alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### HIGH POINT SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY, Administrator of the Estate of ROBERT WAYNE MARTIN, Deceased v. JOHN CAMPBELL KING, by his Guardian Ad Litem, WILLY L. KING; BRYON CAMPBELL KING, and UNIVERSAL C. I. T. CREDIT CORPORATION and JOYCE FAYE MARTIN, by her General Guardian, HIGH POINT SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY v. JOHN CAMPBELL KING, by his Next Friend, WILLY L. KING; BRYON CAMPBELL KING; and UNIVERSAL C. I. T. CREDIT CORPORATION.

(Filed 14 December, 1960.)

Automobiles § 52—

Tlie bolder of a chattel mortgage on an automobile, nothing else appearing, cannot be held liable for the negligent operation of the vehicle by the mortgagor or the mortgagor’s agent, since the mortgagor of the vehicle is deemed the owner. G.S. 20-279.1(8).

Appeals by plaintiffs from *Preyer, J.,*June 1960 Civil Term, Gtjil-FORn Superior Court (High Point Division).

These civil actions were instituted to recover for the wrongful death •of Robert Wayne Martin and for personal injury to Joyce Faye Martin, passengers in a Ford automobile which was involved in an ■accident. The complaints are identical in so far as they relate to •defendant Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation, the appellee.

The complaints allege in substance that John Campbell King :and his father, Bryon Campbell King, purchased the Ford from a used car dealer; that the appellee advanced the money for the purchase and as security took a title-retaining contract on the vehicle. The appellee held the certificate of title which was not delivered to the Motor Vehicles Department for registration, though a promise to do so is alleged. The appellee permitted the delivery of the vehicle to John Campbell King and Bryon Campbell King, and the .-accident causing the death and injury occurred while the vehicle was being operated on the public highway by John Campbell King. Neither John Campbell King nor his father complied with the requirements of G.S. 20-309, 319, the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act of 1957. The plaintiffs demand judgment against the *572defendants, including the appellee who filed a demurrer upon the-ground the complaint failed to state a cause of action against it.. The court sustained the demurrer and the plaintiffs appealed.

*Haworth, Riggs, & Kuhn for plaintiffs, appellants.*

*Roberson, Haworth & Reese, By: Horace S. Haworth for defendant,, appellee.*

PER CuRiam.

Under the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act, G.S. 20-279.1(8), a conditional vendee, lessee, or mortgagor of a motor vehicle is deemed -to be the owner. Liability on the part of the appellee can arise only by application of the doctrine *respondeat superior,*that is, by showing the relationship of master and servant, or employer and employee, or principal and agent. The complaint does not allege facts showing any such relationship. The demurrer was properly sustained.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF LINCARE HOLDINGS, INC. FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS 
ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE 
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           4,078
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   76,334
<ALLOWANCES>                                     7,951
<INVENTORY>                                      1,542
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                77,049
<PP&E>                                         181,438
<DEPRECIATION>                                  73,148
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 440,388
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           34,943
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<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                           287
<OTHER-SE>                                     392,780
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   440,388
<SALES>                                        443,181
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               443,181
<CGS>                                           65,932
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   65,932
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               245,876
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 4,432
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,161
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                130,321
<INCOME-TAX>                                    50,173
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             80,148
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<NET-INCOME>                                    80,148
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.82
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     2.73
        

</TABLE>
#### STATE v. DAVID GILLYARD.

(Filed 8 May, 1957.)

Criminal Daw § 52b (6)—

Where the State’s evidence is ample to show defendant’s commission of the criminal act as charged in the bill of indictment, the failure of the State to establish that the crime was committed on the very date specified in the indictment does not relieve defendant of criminal responsibility or justify nonsuit, time not being of the essence.

*218Appeal by defendant from *Crissman, J.,*10 September, 1956 Criminal Term Guileoed Superior Court (Greensboro Division).

Defendant was charged in the bill of indictment with having, on 27 March 1956, committed the crime against nature with Clyde Colson. Three witnesses testified to the commission of the crime — Clyde Colson, a 12-year-old boy on whom the crime was committed, and two other youths, one 15, the other 18, who testified they looked in a window and saw the defendant in the commission of the act. Colson, in response to a question as to what occurred the latter part of March, told of the commission of the crime; on cross-examination he stated the act was committed between Thanksgiving and Christmas; on examination by the court he was unable to correctly name the months of the year. One of the witnesses testified the act was committed in March; he was unable to say whether the first or latter part of the month. The other witness stated the crime was committed the latter part of March but was unable to more accurately fix the date. No witness could fix the day of the week. One witness fixed the hour as “about 3:30,” another, “about 3 or 4 o’clock," and the other, “about 4:30.”

The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged, whereupon prison sentence was imposed and defendant appealed.

*Attorney-General Patton and Assistant Attorney-General McGal-liard for the State.*

*Elreta Melton Alexander for defendant appellant.*

PER CuRiam.

Defendant’s motion to nonsuit and other assignments of error revolve around the failure of the State to establish that the alleged crime was committed on the date specified in the bill of indictment. The failure of the State to establish that the crime was committed on 27 March as alleged in the bill of indictment does not relieve defendant from responsibility for his criminal act. Time was not of the essence. *S. v. Trippe,*222 N.C. 600, 24 S.E. 2d 340.

No error.
** **

**Exhibit 31.4**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

 

I, Daniel M. Bradbury,certify that:

 

1.          I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1to Form 10-K of Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; and

 

2.          Based on my knowledge, this report doesnot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report.

 

 
| Date: April 19,  2010 |     |                                    |
|----------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------|
|                       |     |                                    |
|                       | By:      |  /s/  Daniel M. Bradbury           |
| * *                   | * * | *President and Chief Executive Officer* |

 

----
#### NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION COMMISSION v. BANK OF HYDE, BRANCH BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Receiver.

(Filed 12 September, 1928.)

Appeal and Error — Review—Burden of Showing Error.

The burden of showing error on appeal to the Supreme Court is on the appellant.

Appeal from *Bwrnhül,*Jat May Term, 1928, of Hyde.

Affirmed.

*Ehringhaus & Hall and O. B. Spencer for appellant.*

*Miley O. Glov'er and Finch & Band for appellee.*

Per Curiam.

C. L. Bell, clerk of tbe Superior Court of Hyde County made a motion in tbe above-entitled cause “to bave a certain sum of money, to wit, $2,172.78, on deposit in tbe defunct Bank of Hyde declared a trust fund and a preferred lien against tbe assets of tbe Bank of Hyde and an order directing tbat same be paid as a preferred claim.”

In tbe findings of fact by tbe court below it appears tbat “Trial by jury was expressly waived and tbe parties agreed tbat tbe court should hear and determine tbe facts as well as tbe law and enter sucb judgment as to bim should appear proper. After bearing tbe evidence offered by tbe petitioner, tbe court found as a fact tbat tbe deposit made by tbe petitioner was not sucb a special deposit as entitled tbe petitioner to priority in payment out of tbe assets of tbe defunct bank, and entered judgment accordingly.”

Tbe court below found tbe facts upon which it based its judgment. Tbe burden is on appellant to show error.

From a careful reading of tbe record and tbe authorities cited in tbe briefs, we are of tbe opinion tbat tbe judgment below must be

Affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 42 (Friday, March 3, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 12004-12005]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-5237]



=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary


Fitness Determination of Balter Worldwide Corp. d/b/a Sunshine 
Airlines d/b/a Sunshine Air

AGENCY: Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Notice of Commuter Air Carrier Fitness Determination--Order 95-
2-56, Order to Show Cause.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation is proposing to find that 
Balter Worldwide Corp. d/b/a Sunshine Airlines d/b/a Sunshine Air is 
fit, willing, and able to provide commuter air service under 49 U.S.C. 
41738.

RESPONSES: All interested persons wishing to respond to the Department 
of Transportation's tentative fitness determinations should file their 
responses with Janet A. Davis, Air Carrier Fitness Division, X-56, Room 
6401, Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20590, and serve them on all persons listed in 
Attachment A to the order. Responses shall be filed no later than March 
14, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Janet A. Davis, Air Carrier Fitness 
Division, Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Washington, D.C. 20590, (202) 366-9721.

    [[Page 12005]] Dated: February 27, 1995.
Patrick V. Murphy,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs.
[FR Doc. 95-5237 Filed 3-2-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-62-P
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 45 (Wednesday, March 8, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 12740]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-5676]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------


DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Business Development Center Applications: Baton Rouge, LA

AGENCY: Minority Business Development Agency.

ACTION: Correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On page 9662, in the issue dated February 21, 1995, third 
column, third paragraph, the closing date for applications is corrected 
to read March 24, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: Demetrice Jenkins at (214) 767-8001.

11.800  Minority Business Development Center

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance)

    Dated: March 3, 1995.
Donald L. Powers,
Federal Register Liaison Office, Minority Business Development Agency.
[FR Doc. 95-5676 Filed 3-7-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-21-P
## Detailed Single Year Tables

- Individual Provisions
- Payroll Taxes (including maximum taxable)

### **Description of Proposed Provision:						E2.14: Apply OASDI 12.4 percent payroll tax rate on earnings above $250,000 starting in 2025, and tax all earnings once the current-law taxable maximum exceeds $250,000. Provide benefit credit for earnings above the current-law taxable maximum that are subject to the payroll tax, using a secondary PIA formula. This secondary PIA formula involves: (1) an "AIME+" derived from annual earnings from each year after 2024 that were in excess of that year's current-law taxable maximum; and (2) a formula factor of 2 percent on this newly computed "AIME+".**

### Financial Estimates for the OASDI Trust Fund Program

### Summarized Estimates
II 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3829 

To require the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

to make publicly available information regarding the calculation of premiums under the National Flood Insurance Program, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 14, 2022 

Mr. CASSIDY (for himself, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, and Mr. KENNEDY) introduced 

the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee 

on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

A BILL 

To require the Administrator of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency to make publicly available information regarding the calculation of premiums under the 

National Flood Insurance Program, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Flood Insurance Pric5 ing Transparency Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. PREMIUM CALCULATOR. 

7 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 3829 IS

1 (1) the term ‘‘Administrator’’ means the Ad2 ministrator of the Federal Emergency Management 

3 Agency; 

4 (2) the term ‘‘covered property’’ means a prop5 erty for which insurance is provided under the Na6 tional Flood Insurance Program; 

7 (3) the term ‘‘National Flood Insurance Pro8 gram’’ means the program established under the Na9 tional Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 4001 

10 et seq.); and 

11 (4) the term ‘‘premium rates’’ means charge12 able premium rates prescribed under section 1308 of 

13 the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42 

14 U.S.C. 4015). 

15 (b) REQUIREMENTS.—The Administrator shall— 

16 (1) not later than 60 days after the date of en17 actment of this Act, make public all formulas used 

18 by the Administrator to calculate the value of miti19 gation credits provided with respect to covered prop20 erties, including, at a minimum, credits for— 

21 (A) installing a flood opening; 

22 (B) elevating such a property onto a post, 

23 pile, or pier; and 

24 (C) elevating machinery and equipment 

25 above the lowest floor of such a property; and 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 3829 IS

1 (2) not later than 90 days after the date of en2 actment of this Act, establish a tool that allows 

3 members of the public to estimate premium rates for 

4 covered properties under the Risk Rating 2.0 pro5 gram (or any similar methodology) within a reason6 able margin of error based on user inputs, which 

7 shall include a mechanism for determining how the 

8 premium rates for a covered property would change 

9 based on taking a particular mitigation action, in10 cluding an action described in subparagraph (A), 

11 (B), or (C) of paragraph (1) with respect to the cov12 ered property. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-50203

(Summary Calendar)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JAIME EDUARDO ALARCON,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(USDC No. EP-95-CV-488-H)

- - - - - - - - - -

September 30, 1996

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jaime Eduardo Alarcon appeals from the district court’s order

dismissing his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Alarcon argues that his guilty plea

was unknowing and involuntary, the factual basis was inadequate to

support his guilty plea, counsel was ineffective because he coerced2

Alarcon into entering a guilty plea, and the district court erred

in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

Alarcon failed to establi sh that his guilty plea, which was

allegedly based on an unkept promise, was unknowing and

involuntary. S ee United States v. Smith

, 915 F.2d 959, 963

(5th Cir. 1990). The district court's finding that the factual

basis was sufficient to support the plea was not clearly erroneous.

See United States v. Adams

, 961 F.2d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 1992). The

district court did not err in determin ing that Alarcon’s guilty

plea was not coerced. See Blackledge v. Allison , 431 U.S. 63, 74

(1977). Alarcon’s contention that counsel was ineffective for

failing to investigate or file pretrial motions was not adequately

briefed and is thus deemed abandoned. S ee Brinkmann v. Dallas

County Deputy Sheriff Abner

, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

The district court did not err in refusing to conduct an

evidentiary hearing because the record is suf ficient for

determination of Alarcon’s contentions. S ee United States v.

Drummond

, 910 F.2d 284, 285 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied

, 498 U.S.

1104 (1991).

AFFIRMED.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED AP RIL 10, 2014

NO. 03

- 13

- 00770

- CV

Wanda McDonald, Appellant

v.

Federal National Mortgage Association, Appellee

APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 4 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE JONES, JUSTICES PEMBERTON A ND ROSE

DISMISSED AS MOOT

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSE

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the tr i a l court on November 8, 2013 . H aving

reviewed the record , it appears that the appeal should be dismissed . Therefore, the Court

dismisses the appeal. Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of

costs is made.
Exhibit No. 99.1
                                                               ----------------


                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                            AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of United Retail Group, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending February 1, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") on the date hereof
(the "Report"), We, Raphael Benaroya, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
and George R. Remeta, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, that based on our knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
the Commission or its staff upon request.



/s/ Raphael Benaroya
----------------------
Raphael Benaroya
Chief Executive Officer
April 3, 2003



/s/ George R. Remeta
-----------------------
George R. Remeta
Chief Financial Officer
April 3, 2003
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 37 (Friday, February 24, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 10409]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-4605]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Veterans' Employment and Training


Secretary of Labor's Advisory Committee for Veterans' Employment 
and Training; Notice of Meeting

    The Secretary's Advisory Committee for Veterans' Employment and 
Training was established under Section 4110 of title 38, United States 
Code, to bring to the attention of the Secretary, problems and issues 
relating to veterans' employment and training.
    Notice is hereby given that the Secretary of Labor's Advisory 
Committee for Veterans' Employment and Training will meet on March 14 
and 15 in Rooms S4215 A, B, and C at the Department of Labor, 200 
Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. The meeting on Tuesday, 
March 14, will be from approximately 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM, and on 
Wednesday, March 15, will be from approximately 8:30 AM to Noon.
    Written comments are welcome and may be submitted by addressing 
them to: Mr. Thomas S. Keefe, Special Assistant, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Veterans' Employment and Training, U.S. 
Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Room S1315, 
Washington, D.C. 20210.
    The primary items on the agenda are:
    <bullet> Adoption of minutes of previous meeting.
    <bullet> Report from the Task Forces--

--Rewrite of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
--Employee Unions Not Recognizing Military Training
--Women Veterans' Issues
--Minority and Low Income (homeless and dislocated workers)
--Overview of All Training Programs That Exist
--Standards Indicators Used by the Department of Labor
--JTPA Titles II and III information breakdown

    <bullet> Any other business.
    The meeting will be open to the public.
    Persons with disabilities, needing special accommodations, should 
contact Thomas S. Keefe at telephone number 202-219-9116 no later than 
Friday, March 10.

    Signed at Washington, D.C. this 21st day of February, 1995.
Preston M. Taylor Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Veterans' Employment and Training.
[FR Doc. 95-4605 Filed 2-23-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-79-M