FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-0003

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LISA VENN,

Appellant,

v.

KENNETH M. FOWLKES, III,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Elizabeth A. Senterfitt, Judge.

October 31, 2018

PER CURIAM.

Lisa Venn appeals a final judgment granting a petition for a 

stalking injunction filed by Kenneth M. Fowlkes, III. We reverse 

because it is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. 

In November 2016, Mr. Fowlkes filed a petition for protection 

against stalking against Ms. Venn with whom he had a 15-year 

relationship and shared a minor child. Upon separating in 2009, 

they sought and obtained injunctions against each other. And since 

that time their relationship has remained turbulent. In Mr. 

Fowlkes’s 2016 petition here, he alleged that Ms. Venn stalked and 

harassed him at all hours at his work and home, and harassed him 

by filing a child support case. The allegations include that Ms. 

Venn called him many times without leaving a message; has 

knocked on the door of his house and ran; has created many 
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problems at the restaurant where he works; has claimed to have 

many pictures of him and his wife; has called and bothered Mr. 

Fowlkes’s brother; has claimed to be in fear of Mr. Fowlkes; and 

has told a third-party that she would “get the crackers on [him].” 

Claiming to be “tired of [Ms. Venn’s] games, [her] stalking, [and 

her] harassment through the child support case,” Mr. Fowlkes 

asked the trial court to stop it immediately by granting an 

injunction.

The trial court held a hearing in which both parties appeared

pro se. By that time, the transcript indicates that Ms. Venn had 

filed her own petition for a stalking injunction against Mr. 

Fowlkes. At the hearing, Mr. Fowlkes testified that everything in 

his petition was true and correct and provided no additional 

substantive testimony. Ms. Venn objected to the injunction and, in 

response to the trial court’s questions, testified to having 

legitimate reasons for visiting Mr. Fowlkes’s workplace and home. 

For instance, she testified that she came to the restaurant several 

times with the parties’ daughter, at the daughter’s request and 

after Mr. Fowlkes had invited the daughter to eat there. Ms. Venn 

also conceded placing something in Mr. Fowlkes’s mailbox related 

to her child support case against him. In Ms. Venn’s view, Mr. 

Fowlkes’s petition was filed in retaliation for her having filed a 

child support case against him. And she asked the trial court to 

have her own stalking petition granted against Mr. Fowlkes. In 

her view, Mr. Fowlkes and others were conspiring against her. 

“A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, 

harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of 

stalking.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. “Harass” means “to engage in a 

course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes 

substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no 

legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. “Whether the 

purpose for contact is ‘legitimate’ is evaluated on a case-by-case 

basis. . . . However, courts have generally held that contact is 

legitimate when there is a reason for the contact other than to 

harass the victim.” O’Neill v. Goodwin, 195 So. 3d 411, 413 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2016). To be entitled to a stalking injunction, a petitioner 

must allege and prove two separate instances of stalking, and that 

the incidents alleged objectively caused substantial emotional 
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distress. Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So. 3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2018). 

In this case, Mr. Fowlkes alleged numerous acts of 

harassment. But he did not sufficiently establish his case that Ms. 

Venn’s conduct caused him substantial emotional distress. The 

“substantial emotional distress” that is necessary to support a 

stalking injunction is greater than just an ordinary feeling of 

distress. Burroughs v. Corey, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1205 (M.D. Fla. 

2015) (“Under Florida law, a reasonable person does not suffer 

substantial emotional distress easily.”), aff’d, 647 Fed. Appx. 967 

(11th Cir. 2016). And here, neither the petition, nor Ms. Venn’s 

testimony at the hearing, support the conclusion that her alleged 

conduct would have caused a reasonable person in Mr. Fowlkes’s 

situation to experience substantial emotional distress as required 

to obtain a permanent stalking injunction. See Mitchell v. Brogden, 

249 So. 3d 781, 782 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (listing cases with similar 

facts where the statutory standard was not met). Certainly Mr. 

Fowlkes’s petition, and its description of the years after his 

personal relationship ended with Ms. Venn, shows that he is 

annoyed, frustrated, and feeling harassed in his dealings with Ms. 

Venn, and with the pending child support issue relating to their 

daughter. But his petition and these circumstances do not 

demonstrate that Ms. Venn’s actions would have caused an 

objective, reasonable person in his situation to suffer substantial

emotional distress.

Accordingly, the final judgment is reversed.*

REVERSED.

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and OSTERHAUS and BILBREY, JJ., concur.

 * We also reject Mr. Fowlkes’s preservation arguments, 

because Ms. Venn clearly expressed her objections to the entry of 

the injunction at the hearing below.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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William S. Graessle and Jonathan W. Graessle, William S. 

Graessle, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Rebecca B. Creed and Thomas A. Burns, Creed & Gowdy, P.A.,

Jacksvonville, for Appellee.