IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 22–1995

Submitted February 21, 2024—Filed May 3, 2024

TERRACE HILL SOCIETY FOUNDATION,

Appellee,

vs.

TERRACE HILL COMMISSION and KRISTIN HURD, in her official capacity as 

chairperson of the Terrace Hill Commission,

Appellants.

Interlocutory appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David 

Nelmark, Judge.

Interlocutory appeal from denial of motion to dismiss on sovereign 

immunity grounds. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which all justices 

joined. 

Brenna Bird, Attorney General; Eric Wessan (argued), Solicitor General; 

Andrew Ewing, Assistant Attorney General; and Samuel P. Langholz (until 

withdrawal), Chief Deputy Attorney General, for appellants.

Jason M. Casini (argued) of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for 

appellee.
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MCDONALD, Justice.

This interlocutory appeal concerns a dispute between the Terrace Hill 

Society Foundation (THSF) and the Terrace Hill Commission (the Commission) 

regarding property and historical artifacts (the collection) used and displayed in 

the Governor’s official residence, Terrace Hill. THSF filed a petition and then an 

amended petition for declaratory relief against the Commission and its 

chairperson, Kristin Hurd. In its amended petition, THSF sought a declaration 

that it was the sole owner of the collection and sought injunctive relief that gives 

it the right to access the collection to itemize, insure, maintain, and preserve it. 

The defendants moved to dismiss the suit on the ground the suit was barred by 

the doctrine of sovereign immunity and on the ground Hurd could not provide 

the requested relief. The district court denied the motion with respect to the 

Commission, but it granted the motion with respect to Hurd and dismissed the 

claims against her without prejudice. The questions presented in this appeal are 

whether the district court erred in denying the State’s motion to dismiss this suit 

against the Commission and whether the district court should have dismissed 

the suit against Hurd with prejudice. 

I.

In reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the factual 

allegations contained in the pleading. See Shumate v. Drake Univ., 846 N.W.2d 

503, 507 (Iowa 2014). Terrace Hill is the official residence of the Governor of the 

State of Iowa. THSF is a nonpartisan, nonprofit corporation organized pursuant 

to Iowa Code chapter 504. It is the result of a 2012 merger between two 

predecessor organizations, the Terrace Hill Foundation (the Foundation) and the 

Terrace Hill Society (the Society). For ease of reading, unless context and 

specificity require otherwise, we refer to all three organizations collectively as 

“THSF.” The Commission is a state agency organized under Iowa Code 
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section 8A.326. The Commission is charged with “provid[ing] for the 

preservation, maintenance, renovation, landscaping, and administration of the 

Terrace Hill facility.” Iowa Code § 8A.326(3) (2022). Hurd serves as the 

chairperson of the Commission. THSF’s claims against Hurd were asserted 

against her “solely in her official capacity as” chairperson of the Commission. 

According to the amended petition, in 1996, the Commission, the Society, 

and the Foundation entered into an operating agreement regarding Terrace Hill. 

The 1996 agreement provided, as relevant here, that the Commission, the 

Society, and the Foundation were “mutually resolved in the future to work 

harmoniously and cooperatively in the overall goal of restoring, preserving and 

improving Terrace Hill; and will present honestly and forthrightly, as with a 

single voice, the workings and needs of Terrace Hill to the community at large.” 

THSF concedes the 1996 agreement is no longer in force. 

The amended petition averred that “[f]or nearly fifty years, including, but 

not limited to, the time period in which the 1996 Agreement was in effect, THSF 

. . . received hundreds of items of donated property, including, but not limited 

to, historical artifacts . . . along with monetary donations for Terrace Hill 

furnishings and for the restoration, preservation, and improvement of Terrace 

Hill.” THSF placed many items from the collection into the “custody and control 

of the Commission, in reliance on the commitments by the Commission as set 

forth in the 1996 Agreement and in many other communications with present 

and former members of the Commission to work together ‘harmoniously’ and 

‘cooperatively’ with the ‘mutual goal of restoring, preserving and improving 

Terrace Hill.’ ” The amended petition stated that THSF placed items in the care 

and custody of the Commission “subject to the express understanding that it 

was owned by, and would continue to be owned by, those predecessor 
4

organizations and (now) THSF, without any express or implied relinquishment of 

any ownership rights by THSF or its predecessor organizations.”

The amended petition stated that a disagreement has developed between 

THSF and the Commission “regarding ownership and control over the Collection, 

resulting in the Commission, in effect, asserting control over the Collection and 

denying THSF control over it or access to it.” In the amended petition, THSF 

sought a declaration that it was the sole owner of the collection, an injunction to 

obtain access to the collection for a variety of purposes, and any “other . . . 

additional relief that the Court deems just and equitable under the 

circumstances.” THSF also sought a declaration that any claim of ownership 

contrary to THSF’s interests was “invalid and unenforceable, and in violation of 

federal law . . . and state law.” 

The defendants moved to dismiss THSF’s amended petition. The 

Commission argued the suit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 

The Commission argued that the State had explicitly waived its sovereign 

immunity and consented to suit for certain claims involving real property, citing 

Iowa Code section 613.8. By negative inference, the Commission argued, the 

State had not waived its sovereign immunity and consented to suit for claims 

involving personal property. Hurd argued the claims against her failed because 

she did not have the legal authority as chairperson to provide the requested 

relief. In her view, only the Commission as a whole could provide the requested 

relief. 

THSF resisted the motion to dismiss. THSF argued the Commission 

constructively or impliedly waived sovereign immunity through its prior conduct.

Relying on Lee v. State, 815 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 2012), State v. Dvorak, 

261 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 1978), and Kersten Co. v. Department of Social Services, 

207 N.W.2d 117 (Iowa 1973) (en banc), THSF maintained that this was a case 
5

where “the rule of immunity was waived because the State had voluntarily 

created [a] legal relationship[] with private citizens that subjected it to liability.” 

Lee, 815 N.W.2d at 738. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, THSF’s counsel 

specified that the voluntary legal relationship between THSF and the 

Commission was “clearly” or “essentially” a “common law bailment.” 

The district court denied in part and granted in part the defendants’ 

motion to dismiss. The district court concluded that the factual allegations in 

the petition, when taken in the light most favorable to THSF, alleged facts 

sufficient to overcome the State’s immunity from suit. The district court 

explained:

Here, the Court finds that, when looking at the factual 

allegations in the light most favorable to THSF, the Commission’s 

prior conduct subjects it to suit in this matter. The Commission 

willingly accepted possession of THSF’s property. It retained such 

possession after the 1996 Agreement expired. THSF has property 

rights under state law and the Iowa Constitution, and it is entitled 

to have this Court rule on the merits of its ownership claims.

The district court granted the motion with respect to Hurd and dismissed the 

claims against her without prejudice rather than with prejudice. 

II.

We first address the Commission’s sovereign immunity argument. As early 

as 1855, this court applied the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. See 

Chance v. Temple, 1 Iowa (Clarke) 179, 201 (1855). Under this doctrine, the State 

cannot be sued absent its waiver or consent to suit. See Lee, 815 N.W.2d at 738; 

Dvorak, 261 N.W.2d at 489. Under Iowa law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity 

is more than immunity from liability, it is immunity from suit. See Anderson v. 

State, 2 N.W.3d 807, 812 (Iowa 2024); Wagner v. State, 952 N.W.2d 843, 856 

(Iowa 2020) (“The immunity of the State is from suit rather than from liability 

and remains the rule rather than the exception.” (quoting Lloyd v. State, 
6

251 N.W.2d 551, 555 (Iowa 1977))); Lee v. State, 874 N.W.2d 631, 637–38 (Iowa 

2016) (stating the “principle of state sovereign immunity . . . recognizes that 

inherent in the nature of sovereignty is some degree of immunity from suit”); 

Nixon v. State, 704 N.W.2d 643, 645 (Iowa 2005) (stating the State “was immune 

from suit under the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity”); Callahan ex 

rel. M.H. v. State, 385 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Iowa 1986) (discussing the “removal of 

immunity from suit”). The doctrine relieves the State from suffering “the 

indignity” of being subjected “to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the 

instance of private parties.” Lee, 815 N.W.2d at 738 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 

527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999)). 

This court has “consistently held [sovereign immunity] is a jurisdictional 

bar” to initiating and prosecuting a suit against the State absent its waiver or 

consent. Segura v. State, 889 N.W.2d 215, 220 (Iowa 2017); see also Wagner, 

952 N.W.2d at 856–57 (stating “our courts lacked jurisdiction over suits brought 

against the state or its agencies sounding in tort” (quoting Lloyd, 251 N.W.2d at 

555)); Godfrey v. State, 847 N.W.2d 578, 582–83 (Iowa 2014) (stating the doctrine 

of sovereign immunity is jurisdictional); Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 80 

(Iowa 2013) (stating sovereign immunity is “a jurisdictional matter” (quoting 

Swanger v. Iowa, 445 N.W.2d 344, 346–47 (Iowa 1989))); Hyde v. Buckalew, 

393 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa 1986) (stating that the waiver of “sovereign immunity 

with respect to a particular type of claim is a matter of jurisdiction, the power of 

the court to hear and adjudicate a particular class of cases,” and that sovereign 

“immunity was jurisdictional”). As a jurisdictional bar, the doctrine of sovereign 

immunity “prevent[s] our courts from hearing cases brought against the State or 

its agencies.” Callahan, 385 N.W.2d at 538. 

Because the doctrine of sovereign immunity is an immunity from suit and 

jurisdictional in nature, any waiver of sovereign immunity must be “strictly 
7

construed.” Feltes v. State, 385 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Iowa 1986) (en banc); see also

Segura, 889 N.W.2d at 224 (recognizing “that jurisdictional matters must be 

carefully construed”). “[W]hen sovereign immunity is asserted, it is not the 

State’s burden to show that the plaintiff could never state a viable claim. Instead, 

it is the plaintiff’s burden to plead facts that affirmatively state a viable claim.” 

Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 393–94 (Tex. 2021); see also Young v. 

Johnson, 860 S.E.2d 82, 83–84 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021) (holding plaintiff failed to 

satisfy burden of pleading waiver of sovereign immunity).

The Commission argues the district court erred in denying its motion to 

dismiss the amended petition on sovereign immunity grounds. The Commission 

emphasizes that the legislature has expressly waived sovereign immunity for

suits “involving the title to real estate, the partition of real estate, the foreclosure 

of liens or mortgages against real estate, or the determination of the priorities of 

liens or claims against real estate, for the purpose of obtaining an adjudication

touching or pertaining to any mortgage or other lien or claim which the state 

may have or claim to the real estate involved.” Iowa Code § 613.8. Because the 

express statutory waiver involves only actions or claims relating to real property 

and not personal property, the Commission argues that the legislature has not 

waived the State’s sovereign immunity for actions or claims relating to personal 

property. 

The Commission is correct that the State can expressly waive its sovereign 

immunity when it enacts a statute consenting to suit. See, e.g., Iowa Code 

§ 17A.19(1) (waiving sovereign immunity for judicial review of agency actions); 

id. § 613.8 (waiving sovereign immunity in certain suits involving real estate); id.

§ 669.4(2) (waiving sovereign immunity for suits sounding in tort). But express 

statutory waiver is not the only way the State can waive its immunity as 

sovereign. The State can impliedly or constructively waive its immunity from suit 
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when it voluntarily creates certain legal relationships that subject it to liability. 

See Lee, 815 N.W.2d at 737–38. For example, we have held the State impliedly 

waived its sovereign immunity when it entered a contractual relationship. See 

Kersten Co., 207 N.W.2d at 122. We have also held that the State impliedly 

waived its sovereign immunity when it assumed the legal obligations of a 

landowner. See Dvorak, 261 N.W.2d at 489. The implied waiver found in 

Kersten Co. and Dvorak “reflected our belief that the State is answerable for the 

legal relationships it voluntarily creates.” Lee, 815 N.W.2d at 740.

A voluntary bailment is a legal relationship sounding in contract. See 

Farmers Butter & Dairy Co-op. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 196 N.W.2d 533, 538 

(Iowa 1972). “A bailment occurs when personal property has been delivered by 

one person, the bailor, to another, the bailee, for a specific purpose beneficial to 

the bailee or the bailor, or both, with the understanding the property will be 

returned to the bailor after the purpose has been accomplished.” Khan v. 

Heritage Prop. Mgmt., 584 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). “Once a 

bailment is established, the law imposes specific duties upon bailees to care for 

the bailor’s property while it is in their possession.” Id. at 730. 

THSF’s amended petition alleges sufficient facts to plead a voluntary 

bailment and thus a voluntary legal relationship that impliedly waived the State’s 

sovereign immunity. The amended petition provides, among other things, as 

follows:

18. At all material times, the Collection was placed in the care 

and custody of the Commission by THSF and its predecessor 

organizations, for use and display at Terrace Hill, subject to the 

express understanding that it was owned by, and would continue to 

be owned by, those predecessor organizations and (now) THSF, 

without any express or implied relinquishment of any ownership 

rights by THSF or its predecessor organizations. 

19. As a result of the ongoing disagreement between the 

Commission and THSF regarding ownership and control over the 

Collection, the Commission has, in effect, and without legal 
9

authority to do so, asserted control over the Collection and denied 

THSF control over it or access to it.

“[T]he State, by entering into a contract, agrees to be answerable for its breach 

and waives its immunity from suit to that extent.” Kersten Co., 207 N.W.2d at 

120; see also Sweeten v. Lawson, 404 P.3d 885, 886–87, 890–93 (Okla. Civ. App. 

2017) (holding that action against museum for recovery of personal property 

could proceed notwithstanding sovereign immunity).

It is immaterial to our analysis that the amended petition did not use the 

word “bailment.” “Iowa is a notice pleading state.” Nahas v. Polk County, 

991 N.W.2d 770, 776 (Iowa 2023). Under our notice pleading standard, the 

“petition need not allege ultimate facts that support each element of the cause 

of action.” Id. (quoting Rees v. City of Shenandoah, 682 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa 

2004)). And the petition need not “identify a specific legal theory.” Adam v. Mt. 

Pleasant Bank & Tr. Co., 355 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Iowa 1984). Instead, the petition 

need only contain “factual allegations that give the defendant ‘fair notice’ of the 

claim asserted so the defendant can adequately respond to the petition.” Nahas,

991 N.W.2d at 776 (quoting Rees, 682 N.W.2d at 79). “A petition complies with 

the ‘fair notice’ requirement if it informs the defendant of the incident giving rise 

to the claim and of the claim’s general nature.” Id. (quoting Rees, 682 N.W.2d at 

79).

“A court should grant a motion to dismiss ‘only if the petition on its face 

shows no right of recovery under any state of facts.’ ” Id. (quoting Young v. 

HealthPort Techs., Inc., 877 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Iowa 2016)). Under our liberal 

notice pleading standards, we conclude the district court did not err in finding

THSF’s amended petition alleged sufficient facts to plead a voluntary legal 

relationship waiving the State’s immunity from suit. 
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III.

We now address Hurd’s appeal. Hurd contends the district court should 

have dismissed the claims against her with prejudice rather than without 

prejudice. The district court granted dismissal on the ground that Hurd is not a 

proper party in this suit because she could not provide the pleaded-for relief. On 

appeal, Hurd contends that this defect “cannot be cured by repleading.” She 

points out that, under the Code, “[o]nly the Commission, acting in its discretion 

under state law, could contract with THSF to give it access to the historical 

collection.” We find this argument unconvincing. Even if this were true, THSF 

could replead and add the remaining commissioners to the suit. In that event, 

Hurd would still be a party to the action. We affirm this part of the district court’s 

ruling. See 5B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & A. Benjamin Spencer, 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 491 (4th ed. 2024) (stating that it is 

“clear” that dismissal pursuant to a motion to dismiss “generally is not with 

prejudice . . . because the district court normally will give the plaintiff leave to 

file an amended complaint to see if the shortcomings of the original document 

can be corrected”).

IV.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s order on the 

motion to dismiss. We remand to the district for further proceedings. 

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.