[Cite as Crabtree v. Dinsmoor, 2013-Ohio-5797.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Natasha M. Crabtree, : 

 Petitioner-Appellee, : 

 No. 13AP-342 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 13 DV 530)

James Dinsmoor, : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

 Respondent-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on December 31, 2013 

 

Chuparkoff & Junga LLP, and Mark A. Chuparkoff, for 

appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations 

KLATT, P.J. 

{¶ 1} Respondent-appellant, James Dinsmoor, appeals a judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Commons Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, granting 

petitioner-appellee, Natasha M. Crabtree, a civil protection order against him. For the 

following reasons, we reverse. 

{¶ 2} Crabtree filed a petition for a civil protection order on March 25, 2013. The 

impetus behind the petition was an incident that occurred on March 15, 2013 at a House 

of Japan restaurant. On that date, Crabtree was having dinner with her three children, 

her mother, and her mother's boyfriend when Dinsmoor arrived at the restaurant and 

caused a scene. 
No. 13AP-342 2 

{¶ 3} Dinsmoor is the father of one of Crabtree's children. Crabtree and 

Dinsmoor had a tumultuous, "off-and-on" romantic relationship, which ended soon after 

their daughter, S.D., was born on September 9, 2010. Before January 2013, Crabtree 

voluntarily allowed Dinsmoor to spend time with S.D. However, after Crabtree learned 

that Dinsmoor had expressed concerns to Franklin County Children Services about S.D.'s 

safety around Crabtree's new boyfriend, Crabtree prevented Dinsmoor from seeing his 

daughter. 

{¶ 4} On March 15, 2013, the father of another of Crabtree's children informed 

Dinsmoor that S.D. was at the House of Japan restaurant. Dinsmoor went to the 

restaurant to see his daughter. 

{¶ 5} According to Crabtree, Dinsmoor entered the restaurant, saw her and her 

family, and went to sit at the sushi bar. Crabtree texted him a message that said, "[Y]ou 

need to leave now. You're stalking me." (Tr. 20.) Dinsmoor then approached Crabtree's 

table. Crabtree told him, "You know you need to leave." Id. Dinsmoor replied, "No[,] I'm 

here to see my daughter. There's nothing you can do about it." Id. Both Crabtree's 

mother and the mother's boyfriend rose to confront Dinsmoor. The restaurant manager 

arrived at the table and asked Dinsmoor to leave. Dinsmoor refused. He tried to lift S.D. 

from her highchair, but Crabtree prevented him from doing so. Dinsmoor then left the 

restaurant. Throughout the encounter, Dinsmoor cursed at Crabtree. 

{¶ 6} At the hearing, Dinsmoor admitted that three years prior to the March 15, 

2013 incident, he had choked Crabtree. Dinsmoor pleaded guilty to one count of domestic 

violence as a result. Dinsmoor also testified that he and Crabtree had engaged in physical 

altercations during which Dinsmoor had pushed Crabtree and put his hand in her mouth. 

Neither Dinsmoor nor Crabtree specified when the physical altercations had occurred or if 

Crabtree had suffered any physical harm during them. 

{¶ 7} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that it had a "real 

problem" with Dinsmoor causing a scene, trying to touch S.D., and calling Crabtree a 

crack whore in front of her children and a restaurant full of people. (Tr. 77.) On April 5, 

2013, the trial court issued a civil protection order against Dinsmoor. 

{¶ 8} Dinsmoor now appeals the April 5, 2013 order, and he assigns the following 

errors: 
No. 13AP-342 3 

I. The Court of Common Pleas[,] Division of Domestic 

Relations[,] abused its discretion when it granted 

Petitioner/Appellee a Domestic Protection Order against the 

Respondent/Appellant as such was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence and an abuse of the Court's discretion 

when there was no evidence of harm or threat of immediate 

harm. 

II. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law when it included 

the parties['] minor child, [S.D.], in the Civil Protection Order 

as there was no evidence submitted at [the] hearing 

establishing any domestic violence or threat of imminent 

harm. 

{¶ 9} By his first assignment of error, Dinsmoor argues that the trial court erred 

in granting Crabtree a civil protection order against him. We agree. 

{¶ 10} " 'R.C. 3113.31 provides the victim of domestic violence the ability to seek 

immediate relief through a civil protection order, which enjoins the respondent from 

further violence against the family or household member.' " Fleckner v. Fleckner, 177 

Ohio App.3d 706, 2006-Ohio-4000, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.), quoting Parrish v. Parrish, 95 Ohio 

St.3d 1201, 1204 (2002) (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting). To receive a civil protection 

order, a petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner or 

the petitioner's family or household members are in danger of domestic violence. Felton 

v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34 (1997), paragraph two of the syllabus. Domestic violence 

includes: (1) attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily injury, (2) placing another 

person by the threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical harm or committing a 

violation of R.C. 2903.211 or 2911.211, (3) committing any act with respect to a child that 

would result in the child being an abused child as defined in R.C. 2151.031, and (4) 

committing a sexually oriented offense. R.C. 3113.31(A)(1). 

{¶ 11} "When reviewing whether a trial court properly granted a [civil protection 

order], an appellate court must determine whether sufficient, credible evidence supports a 

finding that the respondent had engaged in acts or threats of domestic violence." Downs 

v. Strouse, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-312, 2006-Ohio-505, ¶ 10. A reviewing court will not 

reverse a civil protection order simply because it holds a different opinion concerning the 

credibility of the witnesses and evidence submitted to the trial court. Fleckner at ¶ 15. If 
No. 13AP-342 4 

the evidence is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the reviewing court must 

construe the evidence consistently with the trial court's judgment. Id.

{¶ 12} Here, although the trial court disapproved of Dinsmoor's behavior in the 

restaurant, it did not identify any act of domestic violence that occurred there. Our review 

of the evidence reveals that, at most, Dinsmoor only caused an embarrassing scene at the 

restaurant. There is no evidence that Dinsmoor attempted or threatened to physically 

harm Crabtree or her family. When asked if Dinsmoor threatened her, her mother, or her 

mother's boyfriend, Crabtree answered, "I don't recall; everything happened so fast." (Tr. 

35.) There is also no evidence that anything that happened in the restaurant caused 

Crabtree to fear imminent serious physical harm. Therefore, after reviewing the evidence 

and construing it consistently with the trial court's order, we conclude that no domestic 

violence occurred on March 15, 2013. 

{¶ 13} While the record contains no evidence of present domestic violence, it does 

show a past act of domestic violence. Such evidence is relevant in determining whether 

domestic violence occurred if the petitioner contends that the respondent committed 

domestic violence through a threat of force. Threats of force constitute domestic violence 

for the purpose of R.C. 3113.31 if the fear resulting from those threats is reasonable. 

Fleckner at ¶ 21. " 'The reasonableness of the fear should be determined with reference to 

the history between the petitioner and the respondent.' " Id. Thus, past acts of domestic 

violence can establish that the petitioner has a genuine, reasonable fear of violence in the 

present circumstances. Strassell v. Chapman, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-793, 2010-Ohio-4376, 

¶ 20; Solomon v. Solomon, 157 Ohio App.3d 807, 2004-Ohio-2486, ¶ 23 (7th Dist.). 

{¶ 14} In the absence of evidence of a present threat that creates fear, past 

domestic violence does not, by itself, justify the issuance of a civil protection order. 

"[W]hile the court may consider past acts to determine whether the incident at issue 

constitutes domestic violence, the issuance of a civil protection order cannot be based 

solely on previous incidents of alleged domestic violence." Id. Generally, a petitioner 

cannot rely only on evidence of long-ago acts to satisfy the burden to show a current 

danger of domestic violence. Pinkney v. Salett, 8th Dist. No. 96130, 2011-Ohio-4121, ¶ 5-

6; Weber v. Weber, 2d Dist. No. 2010-CA-40, 2011-Ohio-2980, ¶ 33-34; McGuire v. 
No. 13AP-342 5 

Sprinkle, 12th Dist. No. CA2006-06-069, 2007-Ohio-2705, ¶ 22; Newhouse v. Williams, 

167 Ohio App.3d 215, 2006-Ohio-3075, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.). 

{¶ 15} Here, Crabtree failed to prove that any domestic violence occurred on 

March 15, 2013. Thus, the past domestic violence stands as the sole evidence Crabtree 

offered to support the issuance of the civil protection order. We conclude that that 

evidence is not competent, credible evidence of a current danger of domestic violence. 

Accordingly, we sustain Dinsmoor's first assignment of error. 

{¶ 16} By Dinsmoor's second assignment of error, he challenges the scope of the 

civil protection order. The resolution of the first assignment of error moots that 

challenge. 

{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the first assignment of error, and we 

find the second assignment of error moot. We reverse the judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations. 

Judgment reversed.

TYACK and CONNOR, JJ., concur.