IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-09-00325-CR

No. 10-09-00326-CR

DAVID SEGOVIA,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 85th District Court

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 08-01596-CRF-85 and 08-02618-CRF-85

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After two indictments charged David Segovia with aggravated robbery, a jury 

found him guilty on both charges and assessed punishment at forty years in prison and 

a $2,500 fine in each case. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served 

concurrently. Segovia appeals from both judgments, filing a joint brief that asserts five 

issues. We will affirm.

On the evening of December 13, 2007, the apparently same person committed 

back-to-back armed robberies of two Handi-Stop convenience stores in Bryan within an 
Segovia v. State Page 2

hour of each other. Both robbery victims said that the robber “clicked” his gun and 

pointed it at them in the robberies. About six months later, one of the stores’ cashiers 

identified Segovia in a police photo line-up as the robber. At trial, the cashier identified 

Segovia as the robber, and the manager of the other store testified that Segovia looked 

like the robber, but she could not positively identify him. The robberies were recorded 

by the stores’ security cameras, and two other witnesses who were familiar with 

Segovia identified him in each robbery videotape.

In his first two issues, Segovia challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the 

evidence on venue. He asserts that the evidence is insufficient to prove that the offenses 

occurred in Texas or that Brazos County is in Texas because no witness testified that 

Brazos County is in Texas. The State first responds that Segovia’s venue complaint is 

waived because the presumption that venue was proved applies. See TEX. R. APP. P.

44.2(c)(1); Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981).

Venue is not an element of the offense. Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 

771, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); State v. Blankenship, 170

S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. ref’d); Henley v. State, 98

S.W.3d 732, 734 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, pet. ref’d). Thus, it need be 

proved by only a preponderance of the evidence. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 13.17 (Vernon 2005); Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 604

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Fairfield, 610 S.W.2d at 779; Blankenship, 170 S.W.3d 

at 681; Sudds v. State, 140 S.W.3d 813, 816 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2004, no pet.). An appellate court must presume that venue was proved 

unless it was challenged in the trial court or the record affirmatively 

shows the contrary. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(c)(1); Hernandez v. State, 198

S.W.3d 257, 268 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. ref’d); Blankenship, 170

S.W.3d at 681; Henley, 98 S.W.3d at 734.

Witt v. State, 237 S.W.3d 394, 399 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. ref’d).

Segovia did not dispute venue in the trial court. We next determine if it is 
Segovia v. State Page 3

affirmatively shown in the record that the presumption of proper venue is inapplicable. 

Lee v. State, 903 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1995, pet. ref’d). For the record 

to affirmatively show that venue was improper, it must affirmatively negate whatever 

proof was made by the State on venue. Holdridge v. State, 707 S.W.2d 18, 21-22 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1986); see also O’Hara v. State, 837 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, 

pet. ref’d).

The cashier testified that she lived and worked in Bryan and that both stores that 

were robbed were in Brazos County. We take judicial notice that Bryan is in Brazos 

County and that Brazos County is in Texas. See Black v. State, 645 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1983). The record does not affirmatively show that venue was improper. 

We therefore presume that venue was proved. Accordingly, Segovia’s sufficiency 

complaints on venue are waived, and we overrule his first two issues.

In his third and fourth issues, Segovia complains that the prosecutor improperly 

commented on Segovia’s failure to testify in the State’s rebuttal argument in the 

punishment phase. The argument at issue is:

[PROSECUTOR]: Again, at one [sic] point does this man take 

responsibility for anything he’s ever done? And before any change could 

ever happen, there has to be an admission and responsibility. And it’s 

required your verdict --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. ... State is going 

to defendant’s election not to testify. It’s clearly a violation of -- of his 

right to not testify and not incriminate himself or make a statement. His 

argument is clearly inappropriate and outside the scope.

THE COURT: Sustained.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I move for a mistrial.
Segovia v. State Page 4

THE COURT: Denied.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Ask the jury be instructed to disregard his 

prior statement.

THE COURT: The jury is instructed that any argument that could 

be interpreted as any comment upon the defendant’s failure to testify in 

this case is improper, and you should disregard the last argument of the 

prosecutor that was made that could have any such implication. The 

defendant is free to not testify, and that circumstance cannot be taken or 

used in any way in determining his punishment that should be assessed in 

this case.

Issue three specifically asserts that the State’s improper argument so infected the 

trial with unfairness as to make the resulting punishment a denial of due process and 

due course of law. Rule 33.1 applies to objections to jury argument. See Threadgill v. 

State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). To preserve a 

complaint for appellate review, the issue on appeal must comport with the objection 

made at trial. Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “[A]n objection 

stating one legal theory may not be used to support a different legal theory on appeal.” 

Dixon v. State, 2 S.W.3d 263, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (op. on reh’g). Constitutional 

claims are not preserved if not timely made in the trial court. See Broxton v. State, 909 

S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Barker v. State, --- S.W.3d ---, ---, 2011 WL 

505236, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 15, 2011, no pet. h.) (holding that 

alleged federal and state due-process violations were not preserved because they were 

not asserted in trial court). The constitutional grounds being asserted in issue three 

were not asserted in the trial court and thus are not preserved for appellate review. 

Accordingly, issue three is overruled.
Segovia v. State Page 5

Issue four specifically asserts that the argument was calculated to deny Segovia a 

fair and impartial trial. We construe this issue as a complaint that the trial court erred 

in failing to grant a mistrial. Jury argument is limited to: (1) summations of the 

evidence; (2) reasonable deductions from the evidence; (3) answers to argument of 

opposing counsel; and (4) a plea for law enforcement. Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 154 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “A comment on an accused’s failure to testify violates the 

accused’s state and federal constitutional privileges against self-incrimination.” Smith v. 

State, 65 S.W.3d 332, 339 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 38.08 (Vernon 2005).

The State replies that the rebuttal argument at issue was invited by Segovia’s 

counsel’s punishment-phase argument that Segovia may not be wholly responsible for 

both robberies and that the argument was thus not improper. See, e.g., Long v. State, 823 

S.W.2d 259, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We will assume without deciding that the 

argument was uninvited and will proceed to a mistrial analysis.

The denial of a motion for mistrial, which is appropriate for “highly 

prejudicial and incurable errors,” is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 

standard. See Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) 

(quoting Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)); Ladd v. 

State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

[T]he question of whether a mistrial should have been granted 

involves most, if not all, of the same considerations that attend a 

harm analysis. A mistrial is the trial court’s remedy for improper 

conduct that is “so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and 

expense would be wasteful and futile.” In effect, the trial court 

conducts an appellate function: determining whether improper 

conduct is so harmful that the case must be redone. Of course, the 

harm analysis is conducted in light of the trial court’s curative 
Segovia v. State Page 6

instruction. Only in extreme circumstances, where the prejudice is 

incurable, will a mistrial be required.

Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Thus, the 

appropriate test for evaluating whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in overruling a motion for mistrial is a tailored version of the 

test originally set out in Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259-60 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1998), a harm analysis case. See Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77. The 

Mosley factors that we consider in determining whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying a mistrial during the punishment phase 

are: (1) the prejudicial effect, (2) curative measures, and (3) the likelihood 

of the same punishment being assessed. Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77; see 

Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259.

Abbott v. State, 196 S.W.3d 334, 347 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d).

Considering the Mosley factors, we cannot say that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. Any prejudicial effect was not incurable 

because the State’s comment was indirect, was arguably invited, and was not flagrantly 

improper. The trial court’s instruction to disregard was the proper curative measure in 

this instance. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

Finally, Segovia was facing a sentence of life or five to ninety-nine years in prison for 

these aggravated robberies, which are first-degree felonies. In each robbery, Segovia 

pointed a gun at the victim. Punishment evidence included Segovia’s prior state-jail 

felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance (heroin) and evidence of two 

loaded guns (a pistol and a shotgun) and drug-dealing paraphernalia found in his 

bedroom. The likelihood of the same punishment being assessed without the State’s 

comment is very high. See Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 85. Issue four is overruled.

Segovia’s fifth issue asserts that he was denied due process and due course of 

law by the introduction of evidence of a flawed identification. Segovia complains that 
Segovia v. State Page 7

the pretrial photo line-up that the cashier used to identify him was impermissibly 

suggestive and tainted the cashier’s in-court identification of Segovia as the robber. The 

cashier had told police that the robber had a teardrop tattoo, and Segovia complains 

that his photo was the only one with a facial tattoo. He also complains that many of the 

persons in the other photos “differ dramatically” from Segovia’s photo.

The State correctly argues that Segovia has failed to preserve this complaint for 

appellate review because he did not obtain a pretrial ruling on the photo line-up, nor 

did he object at trial to the cashier’s testimony or the introduction of the line-up into 

evidence. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); In re G.A.T., 16 S.W.3d 818, 827 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (citing Perry v. State, 703 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1986)). Accordingly, we overrule issue five.

Having overruled all of Segovia’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

REX D. DAVIS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed May 11, 2011

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