Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 88A04-1404-CR-168 | February 9, 2015 Page 1 of 26

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Stacy R. Uliana

Bargersville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Shane L. Keller,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 9, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

88A04-1404-CR-168

Appeal from the 

Washington Superior Court

The Honorable Frank Newkirk, Jr., 

Judge

Cause No. 88D01-1307-FB-489

Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Shane L. Keller was convicted following a jury trial of two counts of Class B 

felony burglary,1 one count of Class C felony burglary,

2

three counts of Class D 

felony theft,3 and two counts of Class D felony receiving stolen property.4 The 

trial court sentenced Keller to maximum sentences on each of the eight 

convictions to run concurrently with one another, for an aggregate of twenty 

years executed. After Keller admitted to being a habitual offender, the trial 

court imposed a thirty-year enhancement to Count I, a Class B felony burglary 

conviction, for a total executed sentence of fifty years. Keller appeals his 

convictions and his sentence raising the following reordered and restated issues:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted and 

excluded certain evidence;

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury 

regarding the definition of “dwelling” for the purpose of convicting 

Keller of Class B felony burglary; and

III. Whether Keller’s convictions and sentences for theft and receiving 

stolen property violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.5 

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(1). 

2

See Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.

3

See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a). 

4

See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(b). We note that, effective July 1, 2014, the statutes pertaining to burglary, theft, 

and receiving stolen property were amended. Keller committed his crimes prior to July 1, 2014; therefore, we 

use the statutes in effect at the time he committed the offenses.

5 Keller also contends that his fifty-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 

character of the offender. Because we remand to the trial court for resentencing, we do not address this issue. 
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[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Jeremy Hardwick’s great-grandparents lived in a farmhouse on property located

in Washington County, Indiana; a barn, a garage, and an outbuilding were also 

located on the land. After Hardwick’s great-grandparents died in the late 1990s, 

the farmhouse remained vacant. In October 2012, Hardwick, his wife, and two 

children moved into Hardwick’s sister-in-law’s home, with the plan to remodel

and then move into the farmhouse. No one slept at the farmhouse during the 

remodeling project; however, some food and most of the family’s belongings 

were stored in the farmhouse. Hardwick also received his mail at the 

farmhouse. 

[4] Hardwick described the farmhouse as being in “pretty rough” condition 

because it “[h]ad been sitting vacant for probably ten or twelve years.” Tr. at 

503. Photographs taken of the farmhouse around May 2013 revealed that most 

of the rooms were filled with boxes, bags, equipment, and assorted debris. 

Def.’s Ex. A. Hardwick began the remodeling project in the spring of 2013 and 

planned to do it alone. The project required Hardwick to do major renovations, 

and Hardwick worked on those renovations about four or five hours each night. 

At that time, he was also working at a factory job about six days a week, eight 

hours a day, and each day, he stopped at the farmhouse property to feed 

livestock.
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[5] On May 9, 2013, Hardwick stopped at the property after his factory shift. As he 

entered the barn, which had been closed but not locked, Hardwick noticed that 

several items had been moved from their normal place. When he inspected 

other buildings, he saw that the locked garage door had been pried open. 

Hardwick called the Washington County Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s 

Department”), and Deputy Joseph Keltner responded. Further investigation 

revealed that Hardwick’s .22 caliber, semiautomatic rifle and shells had been 

stolen from his truck, which had been parked in the barn. Also missing from 

the barn were a socket set and some combination wrenches. A Stihl chainsaw 

and a Stihl weed eater were missing from the garage. 

[6] That same evening, realizing that other items of value were still on the property, 

Hardwick and his wife bought four infrared “game cameras” and installed them

in the farmhouse and other main buildings on the farm. Tr. at 513. Each 

camera was motion activated and took black and white images, which were 

stored on a removable SD memory card (“SD card”). Id. at 652. Thereafter, 

Hardwick checked the game cameras daily.

[7] On June 2, 2013, Hardwick and his wife arrived at the property and noticed 

that the glass to the back door of the farmhouse was shattered. Several items 

were missing from the farmhouse, including an air compressor, a Craftsman 

nail gun, three cans of Zinsser Bulls Eye 1-2-3 primer, a circular saw, twenty 

boxes of cherry laminate flooring, a spool of electrical wiring, a kitchen faucet, 

drywall tools, and various items of food. 
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[8] Hardwick called the Sheriff’s Department, and when Deputy Keltner 

responded, they discovered that the farmhouse game camera had taken several 

images (“June 2 photographs”). Contained within the June 2 photographs were

images of the male burglar’s profile (“State’s Exhibit 17”) and the distinctive 

logo on the t-shirt he wore (“State’s Exhibit 16”). Removing the SD card from 

the camera, Deputy Keltner and Hardwick viewed the June 2 photographs on 

Deputy Keltner’s laptop; neither immediately recognized the man pictured. 

After Deputy Keltner downloaded the June 2 photographs to his laptop, he

returned the SD card to Hardwick, who stored it in a drawer. That evening, 

Hardwick installed a new SD card into the farmhouse game camera. 

[9] Two days later, on June 4, 2013, Hardwick arrived at the farm and noticed 

another door to the farmhouse was broken. Hardwick again called the Sheriff’s 

Department, and this time Sergeant Wayne Blevins responded. Inside the 

farmhouse, Sergeant Blevins found footprints that were imprinted with the Nike 

logo. Hardwick found that a stainless-steel sink and ammunition, among other 

things, were missing from the farmhouse. Sergeant Blevins viewed the pictures 

on the SD card (“June 4 photographs”) and, like Deputy Keltner, downloaded 

them to his laptop and returned the SD card to Hardwick.

[10] As part of the investigation, Deputy Keltner showed a photograph of the 

burglar’s profile—introduced at trial as State’s Exhibit 17—to several Sheriff’s 

Department deputies, individually, to see if they could identify the suspect. 

Sergeant Blevins and Deputy James Strange, each of whom had known Keller 

for twenty years, identified the suspect as Keller. Tr. at 651, 653, 657-59. 
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Detective Brent Miller, who had known Keller for twenty-four years, was 

shown the photograph of the burglar’s profile as well as two enlarged and 

enhanced copies of that same photo. See State’s Exs. 17, 31, 34. Detective 

Miller also identified the suspect as Keller. Tr. at 740-41, 790-92.

[11] Deputy Keltner obtained a warrant to search Keller’s residence. On July 11, 

2013, deputies executed that warrant and seized from Keller’s closet a t-shirt 

marked with the distinctive logo pictured in the June 2 photographs. Keller, 

who was home during the search, admitted that the t-shirt belonged to him. 

The officers also seized a can of the same primer that had been taken from the 

farmhouse and saw no sign that Keller was priming any walls. The officers did 

not find any other stolen items or Nike shoes. On July 12, 2013, the State 

charged Keller in connection with the June 2 burglary with one count of Class 

B felony burglary, one count of Class D felony theft, and one count of Class D 

felony receiving stolen property. The State also alleged that Keller was a 

habitual offender.

[12] Prior to trial, Keller made several phone calls from jail, which were recorded.

The State admitted and published each recording without objection.6 On 

August 23, 2013, Keller called his father (“Father”) and instructed:

You go over to my house and you go, you tell Michelle you want 

papers out of the car and make sure there is no fucking hat, gloves, no 

 

6 While admitted at trial, these recordings are not contained in the record before us. Therefore, we rely on 

the transcription of these conversations. 
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fucking paperwork in the glove box. Take all of that fucking shit with 

you. I need all that out of the car. 

Tr. at 725 (State’s Ex. 39). In the June 2 photographs, the burglar is wearing a 

hat and gloves. Id. at 722-23. 

[13] On September 6, 2013, while still in jail, Keller called James Cole, a neighbor 

who lived across the street from Keller, saying: 

Listen and listen good. Go to my house, go upstairs. Face your house 

and look. That’s all I’m saying, don’t say no more. Don’t repeat what 

I just said . . . . That’s all you got to do. I mean, about four or five up 

and face your house and look around. . . . And everything, like I said, 

I just kind of wanted to see if you’d take care of that one problem for 

me. As far as I know, all they got is two pictures on me and it’s from a 

trail camera. All I need for you . . . to do is that one thing and see 

what’s over there that you think you can sell. If there’s something you 

can sell let me know, write me a letter and tell me what you can get 

out of it, get me some money to get me through til the verdict. . . . 

But there’s five hundred things over there and I think you might be 

able to do something with them, if you’re not just destroy them . . . . 

You’ll be surprised, you’ll be like god damn. But you, I don’t think 

they got anymore, they ain’t got no more charges or nothing against 

me. Just that burglary over there. 

Tr. at 717-18 (State’s Ex. 37). 

[14] On October 9, 2013, Keller called Father and expressed frustration regarding 

Cole. In that recording, Keller told Father, “Jamie was supposed to have 

brought me money up here last month and I ain’t seen none of it, like usual.” 

Id. at 721 (State’s Ex. 38). Father responded, “[W]ell, he got aggravated what 

you said about him and he said . . . well he just dropped it. He said he should 
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have had them, that washing machine and dryer sold but he, you and him got 

into it over the phone and he just dropped it.” Id. at 722. Keller responded, 

“The reason, part of it, that I’m in here. Almost everything that was stolen on 

that list is sitting on his front fucking porch.” Id.

[15] Keller made additional phone calls to Father admitting his responsibility. On 

September 24, 2013, Keller told Father, “I got myself into this fucking mess.”

Id. at 736. On November 1, 2013, Keller again told Father, “But like I said I 

got myself into this mess. I’m going to have to get myself out of it you know.”

Id. at 738. Finally, on November 3, 2013, Keller called Father to complain,

“[T]hey’re wanting to give me more time than what Sterlin and time [sic] got 

for that shit they done, compared to this burglary case.” Id. at 739-40. Father 

responded, “Devon is looking pretty rough then too,” and Keller replied, “I 

know, he’s got his, he ain’t got no pictures or nothing on his.” Id. at 740. 

[16] Presumably based on these conversations, deputies searched Cole’s home on 

November 14, 2013, and recovered from his porch several of Hardwick’s stolen 

items, including the Stihl chainsaw, the Craftsman nail gun, and the stainlesssteel sink, which had been stolen May 9, June 2, and June 4, 2013, respectively. 

Id. at 703-05. On November 25, 2013, the State also charged Keller for the 

May 9 and June 4, 2013 burglaries, with one count of Class B felony burglary, 

two counts of Class C felony burglary, three counts of Class D felony theft, and 

one count of Class D felony receiving stolen property.
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[17] Keller’s trial commenced on February 18, 2014. Over Keller’s objection, the 

State admitted into evidence the June 2 photographs and the June 4 

photographs as State’s Exhibits 16 through18 and Exhibits 21 through 23, 

respectively. Again, over Keller’s objection, the State also admitted copies of 

those same photographs, which had been enlarged and enhanced by Indiana 

State Police Trooper Robert Neal, as State’s Exhibits 27 through 34. Also, over 

Keller’s objection, Sergeant Blevins, Deputy Strange, and Detective Miller 

testified at trial that they had previously identified Keller as being the person 

pictured in State’s Exhibit 17—the June 2 photograph depicting the burglar’s 

profile. Id. at 651, 658-59, 741. Detective Miller testified that the person 

pictured in the June 2 and June 4 photographs could not be Cole, who was 

shorter and heavier than the man pictured. Id. at 792-93. 

[18] The following was not admitted at trial. Keller asked out of the jury’s presence 

to be allowed to try on the t-shirt bearing the distinctive logo to show the jury 

how it fit. He also asked that he be able to show the jury his shoes. The trial 

court granted Keller’s request on the condition that if Keller did so, the State 

could cross-examine him, thereby opening the door to impeaching Keller’s 

credibility. Id. at 769. Keller chose not try on the t-shirt or show his shoes to 

the jury. Additionally, Keller’s request to introduce Sheriff’s Department

booking photographs, to show the jury that other arrested individuals also 

matched Keller’s general description and body type, was also denied unless or 

until one or more of the photographs became relevant. 
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[19] Both parties proposed a jury instruction defining “dwelling” as it pertained to 

the burglary charge. The trial court gave the following as Final Instruction 

Number 17, over Keller’s objection that the last sentence of the instruction was 

overbroad:

For purposes of the burglary statute, a dwelling is defined as a 

building, structure, or other enclosed space, permanent or temporary, 

moveable or fixed, that is a person’s home or place of lodging. Any 

such place where a person keeps personal items with the intent to 

reside in the near future is considered a dwelling.

Appellant’s App. at 596 (emphasis added).

[20] The jury found Keller guilty of two counts of Class B felony burglary (Counts I 

and IV), one count of Class C felony burglary (Count VI), three counts of Class 

D felony theft (Counts II, V, and VII), and two counts of Class D felony 

receiving stolen property (Counts III and X). Id. at 891-92. Keller was found 

not guilty of Counts VIII and IX, one count of Class C felony burglary and one 

count of Class D felony theft, respectively. Following his convictions, Keller 

admitted to being a habitual offender. On March 19, 2014, the trial court 

ordered Keller to serve the maximum sentence for each of his convictions in the 

Department of Correction, i.e., twenty years for each of Counts I and IV, eight 

years for Count VI, three years for each of Counts II, V, and VII, and three 

years for each of Counts III and X. These sentences were to be served 

concurrently with each other, with the habitual offender enhancement of thirty 

years added to Count I, for an aggregate sentence of fifty years executed. Keller 

now appeals his convictions and his sentence. 
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Discussion and Decision

I. Admission and Exclusion of Evidence

[21] Keller contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain 

evidence and excluding other evidence. He contends that these evidentiary 

errors impacted his defense at trial that he was not the burglar pictured in the 

game camera photographs. The admission or exclusion of evidence is entrusted 

to the discretion of the trial court; we therefore review the trial court’s decision 

for an abuse of discretion. Collins v. State, 966 N.E.2d 96, 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or it 

misinterprets the law. Id. In conducting our review, we consider the conflicting 

evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and any uncontested evidence 

favorable to the defendant. Id.

A. Admission of Evidence

[22] Keller asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it: (1) allowed 

testimony of the three deputies who identified Keller as the person pictured in 

State’s Exhibit 17; and (2) admitted State’s Exhibits 27 through 34, the copies of 

the June 2 photographs and the June 4 photographs that were enhanced and 

enlarged by Trooper Neal. We address each of these claims in turn. 

[23] Prior to trial, Keller filed a motion in limine, asking the court to exclude 

Deputy Strange’s and Sergeant Blevin’s lay witness testimony that Keller was 
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the person pictured in State’s Exhibit 17.

7

 Appellant’s App. at 399. At that time, 

Keller asserted that, because of the quality of the photograph, the only thing 

that could be determined was that the suspect was probably a man and probably 

Caucasian. Tr. at 241. Keller argued that the probative value of that testimony 

was substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice.8 Appellant’s App. at 399. 

The trial court denied Keller’s motion, and the deputies testified at trial over 

Keller’s objection.

[24] Both parties recognize that the trial court’s ruling was governed by Indiana 

Rule of Evidence 701, pertaining to opinion testimony by lay witnesses. 

Appellant’s Br. at 18, Appellee’s Br. at 24-25. Rule 701 provides, “If a witness is 

not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to [an 

opinion] that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; and (b) helpful 

to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or to a determination of a 

fact in issue.” Citing to Groves v. State, 456 N.E.2d 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) 

and Gibson v. State, 709 N.E.2d 11 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, Keller 

contends, “There is a disagreement within the Court of Appeals as to whether 

an opinion of a police officer identifying a defendant in a surveillance video or 

photograph is helpful to the jury under Indiana Rule of Evidence 701.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 18. He argues, “‘[A] witness’ opinion as to what [the 

 

7 Keller did not object to the identification testimony of Detective Miller. 

8 Keller’s argument of prejudice was, in part, based on the quality of the photograph. We note, however, that 

during trial, when the State shared with defense counsel the copy of the photograph that had been shown to 

the deputies, defense counsel admitted, “[T]he quality of my photo is not nearly that good.” Tr. at 243. 
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photograph] is saying not only does not address itself to evidentiary competence 

but invades the province of the jury.’” Appellant’s Br. at 19 (quoting Groves, 456 

N.E.2d at 723). The State maintains that Keller incorrectly invites us to elevate 

the dicta in Groves over the later-enacted Rules of Evidence and subsequent 

caselaw, including Goodson v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2001), trans. denied. We agree with the State and find that Goodson controls.

[25] In Goodson, the defendant relied upon Groves and argued that the trial court had 

invaded the province of the jury when it allowed two officers to testify that 

Goodson was the person depicted in videotapes and photographs of a drug sale. 

747 N.E.2d at 1184. The Goodson court disagreed, holding that “the lay opinion 

of a police officer familiar with the defendant was admissible under Indiana 

Evidence Rule 701 . . . .” Id. (footnote omitted). The testifying officers had 

known Goodson for two or three years; accordingly, this court found the trial 

court had not abused its discretion in allowing the officers to testify because 

“their lay opinion that the person shown in the videotape was Goodson was 

helpful to the jury in determining the identity of the person depicted therein.” 

Id. Here, each of the deputies had known Keller for twenty years or more, and 

each gave his lay opinion that the person pictured in State’s Exhibit 17 was 

Keller. Under the reasoning of Goodson, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it allowed the deputies to testify at trial. 

[26] Keller also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted, 

over his objection, State’s Exhibits 27 through 34. At trial, the State offered the 

testimony of Trooper Neal, a detective with the “technical services office,” who 
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testified that State’s Exhibits 27 through 34 were copies of the previously 

admitted June 2 and June 4 photographs, State’s Exhibits 16 through18 and 21 

through 23, respectively,

9

for which he had enlarged and adjusted the contrast 

using an Adobe Photoshop CS5 program. Tr. at 625, 667, 681. Trooper Neal 

explained that the Adobe program did not add or remove objects from the 

photographs, instead, the program “improve[d] the appearance of a still 

image.” Id. at 682. Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting the enhanced exhibits, the error was harmless.10 State’s 

Exhibit 17 was admitted without being enlarged or enhanced; therefore, the

enhanced photos were merely cumulative evidence because Deputy Strange and 

Sergeant Blevins testified that they identified the suspect as Keller by looking 

only at State’s Exhibit 17. Tr. at 651, 653, 657-59. In fact, Sergeant Blevins 

testified he “was a hundred percent sure when [he] saw the photo that it was 

Shane Keller.” Id. at 653. Error, if any, in the trial court’s admission of the 

enhanced and enlarged photographs was, therefore, harmless.

 

9 While Keller objected at trial to the admission of the June 2 and June 4 photographs, he makes no claim on 

appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting those photographs. As such that claim is waived. 

Instead, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the “altered 

photographs,” State’s Exhibits 27 through 34. Appellant’s Br. at 22.

10 We note, however, that in Arlton v. Schraut, 936 N.E.2d 831, 838 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied, this 

court held it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude enlargements made from previously 

admitted digital images where those enlargements were accurate representations of the evidence portrayed. 
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B. Exclusion of Evidence

[27] Keller also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it: (1) 

excluded the Sheriff’s Department booking photographs of other arrested 

individuals, and (2) denied Keller’s request to try on the t-shirt in front of the

jury and show the jury his shoes. We address these claims in turn. 

[28] During trial, Keller moved to admit numerous Sheriff’s Department booking 

photographs as photographs to use in the cross-examination of Detective 

Miller, in order to show the jury that other arrested individuals also matched 

Keller’s general description and body type. The State objected and filed a

motion in limine to exclude the booking photographs. Appellant’s App. at 526. 

Discussion was held outside the presence of the jury, and the trial court granted 

the State’s motion to exclude the photos “unless [a] mug shot becomes 

relevant.” Tr. at 769. The trial court made clear that simply asking Detective 

Miller “to identify mug shots from the jail would not make it relevant.” Id. 

The booking photographs were not admitted.

[29] Keller asserts that the booking photographs would have impeached the 

deputies’ opinions that it was Keller pictured in the game camera at the 

farmhouse. He argues that the photographs were not only relevant to the 

course of investigation, but also to Keller’s defense of a biased misidentification. 

During trial, the State confirmed with Detective Miller that his identification of 

Keller was made after he looked at a photograph of the burglar’s profile. 

Detective Miller testified that the booking photographs were “head on facial 

shots,” not profile shots. Tr. at 783. He also testified that while it might be 
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“possible” to determine someone’s profile using a head-on shot, it would be 

difficult, and he would prefer to have a profile shot. Id. Defense counsel, while 

conceding that the booking photographs were “not ideal,” asked the court to 

admit them on the basis that they depicted “all kinds of people,” and were 

relevant to the issue of identity. Id. at 784. The trial court denied the admission 

of the booking photos, finding that they were not relevant and would not be 

admitted based on the “questions that have been asked at this point.” Id. 

Detective Miller was not asked any more questions about the booking 

photographs, and they were not admitted. Id. at 786. 

[30] The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Here, Keller wanted the booking 

photographs admitted to “put into evidence other possibilities of people who 

have been in the system.” Id. at 749. This evidence was intended to impeach 

the deputies’ previous testimony that Keller was pictured in State’s Exhibit 17. 

Keller intended to ask Detective Miller if he was familiar with the way the 

records were kept and whether the booking photographs were in compliance. 

Tr. at 757. The trial judge inquired, “Well, once he does that, assuming that he 

even can, and I don’t know if he can. Then once he’s done that then you’ve got 

the burden of establishing some relevance.” Id. The trial judge asked defense 

counsel if he was going to cross-examine Detective Miller using certain photos 

to compare them against “the pictures taken at the house.” Id. Defense counsel 

responded, “No.” Id. Keller has failed to prove that the photographs were 

relevant. Furthermore, the exclusion of these photographs was harmless. Even 

without the booking photographs, Keller was able to convey to the jury his 
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defense that he was not the individual pictured in the game camera 

photographs. The jury was able to judge the quality of the June 2 and June 4 

photographs and compare them against Keller’s profile as he sat at trial. We 

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding random 

Sheriff’s Department booking photographs, the use of which was to suggest that 

Exhibit 17 might depict someone other than Keller. 

[31] Keller also argues that the trial court should have allowed him to try on and 

show the jury the logo t-shirt and the shoes he was wearing when he was 

arrested. In part, he contends that by showing the jury that the t-shirt did not fit 

him in the same manner it fit the man pictured in the June 2 photographs and 

by showing that his shoes were not made by Nike, he could show that he was 

not the man pictured. Keller asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 

excluding this evidence because its admission would have undermined the 

identification of Keller as the man in the farmhouse. 

[32] We begin by noting that the trial court did not exclude this evidence; instead, it 

held that Keller would be subject to cross-examination following the 

demonstration. Keller chose not to admit the evidence and subject himself to 

cross-examination. In the absence of context, which cross-examination could 

have provided, Keller’s evidence would have been misleading. Regarding the 

fit of the t-shirt, Keller admitted outside the presence of the jury that he had 

gained a lot of weight since his arrest. Additionally, it was irrelevant what 

shoes Keller was wearing at the time of his arrest, more than a month after the 

crimes were committed. 
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[33] Even if we consider the issue as an error in the exclusion of evidence, as Keller 

asserts, any error was harmless. The t-shirt demonstration and admission of 

shoes were intended to bolster Keller’s contention that he was not the one 

pictured by the game camera. However, there was abundant evidence that 

Keller was the person pictured by the game camera. Deputy Strange, Sergeant 

Blevins, and Detective Miller, each of whom had known Keller for more than 

twenty years, testified that Keller was the person caught on the game camera in

State’s Exhibit 17. Furthermore, during telephone calls from prison, Keller

repeatedly told Father, “I got myself into this mess.” Tr. at 738, 40. Finally, 

Keller recognized that the State had pictures of him when, speaking to Father,

he said, “[T]hey’re wanting to give me more time than what Sterlin and time 

[sic] got for that shit they done, compared to this burglary case.” Id. at 739-40. 

Father responded, “Devon is looking pretty rough then too,” and Keller replied, 

“I know, he’s got his, he ain’t got no pictures or nothing on his.” Id. at 740. 

The demonstration of trying on the t-shirt and showing the jury Keller’s shoes

could not have overcome the properly admitted evidence that Keller was the 

man pictured in State’s Exhibit 17.

II. Jury Instruction

[34] Keller next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when, for purposes 

of Class B felony burglary, it instructed the jury regarding the definition of the 

term dwelling. We afford trial courts broad discretion in the manner of 

instructing a jury, and we review such decisions only for an abuse of that 

discretion. Hayden v. State, 19 N.E.3d 831, 838 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “When 
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reviewing jury instructions on appeal, we look to (1) whether the tendered 

instructions correctly state the law, (2) whether there is evidence in the record to 

support giving the instruction, and (3) whether the substance of the proffered 

instruction is covered by other instructions.” Id. We will reverse a conviction 

only where the appellant demonstrates that an error in the jury instructions 

prejudiced his substantial rights. Id. “[W]here a conviction is clearly sustained 

by the evidence and the jury could not properly have found otherwise, we will 

not reverse the conviction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “‘The 

purpose of [a] jury instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the 

facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case 

clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.’” Id. (quoting Dill v. State, 

741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001)). 

[35] The difference between Class B and Class C felony burglary is the type of 

building that is entered, i.e., burglary is enhanced if it takes place in a 

“dwelling.” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1. Due to the importance of this distinction, 

both parties proposed a jury instructions on the definition of “dwelling.” Keller 

proposed the following instruction, which tracked the statutory definition found 

in Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-107: “‘Dwelling’ means a building, structure 

or other enclosed space, permanent or temporary, moveable or fixed, that is a 

person’s home or place of lodging.” Appellant’s App. at 568. The State offered 

the following proposed instruction, which added the italicized language:

For purposes of the burglary statute, a dwelling is defined as a 

building, structure, or other enclosed space, permanent or temporary, 

moveable or fixed, that is a person’s home or place of lodging. Any 
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such place where a person keeps personal items with the intent to reside at some 

future time is considered a dwelling.

Id. at 544. The State cited White v. State, 846 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006), trans. denied, as the source of the additional language. The trial court 

reviewed White and modified the instruction to one that neither party offered. 

Final Instruction Number 17 read:

For purposes of the burglary statute, a dwelling is defined as a 

building, structure, or other enclosed space, permanent or temporary, 

moveable or fixed, that is a person’s home or place of lodging. Any 

such place where a person keeps personal items with the intent to reside 

in the near future is considered a dwelling.

Appellant’s App. at 596.

[36] In White, the victim, House, bought a residence in August 2003. One month 

later, House was in the process of remodeling. While House was not yet living 

at the home, he had moved furniture, clothes, beds, couches, refrigerator 

freezers, a television set, a radio, tools, and a washer and dryer into the house. 

White, 846 N.E.2d at 1031. House also kept his dog outside and visited several 

times a day. On September 15, 2003, White broke into House’s home and stole

a radio and a television. White was convicted of Class B felony burglary. 

[37] On appeal, White argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

burglary conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the building was a dwelling. In finding that there was sufficient evidence to 

sustain a conviction for Class B felony burglary, the White court reasoned:
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In the instant case, the record clearly supports that House purchased 

the property for use as a permanent residence. At trial, House testified 

he was in the process of remodeling the house and spent time at the 

house several times a day. House had moved furniture, clothes, beds, 

couches, refrigerator freezers, a television set, a radio, tools, and a 

washer and dryer into the house. In a similar case, Byers v. State, 521 

N.E.2d 318, 319 (Ind. 1988), the victims were in the process of moving 

out when their home was burglarized. The defendant argued because 

they did not intend to sleep at that location the night of the break-in 

nor did they intend to sleep there for the week remaining on their 

lease, it was not a dwelling. The Byers court noted, however, that 

because the victims intended to retain their right of dominion and 

return to the premises it should be considered a dwelling. Although, in 

the instant case the evidence established that House was in the process 

of moving into the house, the difference between moving out and 

moving in is too tenuous with regard to the facts at issue to make such 

a distinction. As a result, it would defy logic to classify House’s house 

as anything other than a dwelling for the purposes of the . . . burglary 

statutes. While it is uncertain when House and his family were to take 

up permanent residency in the house, it is clear that they intended to 

do so in the near future. Therefore, we find that the state proved beyond 

a reasonable doubt that the house was a dwelling. 

White, 846 N.E.2d at 1031 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

[38] Under the unusual facts of this case, we need not address whether the trial court 

abused its discretion. Assuming without deciding that the jury was properly 

instructed that a dwelling includes any such place “where a person keeps 

personal items with the intent to reside in the near future,” we find insufficient 

evidence to support the jury’s determination that the farmhouse was a dwelling 

for purposes of a Class B felony burglary conviction. 

[39] Hardwick’s great-grandparents died in the late 1990s and, thereafter, the 

farmhouse remained vacant. In October 2012, Hardwick, his wife, and two 
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children moved into Hardwick’s sister-in-law’s home, with the plan to remodel 

and then move into the farmhouse. Some food was kept in the freezer of the 

farmhouse and most of the family’s belongings were also stored in the 

farmhouse. Hardwick received his mail at the farmhouse and went by daily to 

feed livestock. 

[40] Even so, Hardwick described the farmhouse as being in “pretty rough” 

condition because it “[h]ad been sitting vacant for probably ten or twelve 

years.” Tr. at 503. Hardwick did not even start the remodeling project until the 

spring of 2013 and planned to do it alone. The project required Hardwick to 

tear out walls, install insulation, put up dry wall, paint, install new plumbing, 

redo part of the electrical system, redo the kitchen cabinetry, put in new light 

fixtures, and install a new tub, toilet, and vanity in the bathroom. Hardwick 

worked on the renovations about four or five hours a night. At that time he was 

also working at a factory job about six days a week. Photographs taken of the 

farmhouse around May 2013 revealed that most of the rooms were filled with 

boxes, bags, equipment, and assorted debris. Def.’s Ex. A. 

[41] Indiana courts have held

burglary, like arson, to be an offense against the habitation. This is 

reflected in the burglary statute itself, which provides for greater 

penalties the closer the offense comes to endangering another’s life or 

well-being. In determining what constitutes a dwelling, Watt v. State,

446 N.E.2d 644, 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), purports that the Indiana 

courts have given dwelling its plain and usual meaning. “The 

operative word defining ‘dwelling’ is a ‘home’—a settled residence 

house for a family and their personal possessions.” 
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Hayden, 19 N.E.3d at 837 (quoting White, 846 N.E.2d at 1031) (citations 

omitted). During the February 2014 trial—more than eight months after the 

June 4 burglary—Hardwick testified that he still lived with his relatives. Based 

on this evidence, we cannot say that the State proved that Hardwick intended to 

move into the farmhouse in the near future.

[42] To convict Keller of Class B felony burglary, the State had to prove that he 

broke and entered a building or structure that was a dwelling, with intent to 

commit a felony or theft therein. For Class C felony burglary, the State would 

have to prove that Keller broke and entered any building or structure, with the 

intent to commit a felony or theft therein. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1. A crime is a 

lesser included offense of another if it is impossible to commit the greater 

offense without first having committed the lesser one. Bedgood v. State, 477 

N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ind. 1985). Class C felony burglary is a lesser-included 

offense of Class B felony burglary. Keller’s convictions for two counts of Class 

B felony burglary reveal that the jury believed that Keller was the person who 

broke into the farmhouse with the intent to steal Keller’s property. Here, while 

finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Keller broke into a 

dwelling, there was more than sufficient evidence to convict Keller of the lesserincluded offenses of Class C felony burglary on June 2, 2013 and again on June 

4, 2013. We remand to the trial court with instructions to reduce Keller’s 

convictions under Counts I and IV from Class B felony burglary to Class C 

felony burglary and resentence accordingly. Additionally, we instruct the trial 
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court to resentence Keller’s enhancement for being a habitual offender to reflect 

that Count I is a conviction for Class C felony burglary.

III. Double Jeopardy

[43] Finally, Keller argues that his convictions for theft and receiving stolen property 

violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy. It is well established that two 

or more offenses are the “same offense” in violation of Article I, section 14 of 

the Indiana Constitution if, “with respect to either the statutory elements of the 

challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements 

of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another 

challenged offense.” Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999) 

(emphasis in original). 

[44] Here, we look to the statutory elements. At the time Keller committed the 

crime, Class D felony theft was defined as:

A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control 

over the property of another person, with intent to deprive the other 

person of any part of its value or use, commits theft, a Class D Felony.

[45] Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a). The crime of Class D felony receiving stolen property 

was, in pertinent part, defined as:

A person who knowingly or intentionally receives, retains or disposes 

of the property of another person that has been the subject of theft 

commits receiving stolen property, a Class D Felony.
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I.C. § 35-43-4-2(b). To prove that a person committed the crime of receiving 

stolen property, therefore, the State is also required to prove that the stolen 

object received was the subject of a theft. “Where, as here, the person who 

committed the theft was also convicted of receiving that same stolen property, 

then the elements of theft are inherently included in receiving stolen property.” 

White v. State, 944 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. granted, 

summarily affirmed on this issue, 963 N.E.2d 511, 520 (Ind. 2012). “In other 

words, an individual cannot be convicted of stealing property and of receiving 

that property when the spoils of victory are divvied up.” Id.

Keller notes that the information for Count III, receiving stolen property, 

alleged that he received, retained, or disposed of Hardwick’s Zinsser primer, 

which was one of the items Keller was alleged to have taken in Count II, theft. 

The information for Count X, receiving stolen property, alleged that he 

received, retained, or disposed of a Stihl chainsaw, a Craftsman nail gun, and a 

stainless-steel sink. Keller was charged with the theft of these same items as 

follows: the Craftsman nail gun in Count II; the stainless-steel sink in Count V; 

and the Stihl chainsaw in Count VII. Keller’s convictions for both theft and 

receiving stolen property, therefore, violate the prohibition against double 

jeopardy. We remand with instructions that the trial court vacate Counts III 
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and X, the receiving-stolen-property convictions and the sentences imposed 

thereon.11

[46] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing.

Friedlander, J., and Crone, J., concur.

 

11 As we noted above, Keller also contends that his fifty-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offense and the character of the offender. Because we remand to the trial court, in part, for 

resentencing, we do not address this issue. However, because this issue could be raised on a subsequent 

appeal, we remind Keller that an extensive criminal history is a significant factor in our evaluation of the 

character of the offender when reviewing whether a sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 

7(B).