IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

November 18, 2015 Session

CHURCH OF GOD IN CHRIST, INC., ET AL. v. L. M. HALEY 

MINISTRIES, INC., ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Fayette County

No. 15815 Martha Brasfield, Chancellor

________________________________

No. W2015-00509-COA-R3-CV – Filed January 27, 2016

_________________________________

A hierarchical church filed a complaint against one of its local churches, seeking an order 

establishing the hierarchical church‟s control over the local church‟s real and personal 

property. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the basis of the doctrine of ecclesiastical 

abstention. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRANDON O.

GIBSON, J., joined. ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Darrell J. O‟Neal and JoeDae L. Jenkins, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellants, Church of 

God in Christ, Inc., David A. Hall, Gospel Center Temple Church of God in Christ, and 

Gospel Temple Church of God in Christ.

Veronica F. Coleman-Davis, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, L. M. Haley Ministries, 

Inc., and Lonnie M. Haley, III.

Robert L.J. Spence, Jr. and Bryan M. Meredith, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees,

Gospel Center Temple Moscow, Inc., Jeremiah R. Haley, Ulysses C. Polk, Barry C. Turner, 

Milton Holt, Sr., Erskine J. Murphy.

OPINION

Background
2

On February 2, 2012, Plaintiffs/Appellants Bishop David A. Hall, individually and on 

behalf of Gospel Center Temple Church of God in Christ (“Gospel Center COGIC”), filed a 

complaint for injunction, accounting, and damages against L.M. Haley Ministries, Inc., 

Gospel Center Temple Church Moscow, Inc. (“Gospel Center, Inc.”), and some of its 

members and trustees, Lonnie M. Haley, III, Jeremiah R. Haley, Ulysses C. Polk, Barry C. 

Turner, Milton Holt, Sr., and Erskine J. Murphy (collectively with Gospel Center, Inc., 

“Defendants” or “Appellees”). The initial complaint was amended twice.1 The second 

amended complaint (“Second Amended Complaint”) is the operative complaint for purposes 

of this case. The Second Amended Complaint added as additional plaintiffs Church of God in 

Christ, Inc. (“COGIC”), and “Gospel Center Temple Church of God in Christ, an 

unincorporated religious organization, by and through its duly appointed Trustee, John 

Arnett” (collectively with Bishop Hall and Gospel Center COGIC, “Appellants”).

It is undisputed that Gospel Center COGIC is a member church of the national notfor-profit religious corporation COGIC, which has churches throughout the United States.2

Pertinent to this case, COGIC has created and adopted a code of governance referred to as 

The Official Manual.

3 According to Appellants, The Official Manual provides rules and 

protocols for the management of COGIC-affiliated churches. Pursuant to COGIC‟s 

governing principles, COGIC churches are organized as part of a hierarchical or connectional

system, with various jurisdictional bishops presiding over separate jurisdictions.

4

 

The facts in this case are taken largely from the Second Amended Complaint. In 

2009, after the death of Gospel Center COGIC‟s founding pastor, the then-presiding 

Jurisdictional Bishop for West Tennessee-area COGIC-affiliated churches, J.O. Patterson, 

installed a speaker rotation system to prevent dissention among those vying to take the place 

of the deceased pastor. There was no dispute at that time about Bishop Patterson‟s or 

 

1

Prior to the amendments, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and the parties engaged 

in discovery, including deposing Bishop Hall. 

2

Specifically, in their answer to the Second Amended Complaint, Appellees admit the allegation that 

Gospel Center COGIC “is an unincorporated religious organization that is aligned with, and has membership 

with, [COGIC].”

3 A full copy of The Official Manual is not included in the record. However, the parties do not dispute 

its contents relative to this case.

4

This Court has previously held that COGIC operates its local churches as part of a “connectional 

system.” Church of God In Christ, Inc. v. Middle City Church of God In Christ, 774 S.W.2d 950, 951 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). “The courts in Tennessee have used the term „connectional‟ to mean the same thing as 

„hierarchical.‟” Convention of Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese of Tennessee v. Rector, Wardens, & 

Vestrymen of St. Andrew’s Par., No. M2010-01474-COA-R3CV, 2012 WL 1454846, at *20 n. 16 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Apr. 25, 2012). Hierarchical is defined as “of a hierarch,” which in turn refers to “a system of church 

government by priests or other clergy in graded ranks.” Webster’s New World College Dictionary 685 (5th ed. 

2014).
3

COGIC‟s actions. When Bishop Patterson died in June 2011, however, a new Jurisdictional 

Bishop for Tennessee was appointed by COGIC, Bishop David A. Hall.

Appellants assert that The Official Manual provides that upon his appointment, Bishop 

Hall had authority to appoint a new pastor for Gospel Center COGIC. According to The 

Official Manual: “The Pastor of the local church shall be appointed by the Jurisdictional 

Bishop of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of the Church.” A later amendment to the rule 

provides that: “All vacancies that occur in the pastorate of the local church shall be filled by 

the Jurisdictional Bishop. The jurisdiction and management of the church shall remain with 

the Jurisdictional Bishop or his designee until such time as a pastor has been appointed to fill 

such vacancy.” Based upon this rule, Bishop Hall appointed himself as interim pastor of 

Gospel Center COGIC. Thus, Appellants asserted in their complaint that Bishop Hall is the 

lawful pastor of Gospel Center COGIC, with the right to manage the church and its assets. 

Shortly after Bishop Hall appointed himself as interim pastor of Gospel Center 

COGIC, he took several steps in an effort to manage the church and its assets, including 

coming to the church property to hold services and attempting to transfer Gospel Center 

COGIC‟s bank account into his name. According to Appellants, certain members of Gospel 

Center COGIC threatened Bishop Hall when he tried to come on the church property and 

prevented him from obtaining access to the church‟s liquid assets, which totaled over 

$150,000.00. To this day, it appears that Bishop Hall has been prevented from accessing 

church funds or holding any services at Gospel Center COGIC.

Apparently in response to Bishop Hall‟s efforts to more actively manage Gospel 

Center COGIC, certain members of the church filed a corporate charter for Gospel Center, 

Inc. with the Tennessee Secretary of State on December 16, 2011. The complaint further 

alleges that Defendants Turner, Murphy, and Holt executed and recorded a quit claim deed 

attempting to transfer Gospel Center COGIC‟s real property to Gospel Center, Inc. The prior 

deed to Gospel Center COGIC‟s real property reflects the grantees as “Temple Church of 

God in Christ, Ella Mary Cox, Milton E. Holt, Sr., Lonnie M. Haley, Janice Murphy, John W. 

Arnett and Erskine J. Murphy, Trustees for the use and benefit of Temple Church of God in 

Christ.” The complaint alleged that either deed violated The Official Manual, which provides 

that:

Real Estate or other property may be acquired by purchase, gift 

devise, or otherwise, by local churches. Where real or personal 

property is acquired by deed, the instrument of conveyance shall 

contain the following clause, to wit;

“The said property is held in trust for the use and benefit of the 

members of the Church of God in Christ with National 
4

Headquarters in Memphis, Shelby County, Tennessee, and 

subject to the Charter, Constitution, Laws and Doctrines of said 

Church, now in full effect, or as they may be hereafter amended, 

changed or modified by the General Assembly of said Church.”

Thereafter, certain members of Gospel Center COGIC/Gospel Center, Inc. 

(hereinafter, collectively, “Gospel Center Church”) attempted to call a vote to remove Gospel 

Center Church from Bishop Hall‟s jurisdiction (but still remain a part of COGIC). Appellants 

contend that these church members failed to follow proper protocol in holding the vote5and 

that COGIC consequently rejected their request to transfer and instead informed the members 

of the proper protocol for holding a vote on transfer. As of this appeal, it does not appear that 

Gospel Center Church ever received permission to transfer out of Bishop Hall‟s jurisdiction. 

The complaint requested that the court: (1) “order the defendants to remove 

themselves from control of the church and restore the Church and its property and funds to 

[Bishop Hall]”; (2) “declare the Quit Claim Deed . . . to be a fraudulent transfer and declare it 

to be null and void”; (3) “restructure the Deed to the Church real property such as to cause it 

to properly reflect that title to the real property is held „in trust for the use and benefit of the 

members of the Church of God in Christ with National Headquarters in Memphis, Shelby 

County, Tennessee, and subject to the Charter, Constitution, Laws and Doctrines of said 

Church, now in full effect, or as they may be hereafter amended, changed or modified by the 

General Assembly of said Church‟”; (4) order the defendants to account for all income and 

expenditures from January 1, 2011 to the present; and (5) issue a temporary restraining order 

preventing the defendants from using church funds pending resolution of the case. 

On August 21, 2013, Appellees filed an answer to the Second Amended Complaint, 

denying that Bishop Hall was the lawful pastor of Gospel Center Church. On August 31, 

2013, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, arguing that the 

requested relief was barred by the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention. The Appellees 

contended that because the dispute involved the matter of whom had authority over Gospel 

Center Church based upon religious doctrine, the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction 

to interfere with the dispute. 

Appellants responded in opposition to the motion to dismiss on December 6, 2013. In 

their response, the Appellants provided evidence regarding ecclesiastic proceedings that had 

been recently resolved through a judicial arm of the COGIC organization, the Ecclesiastical 

Council. According to the response, in February 2013, certain members of Gospel Center 

Church filed a charge against Appellees, alleging that they were violating The Official 

 

5 According to Appellants, only those church members that were in favor of the transfer were notified 

of the vote; those church members that were believed to oppose the transfer were allegedly not informed of the 

vote and, therefore, did not take part, in violation of COGIC‟s transfer-vote protocol. 
5

Manual in their refusal to acknowledge Bishop Hall as pastor. The COGIC Ecclesiastical 

Council held a hearing on November 23, 2013. None of the Appellees appeared for the 

hearing. Accordingly, the COGIC Ecclesiastical Council handed down a decision on 

November 23, 2013, finding that Appellees “have ignored the requests and admonitions of 

[Bishop Hall and Presiding Bishop Charles E. Blake] to follow the polity of [COGIC].” The 

COGIC Ecclesiastical Council further found, inter alia, that Appellees were operating 

Gospel Center Church in violation of The Official Manual; that they refused to acknowledge

Bishop Hall, their duly appointed Jurisdictional Bishop and pastor; that they caused Bishop 

Hall to be removed from church premises; that they improperly transferred ownership of 

church property; and that they improperly called a vote to transfer jurisdictions. Based upon 

these findings, the Ecclesiastical Council ruled that:

(a) The Respondents[6] be, and they are hereby, 

excommunicated as members of the Gospel Center Temple 

Church of God in Christ and Church of God in Christ, Inc.

(b) Gospel Center Temple Church of God in Christ shall be 

reorganized under the Pastoral leadership of Bishop David A. 

Hall, Sr. 

On March 7, 2014, Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment; the motion, 

however, was not accompanied by a memorandum of law or a statement of undisputed facts. 

Eventually, on February 18, 2015, the trial court granted Appellees‟ motion to dismiss. 

Specifically, the trial court ruled that: (1) it was ruling only on the motion to dismiss; (2) it 

was considering only the pleadings;7(3) Appellants‟ request for the restructuring of the deed 

was barred by application of Church of God in Christ, Inc. vs. Middle City Church of God 

in Christ, 774 S.W.2d 950 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (discussed in detail, infra); and (4) all other 

requests for relief “deal[] with ecclesiastical issues” that are outside the subject matter 

jurisdiction of the courts. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. 

Issues Presented

Appellants raise two issues for this Court‟s review, which are taken from their brief:

 

6

The Respondents were “Gospel Center Temple Church of God in Christ, Jerry E. Murphy, Joyce A. 

Murphy, Barry C. Turner, Clementine Turner, Barry D. Turner, Milton Holt, Sr., Annie Holt, Elizabeth 

Houston-Arnett, and Randy Arnett. Thus, only two of the individual Appellees were excommunicated, leaving 

four individual Appellees as members of COGIC.

7

The record on appeal reflects that the parties had filed various other materials in support of their 

respective positions, including the deposition testimony of Bishop Hall, the deeds to the church property, and 

various affidavits. 
6

1. Whether the trial court erred when it dismissed 

Appellants‟ complaint without considering the “neutral 

principal” approach.

2. Whether the trial court erred when it dismissed 

Appellants‟ complaint without consideration of the Appellants‟ 

constitution and governing documents.

As we perceive it, there is one dispositive issue in this case: Whether the trial court correctly 

granted Appellees‟ motion to dismiss Appellants‟ complaint.

Standard of Review

Here, the trial court granted Appellees‟ motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint due to the application of the doctrine of 

ecclesiastical abstention. See generally Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of 

Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436 (Tenn. 2012) (discussed in more detail, infra). When reviewing a 

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we employ the following standard of 

review:

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

falls under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1). The 

concept of subject matter jurisdiction involves a court's lawful 

authority to adjudicate a controversy brought before it. See

Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 

639 (Tenn. 1996); Standard Sur. & Casualty Co. v. Sloan, 180 

Tenn. 220, 230, 173 S.W.2d 436, 440 (1943). Subject matter 

jurisdiction involves the nature of the cause of action and the 

relief sought, see Landers v. Jones, 872 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tenn. 

1994), and can only be conferred on a court by constitutional or 

legislative act. See Kane v. Kane, 547 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tenn. 

1977); Computer Shoppe, Inc. v. State, 780 S.W.2d 729, 734 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). Since a determination of whether subject 

matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law, our standard of 

review is de novo, without a presumption of correctness. See

Nelson v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 

1999).

Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000).

Typically, review of the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is confined only to the 

pleadings. Not so, however, of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction:
7

Under different circumstances, [the consideration of documents 

other than the pleadings] would necessitate treating the motion 

to dismiss as though it were a motion for summary judgment. A 

motion to dismiss, however, need not be converted into a motion 

for summary judgment if a trial court considers external

evidence only to determine whether it has subject matter 

jurisdiction. Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 543 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2006).

Higdon v. State, 404 S.W.3d 478, 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). Accordingly, we will consider 

all the evidence included in the record in determining whether the trial court correctly granted

Appellees‟ motion to dismiss the complaint. 

Discussion

The dispositive issue in this case is whether the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention 

bars Appellants‟ requests for relief. The doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention deprives courts 

of subject matter jurisdiction to “interfere[e] in the internal affairs of religious bodies.” 

Anderson v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of New York, Inc., No. M2004-01066-COAR9CV, 2007 WL 161035, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2007). In 2012, the Tennessee 

Supreme Court exhaustively explained the doctrine and its application in Tennessee courts:

Our analysis begins with the recognition that religious 

institutions exist and function in the context of the broader 

secular community. See Dobrota v. Free Serbian Orthodox 

Church St. Nicholas, 191 Ariz. 120, 952 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 1998). The courts do not inhibit the free exercise of 

religion simply by opening their doors to a suit involving a 

religious organization. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary 

Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 

449, 89 S.Ct. 601. Thus, the weight of authority recognizes that 

religious institutions are not above the law, see e.g., Skrzypczak 

v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1244–45 

(10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rayburn v. General Conference of 

Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985)), 

and that, like other societal institutions, they may be amenable to 

suits involving property rights, torts, and criminal conduct, see 

e.g., Dobrota v. Free Serbian Orthodox Church St. Nicholas, 

952 P.2d at 1195; Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of 

Conn., 120 Conn.App. 666, 994 A.2d 212, 219 (2010); Higgins 

v. Maher, 210 Cal.App.3d 1168, 258 Cal.Rptr. 757, 758 (1989); 
8

Tran v. Fiorenza, 934 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. Ct. App.1996); 

see also Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 

1993) (indicating that religious institutions do not have “broad 

immunity against being sued in civil courts”).

In civil cases, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is 

implicated only when the alleged improper conduct that gave 

rise to the lawsuit is “rooted in religious belief.” Bryce v. 

Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 657 

(10th Cir. 2002); McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 800 A.2d 

840, 851 (2002). Adjudication of disputes by state courts is 

appropriate in matters involving religious institutions, as long as 

the court can resolve the dispute by applying neutral legal 

principles and is not required to employ or rely on religious 

doctrine to adjudicate the matter. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at

602–07, 99 S.Ct. 3020; New York Annual Conference of 

United Methodist Church v. Fisher, 182 Conn. 272, 438 A.2d 

62, 68 (1980) (holding that “[i]t is now well established that 

state judicial intervention is justified when it can be 

accomplished by resort to neutral principles of law ... that 

eschew consideration of doctrinal matters such as the ritual and 

liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.”); McKelvey v. Pierce, 

800 A.2d at 856 (holding that the First Amendment does not 

apply if “the dispute can be resolved by the application of purely 

neutral principles of law and without impermissible government 

intrusion (e.g., where the church offers no religious-based 

justification for its actions and points to no internal governance 

rights that would actually be affected)”); Lacy v. Bassett, 132 

S.W.3d 119, 123 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that “a state may 

adopt an approach, including neutral principles of law, for 

resolving church disputes that do not involve consideration of 

doctrinal matters”).

Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 450–51 (Tenn. 

2012) (footnotes omitted). The Tennessee Supreme Court cautioned, however, that courts 

should not apply the doctrine in an overly-broad fashion:

Adopting a more expansive application of the 

ecclesiastical abstention doctrine runs the risk of placing 

religious institutions in a preferred position, Sanders v. Casa 

View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir.1998), and 
9

favoring religious institutions over secular institutions could 

give rise to Establishment Clause concerns. See Zanita E. 

Fenton, Faith in Justice: Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual 

Abuse by Clergy, 8 Mich. J. Gender & L. 45, 75 (2001) (noting 

that “non-application of tort principles where they might 

otherwise apply may be more like Establishment, creating an 

exception for religion”). Employing the application of the 

neutral legal principles approach enables the courts to “give no 

greater or lesser deference to tortious conduct committed on 

third parties by religious organizations than we do to tortious 

conduct committed on third parties by non-religious entities.” 

Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 361 (Fla. 2002).

Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 451. 

Appellants assert that the only issues in this case concern the ownership of property, a 

dispute that may be determined without consideration of religious practice and doctrine. 

Indeed, this Court has held that property disputes in connectional churches may be 

adjudicated by our courts, so long as the issue may be decided on “„neutral principles of law‟ 

equally applicable to church and non-church litigants[.]” Fairmount Presbyterian Church, 

Inc. v. Presbytery of Holston of Presbyterian Church of U. S., 531 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 1975) (quoting United States et al. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l

Presbyterian Church et al., 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969)). Thus, “the 

application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine has not been extended to „questions of 

property or personal rights,‟” and “Tennessee courts have permitted adjudications based upon 

neutral principles.” Convention of Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese of Tenn. v. 

Rector, Wardens, & Vestrymen of St. Andrew’s Parish, No. M2010-01474-COA-R3CV, 

2012 WL 1454846, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2012).

According to Appellants, the trial court erred in declining to decide the issues 

in this case on the basis of ecclesiastical abstention because other Tennessee courts have 

previously considered property disputes that required resolution by application of “an 

organization‟s constitution.” Here, Appellants assert that The Official Manual clearly and 

unambiguously provides that Bishop Hall has control over Gospel Center Church‟s real and 

personal property, as the church‟s pastor. The trial court considered Appellants‟ arguments 

with regard to real and personal property individually. Accordingly, we will likewise 

consider each request for relief in isolation.

Real Property
10

Appellants assert that the Appellees violated The Official Manual in failing to hold the 

real property owned by Gospel Center Church in trust for COGIC. As previously discussed, 

The Official Manual provides that all real property acquired by deed by any COGIC-affiliated 

church should provide in its deed that the property is held in trust for COGIC. Appellants 

insist that this document may be considered in determining whether the deed to the real 

property upon which Gospel Center Church is located should be reformed to provide that it is 

held in trust for COGIC. In addition, Appellants contend that consideration of The Official 

Manual does not run afoul of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. To support this 

argument, Appellants cite Convention of Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese of 

Tennessee v. Rector, Wardens, & Vestrymen of St. Andrew’s Par., No. M2010-01474-

COA-R3CV, 2012 WL 1454846 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2012), which they argue supports a 

holding that the trial court was able to consider COGIC‟s governing documents in deciding a 

property dispute. 

In St. Andrews, “[a]n Episcopal parish in Nashville asserted its intention to 

disassociate from The Diocese of Tennessee, causing the Diocese to file a declaratory 

judgment action to determine whether it or the local congregation owned and controlled the 

real and personal property where the local congregation worshiped.” Id. at *1. The trial court 

found that the Episcopal Church is hierarchical and ruled that the local parish‟s real property 

was held in trust for the Diocese. On appeal, the local parish argued that the trial court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction to decide the issue due to the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention. 

The Court of Appeals disagreed with the local parish and held that the ecclesiastical 

abstention doctrine was limited to “issues of canon law, religious doctrine, or church 

governance.” Id. at *7 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 

710, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976)). In addition, the Court held that simply because 

the court might be required “to examine religious documents such as a church constitution 

for language of a trust” does not violate the neutral principles approach. St. Andrew’s, 2012 

WL 1454846, at *8 (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 

(1979)). Because the dispute in St. Andrews involved only the application of an undisputed 

governing document of the Episcopal Church, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court 

was not required to abstain from deciding the issue.

The Court then went on to consider whether the Episcopal Church‟s governing 

documents required that the parish‟s real property be held in trust for the Diocese. After 

considering these documents, as well as the hierarchical nature of the Episcopal Church, the 

Court held that “property conveyed to a local church which is a part of a connectional church 

does not remain the property of the local church even when there is no trust language in the 

deed.” St. Andrew’s, 2012 WL 1454846, at *20 (footnote omitted) (quoting Church of God 

In Christ, Inc. v. Middle City Church of God In Christ, 774 S.W.2d 950, 952 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1989)). Thus, “when a local church acquires real property by deed, it is held in trust for 
11

the parent church even in the absence of express trust language.” St. Andrew’s, 2012 WL 

1454846, at *20 (quoting Middle City, 774 S.W.2d at 952). Because the church‟s governing 

documents clearly established its intent that all church real property owned by local parishes 

would be held in trust from the Episcopal Church, the Court of Appeals ruled that the parish 

held the property in trust for the Diocese. St. Andrew’s, 2012 WL 1454846, at *20.

Based upon the holding in St. Andrews, Appellants argue that this Court should 

likewise consider the governing documents of COGIC and, based upon their clear 

requirements, determine that the real property where Gospel Center Church is located should 

be held in trust for COGIC. An important fact in St. Andrew’s, however, is that the issue 

concerned “whether an Episcopalian congregation that decides to break away from The 

Episcopal Church is able to retain possession over the real property where its congregation 

worships.” St. Andrew’s, 2012 WL 1454846, at *13. In this case, however, there is no 

allegation that Gospel Center Church has made the decision to “break away” from COGIC. 

Instead, the only action taken by some members of Gospel Center Church was to transfer 

jurisdictions within COGIC. In addition, while Appellants assert that Gospel Center Church 

refuses to follow all of COGIC‟s directives, Appellant does not suggest in its brief that 

Gospel Center Church‟s affiliation with COGIC has been terminated.8

This Court considered a similar situation in Church of God In Christ, Inc. v. Middle 

City Church of God In Christ, 774 S.W.2d 950 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). In Middle City, 

COGIC sued one of its local churches (“the local church”) after its trustees executed a deed 

transferring the real property upon which the local church was located to a religious 

corporation of a different name. Much like in this case, COGIC argued that the transfer deed 

 

8 Although not mentioned by Appellants in their appellate brief, we note that COGIC‟s Ecclesiastical 

Council did vote to excommunicate some members of Gospel Center Church and to reorganize Gospel Center 

Church under Bishop Hall‟s leadership. Along with Gospel Center Church, it appears that two of the six

individual Appellees in this case were excommunicated by the Ecclesiastical Council. Nothing in Appellants‟ 

brief or oral argument to this Court, however, argues that this ruling amounts to a dissociation by COGIC of its 

affiliation with Gospel Center Church. Indeed, the Second Amended Complaint, which was never amended, 

specifically states that Gospel Center Church “has membership” with COGIC, and that COGIC continues to 

consider it a local church for purposes of COGIC‟s Constitution and The Official Manual. In addition, in their 

memorandum in opposition to Appellees‟ motion to dismiss, Appellants specifically assert that “[Appellees] in 

the instant case, being the Local Church and members of its congregation, are without question bound by the 

orders and judgments of the parent church, COGIC.” Clearly this argument is inconsistent with any suggestion 

that Gospel Center Church was no longer a part of the COGIC organization. Arguments that are not raised and 

argued in the trial court are waived for purposes of appeal. See Fayne v. Vincent, 301 S.W.3d 162, 171 (Tenn. 

2009). Arguments that are not set forth in appellate briefs are also deemed waived on appeal. Hodge v. Craig, 

382 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tenn. 2012) (“An issue may be deemed waived, even when it has been specifically 

raised as an issue, when the brief fails to include an argument satisfying the requirements of Tenn. R.App. P. 

27(a)(7).”). Accordingly, any argument that the Ecclesiastical Council‟s ruling signifies that COGIC 

terminated its relationship with Gospel Center Church is waived. 
12

should be declared null and void due to language in The Official Manual requiring that local 

church real property be held in trust for COGIC. Id. at 951. The trial court denied COGIC‟s 

request, and this Court affirmed, adopting the trial court‟s well-reasoned decision in its 

entirety. Id. at 952. 

The Court, speaking through the trial court‟s order, recognized the general rule that 

“[a] church that is a part of a connectional church holds property in trust for the benefit of the 

superior organization.” Id. (citing Fairmount Presbyterian Church, Inc. v. The Presbytery 

of Holston of the Presbyterian Church of the U.S., 531 S.W.2d 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975); 

Cumberland Presbyterian Church v. North Red Bank Cumberland Presbyterian Church, 

430 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968); Hardin v. Starnes, 32 Tenn.App. 66, 221 S.W.2d 

824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949)). The Court, however, affirmed the trial court‟s finding that 

despite the fact that there was “friction between the local church and [COGIC],” “a move of 

location of the church,” and two name changes, “at all times pertinent hereto the local 

congregation was affiliated with [COGIC].” Middle City, 774 S.W.2d at 952. Due to this 

finding, the Court declined to interfere in the intra-church dispute, explaining:

On its face this would appear to be a simple matter of 

property resolution. However, it must be noted that there is no 

showing of withdrawal by the local congregation. The cases 

above cited deal primarily with situations in which the local 

congregation has withdrawn from the connectional system. At 

that time it was necessary for a court to determine the rights to 

the property. That is not the case before us. It may well be that 

there is friction between the local congregation and the 

connectional system; however, that is not to say that such 

amounts to withdrawal making it necessary for the Court to 

become involved in property resolution.

[COGIC] has not taken the position that there has been a 

withdrawal by the local church. It obviously does not wish to 

take such an extreme position as it might be awarded possession 

of the property. [COGIC] apparently does not seek[] possession 

of the property, but rather desires a judicial determination that 

the property is held in trust in accordance with its by-laws.

The fact that there is a deed from the local trustees to a 

corporation does not require court intervention. As stated, there 

has been no showing of a split within the congregation or an 

attempt to withdraw from the connectional system. Furthermore, 
13

it would not appear that the deed is void. See T.C.A. 66-2-201 et 

seq.

In addition there is no need for a judicial determination 

that the corporate conveyances are impressed with a trust. That 

determination might be necessary if there was a withdrawal o[r]

genuine dispute as to the actual control and ownership of the 

property. Again, that is not the case before us.

* * *

There is no need for a judicial determination of property 

rights where the local church has not withdrawn from the 

connectional system and there are no genuine property disputes. 

If the Court grants the relief sought, the result is inescapable. 

This Court would be judicially establishing as of this time, in 

accordance with present Tennessee law, the ownership of the 

church property and parsonage. By impressing a trust for the 

benefit of the connectional system in light of the disagreements 

between the local and connectional church, the order in effect 

would immediately adjudge property rights in [COGIC‟s] favor 

implying that the local congregation would forfeit the property if 

it did not follow the doctrine espoused by [COGIC]. This would 

have a chilling effect upon the exercise of religious freedom by 

[the local church]. This Court, an organ of government, cannot 

do indirectly that which it is forbidden by the Constitution to do 

directly.

Id. at 952–53 (quoting the trial court‟s ruling). Thus, the Court declined to adjudicate the 

property dispute on the basis of ecclesiastical abstention where there was no showing that the 

local church had withdrawn from COGIC. The Court recognized, however, that judicial 

intervention may be required in the future. Id. at 953. 

Clearly, the same situation is presented in this case. Here, Appellants do not assert in 

their brief that COGIC has terminated its affiliation with Gospel Center Church.9Indeed, 

despite the fact that the trial court relied upon Middle City to dismiss Appellants‟ claim to the 

 

9

In our view, it would be inconsistent for Appellants to assert with regard to the real property at issue 

that Gospel Center Church was no longer affiliated with COGIC, as Appellants assert that their entitlement to 

Gospel Center Church‟s personal property is based upon Bishop Hall‟s appointment as pastor of the church, 

due to its continued affiliation with COGIC, as discussed infra. 
14

real property upon which Gospel Center Church is located, Appellants do not cite Middle 

City in their appellate brief, nor do they attempt to distinguish it from the present case.10 

 

10 The dissent makes an eloquent and impassioned argument that the dispute between COGIC and 

Gospel Center Church, along with the alleged fracture of the Gospel Center Church‟s congregation and the 

excommunication of two of the Appellee-parishioners, is sufficient to show a complete breakdown between 

COGIC and the Gospel Center Church necessitating court intervention in spite of the holding in Middle City. 

This argument, while compelling, was simply not raised or argued by Appellants in their brief to this Court. “It 

is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant's case or arguments for him or 

her, and where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her contention or merely constructs a 

skeletal argument, the issue is waived.” Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of Sup.Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 

(Tenn. 2010). As previously discussed, Appellants failed to offer any argument to rebut the trial court‟s finding 

with regard to the application of the Middle City Opinion. While the dissent chooses to construct Appellant‟s 

argument for them despite this clear directive from the Tennessee Supreme Court, we will not.

Furthermore, we cannot fully agree with the dissent‟s application of the Middle City Opinion to the 

facts of this case. The dissent concludes that the case-at-bar is distinguishable from Middle City because there 

has been a “showing of a split within the congregation” as required by Middle City. Middle City, 774 S.W.2d 

at 953. To support this conclusion, the dissent points to the fact that two of the named Appellees have been 

excommunicated from COGIC and that there appears to be a “faction” frustrating COGIC”s interest in the 

church property. We note, however, that only one case has ever relied on the above language from Middle 

City: Avondale Church Of Christ v. Merrill Lynch, No. E2007-02335-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4853085 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2008). In Avondale, however, the parties to the case were the two opposing factions 

of the local church, rather than the parent church and local church of a connectional system. Id. at *2. Here, no 

members of the other faction of Gospel Center Church were named as plaintiffs in the Second Amended 

Complaint. Instead, the only dispute properly before the Court concerns the parent church and the local church. 

Thus, it appears that there must be a withdrawal from the connectional system in order to necessitate judicial 

intervention in this specific situation. Moreover, the Avondale Court held that the “true impasse” language so 

heavily relied upon by the dissent was mere dicta. Id. at *7. Indeed, our research suggests that other courts 

considering property rights in a connectional system have done so only after finding a withdrawal from the 

parent church. See Emmanuel Churches of Christ v. Foster, No. M2000-00812-COA-R3CV, 2001 WL 

327910, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2001) (noting that the local church had voted to withdraw from the 

parent church); Fry v. Emmanuel Churches of Christ, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) 

(“While our courts have declined to adjudicate religious matters, they have held that they would intervene in 

genuine disputes regarding property rights when there has been a withdrawal by a local church.”); St. 

Andrew’s Anglican Catholic Church v. Benemann, No. 03A01-9105CH00172, 1991 WL 209871, at *4 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 1991) (noting that the relevant caselaw was distinguishable from the present case 

because “the cited cases are disputes regarding local churches attempting to withdraw from the general or 

connectional church and take certain real property”); Fairmount Presbyterian Church, Inc. v. Presbytery of 

Holston of Presbyterian Church of U. S., 531 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) (involving a local 

church that withdrew from the parent church); Cumberland Presbyterian Church v. N. Red Bank 

Cumberland Presbyterian Church, 58 Tenn. App. 424, 432, 430 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968) 

(focusing on the fact that the local church had voted to withdraw from the parent church in deciding the case). 

Because of the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention, our courts should exercise discretion before 

interfering in disputes involving churches. Although we should not exercise this discretion so liberally as to 

refuse to become involved in all disputes, we must be reluctant to interfere in disputes until necessary. Here, 

the dissent advances an argument that was not expressly raised by the Appellant. Respectfully, formulating an 
15

Based upon the unambiguous holding in Middle City, we must decline to interfere with this 

intra-church dispute over the creation of a trust for COGIC of Gospel Center Church‟s real 

property on the basis of ecclesiastical abstention, as there has been no showing that Gospel 

Center Church has in any way terminated its affiliation with COGIC. The trial court‟s 

dismissal of Appellants‟ request that the court declare the December 2011 deed null and void 

and to reform the deed to create a trust for the use and benefit of COGIC is, therefore, 

affirmed. 

Personal Property

As we perceive it, Appellants next contend that the trial court erred in not ordering the 

Appellees “to remove themselves from control of the church and restore the Church and its 

property and funds to [Bishop Hall]” and to account for all church income and expenditures 

occurring after January 2011. Appellants, however, devote little if any of the argument in 

their appellate brief to this issue. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for Appellants indicated 

that “the court probably would not have any authority with regard to personal property.” We 

agree. 

From our review of Appellants‟ argument in the trial court, it appears that Appellants‟ 

alleged entitlement to the personal property at issue is predicated on Bishop Hall‟s allegedly 

lawful appointment as pastor of Gospel Center Church. Bishop Hall‟s deposition contains the 

following exchange: 

Q. Where in the COGIC law, if you could show me, does it say 

that you have the authority over bank accounts?

* * *

A. No, it says that I have supervision and control over the 

church.

Q. Show me where it says that.

 

argument for a party so as to encourage judicial intervention does not strike the appropriate balance required by 

the doctrine. Moreover, Gospel Center Church has not withdrawn from the connectional system and does not 

appear to be inclined to do so. COGIC also has not terminated its affiliation with the Church at this juncture. 

Neither party is without recourse, however, as they are free to terminate their affiliation in the future. Instead, 

were the course of action urged by the dissent utilized to resolve this case, we would be doing constructively 

what neither party has chosen to do in actuality. Unless and until that event takes place, this Court has no 

jurisdiction to interfere in this matter.
16

A. All right. Where it says, pastor --

11

Thus, it is clear that Bishop Hall‟s alleged authority regarding Gospel Center Church‟s 

personal property, including its bank accounts, derives from Bishop Hall‟s alleged place as 

the lawful leader of the church.

This Court, however, has no subject matter jurisdiction to declare that Bishop Hall is 

the lawful leader of Gospel Center Church, imbued with all attendant authority. As explained 

by this Court in Avondale Church of Christ v. Merrill Lynch, No. E2007-02335-COA-R3-

CV, 2008 WL 4853085 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2008):

The issue of who should comprise the leadership of the 

church, a question significantly broader and more allencompassing than that of who should control the church 

property, involves a deeper foray into the thicket of religious 

belief and church policy than [i]s necessary to resolve the 

property dispute. “[W]hen our courts have taken jurisdiction 

over an action arising from an ecclesiastical dispute, they have 

been careful to decide only the issues dealing with the civil or 

property right involved using neutral principles of law.” Foster 

v. Collins, No. W2004-01959-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 3527656, 

at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S., filed Dec. 27, 2005) (emphasis 

added). The Tennessee Supreme Court noted long ago that 

“[w]hen a civil right depends upon an ecclesiastical matter it is 

the civil court and not the ecclesiastical which is to decide. But 

the civil tribunal decides the civil right and no more, taking the 

ecclesiastical decisions out of which the civil right arises, as it 

finds them.” Landrith v. Hudgins, 120 S.W. 783, 807 (Tenn. 

1907) (emphasis added).

* * *

Our cases make it clear beyond purview that “decisions as to 

hiring or firing of pastors, as well as other issues regarding 

minister employment, are protected from court inquiry because 

such decisions necessarily involve questions of religious 

practice or governance.” Anderson [v. Watchtower Bible & 

Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., No. M2004-01066-COA-R9-

CV,] 2007 WL 161035, at *14 [(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2007)]; 

see also Mason v. Winstead, 265 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tenn. 1954) 

 

11 The book from which the parties are reading does not appear to be in the record on appeal.
17

(“the removal of a pastor is an ecclesiastical matter, and the 

tribunals of the church have exclusive authority in such cases 

without interference from the civil courts.”); Travers v. Abbey, 

58 S.W. 247 (Tenn. 1900); Foster, 2005 WL 3527656, at *6.

Avondale, 2008 WL 4853085, at *9. Thus, the Avondale Court held that it was error for the 

trial court to enter an order concerning the leadership of the Church. 

Here, Bishop Hall‟s claim to the church‟s personal property derives solely from his 

contention that COGIC‟s governing documents allow him to appoint himself as pastor of 

Gospel Center Church. To hold that Bishop Hall has authority over Gospel Center Church‟s 

personal property, this Court would be required to make a determination as to the appropriate 

leader of Gospel Center Church. Based upon the holding in Avondale, this Court simply has 

no jurisdiction to determine the proper leader of Gospel Center Church and, consequently, 

cannot conclude that Bishop Hall‟s status as pastor entitles him to control over the church‟s 

personal property. The judgment of the trial court dismissing Appellants‟ claims with regard 

to Gospel Center Church‟s personal property is, therefore, affirmed. 

Conclusion

The judgment of the Chancery Court of Fayette County is affirmed, and costs of this 

appeal are taxed to Appellants, Church of God in Christ, Inc., Bishop David A. Hall, 

individually and on behalf of Gospel Center Temple Church of God in Christ, and Gospel 

Center Temple Church of God in Christ, an unincorporated religious organization, by and 

through its duly appointed Trustee, John Arnett, and their surety. 

_________________________________

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE