## NUMBER 13 - 23 - 00 097 - CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI

– EDINBURG

REYNALDO RIOS JR. , Appellant,

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 117 TH DISTRICT COURT

OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS



## MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Tijerina and Peña

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina A jury convicted appellant Reynaldo Rios Jr. of first

- degree arson of a habitation, a first

- degree felony

. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 28.02. The jury assessed punishment for a period of fifty

- five years of imprisonment. Appellant argues the State failed to prove all the elements required to convict him of arson. We affirm

.2 I. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW AND A PPLICABLE L AW In a sufficiency review , we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and reasonable inferences from tha t evidence. Whatley v. State , 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 898

– 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). Sufficient e vidence exists if “the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable based upon t he cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Wise v. State , 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight to be given to their testimony. Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 899. We measure the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State , 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State , 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). “Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability , and adequately describes the particu lar offense for which the defendant was tried.” Villarreal , 286 S.W.3d at 327 (quoting Malik , 953 S.W.2d at 240). The “law as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the offense and those elements “as modified by the indictment.” Curry v. State , 30 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). As applicable here, the State ha d the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) appellant intentionally, knowingly , or recklessly3

started a fire by igniting a couch, (2) with the intent to destroy or damage a habitation, and (3) knew that the habitation had located within it , property , namely furniture and clothes, belonging to another. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 28.02 (a)(2)(E)

. Appellant only challenges the last element.
I I. T HE E VIDENCE On August 2, 2019, the Robstown Fire Department responded to a call about a burning house in Nueces County. When the firefighters arrived on the scene, the house was in flames. Lupe Villarreal, a firefighter on the scene, testified that the fire must have started around twenty or thirty minutes prior to his arrival . The house was “completely destroyed” and “completely burned down” after firefighters spent several hours putting
out the fire. Dana Richardson, a sergeant and investigator with the Nueces County Sheriff’s O ffice on the date of the incident, testified that when he inspected the house the next day, it was “totally destroyed , ” and the house next door was uninhabitable due to smoke, fire damage, and water damage. Rosa Anna Garcia , appellant’s wife, testified that her house des troyed in the fire had been in her family for several generations , which her parents gifted to her in 2000. Garcia stated that she met appellant in 2015, and th e couple married in 2017

. According to Garcia, appellant did not purchase things in the house because he spent his money on beer and child support. Garcia stated that a ppellant had problems with drinking that got

worse over time , and he was physical with Garcia on one occasion a few days before the fire

. Garcia testified that appellant was upset with her children, he threw her children’s PlayStation on the floor , and he pushed Garcia to the wall when she questioned him about4

what he had done . Garcia called the police to remove appellant from her house, and according to Garcia, the police stated that they could not remove him because , due to their marriage , the police considered the house as belonging to Garcia and appellant

. Garcia testified that after telling appellant it was her house , he refused to leave ; therefore, Garcia and her children spent the night next door at her parents’ house. Garcia stated that the house contained all of her and her children’s belongings , including her furniture and clothes, which were destroyed in the fire

. On the day of the fire, Garcia had the electricity, gas, and water turned off in her house, which appeared to upset appellant. A bout thirty

- four minutes before the firefighters arrived at the scene, appellant sent Garcia a text message saying, “[h]opefully going to burn it all down.” Garcia replied, “[w]hat are you going to burn down?” Appellant said , “[m]y eyebrows.” Appellant then texted, “[y]our house is on fire

. ” Garcia soon arrived at the scene to see her entire home engulfed in flames. Garcia testified that she lost everything in the fire , including h er clothes, her children’s clothes, furniture, and photo
albums ; and all she had left were “the clothes on [her] back.” Evidence was also presented that the family’s dog perished in the fire. Appellant was arrested and taken to the criminal investigation division for a custodial interview conducted by Richardson and State Fire Marshall, Greg Houston. 1 Richardson read appellant his Miranda rights and began the interview. Richardson testified that appellant was not intoxicated and had “use of his mental and physical capabilities.” During the interview, appellant admitted to starting the fire by lighting a

1 Houston was not available to testify at trial because he had unfortunately passed away.5

couch on fire with a barbeque lighter. Appellant knew that the house was not insured. Appellant then made statements referring to burning his property in the house by saying, “I can burn my own stuff if I want to,” and, “today I just, you know what, I just burned up all my stuff.” However, appellant also acknowledged that the house belonged to Garcia

. For example, w hen asked who se house it was, appellant said, “it’s hers,” and when drawing a diagram of the house, he described one of the rooms as Garcia’s bedroom. Appellant stated that Garcia and her ex

- husband had taken out a mortgage on the house before he met Garcia

. Appellant also made statements regarding his motive when he said, “well

. . . all day today my wife kept picking at me , ” and “what set me off, she just went and turned off everything, no light, no water. ” The jury convicted appellant of arson of a habitation . This appeal followed.
III. D ISCUSSION By his sole issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for arson because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonabl e doubt that he knew that the habitation contained property belonging to Garcia

. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 28.02 (a)(2)(E)

. The evidence shows that Garcia lived in the house for approximately nineteen years and that Garcia’s belonging s, including furniture and clothing , were located t here

. Evidence was presented that appellant moved into Garcia’s home in 2017, and continued to live there until he started the fire in 2019, and Garcia testified that she paid for everything in the house and appellant spent his money mainly on beer and child support. Additionally, appellant acknowledged that the house belonged to Garcia , that she had a6

bedroom in the house , and that Garcia and her ex

- husband had acquired a mortgage on the house

. Appellant also stated that he started the fire in retaliation to Garcia turning off
the utilities in the home.
T he jury was free to believe that Garcia ’s belongings , including furniture and clothing , were in the house , and it could have reasonably inferred that appellan t

— who lived in the home for approximately two years

— knew that Garcia ’s property was in the home when he started the fire

. See Tate v. State , 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“ The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of witnesses, and juries may draw multiple reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each is supported by the evidence presented at trial. ”). Accordingly, w e conclude that the jury could have rationally found the essential elements of the offense as set out in the hypothetically correct charge for arson beyond a reasonable doubt. See Whatley , 445 S.W.3d at 166; Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 898

– 99; see also T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 28.02

. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
I V

. C ONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment

.
JAIME TIJERINA Justice Do not publish. T EX . R. A PP . P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed on the 15th day of August , 202 4

.