SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4903-18T3

JD JAMES CONSTRUCTION,

LLC, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

PDP LANDSCAPING, LLC,

Defendant,

and

BDP EXCAVATING, INC.,

PHILIP CALABRESE, JR.,

PHILIP CALABRESE, III, and

PERRY DORTONE,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________________

Submitted August 25, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-2404-16.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

September 18, 2020
2

A-4903-18T3

Steven A. Berkowitz & Associates, PC, attorneys for 

appellants (Steven A. Berkowitz, on the briefs).

Hyland, Levin, Shapiro, LLP, attorneys for respondent 

(Daniella Gordon, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendants BDP Excavating, Inc. (BDP), Philip Calabrese, Jr., Philip 

Calabrese, III, and Perry Dortone appeal from the June 27, 2019 judgment

entered in favor of plaintiff JD James Construction, LLC, following a bench 

trial. Pursuant to the judgment, defendants were held jointly and severally liable

for $94,848.78, and assessed $10,000 in attorney's fees against BDP only. We 

affirm.

We derive the following facts from the trial record, adopting by reference 

the "factual conclusions reached by the trial court because we are mindful of, 

and readily observe, the principle that our scope of review of a judgment in a 

non-jury case is extremely limited." Nordstrom v. Lyon, 424 N.J. Super. 80, 86 

(App. Div. 2012) (citing Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 

169 (2011)).

On November 18, 2015, PDP Landscaping, LLC (PDP) entered into a

written agreement with Warfel Construction Company (the Warfel contract) for 

PDP to perform work as a subcontractor for a commercial construction project
3

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in Maple Shade for which Warfel had been hired as the general contractor (the 

project). Signatories on behalf of PDP for the Warfel contract included 

Calabrese, III, as PDP's "Executive," his father, Calabrese, Jr., as the 

"Subcontractor Safety Director," and Dortone, as the "Project Manager."

Thereafter PDP's principals, acting under the entity names of BDP and

"PDP Enterprises,"

1 hired plaintiff to perform concrete construction work for the 

project, by virtue of which the entities executed a written agreement dated 

February 29, 2016 (the subcontract). The subcontract provided that plaintiff was 

to install "[c]oncrete curbing[,] . . . concrete sidewalks[,] and associated concrete 

flat work" with payment due to plaintiff "within [thirty] days of completion" of 

the agreed upon work. Calabrese, Jr. and Dortone signed the subcontract on 

behalf of defendants under the titles "President PDP" and "Vice [P]resident of 

sales/project manager," respectively, and David Peluse signed on behalf of 

plaintiff as its "President" and sole principal.

Throughout 2016, after completing work on the project as required under 

the subcontract, plaintiff submitted three invoices to Dortone for payment as 

1

 Calabrese, Jr. testified that BDP, which had not done business since 2005, and 

PDP both operated out of his house, shared the same phone number, and shared 

the same e-mail address. He also acknowledged that BDP's Facebook page 

posted pictures of PDP's jobs, including pictures of the project.
4

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follows: (1) June 10, 2016 for $55,568; (2) July 16, 2016 for $30,268; and (3) 

August 17, 2016 for $49,588. The August 17 invoice, which was the final 

invoice submitted upon completion of the work in full, indicated the total 

amount of $135,424 was "past due." Peluse testified that none of the "invoices 

[were] ever rejected" by defendants either orally or in writing, and no deficiency 

in the performance of the work was ever reported. Nonetheless, Peluse never 

received payment for any of the work performed. According to Peluse, when 

the invoices were not timely paid, he "sent . . . emails to . . . Dortone" and "called 

. . . Dortone with no results." He also "went to the site to personally talk to 

[Calabrese, Jr.]" about the unpaid invoices. However, Calabrese, Jr. denied 

having any conversations with Peluse regarding non-payment.

Under the Warfel contract, Warfel required PDP to "insure that all subsubcontractors . . . [were] paid all amounts due in connection with the 

performance of th[e] subcontract." PDP also agreed to submit to Warfel with 

their payment applications, claim releases and lien waivers certifying "that all 

amounts owed in connection with performance of th[e] subcontract [were] paid." 

Following receipt of plaintiff's first two invoices, PDP submitted corresponding 

payment applications and accompanying lien waivers to Warfel on June 21 and 

July 22, 2016. In those payment applications, in addition to listing various other 
5

A-4903-18T3

incurred expenses, Dortone "certif[ied]" that the "[c]urb" work had been 

performed.

Although PDP was paid over half a million dollars by Warfel over the 

course of the project,

2

including funds received in direct response to the payment 

applications certifying that the curb work had been performed, it was undisputed 

that PDP failed to make any payments to plaintiff and instead used the funds for 

other business purposes. Peluse testified that when he told Calabrese, Jr. he had 

"done everything . . . asked of [him] and . . . [had not] received a penny[,]"

Calabrese, Jr. responded that defendants "ha[d not] received any money" from 

Warfel. Prior to this conversation, however, Peluse had spoken "to 

representatives through Warfel" who confirmed "through scheduled 

documentation" that PDP had "already billed for [plaintiff's] services."3 

According to Calabrese, Jr., PDP was not paid a balance of over $268,000 

remaining on the Warfel contract, inferring that plaintiff's funds were included 

in the unpaid balance.

2

 The July 22, 2016 lien waiver specified that PDP had "been paid $568,986.89"

by Warfel for all work performed through June 1, 2016.

 

3

 We note that the judge "indicate[d] for the record that [he] underst[oo]d the 

hearsay aspect of [Peluse's testimony]" and remarked that these statements were

"just being offered as an explanation." 
6

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On July 5, 2018, plaintiff filed an amended complaint against PDP and 

BDP alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and violation of the New 

Jersey Prompt Payment Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:30A-1 to -2 (NJPPA). By seeking to 

pierce each entity's corporate veil, the complaint also alleged fraud against

Calabrese, Jr., Calabrese, III, and Dortone, in their individual capacities as well 

as against each entity. PDP filed for bankruptcy on August 31, 2018, in the 

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(bankruptcy court), and plaintiff was listed among the creditors in PDP's 

bankruptcy filing. Pursuant to the automatic stay instituted by the bankruptcy 

court, plaintiff's breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and NJPPA claims

against defendants were no longer viable, leaving only the veil-piercing and 

fraud claims.

Prior to trial, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the 

basis that PDP was an indispensable party for plaintiff to recover on the fraud 

claim. Defendants averred that because plaintiff could no longer proceed against 

PDP as a result of the bankruptcy proceedings, the remaining allegations against 

its alter ego, BDP, and PDP's principals, who were officers common to both 

entities, had to be dismissed. On April 30, 2019, the trial court denied 

defendants' motion on the ground that PDP was "not an indispensable party to 
7

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the litigation." The court determined plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that "the 

principals of the business committed the tortious acts, and therefore the [fraud

and veil-piercing] claims [were] sustainable even without PDP."4

At the conclusion of the two-day bench trial, the judge found in favor of 

plaintiff on the fraud count against BDP and against Calabrese, Jr., Calabrese,

III, and Dortone, individually. In a June 6, 2019 oral decision, the judge

determined the evidence presented justified piercing the corporate veil of BDP

to the extent that it was liable for PDP's fraud as an alter-ego entity. See

Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 482, 497 (D.N.J. 

2002) ("veil-piercing is proper when a subsidiary is an alter ego or 

instrumentality of the parent corporation."). Specifically, the judge found that 

"whatever judgment is entitled to be rendered against . . . [PDP] would be 

entitled to be entered against [BDP]" because there was "no effort to distinguish 

between the two corporations."

Further, the judge concluded that under the participation theory, "a 

director or officer of a corporation is individually liable for his or her own 

tortious acts even when those acts are committed in connection with or in 

4

 Following the entry of the June 27, 2019 judgment, PDP was dismissed from 

the case without prejudice by consent order dated August 6, 2019. 
8

A-4903-18T3

furtherance of the corporate business." See Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc., 170 

N.J. 297, 303-04 (2002) ("[T]he essence of the participation theory is that a 

corporate officer can be held personally liable for a tort committed by the 

corporation when he or she is sufficiently involved in the commission of the 

tort."). See also State, Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 500 

(1983) (finding that veil piercing is appropriate where an individual uses a 

corporation as his or her alter ego and abuses the corporate form to defeat the 

ends of justice, perpetuate a fraud, accomplish a crime, or otherwise evade the 

law).

Next, the judge defined common law fraud 

as an intentional misrepresentation of material existing 

fact made by one person to another with knowledge of 

its falsity and for the purpose of inducing the other 

person to act and upon which the other person relies 

with resulting injury or damage.

Fraud is also the intentional use of deceit, a trick 

or some dishonest means to deprive another of his or 

her money or property or legal right . . . . Also fraud is 

the intentional deception to secure unfair or unlawful 

gain.

In making fact-findings, the judge stated there was "an agreement between 

Warfel and the defendant corporation," which imposed "obligations" on 

defendants to "not . . . put anybody else's rights in jeopardy." Crediting Peluse's 
9

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testimony over that of the defense witnesses,5the judge explained that "[t]here 

was ongoing communication[]" by Peluse, who, "at all times [kept] . . . 

defendants fully aware" of his performance under the terms of the sub-contract,

by virtue of which Calabrese, Jr., Calabrese, III, and Dortone "were fully aware 

of [plaintiff's] progress and . . . what [work] was completed." As a result, the 

judge determined that plaintiff's services under the sub-subcontract "were, in 

fact, undertaken and . . . were, in fact, performed." 

The judge further found that over the course of the subcontract, Warfel 

paid PDP "about $560,000" and PDP "took the money, . . . used [it] for whatever 

other business purposes they thought [were] appropriate, and . . . defrauded . . . 

plaintiff." The judge expressly rejected defendants' claim that they intended to 

pay plaintiff "when [they got] the other 200 plus thousand" from Warfel. The 

judge determined that "[t]here [could] be no other conclusion" but that 

"[e]verything that was done here was done with an effort to deny [plaintiff] fair 

compensation." 

In finding defendants liable for fraud, the judge reasoned that

[b]ased on accepted definitions of fraud, it . . . would 

be just beyond the pale of any fair sense of 

consideration that if I do things and I induce you either 

5

 In addition to Peluse, Calabrese Jr., Calabrese, III, and Dortone testified at the 

trial.
10 A-4903-18T3

as inferentially as an inferred party or as a third party 

beneficiary to do that which you would not have done 

or I collect sums allegedly on your behalf and I deny 

you use of them, it's more than a breach of con[tra]ct. 

It is a breach of your fiduciary obligation. It is fraud. 

It is the doing or not doing of an act which you shouldn't 

or should have done. That's the bottom line here. 

. . . .

It would just stretch beyond all credibility a view 

that . . . inferentially . . . plaintiff would have to wait 

for the unpaid balance from Warfel to [PDP] in order to 

qualify for payment when the individuals in this 

corporation certainly knew on behalf of the corporation 

as well as individually that . . . plaintiff was continuing 

to perform work based on the inferred promise that they 

would be paid. When money was received, they would 

get it. That's the chain of supply here. Warfel . . . to 

the defense corporation, then to plaintiff . . . , but that's 

the acknowledged sense of what was going on. 

And, clearly, giving Warfel releases of liens of 

which at least $85,000 is represented by work done at 

that juncture, acknowledged work done by . . . plaintiff

is just unconscionable. It's unconscionable as a matter 

of equity, it's unconscionable as a matter of law. It 

certainly creates an imbalance, an injustice, a degree of 

fair play which this court or any court in this state 

should not countenance. It is wrong.

In rejecting defendant's contention that any recovery by plaintiff was 

restricted to "a breach of contract [claim,]" and that "the economic loss doctrine" 

prevented plaintiff from "convert[ing] a breach of contract claim into a tort" in 
11 A-4903-18T3

the absence of any "indication of fraud extrinsic to the performance of the 

contract," the judge explained: 

So I do find that all of these gentlemen 

represented themselves to be officials of the 

corporation and that was understood that they held 

themselves out as being part and parcel of what was 

going on here, and to come before the [c]ourt and say, 

. . . there was a contract, it's just a plain old breach of 

contract, I have to say to you . . . that's pure nonsense. 

This was more than all of that. 

And, therefore, I'm entering judgment for the 

reasons that I've indicated because under just pure 

fraud, ongoing fraud, fraud in the inducement, . . . fraud 

in the receipt of payment, fraud in the ability not to pay, 

misuse of the money that [defendants] inferred they 

would [pay to plaintiff], at least it would fit the 

definition in my view . . . that at the very least, . . . 

plaintiff is also a third party beneficiary of [PDP's]

contract [with Warfel].

[6]

. . . .

6

 See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-2 ("A person for whose benefit a contract is made, either 

simple or sealed, may sue thereon in any court . . . although the consideration of 

the contract did not move from him."); Broadway Maint. Corp. v. Rutgers, State 

Univ., 90 N.J. 253, 259-60 (1982) ("The principle that determines the existence 

of a third party beneficiary status focuses on whether the parties to the contract 

intended others to benefit from the existence of the contract, or whether the 

benefit so derived arises merely as an unintended incident of the agreement[,]" 

and, depending on the facts, "construction contracts [may] afford a third party a 

right to sue.").
12 A-4903-18T3

[P]laintiff is more than an incidental beneficiary. 

He is the person for whom these releases and this 

money is received in part as well as others. 

Relying on the June 21 and July 22, 2016 payment applications that PDP

submitted to Warfel certifying that curb work had been performed, as well as 

plaintiff's June 10 and July 16, 2016 invoices, the judge determined that plaintiff 

sustained its burden of proof to find defendants jointly and severally liable in 

the amount of $85,836—the amount owed to plaintiff after its second invoice7—

plus interest later calculated at $9012.78, as well as $10,000 in attorney's fees 

assessed against BDP only. On June 27, 2019, the judge entered a 

memorializing order of judgment, and this appeal followed.

On appeal, defendants argue that the judge erred in entering judgment 

against defendants on the fraud claim because plaintiff "failed to prove at least 

two of the five necessary elements of that tort[,]" and, "[e]qually important," the 

"economic loss doctrine precludes [plaintiff's] fraud claim." 

We review defendants' arguments applying a limited standard of review:

Final determinations made by the trial court sitting in a 

non-jury case are subject to a limited and wellestablished scope of review: "we do not disturb the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge 

7

 The judge determined that plaintiff's final August 17, 2016 invoice "[was] far 

beyond the date" of defendants' "certifications . . . to Warfel" and was therefore 

not recoverable. 
13 A-4903-18T3

unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly 

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, 

relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend 

the interests of justice."

[Seidman, 205 N.J. at 169 (quoting In re Tr. Created By 

Agreement Dated Dec. 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson, 194 

N.J. 276, 284 (2008)).] 

"Deference is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely 

testimonial and involves questions of credibility." Ibid. (quoting Cesare v. 

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)); see also N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon 

Mobil Corp., 453 N.J. Super. 272, 306 (App. Div. 2018) (observing that a judge 

in a non-jury trial has the best "opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to 

get a 'feel' for the case that the reviewing court [cannot] enjoy" (alteration in 

original) (quoting Twp. of W. Windsor v. Nierenberg, 150 N.J. 111, 132 

(1997))). Informed by this deferential standard of review, we turn to the 

substantive principles governing this appeal.

In order to establish the tort of fraudulent inducement, a plaintiff must 

prove a misrepresentation of material fact, knowledge or belief by the defendant 

of its falsity, intent that the other party rely on it, and detrimental reliance 

thereon by the other party. Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990) (citing 

Jewish Center of Sussex County v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 625 (1981)). "The 

representation may consist of a present intention to act or not act in the future." 
14 A-4903-18T3

Stochastic Decisions, Inc. v. DiDomenico, 236 N.J. Super. 388, 395-96 (App. 

Div. 1989). See Van Dam Egg Co. v. Allendale Farms, Inc., 199 N.J. Super. 

452, 457 (App. Div. 1985) ("A promise to pay in the future is fraudulent if there 

is no present intent ever to do so."). 

This intention may be derived from circumstantial 

evidence such as: the recklessness or implausibility of 

the statement in light of later events; showing that the 

promisor's intentions were dependent upon 

contingencies known only to the promisor; or simply 

from evidence indicating that the promisor would not 

or could not fulfill the promise.

[DiDomenico, 236 N.J. Super. at 396 (citing Ocean 

Cape Hotel Corp. v. Masefield Corp., 63 N.J. Super. 

369, 381 (App. Div. 1960)).] 

Fraud in the inducement does not differ materially from common law 

fraud, as it provides a cognizable basis for equitable relief in the event a false 

promise induced reliance. See Lipsit v. Leonard, 64 N.J. 276, 283-84 (1974). 

However, "fraud is never presumed, but must be established by clear and 

convincing evidence." Weil v. Express Container Corp., 360 N.J. Super. 599, 

613 (App. Div. 2003) (citing Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J. Super. 625, 636 (App. 

Div. 1986)).

Under the economic loss doctrine, a plaintiff is prohibited "from 

recovering in tort economic losses to which their entitlement only flows from 
15 A-4903-18T3

contract." Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Bergen Brunswig Drug Co., 226 F. Supp. 

2d 557, 562 (D.N.J. 2002) (quoting Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.

Co., 6 F.3d 604, 618 (3d Cir. 1995)). The doctrine precludes a tort remedy in 

"a contractual relationship unless the breaching party owes an independent duty 

imposed by law." Saltiel, 170 N.J. at 316-17 (holding that "the existence of 

duties that are specifically imposed by law in New Jersey . . . can be enforced 

separately and apart from contractual obligations."). In essence, the doctrine

"functions to eliminate recovery on 'a contract claim in tort clothing.'" G&F 

Graphic Servs. v. Graphic Innovators, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 583, 588-89 (D.N.J. 

2014) (quoting SRC Constr. Corp. v. Atl. City Hous. Auth., 935 F. Supp. 2d 

796, 801 (D.N.J. 2013)); see also New Mea Constr. Corp. v. Harper, 203 N.J. 

Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 1985) (finding that defendant's failure to use 

construction material specified in the parties' contract was a type of conduct "not 

ordinarily alleged in a tort case," and could not give rise to a separate claim by 

"[m]erely nominally casting [the] cause of action" as a tort claim).

While New Jersey courts have applied the economic loss doctrine in the 

strict liability and negligence contexts, see, e.g., Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., 

L.P., 149 N.J. 620 (1997), Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 

N.J. 555 (1985), "[n]o New Jersey Supreme Court case [has held] that a fraud 
16 A-4903-18T3

claim cannot be maintained if based on the same underlying facts as a contract 

claim." Gleason v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 243 F. 3d 130, 144 (3d Cir. 2001). In 

fact, the law on whether a plaintiff may recover for purely economic loss on 

concurrent fraud and contract claims has arisen predominantly out of the New 

Jersey federal courts and other jurisdictions, not our state courts. See Florian 

Greenhouse v. Cardinal IG Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 521, 528 (D.N.J. 1998) 

("Confronted with the 'morass' of case law in this area, the Third Circuit 

commented that 'the continuing validity of fraud claims in cases involving 

frustrated economic expectations under New Jersey law is very complex and 

troublesome.'" (quoting Vanguard Telecomms., Inc. v. S. New England Tel. Co., 

900 F.2d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1990))).

When New Jersey federal courts "have permitted a fraud claim to proceed 

with a breach of contract claim" as an exception to the economic loss doctrine,

such cases "generally appear to have involved a fraud in the inducement of a 

contract" as opposed to "fraud in the performance of a contract . . . ." G&F 

Graphic Servs., 18 F. Supp. 3d at 593 (quoting Bracco Diagnostics, Inc., 226 F. 

Supp. 2d at 563). As a result, "the fraud in the inducement exception to the 

economic loss doctrine" has emerged and has been consistently applied by New 

Jersey federal courts to sustain fraud claims in breach of contract cases. Ibid. 
17 A-4903-18T3

See Florian, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 527 (citing multiple "New Jersey federal . . . cases 

[that] have permitted fraud claims to stand in breach of contract cases."). 

"The distinction between fraud in the inducement and fraud in the 

performance of a contract" is "the conceptual distinction between a 

misrepresentation of a statement of intent at the time of contracting, which then 

induces detrimental reliance on the part of the promisee, and the subsequent 

failure of the promisor to do what he has promised." Bracco Diagnostics, Inc., 

226 F. Supp. 2d at 563 (quoting LoBosco v. Kure Enq'q Ltd., 891 F. Supp. 1020, 

1032 (D.N.J. 1995)). In "recognizing the . . . distinction," the "'critical issue'

with regard to economic loss 'is whether the allegedly tortious conduct is 

extraneous to the contract.'" Id. at 564 (internal citations omitted). See also

Spring Motors, 98 N.J. at 578-79 (dismissing tort-based claims because the 

plaintiff merely alleged that the defendant did not fulfill its contractual 

obligations). 

Here, the judge determined that defendants' unlawful conduct extended 

far beyond mere failure to perform under the sub-contract. The judge 

specifically found defendants liable for "fraud in the receipt of payment, fraud 

in the ability not to pay, [and] misuse of the money" Warfel paid to PDP that 

should have flowed in part to plaintiff. The judge also explicitly found 
18 A-4903-18T3

defendants liable for "fraud in the inducement" in the formation of the subsubcontract with plaintiff, thereby rendering the economic loss doctrine 

inapplicable to bar plaintiff's fraud claim even under federal standards. 

Contrary to defendants' contention, among the various fraud theories 

relied upon by the judge, the judge specifically found fraud in the inducement 

based on defendants contracting with plaintiff to perform work for which there 

was no intention to pay. The judge's decision in this regard was undoubtedly 

informed by the fact that Calabrese, Jr. admitted that neither PDP Enterprises 

nor BDP, the contracting entities under the sub-contract with plaintiff, were

actively operating in 2016 or had any involvement with the Warfel project. 

Further, as the judge noted, both Calabrese, Jr. and Calabrese, III admitted 

"jump[ing] from corporation to corporation" under arguably suspicious 

circumstances when they contracted with plaintiff.

While "[a] promise to pay in the future is fraudulent if there is no present 

intent ever to do so[,]" whether the promisee did rely and, if so, whether the 

reliance was justifiable "is a fact question, in every case in which it is 

disputed[.]" Van Dam Egg Co., 199 N.J. Super. at 457-58. In reviewing the 

judge's fact findings, "[w]e do not weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of 

witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence." Mountain Hill, LLC v. 
19 A-4903-18T3

Twp. of Middletown, 399 N.J. Super. 486, 498 (App. Div. 2008) (alteration in 

original) (quoting State v. Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615 (1997)). While "our review 

of the sufficiency of the facts to satisfy an applicable legal standard is a question 

of law" that is subject to "plenary" review, id. at 498-99, "[r]eversal is reserved 

only for those circumstances when we determine the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the trial judge went 'so wide of the mark that a mistake must have 

been made.'" Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 214 (App. Div. 2015) 

(quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)). 

Here, defendants have demonstrated neither manifest error nor mistake. 

The judge rendered a comprehensive and considered opinion, and, given 

defendants' conduct, a finding of fraud in the inducement was certainly 

permissible and supported by the credible evidence in the record. 

Affirmed.