7812 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 27 / Thursday, February 9, 1995 / Notices

termination or the effective date of the

amendment, provided that:

(a) No such notice need to be given if

the only material effect of an

amendment is to reduce or eliminate the

sales charge payable at the time of a

rollover; and

(b) No notice need to be given if,

under extraordinary circumstances,

either—

(i) There is a suspension of the

redemption of units of the Rollover

Trust under section 22(e) of the Act and

the rules and regulations thereunder, or

(ii) A Reinvestment Trust Series

temporarily delays or ceases the sale of

its units because it is unable to invest

amounts effectively in accordance with

applicable investment objectives,

policies and restrictions.

2. The sales charge collected at the

time of any rollover shall not exceed

2.0% of the public offering price of the

unit being acquired on each rollover.

3. The prospectus of each

Reinvestment Trust Series and any sales

literature or advertising that mentions

the existence of the Rollover Option will

disclose that the Rollover Option is

subject to modification, termination or

suspension.

For the Commission, by the Division of

Investment Management, pursuant to

delegated authority.

Margaret H. McFarland,

Deputy Secretary.

[FR Doc. 95–3283 Filed 2–8–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8010–01–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Notice of order Adjusting the Standard

Foreign Fare Level Index

[Docket 37554]

Section 41509(e) of Title 49 of the

United States Code requires that the

Department, as successor to the Civil

Aeronautics Board, establish a Standard

Foreign Fare Level (SFFL) by adjusting

the SFFL base periodically by

percentage changes in actual operating

costs per available seat-mile (ASM).

Order 80–2–69 established the first

interim SFFL, and Order 94–12–15

established the currently effective twomonth SFFL applicable through January

31, 1995.

In establishing the SFFL for the twomonth period beginning February 1,

1995, we have projected non-fuel costs

based on the year ended September 30,

1994 data, and have determined fuel

prices on the basis of the latest available

experienced monthly fuel cost levels as

reported to the Department.

By Order 95–2–9 fares may be

increased by the following adjustment

factors over the October 1979 level:

Atlantic................................................... 1.3924

Latin America ........................................ 1.4213

Pacific..................................................... 1.7999

Canada.................................................... 1.5129

For further information contact: Keith A.

Shangraw (202) 366–2439.

By the Department of Transportation:

February 3, 1995

Patrick V. Murphy,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Aviation and

International Affairs.

[FR Doc. 95–3223 Filed 2–8–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–62–P

Notice of Order Adjusting International

Cargo Rate Flexibility Level

Policy Statement PS–109,

implemented by Regulation ER–1322 of

the Civil Aeronautics Board and

adopted by the Department, established

geographic zones of cargo pricing

flexibility within which certain cargo

rate tariffs filed by carriers would be

subject to suspension only in

extraordinary circumstances.

The Standard Foreign Rate Level

(SFRL) for a particular market is the rate

in effect on April 1, 1982, adjusted for

the cost experience of the carriers in the

applicable ratemaking entity. The first

adjustment was effective April 1, 1983.

By Order 94–12–16, the Department

established the currently effective SFRL

adjustments.

In establishing the SFRL for the twomonth period beginning February 1,

1995, we have projected non-fuel costs

based on the year ended September 30,

1994 data, and have determined fuel

prices on the basis of the latest available

experienced monthly fuel cost levels as

reported to the Department.

By Order 95–2–8 cargo rates may be

adjusted by the following adjustment

factors over the April 1, 1982 level:

Atlantic...................................................1.1709

Western Hemisphere .............................1.1160

Pacific.....................................................1.3994

For further information contact: Keith A.

Shangraw (202) 366–2439.

By the Department of Transportation:

Dated: February 3, 1995.

Patrick V. Murphy,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Aviation and

International Affairs.

[FR Doc. 95–3222 Filed 2–8–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–62–P

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

Denial of Petition

This notice sets forth the reasons for

the denial of a petition submitted to the

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration (NHTSA) under 49

U.S.C. § 30162 (formerly section 124 of

the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle

Safety Act of 1966, as amended).

By letter dated July 8, 1994, Mr. Kurt

B. Chadwell petitioned NHTSA to

reopen its closed defect investigation

(Engineering Analysis, EA92–030) of

power steering fluid leakage and

resulting engine compartment fires in

1988 through 1990 Ford Taurus,

Mercury Sable, and Lincoln Continental

vehicles equipped with 3.8 liter engines.

The petition also asked the NHTSA take

all actions necessary to compel the Ford

Motor Company (Ford) to initiate a

safety recall of the 429,000 subject

vehicles to remedy the alleged defect.

By letter dated September 14, 1994, Mr.

Chadwell provided additional

information. By letter dated November

9, 1994, Mr. Chadwell requested that the

investigation be expanded to include

Taurus and Sable vehicles equipped

with 2.5 liter and 3.0 liter engines.

The following are principal elements

of the subject petition:

• The petitioner takes issue with

NHTSA’s decision to close the original

investigation in October 1993.

• The petitioner states that Ford has

followed an organizational practice of

under-reporting to NHTSA the numbers

of known failure incidents in this as

well as in other investigations.

• The petitioner provides a document

maintained by the U.S. Fire

Administration in its National Fire

Incident Reporting System (NFIRS),

which lists engine compartment fires in

Taurus, Sable, and Lincoln Continental

vehicles equipped with 2.5 liter, 3.0

liter, and 3.8 liter engines. These data

are presented as the basis for the

petitioner’s request that the

investigation be expanded to include

those vehicles with 2.5 liter and 3.0 liter

engines.

In support of his claims, the petitioner

discusses information taken from

NHTSA’s public record concerning

EA92–030, other defect investigations,

and other issues regarding compliance

with Federal motor vehicle safety

standards. In addition, he cites his

personal experience as a former

employee of Ford.

Regarding the specific petition

elements as outlined above, the first

represents a basic disagreement with

NHTSA’s conclusion in closing EA92–
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 27 / Thursday, February 9, 1995 / Notices 7813

030. The EA closing report clearly states

that ‘‘the evidence does not support a

conclusion that a safety defect exists’’

and that ‘‘it does not appear that further

investigation would result in an

enforceable defect finding.’’ NHTSA

finds no information in the subject

petition that demonstrates that these

conclusions should be withdrawn or

modified.

Petitioner’s September 14, 1994,

submission entitled ‘‘Supplemental

Information Relevant to Safety Recall

Petition’’ questions the accuracy of the

number of incidents (230) reported by

Ford to NHTSA during the pendency of

EA92–030, in part on the basis of

numbers of power steering system parts

sales reported in the EA Closing Report,

and in part on the basis of alleged

under-reporting by Ford with respect to

another ODI investigation (EA93–033).

These allegations appear to be

speculative, and seem to be based solely

on petitioner’s opinions, inferences,

beliefs, and grossly unscientific

extrapolations of data that, in and of

themselves, are questionable. In the

absence of factual and reliable

information, NHTSA views these

allegations of under-reporting by Ford to

be without substance.

The data from the NFIRS listing does

not provide compelling evidence that

NHTSA should expand its investigation

of this matter. While the incidents listed

are identified as engine compartment

fires, there is no evidence that the

leakage and ignition of power steering

fluid was in any way the cause of these

incidents. On the contrary, NHTSA

finds no apparent source of ignition of

any such fluid that may leak in those

vehicles equipped with 2.5 liter or 3.0

liter engines. Analyses of the NFIRS

data discloses that the 3.0 liter models

of the subject vehicles have experienced

a relatively low engine compartment fire

incidence, for all causes. In the case of

the relatively small population of

vehicles equipped with 2.5 liter engines,

the incidence of engine compartment

fires does appear to be high. The

absence of an apparent source of

ignition for power steering fluid that

may leak, however, indicates that other

failures or malfunctions are more likely

to be the cause of the fires. On this

basis, even if NHTSA were to consider

this matter as a potential issue for

investigation, it would be a separate

investigation unrelated to the prior

investigation of power steering fluid-fed

fires in vehicles with 3.8 liter engines.

The petition fails to present any

substantive, significant, or new

information of NHTSA’s consideration

regarding the request to reopen EA92–

030. Similarly, no new evidence has

been discovered through any other

source to justify reopening that

investigation.

NHTSA recognizes that engine

compartment fires create a serious safety

problem. Manufacturers have

consistently conducted safety recalls to

remedy problems that lead to such fires,

often in cases with a lower fire rate than

that experienced by these Ford vehicles.

Unfortunately, the available data

indicates that the vast majority of these

fires occurred after maintenance or

repair work had been performed by Ford

dealers or other maintenance facilities.

NHTSA cannot compel dealers to

conduct a safety recall and, under these

circumstances, cannot compel Ford to

remedy problems created by its dealers.

Nevertheless, NHTSA has urged Ford on

several occasions to take action to

reduce the likelihood of engine

compartment fires in these vehicles by

notifying owners of the problem and

bearing the expenses of repairs to

correct the condition that can lead to

such fires. To date, Ford has refused to

do so.

In consideration of the available

information, NHTSA has concluded that

there is not a reasonable possibility that

an order concerning recall and remedy

of a safety-related defect in relation to

the petitioner’s allegations would be

issued at the conclusion of an

investigation. Further commitment of

resources to reopen this investigation

does not appear to be warranted.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162; delegations of

authority at 49 CFR 1.50 and 501.8.

Issued on: February 1, 1995.

William A. Boehly,

Associate Administrator for Enforcement.

[FR Doc. 95–3174 Filed 2–8–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–59–M

Maritime Administration

[Docket S–917]

Notice of Application for Written

Permission Pursuant to Section 805(a)

of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as

amended; Waterman Steamship

Corporation

Central Gulf Lines, Inc. (Central Gulf),

a U.S. corporate affiliate of Waterman

Steamship Corporation (Waterman), by

letter of January 26, 1995, requests

written permission pursuant to section

805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act,

1936, as amended (Act), and

Waterman’s Operating-Differential

Subsidy Agreement (ODSA), Contract

MA/MSB–450, to operate the U.S.-flag

S/S ENERGY INDEPENDENCE (Vessel),

Official Number 657540, in the

coastwise trade of the United States.

Central Gulf states that it has agreed to

purchase the Vessel from New England

Power Company (New England Power)

and, in turn, own and operate the Vessel

beginning on or about May 1, 1995

under time charter to New England

Power for a term of fifteen years.

New England Power, which is

headquartered in Westborough,

Massachusetts, generates and transmits

electricity to consumers in the New

England area, including Vermont, New

Hampshire, Rhode Island and

Massachusetts. In addition, it regularly

purchases coal for transportation by

ship from east coast ports of the United

States to its harbor side facilities located

in Massachusetts.

According to Central Gulf, the Vessel

will transport New England Power’s

proprietary cargo in the coastwise trade

from points along the east coast of the

United States to Brayton Point,

Massachusetts or Salem, Massachusetts.

At other times during the fifteen years,

the Vessel may carry cargo in the

coastwise trade of the United States for

account of other clients of Central Gulf

as yet undetermined. Central Gulf states

that it may also operate the Vessel in the

foreign trade from time to time for yet

undetermined charterers.

The Vessel is a 38,234 long tons total

deadweight capacity self-unloading bulk

carrier with a coal and/or oil-fired steam

turbine main engine and an inclined lift

conveyor system. It was built by General

Dynamics Corporation in Quincy,

Massachusetts in 1983 and has been

documented under the laws of the

United States since that time. Central

Gulf maintains that as a U.S. built, U.S.

flag, U.S. owned and U.S. citizencrewed vessel, the Vessel is coastwisequalified within the meaning of section

27 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (46

U.S.C. App. 883), popularly known as

the Jones Act. It is also uniquely capable

of transporting New England Power’s

cargo requirements, Central Gulf adds.

Central Gulf emphasizes that it will

continue to function as a discrete

corporate entity having entirely separate

financial records and accounts, and that

the operating and accounting activities

of Central Gulf are, and will continue to

be, entirely separate from the operating

and accounting activities of Waterman.

Central Gulf believes that its instant

application clearly warrants MARAD

approval and section 805(a) permission

should be granted until the expiration

date of Waterman’s ODS contract, which

expires on December 31, 1996.

The application may be inspected in

the Office of the Secretary, Maritime

Administration. Any person, firm or