UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4838

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOHN IVEY HALL, a/k/a John John,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (5:10-cr-00237-FL-1)

Submitted: June 13, 2012 Decided: June 26, 2012

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

J. Mark Herring, WHITE & ALLEN, P.A., Kinston, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Jennifer E. Wells, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

John Ivey Hall appeals the 240-month sentence imposed 

following his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and 

possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine 

base and a quantity of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846 (2006). Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no 

meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the 

district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. Hall was 

notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but 

has not done so. We affirm.

We review a sentence imposed by a district court for 

reasonableness. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51

(2007). We must first ensure that the district court committed 

no “significant procedural error,” including improper 

calculation of the Guidelines range, insufficient consideration 

of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, and inadequate 

explanation of the sentence imposed. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If 

we find the sentence procedurally reasonable, we must examine 

the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under the 

totality of the circumstances. Id.

Upon review of the record, we conclude that Hall’s 

sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. 

Assuming, without deciding, that the 1997 drug sales should have 
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been excluded from the relevant conduct determination in Hall’s 

presentence report, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

(“USSG”) § 1B1.3 & cmt. n.9; United States v. Mullins, 971 F.2d 

1138, 1144 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting, in context of wire fraud, 

that regularity and temporal proximity were weak or absent when 

charged and relevant conduct were separated by six months), 

Hall’s base offense level and criminal history category would 

remain the same. See USSG §§ 2D1.1, 4A1.1(c), (d), (e) & cmt. 

n.8. The district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and 

provided an adequate explanation for the chosen sentence. See

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In addition, Hall’s within-Guidelines 

sentence is deemed on appeal to be substantively reasonable,

United States Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2012), and 

we conclude that Hall did not rebut this presumption. United 

States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) 

(stating that presumption may be rebutted by showing “that the 

sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) 

factors”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Hall, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Hall requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 
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believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Hall.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED