*

Honorable Anthony A. Alaimo, Senior U.S. District Judge for

the Southern District of Georgia, sitting by designation. 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 94-2981.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Ronald Gene BARBOUR, Defendant-Appellant.

Dec. 12, 1995.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Florida. (No. 94-21-CR-ORL-22), Conway, Anne A.,

District Judge.

Before KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, HILL, Senior Circuit Judge, and

ALAIMO*

, Senior District Judge.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

Ronald Gene Barbour appeals his conviction and sentence for

threatening the President of the United States, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 871. He contends that the district court erred in denying

his motion to suppress evidence he alleges was taken in violation

of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694

(1966). Barbour also argues that at sentencing the district court

improperly used evidence of action taken prior to his threat to

kill the President, in order to support a six-level enhancement on

the ground that he demonstrated an intent to carry out this threat,

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(1). We affirm defendant's

conviction and sentence.

I.

On January 11, 1994, suffering from severe depression, Barbour

attempted suicide at his apartment in Florida. Before his attempt,
he had written a suicide note. After the attempt failed, he put

his gun and clothes in his car and drove toward West Virginia,

where he again intended to commit suicide. Barbour missed his

exit, however, and decided instead to drive to Washington, D.C. to

assassinate President Clinton. That same night, Barbour checked

into the Mt. Vee Motel in Alexandria, Virginia, where he stayed for

seven nights.

According to statements subsequently made by Barbour to Secret

Service agents, Barbour went to the Mall in Washington each day of

his trip, intending to shoot the President while the President was

jogging. Barbour also told the agents that he walked around the

White House several times and that he transported one hundred

rounds of ammunition to Washington. It had been Barbour's

intention to kill the President and to get himself killed in the

process. While in Washington, however, Barbour discovered that the

President was in Russia. On January 18, 1994, Barbour headed back

to Florida, and a few days later he sold his gun.

On January 29, 1994, Barbour invited a neighbor into his

apartment. Barbour told him about his journey to Washington. His

neighbor returned with his fiancee and a tape recorder. Barbour's

brother also was present. Barbour told these witnesses, as

recorded on tape, of his desire to kill the President. Over the

next few days, Barbour related the events of his trip to several

other people. At the urging of some of his neighbors, Barbour went

to the Veteran's Administration hospital (V.A.) on February 3, 1994

for psychiatric treatment.

On February 1, 1994, Secret Service agents began an
investigation based on information that someone had attempted to

assassinate the President. In the course of their investigation,

which eventually led them to Barbour, the agents saw Barbour's

suicide note and learned that he had attempted suicide. On

February 3, 1994, the agents were told that Barbour was going to

the V.A. to seek treatment for a mental problem. With this

information, the agents traveled to the V.A. While Secret Service

Special Agents John F. McKenna and Eugene L. Sveum met with Daniel

Doherty, head of the administration at the V.A. Clinic, Barbour was

in the lobby awaiting treatment.

Doherty agreed to assist the agents in finding Barbour. After

locating Barbour in the lobby, Doherty brought him to his office

where he was immediately joined by the special agents. According

to Barbour, McKenna and Sveum were identified as agents, and both

"quickly flashed their badge." The agents advised Barbour that

they wanted to talk to him about the information they had received

that he had traveled to Washington to attempt to assassinate

President Clinton. They also told him that they would help him

receive mental health treatment. Agent McKenna testified that he

took Barbour's personal history and in the process learned that

Barbour had once been committed to the Walter Reed Army Medical

Center after attempting suicide. After taking Barbour's history,

McKenna read him the Miranda warnings. Barbour told McKenna that

he understood his rights and indicated that he wished to talk to

the agents. At the time, Barbour indicated that he was aware that

it is a crime to attempt to kill the President. At the suppression

hearing, Barbour denied that Miranda warnings were ever recited,
 1

Barbour served as a military police officer. Additionally,

he received a liberal arts degree from Rollins College and took

correspondence courses in criminal justice. He testified that he

had read the Miranda opinion for one of these courses. 

but testified that, had they been read, he would have understood

them.1 The agents described Barbour as well-mannered, courteous

and cooperative throughout the entire interview. Barbour described

the Secret Service agents as extremely polite, courteous and

friendly, reminding him of "workers at Disney World."

Immediately after his interview with the agents, Barbour met

with Dr. DeCastro, who found him to be suicidal and in need of

immediate treatment. Pursuant to Florida law, Fla.Stat.Ann. §

394.463, Dr. DeCastro committed Barbour involuntarily to a private

mental health facility, Lakeside Alternatives.

Agent McKenna testified that on the next day, February 4,

1994, he visited Barbour at Lakeside Alternatives, presented him

with a Secret Service form entitled "Consent to Search," and

informed him of his constitutional right to refuse to give consent.

Barbour was cooperative and appeared to Agent McKenna to be logical

in his thinking. The consent to search form, which was read to

Barbour, authorized the agents to search his apartment and car and

to seize any contraband or evidence "in the nature of a threat

against the president." The form also indicated that no promises

were being made in exchange for Barbour's consent. Barbour signed

the form.

Agent McKenna returned to Lakeside Alternatives on February 7,

1994. He told Barbour that he wanted to ask him questions about

his trip to Washington, D.C., and, again, he read Barbour the
 2

The district court found that at the time of the February 3

and 4 meetings, Barbour was not taking the medications

subsequently prescribed for his depression. 

Miranda warnings. Barbour denied that he was given the Miranda

warnings. At this time, Barbour was taking Ativan and Lithium for

his depression.2

 Once again Barbour was cooperative, coherent, and

polite, and answered all questions asked.

The district court found that Barbour was read his Miranda

warnings on February 3 and 7, 1994, and that he understood his

rights. The court further found that Barbour was read the consent

to search form on February 4, 1994, and that he understood his

rights on that occasion as well. Finding no evidence that

Barbour's severe depression interfered with his ability to think

clearly or understand the charges being made against him, and that

on the facts of this case the promise of mental health treatment

was not coercive, the district court found that his statements were

not coerced and that the government had met its burden of proving

by a preponderance of the evidence that Barbour voluntarily waived

his rights. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69, 107

S.Ct. 515, 522-23, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).

II. Motion to Suppress

 The denial of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question

of law and fact. In determining whether Barbour's consent to

search was voluntary, we defer to the district court's findings of

fact unless clearly erroneous. See United States v. Blackman, 66

F.3d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir.1995). However, we review the district

court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. "The

district court's ultimate conclusion on the voluntariness of a
confession, or the waiver of Miranda rights, raises questions of

law to be reviewed de novo. " Id. (citing Beckwith v. United

States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1616-17, 48 L.Ed.2d 1

(1976); United States v. Parr, 716 F.2d 796, 817-18 (11th

Cir.1983)); see Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1426 (11th

Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1801, 131 L.Ed.2d

727 (1995). We base our determination on the "totality of the

circumstances," Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61

L.Ed.2d 197 (1979), construing the facts in the light most

favorable to the party prevailing below. United States v. Cure,

996 F.2d 1136, 1138 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----,

114 S.Ct. 1075, 127 L.Ed.2d 393 (1994).

Barbour alleges that he was never informed of his Miranda

rights. He also contends that even if he were informed of these

rights, he did not waive them "voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. He

claims that given his severe mental depression and medicated state,

Agent McKenna's promise to provide help in obtaining mental health

treatment was coercive.

 The threshold inquiry is whether Barbour was informed of his

Miranda rights. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654, 104

S.Ct. 2626, 2630, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-

70, 86 S.Ct. at 1624-26. The district court found that Barbour was

read his Miranda warnings on February 3 and 7. Barbour himself

admitted that he signed the "Consent to Search" form on February 4.

Because we conclude that the district court's determination is not

clearly erroneous, this threshold inquiry is satisfied. Thus, we
turn to Barbour's claim that his Miranda rights were not waived

"voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently."

In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d

410 (1986), the Supreme Court explained the two-part inquiry into

whether a defendant's waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary,

knowing, and intelligent.

First, the relinquishment of the right must have been

voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and

deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or

deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full

awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and

the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the

"totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation"

reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of

comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda

rights have been waived.

Id. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141 (quoting Fare, 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct.

2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197) (citations omitted).

 We begin with the first prong, whether the waiver was made

voluntarily. The fact that a defendant suffers a mental disability

does not, by itself, render a waiver involuntary; there must be

coercion by an official actor. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S.

at 169-70, 107 S.Ct. at 522-23; Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d at

1426; Purvis v. Dugger, 932 F.2d 1413, 1422-23 (11th Cir.1991),

cert. denied, 503 U.S. 940, 112 S.Ct. 1485, 117 L.Ed.2d 627 (1992).

Thus, the fact that Barbour was suffering severe depression does

not render his statements involuntary unless the agents took

advantage of his mental illness. In this case, the agents did no

more than offer to help Barbour obtain medical assistance, which he

in fact received. The district court found that the agents'

promise to help Barbour receive mental health treatment was not an

assurance that the entire matter would not be treated as a criminal
issue. This conclusion is supported by the testimony of Agent

McKenna, Barbour's own statement that he was aware that the agents

were investigating a charge that he had attempted to kill the

President, and his knowledge that this attempt was a crime.

Finally, Barbour described the agents as extremely polite and very

courteous. Absent any evidence of psychological or physical

coercion on the part of the agents, there is no basis for declaring

Barbour's statements and consent to search involuntary.

 We turn now to the second prong of the waiver analysis,

namely, whether the waiver was made with "a full awareness of both

the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the

decision to abandon it." Moran, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at

1141. Barbour appears to argue that because of his mental

condition and use of the drugs Lithium and Ativan, he was unaware

of the consequences of abandoning his rights, that is, he did not

abandon them knowingly and intelligently. Although a defendant's

impaired mental state (whether drug induced or otherwise) may

prevent that person from understanding the nature of his or her

waiver, Coleman, 30 F.3d at 1426, this is not the case here. The

district court found there was no evidence that Barbour's severe

depression interfered with his ability to think clearly or with his

understanding of the charges made against him. Likewise, the court

found that the Lithium and Ativan Barbour was taking on February 7

did not impair his ability to understand his rights on that day.

In fact, Barbour himself testified that had he been informed of his

Miranda rights he would have understood their meaning, and his

educational and military experience support this admission.
Because the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous,

we accept that Barbour was informed of his Miranda rights. Because

we also accept Barbour's own admission that he would have

understood his rights had they been read to him, we conclude that

Barbour voluntarily waived his rights and that he was aware of the

nature of these rights and the consequences of waiving them.

III. Sentence Enhancement

 The Sentencing Guidelines require a six-level enhancement

"[i]f the offense involved any conduct evidencing an intent to

carry out such threat." U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(1). Barbour argues

that this enhancement was incorrectly applied to his sentence by

the district judge.

 Whether Barbour's conduct evidenced an intent to carry out

his threat raises a mixed question of law and fact. Although we

review the district court's factual findings under a clearly

erroneous standard, United States v. Burton, 933 F.2d 916, 917

(11th Cir.1991), whether the facts evidence an intent to carry out

the threat is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Id.

Whether conduct that occurred prior to a threat may be considered

when determining if a defendant evidenced an intent to carry out

that threat is a pure question of law subject to de novo review.

Id.

Barbour contends that the conduct upon which the district

court based its application of the enhancement should not have been

considered because it occurred prior to his threat. Specifically,

Barbour argues that evidence of his January 11-18 trip to

Washington and the events that occurred there may not be used to
 3

The sentence was also overturned. Philibert, 947 F.2d at

1472. 

prove an intent to carry out a threat made on January 29 of that

same year.

 Barbour cites United States v. Philibert, 947 F.2d 1467, 1468

(11th Cir.1991), in which this court refused to uphold a six-level

enhancement under § 2A6.1(b)(1). Philibert involved a defendant's

threat to kill his supervisor. The first time the defendant made

such a threat, he said he did it "because he felt like it." Id. at

1468. Nine months after this first threat, the defendant purchased

guns, bayonets and ammunition. Id. Fifty-three days after

purchasing these weapons, the defendant telephoned his supervisor

and threatened his life. Id. at 1468-69. The district court based

the enhancement on the fact that the defendant had purchased the

weapons. This court refused to uphold the enhancement because

there was no evidence in the record

to suggest any connection whatever between appellant's

acquisition of firearms ... and any effort to carry out the

threat.... Indeed, a reasonable conclusion from the facts of

record is that [the appellant made the second threatening

call] "because he felt like it'; there is no evidence

whatever that he had any intention of carrying out the threat.

Id. at 1471. This Court added that if the defendant were

reconvicted,3

 the six-level enhancement should not be applied

unless there were additional evidence to justify the required

factual finding. Philibert requires that for a § 2A6.1(b)(1)

enhancement to be justified, there must be an evidentiary basis to

support the conclusion that the defendant's conduct evidenced an

intent to carry out the threat. The decision in Philibert did not,

however, rule out the use of pre-threat conduct in determining
 4

The facts of Hines are strikingly similar to those of the

present case. Hines had gone to Washington, armed with a gun, in

order to kill President Bush. He went to where he thought the

President was making an appearance, but the President was 45

miles away. He then left Washington. Over the course of the

next month, Hines told several people that he intended to kill

President Bush. 26 F.3d at 1472. 

whether a defendant intended to carry out his or her threat. See

United States v. Hines, 26 F.3d 1469, 1474 n. 2 (9th Cir.1994).

 Barbour also refers us to United States v. Hornick, 942 F.2d

105 (2nd Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1061, 112 S.Ct. 942, 117

L.Ed.2d 112 (1992), where the Second Circuit held that pre-threat

conduct may not be used to support an enhancement under §

2A6.1(b)(1). We follow the Ninth Circuit in declining to follow

Hornick. See United States v. Hines, 26 F.3d at 1474;4 see also

United States v. Gary, 18 F.3d 1123, 1128 (4th Cir.) (holding that

pre-threat conduct may form the basis of a § 2A6.1(b)(1)

enhancement), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 134, 130

L.Ed.2d 77 (1994). The guideline recognizes that "the seriousness

of [the threat] depends upon the defendant's intent and the

likelihood that the defendant would carry out the threat." §

2A6.1, comment. (backg'd.); see also Hines, 26 F.3d at 1474. If

the defendant's acts demonstrate both that he or she intends to act

on the threat and is, in fact, likely to do so, then whether those

acts occurred before or after the threat should make no difference.

It would make no sense to punish more severely the person who

threatens to kill the President while driving to the store to

purchase a gun than the person who makes the same threat on the way

home from the same store. See United States v. Harris, 763 F.Supp.

546, 551 n. 11 (M.D.Ala.1991).
 Despite our disagreement with the Second Circuit's

categorical rule in Hornick, however, we are sensitive to the

concern expressed by that court when it wrote:

If prior to the actual making of a threat, the government

might scour a defendant's past to unearth some incident that

might point to an intent on defendant's part to carry out a

threat he made later, an upward adjustment would become almost

automatic, and would bear only a tenuous relationship to the

primary conduct at issue—the threat itself.

Hornick, 942 F.2d at 108. The fact that a person has at some point

in life engaged in dangerous or even illegal activity is

insufficient to demonstrate that that person intended to carry out

any particular threat. The purpose of the enhancement is to punish

more severely the individual whose actions indicate an intent to

carry out the threat that serves as the basis for the underlying

conviction. It is not a general mandate to punish more severely

people with bad character or those generally more likely to carry

out their threats. This is the reason why the enhancement in

Philibert was reversed. Although there may be every reason to

think that a person who purchases weaponry is more likely to carry

out death threats than one who does not, the district court in

Philibert did not make the necessary further findings to support

the claim that there was a close nexus between the defendant's acts

and his threat.

 Because the evidence must support a direct connection between

the defendant's acts and his or her threat, pre-threat conduct

often may be less persuasive than post-threat conduct.

Nonetheless, we hold that under certain circumstances pre-threat

conduct may be used as evidence to demonstrate a defendant's intent

to carry out a threat. Factors a district court should consider in
determining the probative value of pre-threat conduct include the

following: the proximity in time between the threat and the prior

conduct, the seriousness of defendant's prior conduct, and the

extent to which the pre-threat conduct has progressed towards

carrying out the threat.

 In the present case, Barbour "was not just making idle

threats." Hines, 26 F.3d at 1474. Less than two weeks prior to

his threats, Barbour was in Washington, D.C., with one hundred

rounds of ammunition, waiting to assassinate the President. He

failed to carry out his plan only because the President never

arrived where Barbour was waiting, and he returned home only after

discovering the President was out of the country. Barbour never

deviated from his plan to kill the President; he was just denied

the opportunity. Thus, when Barbour made his threats after

returning home, there was every reason to conclude that he intended

to act on those threats and that he was likely to do so. Because

the record supports the district court's determination that Barbour

had evidenced an intent to carry out his threat, the six-level

enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(1) was properly

applied.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, Barbour's conviction and sentence

are AFFIRMED.