12990 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Notices

provide adequate margins of safety to

the reactor vessel during LTOP

transients, thus providing an acceptable

level of quality and safety. Accordingly,

the use of the Code case will satisfy the

underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.60 for

fracture toughness requirements for

normal operation and anticipated

operational occurrences.

IV

For the foregoing reason, the NRC

staff has concluded that the licensee’s

proposed use of the alternate

methodology in determining the

acceptable setpoint for LTOP events will

not present an undue risk to public

health and safety and is consistent with

the common defense and security. The

NRC staff has determined that there are

special circumstances present, as

specified in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), such

that application of 10 CFR 50.60 is not

necessary in order to achieve the

underlying purpose of this regulation.

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR

50.12(a), an exemption is authorized by

law, will not endanger life or property

or common defense and security, and is,

otherwise, in the public interest.

Therefore, the Commission hereby

grants the Consumers Power Company

an exemption from the requirements of

10 CFR 50.60 such that in determining

the setpoint for LTOP events, the ASME

Appendix G curves for P/T limits are

not exceeded by more than 10% in

order to be in compliance with these

regulations. This exemption is

applicable only to LTOP conditions

during normal operation.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has prepared an

environmental assessment and

determined that the granting of this

exemption will not have a significant

effect on the quality of the human

environment (February 27, 1995, 60 FR

10615).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day

of March 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Elinor G. Adensam,

Acting Director, Division of Reactor Projects—

III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–5774 Filed 3–8–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket Nos. 50–282 and 50–306]

Exemption

In the Matter of Northern States Power Co.

(Prairie Island Units 1 and 2)

I

Northern States Power Company

(NSP, the licensee) is the holder of

Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR–

42 and DPR–60 which authorize

operation of Prairie Island Nuclear

Generating Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The

units are pressurized water reactors

(PWR) located in Goodhue County,

Minnesota. The licenses provide, among

other things, that the facilities are

subject to all rules, regulations, and

orders of the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) now or

hereafter in effect.

II

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), the NRC

may grant exemptions from the

requirements of the regulations (1)

which are authorized by law, will not

present an undue risk to the public

health and safety, and are consistent

with the common defense and security;

and (2) where special circumstances are

present.

Section III.G.1 of Appendix R to 10

CFR part 50 requires, in part, that fire

protection features shall be provided for

structures, systems, and components

important to safe shutdown so that one

train of systems necessary to achieve

and maintain hot shutdown conditions

be free of fire damage. The staff has

interpreted these provisions as requiring

that features shall be such that one train

of safe shutdown systems remains

operable, notwithstanding a fire or

consequences therefrom, without one

having to perform any repair. In this

context, the staff considers manually

pulling fuses to isolate certain systems

as a repair. Accordingly, the staff

interprets Section III.G.1 of Appendix R

as not permitting the pulling of fuses in

order to be in compliance.

By letter dated May 2, 1994, the

licensee requested an exemption to

permit it to manually remove fuses from

the power-operated relief valve control

circuit in the event of a fire, in lieu of

modifying plant hardware which would

otherwise be required to achieve

compliance with Section III.G.1 of

Appendix R. The licensee’s submittal

initially referenced Section III.G.2 of

Appendix R as providing the

requirements from which the licensee

was seeking an exemption, but in a

follow-up telephone conversation with

the staff the licensee concurred that

Section III.G.1 is the appropriate

reference.

This exemption was requested by the

licensee in response to inspection

findings identified in inspection reports

50–282/87–004, 50–282/88–013, 50–

282/92–011 and 50–282/94–004. These

findings addressed a concern with

circuit failure modes that could

adversely affect the ability to maintain

hot shutdown in the event of a control

room fire. This condition could occur if

the power operated relief valves (PORV)

block valves were not shut and a hot

short damaged the PORV control circuit

causing the PORV to open and remain

open. Specifically, this involves the

high/low pressure interface spurious

signal concerns associated with Unit 1

PORVs CV–31231 and CV–31232 and

their associated block valves MOV–

32195 and MOV–32196 and with Unit 2

PORVs CV–31233 and CV–31234 and

their associated block valves MOV–

32197 and MOV–32198. As a precaution

to prevent the potential loss of reactor

coolant system (RCS) inventory during a

control room fire, the licensee has

proposed to close the PORV block

valves prior to control room evacuation.

The licensee also proposed to remove

the PORV control circuit fuses to

prevent a hot short or short to ground

which may cause the PORV to open or

be maintained open. As stated above,

removal of fuses for isolation in such

circumstances is considered a repair

and, therefore, does not meet Appendix

R, Section III.G.1, as interpreted by the

staff.

The licensee’s proposed actions of

closing the PORV block valves and

removing the control circuit fuses was

reviewed by the staff and was found to

be an effective means of assuring that a

control room fire will not result in a

sustained loss of RCS inventory.

The substance of the licensee’s

submittal was reviewed by Region III

inspectors during the inspection

conducted from July 18–22, 1988. The

inspection findings were documented in

NRC Inspection Report No. 50–282/88–

013 and 50–306/88–013. The inspectors

walked down the control room

evacuation shutdown procedures. Step

3.3.1 of Procedure F5, Appendix B,

‘‘Control Room Evacuation (Fire),’’

directs the operators to remove/pull the

fuses for the PORVs as an immediate

action in response to a control room

evacuation. The inspectors found that

the fuse panels were readily accessible

and the fuses were clearly identified in

the panels. The inspectors also found

that sufficient space is available to

permit access for pulling fuses and that

emergency lights and the fuse pullers

had been provided in the vicinity of

each panel. A training program has been

established for all plant operators to

enhance the familiarity with and proper

response to the control room

evacuation. Additionally, as a part of

Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP)

training, all the operators are trained on
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Notices 12991

the above-mentioned procedures to

ensure their familiarity with respect to

the removal of fuses during hot

shutdown. Therefore, operators are

trained and experienced in removing

the fuses.

On the basis of this evaluation, the

Commission concludes that the

proposed action to close the PORV

block valves prior to control room

evacuation and to remove fuses from the

PORV control circuit provides

reasonable assurance that safe shutdown

can be achieved in the event of a control

room fire and is acceptable.

III

The Commission has determined,

pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.12, that this

exemption as described in Section II

above is authorized by law, will not

present an undue risk to the public

health and safety, and is consistent with

the common defense and security.

Furthermore, the Commission has

determined that special circumstances

as provided in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are

present in that application of the

regulation, as interpreted by the staff, in

the particular circumstances is not

necessary to achieve the underlying

purpose of the rule. The underlying

purpose of Section III.G.1 of Appendix

R is to ensure that safe shutdown can be

achieved notwithstanding a fire or the

consequences therefrom. Application of

this section to the extent it precludes

the removal of fuses as a fire protection

feature is not necessary to achieve the

underlying purpose of the rule because

the licensee’s proposal still provides

reasonable assurance that one safe

shutdown train will be operable and

free of fire damage.

IV

Accordingly, the Commission hereby

grants an exemption from the

requirements of Section III.G.1 of

Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 to allow

removal of fuses from the PORV control

circuit in the event of a control room

fire.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will have no

significant impact on the quality of the

human environment (59 FR 62415).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 21st day

of February 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John N. Hannon,

Acting Director, Division of Reactor Projects—

III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–5773 Filed 3–8–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

POSTAL RATE COMMISSION

Notice of Commission Visits

March 3, 1995.

Notice is hereby given that members

of the Postal Rate Commission and

certain advisory staff members will visit

the facilities of the following businesses

to observe their operations:

Penton Press, Cleveland, Ohio and then

meet with officials from Lands End,

Inc. in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on

March 7, 1995.

Quad/Graphics, Hartford, Wisconsin on

March 8, 1995.

Hallmark Cards, Kansas City, Missouri,

March 9, 1995.

Reports of these visits will be placed

on file in the Commission’s Docket

Room. For further information contact

Margaret P. Crenshaw, Secretary of the

Commission at 202–789–6840.

Margaret P. Crenshaw,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 95–5813 Filed 3–8–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7710–FW–P

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD

Agency Forms Submitted for OMB

Review

SUMMARY: In accordance with the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44

U.S.C. Chapter 35), the Railroad

Retirement Board has submitted the

following proposal(s) for the collection

of information to the Office of

Management and Budget for review and

approval.

Summary of Proposal(s):

(1) Collection title: Placement Service.

(2) Form(s) submitted: ES–2, ES–20a,

ES–20b, ES–21, ES–21c, UI–35.

(3) OMB Number: 3220–0057.

(4) Expiration date of current OMB

clearance: April 30, 1995.

(5) Type of request: Revision of a

currently approved collection.

(6) Respondents: Individuals or

households, Business or other for-profit,

State, Local or Tribal Government.

(7) Estimated annual number of

respondents: 27,700.

(8) Total annual responses: 31,250.

(9) Total annual reporting hours:

1,981.

(10) Collection description: Under the

RUIA, the Railroad Retirement Board

provides job placement assistance for

unemployed railroad workers. The

collection obtains information from job

applicants, railroad and non-railroad

employers, and State Employment

Service offices for use in placement, for

providing referrals for job openings and

reports of referral results and for

verifying and monitoring claimant

eligibility.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR COMMENTS:

Copies of the form and supporting

documents can be obtained from Chuck

Mierzwa, the agency clearance officer

(312–751–3363). Comments regarding

the information collection should be

addressed to Ronald J. Hodapp, Railroad

Retirement Board, 844 North Rush

Street, Chicago, Illinois 60611–2092 and

the OMB reviewer, Laura Oliven (202–

395–7316), Office of Management and

Budget, Room 10230, New Executive

Office Building, Washington, DC 20503.

Chuck Mierzwa,

Clearance Officer.

[FR Doc. 95–5767 Filed 3–8–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7905–01–M

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION

[Release No. 34–35437; File No. SR–CBOE–

95–14]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice

of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by

the Chicago Board Options Exchange,

Inc. Relating to Buy-Write Options

Unitary Derivatives

March 2, 1995.

Pursuant to section 19(b)(1) of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934

(‘‘Act’’), 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1), notice is

hereby given that on February 1, 1995,

the Chicago Board Options Exchange,

Inc. (‘‘CBOE’’ or ‘‘Exchange’’) filed with

the Securities and Exchange

Commission (‘‘Commission’’) the

proposed rule change as described in

items I, II and III below, which Items

have been prepared by the selfregulatory organization. The

Commission is publishing this notice to

solicit comments on the proposed rule

change from interested persons.

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s

Statement of the Terms of Substance of

the Proposed Rule Change

The Exchange, pursuant to Rule 19b–

4 under the Act, proposes to amend its

rules to permit trading in Buy-Write

Options Unitary Derivatives

(‘‘BOUNDs’’). As described in more

detail below, BOUNDs are long term

options which the CBOE believes have

the same economic characteristics as a

covered call writing strategy.

The text of the proposed rule change

is available at the Office of the

Secretary, CBOE and at the Commission.