MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 9 ME 131 Docket: Cum

- 18

- 434 Argued : June	12,	2019 Decided: August 8 ,	2019 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR , and HUMPHREY, JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. KEVIN	CAREY

SAUFLEY , C. J. [¶1] Kevin	Carey appeals	fro m	a	judgment	of	conviction	entered	by	the court	 (Cumberland	 County, L.	 Walker,	 J. )	 after	 a	 jury found	 him	 guilty	 of multiple	sex	crimes

. 1 H e argues	that	the	court	( Cashman,	J. )	erred	in the	jury selection	process	when	it den ied his	motion	to	strike	one	of	the	jurors	for	cause and denied his	motion	to	strike	the	entire	venire	after	one	prospective	juror	left the	courtroom	in	an	agitated	state. We	affirm	the	judgment.

1 Specifically,	Carey	was	convicted	of	seven	counts	of	gross	sexual	assault	(Class	A),	17

- A	M.R.S. § 253(1)(C)	(2018);	 two	counts	of	gross	sexual	assault	 (Class	A),	17

- A	M.R.S.	 §	253(1)(B)	(2018); three	count s	of	gross	sexual	assault	(Class	A),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	253(1)(A)	(2018);	one	count	of	unlawful sexual	contact	(Class	A),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	255

- A(1)(F

- 1)	(2018);	one	count	of	unlawful	sexual	contact (Class	B),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 255

- A(1)(F)	(2018);	and	one	count	of	visu al	sexual	aggression	against	a	child (Class	C),	17

- A M.R.S.	§	256(1)(B)	(2018).2 I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] Viewing	 the	evidence in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	State,	 the jury	rationally	could	have	found	the	following	facts	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.
See State	v.	Ayotte ,	2019	ME	61,	¶	2, 207 A.3d 614

. When Carey was	more	than thirty

- five	 years	 old , he began	 to sexually	 assault a seven - year - old female relative who lived	with	him and other members of	their	family

. After his first assault,	 his	 conduct became	 more	 frequent and	 he would	 enter the	 child’s bedroom every night ,	touch her genitals with	his	finger s,	put	his	mouth	on	her genitals	and	make	her	put	her	mouth	on	his,	and	place	objects	in	her	vagina	and

anus. He told	her	not	to	tell	anyone	because	they	would	both	be	in	trouble. [¶ 3 ] After the	 child moved	 to	 a different home	 with other	 family members to	avoid	him , Carey would	visit that	home to	babysit	one	night	each week .		During	those	visits,	he	would	sexually	assault	the	child. He	threatened

to hurt	her	or other, younger	children	in	her	family if she	told	anyone.		When the	child	was	about	 twelve years	old ,	Carey	moved	into	 the	house	where	 the child	was	living. Every	day,	he sexual ly assault ed the	child. He	did	not	listen when	she	told	him	to	stop. Even	after	the	child	moved	a second time	to	avo id Carey,	Carey continued	his	sexual	assaults	against her on	each of the	three	days each	week that she	would return	to his residence	to visit others	in her	family

.3 At	 age	 sixteen, the	 child to ld	 a	 friend	 and	 a	 family	 member what	 had	 been happening. 2 [¶ 4 ]		In	March	2017,	Carey	was	initially	charged	by	complaint	with	seven counts	of	gross	sexual	assault,	one	count	of	unlawful	sexual	contact,	one	count of	visual	sexual	aggression	against	a	child,	and	one	count	of	sexual	misconduct with	a	child (Class	C) ,	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	258(1

- A)	(2018).		He	was	later	charged	by indictment	with	fifteen	counts	of	gross	sexual	assault,	two	counts	of	unlawful sexual	contact,	one	count	of	visual	sexual	aggression	against	a	child,	and	one count	of	sexual	misconduct	with	a	child. [¶ 5 ] Jury	selection	was	held in September	2018.		At	the	beginning	of	jury selection,	in	front	of	the full pool	of	jurors,	one	prospective	juror abruptly	left the	room	when	the	charges	against	Carey	were	being	described. Although	not everyone	could	hear	i t,	t he	prospective	juror	said, as	captured	on	the	record,

2 The	evidence	was	sufficient	to	support	the	jury’s	findings	that	Carey	engaged	in	the	charged	acts of	 physical	 contact	 between	 his	mouth ,	 or	 an	instrument	 or	 device	manipula ted	 by	 him, and	 the genitals	of	the	child,	and	between	her	mouth	and	his	genitals,	before	the	age	of	twelve,	before	the	age of	fourteen,	and,	regardless	of	age,	through	threats	of	physical	force. See 17

- A M.R.S.	§§ 251(1)(C), (E),	253(1)	(2018)	(gross	sex ual	assault).		The	evidence	was	also	sufficient	to	demonstrate	that,	on all	charged	occasions,	Carey,	with	the	conscious	object	to	do	so,	touched	the	child’s	genitals	or	anus for	 the	 purpose	 of	 arousing	 or	 gratifying	 sexual	 desire	 before	 she	 turned	 twelve and	 before	 she turned	 fourteen	when	he	was	not	her	spouse	and	was	at	least	 three	years	older	than	she	was, see 17

- A	M.R.S.	§§ 35(1) (A) ,	251(1)(D),	255

- A(1)(F),	(F

- 1)	(2018)	(unlawful	sexual	contact),	and that he exposed	 his	genitals	 to	 her	 and	 caused	 her	 to	 expose	 hers	 to	 him	 for	 the	purpose	 of	arousing	 or gratifying	sexual	desire	when	she	was	under	the	age	of	twelve	and	he	was	an	adult, see 17

- A	M.R.S. § 256(1)(B)	(visual	sexual	aggression	against	a	child).4 “No,	I’m	not	staying	for	this

. ” Defense	counsel	also	heard the	prospective	juror say	something	like, “This	is	ridiculous

. ” T he	court	directed	the	judicial	marshal

to go	after	that	prospective	juro r	and ask him to	stop. [¶ 6 ] The	 court	 then	 took	 a	 short	 break ,	 met	 with	 counsel, and upon return, asked	the	remaining	pool	of	jurors , “Based	on	what	just	happened	with the	individual	who	left	the	courtroom,	is	there	anyone,	who,	based	on	that	act alone,	would	have	 any	difficulty	being	 fair	 and	impartial	going	 forward	here today	 or	 through	 this	 case?” T hirty

- four	 potential	 jurors answer ed	 in	 the affirmative

. Based	 on	 the	 number	 of	 people	 who	 rose	 in	 response	 to	 the question,	Carey	moved	at	sidebar	to	strike	the entire jury	venire	for	this	case. The	court denied	the	motion to	strike	the	entire	venire but struck	all	members of	the	jury	p ool	who	had indicated	that	the y	would	have	difficulty	being	fair	and impartial	after	witnessing	the potential juror leave the	courtroom

. [¶ 7 ] The	 court	 read	 the	 remaining	 charges	 and	 asked the	 remaining potential	jurors if	they knew	any	of	the	attorneys or	listed	witnesses,	had	heard of	 the	matter	in	 the	media,	had	an	inability	 to	be fair	and impartial	as	 to	law enforcement	witnesses,	believed	that	anyone	charged	with	a	crime	must	have done	something	wrong ,	had	philosophical	or	religious	beliefs	that	would	make5 it	difficult	to	sit	in	judgment,	or	had	any	other	reason	that	they	could	not	be	fair and	impartial

. [¶ 8 ]		After	receiving	responses,	the	court	held	a	conference	with	counsel during	which	Carey aga in moved	for	the	entire	pool	to	be	stricken .		In	support of	that	motion,	he	argued that	the	potential	juror	who left	the	courtroom had been	sputtering	negative	words, that there	were	audible	sighs	and	groans	from other	potential	jurors	when	the	charges	wer e	read,	and that there	seemed	to	be a	pervasiv ely negative	view	of	Carey within the	pool	of	jurors.		The	court	stated that	 it intended	 to	 “continue	 on	 and	 do	 the	 individual	 voir	 dire,”	 but	 that	 it would also	 ask	 those jurors	who	would	be	questioned	in indi vidualized voir dire	whether	the	events	in	court	would	affect	their	ability	to	be	impartial. [¶ 9 ]	 	 The	 court then proceeded	 with individual voir	 dire	 of	 particular jurors , separate	from	the	rest	of	the	jury	pool

. Relevant	here,	t he	court inquired why	 J uror	 183	 had answered	 “yes”	 to the	 question on	 the written sex questionnaire “ involving	 knowledge	of	either [him] self,	or	a	 friend,	or	 family member .” The	juror indicated	that	a	friend	had	been	a	victim	of	sexual	abuse by	 a	 priest	 when	 he	 was	 a	 child.	 	 Asked	 if	 there	 had	 been	 any	 type	 of prosecution,	 the	 juror	 stated,	 “ I	 don’t	 know	 the	 final	 outcome.

.	 .	 . So	 I	 don’t know.	 	 I	 know	 he	was

.	 .	 . defrocked. And	 the n	 I	 don’t	 honestly	 know	what6 happened. ”		The court inquired	 further	about	 those	circumstances	and	about the	effect of the	in

- court	outburst	on	the	potential	juror: THE	 COURT:	 All	 right.	 And	 was	 there	 anything

— is	 there anything	about	that	incident	and	frie nd

— did	you	and	your	friend talk	about	it? PROSPECTIVE	JUROR:	No,	no.	I	kind	of	knew.		We	knew,	we had	 heard	 things	 were	 happening,	 et	 cetera,	 but	 never	 spoke directly	about	it.		 I	spoke	with	him	after	everything	kind	of	came out.		But	he	never	talked	abo ut	the	situation. THE	 COURT:	 All	 right.	 Would	 anything	 about	 that

— the knowledge	of	that	event	or	what	you	believe	happened,	would	that affect	your	ability	to	be	fair	and	impartial	in	this	case? PROSPECTIVE	JUROR:	I	don’t	believe	so. THE	 COURT:	 And	 is there	 anything	 that	 happened	 in	 the courtroom	this	afternoon,	having	had	a	little	bit	of	time	to	reflect, has	that	had	any	effect	on	your	ability	to	be	fair	and	impartial? PROSPECTIVE	JUROR:	I	don’t	believe	so. THE	COURT:	 Is	 there	any	question?	You	sa id,	“I	don’t	 think so.” Do	you	have	any	pause	about	that? PROSPECTIVE	 JUROR:	 No,	 it’s

— no.	 I	 would	 say	 “no.”	 My answer	would	be	“no.”		It’s	just,	I	guess,	you’re	hard	until	you’re	in that	situation	to	know	for	sure. But	I	would	say	most	likely	not.
Car ey	moved	to	strike	the	juror	on	the	ground	that	he had	been equivocal	about his	ability	to	remain	fair	and	impartial. See M.R.U.	Crim. P. 24(b)	(“ Challenges for	 cause	 of	individual	 prospective	jurors	 shall	 be	made	 at	 the	 bench,	 at	 the7 conclusion	of	the	examination.”). The	court	stated,	“The	fact	patterns	are	very different.	 	 And	 he	 didn’t	 have	 any	 direct	 conversations,	 he	 said,	 with	 that individual.		It	was	more	stuff	that	he	had	heard	about	or	suspected.		So	I	will deny	[the	motion].” [¶1 0 ]		After	the	court	struck nine other jurors	for	cause,	Carey	renewed his	motion	 to	 strike	 the	entire	 venire.		 The	court	denied	 that	motion finding that ,	after having	spoken to	the potential jur ors in	individual	voir	dire ,	it was confident that	they had	been candid in	their responses	to	questions and could be fair	 and	 impartial. The	 State	 and	 Carey	 then	 exercised	 their	 peremptory strikes;	Carey	used	all	of	his	peremptory	strikes	but	did	not	remove	Juror	183. 3 [¶1 1 ]		The	court	( L.	Walker,	J. )	held a	jury	 trial	beginning	 the	next	day. After	the	State	presented	its	case,	Carey	moved	for	a	judgment	of	acquittal	on
Count s 7, 9,	13,	and	17

— t he charge	of sexual	misconduct	with	a	child and	three charges	of gross	sexual	assault.		The	court	granted	that	mo tion. [¶1 2 ]		The	jury	found	Carey	guilty	of	the remaining fifteen	charges

. A fter holding	 a sentencing	 hearing ,	 t he	 court	 sentenced	 Carey	 to concurrent forty

- year	sentences	on	seven	of	the gross	sexual	assault counts and	imposed

3 “As	long	as	a	defendant	exercised	all	of	his	peremptory	strikes	.	.	.	the	fact	that	he	did	not	use them	to	strike	a	juror	that	he	challenged	for	cause	does	not	defeat	his	right	to	complain	on	appeal	as to	the	impaneling	of	those	jurors.” State	v.	Holla nd ,	2009	ME	72,	¶	55	n.15,	976	A.2d	227.8
concurrent	 sentences	 on the	 other counts

. 4 Carey	 timely	 appealed. See 15 M.R.S.	§	2115	(2018);	M.R.	App.	P.	2A,	2B (b)(1)

. II. DISCUSSION [¶1 3 ]		The	United	States	Constitution	guarantees	the	right	of	an	accused

“ to	 a	 speedy	 and	 public	 trial,	 by	 an impartial jury.”	 	 U.S.	 Const.	 amend.	 VI (emphasis	 added); see	 also Me.	 Const.	 art.	 I,	 §	 6	 (guaranteeing	 the	 right	 to	 a “speedy,	public	and impartial trial”	(emphasis	added)).		The	Due	Process	Clause also	guarantees	this	right. See U.S.	Const.	amend.	XIV,	§	1; Morg an	v.	Illinois ,	504 U.S.	719,	727	(1992) ; see	also Me.	Const.	art.	I,	§ 6

- A.
A. Appellate	Review	of	Determinations	of	Juror	Impartiality [¶1 4 ]		We	“review	the	trial	court’s	finding	of	juror	impartiality	for	clear error	and	the	conduct	of	voir	dire	for	an abuse	of	discretion.” State	v.	Simons , 2017	 ME	 180,	 ¶	 19,	 169	 A.3d	 399	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 A	 finding	 of

4 Specifically,	the	court	sentenced	Carey	to	concurrent	sentences	of	forty	years	for	the	gross	sexual assaults	charged	in	Counts	1,	2,	3,	4,	8,	10,	and	11;	thirty	years	for	the	gross	sexual	assaults	charged in	Coun ts	14,	15,	16,	18,	and	19;	thirty	years	for	the	unlawful	sexual	contact	charged	in	Count	5;	ten years	for	the	unlawful	sexual	contact	charged	in	Count	12;	and	five	years	for	visual	sexual	aggression against	a	child,	charged	in	Count	6.9 impartiality	will	stand	unless	there	is	no	competent	evidence	to	support	that decision. State	v.	Diana ,	2014	ME	45,	¶ 22,	89	A.3d	132. [¶1 5 ]	 	 We	 “accord	 substantial	 deference”	 to	 the	 trial	 court’s	 ultimate finding	about	whether	a	juror	can	be	fair	and	impartial	“because	of	its	unique ability	to	observe	and	assess	the	juror’s	credibility.” State	v.	Durant ,	2004	ME 136,	¶	15,	861	A.2d	637; see also Skilling	v.	United	States ,	561	U.S.	358,	397

- 98 (2010) (stating	that	the	trial	court	is	in	the	best	position	to	observe	a	potential juror’s	comprehension	of	the	questions	asked	and	the	certainty	of	the	juror’s responses). The	trial	court’s	“predomin ant	function	in	determining	juror	bias involves	 credibility	 findings	whose	 basis	 cannot	 be	 easily	 discerned	 from	 an appellate	record.” Wainwright	v.	Witt ,	469	U.S.	412,	429	(1985)

. 5 [¶1 6 ]	 	 Because	 of	 the	 constitutional	 rights	 at	 stake,	 however,	 if	we	 do discern	 an	 error	 that	 affects	 the	 right	 to	 an	impartial	 adjudicator,	 that	 error cannot	 be	 regarded	 as	 harmless. See	 Gray	 v.	 Mississippi ,	 481	 U.S.	 648,	 668 (198 7 ); United	 States	 v.	 French ,	 904	 F.3d	 111,	 119	 (1st	 Cir.	 2018)

5 See	 also	 Skilli ng	 v.	 United	 States ,	 561	U.S.	 358,	 386	 (2010)	 (“Reviewing	 courts	 are	 properly resistant	 to	 second

- guessing	 the	 trial	 judge’s	 estimation	 of	 a	 juror’s	 impartiality,	 for	 that	 judge’s appraisal	is	 ordinarily	influenced	 by	a	 host	 of	 factors	impossible	 to	 captur e	 fully	in	 the	 record

— among	 them,	 the	 prospective	 juror’s	 inflection,	 sincerity,	 demeanor,	 candor,	 body	 language,	 and apprehension	of	duty.”).10 (characterizing	such	error	as	“st ructural	error

— that	is,	per	se	prejudicial	and not	susceptible	to	harmlessness	analysis”).
B. Trial	Court	Process

— Ensuring the Impartiality	of	Individual	Jurors [¶1 7 ] As	a	p rocedural matter , Maine’s	statute	governing	jury	selection	in criminal	cases authorizes	those	accused	of	crimes	to	challenge	jurors	for	cause

“ as	in	civil	cases.”		15	M.R.S.	§ 1259	(2018). T hus, “ [t] he	court,	on	motion	of either	party	in	an	action, may examine,	 on	oath,	any	person	called	as	a	juror therein,	whether	he

.	.	. has	g iven	or	formed	an	opinion	or	is	sensible	of	any	bias, prejudice	or	particular	interest	in	 the	cause. ”		14	M.R.S.	§	1301	(2018). “ If	it appears	 from	his	answers	 or	 from	any	 competent	evidence	 that	he	does	not stand	indifferent	in	 the	cause,	another	juror	s hall	be	called	and	placed	in	his stead.” Id. [¶1 8 ]	 	 Criminal	 charges	 alleging	 sexual	 assaults	 on	 children	 present particular	 challenges	 in	 jury	 selection.	 	 Judges,	 prosecutors,	 and	 defense counsel	 must	 help	 jurors	 distinguish	 between	 the	 natural	 and	 unav oidable abhorrence	of	those	types	of	assaults	and	the	very	different	issue	of	each	juror’s capacity	 to	determine	whether	 the	defendant	committed	 the	crimes	charged. Although	the	court	must	be	alert	to	the	sort	of	animus	that	would	undermine	a juror’s	 abil ity	 to	 presume	 the	 particular	 defendant’s	 innocence,	 a	 juror’s11 consideration	of	sexual	assault	on	a	child	to	be	repulsive	does	not	alone	require the	court	to	strike	the	juror	for	cause.		Sexual	assaults	are	designated	as	crimes for	the	very	reason	that	soc iety	condemns	such	behavior. [¶1 9 ]	 	 If	 the	 impartiality	 of	 a	 potential	 juror	 has	 been	 brought	 into question,	 a	 trial	 court	 should	 interview	 the	 prospective	 juror	 “to	 determine whether	he	or	she	can	remain	impartial.” Durant ,	2004	ME	136,	¶	15,	861	A.2d 637.	 	 The	 questions	 that	 a	 court	 chooses	 to	 ask	 during	 voir	 dire	 must	 be sufficient	to	elicit	any	facts	that	would	reveal	juror	bias	so	that	the	court	can make	an	informed	decision. State	v.	Lowry ,	2003	ME	38,	¶ 11,	819	A.2d 331. There	 is,	 however,	 no	 “hard

- and

- fast	 formula”	 that	 dictates	 exactly	 what questions the	individual	voir	dire	must	include. Skilling ,	561	U.S. at 386. The trial	court	has	“[c]onsiderable	discretion	over	the	conduct	and	scope	of	juror voir	dire”	and	m ust	balance “the	competing	considerations	 of	 fairness	 to	 the defendant,	 judicial	 economy,	 and	 avoidance	 of	 embarrassment	 to	 potential jurors.” State	v.	Woodburn ,	559	A.2d	343,	344	(Me.	1989). [¶ 20 ]		Because	jurors,	in	responding	 to	 voir	dire	questions,	“ cannot	be expected	 invariably	 to	 express	 themselves	 carefully	 or	 even	 consistently,” Skilling ,	561	U.S.	at	397	(quotation	marks	omitted),	the	observations	of	the	trial court	and	input	from	counsel	at	the	point	of	the	individual	voir	dire	are	of	great12 impor tance.		Colloquial	uses	of	phrases	 such	as	“I	 think”	or	“I	hope”	must	be understood	by	the	trial	court	in	context.		For	instance,	a	court	may	determine that	there	is	no	actual	bias	when	a	juror,	in	the	course	of	the	voir	dire,	says,	“I think	 I	 could	 be	 fai r”;	 the	 court	is	 not	 required	 to	 find	 that	 statement ,	 taken alone, to	 represent	equivocation. Miller v.	Webb ,	385	F.3d 666, 675 (6 th Cir. 2004) (quotation	marks	omitted). The	trial	court	may also weigh	most	heavily “those	statements	that	were	the	most fully	articulated”	by	the	juror	during	voir dire

. Patton	v.	Yount ,	467	U.S.	1025,	1039	(1984)

. [¶ 2 1]		If	a	potential	juror	overhears	the	improper	comments	of	a	fellow prospective	juror,	“the	test	for	juror	impartiality	is	whether	a	juror	can	lay	aside

an y	impressions	from	the	improper	comment	and	render	a	verdict	based	only on	the	evidence	presented	during	the	trial.”		Alexander, Maine	Jury	Instruction Manual §	2

- 7	at	2

- 34 (201 8

- 201 9 ed.	201 8 )	 (citing United	States	v.	Lacey ,	86 F.3d	956,	969	(10th	Cir.	19 96)).		If	a	juror	is	exposed	to	information	that	could affect	the	juror’s	impartiality,	the	court	may still seat	the	juror	if	the	juror,	upon court	inquiry,	credibly	states	that	the	information	would	not	affect	the	juror’s ability	to	be	impartial. Durant , 2004	ME	136,	¶¶	16

- 17,	861	A.2d	637. Similarly, a	court	may	find	it	appropriate	to	seat	a	juror	who,	when	asked	if	the	juror	could set	aside	an	opinion	regarding	guilt	before	entering	the	jury	box,	says,	“I	think13 I	could	enter	it	[the	jury	box]	with	a	ve ry	open	mind.		I	think	I	could	.	.	.	very easily.” Patton ,	467	U.S.	at	1039

- 40 (alterations	in	original) (quotation	marks omitted) .		And	when	a	juror	indicates	that	she	“believe[s]”	she	can	be	impartial, the	 trial	 court	 may	 find	 that	 the	 juror	 can	 be	 impartial. United	 States	 v. Alexander ,	48	F.3d	1477,	1484	(9th	Cir.	1995) (quotation	marks	omitted)

. [¶ 22 ]	 	 It	 is	 against	 this	 backd rop	 that	 we	 review	 the	 jury	 selection process,	and	the	ultimate	seating	of	the	jury,	in	the	matter	before	us.
C

. Review	of	Jury	Selection	in	Carey’s	Case
1. Individual	Voir	Dire,	Juror	183 [¶ 23 ]		In	speaking	with	Juror	183,	t he	court here ( Cashman,	J. ) did	exactly what	a	trial	court	should	do when	a	juror’s	impartiality	has	been	questioned ;	it posed	questions	 to the	potential	juror individually that	were	designed	 to	aid the	 court	 in	 evaluating	 whether	 the	 juror	 could	 be	 fair	 and	 impartia l notwithstanding the	sexual	abuse	of	his	childhood	friend	and	his	observation of	the	potential	juror’s conduct in leaving	the court room . See Durant ,	2004	ME 136, ¶ ¶ 15

- 17 ,	861	A.2d	637

. W hen	asked	if	either	his	friend’s	experience	of sexual	 abuse	 or	 the	 events	 he	 witnessed	 in	 the	 courtroom	 would	 affect	 his ability	to	be	impartial, the	juror stated,	“I	don’t	believe	so

. ” T he	court carefully follow ed up by question ing whether	he	had	any	pau se .		The	juror	then	made	his14 response	clear: “No,	it’s

— no.		I	would		say	‘no.’		My	answer	would	be	‘no.’ ” T he juror added,	“ It’s	just,	I	guess,	you’re	hard	until	you’re	in	that	situation	to	know for	sure.		But	I	would	say	most	likely	not

. ” T he	court	conc luded	that	those final ruminations	did	not undermine its	determination of	the	juror ’s	impartiality

. [¶ 24 ] T he	court acted	in	its	proper role when	it interpret ed the	juror’s repeated	“no”	answers	as	genuinely	communicating	a belief	that neither	his	life experiences	nor	the	events	he	observed	in	court	would	affect	his	ability	to	be fair	 and	 impartial

. B ased	 on its observation	 of	 the	 potential	 juror	 and consideration	of	his	words and	the	way	in	which	he	delivered	them , the	court ’s reliance on	 the	 juror ’s	 “ most	 fully	 articulated”	 statements provided	 a	 solid foundation	for	its	determination that Juror	183 could	be	impartial. Patton , 467
U.S.	at	1039. We	defer	to	the	court’s	finding	following	its individualized inquiry ,
see Durant ,	2004	ME 136,	¶	15,	861	A.2d	637 ,	and	we	discern	no	error	in	the court’s	decision.
2

. Denial	of	Motion	to	Strike	the	Entire	Jury	Pool [¶ 25 ] Carey also contends	 that	 the entire jury	 pool should	 have	 been stricken	because	the	pool was	impliedly	biased	against	him	a fter	the	outburst that the	potential	jurors	witnessed	in	court. “Whether	a	juror’s	partiality	may be	 presumed	 from	 the	 circumstances	 is	 a	 question	 of	 law” that	 calls for	 a15 determination	of	whether	the	circumstances	at	hand	are “ extraordinary ”	such that	bi as	or	prejudice	will	be	implied	or	presumed. Hunley	v.	Godinez ,	975	F.2d 316,	318

- 19 (7th	Cir.	1992). The	inquiry	is	an	objective	one	that	asks	whether “it	 is	 highly	 unlikely	 that	 the	 average	 person	 could	 remain	 impartial	 in	 .	 .	 . deliberations	under	the	circumstances.” United	States	v.	Kechedzian ,	902	F.3d 1023,	1027

- 28	(9th	Cir.	2018)	(quotation	marks	o mitted). [¶ 26 ] Although we	have not	had	occasion	to	address	the issue ,	federal jurisprudence has	made	clear	that bias	can	be	implied	or	prejudice	presumed only	in	extreme	or	extraordinary	circumstances. See	Hunley ,	975	F.2d at 318 (“Use	 of	 the	 ‘implied bias’	 doctrine	 is	 certainly	 the	 rare	 exception.”).	 	 For instance, b ias	 was	 implied	 when	 jurors’	 hotel	 rooms	 were	 burglarized overnight	while	the	jurors	were	sequestered	for	a	trial	involving	a	burglary	and murder ,	and	 there	was	 some	indication	 that	jurors who	had	been	 victimized changed	their	votes	to	guilty

. Id. at 317, 320 .		In	another	case,	b ias	was	implied when	jurors	listened	to	sixty

- five	percent	of	the	potential	jurors	indicate	that they	thought	the	defendant	was	guilty	of	murder	and	state	that	they could	not be	fair	and	impartial

. Seals	v.	State ,	44	So.	2d	61,	67

- 68	(Miss.	1950)

. [¶ 27 ] The	 circumstances	 of	 this	 case	 do	 not in	 any	 way present an extraordinary	situation	in	which	prejudice	may	be	presumed	or	bias	implied.16 The	 departing	 potential	 juror	 did	 not	 speak	 about	 the defendant	 or	 the defendant’s	 guilt;	 he	 said	 only,	 “No,	 I’m	 not	 staying	 for	 this,”	 and,	 “This	 is ridiculous.”		We	cannot	conclude,	 as	 a	matter	 of	law,	 that	it	would	be	highly unlikely	 that	 members	 of	 the jury	 pool	 could	 be	 fair	 and	 impartial	 after observing one juror’s	 reaction to	 charges	 of	 child	 sexual	 assault

. 6 See Kechedzian ,	902	F.3d	at	1027

- 28. The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

Rory	A.	McNamara,	Esq. (orally) ,	Drake	Law, LLC, Berwick,	for appellant	Kevin Carey Jonathan	 Sahrbeck,	 District	 Attorney , and	 Nicole	 M.	 Albert,	 Asst.	 Dist.	 Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial	District No. Two ,	Portland,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Cumberland	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR

- 201 7

- 1609 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY

6 Although it	was	possible that some	potential jurors	had	identified , in	the	court’s	question, an expedited	meth od	 for	avoiding	jury	 service , the	 court	 here	made	 no	such	 finding,	 and	we	 do	not discuss	that	issue. See , e.g. , Gray	v.	Mississippi ,	481	U.S.	648,	652

- 53,	656	(1987).