### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 404 -CV

Jo hn G anno n, I nc . , A ppe lla nt

v. Gunnarson Ou tdoor Adver tising, In c , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF HAY S COUNTY , 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 99- 0584 , HO NORAB LE RONALD G. CARR , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
J ohn Gannon, I

nc. (“ Gannon ”) sued Gunna rson Outdoor Adve rtising, Inc. (“G unnarson” ) for brea ch of contra ct and related claims. The pa rties executed a

contra ct wher eby Gannon was to buy various assets from Gunnar son, but Gunnarson ter minated the contr act be fore the sale w as consummated. G annon soug ht damag es and spe cific p er fo rm ance . Gunnar son eventua lly

moved for tr aditional and no-e vidence summary judgme nt. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c ), (i ). I t argue d th a t it

ha d n ot b re a c he d th e c on tr a c t f or tw o bas ic re a so ns : ( 1) Ga nn on ha d it se lf nullified the contra ct by failing to a cce pt the assets Gunnar son tender ed; and ( 2) eve n if Gannon ha d not itself nullified the contrac t, Gunn ar s o n wa s entitled to terminate bec ause the contra ctual
c o n d i t i o n s p r e c e d e n tt o c l o s i n g w e r e n o t s a t i s f i e d
. T h e t r i a l c o u r

t g r an t e d G u n n ar s o n ’ s s u m m a ryjud g me nt m oti on s, and

Ga nn on a pp e a le d. We w ill a ff

ir m.2 F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND Gannon a

nd Gunnar son were both in the outdoor-adv er t i s i ng business. On Aug ust 13, 1998, they signe d a contract whereby Gannon ag ree d to buy assets fr om Gunnarson that included billboards and r elated la nd lease s , ad v er tising contra cts, sign pe rmits, and acc ounting
re c or ds . Pa

ra g ra ph2 of the c on tr a c t c on ta ine d a

“ Du e Di lig e nc e ” c la

us e tha t g a ve Ga nn on tw e nty day s to inspect the assets fr om the day Gunnar son made them a

vailable ( Gunnar son was supposed to do so b y August 18, 1998). When the twenty -day revie w per iod ended, Ga nnon had to notify Gunnar son in writing whe ther i t ac ce p ted or re jected the assets. I f it rejec ted them, the contr act would be re ndere d null and void.

Parag raph 12 of the parties’ contra ct, entit led “Condi tion[ s] to Seller’s Oblig ations,” provided in re levant par

t that “[t] he oblig ation of Seller to c onsummate the transa ction contemplated here by is subject to the fulfillment of . . . all obligations of Purchase r to be per formed he reunde r.” Parag raph 17, e ntitled “Termination,” pr ovided i n re l ev ant par t that “[t] his Ag ree ment and the transac tion contemplated her eby may be ter minated at an y t i m e prior to the Closing . . . by any [party ] i f the Closing sha ll not have oc curr ed within thirty (30) da y s of the date of this Ag ree ment [as] a re sult of the non-fulfillment at such time of any of such party ’s conditions [on perf ormanc e].” The pa rties ag ree that para g raph 17 a llowed either party to terminate the c ontrac t after Se pte mbe r 1 3, 19 98 (t

hir ty da y s f ro m th e date of e xec uti on ) if any of the c on dit ion s pre c e de nt to i ts perf ormanc e wa s unfulfilled.

Gannon state s in its appellate brief that, pursuant to par ag raph 2, it “be g an its ‘due diligenc e’ immediate ly

afte r t he P urcha se Agre ement was signe d.” The parties disag ree , howeve r,Gannon c laims, though, that fr om the outset Gunnarson w as not fully cooper ative. 1 3 on when the twe nty -day

clock on Gannon’ s due-dilig ence period beg an to r un. Gannon argues that the tw e nty -d ay c loc k ne ve r be g an to ru n be c a us e Gunn ars on ne ve r fi nis he d ma kin g a ll o f i ts a sse tre la te d in fo rm a tio n av a ila ble fo r ins pe c tio n. Gunn ars on , on the oth e r hand , ar g ue s th a t it ma de a ll of the re levant information available f or inspection by September 15, 1998. Whatever the case , afte r Gannon be g an re viewing the assets that Gunnar son did make available, it quickly decide d that the assets we re not a s it desired. F or example, Gannon took issue with the fa ct that a number of Gunn ars on ’s land

le a se s and

a dv e rt isi ngc on tr a c ts a

pp e are d to have e xpir ed. Ganno n a dmi ts that G un na

rs on “ did un de rt a ke to r e so lve the se dis c re pa nc ie s a nd wa s su c c e ssf

ul w itha t le a st some of them.”

Thus , to an e xten t, t

he pa rt ies wo rk e d to g e the r i n th e fa ll o f 1 99 8 to tr y to consummate the contra ct: Gannon pointed out shortcoming s in Gunnarson’s a ssets, and Gunna rson
a tte mpt e d to re c tif

y a t le a st s ome of

the m. Simul tan eou sly , G ann on tr ie d to ob ta in p ur c ha se 1 financ ing f

rom Fr ost B ank. Evidence in the rec ord indicates that Fr ost Bank w as indee d interested in financingGannon’ s purcha se but would not do s o u n l es s certain shortcoming s in Gunnarson’s assets we re r ectifie d (for

example, Gunnarson’ s land lease s were extended). On Ja n u ar

y 1 5 , 1 9 9 9 , G u n n ar s o n s e n t G an n o n a le tt e r p r o p o s in g to te r mi nate the contra ct bec ause the parties c ould not achie ve a “me eting of the minds.” Gunna rson offe red to re turn Gannon’ s $25,000 ear

nest money

deposit. Gannon insisted that the parties’ contra ct was va lid and br ou g ht t his laws uit

to e nf or c e it. Ga

nn on ’s pe tit ion inc lud e d ca us e s of ac tio n f

or br e a c h o f c on tr a c t, f r a u d u l e n t i n d u c e m e n t , c o m m o n - l aw f

r a u d , s t a tu t o r

y f r a u d , an d n e g l i g e n tm i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . It4

soug ht remedie s including spe cific perf ormanc e, “loss of bar g ain” damag es for Gunnar son’s alleg ed bad fa ith, ex emplary

damag es, and attorney ’s fe es. After near ly nine y ear s of discover

y , Gunnar son filed two par tial mot ions for
su mma ry jud g me nt— on e on Ga

nn on ’s re qu e st f

or sp e c if ic pe rf or manc e , a nd on e on Ga nn on ’s c la im fo r b re a c h o f c on tr a c t. G un na rs on sty le d it s mo tio ns a s bo th tr a dit ion a l and no -e vid e nc e mot ion s. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c), ( i). The trial c ourt g rante d both of Gunnar son’s motions without stating its re a so ns fo r doi ng so . Ga nn on su bs e qu e ntl y no ns uit e d its re ma ini ngc la ims and fi le d th is a

pp e a l.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW A “tra ditional” motion for summary judgme nt is proper ly g rante d when the mova

nt
e sta bli sh e s th at th ere are no ge nu ine iss ue s o f m a te ri a l f a c t and that it is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a
ma tte r of law
. Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ); Lear Siegler, Inc . v. Pe rez , 819 S.W .2d 470, 471 (T e x. 19 91 ); Holmstrom v. Lee , 26 S.W .3d 526, 530 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.).

A party seeking a “no-e vidence ” summary judgme nt, on the other ha nd, does not bea

r the burd e n o f es ta

bli sh ing its ri g ht to j ud g me nt b y pr ov inga

c la im, bu t in ste a d a sse rt s th a t th e re is no evidenc e of one or more essential elements of a claim on which the opposingparty will have the burd e n o f proo f at tr ia l. T e x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (i ); Hamilton v. W ilson , 249 S.W .3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008) (per

cur i am ). I f the nonmovant fa ils to produce more than a sc intill a of pr obative evidenc e ra ising a

g enuine issue of

materia l fac t as to eac h challeng ed ele ment on which he ha s the burden of proof, summary

judgme nt is proper. Id
. I n revie wing a g rant of summar y judgme nt, we take as t rue evidence favor able to the nonmovant, making ever

y rea sonable infe renc e and r esolving all doubts in the nonmova nt’s favor
.Ag ain, par ag raph 2 of the contra ct imposed an a ffirmative obligation on Gannon to acc ept 2 or re ject Gunna

rson’s asse ts at the conc lusion of the twenty -day due-dilig ence period. 5 Centeq Realty, I

nc. v. Sie gler , 8 99 S.W. 2d

19 5, 19 7 ( Te x. 19 95 ). “ [W]he n th e re are mul tip le g rounds for summar

y judgme nt and the orde r does not specify the g round on which the summary judgme nt was g rante d, the appe aling p arty must neg ate a ll gr ounds on appea l.” Sta te Fa rm Fi re & C a s . C o . v . S

. S

. & G

. W. , 858 S.W .2d 374 , 3 8 1 (T ex . 1 9 9 3 ). Put another wa y , if summary judgme nt may

have be en g rante d, proper l y o r improper ly , on a g round that an a ppellant does not challeng e, we must affirm it. See Holloway v. Starnes , 840 S.W .2d 14, 23 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied) (citing , inter alia, Malooly Bros., Inc . v. Napier , 461 S.W .2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970)).
DI SCU SSIO N Gannon a rg u es t hat the trial c ourt should not have g rante d either of Gunnar son’s partial-summar

y -judg ment motions. W e will addre ss those motions i n turn.
I. Gun nar

so n’ s Mo tio n f

or Summ ar y Jud gment on G anno n’ s Bre ac h- of

-C ont ra c t Cla im As noted above , Gu n n ar s on moved for both tra ditional and no-evide nce summar y judgme nt on Gannon’ s brea ch-of -contra ct claim. As a ground f or both traditional and no- evidenc e summary judgme nt, Gunnarson a rg ued that ther e wa s no evidenc e Ga nnon had ac cepte d Gunn ars on ’s a sse ts. As a re sult, Gunnarson ar g ued, it was e ntitled to terminate the contra ct under 2 para g raphs 12 a

nd 17. Gannon arg ues on appeal that its contrac tual duty to acc ept Gunnar son’s assets neve r matured. G annon ac knowledg es that under para g raph 2 of t he parties’ contra ct it had to acc ept or reje ct Gunnar son’s assets at the e nd of the twe nty -day due-dilig ence period, but i t ar gu es t hat theGann o n wr i t es : “Unde r the e x press ter ms of [parag raph 2], Gannon’ s twenty -day due 3 diligenc e per iod did not even be gin to run until Gunna

rson had first provided the infor mation it was require d to make available for Gannon to r eview. That information was never provided in f ull . . . . [s] o the time for Ga

nnon to either a cce pt or reje ct the asse ts never a rrived.” The only

argument Gannon c ou ld raise f or the fir st ti m e o n appea l—that Gunnarson’ s 4 pr of fe re d gro un ds fo r s umm ary jud g me nt w e re legal ly

ins uf fi c ie nt— Ga

nn on do e s not raise on appea l. See Cit

y of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 5 89 S.W. 2d 67 1, 67 8 ( Te x. 19 79 ) ( on ly issue summ ar y -j udg ment non-movant may raise f or first time on appe al is that movant’s g rounds wer e leg ally

insufficient to support summary judgme nt). 6 clock ne ver star

ted to run on its due-dilig ence period be cause Gunnar son failed to turn ove r all of the re quired due -dilige nce inf ormation. 3 Although G annon make s this arg ument on appea l, it did not make it in its written trial-cour t response to Gunnar son’s summary -judg ment motion (G annon’s “Response” ). Thus, as Gunnar son points out, t he ar g ument is waived. See Te x. R Civ
. P. 16 6a (c ) (“ I ssu e s not ex press ly prese nted t o the trial cour t by written motion, answer

or other r esponse sha ll not be considere d on
a pp e a l a s g ro un ds fo r r e ve rs a l” of su mma ry jud g me nt. ). Ga

nn on is ins te a d li mit e d to the argume nts contained in its Response. See Cit y of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 589 S.W .2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). 4 Ga

nn on ’s Re sp on se a c tua lly

did no t e ve n a dd

re ss G u nn a r s o n ’s a c c e pta

nc e argume nt. I t did object to Gunnar son’s char acte rization of related facts as “undisputed,” but it did not provide argument or evide nce to substantiate this objection. Gannon did a ttach nine exhibi ts to its response, b u t i t did not ex pressly relate them to its objection or explain how they demonstrated that Gunnar son’s “fa cts” we re g enuinely disputable. The trial c ourt had no oblig ation to comb Gannon’ s exhibi ts for re levant information and deduce how that information might demonstrate the exis tence of g enuine disputes. See G uthrie v. Suiter , 934 S.W .2d 820, 826 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.]7

1996, no writ) (summary -judg ment non-movant has “ burden of pointing out to the trial cour t where in the evidenc e the issues set f orth in [i ts] response are raised” ). In other wor d s , Ga n n o n d i d not
e ff e c tiv e ly su bs t a nt i a t e i t s o b j e c t i o n to the “ fa c ts” in G un na rs on ’s su mma

ry -j ud g me nt m oti on . T hu s, the objection could not itself pre clude summary judgme nt. Gannon’ s Response did state that Gannon “ perf ormed” and “w as in full compliance with i t s d u ties and oblig ations” under the contra ct, but the ar g ument supporting the se asse rtions
conce rned only

Gannon’ s eff

orts to obta in f

inancing
. I t did not e ven mention Gannon’ s obligation to a c c e pt G un na

rs on ’s a sse ts. Th e tr ia l c ourt

may , r ig htl y or wr on g ly , have g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt o n th e ba sis of Gunna rson’s acce p t an ce ar gu m en t
. As n o t edab o v e, Ga n n o nh as wa i v edan y ar gu m en tco n ce rni ng that issue on appea l beca

use i t failed to raise it in t he trial c ourt. See Te x. R Civ . P. 16 6a (c ). As a result, we must af

firm the summary

judgme nt. See H

olloway , 8 4 0 S. W. 2 d a t 2 3 ( if summary jud g me nt m ay

have be e n g ra

nte d, pr op e rl y

or imp ro pe rl y , o n g ro un d n ot c ha lle ng e d, we mus t affi rm ); J ua re z v . Lo ngor ia , 303 S.W .3d 329, 330-31 (Te x . App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.) (listing
case s holding same ). We overr ule Gannon’ s first issue.
II. Gunn arson’s Moti on for Su m m ary Judgm ent on Gann on’s Request for Specific Pe rform ance

Gannon a rg ues that, should it pr evail on its breac h-of- contra ct claim, it was e ntitled to the reme dy

of specific perf

ormanc e. See Stafford v. Southern Vanity M agazine, Inc. , 231 S.W .3d 530, 535 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pe t. denied) (“Spec ific perf ormanc e is an e quitable re medy that may be aw arde d upon a showing of bre ach of contra ct.”) . This argument is obvi at ed by our aff irmance of the summary

judgme nt on Gannon’s b re ac h -of- contra ct claim. B ut in any event, aThis evidence included deposition testimony i n wh i ch J ohn Gannon, the owner of J ohn 5 Gannon, Inc., admitted that (1) Gannon a nticipated fina

ncing the purc hase throug h Fr ost Bank; (2) F rost Ba

nk never firmly

committed to financing the purc hase; a nd (3) Ga nnon had not sec ured fi na nc ingby J anu ary

of 19 99 . T he e vid e nc e a lso inc lud e d G ann on ba nk state me nts , s ub mit te d in ca m er a t o d em o n s t ra t e t h at Ga n n o n d i d n o t h av e en o u gh ca s h t o cl o s e t h e d ea l wi t h o u tfi n an ci n g. (These statements ar e not in the re cord.) 8 pla int if f s e e kin g sp e c if

ic pe rf or manc e mus t pro ve that it wa s re a dy , will ing , an d a ble to p e rf

or m it s contra ctual oblig ations at the time the def endant br eac hed. Se e Luc c ia v . R os s , 274 S.W .3d 140, 147 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 08 , pet . de nie d) . T his me ans that if the pla int if

f’ s a bil ity to perf orm depe nded on third-pa rty financ ing, the plaintiff “must show that [it ] had a firm commitment for f inancing , or [it] will not be entitled to s p ec i fi c per formanc e.” Id
. G u n n ar s o n ’ s s u m m a ryjudgme nt evidence established that Ga nnon (1) required f

inancingto consummate the pa rties’ de al and (2) did not have a f irm commitment fo r financing from F rost Ba nk. Thus, summary 5 judgme nt ag ainst Gannon wa s proper on the issue of spec ific per formanc e. We over rule Ga nnon’s second issue.
CO NC LU SION

For the re asons stated a

bove, we aff

irm the summary judgme nt in Gunnar son’s favor
.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton; Dissenting O pinion by J ustice Patterson Affir med Filed: August 11, 2010