Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Notices 65725

DATES: Comments must be received on

or before January 19, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this

application may be mailed or delivered

in triplicate to the FAA at the following

address:

Federal Aviation Administration, Airport

Division, 12 New England Executive Park,

Burlington, Massachusetts 01803.

In addition, one copy of any

comments submitted to the FAA must

be mailed or delivered to Mr. Alfred

Testa, Jr., Airport Director for

Manchester Airport at the following

address: Manchester Airport, One

Airport Road, Suite 300, Manchester,

New Hampshire, 03103.

Air carriers and foreign air carriers

may submit copies of written comments

previously provided to the City of

Manchester under § 158.23 of Part 158

of the Federal Aviation Regulations.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Priscilla A. Scott, Airports Program

Specialist, Federal Aviation

Administration, Airports Division, 12

New England Executive Park,

Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, (617)

238–7614. The application may be

reviewed in person at 16 New England

Executive Park, Burlington,

Massachusetts.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA

proposes to rule and invites public

comment on the application to use the

revenue from a Passenger Facility

Charge (PFC) at Manchester Airport

under the provisions of the Aviation

Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of

1990 (Title IX of the Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act of 1990) (Pub. L.

101–508) and Part 158 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Part 158).

On December 5, 1995, the FAA

determined that the application to use

the revenue from a PFC submitted by

the City of Manchester was substantially

complete within the requirements of

§ 158.25 of Part 158 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations. The FAA will

approve or disapprove the application,

in whole or in part, no later than March

5, 1996.

The following is a brief overview of

the use application.

PFC Project #: 96–02–U–00–MHT

Level of the proposed PFC: $3.00

Charge effective date: January 1, 1993

Estimated charge expiration date: March

1, 1997

Estimated total net PFC revenue:

$1,100,000

Brief description of project: Part 150

Noise Mitigation/Residential

Soundproofing/Land Acquisition.

Class or classes of air carriers which

the public agency has requested not be

required to collect PFCs: On demand

Air Taxi/Commercial Operators (ATCO).

Any person may inspect the

application in person at the FAA office

listed above under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT.

In addition, any person may, upon

request, inspect the application, notice

and other documents germane to the

application in person at the Manchester

Airport, One Airport Road, Suite 300,

Manchester, New Hampshire 03103:

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts on

December 12, 1995.

Vincent A. Scarano,

Manager, Airports Division, New England

Region.

[FR Doc. 95–30918 Filed 12–19–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

Federal Highway Administration

Environmental Impact Statement:

Brunswick and New Hanover Counties,

NC

AGENCY: Federal Highway

Administration (FHWA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of intent.

SUMMARY: The FHWA is issuing this

notice to advise the public that an

environmental impact statement will be

prepared for a proposed highway project

in Brunswick and New Hanover

Counties, North Carolina.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Roy

C. Shelton, Operations Engineer, 310

New Bern Avenue, Suite 410, Raleigh,

North Carolina 27601, Telephone (919)

856–4350.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

FHWA in cooperation with the North

Carolina Department of Transportation

(NCDOT) will prepare an environmental

impact statement (EIS) on a proposal to

relocate US 17 in Brunswick and New

Hanover Counties, North Carolina. The

proposed improvement would involve

the relocation of the existing US 17 from

US 421 to existing US 17 south of

Wilmington. The proposed action is

considered necessary to provide for the

existing and projected traffic demand.

Alternatives under consideration

include: (1) The ‘‘no-build,’’ (2) two

build alternatives for constructing a

four-lane full control of access freeway

on new location, and (3) improvements

to existing US 421 and US 17/74/76.

Letters describing the proposed action

and soliciting comments have been sent

to appropriate Federal, State and local

agencies, and to private organizations

and citizens who have previously

expressed or are known to have interest

in this proposal. A complete public

involvement program has been

developed for this project to include:

the distribution of newsletters to

interested parties, along with public

meetings and a public hearing to be held

in this project study area. A toll-free

project telephone ‘‘hotline’’ is also being

made available. Information on the time

and place of the public hearing will be

provided in the local news media. The

draft EIS will be available for public and

agency review and comment prior to the

public hearing.

To ensure that the full range of issues

related to this proposed action are

addressed and all significant issues are

identified, comments and suggestions

are invited from all interested parties.

Comments or questions concerning this

proposed action and the EIS should be

directed to the FHWA at the address

provided above.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance

Program Number 20.205, Highway Research,

Planning and Construction. The regulations

implementing Executive Order 12372

regarding intergovernmental consultation on

Federal programs and activities apply to this

program.

Issued on: December 8, 1995.

Roy C. Shelton,

Operations Engineer, Raleigh, NC.

[FR Doc. 95–30843 Filed 12–19–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–22–M

Research and Special Programs

Administration

[Docket No. PS–142; Notice 2]

Considerations for a Program

Framework for Risk Management

Demonstrations

AGENCY: Office of Pipeline Safety, DOT.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Research and Special

Programs Administration’s (RSPA)

Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) is

considering how to implement a

program administrative framework to

receive, analyze, accept, monitor and

revise risk management plans that

interstate natural gas transmission and

hazardous liquid pipeline companies

would submit as risk management

demonstration projects. RSPA is not yet

prepared to consider a conceptual

administrative framework for intrastate

companies.

A demonstration project framework is

needed to validate benefits in applying

risk management in the pipeline

industry and to determine how it would

work most effectively. A framework is

also needed to evaluate the use of
65726 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Notices

company-specific risk management

plans as an alternative to the existing

regulatory requirements and to plan for

a transition should the demonstration

justify it. For demonstration projects to

help further the transition, the

framework must identify how pipeline

companies would submit, implement

and improve risk management

demonstration plans and how OPS, in

consultation with State pipeline safety

agencies, would evaluate and monitor

them.

The demonstration projects are

intended to test whether companyspecific plans can provide equal or

greater safety than the current regulatory

requirements provide. The results will

be evaluated, and if determined to be

successful, OPS would consider

expanding the application. Participation

in risk management initiatives will be

voluntary and subject to OPS discretion.

The proposed framework outlined

below was distributed and discussed at

a public meeting on this subject held on

November 7, 1995, in McLean Virginia.

Provisions for written comments to the

framework were announced in a Federal

Register notice published September 21,

1995. Through this notice, OPS is again

requesting comments on the proposed

framework.

DATES: Responses to this request for

comments should be submitted on or

before February 20, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Send comments in

duplicate to the Dockets Unit, Room

8421, Research and Special Programs

Administration, U.S. Department of

Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW,

Washington, DC 20590. Identify the

docket and notice number stated in the

heading of this notice. All comments

and docketed material will be available

for inspection and copying in room

8421 between 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m. each

business day.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Patrick J. Ramirez, (202) 366–9864

regarding the subject matter of this

notice. Contact the Dockets Unit, (202)

366–5046, for docket material.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS)

furthers pipeline safety through a

compliance-based system of primarily

performance-based regulations

embodied in 49 CFR Parts 192–195 and

Part 199. The program is conducted in

partnership with the states, where

certified states take responsibility for

intrastate pipeline systems and OPS

retains responsibility for interstate

pipeline systems.

Certain pipeline incidents in the last

two years have heightened public

awareness of, and concerns about,

pipeline safety and environmental

protection. Although the pipeline safety

record compares favorably with other

forms of energy transportation, recent

incidents have raised the question of

whether safety and environmental

protection can be improved by means

other than the current system of

compliance with minimum federal

requirements. There are also

expectations of increasing cost and

complexity of managing pipeline

systems from future potential

regulations. Many government and

industry officials are interested in new

approaches that might more effectively

evaluate risks and focus resources in

areas with the greatest potential for

reducing risk. There is also interest in

improving accountability of the industry

and the government to the public.

The Department of Transportation

transmitted a legislative proposal for

reauthorization of the pipeline safety

program on March 13, 1995 that would

establish a structure to evaluate pipeline

risks and their consequences, develop

solutions to address the risks, and

establish priorities for implementing the

solutions. This process is generally

referred to as Risk Assessment

Prioritization.

The pipeline industry supported an

approach that focused on operator risk

management by explicitly authorizing

demonstration projects. This approach

was included in H.R. 1323 which was

ordered reported by the House

Committee on Transportation and

Infrastructure on April 5, 1995. A

similar bill was reported by the House

Committee on Commerce. Section 6 of

H.R. 1323 would require the Secretary

to establish a demonstration project on

risk management that would seek

voluntary participation by operators to

demonstrate applications of risk

management. In carrying out the

demonstrations, the Secretary would

ensure that approved plans under the

project achieve an equivalent or greater

overall level of safety than would be

achieved by complying with the existing

regulatory requirements. The

Department formally expressed its view

to the Committee on Transportation and

Infrastructure that this provision is

consistent with the Department’s

proposal for a risk management

program.

The pipeline risk management

demonstration projects for interstate

natural gas and hazardous liquid

transmission companies would be a

vital step in the transition between

compliance-based regulations and risk

management. The demonstration

projects would allow both the

government and industry to gain some

experience before extending the

program. The transition period between

compliance-based regulation and risk

management programs used by a large

segment of the pipeline industry will

likely take several years.

To study the applicability and

benefits of formal pipeline risk

management programs, OPS,

representatives of the oil and gas

industry, states and local interest groups

formed two ‘‘risk assessment quality

action teams’’ (RAQTs). The first, in

1994, focused on oil and petroleum

product transmission application of risk

management and the second, in 1995,

focused on natural gas transmission.

Both RAQTs have been defining how

risk management might be beneficially

applied in the pipeline industry. This

work has been based on how other

industries and government agencies are

using risk assessment and management

to more efficiently allocate resources for

safety.

II. Risk Assessment Quality Team

(RAQT) Findings

A. Definition of Risk Management

Risk management is the process of

deciding what to do about risk

associated with a system. Risk can be

expressed as the likelihood of an event

occurring multiplied by the severity or

the consequence of its effect. The goal

of risk management is to set priorities

for using finite resources to reduce risk.

A formal definition of risk

management from a Gas Research

Institute report, adopted by the Gas

RAQT is: ‘‘Risk Management is the

systematic application of management

policies, procedures, finite resources

and practices to the tasks of analyzing,

assessing and controlling risks to protect

the public, the environment and

company employees and assets.’’

The Oil RAQT report stated that ‘‘Risk

management is the overall logical

process by which a company

understands the risk associated with

operation of its facilities and determines

whether and how to take action to

reduce or accept risks. ‘‘

B. Successful Efforts in Other Industries

The RAQTs focused on how risk

management practices have been

applied worldwide to reduce risk from

chemical, nuclear and industrial process

hazards as well as from pipeline system

leaks and ruptures. The teams’ technical

conclusions were influenced by the

experience of industries and current

effective practices of risk management.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Notices 65727

In the industries referenced above, the

risk management process is applied to

the entire physical system that is the

source of the risk and follows a life

cycle analysis. Various analytical

approaches can be performed

qualitatively or quantitatively and at

many levels of effort. Both teams placed

considerable importance on the

historical role and value that has

accrued from industry codes and

standards and recognized the major

influence of the insurance industry on

corporate loss reduction programs.

C. Expected Benefits in the Pipeline

Industry

Companies in the industries using

risk management have reported

improved safety records and reduction

in the number of incidents. The

execution of risk management generally

leads to a discipline of detailed review

of the system, its operation and

maintenance. This expanded review can

lead to identifying new sources of risk

that may not be recognized in a

compliance-based management process.

Another aspect of the risk management

discipline is that it entails a rigorous

and comprehensive analysis of the

likelihood of incidents and the

magnitude of the consequences.

Many pipeline companies have

elements of risk management systems in

place, although they lack a

comprehensive program with formal

documentation and public reporting.

Practices identified include use of risk

assessment techniques that exceed

current regulatory requirements. Clearly

an area of improvement in the future

would be integration of practices into a

formal program with clear tracking of

goals, activities and performance

measurement.

Many pipeline operators routinely

exceed the safety levels mandated in

current regulation. The Gas RAQT

found that the gas transmission industry

expends significant resources

complying with minimum

requirements, and then further allocates

resources for practices which exceed the

minimum regulatory requirements.

OPS would like to consider an

alternative plan that would allow

operators flexibility to determine how

best to meet safety goals under Federal

and state oversight. For example, rather

than OPS requiring operators to use a

particular inspection tool on their

pipelines, an alternative approach

would be OPS allowing operators to

employ their understanding of their

systems to prioritize resources to best

ensure pipeline integrity. Operators

could take an integrated systems

approach from start to finish rather than

the current practice of maintaining some

systems because they meet federal

requirements and then overlaying

additional safety measures.

OPS believes that there are many

methods and initiatives outside the

current regulatory structure that hold

promise for pipeline industry use in

maintaining or improving safety while

recognizing competitive pressures in the

marketplace. OPS is considering risk

management demonstration projects to

test the effectiveness of risk

management and to provide a basis for

refining the process to improve pipeline

safety in the years ahead.

D. Conceptualization of a Risk

Management Process

To set parameters for integrating risk

management programs into the

oversight of pipeline transportation as

an option to the current compliancebased scheme, certain assumptions are

fundamental: (1) Each pipeline system

is different, (2) each risk does not pose

the same probability of occurrence and

consequence, and (3) given the right

analytical tools, technical discretion and

financial capability, pipeline operators

can make better decisions about how to

allocate resources with the data

available.

For risk management to work,

operators will need to give OPS detailed

information about, and the reasons for,

taking alternative safety actions in

addition to providing baseline safety

level information and performance

measures to evaluate program progress.

At the same time, OPS will give

operators greater latitude to choose how

to assess and manage risk and what

methodologies are most effective.

OPS is considering the approach to

risk management that the Gas RAQT

outlined. The team report was

developed with support from the Gas

Research Institute and input from the

risk management project team of the

Interstate Natural Gas Association of

America. It identifies (1) Process

elements that define technical details of

risk management execution and (2)

program elements that define

administrative, managerial and

logistical aspects of execution with the

structure of an organization.

The process steps have conceptually

been expressed in a three, four, or five

step approach in other industries, but

each approach basically utilizes a Risk

Assessment, Risk Control and Decision

making, and Performance Measurement

process. These steps result in assessing

threats from specific problems or

sources, ranking their relative

importance, determining which have

greatest risk reduction potential,

allocating resources, and monitoring the

effectiveness of prevention and

mitigation actions over time.

The program elements constitute a

management framework that

implements and supports the process by

taking the results of the assessment and

decisions and putting them into practice

in day-to-day operations. Program

elements could include Management

Responsibilities, Standards, Guidelines,

Operation and Maintenance, Training,

Security, Incident Reporting, Emergency

Preparedness and Response,

Communications, and Auditing and

Corrective Action, to name some

examples.

The process and program elements of

risk management can be performed at

various levels of detail. The RAQTs

referred to this as a ‘‘graded approach’’

—the methods applied should be

commensurate with the risk. Further,

the RAQTs expect that companies

wishing to demonstrate risk

management programs may wish to try

the concepts out within a part of a

pipeline system, rather than within the

entire pipeline.

In summary, risk management is

based on sound engineering principles

and good business practices to help

make decisions that reduce risk. A

pipeline risk management program

depends on good data to help predict

accident likelihood and consequence in

the risk assessment stage. All elements

of the pipeline business, including

location, product, process, equipment,

components, procedures, supervision,

management, records, and human

resources are considered and integrated.

Eventually, risk management should

address the life of the pipeline system

from design and construction through

start up, operation, maintenance, and

shut down.

III. Integrating Risk Management

Programs into the National Pipeline

Safety Program

While government and industry

objectives to assure safety and

environmental protection would remain

the same under risk management, and

the respective roles and responsibilities

remain the same fundamentally, risk

management offers the opportunity to

approach the objectives in a manner that

is more flexible to individual

circumstance. The new approach will be

more open, interactive and dynamic.

OPS believes that the program

framework must have the following

characteristics:

(1) Because consideration needs to be

given to providing information and

assurances about pipeline safety to other

levels of government, the
65728 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Notices

communication process needs to be

more interactive and efficient.

(2) Because the primary function of

these communications will be the

exchange of proposals and their

justification, data must be provided on

the current safety level or baseline and

the expected levels resulting from the

program. The data development process

and cost must be practical.

(3) Because assessing the program is

a critical but new function, the

performance measurement activity will

likely advance incrementally.

IV. Risk Management Demonstration

Project Objectives

OPS offers the following risk

management demonstration project

objectives for public comment and

discussion:

• To give a limited number of

qualified interstate transmission

operators the opportunity to conduct

risk management demonstration

projects.

• To determine whether risk

management provides equal or greater

safety than a compliance-based

approach.

• To help each operator

comprehensively assess threats to

integrity, whatever the scope of the

project, or whatever aspect of its system

is involved in the project.

• To demonstrate how appropriately

the draft risk management standards

address risks and can be applied

effectively.

• To determine how operators

consider low probability—high

consequence incidents in addition to

past accident or component failure

history.

• To determine how operators

evaluate smaller precursor events that

could lead to larger failures.

• To have operators demonstrate how

an integrated review of safety operations

across the company can expedite

prompt response to situations that could

lead to failures.

• To have operators systematically

correlate data, rank planned actions

according to their potential to reduce

risk, and follow through on these

actions.

• To promote technological

innovation.

OPS seeks comment on whether these

objectives are appropriate for a four year

demonstration project.

V. Program Framework Elements

This program administrative

framework to receive, analyze, approve,

monitor and revise risk management

plans is being considered for interstate

natural gas transmission and hazardous

liquid pipeline companies that would

submit proposals for risk management

demonstration projects.

The framework being considered

would have four primary elements,

appropriate to the features and

characteristics of risk management. The

first two elements would be developed

through industry standards processes.

The contents would be similar to the

description in II D of this document.

The second two OPS would construct:

(1) Industry Technical Process Standard

(R1), covering Risk Assessment,

Risk Control and Decision-making,

and Performance Measurement.

(2) Industry Quality Program Standard

(Q1), covering the operator’s

management framework that

implements and supports this

process, and puts risk management

into daily operations.

(3) Federally developed risk

management program participation

requirements for communications

and reporting, planned oversight

and evaluation.

(4) Third party review to simultaneously

validate the quality and adequacy of

the technical review and

administrative process used by

OPS.

Elements (1) and (2) of the program

framework would be the basis for

operators to apply for and OPS to accept

a risk management program

demonstration project.

To develop knowledge and skill in the

application and use of the industry

standards, OPS envisions a cooperative

effort to develop risk management

training curriculum concurrently with

the standards. Further, OPS expects that

trade groups, OPS, and state agencies

would participate in design and

development.

OPS would encourage a broad range

of stakeholders, including Federal and

State pipeline safety officials, to

participate in review of the draft

industry standards. This process is

expected to begin under the auspices of

the several trade organizations. While

developing and approving Risk

Management standards (R1 and Q1)

would be a multi-year process, a basic

draft would be considered as a point of

reference for the demonstration program

preliminary review.

The third element, Federally

developed requirements likely to be

subject to public notice and comment,

should identify the project

administrative framework components,

particularly requirements for applying

for the program, obtaining interim

project approval, participating in longterm evaluation and monitoring, conflict

resolution, penalties, incentives, and

program maintenance.

VI. Third Element: Possible Elements of

the Administrative Risk Management

Demonstration Project Process

(1) An Informal Consultation with

OPS and States. The interstate

transmission operator would consult

OPS Headquarters staff, Regional

Directors and State pipeline safety

program officials affected by the

pipeline system to declare program

technical objectives. These regulatory

officials would express safety concerns

and give advice before formal proposals

are submitted.

Identifying risk management proposal

objectives would begin with the

operator submitting a letter of intent.

The letter would describe the initial

proposal including a request for a

consultation with OPS and other

pipeline safety regulators on the

proposal and justification. In the

consultation, the operator would

discuss such issues as how hazards are

assessed and how risks are currently

managed, baseline performance data to

indicate the safety level under current

regulatory activities and future

indicators, program goals, and the scope

of the demonstration program.

During the consultation with OPS and

state pipeline safety regulators, an

operator would explain the risks it

intends to address and the nature and

extent of its proposal. The operator

would demonstrate why it believes the

proposal could make its pipeline

operate at least as safely as it does by

adhering to the current federal safety

requirements. Federal and State

pipeline regulators would actively

participate in the consultation,

responding to the operator and raising

any concerns.

(2) Formal Written Proposal. An

operator would submit a formal written

proposal to OPS, resulting from the

consultation. The proposal would state

how the operator would apply the two

industry risk management standards

and how the plan is expected to meet or

exceed the safety level achieved through

the current regulatory program.

The proposal would describe the risk

assessment process, the means for and

the technical rationales for ranking

actions, improvement targets, and a

preliminary risk reduction plan with

decision points for action. Also

included would be baseline

performance measures against which

process targets can be set.

Organizational structure, financial

capability, and engineering control

accountability and integrated evaluation

would be briefly described. An operator
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Notices 65729

would need to address in the formal

proposal the concerns raised in the

consultation session and to provide

assurances that management commits to

allocating enough resources and to

implementing the program in

accordance with the proposal.

(3) Program Sufficiency Review. OPS

and state officials affected by the

pipeline system would examine the

proposal for completeness against the

technical process and quality program

standards. This is estimated to occur

within sixty to ninety days of the date

OPS received the proposal. The review

would determine safety expectations

from the program initiatives and that

current safety would be equalled or

exceeded. OPS would also consider

experience with the operator,

compliance history and performance.

The sufficiency review could result in

a proposal being accepted or returned.

OPS acceptance at this stage would

mean officially accepting the

demonstration project as an alternative

to complying with the current

regulatory process. A returned proposal

would lead to second consultation

where recommendations would be made

or the project could be postponed to a

later date.

(4) Technical Process Review. OPS

and its consultants would perform this

review after several months of the

project’s operation under the risk

management scheme and periodically

thereafter to assure that the program is

meeting the safety goals established by

the program performance indicators or

metrics. It will take several years to

assess trends on long range issues. This

review would involve substantive

engineering reviews to validate former

assumptions and expected outcomes. A

follow-on joint government/industry

team process would be charged with the

task of developing guidelines on use of

performance measurements. The review

would verify that operators were

keeping to their planned program

milestones.

(5) Required Public Prospectus. As

part of the process review, an operator

in the demonstration programs would

prepare public documents that explain

its risk management plans and

objectives. An operator would explain

how it plans to meet or exceed existing

safety levels, what its performance

metrics are and how well it has

performed. The public would be able to

read the operator prospectus before OPS

conducts the process reviews and

forward any questions to OPS to present

during the regularly scheduled audit.

OPS could provide feedback through

public notice or other means. This

mechanism is designed to improve

accountability to the public.

(6) Conflict Resolution. Procedures

may be developed to resolve conflicts

between an operator and the

government or other stakeholders on

program adequacy.

(7) Civil Penalties. Penalties would be

administered for an operator not

following the technical process and

quality program standards and not

keeping its program commitments

within its risk management plan and

would be addressed within the

provisions of the existing regulations.

VII. Fourth Element: Third Party

Review Being Considered

The final planned framework element

being considered would be a third party

review that would be conducted during

the four year demonstration project.

OPS would contract with an

independent scientific organization to

give OPS findings on the planned

framework. Findings would include

whether the draft standard is adequate

and complete, and whether the

administrative project framework is

sufficient to assure that the program is

delivering the expected goals.

VIII. Evaluation and Follow-Up

A limited number of demonstration

projects would provide the opportunity

to evaluate whether operators’ risk

management decisions on how best to

use their companies’ resources to

protect people and the environment are

an appropriate alternative to industrywide regulation. The Demonstration

program in its entirety would be

evaluated in the final year. A successful

evaluation would (1) determine that risk

management can be a cost-effective way

to manage risks pipelines pose and (2)

give operators flexibility to manage risk

based on their companies’ needs,

conditions and expertise rather than

complying with compliance-based

safety regulations.

Successfully completing the

demonstration projects is an important

part of the Government’s evolving

regulatory process. OPS and industry

having sufficient pipeline operator

safety data is critical to managing the

risks pipelines pose. OPS does not have

enough safety data to be statistically

meaningful as a risk management

baseline. OPS believes the

demonstration program would identify

the type and amount of pipeline

performance data, pipeline

characteristics including failure data,

needed to manage risk. The

demonstration projects might also lead

to more research and development

activity in designing models to predict

pipeline failure. The demonstration

projects would also be the basis for

improving the industry technical

standards for other operators to develop

more effective risk management

programs and helping OPS be more

creative, effective, and flexible in

overseeing and approving ways to make

pipelines safer.

OPS would report lessons learned

from the demonstration projects through

public meetings and to Congress. The

report would address project results,

including whether or not the

demonstrations maintained or

strengthened safety and how OPS and

industry can improve safety.

Issued in Washington, DC on December 11,

1995.

Richard B. Felder,

Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.

[FR Doc. 95–30775 Filed 12–19–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Fiscal Service

1996 Fee Schedules for the Issuance of

Definitive Securities and TREASURY

DIRECT Securities Accounts

AGENCY: Bureau of the Public Debt,

Fiscal Service, Treasury.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Department of the

Treasury is announcing two schedules

of fees to be charged in 1996 for

marketable Treasury securities. The

schedules are for the fees charged for

the issuance of definitive securities and

the fees for the annual maintenance of

certain TREASURY DIRECT securities

accounts.

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 2, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Maureen Parker, Director, Division of

Securities Systems, Bureau of the Public

Debt, Parkersburg, West Virginia,

26106–1328, (304) 480–7761.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On

January 23, 1995, the Department of the

Treasury established fee schedules for

the issuance of definitive securities and

the maintenance of certain TREASURY

DIRECT securities accounts.

The Treasury has decided that the

fees for the issuance of definitive

securities and the maintenance of

certain TREASURY DIRECT Securities

Accounts in 1996 should remain

unchanged from the amounts currently

in effect.