This opinion is subject to revision before publication

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ARMED FORCES

_______________

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Conner B. HISER, Private First Class

United States Army, Appellant

No. 21-0219

Crim. App. No. 20190325

Argued November 17, 2021—Decided January 13, 2022

Military Judge: Teresa L. Raymond

For Appellant: Captain Carol K. Rim (argued); Daniel S. 

Conway, Esq. (on brief); Major Alexander N. Hess and Scott 

R. Hockenberry, Esq.

For Appellee: Captain Jennifer A. Sundook (argued); Colonel Steven P. Haight, Lieutenant Colonel Craig Schapira, 

Lieutenant Colonel Wayne H. Williams, and Captain A. Benjamin Spencer (on brief); Major Mark T. Robinson and Captain Christopher K. Wills.

Judge MAGGS delivered the opinion of the Court, in 

which Chief Judge OHLSON, Judge SPARKS, Judge 

HARDY, and Senior Judge COX, joined. 

_______________

Judge MAGGS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant contends that the military judge abused her discretion in accepting his guilty plea to three specifications of 

wrongfully broadcasting intimate visual images in violation 

of Article 117a, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 

U.S.C. § 917a (2018). According to Appellant, the providence 

inquiry in this case failed to establish that the victim was 

“identifiable” and also failed to establish a “connection to a . . .

military environment” as required by Article 117a(a), UCMJ.

The record, however, does not support Appellant’s contentions. Because we see no substantial basis in law or fact for 

questioning the plea, we affirm the judgment of the United 

States Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA).
United States v. Hiser, No. 21-0219/AR

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2

I. Background

The three Specifications of Charge III allege violations of 

Article 117a, UCMJ:

In that Private First Class (E-3) Conner B. Hiser, 

U.S. Army, did, at or near Fort Drum, New York, on 

or about [May 5, 2018, for Specification 1; May 6,

2018, for Specification 2; and May 9, 2018, for Specification 3], knowingly, wrongfully, and without the 

explicit consent of Specialist [V.G.] broadcast a visual image of sexually explicit conduct involving Specialist [V.G.], who was at least 18 years of age when 

the visual image was created and is identifiable from 

the visual image and from [the] information displayed in connection with the visual image, when he 

knew or reasonably should have known that the visual image was made under circumstances in which

Specialist [V.G.] retained a reasonable expectation 

of privacy regarding any broadcast of the visual image, and when he knew or reasonably should have 

known that the broadcast of the visual image was 

likely to cause harassment, intimidation, and emotional distress for Specialist [V.G.], which conduct, 

under the circumstances, had a reasonably direct 

and palpable connection to a military mission or military environment.

Appellant and the Government entered into a stipulation 

of fact relevant to the Article 117a, UCMJ, specifications. The 

stipulation recounts that Appellant was married to Specialist 

(SPC) V.G. at the time of the charged offenses. The stipulation

further provides in relevant part:

14. On 8 April 2018, SPC [V.G.] looked at the Accused’s phone and noticed that he uploaded a video 

to the porn website Pornhub.com (Pornhub). The 

video was roughly three minutes long and depicted 

SPC [V.G.] and the Accused engaging in sexual intercourse. When SPC [V.G.] confronted the Accused, 

he explained that it had been on the internet for a 

few days and he posted it to make extra money. SPC 

[V.G.] told him to take down the video. The Accused 

complied and SPC [V.G.] later confirmed that the 

video was removed from the website.

15. On 10 May 2018, SPC [V.G.] was reflecting on 

everything that happened in their relationship and 

remembered that the Accused had posted a video on 

Pornhub without her permission in April 2018. SPC 
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3

[V.G.] had a bad feeling that the Accused might do 

that again. She checked Pornhub and saw that the

Accused had wrongfully broadcasted three (3) videos 

depicting sexually explicit conduct involving her. 

The three videos are different segments of the same

original video. SPC [V.G.] was over 18 years of age 

when the original video was created. SPC [V.G.]

consented to the creation of the video on the 

condition that the Accused not post, share, or show 

the video to any third party. SPC [V.G.] did not 

consent, in any way, to the Accused posting these 

videos on Pornhub.

16. The Accused knew, or reasonably should have 

known, that SPC [V.G.] retained a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding any broadcast of the videos. The Accused also knew, or reasonably should 

have known, that the broadcast of the videos was 

likely to cause harassment, intimidation, and emotional distress for SPC [V.G.].

17. . . . The Accused posted all three videos on Pornhub using his personal Pornhub profile. The Accused’s profile name is “cbhiser02” and contains a 

picture of the Accused. The video posted on 5 May 

2018 is titled “[expletive deleted] my wife,” the video 

post on 6 May 2018 is titled “[expletive deleted] my 

wife’s [expletive deleted],” and the video posted on 9 

May 2018 is titled ‘‘Quickie with the wife.”

18. The video titled “[expletive deleted] my wife” is 

approximately one minute and forty[-]three seconds 

long and depicts the Accused’s penis penetrating 

SPC [V.G.’s] vagina from behind. The video is filmed 

from the Accused’s perspective. The video titled “[expletive deleted] my wife’s [expletive deleted]” is approximately three minutes long and depicts the Accused’s penis penetrating SPC [V.G.’s] vagina from 

behind. The beginning of the video is filmed from the 

Accused’s perspective, later the camera is moved 

and the remainder of the video is filmed from underneath SPC [V.G.]. The video titled ‘‘Quickie with the 

wife’’ is approximately 38 seconds long and depicts 

the Accused’s penis penetrating SPC [V.G.’s] vagina 

from behind. The video is filmed from the Accused’s 

perspective.

19. SPC [V.G.’s] face is not visible in any video. However, the video titled “[expletive deleted] my wife”

shows SPC [V.G.’s] hair in a military style bun and 
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4

the video titled “quickie with the wife” shows SPC 

[V.G.’s] wedding ring on her left ring finger.

20. The Accused posted the videos online “as revenge” because he believed SPC [V.G.] might be romantically involved with members of his unit. The

Accused told [agents of the Criminal Investigation 

Command] that he posted the videos “roughly between 30 April and 5 May 2018.” The Accused’s conduct had a reasonably direct and palpable connection to a military mission or military environment. 

In conjunction with the Accused’s profile name, 

“cbhiser02” other Soldiers could have reviewed the

video and known SPC [V.G.] was depicted, particularly as her distinctive, military-style bun was visible. At the time of the offenses, SPC [V.G.’s] legal

[last] name was . . . Hiser. She was, and is, an active 

duty Soldier. SPC [V.G.] and PFC Hiser were wellknown as a dual-military couple within the Fort 

Drum military environment.

Based on the entirety of the stipulation of fact and Appellant’s answers during the providence inquiry, a military judge 

sitting as a general court-martial found Appellant guilty of 

the three specifications of wrongfully broadcasting intimate 

visual images quoted above, in violation of Article 117a, 

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 917a, and also of one specification of disrespecting a superior commissioned officer, one specification 

of aggravated assault, one specification of assault consummated by a battery, and one specification of communicating a 

threat, in violation of Articles 89, 128, and 134, UCMJ, 10 

U.S.C. §§ 889, 928, 934 (2018). The military judge sentenced 

Appellant to a reduction to the grade of E-1, confinement for 

thirty-nine months, and a dishonorable discharge from the 

service. In accordance with the terms of the pretrial agreement, the convening authority approved only so much of the

adjudged sentence as provided for a reduction to the grade of 

E-1, confinement for three years, and a dishonorable discharge. The ACCA affirmed the findings of guilty and sentence. United States v. Hiser, No. ARMY 20190325 (A. Ct. 

Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2021).

We granted review of the following question: “Whether the 

military judge abused her discretion by accepting Appellant’s 

guilty plea to a violation of Article 117a, UCMJ, when Appellant posted intimate videos of a person under circumstances 
United States v. Hiser, No. 21-0219/AR

Opinion of the Court

5

where the person was not readily identifiable and there was 

no reasonable connection to the military environment.” 

United States v. Hiser, 81 M.J. 302, 303 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (order 

granting review).

II. Standards of Review

Three standards of review are relevant to this appeal. One 

standard of review applies to the stipulation of fact. Under 

Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 811(e), “[u]nless properly 

withdrawn or ordered stricken from the record, a stipulation 

of fact that has been accepted is binding on the court-martial 

and may not be contradicted by the parties thereto.” Because 

the stipulation of fact quoted above has not been withdrawn 

or stricken, we accept the assertions within it as true. See

United States v. Nance, 67 M.J. 362, 363 (C.A.A.F. 2009).

Another standard of review applies to the military judge’s 

acceptance of Appellant’s guilty plea. Under R.C.M. 910(e),

“[t]he military judge shall not accept a plea of guilty without 

making such inquiry of the accused as shall satisfy the military judge that there is a factual basis for the plea.” We review a military judge’s acceptance of a guilty plea for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Prater, 32 M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A. 

1991). Applying this standard, we must uphold a guilty plea 

unless there is “a ‘substantial basis’ in law and fact for questioning” the plea. Id.

A third standard of review applies to the interpretation of 

the terms “identifiable” and “connection to a . . . military environment” in Article 117a(a), UCMJ. The meaning of these 

terms is a question of statutory interpretation. This Court reviews matters of statutory interpretation de novo. United 

States v. Gay, 75 M.J. 264, 267 (C.A.A.F. 2016).

III. Discussion

Congress enacted Article 117a, UCMJ, in 2017 to address 

the “[w]rongful broadcast or distribution of intimate visual 

images.” 10 U.S.C. § 917a (2018) (enacted by National Defense Authorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 533(a), 

131 Stat. 1283, 1389 (2017). This prolix provision, which this 

Court has not previously interpreted, is complicated. Article 

117a(a), UCMJ, describes the prohibited offense in a single
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6

sentence of more than 300 words.1 For the Article 117a, 

UCMJ, specifications charged in this case, four elements are 

 

1 Article 117a(a), UCMJ, provides:

Wrongful broadcast or distribution of intimate visual 

images

(a) PROHIBITION.—Any person subject to this

chapter—

(1) who knowingly and wrongfully broadcasts or 

distributes an intimate visual image of another person or a visual image of sexually explicit conduct involving a person who—

(A) is at least 18 years of age at the time the 

intimate visual image or visual image of sexually 

explicit conduct was created;

(B) is identifiable from the intimate visual

image or visual image of sexually explicit conduct itself, or from information displayed in connection with the intimate visual image or visual 

image of sexually explicit conduct; and

(C) does not explicitly consent to the broadcast or distribution of the intimate visual image 

or visual image of sexually explicit conduct;

(2) who knows or reasonably should have known 

that the intimate visual image or visual image of 

sexually explicit conduct was made under 

circumstances in which the person depicted in the 

intimate visual image or visual image of sexually 

explicit conduct retained a reasonable expectation of 

privacy regarding any broadcast or distribution of 

the intimate visual image or visual image of sexually 

explicit conduct;

(3) who knows or reasonably should have known 

that the broadcast or distribution of the intimate visual image or visual image of sexually explicit conduct is likely—

(A) to cause harm, harassment, intimidation,

emotional distress, or financial loss for the person depicted in the intimate visual image or visual image of sexually explicit conduct; or
United States v. Hiser, No. 21-0219/AR

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relevant. First is that the accused “knowingly and wrongfully 

broadcast[ed] . . . a visual image of sexually explicit conduct 

involving a person who . . . is identifiable from the . . . visual 

image . . . or from information displayed in connection with 

the . . . visual image.” Id. § 917a(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).

Second is that the accused “[knew] or reasonably should have 

known that the . . . visual image of sexually explicit conduct 

was made under circumstances in which the person depicted 

in the . . . visual image of sexually explicit conduct retained a 

reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. § 917a(a)(2). Third is 

that the accused “[knew] or reasonably should have known 

that the broadcast . . . of the . . . visual image of sexually explicit conduct is likely . . . to cause harm, harassment, intimidation, emotional distress, or financial loss for the person depicted.” Id. § 917a(a)(3)(A). Fourth is that the accused’s 

“conduct, under the circumstances, had a reasonably direct 

and palpable connection to a military mission or military environment.” Id. § 917a(a)(4) (emphasis added).

This appeal concerns the first and fourth of these elements. With respect to the first element, Appellant contends 

that “in the circumstances captured within the videos appellant [and] his wife are not readily identifiable.” With respect 

to the fourth element, Appellant argues that “there was no 

reasonable connection to the military environment.” We disagree with both of Appellant’s arguments and conclude that 

there is no substantial basis in law and fact for questioning 

Appellant’s guilty plea.

 

(B) to harm substantially the depicted person

with respect to that person’s health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation, or personal relationships; and

(4) whose conduct, under the circumstances, had 

a reasonably direct and palpable connection to a military mission or military environment,

is guilty of wrongful distribution of intimate visual images 

or visual images of sexually explicit conduct and shall be 

punished as a court-martial may direct.

10 U.S.C. § 917a(a) (2018). Definition of several of these terms appear in Article 117a(b)(1)–(7). Id. § 917a(b)(1)–(7).
United States v. Hiser, No. 21-0219/AR

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A. Whether SPC V.G. Was “Identifiable”

Appellant’s first contention is that the military judge 

abused her discretion by accepting his guilty plea because 

SPC V.G. was not identifiable.2 Appellant asserts that she

was not identifiable because the videos “capture her from her 

back side [sic]” and “her face is not shown.” Appellant further 

argues that even though SPC V.G.’s wedding ring and hair 

bun are visible, they are “not unique nor sufficiently specific” 

to make SPC V.G. identifiable. In addition, Appellant contends that SPC V.G. was not identifiable from the information 

displayed in connection with the photograph because the videos used “the general reference to ‘my wife’ in the title (as opposed to her name).”

Article 117a(a)(1)(B), UCMJ, requires the victim of a 

wrongful broadcast to be “identifiable from the . . . visual image . . . or from information displayed in connection with 

the . . . visual image.” Given that this appeal arises from a 

guilty plea, we need not settle all possible questions about the 

meaning of this provision in order to assess Appellant’s argument. Instead, based on the applicable standards of review, 

we need only determine whether the military judge had a substantial basis in law and fact for concluding that SPC V.G. 

was identifiable. Future contested cases can settle interpretative issues that later might arise.

Based on the stipulation of facts and the providence inquiry, we conclude that the military judge did not abuse her 

discretion in determining that SPC V.G. was identifiable for 

two reasons. First, the military judge had a substantial basis 

in fact for concluding that SPC V.G. was identifiable because 

SPC V.G. actually recognized herself when she saw the postings and videos. As quoted above, the parties stipulated that 

SPC V.G. “checked Pornhub and saw that the Accused had 

wrongfully broadcasted three (3) videos depicting sexually explicit conduct involving her.” See People v. Johnson, 184 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 850, 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that a victim 

 

2 Although Appellant argues in some instances that SPC V.G. 

was not “readily identifiable,” the modifier “readily” does not 

appear in the text of Article 117a(a)(1)(B), UCMJ. We therefore 

construe Appellant’s argument to mean that his wife was not 

“identifiable.”
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9

was “identifiable” under a similar California statute when the 

victim identified herself).

Second, even putting SPC V.G.’s self-recognition aside, the 

military judge would have a substantial basis in fact for concluding that SPC V.G. was identifiable from a combination of 

the visual images in the videos and the information displayed 

in connection with the videos. In posting the videos, Appellant—PFC Conner B. Hiser—adopted the username 

“cbhiser02,” which contained his first and middle initials and 

his last name. He further included a photograph of his face in 

his profile. The titles of the videos described the woman in the 

videos as Appellant’s “wife,” who at the time was SPC V.G.

Her last name at the time was also Hiser. Although SPC V.G. 

might not have been identifiable solely by her wedding ring 

and hair bun, the ring and hair bun were consistent with SPC 

V.G.’s usual appearance. They therefore reinforced the conclusion that the “wife” of “cbhiser02” depicted in the videos 

was SPC V.G. 

In reaching the conclusion that the military judge did not 

abuse her discretion, we recognize that Appellant has advanced a specific legal argument about how courts should construe Article 117a(a)(1)(B), UCMJ. Specifically, Appellant 

contends that the Court should decide whether a person is 

“identifiable” from the perspective of “somebody of the general 

public.” Oral Argument at 13:19–13:23, United States v. 

Hiser, No. 21-0219 (C.A.A.F. Nov. 17, 2021). Under this view, 

if a member of the general public could not identify SPC V.G. 

from the videos and information posted with them, then she 

is not “identifiable” for the purpose of Article 117a(a)(1)(B), 

UCMJ, even if SPC V.G. could identify herself or even if others who actually knew SPC V.G. and Appellant could identify 

her. The text of Article 117a(a)(1)(B), however, does not support this proposed construction. Because the article requires 

that the person depicted in an image be “identifiable” without

further qualification, it provides no basis for requiring a person to be identifiable by “somebody of the general public.”

Based on all of these considerations, we see no substantial 

basis in law or fact for questioning whether Appellant was 

identifiable.
United States v. Hiser, No. 21-0219/AR

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10

B. Connection to a Military Environment

Article 117a(a)(4), UCMJ, requires that the accused’s 

“conduct, under the circumstances, [have] a reasonably direct 

and palpable connection to a . . . military environment.” Relying on our decision in United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442 

(C.A.A.F. 2008), Appellant contends that the connection element is satisfied only if the broadcasted images at issue were

“directed at servicemembers” or were “likely to reach servicemembers.” Oral Argument at 0:48–1:07, United States v. 

Hiser, No. 21-0219 (C.A.A.F. Nov. 17, 2021). Appellant contends that here “[t]he only evidence that anyone else even saw 

the videos was that SPC VG discovered them when she was 

snooping through appellant’s phone.” Appellant further contends that “there is no evidence [soldiers] were aware of, or 

would think to look for, appellant’s profile on PornHub.”

We disagree with these contentions for two reasons. First, 

and fundamentally, Appellant confuses our review of a guilty 

plea with our review of findings following a trial. When an 

accused has pleaded guilty, we do not review the “evidence” 

for legal sufficiency for the simple reason that there is no evidence when there is no trial. Instead, when the accused

pleads guilty, the military judge shall “mak[e] such inquiry of 

the accused as shall satisfy the military judge that there is a 

factual basis for the plea.” R.C.M. 910(e). This Court’s task on 

review, as explained above, is only to determine from any stipulated facts and from the providence inquiry whether the military judge abused his or her discretion in complying with this 

rule. In so doing, we simply must determine whether Appellant’s guilty plea has a substantial basis in law and fact.

Second, we disagree with Appellant’s contention that the 

requirement of a “connection to a . . . military environment” 

in Article 117a(a)(4), UCMJ, is satisfied only if broadcasted 

images are “directed at” or “likely to reach” members of the 

military. In ordinary language, the word “connection” means 

“a coming into or being put in contact.” Webster’s Third New 

International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 481 (1986). Based on this ordinary meaning, we conclude that a “connection” may be established if the broadcasted images actually do reach a servicemember—that is, a 

servicemember is “put in contact” with the images—regardless of whether the accused specifically directed the images at 
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11

the military and regardless of how likely the images were to 

reach the military.3 In this case, the parties stipulated that 

SPC V.G. is a member of the military and that the images 

reached her. The connection requirement is therefore met.

And this connection could hardly have been more “direct and 

palpable” because Appellant posted the videos on the Pornhub website, and SPC V.G. soon thereafter found the videos 

on the same website.

The Wilcox decision is not controlling on this specific issue.

In Wilcox, the appellant was charged with a violation of Article 134, UCMJ, for “wrongfully advocat[ing] anti-government 

and disloyal sentiments, and encourag[ing] participation in 

extremist organizations while identifying himself as a ‘US 

Army Paratrooper’ on an America OnLine [AOL] Profile and 

advocat[ing] racial intolerance by counseling and advising individuals on racist views” when “under the circumstances, the 

[appellant’s] conduct was to the prejudice of good order and 

discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit to the armed forces.” 66 M.J. at 443–44 (alterations in 

original) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court determined that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish the “good order and discipline” or “service discrediting” 

elements because “no evidence was produced that the profiles 

were directed at other members of the military, or that any 

military member other than the investigators stumbled upon 

them or was likely to do so.” Id. at 451.

This case is distinguishable. Article 117a(a)(1), UCMJ,

unlike Article 134, UCMJ, does not include an element that 

the conduct be prejudicial to good order and discipline or that 

it discredit the military. In addition, in this case, SPC V.G.

was a member of the military and she actually did find the 

videos. Appellant specifically stated he uploaded the video to 

embarrass SPC V.G., and recognized that other members of 

her command could see them and think “this is degrading to 

the U.S. military that Soldiers are uploading this kind of behavior and their intimate lives on to social media or the internet.” Appellant stipulated that there was a negative impact 

 

3 We express no opinion on whether a “connection to a . . . military environment” may be established in other ways because that 

issue is not before this Court.
United States v. Hiser, No. 21-0219/AR

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12

on the military community at Fort Drum. Finally, unlike the 

investigators in Wilcox who presumably were not affected by 

the controversial statements they uncovered, SPC V.G. was 

(according to the stipulated facts) “likely” to suffer “emotional 

distress” because of the broadcasting of the videos. Under the 

plain language of Article 117a(a)(4), UCMJ, nothing more is 

needed to establish a “direct and palpable connection to a . . .

military environment.”

C. Other Contentions

We note three other arguments that Appellant has made.

The first argument lacks merit. Appellant contends that a 

court-martial cannot use “a single factual basis . . . to satisfy 

two elements” of Article 117a(a), UCMJ. Accordingly, Appellant argues, the court-martial could not consider the effects of 

the video on SPC V.G. for elements in Article 117a(a)(3), 

UCMJ, and also Article 117a(a)(4), UCMJ. We reject this contention. Evidence sometimes may satisfy two elements of an 

offense. See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 

355 (2005) (holding that evidence of “[p]etitioners’ smuggling 

operation” satisfied two elements of the federal wire fraud 

statute).

The second and third arguments are not properly before 

this Court. Appellant contends that Article 117a(a), UCMJ, 

has “[c]onstitutional implications” that this Court must consider. Citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 

(2008), and other decisions, he questions whether Article 

117a(a), UCMJ, gives persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited. Appellant also contended at oral 

argument that there were some unresolved inconsistencies

between what Appellant stated in the stipulation of fact and 

what the videos actually showed when they were introduced

later at sentencing. We decline to reach these arguments because they are not within the scope of the granted issue and 

were not briefed by both parties. See United States v. 

Guardado, 77 M.J. 90, 95 n.1 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (declining to address an issue outside the scope of the granted issue).

IV. Conclusion

The judgment of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.