Filed 1/26/24 P. v. Taylor CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ISAAC WILLIAM TAYLOR,

Defendant and Appellant.

B324559

 Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. MA072867

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Shannon Knight, Judge. Affirmed.

Maxine Weksler, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, and Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________
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Isaac William Taylor appeals a resentencing order. We 

affirm.

Statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

When he was 54 years old, Taylor approached David Ho on 

a sidewalk and told Ho to look down. Taylor was holding a gun 

at waist level. Taylor told Ho to move back a short distance into 

an alley and demanded Ho’s wallet. Ho surrendered the wallet.

Taylor said, “[T]here better be money [in the wallet] or you’re 

going to die tonight.” (People v. Taylor (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 

1102, 1104–1105 (Taylor).)

According to his probation report, police found Taylor 

shortly after the robbery and found a gun nearby. The gun had 

six rounds in the magazine and a round in the chamber. During 

his resentencing and in his appellate briefs, Taylor has not 

contested this information about his loaded gun.

A jury convicted Taylor of robbery and kidnapping for 

robbery and found he had used a handgun. Taylor admitted a 

prior serious felony conviction that also qualified as a strike. The 

trial court originally sentenced him to 29 years to life in prison 

for kidnapping and 25 years for robbery.

This is Taylor’s third appeal.

In the first appeal, we reversed the kidnapping for robbery 

conviction. (Taylor, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105.) The trial 

court then resentenced Taylor to 25 years in prison: the upper 

term of five years for robbery, doubled due to a prior strike, plus 

15 years for the firearm and prior serious felony enhancements.

In the second appeal, we remanded for resentencing due to 

an ameliorative sentencing law. (People v. Taylor (May 5, 2022, 

B307932) [nonpub. opn.].)
3

At resentencing, defense counsel asked the court to strike 

the prior serious felony enhancement and to reduce or stay the 

gun enhancement. Counsel argued Taylor’s criminal history was 

remote and largely for drug offenses; he had substance abuse 

disorder; he was almost 60 years old and in poor health; he 

experienced trauma as a child; and he had made positive changes 

while in prison for the robbery of Ho.

The court resentenced Taylor to 16 years in prison: the 

middle term of three years for robbery, doubled due to the prior 

strike, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement. The court 

struck the prior serious felony enhancement.

The court explained its reasoning. It struck the prior 

serious felony enhancement due to Taylor’s age and medical 

history. It imposed the 10-year firearm enhancement based on 

the facts of the robbery, which included a loaded gun and 

significant risk to the victim.

The court also discussed Taylor’s criminal history. The 

prosecution presented four relevant documents: a certified 

“California rap sheet,” a certified “F.B.I. C.L.E.T.S. rap sheet,” 

and two certified records of conviction from Nevada. The court 

admitted these documents without objection from Taylor’s 

counsel. The court found the convictions listed in the exhibits to 

be true and found Taylor’s convictions were numerous and 

increasingly serious.

The court found that reducing Taylor’s sentence would 

endanger public safety: it “may very well result in physical 

injury or serious danger to others.”

In this third and present appeal, Taylor challenges the 16-

year sentence. Specifically, he argues the court abused its 

discretion by imposing the 10-year firearm enhancement.
4

We affirm because imposition of the enhancement was 

reasonable given the nature of the robbery and Taylor’s extensive 

criminal history.

Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) now requires courts to 

dismiss enhancements if it is in the furtherance of justice to do 

so. The law lists nine mitigating circumstances, including if a 

case has multiple enhancements or if the current offense is 

connected to mental illness. (Id., subd. (c)(2)(B) & (D).) Proof of 

one or more circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing 

the enhancement unless dismissal would endanger public safety.

(Id., subd. (c)(2).) Endanger public safety means a likelihood the 

dismissal would result in physical injury or serious danger to 

others. (Ibid.)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding 

dismissal of the firearm enhancement would endanger public 

safety. The facts of the robbery support the finding. Taylor held 

a gun. It was loaded with several rounds, including a round in 

the chamber. He gratuitously threatened death to Ho. The 

dangerousness and callousness of this robbery made it more 

likely Taylor would endanger public safety without the 

enhancement.

Taylor’s criminal history bolsters the finding. The four 

documents the court admitted with Taylor’s records of conviction 

are not in our appellate record. Neither party addresses this 

omission. Based on Taylor’s probation report and reporters’

transcripts in which the parties discussed Taylor’s criminal 

history, Taylor had several convictions for possession or sale of 

drugs in the 1980s, a 1984 conviction for vehicle theft, a 1992 

conviction for possession of a controlled substance and attempted 

coercion, a 1994 conviction for robbery for which Taylor received 
5

a 12-year sentence, and a Nevada conditional release violation 

that Taylor admitted in 2011. The trial court was correct that 

Taylor’s convictions were numerous and his present conviction 

was the most serious. Based on this pattern, the court did not 

abuse its discretion by finding Taylor was likely to endanger 

public safety without the enhancement.

On appeal, Taylor emphasizes mitigating factors including 

his age, health, and substance use disorder, but the trial court 

properly heard and considered these points. The court lowered 

Taylor’s sentence to a middle term and struck one enhancement, 

thereby shortening Taylor’s sentence by nine years. The court 

appropriately exercised its discretion.

Taylor’s strike is not an enhancement under section 1385, 

so there were not multiple enhancements. Taylor’s opening brief 

says his strike and firearm enhancement constituted multiple 

enhancements and all but one of them should be dismissed under 

section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B). He says his strike was an 

enhancement based on one statement in a Senate bill analysis:

“Sentence enhancements are not elements of the crime, they are 

additional circumstances that increase the penalty, or time 

served, of the underlying crime.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. 

Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 81 (2021–

2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 30, 2021, p. 2.) The 

prosecution responds by citing People v. Burke (2023) 89 

Cal.App.5th 237, 243–244, which held that section 1385, 

subdivision (c) does not apply to the Three Strikes law. Taylor 

does not address this issue in his reply. The recent case People v. 

Olay (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60 came to the same conclusion as

Burke and comprehensively analyzed the statute’s text and 

legislative history. (Id. at pp. 67–69.) We agree with Burke and
6

Olay’s holding. Taylor’s strike was not an enhancement under 

section 1385, so the provision about multiple enhancements did 

not apply.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

WILEY, J.

We concur: 

STRATTON, P. J. 

GRIMES, J.