RENDERED: APRIL 16, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2019-CA-1845-MR

TYKESHA STOKES APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE AUDRA J. ECKERLE, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 19-CR-000877-002

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Tykesha Stokes appeals from the order holding her in contempt 

of court entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court on December 17, 2019. After 

careful review of the briefs, record, and the law, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 17, 2019, Stokes was present in Jefferson Circuit Court 

for the sentencing hearing of her son, Dominique Parker. After his sentence was 
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announced, Stokes loudly exclaimed, “I don’t know how you all sleep at night!” 

The trial court directed the sheriff to take Stokes into custody as she was leaving

the courtroom. The sheriff was the only bailiff present and, charged with keeping 

Parker in custody as well as the order of the courtroom, could not pursue Stokes

after she exited the courtroom. A deputy apprehended Stokes outside the 

courtroom in the corridor awaiting the elevator. Stokes was escorted before the 

trial court and informed she was to serve 30 days in jail. In response, Stokes was 

argumentative and disrespectful, and the court threatened to lengthen her sentence 

if she continued such behavior. A short time later, Stokes was represented by her 

son’s trial counsel who offered an apology on her behalf and requested relief from 

imprisonment so that Stokes would not lose her job. The trial court refused to 

modify Stokes’s sentence, and this appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review the trial court’s exercise of its contempt powers for abuse 

of discretion, Lewis [v. Lewis], 875 S.W.2d [862,] 864 [(Ky. 1993)], but we apply 

the clear error standard to the underlying findings of fact.” Commonwealth,

Cabinet for Health and Family Servs. v. Ivy, 353 S.W.3d 324, 332 (Ky. 2011) 

(citing Blakeman v. Schneider, 864 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1993)). “The test for abuse 

of discretion is whether the trial [court’s] decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, 
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unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 

S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Stokes argues the trial court abused its discretion by 

finding her in criminal contempt and sentencing her to 30 days’ imprisonment

without conducting a hearing. “Contempt is the willful disobedience toward, or 

open disrespect for, the rules or orders of a court.” Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 

S.W.2d 805, 808 (Ky. 1996). Contempt may be civil or criminal. Here, we are 

dealing with criminal contempt, which:

includes those acts done in disrespect of the court or its 

processes or which obstruct the administration of justice 

or tend to bring the court into disrepute. It covers not 

only acts which directly and openly insult or resist the 

powers of the court or the persons of the judges, but to 

consequential, indirect, and constructive contempts 

which obstruct the process, degrade the authority, and 

contaminate the purity of the court.

Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 634, 268 S.W. 313 (1925). See also A.W. v. 

Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 4, 10-11 (Ky. 2005). 

Contempt may also be direct or indirect. Another panel of our Court 

described the distinction between the two as follows:

direct contempt occurs while the actor is before the court 

and is “an affront to the dignity of the court” which may 

be punished summarily. Indirect criminal contempt, on 

the other hand, “‘is committed outside the presence of the 

court and requires a hearing and the presentation of 
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evidence’ in order ‘to establish a violation of the court’s 

order. It may be punished only in proceedings that 

comport with due process.’”

Brockman v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 205, 208 (Ky. App. 2005) (footnotes 

omitted). Here, it is clear from the record this case concerns direct contempt as the 

basis of the contempt order occurred in the presence of the court.

There are also varying degrees of contempt: petty, serious, or 

somewhere in between. The record herein demonstrates that Stokes’s behavior—

while no doubt is to be taken seriously—was of the “petty” variety. Kentucky’s 

highest Court has observed:

traditionally and under current Supreme Court doctrine a 

court may proceed summarily to sanction petty 

contempts committed directly in the court’s presence. 

[Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of America v. 

Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 832, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2559, 129 

L.Ed.2d 642 (1994).] Such on-the-record contempts are 

“self-proving,” as it were, and thus do not require the 

court to assume a prosecutorial role in identifying or 

establishing them. The court’s sanctioning response is a 

judicial act, and it is an act so naturally to be anticipated 

that the direct contemnor may be presumed to have 

notice of it. Where the conduct giving rise to the 

sanction occurs directly on the record, moreover, that 

record, even without benefit of formal hearing and 

adversarial briefing, will generally provide an adequate 

basis for appellate review of . . . the trial court’s “nearly 

unlimited discretion” in exercising its contempt powers 

to assure the orderliness and decorum of its proceedings.

Cabinet for Health and Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 475 S.W.3d 600, 615 (Ky. 2015). 
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Nevertheless, Stokes contends the trial court made factual findings 

regarding her conduct both inside the courtroom and outside the court’s presence, 

meaning the trial court found her guilty of direct and indirect contempt without 

sufficient due process because a hearing was required. Specifically, she challenges 

the order for addressing her conduct outside the courtroom regarding her attempt to 

flee via the elevator. Stokes’s intended means of escape after leaving the 

courtroom is largely immaterial to the substance of the trial court’s order, which 

would be well supported even if the language concerning the means of escape were 

omitted. Furthermore, we may affirm for any reason supported by the record. 

Peterson v. Foley, 559 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Ky. 2018). The mere fact Stokes evaded 

custody by continuing to walk away and exiting the courtroom after hearing the 

trial court’s order is sufficient evidence to hold her in direct contempt. The fact 

Stokes’s brief custodial evasion extended to the hallway does not transform her 

behavior from direct to indirect contempt requiring heightened criminal due 

process consideration. Herein, the trial court had already determined Stokes’s

sentence for contempt before she exited the courtroom. As the trial court did not 

increase Stokes’s days of incarceration due to whatever occurred outside its 

presence, such clearly made no impact on the court’s prior determination.

Stokes further asserts the trial court relied on statements allegedly 

made by her that are not part of the video record on appeal; however, Stokes failed 
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to include the record in her appeal. It is well-established that it is an appellant’s 

duty to see that the record is complete on appeal. Commonwealth, Dept. of 

Highways v. Richardson, 424 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Ky. 1968). “It is also reasonable 

to place upon appellant the duty to designate and file a record sufficient to enable 

the court to pass on the alleged errors.” Burberry v. Bridges, 427 S.W.2d 583, 585 

(Ky. 1968). “[W]e have consistently and repeatedly held that it is an appellant’s 

responsibility to ensure that the record contains all of the materials necessary for an 

appellate court to rule upon all the issues raised.” Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 

S.W.3d 90, 102 (Ky. 2007). When the complete record is not before an appellate 

court, we are bound to assume the omitted record supports the decision of the trial 

court. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 697 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Ky. 1985). We will 

not “engage in gratuitous speculation . . . based upon a silent record.” Id. 

Accordingly, here we must assume any omitted portion of the video record

supports the trial court’s contempt order.

Stokes also takes issue with the trial court’s disagreement with her 

assertion that she was remorseful for her conduct based on the trial court’s stating, 

“it does not appear that [defense counsel] had the opportunity to speak with her[.]” 

This issue is immaterial to the trial court’s decision. The trial court is not bound by 

Stokes’s remorse, or lack thereof. We see no clear error or abuse of discretion in 

this regard.
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Stokes’s final argument is that the trial court’s contempt order was an 

abuse of its discretion because the punishment was arbitrary, unfair, and 

unreasonable. She asserts the punishment was not “reasonably related to the 

nature and seriousness of the party’s contemptuous behavior.” Meyers v. Petrie,

233 S.W.3d 212, 216 (Ky. App. 2007) (emphasis in original) (citing U.S. v.

Conole, 365 F.2d 306, 308 (3d Cir. 1966)). However, Stokes offers little, if any,

support for this argument. “It is not our function as an appellate court to research 

and construct a party’s legal arguments.” Hadley v. Citizen Deposit Bank, 186 

S.W.3d 754, 759 (Ky. App. 2005). We will not search the record to construct 

Stokes’s argument, nor will we go on a fishing expedition to find support for this 

underdeveloped argument. “Even when briefs have been filed, a reviewing court 

will generally confine itself to errors pointed out in the briefs and will not search

the record for errors.” Milby v. Mears, 580 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Ky. App. 1979). 

The trial court has much discretion in determining an appropriate contempt 

sentence, and we will not disturb that discretion.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson 

Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Kristin Logan Mischel

Rob Eggert

Louisville, Kentucky 

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Lauren Lewis

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky