UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4621

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ORAN TILLMAN DAVIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Richard L. Voorhees, 

District Judge. (3:02-cr-00251-RLV-DCK-1)

Submitted: February 24, 2010 Decided: March 10, 2010

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Aaron E. Michel, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Edward R. Ryan, United States Attorney, David A. Brown, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Oran Tillman Davis appeals his convictions for two 

counts of tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006). 

Finding no error, we affirm.

Davis first argues that the district court erred in 

denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground that 

the indictment was not returned within the applicable statute of 

limitations. We review de novo the district court’s denial of a 

Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. 

Reid, 523 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 663 

(2008). We also review Davis’s statute of limitations claim de 

novo. United States v. Uribe-Rios, 558 F.3d 347, 351 (4th Cir. 

2009); see also United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 236 (4th 

Cir. 1997) (“The government bears the burden of proving that it 

began its prosecution within the statute of limitations 

period.”).

The applicable statute of limitations in this case is 

six years. See 26 U.S.C. § 6531 (2006); Wilson, 118 F.3d at 

236. “The limitations period for a violation of [26 U.S.C.] 

§ 7201 begins to run on the date of the last affirmative act of 

tax evasion.” 118 F.3d at 236. Based on our review of the 

record, we find that Davis’s last affirmative act of tax evasion 

occurred in March 1997, when he mailed documents misrepresenting 

his relationship with Prime Management Group to Agent James. 
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Davis was therefore properly indicted within the statute of 

limitations. 

Davis next argues that the evidence was insufficient 

to support the jury’s verdict. “A defendant challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence” faces a “heavy burden.” United 

States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). “[A]n 

appellate court’s reversal of a conviction on grounds of 

insufficient evidence should be ‘confined to cases where the 

prosecution’s failure is clear.’” United States v. Jones, 735 

F.2d 785, 791 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Burks v. United States, 

437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978)). A verdict must be upheld on appeal if 

there is substantial evidence in the record to support it. 

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In 

determining whether the evidence in the record is substantial, 

this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Government, and inquires whether there is evidence that a 

reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and 

sufficient to establish a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th Cir. 

1996). Based on our review of the record, we find that 

substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict.

Finally, Davis argues that the indictment was 

defective for failing to set forth the precise amount of taxes 

that he sought to evade. Because this claim is raised for the 
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first time on appeal, we review for plain error. See United 

States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) (applying plain error 

test to claim that the indictment failed to allege element of 

charged offense).

Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure directs that an indictment “must be a plain, concise 

and definite written statement of the essential facts 

constituting the offense charged.” To pass constitutional 

muster, an indictment must satisfy two requirements: “‘[F]irst, 

that it contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly 

informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, 

and second, that it enables him to plead an acquittal or 

conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.’” 

United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007) 

(quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) 

(internal brackets omitted)); see also United States v. 

Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 1998) (“‘One of the 

principal purposes of an indictment is to apprise the accused of 

the charge or charges against him so he can prepare his 

defense.’”) (quoting United States v. Fogel, 901 F.2d 23, 25 

(4th Cir. 1990)).

Each count of the indictment in this case stated, in 

relevant part, that Davis “knew and believed [his] joint taxable 

income for the calendar year was substantially in excess of the 
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amount stated, and that an additional tax was due and owing to 

the United States.” Because the Government was not required to 

allege or prove the precise amount of additional tax due and 

owing at trial, see United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 235-36 

(3d Cir. 2007), we find that an exact amount was not required to 

be set forth in the indictment. See United States v. Citron, 

783 F.2d 307, 315 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The grand jury was not 

required to make . . . allegations as to the amounts of tax [a 

defendant in a § 7201 case] sought to evade. . . . [S]ince the 

indictment need not allege that which is not part of the 

government’s required proof, no exact figure need be stated in 

the indictment.”).

Accordingly, we affirm Davis’s convictions and 

sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED