NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

DIANE S. BLODGETT, TOM LINGENFELTER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2018-2398

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:17-cv-02000-LAS, Senior Judge Loren A. Smith.

______________________

Decided: December 3, 2019

______________________

DIANE S. BLODGETT, St. Louis Park, MN, pro se. 

 TOM LINGENFELTER, Doylestown, PA, pro se. 

 BORISLAV KUSHNIR, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

JOSEPH H. HUNT, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, ROBERT 

EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR. 

 ______________________
2 BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Diane S. Blodgett and Tom Lingenfelter are associates 

of T.G. Morgan, Inc., a rare coin dealer that was shut down 

by the Federal Trade Commission in the early 1990s for 

fraudulent and deceptive business practices. Shortly after 

the shutdown, TGM’s creditors forced the company into 

bankruptcy. More than 25 years later, Blodgett and Lingenfelter, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit at the U.S. 

Court of Federal Claims. Their 832-page complaint alleged

that the 1990s proceedings were part of an “egregious conspiracy” perpetrated by multiple federal courts, multiple

federal agencies, and by their own attorneys. The Claims 

Court dismissed Blodgett’s and Lingenfelter’s complaint 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, untimeliness, and 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

[SA 1, 5] Because we agree with the Claims Court on each 

ground for dismissal, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

In August 1991, the Federal Trade Commission 

(“FTC”) brought fraud charges in federal district court 

against a rare coin dealer, T.G. Morgan, Inc. (“TGM”), and 

its president, Michael Blodgett. To settle the FTC action, 

TGM and its principals agreed in a signed consent order to 

transfer TGM’s assets to a “settlement estate” that would 

reimburse the victims of TGM’s fraud. TGM’s assets were 

transferred to the settlement estate “irrevocably and without the possibility of reversion to themselves or to any entity owned or controlled by them.” Fed. Trade Comm. v. 

T.G. Morgan, Inc., No. Civ. 4-91-638, 1992 WL 88162, at *4 

(D. Minn. Mar. 4, 1992). The district court explained that 

TGM and its principals had thus “waive[d] any and all 

claims that they, or entities owned or controlled by them, 

may have to the [transferred] assets.” Id. at *5. 
BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES 3

Shortly thereafter, TGM’s creditors forced the company 

into involuntary bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court appointed a trustee to manage the bankruptcy estate. The 

trustee filed a motion to seize assets in the settlement estate and transfer those assets to the bankruptcy estate. 

Mrs. Diane S. Blodgett, a principle of TGM, and Mr. 

Thomas Lingenfelter, a business associate and third party 

beneficiary of TGM, objected to the transfer. The bankruptcy court rejected their arguments, finding that neither

party had a legally cognizable claim against the settlement 

estate. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion. 

Over the next 25 years, Mrs. Blodgett and Mr. Lingenfelter (collectively, “Blodgett”) filed more than a dozen lawsuits that claimed an interest in the assets seized by the 

trustee and challenged the scope and content of the bankruptcy estate. In each case, the court rejected Blodgett’s 

claims as meritless. 

On December 18, 2017, Blodgett filed an 832-page pro 

se complaint in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (“Claims 

Court”). Blodgett’s complaint, which gave rise to this appeal, alleges a 26-year government conspiracy that involves breach of contract, various torts, a Fifth Amendment 

taking, and violations of the Bankruptcy Code, the Internal 

Review Code (“IRC”), and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 

On March 13, 2018, the Government moved to dismiss

Blodgett’s complaint. Blodgett opposed. On July 26, 2018, 

the Claims Court granted the Government’s motion for 

three reasons. First, the Claims Court found a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over Blodgett’s Bankruptcy Code, 

IRC, and ERISA claims. Second, the Claims Court held

that all of Blodgett’s claims are barred by the Tucker Act’s 

six-year statute of limitations. Third, the Claims Court 

held that Blodgett failed to state a takings claim because 

Blodgett irrevocably transferred the assets-in-question to 

the settlement estate and relinquished all rights and 
4 BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES

property interests in those assets. The Claims Court instructed the clerk to refuse any further filings or complaints from Blodgett without leave of court.

Blodgett timely appealed pro se. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

DISCUSSION

We review de novo whether the Claims Court has 

properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to 

state a claim, both of which are questions of law. Turping 

v. United States, 913 F.3d 1060, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2019). To 

survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if true, would state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face. Call Henry, Inc. v. 

United States, 855 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 

To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the court possesses jurisdiction. 

Id. When determining whether subject matter jurisdiction 

exists, we generally “accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted Integration, 

Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

While pro se pleadings, like those here, are to be liberally 

construed, that does not alleviate a plaintiff’s burden to establish jurisdiction. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. 

Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

The jurisdiction of the Claims Court is limited in two 

ways: by subject matter and by timing. First, the Tucker 

Act limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the Claims 

Court to claims against the United States for money damages other than those sounding in tort, including those 

arising from a contract, the Constitution, or a federal statute or regulation. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Because the 

Tucker Act itself does not create a substantive cause of 
BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES 5

action, a plaintiff must identify a separate money-mandating source of substantive law that creates the right to 

money damages. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 

1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

Second, all claims brought before the Claims Court 

“shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within 

six years after such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501. 

See Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 

2011) (explaining that “[c]ompliance with the statute of 

limitations is a jurisdictional requirement”). A cause of action “first accrues” when “all the events have occurred that 

fix the alleged liability of the government and entitle the 

claimant to institute an action.” Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1317. 

For example, “[i]n the case of a breach of a contract, a cause 

of action accrues when the breach occurs.” Id. 

We begin with Blodgett’s claims that are based on violations of the Bankruptcy Code, the IRC, and the ERISA. 

We conclude that the Claims Court properly dismissed 

each claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Blodgett appears to assert three bankruptcy-related 

claims, each arising under Title 11: (i) the court-appointed 

trustee failed to perform his fiduciary duties in violation of 

11 U.S.C. § 704, (ii) the bankruptcy court performed an improper offset in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7); and (iii) 

TGM’s creditors filed involuntary bankruptcy filing in bad 

faith in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 303. S.A. 126, 137, S.A. 

249; S.A. 607. We conclude that the Claims Court properly 

dismissed each of Blodgett’s bankruptcy claims for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction because district courts—and 

not the Claims Court—have “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334.

Blodgett’s IRC-based claim appears to assert that the 

government conducted unauthorized tax collections by virtue of the 1990s FTC proceedings and consent order. S.A. 

167, S.A. 595. We conclude that the Claims Court properly 

dismissed this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
6 BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES

because claims for damages based on allegedly unauthorized tax collections must be brought “exclusively before a 

district court of the United States.” Ledford v. United 

States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

Blodgett’s ERISA-based claim appears to assert that

the bankruptcy court violated ERISA’s anti-alienation provisions by alienating “Blodgett’s fully funded, fully vested, 

fully compliant ERISA pension” and subjecting it to a constructive trust. S.A. 24. See also S.A. 14, 51, 69 (claiming 

the FTC “loot[ed] the Blodgett’s TGM fully funded ERISA 

pension fund”). We conclude that the Claims Court 

properly dismissed this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Claims Court “shall not have jurisdiction [over] any claim for a pension.” 28 U.S.C. § 1501. 

We likewise conclude that the Claims Court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction over Blodgett’s torts claims. 

Blodgett asserts that the government committed “hundreds of torts” and “years of unending torts,” including 

“bad faith torts,” and “torts in court filings.” S.A. 9, S.A. 

14, S.A. 18, S.A. 40, S.A. 69. As a result, Blodgett contends, 

“the United States must now pay the bill.” S.A. 107. We 

conclude that the Claims Court properly dismissed these 

claims because the Claims Court “lacks jurisdiction over 

tort actions against the United States.” Brown v. United 

States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491(a) (excluding from the Claims Court’s jurisdiction 

cases “sounding in tort”)).

Blodgett’s remaining claims—a breach of contract 

claim and Fifth Amendment taking claim—are barred by 

the Claims Court’s six-year statute of limitations. 

Blodgett’s contract claim appears to assert that 

Blodgett entered into a “settlement contract with the FTC” 

when Mrs. Blodgett signed the FTC consent order and 

“fully funded 50% of the consent settlement on December 

31, 1991.” S.A. 8, S.A. 12. Blodgett alleges that the bankruptcy trustee’s 1992 seizure of funds from the settlement 
BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES 7

estate breached the contract “by interference with Ms. 

Blodgett’s access to untainted personal assets.” S.A. 118, 

801. The contract claim thus “first accrued” in 1992, when 

Blodgett contends the breach occurred. Holmes, 657 F.3d 

at 1317. As a result, Blodgett’s contract claim is barred 

because it was filed in 2017, more than six years after it 

first accrued. 28 U.S.C. § 2501. 

Blodgett’s Fifth Amendment taking claim appears to 

assert that the FTC’s acquisition and liquidation of assets 

in 1991 and 1992 constituted a taking of personal property

“without just compensation.” S.A. 39, S.A. 258–259, S.A. 

392–393. A takings claim under the Fifth Amendment “accrues when the taking action occurs.” Navajo Nation v. 

United States, 631 F.3d 1268, 1273–74 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 

Nw. La. Fish & Game Pres. Comm’n v. United States, 446 

F.3d 1285, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“A taking occurs when 

governmental action deprives the owner of all or most of its 

property interest.”). Construing Blodgett’s complaint liberally, the takings claim first accrued in 1992, when the 

FTC placed TGM’s assets in the settlement estate. As a 

result, Blodgett’s Fifth Amendment takings claim is barred 

because it was filed in 2017, more than six years after it 

first accrued. 28 U.S.C. § 2501.1 

Blodgett attempts to circumvent the six-year statute of 

limitations by arguing that Blodgett “first sued under the 

Tucker Act in December 1994, thus arguably timely preserving their claims back to 1991.” S.A. 1990. See also 

 

1 We also agree with the Claims Court that Blodgett

failed to state a Fifth Amendment takings claim upon 

which relief can be granted. Because TGM irrevocably 

transferred the assets-in-question and “waive[d] any and 

all claims” to those assets, T.G. Morgan, 1992 WL 88162, 

at *4–*5, Blodgett cannot “identify a legally cognizable 

property interest.” Am. Bankers Ass’n v. United States, 932 

F.3d 1375, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
8 BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES

Appellant Br. at 13–14 (asserting that the 1994 complaint

“tolled any statute of limitations”). As we have explained, 

the Claims Court’s six-year statute of limitations “is jurisdictional and may not be waived or tolled.” FloorPro, Inc. 

v. United States, 680 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (the 

six-year period “cannot be extended even in cases where 

such an extension might be justified on equitable 

grounds.”). Nor can Blodgett argue that the instant complaint is timely under the “relate back doctrine” of Rule 

15(c) of the Rules of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, because Rule 15(c) expressly applies only to amended complaints, not newly filed complaints. 

Because all of Blodgett’s claims are outside the scope of 

the Tucker Act or time-barred, we conclude that the Claims 

Court properly dismissed Blodgett’s complaint. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered Blodgett’s other arguments and 

find them unpersuasive. We conclude that the Claims 

Court properly dismissed Blodgett’s complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, untimeliness, and failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.