[Cite as State ex rel. Ball v. Indus. Comm., 2017-Ohio-1381.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

The State ex rel. Renee L. Ball, : 

 

 Relator, : 

v. : No. 16AP-446 

 

The Industrial Commission of Ohio : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 

 : 

 Respondents. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on April 13, 2017 

 

On brief: Hochman, & Plunkett Co., L.P.A., Gary D. 

Plunkett and Rachael D. Siekman, for relator. 

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Eric J. 

Tarbox, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio. 

On brief: Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, and 

Robert A. Minor, for respondent Honda of America Mfg., 

Inc. 

 

IN MANDAMUS 

LUPER SCHUSTER, J. 

{¶ 1} Relator Renee L. Ball has filed an original action requesting this court issue 

a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its 

order which denied her application for working wage loss compensation and to find that 

she is entitled to that award. 

{¶ 2} This matter was referred to a magistrate of this court pursuant to Civ.R. 

53(C) and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The magistrate issued the 

appended decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending this 
No. 16AP-446 2 

court deny relator's request for a writ of mandamus. No objections have been filed to that 

decision.

{¶ 3} Finding no error of law or other defect on the face of the magistrate's 

decision, this court adopts the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of 

fact and conclusions of law. In accordance with the magistrate's decision, we deny 

relator's requested writ of mandamus.

Writ of mandamus denied. 

TYACK, P.J., and DORRIAN, J., concur. 

 

 
No. 16AP-446 3 

APPENDIX 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 

The State ex rel. Renee L. Ball, : 

 

 Relator, : 

v. : No. 16AP-446 

 

The Industrial Commission of Ohio : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

and 

Honda of America Mfg., Inc., : 

 

 Respondents. : 

 

M A G I S T R A T E ' S D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on January 19, 2017

 

Hochman, & Plunkett Co., L.P.A., Gary D. Plunkett and 

Rachael D. Siekman, for relator. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Eric J. Tarbox, for 

respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio. 

Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, and Robert A. Minor, 

for respondent Honda of America Mfg., Inc. 

 

IN MANDAMUS 

{¶ 4} Relator, Renee L. Ball, has filed this original action requesting this court 

issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio 

("commission") to vacate its order which denied her application for working wage loss 

("WWL") compensation and ordering the commission to find that she is entitled to that 

award. 
No. 16AP-446 4 

Findings of Fact: 

{¶ 5} 1. On April 22, 1999, relator sustained a work-related injury while working 

for Honda of America Mfg., Inc. ("Honda"), and her workers' compensation claim has 

been allowed for: "contusion right leg; sprain right knee/leg; mononeuritis right leg." 

{¶ 6} 2. As a self-insured employer, Honda paid relator a period of non-working 

wage loss ("NWWL") compensation in 2013. 

{¶ 7} 3. On January 20, 2014, relator filed an application seeking an award of 

NWWL compensation beginning December 2, 2013. 

{¶ 8} 4. Relator's application was heard before a district hearing officer 

("DHO") on February 26, 2014. The DHO denied relator's request finding that her job 

search was not conducted in good faith: 

First and foremost, District Hearing Officer does not find 

credible medical evidence that the Injured Worker has 

restrictions which prevent her from returning to her former 

position of employment. The C-140 medical report, filed 

contemporaneous to the requested period of nonworking 

wage loss at issue, was completed by Dr. Trygstad on 

08/21/2013. On this medical report, Dr. Trygstad indicated 

that he last examined the Injured Worker on 01/17/2013, 

which this District Hearing Officer finds was seven months 

prior to Dr. Trygstad completing this C-140 medical report. 

In addition, District Hearing Officer does not find the 

Injured Worker to have conducted a good faith job search for 

suitable employment. From this District Hearing Officer's 

review of the Injured Worker's C-141 Job Search Forms, 

District Hearing Officer finds two-thirds of her job contacts 

were made by telephone and only one-third of her contacts 

were made in person. It appears to this District Hearing 

Officer that the Injured Worker limited herself to 

approximately one personal contact per day and 15 total 

contacts per week. At hearing, this District Hearing Officer 

asked the Injured Worker to give an estimate as to how many 

hours per day she searched for work. She stated, at a 

minimum, "one solid hour". District Hearing Officer finds 

the former position of employment was full time work and 

the Injured Worker's job search was far from being full time 

in nature. Therefore, based on the above findings, this 

District Hearing Officer does not find the Injured Worker to 

have met her burden to establish her entitlement to 
No. 16AP-446 5 

nonworking wage loss benefits under Ohio Administrative 

Code 4125-1-01. 

{¶ 9} 5. Relator's appeal was heard before a staff hearing officer ("SHO") on 

April 10, 2014. The SHO modified the prior DHO order and yet still found that relator 

failed to establish a good-faith job search and denied the request for NWWL 

compensation: 

This Staff Hearing Officer notes that the Injured Worker 

testified, as memorized [sic] by the District Hearing Officer, 

at the District hearing level that she spent a minimum of 

"one solid hour" searching for employment. While at the 

Staff level the Injured Worker testified she spent six to eight 

hours a day searching for employment. As evidence of an 

alleged good faith job search the Injured Worker submitted 

C-141 forms indicating that the week ending 12/07/2013 she 

had 15 contacts for the week, over a three day period of these 

contacts 12 were made by telephone and three were in 

person. For the week ending 12/14/2013 the Injured Worker 

again made 15 contacts eight by telephone, seven in person, 

again over a three day period. For the week ending 

12/21/2013 the Injured Worker again made 15 contacts, six 

by telephone, nine in person, again over a three day period. 

For the last week, ending 12/28/2013 the Injured Worker 

again made 15 contacts this time ten by telephone and five in 

person. Interestingly, of the 65 contacts made none were 

hiring. Further, while the Injured Worker alleges six to eight 

hours a day of involvement in job searches, job searches 

appear to have only been performed three days each week as 

contacts were only made three days per week. Thirty-six of 

these contacts were made by telephone and only 24 in 

person. 

This Staff Hearing Officer does not find this evidence is a 

good faith job search. 

This Staff Hearing Officer finds a good faith job search in 

which the Injured Worker was spending six to eight hours 

each day reviewing potential Employers and applying would 

be evidenced by at least one Employer to which she applied 

actually hiring at the time she applied. Further, 36 telephone 

contacts over a four week period is not evidence of a good 

faith job search during which the Injured Worker is spending 

six to eight hours a day in a job search. 
No. 16AP-446 6 

Given that the Injured Worker contacted 65 Employers, none 

of whom were hiring per the Injured Worker's C-141 forms 

and more than the half of these contacts were made by 

telephone, this Staff Hearing Officer does not find that this 

evidence is a good faith job search. Clearly, the mere fact that 

the Employers were not hiring does not, by itself, negate the 

contacts. The difficulty arises in that the telephone contact 

would [sic] required merely a few minutes of the Injured 

Worker's time rather than hours. As such, these 36 telephone 

contacts are not found to constitute six to eight hours of daily 

job search. The Injured Worker did make 24 in person 

contacts. However, these contacts appear to stand alone as 

the telephone contacts are not found to have been in good 

faith. When the Injured Worker alleges she spends six to 

eight hours a day searching for a [sic] job contacts, this Staff 

Hearing Officer finds 24 contacts with Employers who are 

not hiring does not evidence a good faith job search of a six 

to eight a day basis [sic]. 

For the above reasons, the request for payment of nonworking wage loss for the period of 12/02/2013 through 

12/27/2013 is denied. 

The remainder of the District Hearing Officer's order, not in 

conflict with this order, remains in full force and effect. 

{¶ 10} 6. Relator's further appeal was refused by order of the commission mailed 

May 6, 2014. 

{¶ 11} 7. In September 2015, relator's treating physician Richard Donnini, D.O., 

placed restrictions on her which limited her standing and walking, precluded climbing, 

and limited her to working 8 hours per day, 40 hours per week. 

{¶ 12} 8. On December 8, 2015, relator filed the request for WWL compensation 

which is the subject of this mandamus action. Relator sought WWL compensation from 

the period May 16 through September 18, 2015. Relator attached medical records from 

Dr. Donnini which included the restrictions he placed on her, paystubs from NC Choices 

and Creative Foundations, evidence that she registered with the Ohio Department of Job 

and Family Services, a light-duty letter from Honda, an affidavit, and several pages 

representing her job search for the relevant period of time. 
No. 16AP-446 7 

{¶ 13} 9. Relator's application was heard before a DHO on February 16, 2016. 

The DHO granted in part and denied in part relator's application, stating: 

The District Hearing Officer finds the Injured Worker has 

physical restrictions as set forth in the C-140 Medical Report, 

dated 05/18/2015, by Richard Donnini, D.O. The District 

Hearing Officer finds the Injured Worker returned to 

employment on 05/16/2015, to positions within the physical 

restrictions stated by Dr. Donnini, and has suffered a wage 

loss as a direct result of the industrial injury. 

The District Hearing Officer finds the Injured Worker's 

present earnings are less than the Injured Worker's wages 

were at the time of this industrial injury 

It is the order of the District Hearing Officer wage loss 

compensation is granted from 05/16/2015 through 

07/24/2015. Wage loss compensation may continue upon 

the submission of evidence that documents an ongoing wage 

loss due to the industrial injury and this wage loss is a result 

of a medical impairment that is causally related to the 

industrial injury. 

Further, the District Hearing Officer denies wage loss 

compensation from 07/25/2015 through 09/18/2015. The 

District Hearing Officer finds this Injured Worker was 

employed during this period, however, was not engaged in 

full-time employment and therefore required to provide 

evidence of good faith job searching. The District Hearing 

Officer finds the submitted C-141 Wage Loss Statement for 

Job Search forms do not document sufficient contacts for 

this period. The Injured Worker testified at hearing she 

completes job applications online through websites posting 

job opportunities. The District Hearing Officer does not find 

evidence in the claim file to support the Injured Worker's 

testimony. 

Wage loss is payable at 66 2/3% of the difference between 

the Injured Worker's present earnings and the Injured 

Worker's Average Weekly Wage, not to exceed the Statewide 

Average Weekly Wage. 

Wage loss is authorized no longer then the time period 

specified in R.C. 4123.56. 
No. 16AP-446 8 

This order is based upon the aforementioned documents, in 

addition to the C-141s filed 12/08/2015. 

{¶ 14} 10. Both relator and Honda filed appeals from the DHO order and the 

matter was heard before an SHO on March 29, 2016. The SHO vacated the prior DHO 

order and denied relator's request for WWL compensation in its entirety, stating: 

This Hearing Officer denies payment of working wage loss 

from 05/16/2015 through 07/24/2015 and from 07/25/2015 

through 09/18/2015. 

This Hearing Officer acknowledges that that [sic] Injured 

Worker, during the periods of working wage loss at issue, 

worked in excess of 40 hours a week, for two employers in 

the attempt to mitigate the wage loss resulting from medical 

impairment that is causally related to the industrial injury. 

Further, this Hearing Officer finds the Injured Worker, in 

September of 2015, obtained employment with just one 

employer allowing her to work 70 hours per week and 

completely eliminate the wage loss. 

Although the Injured Worker should be commended on her 

efforts, this Hearing Officer does not find the Injured Worker 

to have met the requirements of the wage loss rule, in effect 

at the time of the inception of this claim, (Ohio Adm.Code 

4125-1-01) for purpose of establishing her entitlement to 

working wage loss. The aforementioned code section 

requires an Injured Worker's application to be supplemented 

with wage loss statements describing the search for suitable 

employment. The statements are to include the address of 

each employer or contact, the employer's telephone number, 

the position sought, a reasonable identification by name or 

position of the person contacted, the method of contact and 

the result of the contact. An Injured Worker who has not 

returned to suitable employment which is comparably 

paying work, is required to conduct a good faith effort to 

search for suitable employment, which is comparably paying 

work. In evaluating whether an Injured Worker has made a 

good faith effort, attention is given to the number, quality 

and regularity of contacts made by the Injured Worker with 

prospective employers, public and private employment 

services. From this Hearing Officer's review of the Injured 

Worker's C-141 wage loss statement for job search forms 

submitted to the claim, this Hearing Officer finds the Injured 

Worker only made prospective contacts, on average, once 

every five to seven days. This Hearing Officer finds these 
No. 16AP-446 9 

forms are incomplete in that they do not list an address, 

contact name, contact number or any specific information 

with respect to result of the contact. Although this Hearing 

Officer finds the Injured Worker's job efforts led to her most 

recent employment, they did not meet the requirements of 

Ohio Adm.Code 4125-1-01 so as to establish the [sic] her 

entitlement to working wage loss benefits. 

{¶ 15} 11. Relator's further appeal was refused by order of the commission 

mailed April 21, 2016. 

{¶ 16} 12. Thereafter, relator filed the instant mandamus action in this court. 

Conclusions of Law: 

{¶ 17} For the reasons that follow, it is this magistrate's decision that this court 

should deny relator's request for a writ of mandamus. 

{¶ 18} The Supreme Court of Ohio has set forth three requirements which must 

be met in establishing a right to a writ of mandamus: (1) that relator has a clear legal 

right to the relief prayed for; (2) that respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform 

the act requested; and (3) that relator has no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary 

course of the law. State ex rel. Berger v. McMonagle, 6 Ohio St.3d 28 (1983). 

{¶ 19} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus as a remedy from a 

determination of the commission, relator must show a clear legal right to the relief 

sought and that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief. State ex 

rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). A clear legal right to a writ of 

mandamus exists where the relator shows that the commission abused its discretion by 

entering an order which is not supported by any evidence in the record. State ex rel. 

Elliott v. Indus. Comm., 26 Ohio St.3d 76 (1986). On the other hand, where the record 

contains some evidence to support the commission's findings, there has been no abuse 

of discretion and mandamus is not appropriate. State ex rel. Lewis v. Diamond 

Foundry Co., 29 Ohio St.3d 56 (1987). Furthermore, questions of credibility and the 

weight to be given evidence are clearly within the discretion of the commission as fact 

finder. State ex rel. Teece v. Indus. Comm., 68 Ohio St.2d 165 (1981). 

{¶ 20} Entitlement to wage loss compensation is governed by R.C. 4123.56(B), 

which provides: 
No. 16AP-446 10 

Where an employee in a claim allowed under this chapter 

suffers a wage loss as a result of returning to employment 

other than the employee's former position of employment or 

as a result of being unable to find employment consistent 

with the claimant's physical capabilities, the employee shall 

receive compensation at sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of 

the employee's weekly wage loss not to exceed the statewide 

average weekly wage for a period not to exceed two hundred 

weeks. 

{¶ 21} In order to receive workers' compensation, a claimant must show not only 

that a work-related injury arose out of and in the course of employment, but, also, that a 

direct and proximate causal relationship exists between the injury and the harm or 

disability. State ex rel. Waddle v. Indus. Comm., 67 Ohio St.3d 452 (1993). This 

principle is equally applicable to claims for wage loss compensation. State ex rel. The 

Andersons v. Indus. Comm., 64 Ohio St.3d 539 (1992). As noted by the court in State ex 

rel. Watts v. Schottenstein Stores Corp., 68 Ohio St.3d 118 (1993), a wage loss claim has 

two components: a reduction in wages and a causal relationship between the allowed 

condition and the wage loss. 

{¶ 22} In considering a claimant's eligibility for wage loss compensation, the 

commission is required to give consideration to, and to base the determination on, 

evidence relating to certain factors, including claimant's search for suitable employment. 

The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a claimant is required to demonstrate a goodfaith effort to search for suitable employment which is comparably paying work before 

claimant is entitled to both nonworking wage loss and working wage loss compensation. 

State ex rel. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Morse (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 210; State ex rel. 

Reamer v. Indus. Comm., 77 Ohio St.3d 450 (1997); and State ex rel. Rizer v. Indus. 

Comm., 88 Ohio St.3d 1 (2000). A good-faith effort necessitates claimant's consistent, 

sincere, and best attempt to obtain suitable employment that will eliminate the wage 

loss. 

{¶ 23} Ohio Adm.Code 4125-1-01(A) defines "suitable employment" and 

"comparably paying work" as follows: 

(7) "Suitable employment" means work which is within the 

claimant's physical capabilities, and which may be 
No. 16AP-446 11 

performed by the claimant subject to all physical, 

psychiatric, mental, and vocational limitations to which the 

claimant is subject at the time of the injury which resulted in 

the allowed conditions in the claim or, in occupational 

disease claims, on the date of the disability which resulted 

from the allowed conditions in the claim. 

(8) "Comparably paying work" means suitable employment 

in which the claimant's weekly rate of pay is equal to or 

greater than the average weekly wage received by the 

claimant in his or her former position of employment. 

{¶ 24} Ohio Adm.Code 4125-1-01(C) identifies for claimants the relevant 

information which must be contained in an application for wage loss compensation. 

Specifically, Ohio Adm.Code 4125-1-01(C)(5) provides: 

(5) All claimants seeking or receiving working or nonworking wage loss payments shall supplement their wage 

loss application with wage loss statements, describing the 

search for suitable employment, as provided herein. The 

claimant's failure to submit wage loss statements in 

accordance with this rule shall not result in the dismissal of 

the wage loss application, but shall result in the suspension 

of wage loss payments until the wage loss statements are 

submitted in accordance with this rule. 

(a) A claimant seeking or receiving wage loss compensation 

shall complete a wage loss statement(s) for every week 

during which wage loss compensation is sought. 

(b) A claimant seeking wage loss compensation shall submit 

the completed wage loss statements with the wage loss 

application and/or any subsequent request for wage loss 

compensation in the same claim. 

(c) A claimant who receives wage loss compensation for 

periods after the filing of the wage loss application and/or 

any subsequent request for wage loss compensation in the 

same claim shall submit the wage loss statements completed 

pursuant to paragraphs (C)(5)(a), (C)(5)(d) and (C)(5)(e) of 

this rule every four weeks to the bureau of worker's 

compensation or the self-insured employer during the period 

when wage loss compensation is received. 
No. 16AP-446 12 

(d) Wage loss statements shall include the address of each 

employer contacted, the employer's telephone number, the 

position sought, a reasonable identification by name or 

position of the person contacted, the method of contact, and 

the result of the contact. 

(e) Wage loss statements shall be submitted on forms 

provided by the bureau of workers' compensation. 

{¶ 25} Thereafter, Ohio Adm.Code 4125-1-01(D) provides, in pertinent part: 

(D) The claimant is solely responsible for and bears the 

burden of producing evidence regarding his or her 

entitlement to wage loss compensation. Unless the claimant 

meets this burden, wage loss compensation shall be denied. 

* * * 

In considering a claimant's eligibility for compensation for 

wage loss, the adjudicator shall give consideration to, and 

base the determinations on, evidence in the file, or presented 

at hearing, relating to: 

(1) The claimant's search for suitable employment. 

(a) As a prerequisite to receiving wage loss compensation for 

any period during which such compensation is requested, 

the claimant shall demonstrate that he or she has: 

(i) Complied with paragraph (C)(2) of this rule and, if 

applicable, with paragraph (C)(3) of this rule [relating to the 

submission of medical evidence]; 

(ii) Sought suitable employment with the employer of record 

at the onset of the first period for which wage loss 

compensation is requested. The claimant shall also seek 

suitable employment with the employer of record where 

there has been an interruption in wage loss compensation 

benefits for a period of three months or more; and 

(iii) Registered with the Ohio bureau of employment services 

and begun or continued a job search if no suitable 

employment is available with the employer of record. 

(b) A claimant may first search for suitable employment 

which is within his or her skills, prior employment history, 
No. 16AP-446 13 

and educational background. If within sixty days from the 

commencement of the claimant's job search, he or she is 

unable to find such employment, the claimant shall expand 

his or her job search to include entry level and/or unskilled 

employment opportunities. 

(c) A good faith effort to search for suitable employment 

which is comparably paying work is required of those 

seeking non-working wage loss and of those seeking 

working-wage loss who have not returned to suitable 

employment which is comparably paying work, except for 

those claimants who are receiving public relief and are 

defined as work relief employees in Chapter 4127. of the 

Revised Code. A good faith effort necessitates the claimant's 

consistent, sincere, and best attempts to obtain suitable 

employment that will eliminate the wage loss. 

{¶ 26} Ohio Adm.Code 4125-1-01(D)(1)(c) provides certain relevant factors to be 

considered by the commission in evaluating whether claimant has made a good-faith 

effort. Those factors including: claimant's skills, prior employment history, and 

educational background; the number, quality, and regularity of contacts made with 

prospective employers; for a claimant seeking any amount of working wage loss 

compensation, the amount of time devoted to making prospective employer contacts 

during the period for which working wage loss is sought, as well as the number of hours 

spent working, any refusal by claimant to accept assistance from the BWC in finding 

employment; any refusal by claimant to accept the assistance of any public or private 

employment agency; labor market conditions; claimant's physical capabilities; any 

recent activity on the part of claimant to change her place of residence and the impact 

such change would have on the reasonable probability of success and the search for 

employment; claimant's economic status; claimant's documentation of efforts to 

produce self-employment income; any part-time employment engaged in by claimant 

and whether that employment constitutes a voluntary limitation on claimant's present 

earnings; whether claimant restricts her search to employment that would require her to 

work fewer hours per week than she worked in the former position of employment; and 

whether, as a result of physical restrictions, claimant is enrolled in a rehabilitation 

program. 
No. 16AP-446 14 

{¶ 27} In this mandamus action, relator argues that the commission abused its 

discretion by blindly adhering to technical requirements to find that she did not present 

evidence of a good-faith job search. Relator argues that the following facts outweigh any 

inadequacies in the documentation she presented: for a period of time she worked 2 

jobs in excess of 40 hours per week, for a period of time she worked approximately 70 

hours per week, and her job search ultimately led to her most recent employment. 

Further, relator points to certain statements contained in the SHO order. After noting 

that she worked 2 jobs and is currently working 70 hours per week to eliminate the wage 

loss, the SHO stated: "the Injured Worker should be commended on her efforts." After 

noting that, despite relator's failure to demonstrate a good-faith job search, she secured 

a job, the SHO further stated: "this Hearing Officer finds the Injured Worker's job 

efforts led to her most recent employment." Relator asserts the SHO found she had 

conducted a good faith search for suitable employment and then denied her WWL 

compensation because her paperwork was "less than perfect." (Relator's Reply Brief at 

1.) 

{¶ 28} The SHO specifically noted that relator's documentation demonstrated 

that she "only made perspective contacts, on average, once every five to seven days * * * 

[and] these forms are incomplete in that they do not list an address, contact name, 

contact number or any specific information with respect to result of the contact." 

{¶ 29} Relator does not dispute the SHO's finding that she averaged one 

perspective employment contact every five to seven days, nor does she contest the 

finding that she failed to list the address, contact name, and contact number, or specific 

information with respect to several of her contacts. In 2014, relator's request for 

NWWL was denied because she did not demonstrate a good-faith job search. Relator 

was familiar with the requirements. The mere fact that relator ultimately secured 

employment thereby demonstrating that her job search was successful, does not, by 

default, establish that she made a good-faith effort as demonstrated by her consistent, 

sincere, and best attempts to obtain suitable employment to eliminate the wage loss. 

The requirements that relator list the company, contact person, telephone number, date, 

and method of contact is not, as relator suggests, a "mere technicality." (Relator's Reply 

Brief at 6.) This evidence allows her employer and the commission to consider the 
No. 16AP-446 15 

quality of her contacts and also allows her employer to verify that she made these 

contacts. Relator simply has not demonstrated that the commission abused its 

discretion when it found that she failed to establish that she made a good-faith job 

search when she made so few contacts and when she failed to present sufficient evidence 

regarding those contacts. 

{¶ 30} Based on the foregoing, it is the magistrate's decision that this court 

should deny relator's request for a writ of mandamus. 

 /S/ MAGISTRATE 

 STEPHANIE BISCA 

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES 

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as 

error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or 

legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a 

finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects 

to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(b).