### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 22
- 00475
- CV

Donald Rhodes, Appellant

v. Laura Pena Tamayo , Appellee

FROM THE 425TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 20 -2205-F425 , THE HONORABLE BETSY F. LAMBETH , JUDGE PRESID I NG

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Appellant Donald Rhodes, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court ’ s final decree of divorce. In eight points of error on appeal, Rhodes asserts that (1) the district
court’ s temporary orders were vag u e and denied him due process ; (2) the district court was biased against him; (3) the district co urt abused its dis cretion by denying Rhodes a continuance; and (4 ) the district court abused its discretion by ordering Rhodes to pay a portion of his

ex - wife ’s at to rney ’ s fees

. 1 We will affirm the divorce decree.

1 Rhodes’ s brief i s four pages long , contains no more than two or t hree sentenc es of

“ analysis ” for each of his points o f error, and fails to cite to the record or any authoritie s for a ny of his points

. Although w e are to “ construe pro se filings liberally and with patienc e ‘ so as to obtain a just, fair and equi table adjudication of the parties ’ rights,’” Housing Auth. of C ity of Austin v. Elbendary , 581 S.W.3d 488, 491 n.1 (Tex. App. —A ustin 2019, no pet.) (quoting Veigel v. Texa s Boll Weevil Eradication Found. , 549 S.W.3d 193, 195 n.1 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2018, no pet.) ), “ pro se litigants must comply with the same rules and s tandards as those represented by attorneys,” id

. (citing Mathis v. Lockwood , 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005) ). Rhodes’ s brief fails to comply with the b riefing rules

. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1

. Nevertheless , we will address Rhodes’ s points of error to the extent we are able to discern them. A dditionally, five of2 BACKGROUND Rhodes and appellee Laura Pena T amayo were married in 2007 and had two children together, A.R. (Ann), born in 2010, and S.R. (Sally), born in 2017. 2 The parents separated th e same year Sa ll y was born

. In 2018, the Offi ce of the Attorney Genera l (OAG)
fi led a suit affecting the parent

- chil d rel ationship involving the parents and their children. That

case r esulted in a n agreed final order establishing the terms of the parents ’ conservators hi p, possession an d access, and support of the children

. The order appointed Tamayo sole managing
conservato r of the children and Rhodes possessory conservator

. Rhodes ’ s p ossession and access was to be agreed upon by the parties, or in the alternative, h e was to have supe rvised visits for four hours on any day in which he was in the same geographi c loc ation as the children, so long

as he provided seven days’ notice to Tamayo. At th e time the ord er was entered , Rhodes reside d in Iowa and Tamayo resided in W illiamson County

. 3 In 2020, Rhodes filed a petition for divorce from Tamayo , and the parties agree d
to consolidate t he divorce case with the OAG case
. R h odes was represented by counsel at th e beginning of the case through 2021

. During the divorce proceed ings, the p arties attended a temporary

- or ders hearing , at which the y announced that they had made several agreements invol v ing th e children, both of whom required therapy for autism and other issues

. Among other agreements, t he parties agreed that Rhodes would “ choo se three therapists that accep t Tricare

Rho des’s points relate to his c laim that the district court was biased against him. For bre vity, we have consolidated those argumen ts into a single issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

2 For the child ren ’s privacy, we will ref er to them by alias es
. See Tex. R. App. P. 9. 9 ( a )( 3 ).

3 Rhodes now resides in Kentucky.3 insurance in order to effectuate therapeut ic visitation with the children ” ; that Rhodes would

“ submit th ose th ree choices ” to Tamayo , who would select one of the three ; and that the parties would fo llow th e recommendatio ns of the therapist regarding possession and access until further order of the court. Rhodes agreed that he would be “ 1 00 percent responsib le ” fo r the cost s associated with that therapy , including any uninsured medical costs

. During the he aring, t he dist ric t court rendered judgment o n the parties’ agreement and made the agreement an order of the court

. T he only disputed issues at the temporary

- orders hearin g were whether to modify the conservatorship and whether Rhodes would be limit ed to s upervised visit ation of the children

. Rhodes and Tamayo testified regarding those issues. Rhodes testified that he had last vis ited the children in person in 2018. Rhodes had spoken with Ann over the phone “ maybe seven or eight times ” since then. Rhode s acknowledged that in 2018, he had sent several vulgar emails and text messages to Lis Schafer, Tamayo ’ s adopted mother and the person who was supervising Rhodes ’ s phone co mmunication with the children . In the messages, cop ies of which were admitt ed into ev idence, Rhodes cal led S c haf er names such a s “ f ucking liberal nazi ” and

“ shitty ass hag ” and demand ed that she allow him to call An n
. Tamayo testified that Rhodes did not make any attempt to contact the children in
2019. Then , in 2020, Rhodes b egan tell i n g Tamayo in emails that he “ felt nothing ” for one of the children, that he would “ ask the courts to disown [the children] legally , ” and that he wanted
to relinquish his parental rights to the children. Rhodes acknow ledged sending these emails , which wer e admitte d into evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district c ourt ordered that Tamayo would continue as sole managing conservator of the c hildren and that Rhodes would be allowed some unsuper vised visits with t he children

.4 The case p roceeded t o a final trial on the merits in early 2022 , at which point Rhodes was no longer represented by counsel

. During trial, Rhodes agreed that the provisions contained in the temporary orders re garding possession and access and the rapy sessions would be inc or p or at ed in to the final order , except for the provision requiri ng Rhodes to pay for the therapy sessions , which Rhodes con tested

. Rhodes agreed that Tamayo would remain sole managing conservator of the children and that he would remain possessory conservat o r
. Tamayo testifi ed that Rhodes had not visited the children in person since June
2018

. Tamayo testified that both childre n continued to require therapy and that h er total monthly income was $1 , 388 , which was compo sed of $692 from the child ren ’ s S oci al

- S ecurity disability payments and $696 that she received from Rhodes ’ s Veterans’ Administration (VA) mili tary

dis ability payments

. She explained that the latter amount would decrease by appro ximately $200 per month following her divorce from R hodes

. Rhodes tes tified that his monthly income was approximately $3 , 700 per month, including $3,050 from the VA and $650 fr om Social Security. Rhodes ac knowledged that since April 2021, he had not paid any money for the children ’ s therapy , despit e the orders requiring
him to do so. The district court granted the divorce and rendered judgment on the parties’ agreements regardi ng conservatorship and possession and access. The court made final the parties’ p revious agreement that Father pay for therap y as a con dition to possession and access

. The court additionally ordered that Father pay a portion of Tamayo ’s attorney’s fees

. This appeal follow ed

.5 DISCUSSION
D ue Process In his first point of error , Rhodes asserts that at the beginning of the case, the di strict cour t “ gave [him] supervised visitation o f the children with very vague temp [orary] court orders ” that den ied h im due process. 4 However, the entry of a final order supersede s a ny temporary order s and renders moot any complaints about the temp orary order s
. Se e Vara

v. Vara , 645 S.W.3d 818 , 823 (Tex. Ap p.

— El Paso 2022, pet. den ied) ; Mauldin v. Clements , 428 S.W.3d 247, 261

– 62 (Tex. App.

– Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ; see also Tex. Fam. Code § 105.001(e) (providing that tempor ary orders mad e “for the safety and welfare of the child” are not subject to appeal ).
We overr ule Rhodes ’ s first point of error

.
Judicial bias In his second , third , fourth, fifth , and eig hth points of error , Rhodes compla ins of judicial bias

. H e asserts that the district court demo nstrated bias against him by “ shrugging off ”
Ta mayo ’ s violati ons of the temporary orders, by allowing Tamayo to “ slander ” him during her testimony without allowing him to ask her certain questio ns on cross - examination , by conditioning hi s possession and ac cess to the children on his payment for therap y, and by

“ loo k [in g] down and talk [ing] down to [ Rhodes ] with a blatant attitude of disrespect and disregard

. ”

4 Rhodes claims that the district court made a determination at the t empor ary - orders hearing that he was denied due process. We have reviewed the record and found no such determination

.6 “All parties have a right to a fair and impartial trial before a neutral judge .” Ellason v. Ellas on , 162 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2005, no pet.) (citing Markowitz

v. Markowitz , 118 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Te x. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied))

. “ In the absence of a clear showin g to the contrary, we will presume the tria l judge was a neutr al and detached officer. ” In re K.L.R. , 162 S.W.3d 291 , 312 (Te x . App.

— Tyler 2005, no pet.). Dur ing trial , “ e xpressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even ange r ” do not establish bias or partiality. Liteky v. United S tates , 510 U.S. 540 , 555

- 56 (1994)

. Moreover, “ ‘ j udicial rulings alone almost neve r constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion, ’ and opinions the judge forms during a trial do not ne cessitate recusal ‘ unless they display a deep

- seated favori tism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. ’ ” Dow Chemical Co.

v. Francis , 46 S.W.3d 237 , 240 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555 )

. “ Thus, judicial remarks during the c ourse of a trial that are critical or disapprovi ng of, or ev en hostile to,

coun sel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a b ias or partiality challenge. ” Id

. (quoting Liteky , 510 U.S. at 555)

. “ Further, a trial court may properly inter vene to maintain control in the courtroom, to expedite the tr ial, and to prevent what it considers to be a waste of time. ” Id

. at 241 ; see a lso Tex. R. Evid. 611(a) ( “ The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and or der of examining witne sses and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedu res effective for d e termining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. ” ). “ In short, a trial court has the inherent power to control t he disposition of cases ‘ with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel , and for litigants. ’ ” Dow Chemical Co

. , 46 S.W.3d at 240 (quoting Landis v. North Am. Co. , 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) )

.7 We have reviewed the entire record and found no evidence of bias or partiality by the district court

. A t both the temporary

- orders h ea ring and at trial , t he court allowed both Rhodes and Tamayo to testify and fully present the ir cases to the court , and the court took care at both proceedings to ensure that the agree d orders were satisfactory to each party before rend ering judgment on t he m
. Also, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the district court treated Rhodes with “ disrespect ” or “ disregard ” as he claims . To the contrary, the district court asked each party at the conclusion of trial if they believe d the court h ad lis te ned to them “ respectfully and with dignity

. ” Both Rhodes and Tamayo answered , “ Yes , ” and th e record reflects that the district court did so. Additionally, we cannot conclude that the district court showed partiality towa rd Tamayo. For example, a t the c on clusion of the temporary

- orders hearing, the district court found in favor of Rhodes ’ s req uest to have some unsupervised visits with the children , despite Tamayo arguing that unsupervised visitation should not be allowed

. T he distri ct court made clear i n its ruling that Tamayo ’ s evidence did not rise to the level of “ where the Court is comfort able restricting that visitation to supervised only. ” This is more evidence that the district court was not biased against Rhodes. As for th e district court ’ s ev id entiary ruling s , t he district court excluded as irrelevant some questions that Rhodes soug ht to ask Tamayo on cross - examination regarding their marital history and conflict

. Exc ludin g such questions do es not rise to the level of sho wing any bias or part ia lity on the part of the district court , particu larly considering that the parties had alre ady agreed that Tamayo would remain sole managi ng conservator of the children

. Similarly , we cannot conclude that the district court demonstr ated bias agains t Rhode s by conditioning his possession and access to the children on his pay ing for therapy

.8 Rh odes had previously agreed to pay for therapy, and the evidence at trial showed that Rhodes had more than twice the monthly income as Tamayo. Thus, rather than showi ng bias, the district
court ’ s decision demonstrated conform ity to the previous agreement b etween the parties and reflected the financial reality that Rhodes was in a better position than Tamayo to pay for therapy. We cann ot conclude th at this or any other r uling by the district court demonst rated bias. Having found no evidence that the di strict court was biased against Rhodes, w e overrule Rhodes ’ s second, third, fourth, fif th , and eight h issues.

Continuance At the beginning of trial in late March 2022 , R hodes moved for a continuance so tha t he could have “time to hire” a new attorney. His previous attorney had withdrawn in December 2021. The district court denied the motion, noting that Rhodes had “had almost four months t o hire a new attorney” and th at the divorce proceedings had been pe nding for over 560 days, making it “a very old case.” In his sixth issue, Rhodes asserts that the district court abused its discretion by de nying his motion for continuance.
We will not disturb a trial court ’ s order d enying a motion for continuance unle ss the trial court has committed a clear abuse of discretion. BMC Software Belgium, N.V.

v. Marchand , 83 S.W.3d 789 , 800 (Tex. 2002) (citing Villegas v. Carter , 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1 986) )

. “ A trial court ‘ abuse s its discretion when it reaches a dec ision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amou nt to a clear and prejudicial error of law. ’ ” Id . (quoting Johnson

v. Fourth Court of Appeals , 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985) )

. “ In exercisi ng its discretion over whethe r to grant or deny a continuance due t o the withdrawal of counsel, a trial court may9 consider the entire procedural history of a case. ” In re Harrison , 557 S.W.3d 99, 140 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14t h Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
H ere, Rhodes ’ s attorney withdr ew in December 2021. Rhodes did not f ile his motion for continuance until March 18, 20 22, four days and two business days before trial was scheduled to begin

. At that tim e, the case had been pending for 560 days. Given the l ength of time the case had be en pending and the length of time Rhodes already had to hire new counsel,
we cannot con clude on this record that the district court abused its discretion by denying Rhodes ’ s motion for continuance

. We overrule Rhodes ’ s sixth issue.
Attorney ’ s fees In h is seventh issue, Rhodes asserts that the district court abused its discret ion by ordering him to pay a portion of Tamayo ’ s attorney ’ s fees. H e claims tha t this was unfair to him. “Texas follows the American ru le on attorney ’ s fees, which provides that,
g enerally, ‘a party may not recover attorney ’ s fees unless authorized by statute or contract.’ ” Wheelabrator Air Pollution Control, Inc. v. City of San Antonio , 489 S.W.3d 448, 453 n.4 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Wells Fargo Bank, N

. A

. v. Murphy , 458 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. 2015)). “ When fee

- shiftin g is authorized, the party seeking to recover those fees bears the burden of establishing the fees are reasonable and necessary. ” In re Nat ional Lloyds Ins. Co. , 532 S.W.3d 794 , 809 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding).

“ In a suit for dissolution of a marriage, the court may award reasonable atto rney ’ s fees and expenses. ” Tex. Fam. Code § 6.708 (c)

. Additionally, “ in a divorce suit, the trial court has the equitable power to awar d either spouse attorney ’ s fees as a part of the just and right10 division of the marital estate. ” Mandell v. Mandell , 3 10 S.W.3d 531, 541 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied). We review such an awar d for abuse of discretion. See Murff v. Murff , 615 S

. W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981). To support an aw ard of attorney ’ s fees in this context , evidence should be presented on th e “hours spent on the case, the nature of preparation, complexity of the case, experience of the attorney, and the prevailing hourly rate s” in the community. Hardin v. Hardin , 161 S .W.3d 14, 24 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.)

. “ The trial c ourt does not need to hear evidence on each factor but can ‘ look at the entire record, the evidence presented on reasonableness, the amou nt in controversy, the common knowledge of th e participants as lawyers a nd judges, and the relative success of the part ies. ’ ”
In re Ma rriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S. , 405 S.W.3d 373, 387 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2013, no pet.) (quoting Hagedorn v. Tisdale , 73 S.W.3d 3 41, 353 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2002, no pet.) )

. Tamayo’s attorney, Lori Wats on, testified that she has been practicing law for twenty

- five years and that she bills at the rate of $350 per hour, which she testified was “the customary rate for an attorney t hat only practices family law as long as [she] ha[ s].” Watson explained that her firm was retained w hen the divorce was filed in September 202 0, that she filed an answer in October 2020, exchanged sworn inventories and documents with Rhodes’s attorney
in November 2020, received discovery and an amende d p etition for custody, sent discovery, and had “been through the whole ringer with responding t o discovery, objecting to it, reviewing what they sent over.” She also “participated in a full

- day mediation . . . in an effort to resolve the issues for tempo rar y orders” and then, shortly after that, attended th e temporary

- orders hearing that lasted app roximately five hours. Watson also offered a n invoice into evidence “that detail[ed] everything that we’ve done in this case, including preparing for trial,” al though the invoice did not include the11 attorney ’ s fees incurred f rom attending the trial

. The invoice included the services that were performed by Watson , wh en they were performed , and the amount of time re quired to perform each service . In total, t he in voice showed that Tamayo had incurred approximately $17,000 in legal fees during the divorce p roceedings , not including the trial itself . The amount Rhodes had incurred in legal fees was disputed, although there was evidence presented that he had paid
app roximately $5,000 to h is attorney before the attorney had withdrawn. Tamayo requested that t he district court order Rhodes to pay $6,000 of her attorney’s fees to equalize the division of the marital estat e , and the district court awarded that
amount of at torney ’ s fees to Tamayo

. On this record, w e cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by doing so. Th e testimony of Watson , combined with the invoice showing the attorney’s fees incur red by Tamayo , provided sufficient evidence from wh ich the district court could conclude t hat the attorney ’ s fees were reasonable and necessary , and we find no abuse of discretion in the district court ’ s awar ding $6,000 of th e $17,000 total amount of
attor ney ’ s fees to Tamayo as part of the just and right division of the marital estate. We overrule Rhodes ’ s seven th issue.

CONCLUSION
We af firm the di vorce decree.

__________________________________________ Gis ela D. Triana , Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Th eofanis Affirmed Filed: May 31, 202 4