THE LONG-RANGE DEMOGRAPHIC ASSUMPTIONS

FOR THE 2024 TRUSTEES REPORT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

May 6, 2024
Demography, Page 2

PRINCIPAL DEMOGRAPHIC ASSUMPTIONS 

OVERVIEW

SECTIONS

1 FERTILITY

2 MORTALITY

3 IMMIGRATION 
Demography, Page 3

Overview

Each year the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and 

Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Funds provides an annual report to the Congress on the financial 

and actuarial status of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. For 

this report, the Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT), on behalf of the Board of Trustees,

projects future cost and income based on three separate sets of long-range (75-year) assumptions 

for key demographic variables. The intermediate (alternative II) set of assumptions represents 

the Trustees’ best estimate for future experience, while the low cost (alternative I) and high cost 

(alternative III) sets of assumptions represent more and less favorable scenarios, respectively, 

from the perspective of program cost/income as a percent of taxable payroll. The intermediate 

assumptions are also used as the point of comparison for sensitivity analysis and the central 

tendency for the stochastic projections presented in the OASDI annual report to the Board of 

Trustees (the “Trustees Report”). This memorandum presents the demographic assumptions

used in the 2024 Trustees Report.

At this time, there is no consensus on what the lasting effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on 

long-term demographic trends will be. The Trustees continue to assume that the pandemic will 

have no significant net effect on most individual long-range ultimate assumptions. 

The key demographic assumptions are:

• The total fertility rate, along with the single-year-of-age birth rates,

• The annual rates of reduction in central death rates by broad age group (0 – 14, 15 – 49, 

50 – 64, 65 – 84, and 85+) and cause of death (cardiovascular, cancer, violence and 

accidents, respiratory, dementia, and all other), and

• Immigration levels, by age and sex, of lawful permanent resident (LPR) new arrivals, 

adjustments to LPR status, LPR and citizen exits, and other-than-LPR entrants; and otherthan-LPR rates of exit.

For the 2024 Trustees Report, the ultimate annual rates of reduction in central death rates and 

ultimate immigration levels were unchanged from those used in the 2023 Trustees Report. 

However, the ultimate total fertility rate assumptions were decreased by 0.1 children per woman

for the 2024 Trustees Report, as explained further in the detailed Fertility section of this 

memorandum.

The following table shows values for key summary measures for the fertility, mortality, and 

immigration assumptions. Note that some of the values of the summary measures were affected 

by the incorporation of new data and their effects on the transition period.
Demography, Page 4

Key Demographic Summary Measures for the Long-Range (75-Year) Projection Period

2023 Trustees Report and 2024 Trustees Report

Measure (for the last 65 years of 

the 75-year projection period 

unless otherwise stated)

2023 Trustees Report 

Alternative

2024 Trustees Report 

Alternative

2024 Trustees Report Less 

2023 Trustees Report

I II III I II III I II III

Ultimate annual total fertility rate 

for years 2040 and later (2056 and 

later for the 2023 Trustees Report)

2.2 2.0 1.7 2.1 1.9 1.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1

Average annual percentage 

reduction in total age-sex-adjusted 

death rates 

0.28 0.74 1.24 0.28 0.73 1.23 0.00 -0.01 -0.01

Ultimate annual net LPR 

immigration (in thousands)

1,000 788 595 1,000 788 595 0 0 0

Average annual net other-thanLPR immigration (in thousands) 683 457 234 683 457 234 0 0 0

In total, the demographic changes resulted in a decrease (worsening) in the OASDI actuarial 

balance of about 0.18 percent of taxable payroll under the intermediate assumptions. More 

specifically:

• Law or policy changes related to the demographic assumptions (an assumed one-year 

delay in the resumption of processing new applications for the Deferred Action for 

Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, program) have a negligible effect on the actuarial balance.

• The combined effects of all fertility changes, including incorporating new data, lowering 

the ultimate TFR by 0.1 child per woman, and revising the transition approach to reach 

the new lower ultimate assumed level by 2040, decrease the actuarial balance by about 

0.16 percent of taxable payroll.

• The combined effects of all mortality changes, including incorporating new population 

data and revising the factors used to account for the pandemic, have a negligible effect on 

the actuarial balance.

• The combined effects of all immigration changes decrease the actuarial balance by about

0.02 percent of taxable payroll.

• Updates to the base marriage rate grid increase the actuarial balance by about 0.01 

percent of taxable payroll.

• Other minor updates, including updates to the starting population, decrease the actuarial 

balance by about 0.01 percent of taxable payroll.

The remainder of this memorandum provides details regarding the historical values and future 

values for each of the demographic assumptions, and the basis for the assumptions.
Fertility, Page 1

1. FERTILITY

ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE 2024 TRUSTEES REPORT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, SSA

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

1.1 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. 2

1.2 HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE........................................................................................................ 3

1.3 ASSUMED FUTURE BIRTH RATES............................................................................................. 3

TABLE 1.1: PAST AND PROJECTED TOTAL FERTILITY RATES FOR THE UNITED STATES..................................................6

TABLE 1.2: HISTORICAL TOTAL FERTILITY RATES, BY COUNTRY..................................................................................7

CHART 1.1: HISTORICAL TOTAL FERTILITY RATES FOR THE UNITED STATES ................................................................8

CHART 1.2: CENTRAL BIRTH RATES FOR FIVE YEAR AGE GROUPS: HISTORICAL AND ALTERNATIVE II PROJECTION ...9

CHART 1.3: HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED TOTAL FERTILITY RATES............................................................................10

CHART 1.4: HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED TOTAL FERTILITY RATES BY BIRTH COHORT .............................................11

CHART 1.5: PAST AND FUTURE EXPECTED BIRTHS PER WOMAN BASED ON THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY 

GROWTH (NSFG)..................................................................................................................................................12
Fertility, Page 2

1.1 Summary

The ultimate total fertility rates (TFRs) assumed for the 2024 Trustees Report are 2.1, 1.9, and 

1.6 children per woman for the low-cost, intermediate, and high-cost alternatives, respectively. 

These rates are 0.1 child per woman lower than the ultimate TFRs assumed in the 2023 Trustees 

Report.

There was a sharp drop in the historical TFR, from a level of 2.12 in 2007 to a level of 2.00 in 

2009 and 1.85 in 2013. This drop was likely largely due to the persistent effects of the 2007-09 

recession on employment opportunity. The TFR increased slightly to 1.87 in 2014, then 

decreased each year from 2015 through 2019, from 1.85 in 2015 to 1.71 in 2019. The TFR 

decreased to 1.64 in 2020 and then increased slightly to 1.66 in 2021. The decreases in 2015 

through 2020 may be partially due to lagging growth in average wages and “tempo” effects1as 

women are waiting to have children until older ages. 

Final data from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) produce a TFR of 1.66 for 

2022. The 2023 TFR is estimated to be 1.64, based on preliminary data from various states. 

For the 2024 Trustees Report, the Trustees assume that the TFR will ultimately rise to an average 

level of 1.9 by 2040, consistent with an ultimate completed cohort fertility rate of 1.9. This 

assumption is consistent with the continued and persistent expectation among women of 

childbearing age that they will ultimately have more than two children on average (with the 

understanding that actual numbers of births typically fall slightly short of expectations). Given 

the continued lower TFRs in recent years, lower TFRs in high immigrant source countries such 

as Mexico, increased utilization of more effective birth control, other societal changes including 

lower marriage rates, and possible concerns about economic opportunity for the future, the 

Trustees decreased the assumed ultimate TFRs by 0.1 child per woman.

For the 2024 Trustees Report, the Office of the Chief Actuary modified the transition approach 

so that the ultimate assumed level of the TFR is reached earlier than would have occurred under 

the approach used in the 2023 report. The modified approach bases the projections on trends in 

birth rates for each age, relative to the birth rate at a base age of 30 for the same year. For the 

2023 report, a TFR of 1.9 was reached in 2034 and then rose gradually to the ultimate TFR of 2.0 

for 2056 and later. For the 2024 report, the ultimate TFR of 1.9 is attained for 2040 and later.

The combined effects of all fertility changes, including incorporating new data, lowering the 

ultimate TFR by 0.1 child per woman, and revising the transition approach to reach the new 

lower ultimate assumed level by 2040, decrease the long-range actuarial balance by about 0.16

percent of taxable payroll. The projected TFRs are lower for every future year in the 2024 report

than they were in the 2023 report.

1 Demographers refer to a temporary drop in the TFR due to a delay in childbearing to older ages as a tempo effect. 

For more information, see the discussion on “Tempo-adjusted total fertility rate” at: 

https://www.humanfertility.org/File/GetDocumentFree/Docs/methods.pdf. 
Fertility, Page 3

1.2 Historical Experience

Past period TFRs in the United States are shown in table 1.1 and chart 1.1. The period TFR for a 

given year is defined as the average number of children that would be born to a woman if she 

were to survive the entire childbearing period and were to experience, at each age of her life, the 

birth rate2observed in that year. During the period 1917 through 1924, the period TFR was 

more than 3.0 children per woman. From 1924 through 1933, the TFR declined from 3.1 to 2.2 

children per woman, and then remained level at 2.1 to 2.2 children per woman through 1940. 

After 1940, the TFR once again began to rise, reaching a peak of 3.7 in 1957 and stayed above 

2.8 for the “baby boom” years of 1946 through 1965. This period of high fertility was followed 

by a period of declining fertility. The TFR fell to 1.7 in 1976. Beginning in 1977, the TFR 

remained fairly stable at 1.8 children per woman until 1987, when it started to increase, reaching 

2.1 in 1990. Between 1990 and the start of the 2007-09 recession, the TFR remained fairly 

stable, fluctuating between 2.0 and 2.1. The TFR decreased from 2.12 in 2007 to 1.85 in 2013. 

The 1.87 TFR for 2014 represented the first increase in the TFR since 2007. The TFR decreased 

again each year from 2015 to 2020, reaching 1.64 in 2020, an historic low. The TFR then 

increased slightly to 1.66 in 2021 and 2022. 

The increase in the TFR after 1976 was primarily due to increases in birth rates among women in 

their 30s. After dropping dramatically between 1960 and 1976, birth rates for women in their 

20s remained quite stable between 1976 and 2007 (see chart 1.2). Because much of the decline 

in birth rates for women in their 20s was understood to represent a desire to defer births until 

women were in their 30s (i.e., the tempo effects mentioned above), the gradual increases in birth 

rates for women in their 30s for 10 to 15 years after 1976 were expected. However, birth rates 

for women in their 30s continued to rise through 2007, partially due to advancements in 

infertility treatments.

1.3 Assumed Future Birth Rates

The Trustees do not expect cohort or period TFRs to return to the high levels experienced during 

the baby boom. Several changes in our society have occurred since the baby boom that have 

contributed to reducing birth rates. Some of these changes are:

• increased availability and use of birth control methods, including long-acting reversible 

contraceptives (LARCs),

• increased female participation in the labor force,

• postponement of family formation and childbearing among young women,

• increased prevalence of divorce,

• decreased death rates among children (requiring fewer births for a desired family size),

• increased percentage of women choosing to remain childless (although this percentage 

has trended down, and then roughly leveled off, since the cohorts born in the mid-1950s),

• other societal changes including lower marriage rates,

• and possible concerns about economic opportunity for the future.

2 The ratio of: (1) the number of live births to mothers of a specified age, to (2) the midyear female population of 

that age.
Fertility, Page 4

In addition, a sustained TFR at the low levels experienced by certain other industrialized 

countries is unlikely due to economic, demographic, and cultural differences between the U.S. 

and those countries. An additional contributing factor to future levels of birth rates is changes in 

abortion laws in certain states following the Supreme Court’s 2022 ruling in Dobbs v. Jackson 

Women’s Health Organization.

The Trustees assume an ultimate TFR of 1.90 for alternative II. The 2015 Technical Panel on 

Assumptions and Methods, appointed by the Social Security Advisory Board, recommended an 

ultimate alternative II TFR assumption of 1.90. The 2019 Technical Panel recommended 

continued increases in births to older women throughout the 75-year projection period, resulting 

in lower period TFRs reaching 1.95 and completed cohort TFRs potentially closer to 2.00. They 

also recommended adopting a new projection framework using cohort TFRs and continued 

tempo effects as the drivers, and period TFRs as an outcome. The Trustees adopted this general

framework for the 2021 Trustees Report. The Congressional Budget Office adopted the 2015 

Technical Panel’s recommended TFR assumption of 1.90 for their 2016 projections3but lowered 

this assumption to 1.85 for their 2021 projections, reaching the ultimate rate in 2029.4 The 

Congressional Budget Office once again lowered their ultimate TFR assumption in their 2022 

projections, reaching the ultimate rate of 1.75 in 2030, and continued this approach for their 2023 

projections.

5 Finally, the Congressional Budget Office lowered their ultimate TFR assumption in 

their 2024 projections, reaching the ultimate rate of 1.70 by 2034.

6

 In the Census Bureau’s 

World Population Estimates and Projections as of February 2024, the projected TFR stays almost 

constant and is 1.84 in 2060.7

As shown in chart 1.2, the Trustees assume a continuation of the historical trend, which shows 

generally increasing birth rates for women age 30 and older, and generally decreasing rates for 

women below age 20. With the cohort-based model, birth rates for women at older ages reach 

ultimate values in later calendar years than those for women at younger ages, reflecting the 

deferral of births to older ages over time. The changing distribution of birth rates by age of 

woman has significant effects on population size, but the age distribution stabilizes after 2040. 

Since the start of the 2007-09 recession, the age group that has had the steepest drop in fertility 

rates is 20-24. (See chart 1.2.) This drastic drop in birth rates for women aged 20-24 could be a 

sign of future tempo effects—an expected increase in birth rates at older ages for these cohorts. 

One cause of this drop could be the increased debt taken on by the millennial and succeeding 

generations.

Examining data from other countries is useful in selecting a range of ultimate assumptions for 

the low-cost and high-cost alternatives. Historical TFRs during the period 1980-2021 that were 

reported to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are shown 

for 24 countries in table 1.2. The TFRs for the most recent year shown in the table range from 

1.2 for Spain and China to 2.0 for India. After India, the highest TFR is 1.8 for Mexico and 

3 See https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51580-ltbo-2.pdf. 

4 See https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57038#_idTextAnchor040.

5 See https://www.cbo.gov/data/budget-economic-data#13.

6 See https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2024-01/59697-Demographic-Outlook.pdf.

7 See https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/data/idb/dataset/idbzip.zip.
Fertility, Page 5

France. Although the TFR in the industrialized countries has been observed at levels as low as 

the 1.2 to 1.5 range, the cultural and economic climate in the U.S. makes it highly unlikely that 

our TFR will remain below a level of 1.6 for any sustained period. Thus, the Trustees assume an 

ultimate TFR for the high-cost scenario of 1.6 children per woman. Using the range of past 

experience for the United States and other countries as a guide, the Trustees assume an ultimate 

TFR for the low-cost scenario of 2.1 children per woman. The ultimate period TFR is reached in 

2040 for all alternatives. The ultimate period TFR in the 2023 Trustees Report was reached in 

2056 for all alternatives.

For the intermediate alternative, the Trustees assume the TFR gradually increases from the 

estimated 2023 value through the ultimate value attained in 2040, with more gradual increases in 

the TFR as the ultimate year approaches. For the low-cost and high-cost alternatives, the 

Trustees assume that the paths of the TFRs gradually grade away from the intermediate 

alternative path. Chart 1.3 shows the historical path of the TFR starting in 1917 and the 

projected paths of the TFRs for all three alternatives.

Examining the TFR by birth cohort is a useful tool in evaluating an ultimate assumption. As 

shown in chart 1.4, the cohort TFRs vary much less over time than the period TFRs shown in 

chart 1.3. Chart 1.4 also shows that the cohort TFR has been near or greater than 2.00 for all 

cohorts who have finished their childbearing years. The most recent cohorts that have just 

completed their childbearing years show an upward trend in their TFRs (see the dark purple 

line). The transition path for alternative II gradually declines to the ultimate assumption of 1.90.

As mentioned above, reported birth expectations for women of childbearing age provide another 

measure to help assess trends in birth rates. NCHS conducts the National Survey of Family 

Growth (NSFG) to gather information about men8and women aged 15-44+.9 Prior to the 1982 

survey, NCHS only asked married women about birth expectations. However, beginning with 

the 1982 survey, NCHS asked all women about past and future expected births.10 As shown in 

chart 1.5, past and future expected births in recent survey waves are all above 2.00. The 

consistency of recent birth expectations above 2.00 strongly suggests that the recent very low 

levels of the TFR will not be permanent.

8 Men were not surveyed until the 2002 survey.

9 For surveys prior to the 2015-17 survey, persons are aged 15-44 at the time of the sampling but may have had their 

45th birthday by the interview date. Starting with the 2015-17 survey, interviewers surveyed men and women aged 

15-49, with some attaining age 50 by the interview date.

10 NCHS refers to the data collected prior to the 2006-10 survey as “Cycle x” where x = 3 for the 1982 survey and x 

= 6 for the 2002 survey as shown at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nsfg/nsfg_questionnaires.htm. 
Fertility, Page 6

Table 1.1: Past and Projected Total Fertility Rates for the United States

Calendar Year 2023 TR 2024 TR

1920 3.263 3.263

1930 2.533 2.533

1940 2.229 2.229

1950 3.028 3.028

1960 3.606 3.606

1965 2.882 2.882

1970 2.432 2.432

1975 1.770 1.770

1980 1.820 1.820

1985 1.835 1.835

1990 2.069 2.069

1995 1.981 1.981

2000 2.054 2.054

2001 2.032 2.032

2002 2.025 2.025

2003 2.055 2.055

2004 2.059 2.059

2005 2.062 2.062

2006 2.112 2.112

2007 2.123 2.123

2008 2.074 2.074

2009 2.002 2.002

2010 1.926 1.926

2011 1.889 1.890

2012 1.875 1.876

2013 1.852 1.854

2014 1.864 1.868

2015 1.845 1.851

2016 1.817 1.823

2017 1.764 1.771

2018 1.727 1.734

2019 1.701 1.707

2020 1.638 1.641

2021 1.663 1.661

2022 1.686 1 1.656

2023 TR 2024 TR 2023 TR 2024 TR 2023 TR 2024 TR

2023 1.784 1.640 1.704 1.640 1.592 1.640

2024 1.829 1.745 1.723 1.673 1.572 1.565

2025 1.870 1.801 1.742 1.704 1.561 1.557

2026 1.909 1.851 1.763 1.733 1.557 1.556

2027 1.945 1.895 1.785 1.761 1.559 1.559

2028 1.980 1.934 1.808 1.787 1.566 1.565

2029 2.013 1.969 1.833 1.811 1.577 1.574

2030 2.046 2.000 1.857 1.833 1.591 1.584

2031 2.063 2.025 1.869 1.851 1.594 1.592

2032 2.079 2.044 1.881 1.865 1.600 1.597

2033 2.095 2.061 1.894 1.878 1.607 1.604

2034 2.110 2.074 1.907 1.888 1.617 1.609

2035 2.124 2.084 1.920 1.895 1.627 1.611

2040 2.176 2.100 1.974 1.900 1.675 1.600

2045 2.196 2.100 1.996 1.900 1.696 1.600

2050 2.199 2.100 2.000 1.900 1.700 1.600

2055 2.200 2.100 2.000 1.900 1.700 1.600

2060 2.200 2.100 2.000 1.900 1.700 1.600

1 Estimated, intermediate alternative. Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

Alternative I Alternative II Alternative III

May 6, 2024
Fertility, Page 7

Table 1.2: Historical Total Fertility Rates, by Country

1980 – 2021

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Most Recent

TFR

Latest

 10-Year Change

Australia 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 -0.2

Austria 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 0.1

Belgium 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 -0.2

Canada 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 -0.2

China 2.7 2.6 2.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 -0.5

Denmark 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.0

Finland 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 -0.4

France 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 -0.2

Germany 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 0.2

Greece 2.2 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 0.0

India 4.8 4.5 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 -0.5

Ireland 3.2 2.5 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 -0.3

Italy 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 -0.2

Japan 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 -0.1

Mexico 4.8 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 -0.5

Netherlands 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 -0.1

New Zealand 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 -0.5

Norway 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 -0.3

Portugal 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 0.0

Spain 2.2 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 -0.2

Sweden 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 -0.2

Switzerland 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.0

United Kingdom 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 -0.4

United States 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 -0.2

Source: United States: Social Security Administration Office of the Chief Actuary calculations based on data from the National Center for Health Statistics and the Census Bureau

 Other countries: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development website at: https://data.oecd.org/pop/fertility-rates.htm

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024
Fertility, Page 8

Chart 1.1: Historical Total Fertility Rates for the United States

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

1915192019251930193519401945195019551960196519701975198019851990199520002005201020152020

Total Fertility Rate

Calendar Year

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024
Fertility, Page 9

Chart 1.2: Central Birth Rates for Five Year Age Groups: Historical and Alternative II Projection

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

191519201925193019351940194519501955196019651970197519801985199019952000200520102015202020252030203520402045205020552060

Central Birth Rate

Calendar Year

25-29

20-24

30-34

35-39

14-19

40-44

45-49

Historical Alternative II 

Projection

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024
Fertility, Page 10

Chart 1.3: Historical and Projected Total Fertility Rates

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024
Fertility, Page 11

Chart 1.4: Historical and Projected Total Fertility Rates by Birth Cohort

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024
Fertility, Page 12

Chart 1.5: Past and Future Expected Births per Woman Based on the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG)

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 15-44

Children Per Woman

Age Group

1982 NSFG 1988 NSFG 1995 NSFG 2002 NSFG 2006-2010 NSFG

2011-2013 NSFG 2013-2015 NSFG 2015-2017 NSFG 2017-2019 NSFG

Notes: The portion of the bar below the horizontal break for each age group shows the average births realized up to that age, while the full height 

of each bar indicates the average of total births expected at that age. In addition, although the 2015-2017 survey was the first to go up to age 49, 

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024
Mortality, Page 1

2. MORTALITY

ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE 2024 TRUSTEES REPORT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, SSA

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

2.1 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. 2

2.2 CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECTING A MORTALITY PROJECTION METHOD............................... 3

2.3 CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECTING MORTALITY ASSUMPTIONS BY AGE AND CAUSE OF 

DEATH............................................................................................................................................. 5

2.4 PAST EXPERIENCE BY CAUSE OF DEATH................................................................................. 7

2.5 ASSUMED FUTURE RATES OF REDUCTION IN MORTALITY BY CAUSE OF DEATH ................. 8

2.6 PROJECTED FUTURE RATES OF REDUCTION BASED ON ASSUMPTIONS BY AGE, SEX, AND 

CAUSE OF DEATH ......................................................................................................................... 10

2.7 TRUSTEES’ ASSUMPTIONS VERSUS HISTORICAL TRENDS AND OTHER ASSUMPTIONS ........ 11

2.8 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS TECHNICAL PANELS AND OTHER PROJECTIONS . 13

TABLE 2.1: HISTORICAL AND ASSUMED RATES OF REDUCTION IN MORTALITY...........................................................15

TABLE 2.2: AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN AGE-ADJUSTED CENTRAL DEATH RATES: FOR THE 

2024 TRUSTEES REPORT .......................................................................................................................................18

TABLE 2.3: AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF REDUCTION IN CENTRAL DEATH RATES BY AGE GROUP, SEX, AND 

CAUSE...................................................................................................................................................................20

TABLE 2.4: AGE-SEX-ADJUSTED CENTRAL DEATH RATES ..........................................................................................21

TABLE 2.5: HISTORICAL UNISEX LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, BY COUNTRY, 1980 – 2021........................................22

CHART 2.1: HISTORICAL UNITED STATES AGE-SEX-ADJUSTED CENTRAL DEATH RATES FROM 1900-2022................23

CHART 2.2: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MALE AND FEMALE ANNUAL PERCENT REDUCTION IN AGE-ADJUSTED 

DEATH RATES FOR POPULATION 65+....................................................................................................................24
Mortality, Page 2

2.1 Summary

For the 2024 Trustees Report, the ultimate annual rates of mortality reduction by age and cause 

of death are unchanged from those used for the 2023 Trustees Report. The assumed ultimate 

rates of reduction apply fully for years 2048 and later. For years between the most recent 

observed data and the full implementation of the ultimate rates of reduction, there is a transition 

from recently observed trends to the ultimate assumed rates of reduction by age, sex, and cause. 

The Trustees assume that the COVID-19 pandemic, which began affecting death rates in 2020,

will continue to affect death rates through 2024. While, in general, the pandemic has caused an 

increase in death rates, final and provisional total death data through July 2023 show that there 

are notable differences by age group. Therefore, the Trustees assume a set of factors 

(representing the multiplicative factors that are applied to the death probabilities that would have 

been assumed in the absence of the pandemic) that vary by broad age group. The following table 

shows the factors used for the 2023 and 2024 Trustees Reports:

Multiplicative Factors Applied to the Death Probabilities That Would Have Been 

Assumed in the Absence of the Pandemic

Year

2023 Trustees Report 2024 Trustees Report

Age

0

Ages 

1-14

Ages 

15-64

Ages 

65-84

Ages 

85+

Age

0

Ages 

1-14

Ages 

15-64

Ages 

65-84

Ages 

85+

2020 0.98* 1.01* 1.19* 1.16* 1.15* 0.99* 1.01* 1.19* 1.16* 1.14*

2021 1.00 1.08 1.33 1.18* 1.08* 1.03* 1.11* 1.32* 1.18* 1.07*

2022 1.00 1.05 1.11 1.12 1.05 1.03* 1.18* 1.16* 1.10* 1.07*

2023 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.22 1.08 1.06 1.04

2024 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.02 1.02 1.01

2025 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

*Based on actual data.

The factors used for the 2024 Trustees Report were applied uniformly for death probabilities

across all causes of death. The combined effect of these factors for the different age groups is an 

overall increase in death rates above those that would have been assumed in the absence of the 

pandemic. See table 2.4 for the resulting age-sex-adjusted central death rates. It is certainly 

possible that the pandemic will have longer-lasting net effects on death rates. The Trustees will 

continue to carefully monitor emerging experience and expectations. These changes to the 

factors compared to those used in the 2023 Trustees Report result in an increase in the longrange actuarial balance of about 0.01 percent of taxable payroll.

Projections for the 2024 Trustees Report reflect updated residential populations from the Census 

Bureau, final National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) data for 2021, provisional NCHS 

data for 2022, final Medicare data for 2020, and preliminary Medicare data for 2021 and 2022. 

Incorporating these new data alone results in a decrease in the long-range actuarial balance of 

about 0.01 percent of taxable payroll.

The low-cost and high-cost alternative ultimate rates of improvement by age and cause are set as 

percentages of the intermediate alternative assumed rates and, as such, are not displayed 
Mortality, Page 3

separately in the tables. Once again, for the 2024 Trustees Report, male and female ultimate rates 

of improvement by age and cause are set equal to each other, but are displayed separately 

because historical rates of change, projected rates of change through the transition years, and 

rates of change for all causes combined throughout the projection period vary by sex.

The combined effects of all mortality changes, including incorporating the new data and revising 

the factors used to account for the pandemic, result in a negligible change in the long-range 

actuarial balance.

2.2 Considerations in Selecting a Mortality Projection Method

Projections of mortality improvement are subject to uncertainty that is possibly greater than any 

other variable used in the Trustees’ assumptions. Some demographers argue that life expectancy 

is potentially limitless and that rates of mortality reduction will match or exceed historical trends 

indefinitely into the future. Others believe that biological limitations make mortality 

improvement more difficult to achieve in the future and, combined with behavioral factors and 

economic considerations, future rates of reduction will be more modest than in the past.

Because the method for projecting future mortality is critical in determining the results, this 

section compares four approaches that are currently in use by demographers. These approaches 

can provide very different results and make very different use of the available data. Some 

relatively simple approaches have been popular for illustrating trends in longevity but do not 

address the full complexities of changing conditions over time. Any projection of mortality used 

to model the size and age structure of the population, which is the foundation for analyzing the 

actuarial status of programs like Social Security and Medicare, should explicitly consider the

past and expected future conditions that affect rates of improvement.

Perhaps the simplest approach to projecting future mortality is to extrapolate past trends in life 

expectancy. Some have presumed that the rate of increase in life expectancy at birth will be 

linear for the indefinite future. Oeppen and Vaupel in 2002 contended that a trend for the “best 

nation” would continue to rise linearly and that the U.S. would catch up to that trend. Further 

analysis by Ron Lee, and more recently by Jacques Villan and France Meslé, has shown that this

historical trend has not been linear but has been decelerating in recent years. In addition, 

experience for the U.S. and for other countries has demonstrated that there are clear differences 

in the populations among developed nations that have made differences in mortality persist. 

Table 2.5 displays unisex life expectancy at birth for selected countries. Finally, life expectancy 

at birth is most highly affected by changes in death rates at young ages, particularly at infancy. 

Even if mortality reduction trends by age were to continue unchanged into the future, increase in 

life expectancy at any age would slow. For assessing the actuarial status of Social Security and 

Medicare, extrapolation of life expectancy is not useful, because it does not address the age 

structure of mortality rates or of the population.

A second approach extrapolates death rates on a cohort basis. Shifts in death rates from one 

cohort to the next have been observed particularly in the U.K., and to a lesser extent in the U.S. 

However, extrapolating such shifts across ages within a cohort requires careful analysis. If a 

cohort shows lower death rates up to a given age due to better health, then the improvement may 
Mortality, Page 4

be expected to persist to older ages. However, if the shift is primarily due to interventions that 

have lowered death rates for individuals with compromised physiology, then death rates for the 

cohort at older ages might actually be worse than the prior cohort. In addition, advances for one 

cohort may reflect a level shift in mortality and not a trend of improvement that will continue for 

succeeding cohorts.

A third, more commonly used approach extrapolates past rates of reduction in mortality, by age 

and sex, indefinitely into the future. Lee and Carter are the most notable proponents of this 

approach. They developed a model for fitting a trend to a selected historical period that is then 

applied for projected future improvement, effectively assuming that future conditions for overall 

reduction by age and sex will match the conditions over the past. Key to this approach is the 

selection of the “appropriate” historical period. For many years, Lee and Carter suggested using 

the period starting with 1900. More recently, they suggested a period starting with 1950, which 

results in somewhat faster projected rates of mortality improvement for ages 65 and older. The 

specific historical time period chosen can have significant impacts on the projections by age 

group. The Lee and Carter extrapolation method presumes no deceleration in the future rate of 

reduction in mortality, and also presumes no change in the relative rate of decline across ages in 

the historical period. In 2016, Ron Lee produced projections of death rates through 2090 using 

national data by age and sex for the period 1950 through 2011. These death rates result in the 

same overall 75-year actuarial balance for the Social Security program as the death rates used in 

the 2015 Trustees Report. See Actuarial Note 158 at 

https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/pdf_notes/note158.pdf. 

The fourth approach for projecting mortality involves more comprehensive use of available data 

and flexibility for considering how future conditions are expected to differ from the past. This 

approach takes advantage of historical mortality data by cause of death, age, and sex, which is 

available on a relatively complete basis for the U.S. starting in 1979. Biologists and many 

demographers have long recognized the value of modeling mortality by cause. Ken Manton was 

a pioneer in evaluating effects of eliminating death by a given cause. Others, like Jay Olshansky,

have emphasized the strides made in mortality for some causes and the failure to improve for 

other causes. The Trustees’ model has, for decades, reflected past trends in mortality by cause,

taking into account future expected changes based on input from researchers at the National 

Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and others. More recently,

medical researchers and clinicians at Johns Hopkins University (JHU) independently assessed

prospects for mortality improvement by cause and age. The JHU study has been extremely

useful in evaluating and benchmarking the Trustees’ assumptions. Of course, developing

assumptions for future rates of mortality reduction by cause and age requires judgment about the 

expectation of future conditions relative to the past. Consideration of past changes in the rates of 

mortality reduction for individual causes, along with expert opinion, provides a rich basis for 

such judgment. Perhaps most importantly, this approach provides a clear disclosure of specific 

assumptions used for improvement by age and cause of death. This can then be explicitly 

compared to the historical experience in considerable detail.

Note that the 2015 Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods, appointed by the independent 

Social Security Advisory Board, endorsed the use of mortality assumptions by cause group. The 
Mortality, Page 5

2019 Technical Panel also endorsed using cause of death, but only for the intermediate term 

(approximately 20 years). 

2.3 Considerations in Selecting Mortality Assumptions by Age and Cause of Death

Simple extrapolation of the average trends experienced for any past period to project long-term 

future trends should only be considered when there is a basis for assuming that future conditions 

will, on average, replicate past conditions. This approach may have merit for processes where 

there is no reason to believe there are natural limits, such as for labor productivity of workers,

where technology has no apparent limit. Human mortality, on the other hand, is limited by 

biology. The maximum verified age of survival for a human is age 122 and shows no signs of 

extending significantly. Biological researchers suggest that extension of the maximum lifespan

would require fundamental alteration of the aging process. This may be possible, but there is no 

clear evidence that it will be achieved in the future. 

In addition, reductions in mortality have occurred in a very irregular pattern over time, closely 

reflecting changes in the economy, access to medical care, and behavior of the population. 

Therefore, in developing assumptions for future mortality improvement by age and cause, it is 

crucial to study the differing historical rates of decline for various periods and the conditions that 

contributed to these variations. Only after considering how future conditions will differ from the 

past can one speculate about future mortality improvement.

The remainder of this section describes many of the overarching factors that have influenced 

mortality improvement since 1900 and that will affect it in the future. Section 2.5 provides

greater detail regarding the Trustees’ assumptions for rates of improvement for each cause of 

death.

A number of extremely important developments have contributed to the generally rapid overall 

rate of mortality improvement since 1900. These developments include:

• Access to primary medical care for the general population (in particular, the access due 

to Medicare and Medicaid health coverage for the elderly, disabled, and poor),

• Discovery of and general availability of antibiotics and immunizations,

• Clean water supply and waste removal,

• The rapid rate of growth in the general standard of living, and

• Medical advancements (such as prenatal and postnatal care, blood pressure and 

cholesterol medications, bypass surgery, angioplasty, etc.).

Each of these developments is expected to make a substantially smaller contribution to annual 

rates of mortality improvement in the future. 

Future reductions in mortality will depend upon such factors as: 

• The development and application of new diagnostic, surgical, and life-sustaining 

techniques,

• The rate of future increase in health spending and the efficiency of that spending relative 

to mortality improvement,

• The presence of environmental pollutants, 
Mortality, Page 6

• Changes in amount and type of physical activity, 

• Improvements in nutrition, 

• The incidence of violence and suicide, 

• The isolation and treatment of causes of disease, 

• The emergence of new forms of disease, 

• The evolution of existing forms of disease, 

• Improvements in prenatal care, 

• The prevalence of obesity,

• The prevalence of cigarette smoking, 

• The misuse of drugs (including alcohol), 

• The extent to which people assume responsibility for their own health, 

• Education regarding health, and 

• Changes in perception of the value of life. 

In reviewing the above list, future progress for some factors seems questionable when recent 

statistics are considered. Recent NCHS releases have reported a substantial increase in the 

prevalence of obesity and diabetes, decreased environmental air quality, and an increase in 

negative side effects from invasive surgical procedures. On the other hand, there is good basis 

for speculation that there will continue to be substantial breakthroughs in advancing medical 

technology and treatment in the future. The extent to which such new technologies will have 

purely positive effects (like improved sanitation) versus mixed effects (as in the case of 

chemotherapy) will determine their potential for improving mortality. A fundamental 

consideration, however, is the ability and willingness of society to pay for the development of 

new treatments and technologies, and to provide these to the population as a whole. 

The expansion of national expenditures for health services, research, and development over the 

last 60 years has been remarkable. Total national health expenditures have risen from 4 percent 

of GDP in 1952 to nearly 18 percent by 2019, then increasing to 20 percent in 2020 during the 

first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, and then decreasing to about 18 percent in 2021. This 

expansion has both enhanced health care for those who already had access and extended access 

to tens of millions through Medicare, Medicaid, and more recently, the Affordable Care Act of 

2010. However, national health expenditures cannot continue to expand at this pace in the 

future. The Medicare Trustees Report projects a dramatic slowdown in the rate of increase in 

per-enrollee Medicare spending in the future, as the average number of enrollees will be 

increasing. The slowdown results from a combination of cost constraints from the Affordable 

Care Act and the fact that individuals will be living longer after attaining age 65, thus pushing 

end-of-life costs to older ages. Even with improved efficiency and targeting of medical care in 

the future, a deceleration in spending per enrollee of this magnitude will tend to slow the rate of 

reduction in mortality.

Much has been made of the reduction in smoking in the U.S. over the past 30 years, particularly 

for men. However, there is a looming concern over other behavioral factors. Reduced physical 

activity and consumption of excess calories has led to the rising epidemic of obesity. In the 

future, assuming the prevalence of obesity stabilizes, an increasing portion of the adult and aged 

population will have been obese for long durations. The effects of prolonged obesity will clearly 

have negative cumulative effects for diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and cancer in the future. 
Mortality, Page 7

Education and income are correlated with mortality differences in the population. More 

education and higher income are associated with lower mortality. It is not entirely clear whether 

this correlation is largely due to the benefits of higher income and education, or to the 

“selection” of more advantaged (and thus healthier) individuals in gaining access to the best 

education and job opportunities. To the extent that the former factor is important, then 

increasing education and income for the population as a whole may provide some further 

benefits, but substantially less than in the past, given that further increases in education are likely 

to slow. 

Future progress in treatment of currently predominant diseases is contingent on the availability 

of funding, research outcomes, and education about lifestyle choices that affect one’s health. 

Quality of life and average years of healthy living have improved on a continual basis. Much 

progress has been made in the predominant causes of death (cardiovascular and respiratory 

disease) over the past several decades. These medical advances have caused the predominant 

causes of death to become less dominant, so that other causes, which have had slower rates of 

improvement or have only recently emerged, are becoming more predominant. For the stillpredominant causes of death where significant progress has been made, further progress may be 

more difficult. In contrast, causes that have been less addressed may receive more research 

attention in the future. Therefore, many causes of death that have recently had rapid rates of 

reduction may have slower rates in the future. Causes that have had slower rates of improvement 

in the past may have more rapid rates of improvement in the future.

Finally, note that improvements in mortality and extension of longevity through the last century 

were relatively unconstrained by limitations of senescence and gradual deterioration of body 

systems, as we had not yet reached the apparent practical limit to life span. While there is likely 

no fixed limit for human longevity, it is true that the average human lifespan has improved much 

more than the maximum observed lifespan. This suggests that even with continued technological 

advances, the inherent limitations of the physical body and the mind to endure successfully past 

about 110 years will continue to provide a decelerating force of mortality improvement. 

2.4 Past Experience by Cause of Death

In the past, the reduction of mortality rates has varied greatly by cause of death. In assessing 

experience and future possible improvement in mortality, it is important to understand the 

varying trends in mortality by cause of death. For the relatively recent period 1979-2019, 

average annual reductions in central death rates1by age group and sex were analyzed for six

basic categories of cause of death: five major groups of cause of death, and a residual group 

(Other) that contains all other causes (see table 2.3). (Note that in the past, death rates by more 

than six categories were analyzed and the Trustees developed assumptions for the same. For 

example, in the 1990s there were 10 different categories. See Actuarial Study 112 at 

https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/pdf_studies/study112.pdf.) The analysis has focused on the 

period 1979-2019 because NCHS has provided death rates by cause on a consistent basis since 

1 The average annual reduction over an “n” year period is calculated as the complement of the nth root of the ratio of 

the death rate in the last year over that of the first year.
Mortality, Page 8

1979, allowing for consistent groupings of death rates by selected cause groups. Note that 

although data for 2020 through 2022 is incorporated in the 2024 Trustees Report, 2019 is used as 

an end year for trend analysis due to distortions in death rates for 2020 through 2022 as a result 

of the pandemic.

For all ages combined, the largest average annual rate of reduction over the period 1979-2019 

was in the category of Cardiovascular Disease, which has been about 2.3 percent for men and 

about 2.2 percent for women. The rate of reduction for Cancer has been about 1.1 percent for 

men and about 0.6 percent for women. For the category of Violence and Accidents, which 

includes domestic violence, opioid and alcohol abuse, and suicides, there has been a rate of 

reduction of about 0.2 percent for men, but a rate of increase of about 0.3 percent for women. 

For the Respiratory Disease category, there has been a rate of reduction of about 0.2 percent for 

men and a rate of increase of about 1.5 percent for women. For the Dementia category, there has 

been a rate of increase of 7.7 percent for men and 8.8 percent for women. For the Other 

category, the rate of increase has been about 0.2 percent for men and 0.3 percent for women.

2.5 Assumed Future Rates of Reduction in Mortality by Cause of Death

The ultimate average annual percentage reductions by age group and cause of death that are 

assumed for the intermediate alternative of the 2024 Trustees Report are presented in table 2.3, 

along with the intermediate assumptions from the 2023 Trustees Report, and the average rates 

experienced during the periods 1979-2019 and 2009-19. The ultimate rates of improvement by 

age, sex, and cause for the low-cost and high-cost alternatives are developed as a ratio to the 

intermediate alternative, with low-cost being one-third of the intermediate rates of improvement 

and the high-cost being two times the intermediate rates. 

As seen in table 2.3, the rate of reduction in mortality due to cardiovascular disease has generally 

slowed in the last 10 years prior to the COVID-19 pandemic (2009-19) for all ages. The 

Trustees believe that ultimate rates of decline for this cause will generally be higher than for 

these 10 years, but somewhat lower than the rapid pace since 1979. For ages 65 and over, 

reductions in death rates from respiratory disease have generally increased over the 10-year 

period, 2009-19, consistent with a partial continuation of the gains at younger ages in the 

previous 10 years. For the ultimate rates of reduction, the Trustees expect more modest 

improvement at ages 65 and over for both the cardiovascular and respiratory causes as the gains 

from reduced smoking and interventions for heart disease will slow, while effects of obesity will 

increase. 

Reductions in death rates due to cancer for those over age 65 have improved significantly in the 

last 10 years prior to the COVID-19 pandemic (2009-19). As indicated by researchers at NCHS, 

cancer is actually many different diseases, and each will be addressed gradually. Progress has 

been made for lung cancer in large part due to reduced smoking. Progress has been made in 

other areas such as breast cancer and prostate cancer due to increased awareness and medical 

treatments. However, progress for other cancers has been slower. In addition, there are 

indications that treatment for a first cancer may result in greater susceptibility to a second cancer 

at a later time. On balance, however, the Trustees expect that the ultimate average rate of 
Mortality, Page 9

reduction in death due to cancer will match or exceed the rate of reduction experienced from 

1979 to 2019. 

Death rates from violence and accidents have actually increased substantially in the last 10 years 

prior to the COVID-19 pandemic for all ages. The Trustees believe that this trend will not 

continue indefinitely. 

Death rates from dementia have increased significantly over the last 40 years prior to the 

COVID-19 pandemic, especially at ages 65 and over. Those increases have slowed somewhat in 

the last 10 years prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, but they have continued to be substantial. 

Public health and other government researchers that the Office of the Chief Actuary consulted 

have expressed pessimism about the prospects for significant breakthroughs in treating dementia 

in the near future, and even beyond. However, the Trustees do assume some modest progress 

over the next 75 years.

Analyzing death rates from all other causes is always a challenge because this category 

incorporates new causes that are identified over time. Death rates for this category (all other 

causes) have risen substantially since 1979. Progress in reducing death rates in this category will 

be extremely challenging in the future, even as the proportion of all deaths from this group 

increases. Even with decelerating spending on health research and services relative to GDP for 

the future, it is reasonable to assume that spending will be redirected from the largest causes of 

death in the past (cardiovascular disease and respiratory disease) to other causes (emerging 

diseases). Thus, the Trustees expect that some progress, even if modest, will be achieved for the 

all other category. 

Advice from the medical research community (including CDC, NCHS, and others) has been 

received on a largely informal basis and has been an essential component in guiding the 

Trustees’ assumptions for reductions in mortality by cause. Insights were gained from a Johns 

Hopkins University (JHU) study that was published in 2016, which enlisted medical researchers

and clinicians to develop expectations for reductions in death rates over about the period 2009-

40. This specific input has been highly instructive in corroborating the Trustees’ assumptions for 

the medium-term and long-term reductions in death rates by cause. The JHU work was

published in the North American Actuarial Journal, Volume 20, Issue 3 (see 

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10920277.2016.1179123). Note that the JHU 

expectations included an assumption that declines for causes not specifically considered by their 

experts would occur at about one-half of the rate for all other causes combined, somewhat 

similar to the Trustees’ assumptions for the “Other” category.

There are three directly comparable categories of cause of death between the JHU experts and 

the Trustees. As an example, consider these three categories at ages 85+. For cardiovascular 

disease, the JHU experts project an average annual rate of decline from 2009-40 of 0.5 percent 

for women and 0.6 percent for men. The Trustees’ ultimate assumption for cardiovascular 

disease is 1.5 percent. For cancer, the JHU experts project an average annual rate of decline 

from 2009-40 of 0.4 percent for women and 0.6 percent for men. The Trustees’ ultimate 

assumption for cancer is 0.5 percent. For respiratory disease, the JHU experts project an average 

annual rate of decline from 2009-40 of 0.1 percent for women and 0.4 percent for men. The 
Mortality, Page 10

Trustees’ ultimate assumption for respiratory disease is 0.2 percent. In particular, note the 

similarity of expectations for the respiratory disease and cancer categories between the JHU 

experts and those assumed for the 2024 Trustees Report. 

2.6 Projected Future Rates of Reduction based on Assumptions by Age, Sex, and Cause of Death

The period for determining the starting levels of annual mortality reduction is the most recent 12

years of historical data prior to the COVID-19 pandemic (2008-19), with variable weighting on 

these 12 years. These starting levels were calculated by age group, sex, and cause as the percent 

reductions in log linear regressions of the central death rates.

2

 The rates of improvement begin

grading to the ultimate rates immediately after the last year of data. The annual reductions in 

mortality are assumed to change rapidly from the starting levels of annual reductions to the 

assumed ultimate rates of reduction for years 2048 and later. Under the low-cost and high-cost 

scenarios, the starting levels of annual reduction are assumed to be 50 percent and 150 percent,3

respectively, of the starting levels for the intermediate assumptions.

Instead of using the measured mortality rates for the last single year of data prior to the pandemic 

(2019) as the starting point of the mortality projections, mortality rates were calculated to be 

consistent with the trend inherent in the last 12 years of available data prior to the COVID-19 

pandemic, 2008-19. This approach reduces the impact of wide fluctuations that tend to occur in 

annual data on the starting levels used for the mortality projection. 

It is also useful to compare the resulting reductions in death rates for all causes combined to past 

trends. These are the “Resulting Total” entries displayed in table 2.3. This analysis allows for a 

further look at the reasonableness of the projections that result from the cause-specific 

assumptions. In addition, results using the Trustees’ assumptions are compared with those of 

demographers who prefer to extrapolate past trends without specific consideration of the 

underlying causes of death. 

Table 2.4 provides age-sex-adjusted death rates4for historical years and projected years, based 

on the assumed future rates of reduction by cause group. The age-sex-adjusted death rates 

presented in table 2.4 use the April 1, 2010, Census resident population as the standard 

population for the age-sex adjustment. 

Because reductions in mortality have differed widely by age in the past, the ultimate reductions 

in death rates vary by age group. Historically, reductions have been very rapid at the youngest 

ages. However, reductions at the oldest ages, ages 85 and over, have been very slow. For many 

2

If the starting level of annual reductions for a particular cause age-sex group is negative, then 75 percent of that 

starting level is assumed for the intermediate alternative.

3

If the starting level of annual reductions for a particular cause age-sex group is negative, then 100 percent of that 

starting level is assumed for the low-cost alternative and 50 percent is assumed for the high-cost alternative.

4 The age-sex-adjusted death rate is the crude rate that would occur in the enumerated total population as of a 

specific date, if that population were to experience the death rates by age and sex observed in, or projected for, the

selected year.
Mortality, Page 11

years, the Trustees’ assumptions have reflected the belief that neither of these extremes will 

persist indefinitely into the future. The Trustees’ assumptions have reflected slower 

improvement at the youngest ages than evidenced since 1900, and faster improvement at the 

oldest ages (85 and over) than experienced historically. 

Table 2.2 shows historical rates of improvement and the projected rates of improvement based 

on assumed rates of reduction by cause, by alternative for the 2024 Trustees Report, summarized 

by age group and sex. For the intermediate alternative, projected rates of improvement for ages 

under 50 are generally lower than those experienced over the period 1900-2019, consistent with 

the Trustees’ expectation of continued generally slower improvement in the future for these age 

groups. For men age 50 and older, the average projected rates of improvement for years after 

2019 are slightly higher than those experienced since 1900. The projected rates of improvement 

for women age 50 and older are slightly lower than those assumed for men and generally lower 

than the rates experienced by this group of women over the period 1900-2019. This is consistent 

with the Trustees’ long-held belief that average rates of mortality improvement for women, 

which had been faster than for men until around 1980, would ultimately converge with male 

improvement rates. Evidence that improvement for women will not always be faster than for 

men is apparent in data for years since about 1980. As shown in table 2.3, the rate of 

improvement in mortality for women ages 65-84 averaged only 0.80 percent per year during the 

period 1979-2019. This amount was about three-fifths of the average rate of improvement for 

men ages 65-84 during this period (1.36 percent). Similarly, the rate of improvement in 

mortality for women age 85 and older averaged only 0.23 percent per year during the period

1979-2019. This amount was about two-thirds of the average rate of improvement for men age 

85 and older during this period (0.35 percent).

Table 2.2 also shows that, for all ages combined, the projected rate of improvement under the 

intermediate alternative for the period 2048-98 is 0.73 percent per year for men and 0.69 percent 

per year for women. The ultimate rates of improvement for the 2023 Trustees Report (for years 

2047-97) were 0.74 and 0.69 percent per year for men and women, respectively.

A comparison of the basis for past improvement in mortality with the expected basis for future 

improvement suggests that future improvement is likely to continue, but at a generally slower 

rate than experienced during the extraordinary 1900-2019 period for ages under 65. Based on 

analysis of experience by cause of death, and expected future conditions affecting mortality 

improvement, it seems reasonable to expect the rate of mortality improvement for the age group 

65 and older for the next 75 years to be slightly slower compared to that experienced during 

1900-2019 (0.78 percent as shown in table 2.2). The Trustees believe that the average annual 

rate of decline of 0.67 percent for ages 65 and older (as shown in table 2.2) over the period 2019-

98 for the intermediate assumption is reasonable in this context.

2.7 Trustees’ Assumptions versus Historical Trends and Other Assumptions 

Table 2.1 shows average rates of reduction in mortality for three broad age groups over two 

historical periods. In addition, the table includes the following ultimate rates of reduction (the 

rate of reduction in mortality averaged over the last 50 years of the 75-year long-range period): 
Mortality, Page 12

• Those assumed for the intermediate ultimate assumptions for various Trustees Reports 

(choosing those reports that included changes in the ultimate assumptions or in the 

methodology and the most recent report), 

• Those recommended by various Technical Panels, and 

• Those resulting from a survey taken at a Society of Actuaries (SOA) seminar.

Rates of improvement shown on the first page of table 2.1 reflect age-sex adjustment to the 

distribution of the 1990 U.S. population; those on the second page use the distribution of the 

2000 U.S. population; and those on the third page use the distribution of the 2010 U.S. 

population. As seen by comparing the rates on the first and second pages in table 2.1 under the 

intermediate assumptions of the 2002 and the 2004 Trustees Reports (for which ultimate rates of 

improvement were the same), the difference in using the different populations for age-sex 

adjusting makes little difference in the ultimate average rates by the broad age groups. This 

conclusion is further supported by comparing the rates from the 2013 Trustees Report using two 

different populations for age-sex adjusting, as shown on the second and third pages in table 2.1. 

For presentations other than table 2.1 of this memorandum, rates of improvement are presented 

with age-sex adjustment to the distribution of the 2010 U.S. population.

Table 2.1 provides the assumed ultimate average annual percent reductions in mortality for the 

intermediate assumptions of the 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2021 and 2024

Trustees Reports. The 1999 and 2000 Trustees Reports are included because ultimate annual 

percent reductions were increased substantially in the 2000 Trustees Report. The 2002 Trustees 

Report is included because changes in methodology were made that resulted in increased 

ultimate annual percent reductions. The 2004 Trustees Report is included to provide 

comparability in the results using a different population for the purpose of age-sex adjustment. 

The 2008 and 2009 Trustees Reports are included because ultimate annual percent reductions 

were revised. The 2011 Trustees Report is included because changes in methodology were made 

that put more emphasis on the recent historical data. The 2013 Trustees Report values are shown 

on both the second and third pages of the table to compare results using different populations for 

age-sex adjustment. The 2021 Trustees Report is included because the dementia category was 

added as a cause of death and changes were made to the ultimate rates of improvement for the 

cardiovascular disease category.

Also included in table 2.1 are the assumed ultimate annual percent reductions in mortality 

recommended by the 1994-96, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2019 Technical Panels and the 

median response from actuaries, demographers, biologists, and economists who participated in 

the 1997 Society of Actuaries Seminar. Focusing on mortality for ages 65 and over, it should be 

noted that since 2000, the Trustees’ intermediate assumptions have provided for an ultimate rate 

of reduction that is somewhat less than the average experienced since 1900. A description of the 

recommendations of recent Technical Panels is presented in section 2.8. 

Comparisons of historical and assumed rates of improvement are included in table 2.2. All rates 

of improvement shown in this table reflect age-sex adjustment to the distribution of the 2010 

U.S. population. For the age group 65 and over (where mortality is concentrated), the average 

annual rate of improvement experienced during 1900-2019 was 0.78 percent. In the most recent 

two sub-periods, there has been both a period of fast improvement (1.79 percent per year for 
Mortality, Page 13

1999 through 2009) and a period of slow improvement (0.63 percent per year for 2009 through 

2019). In fact, mortality at ages 65 and over generally improved at about 0.78 percent per year, 

or less, during 1900-2019 with the exception of three notable periods. The first was for the 

World War II period and subsequent years, 1936-54. During this period, dramatic advances in 

the standard of living were achieved due to expanded medical practice including the introduction 

of antibiotics. The second period was from 1968-82, during which additional dramatic 

advancements in medicine were made and access to medical services was greatly expanded 

through Medicare and Medicaid for the old, frail, and disadvantaged, who account for the vast 

majority of deaths in the population. During the third period, 1999-2009, advances in medicines 

and surgical treatments led to rapid improvements. Cancer and cardiovascular patients 

especially benefitted from these advancements.

Chart 2.1 displays the annual age-sex-adjusted central death rates experienced since 1900. An 

examination of these rates reveals a sequence of distinct periods of mortality reduction. Table 

2.2 provides average annual rates of reduction for these periods. During the period 1900-36, 

annual mortality reduction averaged about 0.5 percent for men and 0.8 percent for women. 

During the following period, 1936-54, there was more rapid reduction (partially due to

antibiotics and other medical advances), averaging 1.8 percent per year for men and 2.5 percent 

per year for women. The period 1954-68 saw a much slower reduction of 0.6 percent per year 

for women and an increase of 0.4 percent per year for men. From 1968 through 1982, the rate of 

reduction in mortality surged (partially due to Medicare and Medicaid), averaging 1.8 percent for 

men and 2.1 percent for women, annually. From 1982 to 1999, moderately slow reduction in 

mortality returned, averaging 0.8 percent per year for men and 0.2 percent per year for women. 

From 1999 to 2009, another more rapid period occurred, averaging 1.8 percent per year for men 

and 1.4 percent per year for women, annually. The latest period, 2009-19, has mortality 

reduction slowing with average mortality improvement of 0.5 percent per year for men and 0.4

percent per year for women.

For the first four periods mentioned above, spanning 1900 through 1982, the average annual rate 

of improvement for men was less than that for women. For the last three periods, spanning 1982 

through 2019, the opposite was true, i.e., the average annual rate of improvement for women was 

less than that for men. Chart 2.2 shows differences between male and female annual rates of 

mortality improvement (male rates minus female rates) for the age group 65 and older for each 

year of the period 1969 through 2022. Differences are shown for rates based on Medicare data. 

Even with normal year-to-year variation, improvement was generally greater for women until 

about 1980, as had been the case since the beginning of the past century. However, female 

improvement was generally less than or equal to that for men beginning in about 1980. The 

differences in the improvement rates for years 2020-22 are affected by the unusual experience 

during the pandemic period.

2.8 Recommendations of the Previous Technical Panels and Other Projections

The 2015 Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods, appointed by the Social Security 

Advisory Board, recommended substantially larger rates of decline than those assumed under the 

2015 Trustees Report. Their recommendation was for an assumption of an overall average 1.00

percent annual reduction in the age-sex-adjusted death rate for the ultimate period (2040 to 
Mortality, Page 14

2089), compared to the 0.71 percent overall average rate of decline for the 2015 Trustees Report. 

However, they supported having an age gradient (i.e., having the rates of improvement at 

younger ages be greater than rates of improvement at the older ages) and using cause-specific 

assumptions. Their 1.00 percent annual reduction recommendation was based on the average 

rate of reduction in the total population (all ages and causes combined) observed for the period 

since 1950. However, the mortality data through 2016 have continued to improve much less 

than was assumed for the 2015 through 2018 Trustees Reports. Based on recent slow rates of 

mortality improvement, the chairperson of the panel stated that she was glad that the Trustees did 

not follow the panel’s recommendation for faster overall mortality reduction (see

http://crr.bc.edu/briefs/social-securitys-financial-outlook-the-2016-update-in-perspective/).

The 2019 Technical Panel recommended a 1.0 percent ultimate average annual reduction for all 

ages combined but noted that the Trustees’ assumed age gradient was reasonable. They also 

recommended considering cause of death in the intermediate term (approximately 20 years), 

while eliminating cause of death projections for the long term. Finally, they recommended 

reflecting little or no improvement in aggregate mortality in the near-term and a slower transition 

to the ultimate rates of improvement.

Since 2016, the Congressional Budget Office has assumed an age gradient in the decline of 

mortality rates. For their 2024 projections, they assume that after 2025, each five-year age group 

will continue to decline at the average rate that it has declined from 1950 – 2019, and the

assumed mortality rates result in a life expectancy at birth of 82.2 years in 2054.

5

 In the Census

Bureau’s World Population Estimates and Projections, as of February 2024, the assumed 

mortality rates result in a life expectancy at birth of 85.0 years in 2054.

6

 For comparison, the 

Trustees’ assumptions result in a life expectancy at birth of 81.9 years in 2054.

5

See https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59697. 

6

See https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/data/idb/dataset/idbzip.zip.
Mortality, Page 15

Table 2.1: Historical and Assumed Rates of Reduction in Mortality1

1994-96

Technical

October-97

SOA

1999

Trustees

1999

Technical

2000

Trustees

2002

Trustees

2003

Technical

1900-2000 1982-2000 Panel2 Seminar3 Alternative 24 Panel5 Alternative 26 Alternative 27 Panel8

0 - 14 3.22 2.51 3.30 0.95 1.20 2.23 1.34 1.54 2.29

15 - 64 1.40 1.19 1.40 0.75 0.58 1.13 0.75 0.79 1.11

65 & Over 0.73 0.36 0.75 0.60 0.50 0.99 0.66 0.70 0.90

1For the 1999 Trustees Report (ages 65 and over), the 1999 Technical Panel (all 3 age groups), and the 2000 Trustees Report (ages 65 and over), the rates of reduction are

 the average of male and female annual rates of reduction in age-adjusted central death rates.

2The 1994-96 Technical Panel (appointed by the Advisory Council) recommended assuming reduction at the average rate experienced during the century.

3The Society of Actuaries Seminar included 60 actuaries, demographers, economists, and other experts on Social Security financing. 

 Values shown are the median responses of the participants.

4The 1999 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2023-2073.

5The 1999 Technical Panel (appointed by the Advisory Board) recommended that ultimate rate of reduction in mortality be increased at all ages

 (over the 1999 Trustees Report assumptions) by enough to increase the projected life expectancy at birth for 2070 by 3.7 years (to the level assumed for the high-cost alternative).

6The 2000 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2024-2074. Ultimate rates of mortality reduction increased.

7The 2002 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2026-2076. Changes to projection methodology increased rates of mortality reduction.

8The 2003 Technical Panel ultimate assumptions are for the period 2027-2077.

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024

Historical average 

annual percent 

reductions in 

age-sex-adjusted 

death rates

(Using the 1990 Census Resident population as the standard population for age-sex adjusting)

Ultimate annual percent reductions in age-sex-adjusted death rates

(Based on data from the 

2003 Trustees Report)
Mortality, Page 16

 

Table 2.1 (Continued): Historical and Assumed Rates of Reduction in Mortality

2004

Trustees

2007

Technical

2008

Trustees

2009

Trustees

2011

Trustees

2011

Technical

2013

Trustees

1900-2009 1982-2009 Alternative 21 Panel2 Alternative 23 Alternative 24 Alternative 25 Panel6 Alternative 27

0 - 14 3.10 2.26 1.54 1.00 1.56 1.55 1.56 1.26 1.57

15 - 64 1.35 1.17 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96 1.26 0.98

65 & Over 0.81 0.84 0.68 1.00 0.65 0.71 0.66 1.26 0.64

1The 2004 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2028-2078.

2The 2007 Technical Panel ultimate assumptions are for the period 2031-2081.

3The 2008 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2032-2082.

4The 2009 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2033-2083.

5The 2011 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2035-2085.

6The 2011 Technical Panel ultimate assumptions are for the period 2035-2085.

7The 2013 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2037-2087.

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024

Historical average 

annual percent 

reductions in 

age-sex-adjusted 

death rates

(Using the 2000 Census Resident population as the standard population for age-sex adjusting)

Ultimate annual percent reductions in age-sex-adjusted death rates

(Based on data from the 

2013 Trustees Report)
Mortality, Page 17

Table 2.1 (Continued): Historical and Assumed Rates of Reduction in Mortality

2013

Trustees

2015

Technical

2019

Technical

2021 

Trustees

2024

Trustees

1900-2019 1982-2019 Alternative 21 Panel2 Panel3 Alternative 24 Alternative 25

0 - 14 2.96 2.02 1.57 2.44 2.10 1.52 1.52

15 - 64 1.19 0.89 1.00 1.48 1.35 0.92 0.91

65 & Over 0.78 0.77 0.63 0.86 0.87 0.64 0.63

1The 2013 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2037-2087.

2The 2015 Technical Panel ultimate assumptions are for the period 2039-2089.

3The 2019 Technical Panel ultimate assumptions are for the period 2043-2093.

4The 2021 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2045-2095.

5The 2024 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2048-2098.

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024

(Based on data from the 

2024 Trustees Report)

(Using the 2010 Census Resident population as the standard population for age-sex adjusting)

Historical average 

annual percent 

reductions in 

age-sex-adjusted 

death rates

Ultimate annual percent reductions in age-sex-adjusted death rates
Mortality, Page 18

Table 2.2: Average Annual Percent Reductions in Age-Adjusted Central Death Rates for the 2024 Trustees Report 1

Sex Age 1900-1936 1936-1954 1954-1968 1968-1982 1982-1999 1999-2009 2009-2019 1900-2019 2019-2048 2019-2098 2048-2098

Male 0-14 2.85 4.76 1.70 4.26 2.76 1.58 1.43 2.94 1.48 1.50 1.51

15-49 1.18 3.32 -0.40 2.13 1.09 0.84 -0.55 1.25 0.59 0.74 0.82

50-64 0.13 1.30 -0.22 2.21 1.87 1.14 0.27 0.86 0.87 0.92 0.95

65-84 0.07 1.32 -0.32 1.49 1.04 2.44 0.92 0.79 0.87 0.78 0.73

85+ 0.19 1.68 -1.07 1.81 -0.53 1.50 0.38 0.49 0.64 0.60 0.58

65+ 0.11 1.44 -0.57 1.60 0.48 2.06 0.69 0.68 0.77 0.70 0.66

Total 0.53 1.77 -0.41 1.83 0.81 1.80 0.51 0.91 0.78 0.75 0.73

Female 0-14 3.10 4.99 1.78 4.06 2.56 1.49 1.33 2.99 1.51 1.53 1.54

15-49 1.70 4.89 0.30 2.74 0.72 0.14 -0.21 1.72 0.68 0.81 0.89

50-64 0.72 2.79 0.68 1.65 1.01 1.33 -0.03 1.17 0.85 0.93 0.97

65-84 0.29 2.23 0.87 2.00 0.23 1.70 0.93 1.02 0.80 0.72 0.67

85+ 0.22 1.59 0.04 2.29 -0.52 1.21 0.16 0.63 0.59 0.55 0.53

65+ 0.27 2.00 0.55 2.12 -0.08 1.48 0.58 0.86 0.70 0.64 0.60

Total 0.80 2.54 0.59 2.14 0.20 1.37 0.44 1.13 0.73 0.70 0.69

Total 0-14 2.96 4.86 1.73 4.18 2.67 1.54 1.39 2.96 1.49 1.51 1.52

15-49 1.42 3.95 -0.15 2.33 0.97 0.60 -0.43 1.44 0.62 0.76 0.84

50-64 0.40 1.91 0.10 2.02 1.54 1.21 0.15 1.00 0.86 0.92 0.96

65-84 0.19 1.77 0.22 1.72 0.70 2.10 0.92 0.91 0.84 0.75 0.70

85+ 0.21 1.62 -0.34 2.10 -0.51 1.34 0.24 0.58 0.61 0.57 0.55

65+ 0.20 1.72 0.02 1.86 0.24 1.79 0.63 0.78 0.73 0.67 0.63

Total 0.66 2.13 0.08 1.98 0.57 1.59 0.46 1.02 0.75 0.73 0.71

1Using the 2010 Census Resident population as the standard population for age adjusting.

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

Historical Period Intermediate Alternative

May 6, 2024
Mortality, Page 19

Table 2.2 (Continued): Average Annual Percent Reductions in Age-Adjusted Central Death Rates

for the 2024 Trustees Report 1

Sex Age 2019-2048 2019-2098 2048-2098 2019-2048 2019-2098 2048-2098

Male 0-14 0.51 0.51 0.52 2.87 2.89 2.90

15-49 0.01 0.18 0.28 1.40 1.52 1.59

50-64 0.21 0.29 0.34 1.78 1.72 1.69

65-84 0.29 0.29 0.29 1.62 1.32 1.15

85+ 0.20 0.22 0.23 1.23 1.02 0.90

65+ 0.25 0.26 0.26 1.45 1.18 1.03

Total 0.22 0.26 0.28 1.51 1.31 1.19

Female 0-14 0.53 0.52 0.52 2.93 2.94 2.95

15-49 0.08 0.22 0.31 1.54 1.64 1.70

50-64 0.19 0.29 0.35 1.77 1.75 1.74

65-84 0.26 0.27 0.27 1.49 1.21 1.04

85+ 0.16 0.19 0.21 1.14 0.93 0.81

65+ 0.21 0.23 0.24 1.32 1.07 0.93

Total 0.20 0.24 0.27 1.43 1.21 1.09

Total 0-14 0.52 0.52 0.52 2.90 2.91 2.92

15-49 0.03 0.20 0.29 1.44 1.56 1.62

50-64 0.20 0.29 0.34 1.78 1.74 1.71

65-84 0.27 0.28 0.28 1.56 1.27 1.10

85+ 0.17 0.20 0.22 1.17 0.96 0.84

65+ 0.23 0.24 0.25 1.38 1.12 0.97

Total 0.21 0.25 0.27 1.47 1.26 1.14

1Using the 2010 Census Resident population as the standard population for age adjusting.

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024

Low-Cost Alternative High-Cost Alternative
Mortality, Page 20

Table 2.3: Average Annual Rates of Reduction in Central 

Death Rates by Age Group, Sex, and Cause

2023 TR 2024 TR 2023 TR 2024 TR 

1979 to 2019 2009 to 2019 2047 to 2097 2048 to 2098 1979 to 2019 2009 to 2019 2047 to 2097 2048 to 2098

Under Age 15

Cardiovascular Disease 1.93 2.18 1.9 1.9 1.66 1.58 1.9 1.9

Cancer 2.37 1.78 1.5 1.5 1.99 1.56 1.5 1.5

Violence and Accidents 2.39 0.28 1.0 1.0 2.06 -0.10 1.0 1.0

Respiratory Disease 2.27 2.02 2.0 2.0 2.44 2.59 2.0 2.0

Dementia 3.07 3.93 0.1 0.1 1.80 -1.78 0.1 0.1

Other 2.21 1.64 1.7 1.7 2.10 1.56 1.7 1.7

Resulting Total ** 2.25 1.43 1.51 1.51 2.09 1.33 1.54 1.54

Ages 15 - 49

Cardiovascular Disease 1.84 1.00 1.3 1.3 1.19 0.41 1.3 1.3

Cancer 1.94 2.50 1.5 1.5 1.57 1.76 1.5 1.5

Violence and Accidents 0.32 -2.28 0.7 0.7 -0.21 -2.35 0.7 0.7

Respiratory Disease 0.50 2.14 0.5 0.5 -0.47 2.08 0.5 0.5

Dementia 1.12 0.73 0.1 0.1 0.96 1.84 0.1 0.1

Other 0.20 0.54 0.8 0.8 -0.09 -0.07 0.8 0.8

Resulting Total ** 0.77 -0.55 0.82 0.82 0.49 -0.21 0.89 0.89

Ages 50 - 64

Cardiovascular Disease 2.42 0.42 1.5 1.5 1.94 0.01 1.5 1.5

Cancer 1.61 2.27 1.5 1.5 1.21 1.34 1.5 1.5

Violence and Accidents -0.32 -3.08 0.5 0.5 -0.69 -2.77 0.5 0.5

Respiratory Disease 0.50 -0.11 0.7 0.7 -1.18 -0.81 0.7 0.7

Dementia -2.46 -2.57 0.1 0.1 -3.25 -3.60 0.1 0.1

Other -0.28 -0.41 0.6 0.6 -0.33 -0.88 0.6 0.6

Resulting Total ** 1.29 0.27 0.95 0.95 0.80 -0.03 0.98 0.97

Ages 65 - 84

Cardiovascular Disease 2.73 1.31 1.9 1.9 2.61 1.69 1.9 1.9

Cancer 1.07 2.18 0.9 0.9 0.34 1.84 0.9 0.9

Violence and Accidents 0.25 -1.79 0.5 0.5 -0.13 -1.58 0.5 0.5

Respiratory Disease 0.48 1.50 0.3 0.3 -1.83 1.07 0.3 0.3

Dementia -6.66 -1.89 0.1 0.1 -7.73 -2.39 0.1 0.1

Other -0.29 -0.64 0.3 0.3 -0.44 0.15 0.3 0.3

Resulting Total ** 1.36 0.92 0.74 0.73 0.80 0.93 0.67 0.67

Ages 85 and older

Cardiovascular Disease 1.67 1.01 1.5 1.5 1.87 1.24 1.5 1.5

Cancer 0.00 0.83 0.5 0.5 -0.29 0.13 0.5 0.5

Violence and Accidents -0.83 -1.80 0.3 0.3 -1.18 -2.16 0.3 0.3

Respiratory Disease -0.45 1.58 0.2 0.2 -1.58 0.51 0.2 0.2

Dementia -9.48 -2.15 0.1 0.1 -10.32 -2.37 0.1 0.1

Other -0.83 0.06 0.3 0.3 -0.78 0.74 0.3 0.3

Resulting Total ** 0.35 0.38 0.58 0.58 0.23 0.16 0.53 0.53

Total

Cardiovascular Disease 2.28 1.04 1.63 1.63 2.18 1.26 1.63 1.63

Cancer 1.06 1.93 0.91 0.90 0.62 1.43 0.96 0.96

Violence and Accidents 0.16 -2.26 0.58 0.58 -0.28 -2.17 0.56 0.56

Respiratory Disease 0.21 1.37 0.32 0.31 -1.54 0.68 0.33 0.33

Dementia -7.71 -2.06 0.10 0.10 -8.77 -2.38 0.10 0.10

Other -0.19 -0.19 0.43 0.43 -0.26 0.18 0.43 0.43

Resulting Total ** 1.04 0.51 0.74 0.73 0.62 0.44 0.69 0.69

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

Female

Male Female

Alternative II* Alternative II*

Male

Female

Historical Historical

Female

Male

* Alternative 1 is 1/3 times Alternative 2; Alternative 3 is 2 times Alternative 2.

May 6, 2024

Male Female

Male Female

Male

** For the "Alternative II" columns, resulting total represents average annual percent reduction in age-adjusted death rates for the last 50 years of the 75-year 

projection period.
Mortality, Page 21

Table 2.4: Age-Sex-Adjusted Central Death Rates

(per 100,000 population)

Year 2023 TR 2024 TR

1900 2,684.3 2,684.3

1910 2,495.9 2,495.9

1920 2,304.5 2,304.5

1930 2,094.9 2,094.9

1940 1,919.8 1,919.8

1945 1,716.6 1,716.6

1950 1,561.9 1,561.9

1955 1,453.8 1,453.8

1960 1,454.3 1,454.3

1965 1,428.8 1,428.8

1970 1,340.0 1,340.0

1975 1,204.8 1,204.8

1980 1,136.9 1,136.9

1985 1,081.0 1,081.0

1990 1,022.9 1,022.9

1991 1,009.2 1,009.2

1992 994.0 994.0

1993 1,017.7 1,017.7

1994 1,005.3 1,005.3

1995 1,002.7 1,002.7

1996 988.8 988.8

1997 972.9 972.9

1998 964.8 964.8

1999 971.7 971.7

2000 961.5 961.5

2001 951.9 951.9

2002 947.6 947.6

2003 933.9 933.9

2004 899.3 899.3

2005 901.9 901.9

2006 879.1 879.1

2007 858.1 858.1

2008 858.1 858.1

2009 827.8 827.8

2010 820.8 820.7

2011 820.7 820.6

2012 811.8 811.5

2013 812.4 811.8

2014 805.2 804.3

2015 815.4 814.2

2016 808.7 807.2

2017 812.8 810.9

2018 803.7 801.5

2019 792.9 790.3

2020 922.4 919.1

2021 937.6 1 933.3

2022 860.3 1 868.6

2023 798.0 1 823.7 1

2023 TR 2024 TR 2023 TR 2024 TR

2024 801.1 806.3 779.2 784.1 752.7 757.4

2025 794.3 791.2 768.2 765.1 736.5 733.4

2030 785.5 782.2 738.4 735.3 680.5 677.5

2040 764.1 760.9 679.9 676.9 581.2 578.7

2050 742.7 739.5 627.3 624.6 502.2 500.1

2060 722.0 718.9 580.7 578.2 439.4 437.6

2070 702.2 699.2 539.4 537.2 388.9 387.4

2080 683.2 680.3 502.7 500.6 347.7 346.5

2090 665.0 662.2 469.9 468.1 313.7 312.7

2100 647.5 644.8 440.6 438.9 285.3 284.4

1

 Estimated, intermediate alternative. Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

Alternative I Alternative II Alternative III

May 6, 2024

2023 TR 2024 TR
Mortality, Page 22

Table 2.5: Historical Unisex Life Expectancy at Birth, by Country

1980 – 2021

Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Most Recent 

Life Expectancy

Latest

 10-Year Change

Australia — 75.5 76.9 77.8 79.2 80.8 81.0 81.3 81.4 81.5 81.7 81.9 82.0 82.1 82.3 82.4 82.4 82.5 82.7 82.9 83.2 83.3 83.3 1.4

Austria 72.7 74.1 75.8 76.9 78.3 79.5 80.1 80.3 80.6 80.5 80.7 81.1 81.1 81.3 81.6 81.3 81.8 81.7 81.8 82.0 81.3 81.3 81.3 0.2

Belgium 73.3 74.6 76.2 77.0 77.9 79.1 79.5 79.9 79.8 80.2 80.3 80.7 80.5 80.7 81.4 81.1 81.5 81.6 81.7 82.1 80.8 81.9 81.9 1.2

Canada 75.1 76.4 77.5 78.1 79.3 80.2 80.7 80.7 80.8 81.2 81.4 81.6 81.8 81.8 81.9 81.9 82.0 81.9 81.9 82.3 81.7 81.6 81.6 0.0

China 63.9 66.3 67.8 69.5 71.4 73.7 74.1 74.5 74.8 74.9 75.3 75.6 75.9 76.2 76.5 76.7 77.0 77.2 77.2 77.7 78.0 78.1 78.1 2.5

Denmark 74.2 74.5 74.9 75.3 76.9 78.3 78.4 78.4 78.8 79.0 79.3 79.9 80.2 80.4 80.7 80.8 80.9 81.1 81.0 81.5 81.6 81.5 81.5 1.6

Finland 73.7 74.5 75.1 76.7 77.8 79.1 79.5 79.6 79.9 80.1 80.2 80.6 80.7 81.1 81.3 81.6 81.5 81.7 81.8 82.1 82.0 81.9 81.9 1.3

France 74.3 75.4 77.0 78.1 79.2 80.4 81.0 81.3 81.4 81.6 81.9 82.3 82.1 82.4 82.9 82.4 82.7 82.7 82.8 83.0 82.3 82.4 82.4 0.1

Germany 72.9 75.1 77.4 76.7 78.3 79.4 79.9 80.1 80.2 80.3 80.5 80.6 80.7 80.6 81.2 80.7 81.0 81.1 81.0 81.3 81.1 80.8 80.8 0.2

Greece 75.3 76.0 77.1 77.8 78.6 79.6 79.9 79.7 80.2 80.4 80.6 80.8 80.7 81.4 81.5 81.1 81.5 81.4 81.9 81.7 81.4 80.2 80.2 -0.6

India 53.1 55.8 58.2 60.2 62.2 64.5 65.0 65.4 65.8 66.1 66.5 66.9 67.4 67.9 68.5 69.1 69.6 70.1 70.5 70.7 70.9 70.2 70.2 3.3

Ireland 72.9 73.4 74.8 75.5 76.6 79.0 79.3 79.7 80.2 80.2 80.8 80.9 80.9 81.0 81.4 81.5 81.7 82.2 82.2 82.8 82.6 82.4 82.4 1.5

Italy 74.0 75.6 77.1 78.3 79.9 80.9 81.4 81.6 81.7 81.8 82.2 82.4 82.4 82.9 83.2 82.7 83.4 83.1 83.4 83.6 82.3 82.7 82.7 0.3

Japan 76.1 77.6 78.9 79.6 81.2 82.0 82.4 82.6 82.7 83.0 82.9 82.7 83.2 83.4 83.7 83.9 84.1 84.2 84.3 84.4 84.6 84.5 84.5 1.8

Mexico 66.2 69.0 70.9 72.2 74.7 75.2 75.5 75.4 75.2 74.9 74.8 74.9 75.0 75.0 75.0 74.7 74.8 74.9 75.0 75.1 75.2 75.4 75.4 0.5

Netherlands 75.9 76.5 77.1 77.6 78.2 79.6 80.0 80.4 80.5 80.9 81.0 81.3 81.2 81.4 81.8 81.6 81.7 81.8 81.9 82.2 81.4 81.4 81.4 0.1

New Zealand 73.2 74.0 75.5 76.8 78.4 79.8 80.1 80.3 80.5 80.7 80.8 81.0 81.2 81.4 81.4 81.5 81.6 81.7 81.7 82.1 82.3 82.3 82.3 1.3

Norway 75.8 76.0 76.6 77.9 78.8 80.3 80.6 80.6 80.8 81.0 81.2 81.4 81.5 81.8 82.2 82.4 82.5 82.7 82.8 83.0 83.3 83.2 83.2 1.8

Portugal 71.5 73.0 74.1 75.4 76.8 78.2 79.0 79.3 79.5 79.7 80.1 80.7 80.6 80.9 81.3 81.3 81.3 81.6 81.5 81.9 81.1 81.5 81.5 0.8

Spain 75.5 76.4 76.9 78.1 79.3 80.3 81.1 81.1 81.5 81.9 82.4 82.6 82.5 83.2 83.3 83.0 83.5 83.4 83.5 84.0 82.4 83.3 83.3 0.7

Sweden 75.8 76.8 77.7 79.0 79.8 80.7 81.0 81.1 81.3 81.5 81.6 81.9 81.8 82.0 82.3 82.2 82.4 82.5 82.6 83.2 82.4 83.1 83.1 1.2

Switzerland 75.7 77.0 77.5 78.7 80.0 81.5 81.8 82.0 82.3 82.3 82.7 82.8 82.8 82.9 83.3 83.0 83.7 83.7 83.8 84.0 83.1 83.9 83.9 1.1

United Kingdom 73.2 74.7 75.7 76.7 77.9 79.2 79.5 79.7 79.8 80.4 80.6 81.0 81.0 81.1 81.4 81.0 81.2 81.3 81.3 81.3 81.0 — 81.0 0.4

United States 73.6 74.5 75.2 75.7 76.6 77.3 77.6 77.8 77.9 78.3 78.5 78.5 78.6 78.6 78.7 78.5 78.5 78.4 78.6 78.7 77.0 76.3 76.3 -2.1

Source: United States: Social Security Administration Office of the Chief Actuary calculations based on data from the National Center for Health Statistics, Census Bureau, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services

 Other countries: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development website at: https://data.oecd.org/healthstat/life-expectancy-at-birth.htm

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024
Mortality, Page 23

Chart 2.1: Historical United States Age-Sex-Adjusted Central Death Rates from 1900-2022

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024
Mortality, Page 24

Chart 2.2: Difference Between Male and Female Annual Percent Reduction in Age-Adjusted 

Death Rates (Male Rates Minus Female Rates) for Population 65+ 

(based on Medicare data)

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024
Immigration, Page 1

3. IMMIGRATION

ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE 2024 TRUSTEES REPORT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, SSA

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

3.1 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. 2

3.2 LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT (LPR) IMMIGRATION......................................................... 3

3.3 LEGAL EMIGRATION ................................................................................................................ 6

3.4 NET LPR IMMIGRATION .......................................................................................................... 6

3.5 OTHER-THAN-LPR IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION............................................................ 6

3.6 RECOMMENDATIONS OF PREVIOUS TECHNICAL PANELS AND OTHER PROJECTIONS........... 8

TABLE 3.1: ANNUAL IMMIGRATION ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY AREA POPULATION............................10

TABLE 3.2: LPR IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES: FISCAL YEARS 1966-91.......................................11

TABLE 3.3: LPR IMMIGRATION LIMITS FOR FISCAL YEARS BEGINNING IN 1995..........................................................12

TABLE 3.4: LPR IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES: FISCAL YEARS BEGINNING IN 1985.....................13
Immigration, Page 2

3.1 Summary

For the 2024 Trustees Report, the ultimate immigration assumptions remain unchanged from 

those used in the 2023 Trustees Report. Table 3.1 displays the annual immigration levels 

assumed for the 2024 Trustees Report as well as those assumed for the 2023 Trustees Report. 

Updated other-than-lawful permanent resident (other-than-LPR) immigration data result in a 

decrease in the long-range OASDI actuarial balance of 0.01 percent of taxable payroll. Other

updates to LPR and other-than-LPR immigration, including the new other-than-LPR immigration 

path to the ultimate assumptions, result in an additional decrease in the actuarial balance of 0.01 

percent of taxable payroll. Thus, the combined immigration changes result in a decrease in the 

actuarial balance of 0.02 percent of taxable payroll.

The annual number of immigrants attaining LPR status has averaged 1.06 million persons per 

year for fiscal years 2010 through 2019, the last decade prior to the pandemic. Based on this 

average and the belief that the number of future immigrants attaining LPR status in the category 

of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens will remain close to recent levels (prior to the pandemic), 

the Trustees’ intermediate ultimate assumption is retained at 1.05 million new LPRs per year for 

the 2024 Trustees Report. The Trustees retained the assumption that legal emigration out of the 

Social Security area will be 25 percent of the number of immigrants attaining LPR status, or 

262,500 per year, ultimately. 

There were no changes to the other-than-LPR immigration model for the 2024 Trustees Report. 

The model projects the annual other-than-LPR immigration flows in three main components: (1) 

the other-than-LPR immigrants entering the Social Security area each year, (2) those who leave 

the stock of other-than-LPR immigrants and move outside the Social Security area, and (3) the 

other-than-LPR immigrants who adjust status to become LPRs, thereby leaving other-than-LPR 

status. The net other-than-LPR immigration is equal to the gross level of other-than-LPR 

immigration, less other-than-LPR emigration out of the Social Security area, and less those who 

adjust status to become LPRs.

The model projects these annual other-than-LPR immigrant flows, and further projects the stock 

of other-than-LPR immigrants in three specific categories: (1) those who have temporary legal 

status (“nonimmigrants”), (2) those who never had legal status (“never-authorized”), and (3)

those who originally entered legally as nonimmigrants but overstayed their visas (“visaoverstayers”). 

Using this model of other-than-LPR immigration, the level of net other-than-LPR immigration, 

under the intermediate alternative, is projected to be about 561,000 persons for 2030, 472,000 

persons for 2050, and 428,000 persons for 2090. The average level of net other-than-LPR

immigration during the 75-year projection period is approximately 476,000 persons per year.

The following table presents the annual net immigration levels for the intermediate alternative. 
Immigration, Page 3

Annual Net Immigration: Alternative II Levels for the 

2024 Trustees Report

Year LPR

Other-thanLPR Total

2023 811,000 914,000 1,725,000

2024 919,000 891,000 1,809,000

2025 919,000 600,000 1,519,000

2026 919,000 589,000 1,507,000

2027 788,000 580,000 1,367,000

2030 788,000 561,000 1,349,000

2040 788,000 506,000 1,293,000

2050 788,000 472,000 1,260,000

2060 788,000 456,000 1,244,000

2070 788,000 442,000 1,230,000

2080 788,000 433,000 1,221,000

2090 788,000 428,000 1,216,000

2100 788,000 426,000 1,214,000

 Notes: Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.

 Levels rounded to the nearest 1,000.

The COVID-19 pandemic started affecting immigration levels in 2020, and the Trustees assume 

that it will continue to affect immigration through 2026. In particular:

• The assumptions for the 2024 Trustees Report include elevated levels of LPR 

immigration in 2023-26, compared to the levels that would have been assumed in the 

absence of the pandemic. These higher levels for 2023-26 reflect the assumption that 

those people who had planned to immigrate in 2020-22, but were unable to enter due to 

reasons related to the pandemic, are delaying their immigration to 2023-26 instead. For 

all years after 2026, the Trustees assume that LPR immigration levels will return to 

ultimate levels. 

• Similarly, the other-than-LPR immigration levels for the 2024 Trustees Report are 

estimated to be higher in 2023 and 2024 compared to what would have been estimated in 

the absence of the pandemic, due to delays in the timing of immigration because of the 

pandemic. For all years after 2024, the Trustees assume that other-than-LPR immigration 

levels will return to ultimate levels. 

Note that the elevated levels of LPR immigration are assumed to extend for a longer period of 

time than the elevated levels of other-than-LPR immigration, because LPR immigration depends 

on the processing capacity of the Department of Homeland Security.

3.2 Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) Immigration

The term LPR immigration refers to the number of persons granted authorization to live and 

work in the United States on a permanent basis. Hereafter, these individuals are referred to as 

lawful permanent residents (LPRs). Many individuals are admitted to the country legally but on 

a temporary basis. These individuals are included as a portion of the other-than-LPR immigrants 

and are discussed in the following sections of this memorandum.
Immigration, Page 4

There are two ways immigrants attain LPR status:

1) New-arrival LPRs are persons who file an application to become an LPR with the 

Department of State while living outside of the United States and become an LPR upon 

entry.

2) Adjustments of Status1are persons who are already living in the United States as 

temporary workers, students, or unauthorized immigrants and apply for and receive an 

adjustment of status to an LPR. 

LPR immigration has been a very important element in the growth of the United States 

population. For the period 1870 through 1930, the population averaged about 13 percent foreign 

born. The Census Bureau estimates that the percentage of the civilian non-institutionalized 

population that is foreign born declined to a low of about 5 percent in the 1970 Census but rose 

to about 8 percent in the 1990 Census. The foreign-born population percentage for the entire 

United States was estimated to be approximately 13.9 percent in the 2022 American Community 

Survey.

Data on the number of LPR immigrants admitted to the U.S., including U.S. possessions and 

territories and Armed Service posts abroad, are obtained from the Office of Immigration 

Statistics (OIS), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). LPR 

immigration averaged nearly one million persons per year for the period 1904 through 1914. 

LPR immigration decreased greatly during World War I and following the adoption of quotas 

based on national origin in 1921. The economic depression in the 1930s caused an additional,

but temporary, decrease that resulted in more emigration than immigration. Annual LPR 

immigration increased after World War II to around 200,000 to 300,000 persons and stayed at 

that level through the 1950s and into the 1960s. With the Immigration Act of 1965 and other 

related changes, annual LPR immigration increased to about 400,000 and remained fairly stable 

until 1977. Between 1977 and 1990, LPR immigration (excluding aliens admitted under the 

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 [IRCA]) averaged approximately 580,000 per

year. This increase was due to the increase in the numbers of relatives admitted and to the large 

numbers of refugees and political asylees admitted during this period. Table 3.2 lists LPR 

immigration for fiscal years 1966 through 1991, reflecting the immigration categories established 

in the 1965 Act. 

The Immigration Act of 1990, which took effect in fiscal year 1992, restructured the immigration 

categories and substantially increased the number of immigrants that may legally enter the 

United States each year. For fiscal years 1995 and later, the 1990 law specified an annual limit 

that could range between 421,000 and 675,000 for certain categories of immigrants. These 

categories and their limits include those admitted based on family-sponsored preference (226,000 

to 480,000), employment-based preference (140,000), and diversity (55,000). Other categories 

of immigrants, such as refugees, are subject to separate limits. The Real ID Act of 2005 

eliminated the numerical limit on asylees and no numerical limitation exists for immediate 

1 DHS also considers refugees and asylees to be adjustments of status, but for the purposes of the immigration 

model, these categories are treated as new arrivals.
Immigration, Page 5

relatives of U.S. citizens. For each of the numerically limited categories, the limits may be 

adjusted annually based on unused amounts from prior years or other categories. Table 3.3 

displays these unadjusted limits and the adjusted limits for each fiscal year from 1995 through 

2022.

The annual level of total LPR immigration and the levels by category can vary considerably from 

year to year as shown in table 3.4. For fiscal years 1998 and 1999, annual LPR immigration was 

about 650,000, the lowest level since the 1990 Act went into effect. This drop is attributed to a 

backlog in the process caused mainly by the longer time required to process the affidavit of 

support and the shifting of responsibilities from the Department of State to DHS. LPR 

immigration was 841,000 in 2000 and over 1,000,000 in 2001 and 2002. These levels in 2000 

through 2002 were significantly above the low levels in 1998 and 1999, mainly due to the efforts 

to reduce the backlog of pending immigration applications. In 2003, LPR immigration declined 

to a level of 704,000 due to a slowdown in processing because of increased security checks. 

Since then, the level has increased dramatically and peaked at a level of 1,266,000 persons in 

2006 before declining about 17 percent to 1,052,000 in 2007. However, the decline in 2007 is 

attributed to an unanticipated spike in naturalization applications that temporarily shifted 

resources away from processing immigration applications. In 2008, the level increased slightly 

from the 2007 level, to 1,107,000. In 2009, there was another slight increase, to 1,131,000. 

From 2010 through 2013, total LPR immigration declined from 1,043,000 in 2010 to 991,000 in 

2013. Total LPR immigration then increased over the next three years to 1,184,000 in 2016, and 

then decreased to 1,032,000 in 2019. Total LPR immigration decreased further to 707,000 in 

2020, and then increased only slightly in 2021 to 740,000, largely due to pandemic-related 

restrictions on immigration in those two years. Total LPR immigration then increased to 

1,018,000 in 2022.

Historically, the adjustment of status category has been a substantial portion of all new LPRs. 

For years 2000 through 2005, approximately 50 percent of all new LPRs were people who had 

already been in the country as temporary workers, foreign students, or unauthorized immigrants

and who filed an application for adjustment to LPR status. However, the percentage decreased 

to an average of approximately 40 percent for years 2006 through 2019. Although the 

percentage increased to approximately 55 percent in years 2020-21, this increase is largely 

attributed to the pandemic-related decrease in new-arrival LPR’s in those years. Therefore, this 

recent increase in the portion of new LPRs who are adjustments of status is not considered to be 

indicative of a long-term trend. Thus, the Trustees assume slightly over 40 percent of future 

individuals becoming LPRs will be adjustments of status from the other-than-LPR immigrant 

population.

As noted above, the Trustees assume that the COVID-19 pandemic will affect LPR immigration 

through 2026. LPR immigration levels in 2023-2026 are generally assumed to be higher than the 

levels that would have been assumed in the absence of the pandemic, fully making up for the 

lower levels in 2020-22. As shown in table 3.1, compared to the 2023 Trustees Report, the 

assumed LPR immigration levels in the 2024 Trustees Report are lower in 2023-2024 but higher 

in 2025-2026, due to lingering pandemic-related effects on processing times. These continued 

processing delays are assumed to prolong the period in which the lower levels in 2020-22 are 

fully made up.
Immigration, Page 6

For the intermediate alternative, the Trustees assume that the future LPR immigration levels will 

average approximately 1,050,000 persons per year, consistent with recent historical levels.

It is possible that future global economic conditions assumed under the high-cost alternative 

and/or less favorable attitudes toward immigration could result in generally lower immigration. 

Therefore, the Trustees assume an ultimate level of 850,000 LPR immigrants per year for the 

high-cost alternative. On the other hand, the possibility of a significant increase in the number of 

immediate relatives admitted and the uncertainty of the number of asylees permits the possibility 

of annual LPR immigration substantially higher than 1,050,000 persons per year. Therefore, the

ultimate level for the low-cost alternative is 1,250,000 persons per year.

3.3 Legal Emigration

Statistics on emigration are sparse and most analysis is based largely on estimates. Research 

done by the Census Bureau, the OIS, and other experts suggests that annual emigration may 

generally be in the range of 20 to 40 percent of annual LPR immigration. Expected emigration 

from the Social Security area should be less than emigration from the United States, especially at 

the older ages. This is primarily because most individuals who leave the United States having 

achieved fully insured status are still eligible to receive OASDI benefits and thus are still 

considered to be in the Social Security area population. For the 2024 Trustees Report, the 

assumed ratios of emigration to immigration are 20, 25, and 30 percent for the low-cost, 

intermediate, and high-cost alternatives, respectively. The same ratios of emigration to 

immigration were assumed for the 2023 Trustees Report.

3.4 Net LPR Immigration

Combining the levels of LPR immigration with the ratios for legal emigration yields ultimate 

levels of net LPR immigration of 1,000,000, 787,500, and 595,000 per year for the low-cost, 

intermediate, and high-cost alternatives, respectively. 

3.5 Other-than-LPR Immigration and Emigration

The term “other-than-LPR immigration” refers to persons entering the United States in a manner 

other than lawfully admitted for permanent residence. This population consists of three

components: 

1) Nonimmigrants: foreign nationals who enter the U.S. with authorization to stay for a 

temporary period of time and for a specific purpose, such as students and exchange 

visitors, temporary workers, and diplomats and other representatives. 

2) Never-authorized: those who are unauthorized on entry and were never previously legally 

authorized to be residing in the United States.

3) Visa-overstayers: those who at one point had temporary legal authorization to be residing 

in the United States but have overstayed their visas.
Immigration, Page 7

The stock of the other-than-LPR immigrant population is included in the starting year population 

level for the Trustees’ projections, in accordance with the official policy of the Census Bureau to 

enumerate all persons residing in the U.S., as well as to provide a basis for estimating the total 

labor force in the United States and total births in the Social Security area. 

During the 1990s, there was rapid growth in the size of the other-than-LPR immigrant 

population. In a joint project, the OIS and the Census Bureau examined the size of the 

unauthorized immigrant population between October 1988 and October 1992. In 1988 there 

were over 4 million unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States. Not counting those 

who would be subsequently legalized under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 

(IRCA), it is estimated that there were 2.2 million unauthorized immigrants in the population as 

of October 1988. At the time of the 1990 Census, 2.6 million persons were estimated to be 

unauthorized, again excluding those who would subsequently be legalized under the IRCA. (The 

total unauthorized population in 1990 was roughly 5.3 million.) Subsequent estimates suggest an 

increase to 3.4 million for October 1992 and approximately 5.0 million for October 1996. The 

rapid rise in the other-than-LPR immigrant population between 1990 and 1996 reflected the 

continued inflow of other-than-LPR immigrants combined with a decreased number leaving this 

status, due to the reduced stock of other-than-LPR immigrants that resulted from the IRCA.

The 2000 Census gave evidence that other-than-LPR immigration since 1990 had been 

consistently underestimated. In producing intercensal estimates of the U.S. population between 

the 1990 and 2000 Census, the Census Bureau estimated the average level of annual net otherthan-LPR immigration to be approximately 550,000. DHS estimated a total other-than-LPR

stock of 9.9 million for the beginning of the year 2000. Based on DHS estimates, the total otherthan-LPR stock was 11.7 million in 2005, then increased to 13.5 million in 2008, and then 

decreased to 12.5 million by 2013. Using DHS methods, the 2020 total other-than-LPR stock is 

estimated to be 13.6 million. For 2022, the stock is estimated to be around 14.1 million.

The other-than-LPR immigration model makes explicit estimates of the following categories:

• The annual numbers of new-arrival other-than-LPR immigrants who enter as neverauthorized and who enter legally as nonimmigrants;

• The annual number of non-immigrants who become visa-overstayers;

• The annual numbers of other-than-LPR emigrants (those leaving the Social Security area) 

who were never-authorized, nonimmigrants, or visa-overstayers; and

• The annual numbers of adjustments of status who were never-authorized, nonimmigrants,

or visa-overstayers.

As noted above, the Trustees assume that the COVID-19 pandemic, which began affecting 

immigration in 2020, will continue to affect other-than-LPR immigration through 2024. Otherthan-LPR immigration levels in 2023 and 2024 are assumed to be higher than would have been 

assumed in the absence of the pandemic, fully making up for the lower levels in 2020 and 2021. 

As shown in table 3.1, the assumed other-than-LPR immigration levels for 2023 and 2024 in the 

2024 Trustees Report are lower than those assumed in the 2023 Trustees Report. 
Immigration, Page 8

For the 2024 Trustees Report, the Trustees assume no change to the ultimate number of new 

other-than-LPR immigrants per year. The Trustees assume an ultimate level of 1,350,000 per 

year, for all years, under the intermediate projections. It is possible that the ultimate level will be 

higher than 1,350,000 in the future, as other-than-LPR immigrants already in the U.S. may help 

family members or additional other-than-LPR immigrants enter the country and the demand for 

other-than-LPR immigrant labor in the economy may increase. Thus, the Trustees assume an 

ultimate level of 1,850,000 per year under the low-cost (high-immigration) scenario. Due to the 

possibility that the government will be increasingly willing to pursue deportation of unauthorized 

immigrants, to withhold services from them, and to penalize those who employ them, the 

Trustees assume an ultimate level of 850,000 under the high-cost (low-immigration) scenario. 

The level of annual other-than-LPR emigration is projected to rise throughout the 75-year 

projection period from its current level of about 254,000 in 2023. As the stock of the other-thanLPR immigrant population rises, more emigration is likely to occur. Thus, other-than-LPR 

emigration is estimated as a function of the population exposed. Rates of emigration by age and 

sex have been developed for the never-authorized, the nonimmigrants, and the overstayers based 

on the number of exits from each of these categories estimated to have occurred during the 

period 2008 through 2010. Ideally, these rates would be developed by age, sex, and duration of 

stay in the country. Unfortunately, at this time, data are too sparse to develop accurate estimates 

of the current stock by duration of stay. However, as in the 2023 Trustees Report, the Trustees 

assume continuing higher rates of emigration for recent entrants.

Applying the method described above results in increasing levels of other-than-LPR emigration2

throughout the projection period. Under the intermediate alternative, the gross emigration rate 

(number of other-than-LPR emigrants divided by the midyear other-than-LPR population) is 

about 1.7 percent in 2023 and reaches a maximum of about 1.8 percent in 2026. Subsequently, it

declines to about 1.3 percent at the end of the 75-year projection period. 

3.6 Recommendations of Previous Technical Panels and Other Projections

The 2015 Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods, appointed by the Social Security 

Advisory Board, recommended setting total net immigration to equal the average between that 

assumed in the 2015 Trustees Report and that projected by the Census Bureau, while maintaining 

the proportion of net LPR and net other-than-LPR the same as assumed in the 2015 Trustees 

Report. The total net levels of immigration recommended by the 2015 panel are generally 

similar to the levels assumed for the 2024 Trustees Report.

The 2019 Technical Panel did not recommend changing immigration assumptions for years 

through 2029. However, for years after 2029, the panel recommended setting immigration 

2 As the population begins to mature, higher numbers of other-than-LPR immigrants in the population and thus 

higher levels of emigration are expected, particularly at ages 35 and over. The current other-than-LPR immigrant 

population is centered very heavily at the younger ages. This concentration at the younger ages is likely due to (1) 

the relatively high levels of other-than-LPR immigration that began in the late 1990s (individuals entering at 

relatively young ages) and (2) the effects of the IRCA legislation in the late 1980s (which legalized largely older 

individuals due to required substantial durations of residence in the country). Therefore, the population of otherthan-LPR immigrants is relatively young, with short durations of stay in the country.
Immigration, Page 9

assumptions so that the following two ratios would stay constant throughout the remaining years 

of the 75-year projection period: (1) the ratio of total net immigration to the total midyear 

population and (2) the ratio of net LPR to net other-than-LPR. The total net levels of 

immigration recommended by the 2019 panel are higher than the levels assumed for the 2024

Trustees Report.

The increases in the levels of total net immigration recommended by the 2019 and some prior

panels reflect a number of factors. One factor is that each panel includes the assumption of 

continuing changes in immigration law to allow more immigrants as the population increases. 

Historically, the Trustees, as well as other Federal Government entities, have assumed that future 

immigration will be consistent with current law and that changes based on potential future 

legislation should not be reflected until enactment. Reflecting the possibility of future changes 

in immigration law is not unreasonable if there is a conviction that such changes are truly 

expected to occur and this change in the basis for projecting is fully disclosed. On the other 

hand, presuming such changes could result in the peculiar situation where the Trustees would 

need to change assumptions in the future because immigration law had not been modified. On 

balance, the Trustees have retained the practice of reflecting changes in the immigration law only 

upon enactment.

In their 2024 projections, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects total net immigration

of 1.2 million people, on average per year, for the period 2024-54.

3

 In the Census Bureau’s 

World Population Estimates and Projections, as of February 2024, total net immigration is about

1.1 million people throughout most of the projection period (i.e., through 2060).

4

In comparison, 

the Trustees’ assumptions for the intermediate alternative of the 2024 Trustees Report result in 

total net immigration of 1.3 million people in 2040.

3 See https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2024-01/59697-Demographic-Outlook.pdf.

4 See https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/data/idb/dataset/idbzip.zip.
Immigration, Page 10

Table 3.1: Annual Immigration Assumptions1for the Social Security Area Population

(All values rounded to the nearest 1,000)

Alternative Year Gross LPR Net LPR

Gross

Other-than-LPR

Net

Other-than-LPR Alternative Year Gross LPR Net LPR

Gross

Other-than-LPR

Net

Other-than-LPR

Low Cost: 2023 1,508,000 1,206,000 2,252,000 1,428,000 Low Cost: 2023 1,231,000 985,000 2,118,000 1,303,000

2024 1,508,000 1,206,000 2,252,000 1,393,000 2024 1,425,000 1,140,000 2,118,000 1,269,000

2025 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 957,000 2025 1,425,000 1,140,000 1,850,000 969,000

2026 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 937,000 2026 1,425,000 1,140,000 1,850,000 948,000

2027 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 922,000 2027 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 931,000

2030 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 888,000 2030 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 894,000

2040 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 779,000 2040 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 785,000

2050 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 709,000 2050 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 714,000

2060 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 671,000 2060 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 675,000

2070 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 647,000 2070 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 649,000

2080 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 633,000 2080 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 635,000

2090 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 627,000 2090 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 628,000

2100 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 625,000 2100 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 625,000

Intermediate: 2023 1,308,000 981,000 1,752,000 1,049,000 Intermediate: 2023 1,081,000 811,000 1,618,000 914,000

2024 1,308,000 981,000 1,752,000 1,024,000 2024 1,225,000 919,000 1,618,000 891,000

2025 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 598,000 2025 1,225,000 919,000 1,350,000 600,000

2026 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 586,000 2026 1,225,000 919,000 1,350,000 589,000

2027 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 577,000 2027 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 580,000

2030 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 561,000 2030 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 561,000

2040 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 504,000 2040 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 506,000

2050 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 470,000 2050 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 472,000

2060 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 454,000 2060 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 456,000

2070 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 440,000 2070 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 442,000

2080 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 432,000 2080 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 433,000

2090 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 428,000 2090 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 428,000

2100 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 426,000 2100 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 426,000

High Cost: 2023 1,108,000 776,000 1,252,000 669,000 High Cost: 2023 931,000 652,000 1,118,000 526,000

2024 1,108,000 776,000 1,252,000 653,000 2024 1,025,000 718,000 1,118,000 512,000

2025 850,000 595,000 850,000 237,000 2025 1,025,000 718,000 850,000 231,000

2026 850,000 595,000 850,000 234,000 2026 1,025,000 718,000 850,000 229,000

2027 850,000 595,000 850,000 231,000 2027 850,000 595,000 850,000 229,000

2030 850,000 595,000 850,000 233,000 2030 850,000 595,000 850,000 228,000

2040 850,000 595,000 850,000 229,000 2040 850,000 595,000 850,000 226,000

2050 850,000 595,000 850,000 232,000 2050 850,000 595,000 850,000 231,000

2060 850,000 595,000 850,000 238,000 2060 850,000 595,000 850,000 238,000

2070 850,000 595,000 850,000 237,000 2070 850,000 595,000 850,000 238,000

2080 850,000 595,000 850,000 235,000 2080 850,000 595,000 850,000 236,000

2090 850,000 595,000 850,000 234,000 2090 850,000 595,000 850,000 234,000

2100 850,000 595,000 850,000 233,000 2100 850,000 595,000 850,000 233,000

1

 This table contains basic assumptions along with key summary values that are derived from basic assumptions. Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024

Values Used for 2023 Trustees Report Values Used for 2024 Trustees Report
Immigration, Page 11

Table 3.2: LPR Immigrants Admitted to the United States: Fiscal Years 1966-91

(in thousands)

Reflecting Categories Established in the 1965 Immigration Act

Fiscal Year IRCA1 Total non IRCA

Numerically 

Limited 2

Western 

Hemisphere 3

Immediate Relatives of 

Citizens

Refugees & 

Asylees

Other Specially Legislated 

Immigrants 4

1966 — 323 126 148 39 4 6

1967 — 362 153 125 47 30 7

1968 — 454 156 154 44 95 6

1969 — 359 291 — 60 1 7

1970 — 373 287 — 79 — 7

1971 — 370 281 — 81 — 8

1972 — 385 284 — 86 — 15

1973 — 400 283 — 101 — 16

1974 — 395 274 — 105 — 16

1975 — 386 282 — 92 — 13

1976 — 399 285 — 102 — 12

TQ 19765 — 104 73 — 28 — 3

1977 — 462 277 — 106 68 12

1978 — 601 341 — 126 122 12

1979 — 460 279 — 138 32 11

1980 — 531 289 — 158 76 8

1981 — 597 330 — 152 107 7

1982 — 594 260 — 168 157 9

1983 — 560 269 — 178 103 10

1984 — 544 262 — 183 92 7

1985 — 570 264 — 204 95 6

1986 — 602 267 — 223 104 7

1987 — 602 271 — 219 92 20

1988 — 643 264 — 219 82 78

1989 479 612 280 — 218 84 30

1990 884 652 298 — 232 97 25

1991 1,133 694 294 — 237 139 24

1

 This category includes those aliens admitted under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.

2

 Legal limits on immigration visas were 170,000 per fiscal year before 1969, 290,000 per fiscal year for 1969 through 1979, 

 280,000 for fiscal year 1980, and 270,000 for fiscal years 1981 and later. Includes additional visas starting 1989.

3

 Natives of Western Hemisphere countries, their children and spouses, Act of October 3, 1965. This category became

 numerically limited to 120,000 starting fiscal year 1969.

4

 This category consists mainly of children born abroad to alien residents, ministers and their families, beginning 1971,

 spouses of U.S. citizens who entered as fiances and their children, and beginning 1988 Amerasians, special

 Cuban / Haitian entrants, and aliens in the U.S. since 1972.

5

 The transition quarter (TQ) for 1976 covers the 3-month period, July-September 1976. Fiscal years 1966 through 1976

 end on June 30. Beginning with fiscal year 1977, the data for fiscal years end on September 30.

Source: Annual Reports of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024
Immigration, Page 12

Table 3.3: LPR Immigration Limits for Fiscal Years Beginning in 1995

Family Sponsored 

Preference

Immediate 

Relatives of U.S. 

Citizens

Employment 

Based Diversity Refugees Asylees

226,000 to 480,000 1 Not Limited 140,000 2 55,000 3 Set Annually Not Limited 4

1995 253,721 Not Limited 146,503 55,000 111,000 10,000

1996 311,819 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 90,000 10,000

1997 226,000 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 78,000 10,000

1998 226,000 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 83,000 10,000

1999 226,000 Not Limited 160,906 55,000 91,000 10,000

2000 294,601 Not Limited 142,299 55,000 90,000 10,000

2001 226,000 Not Limited 192,074 55,000 80,000 10,000

2002 226,000 Not Limited 142,632 55,000 70,000 10,000

2003 226,000 Not Limited 171,532 55,000 70,000 10,000

2004 226,000 Not Limited 204,422 55,000 70,000 10,000

2005 226,000 Not Limited 148,449 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2006 226,000 Not Limited 143,949 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2007 226,000 Not Limited 147,148 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2008 226,000 Not Limited 162,704 55,000 80,000 Not Limited

2009 226,000 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 80,000 Not Limited

2010 226,000 Not Limited 150,657 55,000 80,000 Not Limited

2011 226,000 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 80,000 Not Limited

2012 226,000 Not Limited 144,951 55,000 76,000 Not Limited

2013 226,000 Not Limited 158,466 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2014 226,000 Not Limited 150,241 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2015 226,000 Not Limited 144,796 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2016 226,000 Not Limited 140,338 55,000 85,000 Not Limited

2017 226,000 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 50,000 Not Limited

2018 226,000 Not Limited 140,292 55,000 45,000 Not Limited

2019 226,000 Not Limited 141,918 55,000 30,000 Not Limited

2020 226,000 Not Limited 156,253 55,000 18,000 Not Limited

2021 226,000 Not Limited 262,288 55,000 62,500 Not Limited

2022 226,000 Not Limited 281,507 55,000 125,000 Not Limited

1 The family preference limit is given as a range because it is equal to the larger of: 226,000 or 480,000 minus 

 the previous year's immediate relatives of U.S. citizens minus certain other small categories of children minus

 certain categories of aliens paroled into the U.S. in the second preceding fiscal year plus unused

 employment preferences from the previous year.

2 The employment-based preference can be higher than 140,000 if certain other preferences go unused in the

 previous year.

3

 The Diversity category includes those immigrating through the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central

 American Relief Act (NACARA).

4

 The REAL ID Act of 2005 eliminated the numerical limit for Asylees.

Sources:

1. Family sponsored and Employment based: Table A1 of 

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-02/2022_0405_plcy_lawful_permanent_residents_fy2021v2.pdf

and

https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-bulletin/2022/visa-bulletin-for-september-2022.html

2. Immediate Relatives: all "not limited" unless legislation changes

3. Diversity: Page 3 of

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-02/2022_0405_plcy_lawful_permanent_residents_fy2021v2.pdf

and

https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-bulletin/2022/visa-bulletin-for-september-2022.html

4. Refugees: Page 3 of

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-02/2022_0405_plcy_lawful_permanent_residents_fy2021v2.pdf

and

5. Asylees: Historical years: text on page 6 of 

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2003/2003Yearbook.pdf

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

Unadjusted 

Limit

May 6, 2024

Limit 

For 

Fiscal 

Year

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/08/memorandum-for-the-secretary-of-state-onpresidential-determination-on-refugee-admissions-for-fiscal-year-2022/
Immigration, Page 13

Table 3.4: LPR Immigrants Admitted to the United States: Fiscal Years Beginning in 1985

(in thousands)

Reflecting revised categories in the 1990 Immigration Act, Subject to limitation under the overall flexible cap

Fiscal Year IRCA1

Total non 

IRCA2

Family 

Sponsored

Employment 

Based

Immediate 

Relatives

Refugees & 

Asylees Diversity

Other Specially 

Legislated Immigrants

1985 — 570 213 53 204 95 — 4

1986 — 602 213 57 223 104 — 4

1987 — 602 212 58 219 92 3 19

1988 — 643 201 59 219 82 6 76

1989 479 612 217 58 218 84 7 28

1990 884 652 215 58 232 97 29 21

1991 1,133 694 216 60 237 139 22 20

1992 163 811 213 116 235 117 89 40

1993 17 888 227 147 255 127 89 43

1994 4 800 212 123 250 121 75 19

1995 3 718 238 85 220 115 48 12

1996 3 913 294 117 300 128 58 14

1997 1 797 213 90 321 112 49 11

1998 1 652 191 77 283 52 45 3

1999 — 645 217 57 258 43 48 24

2000 — 841 235 107 346 63 51 39

2001 — 1,059 232 179 440 108 42 58

2002 — 1,059 187 174 484 126 43 46

2003 — 704 159 82 331 45 46 41

2004 — 958 214 155 418 71 50 49

2005 — 1,122 213 247 436 143 46 37

2006 — 1,266 222 159 580 216 44 43

2007 — 1,052 195 162 495 136 42 23

2008 — 1,107 228 165 488 166 42 18

2009 — 1,131 212 141 536 177 48 17

2010 — 1,043 215 148 476 136 50 17

2011 — 1,062 235 139 453 168 50 16

2012 — 1,032 202 144 479 151 40 16

2013 — 991 210 161 439 120 46 14

2014 — 1,017 229 152 416 134 53 32

2015 — 1,051 214 144 465 152 48 28

2016 — 1,184 238 138 567 157 50 34

2017 — 1,127 232 138 517 146 52 43

2018 — 1,097 217 138 479 186 45 32

2019 — 1,032 204 139 506 107 43 32

2020 — 707 122 149 321 64 25 27

2021 — 740 66 193 385 56 15 24

2022 — 1,018 166 270 428 83 43 27

1

 This category includes those aliens admitted under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.

2

 Comprehensive immigration legislation increased total immigration under an overall flexible cap of 675,000 immigrants

 beginning in fiscal year 1995, preceded by a 700,000 level during fiscal years 1992 through 1994. 

Source: Table 6 of the 2022 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics from the Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of

 Homeland Security: https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2022

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

May 6, 2024