IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAVANCE MICKEY WILSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

S118775

San Bernardino County Superior Court

FVA-012968

__________________________________________________________

August 5, 2024

Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Groban, and 

Jenkins concurred.

Justice Evans filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Liu 

concurred.

__________________________________________________________
1

PEOPLE v. WILSON

S118775

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

Defendant Javance Mickey Wilson was charged with 

robbing and murdering or attempting to murder three cab 

drivers on separate occasions over a four-week period. At 

Wilson’s first trial, the jury deadlocked on guilt and the court 

declared a mistrial. On retrial, Wilson was convicted of robbery, 

carjacking, and attempted murder of James Richards; first 

degree murder and robbery of Andres Dominguez; and first 

degree murder and attempted robbery of Victor Henderson. 

(Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 211, 215, subd. (a), 664.) The jury 

also found that Wilson personally used a firearm in committing 

the crimes against Richards (id., § 12022.53, subd. (b)), and 

personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing the 

deaths of Dominguez and Henderson (id., § 12022.53, subd. (d)). 

The jury found true the special circumstances of robbery murder 

and multiple murder. (Id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (17).) At the 

penalty phase, the jury returned a death verdict and the trial 

court entered a judgment of death. This appeal is automatic. 

(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 

We affirm the judgment. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

2

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Guilt Phase

1. Prosecution evidence

The prosecution presented evidence that in early 2000, 

Wilson committed a series of crimes against cab drivers in the 

San Bernardino and Los Angeles areas. On each occasion, the 

perpetrator called for a cab, then robbed and murdered or 

attempted to rob and murder the cab driver. The first victim, 

James Richards, was robbed at gunpoint at the end of a rural 

road in San Bernardino County. The perpetrator attempted to 

kill Richards, but the gun jammed and Richards managed to 

escape. The second victim, Andres Dominguez, was shot and 

killed in the same location several weeks later. The perpetrator 

then used Dominguez’s cell phone to request another taxicab 

from a Pomona company. The driver of the cab that responded, 

Victor Henderson, was the third victim; he was killed 

approximately two hours after Dominguez, shot by the same gun 

used to kill Dominguez.

James Richards picked up a passenger in front of a grocery 

store in downtown San Bernardino on January 7, 2000. The 

passenger was going to Bloomington, about 20 minutes away. 

After reaching Bloomington, the passenger directed Richards to 

stop on a rural, dimly lit road. There, the passenger drew a gun 

and robbed Richards. Then, forcing Richards out of the cab and 

onto his knees, the passenger put the gun into Richards’s mouth 

and tried to shoot him. The gun jammed, however, and Richards 

was able to escape to a nearby house. The owner of the house 

heard Richards screaming and pounding on his door and saw a 

figure in the street pointing a gun at Richards before getting into 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

3

a cab and speeding off. The cab company later recovered 

Richards’s stolen taxi from an apartment complex in Victorville.

When police arrived at the scene, Richards told them the 

perpetrator was a Black male in his 30s, with short hair and 

pock-marked skin, about six feet tall and 220 pounds, and 

wearing a light-colored ski jacket. Although Wilson was 25 at 

the time, Richards’s description generally matched Wilson’s 

appearance. Richards later identified Wilson from a photo 

lineup but was unable to pick Wilson out of a live lineup held 

two weeks after the initial identification. Richards described 

the weapon Wilson used as a smaller, chrome gun. Police later 

recovered a .22 handgun fitting this description from a friend of 

Wilson’s, as part of their investigation into the crime. 

The prosecution presented additional evidence to connect 

Wilson to the weapon used in the Richards robbery and to 

related events and locations. Joe Diaz testified that on January 

6, 2000, intruders broke into his house and took everything from 

his gun case, including a hunting rifle and a .22 handgun that 

jammed nearly every time it was shot. A childhood friend of 

Wilson’s purchased that hunting rifle from Wilson in January or 

February 2000. The same friend testified that Wilson’s 

grandparents lived in Bloomington, not far from the road where 

Richards had been robbed, and that Wilson had lived with his 

grandparents periodically. In an interview with detectives, 

Wilson admitted having access to a small .22 pistol. At the time 

of the robbery, Wilson lived in an apartment in Victorville about 

two miles from Diaz’s home and one street away from the 

location where the cab company recovered Richards’s stolen 

taxicab. It was about 40 miles from Victorville to San 

Bernardino, but in January 2000, Wilson’s mother had been 

staying in a motel right by the grocery store in San Bernardino 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

4

where Richards picked up his assailant; the manager of the 

motel testified that Wilson and his brother Sylvester Seeney 

visited her there on January 6 or 7. 

Andres Dominguez drove his cab to pick up a passenger at 

a San Bernardino grocery store just before midnight on 

February 20, 2000. Soon afterwards, Dominguez was shot and 

killed on the same road where Richards had been robbed. A

resident who heard the gunfire saw a car leaving the scene, 

while Dominguez’s taxicab remained on the street. 

Later that night, a caller used Dominguez’s cell phone to 

request a taxi from a Pomona cab company. Victor Henderson 

picked up the passenger. At approximately 2:30 a.m., 

Henderson was shot and killed a distance from his cab. 

Eyewitnesses saw a man in a white ski jacket running in the 

street where Henderson had been shot. The man then got into 

a car that drove away before he was fully inside, dragging him 

briefly. 

Sara Bancroft and Christina Murphy saw Wilson the day 

before the murders and the morning after; each testified that 

after the murders, Wilson had an injured leg and was 

complaining about scuffs on his new sneakers that had not been 

present the day before. A friend of Bancroft’s, Tiffany Hooper, 

also saw Wilson the morning after the murders and noticed his 

injury. 

Bancroft was a neighbor of Wilson’s in Victorville who 

knew Wilson and his younger brother Seeney. She rented a car 

for Wilson to use on February 20 and 21. She saw Wilson on the 

evening of February 20. He was with an 18- or 19-year-old man 

she did not recognize. The next morning when Wilson came 

back with the rental car, he was with a different man and there 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

5

was something wrong with his knee. He was limping and could 

not bend his leg well. Bancroft and Hooper gave Wilson and the 

man a ride to San Bernardino before returning the rental car. 

Hooper later identified the second man as Cory McKinney. 

Hooper said that Wilson was limping badly and that there was 

a white ski jacket and a cell phone in the back seat of the car. 

Murphy met Wilson on February 19 and he stayed with 

her in San Bernardino until about 3:00 a.m. on February 20. 

She saw him later that day and again the next morning. 

Although he had not been previously injured, on the morning of 

February 21, Wilson was limping, his leg was wrapped and a 

little bloody, and his pant leg was torn. Wilson came to her 

house with Cory McKinney’s brother Brad McKinney, who 

asked if she had seen the news. She had not. Wilson asked her 

sometime after that what she would think if she found out he 

shot someone. 

Criminalists determined that Dominguez and Henderson 

were killed by the same weapon. The investigation later 

revealed the weapon was a .44 revolver stolen from Grant 

Fargon on February 15, 2000. Fargon lived a half mile from 

Wilson’s apartment in Victorville. His entire gun collection —

including the .44 revolver, guns that had been painted in 

camouflage for hunting, and other specialized weapons — had 

been taken in the February 15 burglary. 

Phyllis Woodruff, the girlfriend of Wilson’s brother 

Seeney, testified that shortly before the murders she saw Wilson 

with a large collection of guns on his bed, including camouflaged 

guns. Wilson had been showing off a long black gun that looked 

like the .44 revolver later identified as the murder weapon. 

Woodruff acknowledged that she participated in burglarizing 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

6

some of the homes from which the weapons were taken, serving 

as the driver while Wilson, Seeney, and Brad McKinney went 

inside. She was given immunity from prosecution for those 

crimes. Woodruff testified that she and Seeney were at her 

family’s barbeque on February 20, and that Wilson stopped by 

with Brad McKinney and borrowed Seeney’s white ski jacket. 

Woodruff also knew about the Richards robbery. She 

testified that on January 7, 2000, she was with Seeney and 

Wilson when they visited their mother at her motel in San 

Bernardino. Wilson stayed in San Bernardino after Woodruff 

and Seeney left. Later, back at the apartment Wilson shared 

with Seeney in Victorville, Wilson told them that he had robbed 

a cab driver, described his gun jamming when he tried to shoot 

the driver, and took them to see the taxicab he had stolen and 

abandoned in a nearby apartment complex. Woodruff said that 

Wilson gave the malfunctioning gun to Brad McKinney. Police 

later recovered the .22 handgun stolen in the January 6 breakin of Joe Diaz from the house where Brad and Cory McKinney 

stayed in San Bernardino. 

Woodruff’s father, Henry Woodruff, described the family 

barbeque at his house on February 20. Wilson stopped by the 

barbeque and while there, took the white ski jacket Seeney had 

been wearing and began wearing it himself. Henry Woodruff 

recalled that Seeney and Phyllis stayed at the Woodruff house 

that night. Phyllis and Henry Woodruff’s wife also told 

detectives that Seeney was at the Woodruff home that night, 

which was the night of the murders. 

In a statement to police, Wilson admitted using 

Dominguez’s cell phone, but claimed that he borrowed it from a 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

7

friend and had not known the phone belonged to a murder 

victim. 

Seeney invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid 

testifying; his preliminary hearing testimony was instead read 

to the jury at both the trial and retrial. During the preliminary 

hearing, Seeney had testified under a grant of immunity and 

acknowledged that he had been committing burglaries with 

Wilson and Woodruff in the period shortly before the murders. 

In his testimony, Seeney said that Wilson had talked about his 

plan to rob cab drivers and that he later told Seeney that he hit 

the first driver in the head with the gun after it jammed. Like 

Phyllis Woodruff, Seeney said that Wilson showed him stolen 

items and the abandoned cab from the January 7 robbery, and 

that Wilson gave the malfunctioning gun to Brad McKinney. 

Seeney testified that Wilson had been showing off a .44 revolver 

before the murders and that Wilson borrowed Seeney’s white ski 

jacket at the Woodruff barbeque on February 20. Seeney 

acknowledged that Wilson told him about killing two cab 

drivers; Wilson said he was dragged by the car during one of the 

robberies and scraped his shoes. Seeney also described being 

present when Wilson confessed the murders to his common law 

wife. They were with Wilson’s wife in her big rig when she got 

a call from her dispatcher connecting her to a police detective. 

When she confronted Wilson and asked whether he killed the 

cab drivers, Wilson admitted that he had. 

2. Defense evidence

The defense presented evidence to suggest that Seeney, 

Brad McKinney, Cory McKinney, or another third party, could 

have been responsible for the crimes. One of the detectives who 

interviewed Phyllis Woodruff testified that she said there were 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

8

many nights when she had no idea where Seeney was, though 

the detective clarified during cross-examination that Phyllis had 

been very precise about where Seeney was the night of the 

murders. The sergeant responsible for the investigation 

testified that Cory McKinney gave three different false alibis for 

the night and early morning of the murders, and that Cory and 

Brad McKinney both remained suspects in the case. The 

defense called law enforcement investigators to suggest that 

some of the evidence that might have shown the involvement of 

perpetrators other than Wilson had not been carefully examined 

or tested. In particular, the defense emphasized a shoe found in 

the street some distance from the Pomona crime scene, and hair, 

fiber, and fingerprint evidence that might have been, but was 

not, collected and examined. 

Much of the defense case focused on undermining 

Richards’s identification of Wilson as his attacker. An 

eyewitness identification expert explained how eyewitness 

memory can be influenced and testified about several factors 

suggesting that Richards’s identification of Wilson might not be 

accurate. These factors included the possibility that Richards 

had seen a “wanted” poster with Wilson’s photograph on it 

before making his identification; that Richards could not 

identify Wilson in a live lineup; that the detective administering 

the photo lineup may have prompted Richards to select Wilson’s 

photo by asking about “number five,” Wilson’s position in the 

lineup; that the detective might have improperly showed 

Richards another lineup with Wilson’s photograph before 

Richards made his identification; and that Richards at one point 

thought that someone who did not look much like Wilson could 

have been his attacker. The defense also presented evidence 

that Richards robbed a cigarette store in November 2000. The 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

9

defense tried to establish that Richards was getting preferential 

treatment on his robbery case in exchange for his testimony 

against Wilson. Presenting evidence that Richards’s 

preliminary hearing had been repeatedly continued and the 

prosecutor had not spoken to any witnesses, the defense 

suggested that prosecutors were not actively pursuing the case 

against Richards. 

B. Penalty Phase

The prosecution presented aggravating evidence that 

included Wilson’s admission of guilt for the voluntary 

manslaughter of an individual with whom he had a drug sale 

transaction, assault of an individual whom he had threatened to 

kill, and threats to a courtroom deputy during the retrial. 

Several witnesses related to Dominguez and Henderson 

provided victim impact testimony. 

In mitigation, Wilson presented evidence of his mother’s 

mental illness and substance use, and the learning disabilities, 

brain damage, and behavioral problems he experienced that 

were related to or exacerbated by being physically abused and 

neglected during his chaotic childhood.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Richards’s Identification 

Wilson raises several challenges to the trial court’s 

decision to admit evidence that Richards, the victim of the first 

robbery and attempted murder, identified Wilson from a 

photographic lineup and identified him in court during the 

preliminary hearing. We reject each of his arguments. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

10

1. Background

As noted, the night of the robbery, Richards gave police a 

description of the perpetrator that was roughly consistent with 

Wilson’s appearance. After the robbery, however, Richards 

began to suspect that a man he met in a drug rehabilitation 

program, Ray Bradford, could be the man who robbed him. 

Bradford’s appearance was notably different from Wilson’s; at 

five feet nine inches, Bradford was shorter, darker skinned, and 

had a thinner face. The police did not find reason to suspect 

Bradford. Instead, they showed Richards a photo lineup (not 

including Wilson) with the picture of a different suspect. 

Richards did not identify anyone in the lineup. By late February 

or March, police suspected Wilson. In early March, Detective 

Scott Franks showed Richards a photo lineup that contained 

Wilson’s photo. Franks provided a standard admonishment that 

the lineup might not contain a picture of the suspect, that 

hairstyles and facial hair might have changed, and that the 

complexion of the person could be lighter or darker than 

depicted in the photograph. Richards selected Wilson’s 

photograph, drawing a circle around the photo and stating that 

Wilson’s picture looked “exactly like the guy” and “jumped right 

out at me.” Several days afterwards, however, when officers 

held a live lineup including Wilson, Richards did not identify 

him. In the photograph Richards had identified, Wilson wore a 

mustache and soul patch; in the live lineup he wore a beard. 

Shortly before the preliminary hearing, Richards met with 

the prosecutor in the hallway outside the courtroom. The 

prosecutor showed Richards a variety of photographs and 

documents, including a copy of the photographic lineup on which 

Richards had circled Wilson’s picture. At some point during the 

hallway meeting, the prosecutor asked Richards whether he 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

11

thought he would be able to identify Wilson in the courtroom 

and Richards was not sure. During the preliminary hearing, 

Richards identified Wilson in court as he sat at the defense table 

in a red jail jumpsuit.

The defense moved to exclude both the photo and in-court 

identifications. Defense counsel argued that the requirements 

of People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, governing the admission 

of evidence based on a new scientific method, should apply in 

deciding whether the photo lineup and in-court identification 

procedures were sufficient to ensure the reliability of Richards’s 

identification. Counsel argued the photo lineup from which 

Richards identified Wilson did not comply with accepted 

scientific methods for two reasons: (1) administration of the 

lineup was not “blind” because the detective presenting the 

lineup knew that Wilson was the suspect and might have 

inadvertently provided Richards with subtle cues to select 

Wilson’s photograph; and (2) allowing Richards to view all six 

photos in the lineup simultaneously, rather than sequentially, 

could lead him to make an identification based on the subject 

who looked most like perpetrator relative to the other photos, 

instead of by individually comparing each photo to his own 

memory. Counsel further argued that by showing Richards the 

photo lineup before his preliminary hearing testimony, the 

prosecution used a suggestive process to obtain the in-court 

identification. Counsel argued the identification should be 

excluded under Evidence Code section 352 and the federal due 

process clause. 

In support of the motion, the defense presented the 

testimony of Detective Franks, who had conducted the March 

photographic lineup with Richards. After Detective Franks 

showed Richards the lineup, the following exchange occurred: 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

12

“[Det. Franks]: What are you pointing to? Number five?

“Richards: Yeah.

“[Det. Franks]: What about number five?

“Richards: That looks — that looks exactly like the guy 

right there.

“[Det. Franks]: Okay. Exactly like him?

“Richards: Yeah.

“[Det. Franks]: Okay. What I want you to do then is — I 

want you to circle number five. Circle the whole thing, sign it.” 

Dr. Kathy Pezdek, a memory expert and cognitive 

psychologist, testified for the defense to describe the relevant 

empirical research and explain why blind and sequential 

lineups were considered more reliable. She agreed with counsel 

that when an administrator gave a cue such as “ ‘what about 

No. 5?,’ ” it might lead the witness to select that photograph, an 

interference with the witness’s memory that blind 

administration sought to prevent. The defense provided the 

court a 1998 survey of scientific literature and wrongful 

convictions from a subcommittee of the American 

Psychology/Law Society. That group found “impressive” 

evidence that sequential administration reduces false 

identifications; its final recommendations included the use of 

blind administration and a photographic lineup in which the 

suspect does not stand out. The defense also submitted 1999 

findings and guidelines prepared by the United States 

Department of Justice that were based on 20 years of empirical 

research and best practices identified by law enforcement 

agencies across the country. The Department of Justice’s 

recommendations did not include blind administration or a 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

13

sequential showing of photographs, but the findings and 

guidelines noted evidence indicating that those procedures 

might enhance reliability. 

The trial court admitted Richards’s identifications. 

Although the court acknowledged Wilson’s evidence concerning 

preferred methods of conducting a photo lineup, the court did 

not “find any evidence to support” the conclusion that a lineup 

without those features was so “impermissibly suggestive as to 

violate due process.” The court also ruled that showing Richards 

a copy of the lineup before his preliminary hearing testimony 

and in-court identification was not unduly suggestive. After the 

first trial ended in mistrial, the parties and trial court agreed to 

abide by the trial court’s previous ruling on the admission of 

Richards’s identification. 

The admission of Richards’s identification had been based 

on evidence that Richards saw two lineups, one with Wilson’s 

photo and one without. Later in the trial, however, the defense 

located a third photo lineup in the prosecution files that 

included Wilson’s photo, and a dispute arose over whether 

Richards had seen this third lineup. Whether Richards had seen 

another lineup with Wilson’s photograph before making an 

identification was significant because the defense expert 

testified that Richards might have “recognize[d]” Wilson in the 

final lineup only because he had already seen his photograph 

(without recognizing him) in a previous one. To counter this 

theory, the prosecution presented evidence that Detective 

Franks had not shown Richards the third lineup: Richards 

could not be sure whether he was shown two or three lineups; 

the sergeant in charge of the investigation had prohibited use of 

the third lineup; and Detective Franks denied showing the third 

lineup to Richards. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

14

2. Discussion

a. Lineup procedures

Wilson argues that the photo lineup shown to Richards 

was unduly suggestive and that Richards’s identification should 

therefore have been excluded as unreliable. Based on the record 

before us, we are not persuaded.

The “admission of evidence in state trials is ordinarily 

governed by state law, and the reliability of relevant testimony 

typically falls within the province of the jury to determine.” 

(Perry v. New Hampshire (2012) 565 U.S. 228, 232 (Perry).) 

There is, however, “a due process check on the admission of 

eyewitness identification, applicable when the police have 

arranged suggestive circumstances leading the witness to 

identify a particular person as the perpetrator of a crime.” 

(Ibid.; accord, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 

114.) To determine whether the admission of identification 

evidence violates a defendant’s due process rights, the court 

asks two questions. First, the court asks whether the 

identification procedure was unduly suggestive and 

unnecessary. (People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14, 35.) 

“Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they 

increase the likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessarily 

suggestive ones are condemned for the further reason that the 

increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous.” (Neil v. 

Biggers (1972) 409 U.S. 188, 198.) Second, even if the lineup 

was unnecessarily suggestive, the court asks whether the 

identification was nonetheless reliable under the totality of the 

circumstances. (Sanchez, at p. 35.) Exclusion is required if 

there is “ ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 

misidentification.’ ” (Perry, at p. 232.) “But if the indicia of 

reliability are strong enough to outweigh the corrupting effect of 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

15

the police-arranged suggestive circumstances, the identification 

evidence ordinarily will be admitted, and the jury will 

ultimately determine its worth.” (Ibid.; see Brathwaite, at 

p. 114.)

On appeal, we give deference to “ ‘the trial court’s findings 

of historical fact, especially those that turn on credibility 

determinations, but we independently review the trial court’s 

ruling regarding whether, under those facts, a pretrial 

identification procedure was unduly suggestive.’ [Citation.] 

‘Only if the challenged identification procedure is unnecessarily 

suggestive is it necessary to determine the reliability of the 

resulting identification.’ ” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 

Cal.4th 846, 902.) 

Wilson argues that the photo lineup at issue was unduly 

suggestive because Detective Franks, aware that Wilson was a 

suspect in the case, steered Richards toward selecting Wilson. 

The trial court found no evidence of such steering. Although the 

record reflects that Detective Franks directed Richards to circle 

Wilson’s photograph, the trial court noted this occurred after —

not before — Richards had already selected that photograph. 

The court was also evidently unpersuaded by Wilson’s argument 

that the detective’s question, “What about number five?,” 

prompted Richards’s selection. The record supports the trial 

court’s apparent view. During the lineup, Detective Franks 

asked Richards, “What are you pointing to? Number five?,” 

suggesting that Richards was pointing to the photo before 

Detective Franks said anything about it. The detective then 

asked, “What about number five?,” apparently to prompt 

Richards to explain why he had pointed at the photo — not to 

prompt Richards to select the photo in the first place.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

16

Wilson argues that Detective Franks nonetheless 

interfered with Richards’s identification by directing him to 

circle the photograph in position number five without giving him 

additional time to look at the other photos. After Richards said 

number five looked “exactly like” the perpetrator and Detective 

Franks told him to circle that photo, Richards stated: “I’m 

trying to look at everybody else real quick but — he just jumped 

right out at me.” Detective Franks replied, “Okay. Then circle 

number five.” Wilson identifies nothing in the record to suggest 

that by directing Richards to circle the photograph he had 

identified, Detective Franks was attempting to lock Richards 

into an overly hasty identification. And Richards expressed no 

further need for time before he proceeded to circle the 

photograph he had spontaneously identified as “jump[ing] right 

out” and looking “exactly like” the perpetrator.

Wilson suggests that knowing number five was the 

suspect may have affected Detective Franks’s administration of 

the photo lineup in other ways, causing him to unconsciously 

provide Richards with cues to select Wilson’s photo and affecting 

the reliability of Richards’s identification. (See State v. 

Henderson (N.J. 2011) 27 A.3d 872, 896 (Henderson) [describing 

the “ ‘expectancy effect’ ” in which even an administrator’s 

“seemingly innocuous words and subtle cues . . . can influence a 

witness’ behavior”].)

To the extent Wilson argues that any nonblind lineup is 

inherently suggestive, case law does not support the argument, 

and we reject it. Wilson cites Henderson in support of the 

argument. But the court in Henderson did not hold that a 

nonblind lineup was unduly suggestive; it instead simply 

explained that an “ideal” administrator would not know who the 

suspect is. (Henderson, supra, 27 A.3d at p. 897.) This court, 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

17

likewise, has “never required” that a photographic lineup “be 

administered in a double blind procedure.”

1

(People v. Lucas

(2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 237; see also Com. v. Watson (Mass. 2009) 

915 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 [the absence of a double-blind procedures 

goes to the weight of identification evidence, not its 

admissibility]; State v. Outing (Conn. 2010) 3 A.3d 1, 16 [failure 

to use a double-blind procedure, without more, did not render 

identification unnecessarily suggestive].) We recognize that our 

Legislature has recently enacted requirements, including blind 

administration, designed to enhance the reliability of 

eyewitness identifications. (Pen. Code, § 859.7.) Our inquiry, 

however, is not whether a practice might enhance reliability, but 

whether its omission is indicative of a procedure that is unduly 

suggestive. (Cf. Lucas, at p. 237 [declining to equate the absence 

of “protective measures” such as a nonblind lineup with an 

unduly suggestive procedure].) Recognizing that “[m]ost 

eyewitness identifications involve some element of suggestion” 

(Perry, supra, 565 U.S. at p. 244), we conclude that the 

procedure in this case was not “unduly suggestive and 

unnecessary” simply because the lineup was not blind (People v. 

Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 902).

Wilson claims the identification procedure in his case was 

also unduly suggestive because Richards viewed a group of six 

photographs simultaneously, rather than sequentially. He 

notes that other jurisdictions have found sequential lineups 

1 A “double blind” procedure indicates that the 

administrator does not know who the suspect is, whereas a 

“blind” or “blinded” procedure is one in which the administrator 

knows the identity of the suspect but is not able to see the 

suspect’s position in the lineup. (See Henderson, supra, 27 A.3d 

at p. 896; Pen. Code, § 859.7, subd. (c).) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

18

more reliable than simultaneous ones, citing Henderson, State 

v. Lawson (Or. 2012) 291 P.3d 673, and the Department of 

Justice guidelines presented at trial. The court in Lawson found 

that a witness who views lineup photographs sequentially is 

“less likely to misidentify innocent suspects” (Lawson, at p. 686); 

the Department of Justice guidelines also noted that sequential 

lineups produce more reliable evidence. But the Department of 

Justice found there was not consensus for recommending 

sequential lineups as a preferred procedure, the American 

Psychology/Law Society guidelines Wilson presented to the trial 

court declined to recommend the use of sequential lineups, and 

the court in Henderson similarly concluded that, “[f]or now, 

there is insufficient, authoritative evidence accepted by 

scientific experts for a court to make a finding in favor of either 

procedure.” (Henderson, supra, 27 A.3d at p. 902; see also U.S. 

v. Johnson (7th Cir. 2014) 745 F.3d 227, 229 [noting some 

research has called into question the superiority of sequential 

presentation].) Our own Legislature, in enacting requirements 

designed to enhance the reliability of eyewitness identifications, 

has not included a preference for sequential procedures, either. 

(Pen. Code, § 859.7.) In this case we conclude that “there was 

no undue suggestiveness in the procedures actually employed.” 

(People v. Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 237.)

Wilson also argues that it was unduly suggestive to show 

Richards two different lineups containing Wilson’s picture. The

argument fails because it rests on a factual premise that was 

never established at trial: that Detective Franks had, in fact, 

shown Richards the third lineup later discovered in the 

prosecution’s files, even though Detective Franks testified he 

had not. (Cf. People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 932 [when 

the defendant “merely speculates that [the witness] could have 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

19

seen [the suspects’] photographs,” he has not demonstrated the 

identification procedure was unduly suggestive].) And because 

it has not been established that Richards ever saw the third 

lineup, we reject Wilson’s related claim that the third lineup was 

unduly suggestive because its composition caused him to 

“ ‘ “stand out” from the others in a way that would suggest the 

witness should select him.’ ” (People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 

259, 284.)

Wilson contends that the lineup Richards did see was also 

unduly suggestive because Wilson was the lightest-skinned 

subject in the lineup. The record does not support the 

contention; Wilson’s complexion was not obviously lighter than 

some of the others pictured. Moreover, Detective Franks 

advised Richards that the photographs might not depict the true 

complexion of the subject, which “may be lighter or darker than 

shown in the photo.”

Finally, Wilson argues that the trial court did not make a 

proper determination that the lineup was suggestive and did not 

apply the correct constitutional standard when admitting that 

evidence. Wilson emphasizes that in discussing the 

admissibility of the lineup, the trial court commented that there 

was not a sufficient showing that the identification was 

“ ‘worthless.’ ” As we have indicated, however, the trial court 

ruled that the lineup was not so “impermissibly suggestive as to 

violate due process”; the court also explained its conclusion. At 

any rate, we independently review the trial court’s ruling 

(People v. Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 902), and have 

made our own determination that the identification procedure 

was not unduly suggestive. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

20

Because the photo lineup used in this case did not involve 

an unduly suggestive and unnecessary procedure, the resulting 

identification was admissible into evidence. (People v. 

Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 903.) “[T]he Due Process 

Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the 

reliability of an eyewitness identification when the 

identification was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive 

circumstances arranged by law enforcement.” (Perry, supra, 565 

U.S. at p. 248.) We instead rely on jurors and their ability to 

“ ‘measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony.’ ” 

(Alexander, at p. 903.) 

b. In-court identification

Wilson also challenges the admission of Richards’s incourt identification of him during the preliminary hearing. 

At a hearing on whether to admit the preliminary hearing 

identification at trial, the prosecutor testified that he met with 

Richards before the preliminary hearing and showed him a copy 

of the photo lineup on which Richards had circled Wilson’s 

picture. The prosecutor explained that he wanted to confirm the 

lineup was the one Richards had seen and bore his signature; it 

was among other photos and reports the prosecutor reviewed 

with Richards before his testimony. The prosecutor noted that 

during their meeting Richards was not sure whether he would 

be able to identify Wilson in court. In ruling that the 

identification was admissible, the court observed that the 

defense would be able to present evidence to demonstrate that 

during the in-court identification, Wilson was the only person 

seated at the defense table in jail clothing, and to raise other 

factors bearing on the reliability of the identification, such as 

Richards’s inability to identify Wilson in a live lineup and 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

21

Richards’s mistaken belief that another man with a different 

appearance might have been his assailant. 

Wilson contends the prosecutor tainted Richards’s 

preliminary hearing identification by showing Richards a copy 

of the photo lineup. Wilson argues that this was a suggestive 

pretrial procedure, citing People v. Contreras (1993) 17 

Cal.App.4th 813. In Contreras, the witness failed to identify the 

defendant in a photographic lineup, was shown an individual 

photo of the defendant two days before the preliminary hearing, 

and then identified the defendant in court at the preliminary 

hearing. (Id. at p. 820.) The appellate court found the 

individual photo showup unduly suggestive. (Ibid.) Wilson 

argues that showing Richards a copy of the photo lineup was 

similarly suggestive. The court in Contreras, however, went on 

to hold that the witness’s in-court identification was admissible 

because it was based on the witness’s “independent recollection” 

rather than the suggestive photo lineup. (Id. at p. 821; see 

People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 689 [the taint of an unduly 

suggestive lineup “may be dispelled if the People show by clear 

and convincing evidence that the identification of the defendant 

had an independent origin”].)

Here, unlike in Contreras, Richards made an in-court 

identification after viewing a lineup that was not unduly 

suggestive. Furthermore, the prosecutor showed Richards the 

lineup, along with other photographs and documents, as part of 

the general preparation for Richards’s testimony; there is no 

indication in the record that the prosecutor showed Richards the 

lineup in response to Richards’s uncertainty about his ability to 

identify Wilson in court. But even assuming that seeing the 

marked-up copy of the lineup could have affected Richards’s incourt identification, we conclude that, as in Contreras, the in-
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

22

court identification was nonetheless admissible because the 

record indicates the identification was based on Richards’s 

independent recollection. Richards explained during his trial 

testimony that he recognized Wilson in the preliminary hearing 

when Wilson looked up at him with a distinctive smirk, the 

“same exact expression that he had when the gun didn’t go off 

in my mouth.” The prosecutor also asked Richards about being 

shown Wilson’s photo lineup just before the preliminary 

hearing, and although Richards did not think it affected him, 

the jurors were free to conclude otherwise. And as the trial court 

noted, the defense was able to present evidence to challenge the 

reliability of the in-court identification. As in Ratliff, where we 

ruled the “defendant could raise and argue the issue of 

suggestiveness despite [the witness’s] independent recollection,” 

the “procedure did not deprive [Wilson] of due process or a fair 

trial.” (People v. Ratliff, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 689.)

Wilson argues that before allowing Richards’s in-court 

identification, the trial court should have placed the burden on 

the prosecution to show that Richards had personal knowledge 

of Wilson’s appearance and that Richards’s opinion that Wilson 

was his attacker was rationally based on his perception. 

In urging us to adopt this approach and hold that the trial 

court should have undertaken this inquiry, Wilson now relies 

heavily on the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in State v. 

Lawson, supra, 291 P.3d 673, which sets out foundational 

requirements for admission of identification testimony under 

Oregon statutory law. We have no occasion to address the 

argument because Wilson did not raise it in the trial court. It 

has therefore been forfeited. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

23

What Wilson did request was for the trial court to exclude 

Richards’s identification under Evidence Code section 352, 

arguing that it had limited probative value. The trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying this request. Richards’s 

testimony was clearly relevant and probative, reflecting his 

personal observations made over the course of the crime, and 

there was no showing of undue prejudice. (See People v. 

Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102, 152 [“The fact that evidence, or an 

inference drawn therefrom, is harmful to the defendant’s case 

does not mean the evidence is unfairly prejudicial” under section 

352].) As previously noted, Richards testified that he was 

looking directly at Wilson’s face when the gun Wilson tried to 

shoot him with jammed: he said that Wilson was “kind of 

smiling,” with a “ ‘Damn, you got lucky’ type” of look. Richards 

said he later identified Wilson in the photo lineup and in court 

by the same expression, a “very distinctive” smirk. Wilson has 

not, in short, established a basis for overturning the trial court’s 

decision to admit the identification. 

c. Eyewitness identification instructions

Wilson claims that the trial court erred in instructing the 

jury with CALJIC No. 2.92, which directs jurors to “consider the 

believability of the eyewitness as well as other factors which 

bear upon the accuracy of the witness’ identification,” including 

“[t]he extent to which the witness is either certain or uncertain 

of the identification.” Wilson argues the instruction violated his 

federal and state due process rights.2

2 The Attorney General contends that Wilson has forfeited 

any argument that the instruction should have been modified, 

citing People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 461, in which we 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

24

During his testimony for the prosecution at trial, Richards 

again identified Wilson in the courtroom, stated that he was 

“[v]ery certain” of his identification, and explained that Wilson 

had a distinctive “smirk smile” that he recognized. The defense 

presented several case-specific reasons to distrust Richards’s 

identification; the defense eyewitness identification expert 

reiterated these case-specific points, and described other, more 

general circumstances that rendered Richards’s identification 

unreliable. Regarding Richards’s profession of certainty, the 

expert explained why eyewitness confidence, in general, “is very 

easy to manipulate.” Witnesses who may have been uncertain 

about an identification will become more confident with positive 

feedback that they have selected the right person, even though 

nothing has changed to affect the accuracy of the identification.

The jury instructions included CALJIC No. 2.92, which 

listed 12 factors to consider when assessing the accuracy of an 

eyewitness identification, including the “extent to which the 

witness is either certain or uncertain of the identification.”3 The 

concluded the defendant forfeited a challenge to CALJIC 

No. 2.92 by failing to request that the instruction be modified. 

Here, Wilson’s claim is that the instruction was an incorrect 

statement of law and deprived him of due process. In such 

circumstances, the “failure to request clarification or 

amplification of the instruction at issue does not result in a 

forfeiture of his challenge.” (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 

1002, 1011; see also People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579–

580 [failure to object does not result in forfeiture of a claim that 

an instruction violated due process or other substantial rights]; 

Pen. Code, § 1259.) 

3 The trial court introduced the factors by stating: 

“Eyewitness testimony has been received in this trial for the 

purpose of identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

25

trial court also instructed the jury on factors to consider in 

determining the believability of witnesses generally and in 

weighing expert testimony. In closing, the defense noted that 

Richards expressed certainty in his identification in court, but 

emphasized reasons the defense had offered to question whether 

Richards was correct “even though he really believes it.” In 

response, the prosecutor acknowledged that if “we had nothing 

but the Richards I.D.” then “absolutely I would concede that it 

is a very precarious identification.” The prosecutor referred to 

Richards as a “weak or a susceptible witness” but argued that 

evidence independently linking Wilson to the crime 

corroborated and therefore strengthened Richards’s 

identification testimony. 

To evaluate Wilson’s claim that the jury instruction 

resulted in the deprivation of federal due process, we consider 

the instruction in the context of the trial record and the 

instructions as a whole to determine whether the instruction 

“ ‘ “so infuse[d] the trial with unfairness as to deny due process 

of law.” ’ ” (People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644, 655 

(Lemcke).) In Lemcke, we explained that a similar reference to 

eyewitness certainty in CALCRIM No. 315 was “ ‘superficially 

neutral,’ ” in that it does not direct jurors to presume an 

identification is accurate if the eyewitness has expressed 

certainty, but we recognized that the certainty language had the 

potential to mislead jurors because it reinforced the common 

misconception that certainty is related to greater accuracy. 

crimes charged. In determining the weight to be given 

eyewitness identification testimony, you should consider the 

believability of the eyewitness as well as other factors which 

bear upon the accuracy of the witness’ identification of the 

defendant, including, but not limited to, any of the following.”
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

26

(Lemcke, at p. 657.) We held, however, that the instruction did 

not violate the defendant’s due process rights, either by lowering 

the prosecutor’s burden of proof or by denying a meaningful 

opportunity to present a complete defense on the issue of 

identity. Although the defendant’s conviction “was based almost 

entirely on the testimony of a single witness who expressed 

certainty in her identification and had no prior relationship with 

the defendant” (id. at p. 666), the defendant was able to put on 

a “vigorous defense on the issue of identity” (id. at p. 660). He 

had an eyewitness identification expert testify about the weak 

correlation between certainty and accuracy, he cross-examined 

the eyewitness about inconsistencies in her identification and 

account of the crime and cross-examined investigating officers 

about potentially suggestive procedures used during initial 

identifications. (Ibid.) Given that, and the other instructions 

the jury received about evaluating the evidence, we concluded 

that “listing the witness’s level of certainty as one of 15 factors 

the jury should consider when evaluating an eyewitness 

identification did not render [the defendant’s] trial 

fundamentally unfair or otherwise amount to a due process 

violation.” (Id. at p. 661.)

Wilson argues that Lemcke is not controlling here because 

he is raising a different claim: Rather than arguing that the 

instruction lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof or 

interfered with the ability to present a defense on identity, he is 

arguing that the instruction “materially impair[ed] the jury’s 

ability to accurately find facts regarding an identification’s 

reliability.” Another reason is that this case, in Wilson’s view, 

involves a different set of circumstances from Lemcke. Wilson 

contends that because Richards testified that he was “[v]ery 

certain” when he identified Wilson in court, there was a risk the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

27

jury would infer accuracy from Richards’s certainty; that the 

eyewitness identification was a critical component of the 

prosecution case; and that Richards’s certainty was tainted by 

suggestive identification procedures. 

We are not convinced that this case calls for a different 

analysis or result from Lemcke. The claim Wilson now raises, 

about the interference with the jury’s consideration of the issue 

of identity, arises from substantially similar circumstances as 

Lemcke, which likewise involved an eyewitness who testified as 

to the certainty of her identification despite circumstances 

giving rise to reasonable questions, and it rests on the same core 

argument as the claims we considered in Lemcke: that the 

certainty language in the eyewitness instruction created a risk 

that jurors would “infer that certainty is generally correlative of 

accuracy.” (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 657.) And, as in 

Lemcke, Wilson “was permitted to present” a substantial case 

“to combat that inference.” (Id. at p. 658.) The defense in 

Wilson’s case vigorously challenged Richards’s identification, 

directly challenged the discrepancy between Richards’s 

expressed certainty and evidence that he had difficulty making 

an identification, and presented expert testimony explaining 

why eyewitness confidence is not the same as accuracy. As a 

result, the prosecutor acknowledged that Richards’s 

identification standing alone was weak but gained strength 

from corroborating evidence. Contrary to Wilson’s suggestion, 

this corroborating evidence was substantial and was not limited 

to testimony from Seeney and his girlfriend, whose motives the 

defense questioned. The evidence included, for instance, 

Wilson’s connection to the firearm used in the robbery and 

attempted murder of Richards. Further, as in Lemcke, the jury 

received standard instructions on how to evaluate and weigh the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

28

evidence. (See id. at p. 658.) We therefore are not persuaded 

that CALJIC No. 2.92 interfered with the jury’s ability to assess 

the reliability of Richards’s identification, much less infused the 

trial with such unfairness that it violated Wilson’s federal due 

process rights.

Wilson argues in the alternative that the instruction 

violated his state due process rights. As we have repeatedly 

recognized, the state Constitution affords independent 

protection from the federal Constitution. (See People v. Ramos

(1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 153 [invalidating the so-called Briggs 

Instruction in capital cases as “seriously misleading” and 

inconsistent with the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the 

state due process clause; disagreeing with the contrary holding 

of the United States Supreme Court under the federal due 

process clause].) Here, however, “listing the witness’s level of 

certainty as one of [12] factors the jury should consider when 

evaluating an eyewitness identification” did not render Wilson’s 

trial “fundamentally unfair” under either the state or the federal 

Constitution. (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 661.) To the 

extent that Wilson also asserts that the instruction was a 

violation of state law that did not rise to the level of 

constitutional error, he has not established it was “reasonably 

probable that the jury here was misled to [his] detriment.” 

(People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 956.) As indicated, the 

prosecutor acknowledged that the defense succeeded in 

significantly undermining Richards’s identification and urged 

the jury to convict Wilson on the basis of other evidence of his 

guilt that corroborated Richards’s identification. It is not 

reasonably probable that the instruction caused jurors to rely 

instead on Richards’s expression of certainty in reaching their 

verdict.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

29

B. Identification Impeachment

As we have discussed, the defense questioned the 

reliability of Richards’s identification by presenting evidence 

that Richards may have viewed three photo lineups: one that 

did not contain Wilson’s photo; a second from which Richards 

selected Wilson’s photo; and a third, later found in the 

prosecution files, that also contained Wilson’s photo. The 

defense theorized that the third photo lineup could have been 

shown to Richards before he saw the lineup from which he 

identified Wilson. As noted, however, Detective Franks testified 

that he never showed Richards the third photo lineup found in 

the prosecution’s files. During the first trial, the defense 

attempted to impeach Detective Franks by presenting evidence 

of two work-related incidents involving dishonesty. At the 

retrial, however, the trial court excluded that impeachment 

evidence under Evidence Code section 352. Wilson claims the 

ruling excluding the impeachment evidence was an abuse of 

discretion and a violation of his constitutional rights. 

Ultimately, we do not need to resolve this issue because any 

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1. Background

In an interview with a defense investigator less than two 

weeks after he identified Wilson in a photo lineup, Richards 

explained that detectives showed him one lineup and, a couple 

of days later, came back and showed him a second set of pictures; 

he confirmed that he identified Wilson’s photograph in the 

second lineup. During the preliminary hearing several months 

later and again in the first trial, Richards testified that he 

believed he viewed three photo lineups and did not identify 

anyone during the first two, though he also expressed some 

uncertainty about whether there were two or three lineups. In 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

30

its opposition to the motion to exclude Richards’s identifications, 

the prosecution stated that Richards identified Wilson “at the 

third of three photo lineups that law enforcement showed to 

him” and the defense later found a third photo lineup in the 

prosecution files. The third lineup included Wilson’s 

photograph but was not the same as the lineup from which 

Richards had made his identification. The defense introduced 

the third, late-discovered lineup into evidence as Exhibit 147. 

In the first trial, the defense called Detective Franks to 

describe administering the photo lineup to Richards. Detective 

Franks did not take part in the first photo lineup, from which no 

identification was made. Detective Franks went alone to 

Richards’s home to show him the second photo lineup, from 

which Richards identified Wilson. Detective Franks testified 

that he never showed Exhibit 147, the third photo lineup, to 

Richards because the supervising sergeant did not think it was 

a fair lineup.

During his testimony, the defense confronted Detective 

Franks with statements he made about administering the 

lineup that were later shown to be inaccurate. For example, in 

a prior proceeding Detective Franks said that he told Richards 

to take his time making his identification and denied 

commenting on position number five (Wilson’s position). In a 

tape recording of the lineup, however, Detective Franks did not 

tell Richards to take his time and mentioned position number 

five multiple times, asking Richards if he was pointing to 

number five, for example, and telling him to circle number five 

after selecting it. The defense also asked Detective Franks 

about two instances of misconduct that had occurred in the 

previous year. Regarding the first incident, Detective Franks 

admitted that he had falsely claimed to be a detective from a 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

31

different police department to gain access to a private home and, 

once found out, lied to detectives from the other jurisdiction 

about his reasons for doing so. Detective Franks also admitted 

to a second incident in which he violated department rules by 

moonlighting as a security guard and failing to be available 

within 30 minutes while on call; he acknowledged that when 

confronted with the violations, he lied to his department 

supervisors about his actions. 

Before the retrial, the prosecution moved to exclude the 

evidence of Detective Franks’s misconduct. The prosecutor 

argued the evidence of misconduct was unrelated to Detective 

Franks’s work on Wilson’s case; that it was “incendiary” and 

would distract the jury, “particularly jurors that have a 

resentment toward law enforcement or an inclination to believe 

that law enforcement does stuff like this all the time”; and that 

it would improperly discredit the entire law enforcement 

investigation. Defense counsel argued that the impeachment 

evidence was critical to the defense theory that Richards had 

been shown the third photo lineup and failed to select Wilson, 

undermining the value of his later photo identification. Without 

the impeachment evidence, Detective Franks would refute the 

defense theory by saying there were only two lineups “and the 

jury will then sit there without knowing that Detective Franks 

has done other things that are dishonest” and “will tend to 

believe him.” The trial court acknowledged the impeachment 

evidence had “some probative value” but nonetheless excluded 

the evidence out of concern that “if we dirty Detective Franks 

enough, maybe some of that dirt is going to rub off on other 

investigators or other officers that participated in this

investigation when there’s really no evidence that that was the 

case.” 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

32

During the retrial, Richards testified that he 

“chitchatt[ed]” with the perpetrator the entire ride and had 

“ample opportunity” to see his face. Richards repeated the 

description he had given to police at the scene — of a Black male 

in his 30s, with short hair and pock-marked skin, about six feet 

tall and 220 pounds, wearing a light-colored ski jacket — and 

described the weapon the perpetrator had used. In describing 

his later identification of Wilson, Richards testified that he 

could not remember whether he had seen two photo lineups or 

three. Sergeant Robert Dean, who supervised the preparation 

and conduct of the photo lineups, testified that three photo 

lineups were prepared but that he instructed Detective Franks 

not to use one of them, which had been marked as Exhibit 147, 

because the other subjects in the lineup did not look enough like 

Wilson. Sergeant Dean explained that officers ordinarily made 

a notation on lineups after showing them to a witness; the fact 

that Exhibit 147 did not contain such a notation suggested it 

had not been shown to Richards. Detective Franks also testified 

that he did not show the unauthorized lineup to Richards. As in 

the first trial, the defense attempted to impeach Detective 

Franks with his prior description of admonishments to Richards 

that, upon review of the tape-recorded lineup, was shown to be 

inaccurate. The prosecutor in response suggested the 

inconsistency was the result of a common, good-faith tendency 

of witnesses to provide their best recollection rather than 

confess they did not recall events perfectly. 

The defense also presented evidence that Richards could 

have seen Wilson’s image in the news before making his 

identification. Detectives on the case had prepared a “wanted” 

bulletin with Wilson’s photo on it. The sergeant in charge of the 

investigation could not be sure whether it had been 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

33

disseminated to the public and did not recall whether Wilson’s 

picture had been shown on television or printed in the 

newspapers. Just after Wilson was arrested in Ohio, he said he 

had been told his picture was “all over” the television and in the 

newspapers and Detective Franks told Wilson that investigating 

officers had asked the news to cover the fact that Wilson was 

wanted for murder. Richards had testified that he saw 

information about the murders in the news that prompted him 

to contact the police, and the defense observed that Richards 

identified Wilson in the photo lineup sometime after seeing the 

news reports. 

2. Discussion

A witness may be impeached with evidence of a prior 

conviction or other conduct involving dishonesty or otherwise 

demonstrating moral turpitude, subject to the trial court’s 

exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352. (People 

v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 290–296; see People v. Clark

(2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 931.) Section 352 permits courts to limit 

such evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed 

by the probability that it will consume undue time or create a 

substantial danger of undue prejudice, confusing the issues, or 

misleading the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352.)

Here, Wilson claims that excluding the evidence of 

Detective Franks’s dishonesty constituted both an abuse of 

discretion under Evidence Code section 352 and a violation of 

his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. 

(See People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623 [“[T]he 

right of confrontation includes the right to cross-examine 

adverse witnesses on matters reflecting on their credibility,” 

although “ ‘trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

34

Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits 

on such cross-examination’ ” consistent with Evid. Code, § 352].) 

Wilson asserts that the exclusion also violated his constitutional 

rights to present a defense, to due process, and to reliable guilt 

and penalty determinations.4 

Although the trial court has considerable discretion to 

decide whether to admit or exclude impeachment evidence 

(People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 932), it is questionable 

whether the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion to 

forbid the introduction of prior instances of Detective Franks’s 

dishonesty. As an initial matter, the trial judge remarked that 

when he listened to the evidence in the first trial it did not seem 

particularly relevant. But the relevance of the evidence was not 

difficult to discern: To explain Richards’s recollection of having 

seen three photo lineups and the existence of Exhibit 147, the 

defense theorized that Detective Franks could have shown 

Richards an unauthorized lineup and then lied about it to his 

supervisors and to the jury. Proof that the detective had 

recently flouted the constraints of his position and then lied 

4 The Attorney General argues that Wilson forfeited his 

constitutional claims by failing to raise them below. At trial, 

Wilson argued that the jury would tend to believe Detective 

Franks when he denied showing Richards an unauthorized 

lineup, and Wilson would be unable to offer a significant reason 

to doubt the detective’s credibility. Although counsel did not 

specifically invoke the Sixth Amendment, due process, or 

constitutional reliability concerns, his argument emphasized 

the probative value of the impeachment evidence and its 

relation to the defense and “ ‘called upon the trial court to 

consider the same facts and to apply a legal standard similar to 

that which would also determine the claim raised on appeal.’ ” 

(People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 436.) The claim is 

therefore preserved.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

35

about it to his superiors and other law enforcement officials 

would have been relevant to the jury in evaluating the defense 

theory. Without disputing the relevance of the evidence, the 

prosecutor sought to exclude it on the ground that it would be 

“incendiary” and would distract jurors. The trial judge agreed 

on this point, citing a risk that evidence of the misconduct would 

cast all law enforcement in a bad light: The court observed that 

if the defense were to “dirty Detective Franks enough” it could 

color the jury’s view of other aspects of the police investigation. 

This concern, however, could broadly apply to any evidence 

presented to impeach the conduct of investigating officers. 

Here, there was nothing incendiary or unduly distracting in the 

evidence; nor is there a clear basis for concern that the jury 

would be unable to differentiate between evidence bearing on 

Detective Franks’s instances of dishonesty to his superiors and 

the competence and integrity of other law enforcement officers 

not involved in those instances. 

Ultimately, however, we conclude that any error in the 

trial court’s decision to exclude the impeachment evidence is not 

grounds for reversal. Even assuming for the sake of argument 

that the trial court violated Wilson’s constitutional rights as 

well as committing an error of state evidentiary law, the error 

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. 

California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)

Despite the exclusion of evidence to impeach Detective 

Franks’s testimony about the third photo lineup, the defense 

vigorously attacked the reliability of Richards’s photo 

identification and continued to pursue the theory that Richards 

saw a photo of Wilson before identifying him. The defense 

presented evidence of a third lineup containing Wilson’s photo, 

and although Detective Franks stated that he did not show it to 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

36

Richards, Richards remained uncertain whether he had seen it. 

There was also evidence that Wilson’s photo may have been 

broadcast to the public when he was being sought in connection 

with the Dominguez and Henderson murders; the fact that 

Richards had been following news of the murders raised the 

possibility he could have been exposed to Wilson’s photo in that 

context as well. In addition to evidence that Richards may have 

seen another photo of Wilson, the defense presented lengthy 

expert testimony on the fallibility of eyewitness memory and 

emphasized evidence that Richards was not able to pick Wilson 

out of a live lineup. Commenting on the fact that Richards at 

one point suspected someone who did not look much like Wilson, 

the defense expert suggested that Richards might not have 

actually remembered what the perpetrator looked like when he 

identified Wilson in the photo lineup. Thus, even without 

additional impeachment, the defense was able to significantly 

undermine the reliability of Richards’s photo identification. The 

prosecution so acknowledged to the jury: At the conclusion of 

the case, the prosecutor said of Richards’s photo identification 

that “absolutely I would concede that it is a very precarious 

identification scenario.” The prosecutor nonetheless went on to 

argue that the evidence corroborating the photo identification 

was strong. 

Given the other evidence of Wilson’s responsibility for the 

crimes against Richards, any error in excluding the 

impeachment evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt. On the night of the crimes — long before the photo 

lineups — Richards had described his assailant as a Black man 

in his 30s, about six feet tall and 220 pounds, with short hair 

and pock-marked skin. Wilson, who is Black, was 25 at the time, 

was just over six feet tall, weighed 225 pounds, and had short 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

37

hair and pock-marked skin. Richards also claimed that when he 

saw a picture of Wilson, it was Wilson’s distinctive smirk that 

caught his attention, because he remembered seeing the same 

smirk on the night of the crimes. These aspects of Richards’s 

description suggested that immediately following the incident 

he had some recollection of the perpetrator and his 

distinguishing features; that recollection was independent of the 

photo lineup that occurred nearly two months later. (Cf. United 

States v. Crews (1980) 445 U.S. 463, 473 [finding witness’s incourt identification was based on an independent recollection of 

her assailant from their initial encounter and not on subsequent 

identification procedures].) Although the description was a 

general one, the other potential suspects, Seeney and Brad 

McKinney, were both just 18, and smaller, with no suggestion 

they had blemishes similar to Wilson’s. Given the limited 

number of suspects, it was significant that Richards’s 

description resembled Wilson and not Seeney or McKinney. 

Furthermore, although the defense had vigorously challenged 

the photo identification, it did not counter the significance of 

Richards describing his assailant immediately after the robbery 

and attempted murder. 

In addition, there was considerable additional evidence to 

demonstrate Wilson’s connection to the robbery and attempted 

murder of Richards. Evidence showed that the .22 pistol used 

against Richards was one of several guns taken in a home 

burglary and that Wilson later sold a rifle from the same stolen 

collection; in an interview with detectives after his arrest, 

Wilson admitted using a .22 pistol; Richards picked up his 

assailant across the street from the motel where Wilson’s 

mother was living and Wilson had visited her just before that; 

authorities recovered Richards’s abandoned taxicab one street 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

38

away from Wilson’s apartment; the rural area in Bloomington 

where the crime occurred was familiar to Wilson because his 

grandparents lived nearby; and evidence connected Wilson to 

the commission of a murder in exactly the same location a month 

and a half later. The jury also heard from both Seeney and his 

girlfriend that Wilson had admitted robbing Richards and 

trying to kill him. The defense argued that both had an 

incentive to implicate Wilson and protect Seeney, who had been 

stealing guns with Wilson, lived in the same apartment with 

him, had the same mother, and might also have been related to 

the family in Bloomington. But the jury did not have to rely on 

Seeney and Woodruff’s testimony to conclude that Richards’s 

contemporaneous description of his assailant matched Wilson 

(and not Seeney) and that other evidence linking Wilson to the 

crimes against Richards was substantial. Notably, the 

prosecution did not present Detective Franks as a witness for 

any element of the case against Wilson; his testimony for the 

defense, and his credibility as to whether Richards ever viewed 

a third lineup, were ultimately not central to the case. In sum, 

any error in preventing the jury from hearing evidence tending 

to impeach Detective Franks’s testimony about the third photo 

lineup was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

C. Seeney’s Preliminary Hearing Testimony

Wilson raises a series of objections to the presentation of 

Seeney’s preliminary hearing testimony at the retrial. Although 

the trial court did err in one respect, by excluding later out-ofcourt statements casting doubt on aspects of Seeney’s 

preliminary hearing testimony, there was no reversible error.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

39

1. Background

Seeney was arrested and interrogated in Ohio before being 

transported to California and questioned further. During the 

Ohio interrogation, officers accused Seeney of lying when he 

claimed no knowledge of the murders under investigation; they 

stressed that he was facing decades of incarceration for the 

crimes and said that telling them what he knew was “the only 

thing that’s going to save your butt.” Seeney made no 

inculpatory statements during the questioning.

Later, after Seeney was transported to California, 

detectives emphasized the potential of leniency, suggesting that 

Seeney might avoid punishment for violating his probation if he 

told them what he knew about the robbery murders. Detective 

Chris Elvert testified that he confronted Seeney with details 

about the murder weapon, a .44 revolver, and told Seeney about 

information Seeney’s girlfriend, Phyllis Woodruff, had already 

provided.5 Specifically, Woodruff had said that Seeney was 

present when she saw Wilson with a large gun like a .44 

revolver. During the interrogation, Detective Elvert told Seeney 

that if he were telling the truth, “ ‘[y]ou’re going to see your 

brother with a gun.’ ” When Seeney responded, “ ‘what am I 

going to get out of this?’ ” Detective Elvert observed that Seeney 

was only being held on a probation violation and said the 

detectives were “ ‘still investigating to determine what 

happened.’ ” Detective Elvert stated that he had confronted 

Seeney with his girlfriend’s statements because Seeney was 

“ ‘very cautious’ ” about providing information about his brother. 

The detective also acknowledged telling Seeney that he planned 

5 The interview in which this transpired is not part of the 

record.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

40

to tell Seeney’s probation officer whether Seeney had been 

truthful. 

Seeney eventually said that he had seen Wilson with a .44 

revolver before the murders. He told the California detectives 

that he had been committing burglaries with Wilson and later 

pointed out the houses they had targeted; detectives were then 

able to verify burglaries and stolen property from those 

addresses. Seeney also claimed that Wilson told him that he 

planned to rob some cab drivers, that Wilson described his gun 

jamming when he tried to shoot one victim before taking his 

taxi, and that Wilson later admitted killing two other cab 

drivers. 

Seeney testified for the prosecution at the preliminary 

hearing. At the hearing, Seeney appeared to be a reluctant 

witness. Much of the direct examination involved leading 

questions by the prosecution, which Seeney answered with brief 

affirmative responses. Seeney denied that Wilson made some of 

the incriminating statements the prosecutor sought to elicit, 

even though Seeney had previously repeated some of those 

statements when speaking to detectives. On cross-examination, 

Seeney stated that he felt the detectives had tried to scare him 

into cooperating. Detective Elvert testified that during Seeney’s 

interrogation, detectives provided Seeney “small pieces of 

evidence” from the investigation to “encourage him to tell us the 

truth.” 

Seeney testified that when first questioned, he lied to 

detectives when he denied knowing anything about the crimes; 

he was later willing to say that “maybe” he saw his brother with 

a .44 revolver after detectives told him they already learned that 

fact from Seeney’s girlfriend. Seeney denied that Wilson 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

41

admitted using Dominguez’s cell phone, stating “[t]hat is what 

the detectives told me.” Seeney also denied that Wilson showed 

him a wallet stolen from Richards, said that Wilson did not tell 

him what he had done to Richards, and claimed not to know 

what Wilson did with the gun he used in the Richards robbery; 

in each of these instances, the prosecutor corrected Seeney’s 

testimony by referencing incriminating details from Seeney’s 

interrogation. 

Ultimately, although Seeney backtracked on some of the 

information, Seeney testified that Wilson described several 

details from robbing and attempting to kill Richards and 

confessed the murders to Seeney on two occasions. 

After the preliminary hearing but before the first trial, 

Wilson’s investigator interviewed Seeney. The interview 

focused on Seeney’s interactions with detectives during his 

interrogations in Ohio and California. When asked whether the 

detectives had pressured him to say things that were not true, 

Seeney answered, “Some of it. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I’m not 

saying — he really didn’t tell me a lot of — he didn’t really tell 

me all them things. He didn’t really tell me all of them.” The 

defense investigator then asked Seeney, “How did you know 

what to say?” and Seeney claimed that he had only repeated 

facts the detectives had given him about the investigation. 

When asked whether he gave truthful information about the 

guns and Wilson’s statements, Seeney said that his girlfriend 

had already told detectives that she and Seeney had seen Wilson 

with a gun and had described it; Seeney told the defense, “So I’m 

like — and, see, that’s what really had me screwed right 

there. . . . I mean, she’s saying I did, I mean, and we was all 

right there so, I mean, but — but, I mean, that’s it.” The 

remainder of the interview focused on whether Seeney had seen 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

42

Wilson with a .44 revolver. Seeney first said he did not know 

guns, could not say whether the gun he saw was a .44, “[i]t could 

have been a shotgun,” but then said he had not seen anything 

like the investigator’s rough drawing and description of a .44 

revolver. Seeney said that the only gun he had seen was a 

“deuce five,” a small pistol he saw in the possession of either 

Brad or Cory McKinney. 

2. Asserted coercion 

Because he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, 

Seeney was unavailable to testify for the trial or retrial.6 Before 

trial, Wilson moved to exclude Seeney’s statements and 

preliminary hearing testimony. In particular, he argued that 

Seeney’s statements to law enforcement officers were coerced. 

This coercion, he argued, tainted Seeney’s preliminary hearing 

testimony because Seeney had entered an immunity agreement 

with the People based on his “anticipated” testimony. The trial 

court denied the motion and Seeney’s preliminary hearing 

testimony was read during the trial and retrial. Wilson now 

contends the trial court erred in denying the motion. 

“Defendants have limited standing to challenge the trial 

testimony of a witness on the ground that an earlier out-of-court 

statement made by the witness was the product of police 

coercion. Indeed, defendants generally lack standing to 

complain that a police interrogation violated a third party 

6 Although Seeney was given immunity to testify, he may 

have been advised to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege for 

the later proceedings to avoid questioning that might expose 

him to accusations of having committed perjury during the 

preliminary hearing (conduct that would not have been covered 

by the immunity agreement).
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

43

witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 

or Sixth Amendment right to counsel . . . . [Citation.] A 

defendant may assert a violation of his or her own right to due 

process of the law and a fair trial based upon third party witness 

coercion, however, if the defendant can establish that trial

evidence was coerced or rendered unreliable by prior coercion 

and that the admission of this evidence would deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial.” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 

405, 452–453.) “The burden rests upon the defendant to 

demonstrate how the earlier coercion ‘directly impaired the free 

and voluntary nature of the anticipated testimony in the trial 

itself’ [citation] and impaired the reliability of the trial 

testimony.” (Id. at p. 453.) On appeal, “we independently 

review the entire record to determine whether a witness’s 

testimony was coerced, so as to render the defendant’s trial 

unfair. [Citation.] In doing so, however, we defer to the trial 

court’s credibility determinations, and to its findings of physical 

and chronological fact, insofar as they are supported by 

substantial evidence.” (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 

444.)

When “assessing allegedly coercive police tactics, ‘[t]he 

courts have prohibited only those psychological ploys which, 

under all the circumstances, are so coercive that they tend to 

produce a statement that is both involuntary and unreliable,’ ” 

and have explained that “[w]hether a statement is voluntary 

depends upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 

interrogation.” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 501.) 

Here, drawing on People v. Brommel (1961) 56 Cal.2d 629, 

Wilson claims the interrogations were coercive because some 

officers threatened Seeney with a lengthy prison term and 

others offered him leniency. In Brommel, the defendant had 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

44

“persistently and consistently insisted” that he was not guilty 

throughout a lengthy interrogation. (Brommel, at p. 633.) 

Officers then threatened to inform the sentencing judge the 

defendant was a liar, suggesting it would ensure a harsh 

sentence and foreclose any leniency. (Id. at pp. 633–634.) The 

defendant finally confessed. We concluded the confession was 

coerced under the circumstances, based on, among other things, 

the implied promise of leniency if he “told the officers the story 

that they were insisting that he tell them.” (Id. at p. 634.) 

This case does not involve circumstances comparable to 

those in Brommel. Ohio officers accused Seeney of lying, 

emphasized the punishment Seeney could face for the crimes 

under investigation, and suggested he could avoid that fate by 

telling them what he knew. California officers similarly implied 

that Seeney could avoid some of his legal troubles by providing 

them with information about the crimes. Wilson adds that 

Seeney was 18 when he was interrogated, suggesting his youth 

made him more vulnerable to coercion. Under our precedent, 

however, none of the circumstances Wilson has identified 

amounts to unlawful coercion. We have said that officers may 

“exhort a suspect to tell the truth and repeatedly express that 

they believe a suspect is lying.” (People v. Battle (2021) 11 

Cal.5th 749, 791.) Accusing Seeney of lying or withholding 

information, without more, did not “rise to the threshold 

necessary to taint the interrogation as unlawful.” (People v. 

Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 674.) Furthermore, there “ ‘is 

nothing improper in confronting a suspect with the predicament 

he is in, or with an offer to refrain from prosecuting the suspect 

if he will cooperate with the police investigation.’ ” (People v. 

Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 355.) “ ‘We have never held . . . 

that an offer of leniency in return for cooperation with the police 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

45

renders a third party statement involuntary or eventual trial 

testimony coerced.’ ” (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 

1170.) Finally, although Seeney was young at the time of the 

interrogations, he did have prior experience in the criminal 

justice system and Wilson does not claim that interrogating 

officers attempted to exploit his youth in any way. (See People 

v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 754; People v. Winbush (2017) 2 

Cal.5th 402, 453.)

Wilson also asserts that Seeney’s statements were coerced 

because the detectives told him what to say about seeing his 

brother with a gun. Wilson’s argument refers to the exchange 

during which detectives recounted what Woodruff had already 

told them — including that Seeney was present when she saw 

Wilson with a large gun like a .44 revolver — and told Seeney 

that if he were telling the truth, “[y]ou’re going to see your 

brother with a gun.” Wilson contends the detectives coerced his 

statement about seeing Wilson with a gun by using threats and 

promises “ ‘to establish a predetermined set of facts.’ ” “Threats 

of punishment for failure to conform a statement to the police 

theory . . . may constitute coercion and, under some 

circumstances, produce an unreliable statement.” (People v. 

Smith, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1169.) Here, when Seeney 

hesitated to say he saw the gun and asked what he was going 

“ ‘to get out of this,’ ” Detective Elvert responded that Seeney 

was only being held on a probation violation and the detectives 

were “ ‘still investigating to determine what happened.’ ” But 

this response, and the detective’s comment that he would tell 

Seeney’s probation officer whether Seeney was telling the truth, 

was neither a threat nor a promise of leniency. Further, 

understood in context, it appears the detective’s statement that 

“[y]ou’re going to see your brother with a gun” was meant to 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

46

confront Seeney with information gleaned from another source; 

in particular, detectives were asking Seeney to address 

information the detectives had already obtained from Woodruff. 

Although the statement was phrased provocatively, the record 

does not establish that the statement rises to the level of 

impermissible coercion. As we have previously explained, “an 

interrogation may include ‘ “exchanges of information, 

summaries of evidence, outline of theories of events, 

confrontation with contradictory facts, even debate between 

police and suspect.” ’ ” (People v. Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 

p. 674.) To the extent Wilson argues that Seeney’s statements 

to the detectives should have been excluded, we conclude that 

they were not coerced and that any reference to them during 

Seeney’s testimony did not render Wilson’s trial unfair. 

Wilson’s primary argument concerns the admissibility in 

Wilson’s retrial of the testimony Seeney ultimately gave at the 

preliminary hearing. Even if Seeney’s interrogation were 

coercive, Wilson would have to show that any coercion carried 

over to Seeney’s preliminary hearing testimony. (People v. 

Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 453; People v. Smith, supra, 4 

Cal.5th at p. 1170.) He has not made that showing.

Wilson relies on Seeney’s immunity agreement, which he 

argues improperly pressured Seeney to repeat his assertedly 

coerced statements. (See In re Masters (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1054, 

1085 [it is coercive “for an agreement to require that the witness 

testify consistently with a previous statement to the 

authorities”].) Certainly, the agreement contained no such 

express requirement. In the petition for an order granting 

Seeney immunity, the prosecutor did generally outline Seeney’s 

anticipated testimony, which was based on the statements he 

had given detectives. But the immunity agreement itself merely 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

47

stated that Seeney would “ ‘answer such questions and produce 

such evidence in the case as may be material, competent, and 

relevant to the case.’ ”

Wilson contends that Seeney nonetheless faced implicit 

pressure to conform his testimony to prior statements. To 

support the argument, Wilson points out that during the 

hearing on the motion to exclude his testimony, Seeney invoked 

his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when 

asked whether his preliminary hearing testimony was true. 

Wilson suggests this episode shows that Seeney may not have 

given truthful testimony at the preliminary hearing. But even 

if we were to assume that to be the case, Wilson has not shown 

that the cause was implicit pressure to repeat what he had 

previously told detectives. Again, the immunity agreement 

required only that Seeney provide material, competent, and 

relevant testimony. “[A]lthough there is a certain degree of 

compulsion inherent in any plea agreement or grant of 

immunity” (People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1252), there 

is no indication Seeney was “ ‘under a strong compulsion to 

testify in a particular fashion’ ” (id. at p. 1251). For that reason, 

and because there was no evidence of prior coercion that could 

have rendered his testimony unreliable in any event (People v. 

Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 453), admission of the 

testimony did not violate Wilson’s rights to due process and a 

fair trial. 

3. Admissibility of statements to the defense 

During the retrial, Wilson sought to introduce a portion of 

Seeney’s interview with a defense investigator in which Seeney 

claimed he had not seen Wilson with a gun as he testified in the 

preliminary hearing. The defense argued the statements were 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

48

admissible as a declaration against interest under Evidence 

Code section 1230, inasmuch as they suggested that Seeney 

committed perjury during the preliminary hearing, and as an 

inconsistent statement under Evidence Code sections 1235 and 

770. The defense also argued that if not offered for their truth, 

the statements were at least admissible to impeach Seeney’s 

prior testimony. 

The trial court rejected each of the defense arguments. 

Regarding whether the statements were against Seeney’s 

interest, the trial court observed that members of the defense 

had not asked Seeney about his testimony; the focus of the 

interview was Seeney’s interaction with the police and any fear 

and coercion he might have experienced. In that context, 

viewing the circumstances both objectively and from Seeney’s 

perspective, the court reasoned that a person in Seeney’s 

position would not have realized that his statements might 

subject him to charges of perjury. The trial court rejected 

Wilson’s claim that the statements could come in for their truth 

as inconsistent statements because Evidence Code section 1235 

allowed for the admission of prior inconsistent statements and 

Evidence Code section 770 made that admission dependent on 

the witness’s opportunity to respond to the inconsistencies; 

Seeney’s statements, made after his testimony and when he was 

unavailable as a witness, did not fit within that exception. The 

trial court also reasoned that Evidence Code section 770 

prevented the admission of Seeney’s statements for the limited 

purpose of impeachment because the prosecution would not 

have an opportunity to examine Seeney about them. Wilson 

asserts that the trial court erred in excluding the statements.

Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible under 

state law (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b)), but there is an 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

49

exception allowing admission of a statement that when made “so 

far subjected [the declarant] to the risk of civil or criminal 

liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him 

against another, or created such a risk of making him an object 

of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a 

reasonable man in his position would not have made the 

statement unless he believed it to be true.” (Id., § 1230.) “As 

applied to statements against the declarant’s penal interest, in 

particular, the rationale underlying the exception is that ‘a 

person’s interest against being criminally implicated gives 

reasonable assurance of the veracity of his statement made 

against that interest,’ thereby mitigating the dangers usually 

associated with the admission of out-of-court statements.” 

(People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 711.)

“To demonstrate that an out-of-court declaration is 

admissible as a declaration against interest, ‘[t]he proponent of 

such evidence must show that the declarant is unavailable, that 

the declaration was against the declarant’s penal interest when 

made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to 

warrant admission despite its hearsay character.’ [Citation.] ‘In 

determining whether a statement is truly against interest 

within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is 

sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take 

into account not just the words but the circumstances under 

which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the 

declarant, and the declarant’s relationship to the defendant.’ ” 

(People v. Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 711.) 

Another exception to the general hearsay rule applies to 

statements that are inconsistent with a witness’s trial 

testimony. (Evid. Code, § 1235.) Such statements are 

admissible for their truth only when the witness has been given 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

50

“an opportunity to explain or to deny the statement” or is still 

subject to providing further testimony, unless “the interests of 

justice otherwise require.” (Id., § 770, subd. (a); id., § 1235 [a 

statement inconsistent with trial testimony must be offered in 

compliance with Evid. Code, § 770].) When an inconsistent 

statement is not offered for its truth, but to impeach the 

credibility of a hearsay declarant, different rules apply. In that 

circumstance, “[e]vidence of a statement or other conduct by a 

declarant that is inconsistent with a statement by such 

declarant received in evidence as hearsay evidence is not 

inadmissible for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the 

declarant though he is not given and has not had an opportunity 

to explain or to deny such inconsistent statement or other 

conduct.” (Id., § 1202.) Specifically, inconsistent statements 

may be used to impeach the former testimony of a witness who 

is no longer available to testify if the statements were made 

after the testimony occurred. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 

29B West’s Ann. Evid. Code (2015 ed.) foll. § 1202, p. 59; People 

v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 806.) 

On appeal, Wilson renews his argument that Seeney’s 

statements were admissible as a declaration against interest.7 

Wilson reasons that Seeney’s statements amounted to an 

admission that he had lied at the preliminary hearing under 

oath. Setting aside the merits of the characterization for the 

moment, the pertinent question for purposes of Evidence Code 

section 1230 is whether “a reasonable person in [Seeney’s] 

position would have believed” that his statements to the defense 

investigator could expose him to prosecution for perjury. (People 

7 He does not renew his claim that the statement should 

have been admitted as a prior inconsistent statement.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

51

v. Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 712.) Seeney had testified 

against his brother, implicating him in two murders and an 

attempted murder; he spent much of the subsequent interview 

with the defense investigator discussing his interaction with the 

police and explaining that he had given them information about 

Wilson because he was scared, felt pressured by the detectives, 

and only provided information they already had. Contrary to 

Wilson’s assertion, Seeney did not recant all, or even a 

significant portion of, his preliminary hearing testimony. It is 

not surprising then, that Seeney exhibited neither awareness 

nor concern that his statements to the defense investigator 

might expose him to potential perjury charges. And without this 

awareness, the rationale for the exception — that a person’s 

interest in avoiding criminal liability provides assurance of the 

veracity of a statement against that interest (id. at p. 711) — is 

lacking. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

concluded that Seeney’s efforts to disavow his damaging 

statements to the police in this context were not likely made 

with the possibility of perjury charges in mind, and therefore 

were not admissible as statements against the declarant’s 

interest. 

In the alternative, Wilson argues that Seeney’s 

statements to the defense should have been admitted for 

impeachment purposes under Evidence Code section 1202. The 

Attorney General argues this issue is forfeited because counsel 

did not expressly invoke Evidence Code section 1202. We are 

not persuaded: An issue is preserved for appeal if “[t]he 

substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was 

made known to the court by the questions asked, an offer of 

proof, or by any other means.” (Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a).) 

Construing this provision “reasonably, not formalistically” 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

52

(People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 434), Wilson did not 

forfeit the issue; although Wilson may not have expressly 

invoked section 1202, he did ask the court to admit the evidence 

for impeachment purposes. That suffices to preserve the claim. 

On the merits, we conclude that Seeney’s statements to 

the defense were admissible impeachment under Evidence Code 

section 1202. In ruling otherwise, the trial court reasoned that 

Evidence Code section 770 prohibited introduction of the 

statements for impeachment absent an opportunity for the 

witness to explain or deny the statement. That prohibition, 

however, applies only to the statements of a witness who 

actually testifies at trial. (People v. Blacksher, supra, 52 Cal.4th 

at p. 806.) Seeney was not available for the retrial and so did 

not testify; instead, his testimony from the preliminary hearing 

was read to the jury. (See Evid. Code, § 1291 [providing a 

hearsay exception for the introduction of former testimony by an 

unavailable declarant].) The rule for nontestifying declarants is 

different: Evidence Code section 1202 allows a party to 

challenge the credibility of hearsay evidence — including, 

specifically, “hearsay evidence in the form of former 

testimony” — “with evidence of an inconsistent statement made 

by the hearsay declarant after the former testimony was given, 

even though the declarant was never given an opportunity to 

explain or deny the inconsistency.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. 

com., reprinted at 29B pt. 4 West’s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. 

§ 1202, p. 59; see Blacksher, at p. 806 [statements were 

admissible under Evid. Code, § 1202 to impeach the former 

testimony of a witness who did not testify at trial].) 

Here, Wilson sought to impeach Seeney’s former 

testimony with statements made to a defense investigator after 

the former testimony was given. Seeney indicated that he was 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

53

not entirely truthful when speaking to detectives about Wilson’s 

involvement in the crimes; for example, although he told 

detectives that he saw Wilson with a .44 revolver and later 

testified to that fact, Seeney told the defense investigator that 

he had never seen Wilson with that, or any other, type of gun. 

Evidence Code section 1202 authorized the introduction of 

Seeney’s inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes, 

and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. (See People v. 

Grimes, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 712 [a trial court abuses its 

discretion when it issues an evidentiary ruling based on a 

misunderstanding of the governing law].)8

Although we hold the trial court abused its discretion in 

excluding the impeachment evidence, the error was one of state 

law and not a violation of Wilson’s constitutional rights. Wilson 

claims that the exclusion violated his right to present a defense, 

which in turn infringed on his rights to a fair trial and reliable 

guilt and penalty determinations. “Under federal law, a denial 

of the right to present a defense occurs when . . . ‘[t]he exclusions 

of evidence . . . significantly undermined fundamental elements 

of the accused’s defense.’ ” (People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 

989, 1008.) A court’s application of ordinary rules of evidence 

generally does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right 

to present a defense. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 

8 Wilson asserts in the alternative that the ruling violated 

his right to present relevant evidence under article I, section 28, 

subdivision (f)(2) of the California Constitution, the Truth-inEvidence provision. That provision eliminates state law 

restrictions on the admissibility of evidence that are more 

stringent than those under federal law. (People v. Cahill (1993) 

5 Cal.4th 478, 500.) Because we conclude that the evidence was, 

in fact, admissible under state law, we need not consider this 

contention.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

54

665–666.) Here, although the court erred in its application of 

the rules of evidence, its mistake — judging the admissibility of 

impeachment evidence according to the statutory standard 

applicable to testifying witnesses, as opposed to nontestifying 

hearsay declarants — is not the sort of mistake that 

significantly undermined fundamental elements of Wilson’s 

defense. The error is unlike the cases on which Wilson relies, in 

which the exclusion of reliable hearsay entirely prevented the 

defendant from offering substantial evidence of another person’s 

confession to the charged crime. (E.g., Chambers v. Mississippi

(1973) 410 U.S. 284, 295; Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95, 

96; see also Cudjo v. Ayers (9th Cir. 2012) 698 F.3d 752, 762.) 

We conclude that no federal constitutional violation occurred. 

Wilson also claims that the exclusion of Seeney’s 

statements violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth 

Amendment. The Attorney General contends that Wilson 

forfeited this argument by failing to raise his constitutional 

claim below. Even assuming the claim is preserved, Wilson has 

not established a Sixth Amendment violation. Restrictions on 

the impeachment of witnesses do not violate the confrontation 

clause when the jury would not have had a “significantly 

different impression” of the witness’s credibility had the 

proffered evidence been allowed. (People v. Quartermain, supra, 

16 Cal.4th at p. 624; see Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 

U.S. 673, 680.) Here, Seeney’s statements to defense 

investigators did not paint a significantly different picture of his 

credibility than his preliminary hearing testimony. During his 

direct examination, Seeney denied that Wilson made some of the 

incriminating statements the prosecutor suggested, admitted 

lying to detectives, said that the detectives were trying to scare 

him into cooperating, and claimed that he only admitted seeing 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

55

Wilson with a .44 revolver after learning the detectives already 

had that information. In his statements to the defense 

investigator, Seeney more clearly denied seeing Wilson with 

guns, and made other comments about his fear of the detectives 

and adopting some of the information they provided. Seeney’s 

statements to the defense raised issues about his credibility that 

were not dissimilar from those already apparent in his 

testimony, and thus did not offer such a significantly different 

impression of his credibility as to establish a potential violation 

of Wilson’s confrontation rights. (Quartermain, at pp. 623–624.)

Having concluded that the trial court committed state-law 

error in excluding the evidence of Seeney’s interview with the 

defense investigator, we must next ask whether the error was 

prejudicial and therefore requires reversal. We conclude the 

answer is no; there is no reasonable probability the jury would 

have reached a different verdict had it been made aware of what 

Seeney told the defense investigator. (People v. Watson (1956) 

46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)

Seeney’s statements had limited impeachment value. The 

most significant statement was that Seeney had not seen Wilson 

with guns. But significant evidence in the record cast doubt on 

that assertion. Phyllis Woodruff testified that she helped 

Seeney and Wilson burglarize homes shortly before the murders 

and that among the items they stole were a number of guns. 

Seeney similarly admitted that he, Woodruff, and Wilson were 

committing burglaries together shortly before the murders. The 

.44 revolver used to commit the murders was part of collection 

of distinctive firearms that had been stolen in a burglary. 

Woodruff testified that she had seen Wilson with a .44 revolver 

and other guns that matched the description of the stolen cache, 

that Wilson said he had gotten the guns from burglaries, and 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

56

that Seeney was present when Wilson was showing off the .44. 

Given the considerable evidence that Seeney was involved in 

stealing guns with Wilson, and evidence that he was present 

when Wilson showed off the .44 revolver, the jury would not 

likely have lent much credence to Seeney’s statement. 

Furthermore, some of Seeney’s statements contradicted his 

claimed ignorance of the guns. Seeney stated, for example, that 

upon hearing investigating officers describe the gun used in the 

murders, he thought, “dang, you know? How they know that?” 

The remainder of Seeney’s statement to the defense 

investigator was nonspecific, and thus of even less impeachment 

value. Seeney said that Wilson “didn’t really tell me all them 

things,” and claimed that when speaking to detectives, he just 

endorsed some of the information they shared from their 

investigation. The implication of these statements — that 

Seeney may not have witnessed some of the facts he adopted 

when speaking to the detectives — reflected a credibility issue 

that was already apparent in Seeney’s preliminary hearing 

testimony. Detective Elvert acknowledged providing Seeney 

with some information about the investigation to prompt 

Seeney’s cooperation and Seeney testified that he only said he 

saw his brother with a gun once he knew detectives already had 

that information. Seeney denied knowing that Wilson admitted 

using Dominguez’s cell phone; he also denied having knowledge 

of several facts related to the Richards robbery until confronted 

with prior statements inconsistent with those denials. In other 

words, Seeney’s testimony about receiving some information 

from the detectives, and his denials and conflicting statements, 

already created uncertainty about whether Seeney personally 

witnessed some of Wilson’s alleged statements and actions. An

additional, vague remark that Wilson “didn’t really tell me all 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

57

them things,” would not have meaningfully altered the 

impression Seeney’s testimony left with the jury.

It is true, as Wilson says, that Seeney’s testimony — that 

Wilson confessed to robbing and attempting to shoot Richards, 

confessed to shooting Dominguez and Henderson, and showed 

off a gun like the murder weapon — provided some of the only 

direct evidence of Wilson’s guilt. But for each of the charges 

Wilson faced, there was also evidence of his guilt that did not 

depend on Seeney’s testimony.

We have earlier described the evidence linking Wilson to 

the robbery and attempted murder of Richards. That evidence 

included Richards’s description of his assailant immediately 

after the crimes, a description that resembled Wilson and not 

the other potential suspects. The weapon used against Richards 

was a .22 pistol that jammed. Evidence connected Wilson to a 

burglary in which that pistol was stolen; during his 

interrogation, Wilson also admitted having a .22. Richards 

picked up the perpetrator at a grocery store across the street 

from the motel where Wilson’s mother lived, and Wilson visited 

his mother just before the robbery. The perpetrator drove away 

in Richards’s taxicab, which was later recovered right near 

Wilson’s apartment. And the rural location of the Richards 

robbery was familiar to Wilson because his grandparents lived 

nearby. Dominguez, the second victim, was killed in the same 

location a month and a half later and Wilson used Dominguez’s 

cell phone just hours after he was murdered. Witnesses testified 

that Wilson wore a jacket and had injuries consistent with being 

the shooter eyewitnesses to the Henderson murder described. 

Evidence that Wilson shot Henderson and attempted to shoot 

Richards lent support to the theory that he shot Dominguez as 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

58

well, as did Phyllis Woodruff’s testimony that she had seen 

Wilson with a revolver like the murder weapon.

In sum, there is no reasonable probability that Seeney’s 

statements to the defense would have meaningfully altered the 

reliance, if any, the jury placed on Seeney’s testimony, as 

opposed to the other evidence pointing to Wilson’s guilt. 

D. Henry Woodruff’s Testimony

At trial, Wilson unsuccessfully moved to exclude 

testimony from Phyllis Woodruff’s father, Henry Woodruff, that 

Seeney told him that he did not want to leave the Woodruff home 

with Wilson because Wilson was “doing wrong” and Seeney did 

not want to violate his probation. Wilson contends the 

admission of the testimony violated both state evidence law and 

his constitutional right to a fair trial. We reject the argument.

Before Henry Woodruff’s testimony, the defense objected 

to the prosecution eliciting any description of statements from 

Seeney to Woodruff, arguing that they were inadmissible 

hearsay. The prosecutor responded that the statements were 

not being offered for their truth but were relevant to show 

Seeney’s state of mind and conduct. The trial court overruled 

the defense objection, observing that even if the statements were 

hearsay, they would be admissible to show Seeney’s conduct in 

conformance with his then-existing state of mind. Woodruff 

then testified that at the time of the charged murders, Seeney 

had been staying on the couch in the Woodruff home where his 

girlfriend, Phyllis Woodruff, also lived. During a Woodruff 

family barbeque the day before the murders, Wilson arrived at 

the Woodruff home to pick up Seeney, but Seeney told Henry 

Woodruff that he did not want to leave with Wilson because 

Wilson was “doing wrong” and Seeney did not want to violate 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

59

his probation. Henry Woodruff allowed Seeney to stay at the 

Woodruff home rather than go to San Bernardino with his 

brother. 

As relevant here, Evidence Code section 1250 provides 

that an out-of-court statement of the declarant’s then existing 

state of mind is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when 

it is offered “to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.” 

(Id., subd. (a)(2).) “ ‘[A] prerequisite to this exception to the 

hearsay rule is that the declarant’s mental state or conduct be 

factually relevant.’ ” (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 586.) 

Such evidence is inadmissible “if the statement was made under 

circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.” 

(Evid. Code § 1252; see id., § 1250, subd. (a).) The hearsay rule 

does not apply at all, however, “if the declarant’s statements are 

not being used to prove the truth of their contents.” (Assem. 

Com. on Judiciary com., reprinted at 29B pt. 4 West’s Ann. Evid. 

Code (2015 ed.) foll. § 1250, p. 420; see also Evid. Code, § 1200; 

People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 843.) 

Wilson argues that Seeney’s state of mind was not 

relevant to any issue in dispute. As the trial court noted, 

however, Seeney’s stated concerns about Wilson’s activities 

tended to “prove or explain acts or conduct” (Evid. Code, § 1250, 

subd. (a)(2)) relevant to the action — that is, staying at the 

Woodruff household rather than accompany Wilson to San 

Bernardino. Specifically, evidence that Seeney remained at 

Henry Woodruff’s house that evening was relevant to counter 

the defense theory that Seeney could have been responsible for 

the murders that occurred hours later in the San Bernardino 

vicinity. As the prosecutor noted in arguing to admit Seeney’s 

statements, defense counsel suggested in his opening statement 

that Seeney committed the murders or was an accomplice to 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

60

them and later presented evidence to suggest that Seeney’s 

whereabouts on the night of the murders were unknown. 

Acknowledging that Seeney’s conduct was relevant as “an 

alleged alternative perpetrator[],” Wilson argues Seeney’s 

statements were nonetheless inadmissible to explain his state 

of mind and related conduct because their relevance depended 

on his statements being true, that Wilson actually was engaged 

in wrongdoing. If Seeney’s statement was admissible hearsay 

under a then-existing state of mind exception (Evid. Code, 

§ 1250, subd. (a)(2)), then it could be used for its truth. (People 

v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 843.) If the statement was not 

being used for its truth, then it was not hearsay at all. (Ibid.) 

Wilson appears to challenge the latter, nonhearsay use, relying 

on People v. Lopez (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1028. In that case, we 

concluded the admission of statements for the nonhearsay 

purpose of showing a codefendant’s state of mind was error 

when the theory of relevance depended on the truth of the 

statements. (Id. at pp. 1060–1061.) Here, by contrast, Seeney’s 

state of mind — that he did not want to go to San Bernardino 

with Wilson — was relevant to his apparently successful efforts 

to stay with the Woodruffs, an alibi for the murders. That 

showing did not depend on the truth of Seeney’s statements that 

Wilson was engaged in wrongdoing or that Seeney was 

concerned with violating his probation, establishing a 

nonhearsay purpose for them. 

Wilson argues that even if Seeney’s statements had a 

relevant, nonhearsay purpose, they were inadmissible under 

Evidence Code section 1252 because they were not trustworthy. 

But that trustworthiness inquiry is a limitation on hearsay 

evidence admitted under a state of mind exception (Evid. Code, 

§ 1252; People v. Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 907); it does not 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

61

apply to evidence that is not hearsay. As we have said, the 

prosecutor offered the statements for a nonhearsay purpose and 

there was no theory proposed under which the statements would 

be relevant for their truth.9 But even if Evidence Code section 

1252 applied, we would not find the statements inadmissible. In 

determining whether statements are trustworthy within the 

meaning of Evidence Code section 1252, we consider whether 

they “were made under coercion or ‘with an intent to deceive.’ ” 

(Dworak, at p. 907.) Wilson contends Seeney’s statements to 

Henry Woodruff were not trustworthy because Seeney had 

reason to “create a false impression that he was staying out of 

trouble.” Wilson does not, however, explain how Seeney would 

curry favor with his girlfriend’s father by commenting on his 

brother’s criminal behavior. 

E. Wilson’s Interview with California Detectives

Wilson argues the trial court erred in admitting a 

videotaped interview with California detectives, which he 

claims was conducted after he invoked his Fifth Amendment 

right to remain silent. We conclude there was no error.

9 Wilson emphasizes a portion of the prosecutor’s closing 

argument in which he referred to Seeney’s statement to Henry 

Woodruff and knowledge of Wilson’s plan to rob cab drivers; 

Wilson argues that this demonstrates that the prosecutor “was 

able to conceal his true purpose” of using Seeney’s statements 

for their truth. The prosecutor’s remarks, that Seeney would be 

an accomplice if he knew of the robberies and did something to 

help Wilson, were offered as “illustrations of the concept of 

aiding and abetting.” Whatever the motive for repeating 

Seeney’s statement, Seeney’s knowledge of Wilson’s activities 

was not an element of the charges against Wilson and was not 

relevant to any theory of the prosecution case. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

62

1. Background

After his arrest, Wilson twice spoke to officers about his 

involvement in the robberies and murders under investigation: 

once in Ohio, shortly after the arrest, and then in California a 

day later. In Ohio, detectives advised Wilson of his rights under 

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). Wilson 

initially agreed to speak to the detectives. One of the detectives 

testified that he believed Wilson later invoked his right to 

remain silent but continued questioning him anyway. 

A day later, Wilson flew with detectives to California. 

Detective Jay Hagen, one of the detectives who flew with Wilson, 

testified that during a refueling stop Wilson said that he might 

want to talk about the case and asked whether his statement 

could remain confidential if he decided to say something. 

Detective Hagen advised Wilson to wait until they arrived in 

California. Once in California, Detective Hagen and another 

detective met with Wilson. Detective Hagen made it clear that 

Wilson’s statements would not be confidential and there was 

some additional discussion regarding Wilson’s concern about 

providing information. Upon learning that he was being held on 

a prior hit-and-run charge, Wilson stated, “Let’s put that to the 

side, man. I mean, what’s going on with these other things?” —

apparently referring to the recent robberies and killings. 

Detective Hagen said there was information tying Wilson to 

those crimes and told Wilson he wanted to find out if Wilson had 

an explanation for his involvement.10 

10 Detective Hagen conducted much of the interview and 

testified about the interrogation. The second detective also 

participated in the interview, and there were times when 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

63

When Wilson began to speak to the detective, he repeated 

several times that he did not want to jeopardize his family by 

giving information that would cause others to retaliate against 

him. The detective said that Wilson would not have to worry 

about his brother because Seeney would be in prison as an 

accessory to murder. The conversation then focused for a time 

on whether there was evidence to send Seeney to prison; Wilson 

said there was nothing connecting Seeney to the crimes and the 

detective said that Seeney would at least do time for protecting 

Wilson. Wilson accused the detective of playing games with him 

and said he would have to request his right to remain silent. 

But Wilson immediately went on to challenge the detectives, 

stating that they did not have a murder weapon, fingerprints, or 

eyewitnesses to connect him to the murders. When the detective 

asked how Wilson knew whether they had a murder weapon, 

Wilson said he learned it from the deputies in the county jail. 

The detective noted that was days ago, suggesting there was 

evidence against Wilson. When pressed, Wilson first said he 

learned from the news that there were no fingerprints and then 

said he learned it from the jail deputies, but the detective 

dismissed the explanations and accused Wilson of playing a 

game. Discussing Seeney’s role, the detective again stated that 

Seeney would be charged as an accessory to murder for 

protecting Wilson and Wilson asked if Seeney’s girlfriend would 

be charged for protecting him as well. The detective said, “[T]he 

girl gave it all up” and Wilson remarked that her parents 

probably did too. Wilson asked whether the detectives had the 

Detective Hagen left the interview room. To avoid parsing each 

detective’s role, we use the shorthand “the detective” in our 

discussion of the interview. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

64

Woodruffs on tape, which the detective declined to answer. The 

detective said he would not respond because Wilson was just 

trying to get information about the case.

Wilson then told the detective, “I’m not discussing it any 

no further until I talk to the DA, man.” When informed the 

prosecutor was not interested in speaking with him, Wilson 

reiterated that he was not “going to discuss it further. I mean, 

I’m was [sic] trying to be cooperative with you.” The detective 

encouraged Wilson to take the opportunity to say what he knew 

“right now,” before his “partner” got a deal with the prosecutor. 

The detective also told Wilson that he had “[n]o doubt [Wilson] 

did it.” Wilson responded that, if there was no doubt, “we don’t 

need to talk no more” and he asked the detectives to take him 

back to his holding cell. Just before they left the interview room, 

the detective stated, “You say you wanted to cooperate. I know 

there’s somebody else involved.” As they exited the room, 

Wilson asked for a cigarette.

Without explanation the interview resumed, with Wilson 

again talking about his concern for his family. The detective 

eventually suggested that Wilson could name the person 

responsible for the murders and “we’ll open the door, you’re out 

of here.” Wilson said, “they know who the fuck he is” and 

indicated there were other government actors trying to catch 

him. Wilson then referred to his brother again, stating he did 

not think the detectives had any evidence against Seeney.

Wilson guessed that he was the only suspect; he said, 

“True enough I told you I rented the car, I used the phone,” “I 

allowed this particular person to use that vehicle more than 

once,” and “if he has some buddies or something like that and 

they went on a killing spree, . . . I don’t know.” The detective 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

65

asked who Wilson went to Pomona with, but Wilson denied 

being there. Suggesting that someone saw Wilson with a gun, 

the detective asked if that would be a lie. Wilson said that 

maybe “they seen me with a pistol.” The detective said he knew 

Wilson’s “homeboy” had a gun, the “[s]ame homeboy that I know 

that you know.” Wilson wanted the detectives to say the name 

of the person they had in mind, adding “the same person who 

rented the vehicle” and “the same person that seen me with a 

gun” a “little chrome gun.” Wilson admitted having “a little .22.”

The detective tried to engage Wilson in whether he or his 

“homeboy” pulled the trigger during the murders. The detective 

suggested a scenario in which Wilson was with a buddy who 

robbed and killed someone out of the blue and then insisted on 

doing another one, to make sure Wilson would not rat. Wilson 

said, “In other words, drop a dime, snitch.” Wilson would not 

snitch but said there was a witness on the street. The detective 

and Wilson talked about how much Seeney might have said 

about the events, but the detective would not mention specific 

information about the case. Wilson said the detectives would 

eventually have to give the information to his lawyer and the 

conversation turned to when Wilson would get a lawyer and 

what his bail was.

Wilson made it clear he understood that his statements 

could be used against him, stating, “You know damn well as 

much as I know everything I say in this room is going to be held 

against me in that damn courtroom.” The detective reminded 

Wilson that he could have an attorney, and Wilson said that he 

wanted one “right now.” The detective said they did not have an 

attorney for Wilson but would stop talking about the case. 

Wilson responded, “Is that what you want?” Wilson said he was 

hungry and suggested getting something to eat, “so we can 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

66

continue this interrogation.” While one detective went to see 

about getting food, Wilson said to the other one, “this man can 

continue to interrogate me. You ain’t got nothing to do.” After 

learning the detectives had the cell phone, Wilson asked to see

it. Asking for coffee, Wilson said, “We all going to sit down and 

fucking talk.” Later, referring to his coffee Wilson said, “We 

going to be up all fucking night.”

In the remaining interview, Wilson told the detective that 

he always carried a gun when he went to San Bernardino but 

denied ever carrying a large caliber weapon. Wilson would not 

give the name of the person he knew was involved in the 

murders but said that Detective Franks had mentioned the 

name and “hit that thing on the nose.” The detective asked 

where the person lived, prompting, “where Sarah and Tiffany 

dropped you off?” Wilson said that “Sarah knows the dude” and 

“[y]ou got your man.”

Wilson filed a motion to suppress all of the statements 

made to detectives in Ohio and in California. The trial court 

granted Wilson’s motion to suppress statements he made during 

the Ohio interrogation after the detective disregarded his 

expressed desire to stop answering questions. But the court 

admitted the interview with detectives in California. The trial 

court found that Wilson had been advised of, understood, and 

waived his Miranda rights in Ohio, and further noted that 

during the California interview Wilson recited his rights back to 

the detectives. The court concluded that Wilson initiated the 

California interview during the refueling stop by telling 

Detective Hagen he wanted to talk and that it was clear Wilson 

understood that by talking to the detectives he was waiving his 

right to remain silent. The court further held, contrary to 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

67

Wilson’s contentions, that Wilson did not seriously invoke his 

right to terminate the conversation.

The trial court characterized the California interrogation 

as a “chess game, where each side was trying to obtain damaging 

information from the other” and observed that “[f]or the most 

part, neither side budged, although the defendant did admit to 

using one of the murder victim’s cellular phones . . . , and did 

admit to having a small caliber handgun within two to three 

weeks prior to the murders.” The trial court noted several places 

in the interview where the defense claimed Wilson had invoked 

his right to remain silent. The court observed, however, that 

Wilson’s willingness to talk contradicted his claim that he 

invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. 

During the retrial, defense counsel brought another 

motion to suppress Wilson’s statements because he had 

overlooked the significance of the cigarette break and the 

unexplained resumption of the interview; he sought to exclude 

the statements Wilson made after the break.

The trial court held a hearing focused on the unrecorded 

break. Detective Hagen testified that after he and Wilson left 

the interview room, they stopped to smoke and Wilson initiated 

further discussions about the case. Wilson again stated that he 

was concerned for his family’s safety if he told the detectives 

what he knew about the murders and continued to ask questions 

in an effort to learn what the investigation had uncovered. 

Detective Hagen said that he answered Wilson’s questions as 

best he could without giving him details about the investigation; 

it was the same type of exchange that characterized the 

interview before the break. When they finished smoking, 

Detective Hagen asked Wilson if there was anything else to 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

68

discuss and Wilson indicated that he wanted to continue the 

interview.

Defense counsel argued that suppression was warranted 

because, “[p]utting aside all the other loquacious behavior of 

Mr. Wilson,” the detectives were not able to describe in detail 

how Wilson initiated conversation about the case during the 

break; acknowledged that they had been trained to continue 

questioning after a defendant’s invocation for impeachment 

purposes; and failed to document any reinitiation by Wilson in 

their reports. Counsel asserted that the proper inference to 

draw was that the detectives felt they were questioning outside 

of Miranda.

The trial court denied the motion, crediting Detective 

Hagen’s testimony that Wilson initiated the conversation during 

the break and concluding that “nothing really changed from all 

of the other times that [Wilson] had seemingly not wanted to 

talk, but then kept on with the interview.” At the retrial, the 

prosecution played the video recording of Wilson’s California 

interrogation for the jury.

2. Discussion

“The Fifth Amendment provides, ‘No person . . . shall be 

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself 

. . . .’ (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) ‘To safeguard a suspect’s Fifth 

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination from the 

“inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogation 

(Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 467), the high court adopted a 

set of prophylactic measures requiring law enforcement officers 

to advise an accused of his right to remain silent and to have 

counsel present prior to any custodial interrogation.’ ” (People 

v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 930–931.) Interrogation “ ‘under 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

69

Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any 

words or actions on the part of the police (other than those 

normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should 

know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 

. . . .’ ” (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 923.) 

After “ ‘a defendant has waived his Miranda rights and 

agreed to talk with police, any subsequent invocation of the right 

to counsel or the right to remain silent must be unequivocal and 

unambiguous.’ ” (People v. Hoyt, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 931.) If 

a defendant has unambiguously invoked the right to remain 

silent, the interrogation must stop. (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 

Cal.5th 265, 313.) We have never held, however, “that an initial 

failure to honor a defendant’s invocation — whether of the 

[right] to remain silent or the right to have counsel present —

poses a categorical bar to the admission of any subsequent 

statement regardless of the circumstances.” (Id. at p. 314.) 

Even when law enforcement initially fails to honor a Miranda 

invocation, we have held that “a voluntary confession obtained 

during a subsequent interrogation is admissible.” (Ibid.)

When reviewing the trial court’s denial of a suppression 

motion alleging a Miranda violation, “ ‘it is well established that 

we accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and 

inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by 

substantial evidence. We independently determine from the 

undisputed facts and the facts properly found by the trial court 

whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained.’ ” 

(People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 385.) The question 

whether the defendant or the police reinitiated communications 

after a defendant’s invocation of rights “is predominantly 

factual. [Citation.] Accordingly, we review it for substantial 

evidence.” (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

70

There is no dispute that the Ohio detectives did not honor 

Wilson’s invocation of Miranda rights, and that statements 

Wilson made to the Ohio detectives after that point should have 

been excluded. The question that concerns us here is the 

admissibility of statements Wilson made to California detectives 

the following day. Wilson first argues that all of his statements 

to the California detectives should have been suppressed 

because detectives improperly reinitiated the interrogation on 

the flight from Ohio to California. Wilson claims the flight 

conditions created “inherent pressure” for Wilson to speak to 

them. Wilson invokes the circumstances described in People v. 

Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, in which an investigator unlawfully 

reinitiated the interrogation when he called the defendant back 

into the interrogation room and “launched into a monologue on 

the status of the investigation,” telling the defendant a new 

witness had contradicted the defendant’s claims about when he 

last visited the victim. (Id. at p. 274.) Nothing remotely similar 

occurred here. In fact, it was undisputed that when Wilson 

broached the case during the trip back to California, Detective 

Hagen put him off. Once in California, Wilson acknowledged 

that he had approached Detective Hagen to talk about the case, 

repeated his interest in discussing the case, and readily engaged 

in the subsequent interview with the detectives. Substantial 

evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Wilson 

reinitiated communication with the detectives after the Ohio 

interrogation, and not the other way around.

Wilson next argues that the trial court erred in admitting 

statements he made to detectives after the break when he was 

outside smoking with Detective Hagen. As Wilson notes, 

Detective Hagen agreed to end the interview in response to 

Wilson’s statement that he was not going to discuss the case 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

71

further and request to be taken back to the holding cell. These 

circumstances reflect Wilson’s unambiguous invocation of his 

right to remain silent. (People v. Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at 

p. 313 [defendant’s invocation was unambiguous when he asked 

to be returned to his cell and told officers he had nothing to say].) 

Despite recognizing that Wilson no longer wished to speak, 

Detective Hagen made additional comments that were

reasonably likely to prompt Wilson to continue speaking: He 

encouraged Wilson to cooperate “right now” to get beneficial 

treatment by the prosecutor; he said he had no doubt Wilson 

committed the crimes; he repeated Wilson’s claimed interest in 

cooperating; and he told Wilson that he knew someone else was 

involved. The comments did not elicit any response and 

Detective Hagen ended the interview and began taking Wilson 

to a holding cell as he requested. 

What followed, however, was a short break in which the 

trial court concluded that Wilson reinitiated discussion about 

the case. When a suspect freely decides to reinitiate

communication, the law does not foreclose the admission of 

subsequent statements, notwithstanding an earlier failure to 

honor an invocation of the Miranda rights to silence or to 

counsel. (People v. Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 315.)11 

11 Wilson frames his claim as a violation of his right to 

silence under Michigan v. Mosley (1975) 423 U.S. 96 but 

contends that Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, which 

set out a more stringent standard for resuming interrogation 

following the invocation of a right to counsel, governs the 

inquiry here. It is unnecessary to address any potential 

distinction between the two standards, however, because we 

conclude that there is substantial evidence that Wilson 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

72

Here, although the conversation during the break was not 

recorded, the court credited the detective’s testimony that 

Wilson brought up the case again, noting that Wilson’s apparent 

invocation, followed almost immediately by an expression of 

continued interest in discussing the case, followed a pattern that 

was apparent throughout the interview. (See People v. McCurdy

(2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1089 [finding valid reinitiation of 

communication when the defendant initiated discussion of the 

case 20 seconds after invoking Miranda rights].) After the 

break, Wilson repeatedly demonstrated his desire to continue 

the interrogation, asking for food and coffee in anticipation of 

talking at length and periodically goading the detectives to 

continue discussing the case with him. The record contains no 

suggestion Wilson was pressured into continuing the interview. 

“Apart from his failure to immediately cease questioning, [the 

detective’s] interrogation techniques were not coercive,” and 

there is no other evidence Wilson was unable to exercise his free 

will when he decided to continue speaking to the detectives. 

(People v. Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 315.) We see no error in 

the trial court’s decision to admit the statements Wilson made 

after the cigarette break. 

F. Motion for New Trial

After the jury returned its penalty verdict, Wilson filed a 

new trial motion in which he argued that his lawyer prevented 

him from testifying in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. 

The trial court denied the motion. Wilson argues this was error. 

We find no merit to the claim.

voluntarily reinitiated his interview after the break, which 

would render his subsequent statements admissible under 

either Mosley or Edwards.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

73

Wilson did not testify in either of his trials. In a report 

prepared for purposes of sentencing, a probation officer 

documented Wilson’s complaint that he wanted to testify in the 

retrial but his attorney “ ‘refused to allow it.’ ” At defense 

counsel’s request, the trial court appointed alternate counsel to 

explore the issue, and alternate counsel later filed a motion for 

a new trial alleging that Wilson had been deprived of his right 

to testify. In a sworn declaration accompanying the motion, 

Wilson said he asked to testify several times, but that trial 

counsel informed him that “[his] side of the story could be told 

by other witnesses” and that testifying would expose him to 

impeachment regarding his past criminal history. Wilson 

claimed that after the prosecution rested, he again expressed his 

desire to testify and counsel “told me that I couldn’t testify and 

walked away, not allowing any further discussion.” Wilson 

stated that he was not aware that he could have asserted a right 

to testify over counsel’s objection until after trial.

In a hearing on alternate counsel’s new trial motion, 

defense counsel testified that he had been practicing criminal 

law for over 35 years, that he understood Wilson’s constitutional 

right to testify, and that he had never denied Wilson his right to 

testify. Counsel denied telling Wilson “in emphatic, conclusive 

terms that he was not going to testify in the case”; instead, 

counsel stated that he had conversations in which he 

recommended that Wilson not testify.

As an initial matter, the trial court questioned whether 

Wilson’s request to testify was timely, coming as it did after the 

jury had returned its verdicts. The court noted that Wilson “has 

never been shy about speaking or letting his requests be known” 

and that neither Wilson nor his counsel alerted the court to any 

conflict they had about Wilson wanting to testify. In any event, 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

74

crediting defense counsel’s testimony, the court found that 

counsel had not denied Wilson his right to testify, although 

counsel may have strongly advised Wilson not to testify “for good 

reason.” When alternate counsel raised Wilson’s claim that he 

did not know he had a right to testify against counsel’s advice, 

the trial court reiterated that “[e]ven assuming that’s true,” 

counsel did not prevent Wilson from testifying.

“A criminal defendant has the right to testify at trial, ‘a 

right that is the mirror image of the privilege against compelled 

self-incrimination and accordingly is of equal dignity.’ 

[Citations.] ‘The defendant may exercise the right to testify over 

the objection of, and contrary to the advice of, defense counsel. 

[Citations.] “When the decision is whether to testify . . . at the 

guilt phase of a capital trial [citation] it is only in case of an 

express conflict arising between the defendant and counsel that 

the defendant’s desires must prevail. . . . [T]here is no duty to 

admonish and secure an on the record waiver unless the conflict 

comes to the court’s attention.” ’ ” (People v. Duong (2020) 10 

Cal.5th 36, 55.)

Here, Wilson does not claim that he had an express 

conflict with his trial attorney over whether he would testify. 

Instead, he contends the trial court had an obligation, before 

ruling on his motion for a new trial, to determine whether 

Wilson made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to 

testify during the retrial. Wilson did not raise this issue in the 

trial court, and it appears to be forfeited. The claim also lacks 

merit.

It has long been the rule that, absent an express conflict, 

“ ‘ “[a] trial judge may safely assume that a defendant, who is 

ably represented and who does not testify is merely exercising 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

75

his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is 

abiding by his counsel’s trial strategy. . . .” [Citation.] If that 

assumption is incorrect, defendant’s remedy is not a personal 

waiver in open court, but a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.’ ” (People v. Duong, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 56; People 

v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1053.) The trial court did 

not abuse its discretion when it found that defense counsel did 

not infringe on Wilson’s right to testify and that no conflict arose 

during the retrial that required the court to advise Wilson of his 

right to testify and ensure his knowing and intelligent waiver of 

that right. Like the defendant in Duong, Wilson “does not urge 

his counsel was ineffective, nor does he allege there was a 

conflict with counsel. Any claim of ineffective assistance based 

on evidence not in the trial record must be made in a habeas 

corpus petition.” (Duong, at p. 56.)

G. Speedy Trial Rights

Wilson contends the trial court abused its discretion, and 

violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a speedy 

trial, when it found good cause to continue the trial over his 

objection. We find no error.

Wilson was arrested on March 3, 2000, and his trial 

attorney was appointed the same month. After accepting 

several continuances, in October 2001 Wilson refused to agree 

to a 90-day continuance his attorney had sought; instead, 

invoking his speedy trial rights, he waived time for just 30 days. 

In keeping with Wilson’s 30-day waiver, the court set trial for 

December 3, 2001. Then, in a written motion for continuance, 

defense counsel sought a trial date of March 4, 2002. Counsel 

explained that he was preparing the defense of another client 

facing capital charges and needed additional time to 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

76

competently prepare Wilson’s case. The prosecutor did not 

object to the March 2002 trial date. 

At a hearing on the continuance motion, Wilson again 

refused to waive time and asserted that his constitutional rights 

were being violated. Wilson stated that the 18 months that had 

elapsed since his case began was adequate time to prepare his 

defense. The trial court granted the continuance over Wilson’s 

objection. The court noted that since Wilson did not want to 

waive further time, counsel was going to have to “devote his full 

efforts preparing for this case. But I think I have to give him a 

reasonable time to prepare, and again I think it would be in your 

best interests to allow him to do that.” Trial began on March 4, 

2002.

“A criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial is 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution 

and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. ‘The 

California Legislature has “re-expressed and amplified” these 

fundamental guarantees by various statutory enactments, 

including Penal Code section 1382.’ ” (People v. Lomax (2010) 

49 Cal.4th 530, 552–553.) Penal Code section 1382 provides that 

in a felony case, absent a showing of good cause, the court shall 

dismiss the action if a defendant is not brought to trial within 

60 days of arraignment. (Id., subd. (a)(2).) Factors relevant to 

a determination of good cause include: “(1) the nature and 

strength of the justification for the delay, (2) the duration of the 

delay, and (3) the prejudice to either the defendant or the 

prosecution that is likely to result from the delay.” (People v. 

Sutton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 533, 546.) In general, delay for the 

defendant’s benefit constitutes good cause to continue trial over 

his or her objection. (Lomax, at p. 554.) A trial court has 

“ ‘broad discretion to determine whether good cause exists to 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

77

grant a continuance of the trial’ ”; we review that determination 

for abuse of discretion. (Sutton, at p. 546.)

Wilson argues that “[a]n attorney’s work for other clients 

cannot form a valid basis for overriding appellant’s speedy trial 

rights.” (Italics omitted.) Likening his case to People v. Johnson

(1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, Wilson claims he was entitled to dismissal 

of the charges because systemic flaws, including lack of 

personnel in the Public Defender’s office, prevented his attorney 

from preparing for his trial within the statutory time period. In 

Johnson, postponements over the defendant’s objection “were 

not sought nor granted to serve the best interest of the 

defendant; they stem[med] from calendar conflicts of the public 

defender, and the decision of the public defender and the court 

to resolve these conflicts by trying other cases in advance of that 

of defendant.” (Id. at p. 566.) We held that the record did not 

demonstrate good cause for a continuance because the trial 

court “accepted the public defender’s recital of conflicting 

obligations without inquiring whether the conflict arose from 

exceptional circumstances or resulted from a failure of the state 

to provide defendant with counsel able to protect his right.” (Id. 

at p. 573.)

Unlike Johnson, this case does not involve delay stemming 

from calendar conflicts unrelated to Wilson’s best interests. 

Although counsel assumed the trial of another client would 

precede Wilson’s, the trial court conditioned the continuance on 

counsel devoting his “full efforts” to preparing Wilson’s case and 

found that preparation was in Wilson’s best interest. Although 

Wilson blames a systemic breakdown for counsel’s delay in 

completing his preparation, the record does not contain facts 

about the public defender system that would allow us to 

evaluate this assertion. (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

78

197, 249.) Instead, Wilson’s circumstances appear more like 

those we have found to present “a classic confrontation between 

defendant’s statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial 

and his Sixth Amendment right to competent and adequately 

prepared counsel.” (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at 

p. 556.) As in Lomax, the balance here favored a reasonable 

time for counsel to prepare for a capital trial (ibid.), and the 

duration of the delay was limited; after Wilson invoked his right 

to a speedy trial, counsel sought, and the trial court granted, 

only one continuance. There was no abuse of discretion in 

finding good cause for the continuance under Penal Code section 

1382, and no violation of the state constitutional protections 

those procedures implement (Sykes v. Superior Court (1973) 9 

Cal.3d 83, 88).12 

Wilson also claims that delay in bringing his case to trial 

violated his federal speedy trial right. To determine whether 

there has been a federal violation, we consider the four-part 

balancing test established in Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 

514: “ ‘whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, 

whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to 

blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant 

asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered 

prejudice as the delay’s result.’ ” (People v. Williams, supra, 58 

Cal.4th at p. 233.) Wilson has not carried his burden of 

demonstrating a speedy trial violation under this test. 

12 We have explained that “a defendant may claim a 

violation of the state Constitution’s speedy trial right based on 

delay not covered by any statutory speedy trial provision.” 

(People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 766.) Wilson’s state 

constitutional claim, however, rests on the statutorily 

established delay.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

79

“In a complex case, delay will weigh less heavily against 

the state because the significance of the delay ‘is necessarily 

dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.’ ” 

(People v. Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 234.) In a death 

penalty case, a two-year delay in proceeding to trial “is not 

inordinately long.” (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at 

p. 558.) Furthermore, Wilson acknowledges that the 

continuances were at his attorney’s behest, “and because we 

cannot conclude on this record that the delays caused by 

defendant’s counsel resulted from a systemic breakdown in the 

public defender system,” that delay “must be charged to 

defendant.” (Williams, at p. 252.) 

“Whether defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the 

delay must be assessed in light of the interests the speedy trial 

right was designed to protect: ‘(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial 

incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the 

accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be 

impaired.’ ” (People v. Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 235.) 

“Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a 

defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of 

the entire system.” (Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 532.) 

Here, Wilson claims that “awaiting trial while his life hung in 

the balance inevitably produced great anxiety.” “[D]espite the 

oppressive nature of pretrial incarceration and the anxiety it 

produces,” Wilson does not “demonstrate specific prejudice 

resulting from the delay” and “he cannot benefit from a 

presumption of prejudice because the record does not show that 

the state was responsible for the delay.” (Williams, at p. 252.) 

Considering “the totality of the Barker factors” (People v. 

Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 252), we conclude that Wilson’s 

federal right to a speedy trial was not violated. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

80

H. Other Instructional Issues

Wilson claims that several guilt phase jury instructions 

violated his right not to be convicted “ ‘except upon proof beyond 

a reasonable doubt,’ ” thus violating his constitutional rights to 

due process and trial by jury. Wilson acknowledges that we 

have rejected similar claims, holding that CALJIC No. 2.01 does 

not undermine the reasonable doubt requirement (People v. 

Wright (2021) 12 Cal.5th 419, 455) and that CALJIC Nos. 2.21.2, 

2.22, 2.27, and 8.20 do not urge the jury to decide material issues 

by determining which side had presented relatively stronger 

evidence (People v. Bloom (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1008, 1056). We 

decline his request to reconsider our prior rulings. 

I. Cumulative Error

We have assumed or found three errors. We have assumed 

that an instruction listing eyewitness certainty as a factor in 

assessing the accuracy of Richards’s identification was a 

potential error under state law and that the trial court erred 

when it excluded evidence to impeach testimony about 

Richards’s photo identification. We concluded, however, that it 

was not reasonably probable that the instruction misled the jury 

to Wilson’s detriment and that exclusion of additional evidence 

to challenge the reliability of the photo identification was 

harmless, in part because of defense counsel’s already successful 

efforts in that regard. We also found that the trial court erred 

when it excluded certain statements Seeney made to the defense 

that were purportedly inconsistent with his former testimony 

read into the record at the retrial. But we found it was not 

reasonably probable that evidence of Seeney’s statements would 

have significantly altered the jury’s view of Seeney’s former 

testimony, or, ultimately, its conclusion that Wilson was guilty 

of the charged crimes. Having found these assumed or found 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

81

errors individually harmless, we reach the same conclusion 

when considering the errors together: “ ‘their cumulative effect 

does not warrant reversal of the judgment.’ ” (People v. 

Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 48.) 

J. Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Statute

Wilson raises a number of challenges to California’s death 

penalty statute, all of which we have previously considered and 

rejected. We decline to reconsider the following holdings. 

Penal Code section 190.2 is not impermissibly broad and 

adequately narrows the class of murders for which the death 

penalty may be imposed. (People v. Jackson (2014) 58 Cal.4th 

724, 773.) Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a), which permits 

the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime in sentencing 

“does not result in arbitrary or capricious imposition of the 

death penalty in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” 

(People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 761.) In instructions to 

the jury, the trial court is not required to “ ‘delete inapplicable 

factors’ ” from CALJIC No. 8.85, and the language “ ‘ “so 

substantial” ’ ” and “ ‘warrants’ ” in CALJIC No. 8.88 is not 

unconstitutionally vague. (People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 

Cal.4th 1, 57, 56.) 

“Nothing in the federal Constitution requires the jury, at 

the penalty phase, to make written findings; to unanimously 

agree that particular aggravating circumstances exist; or to find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, that 

aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, or that death 

is the appropriate sentence.” (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 

583, 618–619.) The high court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New 

Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 446, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

82

Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, Cunningham v. 

California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, and Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 

U.S. 92 do not require otherwise. (Jones, at p. 619.) Nor does 

the federal Constitution require the trial court to instruct the 

jury “that the prosecution has the burden of persuasion 

regarding the existence of aggravating factors, the weight of 

aggravating versus mitigating factors, and the appropriateness 

of a death judgment. [Citations.] In addition, the trial court 

need not instruct the jury that life without parole was presumed 

the appropriate sentence.” (People v. Garton (2018) 4 Cal.5th 

485, 522–523.)

The state death penalty scheme does not violate the 

federal Constitution by forgoing intercase proportionality 

review, does not violate equal protection by treating capital and 

noncapital defendants differently, and does not violate 

international law and norms. (People v. Salazar (2016) 63 

Cal.4th 214, 257.) The exercise of prosecutorial discretion in 

different counties does not violate equal protection; Bush v. Gore

(2000) 531 U.S. 98 does not require otherwise. (People v. Brady

(2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 589.)

III. MOTION FOR A STAY AND LIMITED REMAND

While Wilson’s appeal was pending, the Legislature 

passed the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 

317, § 1) (RJA or the Act), which provides statutory authority 

for defendants to challenge criminal proceedings on the basis of 

racial, ethnic, or national origin discrimination. As later 

amended, the RJA applies to cases involving a death sentence, 

as well as to all cases in which the judgment is not yet final. 

(Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (j); Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 2.) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

83

Wilson does not raise RJA claims in this appeal, so we do 

not have any occasion to interpret or apply the RJA’s 

substantive provisions here. Wilson has, however, raised a 

preliminary procedural question about the litigation of RJA 

claims that require the development of new evidence outside of 

the appellate record. Specifically, after briefing in this case was 

complete and after this court issued a letter advising the parties 

that the case would be set for oral argument, Wilson filed a 

motion asking this court to instead stay the appellate 

proceedings and to remand the case to the superior court, where 

he intends to raise RJA claims based on evidence outside of the 

appellate record. In the alternative, if this court proceeds to 

decide the claims he has raised on appeal, Wilson asks that we 

remand the case for litigation of his RJA claims without 

entering a final judgment on his direct appeal. The question we 

must address is whether Wilson has shown good cause to stay 

the adjudication of his direct appeal while he returns to superior 

court to raise and develop evidence supporting new RJA claims 

unrelated to the claims he has raised on appeal.

Wilson’s primary argument is that, under the RJA, good 

cause for a stay of a pending appeal is automatically established 

whenever a defendant signals an intent to raise a colorable RJA 

claim in superior court, as he has done here. In effect, he argues 

that the RJA establishes an across-the-board rule authorizing 

automatic stays of all pending criminal appeals for litigation of 

RJA claims based on evidence outside of the appellate record. 

We understand the statute differently. While the RJA refers to 

a defendant’s ability to move for a stay of appeal and remand, 

the statute does not establish a rule of automatic stays. As in 

other contexts in which courts have employed a stay-andremand procedure, good cause for an appellate stay in this 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

84

context depends on a case-specific consideration of the reasons 

proffered for delaying the adjudication of the appeal.

To evaluate the question of good cause in this case, we 

clarify at the outset that a stay and remand is not legally 

necessary to allow an appellant to raise RJA claims that are 

unrelated to the appeal. Under both the RJA and long-settled 

principles of law, appellants are entitled to file a concurrent 

habeas corpus petition raising extrarecord RJA claims in 

superior court, regardless of where the proceedings stand in the 

appeal. (Pen. Code, § 1473 (section 1473).) Recognizing that 

counsel frequently may not be available to prepare a 

comprehensive petition for a writ of habeas corpus in capital 

cases, we further clarify that filing a limited-purpose petition 

addressing only RJA claims does not jeopardize the ability to 

later bring any other challenges to a capital conviction or 

sentence that appellants may wish to raise once they have the 

assistance of counsel appointed to develop and present a 

comprehensive habeas petition. (See In re Friend (2021) 11 

Cal.5th 720, 732.) 

We recognize that even when there is no legal impediment 

to pursuing RJA claims while an appeal remains pending, there 

may be practical reasons in a particular case why the usual 

appellate process must be altered to ensure timely and effective 

access to RJA remedies. Here, however, Wilson has not shown 

that delaying the resolution of this appeal is necessary to afford 

him a full, fair, and timely opportunity to litigate his RJA claims 

in superior court. We therefore deny his motion to stay the 

appeal and to order a limited remand. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

85

A. The California Racial Justice Act

The Legislature passed the RJA in 2020 with a stated aim 

“to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice 

system” and “to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking 

or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, 

§ 2, subd. (i).) To that end, the RJA prohibits the state from 

seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction, or seeking, obtaining, 

or imposing a sentence, on the basis of race, ethnicity, or 

national origin. (Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (a).) 

The central provision of the RJA, Penal Code section 745 

(section 745), provides that a defendant may establish a 

violation of the Act by proving by a preponderance of the 

evidence that one of the following occurred: “(1) The judge, an 

attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the 

case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited [racial] bias or 

animus towards the defendant”; or “(2) During the defendant’s 

trial, in court and during the proceedings, the judge, an attorney 

in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an 

expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language 

. . . or otherwise exhibited [racial] bias or animus towards the 

defendant . . . , whether or not purposeful.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(1), 

(2).) Alternatively, defendants may establish a violation of the 

Act by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they 

were charged or convicted of a more serious offense than 

defendants of other races who are similarly situated, or that 

they received a longer or more severe sentence by nature of their 

race, or the race of their victim. (Id., subd. (a)(3), (4).) A 

defendant may request disclosure of evidence relevant to these 

claims, and the trial court shall order disclosure upon a showing 

of good cause. (Id., subd. (d).) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

86

The RJA also amended section 1473, which identifies 

bases for prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to add 

a subdivision governing the litigation of RJA claims. The added 

subdivision allows a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “after 

judgment has been entered based on evidence that a criminal 

conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in 

violation of subdivision (a) of Section 745.” (§ 1473, subd. (e) 

(section 1473(e)).) Section 1473(e) provides for the appointment 

of counsel “if the petitioner cannot afford counsel and either the 

petition alleges facts that would establish a violation of 

subdivision (a) of Section 745 or the State Public Defender 

requests counsel be appointed.” Newly appointed counsel may 

also amend a petition filed before their appointment. (Ibid.) 

Under section 1473(e), a petition raising an RJA claim for the 

first time, or on the basis of new evidence, may not be deemed a 

successive or abusive petition. 

The statute also provides that if a habeas petition makes 

a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under the Act, the 

trial court must issue an order to show cause and hold an 

evidentiary hearing. (§ 1473(e).) Likewise, if “a motion is filed 

in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie showing 

of a violation of subdivision (a), the trial court shall hold a 

hearing.” (§ 745, subd. (c).) If, after a hearing, the court finds a 

violation of section 745, subdivision (a) by a preponderance of 

the evidence, the court “shall impose a remedy specific to the 

violation.” (Id., subd. (e).) “Before a judgment has been 

entered,” a court may remedy a violation of the Act by declaring 

a mistrial, empaneling a new jury, dismissing enhancements or 

special circumstances or allegations, or reducing one or more 

charges. (Id., subd. (e)(1)(A), (B), (C).) “After a judgment has 

been entered,” the remedies depend on the nature of the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

87

violation but include vacating the sentence and conviction and 

ordering further proceedings. (Id., subd. (e)(2)(A), (B).) In 

addition, section 745, subdivision (e)(3) provides that, subject to 

exceptions, “[w]hen the court finds there has been a violation of 

subdivision (a), the defendant shall not be eligible for the death 

penalty.” 

When it was first passed, the RJA applied only 

prospectively, to cases in which judgment had not yet been 

entered as of the Act’s effective date of January 1, 2021. (§ 745, 

former subd. (j).) But in 2022, the Legislature extended the Act 

to additional categories of cases, effective at various points over 

the next several years. (Assem. Bill No. 256 (2021–2022 Reg. 

Sess.); Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 2.) As relevant here, the 2022 

amendments made the Act immediately applicable to all cases 

in which judgment is not final (§ 745, subd. (j)(1)), as well as “to 

all cases in which, at the time of the filing of a petition pursuant 

to subdivision [(e)] of Section 1473 raising a claim under this 

section, the petitioner is sentenced to death . . . , regardless of 

when the judgment or disposition became final” (id., 

subd. (j)(2)).13 The 2022 amendments also added a new 

13 Beginning January 1, 2024, the Act applies to all cases in 

which the petitioner is currently serving a sentence for felony or 

juvenile offenses “regardless of when the judgment or 

disposition became final” (§ 745, subd. (j)(3)); beginning in 2025, 

to all cases in which judgment became final for a felony 

conviction or juvenile disposition that “resulted in a 

commitment to the Division of Juvenile Justice on or after 

January 1, 2015” (id., subd. (j)(4)); and beginning in 2026, to all 

cases in which “judgment was for a felony conviction or juvenile 

disposition that resulted in a commitment to the Division of 

Juvenile Justice, regardless of when the judgment or disposition 

became final” (id., subd. (j)(5)).
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

88

subdivision (k), which provides that for petitions that are filed 

in cases in which judgment was entered before January 1, 2021, 

the state may show that a violation of section 745, subdivision 

(a)(1) or (2) — the provisions concerning exhibitions of 

discrimination or bias, including use of language that explicitly 

or implicitly appeals to bias — was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (§ 745, subd. (k).)

In 2023, the Legislature further amended the RJA to 

provide additional guidance about how an RJA claim may be 

raised. As originally enacted, section 745, subdivision (b) 

provided that a “defendant may file a motion in the trial court 

or, if judgment has been imposed, may file a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7[14]in a court of 

competent jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a).” 

As amended by Assembly Bill No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.)

(Assembly Bill 1118), which became effective on January 1, 

2024, the statute now specifies that a defendant “may file a 

motion pursuant to this section, or a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7, in a court of competent 

jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a). For claims 

based on the trial record, a defendant may raise a claim alleging 

a violation of subdivision (a) on direct appeal from the conviction 

or sentence. The defendant may also move to stay the appeal 

and request remand to the superior court to file a motion 

pursuant to this section.” (§ 745, subd. (b).) 

14 Penal Code section 1473.7 allows a person who is no longer 

in custody to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

89

B. Wilson’s Motion

Wilson asks this court to stay his direct appeal and 

remand his case to the superior court, where he intends to 

develop and present non-record-based RJA claims. 

Wilson outlines two potential claims. First, Wilson, who 

is Black, says that his defense investigator learned that during 

penalty phase deliberations one of the jurors referred to 

mitigating evidence of abuse and neglect in Wilson’s background 

as “ ‘cultural.’ ” In the presence of other jurors, she argued that 

many children in Black families were raised under similar 

conditions and did not go on to commit murder. Wilson 

represents that he intends to present this evidence of the juror’s 

comments, as well as lay and expert evidence to show that these 

comments violated the RJA’s prohibition on racially 

discriminatory language (§ 745, subd. (a)(2)), and to establish 

that the juror exhibited racial bias or animus toward Wilson by

implying that jurors should discount the weight of Wilson’s 

mitigation because of his race (id., subd. (a)(1)).

Second, Wilson asserts that there are significant racial 

disparities in both charging and sentencing in San Bernardino, 

his county of conviction. He contends that he will be able to 

show good cause for disclosure of additional evidence to prove a 

violation of the RJA based on racially disproportionate practices 

related to his charging, conviction, and sentence. (§ 745, subd. 

(a)(3), (4).)

C. Discussion

Wilson’s request for a stay and remand relies on Penal 

Code section 745, subdivision (b), as it was recently amended 

during the pendency of his motion. The present version provides 

that a defendant “may . . . move to stay the appeal and request 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

90

remand to the superior court to file a motion pursuant to this 

section.” (§ 745, subd. (b).) But as Wilson acknowledges, while 

the statute permits the filing of a stay-and-remand motion, the 

statute does not specify the standards for deciding whether the 

motion should be granted. The central question we confront 

here concerns that issue. To answer that question, we begin by 

providing a brief overview of the relevant legal background.

1. Legal background related to the stay-and-remand 

procedure

Section 745 provides three vehicles by which a defendant 

may raise an RJA claim. The defendant may raise an RJA claim 

by motion (§ 745, subd. (b); see also, e.g., id., subd. (c) [laying out 

procedure for litigating a motion “filed in the trial court”]); may 

raise an RJA claim on direct appeal from the conviction or 

sentence, provided the claim is based on the trial record (id., 

subd. (b)); or may raise an RJA claim in a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus (ibid.; see § 1473(e)). A petition for habeas corpus 

is, as this court has frequently noted, the standard vehicle for 

developing and presenting claims of error in the judgment based 

on evidence outside the appellate record — as Wilson seeks to 

do here. (E.g., People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 736–737.)

With the Assembly Bill 1118 amendments to section 745, 

subdivision (b) the Legislature did not create a new vehicle for 

raising RJA claims. Instead, evidently aware that “questions 

have been raised as to whether habeas petitions are the 

exclusive avenue for a post-conviction RJA challenge” (Assem. 

Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1118 (2023–

2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 15, 2023, p. 6), the 

Legislature clarified that other types of post-judgment filings 

are also, in some cases, permissible. As relevant here, the 

Legislature clarified that defendants may seek to invoke a stay-
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

91

and-remand procedure that appellate courts had recently 

developed and employed in other contexts, where appropriate to 

enable an individual with a pending, as-yet-unadjudicated 

appeal to return to superior court to pursue statutory 

resentencing or similar alternative relief under newly enacted 

ameliorative criminal laws.

The stay-and-remand procedure derives in the first 

instance from the authority to order a limited remand under 

Penal Code section 1260 (section 1260). Section 1260, by its 

terms, confers authority on appellate courts to “remand the 

cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be 

just under the circumstances.” As we explained in People v. 

Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, this authority includes the 

authority to order a limited remand “to allow the trial court to 

resolve one or more factual issues affecting the validity of the 

judgment but distinct from the issues submitted to the jury, or 

for the exercise of any discretion that is vested by law in the trial 

court.” (Id. at pp. 818–819.) 

But typically when a court orders a remand — limited or 

otherwise — it does so to permit further proceedings concerning 

an issue raised on appeal, as part of its resolution of that appeal. 

(§ 1260 [describing available rulings to resolve an appeal]; see, 

e.g., People v. Braxton, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 819 [concluding 

that the trial court had improperly refused to hold a hearing on 

defendant’s motion for a new trial and ordering a limited 

remand for purposes of holding such a hearing].) In those 

circumstances, the remittitur issues and “ ‘the trial court is 

revested with jurisdiction of the case’ ” to carry out the judgment 

as ordered by the appellate court. (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 

48 Cal.4th 330, 337.) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

92

The stay-and-remand procedure to which Wilson refers, by 

contrast, involves a remand that delays resolution of an appeal. 

This stay-and-remand procedure is a relatively recent 

innovation, developed in recent years in response to the 

enactment of a number of criminal justice reforms that have 

created alternative pathways to relief outside the usual 

appellate process. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 1172.6 [establishing a 

procedure to vacate convictions that were based on the natural 

and probable consequences doctrine]; Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017–

2018 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Confronted with 

questions about how to create effective access to these new 

statutory pathways to relief, appellate courts have recognized 

that in some situations there may be good cause to put the 

appeal on hold and remand the case to the trial court to permit 

appellants to pursue effective relief made newly available by 

statute.

The stay-and-remand approach was first applied in People 

v. Awad (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 215. In that case, defendant 

Awad sought to raise a claim under Proposition 47, legislation 

that reclassified certain felonies as misdemeanors, after he had 

already filed an appeal of the criminal judgment against him. 

(Awad, at p. 218.) Under the new law, eligible offenders could 

file a petition in the trial court for recall of the sentence and 

resentencing according to the amended guidelines. (Pen. Code, 

§ 1170.18.) Because the alternate misdemeanor sentence was 

relatively short, Awad could only take advantage of the early 

release resentencing might afford if a court acted quickly on his 

petition for recall and resentencing. Delay in the process would 

mean that Awad was effectively serving the longer felony 

sentence, even if it were no longer applicable to his offense. 

When Awad filed his Proposition 47 petition, however, the trial 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

93

court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address the petition 

while Awad’s case remained pending on appeal. (Awad, at 

p. 218.) If Awad waited until his appeal was final to pursue his 

petition in the trial court, he would lose the benefit of the 

shortened sentence. But to benefit from the shortened sentence, 

Awad would have to give up his appeal so that the trial court 

could exercise jurisdiction over his petition. Under these 

circumstances, the appellate court held that a discretionary stay 

and remand pursuant to section 1260 was appropriate to avoid 

this “jurisdictional conundrum.” (Awad, at p. 218.) The Court 

of Appeal explained that it would “construe Proposition 47 

together with section 1260 to authorize a limited remand to the 

trial court to hear a postconviction motion to recall a sentence 

under section 1170.18. ‘ “ ‘The . . . power arises from necessity 

where, in the absence of any previously established procedural 

rule, rights would be lost.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 222.)

Since Awad, the stay-and-remand procedure has gained 

general acceptance in our courts. In People v. Martinez (2019) 

31 Cal.App.5th 719, for instance, the court discussed the 

possibility of granting a stay and remand in cases involving a 

different criminal justice reform measure, Senate Bill No. 1437

(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which narrowed the scope of the felony 

murder rule and eliminated murder liability under the natural 

and probable consequences doctrine. (Martinez, at p. 729.) 

Similar to the law in Awad, Senate Bill No. 1437 provided that 

eligible individuals may gain relief by filing a petition in the 

trial court to have their conviction vacated and to be 

resentenced. (Pen. Code, § 1172.6, subds. (a), (d)(3), (e) 

[formerly Pen. Code, § 1170.95].) The court recognized that 

some individuals with nonfinal cases might have reason to 

immediately invoke the statutory procedures of Penal Code 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

94

section 1172.6, and to pursue the relief created by Senate Bill 

No. 1437 without first waiting for the completion of their direct 

appeal. (Martinez, at p. 729.) The court remarked that if 

supported by good cause, a reviewing court could order a stay 

and limited remand to allow the trial court to rule on a petition 

invoking the benefits of the new legislation. (Ibid.; accord, 

People v. Cervantes (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 213, 226.) 

Responding to concerns about unnecessary delay in 

resolving petitions under Penal Code section 1172.6, this court, 

too, has pointed to the possibility that an appellate court may 

grant a motion to stay the appeal and order a limited remand to 

the superior court “where good cause supports the motion.” 

(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 858.) 

We presume that when the Legislature added the stayand-remand language now found in section 745, subdivision (b), 

it meant to draw on the procedure employed in Awad and 

discussed in other cases, under which a court may find good 

cause to stay a pending appeal and remand the case to the trial 

court to permit the appellant to pursue alternative forms of 

relief. (See People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 634 [“the 

Legislature ‘is deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial 

constructions in effect at the time legislation is enacted’ ”].) The 

legislative history bears this out. Addressing the provision in 

its analysis of Assembly Bill 1118, the Assembly Committee on 

Public Safety explained that although a trial court generally 

loses jurisdiction once an appeal is filed, a stay-and-remand 

procedure had been permitted by courts in other post-judgment 

relief contexts. The committee referred specifically to 

Martinez’s observation that an appellate court could order a stay 

and limited remand if the court finds good cause to do so. 

(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1118, 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

95

supra, as amended Mar. 15, 2023, p. 6.) The committee noted 

that a stay and remand “may be necessary” under the RJA “to 

permit the trial court to rule on the claim in the first instance, 

and to allow the parties to fully litigate the issue.” (Ibid.)

Although it relied on an existing procedure developed to 

effectuate other remedial legislation, the Legislature also 

indicated that it meant for the availability of the stay-andremand procedure to serve the specific concerns of the RJA. The 

Legislature envisioned that the stay-and-remand procedure 

would “ensure that the basic civil rights protections provided by 

the RJA can be accessed in an efficient and effective manner” 

(Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1118 

(2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 18, 2023, p. 9), and 

would help to address problems arising in that context, such as 

the shortage of qualified habeas counsel in capital cases (see id., 

p. 6 [a stay and remand is important to capital litigants who lack 

access to qualified habeas counsel]). 

With this background in mind, we infer that when the 

Legislature referred to motions for a stay and remand in section 

745, subdivision (b), it intended that RJA litigants would be able 

to address concerns specific to the RJA by invoking the 

procedure courts have developed in other contexts to facilitate 

prompt adjudication of alternate claims of relief where there is 

good cause to deviate from the usual course of appellate 

adjudication. The parties do not dispute this premise. Their 

disagreement instead centers on what constitutes good cause for 

a stay and remand in the RJA context. We turn to that subject 

next.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

96

2. Whether there is good cause for a stay and remand

As noted, Wilson’s primary argument is that good cause is 

necessarily established, and a stay and remand required, 

whenever a defendant raises a plausible claim that an RJA 

violation could or might have occurred. Wilson contends the 

standard for finding good cause for a remand that delays final 

adjudication of the appeal is the same standard the court in 

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138 adopted for 

determining when a defendant has shown good cause to obtain 

discovery under the RJA. Drawing on the standard for 

obtaining discovery of law enforcement personnel records under 

Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, the court held 

that to show “good cause” for discovery under the RJA, “a 

defendant is required only to advance a plausible factual 

foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the Racial 

Justice Act ‘could or might have occurred’ in his case.” (Young, 

at p. 159.) This standard for obtaining discovery, the court 

concluded, “should not be difficult to meet.” (Id. at p. 161.) 

Here, Wilson contends — and the dissent agrees (dis. opn. of 

Evans, J., post, at p. 7.) — that this court should stay his appeal 

and order a remand for RJA proceedings because he has 

“ ‘advance[d] a plausible factual foundation, based on specific 

facts, that a violation of the Racial Justice Act “could or might 

have occurred” in his case.’ ” 

The Attorney General counters that the standard for 

finding good cause to order discovery in an RJA case is not an 

appropriate standard for determining whether there is good 

cause to delay the final resolution of an appeal of a criminal 

judgment. In the Attorney General’s view, it is not enough 

merely to identify a plausible claim under the RJA; the question 

should instead be “whether the balance of the competing 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

97

interests weighs in favor of granting or denying a stay or a 

limited remand.” The Attorney General invokes as an analogy 

the standard for deciding whether to stay civil proceedings for a 

parallel criminal proceeding, which involves considering 

“ ‘ “ ‘the particular circumstances and competing interests 

involved in the case’ ” ’ ” and factors such as prejudice to the 

party opposing the stay, the burden on the party seeking a stay, 

convenience and efficiency for the court, nonparty interests, and 

the public’s interest in the pending civil and criminal litigation. 

(Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 483.)

We agree that the good cause inquiry is not limited to 

whether the defendant seeks to litigate a colorable claim in an 

alternative forum, but instead takes into account all relevant 

circumstances and interests that counsel for and against a stay 

of appellate proceedings while that litigation occurs. A stay and 

remand is a significant departure from the usual process of 

adjudication and carries with it significant risks of disruption 

and delay. For that reason, courts have uniformly understood 

that good cause must be based on the particular circumstances 

and interests at stake. The fact that an appellant may have 

other, colorable claims that could be raised in a different forum 

has never been thought sufficient, standing alone, to justify 

halting the adjudication of a pending appeal.

Section 745, subdivision (b) contains no indication that the 

Legislature intended to prescribe a different approach. The 

amended version of the provision simply makes clear that a 

defendant “may also move to stay the appeal and request

remand to the superior court.” (Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (b), 

italics added.) The reference to requesting a stay and remand is 

not plausibly read as an implicit command to automatically 

grant such a request whenever the defendant intends to raise 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

98

an RJA claim that is not obviously deficient on its face.15 Such 

a system of virtually automatic stays would not only run counter 

to existing law concerning the stay-and-remand approach, but 

would also significantly impinge on courts’ “ ‘inherent power to 

control litigation before them.’ ” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 

428, 522.) If the Legislature intended to prescribe such a result, 

it “would have done so explicitly” (People v. Bright (1996) 12 

Cal.4th 652, 668), rather than simply referring in general terms 

to defendants’ ability to request a stay and remand (§ 745, subd. 

(b)). 

To the extent the language of the statute admits of any 

doubt on this point, the legislative history contains no indication 

that section 745, subdivision (b) was intended to curtail courts’ 

traditional ability to consider all relevant circumstances in 

determining whether to grant an appellate stay. As noted, it is 

clear the Legislature was aware of the stay-and-remand 

procedure as it had been invoked in recent cases involving post15 The dissent questions why the Legislature would include 

an explicit reference to motions for stay and remand if not to 

create a procedure specific to the RJA. (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., 

post, at pp. 7–8.) But the statutory reference does not, by its 

terms, create any procedure at all; it merely refers to a 

defendant’s ability to file a motion for stay and remand —

language that, as noted, is naturally understood to invoke the 

stay-and-remand procedure developed in Awad and subsequent 

cases. The reasons for including this reference are not difficult 

to discern; before the 2023 amendments, it was unclear whether 

any appellant could ever raise post-judgment RJA claims by any 

means other than a habeas petition. The amendments made 

clear that post-judgment claimants may seek to invoke other 

generally available procedures, including both direct appeal and 

motions for stay and remand, to the extent those procedures are 

appropriate to the circumstances.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

99

judgment access to ameliorative changes in the law. The courts 

in these cases never suggested that a stay and remand should 

be granted as a matter of course; they instead recognized that a 

range of practical considerations are relevant to the decision. 

The legislative history contains no indication the Legislature 

expected courts considering RJA claims to depart from this 

approach. On the contrary, a cosponsor of the amendments to 

section 745, subdivision (b) stated that Assembly Bill 1118 

enacts “narrow, technical reforms” and merely “clarifies” the 

ability to raise RJA claims on appeal or to request a stay and 

remand. (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill 

No. 1118, supra, as amended May 18, 2023, p. 9.) Nothing in 

the history suggests the Legislature instead intended dramatic 

changes to the way courts have typically determined whether 

good cause exists to stay a pending appeal and send the case to 

superior court for the institution of an alternative proceeding.

The plausibility of Wilson’s RJA claims is certainly a 

relevant consideration: Whether defendants are potentially 

eligible for the benefits they seek to pursue on remand is an 

important threshold consideration in determining whether 

there is good cause to grant a request for a stay and remand. 

(Cf. People v. Awad, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 221 [noting 

that defense counsel represented that Awad was eligible for 

Prop. 47 resentencing].) But it is not the only consideration 

relevant to the good cause inquiry. As courts have recognized in 

other contexts, a court must consider whether there are unusual 

circumstances that give rise to pressing concerns warranting a 

departure from the usual conduct of an appeal — such as the 

necessity of preserving a defendant’s rights under newly enacted 

laws and the importance of alleviating delay in accessing 

potentially significant benefits, as in Awad — as well as 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

100

competing concerns of delay and unnecessary disruption in the 

resolution of claims properly presented on appeal. 

This inquiry also takes into account the nature of the 

rights involved. The central purpose of the RJA is to provide 

meaningful remedies for proven racial discrimination in the 

administration of criminal justice, and thus to eliminate racial 

bias in California’s criminal justice system. And through the 

amendments to the statute, the Legislature has made clear the 

importance of ensuring “ ‘efficient and effective’ ” access to these

remedies. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d 

reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) 

as amended May 18, 2023, p. 6; see also Assem. Conc. Sen. 

Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended May 18, 2023, p. 1.)

Mindful of the overriding purposes of the RJA, our good 

cause inquiry begins by considering whether Wilson seeks to 

raise a plausible RJA claim. He does. We thus proceed to 

examine whether Wilson has shown that a stay and remand 

may be needed to ensure that he is able to litigate those claims 

in a timely manner, and thus has timely and effective access to 

the remedies the RJA makes available for proven racial 

discrimination in the administration of criminal justice. 

Finally, we consider other circumstances relevant to the 

existence of good cause.

a. Wilson’s access to RJA remedies

We turn, then, to the circumstances relating to Wilson’s 

access to RJA remedies. At the outset, we observe that this case 

differs in an important respect from other cases in which courts 

have employed the stay-and-remand procedure. In those cases, 

the courts were confronted with a particular jurisdictional 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

101

dilemma: So long as an appeal remained pending, the trial court 

lacked jurisdiction to evaluate the defendant’s eligibility for 

resentencing relief under a newly enacted ameliorative statute. 

The courts concluded that this dilemma established good cause: 

Employing the stay-and-remand procedure provided a way 

around the problem, permitting prompt resolution of the 

defendant’s entitlement to alternative forms of relief in 

circumstances where prompt resolution was needed to 

adequately secure the defendant’s statutory rights. (See People 

v. Awad, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 222 [preventing the loss 

of rights justified a stay and remand].) 

This case poses no similar timing dilemma, for, as we now 

clarify, there is no legal obstacle preventing Wilson and other 

defendants in his position from simultaneously pursuing relief 

through a direct appeal and relief in the superior court through 

a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The RJA, as we read it, 

draws on settled principles in the habeas context to afford 

defendants whose RJA claims are independent of the claims on 

appeal a timely opportunity to raise extrarecord RJA claims 

without regard to the status of proceedings on appeal. 

We begin with settled principles. Again, as we have noted, 

the standard vehicle for developing and presenting claims of 

error in the judgment based on evidence outside the appellate 

record — as Wilson seeks to do here — is a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus. (§ 1473, subd. (a); People v. Romero, supra, 8 

Cal.4th at pp. 736–737.) A habeas petition comes within a trial 

court’s original jurisdiction under article VI, section 10 of the 

California Constitution. (See In re Figueroa (2018) 4 Cal.5th 

576, 586.) But as we explained in In re Carpenter (1995) 9 

Cal.4th 634, this jurisdiction can coexist with an ongoing appeal: 

“Nothing in article VI, section 10, or any other provision of law, 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

102

denies the superior court of subject matter jurisdiction over 

habeas corpus proceedings when the challenged judgment is 

pending on appeal before an appellate court or even when, as 

here, a judgment of death is pending on automatic appeal before 

this court.” (Id. at p. 646.) 

This sort of concurrent jurisdiction is, of course, limited in 

that the trial court “does not have ‘the power to interfere with 

the appellate jurisdiction of either [this court or the Court of 

Appeal] in matters pending before said appellate courts.’ ” (In 

re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 646.) But a trial court 

ordinarily does not interfere with appellate court jurisdiction 

when it entertains a request for relief based on arguments and 

evidence outside the appellate record. In Carpenter, for 

example, we concluded there was no such interference when the 

habeas corpus claim before the superior court involved juror 

misconduct that did not appear in the record. (Ibid.) We 

explained that because “[a]ppellate jurisdiction is limited to the 

four corners of the record on appeal,” we could not consider the 

misconduct claim “[i]n the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction.” 

(Ibid.; cf. People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 220, 225 [trial court 

lacked jurisdiction to grant a habeas petition on the same issue 

that had been adversely decided on the record on appeal].) This 

conclusion was based on a long-standing understanding of the 

law (e.g., France v. Superior Court (1927) 201 Cal. 122, 132 

[superior courts may not exercise their concurrent habeas 

jurisdiction “on any ground appearing upon the face of the 

record on appeal”]; In re Baker (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 493, 500 

[“the trial court was free to determine the [ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim], irrespective of the pendency of the appeal” 

because neither proceeding would interfere with the other]), and 

remains in force (see Robinson v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

103

901–902 [“Petitioners challenging a state court judgment by 

means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that is not related 

to a pending direct appeal should first file the petition in the 

superior court that rendered the judgment”]; People v. 

Scarbrough (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 916, 927 [“where a writ of 

habeas corpus relies on evidence outside the record, it may be 

considered by the superior court despite a pending appeal”]; 

Levenson, Cal. Criminal Procedure (The Rutter Group 2023) 

§ 30.21, p. 627 [“The superior court is not denied subject matter 

jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings when the 

challenged judgment is pending on appeal before an appellate 

court”]). 

The RJA makes use of this concurrent path to relief by 

providing that claims under the Act may be initiated by a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (§ 1473(e).) And here, much 

as in Carpenter, Wilson intends to raise new claims not raised 

on appeal, based on evidence outside the appellate record. 

Indeed, his first proposed RJA claim is much like the claim in 

Carpenter, concerning evidence of potential juror misconduct 

unearthed after the judgment; his second claim involves racially 

disparate charging and sentencing, which again depends on 

discovery and litigation concerning charging and sentencing 

practices that are entirely outside the appellate record. Under 

this court’s precedent, there is no bar to his bringing these 

claims in a habeas petition in the superior court while his direct 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

104

appeal is pending.16 He does not need a stay of the appeal or a 

remand to the superior court to raise them.17 

Although Wilson acknowledges settled precedent 

permitting concurrent jurisdiction in the habeas context, he 

notes that there is “an insurmountable backlog” of capital cases 

awaiting the appointment of habeas counsel. He argues that 

without any “realistic prospect for the appointment of habeas 

counsel,” he would be left with no timely way of raising his RJA 

claims by way of a concurrent habeas petition. He asserts that 

a stay and remand, which would allow him to present a postjudgment RJA motion in the trial court before the final 

resolution of his appellate claims, is necessary to overcome this 

problem. 

16 Because we are resolving Wilson’s direct appeal, his 

judgment likely will soon become final. To be clear, nothing we 

say today prevents individuals with final judgments from 

seeking the appointment of counsel and pursuing RJA claims in 

habeas proceedings in the superior court as envisioned by the 

Act. (E.g., § 745, subd. (j)(2), (3) [establishing the timing for 

filing an RJA habeas petition “regardless of when the judgment 

or disposition became final”]; § 1473(e) [providing for the 

appointment of counsel and prosecution of a writ of habeas 

corpus “after judgment has been entered”].)

17 Wilson contends that Carpenter illustrates the possibility 

that a concurrent habeas proceeding will not expedite resolution 

of extrarecord RJA claims. In that case, the absence of a 

certified appellate record prevented this court from conducting 

the necessary prejudice inquiry to resolve Carpenter’s 

concurrent juror misconduct claim raised on habeas. (In re 

Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 659.) Here, the appellate 

record has been certified for quite some time and, at any rate, it 

is not clear how a stay and remand would avoid any hypothetical 

problems in the preparation of a certified appellate record. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

105

The concern Wilson raises is significant.18 Although an 

indigent person sentenced to death is entitled to the 

appointment of counsel for state post-conviction proceedings

(Gov. Code, § 68662; Pen. Code, § 1509 (section 1509)), there 

are, as Wilson indicates, substantial delays in appointing 

counsel under this authority to develop and present a 

comprehensive collateral attack on Wilson’s death judgment. 

This was true eight years ago, when voters passed Proposition 

66, the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016 (Gen. 

Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) § 1) (Proposition 66), which transferred 

appointment authority from this court to the superior courts. 

(Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 864 (Briggs) (conc. opn. 

of Liu, J.).) There is no indication that the situation has 

improved, and Wilson cites data indicating that it has worsened. 

(See also ibid. [acknowledging the possibility that Prop. 66 could 

exacerbate the shortage of capital habeas counsel].)

But the Legislature contemplated a process for 

appointment of counsel to raise RJA claims that is distinct from 

the process for appointing counsel “in proceedings pursuant to 

Section 1509 of the Penal Code” (Gov. Code, § 68662, subd. (a)) 

to prepare a comprehensive capital habeas petition. The 

representation that superior courts must order pursuant to 

Government Code section 68662, the qualifications for such 

counsel (see id., § 68665 [directing the adoption and 

reevaluation of competency standards]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.652 [counsel qualifications]), and additional procedures for 

18 It is a concern relevant not only to Wilson and other 

similarly situated appellants who might seek a stay and 

remand, but also to those capital defendants whose judgments 

are already final, and whose only avenue for raising their RJA 

claims is therefore by way of habeas proceedings.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

106

those appointments (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.561) pertain to 

capital petitions governed by section 1509, as adopted or 

amended as part of Proposition 66. (See, e.g., Briggs, supra, 3 

Cal.5th at p. 824 [describing Prop. 66 requirements for Judicial 

Council competency standards and the appointment of counsel 

by the superior courts].) 

The RJA authorizes defendants to raise RJA claims 

through the same mechanism contained in section 1509 (that is, 

a petition for writ of habeas corpus), but it does not import all of 

the same provisions governing the appointment of counsel. 

Rather, the RJA contains its own counsel appointment 

provision. (§ 1473(e).) Thus, notwithstanding the various 

provisions of Proposition 66, the Attorney General does not 

dispute that capital petitioners may file limited-purpose RJA 

petitions with counsel appointed pursuant to section 1473(e), 

and we agree. There is no evident reason why the RJA’s counsel 

provision should not be given full effect, even in capital cases 

governed by Proposition 66. A petition addressed specifically to 

RJA claims, with counsel appointed pursuant to the procedures 

specified in the RJA, is not inconsistent with Proposition 66’s 

overarching aim of promoting the efficient resolution of 

challenges to capital sentences. (See generally Briggs, supra, 3 

Cal.5th at pp. 823–825 [describing purposes underlying Prop. 

66].) In other words, a defendant need not necessarily await the 

appointment of counsel available to assist with a full capital 

habeas petition; the defendant may file a post-judgment RJA 

petition with the assistance of counsel appointed pursuant to 

section 1473(e) for that specific, limited purpose. 

Wilson suggests limited-scope RJA representation is not 

viable because of the risk of procedural default. He asserts that 

if he were to file a petition raising only RJA claims under section 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

107

1473, he would thereby be prevented from later raising other 

habeas claims, presumably after the appointment of capital 

habeas counsel, by the bar on successive petitions. As Wilson 

notes, present statutory law provides that a “successive” 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging a judgment of 

death “shall be dismissed unless the court finds, by the 

preponderance of all available evidence, whether or not 

admissible at trial, that the defendant is actually innocent of the 

crime of which he or she was convicted or is ineligible for the 

sentence.” (§ 1509, subd. (d).) But as we recently explained, the 

purpose of this successiveness bar, like preexisting 

successiveness bars developed through case adjudication, is 

simply to prevent abuse of the writ process through repetitive or 

piecemeal claims; it is not to bar the filing of claims that, 

through no fault of the petitioner’s, could not feasibly have been 

raised in an earlier petition. (In re Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 732.) Rather, “the filing of a claim that could not have 

reasonably been raised in an earlier petition” is not “an abuse of 

the writ subject to the bar on successive petitions.” (Ibid.; id. at 

p. 741.)

When the appointment of capital habeas counsel marks 

petitioners’ first opportunity to raise comprehensive challenges 

to their convictions or death sentence on bases other than the 

RJA, such challenges are not barred as successive. (See In re 

Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 724.) This conclusion follows 

from settled law. A petitioner entitled to the appointment of 

capital habeas counsel “is entitled to rely on that attorney to 

conduct a reasonable investigation and, if appropriate, present 

viable claims in a single petition.” (In re Sanders (1999) 21 

Cal.4th 697, 720.) As a consequence, “the actions (or inactions) 

of appointed counsel are relevant to deciding whether the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

108

procedural rule against successive habeas corpus petitions is 

applicable.” (Ibid.) In Sanders, we addressed a different 

procedural bar — delay — and concluded that bar did not apply 

when appointed counsel had abandoned the petitioner. (Ibid.) 

Similar reasoning applies to the scenario Wilson presents: 

Where the scope of appointed counsel’s representation is limited 

to RJA claims, the need to present other claims in a subsequent 

petition, following the appointment of capital habeas counsel, 

arises “through no fault of the prisoner.” (Id. at p. 721; see also 

People v. Superior Court (Morales) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 523, 533 

[“our inability to timely appoint habeas corpus counsel in capital 

cases should not operate to deprive condemned inmates of a 

right otherwise available to them”].) Because the subsequent 

non-RJA claims in those circumstances “could not have 

reasonably been raised” in an earlier petition (In re Friend, at 

p. 741), they do not trip on the successiveness bar.19 

Wilson also contends that even if appellants are entitled 

to file limited-purpose RJA petitions, there is no guarantee that 

qualified habeas counsel will be available to represent them. We 

acknowledge the importance of this concern. The same concern 

is also reflected in the legislative history, which indicates that 

the stay-and-remand procedure could be “particularly important 

for individuals with death sentences . . . [who are] unlikely to 

have habeas attorneys assigned to them due to the 

unavailability of qualified counsel, making it nearly impossible 

to litigate their RJA claims in a timely fashion.” (Sen. Com. on 

19 The Attorney General agrees that a successiveness bar 

would not apply and has confirmed that he would not invoke it 

in these circumstances.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

109

Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1118, supra, as 

amended May 18, 2023, p. 6.) 

But Wilson has not shown this concern is present in his 

own case. Wilson is represented by the Office of the State Public 

Defender (OSPD), which has indicated that it is willing to 

continue to represent Wilson in developing and presenting 

extrarecord RJA claims. Although Wilson would prefer this to 

occur through an RJA motion adjudicated while the final 

resolution of the appeal is stayed,20 he has not shown that OSPD 

would be unavailable to litigate his claims if they were to be 

raised instead through a limited-purpose habeas petition 

addressed exclusively to RJA claims. As for counsel’s 

qualifications, Wilson notes that there are specific requirements 

for capital habeas representation — set out in California Rules 

of Court, rule 8.652 — and that if applicable, those qualification 

requirements would constrain the appointment of counsel for 

capital RJA claimants generally. But as Wilson acknowledges, 

it is not clear the same qualification requirements apply to a 

limited-purpose filing under the RJA. (See Pen. Code, § 1473.1 

[standards for the appointment of counsel to pursue RJA claims 

in capital cases must be “consistent with” existing standards].) 

20 Wilson argues that it would be preferable to proceed 

through motion in superior court, in part because then his RJA 

claims would not be subject to harmless error review, as are 

“petitions” raising RJA claims. (§ 745, subd. (k).) The Attorney 

General contends, however, that the RJA authorizes harmless 

error review for both petitions and motions. We need not, and 

thus do not, resolve this dispute here.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

110

In any event, even if those qualification requirements were 

applicable, Wilson’s counsel would indisputably meet them.21

Wilson argues that the mechanism for appointing habeas 

counsel for RJA petitioners is “at best, unclear” and asserts that 

allowing capital appellants to pursue RJA claims following an 

appellate stay and remand will generally be “much faster than 

waiting for the appointment of capital habeas counsel.” Wilson 

does not, however, point to difficulties that will arise in his own 

case; that is, he does not argue that the RJA appointment 

mechanism is inadequate to ensure prompt appointment of his 

existing counsel to initiate limited-purpose habeas proceedings. 

(See § 1473(e) [requiring the appointment of counsel to pursue 

21 As Wilson acknowledges, OSPD has been appointed for 

both appellate and habeas proceedings in the past and currently 

represents capital habeas clients.

The California Appellate Project, as amicus curiae in 

support of the OSPD, raises concerns about the effect of 

qualification requirements on the appointment of limited-scope, 

RJA habeas counsel for capital appellants who are not 

represented by OSPD. This issue is beyond the scope of our 

decision today. The parties have not addressed the question 

and, as explained above, it is not directly at issue in this case. 

Under the circumstances, the better course is to address the 

matter after the parties have had an opportunity to consider, 

brief, and argue the relevant issues in a case that presents them 

and requires their resolution. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 

266, 276 [reiterating the obligation to avoid ruling on 

“ ‘ “abstract propositions” ’ ”].) For present purposes, it suffices 

to observe that it is not clear that the same qualification and 

appointment requirements apply to RJA habeas counsel as have 

been implemented for comprehensive capital habeas 

representation governed by section 1509 and other Proposition 

66 provisions. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

111

an RJA petition if either the petitioner alleges facts that would 

establish a violation of the RJA, or at the request of OSPD].) 

In sum, Wilson has not demonstrated that any legal or 

practical obstacle will delay or prevent him from raising his 

extrarecord RJA claims through the usual means of a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus. He thus has not shown that a stay of 

the adjudication of his appeal is necessary to afford him timely 

and effective access to RJA remedies.22 

b. Other relevant considerations

To determine whether a stay and remand is warranted, we 

must also consider the interests on the other side of the balance. 

The RJA proceedings Wilson seeks to pursue are potentially 

quite involved, and as such would cause significant delay in the 

resolution of his appeal. (Cf. People v. Awad, supra, 238 

22 The dissent raises a number of possible practical concerns 

that may arise in other cases. Among other things, the dissent 

questions the funding available for RJA habeas counsel and 

suggests that it may be more difficult for the superior courts to 

resolve RJA claims raised in a limited-purpose habeas petition 

than to resolve them in a filing denominated a “motion.” The 

dissent also envisions an untenable burden on OSPD if it 

assumes an obligation to represent all of its current and former 

clients in limited-purpose RJA habeas proceedings. (Dis. opn. of 

Evans, J., post, at pp. 13, 17–18.) 

Our holding today does not preclude litigants from raising 

such concerns in future cases. As the dissent notes, our 

consideration of Wilson’s stay-and-remand request “necessarily 

depends on the specific circumstances of the case and context.” 

(Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 8.) In this particular case, 

Wilson has not pointed to any concrete obstacles to his own 

development and presentation of RJA claims in a habeas 

proceeding. We presume that Wilson and his counsel are best 

positioned to identify matters of concern regarding Wilson’s own 

case. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

112

Cal.App.4th at pp. 224–225 [the hearing for Awad’s uncontested 

petition was estimated to require 15 minutes, a relevant factor

in favor of the stay and remand].) Wilson states that he will 

present evidence from both lay and expert witnesses in support 

of his claim of juror misconduct. He also indicates he will seek 

discovery under section 745, subdivision (d), to obtain 

information to show the disproportionate imposition of the 

death penalty on people of color in San Bernardino County. The 

RJA proceeding may thus generate discovery disputes and 

attendant delays. In short, a limited remand to pursue RJA 

claims in the trial court is not likely to be practically very 

limited. 

We recognize that Wilson is willing to tolerate — indeed, 

perhaps may favor — delaying the final resolution of his appeal 

while he litigates his RJA claims in superior court. But we must 

also consider the interests of victims’ families, witnesses, and 

the public as well. (E.g., Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(9)

[crime victims are entitled to “a prompt and final conclusion of 

the case and any related post-judgment proceedings”].) 

Consideration of these interests counsels against further 

delaying the resolution of Wilson’s appeal when he has not 

demonstrated that it is necessary to do so.

Wilson also invokes judicial economy, noting that success 

on his RJA claims could moot some or all the issues raised on 

direct appeal. As a general matter, of course, the reverse is also 

true, that success on a direct appeal could render RJA 

proceedings unnecessary. And as just described, RJA 

proceedings, with an appropriate showing, may require 

protracted discovery, other difficulties in obtaining and 

presenting evidence, and an evidentiary hearing potentially 

broad in scope. Under the circumstances, considerations of 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

113

judicial economy do not persuade us that a stay and remand is 

warranted.

3. Conclusion

Ultimately, Wilson has not demonstrated that he faces 

legal or practical obstacles to pursuing RJA relief in superior 

court that would be avoided by staying adjudication and final 

resolution of the claims he has raised on direct appeal and 

remanding his case to initiate RJA proceedings. As such, Wilson 

has not established good cause for us to depart from our usual 

practice of adjudicating what we can based on the record before 

us and deferring matters that require substantial factual 

development for presentation through a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus.

The concurrent jurisdiction afforded to habeas corpus 

petitions raising RJA claims, the opportunity, after the 

appointment of full-scope capital habeas counsel, to raise nonRJA claims challenging a death judgment without a successive 

procedural bar, and OSPD’s ability and willingness to develop 

and present Wilson’s RJA extrarecord claims, all mean that this 

usual practice will not prevent Wilson from seeking prompt 

relief for violations of the RJA or undermine the Legislature’s 

clearly expressed urgency to remedy racial discrimination in the 

criminal justice system. A stay and limited remand, or a 

remand without a stay, are not necessary in these circumstances 

to ensure efficient and effective access to RJA proceedings. We 

therefore deny Wilson’s motion for a stay of his appeal and 

limited remand to pursue extrarecord RJA claims and deny his 

alternate request of a remand without a stay.

We emphasize that our holding today is limited. In 

concluding that the RJA does not automatically authorize a stay 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

114

and remand in all pending criminal appeals in which colorable 

RJA claims may be raised on evidence that has not yet been 

developed, we do not suggest that a stay and remand is 

categorically unavailable. We recognize that it may be 

necessary to employ the procedure in some cases to permit the 

timely and effective development of extrarecord RJA claims in 

superior court. The determination whether there is good cause 

for a stay and remand will depend on the circumstances of the 

case at hand. In resolving Wilson’s motion, we have addressed 

the concerns he has raised that relate to his own case; we do not 

reach other issues or concerns not presently before us.23 

23 We also have no occasion here to provide an exhaustive 

catalog of other considerations that may be relevant in 

subsequent cases. For purposes of future guidance, however, we 

note that the analysis will likely be different in cases unlike this 

one, in which the RJA claims are intertwined with issues on 

appeal. In such cases, appellants lose the option of pursuing 

them concurrently in a habeas petition. (In re Carpenter, supra, 

9 Cal.4th at p. 646.) The utility of a stay and remand in such 

cases accordingly may be greater. In those circumstances, the 

stay-and-remand procedure could alleviate significant delay —

particularly in capital cases at an early stage of appellate 

proceedings — by making it unnecessary to wait for conclusion 

of the appeal before pursuing RJA claims. The analysis may 

also be different in noncapital cases in which the claimed RJA 

violations carry the possibility of release, and cases in which 

delay may jeopardize the preservation of evidence needed to 

make out an RJA violation. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

115

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The motion for a stay and 

limited remand is denied.

 KRUGER, J.

We Concur:

GUERRERO, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.
1

PEOPLE v. WILSON

S118775

Dissenting Opinion by Justice Evans

Ironically — in the first case in which this court addresses 

the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA) (Stats. 2020, 

ch. 317) — the majority effectively deprives capital litigants of 

access to the procedure it expressly provides for seeking timely 

relief. A central reason the Legislature enacted the RJA was 

that “[c]urrent law, as interpreted by the courts, stands in sharp 

contrast to [the] Legislature’s commitment to ‘ameliorate biasbased injustice in the courtroom,’ ” with “[c]urrent legal 

precedent often result[ing] in courts sanctioning racism in 

criminal trials.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subds. (g), (d).) The 

majority supplants the Legislature’s demand to swiftly rid the 

criminal justice system of racism with a novel and unnecessary 

RJA-specific habeas path that, as the Legislature was well 

aware, is riddled with delay because of the difficulty of 

appointing habeas counsel and processing capital habeas 

claims. As explained below, this approach is untethered to the 

statute’s text or legislative history, and undermines the 

Legislature’s stated purpose. 

Javance Mickey Wilson was convicted in 2002 of murder 

and robbery of Andres Dominguez; murder and attempted 

robbery of Victor Henderson; and robbery, carjacking, and 

attempted murder of James R. His second jury sentenced him 

to death. In 2020, the Legislature enacted the RJA, requiring 

the remediation of racism in all its forms in our criminal justice 

system. In March 2023, Wilson filed a motion in this court 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

2

requesting that we stay his appeal and remand the matter to 

superior court for litigation of two claims under the RJA: one 

claim based on a juror telling other jurors during penalty phase 

deliberations that the severe childhood abuse and neglect 

Wilson endured was “cultural” and typical in African American 

families; and the other alleging racial disparities in charging 

and sentencing practices in capital cases in San Bernardino 

County.

The question is whether Wilson has established good 

cause for a stay and remand under the RJA. I would hold that 

he has. The Legislature created an express stay-and-remand 

mechanism for appellate defendants to litigate their RJA 

claims. (Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (b) (section 745(b)).)1 Since 

Wilson sets forth nonfrivolous RJA claims that require further 

factual development, he has established good cause for a stay 

and remand under the RJA. Even if the good cause standard of 

section 1260 applies, as the majority concludes, Wilson has 

demonstrated a stay and remand is needed because it is “just 

under the circumstances.” The Legislature said as much. 

Leaving the concerns about procedural bars aside — some of 

which the majority addresses — the fact that a capital 

defendant could technically pursue a limited-scope RJA habeas 

claim at any time during their appeal or upon its finality fails to 

account for serious practical obstacles and does not justify 

overriding legislative intent. Thus, I would grant Wilson’s 

request for a stay and remand — or in the very least, grant his 

request for a conditional affirmance of the judgment and a 

1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

3

limited remand — to pursue his RJA claims. With respect, I 

dissent. 

I.

The California Racial Justice Act & Its Stay-and-Remand 

Mechanism

In enacting the RJA, the Legislature declared: “We cannot 

simply accept the stark reality that race pervades our system of 

justice. Rather, we must acknowledge and seek to remedy that 

reality and create a fair system of justice that upholds our 

democratic ideals.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (b).) The 

Legislature sought to address the “deleterious effect” racial bias 

has “on our system of justice as a whole,” that “undermines 

public confidence in the fairness of the state’s system of justice 

and deprives Californians of equal justice under law.” (Id., § 2, 

subd. (a).) It observed that “[e]ven though racial bias is widely 

acknowledged as intolerable in our criminal justice system, it 

nevertheless persists because courts generally only address 

racial bias in its most extreme and blatant forms.” (Id., § 2, 

subd. (c).) The Legislature squarely rejected “[e]xisting 

precedent” that not only “tolerates the use of racially incendiary 

or racially coded language, images, and racial stereotypes in 

criminal trials” but also “accepts racial disparities in our 

criminal justice system as inevitable.” (Id., § 2, subds. (e), (f).) 

It rejected the legal doctrines that have been used to bar relief, 

deeming them improperly animated by “ ‘a fear of too much 

justice.’ ” (Id., § 2, subd. (f), quoting McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 

481 U.S. 279, 339 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.).) In embarking on a 

different path, the Legislature announced its “intent . . . to 

eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system” 

and “remedy the harm to the defendant’s case and to the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

4

integrity of the judicial system” so as “to ensure that race plays 

no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in 

sentencing.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (i).) 

The Legislature’s intent “to actively work to eradicate” 

racial disparities in the criminal justice system (Stats. 2020, ch. 

317, § 2, subd. (i)) was subsequently extended in 2022 to existing 

judgments (Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 1), putting those under a 

judgment of death at the front of the line. (See § 745, subd. 

(j)(2).) The Legislature deemed it “ ‘imperative that we afford a 

mechanism for retroactive relief so our criminal justice system 

can begin to reckon with systemic racism and correct past 

injustices.’ ” (Assem. Conc. in Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 

256 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 24, 2022, p. 4.) 

Defendants had been waiting far “ ‘too long’ ” for this relief. 

(Ibid.) Indeed, “ ‘[t]hose with prior, racially biased convictions 

and sentences deserve equal justice under the law and have 

waited.’ ” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d 

reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 256 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) 

as amended Aug. 24, 2022, p. 12, italics added.) 

Last year, the Legislature added the stay-and-remand 

provision to section 745(b). Specifically, the RJA was amended 

to provide a defendant “may . . . move to stay the appeal and 

request remand to the superior court.” (§ 745(b).) The 

Legislature added the stay-and-remand provision to section 

745(b) “ ‘to ensure that the basic civil rights protections provided 

by the RJA can be accessed in an efficient and effective 

manner.’ ” (Sen. Rules Com., 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill 

No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 18, 2023, p. 

6; see also Assem. Conc. in Sen. Amends., Assem. Bill No. 1118 

(2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 18, 2023, p. 1 [“ ‘to 

ensure RJA claims are processed more efficiently and that the 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

5

intent of the law is followed’ ”].) According to the Legislature, 

“[t]his stay and remand procedure was designed ‘to permit the 

trial court to rule on the claim in the first instance, and to allow 

the parties to fully litigate the issue.’ [Citations.] Therefore, it 

appears the Legislature intended the stay and remand 

procedure to be available in cases that need further factual 

development.” (People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 

817.)

The Legislature deemed the stay-and-remand mechanism 

“particularly important for individuals with death sentences,” 

since these individuals — like Wilson — are “unlikely to have 

habeas attorneys assigned to them due to the unavailability of 

qualified counsel, making it nearly impossible to litigate their 

RJA claims in a timely fashion.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, 

Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1118 (2023‒2024 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended May 18, 2023, p. 6.) For capital defendants, access to 

these remedies is a matter of life or death. (§ 745, subd. (e)(3).)

II.

Wilson Has Demonstrated Good Cause Pursuant to the RJA’s 

Stay-and-Remand Procedure

The stay-and-remand procedure in section 745(b) 

authorizes a remand to the superior court for RJA proceedings. 

By including an express provision, section 745(b) itself provides 

the “ ‘ “ ‘established procedural rule’ ” ’ ” for stay requests under 

the RJA. (People v. Awad (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 215, 222 

(Awad).) Since section 745(b)’s stay-and-remand provision 

establishes an independent source of authority, we need not look 

beyond the section for such authority. 

In contrast, for example, Proposition 47 (the Safe 

Neighborhoods and Schools Act), which reduced certain 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

6

nonviolent property crimes and drug offenses to misdemeanors, 

did not contain an express stay-and-remand provision. (See 

§ 1170.18; maj. opn., ante, at pp. 92–94.) Unlike the RJA, 

nothing in the terms of Proposition 47 vested authority in the 

appellate courts to stay and remand a matter to apply the 

ameliorative benefits of the initiative. Accordingly, courts 

necessarily looked to section 1260 to fill in the gap. Specifically, 

courts “construe[d] Proposition 47 together with section 1260 to 

authorize a limited remand to the trial court to hear a 

postconviction motion to recall a sentence under section 

1170.18.” (Awad, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 222.) Similarly, 

courts have acknowledged that reviewing courts can order a stay 

and limited remand pursuant to section 1260 to allow the 

superior court to rule on a petition invoking the benefits of 

Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which also does not 

contain an express stay-and-remand provision. (See People v. 

Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 729, citing Awad, at p. 222; 

People v. Cervantes (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 213, 226 [same]; see 

also § 1172.6 [formerly § 1170.95].)

When the Legislature added the stay-and-remand 

procedure to the RJA, it did not state whether a showing of good 

cause is required, nor define what constitutes good cause under 

that provision. The language of section 745(b) — that a 

defendant “may . . . move to stay the appeal and request remand 

to the superior court” (italics added) — suggests that a stay and 

remand is not automatic upon request and that there must be 

some cause to stay a pending appeal and remand the matter. 

The question remains what constitutes good cause under section 

745(b). 

Based on the legislative history related to section 745(b), 

defendants in Wilson’s position — who have viable RJA claims 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

7

requiring further factual development — have shown good 

cause for a stay and remand to efficiently litigate their RJA 

claims. The RJA is a remedial statute, and we must construe it 

liberally to promote its protective purpose. (See Pineda v. 

Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 532.) That 

purpose is to rid the criminal justice system of the scourge of 

racism as efficiently and effectively as possible. The Legislature 

created the stay-and-remand procedure to afford defendants the 

swift opportunity to engage in further factual development of 

their RJA claims. In contrast, the habeas provision of section 

1473, subdivision (e) exists for defendants whose appeal is final, 

for defendants whose RJA claims need no further factual 

development, and for defendants who elect not to request a stay 

and remand for whatever reason (e.g., so their appellate claims 

will be addressed first or for noncapital defendants who want to 

have counsel pursuant to an RJA-qualified appointment). 

Where a defendant presents a nonfrivolous RJA claim requiring 

factual development and elects to utilize the stay-and-remand 

mechanism, good cause has been shown. Since Wilson has done 

just that, I would grant his request. 

III.

Even If Section 1260’s Cause Standard Applies, Wilson Has 

Demonstrated Good Cause Under That Standard

The majority writes the RJA’s stay-and-remand 

mechanism out of the statute and supplants it with section 

1260’s good cause standard. Section 1260 generally confers 

authority on appellate courts to “remand the cause to the trial 

court for such further proceedings as may be just under the 

circumstances.” Viewing section 745(b) as if it contains no stayand-remand provision would render its stay-and-remand 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

8

procedure mere surplusage, which we must avoid. (See Hudec 

v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 815, 828.) Had the 

Legislature intended section 1260 to apply, there would have 

been no need to include a separate stay-and-remand provision 

in section 745(b). It could have simply referred to section 1260 

or not said anything at all about the stay-and-remand 

mechanism.

Even if section 1260’s cause showing applies, the inquiry 

is whether a stay of the appeal and remand for further 

proceedings are “just under the circumstances.” What is “just 

under the circumstances” necessarily depends on the specific 

circumstances of the case and context. The term “good cause” 

can mean different things in different contexts. (See, e.g., 

Laraway v. Sutro & Co. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 266, 274; Young 

v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 158 [“ ‘ “[t]he term 

‘good cause’ is not susceptible of precise definition.” ’ [Citation.] 

This chameleon-like phrase takes on different meanings in 

different contexts”].) When evaluating what good cause means 

“in a particular context, . . . courts utilize common sense based 

upon the totality of the circumstances. Those circumstances 

include the purpose of the underlying statutory scheme.” 

(Laraway, at p. 274.) 

The Legislature designed section 745(b)’s stay-andremand mechanism with the singular aim that viable RJA 

claims be processed efficiently and effectively — to ensure 

defendants are not relegated to waiting for equal justice under 

the law. Here, Wilson presents two plausible RJA claims. 

Success on either claim would make Wilson ineligible for the 

death penalty. (§ 745, subd. (e)(3).) This fact weighs heavily in 

favor of granting a stay and remand under section 745(b). He 

also has shown that remanding the matter to the trial court 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

9

before deciding the appeal is likely to result in a (much) more 

expeditious resolution of his RJA claims than subjecting him to 

the habeas quandary. As the Attorney General recognizes, the 

RJA was intended to facilitate pursuit of RJA claims “as quickly 

as possible.” With a stay and remand under the RJA, Wilson 

would have access to counsel under the purview of his current 

counsel’s appellate appointment. In contrast, as Wilson astutely 

notes, “the mechanism for appointment of counsel to represent 

a capital client in habeas corpus proceedings limited to RJA 

issues is, at best, unclear.” Thus, Wilson has demonstrated a 

stay and remand are “just under the circumstances” (§ 1260) 

and shown good cause. 

In evaluating what is “just under the circumstances” 

(§ 1260), the majority crafts a balancing test for good cause 

without any textual support in the RJA or its legislative history. 

The majority requires defendants seeking a stay and remand to 

prove there are “practical reasons in a particular case why the 

usual appellate process must be altered to ensure timely and 

effective access to RJA remedies.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 84; see 

also id. at p. 99 [“a court must consider whether there are 

unusual circumstances that give rise to pressing concerns 

warranting a departure from the usual conduct of an appeal”].) 

Neither this proposed test nor the majority’s application of it to 

Wilson’s case complies with the RJA’s mandate: to expeditiously 

vindicate a defendant’s rights under the RJA. Contrary to the 

Legislature’s policy choice, the majority favors expeditious 

resolution of Wilson’s appellate claims over all else. Such 

favoring “stands in sharp contrast to th[e] Legislature’s 

commitment to ‘ameliorate bias-based injustice in the 

courtroom’ ” and the judicial “sanctioning [of] racism in criminal 

trials.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subds. (d), (g).) 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

10

The prospect that proceedings to vindicate rights under 

the RJA may be “potentially quite involved” (maj. opn., ante, at 

p. 111) was known to the Legislature at the time it enacted the 

stay-and-remand procedure. Yet the Legislature nonetheless 

believed the stay-and-remand mechanism was “particularly 

important” for capital defendants like Wilson, given the high 

stakes and the time these defendants have been waiting to 

vindicate their rights. 

The RJA is different from the statutes at issue in the cases 

relied upon by the majority. Those cases demonstrate there is a 

different calibration for good cause in the context of the RJA 

favoring a stay and remand here. As noted above, the statutes 

at issue in the cases cited by the majority do not contain express 

stay-and-remand provisions as the RJA does — much less one 

included for the explicit purpose of efficiently and effectively 

resolving claims brought under the statute. In the RJA, the 

Legislature has included a specific stay-and-remand procedure 

and prioritized swift resolution of viable claims over possible 

delay in the finality of appeals. Additionally, unlike the RJA, 

the statutes at issue in the cases relied upon by the majority did 

not involve basic civil rights protections. It would be a category 

error to analogize the stay-and-remand procedure here — which 

facilitates the RJA’s anti-discrimination purpose — to the stayand-remand procedure for recent sentencing reform measures, 

which were enacted merely as “an act of grace and mercy.” 

(People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 716.)

As emphasized by the Legislature, the fact that Wilson is 

a capital defendant carries particular significance and weight in 

the good cause assessment. When the Legislature extended the 

RJA to all defendants, it stated that that these remedies are to 

be expeditious, efficient, and effective. But as to capital 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

11

defendants, in particular, the Legislature instituted the stayand-remand procedure to avoid the extended delays in capital 

appointments. (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Assem. 

Bill No. 1118, supra, as amended May 18, 2023, p. 6.) The 

Legislature was responding to and accounting for the significant 

and serious obstacles capital defendants face in securing 

qualified counsel. It specifically recognized the existence of 

troubling delays in the appointment of qualified capital habeas 

counsel notwithstanding the existing appointment provision of 

section 1473, subdivision (e). While the Legislature viewed 

section 1473, subdivision (e) inadequate for addressing RJA 

claims, the majority considers it sufficient. (See maj. opn., ante, 

at pp. 106, 110–111.) Despite the majority’s recognition that we 

must consider “practical reasons” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 84) why 

a stay and remand may be needed to ensure timely and effective 

access to RJA remedies, it discounts the practical circumstances 

to which the Legislature was responding. 

It is well known, especially to this court, that there is a 

dearth of qualified counsel and funding for capital 

appointments. There are yearslong delays in the appointment 

of counsel for direct appeals and habeas corpus petitions, and 

those delays are particularly protracted in the appointment of 

habeas counsel. (Cal. Com. on the Fair Admin. of Justice, Final 

Report (2008) p. 114 (Commission Report) [“The system is 

plagued with excessive delay in the appointments of counsel for 

direct appeals and habeas corpus petitions”].) “On average in 

California, it takes three to five years after a death judgment to 

appoint appellate counsel. [Citation.] In April 2016, there were 

49 capital defendants waiting for attorneys to be appointed for 

direct appeals and 360 capital defendants waiting for attorneys 

to be appointed for habeas corpus petitions. [Citation.] About 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

12

half of those waiting for appointment of habeas corpus counsel 

have been waiting for over 10 years. [Citation.]” (Briggs v. 

Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 864 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) (Briggs); 

see People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1062–1067 (conc. opn. 

of Liu, J.) (Potts).) “On average, it takes 20 years for state 

habeas counsel to be appointed after someone is sentenced to 

death. There are 363 death-sentenced people awaiting initial 

appointment of counsel for state habeas litigation, more than 

half of all people sentenced to death in California. Eighty-five 

people on death row have been waiting for appointment of 

habeas counsel for more than 20 years.” (Com. on Revision of 

the Pen. Code, Death Penalty Report (Nov. 2021) p. 32 (Death 

Penalty Report) <http://www.clrc.ca.gov/CRPC/Pub/Reports/

CRPC_DPR.pdf> [as of Aug. 5, 2024]; see also Habeas Corpus 

Resource Center (HCRC), Annual Report (2023) p. 19 (HCRC 

Report) [“In total, there are 410 people awaiting the 

appointment of habeas corpus counsel in the California courts”] 

<http://www.hcrc.ca.gov/documents/HCRC%20Annual%20Repo

rt%202023.pdf> [as of Aug. 5, 2024]; all Internet citations in this 

opinion are archived by year, docket number and case name at 

<http:// www.courts.ca.gov/38324.htm>.)

Much of the delay in appointing capital counsel has been 

attributed to a lack of qualified counsel and funding. (Death 

Penalty Report, supra, at p. 32 [“The main reason for these 

delays [in capital proceedings] is a lack of qualified attorneys to 

handle state habeas corpus proceedings”]; HCRC Report, supra, 

at p. 23 [noting the attribution of the backlog to “the acute 

shortage of qualified, competent attorneys willing and able to 

accept appointments in habeas corpus proceedings”].) “The 

California death penalty costs the state approximately $150 

million per year. Even with those costs, the state is not spending 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

13

enough money: people sentenced to death routinely wait 

decades to be assigned post-conviction lawyers because the state 

does not pay for more attorneys.” (Death Penalty Report, supra, 

at p. 31; see Commission Report, supra, at pp. 132–135 [as part 

of the commission’s recommendation for the State to commit to 

an annual investment of at least $95 million dollars per year, 

the commission recommended a 500 percent increase in HCRC’s 

budget and a 33 percent increase in the Office of the State Public 

Defender’s budget to address the unavailability of capital 

counsel]; Death Penalty Information Center, NEW VOICES: 

California’s New Chief Justice Calls Death Penalty System 

Ineffective (Dec. 27, 2011) <https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/

new-voices-californias-new-chief-justice-calls-death-penaltysystem-ineffective> [as of Aug. 5, 2024] [quoting former Chief 

Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye’s statement that the death penalty 

system needs “structural change, and we don’t have the money 

to create the kind of change that is needed”]; see also Potts, 

supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 1062–1067 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.); Briggs, 

supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 864–865 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) 

There is no indication that these barriers to accessing 

qualified capital counsel and funding disappear in the context of 

a limited-scope habeas appointment for a capital defendant. 

(See Death Penalty Report, supra, at p. 31 [“The Judicial 

Council of California recently estimated and sought additional 

annual funding of more than $18 million to cover Proposition 66 

costs. This funding request was not granted”]; id. at p. 32 [“by 

requiring that Superior Courts process habeas cases in the first 

instance, Proposition 66 created an additional level of review: 

either side may appeal the habeas decision of the Superior Court 

and new counsel must then be appointed in the Court of 

Appeals”]; HCRC Report, supra, at p. 19 [“the courts have 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

14

generally stayed habeas corpus appeals because no competent 

authority has indicated the funds from which appellate counsel 

in habeas corpus proceedings will be compensated or the rate at 

which counsel will be compensated. Some superior courts have 

taken the same approach”].) In enacting the RJA’s stay-andremand provision, the Legislature assumed these obstacles 

persist and we have no reason otherwise to question its 

judgment. (But see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 105–111.) 

Nonetheless, the majority effectively has set a policy regarding 

capital habeas-related appointments and assumes — without 

any basis — that the funding needed to implement this policy is 

available or will somehow materialize.

The majority also fails to explain why a limited-scope RJA 

capital habeas appointment does not require compliance with 

California Rules of Court qualifications. (§ 1473.1 

[“Appointment standards for counsel where an individual has 

been sentenced to death shall be consistent with existing 

standards set forth in the California Rules of Court” (italics 

added)].) California Rules of Court, rule 8.652(a) “defines the 

minimum qualifications for attorneys to be appointed by a court 

to represent a person in a habeas corpus proceeding related to a 

sentence of death.” California Rules of Court, rule 8.605(f), 

defining minimum qualifications for capital appellate case 

appointments, incorporates rule 8.652 requirements for 

appointments of appellate counsel in death penalty-related 

habeas corpus proceedings. It appears that, since limited-scope 

RJA capital habeas is a death penalty-related habeas corpus 

proceeding, the appointment standards set forth in California 

Rules of Court, rule 8.652 would apply to limited-scope habeas 

appointments. The majority does not explain why this is not the 

case. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

15

The majority next fails to address whether superior courts 

can prioritize appointing capital habeas counsel for RJA 

proceedings over appointing capital habeas counsel for the 

oldest judgments of death. California Rules of Court, rule 4.561, 

establishes the mechanism for superior courts to appoint 

counsel “in death penalty-related habeas corpus proceedings” 

and requires, as a matter of equity, that superior courts 

prioritize capital habeas appointments for the oldest judgments 

of death. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.561; see also id., rule 

4.561(e)(1), (2) [noting superior court must make “the findings 

required by Government Code section 68662” for appointments 

in death penalty-related habeas corpus proceedings and 

appointments must be “from the statewide panel of counsel 

compiled under rule 4.562(d)(4)”].) Thus, limited-scope RJA 

habeas appointments may suffer from the same practical 

realities and profound barriers that pervade capital 

appointments generally. (See Death Penalty Report, p. 31 [due 

to the financial costs and delays of capital proceedings, the 

former Chief Justice Ronald George “diagnosed California’s 

system as ‘dysfunctional’ and called it a ‘charade’ ”].) The 

majority’s failure to explain which rules for appointment do and 

do not apply is particularly troubling given that both the 

Legislature and the Advisory Committee to the Judicial Council 

appear to assume that existing capital habeas qualifications do

apply to RJA habeas appointment in capital cases. (Sen. Com. 

on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1118 (2023‒2024 

Reg. Sess.) as amended May 18, 2023, p. 6 [deeming the stayand-remand mechanism “particularly important for individuals 

with death sentences,” since these individuals are “unlikely to 

have habeas attorneys assigned to them due to the 

unavailability of qualified counsel, making it nearly impossible 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

16

to litigate their RJA claims in a timely fashion”]; Judicial 

Council of Cal., Criminal Law Advisory Com., Invitation to 

Comment, W24-02 (2024) Criminal Procedure: Appointment of 

Counsel for Claims Filed Under Penal Code Section 1473(f), p. 4 

[electing to not develop RJA qualifications in capital cases, 

“given that qualifications for counsel in death penalty habeas 

proceedings are quite extensive and already difficult to meet”] 

<https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/w24-02.pdf> [as of Aug. 

5, 2024].) With today’s opinion, superior courts have no clear 

guidance from this court as to whether any particular courtappointed capital appellate counsel will meet the RJA capital 

habeas qualifications. All that superior courts will know is that 

“Wilson’s counsel . . . indisputably meet[s] them.” (Maj. opn., 

ante, at p. 110.)

Rather than addressing the Legislature’s concerns about 

capital defendants accessing qualified counsel, the majority 

assumes staying the appellate proceedings is unnecessary by 

relying on the fact that Wilson is represented by the Office of 

the State Public Defender (OSPD) on appeal. The majority 

explains capital defendants can pursue their RJA claims in a 

habeas proceeding separately from their comprehensive habeas 

petition (without tripping any future successiveness bars) and 

posits that Wilson’s appellate counsel can represent him in that 

limited-scope RJA only habeas proceeding. I have no reason to 

doubt that OSPD would meet the qualifications for such an 

appointment under the California Rules of Court, and OSPD has 

given no indication otherwise. But there are several readily 

apparent reasons the majority’s reliance on OSPD’s ability to 

represent Wilson in a limited-purpose RJA is misguided. 

In Wilson’s case, there undoubtedly will be obstacles and 

attendant delays for OSPD to be appointed in this limited 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

17

capacity by the superior court. (See Death Penalty Report, 

supra, at p. 32 [“under Proposition 66, Superior Courts are now 

in charge of appointing habeas counsel instead of the California 

Supreme Court. But no new habeas cases have been assigned 

since the passage of Proposition 66 and only three new attorneys 

have been included in the pool of qualified capital habeas 

counsel”].) In addition to lack of funding, experts have 

expressed concern that “many Superior Courts are not familiar 

with state habeas corpus law” and anticipate “it will likely take 

longer for Superior Courts to adjudicate capital habeas claims.” 

(Id. at p. 33.) 

HCRC reports that, as of 2023, it has only been appointed 

by the superior court in one case, and other than HCRC, only 

“four attorneys licensed to practice in California are qualified 

under the California Rules of Court to represent petitioners in 

their habeas corpus proceedings.” (HCRC Report, supra, at p. 

19, citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.652; see HCRC Report, at 

p. 34 [“Proposition 66 has ground state habeas appointments 

nearly to a halt. Just one of the over 360 people who were 

awaiting the appointment of habeas corpus counsel for their 

initial state habeas proceedings at the time Proposition 66 

became effective have been appointed counsel”].) 

Even if we were to assume these obstacles are 

surmountable — that enough funding is available and the 

delays in appointment of RJA-limited habeas counsel are 

relatively marginal in comparison to the delays in capital 

proceedings — Wilson’s appeal will soon be final, at which point 

OSPD’s capital appellate appointment will end. With OSPD’s 

appellate appointment ending, Wilson will become what is 

known as a Morgan petitioner (In re Morgan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 

932): a capital defendant whose appeal is final and is awaiting 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

18

appointment of state habeas counsel. The California Appellate 

Project (CAP), who assists Morgan petitioners for the limited 

purpose of ensuring future habeas claims are properly 

preserved, reports in its amicus curiae letter that there are 

roughly 140 of these capital defendants. As OSPD is appointed 

counsel in roughly half of capital appeals with counsel, we can 

deduce that roughly half of the Morgan petitioners were OSPD’s 

former clients on appeal.

In relying on OSPD to represent Wilson in an RJA-limited 

habeas proceeding that “is not likely to be practically very 

limited” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 112), the majority effectively 

charges OSPD with a Herculean task: to provide representation 

in RJA habeas proceedings to its current capital appellate 

clients and its former clients who are awaiting appointment of 

capital habeas counsel for their comprehensive habeas petition, 

while simultaneously providing vigorous, timely, and efficient 

representation in their clients’ capital appeals. It is possible, I 

suppose, that CAP could assist Morgan petitioners in this RJA 

habeas appointment vacuum too. But charging OSPD with the 

aforementioned appointments and attendant professional 

responsibilities and obligations demands a significant financial 

investment in staffing and resources for capital appointments 

and proceedings — an investment that has been repeatedly 

called for but never made. (See, e.g., HCRC Report, supra, at p. 

24 [noting HCRC’s recent request to fund 70 new positions was 

denied].) 

In addition, the majority fails to appreciate that half of 

capital appellate appointments are court-appointed private 

counsel, not OSPD. CAP, who provides support to courtappointed, private capital appellate counsel in roughly 140 of 

the 220 capital cases with direct appeal appointments, raises 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

19

serious questions as to whether those appellate attorneys can 

satisfy the appointment requirements in order to represent their 

clients in a limited-purpose habeas petition under section 1473, 

subdivision (e). It is possible that those court-appointed private 

counsel who do not qualify for capital habeas appointments (see 

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.652), may be able to associate with 

counsel who would qualify (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.605(f)), which presumably includes CAP. But, again, given the 

appointment delays and funding issues in capital proceedings, 

we cannot rely on CAP to perform that Herculean task either, 

without a significant ongoing investment in its staffing and 

resources. Instead of CAP filling in that vacuum, it is more 

likely that the difference in court-appointed private counsel and 

public counsel will contribute to a two-tiered system between 

capital defendants with court-appointed public counsel and 

those with court-appointed private counsel — one that may 

violate the equal protection rights of capital petitioners. (See, 

e.g., Jones v. Chappell (C.D.Cal. 2014) 31 F.Supp.3d 1050, 1057–

1058, revd. sub nom. Jones v. Davis (9th Cir. 2015) 806 F.3d 538 

[petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred].) 

This court is responsible for paying court-appointed 

private capital counsel for RJA related work under section 745 

and 1473, subdivision (f), with the $2.15 million provided to us 

by the Legislature as part of the Budget Act of 2023. (Assem.

Bill No. 102 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2023, ch. 38, § 1, eff. 

July 10, 2023; see also ibid. [$500,000 available to the California 

Supreme Court to contract with CAP on RJA related work 

pursuant to sections 745 and 1473, subd. (f), to “supplement” 

existing funding].) These funds were allocated for capital 

counsel to develop and litigate RJA claims. (See Assem. Bill No. 

102, supra, § 1 [funds are to be spent on “experts, investigators, 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

20

paralegals, or other ancillary needs” in order “to provide 

assistance in capital cases regarding potential or actual 

claims”]; see also id., § 231 [$3.1 million to OSPD for RJA 

related work in capital cases for similar expenses].) I doubt the 

Legislature intended this court and capital counsel to waste the 

funds on court-created procedural hurdles, such as the one the 

majority creates with its opinion today. While it appears the 

funding is sufficient to pay court-appointed private capital 

counsel for work related to RJA proceedings at this time, the 

funding will expire in June 2026, at which time the funding 

source for paying court-appointed private capital counsel is 

unclear. (See Assem. Bill No. 102, supra, § 1 [“These funds shall 

be available for encumbrance or expenditure until June 30, 

2026”].) Since the majority’s departure from the 

straightforward mechanism the Legislature provided will likely 

result in significant delays in disposing of stay and remand 

requests, capital defendants may not be able to litigate the 

merits of their RJA claims until after the funds allocated for this 

purpose have expired. 

The majority claims Wilson has not shown “he faces legal 

or practical obstacles” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 113) in accessing 

RJA relief pursuant to a habeas petition. But Wilson did

present a significant and documented obstacle in his letter 

following oral argument: that “the appointment of capital 

counsel to represent a capital client in habeas proceedings has 

essentially ground to a halt.” It is unclear how Wilson (or 

others) will overcome this reality or how they could satisfy the 

majority’s newly articulated burden of proving what “legal or 

practical obstacles” they may face. Today’s opinion places 

Wilson and future litigants in an absurd predicament — one 

that the Legislature by its own words did not intend and indeed 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

21

sought to avoid. Prior to seeking a stay and remand, was Wilson 

expected to predict that his motion before this court would be 

futile and thus seek appointment in the superior court — in the 

very forum where appointments have “ground to a halt” — so he 

could report to the court about the delays he personally 

experienced? The majority faults Wilson for failing to anticipate 

various other “concrete obstacles” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 111, fn. 

22) that today’s decision erects and dismisses the serious 

practical considerations already raised by Wilson and amici 

curiae — and undisputed by the Attorney General — as “beyond 

the scope of [its] decision.” (Id., at p. 110, fn. 21.) But cabining 

these obstacles does not vanish them. 

The majority’s approach injects delay, avoids addressing 

the issue of counsel qualification requirements, and does not 

utilize earmarked funding allocated to this court and capital 

counsel for RJA related work. Most troubling, it allows for the 

affirmance of death sentences even where nonfrivolous claims 

have been raised about racial bias that, if proven, would require 

vacating the conviction and sentence and prohibit the 

prosecution from seeking death. It does not make sense from a 

judicial economy perspective to affirm an appeal in such 

instances and is not what the Legislature contemplated when it 

included an express stay-and-remand provision in the RJA. 

Instead, the stay-and-remand procedure provides a clear, 

prompt, and efficient means of evaluating claims of racial bias. 

Additionally, a stay and remand could effectively take cases out 

of the overburdened, automatic capital appeal pipeline. In cases 

like Wilson’s where such claims can be addressed within the 

scope of his appeal, it makes sense to do so before an appeal is 

final where possible. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

22

The majority suggests “further delaying the resolution of 

Wilson’s appeal” is against “the interests of victims’ families, 

witnesses, and the public.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 112, citing Cal. 

Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(9).) This is an unduly narrow 

understanding of the societal and victims’ interests at stake. 

Article I, section 28 of the California Constitution provides that 

crime victims are entitled to “a prompt and final conclusion of 

the case and any related postjudgment proceedings.” (Id., subd. 

(b)(9), italics added; see also id., subd. (b)(6).) It is not solely 

focused on the resolution of an automatic appeal, but on 

postjudgment proceedings generally. As explained, the majority 

injects additional delay into the resolution of post-judgment 

RJA proceedings by relegating capital defendants to litigate 

their RJA claims on habeas when those claims would be resolved 

more promptly on appeal. Put simply, the majority’s novel RJA 

habeas path does not advance victims’ interests in prompt 

resolution of capital proceedings. 

What’s more, the RJA seeks to vindicate the interests of 

all Californians in having a criminal justice system free of racial 

bias. (See Stats 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (a) [racism in the 

system “undermines public confidence in the fairness of the 

state’s system of justice and deprives Californians of equal 

justice under law”].) The stay-and-remand mechanism was 

designed to accelerate the achievement of that goal, not to 

accelerate the processing of automatic appeals in cases that 

plausibly may be tainted by racial bias. As we have previously 

recognized, Californians value the interest of fairness above 

expediency (Briggs, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 860) and understand 

“a court’s fundamental and overriding obligation to administer 

the proceedings that are pending before it in a manner that is 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

23

consistent with the ends of justice.” (People v. Engram (2010) 

50 Cal.4th 1131, 1151.) 

Lastly, in denying Wilson’s stay and remand request, the 

majority states there will be no successiveness bars for capital 

defendants who bring a limited-scope RJA habeas petition 

separately from a comprehensive habeas petition. (Maj. opn., 

ante, at pp. 84, 86, 101–104, 106–108.) I appreciate the 

majority’s commitment to ensuring it hasn’t laid procedural 

traps for Wilson, as well as its guidance for future RJA capital 

litigants. Nevertheless, the majority’s analysis raises more 

questions than it answers. For instance, if OSPD litigates 

certain RJA claims for select current and former clients by way 

of a habeas petition, will subsequent habeas counsel be barred 

from litigating any additional RJA claims it identifies? Will this 

court more promptly address future requests for a stay and 

remand so that capital appellate defendants who are forced to 

initiate habeas proceedings may do so in a timely fashion? Will 

the Attorney General appreciate the majority’s example of 

“intertwined” RJA claims (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 114, fn. 23) 

as ones more suitable than Wilson’s for a stay and remand, or 

will he argue that remanding “intertwined” claims for further 

factual development provides defendants an impermissible 

second bite of the apple? Can a capital defendant ever show 

good cause for a stay and remand, since the majority views RJA 

proceedings as “not likely to be practically very limited” and an 

obstacle to the resolution of a capital defendant’s appeal? (Maj. 

opn., ante, at p. 112.) While the majority’s assurance it has not 

obliterated the RJA’s stay-and-remand procedure may have 

initial appeal, its approach has created an unnecessary 

procedural maze for Wilson and future litigants. 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

24

There is a certain irony in the majority’s suggestion that 

judicial economy does not support Wilson’s request when today’s 

opinion, by its own terms, opens a new field of case-by-case 

jurisprudence on what constitutes “good cause” and what sorts 

of claims are sufficiently “intertwined” to warrant a stay and 

remand. (Maj. opn., supra, at p. 114, fn. 23 [“We also have no 

occasion here to provide an exhaustive catalog of other 

considerations that may be relevant in subsequent cases. For 

purposes of future guidance, however, we note that the analysis 

will likely be different in cases unlike this one, in which the RJA 

claims are intertwined with issues on appeal”].) None of this 

forthcoming litigation and totality-of-the-circumstances 

decisionmaking under section 1260 would be necessary if the 

court simply followed the Legislature’s clear intent in enacting 

the RJA’s stay-and-remand procedure. 

One thing is clear: capital defendants on appeal who hope 

to have any chance of resolving their RJA claims in an efficient 

and expeditious manner should file their request for a stay and 

remand as soon as practically possible in the event they need to 

join the long line of those awaiting the appointment of habeas 

counsel. There may be a significant lapse in time between 

making the request and the court’s ruling, during which time 

the queue for appointment of RJA habeas counsel may grow. 

And since the majority indicates that cause for cases farther 

along in the appellate pipeline is more difficult to demonstrate 

given the interests favoring resolution of the appeal (none of 

which were noted by the Legislature in enacting the stay-andremand procedure), capital litigants may stand a better chance 

at having their request granted the sooner they make it.

In sum, OSPD and CAP cannot solve the lack-of-qualifiedcounsel conundrum of which the Legislature was rightfully 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

25

attuned. Given the remedial nature of the RJA, the 

Legislature’s commitment to swift resolution of viable RJA 

claims, and its intent to avoid delay associated with capital 

appointments, Wilson has shown a stay and remand is “just 

under the circumstances.” (§ 1260.) Thus, even if the cause 

standard of section 1260 applies, I would grant Wilson’s request 

for a stay and remand — or, in the very least, grant his request 

for a conditional affirmance and limited remand, wherein we 

conditionally affirm his judgment and remand the matter for the 

superior court to conduct RJA proceedings.

* * *

Today’s opinion departs from the Legislature’s demand to 

efficiently rid the criminal justice system of racism in all its 

forms. Despite the Legislature’s clear and urgent call, it 

effectively deems those who may have racially biased 

convictions and death sentences as undeserving of swift access 

to equal justice under the law. The majority achieves an 

affirmance of Wilson’s appeal at the cost of injecting needless 

additional delay into the death penalty system — bringing it 

even closer to collapse. (See Howe, Can California Save Its 

Death Sentences? Will Californians Save the Expense? (2012) 33 

Cardozo L.Rev. 1451, 1452 [noting former Chief Justice Ronald 

George’s warning that the death penalty system is at risk of 

“ ‘fall[ing] of its own weight’ ”]; Shafer, California’s Chief 

Justice: Hard to Say the Death Penalty Is Working (Jan. 23, 

2015) KQED [quoting former Chief Justice Tani CantilSakauye’s statement, “It’s difficult to say it’s working . . . . And 

there’s no talk in the state Legislature of fixing it”].)

Now, the Legislature is left to act once again to address 

the injustices and inefficiencies it aimed to resolve in enacting 
PEOPLE v. WILSON

Evans, J., dissenting

26

the RJA’s stay-and-remand procedure. It can do so by clarifying 

what constitutes good cause for a stay and remand under section 

745(b). Additionally, given the financial resources that will be 

required to litigate stay-and-remand requests following today’s 

opinion, I urge the Legislature to continue committing funding 

for RJA related work, particularly in capital cases. 

I respectfully dissent. 

EVANS, J.

I Concur:

LIU, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Wilson

__________________________________________________________ 

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal XX

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) 

Review Granted (unpublished) 

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________ 

Opinion No. S118775

Date Filed: August 5, 2024

__________________________________________________________ 

Court: Superior

County: San Bernardino

Judge: James A. Edwards

__________________________________________________________ 

Counsel:

Michael J. Hersek, Mary K. McComb and Galit Lipa, State Public 

Defenders, Jessica K. McGuire, Assistant State Public Defender, 

Christina Spaulding, Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Ellen J. 

Eggers and Craig Buckser, Deputy State Public Defenders, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, 

Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys 

General, Julie L. Garland and James W. Bilderback II, Assistant 

Attorneys General, Holly D. Wilkens, Meredith S. White and Donald 

W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 

publication with opinion):

Craig Buckser

Deputy State Public Defender

770 L. Street, Suite 1000

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 322-2676

Christina Spaulding

Chief Deputy State Public Defender

1111 Broadway, 10th Floor

Oakland, CA 94607

(510) 267-3300

Donald W. Ostertag

Deputy Attorney General

600 West Broadway, Suite 1800

San Diego, CA 92101

(619) 738-9557