II 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4112 

To address issues involving the economic statecraft of the United States, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 28, 2022 

Mr. MENENDEZ introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To address issues involving the economic statecraft of the 

United States, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘Economic Statecraft for the Twenty-First Century Act’’. 

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

7 this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title. 

Sec. 2. Findings. 

TITLE I—CONFRONT 

Subtitle A—Economic Coercion 

Sec. 101. Mandatory disclosure of Chinese debt in aid-related applications. 


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Sec. 102. Coordination with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 

Development on Chinese engagement. 

Sec. 103. Countering Chinese Economic Coercion Task Force. 

Sec. 104. Strategy to counter Chinese economic coercion on countries and entities that support Taiwan. 

Subtitle B—Investment Security 

Sec. 111. Provision of assistance to allies and partners with respect to reviewing foreign investment. 

Subtitle C—Anti-competition 

Sec. 121. Improvement of anti-counterfeiting measures. 

Sec. 122. Intellectual property violators list. 

Sec. 123. Report on subsidies provided by Government of People’s Republic of 

China. 

Subtitle D—Supply Chains 

Sec. 131. Definitions. 

Sec. 132. Department of State diplomatic strategy on semiconductor manufacturing equipment export controls. 

Sec. 133. Prohibition on commercial export of semiconductor manufacturing 

equipment to People’s Republic of China. 

Sec. 134. Annual semiconductor industry monitoring report on the People’s Republic of China. 

Sec. 135. Supply chain coordination. 

Sec. 136. Statement of policy on international cooperation to secure critical 

mineral supply chains. 

Sec. 137. Prioritization of efforts and assistance to secure critical mineral supply chains. 

Sec. 138. Leveraging international support. 

TITLE II—COMPETE 

Subtitle A—Infrastructure 

Sec. 201. Sense of Congress on the Build Back Better World initiative. 

Sec. 202. Office of Strategic Investments in United States International Development Finance Corporation. 

Sec. 203. Prohibition on transfer of sovereign loan guarantees to United States 

International Development Finance Corporation. 

Sec. 204. Strategy for promoting and strengthening nearshoring. 

Sec. 205. Sense of Congress on the Blue Dot Initiative. 

Sec. 206. Sense of Congress on the Three Seas Initiative. 

Subtitle B—Energy 

Sec. 211. Sense of Congress regarding United States engagement at the World 

Economic Forum. 

Sec. 212. Clean energy efforts of the United States International Development 

Finance Corporation. 

Sec. 213. Consistency in United States policy on development finance and climate change. 

Sec. 214. Energy diplomacy and security within the Department of State. 

Sec. 215. United States and European Union cooperation on climate finance 

for developing countries. 


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Subtitle C—Technology 

Sec. 221. United States leadership and representation in standards-setting bodies. 

Sec. 222. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the G20 Digital Economy 

Working Group. 

Sec. 223. Statement of policy on artificial intelligence and the global economy. 

Sec. 224. Diplomatic strategy for artificial intelligence. 

Sec. 225. International collaboration on research and development. 

Subtitle D—International Financial Institutions and Multilateral Economic 

Organizations 

Sec. 231. Statement of policy on United States leadership at international financial institutions. 

Sec. 232. Loans to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust of the International Monetary Fund. 

Sec. 233. Clearing World Bank Group arrears. 

Sec. 234. 10th general capital increase for the Inter-American Development 

Bank. 

Sec. 235. Participation of Taiwan in Inter-American Development Bank. 

Sec. 236. Increased United States cooperation with Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. 

Subtitle E—Resilience 

Sec. 241. Sense of Congress regarding United States leadership in recovery and 

resiliency. 

Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding improving resilience capacities through 

foreign assistance. 

Sec. 243. Office of Economic Resiliency. 

Sec. 244. Establishment of Resilience Trust Fund at the World Bank. 

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress makes the following findings: 

3 (1) As of 2020, the United States accounts for 

4 nearly 25 percent of the world’s gross domestic 

5 product, amounting to approximately 

6 $20,953,000,000,000. The United States has major 

7 business dealings on almost every continent with in8 volvement in multilateral financial systems, bilateral 

9 and multilateral economic partnerships, and a robust 

10 economy that held nearly 30 percent of the world’s 

11 share of research and development in 2019. 


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1 (2) Since World War II, the United States has 

2 been a leader in the global economy, as dem3 onstrated by its membership in economic-focused 

4 multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, 

5 the International Finance Corporation, the Inter6 national Labour Organization, and the Group of 

7 Twenty (G20). The United States has leveraged its 

8 economic advantage to ensure its national security in 

9 countless instances, such as through the investment 

10 of billions of dollars used to rebuild Europe and re11 store world order following World War II. 

12 (3) The robust economy of the United States is 

13 directly tied to its ability to engage economically, 

14 diplomatically, and militarily with allies and adver15 saries. In a 2019 Pew Research study, of the coun16 tries surveyed, 46 percent of Asia-Pacific countries, 

17 37 percent of European countries, and 47 percent of 

18 Middle Eastern countries view the United States as 

19 the world’s leading economic power. African coun20 tries that had an overall more favorable impression 

21 of the People’s Republic of China have consequently 

22 been engaging in greater economic partnerships with 

23 the People’s Republic of China, amounting to ap24 proximately $2,960,000,000 in 2020. 


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1 (4) According to the Organisation for Economic 

2 Co-operation and Development, about 70 percent of 

3 global economic activity occurs through global value 

4 chains. Driven by a greater outsourcing of service 

5 industry work and greater financial and business 

6 service linkages with Europe, the United States has 

7 increased its engagement with global value chains in 

8 both the manufacturing and services industries. Al9 though the United States has attempted to encour10 age value-based practices in international business 

11 through business advisories, public diplomacy, and 

12 other economic tools, countries like the People’s Re13 public of China do not operate with such value-ori14 ented business operations. 

15 (5) In 2020, exports made up 10 percent of the 

16 United States economy, and the United States uti17 lizes export controls to safeguard its economic edge 

18 and national security interests. As has been seen in 

19 the case of export controls imposed through the En20 tity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and 

21 Security of the Department of Commerce to restrict 

22 dual-use trade with the People’s Republic of China, 

23 such controls curtail potential militant activity by 

24 the People’s Liberation Army in the South China 

25 Sea, human rights abuses, and the use of semiconVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:14 Apr 30, 2022 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4112.IS S4112

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1 ductor technology for military purposes. The ex2 panded usage of export controls can continue to ben3 efit United States economic security. 

4 (6) International financial institutions such as 

5 the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 

6 the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Af7 rican Development Bank have key roles in encour8 aging regional cooperation, sustaining economic de9 velopment, reducing global greenhouse gas emis10 sions, and reducing global poverty. Those values are 

11 in line with United States international development 

12 practices, a commonality that can be leveraged for 

13 greater coordinated cooperation in the future, espe14 cially in the wake of the COVID–19 pandemic, in15 cluding as follows: 

16 (A) To meet the needs of developing coun17 tries that need to repay debt amounting to ap18 proximately $860,000,000,000 in 2020, United 

19 States cooperation with key multilateral organi20 zations in the smooth rollout of the Debt Serv21 ice Suspension Initiative Refresher can ensure 

22 global economic recovery from the pandemic 

23 while mitigating the risk of loan default. 

24 (B) The rise in debt transparency has be25 come a critical issue as more countries become 


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1 unaware of the full extent of their sovereign 

2 debt as a result of predatory lending and poor 

3 debt management. The continued support by 

4 the United States of international financial in5 stitutions can facilitate reforms that go beyond 

6 the 2003 proposal of the International Mone7 tary Fund for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring 

8 Mechanism. 

9 (7) Despite the impact of the COVID–19 pan10 demic, which has had devastating effects on global 

11 supply chains and economic productivity, the econ12 omy of the People’s Republic of China continues to 

13 grow. As a result, global investors are looking more 

14 toward the People’s Republic of China, instead of 

15 the United States, for potential economic activity 

16 and are willing to turn a blind eye to the People’s 

17 Republic of China’s human rights violations, includ18 ing its use of forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur 

19 Autonomous Region. 

20 (8) The United States, as a major economic 

21 leader, has a role in preventing predatory economic 

22 practices, such as loans to developing countries from 

23 the Government of the People’s Republic of China 

24 through the Belt and Road Initiative. As the Peo25 ple’s Republic of China has come to fill the role of 


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1 an economic leader to many developing countries 

2 with its lending, the United States stands to lose 

3 economically from its trading partners being stuck 

4 in billion dollar debt traps. Furthermore, such pred5 atory practices have come to the United States with 

6 the increase of foreign investment in the United 

7 States from $4,400,000,000,000 to 

8 $4,630,000,000,000 over the course of 2020. 

9 TITLE I—CONFRONT 

10 Subtitle A—Economic Coercion 

11 SEC. 101. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE OF CHINESE DEBT IN 

12 AID-RELATED APPLICATIONS. 

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States International 

14 Development Finance Corporation, the United States 

15 Agency for International Development, the Trade and De16 velopment Agency, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, 

17 and other independent and executive branch agencies re18 sponsible for disbursing foreign aid and development as19 sistance shall require all applicants for United States aid 

20 to disclose any debt the applicant may owe to any entity 

21 known to be owned or controlled by the Government of 

22 the People’s Republic of China, including loan amounts, 

23 duration, rates, and contractual provisions. 

24 (b) LIMITATION.—United States foreign aid and de25 velopment assistance may not be used to amortize any 


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1 loan principal owed to any entity known to be owned or 

2 controlled by the Government of the People’s Republic of 

3 China. 

4 SEC. 102. COORDINATION WITH THE ORGANISATION FOR 

5 ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOP6 MENT ON CHINESE ENGAGEMENT. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall co8 ordinate with willing Organisation for Economic Co-oper9 ation and Development member countries— 

10 (1) to study the effects of the People’s Republic 

11 of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and other preda12 tory economic practices; 

13 (2) to create a shared set of facts and promote 

14 more transparency with respect to such practices, in15 cluding a joint stocktaking of the People’s Republic 

16 of China’s distortive economic practices, such as 

17 subsidies and other forms of market-distorting state 

18 intervention in the People’s Republic of China’s 

19 economy, and the negative global spillovers from 

20 such practices; 

21 (3) to establish a solid definitional foundation 

22 for future dialogues on the People’s Republic of Chi23 na’s unfair economic practices and a clear under24 standing of common concerns and priorities among 

25 member countries; and 


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1 (4) to issue joint informational reports that 

2 contain the results of such data gathering efforts. 

3 SEC. 103. COUNTERING CHINESE ECONOMIC COERCION 

4 TASK FORCE. 

5 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 180 days after 

6 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 

7 establish an interagency task force, which shall be known 

8 as the ‘‘Countering Economic Coercion Task Force’’ (re9 ferred to in this section as the ‘‘Task Force’’). 

10 (b) DUTIES.— 

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Task Force shall— 

12 (A) oversee the development and imple13 mentation of an integrated United States Gov14 ernment strategy to respond to coercive eco15 nomic practices of the People’s Republic of 

16 China that are abusive, arbitrary, pretextual, 

17 and contrary to international rules, which shall 

18 include— 

19 (i) systematically monitoring and eval20 uating— 

21 (I) the costs of such practices on 

22 United States businesses and overall 

23 United States economic performance; 

24 (II) instances in which such prac25 tices taken against a non-Chinese enVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:14 Apr 30, 2022 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4112.IS S4112

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1 tity have benefitted United States 

2 parties; and 

3 (III) the impacts such practices 

4 have had on United States national 

5 interests; 

6 (ii) facilitating coordination among 

7 Federal departments and agencies when 

8 responding to such practices; and 

9 (iii) proactively deterring such eco10 nomic coercion; 

11 (B) consult with United States allies and 

12 partners regarding— 

13 (i) the feasibility and desirability of 

14 collectively identifying, assessing, and re15 sponding to the People’s Republic of Chi16 na’s coercive economic practices; 

17 (ii) actions that could be taken to ex18 pand international coordination; and 

19 (iii) establishing a consistent, coher20 ent, and collective international response to 

21 such coercive practices, including a long22 term deterrence to such practices; 

23 (C) effectively engage the United States 

24 private sector, particularly sectors, groups, or 

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1 cive economic practices, to identify their con2 cerns regarding such practices; and 

3 (D) develop and implement a process for 

4 regularly sharing relevant information, includ5 ing classified information, to the extent appro6 priate and practicable, on such coercive eco7 nomic practices with United States allies, part8 ners, and the private sector. 

9 (2) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out its duties 

10 under this subsection, the Task Force should regu11 larly consult, to the extent necessary and appro12 priate, with— 

13 (A) relevant stakeholders in the private 

14 sector; 

15 (B) Federal departments and agencies that 

16 are not represented on the Task Force; and 

17 (C) United States allies and partners. 

18 (c) MEMBERSHIP.—The President shall— 

19 (1) appoint the Chair of the Task Force from 

20 among the staff of the National Security Council; 

21 (2) appoint the Vice Chair of the Task Force 

22 from among the staff of the National Economic 

23 Council; and 

24 (3) direct the head of each of the following Fed25 eral departments and agencies to appoint personnel, 


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1 at the level of Assistant Secretary or higher, to par2 ticipate in the Task Force: 

3 (A) The Department of State. 

4 (B) The Department of Commerce. 

5 (C) The Department of the Treasury. 

6 (D) The Department of Justice. 

7 (E) The Office of the United States Trade 

8 Representative. 

9 (F) The Department of Agriculture. 

10 (G) The Office of the Director of National 

11 Intelligence and other appropriate elements of 

12 the intelligence community (as defined in sec13 tion 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 

14 U.S.C. 3003)). 

15 (H) The Securities and Exchange Commis16 sion. 

17 (I) The United States International Devel18 opment Finance Corporation. 

19 (J) Any other department or agency des20 ignated by the President. 

21 (d) REPORTS.— 

22 (1) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 1 year 

23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Task 

24 Force shall submit a report to the appropriate con25 gressional committees that includes— 


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1 (A) a comprehensive review of the array of 

2 economic tools the Government of the People’s 

3 Republic of China employs or could employ to 

4 coerce other governments, non-Chinese compa5 nies (including United States companies), and 

6 multilateral institutions and organizations, in7 cluding the Government of the People’s Repub8 lic of China’s continued efforts to codify infor9 mal practices into its domestic law; 

10 (B) the strategy developed pursuant to 

11 subsection (b)(1)(A); 

12 (C) an interagency definition of the Peo13 ple’s Republic of China’s coercive economic 

14 practices that captures— 

15 (i) the use of informal or extralegal 

16 coercive economic practices; and 

17 (ii) the illegitimate use of formal eco18 nomic tools; 

19 (D) a comprehensive review of the array of 

20 economic and diplomatic tools that the United 

21 States Government employs or could employ to 

22 respond to economic coercion against the 

23 United States and United States allies and 

24 partners; 

25 (E) a list of unilateral or multilateral— 


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1 (i) proactive measures to defend or 

2 deter against the People’s Republic of Chi3 na’s coercive economic practices; and 

4 (ii) actions taken in response to the 

5 Government of the People’s Republic of 

6 China’s general use of coercive economic 

7 practices; 

8 (F) an assessment of areas in which 

9 United States allies and partners are vulnerable 

10 to the People’s Republic of China’s coercive eco11 nomic practices; and 

12 (G) a description of the gaps in existing 

13 resources or capabilities of Federal departments 

14 and agencies— 

15 (i) to respond effectively to the Peo16 ple’s Republic of China’s coercive economic 

17 practices directed at United States entities; 

18 and 

19 (ii) to assist United States allies and 

20 partners in their responses to such prac21 tices. 

22 (2) INTERIM REPORTS.— 

23 (A) FIRST INTERIM REPORT.—Not later 

24 than 1 year after the date on which the report 

25 is submitted pursuant to paragraph (1), the 


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1 Task Force shall submit a report to the appro2 priate congressional committees that includes— 

3 (i) updates to the information re4 quired under subparagraphs (A) through 

5 (G) of paragraph (1); and 

6 (ii) a description of the activities con7 ducted by the Task Force to implement 

8 the strategy required under subsection 

9 (b)(1)(A). 

10 (B) SECOND INTERIM REPORT.—Not later 

11 than 1 year after the date on which the report 

12 is submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A), the 

13 Task Force shall submit a report to the appro14 priate congressional committees that includes 

15 an update to the elements required under the 

16 previously submitted report. 

17 (3) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than 30 days 

18 after the date on which the report required under 

19 paragraph (2)(B) is submitted to the appropriate 

20 congressional committees, the Task Force shall sub21 mit a final report to the appropriate congressional 

22 committees and make such report available to the 

23 public on the website of the Executive Office of the 

24 President. The final report shall include— 


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1 (A) an analysis of the Government of the 

2 People’s Republic of China’s coercive economic 

3 practices, including the cost of such practices to 

4 United States businesses; 

5 (B) a description of areas of particular vul6 nerability for United States businesses and the 

7 businesses of United States partners and allies; 

8 (C) recommendations on the best means 

9 for continuing the effort to counter such coer10 cive practices; and 

11 (D) a list of the cases that have been made 

12 public pursuant to subsection (e). 

13 (4) FORM.— 

14 (A) INITIAL AND INTERIM REPORTS.—The 

15 reports required under paragraphs (1), (2)(A), 

16 and (2)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified 

17 form, but may include classified annexes. 

18 (B) FINAL REPORT.—The report required 

19 under paragraph (3) shall be submitted in un20 classified form, but may include a classified 

21 annex. 

22 (e) PUBLICLY AVAILABLE LIST.— 

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days 

24 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 

25 every 180 days thereafter until its termination purVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:14 Apr 30, 2022 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4112.IS S4112

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1 suant to subsection (f), the Task Force, to the ex2 tent practicable, shall make available to the public 

3 on the website of the Executive Office of the Presi4 dent a list of instances during the most recent 6- 

5 month period that the Government of the People’s 

6 Republic of China has directed coercive economic 

7 practices against a non-Chinese entity. 

8 (2) UPDATES.—The list required under para9 graph (1)— 

10 (A) shall be updated every 180 days; and 

11 (B) shall be managed by the Secretary of 

12 State after the Task Force is terminated pursu13 ant to subsection (f). 

14 (f) SUNSET.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Task Force shall be ter16 minated at the end of the 60-day period beginning 

17 on the date on which the final report required under 

18 subsection (d)(3) is submitted to the appropriate 

19 congressional committees and made publicly avail20 able. 

21 (2) ADDITIONAL ACTIONS.—During the 60-day 

22 period referred to in paragraph (1), the Task Force 

23 may conclude its activities, including providing testi24 mony to Congress concerning its final report. 


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1 SEC. 104. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE ECONOMIC CO2 ERCION ON COUNTRIES AND ENTITIES THAT 

3 SUPPORT TAIWAN. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 

5 date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 

6 thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State 

7 shall submit to Congress a description of the strategy 

8 being used by the Department of State to respond to the 

9 Government of the People’s Republic of China’s increased 

10 economic coercion against countries who have strength11 ened their ties with, or support for, Taiwan. 

12 (b) ASSISTANCE FOR LITHUANIA.—The Secretary of 

13 State shall provide assistance to Lithuania to support its 

14 supply chain resilience efforts. 

15 Subtitle B—Investment Security 

16 SEC. 111. PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO ALLIES AND PART17 NERS WITH RESPECT TO REVIEWING FOR18 EIGN INVESTMENT. 

19 The Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Net20 work, in consultation with the Committee on Foreign In21 vestment in the United States and the Office of Technical 

22 Assistance of the Department of the Treasury, shall, to 

23 protect the national security of the United States and 

24 countries that are allies or partners of the United States, 

25 establish a formal process for— 


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1 (1) the exchange of information relating to for2 eign investment with the governments of such coun3 tries; and 

4 (2) the provision of assistance to those coun5 tries with respect to— 

6 (A) reviewing foreign investment trans7 actions in such countries; 

8 (B) determining the beneficial ownership 

9 of parties to such transactions; and 

10 (C) identifying trends in investment and 

11 technology that could pose risks to the national 

12 security of the United States and such coun13 tries. 

14 Subtitle C—Anti-competition 

15 SEC. 121. IMPROVEMENT OF ANTI-COUNTERFEITING MEAS16 URES. 

17 (a) INCREASED INSPECTIONS.— 

18 (1) REPORT ON SEIZURES OF COUNTERFEIT

19 GOODS.—Not later than one year after the date of 

20 the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, 

21 the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Pro22 tection shall submit to the Committee on Finance of 

23 the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means 

24 of the House of Representatives a report on seizures 

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1 feit goods during the one-year period preceding sub2 mission of the report, including the number of such 

3 seizures disaggregated by category of good, source 

4 country, and mode of transport. 

5 (2) INCREASED INSPECTIONS OF GOODS FROM

6 CERTAIN COUNTRIES.—The Commissioner shall in7 crease inspections of imports of goods from each 

8 source country identified in the report required by 

9 subsection (a) as one of the top source countries of 

10 counterfeit goods, as determined by the Commis11 sioner. 

12 (b) PUBLICATION OF CRITERIA FOR NOTORIOUS

13 MARKETS LIST.—Not later than 2 years after the date 

14 of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than 

15 every 5 years thereafter, the United States Trade Rep16 resentative shall publish in the Federal Register criteria 

17 for determining that a market is a notorious market for 

18 purposes of inclusion of that market in the list developed 

19 by the Trade Representative pursuant to section 182(e) 

20 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2242(e)) (commonly 

21 known as the ‘‘Notorious Markets List’’). 

22 SEC. 122. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST. 

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 

24 date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently 

25 than annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of 


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1 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, 

2 the Attorney General, the United States Trade Represent3 ative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall cre4 ate a list (referred to in this section as the ‘‘intellectual 

5 property violators list’’) that identifies— 

6 (1) all centrally administered state-owned enter7 prises incorporated in the People’s Republic of 

8 China that have benefitted from— 

9 (A) a significant act or series of acts of in10 tellectual property theft that subjected an eco11 nomic sector of the United States or a company 

12 incorporated in the United States to harm; or 

13 (B) an act or government policy of involun14 tary or coerced technology transfer of intellec15 tual property ultimately owned by a company 

16 incorporated in the United States; and 

17 (2) any corporate officer of, or principal share18 holder with controlling interests in, an entity de19 scribed in paragraph (1). 

20 (b) RULES FOR IDENTIFICATION.—To determine 

21 whether there is a credible basis for determining that an 

22 entity should be included on the intellectual property viola23 tors list, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 

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1 resentative, and the Director of National Intelligence, 

2 shall consider— 

3 (1) any finding by a court in the United States 

4 that the entity has violated relevant United States 

5 laws intended to protect intellectual property rights; 

6 or 

7 (2) substantial and credible information re8 ceived from any entity described in subsection (c) or 

9 other interested persons. 

10 (c) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, the 

11 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 

12 Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and 

13 the Director of National Intelligence, may consult, as nec14 essary and appropriate, with— 

15 (1) other Federal agencies, including inde16 pendent agencies; 

17 (2) entities in the private sector; 

18 (3) civil society organizations with relevant ex19 pertise; and 

20 (4) the Governments of Australia, Canada, 

21 countries in the European Union, Japan, New Zea22 land, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. 

23 (d) REPORT.— 

24 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year 

25 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and anVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:14 Apr 30, 2022 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4112.IS S4112

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1 nually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State 

2 shall publish in the Federal Register a report that— 

3 (A) lists the entities described in sub4 section (a)(1); 

5 (B) describes the circumstances sur6 rounding acts or policies described in subsection 

7 (a)(1)(B), including any role of the Government 

8 of the People’s Republic of China; 

9 (C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the 

10 economic advantage derived by entities de11 scribed in subsection (a)(1); and 

12 (D) assesses whether each entity described 

13 in subsection (a)(1) is using or has used stolen 

14 intellectual property in commercial activity in 

15 Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, 

16 New Zealand, South Korea, the United King17 dom, or the United States. 

18 (2) FORM.—The report published under para19 graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a 

20 classified annex. 

21 (3) DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.—The 

22 Director of National Intelligence may authorize the 

23 declassification of information, as appropriate, to in24 form the contents of the report published under 

25 paragraph (1). 


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1 (e) REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL

2 BUSINESS INFORMATION.— 

3 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and 

4 the head of any other Federal agency involved in the 

5 production of the intellectual property violators list 

6 shall protect from disclosure any proprietary infor7 mation submitted by a private sector party and 

8 marked as confidential business information, unless 

9 the party submitting the information— 

10 (A) had notice, at the time of submission, 

11 that such information would be disclosed by the 

12 Secretary; or 

13 (B) subsequently consents to the disclosure 

14 of such information. 

15 (2) NONCONFIDENTIAL VERSION OF REPORT.— 

16 If confidential business information is provided by a 

17 private sector party in connection with the produc18 tion of the intellectual property violators list, the 

19 Secretary of State shall publish a nonconfidential 

20 version of the report under subsection (d) in the 

21 Federal Register that summarizes or deletes, if nec22 essary, the confidential business information. 

23 (3) TREATMENT AS TRADE SECRETS.—Propri24 etary information submitted by a private sector 

25 party under this section— 


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1 (A) shall be considered to be trade secrets 

2 and commercial or financial information exempt 

3 under subsection (b)(4) of section 552 of title 

4 5, United States Code, from being made avail5 able to the public under subsection (a) of that 

6 section; and 

7 (B) shall be exempt from disclosure with8 out the express approval of the party. 

9 SEC. 123. REPORT ON SUBSIDIES PROVIDED BY GOVERN10 MENT OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

11 (a) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date 

12 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 

13 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 

14 United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of 

15 Commerce, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

16 committees a report that identifies— 

17 (1) subsidies provided by the central govern18 ment of the People’s Republic of China to enter19 prises in the People’s Republic of China; and 

20 (2) discriminatory treatment favoring enter21 prises in the People’s Republic of China over foreign 

22 market participants. 

23 (b) ELEMENTS OF REPORT.—In compiling each re24 port under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall con25 sider— 


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1 (1) regulatory and other policies enacted or pro2 moted by the central government of the People’s Re3 public of China that— 

4 (A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in 

5 the People’s Republic of China at the expense 

6 of foreign market participants; 

7 (B) shield centrally administered, state8 owned enterprises from competition; or 

9 (C) otherwise suppress market-based com10 petition; 

11 (2) financial subsidies, including favorable lend12 ing terms, from or promoted by the central govern13 ment of the People’s Republic of China or centrally 

14 administered, state-owned enterprises in the People’s 

15 Republic of China that materially benefit enterprises 

16 in the People’s Republic of China over foreign mar17 ket participants in contravention of generally accept18 ed market principles; and 

19 (3) any subsidy that meets the definition of 

20 subsidy under article 1 of the Agreement on Sub21 sidies and Countervailing Measures referred to in 

22 section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round Agree23 ments Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)). 

24 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required by sub25 section (a) may be submitted in classified form. 


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1 (d) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, 

2 the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary 

3 of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, 

4 may, as necessary and appropriate, consult with— 

5 (1) other Federal agencies, including inde6 pendent agencies; 

7 (2) the private sector; and 

8 (3) civil society organizations with relevant ex9 pertise. 

10 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE11 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres12 sional committees’’ means— 

13 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 

14 the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and 

15 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 

16 Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 

17 Representatives. 

18 Subtitle D—Supply Chains 

19 SEC. 131. DEFINITIONS. 

20 In this subtitle: 

21 (1) COVERED ITEM.—The term ‘‘covered item’’ 

22 includes semiconductor manufacturing equipment, 

23 including extreme ultraviolet photolithography equip24 ment and argon fluoride immersion photolithography 

25 equipment. 


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1 (2) CRITICAL MINERAL.—The term ‘‘critical 

2 mineral’’ has the meaning given the term in section 

3 7002(a) of the Energy Act of 2020 (30 U.S.C. 

4 1606(a)). 

5 (3) EXPORT; IN-COUNTRY TRANSFER; REEX6 PORT.—The terms ‘‘export’’, ‘‘in-country transfer’’, 

7 and ‘‘reexport’’ have the meanings given those terms 

8 in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act 

9 of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801). 

10 SEC. 132. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY 

11 ON SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING 

12 EQUIPMENT EXPORT CONTROLS. 

13 (a) REQUIRED STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days 

14 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

15 of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, 

16 the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, and private 

17 sector entities, shall develop a strategy to diplomatically 

18 engage the governments of the Netherlands, Japan, and 

19 other appropriate countries for the purposes of coordi20 nating, developing, and instituting controls on the export 

21 of covered items to the People’s Republic of China. 

22 (b) ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGY.—The diplomatic 

23 strategy required by subsection (a) shall include— 


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1 (1) a review of United States technological as2 sets and capabilities in semiconductor manufacturing 

3 equipment, including photolithography; 

4 (2) an assessment of how export controls on 

5 semiconductor manufacturing equipment can be in6 tegrated into a broader United States technology 

7 strategy that includes support for— 

8 (A) research and development; 

9 (B) investment screening; 

10 (C) talent recruitment and retention; 

11 (D) standard setting; 

12 (E) international partnerships; and 

13 (F) supply chain security; 

14 (3) a plan of action to guide relevant United 

15 States engagement with the Netherlands, Japan, 

16 and other appropriate countries, including con17 ducting bilateral and multilateral engagements to 

18 formulate export controls on semiconductor manu19 facturing equipment; 

20 (4) a plan of action to guide United States en21 gagement with foreign entities that develop, con22 struct, and export semiconductor manufacturing 

23 equipment; 


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1 (5) a review of the potential diplomatic, eco2 nomic, and security effects of implementing export 

3 controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment; 

4 (6) an analysis of the impact of export controls 

5 on semiconductor manufacturing equipment on the 

6 semiconductor manufacturing industry and artificial 

7 intelligence chipmaking capabilities of the People’s 

8 Republic of China; 

9 (7) a review of the potential economic impacts 

10 on United States entities if export controls on semi11 conductor manufacturing equipment are imple12 mented; and 

13 (8) specific, measurable metrics of success for 

14 United States diplomatic activities related to semi15 conductor manufacturing equipment. 

16 (c) OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGY.—The objectives 

17 of the diplomatic strategy required by subsection (a) are— 

18 (1) to formulate a political arrangement among 

19 the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, and 

20 other appropriate countries for the control of exports 

21 of covered items to the People’s Republic of China; 

22 (2) to maintain United States and allied tech23 nological advantages in semiconductor manufac24 turing equipment; 


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1 (3) to protect the interests of United States and 

2 allied companies operating in the field of semicon3 ductor manufacturing and semiconductor manufac4 turing equipment; and 

5 (4) to ensure the United States continues to en6 gage with allies on efforts involving the development 

7 and protection of a free, equitable, open, secure, and 

8 stable digital domain. 

9 (d) FORM.—The strategy required by subsection (a) 

10 shall be submitted to the appropriate congressional com11 mittees in unclassified form, but may include a classified 

12 annex. 

13 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE14 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres15 sional committees’’ means— 

16 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 

17 the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans18 portation; and 

19 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 

20 Committee on Energy and Commerce. 

21 SEC. 133. PROHIBITION ON COMMERCIAL EXPORT OF SEMI22 CONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT 

23 TO PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—Following the completion of the 

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1 hibit the export, reexport, and in-country transfer of cov2 ered items to the People’s Republic of China. 

3 (b) ADDITIONAL CONTROLS.—The President may 

4 prescribe such additional regulations and export controls 

5 as are necessary to carry out the strategy required by sec6 tion 132. 

7 (c) WAIVERS.—The President may waive the applica8 tion of controls under subsection (a) or (b) with respect 

9 to a covered item if the President certifies to the appro10 priate congressional committees that the export, reexport, 

11 or in-country transfer of the covered item is in the na12 tional security interests of the United States. 

13 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

14 DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate con15 gressional committees’’ means— 

16 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

17 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor18 tation, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, 

19 and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and 

20 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

21 Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Com22 mittee on Financial Services of the House of Rep23 resentatives. 


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1 SEC. 134. ANNUAL SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY MONI2 TORING REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUB3 LIC OF CHINA. 

4 (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than May 1, 

5 2023, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State and 

6 the Secretary of Commerce, in concurrence with the Sec7 retary of the Treasury and the Director of the Central 

8 Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate con9 gressional committees a report on the semiconductor man10 ufacturing capabilities of the People’s Republic of China. 

11 (b) CONTENTS.—The report required by subsection 

12 (a) shall include— 

13 (1) a detailed assessment of the domestic semi14 conductor manufacturing capabilities of the People’s 

15 Republic of China; 

16 (2) a detailed assessment of year-by-year tech17 nological development efforts by the People’s Repub18 lic of China in the fields of semiconductor manufac19 turing and artificial intelligence chipmaking, includ20 ing relevant government plans and initiatives; 

21 (3) a detailed assessment of engagement be22 tween the People’s Republic of China and other for23 eign countries with respect to semiconductor manu24 facturing equipment capabilities; 

25 (4) an analysis of the impact of United States 

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1 opment of semiconductor manufacturing in the Peo2 ple’s Republic of China; and 

3 (5) an assessment of whether such export con4 trols remain effective in curbing the development of 

5 semiconductor manufacturing equipment capabilities 

6 in the People’s Republic of China. 

7 (c) FORM.— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—The report required by sub9 section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 

10 but may include a classified annex. 

11 (2) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified 

12 portion of the report required by subsection (a) shall 

13 be made available on a publicly accessible internet 

14 website of the Federal Government. 

15 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

16 DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate con17 gressional committees’’ means— 

18 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

19 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor20 tation, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 

21 Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intel22 ligence of the Senate; and 

23 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

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1 lect Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep2 resentatives. 

3 SEC. 135. SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION. 

4 (a) Not later than 180 days after the date of the en5 actment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 

6 with the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the ap7 propriate congressional committees a report on how the 

8 United States is coordinating with its partners and al9 lies— 

10 (1) to secure global supply chains, including 

11 supply chains for— 

12 (A) semiconductor manufacturing and ad13 vanced packaging; 

14 (B) large capacity batteries, including bat15 teries for electric vehicles; 

16 (C) critical minerals; and 

17 (D) pharmaceuticals and active pharma18 ceutical ingredients; 

19 (2) to develop common standards for trans20 parent, trusted, and sustainable supply chains; and 

21 (3) to end reliance on the People’s Republic of 

22 China for such supply chains. 

23 (b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

24 DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate con25 gressional committees’’ means— 


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1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

2 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor3 tation, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 

4 Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intel5 ligence of the Senate; and 

6 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

7 Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Com8 mittee on Financial Services, and the Permanent Se9 lect Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep10 resentatives. 

11 SEC. 136. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL CO12 OPERATION TO SECURE CRITICAL MINERAL 

13 SUPPLY CHAINS. 

14 It is the policy of the United States to partner, con15 sult, and coordinate with foreign governments (at the na16 tional and subnational levels), civil society, international 

17 organizations, international financial institutions, sub18 national communities, commercial and recreational mining 

19 industry leaders, and the private sector, in a concerted ef20 fort— 

21 (1) to increase knowledge and raise awareness 

22 of the links between mining and refining of critical 

23 minerals, national security, climate change, and 

24 clean energy development; 


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1 (2) to improve, in countries in which such min2 ing and refining is conducted, resource mobilization 

3 and processing, transport, and mineral refining ca4 pacity; 

5 (3) to develop other strategies to maximize eco6 nomic benefits from critical mineral resource devel7 opment for the countries and communities in which 

8 such development takes place; 

9 (4) to promote transparency and combat— 

10 (A) human rights abuses, exploitive labor 

11 practices, and corruption within the critical 

12 mineral extraction industry; and 

13 (B) the influence the industry has on poor 

14 governance, democratic backsliding, and de15 clines in the rule of law; 

16 (5) to support— 

17 (A) strengthening systems and bilateral 

18 and multilateral partnerships for reducing the 

19 monopolization of critical minerals and the ex20 ploitation of workers in the critical mineral ex21 traction industry and reducing corruption as a 

22 means— 

23 (i) to ensure the availability of critical 

24 minerals at competitive market-rate costs; 


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1 (ii) to uphold adequate labor stand2 ards to ensure critical minerals are not 

3 produced at the expense of the lives and 

4 livelihoods of workers in the critical min5 eral extraction industry; and 

6 (iii) to maintain the integrity of insti7 tutions governing the extraction and re8 finement of critical minerals; 

9 (B) deployment of and access to advanced 

10 technologies to recycle critical minerals to ex11 tend use and application beyond a single use; 

12 and 

13 (C) implementation of management meas14 ures to track and report instances of corruption 

15 and exploitation in the critical mineral extrac16 tion industry; and 

17 (6) to work cooperatively with international 

18 partners— 

19 (A) to ensure that the Extractive Indus20 tries Transparency Initiative has full 

21 unimpeded and uninfluenced access to global 

22 critical mineral industrial operations; 

23 (B) to establish— 

24 (i) an alliance to counter any state or 

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1 ply chains, or industrial processing and ex2 traction of critical mineral resources; 

3 (ii) measurable targets for reducing 

4 corruption and exploitation of workers in 

5 the critical mineral extraction industry; 

6 and 

7 (iii) action plans to achieve such tar8 gets and a mechanism to provide regular 

9 reporting; 

10 (C) to promote consumer education, aware11 ness, and outreach on exploitation of workers in 

12 the critical mineral extraction industry; and 

13 (D) to share best practices in materials 

14 management and industrial systems operations 

15 to maximize the benefit of critical mineral re16 sources. 

17 SEC. 137. PRIORITIZATION OF EFFORTS AND ASSISTANCE 

18 TO SECURE CRITICAL MINERAL SUPPLY 

19 CHAINS. 

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall, in 

21 coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal 

22 agencies— 

23 (1) lead and coordinate efforts to implement the 

24 policy described in section 136; and 


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1 (2) develop strategies and implement programs 

2 that prioritize engagement and cooperation with for3 eign governments, subnational, national, and local 

4 stakeholders and the private sector to expedite ef5 forts and assistance in foreign countries— 

6 (A) to partner with, encourage, and advise 

7 national and subnational governments on the 

8 development and execution, where practicable, 

9 of projects, programs, and initiatives— 

10 (i) to improve the capacity, security, 

11 and standards of operations of critical min12 erals supply chains; 

13 (ii) to monitor and track how well 

14 critical minerals supply chains are func15 tioning internationally, based on uniform 

16 and transparent standards developed in co17 operation with municipal, industrial, and 

18 civil society stakeholders; and 

19 (iii) to conduct outreach campaigns to 

20 raise public awareness of the importance of 

21 proper management and oversight of crit22 ical mineral supply chains; 

23 (B) to partner with and provide technical 

24 assistance to investors and national and inter25 national institutions, including private sector 


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1 actors, to develop new business opportunities 

2 and solutions to uphold the highest standards 

3 in critical mineral supply chains and implement 

4 best practices in foreign countries by— 

5 (i) improving and expanding the ca6 pacity of foreign industries to responsibly 

7 employ extractive industry management 

8 practices; 

9 (ii) improving and expanding the ca10 pacity and transparency of tracking mech11 anisms for critical minerals to reduce ex12 ploitation and corruption; 

13 (iii) eliminating incentives that under14 mine responsible supply chain manage15 ment; and 

16 (iv) building the capacity of coun17 tries— 

18 (I) to reduce, monitor, regulate, 

19 and manage the extraction, refine20 ment, and transport of critical min21 erals appropriately and transparently; 

22 and 

23 (II) to encourage private invest24 ment in critical mineral extraction 

25 and refinement. 


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1 (b) PRIORITIZATION.—In carrying out subsection (a), 

2 the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of 

3 other relevant Federal agencies, shall prioritize assistance 

4 to countries and regional organizations in regions with— 

5 (1) rapidly developing economies; and 

6 (2) past instances of human rights abuses, ex7 ploitation, and corruption. 

8 (c) EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT.—In prioritizing 

9 and expediting efforts and assistance under this section, 

10 the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of 

11 other relevant Federal agencies, shall use clear, account12 able, and metric-based targets to measure the effectiveness 

13 of assistance in achieving the policy described in section 

14 136. 

15 SEC. 138. LEVERAGING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. 

16 In implementing the policy described in section 136, 

17 the President shall direct the Secretary of State and the 

18 heads of other relevant Federal agencies, to use the voice, 

19 vote, and influence of the United States, consistent with 

20 the broad development goals of the United States— 

21 (1) to work with countries and the private sec22 tor to break up the monopolization of critical min23 eral industries; 

24 (2) to commit to promoting transparent private 

25 sector development in the critical minerals sector; 


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1 (3) to enhance coordination with the private 

2 sector to increase access to critical minerals; 

3 (4) to provide technical assistance to the regu4 latory authorities of countries that are members of 

5 the body to remove unnecessary barriers to invest6 ment; and 

7 (5) to utilize clear, accountable, and metric8 based targets to measure the effectiveness of such 

9 actions. 

10 TITLE II—COMPETE 

11 Subtitle A—Infrastructure 

12 SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE BUILD BACK BET13 TER WORLD INITIATIVE. 

14 It is the sense of Congress that— 

15 (1) the United States should exercise leadership 

16 in the Build Back Better World initiative of the 

17 Group of Seven (G7) to mobilize public and private 

18 sector capital and expertise toward meeting the in19 frastructure needs of low- and middle-income coun20 tries, estimated to exceed $40,000,000,000,000, over 

21 the next two decades; 

22 (2) the initiative should also advance strategic 

23 objectives, including— 

24 (A) strengthening partnerships with 

25 emerging market and developing countries to 


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1 promote quality, transparent infrastructure in2 vestment that also supports good governance 

3 and the rule of law; 

4 (B) combating climate change through sus5 tainable infrastructure projects that aid partner 

6 countries in the transition to net zero emis7 sions, reduce their vulnerabilities to climate 

8 change, and improve their resilience; 

9 (C) promoting public health and health se10 curity through infrastructure projects that in11 crease the availability, accessibility, and afford12 ability of health care in partner countries; 

13 (D) increasing internal and external con14 nections in digital, transportation, and energy 

15 infrastructure in partner countries; 

16 (E) improving education, economic oppor17 tunities, and standards of living in marginalized 

18 communities in partner countries, including for 

19 women and girls, racial and ethnic minorities, 

20 individuals with disabilities, individuals who are 

21 lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer 

22 (commonly referred to as ‘‘LGBTQ+’’), and in23 dividuals with low incomes; and 


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1 (F) providing partners a principled, sus2 tainable alternative to exploitative, coercive, and 

3 harmful infrastructure investments; and 

4 (3) the United States should establish a Build 

5 Back Better World Task Force— 

6 (A) to coordinate its development finance 

7 agencies, such as the United States Inter8 national Development Finance Corporation, Ex9 port-Import Bank of the United States, the 

10 Trade and Development Agency, the Millen11 nium Challenge Corporation, and the United 

12 States Agency for International Development; 

13 (B) to engage international partners such 

14 as the G7, multilateral development banks, 

15 international financial institutions, multi16 national corporations and banks, non-govern17 mental organizations, and other industrial-coun18 try partners; 

19 (C) to leverage other development finance 

20 institutions, such as the Blue Dot Network, the 

21 Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Net22 work, and the Transaction Advisory Fund; and 

23 (D) to produce strategic guidance that 

24 identifies international infrastructure projects 

25 and details implementation plans, including— 


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1 (i) an explanation of how each infra2 structure project advances the strategic ob3 jectives described in paragraph (2); 

4 (ii) a description of consultations, cri5 teria, and justification for such projects; 

6 (iii) distribution of such projects 

7 across economic sectors and geographical 

8 regions; 

9 (iv) budget estimates, proposed 

10 sources of financing, and required appro11 priations for such projects; 

12 (v) lists of timelines and contractual 

13 parties and their respective rights and re14 sponsibilities with respect to such projects; 

15 and 

16 (vi) certification that such projects— 

17 (I) meet specified standards, 

18 such as those of the Blue Dot Net19 work; and 

20 (II) will not have negative im21 pacts on the environment, local com22 munities, national sovereignty, or eco23 nomic growth. 


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1 SEC. 202. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS IN UNITED 

2 STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FI3 NANCE CORPORATION. 

4 The BUILD Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) 

5 is amended— 

6 (1) in section 1413 (22 U.S.C. 9613)— 

7 (A) in subsection (a), by inserting ‘‘a Stra8 tegic Investments Officer,’’ after ‘‘Development 

9 Officer,’’; 

10 (B) in subsection (g)(2)(F), by striking 

11 ‘‘subsection (i)’’ and inserting ‘‘subsection (j)’’; 

12 (C) by redesignating subsections (h) and 

13 (i) as subsections (i) and (j), respectively; 

14 (D) by inserting after subsection (g) the 

15 following new subsection: 

16 ‘‘(h) STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS OFFICER.— 

17 ‘‘(1) APPOINTMENT.—Subject to the approval 

18 of the Board, the Chief Executive Officer shall ap19 point a Strategic Investments Officer from among 

20 individuals with experience in international economic 

21 policy, who— 

22 ‘‘(A) shall report directly to the Board; 

23 and 

24 ‘‘(B) shall be removable only by a majority 

25 vote of the Board. 


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1 ‘‘(2) DUTIES.—The Strategic Investments Offi2 cer shall— 

3 ‘‘(A) coordinate efforts to develop the Cor4 poration’s initiatives— 

5 ‘‘(i) to counter predatory state-di6 rected investment and coercive economic 

7 practices of adversaries of the United 

8 States; and 

9 ‘‘(ii) to preserve the sovereignty of 

10 partner countries; 

11 ‘‘(B) coordinate the Corporation’s strategic 

12 investment policies and implementation efforts 

13 with the Department of State, the Export-Im14 port Bank of the United States, the Trade and 

15 Development Agency, and other relevant United 

16 States Government departments and agencies, 

17 including by directly liaising with missions of 

18 the Department of State to ensure that depart19 ments, agencies, and missions have training, 

20 awareness, and access to the Corporation’s tools 

21 with respect to strategic investment policy and 

22 projects; 

23 ‘‘(C) manage the responsibilities of the 

24 Corporation under section 1442(b)(5) and para25 graphs (1)(C) and (3)(C) of section 1443(b); 


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1 ‘‘(D) support the Chief Development Offi2 cer in coordinating and implementing the activi3 ties of the Corporation under section 1445; and 

4 ‘‘(E) be an ex officio member of the Devel5 opment Advisory Council established under sub6 section (j), and attend each meeting of the 

7 Council.’’; 

8 (E) in subsection (i)(3)(C), as so redesig9 nated, by striking ‘‘subsection (i)’’ and insert10 ing ‘‘subsection (j)’’; and 

11 (F) by adding at the end the following new 

12 subsection: 

13 ‘‘(k) STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS ADVISORY COUN14 CIL.— 

15 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—There is established a Stra16 tegic Investments Advisory Council (in this sub17 section referred to as the ‘Council’) to advise the 

18 Board on strategic investment objectives of the Cor19 poration. 

20 ‘‘(2) MEMBERSHIP.—Members of the Council 

21 shall be appointed by the Board, on the rec22 ommendation of the Chief Executive Officer and the 

23 Strategic Investment Officer, and shall be composed 

24 of not more than 9 members from the Department 

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1 ment of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, 

2 the Department of Energy, and the Office of Science 

3 and Technology Policy. 

4 ‘‘(3) FUNCTIONS.—The Board shall call upon 

5 members of the Council, either collectively or indi6 vidually, to advise the Board regarding the extent to 

7 which the Corporation is meeting the strategic in8 vestment goals of the United States and any sugges9 tions for improvements with respect to such goals, 

10 including opportunities in countries and project de11 velopment and implementation challenges and oppor12 tunities. 

13 ‘‘(4) FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT.— 

14 The Council shall not be subject to the Federal Ad15 visory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).’’; 

16 (2) in section 1442 (22 U.S.C. 9652)— 

17 (A) in subsection (b)— 

18 (i) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘; 

19 and’’ and inserting a semicolon; 

20 (ii) in paragraph (4)(B), by striking 

21 the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; 

22 and’’; and 

23 (iii) by adding at the end the fol24 lowing new paragraph: 


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1 ‘‘(5) develop standards for, and a method for 

2 ensuring, appropriate strategic investment metrics of 

3 the Corporation’s portfolio.’’; and 

4 (B) in subsection (d), by striking 

5 ‘‘1413(i)’’ and inserting ‘‘1413(j)’’; and 

6 (3) in section 1443 (22 U.S.C. 9653)— 

7 (A) in subsection (a)— 

8 (i) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘; 

9 and’’ and inserting a semicolon; 

10 (ii) in paragraph (4), by striking the 

11 period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; 

12 and 

13 (iii) by adding at the end the fol14 lowing new paragraph: 

15 ‘‘(5) the impact of the strategic investments 

16 made by the Corporation, which shall be included in 

17 a classified annex.’’; and 

18 (B) in subsection (b)— 

19 (i) in paragraph (1)— 

20 (I) in subparagraph (A), by strik21 ing ‘‘; and’’ and inserting a semicolon; 

22 (II) in subparagraph (B), by add23 ing ‘‘and’’ at the end; and 

24 (III) by adding at the end the 

25 following new subparagraph: 


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1 ‘‘(C) the impact of the Corporation’s stra2 tegic investment efforts on United States for3 eign policy goals;’’; and 

4 (ii) in paragraph (3)— 

5 (I) in subparagraph (A), by strik6 ing ‘‘; and’’ and inserting a semicolon; 

7 and 

8 (II) by adding at the end the fol9 lowing new subparagraph: 

10 ‘‘(C) outcomes of the strategic investments 

11 portfolio, and whether or not such investments 

12 are meeting the foreign policy objectives of the 

13 United States; and’’. 

14 SEC. 203. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGN 

15 LOAN GUARANTEES TO UNITED STATES 

16 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 

17 CORPORATION. 

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1463(c)(1) of the Better 

19 Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 

20 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9683(c)(1)) is amended by striking ‘‘the 

21 Corporation or any other appropriate department or agen22 cy of the United States Government’’ and inserting ‘‘any 

23 appropriate department or agency of the United States 

24 Government (other than the Corporation)’’. 


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1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) shall take effect as if included in the enact3 ment of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to 

4 Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.). 

5 SEC. 204. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING AND STRENGTH6 ENING NEARSHORING. 

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find8 ings: 

9 (1) In 2019, the People’s Republic of China 

10 was the top supplier of goods imported into the 

11 United States, providing significant quantities of 

12 rare earth minerals, pharmaceutical ingredients, 

13 medical equipment, and other goods vital to the eco14 nomic prosperity and national security of the United 

15 States. 

16 (2) The COVID–19 pandemic and production 

17 outages and shipping disruptions in the People’s Re18 public of China have jeopardized worldwide access to 

19 critical goods, contributing to an unprecedented, on20 going supply chain crisis that has exposed the severe 

21 risks of concentrating global supply chains in the 

22 People’s Republic of China and demonstrated the 

23 need for the United States to increase supply chain 

24 resiliency and diversity through reshoring and 

25 nearshoring initiatives. 


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1 (3) Relocating supply chains from the People’s 

2 Republic of China to Latin America and the Carib3 bean is in the commercial and security interests of 

4 the United States and offers several significant ad5 vantages for the United States Government and 

6 United States entities, including— 

7 (A) reduced transit times to markets in the 

8 United States, which will lower freight costs, 

9 enable quicker adaptability to fluctuating con10 sumer demand, and lessen the large carbon 

11 footprint of current supply chains; 

12 (B) having supply chains located in coun13 tries with which the United States has long14 standing bilateral ties and shared democratic 

15 values, lessening the risk of geopolitical disrup16 tions to supply chains; and 

17 (C) having supply chains located in coun18 tries with existing comparative advantages for 

19 sourcing and manufacturing key critical goods 

20 that cannot be entirely sourced from or manu21 factured in the United States, including rare 

22 earth minerals, pharmaceuticals, medical goods, 

23 and semiconductors. 

24 (4) Switching 15 percent of United States im25 ports from its top 10 source countries outside of the 


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1 Western Hemisphere to countries in Latin America 

2 and the Caribbean would increase the exports of the 

3 region by approximately $72,000,000,000 annually, 

4 helping the region recover from the effects of the 

5 COVID–19 pandemic while also reducing pressures 

6 encouraging migration to the United States. 

7 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 

8 of the United States— 

9 (1) to work with allies and partners of the 

10 United States in the Western Hemisphere to achieve 

11 more resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains; 

12 (2) to pursue nearshoring initiatives to relocate 

13 supply chains to Latin America and the Caribbean, 

14 particularly for products unlikely to be sourced or 

15 manufactured in the United States, while simulta16 neously pursuing reshoring initiatives to increase do17 mestic production in the United States; and 

18 (3) to engage with regional governments, multi19 lateral development banks, and the private sector to 

20 develop and advance joint efforts to incentivize enti21 ties to relocate supply chains to, and strengthen sup22 ply chains within, the Western Hemisphere. 

23 (c) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State, in coordina24 tion with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as 

25 determined by the Secretary, shall develop and implement 


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1 a strategy to increase supply chain resiliency and security 

2 by promoting and strengthening nearshoring efforts to re3 locate supply chains from the People’s Republic of China 

4 to the Western Hemisphere. 

5 (d) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub6 section (c) shall— 

7 (1) be informed by consultations with the gov8 ernments of allies and partners of the United States 

9 in the Western Hemisphere and labor organizations 

10 and trade unions in the United States; 

11 (2) provide a description of how reshoring and 

12 nearshoring initiatives can be pursued in a com13 plementary fashion to strengthen the national inter14 ests of the United States; 

15 (3) include an assessment of— 

16 (A) the status and effectiveness of current 

17 efforts by regional governments, multilateral de18 velopment banks, and the private sector to pro19 mote nearshoring to the Western Hemisphere; 

20 (B) major challenges hindering those ef21 forts; and 

22 (C) how the United States can strengthen 

23 the effectiveness of those efforts; 

24 (4) identify countries in Latin America and the 

25 Caribbean with comparative advantages for sourcing 


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1 and manufacturing critical goods and countries with 

2 the greatest nearshoring opportunities; 

3 (5) identify how activities by the United States 

4 Agency for International Development and the 

5 United States International Development Finance 

6 Corporation can effectively be leveraged to strength7 en and promote nearshoring to Latin America and 

8 the Caribbean; 

9 (6) advance diplomatic initiatives to secure spe10 cific national commitments by governments in Latin 

11 America and the Caribbean to undertake efforts to 

12 create favorable conditions for nearshoring in the re13 gion, including commitments— 

14 (A) to develop formalized national 

15 nearshoring strategies; 

16 (B) to address corruption and rule of law 

17 concerns; 

18 (C) to modernize digital and physical infra19 structure; 

20 (D) to lower trade barriers; 

21 (E) to improve ease of doing business; and 

22 (F) to finance and incentivize nearshoring 

23 initiatives; 

24 (7) advance diplomatic initiatives to harmonize 

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1 ations, and facilitate economic integration in Latin 

2 America and the Caribbean; and 

3 (8) develop and implement programs to finance, 

4 incentivize, or otherwise promote nearshoring to the 

5 Western Hemisphere in accordance with the assess6 ments and identifications made pursuant to para7 graphs (3), (4), and (5), including, at minimum, 

8 programs— 

9 (A) to develop physical and digital infra10 structure; 

11 (B) to promote transparency in procure12 ment processes; 

13 (C) to provide technical assistance in im14 plementing national nearshoring strategies; 

15 (D) to mobilize private investment; and 

16 (E) to secure commitments by private sec17 tor entities to relocate supply chains from the 

18 People’s Republic of China to the Western 

19 Hemisphere. 

20 (e) COORDINATION WITH MULTILATERAL DEVELOP21 MENT BANKS.—In implementing the strategy required 

22 under subsection (c), the Secretary of State and the heads 

23 of other relevant Federal agencies, as determined by the 

24 Secretary, shall coordinate with the United States Execu25 tive Director to the Inter-American Development Bank 


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1 and the United States Executive Director to the World 

2 Bank. 

3 (f) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there5 after for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to 

6 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 

7 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep8 resentatives the strategy required under subsection (c) 

9 and a description of progress made in the implementation 

10 of that strategy. 

11 SEC. 205. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE BLUE DOT INITIA12 TIVE. 

13 It is the sense of Congress that— 

14 (1) the Blue Dot Network helps public and pri15 vate investors finance infrastructure projects that 

16 are inclusive, transparent, sustainable, environ17 mentally and socially responsible, and compliant 

18 with international standards, laws, and regulations; 

19 (2) the Blue Dot Network helps mitigate 

20 threats such as the predatory infrastructure invest21 ment practices of the People’s Republic of China 

22 and critical shortfalls in global infrastructure financ23 ing; 

24 (3) the Blue Dot Network advances the inter25 ests of the United States through setting principal 


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1 international standards, but also requires sufficient 

2 investments in other tools of economic statecraft 

3 such as the United States International Develop4 ment Finance Corporation and the Millennium Chal5 lenge Corporation to be effective; 

6 (4) the United States International Develop7 ment Finance Corporation should deepen its co8 operation with Japan Bank for International Co9 operation and the Department of Foreign Affairs 

10 and Trade of Australia to promote the Blue Dot 

11 Network and finance certified projects; 

12 (5) the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 

13 and Development must continue to update and re14 fine its methodologies and metrics for infrastructure 

15 project certification based on guidelines such as the 

16 Group of Twenty (G20) Principles for Quality Infra17 structure Investment; 

18 (6) the Blue Dot Network must complement 

19 other principled development finance initiatives such 

20 as the Infrastructure Technology and Assistance 

21 Network and the Transaction Advisory Fund of the 

22 Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network; 

23 (7) future development finance initiatives 

24 should build on the foundations of the initiatives de25 scribed in paragraph (6); and 


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1 (8) the governments of other countries com2 mitted to good governance, international law, and in3 frastructure investment should work with the Blue 

4 Dot Network to certify infrastructure projects and 

5 attract public and private sector investments. 

6 SEC. 206. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE THREE SEAS INI7 TIATIVE. 

8 It is the sense of Congress that— 

9 (1) the Three Seas Initiative promotes security, 

10 economic integration, modernization, and prosperity 

11 in Central and Eastern Europe through critical in12 vestments energy, transportation, and digital infra13 structure; 

14 (2) the United States International Develop15 ment Finance Corporation should finalize its ap16 proved investment of $300,000,000 and approve an 

17 additional $700,000,000 investment in the Three 

18 Seas Initiative to fulfill its 2020 commitments; 

19 (3) Central and Eastern Europe must develop 

20 better north-south infrastructure and economic inte21 gration to break the dominance by the Russian Fed22 eration of east-west trade corridors and regional en23 ergy supplies; 

24 (4) in the wake of the premeditated, 

25 unprovoked, and unjustified invasion of Ukraine by 


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1 the Russian Federation, the Three Seas Initiative 

2 has never been more important for the security of its 

3 12 participants: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the 

4 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lith5 uania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia; 

6 (5) the Three Seas Initiative should prioritize 

7 construction of regional liquid natural gas terminals 

8 that can help diversify the region’s energy supplies 

9 and reduce the malign influence of the Russian Fed10 eration; 

11 (6) the People’s Republic of China’s 

12 $14,000,000,000 of infrastructure investments in 

13 the region have degraded the environment, eroded 

14 the rule of law, infringed upon state sovereignty, and 

15 pose a national security threat; 

16 (7) the Digital Economy Cooperation Initiative 

17 should cooperate with the Three Seas Initiative to 

18 further modernize the region’s economy and develop 

19 the regions digital, communications, and financial 

20 infrastructure; 

21 (8) the European Union has made substantial 

22 contributions to the objectives of the Three Seas Ini23 tiative and should continue to do so through mecha24 nisms such as the Connecting Europe Facility; and 


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1 (9) the United States should encourage regional 

2 initiatives such as the Three Seas Initiative to galva3 nize public and private sector investments in re4 gional infrastructure projects that adhere to environ5 mental, equitable, social, and sustainable standards. 

6 Subtitle B—Energy 

7 SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED 

8 STATES ENGAGEMENT AT THE WORLD ECO9 NOMIC FORUM. 

10 It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of 

11 State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator 

12 of the United States Agency for International Develop13 ment, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States 

14 International Development Finance Corporation should 

15 make climate finance commitments at the World Eco16 nomic Forum. 

17 SEC. 212. CLEAN ENERGY EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES 

18 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 

19 CORPORATION. 

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Chief Executive Officer of the 

21 United States International Development Finance Cor22 poration shall strive to reduce the net carbon footprint of 

23 the Corporation’s entire investment portfolio to zero by 

24 2028. 


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1 (b) PRIORITY.—In carrying out the goal described in 

2 subsection (a), the Chief Executive Officer shall prioritize 

3 projects in countries struggling with transitioning from 

4 carbon intensive electricity to clean energy. 

5 (c) REPORT.—The Chief Executive Officer shall sub6 mit a report to Congress that describes the Corporation’s 

7 efforts to meet the goals described in subsections (a) and 

8 (b). 

9 SEC. 213. CONSISTENCY IN UNITED STATES POLICY ON DE10 VELOPMENT FINANCE AND CLIMATE 

11 CHANGE. 

12 It is the policy of the United States to ensure that 

13 its engagement with multilateral international financial in14 stitution’s is consistent with United States policy to re15 duce greenhouse gas emissions in order to achieve world16 wide net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. 

17 SEC. 214. ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY WITHIN THE 

18 DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 

19 Section 1(c) of the State Department Basic Authori20 ties Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(c)) is amended— 

21 (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘24’’ and in22 serting ‘‘25’’; 

23 (2) by redesignating paragraph (5) as para24 graph (6); and 


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1 (3) by inserting after paragraph (4) the fol2 lowing: 

3 ‘‘(5) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EN4 ERGY RESOURCES.—Subject to the numerical limita5 tion specified in paragraph (1), there is authorized 

6 to be established in the Department of State an As7 sistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources who 

8 shall be responsible to the Secretary of State for 

9 matters pertaining to the formulation and implemen10 tation of international policies— 

11 ‘‘(A) to protect United States energy secu12 rity interests; and 

13 ‘‘(B) to promote responsible global clean 

14 energy production.’’. 

15 SEC. 215. UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION CO16 OPERATION ON CLIMATE FINANCE FOR DE17 VELOPING COUNTRIES. 

18 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con19 gress that the United States should restore its historic alli20 ance with countries of the European Union regarding cli21 mate action by renewing the commitment to advancing 

22 shared values, principles, goals, and global cooperation for 

23 addressing climate change and achieving the goals of the 

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1 ed in Paris December 12, 2015 (commonly known as the 

2 ‘‘Paris Agreement’’). 

3 (b) DISCRETIONARY CLEAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

4 FINANCE FUND.—The Chief Executive Officer of United 

5 States International Development Finance Corporation 

6 shall partner with the European Bank for Reconstruction 

7 and Development to establish the Discretionary Clean En8 ergy Development Finance Fund. 

9 (c) ENERGY TRANSITION ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN

10 EUROPE.—Title V of the Support for East European De11 mocracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5451 et seq.) 

12 is amended by adding at the end the following: 

13 ‘‘SEC. 504. ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN COUN14 TRIES TRANSITIONING FROM FOSSIL FUELS 

15 TO CLEAN ENERGY. 

16 ‘‘(a) AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.—The Admin17 istrator of the United States Agency for International De18 velopment, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the 

19 Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of Commerce, is 

20 authorized to establish a program to support workers and 

21 communities in Eastern European countries that are 

22 struggling with the transition from fossil fuel dependent 

23 economies to clean energy economies. 

24 ‘‘(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

25 is authorized to be appropriated, for each of the fiscal 


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1 years 2023 through 2027, such sums as may be necessary 

2 to carry out the program authorized under subsection 

3 (a).’’. 

4 (d) UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN UNION WORKING

5 GROUP.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 

6 Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Energy, shall 

7 seek to establish a formal United States-European Union 

8 Working Group that will develop a strategy to respond to 

9 the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 

10 Subtitle C—Technology 

11 SEC. 221. UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AND REPRESENTA12 TION IN STANDARDS-SETTING BODIES. 

13 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

14 United States to ensure that the United States leads in 

15 the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such 

16 as next-generation telecommunications, artificial intel17 ligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and bio18 technology, by— 

19 (1) providing necessary investment and concrete 

20 incentives for the private sector to accelerate devel21 opment of such technologies; 

22 (2) modernizing export controls and investment 

23 screening regimes and associated policies and regula24 tions; 


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1 (3) enhancing United States leadership in tech2 nical standards-setting bodies and avenues for devel3 oping norms regarding the use of emerging critical 

4 technologies; 

5 (4) reducing United States barriers and in6 creasing incentives for collaboration with allies and 

7 partners on the research and co-development of crit8 ical technologies; 

9 (5) collaborating with allies and partners to 

10 protect critical technologies by— 

11 (A) crafting multilateral export control 

12 measures; 

13 (B) building capacity for defense tech14 nology security; 

15 (C) safeguarding chokepoints in supply 

16 chains; and 

17 (D) ensuring diversification; and 

18 (6) designing major defense capabilities for ex19 port to allies and partners. 

20 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con21 gress that— 

22 (1) the United States must lead in international 

23 bodies that set the governance norms and rules for 

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1 sure that those technologies operate within a free, 

2 secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain; 

3 (2) the United States, along with allies and 

4 partners, should lead an international effort that uti5 lizes all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its 

6 disposal to combat the expanding use of information 

7 and communications technology products and serv8 ices to surveil, repress, and manipulate populations 

9 (also known as ‘‘digital authoritarianism’’); 

10 (3) the United States should lead a global effort 

11 to ensure that freedom of information, including the 

12 ability to safely consume or publish information 

13 without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as the 

14 digital domain becomes an increasingly integral 

15 mechanism for communication; 

16 (4) the United States should lead a global effort 

17 to develop and adopt a set of common principles and 

18 standards for critical technologies to ensure that the 

19 use of such technologies cannot be abused by malign 

20 actors, whether those actors are governments or 

21 other entities, and that those actors do not threaten 

22 democratic governance or human rights; 

23 (5) the United States and its allies and part24 ners should maintain participation and leadership at 

25 international standards-setting bodies for 5th and 


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1 future generation mobile telecommunications sys2 tems and infrastructure; 

3 (6) the United States should work with its allies 

4 and partners to encourage and facilitate the develop5 ment of secure supply chains and networks for 5th 

6 and future generation mobile telecommunications 

7 systems and infrastructure; and 

8 (7) the maintenance of a high standard of secu9 rity in telecommunications and cyberspace between 

10 the United States and its allies and partners is a na11 tional security interest of the United States. 

12 (c) ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP

13 OF UNITED STATES AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS14 SETTING BODIES.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall— 

16 (A) establish an interagency working group 

17 to provide assistance and technical expertise to 

18 enhance the representation and leadership of 

19 the United States at international bodies that 

20 set standards for equipment, systems, software, 

21 and virtually defined networks that support 5th 

22 and future generation mobile telecommuni23 cations systems and infrastructure, such as the 

24 International Telecommunication Union and the 

25 3rd Generation Partnership Project; and 


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1 (B) work with allies, partners, and the pri2 vate sector to increase productive engagement 

3 with respect to the standards described in sub4 paragraph (A). 

5 (2) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The 

6 interagency working group described in paragraph 

7 (1) shall— 

8 (A) be chaired by the Secretary of State or 

9 a designee of the Secretary of State; and 

10 (B) consist of the head (or designee) of 

11 each Federal department or agency the Presi12 dent determines appropriate. 

13 (3) BRIEFINGS.— 

14 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 

15 days after the date of the enactment of this 

16 Act, and subsequently thereafter as provided 

17 under subparagraph (B), the interagency work18 ing group described in paragraph (1) shall pro19 vide a strategy to the Committee on Foreign 

20 Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 

21 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 

22 that addresses— 

23 (i) promotion of United States leader24 ship at international standards-setting bod25 ies for equipment, systems, software, and 


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1 virtually defined networks relevant to 5th 

2 and future generation mobile telecommuni3 cations systems and infrastructure, taking 

4 into account the different processes fol5 lowed by the various international stand6 ard-setting bodies; 

7 (ii) diplomatic engagement with allies 

8 and partners to share security risk infor9 mation and findings pertaining to equip10 ment that supports or is used in 5th and 

11 future generation mobile telecommuni12 cations systems and infrastructure and co13 operation on mitigating such risks; 

14 (iii) China’s presence and activities at 

15 international standards-setting bodies rel16 evant to 5th and future generation mobile 

17 telecommunications systems and infra18 structure, including information on the dif19 ferences in the scope and scale of China’s 

20 engagement at such bodies compared to 

21 engagement by the United States or its al22 lies and partners and the security risks 

23 raised by Chinese proposals in such stand24 ards-setting bodies; and 


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1 (iv) engagement with private sector 

2 communications and information service 

3 providers, equipment developers, academia, 

4 federally funded research and development 

5 centers, and other private sector stake6 holders to propose and develop secure 

7 standards for equipment, systems, soft8 ware, and virtually defined networks that 

9 support 5th and future generation mobile 

10 telecommunications systems and infra11 structure. 

12 (B) SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS.—Upon re13 ceiving a request from the appropriate congres14 sional committees, or as determined appropriate 

15 by the chair of the interagency working group 

16 described in paragraph (1), the interagency 

17 working group shall provide such committees an 

18 updated briefing that covers the matters de19 scribed in clauses (i) through (iv) of subpara20 graph (A). 

21 SEC. 222. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH 

22 THE G20 DIGITAL ECONOMY WORKING 

23 GROUP. 

24 It is the sense of Congress that— 


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1 (1) the Group of Twenty (G20) Digital Econ2 omy Working Group advances national and inter3 national interests through promoting principled and 

4 practical standards; and 

5 (2) the United States should continue to sup6 port, engage, and exercise leadership in the working 

7 group— 

8 (A) to maximize the benefits and minimize 

9 the harms of the $70,000,000,000 and growing 

10 global digital economy; 

11 (B) to increase international digital 

12 connectivity and trade; 

13 (C) to modernize the global economy with 

14 new technologies such as blockchain, artificial 

15 intelligence, and machine learning; 

16 (D) to protect cross border data flow and 

17 data free flow with trust; 

18 (E) to promote social inclusion through 

19 digital quality control, consumer protection, 

20 child protection, and equitable access to new 

21 technologies; 

22 (F) to improve efficiency and interoper23 ability for technologies and regulations in the 

24 public sector; 


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1 (G) to advance the past initiatives of the 

2 working group such Smart Cities, Digital Secu3 rity, and the Connecting Humanity 2030 Initia4 tive; and 

5 (H) to enable progress toward the United 

6 Nations Sustainable Development Goals. 

7 SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ARTIFICIAL INTEL8 LIGENCE AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. 

9 It is the policy of the United States— 

10 (1) to prioritize diplomacy and international en11 gagement in the artificial intelligence strategies and 

12 policies of the United States; 

13 (2) to prioritize artificial intelligence issues in 

14 United States diplomacy; 

15 (3) to collaborate with allies and partners to— 

16 (A) research, develop, produce, and invest 

17 in artificial intelligence technologies that sup18 port economic prosperity, collective security, de19 mocracy, and human rights; 

20 (B) promote commitments and inter21 national law related to artificial intelligence 

22 that reflect shared values; 

23 (C) ensure that artificial intelligence tech24 nologies are safe, secure, and trustworthy; 


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1 (D) create and maintain artificial intel2 ligence-related technical and institutional infra3 structure; 

4 (E) share artificial intelligence-related 

5 data, technology, and knowledge, subject to ap6 propriate safeguards and restrictions; 

7 (F) prevent the unwanted transfer of sen8 sitive artificial intelligence-related technical in9 formation; 

10 (G) coordinate artificial intelligence-related 

11 export controls and investment screening proce12 dures; and 

13 (H) educate and train new cohorts of arti14 ficial intelligence researchers, developers, and 

15 practitioners; 

16 (4) to incorporate perspectives and expertise 

17 from industry, academia, and civil society into 

18 United States diplomatic activities related to artifi19 cial intelligence; 

20 (5) to engage with bilateral and multilateral or21 ganizations active in artificial intelligence research, 

22 development, and policy; and 

23 (6) to use diplomacy and foreign assistance to 

24 support activities for deploying artificial intelligence 

25 that create broadly shared prosperity, account for 


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1 relevant artificial intelligence safety and security 

2 concerns, and uphold human rights and democratic 

3 values. 

4 SEC. 224. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY FOR ARTIFICIAL INTEL5 LIGENCE. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the 

7 date of the enactment of this Act, and every 2 years there8 after, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to 

9 the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for 

10 United States diplomacy related to artificial intelligence. 

11 (b) CONTENTS.—Each strategy required by sub12 section (a) shall include the following: 

13 (1) A review of relevant prior and ongoing ini14 tiatives, the outcomes of those initiatives, and key 

15 ongoing challenges to those initiatives. 

16 (2) The objectives and priorities that will be 

17 used to guide the diplomacy of the United States 

18 Government related to artificial intelligence, includ19 ing objectives and priorities related to each of the 

20 following: 

21 (A) Promoting human rights and demo22 cratic values in the development and deploy23 ment of artificial intelligence technologies, in24 cluding by advancing relevant international law 

25 and principles. 


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1 (B) Deterring and disrupting malicious 

2 and oppressive uses of artificial intelligence. 

3 (C) Fostering United States collaboration 

4 with allies and partners in artificial intelligence 

5 research and development. 

6 (D) Developing appropriate technical 

7 standards, metrics, and measurement tech8 niques for artificial intelligence. 

9 (E) Mitigating safety risks of artificial in10 telligence. 

11 (F) Maintaining secure supply chains for 

12 artificial intelligence technology and its inputs, 

13 including computing hardware. 

14 (G) Ensuring the integrity of the artificial 

15 intelligence research and development activities 

16 of the United States and its allies and partners. 

17 (H) Ensuring the equitable deployment 

18 and adoption of artificial intelligence tech19 nology, including through trade, foreign assist20 ance, and development finance. 

21 (I) Involving the private sector and civil 

22 society. 

23 (J) Responding to the artificial intelligence 

24 activities and strategies of other countries, in25 cluding the People’s Republic of China. 


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1 (3) Specific, measurable indicators of progress 

2 corresponding to the objectives and priorities de3 scribed in paragraph (2). 

4 (4) For each strategy other than the first strat5 egy required by subsection (a), an assessment of 

6 whether and how progress with respect to each of 

7 the indicators identified in the preceding strategy 

8 was realized. 

9 (5) A detailed implementation plan, including 

10 timelines, designations of lead and supporting imple11 menting entities of the United States Government, 

12 budgetary estimates (as applicable), and descriptions 

13 of any additional budgetary resources, technical ex14 pertise, legal authorities, or personnel needed for im15 plementation of the strategy. 

16 (6) Any other matters the Secretary considers 

17 relevant. 

18 (c) CONSULTATION.—In preparing each strategy re19 quired by subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall con20 sult with— 

21 (1) the Secretary of Defense; 

22 (2) the Secretary of Homeland Security; 

23 (3) the Secretary of Commerce; 

24 (4) the Secretary of Energy; 


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1 (5) the Director of the National Science Foun2 dation; 

3 (6) the Director of the Office of Science and 

4 Technology Policy; 

5 (7) the heads of such other relevant Federal 

6 agencies and departments as the Secretary of State 

7 considers appropriate; and 

8 (8) such nongovernmental partners as the Sec9 retary considers appropriate. 

10 (d) FORM.—Each strategy required by subsection (a) 

11 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 

12 a classified annex. 

13 (e) PUBLICATION.—The Secretary of State shall 

14 make each strategy required by subsection (a) (without 

15 its classified annex, if any) available on a publicly acces16 sible website. 

17 (f) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL

18 COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate 

19 congressional committees’’ means the Committee on For20 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For21 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives. 

22 SEC. 225. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION ON RESEARCH 

23 AND DEVELOPMENT. 

24 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) Innovation in artificial intelligence and 

2 other emerging technology domains has become in3 creasingly global. According to the Organisation for 

4 Economic Co-operation and Development, worldwide 

5 spending on research and development more than 

6 tripled between 2000 and 2020. The United States 

7 accounted for almost 70 percent of such spending in 

1960, but less than 1 8 ⁄3 in 2018. 

9 (2) Many allies and partners of the United 

10 States are technological powers in their own right, 

11 with robust research and development activities and 

12 world-leading capabilities in fields such as artificial 

13 intelligence, semiconductors, robotics, and bio14 technology. 

15 (3) Adversaries of the United States, including 

16 the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federa17 tion, and Iran, also emphasize technology and inno18 vation in their geopolitical strategies. In particular, 

19 the Chinese Communist Party believes innovation is 

20 essential to its continued rule and is investing heav21 ily in research and development as part of a strategy 

22 to ‘‘leapfrog’’ the United States into global leader23 ship. 

24 (4) The United States and its allies and part25 ners collectively control a much larger share of reVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:14 Apr 30, 2022 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4112.IS S4112

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1 search and development activity than the People’s 

2 Republic of China. Together, the United States and 

3 6 like-minded countries, namely, Japan, Germany, 

4 South Korea, India, France, and the United Kingdom, account for more than 1 5 ⁄2 of global spending on 

6 research and development, while the People’s Republic of China accounts for approximately 1 7 ⁄4. 

8 (5) The National Science Board’s ‘‘Vision 

9 2030’’ report, issued in May 2020, states, ‘‘Staying 

10 at the frontiers of discovery requires leaning into 

11 internationalism, particularly given the nation’s fall12 ing share of global knowledge production, paired 

13 with the rising importance and impact of inter14 national collaboration and knowledge- and tech15 nology-intensive industries.’’. 

16 (6) Previously, in 2008, the National Science 

17 Board reported, ‘‘The U.S. Government could play a 

18 more effective role in supporting international S&E 

19 (science and engineering) partnerships by developing 

20 a coherent international S&E strategy to coordinate 

21 the activities and objectives of the various Federal 

22 agencies that play a role in such partnerships. . . . 

23 No single U.S. agency is responsible for coordinating 

24 or supporting international S&E partnerships, and 


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1 few U.S. agencies that do S&E work have explicit 

2 missions in international relations.’’. 

3 (7) As of March 2022, numerous Federal de4 partments and offices administer joint research and 

5 development activities with international partners, 

6 including the Office of International Science and 

7 Engineering within the National Science Founda8 tion, the Division of International Relations within 

9 the National Institutes of Health, and the Office of 

10 International Science & Technology Cooperation 

11 within the Department of Energy. 

12 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con13 gress that— 

14 (1) international collaboration on research and 

15 development is critical to maintaining United States 

16 leadership in artificial intelligence and other critical 

17 technologies; and 

18 (2) Federal initiatives related to international 

19 collaboration on research and development should 

20 be— 

21 (A) consistently and adequately funded; 

22 and 

23 (B) coordinated across agencies to increase 

24 impact, minimize undue duplication, and ensure 


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1 alignment with policies and strategic objectives 

2 of the United States. 

3 (c) GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE RE4 PORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the en5 actment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United 

6 States shall prepare and release to the public a report 

7 that— 

8 (1) enumerates and describes all significant 

9 Federal initiatives related to international collabora10 tion on research and development in emerging tech11 nologies in existence as of the date on which the re12 port is released; 

13 (2) assesses whether those initiatives are 

14 equipped to achieve their stated goals; 

15 (3) assesses whether those initiatives are prop16 erly managed and coordinated within and across 

17 Federal agencies; and 

18 (4) recommends appropriate actions with re19 spect to paragraphs (1) through (3). 

20 (d) INDEPENDENT REPORT.— 

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

22 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec23 retary of State shall seek to enter into a contract 

24 with an appropriately qualified independent research 

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1 velopment center or other nonprofit organization, to 

2 produce a report on Federal activities related to 

3 international collaboration on research and develop4 ment. 

5 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report described in para6 graph (1) shall— 

7 (A) assess the effectiveness of Federal ac8 tivities related to international collaboration 

9 conducted as of the date on which the report is 

10 produced; 

11 (B) identify key opportunities for enhanced 

12 collaboration on research and development with 

13 allies and partners of the United States; 

14 (C) identify key challenges to United 

15 States collaboration on research and develop16 ment with allies and partners; 

17 (D) propose a Federal strategy and cor18 responding implementation plan for future Fed19 eral activities related to international collabora20 tion on research and development; and 

21 (E) recommend other appropriate actions 

22 for the Secretary of State, other officials of the 

23 Department of State, Congress, and other rel24 evant governmental and nongovernmental ac25 tors, and identify any additional resources or 


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1 legal authorities necessary to carry out such ac2 tions. 

3 (3) COMPLETION.—The contract described in 

4 paragraph (1) shall require delivery of the report de5 scribed in that paragraph not later than 1 year after 

6 the date on which the contract is executed. 

7 (4) PUBLICATION.—The Secretary of State 

8 shall make the report described in paragraph (1) 

9 available on a publicly accessible website. 

10 Subtitle D—International Financial 

11 Institutions and Multilateral 

12 Economic Organizations 

13 SEC. 231. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES 

14 LEADERSHIP AT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 

15 INSTITUTIONS. 

16 It is the policy of the United States— 

17 (1) to recognize rising debt stock in emerging 

18 market and developing countries as a national secu19 rity and economic security threat and raise its im20 portance in multilateral fora; 

21 (2) to leverage the voice and vote of the United 

22 States in international financial institutions to pre23 vent future unsustainable debt stocks in emerging 

24 market and developing countries; 


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1 (3) to promote rule-writing standards for trans2 parency and disclosure that hold both debtors and 

3 creditors accountable, allow accurate debt sustain4 ability assessments, and promote better debt man5 agement; 

6 (4) to lead the international community in 

7 translating the G20 Common Framework for Debt 

8 Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Ini9 tiative (commonly known as the ‘‘Common Frame10 work’’) into tangible action, including effective 

11 standstill for debt payments and credit revisions for 

12 petitioner countries and finalizing the debt treat13 ment for the petitioner countries, beginning with 

14 Chad, Ethiopia, and Zambia; 

15 (5) to reduce timelines and increase confidence 

16 in outcomes for the Common Framework so that 

17 private creditors continue to provide sufficient fi18 nances to petitioner countries and other countries 

19 witness the benefits of petitioning; 

20 (6) to expand the Common Framework and 

21 offer its financial assistance to other heavily in22 debted lower-middle-income countries, beyond those 

23 currently covered; 

24 (7) to cooperate with counterparts in the Group 

25 of Twenty (G20), the International Monetary Fund, 


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1 private credit rating agencies, and regulators, to ex2 plore and develop new bond and loan contract 

3 issuance standards that authorize temporary suspen4 sions of debt services to both private and public 

5 creditors without triggering a default in crisis situa6 tions; 

7 (8) to engage with petitioner countries, before 

8 those countries exhaust their reserves, to strategize 

9 their ascension into the Common Framework and 

10 prevent further economic costs; 

11 (9) to leverage the voice and vote of the United 

12 States in the International Monetary Fund and the 

13 World Bank so that the Fund and the Bank com14 plete preliminary assessments of the debt relief 

15 needed by each country eligible for Common Frame16 work treatment before such countries petition for 

17 debt relief; 

18 (10) that assessments described in paragraph 

19 (9) should— 

20 (A) include realistic growth and fiscal pro21 jections; 

22 (B) include implications of Common 

23 Framework debt relief; and 

24 (C) be based on accurate and comprehen25 sive debt data; 


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1 (11) to support the International Monetary 

2 Fund lending into arrears for the Common Frame3 work in the case that private lenders fail to uphold 

4 their initial commitments; 

5 (12) to leverage the voice and vote of the 

6 United States in international financial intuitions to 

7 promote and finance international initiatives to pro8 cure and deploy more affordable and accessible 

9 COVID–19 vaccinations and treatments for emerg10 ing market and developing countries; 

11 (13) to address the near-term problems associ12 ated with the pandemic-induced global recession and 

13 also longer term problems of unsustainable credit 

14 lending and borrowing that victimizes emerging mar15 ket and developing countries; and 

16 (14) to consider the impact of the monetary 

17 policies of the United States and future increases in 

18 interest rates on emerging market and developing 

19 countries and mitigate related harms. 

20 SEC. 232. LOANS TO THE POVERTY REDUCTION AND 

21 GROWTH TRUST OF THE INTERNATIONAL 

22 MONETARY FUND. 

23 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 

24 (1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be 

25 appropriated to the Secretary of the Treasury for 


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1 fiscal year 2022 $102,000,000, for contribution to 

2 the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust or other 

3 special purpose vehicle of the International Monetary 

4 Fund. 

5 (2) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNTS.—Amounts ap6 propriated pursuant to the authorization of appro7 priations under paragraph (1) shall remain available 

8 until September 30, 2031. 

9 (b) USE OF AMOUNTS.—Amounts appropriated pur10 suant to the authorization of appropriations under sub11 section (a) shall be available— 

12 (1) to cover the cost (as defined in section 502 

13 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 

14 661a)) of loans made by the Secretary of the Treas15 ury to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust or 

16 other special purpose vehicle of the International 

17 Monetary Fund; and 

18 (2) to subsidize gross obligations for the prin19 cipal amount of direct loans not to exceed 

20 15,000,000,000 Special Drawing Rights. 

21 (c) NONAPPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN LIMITATION.— 

22 Section 5(f) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 

23 U.S.C. 286c(f)) shall not apply to any loans made pursu24 ant to this section to the Poverty Reduction and Growth 


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1 Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the International 

2 Monetary Fund on or before September 30, 2031. 

3 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS.— 

4 The Exchange Stabilization Fund and the financing ac5 count corresponding to transactions with the International 

6 Monetary Fund are authorized to enter into such trans7 actions as are necessary to effectuate loans made pursuant 

8 to this section and denominated in Special Drawing Rights 

9 to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust or other spe10 cial purpose vehicle of the International Monetary Fund. 

11 SEC. 233. CLEARING WORLD BANK GROUP ARREARS. 

12 Not later than 30 days after the date of the enact13 ment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall pro14 vide the World Bank Group with all necessary amounts 

15 to address the United States arrears in contributions from 

16 fiscal years 2019 and 2020. 

17 SEC. 234. 10TH GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE FOR THE 

18 INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. 

19 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con20 gress that— 

21 (1) the spread of SARS–CoV–2, the virus that 

22 causes COVID–19, has had a significant impact on 

23 economic, social, and humanitarian conditions 

24 throughout Latin America and the Caribbean; 


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1 (2) the Inter-American Development Bank is 

2 the preeminent multilateral development bank dedi3 cated to regional economic and social development 

4 and the betterment of lives across Latin America 

5 and the Caribbean; 

6 (3) the Bank has played an integral role in sup7 porting member countries with the coordination and 

8 implementation of policies to mitigate the effects of 

9 the COVID–19 pandemic, the Venezuelan refugee 

10 and migration crisis, and other crises in the Western 

11 Hemisphere; 

12 (4) a capital increase for the Bank would great13 ly increase its capacity to provide financing, institu14 tional knowledge, and technical support to foster re15 covery and inclusion initiatives between regional gov16 ernments, private sector entities, and international 

17 organizations; and 

18 (5) the United States, as a founding member of 

19 the Bank, should support a capital stock increase to 

20 ensure the Bank is prepared to offer additional sup21 port to member countries severely impacted by the 

22 COVID–19 pandemic and other crises. 

23 (b) TENTH GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE.— 

24 (1) SUPPORT FOR A GENERAL CAPITAL IN25 CREASE.—The President shall take steps to support 


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1 a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-Amer2 ican Development Bank. 

3 (2) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The President 

4 shall advance diplomatic engagement to build sup5 port among member countries of the Bank for a 

6 tenth general capital increase for the Bank in order 

7 to strengthen the capacity of the Bank— 

8 (A) to support Latin American and Carib9 bean countries in their efforts to address the 

10 COVID–19 pandemic and the related economic 

11 impact; and 

12 (B) to advance inclusive economic and so13 cial development in the Americas. 

14 (3) PROGRESS REPORT.—Not later than 45 

15 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

16 President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign 

17 Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Fi18 nancial Services of the House of Representatives a 

19 report detailing efforts to carry out paragraphs (1) 

20 and (2). 

21 (4) TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.—The Inter22 American Development Bank Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et 

23 seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: 


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1 ‘‘SEC. 42. TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE. 

2 ‘‘(a) VOTE AUTHORIZED.—The United States Gov3 ernor of the Bank is authorized to vote in favor of a reso4 lution to increase the capital stock of the Bank by 

5 $80,000,000,000 over a period not to exceed 5 years. 

6 ‘‘(b) SUBSCRIPTION AUTHORIZED.— 

7 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The United States Gov8 ernor of the Bank may subscribe on behalf of the 

9 United States to 1,990,714 additional shares of the 

10 capital stock of the Bank. 

11 ‘‘(2) LIMITATION.—Any subscription by the 

12 United States to the capital stock of the Bank shall 

13 be effective only to such extent and in such amounts 

14 as are provided in advance in appropriations Acts. 

15 ‘‘(c) LIMITATIONS ON AUTHORIZATION OF APPRO16 PRIATIONS.— 

17 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to pay for the in18 crease in the United States subscription to the Bank 

19 under subsection (b), there is authorized to be ap20 propriated $24,014,857,191 for payment by the Sec21 retary of the Treasury. 

22 ‘‘(2) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.—Of the amount 

23 authorized to be appropriated under paragraph 

24 (1)— 

25 ‘‘(A) $600,371,430 shall be for paid in 

26 shares of the Bank; and 


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1 ‘‘(B) $23,414,485,761 shall be for callable 

2 shares of the Bank.’’. 

3 (c) SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

4 INITIATIVES OF INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

5 BANK.— 

6 (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of 

7 Congress that the Inter-American Development 

8 Bank should— 

9 (A) establish its own environmental grant10 making and financing facility in order to imple11 ment and expand environmental policies, 

12 metrics, and standards, to strengthen resilience 

13 and disaster preparedness, and to improve sus14 tainability and conservation; and 

15 (B) continue to strengthen environmental 

16 safeguards as an element of economic develop17 ment in the Western Hemisphere. 

18 (2) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The President 

19 shall advance diplomatic engagement to build sup20 port among member countries of the Bank for the 

21 creation of an environmental fund and financing fa22 cility as part of the tenth general capital increase for 

23 the Bank. 


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1 SEC. 235. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN INTER-AMERICAN 

2 DEVELOPMENT BANK. 

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find4 ings: 

5 (1) The Inter-American Development Bank was 

6 established in 1959 and— 

7 (A) is the premier multilateral development 

8 bank in the Western Hemisphere; 

9 (B) is the largest source of development fi10 nancing for Latin America and the Caribbean; 

11 and 

12 (C) issued more than $140,000,000,000 in 

13 loans and grants between 2011 and 2021. 

14 (2) The Inter-American Development Bank— 

15 (A) has 48 member states, of which 26 are 

16 borrowing members in the Latin America and 

17 the Caribbean region; and 

18 (B) constitutes a critical forum for fos19 tering collective action and meeting shared re20 gional challenges, including COVID–19 recovery 

21 and response. 

22 (3) Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Peo23 ple’s Republic of China are among the 22 non-bor24 rowing, non-Western Hemisphere members of the 

25 Inter-American Development Bank. 

26 (4) Taiwan— 


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1 (A) has been an observer at the Inter2 American Development Bank since 1991; 

3 (B) has contributed to a specialized finan4 cial intermediary development fund at IDB Lab 

5 since 2006; 

6 (C) has been a non-regional member of the 

7 Central American Bank for Economic Integra8 tion since 1992; 

9 (D) is a member of the Asian Development 

10 Bank, the World Trade Organization, the Asia11 Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the Inter12 national Chamber of Commerce; and 

13 (E) is a participant of the Organisation for 

14 Economic Co-operation and Development’s 

15 Competition Committee, its Steel Committee, 

16 and its Fisheries Committee. 

17 (5) Taiwan’s economy is the 7th largest in Asia 

18 and the 20th largest in the world by purchasing 

19 power parity. 

20 (6) Taiwan has been a model contributor of for21 eign aid in Latin America and the Caribbean, allo22 cating between 30 percent and 50 percent of its for23 eign aid budget to Latin America and the Carib24 bean. 


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1 (7) Since 2010, Taiwan’s International Co2 operation and Development Fund has funded 95 

3 projects in Central America, 64 projects in the Car4 ibbean, and 21 projects in South America. 

5 (8) Taiwan has been a firm supporter of Haiti 

6 as it confronts multiple simultaneous crises— 

7 (A) by providing more than $145,000,000 

8 in financing to modernize Haiti’s electrical grid; 

9 (B) by delivering 280,000 masks at the 

10 height of the COVID–19 pandemic; and 

11 (C) by pledging $500,000 in disaster relief 

12 immediately after the August 14, 2021, earth13 quake in Haiti. 

14 (9) According to data from the Pan American 

15 Development Foundation, communities receiving as16 sistance from Taiwan display increased— 

17 (A) food security; 

18 (B) income generation; and 

19 (C) capacity to recover from natural disas20 ters. 

21 (10) Taiwan has placed special emphasis on 

22 fostering development in Central America and in the 

23 Caribbean, including by signing the Agreement on 

24 the Republic of China (Taiwan)—Central America 

25 Economic Development Fund in 1998. 


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1 (11) Through its non-regional member status at 

2 the Central American Bank for Economic Integra3 tion, Taiwan has provided $266,700,000 in financial 

4 assistance to help Central American countries re5 spond to the COVID–19 pandemic. On April 22, 

6 2021, the Central American Bank for Economic In7 tegration announced the opening of its Representa8 tive Office in Taiwan, deepening investment ties be9 tween Taiwan and Central America. 

10 (12) Nine countries in Latin America and the 

11 Caribbean maintain diplomatic relations with Tai12 wan, and Taiwan has 8 representative offices in 7 

13 other countries in the region. 

14 (13) Since 2016, the Government of the Peo15 ple’s Republic of China has engaged in aggressive 

16 economic diplomacy to compel the withdrawal of dip17 lomatic recognition for Taiwan, most notably in 

18 Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, 

19 all of which have terminated longstanding and pro20 ductive diplomatic relationships with Taiwan and 

21 granted diplomatic recognition to the People’s Re22 public of China. 

23 (14) The Government of the People’s Republic 

24 of China— 


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1 (A) announced a $1,100,000,000 construc2 tion project in Panama on the day that Panama 

3 switched from recognizing Taiwan to recog4 nizing the People’s Republic of China as the 

5 government of China; and 

6 (B) similarly offered assistance packages 

7 to the Dominican Republic and El Salvador in 

8 2018 in exchange for those countries ceasing 

9 their diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. 

10 (15) Taiwan’s international engagement has 

11 faced increased resistance from the Government of 

12 the People’s Republic of China, which has used its 

13 influence to deny Taiwan’s invitations to multilateral 

14 fora. For example, Taiwan was not invited to the 

15 2016 Assembly of the International Civil Aviation 

16 Organization (ICAO), despite participating as a 

17 guest at ICAO’s 2013 summit. Taiwan’s requests to 

18 participate in the General Assembly of the Inter19 national Criminal Police Organization (commonly 

20 known as ‘‘INTERPOL’’) were also rejected. 

21 (16) Taiwan’s inclusion in multilateral organi22 zations, such as the Inter-American Development 

23 Bank, advances peace and stability in the world and 

24 in the Western Hemisphere specifically. 


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1 (17) Congress has demonstrated a longstanding 

2 policy of supporting Taiwan’s participation in inter3 national bodies that address shared transnational 

4 challenges by— 

5 (A) authorizing the Secretary of State, in 

6 Public Law 106–137, Public Law 107–10, and 

7 Public Law 108–235, to initiate a United 

8 States plan for supporting Taiwan’s participa9 tion as an observer in the activities of the 

10 World Health Organization; 

11 (B) directing the Secretary of State, in 

12 Public Law 113–17, to report on a strategy to 

13 obtain observer status for Taiwan at the Inter14 national Civil Aviation Organization Assembly; 

15 and 

16 (C) directing the Secretary of State, in 

17 Public Law 114–139, to develop a strategy to 

18 obtain observer status for Taiwan at the 

19 INTERPOL Assembly. 

20 (18) Despite these efforts, Taiwan has not re21 ceived an invitation to attend as an observer any of 

22 the events of the international organizations referred 

23 to in paragraph (17) since 2016. 

24 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con25 gress that— 


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1 (1) the United States fully supports Taiwan’s 

2 participation in, and contribution to, international 

3 organizations and underscores the importance of the 

4 relationship between Taiwan and the United States; 

5 (2) diversifying the Inter-American Develop6 ment Bank’s donor base and increasing ally engage7 ment in the Western Hemisphere reinforces United 

8 States national interests; 

9 (3) Taiwan’s significant contribution to the de10 velopment and economies of Latin America and the 

11 Caribbean demonstrate that Taiwan’s membership 

12 in the Inter-American Development Bank as a non13 borrowing member would benefit the Bank and the 

14 entire Latin American and Caribbean region; and 

15 (4) non-borrowing membership in the Inter16 American Development Bank would allow Taiwan to 

17 substantially leverage and channel the immense re18 sources Taiwan already provides to Latin America 

19 and the Caribbean to reach a larger number of bene20 ficiaries. 

21 (c) PLAN FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN

22 THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK.—The Sec23 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the 

24 Treasury, is authorized— 


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1 (1) to initiate a United States plan to endorse 

2 non-borrowing membership in the Inter-American 

3 Development Bank for Taiwan; and 

4 (2) to instruct the United States Governor of 

5 the Bank to work with the Board of Governors of 

6 the Bank to admit Taiwan as a non-borrowing mem7 ber of the Bank. 

8 (d) REPORT CONCERNING MEMBER STATE STATUS

9 FOR TAIWAN AT THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

10 BANK.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the en11 actment of this Act, and not later than April 1 of each 

12 year thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination 

13 with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit an un14 classified report to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

15 of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

16 the House of Representatives that— 

17 (1) describes the United States plan to endorse 

18 and obtain non-borrowing membership status for 

19 Taiwan at the Inter-American Development Bank; 

20 (2) includes an account of the efforts that the 

21 Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury 

22 have made to encourage member states of the Bank 

23 to promote Taiwan’s bid to obtain non-borrowing 

24 membership at the Bank; and 


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1 (3) identifies the steps that the Secretary of 

2 State and the Secretary of the Treasury will take to 

3 endorse and obtain non-borrowing membership sta4 tus for Taiwan at the Bank in the following year. 

5 SEC. 236. INCREASED UNITED STATES COOPERATION WITH 

6 ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION. 

7 The Secretary of State shall pursue the following ob8 jectives at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum: 

9 (1) Improving efficiency in supply chains, par10 ticularly semi-conductor supply chains. 

11 (2) Encouraging continued public-private dia12 logues with policymakers and promoting a common 

13 set of technology standards, including the possibility 

14 of a digital trade agreement. 

15 (3) Promoting the development and use of pol16 icy recommendations for governments to support re17 search and development of clean energy (both renew18 able and non-renewable) and adopting robust clean 

19 energy standards. 

20 (4) Advancing cooperation that reduces barriers 

21 to cross-border investment into emerging and grow22 ing markets. 

23 (5) Improving cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific 

24 region and developing tools for governments to comVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:14 Apr 30, 2022 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4112.IS S4112

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1 bat cyber threats, including ransomware, 

2 disinformation, and cyber hacks. 

3 Subtitle E—Resilience 

4 SEC. 241. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED 

5 STATES LEADERSHIP IN RECOVERY AND RE6 SILIENCY. 

7 It is the sense of Congress that the United States 

8 must exercise leadership in the international community’s 

9 response to the COVID–19 pandemic regarding public 

10 health and economic recovery and resiliency, including 

11 by— 

12 (1) leveraging multilateral fora, such as the 

13 Group of Seven (G7) and the Group of Twenty 

14 (G20), which constitute more than 30 percent and 

15 70 percent of the global economy, respectively, to co16 ordinate an effective international response to per17 sistent economic issues related to supply chains, in18 flation, and inequality; 

19 (2) revitalizing the United Nations and its asso20 ciated institutions to coordinate and facilitate inter21 national initiatives that— 

22 (A) promote global health and economic se23 curity; and 

24 (B) build resilience to present and fore25 casted shocks and stresses that impede ecoVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:14 Apr 30, 2022 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4112.IS S4112

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1 nomic growth or trigger, contribute to, result 

2 in, or cause backsliding; 

3 (3) empowering like-minded allies and partners 

4 to leverage their respective strengths and assume 

5 greater responsibilities in such international fora 

6 and institutions; 

7 (4) continuing to fund and finance international 

8 initiatives, such as COVAX, to provide and dis9 tribute life-saving vaccinations and medical treat10 ments for COVID–19; 

11 (5) promoting an equitable international eco12 nomic recovery that promotes building developing 

13 countries’ resilience capacities to address enduring 

14 disparities and challenges facing lower and middle 

15 income countries in addition to more recent chal16 lenges related to high-levels of global inflation and 

17 market volatility; and 

18 (6) supporting an impartial, independent, and 

19 international investigation into the origins of the 

20 COVID–19 pandemic to derive lessons learned and 

21 prevent similar international disasters in the future. 


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1 SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING IMPROVING 

2 RESILIENCE CAPACITIES THROUGH FOREIGN 

3 ASSISTANCE. 

4 It is the sense of Congress that United States foreign 

5 assistance and development finance must better suit its 

6 foreign assistance and development finance institutions to 

7 improve global resilience capacities and mitigate the harm8 ful effects of international shocks and stresses, including 

9 by— 

10 (1) equipping people, institutions, and inter11 national systems with the tools and resources nec12 essary to avoid, cope with, and recover from modern 

13 threats, such as pandemic diseases, climate change, 

14 and extreme weather, cybersecurity compromises, 

15 and supply chain disruptions; 

16 (2) partnering with other countries to better as17 sess their vulnerabilities and risks to international 

18 shocks and identifying sustainable strategies for 

19 mitigating risk and improving resilience; 

20 (3) prioritizing funding for foreign assistance 

21 and development finance initiatives that seek to pre22 vent, respond and reduce risks of international 

23 shocks; 

24 (4) expanding foreign capacity building initia25 tives in law enforcement, public health, cybersecu26 rity, food and energy security; 


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1 (5) strengthening institutions that facilitate 

2 economic cooperation and transparency in times of 

3 international crisis and uncertainty; and 

4 (6) providing support for countries to strength5 en domestic resource mobilization and access to ef6 fective and equitable development finance in order to 

7 reduce dependence on foreign assistance. 

8 SEC. 243. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESILIENCY. 

9 Section 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities 

10 Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is amended— 

11 (1) by redesignating subsection (h) (as added 

12 by section 361 of Public Law 116–260) as sub13 section (k); and 

14 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

15 ‘‘(l) OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESILIENCY.— 

16 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—There is established, within 

17 the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs of the 

18 Department of State, the Office of Economic Resil19 iency (in this subsection referred to as the ‘Office’). 

20 ‘‘(2) FUNCTION.—The Office, under the direc21 tion of the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of 

22 Economic and Business Affairs, shall lead United 

23 States’ efforts to develop and implement credible na24 tional action plans with partner countries aimed at 

25 detecting, understanding, preventing impacts of, and 


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1 responding to present and forecasted shocks and 

2 stresses that are destabilizing to countries’ national 

3 security and economic growth, including epidemics, 

4 pandemics, natural disasters, and other destabilizing 

5 events.’’. 

6 SEC. 244. ESTABLISHMENT OF RESILIENCE TRUST FUND AT 

7 THE WORLD BANK. 

8 The United States Executive Director to the World 

9 Bank shall use the voice and vote of the United States 

10 to advocate for the establishment of a multi-donor trust 

11 fund to incentivize countries to develop and implement 

12 credible national action plans aimed at preventing, detect13 ing, and responding to epidemics, pandemics, and other 

14 global destabilizing events. 

Æ 


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