2005 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-15-2005

In Re: Owens Corning

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 04-4080

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Recommended Citation

"In Re: Owens Corning " (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 605.

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-4080

 

IN RE: OWENS CORNING, a Delaware Corporation

CREDIT SUISSE FIRST

BOSTON, as Agent for the

prepetition bank lenders,

Appellant

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civil Action No. 00-cv-03837)

District Judge: Honorable John P. Fullam

 

Argued February 7, 2005

Before: ROTH, AMBRO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Filed August 15, 2005)

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esquire (Argued)

John J. Rapisardi, Esquire
2

Richard A. Rothman, Esquire

Timothy E. Graulich, Esquire

Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP

767 Fifth Avenue, 27th Floor

New York, NY 10153

Ellen R. Nadler, Esquire

Jeffrey S. Trachtman, Esquire

Kenneth H. Eckstein, Esquire

Philip S. Kaufman, Esquire

Kramer, Levin, Naftalis & Frankel LLP

1177 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10036

Roy T. Englert, Jr. Esquire

Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck & Untereiner LLP

1801 K Street, N.W., Suite 411

Washington, DC 20006

Rebecca L. Butcher, Esquire

Adam G. Landis, Esquire

Richard S. Cobb, Esquire

Landis, Rath & Cobb LLP

919 Market Street

Suite 600, P.O. Box 2087

Wilmington, DE 19899

Counsel for (Appellant) Credit Suisse First Boston

Corp., as Agent for the prepetition bank lenders

Alexandra A.E. Shapiro, Esquire

Mitchell A. Seider, Esquire
3

Alan Leavitt, Esquire

Latham & Watkins LLP

885 Third Avenue, Suite 1000

New York, NY 10022-4802

Amanda P. Biles, Esquire

Latham & Watkins LLP

Two Freedom Square

11955 Freedom Drive, Suite 500

Reston, Virginia 20190-5651

Counsel for (Amicus-appellants) The Loan

Syndications and Trading Association, Inc. and

Clearing House Association L.L.C.

Richard M. Kohn, Esquire

Andrew R. Cardonick, Esquire

Goldberg, Kohn, Bell, Black, Rosenbloom & Moritz Ltd.

55 East Monroe Street, Suite 3700

Chicago, IL 60603

Jonathan N. Helfat, Esquire

Otterbourg, Steindler, Houston & Rosen, P.C.

230 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10169

Counsel for (Amicus-appellant) Commercial Financial

Association

Robert K. Rasmussen, Esquire

Milton Underwood Professor of Law

Vanderbilt Law School

131 21 Avenue South st
4

Nashville, TN 37240

Counsel for (Amicus-appellants) Robert K. Rasmussen,

Barry Adler, Susan Block-Lieb, G. Marcus Cole,

Marcel Kahan, Ronald J. Mann, and David A. Skeel,

Jr.

Adam H. Isenberg, Esquire

Saul Ewing LLP

1500 Market Street

Centre Square West, 38 Floor th

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Norman L. Pernick, Esquire

J. Kate Stickles, Esquire

Saul Ewing LLP

222 Delaware Avenue

P.O. Box 1266, Suite 1200

Wilmington, DE 19899

Charles O. Monk, II, Esquire (Argued)

Joseph M. Fairbanks, Esquire

Henry R. Abrams, Esquire

Dan Friedman, Esquire

Saul Ewing LLP

100 South Charles Street, 16 Floor th

Baltimore, MD 21201

Counsel for (Appellee) Owens Corning, a Delaware

Corporation; CDC Corp.; Engineered Yarns American

Inc.; Exterior Systems Inc.; Falcon Foam Corp.;

Fibreboard Corp.; HomeExperts; Integrex; Integrex

Professional Services; Integrex Testing Systems;
5

Integrex Supply Chain Solutions LLC; Integrex

Ventures LLC; Jefferson Holdings Inc.; OwensCorning Fiberglass Technology Inc.; Owens-Corning

HT, Inc.; Owens-Corning Overseas Holdings, Inc.;

Owens- Corning Remodeling Systems, LLC; Soltech,

Inc.

Elihu Inselbuch, Esquire

Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered

399 Park Avenue, 27 Floor th

New York, NY 10022

Peter Van N. Lockwood, Esquire

Nathan D. Finch, Esquire

Walter B. Slocombe, Esquire

Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered

One Thomas Circle NW

Washington, DC 20005

Marla R. Eskin, Esquire

Campbell & Levine, LLC

800 North King Street, Suite 300

Wilmington, DE 19801

Counsel for (Appellee) Official Committee of

Unsecured Creditors

Michael J. Crames, Esquire

Jane W. Parver, Esquire

Edmund M. Emrich, Esquire

Andrew A. Kress, Esquire

Kaye Scholer LLP
6

425 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10022

James L. Patton, Jr., Esquire

Joseph M. Barry, Esquire

Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor LLP

1000 West Street, P.O. Box 391

17 Floor, Brandywine Building th

Wilmington, DE 19801

Counsel for (Appellee) James J. McMonagle, Legal

Representative for Future Claimants

J. Andrew Rahl, Equire (Argued)

John B. Berringer, Esquire

John H. Doyle, III, Esquire

Howard Ressler, Esquire

Dennis J. Artese, Esquire

Anderson, Kill & Olick, P.C.

1251 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10020

Francis A. Monaco, Jr.

Monzack & Monaco P.A.

1201 North Orange Street

400 Commerce Center

Wilmington, DE 19899

Counsel for (Appellee) Official Representatives of the

Bondholders and Trade Creditors f/k/a Official

Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Owens Corning
 Though CSFB is the named appellant, the real parties in 1

interest are the Banks (which include CSFB). Thus, unless the

context requires otherwise, CSFB and the Banks are referred to

interchangeably in this opinion.

7

Howard A. Rosenthal, Esquire

Alan R. Gordon, Esquire

Pelino & Lentz P.C.

1650 Market Street

One Liberty Place, 32 Floor nd

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Lawrence J. Kaiser, Esquire

Law Office of Laurence J. Kaiser

One Whitehall Street, Suite 2100

New York, NY 10004

Counsel for (Amicus-appellee) Commercial Law

League America 

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

We consider under what circumstances a court exercising

bankruptcy powers may substantively consolidate affiliated

entities. Appellant Credit Suisse First Boston (“CSFB”) is the

agent for a syndicate of banks (collectively, the “Banks”) that 1
 For ease of reference, we refer hereinafter solely to OCD as 2

the borrower.

8

extended in 1997 a $2 billion unsecured loan to Owens Corning,

a Delaware corporation (“OCD”), and certain of its subsidiaries.

This credit was enhanced in part by guarantees made by other

OCD subsidiaries. The District Court granted a motion to

consolidate the assets and liabilities of the OCD borrowers and 2

guarantors in anticipation of a plan of reorganization. 

The Banks appeal and argue that the Court erred by

granting the motion, as it misunderstood the reasons for, and

standards for considering, the extraordinary remedy of

substantive consolidation, and in any event did not make factual

determinations necessary even to consider its use. Though we

reverse the ruling of the District Court, we do so aware that it

acted on an issue with no opinion on point by our Court and

differing rationales by other courts. 

While this area of law is difficult and this case important,

its outcome is easy with the facts before us. Among other

problems, the consolidation sought is “deemed.” Should we

approve this non-consensual arrangement, the plan process

would proceed as though assets and liabilities of separate

entities were merged, but in fact they remain separate with the

twist that the guarantees to the Banks are eliminated. From this

we conclude that the proponents of substantive consolidation

request it not to rectify the seldom-seen situations that call for
For example, Owens-Corning Fiberglass Technology, Inc. 3

(“OCFT”) was created as an intellectual property holding

company to which OCD assigned all of its domestic intellectual

property. OCFT licensed this intellectual property back to OCD

in return for royalty payments. OCFT also entered into licensing

agreements with parties outside of the OCD family of

companies. This structure served to shield OCD’s intellectual

property assets (valued at over $500 million) from liability.

9

this last-resort remedy but rather as a ploy to deprive one group

of creditors of their rights while providing a windfall to other

creditors.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History 

A. Owens Corning Group of Companies

OCD and its subsidiaries (which include corporations and

limited liability companies) comprise a multinational corporate

group. Different entities within the group have different

purposes. Some, for example, exist to limit liability concerns

(such as those related to asbestos), others to gain tax benefits,

and others have regulatory reasons for their formation. 

Each subsidiary was a separate legal entity that observed

governance formalities. Each had a specific reason to exist

separately, each maintained its own business records, and

intercompany transactions were regularly documented.3
OCFT operated as an autonomous entity. It prepared its own

accounting and financial records and paid its own expenses from

its separate bank accounts. OCFT had its own employees

working at its Summit, Illinois plant, which contained

machinery and equipment for research and development.

IPM, Inc. (“IPM”) was incorporated as a passive

Delaware investment holding company by OCD to consolidate

the investments of its foreign subsidiaries. IPM shielded the

foreign subsidiaries’ investments from OCD liability and

likewise shielded OCD from the liability of those foreign

subsidiaries. OCD transferred ownership of its foreign

subsidiaries to IPM and entered into a revolving loan agreement

under which IPM loaned dividends from those subsidiaries to

OCD. OCD paid interest on this revolving loan. IPM, like

OCFT, entered into agreements with parties unaffiliated with the

OCD group and operated as an autonomous entity. IPM also

prepared its own accounting and financial records and paid its

own expenses from its separate bank accounts. IPM’s officers

oversaw all investment activity and maintained records of

investment activity in IPM subsidiaries.

Both OCFT and IPM operated outside of OCD’s business

units. Neither company received administrative support from

OCD and both paid payroll and business expenses from their

own accounts. Although summaries of their accounting ledgers

were entered into OCD’s centralized cash management system,

the underlying records were created and maintained by the

subsidiaries, not OCD. OCFT and IPM even had their own

company logos and trade names. 

Integrex was formed by OCD as an asbestos liability

10
management company. For OCD’s asbestos liability, Integrex

ultimately processed only settled asbestos claims. The company

also provided professional services (such as litigation

management and materials testing) to the public. It had its own

trade name and trademarked logo, its own business unit and its

own financial team for business planning, and began several

startup businesses that ultimately failed. 

As discussed at Section I(B), infra, in 1997 OCD

acquired Fibreboard Corporation. Subsequently, OCD formed

Exterior Systems, Inc. (“ESI”) as a separate entity after several

subsidiaries of Fibreboard merged in 1999 in order to shield

itself from successor liability for Fibreboard’s asbestos products.

Although the directors and managers of ESI and OCD

overlapped, ESI observed corporate formalities in electing its

directors and appointing its officers. In addition, it filed its own

tax returns and kept its own accounting records. ESI held

substantial assets, including over $1 billion in property, 20

factories, and between 150 and 180 distribution centers.

11

Although there may have been some “sloppy” bookkeeping, two

of OCD’s own officers testified that the financial statements of

all the subsidiaries were accurate in all material respects.

Further, through an examination of the subsidiaries’ books,

OCD’s postpetition auditors (Ernst & Young) have eliminated

most financial discrepancies, particularly with respect to the

larger guarantor subsidiaries. 
 This standard guarantee term means simply that, once the 4

primary obligor (here OCD) defaults, the Banks can proceed

against the guarantors directly and immediately without first

obtaining a judgment against OCD and collecting against that

judgment to determine if a shortfall from OCD exists.

12

B. The 1997 Credit Agreement

In 1997 OCD sought a loan to acquire Fibreboard

Corporation. At this time OCD faced growing asbestos liability

and a poor credit rating that hindered its ability to obtain

financing. When CSFB was invited to submit a bid, it included

subsidiary guarantees in the terms of its proposal. The

guarantees gave the Banks direct claims against the guarantors

for payment defaults. They were a “credit enhancement”

without which the Banks would not have made the loan to OCD.

All draft loan term sheets included subsidiary guarantees. 

A $2 billion loan from the Banks to OCD closed in June

1997. The loan terms were set out primarily in a Credit

Agreement. Among those terms were the guarantee provisions

and requirements for guarantors, who were defined as “present

or future Domestic Subsidiar[ies] . . . having assets with an

aggregate book value in excess of $30,000,000.” Section 10.07

of the Agreement provided that the guarantees were “absolute

and unconditional” and each “constitute[d] a guarant[ee] of

payment and not a guarant[ee] of collection.” A “No Release 4

of Guarantor” provision in § 10.8 stated that “the obligations of
13

each guarantor . . . shall not be reduced, limited or terminated,

nor shall such guarantor be discharged from any such

obligations, for any reason whatsoever,” except payment and

performance in full or through waiver or amendment of the

Credit Agreement. Under § 13.05 of the Credit Agreement, a

guarantor could be released only through (i) the unanimous

consent of the Banks for the guarantees of Fibreboard

subsidiaries or through the consent of Banks holding 51% of the

debt for other subsidiaries, or (ii) a fair value sale of the

guarantor if its cumulative assets totaled less than 10% of the

book value of the aggregate OCD group of entities. 

CSFB negotiated the Credit Agreement expressly to limit

the ways in which OCD could deal with its subsidiaries. For

example, it could not enter into transactions with a subsidiary

that would result in losses to that subsidiary. Importantly, the

Credit Agreement contained provisions designed to protect the

separateness of OCD and its subsidiaries. The subsidiaries

agreed explicitly to maintain themselves as separate entities. To

further this agreement, they agreed to keep separate books and

financial records in order to prepare separate financial

statements. The Banks were given the right to visit each

subsidiary and discuss business matters directly with that

subsidiary’s management. The subsidiaries also were prohibited

from merging into OCD because both entities were required to

survive a transaction under § 8.09(a)(ii)(A) of the Credit

Agreement. This provision also prohibited guarantor

subsidiaries from merging with other subsidiaries unless there
 For convenience we refer hereinafter simply to “Bankruptcy 5

Code § ” when citing to a Code section.

 As the Plan’s consolidation provisions affected so 6

significantly voting on the Plan and the manner of proceeding at

any confirmation hearing, the Plan Proponents filed a motion for

a ruling on consolidation in anticipation of those events. “While

not a routine procedure, it is not at all unusual for a plan

proponent, or a plan opponent, to seek a determination prior to

the plan confirmation hearing as to the legitimacy of a particular

provision of a proposed plan.” In re Stone & Webster, Inc., 286

B.R. 532, 542 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (Walsh, J.).

14

would be no effect on the guarantees’ value.

C. Procedural History

On October 5, 2000, facing mounting asbestos litigation,

OCD and seventeen of its subsidiaries (collectively, the

“Debtors”) filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. Twenty-seven 5

months later, the Debtors and certain unsecured creditor groups

(collectively, the “Plan Proponents”) proposed a reorganization

plan (as amended, the “Plan”) predicated on obtaining

“substantive consolidation” of the Debtors along with three nonDebtor OCD subsidiaries. Typically this arrangement pools all 6

assets and liabilities of the subsidiaries into their parent and

treats all claims against the subsidiaries as transferred to the

parent. In fact, however, the Plan Proponents sought a form of
 “[A]ll assets and liabilities of each Subsidiary Debtor . . . 7

will be treated as though they were merged into and with the

assets and liabilities of OCD . . . .” Plan § 6.1(b) (emphasis

added).

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), Judge Wolin withdrew the 8

reference of, inter alia, the consolidation motion to the

Bankruptcy Court, thus making the District Court the judicial

forum for the motion to proceed.

15

what is known as a “deemed consolidation,” under which a

consolidation is deemed to exist for purposes of valuing and 7

satisfying creditor claims, voting for or against the Plan, and

making distributions for allowed claims under it. Plan § 6.1.

Yet “the Plan would not result in the merger of or the transfer

or commingling of any assets of any of the Debtors or NonDebtor Subsidiaries, . . . [which] will continue to be owned by

the respective Debtors or Non-Debtors.” Plan § 6.1(a). Despite

this, on the Plan’s effective date “all guarantees of the Debtors

of the obligations of any other Debtor will be deemed

eliminated, so that any claim against any such Debtor and any

guarantee thereof . . . will be deemed to be one obligation of the

Debtors with respect to the consolidated estate.” Plan § 6.1(b).

Put another way, “the Plan eliminates the separate obligations of

the Subsidiary Debtors arising from the guarant[e]es of the 1997

Credit Agreement.” Plan Disclosure Statement at A-9897. 

The Banks objected to the proposed consolidation. Judge

Alfred Wolin held a hearing on this objection. He was 8
16

subsequently recused from the Debtors’ bankruptcy proceedings

in light of In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289 (3d Cir.

2004), and Judge John Fullam was designated by the Chief

Judge of our Court to replace him. Judge Fullam reviewed the

transcripts and exhibits of the hearing, ordered additional

briefing and on October 5, 2004, granted the consolidation

motion in an order accompanied by a short opinion. In re

Owens Corning, 316 B.R. 168 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004). 

Judge Fullam concluded that there existed “substantial

identity between . . . OCD and its wholly-owned subsidiaries.”

Id. at 171. He further determined that “there [was] simply no

basis for a finding that, in extending credit, the Banks relied

upon the separate credit of any of the subsidiary guarantors.” Id.

at 172. In Judge Fullam’s view, it was “also clear that

substantive consolidation would greatly simplify and expedite

the successful completion of this entire bankruptcy proceeding.

More importantly, it would be exceedingly difficult to untangle

the financial affairs of the various entities.” Id. at 171. As such,

he held substantive consolidation should be permitted, as not

only did it allow “obvious advantages . . . [, but was] a virtual

necessity.” Id. at 172. In any event, Judge Fullam wrote, “[t]he

real issue is whether the Banks are entitled to participate, pari

passu, with other unsecured creditors, or whether the Banks’

claim is entitled to priority, in whole or in part, over the claims

of other unsecured creditors.” Id. But this issue, he stated,

“cannot now be determined.” Id.
 This provision, rather than 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), applies when 9

the reference to a bankruptcy court is withdrawn.

17

CSFB appeals on the Banks’ behalf.

II. Appellate Jurisdiction

The Plan Proponents moved to dismiss the appeal of the

District Court’s order granting consolidation on the ground that

it is not a “final decision” from which an appeal may be taken

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We denied that motion prior to 9

oral argument in this case and noted that our reasoning would

follow in this opinion. 

Recognizing the “protracted nature of many bankruptcy

proceedings, and the waste of time and resources that might

result if immediate appeal [is] denied,” United States Trustee v.

Gryphon at the Stone Mansion, Inc., 166 F.3d 552, 556 (3d Cir.

1999), “[w]e apply a broader concept of ‘finality’ when

considering bankruptcy appeals under § 1291 than we do when

considering other civil orders under the same section.” In re

Marvel Entm’t Group, Inc., 140 F.3d 463, 470 (3d Cir. 1998).

See also Buncher Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors

of GenFarm Ltd. P’ship IV, 229 F.3d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 2000)

(noting that we impose a “relaxed standard” of finality because

of unique considerations in bankruptcy cases); 16 Charles A.

Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice

& Procedure § 3926.2 at 274 (2d ed. 1996) (describing the
18

“Third Circuit’s especially flexible approach to bankruptcy

finality”). Particularly relevant to our case is that “[t]o delay

resolution of discrete claims until after final approval of a

reorganization plan . . . would waste time and resources,

particularly if the appeal resulted in reversal of a bankruptcy

court order necessitating re-appraisal of the entire plan.” Clark

v. First State Bank (In re White Beauty View, Inc.), 841 F.2d

524, 526 (3d Cir. 1988). We have also stressed that “issues

central to the progress of the bankruptcy petition, those ‘likely

to affect the distribution of the debtor’s assets, or the

relationship among the creditors,’ should be resolved quickly.”

Century Glove, Inc. v. First Am. Bank, 860 F.2d 94, 98 (3d Cir.

1988) (quoting Southeastern Sprinkler Co. Inc. v. Meyertech

Corp. (In re Meyertech), 831 F.2d 410, 414 (3d Cir. 1987)).

We consider four factors in determining whether we

should exercise jurisdiction over a bankruptcy appeal: “(1) [t]he

impact on the assets of the bankrupt estate; (2) [the] [n]ecessity

for further fact-finding on remand; (3) [t]he preclusive effect of

[the Court’s] decision on the merits of further litigation; and (4)

[t]he interest of judicial economy.” Buncher, 229 F.3d at 250.

All four factors weigh heavily in favor of our jurisdiction to

consider the appeal of an order granting substantive

consolidation. We thus join the four Courts of Appeal that have

exercised jurisdiction in this context. Alexander v. Compton (In

re Bonham), 229 F.3d 750, 762 (9th Cir. 2000); First Nat’l Bank

of El Dorado v. Giller (In re Giller), 962 F.2d 796, 797-98 (8th

Cir. 1992); Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Ass’n., 935 F.2d 245,
19

248 (11th Cir. 1991); and Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo

Baking Co., Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.), 860

F.2d 515, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1988).

First, substantive consolidation has a profound effect on

the assets of the consolidated entities. See, e.g., Nesbit v. Gears

Unlimited, 347 F.3d 72, 86-87 (3d Cir. 2003). Second, there is

no need for additional fact-finding to assess the propriety of an

order granting substantive consolidation. In this case, for

example, Judge Fullam reached his decision after “[a] four-day

evidentiary hearing . . . was held by [his] predecessor, Judge

Wolin,” and after Judge Fullam reviewed “the transcript of the

testimony, and . . . the voluminous documentary record

compiled in the course of the hearing, and [had] the benefit of

post-trial briefing and argument.” In re Owens Corning, 316

B.R. at 169. Third, a substantive consolidation order clearly has

a preclusive effect on the merits of further litigation. In this

case, the order precludes at least the Banks from asserting any

right compromised or eliminated by virtue of the substantive

consolidation. Last, the interests of judicial economy are best

served by an immediate review of a substantive consolidation

order. A later reversal of such an order risks rendering

meaningless any proceedings premised on the viability of a plan

that calls for a consolidation (even if for only a temporary

period).

Having concluded that we generally have jurisdiction to

review appeals of substantive consolidation orders, we inquire
20

whether anything is “different” about this case. The Plan

Proponents argue that

[t]he District Court Order lacks

finality because it will be

implemented, if at all, only

following approval of a disclosure

statement, the solicitation and vote

of creditors as to the terms of the

Proposed Plan, and, assuming the

requisite vote, final confirmation of

the Proposed Plan, before which

creditors other than the Bank Debt

Holders shall be given the

opportunity to contest substantive

consolidation. [Bankruptcy Code]

§ 1129. Thus, the District Court

Order is conditioned upon plan

confirmation . . . . The District

Court Order has no present impact

on the Debtors’ estates and does

not change the status quo.

Plan Proponents’ Mot. to Dismiss at 10. In support of this

contention, the Plan Proponents rely primarily on In re A.S.K.

Plastics, Inc., No. Civ. A. 04-2701, 2004 WL 1903322 (E.D. Pa.

Aug. 24, 2004). Yet the conclusion that the Court lacked

jurisdiction in A.S.K. Plastics was premised on the fact that
21

“[u]nder no reasonable construction of the law could the Order’s

conditional consolidation be viewed as effect[ing] a ‘practical

termination’ of anything.” Id. at *2 (emphasis in original). That

order “emphasized [that] . . . [w]hen a final reorganization plan

[was] submitted to the Bankruptcy Court, [the party appealing

the order] [was] free to object to consolidation.” Id. In effect,

the A.S.K. Plastics order was designed to postpone

consideration of the substantive consolidation issue until the

plan confirmation stage.

That is not our case. For the Banks the District Court’s

determination is hardly conditional. It concluded “that

substantive consolidation should be permitted.” In re Owens

Corning, 316 B.R. at 172. It made no provision for the Banks

to reassert their objection to substantive consolidation at the plan

confirmation stage; the order is final against them and is thus a

practical termination of the substantive consolidation litigation.

Lastly, we address the Plan Proponents’ argument that a

substantive consolidation order must immediately take effect in

order to be final for purposes of our jurisdiction. What they

ignore is that the order approving substantive consolidation is

the foundation on which the Plan is built. To assert that the

actual substantive consolidation can only be implemented in

conjunction with the effectiveness of an approved plan puts

form over function. As the Banks point out, “[t]here is no

support for the proposition that final orders lose their finality

because of a delay in implementation.” CSFB Opp’n to Mot. to
22

Dismiss at 13. Certainly, decisions resolving most disputes

(notably, disputes over the validity and value of claims) are not

implemented until a plan is confirmed and payment under the

plan becomes obligatory. Yet we exercise jurisdiction to review

many of these decisions before that “final” order issues. See,

e.g., Hefta v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am.

Classic Voyages Co.), 405 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2005). No reason

exists for us to vary that routine here. 

We conclude readily that we have appellate jurisdiction

to consider the Banks’ appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III. Substantive Consolidation

Substantive consolidation, a construct of federal common

law, emanates from equity. It “treats separate legal entities as if

they were merged into a single survivor left with all the

cumulative assets and liabilities (save for inter-entity liabilities,

which are erased). The result is that claims of creditors against

separate debtors morph to claims against the consolidated

survivor.” Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. v. Stapleton (In re

Genesis Health Ventures, Inc.), 402 F.3d 416, 423 (3d Cir.

2005). Consolidation restructures (and thus revalues) rights of

creditors and for certain creditors this may result in significantly

less recovery.

While we have not fully considered the character and

scope of substantive consolidation, we discussed the concept in
 A term used by Mary Elisabeth Kors in her comprehensive 10

and well-organized article entitled Altered Egos: Deciphering

Substantive Consolidation, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 381, 383 (1998)

(hereinafter “Kors”).

23

Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 86-88 (surveying substantive consolidation

case law for application by analogy to the Title VII inquiry of

when to consolidate employers for the purpose of assessing a

discrimination claim), and In re Genesis Health Ventures, 402

F.3d at 423-24 (examining, inter alia, whether a “deemed”

consolidation for voting in connection with, and distribution

under, a proposed plan of reorganization is a substantive

consolidation for purposes of calculating U.S. Trustee quarterly

fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6)). Other courts, including the

Supreme Court itself in an opinion that spawned the concept of

consolidation, have holdings more on point than heretofore have

we. We begin with a survey of key cases, drawing from them

when substantive consolidation may apply consistent with the

principles we perceive as cabining its use, and apply those

principles to this case. 

A. History of Substantive Consolidation

The concept of substantively consolidating separate

estates begins with a commonsense deduction. Corporate

disregard as a fault may lead to corporate disregard as a 10

remedy. 
 The actual term was not used until 1967. In re Commercial 11

Envelope Mfg. Co., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 647, 648 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Babitt, J.).

24

Prior to substantive consolidation, other remedies for

corporate disregard were (and remain) in place. For example,

where a subsidiary is so dominated by its corporate parent as to

be the parent’s “alter ego,” the “corporate veil” of the subsidiary

can be ignored (or “pierced”) under state law. Kors, supra, at

386-90 (citing as far back as I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the

Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 Colum. L. Rev. 496 (1912)). Or a

court might mandate that the assets transferred to a corporate

subsidiary be turned over to its parent’s trustee in bankruptcy for

wrongs such as fraudulent transfers, Kors, supra, at 391, in

effect bringing back to the bankruptcy estate assets wrongfully

conveyed to an affiliate. If a corporate parent is both a creditor

of a subsidiary and so dominates the affairs of that entity as to

prejudice unfairly its other creditors, a court may place payment

priority to the parent below that of the other creditors, a remedy

known as equitable subordination, which is now codified in

§ 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. See generally id. at 394-95.

Adding to these remedies, the Supreme Court, little more

than six decades ago, approved (at least indirectly and perhaps

inadvertently) what became known as substantive

consolidation. Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 11

U.S. 215 (1941). In Sampsell an individual in bankruptcy had

transferred assets prepetition to a corporation he controlled.
25

(Apparently these became the corporation’s sole assets.) When

the bankruptcy referee ordered that the transferred assets be

turned over by the corporation to the individual debtor’s trustee,

a creditor of the non-debtor corporation sought distribution

priority with respect to that entity’s assets. In deciding that the

creditor should not be accorded priority (thus affirming the

bankruptcy referee), the Supreme Court turned a typical

turnover/fraudulent transfer case into the forebear of today’s

substantive consolidation by terming the bankruptcy referee’s

order (marshaling the corporation’s assets for the benefit of the

debtor’s estate) as “consolidating the estates.” Id. at 219.

Each of these remedies has subtle differences. “Piercing

the corporate veil” makes shareholders liable for corporate

wrongs. Equitable subordination places bad-acting creditors

behind other creditors when distributions are made. Turnover

and fraudulent transfer bring back to the transferor debtor assets

improperly transferred to another (often an affiliate).

Substantive consolidation goes in a direction different (and in

most cases further) than any of these remedies; it is not limited

to shareholders, it affects distribution to innocent creditors, and

it mandates more than the return of specific assets to the

predecessor owner. It brings all the assets of a group of entities

into a single survivor. Indeed, it merges liabilities as well. “The

result,” to repeat, “is that claims of creditors against separate

debtors morph to claims against the consolidated survivor.” In

re Genesis Health Ventures, 402 F.3d at 423. The bad news for

certain creditors is that, instead of looking to assets of the
 Another case oft-mentioned, and preceding both Sampsell 12

and Stone, is Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940).

Determining that a corporate subsidiary was simply the parent’s

“instrumentality,” id. at 191, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the

turnover of the subsidiary’s assets to the parent. Though

asserting that a “corporate entity may be disregarded where not

to do so will defeat public convenience, justify wrong or protect

fraud,” id., “consolidation” was not mentioned. Indeed, as

creditors of the subsidiary in Fish were given first priority as to

its assets, id., a complete consolidation did not occur. Accord

Kors, supra, at 391 (“true consolidation” occurs only when

creditors of consolidated entities share pari passu).

26

subsidiary with whom they dealt, they now must share those

assets with all creditors of all consolidated entities, raising the

specter for some of a significant distribution diminution.

Though the concept of consolidating estates had Supreme

Court approval, Courts of Appeal (with one exception) were

slow to follow suit. Stone v. Eacho (In re Tip Top Tailors, Inc.),

127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942),

was the first to pick up on Sampsell’s new remedy. Little 12

occurred thereafter for more than two decades, until the Second

Circuit issued several decisions—Soviero v. National Bank of

Long Island, 328 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1964); Chemical Bank New

York Trust Co. v. Kheel (In re Seatrade Corp.), 369 F.2d 845

(2d Cir. 1966); Flora Mir Candy Corp. v. R.S. Dickson & Co.

(In re Flora Mir Candy Corp.), 432 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1970);

and Talcott v. Wharton (In re Continental Vending Machine
27

Corp.), 517 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1975)—that brought substantive

consolidation as a remedy back into play and premise its

modern-day understanding. 

Other Circuit Courts fell in line in acknowledging

substantive consolidation as a possible remedy. See, e.g., FDIC

v. Hogan (In re Gulfco Inv. Corp.), 593 F.2d 921, 927-28 (10th

Cir. 1979); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet, 711 F.2d

1085, 1092-93 (1st Cir. 1983); Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp.

(In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987);

Eastgroup, 935 F.2d at 252; In re Giller, 962 F.2d at 799; First

Nat’l Bank of Barnesville v. Rafoth (In re Baker & Getty Fin.

Servs., Inc.), 974 F.2d 712, 720 (6th Cir. 1992); Reider v. FDIC

(In re Reider), 31 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 1994); and In

re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 771.

The reasons of these courts for allowing substantive

consolidation as a possible remedy span the spectrum and often

overlap. For example, Stone and Soviero followed the well-trod

path of alter ego analysis in state “pierce-the-corporate-veil”

cases. Stone, 127 F.2d at 287-89; Soviero, 328 F.2d at 447-48.

Accord In re Giller, 962 F.2d at 798; In re Gulfco Inv., 593 F.2d

at 928-29. Kheel dealt with, inter alia, the net-negative practical

effects of attempting to thread back the tangled affairs of

entities, separate in name only, with “interrelationships . . .

hopelessly obscured.” 369 F.2d at 847. See also, e.g., In re

Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518-19. In re Continental Vending

Machine balanced the “inequities” involved when substantive
28

rights are affected against the “practical considerations”

spawned by “accounting difficulties (and expense) which may

occur where the interrelationships of the corporate group are

highly complex, or perhaps untraceable.” 517 F.2d at 1001. See

also, e.g., In re Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 276; Eastgroup, 935

F.2d at 249; In re Giller, 962 F.2d at 799; In re Reider, 31 F.3d

at 1108. See generally Kors, supra, at 402-06.

Ultimately most courts slipstreamed behind two

rationales—those of the Second Circuit in Augie/Restivo and

the D.C. Circuit in Auto-Train. The former found that the

competing “considerations are merely variants on two critical

factors: (i) whether creditors dealt with the entities as a single

economic unit and did not rely on their separate identity in

extending credit, . . . or (ii) whether the affairs of the debtors are

so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors . . . .” In

re Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Auto-Train touched many of the same

analytical bases as the prior Second Circuit cases, but in the end

chose as its overarching test the “substantial identity” of the

entities and made allowance for consolidation in spite of

creditor reliance on separateness when “the demonstrated

benefits of consolidation ‘heavily’ outweigh the harm.” In re

Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 276 (citation omitted).

Whatever the rationale, courts have permitted substantive
 Indeed, they have not restricted the remedy to debtors, 13

allowing the consolidation of debtors with non-debtors, see, e.g.,

In re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 765 (explaining that “[c]ourts have

permitted the consolidation of non-debtor and debtor entities in

furtherance of the equitable goals of substantive consolidation”)

(citing In re Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 275-77; In re Tureaud, 59

B.R. 973, 974, 978 (N.D. Okla. 1986); In re Munford, 115 B.R.

390, 395-96 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990)); Soviero, 328 F.2d 446,

and in some cases consolidation retroactively (known also as

nunc pro tunc consolidation), see, e.g., In re Baker & Getty

Financial Services, 974 F.2d at 720-21; Kroh Brothers

Development Co. v. Kroh Brothers Management Co. (In re Kroh

Brothers Development Co.), 117 B.R. 499, 502 (W.D. Mo.

1989); In re Tureaud, 59 B.R. at 977-78; see also Auto-Train,

810 F.2d at 277 (acknowledging that nunc pro tunc

consolidations can occur, though not in that case).

In addition, though we do not permit the consolidation

sought in this case, no reason exists to limit it under the right

circumstances to any particular form of entity. (Indeed, this case

involves corporations and limited liability companies.) Accord

2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 105.09[1][c] (15th rev. ed. 2005).

 See In re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 765 (explaining that “the 14

equitable power [of substantive consolidation] undoubtedly

survived enactment of the Bankruptcy Code” and noting that

“[n]o case has held to the contrary”); but see In re Fas Mart

29

consolidation as an equitable remedy in certain circumstances.13

No court has held that substantive consolidation is not

a u t h o r i zed, t h o u g h ther e app ears ne a rly 1 4
Convenience Stores, Inc., 320 B.R. 587, 594 n.3 (Bankr. E.D.

Va. 2004) (noting “there is persuasive academic argument that

there is no authority in bankruptcy law for substantive

consolidation”) (citing Daniel B. Bogart, Resisting the

Expansion of Bankruptcy Court Power Under Section 105 of the

Bankruptcy Code: The All Writs Act and an Admonition from

Chief Justice Marshall, 35 Ariz. St. L.J. 793, 810 (2003); J.

Maxwell Tucker, Grupo Mexicano and the Death of Substantive

Consolidation, 8 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 427 (2000)

(hereinafter “Tucker”)).

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Grupo Mexicano

Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308

(1999) (federal district courts lack the equitable power to enjoin

prejudgment transfers of assets, as such an equitable remedy did

not exist at the time federal courts were created under the

Judiciary Act of 1789), some argue that substantive

consolidation, judge-made law not expressly codified in the

Bankruptcy Code adopted in the late 1970s, does not qualify as

an available equitable remedy. See, e.g., Tucker, supra at 442-

45. This argument has two facets. The first is that bankruptcy

courts are limited to exercising only the equitable remedies

extant at the time of the adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1789.

As substantive consolidation is a relatively recent remedy

nowhere contemplated in 1789, Grupo Mexicano by analogy

bars substantive consolidation just as it does prejudgment

preliminary injunctions forbidding asset transfers. Id. The

second (and corollary) facet of the argument is that, as

substantive consolidation is not specifically authorized in the

Bankruptcy Code, authority to confer it can exist, if at all, only

30
in § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (bankruptcy courts “may

issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or

appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title”). Even if

§ 105(a) “constitutes a direct, fresh grant of supplemental power

to the bankruptcy courts, independent of the power granted to

the federal courts under title 28 [of the United States Code],” id.

at 447, it can only implement powers already expressed in the

provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 447-48. See In re

Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The

general grant of equitable power contained in § 105(a). . . must

be exercised within the parameters of the Code itself.”); In re

Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The power

conferred by § 105 is one to implement rather than to

override.”). But for joint spouse estates in Bankruptcy Code

§ 302(a), consolidation is permitted only in the context of a

confirmed plan of reorganization and the requirements that

entails. Tucker, supra, at 449 (citing to, inter alia, Bankruptcy

Code § 1123(a)(5)(C)).

The first facet of the argument is, at the outset,

premature. Consolidating estates (indeed, consolidating debtor

and non-debtor entities) traces to the Supreme Court’s Sampsell

decision in 1941. 313 U.S. at 219. What the Court has given as

an equitable remedy remains until it alone removes it or

Congress declares it removed as an option. See In re Stone &

Webster, 286 B.R. at 540 (quoting Official Comm. of Asbestos

Claimants v. G-I Holdings, Inc. (In re G-I Holdings, Inc.), Adv.

No. 01-3065 (RG) (Bankr. D.N.J. March 12, 2001) (Hearing Tr.

at 71-2)). 

In addition, at the core of Grupo Mexicano was the extent

31
of general, unarticulated equity authority in the federal courts

(which, the Court held, can only be justified by reference to

1789 equity authority). It was not a bankruptcy case. The

extensive history of bankruptcy law and judicial precedent

renders the issue of equity authority in the bankruptcy context

different to such a degree as to make it different in kind.

Notably, in the only two instances in which the word

“bankruptcy” appears in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in

Grupo Mexicano, he uses the existence of court authority in the

bankruptcy context as a reason to support the conclusion that the

district court did not have the authority under generalized equity

powers to implement the remedy it imposed. First, he pointed

out that “[t]he law of fraudulent conveyances and bankruptcy

was developed to prevent [the] conduct [at issue]; an equitable

power to restrict a debtor's use of his unencumbered property

before judgment was not.” Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 322

(emphasis added). Second, he stressed that finding the authority

to justify the District Court’s remedy in generalized equity

power would “add[], through judicial fiat, a new and powerful

weapon to the creditor’s arsenal[;] the new rule could radically

alter the balance between debtor’s and creditor’s rights which

has been developed over centuries through many laws–

including those relating to bankruptcy, fraudulent conveyances,

and preferences.” Id. at 331 (emphasis added).

In short, the Court’s opinion in Grupo Mexicano

acknowledged that bankruptcy courts do have the authority to

deal with the problems presented by that case. One way to

conceptualize this idea is to recognize that, had the company in

Grupo Mexicano been in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court

32
would have had the authority to implement the remedy the

district court lacked authority to order under general equity

power outside the bankruptcy context. 

As for the argument’s second facet, it begins with a

concession. Bankruptcy Code § 1123(a)(5)(C)’s very words

allow for “consolidation of the debtor with one or more persons”

pursuant to a plan “[n]otwithstanding any otherwise applicable

non-bankruptcy law.” Accord Tucker, supra, at 448-49. See

also In re Stone & Webster, 286 B.R. at 540-43. Whether

§ 105(a) allows consolidation outside a plan is an issue we need

not address—though that arguably is what the Plan Proponents

propose by moving for a “deemed” consolidation—because, as

we note below, consolidation, no matter how it is packaged,

cannot pass muster in this case.

In this context, we also need not address the argument,

made in the Amicus Curiae Brief of the Commercial Finance

Association, that substantive consolidation fails the “best

interests test” of Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(7) (a requirement

for plan confirmation that each creditor that does not vote to

accept the plan must receive or retain property under the plan at

least equal to its recovery in a Bankruptcy Code Chapter 7

liquidation). See generally In re Stone & Webster, 286 B.R. at

544-46.

33

unanimous consensus that it is a remedy to be used “sparingly.”

In re Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518; see also In re Bonham,

229 F.3d at 767 (explaining that “almost every other court has

noted [that substantive consolidation] should be used
 Thus we disagree with the assertion of a “liberal trend” 15

toward increased use of substantive consolidation—e.g.,

Eastgroup, 935 F.2d at 248 (describing “a ‘modern’ or ‘liberal’

trend toward allowing substantive consolidation”) (citing In re

Murray Indus., Inc., 119 B.R. 820, 828 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.

1990)); In re Vecco Construction Industries, Inc., 4 B.R. 407,

409 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980). 

34

‘sparingly’”) (citing In re Flora Mir, 432 F.2d at 1062-63).15

B. Our View of Substantive Consolidation

Substantive consolidation exists as an equitable remedy.

But when should it be available and by what test should its use

be measured? As already noted, we have commented on

substantive consolidation only generally in Nesbit, 347 F.3d at

86-88, and In re Genesis Health Ventures, 402 F.3d at 423-24.

The latter nonetheless left little doubt that, if presented with a

choice of analytical avenues, we favor essentially that of

Augie/Restivo. Id. at 423. The Auto-Train approach (requiring

“substantial identity” of entities to be consolidated, plus that

consolidation is “necessary to avoid some harm or realize some

benefit,” 810 F.2d at 276) adopts, we presume, one of the

Augie/Restivo touchstones for substantive consolidation while

adding the low bar of avoiding some harm or discerning some

benefit by consolidation. To us this fails to capture completely

the few times substantive consolidation may be considered and

then, when it does hit one chord, it allows a threshold not
 This opens the question whether a court can order partial 16

consolidation (such a consolidation order “could provide that . . .

[a creditor relying on separateness] would receive a distribution

equal to what [it] would have received absent consolidation and

that the remainder of the assets and liabilities be consolidated.”)

Kors, supra, at 450-51. Because this theoretical issue is not

before us—and in any event (i) facts bringing it to the fore are

unlikely, id. at 451 (“If circumstances lead one party to rely on

the single status of the one debtor, it is unlikely that other

creditors are relying on the joint status of the two entities,

especially as reliance must be reasonable.”), and (ii) may present

practical concerns depending on the facts of a particular

case—we do not decide it in this case.

35

sufficiently egregious and too imprecise for easy measure. For

example, we disagree that “[i]f a creditor makes [a showing of

reliance on separateness], the court may order consolidation . . .

if it determines that the demonstrated benefits of consolidation

‘heavily’ outweigh the harm.” Id. at 276 (citation omitted); see

also Eastgroup, 935 F.2d at 249. If an objecting creditor relied

on the separateness of the entities, consolidation cannot be

justified vis-à-vis the claims of that creditor.16

In assessing whether to order substantive consolidation,

courts consider many factors (some of which are noted in

Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 86-88 nn. 7 & 9). They vary (with degrees

of overlap) from court to court. Rather than endorsing any

prefixed factors, in Nesbit we “adopt[ed] an intentionally openended, equitable inquiry. . . to determine when substantively to
 They are Robert K. Rasmussen of Vanderbilt Law School, 17

Barry Adler of the NYU School of Law, Susan Block-Leib of

Fordham University School of Law, G. Marcus Cole of Stanford

Law School, Marcel Kahan of the NYU School of Law, Ronald

J. Mann of the University of Texas Law School, and David A.

Skeel, Jr. of the University of Pennsylvania School of Law.

36

consolidate two entities.” Id. at 87. While we mentioned that

“in the bankruptcy context the inquiry focuses primarily on

financial entanglement,” id., this comment primarily related to

the hopeless commingling test of substantive consolidation. But

when creditors deal with entities as an indivisible, single party,

“the line between operational and financial [factors] may be

blurred.” Id. at 88. We reiterate that belief here. Too often the

factors in a check list fail to separate the unimportant from the

important, or even to set out a standard to make the attempt.

Accord Br. of Law Professors as Amici Curiae at 11-12. This 17

often results in rote following of a form containing factors

where courts tally up and spit out a score without an eye on the

principles that give the rationale for substantive consolidation

(and why, as a result, it should so seldom be in play). Id.

(“[D]iffering tests with . . . agreed . . . factors run the risk that

courts will miss the forest for the trees. Running down factors

as a check list can lead a court to lose sight of why we have

substantive consolidation in the first instance . . . and often [to]

fail [to] identify a metric by which [it] can . . . [assess] the

relative importance among the factors. The . . . [result is] resort

to ad hoc balancing without a steady eye on the . . . [principles]
Though creditors conceivably can cause debtors to conflate 18

separate organizational forms, the specter of lender liability

(which came to the fore in only the last two decades) makes this

theoretical possibility all the more remote.

37

to be advanced . . . .”). 

What, then, are those principles? We perceive them to be

as follows.

(1) Limiting the cross-creep of liability by respecting entity

separateness is a “fundamental ground rule[].” Kors,

supra, at 410. As a result, the general expectation of

state law and of the Bankruptcy Code, and thus of

commercial markets, is that courts respect entity

separateness absent compelling circumstances calling

equity (and even then only possibly substantive

consolidation) into play. 

(2) The harms substantive consolidation addresses are nearly

always those caused by debtors (and entities they control)

who disregard separateness. Harms caused by creditors 18

typically are remedied by provisions found in the

Bankruptcy Code (e.g., fraudulent transfers, §§ 548 and

544(b)(1), and equitable subordination, § 510(c)). 

(3) Mere benefit to the administration of the case (for

example, allowing a court to simplify a case by avoiding
 This rationale is meant to protect in bankruptcy the 19

prepetition expectations of those creditors. Accord Kors, supra,

38

other issues or to make postpetition accounting more

convenient) is hardly a harm calling substantive

consolidation into play. 

(4) Indeed, because substantive consolidation is extreme (it

may affect profoundly creditors’ rights and recoveries)

and imprecise, this “rough justice” remedy should be rare

and, in any event, one of last resort after considering and

rejecting other remedies (for example, the possibility of

more precise remedies conferred by the Bankruptcy

Code).

(5) While substantive consolidation may be used defensively

to remedy the identifiable harms caused by entangled

affairs, it may not be used offensively (for example,

having a primary purpose to disadvantage tactically a

group of creditors in the plan process or to alter creditor

rights).

The upshot is this. In our Court what must be proven

(absent consent) concerning the entities for whom substantive

consolidation is sought is that (i) prepetition they disregarded

separateness so significantly their creditors relied on the

breakdown of entity borders and treated them as one legal

entity, or (ii) postpetition their assets and liabilities are so 19
at 419. The usual scenario is that creditors have been misled by

debtors’ actions (regardless whether those actions were

intentional or inadvertent) and thus perceived incorrectly (and

relied on this perception) that multiple entities were one. 

 This rationale is at bottom one of practicality when the 20

entities’ assets and liabilities have been “hopelessly

commingled.” In re Gulfco Inv., 593 F.2d at 929; In re Vecco,

4 B.R. at 410. Without substantive consolidation all creditors

will be worse off (as Humpty Dumpty cannot be reassembled or,

even if so, the effort will threaten to reprise Jarndyce v.

Jarndyce, the fictional suit in Dickens’ Bleak House where only

the professionals profited). With substantive consolidation the

lot of all creditors will be improved, as consolidation

“advance[s] one of the primary goals of bankruptcy–enhancing

the value of the assets available to creditors . . .–often in a very

material respect.” Kors, supra, at 417 (citation omitted). 

39

scrambled that separating them is prohibitive and hurts all

creditors. 

20

Proponents of substantive consolidation have the burden

of showing one or the other rationale for consolidation. The

second rationale needs no explanation. The first, however, is

more nuanced. A prima facie case for it typically exists when,

based on the parties’ prepetition dealings, a proponent proves

corporate disregard creating contractual expectations of
“[T]ort and statutory claimants, who, as involuntary 21

creditors, by definition did not rely on anything in becoming

creditors,” Kors, supra, at 418, are excluded, leaving only those

creditors who contract with an entity for whom consolidation is

sought.

As noted already, supra n.16, we do not decide here

22

whether such a showing by an opposing creditor defeats totally

the quest for consolidation or merely consolidation as to that

creditor.

40

creditors that they were dealing with debtors as one 21

indistinguishable entity. Kors,supra, at 417-18; Christopher W.

Frost, Organizational Form, Misappropriation Risk and the

Substantive Consolidation of Corporate Groups, 44 Hastings

L.J. 449, 457 (1993). Proponents who are creditors must also

show that, in their prepetition course of dealing, they actually

and reasonably relied on debtors’ supposed unity. Kors, supra,

at 418-19. Creditor opponents of consolidation can nonetheless

defeat a prima facie showing under the first rationale if they can

prove they are adversely affected and actually relied on debtors’

separate existence.

22

C. Application of Substantive Consolidation to

Our Case

With the principles we perceive underlie use of

substantive consolidation, the outcome of this appeal is apparent

at the outset. Substantive consolidation fails to fit the facts of
 The bondholders do claim certain Banks misled them in 23

purchasing OCD debt subsequent to the 1997 loan. But we

know of no claim of wrong by the Banks in connection with the

1997 transaction.

41

our case and, in any event, a “deemed” consolidation cuts

against the grain of all the principles.

To begin, the Banks did the “deal world” equivalent of

“Lending 101.” They loaned $2 billion to OCD and enhanced

the credit of that unsecured loan indirectly by subsidiary

guarantees covering less than half the initial debt. What the

Banks got in lending lingo was “structural seniority”—a direct

claim against the guarantors (and thus against their assets levied

on once a judgment is obtained) that other creditors of OCD did

not have. This kind of lending occurs every business day. To

undo this bargain is a demanding task. 

1. NO PREPETITION DISREGARD OF

CORPORATE SEPARATENESS

Despite the Plan Proponents’ pleas to the contrary, there

is no evidence of the prepetition disregard of the OCD entities’

separateness. To the contrary, OCD (no less than CSFB)

negotiated the 1997 lending transaction premised on the

separateness of all OCD affiliates. Even today no allegation

exists of bad faith by anyone concerning the loan. In this 23

context, OCD and the other Plan Proponents cannot now ignore,
42

or have us ignore, the very ground rules OCD put in place.

Playing by these rules means that obtaining the guarantees of

separate entities, made separate by OCD’s choice of how to

structure the affairs of its affiliate group of companies, entitles

a lender, in bankruptcy or out, to look to any (or all) guarantor(s)

for payment when the time comes. As such, the District Court’s

conclusions of “substantial identity” of OCD and its

subsidiaries, and the Banks’ reliance thereon, are incorrect. For

example, testimony presented by both the Banks and the Debtors

makes plain the parties’ intention to treat the entities separately.

CSFB presented testimony from attorneys and bankers involved

in negotiating the Credit Agreement that reflected their

assessment of the value of the guarantees as partially derived

from the separateness of the entities. As OCD concedes, these

representatives “testified that the guarant[e]es were . . . intended

to provide ‘structural seniority’ to the banks,” and were thus

fundamentally premised on an assumption of separateness.

Debtors Ans. Br. at 26. 

In the face of this testimony, Plan Proponents nonetheless

argue that the Banks intended to ignore the separateness of the

entities. In support of this contention, they assert, inter alia, that

because the Banks did not receive independent financial

statements for each of the entities during the negotiating

process, they must have intended to deal with them as a unified

whole. Because the Banks were unaware of the separate

financial makeup of the subsidiaries, the argument goes, they
 Debtors make a similar argument on the basis of the Banks’ 24

failure to exercise their right to monitor the entities

independently. For much the same reasoning that follows in the

text, we reject that argument as well.

We reject outright Debtors’ claim that the Banks’ alleged

reliance on corporate separateness fails because they did not

obtain a third-party legal opinion from counsel that substantive

consolidation was unlikely to occur were OCD or the guarantors

subject to bankruptcy. By custom and practice this type of

counsel opinion is requested and given for newly formed entities

whose “special purpose” is to obtain structured financing (i.e.,

where “a defined group of assets . . . [are] structurally isolated,

and thus serve as the basis of a financing . . . .” Committee on

Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of The Association

of the Bar of the City of New York, Structured Financing

Techniques, 50 Bus. Law. 527, 529 (1995)). It is customarily

not given (nor even requested) for entities in existence for any

significant period of time or set up for other than a structured

financing transaction. See Tribar Opinion Committee, Opinions

in the Bankruptcy Context: Rating Agency, Structured

Financing, and Chapter 11 Transactions, 46 Bus. Law, 717, 726

& n.42 (1991).

43

could not have relied on their separateness.24

This argument is overly simplistic. Assuming the Banks

did not obtain separate financial statements for each subsidiary,

they nonetheless obtained detailed information about each

subsidiary guarantor from OCD, including information about
 Further, a creditor’s lack of diligence is relevant only 25

insofar as it bears on the credibility of its assertion of reliance on

separateness.

44

that subsidiary’s assets and debt. Moreover, the Banks knew a

great deal about these subsidiaries. For example, they knew that

each subsidiary guarantor had assets with a book value of at

least $30 million as per the terms of the Credit Agreement, that

the aggregate value of the guarantor subsidiaries was over $900

million and that those subsidiaries had little or no debt.

Additionally, the Banks knew that Fibreboard’s subsidiaries

(including the entities that became part of ESI) had no asbestos

liability, would be debt-free post-acquisition and had assets of

approximately $700 million.

Even assuming the Plan Proponents could prove

prepetition disregard of Debtors’ corporate forms, we cannot

conceive of a justification for imposing the rule that a creditor

must obtain financial statements from a debtor in order to rely

reasonably on the separateness of that debtor. Creditors are free

to employ whatever metrics they believe appropriate in deciding

whether to extend credit free of court oversight. We agree with

the Banks that “the reliance inquiry is not an inquiry into

lenders’ internal credit metrics. Rather, it is about the fact that

the credit decision was made in reliance on the existence of

separate entities . . . .” CSFB Opening Br. at 31 (emphasis in

original). Here there is no serious dispute as to that fact. 25
45

2. NO HOPELESS COMMINGLING EXISTS

POSTPETITION

There also is no meaningful evidence postpetition of

hopeless commingling of Debtors’ assets and liabilities. Indeed,

there is no question which entity owns which principal assets

and has which material liabilities. Likely for this reason little

time is spent by the parties on this alternative test for substantive

consolidation. It is similarly likely that the District Court

followed suit. 

The Court nonetheless erred in concluding that the

commingling of assets will justify consolidation when “the

affairs of the two companies are so entangled that consolidation

will be beneficial.” In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. at 171

(emphasis added). As we have explained, commingling justifies

consolidation only when separately accounting for the assets and

liabilities of the distinct entities will reduce the recovery of

every creditor—that is, when every creditor will benefit from the

consolidation. Moreover, the benefit to creditors should be from

cost savings that make assets available rather than from the

shifting of assets to benefit one group of creditors at the expense

of another. Mere benefit to some creditors, or administrative

benefit to the Court, falls far short. The District Court’s test not

only fails to adhere to the theoretical justification for “hopeless

commingling” consolidation—that no creditor’s rights will be

impaired—but also suffers from the infirmity that it will almost

always be met. That is, substantive consolidation will nearly
46

always produce some benefit to some in the form of

simplification and/or avoidance of costs. Among other things,

following such a path misapprehends the degree of harm

required to order substantive consolidation.

But no matter the legal test, a case for hopeless

commingling cannot be made. Arguing nonetheless to the

contrary, Debtors assert that “it would be practically impossible

and prohibitively expensive in time and resources” to account

for the voluntary bankruptcies of the separate entities OCD has

created and maintained. Debtors Ans. Br. at 63. In support of

this contention, Debtors rely almost exclusively on the District

Court’s findings that

it would be exceedingly difficult to

untangle the financial affairs of the

various entities . . . [and] there are

. . . many reasons for challenging

the accuracy of the results achieved

[in accounting efforts thus far]. For

example, transfers of cash between

subsidiaries and parent did not

include any payment of interest;

and calculations of royalties are

subject to question.

In re Owens Corning, 316 B.R. at 171. Assuming arguendo that

these findings are correct, they are simply not enough to
47

establish that substantive consolidation is warranted. 

Neither the impossibility of perfection in untangling the

affairs of the entities nor the likelihood of some inaccuracies in

efforts to do so is sufficient to justify consolidation. We find R

2 Investments, LDC v. World Access, Inc. (In re World Access,

Inc.), 301 B.R. 217 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003), instructive on this

point. In World Access the Court noted that the controlling

entity “had no uniform guidelines for the recording of

intercompany interest charges” and that the debtors failed to

“allocate overhead charges amongst themselves.” Id. at 234.

The Court held, however, that those accounting shortcomings

were “merely imperfections in a sophisticated system of

accounting records that were conscientiously maintained.” Id.

at 279. It ultimately concluded that “all the relevant accounting

data . . . still exist[ed],” that only a “reasonable review to make

any necessary adjustments [was] required,” and, thus, that

substantive consolidation was not warranted. Id. 

The record in our case compels the same conclusion. At

its core, Debtors’ argument amounts to the contention that

because intercompany interest and royalty payments were not

perfectly accounted for, untangling the finances of those entities

is a hopeless endeavor. Yet imperfection in intercompany

accounting is assuredly not atypical in large, complex company

structures. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth of the

R esid u al O w n er, 1 6 n . 5 0 (20 0 4 ) ,

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=401160.
 For example, we simply cannot imagine that it would cost 26

Debtors even 1% of the Banks’ asserted $1.6 billion claim to

account for the allegedly incalculable intercompany interest and

royalty payments.

48

For obvious reasons, we are loathe to entertain the argument that

complex corporate families should have an expanded

substantive consolidation option in bankruptcy. And we find no

reason to doubt that “perfection is not the standard in the

substantive consolidation context.” In re World Access, 301

B.R. at 279. We are confident that a court could properly order

and oversee an accounting process that would sufficiently

account for the interest and royalty payments owed among the

OCD group of companies for purposes of evaluating

intercompany claims—dealing with inaccuracies and difficulties

as they arise and not in hypothetical abstractions. 

On the basis of the record before us, the Plan Proponents

cannot fulfill their burden of demonstrating that Debtors’ affairs

are even tangled, let alone that the cost of untangling them is so

high relative to their assets that the Banks, among other

creditors, will benefit from a consolidation.26

3. O THER C ONSIDERATIONS D O OM

CONSOLIDATION AS WELL

Other considerations drawn from the principles we set

out also counsel strongly against consolidation. First of all,
The same sentiment applies to the argument of the 27

bondholders that, subsequent to the 1997 loan to OCD, the

Banks defrauded them in connection with a prospectus

distributed with respect to a sale of OCD bonds underwritten by

some of the Banks. If the bondholders have a valid claim, they

need to prove it in the District Court and not use their

allegations as means to gerrymander consolidation of estates.

49

holding out the possibility of later giving priority to the Banks

on their claims does not cure an improvident grant of

substantive consolidation. Among other things, the prerequisites

for this last-resort remedy must still be met no matter the priority

of the Banks’ claims. 

Secondly, substantive consolidation should be used

defensively to remedy identifiable harms, not offensively to

achieve advantage over one group in the plan negotiation

process (for example, by deeming assets redistributed to negate

plan voting rights), nor a “free pass” to spare Debtors or any

other group from proving challenges, like fraudulent transfer

claims, that are liberally brandished to scare yet are hard to

show. If the Banks are so vulnerable to the fraudulent transfer

challenges Debtors have teed up (but have not swung at for so

long), then the game should be played to the finish in that

arena.27

But perhaps the flaw most fatal to the Plan Proponents’

proposal is that the consolidation sought was “deemed” (i.e., a
50

pretend consolidation for all but the Banks). If Debtors’

corporate and financial structure was such a sham before the

filing of the motion to consolidate, then how is it that post the

Plan’s effective date this structure stays largely undisturbed,

with the Debtors reaping all the liability-limiting, tax and

regulatory benefits achieved by forming subsidiaries in the first

place? In effect, the Plan Proponents seek to remake substantive

consolidation not as a remedy, but rather a stratagem to “deem”

separate resources reallocated to OCD to strip the Banks of

rights under the Bankruptcy Code, favor other creditors, and yet

trump possible Plan objections by the Banks. Such “deemed”

schemes we deem not Hoyle.

IV. Conclusion

Substantive consolidation at its core is equity. Its

exercise must lead to an equitable result. “Communizing” assets

of affiliated companies to one survivor to feed all creditors of all

companies may to some be equal (and hence equitable). But it

is hardly so for those creditors who have lawfully bargained

prepetition for unequal treatment by obtaining guarantees of

separate entities. Accord Kheel, 369 F.2d at 848 (Friendly, J.,

concurring) (“Equality among creditors who have lawfully

bargained for different treatment is not equity but its opposite

. . . .”). No principled, or even plausible, reason exists to undo

OCD’s and the Banks’ arms-length negotiation and lending

arrangement, especially when to do so punishes the very parties

that conferred the prepetition benefit—a $2 billion loan
51

unsecured by OCD and guaranteed by others only in part. To

overturn this bargain, set in place by OCD’s own pre-loan

choices of organizational form, would cause chaos in the

marketplace, as it would make this case the Banquo’s ghost of

bankruptcy.

With no meaningful evidence supporting either test to

apply substantive consolidation, there is simply not the nearly

“perfect storm” needed to invoke it. Even if there were, a

“deemed” consolidation—“several zip (if not area) codes away

from anything resembling substantive consolidation,” In re

Genesis Health Ventures, 402 F.3d at 424—fails even to qualify

for consideration. It is here a tactic used as a sword and not a

shield. 

We thus reverse and remand this case to the District

Court.