*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________________

No. 96-31134

(Summary Calendar)

_______________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CRIMINAL SHERIFF, The Parish Of Orleans,

Defendant,

LARRY E. BROOME,

Movant-Appellant.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

90-CV-4930

______________________________________________

June 10, 1997

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Movant-Appellant Larry E. Broome, attorney at law, appeals the

district court’s judgment which disqualifies him from representing

the would-be intervenors in this case and requires him to pay

expenses incurred by Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America as

a result of these proceedings. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.
2

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In 1990, the United States filed suit against, inter alia, the

Parish of Orleans Criminal Sheriff, alleging a “pattern and

practice” of discrimination against women in hiring and in the

conditions of employment. In 1995, Broome filed a motion to

intervene on behalf of approximately one hundred individuals.

Counsel for the United States notified the district court, by

letter of August 1996, of its concern that Broome was (1)

soliciting prospective employment with claimants who had been

recommended for relief by the United States and (2) representing a

non-existent relationship with the Department of Justice.

The magistrate judge granted Broome’s motion to intervene (on

a limited basis) but also set a hearing date, at which time Broome

and any client who stated herself to be represented by Broome were

to appear and be questioned by the court as to the circumstances of

Broome’s representation. The court indicated also that it would

hear allegations against Broome concerning his unprofessional

solicitation of clients.

At the hearing, attorney Milton Osborne represented Broome.

According to the testimony of six female claimants, Broome

approached them (or members of their families) and advised them to

sign retainers so that he could assure them a maximum monetary

recovery in the allegedly impending settlement. Some of the women

testified that Broome claimed to work with or be under contract to
1Broome allegedly represents many or most of the claimants in

another unrelated case against the Sheriff involving overtime. 

3

work with the Justice Department. Broome did not deny approaching

these people but testified that he represents so many people that

he did not know if they were his clients or not.1

Broome, however, failed to bring any of his alleged clients to

the hearing. Osborne asked for a continuance to give Broome an

opportunity to “bring these people in,” claiming —— somewhat

incredulously —— that neither he nor Broome had noticed that part

of the magistrate’s order. The magistrate judge denied the

request. 

The district court found that Broome had solicited five women

to sign a retainer agreement and contingency fee contract in

violation of several of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the

Louisiana State Bar Association. The court disqualified Broome

from representing any would-be intervenors in this action and

ordered him to reimburse the United States for expenses incurred in

connection with the hearing. Broome timely appealed pro se,

asserting several errors, none of which concerns his

disqualification from representation of the would-be intervenors.

II.

ANALYSIS

Broome asserts that the magistrate judge (1) failed to inform

him that he was the subject of the scheduled hearing or that he had
1Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d 1406, 1417 (5th Cir.

1995)(quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S.

Ct. 1386, 1389 (1962)).

4

a right to retain counsel of his choice, (2) displayed personal

prejudice against him and should have recused herself from the

hearing, and (3) abused her discretion in denying his request for

a continuance. Broome claims also that his request for a

continuance does not appear in the transcript. 

We find no merit in any of Broome’s claims. First, the

magistrate judge clearly and adequately notified Broome of the

nature of the hearing, and Broome never expressed to the magistrate

any dissatisfaction with being represented by Osborne. Second,

Broome’s accusations of prejudice are completely contrived and

unfounded. He bases his claim on the magistrate’s memorandum to

the Chief Judge of the Eastern District which notifies the Chief

Judge of the action taken against Broome and suggests that Broome

had engaged previously in the unlawful solicitation of clients.

This memorandum does nothing more than factually inform the Chief

Judge of the instant matter in a purely objective manner. Third,

the magistrate’s denial of a continuance was properly within her

discretion, as district courts are “vested with the inherent power

‘to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and

expeditious disposition of cases.’”1 Finally, the transcript of

the hearing accurately reports Broome’s request for a continuance.

In sum, we find Broome’s arguments to be disingenuous and
5

approaching frivolousness. We caution Broome that appeals of this

nature are extremely disfavored and that further prosecution of

this or other meritless appellate actions may well subject him to

sanctions by this court.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is 

AFFIRMED.