[Cite as In re M.J. , 2015-Ohio-127.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY

IN THE MATTERS OF: M.J. and J.J.

Appellate Case No s. 2014-CA-32 and 2014-CA-33

Trial Court Case Nos. S44220 and S43007

(Appeal from Domestic Relations Court)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 16th day of January, 2015.

. . . . . . . . . . . BRITTANY M. HENSLEY, Atty. Reg. No. 0086269, Assistant Greene County Prosecuting Attorney, Counsel for Greene County Childre n Services, 55 Greene Street, First Floor, Xenia, Ohio 45385 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee JENNIFER GETTY, Atty. Reg. No. 0074317, 46 Ea st Franklin Street, Dayton, Ohio 45459 Attorney for Appellee - A.H. MARCY A. VONDERWELL, Atty. Reg. No. 0078311, 120 West Second Street, Suite 333, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Appellant - C.J. JOAN ACKERMAN, c/o Greene County Juvenile C ourt, 2100 Greene Way Boulevard, Xenia, Ohio 45385 Guardian Ad Litem

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

 WELBAUM, J. {¶ 1} Appellant, C.J., the biological fath er of J.J. and M.J., appeals from a judgment terminating his parental rights to th e children. The biological mother, A.H., has not appealed from the judgment termin ating her parental rights. {¶ 2} In support of his appeal, C.J. contends that the judgment that he abandoned his children is against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. C.J. also contends that the judgment that the children c ould not be placed with him within a reasonable period of time is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Finally, C.J. contends that granting permanent custody to Greene County Children Services (GCCS) is not in the best interests of the minor

children. {¶ 3} We conclude that the judgment of the trial court granting permanent custody of the children to GCCS is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, is supported by clear and convincing evidence, and is in the best interests of the children. A ccordingly, the judgment of the

trial court will be affirmed.

I. Facts and Course of Proceedings {¶ 4} In April 2011, GCCS filed a dependency complaint in j uvenile court, alleging that J.J., who was born in February 2011, lacked ad equate care because of the mental or physical condition of her parents, A.H. and C.J. The complaint alleged that GCCS had been involved with the parents previously, when their older ch ild had been placed with the child’s maternal grandmother. {¶ 5} According to the complaint, J.J. had tested positive for marijuana when she was 3

 born, and A.H. admitted to having used marijuana throughout her pregnancy. After receiving a referral, GCCS attempted a safety plan, with A.H. and the baby living with the alleged paternal great-grandfather, and A.H. working with the agency. The plan was unsuccessful, and A.H. agreed to place J.J. in foster care. At th e time, A.H. claimed that she did not know the whereabouts of the child’s father, C.J. In June 2011, the court found that the child was dependent, and awarded tem porary custody to GCCS. {¶ 6} Because A.H. expressed little to no intere st in working with GCCS or completing a case plan, A.H. was removed from the plan and the child was placed with her maternal grandfather in November 2011. By that time, A. H. had tested positive for marijuana on three random drug screens. In March 2012, the court aw arded legal custody to the grandfather, B.H., noting that A.H. had not had contact with the child since the spring of 2011. {¶ 7} On August 5, 2012, A.H. gave birth to another child (M.J.), who had also been fathered by C.J. On August 7, 2012, GCCS reque sted an emergency order of custody of M.J., alleging that there were reasonable grounds to believe M.J. was in imme diate danger from his surroundings. The court issued an order the same day, granting emergency custody of M.J. to GCCS. GCCS then filed a depe ndency complaint on August 8, 2012, based on the fact that A.H. was currently residing at the Family Violence Protection Center due to a history of abuse by C.J. Although A.H. denied having contact with C.J., he had been at the hospital on August 6 and 7, and A.H. planned to have C.J.’s mother transport her from the hospital to the shelter. According to the shelter, A.H. had demonstrated a history of non-compliance with the shelter’s requirements.

{¶ 8} On August 21, 2012, the juvenile court gr anted interim custody of M.J. to GCCS. 4

 A case plan was developed, which required A.H. to obtain stable housing apart from C.J., and to comply with other requirements, including s ubmitting to random drug screens, continuing counseling, and so forth. M.J. was placed in foster care, and A.H. was permitted visits under supervision at the Family Violence Prevention Center due to concerns over C.J.’s prior domestic

violence. The court then set an ad judicatory hearing for October 2, 2012. {¶ 9} On September 17, 2012, an amended case plan was filed, indicating that A.H. had obtained her own apartment, and visitation would be permitted at the apartment. Subsequently, on September 28, 2012, A.H. filed a motion for emergency custody of J.J. She noted in the motion that her father, B.H., who had custody of J.J., was homeless and had placed

J.J. in her care a month earlier. A.H. also indi cated that she was starting school in two weeks and needed to enroll J.J. in daycare. She included C.J.’s address, and indicated that he was subject to a protection order that the domestic re lations court had issued in 2012. {¶ 10} On October 3, 2012, by agreement of GCCS and A.H., the court returned custody of M.J. to A.H., with protective supervision to GCCS. At the time, A.H. was enrolled in college, had completed the “Moms” program at the Wome n’s Center, had moved to her own two-bedroom apartment, and had received a mental health a ssessment. Subsequently, on October 15, 2012, the court gave A.H. interim custody of J.J., and again granted GCCS protective supervision. At the time, A.H. tested negative for any illegal drug use. The father, C.J., was in court at that time. {¶ 11} In November 2012, GCCS filed an am ended case plan, including C.J., and adding services and requirements for him. Accordin g to the plan, C.J. had been in and out of jail for probation violations, had a hi story of drug abuse, and had no stable living environment or income. Both parents were requi red to comply with the civil pr otection order, submit to random 5

 drug screens, obtain counseling, and not engage in domestic violence. The amended case plan was approved, and the court returned legal custody of J.J. to the mother, with GCCS maintaining protective supervision. {¶ 12} Subsequently, on January 16, 2013, GCCS obtained an emergency order of custody for J.J. and M.J. GCCS then filed a complaint on January 17, 2013, alleging that the children were dependent pursuan t to R.C. 2151.04(C). According to the complaint, A.H. had called the agency on January 16, 2013, to report that she had been offered a modeling job for a magazine in Las Vegas and would be leaving with the children the next day. Reportedly, the magazine was furnishing her with a four-bedr oom house, a nanny, and a car. After receiving a release to speak to the employer, a “Mr. Fine” of Virtually Beautiful Magazine , GCCS was unable to confirm A.H.’s potential addr ess and the details of her empl oyment. Upon researching the magazine, GCCS found a website c ontaining nude pictures and refe rences to exotic aquatic pool parties. {¶ 13} The complaint further alleged that upon obtaining ex parte custody, a caseworker

went to A.H.’s house to obtain the children. A. H. was not home, and the children were being cared for by an uncle and friend, who expressed concern about the children because the mother was never home. Contrary to wh at the caseworker had been told, the mother was working at a dance club, where she had met Mr. Fine. {¶ 14} There were also concerns about violation of the protecti on order. C.J. had been arrested on January 8, 2013, for violating the pr otection order, and was in the Greene County

Adult Detention Center. C.J. told the caseworke r that he had seen A.H. over a hundred times (in violation of the order). 6

 {¶ 15} On January 22, 2013, the juvenile court f iled an entry granting interim custody to GCCS. A.H. was ordered to have a drug screen, and tested positive for marijuana and benzodiazepines. The children were placed in foster care, and an adjudicatory hearing was scheduled for March 15, 2013. An amended case pl an was filed, giving A.H. restricted and supervised visits, and again requiring A.H. to comply with various requirements, including counseling, random drug screens, and so fo rth. At the time, C.J. was still in jail. {¶ 16} Neither parent appeared at the March adjudicatory hearing, despite having been notified. The children were adjudicated depe ndent, and GCCS was give n temporary custody. An amended case plan was filed in March 2013, listing reunification as the goal. The plan did not list visitation for C.J., but GCCS indicated it would help facilitate visits for C.J. if the civil protection order or the c ourt allowed visits. {¶ 17} A.H. visited the children sporadically, and did not visit them at all between May 8, 2013 and January 27, 2014, despite re peated attempts by GCCS to involve her. A semi-annual review filed in August 2013 indicated that C.J. was again in jail and had felony charges for violating the protection order. He had also been diagnosed with bipolar disorder in April 2012 and was not taking any medication. {¶ 18} On September 11, 2013, the GCCS caseworke r in charge of the case, Krista V., accidentally encountered A.H. and C.J. together n ear the courthouse on the day that C.J. had been released from jail. Krista asked A.H. if she wanted to work on reuni fication, and after some hesitation and arguing, A.H. agreed to come into the agency. A.H. refused to give the caseworker an address, however. A.H. came into the agen cy and the case plan was updated. The following week, A.H. asked about visitation, and Krista told her it would take some time to process. When 7

 Krista attempted to reach A.H. the following week, the number A.H. had given her was disconnected, and GCCS was unable to contact A.H. The agency was also unable to reach C.J. Both parents tested positive fo r marijuana in September 2013. {¶ 19} On November 4, 2013, GCCS filed a motion requesting modification of temporary custody to permanent custody. The mo tion noted that A.H. had not seen the children since May 2013, and had not kept in contact with the agency to schedule visitation. The motion

also noted that C.J. had not been able to visit the children due to a protection order that had been in effect from August 2012 to August 2013. Ho wever, after being released from jail in September 2013, C.J. had not engaged in case plan activities and had not ke pt in contact with

GCCS in order to schedule visitation. {¶ 20} On November 13, 2013, GCCS filed an am ended case plan, adding restricted and supervised visitation for C.J. The plan indicated that C.J. would need to meet certain requirements before visitation c ould begin, including meeting with a caseworker to establish a schedule, and starting case plan services. Th e same requirements pert ained to A.H. {¶ 21} C.J. and A.H. did not contact G CCS until mid-December 2013, when they came together to the agency to ask about visitation. Visitation for A.H. and C.J. began on January 27, 2014, when they saw the children. However, two days later, on January 29, 2014, C.J. was

arrested for domestic violence and was incarcerated between th en and April 28, 2014. A.H. saw the children five times between January 29, 2014, and March 3, 2014, a nd did not schedule visitation thereafter. A.H. also did not partic ipate in her case plan. {¶ 22} On January 3, 2014, the court scheduled a permanent custody hearing for March 11, 2014, and appointed a guardian ad litem for the children (GAL). The GAL’s preliminary 8

 report, filed on January 28, 2014, r ecommended that the court award permanent custody to GCCS. The GAL then filed a report and recommendati on on March 5, 2014, indicating that the parents had lived together for about a month before C.J. ’s most recent arrest for domestic violence and driving under suspension. A.H. was reportedly preg nant with the father’s fourth child. In addition, C.J. had a history of mental health, dr ug, and legal issues dating to his early teenage years. The GAL noted that despite repeated atte mpts by GCCS, the parents had not been able to complete the goals established by the court and their case plan, and had not shown a consistent interest in visitation. Further, the children were thriving in foster care. The GAL, therefore, recommended that permanent custody be awarded to GCCS. {¶ 23} The custody hearing was continue d until May 28, 2014. In the meantime, C.J. was released from jail on April 28, 2014. After being released from jail, C.J. had three visits with the children. He also had followed up on his me dication at TCN, but had missed appointments on May 15, 19, and 21, 2014, with his case managers there. He was also attending a dual-diagnosis group, which met weekly. {¶ 24} A.H. did not appear at the hearing, although she was represented by counsel. GCCS presented evidence at the hearing from th e various caseworkers who had worked on the case, and from the foster mother, who indicated that the children were doing very well in her care, and that she wished to adopt the children if G CCS were granted permanent custody. M.J. had been in her care since birth, other than the three months that A.H. had custody, and J.J. had been in her care since January 2013. {¶ 25} C.J. also testified at the hearing. He stated that he had obtained two jobs in the two weeks before the hearing, for which he was be ing paid under the table. None of his money 9

 had gone towards the support of the children. In fact, C.J. had never supported the children in any way since their birth. {¶ 26} C.J. also indicated that he was suppos ed to be living with his grandmother. However, he stated at the custody hearing that he had been “roughing” it lately, staying at a cousin’s, as well as his grandmot her’s, and had slept in a park. In addition, C.J. had tested positive for marijuana the previous week, and admitted he would likely test positive again on the day of the custody hearing. Furthermore, C.J. al so testified that he had seen A.H. the previous week at an event called “Cruise Fest,” and that they had intercourse. {¶ 27} After hearing the evidence, the tria l court filed a judgment on June 12, 2014, granting permanent custody of J.J. and M.J. to GCCS. In its decision, th e trial court concluded that both parents had abandoned the children, a nd that despite reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency, C.J. had con tinuously and repeatedly failed to remedy the conditions causing the children to be placed outside the home. The court further concluded that the children could not be placed with either pare nt within a reasonable period of time, and that there were no suitable relative placements available. {¶ 28} C.J. now appeals from the judgment awar ding permanent custody of the children to GCCS. As was noted, A.H. has not appealed from the court’s decision.

II. {¶ 29} C.J.’s First Assignment of Error states that: The Judgment of the Trial Court That Father Abandoned the Minor Children Was Against the Manifest Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence. 10

 {¶ 30} Under this assignment of error, C. J. contends that GCCS did not present

sufficient evidence that the child ren were abandoned. The trial c ourt concluded that C.J. had abandoned the children by failing to visit them between January 2013 and January 2014. C.J. argues, however, that he rebutted the presumpti on of abandonment because GCCS refused to set up visitation. {¶ 31} As pertinent here, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) states that: * * * [T]he court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines, * * * by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply: (a) the child is not abandoned or orphane d or has not been in the custody of one or more public children services agencies * * * for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period e nding on or after March 18, 1999, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents. (b) the child is abandoned. {¶ 32} With respect to abandonment, R.C. 2151.011(C) provides that: For the purposes of this chapter, a ch ild shall be presumed abandoned when the parents of the child have failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than ninety days, regardless of whet her the parents resume contact with the child after that period of ninety days. {¶ 33} The presumption of abandonment under R.C. 2151.011(C) is rebuttable. See In 11

 re Custody of C.E. , 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2005-CA -11, 2005-Ohio-5913, ¶ 12, citing In re Cornell , 11th Dist. Portage No.2003-P-0054, 2003-Ohio-5007, fn. 2; and In re Phillips , 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2005-A-0020, 2005-Ohio-3774, ¶ 32. {¶ 34} With respect to challenges based on manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence, the Tenth District Cour t of Appeals has noted that: In determining whether the trial court's ruling on the permanent custody motion is against the manifest weight of the evidence, we must consider whether the evidence on each element of the agency's case “satisfied or failed to satisfy the burden of persuasion,” i.e., whether cl ear and convincing evidence supports each

element. See Sparre v. Ohio Dept. of Transp ., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-381, 2013-Ohio-4153, ¶ 11, citing Eastley v. Volkman , 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. A judgment “ ‘supporte d by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” Id . at ¶ 10, quoting C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. , 54 Ohio St.2d 279 (1978), syllabus. “ ‘The phrase “some competen t, credible evidence” * * * presupposes evidentiary weighing by an appellate court to determine whether the evidence is competent and credible.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Id. , quoting Eastley at ¶ 15.

In re C.G. , 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 13AP-632, 13AP-653, 2014-Ohio-279, ¶ 30. {¶ 35} After making these comments, the Te nth District Court of Appeals further

commented that: “ ‘Weight of the evidence concerns “t he inclination of the greater amount 12

 of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. * * * Weight is not a ques tion of mathematics, but depends on [the evidence's] effect in inducing be lief.” ’ ” (Emphasis deleted.) Eastley at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990). “Thus, in reviewing a judgment under the manifest-weight standard, a court of appeals weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way.” Sparre at ¶ 10, citing Eastley at ¶ 20. “In undertaking this limited reweighing of the evidence, however, we are guided by the presumption that the factual findings of the trial c ourt were correct.” Sparre at ¶ 12. “Accordingly, the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily questions to be answered by the trier of

fact.” Id. , citing State v. DeHass , 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. The rationale for this deference is the trier of fact is in the best position

to view witnesses and observe their de meanor, voice inflections, and gestures. Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland , 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). Moreover, though sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts, a finding that a judgment is supported by the manifest we ight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding that sufficient evid ence supports the judgment. See State v. Howze , 10th Dist. No. 13AP-386, 2013-Ohio-4800, ¶ 10.

C.G. at ¶ 31-32. 13

 {¶ 36} After reviewing the evidence, we conclude that the trial court’s decision on abandonment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and was supported by clear and convincing evidence. {¶ 37} Although C.J. was in jail during part s of 2013, he was released from jail on September 11, 2013. The protection order had also expired by that time, and C.J. would have been entitled to see his children, regardless of the content of the order. However, C.J. did not

seek visitation with his children until mid-Decembe r 2013, a period of more than ninety days.

Unlike the mother in Custody of C.E. , C.J. had no valid reason for failing to maintain contact with the children. Specifically, the mother in that cas e did not contact her children in order to avoid the substantial possibility that her location would be disclosed to her phy sically abusive husband. Custody of C.E. , 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2005-CA-11, 2005-Ohio-5913, at ¶ 15. In Custody of

C.E. , we stressed that there was no evidence cont radicting the mother’s testimony about her reason for failing to contact the children. Id. {¶ 38} Furthermore, even after C.J. es tablished contact on January 27, 2014, he voluntarily committed acts, i.e., domestic violence, that caused his return to jail, and disrupted his contact with the children for another 90-day pe riod. The other acts that caused C.J. to be incarcerated between at least Ap ril and September 2013 (during whic h time he also did not see the children), were also voluntary. {¶ 39} Moreover, the fact that C.J. visited with the children after he was released from jail in late April 2014 does not negate the presumption of aba ndonment. As was noted in the case

of In re D.P. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP- 780, 2007-Ohio-1703, “R.C. 2151.011(C) clearly indicates that it is immaterial whether the parent resumes contact with the child after the period of 14

 abandonment.” Id. at ¶ 7, citing In re Cravens , 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-03-48, 2004-Ohio-2356, ¶ 23. {¶ 40} C.J. relies on In re N.C.P. , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2014CA00083, 2014-Ohio-3694, in support of the proposition that if a parent attempts to visit but is prevented from doing so by the agency, “it would be difficult to prove that th e parent’s actions were the equivalent of abandonment.” Brief of Appellant, C.J., p. 8. We agree that the Fifth Dist rict Court of Appeals

did make such a statement in N.C.P. See, id. at ¶ 27, citing In re Adoptions of Groh , 153 Ohio App.3d 414, 424, 794 N.E.2d 695 (7th Dist.2003). Notabl y, however, the court of appeals did not find that the agency had interfered with visitation in N.C.P. Likewise, there is no evidence in the case before us that GCCS interfered with C.J.’s attempts to visit his children. {¶ 41} Instead, C.J.’s own actions caused a di fferent court to issue a protection order against C.J. in August 2012. In November 2012, G CCS added C.J. to the case plan, and required him to do certain things, including abiding by th e rules of his probation a nd the protection order, and not engaging in domestic violence incidents. Instead of doing so, C.J. admitted violating the protection order, and e nded up in jail again shortly thereaf ter, from January to March 2013. {¶ 42} Furthermore, despite having been notif ied of the adjudicatory hearing on March 15, 2013, and having been released from jail, C.J. fa iled to appear for the hearing. A few days after the hearing, GCCS filed an amended case plan, indicating that the agency would help facilitate visitation between C.J. and the children if the protection order or the court allowed visitation. Instead of taking steps to obtain vi sitation, C.J. again violat ed the civil protection order and was incarcerated from April to Sept ember 2013. Once visitation was established in January 2014, C.J. again committed domestic violen ce and was incarcerated for several more 15

 months. Thus, any lack of visita tion was not the fault of GCCS. {¶ 43} Accordingly, the judgment that the children were abandoned is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and is supporte d by clear and convincing evidence. The First Assignment of Error, therefore, is overruled.

III. Pl acement of Children Within a Reasonable Time {¶ 44} C.J.’s Second Assignment of Error states that:

The Judgment of the Trial Court That the Children Could Not Be Placed With the Father Within a Reasonable Period of Time Was Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence. {¶ 45} Under this assignment of error, C.J. contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the children coul d not be placed with him within a reasonable period of time. In this regard, C.J. notes that he was able to follow through with services when he was incarcerated,

and that after his latest releas e from jail, he was cooperating with his treatment and had secured employment. C.J. further points to his tes timony that the children could stay with his grandmother. {¶ 46} We have already concluded that the trial court did not err in finding that C.J. had abandoned the children. Since this finding would permit the court to conc lude that a grant of permanent custody to GCCS was appropriate, we are not required to addre ss the remaining ground for terminating parental rights. However, even if we were required to consider the matter, we would find the alleged error without merit. 16

 {¶ 47} As was noted, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) provi des an alternate ground for awarding permanent custody to an agency, where “the child is not abandoned or orphane d or has not been in the custody of one or more public children services agencies * * * for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999, a nd the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.” {¶ 48} Under R.C. 2151.414(E), “[t]he court must consider all relevant evidence before determining the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents.” N.C.P. , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2014CA00083, 2014-Ohio-3694, at ¶ 31. “A trial court may ba se its decision that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with a pa rent upon the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors. The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.” Id. , citing In re William S ., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 661 N.E.2d 738 (1996). (O ther citations omitted.) See, also, In re Gau , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18630, 2001 WL 523963, *6 (May 18, 2001), and In re B.G.W. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-181, 2008-Oh io-3693, ¶ 11 (both citing William S. ). {¶ 49} In concluding that the children could not be placed with C.J. within a reasonable time, the trial court noted that C. J. had failed to remedy the cond itions that caused the children to be removed from the home, and that his stated intent to now comply with case plan activities was belied by his continued use of ma rijuana and his continued involve ment with A.H. Thus, the court relied on R.C. 2151.414(E)(1 ), which states that : Following the placement of the child outside the child's home and 17

 notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and re peatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child's home. In determining whether the pare nts have substantially reme died those conditions, the court shall consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and

other social and rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental duties. {¶ 50} The trial court’s observations are we ll-supported in the record, by clear and convincing evidence, and the cour t’s conclusions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence indicates that during the pendency of the case, the parents made little or no use of rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available, and there was very little likelihood, in view of C.J.’s comments at the hearing, that the conditions causing the children to be removed would be remedied within a reasonable time. Instead, C.J. continued to use marijuana and have contact w ith A.H. – courses of conduct that had proven disastrous in the past. Accordingly, the Second A ssignment of Error is overruled.

IV. Best Interests of the Children {¶ 51} C.J.’s Third Assignment of Error states that: The Granting of Permanent Custody to GCCS Was Not in the Best Interest

of the Children. 18

 {¶ 52} Under this assignment of error, C. J. contends that the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D) indicate that granting permanent custody to GCCS was not in the best interest of the children. In this regard, C.J. argues that th e children had a bond with him; that the children had not been in the agency’s custody for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22 months; and that he believed he could pr ovide a legally secure permanent home for the children. {¶ 53} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) provides that: In determining the best interest of a child * * * the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster car egivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (b) The wishes of the child, as expresse d directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has b een in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty -two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Re vised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equi valent agency in another state; (d) The child's need for a legally s ecure permanent placement and whether 19

 that type of placement can be achieved wit hout a grant of permanent custody to the

agency; (e) Whether any of the factors in divi sions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child. {¶ 54} We have previously held that “ ‘onl y one of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D) needs to be resolved in favor of the award of permanent custody in order for the court to terminate parental rights.’ ” In re N.Q. , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25428, 2013-Ohio-3176, ¶ 71, citing In re Z.T. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88009, 2007-Ohio-827, ¶ 56. (Other citations omitted.) {¶ 55} All the factors, not just one, weigh in favor of granting permanent custody to

GCCS. The children have bonded very well with their foster mo ther, with whom they have lived a great deal of their lives. They have also bonded with her family, including her parents, whom they see frequently. The children are much healthier than when they came into the foster mother’s care, and they are developmentally on target, as well as being loving and happy. Furthermore, although C.J. was described as being attentive a nd friendly to the children during visits, he had seen these very young children onl y four times in more than a year. There is no

evidence that the children were bonded to him. {¶ 56} Regarding the second factor, the children were too young to express their wishes. However, the GAL recommended that GCCS be given permanent custody. {¶ 57} With respect to the custodial history, the children had been in the custody of GCCS more than a year, which was a significant por tion of their lives; in fact, M.J. had only been in his mother’s custody for about three months of his life, and neither child had even been in 20

 C.J.’s custody. {¶ 58} Concerning the fourth factor, the children also needed a legally secure placement, and their foster moth er wished to adopt both of them if GCCS received custody. There was no indication that perm anent placement could be made without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. As was noted, the record reveals no evidence that C.J. could provide a stable, permanent home for the children. {¶ 59} With respect to the factors in R. C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11), GCCS argues that both R.C. 2151.414(E)(9) and (10) apply. Factor (10) indicates that the pa rent has abandoned the child. As was previously noted, we agree with the trial court that both parents abandoned the

children. {¶ 60} Finally, R.C. 2151.414(E)(9) applies where: The parent has placed the child at substantial risk of harm two or more times due to alcohol or drug abuse and has rejected trea tment two or more times or refused to participate in further treatment two or more times after a case plan issued pursuant to section 2151.412 of the Re vised Code requiring treatment of the parent was journalized as part of a dis positional order issued with respect to the child or an order was issued by any othe r court requiring trea tment of the parent. {¶ 61} The record does not specifically indicate that C.J. placed the children at

substantial risk of harm two or more times due to his drug abuse. According to C.J.’s counselor, C.J. has had a long battle with marijuana abuse and addiction. C.J. also failed to complete case plan goals for treating his mental health and a ddiction issues. However, C.J. was rarely around his children, and was in jail most of their lives. Inferentially, C.J.’s actions placed the children at 21

 risk due to his failure to obtain treatment and act as a parent s hould, but there is no evidence that C.J. actually placed the children at substantial ri sk of harm on two or more specific occasions. The absence of specifics on this factor, however , is irrelevant in view of the otherwise overwhelming evidence that a grant of permanent custody to GCCS is in the children’s best

interest. {¶ 62} Accordingly, the Third Assignment of Error is overruled.

V. Conclusion {¶ 63} All of C.J.’s assignments of error ha ving been overruled, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . FAIN, J. and HALL, J., concur.

Copies mailed to: Brittany M. Hensley Jennifer Getty Marcy A. Vonderwell Joan Ackerman Hon. Robert W. Hutcheson