[Cite as Doss v. State, 135 Ohio St.3d 211, 2012-Ohio-5678.]

D OSS , A PPELLEE , v . T HE S TATE OF O HIO , A PPELLANT . [Cite as Doss v. State, 135 Ohio St.3d 211, 2012-Ohio-5678.] Wrongful imprisonment—R.C. 2743.48—Claimant in common pleas court cannot be declared eligible for compensation in Court of Claims unless claimant has affirmatively demonstrated that he is actually innocent of charges for which he was imprisoned—Acquittal or finding of legal insufficiency of evidence is not enough to es tablish actual innocence. (No. 2012-0162—Submitted September 26, 2012—Decided December 6, 2012.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 96452, 2011-Ohio-6429.

__________________ S YLLABUS OF THE C OURT 1. One who claims to be a “wrongfull y imprisoned individual” under R.C. 2743.48 must prove all of the factors in R.C. 2743.48(A) by a preponderance of the evidence before seeking compensation from the state for wrongful imprisonment. 2. A trial court adjudicating proof of innocence pursuant to R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) may not find that the claimant was wr ongfully imprisoned based solely on an appellate court judgment vaca ting a felony conviction due to insufficient evidence and dischargin g the prisoner without a remand for a
new trial.

__________________ L ANZINGER , J. {¶ 1} In this case, we determine that Iran Doss is not entitled to summary judgment that he is a “wrongfully impris oned individual” eligible to sue the state for compensation pursuant to R.C. 2743.48 ba sed solely on the appellate court’sS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 decision to reverse and vacate his convi ction and order his immediate release from prison. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. I. Background {¶ 2} Appellee, Iran Doss, was convicted by a jury in 2006 of one count of rape and one count of kidna pping. He was classified as a sexually oriented offender, sentenced to four years in pr ison, and ordered to pay restitution and a
fine. {¶ 3} On appeal, Doss challenged his ra pe and kidnapping convictions on several grounds, including a challenge to the evidence that the alleged victim’s ability to consent was substantially impaired due to a mental or physical conditionand that Doss knew of that substantial impairment. The Eighth District, in a twoto-one decision, concluded that there wa s sufficient evidence to support a finding that the other party’s capacity to consent was substantially impaired and that Doss knew (or had reason to know) of the substantial impairment. State v. Doss, 8th Dist. No. 88443, 2007-Ohio-6483 ( “Doss I”). {¶ 4} Upon reconsideration, a split panel vacated both the kidnapping and the rape convictions. State v. Doss, 8th Dist. No. 88443, 2008-Ohio-449 ( “Doss II”) . The Doss II majority held that the state failed to present sufficient evidence showing that Doss knew or had reason to know that the alleged victim’s ability to consent was substantially impaired. Id. at ¶ 21-23. The court vacated the
convictions and ordered Do ss discharged from prison. {¶ 5} The state appealed the vacation of the rape conviction, but we
declined review. State v. Doss, 118 Ohio St.3d 1507, 2008-Ohio-3369, 889 N.E.2d 1025. After his release, Doss filed an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to R.C. 2743.48 in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, seeking compensation from the state for wrongful imprisonment. On July 2, 2010, he filed a motion for summary judgment, citing the decision in Doss II.January Term, 2012

3 The motion, which contained no attachment s or exhibits, was two and a half pages long and cited only the appellate judgment in Doss II as a basis for finding eligibility. The state opposed the motion for summary judgment, offering the transcripts from the criminal trial to show that there were issues of fact and arguing that Doss had failed to establish his innocence by a preponderance of the
evidence. {¶ 6} The trial court granted Doss’s motion for summary judgment for the following reason: “The court of appeals’ decision to reverse and vacate plaintiff
Doss’s conviction and order his immediate release can only be interpreted to mean that either plaintiff Doss was i nnocent of the charges upon which he was convicted, or that no crime was committed by plaintiff Doss, or both.” {¶ 7} The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment, in yet
another two-to-one decision. Doss v. State, 8th Dist. No. 96452, 2011-Ohio-6429 (“ Doss III”). The majority reiterated that its review of the record in Doss II had revealed that Doss’s statement was the only evidence of the alleged victim’s mental condition and that the state had pr esented no evidence that Doss knew, or should have known, that the alleged vic tim’s ability to resist or consent was substantially impaired because of voluntary intoxication. Id. at ¶ 15. The court of appeals found no genuine issue of fact and no error in the trial court’s entry of summary judgment. {¶ 8} The dissenting judge stated,

Our holding in [ Doss II ] does not mean that Doss is innocent— merely that, based upon the evid ence the state presented, Doss’s guilt could not be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The same cannot automatically be said of whether Doss can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not know or reasonably should not have known of the victim’s incapacity.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 Id. at ¶ 21 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting). {¶ 9} We accepted jurisdiction to address the state’s propositions of law: (1) “A trial court adjudicating a contested claim of innocence may not grant summary judgment in favor of a former inmate based solely on an appeals court finding that a criminal conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence” and (2) “Under R.C. 2743.48 an inmate must prove actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, which is a separate and distin ct legal standard than whether [sic] the evidence in a crimin al case is sufficient to convict a person beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Doss v. State, 131 Ohio St.3d 1498, 2012-Ohio1501, 964 N.E.2d 439. II. Analysis {¶ 10} The General Assembly has deve loped a two-step process to compensate those who have been wrongful ly imprisoned. The first step is an action in the common pleas court seeking a preliminary factual determination of wrongful imprisonment; the second step is an action in the Court of Claims to recover money damages. Griffith v. Cleveland, 128 Ohio St.3d 35, 2010-Ohio4905, 941 N.E.2d 1157, paragraph two of the syllabus. The wrongfulimprisonment statute, R.C. 2743.48, was a dded to the Revised Code in 1986 by
Sub.H.B. No. 609 “to authorize civil acti ons against the stat e, for specified monetary amounts, in the Court of Cla ims by certain wrongfully imprisoned individuals.” 141 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5351. The statute was designed to replace the former practice of compensating t hose wrongfully imprisoned by ad hoc moral-claims legislation. Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 49, 547 N.E.2d 962 (1989). Under the statutory scheme, a cl aimant must be de termined to be a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” by th e court of common pleas before being permitted to file for compensation against the state of Ohio in the Court ofJanuary Term, 2012

5 Claims. R.C. 2305.02 and 2743.48(B)(2); Griffith v. Cleveland, paragraph two of the syllabus. The Wrongful-Imprisonment Statute {¶ 11} R.C. 2743.48 provides:

(A) As used in this section and section 2743.49 of the Revised Code, a “wrongfully imp risoned individual” means an individual who satisfies each of the following: (1) The individual was charged with a violation of a section of the Revised Code by an indi ctment or information, and the violation charged was an aggravated felony or felony. (2) The individual was found guilty of, but did not plead guilty to, the particular charge or a lesser included offense by the court or jury involved, and the o ffense of which the individual was found guilty was an aggravated felony or felony. (3) The individual was sentenced to an indefinite or definite term of imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the offense of which the individual was found guilty. (4) The individual's conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case cannot or will not seek any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and no criminal proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be brought by any prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation against the individual for any act associated with that conviction. (5) Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, an error in proce dure resulted in the individual’s release, or it was determined by the court of common pleas in theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 county where the underlying criminal action was initiated that the charged offense
, including all lesser-included offenses
, either was not committed by the individual or was not committed by any

person

.

(Emphasis added.) {¶ 12} Thus, a plaintiff in a civil case for wrongful imprisonment must first prove that he or she is a “wrongfu lly imprisoned individual.” In this case, proof of the factors in R.C. 2743.48(A)(1 ) through (4) is undisputed. Doss was convicted of a felony to which he did not plead guilty, he was sentenced to a prison term, his conviction was vacated upon appeal, and he is not subject to further charges. The fifth factor of R.C. 2743.48(A) may be fulfilled in one of two ways: (1) subsequent to senten cing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, “an error in procedure resu lted in the individual’s release” or (2) the charged offense (and any lesser included offense) was not committed by the
individual or no crime was committed at all (actual innocence). R.C. 2743.48(A)(5). {¶ 13} This court’s decision in Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 547 N.E.2d 962, precludes a claimant from relyin g solely on a judgment of acquittal to
establish actual innocence. In Walden , the state appealed determinations of wrongful imprisonment for two individua ls. One of them, Linda Walden, had been acquitted of murder. When she sought a determination that she had been wrongfully imprisoned, the trial court granted summary judgment in her favor, reasoning that the judgment of acquittal precluded the state from contesting her innocence. The state’s appeal was consolidated with its appeal in the case of
Nathaniel Ellis. Ellis had been convicted of felonious assault, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. On retrial, Ellis was acquitted by a general verdict, after which he sought a determination that he was a wrongfullyJanuary Term, 2012

7 imprisoned individual. The trial court held that Ellis was entitled to compensation. In nearly identical opinions released on the same day, the court of appeals held that the two defendants were entitled to compensation for wrongful imprisonment. {¶ 14} In construing a former version of R.C. 2743.48(A), we held that when a person claiming compensation for wrongful imprisonment has obtained a judgment of acquittal, that judgment is not to be given preclusive effect, because an acquittal is a determination that the state has not met its burden of proof. It is not necessarily a finding that the accused is innocent. For this reason, a claimant advancing a wrongful-imprisonment cl aim “must affirmatively prove her innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 52. We explained that in enacting the statute, the “General Assembly intended that the court of common pleas actively separate those who were wrongfully imprisoned from those who have merely avoided criminal liability.” Id. Even though the statute examined in
Walden was an earlier version of R.C. 2743.48, the Walden holding is still applicable. Griffith v. Cleveland, 128 Ohio St.3d 35, 2010-Ohio-4905, 941 N.E.2d 1157, ¶ 30. R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) requires an affirmative showing of innocence beyond proof of an acquittal. {¶ 15} When a court vacates or reverses a criminal conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence, the court is saying that the state has not proven the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; it is not saying that innocence has been proven. Thus, reversal on insufficiency of the evidence does not automatically mean that the defendant was wrongfully imprisoned. Chandler v.
State , 95 Ohio App.3d 142, 641 N.E.2d 1382 (8th Dist.1994). If the legislature had intended to compensate all persons whose convictions are reversed based on insufficient evidence, it could have explicitly stated this in R.C. 2743.48. See Ratcliff v. State, 94 Ohio App.3d 179, 182, 640 N.E.2d 560 (4th Dist.1994).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 {¶ 16} In this case, Doss argues that the vacation of his convictions and discharge from prison are proof of his actu al innocence. In contrast, the state
asserts that R.C. 2743.48 establishes a civ il rather than a criminal action and that
in contrast with the burden of proof in a criminal tria l, the wrongful-imprisonment statute places the burden of proof on the claimant to affirmatively show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was actually innocent of the charged offense, including all lesser included offenses. A judgment of acquittal is not enough. The state contends that in suppor t of his action for declaratory judgment, Doss did not provide the trial court with any additional evidence to prove that the other party consented, or that he did not know and could not reasonably have known of any impairment of her ability to c onsent, or any other proof of his actual innocence of the charge of rape and all lesser included offenses. The trial and appellate courts, therefore, granted Doss a preliminary determination of eligibility for compensation without the required affi rmative proof of his actual innocence. {¶ 17} The differing burdens of proof explain why a vacation of Doss’s conviction does not prove his innocence. The appellate cour t held that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the c onvictions and that the state failed to prove Doss’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But that ruling does not answer the question whether Doss can show by a pr eponderance of the evidence that he did not know, or could not reasonably have known, of the alleged victim’s incapacity. See Ratcliff v. State at 182 (evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not necessarily prove innocence by a preponderance of the evidence). Preponderan ce of the evidence is a distinct legal standard from beyond a reasonable doubt. By not requiring more of Doss, the
lower courts contravened th e mandate of R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) by dispensing with the additional requirement of affirmative proof that the criminal action was not committed by him or by any person. Even though Doss’s successful appeal may have provided some support for his claim of wrongful imprisonment, it is notJanuary Term, 2012

9 enough. He had the burden of proof to affirmatively establish his innocence under R.C. 2743.48(A)(5). State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster , 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 72, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). Proof Offered to Support Summary Judgment {¶ 18} To analyze whether Doss affirmatively established his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, we must examine the evidence that he submitted in support of his motion for su mmary judgment. To prevail on the motion, he must have demonstrated that there was no genuine issue of material fact, that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and that reasonable minds, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, can come to only one conclusion, which is adverse to the nonmoving party. Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54, 2010-Ohio-4505, 936 N.E.2d 481, ¶ 29. Appellate review is de novo. Id. {¶ 19} The record shows that Doss filed his motion for summary judgment relying solely on the Eighth District’s decision in Doss II. And the trial court granted summary judgment on that basis al one. Specifically, the trial court stated:

The court of appeals’ decision to reverse and vacate plaintiff
Doss’s conviction and orde r his immediate release can only be interpreted to mean that either plaintiff Doss was innocent of the charges upon which he was convi cted, or that no crime was committed by plaintiff Doss, or both.

(Emphasis added.) {¶ 20} This conclusion was incorrect. The trial court relied solely on the court of appeals’ reversal and vacation of the conviction to hold that Doss was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It did not require a hearing or additional evidence. It simply cited the court of appeals’ holding that the state had notS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 offered sufficient evidence to prove Doss’s convictions. And in affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the Eighth District correctly acknowledged
Walden’ s rule that an acquittal does not nece ssarily establish actual innocence, but then applied the rule incorrectly. Despite the jury’s verdict of guilty and without any evidence from Doss, the majority held that the record showed insufficient evidence of the alleged victim’s substantial impairment. Thus, the judgment of
the trial court that found Doss to be el igible for compensation and the appellate court’s judgment affirming that findi ng were not based upon an affirmative showing of actual innocence. They were based on a dearth of evidence of guilt.
Both courts relieved Doss of his statut ory obligation to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not commit the charged offense, including all lesser included offenses, an obligation that must be fulfilled before he is allowed to
claim the status of one who was “wrongfully imprisoned.” {¶ 21} To show actual innocence under the wrongful-imprisonment statute, Doss must prove that “the char ged offense, including all lesser-included offenses, either was not committed by [him] or was not committed by any person.” R.C. 2743.48(A)(5). This court has emphasized that this standard is not satisfied by an acquittal or a finding of legal insufficiency of the evidence. Walden, 47 Ohio St.3d at 52, 547 N.E.2d 962. The General Assembly requires a showing of innocence to be made affirm atively and adjudicated de novo before aclaimant can be found to be eligible for compensation in a wrongfulimprisonment action.
III. Conclusion {¶ 22} Not every person who is released from prison because of a successful appeal is entitled to compen sation. The legislature set forth a procedure for claimants like Doss to follow in R.C. 2743.48, so that the common pleas court could actively separate demons trably innocent persons who have been wrongfully imprisoned from persons who have merely avoided criminal liability.January Term, 2012

11 We hold that one who claims to be a “wrongfully imprisoned individual” under R.C. 2743.48 must prove all of the factor s in R.C. 2743.48(A) by a preponderance of the evidence before seeking co mpensation from the state for wrongful imprisonment. We also hold that a tria l court adjudicating proof of innocence pursuant to R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) may not find that a claimant has been wrongfully imprisoned based solely on an appellate court judgment vacating a felony
conviction due to insufficient evidence and discharging the prisoner without a
remand for a new trial. We therefore revers e the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and P FEIFER , L UNDBERG S TRATTON , O’D ONNELL , C UPP , and M C G EE B ROWN , JJ., concur.

__________________ Mancino, Mancino & Ma ncino and Paul Manci no Jr., for appellee. Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor General, and Matthew P. Hampton, De puty Solicitor; and William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, a nd John F. Manley and T. Allan Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.

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