MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020 ME	142

Docket: Pen-20-48

Argued: November	18,	2020

Decided: December	22,	2020

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

JOHN	DE	ST.	CROIX

GORMAN,	J.

[¶1]		In	March	of	2018,	John	De	St.	Croix	locked	two	people into	the	cargo	

area	of	a	box	 truck	and	 then	set	 the	 truck	on	 fire.	 Both	of	 the	people	locked	

inside	the	truck	died.	 In	March	of	2019,	a	jury	found	De	St.	Croix	guilty	of	one	

count	 of	 intentional,	 knowing,	 or	 depraved	 indifference	 murder,	 17-A M.R.S.	

§ 201(1)(A),	 (B)	 (2020);	 one	 count	 of	 depraved	 indifference	 murder,	

17-A M.R.S.	 §	 201(1)(B);	 and	 one	 count	 of	 arson	 (Class	 A),	 17-A M.R.S.	

§ 802(1)(A)	 (2020),	 for	 those	 actions.	 	 Almost	 a	 year	 later,	 the	 trial	 court

(Penobscot	County,	A. Murray,	J.)	sentenced	De	St.	Croix	to	two	life	terms	for	the	

murders	 and	 a	 concurrent	 thirty-year	 sentence	 for	 the	 arson.	 	 De	 St.	 Croix	

appeals	from	the	judgment	and	the	sentences,	and	we	affirm	both.	
2

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]		Viewing	 the	evidence	in	 the	light	most	favorable	 to	 the	State,	 the	

jury	rationally	could	have	found	the	following	facts beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.		

See	 State	 v.	 Gatto,	 2020	 ME	 61,	 ¶	 16,	 232	 A.3d	 228.	 	 On	 March	 28,	 2018,	

De St. Croix locked	Michael	Bridges	and	Desiree	York	in	the	cargo	area	of	a box	

truck,	gathered	camping	fuel	and	cardboard,	and	started a	fire	under	the	truck.		

For	twelve	minutes,	as the	fire	engulfed	the	truck,	De	St.	Croix	stood	watching,

listening	to	Bridges	and	York	screaming	for	help	and	banging	on	the	inside	of	

the	truck	walls;	only	then	did	De	St.	Croix	call	9-1-1.		Bridges	and	York	died	as	

a	result	of	smoke	inhalation	and	thermal	injuries	from	the	fire.		

[¶3]	 	 De	 St.	 Croix	 was	 indicted	 for	 intentional	 or	 knowing	 murder	 or	

depraved	indifference	murder,	17-A	M.R.S.	§	201(1)(A),	(B),	 for	 the	killing	of	

Bridges;	depraved	indifference	murder,	17-A	M.R.S.	§	201(1)(B),	for	the	killing	

of	York;	and	arson	(Class	A),	17-A M.R.S.	§	802(1)(A).1		He	pleaded	not	guilty	to	

the charges.		

[¶4]		After	 a	 four-day	 trial,	a	jury	 found	De	St.	Croix	guilty	 of	all	three

counts.		The	court	sentenced	De	St.	Croix	to	life	in	prison	for	each	of	the	murders	

 1		De	St.	Croix	was	also	charged	with	two	counts	of	felony	murder	(Class	A),	17-A	M.R.S.	§	202(1)	

(2020);	those	counts	were	eventually	dismissed.		
3

and	 to	a	concurrent	thirty	 years in	prison	 for	arson.		The	court	also	 ordered	

De St.	Croix	to	pay	$2,294.46	in	restitution.		De	St.	Croix’s timely	appeal from

his	conviction is based	solely	on	his contention	that	the	court	erred	by	refusing	

to	excuse	for	cause	a	potential	juror.		See 15	M.R.S.	§	2115	(2020);	M.R.	App.	P.	

2B(b)(1).		We	are	not	persuaded by	 that	argument,	and	we	do	not	address	it

further.		See State	v.	Carey,	2019	ME	131,	¶¶	14-15,	214	A.3d	488;	State	v.	Diana,	

2014 ME	45,	¶ 22,	89	A.3d	132;	State	v.	Rollins,	2008	ME	189,	¶¶ 11-13,	961	

A.2d	 546;	 M.R.U. Crim.	 P.	 24(b).	 The	 Sentence	 Review	 Panel granted

De St. Croix’s	application	for	review	of	his	sentence, see 15	M.R.S.	§§	2151-2153	

(2020);	M.R.	App.	P.	20, and	we	address	his challenge	 to	his	sentence	below.		

State	v.	De	St. Croix,	No.	SRP-20-49	(Me.	Sent.	Rev.	Panel	Mar.	13,	2020).		

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶5]	 	 A	 court	 crafting a	 murder	 sentence	 must complete	 two	 steps.		

17-A M.R.S.	 §	 1252-C	 (2018);2 State	 v.	 Sweeney,	 2019	 ME	 164,	 ¶	 17 &	 n.5,	

221 A.3d	 130.	 	 “First,	 the	 court	 determines	 the	 basic	 term	 of	 imprisonment	

based	on	an	objective	consideration	of	the	particular	nature	and	seriousness	of	

the	 crime.”	 	 Sweeney,	 2019	 ME	 164,	 ¶	 17,	 221 A.3d	 130	 (quotation	 marks	

 2		Title	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1252-C (2018) has	since	been	repealed	and	replaced,	but	both	versions	of	the	

sentencing	 statute	 set	 out	 the	 same	 steps.	 	 P.L.	 2019,	 ch.	 113,	 §§	 A-1,	 A-2 (emergency,	 effective	

May 16,	2019)	(codified	at	17-A M.R.S.	§	1602	(2020)).
4

omitted);	 see 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1252-C(1).	 	 Second,	 the	 court	 determines	 the	

maximum	 period	 of	 incarceration	 based	 on	 “all	 other	 relevant	 sentencing	

factors,	both	aggravating	and	mitigating,	appropriate	to	that	case,	 [including]	

the	character	of	the	offender	and	the	offender’s	criminal	history,	the	effect	of	

the	offense	on	the	victim	and	the	protection	of	the	public	interest.”		17-A	M.R.S.	

§	1252-C(2);	see Sweeney,	2019	ME	164,	¶	17,	221 A.3d	130.		We	 review	 the	

court’s	basic	sentence	de	novo	for	a	misapplication	of	legal	principles,	and	we	

review	 its final	 maximum	 sentence	 for	 an	 abuse	 of	 discretion.	 	 Sweeney,	

2019 ME	164,	¶	17,	221	A.3d	130.

[¶6]		“A	person	convicted	of	the	crime	of	murder	must	be	sentenced	to	

imprisonment	 for	 life	 or	 for	 any	 term	 of	 years	 that	 is	 not	 less	 than	 25.”		

17-A M.R.S.	§	1251(1)	(2018).3		As	we	held	more	than	thirty years	ago,	however,	

“[t]he	imposition	of	a	life	sentence	has	such	a	serious	impact	on	the	offender	so	

different	from	the	impact	of a	sentence	for	a	term	of	years	that	a	life	sentence	

is	 never	 justified	 unless	 the	 murder	 is	 accompanied	 by	 aggravating	

circumstances.” State	v.	Shortsleeves,	580	A.2d	145,	149	(Me.	1990)	(alteration	

 3		Title	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1251	(2018) has	since	been	repealed	and	replaced,	but	the	new	sentencing	

statute	contains	the	same	requirements.		P.L.	2019,	ch.	113,	§§	A-1,	A-2	(emergency,	effective	May	16,	

2019) (codified	at	17-A	M.R.S.	 §	 1603	 (2020));	see	 State	 v.	Hardy,	489	A.2d	 508,	 512	 (Me.	 1985)

(holding	 that	 “the	 wrongdoer	 must	 be	 punished	 pursuant	 to	 the	 law	 in	 effect	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	

offense”	rather	than	at	the	time	of	sentencing).
5

omitted)	(quotation	marks	omitted).		Those aggravating	circumstances	include,	

but	are	not	limited	to,	matters	involving	premeditation-in-fact;	multiple	deaths;	

murder	by	a	person	who	has	already	been	convicted	of	a	homicide	or	any	other	

crime	involving	the	use	of	deadly	force	against	a	person;	murder	accompanied	

by	torture,	sexual	abuse,	or	extreme	cruelty;	murder	committed	by	an	inmate	

in	a	penal	institution;	murder	of	a	law	enforcement	officer	who	is	performing	

his	or	her	duties;	and	murder	of	a	hostage.		Id.	at 149-50; State	v.	Waterman,	

2010	 ME	 45,	 ¶ 44	 &	 n.5,	 995	 A.2d	 243	 (“The	 Shortsleeves list	 is	 neither	

exhaustive	nor	all-inclusive.”); State	v.	Koehler,	2012 ME	93,	¶	34,	46	A.3d	1134.

The	factors	set	out	in	Shortsleeves provide	“guidelines	to	assist	[trial	courts]	in	

placing	murderous	behavior	along	a	continuum.”		State	v. Wilson,	669	A.2d	766,	

768	(Me.	1996).

[¶7]		Here,	the	court	set	De	St.	Croix’s	basic	sentence	for	both	murders	at	

life	 imprisonment	 based	 on	 the	 application	 of	 two	 of	 the	 aggravating	

circumstances	 named	 in	 Shortsleeves:	 premeditation-in-fact	 and	 extreme	

cruelty.		De	St.	Croix	challenges	both.

4		

 4		De	St.	Croix	makes	no	argument	regarding	his	thirty-year	sentence	for	arson.		
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A. Premeditation-in-Fact

[¶8]	 	 De	 St.	 Croix	 argues	 that	 the	 court	 erred	 by	 applying the	

premeditation-in-fact	 aggravating	 circumstance	 because	 (1)	 premeditation	

requires	more	 time	 and	 planning	 than	 occurred	 here	 and	 (2)	 premeditation	

cannot	be	applied as	to	depraved	indifference	murder	because	that	crime	has	

no	state-of-mind	element.		Neither argument	is persuasive.		

[¶9]		When	a court	determines	that	a murder	was	a	“planned,	deliberate	

killing,”	that	 court’s	 use	 of	 premeditation	 as	 an	 aggravating	 circumstance is

appropriate.	 Shortsleeves,	580	A.2d	at	149	(quotation	marks	omitted)	(naming	

a	“killing	for	hire”	as	one	example	of	a	premeditated	killing (quotation	marks	

omitted));	accord	State	v.	Cookson,	2003	ME	136,	¶	40,	837 A.2d	101.		Contrary	

to	De	St.	Croix’s	suggestion,	we	have never	stated	that	premeditation-in-fact is	

satisfied	only	by	a	particular	type	or	duration	of	planning.		Rather,	application	

of	 the	 premeditation	 aggravating	 circumstance	 to	 justify	 a	 life	 sentence	 has	

been	upheld	in	a	variety	of	situations.	 See, e.g.,	Waterman,	2010 ME	45,	¶¶	11,	

25,	 45,	 995	 A.2d	 243 (the	defendant’s angry	 phone	 conversation	 concerning	

one	of	the	victims	a	few	hours	before	he killed them);	State	v.	Nichols,	2013	ME	

71,	¶¶	4,	28,	32,	72	A.3d	503 (a	reference	to	killing	the	victim	in	the	days	leading	

up	 to the	 murder);	 Koehler,	 2012	 ME	 93,	 ¶¶ 4-5,	 26,	 36,	 38,	 46	 A.3d	 1134	
7

(a stabbing	motion	and	comments	the	defendant	made	regarding the	victim	the	

night	before	he	stabbed	her	to death);	State	v.	Dwyer,	2009	ME	127,	¶¶	2-4,	38,	

985	A.2d	469 (the	steps	the	defendant	took	to	set	up	a	meeting	with	the	victim	

on	 the	day	of	 the	murder);	State	v.	Holland,	2012 ME	2,	¶¶	5,	39,	43,	34	A.3d	

1130 (the	defendant’s	actions,	on	numerous	occasions	in	the	month	before	the	

murder,	of	walking	past	the	victim’s	home	and	patting his	side	to suggest	that	

he	 was	 armed); State	 v.	 Hayden,	 2014 ME	 31,	 ¶¶ 9,	 11,	 19,	 86	 A.3d	 1221

(statements	the	defendant	made	the	day	before	the	murders	that	he	was	going	

to	 kill	 the	 victims	 and	 the	 defendant’s	 efforts	 to	 obtain ammunition	 on	 that	

same	day);	Cookson,	2003	ME	136,	¶¶ 39-40,	44,	837	A.2d	101	(the	defendant’s	

efforts	in	the	few	days	before	the	murders	to	arrange	for	use	of	another	vehicle	

and	for	an	alibi).		

[¶10]		Although	De	St.	Croix	attempts	to	characterize	his	actions	as	based	

on	 a	 “momentary	 type	 of	 premeditation,	 if	 any	 at	 all,”	 that	 characterization	

simply	 does	 not	 comport	 with	 the	 court’s	 actual	 findings.	 	 Rather,	 the	 court	

deemed	De	St.	Croix’s	actions	“goal-directed	behavior”	that	“did	not	occur	in	the	

snap	of	the	fingers.”		The	court	noted	that	De St. Croix	“took	steps	to	lock	the	

people	in	and	then	took	.	.	.	about	a	half	hour	to	gather	the	materials	and	to	put	

them	in	a	position	underneath	the	truck	to	start	the	fire	and	feed	the	fire	.	.	.	,	
8

knowing	that	when	the	vehicle	was	locked	that	there	was	at	least	one	person	

definitely	in	there,	and	certainly	an	awareness	that	[York]	was	not	outside	the	

truck	at	the	time	that	happened.”		

[¶11]	 	 Further,	 although De	 St.	 Croix	 would	 have	 us declare that	 a	

determination	of	premeditation-in-fact	is tantamount	to	a	finding that	he	acted	

intentionally	in	murdering	York	as	well	as	Bridges,	premeditation	for	purposes	

of	sentencing	is	legally	distinct	from	intent	for	purposes	of	finding	guilt	of	the	

underlying	crime.

5		See	Shortsleeves,	580 A.2d	at	149	(“By	the	use	of	the	words	

‘in-fact,’	we	mean	to	differentiate	the	premeditation	to	which	we	refer	from	the	

legal	 fiction	 of	 premeditation	 recognized	 in	 some	 states	 in	 which	 the	

premeditation	 exists	 for	 only	 an	 instant	 of	 time	 before	 the	 actual	 killing.”

(quotation	marks	 omitted)).		An	intentional	act	is	committed	when	 “it	is	 the	

 5		Intentional	or	knowing	murder	is	committed	when	the	defendant	“[i]ntentionally	or	knowingly	

causes	the	death	of	another	human	being.”		17-A	M.R.S.	§	201(1)(A)	(2020).		Depraved	indifference	

murder	 is	 committed	 when	 the	 defendant	 “[e]ngages	 in	 conduct	 that	 manifests	 a	 depraved	

indifference	to	the	value	of	human	life	and	that	in	 fact	causes	the	death	of	another	human	being.”		

17-A	M.R.S.	§	201(1)(B)	(2020);	see State	v.	Cummings,	2017	ME	143,	¶	21,	166	A.3d	996 (stating	that	

intentional	or	knowing	murder	and	depraved	indifference	murder	may	be	charged	as	alternatives	in	

a	single	count,	and	 “a	unanimous	 verdict	can	be	 reached	even	if	individual	jurors	disagree	about	

whether	the	murder	was	an	intentional	or	knowing	murder	or	a	depraved	indifference	murder,	as	

long	as	the	evidence	presented	to	the	jury	is	sufficient	to	support	each	of	the	alternative	theories”	

(citation	omitted)).		Although	intent	is	not	a	required	element	of	depraved	indifference	murder,	that	

does	not	mean	that	depraved	indifference	murder	cannot be	committed	with	intent, only	 that	 the	

State	may	be	unable	to	prove	such	intent.		See Cummings,	2017	ME	143,	¶	20,	166	A.3d	996	(“Because	

direct	evidence	of	a	defendant's	intent	or	knowledge	can	be	difficult	to	obtain,	the	State	may	charge	

depraved	indifference	murder	as	an	alternative	to	intentional	or	knowing	murder,	in	a	single	count,	

in	cases	where	the	defendant’s	intent	is	not	known	when	the	defendant	is	charged.”).
9

person’s	 conscious	 object	 to	 cause	 [a	 particular]	 result,”	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 35	

(2020),	 and	 only	 the	 fact-finder	 (here,	 the	 jury)	 can	 determine,	 beyond	 a	

reasonable	 doubt,	 whether	 a	 person	 acted	 with	 such	 intent	 for	 purposes	 of	

determining	guilt	based	on	evidence	admitted	in	accordance	with	evidentiary	

rules,	17-A	M.R.S.	§	201(1)(A);	State	v.	Cummings,	2017	ME	143,	¶	21,	166	A.3d	

996.	 	 Premeditation-in-fact,	 in	 contrast,	 is	 defined	 by	 the	 planning	 and	

preparation	that	goes	into	some	murders,	Shortsleeves,	580	A.2d	at	149-50,	and	

the	 sentencing	 court—rather	 than	 the	 jury—makes	 such	 factual	 findings	 for	

sentencing	purposes	by	a	preponderance	of	 the	evidence	based	on	whatever	

information	 the	 court	 deems	 reliable,	 see	 State	 v.	 Hutchinson,	 2009 ME	 44,	

¶¶ 34-38,	969 A.2d	923;	State	v.	Witmer,	2011	ME	7,	¶	20,	10	A.3d	728	(“Courts	

have	 broad	 discretion	 in	 determining	 what	 information	 to	 consider	 in	

sentencing; they	 are	 limited	 only	 by	 the	 due	 process	 requirement	 that	 such	

information	 must	 be	 factually	 reliable	 and	 relevant.	 	 A	 sentencing	 court	 has	

discretion	 to	 determine	 the	 appropriate	 procedure	 for	 ensuring	 the	 factual	

reliability	 of	 sentencing	information.”	 (alteration	 omitted)	 (citation	 omitted)	

(quotation	marks	omitted)).6

 6 Because	 the	 court’s	 finding	 of	 premeditation-in-fact	in	 sentencing	is	 unrelated	 to	 the	jury’s	

finding	 of	intent	in	determining	 guilt	as	 to	 the	 underlying	 crime,	we	 disagree	with	De	 St.	 Croix’s	

contention—referenced	only	briefly	in	a	footnote	of	his	brief—that	the	court	violated	his	due	process	

rights	 by	 finding	 the	 element	 of	intent	in	 contradiction	 to	 the	 jury’s	 finding	 of	 guilt	 that	 did	 not	
10

[¶12]		In	sum,	De	St.	Croix	offers	no	authority	to	support	his	proposition	

that	his	actions in	planning	these	two	murders—locking the	victims	inside the	

truck,	gathering materials,	starting and	coaxing the	 fire,	and	standing nearby	

while listening to	 their	 screams—cannot	 constitute	 premeditation-in-fact	 as	

that	term	is	used	in Shortsleeves.		We	conclude	that	the	trial	court	committed	

no	error	by	applying	premeditation-in-fact	as	an	aggravating	circumstance	to	

justify	imposition	of	a	basic	sentence	of	life	in	prison for	both	counts	of	murder.		

See Shortsleeves,	580 A.2d	at	149-50.

B. Extreme	Cruelty

[¶13]	 	 A	 court	 may	 impose a	 life	 sentence	 upon	 a	 finding	 that	 the	

defendant	 committed	 the	 murder	“accompanied	 by	 torture,	 sexual	 abuse	 or	

other	extreme	cruelty	inflicted	upon	the	victim.”		Id. at	150 (quotation	marks	

omitted).		“Imposition	of	a	life	sentence	on	the	basis	of	extreme	cruelty	alone	

will	 require	 a	 showing	 that	 the	 viciousness	 of	 the	 murder	 differed	 in	 a	

substantial	degree	from	that	which	inheres	in	the	crime	of	murder.”		State	v.	St.	

Pierre,	584	A.2d	618,	621	(Me. 1990).		De	St.	Croix	essentially	argues	that	his	

 

necessarily	include	a	finding	of	intent.		See Libby v.	State,	2007	ME	80,	¶	6	n.9,	926	A.2d	724	(“[W]hen	

a	trial	judge	exercises	[his	or	her]	discretion	to	select	a	specific	sentence	within	a	defined	range,	the	

defendant	has	no	right	to	a	jury	determination	of	the	facts	that	the	judge	deems	relevant.”	(quotation	

marks	omitted));	see	also State	v.	Jandreau,	2017	ME	44,	¶	14,	157	A.3d	239 (“Issues	adverted	to	in	a	

perfunctory	 manner,	 unaccompanied	 by	 some	 effort	 at	 developed	 argumentation,	 are	 deemed	

waived.”	(alteration	omitted)	(quotation	marks	omitted)).		
11

crime	was	not	vicious	enough	to	qualify	for	application	of	the	extreme	cruelty	

aggravating	circumstance.7		

[¶14]		Here,	the	court	found	extreme	cruelty	based	on	De	St.	Croix	having	

“lock[ed]	the	box	truck	absolutely	knowing	there’s	somebody	inside,	setting	it	

afire,	and	listening	as	two	people	are	screaming,	with	no	reconsideration	of	the	

action	before	these	people	died,	absolutely	.	.	.	no	effort	to	stop	this	.	.	.	.	They	

didn’t	 die	immediately	 .	 .	 .	 .”		The	 court	 concluded,	 “I	 do	 find	 that	 these	 acts	

substantially	exceed	the	degree	of	viciousness	inherent	in	the	crime	of	murder.”		

[¶15]		Contrary	to	De	St.	Croix’s	contention,	his	actions—as	analyzed	by	

the	court	in	sentencing—are	not	appreciably	less	vicious than	 those	in	other	

matters	 in	 which	 we	 have upheld	 the	 application	 of	 the	 extreme	 cruelty	

aggravating	 circumstance	 to	 justify	 a	 life	 sentence.8	 	 See,	 e.g.,	 Hutchinson,	

2009 ME	44,	¶¶	13,	40-43,	969	A.2d	923	(in	addition	to	executing	a	fatal	chest	

wound	and	a	sexual	assault,	the	defendant	stabbed	the	victim’s	face	over	fifty	

 7	 	 The	 presence	 of	 one	 aggravating	 circumstance	 alone	 is	 a	 sufficient	 basis	 to	 impose	 a	 life	

sentence.	 	 State	 v.	Waterman,	 2010	ME	 45,	 ¶	 44,	 995	 A.2d	243.	 	Although	we	 need	 not	 consider	

extreme	cruelty	given	our	agreement	with	the	application	of	the	premeditation-in-fact	aggravating	

circumstance,	we	do	so	for	the	sake	of	completeness.

8	 	 De	 St.	 Croix’s	 reliance	 on	 other	 cases	 involving	 a	 death	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 arson	 is	 also	

misplaced.		Neither	State	v.	Smith,	675	A.2d	93	(Me.	1996),	nor		State	v.	Joy,	452 A.2d	408	(Me.	1982),	

involved	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 sentence	 imposed.	 	 Both	 cases	 are	 also	 easily	 distinguished	 in	 that,	

although	the	victims	died	as	the	result	of	fires	set	by	the	defendants,	none	of	the	victims	in	Smith or	

Joy was	locked	inside	a	small	space	with	no	means	of	escape	while	the	defendant	stood	outside	that	

space	listening	to	their	pleas	for	help	as	they	died.		Smith,	675	A.2d	at	95-96;	Joy,	452	A.2d	at	410.
12

times	with	 sufficient	 force	 that	 the	 knife	 tip	broke	 off	in	her	head);	Cookson,	

2003	ME	 136,	 ¶¶	2,	39,	44,	 837	 A.2d	 101	 (although	 each victim	died	 from	a	

single	gunshot	wound	to	the	head,	the	defendant	showed	the	adult	victim	the	

gun,	and	she was	 therefore	aware	 that	she	was	going	 to	die	at	his	hands	and	

also	would	have	 feared	 for	 the	 other	 victim,	 the	 twenty-one-month-old	child	

that	she was babysitting);	Wilson,	669	A.2d	at	769	(the	victim	was	bound	and	

gagged	by	 tape	and	asphyxiated	with	a	choker	chain,	 sexually	assaulted,	and	

conscious	for	some	portion	of	the	time	that	she	was	subjected	to	the	attack);	

Hayden,	2014 ME	31,	¶¶	5-6,	19,	86	A.3d	1221	 (the	 defendant	 shot	both	the	

mother	of	his	children	and	a	family	friend in	front	of	the children).

[¶16]		We	conclude	that, through its careful analysis of	the	aggravating	

circumstances	 of	 premeditation-in-fact	 and	 extreme	 cruelty,	 the	 trial	 court	

precisely	 complied	 with	 the	 legal	 principles	 that	 apply	 to	 setting	 the	 basic	

sentence.	 	 See	 Shortsleeves,	 580 A.2d	 at	 149-50;	 Nichols,	 2013	 ME	 71,	 ¶	 13,	

72 A.3d	503	(“A basic	sentence	will	survive	appellate	scrutiny	unless	it	appears	

to	err	in	principle.”	(alteration	omitted)	(quotation	marks	omitted)).		Contrary	

to De St. Croix’s	additional	contention,	we	also	discern	no	error	in	the	court’s	

determination	 and	 weighing	 of	 the	 applicable	 aggravating	 and	 mitigating	

factors	 in	 the	 second	 step	 of	 its sentencing	 analysis.	 	 See	 State	 v.	 Schofield,	
13

2006 ME	 101,	 ¶ 15,	 904	 A.2d	 409	 (refusing	 to	 disturb	 the	 sentence	 on	 the	

defendant’s	argument	that	the	court	did	not	assign	sufficient	weight	to	her	lack	

of	 criminal	 record	 as	 a	 mitigating	 factor);	 Shortsleeves,	 580	 A.2d	 at	 150-51	

(declining	 to	disturb	 the	court’s	determination	 that	 the	applicable	mitigating	

factors	did	not	require	a	reduction	in	the	basic	sentence);	see	also Waterman,	

2010	 ME	 45,	 ¶ 48,	 995 A.2d	 243	 (“In	 determining	 the	 appropriate	 degree	 of	

mitigation	 or	 aggravation	 of	 an	 offender’s	 basic	 sentence,	 the	 court	 may	

consider	 any	 evidence	 that	 is	 factually	 reliable	 and	 relevant.”	 (alteration	

omitted)	(quotation	marks	omitted)).		

[¶17]	 	In	 sum,	 De	 St.	 Croix’s	 sentence	 reflected	 the	 court’s	 thoughtful	

scrutiny of	the	particular	facts	of	this	case and was	imposed through	the	court’s	

faithful	adherence	 to	 the	 two-step	murder	sentencing	process.		We	therefore	

decline	to	disturb	De	St.	Croix’s	sentence.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	and	sentences affirmed.
14

Jeremy	Pratt,	Esq.(orally),	and	Ellen	Simmons,	Esq.,	Camden,	for	Appellant	John	

De	St.	Croix

Aaron	 M.	 Frey,	 Attorney	 General, and	 Lara	 Nomani,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen. (orally),	

Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Penobscot	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR-2018-1209

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY