COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Kelsey, Petty and Senior Judge Bumgardner

DARIUS KEITH CHITTUM

MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0028-11-1 PER CURIAM

NOVEMBER 8, 2011

DEANA MARIE HIPPENSTIEL AND

 MARK JOHN HIPPENSTIEL

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK

Junius P. Fulton, III, Judge

(Andrew K. James, on brief), for appellant.

(Jill R. Harris; Kaufman & Canoles, P.C., on brief), for appellees.

(Margaret V. Weaver; Thomas & Associates, P.C., on brief), 

Guardian ad litem for the minor child.

Darius Keith Chittum (father) appeals an order granting the petition for adoption filed by 

Deana Marie Hippenstiel (mother) and Mark John Hippenstiel (stepfather). Father argues that the 

trial court erred by (1) granting the adoption and name change because it was not in the child’s best 

interests and (2) violating father’s due process rights because it failed to make a finding that a 

continuing relationship with the child would be detrimental to the child’s welfare. Upon reviewing 

the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, 

we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.

BACKGROUND

“On appeal, ‘[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in 

the circuit court and grant to that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
- 2 -

therefrom.’” T.S.G. v. B.A.S., 52 Va. App. 583, 585, 665 S.E.2d 854, 855 (2008) (quoting Toms 

v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 262, 616 S.E.2d 765, 767 (2005) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted)).

So viewed, the evidence proved that mother and father were never married and had one 

child, born in 2003. Father saw the child for approximately ten minutes when she was one 

month old. He attempted to see the child approximately one month after the initial meeting, but 

mother refused his request because he was screaming, yelling, and driving his vehicle erratically 

up and down the street on which she lived. Father called mother once in 2008, and other than 

those three occurrences, he has never tried to contact or visit the child. At the time of the 

hearing, the child was seven years old.

On January 12, 2004, mother was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the child. 

Father has not filed any petitions for custody or visitation.

Father has a history of substance abuse and domestic violence. He has been incarcerated 

several times since the child was born. As of the hearing, father had been incarcerated since

2008 for malicious wounding, violation of probation, and assault and battery – third offense.

1

 

Mother testified that while the parties were dating, father was mentally, physically, and 

emotionally abusive toward her.

In May 2008, mother and stepfather married. Stepfather has been involved in the child’s 

life since she was one and a half years old, and he is the only father figure that the child knows. 

On July 6, 2009, mother and stepfather filed their petition for adoption and name change. Father 

objected. After hearing the evidence and argument, the trial court granted the petition and 

entered a final adoption order and name change order on December 7, 2010. This appeal 

followed.

 1 Father’s projected release date is in February 2017.
- 3 -

ANALYSIS

Adoption

Father argues that the trial court erred in granting mother and stepfather’s petition for 

adoption. He contends that the adoption is not in the child’s best interests and that the trial court 

violated his due process rights by not finding that a continued relationship with his child would 

not be a detriment to her.

In 2006, “the General Assembly amended Code § 63.2-1205 to remove the language 

requiring a finding of detriment to the child to permit adoption without parental consent.” 

Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 196, 715 S.E.2d 11, __ (2011) (citing 2006 Acts chs. 825, 848 

(effective July 1, 2006)).2

In Todd v. Copeland, 55 Va. App. 773, 778, 689 S.E.2d 784, 787 (2010) (emphasis in 

original), this Court held that

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

requires prospective adoptive parents to prove, by clear and 

convincing evidence, both that the entry of an adoption order over 

 2 Code § 63.2-1205 states:

In determining whether the valid consent of any person whose 

consent is required is withheld contrary to the best interests of the 

child, or is unobtainable, the circuit court or juvenile and domestic 

relations district court, as the case may be, shall consider whether 

granting the petition pending before it would be in the best interest 

of the child. The circuit court or juvenile and domestic relations 

district court, as the case may be, shall consider all relevant factors, 

including the birth parent(s)’ efforts to obtain or maintain legal and 

physical custody of the child; whether the birth parent(s) are 

currently willing and able to assume full custody of the child; 

whether the birth parent(s)’ efforts to assert parental rights were 

thwarted by other people; the birth parent(s)’ ability to care for the

child; the age of the child; the quality of any previous relationship 

between the birth parent(s) and the child and between the birth 

parent(s) and any other minor children; the duration and suitability 

of the child’s present custodial environment; and the effect of a 

change of physical custody on the child.
- 4 -

the objection of a nonconsenting parent is in the best interest of the 

child and that a continuing relationship with the birth parent would 

be detrimental to the child’s welfare.

This Court concluded that “a trial court must make a detriment to the child determination, 

regardless of the language of the relevant statute, before entering an adoption order, in order to 

protect the Fourteenth Amendment rights of a nonconsenting biological parent.” Id. at 790, 689 

S.E.2d at 792.

In reaching its conclusion in this case, the trial court reviewed the factors in Code 

§ 63.2-1205, and although it did not specifically use the phrase “detriment to the child,” it 

considered whether a relationship between father and the child would be detrimental to her 

welfare.

Since the trial court’s ruling, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued its opinion in 

Copeland. The Supreme Court of Virginia acknowledged that “the Constitution requires more 

than a mere showing of the child’s best interests to terminate parental rights.” Copeland, 282

Va. at 198, 715 S.E.2d at __. The Supreme Court of Virginia found that “Virginia’s statutory 

scheme for adoption, including Code §§ 63.2-1205 and -1208, defines the best interests of the 

child in terms that require more expansive analysis than when the contest is between two 

biological parents.” Id. at 199, 715 S.E.2d at __. It concluded that “the Virginia statutory 

scheme” passes “constitutional due process scrutiny” because the statutes “provide for 

consideration of parental fitness and detriment to the child,” despite the fact that they do not 

include the phrase “detriment to the child.” Id. at 199, 715 S.E.2d at __.

In light of the decision in Copeland, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the petition 

for adoption.

“Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to great 

weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support 
- 5 -

it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 

(1986) (citations omitted).

Father argues that his due process rights were violated because the trial court did not 

make a specific finding that a continuation of the relationship between father and the child would 

be detrimental to the child’s welfare. According to the Supreme Court of Virginia, it was not 

necessary for the trial court to find that a continued relationship with the father would be 

detrimental to the child because the factors in Code § 63.2-1205 “focus on both the parent and 

child and therefore compel a court to consider whether a parent’s unfitness would be harmful to 

the child’s welfare.” Copeland, 282 Va. at 199, 715 S.E.2d at __ (citing Code § 63.2-1205).

The trial court clearly considered father’s fitness as a parent and whether a relationship 

between him and the child would be detrimental to her welfare. The trial court stated that it was 

concerned about the “great potential of destructive impact on [the child’s] sense of security” 

when father was released from prison in 2017. It further stated that father’s “well documented 

history of violence reflects poorly on his fitness.” The trial court also found that father made no 

attempts to “act as a father to this child.” He had only seen the child once. Although father was 

incarcerated several times since the child’s birth, there were times when he was available to 

pursue a relationship with the child, but did not do so. He did not file a petition for visitation 

with the courts; instead, he contested paternity when mother sought a custody order in 2004. 

Father had no relationship with the child, and the trial court found that any future relationship 

would harm the child.

Father also argues that the adoption was not in the child’s best interests and that less 

drastic measures could have been taken. The trial court reviewed the factors in Code 

§ 63.2-1205 and found that the adoption was in the child’s best interests. The trial court 

dismissed any less drastic measure because it was concerned about the child’s well-being if 
- 6 -

father was released from prison in 2017 and sought a relationship with the child. The trial court 

noted that “this will occur sometime in the future when as a child she’s perhaps the most 

vulnerable because of her teenage years.” Meanwhile, the child was being raised in a “stable 

family unit” with mother, stepfather who is the man that she considers her father, and her 

brother.3

The trial court heard the evidence presented by both parties and found father to be less 

credible than mother and stepfather. The trial court found father’s testimony about his 

relationship with mother and his attempts to visit the child as incredible. “It is well established 

that the trier of fact ascertains a witness’ credibility, determines the weight to be given to their 

testimony, and has the discretion to accept or reject any of the witness’ testimony.” Street v. 

Street, 25 Va. App. 380, 387, 488 S.E.2d 665, 668 (1997) (en banc).

Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting the petition for adoption and name 

change.

Attorney’s fees and costs

Mother and stepfather requested that they be awarded their attorney’s fees and costs in 

defending this appeal. On consideration of the record before us, we deny their request for an 

award of attorney’s fees and costs they incurred on appeal. See O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 23 

Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling is summarily affirmed. Rule 5A:27.

Affirmed.

 3 Stepfather has a son from a previous relationship. There was testimony that the child 

and his son have a close relationship.