[Cite as Doss v. State, 135 Ohio St.3d 211, 2012-Ohio-5678.] 

DOSS, APPELLEE, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT. 

[Cite as Doss v. State, 135 Ohio St.3d 211, 2012-Ohio-5678.] 

Wrongful imprisonment—R.C. 2743.48—Claimant in common pleas court cannot 

be declared eligible for compensation in Court of Claims unless claimant 

has affirmatively demonstrated that he is actually innocent of charges for 

which he was imprisoned—Acquittal or finding of legal insufficiency of 

evidence is not enough to establish actual innocence. 

(No. 2012-0162—Submitted September 26, 2012—Decided December 6, 2012.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 

No. 96452, 2011-Ohio-6429. 

__________________

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

1. One who claims to be a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” under R.C. 

2743.48 must prove all of the factors in R.C. 2743.48(A) by a 

preponderance of the evidence before seeking compensation from the state 

for wrongful imprisonment. 

2. A trial court adjudicating proof of innocence pursuant to R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) 

may not find that the claimant was wrongfully imprisoned based solely on 

an appellate court judgment vacating a felony conviction due to 

insufficient evidence and discharging the prisoner without a remand for a 

new trial. 

__________________

LANZINGER, J.

{¶ 1} In this case, we determine that Iran Doss is not entitled to summary 

judgment that he is a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” eligible to sue the state 

for compensation pursuant to R.C. 2743.48 based solely on the appellate court’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

decision to reverse and vacate his conviction and order his immediate release 

from prison. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 

remand to the trial court for further proceedings. 

I. Background 

{¶ 2} Appellee, Iran Doss, was convicted by a jury in 2006 of one count of 

rape and one count of kidnapping. He was classified as a sexually oriented 

offender, sentenced to four years in prison, and ordered to pay restitution and a 

fine. 

{¶ 3} On appeal, Doss challenged his rape and kidnapping convictions on 

several grounds, including a challenge to the evidence that the alleged victim’s 

ability to consent was substantially impaired due to a mental or physical condition 

and that Doss knew of that substantial impairment. The Eighth District, in a twoto-one decision, concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding 

that the other party’s capacity to consent was substantially impaired and that Doss 

knew (or had reason to know) of the substantial impairment. State v. Doss, 8th 

Dist. No. 88443, 2007-Ohio-6483 (“Doss I”).

{¶ 4} Upon reconsideration, a split panel vacated both the kidnapping and 

the rape convictions. State v. Doss, 8th Dist. No. 88443, 2008-Ohio-449 (“Doss 

II”). The Doss II majority held that the state failed to present sufficient evidence 

showing that Doss knew or had reason to know that the alleged victim’s ability to 

consent was substantially impaired. Id. at ¶ 21-23. The court vacated the 

convictions and ordered Doss discharged from prison. 

{¶ 5} The state appealed the vacation of the rape conviction, but we 

declined review. State v. Doss, 118 Ohio St.3d 1507, 2008-Ohio-3369, 889 

N.E.2d 1025. After his release, Doss filed an action for declaratory judgment 

pursuant to R.C. 2743.48 in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 

seeking compensation from the state for wrongful imprisonment. On July 2, 

2010, he filed a motion for summary judgment, citing the decision in Doss II. 
January Term, 2012 

3 

The motion, which contained no attachments or exhibits, was two and a half 

pages long and cited only the appellate judgment in Doss II as a basis for finding 

eligibility. The state opposed the motion for summary judgment, offering the 

transcripts from the criminal trial to show that there were issues of fact and 

arguing that Doss had failed to establish his innocence by a preponderance of the 

evidence. 

{¶ 6} The trial court granted Doss’s motion for summary judgment for the 

following reason: “The court of appeals’ decision to reverse and vacate plaintiff 

Doss’s conviction and order his immediate release can only be interpreted to 

mean that either plaintiff Doss was innocent of the charges upon which he was 

convicted, or that no crime was committed by plaintiff Doss, or both.” 

{¶ 7} The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment, in yet 

another two-to-one decision. Doss v. State, 8th Dist. No. 96452, 2011-Ohio-6429 

(“Doss III”). The majority reiterated that its review of the record in Doss II had 

revealed that Doss’s statement was the only evidence of the alleged victim’s 

mental condition and that the state had presented no evidence that Doss knew, or 

should have known, that the alleged victim’s ability to resist or consent was 

substantially impaired because of voluntary intoxication. Id. at ¶ 15. The court of 

appeals found no genuine issue of fact and no error in the trial court’s entry of 

summary judgment. 

{¶ 8} The dissenting judge stated, 

Our holding in [Doss II] does not mean that Doss is innocent—

merely that, based upon the evidence the state presented, Doss’s 

guilt could not be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The 

same cannot automatically be said of whether Doss can show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he did not know or reasonably 

should not have known of the victim’s incapacity. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

Id. at ¶ 21 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting). 

{¶ 9} We accepted jurisdiction to address the state’s propositions of law: 

(1) “A trial court adjudicating a contested claim of innocence may not grant 

summary judgment in favor of a former inmate based solely on an appeals court 

finding that a criminal conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence” and 

(2) “Under R.C. 2743.48 an inmate must prove actual innocence by a 

preponderance of the evidence, which is a separate and distinct legal standard 

than whether [sic] the evidence in a criminal case is sufficient to convict a person 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Doss v. State, 131 Ohio St.3d 1498, 2012-Ohio1501, 964 N.E.2d 439. 

II. Analysis 

{¶ 10} The General Assembly has developed a two-step process to 

compensate those who have been wrongfully imprisoned. The first step is an 

action in the common pleas court seeking a preliminary factual determination of 

wrongful imprisonment; the second step is an action in the Court of Claims to 

recover money damages. Griffith v. Cleveland, 128 Ohio St.3d 35, 2010-Ohio4905, 941 N.E.2d 1157, paragraph two of the syllabus. The wrongfulimprisonment statute, R.C. 2743.48, was added to the Revised Code in 1986 by 

Sub.H.B. No. 609 “to authorize civil actions against the state, for specified 

monetary amounts, in the Court of Claims by certain wrongfully imprisoned 

individuals.” 141 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5351. The statute was designed to replace 

the former practice of compensating those wrongfully imprisoned by ad hoc 

moral-claims legislation. Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 49, 547 N.E.2d 962 

(1989). Under the statutory scheme, a claimant must be determined to be a 

“wrongfully imprisoned individual” by the court of common pleas before being 

permitted to file for compensation against the state of Ohio in the Court of 
January Term, 2012 

5 

Claims. R.C. 2305.02 and 2743.48(B)(2); Griffith v. Cleveland, paragraph two of 

the syllabus. 

The Wrongful-Imprisonment Statute 

{¶ 11} R.C. 2743.48 provides: 

(A) As used in this section and section 2743.49 of the 

Revised Code, a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” means an 

individual who satisfies each of the following: 

(1) The individual was charged with a violation of a section 

of the Revised Code by an indictment or information, and the 

violation charged was an aggravated felony or felony. 

(2) The individual was found guilty of, but did not plead 

guilty to, the particular charge or a lesser included offense by the 

court or jury involved, and the offense of which the individual was 

found guilty was an aggravated felony or felony. 

(3) The individual was sentenced to an indefinite or definite 

term of imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the 

offense of which the individual was found guilty. 

(4) The individual's conviction was vacated, dismissed, or 

reversed on appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case cannot or 

will not seek any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and 

no criminal proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be 

brought by any prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village 

solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation 

against the individual for any act associated with that conviction. 

(5) Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to 

imprisonment, an error in procedure resulted in the individual’s 

release, or it was determined by the court of common pleas in the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

county where the underlying criminal action was initiated that the 

charged offense, including all lesser-included offenses, either was 

not committed by the individual or was not committed by any 

person. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 12} Thus, a plaintiff in a civil case for wrongful imprisonment must 

first prove that he or she is a “wrongfully imprisoned individual.” In this case, 

proof of the factors in R.C. 2743.48(A)(1) through (4) is undisputed. Doss was 

convicted of a felony to which he did not plead guilty, he was sentenced to a 

prison term, his conviction was vacated upon appeal, and he is not subject to 

further charges. The fifth factor of R.C. 2743.48(A) may be fulfilled in one of 

two ways: (1) subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to 

imprisonment, “an error in procedure resulted in the individual’s release” or (2) 

the charged offense (and any lesser included offense) was not committed by the 

individual or no crime was committed at all (actual innocence). R.C. 

2743.48(A)(5). 

{¶ 13} This court’s decision in Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 547 

N.E.2d 962, precludes a claimant from relying solely on a judgment of acquittal to 

establish actual innocence. In Walden, the state appealed determinations of 

wrongful imprisonment for two individuals. One of them, Linda Walden, had 

been acquitted of murder. When she sought a determination that she had been 

wrongfully imprisoned, the trial court granted summary judgment in her favor, 

reasoning that the judgment of acquittal precluded the state from contesting her 

innocence. The state’s appeal was consolidated with its appeal in the case of 

Nathaniel Ellis. Ellis had been convicted of felonious assault, but the court of 

appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. On retrial, Ellis was acquitted by 

a general verdict, after which he sought a determination that he was a wrongfully 
January Term, 2012 

7 

imprisoned individual. The trial court held that Ellis was entitled to 

compensation. In nearly identical opinions released on the same day, the court of 

appeals held that the two defendants were entitled to compensation for wrongful 

imprisonment. 

{¶ 14} In construing a former version of R.C. 2743.48(A), we held that 

when a person claiming compensation for wrongful imprisonment has obtained a 

judgment of acquittal, that judgment is not to be given preclusive effect, because 

an acquittal is a determination that the state has not met its burden of proof. It is 

not necessarily a finding that the accused is innocent. For this reason, a claimant 

advancing a wrongful-imprisonment claim “must affirmatively prove her 

innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 52. We explained that in 

enacting the statute, the “General Assembly intended that the court of common 

pleas actively separate those who were wrongfully imprisoned from those who 

have merely avoided criminal liability.” Id. Even though the statute examined in 

Walden was an earlier version of R.C. 2743.48, the Walden holding is still 

applicable. Griffith v. Cleveland, 128 Ohio St.3d 35, 2010-Ohio-4905, 941 N.E.2d 

1157, ¶ 30. R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) requires an affirmative showing of innocence 

beyond proof of an acquittal. 

{¶ 15} When a court vacates or reverses a criminal conviction based on 

insufficiency of the evidence, the court is saying that the state has not proven the 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; it is not saying that innocence 

has been proven. Thus, reversal on insufficiency of the evidence does not 

automatically mean that the defendant was wrongfully imprisoned. Chandler v. 

State, 95 Ohio App.3d 142, 641 N.E.2d 1382 (8th Dist.1994). If the legislature 

had intended to compensate all persons whose convictions are reversed based on 

insufficient evidence, it could have explicitly stated this in R.C. 2743.48. See 

Ratcliff v. State, 94 Ohio App.3d 179, 182, 640 N.E.2d 560 (4th Dist.1994). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

{¶ 16} In this case, Doss argues that the vacation of his convictions and 

discharge from prison are proof of his actual innocence. In contrast, the state 

asserts that R.C. 2743.48 establishes a civil rather than a criminal action and that 

in contrast with the burden of proof in a criminal trial, the wrongful-imprisonment 

statute places the burden of proof on the claimant to affirmatively show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he or she was actually innocent of the charged 

offense, including all lesser included offenses. A judgment of acquittal is not 

enough. The state contends that in support of his action for declaratory judgment, 

Doss did not provide the trial court with any additional evidence to prove that the 

other party consented, or that he did not know and could not reasonably have 

known of any impairment of her ability to consent, or any other proof of his actual 

innocence of the charge of rape and all lesser included offenses. The trial and 

appellate courts, therefore, granted Doss a preliminary determination of eligibility 

for compensation without the required affirmative proof of his actual innocence. 

{¶ 17} The differing burdens of proof explain why a vacation of Doss’s 

conviction does not prove his innocence. The appellate court held that the 

evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the state failed to 

prove Doss’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But that ruling does not answer 

the question whether Doss can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he 

did not know, or could not reasonably have known, of the alleged victim’s 

incapacity. See Ratcliff v. State at 182 (evidence insufficient to prove guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt does not necessarily prove innocence by a 

preponderance of the evidence). Preponderance of the evidence is a distinct legal 

standard from beyond a reasonable doubt. By not requiring more of Doss, the 

lower courts contravened the mandate of R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) by dispensing with 

the additional requirement of affirmative proof that the criminal action was not 

committed by him or by any person. Even though Doss’s successful appeal may 

have provided some support for his claim of wrongful imprisonment, it is not 
January Term, 2012 

9 

enough. He had the burden of proof to affirmatively establish his innocence 

under R.C. 2743.48(A)(5). State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 

72, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). 

Proof Offered to Support Summary Judgment 

{¶ 18} To analyze whether Doss affirmatively established his innocence 

by a preponderance of the evidence, we must examine the evidence that he 

submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment. To prevail on the 

motion, he must have demonstrated that there was no genuine issue of material 

fact, that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and that reasonable 

minds, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 

can come to only one conclusion, which is adverse to the nonmoving party. 

Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54, 2010-Ohio-4505, 936 N.E.2d 

481, ¶ 29. Appellate review is de novo. Id.

{¶ 19} The record shows that Doss filed his motion for summary judgment 

relying solely on the Eighth District’s decision in Doss II. And the trial court 

granted summary judgment on that basis alone. Specifically, the trial court stated: 

The court of appeals’ decision to reverse and vacate plaintiff 

Doss’s conviction and order his immediate release can only be 

interpreted to mean that either plaintiff Doss was innocent of the 

charges upon which he was convicted, or that no crime was 

committed by plaintiff Doss, or both. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 20} This conclusion was incorrect. The trial court relied solely on the 

court of appeals’ reversal and vacation of the conviction to hold that Doss was 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It did not require a hearing or additional 

evidence. It simply cited the court of appeals’ holding that the state had not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10

offered sufficient evidence to prove Doss’s convictions. And in affirming the trial 

court’s grant of summary judgment, the Eighth District correctly acknowledged 

Walden’s rule that an acquittal does not necessarily establish actual innocence, but 

then applied the rule incorrectly. Despite the jury’s verdict of guilty and without 

any evidence from Doss, the majority held that the record showed insufficient 

evidence of the alleged victim’s substantial impairment. Thus, the judgment of 

the trial court that found Doss to be eligible for compensation and the appellate 

court’s judgment affirming that finding were not based upon an affirmative 

showing of actual innocence. They were based on a dearth of evidence of guilt. 

Both courts relieved Doss of his statutory obligation to prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence that he did not commit the charged offense, including all lesser 

included offenses, an obligation that must be fulfilled before he is allowed to 

claim the status of one who was “wrongfully imprisoned.” 

{¶ 21} To show actual innocence under the wrongful-imprisonment 

statute, Doss must prove that “the charged offense, including all lesser-included 

offenses, either was not committed by [him] or was not committed by any 

person.” R.C. 2743.48(A)(5). This court has emphasized that this standard is not 

satisfied by an acquittal or a finding of legal insufficiency of the evidence. 

Walden, 47 Ohio St.3d at 52, 547 N.E.2d 962. The General Assembly requires a 

showing of innocence to be made affirmatively and adjudicated de novo before a 

claimant can be found to be eligible for compensation in a wrongfulimprisonment action. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 22} Not every person who is released from prison because of a 

successful appeal is entitled to compensation. The legislature set forth a 

procedure for claimants like Doss to follow in R.C. 2743.48, so that the common 

pleas court could actively separate demonstrably innocent persons who have been 

wrongfully imprisoned from persons who have merely avoided criminal liability. 
January Term, 2012 

11 

We hold that one who claims to be a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” under 

R.C. 2743.48 must prove all of the factors in R.C. 2743.48(A) by a preponderance 

of the evidence before seeking compensation from the state for wrongful 

imprisonment. We also hold that a trial court adjudicating proof of innocence 

pursuant to R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) may not find that a claimant has been wrongfully 

imprisoned based solely on an appellate court judgment vacating a felony 

conviction due to insufficient evidence and discharging the prisoner without a 

remand for a new trial. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 

and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

 O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, CUPP, 

and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

 Mancino, Mancino & Mancino and Paul Mancino Jr., for appellee. 

 Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 

General, and Matthew P. Hampton, Deputy Solicitor; and William D. Mason, 

Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and John F. Manley and T. Allan Regas, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 

______________________