UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4053

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CARLTON BRONTA MAY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan, 

Chief District Judge. (5:08-cr-00331-FL-1)

Submitted: June 27, 2011 Decided: September 21, 2011

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

W. James Payne, Shallotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. MayParker, Jennifer E. Wells, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Carlton Bronta May appeals his conviction and 300-

month sentence for one count of conspiracy to distribute and 

possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine 

base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006) (“Count 

One”); one count of distribution of five grams or more of 

cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (“Count 

Two”); one count of possession with intent to distribute five 

grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) (“Count Three”); one count of possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2006) (“Count Four”); and one count of 

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (“Count Five”). He 

argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress certain evidence, that insufficient evidence supported 

his conviction, and that the court erred in its drug quantity 

finding for sentencing. We affirm.

May was indicted after police executed a search 

warrant on his home, catching him in the act of trying to 

dispose of cocaine base in the toilet, and discovering firearms, 

currency, more cocaine base, digital scales and drug packaging 

materials. Prior to executing the warrant, police arranged a 

controlled purchase wherein an informant, Tyrone Kenney, 
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purchased fourteen grams of cocaine base from May for $400. 

After he was arrested and read his Miranda*

May moved prior to trial to suppress the evidence 

seized during the search. He argued that the address listed on 

the affidavit for his home is actually shared by three trailer 

homes and the warrant was thus not sufficiently particularized. 

The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion and the 

district court adopted that recommendation. 

warnings, May made 

inculpatory statements to police indicating that he owned the 

firearms despite his prior felony conviction and had distributed 

significant quantities of cocaine and cocaine base. 

At trial, the Government adduced evidence from the 

police who arranged the controlled purchase and executed the 

warrant, as well as Kenney and another witness, George 

Jefferson, who testified that they frequently purchased cocaine 

and cocaine base from May. May’s witnesses testified that May 

was not a drug dealer and that they did not observe May sell 

Kenney cocaine base on the day of the controlled purchase. May 

was convicted of each count of the indictment.

Prior to sentencing, the Probation Office issued a 

presentence investigation report (“PSR”) indicating that based 

on the amount of cocaine base sold to Kenney, the amount 

 * Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
4

recovered from the home, and the amount May stated in his 

interview with police, for sentencing purposes, May was 

accountable for 3304 grams of cocaine base. May objected, but 

the district court indicated that because it was contemplating 

sentencing May to the statutory mandatory minimum, disputing the 

drug quantity would be an academic exercise. May ultimately was 

sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment, the statutory mandatory 

minimum pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006) and 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). He noted a timely appeal.

I. Motion to Suppress

May argues that the district court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress. He claims error in four respects: 

(1) that the warrant was facially defective; (2) that the good 

faith exception should not apply; (3) that the seizure of the 

firearms was not authorized by the warrant or the plain view

exception; and (4) that his statements were fruits of the 

illegal arrest. We review the factual findings underlying a 

district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error 

and the court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v. 

Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 

3374 (2010). When evaluating the denial of a suppression 

motion, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Government, the prevailing party below. Id.
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a. Validity of the Warrant

May first claims that the warrant was invalid on its 

face because it was not sufficiently particular in describing 

the place to be searched. The validity of a search warrant is 

reviewed under the totality of the circumstances, determining 

whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for finding 

there was probable cause to issue the warrant. Illinois v. 

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983); United States v. Grossman, 

400 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2005). We afford great deference to 

the probable cause determination of the issuing judge. United 

States v. Allen, 631 F.3d 164, 173 (4th Cir. 2011). We avoid 

applying “‘hypertechnical’ scrutiny of affidavits lest police 

officers be encouraged to forgo the warrant application process 

altogether.” United States v. Robinson, 275 F.3d 371, 380 

(4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236).

The requirement for particularity in warrants “ensures 

that the search will be carefully tailored to its 

justifications, and will not take on the character of the wideranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” 

Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). The particularity 

requirement is satisfied when an officer in possession of a 

search warrant describing a particular place to be searched can 

reasonably ascertain and identify the intended place to be 

searched. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). 
6

The gravamen of May’s objection to the warrant is that 

there are three trailer homes, located near one another, that 

share the same address. We are not persuaded by his argument. 

The application for the warrant described May and his vehicle, 

and the police involved were familiar with May and his home. 

Other courts of appeal have upheld the validity of a warrant 

where, as here, a potential ambiguity is remedied by the 

warrant’s reference to the owner of the property or the subject 

of the search. See, e.g., United States v. Durk, 149 F.3d 464, 

466 (6th Cir. 1998) (warrant not invalid when one part of the 

description of the premises to be searched is inaccurate, but 

the description has other parts that identify the place with 

particularity); United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650, 655 

(3d Cir. 1975) (noting that warrant lacking any physical 

description of particular apartment is valid if it specifies the 

name of the occupant of the apartment against which it is 

directed); United States v. Gitcho, 601 F.2d 369, 371 

(8th Cir. 1979) (stating that personal knowledge of agents 

executing the warrant of particular premises intended to be 

searched validated a search pursuant to a warrant providing the 

incorrect address). Here, it is clear that the officers 

executing the warrant knew which trailer home was to be searched 

and there was minimal risk of mistake. We accordingly conclude 

that May’s argument is without merit. 
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Because we conclude that the warrant was not 

overbroad, we need not address whether the officers’ conduct was 

reasonable for the purposes of the United States v. Leon, 468 

U.S. 897, 922-26 (1987) good faith exception. 

b. Firearms Seizure

May next argues that the firearms were improperly 

seized. He argues that because the warrant application only 

listed specific drugs, and items indicating the possession and 

sale of controlled substances, and did not specifically list 

firearms, the seizure of the firearms was outside the warrant’s 

scope. We do not agree.

In United States v. Ward, 171 F.3d 188, 195 

(4th Cir. 1999), we stated that “guns are tools of the drug 

trade and are commonly recognized articles of drug 

paraphernalia.” Thus, under the plan language of the warrant 

application, the seizure of firearms was authorized. Moreover, 

because the officers were lawfully present in the home and the 

firearms were discovered in the open, they were properly seized 

under the plain view doctrine. See United States v. Williams, 

592 F.3d 511, 521 (4th Cir. 2010) (describing the scope of the 

plain view doctrine). 
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c. May’s Statements to Police

May next argues that his statements to police were 

invalid as fruits of the illegal search. The Fourth Amendment 

requires the suppression of evidence that is the fruit of 

unlawful police conduct. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 

471, 484 (1963). Because the search was valid, May’s claim that 

the statements must be suppressed fails. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

May next argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

support any of his five convictions. We review de novo 

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury 

verdict. United States v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 440 

(4th Cir. 2007). “A defendant challenging the sufficiency of 

the evidence faces a heavy burden.” United States v. Foster, 

507 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 2007). We review a sufficiency of 

the evidence challenge by determining whether, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any 

rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Collins, 412 

F.3d 515, 519 (4th Cir. 2005). We review both direct and 

circumstantial evidence, and accord the government all 

reasonable inferences from the facts shown to those sought to be 

established. United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333 
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(4th Cir. 2008). In reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, 

we do not review the credibility of the witnesses, and assume 

that the jury resolved all contradictions in the testimony in 

favor of the government. Kelly, 510 F.3d at 440. We will 

uphold the jury’s verdict if substantial evidence supports it, 

and will reverse only in those rare cases of clear failure by 

the prosecution. Foster, 507 F.3d at 244-45.

May challenges each count for which he was convicted, 

and we address each in turn.

a. Count One

Because this count involved a conspiracy charge under 

21 U.S.C. § 846, the Government was required to prove (1) an 

agreement between May and another person to engage in conduct 

that violated a federal drug law; (2) May’s knowledge of the 

conspiracy; and (3) May’s knowing and voluntary participation in 

the conspiracy. See United States v. Strickland, 245 F.3d 368, 

384-85 (4th Cir. 2001). Since a conspiracy is by its nature 

clandestine and covert, it is generally proved by circumstantial 

evidence. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857 

(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Evidence tending to prove a 

conspiracy may include a defendant’s relationship with other 

members of the conspiracy, and the existence of a conspiracy may 

be inferred from a development and collocation of circumstances. 
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Id. at 858. “Circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a 

conspiracy conviction need not exclude every reasonable 

hypothesis of innocence, provided the summation of the evidence 

permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

(citation omitted).

May argues that, at best, the Government’s evidence 

shows that he had a buyer-seller relationship with Kenney and 

Jefferson. Such a relationship is not, in and of itself, 

evidence of a conspiracy. United States v. Mills, 995 F.2d 480, 

485 (4th Cir. 1993). 

After review of the record, we are unpersuaded by 

May’s claims. First, evidence of a buyer-seller relationship is 

relevant to “the issue of whether a conspiratorial relationship 

exists,” United States v. Yearwood, 518 F.3d 220, 226 

(4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, 

“[e]vidence of a buy-sell transaction coupled with a substantial 

quantity of drugs . . . support[s] a reasonable inference that 

the parties [are] co-conspirators.” United States v. Reid, 523 

F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and 

ellipsis omitted). Similarly, continued relationships and 

repeated drug transactions between parties are indicative of a 

conspiracy, particularly when the transactions involve 

substantial amounts of drugs. Id. 
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Here, May’s statements to police, coupled with 

Kenney’s and Jefferson’s testimony, indicate that May was 

involved in a longstanding relationship with both men that 

centered around the purchase, processing, and distribution of 

cocaine and cocaine base. May frequently “fronted” Jefferson 

cocaine base to distribute to others. Jefferson “cooked” 

cocaine into cocaine base for May. Kenney frequently purchased 

large quantities of cocaine base from May. In light of these 

facts, the jury was permitted to convict May of the conspiracy 

charge, and we will not disturb that conviction.

b. Count Two

May next argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

convict him of distribution of five grams or more of cocaine 

base. The Government sought to prove this charge through 

evidence that on April 21, 2008, Kenney conducted a controlled 

purchase of cocaine base from May wherein he purchased fourteen 

grams of cocaine base for $400. The elements of distribution 

are “(1) distribution of [a] narcotic controlled substance, 

(2) knowledge of the distribution, and (3) intent to distribute 

the narcotic controlled substance.” United States v. Randall, 

171 F.3d 195, 209 (4th Cir. 1999).

May argues that while witnesses agreed that Kenney was 

present in May’s home on the day of the alleged controlled 
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transaction, several of his witnesses disputed Kenney’s account. 

At bottom, May’s challenge is based on a dispute over the 

credibility of the witnesses. The jury was entitled to believe 

Kenney’s account over those of May’s witnesses. It is, of 

course, axiomatic that we do not review the credibility of the 

witnesses. See Kelly, 510 F.3d at 440.

c. Count Three

May next argues that there was insufficient evidence 

for the jury to convict him of possession with intent to 

distribute. In order to establish a violation of § 841(a)(1), 

the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: 

“(1) possession of the controlled substance; (2) knowledge of 

the possession; and (3) intent to distribute.” United States v. 

Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 267 n.10 (4th Cir. 2009). Possession may be 

actual or constructive. United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 

878 (4th Cir. 1992). “A person may have constructive possession 

of contraband if he has ownership, dominion, or control over the 

contraband or the premises or vehicle in which the contraband 

was concealed.” United States v. Herder, 594 F.3d 352, 358 

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3440 (2010). Intent to 

distribute may be inferred if the amount of drugs found exceeds 

an amount normally associated with personal consumption. United 

States v. Wright, 991 F.2d 1182, 1187 (4th Cir. 1993). 
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On appeal, May argues that the only basis for his 

conviction for possession with intent to distribute was his 

statements made to police at the time of his arrest. He further 

claims that his statements cannot form the basis for his 

conviction because his wife testified that he was intoxicated at 

the time he was released from jail.

Again, we are unpersuaded. First, May’s statements 

are sufficient on their own to form the basis of this 

conviction. Moreover, in executing the warrant, police 

discovered cocaine base and digital scales, packaging material, 

large amounts of currency, and firearms – all indicia of 

distribution. Finally, the Government offered rebuttal evidence 

attacking May’s claim that he was intoxicated when he made 

statements to police, and we will not second-guess the jury’s 

decision to credit the Government’s witnesses over May’s. In 

sum, this evidence is more than enough to form the basis of a 

conviction.

d. Count Four

May next argues that his conviction for possession of 

a firearm by a convicted felon was not supported by sufficient 

evidence. To support a conviction for being a felon in 

possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the 

government must prove the following elements: “(1) the
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defendant previously had been convicted of a [felony]; (2) the 

defendant knowingly possessed . . . the firearm; and (3) the 

possession was in or affecting commerce, because the firearm had 

traveled in interstate or foreign commerce at some point during 

its existence.” United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394-95 

(4th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

Here, three firearms were found in May’s home. He 

conceded that he was a convicted felon and admitted that he 

possessed the firearms, and as we have already concluded that 

his statements were admissible, the evidence supports this 

conviction.

e. Count Five

May argues that the Government did not adduce 

sufficient evidence to convict him of Count Five, possession of 

a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. In 

order to prove a 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) violation, the Government 

must prove two elements: “(1) the defendant used or carried a 

firearm, and (2) the defendant did so during and in relation to 

a drug trafficking offense or crime of violence.” United 

States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir. 1997).

The Government adduced evidence that May possessed the 

firearms, two of which were located in the room where police 

discovered the strong evidence of drug distribution activities. 
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The Government also adduced uncontroverted expert witness 

testimony that drug dealers rely on firearms to protect 

themselves because they cannot avail themselves of traditional 

law enforcement services for protection. May claims that 

because not all of the guns were loaded, they were not used in 

furtherance of a drug crime. The presence of ammunition, 

however, is only one factor weighing in favor of concluding that 

the firearms were used in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime. Based on the location of the firearms, the presence of 

ammunition in the handgun seized, and May’s statements, the jury 

could properly have convicted him of a violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c). We will therefore affirm May’s convictions. 

III. Drug Quantity Calculation

Finally, May argues that the district court erred in 

calculating the amount of drugs attributable to him. The court 

concluded that May was accountable for 3304 grams of cocaine 

base. We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuseof-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007). A preserved objection to a sentence is reviewed for 

harmless error. See Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 

1432 (2009) (noting that procedural errors at sentencing are 

“routinely subject to harmlessness review”); see also United 

States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (preserved 
16

claims are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and if the court 

finds abuse, reversal is required unless the court concludes the 

error was harmless).

Here, the only claim of sentencing error raised by May 

is that the drug quantity was incorrect. However, as May was 

sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum, any error in drug 

quantity calculation is clearly harmless. We therefore affirm 

his sentence. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw/substitute counsel is denied. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED