2006 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

2-21-2006

Amer Trucking Assoc v. Governor NJ

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 04-2201

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-2201

 

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC. and US

XPRESS, INC.,

v.

CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, in her official capacity as the

Governor of the State of New Jersey; JAMES WEINSTEIN, in

his official capacity as the Commissioner of the New Jersey

Department of Transportation; COL. CARSON DUNBAR, in

his official capacity as the Superintendent of the New Jersey

State Police; JOHN J. FARMER, JR., in his official capacity as

the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey,

Appellants

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District

of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 00-489)

District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler

 

Argued September 26, 2005

Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and GARTH, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: February 21, 2006)

Patrick DeAlmeida (Argued)
2

Office of the Attorney General of New Jersey

Department of Law & Public Safety

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

Trenton, NJ 08625

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

Janine G Bauer, Esq.

416 Clark Street

South Orange, NJ 07079

ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS - APPELLANT,

Tri State Transportation

Trishka Waterbury, Esq.

Mason, Griffin & Pierson

101 Poor Farm Road

P.O. Box 391

Princeton, NJ 08542

ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS - APPELLANT,

NJ State League Mun.

Richard F. Ricci

Alix R. Rubin

Lowenstein Sandler PC

65 Livingston Avenue

Roseland, NJ 07068

Robert S. Digges, Jr. (Argued)

American Trucking Associations, Inc.

2200 Mill Road

Alexandria, VA 22314

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

____

 OPINION OF THE COURT

 
 1

 The National Network roads are designated at 23 C.F.R. Part

658 App. A. In New Jersey, that Network includes sections of I76, I-78, I-80, I-95, I-195, I-278, I-280, I-287, I-295, I-676, N.J. 42,

N.J. 81, U.S. 130, U.S. 322, N.J. 440, the New Jersey Turnpike,

and the Atlantic City Expressway. N.J. Admin. Code § 16:32-

1.4(a) (1999).

3

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

In 1999, in response to the threat to health and safety posed by

large trucks on local roads, the New Jersey Department of

Transportation adopted emergency highway safety regulations (the

“Regulations”) designed to detour some of those trucks away from local

roads and congested areas. The Regulations require double-trailer truck

combinations and 102-inch-wide tractor trailers (collectively, “restricted

vehicles”) traveling through New Jersey, with neither an origin nor a

destination in the state, to use the national network of interstate

highways (the “National Network”)1 rather than New Jersey state

highways and local roads (the “New Jersey Network”). This case

requires us to determine whether the Regulations discriminate

against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce

Clause. Because the Regulations favor instate businesses over

those out-of-state businesses that are neither buying nor selling

goods in New Jersey by imposing economic burdens on the out-ofstate interests while not imposing similar burdens on the instate

interests, we hold that the Regulations discriminate against

interstate commerce. Furthermore, as there exist available

nondiscriminatory alternatives, we hold that the Regulations violate

the dormant Commerce Clause. We accordingly affirm the

judgment of the District Court.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In the 1980s, in response to the trucking industry’s desire to

use 102-inch wide trucks and double-trailer truck combinations, the

federal government required states to establish the National

Network, a connected network of interstate highways to permit

interstate travel by these vehicles. New Jersey complied with this

directive, resulting in 545.7 miles of roads in New Jersey that

contribute to the National Network.
4

Years later, in response to the threat to health and highway

safety posed by large trucks on local roads, the New Jersey

Department of Transportation adopted the Regulations, which were

designed to reroute large trucks onto the National Network. The

Regulations require restricted vehicles that do not have an origin or

destination in New Jersey to use the National Network while in

New Jersey, except as necessary to access food, rest, repairs, and

fuel. N.J. Admin. Code § 16:32-1.1 (1999). However, restricted

vehicles engaged in purely intrastate commerce or in interstate

commerce that includes an origin or destination in New Jersey are

able to use both the National Network and the New Jersey

Network. N.J. Admin. Code § 16:32-1.4. The New Jersey

Network consists of roadways secondary to the National Network

that often snake through populated areas and are heavy with noncommercial traffic. N.J. Admin. Code §16:32-1.5(a) (1999).

Penalties for violating the Regulations include a mandatory fine of

no more than $400 for the first violation, a mandatory fine of $700

for the second violation, and a mandatory fine of $1000 for each

subsequent violation.

Soon after the adoption of the Regulations, plaintiffs

American Trucking Associations, Inc. (“American Trucking”) and

US Xpress filed a complaint in the United States District Court for

the District of New Jersey alleging that the Regulations violate the

dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S.

Const. art. I, § 8 cl. 3. American Trucking is a non-profit national

trucking trade association suing on behalf of its members. US

Xpress, a Nevada corporation, is an interstate motor carrier based

in Tennessee. The defendants are former New Jersey officials that

the plaintiffs sued in their official capacities. 

The plaintiffs sought an order declaring the Regulations

unconstitutional and an order enjoining the defendants (the “state

officials”) from enforcing the Regulations. After a period of

discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment, which

the District Court denied. The judge hearing the motions

determined that the Regulations are not facially discriminatory

because, although “the Regulations [distinguish] between trucks

with and without an origin or destination in New Jersey,” they are

applied “with equal force to all truck drivers.” Am. Trucking

Ass’ns, Inc. v. Whitman, 136 F. Supp. 2d 343, 350 (D.N.J. 2001).

Though the District Court concluded that the Regulations are not
5

facially discriminatory, it denied summary judgment because an

evidentiary record was needed to determine whether the

Regulations impose costs and delays on out-of-state trucking.

According to the District Court, “[e]vidence of a significant

expense to out-of-state trucking not suffered by in-state trucking

would demonstrate that the Regulations discriminate in their effect

against out-of-state interests.” Id. at 351.

In September 2003, the parties commenced a five-day bench

trial before a different judge. During the trial, Dr. Lazar Spasovic,

testifying for the state officials, stated that, despite a New Jersey

Department of Transportation study demonstrating that the

Regulations would force many interstate trucks to take longer and

costlier routes when required to use the National Network rather

than the New Jersey Network, the Regulations would not adversely

affect interstate commerce. Spasovic based this conclusion on a

theory that some truck drivers were using the New Jersey Network

only to avoid tolls, even when that choice involved higher

aggregate costs of time and fuel for those trucks. According to

Spasovic, those interstate trucks would save money by using the

National Network, and those savings would outweigh the

additional costs the Regulations cause other interstate trucks; thus

the Regulations would have a net positive impact. 

The state officials also argued that, even if the Regulations

were discriminatory, they do not violate the dormant Commerce

Clause because there are no available non-discriminatory means

with which to achieve the legitimate goal of decreasing truck traffic

on local roads. Assistant Commissioner and State Planning

Engineer Dennis Keck testified that a non-discriminatory statute

that prohibited all restricted vehicles from using the New Jersey

Network, except as necessary to reach New Jersey origins or

destinations or for food, rest, repairs, and fuel, would be nearly

impossible to enforce. Keck testified that such a statute would

require law enforcement officials to stop trucks on the New Jersey

Network randomly to ensure compliance with the statute, and to

perform complex calculations to discern whether the trucks needed

to be at that point on the New Jersey Network to reach a New

Jersey destination or to reach the National Network from a New

Jersey origin. 

At the conclusion of the trial, the District Court held that the
6

Regulations violate the dormant Commerce Clause and accordingly

enjoined the state officials from enforcing them. Am. Trucking

Ass’ns, Inc. v. Whitman, No. 00-CV-489, 2004 WL 601659, at *11

(D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2004). The District Court found that Spasovic’s

conclusion was based on the unreasonable assumption that truck

drivers were acting against their economic interest. Id. at *5-6. In

other words, the District Court did not accept Spasovic’s assertion

that interstate truck drivers were using the New Jersey Network to

avoid paying tolls even though those truck drivers paid more in fuel

and increased travel time by taking local road detours. The District

Court therefore rejected Spasovic’s conclusion that the

Regulations would result in a net positive economic impact by

correcting the irrational behavior of many interstate truck drivers.

Id. at *6. Moreover, the District Court found that, regardless of

whether the Regulations provide a net positive economic impact,

the evidence showed that the Regulations force many truckers to

engage in conduct counter to their economic interests. Id. The

District Court concluded that the Regulations are discriminatory in

effect. Id. at *9-10. 

Additionally, the District Court found that, although the

Regulations advance the legitimate local purpose of improving

highway safety, there are available non-discriminatory means to

accomplish that goal. Id. at *10-11. Specifically, the District

Court noted that the state officials could accomplish the same

legitimate local purpose by prohibiting all restricted vehicles from

using the New Jersey Network except as necessary to: 1) reach a

New Jersey destination from the National Network; 2) reach the

National Network from a New Jersey origin; or 3) access food, rest,

fuel, or repairs. Id. at *11 n.11. Because a non-discriminatory

alternative was available, the District Court held that the

Regulations discriminate against interstate commerce in violation

of the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at *11.

The state officials timely filed a notice of appeal on April

23, 2003.

II. Regulatory Background

First, we must consider the state law at issue. The

Regulations, enacted in 1999, determine which roads may be used

by restricted vehicles traveling in New Jersey. The Regulations

describe their purpose as follows:
7

The New Jersey Department of Transportation has

determined that it is in New Jersey's best interest to limit

interstate through travel of large trucks to the National

Network, the NJ Turnpike, and the Atlantic City

Expressway. Large trucks restricted herein include 102-inch

wide standard trucks and double trailer truck combinations.

Interstate through travel for the purposes of this chapter

shall be a trip with both an origin and destination outside of

New Jersey. Reasonable access shall be permitted to

terminals and to facilities for food, fuel, repairs and rest.

N.J. Admin. Code § 16:32-1.1 (1999).

A “double trailer-truck combination” is defined as “a truck

tractor-semitrailer-trailer combination, and which meets the

equipment length requirement as set forth in N.J.S.A. 39.3-84 and

23 CFR 658.13.” N.J. Admin. Code § 16:32-1.2 (1999). The

Regulations define “102-inch wide standard truck” as “a truck

greater than 96 inches but not greater than 102 inches in width,

exclusive of mirrors and other safety devices, and which meets the

equipment length requirements as set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:3-84(3)

and (4), as amended.” Id. “Interstate through travel” is defined as

“a trip with neither an origin nor destination in New Jersey.” Id.

Under the Regulations, “double-trailer truck combinations

and 102-inch wide standard trucks in interstate through travel may

be operated in New Jersey only on the National Network . . . in

addition to the New Jersey Turnpike, and the Atlantic City

Expressway.” N.J. Admin Code § 16:32-1.4(a). However, the

Regulations allow that, 

“[a] double-trailer truck combination is permitted access

from [the National Network] to facilities providing food,

fuel, repairs and rest, within one mile roadway distance

from the designated system except upon those roads,

highways, streets, public alleys or other thoroughfares

which cannot safely accommodate a double-trailer truck

combination and are so designated by the Department.” 
8

N.J. Admin Code § 16:32-1.6(c).

Thus, under the Regulations, restricted vehicles traveling

through New Jersey with no origin or destination in New Jersey

must use the National Network, and are prohibited from using the

New Jersey Network except as necessary to access food, fuel,

repairs or rest. Restricted vehicles engaged in intrastate travel or

in interstate travel with an origin or destination in New Jersey have

unlimited access to the New Jersey Network.

III. Legal Analysis

A. The Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power “to

regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. Const. art.

I, § 8 cl. 3. “Although the Clause thus speaks in terms of powers

bestowed upon Congress, the Court has long recognized that it also

limits the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate

trade.” Lewis v. B.T. Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980).

In other words, there is a “dormant” Commerce Clause “which

limits state authority to regulate areas where Congress has not

affirmatively acted to either authorize or forbid the challenged state

activity.” Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d

788, 796 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Because Congress has neither prohibited nor authorized

the highway safety regulations at issue here, we must determine

whether the Regulations violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 

The dormant Commerce Clause “prohibits the states from

imposing restrictions that benefit in-state economic interests at outof-state interests’ expense, thus reinforcing ‘the principle of the

unitary national market.’” Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc.

v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 298 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting

West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994)).

The dormant Commerce clause therefore prohibits a state from

impeding free market forces to shield in-state businesses from outof-state competition. Id. A state law that discriminates against

interstate commerce faces “a virtually per se rule of invalidity”

under the dormant Commerce Clause. Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
 2

 In Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1987), we

expressed some doubt about whether statutes that are

discriminatory in effect truly merit the application of strict scrutiny.

822 F.2d at 400-01 n.18. However, this doubt was subsequently

resolved by the Supreme Court’s decision in C & A Carbone, Inc.

v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994), in which it stated that

a statute that did not explicitly seek to regulate interstate commerce

but nonetheless did so “by its practical effect and design” was

subject to heightened scrutiny. Id. at 394. We have since

explicitly found that under Carbone and its progeny, “either

purpose or effect will trigger strict scrutiny analysis.” Harvey &

Harvey, 68 F.3d at 798. 

9

437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 

B. The Appropriate Level of Scrutiny

To determine whether the Regulations violate the dormant

Commerce Clause, the District Court applied the heightened

scrutiny standard. The state officials argue that the District Court

erred because, under American Trucking Ass’ns v. Larson, 683

F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1982), all highway safety regulations are entitled

to deferential treatment. (Defendants’ Brief at 19-20, 22.) 

We have previously stated that the level of scrutiny to be

applied to a statute or regulation that affects interstate commerce

is contingent upon whether the court finds that the statute or

regulation is discriminatory. See Cloverland-Green, 298 F.3d at

210-11; Harvey & Harvey, 68 F.3d at 797; Old Coach Dev. Corp.

v. Tanzman, 881 F.2d 1227, 1231 (3d Cir. 1989). There are two

ways in which a statute could discriminate against interstate

commerce and thus be subject to heightened scrutiny: on its face

(interchangeably referred to as having a discriminatory purpose) or

in effect.2

 See Old Coach, 881 F.2d at 1231; Norfolk S. Corp. v.

Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 400 (3d Cir. 1987). If a regulation

discriminates against interstate commerce on its face or in effect,

then heightened scrutiny applies. See Cloverland-Green, 298 F.3d

at 210-11; Harvey & Harvey, 68 F.3d at 797. Under the

heightened scrutiny standard, the State must demonstrate 1) that the

statute serves a legitimate local interest, and 2) that this purpose
 3

The amicus curiae brief submitted by Tri-State Transportation

Campaign also makes a general argument against the application

of the heightened scrutiny test to regulations that are merely

discriminatory in effect. (See Brief for Amicus Curiae Tri-State

Transportation Campaign, Inc. (“Tri-State Brief”) at 1-10.) It

argues that there is a difference between a tolerable effect on

interstate commerce and an impermissible burden, and that

applying heightened scrutiny to a regulation with an effect on

interstate commerce ignores this distinction. (Id. at 6-10.) This

argument fails because the District Court, echoing Third Circuit

and Supreme Court precedent, did not apply heightened scrutiny to

10

could not be served as well by available non-discriminatory means.

See Cloverland-Green, 298 F.3d at 210-11; Harvey & Harvey, 68

F.3d at 797. If the statute at issue does not discriminate against

interstate commerce, it is subjected to a balancing test whereby the

statute must be upheld unless the burden imposed on interstate

commerce is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local

benefits.” Cloverland-Green, 298 F.3d at 211 (quoting Pike v.

Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)); Harvey & Harvey,

68 F.3d at 797. In Larson, however, we held that nondiscriminatory highway safety statutes must be given a more

deferential treatment, and may not be overturned absent a showing

that the safety benefits are slight, problematic, or illusory. See

Larson, 683 F.2d at 795

We find the state officials’ contention that all highway

safety regulations are entitled to deferential treatment to be without

merit. The state officials misinterpret Larson, which explicitly

limits its deferential standard to non-discriminatory highway safety

regulations. Larson, 683 F.2d at 795. There is simply nothing in

Larson that implies that the deferential standard adopted in Larson

should be applied to discriminatory highway safety regulations.

Moreover, in support of their argument, the state officials cite cases

decided before C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511

U.S. 383 (1994), in which the Supreme Court held that regulations

that discriminate in effect and design are subject to the heightened

scrutiny test. See 511 U.S. at 394; Harvey & Harvey, 68 F.3d at

798. Therefore, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that

discriminatory highway safety regulations are subject to heightened

scrutiny.3
the Regulations merely because they affect interstate commerce,

but because they have a discriminatory effect. 

 4

The question of whether a statute is discriminatory is a

question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. See, e.g., Atl.

Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders

of Atl. County, 112 F.3d 652, 663 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Nat’l

Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir.

1995). 

11

C. Whether the Regulations Are Discriminatory

At the summary judgment stage, when determining the

appropriate level of scrutiny, the District Court found that the

Regulations are not facially discriminatory.4

 Am. Trucking, 136 F.

Supp. 2d at 350. The motion judge noted that the Regulations

distinguish between trucks with and trucks without an origin or

destination in New Jersey, but that the Regulations are not facially

discriminatory because they “apply evenhandedly without regard

to citizenship of the truck driver or owner.” Id. Perhaps

considering himself bound by the motion judge’s ruling, the trial

judge did not consider whether the Regulations are facially

discriminatory. We conclude that they are.

The Regulations state that their purpose is “to limit interstate

through travel of large trucks,” defining “interstate through travel”

as “a trip with both an origin and destination outside of New

Jersey.” N.J. Admin. Code § 16:32-1.1. The Regulations achieve

this purpose by mandating that restricted vehicles engaged “in

interstate through travel may be operated in New Jersey only on the

National Network,” except as necessary to access food, fuel, rest,

or repairs. N.J. Admin. Code § 16:32-1.4(a). 

The text of the Regulations explicitly distinguishes out-ofstate trucks that are passing through New Jersey and imposes

additional burdens on these trucks. The Regulations deny trucks

of out-of-state businesses that pass through New Jersey access to

3600 miles of New Jersey Network roads. These out-of-state

trucks are only exempt from this restriction under limited

circumstances – namely, if they doing business in New Jersey that

would require the dropping off or picking up of goods in New

Jersey, or to access food, fuel, repairs, or rest. Meanwhile, trucks
 5

For example, the New Jersey Department of Transportation

study in evidence showed that the trip from Philadelphia to upstate

New York was longer in distance and time, and costlier in tolls and

fuel, when the driver was forced to use the National Network

instead of the New Jersey Network. (App. at Da491; Supp. App.

at Pa16-Pa22.) 

 6

In Granholm, the Supreme Court also invalidated on similar

grounds Michigan statutes governing alcohol distribution.

Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1896.

12

doing business in New Jersey are allowed unlimited access to the

New Jersey Network. As was demonstrated at trial by the state

officials’ own expert and a New Jersey Department of

Transportation study, forcing trucks that are passing through New

Jersey to use only the National Network imposes increased costs on

those trucks.5

 (Appendix (“App.”) at Da491; Plaintiffs’

Supplemental Appendix (“Supp. App.”) at Pa16-Pa22, Pa52-Pa57.)

 By granting trucks doing business in New Jersey unlimited access

to the New Jersey Network while prohibiting trucks serving solely

out-of-state interests from accessing the New Jersey Network, the

Regulations explicitly impose costs on the citizens and businesses

of other states while exempting New Jersey=s own citizens and

businesses from those same costs. For this reason, we find the

Regulations facially discriminatory.

Our holding here is informed by the Supreme Court’s

reasoning in Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005), in which

the Supreme Court found unconstitutional New York statutes

imposing additional burdens on out-of-state wineries seeking to

ship wine directly to New York consumers.6

 In finding the statutes

violated the dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court noted

that, “[t]ime and again this Court had held that, in all but the

narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause

if they mandate ‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state

economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’”

Id. at 1895 (quoting Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl.

Quality of Ore., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)). Here, the Regulations

explicitly provide for different treatment of in-state and out-of-state

economic interests by limiting the access that the latter interest has
13

to New Jersey roads. It is immaterial that a limited exception is

allowed for out-of-state trucks with an origin or destination in New

Jersey because, as in Granholm, “[t]he suggestion of a limited

exception for [out-of-state economic interests] does nothing to

eliminate the discriminatory nature” of the Regulations. Id. at

1896. The Regulations’ explicit distinction and consequent

burdening of out-of-state economic interests requires that

heightened scrutiny be applied.

Also relevant here is the Supreme Court’s decision in

Philadelphia v. New Jersey, which held that a New Jersey law that

bans the importation of most “solid waste or liquid waste which

originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the

State” violated the Commerce Clause. 437 U.S. at 618. In City of

Philadelphia, the Court observed that “[on] its face, [the New

Jersey law] imposes on out-of-state commercial interests the full

burden of conserving the State’s remaining remaining landfill

space.” Id. at 628. According to the state, the purpose of the

landfill law was to stem the “threat to the quality of the

environment of New Jersey,” to protect the State’s diminishing

landfill sites. The law was also enacted because “the public health,

safety and welfare require that the treatment and disposal within

this State of all wastes generated outside of the State be

prohibited.” Id. at 625. The Supreme Court held that the purpose

of the law would not be relevant to whether the statute was

discriminatory because:

[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well

as legislative ends. Thus, it does not matter whether the ultimate

aim of [the statute] is to reduce the waste disposal costs of New

Jersey residents or to save remaining open lands from pollution, for

we assume New Jersey has every right to protect its residents=

pocketbooks as well as their environment. And it may be assumed

as well that New Jersey may pursue those ends by slowing the flow

of all waste into the State=s remaining landfills . . . . But whatever

New Jersey=s ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by

discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside

the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to

treat them differently. Both on its face and in its plain effect, [the

statute in question] violates this principle of nondiscrimination. 
14

Id. at 626-27.

Similarly, here, the Regulations, on their face, violate this

notion of nondiscrimination.

Our holding also parallels our reasoning in Old Coach, in

which we held that New Jersey laws providing for separate

regulatory schemes for New Jersey land sales to New Jersey

residents and for out-of-state land sales to New Jersey residents,

imposing tighter and costlier restrictions on the latter, were

discriminatory on their face. 881 F.2d at 1232. Like the

Regulations here, the statutes at issue in Old Coach did not

distinguish between businesses based on citizenship. Id.

Regardless, the statutes in Old Coach were facially discriminatory

because they explicitly imposed additional costs on interstate land

sales that intrastate land sales were not subject to. Id. Similarly,

by limiting the access that out-of-state trucks have to the New

Jersey Network to only circumstances in which they have an origin

or destination in New Jersey, while allowing New Jersey trucks

unlimited access to the same network, the Regulations on their face

impose additional costs on out-of-state economic interests that New

Jersey economic interests are not required to bear. 

Even if we were to find, as the District Court did, that the

Regulations are not facially discriminatory, we agree with the

District Court that the Regulations are discriminatory in effect. In

finding that the Regulations have a negative impact on interstate

commerce, the District Court gave a well-reasoned analysis of the

facts in evidence and concluded that, based on a New Jersey

Department of Transportation study, many truckers involved in

interstate commerce with no origin or destination in New Jersey

would be forced to take longer and costlier routes when forced to

use the National Network rather than the New Jersey Network.

Am. Trucking, 2004 WL 601659, at *5-6. Commercial interests

which rely on imports from and exports to New Jersey are not

subject to these increased costs. The District Court properly

rejected Spasovic’s conclusion that the Regulations would have a

positive net economic impact on interstate trucking despite these

added costs because it found no support for the assumption that

truckers choose to act against their economic interest. As the

District Court concluded, truck drivers act in their economic

interest, and that interest is best served by their using the New
15

Jersey Network as opposed to the National Network when doing so

results in a net gain of time and money. In these circumstances, the

Regulations barring from the New Jersey Network interstate trucks

with no origin or destination in New Jersey produce a negative, not

a positive, impact on interstate commerce.

Moreover, the District Court’s conclusion is consistent with

Supreme Court precedent stating that statutes that increase out-ofstate competitors’ costs are subject to heightened scrutiny under the

Commerce Clause. In Carbone, the Supreme Court found that an

ordinance requiring that solid waste processed or handled within

the town be processed or handled at the town’s transfer station was

discriminatory in effect and thus subject to heightened scrutiny.

Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392. The Supreme Court determined that,

although the ordinance’s immediate effect was to direct local

transport of solid waste to a designated site within the local

jurisdiction, its economic effects were “interstate in reach”

because, among other things, the requirements of the ordinance had

the effect of driving up the cost for out-of-state interests to dispose

of their solid waste. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 389. In American

Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), the

Supreme Court invalidated a state’s flat tax levied on all trucks that

used its roads because data showed that the fees imposed a cost per

mile on interstate trucks that was nearly five times as heavy as the

cost borne by local trucks, and did “not even purport to

approximate fairly the cost or value of the use of Pennsylvania’s

roads.” See Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 284-86, 290. In these cases, the

Supreme Court interpreted the dormant Commerce Clause to

invalidate “local laws that impose commercial barriers or

discriminate against an article of commerce by reason of its origin

or destination out of state.” Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390; see also

Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 125 S.Ct.

2419, 2423 (2005); Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 284. This is precisely

what the Regulations do by discriminating against trucking services

by reason of their out-of-state origin and destination.

Because the Regulations are discriminatory both on their

face and in effect, the District Court did not err in applying

heightened scrutiny. 

D. The Availability of Nondiscriminatory Alternatives

The state officials argue that, even if heightened scrutiny is
16

appropriate, the District Court erred in finding that there is an

available non-discriminatory alternative to the Regulations that

would accomplish the goal of improving highway safety by

reducing the number of restricted vehicles on the New Jersey

Network. We review the District Court’s finding of an available

non-discriminatory alternative for clear error. See Atl. Coast, 112

F.3d at 663, 665. 

The District Court found that a non-discriminatory

alternative was available in the form of a regulation that would

prohibit all trucks, regardless of origin or destination, from using

the New Jersey Network except as needed to reach the National

Network from a New Jersey origin, to reach a New Jersey

destination from the National Network, or to access food, rest, fuel,

or repairs. Am. Trucking, 2004 WL 601659, at *6-7. The state

officials argue that this alternative would be impossible to enforce

because: 1) it would require police to stop restricted vehicles on the

New Jersey Network randomly to determine compliance with the

statute, and 2) such a determination would require the officer

making the stop to make difficult calculations regarding whether

the truck needed to be on that road to reach a specific New Jersey

destination from the National Network or to access the National

Network from a New Jersey origin.

It was not clear error for the District Court to reject this

argument and to find that a non-discriminatory alternative was

available. Both the Regulations and the non-discriminatory

alternative would require that the police randomly stop trucks on

the New Jersey Network to ensure compliance with the applicable

law. Moreover, as the District Court noted, the police are regularly

entrusted with the responsibility to make complex determinations

when stopping a vehicle to ensure compliance with the law, such

as the “nuanced determinations” inherent in finding probable cause

or the calculations necessary for the enforcement of similar needsbased exemptions to other highway regulations. Id. The

Regulations themselves would have involved such determinations

in order to allow interstate trucks to leave the National Network to

the extent necessary for fuel, food, rest, or repairs. 

The District Court’s conclusion that a non-discriminatory

alternative was available was based on solid reasoning and

grounded in the evidence. This is a far cry from clear error, in
which a district court’s finding is “completely devoid of minimum

evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility” or bears

“no rational relationship to the supporting evidentiary data.”

Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 104

(3d Cir. 1981) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We

therefore affirm the District Court’s determination that the

Regulations do not survive heightened scrutiny.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the District Court=s

decision holding that the Regulations violate the Commerce Clause

of the United States Constitution and its decision to enjoin

enforcement of the Regulations.