IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

September 7, 2023 Session

ANDREW FRANCIS TITTLE v. DEIDRE LYN DEYOUNG TITTLE

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Williamson County

No. 21CV-50282 Joseph A. Woodruff, Chancellor

No. M2022-01299-COA-R3-CV

This is a divorce action in which the trial court awarded the wife a divorce based on the 

husband’s inappropriate marital conduct, divided the marital estate and awarded the wife, 

inter alia, child support as well as transitional alimony of $2,000 per month for four years, 

followed by $1,500 per month for two years, then $1,000 per month for two years, and 

$500 per month for two years. The court also awarded the wife alimony in solido of 

$50,000 as necessary spousal support and an additional $75,000 to defray the cost of most 

of her attorney’s fees. The husband appeals. We have determined that the record contains 

an inconsistency concerning the amount of the work-related childcare expenses the 

husband is required to pay, and it appears that the trial court failed to consider the husband’s 

obligation to pay work-related childcare costs in setting transitional alimony at $2,000 per 

month during the first four years, which additional expense appears to impair the husband’s 

ability to pay that amount. Accordingly, we vacate the award of child support and that 

portion of the transitional alimony award and remand these issues for reconsideration,

taking into account, inter alia, the allocation of childcare expenses, the wife’s need, and the 

husband’s ability to pay. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. Both parties seek to 

recover the attorney’s fees and costs each incurred in this appeal. Exercising our discretion, 

we deny both requests. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Vacated in Part; Affirmed in Part; and Remanded

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S. delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. NEAL 

MCBRAYER and KENNY ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined. 

Amanda Raye Thornton and Corey T. Coleman, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, 

Andrew Francis Tittle.

Sarah Richter Perky, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellees, Deidre Lyn DeYoung Tittle.

01/29/2024
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OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

The parties met in 2011 in Michigan, where Deidre DeYoung Tittle (“Wife”) was 

employed full time as a case worker for Michigan Department of Children’s Services,

while Andrew Tittle (“Husband”) was employed by his father, Otto Tittle, for 

Aireconomics, Inc. (“AirEcon”). In 2013, Husband’s father offered him the opportunity to 

move to Middle Tennessee to become the principal manager of AirEcon’s operations in the 

region. Husband accepted, and the parties moved to Tennessee where they continued their 

domestic partnership. Wife began working for the Tennessee Department of Children’s 

Services, and Husband continued working for AirEcon in his new position. 

The parties married on September 13, 2014, and purchased a home in Williamson 

County the following February. Their only child, Alex, was born in January of 2018. Wife 

agreed to work part-time after Alex was born in order to care for the home and their child.

In March 2021, Husband moved out of the marital home, first into his parents’

condominium, then into an apartment that his father had leased. He then filed a petition for 

divorce, claiming irreconcilable differences, later amended to add inappropriate marital 

conduct. Wife’s counter-complaint also cited irreconcilable differences, but alleged, in the 

alternative, that Husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. In May 2021, after 

Husband denied Wife access to marital funds that maintained the marital home and the care 

of their three-year-old son, Wife filed a motion for reinstatement of access to credit card, 

for pendente lite support, to maintain financial status quo, and for exclusive possession of 

the marital residence. The court entered a pendente lite agreed order, reinstating Wife’s 

access to the credit card and awarding her exclusive possession of the marital home. A few 

months later, Wife filed an emergency motion for contempt and for wage garnishment after 

Husband refused to pay the court-ordered support. The court then ordered Husband to pay 

by wage assignment. The marital home was then sold pursuant to Husband’s motion and 

the court’s subsequent order, from which Wife was awarded a portion to cover her moving 

costs, as well as $9,140 from Husband’s portion for support that was still owed to Wife as 

a result of Husband’s nonpayment. 

A hearing was held for three days in July 2022, after which the trial court issued a 

fifty-page memorandum and order detailing its findings and determinations. Significantly, 

the court found Wife to be more credible than Husband, stating that it “has no confidence 

in Husband’s credibility” and noting that he, among other things, “changed his testimony 

to suit the exigencies of circumstances.”

The court found that Husband was 38 years old at the time of divorce and employed 

at his father’s company, AirEcon, as an engineer with an engineering degree from Purdue 

University and NEBB, CP, and LEED certifications in building construction management. 

It also noted that Husband’s Social Security statements reflected gross wages of $145,200 
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in 2019 and $146,600 in 2020, and that Husband also had the use and benefit of a company

vehicle and a business credit card, both of which he routinely used for personal purposes.

Furthermore, the court found and stated:

[Husband] grossly understated his income as $103,999.92 per year on his 

sworn income and expense statement and the proof showed that he colluded 

with his father to artificially reduce his salary days before filing for divorce 

in an effort to commit a fraud on the Court and avoid his financial 

responsibilities to his wife and child. [Husband] earned $146,600 per year 

twenty-five (25) days before he filed for divorce. [Husband] also failed to 

include the significant untaxed fringe benefits he received from employment 

by his father totaling an additional $57,844.61 per year including a cellular 

telephone, a 2020 Toyota 4Runner, car insurance, health insurance, 

automotive expenses, bills and utilities, entertainment, food and beverages, 

gasoline, health and wellness, merchandise, repairs and maintenance, and 

travel. [Husband] admitted that he fully intended and expected to take over 

as owner of Aireconomics, Inc. after the divorce.

(Citations to the record omitted).

With regard to the issue of transitional and in solido alimony, the court made the 

following findings:

Husband has an earning capacity five times greater than Wife. Wife’s 

resources are limited to her ability to earn income from gainful employment 

and Husband’s faithful payment of child support over the next fourteen years. 

Husband, on the other hand, not only has a well-paying job in an esoteric 

field for which he has been specially trained and qualified, but he also has 

the very reasonable expectation that he will one day be the successor to the 

successful business his father has built and which provides him a livelihood. 

Husband is obligated to provide financially for his son until the child is 

emancipated, and to provide adequate and sufficient financial resources for 

Wife to adjust to the change in circumstances Husband has brought about.

Over the near and medium term, Wife is facing the prospect of making 

substantially greater adjustments to her life than is Husband. The parties are 

both college-educated. Both have a track-record of employment in a field 

related to their formal education; Wife’s degree is in psychology, Husband’s 

degree is in engineering. Wife’s most obvious path to secure more lucrative 

employment, and improve her earning capacity within the healthcare arena, 

depends upon her ability to secure further education and licensure as a 

registered nurse. Wife testified that there are educational opportunities 

available to her in Middle Tennessee where she can pursue either an associate 
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or bachelor degree in nursing. She expressed an ambition to one day become 

a registered nurse practitioner. Statistics from the federal bureau of labor 

statistics reflect that nurses and nurse practitioners in Tennessee can earn 

more than three-times what Wife can earn in her current job. Wife did not 

present sufficient facts, however, for the Court to determine whether an 

award of rehabilitative alimony was appropriate where the amount is tied to 

the expenses associated with a particular course of study. Nevertheless, Wife 

clearly needs financial support to adjust to the economic consequences of 

divorce, which include improving her capacity to earn income. Wife is 

capable of earning income, increasing her earning capacity over time, and 

eventually becoming self-sufficient. Therefore, she is not an appropriate 

candidate for permanent alimony. Husband has all of the formal training and 

certifications he requires to prosper in his chosen field.

Based on these and other findings, the court awarded Wife a divorce on the ground 

of inappropriate marital conduct, due to Husband’s “financial duplicity” and abuse of 

alcohol. The court pointed to evidence of Husband’s “financial chicanery” with his father, 

obscuring Husband’s actual income and benefitting Husband with “constructive 

undeclared income.” It also noted evidence of Husband’s alcohol abuse, including an event 

when Husband had driven while intoxicated.

The court then divided the marital estate awarding Wife $238,522 and Husband 

$151,140, representing approximately 61% and 39%, respectively, of the net marital estate, 

little of which was income-producing. The court also approved a parenting plan and 

awarded Wife child support in the amount of $1,190 per month. 

The parenting plan states in Section J. #6, that Husband “shall be responsible for 

directly and timely paying the cost of all work-related childcare for the minor child,”

which was listed as $1,624 per month.1(Emphasis added). However, as Husband states in 

his appellate brief, the child support worksheet credits Wife with $307 and Husband with 

only $1,317 of the work-related childcare costs. Therefore, relying on the child support 

guidelines, which provide that the party paying work-related childcare expenses is entitled 

to a credit for the same on the child support worksheet, Husband contends he is being 

deprived of a credit in the amount of $307 monthly and, conversely, Wife is being credited, 

unjustly, in the same amount.

Conversely, as Wife correctly notes, the trial court’s final order states that the parties 

agreed that Alex would remain in his current preschool setting for the coming academic 

year and that “[t]he Court allocates to each party their pro rata shares of this monthly cost; 

 

1 These childcare costs were expected to terminate when Alex started kindergarten in the fall of 

2023.
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Husband’s share per month is $1,317 and Wife’s share is $307.”

2 The credits reflected on 

the child support worksheet mirrors this language. Thus, among the final order, the 

approved parenting plan, and the child support worksheet, there is conflicting language that 

creates a question of whether 1) Husband is responsible for paying all of the childcare 

expenses, in the amount of $1,624 per month, or 2) Husband is responsible for $1,317 of 

the work-related childcare costs, with Wife being responsible for the balance. 

As for the award of transitional alimony, the court used Wife’s projected monthly 

income of $2,503.20 and expenses of $5,728.86 to calculate a cash-flow deficit of 

$3,225.66. Then, adding Husband’s child support obligation of $1,190, the court’s final 

order states that it determined Wife’s monthly cash-flow deficit to be $4,538.86; however, 

this was a mathematical error. Based on the numbers listed, her deficit was $2,035.66, 

which is the amount the court relied upon in setting alimony.

3

The court acknowledged that Husband’s gross income was “harder to determine”

because of the “gamesmanship” used to “create the appearance” of Husband’s reduced 

income. Therefore, the court used a three-year average of Husband’s income plus his 

estimated fringe benefits in determining his gross annual income to be $158,700. 

Determining that wife “clearly needs financial support to adjust to the economic 

consequences of divorce,” the court awarded alimony in solido in the amount of $50,000 

to be paid directly to Wife from Husband’s share of the marital estate being held by the 

court. The court also awarded transitional alimony in the amounts of $2,000 per month for 

four years, followed by $1,500 per month for two years, then $1,000 per month for two 

years, and $500 per month for two years. Additionally, the court awarded Wife alimony in 

solido of $50,000 as necessary spousal support to defray the monthly deficits she was 

expected to incur as her transitional alimony payments decreased over time.

As for attorney’s fees, the court noted that Wife had incurred a total of $116,284.09 

in attorney’s fees and expenses, with $74,756.53 outstanding while Husband reported 

$13,500 in outstanding attorney’s fees. The court considered the complications caused by 

Husband’s changing counsel multiple times, his “litigation tactics, failure to cooperate fully 

in discovery, and efforts to obtain financial leverage over Wife,” requiring Wife to seek 

“relief from the court to obtain and enforce pendente lite support orders,” as well as Wife’s 

need and Husband’s ability to pay and awarded Wife alimony in solido in the amount of 

$75,000 for reimbursement of a portion of her attorney’s fees and other expenses.

This appeal followed. 

 

2 This provision appears on page 36 of the final order.

3 Both parties agree that this was a mathematical error, with the trial court adding the child support 

amount to Wife’s deficit instead of subtracting it. As Wife correctly notes on appeal, “however, all the 

variables upon which the alimony calculation were made are correct and supported by the record.”
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Issues

Husband raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding [Husband] suffered untreated 

alcohol addiction despite there being no credible evidence supporting this 

conclusion.

2. Whether the trial court erred in the amount and duration of transitional 

alimony and amount of alimony in solido awarded to [Wife], and whether 

the trial court failed to consider [Husband’s] ability to pay. 

3. Whether the trial court erred in crediting [Wife] with a portion of the 

work-related childcare while simultaneously ordering [Husband] to pay the 

costs in full.

4. Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to the [Wife], 

and whether the court erred in the amount of attorney fees awarded.

5. That [Husband] be awarded attorney fees and costs incurred in 

bringing this appeal.

For her part, Wife seeks to recover her attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on 

appeal and insists that Husband is not entitled to recover his costs.

4

ANALYSIS

I. HUSBAND’S ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION

For his first issue, Husband contends that the trial court erred in finding that 

Husband “suffered untreated alcohol addiction despite there being no credible evidence 

supporting this conclusion.” Furthermore, and as he states in his appellate brief, Husband 

contends that his alcohol consumption was “a major consideration in the court’s finding 

that said usage constituted inappropriate marital conduct and, further, that said conduct was 

a relevant consideration when awarding [Wife] alimony.”

For her part, Wife correctly states that the trial court awarded her the divorce on the 

ground of Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct based on two separate circumstances, 

 

4 Wife also contends that Husband should be precluded from any relief on appeal under the doctrine 

of unclean hands. We respectfully disagree.
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Husband’s “financial duplicity”

5

and abuse of alcohol,

6

and she contends that there was 

more than sufficient evidence to support each finding. 

Significantly, Husband does not challenge the trial court’s finding that Husband’s

“financial duplicity is inappropriate marital conduct.” Because Husband’s conduct of 

financial duplicity was a separate basis upon which the court found that Husband had 

engaged in inappropriate marital conduct, we affirm the trial court’s decision to award Wife 

the divorce based on Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct.

We shall now address Husband’s contentions that the evidence preponderates 

against the trial court’s findings regarding his consumption of alcohol. For her part, Wife 

contends there was more than sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings.

In cases where the action is “tried upon the facts without a jury,” Tennessee Rule of 

Civil Procedure 52.01 provides that the trial court “shall find the facts specially and shall 

state separately its conclusions of law and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.” If 

the trial court makes the required findings of fact, the trial court’s factual findings are 

reviewed de novo, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding of fact, 

unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); see 

Boarman v. Jaynes, 109 S.W.3d 286, 290 (Tenn. 2003). For the evidence to preponderate 

against a trial court’s finding of fact, it must support another finding of fact with greater 

convincing effect. Walker v. Sidney Gilreath & Assocs., 40 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2000); Realty Shop, Inc. v. R.R. Westminster Holding, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1999). 

We also give great deference to the trial court’s credibility assessments. See Watson 

v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). Also, we do not disturb “factual 

findings based on witness credibility unless clear and convincing evidence supports a 

different finding.” Coleman Mgmt., Inc. v. Meyer, 304 S.W.3d 340, 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2009) (citing Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 315, 315–16 (Tenn. 

1987).

Before the parties met, Husband pled guilty to vehicular homicide due to 

intoxication in Michigan for which he was sentenced to probation, the conditions of which

required Husband to abstain from consuming alcoholic beverages and to participate in a 

 

5 The trial court found that Husband engaged in “financial chicanery” and “financial duplicity” in 

concert with his father, who controlled the company for which Husband had been employed for years. The 

court found the chicaner and duplicity included Husband’s annual salary being reduced by $48,000 annually 

immediately prior to moving out of the marital home and filing for divorce, and Husband cutting Wife off 

from all credit cards and bank accounts. Based on these and other findings, the trial court held that “this 

financial duplicity is inappropriate marital conduct.”

6 The trial court found that “Husband’s abuse of beverage alcohol also amounts to inappropriate 

marital conduct.”
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twelve-step recovery program for alcohol abuse disorder. Husband completed his 

probation without a violation. After completing probation, Husband relocated to Tennessee

at which time he resumed drinking alcoholic beverages. As the trial court found, his drink 

of choice is beer, and he routinely consumes several beers every day; a couple of witnesses 

testified that he occasionally drinks to the point of intoxication. 

Wife’s sister-in-law, Hilary DeYoung, testified that Husband was “very focused”

on drinking alcohol when she visited and that he would insist on driving a vehicle after 

drinking even when there were sober adults available to drive. Mrs. DeYoung testified that 

she believed Husband had a problem with alcohol based on her interactions with him. Wife 

testified, and the trial court found, that “excessive consumption of alcohol is part of the 

family culture within which Husband was raised.” Specifically, Wife testified that when 

Husband is around his parents, particularly during visits at the parents’ home in Florida, 

Husband increases the amount he consumes.

One incident in particular drew the court’s attention. It was on Wife’s birthday in 

February of 2021. Although Wife had informed Husband that she planned to cook dinner 

for the family that evening, Husband informed Wife that he was going to a friend’s farm. 

When he returned home around 8:30 p.m., he appeared to be intoxicated. Although he 

missed the family birthday dinner, Wife testified that he attempted to disrupt their minor 

child’s bedtime routine. When Wife objected and expressed concern to Husband about his 

alcohol consumption, he defensively told her that he “could have a drink if he wanted” and 

he just “wanted to relax.” As the trial court described it in the final order:

The precipitating events for Husband’s decision [to get a divorce] began to 

unfold over the weekend of Wife’s birthday. February 26. On Sunday,

February 28, 2021, Husband spent the afternoon in the company of two of 

his male friends drinking beer. When he returned home that evening, he was 

noticeably intoxicated, and Wife, who had been on her own caring for their 

child, was irritated with him. 

The trial court also found that:

[Husband] routinely drinks several beers every day and often drinks to the 

point of intoxication. Excessive consumption of alcohol is part of the family 

culture within which Husband was raised. After their child was born, Wife 

urged Husband to moderate his alcohol consumption by drinking less; 

Husband responded to Wife’s pleas by insisting he did not have an alcohol 

problem. 

(Footnote omitted).
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Moreover, and significantly, the trial court credited Wife’s testimony over that of 

Husband. In fact, the discussion of the issues in the trial court’s final order begins with the 

following credibility findings:

Determining the facts of this case requires the Court to assess the relative 

credibility of the witnesses. Having done so, the Court finds Wife to be more 

credible than Husband.

Wife’s testimony was coherent and plausible. She answered questions 

directly, even on cross examination, without evasion or equivocation. She 

clearly blames Husband for the failure of the marriage, but apart from this 

bias (which is not unreasonable), Wife’s testimony was not impeached. Her 

emotional affect and demeanor while testifying were consistent with those of 

a person testifying truthfully. 

Husband’s testimony lacked these essential hallmarks of trustworthiness and 

reliability. His testimony was often contradictory. He changed his testimony 

to suit the exigencies of circumstances, and his accounts of facts were 

frequently subject to revision. Husband’s conduct during discovery was 

characterized by repeated unexcused failures to produce responsive 

documents in his possession or control. Therefore, when Husband testified 

about financial matters he claimed would be corroborated by documents he 

never produced, the Court took an adverse evidentiary inference; namely, 

that no such corroborative documents existed or, if such documents existed, 

they would contradict rather than support Husband’s factual assertions.

Husband’s demeanor and emotional affect while testifying were inconsistent 

with those of a person attempting to testify honestly. Not all of his testimony 

was contradicted by Wife, however, and the Court has no reason to discount 

Husband’s concessions and agreements to facts that benefitted Wife’s 

position. But to the extent that Husband relies upon his uncorroborated 

testimony to carry his burden of proof on matters to which Wife has offered 

contrary testimony, the Court has no confidence in Husband’s credibility.

As noted earlier, we give great deference to the trial court’s credibility 

assessments, see Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d at 490, and we do not disturb “factual 

findings based on witness credibility unless clear and convincing evidence supports a 

different finding.” Coleman Mgmt., Inc. v. Meyer, 304 S.W.3d at 348 (other citations 

omitted). Following a thorough review of this record, we have determined that the trial 

court’s factual findings concerning Husband’s lack of credibility do not support different 

or contrary findings. See id. Moreover, the trial court made the required findings of fact,

and the evidence in this record does not preponderate against those findings. See Tenn. R. 

App. P. 13(d); see also Boarman v. Jaynes, 109 S.W.3d at 290. 
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Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Husband had an alcohol 

problem that adversely affected the marriage to the extent that it constituted inappropriate 

marital conduct.

II. CREDIT FOR WORK-RELATED CHILDCARE EXPENSES

Husband contends the trial court erred in crediting Wife with a portion of the workrelated childcare expenses while simultaneously ordering Husband to pay the costs in full. 

Wife counters insisting that the final order and the child support worksheet both correctly 

note that Wife pays $307 and Husband pays $1,317 of the preschool childcare costs. We 

have determined that they are both correct because there is a conflict within the court 

documents, specifically the final order, the permanent parenting plan, and the child support 

worksheet.

As Husband states, Section J. 6. of the Permanent Parenting Plan, which is 

incorporated in the final order, states: “Father shall be responsible for directly and timely 

paying the cost of all work-related childcare for the minor child.” However, as he correctly

notes, the child support worksheet credits Wife with $307 and Husband with $1,317 of the 

work-related childcare costs. Therefore, relying on the child support guidelines, which 

provide that the party paying work-related childcare expenses is entitled to a credit for the 

same on the child support worksheet, Husband contends that he is being deprived of a credit 

in the amount of $307 monthly and, conversely, Wife is being credited, unjustly, in the 

same amount.

Conversely, as Wife correctly notes, the trial court’s final order states that the parties 

agreed that Alex would remain in his current preschool setting for the coming academic 

year and “[t]he Court allocates to each party their pro rata shares of this monthly cost; 

Husband’s share per month is $1,317 and Wife’s share is $307.” The credits reflected on 

the child support worksheet mirrors this language.

Thus, Section J. 6. of the parenting plan allocates 100% of the work-related 

childcare costs to Husband, for which he is entitled to a credit, while the final order and 

the child support worksheet credits Wife for purportedly paying $307 of the monthly costs.

Because we are unable to resolve the conflict, we remand this issue to the trial court 

to clarify its intent, allocate the costs and credits as the court intended, and, if the trial court 

deems appropriate, modify child support accordingly.

III. ALIMONY IN SOLIDO AND TRANSITIONAL ALIMONY
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Husband contends that the trial court erred in the amount7 of transitional alimony 

and amount of alimony in solido awarded to Wife. As part of this argument, Husband

contends that the amount of alimony awarded exceeded Wife’s need and that the trial court 

failed to consider Husband’s ability to pay, which “resulted in an illogical outcome creating 

an injustice for [Husband].” For her part, Wife contends that the trial court properly 

exercised its discretion in determining the amount and duration of alimony.

As both parties acknowledge, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121(i) sets forth 

the factors a court is to consider when determining whether to award spousal support, and 

“the two that are considered the most important are the disadvantaged spouse’s need and 

the obligor spouse’s ability to pay.” Riggs v. Riggs, 250 S.W.3d 453, 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2007).

Trial courts have broad discretion in determining the amount of alimony, if any, and 

the type of alimony to be awarded in view of the circumstances of each particular case, and 

such awards will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. See Broadbent v. 

Broadbent, 211 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tenn. 2006); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 976 S.W.2d 175, 180 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Thus, an appellate court reviews an award of alimony pursuant to 

the abuse of discretion standard. Broadbent, 211 S.W.3d at 220. More specifically, “[t]he 

role of an appellate court in reviewing an award of spousal support is to determine whether 

the trial court applied the correct legal standard and reached a decision that is not clearly 

unreasonable.” Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court causes an injustice 

by: (1) applying an incorrect legal standard, (2) reaching an illogical result, (3) resolving 

the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or (4) relying on reasoning that 

causes an injustice. Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011). [W]hen 

reviewing a discretionary decision by the trial court, such as an alimony determination, the 

appellate court should presume that the decision is correct and should review the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the decision.” Id. at 105–06.

The trial court found that Husband was not a credible witness, and as noted earlier,

we give great deference to the trial court’s credibility assessments. See Watson v. Watson, 

309 S.W.3d at 490. Furthermore, the trial court found that Husband and his father, who 

controlled the company that employed Husband, engaged in “financial chicanery” in an 

attempt to hide or understate his salary and the economic benefits Husband receives from 

AirEcon. The trial court’s findings regarding their financial chicanery include the 

following:

 

7 Husband frames this issue as though he is also challenging the “duration” of transitional alimony; 

however, he makes no argument and cites no authority in his brief in support of this issue. See Tenn. R.

App. P. 27(a)(7). “It is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case 

or arguments for him or her, and where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her

contention or merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.” Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Resp. of 

Sup. Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). Thus, the question of whether the evidence is sufficient to 

support an award of transitional alimony for the duration of ten years is waived.
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As detailed infra, Husband also engaged with his father, Otto Tittle, in 

financial chicanery benefitting Husband with constructive undeclared 

income, culminating in a scheme calculated to make it appear that Husband’s 

income had been reduced by $48,000 shortly prior to Husband filing for 

divorce. Otto Tittle is the undisputed controlling principal of AirEcon. Otto 

Tittle has a long-established practice of providing Husband use of the 

AirEcon company credit card for Husband’s personal charges, and allowing 

Husband personal use of a vehicle titled to AirEcon but used by Husband as 

his primary means of personal transportation, all without reimbursement to 

AirEcon. Husband even invested marital funds into purchasing upgrades and 

alterations for the most recent AirEcon vehicle Husband drives. According 

to Husband’s testimony, Otto Tittle suddenly and unilaterally reduced 

Husband’s annual compensation by $48,000 effective on the last pay period 

of February 2021.

Husband separated from Wife on March 13, 2021. . . . On or about March 8 

or 9. 2021, Husband claims to have informed his parents that he was going 

to initiate a divorce. Husband moved out of the marital residence on March 

13, 2021, and spent the next two nights with another married couple in the 

neighborhood. He then temporarily stayed in his parent’s condominium in 

the Green Hills area of Nashville.

On March 25, 2021, Otto Tittle executed a lease for a luxury apartment in 

Franklin with a monthly expense of $2,569.21. Husband moved into this 

apartment. There is no bona fide, enforceable agreement between Husband 

and Otto Tittle requiring Husband to reimburse Otto Tittle for the cost of this 

apartment. This arrangement between Husband and Otto Tittle is simply a 

constructive replacement of Husband’s purportedly reduced income. There 

is no writing of any kind, and no credible evidence from any witness, from 

which any other inference could be drawn. This financial duplicity is 

inappropriate marital conduct.

(Footnotes omitted).

The trial court additionally found, in pertinent part, as noted earlier in this opinion, 

that:

Husband has an earning capacity five times greater than Wife. Wife’s 

resources are limited to her ability to earn income from gainful employment 

and Husband’s faithful payment of child support over the next fourteen years. 

Husband, on the other hand, not only has a well-paying job in an esoteric 

field for which he has been specially trained and qualified, but he also has 
- 13 -

the very reasonable expectation that he will one day be the successor to the 

successful business his father has built and which provides him a livelihood. 

Husband is obligated to provide financially for his son until the child is 

emancipated, and to provide adequate and sufficient financial resources for 

Wife to adjust to the change in circumstances Husband has brought about.

Over the near and medium term, Wife is facing the prospect of making 

substantially greater adjustments to her life than is Husband. The parties are 

both college-educated. Both have a track-record of employment in a field 

related to their formal education; Wife’s degree is in psychology, Husband’s 

degree is in engineering. Wife’s most obvious path to secure more lucrative 

employment, and improve her earning capacity within the healthcare arena, 

depends upon her ability to secure further education and licensure as a 

registered nurse. Wife testified that there are educational opportunities 

available to her in Middle Tennessee where she can pursue either an associate 

or bachelor degree in nursing. She expressed an ambition to one day become 

a registered nurse practitioner. Statistics from the federal bureau of labor 

statistics reflect that nurses and nurse practitioners in Tennessee can earn 

more than three-times what Wife can earn in her current job. Wife did not 

present sufficient facts, however, for the Court to determine whether an 

award of rehabilitative alimony was appropriate where the amount is tied to 

the expenses associated with a particular course of study. Nevertheless, Wife 

clearly needs financial support to adjust to the economic consequences of 

divorce, which include improving her capacity to earn income. Wife is 

capable of earning income, increasing her earning capacity over time, and 

eventually becoming self-sufficient. Therefore, she is not an appropriate 

candidate for permanent alimony. Husband has all of the formal training and 

certifications he requires to prosper in his chosen field.

. . . .

Both parties must work outside the home, notwithstanding the allocation of 

residential parenting time. It is foreseeable that Wife’s employment options, 

other than her current employment, may be limited by her status as the 

primary custodial parent with the greater share of residential parenting time; 

but, at present, Wife is able to meet the requirements of her job and perform 

all her parenting responsibilities. Husband testified that Otto Tittle cut his 

pay when Husband started keeping Alex on Thursdays. Assuming this is true, 

then Husband’s financial interests are incompatible with exercising more 

parenting time than the Court has set in the permanent parenting plan.

Neither party has separate property they can use for generating income. 

Although Wife was awarded a slightly greater share of the marital estate, 
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Husband nevertheless has been awarded approximately $90,000 from the 

remaining undistributed proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. With 

annual income that has averaged greater than $150,000 over the last three 

years, Husband has a greater ability to pay marital debts, and to provide lump 

sum support to Wife in the near term, which may mitigate her need for 

support over a longer term. 

. . . .

Initially, both parties worked full time and contributed their incomes to each 

other. After the birth of their son, the parties agreed to organize their familial 

responsibilities so that Husband devoted his time and energy into generating 

income while Wife reduced her employment to part-time in order to have 

more time available for the responsibilities of homemaker and primary 

caregiving parent.

Husband is the party at fault for the demise of the marriage. He resumed and 

gradually increased his consumption of beverage alcohol notwithstanding his 

previous felony conviction for vehicular homicide involving intoxication. It 

was Husband’s decision to separate from his family and file for divorce. 

Husband offered no credible evidence that Wife engaged in any 

inappropriate marital conduct. He and his father, Otto Tittle, contrived a 

scenario calculated to make it appear that Husband had less income than he 

actually received. Husband chose to pursue litigation tactics that 

unreasonably and unnecessarily increased Wife’s attorney fees and expenses. 

His inappropriate marital conduct is a relevant factor to consider in 

determining the question of alimony.

At trial, Wife projected her net post-divorce monthly cash-flow to be a deficit 

of ($3,225.66). She projected net monthly income of $2,503.20 and total 

expenses of ($5,728.86). These projections do not include Wife’s receipt of 

any child support from Husband. Using Wife’s projected gross monthly 

income of $3,083.88, the Court has calculated Husband’s child support 

obligation to be $1,190, thereby reducing Wife’s negative monthly cash flow 

by that amount. This still leaves Wife with a net monthly cash-flow deficit 

of ($4,538.86).8

Husband submitted income and expense statements that understate his 

income and overstate his expenses. He purports to have gross income of only 

$104,000. As detailed in the computation of child support, Husband actually 

 

8 As noted earlier, Wife’s deficit was actually $2,035.66, not $4,538.86. Importantly, the trial court 

applied the correct deficit of $2,035.66 when setting alimony instead of the erroneous figure of $4,538.86.
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receives income, both direct compensation, and constructive income through 

fringe benefits, of more than $150,000. Husband is in the 20% marginal tax 

bracket for federal income taxes and is exposed to payroll taxes of 7.65%. 

Therefore, he has approximately $108,400 net, after-tax, annual income. This 

leaves Husband with $9,033 net after-tax income each month. The Court has 

determined Husband’s child support obligation to be $1,190; therefore, 

Husband has $7,843 available income net of taxes and child support with 

which to pay for his monthly expenses and to pay alimony.

Husband claims he has monthly living expenses of $5,660, not including debt 

service on the $23,288 balance of the Chase credit card. Husband has 

sufficient liquid assets from the division of the marital estate with which to 

pay off the Chase credit card. Therefore, every month Husband has $2,183 

net of taxes, child support and his personal living expenses with which to pay 

alimony. This is still an amount less than Wife’s monthly cash flow deficit. 

An award of alimony in solido can mitigate Wife’s monthly shortfall, and 

provide a cushion by which she can absorb it over time.

(Footnotes omitted).

Based on the foregoing facts and findings, as well as others, the trial court awarded 

Wife $2,000 per month for 48 months; followed by $1,500 per months for 24 months; 

followed by $1,000 per month for 24 months; followed by $500 per month for 24 months. 

It additionally awarded Wife alimony in solido in the amount of $50,000 to “mitigate 

Wife’s monthly shortfall, and provide a cushion by which she can absorb it over time.”

The court explained that its reasoning for the transitional alimony time frame of ten 

years was that “the period of time [was] necessary for Alex to complete the eighth grade. 

The declining amount of transitional alimony is calculated to incentivize Wife’s reasonable 

efforts to achieve financial independence.” The court also explained that the “award of 

transitional alimony shall be modifiable in both amount and duration in the event of a 

material change in circumstances during the period of the award.”

9

Husband contends that the awards exceed Wife’s need and his ability to pay. 

Specifically, while addressing Wife’s need, Husband argues:

The court found that [Wife’s] net monthly income to be $2,503.20 and her 

total expenses to be $5,728.86. This results in a monthly deficit of $3,225.66. 

Next, the court states that Plaintiff’s child support obligation of $1,190.00 

should be applied to reduce [Wife’s] negative monthly cash flow by an equal 

 

9 The court also ruled that the award of transitional alimony shall terminate upon Wife’s death or

remarriage and upon Husband’s death.
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amount. The court finds that this results in [Wife] having a net monthly cash 

flow of $4,538.86. However, adding $1,190.00 to $2,503.2 equals $3,693.20. 

Subtracting that amount from [Wife’s] total expenses results in a monthly 

deficit of $2,035.66, not $4,539.86. The court overstates [Wife’s] need.

We agree that Wife’s monthly deficit was $2,035.66, not $4,539.86. Nevertheless, 

the record reveals that the trial court based its transitional alimony award on Wife having 

a deficit of a monthly deficit of $2,035.66, not $4,539.86. Although the trial court stated 

the wrong sum in one paragraph, the trial court’s alimony ruling was not based on Wife 

having a monthly deficit of $4,539.86.

As both parties acknowledge in their briefs, both Husband and Wife have an 

effective deficit during the first four years. As for Wife, the amount of transitional alimony 

awarded to her was $2,000 per month for 48 months, which represents an apparent deficit 

to her of $35.66 per month, then she is scheduled to receive $1,500 per month for 24 

months, which represents a deficit of $535.66 per month, and her deficit increases every 

two years as her transitional alimony decreases. At the same time, Husband has a deficit as 

well, but it appears that the amount of Husband’s deficit during the first year or two, is 

incorrect because the trial court apparently failed to include Husband’s work-related 

childcare for that period of time, which is either the entire amount of childcare, that being 

either $1,624, or a prorated share of $1,317.10

The alimony payments were to begin the first month following the entry of the final 

order, which was entered on September 16, 2022. Thus, the first alimony payment was due 

on October 1, 2022, and Husband was obligated to pay work related childcare until Alex 

started kindergarten. The record suggests that Alex was to being kindergarten the following 

fall, but that is not entirely certain. Thus, until Alex started kindergarten, Husband was 

obligated to pay either all of the childcare expense, which was listed as $1,624, or his 

prorated share, which was listed as $1,317, with Wife’s share being $307. Regardless of 

which amount is correct, it appears that the trial court did not factor this expense in when 

determining Husband’s ability to pay $2,000 of alimony during the first year or two 

following the divorce. Accordingly, Husband’s deficit may be greater for the first year or 

two, depending on when Alex starts kindergarten, than anticipated by the trial court.

As for the remaining eight years of transitional alimony, Husband’s deficit is 

diminished and then eliminated as his alimony obligation decreases, while Wife’s deficit 

increases. Nevertheless, the trial court took Wife’s ongoing deficit into consideration when 

it awarded Wife alimony in solido of $50,000 to bridge this gap.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that Husband’s transitional alimony obligation 

for the first two years, or a portion of that period during which he pays childcare expenses, 

 

10 Which amount is correct is to be determined by the trial court on remand as noted above.
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creates a burden on Husband that appears greater than he is able to pay. Thus, it may 

constitute an injustice to Husband. For this reason, we vacate the award of alimony for the 

first two years and remand the issue to the trial court to reconsider Husband’s ability to pay 

in light of his obligation to pay all or a prorated portion of the work-related childcare and 

to modify the alimony award accordingly. We affirm the remainder of the award of 

transitional alimony, as well as the award of alimony in solido in the amount of $50,000 to 

aid Wife in the transition as her transitional alimony decreases.

IV. ATTORNEY’S FEES INCURRED IN THE TRIAL COURT

Husband contends that the trial court erred in awarding Wife her attorney’s fees 

incurred in the trial court proceedings. Husband does not dispute that the trial court applied 

the relevant factors and considered each in its determination. Nevertheless, he contends 

that the court incorrectly calculated both Wife’s need and his ability to pay which “resulted 

in an illogical outcome creating an injustice for [Husband].” For her part, Wife contends 

that the trial court based its decision on a thorough weighing of the factors set forth in 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121, and the award was justifiably based on Husband’s 

“abuse of the litigation and discovery processes, financial duplicity, and dishonest and 

legally untenable positions.” She also notes that the trial court only awarded her a portion 

of her attorney’s fees. 

In a divorce action, an award of attorney’s fees constitutes alimony in solido.

Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 113 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(h)(1)(B)). When 

determining whether to award attorney’s fees as alimony in solido, the trial court must 

consider: (1) the total amount of attorney fees and expenses paid by each party in 

connection with the proceedings; (2) whether the attorney fees and expenses requested are 

reasonable; (3) whether the attorney fees and expenses were necessary; and (4) the relevant 

factors regarding alimony set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121(i). Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-5-121(h)(1)(B)). Such an award is only appropriate when the spouse 

seeking it lacks sufficient funds to pay his or her legal expenses or would be required to 

deplete his or her resources in order to pay them. Gonsewski, 350 S.W. 3d at 113.

An award of attorney fees in a divorce case is “within the sound discretion of the 

trial court, and unless the evidence preponderates against the award, it will not be disturbed 

on appeal.” Kincaid v. Kincaid, 912 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Lyon 

v. Lyon, 765 S.W.2d 759, 762–63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)).

The trial court’s ruling on this issue is thorough and complete. After noting the 

professional expertise of Wife’s trial counsel, Sarah Richter Perky, and the fact that she is 

representing Wife pursuant to an hourly-rate fee arrangement that is neither contingent nor 

fixed, the court stated in its order:
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Her law firm maintains business records that capture and report the services 

rendered by billing professionals, along with the timekeeper’s hourly rate, a 

narrative description of services provided, the time required for the services 

to be performed and the value of those services as calculated by multiplying 

the time invested by the timekeeper’s hourly rate. From these business 

records, the Court finds Ms. Perky’s initial hourly billing rate was $400 

which is within the range of hourly rates customarily charged in this judicial 

district for contested divorce litigation between parents with minor children. 

As a cost containment measure, beginning in March, 2022 Ms. Perky reduced 

her hourly rate to $375. Throughout her representation of Wife, Ms. Perky, 

from time to time used the services of paralegals and other attorneys to 

perform tasks at a lower hourly rate than her own.

Ms. Perky’s representation of Wife in this case was complicated in part by 

the fact Husband changed his own counsel more than once. Moreover. 

Husband’s litigation tactics, failure to cooperate fully in discovery, and 

efforts to obtain financial leverage over Wife by deviating from the 

customary manner by which the family paid its monthly bills, created 

circumstances that required Wife to seek interlocutory relief from the court 

to obtain and enforce pendente lite support orders.

The issues in this case were made more complicated by Husband’s efforts to 

conceal his income and not to cooperate in discovery. Nevertheless, Wife 

was the prevailing party in all respects.

From all of the foregoing, the Court concludes the services provided by Ms. 

Perky and her firm were necessary and Wife’s attorney fees are reasonable 

in the aggregate amount of $116,284. The Court hereby awards Wife 

additional alimony in solido in the total amount of $75,000 representing 

Wife’s unpaid attorney fees and expenses and partial reimbursement of 

attorney fees Wife has paid during the course of the litigation[.]

(Footnotes omitted).11

As noted earlier, the trial court made the express finding that 

Husband’s testimony lacked [the] essential hallmarks of trustworthiness and 

reliability. His testimony was often contradictory. He changed his testimony 

 

11 The order went on to state that Husband has the option to pay the attorney’s fee award as follows:

“$15,000 lump sum on the first day of September for the first five anniversaries of the entry of this 

Memorandum and Order. Husband shall have the right, at his option, to pre-pay all or a portion of the total 

amount of $75.000 and/or any of the five lump sum installments of $15,000, at any time before the due date 

thereof.”
- 19 -

to suit the exigencies of circumstances, and his accounts were frequently 

subject to revision. Husband’s conduct during discovery was characterized 

by repeated unexcused failures to produce responsive documents in his 

possession or control. 

The court also found that Husband also engaged with his father “in financial 

chicanery benefitting Husband with constructive undeclared income, culminating in a 

scheme calculated to make it appear that Husband’s income had been reduced by $48,000 

shortly prior to Husband filing for divorce.” This included his father executing a lease for 

an upscale apartment with a monthly expense of $2,569, which his father paid for. And, as 

the trial court found, “This arrangement between Husband and Otto Tittle is simply a 

constructive replacement of Husband’s purportedly reduced income. There is no writing of 

any kind, and no credible evidence from any witness, from which any other inference could 

be drawn. This financial duplicity is inappropriate marital conduct.” The trial court also 

found that Husband’s “unconstrained use of the [company] 4Runner and unrestricted 

access to the AirEcon credit card create[s] constructive income to Husband which the Court 

must recognize when computing child support, [and] when determining Husband’s ability 

to pay alimony[.]”

As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained:

It is well-settled that an award of attorney’s fees in a divorce case constitutes 

alimony in solido. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(h)(1) (“alimony in solido 

may include attorney fees, where appropriate”); Herrera v. Herrera, 944 

S.W.2d 379, 390 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). . . . As with any alimony award, in 

deciding whether to award attorney’s fees as alimony in solido, the trial court 

should consider the factors enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 

36-5-121(i). A spouse with adequate property and income is not entitled to 

an award of alimony to pay attorney’s fees and expenses. Umstot v. Umstot, 

968 S.W.2d 819, 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Such awards are appropriate 

only when the spouse seeking them lacks sufficient funds to pay his or her 

own legal expenses, see Houghland v. Houghland, 844 S.W.2d 619, 623 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), or the spouse would be required to deplete his or her 

resources in order to pay them, see Harwell v. Harwell, 612 S.W.2d 182, 185 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). Thus, where the spouse seeking such an award has 

demonstrated that he or she is financially unable to procure counsel, and 

where the other spouse has the ability to pay, the court may properly grant 

an award of attorney’s fees as alimony. See id. at 185. 

Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 113.

Here, Wife’s monthly expenses exceed her income, and she lacks sufficient funds 

to pay her own legal expenses. See Houghland, 844 S.W.2d at 623. Moreover, if she were 
- 20 -

to pay her legal expenses, she would be required to deplete her resources in order to pay 

them. See Harwell, 612 S.W.2d at 185. Accordingly, she has demonstrated that she is 

financially unable to procure counsel, while Husband has the ability to pay. Accordingly, 

we affirm the trial court’s award to Wife of $75,000 to pay a portion of her attorney’s fees 

and expenses incurred in this action.

V. ATTORNEY’S FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL

Husband requests that he be awarded his reasonable attorney fees incurred in 

bringing this appeal. Wife requests that she be awarded her attorney’s fees on appeal and 

that Husband’s request be denied. 

“Whether to grant such an award is within this Court’s sole discretion.” Sample v. 

Sample, 605 S.W.3d 629, 640 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Cain-Swope v. Swope, 523 

S.W.3d 79, 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016)) (other citation omitted). In considering a request 

for attorney’s fees, we examine “the ability of the requesting party to pay the accrued fees, 

the requesting party’s success in the appeal . . . and any other equitable factor that need be 

considered.” Id. (quoting Cain-Swope, 523 S.W.3d at 101–02). We also consider whether 

the other party has the ability to pay the requesting party’s attorney’s fees. See Harwell v. 

Harwell, 612 S.W.2d at 185; see also Tippens-Florea v. Florea, No. M2011-00408-COAR3-CV, 2012 WL 1965593 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2012). 

Here, we conclude that Husband sought this appeal in good faith, and he has 

prevailed on two issues while Wife prevailed on the remaining issues. We are also 

cognizant of the fact that the trial court awarded Wife $50,000 in the form of alimony in 

solido to defray the monthly deficit she will likely experience during the ten-year period of 

transitional alimony. Further, she was awarded an additional $75,000 to defer the bulk of 

the attorney’s fees she incurred in the trial court proceedings. Considering these two 

substantial awards and concluding that neither party has the ability to pay the other’s

attorney’s fees incurred on appeal, we deny both parties’ requests for attorney’s fees.

IN CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is vacated in part, affirmed in part, and this cause is 

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Two-thirds 

of the costs of appeal are assessed against Husband, Andrew Francis Tittle, and one-third 

against Wife, Deidre Lyn DeYoung Tittle.

________________________________

 FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S.