alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### VIRGINIA BELL SWINK v. P. W. HORN.

(Filed 20 November, 1946.)

Appeal and *Error*§ o—

Tbe subject matter of plaintiff’s action in summary ejectment is located in an area subject to- Pederal Rent Control. Plaintiff sought possession for personal occupancy to be near ber aged and ailing mother. Pending defendant’s appeal from judgment for plaintiff, plaintiff’s mother died. *Held:*The changed circumstances affected merely an element of proof incidental to the relief sought and does not destroy plaintiff’s cause of action, and therefore defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s action as having abated, is denied.

MotioN to dismiss plaintiff’s action. Motion denied.

*J. C. Sedberry for plaintiff.*

*O. W. Clayton for defendant.*

Devin, J.

The defendant in the above entitled cause moves in this Court that plaintiff’s action be dismissed as having abated by reason of the death, pending the appeal, of the plaintiff’s mother whose critical illness was alleged to have rendered it necessary for plaintiff to obtain possession of the apartment now occupied by the defendant, under Federal Rent Control Regulations. It was contended that plaintiff’s cause of action has become moot and is no longer supported by existing facts.

*719Undoubtedly, where, pending an appeal, the subject of the action has been destroyed or has ceased to exist, or been settled between the parties, or tbe right of action does not survive the death of the plaintiff, or the action or thing sought to be enjoined has happened or been completed, or because of devolution of title plaintiff’s interest has determined, a motion in this Court to dismiss the action as having abated ordinarily would be entertained. *Cochran v. Rowe,*225 N. C., 645, 36 S. E. (2d), 75; *Efird v. Commissioners,*217 N. C., 691, 9 S. E. (2d), 466; *Rousseau v. Bullis,*201 N. C., 12, 158 S. E., 553; *Rasberry v. Hicks,*199 N. C., 702, 155 S. E., 616; *Glenn v. Culbreth,*197 N. C., 675, 150 S. E., 332; *Kilpatrick v. Harvey,*170 N. C., 668, 86 S. E., 596; *Reid v. R. R.,*162 N. C., 355, 78 S. E., 306; *Wikel v. Commissioners,*120 N. C., 451, 27 S. E., 117; *S. v. R. R.,*74 N. C., 287; *Kidd v. Morrison,*62 N. C., 31; McIntosh, 775. But here the ground on which defendant’s motion is based is in substance that evidence material to the issue tried below is no longer available to the plaintiff. This applies not to the subject of the action but to an element of proof. It is merely incidental to the relief sought. Plaintiff’s cause of action has not been destroyed. The evidence referred to was used by the plaintiff in the trial below to overcome the artificial strength temporarily given the defendant’s defense by the rent regulations under the Emergency Price Control Act. The plaintiff’s right to repossess her property upon the expiration of the defendant’s lease, after due notice to vacate, under the law in this State, may not be deemed to have ceased to exist, or to afford the defendant ground for the reversal of the result in plaintiff’s favor in the trial in the Superior Court by the dismissal of the action by this Court.

Motion denied.
II 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3665 

To authorize certain aliens seeking asylum to be employed in the United 

States while their applications are being adjudicated. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 16, 2022 

Ms. COLLINS (for herself, Ms. SINEMA, and Mr. KING) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the 

Judiciary 

A BILL 

To authorize certain aliens seeking asylum to be employed 

in the United States while their applications are being 

adjudicated. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Asylum Seeker Work 

5 Authorization Act of 2022’’. 

6 SEC. 2. EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION FOR ALIENS SEEK7 ING ASYLUM. 

8 Section 208(d)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality 

9 Act (8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(2)) is amended to read as follows: 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 3665 IS

1 ‘‘(2) EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION.— 

2 ‘‘(A) ELIGIBILITY.—The Secretary of 

3 Homeland Security shall authorize employment 

4 for an applicant for asylum— 

5 ‘‘(i) who is not in detention; 

6 ‘‘(ii) whose application for asylum has 

7 not been determined frivolous; and 

8 ‘‘(iii) with respect to whom the proce9 dures required under paragraph (5)(A)(i) 

10 have been completed. 

11 ‘‘(B) APPLICATION.—The Secretary may 

12 not grant employment authorization under this 

13 paragraph to an applicant for asylum who is 

14 not otherwise eligible for employment authoriza15 tion until 30 days after the date on which the 

16 applicant filed an application for asylum. 

17 ‘‘(C) TERM.—Employment authorization 

18 under this paragraph— 

19 ‘‘(i) shall be for a period of 1 year; 

20 and 

21 ‘‘(ii) shall be renewable for additional 

22 1-year periods while the applicant’s asylum 

23 claim is being adjudicated, including ad24 ministrative or judicial review.’’. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 1/14/97 TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. ALBERT FOSTER, JR.,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 95-7131

ORDER
Before ANDERSON , McKAY, and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
The United States has filed a petition for rehearin g in this case, arguing that the panel failed to “address controlling Supre me Court authority” in affirming the district court’s order of blanket sup pression. We deny the petition for rehearing. In doing so, we make the following observations. The United States argues that, properly interpreted , Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39 (1984), allows the remedy of blanket suppre ssion only when the officers conducting a search exceed the warrant with regard to the range of places to be-2-

searched. The problem with this argument, however, is that this panel is not free to adopt the United States’ interpretation of Waller. In United States v. Medlin , 842 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (1988), a panel of this court cited Walleras one of several cases standing for the propositi on “that even evidence which is properly seized pursuant to a war rant must be suppressed if the officers executing the warrant exhibit ‘flagrant di sregard’ for its terms.” The panel in Medlin went on to hold that “[w]hen law enforcement offic ers grossly exceed the scope of a search warrant in seizing property , the particularity requirement is undermined and a valid warrant is tr ansformed into a general warrant thereby requiring suppression of all eviden ce seized under that warrant.” Id. at 1199 (emphasis added). Accordingly, a panel of this court has already determined that Wallersupports the remedy of blanket suppression in the context of an overly broad seizure. As noted in the panel opinion in this case, a threejudge panel cannot disregard or overrule circuit pr ecedent. United States v. Foster , 100 F.3d 846, 851 (10th Cir. 1996). Absent en banc reconsideration, which the United States has not suggested, or a supersedingcontrary decision by the Supreme Court, this panel is obligated to apply the interpretation of Wallerset out in Medlin. In re Smith , 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 53 (1994).-3-

Judge Anderson would also deny the petition for reh earing but does not otherwise join this order. The petition for rehearing is hereby DENIED
. Entered for the Court Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge
Long-Range 

Actuarial 

Balance

Annual 

Balance in 

75th Year

Long-Range 

Actuarial 

Balance

Annual 

Balance in 75th 

Year

Long-Range 

Actuarial 

Balance

Annual 

Balance in 

75th Year

-2.00% -4.34% 0.09% 0.00% -1.91% -4.34%

Summary Measures and Graphs

Category of Change: Retirement Age

Proposed Provision: Shorten the hiatus in the normal retirement age (start increasing to age 67 for those 

age 62 in 2010, rather than those age 62 in 2017).

Present Law Change From Present Law in Results with this provision

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(as a percentage of taxable payroll)

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Cost rates under present law

0

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(assets as a percentage of annual expenditures)

Present law With this provision

Estimates based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2009 Trustees Report Office of the Chief Actuary, Social Security

November 16, 2009

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(as a percentage of taxable payroll)

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Income rates under present law

Income rates with this provision

Cost rates under present law

0

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(assets as a percentage of annual expenditures)

Present law With this provision
In the United States Court of Federal Claims 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 19-285V

UNPUBLISHED

VANESSA GAMEZ,

 Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES,

 Respondent.

Chief Special Master Corcoran 

Filed: March 23, 2020

Special Processing Unit (SPU);

Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;

Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;

Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS)

William E. Cochran, Jr., Black McLaren Jones Ryland & Griffee, P.C., Memphis, TN , for 

petitioner.

Sarah Christina Duncan, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1

On February 22, 2019, Vanessa Gamez filed a petition for compensation under 

the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.,

2

(the 

“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered Guillain-Barre Syndrome (“GBS”) as 

a result of an influenza (“flu”) vaccine administered to her on September 7, 2017. 

Petition at 1. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of 

Special Masters.

On March 18, 2020, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes

that Petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report

 

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am 

required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the EGovernment Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of 

Electronic Government Services). This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to 

the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to 

redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of 

privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such 

material from public access. 

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for 

ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 

300aa (2012).
2

at 1. Specifically, Respondent concludes that “petitioner has satisfied the criteria set 

forth in the recently revised Vaccine Injury Table (“Table”) and the Qualifications and 

Aids to Interpretation (“QAI”), which afford petitioner a presumption of causation if the 

onset of GBS occurs between three and forty-two days after a seasonal flu vaccination 

and there is no apparent alternative cause.” Id. at 5. 

In view of Respondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that 

Petitioner is entitled to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Brian H. Corcoran

Brian H. Corcoran

Chief Special Master
Exhibit
10.1


 


RESOLUTIONS
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF FOMO CORP.


 


Effective
December 28, 2022, pursuant to the provisions of California Corporation law, as amended, and the Certificate of Incorporation and By-Laws
of FOMO CORP., a California corporation (the “Company”), the undersigned approves the issuance of up to 500 million common
stock purchase warrants to employees or contractors of SMARTSolution Technologies LP. Recipients, amounts, exercise prices, and vesting
schedules will be determined by SST management and the FOMO Board of Directors on a case-by-case basis.


 


WHEREAS,
the undersigned approves the issuance of up to 500 million common stock purchase warrants to employees or contractors of SMARTSolution
Technologies LP. Recipients, amounts, exercise prices, and vesting schedules will be determined by SST management and the FOMO Board
of Directors on a case-by-case basis.


 


WHEREAS,
the Board of Directors believes it is in the best interests of the Company to approve the issuance of up to 500 million common stock
purchase warrants to employees or contractors of SMARTSolution Technologies LP. Recipients, amounts, exercise prices, and vesting schedules
will be determined by SST management and the FOMO Board of Directors on a case-by-case basis.


 


NOW
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT:


 


RESOLVED,
the Board of Directors undersigned approves the issuance of up to 500 million common stock purchase warrants to employees or contractors
of SMARTSolution Technologies LP. Recipients, amounts, exercise prices, and vesting schedules will be determined by SST management and
the FOMO Board of Directors on a case-by-case basis.


 


RESOLVED,
that any of the Executive Officers of the Company are hereby authorized and directed for and on behalf of the Company to do and perform
all acts and things and execute and deliver all documents and take all such other steps as may be necessary or desirable to give full
effect to the consent resolutions set forth above.


 


		 
	Vikram
Grover, CEO & Director
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-84,064-01

EX PARTE JAMES HARRIS, JR.

ON MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE AN APPLICATION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN CAUSE NO. 67063-A

IN THE 149 DISTRICT COURT

TH

BRAZORIA COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

This case is before us because applicant has filed a motion for an extension of time

to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the provisions of Texas Code

of Criminal Procedure Article 11.071.

1

On December 13, 2013, a jury convicted applicant of capital murder and the trial

Unless otherwise indicated all references to Articles refer to the Code of

1

Criminal Procedure.
Harris - 2

court sentenced him to death. The trial court immediately appointed the Office of

2

Capital Writs to represent applicant on an Article 11.071 writ application. During

3

several months of 2015, the Office of Capital Writs found itself in transition and without

a director. By Court appointment, the Office installed a new director on October 1, 2015.

On August 4, 2015, the State filed its brief on applicant’s direct appeal. Under

4

Article 11.071 § 4(b), this initially made applicant’s writ application due in the trial court

no later than September 18, 2015. Because the OCW timely requested and received the

statutorily allowed 90-day extension for filing, applicant’s writ application is now due in

the trial court on or before December 17, 2015. However, as the due date draws closer,

the new director of the OCW has expressed concern over whether he will have enough

time to complete his review of the case. Acknowledging that the trial court is without the

authority to grant the OCW another extension, the Office has filed with this Court an

early motion for an extension of time under Article 11.071 § 4A.

5

Under the circumstances, this Court holds that the OCW has shown good cause

Applicant’s direct appeal is currently pending before this Court.

2

The Office of Capital Writs has been renamed. It is now the Office of Capital

3

and Forensic Writs.

The OCW mistakenly asserts that the State’s brief was filed on August 3, 2015.

4

It was actually filed on August 4, 2015, which makes the OCW’s calculations off by a

day.

The motion for an extension of time will not be sealed. However, the affidavit

5

accompanying the motion shall be sealed by order of this Court (this order includes that

same affidavit included as an attachment to the State’s Response).
Harris - 3

supporting its request for additional time to file applicant’s writ application. Although

the extension allowed by Article 11.071 § 4A is technically only invoked after a party has

failed to timely filed a writ application, we grant the OCW’s preemptive motion and hold

that it shall have an additional 90 days from the day the writ application is currently due

to file the application. Thus, applicant’s writ application shall be due in the trial court on

or before March 16, 2016.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS THE 5 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2015.

TH

Do Not Publish
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 26 (Tuesday, February 9, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Page 6844]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-02508]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. IC16-4-000]


Commission Information Collection Activities (FERC-500, FERC-
542); Consolidated Comment Request; Extension; Errata Notice

    On December 14, 2015, the Commission published a ``60-day Public 
Notice'' in the above-captioned proceeding, Commission Information 
Collection Activities (FERC-500, FERC-542); Consolidated Comment 
Request; Extension. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 80 FR 79322, December 21, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This errata notice serves to correct the section and associated 
table for the FERC-542 (Gas Pipeline Rates: Rate Tracking, OMB Control 
No. 1902-0070).
    The Abstract should indicate that the FERC-542 also includes the 
reporting requirements in 18 CFR 154.401 (research, development, and 
demonstration [RD&D] expenditures) and 18 CFR 154.403 (Periodic rate 
adjustments). In the table for FERC-542, the correct number of 
respondents is 87, with an average of 2.13 responses per respondent and 
a total of 185 responses.
    With the updates stated above, the correct total annual burden 
hours is 370, and the correct total annual cost is $26,640.

    Dated: February 3, 2016.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2016-02508 Filed 2-8-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
Exhibit 12.1

Lincare Holdings Inc.Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges(In thousands, except ratios)

|                               |  | FOR THE YEAR ENDED
|------------------------------ |  | ------------------
|                               |  | DECEMBER 31,      
|                               |  | 2006              
|EARNINGS AVAILABLE TO COVER    |  |                   
|FIXED CHARGES:                 |  |                   
|Income (loss) from continuing  |  | $339,843          
|operations before income taxes |  |                   
|and minority interests         |  |                   
|Add:                           |  |                   
|Fixed charges deducted from    |  |                   
|earnings (see below)           |  | 29,960            
|Earnings available to cover    |  |                   
|fixed charges                  |  | $369,803          
|                               | 
|FIXED CHARGES:                 |  |                   
|Interest expense, including    |  | $9,935            
|amounts in operating expense   |  |                   
|Amortized indebtedness         |  | 953               
|Interest within rent expense   |  | 19,072            
|Fixed charges                  |  | $29,960           
|                               | 
|RATIO OF EARNINGS TO           |  |                   
|FIXED CHARGES                  |  | 12.34             

---
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 39 (Tuesday, February 28, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 10841-10842]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-4826]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Project Nos. 2551-004-MI and 2579-010-IN]


Indiana Michigan Power Company; Notice of Availability of Draft 
Environmental Assessment

February 22, 1995.
    In accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (Commission's) 
regulations, 18 CFR Part 380 (Order No. [[Page 10842]] 486, 52 FR 
47897), the Office of Hydropower Licensing has reviewed the 
applications for new license for two existing licensed hydropower 
projects on the St. Joseph River owned and operated by the Indiana 
Michigan Power Company: the Buchanan Project, No. 2551, located in 
Berrien County, Michigan; and the Twin Branch Project, No. 2579, 
located in St. Joseph County, Indiana. Subsequently, the Commission's 
staff prepared one Draft Environmental Assessment (DEA) that discusses 
the relicensing of the two projects.
    In the DEA, staff evaluates the potential environmental impacts 
that would result from the continued operation of the projects. Staff 
concludes that relicensing the projects with appropriate enhancement 
measures would not constitute a major federal action significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment.
    Copies of the DEA are available for review in the Public Reference 
Branch, Room 3104, of the Commission's offices at 941 North Capitol 
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
    Any comments should be filed within 45 days from the date of this 
notice and should be addressed to Lois D. Cashell, Secretary, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 825 North Capitol Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426. Please affix Project Nos. 2551 and 2579 to the 
first page of all comments.
    For further information, please contact Jim Haimes, Environmental 
Coordinator, at (202) 219-2780.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 95-4826 Filed 2-27-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 39 (Tuesday, February 28, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 10842]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-4827]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[Project No. 11285-001 California]


Lake Casitas Municipal Water District; Notice of Availability of 
Final Environmental Assessment

February 22, 1995.
    In accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (Commission) 
regulations, 18 CFR Part 380 (Order No. 486, 52 FR 47897), the Office 
of Hydropower Licensing has reviewed the application for an original, 
minor license for the Lake Casitas Power Recovery Facility (project), 
and has prepared a Final Environmental Assessment (FEA) for the 
project. The project is located on the Bureau of Reclamation's existing 
pipeline between its Casitas dam Venture, in Ventura County, 
California.
    In the FEA, the Commission's staff has analyzed the potential 
future environmental impacts of the project and has concluded that 
approval of the project, with appropriate environmental protective 
measures, would not constitute a major federal action that would 
significantly affect quality of the human environment.
    Copies of the FEA are available for review in the Public Reference 
Branch, Room 3104, of the Commission's offices at 941 North Capitol 
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 95-4827 Filed 2-27-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M