9824 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 35 / Wednesday, February 22, 1995 / Notices

determination have been corrected, and

the SEA or LEA is, in all other respects,

in compliance with the requirements of

the applicable program;

(2) SEA has submitted to the Secretary

a plan for the use of the funds to be

awarded under the grantback

arrangement that meets the

requirements of the program, and to the

extent possible, benefits the population

that was affected by the failure to

comply or by the misexpenditures that

resulted in the audit exception; and

(3) Use of funds to be awarded under

the grantback arrangement in

accordance with the SEA’s plan would

serve to achieve the purposes of the

program under which the funds were

originally granted.

C. Plan for Use of Funds Awarded

Under a Grantback Arrangement

Pursuant to section 459(a)(2) of GEPA,

the SEA has applied for a grantback of

$31,696—75 percent of the principal

amount recovered by the Department—

and has submitted a plan on behalf of

the LEA for use of the grantback funds

to meet the special educational needs of

both educationally deprived children in

programs administered under Chapter 1,

ESEA (20 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.), as well

as those of migratory children under the

Chapter 1 MEP (20 U.S.C. 2781 et seq.).

According to the plan, the LEA will

use the grantback funds under Chapter

1 to upgrade its existing Higher Order

Thinking Skills program (H.O.T.S.).

This computer-assisted instruction has

been used successfully in the county for

the past two years to improve the skills

of educationally deprived children, and

the use of the program promotes the

purpose of the Chapter 1 program under

which funds were allocated (see section

1001(b)).

The KCSD currently has five existing

H.O.T.S. Mac Labs, which serve an

average of 28 students, in grades 4

through 7. The requested grantback

funds will be used to upgrade existing

H.O.T.S. sites and allow for another Mac

Lab site to be established at Keno

Elementary School. Also, software

would be purchased for the five existing

Mac Labs, as well as for the new Mac

Lab.

The grantback funds under the

Chapter 1 MEP will be used to purchase

computer hardware and software for

language instruction to migratory

children in four schools in the LEA.

D. The Secretary’s Determinations

The Secretary has carefully reviewed

the plan submitted by the SEA. Based

upon that review, the Secretary has

determined that the conditions under

section 459 of GEPA have been met.

These determinations are based upon

the best information available to the

Secretary at the present time. If this

information is not accurate or complete,

the Secretary may take appropriate

administrative action. In finding that the

conditions of section 459 of GEPA have

been met, the Secretary makes no

determination concerning any pending

audit recommendations or final audit

determinations.

E. Notice of the Secretary’s Intent to

Enter Into a Grantback Arrangement

Section 459(d) of GEPA requires that,

at least 30 days before entering into an

arrangement to award funds under a

grantback, the Secretary must publish in

the Federal Register a notice of intent

to do so, and the terms and conditions

under which payment will be made.

In accordance with section 459(d) of

GEPA, notice is hereby given that the

Secretary intends to make funds

available to the SEA under a grantback

arrangement. The grantback award

would be in the amount of $31,696.

F. Terms and Conditions Under Which

Payments Under a Grantback

Arrangement Would Be Made

The SEA and LEA agree to comply

with the following terms and conditions

under which payment under a grantback

arrangement would be made:

(1) The funds awarded under the

grantback must be spent in accordance

with—

(a) All applicable statutory and

regulatory requirements;

(b) The plan that the SEA submitted

and any amendments to that plan that

are approved in advance by the

Secretary; and

(c) The budget that was submitted

with the plan and any amendments to

the budget that are approved in advance

by the Secretary.

(2) All funds received under the

grantback arrangement must be

obligated by September 30, 1995, in

accordance with section 459(c) of GEPA

and the SEA’s plan.

(3) The SEA, on behalf of the LEA,

will, not later than December 31, 1995,

submit a report to the Secretary that—

(a) Indicates that the funds awarded

under the grantback have been spent in

accordance with the proposed plan and

approved budget; and

(b) Describes the results and

effectiveness of the project for which the

funds were spent.

(4) Separate accounting records must

be maintained documenting the

expenditures of funds awarded under

the grantback arrangement.

Dated: February 8, 1995.

Thomas W. Payzant,

Assistant Secretary for Elementary and

Secondary Education.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance

Number 84.010, Educationally Deprived

Children—Local Educational Agencies; and

Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance

Number 84.011, Chapter 1 Migrant Education

Program)

[FR Doc. 95–4247 Filed 2–21–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4000–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Savannah River Operations Office;

Record of Decision: Stabilization of

Plutonium Solutions Stored in the FCanyon Facility at the Savannah River

Site, Aiken, SC

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of Decision,

Stabilization of Plutonium Solutions

Stored in the F-Canyon Facility at the

Savannah River Site, Aiken, South

Carolina.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of

Energy (DOE) has prepared and issued

a Final Environmental Impact Statement

(EIS) (DOE/EIS–0219, December 30,

1994), to assess the potential

environmental impacts of stabilizing

approximately 80,000 gallons of

plutonium solutions currently stored in

tanks in the F-Canyon chemical

separations facility at the Savannah

River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South

Carolina. As long as the plutonium

remains in solution there is a risk of

releases and subsequent radiation

exposure to workers, the public, and the

environment from accidental criticality

incidents, leaks, and disruptions of

engineered systems from earthquakes.

The Department has evaluated the

impacts of alternative methods that

would achieve stabilization of the

solutions. The analysis reveals that the

potential environmental impacts of

implementing alternatives that would

eliminate the risk inherent in storing

plutonium in liquid form are small.

Further, the impacts differ little among

the alternatives. DOE currently has

available the capability to process the

plutonium solutions to a metal form.

Given this existing capability, the

potential for environmental releases that

exists as a result of storing the

plutonium in liquid form, and the

relative lack of environmental

advantages to implementing other

options, DOE has decided to process the

plutonium solutions to metal form using

the F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities at

the SRS. DOE has committed that this
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 35 / Wednesday, February 22, 1995 / Notices 9825

plutonium metal will not be used for

nuclear explosive purposes and intends

to offer it for inspection by the

International Atomic Energy Agency.

During the time the SRS was actively

involved in nuclear material

production, DOE transferred irradiated

fuels and targets from SRS reactors to

disassembly basins, which are waterfilled pools, to allow short-lived

radioactive isotopes to decay. From the

pools, DOE transferred the fuel and

targets to canyon facilities in F- and HAreas, where they were chemically

dissolved into liquid solutions. The

useful isotopes were recovered,

converted to a solid form, and either

shipped to other DOE facilities or stored

at the SRS. This chemical reprocessing

activity has been suspended since 1992,

and plutonium solutions have been

stored in tanks in the F-Canyon facility

since that time. The Final F-Canyon

Plutonium Solutions EIS examines

alternative methods for stabilizing these

solutions.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For

further information on the stabilization

of F-Canyon plutonium solutions or to

receive a copy of the Final EIS contact:

A. B. Gould, Jr., NEPA Compliance

Officer, U.S. Department of Energy,

Savannah River Operations Office, P.O.

Box 5031, Aiken, South Carolina 29804–

5031, (800) 242–8269.

For further information on the DOE

National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA) process, contact: Carol M.

Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA

Policy and Assistance (EH–4.2), U.S.

Department of Energy, 1000

Independence Avenue, SW.,

Washington, D.C. 20585, (202) 586–

4600, or leave a message at (800) 472–

2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

DOE prepared this Record of Decision

in accordance with the regulations of

the Council on Environmental Quality

for implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts

1500–1508) and DOE’s NEPA

Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part

1021). This Record of Decision is based

on DOE’s Final F-Canyon Plutonium

Solutions Environmental Impact

Statement, Savannah River Site, Aiken,

South Carolina (DOE/EIS–0219).

The SRS occupies approximately 800

square kilometers (300 square miles)

adjacent to the Savannah River, mostly

in Aiken and Barnwell Counties of

South Carolina, about 40 kilometers (25

miles) southeast of Augusta, Georgia,

and about 32 kilometers (20 miles)

south of Aiken, South Carolina. When

established in the early 1950s, SRS’s

primary mission was to produce nuclear

materials to support the defense,

research, and medical programs of the

United States. The present mission

emphasizes waste management,

environmental restoration, transition

activities, and decontamination and

decommissioning of facilities that are no

longer needed for nuclear materials

production.

In March 1992, DOE suspended

chemical processing operations in the FCanyon to address a potential safety

concern. That concern was addressed;

however, prior to the resumption of

processing, the Secretary of Energy

directed that SRS phase out chemical

separations activities (i.e., reprocessing).

Non-safety-related facility operations

have remained shut down since that

time (March 1992). Approximately

303,000 liters (80,000 gallons) of

solutions containing plutonium have

remained in tanks in F-Canyon since the

suspension of operation.

In September 1992, the SRS

completed a plan that described the

actions that DOE would have to take to

phase out reprocessing. The plan

included actions for removing the

material that remained in the canyons as

a result of the suspension of chemical

separation activities in March 1992. In

February 1993, the Site requested

approval from DOE to restart F-Canyon

after the completion of operational

readiness reviews conducted as part of

the response to the above-mentioned

March 1992 safety concern. The SRS

made this startup request in light of the

Secretary’s direction to accelerate the

transition of F-Area reprocessing

facilities to a standby condition and

because all contemplated actions were

typical of previous facility operations.

During this same time period, DOE

was drafting new requirements for

operational readiness reviews necessary

for the startup or restart of nuclear

facilities. Under these requirements,

facilities had to be able to demonstrate

the capability to perform satisfactorily

in relation to a broad range of topics

associated with the safe operation of a

nuclear facility. DOE promulgated these

requirements in DOE Order 5480.31,

‘‘Startup and Restart of Nuclear

Facilities,’’ which it issued in

September 1993. DOE decided that the

SRS should apply these requirements to

the restart of the F- and H-Canyons and,

in November 1993, determined that the

Site should hold the proposed F-Canyon

(and FB-Line) restart in abeyance until

it had completed a restart review in

accordance with the new Order. In

January 1994, DOE determined that

unless there was an emergency

condition, there should be no

processing in F-Canyon before the

completion of an environmental impact

statement.

On March 17, 1994, DOE published a

Notice of Intent (59 FR 12588) to

prepare an environmental impact

statement on the interim management of

nuclear materials at the SRS. The

proposed DOE interim management

actions are to stabilize those nuclear

materials at the SRS that represent a

health or safety concern for the public,

workers, and the environment and to

convert certain materials to a usable

form to support DOE program needs.

These proposed interim actions would

be carried out while DOE makes and

implements long-term decisions on the

disposition of nuclear materials. DOE is

addressing its long-term decisions in a

Programmatic Environmental Impact

Statement for Storage and Disposition of

Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials, for

which it issued an NOI on June 21, 1994

(59 FR 31985). DOE expects that it could

require 10 years or more to make and

implement these long-term decisions.

In May 1994, the Manager of the

Savannah River Operations Office

recommended that the DOE Assistant

Secretary for Defense Programs seek

alternative arrangements for compliance

with the National Environmental Policy

Act (NEPA) under the emergency

provisions of the Council on

Environmental Quality NEPA

Regulations, 40 CFR Part 1506.11, to

allow immediate stabilization of the

plutonium solutions in F-Canyon and

the Mark-31 targets stored in the LReactor Disassembly Basin. The

recommendation was based on the

Manager’s determination that the

materials present risks to workers, the

public, and the environment in the form

of radiation exposure from normal

operations and potential accidents,

which DOE could reduce by converting

the material to a solid stable form.

The Assistant Secretary for Defense

Programs endorsed the Savannah River

Operations Office Manager’s request and

asked that the DOE Office of

Environment, Safety and Health perform

an independent evaluation to determine

if stabilization actions should proceed

in advance of the completion of the

Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials EIS. The DOE Office of

Environment, Safety and Health

performed this independent evaluation

in June 1994. The report from the

evaluation characterized the following

potential facility accidents to be of

serious significance: (1) the potential for

inadvertent criticality of plutonium due

to precipitation of plutonium from the

F-Canyon plutonium solutions, and (2)

potential radiological releases to the
9826 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 35 / Wednesday, February 22, 1995 / Notices

environment due to leakage of

plutonium solutions through tank

cooling coils. The loss of experienced

facility personnel through resignation

and retirement was an issue of marginal

concern, with the recognition that this

could become a serious concern if the

current trend continued. The report did

not include the Mark-31 targets in the

materials of serious concern. DOE

evaluated the request to pursue

alternative arrangements for compliance

with NEPA under the emergency

provisions of 40 CFR 1506.11 in light of

the Office of Environment, Safety and

Health’s evaluation and determined that

the appropriate action would be to

accelerate the evaluation of stabilization

alternatives for the F-Canyon plutonium

solutions by preparing a separate

environmental impact statement on an

accelerated schedule.

The vulnerabilities associated with

the continued storage of the plutonium

in solution have also been documented

by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety

Board (DNFSB). In April 1994, the

DNFSB ‘‘concluded from observations

and discussions with others that

imminent hazards could arise within

two to three years unless certain

problems are corrected. . . . The Board

is especially concerned about . . .

(s)everal large tanks in the F-Canyon at

the Savannah River Site (that) contain

tens of thousands of gallons of solutions

of plutonium and trans-plutonium

isotopes. . . . If an earthquake or other

accident were to breach the tanks, FCanyon would become so contaminated

that cleanup would be practically

impossible. Containment of the

radioactive materials under such

circumstances would be highly

uncertain . . . therefore, the Board

recommends . . . (t)hat preparations be

expedited to process the dissolved

plutonium and trans-plutonium

isotopes in tanks in the F-Canyon at the

Savannah River Site into forms safer for

interim storage. The Board considers

this problem to be especially urgent.’’

While the Defense Nuclear Facilities

Safety Board noted that no emergency

presently exists, the Board also noted

that the plutonium solutions in FCanyon could present an imminent

hazard within two or three years. Given

that even the shortest time to complete

stabilization is almost two years, the

Department concluded that expediting

the decision to stabilize plutonium

solutions was prudent.

As noted above, DOE determined that

there are safety concerns associated

with plutonium solutions stored in FCanyon that warrant consideration of

actions prior to the issuance of a Record

of Decision for the Interim Management

of Nuclear Materials EIS. Therefore,

DOE decided to prepare the F-Canyon

Plutonium Solutions EIS on an

expedited basis. On August 23, 1994,

DOE published in the Federal Register

a notice amending the NOI for the

Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials at the SRS. The notice

explained DOE’s decision to prepare the

F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions EIS.

The NOI for the Interim Management

of Nuclear Materials EIS requested

public comments and suggestions for

DOE to consider in its determination of

the scope of that EIS, and announced a

public scoping period that ended on

May 31, 1994. DOE held scoping

meetings in Savannah, Georgia, North

Augusta and Columbia, South Carolina,

on May 12, 17, and 19, 1994,

respectively. As a result of this public

scoping process, DOE received

comments applicable to the stabilization

of F-Canyon plutonium solutions from

individuals, organizations, and

government agencies, and has

considered these comments in the

preparation of the F-Canyon Plutonium

Solutions EIS.

On September 9, 1994, the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency

published a Notice of Availability

(NOA) in the Federal Register (59 FR

174, pages 46643–46644), which started

the public comment period on the Draft

F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions EIS;

DOE published a corresponding NOA

for the Draft EIS on September 9, 1994

(59 FR 174, pages 46627–46628). The

public comment period ended on

October 24, 1994.

DOE revised the Draft EIS in response

to written and oral comments received

during the public comment period from

individuals, organizations, and Federal

and state agencies. Public hearings were

held in Columbia and North Augusta,

South Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia

(October 4, 6, and 11, 1994,

respectively). On December 30, 1994,

EPA published a Notice of Availability

of the Final F-Canyon Plutonium

Solutions EIS in the Federal Register

(59 FR 250, page 67706), following

distribution of approximately 400

copies to government officials and

interested groups and individuals.

The Department of Energy received

letters from the following organizations

following the distribution of the Final

EIS: (1) the South Carolina Department

of Transportation; (2) the Centers for

Disease Control, U.S. Department of

Health and Human Services; (3) the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration, U.S. Department of

Commerce; and, (4) the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA), Region IV. The EPA Region IV

letter indicates that a comment on the

Draft EIS concerning impacts to

ecological systems is only partially

addressed in the Final EIS. The Final

EIS briefly considered the potential for

impacts to ecological systems and

concluded that none of the alternatives

discussed in the EIS would affect

threatened or endangered species or any

of the flora or fauna routinely found in

the vicinity of F-Canyon areas.

Therefore, DOE did not include a

detailed analysis of the impacts on

ecological systems in the Final EIS. DOE

will be discussing with EPA how to

better represent/analyze potential

impacts of emissions on ecosystems.

The EPA Region IV letter states that the

preferred alternative will have the least

overall impact and that EPA supports

DOE’s action. The National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration concluded

that no federally-listed threatened or

endangered species under its

jurisdiction would be affected by the

proposed action. The other

organizations had no comments on the

Final EIS, and indicated they supported

DOE’s action plans or provided neither

an indication of support nor opposition

of DOE’s action plans.

II. Alternatives

The proposed action addressed in the

Final F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions

EIS is to stabilize the plutonium

solutions in order to eliminate the risks

inherent in storing this plutonium in

liquid form. DOE examined four

alternatives for stabilizing the solutions,

and a no-action alternative, in the Final

EIS.

A. No Action

DOE would continue to manage the

existing 303,000 liter (80,000 gallon)

inventory of solutions in stainless steel

tanks in the F-Canyon. The solutions

would be monitored and corrective

actions taken, as necessary, to minimize

the potential for precipitation of the

plutonium and the possibility of an

inadvertent criticality. This action

would continue for the 10-year time

period evaluated in the Final EIS.

B. Process to Plutonium Metal (the

Preferred Alternative)

Under this alternative, DOE would

use the existing F-Canyon and FB-Line

processes and equipment to convert the

plutonium solutions to metal. The metal

would be a chemically stable form of

plutonium that DOE could produce

without modifying the existing

equipment. Because there is no need for

additional plutonium for weapons, DOE

would not attempt to meet previous

isotopic or chemical purity
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 35 / Wednesday, February 22, 1995 / Notices 9827

specifications that were applicable for

weapons production. In addition, DOE

has made a commitment that

plutonium-239 from stabilization

actions would not be used for nuclear

explosive purposes. The plutonium

metal would be packaged and stored,

similar to other plutonium metal

already in vault storage. DOE expects

this stabilization alternative could be

accomplished in 20 months from the

date of a Record of Decision, which

would be significantly faster than

stabilization could be accomplished

under the other alternatives. In

conjunction with stabilizing the

solutions to metal, DOE would

undertake a project to modify a portion

of the FB-Line facility to provide the

capability to repackage the plutonium

metal into a configuration that meets the

recently issued DOE standard for longterm storage of plutonium (U.S.

Department of Energy Criteria for

Storage of Plutonium Metals and

Oxides, DOE–STD–3013–94,

Washington, D.C.). The new storage

standard requires plutonium to be

packaged in a form that is stable over an

extended period (e.g., 20 years) without

human intervention. Plutonium metal

would be packaged in sealed metal cans

without the presence of plastics. Current

SRS plutonium metal packaging

requires the use of plastic around an

inner can for contamination control

purposes. DOE estimates that it could

accomplish the modifications to the FBLine packaging capability by late 1997

at a cost of approximately $3 million.

Alternatively, while the solutions are

stabilized to metal, DOE could modify a

different vault facility to provide the

necessary equipment to repackage the

metal to meet long-term storage

requirements. DOE estimates this could

cost between $70 million and $150

million and that it could complete

repackaging by the end of 2001.

The stabilization to metal alternative

would produce a solid form of

plutonium that would be safer and

easier to store in the shortest period of

time. As a result, this is DOE’s preferred

alternative.

C. Processing to Plutonium Oxide

DOE would modify the FB-Line to

support conversion of the plutonium

solutions to a plutonium oxide and to

package the material for storage. The

objective would be to produce a

material form and packaging

configuration that met the new DOE

standard for long-term storage of

plutonium. If the extent of the FB-Line

modifications necessary to convert the

plutonium solutions to a plutonium

oxide and to package the material to

meet the long-term storage standard

were economically or physically

impractical, DOE would perform the

stabilization in two phases. DOE would

modify FB-Line to be able to convert the

material initially to an oxide form and

package it in FB-Line. At the same time,

DOE would design and construct a new

facility to process, package, and store

the oxide in accordance with the new

standard. DOE estimates that the

minimally required modifications to FBLine to provide the solution-to-oxide

conversion capability would cost $7

million and take three years to

complete. Following completion and

modification, DOE would operate the

FB-line for approximately 9 months to

convert and package the oxide for

storage. Repackaging the oxide to meet

the new plutonium storage standard

would not occur for another three years

when the new facility for packaging

were available. This new facility is

estimated to cost between $70 million

and $150 million; repackaging of the

oxide could also be completed by the

end of 2001.

D. Vitrification in the Defense Waste

Processing Facility

DOE would transfer the plutonium

solutions to the SRS waste tank farm.

Before transfer, the solutions would be

adjusted to ensure the safety of the

material in the tanks. DOE has

identified several concepts for adjusting

the solutions: diluting the solutions

with water and chemicals to achieve

very low plutonium concentration,

diluting the solutions with depleted

uranium, or adding iron and manganese

or other neutron poisons such as

gadolinium. In the waste tanks, highactivity waste would settle to the bottom

of the tank in the form of sludge. DOE

would transfer highly radioactive sludge

to the Defense Waste Processing

Facility, where it would be vitrified

(converted to a glass-like substance) and

stored on the Site until DOE made and

implemented final disposition

decisions.

DOE estimates it would take

approximately six years to perform the

technical studies, training, and

qualification efforts necessary to ensure

safe operations for transferring the

solutions for subsequent vitrification

under this alternative. The solutions

would not be transferred to the highlevel waste tanks until all studies for

vitrification were final. After these

studies were completed, DOE estimates

that it would take an additional three

years to complete the process of

transferring all the plutonium solutions

to the high-level waste tanks because of

the limited availability of tank space

and criticality concerns. The plutonium

solutions would remain in the highlevel waste tanks until DOE transferred

the contents to the Defense Waste

Processing Facility for vitrification.

E. Vitrification in F-Canyon

Under this alternative, DOE would

vitrify the plutonium into a borosilicate

glass matrix using an F-Canyon

vitrification facility. Modifications to

the F-Canyon would be necessary, and

include the installation of a

geometrically favorable evaporator to

concentrate plutonium solution, and

equipment to convert the concentrated

plutonium solution to a glass matrix

using technology similar to that to be

used on a larger scale in the Defense

Waste Processing Facility. The capital

costs of these modifications would be

about $27 million; the facility could be

available by January 1999.

When the modifications to the FCanyon to install the vitrification

facility were completed, the plutonium

solutions would be transferred to the

facility and evaporated. This

concentrated plutonium solution would

be fed, along with finely ground glass

(frit), to a melter to produce a

borosilicate glass containing the

plutonium. The molten glass would be

poured into stainless steel packages and

stored in an existing vault at the SRS

until final disposition decisions were

made and implemented.

Although the vitrification of this

plutonium could begin as early as

January 1999, DOE analyzed the

Vitrification in F-Canyon Alternative as

though it began during the first six

months of 2000. The Final EIS describes

its environmental consequences, which

are largely independent of the schedule

for vitrification.

F. Other Activities for Reduction of Risk

In addition to the alternatives

analyzed in detail in the Final F-Canyon

Plutonium Solutions EIS to stabilize the

plutonium solutions, DOE identified

other activities that have the potential to

reduce the risk associated with storing

the plutonium solutions in liquid form.

These activities are: (1) transporting the

solutions to H-Canyon for stabilization,

(2) purification of the solutions by

processing those that have the greatest

criticality risk through the second

plutonium cycle in F-Canyon, (3) risk

reduction activities identified in the

DOE Office of Environment, Safety and

Health Assessment of Interim Storage of

Plutonium Solutions in F-Canyon and

Mark-31 Targets in L-Basin at the

Savannah River Site (DOE–EH–0397P/

SRS–FCAN–94–01), and (4) shipment of

the solutions off the Site for
9828 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 35 / Wednesday, February 22, 1995 / Notices

stabilization. Activities that involve

transportation of the plutonium

solutions would involve all the risks

associated with the alternatives for

stabilization plus the risks and costs

associated with transportation of

radioactive liquids. Activities such as

purification of the plutonium solutions

by operating the second plutonium

cycle in F-Canyon would reduce but not

eliminate the risks associated with

storing liquid plutonium solutions. In

addition, operation of only the second

plutonium cycle to purify plutonium

solutions would require process

development work and establishment of

operating parameters, because the FCanyon process has never been operated

in this manner. One important issue

associated with this approach would be

unprecedented high levels of radiation

in the second cycle portion of the

facility due to the greatly increased

presence of fission products.

III. Environmental Impacts of

Alternatives

The Final F-Canyon Plutonium

Solutions EIS evaluated the

environmental impacts of the

alternatives, including the no action

alternative. DOE analyzed the potential

impacts that would result from

implementation of the alternatives and

believes there would be minimal

impacts in the areas of geologic

resources, ecological and cultural

resources, socioeconomics, aesthetics

and scenic resources, and noise. This is

because implementation of each of the

alternatives would occur within the FArea and mostly within the F-Canyon

building. In light of planned SRS

workforce reductions, any jobs

associated with implementation of any

of the alternatives could be filled

through reassignment of current

workers, resulting in no discernible

impact on the regional economy.

Radiological health effects on workers

from normal operations would be small

for any alternative, much less than one

additional cancer death (0.2 latent

cancer fatalities for the no action

alternative and less for the other

alternatives) during the lifetimes of the

affected individuals. The effect on the

general public could be at most 0.0006

additional cancer deaths (for the

processing to oxide and vitrification in

F-Canyon alternatives, and less for the

other alternatives) in the general

population within 80 kilometers (50

miles) of the SRS. This is to say that no

latent cancer fatalities in either workers

or the general population are expected

to occur as a result of routine

operations. DOE expects similarly small

adverse nonradiological health effects to

workers and the public from emissions

of toxic pollutants. Because discharges

and emissions would vary little among

the alternatives, public health effects

would vary little among the alternatives.

The analysis in the EIS shows that these

potential small impacts would not

disproportionately affect minority or

low income populations.

Implementation of any of the

alternatives, including the No Action

alternative, would result in a risk of

accidents. The Final EIS evaluates a

spectrum of potential accidents for each

alternative. To enable a relative

comparison of potential impacts among

the alternatives, the accident with the

highest reasonably foreseeable

consequence for each alternative was

assumed to occur and the maximum

potential effects (latent cancer fatalities)

were calculated. The projected

frequency for these high-consequence

accidents ranged from once in 17,000

years for a plutonium solutions fire

involving solvents to once in 5,000

years for a severe earthquake. The

maximum potential effect accident,

although with a low probability, during

the storage of plutonium solutions (for

the periods prior to stabilization and for

the No Action alternative) and during FCanyon operation for stabilization is

about 6 latent cancer fatalities to the

exposed offsite population. For the

stabilization actions involving FB-Line

operations (processing to metal or

processing to oxide), the maximum

potential effect from an accident is less

than 2 latent cancer fatalities in the

exposed offsite population. Following

stabilization and during stabilized

plutonium storage, the maximum

potential effect from an accident is less

than 1 latent cancer fatality in the

exposed offsite population.

The SRS generates several different

types of waste, including low-level

waste, high-level waste, transuranic

waste and mixed waste. The Final EIS

lists estimates of waste generation for

each alternative. DOE estimates that the

smallest increase for all waste types

would occur if the processing to

plutonium metal alternative were

implemented. Implementation of this

alternative would eventually result in

high-level waste equivalent to 40

Defense Waste Processing Facility

(DWPF) high-level waste canisters. The

largest increase in high-level waste

would occur if the vitrification in DWPF

alternative were implemented. The

largest increase in saltstone and lowlevel waste generation would result

from implementing the processing to

oxide alternative. None of the

alternatives is expected to generate

substantial quantities of mixed waste.

With the exception of vitrification in

DWPF, the impact on SRS waste

management capacities from

implementing any of the alternatives

would be minimal because the Site can

accommodate all the waste generated

with existing and planned radioactive

waste storage and disposal facilities.

It would not be appropriate under any

of the alternatives that would result in

stabilized plutonium to characterize the

stabilized plutonium as waste. The

alternatives for the disposition of

surplus weapons-usable plutonium are

currently being examined in a

programmatic environmental impact

statement that is scheduled for

completion early next year. The nitric

acid that is associated with the

plutonium solutions likewise should

not be characterized as waste. The nitric

acid historically was introduced into the

separations process to dissolve

irradiated materials and provide for

criticality/radiological safety by

maintaining the plutonium in solution

pending stabilization. The nitric acid

continues to serve this vital safety

function. The South Carolina

Department of Health and

Environmental Control (SCDHEC) agrees

with DOE that the F-Canyon plutonium

solutions should not be regulated as a

mixed waste (Letter, R. Lewis Shaw,

SCDHEC to Frank R. McCoy, III, DOE,

January 26, 1995).

IV. Other Factors

In addition to examining the

environmental impacts of the

alternatives, DOE also considered other

factors related to the stabilization of the

F-Canyon plutonium solutions. These

factors are: (1) new facilities that would

be required, (2) security and nuclear

nonproliferation, (3) implementation

schedule, (4) technology availability and

technical feasibility, (5) labor

availability and core competency, (6)

degree of reliance on aging facilities,

and (7) post-stabilization custodial care

required. The processing to plutonium

metal alternative would be the most

advantageous for all factors except: (2)

security and nuclear nonproliferation

and (6) reliance on aging facilities.

The processing to oxide and

vitrification alternatives would involve

minimal reliance on aging facilities

because they would use new facilities

for the final step involved in stabilizing

the plutonium and for storing the

plutonium after completion of

stabilization. The processing to metal

alternative would use existing facilities

to stabilize the plutonium solutions.

The vitrification alternatives would be

preferable from the security and nuclear

nonproliferation standpoint because
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 35 / Wednesday, February 22, 1995 / Notices 9829

vitrification would produce a form of

material least likely to be used in

manufacturing a nuclear weapon.

However, a proliferator could recover

the plutonium from the vitrified (glass)

matrix if the necessary resources and

proper technology were available. The

processing to metal alternative would

result in a form of plutonium that

closely resembles materials used in

weapons production. DOE does not

believe that processing these solutions

to metal and storing the metal in vaults

in protected areas of the SRS, adding

appreciably less than one percent to the

U.S. inventory of many metric tons,

would constitute a proliferation risk.

DOE has committed to not using

plutonium-239 and weapons-usable

highly enriched uranium separated or

stabilized during the phaseout,

shutdown, and cleanout of weapons

complex facilities for nuclear explosive

purposes. This prohibition would apply

to the plutonium metal produced as a

result of the decision to process the FCanyon plutonium solutions to metal.

DOE believes that the processing to

metal alternative is fully consistent with

the Presidential Nonproliferation and

Export Control Policy, under which the

United States ‘‘* * * will seek to

eliminate where possible the

accumulation of stockpiles of highlyenriched uranium or plutonium, and to

ensure that where these materials

already exist they are subject to the

highest standards of safety, security, and

international accountability.’’

Furthermore, in accordance with the

provision in this Policy to submit U.S.

fissile material surplus to national

security requirements to inspection by

the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), the Department intends to offer

this material along with other material

at the SRS for IAEA inspection when

the material is in a form and

consolidated in a storage facility

suitable for safe and effective

monitoring by the IAEA.

V. Environmentally Preferable

Alternative

As shown in the Final F-Canyon

Plutonium Solutions EIS, the potential

environmental impacts of implementing

any of the alternatives are generally

small and within the same range. DOE

believes that any of the action

alternatives would be preferable to the

no action alternative because the

inherent risk of storing plutonium in

liquid form would be eliminated. DOE

considers the processing to metal

alternative the environmentally

preferable alternative because it would

eliminate the inherent risk of

maintaining plutonium in solution in

the shortest period of time. While the

plutonium remains in solution, there is

a risk of releases and subsequent

radiation exposure to workers, the

public, and the environment from

accidental criticality incidents, leaks,

and disruptions to engineered systems

from earthquakes.

VI. Decision

DOE has decided to implement the

preferred alternative, processing the FCanyon plutonium solutions to metal, as

discussed in the Final F-Canyon

Plutonium Solutions EIS. Concurrent

with the processing, packaging and

storage of the metal, which is expected

to take about 20 months, DOE will

undertake activities to modify part of

the FB-Line facility to provide the

capability to repackage the plutonium

metal into a configuration that meets the

DOE standard for long-term storage of

plutonium. The plutonium metal

resulting from this action will not be

used for nuclear explosive purposes.

VII. Mitigation

The F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities

that will be used to process the

plutonium solutions to metal

incorporate engineered features to limit

the potential impacts of facility

operations to workers, the public and

the environment. All of the engineered

systems and administrative controls are

subject to the startup requirements of

DOE Order 5480.31, which will assure,

prior to startup, the safe operation of the

facilities. No other mitigation measures

have been identified; therefore, DOE

need not prepare a Mitigation Action

Plan.

VIII. Conclusion

DOE has determined that the FCanyon and FB-Line facilities should be

operated to process to metal

approximately 303,000 liters (80,000)

gallons of plutonium solutions currently

stored in F-Canyon. In reaching this

decision, DOE considered the analysis

of the potential environmental impacts

of alternatives for stabilizing this

material in the Final F-Canyon

Plutonium Solutions EIS. This action

will produce a solid form of plutonium

that will be safer and easier to store than

a liquid solution. It will take less time

than other alternatives and will

therefore eliminate more quickly the

risk inherent in storing plutonium in

liquid form. The plutonium metal

resulting from this action will be stored

at the Savannah River Site pending

decisions on its disposition and will not

be used for nuclear explosive purposes.

Issued at Washington, DC, February 1,

1995.

Thomas P. Grumbly,

Assistant Secretary for Environmental

Management.

[FR Doc. 95–4308 Filed 2–21–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Golden Field Office; Notice of Federal

Assistance Award to WalMart Stores,

Incorporated

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of Financial Assistance

Award in Response to an Unsolicited

Financial Assistance Application; DE–

FG36–95G010057.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of

Energy (DOE), pursuant to the DOE

Financial Assistance Rules, 10 CFR

600.14, is announcing its intention to

grant funding to WalMart Stores,

Incorporated to implement

photovoltaics in the City of Industry

Environmental Demonstration Store’s

vestibule to power battery-operated

shopping carts, store equipment and an

electric demonstration vehicle.

ADDRESSES: Questions regarding this

announcement may be addressed to the

U.S. Department of Energy, Golden

Field Office, 1617 Cole Blvd., Golden,

Colorado 80401, Attention: John P.

Motz, Contract Specialist. The

telephone number is 303–275–4737.

The Contracting Officer for this action is

John W. Meeker.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: DOE has

evaluated, in accordance with the DOE

Federal Assistance Regulations, 10 CFR

section 600.14, the unsolicited proposal

entitled ‘‘Building Integrated

Photovoltaic System’’ and recommends

that the unsolicited proposal be

accepted for support without further

competition in accordance with section

600.14 of the Federal Assistance

Regulations.

The proposed WalMart Store for City

of Industry, California, has been

selected by WalMart as one of the

‘‘Environmental Demonstration Stores’’.

WalMart’s Environmental

Demonstration Store program was

established to investigate the feasibility

of various environmentally sensitive

options for building design and

development. The City of Industry store

has been designated to test energy

efficiency concepts such as the

proposed implementation of

photovoltaics.

The proposed photovoltaic system

will be used as roofing of the entrance

vestibule canopy. The energy produced