2016 UT App 236

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SHAYNE E. TODD,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE,

Appellee.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20160013-CA

Filed December 8, 2016

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Su Chon

No. 150901233

Shayne E. Todd, Appellant Pro Se

Sean D. Reyes, Stanford E. Purser, and Amanda N. 

Montague, Attorneys for Appellee

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, and 

JILL M. POHLMAN.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Shayne E. Todd appeals the district court’s order granting 

the Board of Pardons and Parole’s motion for summary 

judgment resulting in the dismissal of his petition for 

extraordinary relief. We affirm.

¶2 When reviewing an appeal from an order dismissing a 

petition for extraordinary relief, we accord no deference to the 

lower court’s conclusions of law but review them for correctness. 

See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022–23 (Utah 1996). 

However, generally decisions of the Board of Pardons and 

Parole regarding paroles “are final and are not subject to judicial 

review.” Utah Code Ann. § 77–27–5(3) (LexisNexis 2012). 

Judicial review is limited only to “the fairness of the process by 

which the Board undertakes its sentencing function,” and does 
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20160013-CA 2 2016 UT App 236

not include review of the result. Lancaster v. Board of Pardons, 869 

P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994).

¶3 Todd makes several arguments on appeal concerning the 

Board’s decision several years ago to not hold a parole hearing 

until 2029. He previously made some of these arguments when 

he filed a motion in his criminal case to correct an illegal 

sentence. See State v. Todd, 2013 UT App 231, 312 P.3d 936. Todd 

repackaged those arguments, with some minor differences, in 

his petition for extraordinary relief, but the crux of his

arguments remain the same.

¶4 First, Todd argues that Utah’s indeterminate sentencing 

scheme is unconstitutional for several reasons. However, this

sentencing structure has repeatedly been upheld by the courts as 

constitutional. See State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, ¶ 3, 48 P.3d 228 

(per curiam) (stating that there was “no basis for [the court] to 

depart from established precedent” and that indeterminate 

sentencing was indeed constitutional); Padilla v. Board of Pardons, 

947 P.2d 664, 669 (Utah 1997) (rejecting arguments that 

sentencing scheme violates due process or separation of powers 

clause); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Utah 1996) 

(rejecting claim that Utah’s sentencing scheme violated the 

Constitution because it was mentally cruel to prisoners).

Accordingly, we reject Todd’s arguments that the indeterminate 

sentencing scheme is unconstitutional.

¶5 Todd next asserts that the Sentencing Guidelines created a 

liberty interest, of which he was deprived by the Board’s 

decision to not schedule his next parole hearing until 2029. It is 

well established that the guidelines do not have the effect of law 

and are not binding on the Board, as such, they create no liberty 

interest or expectation of release. See Monson, 928 P.2d at 1023. 

The guidelines are merely estimates that reflect what may be a 

typical term. The Board retains full discretion to determine 

incarceration terms on an individual basis considering the 

unique facts of each case. Labrum v. Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 

902, 909 (Utah 1993). Thus, the district court correctly concluded 
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20160013-CA 3 2016 UT App 236

that Todd was not entitled to relief on his arguments concerning 

whether the sentencing guidelines created a protected liberty 

interest.

¶6 Third, Todd claims that the rationale sheet the Board used 

to memorialize its decision concerning when to schedule Todd’s 

parole review date was insufficient. Specifically, he seems to

argue that the preprinted rationale sheets, on which the Board 

checks off the “mitigating” and “aggravating” factors it deems 

relevant in making the parole determination, did not provide a

detailed enough explanation of the Board's actions to satisfy due 

process. However, the Utah Supreme Court has previously 

determined that the rationale sheets used by the Board to explain 

its decisions are adequate and satisfy due process. See Monson,

928 P.2d at 1031 (“While perhaps not a perfect explanation of the 

Board’s rationale, this document [i.e., a rationale sheet] 

nonetheless satisfies the Board’s own requirement that it provide 

a written explanation of the reasons for its decision.”). Thus, 

Todd is not entitled to relief on this claim.

¶7 Finally, Todd complains about the Board’s internal 

operating procedures and how they may affect his due process 

rights. However, it does not appear that Todd raised these issues 

either in his original petition for extraordinary relief or in his 

amended petition. Accordingly, the issue is not properly 

preserved for appeal. See Holman v. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 

905 P.2d 895, 899 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (stating that a litigant’s 

failure to raise an issue with the district court fails to preserve 

the claim for appeal).

¶8 Affirmed.1

 

1. To the extent that Todd’s brief could be construed to set forth 

any further arguments not specifically addressed above, Todd 

has failed to demonstrate such arguments entitle him to the relief 

requested.