Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 44A03-1703-DR-485 | August 24, 2017 Page 1 of 24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark A. Garvin

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael H. Michmerhuizen

Barrett McNagny LLP

Fort Wayne, Indiana

Cornelius B. (Neil) Hayes

Hayes & Hayes

Fort Wayne, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

L.T.,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

E.T.,

Appellee-Respondent

August 24, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

44A03-1703-DR-485

Appeal from the LaGrange Circuit 

Court

The Honorable J. Scott 

VanDerbeck, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

44C01-0506-DR-35

Baker, Judge.
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[1] L.T. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s modification of the child support order 

between her and E.T. (Father). She argues that the trial court committed 

procedural errors when it (1) conducted summary proceedings and (2) adopted 

Father’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. She also argues that 

the trial court erred when it (1) considered Father’s motion to modify child 

support; (2) considered her potential income; (3) treated Father as the custodial 

parent and ordered both parties to share the controlled expenses equally; (4) did 

not prorate the weekly health insurance premium paid for by Father; (5) 

calculated one child’s “weeks at home”; and (6) transferred control of the 529 

Plans to Father. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts

[2] Father and Mother married on May 6, 1995. Two children were born of their 

marriage: H.T., born on August 9, 1997, and S.T., born on September 24, 

1999. On December 6, 2002, Mother filed a petition for dissolution of 

marriage.

[3] In 2004, the trial court granted the parties joint legal custody of their children 

and granted Mother physical custody. The trial court ordered Father to pay 

child support of $429 per week. 

[4] On April 26, 2006, following a motion to modify child custody filed by Father,

the trial court modified child custody, granting sole legal custody to Father and 

ordering the parties to share equal parenting time. The trial court granted 

Father parenting time credit and modified his child support payments to $387 
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per week. In its order, the trial court noted that “both parties previously 

delegated their parental authority, in loco parentis” to “The Panel.”

1

 Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II p. 92. The trial court found the following regarding the panel and 

guardian ad litem: 

• Mother was treated for Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy.

• Mother’s act of filing complaints against two panel members was selfserving and resulted in the children failing to have access to a 

professional psychotherapist.

• Mother’s allegations of sexual misconduct by Father were 

unsubstantiated.

Id. at 97. Regarding the change of legal custody, the trial court found the 

following:

• Mother had undertaken acts to upset or interfere with the operation of 

the panel and the guardian ad litem;

• Following a court order requiring both parents to participate in 

individual psychotherapy, Father routinely participated in 

psychotherapy, whereas Mother attended only three sessions and at the 

time of the April 26, 2006, order, was not seeing a therapist.

• Mother attempted to unilaterally modify child visitation, which led H.T. 

to being frustrated and upset.

• Mother took the children on a family vacation that resulted in Father 

losing some of his court-ordered parenting time.

• When the children, then aged eight and six, are with Mother, they sleep 

in Mother’s bed every night.

• Mother acted contrary to the court’s prior order that she act in good faith 

and encourage the maximum relation of affection toward each parent.

 

1 The record does not include information about the purpose of this panel or who served on it.
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Id. at 100-101. 

[5] On August 10, 2015, Father filed a motion to modify child support and a 

motion for an order on higher education. On October 5, 2016, Mother filed her 

opposition to Father’s motions. A hearing took place on October 11, 2016, and 

the trial court issued its order on November 2, 2016. The trial court found as 

follows regarding Father’s pending motion for modification of support:

• While Father’s motions were pending, he continued to pay $387 per 

week in child support, even though changed circumstances of a 

substantial and continuing nature occurred that would justify a 

modification of child support.

• The changed circumstances were that H.T. left for college and turned 19 

on August 9, 2016. As a matter of law, child support for H.T. ceased 

when she turned nineteen.

• Mother financially benefitted from the delay in the proceeding because 

she collected child support for two children at home, even though only 

one child was at home and the other was living on a college campus and 

was past the age of emancipation.

Id. at 38-39. Regarding the child support modification, the trial court found as 

follows: 

• Father works as an anesthesiologist between 60-100 hours per week. 

Father’s yearly income averaged to $410,241 over the course of three 

years, or $7,889.25 per week.

• Mother works part-time, by choice, as a nurse anesthetist for 

approximately fifteen hours per week. She earns $95 per hour, or a 

weekly income of $1,370. 

• Mother worked part-time during the marriage; she continued to work 

part-time after the trial court divided the children’s time equally between 

the parties, despite having more free time.
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• Mother is voluntarily underemployed. By her own admission, she is 

capable of earning $175,000 annually. Mother could work additional 

hours, but chooses not to, citing an inability to be a good mother, an 

inability to give “life lessons,” and a negative impact to mental health.

• Mother’s potential annual income is $175,000, or $3,365 per week.

Id. at 39-40, 42. The trial court continued with the following findings:

• Controlled expenses were not previously specifically allocated between 

the parties. The parties traditionally shared in the controlled expenses of 

the children, even though Father has paid child support. The trial court 

ordered that, based upon the equal sharing of the children’s time, the 

controlled expenses be equally shared, with the exception of uninsured 

healthcare expense.

• Father provided evidence of insurance coverage for the children that cost 

him an additional $269 per month, or $62 per week; the trial court found 

that Father’s calculation was correct, and that the cost of health 

insurance coverage for H.T. and S.T. was $62 per week.

• During the summer, when H.T. was not at school, her time was divided 

equally between the parties. A reasonable summer break is ten weeks at 

home. The child support obligation worksheet compensated Mother for 

the five weeks H.T. resided with her.

• Child support should be retroactively modified on August 20, 2015, 

when H.T. went to Purdue, and again on August 9, 2016, when H.T. 

turned nineteen.

Id. at 41-43. The trial court entered the following judgment:

• Father would pay child support to Mother. 

• Retroactively effective August 20, 2015, Father would pay child support 

of $128 per week for two children.

• Retroactively effective August 9, 2016, when H.T. turned 19, Father 

would pay child support of $137 per week for S.T.

• Because Father overpaid child support from August 20, 2015, to August 

9, 2016, Mother would repay Father $13,134, the amount he overpaid 

during this time.
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• Because Father overpaid child support from August 9, 2016, to the date 

of the hearing on October 11, 2016, Mother would repay Father $2,215, 

the amount he overpaid during this time, along with any further 

overpayment made subsequent to the hearing date.

• The parties would use all existing higher education plans, including 

existing 529 Plans. All 529 Plans would be placed under Father’s 

control.

Id. at 44-45. 

[6] On November 17, 2016, Mother filed a motion to correct error. On January 3, 

2017, Father filed a response to Mother’s motion. The trial court held a hearing 

on January 26, 2017. On February 20, 2017, it denied Mother’s motion and 

issued its order, which provided as follows:

• Mother would pay the first $427.32 of the ongoing uninsured medical, 

dental, optical, pharmaceutical, ophthalmologist, and orthodontic 

expenses; regarding any remaining costs, Father would pay 69% and 

Mother would pay 31%.

• In its November 2, 2016, order, the trial court relied on its April 26, 

2006, order, including findings of fact about Mother’s interference with 

proceedings; Father’s participation in psychotherapy and Mother’s lack 

of participation; Mother’s attempts to unilaterally modify child visitation 

and the effect of those attempts on H.T.; Father’s enrollment of the 

children in wholesome activities; and Mother’s false allegations about 

Father’s inappropriate behavior with the children.

Id. at 54-55. Mother now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[7] A trial court’s calculation of child support is presumptively valid. Young v. 

Young, 891 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. 2008). Child support calculations are made 

utilizing the income shares model set forth in the Indiana Child Support 

Guidelines. Sandlin v. Sandlin, 972 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The 

Guidelines apportion the cost of supporting children between the parents 

according to their means, on the premise that children should receive the same 

portion of parental income after a dissolution that they would have received if 

the family had remained intact. Id. The trial court is vested with broad 

discretion in making child support determinations. Id. We reverse a decision 

regarding child support only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Young, 

891 N.E.2d at 1047. We do not reweigh the evidence and consider only the 

evidence most favorable to the judgment. Saalfrank v. Saalfrank, 899 N.E.2d 

671, 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

II. Procedural Matters

A. Summary Proceeding

[8] Mother asserts that the trial court improperly treated the October 11, 2016, 

hearing as a summary proceeding. Our Supreme Court has recently explained 

that

[s]ummary proceedings function to efficiently resolve disputes by 

allowing parties and the court to forego the use of formal rules of 
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procedure and evidence and instead allow the court to base its 

findings and conclusions upon the arguments of counsel and 

limited evidence. Summary proceedings commonly take place 

when parties are not disputing essential facts, but rather the legal 

outcome compelled by those facts.

Bogner v. Bogner, 29 N.E.3d 733, 739 (Ind. 2015). When properly agreed to, 

summary proceedings can minimize the negative impact on children in matters 

of custody and parenting time, but they “may be less appropriate where the 

parties are vigorously contesting every facet of the process and appear incapable 

of approaching these decisions in a civil or cooperative manner.” Id.

[9] Both parties were present at the October 11, 2016, hearing. At the beginning of 

the hearing, the trial court requested opening statements. Father gave one by 

counsel, as did Mother, who was proceeding pro se. After the statements, the 

following exchange took place:

Father’s Counsel: . . . Would it be easier, Your Honor, uh, for us 

to do this in a summary fashion and then swear the parties?

The Court: I – well I welcome that. Try to go as far as you can. 

You each affirm you’ll tell the truth today, so help you God?

Father: I do.

Mother: I do.

Tr. p. 11. At no point did Mother object to the summary nature of the 

proceedings. She also did not object to the exhibits offered by Father. Mother 
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argues that she was not advised about the implications of conducting the 

hearing as a summary proceeding, but Mother’s status as a pro se litigant at the 

hearing does not make ignorance of the law a valid argument on appeal. See

Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that pro se 

litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys, are bound to 

follow the established rules of procedure, and must be prepared to accept the 

consequences of their failure to do so). If Mother did not want to proceed in a 

summary fashion, that objection should have been raised at the time of the 

hearing. See Bogner, 29 N.E.3d at 741.

[10] At the hearing, the trial court acknowledged that Mother was proceeding pro se

and would “take liberties” because Mother did not have an attorney. Tr. p. 5. 

Toward the beginning of the hearing, the trial court gave Mother ample 

opportunity to raise the issues she wanted the trial court to consider. As it 

continued, the trial court gave Mother ample opportunity to provide other 

relevant information regarding the issues in dispute. Finally, the trial court 

allowed Mother to make two closing arguments. In short, Mother fails to show 

how she was prejudiced by the summary nature of the proceedings. Mother’s 

argument regarding the summary proceeding is unavailing.2

 

2 Although we find that a summary proceeding was properly conducted, we remind the trial court that our 

Supreme Court has outlined best practices for summary proceedings, which include establishing on the 

record: “1) affirmative agreement from the attorneys that proceedings will be conducted summarily, for 

those represented by counsel; 2) affirmative agreement by both clients or unrepresented litigants to summary 

proceedings; 3) opportunity for both parties to add any other relevant information regarding the issues in 

dispute before the summary proceeding is concluded or to affirm the arguments made by counsel; and 4) an 

advisement in advance of the hearing that either party is free to object to the form of the proceeding and 
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B. Trial Court’s Findings and Conclusions 

[11] Mother also takes issue with the trial court’s November 2, 2016, order, which, 

she contends, adopts Father’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 

“essentially verbatim.” Appellant’s Br. p. 25.

[12] In its order, the trial court adopted verbatim many but not all of Father’s 

proposed findings. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 37-45, 139-148. Trial Rule 

52(C) encourages trial courts to request that parties submit proposed findings of 

fact and conclusions of law and it is not uncommon or per se improper for a 

trial court to enter findings that are verbatim reproductions of submissions by 

the prevailing party. Clark v. Crowe, 778 N.E.2d 835, 841 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App.

2002). Our Supreme Court has noted that the practice of accepting verbatim a 

party’s proposed findings of fact “weakens our confidence as an appellate court 

that the findings are the result of considered judgment by the trial court.” Cook 

v. Whitsell-Sherman, 796 N.E.2d 271, 273 n.1 (Ind. 2003). However, because the 

trial courts of this state are faced with an enormous volume of cases and they 

prioritize the need to keep the docket moving, the practice of adopting a party’s 

proposed findings is not prohibited. Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 708 (Ind.

2001). Thus, although we by no means encourage the wholesale adoption of a 

party’s proposed findings and conclusions, the critical inquiry is whether such 

 

request a full evidentiary hearing, upon which formal rules of evidence and procedure will be observed.” 

Bogner, 29 N.E.3d at 743.
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findings, as adopted by the court, are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Nickels, 

834 N.E.2d 1091, 1096 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

[13] Initially, we note that while Mother argues that the trial court “adopts verbatim 

proposed findings and conclusions for issues never raised by [Father], never 

supported by evidence, and never argued or mentioned at the hearing[,]” she 

fails to specify even one finding of fact or conclusion of law that was not raised 

before the trial court, not supported by evidence, or not argued at the hearing. 

Second, the trial court did not adopt the entirety of Father’s proposed findings 

and conclusions. Specifically, the trial court did not adopt Father’s proposed 

division of attorney fees to the benefit of Mother. The trial court consolidated 

at least two of Father’s proposed findings regarding Mother’s potential income. 

The trial court also made multiple grammatical edits to Father’s proposed 

findings and conclusions. We find no error with the trial court’s adoption of 

many of Father’s proposed findings and conclusions.

III. Child Support

A. Father’s Motion to Modify

[14] Mother argues that the trial court erred in modifying Father’s child support 

even though his motion did not satisfy the requirements of Indiana Code 

section 31-16-8-1. This statute provides that modification of an order with 

respect to child support may be made only (1) upon a showing of changed 

circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable; 

or (2) upon a showing that a party has been ordered to pay an amount in child 
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support that differs by more than twenty percent from the amount that would 

be ordered by applying the child support guidelines, and the order requested to 

be modified was issued at least twelve months before the petition requesting 

modification was filed. I.C. § 31-16-8-1(b).

[15] Specifically, Mother argues that Father failed to show that he had been ordered 

to pay an amount in child support that differed by more than twenty percent 

from the amount that would be ordered by applying the child support 

guidelines. Even if this argument were persuasive, Mother fails to correctly 

read the statute, which provides that a modification may be made either upon a 

showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the 

terms unreasonable, or upon a showing that a party has been ordered to pay an 

amount that differs by more than twenty percent from the amount that would 

be ordered by applying the child support guidelines.

[16] In this case, Father’s motion for modification of child support clearly shows 

changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms of 

his child support payments unreasonable. While Father’s motion was pending, 

H.T. started college and turned nineteen, thereby making her emancipated as a 

matter of law. See Ind. Code § 31-16-6-6(a) (“The duty to support a child under 

this chapter, which does not include support for educational needs, ceases when 

the child becomes nineteen (19) years of age”). 

[17] Nonetheless, Mother contends that Father’s motion for modification should not 

succeed because the changed circumstances do not make Father’s child support 
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payments unreasonable. She reasons that, based on her own calculations, a 

recalculation of Father’s child support payments would lead to a negligible 

increase in Father’s payments—and that, in light of the parties’ incomes and 

amount of support provided, a negligible increase cannot make Father’s 

payments unreasonable. Mother does not cite any authority to support this 

distinctive line of reasoning, nor do we find any. Rather, this Court has found 

that emancipation necessarily warrants modification of child support. See, e.g., 

Patton v. Patton, 48 N.E.3d 17, 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (reducing Father’s 

weekly child support payment from $160 to $136.42 following the 

emancipation of one of his three children). The trial court did not err in 

considering Father’s motion to modify child support.

B. Indiana Child Support Guidelines

[18] Mother contends that the trial court failed to follow the Indiana Child Support 

Guidelines in determining Father’s support obligation. Specifically, she asserts

that the trial court did not make the findings required under Child Support Rule 

3.

[19] Our Supreme Court has recently discussed the role of the Indiana Child 

Support Guidelines:

The Indiana Child Support Guidelines serve three objectives: 1) 

establish an appropriate level of support for children, based on 

each parent's ability to contribute to that support; 2) increase 

consistency in support levels for those in similar circumstances; 

and 3) improve efficiency by encouraging settlements and giving 

both the court and the parties guidelines for setting awards. Ind. 
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Child Supp. G. 1. To reach these goals, child support is 

calculated under the Guidelines “as the share of each parent's 

income estimated to have been spent on the child if the parents 

and child were living in an intact household.” Id. However, the 

support award under the Guidelines is not binding upon the 

parties or the court. Rather, “[i]f the court concludes from the 

evidence in a particular case that the amount of the award 

reached through application of the guidelines would be unjust, 

the court shall enter a written finding articulating the factual 

circumstances supporting that conclusion.” Ind. Child Supp. G. 

Supp. R. 3. However, the findings required “need not be as 

formal as Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; the finding 

need only articulate the judge's reasoning.” Ind. Child Supp. G. 

1 Cmt. Furthermore, the “Guidelines are not immutable, black 

letter law,” but provide “room for flexibility.” Id.

Bogner, 29 N.E.3d at 738.

[20] Here, the trial court’s February 20, 2017, order explains that it relied on the 

findings of fact from its April 26, 2006, order to justify its child support 

modification calculation. In that 2006 order, the trial court included findings of 

fact about Mother’s interference with proceedings; Father’s participation in 

psychotherapy and Mother’s lack of participation; Mother’s attempts to 

unilaterally modify child visitation and the effect of those attempts on H.T.; 

Father’s enrollment of the children in wholesome activities; and Mother’s false 

allegations about Father’s inappropriate behavior with the children. We find 

that the trial court’s order’s reference to these findings of fact sufficiently

articulates the trial court’s reasoning for its award calculation. Therefore, we 

find no error.
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C. Impution of Income to Mother

[21] Mother argues that the trial court erred in attributing potential income to her. 

The Guidelines provide as follows for potential income:

If a court finds a parent is voluntarily unemployed or 

underemployed without just cause, child support shall be 

calculated based on a determination of potential income. A 

determination of potential income shall be made by determining 

employment potential and probable earnings level based on the 

obligor's work history, occupational qualifications, prevailing job 

opportunities, and earnings levels in the community. 

Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(A)(3). The Commentary to this Guideline 

explains that 

When a parent has some history of working and is capable of 

entering the work force, but without just cause voluntarily fails . . . 

to be employed in a capacity in keeping with his or her 

capabilities, such a parent's potential income shall be included in 

the gross income of that parent. . . . Discretion must be exercised 

on an individual case basis to determine whether under the 

circumstances there is just cause to attribute potential income to 

a particular unemployed or underemployed parent. 

Child Supp. G. 3(A), Commentary 2(c)(2) (emphasis added). A trial court may 

use its discretion “to impute potential income even under circumstances where 

avoiding child support is not the reason for a parent’s unemployment.” In re 

Paternity of Pickett, 44 N.E.3d 756, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 

[22] Here, the trial court heard evidence indicating that Mother has the ability and 

opportunity to work full-time but chooses to work part-time. She testified that 
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My boss has gone with me through this divorce and he has 

molded my schedule around my daughters. . . . So my boss 

created this, uh, this position for me that I can start at 8 a.m. on 

the days I have my daughters and I can leave at 2:30 to pick them 

up after school. Now, the risks of this is I don’t have predictable 

hours. He can cancel me the night before. And I’ve taken this 

risk because it is very important for me to be around my 

daughters. . . . My job quite frankly is very stressful. . . . It’s a 

very fast paced environment and to work fifty hours a week is, 

would be impossible for me to be a good parent as well. . . . [The 

job my] boss has created for me is a blessing for my, for my life 

and for my children’s lives. And I’m asking to just maintain it 

for two more years. [S.T.] will be emancipated, uh, one month 

after she leaves for college.

Tr. p. 24-25. The trial court also heard evidence that H.T. is away at college, 

that Father and Mother share physical custody of S.T., and that S.T. is in 

Mother’s care for only half the year. The trial court imputed income to Mother 

that she admitted she could earn if she were employed full-time in her same 

position with her same employer. Compare with Salser v. Salser, 75 N.E.3d 555, 

561 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that the trial court’s decision to assign 

potential income to Mother was clearly erroneous because the determination of 

potential income would effectively force Mother to follow a career path she did 

not want, including leaving her current medical practice and seeking 

employment in another kind of medical practice). 

[23] Mother also contends that the trial court failed to make a specific finding that 

she was underemployed without just cause. However, Mother does not provide 

authority for her contention that the trial court was required to make a specific 
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finding on this point. The trial court found that Mother is working 14-15 hours 

a week in order to parent her children, one of whom is already in college and 

emancipated, and one of whom is a teenager who is with her only half of the 

year; these facts are sufficient articulation of the basis of its determination that 

Mother was underemployed without just cause.

[24] Mother further contends that the trial court had no basis to discount her 

argument that working part-time provided her with mental health benefits. Yet 

Mother offered no evidence beyond her own testimony that her work is “fastpaced” and “stressful” to support her contention that full-time employment 

would be detrimental to her mental health. Tr. p. 25. Mother also contends 

that her decision to work part-time allows her to parent her children. True as 

that may be, she fails to recognize that H.T. is away at college in another city, 

and S.T. resides with Mother for only half the year. Moreover, on appeal, 

Mother fails to present evidence of what her parenting actually involves. See In 

re Paternity of Pickett, 44 N.E.3d 756, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (finding that 

Father was voluntarily underemployed because, although he was serving as his 

mother’s primary caregiver, there was no evidence regarding the level of care 

she needed or what care Father actually provided). 

[25] In light of these facts, the trial court did not err in finding that Mother is 

voluntarily underemployed without just cause and in imputing income to her.
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D. Custodial/Controlled Expense Parent

[26] Mother argues that the trial court erred in determining Father to be the 

custodial and controlled expense parent.

[27] The Commentary to Indiana Child Support Guideline 6 defines “controlled 

expenses” as follows:

This type of expense for the child(ren) is typically paid by the 

custodial parent and is not transferred or duplicated. Controlled 

expenses are items like clothing, education, school books and 

supplies, ordinary uninsured health care and personal care. . . . 

“Education” expenses include ordinary costs assessed to all 

students, such as textbook rental, laboratory fees, and lunches, 

which should be paid by the custodial parent. . . . 

The controlled expenses account for 15% of the cost of raising 

the child. The parenting time credit is based on the more time 

the parents share, the more expenses are duplicated and 

transferred. The controlled expenses are not shared and remain 

with the parent that does not get the parenting time credit. 

Controlled expenses are generally not a consideration unless 

there is equal parenting time. These categories of expenses are 

not pertinent for litigation. They are presented only to explain the 

factors used in developing the parenting time credit formula. . . . 

[28] Mother argues that the November 2, 2016, order treats Father as the custodial 

parent for the first time for purposes of calculating retroactive and prospective 

support, which, she contends, is a change from the prior fourteen years of 

calculations and significantly benefits Father. In support of this argument, 

Mother asserts that the judgment requires her “to pay the vast majority of 
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controlled expenses, including all of the ordinary uninsured medical expenses 

and 50% of all other controlled expenses.” Appellant’s Br. p. 39. 

[29] As for the controlled expenses, initially we note that our Supreme Court 

amended the Guidelines effective January 1, 2010; the amended Guidelines use 

the term “controlled expenses” for the first time. The November 2, 2016, order 

was the first modification of the parties’ child support since the 2010 

amendments to the Guidelines, and therefore the first time that the trial court 

would have considered “controlled expenses” in the parties’ child support plan. 

This chronology explains this particular change from the parties’ prior 2006 

order.

[30] The November 2, 2016, order explicitly contradicts Mother’s arguments

regarding controlled expenses. Mother argues that she is required to pay the 

vast majority of controlled expenses; however, the order states that Mother and 

Father are each to pay half of the controlled expenses. Mother argues that she 

is required to pay all of the ordinary uninsured medical expenses, but the 

corrected February 20, 2017, order required Mother to pay only the first 

$427.32 of uninsured medical expenses, with Father paying 69% and Mother 

paying 31% of the remaining expenses. 

[31] Mother contends that items she paid for, including cell phone service, gym 

memberships for the children, and one $10,000 vehicle for H.T., are all 

controlled expenses. Although Father is willing to agree that cell phone service 

and gym memberships are controlled expenses, see Appellee’s Br. p. 39, we find 
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that none of these items constitute controlled expenses. Under the 

Commentary to Child Support Guideline 6, controlled expenses include 

everyday, ordinary expenses for a child’s well-being and educational needs. 

While cell phones, gym memberships, and a vehicle may make life more 

enjoyable for the children, we cannot say these items are everyday, ordinary 

expenses required for their well-being and education, but are instead optional in 

nature.

[32] As for the trial court’s determination that Father is the custodial parent, 

Mother’s argument seems to turn on the fact that “[c]hanging the custodial 

parent to [Father] saves him even more money.” Appellant’s Br. p. 39. We are 

unpersuaded by this argument; indeed, it seems more focused on the amount of 

money that Mother could receive from Father than with the children’s actual

financial needs. Father, as the custodial parent, is paying for half of the 

children’s controlled expenses, for their health insurance, and for a 

proportionate share of their private school tuition and uninsured health care. 

He continued to pay child support for two children long after H.T. left for 

college and was emancipated. The record shows that Father paid a nearly fivethousand dollar bill for H.T.’s orthodontic treatment without assistance from 

Mother, despite the 2006 order controlling how the parties were to share this 

kind of expense. Considering that nothing in the record suggests that Father 

has done anything but financially provide for his children to the best of his 

ability, we find Mother’s implication that Father, in becoming the custodial 
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parent, is trying to save money, to be outlandish and not based on a rational 

view of the parties’ situation.

[33] Mother’s argument regarding the trial court’s designation of Father as the 

custodial parent and the controlled expenses is unavailing.

E. Weekly Health Insurance Premium

[34] Mother argues that the trial court erred by giving Father a credit for a health 

insurance premium even though the trial court did not prorate the cost of 

Father’s health insurance premium.

[35] The Commentary to Child Support Guideline 3E provides:

The weekly costs of health insurance premiums only for the 

child(ren) should be added to the basic obligation so as to 

apportion that cost between the parents. The parent who 

actually pays that cost then receives a credit towards his or her 

child support obligation on Line 7 of the Worksheet. . . . Only 

that portion of the cost actually paid by a parent is added to the 

basic obligation. If coverage is provided without cost to the 

parent(s), then zero should be entered as the amount. If health 

insurance coverage is provided through an employer, only the 

child(ren)'s portion should be added. In determining the amount 

to be added, only the amount of the insurance cost attributable to 

the child(ren) subject of the child support order shall be included, 

such as the difference between the cost of insuring a single party 

versus the cost of family coverage. In circumstances where 

coverage is applicable to persons other than the child(ren) subject 

of the child support order, such as other child(ren) and/or a 

subsequent spouse, the total cost of the insurance premium shall 

be prorated by the number of persons covered to determine a per 

person cost.
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[36] The trial court found that Father’s health insurance premiums cost him $338 

per month, with $269 of that monthly amount providing coverage for the 

children, or $62 per week for H.T. and S.T. The trial court stated that Father’s 

calculation for this amount was correct. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 41.

[37] Mother argues that Father’s calculations were erroneous, but Mother fails to 

provide a record of those calculations for us to review. See generally Appellant’s 

App Vol. II. As the appellant, Mother bears the burden of providing a full 

record for appeal. Without it, we cannot effectively review the trial court’s 

judgment. See, e.g., Finke v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 862 N.E.2d 266, 272 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2006) (holding that appellant bears the burden of presenting a complete 

record with respect to the issues raised on appeal and that we “cannot review a 

claim . . . when the appellant does not include in the record all the evidence” 

relevant to that claim). Therefore, this argument is unavailing. 

F. H.T.’s Weeks at Home

[38] Next, Mother argues that the trial court erred in calculating the number of 

weeks H.T. lives at home, asserting that the trial court considered a reasonable 

summer break to be ten weeks at home, whereas H.T. was home from college 

for seventeen weeks. Yet Mother concedes that a change in the number of 

weeks home benefits the custodial/controlled expense parent, who, in this case, 

is Father. Mother contends that she is seeking child support calculated 

consistent with the Guidelines so that the children receive the support to which 

they are entitled, yet she concedes that the change in weeks at home would 
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reduce Father’s child support obligation, a change contrary to her argument on 

appeal. We decline to find error on the trial court’s calculation.

G. 529 Plans

[39] Mother contends that the trial court erred in transferring control of the parties’ 

529 Plans to Father. She states that the trial court did not have the ability to 

address the issue of 529 Plans because the issue was not raised before the trial 

court and that “[t]here was nothing to alert [Mother] that the Trial Court would 

consider transferring control of the 529 Plans held by her to [Father].” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 53.

[40] We disagree. At the October 11, 2016, hearing, Father’s counsel asked the 

court to transfer control of the 529 Plans to Father. Father’s counsel argued

[Father] has been paying by himself out of his 529, uh, planning 

for the benefit of [H.T.] down at West Lafayette, Your Honor. 

Uh, the parties, uh, during the marriage set aside money and 

[H.T.] is requesting that the court because of this difficulty, uh, 

and to be, have it be, uh, (indiscernible) so that [Mother] does not 

cherry-pick what she wants to pay and what she doesn’t want to 

pay. Is that [Father] be the, uh, caretaker of the 529s. They were 

in place, uh, there’d have to be a transfer and it’d be tax free 

totally, uh, obviously, a lateral movement, not - not unlike a 

QUADRO [sic] from [Mother’s] name to [Father], so they can 

take care of the girls, uh, costs as they come due. [Mother], uh, 

[Father] will testify takes issue with things.

Tr. p. 18. During the hearing, Mother did not object to Father raising this 

issue, nor did she present a counter-argument to Father’s request. See Glover v. 
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Torrence, 723 N.E.2d 924, 935 (finding that once the issue is raised, “the party 

opposing the evidence must object or the issue supported by the evidence will 

impliedly be consented to having been tried by that party”). The record shows 

that the issue of the control of the 529 Plans was squarely before the trial court. 

Mother’s argument is unavailing. 

[41] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.