alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

July 30, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

130609 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. STEVEN JAMES, Personal Representative Stephen J. Markman, of the Estate of MARJORIE JAMES, Justices Deceased, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 130609 

 COA: 262622 

Jackson CC: 03-006278-NH 

W. A. FOOTE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,

and KHAWAJA IKRAM, M.D.,

 Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

PHILLIP RICHARDS, M.D., 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 19, 2006 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

YOUNG, J., concurs and states as follows: 

I concur in the majority's decision to deny leave to appeal. I write separately 

because I am disturbed by the analysis the Court of Appeals employed in justifying its 

decision to reverse the trial court's summary disposition order. The statute at issue in this 

case, MCL 600.2912d(1), requires a medical malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit of 

merit with his complaint. In Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp (After Remand)1

, this 

1 470 Mich 679 (2004). 
 _________________________________________ 

 

 

 

 

2 

2

Court discussed the adequacy requirements for notices of intent under MCL 600.2912b. 

Despite the striking similarities between the notice of intent statute and the affidavit of 

merit statute, the Court of Appeals held that differing "policy considerations" made an 

application of Roberts unwarranted. Indeed the panel made its "policy considerations" 

known by holding that "unlike the court in Roberts, we do not need to read additional 

requirements or limitations into the [affidavit of merit] statute to aid its rational 

application or workability." 

Simply stated, the Court of Appeals erred by not applying Roberts to this case.2 

The panel did not provide adequate justification for its decision to disregard Roberts, but 

merely relied on "policy considerations" as a subterfuge for its obvious disagreement 

with Roberts. While the Court of Appeals is not required to agree with this Court's 

decisions, it is required to properly apply those decisions. However, because the Court of 

Appeals opinion is unpublished and has no precedential value, this Court's intervention is 

unwarranted at this time. 

 Moreover, the Court of Appeals ignored this Court's remand order in Mullaney v 

Kistler, 471 Mich 932 (2004), where this Court remanded back to the Court of Appeals a 

case dealing with the sufficiency of an affidavit of merit specifically instructing the Court 

of Appeals to reconsider the case in light of Roberts. 

l0723 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

July 30, 2007 

 Clerk
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED APRIL 26, 2024

NO. 03-24-00113-CV

Monocoque Diversified Interests, LLC, Appellant

v.

InterTex Enterprises, LLC, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 200TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE BYRNE, JUSTICES SMITH AND THEOFANIS

DISMISSED ON APPELLANT’S MOTION -- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE BYRNE

This is an appeal from the order signed by the trial court on January 26, 2024. Appellant has 

filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, and having considered the motion, the Court agrees that the 

motion should be granted. Therefore, the Court grants the motion and dismisses the appeal. The 

appellant shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and in the court below.
## Summary Measures and Graphs

- Individual Provisions
- Level of Monthly Benefits

### **Description of Proposed Provision:						B3.16: For retired worker and disabled worker beneficiaries becoming initially eligible in January 2030 or later, phase in a new benefit formula (from 2030 to 2039). Replace the existing two primary insurance amount (PIA) bend points with three new bend points as follows:  (1) 25% AWI/12 from 2 years prior to initial eligibility; (2) 100% AWI/12 from 2 years prior to initial eligibility; and (3) 125% AWI/12 from 2 years prior to initial eligibility.  The new PIA factors are 95%, 27.5%, 5% and 2%. During the phase in, those becoming newly eligible for benefits will receive an increasing portion of their benefits based on the new formula, reaching 100% of the new formula in 2039.**

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II 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 365 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to require a provider of a report 

to the CyberTipline related to online sexual exploitation of children to 

preserve the contents of such report for 180 days, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 23, 2021 

Mrs. BLACKBURN (for herself, Ms. CORTEZ MASTO, Ms. HASSAN, and Mr. 

HAWLEY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to require a provider 

of a report to the CyberTipline related to online sexual 

exploitation of children to preserve the contents of such 

report for 180 days, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Eliminate Network 

5 Distribution of Child Exploitation Act’’ or the ‘‘END 

6 Child Exploitation Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 365 IS

1 SEC. 2. PRESERVATION OF REPORTS TO CYBERTIPLINE RE2 LATED TO ONLINE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF 

3 CHILDREN. 

4 Section 2258A(h) of title 18, United States Code, is 

5 amended— 

6 (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘90 days’’ and 

7 inserting ‘‘180 days’’; and 

8 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

9 ‘‘(5) EXTENSION OF PRESERVATION.—A pro10 vider of a report to the CyberTipline may voluntarily 

11 preserve the contents provided in the report (includ12 ing any comingled content described in paragraph 

13 (2)) for longer than 180 days after the submission 

14 to the CyberTipline for the purpose of reducing the 

15 proliferation of online child sexual exploitation or 

16 preventing the online sexual exploitation of chil17 dren.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
### Proposed Provision: D3. Allow divorced aged spouses and divorced surviving spouses married 5 to 9 years to get benefits based on the former spouse's account. Divorced aged and surviving spouses would receive 50% of the applicable current-law PIA percentage if married 5 years, 60% of the applicable PIA percentage if married 6 years, ..., 90% of the applicable PIA percentage if married 9 years. This benefit would be available to divorced spouses on the rolls at the beginning of 2025 and those becoming eligible after 2024.
II 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3655 

To amend the Civil Rights Cold Case Records Collection Act of 2018 to 

extend the termination date of the Civil Rights Cold Case Records 

Review Board. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 16, 2022 

Mr. OSSOFF (for himself and Mr. CRUZ) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend the Civil Rights Cold Case Records Collection 

Act of 2018 to extend the termination date of the Civil 

Rights Cold Case Records Review Board. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Civil Rights Cold Case 

5 Investigations Support Act of 2022’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 3655 IS

1 SEC. 2. CIVIL RIGHTS COLD CASE RECORDS REVIEW 

2 BOARD EXTENSION OF TENURE. 

3 Section 5(n)(1) of Civil Rights Cold Case Records 

4 Collection Act of 2018 (44 U.S.C. 2107 note; Public Law 

5 115–426) is amended— 

6 (1) by striking ‘‘4 years’’ and inserting ‘‘7 

7 years’’; and 

8 (2) by striking ‘‘4-year period’’ and inserting 

9 ‘‘7-year period’’. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
FIRST AMENDMENT

         This is a First Amendment to the License  Agreement between THE GENERAL
HOSPITAL   CORPORATION,   a   not-for-profit   corporation   doing  business  as
Massachusetts  General  Hospital,  having a place of business  at Fruit  Street,
Boston,  Massachusetts  02114  ("GENERAL") and Palomar Medical  Technologies,  a
Delaware  corporation having offices at 66 Cherry Hill Drive,  Beverly, MA 01915
("PALOMAR"), effective August 18, 1995 ("License Agreement").

         For good and valuable consideration GENERAL and PALOMAR hereby agree to
amend the License Agreement as follows:

         1. In paragraph 5.1(b)(iii)(B), delete the following words:

         "(which royalty rate the parties  anticipate will fall within the range
         of twenty to thirty  percent  (20-30%) of  PALOMAR's  estimated  profit
         margin on said PRODUCTS or SERVICES)"

         2. In paragraph 5.1(b)(iii)(C), delete the following words:

         "which the parties anticipate will fall within the range of five to six
         and one quarter percent (5-6 1/4%) of PALOMAR's estimated profit margin
         on said PRODUCTS or SERVICES"

         3. This First Amendment shall be effective as of August 18, 1995.

Agreed to:

PALOMAR                                         THE GENERAL HOSPITAL CORPORATION



BY:  /s/ Michael H. Smotrich                    BY:  /s/ Nikki J. Zapol
     -----------------------                         ---------------------------
TITLE:  President                               TITLE  Managing Director
                                                       Office of Technology
                                                       Affairs

DATE    December 14, 1995                       DATE   January 2, 1996
#### STATE v. ED JENKINS.

(Filed 20 November, 1935.)

Criminal law B a — Inability to distinguish right from wrong, and not low mentality, is the legal test of insanity.

The test of mental irresponsibility sufficient to render defendant incapable of the commission of crime is the inability to distinguish right from wrong, and the exclusion of testimony that defendant is of low mentality is not error, low mentality not being the test of insanity.

*741Appeal by defendant from *Warlich, J.,*at July Term, 1935, of GASTON.

Criminal prosecution, tried upon indictment charging the defendant with the murder of one Paul Collins.

Yerdict: Guilty of murder in the first degree.

Judgment: Death by inhaling lethal gas.

The defendant appeals, assigning errors.

*Attorney-General Seawell and! Assistant Attorneys-General Aihen and Bruton for the State.*

*Ernest R. Warren for defendant.*

Stagy, O. J.

The evidence on behalf of the State tends to show that on the night of 4 July, 1935, the defendant shot and killed Paul Collins under circumstances which the jury found to be murder in the first degree. The shooting occurred on one of the principal streets in the town of Bessemer City. The defendant told the night policeman, who arrested him, “that he didn’t want to shoot the deceased, but he made me do it.” Later, on being informed by the same policeman that Collins was dead, the defendant said, “I am glad, I did a damn good job”; and, further, “there was an old grudge between me and Paul Collins and Doc Horsley over dope.”

The pleas interposed by the defendant were self-defense and insanity or mental irresponsibility. Both of these pleas were rejected by the jury. The only testimony offered by the defendant to support his plea of insanity was that of several witnesses who would have testified, if permitted to dó so, that the defendant was a man of low mentality. The exclusion of this evidence is the principal question presented by the appeal. There was no error in its exclusion. *S. v. Vernon, ante,*340. Low mentality is not the test of insanity. *S. v. Spivey,*132 N. C., 989, 43 S. E., 475. He who knows the right and still the wrong pursues is amenable to the criminal law. *S. v. Potts,*100 N. C., 457, 6 S. E., 657. *We*are aware of the criticism of this standard by some psychiatrists and others. Nevertheless, the critics have offered nothing better. It has the merit of being well established, practical, and so plain “that he may run that readeth it.” Hab. 2:2.

The verdict and judgment will be upheld.

No error.
117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 325 

AN ACT 

To amend the Alyce Spotted Bear and Walter Soboleff Commission on Native Children Act to extend the deadline 

for a report by the Alyce Spotted Bear and Walter 

Soboleff Commission on Native Children, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

†S 325 ES

1 SECTION 1. ALYCE SPOTTED BEAR AND WALTER SOBOLEFF 

2 COMMISSION ON NATIVE CHILDREN REPORT. 

3 Section 3(f) of the Alyce Spotted Bear and Walter 

4 Soboleff Commission on Native Children Act (Public Law 

5 114–244; 130 Stat. 987) is amended, in the matter pre6 ceding paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘3 years’’ and inserting 

7 ‘‘5 years’’. 

Passed the Senate May 26, 2021. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 325 

AN ACT 

To amend the Alyce Spotted Bear and Walter 

on Native Children, and for other purposes. Spotted Bear and Walter Soboleff Commission extend the deadline for a report by the Alyce Soboleff Commission on Native Children Act to
| Skip to contentSocial Security Online | Actuarial Publications |
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|------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|

| Solvency provisions | Summary Measures and GraphsUpdated May 3, 2006   |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|

| Trust Fund Investment in Equities | Description of Proposed Provision:      Invest 40 percent of the Trust Funds in equities (phased in 2006-2020), assuming an ultimate 5.5 percent real rate of return on equities |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
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*Estimates based on the intermediate assumptions        of the 2005 Trustees Report*

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Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, March 26, 2020.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, March 26, 2020

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A20D0331. JIMMY BROCK v. CRYSTAL BROCK.

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

2018SUCV846
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 28 (Friday, February 10, 1995)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 8166]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-3481]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------


DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
14 CFR Part 91

[Docket No. 27583; Amendment No. 91-243]


Special Visual Flight Rules (SVFR); Denver, CO

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule announcement of effective date.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On January 19, 1994, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
published a final rule to amend appendix D, part 91 of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations to accurately reflect the name of the new Denver, 
Colorado airport. This action was previously delayed pending the 
opening of the Denver International Airport. This amendment coincides 
with the scheduled opening date of the new airport.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The final rule at 59 FR 2918, as corrected at 59 FR 
6547, as postponed at 59 FR 10958 and 59 FR 24915 is effective 0701 
UTC, February 28, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Ellen E. Crum, Air Traffic Rules Branch (ATP-230), Airspace-Rules and 
Aeronautical Information Division, Air Traffic Rules and Procedures 
Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., 
Washington, DC 20591; telephone: (202) 267-8783.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On January 19, 1994, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) published a technical amendment to sections 1 and 
3 of appendix D, 14 CFR part 91, replacing the reference to Stapleton 
International Airport with the Denver International Airport (Amendment 
No. 91-236; 59 FR 2918). In the amendment, however, the FAA 
inadvertently indicated that the word ``Stapleton'' should be replaced 
with the word ``International''. The FAA issued a correcting amendment 
on February 11, 1994 (59 FR 6547). Most recently, the FAA delayed the 
rule indefinitely pending the official opening of the Denver 
International Airport. The new airport is scheduled to open on February 
28, 1995. This action coincides with the opening of the new airport. 
Because the public needs to be made aware of the opening date 
immediately, notice and public procedure are impracticable and good 
cause exists for making this action effective in less than 30 days.

    In consideration of the foregoing, the final rule (Docket No. 
27583) amending the name of the Denver International Airport in 
appendix D of 14 CFR part 91 (59 FR 2918; January 19, 1994) and the 
final rule correction (59 CFR 6547, February 11, 1994) postponed at 59 
FR 10958, March 9, 1994, and 59 FR 24915, May 13, 1994 is effective 
February 28, 1995.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on February 8, 1995.
Harold W. Baker,
Manager, Airspace-Rules and Aeronautical Information Division.
[FR Doc. 95-3481 Filed 2-8-94; 11:42 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DIMITRIUS BROWN,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 119 EAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 17th day of October, 2022, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
**Exhibit 23.2**

 

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S­8 (Nos. 333-30882, 333-70608 and 333-119123 of Perfumania Holdings, Inc.and Subsidiaries of our report dated October 13, 2008 related to the consolidated financial statements as of and for the thirteen weeks ended February 2, 2008 and for the year ended October 31, 2007, which appears in this Form 10-K.

/s/ BDO Seidman, LLP 

New York, New York 

June 30, 2009
Exhibit 35

ITEM 1123 CERTIFICATION

I, David Duclos, Vice
President of U.S. Bank National Association (the Servicer), hereby certify that:

(1) A review of the activities of the Servicer during the
fiscal year covered by this annual report on Form 10-K and of the performance of the Servicer under the Standard Terms for Trust Agreement, dated as of November 9, 2006, between the Servicer and the depositor (the Agreement) has been
made under my supervision;

and

(2) To the best of my
knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the reporting period, or, if there has been a failure to fulfill any such obligation in any material respect, I
have specified below each such failure known to me and the nature and status thereof.

Date: March 30, 2016



|                
|----------------
|/s/ David Duclos
|David Duclos    
|Vice President
NO. 07-04-0381-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL B

SEPTEMBER 8, 2004

______________________________

DANNY CLEMENT,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

Appellee

_________________________________

FROM THE 7TH DISTRICT COURT OF SMITH COUNTY;

NO. 007-2018-03; HON. KERRY L. RUSSELL, PRESIDING

_______________________________

ABATEMENT AND REMAND

_______________________________

Before JOHNSON, C.J., and QUINN and CAMPBELL, JJ.

Appellant Danny Clement appeals from a judgment convicting him of possession of

a controlled substance. The reporter’s record is due in this cause. An extension of the

applicable deadline was sought by the court reporter. To justify the extension, the court

reporter represented that appellant has failed to pay or make arrangements to pay for the

record. Nothing of record shows that appellant is indigent and entitled to a free record.
2

Accordingly, we now abate this appeal and remand the cause to the 7th District Court

of Smith County (trial court) for further proceedings. Upon remand, the trial court shall

immediately cause notice of a hearing to be given and, thereafter, conduct a hearing to

determine the following: 

 1. whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal; 

 2. whether appellant is indigent; and, 

 3. whether the appellant is entitled to appointed counsel and a free appellate 

record. 

The trial court shall cause the hearing to be transcribed. So too shall it 1) execute findings

of fact and conclusions of law addressing the foregoing issues, 2) cause to be developed

a supplemental clerk’s record containing the findings of fact and conclusions of law and all

orders it may issue as a result of its hearing on this matter, and 3) cause to be developed

a supplemental reporter’s record transcribing the evidence and arguments presented at the

aforementioned hearing. Should it be determined that appellant wishes to prosecute the

appeal, is indigent, and is entitled to an appointed attorney but has none, then the trial court

shall appoint counsel, unless appellant knowingly and voluntarily waives counsel.

Furthermore, the name, address, and phone number of any counsel appointed by the trial

court to represent appellant shall be included in the supplemental record. The trial court

shall also file both supplemental records with the clerk of this court on or before October

8, 2004. Should further time be needed by the trial court to perform these tasks, then it

must be requested before October 8, 2004. 

 It is so ordered. 

 Per Curiam 

 Do not publish.