IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 17, 2017

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRISTOPHER JONES

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County

No. S64928 James F. Goodwin, Judge

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No. E2016-00769-CCA-R3-CD

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Defendant, Christopher Jones, appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to serve in 

confinement his effective two-year sentence resulting from his guilty pleas to reckless 

aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, driving under the influence of an intoxicant 

(DUI), simple possession of buprenophine (a Schedule III drug), and simple possession 

of marijuana (a Schedule VI drug). Upon reviewing the applicable law, we affirm the 

judgments of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

THOMAS T. WOODALL, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT 

WILLIAMS and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

Ricky A.W. Curtis, Blountville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Christopher Jones.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Clark B. Thornton, Senior 

Counsel; Barry Staubus, District Attorney General; and Benjamin Rowe, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Background

Guilty Pleas

At the guilty plea hearing the State and Defendant stipulated that the summary of 

the facts contained in the presentence report, as taken from the narrative/case notes of 

Officer K. Frederick of the Bristol Police Department, was accurate and sufficient to 

provide a factual basis for the offenses of reckless aggravated assault, reckless 

endangerment, driving under the influence (DUI), simple possession of buprenorphine, a 

01/19/2018
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Schedule III drug, simple possession of marijuana, and failure to exercise due care while 

driving a motor vehicle:

On 9/28/14 at 6:00 p.m. I, Officer Frederick, responded with Officer Joe 

Newman to Highway 394 at White Top[] Rd. in reference to a traffic 

accident. Upon arrival, I saw a black Chevrolet pickup truck with the 

NC registration of BZ2597 on the shoulder of the west bound lane. 

Underneath the front of the pickup truck was a white Suzuki motorcycle 

with the TN registration of 63ZK00 belonging to [Defendant]. The 

driver of the Chevy pickup was identified as Amy Thompson. Her 

husband, Brandon Lee Thompson, was in the front seat passenger seat 

while their 12[-] year old son was in the back[] seat on the driver-side of 

the vehicle. None of the occupants of the Chevy pickup reported having 

injuries. [Defendant] was standing on the hillside on the other side of 

the guardrail at the right side passenger door of the pickup smoking a 

cigarette. A female who later identified herself as Angela Whitaker was 

on the ground behind and to the right of the vehicle. The fire department 

was already on the scene and was tending to a female. It was determined 

that [Defendant] was driving a Suzuki motorcycle while Angela 

Whitaker was on the back of the motorcycle. There was significant 

debris from the motorcycle that was scattered at the scene. I tried to 

speak to [Defendant] but he seemed to be in a daze and was unable to 

state what happened. He did not express any concern for the female who 

had been his passenger. It was unknown at that time if his condition was 

due to the accident or if he was under the influence of alcohol/or drugs. 

Even the first responders with the fire department believed his behavior 

was odd and not common with somebody involved in a accident. 

[Defendant] was transported to BRMC by Rescue 2. Officer Bush 

responded to the emergency room to follow up with [Defendant] who 

refused to submit willingly to a blood test. Officers had spoken to 

[Defendant] when he had responded to the scene of a motorcycle 

accident at 2010 Weaver Pike the night before to pick up the motorcycle 

which was involved in that accident (OCAC2014006339). The owner of 

the motorcycle, Steven Bryant, was found to be in possession of 

methamphetamine, and a small amount of green plant like substance that 

had the appearance and smell of marijuana. The family of [Defendant] 

remained on the scene after he was transported to the hospital and kept 

asking about getting the motorcycle and his personal belongings. Due to 

his suspicious circumstances, Sgt. Matthew Cousins then requested that 

officer Chesney Griffin respond to the scene to have K9 Ruger conduct 

an open air sniff of the area. At the request of Sgt. Still I transported the 

driver of the Chevy, Amy Thompson, to the hospital for a voluntary 

blood draw. The blood was collected and I escorted her back to the 
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scene. When I arrived back on the scene Officer Griffin had already had 

K9 Ruger conduct an open air sniff of the area. She reported K[]9 Ruger 

alerted on the back seat of the motorcycle. As well as, the area near 

where [Defendant] was standing. During a search of the area, Officer 

Keese located what appeared to be a “Joint” which was a green plant like 

substance that had the appearance and odor of marijuana rolled up in 

rolling paper. Officer Griffin also reported that K[]9 Ruger was trying to 

get into the area between the guardrail and the truck. Upon checking this 

area, Officer Griffin located a cellophane cigarette wrapper that 

contained three whole pills and one half of a pill all of which were the 

same in appearance. The round white pills with inscription 54 411 had 

the appearance identical with that of Suboxone (Schedule III). These 

items were collected as evidence and are being sent to the TBI Lab for 

identification. An accident report was also completed.

Sentencing Hearing

Trial counsel indicated that the presentence report had been filed and that he had 

reviewed it with Defendant. He also stated that Defendant agreed to proceed 

immediately to sentencing. Trial counsel then entered into evidence two letters from 

Defendant’s present employer, “Crosswhite AC Services.” 

Katheryn Strouth, Defendant’s mother, acknowledged that Defendant had been 

sentenced to the Department of Correction for previous offenses and was released in 

2012. Other than the present offenses, Defendant had not had any further legal 

difficulties. Ms. Strouth testified that she has had constant contact with Defendant since 

his release from prison, and he lived in Bristol with his two sons, ages 10 and 2. She said 

that Defendant was both the “primary residential parent” and the “full legal custodian” of 

the two children. Ms. Strouth testified that the children would be “devastated” if 

Defendant were to be incarcerated, and she felt that they would become “wards of the 

state” due to the lack of family resources to care for them. She said that employees of the 

Department of Children’s Services and various members of law enforcement had stopped 

by Defendant’s house for welfare checks on the children, and they had never found 

anything improper during their search. On cross-examination, Ms. Strouth testified that 

she had not witnessed any drug use by Defendant since 2012. 

Analysis

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve his effective 

two-year sentence in confinement. The State responds that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in ordering Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. We agree with 

the State. 
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The trial court has broad discretion to impose a sentence anywhere within the 

applicable range, regardless of the presence or absence of enhancement or mitigating 

factors, and “sentences should be upheld so long as the statutory purposes and principles, 

along with any enhancement and mitigating factors, have been properly addressed.” 

State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 706 (Tenn. 2012). Accordingly, we review a trial court’s 

sentencing determinations under an abuse of discretion standard, “granting a presumption 

of reasonableness to within-range sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of 

the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.” Id. at 707. In State v. Caudle, our 

Supreme Court clarified that the “abuse of discretion standard, accompanied by a 

presumption of reasonableness, applies to within-range sentences that reflect a decision 

based upon the purposes and principles of sentencing, including the questions related to 

probation or any other alternative sentence.” 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012). 

Under the 2005 amendments to the Sentencing Act, trial courts are to consider the 

following factors when determining a defendant’s sentence and the appropriate 

combination of sentencing alternatives:

(1) The evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing;

(2) The presentence report;

(3) The principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing 

alternatives;

(4) The nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved;

(5) Evidence and information offered by the parties on the mitigating and 

enhancement factors set out in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114;

(6) Any statistical information provided by the administrative office of 

the courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; 

and

(7) Any statement the defendant wishes to make in the defendant’s own 

behalf about sentencing.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b).

The trial court must state on the record the factors it considered and the reasons for 

the ordered sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(e); Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. “Mere 

inadequacy in the articulation of the reasons for imposing a particular sentence . . . should 

not negate the presumption [of reasonableness].” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705-06. The party 

challenging the sentence on appeal bears the burden of establishing that the sentence was 

improper. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts.

Under the revised Tennessee sentencing statutes, a defendant is no longer 

presumed to be a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing. State v. Carter, 254 

S.W.3d 335, 347 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)). Instead, the 

“advisory” sentencing guidelines provide that a defendant “who is an especially mitigated 

or standard offender convicted of a Class C, D or E felony, should be considered as a 
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favorable candidate for alternative sentencing options in the absence of evidence to the 

contrary.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6). However, no criminal defendant is 

automatically entitled to probation as a matter of law. State v. Davis, 940 S.W.2d 558, 

559 (Tenn. 1997). Instead, the defendant bears the burden of proving his or her 

suitability for alternative sentencing options. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 347 (citing Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-35-303(b)). The defendant must show that the alternative sentencing 

option imposed “will subserve the ends of justice and the best interests of both the public 

and the defendant.” Hooper v. State, 297 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tenn. 1956), overruled on 

other grounds, State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Tenn. 2000).

When imposing a sentence of full confinement, the trial court should consider 

whether:

(A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a 

defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct;

(B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of 

the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective 

deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or

(C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or 

recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant [.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C). In addition, the sentence imposed should be (1) 

“no greater than that deserved for the offense committed,” and (2) “the least severe 

measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is imposed.” Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-35-103(2),(4).

Defendant pled guilty to reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, reckless 

endangerment, a Class E felony, DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, possession of a Schedule 

III drug, a Class A misdemeanor, simple possession of marijuana, a Class A 

misdemeanor, and failure to exercise due care, a Class C misdemeanor. Defendant’s 

conviction for failure to exercise due care was merged with his conviction for reckless 

aggravated assault, and he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective 

two-year sentence. As a standard offender convicted of Class D and Class E felonies, 

Defendant is eligible for alternative sentencing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6).

Defendant concedes that that trial court considered the appropriate sentencing 

factors and the principles of sentencing, and the record supports this determination. In 

finding that Defendant’s sentence should be served in confinement, the trial court said:

So [Defendant’s] prior criminal history starts on page 6 and as [defense 

counsel] pointed out most everything happened before 2012 but there’s a 

lot that happened before 2012. The Court notes that [Defendant] is 

currently a 29[-] year old male. He has numerous felony convictions out 
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of the Commonwealth of Virginia, a grand larceny. Any case that’s been 

dismissed, [defense counsel], I’m not going to consider; manufacture of 

a controlled substance, possession of a gun while selling a pound of 

marijuana, aggravated burglary, that’s in Sullivan County. I think that’s 

the sentence that he had to serve in the department of correction[]. The 

theft went along with that aggravated burglary. The criminal history on 

page 9, his criminal history started on page 6, it goes through page 9. It 

shows that he had - - his history of supervision that he has had a 

violation of probation in the past which is because of the Sullivan 

County aggravated burglary that he had to serve in the department of 

correction[] and he was positive for drugs is what caused him to have to 

serve that. It looks like also on page 9 that he has cases in Washington 

County Virginia Circuit Court that he’s on an appeal bond for which are 

a series of animal violation cases which I don’t know what animal 

violation is but - - is he aware of those or - -

* * *

Beginning on page 10 [Defendant] recounts his alcohol and drug use 

specifically with regard to marijuana. He states that he started using 

marijuana at age 21. He describes his use as daily, last use into 2015, 

morphine, Lortab and Percocet. He reported his last illegal use - - he 

reports that he became addicted after an accident. Last reported illegal 

use was in January of this year, 2016. Methamphetamine, he reports that 

he started taking methamphetamine at age 21. He says his last use was 

in August of 2015. He has received some treatment for his addiction to 

pain medication, basically gone to a Suboxone clinic. He is employed 

with Crosswhite AC Sales and Services and we have a letter from Mr. 

Crosswhite and the Crosswhite family on his behalf. [Defense counsel] 

this isn’t the normal crash case that comes before the Court, I grant you 

that, but he had pled guilty and in his statement, [Defendant’s] statement 

at page 5 he recites that he was sitting at a stop sign while on White Top 

Extension, that he was struck by a truck heading down 394; says he was 

sitting at the stop sign when the truck turned down White Top Road, 

eased out of the traffic to look around the truck when the driver of the 

truck “thought I was going to try and beat her and so she corrected into 

me.” He admitted he had no license or insurance at the time and that 

was January 14th, 2016 when he made that statement so he had taken 

responsibility and I give him credit for that. He has a lengthy prior 

record. He has felony convictions in excess of what would take to make 

a Range I offense so he pled as a Range I offender. Probation had been 

tried unsuccessfully in the past. He has continued using drugs while on 

bond in this case and according to his statement - - well, according to his 
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reporting on pages 10 and 11 he’s continued to use marijuana, morphine, 

Lortab, Percocet, methamphetamine while he was on bond while this 

case was pending. We sent him and had him drug tested back in 

September of last year and it was positive for all those things that he’s 

admitted to. Based on all those findings he’s going to have to serve his 2 

year sentence at 30%. He will come out on determinate release. When 

he does come out on determinate release the conditions of the plea that I 

read in, those will all apply and I want him to be evaluated for drug and 

alcohol and have - - complete whatever treatment to try to get him off of 

drugs. If we don’t get him off the drugs he might as well not come out 

and I hope that, he’s 29 years old and he’s got two kids who are 

absolutely going to be dependent on him when he gets out so I’m hoping 

that he’ll realize that. 

The record supports the trial court’s findings. Initially, the State asserts that 

although Defendant is eligible for probation, he not considered a favorable candidate for 

probation. “[A] Defendant who is being sentenced for a third or subsequent felony 

conviction involving separate periods of incarceration or supervision shall not be 

considered a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing.” T.C.A. § 40-35-102(6)(A). 

“Separate periods of incarceration or supervision” have been defined to mean “that the 

defendant serves and is released or discharged from a period of incarceration or 

supervision for the commission of a felony prior to committing another felony. T.C.A. § 

40-35-102(6)(B)(emphasis added). Defendant was convicted on November 13, 2007, in 

Tennessee of aggravated burglary and theft, and he received a three-year suspended 

sentence. He was found on January 11, 2008, to having violated his probation. 

Defendant was also charged in Virginia with two counts of manufacturing a controlled 

substance and possession of a gun during the sale of marijuana. The presentence report 

reflects that the date for the offenses was January 23, 2009. Defendant also committed 

the offense of grand larceny in Virginia on June 8, 2010. The two sets of offenses were 

disposed of on November 8, 2010. Defendant received concurrent five-year sentences 

that were suspended with two years on probation. The present offenses, Defendant’s third 

set of offenses, were committed on September 28, 2014. Although Defendant committed 

three sets of offenses, we cannot determine from the presentence report that Defendant 

had been released from supervision from his Tennessee offenses of aggravated burglary 

and theft when he committed the Virginia offenses of two counts of manufacturing a 

controlled substance and possession of a gun during the sale of marijuana on January 23, 

2009. Defendant also committed the offense of grand larceny in Virginia on June 8, 

2010. The two sets of offenses were disposed of on November 8, 2010. Therefore, 

Defendant is considered a favorable candidate for probation. 

In any event, Defendant’s extensive criminal history and his lack of success while 

on probation for previous offenses justify the denial of alternative sentencing. The 29-

year-old Defendant has prior convictions for aggravated burglary, theft, two counts of 
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manufacturing a controlled substance, possession of a gun during the sale of marijuana, 

and grand larceny, and Defendant violated his probation on the aggravated burglary and 

theft convictions. The trial court also stated: “We sent him and had him drug tested back 

in September of last year and it was positive for all those things that he’s admitted to.” In 

this case, we do not have to, and thus have not, relied on Defendant’s admissions to using 

drugs to justify the denial of alternative sentencing. Defendant is not entitled to relief in 

this appeal. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

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THOMAS T. WOODALL, PRESIDING JUDGE