Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 38 / Monday, February 27, 1995 / Rules and Regulations 10483

are issued. Should the applicant apply

for a supplemental type certificate to

modify any other model included on the

same type certificate to incorporate the

same novel or unusual design feature,

the special conditions would also apply

to the other model under the provisions

of § 21.101(a)(1).

Discussion

There is no specific regulation that

address protection requirements for

electrical and electronic systems from

HIRF. Increased power levels from

ground based radio transmitters and the

growing use of sensitive electrical and

electronic systems to command and

control airplanes have made it necessary

to provide adequate protection.

To ensure that a level of safety is

achieved equivalent to that intended by

the regulations incorporated by

reference, special conditions are needed

for the Cessna 550 series airplanes that

would require that new technology

electrical and electronic systems, such

as the HUD, be designed and installed

to preclude component damage and

interruption of function due to both the

direct and indirect effects of HIRF.

High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

With the trend toward increased

power levels from ground based

transmitters, plus the advent of space

and satellite communications, coupled

with electronic command and control of

the airplane, the immunity of critical

digital avionics systems, such as the

HUD, to HIRF must be established.

It is not possible to precisely define

the HIRF to which the airplane will be

exposed in service. There is also

uncertainty concerning the effectiveness

of airframe shielding for HIRF.

Furthermore, coupling of

electromagnetic energy to cockpit

installed equipment through the cockpit

window apertures is undefined. Based

on surveys and analysis of existing HIRF

emitters, an adequate level of protection

exists when compliance with the HIRF

protection special condition is shown

with either paragraphs 1 or 2 below:

1. A minimum threat of 100 volts per

meter peak electric field strength from

10 KHz to 18 GHz.

a. The threat must be applied to the

system elements and their associated

wiring harnesses without the benefit of

airframe shielding.

b. Demonstration of this level of

protection is established through system

tests and analysis.

2. A threat external to the airframe of

the following field strengths for the

frequency ranges indicated.

Frequency Peak

(V/M)

Average

(V/M)

10 KHz–100 KHz .......... 50 50

100 KHz–500 KHz ........ 60 60

500 KHz– 2 MHz .......... 70 70

2 MHz–30 MHz ............ 200 200

30 MHz–70 MHz .......... 30 30

70 MHz–100 MHz ........ 30 30

100 MHz–200 MHz ...... 150 33

200 MHz–400 MHz ...... 70 70

400 MHz–700 MHz ...... 4,020 935

700 MHz–1 GHz ........... 1,700 170

1 GHz–2 GHz ............... 5,000 990

2 GHz–4 GHz ............... 6,680 840

4 GHz–6 GHz ............... 6,850 310

6 GHz–8 GHz ............... 3,600 670

8 GHz–12 GHz ............. 3,500 1,270

12 GHz–18 GHz ........... 3,500 360

18 GHz–40 GHz ........... 2,100 750

As discussed above, these special

conditions are applicable to Cessna 550

series airplanes, modified by Elliott

Aviation Technical Products

Development, Inc. Should Elliott

Aviation Technical Products

Development, Inc. apply at a later date

for a supplemental type certificate to

modify any other model included on

Type Certificate No. A22CE to

incorporate the same novel or unusual

design feature, the special conditions

would apply to that model as well,

under the provisions of § 21.101(a)(1).

Conclusion

This action affects only certain

unusual or novel design features on

Cessna 550 series airplanes modified by

Elliott Aviation Technical Products

Development, Inc. of Moline, Illinois. It

is not a rule of general applicability and

affects only the applicant who applied

to the FAA for approval of these features

on modified Cessna 550 series airplanes.

The substance of the special

conditions for these airplanes has been

subjected to the notice and comment

procedure in several prior instances and

has been derived without substantive

change from those previously issued. It

is unlikely that prior public comment

would result in a significant change

from the substance contained herein.

For this reason, and because a delay

would significantly affect the

certification of the airplane, which is

imminent, the FAA has determined that

prior public notice and comment are

unnecessary and impracticable, and

good cause exists for adopting these

special conditions immediately.

Therefore, these special conditions are

being made effective upon issuance. The

FAA is requesting comments to allow

interested persons to submit views that

may have not been submitted in

response to the prior opportunities for

comment described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting

and recordkeeping requirements.

The authority citation for these

special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. app. 1344, 1348(c),

1352, 1354(a), 1355, 1421 through 1431,

1502, 1651(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. 1857f–10, 4321 et

seq.; E.O. 11514; and 49 U.S.C. 106(g).

The Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the following special

condition is issued as part of the

supplemental type certification basis for

Cessna 550 series airplanes modified by

Elliott Aviation Technical Products

Development, Inc.

1. Protection from Unwanted Effects

of High-Intensity Radiated Fields

(HIRF). Each electrical and electronic

system that performs critical functions

must be designed and installed to

ensure that the operation and

operational capability of these systems

to perform critical functions are not

adversely affected when the airplane is

exposed to high-intensity radiated fields

external to the airplane.

2. The following definition applies

with respect to this special condition:

Critical Functions. Functions whose

failure would contribute to or cause a

failure condition that would prevent the

continued safe flight and landing of the

airplane.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February

13, 1995.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service,

ANM–101.

[FR Doc. 95–4772 Filed 2–24–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. NM–103; Special Conditions

No. 25–ANM–94]

Special Conditions: Dassault Aviation

Model Falcon 2000 Airplane; Automatic

Takeoff Thrust Control System

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions.

SUMMARY: These special conditions are

issued for the Dassault Aviation Model

Falcon 2000 airplane. This new airplane

will have an unusual design feature

associated with an Automatic Takeoff

Thrust Control System (ATTCS), for

which the applicable airworthiness

regulations do not contain appropriate

safety standards for approach climb
10484 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 38 / Monday, February 27, 1995 / Rules and Regulations

performance using an ATTCS. These

special conditions contain the

additional safety standards that the

Administrator considers necessary to

establish a level of safety equivalent to

that established by the existing

airworthiness standards.

EFFECTIVE DATE: February 3, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Stephen Slotte, FAA, Standardization

Branch, ANM–113, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification

Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056,

telephone (206) 227–2797.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On September 13, 1989, Dassault

Aviation, B.P. 24, 33701 Me ́rignac

Ce ́dex, France, applied for a new type

certificate in the transport airplane

category for the Model Falcon 2000

airplane. The Dassault Aviation Model

Falcon 2000 is a medium-sized

transcontinental business jet powered

by two General Electric/Garrett CFE 738

turbofan engines mounted on pylons

extending from the aft fuselage. Each

engine will be capable of delivering

5,600 lbs. thrust. The airplane will be

capable of operation with two flight

crewmembers and eight passengers.

The Model Falcon 2000 will

incorporate an unusual design feature,

the Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control

System (ATTCS), referred to by Dassault

as Automatic Power Reserve or APR, to

show compliance with the approach

climb requirements of § 25.121(d).

Appendix I to part 25 limits the

application of performance credit for

ATTCS to takeoff only. Since the

airworthiness regulations do not contain

appropriate safety standards for

approach climb performance using

ATTCS, special conditions are required

to ensure a level of safety equivalent to

that established in the regulations.

Type Certification Basis

Under the provisions of § 21.17 of the

FAR, Dassault Aviation must show that

the Falcon 2000 meets the applicable

provisions or part 25, effective February

1, 1965, as amended by Amendments

25–1 through 25–69. The certification

basis may also include later

amendments to part 25 that are not

relevant to these special conditions. In

addition, the certification basis for the

Falcon 2000 includes part 34, effective

September 10, 1990, plus any

amendments in effect at the time of

certification; and part 36, effective

December 1, 1969, as amended by

Amendments 36–1 through the

amendment in effect at the time of

certification. These special conditions

form an additional part of the type

certification basis. In addition, the

certification basis may include other

special conditions that are not relevant

to these special conditions.

If the Administrator finds that the

applicable airworthiness regulations

(i.e., part 25, as amended) do not

contain adequate or appropriate safety

standards for the Dassault Aviation

Model Falcon 2000 because of a novel

or unusual design feature, special

conditions are prescribed under the

provisions of § 21.16 to establish a level

of safety equivalent to that established

in the regulations.

Special conditions, as appropriate, are

issued in accordance with § 11.49 of the

FAR after public notice, as required by

§§ 11.28 and 11.29, and become part of

the type certification basis in

accordance with § 21.17(a)(2).

Special conditions are initially

applicable to the model for which they

are issued. Should the type certificate

for that model be amended later to

include any other model that

incorporates the same novel or unusual

design feature, or should any other

model already included on the same

type certificate be modified to

incorporate the same novel or unusual

design feature, the special conditions

would also apply to the other model

under the provisions of § 21.101(a)(1).

Novel or Unusual Design Features

The Model Falcon 2000 will

incorporate an unusual design feature,

the ATTCS (referred to by Dassault as

the Automatic Power Reserve or APR),

to show compliance with the approach

climb requirements of § 25.121(d). The

FALCON 2000 is a twin-turbofanpowered airplane equipped with Full

Authority Digital Engine Controls

(FADECs) that, in part, protect against

exceeding engine limits. Further, the

FALCON 2000 incorporates a nonmoving throttle system that functions by

placing the throttle levers in detents for

the takeoff and climb phases of flight,

allowing the FADEC to schedule power

setting based on flight phase. With the

throttle levers placed in either of the

two forward detents (takeoff/go-around

and climb), if an engine failure (RPM

(N1)) difference of greater than 10

percent between engines is sensed,

power is automatically advanced on the

remaining engine to the APR power

level associated with the detent. The

system is permanently armed and will

function any time the throttle levers are

in either of the two forward detents and

an engine failure is sensed.

Additionally, as in the case of an APR

failure, or in an all-engines mode, the

crew can select APR by placing the

throttle levers in either of the two

forward detents and manually activating

the system using an instrument panelmounted override switch.

APR power levels manifest

themselves as an increase in the engine

flat-rating temperature for the operating

altitude, and, in general, result in higher

thrust levels than those associated with

the throttle detents alone. Dassault also

makes reference in the APR logic

description to thrust increase being

armed for a throttle lever angle above 27

degrees (max cruise position), but does

not make it clear in the system

description if the APR system functions

when the throttle is not in a detent.

Further discussions with Dassault make

it clear that when the throttle is between

two detents, the FADEC makes a linear

interpolation between the related tables

of corrected N1; i.e., an almost linear

thrust change. As function outside of a

detent is possible, then a throttle angle

of 28 degrees (arming angle + 1 degree)

would produce almost no additional

thrust when APR is activated, while 1

degree before the next detent (max

cruise/max continuous) would produce

almost the same thrust increase as when

the throttle is in that detent. Logic for

the max climb/max continuous detents

is the same. From a practical point of

view, throttle positions between the

detents are not used.

The part 25 standards for ATTCS,

contained in § 25.904 and Appendix I,

specifically restrict performance credit

for ATTCS to takeoff. Expanding the

scope of the standards to include other

phases of flight, including go-around,

was considered at the time the

standards were issued, but flightcrew

workload issues precluded further

consideration. As stated in the preamble

to Amendment 25–62:

‘‘In regard to ATTCS credit for approach

climb and go-around maneuvers, current

regulations preclude a higher thrust for the

approach climb (§ 25.122(d)) than for the

landing climb (§ 25.119). The workload

required for the flightcrew to monitor and

select from multiple in-flight thrust settings

in the event of an engine failure during a

critical point in the approach, landing, or goaround operations is excessive. Therefore,

the FAA does not agree that the scope of the

amendment should be changed to include the

use of ATTCS for anything except the takeoff

phase.’’ (52 FR 43153, November 9, 1987)

The ATTCS incorporated on the

FALCON 2000 allows the pilot to use

the same power setting procedure

during a go-around, regardless of

whether or not an engine fails. In either

case, the pilot obtains go-around power

by moving the throttles into the forward

(takeoff/go-around) throttle detent.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 38 / Monday, February 27, 1995 / Rules and Regulations 10485

Since the ATTCS is permanently armed,

it will function automatically following

an engine failure, and advance the

remaining engine to the ATTCS thrust

level. Therefore, this design adequately

addresses the pilot workload concerns

identified in the preamble to

Amendment 25–62. Accordingly, these

special conditions require a showing of

compliance with those provisions of

§ 25.904 and Appendix I that are

applicable to the approach climb and

go-around maneuvers.

The definition of a critical time

interval for the approach climb case,

during which time it must be extremely

improbable to violate a flight path based

on the § 25.121(d) gradient requirement,

is of primary importance. The

§ 25.121(d) gradient requirement

implies a minimum one-engineinoperative flight path capability with

the airplane in the approach

configuration. The engine may have

been inoperative before initiating the goaround, or it may become inoperative

during the go-around. The definition of

the critical time interval must consider

both possibilities.

Discussion of Comments

Notice of Proposed Special

Conditions No. SC–94–4–NM for the

Dassault Aviation Model Falcon 2000

airplane was published in the Federal

Register on December 16, 1994 (59 FR

64869). No comments were received,

and the special conditions are adopted

as proposed.

As discussed above, these special

conditions are applicable to the Dassault

Aviation Model Falcon 2000. Should

Dassault Aviation apply at a later date

for a change to the type certificate to

include another model incorporating the

same novel or unusual design feature,

these special conditions would apply to

that model as well under the provisions

of § 21.101(a)(1).

Under standard practice, the effective

date of final special conditions would

be 30 days after the date of publication

in the Federal Register; however, as the

certification date for the Falcon 2000 is

imminent, the FAA finds that good

cause exists to make these special

conditions effective upon issuance.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain design

features on the Dassault Aviation Model

Falcon 2000 airplane. It is not a rule of

general applicability and affects only

the manufacturer who applied to the

FAA for approval of these features on

the airplane.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting

and recordkeeping requirements.

The authority citation for these

special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. app. 1344, 1348(c),

1352, 1354(a), 1355, 1421 through 1431,

1502, 1651(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. 1857f–10, 4321 et

seq.; E.O. 11514; and 49 U.S.C. 106(g).

The Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority

delegated to me by the Administrator, the

following special conditions are issued as

part of the type certification basis for the

Dassault Aviation Model Falcon 2000

airplane.

(a) General: An ATTCS is defined as the

entire automatic system, including all

devices, both mechanical and electrical, that

sense engine failure, transmit signals, actuate

fuel controls or power levers, or increase

engine power by other means on operating

engines to achieve scheduled thrust or power

increases and furnish cockpit information on

system operation.

(b) Automatic takeoff thrust control system

(ATTCS). The engine power control system

that automatically resets the power or thrust

on the operating engine (following engine

failure during the approach for landing) must

comply with the following requirements:

(1) Performance and System Reliability

Requirements. The probability analysis must

include consideration of ATTCS failure

occurring after the time at which the

flightcrew last verifies that the ATTCS is in

a condition to operate until the beginning of

the critical time interval.

(2) Thrust Setting. The initial takeoff thrust

set on each engine at the beginning of the

takeoff roll or go-around may not be less

than:

(i) Ninety (90) percent of the thrust level

set by the ATTCS (the maximum takeoff

thrust or power approved for the airplane

under existing ambient conditions);

(ii) That required to permit normal

operation of all safety-related systems and

equipment dependent upon engine thrust or

power lever position; or

(iii) That shown to be free of hazardous

engine response characteristics when thrust

is advanced from the initial takeoff thrust or

power to the maximum approved takeoff

thrust or power.

(3) Powerplant Controls. In addition to the

requirements of § 25.1141, no single failure

or malfunction, or probable combination

thereof, of the ATTCS, including associated

systems, may cause the failure of any

powerplant function necessary for safety. The

ATTCS must be designed to:

(i) Apply thrust or power on the operating

engine(s), following any one engine failure

during takeoff or go-around, to achieve the

maximum approved takeoff thrust or power

without exceeding engine operating limits;

and

(ii) Provide a means to verify to the

flightcrew before takeoff and before

beginning an approach for landing that the

ATTCS is in a condition to operate.

(c) Critical Time Interval. The definition of

the Critical Time Interval in Appendix I,

Section I25.2(b) shall be expanded to include

the following:

(1) When conducting an approach for

landing using ATTCS, the critical time

interval is defined as follows:

(i) The critical time interval begins at a

point on a 2.5 degree approach glide path

from which, assuming a simultaneous engine

and ATTCS failure, the resulting approach

climb flight path intersects a flight path

originating at a later point on the same

approach path corresponding to the Part 25

one-engine-inoperative approach climb

gradient. The period of time from the point

of simultaneous engine and ATTCS failure to

the intersection of these flight paths must be

no shorter than the time interval used in

evaluating the critical time interval for

takeoff beginning from the point of

simultaneous engine and ATTCS failure and

ending upon reaching a height of 400 feet.

(ii) The critical time interval ends at the

point on a minimum performance, allengines-operating go-around flight path from

which, assuming a simultaneous engine and

ATTCS failure, the resulting minimum

approach climb flight path intersects a flight

path corresponding to the Part 25 minimum

one-engine-inoperative approach climb

gradient. The all-engines-operating go-around

flight path and the Part 25 one-engineinoperative approach climb gradient flight

path originate from a common point on a 2.5

degree approach path. The period of time

from the point of simultaneous engine and

ATTCS failure to the intersection of these

flight paths must be no shorter than the time

interval used in evaluating the critical time

interval for the takeoff beginning from the

point of simultaneous engine and ATTCS

failure and ending upon reaching a height of

400 feet.

(2) The critical time interval must be

determined at the altitude resulting in the

longest critical time interval for which oneengine-inoperative approach climb

performance data are presented in the

Airplane Flight Manual.

(3) The critical time interval is illustrated

in the following figure:

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M
10486 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 38 / Monday, February 27, 1995 / Rules and Regulations

BILLING CODE 4910–13–C

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February

3, 1995.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service,

NAM–101.

[FR Doc. 95–4774 Filed 2–24–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. NM–108; Special Conditions

No. 25–ANM–96]

Special Conditions: Modified

Gulfstream American Corporation

Model G–IV Airplane; High Intensity

Radiated Fields (HIRF)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request

for comments.

SUMMARY: These special conditions are

issued for the Gulfstream American

Corporation (GAC) Model G–IV airplane

modified by Duncan Aviation, Inc., of

Lincoln, Nebraska. This airplane will be

equipped with a Flight Visions

Corporation, FV–2000 Head-Up Display

System (HUD) that will perform critical

functions. The applicable regulations do

not contain adequate or appropriate

safety standards for the protection of the

HUD from the effects of high-intensity

radiated fields (HIRF). These special

conditions provide the additional safety

standards that the Administrator

considers necessary to ensure that the

critical functions performed by this

system are maintained when the

airplane is exposed to HIRF.

DATES: The effective date of these

special conditions is February 13, 1995.

Comments must be received on or

before April 13, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Comments on these final

special conditions, request for

comments, may be mailed in duplicate

to: Federal Aviation Administration,

Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel,

Attn: Rules Docket (ANM–7), Docket

No. NM–108, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,

Renton, Washington, 98055–4056; or

delivered in duplicate to the Office of

the Assistant Chief Counsel at the above

address. Comments must be marked

‘‘Docket No. NM–108.’’ Comments may

be inspected in the Rules Docket

weekdays, except Federal holidays,

between 7:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mark Quam, FAA, Standardization

Branch, Transport Airplane Directorate,

Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind

Avenue SW., Renton, Washington,

98055–4056; telephone (206) 227–2145.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

The FAA has determined that good

cause exists for making these special

conditions effective upon issuance;

however, interested persons are invited

to submit such written data, views, or

arguments as they may desire.

Communications should identify the

regulatory docket and special conditions

number and be submitted in duplicate

to the address specified above. All

communications received on or before

the closing date for comments will be

considered by the Administrator. These

special conditions may be changed in

light of the comments received. All