T h e par t i es i n di ca t ed du r i n g or al a r g u men t t h at t h e B oar d of Zon i n g Appea l s h ad g r an t ed B l an k en s h i p a 1 special excep t i o n pe rmit t o have o p en ai r conce rt s at t he p rop ert y
. I n t he reco rd o n ap p eal , t he o nl y i nd i cat i o n of t he excep t i o n pe rmit i s a ref erence i n B l ankenshi p ’ s res p o nse t o t he m o t i o n fo r s um m ary judgm ent

. H o wever, t he reco rd

s hows t hat t he propert y was t axe d f or c om merc i al us e.



### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON Ja nuary 23, 200 4 S es sio n
ALLEN BL ANKENSH IP, D 

### /B 

### / A 

### S KU LL BO N E M U SI C P A R K, IN C
. v. GI BSO N COUNTY AND COUNTY COMMISS IO NERS, ET AL 

### .

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for G ibson County No. 15765 W. Michael M aloan, Chan cellor

No. W2003-00735-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Jun e 10, 2004

Th is i s a zon ing c a se . T he pr op e rt y ow ne r a pp lie d to re -zo ne the pr op e rt y fr om a g ri c ultur a l to bu sin e ss. Th e Te nn e sse e De pa rt me nt o f E c on omi c a ndCom mun it y De ve lop me nt andthe c ou nty planning commission recommende d that the County Commi ssion deny

the propert y

owner ’s
app lic a tio n. Th e Cou nty

Com mis sio n v ote d to de ny th ea p p lic a tio n. Th e plaint if

f/ app e lla nt p ro pe rt y owner filed a complaint for decla ratory judgme nt in chance ry

court, see king to ove rturn the de cision. The de fenda nt/appellee County Commi ssion filed a motion for summary judgme nt, which was g rante d. The prope rty

owner now appe als. We aff

irm, finding no g enuine issue of materia l fac t and that the County

Commi ssion had a ra

tional basis for its decision. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court is Aff irm ed

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the Court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., and D A V ID R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Mark L . Ag ee, T renton, for the appe llant Allen Bla nkenship, d/b/a Skullbone Music Park, I nc.

J a m e s I. P e n t e c o s ta n d B r a n d o n O

. G i b s o n , J a c k s o n , f o r t h e ap p e l l e e G i b s o n C o u n t y.
OP IN ION Plaintiff/Appellant Allen B lankenship (“ Bla nkenship”) is the own er a nd operator of Skullbone Music Park, an ente rtainment venue which has hosted four to six conce rts annually

since 1998. The fac ility is loc ated in an otherw ise commerc ially undevelope d are a of G ibson Countyand sits on property that is z oned A- 1 (Ag riculture/F orestry ). I n Marc h 2001, when B lankenship beg an 1-2-

considering adding a re staurant or country club to the music park, he filed an application with the Gibson CountyPlanning Commission (“Planning Commi ssion”) reque sting that the property be re

zon e d to B -2 (G e ne ral Bus ines s) . T he Te nn e sse e De pa rt me nt o f E c on omi c a ndCom mun ity Deve lopment (“th e Department”) sta ff planne rs consider ed B lankenship’s a pplication and
rec ommended that the Plannin g Commi ssion oppose Blanke nship’s reque st before the Gibson Cou n t y C o m m i s s i o n (“ C o u n t y

C o m m i s s i o n ”)

. Af

t ert h e P l an n i n g C o m m i s s i o n v o t ed t o re comm end that the County

Commi ssion deny

the re quest, Bla nkenship withdrew his a pplication.

I n October

2001, Bla nkenship rea

pplied for the zoning chang e, this time indicating that the
rea s o n f o r th e r e q u e s t w a s th a t h e s o u g h t to s e ll a lc o h o li c b e v e r a g e s o n th e p r o p erty . The Depa rtment ag ain re commended ag ainst approva l of the re- zoning reque st. A communityplanner from the De partment’s loc al planning assistance office , Shelton I . Merrel l (“Me rre ll”), dra fted a memorandum indicating the r easons f or the De partment’s r ecommendation agai n s t the re -zoning reque st. Among Me rre ll’s conce rns was c ompliance with the Gibson County L and Use Plan:

Th e Gi bs on Cou nty

L a ndUs e Pla n [doe s] no t de sig nate the are a a s a future co m m erc ial one. The plan also state[s] that highw ay bu sin e sse s sh ou ld b e loc a te d o n ma jor tho ro ug hf

are app ro a c he s to urban a rea s where sites are adequate for integ rate d desig n and prope r consideration c an be g iven to hig hway safe ty and gen era l compatibilityof adjoining uses. T h e p roperty is not located on a major thoroug hfar e.
Th us , th e De pa

rt me nt w a s c on c e rn e d, in pa rt , th a t th e c ha ng e in zo nin g so ug ht b y B la nk e ns hip did
n o tc o m p o r tw i t h t h e C o u n t y ’ s l a n d u s e p l a n , b e c a u s e t h e p r o p e r t y h a d n o tb e e n d e s i g na te d as a future c ommercia l site and bec ause it wa s not located on a major thoroug hfar e. Rely ing on Merr ell’s memorandum, the Planning Commi ssion voted to recommend de nial of B lankenship’s re quest to r e-zone the property

. The Planning Commi ssion’s rec ommendation was then forw arde d to the Gibson CountyCommi ssion. The Gibson CountyCommi ssion considered the
rec ommendation by

the Planning Commission, Merre l l ’s m emora ndum, and the opinions of
conce rned c itiz ens, voice d at their public he aring . On Novembe r 19, 2001, the County Commi ssion
v o t e d t o d e n y B l a n k e n s h i p ’ s ap p l i c a t i o n t o r e
- z o n e t h e p r o p e r t y.
On J anuary

18, 2002, Bla nkenship challeng ed the County Commi ssion’s decision by filing
a c omp la int fo r de c laratory jud g me nt a g a ins t De fe nd a nts /A pp e lla nts Gi bs on Cou nty a ndthe Cou nty Commi ssioners. B lankenship ar g ued that the County Commi ssion h ad appr oved zoning other properties as commercial on thirty -eig ht previous occ asions, despite the fa ct that the prope rties wer e outside the land use plan. In fourtee n of those instance s, the properties were not located on major tho ro ug hf are s. I n a dd iti on , B la nk e ns hip arg ue d, the Me rr e ll me mor a nd um, re lie d on by the Cou nty Commi ssion, incorrec tly

desig nates the ba ck entr ance of the prope rty , used only by the music park sta ff , a s th e ma in e ntr a nc e of the mus ic pa

rk . B la nkens hi p conte nd e d th a t, a lth ou g h th e pu bli c e n tr a n c e is n o t lo c a te d o n a ma jo r th o r o u g h f

ar e , th e r o a d o n w h ic h it is lo c a te d is o f th e s a me s iz e-3-

a ndc omp os iti on a s r oa ds de sig nate d a s ma jor tho ro ug hf

are s.

I n N ov e mbe r 2 00 2, the De fe nd a nts fi le d a motio n for su mma ry jud g me nt. Th e De fe nd a nts cited the Planning Commi ssion’s rec ommendation, Merr ell’s m emora ndum and the statements by
conce rned c itiz ens, and ma intained that the County Commi ssion had a b as i s for de ny ing B la nk e ns hip ’s app lic a tio n f or re -zo nin g . T he tr ia l c ou rt g rante d th e mot ion fo r sum mary jud g me nt, fi nd ing that “ the de nia l of plaint if f’ s zon ing re qu e st b y

the Gi bson Cou nty

Com mis sio n is ‘f

a ir ly debata ble’ a nd was not a

rbitrary , capricious, or unre asonable [,] had a substantial r elationship to the public health, saf

ety , or we lfare , and wa s not contrary to the zoning laws.” Fr o m t h at order, B la nk e ns hip no w a

pp e a ls. A motion for summary

judgme nt should be g rante d when the mova nt demonstrates that ther e are no g enuine issues of materia l fac t and that the m oving pa rty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Te nn. R. Civ. P . 56.04. Summary judgme nt is onlyappropriate whe n the facts and the leg al conclusions dra wn from the f acts re asonably permit only one conc lusion. C

a r v e l l v . B o t t o ms , 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995)

. Since only questions of law a

re involved, the re is no pre sumption of
corr ectne ss r eg arding a trial c ourt’s g rant of summary judgme nt. Bain v . W

e lls , 936 S.W .2d 618, 62 2 (T e nn . 199 7) . T he re fo re , o ur re vie w o f the tr ia l c ou rt ’s g rant o f s umm ary jud g me nt i s de novo on the re cord be fore this Court. Wa rre n v . Es tat e of Kir k , 954 S.W .2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997)

.
I n Tenne ssee, the sta ndard f or court review of zoning de cisions is well settled. The Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ha s h e ld:

“I n enac ting or

amending zoning l eg islation, the l ocal authorities are vested with br oad discretion and, in cases where the validi ty of a zoning ordinance is fairlyde ba tab le , th e c ou rt c an no t su bs tit ute its jud gm e nt f o r th a t of the le g isl a tiv e aut ho rity . I f the re is a ra tio na l or jus tif iab le ba sis for the
enac tment and it doe s not violate any state statute or positive constitutional g uara nty , . . . . the c ou rt sho uld no t in te rfe re with the exercise of the zoning p o w e r

. . . , u n l e s s t h e e n a c t m e n t

. . . i s s h o w n t o b e c l e ar l ya r b i tr ar y, c apric iou s, or

un re a so na

ble , h a vin g no su bs ta nti a l re la tio ns hip to the pu bli c health, saf

ety , or we lfare , or plainly contra ry to the zoning laws.”

Mc Cal le n v . City of

Me mphis , 7 8 6 S

. W

. 2 d 6 3 3 , 6 4 0 (T en n

. 1 9 9 0 ) ( q u o t i n g Fal lin v . Knox Co unty Bd. of Comm’rs , 656 S.W .2d 338, 342-43 (Tenn. 1983) ). Unde r this standard, the de cision of the Cou nty le g isl a tiv e bo dy

is p re su me d to be va lid , a ndits de c isi on mus t be up he ld i f “ ‘any po ssi ble
rea son’ ” e x ists to j ustify

the ac tion. Id. at 6 4 1 (q u o t i n g Fal lin , 656 S.W .2d at 342).

On app e a l, B la nk e ns hip arg ue s th a t the Com mis sio n’ s ba sis fo r d e nying his zon ing re qu e st
was a rbitrary and ca pricious. He a

rg ues that t h e M er re l l memorandum, re lied on by the Commi ssion, was err oneous and m i s l eading, c onsidering the County Commi ssion’s history

of approv in g c o mm e r c ia l z o n in g o u ts id e o f th e c o u n ty

lan d u s e p lan , th e f

a c t th a t th e me morandum f a il e d to n o te th a t th e r o a d o n w h ic h th e e n tr a n c e o f th e mu s ic p ark

w a s s itu a te d h a d th e s a me s iz e-4-

and composition as major thoroug hfar es, and the fac t that the property had bee n commerc ially

taxed
a ndus e d a s a

c on c e rt ve nu e sin c e 19 98 . T hu s, he arg ue s, the Mer re ll m e mor a nd um w a s n ot a leg itimate basis for the County Commi ssion’s decision. Bla nkenship arg ues further that the arg uments by the citi zens who s poke in opposition to the re -zoning at the public hearing w ere not a leg itimate basis for the Commi ssion’s decision. Thoug h Bla nkenship does notcite to the re cord, he ar g ues that those speak i n g at the public hea ring wer e “c lear ly ” doing so because they wer e op po se d to a lc oh ol dri nking a ndc on c e rt s o n th e pr op e rt y —a n il log ic a l posi tio n, he c on te nd s, be c a us e c on c e rt patr on s we re pe rm itt e d to bring a lc oh ol to mus ic a l pe rf orma nc e s. B la nk e ns hip a lso notes th at the voices in opposition were in the minority , asserting that thre e to four times more citizens signed pe titions in favor of the re -zoning than those indicating their opposition.

As s u m i n g arguendo the truthof B la nk e ns hip ’s a sse rt ion s, it i s u nd isp ute d th a t th e are a in which his property

is located ha s not been de signated for f uture commercial use under the Gibson CountyL and Use Plan and that the roa d on which the public e ntranc e of the music park is loca ted ha s n ot b e e n d e sig nate d a ma jor tho ro ug hf

are

. I n vie w of B la nk e ns hip ’s prior ind ic a tio n o f i nte re st in opening a re staurant or club on his property , either c oncerned citizens or the County Commi ssion had a ba sis for believing that approving the z oning chang e would expand the commercial use and the use of a lcohol on the prope rty bey ond the cur

rent use. T hus, re gar d l es s o f any exceptions the CountyCommi ssion may have ma de in the past, the County Commi ssion clear ly

had a rational and justifiable basis for de ny ing B lankenship’s re- z oning r equest. Unde r the a pplicable standa

rd, we
ca n n o t conclude that the County Commi ssion’s decision to maintain the property ’s zoning de sig natio n a s A -1 (A g ri c ultur e /F or e stry ) w a s a rb itr ary , c apric iou s, un re a so na ble , o r cont ra

ry to
zon ing la ws . T hu s, we a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s g rant o f s umm ary jud g me nt i n f

a vo r of the de fe nd a nts

. The de cision of the trial c ourt is affirmed. Costs are taxed a g ainst Plaintiff/Appellant Allen B la nk e ns hip , d

/b/ a Sku llb on e Mu sic Park

a ndhis su re ty , f

or which ex ecu tio n may

iss ue , if
n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE