* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except in

the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-60320

Summary Calendar

GARRY LEE MOORE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

VERSUS

JAMES V. ANDERSON, SUPERINTENDENT, MISSISSIPPI STATE

PENITENTIARY; ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF MISSISSIPPI,

Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

(1:94-CV-177)

July 28, 1998

Before WISDOM, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

A jury convicted Garry Lee Moore, Mississippi prisoner #

65396, of forgery. The state trial court concluded that Moore was

an habitual offender and sentenced him to a fifteen-year term of

imprisonment without parole. Moore exhausted all of his state

court remedies without success. He then sought relief in federal

district court under 28 U.S.C. §2254. The magistrate judge denied2 See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2 Moore’s p etition, and the district court adopted the magistrate

judge’s report. Moore timely filed notice of appeal. We affirm.

Moore raises several assignments of err or; none has merit.

First, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to preserve his right to a speedy trial. Though 15 months elapsed

between the time of his arrest and his trial, Mo ore has not

demonstrated that his defense was impaired. His naked assertion

that the government delayed his trial for the sole purpose of

reindicting him as an habitual offender is unpersuasive. There is

simply no evidence in the record to suggest that the government

would not have charged hi m as an habitual offender had he been

brought to trial sooner. Because he suffered no prejudice, his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. 2

Second, Moore argue s that his counsel’s heavy caseload

prevented him from rendering constitutionally-adequate assistance

on his behalf. The record, however, reflects that counsel was

well-versed in the facts of Moore’s case and that he provided

effective assistance at all stages of the prosecution.

Third, Moore argues that his counsel was ineffective because

he failed to object properly to the prosecution’s introduction of

inadmissible evidence of other crimes. Again, Moore has failed to

demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice. Given the substantial

amount of admissible, inculpatory evidence marshaled against him,3 See Lynumn v. Illinois , 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).

3 he cannot prevail on this claim.

Fourth, Moore argues that his counsel rendered in effective

assistance because he failed to object properly to the court’s

decision to classify Moore as an habitual offender. The

government, however, introduced certified copies of Moore’s

conviction records to the trial court. Since Moore’s identity was

not in question, we cannot say that counsel’s failure to object to

the habitual offender classification was inappropriate, much less

constitutionally-substandard.

Fifth, Moore argues that the district court erred in according

a presumption of correctness to the state court’s finding that his

confession was voluntarily made. While the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth Amendment prohibits the introduction of any c onfession

which is not the product of a rational intellect and a free will, 3

Moore has n ot made any showing that his confession was less than

voluntary and intelligent. The trial court made sufficient

credibility determinations on this issue. We do not disturb those

findings.

Sixth, Moore argues that the trial judge’s refusal to recuse

himself rendered his trial unfair. Moore specifically alleges that

his pending lawsuit against the trial judge created judicial

prejudice. Moore has not, however, produced evidence that would

cause a reasonable person to doubt the trial judge’s impartiality.4 Law rence v. Lensing , 42 F.3d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1994)

(citation omitted).

4 As the trial judge commented, Moore had “filed lawsuits against

everyone I think that is a member of the Clay County Bar, as well

as the Court, and others, being law enforcement officers.” Moore

has not made a colorable showing that the trial judge should have

recused himself.

Finally, Moore argues that the district court erred in failing

to hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to his § 2254 petition.

“An evidentiary hearing is not ‘required when the record is

complete or the petitioner has raised only legal claims that can be

resolved without the taking of additional evidence.’” 4 In this

case, the record before the district court was sufficient for the

resolution of Moore’s claims.

AFFIRMED.