### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

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NO. 03-0 5 -00 277 -CR

Ex pa r t e Th o m a s R e t z la ff

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ELL COUNTY , 264TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 47,8 46- A , HO NORAB LE JO E CARROLL , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
We w ith dr aw t he op inion and jud g me nt d a te d D e c e mbe r 5 , 2 00 6, and su bs tit ute t h e f o l l o wi n g. Thomas Retzlaff, ac ting pr o se, applied f or habe as cor

pus re l ief fr om a judg ment
o f c o n v ic ti o no r d e r in g c o mm u n it y s u p e r v is io n. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 11.072 (We st 2 00 5) . T he wr it i ssu e d by op e ra tio n o f l aw, and

the tr ia l c ourt

su bs e qu e ntl y

de nie d r e lie f i n
a w r itten orde r. See id . art. 11.072, §§ 4(a ), 6. This appe al followed. Se e id . § 8. We w ill
a ff ir m th e or de r i n p art , a

nd re ve rs e and

re nd e r i n p art
.The infor mation alleg ed that Retzlaff, knowingthat an investig ation of the thef t of books from 1 the B e ll Co un ty

law l ibr ary wa s in pr og re ss, ma de , pr e se nte d, and us e d a fa lse bo ok c he c k- ou t sl ip with knowledg e of its fa lsity and with the intent to aff ect the c ourse a n d o u t come of the investigation. I t ap p ea rs that Retzl aff , a prolific pr o se litigator, was suspec ted of stea ling books f r o m t h e l i b r ar

y. 2 I n Aug ust 1997, Retz laff ple aded guilty to tampering with or fabr icating phy sical evide nce. See T ex . P en al C ode Ann. § 37.09 ( West 2003). The trial c ourt defe rre d 1

a dju dic a tio n a

nd p l a c e d Re tzla ff on c omm un ity su pe rv isi on a s c a lle d f

or in a ple a ba rg a in a g re e me nt. I n Marc h 1998, the cour

t adjudg ed R etzlaff guilty

and sente nced him to ten y ear s’ imprisonment and
a $1 0, 00 0 f

ine . T he c ourt

su sp e nd e d impo si ti on of se nte nc e and re tur ne d Re tzla ff

to c omm un ity supervision for ten y ear s. Retzl aff filed a motion to modify the conditions of supervision in October 1998, but the court took no ac tion on th e m o t i o n . He filed an a mended motion to modify the supervisory

conditions in J uly

2004. The re cord r efle cts t h at t h e co u rt took this mot ion under advisement, but did not rule. Retzlaff filed his a rticle 11.072 a

pplication in J anuar

y 2005. Enac ted in 2003, article 11.072 “esta blishes the proc edure s for a n application for

a writ of habea s corpus in a felony or misdemeanor case in w hich the applicant se eks re lief fr om an order or a judg ment of convic tion orderingcommunity supervision.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, § 1. At the time the a pplication is fil ed , t h e ap p l i cant must be, or ha ve bee n, on community

supervision, and the a

pplication must chal leng e the leg al validity of the c onditions of community

supervision or of the conviction or order in w hich community supervision was imposed. Id . § 2(b). Ar

ti cl e 1 1
. 0 7 2 m ay

be used to c halleng e a c ondition of community supervision onAn application may not be filed pursua

nt to article 1 1 .072 “if the a pplicant could obtain the 2 reque sted relief

by means of a

n appea l.” Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. ar t
. 1 1
. 0 7 2 , § 3(a) (We st 2 00 5) . Se c tio n 3 (a ) c le arl y pr oh ibi ts the us e of ar ti cle 11 .0 72 wh e n r e lie f b y a pp e a l is a va ila ble at the t ime the pe tit ion is f ile d. On e c ourt

of a pp e a ls h a s c on str

ue d s e c tio n 3 (a ) a lso to pr oh ibi t th e us e of

art ic le 11 .0 72 to c ha lle ng e a c on dit ion

of su pe rv isi on if the c ha lle ng e c ou ld have be en made on appea l fr o m t h e conviction. Ex parte W ilson , 171 S.W .3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pe t.). This is in accor d with t h e g ener al rule that habea s corpus can n o t be used a s a substitute for appe al, and that it may not be used to bringclaims—eve n constitutional c laims—that c ould have be en broug ht on appea l. Ex parte Nelson , 137 S.W .3d 666, 66 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); Ex parte Townsend , 13 7 S.W. 3d 79 , 8 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); see Ex pa rteClo re , 6 9 0 S
. W
. 2 d 8 9 9 , 9 0 0 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 8 5 ) ( ap p ro p ri at e r em ed y t o c h a l l en ge condition of probation is by appea l from conviction). A ssuming without decidingthat this is t he corr ect inter

pretation of section 3(a ), it does not a pply here beca

use, under the appellate rules as the y wer e then inter

prete d by the cour t of criminal appe als, Retzl aff had no rig ht of appe al re g ardingthe conditions of his supervision following e ither the 1997 orde r def err ing a djudicatio n o r t h e 1998 judgme nt of conviction. Se e Ly on v . S tat e , 8 72 S.W. 2d

73 2, 73 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); W atson v . S tat e , 924 S.W .2d 711, 714-15 (Te x . Crim. App. 1996). We also note that the cour t of criminal a pp e a ls h a s st a te d, a lbe it i n an un pu bli sh e d opin ion havin g no pr e c e de nti a l val ue , tha t c ha lle ng e s to conditions of community

supervision must now be made pursuant to article 11.072 and that relief via direc t appea l is not av ailable. Be au c ha mp v . S tat e , No. 254-03, 2004 WL3093227 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 22, 2004) (not desig nated f or publication). 3 c on sti tut ion a l g ro un ds on ly , a nd the a pp lic ant m

us t f ir st atte mpt

to g a in r e lie f b y

fi lin g a mot ion to amend the c onditions of supervision. Id . § 3(b), ( c). 2

In h i s h a b e a s c o r p u s a p p l i c a t i o n , R e t z l a f f c h a l l e n g e d

t h i rt y- t w o o f

t h e f o rt ysix conditions of his supervision. As it is i n any habea s corpu s p ro cee ding, the burden w as on Retzl aff to pr o v e his claims by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Ex parte Pe terson , 117 S.W .3d 804, 8 1 8 (T ex . Crim. App. 2003). The tria l court denie d relief without conducting a hea ring
. See T e x. Co d e Cr im
. Pr o c . A n n . art. 1 1
. 0 7 2 , § 6
. I n r e v ie w in g th e o r d e r , w e d e f e r to th e tr ial court’s deter minations of historical fac ts that the rec ord supports. Peterson , 1 1 7 S. W. 3 d a t 8 1 9. We
c on du c t a de no vo re vie w of mixe d qu e sti on s of law and fa c t that do no t de pe nd on credib ili ty and deme anor. Id
.Re tzla ff state s th e iss ue a s f

oll ow s: “ Can a

tr ia l c ourt

im po se con di ti on s o f c omm un ity 3 s u p e r v i s i o nu p o na p r o b a t i o n e r

th a tt h e p r o b a t i o n e r

d i d n o te v e r a g r e e t o o r

e v e nkn o w a

b o u t ?” 4 I n h is s e c on d p oin t of

e rr or , Re tzla ff

c ha lle ng e s th e c on dit ion s o f s up e rv isi on a s a wh ole on the g ro un d th a t he wa s n ot g ive n p ro pe r n oti c e . Re tzla ff did no t r a ise thi s c on te nti on

in 3 his writ application and, there fore , nothing is prese nted for revie w. Point of er ror two is over

ruled. I n p oin t of

e rr or on e , Re tzla ff

c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y ov e rr uli nghis challeng es to eig hteen spe cific supe rv isory conditions. Retz laff’ s principal ar g ument is that the imp os iti on

of e a c h c on dit ion

wa s an a bu se of dis c re tio n be c a

us e the c on dit ion

ha s n o r e la tio ns hip to the crime f

or which he was c onvicted, re lates to conduc t that is not in i tself cr iminal, and is not
re as o n ab l y related to his future c riminality or does not ser

ve the statutory

ends of pr obation. See Ma rc um v . S

tat e , 983 S.W .2d 762, 768 (Tex. App.—Houston [ 1 4 t h Dist.] 1998, pet. re f’d) . As pr e vio us ly

no te d, ho we ve r, a

c on dit ion of su pe rv isi on may be c ha lle ng e d un de r art ic le 11 .0 72 on ly on constitutional grounds. Te x . Code Crim. Proc. Ann. ar t. 11.072, § 3(c). T his require s more than
a mer e showing that the cour t a bused its discretion. Retzl aff must demonstrate that the c halleng ed condition violates a spec ific constitutional rig ht or g uara ntee. F ine s a nd fe e s. Retzl aff

asser ts that the trial court did not c onsider his a bility to pay
a s re qu ir e d by the pr ob a tio n statut e , and the re by de nie d him du e pr oc e ss o f l aw, be fo re or de ri nghim to pay court c osts (condition 11), a superv i s i o n fe e (condition 13), a f ine (c ondition 14), and a substance a

buse testing fee (condition 18). Se e id . art. 42.12, § 11(b) (West Supp. 2006). The trialThe rec o rd before us include s the repor ter’s r ecor d from the August 20 and 29, 1997, 4 pr oc e e din g s at w hic h Re tzla ff ple a de d g uil ty and wa s pla c e d on de fe rr e d a dju dic a tio n c omm un ity supervision, and fr om the Marc h 18, 1 9 98, hear ing at which he wa s adjudg ed g uilty . The re cord does not contain the Ma

rch 26 , 1 9 9 8 , hear ing at which sentenc e wa s suspended a nd Retzl aff

was order ed back t o community supervision. We are advised that the r eporte r’s notes f rom this hearing have be en los t or destroy ed. Retzlaff doe s not complain of this in his brief, and the a bsence of the re c or d of thi s hea

ri ng ha s not af

fe c te d our c on sid e ra

tio n of the a

pp e a l. Re tzla ff

’s mot ion to a bate the appe al for a

hear ing r eg ardingthe lost recor d is overrule d. 5 court found in its order

that Retzl aff

’s ability to pay was considere d befor e these conditions were imposed, but Retz laff r esponds that there is no evidence of such c onsideration in the re cord. 4

Al tho ug h Re tzla ff

c ha lle ng e d c on dit ion

18 in h is w ri t app lic a tio n, he did no t do so on the g round he now as s erts. Moreover, w hile a proc edura l error or statutory

violation might be
reve rsible er

ror on dire ct appe al, it is not a constituti onal er ror t h at re quires re lief on a w rit of habea s corpus. Ex

pa rteMc Cai n , 67 S.W .3d 204, 209-10 (Te x . Crim. App. 2002)
. T he fa ilure to adher e to statutory

proce dures se rving to protect a constitutional rig ht violates the statute, not the constitution i tself. Ex parte Grav es , 70 S.W .3d 103, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The trial c ourt’s alleg ed fa ilure to comply

with a rticle 42.12, section 11(b), even if true, was a statutory violation that
ca n n o tb e a s s er t e d t o c h al l en ge t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f s u p er v i s i o ni nt h i s ar t i cl e 1 1
. 0 7 2 p ro ce ed i n g. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 11.072, § 3(c ).

Stay-away. Con dit ion s 3 6 a nd 37 pr oh ibi t Re tz laff f

ro m di re c tly

or ind ir e c tly
c on ta c tin g or

c omm un ic a tin g wi th c e rt a in name d ind ivi du a ls, liv ing in the same re sid e nc e wi th t he se ind ivi du a ls, or g oin g wi thi n f our h un dr e d y ard s o f l oc a tio ns fr e qu e nte d b y the se ind ivi du a ls. As to
e a c h p e rs on , Re tzla ff

a sse rt s th a t th e re is n o ba sis in t he re c or d f

or c on c lud ingthat th e c on dit ion is rele vant to the cr ime for whic h he wa s convicted, is desig ned to pre vent future criminality , or ser ves6

the s t at u t o ry ends of probation. See M arcum , 983 S.W .2d at 768. This is an abuse of discretion challeng e, not a c onstitut ional one. Retzl aff ’s other a rg uments reg ardingthese c onditions were not
ra ise d in the wr it a

pp lic a tio n a

nd we re no t pr e se rv e d f

or a pp e a l. Lit iga ti on. Con dition 39 prohibit s Retzl aff from thre ateningto file and c ondition 40 prohibits Retz laff f

rom filing pr o se civil litigation without f irst de monstrating to the trial court that such litigation would not be frivolous within the meaning of the c ivil practice and re medies code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 9.001-10.006 (W est 2002). I n its order de ny ing relief , the trial cour

t wrote that ther e is e vidence Retzl aff “soug ht to use liti g ation as a w eapon, a nd these c onditions were imposed to cur b these tende ncies.” The court added that the conditions do not pr e ve nt R e tzla ff

fr om d e fe nd inghim se lf

if su e d o r p ro hib it Ret zla ff fr om f ili ngme ri tor iou s la

ws uit s. I n addition to urg ing that these conditions are an abuse of the c ourt’s discre tion, Retz laff a sserts that the conditions violate his free dom of spee ch , deny him meaning ful ac cess to the c ourts, and
c o n s t i tu t e o u t l aw r

y. A co n d it io n o f s u

p e r v is io n is n o t n e c e s s ar il y inv a li d b e c a u s e it in te r f

e r e s with the exercise of a co n s t itutional right. Ex parte Alak ayi , 102 S.W .3d 426, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h D ist .] 20 03 , p e t. r e f’ d) . Ac on dit ion that int ru de s on a pr ob a tio ne r’ s c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts wi ll b e u p h el d i f i t bear s a re asonable relationship t o the purposes of community

supervision or the leg itimate needs of la

w enf orce ment. Id
. Conditi on 39 constitutes a prior r estraint on Retzlaff’s F irst Amendment fre edom of sp e e c h. Pr ior

re str a int s are str on g ly

dis fa vo re d, and wi ll be up he ld a g a ins t c on sti tut ion a l a tta c k o nly in e xce pti on a l c a se s; f

or e xamp le , to pr e ve nt the pu bli c a tio n o f i nf

or ma tio n a bo ut t ro op mov e me nts7

during war

time or to prohibit incitement to acts of violence
. Se e Ne ar v . M inn eso ta , 283 U.S. 697, 71 6 ( 19 31 ). Con dit ion

39 be ars a tenu ou s c on ne c tio n at be st t o th e of fe ns e fo r w hic h Re tzla ff

is on prob ation. The pe rce ived nee d to curb Retzlaff’ s tendenc y to use litigation as a

wea pon can be acc omplished without t he extraordinar y imposit ion of a pr i o r re s t ra i nt on his free dom of speec h. We will, therefor e, sustain Retzlaff’s c halleng e to condition 39 and re verse the trial cour t’s denial of r elief.

Turn ing to co nd iti on

40 , Re tzla ff

c ite s n o a uth or ity ho ldi ngthat th e fi lin g of

a laws uit is an ex pressive a ctivity

protec ted by

the fre e spee ch cla

uses. See U. S. Con st. a me nd
. I ; T e x. Con st. art. I , § 8. I t has bee n held that there is no constitutionally protec ted rig ht to file or pursue f rivolous or malicious litigation. Hicks v . Brysch , 989 F. Supp. 7 9 7 , 8 2 2 ( W. D
. T e x. 1 9 9 7 )
. We
are u n p er s uaded that condition 40 constitut es a pr ior restra int on Retz laff’ s fre edom of spee ch and expression.

Th e Te xas Con sti tut ion pr ov ide s tha t “ [n]o c iti zen sh a ll b e ou tla

we d. ” Te x. Con st. art. I , § 20. Outlawry , in the English common law, wa s the withdrawa l by civil society

of all leg al rig hts an d p ro tection from one of its offendingmembers. Id . interp. commenta ry (West 1997). Article I , section 20 “w as intended t o p ro h i b i t t h e s tate only from . . . deny

ing a citizen all

leg al rig hts.” Pee ler v. Hughe

s & Luce , 909 S.W .2d 494, 499 (Tex 1995). We conclude that condition 4 0 d o e s n o tc o n s t i tu t e o u t l aw r y. The Te x as Constitut ion gua rante es that “[a]ll courts shall be open, a nd ever y person for an injury done him .
. . shall have reme dy by due course of law.” Tex. Const. art. I , § 13. Under thi s p ro vis ion , th e c ourt s must a c tua lly be op e n a nd op e ratin g , c iti zen s mu st h a ve a c c e ss t o th e c ourt s8

unimpeded by

unrea sonable financ ial barr iers, and the leg islature may not abrog ate the r ight to asse rt
a well-e stablished common law cause of action. L eon ar d v . A bb ott , 171 S.W .3d 451, 457 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied). To establish an open courts viol ation, it must be shown that the litigant ha s a cog nizable common law ca use of a ction being restric ted by a statute, a

nd that the restric tion is unrea sonable or arbitra ry when ba lance d ag ainst the purpose of the statute. Id . B e c a

us e Retzl aff does not cha lleng e a le g islative act that a bridg es a c og nizable common law claim, his open courts cha lleng e is without merit. See F ederal Sign v. Tex as S. Univ. , 951 S
. W
. 2 d 401, 410 (Tex. 1997).

Retzl aff also asser ts that condition 40 a

bridg es his c onstitut ional rig ht to mea ningf ul
ac ce s s t o t h e c o u rt s , ci t i n g Bo un ds v . S mi th , 430 U.S. 817 (1977). Bounds held that “the fu nd a me nta l r ig ht o f a c c e ss t o th e c ourt s” re qu ir e s p ri so n a uth or iti e s to pr ov ide i nm ate s ade qu a te law librar ies or ade quate a ssistance fr om persons traine d in the law. 430 U.S. at 828. This holding g rewout of ea

rlier c ases r ecog nizi ng that prisoners have “a rig ht to bring to c ourt a g rieva nce that the inmate wishe[s] t o prese nt.” Lewis v. Casey , 518 U. S. 3 43 , 3 54 (1 99 6) . T his ri g ht i s li mit e d to dir e c t a pp e a ls f ro m th e c on vic tio ns fo r wh ic h the pr iso ne r is inc arc e rate d, ha be a s c or pu s p e tit ion s, and civil rig hts actions to vindicate basic constitutional rights. Id . The c hallenged condition of supervision does not violate the rig ht of ac cess to the c ourts rec og nized in the Bounds lin e of c a se s. Finally , in his motion for rehea ring , Retzl aff urg es for the first time that condition 40 vio la te s h is F ir st A me ndme nt ri g ht to pe tit ion the g ov e rnme nt f or a re dr e ss o f g ri e va

nc e s. B e c a

us e this contention was not prese nted to the trial cour t in the habea s corpus pe tition, i t was not prese rved fo r a pp e a l.9 Adultery. Conditi on 41 prohibits Retz laff f rom “knowing ly

eng ag [i ng ] i n any
a du lte ro us rel atio ns hip s at any tim e wi th a

ny on e .” Re tzla ff

c omp la ins that th is c on dit ion is

“ sil ly ” and

“ un e nf or ceabl e,” and he state s th a t he “ ha s a bs olute ly no int e nti on

of ob e y ingthi s bog us probation condition.” Retzlaff a sserts that the condition is unconstitutional, but he offer s
n o argume nt in support of this assertion. None of Re tzl aff ’s ar g uments are cog nizable under article 11.072. Law yer. Conditi on 38 prohibits Ret zlaff from holding himself out as a law y er,
a tto rn e y , o r l e g a l a dv iso r a t any tim e . Re tzla ff argue s tha t un de r t he F ir st A me ndme nt, he “ c an c a ll himself whateve r he w ants” so long as it is not done fraudule ntly or for financ ial g ain. We note that falsely holding oneself out as a la wy er is a c rime. See Tex. Pena l Code Ann. § 38.122 (West 2003). Retzl aff cites no authority

for his asse rtion that such conduc t is constitut ionally protec ted. Co n ta ct with w if

e. C o n d i t i o n s 2 5 an d

2 6 p ro h i b i tR et z l af

f f ro m co n t ac t i n g, communicating with, or g oing within 400 y ards of the residenc e of Denise Retzl aff , his wife at the time the condition was imposed. Retzlaff conc edes that these co n d itions were r easona ble when imp os e d, bu t he a sse rt s th a t “ c ir c ums tanc e s have c ha ng e d. ” Spe c if

ic a lly , he a sse rt s that he and his
no w f or me r w if e “ have fu lly

and c omp le te ly

re c on c ile d. ” Retzla ff

’s argume nt d oe s n ot p re se nt a
c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e to t he se c on dit ion s. Al c oho l and inj ur iou s ha bit s. Conditi on 2 order s Retzl aff to “[a]void i njurious or vicious habits and abstain fr om the use of na rcotic dr ug s in any form; not use alc oholic bever ag es.” See Tex. Code Crim. P roc . An n . art. 42.12, § 11(a )(2) (West Supp. 2006). Retz laff a rg ues that the phra se “a

void injurious or vicious habits” is unconstitut ionally vagu e. Any

vag ueness wa s10

cure d, howeve r, by

the re fer ence to narc otics and alc oholic bever ag es in the same c ondi t ion. See Fl or es v . S

tat e , 513 S.W .2d 66, 68-69 (Te x . Crim. App. 1974). Alcoholic beve rag es ar e also the subjec t of condition 32, which order s Retzl aff “not to consume, transpor

t, purcha se, trade for, own or poss ess any alcoholic be vera g e at a

ny time or any place .” Retzlaff c omplains that this condition is unreasona ble bec ause he was not shown to be a n
a lc oh oli c and

be c a us e it l imi ts h is o pp or

tun iti e s f or e mpl oy men t. Onc e a g a in, ho we ve r, art ic le 11.072 only

permits constitutional challeng es to the conditions of super vision. Tr ut hfulne ss. Con dit ion 28 re qu ir e s Re tzla ff

to g ive tr

uth fu l in fo rm a tio n to his probation off

icer . He c ontends that this viola t es h i s Fi ft h Amendment privileg e ag ainst selfincrimination. We disagr ee. Condition 28 does not prohibit Retz laff f rom dec lining to g ive incriminating information; it merely prohibits him from giving false inf ormation. F ir e ar m s. C o n d i tion 31 prohibits R etzlaff fr om residing in a home whe re a ny firea rm or ammunit i o n is kept. He c omplains that this conditi on is vag ue bec ause “ reside” is not de fi ne d. He did

no t make thi s argume nt i n h is w ri t a pp lic ati on . I n any

e ve nt, we be lie ve that a pe rs on of or din ary int e lli g e nc e , a

pp lyingthe c omm on ly

un de rs too d mea

nin g of the wo rd , w ou ld
un de rs tand

thi s c on dit ion ’s re qu ir e me nts
. Medical tr eatm ent. Conditi on 34 require s Retzl aff to attend and pa

y for a ny ps y c ho log ic a l e va luatio n a nd tr e a tme nt ar

ra ng e d by his su

pe rv isi on of

fi c e r, and to m a ke the re su lts of any ev al u ation or treatment available to the of fice r. Condition 35 requires Retzlaff to take the
me dic a tio ns pr e sc ri be d b y any tr e a tin g ph y sic ian. Re tzla ff argue s that the se c on dit ion s a re an a bu se of discre tion because he wa s not shown to ne ed medical treatment a nd cannot aff

ord it, they do not11

se rv e the purp os e s o f p ro batio n, and the y vio la te do c tor -p a tie nt c on fi de nti a lity . N on e of the se
argume nts is a

c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e to t he c on dit ion s. The motion for re hear ing a nd the m otion for en banc r econside ration ar e over ruled. We sust a in

Re tz la f f ’ s c h a ll e n g e to th e v a li d it y o f s u p e r v is o r y c o n d it io n3 9 , o v e r

r u le th e d is tr ict court’s or der de ny ing relief as to that condition, and order the condition struck. The district court’s
or de r i s a ff

ir me d in a ll o the r r e sp e c ts.

____________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ________________ W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton; Concurringand Dissenting Opinion by J ustice Pemberton Affir med in part; Rever sed and Rende red in pa rt on Motion for Rehea

ring Filed: May

15, 2007 Do No t Pu

bli sh