United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 21-2658

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

John Willard Greywind

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of North Dakota

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Submitted: June 13, 2022

Filed: January 10, 2023

[Unpublished]

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Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

John Greywind is currently serving a sentence of 120 months of imprisonment 

after pleading guilty to voluntary manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112 

and 1153. As part of his sentence, Greywind was also required to pay $4,184.54 in

restitution through installment payments based on inmate earnings “and not less than 

$25 per quarter.” In June 2021, the government filed a motion to release funds, 
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seeking turnover of funds from Greywind’s inmate trust account under 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3613(a) and 3664(n). Greywind objected, claiming the funds in question were 

“Economic Impact Payment[s]” provided through various COVID-related tax relief 

provisions and therefore exempt. The district court1 granted the government’s 

motion and ordered the Bureau of Prisons to turn over approximately $3,100 from 

Greywind’s trust account for application toward his outstanding restitution 

obligations. The district court concluded the funds were not exempt under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3613(a)(1) and there was a valid lien against the funds. 

Greywind argues on appeal (1) the government lacked authority to collect 

more than the scheduled installment payments, (2) the district court failed to 

adequately identify the source of the funds to avoid collecting exempt funds, and (3) 

the release was not justified under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k). Because the installment 

schedule does not preclude release under § 3664(n) and no dispute exists about the 

sources of the funds, we affirm.

We review a district court’s order to grant the turnover of funds from an 

inmate’s trust account for abuse of discretion and its statutory interpretation de novo. 

See United States v. Robinson, 44 F.4th 758, 760 (8th Cir. 2022). However, this 

court applies a plain error standard when reviewing arguments raised for the first 

time on appeal. See United States v. Beston, 43 F.4th 867, 873 (8th Cir. 2022). 

Under plain error review, we reverse only if there is “(1) an error, (2) that was plain,

(3) affects substantial rights,” and (4) “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Rush-Richardson, 574 

F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). 

Greywind argues, for the first time on appeal, the district court erred by 

ordering the release of funds in excess of the amount required in the oral 

pronouncement during sentencing for restitution installment payments. Greywind 

1

The Honorable Peter D. Welte, Chief Judge, United States District Court for 

the District of North Dakota.
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is correct that “when an oral sentence and the written judgment conflict, the oral 

controls.” United States v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

United States v. Mayo, 642 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2011)). Here, however, the oral 

sentence’s general payment scheme only sets a minimum payment and must defer

to the statutory mandate of § 3664(n). Under its plain language, § 3664(n) triggers 

a mandatory payment requirement to satisfy restitution obligations still owed 

without a limitation as to whether an installment payment plan exists or the 

defendant is in default. See United States v. Kendrick, No. 10-CR-6096-FPG, 2022 

WL 1819390, at *4 & n.4 (W.D.N.Y. June 3, 2022) (slip op.) (noting § 3664(n)

triggered by receipt of a windfall during imprisonment without a statutory 

requirement for default); but see United States v. Raifsnider, 846 F. App’x 423, 424 

(8th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (noting clear authority must exist to override payment 

plan to obtain funds representing sixteen years of inmate’s savings).

Generally, “[f]unds held in an inmate trust account are not exempt from 

enforcement” of a lien, such as a restitution order. Robinson, 44 F.4th at 760. 

Rather, as the plain language of § 3664(n) requires, money within an inmate trust 

account will be applied to a defendant’s restitution obligations if it qualifies as 

“substantial resources from any source.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n). Greywind does 

not dispute the tax relief payments are substantial resources. But because not all 

funds contained in a trust account may be considered as such, we must determine

the composition of trust account funds. See United States v. Kidd, 23 F.4th 781, 787 

(8th Cir. 2022) (noting “substantial resources” do not include the accumulation of 

funds from prison wages); see also United States v. Evans, 48 F.4th 888, 892 (8th 

Cir. 2022) (noting this circuit has not decided the issue, but “[t]he few courts to 

consider the issue have concluded that COVID-19 stimulus payments are the ‘receipt 

of substantial resources’ under § 3664(n)”); see, e.g., United States v. Wade, 580 F. 

Supp. 3d 661, 665 (D. Neb. 2022) (“An influx of stimulus funds represents receipt 

of substantial resources [ ] that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) must be applied to 

outstanding restitution obligations.”).
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The source of funds here is not disputed. Greywind admitted $3200 came 

from COVID-related tax relief payments, noting he had spent some of the funds. 

Unlike the situations in United States v. Woodring, 35 F.4th 633 (8th Cir. 2022), and 

Evans, 48 F.4th at 891−92, meaningful appellate review is possible because the 

record indicates the amount of the tax relief payments. Accordingly, the district 

court had evidence, coming from Greywind himself, that the money was not an 

exempt accumulation of wages, but was instead a non-exempt “windfall or 

substantial financial injection.” See Kidd, 23 F.4th at 785 (quoting United States v. 

Hughes, 914 F.3d 947, 951 (5th Cir. 2019)). This allowed the district court to 

consider turnover of the funds under § 3664(n).

The district court did not commit plain error. Because we determine the 

restitution installment schedule does not bar turnover of the funds, whose source was 

undisputed, in Greywind’s inmate trust account under § 3664(n), there is no need for 

us to address the remaining issues raised on appeal. The judgment of the district 

court is affirmed.

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