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IMG-025 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 11-3253

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LUIZ C. RIBEIRO; TALLES G. RIBEIRO; 

NATASHA RIBEIRO; LUIS C. RIBEIRO, JR.,

Petitioners

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

 Respondent 

____________________________________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency Nos. A096-644-255, A096-644-256, A096-644-257 and A096-656-701)

Immigration Judge: Honorable Margaret Reichenberg

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 2, 2012

Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN AND STAPLETON, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 3, 2012)

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OPINION

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PER CURIAM

Petitioners seek review of the final order of removal of the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ (“BIA” or “Board”). For the following reasons, we will deny the petition for 

review.
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I.

Petitioners Luis Ribeiro and his children, Talles Ribeiro, Natasha Ribeiro, and 

Luis Ribeiro, Jr., are natives and citizens of Brazil. They entered the United States in 

2000 as visitors and overstayed their visas. In 2007, the Government instituted removal 

proceedings pursuant to INA § 237(a)(1)B). After conceding removability, Luis Ribeiro 

applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against 

Torture (“CAT”) on behalf of himself and his children.1 Ribeiro claimed that he 

experienced past persecution and fears future persecution by drug traffickers on account 

of his political opinion. Specifically, he claimed that he was targeted for his “civil 

obedience” because he opposes illegal drug trafficking in Brazil.

Ribeiro, a dentist, testified that in 1996 he asked a co-worker to assist him in 

finding a used diesel engine for his truck. His co-worker introduced him to two men who 

offered to sell Ribeiro an engine from a nearly-new truck at a reduced price. Fearing that 

the truck was stolen, Ribeiro refused to purchase the engine. When the men tried to force 

him to buy the engine, Ribiero claimed that he left the parking lot to alert security, at 

which point the men fled. Several days later, Ribeiro alleged that unidentified 

individuals shot at him while he was driving. He believes that they are affiliated with the 

men who tried to sell him the used diesel engine. 

Ribeiro also testified that he moved to another town, where he lived undisturbed 

from the beginning of 1997 until the end of 1999. At the end of 1999 he began receiving 

 

1

For simplicity, we will refer only to Luis Ribeiro (“Ribeiro”) as he is the lead petitioner 

and Ribeiro’s children have not raised any claims in their opening brief independent of 

Ribeiro’s claims.
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anonymous telephone calls from individuals who said that they had found him. In 

December 1999, Ribeiro’s former co-worker and another person came to Ribeiro’s new 

place of business and told him that he still owed them money from the previous failed 

transaction. In lieu of payment, the men proposed that Ribeiro drive a car for them to 

Bolivia, leave it for a few days, and then drive it back to Brazil. Ribeiro agreed to the 

proposal, but did not intend to carry out the plan, fearing that it was essentially a drugrunning operation. Instead, Ribeiro procured a visitor visa and came to the United States. 

His wife and three children came to the United States shortly thereafter. Ribeiro testified 

that he fears that if he returns to Brazil, the same individuals will find him and harm him 

and his children.

The IJ concluded that Ribeiro’s asylum claim was time-barred and denied his

withholding of removal claim based upon her finding that Ribeiro had not been targeted 

in Brazil on account of his political opinion, but rather because drug traffickers wished to 

obtain money from him. The IJ further determined that neither Ribeiro nor his children 

had shown that it was more likely than not that they would experience future persecution 

on account of Ribeiro’s political opinion or another protected ground. Lastly, the IJ 

concluded that Ribeiro was unable to demonstrate that he or his children would likely be 

tortured by, or with the acquiescence of, the Brazilian government. On appeal, the BIA

agreed with the IJ’s conclusions and dismissed the appeal. Ribeiro timely petitioned for 

review of the Board’s decision.

II.

This Court has authority to review final orders of removal. See 8 U.S.C. '
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1252(a). “[W]hen the BIA both adopts the findings of the IJ and discusses some of the 

bases for the IJ’s decision, we have authority to review the decisions of both the IJ and 

the BIA.” Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). We review an agency’s

factual determinations for substantial evidence, and will uphold such determinations 

“unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Zhang v. 

Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

An alien seeking withholding of removal must demonstrate a clear probability that 

if he returns to the country to which his removal is proposed, i.e., the country of removal, 

he will be persecuted, meaning that it is more likely than not that his life or freedom 

would be threatened and that the threat would be attributable to his race, religion, 

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See 8 U.S.C. § 

1231(b)(3)(A); Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2003). If an alien can 

establish that he suffered past persecution in the country of removal, there is a rebuttable 

presumption that he will be subjected to future persecution if removed to that country. 

See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). But even if an alien has not suffered past persecution in the 

country of removal, provided the alien can establish through other evidence that there is a 

likelihood that he will be subject to future persecution in the country of removal, he will 

be eligible for withholding of removal relief. Id.

To obtain relief under the CAT, an alien must establish that it is more likely than 

not that he will be tortured in the country of removal by or at the instigation of, or with 

the consent or acquiescence of, a public official. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.18(a)(1); Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 64-65 (3d Cir. 2007).
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On appeal, Ribeiro argues that the agency: 1) improperly determined that he failed 

to qualify for withholding of removal based on his political opinion, namely his “civil 

obedience” against illegal drug trafficking; 2) improperly determined that he failed to 

satisfy the statutory criteria for protection under the CAT; and 3) violated his due process 

rights by failing to sufficiently consider the report submitted by his expert.2 (See

Petitioner’s Brief (“Pet. Br.”) at 14, 19, 27.) 

With regard to Ribeiro’s first argument, after reviewing the administrative record, 

we conclude that the BIA did not err in upholding the IJ’s denial of Ribeiro’s request for

withholding of removal. There is no indication that the alleged criminals who targeted 

him did so because he opposes illegal drug trafficking in Brazil, a feature distinguishing

this case from Espinosa-Cortez, in which we found the petitioner’s “close, direct

affiliation with, and support of, the Colombian government and military” to be persuasive 

circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of imputed political opinion. EspinosaCortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 110-11 (3d Cir. 2010). Rather, as the BIA discussed, 

the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that Ribeiro was repeatedly targeted because he 

refused to enter into financial dealings with alleged criminals.

We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision to deny 

Ribeiro’s application for CAT relief. In his opening brief, Ribeiro does not point to any 

 

2 Ribeiro does not dispute the agency’s conclusion that his asylum application was 

untimely filed and, in any event, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review that 

determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3); Tarrawally, 338 F.3d at 185.
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record evidence that would compel the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the 

people who threatened him in the 1990s would torture him or his children upon their 

return to Brazil with the consent or acquiescence of public officials. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.18(a)(1).

Finally, Ribeiro argues that the IJ violated his due process rights by failing to 

adequately consider the report of his expert, Professor Robert Gay, before rendering a 

decision. We note however, that the IJ stated in her decision that she carefully reviewed 

the evidence of record before issuing a decision. (See Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at

69.) Indeed, she referenced the expert report specifically. (Id.) The BIA, in its opinion 

dismissing Ribeiro’s administrative appeal, noted that Professor Gay’s report “does not 

address the issue on which Ribeiro’s claim turns, i.e. whether [his] life will be in danger 

on account of a protected ground under the Act.” (Id. at 5.) 

We have previously determined that the BIA need not “write an exegesis on every 

contention, but only . . . show that it has reviewed the record and grasped the 

[petitioner’s] claims.” Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Here, we are satisfied that the BIA fully grasped Ribeiro’s 

claims and conclude that he has not met his burden of showing that the IJ or BIA failed to 

adequately consider Professor Gay’s report. See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 550 

(3d Cir. 2001) (petitioner bears the burden of proving that the BIA failed to consider the 

record before it).

Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.