J

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IN THE INTEREST OF: J.C.

APPEAL OF: J.C. : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 2114 EDA 2021 Appeal from the Order Entered August 19, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Juvenile Division at

No(s): CP

- 45

- JV

- 0000171

- 2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J. CONCURRING OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2022 I agree with my learned colleagues’ decision to vacate the dispositional order and reverse the adjudication of delinquency

. I w rit e separately to emphasi ze that this case does not concern the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction , which I believe the majority infers by discussing situations where the Juvenile Act expressly vested original ju risdiction in criminal courts . As the majority highlights, there are specific instances where the legislature placed original jurisdiction in the criminal court

. However , t his is not one of those cases. R ather , this appeal implicates the narrow question concerning a court’s authority to render a given decision in exercising its subject matter jurisdiction

. Specifically, the issue is whether the juvenile court had theJ

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authority to accept J.C.’s admission 1 to corruption of minor s when the offense applies specifically to actors “the age of eighteen years and upwards

. ” 2 See 18 Pa.C.S. 6301(a)(1)(i). More importantly , presuming that the juvenile court did, in fact, lack the authority to accept J.C.’s admission, may we grant relief sua sponte ? 3
F or the reasons explained, infra , I believe we can address the dispositive issue sua sponte because J.C.’s admission to the commission of corruption of minors is void ab initio insofar as the juv enile court was not empowered to

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ 1 An a dmission is the juvenile court corollary to a guilty plea and therefore cannot be accepted unless the court confirms “ that the admission is knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made

. ” Pa.R.J.C.P. 407(A) (1)(a) ; see also Rule 407 comment(“ The admission colloquy is similar to a guilty plea colloquy in criminal court; howeve r, the juvenile court judge has special responsibilities under the Juvenile Act in providing a balanced attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for delinquent acts committed, and the development of competencies to ena ble juveniles to become responsible and productive members of the community. ”).

2 As the majority aptly observes, the Commonwealth’s delinquency petition alleged that J.C. committed aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, and open lewdness, but the Commonwealth subsequently agreed to nolle pross e those charges in return for the juvenile’s admission to corruption of minors, which was designated amended count one in the delinquency petition. See N.T. Adjudicatory Hearing, 7/7/21, at 31.

3 Neither J.C., the Commonwealth, nor the juvenile court recognized that, based upon the elements of corruption of minors , a juvenile can never be adjudicated delinquent for that offense . The Majority character ized this situation as a “legal impossibility , ” and differentiate d it from the issue of evidentiary insufficiency. See Majority Opinion at 14 , n. 18

. In my view, legal impossibility and insufficient evidence are coterminous concepts insofar as b oth princi ples concern the Commonwealth’s impossible burden of proving the elements of corruption of minors . Neither implicates subject matter jurisdiction.J

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accept an admission to an offense that is impossible for a child to commit. See e.g., Commonwealth v. McIntyre , 232 A.3d 609 , 616 (Pa. 2020) ( issue implicates legality “ given that a trial court is not empowered

. . . to sentence an individual for a non

- existent criminal offense .” ) . Accordingly, I respectfully

concur. First, I observe that the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the delinquency proceedings is unassailable. The traditional concept of subject matter jurisdiction, “[a]lso termed jurisdiction of the subject matter” concerns the court’s authority to consider cases of a given nature and grant the type of relief requested. See Black’s Law Diction ary 857, 1413 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis omitted). The Courts of Common Pleas have unlimited original jurisdiction except where a statute or rule has vested exclusive original jurisdiction in another Pennsylvania court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 931 (a) ; see also Co nst. art. V, § 5 (“T here shall be one court of common pleas for each judicial district (a) having such divisions and

. . . (b) having unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law. ”). It is beyond cavil that “[t] h is general grant of authority extends to juvenile delinquency matters, among many others .” Pennsylvania Juvenile Delinquency Benchbook (2018) , at 3.4. The Juvenile Act applies exclusively to, inter ali a , “[p] roceedings in which a child is alleged to be delinquent or dependent. ” The act defines a delinquent child as “[a] child ten years of age or older whom the court has found to have committed a delinquent act and is in need of treatment,J

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supervision or rehabilitation. ” 42 Pa.C.S. at § 6302. I n this situation, a delinquent act “ means an act designated a crime under the law of this Commonwealth , ” other than murder. Id . (emphasis added). As the majority observes , s ince the enactment of the 1995 a mendments to the Juvenile Act, the definition has not included enumerated violent offense s committed by a fifteen

- year - old child (1) with a deadly weapon or (2) who has been previously adjudicated delinquent of an enumerated offense. 4 Id

. Thus, in these specified situations, “the Juvenile Act vests original jurisdiction in the criminal courts

. . . .” Commonwealth. v. D.S. , 903 A.2d 582, 584 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cotto , 753 A.2d 217, 219 (2000) )

. Th is p rinciple is also ensconced in the Juvenile Act’s provisions regarding the transfer of matters to criminal courts for prosecution. (e) Murder and other excluded acts. — Where the petition alleges conduct which if proven would constitute murder, or any of the offenses excluded by paragraph (2)(ii) or (iii) of the definition of “delinquent act” in section 6302 (relating to

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ 4 As the High Court explained in Commonwealth v. Cotto , 753 A.2d 217, 219 ( Pa. 2000) ) , Prior to the amendments, those serious felonies initially came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts, subject to certification and transfer to adult court. The 1995 amendments reflect a legislative judgment that the most serious violent felonies s hould be treated in the same manner as murder charges, i.e. , as adult crimes in adult court, at least in the first instance. Thus, the 1995 amendments explicitly excluded the enumerated offenses from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court s specifically be cause of the violence innate in the crimes

.J

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definitions), the court shall require the offense t o be prosecuted under the criminal law and procedures [.] 42 Pa.C.S. § 6355 (e) (emphasis in original)

. O ur High Court explained that “ the Legislature has deemed [these] crimes so heinous ” that it removed the offenses from the definition of delinquent act a nd conferred presumptive jurisdiction to the criminal court

. Commonwealth v. Ramos , 920 A.2d 1253, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2007). Accordingly , where an offense is excluded from the definition of a delinquent act, the charges may be transferred or filed directly in criminal court. See Cotto , supra at 219

- 20. Instantly, the Commonwealth’s delinquency petition alleged that fifteen
year - old J.C. committed several delinquent acts, i.e. a “ crime [s ] under the law of this Commonwealth” that are not specifically excluded from the statutory definition of delinquent act due to their heinous nature . Hence, it is beyond argument that the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction to confront the Commonwealth’s delinquency petition, rule on the merits of the matters at hand, and, if the allegations are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, adjudicate J.C. delinquent and craft an appropriate disposition best suited for the child’s treatment and consistent with the public interest. Clearly, t here is no juri sdictional issue in this case. By invoking the legal framework addressed in Cotto , supra , Ramos , supra , and D.S. , supra , the majority intimates that the juvenile court l ack ed subject matter jurisdiction in this case

. Our High Court in Cotto up held the constitutionality of the Juvenile Act ’ s provisions permitting the criminalJ

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prosecution of a juvenile who was fifteen years old when he committed two armed robberies. In upholding the criminal court’s express jurisdiction in this situation , the Supreme Court reasoned,

The fact that the legislature chose in the past to presumptively extend the benefits of the juvenile system to older juveniles charged with armed robbery and other serious violent offenses does not act as a constitutional restraint upon it to make a different judgment in response to changing societal conditions. It is no less the legislature's prerogative now to limit those benefits than it was to extend them in the first place. Id . at 224. Hence, the High Court recognize that the legis lature carved explicit exceptions that removed specific violent offense from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. Similarly, i n Ramos , supra at 1258, this Court observed that a criminal
court had exclusive and presumptively proper jurisdiction over a seventeen

year - old’s prosecution for armed robbery because the offense was expressly

“ excluded from the Juvenile Act ’ s definition of a delinquent [act.]” We reasoned, “ despite the fact that Appellant was seventeen at the time he
commit ted his offenses, because he committed the predicate offense of robbery while possessing a deadly weapon, his crimes were not considered delinquent acts. ” Id

. Thus, “ [the a] ppellant ’ s charges were directly filed with the criminal court where original exc lusive jurisdiction vests and is presumptively proper. ” Id

. Finally, in D.S. , we applied th e express legislative exception to the definition of delinquent act to reverse a trial court’s refusal to transfer aJ

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fifteen

- year - old to criminal court for the prosecution of aggravated assault and robbery with a deadly weapon . Again, we reiterated, “ [a] s amended in 1995, the Juvenile Act vests original jurisdiction in the criminal courts for specified violent felonies...committed by minors aged fifteen or older who use a deadly weapon in the commission.” D.S. , supra at 584 (quoting Cotto , supra at 217). Hence, we concluded , “ Because the offenses do not qualify as “delinquent acts,” [the] offenses must be prosecuted under the criminal law and procedures. ” Id . at 586. While the majority acknowledges that corruption of minors is not one of the enumerated violent offenses that the legislature decided should be prosecuted in a criminal court , it relies upon legal authority that discusses that precise situation and implies that because it is impossible for a juvenile to commit corruption of minor s , the juvenile court lacked s ubject matter jurisdiction in this case

. See e.g. , Majority Opinion at 13

- 14 (“[I]t logically follows that crimes that can only be committed by adults do not fall within the class of offenses subject to a juvenile adjudications under the [Juvenile]
Act. ”) ; Majority Opinion at 14 , n.18 ( rel ying upon In re D.S., supra , for the
propo sition “where juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, all juvenile proceedings that took place so far were legally invalid”) ; Majority Opinion at 1 6 (“The instant case presents a unique and rare situation because a juvenile can never be adjudica ted delinquent for a crime under the Crimes Code, notwithstanding one excluded by 6302, which , by its very definition,J

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can only apply to adult perpetrators.”)

. Th is rationale blurs the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction with its legal authority to accept J.C.’s admission to an offense that was impossible for the juvenile to commit. The majorit y’s reliance upon In re R.A. , is equally unavailing

. That case concerns whether a juvenile court had statutory authority to issue a protective order pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4954 , when that provision of the Pennsylvania
Crimes C ode related to “ Any court with jurisdiction over any criminal matter[.] ” Recognizing the obvious difference s between juvenile co urts and criminal court s , we concluded, “ the Legislature expressly limited the power to issue protective orders under § 4954 to courts with jurisdiction over criminal
matters [and] because the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over a criminal matter at the time that it issued the protective order, it lacked statutory authority to issue the order. ” Id . at 1224. I do not share my colleagues’ view that this relatively straight

- forward principle bears upon the juvenile court’s statutory authority over the juvenile petition in the case at bar

. Thus, w hile it was patent legal error for the court to accept J.C.’s admission to an offense that was impossible for a juvenile to commit , the fact that J .C. admitted to the offense did not divest the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction. Regardless of the elements of the offense, c orruption of
minors is “ an act designated a crime under the law of this Commonwealth” and because the offense was not specifically excised from the definition of aJ

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delinquent act , jurisdiction does not rest in the criminal court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6303 (defining delinquent act). Thus, to the extent that the import of the majority’s rationale sounds in subject matter jurisdiction, w e can not simply

renounce the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the juvenile delinquency proceeding because the offense that J.C. eventually admitted to committing include d an element that is impossible to prove in a juvenile court

. As the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the delinquency proceedings is irrefutable , I next address whether we can raise the juvenile court error under the rubric of an “ illegal sentence ” when j uvenile c ourt’s do not impose sentences or punishments. Juvenile delinquency involves a two

step process: ( 1) whether the juvenile committed a delinquent act and is need of treatment, supervision or rehabilitation; and ( 2) the appropriate disposition to serve thos e needs. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(b) (Finding of delinquency); 42 Pa.C.S § 6352(a) (Disposition of delinquent child) (“If the child is found to be a delinquent child the court may make any of the following orders of disposition determined to be consistent wit h the protection of the public interest and best suited to the child's treatment, supervision, rehabilitation and welfare[.]”). Thus, w hile it is well ensconced that this C ourt will address an illegal sentence sua sponte , it is less obvious whether this p rinciple applies to juvenile dispositions , which are designed to balanc e the protection of public’s interest with the treatment, supervision, and rehabilitation of theJ

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juvenile

. Hence, this dynamic presents an ill

- fitting analogy comparing the delinquency adjudication to an illegal sentence

. 5 Nevertheless, in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in McIntyre , supra , I agree with the majorit y’ s ultimate conclusion that we may address the underlying issue sua sponte , albeit for reasons that do not interweave principles of subject matter jurisdiction. I summarize the High Court’s holding
in McIntyre , as follows. McIntyre was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender under Megan’s Law III, which was subsequently deemed

u nconstitutional in its entirety because the legislature utilized an unconstitutional process to enacted it

. McIntyre filed a PCRA petition raising unrelated claims of error , which was denied on the merits. He appealed to this Court, where he assert ed for the first time that his conviction and
sentence could not stand on an unconstitutional statute. We affirmed the denial of PCRA relief, finding the novel issue waived pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 302 because McIntyre failed to present the claim to the PCRA court. Interpreting McIntyre’s claim as falling under the classification of an illegal sentence , our Supreme Court reversed ou r determination , found the statute void ab initio , and granted relief

. Critically, i n deeming the issue non

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_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ 5 A n apt sentencing analogy would i nvolve the legality of the disposition, i.e. , whether the juvenile court exceeded its statutory authority in impos ing probation, community service, the submission of DNA sample s and fingerprints, and the directive to undergo a sexual offender evaluation. Instantly, n one of the components of J.C.’s disposition exceed s the juvenile court’s authority.J

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waivable , the McIntyre Court reasoned, “ there was no validly

- enacted criminal statute on which the Commonwealth could base Appellant's conviction.” McIntyre , supra at 619. Phrased differently, the Supreme C ourt concluded that the “ illegality ” arose from the trial court proceeding on an inherently defective statute

. Just as our High Court determined that the trial court in McIntyre lacked authority to impose a sentence, the juvenile court lacked the statutory authority to accept J.C.’s admission to committing corruption of minor s because it was legally impossible for a juvenile to commit that offense

. Thus, in the same manner that the Supreme Court deemed McIntyre’s conviction and sentence void ab initio in correct ing the predicate error despite waiver under R ule 903 , I believe that the juvenile court’s acceptance of J .C.’s admission to corr uption of minor s was inherently defective and facially invalid insofar as the offense cannot be committed by a minor . Thus, we may address the juvenile court’s error sua sp onte and grant relief. See e.g. , McIntyre , supra at 616 (issue concerns legality “given that a trial court is not empowered . . . to sentence an individual for a non

- existent criminal offense.”) Accordingly , while I disagree with the portion of the majority’s rationale that sounds in subject matter jurisdiction , for the reasons explai ned above, I concur with the decision to address the trial court error sua sponte , vacate the dispositional order, and reverse the adjudication of delinquency

.