This ,pinion was file~ for record 

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Suprem7court Clerk 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

GEORGIANA ARNOLD, ) 

) 

Respondent, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

CITY OF SEATTLE, d/b/a HUMAN ) 

SERVICES DEPARTMENT, ) 

) 

Petitioner. ) 

_________________________) 

No. 91742-6 

ENBANC 

Filed MAY 0 5 2016 

FAIRHURST, J.-RCW 49.48.030 provides that employees are entitled to 

reasonable attorney fees from their employer or former employer "[i]n any action in 

which any person is successful in recovering judgment for wages or salary owed to 

him or her." This case concerns whether a city of Seattle (City) employee who 

recovered wages from a Seattle Civil Service Commission (Commission) hearing is 

entitled to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030 when the city code provides she may 

be represented in those proceedings only at her own expense. See SEATTLE 

MUNICIPAL CODE (SMC) 4.04.260(E). After Georgiana Arnold recovered wages 

from the civil service proceeding, she initiated an action in superior court requesting 

attorney fees. The trial court denied attorney fees, but the Court of Appeals reversed 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

and granted her attorney fees. We affirm and hold that the commission proceedings 

at issue here constitute an "action" for which RCW 49.48.030 provides attorney fees 

when requested in a separate court action. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Arnold was employed as a manager for the City's Human Services 

Department in the Aging and Disability Services Division. In 2011, the City 

discharged Arnold from her management position and demoted her to a significantly 

lower paying entry-level position for failing to adequately supervise one of her 

employees who the City ultimately discovered had embezzled city funds. 

Seattle's civil service code provides a mechanism for aggrieved civil service 

employees to appeal adverse employment decisions (including demotion, 

suspension, and termination). SMC 4.04.260(A). After an employee exhausts certain 

grievance remedies, she may appeal her disciplinary decision to the Commission. !d. 

The Commission may refer the matter to a hearing examiner, and an employee may 

appeal the hearing examiner's decision to the Commission. SMC 4.04.250(L)(7). 

The Commission conducts hearings where it has the authority to "administer oaths, 

issue subpoenas, receive evidence, compel the production of documents for such 

purposes, and ... question witnesses." SMC 4.04.250(L)(3). Employees have the 

"right to cross-examine witnesses and to produce relevant evidence at hearings." 

SMC 4.04.260(0). The Commission has authority to issue remedial orders including 

2 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

reinstatement, SMC 4.04.250(L)(5), and must issue its decision within 90 days after 

a hearing, SMC 4.04.260(H). Although an employee has the right to be represented 

by a person of her choice, the code provides that she must do so "at his/her own 

expense." SMC 4.04.260(E). 

Arnold utilized this process when she appealed her demotion to the 

Commission. She hired counsel to represent her. 1 The Commission consolidated her 

case with another employee's and assigned the case to a hearing examiner. The 

hearing lasted eight days and included written discovery and depositions, significant 

briefing, witness testimony and cross-examination, thousands of pages of exhibits 

and record, evidentiary rulings, and an audio recording of the proceedings. The 

hearing examiner issued a 25-page decision that analyzed the two employees' 

discipline in detail and compared it to that of other employees. The hearing examiner 

concluded that their discipline was too harsh and, therefore, reversed Arnold's 

demotion and reduced her discipline to a two week suspension. The decision ordered 

Arnold's employer to reinstate her to her former manager position and awarded back 

pay and other employee benefits. 

1

The parties dispute Arnold's rationale for hiring counsel to represent her in the 

commission proceedings. Arnold maintains that it was necessary to combat the City's 

representation from the City Attorney's Office, see, e.g., Clerk's Papers (CP) at 35, 68, while the 

City asserts it does not utilize its own counsel unless the employee first retains counsel, CP at 48, 

158. 

3 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

Arnold then requested attorney fees pursuant to RCW 49.48.030. The hearing 

examiner denied her request for attorney fees, and the Commission affirmed, stating, 

"[T]here is no statutory authority in the Seattle Municipal Code for the Civil Service 

Commission to award attorney's fees." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 7. 

After the Commission denied attorney fees, Arnold instituted an action in 

King County Superior Court requesting attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030.2 The 

trial court dismissed the case. Arnold sought direct review, and we transferred the 

case to the Court of Appeals. 

Division One of the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that 

Arnold was entitled to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030. Arnold v. City of Seattle, 

186 Wn. App. 653, 345 P.3d 1285 (2015). Division One recognized some 

disagreement among the Court of Appeals divisions over the application of RCW 

49.48.030 in similar proceedings. After reexamining these conflicting cases in light 

of our precedent, the Court of Appeals concluded that civil service appeals constitute 

"'action[s]"' and their decisions awarding back pay constitute '"judgment[s]"' for 

which attorney fees are available under RCW 49.48.030. Id. at 664. According to 

the Court of Appeals' interpretation of RCW 49.48.030, "[a] person may seek an 

award of attorney fees from the superior court under this statute upon winning an 

2 Arnold initially filed this case both as an appeal from the Commission and as an original 

action for an award of attorney fees. However, she later abandoned the appeal and instead 

proceeded with only the original action for attorney fees. 

4 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

appeal to a city civil service commission that results in an order for back pay." Id. at 

655. We granted review. Arnold v. City of Seattle, 184 Wn.2d 1001, 357 P.3d 665 

(2015). 

II. ANALYSIS 

We must determine whether an employee who recovers wages from a 

commission proceeding is entitled to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030 when 

requested in a separate superior court action. We conclude that Arnold is entitled to 

recover these attorney fees. 

RCW 49.48.030 provides that any person who is successful in recovering a 

judgment for wages "[i]n any action" is entitled to attorney fees from her employer. 

(Emphasis added.) This case primarily concerns whether the City's civil service 

proceedings are "actions" within the meaning of RCW 49.48.030. We must also 

address whether the City's statutory authority, including a provision explicitly 

providing that individuals may be represented only at their own expense m 

commission hearings, prohibits attorney fee awards under RCW 49.48.030. 

A. Relevant authority 

Arnold relies heavily on our interpretation of this statute in International 

Ass 'n of Fire Fighters, Local 46 v. City of Everett, 146 Wn.2d 29, 42 P.3d 1265 

(2002), which held that an arbitration proceeding awarding back pay constitutes an 

"action" for which a union could recover attorney fees when requested in a separate 

5 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

superior court action. Arnold asserts the administrative proceeding at issue here 

should be considered an "action" as we defined that term in Fire Fighters. However, 

Fire Fighters expressly declined to address whether its holding would extend to 

administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings outside of arbitration. !d. at 42 n.ll. 

The City relies more on Court of Appeals decisions assessing the availability 

of attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030. Although lower courts have analyzed 

proceedings similar to the one at issue, these cases rest on premises that arguably 

conflict with our decision in Fire Fighters and the general policy of the statute. 

In Fire Fighters, we held that RCW 49.48.030 provides attorney fees for 

successful grievance arbitration proceedings. !d. at 32. The arbitration proceeding in 

Fire Fighters arose after the city of Everett suspended two firefighters without pay 

for 24 hours. !d. The employees' union brought a grievance proceeding challenging 

the suspension, and the matter was submitted to arbitration pursuant to the terms of 

the collective bargaining agreement between the union and Everett. !d. The union 

retained counsel for the two day arbitration proceeding. !d. The arbiter ruled in favor 

of the union and awarded the employees back pay. !d. Everett paid the wages as 

ordered but refused the union's request for attorney fees. !d. at 32-33. 

The union and two employees then filed a separate lawsuit in Snohomish 

County Superior Court seeking attorney fees. !d. at 33. The trial court granted 

Everett's motion for summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding 

6 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

the union was entitled to attorney fees for both the arbitration proceedings and the 

court proceedings seeking attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030. We affirmed.Jd. at 

51-52. 

Our opinion in Fire Fighters rested on three rationales that are relevant here. 

First, we cited the strong remedial purpose of the statute favoring employees' wage 

rights and emphasized that we should interpret the statute in light of this purpose.Jd. 

at 34-36. Second, we determined that grievance arbitration constitutes an "action" 

for purposes ofRCW 49.48.030.Jd. at 36-41. Third, we concluded that employees 

or their representatives need not recover wages in the same action in which they 

recover attorney fees-it is permissible to initiate a separate lawsuit in court to 

recover fees from the successful arbitration proceeding. I d. at 41-44. The legislature 

has not substantively amended RCW 49.48.030 since our decision in Fire Fighters. 3 

Although Fire Fighters expands the scope of what constitutes an "action" 

under RCW 49.48.030 by including grievance arbitration proceedings, we declined 

to address "whether RCW 49.48. 03 0 would apply to other types of administrative or 

quasi-judicial proceedings." Id. at 42 n.11. The City seizes on this distinction and 

relies on Court of Appeals cases that deny attorney fee awards under RCW 49.48.030 

in administrative proceedings that resemble commission hearings. Similar to 

3

The 2010 amendments to this statute made technical corrections to gender-based terms 

but did not substantively change the provision. SUBSTITUTE S.B. 6239, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. 

(Wash. 2010). 

7 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

Seattle's system at issue here, the State provides an administrative forum in which 

civil service employees can challenge disciplinary decisions and appeal to the State's 

Personnel Resources Board (Board). See ch. 41.06 RCW; ch. 357-52 WAC. The 

City relies on two cases that denied attorney fees to state civil service employees in 

board hearings-one prior to Fire Fighters and one following it-and distinguishes 

a third case that granted attorney fees to a state employee who was not subject to the 

state civil service laws. 

Prior to our decision in Fire Fighters, the Court of Appeals held in Cohn v. 

Department of Corrections, 78 Wn. App. 63, 895 P.2d 857 (1995) that RCW 

49.48.030 does not apply to state civil service proceedings for three reasons. First, 

Cohn noted that agencies may only exercise functions that are expressly delegated 

or that are necessarily implied from statutory authority and concluded that the state 

civil service law does not provide the agency the authority to award attorney fees. 

Id. at 67-68. Second, Cohn held that when the agency lacks authority to award 

attorney fees, the courts acting in an appellate capacity reviewing that decision 

(there, the superior court) likewise lack authority to grant attorney fees. Id. at 69-70. 

Third, Cohn stated that the superior court did not enter a "'judgment for wages or 

salary owed'" because it "merely affirmed the Board's award, it did not award any 

amounts greater than the back pay already awarded by the Board." !d. at 71 (quoting 

RCW 49.48.030). 

8 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

Following our decision in Fire Fighters, Division One also concluded that 

RCW 49.48.030 does not apply to board proceedings awarding wages under the state 

civil service laws. Trachtenberg v. Dep 't ofCorr., 122 Wn. App. 491, 93 P.3d 217 

(2004 ). Trachtenberg relied heavily on the reasoning in Cohn, noting that we merely 

distinguished, but did not expressly overrule, Cohn in Fire Fighters. Id. at 494-95. 

Tracking Cohn's rationale, Trachtenberg analyzed the state civil service laws, which 

do not expressly list attorney fees among the enumerated remedies, and concluded, 

"[T]he legislature did not intend RCW 49.48.030 to apply to disciplinary challenges 

before the Board." Id. at 497. 

On the other hand, Division Two granted attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030 

to a non-civil-service state employee who recovered back wages in Mcintyre v. 

Washington State Patrol, 135 Wn. App. 594, 141 P.3d 75 (2006). Mcintyre, a state 

patrol officer, challenged her termination through the Washington State Patrol's 

administrative board, which denied her challenge. Id. at 597. She appealed to 

Thurston County Superior Court, which affirmed, and then to Division Two of the 

Court of Appeals, which reversed, reinstating her to her former position and granting 

her wages. ld. She then brought a separate action in Pierce County Superior Court 

requesting attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030, which the court denied, and 

Division Two reversed. Id. at 597-98. In awarding her attorney fees, the Mcintyre 

court distinguished Cohn and Trachtenberg because those cases rested on the state 

9 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

civil service laws with limited authority to provide relief, while here the 

administrative body was not limited to awarding a single statutory remedy. Id. at 

600-02. The court also distinguished Mcintyre's attorney fee award because the 

court, not the administrative body, ordered her remedy. I d. at 602. 

The City asserts these cases confirm that RCW 49.48.030 does not apply to 

commission hearings. Like the state civil service law in Cohn and Trachtenberg, the 

City points out that there is no express or implied statutory authority for the 

Commission to grant attorney fees-in fact, there is an express prohibition in SMC 

4.04.260(E)-and claims both the Commission and the court therefore lack the 

authority to award attorney fees. The City distinguishes the attorney fee award 

permitted in Mcintyre because the administrative proceeding in that case was outside 

of the civil service context (which is constrained by limited statutory authority) and 

because the court, not the administrative body, awarded wages in that case. 

Arnold points out that the City ignores a crucial first step in the analysis: 

determining whether the administrative proceeding at issue constitutes an "action" 

within the meaning ofRCW 49.48.030. If so, Arnold argues, she is entitled to back 

pay for the wages she recovered in this "action" based on the plain meaning of the 

statute. Moreover, Arnold claims the distinctions on which the City relies-statutory 

authority and separate recovery in court-are not sustainable in light of Fire Fighters 

and the broad remedial purpose of the statute. We agree. 

10 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

B. Action 

RCW 49.48.030 requires an employer to pay reasonable attorney fees in "any 

action" in which a person recovers a "judgment for wages or salary owed." 

(Emphasis added.) At issue is whether Arnold's proceedings before the City's 

Commission constitutes an "action" for purposes of the statute.4 

In Fire Fighters, we recognized that the term "action" in the statute is broader 

than a traditional court of law proceeding and held that a grievance arbitration 

proceeding constitutes an action. We began by citing the strong remedial purpose of 

RCW 49.48.030, explaining that the statute is meant to be construed liberally in 

order to effectuate the purpose of protecting employees' rights. Fire Fighters, 146 

Wn.2d at 34 (collecting cases). We recognized that arbitration proceedings have 

been characterized as both "judicial" and "nonjudicial" in prior cases but that the 

plain meaning of the statute does not foreclose including grievance arbitration 

proceedings within the definition of an "action." Id. at 38, 41. While some 

definitions of "action" are restricted to proceedings within a court of law, we 

emphasized that others define the term more broadly to include other types of 

judicial proceedings. Id. at 40-41 ("Black's Law Dictionary defines 'action' as a 

4

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Commission's order awarding back pay 

constitutes a "judgment for wages." RCW 49.48.030. Contrary to the City's assertions, a tribunal 

other than a court of law may issue a "judgment" awarding wages for purposes ofRCW 49.48.030. 

See Fire Fighters, 146 Wn.2d at 36 n.8 (noting that '"a court or other tribunal"' may issue a 

judgment and applying that definition to arbitration proceedings (emphasis added) (quoting 49 

C.J.S. Judgments § 2, at 51, 52 (1997))). 

11 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

'civil or criminal judicial proceeding,' 'an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice,' 

and 'any judicial proceeding, which, if conducted to a determination, will result in a 

judgment or decree.' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 28-29 (7th ed. 1999). American 

[.!Jurisprudence defines 'action' as 'a judicial proceeding in which one asserts a right 

or seeks redress for a wrong.' 1 AM. JUR. 2DActions § 4, at 725-26 (1994)." (italics 

added)). In light of the strong remedial purpose of the statute, we concluded that 

grievance arbitration proceedings constitute an "action" for purposes of RCW 

49.48.030: 

It is clear that had this case been brought in superior court, 

attorney fees would have been available. Because RCW 49.48.030 is a 

remedial statute, which must be construed to effectuate its purpose, we 

find no reason to not interpret "action" to include arbitration 

proceedings. A restrictive interpretation of "action" would preclude 

recovery of attorney fees in cases involving arbitration even though the 

employee is successful in recovering wages or salary owed. Thus, it 

would be inconsistent with the legislative policy in favor of payment of 

wages due employees. See Schilling [v. Radio Holdings, Inc.], 136 

Wn.2d [152,] 157[, 961 P.2d 371 (1998)]. Therefore, we hold that 

"action" as used in RCW 49.48.030 includes grievance arbitration 

proceedings in which wages or salary owed are recovered. 

Id. at 41.5 

5

Legislative history may also support reading "action" to be broader than a traditional court 

of law proceeding. This statute dates back to 1888, and it has been substantively amended only 

once since that time. S.B. 261, 42nd Leg., 1st Ex. Sess. (Wash. 1971). The 1888 statute provided, 

"[T]he court shall tax an attorney's fee" whenever an employee or company is "compelled to sue 

... for the payment of wages for labor ... if judgment should be granted the plaintiff' (along with 

certain exceptions not relevant here). Former RCW 49.48.030 (1888). When the legislature 

amended this statute in 1971, it eliminated references to "the court," "plaintiff," and "sue," which 

all insinuate traditional courtroom litigation, and instead broadly allowed attorney fees for wages 

recovered "[i]n any action." S.B. 261 (emphasis added). 

12 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

Arnold's administrative proceeding before the Commission appears to fit 

within this definition of an "action." The hearing resembled a judicial proceeding in 

many ways. All parties were represented by counsel. Prior to the hearing, the parties 

conducted discovery and exchanged lists of witnesses and exhibits. Although the 

hearing examiner was not bound by the Rules of Evidence, she issued evidentiary 

rulings pursuant to the Commission's Rules ofPractice and Procedure (Commission 

Rules) and ruled on motions. See Commission Rule 5.13(A) (witnesses are subject 

to cross-examination), 5.14 (authorizing the parties to file and the presiding officer 

to rule on motions and allowing oral argument on motions), 5.15 (evidentiary rules). 

The hearing spanned multiple months, including eight days of testimony during 

which the parties exercised their rights to examine and cross-examine the 15 

witnesses called in the case. See Commission Rule 5.12(A) (requiring all testimony 

to be taken under oath). Following the hearing, the parties submitted closing 

arguments in written briefing. The hearing examiner issued a 25-page order, 

including 84 findings of fact and 41 conclusions along with a "Decision and Order" 

reversing the employees' discipline and awarding back pay and benefits. The 

extensive record for this proceeding is 2,997 pages. The City does not dispute these 

judicial-like features of the proceeding. 

The commission proceedings may not qualify as an "action" under some of 

the more limited definitions of that term because the proceedings do not involve 

13 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

traditional civil litigation in a court oflaw. However, similarly restrictive definitions 

of "action" did not prevail in Fire Fighters. See 146 Wn.2d at 54 (Johnson, J., 

dissenting) (defining an "'action"' as "'a prosecution in a court for the enforcement 

or protection of private rights and the redress of private wrongs"' (quoting 

Thorgaard Plumbing & Heating Co. v. King County, 71 Wn.2d 126, 130-32, 426 

P.2d 828 (1967))), 55 (stating RCW 49.48.030 does not apply to arbitration because 

it applies only "when a lawsuit is brought and the plaintiff successfully recovers 

judgment for wages or salary owed" (emphasis added)). Moreover, we have applied 

RCW 49.48.030 to another city's civil service appeals process. See Hanson v. City 

ofTacoma, 105 Wn.2d 864, 872, 719 P.2d 104 (1986). 

Other statutory provisions within chapter 49.48 RCW support a broader 

definition of the term "action" as used in that statute. We interpret statutes relating 

to the same subject matter together through the principle of in pari materia. Hallauer 

v. Spectrum Props., Inc., 143 Wn.2d 126, 146, 18 P.3d 540 (2001). In 2006, the 

legislature amended portions of chapter 49.48 RCW relating to the Department of 

Labor and Industries' enforcement of employees' wage rights. RCW 49.48.085 

describes various types of actions in a way that suggests the term "action" includes 

administrative proceedings: 

(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or affect: 

(a) The right of any employee to pursue any judicial, administrative, or 

other action available with respect to an employer; (b) the right of the 

department to pursue any judicial, administrative, or other 

14 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

action available with respect to an employee that is identified as a result 

of a wage complaint; or (c) the right of the department to pursue 

any judicial, administrative, or other action available with respect to an 

employer in the absence of a wage complaint. 

RCW 49.48.085 (emphasis added). The emphasized language suggests that the 

legislature views administrative proceedings as a type of "action" under chapter 

49.48 RCW. Notably, this statute was enacted in 2006, four years after we decided 

Fire Fighters. Reading this provision in pari materia with RCW 49.48.030, it is 

apparent that the phrase "any action" can include administrative proceedings. 

Based on our broader definition of "action" in Fire Fighters that includes 

judicial proceedings outside a court oflaw, we hold that the civil service proceedings 

at issue sufficiently resemble a judicial proceeding to constitute an "action" under 

RCW 49.48.030. When viewed in light of the statute's remedial purpose and 

protection of employee wage recovery, an employee who recovers a judgment for 

wages in a proceeding that permits this level of pretrial discovery, written briefing, 

exhibits, witnesses, cross-examination, evidentiary rulings, and detailed findings 

and decision is permitted to recover attorney fees for an "action" under RCW 

49.48.030. 

C. Statutory authority 

The City contends that Arnold is not entitled to attorney fees because the 

Commission has no authority to award attorney fees. As discussed above, Cohn and 

Trachtenberg both held that RCW 49.48.030 does not apply to state civil service 

15 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

proceedings because the Board has only limited statutory authority, which does not 

include the ability to grant attorney fees to prevailing employees. Similarly, we have 

recognized that the Commission "is created by, and derives its authority from, the 

city charter. It has only such powers as are there enumerated." State ex rel. Worsham 

v. Brown, 126 Wash. 175, 177, 218 P. 9 (1923). Although the City admits that the 

city code does not identify an exclusive list of remedies like the state civil service 

law, it argues the provision stating that employees may obtain representation only at 

their own expense serves a similar (and stronger) purpose to the limited statutory 

authority described in Cohn and reiterated in Trachtenberg. 

But a careful analysis of the procedural posture reveals that this case Is 

distinct. The plaintiff in Cohn requested attorney fees from an administrative body 

that apparently had no statutory authority to provide attorney fees because it was 

limited to awarding employees only certain types of remedies. In turn, the superior 

court and Court of Appeals reviewing the agency's refusal to grant attorney fees held 

they could not order that body to exercise a power that it did not possess. Here, in 

contrast, even if we were to accept Cohn, the case on which Trachtenberg relies, and 

even assuming the Commission similarly has no authority to award attorney fees, 

Arnold is not asking the Commission to exceed its authority and grant her attorney 

16 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

fees. 6 Instead, Arnold instituted a separate proceeding in superior court, filing a new 

complaint solely for that court to award her attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030. 

Therefore, we consider only Arnold's right to receive attorney fees from a separate 

superior court action. 

In Fire Fighters, we plainly permitted employees (or their representatives) 

who recovered a judgment for wages in a proceeding to initiate a separate lawsuit in 

superior court solely for the recovery of attorney fees. In that case, the plaintiff 

recovered back pay during an arbitration proceeding against Everett, then filed a 

complaint in superior court against Everett, seeking attorney fees. Everett claimed 

that RCW 49.48.030 did not allow a separate action for attorney fees. We rejected 

Everett's restrictive reading of the statute, explaining that RCW 49.48.030 provides 

attorney fees for '"any action"' in which a judgment for wages is recovered, and is 

not limited to "the same action" in which the wages or salary are recovered. Fire 

Fighters, 146 Wn.2d at 43-44 (quoting RCW 49.48.030). 

Here, the City seeks to distinguish this analysis in Fire Fighters, emphasizing 

that Fire Fighters applied only to arbitration, not administrative proceedings. See id. 

at 42-43. The City claims that agencies are distinguishable because they are 

6 Arnold initially filed this case both as a challenge to the Commission's denial of attorney 

fees and as an original action for an award of attorney fees, but she later abandoned her challenge 

to the Commission's order and proceeded solely with the original action for attorney fees. 

17 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

constrained by their limited statutory authority and points out we discussed and did 

not overrule that principle when we cited Cohn in Fire Fighters. !d. 

However, as noted above, the statutory authority of the agency is not relevant 

in cases such as this where the employee is not asking the agency to award attorney 

fees, but rather initiated a separate action in court to recover attorney fees. Moreover, 

in Fire Fighters we cited Hanson, 105 Wn.2d at 872 for the proposition that "the 

nature of the proceeding did not affect the availability of attorney fees to an 

employee who is successful in recovering wages or salary owed," and explained the 

attorney fees need not be recovered in that same action. Id. at 43. 

Fire Fighters confirms that attorney fees are available in a separate court 

action under RCW 49.48.030 even when the tribunal awarding the wages lacks 

authority to issue attorney fees in the first instance. Because the arbiter in that case 

lacked authority to grant attorney fees under the parties' collective bargaining 

agreement, after recovering fees in arbitration the union and employees instituted a 

separate court action seeking to recover attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030. Int'l 

Ass 'n of Fire Fighters, Local 46 v. City of Everett, 101 Wn. App. 743, 749-50, 6 

P.3d 50 (2000). In awarding attorney fees, the Court of Appeals concluded that "[t]he 

right to fees arose outside the terms of the labor agreement, and a court action was 

therefore necessary to recover them." Id. at 750. We affirmed, agreeing that the 

union was entitled to recover attorney fees through the separate court action and 

18 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

explaining that the nature of the initial action awarding wages did not impact that 

outcome. Fire Fighters, 146 Wn.2d at 42. 

Thus, according to Fire Fighters, an employee who successfully recovers 

wages in an action may institute a separate court action to recover attorney fees, even 

when the body issuing the wages has no authority to grant attorney fees. To the 

extent lower court opinions conflict with this principle, they are overruled. This is 

in keeping with the broad remedial purpose of RCW 49.48.030 that is designed to 

ensure employees receive payment for wages and meant to provide incentives for 

employees to assert their wage rights. See Fire Fighters, id. at 35 (collecting cases). 

Therefore, even if the Commission can properly decline to award attorney fees, 

Arnold was entitled to institute a separate court proceeding to recover her fees under 

RCW 49.48.030.7 

D. Preemption 

The City argues that Arnold is not entitled to attorney fees because the SMC 

explicitly prohibits such fees in commission hearings: "An employee may be 

represented at a hearing before the Commission by a person of his/her own choosing 

at his/her own expense." SMC 4.04.260(E). The City claims that this provision is 

7Some cases seem to suggest that attorney fees are available only if the court awards more 

relief than the administrative body. See, e.g., Mcintyre, 135 Wn. App. at 602 (citing Hanson, 105 

Wn.2d 864). However, this is contrary to the facts of Fire Fighters. There, the arbiter awarded 

wages, then the union sought a separate court action solely for the recovery of attorney fees. We 

upheld the fee award despite the fact that the court provided no further relief beyond what the 

arbiter originally granted. 

19 
Arnoldv. CityofSeattle, No. 91742-6 

valid and should govern here because the reach ofRCW 49.48.030 is not absolute, 

and states that an exception is warranted when a city voluntarily adopts a civil 

service scheme to benefit employees. 

Arnold counters that the state law preempts SMC 4.04.260(E), citing Mosebar 

v. Moore, 41 Wn.2d 216, 248 P.2d 385 (1952). In that case, we held that a state law 

preventing employers from firing civil service employees for moving outside of the 

city limits preempted a local law to the contrary. Arnold also disputes the City's 

policy arguments and reiterates that the main policy under RCW 49.48.030 of 

vindicating employees' wage rights and providing attorney fees for successful wage 

recovery should govern. We agree. 

Article XI, section 11 of our state constitution permits local governments to 

make "all ... local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with 

general laws." "A local regulation conflicts with state law where it permits what state 

law forbids or forbids what state law permits." State v. Kirwin, 165 Wn.2d 818, 825, 

203 P.3d 1044 (2009) (citing Parkland Light & Water Co. v. Tacoma-Pierce County 

Bd. of Health, 151 Wn.2d 428,433,90 P.3d 37 (2004); City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 

Wn.2d 22, 33, 759 P.2d 366 (1988)). 

The City claims that RCW 49.48.030 does not unconstitutionally conflict with 

the City's civil service code for two reasons. First, the City claims there is no conflict 

because RCW 49.48.030 is not absolute and the City's civil service laws constitute 

20 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

a valid exception. The City points out that we have suggested employees may waive 

attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030 through collective bargaining agreements, see 

Fire Fighters, 146 Wn.2d at 49, and asserts that employees entering civil service 

employment similarly waive their rights to fees under RCW 49.48.030 when they 

accept the benefits of this employment relationship. Second, the City claims that any 

apparent conflict between the two laws is not specific enough for preemption to 

apply. The City distinguishes Mosebar, asserting it was much clearer in that case 

that the legislature designed the state law to specifically preempt the particular local 

law at issue. 41 Wn.2d at 220 ("We think [the state law] is clear in its intent to protect 

civil service employees, as a class, from the operation of any city charter or 

ordinance requiring continued residence, as a requisite of continued employment."). 

We disagree with both of the City's rationales. First, even if an employee 

could waive a right to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030, waiving that right in a 

collective bargaining agreement is distinct from the City specifically denying that 

right through its civil service code. While an employee might be able to knowingly 

decide to give up such a right either personally or with her interests represented 

through a collective bargaining process, the City's unilateral denial of attorney fees 

under SMC 4.04.260(E) does not similarly account for the employee's 

understanding and consent in the same way as a contract. 

21 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

Second, SMC 4.04.260(E) directly conflicts with RCW 49.48.030 because the 

state statute requires an employer to pay the employee's attorney fees in any action 

in which the employee recovers wages, while the city code provides that an 

individual may be represented by counsel in civil service hearings at only the 

employee's own expense. Thus, the local regulation "forbids what state law 

permits." Kirwin, 165 Wn.2d at 825. RCW 49.48.030 therefore preempts the City's 

attempt to deny attorney fees to employees who recover wages in commission 

proceedings. 

E. Policy 

The City finally urges several policy reasons in asserting that RCW 49.48.030 

should not apply in the civil service context. The City explains that civil service 

codes are designed to benefit employees and the public by providing additional 

protections beyond those that are generally afforded to at-will employees and by 

helping ensure services are rendered efficiently. Suppl. Br. ofPet'r at 18 (citing City 

ofYakima v.Int'l Ass 'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, Local469, 117 Wn.2d 655, 665, 

818 P.2d 1076 (1991); Herriott v. City of Seattle, 81 Wn.2d 48, 61, 500 P.2d 101 

(1972)). The City fears that allowing attorney fees in civil service proceedings will 

create a disincentive for local governments to voluntarily adopt these codes and may 

result in limiting or eliminating the reach of employee protections in civil service 

22 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

codes. The City also suggests that public employers may be more hesitant to 

discipline employees if attorney fee awards are available to employees. 

The City fails to persuade us that RCW 49.48.030 should not apply to its civil 

service proceedings. Even if the City means to protect employees through its civil 

service system, if by doing so it creates an "action" that allows payment of wages, 

the City cannot avoid a legislative directive allowing prevailing employees to 

recover attorney fees. We find nothing to indicate that the legislature meant to 

exempt the City's civil service law from RCW 49.48.030. The legislature has shown 

it knows how to exempt public employees, particularly local government employees, 

in the context of other wage laws but has not done so here. See RCW 49.48.080 

(exempting certain state and local government employees from Department of Labor 

and Industries wage enforcement laws). In addition, the consequences may not be as 

significant as the City suggests. Applying RCW 49.48.030 to commission 

proceedings will not necessarily result in expensive attorney fee awards or 

discourage employers from disciplining employees because the statute allows for 

attorney fees only in circumstances when the employer's discipline was wrongful 

and the employee is successful in recovering wages. Moreover, in Fire Fighters we 

recognized that RCW 49.48.030's purpose of allowing aggrieved employees or their 

representatives "to pursue wage claims that they may not have otherwise been able 

23 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

to pursue" prevailed over the employers' economic interests and expectations that 

each side would bear its own costs. 146 Wn.2d at 50. 

Finally, our decision does not necessarily extend attorney fee awards under 

RCW 49.48.030 to all quasi-judicial proceedings. RCW 49.48.030 is limited to 

"actions" in which an employee recovers wages, and we have considered only the 

court's authority to award attorney fees requested in a separate action. We hold that 

when an employee recovers wages in a proceeding with sufficient judicial hallmarks 

to constitute an "action" and seeks attorney fees in a separate court action, she is 

entitled to recover attorney fees in that separate proceeding under RCW 49.48.030. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that an employee who recovers 

wages from a commission proceeding is entitled to attorney fees under RCW 

49.48.030 when requested in a separate superior court action. We remand this case 

to the superior court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees to award 

for the proceedings leading to Arnold's recovery of wages and her proceedings 

seeking attorney fees. 

24 
Arnold v. City of Seattle, No. 91742-6 

WE CONCUR: 

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