Presidential Documents

12859

Federal Register

Vol. 60, No. 46

Thursday, March 9, 1995

Title 3—

The President

Presidential Determination No. 95–15 of February 28, 1995

Certifications for Major Narcotics Producing and Transit

Countries

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 490(b)(1)(A) of the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (‘‘the Act’’), I hereby determine and

certify that the following major drug producing and/or major drug transit

countries/dependent territories have cooperated fully with the United States,

or taken adequate steps on their own, to achieve full compliance with

the goals and objectives of the 1988 United Nations Convention Against

Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances:

The Bahamas, Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong,

India, Jamaica, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

By virtue of the authority vested in my by section 490(b)(1)(B) of the Act,

I hereby determine that it is in the vital national interests of the United

States to certify the following countries:

Bolivia, Colombia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Paraguay, and Peru.

Information on these countries, as required under section 490(b)(3) of the

Act, is attached.

I have determined that the following major producing and/or major transit

countries do not meet the standards set forth in section 490(b):

Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, Nigeria, and Syria.

I have made these determinations, taking into account the factors set forth

in section 490 of the Act, and based on the information contained in the

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 1995. Because the performance of these countries varies, I have attached an explanatory statement

in each case.

You are hereby authorized and directed to report this determination to

the Congress immediately and to publish it in the 

œ–

Federal Register.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, February 28, 1995.

STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION

The Bahamas

U.S.-Bahamian drug enforcement cooperation under Operation Bahamas

and Turks & Caicos (OPBAT) has been excellent and resulted in a dramatic

reduction in the flow of drugs through The Bahamas into the United States,

as indicated by vastly reduced drug-seizure levels over the last several

years. Nevertheless, The Bahamas remains a major transit country for U.S.-
12860 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents

bound Colombian cocaine and Jamaican marijuana. As a major financial

center, The Bahamas is vulnerable to money laundering. The Bahamas is

a party to the 1988 UN Convention. The Ingraham government has taken

a firm stand against drug trafficking, drug abuse and money laundering

and worked diligently during 1994 to fulfill the goals and objectives of

the UN Convention and U.S.-Bahamian bilateral counternarcotics accords.

During 1994, Bahamian maritime cooperation with the United States was

excellent under the terms of several bilateral agreements and arrangements.

The Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas (GCOB) moved

to improve cooperation with the Cuban government when traffickers intensified their exploitation of Cuban territory to avoid OPBAT enforcement efforts.

The GCOB generally responds positively to specific U.S. requests under

our Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. In 1994, the GCOB took judicial action

against three public officials for drug-related corruption: a prison official,

an immigration officer and a customs officer.

The GCOB took several strong steps to improve its drug-trafficking-control

tools. The new U.S.-Bahamas extradition treaty entered into force in 1994.

The GCOB also adopted legislation, based on U.S. law, making it a crime

to engage in a continuing criminal enterprise related to narcotics trafficking.

Working closely with the USG, the GCOB placed special emphasis on

strengthening its judicial system by increasing its courts budget, implementing a court automation system, and enacting stronger bail and sentencing

legislation.

In 1994, the GCOB drafted stronger money laundering legislation, which

it expects Parliament to approve in 1995. When enacted, this legislation

will criminalize money laundering. The GCOB agreed to an evaluation of

its money laundering controls by the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force,

also expected to take place during 1995. We urge continued vigilance by

The Bahamas on possible money laundering through shell corporations and

international business companies, which are proliferating in The Bahamas

and elsewhere in the Caribbean. Although Bahamian law renders the assets

of a convicted drug offender subject to forfeiture, in practice asset forfeiture

has been difficult to implement. No procedures exist for civil asset forfeiture

in narcotics cases.

Brazil

Brazil is a major transit country for cocaine from Colombia destined for

the United States and Europe. Increased cocaine and precursor chemical

trafficking and money laundering contribute to Brazil’s escalating narcotics

problem; corruption allegations against counternarcotics officials in Brazil

persist.

Despite these problems, Brazil endeavors to meet the goals and objectives

of the 1988 UN Convention, and has succeeded in some significant interdiction efforts. The government has made progress towards complying with

the UN Convention in law enforcement, asset forfeiture, extradition, and

anti-corruption. The Brazilian government generally meets the goals of bilateral counternarcotics agreements with the USG on enforcement and demand

reduction.

Brazil’s increased seizure rate in 1994 of 11 metric tons of cocaine marks

both heightened trafficker use of Brazil and improved abilities of the Brazilian

Federal Police Counternarcotics Unit (DPF/DRE). Brazilian non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) hosted seminars by U.S. police in schools to voice

the message against drug abuse. The DPF/DRE has targetted and disrupted

major Cali-connected drug trafficking organizations.

However, the Brazilian government has not hired new police or provided

increased funding for the DPF/DRE. The Brazilians have not yet enacted

legislation first proposed in 1991 to implement effectively the goals and

objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, nor has it drafted a national drug

control strategy. Brazil has not yet proposed specialized anti-money launder-
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents 12861

ing legislation, but requires reporting of cash transactions involving amounts

over $10,000.

The international consultative forum, the Dublin Group, has focused worldwide donor attention on the need for Brazil to pay greater attention to

counternarcotics issues and urged the GOB to take more vigorous action

against its growing drug problem. Newly-elected President Cardoso is expected to take such action to confront narcotics traffickers.

Brazil’s former President Franco signed a decree increasing the DPF’s

licensing and oversight responsibility for chemicals. The DPF/DRE initiated

a sea/airport security program, and continued to seize drugs by riverine

and ground law enforcement methods. Brazil continues to plan for a radar

system (SIVAM), financed by the Export-Import Bank, to detect narcotics

trafficking aircraft in the Amazon.

China

The Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is committed

to combatting narcotics trafficking and use. China is a major transit route

for heroin from neighboring Burma, Laos and Vietnam to the United States

and other overseas markets. Drug addiction, which was effectively stamped

out following the founding of the PRC in 1949, is once again on the rise.

Thanks to China’s expanding economy and increasing openness to the outside

world, narcotics consumption within the PRC is growing. In addition, opportunities for investment in China provide greater potential for money laundering.

Chinese enforcement efforts continue to be vigorous and were stepped

up in 1994. Strong laws based on a national directive issued in 1990 call

for the death penalty for many drug-related crimes. Hundreds of drug criminals are executed in accordance with these laws annually. Narcotics trafficking in Yunnan province, which borders Burma, decreased in the latter part

of 1994. The Chinese arrested major figures in two drug trafficking groups

based in Burma, the Kokang and the Wa. Better surveillance of the Burmese

border, improved intelligence work, and better control of precursor chemicals

have also contributed to at least a temporary decrease in trafficking in

Yunnan. PRC counternarcotics officials project no increase in national trafficking figures over 1993 levels. The PRC has taken a strong stand against

official corruption, and has laws dealing specifically with government officials who are found guilty of the use, manufacture or delivery of narcotics.

The United States and China do not have a bilateral counternarcotics

agreement in place. China has met, or is actively seeking to meet, the

goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, to which it is a party,

by continuing its efforts to enhance law enforcement measures, public education, and international cooperation.

Illicit opium cultivation exists in remote, often roadless areas of Yunnan

province and is suspected to exist in scattered pockets in other parts of

China. The authorities are committed to eradicating opium cultivation when

it is detected. Yunnan province cultivation is estimated at 1,965 hectares,

capable of yielding approximately 25 metric tons of opium gum.

Impediments to bilateral cooperation remain. The Chinese frequently cite

the 1993 U.S. court decision blocking the forced return to China of a Chinese

drug trafficker (‘‘goldfish case’’) as an obstacle to U.S.-China counternarcotics

cooperation, but these same officials state that they would like to expand

bilateral cooperation in the future.

Dominican Republic

The United States Government and the Government of the Dominican

Republic (GODR) maintained close, effective counternarcotics cooperation

in 1994, despite tensions over the disputed Dominican presidential election

and over Haiti. The Dominican Republic intensified its counternarcotics

effort and improved interagency/inter-service cooperation under the leadership of the new director of the National Directorate of Drug Control (DNCD).
12862 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents

GODR personnel, working with U.S. law enforcement, made several multihundred kilo cocaine seizures in 1994. The GODR was especially helpful

in arranging the return of several major drug figures who were fugitives

from U.S. justice.

Threat assessments indicate an increased flow of narcotics into the Dominican Republic from Haiti, especially since the September 1991 coup in Haiti.

Maritime shipments from Panama are also increasing. The DNCD and Dominican Navy, working in concert with DEA, interdicted one such maritime

shipment on November 22, seizing nearly a metric ton of cocaine and

uncovering a major smuggling operation.

During 1994, a wide range of USG-financed professional training (law

enforcement, drug abuse prevention, financial investigations, and canine

handling assessment) was provided to DNCD personnel and other military

and civilian officials. The GODR complied fully with its commitments under

the bilateral counternarcotics assistance agreement.

The Dominican Republic became a party to the UN Convention in late

1993 and has taken action consistent with the goals and objectives of the

UN Convention. Additional legislation, however, is needed in areas such

as money laundering and asset seizure to enable the GODR to comply

more fully with the Convention. The GODR has been active in the InterAmerican Drug Abuse Control Commission and the United Nations Drug

Control Program. It hosted the 1994 United Nations Heads of Narcotics

Law Enforcement Agencies Conference for Latin America and will host

the Latin American International Drug Enforcement Conference in April

1995. It has established cooperative relationships with a number of other

governments in the hemisphere, most recently signing a bilateral drug cooperation agreement with Venezuela.

The GODR still faces many challenges in establishing an effective national

anti-drug effort. While it has taken steps to address narcotics-related and

other official corruption, corruption continues to undermine GODR law enforcement efforts. Anti-drug legislation, while strengthened, has serious flaws;

in the area of money laundering control, for example, the Dominican legislature removed prison sentences, leaving only moderate fines for bankers

convicted of involvement in laundering activities. The GODR will resubmit

the package in 1995 to correct this.

Ecuador

Ecuador is a bridge between the world’s largest supplier of coca leaf,

Peru, and the world’s major processor of cocaine hydrochloride, Colombia.

Traffickers use Ecuador as a transit point to ship 30–50 metric tons (mt)

of cocaine per year to the United States and Europe, as well as to smuggle

chemicals into Colombia for cocaine processing. Money launderers take advantage of Ecuador’s loose banking laws and extensive offshore banking

system to conceal the illicit nature of their proceeds.

Ecuadorian judges are subject to trafficker intimidation and subornation,

which has obstructed efforts to bring Cali-connected kingpin Jorge Reyes

Torres to justice. Corrupt judicial practices have precluded indictments in

Reyes Torres-related cases, specifically the Banco De Los Andes case. Stronger

resolve by the Government of Ecuador (GOE) to confront judicial corruption

will be necessary to successfully conclude the Jorge Reyes Torres case and

other counternarcotics initiatives.

Ecuador made significant strides this year toward complying with the

1988 UN Convention, to which it is a party. The government has taken

steps to generally meet the goals of bilateral counternarcotics agreements

with the USG on enforcement, demand reduction, and prosecutions of major

narcotics traffickers. The GOE enacted a law based on OAS model legislation

on asset sharing and completed a study to determine the amount of licit

chemical use in Ecuador.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents 12863

However, the Ecuadorians should strive to control trafficking in precursor

and essential chemicals by creating an effective monitoring and control

system based on the results of the completed study. Ecuador is making

efforts to control money laundering by involving the police, Superintendency

of Banks, and the National Drug Council (CONSEP) in collaborative investigations.

The USG has provided Thrush aircraft to identify illicit crop cultivation

in Ecuador. None was discovered in 1994, but search flights will continue

in 1995. Ecuador is progressing in implementing its National Drug Strategy.

Ecuador signed an asset-sharing agreement with the USG in 1994. A limited

amount of asset-sharing has already taken place based on this agreement.

The Ecuadorians used the funds for law enforcement purposes. Ecuador

continues to work toward sharing the remainder of $3 million in assets

forfeited in the Reyes Torres investigation.

The USG counternarcotics assistance program helps Ecuador to reduce

money laundering, control essential chemicals, and buttress the judiciary’s

ability to preserve democracy by enforcing the rule of law.

Guatemala

The Government of Guatemala (GOG) has successful programs to reduce

demand, cultivation, and transit of illicit narcotics.

With USG technical support, specially trained units of the Guatemalan

Treasury Police conduct ongoing eradication that has reduced opium poppy

cultivation to minimal levels. Persistent attempts to revive poppy cultivation

are the focus of a continuing suppression program which includes detection

and eradication.

Guatemala’s hundreds of small, unmonitored airfields connected by good

roads appear to have almost been forsaken by traffickers moving cocaine

in small planes to the United States from South America. In response to

DEA’s Operation Cadence and GOG vigilance in-country, traffickers are increasingly transporting drugs overland and by sea. During 1994, over 1.5

metric tons of cocaine were seized outside Guatemala as a result of Guatemalan-based intelligence. Almost two metric tons were seized in-country.

The GOG’s aggressive investigation, interdiction and eradication operations

are consistent with the goals of the 1988 UN Convention, to which Guatemala

is a party. However, Guatemala lacks legislation needed to implement the

Convention in areas such as money laundering and essential chemical control. Money laundering has not been criminalized in Guatemala and is

not considered a significant problem.

Corruption, especially in the judicial branch, is a major problem in Guatemala. The GOG has begun to focus attention on corruption, particularly

in the courts where several judges were relieved of their positions for releasing prisoners under allegedly questionable circumstances. The GOG does

not, as a matter of policy or practice encourage or facilitate illicit narcotics

production or distribution, or laundering of drug proceeds.

Guatemala continues to accomplish the goals of its bilateral narcotics

agreements with the USG for drug eradication, interdiction, and demand

reduction. The USG is working with the GOG to implement cost reductions

while retaining the high level of effectiveness demonstrated by Guatemala’s

counternarcotics programs.

Haiti

Because of its ideal geographic location for smuggling, the island of Hispaniola has long been a significant transit point for cocaine destined for

U.S. and European markets. The unstable political situation and weak government institutions in Haiti facilitated narcotics trafficking for many years.

The opportunities for traffickers to take advantage of these conditions were

even greater after the September 1991 coup which ousted President Jean

Bertrand Aristide. Multi-hundred kilo and multi-ton shipments of cocaine
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transited the country frequently. The USG has received credible, but unsubstantiated, reports for many years that the Haitian military was involved

in assisting traffickers. However, the USG was unable to determine the

veracity of reports that the de facto regime or the military hierarchy secretly

condoned such activity.

Until the legitimate government of Haiti was restored in September 1994,

the USG maintained only limited counternarcotics cooperation with the

de facto regime in Haiti, largely through the Haitian Center for Information

Coordination (CICC), which the United States helped establish in 1987.

The de facto government undertook some drug enforcement efforts and

made a number of cocaine seizures in the 2–60 kg range in 1993–1994,

some in cooperation with USG law enforcement personnel from the U.S.

Embassy. However, suspected multi-ton shipments transited Haiti unimpeded

until the country was subjected to an international maritime blockade in

April 1994.

Drug trafficking was among the six issues President Clinton listed in

early 1994 as key areas of U.S. concern relating to Haiti. Growing drug

trafficker influence in Haiti may well have impeded the return of democracy,

sound administration of justice and economic recovery. The Aristide administration, working with the international community, has initiated an extensive

administration of justice and police reform program. Former military and

police personnel suspected of involvement in drug trafficking are being

excluded from the new civilian police corps and the reorganized military.

This massive and critical reform is the most important step that the

Government of Haiti can take at this stage to attack the narcotics problem

at its core. Since the restoration of the Aristide government, the USGled Multinational Force and the International Police Monitors have played

a large role in law enforcement in Haiti. These efforts have included control

of the major ports and airfields, and supervising and monitoring the interim

Haitian police. This, and all other relevant activity, is undertaken with

the full concurrence of the Haitian government. The Aristide government

cooperated completely with the United States in all aspects of this effort.

In the future, the restored Aristide government will need to take a number

of other measures to address drug trafficking more effectively: it should

become a party to the 1988 UN Convention, establish a national council

to coordinate Haitian counternarcotics activities, implement money laundering controls, and forcefully address the problem of narco-corruption within

the police and military forces.-

Hong Kong

Hong Kong is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but the territory’s

counternarcotics efforts effectively comply with most of the goals and objectives of the agreement. Hong Kong takes serious and effective measures

to combat narcotics trafficking. Nevertheless, Hong Kong remains an important transshipment center for heroin from Southeast Asia. Due to enforcement

efforts and changes in trafficking patterns, the volume of drugs passing

through Hong Kong seems to be dropping. The amount of heroin detected

transiting Hong Kong for Taiwan, Japan, and the United States fell during

1994 and heroin arriving in Hong Kong is increasingly intended for domestic

consumption.

The USG is not aware of any narcotics-related corruption among senior

government or law enforcement officials in Hong Kong. Hong Kong has

a comprehensive anti-corruption ordinance that is effectively enforced by

an independent commission that reports directly to the Governor.

Hong Kong continues to serve as a major center of money laundering

of drug proceeds by local and regional groups trafficking in heroin. Passage

of the new Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance improves the Hong

Kong Government’s (HKG) ability to prosecute money launderers. The HKG

is in the final stages of drafting amendments to the Financial Recovery
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of Proceeds Act to conform more fully with the Financial Action Task

Force recommendations and the UN Convention.

There is a bilateral narcotics agreement, which facilitates asset freezing

and asset forfeiture. The Hong Kong Government and the USG have worked

closely together on U.S. extradition requests, although there is some concern

that overly strict application of Hong Kong evidentiary requirements has

made extradition difficult in some cases. Overall bilateral cooperation on

drug enforcement efforts is very good.

India

India is the world’s largest producer of licit opium and the largest supplier

to the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Opium is diverted from legal production,

and there is substantial illicit opium cultivation in certain districts. India

is also a transit route for heroin from nearby producing countries, and

an exporter of methaqualone and heroin precursor chemicals en route to

the Middle East, Africa, Europe and North America.

As a licit producer of opium, India must meet an additional certification

requirement. In accordance with Section 490(c) of the Foreign Assistance

Act, it must maintain licit production and stockpiles at levels no higher

than those consistent with licit market demand and take adequate steps

to prevent significant diversion of its licit cultivation and production into

illicit markets and to prevent illicit cultivation and production.

The United States and India conducted an intensive dialogue on narcotics

issues, with meetings of a Joint Working Group and a 1994 visit by Dr.

Lee Brown. With U.S. encouragement, India maintained during 1994 a promising narcotics dialogue with Pakistan on cross-border smuggling of heroin

and precursor chemicals, despite poor bilateral relations in other areas.

Over the past several years, the Government of India (GOI) has taken

steps to reduce licit opium stockpiles and the potential for diversion of

licit opium to the illicit market. The total area licensed for cultivation

was kept at about 14,000 hectares (ha) in the 1993/4 crop season and

physical controls on harvested opium were enhanced. In 1994, in the course

of taking the first physical inventory in many years, it became clear that

real stocks on hand were far lower (by 800 metric tons) than official inventories and that supplies were insufficient to fulfill 1994 contractual requirements. An International Narcotics Control Board audit described the failure

to have maintained adequate inventory records as a violation of the 1961

Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs. No adequate accounting of several

hundred tons of the discrepancy between book stocks and real stocks has

been made. New storage and accounting controls put into place in 1994

should reduce potential for diversion from licit stocks.

To combat large-scale diversion by growers, the GOI has slowly increased

minimum qualifying yields (MQY) on licensed growers. MQY was raised

from 40 kg per ha to 43 kg/ha for the 1994/5 growing season. An unreleased

GOI crop survey reportedly suggests that MQY could be raised by a substantially greater amount. The United States raised with India the need for

a scientific crop yield survey in the near future so that MQY can be raised

to a level high enough to prevent substantial diversion to the illicit market.

To cope with the 1994 opium shortfall and rebuild an appropriate reserve

stockpile, the GOI decided in 1994/5 to expand the cultivated area to about

24,000 hectares, but to improve security by concentrating production in

a more limited region, granting additional hectarage to farmers with a history

of high yields, and delicensing some 40,000 farmers whose opium deliveries

to the GOI fell below the MQY. This expansion in cultivated area raises

concern about the potential for increased diversion.

The Government of India cooperates well with the United States on individual cases of trafficking. There has been little success, however, in cracking

major smuggling rings, pointing up a continuing lack of resources and personnel, including lack of intelligence-gathering capability and high-level political
12866 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents

support, allocated to narcotics enforcement. There were no seizures of heroin

laboratories in 1994. The United States has no specific knowledge of any

senior GOI officials encouraging or facilitating trafficking or money laundering. Allegations of corruption among lower-level judicial and law enforcement personnel are widespread, but successful prosecutions rare.

Illicit cultivation of opium is concentrated in the state of Jammu and

Kashmir, in remote areas of Uttar Pradesh, and in other areas where political

disturbances and inadequate enforcement resources kept GOI eradication

efforts to a minimum. The GOI cited bureaucratic difficulties in turning

down a U.S. offer of partial U.S. funding for an aerial crop survey in

1994. Illicit opium production is estimated to be in the range of 80 metric

tons on 5,500 hectares, with reported eradication of about 100 hectares.

India is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has made some progress

toward precursor chemical control and law enforcement cooperation. However, India has not yet passed asset seizure legislation or implemented

recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force. Although India did

not sign a bilateral agreement with the United States in 1994, the goals

of a 1993 agreement aimed at improving security at the opium factories

are being achieved.

India fulfilled the requirement of FAA Section 490(c) to maintain licit

production and stockpiles at levels no higher than consistent with market

demand. The GOI addressed a number of the specific U.S. concerns expressed

in 1994 bilateral narcotics consultations, which focussed on better controls

on licit opium production. For 1994, India’s efforts to impose necessary

controls on licit opium and cooperation with DEA and other endorsement

agencies justify continued certification. In 1995, significant additional steps

will need to be taken if full certification is to continue. Areas of outstanding

concern include: quantifying real licit opium yields; revising MQY to appropriate levels; eradicating illicit cultivation; taking effective action against

major narcotics trafficking syndicates and kingpins; and implementing effective measures on money laundering and asset seizure.

Jamaica

Jamaica is both a major producer of marijuana and a flourishing transshipment site for South American cocaine en route to the United States,

The Bahamas, Canada and Europe. There is scant evidence of money laundering at this point. Jamaica is not yet a party to the 1988 UN Convention.

However, the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) took adequate steps during 1994

to fulfill the goals and objectives of both the Convention and U.S.-Jamaican

counternarcotics agreements.

The GOJ made progress during 1994 in strengthening its narcotics control

effort. Jamaica’s Forfeiture of Assets Act, which allows for criminal but

not civil forfeiture, went into effect in August. The GOJ also amended

its Dangerous Drugs Act to provide for tougher fines and longer imprisonment

for drug offenders. The GOJ continued work on money laundering control

legislation and expects to present it to Parliament before April 1995. With

the adoption of money laundering legislation, Jamaica will have the full

range of implementing legislation for the 1988 UN Convention, which it

then intends to ratify. In 1994, the GOJ submitted to Parliament enabling

legislation to permit Jamaican ratification of the U.S.-Jamaica Mutual Legal

Assistance Treaty, and the GOJ expects passage soon.

Throughout 1994, the GOJ continued its excellent cooperation on extradition. GOJ drug enforcement agencies also continued to cooperate well

with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). These agencies have

recognized the need to bring major traffickers to justice and break up trafficker

networks and are taking appropriate steps. Recognizing the necessity of

prompt prosecution and conviction, the GOJ has begun to work with the

USG on judicial reform, the objectives being to improve the flow of cases

through Jamaica’s court system and obtain more convictions. Although we

know of no GOJ prosecutions of officials for corruption in 1994, the GOJ,
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents 12867

and especially the Police Commissioner, has attempted to de-politicize the

police force and control corruption, largely by transferring suspect personnel.

The Commissioner fully supported the USG’s revocation of the visas of

several police officers suspected of drug trafficking, as permitted under

U.S. law. The GOJ’s major demand reduction program, a UNDCP-funded

project, is not making appreciable progress at this time due to internal

problems within the National Council on Drug Abuse.

During 1994, the GOJ revitalized its marijuana eradication program. In

November, the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF), Jamaica Constabulary Force

(JCF) and DEA cooperated to estimate the total amount of illegally-grown

marijuana. The JDF and JCF quickly organized a task force to eradicate

the marijuana detected during the estimation exercise. During 1994, the

GOJ eradicated 692 hectares of marijuana, a 52 percent increase over 1993

eradication.

Laos

Laos is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but has drafted a comprehensive drug control program that commits it to the goals of the Convention. As part of this program, the government has pledged to become a

party to the Convention no later than the year 2000. A letter of agreement

on counternarcotics signed in 1989 is the basis for ongoing drug control

projects funded by the USG. These projects consist of an alternative crop

development project and a law enforcement support project. In 1994, police

units supported by the law enforcement project became operational and

began to make arrests. Road building, dam site preparation and other basic

development work was undertaken in the crop development project.

Based on USG estimates, Laos remains one of the world’s major producers

of opium, although production has been on a declining trend since 1990.

Due primarily to weather, opium cultivation and yield fell sharply during

the 1993/4 growing season. USG estimates for the 1994 crop show a decrease

in cultivation of approximately 29 percent, from 26,040 hectares in 1993

to 18,520 in 1994. Production of opium gum dropped even more significantly,

from about 180 metric tons in 1993 to only 85 metric tons in 1994, a

decline of 53 percent. Opium cultivation is not illegal under existing statutes.

In the past year, the Lao government has moved forward in its antinarcotics efforts through continuation of both bilateral and multilateral programs. Bilateral agreements signed with the USG continued the crop control

project in Houaphan Province and the law enforcement project. An additional

crop control project has been approved, which will be implemented by

Norwegian Church Aid/UNDCP. An active UNDCP program also operates

an alternative development program aimed at opium crop control. The Lao

special counternarcotics unit, which was formed as a result of the 1992

bilateral USG-Lao law enforcement project agreement, is now functioning

and had some successes in 1994 in heroin interdiction efforts. Lao customs

has worked closely and effectively with the special unit in several significant

seizures of illicit drugs and in follow-on investigations.

There have been allegations of military and official collusion in narcotics

production and trafficking, but there is no solid evidence of official corruption. Lao government employees receive low pay, making them susceptible

to corruption and low-level corruption is assumed to exist. There is no

clear evidence that the Lao government as a matter of policy encourages

or facilitates the illicit production or distribution of drugs or the laundering

of drug money.

Malaysia

Malaysia ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1993 and has worked cooperatively with the USG, as well as taking adequate steps on its own, to fulfill

the Convention’s goals and objectives. The USG and the Government of

Malaysia (GOM) continue strong antinarcotics cooperation. Several important

steps forward in bilateral cooperation were made this year. The two govern-
12868 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents

ments renewed efforts to collect and analyze intelligence on international

drug trafficking, and the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Royal

Malaysian Police restored their cooperative relations. A bilateral agreement

to assist in demand reduction programs is being implemented effectively.

Negotiations for a new U.S.-Malaysia extradition treaty are proceeding.

The Government of Malaysia considers the narcotics problem a priority

issue. Malaysia pursues an aggressive enforcement policy under one of the

most severe drug laws in the world. A well-funded counternarcotics program

emphasizes both enforcement and demand reduction.

Illicit heroin processing, heroin trafficking, and growing addiction continue

to be serious problems in Malaysia. Traffickers smuggle heroin base into

Malaysia from Thailand and Burma and refined heroin continues to transit

Malaysia en route to the United States and other Western markets.

During 1994, there were no notable cases of corruption involving narcotics.

However, Penang, where Chinese triad gangs control most narcotics trafficking, is still considered to be vulnerable to corruption and gang members

are believed to be involved in attempts to engage law enforcement officials

in various forms of corruption. Corruption continued to be addressed by

law enforcement agencies. The Royal Malaysian Police continued to take

precautions against potential corruption by a careful selection of officers

for its anti-narcotics unit and frequent transfers within the unit. Although

some law enforcement officials have been charged with corruption in the

past, there has been no evidence of corruption among senior officials.

Despite severe legal penalties for both drug use and trafficking, drug

trafficking remains a major problem. Illicit narcotics generally continue to

be available at stable prices for the local addict population.

There is no evidence that Malaysia is a significant center for money

laundering now, but the Malaysian government is concerned that a new

offshore financial center may be vulnerable to money laundering activities

and is looking for ways to head off this threat.

Mexico

The United States Government and the Government of Mexico (GOM)

maintained close counternarcotics cooperation in 1994, the final year of

the Salinas administration, in keeping with the commitments of the bilateral

agreement on cooperation in combatting narcotics trafficking and drug dependency (Chiles Amendment Agreement). Mexico continued its multi-faceted national campaign against production, trafficking and abuse of illegal

drugs, meeting many of the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.

However, the results of this campaign were mixed, with cocaine seizures

falling to the lowest level of Salinas’ tenure (about 21 mt) and few major

traffickers arrested and prosecuted. Narco-corruption remains a serious impediment to effective drug law enforcement. Eradication of opium poppy

and cannabis also declined substantially. One factor causing the decline

may have been the diversion of military personnel and resources to handle

the political uprising in the state of Chiapas. On the positive side, heroin

seizures increased to about 300 kilograms, more than the previous five

years combined. Seizures of precursor and essential chemicals and destruction of clandestine laboratories likewise increased. Money laundering, particularly the large-scale conversion of cash from the United States, remains

a major problem in Mexico, which the GOM has not yet effectively curbed.

The decline in cocaine seizures was due to a number of factors. Much

of the Mexican Attorney General’s Office was devoted to investigating the

assassinations of the leading Presidential candidate and the Secretary General

of the ruling PRI party. Also, to avoid detection by U.S. and Mexican

air interdiction systems, traffickers increased the use of fast moving cargo

jets, each transporting huge quantities of cocaine into Mexico. Only one

of these aircraft was seized; the U.S. and Mexican governments are sharing

intelligence and upgrading equipment to address this situation.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents 12869

Despite commendable efforts by the Salinas administration to tackle endemic corruption with the Mexican police and judicial systems, including

hundreds of dismissals and numerous prosecutions, the measures taken

did not turn the tide. Anti-corruption actions, as well as efforts to build

strong anti-drug institutions, were undermined by narco-influence (and

money) and frequent personnel turnovers, especially in 1994.

The actions taken by newly-inaugurated President Ernesto Zedillo are

encouraging. Zedillo stated publicly that narcotrafficking presented the single

greatest threat to the national security of Mexico. Within a few weeks of

taking office, he promulgated a sweeping judicial reform package, which

was overwhelmingly approved by the Mexican Congress. The Zedillo administration has also pledged to pursue institutional reform of Mexican law

enforcement agencies to counter official corruption and to strengthen legal

controls over money laundering and precursor chemicals.

Panama

Panama is a major money laundering center, a producer of coca leaf,

and a transit point for cocaine destined for the United States.

For most of 1994, Panama was preoccupied by election year politics

and the transition of administration from President Endara to President

Perez Balladares. Nonetheless, there were significant policy and legislative

initiatives on the counternarcotics front.

Two important counternarcotics achievements were enacted by the Endara

administration before it left office: the establishment of cross-border currency

controls and the passage of Law 13 which expanded the Government of

Panama’s (GOP) ability to investigate and prosecute narcotics-related crime.

Since taking office in September 1994, the administration of Perez

Balladares acknowledged that narcotrafficking and narcotics-related money

laundering threaten Panama’s political and economic stability. In an effort

to prevent abuse of incorporation laws, the new President issued a decree

mandating attorneys to follow ‘‘know-your-customer’’ practices. He then established a special commission to develop money laundering controls. The

resulting policy statement prescribed a number of far-reaching changes. For

example, it criminalized drug-related money laundering, mandated suspicious transaction reporting, and extended cash transaction reporting obligations to non-financial institutions. Moreover, Panama’s new controls include

strengthening the regulatory authority of the National Banking Commission

and developing a financial analysis center, an investigations unit, and a

prosecutor’s office to develop cases of financial crime.

Panama was generally successful in meeting the goals and objectives of

the 1988 UN Convention and bilateral counternarcotics agreements with

the United States. The GOP’s aggressive eradication efforts continued, and

interdiction operations showed a marked improvement. To combat money

laundering and corruption, the administration of Perez Ballardares moved

rapidly on the policy front but was unable to begin implementation of

controls before the end of the year. Several middle- and low-level officials

were investigated for corruption and, in a few cases, dismissed. The GOP

does not, as a matter of policy or practice, encourage or facilitate illicit

narcotics distribution, corruption, or laundering of drug proceeds.

In 1994, Panama developed a framework on which it can wage a campaign

against traffickers and money launderers. In 1995, the measure of the GOP’s

counternarcotics programs will be the degree to which it builds upon that

framework by implementing controls, seizing assets, and prosecuting offenders.

Taiwan

Changing drug trafficking patterns in East Asia have created a growing

heroin trafficking problem in Taiwan. Domestic demand for heroin has risen

sharply, and Taiwan has also emerged as an important center for the transshipment of heroin. Over the past three or four years, Taiwan authorities
12870 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents

have made drug enforcement a priority and heroin seizures have risen sharply, climbing to over one metric ton in 1993.

Taiwan is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but the vigorous

drug enforcement campaign mounted by the Taiwan authorities demonstrates

substantial progress toward meeting some of the goals of the Convention,

and shows Taiwan is taking adequate steps on its own to address the

problem of heroin trafficking. However, legislation and agreements do not

yet exist to implement the provisions of the Convention regarding asset

forfeiture, controlled delivery, extradition, mutual legal assistance and illicit

traffic by sea. Taiwan authorities have expressed an interest in developing

agreements in some of these areas. There were no reported incidents of

police corruption involving drugs. There is no evidence of senior Taiwan

officials being involved with the illegal drug trade.

Working cooperation between the Drug Enforcement Administration and

both the Taiwan National Police and the Ministry of Justice Investigation

Bureau has been good. Efforts are being made to enhance enforcement cooperation and Taiwan authorities have expressed interest in entering into

a bilateral counternarcotics agreement under the auspices of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States and the American Institute in Taiwan.

Thailand

Thailand is the main transit route for the illicit drug production from

the Golden Triangle. Successful eradication and development efforts have

reduced opium cultivation far below the amounts grown in the neighboring

countries of Burma and Laos. Due to the efforts of the Thai Government

authorities, 1994 cultivation of illicit opium was only 2,110 hectares, yielding

17 metric tons of opium.

Drug enforcement cooperation is very good and improved even further

in 1994. In a precedent-setting cooperative law enforcement operation, the

Royal Thai government in November 1994 arrested ten major traffickers

under indictment in the United States who form part of drug lord Khun

Sa’s Shan United Army (SUA) infrastructure and proceedings to extradite

the fugitives to the United States are now pending in Thai courts. During

1994, Thailand also took action to close off its northern border, reducing

the flow of supplies and other logistical support to the SUA in Burma.

Efforts continue to enhance judicial cooperation and the Thai Cabinet has

just moved to permit the courts to consider the extradition of a former

Thai Member of Parliament under indictment in the United States on largescale marijuana smuggling charges.

Thailand is a leader in regional drug control programs and shares its

expertise through agreements with neighboring countries and the United

Nations and through training and cooperative enforcement activities.

Thailand remains vulnerable to money laundering due to the relatively

low level of sophistication of the Thai banking system and the presence

of an active quasi-legal non-bank financial system. Thailand is now in the

process of drafting money laundering legislation. Drug-related corruption

of some politicians and police officials remains a problem.

A bilateral agreement with the United States supports law enforcement

cooperation and crop control, including eradication of opium poppies and

Thailand has performed well under that agreement. Thailand is not a party

to the 1988 UN Convention, but is a party to the 1961 Single Convention

on Narcotic Drugs, its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

Venezuela

Venezuela is a major drug transit country. Traffickers ship an estimated

100–200 metric tons (mt) of cocaine annually through Venezuela. Precursor

and essential chemical trafficking and money laundering are also serious

problems in Venezuela. The Venezuelan judiciary’s marginal ability to resist
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the corruptive influence of traffickers has hampered counternarcotics efforts

in that country.

Venezuela has taken adequate steps to meet the goals and objectives

of the 1988 UN Convention, to which it is a party, especially in its vigorous

response to illicit crop cultivation. Venezuela quickly eradicated in 1994,

with USG assistance, over 1,000 hectares of coca and opium poppy cultivation in Zulia state near its western border with Colombia. The government

generally meets the goals of bilateral counternarcotics agreements with the

USG. In addition, the Venezuela-Colombia border agreement to keep Venezuela free of narcotics traffickers and the successful eradication effort indicates serious Government of Venezuela (GOV) interest in preventing traffickers from making incursions into Venezuela.

Seizures of cocaine increased in 1994 to 5.0 mt, indicating both more

trafficker use of Venezuela and better interdiction of cocaine by Venezuelan

counternarcotics forces. Venezuela’s bilateral agreement with the United

States to conduct counternarcotics air interdiction operations reflects invigorated cooperation on strategic initiatives.

In 1994, the Guardia Nacional (GN) seized 5.0 mt of cocaine and 15

kilograms (kg) of heroin. However, the recent arrests of two GN members

for trafficking 250 kg of cocaine through Maiquetia Airport evinces corruption

problems at lower levels in the organization. The GN quickly removed

the two soldiers and began an investigation of the unit.

Although President Caldera has spoken out strongly against narco-corruption, most recently at the December Summit of the Americas, corruption

in Venezuela remains a serious problem. A convicted trafficker, Larry Tovar

Acuna, fled to Colombia after fraudulently obtaining a pardon, and the

Venezuelan government made an extradition request to Colombia for Tovar.

In addition, a corrupt judge released members of the Sinforoso Caballero

money laundering organization. The Venezuelan Supreme Court reopened

the case and investigated the judge.

Venezuela has not yet approved its draft national counternarcotics strategy

and has not begun to control precursor and essential chemicals. With more

attention from President Caldera, Venezuela’s compliance with bilateral

agreements on chemical control and money laundering measures should

improve.

Vietnam

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam has a significant opiate abuse problem

and is emerging as a location for drug trafficking. Illicit opium production

exceeded 1,000 hectares, but the precise extent of cultivation remains unclear.

Estimates have ranged as high as 14,000 hectares during the 1992/3 growing

season. The government is undertaking a serious eradication effort and has

pledged to eliminate opium cultivation, which exists primarily in relatively

inaccessible regions of the north.

Opiate addiction in urban areas is a serious problem. The government,

with the aid of the United Nations International Drug Control Program

(UNDCP), is formulating a drug control plan to combat both production

and consumption in Vietnam. Economic reforms and the growing overall

volume of the Southeast Asian heroin trade have made Vietnam an emerging

transit point for heroin destined for Taiwan, the United States and other

locations.

Corruption is a complicating factor in domestic enforcement efforts, but

there is no evidence that the government tolerates, condones or profits

from drug trafficking activity.

The government is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but is developing a program to work toward fulfillment of the goals and objectives of

the Convention. This program is embodied in the drug control plan being

drafted with the assistance of UNDCP. In coordination with UNDCP, the

government is drafting legislation that meets the goals of the Convention.
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There is no bilateral counternarcotics agreement between the United States

and Vietnam. However, informal discussions have begun between representatives of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the USG about counternarcotics

cooperation and the Vietnamese response has been positive.

VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS JUSTIFICATION

Bolivia

Bolivia is the world’s second largest producer of coca leaf after Peru

and the second largest producer of cocaine after Colombia. Most of the

cocaine refined from Bolivian coca leaf is consumed in the United States.

Bolivia was highly successful in counternarcotics law enforcement operations during 1994. The Government of Bolivia (GOB) conducted four major

operations designed to block trafficker movements, seized two large cocaine

HCl laboratories, and arrested major traffickers with links to the Medellin

drug mafia. GOB forces foiled Colombian traffickers and their Bolivian accomplices attempting a prison break at a maximum security facility and arrested

the prison warden for complicity in the plot. Throughout 1994, the GOB

continued its probe of alleged trafficker ties to former President Jaime Paz

Zamora and members of his Movement of the Left (MIR) political party.

In June, the Bolivian Congress removed two Supreme Court justices for

corruption.

President Sanchez de Lozada is seeking to develop a strategy to eliminate

illegal coca from the country without the use of measures he considers

to be divisive, such as forced eradication. In 1994, however, the GOB made

no measurable progress toward creating a plan to carry out this strategy.

In February 1994, the GOB briefly undertook a campaign of forced eradication which resulted in a violent reaction by coca growers. Voluntary,

compensated eradication dropped off sharply and new plantings increased,

resulting in a net increase in the area of coca under cultivation.

The Sanchez de Lozada administration has supported USG efforts to extradite drug traffickers, but such efforts stalled in the Bolivian Supreme Court

in 1994. In early 1995, however, prominent trafficker Jose Faustino Rico

Toro was declared extraditable. Thirty-five other extradition requests by

the United States are pending with Bolivia. The GOB has declined to sign

an extradition treaty negotiated in 1990, but in early 1995, the Sanchez

de Lozada administration proposed a new draft treaty, which USG officials

are reviewing.

It is in the vital national interests of the United States to maintain and

increase the level of cooperation with Bolivia, the world’s second largest

coca and cocaine producer. Denial of certification would likely terminate

much of Bolivia’s multilateral development bank assistance, which would

have an extremely harmful effect on the Bolivian economy. It would reduce

significantly the resources available to the GOB to combat narcotics trafficking

and would foster conditions in which more Bolivians would be driven

to engage in illicit coca cultivation and trafficking.

Because the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank are Bolivian’s largest aid donors, USG opposition to loans to Bolivia by those institutions would result in strident calls within Bolivia for the GOB to cease

its counternarcotics cooperation with the USG. Economic instability could

lead to a loss of confidence throughout the country and thereby serve to

undermine Bolivia’s still-fledging democratic institutions. Should Bolivia’s

current democratically-elected government be followed by an authoritarian

regime, narcotraffickers might gain a strong foothold, as they did in the

corrupt dictatorships of the early 1980’s. Preserving and promoting democracy in Bolivia is in the U.S. national interest of enhancing democracy

throughout the Western Hemisphere.

In 1994, although the GOB’s efforts and cooperation with the USG on

interdiction and on broader political issues were substantial, its overall
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents 12873

counternarcotics efforts were not adequate to meet the goals and objectives

of the 1988 UN Convention. Nevertheless, the risks posed to vital U.S.

national interests from the possible consequences of terminating U.S. assistance, as noted above, greatly outweigh the risks posed by the lack of complete

GOB cooperation on counternarcotics. With recent positive signs of action

from the GOB, the USG will enter into further discussions to secure commitments for action in key areas.

Colombia

In 1994, Colombia remained the world’s largest supplier of cocaine and

the source of virtually all the cocaine imported into the United States.

There are currently more than 111,000 acres (45,000 hectares) of coca being

cultivated, a 13.3 percent increase over 1993 and, if such cultivation is

not contained and crops are not eradicated, Colombia could soon surpass

Bolivia as the second largest source of coca after Peru. Colombia is also

a significant supplier of heroin and one of the largest cultivators of opium

poppy in the world, along with Burma, Afghanistan and Laos. Recent data

indicate that after having been suppressed over the last few years, Colombia’s

marijuana cultivation and export to the United States is again increasing.

The expected diminution in the movement and flow of narcotics originating

in Colombia as a result of the destruction of the Medellin syndicate in

1993 did not materialize. It is apparent that the removal of Pablo Escobar

and his drug empire from the Colombia narcotics scene only benefited

the now-dominant syndicate headquartered in the city of Cali.

During 1994, the USG and the Government of Colombia (GOC) collaborated

on a number of fronts against the scourge of narcotics trafficking in both

countries. The GOC had some successes. GOC performance on a number

of critical issues, however, was inadequate. Among the successes attained

by the GOC were ratification of the 1988 UN Convention which entered

into force for Colombia in September 1994, the legalization of the herbicide

glyphosate for use against coca cultivation, the defeat of a bill in Congress

supported by narco-traffickers that would have diluted the existing illicit

enrichment law, the indictment of Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela, and an aerial

eradication campaign against illicit cultivation, which the GOC has pressed

in the face of large-scale protests by the cultivators. Colombia remains the

only producer of coca currently permitting aerial eradication of illegal crops.

Individual police and other officials operating at the ground level show

considerable determination to bring narcotics traffickers to justice. Sporadic

and ambivalent support by some quarters of the Colombian political establishment prevents significant damage to the Colombian drug syndicates. In

1994, the GOC took no legislative steps to reverse the 1993 revision of

the criminal procedures code which made it more difficult to bring midlevel and senior syndicate heads to justice. As a result, following the trend

set in 1993, there were no arrests, incarcerations, or fines imposed on

such traffickers. In addition, a number of previously convicted traffickers

were able to benefit from significant reductions in their sentences pursuant

to Colombia’s woefully lenient sentencing laws. The GOC’s inability to protect and use information provided to them by the U.S. Justice Department

has made impossible a full resumption of our previous law enforcement

evidence-sharing relationship. The GOC has been informed that evidence

obtained in the United States will not be provided for any new criminal

cases pending a successful resolution of old cases for which we have provided

evidence.

In 1994, total drug seizures through interdiction efforts were above those

of 1993 but did not reach the levels accomplished in 1991 (86.35 mt)

as the USG had recommended to the GOC. Performance on eradication

has improved, but results to date have not met expectations. Even with

increased USG-provided air and herbicide assets, the amount of opium poppy

eradicated was almost 50 percent less than in 1993. As for coca the numbers

are impressive (4,500+ hectares vs. 793 ha in 1993). They might have been
12874 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents

greater had not local grower protests temporarily brought the program to

a near halt in December.

In excess of 15,000 active criminal corruption investigations have been

filed by the Attorney General against government officials, including 21

Colombian members of Congress. In 1994, there were no senior government

officials indicted for corruption. Although Colombia and the United States

in 1980 signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, Colombia has failed to

ratify the treaty, and it has not entered into force. The Colombian Congress

did not pass bills introduced by the Samper administration to counter money

laundering activities and asset retention by illegal enterprises and those

who participate in them. There was insufficient progress to detect and

remove those corrupt officials primarily involved in counternarcotics efforts.

There continues to be a problem with drug syndicate control of sovereign

territory, such as San Andres Island.

The performance of two successive governments of Colombia during 1994

on the counternarcotics front did not meet the expectations agreed upon

between our governments in numerous official and non-official meetings

on the subject. Certain performance criteria were set out with the GOC

in order to advance our joint commitments to this problem. Despite a national

election and promises by the new government, Colombia did not meet

these performance criteria nor did it take adequate steps on its own to

achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives established by the

1988 UN Convention. As a result, the activities of the Colombian drug

syndicates continue to ensure that the flow of cocaine, heroin and marijuana

from Colombia to the United States remains undiminished.

There was a demonstrable absence of support by some quarters of the

political establishment to buttress the gains achieved by GOC institutions

operating at the ground level. There were no efforts made in the areas

of judicial reform, capture and incarceration of syndicate heads, or the

strengthening of executive institutions to counter the successful efforts of

the trafficking syndicates. Lack of action by the Congress on GOC-introduced

legislation also remains a problem.

Vital U.S. national interests would be at risk if we were to deny Columbia

certification. As Colombia is the primary source of cocaine to the United

States, continued cooperation with the GOC is very important to this country.

A vital national interest certification will ensure that USG policy and assistance remain focused on developing more effective Colombian anti-drug efforts, while acknowledging that GOC actions to date have not had the

desired impact on the flow of illegal narcotics to the United States. Further,

such a certification allows the United States to continue working closely

with Colombia on the other important issues on our bilateral agenda: promoting human rights, advancing free trade, and cooperating in international

fora.

If Colombia were not certified, the USG would be required to vote against

multilateral development lending. Termination of such assistance would

have an adverse effect on the Colombian economy, reducing the resources

available to the GOC to combat narcotics trafficking and fostering conditions

in which more Colombians would be encouraged to engage in illicit coca

cultivation and trafficking. Moreover, Colombia would find it more difficult

to get international donors to help fund its projected alternative development

scheme. Columbia’s planned purchase of a U.S. radar system using ExportImport Bank financing would be cancelled, further reducing Colombia’s

interdiction capabilities.

While the GOC needs to do more in its efforts against drugs, the decrease

in narcotics cooperation that would likely attend denial of certification

would result in even more narcotics entering this country. Decertification

would result in strident nationalistic calls on the GOC to cease its CN

cooperation with the USG. In short, the risks associated with denying certification to Colombia are greater than the risks associated with Colombia’s

failure in the last year to cooperate fully with the United States, or to
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents 12875

take adequate steps on its own, to combat narcotics. Continued cooperation

with the GOC will serve our drug control interests. Contrary to our national

interests, the net result of decertification would be an increase in the flow

of narcotics from Colombia to the United States and in the number of

deaths among American drug victims.

Lebanon

Lebanon remained a major nexus for narcotics production and trafficking

in 1994. Lebanese success in dramatically reducing the cultivation of both

opium and cannabis in 1994 was offset by the continued processing of

imported narcotics. Lebanese production facilities maintained pre-eradication

levels of output. The Syrians have been cooperative in facilitating some

advances in the Lebanese counternarcotics effort. However, no processing

laboratories in Lebanon were dismantled in 1994 and the number of heroin

and cocaine laboratories increased significantly. The volume of raw opium

and cocaine flowing into Lebanon for processing and reexport offset the

decreased volume of opium and cannabis cultivated in the Biqa’ Valley.

In addition to significant successful eradication efforts, positive developments in Lebanon during 1994 include the lifting of immunity to permit

prosecution of a legislator alleged to be corrupt, and the initiation of investigations of other public figures. There was also a marked increase in the

number of small seizures and arrests reported in Lebanon, a major seizure

of cocaine base in the port of Beirut was recorded, and a major importer

of pharmaceuticals was also arrested on suspicion of diverting chemicals

to illicit laboratories.

Although Lebanon has signalled its intent to accede, it is not yet a party

to the 1988 UN Convention and has not met some of the goals and objectives

of the Convention. Lebanon does not have a bilateral narcotics agreement

with the United States.

The threat posed to the United States by drug trafficking and processing

in Lebanon remains real. However, Lebanon’s inability to confront in a

wholly successful manner the narcotics threat, or to cooperate fully with

the United States reflects, in part, the weakness of its institutions and

regional political dynamics. Moreover, the stability, peace, and economic

development of Lebanon are important to the stability of the Middle East

region. The United States’ vital national interests in continuing assistance

to Lebanon and in furthering regional stability outweigh the threat posed

by drug trafficking through Lebanon to the United States.

Pakistan

Pakistan is both a producer and an important transit country for opiates

destined for international drug markets. Laboratories in Pakistan’s Northwest

Frontier Province process opium grown there and in neighboring Afghanistan.

The USG estimates that about one-tenth of heroin consumed in the United

States originates in Southwest Asia, much of it produced in the illegal

labs in Pakistan. During the 1993–94 crop year, Pakistan produced about

160 metric tons of opium from about 7,300 hectares of poppy.

Despite limited progress in some areas, in 1994 the Government of Pakistan

laid the foundation for significant progress in early 1995.

The GOP extended, by decree, the 1930 Narcotics Law to the tribal areas,

increased significantly seizures of opium and heroin, increased financial

resources devoted to combatting illicit narcotics processing and trade, and

in several meetings with Government of India officials agreed to expand

counternarcotics cooperation. It also initiated twelve new asset seizure cases

in 1994 and used the media to alert the public to the GOP counternarcotics

efforts and the dangers of narcotics.

There was limited progress in other areas. Despite the GOP extension

of the 1930 Narcotics Law to the frontier areas, few major drug traffickers

were arrested or prosecuted during calendar year 1994. None of the new

asset seizure cases has been prosecuted. Pakistan marginally extended the
12876 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents

opium cultivation ban while eradication equaled only 1993’s total eradication. Poppy cultivation was up 16 percent in 1994, although the overall

level of cultivation has remained more or less constant over the last five

years.

By year end, Pakistan had drafted and vetted legislation to bring Pakistani

law into conformance with the 1988 UN Convention, to which Pakistan

is a party, and to prevent drug money laundering. President Leghari promulgated the legislative package as a temporary decree January 9, effective

for 120 days after disagreements in the cabinet precluded submission to

the National Assembly. Legislative action will be required to make it permanent. Politically difficult efforts to curb corruption in GOP law enforcement

agencies and the courts have been modest.

Building on the foundation laid in 1994, Pakistan intensified its antinarcotics efforts in 1995. The government began an eradication campaign

in Bajaur Agency in January 1995 and created a demand reduction office.

It also announced on January 25 that it had frozen $68 million in assets

of narcotics traffickers. In a late January raid on a drug warehouse in the

Northwest Frontier Province, 132 metric tons of drugs, primarily hashish,

were seized. Recently, the GOP indicated a willingness to proceed expeditiously on outstanding extradition requests. Pakistan recently expanded the

poppy ban in the NWFP.

Vital U.S. national interests could be damaged if Pakistan were to be

denied certification. Pakistan is a strategically-located, moderate Islamic state

with a nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan has provided troops for UN

peacekeeping operations, most recently in Bosnia and Somalia, and has

cooperated in the international fight against terrorists. The Government of

Pakistan has also used its moderating influence with other Islamic countries.

Decertification would be viewed in Pakistan as abandonment of a loyal

ally and would endanger U.S./Pakistani dialogue and cooperation on these

vital issues. It could also undermine Pakistan’s ongoing efforts to address

the drug problem, including cooperation by Pakistani anti-narcotics forces

with DEA and the embassy narcotics affairs section.

The risk to these vital U.S. interests, and particularly our narcotics cooperation efforts, outweighs the potential gain from decertifying Pakistan for its

inadequate efforts to combat narcotics. Pakistan is the conduit for opium

and morphine base from Afghanistan, the second largest opium producer

in the world. If the surge of Afghan drugs is to be stemmed, we need

more Pakistani cooperation. Morale in Pakistan’s anti-narcotics organizations

could be adversely affected by decertification.

Although Pakistan is currently prohibited from receiving many forms of

aid by the Pressler Amendment, denial of certification would add a requirement to vote against Pakistan in multilateral development banks. Access

to such loans is vital to Pakistan. During the period of national interest

certification, the USG will redouble its efforts to assist the GOP in improving

its anti-narcotics performance to meet the criteria for full certification.

Paraguay

Paraguay is used as a transit route for cocaine shipped primarily from

Bolivia, and perhaps increasingly from Colombia, to Argentina and Brazil

for onward shipment to the United States and Europe. High-quality marijuana

is exported to Argentina and Brazil and consumed within Paraguay. Paraguay

is potentially a major money laundering center, based on its extensive reexport trade and its expanding and poorly regulated financial sector.

President Juan Carlos Wasmosy, Paraguay’s first democratically-elected

civilian President in over five decades, has stressed his personal commitment

to combatting narcotics trafficking. He has continued authorization to stage

USG counternarcotics surveillance aircraft in Paraquay and submitted to

Congress legislation to control money laundering. Nevertheless, he failed

in 1994 to act decisively when brought information relating to corruption

within the GOP’s counternarcotics leadership. As a result, Paraquay’s co-
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents 12877

operation in drug law enforcement was weak in the first half of the year,

and one criminal investigation was very probably compromised due to corruption. A lack of political will to uncover what is widely believed to

be extensive official corruption led to an overall weak drug control program.

Given this situation, Paraguay cannot be considered to be in compliance

with the goals of the 1987 bilateral counternarcotics agreement with the

USG, which seeks to eliminate the illicit production, processing, trafficking,

and consumption of narcotics in Paraguay and the transit of narcotics through

contiguous territorial waters.

Cooperation briefly improved in mid-year, resulting in a successful joint

investigation with the Drug Enforcement Administration that netted 756

kilos of cocaine, the largest seizure ever in Paraguay. In October, the head

of the anti-narcotics secretariat (SENAD) was assassinated, apparently in

a personal dispute, disrupting further drug enforcement investigations for

the remainder of the year. The new head of SENAD has expressed commitment to a cooperative drug control effort and has promised to carry out

widespread changes in the composition of SENAD and the national antinarcotics police. The USG remains concerned, however, that the Paraguayan

military’s control over SENAD will cloud any efforts to change the organization fundamentally.

The Government of Paraguay (GOP) made some progress toward meeting

the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention when the Paraguayan

Congress ratified a financial information exchange agreement with the USG.

However, until the GOP takes credible action to investigate allegations of

corruption and to promote an aggressive investigative stance against those

aiding drug trafficking, it cannot be considered to be fully cooperating with

the United States, or to be taking adequate steps on its own, to comply

with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.

Despite its concerns about the GOP’s lack of political will to seriously

address drug trafficking, the USG is cognizant that Paraguay remains a

young, fragile democracy. The consequences of decertification would likely

have a significant adverse impact on Paraguay’s ability to consolidate and

sustain its fledgling democracy. The USG believes that its long-term

counternarcotics goal for Paraguay, the promotion of strong, independent,

credible institutions of government able to defeat drug trafficking, is best

served by fully supporting the continued growth of democracy. Such support

is in the vital national interest of the United States. Therefore, the vital

U.S. national interest of promoting democracy outweighs the risks posed

by the lack of full GOP cooperation on counternarcotics.

Peru

Vital U.S. national interests would be harmed if we deny certification

to Peru. Peru remains the largest source of coca leaf in the world, making

continued cooperation with the Government of Peru very important to the

United States. In 1994, there was no measurable reduction in the flow

of coca base from Peru to Colombia and no systematic mature coca eradication. While the amount of coca under cultivation remained the same,

coca leaf production increased by six percent due to new, more productive

coca plantings in expanded new areas that are superseding older areas,

such as the Huallaga Valley. A vital national interests certification will

ensure that U.S. Government policy and assistance remain focused on reducing the cultivation of coca and implementing the Peruvian drug strategy

promulgated in 1994. Further, such a certification will allow the United

States to continue working closely with Peru on other important issues

such as democracy, economic reform and human rights.

In September, the Government of Peru (GOP) approved a national drug

plan that defines measures to eliminate illegal drug production, trafficking

and abuse, including eliminating all coca cultivation destined for illicit

uses. It also established timetables and assigned responsibilities for implementing sectoral plans and programs, including a national alternative development program. In June, the GOP passed a stringent law with strict penalties
12878 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents

for any aspect of opium poppy cultivation trafficking or use, which requires

destruction of any poppy found in Peru. The GOP cooperated on most

counternarcotics matters contained in its bilateral narcotics agreement with

the United States, and took some steps to comply with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention. However, it made no progress toward

the critical goal of reducing mature coca cultivations.

In 1994, there was concrete evidence of refined cocaine HCl processing

and shipment from Peru to Mexico by Peruvian trafficking organizations,

raising the specter of Peru as a potentially large-scale cocaine refining and

shipping center, similar to Colombia. Police and armed forces seized over

9 mt of cocaine base through November 1994, exceeding the 1993 total.

Nearly 6 mt were seized by the armed forces, using police intelligence.

In January 1994, at GOP request, Colombia arrested major Peruvian trafficker

Demetrio Limonier Chavez-Penaherrera (‘‘Vaticano’’). He was tried in Peru

and is serving a 30-year sentence. There were similar successes against

other major Peruvian trafficking organizations. The Peruvian Air Force (FAP)

continued to implement an air intercept program with A–37s and Tucano

aircraft, despite the USG shutdown of intelligence sharing in May (which

has now resumed pursuant to a U.S. Presidential Determination).

The GOP has cooperated with UN Drug Control Program alternative development projects in parts of the Huallaga, Aguaytia, Pachitea and Urubamba

valleys. Resumption of international financial institution lending was followed by World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank projects to

rehabilitate over 1500 kilometers of roads, and improved electrical power

facilities in areas affected by the coca economy. Such improvements in

infrastructure facilitate the production and transport of alternative licit crops.

Coca seedbed eradication was resumed in July, and has had a measurable

impact on efforts to reduce the cultivation of coca in specific areas.

Alternative development programs in or near coca-producing regions will

set the stage for future coca crop reduction. The GOP must integrate alternative development efforts with actual net reduction of coca cultivation

and prevent the expansion of new coca cultivation areas in order to comply

with 1988 UN Convention goals and U.S. and Peruvian drug plans.

A decrease in narcotics cooperation with the GOP would result in more

cocaine entering the United States. The risks associated with denying certification to Peru are greater than the risks associated with Peru’s failure in

the past year to cooperate fully with the United States, or take adequate

steps on its own to reduce coca cultivations.

STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION

Afghanistan

In 1994, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan increased dramatically

amid ongoing civil war, widespread lawlessness, and poor economic opportunities. According to USG estimates, opium production in Afghanistan rose

38 percent to approximately 950 metric tons of opium in 1994. Cultivated

hectarage rose 39 percent to 29,180 hectares. USG analysis indicates Afghanistan remains the second largest opium producer in the world.

The nominal Government of Afghanistan was unable to eradicate systematically poppy plants, investigate or prosecute traffickers, or impede the transportation of opium, morphine base, or other narcotics. Few provincial leaders

apart from Haji Qadir, Governor of poppy-rich Nangarhar, attempted to

disrupt the cultivation or trafficking through the areas under their control.

Haji Qadir in late 1994 began a campaign of plowing under Nangarhar’s

newly-planted poppy fields. Despite a demonstration of poppy-plowing for

the benefit of U.S. and other international officials, we are unable to judge

the extent or efficacy of Qadir’s campaign.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents 12879

Afghan traffickers continued development of new trafficking routes through

the Newly Independent States, supplementing existing routes through Pakistan and Iran.

Reports continue to allege the direct involvement of some factional leaders,

particularly small-scale independent ‘‘commanders,’’ in narcotics production

and trafficking and the indirect involvement of others who provide security

to the narcotics trade in return for payment.

There is no functioning bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and the

United States. While Afghanistan ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1992,

it has made virtually no progress in achieving its goals.

The tremendous increase in poppy cultivation during 1994, combined

with the inadequate efforts to eliminate cultivation and trafficking, precludes

a determination that Afghanistan has cooperated fully with the United States

or taken adequate steps on its own to meet the goals and objectives established by the 1988 Convention. The core problem in Afghanistan is the

absence of a functional central government. Although the USG has vital

national interests in fostering the re-establishment of a functioning central

government that could cooperate with us on regional security issues and

drug eradication, USG assistance for such purposes falls largely outside

the definition of U.S. assistance that would be cut off by denial of certification, at least this fiscal year. Accordingly, denial of certification is appropriate.

Burma

Burma remains the world’s largest producer of illicit opium and heroin

and the Government of Burma (GOB) continues to treat counternarcotics

efforts as a matter of secondary importance. Estimated opium production

in 1993/94 was 2,030 metric tons and illicit poppy cultivation covered

146,600 hectares. Opium production fell by 21 percent, due principally

to poor weather. There were some modest signs of greater government efforts

in counternarcotics. One of the results of a Burmese Army campaign against

the Shan United Army (SUA) of Khun Sa was to restrict the opium supply

and drug trafficking routes of the SUA. The GOB has also begun to show

signs of willingness to cooperate in counternarcotics efforts and has agreed

to facilitate an opium yield survey in 1995 and to allow the UN Drug

Control Program (UNDCP) to perform an aerial survey of project areas.

Domestic enforcement efforts have also shown some marginal improvement

with regional task forces under the Burmese police becoming more active

in drug enforcement. These efforts, however, fall short of what is required

to address seriously the drug problem in Burma.

The government’s ability to suppress Burma’s opium and heroin trade

is severely limited by lack of access to and control over the areas in which

most opium is grown and heroin processed. Well-equipped ethnic armies

sheltered in these remote mountainous regions have been permitted wideranging, local autonomy in exchange for halting their active insurgencies

against Rangoon. At the same time, opium poppy cultivation has soared

in the base areas of the insurgent groups, especially in the Wa hills, despite

nominal commitments by insurgents and the government alike that efforts

would be made to reduce opium growing. Direct government complicity

in the drug trade does not appear to be a problem among senior officials,

but narcotics corruption is a problem among lower level officials.

Multilateral drug control projects in enforcement and alternative development under the UNDCP involving cooperative efforts between Burma, China

and Thailand are underway. These projects continue to receive support

from the international community. Project scale is small, however, and the

overall impact of these efforts on the huge opium cultivation problem in

Burma has been extremely limited so far.

Burma is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has enacted some

legislation in conformity with the Convention, but has not made a strong

effort to enforce these laws. There has been no bilateral counternarcotics
12880 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents

agreement with the USG since the State Law and Order Restoration Council

assumed power in 1988.

Iran

Iran is a major drug transit country. Reportedly, almost half the morphine

base that arrives in Turkey monthly for processing as heroin passes through

Iran. It also continues to grow opium poppy in remote provinces. Although

the USG did not estimate production in 1994, the USG does not believe

cultivation diminished significantly as we know of no eradication campaigns.

The 1993 estimate was about 3,500 hectares of cultivation with a yield

of between 35 and 70 metric tons of opium.

Iran is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has undertaken at least

some activities to fulfill the goals and objectives the Convention established.

Since Iran and the United States do not have diplomatic relations and

have not cooperated in counternarcotic efforts, the U.S. has been unable

to ascertain the extent or adequacy of Iran’s undertakings. There is no

bilateral counternarcotics agreement in place between Iran’s government

and the USG.

According to both Iranian radio reports and Iranian government reports

to the UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP), the Government of Iran (GOI)

is waging a vigorous campaign to eradicate trafficking through Iran. Almost

daily radio reports announce substantial morphine base and heroin seizures.

Reportedly many individuals are arrested and later executed for drug trafficking. The USG cannot verify many of these reports as it has no representatives

in Iran. UNDCP observers have viewed some seizures, including 30 tons

of opium in one exhibit bond room. Interpol statistics for 1994, probably

based on Iranian government reports, state Iran seized 112 tons of opium,

800 kilograms of heroin and 15 tons of morphine base. However, despite

claims about the high level of Iran’s counternarcotics effort, the level of

drugs arriving in Syria and Turkey has not noticeably decreased.

UNDCP representatives have verified that Iran has fortified frontier guard

posts with Pakistan and dug a trench to prevent crossing between posts

in an effort to decrease trafficking. Intelligence reports suggest that border

guards continue to be bribed to permit drug caravans through, however.

The USG believes drug-related corruption continues to be a serious problem

among Iran’s law enforcement and security services. The USG does not

know the extent to which Iran enforces its prominently advertised campaign

to prevent and punish public corruption.

Human rights organizations and some Iranian exiles accuse Iran of executing dissidents on false charges of drug trafficking.

Nigeria

A major transit country for Asian heroin and Latin American cocaine

destined for the United States and numerous other points around the world,

Nigeria remains the focal point for most West African trafficking organizations. Corruption in the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA)

and other law enforcement agencies has not been addressed adequately,

thereby hindering counternarcotics efforts. The export of Nigerian drug trafficking to Liberia and other West African counties is of particular concern.

The NDLEA’s focus in 1994 remained almost exclusively on drug couriers

rather than on leaders of drug trafficking groups.

The Government of Nigeria (GON) did begin to show concern about international and domestic drug abuse during 1994. The GON prepared a draft

national drug policy plan aimed at rooting out trafficking and substance

abuse. The GON formed a ministerial level task force on drug abuse which

will develop a drug control strategy by mid-1995. In late December, the

GON appointed a special advisor on drugs, money laundering, and advance

fee fraud whose task is to coordinate the anti-drug efforts of the NDLEA,

the police, and the customs agency. In 1994, the GON returned to the

United States three drug barons responsible for heroin rings.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 / Presidential Documents 12881

These steps may have potential for significant improvement in Nigeria’s

anti-drug efforts. We will evaluate at an early stage if they and other steps

are being implemented effectively and if these steps are followed by additional anti-drug measures.

While the United States welcomes the positive steps taken during the

past year, Nigeria did not meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN

Convention. Nigeria did not effectively implement its bilateral agreement

with the United States.

Based on a complete and thorough review of the GON’s counternarcotics

actions throughout 1994, Nigeria’s prominent role in international narcotics

trafficking, and its failure in 1994 to make significant progress in meeting

the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, the threat posed to

the United States by drug trafficking by Nigerians through Nigeria and

elsewhere justifies continued denial of certification.

Syria

Syria is a transit point for narcotics flowing through the Middle East

to Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States. In addition, Syria

continues to have a responsibility for assisting Lebanese authorities in ending

drug production and trafficking through Lebanon because of the presence

of some 30,000 Syrian troops in the Bekaa Valley. In 1994, Syria continued

and expanded its cooperation with Lebanese authorities to eradicate opium

poppy and cannabis cultivation in the Bekaa Valley, significantly reducing

opium and cannabis cultivation. Syrian forces increased seizures of cocaine,

heroin, and hashish and raised the number of arrests of drug traffickers

in Syria and Lebanon. Syrian military authorities in Lebanon assisted in

a significant seizure of cocaine base delivered to Beirut’s port during 1994.

Despite these efforts, however, the flow of narcotics did not diminish in

1994.

The Syrian government has reiterated its willingness to pursue all information regarding the possible production of narcotics in Lebanon and Syria.

However, neither the Syrian nor the Lebanese authorities moved successfully

against cocaine or heroin laboratories operating in either country. There

were a significant number of arrests in Syria for drug-related offenses, but

despite reports of individual Syrian military officials profiting from the

drug trade in Lebanon, no corruption investigations or charges were brought

against any Syrian government or military officials in 1994.

The USG does not provide Syria with bilateral assistance and does not

support loans for Syria in multilateral institutions.

Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. While Syria greatly improved

its performance in reducing illicit cultivation and increased seizures in

Lebanon, it did not meet some of the other goals and objectives of the

1988 UN Convention. Syria does not have a bilateral narcotics agreement

with the United States.

[FR Doc. 95–5850

Filed 3–6–95; 4:03 pm]

Billing code 4710–10–M