### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A ugus t 3, 200 4

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . CEDRIC ANTHO NY

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty

No. 02-01482 Chris Cr aft, Jud ge

No. W2004-00255-C CA-M R3-CD - F iled Dece m ber 10, 2004

De fe nd a nt, Ce dr ic An tho ny , wa s indi c te d in c ou nt o ne fo r the a g g ra vate d r ob be ry of Te re sa Ste g a ll, in count two for the a g g ravated robbe ry of Reg ina Davis, in count thre e for the ag g ravated robbe ry of Antoinette Hubba

rd, and in c ount four for

the ag g ravated robbe ry

of L eslie Ross. Following a jury trial, Def endant wa s convicted of

all four c ounts of ag g ravated robbe ry and sente nced to e ight y ear s for e ach of

fense . The trial court order ed Defenda nt’s sentenc es for counts two, three , and four to be
se rv e d c on c ur

re ntl y , a ndhis se nte nc e fo r c ou nt on e to be se rv e d c on se c uti ve ly to the oth e r c ou nts for a n eff

ective se ntence of six teen y ears . Def endant doe s not appea l the sufficie ncy of the convicting evidenc e but ar g ues that his ag g ravated robbe ry convictions in counts t h ree and four vio la te the princ ipl e s o f do ub le je op ard y . D e fe nd a nt d oe s n ot a rg ue on app e a l th a t hi s c on vic tio n in
c ou nt t wo of

the a g g ra va te d ro bb e ry of Ms. Da vis raise s do ub le je op ard y c on c e rn s. De fe nd a nt a lso arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in orde ring his sentence for c ount one, ag g ravat ed ro b b er y , to be
serve d consec utively to the other sentenc es. Since the filing of the brie fs, Def endant ha s also asked us to co n s i d er t h e i m p act of the ruling in Blakely v. W ashington , 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. C t. 2531 (2004) on his sentenc es. Afte r a thoroug h revie w of the re cord, w e af firm Def endant’ s convictions for a g g ravated robbe ry

in counts one and two. Be cause the fa cts and c ircumstance s supporting the offe nses in counts one, thre e, an d fo u r support onl y one convic tion for ag g ravated robbe ry , we modify Def endant’ s convictions for a g g ravated robbe ry in counts t h ree and four to ag g ravated assault. W e remand Defenda nt’s convictions in counts three and four for r esente ncing during which the trial co u rt m ay

only consider D efe ndant’s prior c onvictions as an enhanceme nt fac tor under Bl ake ly . We affirm Defe ndant’s convic tions for ag g ravated robbe ry in counts one and two , and af fi rm t h e t ri al co u rt ’s i m p o s i t i o n o f c o n s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t A ffirm e d as M odi fie d; Re m ande d forRe se nt e nc ing forCo nvi c ti ons of C ount s Thr e e and F our

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., joined.

Robert Wils on J ones, District Public Defe nder; Ga rland Erg uden, Assistant Public Def ender ; Trent Ha ll, As sis ta nt P ub lic De fe nd e r; a ndCa thy Ha iley , As sista nt P ub lic De fe nd e r, fo r the app e lla nt, C e d r i c A n t h o n y.-2-

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Kathy D. As lin g e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Willi a m L . G ibb on s, Di stric t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; an d G le n B a ity , A ssi sta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, the State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

Tere sa Steg all was wor

king a s a cashie r at a B ig Star g roce ry store in Memphis, Tenne ssee, when two Afric an-A merica n men enter ed the store around 5:00 p.m. One of the men a pproac hed Ms. Ste g a ll, po int e d a

g un a t he r, a ndor de re d h e r t o o pe n h e r c a sh re g ist e r. Th e ma n g ra bb e d s ome money from the r eg ister. He then remove d cash from the ca sh reg ister locate d next t o Ms. Stega ll’s wh ic h wa s op e rate d by An toi ne tte Hu bb ard

. Th e ma n a lso too k mon e y fr om a c us tom e r w ho m Ms

. Ste g a ll h a d b e e n a ssi sti ng pr ior to the ro bb e ry

. Ms. Ste g a ll s a id that a se c on d man a

pp ro a c he d L e sli e Ross, who was working at the store’ s customer service de sk, and pointed a g un at her . The c ustomer service desk wa s located a bout fifteen to twe nty

fee t away from Ms. Steg all’s ca sh reg ister. The two perpe trators lef

t the store throug h the front door. One of the men fired two g unshots at the door as he lef t.

Ms. Ste g a ll sa id that the tw o me n we re in the ir tw e nti e s. Th e ma n w ho ro bb e d M s. Ste g a ll was tall and w ore da

rk jea ns, a striped shirt, and a bandana over his fa ce. Ms. St eg all said that the man also wore a hat so that only his ey es we re visible. Ms. Steg all said that she could not identify Def endant a s the man who robbe d her.
Reg in a Da v i s testified that she wa s pay ing f or her g roce ries at Ms. Steg all’s ca sh reg ister when the two me n enter ed the store. One of the men turne d toward the customer se rvice desk, and the oth e r c a me to the c he c k- ou t are a a ndde ma nd e d th a t Ms. Ste g a ll g ive him the c a sh in h e r c a sh reg ister. Ms. Davis desc ribed the ma n who r o b b ed her as in his ear ly

to mid-twenties, thin, and
ar o u n d fi v e f

ee tn i n e i n ch es t al l

. M s

. Da v i s s ai d t h at t h e p erp et ra t o r wo re a s tri p ed p o l o s h i rt , a b ei ge paisley bandana over his fa ce, a nd car

ried a n automatic g un. The man g rabbe d some money out of Ms. D avis’ hand and de manded he r purse . Ms. Davis slid her purse over the counter , and the man
remove d some ca sh. Ms. Davis said that the other ma n wore dark c lothes and a ski ma sk. Both men le ft by the fr on t do or . O ne of

the me n f

ir e d tw o s ho ts at th e do or a s h e le ft

.
An toi ne tte Hu bb ardwa s w or kin g a t th e se c on d c a sh re g ist e r. Th e ma n who ro bb e d h e r c a sh reg ister was c arry ing a wea pon, but Ms. Hubbar d could not identify the type of g un. Ms. Hubbard said that she did not think the ma n who robbe d her w as we aring a mask, but ag ree d that one of the men fire d two g unshots at the store’s f ront door. Ms. Hubbar d said that the robber did not take any of he r p e rs on a l be lon g ing s. She c ou ld n ot i de ntify Defen da nt a s th e ma n w ho ro bb e d h e r c a sh reg ister.

L eslie Ross said that one of the m en approac hed her customer se rvice counter

and dema nded that she open the cash r eg ister that was be hind the counter . After she opene d the ca sh drawe r, the man g rabbe d some money . He wa s car ry ing a gu n wi t h a s i l ver ba rre l and black handle. The-3-

pe rp e tr a tor

wo re la tex glov e s. Ms. Ros s said that th e ma n w ho ro bb e d M s. Ste g a ll’ s a ndMs. Hubbar d’s ca sh reg isters was we aring a hor i z o n t al l ystriped shirt. Ms. Ross said that none of her persona l belong ings w ere taken during the robbery

. Ms. Ross also hea rd two g unshots after the men had lef t the store.

Wil liam Warren ha d just entered the g roce ry store whe n he saw an armed man at one of the
c a sh re g ist e rs . H e turne d a ro un d a ndle ft th e st ore and g ot b a c k in to a frie nd ’s truc k. Whe n h is friend dr ove ar ound to the front of the store, Mr. Warr en saw two men running down the street. Mr. Warren a nd his friend followed the m en unti l they lost sight of them. When Mr. Warre n g ot out of the truck, he spotted the two men ag ain and y elled at them. Mr. Warren said t h at t h e m en threw some items in the bushes near a house on G ibbons Pl ace

.
J ohn Chevalier, an office r wit h the M emphis Poli ce D epartment, responded to the c all about the robbe ry

at Big Star. When he arrived at the store, some by standers pointed out two men running
away from the g roce ry

store. Of

fice r Chevalier

chase d the men until they wer e appr ehende d.

Se rg e a nt Joe Ed wa

rdSta rk sa id that he du ste d the g ro c e ry sto re ’s fr on t do or fo r f ing e rp ri nts , but did not find any . Two .22 ca liber shell ca sings we re discove red just outside the fr ont door. Police office rs had r etrieve d two g uns and a black hat with holes cut out for the wea rer ’s ey es by

the time Ser g eant Stark arrived at the house on Gibbons Place. The police later f ound a long -sleeve d, multi-colored shirt and a

bandana hidden in a bar

beque grill behind a house on Sellers S tree t. The police also found a

chec k made out to “B ig Star ,” various sa les rec eipts with the name of the store,
some ca sh and a pa ir of latex glove s in the vicinityof the Sellers Stree t house.
Serg eant Walter L ee Williams, J r. took Def endant’ s statement afte r he was transporte d to the M e m p h i s P o l i c e D e p ar t m e n t

. S e r g e a n t W i l l i a m s a d v i s e d D e f e n d a nt o f h is Mi randa rig hts and testified that Def

endant appear ed to understand the proce ss. I n his statement, Def endant c onfesse d that he c omm itt e d th e ro bb e ry . H e sa id that a frie nddr ov e him a nd his br oth e r, Se a n A nth on y , to the B ig Star

g roce ry store. De fenda nt said t h at his brother wa s wea ring a g ray

shirt and black hat pulled down over

his face and carrie d a .22 ca liber Smith and W esson re volver. De fenda nt said that he wor e a blue tee- shirt and a ba ndana ove r the lowe r half of his faceand wa s armed w i th a .22 caliber semi-automatic Smith and Wesson. Defe ndant said that he took the money out of the two cash r eg isters at the fr ont of the store w hile his brother took the money out of the ca sh reg ister located at the customer service desk. Def endant sa id that he also took some money from a c ustomer standing at the first c ash re g ister. Def endant sa id that he put his s h i rt an d b andana in a bric k barbe cue g rill behind a house. De fenda nt said that he tripped on the way out of t he groc ery store, and his g un discharg ed twice

.
II. Do uble Je opa r dy

Def endant doe s not challeng e his convictions in counts one a nd tw o fo r t h e agg ravated robberies of Te resa

Ste gal l and the c ustomer, Reg ina Davis. Rely ing on Sta te v . Fra nk lin , 130 S.W .3d 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) , Def endant a rg ues, howe ver, t h at t he convic tions for the-4-

ag g ravated robbe ry

of Ms. Hubbar d and Ms. Ross violate double je opardy provisions. Defe ndant contends that the e vidence supports only a si ng le robbery connec ted t o the t heft from the Big Star g roce ry store. He a

rg ues that his other two c onvictions for ag g ravated robbe ry should be modified to ag g ravated assault as a lesser inc luded offe nse of a g g ravated robbe ry . The St at e, on the other ha nd , a rg ue s th a t De fe nd a nt’ s c on du c t c on sti tut e d th re e se pa rate “ takin g s” wh ic h s ur viv e a do ub le jeopar dy challeng e.
The State initially arg ues that Def endant has waived consideration of his d o u b l e j eo pardy issue on appea l be cause he failed to r aise this issue in his motion for new tria l. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3 (e ). Ne ve rthe le ss, we c ho os e to a dd re ss this iss ue on it s mer its . T e nn . R. Cr im. P. 5 2( b) ; see als o S tat e v . Le wis , 9 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d 7 3 6 (T en n

. 1 9 9 7 ) ( ci t i n g State v. Goins , 705 S.W .2d 648, 650 (Tenn. 19 86 )) ; State v. Epps , 989 S.W .2d 742, 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)(a pply ing pla in error

doctrine to review whether

the def endant’ s dual convictions violated double jeopa rdy principles).

B o t h o u r f e d e r a l a n d s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s p r o h i b i t p e r s o n s f r o mb e i n g “ t w i c e p u ti n j e o p ar d y” fo r the sa me of

fe ns e . U .S. Co ns t. a me nd . V ; T e nn . Co ns t. a rt . I , § 10 . “ Th is p ro hib iti on a g a ins t ‘d ou ble je op ardy

pr ov ide s p ro te c tio n f

ro m th re e e vil s: ( 1) a

se c on d p ro se c uti on a ft e r an a c qu itt a l; (2) a second pr osecution af

ter a convi ct i o n ; and (3) multipl e punishments for the sa me offe nse.” Fr an k lin , 1 3 0 S

. W

. 3 d at 7 9 7 (c i t i n g Lewis, 958 S.W .2d at 738).

I n Fr an k lin , the owner

of an A moco marke t and his employ ee wer e working behind the sale s co u n t erwh en t h e d ef

en d an tan d t h e co -d ef

en d an ten t er ed t h e s t o re

. T h e d ef en d an t , b ra n d i s h i n g a handg un, went behind the c ounter a nd o rd er ed t h e s t ore’ s owner to ope n the ca sh reg ister. The de fe nd a nt t oo k th e mon e y fr om the c a sh re g ist e r. He the n to ld the ow ne r an d his emplo y e e to g o in to the marke t’s restroom, a nd the t wo perpetrator s left t he st ore. Def endant was later convicted of two counts of ag gra v ated r obbery

. Fr an k lin , 130 S.W .3d at 791. Althoug h the State pursued dua l
c on vic tio ns un de r the the ory that tw o e mpl oy e e s h a d b e e n th re a te ne d witha ha nd g un , a

pa ne l of thi s court c oncluded that th e d ef en d an ts had committed a sing le theft fr om the Amoco mar ket, and there fore only

one ag g ravated robbe ry

. Id. at 798.

The Fr an k lin c ou rt

ob se rv e d th a t

Tenne ssee’ s leg islature has de fined robbe ry as “the intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fea r.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-401( a). Thus, Te nnessee ’s robbe ry statute is defined in terms of “thef t.” “A person commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owne r of property , the person knowing ly obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner ’s ef

fec tive consent.” Id . § 39-14-103. Our supreme court ha s rec og nized that, “[t] he ele ment which distinguishes r obbery from thef t is the use of violence or fea r.” State v. Owens , 20 S.W .3d 63 4 , 6 3 8 (Tenn. 2000). “The ref ore, w hether

a taking is properly

char acte rized as a thef

t or a robbe ry

is continge nt upon whether and when violence or fea

r i s imposed.” Id. I nd e e d, Te nn e sse e c ou rt s h a ve fr e qu e ntl y char acte rized the crime of robbery as “‘ an ag g ravated form of larc eny .’” See, e. g.,-5-

Sta te v . W ins e tt , 2 1 7 T e n n

. 5 6 4 , 3 9 9 S

. W

. 2 d 7 4 1 , 7 4 2 ( T e n n

. 1 9 6 5 ) ( q u o t i n g 5 4 C

. J. 10 10 ); Fre e ma n v . S tat e , 520 S.W .2d 739, 741 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974)

.
Fr an k lin , 130 S.W .3d at 796.

The Fr an k lin c ou rt

thu s c on c lud e d th a t,

Tenne ssee a

ppear s to disti ng uish robbery from theft on the basis of the method of the taking , rathe r than on the ba sis of from whom the prope rty is taken. “It is viol ence that makes robbery an offense of g reater a trocity

than larc eny .” W

ins e tt , 399 S.W .2d, at 743. The method of the taking rema ins unaffe cted by the number of

persons who may be thre atene d during the crime. Acc ording ly , we hold t h at t h e p roper unit of prosec ution fo r ro b bery

in Tennesse e is the number of taking s, i.e. the number of the ft s.

Fr an k lin , 130 S.W .3d at 796-97.
Thus, the question prese nted in the case sub judice is h ow ma ny the ft s o c c ur

re d at th e B ig Star g roce ry

store, involving e mploy ees of the s tore. (As noted above, Defe ndant concedes tha t the of fense c omm itt e d a g a ins t th e c us tom e r c on sti tut e d a se pa rate the ft , a ndthe re fo re a se pa rate ag g ravated robbe ry .) I n Epps , Eliz abeth Franklin re turned home f rom a shopping trip and di s c o v ere d that someone ha d enter ed the house throug h a broke n window. Mrs. F ranklin determined that a .38 p i s t o l wa s m i s s i n g fr o mh erd re s s erd ra we r a n d t h at t h e p erp et ra t o r( s ) h ad al s o t ak en a . 2 0 gau ge shotgun, a .38 long barr el pistol, and a Winchester rifle

. Epps , 989 S.W. 2d a t 743. Th e re wa s a lso
e vid e nc e that th e pe rp e tr a tor (s ) h a d att e mpt e d to ste a l Mrs . Fr a nk lin ’s a uto mob ile . B a se d o n th e se fa c ts, the de fe nd a nt w a s c on vic te d of on e c ou nt o f a g g ra vate d b ur g lary , o ne c ou nt o f the ft of pr op e rt y over $1,000 a nd one count of attempted thef

t of property over $1,000. A lthough not ra ised in the trial court, this Court conclude d, as plain err or, that the defe ndant’s convic tions for both theft and attempted theft violated double jeopa rdy principles. Id. at 745. “Spec ifically , the proof e stablished that the offe nses of thef

t and attempted thef

t arose f rom a si n gl e crimi nal episode, involved the property of one vic tim, and both occurr ed at the sa me location.” Id.

The Epps court noted that “[t] he issue of multipl e punishments arising f rom a sing le criminal episode wa s addre ss ed by our supre me court in State v. Phillips , 924 S.W .2d 662 (Tenn. 1996) .” Id. The supre me court, in Ph ill ips , outlined the g ener al principles involved in dete rmining w hen of fe ns e s a re mul tip lic ito us :
1. A sin g le of

fe ns e ma y no t be div ide d in to sepa rate pa rt s; g e ne ra lly , a

sin g le wrong ful ac t m ay not furnish the basis for more than one criminal prosec ution;

2. I f eac h offe nse char g ed require s proof of a fac t not re quired in proving the other, the of

fense s are not multi plicitous; and-6-

3. Where time and loc ation separ ate a n d d i s t i n gu i sh the commission of the offe nses, the off

enses c annot be said to have arisen out of a sing le wrong ful
a c t. Phillips , 924 S.W .2d at 6 6 5

. “Additional fa ctors such a s the nature of the a ct; the time elapse d betwee n the alleg ed conduc t; the intent of the ac cused, i.e., was a new intent formed; and cumulative pu nis hme nt m a y

be c on sid e re d f

or g uid a nc e in d e te rm ini ng wh e the r the mul tip le c on vic tio ns vio la te doubl e j eopardy .” Epps , 9 8 9 S

. W

. 2 d at 7 4 5 (c i t i n g Phillips , 9 24 S.W. 2da t 66 5) . With th e se principles in mind, the Ep ps court a naly zed,
Ag ain, the conduc t at issue involves the theft of prope rty and attempted the ft of prope rty

from the pr emises of Elizabeth Franklin. There is no dispute that the four
wea pons t ak en from inside the home and the automobile, parked unde r the shed,
wer e the pr operty

of Elizabeth Fr anklin. Where severa l articles a re stolen f rom the
same owner at the same time and place , only a sing le crime is committ ed. See 52A C.J .S. Larceny § 5 3 ( 19 68 ); s e e a l s o N e l s o n v
. Sta te , 2 0 8 T enn. 179, 344 S.W.2d 54 0, 54 2 ( 19 60 ); People v . Timmons , 233 I ll

. App. 3d 591, 174 I ll. Dec. 616, 599 N. E. 2d16 2, 16 5 ( 2 D ist . 1 99 2) ; H o l t v . S tat e , 178 I nd. App. 631, 383 N.E.2d 467, 4 7 2 ( 1978). Cf. Sta te v . B y rd , 968 S.W .2d 290 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that theft of fe ns e s may

be a g g re g a te d in to one sin g le c ha rg e wh e n th e se pa

rate larc e no us a c ts
are fr om the sa me loc a tio n, a nd pu rs ua nt to a c on tin uin g c ri min a l impu lse ); State v. Le wis , 958 S.W .2d 7 3 6 , 7 3 9 (Tenn. 1997) (holding that act of setting a partment building on fire was sing le ac tion and double jeopar dy prohibits separate convictions for eac h apartment de stroy ed). Whether the ac ts of the def endant c onstitut e seve ral thefts or one single c rime must be determined by the fa cts and c ircumstance s of ea ch
case

. Id. I f ea ch taking is the result of a se parate in t en t , eac h is a separ ate c rime; ho we ve r, wh e re the takin g s a re a ll p ur su a nt t o a

sin g le int e nt, the re is bu t a sin g le larc eny

. Id. See also Philli ps , 924 S.W .2d at 665. I t is of no conseque nce w hether the t aking is completed, or, but, a mere attempt. Se e De lle nb ac h v . S tat e , 508 N.E.2d 1309, 1314 (I nd. App. 3 Dist. 1987). Cf. A MER I C AN LAW INS TI TU TE , M O D EL P EN AL C ODE § 223.1(2)( c) & Comment (1980).
Epps , 989 S.W .2d at 745-46.

I n Sta te v . P au li , No. M2002-01607-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21302991 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, June 5, 2003), perm. to appeal de nied (Tenn. O ct. 27, 2003), the de fenda nt, among other char g es, wa s initi ally

char g ed with six teen c ounts of t h ef t o f p ro perty

over $60,000. The char g es related to a series of invoices, issued ove r a spa n of nea rly four months , which documented s ales of products fr om the defe ndant’s compa ny , AKO- I SMET, to KMS, an unrelat ed co mpany . The de fe nd a nt, a n e mpl oy e e of AK O- I SME T, pu rc ha se d pr od uc ts fr om AK O- I SME T a nd so ld the m to KMS at unauthoriz ed prices wit hout the knowledge of AKO-I SMET. Testimonyat trial established that the losses, based upon the differ ence betwee n the authorized price of the produc ts and the ac tual sales price t o KMS, exceede d $60,000 per invoice

. Id. , 2003 WL 21302991, at *10. I n its amended-7-

bil l of pa rt ic ula rs , th e Sta te a g g re g a te d th e sixte e n th e ft c ou nts int o thre e c ha

rg e s o f the ft

of pr op e rt y over $60,000. The first count included invoice s dated be tween A pril 24 to May 19, 1998; the second count included invoice s dated be tween June 9 t o Au gu s t 1 2, 1998; and the third count include d invoices date d betwee n Aug ust 26 to S eptember 18, 1998. The jury

subsequently

found the defe ndant g uilty , among other off enses, of the three counts of thef

t of property

over $60,000. Although not r aised on a

ppeal, a p an el of this Court addresse d the double jeopa rdy issues implicated by

the defe ndant’s thre e thef t convictions. Utiliz ing theprinciples enunc iated in Phillips , this Court concluded that “the three separ ate convictions for theft over $60,000 was plain err or and violated the prohibition ag ainst double jeopar dy

. The acts upon which the convictions wer e base d
arose from a single criminal episode, involved the same vic tim, and occur red at the same location. Therefo re , the ac ts constituted onlyone off ense of theft.” Pa uli , 2003 WL 21302991, at *15 (citation omitted). Turning to the instant case, the ev i d en ce showed that De fenda nt and his brother, Sea n Anthony , enter ed the Big Star g roce ry store at the sa me time and proc eede d to separate ca sh reg isters in the same g ener al locat ion of the store, e videncing an intent to rob all three cash r eg isters simult aneously . Sean Anthony went to the customer

service are a, bra ndished a g un over the counter
a t Ms . Ro ss, a ndthe n r e a c he d b e hin d th e c ou nte r to re mov e mon e y fr om h e r c a sh re g ist e r a ft e r M s. Ross opened the cash draw er. Def endant admitted that at the same time, he went to the ca sh reg isters
near the front door and told e ach employ ee to ope n her cash reg ister. He first remove d the ca sh from Ms. Ste g a ll’ s r e g ist e r a ndthe n the c a sh fr om Ms. Hu bb ard ’s re g ist e r. De fe nd a nt andhis br oth e r b oth exit ed the store at the same time throug h the front door

.
Ba sed on these f

acts presented in this case , we c onclude that De fenda nt’s three convictions for a g g ravated robbe ry

based upon the robbery

of ea ch of the store ’s three employ ees violate s the prohibition ag ainst double jeopar dy

. The acts upon which the convictions wer e based oc curr ed at the same tim e and location and repr esente d a si ng le criminal episode with a single c riminal intent to r ob the c a sh re g ist e rs wi thi n the re a c h o f the tw o p e rp e tr a tor s a ndthe n e sc ape fr om the pr e mis e s. See Franklin, 13 0 S. W.3 d a t 79 8; Epps , 989 S.W .2d at 745-46.

Acc ording ly , as re quired by double jeopar dy

principles, we reve rse De fenda nt’s convictions for a g g ravated robbe ry

in counts three and four. That is not t o say , howeve r, that De fenda nt is not g uilty of an offe nse ag ainst Ms. Hubbard a nd Ms. Ross. Se e Fr an k lin , 130 S.W .3d at 798. A per son wh o in te nti on a lly

or kn ow ing ly

dis play s a g un to a no the r, a nd the re by c a us e s th e oth e r t o r e a so na bly fea r imminent bodily i njury , has committed an a g g ravated assault. Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 102(a) (10(B ). Both Ms. Ross and Ms. H ubbard testified that Def endant br andished a

g un during the robbery , and that they

wer e af raid. Aggrav at ed assault is a lesser included of fense of ag g ravated robbery

. See State v . Jason C. Carter , No. M19 9 8 -CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 515930, at *8 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nashvill e, Apr. 27, 2000), perm. to appeal de nied (Tenn. 2000) . As a lesse r included offe nse, De fenda nt was cha rg ed with this offense in count three an d co unt four alleg ing the
a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

of Ms. Hu bb arda ndMs. Ros s. Th us , th e e vid e nc e is s uf fi c ie nt to su pp ort a conviction in counts three and four for a g g ravated assault ag ainst Ms. Hubbard a nd Ms. Ross. See Fr an k lin , 130 S.W .3d at 798.-8-

III. Sentencing Iss ues
At t he conc lusion of Defe ndant’s sente ncing hearing, the trial court f ound that three enhanc ement fa ctors we re a pplicable: fa ctor (2) , Def endant ha s a prev i o us history of criminal convictions; fac tor (3 ), Def endant wa s a lea der in the c ommissi on of the off ense; a nd fac tor (9), Def endant ha s shown a p r e v io u s unwillingness to comply with the conditions of a sente nce involving rele ase in the c ommunity . Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35-114(2) , (3), and (9). The trial court ext ended some slight conside ration to Def endant’ s learning disabilit y and the f act that he was on medic ation for a mental condition in miti g ation of the leng th of his sentence

. The trial c ourt also found that De fendan t wa s a dang erous of fende r and tha t consec utive sentenc ing w as nec essary to protec t society from Defenda nt’s criminal acts. The trial c ourt based its findings on the e x tent of De fenda nt’s criminal ac tivity since turning eig hteen a nd the dang erous circ umstances unde r which the curr ent offe nses wer e committed. See I d. § 40-35-115( b)(2) , (4).

The trial c ourt conc luded, howeve r, that the leng th of Defenda nt’s sentenc e would be g reater than that dese rved f

or the off ense if both e nhance ment fac tors and conse cutive sen t en ci ng wer e imposed. Acc ording ly , the trial court sentence d Def endant to the minimum term of eig ht y ear s for
eac h c o u n t o f

a g g r a v a te d r o b b e r y

a s a Ra n g e I , s tan d ar d o f

f e n d e r

. T h e tria l c o u r t o r d e r ed Def endant’ s sentenc es for counts two, three , and four to run concurre ntly , and his sentenc e for count one to run c onsecutively

with h i s sentenc es for

the re maining c ounts, for an e ffe ctive sente nce of sixte e n y e ars

. Def endant now a

ppeals the tria l court’s orde r of c o n s ecutive se ntencing arg uing that the
ev id e n c e f

a il s to s u p p o r t th e tria l c o u r t’ s c o n c lu s io n th a t D e f e n d a n t is a d a n g e r o u s offe nder. Def endant a lso contend s t h at the trial court improperly considere d Def

endant’ s prior convic tions in determining whether

Def endant’ s rec o rd o f cr i minal activity was e x tensive for

purposes of
co n s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g.
Whe n a de fe nd a nt a

pp e a ls the ma nn e r o f s e rv ic e of a se nte nc e imp os e d by

the tr ia l c ou rt , th is court c onducts a de novo revie w of the re cord w ith a presumption that the trial court’s determinations
are corr ect. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). The pre sumption of corre ctness is “c onditioned upon the a ff ir ma tiv e sh ow ing in the re c or d that the tr ia l c ou rt c on sid e re d the se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W

. 2 d 1 6 6 , 169 (Tenn. 1991) . The defe ndant has the bur den of showing that the sentenc e is improp er

. T en n

. C o d e Ann. § 40- 35- 401(d), Sentencing Commi ssion Comments. Howeve r, i f the re cord shows tha t the trial court f ailed to consider the se ntencing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances, then r eview of the
s e n t e n c e i s p u r e l y de novo

. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

When a Def

endant is convic ted of multiple crimes, the tria l court, in its discretion, may order the se nte nc e s to ru n c on se c uti ve ly if it f ind s b y a pr e po nd e ranc e of the e vid e nc e that a de fe nd a nt f

a lls into one of seve n cate g ories li sted in Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-35-115. I n this inst ance , the trial court found that Def endant wa s “a da ng erous of fende r whose behavior

indicates little or no-9-

reg ard f or human li fe, and no hesitation about commi tting a crime in which the risk to human life is high.” Tenn. Code Ann. §40-35-115(a )(4) . Howeve r, if the tria l court re sts its determination of
consec utive s en t en cing on this categ ory , the court must m ake two a dditional findings. State v. Im fe ld , 70 S.W .3d 698, 708 (Tenn. 2002). First, the trial court must find that an ex tended se ntence is n e c e ssa ry to p ro te c t th e pu bli c fr om f urthe r crimi na l con du c t by De fe nd a nt, a nd , s e c on d, it m us t f in d c o n s e c u ti v e s e n te n c in g to b e r e a s o n ab ly r e late d to th e s e v e r it y o f th e o f f enses. S t a te v. W ilkerson , 905 S.W .2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995)

. Although suc h specific fac tual finding s are unnece ssary for the other c ateg ories enume rate d in T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 40 -3 5- 11 5( b) , the imp os iti on of c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s is a lso g uid e d b y the g e ne ra l se nte nc ing princ ipl e s th a t th e le ng th o f a se nte nc e be “ju stly

de se rv e d in
re la tio n to the se ri ou sn e ss o f the of fe ns e ” a nd“ no g reater th an th a t de se rv e d f or the of fe ns e committed.” Im

fe ld , 70 S.W .3d at 708 (quoti n g T en n

. Code Ann. §§ 40-35- 102(1) a nd -103(2) ); State v. Lane , 3 S.W .3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999)

. Def endant’ s contention th at a

s e n te ncing court is limited to consideration of only the offe nses befor e it in determining whether a def endant ha s an extensive criminal history , for pur poses of
consec utive sentenc ing, ha s been spe cifica lly reje cted by

this Court i n State v. Palme r , 10 S.W .3d 638, 648-49 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). I n Palmer , this Court concluded that Tenne ssee Code An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 15 (b )( 2) app lie s to de fe nd a nts wi th e xten siv e prior c ri min a l c on vic tio ns

. Id . at 649.

I n the seve n y ear s betwee n the time Def endant turne d eig hteen a nd the pre -sentenc ing r eport was pre pare d, Def

endant ha d at least thirtee n convictions including one fe lony and two mi s d e me an or theft convic tions, thre e assault convictions, two misdemeanor drug convictions, four c onvictions for driving with a suspended or revoke d license, and one violation of probation. The e vidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s finding that Def endant is an offe nder whose rec ord of c riminal activity is ex tensive.

Def endant a rg ues th at t he re cord doe s not support a finding that there wer e ag g ravating circ umstances be y ond that inhere nt in the offense of ag g ravated robbe ry that would support the trial
cour t ’s fi n d ing that he is a dang erous of fende r. The trial court found that Defe ndant’s pattern of
c ri min a l a c tiv ity

sin c e turnin g e ig hte e n, pa rt ic ul arl y the a ssa

ult c on vic tio ns , e vid e nc e d h is dang erousne ss to soc iety

. Further, the trial court found that Def endant’ s numerous convic tions for driving with a revoked l icense and his violation of probation indicated a lac k of intent to abide by the law. Coupled with the da ng erousne ss display ed during the ag g ravated robberies at the B ig Star , the t rial court found t hat conse cutive sente ncing was ne cessa ry to protect socie ty

from De fenda nt’s
c on du c t.

Ba sed on our r eview, w e ca nnot conclude that the trial court e rre d in classify ing D efe ndant as a da ng erous of

fende r for purposes of c onsecutive se ntencing . I n any event, it i s nece ssary to find the pre sence of only

one of the statutory cate g ories li sted in Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 40- 35-115(b) to support the imposit ion of consec utive sentenc ing. See State v. Adams , 973 S.W .2d 224,-10-

231 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) . Def endant’ s extensive c riminal history alone is suffic ient to support
consec utive sentenc ing. Id. Def endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.
IV. Blakely Issues

Def endant d o e s n o t c h a ll e n g e th e le n g th o f h is s e n te n c e s o n ap p e a l b e c a u s e th e tria l c ourt sentenc ed him to the minimum sentenc e of e ight y ear s for a Rang e I standard of

fende r convic ted of
a Cl a ss B fe lon y . A ft e r the pa rt ie s f ile d th e ir brie fs in this ma tte r, ho we ve r, De fe nd a nt a sk e d th is Court to consider the impact of the ruling in Blakely v. W ashington , 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. C t. 2531 (2004) a s to the trial court’ s imposit ion of consec utive sentenc es. The State a rg ues that De fenda nt has waived this issue under rules 3( e) a nd 36(a) of the Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e. Be cause Bl ake ly , howeve r, calls into question certain aspec ts of our cur rent sente ncing scheme , we will a ddress Def

endant’ s issue on the merits. See State v . Graham , 90 S.W .3d 687, 692 (Tenn. 2002) (Unde r Apprendi , a trial c ourt still retains its di scre tion to consider applica ble enh an ce ment and mitigating fac tors so long a s the d ef en d an t ’s sentenc e is not enhanc ed bey ond the statutory maxi mum.)

I n Bl ake ly , the Supreme Court’s c oncern was the method by which a particular punishment for an offe nse can be imposed “in a way that respe cts the Six th A mendment.” Bl ake ly , 124 S.Ct . at 2540. The c ourt conc luded that “‘ [o] ther than the fac t of a prior conviction, any

fac t that increa ses the pena lty

for a crime be y ond the pre scribed sta tutory maxi mum must be submitted to a jury , and proved bey ond a rea sonable doubt.’” Bl ake ly , 1 2 4 S

. C t

. at 2 5 3 6 (q u o t i n g Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. C t. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L . Ed. 2d 435 (2000))

.
P rior to Bl ake ly , the Ap

pre nd i c o u r t h a d o b s e r v e d “ th a t n o th in g in [t h e ] h is to ry[of the
c omm on la w] s ug g e sts that it is i mpe rm iss ibl e fo r j ud g e s to e xer c ise dis c re tio n– takin g int o c on sid e ratio n v ari ou s f

a c tor s r e la tin g bo th to of

fe ns e a ndof

fe nd e r– in i mpo sin g a

jud g me nt with in the range presc ribed by

statute.” Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 481, 120 S. Ct. at 2358, 47 L . Ed. 2d at 449; see also Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 602, 122 S. C t. 2428, 2439, 153 L

. Ed. 2d 556, 572 (2002) (“I f a St ate makes an increase in a def endant’ s authorized punishment continge nt on the finding of
a fa c t, that fa c t–n o ma tte r ho w the Sta te la be ls it– mus t be fo un d by a jury be y on d a rea so na ble doubt.”).

The Bl ake ly court clarified that the rele vant “statutory maxi mum” which forms the basis of the Apprendi ru le “ is n ot the ma ximum se nte nc e a

jud g e ma y imp os e a ft e r fi nd ing a dd iti on a l f a c ts, but the maxi mum he may impose without any additional finding s.” Bl ake ly , 1 2 4 S

. C t

. a t2 5 3 7

. In the ca se sub judice , althoug h finding that sever al enha nceme nt fac tors wer e applica ble, the trial c ourt i m p o s e d t h e m i n i m u ms e n t e n c e f o r e a c h a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y c o n v i c t i o n r e l e v a n tt o a C l a s s B f e l o n y. Thus, the le ng th o f

e a c h o f D e f e n d a n t ’ s s e n t e n c e s i s n o ta f f e c t e d b y Bl ake ly

. Def endant a rg ues, howe ver, that although t h e leng th of his sentence was not enha nced bey ond the statutory

minimum , the impositi on of conse cutive sente ncing has t he pra ctical e ffe ct of incre asing the leng th of time h e m ust serve a s a re sult of his convictions. I t is thi s eff ect of
c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing wh ic h D e fe nd a nt c on te nd s o ff e nd s Blakely

.-11-

We observe initially , and as the State points out i n i t s b ri ef , a pane l of this Court has pr e vio us ly

c on c luded tha t Apprendi does not prec lude a tria l court fr om determining whether a defe ndant’s multipl e sentenc es should be serve d consec utively or conc urre ntly

. State v. Ira I shmael Muhamme d , No. E 2 0 0 3

- 0 1 6 2 9

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 2 0 4 WL 1 0 7 3 8 8 9 ( T e n n

. Cr

im

. A p p ., Knoxvi lle, May 10 , 20 04 ). The qu e sti on be c ome s, the re fo re , to wh a t e xten t, i f any , d oe s Bl ake ly impact the trial court’s discr etion to impose consecutive se ntencing under our sentenc ing sc heme.

As noted above , the co n cerns expressed in Bl ake ly re vo lve aro un d a de fe nd a nt’ s Sixth Amendment rig ht to have a jury determine the pre sence of all of the e ssential elements of the char g ed offe nse bey ond a re asonable doubt, no matter how these elements are labeled by the State. Bl ake ly , 124 S. Ct . 2538-39. The de termination of the manne r in wh ich a de fenda nt’s sentenc es will be
serve d, howeve r, occur s only afte r the defe ndant has either pled g uilty or been found g uiltyof two or more of

fense s bey ond a re asonable doubt and under the protec tions a ffor ded by the def endant’ s due proce ss and Six th Amendment rig hts. See Te nn . Code An n. § 40- 35 -1 15 (a ). As ou r s up re me c ou rt recen tl y ob se rv e d, “ se ve ra l c ou rt s h a ve re je c te d [th is] c on te nti on a ndhe ld that Blakely and Apprendi do not apply

to the decision to impose consec utive sentenc es.” State v. Gre gory Robinson , ___ S.W .3d ___, No. W2001-01299SC-R11-DD, slip op. at 26 n.14 (Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004) (citing People v . Syke s , 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317, 327 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2004) (citing case s)). The Sy k e s court conclude d that althoug h “[t] hose fa cts which a ffe ct the appr o p ri ate sentence within the rang e of potential terms of inca

rce ration for

eac h off e ns e are subject to Bl ake ly and A pprendi ; t his constitutional princ iple does not e x tend to whether the sentenc es for

char g es which ha ve bee n found to be true be y ond a reasonable doubt shall be served consecutively .” Syke s , 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 327.

Unless m an d at ed by

statute, a trial c ourt must find that a defe ndant meets one of seve n enumer ated c riteria be fore imposing conse cu t ive sentenc ing. Id. §§ 40 -3 5- 11 5( a ); see 39-16-605 (conse cutive sente nces f or esc ape f

rom a pe nal institut ion mandatory ); and 40-20- 111(b) (conse cutive sente nces ma ndatory for f elonies committed on bail). These fac tors include a f inding that:
(1) The defe ndant is a prof essional criminal who has knowing ly devot ed such defe ndant’s life to c riminal acts as a major sourc e of livelihood; (2) The defe ndant is an off ender whose re cord of

criminal ac tivityis ex tensive; ( 3 ) T h e d e f

e n d a n ti s a

d a n g e r o u s m e n t a l l y a b n o r m a l p e r s o n s o d e c l ar e d b y a competent psy chiatrist . . .; (4) The defe ndant is a dang erous offe nder whose behavior indicates littl e or no r eg ard fo r h uma n li fe , a ndno he sit a tio n a bout comm itt ing a

c ri me in w hic h th e ri sk

to human life is hig h; (5) The defe ndant i s convicted of two (2) or more statutory

offe nses involving se x ual abuse of a minor . . .; (6) The defe ndant is sentence d for a n offe nse committed while on probation; [ or] (7 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s se nte nc e d f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115(b)

.-12-

None of these fa ctors involve fa cts n ec es s ar yto constitute the elements of the underly ing offe nse. Rather , the deter mination rests u p o n a n eed “ to protect the public f rom furthe r criminal conduct by

the def endant,” resulting in an ag g reg ate maximum sentenc e that is “re asonably rela ted to the severity

of the off enses involved.” State v. Taylor, 73 9 S. W.2 d 2 27 , 2 30 (T e nn . 1 98 7) ; Gray
v . S tat e , 5 3 8 S

. W

. 2 d 3 9 1 ( Te nn . 1 97 6) ; se e als o Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115, Sentenc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts

.
I t app e ars that Blakely c o n c e r n s d o n o tap p l y t o t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n t o i mpo se consec utive sentenc ing unde r our se ntencing scheme . Def endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.
CO NC LU SION

After a thoroug h revie w of the r ecor d, we a ffi rm Def endant’ s convictions of ag g ravated
ro bb e ry in c ou nts on e a ndtw o. We m od if y Defen dan t’ s c on vic tio ns in c ou nts thr e e a ndfo ur to
a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult . We re ma ndon ly

De fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio ns fo r a g g ra vate d a ssa ult fo r the pu rp os e of re sentenc ing. U nder Bl ake ly , the trial court may only consider D efe ndant’s prior convictions as an enha nceme nt fac tor in determining the leng th of his sentence s for a g g ravated assault. We af firm t h e t ri al co u rt ’s j u d gm en ti n al l o t h erre s p ec t s i n cl u d i n g t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f c o n s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE