### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 355 -CR

Ro nal d G r e y , A ppe lla nt

v . The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 427TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- DC-07 -20 2476 , HO NORAB LE MELI SSA YO UNG G OO DWI N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N A j ur y fo un d a pp e lla nt R on a ld G rey

g uil ty of a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult wi th a de a dly
wea pon. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 22.02 (West Supp. 2009). After finding that appellant ha d one p r e v i o u s f

e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n , t h e j u r

y a s s e s s e d h i s p un i s h m e n ta tt w e n t y y e ar s ’ i mp r i s o n m e n t
. In four points of er

ror, a ppellant contends that the evidenc e is leg ally insufficient to sustain the jury ’s verdic t, his S ix th A mendment confr ontation r ight was violated, and his tria l counsel wa s ineffe ctive. We overrule these c ontentions and aff irm the conviction.
BACK GR OUND Ar ound 11 :30 p. m. o n M ay 5, 20 07 , app e lla nt a nd his fi anc e e , B ri dg e tte B ryant, enter ed a c onvenienc e store on B en White Bouleva rd in Au s t i n . The c ashier at the store, G e o r g e R o s a l e s , t e s t i f

i e d t h a ta p p e l l an tw a s w a v i n g h i s ar m s an d s c r e a m i n g , o b v i o u s l y an g r y.2

Br y ant testified that appe llant was angr y at her beca use she ha d been on a

three -day cra ck coc aine bin g e . B ryant a dd e d th a t be fo re the y e nte re d th e sto re , a

pp e lla nt t old he r, “ Go d f

or g ive me fo r t

his , I ’m g oing to kill y ou, bitch.” While in the store, appe llant threw a can of beer at Br y ant, missing her
. Rosales testified that B ry ant, who appe are d to be “in a pa nic, sca red,” to l d him that appellant had a knife and wa s g oing to kill her. When ap p ell ant left the store , Rosales ca lled 911. Br y ant
rema ined at the store and spoke to O ffice r Christopher Sablotne, who re sponded to the ca ll. After taking Br y ant’s re port and unsucc essfully looking for appellant in the are a, Sablotne lef t the scene
. Ap pe lla nt a nd B ryant r e tur

ne d to the sto re tw e nty

min ute s late r, near

mid nig ht. Rosales saw them outside. He testified that appellant and B ry ant wer e still arg uing, w ith appellant shouting a

nd wavinghis arms. Br

y ant still appeare d to be “e x cited, sca red.” Br y ant enter ed the store, leaving a

ppellant outside, and asked Rosales to lock t he door behind her. Rosales did so, and then he called 911 a second time. Sablotne also responde d to this call. Br y ant told the office r that appellant ha d made a

nother thre at to kill her. She said she wa s afr aid that appe llant was hiding
near by , waiting to attack he r, “be cause that’s what he usually does, he hide s somewher e and surprises he r.” B ry ant and Sablotne discussed the pos sibili ty of B ry ant g oing to Saf

ePlace , but she decide d ag ainst it. Bry ant told Sablo t n e t h at s he had a friend on the way , but this friend neve r
arr ived. B ry ant dec ided to g o home t o wait for her friend, and the officer of fer ed to take he r there
. Br y ant dec lined this offer a

nd said she would wa lk. Sablotne, conce rned f

or B ry ant’s saf

ety , decide d to drive besi d e h er as she wa lked home. B ry ant had wa lked only a fe w y ards from the convenie nce store parking are a when a ppellant suddenly appea red f rom behind a ba

nk of mail box es. The office r testified, “I pulled out rig ht there3

and turne d my

brig ht lights on so Icould g et a be tter view of the ot her side of t he st ree t
. . . . So I pu lle d a lon g he re and , a ll o f a su dd e n, Ise e so me bo dy

da rt ou t f ro m r ig ht h e re wi th a

larg e ro c k in their hand a

nd it appear ed they

wer e making a lunge straig ht toward [Br y ant].” Sablotne acc eler ated his patr ol c ar t o b loc k the atta c ke r. Ap pe lla nt bum pe d into the patr ol c ar, dr op pe d th e ro c k, and fe ll to the g round. He was immediately arr ested. Br y ant testified that as she was wa lking away from the store, she “looked up and saw him coming,” then she ba cked up “ quick like, oh, shit, y ou know.” B ry an t al so testified that
a pp e lla nt “ wa s c omi nga t me re a lly fa st. ” She sa id, “ Iwa s su rp ri se d a nd Iwa s a little bit a fr a id, y e s, a little bit. More surprised than a ny thing.” She added, “He comes this way and I just move out of his way and let the police interce de him and tell him to g et on the ground.” Sablotne testified that he g lance d at B ry ant when a ppellan t ap p ea re d , an d that she “w as trying to g et awa y . She was running quickly .” Bry ant denied running from appellant. She said, “I just backed up a

nd they g ot in betwee n us.” B ry ant testified that she ne ver sa w the roc k in appellant’s ha nd.
SUF F ICIENCY OF EVIDENCE The indictment alleg ed that appellant intentionally and knowing ly

threatened B ry ant with immi nent bodi ly

injury , and that appe llant used and e x hibited a dea dly wea pon, a roc k, during the commission of t he assault. Se e id . § 22.01(a) (2) ( assault), § 22.02(a )(2) (ag g ravating e lement). Ap pe lla nt co nte nd s tha t the e vid e nc e is le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt to sup po rt

the jur y ’s fi nd ing s b oth

a s to his commissi on of the a ssaultive threat and his use or e x hibition of a deadly wea pon. When t h ere is a cha lleng e to the suff iciency of the e vidence to sustain a criminal conviction, the question pre sented is whethe r a rational t rier of fac t could have found the e ssential4

elements of the offe nse bey ond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); Cla y ton v . S tate , 235 S.W .3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). I n a leg al suffic iency revie w, all the evidenc e is r e v ie w e d

in th e li g h t m o s t f

a v o r a b le to th e v e r d ic t; it

is a s s u me d

th a t t h e tr ie r o f f act
r e s o lv e d c o n f li c ts in th e te s ti mo n y , w e ig h e d

th e e v id e n c e , an d

dr e w r e a s o n a

b le in f e r ence s in a
manner that supports the verdic t. Clayton , 234 S.W .3d at 778. I n Mc Go wan v . S

tate , 664 S.W .2d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), the defe ndant was convicted f

or the a ssault by threat of two persons, a mother and her daug hter. The e vidence showed that the def

endant pushe d the daug hter to the g round, beat and kicked he r, then stabbe d her. Id . at 357. The da

ug hter, see ing the knife in the de fenda nt’s hand, beg g ed him not to cut her. Id
. The mot her, una

war e that the de fenda

nt was ar med, re ache d down to aid her daug hter. Id . When she did so, the def

endant stabbe d her a

nd then fled. Id . The c ourt of cr iminal ap p ea l s fo u nd the evidenc e leg ally

sufficie nt to prove that the de fenda nt had threa tened the da

ug hter with imminent bodily injury
. Id . at 358. The c ourt held, howe ver, that the evidenc e did not support the de fenda nt’s conviction for thr eate ning the mother. Id
. The mother never saw the de fenda

nt holding the knife , and ther e wa s no evidenc e that he ha d threatened he r in any way befor e stabbingher. Id . at 357. Ap pe lla nt u rg e s th a t th e e vid e nc e in t his c a se is anal og ou s to the e vid e nc e in McG owan with reg ard to the assault of the mother. He argues, “[Br y ant] was unawa

re of appellant’ s possession of the roc k. No ver bal threa t was made befor e appe llant was restrained by the offic er. Appellant ag ree s with the office r’s assessment that he preve nted the assa ult from occur

ring . That keen a nd commendable police wor k also prevented appe llant from threatening [Bry ant] with t he imminent infli ction of bodily injury as alleg ed in t he indi ctment.” I n eff ect, appellant contends that5

while the evide nce ma

y show him to be g uilty of attempted bodily injury assault (just as McGow an was shown to be guilty

of the bodily

injury assault of the mother), the State failed to prove that he
ever threatened B ry ant as a lleg ed.

Appellant’s a

rg ument ignor es the e v ents shown to have pr ece ded the f inal attack. Se e Ol iv as v . S

tate , 20 3 S
. W.3d 341, 349-50 (Tex. Crim . App. 2006) (c onsidering defe ndant’s threatening conduct lea ding up to c harg ed incident in deter mining sufficiency of evidence to support conviction for a ssault by

threat)
. Appellant had twic e thre atene d to kill Bry ant that nig ht, once at 11:30 and ag ain at midnight, just minutes before he ran at her with the rock. He ha d also thrown a
ca n o f b eer at B ry ant inside the store. B oth the store cle rk, Rosales, and the office r, Sablotne, testified that Br

y ant was visibly afr aid of appellant, a nd Br y ant told both of them that appellant wa s
ar m e d w i t h a kn i f e . B r yan ta l s o t o l d

S a b l o t n e t h a ts h e w a s a f

r a i d t h a ta p p e l l an tw a s h i d i n g n e ar

b y, lyingin w a it t o atta c k h e r. A thr e a t c an be c omm un ic a te d b y

a c tio n o r c on du c t a s w e ll a s b y wo rd s. McG owan , 664 S.W .2d at 357. Alt houg h there is no evidenc e that B ry ant saw the rock in a ppellant’s ha nd wh e n h e e me rg e d f

ro m be hin d th e ma il b oxe s, the re i s no re qu ir e me nt t hat a vic timmus t instantaneously

perc eive a

threat as the actor

is perfor ming it. Olivas , 203 S.W .3d at 350-51. B ry ant testified that she saw

appellant r

unning towa

rd her , that she was surprised a nd afr aid, and that she qu ic kly ba c ke d a wa y to a llo w the po lic e to i nte rc e de . V ie wi nga ll the e vid e nc e in th e lig ht m os t favor able to the verdic t, w e hold that the jury could rationally

find beyond a re asonable doubt that appellant, by

his act i o n s , threatened B ry ant with imminent bodil y injury . Point of error one is overrule d.6 Ap pe lla nt co nte nd s tha t the State fa ile d to pro ve tha t he us e d o r e xhibi te d a

de a dly
wea pon during the assault. He conce des that the roc k, which wa s shown to weig h eig ht pounds, was in the manner of its use capa ble of c ausing death or

serious bodily

injury
. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 1.07(a) (17)( B) (West Supp. 2009). He ar g ues, howe ver, that there is no evide nce that he used or exhibi ted the roc k during the offense. Sablotne never saw appellant raise the roc k above his he ad
as if to strike someone, and the of fice r estimated that a

ppellant was twe nty

to twenty -five f

eet a way from B ry ant when he was stopped. Fr om this, appellant arg ues t hat he was not shown to have use d the roc k to fac ilitate the offe nse. Se e Pa tte rso n v . S tate , 769 S.W .2d 938, 941 (Tex. Cri m . App. 19 89). Ap pe lla

nt f ur the r a rgue s th a t be c a

us e B ryant d id n ot s e e the ro c k, the e vid e nc e is l e g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o p ro ve that he us e d o r e xhibi te d th e ro c k d ur ingthe c omm iss ion

of the a ssa ult
. We have a lr e a dy he ld that a pp e lla nt’ s c on du c t wa s su ff

ic ie nt to thr e a te n B ryant w ith imminent bodil y

injury even thoug h she did not see the rock in a ppellant’s hand a s he ra

n toward he r. The State ha d only

to prove that appellant used or exhibit ed the r ock duringthe commission of the assaultive thre at. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 22.02(a) (2). I t is undisputed that appellant ha d the rock in his hand a s he ra

n toward Br

y ant. The r ock is clea

rly visible in the video rec ording of the inc ide nt m a de by equ ip men t in Sab lot ne ’s patr ol c a

r. Vi e wi ngthe e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the verdic t, the jury could rationally find bey ond a rea sonable dou b t t h at ap p ellant consciously display ed the rock during the commission of the offe nse. See Patterson , 769 S.W .2d at 941 (de fining “exhibit”). Moreove r, the jury could re asonably

find that the exhibi tion of the roc k was intende d by

appellant to induce fea

r i n Br y ant and thus fac ilitated the under ly ing a ssault. Se e id
.App el l an t ’s p o i n t o f error is direc ted to the summary as a w hole. Althoug h the summary 1 c on ta ins he ars ay

wi thi n h e ars ay , a

pp ell ant d oe s n ot c omp la in o f a ny sp e c if ic state me nts wi thi n t h e s u m m ar

y. 7 (d e fi nin g “ us e ” ); se e als o M c Cai n v . S

tate , 22 S.W .3d 497, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Point of
err or two is overr

uled.
CO NF RO NT AT ION Appellant conte nds that his Si x th Amendment conf rontation rig ht was viol ated at the punishment stage of the trial. T h e s u b j ec t of this contention is St ate’ s exhi bit 16A, a “pe n pack” do c ume nti nga

pp e lla nt’ s 1 98 9 r e ta liatio n c on vict ion in D a lla s Co un ty . A mon g the do c ume nts contained in the e x hibit is a four -pag e department of corr ections social and criminal history prepa red by an unname d depar

tment employ ee when appe llant was admitted int o prison in J anuar y 1990. I nc lud e d in thi s his tor

y is a pa g e -a

nd -a -h a lf summa

ry , ba se d in p art

on an in te rv ie w w itha

pp e lla nt,
rec ounting f

ifteen to ninete en prior a rr es t s, juvenile adjudications, criminal char g es, cr iminal convictions (some with deta ils of the offe nse), probation revoc ations, prison disciplinary violations (s ome wi th d e ta ils ), and a de ta ile d a c c ount o f t he re ta liatio n o ff

e ns e . App e lla

nt c on te nd s th a t th is
summa ry is a n o ut- of -c ourt te sti mon ia l st a te me nt o ff e re d to pr ov e the tr

uth of the matte rs state d in violation of Crawf

ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 1 T h e St a te u r g e s that ap p e ll an t d id n o t p r e s e r

v e th is c o n te n ti o nf

o r a p p e a l. We dis agr ee. T he penitentiar y rec ord wa s first offe red by the State as e x hibit 16. Appellant objected to the exhibi t on rele vance g rounds, and the obje ction was ove rruled. T here was a brief r ece ss, then the cour t asked defense counsel if he had “some additional comments on 16.” Counsel said that he8

did , a nd the n h e ob

je c te d th a t th e e xhibi t c on ta ine d h e ars ay and vio late d a

pp e llan t’ s Sixth Amendment rig ht of confr ontation. From the c omments of counsel, we infer that this obj ection wa s direc ted to the summary

of appe llant’s criminal history descr ibed above . After

further discussion by counsel a nd the cour

t, the S tate agr eed to remove cer tain other doc uments from the pe n pack, but not the criminal history

summary . The State then reof fer ed the pen pack as exhibi t 16A . Appellant
rene wed his conf

rontation objection, which w as over ruled. Appe llant’s contention was pr eser ved fo r a pp e a l. Th e Sixth Ame ndme nt p ro vid e s th a t in a ll c ri min a l pr os e c uti on s, the a c c us e d s ha ll h a v e t h e r i g h tt o b e c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e w i t n e s s e s a g a i n s th i m . U
. S
. C o n s t
. a m e n d
. X V I. In Cra wfo rd , the Sup re me Court he ld that thi s ri g ht a pp lie s n ot o nly

to i n- c ourt

te sti mony , b ut a lso to
ou t- of -c ourt state me nts that are te sti mon ia l in natur e . 5 41 U. S. at 51 . T he Confron tat io n Cl a us e fo rb ids the a dmi ssi on

of te sti mon ia l he ars ay

un le ss t he de c lara

nt (the wi tne ss) is u

nava ila ble to testify and the defe ndant had a prior opportunity to cross-e x amine the de clar ant. Id . at 68. Whether a par ticular out-of

-cour t statement is testimoni al i s a q uestion of law. DeLa P az v . S tate , 273 S.W .3d 67 1 , 6 8 0 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 2 0 0 8 )
. I t w a s th e St a te ’ s b u r d e n , a s th e p r o p o n e n t o f the challeng ed evidence, to establish its admissi bility
. Id . We reviewthe trial cour t’s ruling admitting the evidenc e under

a bifurc ated standa rd , g iving de fer ence to the court’s f indings re g ardingany pe rt ine nt h is to ri c a l f

a c ts b ut r e vie wi ngde no vo the c ourt ’s a pp lic a tio n o f t

he law t o th os e fa c ts. W all v . S tat e , 184 S.W .3d 730, 742-43 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006). Th e State argue s that the a dmi ssi on of the c ha lle ng e d e vid e nc e wa s n ot e rr or be c a us e the penitentiar

y rec ords wer e business re cords. See Te x. R. Ev id. 80 3( 6)
. B ut a ft e r t he State fi le d it s9

brief, the Supreme Court announc ed its opinion in Me le nd e z- Di az v . M as sa c hu se tts , ___ U.S. ___, 17 4 L .E d. 2d

31 4 ( 20 09 ). I n th a t c a se , th e Court he ld t hat r e po rt s p re pa

re d b y anal y sts a t th e state crime la boratory s t ating that a substance was c ocaine wer e testimonial statements, and that the analy sts who prepa

red the repor

ts were witnesses for the purpose of the Six th Amendment. Id . at 31 2- 22 . T he g ov e rnme nt a rgue d, a mon g oth e r t

hin g s, that the re po rt s we re no t te sti mon ia l be c a us e they we re business recor ds. Id . at 328. The Court re jected the notion that business recor ds are
c a te g or ic a lly

no nte sti mon ia l:
Business a

nd public rec ords ar e g ener ally admissib l e ab s ent conf rontation not beca use they qualify under a n exc ep t i o n to the hear say rules, but bec ause—ha

ving been c reated fo r t he administration of a n entity ’s af

fairs a nd not for the pur

pose of establishing or

proving some fac t at trial—they are not te stimoni al. Whether or not they qualify as busi ness or officia l rec ords, the ana ly sts’ statements here —prepa red specific ally

for use at pe t i t ioner’s tria l—were testimony ag ainst petitioner, and the ana ly sts we re su

bje c t to c on fr on tatio n und e r t he Sixth A me ndme nt.
Id
. at 329- 3 0
. Re g ar d le s s o f w h e th e r th e y qu a li f y f o r a dmi s s io nu n d e r

th e r u le s o f e v id e n c e, do c ume nts ke pt i n th e re g ula r c ours e of bu sin e ss are no t a dmi ssi ble un de r t he Con fr on tatio n Cl a

us e “if the r eg ularly

conducte d business activity is the production of e vidence for use at trial.” Id . at 328. I ns of ar a s th e State argue s th a t bu sin e ss r e c or ds are c ate gori cally e xemp t f

ro m Cra wfo rd , the
argume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.

Appellant ar g ues that the c halleng ed evidence is simil ar to that held t o be testimonial h ea rsay in Ru sse au v . S

tate , 1 7 1 S
. W
. 3 d 8 7 1 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 5 )
. I n t h a t c a s e , th e Sta te introduced at t h e punishment stage jail “incident re ports” and pr ison “disciplinary repor ts” that “purpo rted to docume nt, in the most detailed and g raphic of terms, numer ous and re peate d10

disciplinary

offe nses on the par

t of [t he def

endant] while he wa s incarc erated.” Id
. at 880. None of the persons who observe d the def endant’ s behavior or

prepa red the repor

ts testified at the trial. Id
. The c ourt of cr iminal appeals he ld th at t h e re p o rts contained te stimoni al statements that we re inadmissible under the Confrontation Cl ause. Id . at 880-81.

I n Se gu nd o v . S tate , th e St a te o f

f e r e d in e v id e n c e c e rti f

ic a te s f r o m th e board of pa rd on s and pa ro le s st a tin g that th e de fe nd ant h a d “ fa ile d to fu lf ill the te rm s and

c on dit ion s” of

his
re le a se , h a d “ vio late d th e c on dit ion s o f a dmi nis tr a tiv e re le a se ,” and wa s an “ a dmi nis tr a tiv e re le a se violator.” 270 S.W.3d 79, 106 (Tex. C rim. App. 2008) (op. o n re h ’g). The defe ndant urg ed that th e s e d o c u me n ts c o n ta in e d in a dmi s s ib le te s ti mo n ia l h e ar s ay u n d e r th e h o ld in g in R u sseau . The court of criminal appe als disag ree d. The c ourt explained that unlike the rec ords at issue in Russeau , which we re “ written by corr ections off

icer s [and] g raphic ally

document[ed] their detailed
o b s e r v a ti o n s o f th e d e f e n d a nt’ s n u me r o u s disciplinary

offe nses,” the “ ‘boilerplate ’ par ole-re vocation
cer tificates” admitt ed i n t h i s case “did not contain any such testimonial statements, narr atives of specific events, or written obse rvations.” Id
. at 107. The c ourt wrote that there w as a “ distinction betwee n officia l rec ords that set out a ster i l e an d ro utine rec itation of an off icial finding or unambig uous fac tual matter,” which ar e not testimonial, and rec ords that contain “ a fa ctual descr iption of specific observations or events that is a kin to testimony ,” which ar e testimonial. Id
. The court of criminal appea ls a lso invoke d this dist i n ct i o n in Sm ith v . S tate , No. AP-75,479, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. L EXI S 527 (Tex. C rim. App. May 9, 2009). Once ag ain, the issue wa s t h e admissibili ty under Cra wfo rd

of pr iso n d isc ipl ina

ry re po rt s a nd he ari ngre c or ds
. Id . at *32. The c ourt held t hat t he reports and re cords at issue “mostly contain bar e-bone s rec itations11

of infrac tions c ommitt ed by [t he def endant]” and w ere not testimoni al. Id
. at *35. Howe ver, two of the doc uments “g o bey ond a sterile de scription and violate a ppellant’s rig hts as set out in Russeau
. The re ports contain desc rip t i o n s of the off enses whic h appea

r to have been c opied from the
c or re c tio ns of

fi c e rs’ repo rt s and

wh ic h p ur

po rt to d oc ume nt, in d e ta ile d te rm s, [the de fe nd ant’ s] d is c ip li n ar

y offe nses.” Id . a

t *3 5- 36 Th e se latte r r e po rt s, the c ourt he ld, we re ina dmi ssi ble testimonial hearsa

y . Id . at *36. These c ourt of cr iminal appeals opinions predate Mele ndez-Diaz , and they must be
r e a d i nl i g h to f t h i s m o s tr e c e n tC o n f r o n t a t i o nC l a

u s e o p i n i o nb y

t h e S u p r e m e C o u rt
. In Mele ndez-Diaz , the g overnme nt a rg ued that the labora

tory repor

ts at issue wer e nontesti monial beca use the a naly sts were not “ac cusatory” witnesses, t hat is, they did not directly

acc use the de fe nd ant o f wro ng do ing ; r a the r, the ir te sti mo ny wa s in c ulp a tor y on ly wh e n ta ke n to g e the r w ith
o t h er evidenc e. See 1 7 4 L
. E d
. 2 d
. a t 3 2 3
. T h e Co u rt h e ld , h o w e v e r , th a t t h e Si xth A mendment “co n t em p l at es two cla sses of witnesses—those a g ainst the defe ndant and those in his favor. The prosec ution mu st p ro duce the former . . . . Contrary

to respondent’ s assertion, ther e is not a third
ca t egory of witnesses . . . .” Id
. T h e Su p r e me Co u rt a ls o f

o u n d u n c o n v in c in g th e g o v e r

n me n t’ s argument that the laboratory analy sts, be cause they had “obser ve[d] neither the crime nor any human action re lated to it, ” we re not “conve ntional witnesses” subjec t to confrontation. Id . at 325. The Court also rejec ted the ar g ument that, for Confr ontation Clause purposes, a distinction shoul d be dr awn be tw een tes timon y

re c ounti nghis tor ic a l e ve nts and te sti mony

that is the re su lt o f “ ne utr a l, scientific testing .” Id
.12 Mele ndez-Diaz make s it c le ar that if a state me nt i s ma de fo r p ro se c uto ri a l us e , o r i n anticipation that it will be use d p ro s ec u torially , the statement is testimonial reg ardle ss of the substance of what is sa id. This is consistent with t he opinion in Cra wfo rd , wher e the Court did not attempt to comprehe nsively define a “te stimoni al statement,” b u t d i d quote seve ral propose d de fi nit ion s: “ a ff

idavi ts , c us tod ia l e xami natio ns , p ri or te sti mony

. . . o r s imi lar p re tr ia l st a te me nts that decla rants would expect to be use d prosec utori al l y , ” “s t atements . . . c ontained in forma liz ed testimonial materia ls,” and “statements made under circumstance s which would lea d an objec tive wi tne ss re a so na

bly to be lie ve that the state me nt wo uld be a va ila ble fo r us e a t a late r t

ri a l.” 54 1 U .S. at 51-52. The Court a lso he ld that, at a minimum , statements ar e testimonial if they are made dur ing testimony at a pr eliminary

hear ing, be fore a g rand jury , or at a former trial, or duringpolice in te rrog ations. Id . at 68. Eac h of these pr oposed or a dopted def initions in Crawf

ord define a testimonial statement by ref ere nce to the declara

nt’s purpose in making the state ment as shown by the circ umstances in which the statement wa s ma d e, and without ref ere nce to the c ontent of the state me nt. The opinion of t he S upreme Court in Davis v. W ashington and its companion ca se, Hammon v . Indiana , also supports the conc lusi o n t h at i t is the intended or anticipated use of a state me nt t

hat de te rm ine s w he the r t

he state me nt is te sti mon ia l. 54 7 U .S. 81 3 ( 20 06 ). Th e iss ue in these two domestic violenc e prose cutions was whe ther the defenda nts’ confr ontation rig hts had bee n violated by the admis sion of t he complainants’ out-of-c ourt statements t o the pol ice de scribing the attack an d n am i ng the attac ker. Id . at 817-21. The Supreme Court held that the c omplainant’s statements in Da v is wer e not testimonial beca use the ci rc u m s t ance s objectively indicated that the13

p r i m ar y p u r p o s e o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s w a s t o e n a b l e p o l i c e a s s i s t an c e t o m e e tano n g o i n g e m e r g e n c y. Id
. at 828. The complainant’s substantially identical statements in Hammon , on the other ha nd, wer e held to be testimonial beca use the c ircumstance s indicated that the pr imary purpose of

the police questioning that produce d the statements had be en to investig ate a possible crime, to establish or prove f acts re levant to a late r cr iminal prosecution. Id . at 822 & 829-30. Under Mele ndez-Diaz , a state me nt ma de fo r pr os e c uto ri a l us e is t e sti mon ia l e ve n if the statement doe s not direc tly acc use t he defenda nt or wrongdoing , does not descr ibe the cr ime or any human ac tion related to i t , o r d escr ibes the re sults of neutral scie ntific testing. T his Court
rec ently held t hat under Mele ndez-Diaz , an autopsy repor t pr epar ed in a

nticipation of its use at trial
wa s a te sti mon ia l st a te me nt, re je c tin g argume nts tha

t a uto ps y re po rt s are no t tes tim on ia l be c a us e they contain “ste rile re citations” of “ objective f acts,” are “routine, descriptive, a nd nonanaly

tical,” and “[do] not relate subjective na rratives pertainin g t o [t he def endant’ s] guilt or innocenc e.” W oo d v . S tate , N o. 03 -0 8- 00 25 7- CR, 20 09 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 78 82 , at *20 -2 1 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin Oc t
. 7 , 2 0 09, no pet. h.). Similarly , under Mele ndez-Diaz , a pr iso n d isc ipl ina

ry re po rt ma de in anticipation of its prosec utorial use is te stimoni al even if it contains only

sterile, routine r ecitations of off icial finding s or unambig uous fac tual matters. The conver se is also true. I f a n out-of-c ourt statement wa s not made for prosec utor i al u s e o r i n rea sonable e x pectation of such use, it is not testimonial even if it is a g raphic descr iption of specifi c o b s er v at i ons or eve nts (as in Da v is , for example). The substa n ce of a par ticular stateme nt may

be a r eleva

nt circumstanc e in dec iding wh e the r th e st a te me nt w a s ma de fo r p ro se c uto ri a l us e , b ut t he Sup re me Court ’s op ini on s ma ke it
c le ar t hat what was said is less important than whyit was said.14 As we have alre ady stated, the summary of appe llant’s criminal history at issue her e is pa rt of a soc ial and cr iminal hist ory prepa red in 1990 upon a

ppellant’s ar

rival at the de partment of cor rec tions following his 1989 reta liation c onviction. The doc ument is stamped “re stricted and confide ntial.” The obje ctive cir cumstance s indicate that the d o cu m en t was not pre pare d for prosec utorial u s e; appellant ha d alre ady been c onvicted, and he was be g inning a forty -five- y ear prison sentenc e. I nstead, the soc ial and cr iminal hist ory appea rs on its face to have be en pre pare d for the inter

nal use of the depar

tment i n d etermining appe llant’s proper classification and
a ssi g nme nt. We c on c lud e that the c ha lle ng e d c ri min a l his tor y summa ry , no t havin g be e n ma de in anticipation of prosec utorial use, wa s not testimoni al, and the a dmission of the summary in evidence did not violate appellant’s c onstitut ional confr ontation rig ht. Point of er ror thre e is overr

uled.
EF F EC TIV EN ESS OF CO UN SEL Appellant conte nds that his trial counsel was ineffe ctive bec ause, at the punishment stag e of trial, counsel did not object to the admission of State’s exhibit 16A, the pen pack f rom the 1989 Dallas County

reta liation conviction, on the g round that the c onvict ion in that case w as not shown to be final. This c onviction w as one of the two previous convic tions alleg ed in the indictment for e nh an ce m en t o f puni shment. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 12.42(d) ( West S upp. 2009). The second was a 1980 Har

ris County robber

y conviction. The jury found the latter a lleg ation to be true, but not the former
.

The Da llas County judgme nt f ound in e x hibit 16A ref

lects that appellant g ave notice of appe al. The State did not off er e vidence that the conviction had be en af firmed on a

ppeal, a nd there fore the conviction was not show n to be final. Se e J oh ns on v . S

tate , 7 8 4 S. W. 2 d

4 1 3 , 4 1 4 ( T e x.15

Crim. App. 1990). Only final convic tions may be used to for

mally enhanc e. Id ; see Tex. P enal Code Ann. 12.42(d). The finality of the Dallas County conviction beca me a moot issue whe n t h e jury found this enhanc ement alleg ation to be untrue.

To preva il on a claim of inef fec tive assistance of couns el, an a ppellant must show that
c ouns e l ma de su c h s e ri ou s er ro rs that he wa s not func tio nin g e ff e c tiv e ly a s cou

ns e l and that th e se
e rr or s p re jud ic e d th e a

pp e lla nt’ s defe nse t o s uc h a

de g re e that he wa s d e pr ive d o f a fa ir tr ia l. Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); He rn an de z v . S tate , 988 S.W .2d 770, 771-72 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); He rn an de z v . S tate , 7 26 S.W. 2d

53 , 5 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ). On thi s
re co rd , ap p el l an td o es n o ts at i s fy ei t h er p ro n g. Ap pe lla nt a rgue s th a t e xhibi t 16 A w a s in a dmi ssi ble be c a us e the Dal la s Co un ty conviction was not shown to be final, but that is not the case. Aconviction must be final to be use d for f ormal enhanc ement of punishment under section 12.42, but at the punishment stag e, the tria l court may

admit evidence of any

matter re levant to sentencing , including the defe ndant’s prior
c ri min a l r e c or d a

nd c on du c t “ re g ard le ss of

wh e the r h e ha s p re vio us ly be e n c ha rg e d w ithor

fi na lly convicted of

the cr ime or ac t.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (1) ( West S upp. 2009);

se e Lop e z v . S tate , 253 S.W .3d 680, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (stating that prior cr iminal recor d inc lud e s matte rs oth e r t

ha n f ina l c on vic tio ns ). Th e Da lla s Co un ty c on vi cti on

wa s a dmi ssi ble pursuant to ar

ticle 37.07, sec tion 3 whether or not it was final, an d co u n s el cannot be acc used of having failed to object to inadmissible evidenc e. Moreove r, if counse l was ineff ective be cause he fa ile d to ra ise the fi na lity iss ue a s it

re late d to the e nh anc e me nt o f pun ish me nt p ur su ant t o16

section 12.42(d) , appellant’ s defe nse was not pr ejudiced be cause the jury found the a lleg ation to be untrue. Point of err or four is overrule d. The judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

__________________________________________ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: Nove mber 4, 2009 Pub lis h