NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0053n.06 

Case No. 16-1896 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

MICHAEL POTTS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

GOBLES PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT and its 

BOARD OF EDUCATION; JEFF REHLANDER 

individually and in his capacity as Superintendent 

for Gobles Public Schools; TERRY DOYLE, 

individually and in his capacity as a Board of 

Education Member of Gobles Public Schools; 

BRIAN BEAM, individually and in his capacity as 

a Board of Education Member of Gobles Public 

Schools; DANIEL WAHMHOFF, individually 

and in his capacity as a Board of Education 

Member of Gobles Public Schools; BONNIE 

MILLER, individually and in her capacity as a 

Board of Education Member of Gobles Public 

Schools; and MITCH SMITH, individually and in 

his capacity as a Board of Education Member of 

Gobles Public Schools, 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE WESTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

O P I N I O N

BEFORE: SUHRHEINRICH, SUTTON, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges. 

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Michael Potts, a teacher employed by Gobles Public 

School District, was suspended for ten days without pay after allegedly slapping a student on the 
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Michael Potts v. Gobles Public School District, et al. 

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arm. He now brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging he was denied constitutionally 

adequate due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Potts claims he has a property 

interest in continuing tenure, as created by Michigan’s Teachers’ Tenure Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 

§§ 38.71–38.191, and that the ten-day suspension temporarily deprived him of that interest 

without due process. Because any property interest created by the act was not implicated by 

Potts’ suspension, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his claims. 

I 

Factual Background: Michael Potts has been an employee of Gobles Public Schools 

since 1966. Since then, he has taught various grades at the middle and high school level and 

served as a basketball coach. Throughout his career, Potts has received commendations and 

generally positive evaluations. 

Then, on November 11, 2013, a student complained that Potts “slapped” her arm. Potts 

met with Superintendent Rehlander twice that day to discuss the allegation. In the first meeting, 

Potts denied inappropriately touching the student. In the second meeting, which also included 

the mother of the student who was allegedly slapped, Rehlander reportedly told Potts that he was 

not going to be disciplined because any contact was done in a joking fashion with no intent to 

harm. But, a day later, Potts was placed on administrative leave by the school district. And, 

about a month after that, he was given a written reprimand, suspended without pay for ten days, 

and advised that the “slap” was unprofessional misconduct. 

Other repercussions flowed from this discipline. For one thing, Potts was relieved of his 

duties as basketball coach. For another, the conduct became part of Potts’ permanent public 

record. Additionally, should Potts seek another teaching job in the state of Michigan, Gobles 

will need to report the November 11, 2013 misconduct to any prospective employer. Potts also 
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alleges that his poor performance evaluation that year—in which he was rated “minimally 

effective”—was arbitrarily based on the slap. Further, that relatively low performance rating 

subjected him to a personal improvement plan for the 2014–2015 school year and increases the 

chance of his losing his job should the district implement a reduction in force. 

Subsequently, Potts filed a grievance protesting the discipline which was presented on his 

behalf at a March 5, 2014 Gobles Board of Education meeting. The Board refused to hear the 

grievance and dismissed it for “jurisdictional” reasons. By all accounts, Potts remains a teacher 

in Gobles Public Schools. 

Procedural History: Faced with these circumstances, Potts filed a complaint in the 

Western District of Michigan. He brought suit against Gobles Public Schools, the Board of 

Education, Superintendent Rehlander, and the Board of Education members individually.1

 In the 

complaint, he alleges one count against all defendants, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that his 

unpaid, ten-day suspension deprived him of a property interest without due process of law. In 

response, defendants submitted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion, finding that the 

property interest created by Michigan law was not implicated by Potts’ ten-day suspension. 

(R. 37, Dist. Ct. Op., PID 389.). This appeal followed. 

II 

We review the district court’s dismissal of Potts’ complaint de novo. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical 

Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011). In order to survive a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Id. 

 1

Those Board members are Terry Doyle, Brian Beam, Daniel Wahmhoff, Bonnie Miller, and Mitch Smith. 
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In reviewing the complaint, we accept its factual allegations as true, but need not accept its legal 

conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). 

 Potts claims he was deprived of a property interest without adequate process. In order to 

establish a claim under the Due Process Clause, Potts “must show that (1) he had a life, liberty, 

or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause; (2) he was deprived of this protected 

interest; and (3) the state did not afford him adequate procedural rights prior to depriving him of 

the interest.” Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006). 

We begin by determining whether there was a property interest at stake. Such property 

interests are not created by the Constitution itself. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 

(1972). Rather, “they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 

understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” Id. It is not in dispute 

that Michigan’s Teachers’ Tenure Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 38.71–38.191, creates a property 

interest. See Tomiak v. Hamtramck Sch. Dist., 397 N.W.2d 770, 780 (Mich. 1986) (finding that 

tenured teachers have protected “tenure rights” under Michigan’s Teacher Tenure Act). Rather, 

the disagreement lies in just how broadly we are to construe that interest. 

The act’s language—the source of the property interest—provides the scope. See Roth, 

408 U.S. at 577–78. Here, the property interest granted by the Teacher Tenure Act is one in 

“continuing tenure.” See Mich. Comp. Laws § 38.91(1); Tomiak, 397 N.W.2d at 778–81. 

Continuing tenure is provided as follows: 

After the satisfactory completion of the probationary period, a teacher is 

considered to be on continuing tenure under this act. A teacher on continuing 

tenure shall be employed continuously by the controlling board under which the 

probationary period has been completed and shall not be dismissed or demoted

except as specified in this act. 
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Mich. Comp. Laws § 38.91(1) (emphasis added). Section 38.74 of the act defines “demote,” in 

relevant part, as suspension without pay for fifteen or more consecutive days. 

 Potts argues that “shall be employed continuously” in § 38.91 means that continuing 

tenure is a broad interest such that anything more than a de minimis suspension from 

employment requires constitutionally adequate due process. Defendants argue that the 

continuing tenure interest is narrower, providing teachers with an employment interest in not 

being “dismissed or demoted” except as provided for in the act. 

To begin with, Potts’ reading of “employed continuously by” fails as a matter of plain 

meaning. The ordinary meaning of “employed” is binary: either you have a job or you don’t. 

And the phrase “employed by” comes loaded with the inference that there is someone employing 

you—it speaks to a relationship with an employer. Thus, to be “employed continuously by” an 

employer would ordinarily mean that there is no point where you are not employed by that 

particular employer. See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539 (1985) 

(public employees’ termination implicated property rights in “continued employment”). 

Therefore, a teacher “employed continuously by the controlling board” remains at all times an 

employee of that board. It does not mean (as Potts contends) he can never be temporarily 

suspended or demoted by that board. The reason why should be obvious: in either circumstance, 

a teacher remains employed by the board—as Potts did here. 

Moreover, Potts’ construction uproots the phrase “employed continuously” from its 

surrounding language. We do not read words or phrases in isolation. See Deal v. United States, 

508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993). And what Potts fails to note is that, immediately after the statute says 

a tenured teacher is to be employed continuously by a particular board, it goes on—in that very 

same sentence—to say “and shall not be dismissed or demoted except as specified in this act.” 
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Mich. Comp. Laws § 38.91(1). Accordingly, the scope of the interest in “continuing tenure” 

cannot be understood without giving effect to the full sentence that provides its meaning.2 That 

includes the sentence’s second half, which limits the employing board’s discretion in dismissing 

or demoting tenured teachers. See also id. § 38.101 (“discharge or demotion of a teacher on 

continuing tenure may be made only for a reason that is not arbitrary or capricious”). It is 

precisely this statutory limit on a board’s discretion to dismiss or demote a tenured teacher that 

establishes the scope of the property interest established by the state law. See Loudermill, 470 

U.S. at 538–39; Med Corp. v. City of Lima, 296 F.3d 404, 409–10 (6th Cir. 2002) (“in order to 

assert a property interest . . . [plaintiff] must point to some policy, law, or mutually explicit 

understanding that both confers the benefit and limits the discretion . . . to rescind the benefit.”). 

Thus, the interest in “continuing tenure” provided by the Teacher Tenure Act is an 

ongoing employment relationship between a particular board and a tenured teacher such that the 

board cannot “demote” or “discharge” the teacher absent constitutionally adequate procedures. 

See Mich. Comp. Laws § 38.91(1); Kramer v. Van Dyke Pub. Sch., 351 N.W.2d 572, 575 (Mich. 

Ct. App. 1984) (“It is clear to this Court, that when a teacher, such as Plaintiff, alleges that a 

school board’s action amounted to a ‘discharge or demotion’. . . she is entitled to [Due Process 

requirements].”); see generally O’Donnell v. NICE, PDO 12-23 (Mich. Tenure Commission 

2012) (finding a five-day suspension did not implicate due process property rights because it was 

not a “demotion” under Teacher Tenure Act). Potts does not claim he was either dismissed or 

demoted as it is defined in the act. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 38.74 (defining “demote,” in 

 2

Tellingly, in his briefs, Potts never provides the full sentence. 
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relevant part, as a suspension of fifteen days or longer). Thus, no property interest was 

implicated by his ten-day, without-pay suspension.3 

Moreover, assuming arguendo that the suspension did implicate a property interest, Potts 

was not denied adequate process. Potts met with Superintendent Rehlander twice before he was 

suspended. In those meetings, he was made aware of the student’s allegation about the slap and 

given the opportunity to present his side of the story. In the circumstances of this short-term 

suspension, Due Process requires nothing more. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546 (holding that, 

prior to termination, “[t]he tenured employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges 

against him, an explanation of the employee’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of 

the story”). Thus—even if we were to find the suspension implicated a property interest—Potts 

has failed to allege a Due Process violation. The district court properly dismissed his complaint. 

III 

For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

 3

And Potts fails to show (and does not argue on appeal) that the suspension’s ramifications, including 

Potts’ lost coaching job and any reputational damage he may have suffered, constitute independent deprivations of 

any other property or liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.