GENERAL 

OF TEXAS 

Honorable Q. J. Campbell 

Gbunty Attorney 

Gai+za County 

Post, Texas 

Dear Sir: Opinion No. o-5082 

Re: Reversion of property conveyed 

to and to be held by a School 

District 50 long as used for 

school purposes. 

Acknowledgment is made herein of your 'letter of February 1, 1943, yequesting an opinion of this Department ana of 

your letter5 of February 12th and 20th submitting additional 

factual Information requested by this Department, the substance 

of all of said letter5 being a5 follows: 

The deed conveying the one acre of land,~upoti 

which the building of the Laforest Common School 

District is located, contain5 the following clauses: 

"To have and. to hold the . D D described pretilses 

* 0 * as long as such property is used for school 

puPpose o o . with the axppess understanding that 

when said property Is no longer used for school purposes, it reverts to a . e and his heirs or assigns.' 

That because of the close proximity and availability of the Justiceburg School ana its school 

buses and the fact that there were but thirteen (13) 

OP fourteen (14) scholastics in 1935, said scholastics 

were transferred to Justiceburg and no school has been 

had or held in that Laforest School District for the 

past seven (7) years, or since the year 1935. The 

Laforest School District, however, Is dill functlonlng, trustees are elected at regular elections. The 

trustees have never expressed abanclonment of the 

location or an intention to abandon same. 

An old school bullding std.11 stands on the location and up until the last term and a part of this 

term neither the building nor the location has been 

used. During the last school term and a papt of 

this term the schoolhouse was used to accommodate 

the school bus driver. 
Hon. V. 6. Campbell; page 2 o -5082 

j 

:;.: 

It may be necessary to have school at this 

place this year atid ~f0r theaar's ~duration in view 

of tha fact the school buses are quite worn and 

cannot be replaced, the manufacture of buses and 

other automobiles having been discontinued. 

The question submittea for answer is: Do the described 

facts constitute abandonment of the property 50 that it reverts to the grantor? Howafer, the quo' tion involved herein 

3eema more clearly to be: 'Under the d f scribed%‘facfs has the 

title reverted to~~the original owner, hi5 heirs ore assigns, 

because of the elamses quoted above from the deed? The department proceeas to answer the question in its revised form. 

By the terms of the deed itself, the land so conveyed 

would be forfeited automatically upon its ceasl 

for school purpoees. Eyssen v. Zeppa, 100 S .W. n$2;,o~fiG"q~:xl 

Civ. hpp.) and the several authorities cited therein;.Swink.v. 

City of Dallas, 36 SiW. (2d) ,222 (Tex. Comm. App;, Sec.'B.); 

37 Tex. Ju?;, Sec. 80, p. 949. It is, therefore/the use to 

xhich the land la put, not the intention of the school trustees 

with respect thereto, which governs. Putney~ v. School Dist ; 

HO. '4 of Town of Mookfield, 255 I:W. 76 (Wlsci)'; Richey v., 

eorralitds Union School piat. of Santa Crnz 'county, 228 P. 348 

(Calif .) ; Attorney G$meral Opinion MoI.0-49?9. 

From these authorities and the cases cited therein it 

follow5 that the words "as long as such property is used for 

sahool purposes 'I~ iti the said deed fr~om J. 3';: Reed to the Laforest School District create5 a conditional limitation ana 

the title thereto ipso facto would revert to the grantor, his 

heirs o@ aselgns, at that time when the same ceased to be used 

by the school district fur school purpoaes. It should be noted, 

however, that instruments containing such condition5 are strictly construed agalnst the grantor. ,%&lox v. Aaair, (Civ. App.) 

66~S.W.~811 (Writ of Error denied 95 Tex, 682; 12 Tex. Jur. 

sec. 88, P.,,134. 

chit has been held that the term "school purposes includes 

the recreation ti@ pupils attend1 school. St. gawaras College 

V. Tax Collector, 82 Tex. 1 0891,~. 7 In Peoples exral Pearsall 

county Collector V. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 142 El. E. 520, 

a 385 acre tract used by a school for boating, swimming, skating, 

and some of which had been beautified with drives, walks and 

other improvements, and of which only a small part was used for 

buildings, was exempt from taxes under a State statute providing 

that all property used exclusivelg for school pnrposes should 

be exempt fram taxes. 

In McCullough v. Swifton Consolidated School Dist., 155 
Hon. Q,J. Campbell, page 3 0 -5082 

S.W. (28) 353, (1941) the Supreme Court of Arkansas, held that 

where a deed to the school district provided that property 

should be used for school purposes only and should the district 

at any time abandon the property, title should revert to the 

grantor, and thereafter the school district was consolidated 

with another which tore down the school building located on 

the land, part of the material of which was used in the erection of a waiting station on the land for the comfort of children who rode school bus to the consolidated school, the land 

was not "abandoned" for %chool purposes" and aid not revert 

to the grantor, notwithstanding that no school was conducted 

there, since It was still used for school purposes. The court 

reasoned, and correctly we think, that the school aLstrict has 

not abandoned the land for school purposes although,lt has done 

50 as a school. See also Atty. Gen, Opinion No. O-485. 

Cn the other hand, it has been held that the-use of a 

building for the storage of school furniture, books, etc., is 

not "for school purposes' and. does not prevent an abandonment 

of the property under a deed specifying that the property was 

to be used for such purposes and containing a reversionary 

clause. Putnam v. School Dist. No, 4 of Town of Brookfield'~ 

(Wise.), 255 R.W. 76; Riche 

of Santa Cruz County (Calif. 7. 

v. Corralitos Union School Dist. 

228. P. 348. 

An opinion in a case of this kind depends entirely upon 

all the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of 

the deed and the use made bf the land. We could not give an 

entirely accurate opinion without the benefit of all such facts, 

which could only be brought out upon a trial or upon a thorough 

investigation preparatory for trial. However, based upon the 

facts submitted in your letters and herein summarized wherein 

it is shown that the land in question was used for~no school 

purposes whatsoever from and during the year, 1935, until "the 

last school term In the year, 1942 and partof this school term 

In the year, 1943," and then only 'to accommodate the school 

bus driver", It is the opinion of this department that the land 

ceased to be used for school purposes prior to the time when 

the schoolhouse was used to accommodate the bus driver. Under 

the law and the facts herein submitted, the said land has ceased 

to be used for school purposes, and under the terms of the deed 

the title thereto reverted automatlcallg to the grantor, his 

heirs or assigns. 

Your attention is directed to Attorney General Opinion 

MO. O-4939, for any assistance it may offer with respect to 

school property on said land, wherein It was held that where 

under a deed containing a reversionary clause, land has been 

conveyed to a school district for school purposes only and 

thereafter a schoolhouse is erected thereon, the school district 
Eon. V. J. Campbell, page 4 o-5082 

may remove such buildfng when the property has been abandoned 

for school purposes and has reverted under the deed to the 

grantor. 

Yours very truly 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

By s/Chester E. Ollistin 

Chestee E. Ollison 

Assistant 

CEO:flo:wc 

APPROVED MAR 3, 19'43 

s/Grover Sellers 

FIRST ASSISTANT 

ATTORNEY GENERAL 

Approved Oplnlon Committee By s/BWB ChaLrman