United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-60753

Kameko R. Williams, as the administratrix of the Estate of James 

Lee Brownlee, and as natural daughter and next friend of James Lee 

Brownlee, Deceased, and on behalf of all of the Heirs-atLaw and Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of James Lee 

Brownlee, Deceased; The Estate of James Lee Brownlee, 

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

Patrolman Adam Zachary, in his individual capacity; Deputy 

Cody Shankle, in his individual capacity; Deputy Diana 

Westmoreland, in her individual capacity; Sheriff James D. 

Meyers, in his official capacity; Other Unknown John and Jane 

Does 1-10; Chickasaw County, Mississippi; Chickasaw 

County, Mississippi Sheriff’s Department, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:18-cv-128

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 10, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Before Higginbotham, Higginson, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Police arrested James Brownlee on the evening of July 4, 2016, and 

booked him into the Chickasaw County, Mississippi jail that night. Brownlee, 

who had no known preexisting conditions, went into cardiac arrest and died 

early the next morning. Brownlee’s daughter sued law enforcement officers 

and the county. The district court granted summary judgment, and we affirm.

I.

A.

For summary-judgment purposes, we view the facts in the light most 

favorable to the non-movant. E.g., Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th 

Cir. 2010). Here, that is Kameko Williams—Brownlee’s daughter—who 

brings this lawsuit on Brownlee’s behalf.

We summarize (1) events starting with Brownlee’s first encounter 

with police and ending when Chickasaw County jailors took custody of him. 

These facts are primarily relevant to Mississippi Highway Patrol Trooper 

Adam Zachary. Then we summarize (2) events starting with the jailors’ 

custody and ending with Brownlee’s death. These facts are primarily relevant 

to Jailor Cody Shankle.

1.

On July 4, 2016, Trooper Zachary and Trooper Kindle Jones were 

manning a traffic checkpoint. They stopped James Brownlee at that 

checkpoint. Mrs. Brownlee, Brownlee’s wife, was driving. But the officers 

suspected that Brownlee had been driving drunk, and that the pair had 

stopped the car about 100 yards shy of the checkpoint in order to switch 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

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drivers. After some discussion not relevant here, Zachary arrested Brownlee

on various misdemeanor charges.

Shortly after the stop, Mrs. Brownlee saw her husband “leaning over” 

in a way that made her think “he was sick.” (But there is no affirmative 

indication that Zachary saw this.) Brownlee was very intoxicated at the time, 

nearly double the legal limit for driving.

Before driving Brownlee to the jail, Zachary stopped along the side of 

the road, rolled down his window, and talked with Jones. Brownlee 

repeatedly complained of back pain and said he needed to stand up and 

stretch. Brownlee said, “my back is killing me.” Zachary and Jones both 

heard this, and Jones opened up the door to let Brownlee get out and stretch.

Brownlee also said the handcuffs were hurting him, so Zachary took them off 

and “swapped them to the front.”

On the way to the jail, Brownlee said, “Man, I don’t know if I am going 

to make it to the jail. I just want to stand up.” So Zachary turned on his patrol 

car’s blue lights and sped up in order to get to the jail faster. Zachary did not 

stop at the hospital, and Brownlee did not ask him to do so. Zachary’s car had 

a recording system that turns on by default when the blue lights are on, but it 

was switched off.

Upon arrival, Zachary transferred Brownlee into the custody of jail 

sheriffs. There is nothing in the record establishing that Zachary told the jail 

sheriffs about Brownlee’s back pain. Before Zachary left, Brownlee told him 

he wanted to see a doctor. Zachary responded that Brownlee had a right to 

one phone call “for legal or medical assistance.” A phone was available, but 

Brownlee did not call a doctor. Williams does not contend that Zachary had 

any reason to believe Brownlee had a pre-existing medical condition.

The record includes various video recordings, including a recording 

of the room where Brownlee was held during the booking process. Williams’s 

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brief claims the video footage of Brownlee in the booking room shows that 

Brownlee was in significant pain. Zachary and Shankle say Brownlee’s 

extreme intoxication, along with his upset stomach, explain the fact that 

Brownlee seemed unable to get comfortable in the booking room. For 

purposes of this appeal, we assume the video establishes that Brownlee was 

in pain. We also assume that both Zachary and Shankle saw Brownlee’s 

indicators of pain.

2.

The district court found the following five facts, none of which 

Williams now contests, in its summary-judgment order. First, Shankle 

booked Brownlee into the jail and put him in a segregated cell specifically for 

intoxicated inmates. Second, neither Zachary, nor Brownlee himself, nor 

anybody else told Shankle that Brownlee had any pre-existing medical 

condition. Third, Brownlee filled out an intake form and did not indicate any 

preexisting medical condition—and he specifically indicated on the form that 

he did not have a heart condition. Fourth, Brownlee said his stomach hurt 

during the booking process, and Shankle gave him permission to use the 

restroom. And fifth, Brownlee made no further complaints of stomach pain 

after returning from the restroom.

Once Brownlee was booked and in his cell, Shankle and Deputy Diana 

Westmoreland (“Westmoreland”) checked on him intermittently—an 

average of once every half-hour or so. Williams does not contest this, but she 

says Shankle and Westmoreland checked on Brownlee less thoroughly than 

they should have. For instance, she points to deposition testimony that 

Westmoreland “could have done better,” and that she looked into 

Brownlee’s cell without stopping outside the cell. We assume Williams is right 

about this. We also assume, as Williams contends, that Shankle signed off as 

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having checked on Brownlee in some instances when Westmoreland was in 

fact the one doing the checking.

In the morning, Shankle went to Brownlee’s cell to bring him his 

breakfast. Brownlee did not respond, so Shankle eventually entered.

Brownlee was unresponsive. Shankle called for help, and several officers and 

medical personnel responded. They performed CPR, but it did not work. 

Brownlee was pronounced dead at 6:28 a.m. The cause of death was listed as 

hypertension and arthroscopic vascular disease. Williams does not now 

contend that this cause of death is inaccurate.

B.

Williams brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She sued Zachary, 

Shankle, and Westmoreland1 in their individual capacities, arguing the 

officers violated Brownlee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate 

medical care as a pretrial detainee. 

She also brought a claim against Chickasaw County, Mississippi and 

Sheriff Myers (in his official capacity). We refer to the County and Myers 

collectively as “Chickasaw” or the “County.” Williams argued Chickasaw 

was liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 

436 U.S. 658 (1978), on the ground that the County had violated Brownlee’s 

constitutional rights by failing to train its officers.

1 Williams purports to bring a claim against Westmoreland in her individual 

capacity. But the district court dismissed this claim on the ground that Westmoreland never 

received adequate process. Williams in no way contests that holding. Thus, we hold 

Williams forfeited the issue by failing to brief it, and we affirm the dismissal as to 

Westmoreland on that ground. See Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. EPA, 937 F.3d 533, 542 (5th Cir. 

2019) (“Petitioners forfeited [an] argument by failing to include it in their opening brief.”).

We discuss Westmoreland herein only to the extent her actions are relevant to the other 

defendants.

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After some discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The court held Zachary and 

Shankle were entitled to qualified immunity because, among other things,

they had not violated a clearly established constitutional right. And the court 

held Williams had failed to show Chickasaw was liable under Monell. So the 

court granted summary judgment in favor of Zachary, Shankle, and 

Chickasaw.

Williams timely appealed. We have jurisdiction to review the district 

court’s final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. E.g., Zurich Am. Ins. 

Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 20 F.4th 250, 254 (5th Cir. 2021). Generally, as 

mentioned above, we construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant (here, Williams). Brown, 623 F.3d at 253. And generally, summaryjudgment movants (here, the defendants) bear the burden of showing “that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

We (A) hold that Zachary and Shankle are entitled to qualified 

immunity. Then we (B) affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to Chickasaw.

A.

We begin by outlining (1) the rules governing qualified immunity.

Then we hold (2) Williams’s argument fails (as to both officers) because her 

brief frames the constitutional issue at an impermissibly high level of 

generality. Next, we hold (3) Williams’s argument fails (as to both officers) 

because, even if she had framed the issue with the requisite specificity, she 

does not point to any precedents that clearly establish the right the officers 

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are supposed to have violated. And finally, we hold (4) to the extent there is 

clearly established law in this case, it cuts against Williams rather than in her 

favor—again, as to both officers.

1.

Because the officers have asserted qualified immunity in good faith, 

Williams bears the burden of showing a genuine dispute of material fact on 

that issue. See Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 328–29 (5th Cir. 2020). More 

specifically, Williams must first show there is a genuine dispute of material 

fact concerning “whether the officer[s] violated a constitutional right.” 

Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019); Joseph, 981 F.3d at 

329. Second, she must show there is a genuine dispute of material fact 

concerning “whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of 

the alleged misconduct.” Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874 (quotation omitted); 

Joseph, 981 F.3d at 329. “We can decide one question or both.” Morrow, 917 

F.3d at 874.

In this case, we need decide only the second question—whether the 

officers violated clearly established law. “A Government official’s conduct 

violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, 

the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official 

would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. 

Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quotation omitted). Importantly for 

present purposes, “we must frame the constitutional question with 

specificity and granularity.” Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874–75. It is almost never

enough to point to “general rules set forth in” existing precedents: General 

rules “do not by themselves create clearly established law outside an obvious 

case.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (per curiam) (quotation 

omitted); see also al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (“We do not require a case directly 

on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 

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question beyond debate.” (emphasis added)). For purposes of this appeal, 

“[w]e assume without deciding that our precedent,” as opposed to Supreme 

Court precedent, “could, in an appropriate case, clearly establish the law.” 

Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 677 (5th Cir. 2019).

2.

Williams argues that Zachary violated one of Brownlee’s clearly 

established constitutional rights. Williams points to the Fourteenth 

Amendment, which guarantees that pretrial detainees will not “have their 

serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of . . . 

confining officials.” Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 

2001) (using this formulation in a rule statement). “To establish a 

constitutional violation [on this theory], a plaintiff must show that the 

defendant: (1) was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists; (2) subjectively drew the 

inference that the risk existed; and (3) disregarded the risk.” Cleveland, 938 

F.3d at 676 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).

Williams’s brief first states the no-deliberate-indifference rule, citing 

Thompson. Then it applies that general rule to the facts of this case. It 

concludes that Zachary and Shankle violated Brownlee’s clearly established 

right to adequate pretrial care by showing deliberate indifference to his 

medical needs.

That is not nearly specific enough. To the extent (if any) cases like 

Thompson clearly establish law, they do not do so merely by stating the general 

no-deliberate-indifference rule. They do so by applying the rule to a particular 

set of facts. See Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2020) (running 

down the facts in Thompson and explaining Thompson had clearly established 

law with respect to factually similar scenarios—not in virtue of its mere rule 

statement); see also infra, Part II.A.3 (discussing these facts in more detail). 

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“The dispositive question in this step of the qualified-immunity analysis is 

whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established. Cases 

that are too factually distinct to speak clearly to the specific circumstances 

here are not enough to deny qualified immunity.” Cleveland, 938 F.3d at 677 

(quotations omitted). It is simply not enough to rely on general rule 

statements, as most of Williams’s briefing does. We therefore reject 

Williams’s impermissibly high-level framing of the right at issue. See Morrow, 

917 F.3d at 875 (“The Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly told courts not to 

define clearly established law at [a] high level of generality.’” (quoting alKidd, 563 U.S. at 742) (alteration omitted)).

3.

Even if Williams had framed the right with adequate specificity, she

has not shown that either Zachary or Shankle “violated clearly established 

law.” Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874. That is because Williams points to no 

“existing precedent” that “place[s] the . . . constitutional question[s]” in 

this case “beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.

Consider the cases Williams does cite. One is Nerren v. Livingston 

Police Dep’t, 86 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 1996), a case where we found officers had 

violated a detainee’s clearly established constitutional rights. See id. at 473.

The detainee’s “face and chest were marred with abrasions, he was in 

[obvious] pain, and he informed the Arresting Officers that he needed 

medical attention” for his injuries. Id. The detainee’s need for care was 

obvious because the officers knew he “had recently been involved in a 

multiple vehicle . . . accident.” Id. But the officers flat-out “denied [the 

detainee’s] request for the express reason that he had fled the scene of the 

accident without regard for the plight of the other victims.” Id. We affirmed 

the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. Id. at 474.

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Nerren does not place it “beyond debate” that Zachary violated 

Brownlee’s constitutional rights. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. It is undisputed 

that Brownlee complained only of wrist pain, back pain, and stomach 

discomfort—and only intermittently at that. And Zachary, unlike the officers 

in Nerren, was not on notice that Brownlee had recently undergone 

significant trauma. (This is true even on the assumption that the bookingroom video demonstrates Brownlee was in significant pain and not just 

discomfort.) Further, rather than denying Brownlee care, Zachary explicitly 

told Brownlee he could use a readily accessible phone to call a doctor if he 

needed one.

Likewise with Shankle. Williams does not contend that Brownlee 

asked Shankle for medical care even once. That alone puts Shankle outside 

Nerren’s domain. Moreover, the only complaint Brownlee voiced to Shankle

was that his stomach hurt, and the only thing he requested was to use the 

restroom. Shankle let him do so, then he went about business as usual—

including checking on Brownlee at regular intervals. To describe those 

circumstances is to explain why Nerren has nothing to do with them.

Williams also cites Thompson and Dyer. Those cases have three key 

characteristics in common with each other—none of which appear in this 

case. First, in both Thompson and Dyer, the detainee was suffering from some 

form of psychosis. See Thompson, 245 F.3d at 452–54 (alcohol-related delirium 

tremens); Dyer, 964 F.3d at 377–78 (LSD). Second, the psychosis brought on 

seizures in each case, which in turn caused the detainee to thrash around and 

inflict himself with serious and obvious head wounds. See Thompson, 245 F.3d 

at 454 (Thompson had begun “to collide with objects in his cell, sometimes 

falling and striking his head against the window, floor or concrete bench.”); 

Dyer, 964 F.3d at 378–789 (The detainee had “thrashed violently . . . and 

slammed his head . . . against the interior of [a patrol] car” a total of more 

than 40 times.). Third, the relevant officers had first-hand knowledge of

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these traumatic injuries and nevertheless did little or nothing to help—and 

the detainees eventually died as a result. See Thompson, 245 F.3d at 454 (jailor 

provided some care but, at the end of her shift, specifically instructed her 

colleagues not to seek help without contacting her first and to contact her 

only if the detainee was “dying”); Dyer, 964 F.3d at 384–85 (despite 

witnessing the eventually fatal injuries as they occurred, transporting officers 

gave jailors the impression that all was well by “inform[ing] the jail sergeant 

only that Graham had been medically cleared at the scene”). Again, as the 

Dyer court itself explained, “Thompson define[d] clearly established law in 

sufficient detail to have notified the Officers [in Dyer] that their actions were 

unconstitutional” precisely because the cases shared these factual similarities.

964 F.3d at 384.

This case has none of the three characteristicsthat—as the Dyer court 

recognized—were central to Thompson’s holding. Brownlee (i) wasn’t 

suffering from psychosis. He (ii) didn’t have seizures, head injuries, or

traumatic injuries of any sort. And (iii) because he didn’t suffer traumatic 

injuries, the officers necessarily didn’t witness him undergoing such injuries.

Those three dissimilarities mean that Thompson, just like Nerren, 

doesn’t put it “beyond debate” that Zachary violated Brownlee’s 

constitutional rights. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741; see also Dyer, 964 F.3d at 384 

(properly framing Thompson in very particularized terms). Put simply: 

Because there were no psychosis-related, self-inflicted injuries to ignore, 

Zachary can’t have ignored them. That means Zachary can’t have violated 

any law Thompson clearly established. Doubly so given that, even on 

Williams’s own account, Zachary had no reason to believe Brownlee was at 

serious risk of a cardiac event. See Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 239 

F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (a fortiori case holding that “the failure to 

alleviate a significant risk that the official should have perceived, but did not[,]

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is insufficient to show deliberate indifference.” (quotation omitted) 

(emphasis added)).

Exactly the same reasoning applies to Shankle. His actions and 

omissions have nothing to do with psychosis, seizures, head injuries, acute 

trauma, or anything else that was in play in Thompson. That is the end of the 

inquiry.

4.

“To the extent we can identify clearly established law” in this case, it 

supports Zachary and Shankle rather than Williams. Morrow, 917 F.3d at 877. 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), is arguably the most on-point case. 

There, a prisoner complained of back pain after a heavy object fell on him. 

See id. at 99, 107. Prison doctors “diagnosed his injury as a lower back strain 

and treated it with bed rest, muscle relaxants and pain relievers.” Id. at 107.

When his symptoms worsened, they also treated him for high blood pressure. 

See id. at 99–100. But the prisoner continued to get worse, and the doctors 

eventually discovered that he had “irregular cardiac rhythm.” Id. at 101. The 

prisoner sued a prison doctor. The Court held the doctor had not violated the 

prisoner’s rights—even if the doctor had misunderstood the import of the 

prisoner’s symptoms, and even if the doctor had accordingly mistreated the 

prisoner.

Estelle is not directly on point. But its facts are arguably closer to this 

case than are any of Williams’s cited cases. There, as here, a detainee 

complained of severe back pain. There, as here, the relevant state employees 

treated the detainee as if he had a back injury. And there, as here, it turns out 

that there was something seriously wrong with the detainee’s heart—not just 

his back. As far as it goes, then, Estelle seriously undercuts Williams’s 

argument. See id. at 107–08 (holding there was no constitutional violation); 

see also Batiste v. Theriot, 458 F. App’x 351, 355–57 (5th Cir. 2012) (per 

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curiam) (granting qualified immunity to officers who failed to perceive that a 

detainee, whom they had just tased, was undergoing a drug-induced and 

ultimately fatal medical emergency).

B.

Williams also urges us to vacate the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to Chickasaw. Williams argues Chickasaw failed to train its jailors 

adequately, and that this failure amounted to a violation of Brownlee’s 

constitutional rights.

The Supreme Court says failure to train can give rise to municipal 

liability under Monell. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). But 

because Monell claims focus on customs and policies, failure-to-train theories 

are an awkward fit for the doctrine. The Supreme Court recognized this in 

Canton—and its solution was to make it very difficult to show liability on a 

failure-to-train theory. Id. (acknowledging, “[i]t may seem contrary to 

common sense to assert that a municipality will actually have a policy of not 

taking reasonable steps to train its employees” but going on to provide a 

narrow route toward liability). The doctrinal bottom line: “Only where a 

municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a 

‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants can such a 

shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is 

actionable under § 1983.” Id. at 389; see also id. at 391 (“To adopt lesser 

standards of fault and causation would open municipalities to unprecedented 

liability under § 1983.”).

In this case, the district court correctly explained Williams did not 

clear that high bar. The district court held that “[n]othing in the record 

indicates a systemic failure to provide officers with training related to inmate 

medical assessment, and certainly not to the level required to invoke the 

[Canton] exception to Monell.” We agree. After reviewing the record and the 

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briefing, we see no reversible error in the district court’s decision to grant 

summary judgment to Chickasaw.

AFFIRMED.

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