[Cite as Stalder v. Bucher, 2019-Ohio-936.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MONROE COUNTY

DAVID STALDER, ANO., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

JOHN R. BUCHER ET AL., 

Defendants-Appellants.

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 17 MO 0017 

 

Civil Appeal from the 

Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Ohio 

Case No. 2013-234 

BEFORE: 

Gene Donofrio, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges. 

JUDGMENT: 

Reversed 

Judgment for Appellants 

Atty. Richard A. Yoss, Atty. Ryan M. Regel, Yoss Law Office, 122 North Main Street, 

Woodsfield, Ohio 43793, for Plaintiffs-Appellees, and 
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Case No. 17 MO 0017

Atty. Scott D. Eickelberger, Atty. William J. Taylor, Atty. David J. Tarbert, Atty. Ryan 

H. Linn, Kincaid, Taylor & Geyer, 50 North Fourth Street, Zanesville, Ohio 43702, for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

 

Dated: 

March 13, 2019 

 

Donofrio, J. 

{¶1} Defendants-appellants, John R. Bucher, Jan Bucher Carmichael, Brian 

Castilow, Henry Carter Castilow, Ann Sharon Castilow, Fred L. May, Dale L. Binkley, 

Elizabeth Miller, Michael Vreeland, and Susan Leach Swisher, appeal the judgment of 

the Monroe County Common Pleas Court granting summary judgment in favor of 

plaintiffs-appellees, David and Sherrie Stalder, on their quiet title action concerning 

mineral rights. 

{¶2} In 1946, Godfrey Winkler conveyed 110.25 acres of real property (the 

property) to his daughter Anna Winkler. The deed from Godfrey to Anna contained the 

reservation “[e]xcepting and reserving therefrom all oil and gas in the underlying said 

premises.” (First Amended Complaint, Exhibit B). Godfrey passed away intestate in 

1947. Anna and her six siblings each inherited an equal 1/7 share of the oil and gas 

rights. 

{¶3} In 1955, Anna passed away intestate and without children. As such, Anna’s 

rights in the surface property and her share of the oil and gas rights went to her siblings. 

This meant that Anna’s siblings now each owned an equal 1/6 share of the property’s 

surface and oil and gas interests. Appellants are Anna’s siblings’ heirs. 

{¶4} In 1956, Anna’s siblings conveyed the property by quit claim deed to Glen 

and Juanita Stalder. The 1956 deed contained the following reservation: 

But excepting and reserving, however, unto the grantors, their heirs and 

assigns, all of the oil, gas, coal and all other minerals of a similar or 

dissimilar nature on, within and underlying the above three tracts of land, 

together with all of the leasing and mining rights and privileges belonging 

thereto. 

(First Amended Complaint, Exhibit C). 
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Case No. 17 MO 0017

{¶5} In 2001, Glen and Juanita deeded the property to appellees. On May 15, 

2013, appellees filed an affidavit pursuant to R.C. 5301.252. This affidavit declared that 

appellants had abandoned their interest in the mineral rights of the property and that, due 

to the self-executing nature of the 1989 Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (DMA), the mineral 

rights vested in appellees. In response to the affidavit, appellants filed a claim to preserve 

the mineral rights to the property pursuant to the 2006 DMA. 

{¶6} On May 28, 2013, appellees filed this quiet title action seeking a declaratory 

judgment that appellants’ mineral rights in the property were abandoned. Appellees 

subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that because the mineral 

rights vested before the 2006 DMA became effective, the 1989 DMA applied and 

appellants’ claims to the mineral rights under the property were abandoned. In the 

alternative, appellees argued that appellants’ mineral rights were extinguished pursuant 

to the Marketable Title Act (MTA). The trial court granted appellees’ motion holding that 

the mineral rights vested in appellees pursuant to the 1989 DMA. The trial court did not 

address the 2006 DMA or the MTA. 

{¶7} Appellants appealed to this court. In Stalder v. Bucher, 7th Dist. No. 14 MO 

0010, 2017-Ohio-725, we reversed the trial court’s judgment and held that, pursuant to 

Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 149 Ohio St.3d 512, 2016-Ohio-5796, 76 

N.E.3d 1089, the 2006 DMA applied to any action filed after June 30, 2006. Stalder at ¶ 

10-12. Because the trial court made no ruling concerning the 2006 DMA or the MTA, we 

remanded the action for further proceedings. 

{¶8} On remand, both parties filed reciprocal motions for summary judgment. 

Appellees argued that the MTA applied and extinguished any interest appellants had in 

the property, including mineral interests. Appellants argued that the 2006 DMA applied 

and that appellees did not follow the proper procedure to declare the mineral interest 

abandoned. 

{¶9} In a judgment entry dated August 29, 2017, the trial court granted appellees’ 

motion for summary judgment holding that appellants’ interest in the property’s minerals 

was extinguished pursuant to the MTA. Appellants timely filed this appeal on September 

28, 2017. Appellants now raise two assignments of error. 

{¶10} Appellants’ first assignment of error states: 
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Case No. 17 MO 0017

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

PURSUANT TO THE MARKETABLE TITLE ACT AS THE 2006 DMA IS 

THE SPECIFIC STATUTE THAT PROPERLY CONTROLS A 

LANDOWNER’S ABILITY TO EXTINGUISH SEVERED MINERAL 

INTERESTS. 

{¶11} Appellants argue that the trial court erred when it applied the MTA in its 

ruling on appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Appellants argue that, pursuant to 

Corban, the 2006 DMA applies to all cases concerning mineral rights, not the MTA. 

{¶12} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s summary judgment decision de 

novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court. Ohio Govt. Risk Mgt. Plan v. 

Harrison, 115 Ohio St.3d 241, 2007-Ohio-4948, 874 N.E.2d 1155, ¶ 5. A motion for 

summary judgment is properly granted if the court, upon viewing the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party, determines that: (1) there are no genuine issues 

as to any material facts; (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) 

the evidence is such that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that 

conclusion is adverse to the opposing party. Civ. R. 56(C); Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St. 

3d 24, 2006-Ohio-3455, 850 N.E.2d 47, ¶ 10. 

{¶13} Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact. A “material fact” depends on the substantive law of the claim being litigated. 

Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & Assoc., Inc., 104 Ohio App.3d, 598, 603, 662 N.E.2d 1088 (8th 

Dist. 1995), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 

91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 

{¶14} Pursuant to the MTA, a person who has an unbroken chain of title of record 

to any interest in land for 40 years or more has a marketable record title to such interest. 

R.C. 5301.48. A “marketable record title” is defined as “a title of record, as indicated in 

section 5301.48 of the Revised Code, which operates to extinguish such interests and 

claims, existing prior to the effective date of the root of title, as are stated in section 

530.1.50 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 5301.47(A). “Root of title” is defined as “that 

conveyance or other title transaction in the chain of title of a person, purporting to create 

the interest claimed by such person, upon which he relies as a basis for the marketability 
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Case No. 17 MO 0017

of his title, and which was the most recent to be recorded as of a date of forty years prior 

to the time when marketability is being determined.” R.C. 5301.47(E). The effective date 

of the root of title is the date it was recorded. R.C. 5301.47(E). 

{¶15} On December 13, 2018, the Ohio Supreme Court released its opinion in 

Blackstone v. Moore, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4959. In Blackstone, the Ohio 

Supreme Court applied the MTA and concluded that an oil and gas royalty right in real 

property was preserved. 

{¶16} The MTA does not differentiate between different types of interests; it 

applies to all interests. Pollock v. Mooney, 7th Dist. No. 13 MO 9, 2014-Ohio-4435, ¶ 21. 

Therefore, the MTA can be used to extinguish or preserve oil, gas, and mineral interests. 

{¶17} Likewise, the 2006 DMA can be used to preserve oil, gas, and mineral 

interests or to have those interests declared abandoned. See generally Greer v. Frye, 

7th Dist. No. 14 BE 0032, 2017-Ohio-4035. 

{¶18} Recently, this court, citing Blackstone, found that an oil and gas royalty 

interest is subject to both the MTA and the DMA. Hickman v. Consolidation Coal Co., 7th 

Dist. No. 17 CO 0012, 2019-Ohio-492, ¶ 24. In that case, we noted that the oil and gas 

interest at issue was recorded before the enactment of the 2006 DMA and before the 

appellants became the surface owners of the property at issue. Id. at ¶ 25. The same is 

the case here. The oil and gas interest at issue was recorded in 1946, long before the 

2006 DMA was enacted and long before appellants became the surface owners of the 

property in 2001. 

{¶19} Because an oil and gas interest is subject to both the MTA and the DMA, 

the trial court did not err in finding the MTA applicable in this case. 

{¶20} Accordingly, appellants’ first assignment of error lacks merit and is 

overruled.

{¶21} Appellants’ second assignment of error states: 

 NOTWITHSTANDING ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1, THE 

TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOW IT APPLIED THE 

MARKETABLE TITLE ACT. 
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Case No. 17 MO 0017

{¶22} Appellants alternatively argue that the trial court incorrectly applied the MTA 

when it declared their mineral interests extinguished. 

{¶23} Appellants raise two arguments within this assignment of error. Because 

their second argument is dispositive, we will only address the second argument. 

{¶24} Appellants argue that an exception to the MTA found in R.C. 5301.49(A) 

preserves their mineral interests. 

{¶25} R.C. 5301.49(A) provides that record marketable titles are subject to: 

All interests and defects which are inherent in the muniments of which such 

chain of record title is formed; provided that a general reference in such 

muniments * * * to * * * interests created prior to the root of title shall not be 

sufficient to preserve them, unless specific identification be made therein of 

a recorded title transaction which creates such * * * interest; and provided 

that possibilities of reverter, and rights of entry or powers of termination for 

breach of condition subsequent, which interests are inherent in the 

muniments of which such chain of record title is formed and which have 

existed for forty years or more, shall be preserved and kept effective only in 

the manner provided in section 5301.51 of the Revised Code. 

{¶26} The Ohio Supreme Court set out a three-step inquiry as specified in R.C. 

5301.59(A): 

(1) Is there an interest described within the chain of title? (2) If so, is the 

reference to that interest a “general reference”? (3) If the answers to the 

first two questions are yes, does the general reference contain a specific 

identification of a recorded title transaction? 

Blackstone, 2018-Ohio-4959, at ¶ 12. If, however, the answer to the second question is 

no and the reference is instead a specific reference, then there is no need to proceed to 

the third prong. Id. at ¶ 15. In the case of a specific reference, the exception in R.C. 

5301.59(A) applies and the interest is preserved. 

{¶27} Because R.C. 5301.59 does not define the terms “general” and “specific,” 

the Blackstone Court applied the ordinary meanings of the terms. The Court described 
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Case No. 17 MO 0017

“general” as being “‘marked by broad overall character without being limited, modified, or 

checked by narrow precise considerations: concerned with main elements, major matters 

rather than limited details, or universals rather than particulars: approximate rather than 

strictly accurate.’” Id. at ¶ 13, quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 944 

(2002). The Court described “specific” as being “‘characterized by precise formulation or 

accurate restriction (as in stating, describing, defining, reserving): free from such 

ambiguity as results from careless lack of precision or from omission of pertinent matter.’” 

Id. at ¶ 14, quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 2187. The Court 

pointed out that if a reference is specific, it is not a general reference. Id. 

{¶28} The 1956 deed, contains the following mineral right reservation: 

But excepting and reserving, however, unto the grantors, their heirs 

and assigns, all of the oil, gas, coal and all other minerals of a similar or 

dissimilar nature on, within and underlying the above three tracts of land, 

together with all of the leasing and mining rights and privileges belonging 

thereto. 

(First Amended Complaint, Exhibit C). 

{¶29} Immediately preceding the above reservation, the 1956 deed also contains 

the following reference to the prior deed and prior owners of the property at issue: 

And being the same premises that were conveyed to Anna S. Winkler by 

Godfrey Winkler, widower, by deed dated January 18, 1946, and recorded 

in the recorder’s office of Monroe County, Ohio, in deed book no. 118, at 

page 201, as instrument number 78263. The said Anna S. Winkler having 

heretofore died intestate, left as her heirs at law, with the respective 

spouses of such of them as are married, the grantors herein. 

(First Amended Complaint, Exhibit C). 

{¶30} These provisions satisfy R.C. 5301.49(A). The answer to the first question 

is yes: the 1956 deed that constitutes the root of title states that it is subject to the oil, 

gas, and mineral reservation. Thus, we must consider whether the reference is general 

or specific. 
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Case No. 17 MO 0017

{¶31} The reference here is not a “general reference.” Instead, it meets the 

definition of a specific reference as set out by Blackstone. The reference to the interest 

includes details and particulars about the interest in question. It describes what type of 

interest is created, that being “all of the oil, gas, coal and all other minerals of a similar 

nature on, within and underlying” the three specifically described tracts of land. It also 

specifies that these are the same premises conveyed by Godfrey Winkler to Anna Winkler 

by deed dated January 18, 1946. It also lists the specific deed book and page numbers 

where the original reservation can be found. Considering all of the above details that 

describe and define the reference, we can conclude that the reference “‘is free from such 

ambiguity as results from careless lack of precision or from omission of pertinent matter.’” 

Blackstone, at ¶ 14, quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 2187. In 

other words, the reference is specific. 

{¶32} Because the reference to appellants’ interest is a specific reference, our 

inquiry ends here. The exception in R.C. 5301.59(A) applies and the interest is preserved. 

{¶33} Appellants’ interest was sufficiently preserved per the terms of the MTA. 

Thus, the trial court erred when it extinguished appellants’ interest because reference to 

the reserving deed was sufficiently specific. 

{¶34} Accordingly, appellants’ second assignment of error has merit and is 

sustained. 

{¶35} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby reversed. 

Judgment is entered for appellants preserving the mineral interest in their favor. 

Waite, P. J., concurs. 

Robb, J., concurs. 
[Cite as Stalder v. Bucher, 2019-Ohio-936.]

 

 

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, appellants’ first 

assignment of error is overruled. Appellants’ second assignment of error is sustained. 

It is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Monroe County, Ohio, is reversed and judgment is entered for appellants 

preserving the mineral interest in their favor. Costs to be taxed against Appellees. 

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.