alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32****CERTIFICATION**The undersigned certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, that:(1) The accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended December 31, 2006, fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and(2) The information contained in the accompanying Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.     Date: February 14, 2007 /s/ Mark N. Schwartz     Chief Executive Officer       Date: February 14, 2007 /s/ Mark P. O’Neill     Manager of Finance and Accounting
#### STATE v. L. C. PARKER.

(Filed 19 March, 1952.)

1. Criminal Raw § 21—

Acquittal on a charge of possession of intoxicating liquor in Recorder’s Court upon a warrant issued subsequent to the institution of a prosecution in the Superior Court for possession of intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale will not support a plea of former acquittal.

2. Criminal Raw §§ 57b, 81a—

Motion for a new trial for newly discovered evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its refusal of the motion is not reviewable in the absence of abuse of discretion.

Appeal by defendant from *Sharp, Special Judge,*December Term, 1951, of JohNstoN.

Affirmed.

*Attorney-General McMullam, and Assistant Attorney-General Love for the State.*

*J. R. Barefoot and F. Reamuel Temple for defendant, appellant.*

DeviN, C. J.

On defendant’s former appeal in this case *(S. v. Parker,*234 N.C. 236, 66 S.E. 2d 907), his conviction on the charge of possession of intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale was upheld by this Court and the case remanded to the Superior Court “to the end that proper judgment be entered in accordance with this opinion.” Judgment has now been rendered within the terms of the statute and in accordance with the decision of this Court. From this no appeal would lie.

Defendant, however, moved in arrest of judgment and interposed plea of former jeopardy, on the ground that subsequent to defendant’s conviction in the Superior Court he was acquitted in the Recorder’s Court of the charge of possession of intoxicating liquor. His motion was denied, and plea overruled, and properly so, we think, for the reasons set out in the opinion in the former appeal. *S. v. Parker, supra; S. v. Lippard,*223 N.C. 167, 25 S.E. 2d 594. See also *S. v. Bell,*205 N.C. 225, 171 S.E. 50.

*303Defendant’s motion for new trial for newly discovered evidence was presented to tbe court below and was denied in tbe court’s discretion. Abuse of discretion is not suggested. No question is presented for our decision. *S. v. Lea,*203 N.C. 316, 166 S.E. 292.

Tbe judgment imposing sentence is

Affirmed.
#### STATE v. JESSIE FARRAR.

(Filed 5 June, 1946.)

Criminal Raw §§ 63, 68b—

No appeal lies from an order that a suspended judgment be executed upon findings that defendant had violated the conditions upon which judgment was suspended.

Appeal by defendant from *Frizzelle, J.,*at March Term, 1946, of ORANGE.

Criminal prosecution upon warrant issued out of the recorder’s court of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, charging defendant with unlawful possession of “non tax paid liquor” “for the purpose of sale,” etc. Upon trial defendant was found guilty and sentenced to jail for specified term — the judgment being suspended upon conditions stated. Thereafter, upon hearing on “order to show cause,” the judge of recorder’s *479court, finding as a fact that defendant bad violated tbe conditions upon wbicb tbe said judgment was suspended, ordered tbe jail sentence into effect. Defendant, in open court, gave notice of appeal. Tbe court, being of opinion tbat no appeal is provided in sucb case, denied tbe motion. Whereupon, defendant started serving tbe sentence, and was released upon *habeas corpus.*Sbe tben gave bond for appearance in Superior Court of Orange County. On bearing there tbe presiding judge •approved and confirmed tbe judgment of recorder’s court, and ordered same into execution. Defendant appeals therefrom to tbe Supreme Court. And tbe Attorney-General for tbe State moves to dismiss tbe appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

*Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorneys-General Rhodes, Moody, and Tucker for the State.*

*A. A. McDonald for defendant, appellant.*

Per Curiam.

On tbe record as it appears in this Court, tbe motion of tbe State to dismiss tbe appeal is allowed on authority of *S. v. Miller,*225 N. C., 213, 34 S. E. (2d), 143, and cases cited, including *S. v. King,*222 N. C., 137, 22 S. E. (2d), 241.

Appeal dismissed.
#### JOSEPH STRICKLIN and THEO. F. COLLINS v. JOHN C. DAVIS.

(Filed 10 October, 1928.)

Parties Defendant — Persons who Must he Sued in Action Against Railroad Under Federal Control.

The United States Director General of Railroads is a necessary and only party defendant in an action for negligence when the railroads were under government war control, and when the present incumbent has not been made a party, the action is properly dismissed.

*162Appeal by plaintiffs from *Granmer, J.,*at February Term, 1928, of Lenoir.

Affirmed.

*Shaw & Jones for appellant.*

*Rouse & Rouse for appellee.*

Pee Curiam:.

On 25 April, 1921, plaintiffs brought suit against the Norfolk Southern Railroad Company, Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company, and the Randolph & Cumberland Railway Company for the recovery of damages for negligence in the transportation of certain horses and mules from Kinston in Lenoir County to Carthage in Moore County. On 29 January, 1924, plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging that the horses and mules were delivered to the initial carrier at Kinston on 4 December, 1919. The return of the officers shows service on the several railroads; and after complaint was filed James C. Davis entered a special appearance and moved to dismiss the action for the reason that between 1 January, 1918, and 29 February, 1920, the United States Government through the Director General of Railroads operated the railroads in question and that the railroads were not in the use, possession or control of their property. Thereafter an amended complaint was-filed, and an answer thereto in which it is alleged that the suit had never been instituted against James C. Davis, Director General, as provided by section 206 of the Transportation Act of 1920. At the June Term, 1924, Judge Horton ordered that the original summons and all other process and pleadings should be amended so that the name of John C. Davis, Director General, should be corrected so as to read James C. Davis, Director General; also that the action be dismissed as to the several railroad companies which had been made parties defendant, James C. Davis’s tenure as Director General continued from 26 January, 1921, to 14 December, 1925, and at the latter date he was succeeded by Andrew W. Mellon as Director General. It will be noted that Andrew *W.*Mellon has never been made a party and that, the railroad companies are not parties defendant. Upon this ground Judge Granmer at February Term, 1928, rendered judgment dismissing the action at the cost of the plaintiffs. In this judgment we find no error. *Mellon v. Lumber Company,*U. S. Advance Opinions, 16 January, 1928, p. 154.

Affirmed.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of NASB Financial, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2003, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, David H. Hancock, Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
the Company.


May 15, 2003             By: /s/ David H. Hancock
                             David H. Hancock
                             Chairman and Chief
                                 Executive Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to NASB Financial, Inc. and will be retained by NASB
Financial, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.


This certification is made solely for purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
subject to the knowledge standard contained therein , and not for any
other purpose.

<Page>
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 247 (Tuesday, December 26, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 66804]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-31211]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
[ID-957-1420-00]


Filing of Plats of Survey; Idaho

    The plat of the following described land was officially filed in 
the Idaho State Office, Bureau of Land Management, Boise, Idaho, 
effective 9:00 a.m., December 13, 1995.
    The supplemental plat, prepared to amend an old lot in section 18 
and to correct the mineral survey number of Gem Knob Nos. 1 and 2 
lodes, was accepted December 13, 1995.
    This survey was executed to meet certain administrative needs of 
the Bureau of Land Management.
    All inquiries concerning the survey of the above described land 
must be sent to the Chief, Cadastral Survey, Idaho State Office, Bureau 
of Land Management, 3380 Americana Terrace, Boise, Idaho, 83706.

    Dated: December 13, 1995.
Duane E. Olsen,
Chief Cadastral Surveyor for Idaho.
[FR Doc. 95-31211 Filed 12-22-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-GG-M
Long-Range 

Actuarial 

Balance

Annual 

Balance in 

75th Year

Long-Range 

Actuarial 

Balance

Annual 

Balance in 75th 

Year

Long-Range 

Actuarial 

Balance

Annual 

Balance in 

75th Year

-2.00% -4.34% -0.03% -0.37% -2.03% -4.71%

Summary Measures and Graphs

Category of Change: Retirement Age

Proposed Provision: Gradually raise the earliest eligibility age (EEA) for Social Security retirement 

benefits from 62 to 65. The EEA would be increased by 2 months for individuals reaching age 62 in every 

year, starting in 2011. The EEA of 65 would apply for those reaching age 62 in 2028 and later (those 

reaching age 65 in 2031 and later). As under current law, the PIA formula applicable for any individual 

would depend on the year in which eligibility age is attained. It should be noted that the elimination of 

retirement eligibility between ages 62 and 65 would increase the number of individuals who would apply 

Present Law Change From Present Law in Results with this provision

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

18.0

20.0

2009 2019 2029 2039 2049 2059 2069 2079

Percent

Year

OASDI Cost Rates and Income Rates

(as a percentage of taxable payroll)

Cost rates with this provision

Income rates under present law

Income rates with this provision

Cost rates under present law

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

2009 2019 2029 2039 2049 2059 2069 2079

Percent

Year

OASDI Trust Fund Ratio

(assets as a percentage of annual expenditures)

Present law With this provision

Estimates based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2009 Trustees Report Office of the Chief Actuary, Social Security

November 16, 2009

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

18.0

20.0

2009 2019 2029 2039 2049 2059 2069 2079

Percent

Year

OASDI Cost Rates and Income Rates

(as a percentage of taxable payroll)

Cost rates with this provision

Income rates under present law

Income rates with this provision

Cost rates under present law

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

2009 2019 2029 2039 2049 2059 2069 2079

Percent

Year

OASDI Trust Fund Ratio

(assets as a percentage of annual expenditures)

Present law With this provision
##### 



6.
    
    I have reviewed and read this Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Kolorfusion
International, Inc.;7.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this Quarterly Report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made,
not misleading with respect to the period covered by this Quarterly Report;8.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial information
included in this Quarterly Report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and
for, the periods presented in this Quarterly Report;9.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in the
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:
 (a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervisions,
to ensure that material information relating to the registrant is made known to
us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which
this Quarterly Report is being prepared;(b)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this Quarterly Report based on such evaluation; and(c)
    
    disclosed in this Quarterly Report any change in the
registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter
in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably
likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial
reporting; and
 10.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrants auditors and board of directors performing the equivalent functions of an
audit committee:
 (a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and(b)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal
controls over financial reporting; and
 Date: November 30, 2005
    
    By: /s/ Stephen NagelPresident and Chief Financial Officer
#### MOSS-MARLOW BUILDING COMPANY, INC., v. JOHN L. JONES and His Wife, MRS. JOHN L. JONES.

(Filed 26 March, 1947.)

Pleadings § 37: Appeal and Error § 40g—

An application for a bill of particulars is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the court’s ruling thereon is *not*reviewable, except perhaps in extreme cases. G. S., 1-150.

Appeal by defendants from *Warlick, J.,*at 15 November, 1946, Term, of Catawba.

Civil action to recover on contract.

Plaintiff attaches to its complaint as “Exhibit A” a copy of the contract between it and defendants for the construction of a dwelling house on cost plus basis, and as “Exhibit B” what purports to be an itemized list of materials and labor furnished. Defendants, in apt time, moved for a bill of particulars. The court, finding that plaintiff’s complaint, and more particularly “Exhibit B,” is sufficiently definite to enable defendants to file answer to complaint, entered order denying the said motion.

Defendants appeal therefrom to Supreme Court and assign error.

*283
      *Louis A. Whitener for plaintiff, appellee.*

*Willis •& Geitner for defendants, appellants.*

Per Curiam.

An application for a bill of particulars under G. S., 1-150, formerly C. S., 534, “is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and his ruling thereon, made in the exercise of such discretion, is not reviewable on appeal, except perhaps in extreme cases.” *Tickle v. Hobgood,*212 N. C., 762, 194 S. E., 461. "While appellants concede this principle of law, they contend that this ease comes within the exception. However, the argument advanced, in the light of the allegations in the complaint and the exhibit attached thereto, fails in persuasiveness. Hence, the ruling of the court below is

Affirmed.
```
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 245 (Thursday, December 21, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 66275]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-30991]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

ABNA Holding, Inc.; Change in Bank Control Notices; Acquisitions 
of Shares of Banks or Bank Holding Companies; Correction

    This notice corrects a notice (FR Doc. 95-3034) published on page 
64064 of the issue for Wednesday, December 13, 1995.
    Under the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas heading, the entry for 
Community Bankshares, Inc., is revised to read as follows:
    1. ABNA Holdings, Inc., Denton, Texas; to become a bank holding 
company by acquiring 97.6 percent of the voting shares of American 
Bank, N.A., Dallas, Texas.
    Comments on this application must be received by December 27, 1995.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, December 15, 
1995.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Deputy Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 95-30991 Filed 12-20-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-F
```
#### BALTIMORE TRUST COMPANY, Trustee, v. GURNEY P. HOOD, Commissioner.

(Filed 15 March, 1933.)

Appeal by defendants from *Sink, J.,*at June Term, 1932, of BUNCOMBE.

Civil action by plaintiff, as substituted trustee, to establish preference or priority of claim for $52,242.79 against funds in hands of liquidating agent of Central Bank and Trust Company, said amount having been deposited for a specific purpose and misused or misapplied by the bank prior to its insolvency and closing, 19 November, 1930.

From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendants appeal

*Alfred S. Barnard for plaintiff.*

*Johnson, Smaihers & Rollins for defendants.*

Pee Cueiam.

Affirmed on authority of *Safe Deposit Co. v. Hood, Comr., ante,*346, *Flack v. Hood, Comr., ante,*337, *Post No. 70 of the American Legion v. Trust Co., ante,*342, and *Trust Co. v. Hood, Comr., post,*777.

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7137

QUENTIN A. WHALEY, SR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge. (CA97-1397-S)

Submitted: November 25, 1997 Decided: January 6, 1998

Before ERVIN, HAMILTON, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Quentin A. Whaley, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Lynne Ann Battaglia,

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland; Larry David Adams,

Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order denying relief on

his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition. We have reviewed the record

and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Whaley

v. United States Parole Commission, No. CA-97-1397-S (D. Md. June

11, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Anthony Trophia et al., Plaintiffs, v Joseph Valvo et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Oneida County,

March 9, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Smith, Sovik, Kendrick, Schwarzer & Sugnet, P. C.,*for defendants. *Zogby, Jonas & Bossone (Anthony G. Bossone*of counsel), for plaintiff.

OPINION OF THE COURT

John R. Tenney, J.

In this medical malpractice action, defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for plaintiffs’ failure to timely comply with the "notice of * * * medical * * * malpractice” requirement of CPLR 3406 (a). In the alternative, they have also moved for an order of preclusion based on certain allegedly insufficient answers to a demand for bill of particulars and on a failure to comply with a demand pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d).

*926Plaintiffs’ counsel admits unfamiliarity with the recently enacted requirements of CPLR 3406 and has now supplied a proposed notice. While the statute is phrased in mandatory terms ("Not more than sixty days after issue is joined, the plaintiff * * * shall file”), there is no indication that the Legislature intended that a failure to comply ought to be deemed jurisdictional. The express purpose of the statute is to facilitate case management in malpractice cases. Filing the notice brings the action within the Individual Assignment System and commences the running of the maximum 12- and 18-month periods within which discovery must be completed and trial must be commenced. The notice is not designed to supplant discovery, and the delay in filing has not prejudiced defendants in any way. The late filing is permitted (CPLR 2004).

Defendants allege that plaintiffs are not sufficiently specific as to which procedures, tests, medicines or alternate courses of treatment should have been undertaken prior to the surgery actually performed. The Fourth Department has taken a pragmatic approach to the issue: " 'We apprehend no beneficial reason to put the plaintiff in a malpractice action (who most often is less likely than the defendant to have knowledge of proper "surgical procedures”, "medicines” and "tests”) to a greater burden than plaintiffs in other types of personal injury actions.’ ” *(Randall v Pech,*51 AD2d 864, 865.) The test is whether the bill provides a " ' "general statement of the acts or omissions constituting the negligence claimed” ’ ” *(supra,*at 865), and that test is readily met here.

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs have failed to properly respond to their request for a copy of their own statements (CPLR 3101 [e]) by replying that no written statements exist. They allege that there is "no distinction between written and oral statements”. If the oral statements are recorded, plaintiffs must comply. *(Chase v Patron Transmission Co.,*61 Misc 2d 200.)

Finally, plaintiffs have properly treated defendants’ demand for experts’ reports (CPLR 3101 [d]) as a continuing demand until such time as an expert is retained and a report rendered.

Submit order.