NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0229

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

Nos. JD535564, JS520700

The Honorable Pamela S. Gates, Judge

The Honorable Adele Ponce, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Denise L. Carroll, Attorney at Law, Scottsdale 

By Denise L. Carroll

Counsel for Appellant Mother

The Czop Law Firm, PLLC, Higley

By Steven Czop

Counsel for Appellant Father

Gillespie, Shields & Taylor, Mesa

By Mark A. Shields, Jeffrey McCombs

Counsel for Appellees

FILED 06-27-2024
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Malorie R. (“Mother”) and Kevin C. (“Father”) appeal from 

the juvenile court’s termination of their parental rights to their child, K.C., 

based on abandonment. Because neither parent has shown that the court 

erred, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother, who is diagnosed with a mild intellectual disability, 

was born in 1988. After her own mother passed away, a guardian was 

appointed for Mother in 2003 until Mother “aged out of the system.” 

Mother gave birth to K.C. in April 2020. Through the first two years of 

K.C.’s life, Mother and Father’s relationship was abusive, with several 

instances of domestic violence where Mother was the victim. In late 2021 

or early 2022, the relationship between Mother and Father ended. The last 

time Father acknowledged being in the same room with K.C. was either in 

January or February 2022.

¶3 K.C. had several health concerns early on, and by April 2022 

she had been diagnosed with failure to thrive. Throughout this time, Isaac

and Heather (“Petitioners”), who are Mother’s brother and sister-in-law, 

frequently looked after K.C. Petitioners had also been appointed as 

permanent guardians for Mother’s older daughter (born in 2017), after 

Mother’s rights to that child had been terminated in a prior proceeding.

¶4 In April 2022, K.C. began living with her older half-sister and 

Petitioners full time. The reasons for this move are disputed. Mother 

claimed she entrusted K.C. to Petitioners’ care because she had been in an 

abusive relationship. But according to Mother’s guardian, Mother had 

asked the Petitioners take in and raise K.C., because Mother “felt she could 

not raise her properly” and Mother wanted K.C. “to be raised with [K.C.’s]

sister.” Through text messages, Mother told Heather, “I know [K.C. is] 

gonna be really happy especially knowing she [is] with a mom and a dad 

and her [sister]” and that Mother was “[s]orry [she] couldn’t provide the 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.

Decision of the Court

3

best family” like the one Petitioners have. She also asked Petitioners

whether she will “always be a mom” in discussing the move. Mother went 

on to say that “[I] brought them into the world,” but that she could not 

“even take care of them at all and now [Petitioners] have to.” Several weeks 

later, Mother signed a temporary guardianship form giving Petitioners 

custody of K.C.

¶5 In the months that followed, Mother frequently reached out 

to Heather to ask how K.C. was doing and for pictures of the children. Text 

messages, however, reveal that Mother rarely explicitly asked to see K.C., 

the first instance occurring in July 2022. Heather cautioned that seeing 

Mother again would interrupt the process of K.C. adapting to life with 

Petitioners, and that Mother and Petitioners had discussed K.C. needing “a 

substantial break.” Heather then told Mother they would resume the 

conversation in person, and the matter was not brought up again. Mother 

and Heather seemed to communicate semi-regularly until around April of 

2023, with Mother asking about K.C. and requesting pictures. From the 

record on appeal, the only other time Mother asked to see K.C. in person 

came in August 2023.

¶6 Sometime before the summer of 2023, Mother communicated 

with an attorney to inquire about regaining custody of K.C. The attorney

contacted law enforcement and tried to convince them that Petitioners were 

engaged in “felony custodial interference.” Police went to Petitioners’

home to perform a welfare check, but took no other action regarding K.C. 

In June 2023, Petitioners filed a petition to terminate Mother and Father’s 

parental rights as to K.C., alleging, in relevant part, abandonment. As to 

Mother only, the petition also alleged mental health and prior termination 

within the last two years for the same cause as additional grounds. 

¶7 In August 2023, the juvenile court ordered that a social study 

be conducted and that the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) conduct an 

investigation. Following their investigation, DCS disagreed with the 

termination petition, and instead wanted to provide Mother with 

reunification services, though DCS did recommend that K.C. remain with 

the Petitioners. DCS then filed a dependency petition as to Mother and 

Father. The dependency and termination cases were later consolidated, and 

the court held a three-day adjudication hearing in November 2023 on 

dependency and termination. 

¶8 At the hearing, social worker Polly Thomas, who had 

authored the social study, testified as to her findings after communicating 

with Mother, Father, and Petitioners. Thomas recommended termination, 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.

Decision of the Court

4

noting that she believed it would be in K.C.’s best interests and that the 

Petitioners were able to provide a safe environment for K.C. Thomas also 

explained that K.C. and her older sibling had a close bond and that 

reunification would have a negative impact on their relationship. On 

cross-examination Thomas acknowledged that guardianship could also be 

in K.C.’s best interests, and with certain safeguards could be a viable 

alternative. The attorney with whom Mother communicated earlier in 2023

briefly testified about his efforts to aid Mother.

¶9 Heather testified that Mother had willingly entrusted K.C. 

into their care. Heather stated that she had never interfered with Mother’s 

ability to visit or contact K.C., nor did she ignore Mother’s messages or 

other communications. Isaac affirmed Heather’s testimony, and further

explained that K.C. was doing well living in their home, that she 

recognized him and Heather as her parents, and that reunification with 

Mother and Father would be detrimental to K.C.’s best interests. Mother’s 

guardian corroborated Petitioners’ claims that Mother had willingly given 

K.C. to them with an intention of adoption, and reunification would be 

detrimental to K.C. 

¶10 Father, who had been homeless in the two years since he had 

last seen K.C., also testified. He acknowledged he was not currently able to 

care for K.C., but believed he would be able to if provided services by DCS. 

He also said that Isaac had threatened him with “physical harm.” Mother 

testified after Father, claiming she had given K.C. to Petitioners only to 

protect K.C. from domestic violence, and that Petitioners had blocked her 

from communicating with them to make arrangements to see K.C. 

Mother’s roommate corroborated Mother’s testimony that she had not 

intended to give K.C. to Petitioners for the purpose of adoption. 

¶11 On the final day of the hearing, the DCS case manager opined 

that reunification services would be appropriate for Mother and described 

what services DCS intended to offer. But the case manager declined to offer 

an opinion on whether termination would be in K.C.’s best interests. She 

also testified about two virtual visits that Mother recently had with K.C. 

The case manager explained that K.C. seemed “terrified” during the first

visit and did not want to engage, and that there was minimal if any 

improvement in K.C.’s engagement during the second visit.

¶12 Following the hearing, the juvenile court issued a detailed 

order terminating both parents’ rights based on abandonment. See A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(1). The court determined (1) there was no “credible evidence to 

support” a finding that Petitioners had prevented or restricted Mother’s 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.

Decision of the Court

5

“interactions with the child,” and (2) that Mother “did not make reasonable 

efforts to maintain contact with [K.C.]” after the child was placed in 

Petitioner’s care. The court also found that termination was in K.C.’s best 

interests, citing the health concerns K.C. had while in Mother’s care before 

April 2022 and Father’s lack of a stable home. The court further noted that 

K.C. “bonded closely to the [Petitioners] and her sister” and that severing 

those bonds by reunifying K.C. “would be devastating and traumatic.” 

¶13 The court then deemed DCS’s dependency petition moot, and 

appointed Petitioners “as the legal guardian” of K.C., “vesting them with 

legal decision-making authority” over her. Father and Mother each filed 

timely notices of appeal from the termination order. We have jurisdiction 

under A.R.S. § 8-235(A). 

DISCUSSION

¶14 Mother argues (1) she was entitled to continue with DCS’s 

reunification services before the juvenile court could terminate her parental 

rights; (2) depriving her of the opportunity to participate in reunification 

services violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (3) 

Petitioners failed to prove abandonment because they prevented her from 

seeing K.C.; and (4) the court erred in finding that termination was in K.C.’s 

best interests. Father challenges only the court’s best interests finding.

A. Reunification Services

¶15 Mother argues that she should have been allowed to 

participate in the services offered by DCS before the court could terminate 

her parental rights, and that she was constitutionally entitled to such 

services. She relies on this court’s decision in Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ Sec., 193 Ariz. 185 (App. 1999), a case involving termination due to the 

mother’s mental health, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). In those circumstances, this 

court held that DCS “must provide a parent with the time and opportunity 

to participate in programs designed to improve the parent’s ability to care 

for the child.” Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 37. This duty arises from 

the fact that parents have a “fundamental liberty interest . . . in the care, 

custody, and management of their child,” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 

753 (1982), combined with the “severity and permanence of termination,” 

Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 32. 

¶16 Mother’s rights, however, were not terminated due to her 

mental health. Instead, the juvenile court based its decision to terminate 

her parental rights on abandonment. In Toni W. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ Sec., 

196 Ariz. 61, 66, ¶ 15 (App. 1999), this court held that the reasoning in Mary 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.

Decision of the Court

6

Ellen C. that compels DCS to provide reasonable reunification services does 

not extend to abandonment. In cases where a parent has abandoned a child, 

“a biological parent’s interest in the child is nothing more than a genetic 

link.” Id. Under that circumstance, the parent-child relationship is “devoid 

of ‘the full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood’ that warrants 

substantial protection of the parental interests under the [United States 

Constitution].” Id. at 66, ¶ 14 (citation omitted). Thus, reunification efforts 

are not constitutionally required before the court terminates parental rights 

due to abandonment. Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, 510, 

¶ 11 (App. 2008).

¶17 Nor does anything in our statutes require the provision of

services by DCS before terminating parental rights based on abandonment, 

especially in a private termination proceeding. Compare A.R.S.

§ 8-533(B)(8), (11)(b) with § 8-533(B)(1). Accordingly, the court was not 

required to find that Mother was provided reunification services before 

terminating her rights based on abandonment. 

B. ADA Claim

¶18 Mother argues that termination of her parental rights 

constituted disability discrimination under the ADA. Given that Mother 

did not raise this issue in the juvenile court, she has waived it on appeal. 

Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 536, ¶ 9 (App. 2018). Despite 

waiver, the court’s ruling did not violate the ADA, which states that “no 

qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 

excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 

programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. It is true that 

“DCS must provide a disabled parent . . . with reunification services that 

comply with the ADA,” however, “Arizona’s statutory requirement that 

DCS make reasonable efforts to provide reunification services satisfies the 

ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement.” Jessica P. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 251 Ariz. 34, 38–39, ¶¶ 14–15 (App. 2021).

¶19 Mother contends the court denied her the opportunity to 

participate in reunification services by terminating her parental rights 

before having the chance to engage in services. But this alone is not 

sufficient to create a claim of discrimination by a public entity under the 

ADA. Assuming that Mother is a qualified individual with a disability 

under the ADA, Mother has not shown that she was excluded from 

participation in these services because of her disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 

To the extent the court’s action precluded Mother from engaging in 

reunification services, it did so based on her abandonment of K.C., not by 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.

Decision of the Court

7

reason of her disability. Moreover, Mother has not shown that she has been 

denied access to services that are otherwise available to other parents 

whose rights are being terminated on grounds of abandonment. See In re 

Welfare of H.S., 973 P.2d 474, 481 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (“The [ADA] does 

not require public entities to provide the disabled with services not offered 

to others.”).

C. Evidence of Abandonment

¶20 Mother next challenges the court’s finding that she 

abandoned K.C. In reviewing a court’s termination order, we accept a 

juvenile court’s factual findings if reasonable evidence and inferences 

support them. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30 

(2023). We will affirm the court’s legal conclusion that clear and convincing 

evidence met the statutory ground unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. at 

478–79, ¶ 31. We view the facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the 

court’s findings. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 2, ¶ 2 (2016).

¶21 Mother argues the court ignored evidence that Petitioners 

intentionally interfered with her attempts to maintain a parental 

relationship with K.C. In Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 297, 

¶¶ 21–24 (App. 2013), a private termination action, this court determined 

the evidence supporting an abandonment finding was lacking because the 

parent petitioning for termination intentionally interfered with the other 

parent’s ability to contact the child and maintain a parental relationship. 

Mother contends that facts are similar in this case, because Petitioners 

“convinced [her] that she couldn’t see the child until 6 months went by.” 

The record does not support Mother’s contention.

¶22 Heather testified that Petitioners never (1) prevented Mother 

from contacting or spending time with K.C., (2) ignored Mother’s 

communications, or (3) otherwise prevented Mother from having access to 

K.C. Though Mother testified that she made other attempts to request visits 

with K.C., the court noted that “[t]he credible evidence belies this assertion” 

and that the court “did not hear any credible evidence to support that the 

[Petitioners] prevented [Mother] from having contact with [K.C.].” The 

credibility of witnesses and which testimony the court believes are 

“uniquely the province of the juvenile court.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ 

Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 12 (App. 2002). Likewise, in Calvin B. this court 

noted that the father had “actively sought more involvement with their son 

than [Mother] would allow.” Calvin B., 232 Ariz. at 297, ¶ 22. In contrast, 

our record shows only two instances over the course of a year and a half in 

which Mother explicitly requested to see K.C. Even assuming Petitioners 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.

Decision of the Court

8

denied those requests, Mother has not shown she actively sought 

involvement in K.C.’s life so as to overcome a finding of abandonment. 

¶23 Aside from the alleged interference, reasonable evidence 

supports the court’s finding that Mother abandoned K.C. Proving 

abandonment required Petitioners to prove that Mother failed “to provide 

reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child, 

including providing normal supervision.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). Petitioners 

also needed to prove that Mother “made only minimal efforts to support 

and communicate with [K.C.].” Id. Though Mother did communicate with 

Petitioners and asked them to tell K.C. that Mother loved her, the record 

shows only two instances where Mother asked to have contact with K.C. 

Likewise, Heather testified that Petitioners had not received any 

meaningful support from Mother while caring for K.C., and that Mother 

“ha[d] not contributed a toy, a card, a letter, nothing.” The juvenile court 

could reasonably conclude that Mother failed to provide reasonable 

support or maintain regular contact with K.C.

¶24 Mother argues that Petitioners did not meet this standard. 

She claims that, due to her intellectual disability and age, she did not 

understand what steps she would need to take to get K.C. back from 

Petitioners, but despite such disability she engaged with an attorney in an 

effort to get K.C. back. But “abandonment is measured not by a parent’s 

subjective intent, but by the parent’s conduct,” with the central inquiry 

being “whether a parent has provided reasonable support, maintained 

regular contact, made more than minimal efforts to support and 

communicate with the child, and maintained a normal parental 

relationship.” Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249–50, 

¶ 18 (2000). Though Mother may not have foreseen the full ramifications of 

her conduct, our analysis is focused on the conduct itself. And while it is 

true that Mother briefly engaged with an attorney to regain custody of K.C. 

in 2023, such action does not erase the fact that Mother had provided little 

to no support of K.C. for more than a year by that point. The court had 

sufficient evidence to conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

Mother had abandoned K.C.

D. Best Interests

¶25 Mother and Father challenge the juvenile court’s finding that 

termination would be in K.C.’s best interests. The party seeking 

termination of parental rights must show termination is in the child’s best 

interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 

279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). A court may find that termination is in the child’s best 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.

Decision of the Court

9

interests if (1) the child will benefit from termination; or (2) the child would 

be harmed if termination is denied. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 

146, 150, ¶ 13 (2018). The court must consider the totality of the 

circumstances in assessing whether termination is in the child’s best 

interests. Id. The court’s primary concern in this analysis is the child’s 

interest in stability and security. Id. at ¶ 12.

¶26 Both parents argue that the court’s determination was 

erroneous due to several issues in the testimony presented at trial. They 

first point to the DCS case manager’s opinion that termination was not 

warranted, and that allowing time to participate in reunification services 

would be preferable. Father asserts that DCS’s position of neutrality in this 

case cannot be overstated. But neither Father nor Mother cite any authority 

that requires the court to prioritize the opinions of DCS personnel over 

other testimony and evidence, and the weight to give such testimony falls 

squarely on the trier of fact, not this court. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 282, 

¶¶ 11–12. 

¶27 The parents also point to testimony by Thomas (social 

worker) when she acknowledged that guardianship could be a viable 

alternative to termination. But Thomas also testified that termination 

would ultimately be in K.C.’s best interests. Additionally, in performing 

the social study, Thomas found that K.C. was “loved and secure in the 

environment where all her emotional, and physical needs are met in a 

timely manner.” 

¶28 Father contends the court failed to appropriately weigh his 

circumstances in deciding that termination was in K.C.’s best interests. But

we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Id. Further, the totality of the 

circumstances presented to the court supports its findings. The court heard 

testimony about the bond K.C. shares with her sister and Petitioners, which 

reunification could potentially damage, along with opinions from other 

members of K.C.’s family that termination was in her best interests. Based 

on this evidence, we cannot say it was clearly erroneous for the court to 

conclude that termination would benefit K.C., or that failing to terminate 

Mother and Father’s parental rights would harm K.C. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.C.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶29 We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of Mother and 

Father’s parental rights.