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Filed 12/4/23 Mendocino Farms Wage and Hour Cases CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

MENDOCINO FARMS WAGE AND HOUR CASES

. C096869
(JCCP No. 5153)
( S acramento Super. Ct. No. 34

- 2020

- 00277871; Los Angeles Super. Ct. Nos. 20STCV15652, 20STCV27610, 20STCV34641)

The appeal in this coordinated proceeding arises from an order and judgment granting approval of a class action settlement reached between plaintiffs Sean Lalor (Lalor) , Yaneth Elias (Elias) , et al. ( collectively, p laintiffs) and defendant Mendocino Farms, LLC (Mendocino Farms). Appellant Michael Moreli (Moreli) is a settlement
class member who objected to the proposed settlement and subsequently filed a motion to vacate the judgmen t. He contends that we should reverse the judgment because the trial2

court (1) failed to apply the correct legal standard when reviewing the settlement ; (2) did
not receive sufficient informa tion about the maximum potential value of each claim to make an informed evaluation of the settlement ; and (3) did not receive sufficient documentation to support its attorney fee award.
We conclude that Moreli has not met his burden to show the trial cour t failed to proceed in the manner required by law or otherwise abused its discretion in determining that the settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Lalor and Elias C omplaints
Defendant Mendocino Farms owns and operates a chain of fast

- casual r estaurants in California. At various times between 2018 and 2020, p laintiffs worked for Mendocino Farms as nonexempt employees

. In or about May 2020, p laintiff Lalor filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint against Mendocino Farms (Sacramento County c ase No. 34

- 2020

- 00277871) (the Lalor action). 1 Lalor generally alleged that Mendocino Farms failed to provide required meal and rest periods and, as a result, faile d to maintain and provide accurate wage statements and pay all wages owed. Lalor’s complaint alleged causes of action for (1) violation of California’s unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 , et seq. ) ; (2) fail ure to provide accurate itemized wage statements ; ( 3 ) fail ure to pay minimum
wages ; ( 4 ) fail ure to provide required meal and rest periods ; ( 5 ) waiting time penalties ; (6) fail ure to pay overtime wages, and ( 7 ) fail ure to reimburse business expenses . Lalor
later filed a f

irst a mended c omplaint adding plaintiffs Jemelle Jordan and Alexandria

1 Although p laintiffs contend the Lalor complaint was submitted to the trial court’s drop box in March 2020, the complaint was not filed until May 6, 2020. Plaintiffs’ estimate of the defendant’s maximum exposure is tied to the May 6, 2020 filing date.3

Wheeler and a claim for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) 2 (PAGA)

. Around the same time, p laintiff Elias filed a separate wage and hour class action complaint against Mendocino Farms (Los Angeles County c ase No. 20STCV15652 ) (the
Elias action)

. Elias alleged the same causes of action as Lalo r , plus an additional claim
for fail ure to maintain required records. Plaintiffs and their counsel subsequently agreed to coordinate their efforts and signed a joint prosecution agreement. Mendocino Farms disputed p laintiffs’ claims, arguing that class treatment was not appropriate and that it complied with all applicable wa ge and hour laws. Among other things, the company claimed that the putative class members were paid for all hours
worked and were automatically paid premium wages for missed meal break periods.
Mendocino Farms also claimed that many of the class members had signed mandatory arbitration agreements covering the class claims. In June 2020, p laintiffs and Mendocino Farms (collectively, the P arties) agreed to
mediate the Lalor and Elias actions before the Hon. Louis M. Meisinger ( R et.) a former superior court judge with extensive wage and hour class action and PAGA representative
claim experience

. Before the mediation, the Parties exchanged a significant amount of information through informal discovery. In a ddition to employment policies and re lated documents, Mendocino Farms produced data on the number of putative class members, a
class list with hire and termination dates for the relevant four

- year period, and payroll and timekeeping records for 2,292 individuals (or approximately 47 percent o f the 4,928 putative class members) , which represented 393,019 shifts, 50,024 pay periods and 95,310 workweeks. The payroll and timekeeping data included information about job titles, pay periods and workweeks, type of compensation paid (e.g., tips, overt ime,

2 Undesignated section references are to the Labor Code.4

regular wages) , as well as hourly wage rates for the period from March/April 2016 through August 2020

. All told, Mendocino Farms produced 778,465 rows of d ata , which p laintiffs’
counsel reviewed and analyzed. The Parties additionally conducted their own investigations and research, including interviews of putative class members, to ascertain whether Mendocino Farms’ s employment policies were understood and followed. The
Parties also separately engaged experts to analyze the time and p ayroll data and prepare
an estimate of Mendocino Farms’ s potential exposure.
B. Moreli ’s C omplaints
Like p laintiffs, plaintiff Moreli is a former employee of Mendocino Farms. He worked as an hourly, nonexempt “ [ m ] anager in [ t ] raining” from May 2019 until March
2020. In July 2020, after the Parties agreed to mediate the Lalor and Elias actions, Moreli filed a putative class action complaint and a separate representative PAGA complaint against Mendocino Farms (Los Angeles County c ase Nos. 20STCV27 610 and
20S TCV34641), alleging causes of action similar to those in the Lalor and Elias actions. In November 2020, Moreli filed a motion to intervene in the Lalor action, which
was denied

. Moreli also filed a petition to coordinate his cases with the Lalor and Elias
actions . The trial court gran ted the petition and assigned the coordinated cases to the Sacramento County Superior Court as the Mendocino Farms Wage and Hour Cases , JCCP No. 5153.
C. The S ettlement A greement On December 8, 2020, after more than eight hours of mediation with retired Judge Meisinger , the Parties agreed to the core terms of a settlement for the Lalor and Elias
actions

. A few months later , the Parties executed a j oint s tipulation of s ettlement agreement (the Settlement)

.5

The Settlement provides for a class consisting of all nonexempt employees employed by Mendocino Farms in California at any time from March 18, 2016 , to January 31, 2021 , estimated to include 5,209 class members

. The Settlement provides for

a (non

- reversionary) gross sett lement amount of $1,500,000

. F rom that amount, the Settlement provides that $75,000 is to be allocated to the PAGA claims; $10,000 to each class representative as a service award; approximately $50,000 to a settlement
administrator ; and ( up to ) $499,950.00 to class counsel for attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting the actions. The remain ing net settlement amount of approximately $83 4 , 0 00 is to be paid to the settlement class based upon the number of workweeks each participating class member worked in a nonexempt position during the relevant period

. The average payout to class members is expecte d to be approximately $160

. D. Court A

pproval of the S ettlement In March 2021, p laintiffs filed a motion requesting conditional certif ication of the

c lass and preliminary approv al of the S ettlement. In support of the motion, p laintiffs submitted declarations describing what class counsel did to investigate the claims and why p laintiffs believed the Settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable. Plaintiffs estimated Mendocino Farms’ s maximum exposure at approximately $38,517,473 , calculated as follows: $11,419,946 for rest break violations (assuming one rest period violation per 3.5

- hour shift) , plus $2,304,388 for meal break violations (based

on total unique meal period violations ) , plus $4,330,300 for wage statement penalties (based on 2,568 employees and 44,587 pay periods) , plus $49,025 for unpaid overtime, plus $11,492,764 for waiting time penalties (based on 4,262 former employees) , plus $260,450 for unreimbursed expenses (based on the estimated cost of $50 times the
number of class members) , for a total of $29,856,873 for the class claims ; plus an additional $8,660,600 in PAGA penalties (based on 2,568 employees and 44,587 pay periods from May 6, 2019 , to December 8, 2020 ). After balancing t he merits of the
claims against the costs, risks , and delays of litigation, the uncertainties involved in6

achieving class certification, the difficulties in establishing liability, the assertion that many of the claims are governed by an arbitration agreement, the trial court’s discretio n in reducing PAGA penalties, and the high likelihood of an appeal, p laintiffs concluded the proposed Settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable. Moreli objected to the motion for preliminary approval on the grounds p laintiffs had “dramatically underval ued” the maximum possible value of the claims and therefore settled the lawsuits too cheaply. Moreli argued that Mendocino Farms’ true maximum exposure was in excess of $102 million.
The trial court preliminar il y approv ed the Settlement , while granting Mo reli’s request for discovery of all non

- privileged information previously provided to p laintiffs

. Mendocino Farms subsequently provided Moreli with the payroll and timekeeping data and other information provided to class counsel

. After the trial court’s p reliminary approval, a notice of settlement was
disseminated to the putative class members. Out of the 5,209 putative class members, there were six requests for exclusion and one objection

— from Moreli.
In April 2022, p laintiffs filed their motion for final approval of the settlement.
Plaintiffs argued that Moreli’s objections to the Settlement lacked merit and that the trial court should approve the Settlement as f air, a dequate , and r easonable. In May 2022, Moreli file d a formal objection to the motion for final approval of
the Settlement. As before, Moreli claimed that p laintiffs had underestimated the
maximum potential value of the claims by more than $60 million

. Both p laintiffs and Mendocino Farms responded to More li’s objections. After a hearing, t he trial court issued a 14

- page ruling rejecting Moreli’s objections and granting final approval to the Settlement. T he court found the p arties’ arguments “persuasive” and
the Settlement , as a whole, to be fair, adequat e, and reasonable. The court likewise approved the fee requests as reasonable and appropriate. The court subsequently entered a formal order and judgment granting final approval of the Settlement.7

E. Moreli’s M

otion to V acate the J

udgment
Moreli filed a motion to vacate the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure
section 663 on three grounds: (1) the trial court failed to apply the heightened standard required to approve a precertification class action settlement ; (2) p laintiffs failed to properly value the claims being released and therefore underestimated the maximum value of the case by more than $60 million ; and (3) p laintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the attorney fee award. Plaintiffs and Mendocino Farms opposed the

mo tion. T he trial court issued an order denying the motion to vacate on July 22, 2022

. This appeal followed. Moreli challenges the order and judgment approving the
settlement , as well as the order denying his postjudgment motion to vacate.
DISCUSSION
I
Ba ckground Legal Principles
A. Cla ss A ction S ettlements

“ A trial court must approve a class action settlement agreement and may do so only after determining it is fair, adequate, and reasonable. [Citation.]” ( In re Microsoft I

V Cases (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 706, 723 .) The trial court is vested with “ broad
discretion ” in making this determination. ( Ibid .) I n exercising its discretion, the court

“ should consider relevant factors, such as the strength of plaintiffs ’ case, the risk, expense, comple xity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the
presen ce of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. ” ( Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 ( Dunk ); accord, Cho v. Seagate Technology Holdings, Inc

. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 734,
743 .) The m ost important factor is the strength of the plaintiff’s case, balanced against8

the amount offered in settlement. ( Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008)
168 Cal.App.4th 116, 130 ( Kullar )

. ) California law requires that class action settlements be scruti nized more carefully when they are settled before class certification proceedings . ( Luckey v. Superior Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 81, 9 4; In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litigation (9th
Cir. 2011 ) 654 F.3d 935, 946 .) This more exacting revie w is warranted to ensure that class representatives and their counsel have not allowed self

- interest to infect the negotiations . ( Bluetooth, at p. 947 .) At the same time, because public policy generally favors the settlement of complex class action lawsuits, “ [d]ue regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties. ” ( Dunk, supra , 48 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1801; Microsoft I

- V Cases , supra , 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 723.) Accordingly, even bea ring in mind the need for heightened scrutiny, “ precertification settlements are not necessarily flawed and in fact are routinely approved if found to be fair and reasonable. ” ( Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 24 8 ( Wershba ),
disa pproved on other grounds by Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018)
4 Cal.5th 260 , 269

- 270 ; accord, Cho v. Seagate Technology Holdings , supra , 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 743 .) The burden is on the proponent to demonstrate that a proposed settlement is fair , adequate, and reasonable. ( Wershba , supra , 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 245 .) However, a presumption of fairness exists when : “ ‘ (1) the settlement is reached through arm ’ s

length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. [Citation.] ’ ” ( Ibid .) The objector bears the burden to
rebut th at presumption. ( Carter v. City of Los An geles (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 808, 820 ; accord, Dunk

, supra , 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 180 0; 7

- Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp . (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1165

- 1166 ( 7

- Eleven ).)9

Our review of the trial court ’ s approval of a settlement is limited. We do not reweigh the evidence or make an independent determination of whether the terms of the settlement are fair, adequate, and reasonable. ( Nordstrom Com. Cases (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 576, 581.) We instead exam ine only whether there is a strong showing
of a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in approving the settlement . ( Ibid .)
B. PAGA S ettlements

“ The Legislature enacted PAGA almost two decades ago in response to widespread violations of the Labor Co de and significant underenforcement of those laws. [Citations.] Before PAGA ’ s enactment, tools for enforcing the Labor Code were
limited. Some statutes allowed employees to sue their employers for damages resulting from Labor Code violations such as unp aid wages. [Citations.] Other Labor Code violations were punishable only as criminal misdemeanors, which local prosecutors tended not to prioritize. [Citation.] Additionally, several statutes provided civil penalties for Labor Code violations, but only state labor law enforcement agencies could bring an action for civil penalties and those agencies lacked sufficient enforcement resources. [Citations.]” (

Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. 14 Cal.5th 1104 , 1116 ( Adolph ) .)
PAGA addressed these problems by creating civil penalties for most Labor Code
violations and by empowering “ ‘ aggrieved employees ’ ” to sue on behalf of themselves and other employees to recover those penalties . ( Adolph , supra , at p. 1116 ; Arias v. Superior Co urt (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980 .) A PAGA claim is “ ‘legally and conceptually different’ ” from an employee’s individual claim for damages and statutory penalties. ( Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 74

. ) An aggrieved employee suing under PAGA does so as the proxy or agent of the state , acting as private attorneys general , to recover civil penalties that otherwise would have been assessed and collected by the state’s labor law enforcement agencies . ( Ibid .) A PAGA representative action is therefore “ ‘ “ fundamentally a law
enforcement action ” ’ and relief is ‘ “ designed to protect the public [rather than] benefit10

private parties. ” ’ ” ( Ibid .) If an employee successfully recovers an award of civil penalties, PAGA r equires that 75 percent of the recovery be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency , leaving only twenty

- five percent for the aggrieved employees. (

Adolph, supra , 14 C al.5 th at p. 1116 ; § 2699, subd. (i).) PAGA claims are subject to a one

- year statute of limitations

. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (a).) The Labor and Workforce Development Agency must be provided with notice of any proposed settlement, 3 and any final settlement requires review and approval by the trial court. ( § 2699 , subd. ( l )(2).) Although PAGA itself does not provide a standard for the trial court’s review ,

case law establishes that trial courts should review a PAGA settlement to ascertain
whether it is fair, reasonable, and adequate in view of PAGA ’ s purposes and p olicies

. ( Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. , supra , 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 77 .) The trial court’s approval
of a PAGA settlement is reviewed for abuse of discretion . ( Id . at p. 78.)
I I Moreli’s Arguments
Moreli argues, as he did in his motion to vacate, that the trial court erred in approving the Settlement because the court (1) failed to apply the heightened scrutiny required when reviewing a precertification class action settlement ; (2) lacked sufficient information about the potentia l value of the claims to make an informed evaluation of the proposed settlement ; and (3) lacked the documentation necessary to determine a reasonable attorney fee award. We find no abuse of discretion

.

3 Plaintiffs sent the executed Settlement agreement to the Labor and Workforce Development A gency on February 28, 2021.11

A. Failure to A

pply t he H

eightened S crutiny As a threshold issue, we reject Morel i’s contention that the trial court erred by failing to apply the heightened scrutiny required for settlements reached before class
certification

. Moreli argues that because the trial court did not expressly state that it applied heightened scrutiny , we must presume it did not

. Controlling legal principles dictate s the opposite result. In the absence of contrary evidence, we must presume that judicial dut ies

were properly performed and that the trial court followed the law. ( In re Marriage of Winternitz (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 644, 653

- 654; Ross v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913

- 914; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557,
564 .) We find no reaso n to depart from th at presumption here. The trial court’s lengthy order shows that it carefully analyzed the evidence, including Moreli’s own evidence and arguments, before approving the Settlement. Moreli, in contrast, cites nothing to support his conte ntion that the court failed to apply the required level of scrutiny. Accordingly, we reject Moreli’s claim that the court failed to apply the correct standard in approving
the Settlement.
B. Sufficiency of the R ecord
Moreli next contends that the trial co urt was not sufficiently informed of the value
of p laintiffs’ claims to intelligently evaluate the Settlement. In particular, he claims that
the p laintiffs failed to properly estimate the maximum potential value of each claim released in the Settlement, thereby understating Mendocino Farms’ total exposure in the case by more than $60 million. As a result, he contends the court lacked a sufficient understanding of the amount in controversy to assess the reasonablenes s, adequacy, and
fairness of the Settlement. We disagree

. We begin with some general observations about what the law require s

— and what
it does not

— when a trial court reviews a proposed class action settlement involv ing
PAGA claims.12

First, we reject Moreli’s contention that the law requires the trial court to evaluate
the fairness of a settlement on a claim

- by

- claim basis. I t is the settlement as a whole, not just its constituent parts, that must be examined for fairness. ( Dunk , sup ra , 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1801 ; Lane v. Facebook, Inc. (9th Cir. 2012) 696 F.3d 811, 823 .) Second, we reject Moreli’s contention that the law requires evidence of the
theoretical “ maximum value of each claim ” released in the settlement. Moreli ’s reliance

on Kullar , supra , 168 Cal.App.4th 116 is misplaced. Kullar does not “ require the record in all cases to contain evidence in the form of an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its cl aims .” ( Munoz v. BCI
Coca

- Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 409 ( Munoz ).) It only requires a record that is sufficiently developed to allow the court to understand the amount in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes o f the litigation. ( Ibid .) Thus,
while a court must receive basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question , and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the
release of those claims is reasonable , the court need not determine the maximum potential
recovery for each released claim. ( See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., supra , 696 F.3d at
p. 823 .) A proposed settlement is not to be judged against a hypothetical or speculative
measure of the maximum amount the plaintiffs could have obtained at trial, but whether
the settlement is “within the ‘ballpark’ of reasonableness” under all the circumstances. ( Wershba , supra , 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 ; Kullar, at p. 133; Chavez v. Netflix, Inc

. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 55.) Starting with the absolute maximum value of a case and discounting from that amount based on the risks of litigation is certainly on e way to arrive at a realistic understanding of the amount in controversy, but it is not the only way. Third, although the moving parties have the burden to show that a proposed
settlement is fair and reasonable , “in the final analysis it is the court that bears the responsibility to ensure that the recovery represents a reasonable compromise

. . . .” ( Kullar, supra , 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) While the trial court should not give a13

rubber

- stamp approval, the settlement hearing also should not be tur ned into a trial or
rehearsal for trial on the merits. ( 7

- Eleven , supra , 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145; accord,
Wershba , supra , 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 246 .) “ ‘ Neither the trial court nor this court is to reach any ultimate conclusions on the contested issues of fact and law which underlie the merits of the dispute, for it is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlements. ’ [Citation.]” ( 7

- Eleven , at p. 1145 .) Fourth, when re viewing a settlement in a lawsuit that includes both class claims and PAGA penalties, the trial court may apply a sliding scale in determining whether the PAGA settlement is reasonable. For example, where there is a robust settlement of class
claims , sett lement of the PAGA claims may be substantially reduced below their
standalone settlement value . ( See, e.g., Stoddart v. Express Servs. (E.D.Cal. , Oct. 6, 2020, No. 2:12

- cv

- 01054

- KJM

- CKD) 2020 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 186315, at pp. * 43

- 44 ; Slavkov v. Fast Water Heater Partners I, LP (N.D.Cal. , July 25, 2017, No. 14

- cv

- 04324

- JST) 2017 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 116303, at p. *5 ; Swain v. Anders Grp., LLC (E.D.Cal. , Apr

. 17, 2023, No. 1:21

- cv

- 00197

- SKO) 2023 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 67162, at p p

. *19

- 20 .) Applying these principles , we reject Moreli’s claim that the trial court lacked
sufficient information about the nature and magnitude of p laintiffs’ claims to evaluate the
fairn ess of the Settlement. The information before the court included declarations from experienced class counsel describing how counsel investigat ed the merits of the class claims and potential damages through informal discovery and exchange of documents
with the defendant . Specifically, the record shows that Mendocino Farms pro vided
p laintiffs with data on the number of putative class members, a class list with hire and termination dates, relevant wage and hour policies, and sev eral years ’ worth of payroll and timekeeping records. The combined data sample amounted to nearly three

- quarters of a million lines of data , and represented more than 393,000 shifts, 50,000 pay periods, and 95,000 workweeks

. In addition, p laintiffs retai ned an expert to review the time and14

payroll data and prepare an analysis of meal and rest break violations, premium wages paid and owed, unpaid wages, interest, and penalties. Plaintiffs also engaged in extensive negotiations and participated in a privat e , arm’s

- length mediation with Mendocino Farms before a mediator experienced in the legal issues before him

. Based on their investigation, p laintiffs determined that “a generous likely total exposure for the asserted claims” is approximately $38.5 million. Plaintiffs described how they arrived at the estimate

. They explained that the assigned value for meal break claims, about $2.3 million, was based on a calculated total of unique meal period violations, multiplied by average pay rate s

. The assigned val ue for rest break claims, about $10.3 million, was based on the assumption of one rest period violation per shift over 3.5 hours, multiplied by average pay rates. The assigned value for wage statement violations, about $4.3 million, was calculated based o n 2,568 employees and 44,587 pay periods. The assigned value for waiting time penalties, about $11.5 million, was calculated based on 4,262 former employees. The assigned value for un reimburse d business expenses, less than $300,000, was based on an assum ed cost of $50 per cell phone multiplied by 5,209 class members. T he assigned value for PAGA penalties was approximately $8.7 million (also based on 2,568 employees and 44,587 pay periods )

. Plaintiffs explained that their investigations did not reveal si gnificant issues with respect to unpaid overtime or off

- the

- clock claims

. While acknowledging that the maximum potential exposure could exceed $38 million, p laintiffs asserted that $38 million was believed to be the “likely maximum recovery if P laintiffs and the class were to prevail at trial on all claims.” After taking account of the costs and risks of litigation, such as class certification, the possibility of arbitration, proving liability at trial, and the possibility that an award of civil penaltie s would be reduced by the court, p laintiffs determined that the proposed gross settlement amount of $1.5 million was fair and reasonable.15

To be sure, p laintiffs ’ showing was not perfect. P laintiffs could have done more to explain how they valued the PAGA penalties and why they determined the overtime
claims ha d little or no value

. However, the trial court was not limited to the information presented by p laintiffs in support of the ir motion

. The court also was able to consider
Moreli ’ s opposition , and the responses to that opposition

. Using essentially the same data as p laintiffs, Moreli prepared and submitted his

own valuation analysis in support of his opposition

. According to Moreli, his valuation
showed that p laintiffs underestimated the maximum value of the class claims by more than $5 million and the maximum value of the PAGA penalties by more than $70 million. Moreli explained how he arrived at his estimates and why he believed p laintiffs’
valuations were to o low . Specifically, he argued that p laintiffs : (1) ignored penalties for wage statement violations available under section 226.3 ; (2) improperly released section
226.3 penalties for no value ; ( 3 ) failed to include additional penalties for recurring
viol ations under section 210; ( 4 ) wrongly assumed that multiple PAGA penalties cannot be imposed (“stacked”) for the same underlying conduct ; ( 5 ) wrongly assumed that heightened PAGA penalties for a “subsequent” violation can not be imposed without
notice of th e prior violation ; ( 6 ) improperly assumed certain PAGA penalties had no
value ; ( 7 ) failed to include the cost of cell phone service in valuing the expense reimbursement claim ; ( 8 ) underestimated meal and rest break claims by at least $1
million ; and ( 9 ) failed to assign any value to off

- the

- clock (and related minimum wage)
claims related to meal breaks. In response, the settling Parties explained why they believed Moreli’s evidence and arguments did not show the Settlement was unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable

. To begin, p laintiffs argued that “his valuations of the most valuable claims

— rest break, meal break, unpaid overtime, waiting time penalties, statutory wage statement penal ty

— are either remarkably similar or identical ” to p laintiffs’ estimates, with the primary
differences attributable to interest calculations and an additional two months of16

extrapolated damages . The settling Parties also disagreed that the reimbursement cl aim
should include the full cost of cell phone service since Mendocino Farms d id not require employees to use their personal cell phones for business purposes and had a policy prohibiting employees from using personal devices except on breaks.
The Parties further disputed the claim that they ignored significant off

- the

- clock (and minimum wage) claims. The Parties pointed to evidence in the record showing that hourly managers “did not clock out” for meal periods during their shifts and therefore generally d id not work off

- the

- clock. Thus, the y asserted, the realistic exposure for such claims was likely “very modest,” less than $150,000, and would not render the Settlement
unreasonable. As to the PAGA penalties, the Parties cited legal authority showing that it is not improper to release all known and unknown claims that were or could have been pled based on the allegations of the complaint (see, e.g., Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (20 10) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 586

- 587; Carter v. City of Los Angeles , supra , 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 820

- 821 ) , and that an employer generally cannot be subject to heightened PAGA penalties for “subsequent” (recurring) violations unless it received
notice of the prior violation ( Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157 , 1209 ; Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc. (9th Cir. 2021) 3 F.4th 1127, 1144; Trang v. Turbine Engine Components Technologies Corp. (C.D. Cal., Dec. 19, 2012, No. CV 12

- 07658 DDP RZX) 2012 WL 6618854, at p. *5 .) They also showed that it is ( at best ) legally uncertain whether PAGA penalties may be recovered under section 226.3 for inaccurate wage statements , 4 and whether

4 Compare Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 334, with Raines v. Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 667 . (See also Lopez v. Friant & Associates, LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 773, 784, fn. 6

.17

multiple PAGA penalties may be recovered for the same underlying conduct

. 5 Plaintiffs
further explained that calculating exposure for a PAGA claim is inherently speculative
because courts have discretion to reduce PAGA penalties where an award would be unjust or oppr essive

. (§ 2699, subd. (e)(2) ; see also § 226.3 )
The trial court was able to consider Moreli’s evidence and arguments , and the settling Parties’ responses to it, before approving the Settlement

. I n our view, th is
information , together with the other evidence presented in support of the motion, was sufficient for the court to make an informed evaluation of the Settlement.
Kullar , supra , 168 Cal.App.4th 116, which Moreli relies upon, is distinguishable

. In Kullar , there was “nothing ” before the court to establish the sufficiency of the investigation other than an assurance from class counsel that “ they had seen what they needed to see.” ( Id

. at p p. 126, 129 ; Munoz, supra , 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 410. ) The
court did not receiv e even basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration received for the release of the claims was reasonable. ( Kullar, at pp. 12 9 , 133.) Here, in contrast, the record
contains ample information from which the court could evaluate whether the Settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable.

5 Compare Snow v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (C.D. Cal., Apr. 1, 2020, No. EDCV20025PSGAFMX) 2020 WL 1638250, at pp. *3

- 4; Smith v. Lux Retail North America, Inc. (N.D. Cal., June 13, 2013, No. C 13

- 01579 WHA) 2013 WL 2932243, at p. *3 ; and Posephny v. AMN Healthcare Inc. (N.D. Cal., July 9, 2020, No. 18

- CV

- 06284

- KAW) 2020 WL 13612298, at p. *3 ; with Schiller v. David ’ s Bridal, Inc. (E.D. Cal., July 14, 2010, No. 1:10

- CV

- 00616 AWI) 2010 WL 2793650, at p. *6 [it is conceivable t hat plaintiff could stack PAGA penalties for each violation]; Salazar v. PODS Enterprises, LLC (C.D. Cal., May 8, 2019, No. EDCV19260MWFKKX) 2019 WL 2023726, at p. *6 [holding that it is possible “although highly unlikely” plaintiff could stack PAGA penalties for each violation]; and Steenhuyse v. UBS Financial Services, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2018) 317 F.Supp.3d 1062, 1070 [allowing stacking]

.18

We acknowledge Moreli’s concern that class counsel took an overly pessimistic
view of the maximum value of the PAGA penalties. However, we must be mindful of the limited scope of our review. We reiterate that our role is not to make an independent determination whether the terms of the Settlement are fair, adequate, and reasonable. ( Munoz, supra , 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 407 .) No r should we reach any dispositive
conclusions on the unsettled issues of fact and law underlying the merits of the dispute. ( 7

- Eleven , supra , 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146; Wershba , supra , 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 246.) We only determine whether the trial judge, whose views are entitled to great weight, acted within the scope of his or her broad discretion. 6 ( Munoz , at p. 4 10.)
We see no basis for finding an abuse of discretion here

. The record before the
court established that the Settlement was entitled to a presumption of fairness , and Moreli failed to adequately rebut that presumption. On appeal, Moreli asserts the same basic argument that he raised below , i.e., that
p laintiffs underestimated the maximum potential value of the claims and therefore settled too cheaply. However, as p laintiffs showed, the assumptions underlying his valuation are
either contrary to law or rest on unresolved legal and factual issues that are fraught with
risk and uncertainty. In sum, t he trial court was informed of the differing valuations and the reasons why they differed. The court carefully considered the arguments and weighed the
evidence before it and determined that Moreli’s objections were not a basis for rejecting the agreement. Nothing Moreli argues on appeal has convinced us that this was an abuse
of discretion. We find that the trial court understood the amount in controversy and the

6 Although not dispositive, we note again that p laintiffs sent the executed Settlement agreement to the PAGA u nit in the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and the agency did not object to its terms. (See Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 955, 973 [“the [Labor and Workfo rce Development Agency] may provide the trial court with comments on or objections to a proposed settlement, and has done so in the past”], review granted Ja n. 5, 2022, S271721 .)19

realistic range of outcomes in the litigation. We are not persuaded the trial court misapplied the law by rejecting Moreli’s differing opinions. Accordingly, even bearing in mind the heightened scrutiny that applies to precertification settlements, we conclude
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in approving the Settlement

. C. Approval of t he F

ee A ward As part of the Settlement, the Parties agreed that no more than one

- third of the gross settlement amount would be paid to class counsel as attorney fees. After hearing Moreli’s objections to the Settlement, the trial court approved the maximum fee award of $499,950, representing one

- third of the common fund. Moreli challenges the fee award, arguing the court erred by using a percentage

- of

- recovery method without requiring detailed time sheets and performing a “lodestar for fees as a cross

- check.” We review an attorney fee award under an abuse of discretion standard. ( Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488 ( Laffitte ).) W e find no abuse here.
T here are two primary methods of determining a reasonable attorney fee in the context of class action litigation. ( Laffitte , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 489 .) The percentage

of

- recovery method calculates the fee as a percentage of a common fund recovered on behalf of the class. ( Ibid .) The lodestar method calculates the fee by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable h ourly rate, which

amount then may be adjusted based on other factors. ( Ibid .)
In Laffitte , the Supreme Court held that trial courts have the discretion to choose between the two fee calculation methods. ( Laffitte, supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 504.) An objecti ng class member in that case argued that courts should not be permitted to use the percentage

- of

- recovery method and that fee awards should be calculated only under the
lodestar method . ( Id . at p. 486.) The court disagreed, holding that it is not an abuse of discretion to use the percentage method to calculate a fee in a common fund case. ( Id . at p. 503.)20

The court further held that trial courts have the discretion to blend the two fee
cal culation methods, using one method to “cross

- check” the reasonableness of the other’s result. ( Laffitte , supra , 1 Cal.5th at pp. 496, 506.) Thus, when percentage

- of

- recovery is used as the primary fee calculation method, trial courts have the discretion to “cross

check” the reasonableness of that fee through a lodestar calculation. ( Id . at pp. 488, 496, 504.) But the Supreme Court was clear that a lodestar cross

- check is not required : T rial courts “also retain the discretion to forgo a lodestar cross

- c heck and use other means to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested percentage fee.” ( Id . at p. 506.) In this case, the trial court elected not to perform a lodestar cross

- check. Instead,
it used other means to satisfy itself that the requested fee wa s reasonable, including a comparison of the requested fee to the “ ‘ going rate ’ ” for counsel in similar actions. The methodology employed by the trial court is consistent with Laffitte and the resulting percentage fee award is consistent with awards in other cases

. ( Laffitte, supra , 1 Cal.5th

at pp. 485

- 486 [approving a one

- third attorney fee award]; Chavez v. Netflix , Inc., supra , 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 66, fn. 11 [ noting that fee awards average around one

- third of the
recovery ]; In re Activis ion Sec. Litigation (N.D.Cal. 1989) 723 F.Supp. 1373, 1378 [the benchmark is at approximately 30 percent ] .) We therefore conclude t he trial court did
not abuse its discretion in approving the fee award.21 DISPOSITION The order and judgment approving the S ettlement, and the postjudgment order denying the motion to vacate, are affirmed. The respondents shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a) (1) & (2 ) .)

\ s \ , Krause, J.

We concur:

\ s \ , Duarte, Acting P. J.

\ s \ , Boulware Eurie, J.