* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-10880 Summary Calendar

LAURIE ABDELJALIL, on behalf of Marcus Walker, on behalf of Sarah Walker, on behalf of Khaled Kasem Abdeljalil, on behalf of Kasem Mahmoud Abdeljalil, Individually and as Natural Parent and Next Friend of Marcus Walker, a Minor and Sarah Walker, a Minor, and as the Administratrix and Personal Representative of the Estate of Khaled Kasem Abdeljalil, Deceased, and Kasem Mahmoud Abdeljalil,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

CITY OF FORT WORTH; ET AL.,

Defendants,

CITY OF FORT WORTH; SHIRLEY WALKER, In her Individual and Official Capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:98-CV-342-A

- - - - - - - - - - September 11, 2000

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM: *

Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s grant of summary

judgment for the defendants. Because plaintiffs have waived their

state-law claims by failing to argue them on appeal, only theirNo. 99-10880

-2-

claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are at issue. S ee Yohey

v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 223-24 (5th Cir. 1993).

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo

. See Green v.

Touro Infirmary

, 992 F.2d 537, 538 (5th Cir. 1993). Summary

judgment is appropriate w hen, considering all of the admissible

evidence and drawing all reasonable inference s in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of

material f act and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. S ee F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 56(c); Litt le v. Liquid Air

Corp.

, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc). After

examination of the records and briefs, we have determined that

there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the

defendants’ motions for summary judgment were properly granted.

Plaintiffs also argue that the district court abused its

discretion in granting the defendants’ motions to str ike Jim

Bearden’s testimony as bo th an expert and a fact witness. The

district court analyzed Bearden’s methodology in light of Daubert

v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.

, 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993), and held

that his expert testimony was not reliable. The district court

refused to consider Bearden’s affidavit regarding a factual matter

because it held that his affidavit was based entirely on hearsay.

After considering Bearden’s deposition and affidavit, we hold that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the

defendants’ motions to strike Bearden’s testimony or in refusing to

consider his affidavit.

Plaintiffs also contend that the district court erred in

denying their motion for leave to file a sixth amended originalNo. 99-10880
-3-

complaint. The district court failed to specify the basis for its

denial of such motion. Such a failure to specify would normally

constitute an abuse of discretion requiring remand. See Foman v.

Davis

, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The district court, however,

explicitly considered the allegations contained in plaintiffs’

proposed sixth amended original complaint and held that summary

judgment woul d be appropriate even if such complaint had been

filed. Because the district court’s grant of summary judgment is

affirme d, a remand regarding plaintiffs’ motion to amend would

constitute a waste of judicial resources. See Halbert v. City of

Sherman , 33 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 1994)(a denial of a motion to

amend when a remand would be a waste of judicial resources should

be affirmed).

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.