loss of fluid. This condition, if not

corrected, could result in loss of

operation of the hydraulic system.–

The service bulletin describes

procedures for replacement of the

hydraulic pipe assemblies of the flap

lock valve with new pipe assemblies

having increased flexibility and

strength. Installation of these pipe

assemblies will minimize the possibility

of rupture of the pipe assemblies during

events such as those described

previously.–

6. McDonnell Douglas DC–10 Service

Bulletin 27–208, dated September 5,

1989, was issued in response to reports

of cracking of the end caps of the trim

control valve of the horizontal stabilizer

on Model DC–10 series airplanes that

had accumulated between 9,800 and

16,000 flight hours. Investigation

revealed that fatigue cracking initiated

from inside the radius of the end cap.

Such fatigue cracking, if not corrected,

could result in loss of hydraulic fluid

and eventual shutdown of the hydraulic

system.–

The service bulletin describes

procedures for replacement of eight end

caps of the trim control valve of the

horizontal stabilizer with new end caps

having a larger inside radius.

Replacement of the end caps will

minimize the possibility of cracking of

the end caps.–

7. McDonnell Douglas DC–10 Service

Bulletin 27–209, dated October 20,

1989, was issued in response to reports

of failure of the chain drive fuse of the

horizontal stabilizer on Model DC–10

series airplanes that had accumulated

between 4,000 and 18,000 flight hours.

Investigation revealed that a fuse pin

within the chain drive unit had sheared

due to loose nuts on the shaft assembly.

These conditions, if not corrected, could

result in the horizontal stabilizer drive

system becoming inoperative.–

The service bulletin describes

procedures for inspecting the nuts on

the shaft assembly for looseness, proper

orientation, excess backlash, and

engagement of the washer locking tab;

and replacing the fuse pin, adjusting

backlash, and properly positioning and

tightening the nuts, if necessary.

Replacing the fuse pin and tightening

the nuts will minimize the possibility of

failure of the chain drive fuse of the

horizontal stabilizer.–

Two of the 12 service bulletins

describe procedures for modifications of

certain hydraulic power systems:–

8. McDonnell Douglas DC–10 Service

Bulletin 29–109, Revision 1, dated

September 22, 1978, was issued in

response to reports of rapid rise in

temperature in hydraulic system 3

subsequent to the loss of hydraulic fluid

in hydraulic system 1 or 2. Investigation

revealed that a shutoff valve on the

reversible motor pump may fail on one

side of the reversible motor pump and

that failure may go undetected. This

failure poses a problem if a failure

occurs in the opposite hydraulic system

that causes total loss of that system’s

fluid. If a valve fails in the open

position on one side and fluid is lost

from the opposite hydraulic system, the

reversible motor pump will rotate at

maximum rpm (limited by the flow

control). This condition, if not

corrected, could result in a rise in

temperature in the opposite hydraulic

system, which may necessitate limited

use of the engine-drive pumps on that

hydraulic system.–

The service bulletin describes

procedures for installation of an

indication system that will allow the

flight crew to immediately detect an

inoperative shutoff valve on the

reversible motor pump. The installation

of the indication system involves

installing two pressure switches on the

reversible motor pumps; installing a

ground stud, two relays, and receptacles

on the center compartment electrical

rack; replacing the 6-post terminal strip

in the wheel well of the right main

landing gear with an 8-post terminal

strip; installing an annunciator legend

on the flight engineer’s annunciator

panel; installing a circuit breaker and

replacing the nameplate on the flight

engineer’s circuit breaker panel; revising

the failure indication wiring on the

constant speed drive; and installing

indication wiring and associated clamps

and brackets on the reversible motor

pump.–

9. McDonnell Douglas DC–10 Service

Bulletin 29–125, Revision 2, dated

October 23, 1987, was issued in

response to reports of complete loss of

fluid from the number 3 hydraulic

system. The fluid loss was caused by a

ruptured hi-pressure switch on the

hydraulic case drain. This condition, if
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 2 / Wednesday, January 4, 1995 / Proposed Rules 391

not corrected, could result in the loss of

function of the hydraulic system.

The service bulletin describes

procedures for modification of the main

hydraulic power system. The

modification involves replacing the hipressure switches on the hydraulic case

drain on engine numbers 1, 2, and 3

with plugs; removing one relay and one

receptacle on the aft relay panel of the

equipment rack; replacing the existing

legend in position 8 on the flight

engineer’s annunciator panel with a

blank legend; and revising the wiring for

indicating the aircraft hydraulic

temperature and pressure.

Accomplishment of this modification

will minimize the possibility of loss of

hydraulic fluid.–

Three of the 12 service bulletins

describe procedures for modifications of

the landing gear:–

10. McDonnell Douglas DC–10

Service Bulletin 32–134, dated March

22, 1977, was issued in response to

reports of damage to the electrical and

hydraulic installations of the aft

antiskid manifold on the main landing

gear. The damage resulted from blown

tire fragments and debris, which

rendered the antiskid system

inoperative and, in one case, ruptured a

hydraulic pipe. Failure of the pipe, if

not corrected, could cause hydraulic

system numbers 1 or 3 to become

inoperative due to the loss of hydraulic

fluid.–

The service bulletin describes

procedures for modification of the aft

antiskid manifold on the left and right

main landing gear. The modification

entails installing a protective shield and

associated brackets on the aft antiskid

manifold. Accomplishment of this

modification will minimize the

possibility of damage to the aft antiskid

manifold.–

11. McDonnell Douglas DC–10

Service Bulletin 32–143, dated August

8, 1978, was issued in response to

reports of damage to the brake piping

that is routed between the antiskid

manifolds and the swivel glands of the

main landing gear. This damage

occurred as a result of the impact of

debris following failure of a tire on the

main landing gear. A ruptured antiskid

return pipe could result in loss of fluid

from the affected antiskid system during

application of the brakes. A single

failure of a pressure pipe will limit

brake performance on a single system.

Failure of brake pressure pipes in both

systems, if not corrected, could result in

complete loss of braking capability.–

The service bulletin describes

procedures for installation of protective

shields over the brake and the antiskid

piping located on the aft side of the left

and right main landing gear.

Accomplishment of this modification

will minimize the possibility of brake

pressure and damage to the antiskid

return piping caused by failure of a tire

on the main landing gear.–

12. McDonnell Douglas DC–10

Service Bulletin 32–157, Revision 1,

dated October 29, 1980, was issued in

response to a report of damage to a

support bracket on the aileron trim

cable and to a flight control mixer in the

wheel well of the centerline landing

gear. Investigation revealed that the

damage was caused by the impact of a

tire tread that was thrown into the open

area created by the aft doors on the

centerline landing gear when the

landing gear is in the down position.

This condition, if not corrected, could

result in damage to components located

in the wheel well of that landing gear.–

The service bulletin describes

procedures for installing a doubler on

the web assembly between the wheel

wells of the center landing gear and the

right main landing gear; installing a

fiberglass deflector assembly on the

shock strut of the centerline landing

gear; replacing the pressure gage

manifold of the shock strut; and

installing an instruction plate and

adding precaution instruction markings

in the wheel well of the right main

landing gear and on the forward door of

the center landing gear.

Accomplishment of this modification

will minimize the possibility of damage

to components in the wheel well of the

centerline landing gear caused by a

thrown tire tread or other debris.

Explanation of the Proposed Rule–

Since an unsafe condition has been

identified that is likely to exist or

develop on other products of this same

type design, the proposed AD would

require various modifications of the

flight controls, hydraulic power

systems, and landing gear. The actions

would be required to be accomplished

in accordance with the McDonnell

Douglas service bulletins described

previously.–

The FAA is continuing to review the

recommendations of the SRTF working

group for these airplanes and may

consider further rulemaking based on

those recommendations.–

As a result of recent communications

with the Air Transport Association

(ATA) of America, the FAA has learned

that, in general, some operators may

misunderstand the legal effect of AD’s

on airplanes that are identified in the

applicability provision of the AD, but

that have been altered or repaired in the

area addressed by the AD. The FAA

points out that all airplanes identified in

the applicability provision of an AD are

legally subject to the AD. If an airplane

has been altered or repaired in the

affected area in such a way as to affect

compliance with the AD, the owner or

operator is required to obtain FAA

approval for an alternative method of

compliance with the AD, in accordance

with the paragraph of each AD that

provides for such approvals. A note has

been included in this notice to clarify

this requirement.

Cost Impact–

There are approximately 427 Model

DC–10 series airplanes and Model KC–

10A (military) airplanes of the affected

design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA

estimates that 254 airplanes of U.S.

registry would be affected by this

proposed AD.–

Approximate work hours to

accomplish the proposed actions and

costs for required parts are listed in the

following table. The average labor rate is

$60 per work hour.

Service

bulletin

No.–

Estimated

work

hours–

Parts cost

per airplane

Total cost

per airplane

27–71 .... 5 (1) $300.00

27–120 .. 3 $68.00 248.00

27–152 .. 1 278.00 338.00

27–181 .. 5 431.00 731.00

27–201 .. 10 7,943.00 8,543.00

27–208 .. 5 3,704.00 4,004.00

27–209 .. 9 N/A 540.00

29–109 .. 101 713.00 6,773.00

29–125 .. 4 498.00 738.00

32–134 .. 3 2,034.00 2,214.00

32–143 .. 3 649.00 829.00

32–157 .. 6 46,463.00 46,823.00

1 Required parts would be supplied by the

manufacturer at no cost to operators.–

Based on these figures, the total cost

impact of the proposed AD on U.S.

operators is estimated to be $18,308,574,

or $72,081 per airplane.–

The total cost impact figure discussed

above is based on assumptions that no

operator has yet accomplished any of

the proposed requirements of this AD

action, and that no operator would

accomplish those actions in the future if

this AD were not adopted.–

The number of required work hours,

as indicated above, is presented as if the

accomplishment of the actions proposed

in this AD were to be conducted as

‘‘stand alone’’ actions. However, the 24-

month compliance time specified in

paragraph (a) of this proposed AD

should allow ample time for the actions

to be accomplished coincidentally with

scheduled major airplane inspection

and maintenance activities, thereby

minimizing the costs associated with

special airplane scheduling.–
392 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 2 / Wednesday, January 4, 1995 / Proposed Rules

Further, the FAA recognizes that the

obligation to maintain aircraft in an

airworthy condition is vital, but

sometimes expensive. Because AD’s

require specific actions to address

specific unsafe conditions, they appear

to impose costs that would not

otherwise be borne by operators.

However, because of the general

obligation of operators to maintain

aircraft in an airworthy condition, this

appearance is deceptive. Attributing

those costs solely to the issuance of this

AD is unrealistic because, in the interest

of maintaining safe aircraft, most

prudent operators would accomplish

the required actions even if they were

not required to do so by the AD. –

A full cost-benefit analysis has not

been accomplished for this proposed

AD. As a matter of law, in order to be

airworthy, an aircraft must conform to

its type design and be in a condition for

safe operation. The type design is

approved only after the FAA makes a

determination that it complies with all

applicable airworthiness requirements.

In adopting and maintaining those

requirements, the FAA has already

made the determination that they

establish a level of safety that is costbeneficial. When the FAA, as in this

proposed AD, makes a finding of an

unsafe condition, this means that the

original cost-beneficial level of safety is

no longer being achieved and that the

proposed actions are necessary to

restore that level of safety. Because this

level of safety has already been

determined to be cost-beneficial, a full

cost-benefit analysis for this proposed

AD would be redundant and

unnecessary.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein

would not have substantial direct effects

on the States, on the relationship

between the national government and

the States, or on the distribution of

power and responsibilities among the

various levels of government. Therefore,

in accordance with Executive Order

12612, it is determined that this

proposal would not have sufficient

federalism implications to warrant the

preparation of a Federalism

Assessment.–

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this proposed regulation (1)

is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’

under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not

a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if

promulgated, will not have a significant

economic impact, positive or negative,

on a substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft

regulatory evaluation prepared for this

action is contained in the Rules Docket.

A copy of it may be obtained by

contacting the Rules Docket at the

location provided under the caption

ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39–

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment–

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration proposes to amend part

39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations

(14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421

and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 106(g); and 14 CFR

11.89.

§ 39.13 [Amended]–

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness

directive:

McDonnell Douglas: Docket 94–NM–114–

AD.–

Applicability: Model DC–10–10, –10F, –15,

–30, –30F, –40, and –40F series airplanes and

Model KC–10A (military) airplanes; as listed

in the following McDonnell Douglas DC–10

service bulletins; certificated in any

category:–

Service

bulletin

No. –

Revision

level – Date issued–

27–71– .... 1 – .......... February 14, 1973.–

27–120– .. Original– . February 10, 1975.–

27–152– .. Original– . August 9, 1976.–

27–181– .. 1 – .......... May 28, 1981.–

27–201– .. Original– . December 30,

1985.–

27–208– .. Original– . September 5,

1989.–

27–209– .. Original– . October 20, 1989.–

29–109– .. 1– ........... September 22,

1978.–

29–125– .. 2– ........... October 23, 1987.–

32–134– .. Original– . March 22, 1977.–

32–143– .. Original– . August 8, 1978.–

32–157– .. 1– ........... October 29, 1980.–

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must use the authority

provided in paragraph (b) to request approval

from the FAA. This approval may address

either no action, if the current configuration

eliminates the unsafe condition; or different

actions necessary to address the unsafe

condition described in this AD. Such a

request should include an assessment of the

effect of the changed configuration on the

unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no

case does the presence of any modification,

alteration, or repair remove any airplane from

the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously. –

To ensure airplane survivability in the

event of damage to fully powered flight

control systems, accomplish the following:–

(a) Within 24 months after the effective

date of this AD, modify the flight controls,

hydraulic power systems, and landing gear in

accordance with paragraphs (a)(1) through

(a)(12) of this AD, as applicable.–

(1) For airplanes listed in McDonnell

Douglas DC–10 Service Bulletin 27–71,

Revision 1, dated February 14, 1973: Install

surge damper assemblies and new piping

assemblies in hydraulic systems 1 and 3 of

the horizontal stabilizer in accordance with

the service bulletin. As of the effective date

of this AD, no person shall install a pipe

assembly, part number AJK7004–641, –642,

–643, –644, –645, –646, –647, or –648 on any

airplane. As of the effective date of this AD,

no person shall install a valve assembly, part

number AJG7041–5515 or –5517, on any

airplane unless that assembly has been

modified in accordance with the service

bulletin.–

(2) For airplanes listed in McDonnell

Douglas DC–10 Service Bulletin 27–120,

dated February 10, 1975: Modify and

reidentify the trim hydraulic motor assembly

of the horizontal stabilizer in accordance

with the service bulletin.

Note 2: The McDonnell Douglas service

bulletin references Sperry Rand Corporation,

Vickers Division, Service Bulletin 390017–

27–2, dated December 2, 1974, as an

additional source of service information.

(3) For airplanes listed in McDonnell

Douglas DC–10 Service Bulletin 27–152,

dated August 9, 1976: Replace the existing

retaining nut locking clip on the torsional

coupling of the horizontal stabilizer with a

new retaining nut locking clip in accordance

with the service bulletin. As of the effective

date of this AD, no person shall install a

locking clip or nut retainer, part number

AJH7259–1, on any airplane.–

(4) For airplanes listed in McDonnell

Douglas DC–10 Service Bulletin 27–181,

Revision 1, dated May 28, 1981: Install a

modified chain drive unit on the horizontal

stabilizer in accordance with the service

bulletin. As of the effective date of this AD,

no person shall install a chain drive unit

assembly, part number AJH7337–1 or

AJH7337–501; pin, part number AJH7343–1;

housing assembly, part number AJH7345–1;

shaft, part number AJH7075–1 or –501; or

decal, part number AJH7347–1; on any

airplane.–

(5) For airplanes listed in McDonnell

Douglas DC–10 Service Bulletin 27–201,

dated December 30, 1985: Replace the

hydraulic pipe assemblies of the flap lock

valve with new pipe assemblies in

accordance with the service bulletin. As of

the effective date of this AD, no person shall
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 2 / Wednesday, January 4, 1995 / Proposed Rules 393

install a pipe assembly, part number

AYK7002–876, –877, –878, –879, –880, and

–881; AYK7136–1; and AYK7137–1; on any

airplane.–

(6) For airplanes listed in McDonnell

Douglas DC–10 Service Bulletin 27–208,

dated September 5, 1989: Replace eight end

caps of the trim control valve of the

horizontal stabilizer with new end caps

having a larger inside radius, in accordance

with the service bulletin. As of the effective

date of this AD, no person shall install an

end cap, part number AJG7020–503; or valve

assembly, part number AJG7041–5535,

–5533, –5531, –5529, –5527, –5525, –5523,

–5521, –5519, –5517, –5515, –5513, –5511,

–5509, –5507, –5505, –5503, –5501, or –5001;

on any airplane.–

(7) For airplanes listed in McDonnell

Douglas DC–10 Service Bulletin 27–209,

dated October 20, 1989: Inspect the nuts on

the shaft assembly for looseness, proper

orientation, excess backlash, and engagement

of the washer locking tab, in accordance with

the service bulletin. As of the effective date

of this AD, no person shall install a drive

assembly, part number AJH7337–505, on any

airplane unless that assembly has been

modified in accordance with the service

bulletin.–

(i) If no discrepancy is found, no further

action is required by this paragraph.–

(ii) If any discrepancy is found, prior to

further flight, replace the fuse pin, adjust

backlash, and properly position and tighten

the nuts in accordance with the service

bulletin.–

(8) For airplanes listed in McDonnell

Douglas Service Bulletin 29–109, Revision 1,

dated September 22, 1978: Install an

indication system on the reversible motor

pump in accordance with the service

bulletin. As of the effective date of this AD,

no person shall install a nameplate, part

number ABN7191–1124, –1125, –1126, –872,

–873, –874, –878, or –1084; a support, part

number 2394536–509; or a plate, part number

2710497–1–6; on any airplane.–

(9) For airplanes listed in McDonnell

Douglas DC–10 Service Bulletin 29–125,

Revision 2, dated October 23, 1987: Modify

the main hydraulic power system in

accordance with the service bulletin. As of

the effective date of this AD, no person shall

install an annunciator panel, part number

102200–268, or –274, on any airplane unless

that panel has been modified in accordance

with the service bulletin.–

(10) For airplanes listed in McDonnell

Douglas DC–10 Service Bulletin 32–134,

dated March 22, 1977: Modify the aft antiskid

manifold on the left and right main landing

gear in accordance with the service bulletin.

As of the effective date of this AD, no person

shall install a bracket, part number

ARG7291–1, ARG7291–501,ARG7485–501,

or ARG7485–502 on any airplane. As of the

effective date of this AD, no person shall

install a main landing gear assembly, part

number ARG7393-(Any Configuration), on

any airplane unless that assembly has been

modified in accordance with the service

bulletin.–

(11) For airplanes listed in McDonnell

Douglas DC–10 Service Bulletin 32–143,

dated August 8, 1978: Install protective

shields over the brake and antiskid piping

located on the aft side of the left and right

main landing gear in accordance with the

service bulletin. As of the effective date of

this AD, no person shall install a support,

part number ARG7551–1 or ARG7552–1, or

bracket, part number AEP8009–25, on any

airplane. As of the effective date of this AD,

no person shall install a main landing gear

assembly, part number ARG7393-(Any

Configuration), on any airplane unless that

assembly has been modified in accordance

with the service bulletin.–

(12) For airplanes listed in McDonnell

Douglas DC–10 Service Bulletin 32–157,

Revision 1, dated October 29, 1980: Install a

doubler on the web assembly between the

wheel wells of the center landing gear and

the right main landing gear; install a

fiberglass deflector assembly on the shock

strut of the centerline landing gear; replace

the pressure gage manifold of the shock strut;

and install an instruction plate and adding

precaution instruction markings in the wheel

well of the right main landing gear and on

the forward door of the center landing gear

in accordance with the service bulletin. As of

the effective date of this AD, no person shall

install a manifold, part number AYK7162–

501, on any airplane.–

(b) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Los

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.

Operators shall submit their requests through

an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

Note 3: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished. Issued in Renton,

Washington, on December 28, 1994.

S.R. Miller,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 95–62 Filed 1–3–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 94–ANE–64]

Airworthiness Directives; Textron

Lycoming LTS101 Series Turboshaft

and LTP101 Series Turboprop Engines

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the

adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to

Textron Lycoming LTS101 series

turboshaft and LTP101 series turboprop

engines. This proposal would require

replacement of cast material axial

compressor rotors with wrought

material axial compressor rotors that

have improved fatigue characteristics

and material properties. This proposal is

prompted by 36 reports of axial

compressor blade failures on cast rotors.

The actions specified by the proposed

AD are intended to prevent engine

power loss and inflight engine

shutdown.

DATES: Comments must be received by

February 3, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Office of the

Assistant Chief Counsel, Attention:

Rules Docket No. 94–ANE–64, 12 New

England Executive Park, Burlington, MA

01803–5299. Comments may be

inspected at this location between 8:00

a.m. and 4:30 p.m., Monday through

Friday, except Federal holidays. The

service information referenced in the

proposed rule may be obtained from

Textron Lycoming, 550 Main Street,

Stratford, CT 06497. This information

may be examined at the FAA, New

England Region, Office of the Assistant

Chief Counsel, 12 New England

Executive Park, Burlington, MA.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Eugene Triozzi, Aerospace Engineer,

Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine

and Propeller Directorate, 12 New

England Executive Park, Burlington, MA

01803–5299; telephone (617) 238–7131,

fax (617) 238–7199.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications

should identify the Rules Docket

number and be submitted in triplicate to

the address specified above. All

communications received on or before

the closing date for comments, specified

above, will be considered before taking

action on the proposed rule. The

proposals contained in this notice may

be changed in light of the comments

received.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report

summarizing each FAA-public contact