[Cite as State ex rel. Chrisman v. Clearcreek Twp., 2013-Ohio-2396.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WARREN COUNTY 

STATE EX REL. JACK CHRISMAN, : 

 Relator-Appellant, : CASE NO. CA2012-08-076 

 

 : O P I N I O N

 - vs - 6/10/2013 

 : 

CLEARCREEK TOWNSHIP, WARREN : 

COUNTY, et al., 

 : 

 Respondents-Appellees. 

 : 

CIVIL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. 11CV80194 

Curt C. Hartman, 3749 Fox Point Court, Amelia, Ohio 45102 and Finney, Stagnaro, Saba & 

Patterson, Christopher P. Finney, 2323 Erie Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio 45208, for relatorappellant 

John D. Smith Co., LPA, John D. Smith, Andrew P. Meier, 140 North Main Street, Suite B, 

Springboro, Ohio 45066, for respondents-appellees, Clearcreek Township, Glenn Wade, and 

Robert Lamb 

Schroder, Maundrell, Barbiere & Powers, Lawrence E. Barbiere, 5300 Socialville-Foster 

Road, Suite 200, Mason, Ohio 45040, for respondent-appellee, Cathy Lynn Anspach 

 RINGLAND, J. 

{¶ 1} Relator-appellant, Jack Chrisman, appeals a decision of the Warren County 

Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of respondents-appellees, 
Warren CA2012-08-076

 - 2 - 

Clearcreek Township (the "Township") and the Township's trustees, Cathy Lynn Anspach, 

Glenn E. Wade, and Robert D. Lamb (the "Trustees"). 

{¶ 2} Appellant filed suit against the Township and the Trustees, alleging systemic 

violations of Ohio's Open Meetings Act (the "OMA") arising out of the meetings between the 

Trustees and the Township Administrator that consistently occurred immediately before the 

regularly-scheduled public Township meetings. 

{¶ 3} Those pre-meeting meetings would generally involve some or all of the 

Trustees arriving up to one-half hour prior to a regularly-scheduled public Township meeting. 

The Trustees would meet with the Township Administrator in his office, with the door open, to 

review and discuss matters that were to appear on that evening's agenda for the public 

meeting. 

{¶ 4} Appellant argued that the pre-meeting meetings were in violation of the OMA. 

He alleges that the Trustees' conversations at those meetings extended beyond simple 

information-gathering and fact-finding, and instead ventured into more thorough deliberations 

of the Trustees' thoughts and assessments on township matters. 

{¶ 5} In turn, appellees argued that the pre-meeting meetings were not prearranged 

or scheduled and that attendance of trustees was not mandatory. Rather, they assert that 

the meetings were merely an informal opportunity to meet with the Township Administrator 

and gather information or generally discuss the items on the agenda. According to 

appellees, they did not take formal action or vote on any matters at the pre-meeting 

meetings. 

{¶ 6} Appellees filed motions for summary judgment, followed by appellant's crossmotion for summary judgment. On July 19, 2012, the trial court filed an entry and decision 

finding that appellant had provided no evidence that there were formal deliberations between 

the Trustees at the pre-meeting meetings. Rather, the trial court found the pre-meeting 
Warren CA2012-08-076

 - 3 - 

meetings to be "classified as information-gathering and fact-finding sessions that do not 

constitute a violation of [OMA]." Accordingly, the trial court granted appellees' motions for 

summary judgment and denied appellant's cross-motion for summary judgment. 

{¶ 7} Appellant appeals from that decision, raising a single assignment of error for 

our review. 

{¶ 8} THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES AND IN 

DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RELATOR-APPELLANT. 

{¶ 9} Within this assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment because sufficient evidence was introduced to show that appellees have 

"regularly and systematically" held pre-meeting meetings that either violated or threaten to 

violate the requirements of the OMA. 

{¶ 10} OMA, as set forth in R.C. 121.22, seeks to prevent public bodies from engaging 

in secret deliberations on public issues with no accountability to the public. State ex rel. 

Hardin v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 12th Dist. Nos. CA2011-05-045 and CA2011-06-

047, 2012-Ohio-2569, ¶ 14. The act "shall be liberally construed to require public officials to 

take official action and to conduct all deliberations upon official business only in open 

meetings unless the subject matter is specifically excepted by law." R.C. 121.22(A). R.C. 

121.22(C) likewise requires "[a]ll meetings of any public body are declared to be public 

meetings open to the public at all times." Thus, OMA requires public bodies to deliberate 

public issues in public. 

{¶ 11} R.C. 121.22(B)(2) defines "meeting" as "any prearranged discussion of the 

public business of the public body by a majority of its members." While "deliberations" are 

not defined in OMA, Ohio courts have found that they "involve more than informationgathering, investigation, or fact-finding." Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio 
Warren CA2012-08-076

 - 4 - 

Assn. of Pub. School Emp., Local 530, 106 Ohio App.3d 855, 864 (9th Dist.1995), citing 

Holeski v. Lawrence, 85 Ohio App.3d 824 (11th Dist.1993). Deliberations involve "'the act of 

weighing and examining the reasons for and against a choice or measure.'" Springfield at 

864, quoting Webster's Third International Dictionary 596 (1961). "Question-and-answer 

sessions between board members and other persons who are not public officials do not 

constitute 'deliberations' unless a majority of the board members also entertain a discussion 

of public business with one another." Springfield, id.; see also Carver v. Deerfield Twp., 139 

Ohio App.3d 64 (11th Dist.2000). 

{¶ 12} Ohio courts have also recognized that information-gathering and fact-finding 

are essential functions of any board, and that the gathering of facts and information for 

ministerial purposes does not constitute a violation of OMA. See Holeski at 829; Cincinnati 

Enquirer v. Cincinnati Bd. of Edn., 192 Ohio App.3d 566, 2011-Ohio-703, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.); 

Steingass Mechanical Contracting, Inc. v. Warrensville Hts. Bd. of Edn., 151 Ohio App.3d 

321, 2003-Ohio-28 (8th Dist.). 

{¶ 13} Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of 

material fact remain to be litigated, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law, and reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse 

to the nonmoving party. Grizinski v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 187 Ohio App.3d 393, 

2010-Ohio-1945, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating there 

is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. A dispute of fact can be considered "material" if it 

affects the outcome of the litigation, and considered "genuine" if it is supported by substantial 

evidence that exceeds the allegations in the complaint. Id. This court's review of a trial 

court's ruling on a summary judgment motion is de novo. Id. 

{¶ 14} In the present case, construing the evidence most favorably for the nonmoving 

party on each party's respective summary judgment motions, we find that reasonable minds 
Warren CA2012-08-076

 - 5 - 

could come to differing conclusions. 

{¶ 15} Appellant argues that there was testimony to indicate that the pre-meeting 

meetings were prearranged and regularly consisted of the majority of the Trustees. In 

support of that argument, appellant notes that Anspach testified that upon first becoming a 

trustee, Wade told her that she needed to be at the meeting place by 6:00 o'clock on the 

night of the meeting, one-half hour before it was to begin publicly. Linda Oda testified that 

upon being elected Fiscal Officer for the Township, she was told the trustees would meet 

prior to the public meeting to go over the agenda and "work things out." In addition, the 

Township Administrator testified that it was typical for one or more of the Trustees to show up 

at his office prior to almost every meeting. 

{¶ 16} Appellant next argues that deliberations took place at those prearranged 

discussions. Oda testified as to numerous instances of potential deliberations that occurred 

during the pre-meeting meetings that could be interpreted as violations of the OMA. Oda 

stated that trustee Lamb informed her that the Trustees would, "meet in that office to go over 

the agenda so that they can appear to be on the same page before the meeting." Oda 

further testified that Lamb explained to her that the reasoning for the pre-meeting meetings 

was so that the Trustees could present a "cohesive front for the public, and that's why it was 

better to get any negative discussions out of the way in private so that they didn't have to 

have any negative discussions in the public." Oda confirmed that it was custom for the 

Trustees to use the pre-meeting meetings as a means to go over the agenda and make 

decisions. 

{¶ 17} Oda also testified as to specific instances wherein the OMA may have been 

violated. In one circumstance, the Trustees voted unanimously at the public meeting to 

approve a portable restroom at a local park. However, Oda asserted that Lamb had advised 

her that there was dissension on the issue at the pre-meeting. According to Oda, this 
Warren CA2012-08-076

 - 6 - 

dissension was nonexistent at the public meeting. 

{¶ 18} In another instance, Oda testified that Lamb told her there had been an 

argument between the Trustees regarding the amount of the raise for the Township 

maintenance superintendent. According to Oda, she was told that the Township 

Administrator and one other trustee believed the superintendent should receive a three 

percent raise, while another trustee fought for a five percent raise. However, when the issue 

came to the floor at the public meeting, the superintendent's raise was approved without 

dissension. 

{¶ 19} Appellant also pointed to testimony from the Trustees that indicated items were 

often removed from the agenda based on the discussions at the pre-meeting meetings. 

Anspach testified the Trustees would discuss how they felt about issues, give points and 

counterpoints, take informal votes on those issues, and occasionally remove items from the 

agenda based on the pre-meeting meeting discussions. 

{¶ 20} In turn, appellees testified that the pre-meeting meetings were merely for 

information-gathering purposes or to discover what other Trustees' opinions were on the 

meeting's agenda. 

{¶ 21} Wade testified that the meeting was used only to gather information and was 

neither scheduled nor was attendance required. He further testified that the removal of 

agenda items only took place when one of the Trustees was in need of additional 

information. Finally, Wade noted that the discussions at the pre-meeting meetings were 

typically between the Trustees and the Township Administrator, rather than between one 

another. 

{¶ 22} Appellees assert that Anspach's testimony supports the argument that no 

formal action was taken at the pre-meeting meetings. While Anspach testified that informal 

votes were taken, she further testified that such votes were inferred based on observations 
Warren CA2012-08-076

 - 7 - 

made during the discussions, rather than by individual Trustees announcing whether they 

were for or against an agenda item. 

{¶ 23} Lamb also testified that the meetings were for information-gathering purposes 

only. He further asserted that the meetings were not private and that people often "stuck 

their head in" to say hello. 

{¶ 24} After a de novo review of the record, and again upon construing the evidence in 

a light most favorable to the non-moving party on each party's respective summary judgment 

motions, we find that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the pre-meeting 

meetings were prearranged, and whether appellees participated in deliberations at the premeeting meetings in violation of the OMA. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether the 

discussions at the pre-meeting meetings were prearranged and extended beyond 

information-gathering and into deliberations. 

{¶ 25} There was conflicting testimony as to whether the pre-meeting meetings were 

prearranged, what the purpose of the meetings was, and whether deliberations took place 

therein. To answer those questions will require a trier of fact to weigh the evidence and 

make determinations as to the credibility of the witnesses' testimony. Accordingly, it is the 

trier of fact, not this court, who will ultimately decide whether a violation of the OMA occurred 

or is threatened to occur. 

{¶ 26} In light of the foregoing, having found that the evidence did create a genuine 

issue of material fact as to whether appellees violated or threaten to violate the OMA, 

appellant's assignment of error is sustained insofar as the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment in favor of appellees, and overruled regarding the trial court's denial of 

appellant's cross-motion for summary judgment. 

{¶ 27} Judgment affirmed insofar as it denied appellant's motion for summary 

judgment, and reversed and remanded insofar as it granted appellees' motions for summary 
Warren CA2012-08-076

 - 8 - 

judgment. 

S. POWELL and PIPER, JJ., concur.