IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2017-CP-00597-COA
JAMES LEE THOMAS A/K/A JAMES L. THOMAS APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/10/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DAL W ILLIAMSON COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JAMES LEE THOMAS (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POSTCONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 07/31/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE IRVING, P.J., CARLTON AND GREENLEE, JJ. CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT : ¶1. In June 2008 , J a me s L

. T h o ma s p l e aded guilty t o a rm ed robbery

. Thom as was sentenced to s erve twenty y e ars, with eight y ear s t o b e s e rved in the custody of the Mississippi Departm ent of C orrections (MDOC), and nine y ears suspended. Tho mas’s

sentence w as also conditioned on him successf ully c om pleting t h r e e y ears on post-release supervision (PRS); successf ully com pleting the circuit court’s com m unity service program ; and pay ing court costs and restitution totaling $4,699.00. ¶2. Thom as w as released on PRS on February 19, 2015. I n July 2016, the C ircuit Court of J ones County (Second Judicial District) f ound that Thom as h ad com m itted two technicalviolations of his P RS conditions. It ordered that Thom as’s PRS would b e extended f or an additional two y ears bey o n d the o riginal PRS expiration d ate, and that Thom as sh o u ld be transported to the P ascagoula Restitution Center where he would rem ain until all court costs and restitution were paid. ¶3. Thom as w as discharged f rom the restitution center on August 26, 2 016. In Septem ber 2016, the State p etitioned to revoke Thom as’s p robation d ue t o several alleged violations of certain conditions of h is PRS. A revocation hearing was held, and the circuit c ourt f ound that Thom a s had c om m itted three technical violations of his PRS conditions. The circuit court revoked T hom as’s PRS and o rdered Thom a s to serve his n ine-y ear suspended sentence. The circuit court sum m arily dism issed Thom as ’ s s u bsequently f iled m otion f

or p ostconviction relief (PCR). ¶4. On appeal, Thom as asserts, pro se, that h is PRS was unlawf ully revoked because (i) his due process rights were violated during his Septem ber 9 , 2 016 revocation hearing; (ii) the cir c u i t court erred in reinstating Thom as’s suspended sentence based upon three technical

v i o l ations because t he court’s a ctions were n ot within the guidelines of Mississi p p i C o d e Annotated section 47-7-37 (Rev. 2015); and (iii) his original sentence was illegal because he had not signed the acknowledgm ent o n page f our of t he June 6, 2008 sentencing order, and thus the circuit c ourt was without authority to reinstate his suspended sentence. W e f ind no violation of Thom as’s d

u e process rights at the Septem ber 9, 2016 revocation h earing, and

we f urther f i nd that the circuit court w as within i ts authority to im pose Thom as’s suspended
sentence. W e theref

o re af f irm the circuit court’s order deny ing Thom as’s PCR m otion.

2FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶5. On June 3, 2 0 08, Thom as f iled a petition to p lead guilty t o t h e c h a r g e o f arm ed robbery

. As part of Thom as’ s plea a greem ent, the State dropped an aggravated assault charg e against Thom as, and a separate f elony -m alicious-m ischief charge (Cause No. 207- 269-KR2) against him

. Thom a s, however, was still required to pay $4,023.50 in restitution to Veronica McCollum

f o r her car relating to the f

elony -m alicious-m ischief charge. ¶6. Thom as’s guilty -plea hearing took place on June 6, 2008. Af t er a ccepting T hom a s ’s guilty plea, the circuit court s entenced Thom as to serve twenty y ears, with eight y ears to be served in the f

ull-tim e custody

of MDOC, and nine y e ars suspended, conditioned upon his

s u c c e s s f ul com pletion of three y ears on PRS and his successf ul com p letion of the circ u i t

c o u r t’s com m

unity service p rogram . Thom as was also required to pay c ourt cos t s i n t h e

am ount of $250.50; $425 restitution to the victim o f the arm ed robbery ; and, as noted above, $4,023.50 restitution to Veronica McCo l l u m relating to the separate f elony -m aliciousm ischief charge, t otaling $4,699.00. The f irst installm ent on these p ay m ents was due within thirty d ay s of Thom as being placed on PRS, and each i nstallm ent was to be p aid at the rate of $135 per m onth until paid in f u ll. The sentencing order was entered June 6, 2008. ¶7. Thom as was released on P RS on February 19, 2015. The record indicates that on July 8, 2016, the circuit court i ssued a sum m ons and order t o show c a use as to why Thom as’s suspended sentence should not be revoked. The revocation hearing was set f o r July 26, 2016. The s how-cause order was based u pon Thom as’s f

ailure to pay any of his i nstallm e nts on his

court costs and restitution obligations; h is f ailure to perf

o rm com m

u nity service as ordered;

3and his f

ailu r e t o pay c om m

unity -service supervision f ees. Thom as was served with the

sum m ons and show-cause order on July 17, 2016. ¶8. The show-cause hearing was h eld on J uly 26 to allow T hom as to appear in open c o urt

so the circuit court c o u l d d e t erm ine whether Thom as w as in com pliance w i th the PRS conditions of t h e J u n e 6 , 2008 sentencing order. At the hearing, the circuit court heard testim o ny f

rom t he Director of the C i r c u i t C o urt Com m unity Service P rogram , Jerald Parrish, who stated that Thom a s h ad only participated in com m unity service f

ive t im es in 2016; f

ailed

to participate i n com m

unity service since May 14, 2016; and had a supervision-f ee arrearage of $600, with a total supervision-f ee balance of $1,250. The record also contains a printout
f rom the Jones County Circuit Clerk showing n o p a y me n ts had b een m ade on Thom as’s restitution or court costs o bligations. The circuit court had the printout entered i nto evidence at the July

26 hearing. ¶9. On July 28, 2016, the circuit court issued an order m odif y ing its original sentencing order. Based on the e vidence bef ore it, the circuit court f

ound that Thom as had com m itted his f irst and second technical violations of the conditions of

his PRS, nam ely (1) f

ailure to

m ake pay m ents towards court costs a nd restituti o n a s required; and (2) f ailure to report to

com m u n i t y s e r v ice and pay s upervision f ees as required. The circuit court ordered that
T h om as’s PRS would be extended f or an additional two y ears bey ond the original P R S expiration date, and that Thom as should be transported to the Pascagoula Restitution Center where he would rem a in until all court costs and restitution were paid. ¶10. Less than a m onth later, on August 26, 2016, T ho ma s w a s d i s c h a r g e d f rom the

4restitution center. On Septem ber 7, 2016, Donald C. Rogers, MDOC Probation a nd Parole
A g e n t, f i led an af f idavit related t o Thom as’s conduct while o n PRS, which set f o r t h t h e f ollowing PRS violations:
C o ndition b) The Def

endant shall obey all orders of t he C ourt and the Probation/Parole Agent. .

. . Def e ndant was order[ ed] o n July 28[ ,] 2016 [ t o] be transported to the Pascagoula Restitution Center to stay until [h e ] c om pleted [ his court costs a n d restitution] pay m e nt[ s]. The Def

endant has f

a iled to com plete the Restitution Center by being kicked out due to f ailing to abide by the rules and r egulations ( f ailed to keep a job ; t e s t i n g p ositive f or THC; and e n c o u r aging other[ s] to ref use work, or participating in work stoppage on 8/26/16). Condition h) The Def

endant shall [ p ]ay

court costs, com m

unity service f ees, f ines and restitution. . . . Def endant has m ade no pay

m ents t owards the court and owes $4,699.00

. The Def endant has f

ailed to p ay com m

unity service f

ees and is in arrears of $1,250.00

. Condition k) The Def

endant shall participate in the D istrict 18 Com m u nity Service Program . The Def endant has f

ailed to participate in the program

. ¶11. Based on the af

f idavit of Agent Rogers, the circuit c o urt judge issued a warrant f or Thom a s. A hearing w as held bef ore the circuit court on Septem ber 9, 2 0 1 6 , to determ ine whether Thom as violated the term s of his PRS. Thom as was p r esent and r epresented by counsel. ¶12. MDOC Of

f icer Carrol W indham testif ied at the hearing a s to the violations set f orth
in Agent Rogers’s af

f idavit, i ncluding Thom as’s d ischarge f r om the P ascagoula Restitution
Center on August 26, 2016; his f ailure to m ake pay

m ents toward court costs and restitution

as r equired; and his f

ailure to participate in c om m unity service and pay p articipation f ees as required. Regarding Thom as’s f ailure to pay his installm ents on the court c osts and restitution, the circuit court also exam ined a printout f r om the circuit clerk’s of

f ice showing

5no pay

m e n ts had been m ade as of Septem ber 9, 2016, and entered that record into e vidence. ¶13. Of f icer Shirlean Anderson, an em ploy ee o f t h e P a s c a g o u l a R e s t i t u t i on Center, testif i ed at the hearing about Thom as’s discharge f rom t h e center. She described Thom as threatening bodily harm to her when she asked h i m t o pick u p his clothes of

f the f loor. 1
Of f icer Anderson also testif

ied about Thom as’s work history , nam ely that he was working
f or a land s c a p i n g com

p any , and w hen she cam e back f rom two day s of

f o f work, Thom as was no longer working at the landscaping job. She f urther testif

ied that Thom as and three others were then sent t o w o r k at Boggy Viney ard, and “the guy [ f rom Boggy Viney ard] called and said com e pick them up, they didn’t want to work any

m ore.” ¶14. Mr. Jerald Parrish testif ied about T hom as’s record and perf orm ance of his com m

unity service obligations f

or 2016 up until July 28, 2016, w hen Thom as was s ent to the restitution

center. In that t im e period, Thom as had twenty -eight opportunities t o r e p o r t a n d reported only f ive tim es. ¶15. Thom as testif

ied o n his own behalf that he never t hreatened Of f icer A nderson; he had

not lost his jobs f

or wrongdoing; and he had receipts and check stubs showing tha t h e h ad

m ade p ay m ents while he was at the restitution center but that they were at his house. Thom as testif i ed that if he could go back t o work, he could pay his f ines. The trial court t hen asked Of f icer Anderson whether the restitution center would take Thom as b ack. She replied, “No, sir.”

1 S p ecif

ically , O f f icer A n d erso n testif

ied th at s h e to ld T h o m a s to g et h is c lo th es o f f th e f lo o r. T h o m as ref

u sed . S h e said th at sh e th en to ld T h o m as to p ick u p th e c l o th es, an d h e to ld h er th a t h e w as g o i n g to b u st h er in th e h ead

. 6¶16. At the close of the hearing, the circuit court f ound that based on the proof bef ore it, Thom a s had com m itted three technical violation s : ( 1 ) f ailure t o participate in com m unity service as required; ( 2) f ailure to pay his court costs and restitu t i o n a s r equired; and (3) discharge f

rom the r estitution center. 2 The circuit court judge s tated that he would be happy

to review any receipts Thom as had th a t s h o w e d h e h ad m a de pay m ents while in the restitution center, and that he wou l d modif y his order if it c hanged any thing. The circuit

court judge f

urther stated that he would need these receipts “pretty soon”; and he e xplained that e ven i f Thom as produced receipts, if Thom as had n ot paid enough to becom e com pliant with the sentencing order, the court would still f ind him in violation. ¶17. The circuit c ourt issued its PRS revocation and m odif ication order on Septem

ber 12, 2016, setting f

orth the testim ony an d evidence presented at the hearing, and f inding that Thom a s com m itted the above-stated three technical violations. The circuit c ourt o rdered that Thom a s’s nine-y ear sentence previously suspended w as r evoked, and f u rther o r d e r e d t hat Thom a s was to serve the rem aining nine y ears of his sentence in the custody of MDOC. ¶18. Thom as served his PCR m otion on March 20, 2017 (f iled April 10, 2017), asserting that his PRS was unlawf

ully revoked because (1) he was not given a pr e lim inary hearing b e f o r e his f inal revocation hearing; (2) he was denied due process a t his f inal revocatio n hearing; and (3) he was not sentenced within the guidelines of section 47-7-37. ¶19. By order e ntered A p r i l 1 0 , 2017, the circuit court s um m a rily d ism issed T hom as’s PCR

2 T h e circu it co u rt j u d g e state d o n th e r eco rd th at h e h ad h e ard n o ev id en ce su p p o rtin g t w o alleg atio n s l isted in A g en t R o g ers’ a f f i d av it in s u p p o r

t o f a v io latio n o f co n d iti o n b , testin g p o sitiv e f o r T H C , an d T h o m as p articip atin g in a w o rk sto p p ag e. T h e circu i t co u rt d ism i ssed th o se alleg atio n s. 7m otion. The circuit court f irst observed that Thom as’s judgm ent of conviction on his guilty plea f or a rm ed robbery was entered on June 6, 2008, and thus Thom a s’s PCR m otion, served

on M arch 2 0 , 2017, was tim e-barred under the lim i tations p rovision of the Unif orm Post
C o n v i c t i o n Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA), Miss i s s i p p i C o d e A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 9 9

- 3 9

- 5 ( 2 ) (Rev. 2015). 3 A ddressing potential exceptions to the UPCCRA’s tim e - bar, the c i rcuit court f ound that Thom as’s PRS was not unlawf ully revoked 4 because the court sentenced him to

serve his suspended sentence af ter determ ining t hat Thom as had three technical violations of c onditions of his probation, which constitutes a sentence w ithin t he guidelines o f section
47-7-37 ( 5)(a). The c ircuit court f urther f ound that none of the other exceptions to the UPCCRA’s tim e-bar were applicable to Thom as’s PCR m o tion. ¶20. Thom as f

i l e d a motion f

or reconsideration of the circuit court’s order in which he again m entioned he had receipts and W -2 f orm s that showed he had worked or paid on his restitution an d c o urt f

ees. No such inf

orm ation was attached to the m otion, h owever, and there is no indication i n the record that a n y r e c e i pts or check stubs w ere provided to the circuit court. 5 The circui t c ourt denied Thom as’s m otion f or reconsideration on April 24,

3 S ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 9 -3 9 -5 (2 ) (p ro v id in g th at “[ a] m o tio n f o r r elief u n d er th is articl e s h all b e m ad e . . . in case o f a g u ilty p lea, w ith i n th r ee (3 ) y e a rs af ter e n try o f th e j u d g m en t o f

co n v ictio n ”).

4 S e e M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 9 -3 9 -5 (1 )(h ) (p ro v id i n g th at an e x c ep tio n t o th e tim e-b ar u n d er th e U P C C R A in clu d es cases i n w h ich th e m o v an t claim s th at “ h is p ro b atio n , p aro le o r co n d itio n al release [ w as] u n law f u l ly rev o k e d ”).

5 T h o m as su p p lem en ted t h e a p p ella te reco rd o n M arch 2 9 , 2 0 1 8 (o v er a y ear an d a h alf af ter h is S e p tem

b e r 9 , 2 0 1 6 rev o c atio n h earin g ), an d ag ain o n M ay 1 , 2 0 1 8 , w ith a receip t f ro m th e Jo n es C o u n t y C ircu it C l erk d ated O cto b er 1 9 , 2 0 1 7 , sh o w in g T h o m as h ad p aid $ 2 5 0 i n c o u rt f

ees, $ 2 1 9 .3 8 in restitu tio n , an d o w ed a b alan ce o f $ 4 ,2 2 9

. 1 2

.

82017.

¶21. T h o ma s a p p e a l e d , a s s e r t i n g , pro se, that (1) the circuit court erred by f ailing to conduct a prelim inary

hearing on his PRS revocation; (2) he was denied due process at his
f inal revocation hearing because the e vidence against him supporting r e v ocation was not disclosed, and he received n o written statem ent of the circuit court’s reasons f or r evocation; and (3) the circuit court erred in reinstating Thom a s’s suspended sentence because it was not within t he guidelines o f s ection 4 7 -7-37. Thom as f iled a supplem ental m em orandum of law
in which he asserted that his o r iginal sentence was illegal because h e h a d not s igned the acknowledgm ent on page f o u r of the June 6, 2008 sentencing o rder, and thus the circuit court

w a s without authority to reinstate his suspended sentence under the Septem ber 12, 2 0 1 6 revocation order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶22. “W hen r e v i e w i n g a c i r c u i t court’s denial or dism issal of a PCR m otion, we will

reverse the judgm ent of the circuit court only if its f actual f i ndings a r e c l e arly erroneous; however, we r e v i e w t h e c ircuit court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of

S u p p lem en t in g th e ap p ellate reco rd w ith t h is receip t d o es n o t c o m p ly w ith th e circu it co u rt’s req u est at th e S ep tem

b er 9 , 2 0 1 6 rev o catio n h earin g th at T h o m as an d h i s co u n s el p ro v id e th e circu it co u rt w ith an y receip ts “ so o n ” a f t er th e h earin g . F u r

th er, th e receip t sh o w s a to tal p ay m en t o f o n l y $ 4 6 9 .8 8

. B y th e S ep tem b er 9 , 2 0 1 6 rev o catio n h earin g , T h o m as o w ed $ 2 ,4 3 0 i n co u rt co sts an d restitu tio n u n d er t h e term s o f th e sen t en cin g o rd er. A s n o ted ab o v e, th e circu it co u rt ex p lain e d to T h o m as at th e h earin g th at ev en if h e p r o d u c ed receip ts, if T h o m as h ad n o t p aid en o u g h t o b eco m e co m p lian t w ith th e sen ten cin g o rd er, th e co u rt w o u l d still f

in d h i m i n v i o l a t i o n . T h e p ay m en t o f $ 4 6 9

. 8 8 d o es n o t p u t T h o m as in c o mp l i a n c e w ith h is P R S co n d itio n s an d d o es n o t af f ect th e v a lid ity o f th e c ircu it co u rt’s d eterm in atio n th at T h o m as’s n o n -p ay m en t o f c o u rt co s t s a n d restitu tio n co n stitu ted a tech n ical v io l atio n o f

co n d itio n (h ) o f

h is P R S

. 9review.” Berry v. State , 230 So. 3d 360, 362 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).
DISCUSSION ¶23. In its order dism issing T hom as’s PCR m otion, the circuit court f ound that the m otion,

on its f ace, was t im e -barred under the t hree-y ear lim itation provision of the UPCCRA because Thom as’s judgm ent of conviction on his arm e d robbery charge was entered June 8, 2008, and Thom as’s PCR m otion was not served u ntil March 20, 2 017. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (“A m o tion f or relief under this a rticle shall be m ade

. . . in c ase of a guilty plea, within three (3) y e ars a f

ter entry of the judgm ent of convictio n . ” ). T h e circuit court also acknowledged that the U PCCRA provi d e s f o r a num ber of exceptions to the tim e-bar, including, in relevant part, those cases in which the m ovant claim s that “his probation, parole

or conditional release [ w as] unlawf ully revoked.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(h). For the

reasons set f

orth below, w e af

f irm the circuit court’s determ ination that T hom as’s PRS was
not unlawf

ully revoked, and we f

urther f ind that Thom as has not shown a ny other e xception

to the UPCCRA’s tim e-bar that warrants reversal of the circuit court’s sum m a ry d enial of his
PCR m otion.
I. Due Process Requirem ents ¶24. Thom as, as the PCR m ovant, has the burden of dem onstrating that his claim s are not tim e-barred because a n exception applies. See McComb v. S tate , 135 So. 3d 928, 9 32 (¶ 10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). I n his f irst assignm ent of e rror, Thom as alleges that his suspended

sentence was unlawf

ully rev o ked because his due process rights were violated at his revocation hearin g . T hom a s alleges the f ollowing due process v iolations: (1) he did not

1 0receive a prelim inary r evocation h earing; and ( 2) at h is f orm al revocation hearing, two of the six m inim

um due-process conditions required u nder Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 4 11 U.S. 778 (1973), were not m et; nam ely , condition (b) (disclosure o f t h e evidence against him ) and condition (f

) (a written statem ent by

the f actf i nder of the evidence relied upon and reasons f or revoking his PRS). ¶25. We a c k n o w l e d g e that under Gagnon , a probationer f aced with revocation of

hi s probation is entitled to (1) a prelim inary hearing to d eterm ine whether probable cause existed

to believe that he violated condition[ s] of his probation; and (2) a f inal revocation hearing. Presley v. State , 4 8 So. 3d 526, 529 (¶11) (Miss. 2010) (c i ting Gagnon , 411 U.S. at 786).
A f inal revocation hearing m ust include the f

ollowing m inim

um d ue-process requirem ents: (a) written notice of the claim ed v i o l a tions of probation or parole; (b) d i s c l o sure t o the probationer or parolee of evidence against him ; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and docum entary evidence; ( d) the right to conf r ont and cross-exam ine adverse witnesses u nless the hearing of

f icer specif

ically f inds good c ause f

or n o t allowing conf rontation; (e) a neutral and detached hearing body such as a parole board, m em bers of which need not be j udicial of f icers or lawy ers; and ( f

) a written statem ent by the f

a ctf inder as to the evidence relied on and reasons f or revoking probation or parole. Id. (quoting Gagnon , 411 U.S. at 786) (internal quotation m arks om itted). ¶26. Rega r d i n g t h e l a c k of a prelim inary hearing, Thom as did not raise this issue at his
f orm al revocation hearing, and t hus he is procedurally barred f rom raising it now. Id. at 528 (¶9). ¶27. Proce d u r a l b a r n o twithstanding, we also reject Thom a s ’s argum ent on the m erits.
Harm l ess-error standard applies “ t o a P C R [ m ovant’s] claim that f ailure to af

f ord a

1 1prelim inary revocation hearing bef ore f inal revocation violated his due

- p r o c e s s rights.” Robertson v. State , 169 So. 3 d 9 10, 913 (¶9) ( Miss. C t. App. 2 014) (citing Presley , 48 So. 3d at 529-30 (¶¶13-14)). In particular, if Thom as cannot show he was prejudiced due to the lack of a p relim inary hearing, and a f orm al revocation hearing was held that m et due process requirem ents, then the lack of a prelim inary

revocation hearing is harm less error. Presley , 48 So. 3d at 530 (¶¶14-16). ¶28. In this regard, Thom as a sserts, without citing specif ic, evidence-based exam

ples, that his due process rights were v iolated at his f orm al revocation hearing because conditions (b) and (f ) required u n der G agnon were not m et. A review of the record shows t hat this was not the case. ¶29. Condition (b) r equires “disclosure t o [ Th o ma s ] o f [ t h e ] e v i d e n c e a gainst him .”
G a gnon , 4 11 U.S. a t 786. The record shows am ple evidence that this c ondition w a s m e t

. Thom a s was present at the Septem ber 9, 2 0 1 6 r e v o cation hearing and was represented by counsel. The State p r e s e nted the evidence against him through the testim ony of Of f icer Carrol W indham (testif

y ing regarding the probation violations set f orth in Agent Rogers’s af f idavit, including non-pay

m ent of restitution and court costs); 6 Of f icer Shirlean A nderson (testif y i ng about Thom as’s term ination f rom the restitution c enter); and Mr. Jerald Parrish (testif y i ng about T hom as’s record and perf orm ance of his com m

u nity service obligations). Thom a s’s counsel was given the opportunity to c ross-exam ine these witnesses and declined

6 R eg ard i n g T h o m as’s f

ailu re to p ay h is in stallm en t s o n t he c ourt co s ts an d restitu tio n , th e circu it co u rt also ex am in ed th e p rin to u t f ro m th e circu it clerk ’s o f f ice sh o w i n g n o p ay m en ts h ad b een m a d e an d en tered th at reco r d in to ev id en ce. 1 2that opportunity

.

¶30. Thom as was also given t he opportunity to be heard, and did, in f a c t , t e s t if y at the hearing. T hom as testif

i ed that h e had r e ceipts and check stubs showing h e had m ade som e
pay m ents on his restitution and court-cost o bligations, b ut d id not have t hem with him

. The circuit court told Thom as and h is counsel t hat he would be happy t o review a ny receipts Thom a s had that showed he had m ade pay m ents while i n the restitution center and would

m odif y h is order i f it c hanged any thing. The circuit court also m ade clear h e w o u l d n e e d those r eceipts soon. As noted above, there is no indication in t he record that any receipts or

c h e ck s tubs were tim ely p rovided to the circuit court. Thom as’s counsel was given t h e opportunity to call witnesses or subm it additional evidence on Thom as’s behalf , and declined

to d o so. I n short, the r e cord plainly shows that the evidence a g ainst Thom as supporting his PRS violations was disclosed to him and condition (b) under Gagnon was m et. ¶31. Thom as also asserts that condition ( f ) unde r G a g n o n w a s n o t m e t , n a me l y , the requirem ent that the circuit court p rovide him w i th “a w ritten statem ent

. . . [ o f ] the evidence relied on and reasons f

o r revoking [ Thom as’s PRS].” Id. at 786. Our r eview of the record, however, s hows that t his condition was f ully m et. The c ircuit court judge presiding over the
h e a r ing heard the evidence and argum ent of counsel, s tated on the record the basis f or hi s revocation ruling, and also detailed the basis f or his determ ination in his Septem ber 12, 2016 revocation and m odif

ication order. ¶32. The Mis s i s s i p p i S u p r e me C o u r t h a s ma d e c l e a r t h a t “ ‘ me rely asserting a constitutional-right violation i s insuf f icient to o vercom e the procedural b a rs.’” Fluker v.

1 3State, 1 70 So. 3d 471, 475 (¶11) (Miss. 2015) (quoting Means v. S tate , 43 So. 3d 438, 442 (¶12) (Miss. 2010)). Rather, “‘[ t]here m ust at least appear t o be som e basis f o r the truth of the [ petitioner’s] c laim bef o re the p r o c e d u r a l bar will be waived.’” Id

. Based upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we f ind Th o ma s ’ s P R S was not unlawf ully revoked because h e was af f o rded the m inim

um due process requirem ents to which he was entitled at his revocation hearing. See Morgan v. State , 995 So. 2d 787, 790 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). Further, Thom as has f ailed to show any p rejudice resulting f rom the lack of a prelim inary hearing. Accordingly , we f ind that Thom as’s a ssignm ent o f error on due process grounds is without m erit.
II. Unsig n e d Acknow ledgm ent to the Original Arm ed Robbery Sentencing Order ¶33. Thom as a sserts t hat his original sentence f or a rm ed r obbery was illegal because he did

not sign the acknowledgm ent on p age f our of the June 6, 2 008 sentencing order. From this Thom a s argues that because that s entence was “illegal,” the c ircuit court was not authorized

to reinstate his suspended s entence in its Septem ber 12, 2 016 revocation order. Thom as did

not raise this point bef

ore t he circuit court. He theref ore waived this issue and m ay not raise it on appeal. Fluker v
. State , 17 So. 3d 1 81, 183 ( ¶5) (Miss. C t. App. 2009) (“[ A] def endant who f ails to raise an issue in his m otion f or post-conviction relief b ef ore the trial court m ay not raise that issue f

o r the f irst tim e on appeal.”). ¶34. Even if Thom as h ad raised this issue in his P CR m o t i o n , i t r e l a tes to his original

sentence f or arm ed robbery

. His judgm ent of conviction o n that charge was entered June 6,
2008 , a n d t h us t his issue would be tim e-barred under section 99-39-5(2) of t he UPCCRA

1 4unless an exception applies. W e recognize that “errors a f f ecting f unda me n t a l rights are excepted f

rom the [ U PCCRA’s] procedural bars,” Rowland v. State , 42 So. 3 d 503, 507 (¶9) (Miss. 2010), i ncluding “ the r ight to be f ree f rom an i llegal sentence.” See S alter v. State , 184 So. 3d 944, 950 (¶22) ( M iss

. Ct. App. 2015). As addressed above, however, Thom as

can n o t o vercom e t he procedural tim e-bar by “m e rely asserting a constitutional-right violation.” Fluker , 170 S o. 3d at 475 (¶11); see McCoy v. S tate , 230 So. 3d 1090, 1094 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). M oreover, Thom as, as the m ovant, “bears the burden of p roviding authority and support f

or his assignm ents of error, and if he does not provide such support

. . . , this Court is under no duty to consider the c l aim .” S immons v. State , 220 So. 3d 1010,
1013 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Hoops v. S tate , 681 So. 2d 521, 526 (Miss. 1996)). ¶35. In t his c a s e , T h o m a s m erely asserts t hat his f a ilure t o sign t he acknowledgm ent on
page f our of the sentencing order constitutes an illegal sentence and t hat reinstatem ent of his suspend e d s e n tence under the original s entencing order was likewise i llegal. Thom as provides no legal authority o r a ny other basis in support of this proposition; nor does this assertion c om

port with the evidence contained in the record. In s t ead, the record indicates that with the assistance of counsel, Thom as com p leted a “Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty ”

as t o t he arm ed robbery charge against h im , and he s igned and acknowledged his plea petition bef

ore a notary

. In his p lea petition, Thom as acknowledged t hat h e understood his constitutional rights as set out in that petition; he u nderstood t hat he v oluntarily waived those rights by entering a guilty plea; and he u nderstood the possible sentence that could be
im p osed. Thom as a lso separately s i g n e d Exhibit 1 to h is plea petition, w hich detailed the

1 5court costs, restitution am ounts, and com m unity service f

e es h e would be o bligated to pay ; and he also s e p arately signed his Com m unity Service Participation Order and Agreem ent, which details h i s com m

unity s ervice obligations. This agreem e nt clearly provides: “I, the undersigned def

endant, certif

y I have read a n d that I agree to and understand, t his ORDER AND AGREEMENT, which will be a part of m y Sentence Order.” ¶36. Additionally , the p lea hearing transcript contained in the record indicates that Thom as

was represented by c ounsel at his plea h earing; h e took the stand at that hearing, and conf irm ed he could read and write and had an e leventh grade education. The circuit court also ascertained at the p lea hearing that Thom as knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights as stated in his plea petition, and voluntarily and knowingly entered his guilty plea to the arm e d robbery charge. Though the sentencing order was not acknowledged by Thom as, his counsel signed the order and “agreed [ to] and approved” its contents. ¶37. In s hort, Thom as provides no legal or evidentiary support bey o nd his own assertions
f or his argum ent t hat his f

ailure to sign the a c knowledgm ent of the June 6, 2008 s e ntencing order constitutes a n illegal sentence. W e theref ore f ind no m erit to t his argum ent. Further, because we f

i nd that Thom as’s original sentence was not “illegal,” we f ind that there is no

m erit in Thom as’s a dditional a ssertion that t he circuit court erred in r einstating his original sentence in its Septem

ber 12, 2016 revocation order.
III. Sentencing Violation Under Section 47-7-37 ¶38. Thom as asserts that under W alker v. State , 230 S o. 3d 709, 715 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) ( W alker I ), the circuit court erred in r einstating his s uspended sentence based upon its

1 6treatm ent of each of the technical violations of his PRS conditions as three separate technical

violations f

or purposes of im

posing the guidelines of section 47-7-37(5). S ection 47-7-37(5) provides, in relevant part, as f ollows:
W i thin t wenty -one (21) day s of arrest and detention by w a r r a n t as h erein provided, t he court shall c ause the probationer to be brought bef o re it a nd m ay continue or revoke a ll or any part o f the probation or the suspension of sentence. If the c ourt r e v o k e s p r o bation f or a technical violation, the court sha l l i mp o se a period of im prisonm ent to b e served in e ither a technical violation c e n t e r o r a restitution c enter not to exceed ninety ( 90) day s f or the f irst technical violation and not to exceed one hundred twenty ( 120) day s f or the second t echnical violation. Fo r t h e third technical violation , t he court m ay im pose a period of im

prisonm e n t t o b e served in either a technical violation center or a restitution center f or up to one hundred eighty (180) d ay s o r t h e court m ay im pose the rem ainder o f the suspended portion of t h e sentence

. F or the f

ourth a nd any subsequent technical violation, the court m ay im p ose up to the rem ainder of the suspended portion of the sentence. (Em phasis added). A “[ t]echnical violation” i s d e f ined as “ an act or om ission by the probationer that violates a condition or conditions of probation placed o n the probationer by the court or the probation of f icer.” Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-2(q) (Rev. 2015). ¶39. Thom as is correct that in apply ing the guidelines under section 47-7-37(5), we held
in W alker I that W a lker’s f

irst revocation o rder, based upon m ultiple t echnical violations, constituted W a lker’s f

irst t echnical violation of his probation, and thus the Court held that
W a lker should not have been sentenced to m o re than ninety day s i n a technical violation or restitution center. W

alker I , 230 So. 3d at 715 (¶19). ¶40. T h o ma s i g n o r e s , h owever, that not long af ter W alker I was decided, w e a g a i n addressed how t o interpret a “technical violation” in t h e c o n text o f section 47-7-37(5) in Cobbert v. State , 223 So. 3d 822 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). In Cobbert , we determ ined that the

1 7proper interpretation requires a f i nding of e a c h s e p arate PRS violation to be counted as a separate technical violation. Id. at 824-25 (¶¶6-7). W e specif i cally acknowledged that “the conclusion i n W

alker [ I ] is contrary to the plain language of the statute a n d s h o u l d be overruled.” Id. at 826 (¶13). 7 ¶41. Thom as also i gnores that on petition f or writ of certiorari , t he Mississippi Suprem e Court reversed W

alker I , in pertine n t part, based on our decision in C obbert

. In W

alker v. State , 230 So. 3 d 7 03 (Miss. 2017) ( W alker II ), the Mississippi Suprem e Court reversed the
Court of Appeals, h olding that the circuit court was authorized to im pose the rem ainder of
W a lker’s s uspended sentence based upon its determ ination that W alker h ad com m itted three technical violations of his probation. Id. at 705-06 ( ¶ ¶ 1 0

- 1 3) (holding that section 47-7-37(5) “requires a f

inding of each separate violation of parole to be a separate and distinct technical violation”). 8 ¶42. B a s e d u p o n t h ese authorities, we f ind no m erit in Thom as’s assignm ent of error on this point because it is based u p o n l a w t h a t is n o longer valid. The circuit court properly determ ined that Thom as violated three conditions of h is PRS as set f orth in the June 6, 2008 sentencing o rder, as f

ollows: f ailure to m ake pay

m ents t oward court costs and restitution as

7 C o b b ert w as h an d ed d o w n Ju n e 2 7 , 2 0 1 7 , b e f o re T h o m as f

iled h is o p en i n g ap p ellan t’s b rief o n A u g u st 1 8 , 2 0 1 7 , an d f iv e m o n t h s b ef

o re T h o m as f

iled h is su p p lem en tal ap p ellan t’s b rief o n N o v em b er 2 1 , 2 0 1 7 , in w h ich h e ag ain r elied o n Wa lker I in arg u in g t h at th e circu it co u rt im

p ro p erly rein s tated h is su sp en d ed s en ten ce b ased u p o n th ree tech n ical v io latio n s.

8 Wa l ker II w as h an d ed d o w n o n S ep tem b er 2 1 , 2 0 1 7 , a m o n th b ef o re T h o m as f

i led h is su p p lem en tal ap p ellan t’s b rief o n N o v em b er 2 1 , 2 0 1 7 , in w h ich h e relied u p o n Wa lker I

. 1 8required under condition (h); term ination f rom the Pascagoula Restitution C enter on August 26, 2016, in violation of condition (b); a nd f a ilure to participate in com m unity service and
pay supervision f

ees as required under conditions (k) and ( h), respectively

. Accordingly , the circuit court correctly determ i n e d t h a t Thom as had three technical violations and was authorized to reinstate Thom as’s suspended sentence under section 47-7-37(5)(a). 9
IV. Tw o Points Raised Only in the “Sum m ary of Argum e n t ” S e c tion of Thom as’s Appellant’s Brief ¶43. In the “Sum m a ry o f the Argum ent” portion of his appellant’s brief , Thom a s lists two points, as f

ollows:
III. The trial court erred when i t d i d not consider that Thom as[ ’ s] right to ef f ective assista n c e o f counsel was not rendered by an a ttorney , and the perf orm ance was def

icient to say

the least.
IV. The trial court erred i n not seeing t he dism issed charge and f ine f or Cause No. 207-269-KR2 [ was] to be dism i ssed as p art of the plea. See Exhibit (B) of sentence order. . . . 10

9 B ef o re h is S ep tem

b er 9 , 2 0 1 6 rev o catio n h e arin g , T h o m as h a d , in f act, alread y b een f o u n d to h av e co m m itted tw o tech n ical v io l atio n s . T h is w as d eterm in ed b y th e circu it co u rt in i ts J u ly 2 8 , 2 0 1 6 o rd er en t ered af ter T h o m as’s Ju ly 2 6 sh o w -cau se h earin g o n h is P R S v io latio n s o ccu rrin g b etw een F eb ru ary 1 9 , 2 0 1 5 (w h en T h o m as w as released o n P R S ) an d Ju ly 2 6 , 2 0 1 6 . A t th at tim e h e w as f o u n d in v io latio n o f co n d i tio n (h ) d u e t o h is f ailu re to m ak e p a y m e n ts to w a r d c o u r t c o sts an d restitu tio n , an d co n d itio n ( k ) d u e to h is f ailu re to rep o rt f o r co m m u n ity serv ice. P articu larly in lig h t o f th ese t w o t ech n ical v io latio n s d u rin g th at tim e p erio d , th e circu it co u rt w as w ell w i th in its au th o rity t o r e v o k e T h o m as’s P R S statu s an d rein state h is s u sp e n d ed sen t en ce in its S ep tem b er 1 2 , 2 0 1 6 rev o catio n o rd er. S ee C o b b ert , 2 2 3 S o . 3 d at 8 2 6 (¶¶1 2 -1 5 ) (reaso n in g th at d ef en d an t h ad c o m m itted f

o u r sep arate v io latio n s o f co n d itio n s o f h is P R S w h e re it w as estab lish ed at d e f en d a n t’s f i rst rev o catio n h earin g th at h e h ad co m

m itted t h ree tech n ical v io latio n s (in clu d in g f a ilu re to rep o rt to h is p aro le o f f icer), an d i t w as estab l ish ed at h is seco n d r ev o catio n h earin g th at h e h ad o n ce ag ain f ailed to rep o rt to h is p aro le o f f icer, f o r a to tal o f

f o u r v io latio n s).

10 T h o m a s also n o tes in p o in t IV th at p a g e f o u r o f th e sen ten c in g o rd e r w as n ev er sig n e d

. We ad d ressed th at issu e sep arately ab o v e, as T h o m as raised it in h is su p p lem en tal 1 9T h o ma s d id not raise either of these i ssues in his PCR m otion. Thom as theref o re waiv e d these issues and m ay not raise them o n appeal. Fluker , 17 So. 3d at 183 (¶5). A dditionally , Thom a s bears the burden of p r oving these a ssertions. He f a ils to cite to a ny l egal authorities

or evidence in the record to support them

. As such, we are u nder no duty to consider these issues. S ee Simmons , 220 So. 3d at 1013 (¶14). 11 ¶44. Eve n i f we did consider them , both assertions f ail on the m erits. As to point III, to
prove inef

f ective assistance o f counsel, Thom as would need to show that “(1) his attorney ’s perf orm ance w as def

i cient, and (2) this def

iciency deprived h i m o f a f a i r trial.” Vitela v. State , 183 So. 3d 104, 107 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015); see Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Thom as has m ade no showing at all as to either f a c tor. ¶45. Regarding point IV, Thom as asserts that t he c ircuit court erred in f ailing to see that the f ine (i.e., the $4,023.50 r estitution pay m ent to Veronica McCollum ) associated with the
f elony -m alicious-m ischief charge under Cause No. 2007-269-KR2 was allegedly dism issed

as part of his p l ea. A review o f the record s h ows that this a ssertion is sim ply i n c o r r ect. Though the f

elony -m a licious-m ischief charge was dropped as part of his plea a greem ent, he

was not relieved of his restitution obligations. Thom as’s own plea p e t i t i o n , w hich he

com pleted and signed, shows that Thom a s was still o bligated t o m ake r e s t i t u t ion in the

am ount of $4,023.50 to Veronica McCullum relating to this c harge. Indeed, Thom as signed

m em o ran d u m o f

law f iled N o v em

b er 2 1 , 2 0 1 7

. 11 T h o m as’s in e f

f ectiv e-co u n sel claim is also t im e-b arred

. A lth o u g h it i n v o l v e s f u n d am en tal co n stitu tio n al rig h ts, it is n o t ex cep ted f ro m t h e t h r ee-y ear lim itatio n s p ro v isio n o f th e U P C C R A

. S

ee Jo n es v. S ta te , 1 7 4 S o . 3 d 9 0 2 , 9 0 7 (¶1 2 ) (M iss. C t. A p p . 2 0 1 5 ).

2 0the “Exhibit to Plea P etition” which specif ically provides that “Def

endant [ Thom as] will pay restitution of $4023.50 to Veronica McCullum .” Thom as was also present at his plea hearing where his counsel and counsel f or the State conf

irm ed that his aggravated a s sault and f elony

m alicious-m ischief charges w ere to b e dism i ssed, with the r estitution relating to the f elony

m alicious-m is c h i e f c h a r g e to be included in Thom as’s p lea. Finally , Thom as’s restitution obligations were c learly set out in the June 6, 2008 sentencing order, indicating that he owed
1st Avenue Curb Store $425.00 in restitution f or the arm ed robbery , a n d that he owed Veronica McCullum $4,023.50 i n restitution r elating to Cause N o . 2007-269-KR2 (the
f elony -m alicious-m ischief charge). ¶46. For the reasons addressed, we reject, on both procedural and substantive grounds, the

two points that were raised b y Thom as only in his “Sum m ary o f the Argum ent” sec t i o n of his appellant’s brief

. ¶47. AFFIRMED. LEE, C.J., I RVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES , FAIR, WILSON, GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR.

2 1