COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judge McCl anahan, Senior Judges Coleman and Annunziata

KARL J. OTTOSEN MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0953-05-4 PER CURIAM DECEMBER 6, 2005 CARLA L. SAUNDERS

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF FAIRFAX COUNTY Jonathan C. Th acher, Judge (Michael A. Ward, on briefs), for appellant. (Lisa C. Fried, on brief), for appellee.
Karl J. Ottosen (father) appe als from the circuit court’s Marc h 18, 2005 order finding he violated Code § 8.01-271.1 and ordering him to pay costs and atto rney’s fees to Ca rla L. Saunders (mother). On appeal, fath er contends the trial cour t erred (1) in finding moth er is entitled to relief under Code § 8.01-271.1 an d (2) in determining the amount of the award. Both parties seek attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection wi th this appeal. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this app eal is without me rit. Accordingl y, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND On appeal, we view the evidence and all reas onable inferences in the light most favorable to appellee as the party prevailing below. See McGuire v. McGuire , 10 Va. App. 248, 250, 391 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990).

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - The parties’ children we re born on November 1, 1991. The parties, never married, entered into an “Agreed Order” on November 8, 2000. In that order, they agreed the parties would have joint legal custody of the twins, with mother having primary p hysical custody, s ubject to visitation as outlined in the order. The or der further provided that either pa rty could recover attorney’s fees expended in successfully enforcing the order. On May 30, 2003, father petiti oned the juvenile and domestic relations district court for a change in custody for the two chil dren. The first trial date of Ja nuary 26, 2004 was cancelled due to weather, but mother and the children had already tr aveled to Virginia from Florida for the event. Mother again traveled to Virginia for the second trial da te of May 24, 2004. The following day, the juvenile court dismissed father’s petition, on mother’s motion, concl uding father had failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances since the entry of th e consent order. The juvenile court denied mother’s motion for atto rney’s fees and also denied her motion to reconsider the denial of attorney’s fees, concluding that responding to father’s petitions was not a “successful enforcement of any of the provisions” of the parties’ consent order. On June 2, 2004, father appealed the juvenile court decision to the circuit court. Father’s counsel sought to non-suit the appeal just days be fore the scheduled November 17, 2004 trial date. Mother objected to the non-suit. The circuit court allowed father to withdraw his appeal with prejudice but rejected the non-suit attempt. The court al so allowed mother to file a renewed motion for attorney’s fees and af ter reviewing the record and evidence presented determined father violated Code § 8.01-271.1 and awarded sanc tions to mother in th e amount of her attorney’s fees and costs associated with defending the actio n father initiated against her.- 3 - ANALYSIS
I. Under Code § 8.01-271.1, every motion signed or made orally by an a ttorney constitutes a representation that “to the best of his know ledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry,” the argument or legal posi tion is “well grounded in fact,” and is well grounded in current law or is made in good faith application of law that should be extended, modified, or reversed. If this statute is vi olated, then the trial court shall impose upon the attorney and/or the represented party “an appr opriate sanction.” The trial court found father vindictively “pursu[ed] his fruitl ess litigation” causing unnecessary expense and stress to mother and the children. Father argue s this ruling was in error. This Court reviews an award of sanctions for abuse of discretion by the trial court. Oxenham v. Johnson , 241 Va. 281, 287, 402 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1991). In applying that standard, we use an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whet her a litigant and his attorney, after reasonable inquiry, could have formed a reasonable belief that the pleading was well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and not interposed for an improper purpose. Flippo v. CSC Assocs. III, L.L.C. , 262 Va. 48, 65-66, 547 S.E.2d 216, 227 (2001). See also Gilmore v. Finn , 259 Va. 448, 466, 527 S.E.2d 426, 435 (2000). In this context, we review the trial court’s determination that father did not r easonably believe that his representations to the court, both orally and in his pleadings, were well grounded or made in good faith. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that father filed his motions for the improper purpose of harassing moth er or to cause her unnecessary expense. The record reveals the juvenile court determined fath er failed to demonstrate any material changes in circumstances. After initiating an appeal to th e circuit court, father attempted to non-suit the- 4 - case just days before the scheduled trial. Th e court permissibly inferred from the record that father “use[d] his pending appeal as leverage, [in] offer[ing] a settlement to [m]other . . . .” Based in part on the parties’ “disparate financial positions,” the court concluded “[t]he financial burden of the instant litigation is far more bur densome on the mother than the father, and the father was aware of the impact his litigation had on her.” Given the facts in this case, father was not reasonable in his pursuit of the cause he initiated. The trial court did not abuse its di scretion in awarding sanc tions pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1.
II. Father argues the trial cour t erred in its determination of the amount of sanctions. Specifically, he contends mother’s evidence “sup port[ing] her claim for an award of sanctions . . . was unverified and unsubstantiated.” He doe s not, on appeal, challeng e the admissibility of the evidence mother presented. The validity of the court’s ruling on the admissibility of the evidence is not part of the question presented and thus is not cognizab le on appeal. See Hillcrest Manor Nursing Home v. Underwood , 35 Va. App. 31, 39 n.4, 542 S.E.2d 785, 789 n.4 (2001) (finding “an issue [was] not expres sly stated among the ‘questions presented,’ . . . we, therefore, decline to consider [it] on appeal”); see also Rule 5A:20(c). The only issue before us is whether the evidence presented to the tr ial court supports its determinati on of the amount of the sanctions awarded. Mother presented attorney’s fees statem ents, airline receipts, and various other documentation regarding the costs she incurred as a result of father’s lawsuit. “The credibility of the witnesses and the weight acco rded the evidence are matters sole ly for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is pr esented.” Thomas v. Thomas , 40- 5 - Va. App. 639, 644, 580 S.E.2d 503, 505 (2003). Mother fully documented her expenses. The trial court accepted mother’s evidence. We find no error in the court’s determination.
III. Both parties request costs and attorneys’ fees for matters relating to this appeal. The rationale for the appellate court being the proper forum to determine the propriety of an award of attorney’s fees for efforts expended on appeal is clear. The appellate court has the opportunity to view the record in its entirety and determine whether the appeal is frivolous or whether other reasons exist for requiring additional payment. O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin , 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996). In this context, and upon consideration of the entire record in this case, we hold that husband is not entitled to costs or attorney’s fees in the matter. Upon a review of this appeal, we find that husband’s case presented numerous questions that were not supported by law or evidence. See Gottlieb v. Gottlieb , 19 Va. App. 77, 95, 448 S.E.2d 666, 677 (1994). Therefore, we award attorney ’s fees to wife and remand this case to the trial court for determination of attorney’s fees and costs incurred in re sponding to this appeal, and for any costs incurred at the hearing on re mand, including any attorn ey’s fees and costs incurred at the remand hearing, and any reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of collection, if
necessary. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.