NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0357n.06 No. 09-5660 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
MI CHAEL

FL I NT, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. L I BERTY I

NSURANCE CORP ORATI ON, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY

B EF OR E: KE I TH , CLAY , a nd GR I F F I N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Plaintiff Michae l Flint appea ls the district court’s orde r g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of his a uto mob ile ins ur e r, de fe nd ant L ibe rt y I ns ur anc e Cor

po ratio n (“ L ibe rt

y ” ). B e c a us e we ho ld that Kentucky

choice of law pr inciples favor the application of I ndiana law to Flint’s underinsure d motorist poli cy , we a ffirm the judg ment of the district cour t. I. On Aug ust 5, 2005, Flint was inj ured in a two-vehicle accide nt in Danville, Kentucky
. The driver of the sec ond v eh i cle, Cra ig A . Stins on, car ried a n automobile insurance policy with a $100,000 per- person bodily -injury limit . At the time of the a ccide nt, Flint was driving his 2004 Cadillac CTS, which was titled and r eg istered in Indiana.No. 09-5660

Flint v. Liberty Ins. Corp.

- 2 - Stin so n’ s in sure r p aid F lin t $1 00 ,0 00 . T he re a ft e r, F lin t f ile d a c la im w ithhis a

uto mob ile ins ur e r, L ib ert y , se e kin g un de ri ns ur e d mo tor ist be ne fi ts ( “ UI M” ). Hi s 2 00 2 L ibe rt y a uto mob ile policy , No. A07-248869582- 002 (her einaf ter “ policy ”), w as writ t en as an I ndiana policy and contained a

UI M endorse ment provision with policy limit s of $250,000 (for eac h insured) a nd an off

set provision under Indiana law for “ all sums paid because of the ‘bodily injury ’ by

or on beha lf of pe rs on s o r o rg anizatio ns wh o ma y be le g a lly

re sp on sib le .” B a se d o n th is o ff -s e t pr ov isi on , L ibe rt

y informed F lint that his maxi mum UI M benef it under Indiana law wa s $150,000 beca use he ha d
rec eived $100,000 f

rom Stinson’s ins urer . On Dec ember

3, 2007, Flint filed a c omplaint in Boy le County Circuit Court in Kentucky
s e e k i n g a d e c l ar a t i o n o f h i s i n s u r an c e b e n e f i t s u n d e r t h e U IM p r o v i s i o no f

h i s L i b e rt y p o l i c y. Acc ording to Flint, his UI M benef its were g overne d by

Kentucky law, rather than I ndiana law , be c a us e Ke ntu c ky

ha d th e mos t si g nif

ic ant r e la tio ns hip wi th t

he ins ur anc e c on tr a c t and the pa rt ie s. L iberty remove d the complaint to the Easter n District of Kentucky

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 2201(a ). In i t s o r d e r

g r an t i n g s u m m ar

y j u d g m e n tan d

d e c l ar a t o r

y r e l i e f i nf a v o r o f d e f e n d an tL i b e rt y, the dis tr ic t c ourt

a c c ur a te ly

state d th e re le va

nt f a c ts: I n 1995, Plaintiff Michael F lint (“Flint”) move d to L ouisvill e, Ke ntucky . I n 2000, Flint purcha sed a farm in Deputy , I ndiana, a nd owned other

commerc ial and re ntal proper ties in I ndiana. In 2005, Flint moved his g overnme nt consulting business fr om L ou isv ill e to F ra

nkfor t, Ken tuc ky . F lin t sp lit his tim e be tw e e n h is h ome s in L ouisvill e and I

ndiana. He renovated the Indiana home on w ee k en d s d uring the war m months. Flint listed the I ndiana home as hi s residenc e on his 2004 and 2005 fede ral income tax returns. He a lso testified that he told the I ndiana F arm Servic e Ag ency that he wa s an I ndiana r esident.No. 09-5660

Flint v. Liberty Ins. Corp.

- 3 - F lin t’ s r e la tio ns hip wi th D e fe nd ant L ibe rt y I ns ur anc e Cor

p. (“ L ibe rt

y ”) b e g an in 2000. L iberty

insurance ag ent Matt Sturge on (“Sturg eon”) , wor king in L ouisvill e, Kentucky , sold Flint an auto insuranc e policy to cover Flint’s 1999 GMC Yukon. I n J une 2002, F lint purchased a 2001 GMC Sierra tr

uck fr om his friend, an Indiana auto dea ler. F lint permitted his friend to reg ister the vehic le i n I n d i an a. Flint testified that he knew I ndiana insurance rate s for the Sierra wer e less than Kentuc ky rate s, althoug h he did not remembe r spec ific rates. He w as informe d that he nee ded to reg ister the vehic le in I ndiana to re ceive the I ndiana insurance r ates. F lint st ated that he purc hased the vehicle f or use on his I ndiana f

arm. The truck wa s titl ed and re g ist e re d in

I nd iana a nd F lin t pu rchase d in sura

nc e fo r t he ve hic le fr om L ibe rt

y throug h Sturge on. The policy was wr itten in I n d i an a b eca use the Sierr a wa s reg istered in Indiana, F lint held an I ndiana dr iver’s lice nse, and Fl i n t re quested a n I ndiana policy , in part, to save mone y . I n April 2005, Flint trade d the Sierra for a 2004 Cadillac C TS []
. The Cadillac w as purcha sed and r eg istered in I ndiana by the same f

riend that purc hased the Sierra. O n May 10 , 20 05 , F lin t su

bs tit ute d the Ca dil la c fo r the Sie rr a on his a uto pol icy

with L iberty
. He listed his residenc e as Deputy , I ndiana, on his “Reque st for Auto Policy Chang e” f

orm. Under

the terms of the polic y , Flint ’s insuranc e included underinsure d motorist (“UI M”) c overa g e up to a max imum of $250,000 per person. F lin t’ s U I M e nd or se me nt, wr itt e n in I nd iana , s ta te s, in p art : L I MI T OF L I AB I L I TY A. The limit of liability

shown in the Schedule or in the Dec larations for e ach pe rson for U nderinsure d Motorists C overa g e is our maxi mum li m it of liabilit y for a ll damag es, including damag es for car e, loss of services or death, arising out of “bodily injury ” sustained by any one per son in any

one ac cident. . . . B. The limit of l iability

shall be re duced by

all sums paid beca

use of the “bodily

injury ” by

or on b eh alf of pe rsons or org anizations who may be leg ally

responsible. . . . * * * D. [ L i b er t y ] wi l l n o t m ak e ad u p l i ca t e p ay

m en tu n d er

t h i s co v er age for a ny element of

loss for which pa

y ment has been m ad e by

or on behalf of per sons or org anizations who may be leg ally

responsible.No. 09-5660

Flint v. Liberty Ins. Corp.

Th e po lic y ’s UI M pr ov isi on re fl e c ts I nd
. Re v. Cod e § 27 -7 -5 -5 (c )( 1) (A ), wh ic h p e rm its a 1 reduc tion f

or “the amount paid in da mag es to the insured by or for any person or org anization who may be lia

ble fo r the ins ur e d’ s bo dil y inj ur y .” “ Othe r i ns ur anc e ” c la us e s are va lid

and e nf or c e a ble under Indiana law
. Pafco Ge n. Ins. Co. v. Provide nce W ash. Ins. Co. , 587 N.E.2d 728, 729 n.2 (I nd. Ct. Ap p. 19 92 ) ( “ ‘O the r i ns ur anc e ’ c la us e s li mit c overage whe n c ov e ra g e un de r a no the r p oli c y

is c on c ur re ntl y a va ila ble so a s to pr e c lud e sta c kin g or do ub le re c ov e ry

of un ins ur e d mo tor ist s c ov e ra g e s. ” ). Un ins ur e d a nd un de ri ns ur e d mo tor ist

statut e s
are reme dia l p r o v is io n s th a t a r e n o t i n te n d e d

to s e r v e a s a s u b s ti tute f or compre hensive pe rsonal liability insurance , but r ather to provide protec tion for the innocent par

ty by making the i nsuranc e carrie r st and as the insurer of the uninsured motorist, and enabling the insured to re cover from his or her own insurer f or injuries c a us e d b y an unin sure d mo tor ist. I n so me state s, un ins ur e d mo tor ist c ov e ra g e is desig ned to provide pr otection for the motoring public f rom inj u ries ca

used by uninsured motorists and hit-and-r un motorists, and to protect innocent pe rsons from the neg lige nce of

unknown or impec unious tortfeasor s. 81 Am. J ur. Tria ls § 425 (2009). UI M cover ag e is unique insofar as i t i s p er sonal to the insured, wher eas standa

rd automobile insuranc e follows the ve hicle. Id
. - 4 - (Interna l citations omit ted.) 1 The p a r ti e s f il e d c r o s s - motions for

summary judgme nt in Dece mber 2008. The parties a g ree d that if I ndiana law

applied, F lint’s max imum UI M benef it was $150,000 bec ause of t h e $100,000 p a ym e n t F l i n tr e c e i v e d

f r o m S t i n s o n ’ s i n s u r e r , b u ti f K e n tu c ky

l aw a p p l i e d , h i s m a x i m u m U IM benef it was $250,000. Thus, the sole issue bef ore the district court wa s whether Kentucky

or Indiana law applied to Flint’s UI M policy . The district cour t ruled that F lint’s UI M policy was g overne d by I ndiana law

and ente red judg ment in favor of L iberty
. Flint timely

appea ls.No. 09-5660

Flint v. Liberty Ins. Corp.

- 5 - II. We reviewde novo the district court’s c hoice of law ruling
. Mi ll’

s P rid e, I nc . v . Co nt’ l I

ns . Co. , 3 00 F .3 d 7 01 , 7 04 (6 Cir . 2 00 2) ; Sa lv e Re gin a Co ll. v . R us se ll , 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991). th When sitt ing in diver sity , a fe dera l court “a ppl[ ies] the law, including the choice of law r ules, of the forum state.” Himmel v . Ford Motor Co. , 342 F.3d 593, 598 ( 6th Cir. 2003)
. Kentucky is the forum state. “Ke ntucky has consistently applied § 188 of the Re sta te me nt (

Se c on d) of C

on fli c t of Laws to r esolve choice of law issues that a rise in contract

disputes.” Saleba v. Sc hrand , 300 S.W .3d 177, 181 (Ky . 2 0 0 9 )
. “ K e n tu c ky h a s a mp le c a s e la

w e xp la in in g th a t .
. . [S e c ti o n1 8 8 ( 1 ) o f the] Restateme nt’s ‘most significa nt contacts’ te st applies to contrac t disputes.” Id. (c i t i n g Breeding v

. Mass. Indem . & Life Ins. Co. , 633 S.W .2d 717, 719 (Ky . 1982) (holding that in disputes involvi ng the “ va lid ity of a c on tr a c t .
. . [t]he mod e rn te st i s w hic h s ta te ha s th e mos t si g nif ic ant r e la tio ns hip to the transac tion and the par ties.”))
. Se c tio n 1 88 of

the Re state me nt ( Se c on d) state s th a t: (1) The rig hts and duties of the pa rties with respe ct to an issue in contract ar e de te rm ine d b y

the loc a l la

w o f t he state wh ic h, wi th r e sp e c t to that issu e , ha s th e mos t signific ant relationship to the transa ction and the pa rties under

the principles state d in § 6. (2 ) I nth e a

b s e n c e o f a ne f f e c ti v e c h o ic e o f

la w b y th e p arti e s ( s e e § 1 8 7 ) , the contac ts to b e t ak en int o acc ount in apply ing the principles of § 6 to de termine the law a pp lic a ble to a n is su e inc lud e : (a ) t h e p l ac e o f c o n t ra ct i n g, (b ) t he pla c e of

ne g oti a tio n o f t

he c on tr a c t, (c) the place of per formanc e,No. 09-5660

Flint v. Liberty Ins. Corp.

- 6 -

(d) the loc ation of the subjec t matter of the c ontrac t, and (e) the domicil, r esidenc e, nationality , place of incorporat i o n and pla c e of bu sin e ss o f t

he pa rt ie s. These contac ts a

re to be evaluated ac cordingto their relative importance with respec t to the particula

r issue. (3) I f the plac e of ne g otiating the contra ct and the pl ace of per formanc e ar e in the same state , th e loc a l la

w o f t his state wi ll u su a lly be app li e d, e xce pt a s o the rw ise provided in §§ 189-199 a nd 203. Restatement (Sec ond) Conflict of L aws § 188 (1971)
. “Unde r this approa ch, the co u rt h ea ring the ca se must apply the law of

that jurisdiction wh ic h, ‘b e c a

us e of its re la tio ns hip or

c on ta c t w iththe o c c ur

re nc e or the pa rt ie s, ha s th e g re a te st
conce rn with the spec ific issue ra ised in the litigation.’” Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc. , 7 1 2 F.2d 1 0 6 9 , 1 0 7 2 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 8 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Breeding , 6 33 S.W. 2d a t 71 9) ; Bonnlander, 949 S.W .2d at 620 (“[I ]t has bee n held in cont rac t actions that the law of the state with the g reatest interest in the outcome of the litigation should be applied.” ). A. F lin t pr ima

ri ly argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt pla c e d too muc h e mph a sis on the “ law of the state
o f th e in s u r an c e c o n tr a c t[ , ]” a s s e rti n g th a t t h is f a c to r “ tr u mp [e d ] a ll o th e r

c o n s iderati o n s [. ]” Acc ording to Flint, Kentucky has t he mos t significa nt relationship to the UI M policy and the pa

rties i nt h e p r e s e n tc a s e b e c a

u s e : ( 1 ) h e f

i l l e d o u th i s a p p l i c a t i o n f

o r a u t o m o b i l e i n s u r an c e i nK e n tu c ky; (2) he signe d it in Kentucky ; ( 3) he used a Kentucky mailing addre ss; ( 4) he paid all i nsuranc e pr e miums f

ro m his Ke ntu c ky ba

nk a c c ount; (5 ) his pr ima

ry bu sin e ss a

nd pla c e of e mpl oy me nt i s in Ke ntu c ky ; (6) the a c c ide nt oc c ur re d in Ke ntu c ky ; and (7 ) his fa mil y liv e s in Ke ntu c ky . A t th e tim eNo. 09-5660

Flint v. Liberty Ins. Corp.

- 7 - of the 2005 a ccide nt, Flint also maintained a r esidenc e in Kentuc ky . Flint’s ar g ument focuse s upon Restatement (Sec ond) Conflict of L aw s § 1 8 8 (2) ( a)- (c) and (e ), which c onsiders the plac e of
c on tr a c tin g , th e pla c e of

ne g oti a tin g the c on tr a c t, h is K e ntu c ky re sid e nc e , a

nd his e mpl oy

ment in Kentucky
. L iberty responds that the g reat w eig ht of authority under K entucky law supports the district court’s de cision to apply

I ndiana law

to Flint’s UIM p o l i cy . We ag ree . I ndeed, the majority of Ke ntu c ky c a se law a dd

re ssi nga uto mob il e ac c ide nts in K e ntu c ky that in vo lve I nd iana

re sid e nts ins ur e d b y

I nd iana po lic ie s a pp ly I nd iana law t o d e te rm ine the sc op e of the ins ur e d’ s UI M b e ne fi ts. I n Lewis v. American Fam ily In s u rance G roup, 555 S.W .2d 579 (Ky . 1977), an Indiana driver a nd passeng er in a vehicle reg istered a nd insured in I ndiana we re involved in a two-ca r
acc ident with a vehicle driven by an uninsured K entucky

resident. 555 S.W .2d at 581. The injure d I ndiana plaintiffs f

iled a lawsuit in Kentuc ky ag ainst the Kentuc ky

driver a n d their own insure r, which had issued two a

utomobile insurance policie s – to the driver a n d t he drive r’s unc le (who owned the ve hicle) – both of w hich included uninsure d motorist covera g e. The question in Le wis
wa s w he the r t

he law o f I

nd iana or that of Ke ntu cky wou ld gover

n th e qu e sti on

of pla int if fs ’ uninsured motorist cover ag e. Id. The S u p reme Court of Kentuc ky conclude d that wher e Indiana dr ivers of a n I ndiana reg istered a

utomobile seeking UI M cover ag e under an I ndiana- issued automobile policy for injuries sustained in Kentu ck y , Ke ntucky courts should apply

I ndiana law

to interpret the c ontrac t ofNo. 09-5660

Flint v. Liberty Ins. Corp.

- 8 - insurance
. Id. at 582. The Le wis court quoted Restatement (Sec ond) of Conflict of L aws § 193 (1 97 1) a s r e le va

nt t o it s c ho ic e of

law a na ly sis : Con tr a c ts o f F ir e , Sure ty

or Ca su a lty I ns ur anc e : The va lidity

of a c ontrac t of fire, surety or ca sualty

insurance and the r ights c reated t h e r e b y are determined by the local law of the state whi ch the parties understood was to be the principal location of the insured risk during the term of the policy , unle ss with respec t to the particular i s s u e, some other state has a more signific ant re la tio ns hip un de r t

he pr inc ipl e s sta te d in sec . 6 to t he tr ans a c tio n a

nd the pa rt ie s, in which eve nt the local law of the other state will be applied. Id. (empha sis added) . After rec iting §§ 188 and 193 f rom the Restateme nt (Second) of Conflict of L aws, the Le wis court he ld that “[b] eca use the insura

nce contra cts . . . wer e ente red into in I ndiana betwee n I ndiana pa

rties and c oncer

ned automobiles which wer e li cense d and gar ag ed in I ndiana, we
are of the op ini on

that I nd iana law sho uld g ov e rn the ri g hts and lia bil iti e s o f t

he pa rt ie s und e r t

he se contra cts.” Id. Simi larly , in Bonnlander , s e ve ra l in sure ds fro m I ndiana we re inj ur e d in

an a uto mob ile
acc ident in Kentucky . 949 S.W .2d at 619. The ins u re d s h ad au tomobile policies written under I nd iana law th at w e re pr ov ide d b y ou t- of -s ta te ins ur anc e c omp anie s th a t c on du c te d b us ine ss i n Kentucky
. Id. Th e a

pp e lla nts argue d th a t K

y . Re v. Stat. § 30 4. 39 .1 00 (2 ) r e qu ir e d th e ou t- of -s ta te insurance companies to provide t h e s am e UI M cover ag e as r equire d under K entucky law,

n o tw it h s ta n d in g th e f

a c t th a t th e p o li c ie s a t is s u e w e r e w r itte n u n d e r I n d iana law
. Id. at 621. Acc ording to the Bonnlander c ourt : [a] ppellants [] maintain that beca use appe llee insuranc e compa nies wer e author ized to do business in the state of Ke ntucky and eac h filed a “De clar ation of Compliance wi th N o- fa

ult I ns ur anc e Re qu ir e me nts ,” the y mus t pr ov ide un de ri ns ur e d mo tor ist s’No. 09-5660

Flint v. Liberty Ins. Corp.

Spe c if ic a ll y , p u r s u an t to I n d ia

n a la w an d th e la

n g u a g e o f th e p la in ti f

f s ’ p o lic ies, the 2 defe ndant was not a

n underinsure d motorist because his total insurance c overa g e of $125,000 pe r individual was gre at er than the UI M limi t contained in the plaintiffs’ policies. Althoug h the plaintiffs had two separ ate policies, e ach policy contained a

nti-stacking lang uag e for

underinsure d motorists. Owens , 134 F.3d 372, at *1. - 9 - cover ag e to appe llants pursuant to Kentucky law. The de clar ations filed by appellee s pursuant to KRS 304.39-100(2) only require that appellee s provide ba sic repa rations be ne fi ts and the statut or

y min imum tor

t lia bil ity ins ur anc e on any c ov ered veh icle whi l e it is i n the state of K entucky . There is no require ment that they provide un de ri ns ur e d mo tor ist s c ov e ra g e to t he ir ins ur e ds
. Th is is in kee pin g wi th t he pu bli c policy of Ke ntucky ’s Motor Vehic le Repar ations Act, which is to protect Ke ntucky re sid e nts fr om o ut- of

-s ta te ve hic le s w hic h c ome int o Ke ntu c ky and c a us e a c c ide nts and have inadequate or no insurance . I t follows that basic re parations benefits and min imum to rt

lia bil ity ins ur anc e g o w iththe ve hic le , w hil e un de ri ns ur e d mo tor ist s cover ag e is persona l to the insured. Id. at 620-21. Conseque ntly , the Bonnlander court he ld that Ky . Rev. Stat. § 304.39.100(2) did not
re qu i re a fo re i gn i n s u ra n ce co mp an y d o i n g b u s i n es s i n Ke n tu ck y t o p ro v i d e th e m i n i m u m U IM
cover ag e re quired unde r Ke ntucky law for automobile insurance policies written in other states. Id. Finally , Ow e ns v . D e c lar

k , No. CI V. A94-265, 1995 WL912492, at *1 (E.D. K y . 1995), aff’d 134 F.2d 372 ( 6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion), also lends support to Le wis and Bonnlander
. I n Owens , an Indiana r esident wa s injured in an automobil e accident in Kentucky wher e the insure d’s passeng er was c overe d by an Indiana policy
. Id. Subsequently , a dis pute arouse between the insure r and the injure d passeng er reg arding whether the policy ’s UI M cover ag e applied. Id. Kentucky law provided c overa g e and I

ndiana law did not. The district c ourt ruled that I ndiana law applied to the 2 insured’s UI M policy , relying on Le wis and the Restate ment (Second) Conflicts of L aws. Id.No. 09-5660

Flint v. Liberty Ins. Corp.

- 10 - On d i re ct ap p ea l , we agr ee d , ci t i n g L e wis and Bonnlander , holding “ that the district court proper ly held that I ndiana, not Ke ntucky , law applies, be cause Kentucky was only the site of the
a c c ide nt. Th e sig nif

ic ant c on ta c ts i n th is c a se be tw e e n M r. and Mr s. Ow e ns [the inj ur e d p la int if fs ]
an d St a te F a r

m [th e ir in s u r e r ] w e r e in I ndiana.” Owens , 134 F.3d 372 at *2. As in Le wis , we concluded that Kentucky had no sig nificant intere st in the outcome of the litiga tion because the d i s t r i c tc o u rtw a s i n t e r

p r e t i n g p o l i c i e s w r i t t e nu n d e r In d i an a l aw t h a ti n t e n d e d t o p r o v i d e U IM
cover ag e to I ndiana r esidents. Id. The same result was r eac hed in Hamme r v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 950 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Ky
. 1996) where the plaintiff driver, an I ndiana resident, was injured in an automobile acc ident in Kentucky involving an underinsure d Kentucky motorist. Id. at 193. Once
a g a i n , t h e i n

j u r e d p l a i n t i f

f w a s i n s u r e d

u n d e r anIn d i an a

a u t o m o b i l e p o l i c y

t h a ti n c l u d e d

U IM
cover ag e. Ne verthe less, the driver argued that Kentucky law g overne d the UI M provision of her two I ndiana policies beca

use Ke ntucky

law provide d more fa

vorable cover ag e. The re, the district court applied Indiana law , rel y i ng on Le wis and Owens , f or the pr op os iti on

that Ind iana

ha d th e mos t signific ant intere st in the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 195. I n the pre sent ca se, under Le wis , Owens , Bonnlander , and Hamme r , Kentucky choice of law pr inc ipl e s a lmo st e xclu siv e ly fa vo r L ibe rt

y ’s po sit ion . M or e ov e r, F lin t ha s f a il e d to pe rs ua siv e ly d i s t i n g u i s h t h e s e c a s e s . In d i an a h a s a m o r e s i g n i f i c an ti n t e r e s ti nt h e i n t e r

p r e t a t i o no f

F l i n t ’ s U IM provision beca

use the policy

was wr itten as an Indiana policy to cover an I n d i an a re sident who g ara g e d h is v e hic le in I

nd iana . B oth

F lin t and Stin so n r e po rt ed th at they we re I nd iana

re sid e nts ,No. 09-5660

Flint v. Liberty Ins. Corp.

- 11 - F lin t a ff ir ma tiv e ly c la ime d Ind iana

re sid e nc y

wh e n h e e xec ute d th e po lic y , h e was lic e ns e d in I ndiana, a nd he titled and re g istered his vehic le in I ndiana. Mo st i mpo rt antl y , F lin t to ok a ff ir ma tive ste ps to r e mov e his Ke ntu c ky a dd re ss a s h is residential addre ss in his 2003 reque st f or policy chang e. Specifica lly , the “De s cr i b e C h an g e”
se c tio n in a Marc h 1 3, 20 03 “ Re qu e st f or Auto P oli c y

Cha ng e ” fo rm

re po rt s:
c or re c te d p h’ s r e sid e nti a l a dd re ss ( he lives in deputy, indiana ) [sic] and cor rec ted the ma ili nga dd

re ss. (t he c ur rent add re ss o n h is p oli c y is h is w or

k a dd re ss a nd sh ou ld have be en listed not as his residential a ddress, bu t as his ma ili ng ad dr ess .) als o, pls delete alternate garaging
. (Emphasis adde d.) Flint’s policy

chang e re quest applied to policy number No. A 07-248869582-002, the policy that c ov e re d th e 20 04 Ca dil la c . At the tim e of the a c c ide nt, the 20 04 Ca dil la c wa s th e po lic y ’s on ly ins ur e d v e hic le . F lin t’ s r e qu e st that L ibe rt y de le te an alt erna te g ara g ingop tio n a nd c ha ng e his residential a ddress to I ndiana c reates, by implication, an assura

nce to L iberty

that as of Ma

rch 2003, th e in s u r e d

v e h ic le w a s g ar a g e d

e xc lu s iv e ly

in I n d ia n a . T h u s , F li n t’ s a f

f ir mati v e c o n d

u c t c rea ted
an assur ance to L iberty

that I ndiana “wa s to be the principa l location of the insure d risk during the term of the policy

. . . .” Lewis, 555 S.W .2d at 582. Flint asser

ts that he made the 2003 policy chang e whe n the policy

cover ed the 2001 Sierr a
and no t th e 20 04 Ca dil la c , a

nd , th us , th e Marc h 200 3 poli c y c ha ng e is ins ig nif

ic ant. We r e

je c t th is argument. Simpl y

put, it was Flint’s dec ision to subs titute the 2004 Cadillac for the 2001 Sierra on his ex isting policy

instead of se eking a fr esh policy to cover the Cadillac.No. 09-5660

Flint v. Liberty Ins. Corp.

- 12 - We hold t h at the district court c orre ctly applied Ke ntucky

choice of law pr inciples and proper ly ruled that Indiana, not Ke ntucky , law applied, be cause I ndiana ha s the most significa nt
re la tio ns hip wi th t

he c on tr a c t and

the pa rtie s. Th e signif

ic ant c on ta c ts b e tw e e n F lin t and L ibe rt y
we re in I nd iana . F lin t’ s c on ta c ts w ithKe ntu c ky – h is f or me r p art -t ime Ke ntu c ky

res ide nc e , h is Ke n tu ck y b u s i n es s , an d h i s fa m i l y
– h av e v ery l i t t l e t o d o wi t h t h e s co p e o f F l i n t ’s UIM c o v er age as a lice nsed Indian a driver ope rating a vehic le titled, insured, and g ara g ed in I ndiana, who w as involved in a

n acc ident with a

n underinsure d I ndiana driver. I n fac t, simi lar to Le wis , Kentucky ’s only signific ant conne ction with the transac tion and parties is the site of the acc ident. B. F lin t ma ke s a pe rf un c tor y argume nt that the dis tr ic t cou rt sh ou ld have de c lin e d to e xer c ise it s ju r is d ic ti o no v e r

th is d iv e r s it

y a c ti o nu n d e r

th e D e c la

r a to r y Ju d g me n t A ct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) . The Supreme Court ha s explained that w hile the Dec laratory J udg ment Act provide s the dis tr ic t c ourt

wi th t he a uth or ity to d e c ide su c h a c tio ns , it is “ un de r n o c omp uls ion to e xer c ise [its] jurisdiction.” Brillhart

v. Ex cess I

ns. Co. of Am. , 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942). Howeve r, F lint did not raise this ar g ument befor e the district cour t. We have he ld that where a par ty “fa il[ s] t o p ro p er ly

raise the issue of the propr iety of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s e xer c ise of jur isd ic tio n w iththe dis tr ic t court ” un de r the De c larator y Judg me nt A c t, the par ty forf eits the claim on appe al. Sc ott sd aleIn s. Co. v . F

low e rs , 513 F.3d 546, 553 ( 6th Cir. 20 08 ). Mo re ov e r, e ve n if Fl int ha d pro pe rl y pr e se nte d this argume nt (a nd we c on c lud e that he did not), his appellate br ief provide s insufficient tre atment of t h i s issue. “I ssues adve rted to in aNo. 09-5660

Flint v. Liberty Ins. Corp.

- 13 - perf unctor y m anner , unacc ompanied by some eff

ort at deve loped ar g umentation, are deeme d waived.” El-Moussa v. H older , 569 F.3d 250, 257 (6th Cir. 2009) (c itation and internal quotation marks omitted). III
. For these re asons, we a ffirm the or der of the district court.