SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

673 

KA 12-00874 

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, PERADOTTO, AND CARNI, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FAHEEM ABDUL-JALEEL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER, NIXON PEABODY LLP

(BRIAN J. JACEK OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LEAH R. MERVINE OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J.

Piampiano, J.), rendered April 26, 2012. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon a jury verdict, of attempted murder in the second

degree and assault in the first degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

upon a jury verdict of attempted murder in the second degree (Penal

Law §§ 110.00, 125.25 [1]) and assault in the first degree (§ 120.10

[1]) arising from an incident in which he repeatedly stabbed his 13-

year-old cousin with a knife. Defendant contends that County Court

erred in denying his request for a missing witness charge with respect

to his cousin and his aunt. Even assuming, arguendo, that the court

erred in denying the request, we conclude that any error is harmless

inasmuch as the evidence of defendant’s guilt is overwhelming, and

there is no significant probability that defendant would have been

acquitted but for the error (see People v Fields, 76 NY2d 761, 763;

People v Thomas, 96 AD3d 1670, 1672, lv denied 19 NY3d 1002; see

generally People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242).

Contrary to defendant’s further contention, we conclude that the

court did not err in discharging a juror over his objection. It is

well established that the trial court is generally “accorded latitude

in making the findings necessary to determine whether a juror is

grossly unqualified under CPL 270.35” (People v Rodriguez, 71 NY2d

214, 219), and that “ ‘[a] determination whether a juror is . . .

grossly unqualified, and subsequently to discharge such a juror, is

left to the broad discretion of the court’ ” (People v Jean-Philippe,

101 AD3d 1582, 1582). Here, upon the court’s “ ‘probing and tactful

inquiry’ into the facts of the situation” (People v Harris, 99 NY2d
-2- 673 

KA 12-00874 

202, 213), the juror acknowledged that she had “doz[ed] off a little

bit” during defense counsel’s summation and had turned to another

juror to convey her concern about staying awake, and she expressed her

impression that she could obtain any missed portions from the court

reporter. The court found that the juror acknowledged that there was

some part of defense counsel’s summation that she did not hear due to

nodding off or otherwise being inattentive, and discharged the juror

as grossly unqualified. Recognizing that “ ‘[t]he decision to

disqualify turns on the facts of each particular case,’ ” and

according deference to the court’s evaluation of the juror’s answers

and demeanor, we conclude that there is no basis upon which to disturb

the court’s determination (People v Chatt, 77 AD3d 1285, 1286, lv

denied 17 NY3d 793; see generally People v Snowden, 44 AD3d 492, 493,

lv denied 9 NY3d 1039; People v Williams, 202 AD2d 1004, 1004).

We reject defendant’s contention that the court failed to provide

a meaningful response to a note from the jury during deliberations. 

Here, the jury, which had previously requested a readback of the

elements of attempted murder in the second degree, sent another note

asking whether “the element of intent [is] satisfied for determining

guilt for the attempted murder charge if it is concluded from the

evidence that the defend[a]nt consciously intended to cause harm that

could cause death and there is some evidence to support the conclusion

that the defend[a]nt did not consciously intend to murder the victim?” 

The jury expressed its preference for a “yes/no” answer, but also

indicated that another rereading of the original instruction on the

law would be acceptable, and defense counsel suggested that the court

simply respond in the negative. We conclude that the court, to avoid

juror confusion, did not abuse its discretion in again rereading its

original instruction for attempted murder in the second degree,

including a description of the element of intent, because, under the

circumstances of this case, “rereading the original, proper

instruction was sufficient to convey the appropriate message to

reasonable jurors” (People v Santi, 3 NY3d 234, 249; see People v

Steinberg, 79 NY2d 673, 684-685). Particularly in light of the

phrasing of the question and the jury’s apparent misstatement of the

law, we conclude that the court appropriately declined to give a

categorical “yes” or “no” answer in favor of providing a more

expansive supplemental instruction (see Steinberg, 79 NY2d at 684-685;

People v Malloy, 55 NY2d 296, 302, cert denied 459 US 847; see also

People v Gonzalez, 293 NY 259, 262; People v Mobley, 118 AD3d 1339,

1340, lv denied 24 NY3d 1121). Indeed, “[i]ntent can be a difficult

issue to grasp, and thus the trial court cannot be faulted for giving

a broader response than defendant would have liked” (Steinberg, 79

NY2d at 684). Contrary to defendant’s further contention, the court’s

explanation to the jury of its decision to reread the original

instruction merely conveyed that a full explanation of the law was

required and did not erroneously imply that the jury could convict

defendant of attempted murder in the second degree even without the

requisite intent to cause death (see id. at 685). 

The record before us does not support defendant’s further

contention that the court failed to conclusively determine his age at

the time of the offense and erred in sentencing him as an adult. To
-3- 673 

KA 12-00874 

the extent that defendant asserts that there is documentary evidence

or other relevant proof that allegedly would establish that he was 15

years old at the time of the offense, thereby demonstrating that he

should have been sentenced as a juvenile offender rather than as an

adult (see Penal Law §§ 10.00 [18] [2]; 60.10 [1]), we conclude that

defendant’s remedy is to make a motion to set aside the sentence

pursuant to CPL 440.20 (see generally People v Chu-Joi, 26 NY3d 1105,

1106-1107).

We likewise reject defendant’s contention that the court abused

its discretion in denying his request for youthful offender status,

particularly “[i]n light of the brutal and senseless nature of the

crime” (People v Davis, 84 AD3d 1710, 1710, lv denied 17 NY3d 815; see

People v Abbott, 24 AD3d 243, 243, lv denied 6 NY3d 808). Here,

defendant stabbed his 13-year-old cousin in the neck and upper chest

multiple times, dragged her behind a vehicle in the garage where the

incident occurred and tried to cover her mouth with duct tape, and

left her there with severe, life-threatening wounds. Contrary to

defendant’s contention, the record reflects that the court properly

considered the relevant facts and circumstances in denying defendant’s

request (see People v Dawson, 71 AD3d 1490, 1490-1491, lv denied 15

NY3d 749), including the mitigating factors presented by the defense,

defendant’s lack of a criminal record, the presentence report

recommending denial of youthful offender status, and the gravity of

the crime. In addition, under these circumstances, we decline to

exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction to adjudicate defendant

a youthful offender (see e.g. People v Gibson, 134 AD3d 1517,

1518-1519, lv denied 27 NY3d 1069). Finally, the sentence is not

unduly harsh or severe.

Entered: September 30, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court