FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-3833

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RUFUS B. JONES,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

James C. Hankinson, Judge.

October 30, 2019

M.K. THOMAS, J.

Rufus Jones appeals the denial of his motion for 

postconviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. He argues the 

postconviction court erred by failing to find ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel for improperly advising him regarding the State’s 

plea offer.

∗

 We disagree and affirm the denial of Appellant’s 

postconviction motion.

 ∗ Appellant also claims the postconviction court erred in its 

analysis of whether he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged 

deficient performance. However, because we find Appellant fails 
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I. Facts and Procedural History

Following a jury trial, Jones was found guilty of attempted 

second-degree murder and received the minimum mandatory 

sentence of twenty years imprisonment. This Court affirmed the

judgment and sentence. See Jones v. State, 107 So. 3d 563 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2013). Thereafter, Jones timely filed a motion for 

postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 3.850, arguing his lead trial counsel, Attorney 

Handfield, rendered ineffective assistance in advising him to 

decline a favorable plea offer from the State. The postconviction 

court held an evidentiary hearing on his claims.

Jones was represented by Attorney Handfield, lead counsel at 

trial, and Attorney Akbar, a local attorney acting as second chair. 

It is undisputed that prior to trial the State submitted a five-year

plea offer, which was renewed on the day of trial.

At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Jones claimed

Attorney Handfield advised him not to accept the plea offer

because he believed the victim’s testimony would be favorable to 

Jones’ defense, and he was confident he would win at trial. 

However, Jones could not recall whether Attorney Handfield 

advised if he had spoken with or deposed the victim. Jones claims

that had he known the victim’s testimony would not be favorable 

to him at trial, he would have accepted the plea offer.

Attorney Akbar, defense co-counsel, confirmed that Jones was 

offered a five-year plea deal, which he conveyed to Jones. He was 

not present when Attorney Handfield discussed the plea offer with 

Jones. According to Attorney Akbar, Attorney Handfield told 

Jones’ family not to take the plea as he had a strong case for trial. 

Attorney Akbar indicated Jones relied heavily on what his family 

thought and suggested. Attorney Akbar also recalled Attorney 

Handfield advising the family that the victim’s testimony would be 

favorable to the defense. However, in his opinion it was not. 

Attorney Akbar testified that he encouraged both Jones and his 

family to take the plea offer, as Jones was facing a maximum 

 

to establish deficient performance, we need not address issues 

related to the prejudice prong.
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sentence of life with a minimum mandatory of twenty years. 

Regardless, Jones declined the offer. 

Attorney Handfield, lead defense counsel, testified the victim 

was not a cooperative witness. But, at trial, he was able to elicit 

testimony from the victim that he was a convicted murderer, did 

not see who shot him, did not want the case prosecuted, had been 

stalking Jones’ mother, and had threatened to take her life. 

Attorney Handfield believed the five-year plea offer was 

reasonable under the circumstances, but Jones declined to accept. 

He claimed that when he spoke with Jones’ family, he explained 

the offer was reasonable. He denied instructing Jones to reject the 

plea offer, but instead recommended to Jones that he accept it. 

Attorney Handfield agreed that he believed there was a good 

chance of winning at trial but claimed he never guarantees a 

victory and did not do so in this case. According to Attorney 

Handfield, Jones’ family was encouraging him not to accept the 

plea agreement. He could not recall whether he or Attorney Akbar 

took the victim’s deposition and claimed he was not relying on the 

victim’s testimony to make his case.

The prosecutor in the case testified he discussed the plea offer

with Attorney Akbar and both agreed Jones should have taken the 

plea offer. However, he recalled that Attorney Handfield was “in 

charge” of the defense. According to the prosecutor, both defense 

attorneys discussed the plea offer with Jones, but he did not wish 

to accept.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the 

postconviction judge orally announced his ruling. Regarding the 

legal advice given to Jones on the plea offer, the judge stated:

I don't find that there's a direct conflict between the 

testimony of Mr. Akbar and Mr. Handfield. Mr. Akbar

was certain about certain parts of his testimony, which

was that he recommended to Mr. Jones that he take the

plea. He was less confident about having heard

everything that was said between Mr. Handfield and Mr. 

Jones; and, in fact, had indicated he did not hear all the 

conversations. I don't think there's a direct conflict there.

He did say -- Mr. Akbar said that Mr. Handfield believed 
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this was a winnable case. I think that's supported by Mr. 

Handfield's testimony, but I accept Mr. Handfield's 

testimony that he recommended, as did Mr. Akbar, that 

Mr. Jones take the plea. For whatever reason, Mr. Jones 

decided to ignore their advice. I suspect what was 

happening, and unfortunate, but I suspect Mr. Jones was 

listening to family members more so than he was 

listening to his attorneys. But, anyway, to the extent it's 

asserted of a direct conflict there, I don't find that to be 

the case.

The postconviction court entered an order denying postconviction 

relief, finding Jones failed to show he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel or that he was prejudiced by any alleged 

deficiency.

II. Legal Analysis

When reviewing the trial court’s denial of an appellant’s 

motion after an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court must give 

deference to the trial court’s findings of facts that are supported by 

competent, substantial evidence and review the findings of law de 

novo. Hunter v. State, 87 So. 3d 1273, 1275 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). 

An appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 

trial court as to the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be 

given to the evidence. State v. Dickson, 89 So. 3d 277, 279 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2012). A determination as to which testimony is most credible 

is a finding of fact which should be made by the postconviction 

court. See Santiago v. State, 252 So. 3d 421, 422 (Fla. 5th DCA 

2018) (Lambert J. concurring opinion) (citing Shere v. State, 742 

So. 2d 215, 218 n.8 (Fla. 1999)).

To show ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must 

demonstrate: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the 

deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Regarding the first prong, the Supreme 

Court has detailed that a defendant must show “counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 

Id. at 688. In establishing the second prong, “the defendant must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have 
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been different.” Id. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is one which 

is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the 

proceeding. Id. “Because the Strickland standard requires a 

showing of both counsel’s deficient performance and prejudice to 

the defendant, once a reviewing court determines that the 

defendant has not established one prong, the court is not required 

to analyze whether the defendant has established the other prong.” 

Frances v. State, 143 So. 3d 340, 347 (Fla. 2014) (citing Stewart v. 

State, 801 So. 2d 59, 64 (Fla. 2001).

The postconviction court held Jones failed to show Attorney 

Handfield’s performance was deficient, concluding Jones had 

chosen not to accept his attorneys’ advice when he rejected the plea

offer. In reaching this conclusion, the postconviction court found 

no conflict between Attorney Akbar’s and Attorney Handfield’s 

testimony with respect to both advising Jones to accept the offer. 

This is a finding of fact which this Court will not disturb if 

supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Hunter, 87 So. 

3d at 1275. Here, the record supports this conclusion. Both 

Attorneys Akbar and Handfield testified that they urged Jones to 

take the plea offer. Attorney Akbar acknowledged he was not 

present when Attorney Handfield spoke to Jones regarding

whether he should take the plea offer. The postconviction court 

found the testimony of the attorneys that Jones was advised to 

accept the plea offer more credible than that of Jones. We will not 

disturb this factual finding on appeal. 

III. Conclusion

It is not the role of the appellate court to substitute its 

judgment for that of the trial court as to the credibility of the 

witnesses or the weight to be given to the evidence. Competent,

substantial evidence supports the postconviction court’s factual 

findings. Therefore, we affirm the denial of Appellant’s motion for 

postconviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF and MAKAR, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Michael Ufferman of the Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., 

Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Steven Edward Woods, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.