(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DISTRICT v. GUIDO ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 17–587. Argued October 1, 2018—Decided November 6, 2018 

John Guido and Dennis Rankin filed suit, alleging that the Mount

Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision in Arizona, terminated

their employment as firefighters in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The Fire District responded

that it was too small to qualify as an “employer” under the ADEA, 

which provides: “The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an 

industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees . . . . 

The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State

or political subdivision of a State . . . .” 29 U. S. C. §630(b).

Initially, both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 

ADEA applied solely to private sector employers. In 1974, Congress 

amended the ADEA to cover state and local governments. A previous, 1972, amendment to Title VII added States and their subdivisions to the definition of “person[s],” specifying that those entities are 

engaged in an industry affecting commerce. The Title VII amendment thus subjected States and their subdivisions to liability only if 

they employ a threshold number of workers, currently 15. By contrast, the 1974 ADEA amendment added state and local governments 

directly to the definition of “employer.” The same 1974 enactment also amended the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), on which many

aspects of the ADEA are based, to reach all government employers 

regardless of their size. 29 U. S. C. §203(d), (x). 

Held: The definitional provision’s two-sentence delineation, set out in 

§630(b), and the expression “also means” at the start of §630(b)’s second sentence, combine to establish separate categories: persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 20 or more employees; 

and States or political subdivisions with no attendant numerosity 

limitation. 
 

 

2 MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DIST. v. GUIDO 

Syllabus 

The words “also means” in §630(b) add new categories of employers

to the ADEA’s reach. First and foremost, the ordinary meaning of

“also means” is additive rather than clarifying. See 859 F. 3d 1168, 

1171 (case below) (quoting Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 34). 

The words “also means” occur dozens of times throughout the U. S.

Code, typically carrying an additive meaning. E.g., 12 U. S. C. 

§1715z–1(i)(4). Furthermore, the second sentence of the ADEA’s definitional provision, §630(b), pairs States and their political subdivisions with agents, a discrete category that carries no numerical limitation. 

Reading the ADEA’s definitional provision, §630(b), as written to

apply to States and political subdivisions regardless of size may give

the ADEA a broader reach than Title VII, but this disparity is a consequence of the different language Congress chose to employ. The 

better comparator for the ADEA is the FLSA, which also ranks 

States and political subdivisions as employers regardless of the number of employees they have. The Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission has, for 30 years, interpreted the ADEA to cover political

subdivisions regardless of size, and a majority of the States impose

age discrimination proscriptions on political subdivisions with no 

numerical threshold. Pp. 4–6. 

859 F. 3d 1168, affirmed. 

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other

Members joined, except KAVANAUGH, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2018) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 17–587 

MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DISTRICT, PETITIONER v.
 

JOHN GUIDO, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[November 6, 2018]

 JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Faced with a budget shortfall, Mount Lemmon Fire 

District, a political subdivision in Arizona, laid off its two 

oldest full-time firefighters, John Guido (then 46) and 

Dennis Rankin (then 54). Guido and Rankin sued the Fire 

District, alleging that their termination violated the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81

Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §621 et seq. The Fire 

District sought dismissal of the suit on the ground that the 

District was too small to qualify as an “employer” within

the ADEA’s compass. The Act’s controlling definitional

provision, 29 U. S. C. §630(b), reads: 

“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an 

industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more 

employees . . . . The term also means (1) any agent of 

such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision 

of a State . . . .” 

The question presented: Does the ADEA’s numerosity 

specification (20 or more employees), applicable to “a 

person engaged in an industry affecting commerce,” apply 

as well to state entities (including state political subdivi-
 

 

 

2 MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DIST. v. GUIDO 

Opinion of the Court 

sions)? We hold, in accord with the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that §630(b)’s two-sentence 

delineation, and the expression “also means” at the start 

of the second sentence, combine to establish separate

categories: persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 20 or more employees; and States or political

subdivisions with no attendant numerosity limitation. 

“[T]wenty or more employees” is confining language, but 

the confinement is tied to §630(b)’s first sentence, and does

not limit the ADEA’s governance of the employment practices of States and political subdivisions thereof. 

I 

Initially, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 

Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., which 

prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, 

color, religion, sex, and national origin, applied solely to

private sector employers. The same was true of the 

ADEA, enacted three years later to protect workers 

against “arbitrary age discrimination.” 29 U. S. C. 

§621(b). As originally enacted, both Title VII and the

ADEA imposed liability on “employer[s],” defined in both 

statutes to include “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce” whose employees met a numerical 

threshold, but specifically to exclude governmental entities. 78 Stat. 253 (Title VII); 81 Stat. 605 (ADEA).

In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to reach state and

local employers. Under the revised provision of Title VII,

“[t]he term ‘person’ includes one or more individuals, 

governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions,” also certain other specified entities, and “[t]he

term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry

affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees 

. . . .” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(a)–(b). For this purpose, amended 

Title VII defines “industry affecting commerce” to “includ[e] any governmental industry, business, or activity.” 
Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

§2000e(h). The 1972 amendment to Title VII thereby 

extended the statute’s coverage to state and local government entities by defining them as “person[s].” In turn, as 

“person[s],” these entities meet Title VII’s definition of

“employer” and are subject to liability only if they have at 

least 15 employees.1 

Two years later, in 1974, Congress amended the ADEA 

to cover state and local governments. Unlike in Title VII, 

where Congress added such entities to the definition of 

“person,” in the ADEA, Congress added them directly to 

the definition of “employer.” Thus, since 1974, the ADEA’s 

key definitional provision has read: 

“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an 

industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more 

employees . . . . The term also means (1) any agent of 

such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision 

of a State . . . .” 29 U. S. C. §630(b). 

In the same 1974 enactment, Congress amended the Fair

Labor Standards Act (FLSA), on which parts of the ADEA

had been modeled, to reach all government employers

regardless of their size. See 88 Stat. 58, 29 U. S. C. 

§203(d), (x).

The parties dispute the proper reading of the ADEA 

following the 1974 amendment. Does “also means” add 

new categories to the definition of “employer,” or does it

merely clarify that States and their political subdivisions

are a type of “person” included in §630(b)’s first sentence? 

If the former, state and local governments are covered by

the ADEA regardless of whether they have as many as 20

employees. If the latter, they are covered only if they have 

at least 20 employees. Federal courts have divided on this 

question. Compare Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 

—————— 

1The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 defines “employer” in

materially the same way as Title VII and accords “person . . . the same

meaning” as in Title VII. 42 U. S. C. §12111(5), (7). 
 

 

4 MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DIST. v. GUIDO 

Opinion of the Court 

F. 2d 269 (CA7 1986) (state and local governments are 

covered by the ADEA only if they have at least 20 employees); Cink v. Grant County, 635 Fed. Appx. 470 (CA10 

2015) (same); Palmer v. Arkansas Council on Economic 

Educ., 154 F. 3d 892 (CA8 1998) (same); EEOC v. Monclova, 

920 F. 2d 360 (CA6 1990) (same), with this case, 859 F. 3d

1168 (CA9 2017) (state and local governments are covered 

by the ADEA regardless of their number of employees). 

We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 583 U. S. __ 

(2018). 

II 

For several reasons, we conclude that the words “also 

means” in §630(b) add new categories of employers to the 

ADEA’s reach. First and foremost, the ordinary meaning

of “also means” is additive rather than clarifying. As the 

Ninth Circuit explained, “‘also’ is a term of enhancement; 

it means ‘in addition; besides’ and ‘likewise; too.’” 859 

F. 3d, at 1171 (quoting Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 34 (1973)). Indeed, reading “also” additively to create 

a separate category of “employer” seemed to this Court

altogether fitting in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 

(1983). There, we held that applying the ADEA to state 

and local governments does not encroach on States’ sovereignty or Tenth Amendment immunity. Id., at 240–242. 

In the course of so holding, we described the 1974 ADEA

amendment as “extend[ing] the substantive prohibitions of

the Act to employers having at least 20 workers [as opposed to 25 in the original version], and to the Federal and 

State Governments.” Id., at 233 (emphasis added). In this 

regard, we note, it is undisputed that the ADEA covers 

Federal Government entities, which our opinion in Wyoming grouped with state entities, regardless of the number 

of workers they employ. 29 U. S. C. §633a.

Instructive as well, the phrase “also means” occurs

dozens of times throughout the U. S. Code, typically carry-
Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2018) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

ing an additive meaning. See Brief for Respondents 11–

13, and n. 2 (collecting citations). For example, 12 U. S. C. 

§1715z–1(i)(4), provides: 

“[T]he term ‘elderly families’ means families which 

consist of two or more persons the head of which (or

his spouse) is sixty-two years of age or over or is handicapped. Such term also means a single person who is 

sixty-two years of age or over or is handicapped.” 

“[A] single person” plainly adds to, rather than clarifies,

the preceding statutory delineation, “two or more persons.” Just so with States and their political subdivisions 

in the ADEA’s definition of “employer.” Notably, in

§1715z–1(i)(4), Congress repeated the “sixty-two years of

age or over or is handicapped” qualifier to render it applicable to “a single person.” In the ADEA, by contrast, 

Congress did not repeat the “twenty or more employees”

qualifier when referencing state and local government 

entities. This Court is not at liberty to insert the absent 

qualifier.

Furthermore, the text of §630(b) pairs States and their 

political subdivisions with agents, a discrete category that,

beyond doubt, carries no numerical limitation. See Tr. of 

Oral Arg. 55–56. The Fire District does not gainsay that 

the 20-employee restriction applies to §630(b)’s first sentence. Its construction, however, would lift that restriction for the agent portion of the second sentence, and 

then reimpose it for the portion of that sentence addressing States and their political subdivisions. We resist a 

reading so strange.2 

The Fire District presses the argument that the ADEA

should be interpreted in line with Title VII, which, as 

noted supra, at 3, applies to state and local governments 

—————— 

2We need not linger over possible applications of the agent clause, for

no question of agent liability is before us in this case. 
 

 

 

6 MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DIST. v. GUIDO 

Opinion of the Court 

only if they meet a numerosity specification. True, reading the ADEA as written to apply to States and political

subdivisions regardless of size gives the ADEA, in this 

regard, a broader reach than Title VII. But this disparity

is a consequence of the different language Congress chose 

to employ. See Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 

U. S. 167, 174 (2009) (differences between Title VII’s and 

the ADEA’s language should not be ignored). The better 

comparator is the FLSA, on which many aspects of the

ADEA are based. See 29 U. S. C. §626(b) (ADEA incorporates the “powers, remedies, and procedures” of the 

FLSA). Like the FLSA, the ADEA ranks States and political subdivisions as “employer[s]” regardless of the number 

of employees they have. 

The Fire District warns that applying the ADEA to

small public entities risks curtailment of vital public 

services such as fire protection. Experience suggests

otherwise. For 30 years, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has consistently interpreted the ADEA

as we do today. EEOC Compliance Manual: Threshold 

Issues §2–III(B)(1)(a)(i), and n. 99. See also Kelly, 801 

F. 2d, at 270, n. 1. And a majority of States forbid age 

discrimination by political subdivisions of any size; some 

15 of these States subject private sector employers to age 

discrimination proscriptions only if they employ at least a

threshold number of workers. See Brief for Respondents

28–29, and n. 6 (collecting citations). No untoward service 

shrinkages have been documented. 

In short, the text of the ADEA’s definitional provision, 

also its kinship to the FLSA and differences from Title 

VII, leave scant room for doubt that state and local governments are “employer[s]” covered by the ADEA regardless of their size. 

* * * 

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of 
Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2018) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is 

Affirmed.

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH took no part in the consideration

or decision of this case.