2023 IL App (1st) 220350

SIXTH DIVISION

Filing Date May 26, 2023 

No. 1-22-0350 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

STEVEN OWEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

THE VILLAGE OF MAYWOOD, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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Appeal from the 

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 19 CH 12892 

The Honorable 

Anna Helen Demacopoulos, 

Judge, Presiding. 

JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices C.A. Walker and Tailor concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Steven Owen, appeals from the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment in 

favor of defendant, Village of Maywood (Village), on his breach of contract and declaratory 

judgment action. Plaintiff, a former firefighter who was injured in the line of duty and was 

pensioned in 2015, sought family insurance coverage for his wife, whom he married in May 

2019, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). On appeal, plaintiff contends that 

the circuit court erred by (1) finding that defendant did not have to provide family health 
No. 1-22-0350 

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insurance for his spouse, and (2) denying his claim for damages under the Wage Payment and 

Collection Act (Wage Payment Act) (820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 2018)) and attorney fees 

under the Attorneys Fees in Wage Actions Act (Wage Actions Act) (705 ILCS 225/0.01 et seq.

(West 2018)). For the following reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 A. Factual Background 

¶ 4 The underlying facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff was employed as a firefighter/EMT for 

defendant from August 12, 2002, until he was injured in the line of duty on January 5, 2014. 

On August 17, 2017, the circuit court of Cook County found that plaintiff was entitled to a line 

of duty disability pension, retroactive to October 11, 2015. 

¶ 5 The firefighter’s union and defendant executed a CBA on June 2, 2015, which provided, 

among other things, benefits for firefighters who sustained line of duty disabilities. As part of 

his disability pension, plaintiff received payments for his healthcare premiums under article 16 

of the CBA. Article 16, titled “Pension Benefits,” provides in relevant part: 

“The Village shall pay the medical insurance premiums for employees injured in the 

line of duty. Upon certification of the Maywood Fireman’s Pension Board that the 

employee is being pensioned with an on-the-job medical pension pursuant to Illinois State 

Statutes, the Village agrees to pay the entire amount of the individual or, where applicable, 

family medical insurance in an amount not to exceed the cost paid by the Village for the

employee and his dependents in this category. 

In the event an employee receives a pension other than a duty related medical disability 

pension from the Maywood Fireman’s Pension Board, the Village agrees to pay 50% of 
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the medical insurance in an amount not to exceed the cost paid by the Village on the date 

pensioned.” 

¶ 6 The CBA was valid from May 1, 2014, until April 30, 2018. The CBA provided that it 

would continue in effect every year thereafter unless terminated by the parties; however, the 

record does not contain information as to whether or when the CBA was subsequently 

terminated. 

¶ 7 Plaintiff got married on May 11, 2019, and requested that his insurance coverage be 

changed from single coverage to family coverage. On June 6, 2019, the Village, through its 

attorney, denied plaintiff’s request. 

¶ 8 B. Procedural Background 

¶ 9 Plaintiff filed his initial complaint for breach of contract and declaratory judgment on 

November 6, 2019. The complaint was dismissed on defendant’s motion on August 20, 2020, 

and plaintiff was given leave to refile. Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint on September 

10, 2020. Count I alleged breach of contract for defendant’s refusal to provide family health 

care benefits for plaintiff’s wife and stepchild under the CBA. Count II sought a declaratory 

judgment for attorney fees under the Wage Actions Act because plaintiff made a demand for 

payment of the health insurance premiums to defendant in writing at least three days before 

the action was brought. Count III sought a declaratory judgment for the health insurance 

premiums as benefits that plaintiff was entitled to as part of his compensation under article 16 

of the CBA. Plaintiff sought the amount paid for family insurance premiums from May 2019 

through the resolution of the case, in addition to his attorney fees. 

¶ 10 Defendant filed a section 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)) motion to dismiss the 

first amended complaint on October 8, 2020. However, the circuit court denied the motion to 
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dismiss on December 17, 2020. Subsequently, the parties filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment on December 6, 2021. 

¶ 11 Plaintiff argued that his motion for summary judgment should be granted because the 

language of the CBA did not limit the coverage to an amount “on the date pensioned” for line 

of duty disability claims like his. Conversely, the CBA did limit the benefit coverage for 

nonduty disability claims to “an amount not to exceed the cost paid by the Village on the date 

pensioned.” Plaintiff maintained that the Village did not have a valid excuse for its refusal to 

pay his family health care premiums because it was undisputed that he suffered a duty related 

disability entitling him to benefits of the contract and the CBA was clear and unambiguous 

that defendant was responsible for the premiums for single or “where applicable, family 

medical insurance.” Plaintiff asserted that family coverage became applicable when he got 

married and thus he was entitled to summary judgment. 

¶ 12 Defendant, on the other hand, contended in its motion for summary judgment that it was 

entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff’s right to single postemployment health 

insurance coverage under the CBA became fixed when he was granted his line of duty 

disability pension and he had no vested right to change plans to family coverage four years 

later after he got married. Defendant further noted that the CBA that granted plaintiff’s benefits 

expired prior to plaintiff’s marriage. Additionally, defendant argued that even if plaintiff was 

entitled to change his postemployment health insurance plan, postemployment health 

insurance premiums were not wages earned, due, and owing under the Wage Actions Act nor 

was the Wage Payment Act implicated because postemployment health insurance benefits 

were not wages or earned benefits. Defendant maintained that plaintiff was no longer an 

employee of the Village and no longer covered by the CBA when he got married and requested 
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a change to his postemployment health insurance benefits more than three years after receiving

such benefits. 

¶ 13 After a hearing on the motions, the circuit court granted summary judgment in defendant’s 

favor on plaintiff’s first amended complaint on February 17, 2022, “for the reasons stated in 

open court.” Plaintiff filed his timely notice of appeal on March 14, 2022. 

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On appeal, plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred by (1) finding that defendant did 

not have to provide family health insurance for his spouse and (2) denying his claim for 

damages under the Wage Payment Act (820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 2018)) and attorney fees 

under the Wage Actions Act (705 ILCS 225/0.01 et seq. (West 2018)). 

¶ 16 A. Standard of Review 

¶ 17 This case is before us on the entry of summary judgment in defendant’s favor after the 

parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Since the parties filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment, they conceded that no material questions of fact existed and that only a 

question of law existed that the court could decide based on the record. Best Buy Stores, L.P. 

v. Department of Revenue, 2020 IL App (1st) 191680, ¶ 12. However, the mere filing of crossmotions for summary judgment does not conclusively establish that there is no issue of material 

fact, nor is the circuit court obligated to enter summary judgment for either party. Id.

¶ 18 Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact, and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nine Group II, LLC v. Liberty 

International Underwriters, Inc., 2020 IL App (1st) 190320, ¶ 34; 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 

2020). A genuine issue of material facts exists where the facts are disputed or where reasonable 

minds could draw different inferences from the undisputed facts. Nine Group II, 2020 IL App 
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(1st) 190320, ¶ 34. Summary judgment is a drastic measure and should be granted only if the 

movant’s right to judgment is free and clear from doubt. Id. In appeals from summary judgment 

rulings, our review is de novo. Id. We review the judgment, not the reasoning of the circuit 

court, and we may affirm on any grounds in the record, regardless of whether the circuit court 

relied on those grounds or whether its reasoning was correct. Best Buy, 2020 IL App (1st) 

191680, ¶ 12. 

¶ 19 We further note that plaintiff has not filed a report of proceedings from the hearing on the 

cross-motions for summary judgment. However, this does not preclude our review because we 

are considering only materials included in the appellate record and we are reviewing the ruling 

and not the reasoning of the circuit court. Harlin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 369 Ill. App. 3d 27, 

31-32 (2006). 

¶ 20 B. Interpretation of the CBA 

¶ 21 Here the parties dispute the meaning of the terms contained in the CBA. The interpretation 

of a contract presents a question of law subject to de novo review in accordance with the 

general rules applicable to contract interpretation. Ritacca Laser Center v. Brydges, 2018 IL 

App (2d) 160989, ¶ 15. Our primary goal in interpreting a contract is to give effect to the intent 

of the parties. Id. When the words of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given 

their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Id. When the language of the contract is susceptible 

to more than one reasonable meaning, it is ambiguous, and the court can consider extrinsic 

evidence to determine the parties’ intent. Id. However, the parties’ disagreement on the 

meaning of a contract term does not, by itself, make that term ambiguous. Id. Rather, ambiguity 

arises only when the language has more than one reasonable interpretation. Id.
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¶ 22 In this case, plaintiff contends that the terms of the CBA entitled him to family insurance 

when he got married. He argues that defendant admits that the intent of the CBA was to provide 

continued health care coverage for firefighters and their families who were injured in the line 

of duty, similar to those provided in the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (820 ILCS 320/1 

et seq. (West 2020)). Plaintiff’s argument hinges on the use of the word “continue” in relation 

to coverage for an injured employee or his family. He points to language within article 16 of 

the CBA that provides for continued benefits for employees injured in the line of duty and their 

families and argues that the language does not limit coverage to an amount “on the date 

pensioned” for line of duty disability claims. Instead, plaintiff maintains that because article 

16 did not provide an explicit limitation for insurance benefits to the date pensioned in the line 

of duty disability provision, when he married in May 2019, family coverage became 

applicable. As such, it was a breach of contract for defendant to deny family coverage under 

the CBA.

¶ 23 We have reviewed the CBA and conclude that plaintiff’s argument is without merit. As 

noted above, the applicable paragraph in article 16 of the CBA reads as follows: 

“The Village shall pay the medical insurance premiums for employees injured in the 

line of duty. Upon certification of the Maywood Fireman’s Pension Board that the 

employee is being pensioned with an on-the-job medical pension pursuant to Illinois State 

Statutes, the Village agrees to pay the entire amount of the individual or, where applicable, 

family medical insurance in an amount not to exceed the cost paid by the Village for the 

employee and his dependents in this category.” 

¶ 24 Plaintiff argues that there is no language in that paragraph limiting full coverage of his 

health insurance premiums to the date his pension began. Instead, he claims that because the 
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paragraph provides for individual coverage or family coverage where applicable, he was 

entitled to change his medical coverage once he got married. Plaintiff’s interpretation of that 

provision is incomplete as it completely ignores the beginning of the sentence at issue. 

¶ 25 Contrary to plaintiff’s interpretation, the sentence at issue in article 16 of the CBA reveals 

that there is a condition precedent, or limiting language, at the beginning of the sentence, which 

establishes the vesting period for benefits to employees who receive on-the-job medical 

pensions. Specifically, the sentence begins as follows: “[u]pon certification of the Maywood 

Fireman’s Pension Board that the employee is being pensioned with an on-the-job medical 

pension.” That wording establishes a contingency for the vesting of health insurance premiums 

for employees with on-the-job medical pensions, namely certification by the pension board 

that the employee will receive an on-the-job medical pension. 

¶ 26 A condition precedent is defined as a condition in which performance by one party is 

required before the other party is obligated to perform. Midwest Builder Distributing, Inc. v. 

Lord & Essex, Inc., 383 Ill. App. 3d 645, 668 (2007). When contracts contain express 

conditions precedent, strict compliance with such conditions is required. Id. It is well 

established where a contract contains a condition precedent, the contract does not become 

enforceable or effective until the condition is performed, or the contingency occurs. Id.

¶ 27 We cannot ignore the clear contingency at the beginning of the sentence, despite plaintiff’s 

arguments. Where a contract is unambiguous, its express provisions govern and its language, 

as a whole, is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. O’Shield v. Lakeside Bank, 335 Ill. 

App. 3d 834, 839 (2002). The parties’ intent is ascertained from this clear language, and the 

parties’ rights under the contract are limited by the terms expressed therein. Id. Here, the 

express provision in article 16 of the CBA which governs the payment of health insurance 
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premiums for employees with on-the-job medical pensions requires a certification by the 

Pension Board before defendant is obligated to pay. Further, the language “where applicable” 

in relation to family medical insurance clearly refers to the applicable status at the time of the 

certification. This is further apparent when the entire provision is read as a whole. Article 16 

further states, in addition to the condition precedent, that it would pay medical insurance for 

pensioned employees “in an amount not to exceed the cost paid by the Village for the employee 

and his dependents in this category.” The CBA provides in article 15 that defendant pays 85% 

of the medical insurance costs of full-time employees and the employee is responsible for 

paying 15%. As noted above, plaintiff was single throughout his employment and remained so 

at the time he was pensioned. Adopting plaintiff’s interpretation of article 16 would make 

defendant’s cost for plaintiff’s pension medical insurance costs exceed the cost paid, which 

would be a direct contradiction to that provision. Plaintiff’s interpretation would render this 

language meaningless. Agreements are interpreted as a whole, giving meaning and effect to 

every provision when possible, and a court will not interpret the agreement in a way that would 

nullify provisions or render them meaningless. Regency Commercial Associates, LLC v. 

Lopax, Inc., 373 Ill. App. 3d 270, 275 (2007). 

¶ 28 We therefore conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of article 16 is that the 

applicable period for the calculation of payment of the medical insurance premiums is when 

the pension board certifies that the employee will receive an on-the-job medical pension per 

the plain language of the contract. Plaintiff was unmarried when his pension status was 

certified in 2017 as an on-the-job medical pension (retroactive to October 2015). As such, 

defendant was obligated to fully pay his individual medical insurance premiums, which it has 

done and continues to do. Plaintiff’s marriage in May 2019 occurred several years after the 
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certification of his pension status. Under the provisions of article 16, plaintiff was not entitled 

to change from individual to family medical insurance because such status was not applicable 

when the certification was made. He was single at the time of certification and did not marry 

until after the applicable CBA expired, and thus there was no way for him to create or establish 

a new right to family coverage. 

¶ 29 We conclude as a matter of law that defendant did not have a contractual obligation to 

reimburse plaintiff for family medical insurance premiums paid since 2019 and that summary 

judgment was properly granted in defendant’s favor on count I of the first amended complaint.

¶ 30 C. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims Under the Wage Payment Act and Wage Actions Act

¶ 31 Plaintiff’s remaining claims fall under the Wage Payment Act and the Wage Actions Act. 

Specifically, plaintiff contends that the difference between the single and family health 

insurance premiums qualified as wages due under the Wage Payment Act (820 ILCS 115/2 

(West 2018)), and additionally that he is entitled to attorney fees under the Wage Actions Act 

(705 ILCS 225/1 (West 2018)) because this was an action for wages. We disagree.

¶ 32 The purpose of the Wage Payment Act is to provide employees with a cause of action for 

the timely payment of earned wages or final compensation. Majmudar v. House of Spices 

(India), Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 130292, ¶ 11. To establish a claim under the Wage Payment 

Act, a plaintiff must show that wages or final compensation are due to him as an employee 

from an employer under an employment contract or agreement. Id. Payments to separated 

employees are termed “final compensation,” which is defined as wages, salaries, earned 

commissions, earned bonuses, and the monetary equivalent of earned vacation and earned 

holidays, and any other compensation owed the employee by the employer pursuant to an 

employment contract or agreement. Id.
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¶ 33 Similarly, the Wage Actions Act applies to actions for wages earned, due and owing 

according to the terms of employment and allows an employee to recover reasonable attorney 

fees. 705 ILCS 225/1 (West 2018)). 

¶ 34 Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under either statute. It goes without saying that a person 

cannot recover wages, final compensation, or wage supplements to which they were not 

entitled or that the employer was not obligated to pay. See McCaffrey v. Village of Hoffman 

Estates, 2021 IL App (1st) 200395, ¶ 50. Here, as discussed above, plaintiff was not entitled 

to have defendant pay health insurance premiums for his family based on his subsequent 

marriage because he was not married at the time his pension benefits vested. Because plaintiff 

was not entitled to have defendant pay family health insurance premiums under the CBA, his 

claim under the Wage Payment Act fails as a matter of law.

¶ 35 It follows then that plaintiff’s claim under the Wage Actions Act is also precluded as 

defendant did not owe plaintiff any wages or other earned benefits under the terms of the CBA. 

We therefore conclude that summary judgment was properly entered on plaintiff’s claims in 

counts II and III of the first amended complaint. 

¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment in favor 

of defendant against plaintiff and the denial of plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

¶ 38 Affirmed.
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Owen v. Village of Maywood, 2023 IL App (1st) 220350 

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 19-CH12892; the Hon. Anna Helen Demacopoulos, Judge, presiding. 

Attorneys

for

Appellant:

Thomas S. Radja Jr., of Collins Radja & Hartwell, of Palatine, 

for appellant. 

Attorneys

for

Appellee:

Jason A. Guisinger, Colleen M. Shannon, and Michael T. 

Jurusik, of Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, Ltd., of Chicago, and 

Michael J. McGrath, of Odelson, Sterk, Murphey, Frazier & 

McGrath, Ltd., of Evergreen Park, for appellee.