PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LOLITA MONDRAGON,

 No. 01-2434 Claimant-Appellant,

and

$500,684 IN U.S. CURRENCY,

Defendant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Marvin J. Garbis, District Judge.

(CA-00-3531-MJG)

Argued: September 24, 2002

Decided: December 13, 2002

Before MICHAEL, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON,

Senior Circuit Judge, and Claude M. HILTON,

Chief United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Virginia,

sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Michael wrote the opinion, in

which Senior Judge Hamilton and Chief Judge Hilton joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Bruce Wallace Simon, Kansas City, Missouri, for Appellant. Richard Charles Kay, Assistant United States Attorney, Balti-
more, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Joseph S. Lyons,

Towson, Maryland, for Appellant. Thomas M. DiBiagio, United

States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. 

OPINION

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge: 

The claimant in this civil forfeiture case appeals an order denying

her motion to strike the government’s complaint for failing to meet

the particularity in pleading requirement of Rule E(2)(a) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims (the Supplemental Rules). We affirm. 

I.

On February 19, 2000, Sergeant Paul Quill of the Maryland State

Police stopped a Lincoln Town Car with Kansas tags as it was traveling west on Interstate 70 near Frederick. Sergeant Quill made the stop

after he saw the Lincoln dart across two lanes of traffic without a signal. The driver identified herself as Lolita Mondragon and handed

over a Kansas driver’s license. Sergeant Quill ran a check and discovered that Mondragon’s license had been revoked. Mondragon then

gave verbal and written consent to allow the sergeant to search the

car. In the course of the search Sergeant Quill discovered, behind the

back seat, a hidden compartment with electronic spring locks.

According to the sergeant, the installation job was of professional

quality. He had seen many such secret compartments and knew they

were routinely used by drug traffickers to transport large quantities of

drugs as well as the cash proceeds from drug transactions. Inside this

compartment Sergeant Quill found nearly $500,000 in cash, sealed in

fifteen plastic bags. A drug detection dog from the Frederick police

department gave a positive alert to the back seat area of the car. Mondragon was arrested for driving on a revoked license. Her purse was

then searched, and an additional $5,900 in cash was found. Sergeant

Quill issued a traffic citation to Mondragon, and she was released.

The currency, which had been seized, was turned over to the U.S.

Customs Service. Mondragon filed an administrative claim to the

money. 

2 UNITED STATES v. MONDRAGON
On November 30, 2000, the government filed a verified complaint

in the District of Maryland, seeking forfeiture of the currency on the

ground that it was the proceeds of drug trafficking, see 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1), and was involved in a money laundering transaction, see

18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). (The government did not pursue the

money laundering allegation.) The complaint incorporated a joint affidavit, executed by Sergeant Quill and a U.S. Customs Agent, setting

forth the facts recounted above. Mondragon, as claimant, filed a

motion to strike the complaint, arguing that it failed to state the

grounds for forfeiture with the particularity required by Rule E(2)(a)

of the Supplemental Rules. The district court denied the motion. Mondragon then filed an answer to the complaint, stating that she was

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the

truth of the charging allegations. After deposing Mondragon, the government made a motion for summary judgment that was not opposed.

The district court granted this motion and entered a final order of forfeiture. Mondragon appeals, contesting only the district court’s order

denying her motion to strike the complaint. Whether the complaint,

including the incorporated affidavit, satisfies the particularity requirement of Rule E(2)(a) is a legal question that we review de novo.

United States v. United States Currency, in the Amount of $150,660,

980 F.2d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 1992). 

II.

A.

A civil forfeiture complaint against property allegedly connected to

drug trafficking must meet the particularity in pleading requirement

of Supplemental Rule E(2)(a). See 21 U.S.C. § 881(b), (d); United

States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 921 F.2d 370, 373-74 (1st Cir.

1990). Rule E(2)(a) requires the complaint to "state the circumstances

from which the claim arises with such particularity that the defendant

or claimant will be able, without moving for a more definite statement, to commence an investigation of the facts and to frame a

responsive pleading." Mondragon argues that the government’s complaint lacks the factual detail necessary to satisfy Rule E(2)(a). 

Our court has not discussed the particularity requirement of Rule

E(2)(a). The leading case on the subject is Riverway Co. v. Spivey

UNITED STATES v. MONDRAGON 3
Marine and Harbor Service Co., 598 F. Supp. 909 (S.D. Ill. 1984), an

in rem proceeding against a tugboat. The court in Riverway said that

vessel owners "are entitled to freedom from the threat of seizure of

their livelihood upon conclusory allegations and dubious circumstances." Id. at 913. Rule E(2)(a)’s requirement for "[p]leading specific circumstances is one part of the process which guards against the

improper use of admiralty seizure proceedings." Id. Thus, the rule’s

"heightened particularity in pleading requirement[ ]" is "always subject to the general standard that the complaint sufficiently notify the

defendant of the incident in dispute and afford a reasonable belief that

the claim has merit." Id.

Several circuit courts have interpreted Rule E(2)(a) in evaluating

government complaints for the civil forfeiture of property allegedly

connected to illegal activity. Almost all of these courts adopt a form

of Riverway’s "reasonable belief that the claim has merit" standard.

They begin their analysis by saying that Rule E(2)(a) requires a complaint to allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable belief that the

property is subject to forfeiture. See United States v. $38,000 in

United States Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1548 (11th Cir. 1987); United

States v. Pole No. 3172, 852 F.2d 636, 638 (1st Cir. 1988); United

States v. 2323 Charms Rd., 946 F.2d 437, 441 (6th Cir. 1991); United

States Currency, in the Amount of $150,660, 980 F.2d at 1204-05.

These courts go on to hold more specifically that the complaint must

allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable belief that the government can demonstrate probable cause for forfeiture at trial. $38,000

in United States Currency, 816 F.2d at 1548; Pole No. 3172, 852 F.2d

at 640; 2323 Charms Rd., 946 F.2d at 441; United States Currency,

in the Amount of $150,600, 980 F.2d at 1205; see also United States

v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1993). 

The pleading requirement of a "reasonable belief that probable

cause can be shown at trial" was apparently keyed to the government’s burden of proof at the time (prior to 2000) these cases were

decided. See Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 47. Before Congress enacted the

Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No.

106-185, 114 Stat. 202, 205, the government’s trial burden was to

show probable cause for forfeiture; the burden of proof then shifted

to the claimant. See United States v. Leak, 123 F.3d 787, 792 (4th Cir.

1997); 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (superceded by 18 U.S.C. § 938(c)(1)). Now,

4 UNITED STATES v. MONDRAGON
after CAFRA’s enactment, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture. 18

U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). 

In light of CAFRA’s change in the burden of proof, it is a bit awkward to say now that Rule E(2)(a) requires the complaint to allege

facts sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the government can

establish probable cause for forfeiture at trial. We therefore decline to

adopt this interpretation of Rule E(2)(a). A useful point survives the

pre-CAFRA opinions, however. As we have said, most of these opinions begin by recognizing the general standard that a complaint under

Rule E(2)(a) must allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable belief

that the property is subject to forfeiture. We, too, adopt this general

standard. 

There is a more basic point, however. Rule E(2)(a) needs little

interpretation. It is plainly written and "means precisely what it says."

$38,000 in United States Currency, 816 F.2d at 1548. Again, the rule

says, "the complaint shall state the circumstances from which the

claim arises with such particularity that the defendant or claimant will

be able, without moving for a more definite statement, to commence

an investigation of the facts and to frame a responsive pleading." Supplemental Rule E(2)(a). We will evaluate the government’s complaint

in light of the language of the rule, keeping in mind that the complaint

must at bottom allege facts sufficient to support a reasonable belief

that the property is subject to forfeiture. 

B.

Because Rule E(2)(a) requires the complaint to "state the circumstances from which the claim arises," we begin with the bare bones

of the government’s claim. The government alleged that the currency

seized from the car driven by Mondragon was the proceeds of drug

trafficking and should be forfeited under 18 U.S.C. § 981. The basic

question raised by Mondragon is whether the complaint stated the circumstances giving rise to this claim with "such particularity" that she

could, without more information, "commence an investigation of the

facts" and "frame a responsive pleading." 

Mondragon cannot deny that the complaint provides a number of

the elemental circumstances underlying the government’s claim.

UNITED STATES v. MONDRAGON 5
Mondragon was present when the currency was seized. Thus, from

the facts alleged in the complaint, which Mondragon also witnessed,

she was informed of (1) what currency was seized, (2) how it was

packaged, (3) when it was seized, (4) where it was seized, and (5) by

whom it was seized. While these facts would be important to any

investigation Mondragon might have begun, they do not, by themselves, show a sufficient connection between the currency and drug

trafficking to satisfy the pleading requirement of Rule E(2)(a). The

government argues that certain additional facts are sufficiently particular to satisfy the rule. These are (1) the large sum of currency in

unusual packaging, (2) the hidden compartment where it was stored,

and (3) the drug dog alert in the area of the car near the hidden compartment. With these facts added, we agree that the complaint satisfies

the particularity requirement. 

The complaint alleges that Sergeant Quill, in his search of the car

driven by Mondragon, found nearly one-half million dollars sealed in

fifteen plastic bags. The presence of that much cash, oddly packaged,

could raise a suspicion that someone was up to no good, but without

more it does not suggest a connection to drug trafficking. There is

more, of course. The complaint alleges that Sergeant Quill found the

money hidden in a professionally constructed secret compartment

behind the back seat of the car. The sergeant, according to the complaint, was experienced in drug investigations and knew that these

hidden compartments were routinely used by drug traffickers to transport both drugs and cash proceeds. Finally, the complaint alleges that

the drug dog alerted to the back seat area of the car, signaling the

scent of illegal drug residue. Mondragon argues that the dog sniff had

no value because a high percentage of U.S. paper currency is contaminated with drug residue. See, e.g., United States v. $10,700 in United

States Currency, 158 F.3d 215, 229-30 (3d Cir. 2001). According to

Mondragon, the dog could have been alerting to contaminated currency, but the alert did not mean that the currency in the secret compartment came straight from a drug deal. As an attack on the

complaint in this case, the argument falls short. The dog did not alert

directly on the sealed plastic bags of currency, but rather on the back

seat area of the car. Thus, when the complaint was drafted, the nature

of the dog’s alert, coupled with the rest of the circumstances, supported a reasonable belief that drugs had been transported in the car,

6 UNITED STATES v. MONDRAGON
probably in the secret compartment, and that the currency found in the

compartment was linked to drug trafficking. 

In sum, the complaint’s factual allegations, which we have just discussed, permit a reasonable belief for pleading purposes that the currency was the proceeds of drug trafficking and was therefore subject

to forfeiture. The complaint states the circumstances giving rise to the

forfeiture claim with sufficient particularity that Mondragon could

have commenced a meaningful investigation of the facts and drafted

a responsive pleading. Rule E(2)(a)’s particularity requirement was

therefore satisfied.*

The district court properly denied Mondragon’s motion to strike

the complaint. The order is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

*The government also argues that Rule E(2)(a)’s particularity requirement is satisfied because a magistrate judge, relying on the affidavit that

was later incorporated into the complaint, found probable cause to issue

a warrant for the seizure of the currency. Although the magistrate judge’s

probable cause determination has not been challenged, we do not rely on

it. Whether there is probable cause for a seizure warrant and whether a

complaint meets the particularity requirement of Rule E(2)(a) are separate issues. The determination of one issue is not a substitute for the

determination of the other. 

UNITED STATES v. MONDRAGON 7