UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) v. ) Crim. Action No. 16-0023-3 (ABJ) ) BRADLEY LEE, ) ) Defendant. ) ____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION On June 7, 2016, defendant Bradley Lee was indicted on one count of interfer ence with interstate commerce by robbery, in v iolation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Indictme nt [Dkt. # 13] at 3. He was not arrested until July 27, 2016, when he was apprehended in Rochester, New York. See Rule 5 Letter [Dkt. # 25]; Bradley Lee Arrest Warrant [Dkt. # 26]. On August 11, 20 16, after he was transferred back to this District, the government moved for his temporary detention. Oral Mot. for Temporary Detention (Aug. 11, 2016); Min. Entry (Aug. 11, 2016). After a hearing on August 23, 2016, the Magistrate Judge ordered that the de fendant be released into the High Intensity Supervision Program, on personal recogn izance. Min. Entry (Aug. 23, 2016); Order (Aug. 23, 2016) [Dkt. # 30]. The government asked the Court to stay the pretrial release order and sought review of the Magistrate Judge’s denial of the det ention motion. Mot. for Emergency Review & Appeal of Release Order [Dkt. # 27] (“Gov’t Appeal Mot.” ). The Court granted the motion, stayed the Magistrate Judge’s release order, and set a detention hearing for August 24, 2016. Order (Aug. 23, 2016) [Dkt. # 28]. The government renewed i ts motion for pretrial detention the next day, Mot. for Pretrial Detention [Dkt. # 29] (“ Gov’t Detention Mot.”), and the defendant opposed it. Def.’s Suppl. to Record [Dkt. # 35] (“Def.’s Suppl.”). The detention hearing was held on August 24, 2016, and continued on August 2 5, 2016. Min. Entry (Aug. 24, 2016); Min. Entry (Aug. 25, 2016). At the conclusion of the hearing, the2 Court granted the government’s motio n and ordered the defendant to be held without bond. In reaching that decision, the Court considered the relevant law, the allegations presented in the indictment, the motion and opposition, the evidence presented at the hear ings, and the information provided by the Pretrial Services Agency, as well as the statements and arguments of counsel. Based on the record before it, the Court found by clear and convincing evide nce that there was no condition or combination of conditions that could “reasonably assure the appearance of the [defendant] as required and the safety of any other person and the community” if defendant was released. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). The reasons for the Court’s decision are set forth in mo re detail in this Memorandum Opinion; in su m, there is a presumption of danger ousness that has not been rebutted, and there is significant evidence of defendant’s efforts t o flee from the police and evade capture, including the undeniable fact that he was apprehended in Ro chester, New York.
BACKGROUND This case involves a series of armed robberies allegedly committed by a sma ll group of friends and relatives in various combin ations. At the detention hearing and in pleadings filed before the Court, the government proceeded by proffer, and it also present ed evidence, including surveillance footage, still photogra phs, social media postings, a video tape of statements made by the defendant after his arrest, and the testimony of Special Agent Charles Rooney, the FBI case agent who investigated the robberies in question. Defendant also present ed evidence and offered testimony from his girlfriend of five years, Faith Hudson. Based on the ple adings filed and the evidence presented in this case to date, the Court makes the following find ings of fact. The indictment charges, among other offenses, that defendant Bradley Lee , his brother Breyon Lee, and an individual named Gregory Hull committed a robbery in vio lation of the Hobbs3 Act on December 21, 2015. Indictment at 3; Mem. Op. & Order (July 1, 2016) [Dk t. # 24] at 2. 1 On that date, at 8:33 p.m., four indivi duals entered the Rite-Aid pharmacy located at 4635 South Capitol Street, S.W., with their faces covered. Mem. Op. & Order at 2. Surve illance footage shows that one of the individuals hopped the front counter and pointed a gun at the cashier. Id. According to an eyewitness, the man told the cashier to give him the money fr om the register or he would kill him. Id. A second individual pointed a second gun at a different eyewitness who was at the counter purchasing items, and he told her to stay down. Id. As this was occurring, security camera footage shows a third individual hopping over the pharmac y counter, taking several bottles of medicine, and crossing back over the counter. Id. The four men then left the store together. Id. An eyewitness alerted passing Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) of ficers to what had occurred and directed the officers to a white BMW parked nearby, which t he suspects had just entered. Id. The suspects fled in the BMW into the Barry Farms neighborhood in Washingto n, D.C., where they bailed out of the car and fled on foot. Id. Officers eventually apprehended defendant Hull, but they did not locate any of the other suspects. Id. Inside the BMW, police found three bottles of medicine, at least two of which appear to have origin ated at the Rite-Aid.
Id. at 2–3. Fingerprints belonging to Hull and another indicted defendant, Anthony Burns, were found in the BMW. Id. at 3. Defendant’s brother, Breyon Lee, was later determined to be the source of fingerprints recovered from the spot where the third robber plac ed his hand as he vaulted the pharmacy counter. Id.

1 At a detention hearing held for defendant’s brother, Breyon Lee, see Min. Entry (June 23, 2016); Min. Entry (June 28, 2016), the government presented evidence rele vant to both defendants. That evidence was also introduced in this proceeding. For that reason, the Court relies in part on the recitation of facts contained in its Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the government’s request that Breyon Lee be detained pending trial. See Mem. Op. & Order (July 1, 2016). Much of the legal analysis in that opinion is reprinted here, as well.4 Four fingerprints belonging to defendant Bradley Lee were found on or insi de the BMW. Gov’t Detention Mot. at 2. In addition, the government has proffered that the suspect they believe to be the defendant was shown entering the Rite-Aid on the surveillance foo tage wearing a black “True Religion” brand hooded sweatsh irt with white piping and black jeans , an outfit which matches clothing worn by the defend ant in a photograph posted to social med ia by co-defendant Burns in late 2015. Id. at 2–3. The government has also put forth evidence, including surveillance foota ge, that tends to tie defendant Bradley Lee to at least two additional armed robberies of two 7-11 convenience stores on December 12, 2015. See id. at 3. Surveillance photographs show that a suspect in the 7- 11 robberies was wearing the black “T rue Religion” brand hooded sweatshir t with white piping similar to the one the government proffers was worn by defendant Bradley Le e during the RiteAid robbery. Id. On top of the hoodie, the suspect was wearing a parka-like jacket with a furtrimmed hood that appears similar to a jacket worn by defendant’s brother, Breyon Lee, in a photograph taken during a January 7, 2016 arrest. Id. A second suspect was wearing clothing associated with one of defendant’s co-defendants, Anthony Burns, and the third was wearing clothing associated with defendant’s brother, Breyon Lee. See Gov’t Ex. 1. In carrying out the two 7-11 robberies on December 12, 2015, it appears from the surveillance v ideo that the perpetrators followed a procedure s imilar to the one involved in the Rite- Aid robbery. On June 7, 2016, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment, chargin g defendant Bradley Lee, his brother Breyon Lee, and Gregory Hull with the Rite-Aid rob bery. Indictment at 3. Count Four charges that those defe ndants took merchandise belonging to a Rite Aid Pharmacy located at 4635 South Capitol Street, S.W., Washington, D.C., “from the cu stody and possession5 of employees of that store, against their will by means of actual and threat ened force, violence, and fear of injury, immediate and future, to their persons.” Id. 2 On June 17, 2016, defendant’s brother, Breyon Lee, was arrested in the District of Columbia. Breyon Lee Arrest Warrant [Dkt. # 14]; Gov’t Detention Mot. at 3. 3 At the detention hearing, Special Agent Rooney testified that he was the FBI case agent assi gned to investigate the string of armed robberies in the District and Maryland, and that he was surv eilling Breyon and Bradley Lee as part of that investigation when he observed both defendants cross the street within a few feet of his unmarked vehicle and join a group of several individuals outside of an apartment complex. Special Agent Rooney testified that he called MPD officers to the scene to arrest both defendants, and that as the MPD officers approached the group of individua ls, Bradley Lee turned and walked quickly away. Special Agent Rooney added that he observed Bradl ey Lee turn and look back over his shoulder before ducking into a nearby apartment buildin g. Breyon Lee was arrested, but Bradley Lee was not appr ehended on that date, despite effort s to locate him. On July 27, 2016, more than five weeks after his brother was apprehended, Br adley Lee was arrested in Rochester, New York. Gov’t Detention Mot. at 3. Special Age nt Rooney testified that he was informed by the arresting agents that defendant fled from the of ficers during the arrest, but did not get very far before he was apprehended. Defendant’s own witness , Ms. Hudson, confirmed this account, as she told th e Court that when the agents in Rochet er appeared on the street and called the defendant’s name, he ran. The government proffered that while defendant
2 Bradley Lee’s co-defendants – Breyon Lee, Gregory Hull, and Anthony Burn s – are all being held without bond. See Min. Entry (Feb. 18, 2016); Mem. Op. & Order (July 1, 2016). 3 The arrest warrant and the docket in this matter indicate that the arrest o ccurred on June 17, 2016, and the government’s motion pr ovides the same date. However, Spe cial Agent Rooney testified during the detention hearing that Breyon Lee was arrested on Jun e 16, 2016, and the FBI Form 302 completed by Special Agent Rooney with regard to that arrest also s tates that it took place on June 16, 2016. Because the date is not material to the Court’s analy sis, it will use the date provided in the arrest warrant that is part of the Court’s docket.6 was being held after his arrest, he told the agents that “he had run from ‘MPD ’ in D.C.,” that “he knew an arrest warrant had been issued for him because his friends who were i ncarcerated told him,” and that “he was relieved he was apprehended so that he did not have to b e on alert at all times.” Id. He also allegedly told the arresting a gents “that his mother wanted him to turn himself [in],” but that “this was not something he wanted to do.” Id. Defendant’s own witness, Ms. Hudson, confirmed that def endant spoke to his mother and other family memb ers regularly while he was staying with her in Rochester. The government introduced an FBI Form 302 completed by the arresting agent s which memorializes these statements, as well as a video of the comments made by th e defendant while sitting in the custody of the FBI Agents in Rochester. During the nearly two -hour video, defendant proudly volunteered that he had been well aware that he was under surveillance in the District and in Rochester, and that he had managed to elude police in the District.
STANDARD OF REVIEW The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 et seq. , provides that if a judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that “no condition or combination o f conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety o f any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the pers on before trial.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e)(1), (f)(2)(g). Even if defendant does not pose a flight risk, danger to the community alone is a sufficient reason to order pretrial detention. United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 754–55 (1987); United States v. Simpkins , 826 F.2d 94, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Congress also specified in the Bail Reform Act that a judicial finding that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed certain offenses – includin g the offense of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, or possess ing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) – gives rise to a rebuttable7 presumption that a defendant is a danger, and that no pretrial condition or combination of conditions will be sufficient to protect the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e )(3)(B). Once a rebuttable presumption has been triggered, “the presumption operate[s] at a
minimum to impose a burden of production on the defendant to offer some credible evi dence contrary to the statutory presumption.” United States v. Alatishe , 768 F.2d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original); s ee also United States v. Portes , 786 F.2d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 1985) (the presumptions in § 3142(e) “are ‘re butted’ when the defendant meets a b urden of production by coming forward with some evidence that he will not flee or endanger the co mmunity if released”), quoting United States v. Dominguez , 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Rodriguez , 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] defendant must introduce some evidenc e contrary to the presumed fact in orde r to rebut the presumption.”), citing United States v. Matir , 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986). While the burden of production may not be heavy, see United
States v. Stricklin , 932 F.2d 1353, 1355 (10th Cir. 1991), the applicable cases all speak in ter ms of a defendant’s obligation to introduce “evidence.” And, as the court explained in United States v. Ali , 793 F. Supp. 2d 386 (D.D.C. 2011), even if the defendant offers evidence to counter the presumption, the pres umption does not disappear entirely: At oral argument, defendant’s counsel posited that the rebuttable presumption functions as a “bursting bubble” that ceases to exist once a defendant produces any credible evide nce. Although the D.C. Circuit has not expressly ruled on this issue, circuits that have considered the issue require using the presumption as a factor even after the defendant has produced credible evidence as do judges of this Court.
Id. at 388 n.2 (internal citations omitted), citing United States v. Bess , 678 F. Supp. 929, 934 (D.D.C. 1988) (“[The presumption] is incorporated into the § 3142(g) fact ors considered by the court when determining whether cond itions of release can be fashioned or whether the defendant must be detained pretrial.”); see also United States v. Stone , 608 F.3d 939, 945 (6th Cir. 2010)8 (“Even when a defendant satisfies his burden of production, however, ‘the presumption favoring detention does not disappear entirely but remains a factor to be considere d among those weighed by the district court.’”), quoting United States v. Mercedes , 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001);
Portes , 786 F.2d at 764 (“[U]se of [the word rebutted] in this context is somewhat m isleading because the rebutted presumption is not erased. Instead, it remains in the case as an evidentiary finding militating against release, to be weighted along with other evide nce relevant to factors listed in § 3142(g).”), quoting Dominguez , 783 F.2d at 707. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained: The presumption remains as a factor because it is not simply an evidentiary tool designed for the courts. Instead, the presumption reflects Congress ’s substantive judgment that particular classes of offenders should ordinarily be detained prior to trial. To rebut the presumption, therefore, a defendant should “present all the special featur es of his case” that take it outside “ the congressional paradigm.”
Stone , 608 F.3d at 945–46 (internal citations omitted), quoting United States v. Jessup , 757 F.2d 378, 387 (1st Cir. 1985). But in the end, while the presumption ope rates to shift the burden of produc tion, it does not alter the government’s statutory burden of persuasion, which is consi stent with the presumption of innocence. Portes , 786 F.2d at 764. “Regardless of whether the presumption applies, the government’s ultimate burden is to prove that no conditions of release can assure that the defendant will appear and to assure the safety of the community.” Stone , 608 F.3d at 946. To determine whether the government has carried its burden, the Court must consider: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including wheth er the offense is a crime of violence,” (2) the weight of the evidence, (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant, and (4) “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the commun ity that would be posed by the person’s release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).9 Finally, although the D.C. Circuit has not yet addressed the issue, the many circuits that have agree that the district judge should review de novo a detention decision rendered by a Magistrate Judge. See, e.g. , United States v. Koenig , 912 F.2d 1190, 1191 (9th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases); United States v. Stewart , 19 F. App’x 46, 48 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gonzales , 149 F.3d 1192 at *1 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hazime , 762 F.2d 34, 36 (6th Cir. 1985); Portes , 786 F.2d at 761. The Court will follow that procedure in this case.
ANALYSIS The government maintains that defendant Bradley Lee is subject to pretria l detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(f)(1)(A) and (f)(2)(A) because the charged o ffense qualifies as a crime of violence and because there is a serious risk that the defendant wil l flee. Gov’t Appeal Mot. at 3. There appears to be no dispute in this case that armed robbery in vi olation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 qualifies as a “crime of violence” for purposes of section 3142(f)(1 )(A). 4 The government has taken the position that “[d]ue to the Defendant’s indic tment for the Rite-Aid Hobbs Act violatio n . . . the rebuttable presumption under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) appl[ies].” Gov’t Detention Mot. at 3. The Court agrees that there is probable cause to b elieve that the defendant committed an offense that triggers the presumption, and it find s that defendant has failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption if it app lies. The Court also finds, after consideration of the four factors set forth in section 3142(g ), that there is clear and convincing evidence that “no cond ition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the [defendant] as required and the safety of any other perso n and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).

4 With respect to whether a Hobbs Act r obbery constitutes a “crime of violen ce” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3), see United States v. McCallister , No. CR 15-0171 (ABJ), 2016 WL 3072237, at *7 (D.D.C. May 31, 2016) (collecting cases).10 I. The defendant is presumed to be dangerous, and he has not rebutted the pre sumption in this case. The Bail Reform Act creates a rebuttable presumption “that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the . . . safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the [defendant] committe d . . . an offense under section 924(c) . . . of this title.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(B). This defendant is not currently charge d with a violation of section 924(c); at this time, he is only charged with the robb ery in violation of the Hobbs Act. Indictment at 3. But as the court reasoned in United States v. Bess , 687 F. Supp. 929 (D.D.C. 1988): [T]he facts found by the judicial officer at the detention hearing determi ne whether the statutory presumption is implicated; . . . the complaint need n ot allege a violation of one of the particular predicate offenses for the presumption to come into play. If the facts establish probable cause that the defendant has violated 18 U.S.C. § 924( c), the judicial officer should giv e proper weight to Congress’s general factual view that the defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to the community when applying the § 3142(g) factors. Id. at 934. So the question is whether this Court can make a finding on this record that t here is probable cause to believe that the def endant violated section 924(c) when : (1) there is probable cause to believe, based upon the fingerprint evidence, that he was an activ e participant in a multidefendant Hobbs Act robbery at a Rite-Aid on December 21, 2015; and (2) ther e is probable cause to believe, based on the eyewitness a ccounts and the surveillance video, that two of the participants either used or carried a firearm during the commission of that crime of viol ence, or possessed a firearm in furtherance of that crime , in violation of section 924(c); but ( 3) defendant Lee was not one of the gunmen. In other words, can a defendant be liable as an aider and ab ettor or a coconspirator for an alleged violation of section 924(c), which imposes enh anced penalties for “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . uses or carri es a firearm or who,11 in furtherance of any such crime, po ssesses a firearm”? 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1 )(A). And if so, would the presumption of dangerousness att ach? The Court answered these questi ons in its Memorandum Opinion and Order supporting the pretrial detention of Breyon Lee, see Mem. Op. & Order (July 1, 2016), and it will apply the same reasoning here. The Supreme Court has held that the government can “make its case” of aiding and abetting a section 924(c) violation “by proving that the defendant actively partic ipated in the underlying drug trafficking or violent crime w ith advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun during the crime’s commission.” Rosemond v. United States , 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1243 (2014). And the D.C. Circuit has concluded that a defendant who did not actually or c onstructively possess a firearm may be punished as a principal if the government can show that the d efendant conspired in, or aided and abetted, a section 924(c)(1) offense. United States v. Long , 905 F.2d 1572, 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Washington , 106 F.3d 983, 1011–12 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Having viewed the videotape of this armed robbery in progress, the Court fi nds that there is probable cause to conclude that Brad ley Lee either aided and abetted, or conspired in, the use of a firearm during and in relation to, or the possession of a firearm in furthe rance of, a crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The surveillance f ootage showed an efficient, well-or chestrated robbery of the Rite-Aid pharmacy. Th e four men who committed the offense entered the store together, and one of them visibly drew his weapon just as he passed through the doors. Nothing shown on the tape or any of the evidence presented during any of the hearings in this matter gave rise to the impression that the individual alleged to be Bradley Lee was sur prised or concerned in any way about the use of the firearms, and the perpetrators left the store to gether and fled in a single car. So there is probable cause to believe that this defendant aided and abetted, or conspired in, the commission of the uncharged firearms offense.12 The government has not pointed the Court to authority for the proposition that under the Bail Reform Act, it may rely upon a vicarious liability theory to establish the commission of an offense that gives rise to the rebuttable presumption under section 18 U.S .C. § 3142(e)(3). But in interpreting another section of the Bail Reform Act, the First Circuit stated that “a conspiracy to commit a crime of violence is itself a crime of violence” under the Act. United States v. Mitchell , 23 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994). In other words, the Bail Reform Act “does not req uire that the defendant himself commit acts of physical violence as a condition precede nt to a detention order.”
United States v. Ciccone , 312 F.3d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 2002). Because the government has established probable cause to believe that that defendant violated secti on 924(c) by aiding and abetting or conspiring in the commission of that offense, the Court could f ind that the rebuttable presumption prescribed in § 3142(e)(3)(B) applies in this case. If the presumption applies, the burde n then shifts to the defendant to come forward with credible evidence that he does not pose a danger to the community. Alatishe , 768 F.2d at 371. Defendant has pointed the Court to his limited criminal history, and he ins ists that there is only circumstantial evidence of his invol vement in the two 7-11 robberies, but he has offered no
evidence to rebut the statutory presumption. But even if the Court were to conclude that the defendant has come forward wi th something to counter the presumption and show that he does not pose a danger to the community, it would be bound to go on and consider the all of the factors set forth in section 3142(g ). And with or without the presumption, the Court finds that consideration of those factors weighs in favor of detention. II. Considering only the factors set out in the Bail Reform Act, the Court fi nds that the defendant should be detained. A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense Charged In determining whether there are conditions of release that will assure de fendant’s appearance and the safety of the community, the Court must first consider “ the nature and13 circumstances of the offense charged.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1). Section 31 42(g)(1) specifically directs the Court to consider “whether the offense is a crime of violence . . . or involves a . . . firearm” in making that assessment. Id. Here, both are true. Armed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 qualifie s as a crime of violence, see United States v. McCallister , No. CR 15-0171 (ABJ), 2016 WL 3072237, at *7 (D.D.C. May 31, 2016), and defendant does not contest that two handguns wer e involved in the Rite-Aid robbery. The surveillance camera captured a clear view of one of the robbers violently jerking the cashier back by his collar and pointing a gun directly at his hea d. The fact that the defendant did not personally brandish one of the two weapons used in the off ense is of no moment. For those reasons, the Court finds that the nature and circumstances of the offense weigh heavily in favor of detention. B. The Weight of the Evidence of Defendant’s Dangerousness The Court must next consider the weight of the evidence against the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2). Courts in other circuits have cautioned that a district cour t assessing the weight of the evidence at this juncture must not c onsider the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, but rather, they must consider only the weight of th e evidence of the defendant’s dange rousness. Stone , 608 F.3d at 948; see also United States v. Gebro , 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that section 3142(g) “neither requires nor permits a pretrial determination o f guilt”). Here, while the defendant does not have an extensive prior criminal history, the weight of the evidence of his dangerousness is strong. On the indicted offense itsel f, the evidence provided by the government indicates that defendant was a participant in a violent a nd dangerous armed robbery, which placed several innocent victims at risk and involved two we apons. When the Court also considers the evidence linking defendant to the two 7-11 robberies, which also involved handguns and the violent use of force against victims, the evidence of defe ndant’s dangerousness14 becomes even stronger. And he has offered no evidence himself to controvert the government’s proffer on this issue. Accordingly, this factor also favors pretrial dete ntion. C. The History and Characteristics of the Defendant The Court is also required to consider the history and characteristics of t he defendant, including his character, family, employment, and criminal history, financial resources, community ties, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings, among other factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A). While defendant’s c riminal history is not significant, the Pretrial Services Agency report does reflect that he has a 2014 conviction for marijuana poss ession with intent to distribute, for which he completed a term of probation without incident, and that that he was again charged with a similar offense as recently as June 2016. And the Court canno t help but observe that one cannot talk about the defendant’s lack of criminal history without first putting aside the evidence of his alleged connection to three armed robberies. Defendant’s experience with violence may have been short-lived, but it was significant enough to make him dangerous. Defendant insists that he has strong family ties to the area, and he has offe red a proposal for his supervision – that he be permitted to reside with his mother in Maryl and while on pretrial release. But the Court has yet to hear from the mother in any fashion. And def endant has failed to come forward with any evidence or testimony that would indicate how he wo uld be supervised or occupied if released – he is unemployed, and his mother works full time outside the home. As to defendant’s other personal characteristics, he did not graduate fro m high school, but to his credit, he has completed his GED. He insists that he is not a flight ris k because he “is a lifelong resident of the D.C. metro ar ea and has finished high school,” and is currently in a relationship with Ms. Hudson, who is a full-time student at the George Wash ington University in the District. Def.’s Suppl. at 1. He “c ontests the Government’s assertion . . . that [he] fled from officers when his brother was arrested on June 17, 2016.” Id. He also insists that he did not flee15 the District, but simply was visiting Ms. Hudson in Rochester, while she wo rked for the summer, and that he returned to the District after two trips before he was arrested i n Rochester on July 27,
2016. Id. at 1–2. Defendant took the position in his opposition that while he “no doub t . . . knew of his brother’s arrest and indictment ,” there was no indication that defe ndant “knew that he himself had been indicted and if he did know, when he knew he had been indicte d.” Id. at 2. The evidence shows that defendant made several trips to and from Rochester during June and July, and it is not particularly probative on the question of his knowle dge of the indictment or his attempt to evade capture by leaving the jurisdiction. Defendant took a n American Airlines flight to New York on June 6, 2016, the d ay before the indictment was handed d own, but despite having already purchased a return tic ket home, he chose instead to take a bu s back to the District on June 14, 2016. 5 He returned to Rochester with Ms. Hudson on June 26, 2016, via automobile, and took a bus back to the District on July 1, 2016. Finally, he traveled to Ro chester by bus on July 25, 2016, and was arrested there two days later. But the other evidence introduced at the hearing destroys any claim that de fendant was unaware that he was wanted. First, defe ndant has offered nothing to underm ine Special Agent Rooney’s testimony that he observed def endant fleeing from the scene of hi s brother’s arrest by turning, quickly walking away from the approaching officers, and ducking into a nearby apartment building. Furthermore, while he may have had a legitimate reason for trave ling to Rochester in the first place – to visit his long-time girlfriend – the fact that he had a purpose for being there is not incompatible with the notion that he returned there to avoid capture. D efendant also has not

5 The government posits that the defendant changed his method of transport ation to reduce the chance that he would be tracked by authorities; defendant’s girlfrien d testified that defendant had been so frightened by the flight to New York – his first airplane trip – th at he decided to take the bus back instead. It is somewhat s uspicious that a wanted individual wi th no means of support purchased a bus ticket without seeking a refund or credit for the unused por tion of the airline ticket, but none of this evidence weighs heavily in the Court’s decision.16 controverted the testimony offered by Special Agent Rooney – and confirme d by Ms. Hudson, who was present at the scene of the arre st – that defendant attempted to flee from the arresting officers in Rochester as soon as they yelled his name and identified themse lves as federal agents, and that he only stopped when he was caught by the agents. Most important, th e evidence includes a video tape of the defendant boasting to the Rochester FBI agents – not in re sponse to any question – about how he knew the police were looking for him but, since he was “street smart,” he successfully evaded them. So this factor weighs in favor of detention. D. The Nature and Seriousness of the Danger to Any Person or the Community That Would Be Posed by the Defendant’s Release Finally, the Court considers “the nature and seriousness of the danger to a ny person or the community that would be posed” by defendant’s release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (4). And it concludes that this final factor also weighs in favor of detention. With respect to the charged offense, as discussed above, the evidence show s that defendant was part of a group that allegedly planned and executed a violent armed robb ery. The robbery was both a serious and violent offense involving the use of two weapons against several victims, and it indicates that defendant would pose a threat to the community were he to b e released. Beyond the charged offense, there is other evidence of defendant’s danger ousness. While the D.C. Circuit does not appear to have addressed the issue, other courts h ave found that a court may consider a variety of sources of evidence of the defendant’s danger to t he community, separate and apart from evidence relating to the crime charged. See, e.g. , Stone , 608 F.3d at 953; United States v. Rodriguez , 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Quartermaine , 913 F.2d 910, 917 (11th. Cir. 1990). As one court in this district has observed, “[e]vide nce of a defendant’s dangerousness is in no way limited to evidence of the elements of the crime w ith which he is charged” – rather, “evidence of a defendant’s dangerousness can be virtua lly unrelated to the17 charged offense,” especially “where the evidence of defendant’s dangero usness relates to prior offenses.” Bess , 678 F. Supp. at 933. In this case, the Court has seen evidence – albeit circumstantial – that connects this defendant to a series of armed robberies and/or a conspiracy to commit a ser ies of armed robberies, and which tends to show that he was a participant in two armed robberies in ad dition to the one charged in the indictment. In other words, the government has presented ev idence to show, and the Court has significant reason to believe, that the charged offense was n ot an isolated event, but rather, part of a string of organized, planned armed robberies that involv ed one or more weapons and put innocent people in significant danger. For all those reasons, the Court finds that the fourth statutory factor wei ghs heavily in favor of detention.
CONCLUSION Because defendant has failed to rebut the presumption of dangerousness, and because the factors set forth in the Bail Reform Act counsel in favor of detention in any event, the Court concluded that there is clear and convi ncing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the safety of the community or defendant’s appearance as required at future proceedings in this matter. For that reason, it granted the government’s motion for pretrial detention, and ordered defendant held without bond.

AMY BERMAN JACKSON United States District Judge DATE: August 30, 2016