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[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 247 (Tuesday, December 26, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 66805-66806]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-31254]

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304]

Commonwealth Edison Company (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Unit 
Nos. 1 and 2)

Exemption

I

    Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd or the licensee) is the holder 
of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-39 and DPR-48, which authorize 
operation of the Zion Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, at a 
steady-state reactor power level not in excess of 3250 megawatts 
thermal. The facilities are pressurized water reactors located at the 
licensee's site in Lake County, Illinois. The licenses provide, among 
other things, that the Zion Nuclear Power Station is subject to all 
rules, regulations, and Orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (the Commission or NRC) now or hereafter in effect.

II

    Sections III.C and III.D.3 of 10 CFR part 50, appendix J, require 
that Type C local leak rate periodic tests shall be performed during 
reactor shutdown for refueling, or other convenient intervals, but in 
no case at intervals greater than 2 years. These requirements are 
reflected in the Zion Technical Specifications (TS) as requirements to 
perform type C containment leak rate testing in accordance with 10 CFR 
part 50, appendix J, and approved exemptions.

III

    The licensee has determined that certain containment isolation 
pathways have not been locally leak rate tested (type C tests) as 
required by appendix J to 10 CFR part 50. In a letter dated August 16, 
1995, the licensee requested relief from the requirement to perform the 
type C containment leak rate tests of certain penetrations and valves 
in these pathways in accordance with the requirements of sections III.C 
and III.D of 10 CFR part 50, appendix J. On August 16, 1995 the staff 
authorized in writing, continued operation of the Zion units in a 
notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) until such time as the staff 
acted on the exemption requests. In a letter dated November 20, 1995, 
the staff granted the schedular exemptions requested in the licensee's 
letter of August 16, 1995, and granted schedular exemptions for the 
permanent exemption requests to allow time for additional staff review 
and until final staff action could be taken. In its letter of November 
28, 1995, and supplemented on December 6, 1995, the licensee requested 
that certain schedular exemption requests be granted as permanent 
exemptions.
    The licensee's letter of November 28, 1995, requested permanent 
exemptions for components in the following containment penetrations:
    Units 1 and 2: P-70, Valve 1(2)SF8767, Refuel Cavity to 
Purification Pump; P-99, Valve 1(2)SF8787, Purification Pump to Refuel 
Cavity.
    The licensee's letter of November 28, 1995, also requested that the 
following permanent exemption requests be changed to schedular 
exemption requests.
    Units 1 and 2: P-77, 1(2)PP0101, 1(2)PP0102, 1(2)PP0103, 1(2)PP0104 
(Penetration Pressurization to Containment Valve Stations); P-102, 
1(2)AOV-RC8029 (Primary Water to the Pressurizer Relief Tank).
    For unit 1, the penetrations would be tested during the refueling 
outage in the fall of 1995, and for unit 2, they would be tested during 
the next cold shutdown of sufficient duration, and subsequently 
thereafter as required. For P-77 and P-102, the staff's letter of 
November 20, 1995, granted schedular exemptions until December 31, 
1995, at which time final action will be taken. This schedular 
exemption still applies for units 1 and 2.
    The licensee's letter of November 28, 1995, also requested that for 
P-44, the permanent exemption request be changed to a schedular 
exemption request. In a letter dated December 6, 1995, the licensee 
withdrew the previous requests because it intends to test the 
penetration in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, 
appendix J.
    The licensee's request dated November 28, 1995, justified the 
proposed permanent exemptions for P-70 and P-99 on the following basis.
    For P-70 and P-99, the tests were intended to be performed with air 
by installing a hole plug to allow a pressure source hookup while 
maintaining an adequate pressure boundary. During a walkdown of the 
test boundary, it was identified that the design of the piping for 
these penetrations does not allow draining of accumulated water in the 
line and, therefore, prevents a proper leak rate test with air per the 
requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix J. The piping configurations 
were not known to the licensee when the exemption request dated August 
16, 1995, was submitted. For P-70, in addition to not being able to 
completely drain the line, the dose rates for the location where the 
hole plug would have to be installed are extremely high, on the order 
of 1-2 Rem/hour. For P-99, the piping configuration is such that the 
location of the test connection would pose a personnel safety issue 
since the connection is located on the side of the refueling cavity 
approximately 30 feet above the cavity floor. In its submittal dated 
November 28, 1995, the licensee, therefore, requested a permanent 
exemption to be allowed to perform the test with water. If the 
exemptions were approved, dewatering of the lines would not be 
necessary, and the isolation for the test boundaries would be by other 
means. The test would be performed by pressurizing the subject valve 
with water to approximately 100 psig (greater than Pa, which is 47 
psig) and inspecting the valve for leakage. The acceptance criterion 
will be the same as the other tests which use water as a test medium, 
zero leakage.
    The leakage pathways for P-70 and P-99 do not consist of through-
valve 

[[Page 66806]]
leakage paths, but rather leakage paths out of containment isolation 
valves through valve diaphragms. The potential leakage paths are small 
or restrictive and are through cracks or tears in valve diaphragms. The 
leakage path for a significant leak to occur requires a sequence of 
events for which the probability of occurrence is low. The proposed 
test, with water as the test medium and with a zero leakage acceptance 
criterion, is conservative enough to provide reasonable assurance of no 
significant increase in risk to health and safety of the public when 
compared to testing with air. In addition, seismic support of the 
systems, missile protection, and, for P-70, the isolation valve seal 
water system all provide additional assurance that the risk of a 
significant leak is minimal.
    To justify granting an exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 
50, Appendix J, a licensee must show that the requirements of 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(1) are met. The licensee stated that its exemption requests 
meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1), for the following reasons:

Criteria for Granting Exemptions are Met per 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1)

    1. The requested exemptions and the activities which would be 
allowed thereunder are authorized by law.
    If the criteria established in 10 CFR 50.12(a) are satisfied, as 
they are in this case, and if no other prohibition of law exists to 
preclude the activities which would be authorized by the requested 
exemption, and there is no such prohibition, the Commission is 
authorized by law to grant this exemption request.
    2. The requested exemption will not present undue risk to the 
public.
    As stated in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, the purpose of primary 
containment leak rate testing is to assure that leakage through 
primary containment and systems and components penetrating primary 
containment shall not exceed the allowable leakage rate values as 
specified by the Technical Specifications or associated bases and to 
ensure that the proper maintenance and repairs are made during the 
service life of the containment and systems and components 
penetrating primary containment. The requested exemption is 
consistent with this intent for those penetrations in that alternate 
means of ensuring leakage remains acceptably low will be performed 
as proposed herein.
    3. The requested exemption will not endanger the common defense 
and security.
    The common defense and security are not in any way compromised 
by this exemption request.

    In addition, the licensee must show that at least one of the 
special circumstances, as defined in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) is present. One 
of the special circumstances that a licensee may show to exist is that 
the application of the regulation in the particular circumstance is not 
necessary to achieve the underlying purposes of the rule. The purposes 
of the rule, as stated in Section I of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, are to 
ensure that: (1) Leakage through the primary reactor containment and 
systems and components penetrating containment shall not exceed 
allowable values, and (2) periodic surveillance of reactor containment 
penetrations and isolation valves is performed so that proper 
maintenance and repairs are made. The staff has reviewed the licensee's 
proposal and has concluded that the proposed alternative tests will 
confirm the integrity of the subject pathways. Therefore, application 
of the regulation in this particular circumstance is not necessary to 
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.

IV

    Sections III.C and III.D.3 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, require 
that Type C local leak rate periodic tests shall be performed during 
reactor shutdown for refueling, or other convenient intervals, but in 
no case at intervals greater than 2 years.
    The licensee proposes exemptions to these sections which would 
provide relief from the requirement to perform the Type C containment 
leak rate tests of certain valves in accordance with the requirements 
of Sections III.C and III.D of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J.
    The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1), 
this exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to 
the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense 
and security. The Commission further determined that special 
circumstances, as provided in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present 
justifying the exemption; namely, that the application of the 
regulation is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule.

    Therefore the Commission hereby grants the following exemption:
    The requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, to pressurize the 
valves in penetrations P-70 and P-99 with air or nitrogen is not 
necessary. Instead, the test pressure medium may be water.

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that 
granting these exemptions will not have a significant impact on the 
human environment (60 FR 63549).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of December 1995.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jack W. Roe,
Director, Division of Reactor Projects--III/IV, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-31254 Filed 12-22-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
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