IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs October 6, 2015

QUANTEL TAYLOR v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Crockett County

No. 3706 Clayburn Peeples, Judge

No. W2015-00640-CCA-R3-PC - Filed May 31, 2016

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Petitioner, Quantel Taylor, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction 

relief following remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Taylor v. State, 443 

S.W.3d 80 (Tenn. 2014). In his post-conviction petition, Petitioner alleged, in part, that 

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview his three co-defendants. 

Petitioner subpoenaed the co-defendants to testify at the post-conviction hearing. The 

post-conviction court granted the State‟s motion to quash subpoenas for the codefendants, who were incarcerated. A panel of this court concluded that the postconviction court erred, but held that the error was harmless under the circumstances. 

Quantel Taylor v. State, No. W2012-00760-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 6228151 (Tenn. 

Crim. App., Nashville, April 29, 2013). Our supreme court reversed the decision of this 

court, holding that the post-conviction court committed prejudicial error by granting the 

State‟s motion to quash because the post-conviction court applied an incorrect legal 

standard. Taylor, 443 S.W.3d at 86. The court remanded the case for reconsideration of 

the motion to quash under the proper standard. On remand, the post-conviction court 

denied the State‟s motion to quash, and all three co-defendants were subpoenaed for an 

evidentiary hearing. Two of Petitioner‟s co-defendants, Allen and Bricco, refused to take 

the stand. The third co-defendant, Spivey, took the stand and refused to testify. The 

post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief. Petitioner appealed. We conclude 

that he has failed to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. The judgment of 

the post-conviction court is affirmed. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

THOMAS T. WOODALL, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CAMILLE R.

MCMULLEN and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR.,JJ., joined.

Justin P. Jones, Brownsville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Quantel Taylor.
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Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley, Senior Counsel, 

Garry G. Brown, District Attorney General; and Hillary Lawler Parham, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Procedural history

On October 6, 2009, Petitioner entered best interest guilty pleas to charges of 

attempted first degree murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. 

Two of Petitioner‟s three co-defendants, Eugene Spivey and Chad Bricco, entered guilty 

pleas, and the third, Jeffery Allen, was convicted at trial. The facts underlying 

Petitioner‟s convictions were summarized in the supreme court‟s opinion. See Taylor, 

443 S.W.3d at 82. At Petitioner‟s guilty plea hearing, the State asserted that the evidence 

would show that on the night of January 21, 2003, Petitioner, accompanied by Eugene 

Spivey and Jeffery Allen, attempted to rob brothers John and Louis Neely (collectively, 

the “victims”) at their residence in Crockett County, but that the victims managed to fend 

them off. The State alleged that Petitioner, Spivey, Allen, and a fourth man, Chad 

Bricco, returned to the victims‟ house the following night. The State alleged that 

Petitioner either acted as a lookout or stood outside the residence with a shotgun while 

Spivey and Allen broke into the victims‟ house, killed John Neely, and severely injured 

Louis Neely. At the plea hearing, Petitioner claimed that he stayed in the car during the 

attempted robbery on the first night and that he did not participate in any way on the 

second night. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to twenty years on each count, to be 

served concurrently at 100 percent. 

Petitioner subsequently timely filed a post-conviction petition, contending that his 

co-defendants would have exonerated him and that counsel had been ineffective for not 

interviewing the co-defendants prior to Petitioner entering his plea. Petitioner asserted 

that based on counsel‟s ineffective assistance, his pleas were not knowing and voluntary. 

Petitioner sought to subpoena the three co-defendants to testify at the post-conviction 

hearing. The State filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, arguing that it would be 

“unreasonable and oppressive” to arrange for Petitioner‟s three co-defendants to be 

transported to the post-conviction hearing. The Tennessee Supreme Court summarized 

what transpired next:

When the petitioner subpoenaed his three co-defendants to testify at the 

post-conviction hearing, the State filed a motion to quash because the codefendants were all incarcerated. The post-conviction court granted the 

State‟s motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the postconviction court had erred, but held that the error was harmless under the 
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circumstances. We hold that the post-conviction court committed 

prejudicial error by applying an incorrect legal standard and by failing to 

consider whether the proposed testimony by the co-defendants was 

material to the petitioner‟s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Because the record is insufficient for the issue to be resolved on appeal, 

we remand for the post-conviction court to reconsider the motion to 

quash under the proper standard. 

Taylor, 443 S.W.3d at 81. 

Our supreme court held that the post-conviction court erred by basing its ruling on 

the “great burden” imposed by compliance with the subpoenas. Id. at 85. The court 

noted that “the appropriate standard for determining a motion to quash in this context 

focuses on the materiality and admissibility of the proposed testimony, as well as the 

competence of the proposed witness.” Id. The court found that the post-conviction court 

failed to consider whether the proposed testimony was material to Petitioner‟s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, and “[t]he ruling of the post-conviction court prevented 

an effective offer of proof.” The court stated,

The Petitioner attempted to make an offer of proof in the only manner 

available, asserting that his co-defendants would provide generally 

exculpatory testimony; however, because of the limited nature of the 

offer of proof, the record is simply inadequate for us to assess any 

deficiency in the performance of counsel or prejudice in the result.

Id.

The court recognized that “additional considerations come into play when a postconviction petitioner seeks to subpoena a represented co-defendant[,]” because “our Rule 

of Professional Conduct prohibited Petitioner‟s trial counsel from communicating with 

his co-defendants about the case absent the consent of their attorneys or authorization by 

law or a court order.” Id. at 86 (citing Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 4.2). The court explained,

[i]f counsel for the co-defendants denied consent or would have denied 

consent for an interview, then the co-defendants‟ testimony as to what 

they would have said had they been interviewed must be deemed 

immaterial. Conversely, if the Petitioner demonstrates that counsel for 

the co-defendants consented or would have consented to an interview, 

then the Petitioner will not be precluded from establishing the materiality 

of the proposed testimony. 
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Id. The supreme court remanded the case for the post-conviction court to consider the 

State‟s motion to quash under the proper standard. 

On remand, the post-conviction court denied the State‟s motion to quash and

entered orders that Petitioner‟s three co-defendants be transported to testify at an 

evidentiary hearing. All three co-defendants asserted their Fifth Amendment rights 

against self-incrimination and refused to testify at Petitioner‟s evidentiary hearing. The 

court entered an order denying post-conviction relief. In its written order denying relief, 

the post-conviction court concluded that Petitioner failed to establish that trial counsel 

was deficient “in the investigation of the facts or calling a known witness[,]” and the 

court adopted its findings from its previous order denying post-conviction relief. 

Post-conviction hearing

At the evidentiary hearing on remand, Petitioner‟s post-conviction counsel called 

Petitioner‟s three co-defendants to testify. Allen and Bricco refused to testify. Counsel 

for Petitioner attempted to call Allen to the stand, and the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: I‟m going to let him testify if you want him to, but I 

don‟t see how his testimony at this point could be relevant under the 

timeframe that existed.

[Prosecutor]: I agree with the Court, Your Honor, and Mr. Allen has 

been transported. He‟s been served with a subpoena and it appears from 

the officers from the Department of Correction that Mr. Allen is refusing 

to testify. 

THE COURT: Is he refusing to take the stand?

OFFICER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Let the record note that. I can‟t make him do 

that.

[Petitioner‟s counsel]: Let the record reflect that he‟s not willing to 

testify – Mr. Allen.

THE COURT: All right.

[Petitioner‟s counsel]: All right. We‟ll call Chad Bricco.
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OFFICER: He don‟t [sic] want to testify either, Judge.

THE COURT: What did he say?

[Petitioner‟s counsel]: Judge, let the record reflect that Mr. Bricco is 

refusing to take the stand and testify, too.

THE COURT: All right. 

Eugene Spivey was called to testify, and unlike the other two co-defendants,

Spivey actually took the witness stand. He stated that he had filed a motion to reopen his 

case that was denied, and he anticipated appealing the trial court‟s decision. He testified 

that he did not want to give any testimony that might incriminate him. Counsel for 

Petitioner asked Spivey if he would be willing to testify in Petitioner‟s case after the 

conclusion of his appeal, and Spivey answered, “I dread it, you know.” The postconviction court advised Spivey: “Here‟s what it amounts to. If you testify today, 

anything that you say could possibly be used against you if you ever get a new trial. For 

that reason, a lawyer might tell you not to testify today. Do you understand that?” 

Spivey answered, “I‟m gonna exercise my right because I‟ve got something going.” The 

post-conviction court denied Petitioner‟s counsel‟s request to stay the proceedings 

pending the outcome of Spivey‟s appeal. Counsel for Petitioner made an offer of proof to 

the court as to what Petitioner believed Spivey‟s testimony would be:

I think he would have said that [Petitioner]‟s involvement was minimal 

or none; that he never got out of the vehicle; that he had no knowledge of 

what was happening that night; that he never had a gun; that he never 

possessed a gun and was just along for the ride.

Petitioner‟s trial counsel testified that she attempted to interview Jeffrey Allen

prior to Petitioner‟s guilty plea hearing, and Allen‟s attorney informed her that Allen 

would not speak to her. Trial counsel attended Allen‟s criminal trial and subsequently 

obtained a transcript of the trial proceedings. Trial counsel testified that she did not 

attempt to interview Spivey. She testified that Petitioner and all three of his codefendants made statements to law enforcement, and she obtained copies of their 

statements. She testified that Spivey gave two statements, and his statements were 

inconsistent with each other. She testified that “none of [the information in Spivey‟s 

statements] seemed to help [Petitioner].” Trial counsel attended Spivey‟s guilty plea 

hearing and subsequently obtained a transcript of the hearing. She testified that Spivey 

stated at the time of his guilty pleas that Petitioner obtained a gun before the offenses and 

approached the victims‟ house with Allen. Trial counsel testified that in her assessment, 

Spivey “was not going to be a witness who anyone would be able to [ ] believe[ ]; that he 
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was not credible at all.” She testified that she probably would have interviewed Spivey 

after he entered his guilty pleas, “if [she] had not heard the tone of voice and how angry 

he was whenever he entered his guilty plea and putting blame on other people.” She 

testified that based on Spivey‟s statements to police and his testimony at his guilty plea 

hearing, Spivey‟s testimony would not have benefitted Petitioner‟s defense at trial. 

Trial counsel testified that she did not attempt to speak to Chad Bricco because his 

charges were still pending at the time of Petitioner‟s guilty pleas, and Bricco was 

represented by counsel. Trial counsel testified that Bricco testified at Allen‟s trial. Trial 

counsel testified that, based on Bricco‟s statements to police and his testimony at Allen‟s 

trial, she did not believe that Bricco‟s testimony would have benefitted Petitioner‟s 

defense. 

Trial counsel testified that Petitioner and his three co-defendants each stated that 

Petitioner was present during the commission of the offenses. Trial counsel testified that 

based on her investigation of Petitioner‟s case, she did not believe any of Petitioner‟s codefendants would have given testimony that would be helpful to Petitioner‟s defense. 

She testified that Petitioner‟s statement to police contradicted what Petitioner believed 

Spivey‟s testimony would have been. In Petitioner‟s statement, “[he] sa[id] they 

discussed robbing somebody, maybe a bootlegger, so it‟s real hard for someone to say he 

had no knowledge of what was going on when he admitted in his own statement that he 

knew where they were going and what they were discussing doing[.]” Trial counsel 

testified that, according to Petitioner, Spivey “was going to testify that [Petitioner] never 

got out of the car.” 

Analysis

Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily 

entered and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, Petitioner 

argues that trial counsel was deficient in her investigation of the facts and by failing to 

call known witnesses and that Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel‟s deficiencies. 

Petitioner also contends that the post-conviction court should have compelled his codefendants to testify, despite their assertion of their Fifth Amendment rights. The State 

responds that Petitioner failed to establish that counsel for the co-defendants would have 

granted consent for an interview during the time period preceding Petitioner‟s plea 

hearing; therefore, the State argues, Petitioner has not established that their testimony was 

material. 

In a post-conviction proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to prove his 

grounds for relief by clear and convincing evidence. T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f); see 

Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 293–94 (Tenn. 2009). On appeal, we are bound by 
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the trial court‟s findings of fact unless we conclude that the evidence in the record 

preponderates against those findings. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456 (Tenn. 2001). 

Additionally, “questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value 

to be given their testimony, and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to be 

resolved” by the post-conviction court. Id. Because they relate to mixed questions of 

law and fact, we review the trial court‟s conclusions as to whether counsel‟s performance 

was deficient and whether that deficiency was prejudicial under a de novo standard with 

no presumption of correctness. Id. at 457. 

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner 

must establish that (1) his lawyer‟s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.

Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). 

“[A] failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny 

relief on the ineffective assistance claim. Indeed, a court need not address the 

components in any particular order or even address both if the [petitioner] makes an 

insufficient showing of one component.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn.

1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

A petitioner successfully demonstrates deficient performance when the clear and 

convincing evidence proves that his attorney‟s conduct fell below “an objective standard 

of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 369 (citing Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 688; Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936). Prejudice arising therefrom is demonstrated 

once the petitioner establishes “„a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.‟” Id. at 370 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In order to satisfy the 

“prejudice” requirement in the context of a guilty plea, the petitioner must show that, but 

for counsel‟s errors, he would not have entered his guilty plea and would have proceeded 

to trial. Serrano v. State, 133 S.W.3d 599, 605 (Tenn. 2004) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 

U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985)). 

Additionally, we note that in determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea, a trial 

court must advise the defendant of the consequences of a guilty plea and determine 

whether the defendant understands those consequences to ensure the plea is a “voluntary 

and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” 

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970); see 

also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). The 

trial court must address the defendant personally in open court, inform the defendant of 

the consequences of the guilty plea, and determine whether the defendant understands 

those consequences. See State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1977), 
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superseded on other grounds by rule as stated in State v. Wilson, 31 S.W.3d 189, 193 

(Tenn. 2000); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(c). In determining whether the petitioner‟s guilty 

pleas were knowing and voluntary, this court looks to the following factors:

the relative intelligence of the [petitioner]; the degree of his familiarity 

with criminal proceedings; whether he was represented by competent 

counsel and had the opportunity to confer with counsel about the options 

available to him; the extent of advice from counsel and the court 

concerning the charges against him; and the reasons for his decision to 

plead guilty, including a desire to avoid a greater penalty that might 

result from a jury trial.

Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993). 

At the conclusion of the post-conviction hearing after remand, the post-conviction 

court held as follows:

I think, certainly, I had already made a determination that [trial 

counsel]‟s conduct was completely consistent with what it should have 

been for a defense attorney. She has, I think, completely adequately 

explained why she didn‟t call [the co-defendants]. Taking Mr. Spivey‟s 

purported testimony as you presented it, she still convincingly explained 

why she wouldn‟t have called him even had she had that information. 

She couldn‟t talk to Bricco and she couldn‟t talk to Allen. The only one 

she could possibly have talked to would have been Spivey and she 

adequately explained, I think, why she didn‟t do that. 

In its written order entered following the hearing on remand, the post-conviction 

court made the following findings and conclusions:

1. That the State‟s Motion to quash the subpoena[ ]s of Chad Bricco, 

Eugene Spivey and Jeffery Allen is denied;

2. That the State shall transport said witnesses for an evidentiary 

hearing;

3. That at an evidentiary hearing in this matter[,] Chad Bricco refused to 

testify claiming his privilege against self[-]incrimination;

4. That at an evidentiary hearing in this matter[,] Jeffery Allen refused 

to testify claiming his privilege against self[-]incrimination;

5. That at an evidentiary hearing in this matter[,] Eugene Spivey refused 

to testify claiming his privilege against self[-]incrimination;
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6. That [ ] trial counsel testified that she attempted to speak with Jeffery 

Allen and [was] denied access to him by his trial counsel;

7. That [trial counsel] sat through the trial of Jeffery Allen and listened 

to the testimony of Chad Bricco in that trial;

8. That [trial counsel] had obtained copies of all statements that Chad 

Bricco, Eugene Spivey, and Jeffery Allen had given to law enforcement;

9. That [trial counsel] was present for and listened to the plea allocution 

of Eugene Spivey;

10. That [trial counsel] did not have access to Chad Bricco to speak with 

him prior to the plea in this matter because he was currently represented 

with pending charges;

11. That [Petitioner] did not show that [trial] counsel was deficient in 

the investigation of the facts or calling a known witness;

12. That this Court adopts all findings in the Order of October 27, 2011; 

and

13. Therefore, the Petition for Post[-]Conviction Relief is denied.

Co-defendants Allen and Bricco

Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by not compelling the 

testimony of Allen and Bricco at the post-conviction hearing. However, Petitioner made 

no request or argument to the post-conviction court to compel either witness to testify. A 

party who fails to take reasonably available steps to mitigate the harmful effect of an 

error, however, is not entitled to use the error to obtain relief on appeal. See Tenn. R.

App. P. 36(a). Both co-defendants were subpoenaed, transported, and available to testify. 

Petitioner argues on appeal that the post-conviction court abused its discretion by not 

compelling them to testify, but Petitioner did not request that they take the stand to assert 

their Fifth Amendment right, or make the argument he now makes on appeal. 

We further conclude that Petitioner has failed to establish prejudice with respect to 

these witnesses. “When a post-conviction petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to 

discover, interview, or present witnesses in support of his defense, these witnesses should 

be presented by the petitioner at the evidentiary hearing.” Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 

752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Generally, presenting such witnesses at the postconviction hearing is the only way a petitioner can establish that “the failure to discover 

or interview a witness inured to his prejudice . . . or . . . the failure to have a known 

witness present or call the witness to the stand resulted in the denial of critical evidence 

which inured to the prejudice of the petitioner.” Id. Accordingly, even a petitioner who 

establishes that trial counsel‟s performance was deficient for failing to investigate or call 

witnesses is entitled to no relief “unless he can produce a material witness who (a) could 
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have been found by a reasonable investigation and (b) would have testified favorably in 

support of his defense if called.” Id. at 758. 

Furthermore, trial counsel testified that she was denied an interview with Allen by 

his trial counsel. Under our supreme court‟s opinion in this case, that causes Allen‟s 

testimony to be immaterial. Taylor, 443 S.W.3d at 86. Trial counsel testified that she did 

not attempt to interview Bricco, but that he had pending charges at the time Petitioner 

entered his pleas, and he was represented by counsel. Because Allen and Bricco were 

both available to testify at Petitioner‟s post-conviction hearing, and counsel for Petitioner 

conceded their refusal to testify and did not request that the post-conviction court compel 

them to take the stand, Petitioner has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by his trial 

counsel‟s alleged deficiencies. 

Co-defendant Spivey

With regard to co-defendant Spivey, we conclude that the evidence does not 

preponderate against the post-conviction court‟s finding that trial counsel was not 

deficient for failing to interview or call him as a witness. At the post-conviction hearing, 

the post-conviction court accepted Petitioner‟s counsel‟s offer of proof as to Spivey‟s 

testimony. The court considered the proffered testimony and accredited trial counsel‟s 

testimony that she made an informed and strategic decision not to call Spivey. The court 

determined that trial counsel adequately investigated the facts of the case. 

Trial counsel testified that she did not attempt to interview Spivey. She testified 

that she obtained copies of his statements to police, which were inconsistent with each 

other and inconsistent with what Petitioner alleges Spivey would have testified to had he 

been called as a witness. Trial counsel assessed, based on Spivey‟s statements to police 

and his testimony at his guilty plea hearing, whether his testimony would benefit 

Petitioner‟s defense. She determined that Spivey was not a credible witness, nor would 

his testimony benefit Petitioner‟s defense. We will not second-guess a reasonable trial 

strategy, and we will not grant relief based on a sound, yet ultimately unsuccessful, 

tactical decision. Granderson v. State, 197 S.W.3d 782, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006). 

Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel‟s performance was deficient. Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. 

____________________________________________

THOMAS T. WOODALL, PRESIDING JUDGE