13306 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 47 / Friday, March 10, 1995 / Proposed Rules

1For the purposes of section 4012, the term

‘‘commercial motor vehicle’’ means any selfpropelled or towed vehicle used on highways to

transport passengers or property if such vehicle has

a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 11,794

kilograms (kg) (26,001 pounds) or more. The

NHTSA’s final rule on ABS applies to medium and

heavy vehicles with a GVWR of 4,536 kg (10,001

pounds) or more.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Highway Administration

49 CFR PART 393

[FHWA Docket No. MC–94–31]

RIN 2125–AD46

Parts and Accessories Necessary for

Safe Operation; Antilock Brake

Systems

AGENCY: Federal Highway

Administration (FHWA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of intent; request for

comments.

SUMMARY: This document requests

comments on the intent of the FHWA to

initiate a rulemaking concerning

requirements for antilock brake systems

(ABS) on commercial motor vehicles

engaged in interstate commerce. The

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration (NHTSA) has issued a

final rule, published elsewhere in

today’s Federal Register, requiring

certain newly manufactured vehicles to

be equipped with ABS. The FHWA

intends to initiate a rulemaking

addressing requirements for motor

carriers to maintain the ABS on those

vehicles which are subject to the

NHTSA’s final rule and address certain

other ABS issues related to vehicles

subject to the Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Regulations (FMCSRs). The

FHWA requests comments on this

action.

DATES: Comments must be received on

or before May 9, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Submit written, signed

comments to FHWA Docket No. MC–

94–31, Room 4232, HCC–10, Office of

the Chief Counsel, Federal Highway

Administration, 400 Seventh Street,

SW., Washington, D.C. 20590. All

comments received will be available for

examination at the above address from

8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., e.t., Monday

through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Those desiring notification of receipt of

comments must include a selfaddressed, stamped postcard.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

Larry W. Minor, Office of Motor Carrier

Standards, HCS–10, (202) 366–2981; or

Mr. Charles E. Medalen, Office of the

Chief Counsel, HCC–20, (202) 366–1354,

Federal Highway Administration, 400

Seventh Street, SW., Washington, D. C.

20590. Office hours are from 7:45 a.m.

to 4:15 p.m., e.t., Monday through

Friday, except Federal holidays.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Section 4012 of the Intermodal

Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of

1991 (ISTEA) (Pub. L. 102–240, 105

Stat. 1914, 2157) directs the Secretary of

Transportation to initiate a rulemaking

concerning methods for improving

braking performance of new commercial

motor vehicles,1 including truck

tractors, trailers, and their dollies.

Congress specifically directed that such

a rulemaking examine antilock systems,

means of improving brake compatibility,

and methods of ensuring effectiveness

of brake timing. The ISTEA requires that

the rulemaking be consistent with the

Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (49

U.S.C. 31147(b)) and be carried out

pursuant to, and in accordance with, the

National Traffic and Motor Vehicle

Safety Act of 1966 (49 U.S.C. 30111 et

seq.).

The NHTSA Rulemaking

In response to the ISTEA, the NHTSA

has issued a final rule (which is

published elsewhere in today’s Federal

Register) amending Federal Motor

Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No.

105, Hydraulic Brake Systems, and

FMVSS No. 121, Air Brake Systems, to

require medium and heavy vehicles to

be equipped with an antilock brake

system (ABS) to improve the lateral

stability (i.e., traction) and steering

control of these vehicles during braking.

For truck tractors, the ABS requirement

is supplemented by a 30-mph brakingin-a-curve test on a low coefficient of

friction surface using a full brake

application. By improving lateral

stability and control, these requirements

will significantly reduce jackknifing and

other losses of control during braking as

well as the deaths and injuries caused

by those control problems.

In addition, the NHTSA final rule

requires all powered heavy vehicles to

be equipped with an in-cab lamp to

indicate ABS malfunctions. Truck

tractors and other trucks equipped to

tow air-braked trailers are required to be

equipped with two separate in-cab

lamps: one indicating malfunctions in

the towing vehicle ABS and the other in

the trailer ABS. Trailers produced

during an initial eight-year period must

also be equipped with an external

malfunction indicator that will be

visible to the driver of the towing

tractor. These indicators will provide

valuable information about ABS

malfunctioning to the driver in the

event that the trailer is towed by a

vehicle that is not equipped with an incab ABS malfunction indicator for

trailers.

The amendments to FMVSS No. 105

become effective on March 1, 1999. The

amendments to FMVSS No. 121 become

effective on March 1, 1997, with respect

to truck tractors, and on March 1, 1998,

with respect to air-braked trailers,

converter dollies, single unit trucks and

buses.

In the 1970’s, FMVSS No. 121

included stopping distance

requirements which essentially required

heavy vehicles to be equipped with

antilock brake systems. In response to a

legal challenge, the United States Court

of Appeals for the 9th Circuit

invalidated the stopping distance and

‘‘no lockup’’ requirements in Standard

No. 121, along with certain other

provisions, holding that the standard

was ‘‘neither reasonable nor practicable

at the time it was put into effect.’’

PACCAR v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632 (9th

Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862

(1978).

As explained in NHTSA’s final rule,

the preconditions for an ABS

requirement for heavy vehicles differ

markedly from 20 years ago when the

petitioners challenged the agency in

PACCAR. First, NHTSA’s extensive fleet

study of heavy vehicle antilock systems

demonstrates that these systems are

reliable. Second, the agency’s testing of

truck tractors equipped with antilock

systems indicates that they provide

significantly improved lateral control

and stability compared to vehicles

without antilock systems. Third, unlike

air brake systems in existence in the

mid-1970’s that relied on significantly

larger, more aggressive foundation

brakes, which could possibly create

safety problems if the antilock system

malfunctioned, the requirements being

adopted today do not necessitate such

aggressive brakes. Fourth, antilock brake

systems are now in widespread,

everyday use in this country and

throughout the world. Fifth, the

performance requirements adopted in

today’s final rule are objective and

practicable. Based on these and other

considerations discussed throughout its

final rule, NHTSA believes the final rule

satisfies the concerns raised in the

PACCAR case.

To evaluate the reliability of currentgeneration ABS designs, the NHTSA

conducted extensive field studies of

ABS-equipped heavy truck tractors and
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 47 / Friday, March 10, 1995 / Proposed Rules 13307

2 ‘‘An In-Service Evaluation of the Reliability,

Maintainability, and Durability of Antilock Braking

Systems (ABS) for Heavy Truck Tractors,’’ DOT

Report No. 807 846, March 1992, and ‘‘An InService Evaluation of the Reliability,

Maintainability, and Durability of Antilock Braking

Systems (ABS) for Semitrailers,’’ DOT Report No.

808 059, October 1993.

semitrailers 2 in developing its final

rule. In response to the PACCAR case,

these studies were structured to assess

whether current-generation heavy

vehicle antilock brake systems were

reliable and fail-safe, whether they

inordinately increased vehicle

maintenance costs, and whether they

could be successfully maintained and

would remain functioning in typical

U.S. heavy truck operating

environments.

The NHTSA Research

Between 1988 and 1993, the agency

tracked the maintenance performance

histories of 200 truck tractors and 50

semitrailers equipped with ABS, as well

as the histories of a comparison group

of 88 truck tractors and 35 semitrailers

not equipped with ABS, to determine

the incremental maintenance costs and

patterns associated with installing ABS

on these heavy vehicles. Additionally,

special on-board vehicle recorders were

used to monitor the functioning and

performance of the ABSs. Finally,

drivers and mechanics at the

participating test fleets were

periodically interviewed to ascertain

their views about the ABS test vehicles’

performance and ease of maintenance.

The study authors concluded that, based

on the data collected during the fleet

study, currently available antilock brake

systems are reliable, durable and

maintainable. While ABS is not a zerocost maintenance item, its presence on

a vehicle did not substantially increase

maintenance costs (less than one

percent for tractors, less than two

percent for trailers) or decrease vehicle

operational availability. Moreover, the

NHTSA study found that system

malfunctions would not render the

vehicle’s braking system unsafe, since

the brake system would merely revert to

one without an ABS; foundation brakes

are unchanged when ABS is added. The

incidents noted during the test program

in which an ABS malfunction did

compromise the vehicle’s underlying

brake system performance involved

defective components.

The NHTSA’s research report

indicates that in both the tractor and the

trailer studies, many of the test vehicles

either arrived in the test fleets with

faulty ABS or had ABS malfunction

indications shortly thereafter. These

problems were the result of what was

referred to as installation or preproduction design-related problems. In

general, these problems were easily

remedied, with most of the ABSs

requiring only adjustments or minor

repairs. Problems of this nature were at

least partially attributable to the

prototype nature of many of the

installations accomplished for this test

program.

The NHTSA emphasizes that the

problems encountered in the test

program do not reflect inherent design

flaws with the principal components

(i.e., the electronic control units (ECU),

modulators, and wheel-speed sensing

hardware) of ABS. Instead, they

highlight the importance of using high

quality wiring components and paying

close attention to installation details.

The NHTSA anticipates that the

frequency of these problems will be

lower than that experienced during the

agency’s test program once ABS

production/installation increases to a

level high enough to enable the quality

control programs typically utilized by

suppliers and truck manufacturers to

take effect.

An average of 1.35 labor hours and

$106.46 for replacement components

per test truck tractor were necessary to

rectify these installation/pre-production

design-related problems. Comparable

figures for semitrailers were 1.9 labor

hours and $65.36 for parts. All these

costs are usually recovered by fleets

under the terms of typical warranties

offered by ABS suppliers and/or truck

manufacturers. The NHTSA notes that

the start-up or installation/preproduction design-related problems that

the test fleets experienced are similar to

the experiences that fleets were reported

to have had with electronically

controlled engines when they were first

introduced on heavy trucks in the mid1980’s.

During the two-year period in which

the reliability of these systems was

evaluated, 200 ABS-equipped test

tractors accumulated 39,818,659 miles

of travel. During that period, 126 trucks

(63 percent) needed ABS related

maintenance that could best be

attributed to normal service wear factors

rather than installation or preproduction design-related problems. A

total of 421 incidents of this type

occurred with the 126 trucks, the

majority (321 or 76 percent) of which

involved inspections/adjustments. The

remainder (100 or 24 percent) involved

repairs/replacements. All brands of the

ABSs involved in the test program

experienced incidents of this type at one

time or another during their in-service

operation.

Forty vehicles experienced more than

one failure warning, the reason for

which could not be discovered. Two

vehicles experienced 35 and 31 such

indications (23 percent of the total ECU

resets (clearing the failure message from

the ECU memory)) respectively. Two

other trucks experienced 12 and 10

separate indications, respectively. These

four vehicles (4.5 percent of the trucks

with failure warning problems)

accounted for 30 percent of the total

intermittent failure warning indications

and ECU resets.

All five ABS systems (Bendix, Bosch,

Midland, Rockwell, and WABCO)

experienced intermittent failure

indications with at least one of the forty

test trucks each had involved in the test

program. In each case, the ABS was

either manually reset or the warning

light did not reactivate when the truck’s

ignition was turned off and

subsequently turned on again at some

later time. However, 61 percent of the

total failure warning indications of this

type, and 34 percent of the vehicles

experiencing intermittent failure

indications, were attributable to one

supplier’s ABS. Another supplier’s

system accounted for 18 percent of total

failure warning indications and 28

percent of the total vehicles involved.

Since the time of the agency’s test, both

suppliers’ systems have been modified

to reduce the number of these falsepositive malfunction indications.

The NHTSA’s final rule summarizes

the maintenance related to in-service

wear that was required during the

tractor portion of the program on each

of the ABS components. Inspections and

ECU resets associated with intermittent

failure warning indications were the

principal occurrences. In general, most

of the work did not involve parts

replacements. Parts-replacement

incidents totaled 40, with 55 percent of

these (22) involving failure warning

lamp bulbs or fuses. The average

number of in-service wear-related

maintenance incidents, including all

inspections, adjustments, repairs, and

replacements, was 2.11 incidents per

truck over the two-year period of the

test.

Replacing faulty major ABS

components, plus performing all other

inspections, adjustments and repairs

that were in-service wear-related,

required approximately 403 hours of

labor and $4,068 for parts replacements

for all tractors in the test. At a standard

hourly rate of $35, this amounts to

$18,173, or 0.046 cents per mile (based

on 39,818,659 total miles of travel) for

the cost of maintaining the ABSs over

the two-year period. The inspections/

ECU resets, which only involved labor
13308 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 47 / Friday, March 10, 1995 / Proposed Rules

expenditure, accounted for 45 percent of

these total costs. Although they

occurred infrequently, ECU

replacements were costly, accounting

for 21 percent of the in-service wearrelated maintenance costs.

Similar findings were noted for the 50

ABS-equipped semitrailers that were

evaluated. The test vehicles

accumulated 4,001,369 miles of inservice use during almost two years of

operation. In that period, 23 semitrailers

(46 percent) needed ABS-related

maintenance that could best be

attributed to normal service factors,

rather than installation or preproduction design-related problems.

This compares favorably to the 63

percent of tractors requiring ABS service

during the tractor program. A total of 44

incidents of this type occurred with the

semitrailers, with the majority (29, or 66

percent) involving inspections or

adjustments. The remainder (15, or 34

percent) involved repairs or

replacements. These percentages are

similar to the 76 percent for adjustments

and inspections and 24 percent for

repairs and replacements seen during

the tractor program.

In summarizing the in-service

maintenance that was required for ABS

components during the trailer portion of

the test program, the NHTSA notes that

inspections and ECU resets associated

with intermittent failure warning

indications were the principal

occurrences. Parts-replacement

incidents totaled six, with three of these

being status light bulbs and three speed

sensors. In general, most of the work did

not involve parts replacement.

The average number of in-service

maintenance incidents, including all

inspections, adjustments, repairs, and

replacements, was 0.88 incidents per

semitrailer over the two-year test period.

This compares well with the 2.11

incidents per tractor seen during the

tractor portion of this program.

Replacing faulty ABS components,

plus performing all other inspections,

adjustments, and repairs that were inservice related, required approximately

44 hours of labor and $234 for parts

replacements. At a standardized hourly

rate of $35, the total cost of maintaining

the ABSs over the two-year period

($1,774) amounts to 0.044 cents per mile

(based on 4,001,369 total miles of

travel). The inspections and ECU resets

(which only involved labor expenditure)

accounted for 35 percent of the total

costs. The comparable tractor figures are

0.046 cents per mile for total costs and

45 percent of the total costs for

inspection and ECU reset, indicating

that the semitrailers performed very

much like the tractors.

Maintenance of ABS

At the completion of the overall 5-

year test program, the NHTSA

conducted a final follow-up survey

among the participating fleets. Among

the 13 fleets that were continuing to

maintain the ABS on the original test

tractors, 97 percent of those tractors had

functioning ABS. On the other hand, the

ABSs were not functioning on twothirds of the original test tractors in the

other three fleets surveyed that chose

not to continue maintaining the

systems. This demonstrates that fleets

must be committed to maintaining the

ABS if it is to be kept operational.

Antilock brake systems require some

periodic, and occasionally non-periodic,

non-scheduled maintenance in order to

remain functional. Nonetheless, the

NHTSA believes that the data contained

in the two fleet study reports indicate

that equipping vehicles with ABS is

appropriate. Taken in total, those data

indicate that, while ABS is not a zeromaintenance component, it is neither

difficult nor unduly expensive to

maintain. The fleet test results do not

indicate that the level of maintenance

attention needed to keep ABS functional

is unreasonable relative to the safety

benefits that will result from use of

these systems.

FHWA Intention

The FHWA has concluded that a

rulemaking should be initiated

proposing to amend the FMCSRs to

include ABS requirements for certain

commercial motor vehicles subject to

those regulations. At a minimum, the

rulemaking would propose that motor

carriers be required to maintain the ABS

units on all vehicles subject to the

NHTSA rule.

The agency is not offering for

comment at this time any proposed

language for amendments to the

FMCSRs. The FHWA does, however,

solicit comments on its decision to

initiate a rulemaking on ABS. Following

a careful review of the docket comments

sent in response to this notice, the

FHWA will publish a notice of proposed

rulemaking containing specific

regulatory language. The FHWA

anticipates that this rulemaking will be

concluded prior to the effective date of

the NHTSA’s ABS requirement.

Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

All comments received before the

close of business on the comment

closing date indicated above will be

considered and will be available for

examination in the docket room at the

above address. Comments received after

the comment closing date will be filed

in the docket and will be considered to

the extent practicable. In addition to late

comments, the FHWA will also

continue to file in the docket relevant

information that becomes available after

the comment closing date, and

interested persons should continue to

examine the docket for new material.

Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory

Planning and Review) and DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

The FHWA has determined that this

action is not a significant regulatory

action within the meaning of Executive

Order 12866 or significant within the

meaning of Department of

Transportation regulatory policies and

procedures. Due to the preliminary

nature of this document and lack of

necessary information on costs,

however, the FHWA is unable to

evaluate fully the economic impact of

the potential regulatory changes being

considered in this rulemaking. Based on

the information received in response to

this notice, the FHWA intends to

carefully consider the costs and benefits

associated with various alternative

requirements. Comments, information,

and data are solicited on the economic

impact of the potential changes.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

Due to the preliminary nature of this

document and lack of necessary

information on costs, the FHWA is

unable to evaluate fully the effects of the

potential regulatory changes on small

entities. Based on the information

received in response to this notice, the

FHWA intends, in compliance with the

Regulatory Flexibility Act (Pub. L. 96–

354; 5 U.S.C. 601–612), to carefully

consider the economic impacts of these

potential changes on small entities. The

FHWA solicits comments, information,

and data on these impacts.

Executive Order 12612 (Federalism

Assessment)

This action has been analyzed in

accordance with the principles and

criteria contained in Executive Order

12612, and it has been determined that

this rulemaking does not have sufficient

Federalism implications to warrant the

preparation of a Federalism assessment.

Nothing in this document directly

preempts any State law or regulation.

Executive Order 12372

(Intergovernmental Review)

Catalog of Federal Domestic

Assistance Program Number 20.217,

Motor Carrier Safety. The regulations

implementing Executive Order 12372

regarding intergovernmental
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 47 / Friday, March 10, 1995 / Proposed Rules 13309

consultation on Federal programs and

activities apply to this program.

Paperwork Reduction Act

This action does not contain a

collection of information requirement

for the purposes of the Paperwork

Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. 3501

et seq.

National Environmental Policy Act

The agency has analyzed this

rulemaking for the purpose of the

National Environmental Policy Act of

1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and has

determined that this action would not

have any effect on the quality of the

environment.

Regulation Identification Number

A regulation identification number

(RIN) is assigned to each regulatory

action listed in the Unified Agenda of

Federal Regulations. The Regulatory

Information Service Center publishes

the Unified Agenda in April and

October of each year. The RIN contained

in the heading of this document can be

used to cross reference this action with

the Unified Agenda.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 393

Highway safety, Motor carriers, Motor

vehicle safety.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 31136, 31502; 49 CFR

1.48

Issued on: March 1, 1995.

Rodney E. Slater,

Federal Highway Administrator.

[FR Doc. 95–5414 Filed 3–7–95; 8:45 am]

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