UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v. MICHAEL LAMONT PHILLIPS, Defendant–Appellant. No. 12-5043 (D.C. No. 4:05-CR -00054-JHP-1) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before LUCERO , O’BRIEN , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.

Michael Phillips appeals from his sentence of two consecutive twenty-four month terms of imprisonment with no supervised release. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument wo uld not materially assi st the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a )(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34 .1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argu ment. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctri nes of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 19, 2012

Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court– 2 – I On July 7, 2005, Phillips pled guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm and

ammunition after former conviction of a felo ny, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Phillips received a sentence of two concurrent thirty-seven month terms of imprisonment, followed by two concurrent three-year terms of supervised release. After Phillips was released from prison, the Probation Office alleged that Phillips

had violated the standard co nditions of his supervised re lease by testing positive for cocaine and failing to participate in a cognitiv e training program, am ong other violations. On January 27, 2011, Phillips’ supervised release was re voked and he was sentenced to

two concurrent eleven month terms of im prisonment and two concurrent twenty-five month terms of supervised release. Phillips began a second term of supervised release on May 27, 2011. That fall, the Probation Office again alleged that Phillips ha d violated the conditions of supervised release by, among other violations, possessi ng a firearm and failing to report within seventy-two hours that police officers had qu estioned Phillips in relation to a September 4, 2011 homicide. On February 29, 2012, the district court revoked Phillip s’ supervised release and sentenced him to two consecutive twenty-four month terms of imprisonment with no supervised release, the ma ximum sentence allowed under the statute. 18 U.S.C.– 3 – § 3583(e)(3). After pronouncement of the se ntence, Phillips did not raise any objections. Phillips timely filed a notice of appeal.

II We review a sentencing decision for reasona bleness, applying a deferential abuse

of discretion standard. See United States v. Haley, 529 F.3d 1308, 1311 (10th Cir. 2008). A review of reasonableness has two components: (1) substantive reasonableness; and (2) procedural reasonableness. Id. Phillips challenges both aspects of his revocation

sentence. A A sentence is substantively unreasonable if its length is unreasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Id. A district court has discretion to impose

consecutive sentences after the revocation of s upervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584. Repeated violation of supervised release conditions is a factor that has justified imposition of consecutive sentences or terms we ll above the Chapter 7 Guidelines range. See, e.g., United States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 2 006); United States v. Tedford, 405 F.3d 1159, 1161-62 (10th Cir. 2005). In light of Phillips’ history of recidivism, the district cour t did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Phillips to the statutory maximum sentence.

B– 4 – Phillips also alleges that the district cour t insufficiently explained its decision to impose the maximum sentence allowed under the statute. Haley, 529 F.3d at 1311 (“A sentence is procedurally unreason able if the district court . . . inadequately explains the sentence.”). Phillips argues that although the district cour t generally considered the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court prov ided insufficiently specific reasons for the sentence imposed. At the sentencing hearing, Phillips did not aler t the district court that he considered the court’s statement of reasons inadequate. Where a defendant fails to object to the adequacy of the statement of reasons, a procedural reasonableness claim on this ground is reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Uscanga-Mora, 562 F.3d 1289, 1293 (10th Cir. 2009). The plain error standa rd is satisfied “when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judici al proceedings.” Id. at 1295. When we review for plain error, we w ill remand only if substantial rights are affected. If there was error, Phillips has not shown that “the re is a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Mendoza, 543 F.3d 1186, 1194 (10th Cir. 2008). Phillips does not provide any indication that the district cour t would have imposed a lower sentence had it more fully explained its reasoning. Because ther e is no basis to conclude that the district– 5 – court’s explanation affected Phillips’ substantia l rights, he has not satisfied the plain error

standard.

III

The district court did not abuse its discretion in setting Phillips’ revocation sentence, nor did the court plainly err in explaining it. We affirm.

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge