* The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant to

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAR 13 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

SHERRIE KIESLING, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. JOHN D. TROUGHTON, Third Judicial District Judge for Lincoln County; ROBERT M. McCLOUD, Third Judicial District Clerk of Lincoln County; LYNN W. CLARK, Lincoln County Sheriff; TIM MALIK, Lincoln County Deputy Sheriff; KATHLEEN DAVISON; CLYDE GEPHART; ROBERT MURDOCK, Lincoln County Commissioners, Defendants - Appellees. No. 95-8048 (D.C. No. 94-CV-245) (District of Wyoming)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TACHA , BALDOCKand LUCERO , Circuit Judges.1 Because we are called upon to review the district court’s entry of summary

judgment, we recite only those facts which are uncontroverted.

2 This incident resulted in the filing of criminal charges against appellant, including Interference With Custody, Interference With a Peace Officer, and Fleeing a Peace Officer. Appellees’ App. at 84. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Ms. Kiesling entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of Interference With Custody, and entered the same plea to one count of Interference with a Peace Officer. Id. - 2 - In early 1993, plaintiff-appellant Sherrie Kieslin g became embroiled in a child custody dispute with her husband, Lindig Kies ling. 1 Following a series of state court proceedings, Judge John D. Troughton of the Third Judicial District Court of Wyoming concluded that appellant was willf ully violating orders of the Court, and was hiding and secreting her children fr om Mr. Kiesling. Appellees’ App. at 65-66. In accordance with that finding, Ju dge Troughton ordered the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office to take the four ch ildren into custody and deliver them to their father. Id. at 66. Upon observing appellant and her children in Afton, Wyoming, sheriff’s deputies attempted to execute Judge Troughton’s ord er. Appellant failed to cooperate with the officers’ requests, attempted to elude them by speeding away, and did not bring her vehicle to a halt until boxed -in by patrol cars. Appellant’s noncompliance with subsequent police requests resul ted in a brief struggle and, ultimately, in her being placed under arrest. 2 The foregoing events led appellant to file the unde rlying action in federal district court, wherein she alleges numerous consti tutional and statutory3Appellant alleges that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988,

as well as her rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Her complaint seeks a panoply of remedies, including compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, costs of suit, and various forms of declaratory and injunctive relief.

4Appellant repeatedly refused to accept correspondence or otherwise meaningfully participate in the federal court proceedings. For example, she inscribed the following on defendants’ motion for summary judgment: “Return to Sender. Refused for Cause w/out Dishonor. UCC 3-501 not corporate person described.” Appellees’ App. at 151-152. - 3 - violations. 3 Judge William Downes of the United States Distric t Court for the District of Wyoming on several occasions urged Ms. Kiesling to seek the advice of counsel. She failed to do so, however, and inst ead “engaged in a course of unbridled lawlessness throughout [the] proceedings. ” 4 Appellees’ App. at 152. Defendants sought summary judgment in both their of ficial and individual capacities. The district court granted that motion . We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. Defendants supported their motion for summary judgm ent with briefs and affidavits. Appellant opted not to file a written response or otherwise supplement her pleadings. We review the district court’s gran t of summary judgment de novo. Webber v. Mefford , 43 F.3d 1340, 1342 (10th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgmen t as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “If a movant establishes his entitl ement to judgment as a matter of- 4 -

law based on uncontroverted, operative facts contai ned in the documentary evidence, summary judgment will lie.” Webber , 43 F.3d at 1343. “Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for judicial acts, unless committed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. ” Henriksen v. Bentley , 644 F.2d 852, 855 (10th Cir. 1981). The district courtfound that Judge Troughton’s actions were within his official capacity and scope of authority, and consequently concluded he was entitled to judicial immunity. Ap pellant advances no evidence which would support a contrary result, and we decli ne to disturb the district court’s ruling. Similar immunity principles support the court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Clerk Robert McCloud. See id. (clerks immune from suit under § 1983 when performing “quasi-judicial” dutie s). We next address Ms. Kiesling’s claims against defen dant Malik. Appellant asserts that deputy Malik falsely arrested her and used excessive force in doing so. A claim of false arrest is premised on a lack of probable cause. Cottrell v. Kaysville City , 994 F.2d 730, 733 (10th Cir. 1993). The uncontro verted evidence establishes that Malik arrested appellant only afte r she refused to cooperate with legitimate police requests and assaulted his partne r. Appellees’ App. at 98. Under these circumstances, deputy Malik had probabl e cause to arrest appellant. With respect to Ms. Kiesling’s excessive force clai m, the relevant inquiry is- 5 -

whether the arresting officer’s actions were object ively reasonable. See Graham
v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). As the Supreme Court h as explained, the “reasonableness” of a particular use of force m ust be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, r ather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight . . . . With respect to a claim of excessive force . . . [n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later see m unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers . . . violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance fo r the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judg ments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—abo ut the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Id. at 396-397 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Relevant factors in determining whether the force used by an arresting officer was objectively reasonable include the severity of the crime, wheth er the subject posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer, and whether the subject was resisting
arrest. See Wilson v. Meeks , 52 F.3d 1547, 1553 (10th Cir. 1995). The uncontroverted facts before us establish that appellant failed to comply with police requests, initiated a car chase, attemp ted to elude the officers, failed to stop her vehicle until boxed-in by patrol cars, and physically resisted arrest by striking and kicking a deputy. Thus, we perceive n o basis for concluding that deputy Malik—or any other officer at the scene—acte d in a constitutionally impermissible manner during appellant’s arrest. We therefore decline to overturn the district court’s entry of summary judgment as t o defendant Malik. Appellant’s claims against sheriff Clark are premised upon Clar k’s alleged failure to train and- 6 -

properly supervise his deputies. Given our review of deputy Malik’s actions, we are unable to detect any improper training or supervision. Lincoln County Commissioners Davison, Gephart and M urdock were also joined as defendants in appellant’s suit. If liber ally construed, Ms. Kiesling’s complaint alleges that these defendants are liable— as representatives of Lincoln County—for condoning and ratifying the policies und er which her Fourth Amendment violations arose. This court has held th at a supervisor is not liable under § 1983 unless there is an affirmative link be tween the constitutional deprivation and the supervisor’s exercise of contro l or direction, his personal participation, or his failure to supervise. See Meade v. Grubbs , 841 F.2d 1512, 1527 (10th Cir. 1988). The record before us contai ns no evidence indicating that appellant suffered a constitutional deprivation, no r is there evidence the Lincoln County Commissioners could be liable under the Mead e standard. Consequently, we affirm summary judgment in their favor. Upon careful consideration of the record, the brief s of the parties, the district court’s order, and applicable law, we find appellant’s additional claims and arguments to be without merit.- 7 -

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

PER CURIAM