J-S64015-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF: 

M.C.B. AND D.A.B. 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

APPEAL OF: J.D.B., NATURAL FATHER 

 No. 988 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order May 19, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 68 & 68a IN Adoption 2013 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and LAZARUS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 17, 2014 

 J.D.B. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s order involuntarily 

terminating his parental rights to his twin children, M.B. and D.B. (Children) 

(born July 2011).1 Because Father made minimal progress in acquiring the 

necessary skills to parent Children, despite one year of assistance and 

county services, the court properly terminated his parental rights. Thus, we 

affirm. 

 Due to the fact that both Father and Mother have borderline mental 

capacities,2 various social service agencies intervened to provide them inhome assistance with basic parenting skills. After months of assistance, 

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1

 Mother’s rights to children were terminated by separate order. She has not 

appealed that decision. 

2

 Cognitive testing indicated that Father had an IQ of 78, in the borderline 

mental retardation range. 
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parents made minimal progress; Children were removed from the home in 

October 2012 and placed in a foster home.3 On October 18, 2012, Parents 

stipulated with Erie County Office of Children and Youth (Agency) that 

Children would be adjudicated dependent. Parents admitted that Children 

had poor hygiene at their doctors’ appointments, they made no progress 

with program interventions and services provided to them prior to Children’s 

birth, Children were left in their cribs with soiled diapers and covered in 

feces, Father had trouble providing food for Children despite public 

assistance, gas service had been shut off to the family home, Father did not 

supervise Children appropriately and did not have the ability to meet the 

basic needs of Children. The Agency initiated services to assist with 

parenting, budgeting, conditions in the home and the basic needs of 

Children. 

 Despite almost one year’s worth of assistance from two caseworkers, 

an occupational therapist, a nutritionist, a physical therapist, and 

representatives from service programs, Father has not progressed to the 

point of unsupervised visits with Children. In January 2014, the goal was 

changed from reunification to adoption. 

____________________________________________ 

3

 In August 2012, re-referral was made to the Family Focus program due to 

concerns about the twins’ lack of weight gain. However, despite intervention 

efforts, the Children were placed in foster care. 
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 On May 16, 2014, the court held a termination hearing during which 

seven witnesses (including several Agency caseworkers, a licensed 

psychologist, a counselor, and Children’s foster mother) testified. On May 

19, 2014, the trial court entered an order involuntarily terminating Father’s 

rights to Children pursuant to sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (b) of 

the Adoption Act.4 This timely appeal follows. 

 On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our consideration: 

(1) Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or 

abused its discretion in involuntarily terminating the 

Appellant’s paternal rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), (2), 

and (5) when the Appellant complied with all of the

services and only asked for more services and time to 

learn to parent the children, greatly loved the children, and 

wanted to parent the children. 

(2) Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or 

abused its discretion in involuntarily terminating the 

Appellant’s paternal rights pursuant to § 2511(b) when the 

statutory requirements for termination had not been met, 

the Appellant was bonded to the children, loved the

children, and such finding was contrary to the best

interests of the children. 

Under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated 

process prior to terminating parental rights. In re D.A.T., 91 A.3d 197 (Pa. 

Super. 2014). Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. Id. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

____________________________________________ 

4

 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. 
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delineated in section 2511(a). Id. See also In re adoption of S.M., 816 

A.2d 1117 (Pa. Super. 2003) (in termination matters, burden of proof is on 

party seeking termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

existence of grounds for doing so; court must examine individual 

circumstances of each and every case and consider all explanations offered 

by parent to determine if evidence in light of totality of circumstances clearly 

warrants termination). 

 Only after determining that the parent's conduct warrants termination 

of his or her parental rights must the court engage in the second part of the 

analysis: determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 

999, 1004 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). Although a needs and welfare 

analysis is mandated by the statute, it is distinct from and not relevant to a 

determination of whether the parent's conduct justifies termination of 

parental rights under the statute. Id. One major aspect of the needs and 

welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond 

between parent and child. Id.

 We review a trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate parental 

rights for an abuse of discretion or error of law. In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 

563 (Pa. Super. 2003). Our scope of review is limited to determining 

whether the trial court’s order is supported by competent evidence. Id. 

 Despite the fact that Father may have made a sincere effort to take 

advantage of services provided to him by the agency to fulfil his parental 
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obligations, it does not mean that he is capable of meeting Children’s 

essential physical and emotional needs. In Adoption of B.J.R., 579 A.2d 

906 (Pa. Super. 1990), this Court stated: 

A parent who is incapable of performing parental duties is 

equally as unfit as one who is unwilling to do so. In re 

Adoption of J.J., [] 515 A.2d at 891 [Pa. 1986] [quoting In re 

William L., [] 383 A.2d 1228, 1239 (1978)[.] Accordingly, 

proceedings to terminate the parental rights of mentally or 

physically impaired parents do not require the application of a 

more stringent "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof. 

Id. [] 515 A.2d at 892. What is important is the demonstrated 

willingness and ability of the parent to perform, at a minimal 

level, his or her parental duties. [] Id. at 608. 

Id. at 913 (emphasis added). 

 The fact that Children “were never harmed [and] never suffered any 

physical or sexual abuse,” Appellant’s Brief, at 12, is not the standard by 

which we determine what is in their best interests. Moreover, the fact that 

Father may have “acted in good faith,” id. at 13, and “complied with every 

service offered, and took advantage of every visit”, id., is also not the 

benchmark for being a fit parent. See In re J.W., 578 A.2d 952, 959 (Pa. 

Super. 1990) (parenting requires "action as well as intent."). In addition, 

while Father, may feel that he needs further services or that he was never 

provided the proper services by the Agency, we remind him that the State is 

required to make reasonable efforts to promote family stability and preserve 

the family unit. In re A.L.D., supra. Moreover, “when the goal of 

preserving the family unit conflicts with the reality of the child(ren)’s unmet 

irreducible essential needs, the dispositive question then becomes, to what 
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extent may the parent be helped to meet those needs without permitting 

those needs to go unmet.” In re J.W., 578 A.2d 952, 959 (Pa. Super. 

1990). A parent who cannot meet the irreducible minimum requirements 

set by the Juvenile Act within a reasonable time following state intervention 

may properly be considered “unfit,” and may properly have parental rights 

terminated. Id. at 958. 

 Here, a caseworker testified that Parents were provided more services 

than she had seen given to any other family in her thirteen years of 

employment with the Agency. N.T. Termination Hearing, 5/16/2014, at 83-

84. Moreover, another caseworker testified that there were no other 

temporary services that could be provided to help Father parent safely. Id.

at 132.5 The State is not required to extend services beyond what our 

legislature has deemed a reasonable time “or require Herculean efforts by 

CYS or other agencies after the goal has changed to adoption.” In the 

Interest of Feidler, 573 A.2d 587, 588 (Pa. Super. 1990); In the Interest 

of S.A.D., 555 A.2d 123, 124-25 (Pa. Super. 1989). Moreover, an agency is 

not required to provide services indefinitely if a parent is either unable or 

unwilling to apply the instruction given. In re R.T., 778 A.2d 670 (Pa. 

Super. 2001). 

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5

 Caseworkers testified that Parents needed constant supervision to properly 

parent Children. N.T. Termination Hearing, 5/16/14, at 132. 
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 Here, the record bears out the fact that the Agency provided Father 

with relevant and consistent services to increase his parenting skills to the 

level that he could be reunited with Children. However, the unfortunate fact 

remains that, despite his compliance with all services provided, Father’s 

progress remains minimal at best. Serious safety concerns for Children 

continue to exist in the family home and Father does not have the ability to 

meet the basic needs of Children. Under these circumstances, Father is 

“unfit” to parent Children and termination is proper. In re J.W., supra. 

 Instantly, Agency caseworkers testified that Father did not consistently 

follow through with proper feeding and nutrition for Children, did not remedy 

safety issues apparent in the family residence, and was unable to manage 

the home. These issues remained even after one year of services was 

provided to Parents. See In the Interest of A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (if parent appears incapable of benefiting from reasonable 

efforts supplied over realistic period of time, county CYS has fulfilled its 

mandate and upon proof of satisfaction of reasonable good faith effort, 

termination petition may be granted). Accordingly, we agree that the trial 

court properly terminated Father’s parental rights under sections 2511(a)(1) 

and 2511(a)(2).6 See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) (termination of parental 

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6

 "[W]e need only agree with [a trial court's] decision as to any one 

subsection [of 2511(a), along with 2511(b),] in order to affirm the 

termination of parental rights." In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc). 
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rights warranted where “[t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has 

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties”); 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) 

(termination of parental rights warranted where “[t]he repeated and 

continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the 

parent.”).

 Finally, with regard to the evidence necessary to support termination 

under section 2511(b) of the Adoption Act, we must consider whether the 

termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical 

and emotional needs and welfare of the child. See In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 

1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005). "Intangibles such as love, comfort, 

security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare 

of the child." Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). The court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the 

effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. See id.

 The fact that Father loves Children very much, Appellant’s Brief at 14, 

and wants to be involved in every moment of their lives does not necessarily 

mean that he is capable of meeting their needs and welfare under 2511(b). 

Agency Caseworker Gaylene Abbott Faye testified that the Children walked 
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right by Parents in the courthouse hallway, did not recognize them, and do 

not ask about Parents. N.T. Termination Hearing, 5/16/14, at 137-38. 

Moreover, she testified that there has been no noticeable adverse effect on 

the Children since visitation ceased and that there would be no negative 

effect if Parents’ rights were terminated. Id. at 138. A caseworker testified 

that Children never looked for affection or nurturing from Parents during 

visits. Id. at 134. 

 On the other hand, Children have developed a strong bond with foster 

parents, in whose care they had been for 20 months at the time of the 

termination hearing; they continue to thrive in their care. N.T. Termination 

Hearing, 5/16/14, at 103, 108-109. They have developed a strong 

attachment to the foster family and crave the structure and routine of the 

foster home. Id. at 141. Despite the bond Father may feel for Children, 

they do not have a recognized, reciprocal bond with him. Most important, 

however, is the fact that despite all of his efforts, the evidence demonstrates 

that Father is simply incapable of meeting Children’s overall psychological 

and physical needs on his own. See In re D.A.T., (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(termination under section 2511(b) warranted even where children 

recognized Mother and may miss her to some degree, testimony indicated 

that Mother is unable to meet child’s emotional, physical, and developmental 

needs on her own or provide Child with healthy, safe environment, and had 

not been able to do so for almost two years prior to termination hearing; 

child's main sources of love, comfort, stability and security are foster 
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parents). Accordingly, the Agency met its burden by clear and convincing 

evidence and the trial court properly terminated Father’s parental rights 

under section 2511(b). 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/17/2014