1 Filed 9/12/13 P. v. Saxon CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELL ATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. CUTRENIA SAXON, Defendant and Appellant. E054593 (Super.Ct.Nos. PEF005081, RIF137090) OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Ri verside County. Jeffre y Prevost, Judge. Affirmed. Daniel G. Koryn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, A ssistant Attorney General, Pe ter Quon, Jr., and Anthony Da Silva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 In 2006 and 2007, defendant Cutrenia Sa xon convinced five people to disclose their Social Security numbers and other pertinent personal in formation to her by posing as a loan broker who could help them refi nance their homes or buy new homes. After these transactions fell through or the poten tial buyers backed out of the transactions, defendant continued w ith the loan process by submittin g false loan applications and obtained the loans. Forged deeds of trust on the properties were filed as collateral for the loans. Defendant set up a corporation that she used to wire m oney from the loans. During the time she obtained these proceeds, sh e did not file tax returns reporting this income. Defendant was found guilty of numerous counts of ident ity theft, grand theft by false pretenses against several lending ins titutions, recording fraudulent trust deeds, money laundering, and tax evasion. Defendant contends on appeal as follows: 1. The trial court erred in denying her motion under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ( Batson ) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 ( Wheeler ) based on the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge to excuse a female African-Am erican prospective juror and denying her mistrial motions based on the pr osecutor’s racially charged questions during voir dire in front of the entire panel.3 2. Her sentences for laundering of m oney under Penal Code section 186.10, subdivision (a) 1 should have been stayed pu rsuant to section 654. We affirm the judgment.
I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2
A. Crimes Against Celena Salazar ( Counts 1-5 ) In 2005, Celena Salazar’s mother’s hom e was facing foreclosure. Salazar’s cousin referred her to a friend, claiming he c ould help Salazar. Salazar gave the friend all of her personal information. During this proce ss, she spoke with defendant on the phone. Nonetheless, Salazar’s mother’s home went into foreclosure. Sometime in 2006, Salazar received ca lls from a bank for past due mortgage payments for a property located at 23911 Via Alisol in Murrieta (Via Alisol). Salazar never signed loan documents for the prope rty. Her signature on the documents was forged. Two trust deeds for s ecurity for the Via Alisol pr operty were filed; one for $576,800 and another for $144, 200.

1 All further statutory references ar e to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 2 We will only briefly recite the facts of this voluminous case along with the procedural background, as the facts of the case are minimally relevant to the issues raised on appeal.4 In the escrow instructi ons, DRE Home Improvement (DRE) was to be paid $83,980 from the loan, purportedly for improvem ents to the home to be completed after the purchase. DRE was wired that amount on September 21, 2006. DRE was owned by defendant. The Via Alisol prop erty was vacant after the sale. Defendant admitted us ing Salazar’s name and identif ying information but claimed that it was a legitimate transaction. Defenda nt was arrested attempting to take $43,000
out of the DRE account. For these actions, defendant was convicted of forgery (§ 470, subd. (b)) (count 1); grand theft by false pretenses for the loan (§ 487, subd. (a)) (count 2) with the enhancement that the value exceeded $150,000 (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)), i.e. a monetary enhancement; two counts of recording a fals e document for the first and second trust deeds on Via Alisol (§ 115) (counts 3 &4); and money laundering (§ 186.10, subd. (a)) for the wire transfer in the amount of $ 83,980 to DRE (count 5) with a monetary enhancement (§ 186.1 0, subd. (c)(1)(A)).
B. Crimes Against Kevin Crockett ( Counts 7-10 ) During a search of defendant’s vehicle on June 2, 2007, offi cers found documents regarding a $100,000 line of credit from Na tional City Bank in Kevin Crockett’s name, which was secured by a property located at 18713 Glass Mountain Street in Riverside (Glass Mountain). Defendant had a checkbook and credit cards in her purse for the line of credit.5 On May 18, 2007, a $75,000 payout to DRE was made on this line of credit. Crockett did not write the check . Information on the docume nts to obtain the loan was false. Defendant was Crockett’s cousin-in-law. Crockett had sought de fendant’s help to buy a property and had gi ven her all of his information. The sale never occurred, and he never gave permission for her to obtain a line of credit. He checked his credit when he found out defendant was arrested and di scovered the unauthorized loans. Defendant was convicted of identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a)) (count 7); forgery (§ 470, subd. (b)) (count 8); grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)) for the money taken from National City (count 9) with monetary e nhancement (§12022.6, subdivision (a)(1)); and money laundering (§ 186.10, subd. (a)) (c ount 10) for the $75,000 check to DRE.
C. Crimes Against Candice Grizzell ( Counts 11-17 ) In the latter part of 2006, defendant offered to help Candice Grizzell and her husband (who was defendant’s cousin) obtain a loan to purchase a residence in Moreno Valley. The transaction was cancelled, but Grizzell had given all of her personal information to defendant. In 2007, Grizzell received notice from a bank for n onpayment of a loan for property located on Cape Cod Court in Yuca ipa. Loan documents found in a storage facility belonging to defendant contained corr ect personal information for Grizzell, but she had not signed them, and the monthly in come and employer were incorrect. There were two trust deeds filed on December 13, 2 006, to secure the loan in the amounts of6 $328,000 and $82,000. Th e escrow for the property sh owed that $70,228.77 was transferred to DRE on December 18, 2006. Defendant was convicted of forgery (§ 470, subd. (b)) (count 11); grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)) for the $328 ,000 trust deed (count 12) with a monetary enhancement (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(2)); two counts of recording a false document (§ 115) for the two trust deeds (counts 13 & 15); grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)) for the $82,000 trust deed (count 14) with a monetary enhancement (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(1)); money laundering (§ 186.10, subd. (a)) for the wire transfer of $70,228.77 to DRE (count 16) with a monetary enhancement (§ 186. 10, subd. (c)(1)(a)); and identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a)) (count 17).
D. Crimes Against Sterling Saintilus ( Counts 18-21 ) During the search of the storage facility belonging to defenda nt, loan documents bearing Sterling Saintilus’s na me were found. They re flected a purchase of Glass Mountain. Saintilus had never purchase d the home or obtained a lo an on the property. In 2005, Saintilus had given defendant his pe rsonal information in connection with a possible home purchase. However, Saintilus m oved out of the stat e and never followed through with the purchase. Defendant went through with the purcha se. She moved into the property. There was a trust deed filed in the amount of $796,000. All of the
information on the loan doc uments was false.7 For these actions, defendant was convicted of forgery (§470, subd. (b)) (count 18); grand theft by false pretenses (§ 487, subd. (a )) for the loan (count 19) with a monetary enhancement (§ 12022.6, subd. (a )); recording a false document (§ 115) for the trust deed on Glass Mountain (count 20); and identit y theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a)) (count 21).
E. Crimes against Monique Vargas ( Counts 22-23, 25-27 ) In December 2006, Monique Va rgas received a notice that she was in default on a loan she never obtained. During the search of the storage facility belongin g to defendant, loan documents in Vargas’s name were found for two resi dences: 45377 Saint Tisbury Street in Temecula (St. Tisbury) and 26492 Aloe Way in Mu rrieta (Aloe Way). Photocopies of Vargas’s driver’s license a nd Social Security card were in the storage facility. In 2007, Vargas was shown the loan documents and deni ed signing any of them. The information on the loan documents was false. There were two deeds of trust on Aloe Way. There was $600,000 for a first trust deed and $150,000 for the second, for a tota l of $750,000. There was a $632,000 deed of trust for St. Tisbury and another for $158,0 00. On July 21, 2 006, there was a wire transfer to DRE in the amount of $54,534.88 from the Aloe Way loan. On June 16, 2006, there was a wire transfer from the St. Tisbur y loan to DRE in the amount of $59,278. Defendant was convicted of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)) for the St. Tisbury loan (count 22) with a monetary enhancement (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(2)); money laundering (§ 186.10, subd. (a)) for the wi re transfer of $59,278 to DRE (count 23) with a monetary8 enhancement (§ 186.10, subd. (c)(1)(a)); grand theft (§ 487, subdivision (a)) for the Aloe Way loan (count 25) with a monetary enha ncement (§ 12022.6, s ubd. (a)); recording a false document (§115) (count 26); and money la undering (§186.10, subd. (a)) for the wire transfer of $54, 534.88 to DRE (count 27) with a monetary enhancement (§ 186.10, subd. (c)(1)(a).
F. Remaining Convictions ( Counts 29 & 30 ) and Sentence Defendant did not personally file state income taxes or on behalf of DRE in 2006 or 2007 despite an income of over $700,000. Defendant was the owner of DRE. She was convicted of two counts of failing to file a tax return w ithin the meaning of section 19706 (counts 29 & 30 ). Defendant was also foun d guilty of an enhancement pursuant to section 186.11, subdivision (a )(2) that she had committed two or more felonies involving embezzlemen t exceeding $500,000 . She admitted that she had served three prior prison terms with in the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant was found not guilty of one count of forgery and one count of identity theft in regard to Vargas (counts 24 & 28), a nd the jury was hung on count 6, a count involving Salazar, which was dismissed in th e interest of justice under section 1385. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for a total term of 26 years 8 months. All of the money laundering sentences were imposed.9 II
BATSON/WHEELER VIOLATION Defendant contends th e prosecutor violated Batson/Wheeler by peremptorily challenging and removing one prospective female African-American juror, Prospective Juror Thompson, from th e jury panel. Defendant additionally stated in the heading of her argument that the denial of the mistrial motion, as will be discussed in more detail, post , was error. However, defendant provides no legal authority or argument as to why the trial court sh ould have granted a mistrial based on what she calls the prosecuto r’s “racially-charged” questions to the jury during voir dire. Although th e People provided case law a nd statutory authority -- Code of Civil Procedure section 223 -- regarding voir dire in their responding brief, in her reply brief, again defendant provides only argumen t as to why the prosecutor’s removal of Prospective Juror Thompson constituted Batson/Wheeler error. As such, we find she has forfeited her claim on appeal that the trial c ourt’s denial of a mistrial was error. ( Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862 [“‘[w]hen a[] [defendant] fails to raise a point, or assert s it but fails to sup port it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived’”].) We address only whether the removal by the prosecutor of Prospective Juror Th ompson constituted a Batson/Wheeler violation and refer to voir dire by th e prosecutor as it was relevant to her removal.10 “[O]ne accused of a crime ha s a constitutional right to a trial by impartial jurors. [Citations.]” ( In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 110.) “Both the California and United States Constitutions are violated by the exerci se of peremptory cha llenges based on group bias, instead of reasons specific to the ch allenged prospective ju ror. [Citation.]” ( People
v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 74.) “The procedure governing ob jections on this ground is settled: ‘First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by “showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discrimina tory purpose.” [Citations .] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, th e “burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.]’” ( People v. Lancaster , supra , 41 Cal.4th at p. 74.) “A prosecutor asked to explain his cond uct must provide a ‘“clear and reasonably specific” explanation of his “legitimate r easons” for exercising the challenges.’ [Citation.] ‘The justification ne ed not support a challenge for cause , and even a “trivial” reason, if genuine and neutral, will suffice .’ [Citation.] A pros pective juror may be excused based upon facial expressions, gest ures, hunches, and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons. [Citations.] Neverthele ss, although a prosecutor may rely on any number of bases to select jurors, a legitim ate reason is one that does not deny equal protection.” ( People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 613 ( Lenix ).) The trial court must then make a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the explanation for each challenged juror in light of the circumstances of th e case, trial techniques, examination of11 prospective jurors, and exercise of peremptory challenges. ( People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 718.) “Review of a trial court’s denial of a Wheeler/Batson motion is deferential, examining only whether substantial evidence su pports its conclusions. [Citation.] ‘We review a trial court’s determination rega rding the sufficiency of a prosecutor’s justifications for exercising pe remptory challenges “‘with grea t restraint.’” [Citation.] We presume that a prosecutor uses perempto ry challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justificati ons offered, its conc lusions are entitled to deference on appeal. [Cita tion.]’ [Citation.]” ( Lenix, supra, at pp. 613-614, fn. omitted.) Here, defendant disputes the prosecutor’s removal of Prospective Juror Thompson. Prospective Juror Thompson stat ed that she lived in More no Valley. She was married and employed by Los Angeles County as an “Acc ounting 2.” She had four children. One of her children lived with her, one worked at Target, another work ed for the City of Riverside, and the fourth work ed for the City of Highland as a bus driver. She had previously been on a ci vil jury where the case had settled pr ior to the verdic t. No one in her family was in law enforcement, and she c ould be fair. Nothing about the civil case settling caused her to be less fair or impartia l. Prospective Juror Thompson explained she worked in internal services responsible for maintena nce for Los Angeles County.12 Prospective Juror Thompson was asked by the prosecutor about her experience with loan brokers and real estate agents in buying a house and if she found they were a “bit less than truthful.” She responded, “No. When we bought ours in ’89, everything was good. The economy was good. We were still there. It increased $30,000. But at the time they looked truthful to me. I had no problems.” The prosecutor advised the jurors that it was going to ask questions in order to determine possible bias on the part of the juro rs. The prosecutor noted that the jurors may not like some of the victims in the case a nd asked the jurors as a whole if they could set aside that bias. The prosp ective jurors must have respond ed in the affirmative. The prosecutor relayed that in some instances when prosecuting gang members the victim may become the defendant in th e next case. The prosecutor asked if anyone felt that a gang member could not be a victim. The prosecutor then asked Prospective Juror Thompson this question direc tly, and she responded that a gang member was a human being and “has every right to be the victim.” She also stated th at someone should be punished for harming another. The prosecutor then in formed the jurors that he had reached the “most uncomfortable part of my jury voir dire.” The prosecutor told a story about he and his father, who he described “looks very, very Mexican” and a border patrol agent singling his father out at an airport in El Paso, Texa s. The prosecutor then asked “Now, is there anybody here that has heard fro m relatives or friend of frie nds or a friend that a police officer unfairly targeted them?” Apparently no one responded, and the prosecutor stated,13 “You’re an unusual group.” Two jurors then stated that they had family members who had been targeted by police. The prosecutor then stated, “Okay. We have before us a very attractive Black woman that we’re prosecuting, and that of cour se raises the specter for us whether or not we have unfairly targeted a Black woman. It’s a question that we have to ask. It’s not a politically correct question. I understand th at. But we need to know whether or not there’s anybody here that might feel that Blac k people -- and if they are Hispanic, I’d be asking about Hispanics -- but are Bl ack people unfairly targeted.” Prospective Juror Thompson responded, “I agree. I have a six-four Black male, and, yes, [he] has been stopped going to and fr om school.” The prosecutor asked if this was her son. She responded, “Yes. And I te ll him, ‘If you’re not guilty, sit on the curb. If they stop you, be truthful.’ So far, they just stopped him because they said somebody was down the street robbing the car. Found out it wasn’t him on the way home. That happens. That’s life.” Other A frican-American juro rs responded. The prosecutor then stated, “Okay. Now, you know, before I started this, I actually started to ask the question in a very general sense whether or not anybody has ever felt that a friend or relativ e or somebody like that has b een unfairly ta rgeted, and no one raised their hand. But if I directly aske d you now, all of you ha ve told me that, and I’ve picked the Black people in this room. That’s obvious.” He asked the jurors why they held back. Several Afri can-American jurors responded.14 Prospective Juror Thompson stated that she did not think the prosecutor was Hispanic until he mentioned his father and further stated, “So na turally everybody is biased about something, and you have to look at a person as being human, first of all. Not race, just a human.” The prosecutor then asked, “Okay. Now I asked the rest. I think the air is quite clear enough now so I can ask the question ge nerally. Is there anyone here that feels Black people are unfairly targeted and that mi ght affect your ability to be fair in this trial?” Several jurors responded that they could be fair. The prosecutor told the jurors a story ab out a case involving an African-American defendant and an African-Ameri can juror in a case where th e defendant confessed. The African-American juror said in deliberations, “‘You know what, I canno t vote guilty against a Black person.’” The prosecutor then told the jurors, “And that’s why I question Black people specifically about that issu e, because you have before you a Black defendant. Is there anybody here that has that feeling? And I recognize that if you really do think that way, you may not tell me, but I’m asking for your honest opinion. [¶] Is there anybody that feels Black pe ople are so unfairly targeted that they just can’t -- they don’t feel right? Because what’s happening is it’s almost a family situation. And I don’t think it’s wrong to feel that way. It would be wrong for someone to ask me to vote guilty against my mother, against my father, against my cousin. You know, you may have that feeling internally that says, ‘You know what, I can’t do it. I think we’ve been so badly treated historically that I just can’t do it.’”15 The prosecutor then directly asked two other African-American jurors and Prospective Juror Thompson, wh o responded they could do it. One other juror responded she could not convict an African-American person. A sidebar conference was called. Defens e counsel asked for a mistrial, arguing it was one of the most “absurd voir dire pro cesses in the 33 years I’ve been practicing I’ve ever witnessed. He focused on five or six Black people exclusively. He browbeat [a juror] into saying she couldn’t be fair.” Defense counsel complained that the prosecutor focused on just the A frican-American jurors. He argue d the prosecutor poisoned the entire jury panel, focused on the African-Amer ican jurors, and put them on the spot by saying they were all part of the same family and that to find not guilty would be doing that because they were Afri can-American. He asked for a new panel, stating that although the prosecutor could inquire of the ne w panel about bias and prejudice, he could not focus on African-A merican jurors. The prosecutor stated, “This is not racism. Th is is simply trying to get at the heart. And I also have to say, I’d like this to be on the record, I have spoken to several defense attorneys in this county and they have told me they have received -- one told me as much as 13 mistrials in Riverside County, and th eir whole intention is to have one Black juror . . . .” Defense counsel again interrupted and said this was racist. The prosecutor reiterated that is was well known that defe nse counsel in the county were seeking mistrials by keeping African-American jurors on the panel. The prosecutor argued it was fair to ferret out the issue and determine if the African-American juro rs could be fair.16 The trial court expressed concern that the prosecutor had only questioned the African-American jurors and ne ver expanded the concern to the entire panel. The trial court was concerned that, “by focusing al most exclusively on African-American members of the panel . . . you have tended to cause them to them to go somewhat the other way by assuring you that they will be able to vote guilty.” Defense counsel argued that, “These African-Americans, if they remain on the panel, have pledged to him they’re going to be fair because they’re Black. That’s ridiculous.” The prosecutor concluded, “ . . . I’m not going to peremptorily challenge them. I don’t think I have grounds. And if I got rid of all of these, it would be an easy case for Wheeler , but that’s just not here.” The trial court stated, “My feeling tends to be that counsel should be afforded a fairly wide latitude in pursuing a line of qu estioning that appears to possibly bear fruit with respect to discovery of a challenge for cause, even though it may be -- I don’t want to use the word inflammatory -- may be something that is of great controversy or engender strong feelings, so lo ng as it does not tend to cause other jurors, sitting jurors, to prejudge or commit themselves to a certai n position.” Defense counsel continued to argue that the prosecutor had crossed th e line by only interrogating African-American jurors. The trial court ruled, “My preference woul d have been for the questions to have been directed more generally to the entire panel or to other persons who might harbor similar feelings, even though they may not be members of the African-American race.17 However, I don’t believe that [the prosecutor ]’s questioning was inte nded to taint either the panel or the African-American members of the prospective panel to vote in a particular way. I tend to agree with [defen se counsel] that the questioning was about as penetrating as I’ve ever heard, but I don’ t think it crossed the line.” The motion for mistrial was denied. The prosecutor peremptorily challenged three jurors, and defense counsel removed three jurors. The prosecutor accepted the pa nel as it was constitu ted, which included Prospective Juror Thompson. Five more jurors were excused, one by the prosecutor and four by the defense. The People accepted th e panel after each excusal by the defense. Twelve more jurors were cal led who had been in the audi ence and had heard the prior voir dire. Defense counsel was asking general questio ns about jurors being fair and agreeing with the criminal justic e system. Juror Herna ndez proffered, “ . . . I have tell you that I went to a seminar on paralegal training at UC Irvine to decide whet her I wanted to go further with it, and after I heard the attorney s talk, I realized I c ouldn’t work for the defense . . . a defense lawyer. I could work for the prosecutor.” Defense counsel asked her why. She responded, “A strong sense of right and wrong. I d on’t know how else to describe it. Just a clear black and white se nse of right and wrong when it comes to the law.” She also stated, “[T]he idea of defe nding people who are guilty, in my conscience, I could not do it.” She denied she had prej udged the case but was stating her “inner conscience . . . .”18 Five of the new jurors were excused for cause or due to hardship. At this point, the first peremptory challenge by the pros ecutor was to Prospec tive Juror Thompson. Defense counsel immediately made a Wheeler motion. Defense counsel argued that in the morning session that the prosecutor admitted that if he removed any of the 12 jurors in the box, which included Prospec tive Juror Thompson, it would be a Wheeler violation. Defense counsel stated, “So I’m not quite certain what my remedy is other than raising again the motion for mistrial, which I’ll do, b ecause now he has effectively gotten away with tainting the pa nel and then exercised a peremp tory after conceding to so with [ sic ] a Wheeler violation. That’s just absurd.” The trial court found a prima facie case had been shown and said to the prosecutor, “Go ahead.” The prosecutor responded, “All right. The reason . . . and I agree, I did say . . . I do not agree, I should say, with defense counsel again that I have infected the jury. I think what I did was absolutely appropriate, which is to try and fe rret out any type of bias. [¶] Now, I said before the lunch hou r, I don’t have a problem with the ones that are there, and [Thompson] was included, I had no intention of peremptorily challenging her. After the lunch hour, when I came back, during the breaks and throughout the proceedings, she was refusing to look at me at all. [¶] When [Hernand ez] made the statement that she doesn’t like defense counsel, she looked away in disdain. She put her head down and looked right aw ay. And I was right there next to her, and that’s what I saw. And we’re not given a lot of information. We have to believe what they say, but you have to take those kind of cues. So that’s the reason that I did it.”19 The trial court understood the position of the prosecutor to be that as of the morning session, he was satisfied with Prospe ctive Juror Thompson. The trial court then stated, “You have since, based upon observa tions, discerned that she appears to be demonstrating an aversion to the prosecution or towards the process? I’m not quite sure.” The prosecutor explained that Hernandez showed disdain for the defense, and Thompson looked away in “disdain.” Defense counsel did not see any disdai n by Thompson. Defe nse counsel argued that if she did look away in disdain, it was because of the way the prosecutor had conducted voir dire during the morning session. He argued , “He has made this whole think toxic by the way he con fronted those African-American s and put them on the spot to make them feel as if they wouldn’t be fair simply because of their race or color, and that’s exactly what -- if she did have disdain, I didn’t see it. And if she did, I can see why it was there.” The trial court ruled, “All right. I’ll deny the Wheeler/Batson motion at this time. I’ll find that [the prosecutor]’s statements, although I did not observe that myself, are credible and that the prosecu tor may rely upon his observa tion of body language and demonstrated antipathy, If you interpret it as such, towards other jurors or their attitudes as a ground for exercise of a peremptory cha llenge. [¶] I don’t believe that I’m going to be required to engage in a comp arative analysis at this time , but if the motion is renewed at any point, I probably will have to.”20 The following day, the prosecutor stated to the trial court, “Based on the charges of racism yesterday, I really think it’s important that it be on the record that there, first of all, w[ere] six black jurors, I believe, that were left on the pa nel and one black alternate.” The trial court confirmed that there were at least five or six African-Americans on the panel, and one alternate. We find the trial court could find the r easons given by the prosecutor were credible and race neutral. “At the third stage of the Wheeler/Batson inquiry, ‘the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds th e prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible. Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbab le, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accept ed trial strategy.’ [Citation.] In assessing credibility, the court draws upon its contempora neous observations of the voir dire. It may also rely on the court’s own experien ces as a lawyer and bench officer in the community, and even th e common practices of the advoca te and the office that employs him or her.” ( Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613, fn. omitted.) Here, the record establishes that someth ing had changed with Prospective Juror Thompson. It is clear from the record that Prospective Juror Thompson was initially actively engaged in the voir di re process. The prosecutor had accepted the panel as constituted, which included Pr ospective Juror Thompson. However, after voir dire of new members, the prosecutor pe remptorily challenged Prospe ctive Juror Thompson. The prosecutor explained that Prospective Juror Thompson’s demeanor had changed. She21 would not longer look at him and also look ed away in disdain. These were proper reasons that the trial court could rely upon to support the removal. Such explanations were credible given that the prosecutor ha d initially accepted the panel that included Prospective Juror Thompson. Despite the fact that defense claimed not to see the change in her demeanor, the trial court could reasonably re ly on the prosecutor’s own observations. The trial court’s finding that the prosecutor’s stated reasons were sincere a nd genuine “is entitled to great deference where, as here, the reasons are ba sed on the prospective juror’s appearance and demeanor. [Citation.]” ( People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 202.) Moreover, “[a]lthough circumstances may be imagined in which a prima facie case could be shown on the basis of a single ex cusal, in the ordinary case, including this one, to make a prima facie cas e after the excusal of only one or two members of a group is very difficult. [Citation.]” ( People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 598, fn. 3.) Although the trial court found a prima facie case, since only one African-American juror was peremptorily challenged by the prosecuto r, defendant’s claim that the prosecutor was motivated by race to excuse Prospec tive Juror Thompson is untenable. Additionally, at the time that the prosec utor exercised this single peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror Thompson, at least six African-American jurors remained on the panel. “While the fact that the jury included members of a group allegedly discriminated against is not conclusive, it is an indication of good faith in exercising peremptories, and an appropriate factor for the tria l judge to consider in ruling22 on a Wheeler objection.” ( People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 168, abrogated on other grounds in People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 555, fn. 5.) Although this is not conclusive, it is an indi cation that the prosecutor acted in good faith. Finally, we see nothing from the record that supports that Prospective Juror Thompson was influenced by th e prosecutor’s voir dire que stions. During questioning, Prospective Juror Thompson was actively engage d. Only after a break and the comments by another juror did she shun the prosecutor. We note that defendant has not asked this court, and he did not ask the trial court, to engage in comparative ju ror analysis. “Despite problems inherent in conducting comparative juror analysis fo r the first time on appeal — including the difficulties of comparing what might be superficial similari ties among prospective jurors and trying to determine why the prosecutor challenged one prospective ju ror and not another when no explanation was asked for or provided at trial — both the high court and this court have done so on request. [Citations.]” ( People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 364.) Moreover, “‘evidence of comparative analysis must be c onsidered in the trial court and even for the first time on appeal if relied upon by defendant and the record is adequate to permit the urged comparisons.” ( Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 622.) Since defendant has not made such a request, and did not adequate ly develop the record below, we decline to engage in such analysis on th e cold appellate record.23 After the briefing was complete in this case, the California Supreme Court issued several opinions addressing Batson/Wheeler claims. ( People v. Harris (Aug. 26, 2013, No. S081700) ____Cal.4th ______ [2013 D.A.R 11317]; People v. Jones (Aug. 26, 2013, No. S042346) ____Cal.4th __ ____ [2013 D.A.R. 11413]; People v. Mai (Aug. 26, 2013, No. S089478) ____ Cal.4th _____ [2013 D.A.R. 11356].) In the c oncurring opinion in
Harris , Justice Liu expressed his concern that the court (in the majority opinion in Harris and in prior cases) was elevating the standard for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination beyond that requi red by the United States Supr eme Court, that the court had found discrimination in on ly one of the more than 10 0 cases that had adjudicated
Batson claims over the prior two decades, and en couraged comparative juror analysis be conducted in all cases. ( People v. Harris, supra , _____ Cal.4th _____ [2013 D.A.R. 11317, 11340, 11345, 11352] (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) Ju stice Liu again expressed his concern in concurring opinions in both Mai and Jones. ( People v. Mai, supra,

____ Cal.4th _____ [2013 D.A.R. 11356, 11383 , 11388] (conc. opn. of Liu, J.)); People v. Jones, supra, ____ Cal.4th ______ [2013 D.A.R. 114 13, 11444-11446] (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) However, the majority opinions in th ese cases continued to employ the standard for evaluating Batson/Wheeler claims as set fort h in this opinion, ante . ( See People v. Mai, supra, _____ Cal.4th _____ [2013 D.A.R. 11 356, 11379].) These recent opinions have no impact on the result here. We conc lude that the trial court did not error by finding that the race-neutral reasons given by the prosecutor were adequate and find no Wheeler/Batson had occurred.24 III SECTION 654 AND MONEY LAUNDERING Defendant contends that her convicti ons for money laundering in counts 5 (Salazar), 10 (Crockett), 16 (Grizzell), and 23 and 27 (Vargas) should have been stayed pursuant to section 654. She argues that she had a single objective of stealing the victims’ money. The money laundering occurred simultaneo us with the unlawful receipt of money. These co nvictions, as outlined, ante , were based on the wire transfers out of escrow to DRE. As such, wh en the deeds of trust were filed, the money was transferred
to DRE. At sentencing, the People argued that the money laundering convictions should run consecutively, as they we re “separate and apart” from the other parts of defendant’s scheme. Defendant’s counsel argued that the money laundering was all part of one transaction to obtain fraudulent loans and have the money wired to defendant. The People then argued that section 186.10 expressl y stated that section 65 4 should not apply. The prosecutor referred to the fact that se ction 115 contained language that it was not subject to the bar in section 654, and secti on 186.10, subdivision (b ) contained the same language. The trial court ruled, “Subdivision (b ) sets forth the penalty in language that is similar to that in 115. I’ll find that money laundering in violation of Penal Code section 186.10, specifically subdivision (b), is not subj ect to the provisions of Penal Code section 654.” Inexplicably, on appeal, neither party discusses subdivision (b) of section 186.10.25 We conclude the trial court properly determ ined that the plain language of section 186.10, subdivision (b) excludes its provisions from being subject to section 654. Section 654, subdivision (a), enacted in 18 72, “bars multiple punishment not only for a single criminal act but for a single indivisible course of conduct in which the defendant had only one criminal intent or objective.” ( People v. Moseley (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1598, 1603.) “ . . . ‘If all of the crimes were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, a defendant may be punished only once. [Citation] If, however, a defe ndant had several independent criminal objectives, he may be punished for each crime committed in pursuit of each objective, even though the crimes shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Conners (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 443, 458.) Section 186.10, subdivision (a ) provides in pertinent part as follows: “Any person who conducts or attempts to conduct a transaction or more than one transaction within a seven-day period involving a monetary inst rument or instruments of a total value exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000) . . . through one or more financial institutions (1) with the specific intent to promote, mana ge, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or ca rrying on of any criminal activity, or (2) knowing that the monetary instru ment represents the proceeds of, or is derived directly or indirectly from the proceeds of, criminal ac tivity, is guilty of the crime of money laundering.” A transaction includes a depo sit into or withdrawal from a financial institution. (§ 186.9, subd. (c).)26 “[A] Penal Code section 186.10, su bdivision (a) pros ecution based on a defendant’s conducting a transaction throu gh a financial institution with a monetary instrument of $5,000 or mo re based on the knowledge of criminal proceeds theory, requires proof that (1) the defendant’s entire business was illegal, (2 ) there were deposits of $5,000 or more in crimina lly derived funds, or (3) there was a transfer of all funds out of the account.” ( People v. Mays (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 13, 32.) Section 186.10, subdivision (b) provides, “ Notwithstanding any other law , for purposes of this section, each individual tran saction conducted in excess of five thousand dollars ($5,000), each series of transactions conducted with in a seven-day period that total in excess of five thousand dollars ($5,00 0), or each series of transactions conducted within a 30-day period that total in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), shall constitute a separat e, punishable offense .” (Italics added.)
In People v. Gangemi (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1790, the court, in addressing the application of section 6 54 to violations of section 115, not ed that a different rule applies to offering false instruments for filing or recording. ( Gangemi , at p. 1800.) It recognized that the language of section 115, subdivisio n (d) provides that “‘[f]or purposes of prosecution under this section, each act of pr ocurement or of offeri ng a false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded shall be considered a separately punishable offense.’” ( Gangemi , at p. 1800.) It noted, “This language demonstrates an express legislative intent to exclude section 115 fro m the penalty limitations of section 654. Thus, the Legislature has unmistakably author ized the imposition of separate penalties for27 each prohibited act even though they may be part of a contin uous course of conduct and have the same objective. [Citation.] . . . [E ]ach false filing is separately punishable.” ( Ibid .) Section 186.10, subdivision (b) contains even stronger language that it is not subject to section 654. “It is assumed that the Legislature has in mind existing laws when it passes a statute. [Citations.]” ( Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 837.) Here, in enacting section 186.10, it is presumed that th e Legislature was familiar with section 654. The California Supreme Court has recognized that the Legislature has the power to override section 654 in specific circumstances and that it need not ne cessarily cite section 654 specifically. (See People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 32-33.) Based on the plain language of section 186.10, subdivision (b), defendant’s convictions pursuant to section 186.10, subdivision (a) were not subject to the prohibition of multiple punishment under section 654. Defendant relies exclusively on the holding of Conners as support for her position that all of the money laundering convic tions should have be en stayed. In Conners , the defendant was charged with money laundering and receiving stolen property for cashing five checks that were written to him from a fund that was illegally obtained through a fraudulent sale of property. ( People v. Conners , supra , 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 450.) The issue in that case was whether the defendant could be separa tely punished for receiving stolen property based on the same act that wa s the subject of the money laundering. The appellate court concluded there was clearly a single, indivisible course of conduct since28 the receipt of the stolen money and the cashi ng of the five checks were part of the same transaction. It noted that any sentence at his resentencing must reflect a stay of the sentence for receiving stolen property. ( Id . p. 458.) We note that the Conners did not discuss the lang uage in section 186.10, subdivision (b). However, it noted that the receiving stolen pr operty convictions must be stayed, not the money laundering convictions. As such, it is not in conflict with our decision here. Even if we were to conclude that defe ndant’s convictions fo r violating section 186.10, subdivision (a) were subject to sec tion 654, its provisions were not violated. Defendant obtained the fraudulent loans and properties in the names of Salazar, Crockett, Grizzell, and Vargas all on separate occasi ons. Moreover, defendant first obtained the deeds of trust for these proper ties. In addition to obtaini ng the deeds of trust, she siphoned off money to DRE from the loans for her personal use. It remained to be seen what she was planning to do w ith the deeds of trust and the properties that she had fraudulently obtained. She clearly had a separate objective in taking money from the loans initially and could be separately punished. Based on the foregoing, defendant was pr operly sentenced consecutively for her convictions pursuant to section 186.10, subdivision (a).29 IV DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS.

RICHLI J. We concur:

McKINSTER Acting P. J.

KING J.