THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Skydive Myrtle Beach, Inc., Petitioner, 

v. 

Horry County, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2018-001910 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from Horry County 

Larry B. Hyman Jr., Circuit Court Judge, 

Opinion No. 27930 

Heard September 24, 2019 – Filed November 20, 2019 

REVERSED 

Robert Bratton Varnado, Brown & Varnado, LLC, of Mt. 

Pleasant, for Petitioner. 

Michael Warner Battle, Battle Law Firm, LLC, of 

Conway, for Respondent. 

JUSTICE FEW: Horry County filed an action in magistrates court to eject 

Skydive Myrtle Beach, Inc., from a hangar at the Grand Strand Airport in North 

Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. The magistrates court found Skydive did not have 

any right to occupy the hangar, and ejected Skydive. The circuit court affirmed. 

Skydive appealed to the court of appeals, which dismissed the appeal on the ground 
it was moot. We granted Skydive's petition for a writ of certiorari. We reverse the 

court of appeals because we hold the appeal is not moot. On the merits, we agree 

with the magistrates court and the circuit court that Skydive has no right to occupy 

the hangar. Thus, we affirm the circuit court. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

Horry County owns Grand Strand Airport. Until 2013, the County leased the airport 

to Grand Strand Aviation, which operated under the name Ramp 66. On May 10, 

2012, Ramp 66 entered into an agreement with Skydive allowing Skydive to use "a 

minimum of" 2,500 square feet of what is commonly called the "bird hangar" to 

operate its skydiving business. The agreement provided, "This agreement remains 

in effect through Grand Strand Aviation's lease with Horry County Department of 

Airports through July 2020 unless both parties agree to any changes in writing." 

Horry County terminated its lease with Ramp 66 in August 2013 and began its own 

management of the airport. On September 13, 2013, Horry County and Skydive 

entered into a new agreement entitled "Space Use Permit." The new agreement was 

designed to allow Skydive to continue operations at the bird hangar while it 

negotiated a longer-term lease directly with the County. The Space Use Permit 

granted Skydive the right to "occupy and use" a much larger portion of the bird 

hangar—6,800 square feet—than Skydive occupied under the May 2012 agreement. 

It also granted Skydive the right to use the hangar at night, a right Skydive did not 

have under the May 2012 agreement. The Space Use Permit stated "it shall continue 

in force and effect until January 31, 2014," and "either party may terminate [it] for 

any reason by giving at least thirty days written notice to the other party." 

Skydive continued to occupy the bird hangar and to operate its skydiving business 

after January 31, but it did not enter into a new lease. On February 19, Horry County 

wrote Skydive listing numerous safety-related concerns about Skydive's operations. 

The County's letter advised Skydive the Space Use Permit had expired and "you are 

currently occupying County property without any right or authorization." The letter 

explained that in light of what the County perceived to be Skydive's poor safety 

record and other concerns, "Horry County is unwilling to offer Skydive a leasehold 

interest." Instead, the letter offered "a new, short-term Space Use Permit" that would 

allow Skydive to continue occupying the hangar until July 31, 2014. This new Space 

Use Permit would have imposed additional safety requirements that were not in the 

original Space Use Permit. The letter stated that if Skydive did not sign the new 

Space Use Permit within seventy-two hours, "you will need to vacate the premises 

immediately." Skydive did not respond to the February 19 letter. 
On February 28, 2014, Skydive filed a lawsuit in circuit court against Horry County, 

Horry County Department of Airports, and several individually named County 

employees. Skydive alleged the defendants improperly conspired to remove it from 

the bird hangar, breached the May 2012 agreement, and otherwise tortiously 

interfered with Skydive's business. The nature and progress of that lawsuit—which 

is still pending—are discussed in Skydive Myrtle Beach, Inc. v. Horry County, 426 

S.C. 175, 826 S.E.2d 585 (2019). 

Horry County filed this ejectment action on June 5, 2014. The magistrates court 

entered an order ejecting Skydive from the bird hangar, and Skydive appealed to the 

circuit court. The magistrates court allowed Skydive to remain in the bird hangar— 

pending the circuit court's decision on appeal—by making a monthly bond payment 

equal to the rent Skydive paid under the Space Use Permit. The circuit court 

affirmed the ejectment order. Skydive made a motion for a stay of the order, which 

the circuit court denied. 

Skydive appealed the circuit court order to the court of appeals on August 24, 2015. 

Three years later, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal as moot. Skydive Myrtle 

Beach, Inc. v. Horry Cty., 424 S.C. 298, 303, 818 S.E.2d 224, 227 (Ct. App. 2018). 

We granted Skydive's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' 

decision. 

II. Mootness 

Skydive argues that when the Space Use Permit expired on January 31, 2014, 

Skydive's right to occupy the bird hangar was once again governed by the May 2012 

agreement. Horry County, of course, disagrees. However, if the May 2012 

agreement does control, Skydive retains the right to occupy the bird hangar "through 

July 2020." If the court of appeals had agreed with Skydive—or if this Court were 

now to agree—we could order that Skydive may move back into the bird hangar 

"through July 2020." 

A case is moot "when judgment, if rendered, will have no practical legal effect upon 

existing controversy." Mathis v. S.C. State Highway Dep't, 260 S.C. 344, 346, 195 

S.E.2d 713, 715 (1973). This case is not moot because a decision to reverse the 

ejectment order could have the practical effect of putting Skydive back in possession 

of the bird hangar. 
 

 

In support of its decision to dismiss the appeal as moot, the court of appeals relied 

on Berry v. Zahler, 220 S.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 459 (1951). In Berry, a magistrates court 

issued an order of ejectment against a residential tenant. 220 S.C. at 87, 66 S.E.2d 

at 459. On appeal to this Court, the tenants admitted they voluntarily vacated the 

premises during the appeal and that they had delivered possession of the residence 

to the landlord. 220 S.C. at 87, 66 S.E.2d at 460. We stated, "In their brief is the 

statement that since the trial before the magistrate they have vacated the premises 

and delivered possession to the landlord. Under these circumstances, the issue, 

which was the right to possession of the premises, has become moot, and the appeal 

will not be considered." Id. The key fact in Berry that made the tenant's appeal moot 

was the tenant vacated the premises voluntarily. 

Skydive did not vacate the bird hangar voluntarily. After the circuit court affirmed 

the ejectment order and denied Skydive's request for a stay of the order, ten Horry 

County sheriff's deputies arrived at the hangar to ensure Skydive vacated the 

premises by the court-ordered deadline. In contrast to the Berry tenant's voluntary 

relinquishment of possession, Skydive repeatedly contested all rulings by the courts 

in an obvious effort to remain in the bird hangar. At oral argument before this Court, 

counsel for Skydive confirmed his client's intent to resume possession if the 

magistrates court's ejectment order is reversed. 

In its explanation of its dismissal on the grounds of mootness, the court of appeals 

stated, "Skydive has not possessed the property in almost three years." 424 S.C. at 

303, 818 S.E.2d at 227. The court gave no reason the three-year delay affects 

whether the appeal is moot. We find nothing in this record to indicate Skydive 

unnecessarily delayed the resolution of this appeal. While it is unfortunate the court 

of appeals took three years to resolve the appeal, as we have explained, the court still 

has the power to grant the relief Skydive seeks. Therefore, the delay in this case has 

nothing to do with whether the appeal is moot. 

III. Skydive's Right to Occupy the Hangar 

Having determined the court of appeals should not have dismissed the appeal, we 

turn to the merits.1

 Skydive's argument depends on the continued validity of the 

1

 Initially, the parties briefed to this Court only the issue of mootness. Though our 

record contains the parties' briefs to the court of appeals on the merits, after oral 

argument, we gave both sides the opportunity to brief the merits directly to this 

Court. We later received supplemental briefs from Skydive and Horry County 

addressing the merits of whether Skydive retains any right to occupy the bird hangar. 
 

May 2012 agreement after the execution of the Space Use Permit. Under the terms 

of the May 2012 agreement, Skydive contends, it remains entitled to occupy the bird 

hangar through July 2020. The May 2012 agreement is the only basis on which 

Skydive claims it has any right to occupy the hangar. 

We agree with the magistrates court and the circuit court that the May 2012 

agreement is no longer in effect. The Space Use Permit provides in clear and 

unambiguous terms it "constitutes the complete agreement of the parties with respect 

to" occupancy of the hangar and "supersedes all previous agreements." In response 

to this point, Skydive argues the May 2012 agreement provides that it "remains in 

effect through Grand Strand Aviation's lease with Horry County Department of 

Airports through July 2020 unless both parties agree to any changes in writing." 

When Horry County terminated its agreement with Grand Strand Aviation/Ramp 66, 

however, Horry County became the party with the right to "agree in writing" to 

change the relationship. It did precisely that in executing the Space Use Permit, 

which according to its clear and unambiguous terms expired on January 31, 2014. 

When the Space Use Permit expired, Skydive retained no right to continue to occupy 

the hangar. 

IV. Conclusion 

The appeal is not moot because Skydive did not voluntarily vacate the bird hangar, 

and a ruling in favor of Skydive could put it back in possession. However, the Space 

Use Permit superseded the May 2012 agreement, and the Space Use Permit is 

expired. Skydive has no right to occupy the bird hangar. We reverse the court of 

appeals and affirm the circuit court. 

REVERSED. 

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN and JAMES, JJ., concur. 

Skydive also raised procedural issues to the court of appeals. To the extent those 

issues have not been addressed by the court of appeals or this Court, we find it 

unnecessary to do so because our resolution of the merits ends this case. See Futch 

v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 

(1999) (stating an "appellate court need not address remaining issues when 

disposition of prior issue is dispositive").