TO BE PUBLISHED 

,Suprrtur Gaud of eficfirufurkg 

2015-SC-000023-KB 

AND 

2015-SC-000025-KB 

PATE2-264-t s- e..1).4-C7.0,J.wps 

KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION MOVANT 

V. IN SUPREME COURT 

ERIC C. DETERS RESPONDENT 

OPINION AND ORDER 

In two now-consolidated disciplinary actions, the Kentucky Bar 

Association Board of Governors found Eric C. Deters 1guilty of a number of 

ethical violations and recommended he be suspended thirty days for each. 

Deters petitions this Court to strike the Board's Findings of Fact, Conclusions 

of Law, and Recommendation because the Board failed to provide its findings 

to this Court within the time specified under Supreme Court Rules 

(SCR) 3.370(6). We now deny Deters's petition and adopt the Board's 

recommended thirty-day suspension for each action, to run consecutively. 

1Admitted to practice law in Kentucky on October 10, 1986; KBA Member 

No. 81812; Bar roster address: 5247 Madison Pike, Independence, KY 41051. 
I. KBA FILE NO. 19343. 

In 2006, Deters filed a civil complaint in Kenton Circuit Court. 2The 

complaint involved the alleged violation of an individual's rights by the Kenton 

County Jail. Initially, Deters named only the Kenton County Jailer in his 

official capacity as a defendant in the action. Deters eventually filed an 

amended complaint, including the Jailer in his individual capacity and the 

County Judge-Executive and County Commissioners in their respective 

individual capacities. At the time of this amended complaint, the evidence 

indicated the County Judge-Executive and County Commissioners had no 

direct personal involvement with the plaintiff, Deters's client, under the 

circumstances giving rise to the complaint. In addition, Deters's amended 

complaint included "Unknown Kenton County Jail Medical Personnel" and 

"Unknown Deputy Jailers" as defendants. 

The County Judge-Executive and County Commissioners were dismissed 

by summary judgment because, according to the trial court, there was 

"absolutely no basis in law or in fact to support the claims." The "unknown" 

defendants were especially curious because Deters's client "testified in his 

deposition that he had given the names of the individuals whom he believed to 

have violated his rights to his attorney 'in the beginning."' Deters finally 

attempted to file a second amended complaint naming additional parties; but 

the trial court summarily rejected it because the statute of limitations had 

2While not important for the purposes of the instant action, the case serving as 

the basis for Deters's discipline was Chandler v. Carl, Kenton Circuit Court Civil Action 

No. 06-CI-03311. 

2 
expired and, considering that Deters was attempting to substitute a named 

defendant for an unnamed defendant, the amended complaint was not within 

the relation-back rule. 

Ultimately, the trial court found that Deters's complaints were not "well 

grounded in fact nor were they warranted by existing law." Specifically, the 

naming of improper parties was found unreasonable under the circumstances. 

So, in the trial court's view, the complaints were signed in violation of Kentucky 

Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 11. And the trial court ordered Deters to pay 

$29,381.41 for the opposing party's attorneys' fees. The trial court's order was 

entered November 22, 2010, nearly four years after the initial complaint was 

filed in the matter. 

The Inquiry Commission issued a, two-count Charge against Deters for 

his conduct associated with the frivolous or unsubstantiated filings. The 

Charge alleged violations of SCR 3.130(3.1) 3and 3.130(3.4)(c). 4The matter 

was referred to a trial commissioner, who found Deters guilty of both counts 

and recommended a thirty-day suspension. Deters appealed the determination 

3SCR 3.130(3.1) reads, "A lawyer shall not knowingly bring or defend a 

proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and 

fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an 

extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a 

criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in 

incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every 

element of the case be established." 

4SCR 3.130(3.4)(c) reads, "A lawyer shall not . . . knowingly disobey an 

obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an 

assertion that no valid obligation exists." 

3 
to the Board. The Board likewise found Deters guilty of both counts and 

recommended a thirty-day suspension. 

II. KBA FILE NO. 19711. 

In April 2011, Deters was sanctioned by the U. S. District Court for the 

Eastern District of Kentucky. The district judge found that Deters "knowingly 

and vexatiously" multiplied the proceedings and, consequently, under the 

authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 5ordered Deters to pay the costs incurred by the 

opposing parties in defending the case. More specifically, the district judge 

found Deters "knowingly pursued frivolous claims against these two defendants 

long after he knew the claims to be such, thereby causing defendants to incur 

additional litigation costs." In the end, the district judge ordered Deters to pay 

$12,765.45. 

Deters appealed the district judge's determination to the U. S. Sixth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Sixth Circuit 

upheld the district judge's sanction. The Sixth Circuit noted that Deters 

ignored existing law and failed to allege any facts against the defendants that 

would have entitled his client to relief. Furthermore, Deters failed to allege any 

facts that, even arguably, could have served as grounds for extending or 

modifying existing law. The defendants filed a motion seeking sanctions, 

5 28 U.S.C. § 1927 reads, "Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct 

cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the 

proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to 

satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred 

because of such conduct." 

4 
alleging that the appeal was frivolous, as well. The Sixth Circuit agreed and 

ordered Deters to pay attorneys' fees and costs relating to the appeal. 

The Inquiry Commission again issued a two-count Charge against 

Deters; and, again, the Charge alleged violations of SCR 3.130(3.1) and 

3.130(3.4)(c). The trial commissioner found Deters guilty of both counts and 

recommended a thirty-day suspension from the practice of law. The Board 

adopted the findings of the trial commissioner and likewise recommended a 

thirty-day suspension. 

III. ANALYSIS. 

A. We will not Strike the Board's Findings. 

Deters argues the Board's findings should be stricken because the Board 

failed to issue its findings within the time required by our rules. The Board 

held a hearing and determined Deters's guilt on November 21, 2014. Under 

SCR 3.370(6), "[t]he Board shall issue a written decision within forty five (45) 

days of voting on the cases." By Deters's estimation then, the Board's findings 

should have been issued January 5, 2015. The findings, however, were not 

issued until January 14, 2015. From our understanding of Deters's argument, 

it seems he views the Board's delayed,filing as somewhat inadvertent. Deters 

filed a lawsuit on January 5, 2015, challenging the constitutionality of 

SCR 3.150(2); and he posits that lawsuit jogged the Board into the realization 

that its findings had not yet been issued. 

5 
This argument is not a new approach by Deters. Three years ago, he 

made the identical argument in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Deters. 6 That case 

transpired under the former version of SCR 3.370(6), which gave the Board 

thirty days from the date of its hearing to issue its findings to this Court. The 

Board missed its deadline, and we acknowledged as much but refused Deters's 

attempt to dismiss his disciplinary action because he was unable to show any 

degree of prejudice resulting from the Board's tardiness. In reaching that 

conclusion, we relied upon Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Baker, 7 involving a trial 

commissioner's report filed three-and-one-half months late. We disciplined 

Baker despite the trial commissioner's delay, and we disciplined Deters 

previously despite the Board's delay—both times because the attorney subject 

to discipline was unable to show any prejudice. 

We again acknowledge that the Board missed its deadline—a deadline 

that has been extended since our last encounter with this issue. But Deters's 

instant claim fails again because beyond his frustration with the Board's 

"ignor[ing]" our rules, he demonstrates no prejudice. 

We are left to wonder what Deters desires to achieve by striking the 

Board's findings. Even if we were to grant Deters's motion and strike the 

Board's findings, the trial commissioner's findings and report would remain 

within the record. And the trial commissioner found Deters guilty with a 

recommended suspension of thirty days for each KBA file currently under 

6360 S.W.3d 224 (Ky. 2012). 

7889 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1994). 

6 
review. Striking the Board's findings would have little impact on our review of 

Deters's conduct. 

Alternatively to striking the Board's findings, Deters requests we order 

his thirty-day suspensions, as recommended by the Board and trial 

commissioner, run from the date of the Board's vote—November 21, 2014. 

Simply put, this request is completely afield of any cognizable legal concept. 

The Board's vote, while perhaps serving as a factor in our ultimate decision, is 

nonbinding on this Court. This Court possesses "the sole authority to admit 

and discipline attorneys." 8In light of that axiomatic principle, it makes no 

sense for Deters's suspension to run from the date the Board voted on his 

punishment because that vote was nothing more than advisory for this Court. 

B. Deters is Guilty of all Counts. 

Throughout the lower proceedings, Deters has admitted to the factual 

recitation of his conduct but denied that his conduct constitutes a violation of 

the rules cited in both Charges at issue. Before this Court, Deters puts up 

little defense to his guilt. Instead, Deters is singularly focused on the Board's 

filing delay. The evidence of Deters's misconduct is rather clear, though. 

The respective trial courts issued detailed findings regarding Deters's 

frivolous complaints and the convoluted, nearly subversive manner in which 

Deters managed the claims. The Kenton Circuit Court found Deters violated 

CR 11, which we have previously found to be sufficient for discipline. 9In 

8 See, e.g., Grigsby v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 181 S.W.3d 40, 42 (Ky. 2005). 

9 See, e.g., Trainor v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 311 S.W.3d 719 (Ky. 2010); TUrner v. 

Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 955 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1997). 

7 
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Blum, to we attempted to provide clarification about the 

scope of SCR 3.130-3.4(c). In doing so, we noted that violating a rule of civil 

procedure has qualified as disciplinable conduct in past cases." The evidence 

is uncontroverted; the KBA presented sufficient evidence to find Deters guilty of 

violating SCR 3.130(3.4)(c) in KBA File No. 19343. 

Likewise, the Kenton Circuit Court found Deters's claims were entirely 

frivolous. We need not repeat the trial court's findings, but we find them 

sufficient to support a violation of SCR 3.130(3.1). This is especially true in 

light of the trial court's conclusion: "The Court finds that none of these 

complaints were well grounded in fact nor were they warranted by existing law, 

and that the filing of these complaints naming the improper parties was not 

reasonable under the circumstances . . . ." The KBA has sufficiently proven 

Deters guilty of violating SCR 3.130(3.1) in KBA File No. 19343. 

As for KBA File No. 19711, there can be little doubt that Deters violated 

SCR 3.130(3.1). In affirming the federal district judge's decision to sanction 

Deters, the Sixth Circuit noted: "Despite this existing law, Deters did not allege 

any facts against appellees that would entitle [Deters's client] to relief, and he 

did not allege any facts that could arguably extend or modify existing law." 

Deters does not deny this conduct; and, in the end, it is clear Deters asserted a 

claim that had no "basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous" and 

lo 404 S.W.3d 841 (Ky. 2013). 

11404 S.W.3d at 848. 
did not make "a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal 

of existing law." 12 

In sanctioning Deters, the federal district judge mentioned Deters's 

failure to perform a pre-filing investigation as required by Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure (FRCP) 11 and Deters's improper use of FRCP 27 as indicia of 

vexatious practice. Deters's conduct with regard to these rules was expanded 

upon in the federal district judge's later order denying Deters's motion to 

vacate the order imposing sanctions on him. More specifically, the federal 

district judge found Deters, in direct violation of FRCP 11, "presented an 

affidavit for an 'improper purpose,' namely to pursue a personal vendetta 

against persons having nothing to do with this case." The federal district 

judge, furthermore, noted Deters "failed to make 'an inquiry reasonable under 

the circumstances' of the role that the prosecutorial defendants played in the 

prosecution of the plaintiff." Finally, the federal district judge dispelled 

Deters's notion that he was attempting to modify existing law by indicating 

Deters proffered no suitable research to support a modification to existing law. 

In total, the evidence is overwhelming that Deters violated SCR 3.130(3.4)(c) in 

KBA File No. 19711. 

C. Suspension is Appropriate Punishment. 

As for Deters's punishment, both the Board and the Trial Commissioner 

recommended consecutive thirty-day suspensions for the disciplinary violations 

at issue in these cases. We can appreciate why suspensions were 

12SCR 3.130(3.1). 
recommended; and given Deters's past record before this Court, we feel a 

thirty-day suspension for each violation is appropriate. 13 

Deters has been before this Court several times. In 2012, we suspended 

Deters for sixty-one days for various violations stemming from his aggressive 

litigation strategy that exceeded the boundaries of professional conduct. 14We 

also required Deters to attend remedial ethics training in 2012. A year later, 

Deters was before this Court again. In that case, we suspended Deters for a 

total of sixty days as a result of a CR 11 violation and a false statement before 

a tribunal. 15We would be remiss if we did not mention Deters's lengthy 

disciplinary history—the vast majority of which is a direct result of his 

aggressive litigation strategy or conduct similar to the conduct at issue here. 16 

Undeniably, Deters's litigation tactics are unacceptable professionally 

and, given his disciplinary history, prohibited by our conduct rules. Despite 

several disciplinary actions before this Court and various levels of punishment, 

it appears Deters is undeterred. In light of this, we feel that consecutive thirtyday suspensions for each of the instant disciplinary actions are warranted. 

13 We should note that Deters claims to be attempting to retire from the practice 

of law, albeit via an improper method. Deters mailed a letter to the KBA President 

regarding his retirement from the bar. As the KBA points out in its brief before this 

Court, this is not, of course, the proper method for retiring from the bar. SCR 3.480 

details the procedure for withdrawing from bar membership. Of course, an attorney 

facing disciplinary charges may not withdraw from membership while those 

disciplinary proceedings are pending. See SCR 3.480(1). 

14 Deters, 360 S.W.3d 224. 

15 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Deters, 406 S.W.3d 812 (Ky. 2013). 

16 See Deters, 406 S.W.3d at 817. 

10 
IV. ORDER. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS: 

1) Eric C. Deters, KBA Member No. 81812, is guilty of all charges 

alleged in KBA File Nos. 19343 and 19711; 

2) Deters will be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 

thirty days for violations of SCR 3.130(3.1) and SCR 3.130(3.4)(c) in KBA File 

No. 19343, and Deters will be suspended from the practice of law for a period 

of thirty days for violations of SCR 3.130(3.1) and SCR 3.130(3.4)(c) in KBA File 

No. 19711; 

3) Deters's suspensions will run consecutively; and 

4) Under SCR 3.450, Deters is ordered to pay all costs associated 

with this disciplinary proceeding, in the total amount of $2,233.00, for which 

execution may issue from this Court upon finality of this order. 

All sitting. All concur. 

ENTERED: May 14, 2015. 

11