IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 83 / 05-0711 

Filed August 18, 2006 

MATTHEW JOHN STAMMEYER,

 Appellant, 

vs. 

DIVISION OF NARCOTICS 

ENFORCEMENT OF THE IOWA 

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,

 Appellee. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

 On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. 

Huppert, Judge. 

 Employee appeals from order dismissing his veterans’ preference 

claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. DECISION OF COURT OF 

APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 

 John F. Fatino of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for 

appellant. 

 Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jeffrey C. Peterzalek, 

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
2

STREIT, Justice.

Since the Civil War, Iowa has recognized the enormous 

contributions made to our lives by veterans of our armed forces by giving 

preference to veterans seeking employment with the state, as well as 

employment with the cities, counties, and school corporations within the 

state. See generally Kitterman v. Bd. of Supervisors, 137 Iowa 275, 115 

N.W. 13 (1908). The plaintiff-appellant, Matthew Stammeyer, appeals 

from the district court’s dismissal of his veterans’ preference claim. The 

district court dismissed Stammeyer’s claim after it concluded it did not 

have jurisdiction over the dispute. Because we conclude the proper 

avenue for his complaint was the grievance procedure set forth by the 

collective bargaining agreement, we vacate the decision of the court of 

appeals and affirm the district court’s order granting the State’s motion 

to dismiss. 

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings 

Stammeyer served with the Iowa Army National Guard from 1981 

through 2002 and qualifies as a “veteran” for the purposes of Iowa Code 

chapter 35C. See Iowa Code § 35.1(2)(b)(2) (2003). Stammeyer has been 

employed by the Iowa Department of Public Safety, Iowa State Patrol 

Division, as a trooper since August of 1985. Stammeyer is also a 

member of a collective bargaining unit subject to a collective bargaining 

agreement between the State Police Officer Council and the Iowa 

Department of Public Safety. 

In accordance with the provisions of the collective bargaining 

agreement, Stammeyer requested a transfer to the Division of Narcotics 

Enforcement (hereinafter “DNE”). Stammeyer interviewed for two 

positions with DNE but on December 17, 2004, was notified he was not 

selected to fill either position. 
3

On December 19, 2004, Stammeyer sent a letter to DNE 

requesting: (1) the specific reasons he was not selected for either DNE 

position; (2) that any such reasons be filed for public review; and (3) that 

this information be sent to him within ten days of the successful 

applicant’s selection. 

DNE did not respond to this request, so Stammeyer filed a petition 

in district court appealing DNE’s decision and applying for a writ of 

mandamus. See id. § 35C.4 (stating a refusal to allow a veterans’ 

preference entitles the veteran-applicant to maintain an action of 

mandamus to right the wrong). Stammeyer alleged he was entitled to 

preference in employment as a veteran and asked the district court to set 

aside the appointment and to require DNE to allow him the veterans’ 

preference. In his application for writ of mandamus, he alleged Iowa 

Code chapter 35C imposed a duty on DNE, DNE breached this duty, and 

a writ should lie to “right the wrong.” 

The State filed a motion to dismiss alleging the district court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because the collective 

bargaining agreement and chapter 20 of the Iowa Code govern 

Stammeyer’s transfer and provide the exclusive grievance procedure for 

resolving disputes. It also alleged the veterans’ preference applies only to 

“appointment or employment,” not inter-divisional transfers. See id.

§§ 35C.1, .3. 

The district court concluded the grievance procedures set forth in 

the collective bargaining agreement controlled the dispute and deprived 

the court of jurisdiction. See id. § 20.18 (stating public employees shall 

follow the grievance procedures provided in a collective bargaining 

agreement). 
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Stammeyer appealed this dismissal, claiming he was 

improperly denied the opportunity to raise his veterans’ preference claim 

in district court. He further contended his veterans’ preference rights 

were violated when DNE filled one of the positions with a person who was 

not a current state employee. The State Police Officers Council filed an 

amicus curiae brief arguing the district court erred in dismissing 

Stammeyer’s case because the ruling effectively deprived him of the 

veterans’ preference rights conveyed to him by chapter 35C and deprived 

him of any meaningful challenge to the actions which disregarded his 

veterans’ preference rights. 

The court of appeals held chapter 20 of the Iowa Code did not 

preclude Stammeyer from availing himself of the specific remedies set 

forth in chapter 35C. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s 

ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. We granted 

further review. 

II. Standard of Review 

 “The [district] court has inherent power to determine whether it 

has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceedings before it.” 

Tigges v. City of Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 512 (Iowa 1984). Our scope of 

review of rulings on subject matter jurisdiction is for correction of errors 

at law. Id. 

III. Merits 

The question presented in this case is whether a public employee 

subject to a collective bargaining agreement can bypass mandatory 

grievance procedures and seek relief directly from the district court 

under the Iowa Veterans’ Preference Law. The district court answered 

this question in the negative, and Stammeyer made two general 

arguments on appeal: (1) the grievance procedure set forth in the 
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collective bargaining agreement is not the exclusive remedy for 

veterans’ preference claims; (2) because one of the positions was filled by 

a person who was not a state employee, he should be treated as a new 

applicant and not be bound by the collective bargaining agreement. We 

will address each argument in turn. 

A. Exclusive Remedy

Chapter 35C provides veterans are entitled “to preference in 

appointment and employment over other applicants of no greater 

qualifications.” Iowa Code § 35C.1(1). A refusal to allow the preference 

entitles the applicant to maintain an action of mandamus to right the 

wrong. Id. § 35C.4. If, after receiving evidence, the court finds the 

veteran/applicant was qualified to hold the position for which he or she 

has applied, the court can direct further action by the appointing body. 

Id. § 35C.5. 

While chapter 35C does not specifically address employee 

transfers, the collective bargaining agreement which governs 

Stammeyer’s employment with the Iowa Department of Safety has 

explicit provisions that govern the employee transfer process. When 

making the decision as to which potential transferee should be hired, the 

agreement provides the employer “will take into consideration ability, job 

requirements, operational efficiency and seniority.” The employer is not 

required to take into consideration the applicant’s status as a veteran. 

The agreement also sets forth a specific grievance procedure for 

complaints “involving an alleged violation of a specific provision of the 

[collective bargaining] Agreement, or the interpretation or application of a 

term of this Agreement.” The agreement states the grievance procedure 

shall be “exclusive” and “shall replace any other grievance procedure for 

adjustment of any disputes arising from the application and 
6

interpretation of this Agreement.” See also id. § 20.18 (stating public 

employees shall follow the grievance procedures provided in a collective 

bargaining agreement). 

Stammeyer contends public employees who are subject to 

collective bargaining agreements are also allowed to pursue remedies 

under chapter 35C because veterans’ preferences are not a mandatory 

subject of collective bargaining and chapter 35C overrides any 

inconsistent provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. This 

argument involves the intersection of two different chapters of the Iowa 

Code—veterans’ preference rights under chapter 35C and public 

employment relations (collective bargaining) under chapter 20. 

Iowa Code chapter 20, the Public Employment Relations Act, is 

designed “to promote harmonious and co-operative relationships between 

government and its employees by permitting public employees to 

organize and bargain collectively.” Id. § 20.1. Section 20.9 provides the 

public employer and the employee organization shall meet to negotiate 

with respect to 

wages, hours, vacations, insurance, holidays, leaves of 

absence, shift differentials, overtime compensation, 

supplemental pay, seniority, transfer procedures, job 

classifications, health and safety matters, evaluation 

procedures, procedures for staff reduction, in-service 

training and other matters mutually agreed upon. 

(Emphasis added.) The product of these negotiations is the collective 

bargaining agreement. 

Chapter 20 places one important limitation on the scope of 

collective bargaining agreements. It ensures that Iowa statutes 

supersede terms in a collective bargaining agreement that are 

inconsistent with Iowa law. Section 20.28 provides: 
7

A provision of the Code which is inconsistent with 

any term or condition of a collective bargaining agreement 

which is made final under this chapter shall supersede the 

term or condition of the collective bargaining agreement unless 

otherwise provided by the general assembly. 

(Emphasis added.) Stammeyer argues the phrase in section 35C.1 which 

states “preference in appointment and employment over other applicants 

of no greater qualifications” gives veterans’ preference rights to current 

state employees seeking a transfer. He argues the transfer provisions in 

the collective bargaining agreement which do not give such a preference 

are therefore inconsistent with the Iowa Code. Because of this alleged 

inconsistency, Stammeyer contends he is not subject to the mandatory 

grievance procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. In 

order for this court to conclude Stammeyer was not subject to the 

mandatory grievance procedures set forth in the collective bargaining 

agreement, we must first find there is an inconsistency between the 

collective bargaining agreement and section 35C.1. 

 On its face, section 35C.1 does not expressly indicate veterans 

deserve a preference when interviewing for a job transfer. Stammeyer 

does not argue that “appointment” means more than an initial hiring 

decision. Instead, he argues the legislature intended for the term 

“employment” to be interpreted broadly so that it encompasses other 

employment decisions made after the initial hire. 

We do not interpret this term so broadly. Chapter 35C grants 

veterans a preference at the time of the initial hire and, as discussed 

below, at the time of removal. There is nothing to suggest veterans are to 

be given ongoing preferences during their term of employment. 

Beyond the preference in “appointment and employment,” the 

legislature granted veterans a preference for veterans facing removal from 
8

their employment. This removal statute shines light on the 

legislature’s choice of meaning for the word “employment.” Section 

35C.6 states: 

No person holding a public position by appointment or 

employment, and belonging to any of the classes of persons 

to whom a preference is herein granted, shall be removed 

from such position or employment except for incompetency 

or misconduct shown after a hearing, upon due notice, upon 

stated charges, and with the right of such employee or 

appointee to a review by a writ of certiorari or at such 

person’s election, to judicial review in accordance with the 

terms of the Iowa administrative procedure Act, chapter 17A, 

if that is otherwise applicable to their case. 

Use of the phrase “holding a public position by appointment or 

employment” implies a narrow interpretation of the term “employment.” 

The term “holding” refers to the status of the employee. The phrase “by 

appointment or employment” describes how the veteran got the position 

to begin with. One can either be appointed to the position, or employed 

in the position through the regular hiring process. The confluence of 

these terms in the phrase “holding a public position by appointment or 

employment” indicates the legislature intended the term “employment” to 

be used as an alternative description of how the veteran got the position; 

not as a broad term encompassing all employment decisions made after 

the initial hire. 

The legislative history surrounding section 35C.1 also implies the 

term “employment” does not refer to subsequent employment decisions. 

Prior to 1985, the veterans’ preference statute expressly stated veterans 

were “entitled to preference in appointment, employment, and promotion

over other applicants of no greater qualifications.” See Iowa Code § 70.1 

(1985) (now codified in Iowa Code § 35C.1). However, in 1985, the Iowa 

legislature removed the preference for promotions. 1985 Iowa Acts ch. 
9

50, § 1. By removing the phrase “and promotions,” the legislature 

restricted the veterans’ preference to the initial hiring decision and, as 

noted in section 35C.6, to the employment discharge decision. In total, 

we simply cannot interpret the phrase “appointment and employment” so 

broadly that it encompasses other decisions made during employment. 

An analysis of case law from other jurisdictions supports this 

conclusion. In Pinther v. Wyoming, 866 P.2d 1300 (Wyo. 1994), the 

Wyoming Supreme Court faced a similar challenge to a veterans’ 

preference statute that was very similar to the Iowa veterans’ preference 

statute. A state employee, who was a veteran, argued the Wyoming 

veterans’ preference statute, which stated veterans and their widows 

“shall be preferred for appointment or employment,” meant he was 

entitled to the preference when he applied for a job transfer. Pinther, 866 

P.2d at 1303 (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 19-6-102(a) (1977)). The Wyoming 

Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 1304. The court noted the Wyoming 

legislature intended for the veterans’ preference statute to give qualified 

veterans the benefit of a competitive advantage in the state hiring 

process. Id. The court found this benefit was fully satisfied when the 

legislature gave the preference only to those veterans who were initially 

seeking state employment. Id. As a result, the court concluded the 

preference in “appointment or employment” did “not extend to a qualified 

veteran who [was] a state employee seeking a transfer to another state 

agency.” Id. at 1303-04. 

Several federal courts have also concluded veterans’ preference 

rights do not extend to current government employees seeking a transfer 

to a different position. In Brown v. Department of Veteran’s Affairs, 247 

F.3d 1222, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit analyzed the Veterans’ Preference Act (VPA) as codified in 38 
10

U.S.C. § 4214 (1994). Even though the purpose of section 4214 was 

“to promote the maximum of employment and job advancement 

opportunities within the Federal Government for . . . veterans,” the court 

of appeals noted that “veterans are not accorded limitless rights and 

benefits” and concluded veterans were not accorded any preference 

under the VPA when seeking promotion or intra-agency transfers. 

Brown, 247 F.3d at 1224 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4214(a)(1)). 

Also, in a suit brought by city mail carriers who desired positions 

as rural mail carriers at the same salary, the Court of Appeals for the 

Eleventh Circuit analyzed the VPA and stated “veterans’ preference only 

applies to initial employment, not to movement of an incumbent 

employee from one job to another within an agency” and “[t]he scope of 

veterans’ preference cannot be enlarged by the fiction of treating withinagency movement as initial employment.” Glenn v. U.S. Postal Serv., 939 

F.2d 1516, 1521-23 (11th Cir. 1991). And finally, in Pulley v. Tennessee 

Valley Authority, 368 F. Supp. 90, 93 (M.D. Tenn. 1973), a Tennessee 

district court recognized the VPA provided a preference both in 

appointment and retention in federal positions, but found “promotion 

and non-promotion, transfer and non-transfer of employees within a 

department of government [was] a matter of supervisory discretion and 

not ordinarily subject to judicial review.” 

 In short, when divining whether the phrase “preference in 

employment and appointment” should be interpreted broadly to 

encompass intra-agency transfers, we find no authority indicating the 

legislature, after removing the term “and promotion” from the veterans’ 
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preference statute in 1985, intended veterans be given 

preferences in intra-agency transfer requests.1 

 Because we do not find the present veterans’ preference applicable 

to intra-agency transfers, we conclude there is no inconsistency between 

the transfer provisions in the collective bargaining agreement and 

chapter 35C. Without this inconsistency, there is no right of action that 

trumps the mandatory grievance procedures set forth in the collective 

bargaining agreement. 

Even if there is no inconsistency, Stammeyer contends our 

decision in O’Malley v. Gundermann, 618 N.W.2d 286 (Iowa 2000), 

establishes two separate avenues of relief for a veteran subject to a 

collective bargaining agreement—the grievance procedures under the 

collective bargaining agreement and a petition with the district court 

under chapter 35C. Stammeyer argues O’Malley stands for the principle 

that claims under chapter 35C are distinct from avenues of redress for 

violations of the collective bargaining agreement. 

We disagree. Stammeyer’s argument stretches beyond the issues 

ruled upon in O’Malley. O’Malley was a veteran whose employment at 

the Iowa Veterans’ Home was terminated after he sold a knife to one of 

the Home’s residents. O’Malley, 618 N.W.2d at 288. O’Malley challenged 

his dismissal through the grievance procedures set forth in the 

 1In Geyer v. Triplett, 237 Iowa 664, 669, 22 N.W.2d 329, 332 (1946), we stated 

that the soldiers’ preference statute should be given a “liberal construction”; however, 

we also noted that “such act should be so construed, when within reason possible, so 

that its evident purpose be accomplished.” See also Krohn v. Judicial Magistrate 

Appointing Comm’n, 239 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Iowa 1976) (“Although the provisions of the 

soldiers preference law are to be liberally construed they should yield to the power to 

select members of the judiciary. . . . To hold the soldiers preference law applicable to 

appointment for the office [of judicial magistrate] would inappropriately limit and 

restrict the options of the commission . . . .”). As noted above, the evident purpose of 

chapter 35C was to reward veterans by giving them a preference in initial hiring 

decisions. 
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applicable collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 289. This 

process took several months. Once an arbitrator concluded O’Malley was 

discharged for proper cause, O’Malley filed a petition in district court 

seeking a writ of certiorari. Id. In this petition he alleged the action of 

the arbitrator, in determining he had been discharged for just cause, was 

in violation of his rights as a veteran under Iowa Code section 35C.6 

(employment removal procedures). Id. The district court concluded, 

however, that the act O’Malley claimed was illegal was not the 

arbitrator’s decision but his employer’s termination decision. Id. The 

court ruled it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the petition 

because it had not been filed within thirty days of O’Malley’s termination. 

Id. at 290. 

We affirmed the district court’s decision. The discharge decision 

was final at the time it was made, and the delay in processing the 

challenge through the arbitration required by the collective bargaining 

agreement rendered the petition for writ of certiorari untimely. Id. at 

291-92 (citing Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 319 (now rule 1.1402(3)) 

which states a petition for writ of certiorari “must be filed within thirty 

days from the time the tribunal, board, or officer exceeded its jurisdiction 

or otherwise acted illegally”). Because the petition for a writ of certiorari 

was not filed in a timely manner, we concluded the court did not have 

jurisdiction to hear the claim. Id. 

The issue in O’Malley was the determination of the time frame for 

filing a chapter 35C certiorari action for O’Malley’s allegedly improper 

removal. Id. (“the issue here is whether O’Malley filed his petition in a 

timely manner”). We were not presented with the separate and distinct 

question as to whether he was required to first exhaust the grievance 

procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement before he 
13

could file his chapter 35C improper removal petition. In addition, 

O’Malley is distinguished from the present case because it concerned 

veterans’ rights surrounding removal from employment, not veterans’ 

preference rights in hiring decisions. 

B. Transfer or Employment 

 Because a person outside the Department of Public Safety was 

hired for one of the positions for which he had applied, Stammeyer 

argues he should have been treated as a new applicant competing with 

other applicants for a vacant position. Under this theory, he would 

thereby receive the veterans’ preference and retain his right to petition 

the district court directly without any reference to the collective 

bargaining agreement. Stated another way, Stammeyer argues his 

request for an inter-divisional transfer to DNE should be treated the 

same as a request from a new, non-transferring applicant; otherwise, 

there would be an unfair distinction between a current “veteran” 

employee and a new hire and he would lose the preference granted in 

section 35C.1. 

The State contends this argument was not preserved for appellate 

review because the district court did not rule on the issue and 

Stammeyer did not file a motion asking the court to enlarge its findings 

to rule upon the issue. The State’s argument is based on the 

fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be 

both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them 

on appeal. Wilson v. Liberty Mut. Group, 666 N.W.2d 163, 167 (Iowa 

2003). “When a district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by 

a party, the party who raised the issue must file a motion requesting a 

ruling in order to preserve error for appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 

N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). If the court does not rule on an issue and 
14

neither party files a motion requesting the district court to do 

so, there is nothing before us to review. Wilson, 666 N.W.2d at 167. 

Such is the case at hand. 

At the conclusion of its ruling, the district court stated: 

For the reasons set out above, the former statute controls 

over the latter, and this court does not have jurisdiction over 

the present dispute. As such, there is no reason to reach the 

appellee’s [the State’s] second argument regarding the 

applicability of chapter 35C to intra-agency transfers. 

There is nothing indicating the court ruled upon or even considered 

Stammeyer’s “new hire/transfer” argument. Despite the missing ruling, 

Stammeyer contends he did not need to file a further motion because “it 

strains credulity to suggest that a further ruling from the district court 

would be necessary to preserve error on this point.” Stammeyer claims 

“the district court was presented with the argument, but in light of its 

ruling on the issue, it could not reach the latter argument.” 

We disagree. If there are alternative claims or defenses, and the 

district court does not rule on all alternative claims or defenses, the 

losing party must file a posttrial motion to preserve error on the claims or 

defenses not ruled on. See, e.g., Sandbulte v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 

343 N.W.2d 457, 466 (Iowa 1984) (“We do not pass on alternative 

arguments and matters set forth in defendants’ motions for summary 

judgment that were not specifically addressed by the trial court’s 

ruling.”). This new hire/transfer argument is distinct from the court’s 

ruling which considers whether the collective bargaining agreement 

controls the grievance procedure. This can best be described as an 

“even-if” argument—even if the court finds Stammeyer should have 

followed the grievance procedures set forth in the collective bargaining 

agreement because he was a current employee competing with other 
15

current employees for a job transfer, he could still pursue a 

chapter 35C claim in district court because he was (for at least one of the 

positions) competing against an applicant who was not a current 

employee. For whatever reason, the district court did not address 

Stammeyer’s even-if argument, and Stammeyer did not file a motion 

requesting that the court do so. Without such a ruling or motion 

requesting a ruling, there is nothing for us to review on this issue. See 

id. 

IV. Conclusion 

Chapter 35C does not grant a veterans’ preference for intra-agency 

transfers. Therefore, Stammeyer was required to pursue his claim via 

the grievance procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. 

We vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the district 

court’s order granting the State’s motion to dismiss. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.