J-S48022-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TADESSE N. SHIFERAW

Appellant No. 1916 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered November 16, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No: CP-22-CR-003201-2015

BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, and PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 20, 2017

Appellant, Tadesse N. Shiferaw, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed on November 16, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of 

Dauphin County following his conviction of possession with intent to deliver a 

controlled substance (“PWID”). 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). Appellant 

contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. Following 

review, we affirm.

After he was arrested on April 21, 2015, Appellant filed an omnibus 

pre-trial motion to suppress. A hearing on the motion began on November 

13, 2015. Because of scheduling issues, the proceedings were continued to 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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December 2, 2015. The trial court summarized the testimony from the 

suppression hearings as follows:

The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Pennsylvania 

State Trooper David Long (“Trooper Long”). Trooper Long 

testified that on [April] 21, 2015 around 2:00 p.m. in the 

afternoon he was monitoring Interstate 81 in an unmarked SUV. 

Trooper Long noticed a red minivan that drove by that was a 

rental vehicle that had one occupant in it. He began to follow 

the minivan and observed the minivan travel off the right-lane of 

the highway (the right fog line) on a couple of different 

occasions. As the minivan was coming up on an exit (near 

Linglestown, PA), there was a[n] SUV in front of it with its turn 

signal on. As the SUV was exiting the highway, the minivan 

approached the SUV without applying brakes and proceeded to a 

distance that was too close for conditions. At this point, due to 

the traveling off the roadway and following too closely, Trooper 

Long initiated a traffic stop. As the trooper approached the 

passenger side window, he noticed a black-type, garbage looking 

bag in the back. [Appellant] appeared very tired, was yawning, 

and had several energy drinks and coffee in the front console.

Trooper Long had a conversation with [Appellant] and 

[Appellant] told him that he had rented the minivan through his 

company. Additionally, [Appellant] indicated that he was an 

airport shuttle service6 and was transporting someone from 

Columbus, Ohio to Brooklyn, New York. [Appellant] stated that 

he was paid $1500 for his services. Trooper Long testified that 

[Appellant] seemed to be off route and that a flight would have 

been cheaper than the $1500 in order to get from Ohio to New 

York. [Appellant] also stated that while in Brooklyn, N.Y., he 

was directed to wait outside of a hotel while the occupant he had 

transported went into the hotel and returned with a package that 

was put in the back of the van. [Appellant] was directed to 

transport the package back to Ohio and contact his cousin.7 

The rental agreement was provided but instead of being a 

business rental, the rental had been in [Appellant’s] actual 

name. The trooper prepared a written warning for traveling too 

closely to the rear of another vehicle. Finally, the trooper asked 

if there was anything illegal in the vehicle [to] which [Appellant] 

responded “no.” Trooper Long asked for permission and was 

provided both written and verbal consent to search the vehicle. 

A K-9 unit arrived, searched the vehicle, and twenty-two (22) 
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pounds of marijuana was discovered. The Commonwealth 

introduced the rental agreement and consent to search as part 

of the evidence. 

6. The vehicle, however, was not marked as an airport shuttle service 

vehicle.

7. No names were given of the occupant or the cousin.

Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 1/25/17, at 2-4 (references to Notes of 

Testimony omitted). 

By order entered on February 4, 2016, the trial court denied 

Appellant’s suppression motion. Following a June 21, 2016 jury trial, 

Appellant was convicted of PWID. On November 16, 2016, Appellant was 

sentenced to 24 months of intermediate punishment, consisting of three 

months of work release followed by electronic monitoring and house arrest 

for the balance of his term of sentence. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial 

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.1 In this appeal, Appellant asks us to 

consider two related issues:

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1

In his Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal, Appellant 

asserted three errors related to the denial of his suppression motion and two 

errors related to his trial. We note that President Judge Richard A. Lewis 

presided over the suppression proceedings while Senior Judge Kevin A. Hess 

presided over the trial. In their Rule 1925(a) opinions, the judges addressed 

the issues corresponding to the proceedings over which they presided. 

Appellant has abandoned his trial issues in this appeal. Therefore, we shall 

confine our discussion to the suppression proceedings and Judge Lewis’s 

disposition of the suppression issues. 
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I. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by denying the 

Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence based on an 

improper stop and seizure.

II. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by denying the 

Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence of every kind 

which were (sic) unlawfully obtained in violation of the 

Appellant’s Miranda and Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Section 9[2] of the Pennsylvania Constitution 

and in violation of Appellant’s rights against selfincrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

Both of Appellant’s issues challenge the denial of his motion to 

suppress. As our Supreme Court has explained:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the 

denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether 

the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the 

record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts 

are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record 

as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and 

may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. 

Where, as here, the appeal of the determination of the 

suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the 

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an 

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression

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2 We suspect, as did the trial court, that Appellant’s reference to Article I, 

Section 9 (Rights of Accused in Criminal Prosecution) in conjunction with the 

Sixth Amendment was made in error and should be a reference to Article I, 

Section 8 (Security from Searches and Seizures). Trial Court Rule 1925(a) 

Opinion, 1/25/17, at 4, n. 8. 
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court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the 

conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary 

review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

Commonwealth witness Trooper Long was the sole witness who 

testified at the suppression hearing. The trial court admitted Commonwealth 

exhibits consisting of the rental agreement for the minivan and the consent 

to search signed by Appellant. The court also admitted Appellant’s exhibits, 

including the audio and video recording captured on the camera installed in 

the trooper’s SUV, the written warning for following too closely, and 

photographs printed from the video. 

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the traffic stop was unlawful 

because the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proof of probable 

cause for the stop. Appellant contends that the trial court’s finding of a 

lawful stop was against the weight of the evidence presented at the 

suppression hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 19. 

Again, the trooper testified that he observed Appellant cross the fog 

line on a couple of occasions and was following a vehicle too closely. 

Appellant asserts that probable cause warranting a stop for violating the 

roadways laned for traffic statute was lacking because there was no 

evidence that any persons were placed in danger by Appellant’s movements. 

Id. at 16-17. He also argues that the trooper lacked probable cause for 
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stopping Appellant based on traveling too closely, an argument grounded in 

part on Appellant’s interpretation of a question posed by the court. Id. at 

17-19. We disagree. As the Commonwealth correctly asserts, “[p]robable 

cause to effectuate an arrest exists when facts and circumstances within 

[the] knowledge of the arresting officer are reasonably trustworthy and 

sufficient to justify a person of reasonable caution in believing that [the] 

arrestee has committed an offense.” Commonwealth Brief at 9 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Romero, 673 A.2d 374, 376 (Pa. Super. 1996)). 

Further, “[i]n addressing the existence of probable cause, courts must focus 

on the circumstances as seen through the eyes of [the] trained police officer, 

taking into consideration that probable cause does not involve certainties, 

but rather the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 

reasonable and prudent men act.” Id. (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). 

The trial court determined the stop was lawful, noting that “[t]he 

Fourth Amendment does not prevent police from stopping and questioning 

motorists when they witness or suspect a violation of traffic laws, even if it is 

a minor offense.” Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 1/25/17, at 5 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 113 (Pa. 2008) (additional 

citation omitted)). The court explained, “[h]ere, the trooper credibly 

testified that he observed [Appellant] commit two traffic violations. One for 

leaving the lane of traffic (the right fog line) and one for driving too closely 
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to the vehicle in front of him. Accordingly, the stop was valid and did not 

violate any constitutional rights.” Id. 

We find that the court’s factual findings, as summarized in the quoted 

excerpt from the Rule 1925(a) opinion, are supported by the record. 

Therefore, we are bound by those findings and may reverse only if the trial 

court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Jones, 988 A.2d at 654. We find 

no error in the trial court’s legal conclusion that Appellant was lawfully 

stopped. Appellant’s first issue fails. 

Appellant’s second issue ostensibly challenges the trial court’s denial of 

his motion to suppress on constitutional grounds, based on the delay 

between the traffic stop and the time a K-9 unit arrived to conduct the 

search.3-4 However, we have already determined that the stop was valid 

and Appellant ignores the fact he consented to the search he now 

challenges.

As the trial court recognized:

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect 

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3 Appellant’s second issue, as framed, suggests challenges involving 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as well as the Fifth, Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 

Sections 8 and 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. However, his argument 

does not include any reference to Miranda or to any United States or 

Pennsylvania constitutional provisions. 

 

4 Appellant admits he consented to the search. Appellant’s Brief at 10. 
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individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. 

Commonwealth v. By, 812 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. 

2002). As a general rule, all searches and seizures performed 

without a warrant are per se unreasonable and unconstitutional, 

unless an exception applies. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 92 

A.3d 1235, 1241 (Pa. Super. 2014). One exception is a search 

conducted after consent is voluntarily given. By, 812 A.2d at 

1254. Consent cases require a two-prong inquiry: first, to 

examine “the constitutional validity of the citizen/police 

encounter giving rise to the consent” and second, the 

voluntariness of the consent. Id. When a police encounter is 

lawful, the exclusive focus is the voluntariness. Id.

Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 1/25/17, at 8.

The trial court then considered factors identified by our Supreme Court 

in Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884 (Pa. 2000), to determine the 

voluntariness of Appellant’s consent.5 The court noted that Appellant was 

pulled over by a single police officer in an open location during the middle of 

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5 Those factors include: 

(1) the presence or absence of police excesses; (2) whether 

physical contact occurred; (3) whether police directed the 

individual’s movements; (4) police demeanor and manner of 

expression; (5) the location and time of the interdiction; (6) the 

content of the questions and statements; (7) the existence and 

character of the initial investigative detention, including its 

degree of coerciveness; (8) whether and to what degree the 

transition between the traffic stop/investigative detention and 

the subsequent encounter can be viewed as seamless, thus 

suggesting to the individual that his movements may remain 

subject to police restrain[t]; and (9) whether the police 

expressly told the individual that he was free to leave—this latter 

factor being an objective and potent one. 

Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 1/25/17, at 6, n.9 (citing Strickler, 757 

A.2d at 898-901).
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the day. Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 1/25/17, at 8. The detention 

was not exceedingly long; the questioning was neither repetitive nor 

deceptive; the officer did not touch or threaten Appellant or restrict his 

movements; and the officer did not display his weapon. Id. The was no 

suggestion that the officer used any coercive language or tone. Id. 

When the officer asked Appellant for consent to search the vehicle, 

Appellant freely gave consent. Id. at 9. Appellant does not contend that he 

asked to leave or withdrew his consent. “Most importantly, [Appellant] read 

and signed a ‘Pennsylvania State Police Waiver of Rights and Consent to 

Search.’” Id. “As such, [Appellant’s] consent was voluntary and this [c]ourt 

properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress.” Id. 

We conclude that the trial court properly applied the law to the facts of 

this case. Finding no error in the trial court’s legal conclusion, Appellant’s 

second issue does not provide any basis for relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/20/2017