Docket No. 108319.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RENE

 AMIGON, Appellant.

Opinion filed November 18, 2010.

CHIEF JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court,

with opinion.

Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, Burke, and Theis

concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the State’s causation

evidence and the admission of his 1995 custodial statement. While

serving consecutive prison terms for first degree murder (720 ILCS

5/9–1(a)(1) (West 1992)) and two counts of aggravated battery with

a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12–4.2(a)(1) (West 1992)) stemming from a

1994 shooting incident, defendant was charged with a second murder

after another of the original shooting victims died from pneumonia

five years later. During trial in the circuit court of Cook County,

defendant’s 1995 custodial statement was admitted, as was causation

testimony from a Cook County assistant medical examiner. Defendant

was convicted of the murder and sentenced to mandatory life in

prison. The appellate court affirmed (388 Ill. App. 3d 26), and we
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affirm the appellate court judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1998, defendant and a codefendant were convicted in the

Cook County circuit court of first degree murder and two counts of

aggravated battery with a firearm for a 1995 gang-related shooting

that occurred when defendant was 18 years old. He was sentenced to

consecutive prison terms of 50, 30, and 20 years, respectively. During

the investigation of the incident in 1995, defendant made a custodial

statement.

One of defendant’s 1998 aggravated battery convictions was for

the shooting of Alfonso Ruiz. Ruiz was shot in the neck, causing a

spinal cord injury and paralyzing him from the neck down, leaving him

capable of moving only his head and biceps. After his initial

hospitalization and treatment, Ruiz was able to live with family

members, obtain his GED, and begin college classes. He later returned

to physical therapy with the goal of obtaining a driver’s license to

increase his independence by enabling him to drive a specially

equipped vehicle.

Approximately 51⁄2 years after he was shot, Ruiz was hospitalized

with community acquired bacterial pneumonia and died at the age of

22. After a number of Ruiz’s organs were removed for

transplantation, Dr. Nancy Jones, the Cook County assistant medical

examiner, conducted an autopsy. She concluded that the cause of

Ruiz’s death was “pneumonia due to quadriplegia due to a gunshot

wound to the neck.”

In January 2002, defendant was indicted for Ruiz’s murder (720

ILCS 5/9–1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1992)). He filed a motion requesting

the court to take notice that he was already serving a 30-year prison

sentence for the aggravated discharge of a firearm for Ruiz’s 1995

shooting. Defendant also filed a motion in limine to bar the use of his

1995 custodial statement to the police because it was not

electronically recorded, a violation of section 103–2.1 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103–2.1 (West 2006)). That

motion was denied.

At defendant’s 2006 trial for Ruiz’s murder, the State presented

evidence that included: (1) defendant’s 1995 custodial statement; (2)
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testimony about the extent of Ruiz’s injuries and activities after the

shooting; (3) a transcript of Ruiz’s testimony at defendant’s first trial

about the day of the shooting and the injuries Ruiz received; and (4)

the testimony of Dr. Jones, the assistant medical examiner who had

reviewed a report of Ruiz’s background and medical records and

conducted the autopsy.

At trial, Dr. Jones explained that ordinarily only relatively healthy

organs are harvested for transplantation and that Ruiz’s spleen, part

of his small intestine, heart, kidneys, pancreas, adrenal gland, and

many of his lymph nodes had been removed before she conducted the

autopsy. Although she could have obtained descriptions of the

removed organs and even had the organs returned for examination,

she did not find those actions necessary. The autopsy revealed acute

bacterial pneumonia in Ruiz’s lungs, and Dr. Jones identified it as

community acquired pneumonia because his infection did not originate

in a hospital. Dr. Jones stated she was unable to test for the specific

bacteria involved because of contamination from the prior organ

removal and the two-day delay in her receipt of the body.

Dr. Jones concluded, however, that Ruiz’s paralyzing gunshot

injury was related to his development of pneumonia and subsequent

death because the gunshot severely damaged his fourth cervical

vertebra, affecting his lung function.

Dr. Jones also stated that, as a quadriplegic, Ruiz showed typical

signs of medical wasting, causing him to become thinner and

compromising his immune system due to his inability to move around.

She was unable to analyze his immune system, however, because his

spleen and most of his lymph nodes had been removed. Dr. Jones

testified that Ruiz was “more susceptible” to pneumonia than a

“normal” 22-year-old because of his compromised immune system and

his inability to breathe regularly and deeply.

On cross-examination, Dr. Jones admitted that anyone can get

pneumonia. She added, however, that usually the disease is more

severe and lengthy when an individual’s immune system is

compromised, as occurs more commonly in older people and children.

Despite the five years between Ruiz’s initial injury and his death, Dr.

Jones concluded, within a reasonable degree of medical and scientific

certainty, that Ruiz’s death was a homicide because a gunshot wound

caused the quadriplegia that made him more susceptible to pneumonia.
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The defense presented no witnesses or evidence.

An hour after beginning deliberations, the jury requested a

transcript of Dr. Jones’ testimony and, after consulting with counsel,

the trial court informed the jury that a transcript was not available and

instructed it to continue deliberations. The jury found defendant guilty

of first degree murder. The trial court denied his posttrial motion

seeking either a judgment of acquittal or a new trial based on the

insufficiency of the State’s causation evidence and an alleged violation

of section 103–2.1(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725

ILCS 5/103–2.1(b) (West 2006)), requiring electronic recording of an

accused’s custodial statement. Defendant was sentenced to mandatory

life in prison with no possibility of parole because of his 1995 first

degree murder conviction (730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(i) (West

2006)). The appellate court affirmed the conviction. This court

allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315.

II. ANALYSIS

Before this court, defendant raises two issues: (1) the sufficiency

of the State’s proximate cause showing; and (2) the retroactive effect,

if any, of section 103–2.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

(725 ILCS 5/103–2.1 (West 2006)), requiring electronic recording of

an accused’s custodial statement if the statement is to be used as

adverse evidence in any criminal proceeding.

A. Proximate Cause

Defendant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the gunshot he fired in 1995, resulting in Ruiz’s

quadriplegia, was the proximate cause of Ruiz’s death from

pneumonia five years later. In examining this issue, we must consider

whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,

any reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d

237, 261 (1985). Thus, we must affirm defendant’s conviction unless

no reasonable jury could have found that the State had proven the

element of proximate cause beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant argues that the State failed to prove proximate cause

because it offered only Dr. Jones’ unsupported opinion that the
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quadriplegia from the gunshot wound compromised Ruiz’s immune

system, resulting in his death from pneumonia. He contends that Dr.

Jones admitted on cross-examination that able-bodied 22-year-olds

also get pneumonia and that she was unable to establish either: (1)

actual damage to Ruiz’s immune system because his spleen and lymph

nodes had been harvested for transplantation before the autopsy was

conducted; or (2) the specific type of bacteria underlying Ruiz’s

pneumonia due to contamination from the organ removal and the

delay in her receipt of the body.

Defendant maintains that without a sufficient factual basis for Dr.

Jones’ opinions, the jury could not give her testimony the proper

weight, as reflected by the jury’s request for a transcript of her

testimony during deliberations. Thus, the jury verdict was

unreasonable and speculative, and a new trial is necessary. See People

v. Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d 170, 177 (1987).

During oral arguments, defense counsel correctly recognized that

the issue of proximate cause generally presents a question for the jury

but stated that she believed the jury’s request for a transcript of Dr.

Jones’ testimony showed that it was “unclear” on that issue. In

addition, counsel candidly acknowledged that the jury could have

decided the causation question “either way” but argued that the jury

“could have acquitted” defendant.

The mere possibility that a rational jury could have acquitted

defendant based on the proximate cause evidence presented is not

enough, however, to reverse defendant’s conviction under the

standard this court must apply when reviewing a challenge to the

sufficiency of the State’s evidence. A reviewing court may only

overturn a jury’s finding by concluding that no reasonable trier of fact

could have found the requisite elements of the offense proven beyond

a reasonable doubt. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261. Here, even defendant

does not assert the impossibility that some rational fact finder could

have found sufficient proof of causation. Instead, he insists that the

jury did not have to find causation based on the State’s evidence, an

argument we must flatly reject.

Defendant also claims that allowing the verdict to stand will create

a “strict liability” standard for murder when the death occurs long

after the initial injury and the victim has otherwise recovered to “usual

health.” His strict liability argument is largely based on his belief that
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People v. Gulliford, 86 Ill. App. 3d 237 (1980), People v. Reader, 26

Ill. 2d 210 (1962), People v. Carrillo, 164 Ill. 2d 144 (1995), and

People v. Slywka, 365 Ill. App. 3d 34 (2006), are distinguishable from

this case. In Gulliford and Reader, the victims foreseeably died within

a few weeks of their initial injuries, but defendant argues that Ruiz’s

death from pneumonia over five years after being shot was not

reasonably foreseeable.

The length of time between the victim’s initial injuries and later

death has not been determinative of whether a defendant is liable for

murder based on foreseeability since the 1961 abolition of the

common law “one-year-and-a-day” rule. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953,

ch. 38, par. 365, with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 38, par. 9–1 et seq. See

also Carrillo, 164 Ill. 2d at 150 (concluding that the year-and-a-day

rule was legislatively abolished in 1961 and has not been part of the

criminal law of Illinois since that time). Under that rule, murder

charges were barred if the victim died more than a year and a day after

the crime. As the appellate court in People v. Brown, 57 Ill. App. 3d

528, 531-32 (1978), correctly noted, “[t]he existence of a time

interval between the defendant’s act and death does not preclude ***

a causal link [citation]; this is true even where, during this interval,

there has been an apparent recovery from the injuries inflicted.” Thus,

we are not persuaded that defendant’s murder conviction should be

reversed based on the shorter lapses of time between the victims’

injuries and their deaths in Gulliford and Reader.

Defendant also attempts to distinguish his case from Carrillo and

Slywka. In those cases, the lengthy intervals between the victims’

initial injuries and their subsequent deaths, nine years in Carrillo and

eight years in Slywka, were not held to be impediments to the filing of

murder charges. Defendant asserts that those two cases are

distinguishable becausethose victims never recovered from their initial

injuries and “languished” for years before dying (Carrillo, 164 Ill. 2d

at 146; Slywka, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 37), while Ruiz was in a “usual

state of health” when he developed pneumonia, according to hospital

records. As defendant points out, Ruiz had returned to his community,

had obtained his GED, had begun college course work, and was

learning to drive a car when he died.

We are not persuaded by defendant’s argument, however, because

it ignores the reality that Ruiz never fully recovered or returned to
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“normal” life after being shot. He remained a quadriplegic after the

shooting and, according to Dr. Jones, suffered serious secondary

effects to his breathing and immune system as a result of his paralysis.

According to Dr. Jones, those adverse consequences, while not

curtailing his activities completely or leaving him to “languish” for

years, made him more susceptible to pneumonia and less capable of

surviving it.

Although defendant criticizes Dr. Jones’ testimony for a lack of

factual support underlying her opinions on the damage to Ruiz’s

immune system resulting from his quadriplegia, the record reveals that

she testified extensively about the degree of medical wasting she noted

during the autopsy. Early in her testimony, she stated that “the most

remarkable thing” about her external examination of the body was the

“generalized wasting and weight loss with very promenade [sic] bone

and skeletal region.” The autopsy report indicated that Ruiz was five

foot seven inches tall but weighed only 107 pounds, although the

removal of his organs for transplantation reduced his weight

“somewhat.”

Dr. Jones also testified that Ruiz’s liver exhibited changes that

were “not uncommon with individuals who have been losing weight

or wasting away over a period of time.” In addition, she noted the

“atrophy or wasting away [of Ruiz’s spinal cord] from damage that

had been done to the cord from the bullet passing through the spinal

column.” She explained that this atrophy allowed a portion of Ruiz’s

damaged brain stem “on the base of the skull *** to go down the

spinal cord.” She pointed out the evidence of generalized wasting,

spinal cord atrophy, and brain stem movement in photographs shown

to the jury.

When asked about the connection between Ruiz’s gunshot wound

and his pneumonia, Dr. Jones explained that:

“[an] individual who has paralysis or quadriplegia *** from

injuries to their spinal column also begin[s] to undergo

medical wasting. They become thinner and their immune

systems become compromised because of that muscle wasting,

that inability to move and get around adequately. So

individuals with damage to the spinal cords are ***

compromised because their immune system isn’t as strong as

it would normally be in an individual who didn’t have those
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problems.”

Based on the autopsy and her review of Ruiz’s records, Dr. Jones

determined that he “died as result of pneumonia due to quadriplegia

due to a gunshot wound to the neck.” She testified that, within a

reasonable degree of medical and scientific certainty, Ruiz’s death was

a homicide despite the time that had elapsed since his initial gunshot

injury.

Moreover, Dr. Jones’ testimony established that her conclusions

did not rely solely on her medical opinion that Ruiz’s immune system

was damaged from his quadriplegia and resultant medical wasting. She

testified that Ruiz developed and succumbed to pneumonia because

his paralyzing gunshot injury severely damaged his fourth cervical

vertebra. She explained that the nerves joining the spinal cord between

the fourth and fifth cervical vertebras affect the ability to breathe by

using the diaphragm. The gunshot injury to Ruiz’s fourth cervical

vertebra area damaged those nerves, reducing his “ability to expand

his lungs regularly or completely and fully for normal pulmonary

toilet.”

Dr. Jones also explained the effects of pneumonia on the body.

She stated that pneumonia “reduces the person’s ability to exchange

air,” taking in oxygen and expelling carbon dioxide and other waste

gases. “If the lung is compromised in any way, say with pneumonia,

the normal gas exchange cannot go on. So the oxygen level becomes

reduced, and so the organs of the body do not get as much oxygen as

they need to survive.”

She then connected Ruiz’s impaired lung function to his death

from pneumonia, stating that:

“we need an intact nervous system in order to breathe

adequately and to prevent ourselves from developing

pneumonia or infections. We need to be able to take deep

breaths, filling our lungs. And we need to be able to expel that

air completely because any time we can’t completely empty

out the lungs, it allows for secretions, mucosa, saliva, to

accumulte [sic] in the lungs, typically in the lower lungs, and

it becomes a growth media for bacteria. So anything that can

compromise your ability to breathe is going to increase our

risk for developing pneumonia.”
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Dr. Jones concluded that Ruiz was “more susceptible” to

pneumonia than a “normal” 22-year-old due to his compromised

immune system and his inability to breathe regularly and deeply. She

noted that while a “normally healthy 22 years old [sic] usually

survive[s]” pneumonia, because Ruiz’s immune system and lung

function were compromised as a result of his quadriplegia from the

gunshot wound, “he ended up dying from this community acquired

bacteria.”

Dr. Jones completed her direct examination by summarizing that:

“[g]eneralized muscles [sic] atrophy, loss of body mass ***

would affect [Ruiz’s] ability to maintain a normal immune

response.

So Mr. Ruiz acquired a bacterial pneumonia in the

community which because he was a quadriplegic, had atrophy

and muscle wasting and his respiratory capabilities were

compromised because the gunshot wound made him more

susceptible than a normal 22 year old would be.”

Defendant argues that Dr. Jones’ causation testimony suffers from

the same lack of factual support as the expert testimony this court

rejected in People v. Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d 170, 177 (1987). We

disagree.

In Brackett, the doctor failed to perform an autopsy to determine

the source of the embolism that killed the apparently recovering

victim, and at trial he merely “surmised” that the source of the

embolism was the knife wound inflicted by the defendant. In contrast,

here Dr. Jones performed an autopsy, and her testimony was far more

specific and clear about the connection between the gunshot injury

and Ruiz’s ultimate death from pneumonia.

Although the jury did not have to find proximate cause beyond a

reasonable doubt based on Dr. Jones’ testimony, as defense counsel

acknowledged during oral argument, its conclusion that causation

existed beyond a reasonable doubt was supported by sufficient

evidence. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to

the State, a reasonable jury could have come to the same conclusion

after considering Dr. Jones’ testimony, particularly where she

provided the only medical testimony admitted at trial.

Finally, defendant asserts that the appellate court’s reasoning
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would have allowed defendant to be indicted for murder regardless of

when or how Ruiz died simply because he was a quadriplegic. He adds

that the legislature’s purposes of providing for proportionate penalties

while recognizing defendants’ rehabilitative potentials are adequately

satisfied by the sentences totaling 100 years he was already serving for

offenses related to Ruiz’s shooting. These prior sentences effectively

sentence him to life in prison. See 720 ILCS 5/1–2(c) (West 2006).

Defendant argues that adding another natural life sentence for Ruiz’s

murder would be arbitrary and oppressive, particularly when Ruiz

went on to perform many of the same activities as an able-bodied 22-

year-old and Dr. Jones could not specify the type of bacteria

underlying his pneumonia.

We initially note that the sufficiency of Dr. Jones’ testimony to

meet the State’s burden of establishing causation appears unrelated to

defendant’s sentencing argument. Even if defendant’s sentencing

argument is considered, he fails to cite any case law or other authority

for his position, and we have found none. He also does not raise a

constitutional challenge to the mandatory life statute or its application

in his case.

The legislature has chosen to make a natural life sentence

mandatory if the defendant has previously been convicted of first

degree murder. 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(c)(i) (West 2006). We

conclude that defendant’s claim runs counter to the clear legislative

intent to provide for lifetime imprisonment for offenders deemed too

dangerous to be released into society. The class of individuals for

whom the legislature has chosen to mandate mandatory life sentences

includes those, such as defendant, convicted of more than one first

degree murder. We will not override the clear and express will of the

legislature in enacting the mandatory life-sentencing statute based on

defendant’s bare assertion that the addition of a natural life sentence

for his latest murder conviction would be arbitrary and oppressive

under the circumstances in this case. Defendant’s unrelated sentencing

argument does not alter our conclusion that the State presented

sufficient causation evidence for a reasonable jury to find defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
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B. Electronic Recording Statute 

The second issue raised on appeal is whether the appellate court

erred by failing to apply section 103–2.1(b) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103–2.1(b) (West 2006))

retroactively. This issue of statutory interpretation presents a question

of law to be decided de novo on appeal. People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d

188, 198 (2007). The primary goal in construing a statute is to

determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature. The most reliable

means of accomplishing that goal is to apply the plain and ordinary

meaning of the statutory language. We may not depart from the

statute’s plain language by reading in exceptions, limitations, or

conditions that conflict with the legislature’s intent. In re Detention of

Hardin, 238 Ill. 2d 33, 40 (2010).

Section 103–2.1(b) states:

“An oral, written, or sign language statement of an

accused made as a result of a custodial interrogation at a

police station or other place of detention shall be presumed to

be inadmissible as evidence against the accused in any criminal

proceeding *** unless:

(1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial

interrogation; and

(2) the recording is substantially accurate and not

intentionally altered.” 725 ILCS 5/103–2.1(b) (West

2006).

Although this provision was enacted in 2003, the legislature expressly

delayed its effective date until July 2005.

Defendant’s brief relies solely on the argument presented in his

petition for leave to appeal. In that petition, he contends the trial court

erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude his 1995 non-videorecorded custodial statement because it violated section 103–2.1(b).

At oral argument, however, defense counsel candidly conceded to

the court that defendant’s statement was made before the statute’s

effective date. In addition, she agreed that the legislature’s decision to

delay implementation of the recording requirement for two years

established that it intended the recording requirement not to be applied

retroactively to exclude custodial statements made years before the

statute’s enactment date.
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Moreover, defense counsel noted at oral argument that she was

unable to find any case law to support the argument that the

legislature intended the statute to apply retroactively. Notably, neither

of the two appellate decisions cited by the State, People v. Buck, 361

Ill. App. 3d 923 (2005), and People v. Armstrong, 395 Ill. App. 3d

606 (2009), support the retroactive application of the section.

In Buck, the trial court refused defendant’s modified jury

instructions based on section 103–2.1(b). The appellate court

affirmed, noting that the statute underlying the modifications was not

in effect when the defendant made his custodial statement and that the

modified jury instructions had not yet been adopted. Buck, 361 Ill.

App. 3d at 941-42. In Armstrong, only one of the defendant’s three

statements had been electronically recorded, but the appellate court

held that all three statements were properly admitted because the

victim was still being treated at the hospital and had not yet died when

the statements were made, making the statute inapplicable. Neither of

these cases can be construed to support defendant’s argument that the

electronic recording requirement should be imposed retroactively

here.

We conclude that the legislature’s express decision to delay the

enforcement of the electronic recording requirement until 2005, nearly

10 years after the custodial statement at issue in this case, establishes

its intent that the statute not be applied retroactively, as the defense

conceded. In addition, defendant has failed to cite any case law for the

retroactivity argument presented in his petition for leave to appeal.

Accordingly, we decline to override the will of the legislature and

reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion in limine to

exclude his 1995 custodial statement because it violated section

103–2.1(b).

III. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, we conclude that defendant has failed to

meet his burden of showing that no reasonable jury could have found

that the State proved the element of causation beyond a reasonable

doubt. We also conclude that the electronic recording requirement of

section 103–2.1(b) (725 ILCS 5/103–2.1(b) (West 2006)) does not

apply retroactively in this case to bar the admission of his 1995
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custodial statement to the police. His statement was properly admitted

at trial. Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court judgment.

Appellate court judgment affirmed.