In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 24–1426

Submitted September 10, 2024—Filed September 11, 2024

Nicholas Gluba, Charles Aldrich, and Marco Battaglia, 

Appellants,

vs.

State Objection Panel,

Appellee,

Dan Smicker, Cynthia Yockey, Jack Sayers, Garrett Anderson, Trudy 

Caviness, and Elaine Gaesser,

Intervenors-Appellees.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert, 

judge.

Congressional candidates appeal from a district court order denying their 

challenge to a State Objection Panel decision removing their names from the 

general election ballot due to failure to comply with statutory nomination 

requirements. Affirmed.

Per curiam. Waterman, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of 

the case.

Jacob P. Heard (argued) and Julia A. Cutler of Iowa Defenders, PLLC, Clive, 

and Jennifer H. De Kock (argued) of Coppola Hockenberg, P.C., West Des Moines,

for appellants.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General; Leif A. Olson, Chief Deputy Attorney 

General; Eric Wessan, Solicitor General; Patrick C. Valencia, Deputy Solicitor 
2

General; and William C. Admussen (argued) Assistant Solicitor General, for 

appellee. 

Alan R. Ostergren (argued) of Alan R. Ostergren, P.C., Des Moines, for 

intervenors-appellees.

Shayla L. McCormally of McCormally & Cosgrove, P.L.L.C., Des Moines,

for amicus curiae Iowa Democratic Party and Democratic Congressional 

Campaign Committee.
3

Per Curiam.

We are asked to review a district court ruling upholding a decision by the 

State Objection Panel disqualifying three Libertarian Party of Iowa candidates for 

the United States House of Representatives from the 2024 general election ballot.

Both the Panel and the district court found that the Libertarian Party had failed 

to comply with the statutory process for nominating candidates by convention. 

As set forth herein, we generally agree with their reasoning and therefore affirm 

the judgment below.

I. Facts and Procedural History.

Under Iowa law, political parties whose candidates received at least 2% of 

the vote in the previous year’s gubernatorial or presidential elections may apply 

for official political party status. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 721—21.10. In the 

2022 general election, the Libertarian Party candidate for governor received more 

than 2% of the total vote. The Libertarian Party filed for and was granted status 

as a qualified political party.

Qualified political parties generally select their general election candidates 

through a primary election. Iowa law provides, “Candidates of all political parties 

for all offices which are filled at a regular biennial election by direct vote of the 

people shall be nominated at a primary election at the time and in the manner 

directed in this chapter.” Iowa Code § 43.3 (2024).

Iowa holds its primary election on the first Tuesday following the first 

Monday in June. Id. § 43.7. A congressional candidate qualifies for the primary 

election by filing nomination papers with the requisite number of signatures no 

later than 5:00 p.m. on the eighty-first day before the primary election. Id.

§ 43.11(2). Congressional candidates must file petitions with not less than 1,726 

signatures of eligible electors, including at least 47 signatures from each of half 
4

of the counties in their respective districts. Id. § 45.1(3).1 A person may sign more 

than one petition for the same office. Id. § 45.6(1).

This year, at least one Democratic Party candidate and at least one 

Republican Party candidate filed nomination papers by the deadline for the 

offices of United States Representative in Congress for Iowa’s first, third, and 

fourth congressional districts. No Libertarian candidates filed for those districts.

At the June primary, the respective party voters selected the Democratic and 

Republican nominees for those districts whose names will appear on the 

November general election ballot.

Iowa law also provides a second path by which a political party may place 

a candidate on the general election ballot. Specifically, when there is a “vacancy”

due to no candidate from that party having filed nomination papers to get on the

primary ballot, the party may nominate a candidate. Id. § 43.78. For a 

congressional race, the nomination must occur at a congressional district

convention. Id. § 43.78(1)(b). In the event the party makes such a nomination, 

the name of the candidate shall be submitted in writing to the secretary of state 

not later than 5:00 p.m. on the seventy-sixth day before the general election. Id.

§ 43.78(2).

The law prescribes a multi-step process for selecting the delegates to the 

congressional district conventions. First, local precinct caucuses meeting in the 

winter of each even-numbered year elect delegates to county conventions. Id.

§ 43.4(1). When the precinct caucuses select county convention delegates, those 

names are to be provided to the county auditor. Id. §§ 43.4(4), .91. Each county 

convention thus consists of delegates “elected at the last preceding precinct 

1“ ‘Eligible elector’ means a person who possesses all of the qualifications necessary to 

entitle the person to be registered to vote, whether or not the person is in fact so registered.”

Iowa Code § 39.3(6).
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caucus.” Id. § 43.90. Further: “The term of office of delegates to the county 

convention shall begin on the day following their election at the precinct 

caucus . . . .” Id. § 43.94 (emphasis added).

When they convene, the county conventions in turn choose delegates to 

the congressional district conventions and the state convention. Id. § 43.97(3). 

The Libertarian Party collapsed this process somewhat. By its own 

admission, it conducted precinct caucuses and county conventions on the same 

day, January 15, 2024. Following those precinct caucuses, the Libertarian Party 

failed to provide to any county auditor the names of any delegates. See id.

§ 43.4(4). At that time, i.e., January 15, delegates to the district conventions and 

state convention were purportedly selected.2 Later, on June 8, the party had a 

state convention where it filled its ballot vacancies for United States Congress by 

nominating petitioners Nicholas Gluba, Marco Battaglia, and Charles Aldrich as 

the candidates for Iowa’s first, third, and fourth congressional districts,

respectively. On July 29, Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich filed certificates of 

nomination with the secretary of state.

Dan Smicker and Cynthia Yockey (first district), Trudy Caviness and 

Elaine Gassner (third district), and Jack Sayers and Garrett Anderson (fourth

district) timely filed objections to those certificates of nomination. See id.

§ 43.24(1)(a), (b)(2). Each of these individuals resides in one of the nominees’

congressional districts and is eligible to vote in the November 2024 general 

elections. Their objections challenged, primarily, the validity of the Libertarian 

Party’s January 15 county conventions.

2Our record is sparse. There are no minutes of any Libertarian Party precinct caucuses 

or county conventions. We have an affidavit from the cochair of the Libertarian Party who states, 

with reference to January 15, “The Libertarian Party of Iowa held its county conventions in the 

same locations and at the same time as Caucuses.” He also states, “Upon conclusion of the 

conventions, all participating counties submitted their lists of delegates to me.”
6

Thereafter, the State Objection Panel, consisting of the secretary of state, 

auditor of state, and attorney general, scheduled a hearing to determine the 

validity of the nominations. See id. § 43.24(3)(a). Because all three separate 

actions involved nearly identical questions of law and fact, they were 

consolidated and the administrative hearing for all three petitioners was held on 

August 28.

In their motions and oral arguments, the objectors challenged the 

nominations as defective for two reasons: (1) the Libertarian Party failed to 

comply with Iowa’s precinct caucus procedures by not filing the names of their 

elected county convention delegates within sixty days of their caucus, see id.

§ 43.4(4) (“Within sixty days after the date of the caucus the county central 

committee shall certify to the county [auditor] the names of those elected as . . . 

delegates to the county convention.”); and (2) the Libertarian Party’s district and 

state delegates were not authorized to nominate congressional candidates

because the county convention delegates had not validly elected these delegates 

back on January 15, see id. § 43.94 (“The term of office of delegates to the county 

convention shall begin on the day following their election at the 

precinct caucus . . . .”).

Following oral argument, the Panel voted 2–1 to sustain the objections and

remove Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich from the general election ballot. The Panel

found that because there were no county convention delegates whose term had 

begun on January 15 when the county conventions were held, any actions they 

took were invalid, including the selection of delegates to any district or state 

conventions. The Panel noted in a footnote that the Libertarian Party’s failure to 

notify the county auditors of county convention delegates also failed to comply 

with Iowa law. One Panel member dissented on various grounds.
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On September 3, Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich filed a petition in the Polk 

County District Court for judicial review of the Panel’s decision and for a 

temporary injunction. That same day the district court granted the temporary 

injunction and enjoined the secretary of state from certifying the 2024 general 

election ballot pending judicial review. On September 5, a contested hearing was 

held in the district court. 

Working over the weekend, the district court issued a thirteen-page ruling

on Saturday, September 7, dissolving the injunction and affirming the Panel’s 

decision in its entirety. The district court concluded that under Iowa Code 

section 43.94, “any action taken by a [county convention] delegate-elect on the 

day he or she is elected is not a valid exercise of their authority as a delegate.” 

This meant that the June 8 district conventions allegedly formed by the January 

15 county conventions were not valid. The court agreed with the Panel that strict 

compliance with this law was required. 

Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich appealed and asked for expedited review. We 

retained the appeal and granted the request for expedited review. We are filing 

this opinion on an expedited basis based on the Panel’s representation that the 

names of candidates for the general election ballot must be finalized by 11:59 

p.m. on Wednesday, September 11.

II. Standard of Review.

Previously, we have “assumed without deciding that the State Objection 

Panel was an administrative agency from which judicial review could be sought 

under Iowa Code chapter 17A.” Schmett v. State Objections Panel, 973 N.W.2d 

300, 302 (Iowa 2022) (per curiam) (citing Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 

N.W.2d. 845, 848 n.1 (Iowa 2014)). Here, as in those prior cases, the district 

court proceeded on that basis. Resolution of this matter “is not germane to our 
8

determination in this expedited appeal.” Id. (quoting Chiodo, 846 N.W.2d at 848 

n.1). Thus, we will again assume without deciding that the Panel’s decision is 

subject to chapter 17A judicial review.

We review objections to the Panel’s interpretation of the relevant statutes 

for correction of errors at law. Id. at 303. “We review constitutional issues de 

novo.” Save Our Stadiums v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 982 N.W.2d 139, 

143 (Iowa 2022).

III. Legal Analysis.

Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich do not dispute that the process by which 

they were nominated did not comply with Iowa Code section 43.94, in that the 

term of the Libertarian Party county convention delegates who selected the 

Libertarian Party district convention delegates had not commenced on January 

15, 2024. However, they raise several alternative grounds why the Panel erred in 

striking their candidacies from the November ballot.

A. Standing. We begin by addressing whether the objectors had standing 

to make their challenges before the Panel.

Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich argue that the objecting parties—not being 

members of the Libertarian Party—lack standing because they do not “have a 

special interest in the challenged action, ‘as distinguished from a general 

interest.’ ” Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 419 (Iowa 2008) (quoting City of 

Des Moines v. Pub. Emp. Rels. Bd., 275 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Iowa 1979)). This 

argument incorrectly conflates the standing requirements for judicial review with 

the requirements for raising an objection before an agency. “To show 

aggrievement entitling one to judicial review, a party must demonstrate ‘(1) a 

specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the agency decision 

and (2) a specific and injurious effect on this interest by the decision.’ ” Richards 
9

v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 454 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Iowa 1990) (quoting Iowa 

Power & Light Co. v. Iowa State Com. Comm’n, 410 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Iowa 1987)

(en banc)). By contrast, “a person may be a proper party to agency proceedings 

and not have standing to obtain judicial review.” Id.; see also Dickey v. Iowa 

Ethics & Campaign Disclosure Bd., 943 N.W.2d 34, 37–38 (Iowa 2020). The 

requirements to be a proper party to an agency proceeding are purely statutory. 

Here, the statute provides,

1. Written objections required. Nomination petitions or certificates of 

nomination filed under this chapter which are apparently in 

conformity with the law are valid unless objection is made in 

writing.a. Objections to the legal sufficiency of a nomination petition 

or certificate of nomination filed or issued under this chapter or to 

the eligibility of a candidate may be filed in writing by any person 

who would have the right to vote for the candidate for the office in 

question. Objections relating to incorrect or incomplete information 

for information that is required under section 43.14 or 43.18 shall 

be sustained.

Iowa Code § 43.24(1)(a). This is broad language—i.e., “any person who would 

have the right to vote”—and the six objectors met the statutory requirements. Id.

They are residents of the first, third, and fourth congressional districts,

respectively, who would have the right to vote for the proposed Libertarian 

candidates in the general election. They therefore had standing to make 

objections before the Panel.

B. Interpretation of Section 43.24(1)(a). Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich

next argue that the Panel and the district court misread Iowa Code section 

43.24(1)(a). As quoted above, this provision authorizes the filing of “[o]bjections 

to the legal sufficiency of a nomination petition or certificate of nomination.” Id.

According to Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich, “legal sufficiency” refers only to 

deficiencies that appear on the face of the certificate. If the certificate meets the 

formal requirements of section 43.88, no further inquiry can be made. Thus, so 
10

long as a purported “chairperson” and a purported “secretary” of a purported 

convention signed the certificate, no inquiry can be made as to whether there 

ever was a convention or whether any kind of candidate selection process 

occurred.

This is an incorrect and unduly narrow reading of “legal sufficiency.” A

nomination petition or a certificate of nomination can be “legally insufficient” for 

reasons other than obvious facial defects. In another context, we often say that 

a motion to dismiss tests the “legal sufficiency” of a petition. See White v. 

Harkrider, 990 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Iowa 2023). By that, we do not mean that the 

trial court may only consider the formal appearance of the petition. Rather, the 

court looks at the underlying substantive law and considers whether the petition 

states a valid legal claim under that law. See id. at 652–53.

We note that section 43.24(1) also provides, “Nomination petitions or 

certificates of nomination filed under this chapter which are apparently in 

conformity with the law are valid unless objection is made in writing.” Iowa Code 

§ 43.24(1). The logical inference from this language is that objections can be 

made when the certificate of nomination on its face appears to conform to the 

law but there is some other legal problem. Otherwise, the sentence would make 

no sense.

Another argument raised by Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich is that the 

exclusive remedy for any failure of the Libertarian Party to comply with the laws 

regarding party caucuses and conventions is set forth in Iowa Code chapter 39A.

Chapter 39A is the “Election Misconduct and Penalties Act.” Iowa Code 

§ 39A.1(1). It sets forth a series of election-related crimes. Id. §§ 39A.2–5. Also, 

one section of the Act authorizes the secretary of state or a county auditor to 

“administratively provide a written notice and letter of instruction” in the case of 
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“an apparent technical violation.” Id. § 39A.6(1). We view these provisions as 

supplementing rather than superseding the language of section 43.24(1)(a) 

authorizing registered voters to make objections to certificates of nomination.

Another argument raised by Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich is that section 

43.24(1)(a) applies only to primary elections. We are not persuaded because the 

statute allows objections to certificates of nomination, not just nomination 

petitions. Id. at 43.24(1)(a). Certificates of nomination are used when there was 

no person selected at the primary. See Iowa Code § 43.88(1) (explaining that 

nominations by conventions “shall . . . be forthwith certified to the proper officer 

by the chairperson and secretary of the convention . . . and if such certificate is 

received in time, the names of such nominees shall be printed on the official 

ballot the same as if the nomination had been made in the primary election”).

Amicus curiae Iowa Democratic Party makes another argument about 

section 43.24(1)(a), for which it relies on our decision in Schmett v. State 

Objections Panel, 973 N.W.2d 300. The amicus argues that in Schmett, we 

interpreted Iowa Code section 43.24(1)(a) as allowing only objections to “incorrect 

or incomplete information that is required under section 43.14 or 43.18” to be 

sustained. We do not read our Schmett decision so broadly. Schmett was a case 

about petition signing requirements. See 973 N.W.2d at 301. The specific issue 

in Schmett was whether a missing date, an item required by section 43.15(2) but 

not sections 43.14 or 43.18, should result in that signature not being counted. 

Id. We held that it should not. Id. at 304–05. We emphasized that the legislature 

“selected only a subset of the signing requirements as grounds for not counting 

signatures in section 43.14(2)(c) or sustaining objections in 43.24(1). And, 

seemingly, those are the more important signing requirements.” Id. at 304. Thus, 
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Schmett stands for the proposition that objections based on signing requirements 

should be sustained only if the requirement is covered in sections 43.14 or 43.18.

Schmett does not address other types of legal objections. If the amicus were

correct, no defect in the certificate of nomination itself—even a facial defect—

could result in an objection being sustained. That does not make sense and is 

contrary to the position advanced by Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich that facial 

defects can be grounds for sustaining an objection.

We acknowledge what we said in Schmett, “Statutory interpretation is not 

like proving math theorems, and it is sometimes difficult to come up with a neat 

answer that is intellectually satisfying.” Id. The election laws may not be the

model of clarity. Still, a common sense reading of the term “legal sufficiency”

supports the Panel’s and the district court’s rulings. By contrast, as 

acknowledged at oral argument, the approach advocated by Gluba, Battaglia, 

and Aldrich would leave a gap in our election laws. The Panel would have no 

ability to resolve, for example, a dispute between two candidates both claiming 

to have received a nomination for the same office at their party’s convention.

C. Strict or Substantial Compliance. Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich 

further argue that there was substantial compliance with section 43.94 and that 

this was good enough. That is, even though the precinct caucuses and the county 

conventions were not separated by at least a day as required by law, or even 

occurred at the same time, that was a technical noncompliance that should be 

excused.

We believe that Iowa Code section 43.94 requires strict rather than 

substantial compliance. The general rule is that election laws governing 

candidate qualification for the ballot require strict compliance. See 29 C.J.S. 

Elections § 23, at 41 (2015) (“Election laws are mandatory and require strict 
13

compliance. Substantial compliance can satisfy the requirements of a mandatory 

provision of an election statute and is acceptable only when an election provision 

expressly states that it is.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Staber v. Fidler, 482 

N.E.2d 1204, 1205 (N.Y. 1985) (per curiam) (“Broad policy considerations weigh 

in favor of requiring strict compliance with the Election Law . . . . Both the actual 

operation and public perception of the electoral process as one that seeks 

regularity and evenhanded application must not be distorted.”); State ex rel. 

Phillips v. Lorain Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 757 N.E.2d 319, 323 (Ohio 2001) (per 

curiam) (“[T]he settled rule is that election laws are mandatory and require strict 

compliance, and that substantial compliance is acceptable only when an election 

statute expressly permits it.”).3 Iowa has many laws prescribing a substantial 

compliance standard; section 43.94 is not one of them. For example, section 

43.14(1) allows nomination petitions to be “in substantially the form prescribed 

by” the secretary of state. Iowa Code § 43.14(1); see also id. § 43.10 (allowing 

blank nomination papers “which are in form substantially as provided by this 

chapter”). The affidavit accompanying nomination papers shall be “in 

substantially the form required by section 43.67.” Id. § 43.88(3).

3A recent case from another jurisdiction applied strict compliance to candidates for 

judgeships selected at a party convention. See Clinton v. Bd. of Elections of the N.Y.C., No. 

157708/2021, 72 Misc. 3d 1221(A), 151 N.Y.S.3d 618 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 26) (unpublished table 

decision), aff’d, 197 A.D.3d 1025 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021) (mem.). In Clinton v. Board of Elections of 

the City of New York, a political party’s original slate of delegates did not appear on the primary 

ballot because their petitions were “invalidated for failure to file a Cover Sheet.” Id. at *3. 

Following the primary, the party met to fill the delegate positions anyway and submitted those 

names. Id. The delegates were challenged as not having been selected in accordance with New 

York law. Id. The party countered that “the strict requirements under the Election Law regarding 

defects in nominating papers” were inapplicable to “an internal party position” and the party 

should be able to govern its own nomination process. Id. at *11, *13. The New York court applied 

a strict compliance standard and invalidated the delegates and the judicial candidates they had 

purported to select. Id. at *13. The court quoted a prior case as follows: “Strict compliance with 

the Election Law, we have held, ‘reduces the likelihood of unequal enforcement,’ . . . ‘[t]he 

sanctity of the election process can be best guaranteed through uniform application of the law.’ 

” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Seawright v. Bd. of Elections in the N.Y.C., 

150 N.E.3d 848, 851 (N.Y. 2020) (per curiam)).
14

Wingert v. Urban, 250 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1977) (en banc), illustrates the 

governing legal principles. We confronted there the question of what to do about 

a candidate who had been elected but whose candidacy had been challenged on 

the ground that his nomination petition lacked sufficient signatures. Id. at 731–

32. We quoted the general proposition that “statutory provisions in regard to 

nominations are not regarded as mandatory in the sense that noncompliance 

with them vitiates the election, but only in the sense that officers or persons to 

whom they apply are obligated and may be compelled to comply with them prior 

to an election and are subject to the penalties prescribed by the statutes relating 

to offenses against election laws.” Id. at 733 (quoting 25 Am. Jur. 2d Elections §

143). In other words, a strict compliance standard applies before the election, 

but not after the results are in. Ultimately, in Wingert, we held that because the 

district court had entered a preelection injunction in the winning candidate’s 

favor keeping him on the ballot, the “mandatory” approach should apply, 

although we later found “exceptional circumstances” because the candidate had 

relied on the erroneous advice given to him by an election official. Id. at 735.

Wingert supports a strict compliance standard here, given that the election has 

not occurred.

We are not persuaded that strict compliance with section 43.94 is 

fundamentally unfair. Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich could have qualified for the 

November general election ballot by filing nomination petitions with signatures 

like the other political party candidates. They relied instead on an alternative

procedure afforded by Iowa law. Having done so, they had to be in compliance 

with that procedure. In sum, like the district court, we find that strict compliance 

was required and the Libertarian Party did not comply.
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D. First Amendment Arguments. We now turn to whether the Panel’s 

application of Iowa Code sections 43.24 and 43.94 violates the First Amendment 

associational rights of Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich or the Libertarian Party. Two 

distinct but related concepts are at issue here.

The first is the notion that candidates with a certain level of support should 

have a right of access to the general election ballot. Yet that right has limits. The 

United States Supreme Court has held that states have an “undoubted right to 

require candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial support in 

order to qualify for a place on the ballot . . . .” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 

780, 788 n.9 (1983). The Supreme Court has “never required a State to make a 

particularized showing of the existence of voter confusion, ballot overcrowding,

or the presence of frivolous candidacies prior to the imposition of reasonable 

restrictions on ballot access.” Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 

194–95 (1986). States, for example, may even ban write-in voting under certain 

conditions. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992).

That right of access has not been infringed here. As previously noted, 

Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich could have qualified for the June 2024 primary by 

filing petitions with the requisite number of signatures. Had they done so, they 

would now be the Libertarian Party’s general election nominees and would be on 

the November ballot. No claim is made that this threshold requirement for ballot 

access is an unconstitutional burden, and the Supreme Court has upheld far 

higher signature requirements than the one imposed by Iowa Code section 

45.1(3). See Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 295 (1992) (holding that petition 

signatures of approximately 2% of the electorate was not an undue burden); Am. 

Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 783 (1974) (upholding requirement for

nominating petition to have signatures from “1% of the vote for governor at the 
16

last general election”); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 432, 442 (1971) 

(sustaining a requirement that a candidate who does not enter and win a political 

party’s primary election can have their name printed on the ballot at the general 

election only if they had filed a nominating petition signed by at least 5% of the 

number of registered voters at the last general election for the office in question).

Iowa law offers additional flexibility because a major party candidate like Gluba, 

Battaglia, or Aldrich may also appear on the general election ballot by going 

through the caucus-convention process.

The second notion is that political parties should have a right to associate 

and govern their internal affairs as they see fit. For example, the Supreme Court 

has held that parties may not be prohibited from making primary endorsements 

nor may states dictate certain aspects of internal party governance. Eu v. S.F.

Cnty. Dem. Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 229, 232–33 (1989). Also, parties may 

not be forced against their will to have general election candidates selected in a 

“blanket primary” that includes voters from other parties. Cal. Democratic Party 

v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 585–86 (2000).

But this right also has limits. For instance, if state law provides otherwise, 

parties do not have a right to nominate candidates of other parties as their 

candidates (even if neither the candidate nor the other party objects) or to have 

members of other parties participate in their primary. See Timmons v. Twin Cities 

Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 369–70 (1997); Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 

595–97 (2005).

Here the burden on associational rights of the Libertarian Party strikes us 

as well within the boundaries tolerated by Supreme Court precedent. The Panel’s 

ruling does not affect the Libertarian Party’s ability to convey its message to the 

voters of Iowa, to make endorsements, to associate only with individuals it wants 
17

to associate with, or even to determine its own governance structure.4 The only 

effect of the Panel’s application of sections 43.24 and 43.94 is to require the 

party to go through a more formal nomination process with clearly separate 

precinct caucuses and county conventions as its backup mechanism for 

selecting candidates in the event no candidate files for nomination by primary.

The Supreme Court has said, “We have considered it 

‘too plain for argument,’ for example, that a State may require parties to use the 

primary format for selecting their nominees, in order to assure that intraparty 

competition is resolved in a democratic fashion.” Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. 

at 572 (quoting Am. Party of Tex., 415 U.S. at 781). If it’s too plain for argument 

that a state could require the Libertarian Party to select its candidates only by 

primary, it follows that the state may prescribe the format of the caucusconvention process that it allows the party to use as an alternative.

State law specifically requires that the county convention delegates elected 

at precinct caucuses assume their duties as delegates no earlier than the next 

day. See Iowa Code § 43.94. This short time delay imposes a modest burden by 

requiring truly separate precinct caucuses and county conventions. 

Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich object that the requirement of two separate 

days for precinct caucuses and county conventions is arbitrary and hypertechnical. But many election rules are arbitrary and hyper-technical in the same 

sense. Why require forty-seven signatures from at least half of the counties? Why 

should that matter if a candidate has several thousand signatures and the entire 

district elects the representative? Gluba, Battaglia, and Aldrich do not contend 

4The question presented here is not one of purely internal governance. It is one of 

procedure for a political party candidate to get on the general election ballot without having filed 

a nomination petition with signatures. Other provisions of chapter 43, relating to other subjects, 

such as Iowa Code sections 43.100 and 43.111, are not at issue in this case.
18

that the two-day requirement would have been too burdensome for the 

Libertarian Party to meet; it just wasn’t met here.

VI. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Affirmed.

Waterman, J., takes no part.

Procedendo shall issue at 9:00 p.m. on September 11, 2024. This opinion 

will be published.