PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 21

- 1592

______

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

CHARLES J. WEISS, Appellant

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2:19

- cv

- 00502 ) District Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky

____________

Argued: May 3, 2022

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER, and PHIPPS

, Circuit Judges

.

(Filed: November 2, 2022 )

____________2 Michael J. Haungs

John Schumann [ARGUED]

U NITED S TATES D EPARTMENT OF J USTICE

T AX D IVISIO N 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

P.O. Box 502 Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for United States of America

James R. Malone, Jr. [ ARGUED ]

P OST & S CHELL 1600 John F. Kennedy Boulevard Four Penn Center, 14th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Charles J. Weiss

_________ _____________ _

OPINION OF THE COURT

________ _____________ _

_

PHIPPS, Circuit Judge

.

After assessing delinquent taxes, t he United States has ten years to collect them

, s ee 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1) , and t his case comes down to a matter of days within that decade. Importantly, th at limitations period does not necessarily run continuously; it may be tolled for several increments of time, including for the period during which a specific administrative hearing before the Internal Revenue Service “and appeals

therein” are pending. Id. § 6330(e)(1). Here, the taxpayer requested a n administrative hearing, and that began tolling the limitations period. A fter a series o f unfavorable rulings

– at3 the hearing , in the Tax Court, and before the D.C. Circuit

– the taxpayer filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court denied. But the United States waited until after

the denial of that petition to commence this action. B y that

time , even with tolling

, much , if not all, of the limitations period had elapsed

. Yet in interpreting the statute, petitions for

writs of certiorari a re ‘appeals therein

, ’ and also an appeal

remains ‘ pending ’ until the time to file such a petition expires

. Due to that additional tolling of the statute of limitations for

those increments

, this collection action is timely. Id

.

I. F ACTUAL B ACKGROUND (U NDISPUTED BY THE P ARTIES )

For the six

- year period from 1986 through 1991, Charles Weiss did not pay federal income taxes . In October 1994,

Weiss late

- filed his tax returns for those years, self

- reporting a liability of $299,202. Later tha t month

, t he Internal Revenue Service made tax assessments against him for each of those

years

.

By assessing those tax es

, the IRS tri ggered a ten

- year limitations period for collect i ng the unpaid taxes through a court proceeding or a levy , which is a legal seizure of property or a right to property

. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6331(b), 6502(a)(1). Weiss’s subsequent bankruptcies tolled that lim itations period

three times between 1994 and 2009 , yielding a new expiration date for the statute of limitations: July 21, 2009.

In anticipation of that de a dline, the IRS began the process

of coll ecting the unpaid taxes through a levy. It mailed a Fina l

Notice

– Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing letter to Weiss on or about February 13, 2009. That

notice , also referred to as a Letter 1058A, informed Weiss that

the IRS intended to levy his unpaid taxes for the years 1986 to

1991 , and that he had an opportunity to request a Collection

Due Process h earing . A Collection Due Process hearing is an administrative proceeding before an appeals officer with the4 IRS Independent Office of Appeals in which a taxpayer may raise “any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy.” Id. § 6330(c) (2)(A); see id. § 6330(b) ; cf. id

. § 6330(c)(4) (preclu d in g certain previously resolved issues from being raised at a Collection Due Process hearing)

. The notice, although expr essing an intent to levy Weiss’s property, was not sufficient to make a levy

– that requires a notice of

seizure

– and thus, the statute of limitations continued to run.

See id. § 6502(b) (stating that a levy is considered made on the

date that notice of seizure is given); see also id. § 6335(a) (providing for notice of seizure)

.

In response to that notice

, Weiss timely requested a

C ollection D ue P rocess hearing through a Form 12153

. See id.
§ 6330(a)(3)(B) ; see also Weiss v. C omm’r , 2018 WL 2759389, at *2

– 3 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 2018) (per curiam) (concluding that Weiss’s request was timely), cert. denied

, 13 9 S. Ct. 612 (2018). That request suspended the statute of

limitation s for the period during which the hearing “and appeals ther ein” were “ pending. ” 26 U.S.C. § 6330(e)(1). On

the date that Weiss request ed the hearing , no less than 1 29 days remained in the limitations period.

Weiss did not prevail at the hearing or in any of his review

-

as

- of

- right challenges in federal court . The IRS Independent Office of Appeals ruled against him at the Collection Due Process hearing

. Weiss sought review of that determination by timely fil ing a petition with the United States Tax Court. See

id. § 6330(d)(1)

. Over five year s later, the Tax Cour t affirm ed

that determination

. See Weiss v. C omm’r , 147 T.C. 179 , 181 (2016). Weiss then timely appealed the Tax Court’s ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit , but he fared n o better there

. See 26 U.S.C. § 7483

. T he D.C. Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s judgment

, and Weiss petitioned for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc

. See Weiss v. C omm’r , 2018 WL 2759389 (D.C. Cir. May 22,

2018 ). After denying those petitions, the D.C. Circuit issued a mandate on August 23, 2018.5 A s a last resort, Weiss timely filed a petition for a writ of

certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States on October 24, 2018

. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (allowing for

review of court of appeals decisions by writ of certiorari). Through an order on December 3, 2018, t he Supreme Court

denied that petition. See Weiss v. C omm’r , 13 9 S. Ct. 612 (2018).

At that point, instead of proceeding to levy Weiss’s property, the government initiated a collection action in the

District Court

. See 28 U.S.C. § § 1340, 1345 ; see also

26 U.S.C. § 7402(a). Through a complaint filed o n February
5, 2019, the government sought to collect from Weiss his delinquent taxes plus accrued interest, which together to taled $773,899.84.

II. P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY

The issue before the District Court was the timeliness of this action. The parties stipulated to the material facts and

cross

- moved for summary judgment. They disagreed as to the meaning of two terms in the tolling provision of § 6330(e)(1) : whether the phrase ‘ appeals therein ’ includes petitions for

writs of certiorari and whether a denial of a petition for a writ

of certiorari constitute s a ‘ final determination ’ in a Collection Due Process hearing.

The District Court resolved both of those issues in favor of the government. It concluded that a petition for a writ of

certiorari falls within the ‘ appeals therein ’ clause. It also held

that the Supreme Court’s denial of such a petition constitutes a

‘ final determination ’ in a Collection Due Process hearing. On those grounds, the District Court entered summary judgment for the government.

Through a timely appeal, Weiss invok es this Court’s appellate jurisdiction and challenges both bases for the District6 Court’s finding of timeliness. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

III. D ISCUSSION

This case lends itself well to de novo review of the

summary

- judgment record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Cranbury Brick Yard, LLC v. United States , 943 F.3d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 2019). The material facts are undisputed. After the D.C. Circuit issued the mandate, no less than 129 days

remai ned of the ten

- year statute of limitations. Weiss filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 62 days later, and 40 days after that, the Supreme Court denied his petition. The date on which government commenced this action was 64 days after the Supreme Cou rt’s denial of Weiss’s petition for a writ certiorari and 166 days after the D.C. Circuit’s mandate.

Using those dates, the timeliness of this case turns on questions of law. If the statute of limitations

, which had no less than 129 days remaining

, is tolled for either the time

between the D.C. Circuit’s mandate and Weiss’s petition ( 62 days) or the time from Weiss’s filing of that petition to its denial (40 days)

, then the government ’s filing of this case 166 days after the D.C. Circuit’s mandate would be timely

. But if

both of those increments associated with Weiss’s petition fail

to suspend the statute of limitations , then the government’s filing would be too late. As elaborated below, th e time

associated with Weiss’s petition (a combined total of 10 2 days)

toll s the statute of limitations , and that renders this action timely

– without the need to address the applicability of the

‘final determination’ provision relied upon by the District

Court

.

Under the statute of limitatio ns, o nce a tax is assessed, the government has ten years to collect it “by levy or by a proceeding in court.” 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1). But § 6330(e)(1) operates as a tolling statute by suspend ing the7 statute of limitations for the period during which C oll ection

D ue P rocess hearings and appeals therein are pending :

Except as provided in paragraph (2), if a hearing is requested under subsection (a)(3)(B), the levy

actions which are the subject of the requested hearing and the running of any period of limitations under section 6502 (relating to collection after assessment), section 6531 (relating to criminal prosecutions), or section 6532 (relating to other suits) shall be suspended

for the period during which such hearing, and appeals therein , are pend ing

.

Id. § 6330(e)(1) (emphasis added)

.

In allowing tolling for that period, Congress did not define

two relevant terms

– ‘appeals therein ’ and ‘pending. ’ Without a controlling statutory definition, those terms take on their “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning .” Perrin v. United

States , 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); see also Wis. Cent. Ltd. v.

United States , 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2070 (2018) (quoting Perrin

, 444 U.S. at 42); Crane v. C omm’r , 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947) (“[T]he words of statutes

– including revenue acts

– should be interpreted where possible in their ordinary, everyday senses.”); United States v. Jabateh , 974 F.3d 281, 296 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[U]nder the fixed

- meaning canon ‘[w]ords must be given the meaning they had when the text was adopted.’” (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 78 (2012) ) (alteration in original) )

. Yet

, from sources near in time to the statute’s

enactment, inc luding contemporaneous dictionaries, 1 both

1 See generally Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States , 138 S. Ct.
2067, 2070

– 71 (2018) (using contemporaneous dictionaries to ascertain the meaning of an undefined statutory term); see also Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp. , 571 U.S. 220, 227 (2014) (same);

Delawar e Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency , 747 F.3d 215, 2218 terms are capable of multiple meaning s , and this case depends on which of those meanings appl y to the tolling provision

.

A. As Used in the Tolling Statute, the Phrase ‘Appeals Therein’ Includes a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

To interpret the phase ‘appeals therein’ requires an analysis of its two component words , each of which is capable of multiple meanings

.

The first of those, ‘appeal

, ’ had two common meanings when § 6330 was enacted in 1998

. Contempor ary dictionaries

reveal that i t could be used

, in a general sense, to mean a “[r]esort to a superior ( i.e. appellate) court to review the decision of an inferior ( i.e. trial) court.” Appeal

, Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). Under that general meaning , the term ‘appeal’ would include both appeals and petitions

– those filed in court and those filed administratively. See id. But as evidenced by a number of federal statutes and court rules , the term ‘appeal’ could also refer to a narrowe r class within that larger class: it could mean a method of seeking review of an

order that is distinct from other such methods, such as a petition. As used more narrowly, appeals are typically initiated in the court that issued the order, 2 while petitio ns are often

(3d Cir. 2014) (“When words are left undefined, we have turned to ‘standard reference works such as legal and general dictionaries in order to ascertain their ordinary meaning.’” (quoting Eid v. Thompson , 740 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2014))).

2 See, e.g. , Sup. Ct. R. 18 (1) (1997) (stating that appeals from

three

- judge district court panels are commenced by filing a notice of appeal with the district court clerk); Fed. R. App. P. 3(a) (1994) (stating that ap peals as of right from district courts are taken by filing a notice of appeal with the district court clerk); Fed. R. App. P. 13(a) (1994) (stating that appeals as of right from the Tax Court are taken by filing a notice of appeal with the Tax Court clerk) ; Tax Ct. R. 190(a) (1994) (same);9 commenced through a filing with the reviewing body. 3 Cf. Garland v. Ming Dai , 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1677

– 78 (2021)

Bankr. R. 800 3 (a) (1) (1994) (stating that bankruptcy appeals as of right are taken by filing a notice of appeal with the bankruptcy clerk); 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (a)(1)

– (2) (1994) (stating that appeals from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board are taken by filing a notice of appeal in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office); 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994) (stating that appeals of sentences imposed by district courts are taken by filing a notice of appeal in the district court); 26 U.S.C. § 7483 (1994) (stating that review of Tax Court decision is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the Tax Court clerk); 28 U.S.C. § 2522 (1994) (stating that review of decisions of the Court of Federal Claims is taken by filing a notice of appeal with t he clerk of that court); 28 U.S.C. § 2645(c) (1994) (stating that

review of decisions of the Court of International Trade is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of that court);

35 U.S.C. § 142 (1994) (stating that patent appeals from Patent

a nd Trademark Office decisions are taken by filing a notice of appeal with that office); 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) (1994) (stating that review of decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is taken by filing a notice of appeal with that court).

3 See, e.g. , Sup. Ct. R. 12 (1997) (stating that review on certiorari is sought by filing a petition with the Supreme Court clerk); Fed. R. App. P. 5(a) (1994) (stating that permissive appeals to the courts of appeals are sought by filing a petition

with the circuit clerk); Fed. R. App. P. 15(a) (1994) (stating that review of agency orders is commenced by filing a petition with the circuit clerk); Tax Ct. R. 20 (1994) (stating that a case in the Tax Court is commenced by filing a petition with that court); 3 U.S.C. § 425(c)(5) (1997) (stating that persons aggrieved by decisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission or the Secretary of Labor may seek review by filing a petition with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) ( 1994) (stating that decisions of the Merit System s Protection Board are reviewed10 (explaining that appeals typically provide for direct review while petitions typically allow for collateral review). Also

, under t hat narrow er meaning, appeals tend to be provided as of right, while petitions more frequently depend on the discretion of the reviewing body

. Compare Sup. Ct. R. 10 (1997) (explaining that “[r]eview on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion” that “will be granted only for compelling reasons”), and 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1994)

, with Sup. Ct. R. 18 (1997) (explaining that a pa r ty invokes the Supreme Court’s appe llate ju risdiction “by filing a notice of appeal”), and 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1994)

. 4

by filing a petition in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); 7 U.S.C. § 21(i)(4) (1994) (stating that decisions of the Commodity Futures Trading C ommission are reviewed by filing a petition in a court of appeals); 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2) (1994) (stating that review of orders of removal by the Board of Immigration Appeals is taken by filing a petition in a court of appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1994) (pe rmitting review of agency orders by filing a petition in a court of appeals);

29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1994) (permitting review of orders of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission by filing a petition in a court of appeals); 42 U.S.C. § 4915(a) (1 994) (permitting review of actions of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency by filing a petition in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit) ; cf. Fed. R. App. P. 35(b) (1994) (providing for petitions for rehearing en banc to

be fi led with the court of appeals); Fed. R. App. P. 40(a) (1994) (providing for petitions for panel rehearing to be filed with the court of appeals).

4 Because the general meaning of ‘appeal’ fully encompasses its narrower meaning, that word is known as an au tohyponym.

S

ee Laurence R. Horn, Ambiguity, Negation, and the London School of Parsimony , 14 N.E. Linguistics Soc’y 108, 110

– 18 (1984) (discussing a number of common autohyponyms)

. A

common autohyponym is the word ‘finger ,’ which can refer generally to all the digits on one’s hand, but it can also refer to only the non

- thumb digits. See Anu Koskela, Inclusion11 At the time of the tolling statute’s enactment, the word

‘therein’ also had two ordinary, common meanings. I t could

mean “ [ i ] n that place.” Therein

, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th

e d. 1990); see also Webster’s New International Dictionary (‘ Webster’s Third ’) 2372 ( 3d ed. 1993). In context, under that meaning

, the phrase ‘appeals therein’ would refer to appeals pending in the same place as the Collection Due Process hearing, which would be within the IRS, not in a federal court.

But u nder the other definition, ‘therein’ could mean “in such

matter.” We b s ter’ s Third 2372 (defining ‘therein’ as “in that particular[;] in t hat respect[;] in such matter”). Under t hat meaning

, the phrase ‘appeals therein’ in context would refer to appeals of a Collection Due Process hearing determination

.

Because the terms ‘appeal s ’ and ‘therein’ each ha d two meanings, there are four possib le combinations for the meaning of the phrase ‘appeals therein.’ But t hree of those

combinations would render the expression ‘appeal s therein’ meaningless because they reference processes that do not exist, such as administrative appeals of Collection Due Process hearings within the IRS

. By contrast, the fourth combination

– ‘appeals’ in the general sense and ‘therein’ as ‘in such matter’

– produces a reasonable outcome that is consistent with multiple canons of construction.

Contrast and Polysemy in Dictionaries: The Relationship Between Theory, Language Use & Lexiographic Practice

, 12 :4 Rsch. i n Language 319, 320

– 22 (2014)

. A common legal term that is an autohyponym is ‘ res judicata ’ : it has a general meaning that encompasses both claim preclusion and issue preclusion , but it also has a narrower meaning that refers only

to claim preclusion. Se e United States v. 5 Unlabeled Boxes

, 572 F.3d 169, 173

– 74 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng’g & Mach., Inc. , 575 F.2d 530, 535

– 36 (5th Cir. 1978); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper,

Federal Practice & Procedure § 4402 (3d ed. Apr. 2022 update).12 Three combinations of the terms ‘appeals’ and ‘therein’ yield meanings that nullify the phrase’s effect in contravention of the canon against superfluity, which holds that every word

in a statute should be given effect

. See generally Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def. , 138 S. Ct. 617, 632 (2018) (“[T]he Court is ‘obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.’” (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. , 4 42 U.S. 330, 339 (1979))). First, if the term ‘appeal s ’ is read narrowly (to exclude petitions for review) and the term ‘therein’ is used locationally (to mean only administrative appeals within the IRS), then the phrase describes nothing. The IRS does n ot provide for an administrative appeal process, see 26 U.S.C. § 6330(b)

– (d); see also 26 C.F.R. § 301.6330

- 1 (b)(2), so if ‘appeals therein’ referred to only administrative appeals within

the IRS , it would be superfluous. Second, for essentially the

same reasons, the broad meaning of the term ‘appeal s ’ coupled

with the locational definition of ‘therein’ would also render the combined expression useless: the IRS does not permit administrative appeals or administrative petitions

, see 26 U.S.C. § 6330(b)

– (d); see also 26 C.F.R. § 301.6330

- 1(b)(2), so again the phrase would have no effect

. Third, if ‘appeal s ’ is read narrowly, and ‘therein’ is read as ‘in such

matter

, ’ then that too would produce a meaningless result. Seeking review of a Collection Due Proces s hearing requires filing a petition in the Tax Court

, not an appeal, see 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1); see also 26 C.F.R. § 6330

- 1 (b)(2) , (f)(1) , and if the phrase ‘appeals therein’ excludes petitions, then it does no

work.

The fourth combination, however, does not offend th e

canon against superfluity . If the term ‘appeal s ’ receives it s broader meaning ( to include petitions ) and the word ‘therein’ means ‘in such matter,’ then the phrase ‘appeals therein’ refers to any appeal s or petitions from a Collection Due Process hearing. That understanding accounts for the entire judicial review process: the Tax Court reviews petitions from the

Collection Due Process h earing

, see 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1);13 see also 26 C.F.R. § 301.6330

- 1 ( b)(2) , (f)(1) ; the appellate courts review appeals from the Tax Court as well as petitions for panel rehearing and en banc rehearing

, see 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1); Fed. R. App. P. 35, 40 ; and petitions for certiorari from the appellate courts may be filed wi th the Supreme Court

,

see 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

.

Also, with respect to the meaning of the term ‘appeal,’ the fourth combination comports with the general

- terms canon

, which holds that general terms should be interpreted generally.

See Arizona v. Tohono O’odham Nation , 818 F.3d 549, 557 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2016) (“General words are to be understood in a general sense.”); see also Gov’t Emps. Ret. Sys. of V.I. v. Gov’t of V.I. , 995 F.3d 66, 107 (3d Cir. 2021) (Matey, J., concurring in part) (“[G]eneral terms ‘are to be accorded their full and fair scope’ and ‘are not to be arbitrarily limited.’” (quoting Scalia
& Garner, supra

, at 101)) ; 3A J.G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 66:6 (8th ed. 2018) (“Courts construing tax collection statu tes employ the usual maxims of construction.”) . And here, the tolling statute contains no suggestion that the term ‘appeals’ should be given its narrow meaning

. See 26 U.S.C. § 6330. Although in other sections of the tax code, Congress distinguished bet ween notices of appeal

and petitions for certiorari

, s ee, e.g.

, id. § 7481(a) , it did not do

so here

. Thus, under the general

- terms canon, the term ‘appeals’ as used in § 6330 should receive its general meaning.

Altogether, these considerations remove an y uncertainty as to the meaning of the phrase ‘appeals therein’ : it applies to any appeals and petitions seeking review of a Collection Due

Process hearing , including a petition for a writ of certiorari

.14 B. Under the Tolling Statute, a Collection Due

Process H earing or Appeal Therein Is ‘Pending’ from I ts Commencement U ntil the

Date When It Can No Longer Be Challenged.

E ven with clarity on the meaning of ‘appeals therein,’ the calculation of the tolling period depends on the term ‘pending.’

Section 6 330(e)(1) suspends the statute of limitations “for the period during which such hearing, and appeals therein, are pending

. ” 26 U.S.C. § 6330(e)(1). In this context, the term ‘pending’ functions as a predicate adjective, modifying ‘such hearing, and appea ls therein.’ And when Congress enacted
§ 6330(e)(1), the term ‘pending’ had two common ordinary meanings as an adjective

.

Under one definition

, ‘pending’ could mean “[b]egun, but not yet completed.” Pending

, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990); see also Webster’s Third 1669 (defining “pending” as “not yet decided,” “in continuance

, ” and “in suspense”). With that meaning for ‘pending

, ’ the hearing and the ‘ appeals

therein ’ would be pending until the agency resolved the hearing or a court decided the appeal , but after resolution

, neither the hearing nor an ‘ appeal therein ’ would remain pending

. In the context of § 6330(e)(1), that would result in intermittent tolling such that the statute of limitations would be suspended for potentially several disti nct periods. Tolling would occur while the hearing was active, but it would cease for the interval between resolution of the initial hearing and the filing of an appeal. Similarly, the statute of limitations would be suspended while the ‘appeals therein’ were active, but the tolling would stop for the time between resolution of an appeal and the filing of any successive appeal permitted by law.

Alternatively, the term ‘pending’ had the common ordinary meaning of “[a]waiting an occurrence of conclusion of an action,” such that it described “a period of continuance or indeterminacy.” Pending

, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) ; see also Webster’s Third 1669 (defining ‘ pending ’ as15 “ impending ” or “i mminent ”). Und er that meaning, a hearing or an appeal therein would be pending after its resolution for the period while the ruling remained indeterminate due to the possibility of an impending or imminent appeal. Under this

definition

, the tolling under § 6330(e)(1) w ould be continuous

– from the date of the commencement of the hearing through to the date on which the possibility of future appellate review expired

.

For purposes of § 6330(e)(1) , only the second definition works. The tolling clause identifies a singu lar ‘period’ of suspension. The first definition of ‘pending,’ however, would

involve several distinct periods of piecemeal tolling. The statute of limitations would be suspended for the hearing and every appeal, but not for the interim periods between r esolution and appeal. If Congress had intended to account for such

intermittent tolling, it c ould have used the word ‘periods

. ’ But by instead us ing the singular term , ‘period,’ the statute allows only the second meaning of ‘pending,’ such that it descri bes a continuous period inclusive o f not only the hearing and

‘ appeals therein ’ but also any intervening periods of indeterminacy during which an appeal or petition could be

filed

.

Applying the second definition here, the statute of

limitations remained tolled for the 62 days between the D.C. Circuit’s mandate and Weiss’s petition for a writ of certiorari.

C. This Action Is Timely Because the Statute of

Limitations Tolled for the Time Associated

with Weiss’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

With that understanding

, this action is timely. At least 129 days remained on the statute of limitations when the D.C.

Circuit issued its mandate. Due to the meanings of the terms ‘appeals therein’ and ‘pending

, ’ that period is not reduced

either by the time that Weiss took to f ile his petition for a writ of certiorari (62 days) or by the time that the Supreme Court16 took to deny the petition (40 days) . Thus, the government had 129 days after the Supreme Court’s denial of Weiss’s petition
to commence this action, and it did so wi thin 64 days

– leaving at least 65 days of the ten

- year statute of limitations to spare.

IV. C ONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s judgment

will be affirmed

.