UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4744

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff − Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER WEAH BLIDEE,

Defendant − Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Martin K. Reidinger, 

District Judge. (3:04−cr−00329−MR−DCK−2)

Argued: September 23, 2011 Decided: October 31, 2011

Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, 

in which Judges Motz and Keenan joined.

ARGUED: Erin Kimberly Taylor, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH 

CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy 

Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, 

North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Claire J. Rauscher, 

Executive Director, Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal Defender, 

FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States 

Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

Christopher Weah Blidee challenges the district court’s 

revocation of his supervised release. He argues that the 

district court failed to comply with due process when it ruled 

that he was in violation of the conditions of his supervised 

release. Alternatively, Blidee contests the reasonableness of 

the sentence imposed by the district court upon revocation. We 

conclude that the revocation hearing comported with due process 

and the sentence was not plainly unreasonable. Accordingly, we 

affirm the judgment of the district court. 

I.

A.

A citizen of Liberia, Blidee entered the United States as a 

refugee in 1994. He subsequently adjusted his status to that of 

a lawful permanent resident. On December 15, 2004, a grand jury 

returned an indictment charging Blidee with several counts 

arising out of his participation in a scheme to defraud 

financial institutions. Pursuant to a pretrial agreement, 

Blidee pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit 

offenses against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

513, 1028, 1029, 1343, and 1344. The district judge sentenced 
3

Blidee to a 30-month term of imprisonment followed by 3 years of 

supervised release. 

The district court entered judgment on April 19, 2006. It 

provided Blidee with binding conditions of supervised release. 

Two conditions are particularly relevant to this appeal. First, 

Blidee was ordered to “answer truthfully all inquiries by the 

probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation 

officer.” J.A. 20. Second, the district court appended a 

special condition regarding Blidee’s immigration status:

In accordance with established procedures provided by 

the Immigration and Naturalization [sic] Act, . . . 

the defendant, upon release from imprisonment, is to 

be surrendered to a duly-authorized immigration 

official for deportation. As a further condition of 

supervised release, if ordered deported, the defendant 

shall remain outside the United States. Should 

deportation not occur, the defendant shall report 

within 72 hours of release from the custody of the 

Bureau of Prisons or the Immigrations [sic] and 

Customs Enforcement Agency to the probation office in 

the district to which defendant is released.

Id. 

Soon after the entry of judgment, the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Blidee, 

charging that he was removable for having been convicted of an 

aggravated felony. Blidee was finally ordered removed to 

Liberia in 2008. 

Blidee completed his term of imprisonment on August 1, 

2008. He was released and immediately placed in the custody of 
4

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), in accordance 

with the terms of his removal order. Over the next six months, 

ICE officials attempted to remove Blidee to Liberia. A variety 

of logistical impediments, owing mostly to the Liberian 

Embassy’s intransigence, prevented successful removal. ICE 

agents ultimately concluded that Blidee’s removal was not 

imminent, and they released him from custody on March 3, 2009. 

ICE agents also provided Blidee with an order of supervision 

upon his release from their custody, which ordered him to selfremove from the United States. 

After his release from ICE custody, Blidee met with his 

probation officer, Timothy Goodman. Goodman reviewed Blidee’s 

conditions of supervised release at their first meeting on March 

10. Goodman stressed to Blidee that he must “stay in touch with 

ICE as they had directed him to and . . . compl[y] with any and 

all directives from the ICE officials.” Id. 30. Goodman 

informed Blidee that he must follow both his instructions and 

the directives of ICE officials. As Goodman testified at the 

revocation hearing, “I made sure that [Blidee] understood from 

the moment he came to our office that my expectation of him was 

to comply with any and all directives and regulations of ICE.” 

Id. 38. To that end, Goodman confirmed that Blidee understood 

that he must self-remove pursuant to ICE orders. 
5

Over the next year, Blidee failed time and again to comply 

with ICE deadlines to self-remove. His supervising ICE 

detention and removal officer, Erin North, first ordered him to 

leave the United States no later than July 7. After he failed 

to self-remove, North instructed him to report to her on October 

6 with tickets to depart the United States. Blidee met with her 

on October 6, but he failed to produce the tickets. North gave 

him another three months to leave the country, ordering him to 

finalize travel plans and meet with her on January 6, 2010. 

Blidee brought tickets for departure to Ghana to the January 6 

meeting. He explained to North that, though a Liberian citizen, 

he spoke the language of Ghana and would be able to enter the 

country. North testified that Blidee’s affirmation about his 

ability to enter Ghana satisfied ICE requirements, because 

countries often have arrangements allowing citizens reciprocal 

entry. North gave Blidee another extension, directing him to 

leave the country by March 31. Blidee was set for a March 29 

departure from the United States to Ghana. 

Blidee again failed to comply with ICE orders, refusing to 

follow through with the planned March 29 self-removal. He 

arrived at Goodman’s office on March 29 and explained that he 

did not want to leave his wife and kids in the United States. 

Blidee then called North, first telling her that his flight had 

been canceled but later admitting that he had simply refused to 
6

leave the United States. North informed Blidee that he had 

violated the conditions of his release from ICE custody. ICE 

would consider him a fugitive if he failed to leave the country 

within seven days. 

Seven days passed, and Blidee remained in the United 

States. Blidee was now officially in violation of an ICE 

condition of supervision. Goodman reasoned that Blidee was 

similarly in violation of his instructions, because he had 

directed Blidee to comply with all ICE orders. Blidee was 

obligated to follow Goodman’s instructions pursuant to the 

conditions of his supervised release, so Goodman now believed 

that Blidee had violated the terms of his supervised release. 

On April 19, Goodman filed a Petition for Warrant for 

Offender Under Supervision, in which he sought revocation of

Blidee’s supervised release. Goodman wrote that Blidee had 

violated conditions mandating that he follow the instructions of 

his probation officer, tell the truth to his probation officer, 

and remain outside the United States if removed.1

 That same day, 

officers secured a warrant for Blidee’s arrest for violating the 

conditions of his supervised release. 

 1

At the revocation hearing, the government abandoned 

Goodman’s position that Blidee had violated the condition 

directing him to remain outside the United States if removed. 
7

B.

At the revocation hearing, Blidee argued that the district 

court lacked authority to revoke his supervised release. 

Because the conditions of supervised release failed to expressly 

require his self-removal, Blidee maintained that revoking his 

supervised release for failure to depart the United States would 

violate his due process rights.

Rejecting Blidee’s contentions, the district court 

concluded that he had failed to follow the lawful instructions

of his probation officer in violation of his conditions of 

supervised release. The district court reasoned that Goodman’s 

authority “extend[ed] to the ministerial act of . . . ordering 

[Blidee] to follow all directives and orders of immigration 

authorities and abid[e] by all of such directives and orders.” 

J.A. 125. When Blidee failed to heed Goodman’s instructions to 

follow ICE orders to self-remove, he thus violated the 

conditions of his supervised release, stated the court. The 

conditions of supervised release plainly mandated Blidee’s 

compliance with directions given by his probation officer, 

according to the district court, so Blidee had received adequate 

notice that failing to self-remove would violate the terms of 

his supervised release.

As an alternative basis for revocation, the district court 

credited Goodman’s testimony that Blidee had violated the 
8

condition requiring him to “answer truthfully all inquiries by 

the probation officer,” id. 20. Goodman had ordered Blidee to 

present his passport and birth certificate to him. The court 

found that Blidee had lied to Goodman when he told him that he 

did not possess his original passport.

Having determined that Blidee had violated the conditions 

of supervised release, the district court turned to framing an 

appropriate sentence. The court first found that Blidee had 

committed a grade C violation, which did not mandate revocation 

of his supervised release. It further calculated a Guidelines 

range of 3–9 months’ imprisonment, with a maximum term of 2 

years. Blidee and the government agreed with these sentencing 

calculations. 

After establishing the sentencing possibilities, the court 

heard argument from Blidee and the government. Blidee requested 

a below-Guidelines sentence of time served. Such a sentence was 

appropriate, argued Blidee, because he would be placed 

indefinitely in ICE custody upon his release from prison. 

According to Blidee, the prospect of ICE detention rendered an 

additional prison term superfluous. 

The government countered that Blidee should receive a 9-

month prison term, at the top of the Guidelines range. It 

reasoned that Blidee’s actions had evinced a “deliberate effort

. . . to subvert the laws of this country,” and a 9-month 
9

sentence would give him incentive to comply with future ICE 

directives. Id. 133.2

Noting that the case was difficult, the district court 

sympathized with Blidee’s situation--“that you’ve gone through 

this trying to make the best decision that you can for your 

family and I believe you’re sincere in doing that.” Id. 135. 

“But in some respects,” the court continued, “I feel that you’ve 

been somewhat misguided in making that decision because in 

choosing the path that you have, you have in some respects 

[flouted] the law, and that has consequences.” Id. The court 

acknowledged that not all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors 

applied to revocation proceedings. It stressed that it must 

impose a sentence that comports with important interests in 

deterrence--one that deters both Blidee and other potential 

defendants from committing similar criminal conduct. 

Declaring that Blidee had shown “a certain disregard for 

the law . . . that requires that I impose a sentence that sends 

that message [that will deter Blidee and others],” the court 

revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 7 months’ 

imprisonment followed by 29 months of supervised release. J.A. 

 2

The government agreed to request a time-served sentence so 

long as Blidee stipulated to self-removing. If Blidee promised 

to purchase airline tickets within thirty days of the hearing 

and to depart the United States by July 31, the government 

agreed to release his ICE detainer and remove him from custody. 

Blidee refused this offer, however.
10

136. The court further ordered that Blidee be released to ICE 

custody for removal after the expiration of his sentence and 

that he comply with all future ICE directives, including 

mandates to self-remove.

Blidee now appeals both the revocation of his supervised 

release and the sentence. 

II.

Blidee first contends that the district court’s revocation 

of his supervised release violated his right to due process. 

According to Blidee, the conditions of supervised release did 

not provide him with adequate notice that failing to follow ICE 

orders to self-remove would constitute a violation. He thus 

maintains that the district court’s decision to revoke his 

supervised release, grounded in his failure to self-remove, 

deprived him of liberty in violation of the right to notice 

guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

Reviewing Blidee’s due process claim de novo,3 United States 

v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 2000), we find his 

 3

The government challenges the propriety of de novo review. 

It argues that Blidee failed to raise a due process claim before 

the district court and insists that our review must be for plain 

error. We disagree. Blidee consistently maintained to the 

district court that he lacked adequate notice that failure to 

self-remove would expose him to possible revocation of his 

supervised release. This is sufficient to preserve his due 

(Continued)
11

argument unavailing. The conditions of supervised release 

plainly required Blidee to comply with the directions issued by 

his probation officer. When Goodman ordered him to follow ICE’s 

mandate to self-remove, Blidee received adequate notice that his 

failure to depart the United States would render him in 

violation of the conditions of his supervised release. 

Revocation of Blidee’s supervised release for failure to selfremove thus comported with due process.4

 

Defendants facing the prospect of supervised release 

revocation are afforded protections enshrined in the Due Process 

Clause. United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 

1992). As in other contexts, due process at the revocation 

stage ordinarily encompasses notice and an opportunity to be 

heard. Cf. Mora v. City of Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 230 (4th 

Cir. 2008); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b). We have not had 

occasion to expound with precision the due process rights 

secured to defendants charged with violating their conditions of 

supervised release, but federal legislation illuminates the 

 

process argument. See United States v. Robinson, 460 F.3d 550, 

557 (4th Cir. 2006). 

4

Because we hold that Blidee violated his conditions of 

supervised release by failing to self-remove, we need not 

address the district court’s alternative ruling that Blidee’s 

misrepresentations about his passport status similarly 

authorized revocation.
12

inquiry. Congress has mandated that a probation officer 

“provide the defendant with a written statement that sets forth 

all the conditions to which the term of supervised release is 

subject, and that is sufficiently clear and specific to serve as 

a guide for the defendant’s conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(f).

We readily conclude that the district court afforded Blidee 

adequate notice that failure to follow ICE orders to self-remove 

would violate the conditions of his supervised release. The 

conditions mandated that Blidee “answer truthfully all inquiries 

by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the 

probation officer.” J.A. 20. At their very first meeting, 

Goodman ensured that Blidee understood that he must follow ICE 

directives to self-remove. Time and again, Goodman told Blidee 

that his “expectation of him was to comply with any and all 

directives and regulations of ICE.” Id. 38. When Blidee failed 

finally to comply with ICE orders to self-remove by April 5, 

2010, he necessarily neglected to follow Goodman’s instructions. 

And because he failed to “follow the instructions of the 

probation officer,” id. 20, Blidee violated the conditions of 

his supervised release. Revocation was therefore entirely 

appropriate and wholly consonant with our notions of due 

process. 

The record belies Blidee’s contentions that his immigration 

status is a matter wholly independent from his compliance with 
13

the terms of supervised release. From the outset, Goodman 

plainly told Blidee that his obligations to ICE were subsumed 

under his conditions of supervised release. Indeed, even before 

Blidee was released from prison, the conditions of supervised 

release notified him that he must follow ICE orders. An 

additional condition was appended to Blidee’s judgment, stating 

that, “upon release from imprisonment,” he was “to be 

surrendered to a duly-authorized immigration official for 

deportation.” Id. This condition moreover provided that, “if 

ordered deported, the defendant shall remain outside the United 

States.” Id. From the date of judgment, then, Blidee was on 

notice that he must comply with ICE directives as a condition of 

his supervised release.5

 5

In addition to his due process argument, Blidee contends 

that the district court abused its discretion by finding his 

violations willful. Because he made a good-faith attempt to 

depart from the United States, Blidee insists that his failure 

to do so was not willful and cannot support a conclusion that he 

violated the conditions of his supervised release. Although 

endeavoring to meet an obligation of supervised release in good 

faith may be sufficient to resist revocation, at the very least 

it requires “earnestness and effort” to satisfy that condition. 

United States v. Taylor, 321 F.2d 339, 341–42 (4th Cir. 1963). 

Here, Blidee failed even to board the plane to Ghana, let alone 

seek entry to the country. A desire to stay with his family, 

not some external bar, precluded his departing the United 

States. This militates against a conclusion that he tried in 

good faith to secure his removal. 
14

III.

Blidee next challenges the procedural reasonableness of the 

district court’s sentence. He asserts that the district court 

erred by failing to address his argument for a time-served

sentence. We find that the district court adequately responded 

to Blidee’s request for a below-Guidelines sentence and affirm.

We have confirmed, post-Booker, that “revocation sentences 

should be reviewed to determine whether they are ‘plainly 

unreasonable’ with regard to those § 3553(a) factors applicable 

to supervised release revocation sentences.” United States v. 

Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 & n.6 (4th Cir. 2006). “In 

determining whether a sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first 

decide whether the sentence is unreasonable,” generally using 

the same reasonableness determinations that we employ on direct 

review of an original postconviction sentence. Id. at 438–39. 

We are mindful, however, that not all of the § 3553(a) factors 

properly apply in the revocation context. Id. If a revocation 

sentence is not unreasonable, the inquiry ends there. Id. at 

439. Only if we conclude that a revocation sentence is 

unreasonable need we evaluate whether it is plainly 

unreasonable, using the same standards that guide our plainerror analysis. Id. 

“ ‘[A] deferential appellate posture’ ” characterizes our 

review of revocation sentences. Id. (quoting United States v. 
15

Salinas, 365 F.3d 582, 588 (7th Cir. 2004)). Indeed, the 

district court “need not be as detailed or specific when 

imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a 

post-conviction sentence.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 

544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). At bottom, “[w]e may be hard-pressed 

to find any explanation for within-range, revocation sentences 

insufficient given the amount of deference we afford district 

courts when imposing these sentences.” Id. Deference is not 

unlimited, however, and “a district court may not simply impose 

[a] sentence without giving any indication of its reasons for 

doing so.” Id. And as is the case at the initial 

postconviction sentencing proceeding, “ ‘[w]here the defendant or 

prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a 

different sentence’ than that set forth in the advisory 

Guidelines, a district judge should address the party’s 

arguments and ‘explain why he has rejected those arguments.’ ” 

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007)). 

Context often clarifies a district court’s reasons for rejecting 

a particular argument and imposing a certain sentence. 

Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. 

We conclude that the district court sufficiently responded 

to Blidee’s request for a time-served sentence and the sentence 

imposed was not unreasonable. Blidee’s request, grounded in his 
16

contention that he would be detained by ICE even if released 

from incarceration, obligated the district court to respond. 

See Carter, 564 F.3d at 328. Though he did not expressly 

restate and reject Blidee’s argument, the record demonstrates 

that the district judge considered the argument and found it 

unavailing. Blidee’s request was premised on an asserted lack 

of distinction between his being held in prison custody and his 

being detained by ICE. The district judge disagreed, however, 

determining that incarceration provided a deterrent effect that 

ICE detention did not. He sought to craft a sentence that 

deterred both Blidee and other potential defendants from 

ignoring ICE directives. According to the district judge, 

Blidee had shown a “certain disregard for the law . . . that 

requires that I impose a sentence that sends that message [that 

will deter Blidee and others].” J.A. 136. The district court’s 

emphasis on deterrence--that it is promoted to a greater extent

by incarceration than through ICE detention--convinces us that 

he adequately considered and rejected Blidee’s argument for a 

time-served sentence. 

IV.

The revocation of Blidee’s supervised release comported 

with due process. Moreover, the sentence imposed upon 
17

revocation was not plainly unreasonable. We therefore affirm 

the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED