RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1733-20

A.L.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

M.C.L.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted December 1, 2021 – Decided March 7, 2022

Before Judges Gilson and Gummer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket 

No. FV-20-1485-20.

The Bianchi Law Group, LLC, attorneys for appellant 

(Kayla E. Rowe, of counsel and on the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant M.C.L. appeals from a final restraining order (FRO), which 

was entered pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35.1 Defendant argues the trial judge erred in finding 

plaintiff A.L. had proven the predicate acts of harassment and assault and that 

the FRO was needed to ensure plaintiff's future protection. Because the judge's 

findings were supported by adequate, substantial evidence, including testimony 

she found credible, we affirm.

I.

We glean these facts from the trial and the pleadings and orders contained 

in the record. The parties were married in 2005 and have two daughters who 

were nine- and twelve-years old when the FRO was issued. In a May 18, 2020

letter, defendant's lawyer advised plaintiff that defendant would file a complaint 

for divorce if plaintiff did not contact her within two weeks to discuss resolving 

amicably "certain matrimonial issues." 

On June 5, 2020, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) 

against defendant, claiming assault and harassment as predicate acts and 

alleging she had pushed him and had spat on him that morning. He also 

contended she had told him to hit her in an effort to provoke him. He asserted 

1 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the participants in these 

proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
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similar incidents had happened in the past. The trial court granted plaintiff leave 

to amend the complaint to add additional allegations of past domestic violence. 

The parties, both represented by counsel, and their children testified 

during a five-day trial. Plaintiff testified about past domestic-violence incidents

and the events of June 5, 2020, stating defendant with her two hands open "had

pushed [him] in [his] chest, spit at [him] and said to hit her." According to 

plaintiff, because she had pushed him, his back hit the granite countertop in the 

kitchen, causing him to feel pain briefly. Plaintiff also testified he still needed 

protection because "the only thing that has stopped her is the threat of immediate 

arrest . . . ." On cross-examination, plaintiff denied or did not recall any 

occasions in which he committed domestic-violence acts against defendant. 

Defendant denied speaking to plaintiff on June 5, 2020, testified she did 

not recall seeing him that day or speaking with him any time that week, and 

denied other alleged domestic-violence incidents. She admitted breaking a 

bedroom mirror and a sign in their house, tearing a photo of plaintiff's

grandparents and that on another occasion she "very well may have" told 

plaintiff to "drop dead." She accused plaintiff of pushing her several times in 

the past and testified about times he had yelled at her and called her names and 

had engaged in domestic-violence acts against her.
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At the conclusion of the trial, the judge granted plaintiff's FRO 

application, placed her decision on the record, and issued the FRO. The judge 

found plaintiff to be credible. She found defendant's testimony "at points . . . 

not credible," noting defendant had "continually laughed and smirked" and that 

her "ongoing laughing, rolling of eyes, complete[ly] inappropriate reactions 

during the testimony of [plaintiff] weighed against her credibility in this matter." 

The judge found "telling" that defendant was "laughing while the[ir] daughter 

. . . testif[ied] that her mother calls her father a piece of shit all the time." 

Defendant's "troubling" behavior during the trial "couple[d] . . . with the 

testimony and how she testified" and her "complete disregard" for "the 

seriousness of what's happening here" caused the judge "to question her 

veracity." 

The judge also did not find the parties' daughters to be credible. Noting 

it was "not that [the girls] didn't try" during their testimony, the judge concluded 

defendant "[c]learly" had "previously . . . discuss[ed] this [trial] with them." 

Defendant was "mouthing and talking and nodding while the girls were 

testifying." 

The trial judge held defendant had committed an assault by "spitting in 

[plaintiff's] face" as well as "push[ing] [plaintiff] against the counter." She also 
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found by a preponderance of the evidence defendant had intended to harass and 

had harassed plaintiff because "she reaches her breaking point. And she 

explodes," "she's upset, she's angry, she's had it, she's frustrated, she's annoyed, 

it's ongoing and it's constant. And it happens continually." The trial judge 

further underscored "[t]his is way beyond what could possibly be considered 

ordinary domestic contretemps" and "it is with a purpose to harass when you 

look at the totality of the circumstances." Even when "the predicate act as here 

may not . . . be the most egregious of acts," the judge found when placed in 

"context of all the prior history, it can indicate the harassment." Finding a need 

to protect plaintiff from future domestic violence given defendant's "ongoing 

harassment [and] . . . abuse of [plaintiff]" and that "the only time it stopped is 

when [plaintiff] finally got this restraining order," the judge entered the FRO. 

In this appeal, defendant argues the trial court based its decision on factual 

findings that were not supported by the record, faulting the court for finding 

credible plaintiff's testimony and not credible defendant's testimony about prior 

abuse. 

II.

The scope of our review is limited in an appeal involving an FRO issued 

after a bench trial. C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). 
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"We accord substantial deference to Family Part judges, who routinely hear 

domestic violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the difference 

between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise between 

couples.'" Ibid. (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)). 

"[D]eference is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial 

and involves questions of credibility.'" MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 

240, 254 (2007) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)). "The 

general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when 

supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 

411-12 (1998); see also Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015). We defer to 

a trial judge's factual findings unless they are "so manifestly unsupported by or 

inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to 

offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms 

Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)); see also C.C., 

463 N.J. Super. at 428. We defer to a trial judge's credibility determinations. 

Gnall, 222 N.J. at 428. We review de novo a trial judge's legal conclusions. 

C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 429. 

The entry of an FRO under the PDVA requires the trial court to make 

certain findings pursuant to a two-step analysis delineated in Silver v. Silver, 
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387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006). Initially, the court "must 

determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible 

evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) 

has occurred." Id. at 125 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)). Harassment and assault

are among the predicate acts included in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). See N.J.S.A. 

2C:25-19(a)(2), (13). Second, the judge must determine whether a restraining 

order is necessary to protect the plaintiff from immediate harm or further acts of 

violence. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127.

A person commits harassment "if, with purpose to harass another," he or 

she: (a) "[m]akes, or causes to be made, one or more communications 

anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse 

language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;" (b) 

"[s]ubjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or 

threatens to do so;" or (c) "[e]ngages in any other course of alarming conduct or 

of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such 

other person." N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) to (c). 

A person commits assault "if the person: (1) [a]ttempts to cause or 

purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (2) 

[n]egligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or (3) 
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[a]ttempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily 

injury." N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1) to (3). 

Applying these standards, we are satisfied the judge's issuance of an FRO 

is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Plaintiff's testimony 

regarding the events of June 5, 2020, supported the judge's finding of the 

predicate acts of assault and harassment. Plaintiff's testimony and even some of 

defendant's testimony supported a finding of past domestic-violence acts by 

defendant and a need to protect plaintiff from future domestic violence. The 

judge's credibility findings — adopting plaintiff's narrative of the events over 

that of defendant's — were extensive and detailed and are entitled to our 

deference on appeal. We are unpersuaded by defendant's criticisms of the 

judge's assessment in that regard. 

We note defendant, months after filing her appellate brief and without 

leave to supplement the record, submitted a letter from her lawyer, an amended 

FRO dated June 9, 2021, and a June 9, 2021 order with an attached statement of 

reasons issued in the parties' matrimonial litigation. According to defendant's 

counsel, the amended FRO contains changes in parenting time, from which 

defendant does not appeal, and was submitted "for procedural completeness and 

so that the scope of the appeal is clear." The matrimonial-litigation order and 
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defense counsel's letter were not before the trial court in this domestic-violence 

case, and, accordingly, are not subject to our consideration. See R. 2:5-4(a); 

Venner v. Allstate, 306 N.J. Super. 106, 110 (App. Div. 1997).

Affirmed.