NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

BELLA P.,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, Y.D.,

Y.D.,

Appellees

__________________________________

No. 1 CA

- JV 16

- 0141

FILED 9

- 15

- 2016

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD 510937
Th e Honorabl e Timothy Ryan

, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Jeffrey M. Zurbriggen, P.C. , Phoenix By Jeffrey M. Zurbriggen Counsel for Petitioner

/Appellant2

Arizona Attorney General’s Office

, Phoenix By Nicholas Chapman

- Hushek

C ounsel for Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined.

T H O M P S O N

, Judge:

¶1 Bella P. (grandmother) appeals from the juvenile court’s denial of her motion to intervene and her request to change physical custody of her two dependent grandchildren. Because grandmother has not shown the juvenile court abused its discretion , we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Grandmother is the maternal grandmother o f two young children adjudicated depende nt after one of the children was discovered to have had multiple fractures of the legs which occurred during a seven to

ten

- day period

. Parents denied t he abuse and variously assert ed the child’s injuries must have been caused by others

, including hospital personnel and
the rabbi w ho performed the child’s bris. They also alleged that various family members had be en present in their home. The children’s biological
parents ’ parental rights were terminated in 2014 and that determination

was affirmed on appeal in Rosabelle P. v. DCS , 2015 WL4455913

.

¶3 Between 2013

- 2015

, the children lived in multiple family placements , including with their maternal grandfather, the former husband of appellant grandmother

. The children were removed from maternal grandfather’s care after grandfather allowed continued contact with the biological parent s after the severance. He stated the children “ should be ”

wit h their mother.

¶4 In August 2015, the D epartment of C hild S afety (DCS) began the process to transfer the children’s p hysical custody to grandmother.
Grandmother had

, just two weeks before, come from her home state of New
York in order to adopt the se children. Gr andmother passed her home study. At that time, g randmother denied any prior contact w ith child protective services.IN RE: BELLA P.

Decision of the Court

3 ¶5 T he children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) objected to the placement with grandmother

. One objection was the home study was not
done on grandmother’s actual residence

, as she was onl y in Arizona temporarily

. The objection noted grandmother w as staying in an apartment where several family members, including maternal grandfather
and the biological parents, had previously lived. The GAL att ached a copy of the DCS “Assessment for Kinship Foster Care” which included

statements by grandmother that she did not believe the parents abused the
children

, but rather that the injuries had occurred during the child’s bris.
Grandmother stated that her daughter was a “loving” mother and that DCS
should not have removed th e children from her care. The court was further reminded that several family member placements had not worked out, including placement with the maternal grandfat her. The GAL advised t he
court that the children were currently in a prospective adoptive home and

h ad bonded to that family.

¶6 Before the transfer occurred , i t came to DCS’s attention that grandmother had two prior substantiated interactions with the New York child p rote ctive s ervices which she had failed to disclose. DCS successfully moved to stay the transfer. Grandmother filed a letter with the court admitting, and attempting to explain, her two prior contacts with New York
chi ld protective services.

¶7 T wo weeks la ter, grandmother appeared at a scheduled placement report and review hearing. The court voiced concerns about the situation with the children being discussed on the internet and that there

was a potential crowdfunding ef fort related to legal fees. Grandmother
denied “gossip” that she allow ed their mother interact with the children

. Grandmother was apparently escorted from the courtroom by deputies

. At the hearing it became clear the p lacement family believed that their physical
safet y was at risk. T he juve nile court advised the placement to obtain orders of protection against several of the children’s biological family
members.

¶8 Next, g randmother file d the instant motion to intervene and

a request to change physical custody. S he voiced concerns about the children’s current placement and , in her motion, provided the court with a
criminal background search that had been done on one of the pla cements, included copies of Facebook pages, and had photos of the placement letting
a child ride in the front seat whi le dropping the child at school

.

¶9 Oral argument was held solely on the motion to intervene. The request for change in physical custody was tabled until after the courtIN RE: BELLA P.

Decision of the Court

4 determined if intervention was app ropriate. The court stated that if intervention were allowed, an evidentiary hearing would be held on the issue of physical custody. Grand mother did not object.

¶10 At oral argument , DCS advised the court that the Department’s record search indicated that the biological parents mai ling
address was still the same as the physical address listed f or grandmother.

DCS objected to grandmother ’s private investigator conducting searches on the placement and standing in or around the placement’s y ard to take pictures. The GAL advised the co urt of a report from the preschool that grandmother had caused a disturbance, apparently when asked for identification, that nearly required the pol ice being called.

¶11 After taking the matter under advisement, and after review of the record, t he juvenile cou rt denied grandmother’ s motion to intervene and for change in physical custody. This timely appe al followed.

DISCUSSION

¶12 Grandmother sought permission to intervene pursuant to
Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (b)

. 1 That rule reads:

Upon timely applicati on anyone may be permitted to

intervene in an action:

1. When a statute confers a conditional right to intervene.

2. When an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.

In exercising its discretion the court s hall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.

“G randparents are among those people eligible to become guardian o f a child found to be dependent ” and, as such, a child's grandpa rents “should be allowed to intervene in the dependency process unless a specific showing is made that the best interest of the child would not be served thereby.” Bechtel v. Rose

, 150 Ariz. at 73, 722 P.2d at 241 ; see A.R.S. § 8

-

1 Although grandmother quoted Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) in her motion and brief on appeal, she does not assert intervention of right under that rule (as opposed to claiming permissive intervention under Rule 26(b)).IN RE: BELLA P.

Decision of the Court

5 514(B) ( 2014 ). We review the juvenile court's denial of grandmother’s
motion to intervene for an abuse of discretion. See Allen v. Chon

- Lopez , 214 Ariz. 361, 364, 153 P.3d 382, 385 (App. 2007) ( citing Bechtel v. Rose , 150 Ariz. 68, 72, 722 P.2d 236, 240 (1986) )

.

¶13 On appea l, grandmother argues that she met all the legally required Bechtel factors for intervention and, citing Chon

- Lopez

, that she should have been allowed to intervene even if the juvenile court did not expect to eventually award her custody. Bechtel outlined several relevant factors which the court should consider prior to determining whether a grandparent should be allowed to intervene in a dependency matter. See
Bechtel

, 150 Ariz. at 71 , 722 P.2d at 23 9 ( citing Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. Of Educ. , 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9 th Cir. 1974) ( outlining factors generally relevant to permissive intervention) )

. 2

¶14 The court here did find that grandmother met the threshold standard of Rule 24(b)(1), because there was a conditional right to interve ne as a family member. However, after consideration of the facts in the case,

2 Those factors are:

the nature and extent of the intervenors' interest, their standing to raise relevant legal issues, the legal position they seek to advance, and its probable relation to the merits of the case. The court may also consider whether change s have occurred in the litigation so that intervention that was once denied should be reexamined, whether the intervenors' interests are adequately represented by other parties, whether intervention will prolong or unduly delay the litigation, and
whether parties seeking intervention will significantly contribute to full development of the underlying factual issues in the suit and to the just and equitable adjudication of the legal questions presented.

To this end, grandmother asserts that, as she currently has no standing, her intervention would contribute to the full development of the underlying factual issues and that no other party will provide adequate representation of her position related to the stability, consistency, adoption and love for her grandchildren. She states that her intervention would actually shorten the litigation because she “will strongly pursue placement and ad option immediately.”IN RE: BELLA P.

Decision of the Court

6 the court explicitly found grandmother’s intervention was not in the
chil dren’s best interests. The court stated grandmother

has consistently acted in a way that places in serious doubt her ability to: a) work honestly with the professionals involved in prote cting the minor children’s best interests, b) consider the best interests of the children as paramount to the
wishes and w hims of the extended biological family, and c) protect the children from the biological parents, who se rights
have been terminated.

The court concluded “ [i]ntervention would cause extensive delay and detrimentally impact the ability to provide permanency for the children, a goal that ha s already been delayed.” Following that, the court summarily denied grandmother’s request to change physical custody.

¶15 This matter is not akin to Bechtel . In Bechtel , the court found a “paucity” of a record and “no in dication at all as to why the [grandparent’s]
motion was denied.” 150 Ariz. at 72 , 722 P.2d at 240 . Such is not the case
here. This court did not “summarily” deny intervention , rather it made an
“individualized determination” based on the evidence as to whether

intervention was in the children’s best interests as required by Bechtel

. See 150 Ariz. at 74, 722 P.2d at 242; see also William Z. v. ADES , 192 Ariz. 385, 389, 965 P.2d 1224, 1228 (App. 1998) (a summary denial of intervention is
an abuse of disc retion).

¶16 Here

, the court had the full severance record before it and had interacted with grandmother on more than one occasion. It had grand mother’s admission that she failed to disclose to DCS her two prior interactions with child protective services in New York

— which grandmother dismissed as small matters that had occurred a long time ago. It knew that the biological family was close knit, with various relatives,
incl uding the biological parents, previously living in the same apartment grandmother listed as her current address. The court knew the biological parents appeared to still use that same address as their mailing address. It knew that the family had unsuccess fully put forward several family members to take the children, and it had removed the children from the care of the maternal grandfather, who’s apartment it was, because he allowed the biological parents contact with the children. It had the
information t hat grandmother advised the DCS worker, that although she would keep the children away from their biological mother, she did not
believe th e parents caused the injury and they were “loving” parents. It saw the photos and documents she submitted with her m otion to interveneIN RE: BELLA P.

Decision of the Court

7 demonstrating grandmother and her private investigator were watching the placement family. The court heard allegations that grandmother had caused a scene at the children’s daycare which had nearly resulted in the police being called an d had seen her behavior in court . And, most importantly, it knew that there was a prospective adoptive family waiting to adopt the children.

¶17 With all that knowledge and evidence , the court reasonably determined that grandmother, based on the evidence, w as not likely to be cooperative or to protect the children from their biological family. It reasonably determined that additi onal delay resulting from intervention would detrimentally e ffect the children. The juvenile court

, a s the trier of

fact

, is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties ’
demeanor

, and judge the credibility of witne sses

. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't

Econ. Sec. , 203 Ariz. 278, 53 P.3d 203 (App. 2002). We ac cept the juvenile

court's factual findings “unless no re asonable evidence supports those findings

. ” Jennifer B. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 189 Ariz. 553, 555, 944 P.2d 68, 70 (App. 1997).

¶18 Finally, g randmother argues that she requested and was

e ntitled to an evi dentiary hearing. DCS asserts both that the c ourt did not need an evidentiary hearing in order to determine whether intervention should be granted and that grandmother assente d to oral argument on

intervention

. We agree. The court had sufficient evidence to make this best interests determination, even if grandmother had objected to the lack of an

e videntiary hearing

.

¶19 Given the extensive record in this matter

, the court’s prior experience wi th grandmother, the extensive period the children have been
in care and the n eed for permanency

, grandmother has not shown the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her motion to intervene

. For
these same reasons, we also find the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in denying grandmother’s request to change phys ical custody.
See Owen v. Blackhawk , 2 06 Ariz. 418

, 421, ¶ 11, 79 P.3d 667 , 670 (App. 2003) (a change in physical custody determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion)

.IN RE: BELLA P.

Decision of the Court

8 CONCLUSION

¶20 The juvenile court is affirmed

.