NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 21-2857

__________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

BRYAN THORNTON,

a/k/a Moochie,

Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2:91-cr-00570-003)

District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

August 4, 2022

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed August 5, 2022)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Bryan Thornton appeals from an order of the District Court, entered September 9, 

2021, denying his motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

In 1991, Bryan Thornton was convicted of various narcotics offenses, following a 

trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and

received a life sentence. The sentencing court concluded that Thornton was accountable 

for 1,000 kilograms of cocaine; the base level for his offense was 40 plus an additional 

four level increase for a total of 44, and with an enhancement, his total adjusted offense 

level was 46. We affirmed the sentence on direct appeal. See United States v. Thornton, 

1 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 (1993). Since then, Thornton has 

filed numerous motions with the District Court to modify, or otherwise amend, his 

sentence.

Amendment 505 to the Sentencing Guidelines became effective in November 

1994, which reduced Thornton’s relevant base offense level from 40 to 38. Based on this 

Amendment, Thornton filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). 

The District Court concluded that “[d]espite the reduction, Thornton’s sentence remains 

the same under the new offense level,” and therefore he was not entitled to relief. Dkt 

No. 617, at 1 n.1. Thornton appealed, and we summarily affirmed. United States v. 

Thornton, 600 F. App’x 819, 820 (3d Cir. 2015).

In September 2020, Thornton filed his third motion to reduce his sentence 

pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) based on Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782, which 

“retroactively reduced by two levels the base offense levels assigned to many drug 

quantities in the Drug Guidelines.” United States v. Thompson, 825 F.3d 198, 202 (3d 

Cir. 2016). The District Court denied Thornton’s motion after determining that he had 

previously received a two-level base offense level reduction pursuant to Amendment 505, 
3

which set the relevant base offense level at 38, and could not obtain another reduction 

pursuant to Amendment 782. Thornton sought reconsideration, which the District Court 

denied.1 On September 7, 2021, Thornton then filed a “supplemental motion,” again

requesting relief pursuant to Amendment 782. Dkt No. 685. On September 9, 2021, the 

District Court entered an order denying that motion, concluding that it raised the same 

arguments that were addressed previously. Dkt No. 686. Thornton appeals. 

We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s September 9, 2021 order 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Thompson, 825 F.3d at 203. “Our review over a 

district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for sentence reduction is typically for 

abuse of discretion,” but we exercise plenary review over “legal questions concerning the 

proper interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. (quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

A District Court generally cannot modify a term of imprisonment once it has been 

imposed, but a defendant may be eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c) 

under certain circumstances. Section 3582(c) allows for a reduction if two requirements 

are met: (1) the sentence was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been 

lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” and (2) the “reduction is consistent with 

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(2); see 

also United States v. Flemming, 723 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 2013). A sentence reduction 

1 Thornton appealed the denial of his motion for reconsideration, and the appeal 

was dismissed for failure to file a brief. See C.A. No. 20-3502.
4

is inconsistent with stated Sentencing Commission policy if, for example, the newly 

retroactive Guidelines amendment relied on by the defendant “does not have the effect of 

lowering [his] applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).

The District Court correctly denied Thornton’s motion because Amendment 782 

does not have the effect of lowering his applicable guideline range. See § 

1B1.10(a)(2)(B). Amendment 782 imposed a base level offense of 38 for offenses 

involving 450 kilograms or more of cocaine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (Drug Quantity 

Table). Because Thornton was accountable for 1,000 kilograms of cocaine,

2 Amendment 

782 does not alter his relevant base offense level or lower his sentencing range, and 

therefore he is not eligible for a reduction in sentence under § 3582(c)(2). See United 

States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 2009). The District Court therefore properly

denied his motion under § 3582(c)(2).3

2

In the District Court and on appeal, Thornton argues that rather than using the 

amount of cocaine found by the Court at sentencing, this Court should instead conclude 

that Appellant had “150 kilograms of cocaine,” an amount referenced in the jury 

instructions for his continuing conspiracy enterprise offense. See Pro Se Brief, at 11; see 

also Appellee’s Amended Brief, at 9 n.5 (“The district court instructed the jury that it 

must find that the continuing violations involved at least 150 kilos of cocaine in order to 

convict Thornton of the charged CCE offense.”). Thornton, however, has provided no 

legal support for this argument. Rather, the sentencing court had the authority to 

determine the facts, including drug quantity, relevant to imposing his sentence. See

United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 561, 565–66 (3d Cir. 2007). As such, Thornton’s 

argument is meritless.

3 To the extent that Thornton argues that he is entitled to compassionate release 

because of alleged trial and sentencing errors, he essentially presents another challenge to 

the validity of his conviction and sentence, and such challenges are typically brought 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 instead. See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 553 (1998) 

(holding that a prisoner may not circumvent AEDPA’s restrictions by labeling a second 

or successive application for habeas relief something else); Okereke v. United States, 307 
5

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that motions to vacate “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their 

convictions or sentences”). We make no findings, however, as to the timeliness or merits

of such a motion.