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UNIT ED STA TES C OURT OF

APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 02-4038

KH OD AR A E NV IRO NM EN TA L, IN C., GENERAL PARTNER, ON BEHA LF OF EAG LE ENVIRON MEN TAL, L.P.

v.

*MARI ON BLAKEY; FEDER AL AVIAT ION ADMI NIS TRATI ON; CLEARF IE LD- JEF FERS ON COUNTI ES RE GIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY; DONALD R. JOHNS ON; PAUL S EKULA; WILL IAM MI KSI CH; FREDE RIC K G. MURRAY; TI M MORGAN; ROBERT E. REITZ; HENRY DEIBLE;

PAUL MCMI LLEN; MARK MCKINL EY;
JEFFERSON COUNTY; PI NE CREEK TO WN SH IP (Inte rven or-de fend ants in

D.C .)
(D. C. No. 97- cv- 00093 E)
LEATHERWOOD, I NC.

v.

TH E PE NN SY LV AN IA DEPART MENT OF ENVI RONMENTAL PROTE CTI ON; JEF FERS ON COUNTY, PENNS YLVANI A; PI NECREE K TOWNSHI P; FEDER AL AVIAT ION ADMI NIS TRATI ON;

**MARION BLAKEY
(D. C. No. 01- cv- 00018 E)

Kh oda ra E nvi ron me ntal, I nc.,

Appellant *(Amended per Clerk' s Order dat ed

01/16/03) **(Amended per Court' s Order dat ed

08/11/03)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATE S DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE WESTE RN DI STRI CT OF PEN NS YL VA NIA
(Dist. Court No. 97-cv- 00093E and 0 1-c v-0 0018E) Distri ct Court J udge: Honorable Sean

M cLa ugh lin

Argued: October 24, 2003
Before: ALITO, FUENT ES, and BE CK ER , Circuit

Judges

. (Opinion Fi led: J uly 21, 2004)

Willi am F. Fox, Jr ., Esq. (argued) J.P. Mascaro & Sons 320 Godshall Dri ve Hurley svil le, PA 19438 Attorneyfor Appell

ant2

Teal LuthyMiller, Esq. (ar gued) Scott R. McIntosh, Esq. United States Department of Justi ce 60 1 D Str ee t N. W. Washington, DC 20530 Attorneyfor Appellee Federal Aviati on Administr

ation and Marion Blakey
Robert P. Ging, Jr. , Esq. ( argued) 2095 Humbert Road Confluence, PA 15424 Attorneyfor Appellees Jef ferson City and Township of

Pine Creek

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

AL ITO , Circuit

Judge :

Khoda r a Environmental , Inc. , the gen era l partne r of a c om pany (E agle Env ironm ental, L.P.) th at wis hes to develop the “Happy

La nd ing L andf ill” in Jeffers on Co unty, Pen nsylvan ia, con te s ts the Distri ct Court’ s denialof its request

for

a declaratory judgment that th e We nde llH. Ford AviationInvestme nt and R eform Act fo r the 2 1stCentury ( “the WendellFo r d Act”) does not pr ohibit the landfill. The Feder al Aviation Admi nistration (“FA A”), Jeffe rson County, and Pine Creek Tow nship argue that the Wendell Ford Act does proh ibit the lan dfill. In addit ion, the FAA argues that Khodar a and E agle (herei nafter

collectively “Eagle”) l ac k Article III s tanding and tha t their claim is not ri pe . F orth e r ea so ns st at ed be lo w, we
reverse and remand for the entry of the decla ratory judg men t Eag le sou ght.

I.

For some time now, Eag le h as desir ed to devel op a soli d waste dis posal facility on land that i t owns in Jef ferson C ou nt y. The facil ity , which i s located appr oxim ate ly 5.25 mil es from the Duboi s

Jeffers on Co unty Airport , was intended to acceptmunicipalwas te prima rily from outof-sta te p ro ducers. In the earl y 1990s, Eag le bega n to ap ply to the P enns ylvania Departmento f

EnvironmentalProtection (herei nafter

“DEP”) for permit s that were needed to op erate the faci lit y, and the DEP issuedall of the perm its that were required. See Kh odar a En vtl., ex rel. Eag le Envt l. v. Beckman , 237 F.3d 186, 189 & n.1 ( 3d C ir. 2 001 )(“ Khodara I ”). After recei ving these permits , Eagle took steps to d ev elop the facil ity , inc luding ob ta ining engineering studies of t he site, inst alli ng 12 groundwater monitoring wells, beginning work on an a ccess r oad, and insta lling a pe rime ter silt fen ce.

In Sept emb er 1996, however, the Pen nsylvan ia Fish and Boat Com m issi on designated t hree tributaries near the landf ill site as w ild tro ut streams. As a result, th e DEP determined that wetlands in and aro u nd H appy L andin g La ndf ill

were of such an excepti onal val ue that they shou ld not be f illed

. Sho rtly therea fter, the DE P revoked authorizat ion to fi ll i n any wetlands and suspended the other permits. Eag le appealed t o t he Environmental Hearing Board. While the appeal was pending, Eag le and the DEP entered i nto a3

consentorderand agreement t hat rel eased the bonds that

Eagle had submit

ted i n the process of obtai ning one of its permits. In exchange, Eagle agree d not to const ruct or oper ate the landfilluntilthat pe rmit was reins tate d and the a pplicable bonding requ ireme nts were met . In September 1998, the Env ironmen tal Hearing B oard issueda n administ

rati ve order aff

irming the DEP’s suspension o rde r. See Eag le Env tl. L.P. v. Commonw ealth of Pa. De p’t of Envtl. Protection , EH B D ocke t. No. 96- 215 -MG, 199 8 WL 6 128 38 ( Pa. Hr g . Bd. Sep t. 3, 19 98)

. This deci sion was affirmed by th e Pe nns y lv ani a Co mm onw ealth Co urt, see Eagle Envt l. L.P . v

. Co mm onw ealth of P a. De p’t o f E nvtl. Protection , No. 27 04 C.D. 1998 (Pa. Comm w. Ct. 2001); App. at 122, and the DE P’s suspensi on order beca me final when the Penn sylvania Suprem e Cou rt denied fur ther rev iew

. See Eagl e Env tl. L.P. v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep’t of Env tl. Protection , 800 A.2d 934 (Pa. 2002); App. at

9a.

In Octob er 1 996 , wh ile these state proceedi ng s were in progress, Congress

enac ted the Fede ral A viatio n Reauthori zati on Act of 1996 (“ FA RA ”), Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3213. Section122 0 of

FARA, which was drafted by two members of the House of Representatives fr o m the area near the Happy Lan ding Lan dfill s it e, wa s appa rently “inte nded to si ngle out Happy Landing Landfillfor regul ation. ” See Khodar a I , 237 F.3d at 190 n.4. Because landf ills tend to attr ac t birds and because birds can p resen t a safe ty p roblem for air craft fly ing a t l ow altitudes, the FA A regulates the development of l andfil ls near airports. It appears that the Happy Landing Landfillsit e was permitted by the FAA regulat

ions i n effect bef

or e FARA

was enact ed, se e id . at 189 n. 3, but Section1220 of FARA imposed an additi onal restric t ion tha t applie d on ly und er v ery na rrow circu ms tanc es.

Section1220 provided i n releva nt part:

For the purpose o f enhancing avi ation sa fety, in

a case in wh ich 2 la ndf ills have been prop os ed to be constructed or est ablis hed wi thin 6 miles of a commercial service airport with fewer tha n 50,000 emplan em ents per y ear no person shallconstruct or establisheither lan dfill if an offic ial of the Fede ra l AviationAdm inistrati on h as stated in writing withi n the 3-y e ar period endi ng on the date of ena ctm ent of this subsection that 1 of

t h e l a ndf ills would b e incom patible with aircraft operati ons at the a irport, unless the lan dfill is al ready

ac t ive on such date of enactment

or the airpo r t operator agrees to th e constr u c tion o r establ ishmentof the l andf ill.4

49 U.S.C . § 44718 (d) ( amended by Pub. L. No. 106-181, § 503( b), 114 St at. 61, 133 (2000) ( co d ifie d at 49 U .S.C. § 447 18(d))). Since the Dubois-Jefferson Co unty Airport

was a “commercialservi ce ai rp ort w ith fewer than 50, 000 empl a neme nts per year” and since two land fill s (Happy Landi ng Lan dfill and one other) had been proposed for co nstru ction wit

hin si x miles of t

he airpor t, Sec ti on 1 220 wa s pote ntially

a pplica ble to that

airport. Moreove r , accordi ng to a s ta te me n t att ributed to one of the sponsor s of thi s pr o visi on, the DuBois-Jeffer son Cou nty Airport was the

on ly airport in t

he country

to whi c h Section1220 applie d. See Khodara I , 237 F.3 d at 1 90 n .4.

After FA RA wa s ena cted, E agle

c ommenced this acti on, seeki ng, am on g otherthings , a decl ar ati on that Sec tion 1220 wa s unc onstitu tional a nd th at it did

n ot apply to th e H appy L andin g La ndf il l

. In March 1999, the Distri ct Court granted parti al sum mary ju d gment in favor of Eagle, hold ing th at Section 1220 f aile d ratio na l-basis review under t he Equal Protection Cla use

. See Kh odar a En v’t, Inc. v. Beckman , 91 F. Supp. 2d 827, 850- 57 (W .D. P a. 19 99) . A lthoug h the Co urt found that t

he government had alegitima te interest in preventing aircr aft bird strikes, the Court saw no ration al j usti fication for the prov isions th at: ( 1) lim ited the ban to

cases wh ere ex actly two landfi lls had been p ro posed; (2) restric ted the prov ision to airpor ts with fewer than 50,000 annual

e mplanem ents; (3) cover ed onl y
com merc ial, and not comm uter, ai rports; and (4) limited th e statute to pu rely re trospe ctive eff ect. Cross-appea ls wer e taken to this C ourt. Wh ile thes e appeals were pending befo re us, C ong ress en acted the W ende ll Ford Act, which replac ed Secti on 1220 of FARA with a new and somewhat broader provisi on. Section 503( b) of the W ende ll Ford Act, 49 U.S. C. § 44718(d) pr ovides in pertin ent pa rt:
(1) In general .–No person shall construct or es tabli sh a munici pal solid wast e landf ill

. . . that receives putres cible wa ste

. . . with in 6 mile s of a pu blic airport that has re ceive d gra nts
u nder chapter

471 and i s prima rily se r ved by gene ral

av iati o n aircr aft an d regu larly sche duled flights of aircr aft desi gn e d for 60 passeng ers or less unless t he State a viati on agency of the State in w hich th e ai rport is locat ed request s that

the Administr atorof the Feder al Aviat ion Ad minis tratio n exempt the landfillfrom the appl icati o n of thi s
s u bsecti o n and th e Ad min ist

rator determi ne s that such exempti on wou l d h a ve no adverse i mpact on avia tion saf ety.
(2) Limitat ion o n applic abili ty .–Paragr aph (1)

. . . s hall not

applyto th e construction, establish men t,5

expansion, ormo d ific ation of, or to any othe r activity undertake n with respect to,
a mu nicipa l s olid w aste landf ill if the construction or establ ishmentof

the lan dfill

was commenced o n or before the dat e of the enact ment of thi s sub sec tion

.
49 U .S.C. § 447 18(d)(1)-(2).

In Aug us t 2 000 , t he FAA promulgate d FA A A dvis o ry Circular 150/5200-34 to provi de “guidance on complyi ng” wi t h the Act. For our purposes, the Circ u lar’ s most i mportant por tions are its de finition s of th e te rm s “constr uction” and “ establ ishment. ” The Circular states:

a. Construc t a municipal solid wa ste land fill means
exca vate or grade l and, or raise structures, to prepare a municipal so lid wast e landf ill as pe rmi tted by the appro p riate regulatory or pe rm itti ng au th or ity.

b. Establi sh a municipa l

s o lid wa ste land fil l (MSWLF) means recei ve t he firs t load or

putres ci bl e
wa ste on sit e for placement in a prepared muni cipal solid w aste lan dfill.

FAA AdvisoryCircular 150/5200- 34, Ap pend ix 1 (a)-(b) (e mp hasis in original).6

Becaus e of the l egal change effectedby the Act, we vacate d the portion of t he D istrict Co urt’s op inion th at h a d held that Sec tion 12 20 of FARA was unconsti tuti on al , and we rema nded to allow Eagle to file an amended complaint addressi ng the n ew Ac t. Khodara I , 237 F.3 d at 1 95, 1 98.

On rema nd, E agle file d an amended complaint

seeking a declar atoryjudgment to the effect

that Sec tion 503 (b) of the We ndell Ford Act does not applyto Happy La n ding Landfillbecause, prior to the enactment

of thatAct, which became l aw
on Ap ril5, 2000, Eagl e had commenced constructionand est ab lis hment of the landf ill within t

he mea ning of Section 503(b) ’s g ran dfa ther clau se. See 49 U.S .C. § 44718(d)(2) . In t he alt ernat ive , Eag le sought a decl arati on that i t was entitled to an exempti on under 49 U .S.C . § 44718(d)(1) be c ause the ope rati on of Happy Land ing Landfil l would not have an adverse impa ct on a viation safety. Ea gle also sought decl arati ons that the Act was

uncon sti tuti onal in various respects. Eagl e, the FAA, and the other defendan t s all moved f or summary j udgment. Allof the defendants argued that the Act p rohibi ted th e d ev el opm en t o f Ha pp y Landing Landfill , and the F AA also argued that Eag le’s W ende ll Ford Act claims w ere bar red for lack of s tand ing and ripe nes s.

Th e Distri ct Cou rt granted su mm ary judgmentfor the d efe nda nts. On Eagle’s claim that it fe ll wit

hin the gr andfather clause in 49 U.S.C. § 44718(d)(2) , the Cour t re ject ed the FAA’s standi ng and ripeness argu men ts but co nclud ed th a t Eag le had not com menced the const ructi on
or establ ishment of t

he landf ill prior

to the enactment

of the We ndell Ford Act . O n Eagle’s claim that it w as ex emp t b ec ause the landfi ll would not ad ver selyaffect aviation s afety , the Court he ld that the claim was not ripe and t

herefore di smissed it wit hou t pre jud ice. The Court also grantedsum mary jud gm ent ag ainst E agle

on its c onst itutional c laims. Eagle then file d this appeal and argues that its acti ons at Happy Landing Lan dfill brin g it w ithin the grandf

ather c lause. 1

II.

W e beg in by considering the FA A’s argumentthat Eagle lack s Article III standi ng. See Jo in t S to ckSoc ’yv. UDV N. Am ., I nc. , 266 F.3d 164, 175 (3d Cir. 2001) (“ Constitutional s tanding is a thresh old issue t

hat we sh ould address before exam ining is s ues of prudential standi ng and statutory interpretation.”); Peachlum v. City of Yo rk , 333 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 2003 ).

“A rticle I II of the Consti tuti on limits the federal judici al power to ‘Cases’

or ‘Controver sies, ’ thereby ent aili ng as an ‘irredu cible minimum’ that there be (1) an i njury in fac t, (2) a ca usal re latio nshi p

1 Eagle does not

seek revi ew regardi ng its clai m for an exemption und er 49 U.S .C. § 4 471 8(d)(1 ) or its constituti onal claims.7

between t he injur

y and t he chall enged cond uct, and (3) a l ikel iho od that t he inju ry will be redresse d by a favor ab l e dec ision .” Un i ted Food and Commercial Wo rkers Union Local 75 1 v. Bro wn Group, Inc. , 517 U. S. 544 , 551 (19 96)

. See also , e.g. , Bennett v. Spear , 520 U.S. 154, 162 (199 7); Nor the astern Fla. Chapt er Associat ed Gen. Contract ors of Am. v. Jack sonv ille , 508 U.S . 656 (19 93) . T hese “requ ireme nts ensure that plaint iffs have a ‘persona l sta ke’ or ‘ interest’ in the out come of

the proceedings, ‘suff icient to warrant

. . . [the ir] invo cation of fe deralcourt jurisdictio n and to justifyexerci se of the court’ s remedialpowers on . . .[the ir ] behalf.’” Joint Stock S oc’y , 266 F .3d at 175 (quoti ng Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 22 F.3d 5 34, 537-3 8 (3d C ir. 1994)).

A pl aintiff seeking a declaratory judgmentmu st poss ess co nstitu ti onal sta nding but need not

have suffere d “t h e full har m e xpe cted .” The St. Th om as–S t. John Hotel & Touri sm A ss’n v . Virg in Islands , 218 F.3d 232, 240 ( 3d Cir. 2000 ). In su ch a c as e, we have said, a plai ntiff has Arti cle III s tanding if “the re is a substant ial controver sy, between parties having adverse l ega l i nteres ts, of suffici ent immediacyand real ity to warrant

the issuanc e of a declar ato ry judgment. ” Id

.
In the pres ent ca se, these requ ireme nts are m et. The re certa inly is “a substant ial contro versy” b etwe en E agle and the defendant s, and eac h side has in terests that are advers e to the othe r

. Eag le wishes to de velop the Ha ppy Landing Lan dfill an d claim s that this is pe rmi ttedby the W ende ll Ford Ac t, whereas the defendant s take t he position that the Act pre cludes deve lopment of t he landf ill. In addi tion, the dis pute is of “suffici ent immediacyand re ality to warrantthe issuance o f a declaratory jud gm ent.” Although the FAA has not y et taken ac tion against Ea gle, the FA A’s po sition regardi ng the appl ication of th e Act t o the H appy L andin g La ndf ill site is clear. And while the DEP’s revocati on or suspensi on of E agle’s perm its present s an independent

obstacl e to t he development of the faci lit

y, it i s app ar ent tha t it wou ld be inordi natel y expens ive and impractical from a business st andpo int for E agle to atte mpt to cure th at probl em until the We ndell Ford Ac t issue is re solve d. If it is settled that

the Wendell For d Act does not ap pl y, Eag le asse rts (a nd n o par ty disagrees) th at

Pen ns y lv an iala w w o uld perm it Eagle to t

ry to satisfythe Pen nsylvan ia DEP by red es igning t he Happ y Lan din g La ndf ill facility, and E agle intends to pur sue this cou rse if it is successf ul in th is case. It is also note wo rthythat no partyhas suggested that there is any w ay in wh ich E agle c ould have attack ed bo th of th e obs tacles th at it faces i n a single proceeding. Under these parti cular

circumst ances, we bel ieve that the standing req uiremen ts for a declaratory jud gm ent c ase are m et.

In a rguing t

hat Eagle’ s clai m does not meet Article III requirements, the FAA focuses on the second and third prongs of the gene rally applic able test fo r consti tuti onal standi ng, i. e., causati on and

re dr es sa bi lity. The FA A b egin s b y8

identif yin g Eag le’s inju ry as “th e prohibi tion of its p ropo sed lan dfill ” an d concedes that this in jury “likely w ould satis fy the inj ury -fact -requi rement, ” but t he FA A m aintain s that “[ t]he W ende ll Ford Act’s prohibiti on is not the direct
cause of E agle’s inability to construct and oper ate the landfill .” FAA’s Br. at 13-14. “R athe r,” the F AA writ es, “the D EP’s dec isi on to revoke a

porti on of Eagl e’ s water obs tructio n an d en cr oac hme n t perm it and suspend i ts re maini ng perm its prev ents Eagle from const ructi ng the landfi ll and doe s so regardless of whether the Wendell Ford Act appl ies. ” Id . at 14. Si m ila rly, the FAA mai nt ains tha t “it is pure ly spe cul at ive whetherEa gl e’s injury

wo uld be redres sed by the declar ation t hat it s eeks ” bec ause even if the d eclara ti o n
were gran ted, the la ck of sta te perm its

wo uld block the deve lop ment of the land fill. Id

.
There are two ways in whi ch this

ar gume n t can be answered. First , under the circumstan ces presen t here, whe re Eag le faces t wo, independent regulatory obsta cle s t hat ca n on ly be attack ed in sepa rate pr ocee ding s, it mak es sen se to
conc eptua liz e Eagle’s i njury , not a s “the prohibi tion of its proposed l andfil l” in t he general sense, but as t

he prohibi tion of

its landf ill by the chall enged a pplication of the W end ell F ord Ac t. Cf. Northe astern Fla. Chap ter Associated Gen . Contractors of Am . v. Jack sonv ille , 508 U.S. at 664-66 (injury in fact und er the circ ums tance s is not the ult

imate d e nial of

contrac t but t

he inability to comp ete on equ al terms). When Ea gl e’ s in ju ry i s un dersto od in this w ay, both the causati on and r edres sability pro ngs are p lainl y satisf ied.
Second, even if Eagle’s inj ury is defined mo re narr ow ly as its inability to op er ate the landfill , the FAA’s argument hinges on th e pro posit io n that t he “cau sati on” prong of the test for consti tuti onal standi ng de m ands that the chall enged conduct be a but -for cause of the plaintiff ’s inju ry . This pr oposition, how ever, is d oub tful. A rticle III standi ng demands “a causalrelat ionshi p,” but neithe r the Sup reme C ourt nor ou r C o urt has eve r hel d that b ut-for caus ation is alw ays need ed. M oreo ver, it i s w ell recogniz ed tha t b ut-for caus ation is prob lema tic in preci selythe s it uation presen t he re, i.e., wh ere an effe ct is “cau sally over -determ in e d,” i.e., where there are m ultiple sufficient causes. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins , 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (opini on of Bre nna n, J.). See W. Page Ke eton et al., Prosser and Keeton on th e Law of T orts § 41 at 26 6-67 (5 th ed

. 1984); Ric har d W . W righ t, Cau sation in Tort Law , 73 C AL

. L. R EV

. 1735, 1775-76 (1985). A clas sic exa mp le in tort law is the hypothetic al case in which a per son is simu ltaneo usly hit wit h two letha l gun shots fir ed at t he sa m e ti m e b y t wo hunters. Bu t-for

causati on leads to the absurd conclusi on that ne ither shot was the

cau s e of the vi ctim’s demise, and

ac cor ding ly “[i]f tw o cau ses co ncur to bring about an e vent and either one of th em, operati ng al one would have been suffici ent to cau se the id entica l result,

som e other test [i .e. , othe r than but -for causati on] is needed. ” Prosser and Keeton9

on th e La w o f To rts , supra , § 41 at 266.

The FAA ’s argument in this case resembles the argument that ne ither

of the hunters in the hypotheti cal menti oned above was the cause of the victim’s death. The FAA’s argument leads l ogical ly to the conclusi on that any litigati on commenced by Eag le to rem ove e it her o f the two obstacl es that prevent i t from deve lop ing the Happy Landing L andfill si te – the applic ationof the Wendell Ford Act and the lackof p ermits – wo uld fa il Article III st a ndards. Suppose, for example, t

hat Eag le redesi gned its fa cili ty but was unsuccessf

ul in obtai ning the need ed state perm its and then soug ht judic ial review in the Pennsylvania courts. If those cour ts adhered to the same st anding requ ireme nts that the FAA argues applyin feder al cour t, the very same argument t hat the FAA now

a dvances could be m ade w ith resp ect to Eagle’s state-court

litiga tio n. It

could be argued that “ [the deni al of the state permits] is not

the direct caus e of Ea gle’s inability to const ru ct and oper ate the landf ill. Ra ther, the [appl ication of the We ndell F ord Act] pr events Eagl e from

co n struc ting the landfilland does so regardless of whether the [the permits are gra nted ].” FA A’s B r. at 14. L ikew ise, it

cou ld be arg ued th at “it is pu rely speculat ive whether Eagle’ s inj ury wou l d be redres sed by the [astate-court decisi on that it is entitl ed to the permits]” because

even if such a dec isio n we re is sued, t he We ndell Ford Ac t wo uld bl ock the developmen t of t he la ndf ill. Id. In sho rt, under the log ic of th e FA A’s a rgum ent, any atte mpt by Eagl e to at tack ei ther one of the obst acles t

hat it faces would run afoul of t he case-or -contr over s y requ ireme nt.

In our view, however , Article III does not dict ate such an abs urd re sult. Under the part

icular circumstances he re, whe re Eagle fa ce s two, i ndependent obstacl es that are poten tially remov able but that ca nno t be ch alleng ed in a single litigati on, we believe t

hat Arti cle III al lo ws Eag le to c halle nge e ach obstac l e sep arate ly.

The FAA contends, however, t hat Article III dem ands that E agle addr ess its state-law pro blems before litigati ng the federal -law issues p resen ted in th is case, but the FAA provides no conv inci ng explanation for its v ie w. The FAA does not argue that the s upremacy of fe de ral

over state law demands tha t st ate-l aw obstacl es be removed firs t, a nd we see no basis for such an ar gument. Nor does the FAA contend that it

is more eff

ici e nt in th is ca se for the state issue s to be t ackled first – and , if anything , the op posite se ems to be th e c as e. Rat

he r, th e FA A’ s o nly explanation for its posit

ion that Eagle must resol ve the st ate i ssu es fir st i s that “the permitt ing proc ess is logica lly

prior to the constructionand ope ratio n of a lan dfill .” FA A’s Br. at16. The m e anin g of this sta tementis not cle ar, but if the F AA is arguing that the ques tion w hethe r Eag le is enti t led to perm its und er state la w “ is logica lly prior ” to the questi on whether the We ndell Ford Act pr ohib its th e developmen t o f the Happy Landi ng Lan dfill fac ili ty , we do not fol low the10

FA A’s lo gi c. It

doe s no t s eem t o us that logic assign s priority t o eithe r the fe deral or sta te iss ues

.
In sum, underthe part

icular factual circumst ances of t his case, Eagl e has Ar ticle I II sta ndi ng.

III.

The FA A a lso arg ues th at E agle’s claim is unri pe because Eagl e “has not sh own that i t willbe ab le to obtain state perm its to con struc t the p rop ose d lan dfill ,” “has never sought

a formal determination from th e FA A that [ the Wendell For d] Act pr ohi bits its landfi ll, ” and has not request ed the st ate a viation agen cy to pe tit ion the F AA und er 4 9 U .S.C . § 44718(d)(1) for an exempti on for the H a ppy Land ing Lan dfill facility. FA A’s Br. a t 16 , 19.

T he ripeness doctrine serves t o “determine whe ther a partyhas brought an acti on p rema turely and couns els abs tenti on until such tim e as a d ispute is suff iciently

conc rete to sati sfy the constitutional and prudent ial req uire me nts o f the doc trine .” Peachlum v. Ci ty

of Yo r k , 333 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 2003) (ci ting Philad elphia Federati on of Teac hers, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 3, AFL-CIO v. Ridge , 150 F.3d 319, 323 (3d Cir . 1998 ) and Ab bott Labs. v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967), o verrul ed on other grounds , Califano v. Sande rs , 4 30 U

. S. 99, 105 (1977 )). Various considerations “underpi n the ripenes s doc t rine, ” incl uding whether the parties a re in a “ suff iciently adversarial posture to be able t o present their positions vi goro usly,” whether the facts of the case

are “suffici ently

developed to provide t

he court with enou gh in form ation o n w hich to decide the matter conclusi v ely ,” and whether a party i s “genuinely aggri eved so

as to avoid expendi ture of j udicia l

resourc es on matter s which have cause d harm to no one. ” P eachl um , 333 F.3dat 433 -34. In de termin ing w hethe r a case is ripe, w e g en er all y e xam ine: “ (1) ‘t he fitne ss o f the issu es f or ju dicia l dec ision ,’ and (2) ‘the hard ship to the parti es of withholdi ng court cons iderat ion.’ ” Id. at 434 (citing Abbott Labs ., 387 U.S . at 149);

see also Nextel Com munications o f the Mid-Atlanti c, Inc. v. City of M argate , 305 F.3d 18 8, 193 (3d Cir. 2002 ).

In declar atoryjudgment ca ses , w e apply a somewhat “refined” test “because declaratory judgments are ty pical ly sought before a completedinj ury ha s oc cur red .” Pic-A -State Pa. Inc . v . Reno , 76 F.3d 1294, 1298 (3d Ci r. 1996) . Thus, when “determining whether to e ngage in pre

enfo rcementreview of a s tatute in a declaratory ju dgme nt a ction,” w e look to “(1) the adve rsity of the parties’ i nterests, (2) the conclusi ve ness o f the ju dgm ent, and (3) the utilit y of

the judgment .” PicA-S tate Pa. Inc. v. Reno , 76 F.3d 1294 , 1298 (3d Cir. 1996 ) (citations omitted);

s ee also Step-Saver

Data Sys tems, I nc. v. Wyse Technology , 912 F .2d 643, 646- 47 (3d Cir. 199 0). In considering whe ther Eagle’s We ndell Ford Ac t c la im is ri pe , two decisi ons of other courts of a ppeals are inst ructi ve. In Gary D. Peake Excavating,11

Inc. v. Town Bo ard of the Town of Hancock , 93 F.3d 68 (2d Cir . 1 996 ), a to wn enacted a l ocal l aw prohibiting the operat i on of d um ps. Id . at 70-7 1. Th is local law was enacted after the Ne w Y ork State Departmen t of Envir onm enta l Conservati on (the “ DEC”) promulgated new regulations that required a permi t for constructionanddemo li ti on ( “C & D”) debr is land fills. Id . at 70. Peak e , who owned land in t

he town and wa nte d to oper ate a C & D d ebris lan dfil l, and h is company sued the town, cl aiming that the lo cal law wa s un con stitutio nal. Id . at 71

. The town argued that

the plaintiffs’ claim

was not ri pe because the y were not using the pr o pertyfor a debri s landfi ll and because theycould not u se the p rope rty for such a facil ity

without first obt aining a state perm it. Id . at

72. The Second Circu it disagr eed. Id . Observi ng that “ [t]he i ssues present ed by the P laintiffs ’ claim s are fit for judici al revi ew because they are p urely legal and may be deci ded without f urther factua l dev elop me nt,” the Cou rt con tinued:

Mo reover, the P laintif f s
wo uld suffer subs tanti al ha rd ship if judi cial review

w ere withheld. Peake a l ready has spen t “con sidera ble sums” o f money in an effo rt to ob tain

a permit f

rom the DEC to ope rate a C& D la ndf ill. He cl ai ms that he is “r eluct ant to spe n d m ore m oney to obtain the ad diti ona l information required by [the DEC] because, even if a perm it wer e granted, Local Law No

. 1 w ould still preve n t [him] fr o m operati ng [his] disposa l fac ility.” Re vi ewing the ordinance atth is ti me will allo w P eake to make an informed decisio n as to whether he should expend additi onal money to obt ain a DEC permit to o perate a C&D landfill. If

we uph old the ordinance , Peake will be able to cut hi s loss es by halti ng his eff orts to o btain

a DEC pe rmi t; if

we i nvalid ate the ordi nance, Peake can conti nue with the DEC permitting process, knowing that obt aining t he DEC perm it wo uld not be in vain. In contras t, i f judic ial review we re w ithheld until Peake obt ai ned aDEC perm it, Peak e w ould have to c h oose b etween (1 ) abandoning his plan s to construc t the C &D landf ill in defe rence to a po tentially unconsti tuti onal ordinance and (2) exp endin g "considera ble sums" o f money to o bta in aDEC p ermit an d there afte r commencing an actio n chall enging the or d inance. We see no reas on why Pea ke should have t o expend substant

ial s ums of money b efore chal lenging12

the co ns tit

utional ity

of the ordinance

. No r shou ld Peake be required to subj ect hims elf to the t hreat of t h e crimina l penalties i mposed by Law No . 1 in ord er to chall enge the or dinance.

Id.

The case of Triple G Landfill s, I nc.
v. Board of C om missio ners o f Fo untain Cou nty , 977 F.3 d 28 7 (7 th C ir. 19 92) , i s al so closel y on poi nt. Ther e, Tri ple G wanted to buil d a lan dfill in F oun tain Cou nt y, Indian a, but c oun ty residents object ed, an d e ve nt ua lly t he co unty adopted an ordinance that obl igate d a party wishing to const

ruct a l andfil l to ob tain a
coun ty permit i n additi on to the stateissuedpermit t

hat was a lready

required. Id

. at 288. The stringent requirements of the new coun ty o rdinan ce ef fectiv ely barredTriple G from c onstru c ting its landf ill, and T rip le G b roug ht suit, chall enging the co nsti tu tional ity of the ord inan ce.

Be fore reachi ng the meri ts of the case, the Seventh C ircuit he ld that T riple G’s clai ms were ripe eve n though Triple G had not yet applied for eithe r a state or a
coun ty per mit. Tri ple G La ndfill s, I nc. , 977 F. 3d a t 2 88- 90. The C o urt beg an by stating that “ [i]nqui ries into ripenes s gene rally addr ess tw o fac tors: first, whether the relevant issues a re suff iciently focused so as to pe rmit j udicia l res oluti on without fur

ther fa ctual development; and, second, whethe r the part ies would suf

fer any har ds hip by the post ponement of judi cia l acti on.” Id. at 289. Th e Cou rt concluded that t

he firs t fact or we ighed heav ily in fav or of a finding of ripeness because the issues presented were “pur ely lega l.” Id . The Co urt t hen detai led why delaywoul d “w ork a subs tantial ha rdship to Triple G.” Id

. “Postponi ng judici al actio n,” the Court wrote, “w ould force an unwarranteddilem ma upo n T riple G.” Id. at 290. It wo uld b e requ ired eith er to “scu ttle its d evelopment pla ns altog ether in deference to a pot en tially invalid c oun ty regulat ion, or complet e the expens ive and time-c onsuming state permit pr ocess, subm it a perm it applica tion tha t Fo untain Co unty is certain to rejec t, a nd then, aft er in curr ing substant

ial s unk costs, bring a facialchall enge to the or dinan ce.” Id. The Co urt con clude d that thi s di le mma
was unwarran t ed be caus e dela y wou ld result in no “countervaili ng benefit –eithe r to the jud icial pro cess o r the pu blic inter est.” Id. Even though there w as a chance th at

th e s tate wou ld“tur n do wn T r iple G’s pe rmit application,” the C ourt held, this was not “suffi cient to defeat ripenes s.” Id.

We are pers uaded by t

he analy sis of the Second and S eventh Circuits in t hese cases, and f or sim ilar reaso ns, w e hold that Eagle’s clai m i s ripe . Looking t o the factors enumeratedin Pic-a- State Pa. Inc. , 76 F.3 d at 1 298 , we not e, first , that “the adve rsity of the parties’ in terests” is evident and is not di sp ut ed byth e FA A. Second, it is appare nt th at a jud gm ent in this case w ill c onclusivelyestablish whethe r H appy L andin g La ndf ill falls13

with in the Wendell For d Act’s grandfather clause. Third, a judgment on th e me rits wil l have signi ficant

practi cal val ue for Eagle. Eag le will th en be in a po sition to know whe ther i t should undertake the expensive proje c t of red esign ing the site plan and try ing once again to ob tain state permits.

In addition to these fact ors, we note that here, a s in Gary D. Peake Excavating, Inc. and Triple G , delay w ill not lead to further dev elop me nt o f rel eva nt fa cts. The facts that are pertinent to the question o f the applic ation of

the grandf

ather clause – reg ard ing what Eagle did on t he Happy La nding Lan dfill site p rior to the crit ica l date – are simple and undi sputed. The crux of the is sue on the meri ts – i .e. , what the grandfat her cl ause mea ns by th e “com menc e[men t]” of “th e construction

or es tabl is hmen t” of ala ndf il l ( 49 U. S. C. § 447 18(d )(2)) – is p urely lega l. We will not be in a ny better p osition to answer this ques ti o n in th e f

utur e tha n we ar e n ow. No r do w e see a ny other a dvan tage in de lay. Although the FAA argues that Eagl e sh oul d be re quire d t o a skth e FA A for a fo rmal det ermination regarding the applic ationof t he g randfather clause, t he FA A’s position on t hat issu e is per fectly clear. And as for the F AA ’s argument that Eag le shou ld be re quired to ask th e state aviation agency to peti tion the FAA for an exemption under 49 U.S .C. § 44718 (d)(1), the futil ity

of such a reque st is evide nt. We consequentl y hol d that Eagl e ’s claim is ripe

. IV.

We n ow consider

the meri ts of Eagle’ s c laim that the Happy Landing Lan dfill f acility falls w ithin the We ndell Ford Act’s grandf ath er clause. The grandfather clau se a ppl ies, E agl e argues, because it commenced the “constr uction” and “estab lishm ent” o f the la ndf ill facility before the enactm ent of the W endell Ford Ac t. A.

The parti es’ fi rst poi nt of disagr eement is whether the We ndell Ford Act’s gra ndf athe r clau se is a mb igu ous

. According to Eagle, the clause i s clear and,

as a resul t, t

he Di strict Co urt erred in looking beyond the statutory language and in rely ing on the FA A A dvisory Circular.

When inter pre ting a sta tute, we begin w ith th e s tat ut or y l an guage it self, and “[i]t is wellestabl ished t

hat ‘when the sta tute’s language is plain, t he so l e functi on of the cour ts – at le ast where t he disposi tion required by the te xt is not absurd – is to enf orce it a ccord ing to its term s.” Lamie v. U .S . Trustee , 124 S .Ct. 102 3, 10 30 ( 200 4) (c itatio ns o mitte d).

Here, we agree with the District Cou rt tha t th e gran dfath er clau se is ambiguous. As noted , the cl ause st ates that Section 50 3(b) of the W endell Ford Ac t, 49 U .S.C

. § 4 4718(d)(1) , does not apply to th e “c ons truc tion , e st ablishm ent, expansion, or mod ification of, or to any otheractiv ity und ertak en w ith re spe ct to, a municipalsolid wa ste la ndf ill, i f the14

cons tr uc tion or establ ishment of the land fillwas commenced on or before the d ate of enact

ment ” of t

he Ac t. 49 U. S. C. § 4471 8( d)(2) ( emphasis added) . Since the word “com men ced” mo difies b oth “con s truction” an d “ es tabl is hme nt ,” we
m ust ascerta in w hat C ong ress m eant b y commencing constr uction a n d

com men cing e stablish men t.
Eagle’s argument that this lan guage is clear has surfa c e app eal becaus e the releva nt terms – “com menc ed, ” “co nstru ction ,” and “estab lishment” – a re
common and, in man y contex ts, their meaning is en tire ly

pl ai n. As used in the grandfather clause, how ever, the meaning of th ese term s is am big uou s.

In ordinary spe ech, “t o commence”

means “to en te r upo n,” to “ begin ,” to “sta rt,” or “to i niti ate formallyby p erforming the fi rst a ct of. ” Webster ’ s Third New Internati onal Diction ary 456 (1971). “Establ ishment” maymean, among other t

hings, “t he act of bringing into exist ence, cr eati ng, fo unding , origi nating or setti ng up so t hat a c ertain

c ontinuanc e is ass ured ” or “w it h per manence in view. ” Id . at 77 8. A n d “constr uction” means “ th e act of putting parts to get

her to form a co mp lete integr ated object ” or “fabri ca tion. ” Id. at 489

.
U nf or tu na tel y, these definitions are not suffici ently

prec i se to pi n down at

exac tly what point i n the pr ocess of bringi ng a landfi ll i nto exis tence the grandfather clause t akes effect . As the Distri ct Cou rt noted and as the record bears out, th at proce ss is often complex and lengthy, requiring the a cquisi tion of land, the satisf

action of legal requirements, many differe nt st ages of work on the s ite, the solic i tati on of busines s, and t he beginning of a ctua l op erati ons

. On e cou ld plaus ibly contend that the commencement of the est ablis hment of a land filltakes place ver y early in this p roc ess. Along these lin es, it could be arg ued th at a pa rty “start[s]” “th e act of bring ing [a landf ill] into existence” “w i thpe rmane nc e i n vi ew” when it takes th e very fir st st ep of the process that i t intends to bring a bout that result. Thus, if a partybuys l and for use as

a landf ill, that cou ld be v ie wed as the commencement of the est ablis hment of the landf il l. At the othe r extreme, ho wev er,
one co ul d p lau sib ly ar gue that the

c ommencement of the establish men t of a l andf ill does not occur untilthe point

at which “a cert ain continuanc e i s ass ure d,” and this might not

be viewed as occurring until after th e las t legal o bstacle is surmounted or, perhaps, untilcommercial operati on actual ly beg in s. Because t he statuto ry language r eferri ng to th e “com men ce[m ent” of the “estab lishm ent” of a landfi ll can com forta bly acco mm odate these wid ely divergent

interpre tations, it is not una mb igu ous

.
Alt h ough “construction ” is a more

conc rete concept than “establis hment,” t he stat utory r efere nce to th e “com menc e[men t]” of the “const r uction” of a lan dfill is als o un clea r. On t he one hand, doing anyphysi cal work on the site could be viewed as a step i n the “the act of15

putti ng parts to get

her to form a com plete integr ated obj ect,” i.e., the landfill . On the otherhand, “const ru ction” might be

narro wly construed to mean the ere ction of a structure of

some sort on t

he site.

For thes e rea son s, we a gree with t he Distri ct Court that

the st atutor

y l anguage is ambiguous.

B.

Bec ause the statu tory langu age is

am bi guous, we mu st con sider w hethe r to defe r to th e i nt erpr et atio n i n FAA Adv isory Circular 150/5200- 34, which defines “constr uction” an d “es tabli shm ent.” The Distri ct Cou rt gave the Circular the m easure of def erence prescribed by Skidmore v. Swift & Co. , 3 23 U. S. 134 (1944) , but t he FAA argues that the Circular ac tually meri ts the stronge r form of deference ca lled f or by Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De fense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 83 7 (1 984). The FAA makes this argument
even thou gh “in terpreta tions co ntaine d in policy s ta tements, agency manuals, and enforc eme nt guideli nes” genera lly do not fall within Chevron

. Christ ensen v. Ha rris Co unty , 529 U.S. 576, 587 (200 0); see also Alaska Dep’t of Envtl . Conservation v. EPA , 124 S.Ct. 983, 1001 (2004) (a gency interpretation in “intern al guida nc e memoranda” n ot enti tled to Chevron defere nce). We find it u nnec essary to decide this questi on, because ev en if we acceptthe Circular’s defini tions of the key statutory te rm s, the Happy Landing Land fill facilit y fall s w ithin th e grandfather cl aus e. Thus , we wil l a ss ume for the sak e of a rgum ent tha t th e defini tion s in the C ircular a ccura tely cap ture the s tatut ory m ean ing

.

C.
Eag le argues that it commenced the “constr uction ” of the Happy Landi ng Lan dfill before t he Wendell Ford Act bec ame law on Apr il 5, 2 000 . T he FAA Circular, as previ ouslynoted, defines “construction” as foll ows:

a. Construct

a mu nicipa l solid wa ste land fill means
e x cava te or grade l and, or raise structu res, to prepare a municipal solid wa st e la ndf ill as pe rmitted by th e appr opria t e regulatory or pe rm itti ng au th or ity.

In argu ing that i ts activities at Happy Lan ding Lan dfill prio r to Apri l 5, 2000, fall within t

his defi niti on, Eagl e not e s in particular that it compl eted the inst allation of 12 groundwater moni tori ng
we lls in Jun e 199 6 at a c ost of nearly $35,000 and t ha t the process of i nstal ling such wells gen erally re q uires digging and the placement unde rground of i nne r an d outerwe ll casings , gravel , scr eens, s eali ng mate rial, and pumps or bailers. Eagle also poin ts out tha t th e state permit that

ma ndated the insta llation o f these we ll s desc rib ed this process a s “maj o r construc tio n acti vity .” Appell ant’s Br. at 17, 19. Eagle contends that the ins tall ation of the w ells involved both th e16

“excav at[ion]” of lan d and the “rais[ing]” of “structure[ s]. ” Id . at 15 -22

.
We will analy ze this a rgum ent in two parts . Fir st, we will consi der whether Eagle’s installation of the gro und water monitori n g we lls cons tit u t e d “constr uction” under the de finit ion in t he FAA circu lar. Second, we will addre ss the questi on whether the revoc ation of Eagle’s perm it prior to Ap ri l 5, 2 000, affect s the applic ability of the gra ndfather clause.
Turning to the first of these questions, we concl ude that the ins tall ation of the well s comes ea sil y within the Circular’s defini tion. In order to ins tallthe wells, Eag le “ex cava te[d],” i.e., dug o ut, land. See Webst er’s Thi rd New Inter nationa l Dictionary 791 (1971 ) ( defi ning “exc avate ” as “to hollow out: for m a cavity or

hole in, ” “to di g out and

re m ove (as earth or m ineral matter)”). In additi on, Eagle also install ed an access road a nd a silt

perimeter fence, and these

ac tivi ties also i nvolved excavation

. Mo reover, all of th ese ac tivitie s were done , in the w ords o f the C ircular, “to pre par e a m uni cipa l solid wa ste la ndf ill.”

It also se ems likel y that the inst allation of the well s amounted to t he “rais[ing]” of “structures .” That the w ells qualif y as “ struc ture s” se em s ob vio us, see We bster’s T hird Ne w In ternationa l Di c tionary 2267 (1971) (de fining a “structure” as “somethi ng cons tru cted or built”), and w hile it is somew hat aw kwa rd to spea k of th e “rai sing” of a n underground structu re, such usag e falls with in th e bro ad definition o f the term “rai se.” See id . at

1877 (defini ng “rais e” to mean , among other things, “co nstruct”). Thi s i nterpretation is plausi ble in t he present context since most const

ructi on at
a landf ill site is underg round, an d there are othersituation s (for e xam ple , buildi ng a
su bw ay) in whi ch i t is naturalto speak of underground construction. We note that the FAA has not argued that t he refere nce in its Circular to t

he “ rais [ing]” of str uctures is l imit ed to above- ground

cons tr uct ion. In any event, because Eagle’s acti viti es invol ved “excavation” and because this i s suffi cient to invoke t

he gr andf ather

clause, we need not decide whether Eagle also “raise[d]” structures.

The FA A argu es that Eag le’s inst allation of the groundwat er monitoring

we lls was not “constr uction” bu t “preconst

ructi on” activity “un dertak en to determi ne the via bility of the s ite, in antic ipati on of the const ructi on of the landf ill, but not as part of its con struc tion .” FA A’s Br. at

26. As noted, however, the Circular refers to exc avatio n do ne “to prepare” a lan dfill

. Installatio n of we lls for the purpos e of establis hing to t he sati sfacti on of state regu lators tha t a site is

su itable fall s withi n the scope of “prepar[ation] .”

The FAA no te s that

our pri or op i nion in thi s case char acterized the inst alla tion of the well s as “pre

cons tructi o n,” see Khodara Envtl. , Inc. , 237 F.3d at 188 ( “After ob ta ining these permits, Eagle b egan p re-c o nstruc tion by conducti ng en gi ne er in g s ur ve ys an d17

inst alli ng monitori ng wel ls.”), but th is language is of lit

tle si gnif icance for present purposes. We used the te rm “preconstruction” in passi ng and without referenc e to th e g ra ndf athe r c laus e. At issue here is not the meani ng of “constr uction” in ordi nary parlanc e but the defini tion that

the FA A p laced in its Circul ar

. Our casual r eference to “preconstruction” is no more cont roll ing on thatissue t

han the desc ription of th e inst allation of the we lls in Ea gle’s p ermit as “ major c ons truc tion activ ity.” 2

Jeffers on County and Pi ne Creek Tow nship make the interesting argument that the H appy L andin g La ndf il l f acility cannotfall within the grandfather clause because Congress a do pted the statutory provisi on at is sue for the verypurpose of blocking Happ y Landing Landfill. It is a suffici ent r e spon se to this argu men t to ob serve that – a s allthe defendant s have strenu ously advocated – we are apply ing the de fi ni ti on o f “ co ns tr uc ti on” th at

wa s adopted byth e FA A i n its Circular. If Jeffers on County an d Pine Cree k Tow n ship feel that the FAA’s definition does not c o mpo rt with Co ngress’s objective, theyshould not have urged us to d eferto that

defini tion. Jeffers on Count y and Pine Creek Township cont end that the operati on of the Ha ppy La ndin g La ndf ill will pose a threat

to aircraft

using the local airpor t, but we mu st pres ume that t he interpre ta ti on of the grandfather clause ado pte d by the F AA , the ag ency w ith expertise in the fiel d, takes aviatio n saf ety fully in to ac cou nt.

We theref

ore turn to the s econd questi on noted above, i.e ., whether the revocation of E agle’s perm it prior to A pril 5, 2000, affect s the appl icabi lit y of t he grandfather clause . The Distric t C ou rt answered this questi on in the affi rmative and wrote:

We think th at imp licit in the A d vis ory Circu lar’ s defini tion of

“constr uct[i on] of a mun ic ipal solid wa ste landf ill” is a tem pora lity requi rem ent: i.e., the land fill

mu st have been under

c onstruc tion andpermitted b y the appropr iat e regu la tory or permit ting auth or ity” as of Apri l 5, 2000. This requi r ement Eag le did n ot me et, as its Solid Wa ste Pe rmit wa s still under suspensi on in April of 2000. 2 At oral argument, couns el for t he FA A a greed that the statem ent in Khodara I doe s no t bin d us in an y wa y. The FAA contends, however, that the Wend ell Ford Act’s grandfather clause was intended to distinguis h between true “con struction ,” wh ich is fre ighted with developer and comm unity expectat ions, and “ preco nstruc tion” a ctivity, wh ich is not. W e ack now ledge that this distincti on may make sense as a matt er of policy , but ne ither

the Act i tsel f nor the FAA’s interpr etation in t he circ ular gi ves ef fe ct t o s uc h a po lic y.18

App . 51a-52a (e mph asis in original).

In a si mila r vein, the FAA argues tha t beca use “no const ructi on was ‘permit ted by the ap prop riate regulatory or permitt ing auth o rity’ as of

the effect

ive date of the st atute , ” Eag le doe s not f all with in the exc ept ion as i nterpreted bythe FA A. FA A’s Br. at 26 (em phasis add ed). This argument overlooks the fact t hat the grandfat her claus e spe aks o f th e “com menc e[men t]” of c ons truction “ on or be fore ” the dat e of the enact ment of the We ndell Fo r d Act, 49 U.S. C. § 4717(d) (emp hasis added), no t “ as of ” that date. A cc or di ng ly, “con struction ,” as de fined in the FAA Circula r, must hav e “co mme n ce[d]” “on or before” April 5, 2000. This means that “on or before” that date, Eagle must have begun to “ex cava te

. . . l and . . . to prepare a municipal sol i d

wa ste landfill as p ermitted by t he appr opriate regu lato ry o r permit ting auth ority.” In other words, the excavat ion must have been “permi tted by the approp ri ate regulatory or permit ting

au th or ity” on the dat e of commence m ent, and this date mus t have bee n “on o r before Ap ril 5, 2000 .” This readi ng include s “a temp orality requ ir e ment,” but not the one identif ied by the Distric t Cou rt. 3 In sum , we h old tha t E agl e commenced construction of the Ha ppy Landing La n dfillwithin t he meaning of the FAA Circular pri or to t he effecti ve date o f the W ende ll Ford Ac t.

VI.

3 The Distri ct Court s tate d that wit hou t its “te mp ora lity requ irem ent,” the grandf

ather c lause coul d produce the follow ing “a bsurd result”: “ a land fill –

once perm itted rem otely in time – w ould reap the benefit

of § 503(d)( 2)’s [§ 503(b)’s ] exception indef initely .” App. 46. In l ight of t he narrow scope of Section 503( b), however, it maywell be that this situation will never arise. It should be kept

in mind that, prior

to the adoption of

FARA and § 503(b), the FAA generallyprohibi ted the location of a lan dfill wit hin five mile s of an a irpo rt. See Khodara I , 237 F.3 d at 1 89 n .3. Thus, in order to fa ll wit hin the Dis tri ct Court’s hypotheti cal al l of the following conditi ons would have to be met : (1) the landfi ll s ite would ha ve to be l ocated between five and s ix mil es from an airpor t; (2) the a irport w ould have to have recei ved a federalgrant of t he ty pe specifi ed in Section 503(b) ; (3) the airpor t wo uld h ave to be on e that is “primari ly served bygeneral aviation aircr aft and r egularl y sc heduled fl ights of aircr aft desi gned for 60 pass engers or less; (4) the constr

uction or establ ishment of t

he landfi ll would have to hav e com men ce pu rsuan t to state authori zati on prior

to April5, 2000; a nd (5 ) c ompl et io n of

th e l and fi ll , f

orsom e reason, would have to be del ayed “indefi nitel y. ” App. 52a. The cl ass of landfi lls sati sfy ing allof these c onditi ons is al most cert ainly

very small and may

we ll be n one xiste nt.19

For the rea sons se t o utab ove , w e
reverse the order

of the D istri ct Court gran tin g summary j udgment for the defe ndan ts and remand for the entry of

summ ary judg men t in favor of theplaint iff and for the i ssuan c e of a de claratory judgmentthat t

he Hap py Lan dfill falls with in the grandf

ather c lause of t

he W end ell F ord Ac t.