IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Pittsburgh Water and Sewer :

Authority :

: No. 195 C.D. 2022

 v. : No. 196 C.D. 2022

: ARGUED: May 23, 2024

William Towne, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: July 23, 2024

In these consolidated cases, William Towne appeals from an order of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County affirming in part and reversing in 

part a final determination of the Office of Open Records (OOR). At issue in this 

long-running dispute is a request for records Towne submitted to the Pittsburgh 

Water and Sewer Authority (Authority) in 2020 pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law 

(RTKL).

1

 For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I. Background

On March 11, 2019, the Authority sent an erroneous automated call “to 

a five-figure number of customers informing them that their water service may be 

shut off.” Joint Stip., Finding of Fact No. 1, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 742a (the 

shut-off call). Towne submitted his first RTKL request to the Authority in June 

2019, seeking the following: 

1 Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104. 
2

1. All contract documents, specifications, user 

manuals, work plans/orders, invoices, and evidences [sic] 

of payment related to the outbound call system(s) which 

facilitated shut[-]off notices and/or subsequent corrections 

on or about March 11, 2019, including such documents 

related to improvements, enhancements, fixes, and other 

alterations made or still to be made to the system(s).

2. Copies of the recordings played in the calls 

notifying customers of pending shut-off and if applicable, 

correction as of the morning of March 11, 2019, as well as 

any replacements for these recordings created on or after 

March 11, 2019.

3. Any internal reports related to the incident on or 

about March 11, 2019 involving unjustified pending 

shutoff calls.

4. Any e[]mails involving staff of [the Authority] 

and/or its agents containing content related to the incident 

on or about March 11, 2019 involving unjustified pending 

shut[-]off calls.

2019 Request, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 30a. When the Authority failed to 

respond within five days the request was deemed denied, and Towne then appealed 

to OOR. Joint Stip., F.F. Nos. 3-4, R.R. at 742a; see also R.R. at 370a. In response 

to OOR’s invitation to supplement the record, the Authority submitted a position 

statement, certain responsive records, and the affidavit of Julie Quigley, then its 

Director of Administration.2 R.R. at 370a, 801a. While OOR requested that the 

Authority provide an exemption log, it failed to do so during the 2019 appeal. Joint 

Stip., F.F. Nos. 5-6, R.R. at 743a. 

In August 2019, OOR issued a final determination (2019 final 

determination) granting in part and denying in part Towne’s appeal of the 

2 Ms. Quigley’s position with the Authority has changed several times throughout this 

litigation. 
3

Authority’s deemed denial. Joint Stip., F.F. No. 7, R.R. at 743a. Specifically, OOR 

determined that “the Authority has met its burden of proving that ‘specifications, 

user manuals, and work plans/order[s]’ responsive to Item 1 do not exist within [its]

possession[,] control or custody, but has failed to prove that no other records 

responsive to Item 1 of the [2019 r]equest exist within the Authority’s possession[,] 

control or custody.” R.R. at 373a-74a. OOR further found that the Authority failed 

to prove that records responsive to Item 2 are not within its possession, custody, or 

control, and failed to prove that a portion of records responsive to Items 3 and 4 are 

exempt from disclosure. R.R. at 374a-79a. Given these determinations, the 

Authority was required to provide Towne with copies of the recordings played on 

March 11, 2019, as well as any replacement recordings created after that date; 

internal reports related to the shut-off call; and email communications and internal 

reports with only the home addresses of private citizens redated. Id. Neither party 

appealed the 2019 final determination. 

The Authority failed to comply with OOR’s 2019 final determination; 

in fact, it did not provide any additional documents to Towne between the issuance 

of that determination and June 2020. R.R. at 773a. Rather than file a writ of 

mandamus to enforce the 2019 final determination, Towne submitted another RTKL 

request to the Authority in June 2020. See Joint Stip., F.F. No. 9, R.R. at 743a; see 

also R.R. at 804a. The 2020 Request seeks all records which the Authority was 

ordered to provide in the 2019 final determination. R.R. at 86a; see also Joint Stip., 

F.F. No. 10, R.R. at 743a. After invoking a 30-day extension, the Authority failed 

to respond and the 2020 Request was deemed denied. R.R. at 86a-87a. 

Towne appealed to OOR which again invited the parties to supplement 

the record. R.R. at 87a. On August 19, 2020, the Authority submitted the affidavit 
4

of Ms. Quigley as well as a position statement claiming that all responsive, nonexempt records had been provided to Towne except those to which OOR denied 

access in its 2019 final determination. R.R. at 87a, 801a. The position statement

indicated the Authority’s objection to producing any responsive documents subject 

to the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine but noted that the 

Authority had not withheld any responsive documents on those bases. R.R. at 16a. 

Moreover, the Authority indicated that it provided Towne with hundreds of

responsive documents, some of which were unredacted and others with personal 

email addresses and financial information redacted. Id. 

In September 2020, OOR issued the final determination at issue herein, 

granting in part, denying in part, and dismissing as moot in part Towne’s appeal. 

Joint Stip., F.F. No. 12, R.R. at 743a; see also R.R. at 86a. OOR determined that 

the Authority was permitted to redact personal email addresses from the responsive 

records pursuant to Section 708(b)(6) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(6),

3 and the 

names and home addresses of individuals pursuant to the constitutional right to 

privacy. R.R. at 89a-91a. However, OOR found that the Authority failed to meet 

its burden of proof as to redactions for other “personal/financial information” as 

these redactions were unexplained. R.R. at 89a-90a. OOR further held that “the 

Authority has established that it has provided all responsive records within its 

possession, custody, and control.” R.R. at 92a. Given the above, the Authority was 

3 More specifically, Section 708(b)(6)(i)(A) of the RTKL provides that certain personal 

identification information, including personal email addresses, is exempt from access by a 

requester. 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(6)(i)(A). 
5

required to provide Towne with the responsive records without the redactions 

pertaining to other “personal/financial information.” Id.

4

In October 2020, both parties filed timely petitions for review with the 

trial court. Joint Stip., F.F. Nos. 13-14, R.R. at 743a. Towne’s petition for review

asserted that OOR erred by not finding that the Authority acted in bad faith by failing 

to comply with the 2019 final determination. R.R. at 362a-65a. Towne also

requested that the trial court award him “the maximum $1,500 penalty authorized

pursuant to [Section 1305 of the RTKL,] 65 P.S. § 67.1305,”5for the Authority’s 

bad faith denial of access to public records, as well as “reasonable counsel fees and 

costs pursuant to [Section 1304 of the RTKL,] 65 P.S. § 67.1304.”

6

 R.R. at 367a. 

The trial court consolidated the two cases, and the parties stipulated to the admission 

of exhibits and records for in camera review. Joint Stip., F.F. Nos. 15-17, R.R. at 

744a. On April 19, 2021, the trial court conducted a hearing at which Ms. Quigley 

testified for the Authority, and the parties subsequently submitted proposed findings 

of fact and conclusions of law. 

On February 2, 2022, the trial court entered the order at issue here 

affirming in part and reversing in part OOR’s 2020 final determination.7 

Specifically, the trial court order states that the Authority’s petition for review

4 The Authority provided Towne with additional responsive records during the pendency 

of the 2020 appeal to OOR. As such, the 2020 final determination found Towne’s appeal moot to 

the extent that it sought access to the additional records provided on appeal. R.R. at 89a. 

5

In particular, Section 1305(a) of the RTKL provides that “[a] court may impose a civil 

penalty of not more than $1,500 if an agency denied access to a public record in bad faith.” 65 

P.S. § 67.1305(a). 

6 As Section 1304 of the RTKL provides, a “court may award reasonable attorney fees and 

costs of litigation” in certain circumstances, including where the legal challenge was frivolous or 

upon reversal of an agency determination, provided other criteria are met. 65 P.S. § 67.1304. 

7 The trial court entered a single order disposing of both parties’ petitions for review. 
6

is granted, except as provided herein:

(1) Upon review of the privilege log submitted by 

[the Authority] and an in camera review of the subject 

records, I find that all records except those designated log 

numbers 5, 10, and 21 contain privileged attorney-client 

communications. [The Authority] shall provide a copy of 

these [3] records to [] Towne within 30 days. 

(2) The certification of the records provided to [] 

Towne is deficient, as it does not apply to records provided 

after certification and does not contain sufficient 

information. . . . [The Authority] shall provide, within 30 

days, certification of all records provided to [] Towne in 

the format (to the degree applicable) of the certification 

used by [] OOR in its certification dated January 11, 2021.

. . . . 

(3) Information relating to governmental entities, 

businesses, non-profits, educational institutions and 

similar entities is not exempt under applicable law. For all 

documents provided in redacted form to [] Towne, [the 

Authority] shall, within 30 days, re-provide those 

documents with only the following redactions: 

(a) The financial account numbers of any 

entity or private individual; and 

(b) The names, email addresses, phone 

numbers, and home addresses of private 

individuals, even if those individuals 

communicated with [the Authority] on behalf of an 

above-referenced entity.

The [p]etition for [r]eview filed by [] Towne is otherwise 

denied. 

R.R. at 995a-96a. 

Notably, the trial court found that the Authority did not provide certain 

responsive documents to Towne until after the trial court’s April 2021 hearing, 
7

including recordings of the shut-off call, a redacted call log report, and redactions 

the Authority agreed to withdraw by February 25, 2021. R.R. at 778a. However, 

the trial court also determined that the Authority “conducted a good faith search of 

its records, as defined by the RTKL, to determine the existence and potential 

exemption of, such records.” R.R. at 808a. Moreover, it held that the exemptions 

asserted and redactions made by the Authority “in response to the Request were 

based upon a reasonable interpretation of the law and of the scope of the Request.” 

R.R. at 809a. Ultimately, the trial court declined to find that the Authority acted in 

bad faith, or to award penalties or fees in this matter. Towne then appealed to this 

Court. 

II. Related RTKL Request and Mandamus Action

In December 2020, while the parties’ appeals to the trial court were 

pending, Towne submitted yet another RTKL request to the Authority.

8

 This request 

concerned, inter alia, whether the Authority had in fact provided Towne with links 

to responsive documents in the underlying matter here, as it claimed to have done 

through emails to Towne and his counsel. See R.R. at 746a. After invoking a 30-

day extension, the Authority granted in part and denied in part the request and 

provided Towne with responsive records. Towne appealed and in March 2021, OOR 

issued a final determination granting in part, denying in part, and dismissing as moot 

in part the request. See Towne v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth. (OOR Dkt. No. 

AP 2021-0292, issued Mar. 11, 2021) (2021 final determination). Notably, OOR 

8 Towne also filed a formal complaint against the Authority with the Pennsylvania Public 

Utility Commission (PUC) regarding the shut-off call, in which he “requested compensation for 

lost work, legal fees, service restoration fees and other related costs[,]” as well as a civil penalty.

See Towne v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth. (PUC Dkt. No. C-2019-3008437, filed Dec. 8, 2020)

(denying the formal complaint); R.R. at 340a. 
8

found that the Authority acted in bad faith with respect to this particular request and 

its search for responsive records. Id., at 10-11. 

Neither party appealed, and the Authority failed to fully comply with 

the 2021 final determination. Therefore, in September 2021, Towne filed with the 

trial court a complaint in mandamus seeking to enforce the 2021 final determination 

and requesting fees, costs, and penalties pursuant to Sections 1304 and 1305 of the 

RTKL, 65 P.S. §§ 67.1304 and 67.1305. See Towne v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer 

Auth. (C.C.P. Allegheny Cnty., No. GD-21-010514).

9

 On November 21, 2023, the 

trial court issued an order finding that while the Authority complied with the 2021 

final determination as of September 5, 2023, the Authority acted in bad faith 

regarding this particular RTKL request and the mandamus action. Id. The trial court 

awarded Towne attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $32,754.31,10 but ruled 

the Authority’s actions “were not sufficiently egregious to warrant penalties under 

the RTKL[.]” Id. 

III. Issues

Towne raises four issues for this Court’s consideration: (1) whether the 

trial court erred in allowing the Authority to rely on allegedly new grounds for 

disputing the public nature of the records responsive to the 2020 Request; (2)

whether the trial court erred by finding that the Authority established that no further 

responsive records exist and by not requiring production of additional responsive 

records in as close to their original form as possible; (3) whether the trial court erred 

9 The trial court docket for this related matter is publicly available at 

https://dcr.alleghenycounty.us/Civil/View/PublicSearchByCaseNumber.aspx?CasID=GD-21-

010514 (last visited July 22, 2024). 

10 It is evident from the trial court docket that the Authority has since paid Towne the 

$32,754.31 that was awarded. See Towne v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth. (C.C.P. Allegheny 

Cnty., No. GD-21-010514, Towne’s Ltr. filed Mar. 27, 2024). 
9

in declining to award counsel fees and penalties under Sections 1304 and 1305 of 

the RTKL, 65 P.S. §§ 67.1304 and 67.1305; and (4) whether the trial court erred by 

refusing to consider evidence of the Authority’s bad faith conduct as found by OOR 

in its 2021 final determination. 

IV. Discussion

Regarding the first issue, Towne argues that the 2020 Request only 

sought records OOR found were public in its 2019 final determination. Because that 

determination was not appealed by any party it is binding and the doctrines of 

collateral estoppel and res judicata prevent the Authority from re-litigating the 

public nature of the responsive records. However, this issue is waived because 

Towne failed to raise it in his petition for review to the trial court. See R.R. at 351a68a. It is well established that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also Butler v. 

Dauphin Cnty. Dist. Att’y’s Off., 163 A.3d 1139, 1143 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (holding, 

in RTKL context, that requester’s failure to bring due process claim to trial court’s 

attention before filing Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement resulted in waiver). Moreover, 

“mandamus is the action to file where the requester has not appealed the final 

determination to a court for a merits review and seeks compliance with a final 

determination of [OOR].” Capinski v. Upper Pottsgrove Twp., 164 A.3d 601, 609 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Towne cannot complain about “re-litigating” this matter when 

he submitted a new RTKL request to OOR, rather than a mandamus action in the 

trial court to enforce the 2019 final determination. See Capinski; see also Scott v. 

Del. Valley Reg’l Plan. Comm’n, 56 A.3d 40, 44 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (rejecting

requester’s collateral estoppel argument because “decisions of administrative boards 
10

or tribunals have no precedential value on this Court” and, therefore, Court was not 

bound by OOR’s decision). 

Towne also maintains that the Authority’s failure to raise the argument

that certain responsive records are protected by the attorney-client privilege until the 

eve of the evidentiary hearing before the trial court results in waiver. This argument 

lacks merit as the Authority’s August 2020 position statement to OOR explicitly 

states: “Additionally, the [Authority] objects to producing any documents subject to 

the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine[,] and any other 

applicable privilege.” R.R. at 16a. The fact that the Authority, at that time, had not 

withheld any responsive documents based upon these privileges is of no moment. 

Because the Authority raised the privileges with OOR at this early juncture – and 

continued to assert them throughout the trial court appeal, including providing a 

privilege log and submitting potentially privileged material for in camera review –

this means the privileges were properly preserved with respect to after-discovered 

records. Chambersburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Dorsey, 97 A.3d 1281, 1288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2014). 

Towne next argues that the Authority did not meet its burden of

establishing that additional responsive records do not exist. He maintains that, based 

upon the facts accepted by the trial court, it was an error of law to conclude that the 

Authority met its burden. This argument is specious. It ignores the reality that the 

trial court, as fact finder,11 credited the affidavit and testimony of Ms. Quigley with 

11 When a request for records under the RTKL is submitted to a local agency, such as the 

Authority here, the trial court “is the ‘Chapter 13’ court and reviews the determination issued by 

OOR with a de novo standard and a plenary scope; the [trial court] may substitute its own findings 

of fact for that of the agency or rely upon the record created below.” Off. of the Dist. Att’y of Phila. 

v. Bagwell, 155 A.3d 1119, 1123 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) [citing Bowling v. Off. of Open Recs., 75 

A.3d 453, 477 (Pa. 2013)]. Here, the trial court issued its own findings of fact and conclusions of 

law. 
11

respect to the Authority’s record-keeping and its search for responsive records in 

this matter, including her statements that certain documentation did not exist because 

matters were conducted via in-person and telephone communications and meetings 

rather than through email or written reports. See R.R. at 801a-08a. Further, the 

Authority’s search included not just conducting keyword searches, as Towne 

suggests, but reaching out to custodians of potentially responsive records, including 

third-party vendors, and conducting a systematic search of its own records and those 

of its contractors. R.R. at 802a-03a. To the extent Towne asks this Court to overturn 

the credibility determinations of the trial court on this issue, we discern no reason to 

do so. See Borough of Pottstown v. Suber-Aponte (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 1416 & 1417 

C.D. 2019, filed Mar. 19, 2021) (noting, in RTKL appeal, that “[t]his Court . . .

cannot upset the trial court’s credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence to 

reach a finding contrary to the trial court”); see also Taylor v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 842 C.D. 2014, filed Dec. 30, 2014) (same).

12

 In sum, the record 

simply does not support Towne’s bald assertion that the Authority remains in 

possession of responsive, non-exempt, and non-privileged records that have yet to 

be produced.13 

Next, Towne argues that the trial court erred in not requiring the 

Authority to produce the records responsive to Item 3 of the Request in as close to 

their original form as possible. Towne does not dispute that he was provided with 

12 These unreported panel decisions of this Court are cited for their persuasive value 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2) and Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating 

Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). 

13 We also note that when counsel for Towne was asked during oral argument what 

remained for this Court to decide, he did not mention the production of any additional records. 

Rather, counsel stated that the remaining issues are whether penalties and fees should have been 

awarded, and whether the privilege issue has been waived. 
12

the responsive records, nor does he claim that he is entitled to the information 

redacted from those records. Instead, he complains that the Authority provided the 

information “as two non-mergeable lists of calls produced in non-searchable PDF 

format,” and that he is entitled to the information in “Comma Separate Values format 

which is mergeable and analyzable across the multiple relevant files[.]” Towne’s 

Br. at 28 (citing R.R. at 778a). Towne asserts that “[t]here is readily available 

technology that allows these types of files to be verifiably-privately and securely

redacted in this manner.” Id.

Section 705 of the RTKL provides that “an agency shall not be required 

to create a record which does not currently exist or to compile, maintain, format or 

organize a record in a manner in which the agency does not currently compile, 

maintain, format or organize the record.” 65 P.S. § 67.705 (emphasis added). In 

considering this provision, this Court has held that “[a]n agency need only provide 

the information in the manner in which it currently exists.” Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. 

Cole, 52 A.3d 541, 547 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). In addition, while “an agency can be 

required to draw information from a database, . . . the information must be drawn in 

formats available to the agency.” Id. [discussing Gingrich v. Pa. Game Comm’n

(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1254 C.D. 2011, filed Jan. 12, 2012)]. See also Ctr. for 

Investigative Reporting v. Pa. Dep’t of Health (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 227 C.D. 2023, 

filed June 5, 2024), slip op. at 18 (noting this Court has “long held that an agency is 

not required to manipulate or reorganize existing data when responding to a records 

request”). Here, the Authority provided Towne with the responsive information

from its records, with redactions. Towne does not allege that he is entitled to 

additional information or challenge the redactions; rather, he simply complains

about the format in which the records were provided. We discern no error in the trial 
13

court’s decision as the Authority is not required to manipulate its data by utilizing

additional technology to create a format preferable to Towne. 

Finally, Towne maintains that the trial court erred by failing to award 

him attorney fees, costs, and penalties pursuant to Sections 1304 and 1305 of the 

RTKL. In support of this argument, Towne points to OOR’s finding in its 2021 final 

determination that the Authority acted in bad faith, arguing that the trial court in the 

underlying matter erred by failing to consider evidence thereof. In essence, Towne 

argues that the Authority’s bad faith response in the separate but related matter 

mandates a similar finding here. We disagree in both respects. 

As indicated above, Section 1305(a) of the RTKL states that “[a] court 

may impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,500 if an agency denied access to a 

public record in bad faith.” 65 P.S. § 67.1305(a).14 In addition, Section 1304(a)

provides certain circumstances under which a court may award reasonable attorney 

fees and costs, including upon reversal of an agency determination where the court 

finds that the agency acted in bad faith. 65 P.S. § 67.1304(a). In the RTKL context, 

“intent to wrongfully withhold disclosure is not required for a finding of bad faith 

and [] an agency’s failure to provide an adequate response to a request may be the 

basis for such a finding.” Brunermer v. Apollo Borough (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 661 C.D. 

2021, filed July 28, 2022), slip op. at 11 (emphasis in original) [citing Uniontown 

Newspapers, Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 185 A.3d 1161, 1175-76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), 

aff’d, 243 A.3d 19 (Pa. 2020)]. However, it is important to reiterate that the trial 

14 In his brief to this Court, Towne argues that he should be awarded a civil penalty under 

Section 1305(a) of the RTKL of $1,500 on a per record basis due to the Authority’s purported bad 

faith denial of access to public records. See Towne’s Br. at 46-49. Yet in his petition for review 

to the trial court, Towne specifically requested that he be awarded “the maximum $1,500 penalty 

authorized pursuant to [Section 1305 of the RTKL,]” with no claim that the penalty be awarded 

on a per record basis. R.R. at 367a. Again, Towne cannot raise issues for the first time on appeal 

to this Court. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Butler. 
14

court is the finder of fact here, and as the reviewing court we must uphold its 

conclusion regarding bad faith unless that conclusion is legally erroneous or 

unsupported by substantial evidence of record. Off. of the Dist. Att’y of Phila. v.

Bagwell, 155 A.3d 1119, 1123 n.3. (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) [citing Twp. of Worcester v. 

Off. of Open Recs., 129 A.3d 44, 49 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016)]. 

Here, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing, developed a 

comprehensive record, and thoroughly reviewed the complicated procedural posture 

of this case. While the trial court noted the shortcomings of the Authority’s 

response, it also acknowledged the extensive amount of documents which were

produced and credited the testimony of Ms. Quigley regarding the Authority’s 

search. The trial court also determined that the exemptions asserted and redactions 

made by the Authority were based upon a reasonable interpretation of the law. This 

is not a case where the local agency based its denial of access to records on the 

identity of the requester and the presumed use of the requested records, see Bagwell, 

or where the agency failed to perform a search of its records until the matter was in 

post-OOR litigation, see Uniontown Newspapers.

15

 Simply put, there is substantial 

evidence of record to support the trial court’s factual findings in this regard as well 

as the ultimate determination that the Authority did not act in bad faith. 

Moreover, OOR’s 2021 final determination is not at issue here. That 

determination involved a separate request, one which post-dates the 2020 Request 

that is at issue before us. Towne also chose to pursue enforcement of the 2021 final 

determination through a mandamus action, which has since concluded. The trial 

15 We note that while the Authority could have handled the 2020 Request more efficiently 

and effectively, both parties bear some responsibility for extending and complicating this 

litigation. For example, Towne chose to submit a new RTKL request to the Authority rather than

seek to enforce the 2019 final determination through a mandamus action and his arguments have 

changed somewhat at the various levels of review. 
15

court simply was not bound by a finding of bad faith in a different RTKL appeal and 

did not err in determining that it had no bearing on this matter. 

V. Conclusion

In sum, we find that Towne’s arguments which have been properly 

preserved for appeal lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court. 

 

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

President Judge Emerita
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Pittsburgh Water and Sewer :

Authority :

: No. 195 C.D. 2022

 v. : No. 196 C.D. 2022

:

William Towne, :

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 23rd day of July, 2024, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County in the above-captioned consolidated matters is 

AFFIRMED. 

 

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

President Judge Emerita