COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Bumgardner and Agee 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

B. P. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2027-01-4 JUDGE G. STEVEN AGEE 

 AUGUST 20, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY 

Jeffrey W. Parker, Judge 

 Cindy Leigh Decker, Assistant Public Defender 

(Office of the Public Defender, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General 

(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

B.P., a juvenile, appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court 

of Rappahannock County affirming the decision of the juvenile and 

domestic relations district court (the JDR court) holding B.P. in 

contempt for failing to obey an order requiring her to attend 

school. B.P. was ordered to spend ten days in a juvenile 

detention center for violating the order. On appeal, B.P. 

contends the JDR court lacked authority to order her to attend 

school. Therefore, she contends the court's order was void as a 

matter of law and that she cannot be found in contempt of a void 

order. For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm the 

decision of the circuit court. 
I. BACKGROUND 

 On January 27, 2000, a petition was filed in the 

Rappahannock County JDR court alleging B.P., age fourteen, was a 

child in need of supervision because she was "habitually and 

without justification absent from school." The JDR court 

appointed a guardian ad litem for B.P. and an attorney to 

represent her. In a hearing on March 23, 2000, B.P. entered a 

"guilty plea." 

 The JDR court issued an order that day of "Found guilty 

(Interim Disp)" and directed that a report on the child's needs 

be compiled and filed with the court. The matter was continued 

to May 11, 2000. The JDR court also included in the order the 

requirement that B.P. "attend school unless medically excused." 

 On June 1, 2000, October 13, 2000, and January 5, 2001, show 

cause summonses were issued by the JDR court, each alleging B.P. 

had failed to attend school in dereliction of the March 23, 2000 

JDR court order. The JDR court considered all three matters on 

March 8, 2001, when B.P. admitted she had not attended school as 

previously ordered by the court. The JDR court found her guilty 

of violating its order on three separate occasions. B.P. was 

sentenced to spend ten days in a juvenile detention center for 

being in contempt of the order. B.P. appealed the JDR decision 

to the circuit court. 

 In the circuit court, B.P. admitted she had not attended 

school as the JDR court had ordered. She contended, however, 

that the JDR court lacked authority on March 23, 2000, to order 

her to attend school because no final disposition had been made 

pursuant to Code § 16.1-278.5 regarding the original petition. 

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She asserted the "interim disposition" order was void because the 

Code of Virginia does not authorize the JDR court to so act. 

 The circuit court found Code §§ 16.1-227 and 16.1-241(A) 

provide the JDR court with "interlocutory authority" to order a 

juvenile to attend school prior to the entry of a final 

disposition. The court also found Code § 16.1-292(A) provides 

the presiding JDR court judge with the authority to enforce such 

an order and place a juvenile in detention for violating that 

order. The circuit court incorporated these findings into its 

July 5, 2001 order, which affirmed the JDR court order and is now 

the subject of this appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS 

 B.P. challenges the authority of the JDR court to issue and 

enforce an interlocutory order, prior to a final disposition of 

her case, requiring her attendance at school. She argues such an 

order is not authorized because Code § 16.1-278.5 requires final 

disposition to occur only after an agency report assessing her 

needs has been filed. We disagree with B.P.'s contention that 

the JDR court lacked authority to issue an interlocutory order 

requiring her to attend school and that the court could not 

enforce its order. 

 The purpose of Chapter 11 of Title 16.1 of the Code, the 

"Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Law," is crime 

prevention and juvenile rehabilitation. See Kiracofe v. 

Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957). To achieve this 

purpose, JDR courts are vested with (1) jurisdiction over a 

juvenile "who is alleged to be . . . in need of supervision," and 

(2) "all necessary and incidental powers and authority, whether 

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legal or equitable in their nature." Code §§ 16.1-241(A)(1), 

16.1-227. Through these powers, the JDR courts are to act "to 

reduce the incidence of delinquent behavior." Code 

§ 16.1-227(4). 

 It is pursuant to this clear grant of statutory authority 

that the JDR court lawfully issues an interlocutory order. Such 

an order, as in this case requiring B.P. to comply with the 

Commonwealth's compulsory school attendance requirement, can be 

made while awaiting the preparation of an agency report before 

final disposition in a proceeding for a child in need of 

supervision. Nothing in the language of Code § 16.1-278.5 voids 

the inherent powers of the court, granted under Code §§ 16.1-227 

and 16.1-241(A)(1), to issue an interlocutory order. 

 To hold otherwise would require the JDR court to permit a 

juvenile to be absent from school for an indeterminate period of 

time in dereliction of Code § 22.1-2541 while the court awaited 

the generation of a report on how best to supervise the juvenile. 

Such a result would permit a juvenile, already found to be 

habitually absent from school, to continue to disregard the 

Commonwealth's compulsory school attendance requirement at will. 

We will not place a construction upon a statute which leads to an 

absurd result or one plainly contrary to the expressed intent of 

the General Assembly as set out in Code § 22.1-254. See Ragan v. 

Woodcroft Village Apartments, 255 Va. 322, 325-26, 497 S.E.2d 

740, 742 (1998) (a statute should never be construed so that it 

leads to an absurd result); see also Owens v. Commonwealth, 129 

 

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1

 Code § 22.1-254 requires children between the ages of five 

years old and eighteen years old to attend school. 
Va. 757, 761, 105 S.E. 531, 532 (1921) (a statute should not be 

construed to "enervate, impede and paralyze the administration of 

the . . . laws of the state . . . unless the legislative intent 

to produce such a result is clearly indicated"). 

 Therefore, we hold the JDR court possessed authority to 

issue an interlocutory order requiring B.P. to comply with the 

law of the Commonwealth mandating her attendance at school. Code 

§§ 16.1-227 and 16.1-241(A) provide such authority. We further 

hold that as the interlocutory order to attend school was 

properly issued, Code § 16.1-292(A)2

 authorized the JDR court and 

circuit court to enforce that order. This statute provides a 

court with the authority to punish for contempt the violation of 

its order. As the record clearly supports the circuit court's 

finding that B.P. violated the school attendance order, Code 

§ 16.1-292(A) specifically provides for the penalty adjudicated 

in this case: "[C]onfinement . . . in a secure facility for 

juveniles . . . not to exceed ten days . . . ." 

 Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's decision that the 

JDR court had authority to issue the interlocutory school 

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 Code § 16.1-292(A) provides, in pertinent part: 

Except as otherwise expressly provided 

herein, nothing in this chapter shall deprive 

the court of its power to punish summarily 

for contempt for such acts as set forth in § 

18.2-456, or to punish for contempt after 

notice and an opportunity for a hearing on 

the contempt except that confinement in the 

case of a juvenile shall be in a secure 

facility for juveniles rather than in jail 

and shall not exceed a period of ten days for 

each offense. 

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attendance order and to hold B.P. in contempt when she failed to 

obey that order. 

Affirmed.

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Benton, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part. 

 The record establishes that the child properly came within 

the purview of the juvenile court and was declared a "child in 

need of supervision," as that term is defined in Code § 16.1-228. 

I agree with the majority opinion that the juvenile court judge 

had the authority pursuant to Code § 16.1-241 to order the child 

to attend school pending final disposition of her status pursuant 

to Code § 16.1-278.5. Thus, the order requiring her to do so was 

not void. 

 I dissent because I do not believe the juvenile court judge 

was authorized by statute to order the child to detention prior 

to entry of a final disposition under Code § 16.1-278.5 for a 

status offense. The circuit court judge found, however, that 

"pursuant to . . . Code § 16.1-292(A), . . . the [juvenile court] 

judge does have the authority to enforce its decree." The 

Commonwealth contends on appeal that Code § 16.1-292(A) 

authorizes this detention. 

 That portion of the statute provides as follows: 

Any person violating an order of the 

juvenile court entered pursuant to 

§§ 16.1-278.2 through 16.1-278.19, including 

a parent subject to an order issued pursuant 

to subdivision 3 of § 16.1-278.8, may be 

proceeded against (i) by an order requiring 

the person to show cause why the order of 

the court entered pursuant to §§ 16.1-278.2 

through 16.1-278.19 has not been complied 

with, (ii) for contempt of court pursuant to 

§ 16.1-69.24 or as otherwise provided in 

this section, or (iii) by both. Except as 

otherwise expressly provided herein, nothing 

in this chapter shall deprive the court of 

its power to punish summarily for contempt 

for such acts as set forth in § 18.2-456, or 

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to punish for contempt after notice and an 

opportunity for a hearing on the contempt 

except that confinement in the case of a 

juvenile shall be in a secure facility for 

juveniles rather than in jail and shall not 

exceed a period of ten days for each 

offense. However, if the person violating 

the order was a juvenile at the time of the 

original act and is eighteen years of age or 

older when the court enters a disposition 

for violation of the order, the judge may 

order confinement (i) in jail, or (ii) in a 

secure facility for juveniles provided the 

judge finds from the evidence that the 

presence of the person in such a facility is 

consistent with assuring the safety of the 

children confined in the facility and the 

staff of the facility and the finding is in 

writing and included in the order. 

Code § 16.1-292(A) (emphasis added). When three "criminal" show 

cause summonses were issued by the juvenile court, no final 

disposition had been entered under Code § 16.1-278.5. Moreover, 

I see no language in Code §§ 16.1-278.5 or 16.1-292(A) permitting 

detention of the child as an available sanction prior to 

disposition. 

 Because the courts below acted pursuant to subsection (A), 

they did not make any findings as would be required by 

subsections (C), (D), and (E) of Code § 16.1-292. In any event, 

those provisions of Code § 16.1-292, which read as follows, are 

not applicable: 

C. Notwithstanding the contempt power of 

the court, the court shall be limited in the 

actions it may take with respect to a child 

violating the terms and conditions of an 

order to those which the court could have 

taken at the time of the court's original 

disposition pursuant to §§ 16.1-278.2 

through 16.1-278.10, except as hereinafter 

provided. However, this limitation shall 

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not be construed to deprive the court of its 

power to (i) punish a child summarily for 

contempt for acts set forth in § 18.2-456 or 

(ii) punish a child for contempt for 

violation of a dispositional order in a 

delinquency proceeding after notice and an 

opportunity for a hearing regarding such 

contempt, including acts of disobedience of 

the court's dispositional order which are 

committed outside the presence of the court. 

D. In the event a child in need of services 

is found to have willfully and materially 

violated for a second or subsequent time the 

order of the court pursuant to § 16.1-278.4, 

the dispositional alternatives specified in 

subdivision 9 of § 16.1-278.8 shall be 

available to the court. 

E. In the event a child in need of 

supervision is found to have willfully and 

materially violated an order of the court 

pursuant to § 16.1-278.5, the court may 

enter any of the following orders of 

disposition: 

1. Suspend the child's motor vehicle 

driver's license; 

2. Order any such child fourteen years of 

age or older to be (i) placed in a foster 

home, group home or other nonsecure 

residential facility, or, (ii) if the court 

finds that such placement is not likely to 

meet the child's needs, that all other 

treatment options in the community have been 

exhausted, and that secure placement is 

necessary in order to meet the child's 

service needs, detained in a secure facility 

for a period of time not to exceed ten 

consecutive days for violation of any order 

of the court arising out of the same 

petition. The court shall state in its 

order for detention the basis for all 

findings required by this section. When any 

child is detained in a secure facility 

pursuant to this section, the court shall 

direct the agency evaluating the child 

pursuant to § 16.1-278.5 to reconvene the 

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interdisciplinary team participating in such 

evaluation as promptly as possible to review 

its evaluation, develop further treatment 

plans as may be appropriate and submit its 

report to the court for its determination as 

to further treatment efforts either during 

or following the period the child is in 

secure detention. A juvenile may only be 

detained pursuant to this section in a 

detention home or other secure facility in 

compliance with standards established by the 

State Board. Any order issued pursuant to 

this subsection is a final order and is 

appealable to the circuit court as provided 

by law. 

 By placing the child in detention after a "criminal" show 

cause proceeding and before entry of a final disposition pursuant 

to Code § 16.1-278.5, the order effectively reclassifies the 

child as a delinquent. I believe it is contrary to the spirit of 

the statutes to interpret the Code in this manner such that prior 

to a final disposition, a child could be held in contempt and 

sanctioned for the same type of conduct being addressed by the 

underlying proceeding, but without the procedural safeguards 

afforded to the child in the underlying proceeding. Nothing 

within Code § 16.1-292(A), permits a juvenile court judge to 

order the sanctions provided therein for authority exercised 

pursuant to Code §§ 16.1-241 and 16.1-227. Indeed, Code 

§ 16.1-292(F) specifically provides that "[n]othing in this 

section shall be construed to reclassify a child in need of 

services or in need of supervision as a delinquent." I would 

hold that the juvenile court judge could, at most, order those 

sanctions provided for under Code § 16.1-278.5. 

 For these reasons, I would reverse the portion of the order 

that orders the child into detention, prior to the entry of a 

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final disposition under Code § 16.1-278.5, for failure to attend 

school. 

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