IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2014-CA-01136-COA KAREN G. CHANCE (RICHARDS) APPELLANT

v. RICKEY L. CHANCE APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/24/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. G. CHARLES BORDIS IV COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: JACKSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: BRANDI DENTON GATEW O OD ASHLEY HUTCHINGS HENDREN ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: CHARLIENE ROEMER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: FOUND APPELLANT IN CONTEMPT AND AW ARDED APPELLEE ATTORNEY’S FEES DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/10/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND JAMES, JJ. CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Karen Chance (Richards) 1 appeals the Jackson County Chancery C o u r t ’ s j udgm ent holding h e r in contem

p t and awarding attorney ’s f ees to Dr. Rickey Chance. On appeal,
Karen argues that the chancellor’s f indings were m anif

e stly wrong b ecause the af f irm ative def enses of laches, waiver, and equitable estoppel barred Rickey ’s claim s. FACTS ¶2. On March 14, 2003, the chancery court entered a judgm ent granting Rickey and Karen

1 A f ter h er d iv o r ce, K aren rem arried a n d ch an g ed h er last n am e to R ich ard s.an irreconcilable-dif f erences divorce. As part of the property -settlem ent agreem ent (PSA) incorporated into their divor c e judgm ent, the parties agreed that Rickey would retain possession of

two hom es the couple owned while Karen would retain possession of a third property located at 1408 Calhoun Street in Ocean Springs, Mississippi. ¶3. The PSA required R ickey to o btain a t h i r t y - y e ar m ortgage f or Karen’s hom e. The
PSA f urther required that Rickey assum e the responsibility f o r pay ing half of the ad valorem

taxes on the hom e and the e ntire m onthly m ortgage pay m ents f o r ninety -six m onths until the

m ortgage’s principal balance reached $90,000. The PSA required K aren to pay t he other half

o f the ad valorem taxes and to assum e f ull responsibility f

or pay ing the ho me o w n e r ’ s insurance prem ium s. Once the m o rtgage’s principal balance reached $90,000, Karen would

assum e sole r esponsibility f or satisf y i ng all the hom e’s m ortgage pay m ents, t axes, and insurance pay

m ents. ¶4. On February 17, 2004, the att o r n e y f o r t h e h o me closing s ent each of the parties a letter. In t he l e tter, the attorney suggested a course of action that she b elieved provided the easiest way f

or the parties t o f

ulf ill the term s of their PSA. Because the hom e loan required

m onthly escrow pay

m ents f or taxes and insurance, the attorney suggested that Rickey reduce his m onthly alim ony pay

m ents by the am ount of taxes and insurance escrow that Karen was responsible f

or p ay ing each m onth. In doing so, the parties would erase the n eed f or Karen to send Rickey

a m onthly

check f o r the escrow. ¶5. Despi t e t h e c l o s i n g a t t o r n e y ’ s r e c o m m endation, the parties f ailed to adopt her suggested course of action. Instead, Karen, who asserted that she lacked the ability to satisf y

2her f

inancial obligations under the PSA, f ailed to pay either t he insurance prem ium s on the hom e or her half of the a d valorem taxes. As a result, Rickey paid all the ad valorem taxes and insurance prem ium s on the hom e f rom 2003 until 2013. ¶6. Both parties agreed that, on several occasions between 2003 and 2 013, t hey verbally discussed Karen’s continuing o b ligation to pay f or the hom e ’s insurance p rem ium s and her half of the hom e ’s t axes. However, during each conversation , K a r e n m aintained that she lacked the ability

to m eet her f

i nancial obligations under the PSA. On Septem ber 5, 2013, Rickey s ent Karen a letter asking that she reim bur s e him f

or past-due insurance and tax
pay m ents. In the alternative, Rickey stated that K aren c ould ref inance t he h om e’s m ortgage l o a n in her nam e, credit the am ount owed to him a gainst the rem ainder of the prin c i p a l balance, and then allow him to pay of f the d if f erence between that f

igure and $90,000. As stated i n h is letter, Rickey calculated that Karen owed h im $56,660.51, which i n cluded $4,462.35 f

or m oney Rickey paid into the e s c r o w account f or 2013. F ollowing Rickey ’s letter, Karen sent Rickey a c heck f or $ 4,462.35 to cover her share of the 2013 taxes and insurance. ¶7. On October 23, 2013, Rickey f iled a m otion f

or contem p t against Karen f

or her f ailure

to pay the insurance prem ium s and her half of t he ad valorem t axes. K aren f iled an answer and asserted that Rickey ’s cause of action was barred by several a f f i r m ative def

enses, including the seven-y ear statute of lim i tations 2 and the doctrines of unclean hands, waiver, laches, and estoppel.

2 S ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § 1 5 -1 -4 3 (R ev . 2 0 1 2 ). 3¶8. Following a hearing on t h e ma t t e r , t h e c h a n cellor entered a judgm ent o n July 24,
2014. The chancellor noted t h a t t h e p arties both acknowledged having m ultiple verbal

com m unications about the hom e located at 1408 Calhoun Street. During these verbal

com m unications, the parties discussed the p ay m ent o f th e h o m e ’ s m ortgage, t axes, and insurance. The chancellor f ound that Karen asserted she w as unable to satisf y her f inancial obligations as to the hom e, and she claim e d that Rickey i ndicated he would p ay the taxes and insurance as a gif

t to her. The chancellor f ound that Rickey a rgued, however, that he never intended to waive or f

orgive any o f Karen’s f

inancial obligations with regard to the hom e’s

taxes and insurance. The chancellor f urther a cknowledged t hat the parties had n o written

com m unication regarding the hom e until R ickey ’s letter dated Septem ber 5, 2013. The chancellor also f

ound that, since the entry of the divorce judgm ent, Rickey had paid a total of $35,491 in insurance prem ium s on the hom e and a total of $15,678.14 in ad v alorem taxes

on the hom e. In addition, the chancellor stated that, other than t he $4,462.35 Karen m ailed Rickey in May 2014, Karen f ailed to contribute any f

unds toward t he pay

m ent of the hom e’s insurance or her half

of the hom e’s taxes. ¶9. Af ter concluding t hat Karen f ailed to com

ply with the term s o f t he divorce judgm ent, the chancellor next discussed the af f irm ative def

enses Karen asserted. The chancellor f irst addressed Karen’s a ssertion t hat Rickey ’s claim was barred b y the doctrine of u nclean hands. According to K aren, Rickey a lso f ailed t o com

p ly with certain parts of the divorce j udgm ent. Despite Karen’s claim s, the c hancellor f ound that Karen f

ailed to m eet her burden of proof because the evidence she of f ered was general in nature and uncorroborated.

4¶10. The c hancellor next addresse d K a r e n’s claim that section 15-1-43’s seven-y ear statute of lim itations barred Rickey ’s requested relief . Because Rickey

f iled his c ontem

pt m otion

on October 2 3, 2013, the chancellor f ound the statute of lim itations barred him f r om seeking
recovery f

or any p ay

m ents m ade prior to October 2 3, 2006. 3 Thus, the chancellor f ound that
any i n surance prem ium s and taxes Rickey p aid in 2004 and 2005 were not recoverable. However, the chancellor concluded that the statute of lim itations posed n o b ar to Rickey ’s

attem pt to recover the $6,463.90 i n taxes and $32,121 in insurance that he paid on Karen’s behalf af ter October 23, 2006. ¶11. The c hancellor next addressed the d o c t r i n e s o f l a c h e s , w aiver, and estoppel and concluded that none of these def enses ba r r e d R i c key ’s requested relief

. The chancellor

a c k n o w l e dged that a party asserting laches m ust show: (1) a delay in asserting a r i g h t o r claim ; ( 2) the delay was inexcusable; and (3) t he party against whom the claim is asserted suf f e red undue p r e

j udice. Although the chancellor f ound that Rickey d elay ed i n asserting his rights, the chancellor also concluded that the d elay was excusable. The chancellor f ound that both parties had testif ied to verbally com m

unicating about t he taxes and insurance owed on the hom e between 2004 and 2014. ¶12. W i th regard to the parties’ verbal com m u nications, the chancellor f ound: Both [ parties] testif

ied that the content of their discussions a l w ay s centered around Karen in f

o r m ing Rickey that she was unable t o f inancially af

f ord to

3 S e e M o seley v. S

m ith , 1 8 0 S o . 3 d 6 6 7 , 6 7 4 (¶3 3 ) ( M i s s . C t

. A p p . 2 0 1 4 ) (“[ T ] h e statu te o f lim itatio n s o n a rig h t t o co m p el a m o n etary j u d g m en t in a d o m e s tic actio n b eg in s to r u n o n th e d ate o n w h ich th e p ay m en t is d u e an d p ay ab le. F o r ex am p le, th e sev en -y ear statu te o f l im itatio n s to reco v er alim o n y p ay m en ts ru n s f

r om t he m o n t h each p a y

m en t v ested , n o t th e d ate o f

d iv o rce.” (em

p h asis, in tern a l citatio n s, an d q u o tatio n m ark s o m itted )).

5pay her share of the taxes and insurance prem ium s. Rickey a ccepted Karen’s

stateme n t s regarding her f inancial s ituation and p aid 100% of the taxes and insurance prem ium s , but he rem inded Karen t hat it was her obligation to pay one-half of the taxes and all of the insurance p rem ium s. D urin g t h i s s a me tim e, Karen was able to enjoy trips to Hawaii, p urchase a new vehicle, etc. Based upon t he proof

, Rickey was pay i ng the taxes and insurance in an ef f o rt to help Karen due to Karen’s alleged “f inancial dif

f iculties[ .”]
As a r e s u l t o f these f

indings, the chancellor concluded t hat the doctrine of laches f ailed to apply since Rickey ’s delay

in bringing the present action was excusable. ¶13. In next addressing t he doctrine of equitable e stoppel, the chancellor recognized that
Karen m ust prove: ( 1) b e lief and r e l i ance o n som e representation m ade by Rickey ; (2) change of position as a result of the representation; and (3) detrim ent or prejudice c aused by

t h e change of position. The c hancellor f ound that Rickey m ade no representations u p o n which Karen detrim entally relied. Although K aren relied on Rickey ’s statem ents f ollowing each o f t heir conversations that h e would pay the taxes a n d insurance, the chancellor f ound that Rickey ’s actions c onstituted a “nice gesture” and t hat Karen f ailed to show she suf

f ered
any detrim ent or prejudice. T he chancellor instead f ou n d t h a t K aren h ad benef itted f rom Rickey ’s actions since she now o wned her hom e and all the equity that h ad accum ulated due, in l arge part, to t he m ortgage pay m ents Rickey had m ade. In addition, the chancellor f ound that R i c k e y ’ s p a y

m ent of t he hom e’s taxes prevented Karen f rom losing the hom e at a tax sale. Thus, the chancellor concluded that equitable estoppel f ailed to apply

. ¶14. The chancellor next d iscussed Rickey ’s requests that Karen be held in contem pt and that h e b e awarded attorney ’s f ees. The chancellor stated t hat Karen f a i led to of f er a ny proof

to s how her inability to satisf y the obligations im

posed in the divorce judgm e nt. Theref ore,

6the chancello r f o u n d K a r e n in contem

pt of court. However, af ter also f inding that the parties’ verbal com m

unications about Karen’s f ailure to satisf

y her o bligations were open to

m ore than one interpretation, the chancellor con c l u d e d t h a t K a r e n ’ s contem

pt was not willf

ul. ¶15. The chancellor next awarded R ickey attorney ’s f ees since Karen’s f

ailure to com

ply with the divorce judgm ent f orced Rickey to f

ile pleadings to enf

orce the order. The chancellor f

ound that R ickey had incurred $1,720 in attorney ’s f e e s t o p r osecute the case. The chancellor also noted that Rickey ’s attorney had introduced i nto evidence an item ized

s t atem ent of legal services rendered to R ickey , and af ter reviewing the statem ent, th e chancellor concluded the services and f ees were reasonable under the McKee 4 f a ctors. ¶16. As a result of his f indings, the chancellor awarded Rickey a j udgm ent in the am ount of $38,584.90, 5 w hich represented the taxes and insurance prem ium s he paid that were not barred by the statute of lim itations. The chancellor concluded “that t h e mo s t e quitable

rem edy f o r s atisf action of the judgm ent [ was] to credit R ickey in his o bligation to pay the

m onthly m or t g a g e pay

m ent.” As provided in t he divorce judgm ent, Karen was to assum e sole responsibility f

or the hom e’s m ortgage, taxes, a nd insurance when the p rincipal balance of the m ortgage reached $ 90,000. However, in light of his j udgm ent awarding Ric k ey $38, 5 8 4.90, the c hancellor added this am ount to $90,000 a nd ordered K aren to assum e responsibility f

or t he hom e’s f

inancial obligations when the m ortgage reached the new total of $128,584.90.

4 S ee M cK ee v. M cK ee , 4 1 8 S o . 2 d 7 6 4 , 7 6 7 (M iss. 1 9 8 2 ).

5 D u e to a scriv en er’s erro r, th e ch a n cel l o r’s j u d g m en t m isstated th is to tal as $ 3 4 ,1 2 2 .5 5

. 7¶17. Aggrieved by the chancellor’s judgm e n t, Karen appeals to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶18. “ T h i s C o u

r t ’ s s tandard of review in dom estic[ -]relations m atters is extre m e l y l i m i t e d

. ” Phillips v. Phillips , 45 So. 3d 684, 692 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). W e will not disturb a chancellor’s f

indings of f

act unless the f

indings were m anif

estly wrong or clearly erroneous

or unless the chancellor applied an erroneous l egal standard. I d. W here the r ecord contains substantial e vidence to support the chancellor’s f indings, we will n ot revers e h i s d e c i sion. Id. However, we review questions of law de novo. Smith v. W ilson , 90 So. 3d 5 1, 56 (¶13) (Miss. 2012).
DISCUSSION ¶19. A s p r e v iously discussed, the chancellor f ound that the seven-y ear statute o f l i m i t a t i o n s applied to the present case and p revented Rickey f rom seeking reim

bursem e nt of any taxes and insurance p rem ium s he paid prior to October 23, 2006. On appeal, neither party disputes the applicability of s e c t i o n 1 5-1-43’s statute of lim itations. Instead, Karen a r gues that the chancellor was m anif

estly wrong in holding her in contem pt f o r f a i ling to com

ply with the

term s of t he di v orce judgm ent and f or awarding Rickey attorney ’s f ees. According to Karen’s argum ent, the doctrines of laches, waiver, and e q u i t a b l e estoppel barred Rickey ’s

contem pt claim

. A. Laches and Waiver ¶20. A l t h o u g h K a r e n a r gues on appeal that Rickey ’s d elay in asserting his rights wa s inexcusable, the Mississippi Suprem e Court has previously held that “[ a] d elay short of the

8statutory period of l im itations does n ot bar recovery . The doctrine of laches is sim ply inapplicable where a c laim has not y et been barred by the applicable statute of lim itations.” Greenlee v. Mitchell , 607 So. 2 d 97, 111 (Miss. 1992) (internal citations om itted). Because the claim s are not y et b a r r e d b y the applicable statute of lim i tations, our precedent clearly holds that the doctrine of l aches f ails to apply

. S

ee id. See also Nicholas v. Nicholas , 841
So. 2d 1208, 1212 (¶12) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2003). W e likewise f ind that t he doctrine of waiver
f ails to apply t o b ar Rickey ’s claim s. As a result, we f ind no m erit to Karen’s a r gum ents that the doctrines of

laches and waiver preclude Rickey ’s claim s against her.
B. Equitable Estoppel ¶21. Karen also asserts that Rickey ’ s claim s are barred b y t h e d o c t r i n e o f equitable estoppel, which “ requires proof of a (1) belief and reliance on s om e represen t a t i o n ; ( 2 ) change of position as a result of the representation; and (3) detrim ent or prejudice c aused by the change of position.” Nicholas , 841 So. 2d at 1213 (¶13) (citation om itted). “ The burden of establishing the elem ents of an estoppel is on the p a r t y asserting the estoppel. The existence of the elem ents of a n estoppel m ust b e established by the preponderance of the evidence.” R obertson v
. Moody , 918 So. 2d 787, 790 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citation

om itted). ¶22. According to Karen, R ickey led her to b elieve during their conversations t hat his act of pay i ng the insurance p rem ium s and her share of the taxes constituted a gif t f or which he expected n o repay

m ent. Karen argues t hat, i n reliance on Rickey ’s statem e n ts, she f ailed to
set aside m oney either to satisf y those obligations as they becam e due or to repay R ickey on

9som e f

uture date. Karen f

urther asserts that she suf

f ered prejudice f

r om Rickey ’s statem ents since the chancellor’s judgm ent orders her t o assum e responsibility f or t he hom e’s f

inancial obligations when the m o r

tgage r eaches $128,584.90 r ather than a t $ 90,000. Karen contends that the chancellor’s judgm ent f o rces h er to secure her own m ortgage a t a higher am ount than she originally

anticipated. ¶23. Af ter considering the parties’ testim ony and e vidence, the chancellor f ound no m e r it

to Karen’s argum ent that equitable estoppel barred Rickey ’s requested relief

. Although the chancellor f

ound that Karen relied on Rickey ’s statem e nts that he would pay the insurance
prem ium s and her half of the t axes, the c hancellor f o und that R i ckey ’s actions am ounted to

a “nice g e s t u r e ” and that Karen f ailed to show any actual prejudice or detrim ent resulting
f rom her reliance on R ickey ’s statem e nts. In f act, f ar f r om suf f ering prejudice or detrim ent, the chancellor f

o und that Karen actually benef i tted f rom Rickey ’s actions because she now owned the hom e and all the equity that had accum ulated. Furtherm ore, the chancellor f ound that Rickey ’s pay

m en t o f t h e h o me ’s taxes prevented Karen f rom losing the hom e at a tax sale. A s a result of these f indings, the chancellor concluded that equitable estoppel did not bar Rickey ’s claim s. ¶24. As ou r c a s e l a w e s tablishes, the chancellor’s “ [ f ]actual f indings as to

. . . equitable estoppel will be af

f i rm ed when supported by credible evidence

. . . or reasonable i nf erences which m ay be drawn f

rom c redible evidence.” N icholas, 841 So. 2 d at 1213 (¶15) (citations and internal quotation m ar k s o mi t ted). Furtherm ore, “a c hancellor, being the only one to hear the testim ony of witnesses and observe t heir dem eanor, is in the best position to judge

1 0their credibility .” In re Estate of Carter , 9 1 2 S o . 2 d 138, 143 (¶18) (Miss. 2005).

“Moreover, s i n c e t he chancellor is best a ble to d eterm ine the credibility of the witnesses’ testim o ny , it is not [ the appellate court’s] province to underm i ne the chancellor’s authority by replacing the chancellor’s judgm ent with our own.” I d. Because substantial credible evidence supported the c hancellor’s f i ndings, we f

ind no m erit to K a r e n ’ s argum ent that equitable estoppel barred Rickey ’s claim s against her.

C. Contem pt ¶25. Karen also contends that, because Mississippi precedent states that contem pt can only be willf ul, the chancellor clearly

erred by holding her in “unwillf

ul” contem

pt. ¶26. “Contem

pt m atters are com m itted to the substantial discretion of the trial court. T he chancellor’s f

indings will n ot b e disturbed unless m anif estly w r ong.” Gutierrez v
. Gutierrez , 153 S o. 3d 703, 7 13 (¶31) ( Miss. 2014) (internal citations and q uotat i o n m arks om itted).
“Contem pt can o nly b e willf

u l

. A contem

p t citation is proper only when the contem ner has wil[ l]f ully and deliberately ignored the order of the court.” Mizell v. Mizell , 708 S o. 2d 55,
64 ( ¶52) (Mis s . 1 9 9 8 ) (citation and internal quotation m arks om itted). However, our precedent also acknowledges:
As a def e nse to a civil-contem

pt claim , a party can a rgue that the violation of t he c ourt’s order was n ot willf ul or deliberate so as to be lab e l e d “contum a cious.” Another def ense is the party ’s honest inability to perf orm according to the dictates of the order o r decree; however, the def endant bears the duty to prove his inability

with particularity

and not in general term s. In re G uardianship of

McClinton , 157 So. 3d 862, 873 (¶33) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (internal

1 1citations om itted). 6

¶27. Although the c hancellor f ound K aren in contem

pt, he also f

o und Karen’s contem

pt

was n ot willf

ul s ince t he parties’ verbal com m unications about Karen’s f ailure to satisf

y her obligations were open t o m ore than one i nterpretation. In reviewing this issue, we f ind it was within the chancellor’s discretion to f ind that, although Karen f ailed to com

ply with the prior

co u r t o r d er, her noncom

pliance was neither w illf

ul nor deliberate. See Brawdy v. Howell , 841 So. 2d 1175, 1181 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (holding it was within the chancellor’s discretion to f

ind that, though the husband was i n contem pt, the c ontem

p t was not willf

ul).
Because w e cannot say that the chancellor’s f indings were m anif

estly wrong, we ref

use to disturb his f

indings of

f act. Theref

ore, this argum e nt lacks m e r it.
D. Attorney ’ s Fees ¶28. As previou s l y d i s c u s s e d, Karen m aintains that the c h ancellor com m itted m anif est error by not only holding her in contem

pt but b y also awarding Rickey attorney ’s f ees as a result of the contem

pt f inding. “An award o f attorney ’s f e e s in dom estic cases is largely a

m atter entrusted to the sound d iscretion of the trial c ourt. Unless the chancellor is m anif estly wrong, his decision regarding attorney [ ’s] f e es will not be disturbed on appeal.” Gaiennie

v. M cMillin , 138 S o. 3d 131, 137 (¶15) (Miss. 2014) ( internal citation and q uotation m arks

om itted). ¶29. In Douglas v. Douglas , 766 So. 2d 68, 72 (¶14) (Miss. C t. App. 2000), t h i s C o urt stated:

6 S ee a lso M iss. C o d e A n n . § 1 1 -5 1

- 1 2 (4 ) (R ev . 2 0 1 2 ) (“T h e b u rd en o f p ro o f in civ il co n tem p t sh all b e p ro o f

b y a p rep o n d eran ce o f t h e ev i d e n c e.”).

1 2[ W ]here a divorced party is bound to com ply w i t h a p r e v iously issued valid court decree, the dignity and strength of t he C ourt through the enf orcem ent of its decre e s require nothing less than f ull a nd com

plete com

pliance. Thus, where a party who is entitled to the b e n e f its o f a previous judicial decree is f orced to initi a t e f

u r t her proceedings to gain com pliance with the previous order of t he court b y the c ontum a cious party , a f ailure to a ward attorney ’s f ees serves to dim i n i s h t h e f

orce of the decree if the entitled party is not in a position to obtai n counsel. F urtherm ore, where the party responsible f or com pliance w ith the previous decree f orces new litigation t o be f iled i n order to gain the party ’s com

pliance, an award of

attorney ’s f

ees is appropriate. (Internal citations and q

u otation m arks o mi t ted). See also Holloway v. Holloway , 865 So. 2d 382, 383 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (f inding no a

b use of discretion where the chancellor did not specif

i cally hold the husband in contem pt but s t ill awarded the wif e som e of her attorney ’s f

ees incurred i n the prosecution of h er contem pt m otion); Russell v. Russell , 724
S o . 2d 1061, 1066 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing that, “ [ u ]nder a lim i ted exception, attorney ’ s f

ees m ay be r ecovered by a party who gains enf orcem ent of a previous support order even when no contem pt is ordered”). ¶30. As the record ref

lects, although the chancellor f ound Kar e n ’ s c o n t e mp t w a s not willf ul, the chancellor also f

ound t hat Karen’s f

ailure to com

ply with the requirem ents of the divorce j udgm ent f

orced Ric k e y to f

ile pleadings to enf

orce the o rder. Theref

ore, the chancellor’s award of attorney ’s f ees f ell within t he l im ited exception where attorney ’s f ees

m ay be awarded to a par t y who g ains enf o rcem ent of a previous support order o r divorce judgm ent even t hough the c ourt m ade no f inding of contem

pt. See M izell , 708 So. 2d at 64- 65 (¶¶54-58); Russell , 724 So. 2d at 1066 (¶24); Johnson v. Pogue , 716 So. 2d 1123, 1135 (¶44) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). ¶31. T h e s u p r e me c o u r t has established that the m atter of attorney ’s f ees is l a r g e l y

1 3entrusted to the sound discretion of the chancellor. See Gaiennie , 138 So. 3d at 137 (¶15); Mizell , 708 So. 2d at 65 (¶56). The record ref lects substantia l e vidence to s upport the chancello r ’ s d e t e r m ination that Karen’s actions and f a ilure to com

ply with the divorce judgm ent necessitated Rickey ’s institution of l e g a l p roceedings to obtain resolution and relief

. Upon f i nding that Karen f

ailed to com

ply with the divorce judgm ent, the chancellor concluded that an award o f attorney ’s f ees was proper. Af

te r f i nding that the item ized

statem ent of

f ees subm itted by

Rickey ’s attorney w as reasonable under the McKee f actors, the chancellor awarded Rickey $1,720 in attorney ’s f ees. ¶32. The r ecord ref

lects substantial credible evidence to support the chancellor’s f indings that Karen’s f

ailure to com

ply with the divorce judgm ent necessitated t he legal proceedings and that the am ount of the award was reasonable. W e theref ore f i nd n o abuse of discretion based on the award of attorney ’s f ees to Rickey

. 7 As a result, we conc l u d e t h a t Karen’s
argum ent lacks m erit. ¶33. THE J U D G M E N T O F T HE JACKSON COUNTY CHANCERY C OURT IS AFFIRMED. A LL COSTS OF THIS APPE A L ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT. LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, FAIR, W ILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR. JAMES, J., CONCURS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

7 S ee G a ien n ie , 1 3 8 S o . 3 d at 1 3 7 (¶1 5 ); M i zell , 7 0 8 S o . 2 d at 6 5 (¶5 6 ). 1 4