In the United States Court of Federal Claims

Nos. 14-21L/16-405L (Consolidated)

(Filed: December 1, 2017)

ELLEN AND MARK S. BALAGNA, et 

al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

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Keywords: Rails-to-Trails Taking; 

Motion for Reconsideration; RCFC 

59(a). 

ROBERT AND SUSAN BATTERTON, 

et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

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Mark F. (“Thor”) Hearne, II, Arent Fox LLP, Washington, DC, with whom were 

Meghan S. Largent, Lindsay S.C. Brinton, Stephen S. Davis, and Abram J. Pafford, for 

Plaintiffs.

Sarah Izfar, Trial Attorney, Natural Resources Section, Environment and Natural 

Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, with whom was 

Jeffrey H. Wood, Assistant Attorney General, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

KAPLAN, Judge.

On October 5, 2017, the Court granted the government’s motions for summary 

judgment as to all the remaining plaintiffs in these consolidated rails-to-trails cases. See

Balagna v. United States, --- Fed. Cl. ---, 2017 WL 4416820, at *10 (Oct. 5, 2017). 

Pursuant to Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) 59, Plaintiffs have now moved 

for reconsideration of the Court’s ruling with respect to the claims made by the City of 
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Canton (City) and the Village of Norris (Village). See Pls’ Mot. for Partial Reconsid. of 

the Court’s O. Granting the Gov’ts Mot. for Summ. J. (Pls.’ Mot.), ECF No. 133. For the 

reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts were fully set forth in the Court’s October 5, 2017 Opinion, and 

are restated here only in brief. See Balagna, 2017 WL 4416820, at *2–3. In short, the 

City and the Village are Illinois municipal corporations that owned land abutting a 

railroad right-of-way, which was held by the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad 

Company (BNSF). Id. When BNSF sought to abandon the line, the Canton Parks District 

(CPD), another Illinois municipal corporation, filed a Request for Public Use Condition 

and Request for Interim Trail Use (Request) with the Surface Transportation Board 

(STB), indicating its willingness to assume financial responsibility for the corridor. Id. at 

*2. STB then issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU) on May 24, 2013.1Id. 

Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit in this Court. Id. at *2–3. In their complaints, the 

City and the Village alleged that the issuance of the NITU effected a taking of their 

interests in the land underlying the right-of-way. Id. The government then filed partial 

motions for summary judgment as to the City’s and the Village’s claims. Id. at *3; see 

also id. at *9–10. It contended that because the City and the Village, like CPD, were 

Illinois municipal corporations, and because Illinois retains authority over the use and 

disposal of its municipal corporations’ property, the issuance of the NITU at CPD’s 

behest did not constitute a compensable taking. See id. at *9.

After briefing on the government’s partial motions was complete, the Court 

ordered supplemental briefs from the parties. See Suppl. Briefing Order, ECF No. 92. In 

that Order, the Court observed that it was unclear whether “Illinois has delegated to park 

districts like CPD the State’s authority (acting through its legislature) to dispose of or 

interfere with property interests that belong to other municipal corporations, such as the 

City [and the Village].” Id. at 3. The Court thus asked the parties to brief the issue of 

“whether and to what extent Illinois law gives park districts the authority to appropriate 

for their own use land belonging to other municipal corporations.” Id.

After receiving the parties’ supplemental briefs and hearing oral argument, the 

Court ultimately granted the government’s motions with respect to the City and the 

Village on grounds that differed somewhat from those it raised in the supplemental 

briefing order. See Balagna, 2017 WL 4416820, at *9–10. Thus, the Court observed that 

“the parties do not contest (and the Court assumes) that CPD acted within its statutory 

authority under Illinois law when it filed the request for public use with the STB.” Id. at 

*10. Further, the Court concluded that when CPD, acting under that authority, “filed the 

public use request with the STB on the state’s behalf, the state effectively consented to 

the federal government holding the City’s and Village’s properties for use as a trail.” Id.

 

1 To the Court’s knowledge, CPD and BNSF have not yet finalized a trail use agreement. 

See Balagna, 2017 WL 4416820, at *2.
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at *10 & n.10 (citing Carmack v. United States, 329 U.S. 230, 241 n.12 1946)).

Accordingly, the Court determined that no compensable taking had occurred. Id.

DISCUSSION

Under RCFC 59(a), the Court may grant a motion for reconsideration “(A) for any 

reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal 

court; (B) for any reason for which a rehearing has heretofore been granted in a suit in 

equity in federal court; or (C) upon the showing of satisfactory evidence, cumulative or 

otherwise, that any fraud, wrong, or injustice has been done to the United States.” To 

meet this standard, a party generally must demonstrate that the court has committed a 

“manifest error of law[] or mistake of fact.” Johnson v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 558, 

560 (2016) (quoting Bishop v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 281, 286 (1992)). Whether to 

grant reconsideration lies within the sound discretion of the court. See Yuba Natural Res., 

Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 

After careful consideration, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not 

demonstrated that the Court committed a manifest error of law or fact in deciding the 

government’s motions. The heart of the Plaintiffs’ argument on reconsideration is that the 

Court erred by assuming that CPD acted within its statutory authority when it filed its

Request before STB. See Pls.’ Mot. at 2. To the contrary, Plaintiffs argue, they “do 

contest, and have contested, that Illinois law authorized the Canton Park District to take 

the City’s and Village’s property without consent.” Id.

The City and Village have misunderstand the reasoning supporting the Court’s 

October 5, 2017 decision. The Court did not conclude that CPD had powers of 

condemnation under state law that it could have used to obtain property belonging to the 

City or the Village, nor would it have characterized such a conclusion as “uncontested.”

Rather, the Court assumed that—irrespective of whether CPD possessed the authority 

under state law to condemn City or Village property—it did have authority under state 

law to file a Request for Public Use Condition and Request for Interim Trail Use 

(Request) with the STB. And in light of the fact that the state may dispose of the 

property of the Village and the City as it sees fit, the Court concluded that when CPD

exercised this authority under state law, it consented on the state’s behalf to the taking of 

the City’s and the Village’s property by the federal government.

Further, the Court did not err when it stated that Plaintiffs did not previously 

contest that CPD had the authority under state law to invoke the interim trail use process.

Thus, although Plaintiffs’ counsel initially responded “absolutely not” when asked at oral 

argument whether CPD acted within its authority when it filed the Request, she later 

walked back that statement, observing that Illinois law was “silent” regarding the issue. 

Tr. of Hearing at 51, 54 (Sept. 20, 2017), ECF No. 135; see also id. at 53 (“I don’t know 

that they’re prohibited [from filing the Request], but I don’t know that they’re allowed.”). 

Finally, and in any event, the Court agrees with the government that CPD’s 

actions, including its decision to file the Request, are to be accorded a presumption of 

regularity and that principles of federalism dictate that this Court not referee whether
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CPD possessed the authority under state law to file its request with the STB. See The 

United States’ Suppl. Br. in Support of Its Mots. for Partial Summ. J. Against Pls. The 

City of Canton and The Village of Norris (Def.’s Suppl. Br.) at 5–7, ECF No. 98. To the 

contrary, issues regarding the relative powers of a state’s subdivisions lie within the

province of Illinois’ state courts. See Wilmette Park Dist. v. Vill. of Wilmette, 490 

N.E.2d 1282, 1283 (Ill. 1986); City of Des Plaines v. Metro. Sanitary Dist., 268 N.E.2d 

428, 430 (Ill. 1971); Vill. of Schiller Park v. City of Chicago, 186 N.E.2d 343, 345-46 

(1962). The Court therefore did not commit error when it presumed for purposes of 

addressing the question before it that when CPD invoked the rails-to-trails process it

acted within the authority it had been delegated by the State of Illinois.

In summary, Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Court erred by presuming that CPD 

acted within its authority under state law when it filed the Request is unpersuasive. 

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have not shown that the Court has committed a manifest error 

of fact or law. Their motion for reconsideration is therefore DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Elaine D. Kaplan 

ELAINE D. KAPLAN

Judge