J-A16016-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOHNATHAN1 SAVAGE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1646 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 13, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0001056-2017

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED JULY 21, 2022

Johnathan Savage (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence2

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas after his jury 

convictions for robbery, burglary, person prohibited from possession of 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s first name is spelled both “Johnathan” and “Jonathan” in various 

filings. 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

2 Appellant’s notice of appeal states that the appeal is from the order entered 

on “December 13, 2018” and that his post-sentence motion was denied in 

April of 2020. Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, 8/24/20 (emphasis added). 

However, a review of the record reveals the judgment of sentence was entered 

on December 13, 2019. Upon this Court’s order to show cause why this 

appeal should not be quashed as untimely or improperly filed, Appellant 

explained that his notice of appeal contained a typographical error and he was 

appealing from the December 13, 2019, “sentencing order,” made final after 

the denial of his post-sentence motions. See Appellant’s Response to Rule to 

Show Cause, 10/1/20, at 1. The caption has been corrected accordingly. 
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firearms, carrying a firearm without a license, and conspiracy.3 Appellant 

argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion in limine to admit expert 

witness testimony and allowed his co-conspirators to testify at trial. For the 

reasons below, we affirm.

Appellant’s convictions stem from a December 11, 2016, burglary of the 

familial home of Ninja Barnes, Jamil Barnes, and their son I.B. Trial Ct. Op. 

7/5/21, at 2. “[B]efore 9:30 p.m.[,]” two men, later identified as Justin 

Savage4 and Marvel Grierson, knocked on the door of the Barnes’s home on 

Devereaux Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. at 2-3. I.B. asked who 

was at the door and one of the men said, “G[5] or Johnathan.” Id. at 2. I.B.

opened the door and two masked gunmen came into the home. Id. During 

the incident, Grierson sustained a gunshot wound to his leg and both men fled 

the home “toward a waiting sedan . . . driven by a third male[.]” Id. at 4. 

After the crime, video surveillance footage from Hahnemann hospital showed 

an individual, later identified as Appellant, taking Grierson to the emergency 

room for treatment of his gunshot wound. See id. at 5. 

____________________________________________

3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 3502(a)(1), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 903, 

respectively.

4 Appellant and Justin Savage are “close relative[s.]” N.T. Jury Trial, 

10/11/19, at 42. 

5 The Barnes family also knew Appellant by the nickname “G.” Trial Ct. Op. 

at 2.
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A few hours after the incident, the Barnes family viewed two videos, one 

from a neighbor’s security camera showing the three perpetrators shortly 

before the incident and as they fled the scene, and the other from Hahnemann 

Hospital shortly after the burglary. N.T. Jury Trial, 10/9/19, at 12-13, 27. 

After viewing these videos, Mr. and Mrs. Barnes identified Appellant, a family 

friend for over two decades and employee of Mr. Barnes for three years, as 

the third perpetrator. Trial Ct. Op. at 5. 

Appellant was arrested on December 16, 2016, and charged with, inter 

alia, robbery, burglary, person prohibited from possession of firearms, 

carrying a firearm without a license, conspiracy, aggravated assault, and 

unlawful restraint.6 Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion in limine, requesting 

to admit the testimony of Suzanne Mannes, PhD, a purported expert in the 

area of eyewitness testimony. Appellant’s Motion In Limine to Admit Expert 

Testimony, 12/23/18, at 3-4 (unpaginated). After a February 1, 2019, 

evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion. See Order, 

2/1/19. 

This case proceeded to a jury trial on October 8, 2019. The 

Commonwealth presented the testimony of, inter alia, Appellant’s coconspirators, Justin Savage and Grierson. Both men testified, by way of 

____________________________________________

6 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a), 2902(a)(1).
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reading their guilty plea colloquies,7that they conspired with Appellant to 

commit the December 11, 2016, burglary and robbery of the Barnes family. 

N.T. Jury Trial, 10/10/19, at 144-49; N.T., 10/11/19, at 21-39.

The jury found Appellant guilty of robbery, burglary, person prohibited 

from possession of firearms, carrying a firearm without a license, and

conspiracy, and not guilty of aggravated assault and unlawful restraint. On 

December 13, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term 

of 33 to 66 years’ incarceration.

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion8 challenging the weight of the 

evidence and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Appellant’s PostSentence Motion, 12/21/19, at 1, 6. The motion was denied by operation of 

law on April 19, 2020. See Docket Entry, 4/19/20. On August 24, 2020, 

Appellant filed a notice of appeal. 

This Court subsequently issued a rule to show cause why Appellant’s

appeal, submitted more than 30 days after the trial court denied his postsentence motion, should not be quashed as untimely. Appellant filed a 

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7 Grierson pled guilty to robbery, burglary, and conspiracy. N.T., 10/10/19, 

at 138. Savage pled guilty to robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and 

conspiracy. N.T., 10/11/19, at 16.

8 Appellant also filed a pro se “Motion for Post-Trial Relief” prior to sentencing 

on November 22, 2019, which the trial court did not consider. See

Commonwealth v. Williams, 241 A.3d 353, 354 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(hybrid representation is not permitted in Pennsylvania and courts will not 

accept pro se motions when a defendant is represented by counsel) (citation 

omitted).
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response, asserting that the clerk of courts failed to enter an order denying 

his post-sentence motion by operation of law on the docket. Appellant’s

Response to Rule to Show Cause, 10/23/20, at 1-2. Our review of the record 

reveals that although an order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion by 

operation of law was entered on the docket, there is no indication that the 

order was ever sent to Appellant as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). 

See id. (“When a post-sentence motion is denied by operation of law, the 

clerk of courts shall [ ] enter an order on behalf of the court, and . . . shall 

serve a copy of the order on the” parties); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c) 

(mandating that docket entries of orders entered by the trial court contain, 

inter alia, “the date of service of the order or court notice”). Because this 

constitutes a breakdown in the operation of the courts, we decline to quash 

Appellant’s appeal as untimely. See Commonwealth v. Perry, 820 A.2d 

734, 735 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“where the clerk of courts does not enter an order 

indicating that the post-sentence motion is denied by operation of law and 

notify the defendant of same, a breakdown in the court system has occurred 

and we will not find an appeal untimely under these circumstances”); 

Commonwealth v. Braykovich, 664 A.2d 133, 138 (Pa. Super. 1995) 

(excusing facially untimely notice of appeal where clerk of courts failed to 

notify defendant that post-sentence motions were by operation of law, under 

predecessor to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c)). 

Appellant subsequently complied with the trial court’s order to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 
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1925(b), wherein he challenged: (1) the trial court’s exclusion of expert 

witness testimony; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence; (3) the admission of 

co-conspirator testimony; (4) the admission of testimony from the prosecutor 

who handled co-conspirator’s guilty pleas; (5) the weight of the evidence; and 

(6) the discretionary aspects of the imposed sentence. Appellant’s Statement 

of Errors Complained of On Appeal, 3/22/21, at 1-6. 

Appellant raises the following claims on appeal:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding Appellant’s 

proposed expert on eyewitness misidentification?

2. Did the trial court violate Appellant’s due process right to 

present a complete defense by excluding Appellant’s proposed 

expert witness on eyewitness misidentification?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing the 

government to call all of Appellant’s co[-]defendants and 

having the trial prosecutor cross examine them to testify that 

they had pleaded guilty including that they conspired with 

Appellant?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.9 

As all of Appellant’s claims challenge the admission of evidence, 

[appellate courts] apply an evidentiary abuse of discretion

standard of review. The admission of evidence is committed to 

the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial court’s ruling 

regarding the admission of evidence will not be disturbed on 

appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or 

____________________________________________

9 Appellant has, therefore, waived the other claims raised in his 1925(b) 

statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (c) (argument must have discussion of 

pertinent authority and appropriate citation to the record); Commonwealth 

v. Sipps, 225 A.3d 1110, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2019) (failure to adequately 

develop argument results in waiver of claims) (citations omitted). 
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partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be 

clearly erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Moser, 999 A.2d 602, 605 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted). We review a challenge to a trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine

by the same standard as the admission of evidence at trial. Id.

In his first claim, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it denied his motion in limine to admit purported expert 

witness testimony regarding eyewitness misidentification. Appellant’s Brief at 

40. Appellant maintains that the trial court erred when it concluded that “none 

of the factors” relevant to a potential misidentification were present here. 

Appellant’s Brief at 46-47. Appellant contends that the Commonwealth 

“depended solely or primarily” on eyewitness identification and this evidence 

was “critical” to its case. Id. at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted). He 

further argues that there is not an “abundance of circumstantial evidence[,]” 

non-identification evidence, or substantial corroborating evidence that could 

connect Appellant to the neighbor’s security footage. Id. at 48, 50, 52-53. 

Appellant then avers that the trial court “did not cautiously cross-examine Dr. 

Mannes in a brief, unbiased manner” as it should have. Id. at 41. Instead, 

he insists the trial court examined Dr. Mannes “for approximately four times 

as long as” the Commonwealth and “asked questions and made statements 

that only helped” the Commonwealth. Id. at 42. 

To determine if evidence is admissible, the trial court must first 

determine if it is relevant. Pa.R.E. 402; Commonwealth v. Bergen, 142 

A.3d 847, 850 (Pa. Super. 2016). Evidence is relevant when it has
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any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would 

be without the evidence[,] and the fact is of consequence in 

determining the action. Pa.R.E. 401(a), (b). However, pursuant 

to Rule 403, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its 

probative value is outweighed by a danger of . . . confusing the 

issues [or] misleading the jury[.]” Pa.R.E. 403.

Bergen, 142 A.3d at 850 (some internal quotation marks omitted).

When expert testimony is at issue, we are guided by Pennsylvania Rule 

of Evidence 702, which states a witness qualified as an expert “may testify in 

the form of an opinion or otherwise if . . . the expert's scientific, technical, or 

other specialized knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average 

layperson[,] will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 

determine a fact in issue[, and their] methodology is generally accepted in the 

relevant field.” Pa.R.E. 702(a)-(c). 

In support of his argument, Appellant compares the current matter to 

the following cases: Commonwealth v. Thomas, 215 A.3d 36 (Pa. 2019);10

Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766 (Pa. 2017); Commonwealth v. 

Brown, 200 A.3d 986 (Pa. Super. 2018); and Commonwealth v Selenski, 

158 A.3d 102 (Pa. Super. 2017). Appellant’s Brief at 41-53. However, it is 

clear the controlling case concerning the admission of expert testimony on 

eyewitness misidentification is Walker. We conclude Walker is 

distinguishable on the facts. 

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10 The defendant in Thomas offered the same expert witness, Dr. Mannes, on 

a similar basis as Appellant. See Thomas, 215 A.3d at 48.
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In Walker, the appellant was accused of committing two gunpoint 

robberies. Walker, 92 A.3d at 769. In the first robbery, he held three victims 

at gunpoint. Id. 769-70. Two of the victims identified the appellant from 

photo arrays and one of those same victims identified the appellant at a later 

in-person line-up. Id. at 770. During the second robbery, two victims were 

held at gunpoint, and both later identified the appellant as the perpetrator

after viewing photo arrays. Id. “The sole evidence connecting [the a]ppellant 

to the robberies was eyewitness identification by the victims.” Id. 

Walker filed a motion in limine to admit expert testimony regarding the 

fallibility of eyewitness identification. Walker, 92 A.3d at 770-71. The trial 

court denied the motion, stating Pennsylvania case law held that expert 

testimony concerning eyewitness identification was inadmissible because it 

would have an “unwarranted appearance of authority on the eyewitness’s 

credibility[.]” Id. at 771. The appellant was subsequently convicted of the 

second robbery, but acquitted of the first. Id. A panel of this Court affirmed 

the appellant’s judgment of sentence on direct appeal. Id. at 772. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur review “to consider 

whether a trial court may permit, in its discretion, the testimony of an expert 

in the field of eyewitness identification.” Walker, 92 A.3d at 772. Walker

argued that certain factors were relevant to make jurors “aware of the 

variables that impact eyewitness accuracy” and they were “critical to ‘a fair 

adjudication of the truth.’” Id. at 774. The factors include: 
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(1) the phenomenon of ‘weapons focus’; (2) the reduced reliability 

of identification in cross-racial identification cases; (3) the 

significantly decreased accuracy in eyewitness identifications in 

high-stress/traumatic criminal events; (4) increased risk of 

mistaken identification when police investigators do not warn a 

witness, prior to viewing a photo array or line up, that the 

perpetrator may or may not be in the display; and (5) the lack of 

a strong correlation between witness statements of confidence 

and witness accuracy.

Id. at 773. Our Supreme Court agreed and concluded 

such expert testimony on the limited issue of eyewitness 

identification as raised in this appeal may be admissible, at the 

discretion of the trial court, and assuming the expert is qualified, 

the proffered testimony relevant, and will assist the trier of fact. . 

. . The admission must be properly tailored to whether the 

testimony will focus on particular characteristics of the 

identification at issue and explain how those characteristics call 

into question the reliability of the identification. . . . 

Id. at 792. 

Further, the Court opined that to have the evidence admitted, 

the defendant must make an on-the-record detailed proffer to the 

court, including an explanation of precisely how the expert’s 

testimony is relevant to the eyewitness identifications under 

consideration and how it will assist the jury in its evaluation. The 

proof should establish the presence of [the above] factors . . . 

which may be shown to impair the accuracy of eyewitness 

identification in aspects which are (or to a degree which is) beyond 

the common understanding of laypersons.

Id.

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that none of the Walker

factors were present in the case before us. Trial Ct. Op. at 20, 22. First, we 

note that although Appellant offered Dr. Mannes’ testimony to show that the 

eyewitness identification was unreliable based on Walker, her testimony 

amounted to observations that the length of the videos were short, and the 
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videos’ quality did not show full and unobstructed views of Appellant’s face. 

N.T., 2/1/19, at 75, 77. Dr. Mannes opined that she was “not sure” that the 

videos had enough information for a person to have a “detailed impression” 

of the individuals in the videos, but admitted this is something the jurors could 

“[p]ossibly” assess from viewing the videos themselves. Id. at 93. 

Regarding the Walker factors, since Appellant never entered the home, 

the victims would not have been distracted by the presence of a weapon, nor 

would they have misidentified him based on his presence during a traumatic 

event. See Walker, 92 A.3d at 773. Moreover, there was no cross-racial 

identification issue, the police did not present a photo array or line up, and 

the trial court did not believe the confidence in the victims’ identifications 

impacted their accuracy since the victims knew Appellant for nearly three 

decades prior to the incident. See id.; Trial Ct. Op. at 22-23. 

The remaining cases Appellant cites are also distinguishable for similar 

reasons. See Thomas, 215 A.3d at 50 (trial court did not err in excluding 

expert testimony on eyewitness identification because eyewitness testimony 

was not the primary evidence of defendant’s guilt); Brown, 200 A.3d at 991

(trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded expert witness 

testimony on eyewitness identification because the Commonwealth offered 

independent corroborating evidence); Selenski, 158 A.3d at 116 (trial court 

did not abuse its discretion when it excluded expert testimony regarding 

eyewitness identification because the Commonwealth presented 
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circumstantial evidence and “was not solely or primarily dependent” on 

eyewitness identification). 

Further, the Commonwealth offered other corroborating evidence, such 

as the distinct clothing Appellant wore in the hospital surveillance video, the 

car jointly owned by Appellant and Justin Savage, and the blood in the 

backseat of the car that belonged to Grierson. Trial Ct. Op. at 23. Appellant 

failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion since the evidence supported the 

trial court’s determination that Dr. Mannes’ testimony was not relevant, would 

not aid the jury, and where the Commonwealth was not relying “solely or 

primarily” on eyewitness identification. See Walker, 92 A.3d at 787. 

Appellant also argues the trial court “did not cautiously cross-examine 

Dr. Mannes in a brief, unbiased manner” as it should have. Appellant’s Brief 

at 41. In support of this argument, Appellant cites Commonwealth v. 

Seabrook, 379 A.2d 564, 568 (Pa. 1977). In Seabrook, the appellant 

argued the trial court abused its discretion when it showed “pro-prosecution 

bias” while it questioned a witness during a suppression hearing. Id. at 566. 

Ultimately the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion because the questioning (1) occupied “three and one-half 

pages in a 107 page record[;]” (2) drew rational inferences from the evidence; 

and (3) asked questions which “did the Commonwealth’s case no good.” Id.

at 568 (footnote omitted).

Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it examined Dr. Mannes. While the trial court engaged in a 
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lengthy examination of the witness, a review of the transcript demonstrates it 

did so to seek an explanation of how her expertise was relevant to the salient 

facts, and to clarify her research methods and sources, a topic which neither 

party adequately questioned her. N.T., 2/1/19, at 85-99. The length of the 

trial court’s questioning does not, alone, reflect an abuse of discretion. See 

Seabrook, 379 A.2d at 567-68 (It is proper for a trial court to question a 

witness regarding facts “which did not appear from either counsel’s 

examination[.]” A trial court has a duty to “ascertain the truth” in criminal 

proceedings, which may “necessitate[ ] interrogation of witnesses to clear up 

some doubtful fact”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Like 

Seabrook, the nature of the trial court’s questions also no not reflect a bias 

towards any one party. Instead, the examination illustrated a thorough 

inquiry into the usefulness of Dr. Mannes’ specific claimed expertise. Thus, 

no relief is due on Appellant’s first issue. 

In his second claim, Appellant argues that the trial court deprived him 

of his right to due process by not allowing him to present a “complete defense” 

when it excluded expert witness testimony. Appellant’s Brief at 54. Appellant 

avers that Dr. Mannes’ testimony “could have given [the] jury a scientific, 

professional perspective . . . about why” the eyewitness testimony was 

“inherently unreliable.” Id. at 57. Appellant insists that absent this 

testimony, the jury had no basis “beyond the word of [his] counsel” that the 

identification testimony may have been unreliable. Id. at 58. 
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We agree with the trial court’s determination that the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s Walker decision does not “grant carte blanch to admission 

of expert testimony.” Trial Ct. Op. at 16. To the contrary, the Walker

decision limits the admission of such testimony and leaves the decision of 

admissibility to the trial court’s discretion. See Walker, 92 A.3d at 792. For

the reasons stated above, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it excluded irrelevant evidence that would not aid the jury in 

its fact-finding duties. No relief is due.11 

In his final argument, Appellant avers the trial court abused its 

discretion when it allowed his co-defendants to testify that they pled guilty 

____________________________________________

11 We note this Court’s recent decision, Commonwealth v. Robinson, __ 

A.3d __, 1127 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super. June 27, 2022), addresses expert 

testimony concerning eyewitness identification. In Robinson, another panel 

of this Court granted the defendant a new trial on post-conviction review after 

it concluded counsel was ineffective for not offering eyewitness identification 

expert testimony based on the following: (1) the Commonwealth’s case was 

based “solely or primarily” on eyewitness identification; (2) the Walker

factors were present; (3) counsel for the defendant raised a misidentification 

defense; and (4) as a result, the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s 

actions. Robinson, __ A. 3d__, __, 1127 EDA 2021, at 11, 12-13 n.4, 16. 

The panel emphasized the “limited nature” of the decision, stating that while 

expert testimony on eyewitness identification is permitted, it is not required. 

Id. at 24.

Robinson is distinguishable both procedurally and factually from the 

present matter. Here, Appellant has raised a challenge to the trial court’s 

discretion when it did not admit Dr. Mannes’ testimony, whereas the 

defendant in Robinson challenged counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to call 

an expert witness. Further, as discussed supra, the Commonwealth 

presented additional evidence of Appellant’s guilt and the factors outlined in 

Walker are not present.
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and conspired with Appellant to commit the offenses charged. Appellant’s 

Brief at 58. Appellant maintains this evidence was inadmissible as unfairly 

prejudicial by demonstrating to the jury “the case against [him] had already 

twice been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 59. Appellant also 

insists the trial court’s warning to both co-defendants pertaining to perjury 

“unduly influenced them” to change their testimony. Id. at 60-61. 

Preliminarily, the Commonwealth contends Appellant’s challenges to the 

admission of his co-defendants’ testimony are waived. See Commonwealth’s 

Brief at 51-53. First, it insists that Appellant did not raise specific objections

at trial on the basis that the testimony was unfairly prejudicial or that the 

court’s perjury warnings were inappropriate. Commonwealth’s Brief at 50-51. 

Moreover, it asserts Appellant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it warned his co-defendants of the potential consequences of perjury is 

also waived because Appellant failed to include this claim in his Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement. Commonwealth’s Brief at 53. Upon our own review, we 

agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant failed to preserve, in the trial 

court, either of these issues he now raises on appeal. See N.T., 10/10/19, at 

142 (counsel objects to reading of Grierson’s plea colloquy based on hearsay 

grounds); N.T., 10/11/19, at 20 (counsel objects to reading of Justin Savage’s 

plea colloquy based on hearsay and confrontation clause grounds); see also

Appellant’s Statement of Errors Complained of On Appeal at 1-6. Thus, 

Appellant’s arguments here are waived for our review. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) 

(“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the 
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first time on appeal.”); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (issues not included in a 

1925(b) statement are waived); Commonwealth v. McGriff, 160 A.3d 863, 

873 (Pa. Super. 2017) (concluding challenges to the admissibility of evidence 

were waived when the appellant did not make timely and specific objections 

in the trial court). 

In any event, had Appellant preserved his objection that the admission 

of his co-defendants’ testimony was unfairly prejudicial, we would rest on the 

trial court’s opinion:12 

By its very nature, the testimony of both co-defendants was 

relevant to prove Appellant’s secret participation in the conspiracy 

to rob and assault the Barnes’ family members in their home. 

Each defendant was subjected to examination before the jury by 

all parties through their counsel. Thus, this admissible evidence 

far outweighed any prejudicial impact because it supported 

identification of Appellant as a perpetrator. As such, Appellant 

was not unduly prejudiced.

Trial Ct. Op. at 26.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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12 The trial court did not address Appellant’s assertion that it improperly 

influenced the testimony of his co-defendants. We pass no judgment on this 

waived claim.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/21/2022