COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

WHATABURGER RESTAURANTS LLC,

 Appellant, 

v. 

ROSA ELIA FUENTES, 

 Appellee. 

§

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

No. 08-23-00017-CV

Appeal from the 

57th Judicial District Court 

of Bexar County, Texas 

(TC# 2022CI11371) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Appellant, Whataburger Restaurants LLC, appeals from an order denying its motion to 

dismiss based on the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§§ 27.001–.011.2 Appellee Rosa Elia Fuentes brought a negligence suit against Whataburger 

based on premises liability theories. Because we conclude that Fuentes’s legal action in whole is 

exempted from TCPA coverage, we affirm. 

1 We hear this case on transfer from the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio and apply that court’s precedent as 

required by TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 

2 The legislature amended the TCPA effective September 1, 2019, for actions filed on or after that date, as applicable 

to the underlying action. See Act of May 17, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 378, § 11, 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 684, 687. 

All citations to the TCPA are to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
2

BACKGROUND

On June 21, 2022, Fuentes filed suit against both Whataburger and against Selena Michelle 

Acevedo, who is not a party to this appeal. Fuentes alleged that, on or about May 10, 2021, she

entered the drive-thru lane at a Whataburger restaurant located in Rio Grande City, Texas. Relevant 

to this appeal, Fuentes alleged that Acevedo rear-ended her vehicle twice while they both drove

through a drive-thru line. Fuentes further claimed that after the second impact, she asked a 

Whataburger employee to call security or police to enable her to make a report. She then drove to 

the front of the restaurant to wait for an officer to arrive. When Acevedo pulled forward in line, a

Whataburger employee at the drive-thru window advised Acevedo that Fuentes had asked for 

police officers to be called. Fuentes alleged that Acevedo next drove to the front of the restaurant, 

where she confronted Fuentes, and a physical altercation ensued. Fuentes alleged that “[n]o 

security, agent, servant, and/or employee of Whataburger stepped in to stop the altercation.”

By her suit, Fuentes alleged a claim of negligence against Whataburger and assault against 

Acevedo. Against Whataburger, Fuentes alleged claims for negligent security and premises 

liability in the following respects:

[1]. In failing to keep the restaurant reasonably safe for its customers at the time of 

and/or prior to the time of [Fuentes’s’] incident;

[2]. Lack of security outside or inside the restaurant;

[3]. In failing to maintain the restaurant in safe conditions;

[4]. In failing to warn [Fuentes’s] of a potentially dangerous situation that could 

occur after an employee told Defendant, SELENA MICHELLE ACEVEDO, that 

the police were called to the scene;

[5]. In failing to implement and/or maintain the most basic of security measures;

[6]. In failing to properly hire, train and supervise its employees, agents, 

representatives, workers, managers, and staff in reference to a potentially dangerous 

situation that could occur;
3

[7]. In failing to appropriately train employees, agents, representatives, workers, 

managers, and staff to monitor such cameras and timely report perceived dangerous 

activity or respond when a person requests or needs assistance;

[8]. In failing to have adequate security policies and protocols;

[9]. In creating a dangerous condition that the Defendant had actual knowledge of, 

and

[10]. In failing to train employees, agents, representatives, workers, managers, and 

staff in basic security measures, including but not limited to the danger posed by 

Defendant SELENA MICHELLE ACEVEDO.

Fuentes’s suit sought damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish, physical disability, medical 

expenses, and property damage.

Fuentes did not serve Whataburger with her suit until August 12, 2022. On September 2, 

2022, Whataburger responded by filing an original answer asserting a general denial. On October 

10, 2022, Whataburger filed a motion to dismiss “the property claim” pursuant to Chapter 27 of 

the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Whataburger asserted that Fuentes’s lawsuit 

qualified as a legal action filed in response to Whataburger’s exercise of its right to free speech 

and right to petition. Whataburger further asserted that Fuentes could not establish a prima facie 

case of negligent security or premises liability. Seeking relief, Whataburger urged that Fuentes’s 

“property claim” should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the protections of the TCPA. 

Finally, Whataburger asked the trial court to set a hearing to determine Whataburger’s reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs in defending against Fuentes’s legal action. 

In response, Fuentes asserted her suit was not premised on Whataburger’s right to contact 

the police. Moreover, Fuentes claimed that the TCPA statute exempted her legal action from its 

provisions as she had sought a recovery for bodily injury. Whataburger replied asserting that the 

TCPA exemption did not apply to property damage. 
4

On November 3, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on Whataburger’s motion to 

dismiss, but it did not rule that day or within 30 days thereafter. As a result, the motion was denied 

by operation of law. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.008. This accelerated, 

interlocutory appeal then followed. See id.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Whataburger presents seven issues asking the following questions: (1) whether 

communications to and about the police about alleged criminal activity or reckless driving are

matters of public concern; (2) whether interactions with police are protected as a right to petition; 

(3) whether Fuentes can shield her actions from the TCPA by including an exempt claim in her 

pleadings that also contain non-exempt claims; (4) whether Fuentes failed to present clear and 

specific evidence establishing a prima facie case for each essential element of her claims; (5) 

whether claims of inadequate security are separate from an existing premises liability claim; (6) 

whether the action of calling the police created a dangerous condition; and (7) whether the trial 

court erred in denying its motion to dismiss pursuant to the TCPA. 

On May 4, 2023, after briefing was completed, Fuentes filed with this Court a motion to 

dismiss the appeal asserting the case had become moot due to her having amended her petition 

such that she removed any request for property damage from her premises claim. Because it raises 

a jurisdictional question, we first consider Fuentes’s motion to dismiss the appeal based on 

mootness. 

MOOTNESS

In her motion to dismiss, Fuentes asserts she amended her petition and deleted any claim 

for property damage. She urges that she has no intention to seek any property damage in the current 

litigation. Fuentes contends that, because of her pleading amendment, this Court no longer 
5

possesses subject matter jurisdiction and requests the appeal be dismissed. In support of her 

motion, she attached her first amended petition filed on May 1, 2023. 

“A case is rendered moot when: (1) it appears that a party seeks to obtain a judgment upon 

some controversy, when none exists; or (2) a party seeks a judgment upon some matter which 

cannot have a practical legal effect upon a then-existing controversy.” Beltran v. Beltran, 324 

S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.). An actual controversy no longer exists 

between the parties when “the decision of an appellate court would be a mere academic exercise.” 

Id. (quoting Hanna v. Godwin, 876 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no writ)). Texas 

courts long recognize that the mootness doctrine affects a court’s jurisdiction to decide a 

controversy. Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 

439, 442 (Tex. 1998) (justiciability doctrines such as ripeness, standing and mootness, lie in the 

prohibition on advisory opinions, which in turn stem from the separation of powers doctrine set 

forth in Article 2, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution).

Although mootness implicates our subject matter jurisdiction, a concern is also raised by 

Whataburger’s motion to dismiss that is based on the TCPA. Where a motion to dismiss, if granted, 

would afford more relief to a movant than the non-movant filing a nonsuit, the motion to dismiss 

“constitutes a claim for affirmative relief that survives a nonsuit[.]” Rauhauser v. McGibney, 508 

S.W.3d 377, 381–83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.), overruled on other grounds by Hersh 

v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017). This is true for motions to dismiss under the TCPA 

because they may “allow the movant to obtain a dismissal with prejudice, attorney’s fees, and 

sanctions.”3 Abatecola v. 2 Savages Concrete Pumping, LLC, No. 14-17-00678-CV, 2018 WL 

3 When a controversy otherwise becomes moot through circumstances other than a nonsuit, a party’s claim for 

attorney’s fees under a prevailing-party statute like the TCPA “remains a live controversy [only] if the party prevailed 

before the underlying claim became moot.” Glassdoor, Inc. v. Andra Group, LP, 575 S.W.3d 523, 530-31 (Tex. 2019)

(finding underlying case moot when the statute of limitations ran on any potential claim during pendency of appeal 
6

3118601, at *14 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th] Dist.] June 26, 2018, writ denied) (mem. op.); see 

also Diogu Law Firm PLLC v. Melanson, No. 14-18-01053-CV, 2020 WL 6142902, at *6 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] October 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (recognizing the outcome 

of a TCPA motion to dismiss survives a claimant’s nonsuiting of the claim for which dismissal is 

sought). 

Here, Fuentes removed her request for property damage from her live petition only after 

Whataburger had sought to dismiss “the property claim” under the TCPA. Fuentes’s pleading 

amendment operated to omit any claim of property damage. See J.M. Huber Corp. v. Santa Fe 

Energy Res., Inc., 871 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied)

(describing that “[a]n amended petition . . . supersedes all prior petitions and operates to dismiss 

parties and causes of action to the extent they are omitted from the amended pleading”). Moreover, 

Rule 162 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure permits a plaintiff to dismiss a case or take a nonsuit at any time before introducing all of her evidence other than rebuttal evidence. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 162. Even so, Fuentes’s right to non-suit does not necessarily limit Whataburger’s right to 

have its affirmative claim—its motion for dismissal with prejudice and request for attorney’s fees

pursuant to the TCPA—reviewed on appeal. See id. (“Any dismissal pursuant to this rule shall not 

prejudice the right of an adverse party to be heard on a pending claim for affirmative relief. . . . A 

dismissal under this rule shall have no effect on any motion for sanctions, attorney’s fees or other 

costs, pending at the time of dismissal, as determined by the court.”). Consequently, because a live 

controversy remains between the parties, we deny Fuentes’s motion to dismiss based on mootness. 

Accordingly, our subject matter jurisdiction is implicated to consider Whataburger’s appeal of the 

trial court’s denial of its TCPA motion to dismiss. 

and holding respondent could not appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss a Rule 202 petition under the TCPA since 

it did not prevail before the case became moot).
7

Having denied Fuentes’s motion, we now turn to the merits of the appeal. 

TCPA PRINCIPLES AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether the TCPA applies to a legal action is an issue of statutory interpretation that we 

review de novo. See Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591 S.W.3d 127, 132 

(Tex. 2019). In conducting our review, we must construe the TCPA “liberally to effectuate its 

purpose and intent fully.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.011(b); State ex rel. Best v. 

Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2018). “The TCPA was designed to protect both a [movant’s] 

rights of speech, petition, and association and a claimant’s right to pursue valid legal claims for 

injuries the [movant] caused.” Montelongo v. Abrea, 622 S.W.3d 290, 295 (Tex. 2021); see

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.002. Consistent with general rules of statutory 

construction, we ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent as expressed in the statutory 

language, considering the specific language at issue and the TCPA as a whole, and we construe 

the statute’s words according to their plain and common meaning, unless a contrary intention is 

apparent from the context or unless such a construction leads to absurd results. Dyer v. Medoc 

Health Servs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 418, 424 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied); see also Crosstex 

Energy Services, L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384, 389–90 (Tex. 2014). 

We consider, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the pleadings, evidence a court 

could consider under civil procedure Rule 166a, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the 

facts on which the liability or defense is based. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 

§ 27.006(a). A claimant’s pleadings are usually “the best and all-sufficient evidence of the nature 

of the action.” Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017).

The TCPA provides for a three-step process for the dismissal of a legal action to which it 

applies. See id. In the first step, the movant has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that plaintiff’s claims “is based on, relates to, or is in response to the [movant’s] exercise 
8

of” the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association, as those rights are statutorily 

defined. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 586–87. (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding). If the movant 

meets their burden, the court then looks to whether the non-movant has “establishe[d] by clear and 

specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.” TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(c); see also Darnell, 588 S.W.3d at 300–01. If the nonmovant 

fails to meet their burden under the second step, the claim must be dismissed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(b). However, if the nonmovant meets their burden under the second 

step, the third step still requires dismissal if the movant “establishes an affirmative defense or other 

grounds on which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See id. § 27.005(d).

A “legal action” means a “lawsuit, cause of action, petition, complaint, cross-claim, or 

counterclaim or any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal, declaratory, or equitable 

relief.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(6). An “exercise of the right of free speech” 

means a communication made in connection with a matter of public concern. Id. § 27.001(3). An 

“exercise of the right to petition” means, among other things, (1) a communication in or pertaining 

to “an executive or other proceeding before a department of the state or federal government,” or 

(2) “communication in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, 

executive, judicial, or other governmental body or in another governmental or official proceeding.” 

Id. 27.001(4). 

A “communication” is broadly defined as “the making or submitting of a statement or 

document in any form or medium.” Id. § 27.001(1). The definition does not include a “failure to 

communicate.” DOJO Bayhouse, LLC v. Pickford, No. 14-20-00237-CV, 2021 WL 6050677, at 

*4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). As relevant here, a 

“matter of public concern” means a statement or activity regarding “a matter of political, social, 
9

or other interest to the community” or “a subject of concern to the public.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(7).

Intertwined with and overlaying this multi-step dismissal process is the TCPA provision 

exempting certain actions from the TCPA’s application. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 

§ 27.010(a) (listing 12 exemptions under current statute). “A party can avoid the TCPA’s burdenshifting requirements by showing that one of the exemptions applies.” Temple v. Cortez Law Firm, 

PLLC, 657 S.W.3d 337, 343 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.); Clean Energy v. Trillium Transp. 

Fuels, LLC, No. 05-18-01228-CV, 2019 WL 3212145, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 9, 2019, no 

pet.) (mem. op.). The nonmovant bears the burden of proving a statutory exemption. Temple, 657 

S.W.3d at 343; Clean Energy, 2019 WL 3212145, at *3. In relevant part, the “exemptions” section 

of the TCPA provides that the TCPA does not apply to “a legal action seeking recovery for bodily 

injury, wrongful death, or survival.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.010(a)(3).

PROPERTY DAMAGE

Whataburger’s third issue contends that a TCPA exemption does not apply to Fuentes’s 

property damage claim. Putting aside the complex question posed by step one of a TCPA analysis,4

we choose to consider first whether an exemption applies. Whataburger asserts that because it 

directed its motion to dismiss against Fuentes’s request for property damage only, it argues that 

Fuentes may not “shield her entire case” from a TCPA dismissal, nor can she prevent it from 

seeking attorney’s fees based on that dismissal. 

4 In scenarios where a TCPA movant’s step-one burden and a nonmovant’s TCPA exemption are both disputed, the 

TCPA does not answer the question of which issue must be address first. Our sister court has determined that a court 

may consider a nonmovant’s exemption first, if it chooses to do so in accordance with our appellate rules. See Temple, 

PLLC, 657 S.W.3d at 346; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (providing courts “must hand down a written opinion that is 

as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal”). Because 

the TCPA does not apply when one of the exemptions of the statute applies, we decide to address this issue first. 
10

Section 27.010(a)(3) provides that Chapter 27 “does not apply to . . . a legal action seeking 

recovery for bodily injury, wrongful death, or survival or to statements made regarding that legal 

action.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.010(a)(3). Whataburger acknowledges that 

Fuentes’s legal action based on premises liability seeks recovery for both bodily injury and 

property damage. To that extent, it concedes that the bodily injury portion of the premises claim 

is expressly exempted from the TCPA’s provisions. Nevertheless, it argues that the remaining 

portion of the claim—that is, the portion seeking property damage only—is not exempted from 

the TCPA’s coverage. Thus, it argues that a portion of the damages sought in the premises claim 

requires a dismissal with prejudice as to that portion, and such dismissal should include court costs 

and attorney’s fees.

In other words, Whataburger asserts that Fuentes’s premises liability claim, which is the 

only cause of action asserted against it, can be subdivided into separate damage claims for purposes 

of the TCPA’s provisions. That is, one claim seeking recovery of bodily injuries, and a second 

claim seeking property damage alone. From there, it argues that even though the TCPA would not 

apply to the bodily injury claim, it would apply to the claim for property damage. In support of 

this view of the meaning of “legal action,” Whataburger cites to KB Home Lone Star Inc. v. 

Gordon, 629 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.). On review, however, we 

conclude that KB Home is factually distinguishable. 

There, in responding to a motion for dismissal under the TCPA, the plaintiffs argued they 

filed suit under the DTPA, among other causes of action, and the TCPA did not apply to such 

claim. See id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.010). Yet, more narrowly, the 

defendant-movant had only sought a TCPA dismissal of plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions, not 

plaintiffs’ DTPA claim or any of its other causes of action. Id. Relying on controlling precedent 

of the Supreme Court of Texas, KB Home described the TCPA’s use of “legal action” as being 
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“capacious,” meaning it expansively included “a lawsuit or any filing within a lawsuit that seeks 

legal, declaratory, or equitable relief.” Id. (citing Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, 

LLC, 591 S.W.3d 127, 131 (Tex. 2019)). As a result, KB Home determined that a “legal action”

included plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions filed within its suit based on several causes of action, and 

such motion itself sought monetary damages. Id. Because “legal action,” as used by the TCPA, 

included “any court filing requesting monetary relief,” and the TCPA did not otherwise exclude 

sanctions motions from that definition, KB Home found no support in the statute for the exclusion 

of a motion for sanctions from the definition of a “legal action.” Id. KB Home described that, while 

§ 27.010(a)(7) exempts a DTPA claim, it “does not exempt any other claim, document, or filing 

requesting legal, declaratory, or equitable relief that might otherwise be subject to the TCPA.” Id.

Based on this expansive view of the meaning of “legal action” under the TCPA’s terms, 

KB Home rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the presence of a DTPA legal action within the 

lawsuit as a whole otherwise barred a meritorious TCPA motion to dismiss filed against plaintiffs’ 

motion for sanctions. Id. In short, KB Home viewed the motion for sanctions as a legal action 

within a legal action. Id. Such reasoning was also followed by the Tyler Court of Appeals in Baylor 

Scott & White v. Project Rose MSO, LLC, 633 S.W.3d 263, 282 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2021, pet. 

denied) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.010 and KB Home Lone Star Inc., 629 

S.W.3d at 657) (“Given that any particular lawsuit may involve multiple parties redressing several 

independent injuries through a multitude of different causes of action, [the statute’s] laundry list 

exemption methodology demonstrates the legislature’s intent to examine each exemption on a 

cause of action by cause of action basis within the context of the entire lawsuit that otherwise falls 

within the TCPA.”). Although these authorities recognize that a legal action may include multiple 

types of claims, pleadings, or causes of action, neither KB Home nor Baylor Scott & White stand 
12

for the proposition that the legislature intended to examine a single cause of action determining 

whether each exemption applied as to the various damages sought. 

Here, Fuentes brought a single negligence cause of action against Whataburger based on

various theories of premises liability.5 Under that claim, Fuentes sought personal injury damages 

and property damage. A “legal action” means a “lawsuit, cause of action, petition, complaint, 

cross-claim, or counterclaim or any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal, declaratory, 

or equitable relief.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(6). The relief sought within a 

“legal action” or “cause of action,” may vary depending on the nature of the suit. Under the TCPA, 

a legal action seeking recovery for bodily injury will be exempt from its application. See id. § 

27.010(a)(3). But it does not follow from that exemption that bodily injury damage itself stands

apart from the pleaded legal action. Viewing the legal action as a whole, “it does not matter that 

the claim could also result in recovery of damages that arguably fall outside the meaning of ‘bodily 

injury.’” Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Dorsey, 651 S.W.3d 692, 701-02 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2022, no pet.); see also Cavin v. Abbott, 545 S.W.3d 47, 57 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no 

pet.) (holding the TCPA did not apply to an assault claim, which sought recovery for “bodily 

injury,” even though some of the sought-after damages “would arguably fall outside ‘bodily 

injury’”).

Although the application of an exemption is determined on a cause-of-action-by-cause-ofaction basis, and other affirmative claims may also be included within a lawsuit, we reject 

Whataburger’s unsupported argument contending that Fuentes’s suit seeking property damage can 

be isolated from its pleaded cause of action. Property damage does not stand apart from the bodily 

5 Fuentes asserted Whataburger was negligent under theories of negligent security and premises liability. We note 

that negligent security is encompassed in a claim of premises liability. See Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 

S.W.3d 762, 776 (Tex. 2010) (“We have repeatedly treated cases involving claims of inadequate security as premisesliability cases.”). 
13

injury damages included in the negligence lawsuit, and thus, the TCPA exemption applies. See

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.010(a)(3). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial 

court’s denial of Whataburger’s TCPA motion to dismiss because Fuentes established her legal 

action for negligence was exempted from the TCPA’s coverage. Accordingly, we overrule 

Whataburger’s third issue. 

THE REMAINING ISSUES

In light of our disposition of issue three, we do not reach Whataburger’s remaining issues. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (courts “must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable 

but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal”). The 

applicability of an exemption means that the TCPA and its fee-shifting provision does not apply. 

As an unsuccessful movant, Whataburger is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees or costs. 

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 27.009(a)(1) (“[I]f the court orders dismissal of a legal 

action under [Chapter 27] the court shall award to the moving party court costs and reasonable 

attorney’s fees incurred in defending against the legal action”). 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s denial of Whataburger’s TCPA motion by operation of law.

GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

September 7, 2023

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.