2003 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit 11-5-2003 

# Mi l le r v . B e r r y M et al C o P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-1333

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003/134NOT PRE CEDENT IAL IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

____________ No. 03-1333

____________ BE RN AR D M . M ILL ER , JR .,

Appellant
v. BERRY MET AL COMPANY

____________ App eal from th e Un ited States District Co urt For th e W estern Distric t of P enns ylvania D.C. No.: 01- cv-01988 Distri ct Judge: Honorable GaryL. Lancaste r

____________ Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a) October 22, 2003
Before: AL

ITO, FUENTES, and ROSENN, Circuit Judges. (Fil ed November 5, 2003)

____________ OPINI ON OF THE COURT

____________ ROSENN , Circ uit J udge. This appealaris es from an age di scri minati on suit brought by

Bernard Mill er (“Mille r”) agai nst hi s former employ er, Berr y Metal Company (“Berry” or “the1 Appellant ’s bri ef asserts that Mill er reques ted tr aining on t he computeri zed machinerybefore hi s medicalleave i n 1999, contradict ing the f inding of t

he District Cou rt . A ppl ’t ’s Br. at

4. Yet , t

he Dis tric t C our

t’ s f in di ng w as ba se d onApp el lant ’s own testimony, and Appellant points to no factual support in t he record for

this new assertion. 2 Company”). The Distri ct Court a dopted theMagistrate Judge’s Report and Re com me nda tion as its opi nio n, gr antin g th e C om pan y’s mo tion for sum ma ry judg me nt. We af fi rm. I. The histor

y of t he underlying action is known by the par ties ; we will s tateonly the facts ne cessary t o support our reasoni ng and decisi on. Miller began his employment in the Company’s machine shop in 1994 as a class 6 machinist . He maintai ned this same position unti l he was lai d off in Januar y of 2001, at age 5 2. M iller wa s diag nose d w ith fybrom yalgia an d R aynaud s in 19 98, ca using him to take extended sick l eave from August of 1998 until J une of 1999. Upon his return, Miller
wo rke d fo r thre e da ys, but then retu rne d to exte nde d sic k lea ve u ntil N ove mb er o f 20 00. M iller o per ated ma nua l ma chin es d urin g hi s tim e of em plo ymen t at th e C om pan y. The Company owned and operated one c omputer numeri c control led machine ( “CNC”) when M ill er was ini tial ly hired, and added two other CNC s between August of 1998 and June of 1 999 , wh ile M iller wa s on s ick lea ve. In o rder to oper ate the CN Cs, m achin ists must be tr ained byan experi enced operat or for one month, followed byclose s upervis ion for ano th ertwo mont

hs. Mil le r t es ti fi ed t

hat he n eve r a ske d t o be tr ai nedon the CNCs prior to his return from sick l eave in November of 2000. 1 Up on re turn, M iller aske d his3

supervi sor, Mr. Koppel, i f he could be t rained on t

he CNCs. But, the Company asserted that w hile M iller wa s on s ick lea ve, the Co mp any traine d sev eral em ployees to oper ate the C NC s, an d it h ad n o ne ed f or a ddi tion al C NC ope rato rs at th at tim e. Upon termination, Mil ler br ought sui t agai nst the Company under t he Age Discri minati on in Employ ment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq ., Ti tle Iof the Am erica ns w ith D isab ilities A ct (“A DA ”), 4 2 U .S.C . § 12 111 , et seq ., and the Pen nsylv ania Hu ma n R elatio ns A ct (“P HR A” ), 43 Pa.C .S.A . § 95 1, et seq . Mill er
cons ented to the d ismissa l of his AD A a nd P HR A c laims, lea ving only the A DE A c laim for re view upo n app eal. Th e D istrict Co urt had fede ral que stion ju risdiction over this cl ai m pur suantto 28 U. S. C. § 133 1. We ha ve appe ll at e j ur is di ct io n pu rs uan t to 28 U.S .C. § 12 91. II. In a n ap pea l of a n or der of s um ma ry judg me nt, th is co urt’s rev iew is ple nar y. See Na thans on v . Me dical C ollege of P enns ylvania , 926 F.2 d 13 68, 1 380 (3d Cir . 199 1). Summary judgment

may be granted if

there i s “no genuine i ssue of material f act and the
mo ving party is entitled to judg men t as a m atter of law.” Fed .R.C iv.P. 56 (c); Celotex Co rp. V . Catre tt , 477 U.S . 317 (19 86)
. Appellant

clai ms that he s uccessful ly establ ished a prim a facie case of age discrimination under t

he ADEA . To est ablis h a prim a facie cas e of age disc rimi natio n, a plaintiff must demonstrate t hat he or she (1) was a mem ber of the protected age class4

(over 40) ; (2) was qualifi ed to hold t he position; ( 3) suffer ed an adverse employment decisi on; and (4) was replace d by a s ignifi cantl y y ounger indi vidual to permit an infe ren ce o f dis crim inati on. See Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refi ning Corp. , 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995). There is no dispute over the first two elements of M iller ’s pr ima facie case. However, regardi ng the third and fourt h elements , Mill er argues that t he Com pany’s failure to train him to o perate the C NC s, while younge r employees w ere train ed, c ons titute d ad ver se a ction resu lting in h is be ing rep lace by youn ger wo rke rs. Appellant

does not ar gue upon appeal t hat thelay off it self was the adverse a ction, but rather th at by failing to train h im, he wa s left in a less skille d class that w as ev entua lly sub ject to layof fs. Miller’ s arguments rais ed upon appeal fai l to address theprimary point t hat Mill er
was not pr es en t d ur in g the two y ea r p erio d wh en th e Co mpa nywas ac ti ve ly tr ai ni ng C NC operator s. The Company l egiti matelyclai med that i t had tr ained a suf fici ent number of emp lo y ee s p ri orto Mil le r’ s r etur n i n No ve mbe r 2 000 to mee t i ts st af fi ng n ee ds fo r CN C machines. No other y ounger employ ees were offer ed trai ning in pl ace of Mille r duri ng the tw o m ont h pe riod betw een M iller’s retu rn to wo rk a nd t he e ven tual l ayof fs. In fashi oning his argument, Miller poi nts out that t he trai ning was not offered in a class se tting, bu t was perfo rmed at diff erent tim es on an on goin g bas is, presu mp tively indicating t

hat it would not have been bur densome for theCompany to t rain hi m. Yet, t

he Distri ct Court f

ound that whil e trai ning may ha ve been possi ble, the Company already5

had trai ned a suffic ient work force for i ts three CNC machines and did not need another trainee. Next, Mill er argues that Richter, a younger employee working as a class 6
mac hinist (the sam e leve l as M iller) wa s off ered tra ining w hile M iller wa s den ied. Y et, Rich ter, rega rdless o f his ag e or cla ss, wa s ava ilable w hen th e Co mp any dec ided th at it need ed m ore C NC oper ators; M iller wa s not. Miller’ s most emphati c argument arises f rom the te sti mony of Mr. Lindner , who was slightly older t

han Miller . The record shows, and the District Court acknowledged, that Li ndner all egedlyrequested CNC training, but was tol d by a member of t he Company’s management t hat he was too ol d. Appell ee notes t hat thi s comment was likel y made i n jest , give n that Li ndner was the uni on presi dent and both parti es to t he
conv ersation laugh ed at th e com men t. Yet, ev en if th is cou rt draw s an in feren ce fro m this statement in t

he light most favorabl e to Appell ant and ass umes that Li ndner was subjected to age discri mination, that does not affect the court’s analy sis of Miller’s pr ima facie cas e. See Weldon v. Kraft, Inc. , 896 F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir. 1990)(noting that when review ing su mm ary judgm ent, all ev idenc e mu st be re view ed in th e light m ost fav orab le to the non-m oving p arty). Miller was absen t while training w as offered , and therefo re cannot show that

he was denied traini ng based on his age. Mill er cannot base his initial prim a facie claim on c om me nts th at w ere m ade to an oth er em plo yee a ye ar p rior. See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr, and Sol is-Cohen , 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Stray remarks by non-decisionmakers or by decis ionmakers unrelated to the decisi on process6

are rarelygiven great weight, parti cularl y i f theywere made temporal ly remote fr om the date of deci sion. ”). I f Miller had been able to establ ish a prim a facie case of age discrimination b ased on his persona l experience w ith the Com pany, then Lind ner’s experienc e may have been relev ant eviden ce to presen t to a jury to show the c omp any’s past i nclinations or practices. But, without making a prim a facie case base d on M iller’s own experience , he c ann ot p roc eed to th e ne xt p has e of the li tigat ion
. III. The Distri ct Court f

ound that e ven if a prim a facie case is presum ed, summ ary judgm ent is still appropriate becau se M iller failed to show that the Com pany’s justific ations were prete xt. We agree. In cases where a plai ntiff is abl e to est ablis h a prim a facie case through circumst antia l evide nce, courts undertake the burden shi fting analy sis es tabli shed in McD onnell Dougla s Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 ( 1973). Under this analy sis, once a plai ntiff has est ablis hed a prim a facie case, th e bur den s witch es to the defendant

to provi de a legi timat e non-dis criminatoryjustific ation f or the empl oyment dec ision
. See Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins , 45 F .3d 7 24, 7 28 ( 3d C ir.), cert. denied , 515 U.S. 1159 (1995) . If t he defendant pr ovides suc h a justific ation, then theburden switches back to the plai ntiff to show by a

preponderanc e of the evi dence that the pro ffe red justif icatio n is in fac t pre text f or d iscrim inati on. See Fue ntes v . Persk ie , 32 F.3 d 75 9, 76 3 (3 d C ir. 19 94)
. In just ify ing it s acti ons, the Company rei terated that Miller was deni ed trai ning7

not because of his age, but because business was slowing, and the Company alreadyhad trai ned a suffic ient work force to oper ate i ts CNC machines. Furt hermore, when the Company began lay offs, t he class 6 machinist s who primari ly performed manual l abor were the fi rst group to be le t go. Thi s group inc luded Mill er, al ong with some other youn ger em plo yees s uch as R ichte r. To s how the Co mpan y ’s exp la natio n t o be pr et ext , Mi ll ermus t p ro duc e s ome direct or circumstanti al evi dence from which a rea sonable fa ct fi nder could e ither (1) disbel ieve the employ er’s l egiti mate just ific ation, or (2) be lievethat an invidi ous disc rimi nato ry inten t wa s m ore likel y than not the C om pan y’s true mo tivat ion
. See Fuentes , 32 F.3d at

764. Mill er has fai led to meet eithe r standard. Regarding pre text, Miller f irst argues that becaus e the Company was st illusing CNC machines i n 2000 when M ill er reques ted tr aining, there must have been a need for more trai ned employ ees. The fac ts si mply do not support hi s clai m. In November of 200 0 w hen M iller return ed to w ork, the Co mp any w as ex perien cing a dow nturn in busin ess tha t wo uld req uire layof fs w ithin the next tw o m onth s. It is unre ason able to assert u nder these c ircum stance s that sim ply beca use th e Co mp any had CN C m achin es, it
nee dedto tr ai n a l ar ger

workfor ce to op er at e them. M iller nex t addre sses se veral iss ues th at we re raised durin g dep osition s with Co mp any ma nage rs, includ ing w hethe r M iller’s sup erviso r, Ko ppel, w as qu alified to train him and whether t

he management thought that Mil ler was content working on manual8

machines. These arguments do not addres s the Company’ s legi timat e justific ations for refusi ng trai ning and eventually lay ing off Mill er. The Dist rict Court found that the Company’s manager s offered cons ist ent te sti mony on thi s point , and Mill er’s argument abou t these o ther m atters do es no thing to cast do ubt u pon the C om pany’s le gitima te justific ations for it s acti ons. We agree. IV. Accordingly , the judgment and or der of the Distri ct Court wil l be affi rmed. Each side to bear it s own costs.9

TO THE C LERK: Please fi le theforegoing opi nion.

/s/ Max Rosenn, Circuit

Judge