* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not

precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED March 5, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-30844 Summary Calendar

ROBERT P. DAIGLE, Pl aint iff- Appellant,
versus DONALD MCCARTHY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the Western District of Louisiana (6:05-CV-00082-TLM-CMH)
Before DeMOSS, STEWART and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Robert Daigle appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of defendants. For the fo llo wing reasons, we affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Daigle, a resident of Texas, filed a diversity suit in Loui siana federal district court against the Diocese of Alexandria, Loui siana (“Diocese”), and Ronald McCarthy fo r claims relating to his alleged1 In his 1990 let ter outl ining his allegations, Daigle wrote: “Recently I spoke with a lawyer .

. . . However, the attorney also said th at the statute of limit ations had expired. So any criminal recourse I might have is no more. This leaves me with the alternative of writing to you.” 2 sexual abuse as a child. McCarthy was a priest in Texas and working at a Louisiana summer camp when he met Daigle in 1955. Daigle alleges that following the summer camp, McCarthy and Legar Trem blay, a fo rm

er priest at the Diocese, sexually assaulted him. Daigle was fourteen-years-old at the time. Following the alleged incident, Daigle suffered from numerous psychological problems and began seeing a therapist. Daigle first recalled the assault in a 1990 counseling session but could not recall any specific info rmation. Aft er contacting of ficials wit h the Evergreen Pari sh (a divisio n wit hin the Diocese), where Trem blay had worked, Daigle learned Trem blay’s name and th at he was currently working for the Shreveport Diocese. Daigle then contacted Tremblay, who did not remember him. Next, Daigle contacted a lawyer, who told him th at he had a “fat chance” at prevailing in court against the Cathol

ic church. Daigle then sent a let ter to the Diocese bisho p, other Cathol ic church of ficials, various media, family members, and Trem blay outl ining his allegations, perpetrators, legal options, and requesting the church’s help in his effo rts towards holding his perpetrators legally responsible. 1 Over the next thirteen years, Daigle periodically called the Diocese requesting info rmation and was rebuffed. In 2004, an auxilliary bishop told Daigle that Tremblay had been defrocked in 1986 because of other allegations of sexual abuse. Sub sequentl y, Daigle confirmed McCarthy’s identity using an old photograph. Daigle then filed the inst ant suit in early 2005, alleging th at the Diocese had “stonewalled” by refusing to provide him wit h any info rmation for fifteen years following his therapy session and requests. Daigle argued that he needed specific information in order to receive sufficient treatment3

and th at the Diocese was responsible. Daigle also alleged th at his post-traumatic stress prevented him from specifically recalling McCarthy’s identity until 2004 and th at McCarthy was directly responsible fo r his alleged damages. Aft er the district court set a scheduling order, Daigle filed a Motion to Com pel Discovery, which was denied. The Diocese and McC a rthy filed mo tions fo r summary judgment, arguing th at Daigle’s claims are prescribed under Loui siana law. Daigle then filed a Rule 56(f) Motion to Continue Summary Judgment. Following the Magistrate Judge’s memo randum, the district court granted summary judgment fo r the defen dants, holding that Daigle’s claims were prescribed and dismissed his Rule 56(f) mo tion as mo ot. Daigle now appeals the summary judgment and Rule 56(f) rulings to this court. II. DISCUSSION A. This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. Marchesani v. Pellerin-Milnor Corp. , 269 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2001). This court also reviews the district court’s determ inat io n of state l aw de novo. Id
. This court applies, as the district court did, Louisiana’s prescription law. Prescription in Louisiana is governed LA . C IV . C ODE ANN . art. 3492. Under Loui sian a law, del ict ual actions, such as Daigle’s, have a prescriptive period that
com mence one year “from the date injury or damage is sustained.” LA
. C IV
. C ODE ANN
. art. 3492. There are fo ur exceptions to liberative prescription under the doctrine of contra non valentem: (1) where there was som

e legal cause which prevented the courts or their of ficers from taking cognizance of or acting on the plaint iff's action; (2) where there was som e con dit io n coupled with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from suing or acting; (3) where the defendant himself has done som e act effectually to prevent the plaint iff from availing himself of his cause of action; (4) and4

where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaint if f, even though his ignorance is not indu ced by the defendant. H endrick v. ABC Ins. Co. , 787 So. 2d 283, 290 (La. 2001). Daigle argues th at the district court rul ing “evinces” error because it states th at he bears the burden of proving prescription was suspended. Daigle argues th at th e only burden of proof at the
summary judgment stage is to prove that a dispute exists. In cases of prescription, ho wever, if defendants are successful at demonstrating one year has passed between the tortious acts and the filing of the suit, “t hen the burden shift s to the plaint iff to prove an exception to prescri ption.” Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. , 290 F.3d 303, 320 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Miley v. Consol. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 1 , 642 So. 2d 693, 696 (La. Ct. App. 1994)). Daigle’s lawsuit, com

mencing nearly fift y years aft er the as sault, is prescri bed on its face. Therefore, he bears the burden of proving th at the applicable prescription period has been suspended, int errupted, or renounced. Id . The Louisiana Supreme Court has held: Prescription will not begin to run at the earliest possible indication th at a plaint iff may have suffered som

e w ron g. Prescription should not be used to force a person who believes he may have been damaged in som e way to rush to file suit against all parties who might have caused th at damage. On the other hand, a plaint iff will be responsible to seek out those whom he believes may be responsible for a specific injury. When prescription begins to run depends on the reasonableness of a plaint iff's action or inaction. Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corp. , 509 So. 2d 420 (La. 1987). The district court held th at, in Daigle’s ca se, the prescri ption period began to run in 1990 aft er he fir st recalled the 1955 assault in a therapy session. We find no legal error in th at assessment. Daigle argues that he did not have the evidence to support a claim until he received additional info rmation from the auxiliary bisho p in 2004 and th at the Archdiocese’s refusal to provide him any5

info rmation concerning Trem blay until 2004 was in and of it self a “t ort and cause of damage.” This, however, would not rebut the conclusion that Daigle was “reasonably” aware of his legal claims in 1990. The appropri ate fo cus is not when a plaint iff develops a strong legal case but when he has a sufficient ly reasonable knowledge of his legal options. “Contra non valentem does not suspend prescription when a lit igant is perfectly able to bring it s claim, but fails or refuses to do so.” Terre bonne Parish Sch. Bd., 290 F.3d at 885. Daigle also argues th at he was not aware of McCarthy’s identi

ty until 2004; however, in his 1990 letter he identifies McCarthy as Tremblay’s “seminarian driver” and described him as “red haired” in a 1990 therapy session. Therefore, we find no error in t he di strict court’s determ inat io n t hat Daigle had sufficient info rmation in 1990 to seek out the Archdiocese and McCarthy. The case Daigle relies upon fo r the argument th at pol

icy concerns mit igate against relying on general prescriptive statutes fo r sit uations invo lving sexual abuse is inapposite. That case, DeLonga v. Diocese of Sioux Falls , 329 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (D. S.D. 2004), dealt wit h a law exempting sex crimes fr om th e South Dakota statute of limit ations fo r civil actions. Because of “coping mechanisms associated wit h vict ims of sexual abuse which may hinder such vict ims from making the causal connection between their abuse and problems suffered later in life,” many states have enacted such statutes. Id. ; see also Roman Catholic Bishop of Oakland v. Superior Court , 128 Cal. App. 4th 1155 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). Loui siana, however, has no such statute and Daigle’s allegations are not exempted from the prescription statute. B. Rule 56(f), FED
. R. C IV
. P., provides non-movants wit h an impo rtant tool “t o keep open the doors of discovery in order to adequately com bat a summary judgment mo tion.” Wichita Falls Office Assoc. v. Banc One Corp. , 978 F.2d 915, 919 (5th Cir. 1992). The rule authorizes a district court to6

“o rder a continuance to permit affidavit s to be taken or depositions to be taken or di scovery to be had,” if the non-movant files affidavit s showing th at he or she “cannot fo r reasons stated present by affidavit facts necessary to justify the party ’s opposition.” Rule 56(f). Alt hough motions under Rule 56(f) “are favored and should be liberally granted,” the denial of such a mo tion is reviewed fo r abuse of discretion. Beattie v. Madison County Sch. Dist. , 254 F.3d 595, 605-06 (5th Cir. 2001). A non-movant seeking relief under Rule 56(f) must “show (1) why she needs additional discovery and (2) how that di scovery will create a genuine issue of material fact.” I d
. at 605. The non-mov ant cannot “simply rely on vague asse rti ons that addi tional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts.” K

araha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertamba ngan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara , 364 F.3d 274, 305 (5th Cir. 2004). We find no abuse of discret io n in t he district court denying Daigle’s Rule 56(f) motion to continue discovery as mo ot. None of the mat erial Daigle sought, including int errogato ri es and docum ents from the Diocese and McCarthy’s medical records, would have supported his claim th at he did not have sufficient information in 1990 to pursue the defendants. III. CONCLUSION The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. AFFIRMED.