COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00213-CR

NO. 02-14-00214-CR

NO. 02-14-00215-CR

JOSEPH ALAN NEELEY APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NOS. 1338837D, 1338838D, 1338699D

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant Joseph Alan Neeley appeals his sentences for aggravated 

assault with a deadly weapon, burglary of a habitation, and possession of less 

 1

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

than a gram of methamphetamine.

2

 In his only point, he argues that the 

sentences are grossly disproportionate to the facts of his offenses and are 

therefore unconstitutional. We affirm.

Background Facts

One Saturday in the summer of 2013, after eating lunch with her mother 

and her sister, high school student D.L. (Danielle)3 was driving on a one-way

access road to a highway. Appellant, driving the wrong way on the access road, 

crashed with Danielle’s car. V.L. (Vanessa), Danielle’s mother, had been driving 

behind her on the access road and ran to her after the accident occurred. 

Vanessa noticed that one of Danielle’s feet had been displaced and that Danielle

was screaming; Vanessa called 9-1-1. Appellant walked toward Danielle’s car 

and looked at her before running away. An ambulance took Danielle to a 

hospital, where she received treatment for a broken right ankle.

After arriving at the scene, a police officer found that appellant’s car did not 

have a license plate attached to its front and back ends. But the car contained a 

passport and a birth certificate bearing appellant’s name. It also contained pipes 

used for smoking methamphetamine.

 2

Appellant does not ask us to reverse his convictions; he requests only that 

we “reverse his sentences . . . and remand for a new sentencing hearing.”

3

To protect the identity of persons associated with this appeal, we use 

aliases. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3), (b); McClendon v. State, 643 S.W.2d 

936, 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).
3

Appellant ran across a grassy field and eventually entered a residential 

neighborhood. A witness of the accident followed him in a car and called the 

police. When appellant arrived at the house of Shahram Masoumi, who was not 

there at the time, he broke through and damaged the back fence and back door, 

broke a satellite, stayed inside the house for several minutes, and left.

Appellant then jumped over a fence and entered another house, where 

fifteen-year-old D.S. (Dylan) and A.S. (Amy), Dylan’s three-year-old sister, were

present. Upon entering, appellant told Dylan that he had crashed his car and 

that he wanted to “lay low for a while.” Dylan heard sirens and discerned that the 

police were looking for appellant.

Appellant remained in Dylan’s house for approximately thirty minutes. 

While there, he stated that he would not harm Dylan as long as Dylan cooperated 

with his requests. Dylan was scared for his and Amy’s safety and believed that 

they could not leave. Appellant drank some water, washed his face, and lay on a

bed to catch his breath. He then told Dylan to go outside and to “ward off the 

police that were around the area” while appellant remained in the house with 

Amy. After crossing his front yard, Dylan talked to a police officer. To “play it 

smart,” Dylan did not tell the officer about appellant’s presence in the house, and 
4

Dylan returned to the house. At some point, appellant told Dylan that he would 

slit Dylan’s throat if Dylan did not do what appellant asked of him.4

After appellant stole a shirt and a pair of shoes and put them on, Dylan told 

appellant that his parents were likely on their way home. Appellant eventually

told Dylan to take off his shirt and his glasses; he planned to create a diversion 

by having himself and Dylan run out of the house in opposite directions. 

Attempting to ensure his and Amy’s safety, Dylan took off his shirt and glasses. 

But as Dylan opened the door to start running, he saw his parents walking toward 

the house. Dylan began to tell his father what had happened in the last half hour, 

and his father ran into the house. Appellant escaped through a window.

The police eventually found appellant in that neighborhood. An officer told 

appellant to show his hands and to get on the ground, and appellant repeatedly

asked the officer to shoot him. That officer could not restrain appellant on her 

own, but with the use of two Tasers and other physical force, the police

eventually detained appellant, who was flailing, screaming, sweating, and 

appeared to be intoxicated. During the struggle that resulted in appellant’s 

detainment, two police officers were injured. In appellant’s possession, the 

 4

Dylan testified, “I [felt] like at any moment . . . the whole situation could 

have just turned the opposite direction, so I tried to keep it as professional and 

calm as I could.”
5

police found a wallet that contained marijuana, Xanax, and methamphetamine; 

two screwdrivers; a razor blade;

5 and a cell phone.

After appellant’s arrest, Arlington police officer Phillip Hill spoke with Dylan, 

who was nervous and “visibly shaken up.” Officer Hill found appellant’s 

discarded clothing inside Dylan’s house. Dylan identified appellant as the man 

who had entered his house and had threatened him. Appellant received medical 

treatment at a hospital, where blood and urine test results established the

presence of alcohol, cannabinoids (from using marijuana), amphetamines, and 

benzodiazepines (a class of drugs that includes Xanax) in his body.6

Through separate indictments, appellant was charged with burglary (by 

entering a habitation and committing or intending to commit kidnapping), 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (based on the crash), and possessing 

less than a gram of methamphetamine. In each case, he received appointed 

counsel; filed several pretrial motions, including an application for placement on 

community supervision “for whatever punishment may be assessed”; and chose 

the jury to assess his punishment if he was convicted.

At a combined trial on the charges, appellant pled guilty to possessing 

methamphetamine and to aggravated assault, but he pled not guilty to burglary. 

 5

During the punishment phase of the trial, appellant testified that he carried 

the razor blade to cut lines of methamphetamine.

6

A toxicologist testified that when these substances are taken together, 

their negative effects may be multiplied. Specifically, he explained that “[a]lcohol 

increases the danger or the negative side effects of just about every other drug.”
6

After hearing evidence and arguments and briefly deliberating, the jury found him 

guilty of burglary. The jury heard evidence concerning appellant’s punishment7

and assessed twenty-five years’ confinement for burglary, twenty years’

confinement for aggravated assault, and two years’ confinement for possessing 

methamphetamine. The jury did not recommend appellant’s placement on 

community supervision for any of the offenses. The trial court sentenced him in 

accordance with the jury’s verdicts and ordered the sentences to run 

concurrently.

Appellant filed a motion for new trial in which he argued that his sentences 

were “grossly disproportionate to the facts of the case[s] and reflected no 

consideration of mitigative evidence[,] contravening the [s]tate and [f]ederal

[c]onstitutional prohibition[s] against cruel and unusual punishment.” The trial 

court did not expressly rule on the motion, and it was therefore overruled by 

operation of law.8

 Appellant brought these appeals.

Allegedly Unconstitutional Punishment

In his sole point, appellant contends that his sentences are unconstitutional 

because they are grossly disproportionate to the facts of the offenses and are 

therefore cruel and unusual.9 See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Tex. Const. art. I,

 7

We will summarize this evidence below.

8

See Tex. R. App. P. 21.8(a), (c).

9

In the trial court and on appeal, appellant has raised federal and state 

constitutional complaints, but he has not analyzed them separately. We will 
7

§ 13. He raised this argument for the first time in his motion for new trial. We 

review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. 

Colyer v. State, 428 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A trial court 

abuses its discretion by denying a motion for new trial when no reasonable view 

of the record could support its ruling. Id.

The factfinder’s discretion to impose any punishment within a prescribed 

statutory range is essentially “unfettered.” Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 

323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Subject only to an “exceedingly rare” and 

“somewhat amorphous” gross-disproportionality review required by the Eighth 

Amendment, a punishment that falls within the legislatively-prescribed range and 

that is based upon the factfinder’s informed normative judgment is unassailable 

on appeal. Id. at 323–24; Adetomiwa v. State, 421 S.W.3d 922, 928 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.); see Lawrence v. State, 420 S.W.3d 329, 333 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d) (“Generally, punishment assessed within 

the permitted statutory range is not subject to a challenge for excessiveness.”); 

Sample v. State, 405 S.W.3d 295, 304 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d) 

(stating the same).

When deciding whether an exceptional sentence might be grossly 

disproportionate to an offense committed, we compare the gravity of the offense 

 

consider these complaints together. See Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 645 

(Tex. Crim. App.) (declining to interpret the language of our state constitution’s 

prohibition of inflicting cruel or unusual punishment as more expansive than the 

federal constitution’s similar provision), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 994 (1997).
8

committed with the severity of the sentence.10 Lawrence, 420 S.W.3d at 333; 

see also Alvarez v. State, 63 S.W.3d 578, 581 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no 

pet.) (“We judge the gravity of the offense in light of the harm caused or 

threatened to the victim or society and the culpability of the offender.”). We also 

consider the likely impact of the defendant’s criminal history on the factfinder’s 

punishment decision. Sample, 405 S.W.3d at 304–05 (recognizing that a repeat 

offender’s sentence is not based “merely on that person’s most recent offense 

but also on the propensities he has demonstrated over a period of time during 

which he has been convicted of and sentenced for other crimes”); Culton v. 

State, 95 S.W.3d 401, 403–04 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d).

By the effects of his guilty pleas and after considering the evidence 

presented at trial, the jury convicted appellant, who was thirty-three years old at 

the time of the trial, of three felony offenses: possession of less than a gram of 

methamphetamine, which (as a state jail felony) carries a punishment range of 

up to two years’ confinement; aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, which 

(as a second-degree felony) carries a punishment range of up to twenty years’

 10If we determine that a sentence is grossly disproportionate to an offense, 

we may also consider the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same 

jurisdiction and the sentences imposed for the commission of the same crime in 

other jurisdictions. See Hammer v. State, No. 02-13-00480-CR, 2015 WL 

1407385, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 26, 2015, no pet.) (citing Moore v. 

State, 54 S.W.3d 529, 541 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d)); Pollard v. 

State, Nos. 02-11-00496-CR, 02-11-00497-CR, 02-11-00498-CR, 02-11-00499-

CR, 02-11-00500-CR, 2012 WL 5447955, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 8, 

2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Appellant did not 

present any such evidence.
9

confinement; and burglary of a habitation, which, under the circumstances of this 

case (as a first-degree felony) carries a punishment range of confinement for up 

to ninety-nine years or life. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32(a), .33(a),

22.02(a)(2), (b), 30.02(a)(1), (d) (West 2011), § 12.35(a) (West Supp. 2014); Tex. 

Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(b) (West 2010). The jury assessed the 

maximum punishment for possession of methamphetamine and for aggravated 

assault (two and twenty years’ confinement, respectively), but it assessed only 

one quarter of the maximum confinement—twenty-five years—for burglary.11

The jury could have rationally determined that appellant’s crimes were 

sufficiently grave to justify these sentences. The evidence shows that appellant’s 

possession and use of methamphetamine contributed to the aggravated assault 

and that as a result of this assault, Danielle suffered an ankle injury12 that caused 

significant pain and will affect her for the rest of her life. In the punishment 

phase, Danielle testified that when the crash occurred, she “looked down, and 

[her] foot was twisted in a way that . . . wasn’t supposed to be twisted.” She 

stated that appellant “ran instead of helping [her] while [she] was crying and . . . 

screaming.” After the heavy swelling in Danielle’s ankle subsided, she had two

surgeries. She also required physical therapy for seven or eight months. 

 11Appellant concedes that his sentences are “within the applicable 

statutory penalty ranges.”

12From the wreck, Danielle also suffered from a rash on her chest and a 

swollen lip.
10

Danielle’s foot will never be normal again; for example, she cannot kick a ball, 

run, or walk up stairs normally. Danielle has nightmares about the crash. 

According to Vanessa, at the time of the trial, which occurred nine months after 

the wreck, Danielle’s ankle was still not healed; she was still limping, and her 

injured ankle looked different than her other ankle. Vanessa explained, 

“Danielle’s not the same person she was, not physically, not emotionally. She’ll 

never be the same person. We’ll never be the same family.”

The evidence also shows that during his crime spree, appellant broke into 

multiple homes (damaging and stealing property in the process) and confined 

and threatened Dylan and Amy, who were both children, for approximately half 

an hour. Particularly, appellant threatened to slit Dylan’s throat if Dylan did not 

do what appellant commanded. Later, appellant resisted police officers’ attempts 

to detain him, causing minor injuries to two of them.

The jury also heard about appellant’s criminal activity that was unrelated to 

the events supporting these three convictions. On the day before his arrest for 

the events leading to his convictions in these cases, appellant was spotted 

outside of an Addison apartment on an early morning, was suspected of 

committing burglary of a habitation,13 and was arrested for evading arrest and 

possessing methamphetamine. On that occasion, after the police found him and 

 13A caller to the police reported seeing a man jump over a balcony into a 

patio area and then jumping back over the balcony with a “cylindrical object in his 

hand.”
11

caught up to him while he was running, he engaged in a physical struggle but 

was finally subdued with the assistance of three officers, handcuffs, and leg 

restraints. Appellant, who was intoxicated, possessed a small baggy containing 

methamphetamine and one Xanax pill.

Appellant also has two older convictions for driving while intoxicated (DWI). 

The record indicates that concerning one of those DWIs, appellant was stopped 

and arrested after driving 113 miles per hour. With regard to appellant’s first DWI 

conviction, he was placed on community supervision but violated the terms of it 

by committing another DWI. Appellant committed the three offenses at issue

only a year after being discharged from community supervision for his second 

DWI.

Appellant presented evidence that the jury could have considered (and 

perhaps did consider)14 as mitigating. Appellant’s mother, V.P. (Violet), testified 

that when appellant was very young, his father, A.N. (Aaron), was physically 

abusive and used alcohol and drugs to the point of intoxication. According to 

Violet, Aaron would choke her in front of appellant, prompting appellant to ask 

Aaron not to kill Violet. Violet testified that Aaron was strict and mean to 

appellant and that when appellant was three years old, Aaron took him out of the 

 14Appellant argues that mitigating evidence, including issues related to his 

addictions to drugs and alcohol, was not “fairly considered by the jury as 

reflected by the grossly disproportionate maximum sentence assessed.” But the 

jury could have considered this evidence when assessing appellant’s 

confinement for burglary at twenty-five years, which is on the lower end of the 

first-degree felony punishment range.
12

state and separated from Violet. Also, Violet admitted that before Aaron left her, 

while she still had custody of appellant, she was not a good mother and made 

“very bad decisions.”

Appellant returned to Texas and began living with Violet again when he 

was eleven years old. He told Violet at that time that he had been living in 

shelters, that he had been expected to “take care of” his younger brother, and 

that Aaron had been abusive to various women after leaving Texas.

Concerning appellant’s development after he began living with her again, 

Violet testified,

Joseph has always been a great kid. He’s always been good to me. 

He’s always been respectful. He’s always been an achiever. . . .

I was a waitress for many years, so I taught him how to be a 

server. From there, he got a job at a five-star restaurant, worked his 

way up in the company to a manager. From there, he met someone 

who gave him an opportunity at Bank of America. From that, with

hardly no education, he ran with it and learned on his own through 

the company. He eventually built himself up to be a mortgage 

broker. Bank of America sent him to college, and he got married, he 

had a family.

Violet acknowledged, however, that appellant has a problem with abusing alcohol 

and drugs that first surfaced when he began getting laid off from work. She

testified that appellant began using methamphetamine when he was a server at a 

restaurant so that he could work at a second job without becoming tired.

Appellant has been married twice. He has a total of three children, 

including two through his current wife. Upon his arrest for these charges, 

appellant stayed in jail for six months before he was released on bond. 
13

According to Violet, since appellant’s release, he got a job, paid some child 

support to his first wife, and sought treatment for his substance abuse (including 

attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings). Violet recognized, however, that 

appellant had previously sought counseling for abusing alcohol before 

committing these offenses.

Violet testified that appellant has a “heart of gold,” is a great father, and is 

“very protective”; she explained that appellant does not show these qualities 

when he is using drugs. She asked the jury to recommend appellant’s placement 

on community supervision because she believed “in [her] heart and [her] soul 

that putting [appellant] in prison [would] not . . . do any good.” She testified, 

“[Appellant has] three children that depend on him [and] that idolize him, and . . .

it’s going to deeply affect the rest of their lives if he goes to prison.”

William Ritchie, who works with troubled youth, testified that he has known 

appellant since 2000, when they were both waiters at a restaurant. Ritchie 

stated that appellant is an “incredible” and “valiant” father who has worked hard 

to provide for his family. Ritchie opined that appellant had the drive and desire to 

succeed on probation, and Ritchie stated that he could help hold appellant 

accountable for the terms of probation if the jury recommended it. According to 

Ritchie, appellant’s actions on the date of these offenses were “absolutely out of 

character.” But Ritchie recognized that appellant’s prior placement on probation 

for his DWI offenses had not abated future criminal activity. He also conceded 
14

that appellant had not called him for support before committing several offenses 

over the course of two days in August 2013.

Raymond Arendondo, who supervised appellant at a car dealership where 

appellant was working at the time of trial, testified that he met appellant at a 

church retreat and that appellant had attempted to be active in church since then. 

Arendondo stated that at work, appellant was punctual and dependable. He 

testified that appellant’s work schedule would allow him to meet requirements of 

probation and attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.

Mary Jo Gutierrez, a probation officer, told the jury about many potential 

conditions of probation, including committing no further offenses, reporting 

regularly to a probation officer, not using drugs or alcohol, completing community 

service, and paying a victim’s restitution. She also spoke about drug treatment 

programs—including long-term inpatient treatment—that could be available to 

appellant if the jury recommended probation for him. Gutierrez opined, however, 

that a defendant is not a good candidate for probation when in relation to a 

different offense in the past, the defendant has violated probation by committing 

a new offense.

In his punishment-phase testimony, appellant apologized to Dylan and 

Amy’s family and Danielle and Vanessa’s family for the harm he had caused 

them. He stated that because of his drug use at the time, he did not remember 

anything about getting arrested or being confined for the incidents in Addison or 

in Arlington over the course of two days in August 2013. He explained that near 
15

that time, he was taking several prescribed medications to help reduce anxiety 

and to sleep and that he mixed those medications with drinking alcohol and using 

methamphetamine.

Appellant explained that his “dad was a truck driver” who “took [him] from 

[his] mother.” He stated that he constantly moved to different cities and never 

went to the same school for consecutive years. He explained that during that 

time, his father used methamphetamine and was physically abusive to him and 

his brother.

Appellant admitted that he was addicted to alcohol and illegal drugs, and 

he testified that he could benefit from treatment programs.15 He explained that 

upon his release from six months of pretrial confinement for these three offenses, 

he began attending Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar program for drug abusers 

four times per week and had not used alcohol or any illegal drugs.16 Appellant 

also testified that he attempted to go to inpatient drug treatment but that he could 

not afford it. He explained that he would be willing to comply with all conditions 

of probation, including completing drug treatment and 320 hours of community 

service and paying restitution to Danielle. When his counsel asked why he 

deserved probation after threatening to slit Dylan’s throat, appellant testified,

 15Appellant began using marijuana when he was eleven years old and later 

used methamphetamine and cocaine.

16Appellant testified that he had been drug tested three times since his 

release and that he had passed each test.
16

I’m not saying I deserve probation, not at all. I’m just begging for the 

mercy of the jury and the Judge today. That was not in my 

character. And I do have a problem, and I just don’t want to see 

anybody else get hurt because of me. I don’t want my children to 

grow up without a father.

Appellant’s wife of nine years, K.N. (Kim), testified that a couple of months 

before the accident, appellant’s behavior began to change: he became very 

nervous, looked different, did not sleep, and cried a lot. According to Kim, after 

his most recent release from confinement, while he was awaiting trial of these 

charges, appellant found God and thrived in his relationship with her and their 

children. She testified that appellant needed inpatient drug treatment and that 

she could survive financially while he received it.17 While Kim admitted that there 

was “no excuse” for appellant’s crimes, she asked the jury to place appellant on 

probation; she pled for “compassion and . . . forgiveness for a . . . beautiful 

person.”

But when the State asked Danielle whether appellant should be placed on 

probation, she said no and explained,

[W]hat he did to me, it may be minor in some people’s eyes because 

it’s just an ankle, but I don’t think [appellant has] learned from his 

[DWIs] or from any of his past accidents. I don’t think probation is 

going to help because he’s already been on probation, and I don’t

think he should be free. I don’t think he should get out of jail 

because this time it was just my ankle; next time, what is it going to 

be? Another child dead? Another child with a broken ankle? 

Another adult? Someone dead eventually? And I don’t think he 

should be free to teach his kids that it’s okay to break someone’s

 17She also testified that she and the children could survive financially if 

appellant was confined.
17

ankle and to ruin someone’s life and just get off on probation. I don’t 

want to see him free. I want to see him in prison. I want to see him 

in jail. And I don’t think he’s going to learn anything if he has 

probation because he hasn’t learned from any of his past mistakes.

Considering all of these facts and the other evidence presented to the 

jury,18 we cannot conclude that the jury acted unreasonably or arbitrarily when 

exercising its near-unfettered discretion to impose the sentences at issue. See 

Chavez, 213 S.W.3d at 323. Even while recognizing the mitigating facts 

described above, the jury could have rationally assessed lengthy terms of 

confinement based, in part, on the harm or threatened harm to the victims of 

appellant’s crimes at issue and on his failure to abate criminal conduct after 

receiving leniency, in the form of community supervision, for prior offenses.19 

See Sample, 405 S.W.3d at 304–05 (considering a defendant’s criminal history in 

determining whether his sentence was constitutionally excessive); Alvarez, 63 

S.W.3d at 581 (considering the harm caused and threatened to the victim); see 

also Stuer v. State, No. 02-14-00243-CR, 2015 WL 1407750, at *3–4 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth Mar. 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (stating that because a defendant had received leniency with regard 

 18We note that we are reviewing the evidence based on a cold record, 

while the jury saw the witnesses, including appellant, and could judge their 

credibility and sincerity. See Franklin v. State, 193 S.W.3d 616, 620 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (explaining that the jury is free to accept or 

reject any or all of the evidence of either party).

19We reject appellant’s argument that the evidence showed only “a single 

day of escalating poor choices.”
18

to past crimes by being placed on community supervision but had violated terms 

of the community supervision, the jury “could have . . . reasonably rejected [the 

defendant’s] claim” that she would be able to refrain from committing more 

crimes). Likewise, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying (by operation of law) appellant’s motion for new trial based on the 

alleged excessiveness of his sentences. Colyer, 428 S.W.3d at 122.

Appellant relies on the court of criminal appeals’s decision in Jackson v. 

State, 680 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). There, the court held that a trial 

judge had abused his discretion in setting punishment when the judge had not 

presided over the trial on the appellant’s guilt and had not allowed either party to 

offer punishment-related evidence. Id. at 810–14. Here, the jury received 

substantial evidence in the guilt-innocence and punishment phases of appellant’s 

trial; appellant’s reliance on Jackson is therefore misplaced. See id.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that appellant’s sentences are not 

unconstitutionally excessive and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying his motion for new trial. We overrule his sole point.
19

Conclusion

Having overruled appellant’s only point, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgments.

/s/ Terrie Livingston

TERRIE LIVINGSTON

CHIEF JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; GARDNER, J.; and CHARLES BLEIL (Senior 

Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment).

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: July 9, 2015