J-S25017-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ROEGESTER GRAYS 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 29 MDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 20, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-08-CR-0000787-2013

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MAY 31, 2019

Roegester Grays (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his petition 

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. We affirm.

A prior panel of this Court detailed the facts and procedural history of 

this case as follows:

On March 1, 2013, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Appellant, who 

was driving a Chevrolet Avalanche (“Avalanche”) westbound on 

Route 328, collided head-on with a Chevrolet Suburban 

(“Suburban”), which was traveling eastbound on Route 328 and 

being driven by Ryan English. As a result of the crash, Mr. English 

and his wife, Karen English, were killed instantly, and their 

thirteen-year-old son, C.M., and four-year-old son, L.E., were 

injured. Their ten-year-old son, G.E., was not injured.

Appellant was arrested and charged with numerous crimes. On 

November 21, 2013, he filed a lengthy counseled, pre-trial motion 

seeking, inter alia, to suppress his blood alcohol content (“BAC”) 

from blood that was drawn on March 1, 2013, at 9:20 p.m., after 

he was arrested by Pennsylvania State Police Trooper John J. 

Youngblood, to suppress the physical evidence seized by the 
J-S25017-19

- 2 -

police from his vehicle, and to suppress pre-arrest statements 

Appellant made to Trooper Youngblood at the Arnot Ogden Medical 

Center (“Arnot Ogden”) Emergency Room in New York.

Following a hearing held on January 7, 2014, by order and 

opinion filed on April 1, 2014, the trial court granted Appellant’s 

motion to suppress Appellant’s post-arrest BAC from the blood 

drawn at 9:30 p.m. upon request of Trooper Youngblood; 

however, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress the 

evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle and the evidence 

gained by the police at Arnot Ogden prior to Appellant’s arrest. 

Trial Court Order, filed 4/1/14.

On July 25, 2014, Appellant filed an additional pre-trial 

omnibus motion in which he sought, inter alia, to suppress and/or 

preclude the Commonwealth from introducing Appellant’s medical 

records from Arnot Ogden, particularly Appellant’s pre-arrest BAC 

from blood drawn at 5:30 p.m. on March 1, 2013, by order of 

Appellant’s treating physician, Joseph Haluska, M.D. [(Dr. 

Haluska]), at the Arnot Ogden Emergency Room. Specifically, 

Appellant contended the medical records were obtained via an 

improperly issued and served subpoena, in violation of Appellant’s 

doctor-patient privilege, and inadmissible as there was no “paper 

trail” establishing blood was actually drawn by order of Dr. 

Haluska. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion.

* * *

On November 16, 2015, the matter proceeded to a jury trial 

at which the parties stipulated that the death of Mr. and Mrs. 

English was caused by trauma incurred during the motor vehicle 

collision at issue. N.T., 11/16/15, at 32.

* * *

At the conclusion of all testimony, the jury convicted Appellant 

of [two counts of homicide by vehicle while driving under the 

influence of alcohol (“homicide by vehicle–DUI”), one count of 

aggravated assault by vehicle while driving under the influence 

(“aggravated assault by vehicle–DUI”), two counts of homicide by 

vehicle, one count of aggravated assault by vehicle, two counts of 

driving under the influence-general impairment and high rate 

(“DUI”), and one count of possession of a controlled substance]. 

Appellant filed a post-verdict motion alleging the verdicts were not 
J-S25017-19

- 3 -

supported by sufficient evidence and/or the verdicts were against 

the weight of the evidence. By order entered on January 6, 2016, 

the trial court denied Appellant's post-verdict motions, and on 

January 7, 2016, Appellant proceeded to a sentencing hearing, at 

the conclusion of which he was sentenced to an aggregate of 252 

months plus 30 days in prison to 564 months in prison. Appellant 

was given 488 days of credit for time served, and he filed timely 

post-sentence motions, which were denied by operation of law on 

June 20, 2016. [A] timely counseled appeal followed.

Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d 793, 796-805 (Pa Super. 2017)

(citations and footnotes omitted), appeal denied, 178 A.3d 106 (Pa. 2018).

On July 25, 2017, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. 

See id. at 796. On January 8, 2018, our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s 

petition for allowance of appeal.

On January 24, 2018, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. On March 

5, 2018, following the appointment of counsel, Appellant filed an amended 

PCRA petition in which he raised numerous ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims against trial counsel. On September 28, 2018, the PCRA court held a 

hearing on Appellant’s petition.1 On December 20, 2018, the PCRA court 

denied Appellant’s PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for review:

A. Trial [c]ounsel was ineffective for failing to request a written 

report from Commonwealth witness Elizabeth Martin prior to trial 

addressing the conversion factor from serum blood to whole blood 

and in failing to request a continuance during trial to address this 

evidence when the conversion factor and Appellant’s blood alcohol 

level were key issues in Appellant’s trial.

____________________________________________

1 Trial counsel is deceased and was therefore unable to testify during 

Appellant’s PCRA hearing.
J-S25017-19

- 4 -

B. Trial [c]ounsel was ineffective for failing to challenge or 

present any claim prior to or during trial that Appellant’s prearrest blood draw was involuntary, performed without his consent 

and coerced when the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate

Appellant voluntarily consented to the drawing and testing of his 

blood and trial counsel acknowledged his error by raising this issue 

in a Post-Sentence Motion that was deemed waived due to trial 

counsel’s failure to properly preserve the issue.

C. Trial [c]ounsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise 

Appellant regarding his sentencing exposure and in doing so, 

improperly convincing Appellant to reject a plea offer that would 

have resulted in a significantly reduced sentence.

D. Trial [c]ounsel was ineffective in failing to discuss character 

witness testimony with Appellant and in failing to call character 

witnesses on Appellant’s behalf when Appellant had available 

several effective character witnesses and the Commonwealth 

repeatedly argued Appellant was untruthful.

E. Trial [c]ounsel was ineffective for failing to object to an 

expert opinion offered on whether or not a medication 

administered to Appellant contained alcohol and could have 

affected Appellant’s blood alcohol level when Appellant’s blood 

alcohol level was a key element of the trial and the Commonwealth 

failed to qualify the witness to render said opinion or to request to 

admit the witness as an expert in this or any other field of 

expertise.

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

We review the denial of PCRA relief by “examining whether the PCRA 

court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its 

conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Busanet, 

54 A.3d 35, 45 (Pa. 2012). “Our scope of review is limited to the findings of 

the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the party who prevailed in the PCRA court proceeding.” Id.
J-S25017-19

- 5 -

Each of the issues Appellant raises challenges trial counsel’s 

effectiveness. In deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we begin 

with the presumption that counsel rendered effective assistance. 

Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1188 (Pa. 2014). To overcome 

that presumption, the petitioner must establish: “(1) the underlying claim has 

arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or failure 

to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, 

with prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability that the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citation omitted). 

To demonstrate prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the 

petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 613 (Pa. 2012). If the 

petitioner fails to prove any of these prongs, the claim is subject to dismissal. 

Bomar, 104 A.3d at 1188.

In his first issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to request a written report before trial from the Commonwealth for 

expert witness Elizabeth Martin, who testified regarding the conversion factor 

used to determine Appellant’s BAC from his blood serum. Appellant asserts 

that Appellant’s BAC was an important part of the Commonwealth’s burden of 

proof, and trial counsel’s failure to obtain the report prevented trial counsel 
J-S25017-19

- 6 -

from effectively cross-examining Ms. Martin about the methodologies used to 

obtain Appellant’s BAC.

In rejecting this claim, the PCRA court explained:

At trial, the System Director of Phlebotomy Services at Arnot 

Health Services, Elizabeth Martin, testified on behalf of the 

Commonwealth regarding the record of a medical blood draw 

made while [Appellant] was a patient at Arnot [Ogden], on the 

date of the accident. Ms. Martin provided testimony as to the 

serum alcohol blood levels and the conversion to a whole blood 

level required to determine a [person’s] alcohol content for 

criminal offenses. Trial counsel objected claiming that the 

Commonwealth failed to provide a written report[,] as this was 

expert testimony.

Pa.R.Crim.Proc. 573 provides that if the Commonwealth 

intends to call an expert who has not prepared a report, the court, 

upon motion, “may,” order such a report and provide same to [the 

defendant]. Here, no such motion was made. [Appellant] claims 

as a result of that, trial counsel was ineffective.

First, there is no assurance that a report would have been 

ordered had a motion been made. Rule 573 provides that the 

court “may” order such report. Therefore, this claim has no merit.

Second, [Appellant] is misinterpreting trial counsel’s objection 

by claiming trial counsel “acknowledged on the record that he

needed a written report to effectively represent [Appellant].”

[Amended PCRA Petition, 3/5/18, ¶ 34]. Rather, trial [counsel] 

stated his objection that the Commonwealth did not provide him 

with an expert report and that it was “a violation of his discovery, 

mandatory discovery requirements” under the rules. [N.T.], 

11/18/1[5,] [at] 60. He then stated that “I’m just trying to play

by the rules." [N.T.], 11/18/1[5] [at] 61. A review of the 

transcript suggests that trial counsel then effectively cross[-

]examined the witness regarding the conversion factor. [N.T.],

11/18/1[5], at 64-71.

Finally, [Appellant] has not met the burden of showing that he 

suffered prejudice. [Appellant] has not offered any legal theories 

or pointed to any type of cross-examination regarding studies, 

different conversion rates or evidence that demonstrates the 
J-S25017-19

- 7 -

outcome of trial would have been different. [Appellant] has 

presented no evidence that the conversion rate was incorrect or 

based upon an unrecognized study. [Appellant] has not presented 

any “discrepancies” in the witness’s opinion or testimony.

Therefore, this claim has no merit.

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/20/18, at 2-4.

Upon review, we conclude that the PCRA court did not abuse its 

discretion in dismissing this ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Rule 573 

of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part, as 

follows:

(b) If an expert whom the attorney for the Commonwealth intends 

to call in any proceeding has not prepared a report of examination 

or tests, the court, upon motion, may order that the expert 

prepare, and that the attorney for the Commonwealth disclose, a 

report stating the subject matter on which the expert is expected 

to testify; the substance of the facts to which the expert is 

expected to testify; and a summary of the expert's opinions and 

the grounds for each opinion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(2)(b) (emphasis added). Thus, as the PCRA court 

correctly stated, there is no guarantee that had trial counsel filed a motion 

seeking the preparation of a report for Ms. Martin’s testimony, the trial court 

would have granted it, as the decision to do so lies in the court’s discretion. 

See id.

Additionally, we agree with the PCRA court’s conclusion that Appellant 

failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s failure to request a report for Ms. 

Martin’s testimony resulted in prejudice. As this Court has explained, to 

establish the need for a new trial in the context of Rule 573, a defendant must 
J-S25017-19

- 8 -

demonstrate “that the introduction of the expert testimony caused him 

prejudice to the degree that it affected his trial strategy or likely affected the 

outcome of the proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Roles, 116 A.3d 122, 133 

(Pa. Super. 2015).

Appellant asserts that “[b]ecause trial counsel did not request a written 

report, trial counsel was unable to research potential discrepancies in Ms. 

Martin’s opinion, research other studies, determine whether the study cited 

by Ms. Martin was the recognized standard and ask for a review of Ms. Martin’s 

opinion by providing her report to an expert recognized in the field of serum 

blood alcohol conversion.” Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. Although this may be 

true, Appellant introduced no evidence before the PCRA court, scientific or 

otherwise, to indicate that there was anything improper about the conversion 

protocol employed by the Phlebotomy Department at Arnot Health Services. 

Moreover, trial counsel, despite not having a report, was able to crossexamine Ms. Martin on several of these topics. See N.T., 11/18/16, 64-71. 

While a report may have aided trial counsel’s cross-examination of Ms. Martin,

there is no support for Appellant’s claim that the outcome of trial would have 

been different. Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue does not merit relief.

For his second issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to seek suppression of his pre-arrest blood draw conducted by the 

medical staff at Arnot Ogden shortly after the accident; Appellant claims that 
J-S25017-19

- 9 -

the blood draw was involuntary and taken without his consent.2 Appellant 

asserts that trial counsel should have sought suppression of the pre-arrest 

blood draw on the basis of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 

Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).

“The Fourth Amendment to the [United States] Constitution and Article 

I, Section 8 of [the Pennsylvania] Constitution protect citizens from 

unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 

781, 784 (Pa. Super. 2012). The “administration of a blood test ... performed 

by an agent of, or at the direction of the government” constitutes a search 

under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. 

Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308, 315 (Pa. 1992). “A search 

conducted without a warrant is deemed to be unreasonable and therefore 

constitutionally impermissible, unless an established exception applies.” 

Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (Pa. 2000). “One such 

exception is consent, voluntarily given.” Id. at 888-889.

Our Supreme Court explained:

While there is no hard and fast list of factors evincing 

voluntariness, some considerations include: 1) the defendant’s 

custodial status; 2) the use of duress or coercive tactics by law 

enforcement personnel; 3) the defendant’s knowledge of his right 

to refuse to consent; 4) the defendant’s education and

intelligence; 5) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating 

____________________________________________

2 As stated above, the trial court suppressed Appellant’s post-arrest blood 

draw ordered by the Pennsylvania State Police later in the night of the 

accident.
J-S25017-19

- 10 -

evidence will be found; and 6) the extent and level of the 

defendant’s cooperation with the law enforcement personnel.

Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 821 A.2d 1221, 1225 (Pa. 2003) (Eakin, J., 

opinion announcing the judgment of the court) (citing Commonwealth v. 

Cleckley, 738 A.2d 427, 433 n.7 (1999)).

In Birchfield, the United States Supreme Court addressed the 

constitutionality of warrantless blood draws. Although the Court concluded 

that warrantless blood draws are not permissible as searches incident to 

arrest, the Court determined that they are nonetheless permissible under the 

consent exception to the warrant requirement. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 

2185-2186. The Court explained that its “prior opinions have referred 

approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil 

penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply 

with BAC tests[.]” Id. at 2185.

The Court further stated, however, that it is “another matter ... for a 

State not only to insist upon an intrusive blood test, but also to impose 

criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to such a test.” Id. It reasoned

that “[t]here must be a limit to the consequences to which motorists may be 

deemed to have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public roads.” 

Id. Thus, the Court determined that “motorists cannot be deemed to have 

consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense.” 

Id. at 2186.
J-S25017-19

- 11 -

Instantly, we conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 

raise a Birchfield challenge in Appellant’s suppression motion. Appellant filed 

his suppression motions on November 21, 2013 and July 25, 2014 and his trial 

took place in November 2015. The United States Supreme Court decided 

Birchfield on June 23, 2016, well after Appellant filed his suppression motions 

and his trial concluded. As our own Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he law 

is clear that counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to anticipate a change 

in the law.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 983 A.2d 666, 702 (Pa. 2009).

Moreover, we recognize that Birchfield only applies to blood draws 

ordered by law enforcement of persons under arrest at the time the blood 

draw occurs. See Commonwealth v. Myers, 164 A.3d 1162, 1172 (Pa. 

2017) (explaining that Pennsylvania’s implied consent laws provide “the 

statutory right of refusal to ‘any person placed under arrest’ for DUI”); see 

also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(b)(1). In Myers, our Supreme Court held that a 

warrantless blood draw of an unconscious individual who was under arrest at 

the time of the blood draw was unconstitutional. Myers, 164 A.3d at 1181-

82. The Court emphasized that “the critical fact is not whether the motorist 

is conscious, but whether the motorist is under arrest.” Id. at 1171 n.14. 

Here, Appellant concedes that he was not under arrest when medical staff 

conducted the blood draw. Thus, Birchfield is not applicable, and the PCRA 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying this ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim.
J-S25017-19

- 12 -

In his third issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

improperly advising him about the potential length of his sentence. Appellant 

asserts that trial counsel’s allegedly improper advice caused him to reject a 

plea offer that he claims would have resulted in a far lesser sentence.

It is well established that:

a post-conviction petitioner seeking relief on the basis that 

ineffective assistance of counsel caused him or her to reject a 

guilty plea must demonstrate the following circumstance:

[B]ut for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable 

probability that the plea offer would have been presented to 

the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the 

plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light 

of intervening circumstances), that the court would have 

accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or 

both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than 

under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.

Commonwealth v. Steckley, 128 A.3d 826, 832 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164 (2012)).

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the 

denying this ineffective assistance of counsel claim. At his PCRA hearing, 

Appellant testified about a letter sent by the Commonwealth to trial counsel 

that invited trial counsel “to offer to settle the case for a five year minimum.” 

N.T., 9/28/18, at 33, Exhibit 2 (Letter, 3/5/15). Appellant claimed that trial 

counsel informed him that the Commonwealth did not have the evidence to 

convict him of several offenses, and that he would receive, at most, a 10-year 

sentence. Id. at 35. Appellant maintains this advice convinced him to go to 

trial. Id. at 35-36. Appellant stated that had he known he had the potential 
J-S25017-19

- 13 -

to receive a minimum sentence of more than 20 years of incarceration, he 

would have “deeply considered taking [the] plea.” Id.

The PCRA court found that Appellant’s testimony was not credible, 

noting that Appellant “has consistently claimed his innocence” throughout his 

trial and continued to do so during PCRA proceedings. PCRA Court Opinion, 

12/20/18, at 7. Indeed, Appellant admitted on cross-examination during his 

PCRA hearing that he believed during his trial that he had no alcohol in his 

system at the time of the accident and that he was not at fault for the accident. 

N.T., 9/28/18, at 37-38. It is well settled that “[t]he PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court.” 

Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214 (Pa. Super. 2014). Based 

on Appellant’s own assertions of innocence, both at trial and before the PCRA 

court, the record clearly supports the PCRA court’s determination that 

Appellant would not have pled guilty, as doing so would have required him to 

forgo his assertions of innocence. Consequently, Appellant has failed to 

demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that he would have 

accepted a plea offer. See Steckley, 128 A.3d at 832. Appellant’s third 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is meritless.

For his fourth issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to call character witnesses on his behalf after the Commonwealth 

attacked his credibility at trial by stating during closing arguments that the 

testimony of its witnesses was more believable than the Appellant’s testimony 
J-S25017-19

- 14 -

regarding what transpired during and immediately following the accident. We 

have explained:

It has long been the law in Pennsylvania that a defendant in a 

criminal case may introduce evidence of his reputation for 

truthfulness in but two circumstances. First, the accused may 

introduce evidence of his truthful character if the trait of 

truthfulness is relevant to the crime with which he has been 

charged.

Second, the accused may introduce evidence of his truthful 

character if his reputation for truthfulness has first been attacked

by the prosecution.

Commonwealth v. Minich, 4 A.3d 1063, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotations 

and citations omitted).

There is no dispute that truthfulness was not relevant to the crimes at 

issue. Thus, Appellant could only introduce evidence of his truthful character 

if the Commonwealth attacked his reputation for truthfulness at trial. 

Although Appellant points to several instances during closing when the 

Commonwealth argued that the jury should believe the testimony of its 

witnesses over the testimony of Appellant, he is unable to identify a single 

instance where the Commonwealth attacked his reputation for truthfulness. 

“[W]here the prosecution has merely introduced evidence denying or 

contradicting the facts to which the defendant testified, but has not assailed 

the defendant’s community reputation for truthfulness generally, evidence of 

the defendant’s alleged reputation for truthfulness is not admissible.” 

Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 151 A.3d 1117, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(quotations and citation omitted). Thus, because evidence of Appellant’s 
J-S25017-19

- 15 -

reputation for truthfulness was not admissible at trial, trial counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to call character witnesses on Appellant’s behalf, and the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying this ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim.

In his final issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to Dr. Haluska’s testimony. Appellant asserts that Dr. Haluska 

improperly gave expert testimony indicating that there was no alcohol in 

Dilantin — a narcotic and pain reliever that Dr. Haluska administered to 

Appellant while treating Appellant in the emergency room of Arnot Ogden —

and that Dilantin and other medications Appellant received in the emergency 

room would not have affected his BAC. Appellant contends that trial counsel 

should have objected to this testimony because the Commonwealth never 

qualified Dr. Haluska as an expert in the field of pharmaceuticals.

Again, we conclude that the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying this ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Assuming, arguendo, that 

trial counsel should have objected to Dr. Haluska’s testimony relating to 

Dilantin and other medications Appellant received in the emergency room, 

Appellant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the lack of 

objection. Appellant has presented no evidence that Dilantin contained 

alcohol and that it would have affected Appellant’s BAC. Appellant also offers 

no argument explaining how the Dilantin could have affected his pre-arrest

BAC when Dr. Haluska explicitly testified that he ordered Appellant’s BAC 
J-S25017-19

- 16 -

prior to administering any medications to Appellant. See N.T., 11/18/15, at 

36. Thus, trial counsel’s failure to object, even if improper, does not provide 

a sufficient basis to conclude that there was a reasonable probability that the 

outcome at trial would have been different had trial counsel objected to Dr. 

Haluska’s testimony. See King, 57 A.3d at 613. Appellant’s final ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim does not merit relief.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/31/2019