IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2013-CT-00024-SCT
STEV EN EDWARD GALLE

v. ISLE OF CAPRI CASINOS, INC.; RIV ERBOAT CORPORATION OF MISSISSIPPI a/k/a ISLE OF CAPRI CASINO-HOTEL BILOXI a/k/a DIV ISION AND PROPERTY OF ISLE OF CAPRI CASINOS, INC.; JAMES B. PERRY , AS CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD AND CHIEF EXECUTIV E OFFICER, ISLE OF CAPRI CASINOS, INC., AND JAMES B. PERRY , INDIV IDUALLY

; V IRGINIA McDOWELL, AS PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIV E OFFICER, ISLE OF CAPRI CASINOS, INC., AND V IRGINIA McDOWELL, INDIV IDUALLY

; LY NN BANKS, AS CORPORATE DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES, ISLE OF CAPRI CASINOS, INC., AND LY N N BANKS, INDIV IDUALLY

; DOUG SHIPLEY

, AS GENERAL MANAGER OF RIV

ERBOAT CORPORATION OF MISSISSIPPI a/k/a ISLE CASINO-HOTEL BILOXI a/k/a DIV

ISION AND PROPERTY OF ISLE OF CAPRI CASINOS, INC., AND DOUG SHIPLEY , INDIV IDUALLY

; MICHAEL (MIKE) CRAY , AS DIRECTOR OF CASINO OPERATIONS, RIV ERBOAT CORPORATION OF MISSISSIPPI a/k/a ISLE CASINO-HOTEL BILOXI a/k/a DIV ISION AND PROPERTY OF ISLE OF CAPRI CASINOS, INC., AND MICHAEL (MIKE) CRAY , INDIV IDUALLY

; AND BELL KESSLER, AS SENIOR DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES, RIV ERBOAT CORPORATION OF MISSISSIPPI a/k/a ISLE CASINO-HOTEL BILOXI a/k/a DIV ISION AND PROPERTY OF ISLE OF CAPRI CASINOS, INC., AND BELL KESSLER, INDIV IDUALLY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARIDATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/30/2012

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LAW RENCE PAUL BOURGEOIS, JR. TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: STEVEN EDW ARD GALLE (PRO SE) MICHAEL F. CAVANAUGH COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: STEVEN EDW ARD GALLE (PRO SE) ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: FRED L. BANKS, JR. LATOYA CHEREE MERRITT GREGORY TODD BUTLER MICHAEL F. CAVANAUGH NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE DISPOSITION: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND THE CASE IS REMANDED - 07/02/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC. DICKINSON, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. A f

orm er em ploy ee who c laim s he was discharged f or reporting h is em

ploy er’s illegal activity seeks to bring a w rongf ul-discharge claim under a public-policy exception to his atwill em ploy m ent status. Because the f orm er em ploy ee participated in the allegedly illegal activity , w e hold that he m ay not do so, and we af f irm sum m ary judgm ent on h is wrongfuldischarge claim

. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. In D ecem

ber 2005, Steven Edward Galle began working in the p oker room at Isle of
C a pri Casino, Inc., in Biloxi, Mississippi, as an at-will em ploy ee. I n 2008, Isle o f C a p r i

2prom oted him to “poker r o o m ma n a g er,” a “Key Position” requiring a “Key E m ploy ee
License” f

rom the Mississippi Gam ing Com m ission. 1 ¶3. W h en Galle applied f or a Key Em

ploy ee License, he f

ailed to disclose a 1994 burglary

arrest in his application, a nd the Gam ing C om m ission denied h is application because of this oversight. Although Galle could n ot hold a “Key Position” i n the p oker room , he still could
work as a poker dealer or supervisor, so Isle of Capri dem oted him to poker room supervisor. ¶4. Isle of Capri later changed its logos and i ssued new em ploy ee identif

i cation badges. Although Galle’s previous badge had indicated h e was a supervisor, he was i ssued a ne w badge indicating that he was the “poker room m a nager.” G alle told his supervisors that his badge incorrectly identif

ied him as the poker room m a n ager, but h is i m m ediate supervisors
told him to wear the badge any

way , s o he took no f

urther steps to get a new badge, and he

wore both badges, o n e i dentif y ing him as the supervisor, and the other as the poker room

m anager. ¶5. Gam i ng Com m ission enf orcem e nt agents noticed the b a d g e that identif ied Galle as poker r oom m anager and asked him about it. On one occasion, he told the agents that there was no poker room

m a nager, but on another, he adm itted he was the poker room m anager.
The agents reviewed Isl e o f Capri’s em ploy m ent records and d eterm ined t hat Galle was
indeed acting a s the poker room m anager, so the Gam ing Com m ission s e n t Isle of Capri a

1 S ee M iss. G am in g C o m

m ’n R eg u l atio n s, T itle 1 3 , P ar t 2 , R u le 1 .3 , a va ila b le a t h ttp : //w w w .m sg am in g co m m issio n .co m /im age s / upl oa ds / MGCRe gs 4. 21. 15 .p d f (last v isited Ju n e 2 6 , 2 0 1 5 ) (“A n y ex e cu tiv e, em p lo y ee, o r ag en t o f a g am i n g licen see h av in g p o w er to ex ercise a sig n if

ican t i n f lu e n ce o v er d e cisio n s co n cern in g an y p art o f th e o p eratio n o f a g am in g licen see o r w h o is listed . . . m ay b e req u ired to h o ld a K ey E m p lo y ee L icen se.”).
3letter stating: “Ef f ective i mme d i a t e l y , y ou a re to rem ove Mr. Galle f rom any position requiring a Key

License.” A m onth later, Isle of Capri f ired Galle f

or “[ f ]ailure to execute
a directive f

rom gam ing in an ef

f ective m anner.” ¶6. Galle sued Isle of

Capri and a litany

of other em ploy ees and of

f icials, 2 alleging that
Isle of Capri and i ts em

ploy ees violated his constit u t i o n a l r ights, i ntentionally inf licted

em otional distress, and “unjustly term inat[ ed] [ him ] f rom his j o b

. ” I s le of C apri and the
other nam ed def

endants w ho were successf ully served with process responded with a m otion
f or sum m ary

judgm ent on Galle’s wrongf ul-discharge claim , arguing that Galle was an atwill emp l o y e e a nd that he could be f ired f or any reason. The def

endants did not request

s u mma ry judgm ent on Galle’s claim s f or alleged constitutional rights violations o r
intentional inf

liction of em otional distress. ¶7. Af ter holding a h earing on the def endants’ m otion f

or sum m ary j udgm ent, the circuit judge sum m arily dism issed all of Galle’s c laim s
. The circuit judge recognized the two

narrow public-policy e xceptions to the at -will-em ploy m e n t doctrine b ut f

ound that the

“ [ p ] laintif

f has not provided a ny evidence w hatsoever that e i ther o f t hose two ex c e p t i o n s
exist.” T he circuit court also f ound “that [ p]laintif

f has produced no credible ev i d e n ce to

2 G alle su ed (1 ) Isle o f C a p ri C asin o s, I n c.; (2 ) Isle C asin o -H o tel, B ilo x i D i v isio n o f Isle o f C ap ri C asin o s, In c.; (3 ) Jam es B

. P erry , C h airm an o f th e B o ard an d C h ief E x ecu t iv e O f f icer o f Isle o f C ap ri C asin o s, I n c.; (4 ) V irg in ia M cD o w ell, P resid e n t a n d C h ief E x ecu t iv e O f f i cer o f Isle o f C ap ri C a sin o s , In c.; (5 ) L y n n B an k s, C o rp o r ate D irecto r o f H u ma n R e so u rces o f Isle o f C a p ri C a sin o s, I n c.; (6 ) Jo h n D o e 1 E m p lo y ee; (7 ) Jo h n D o e 2 Em p l oy e e ; ( 8 ) D o u g S h ip ley , G en eral M an ag er o f Isle C asin o -H o tel B ilo x i; (9 ) B ell K essler, S en io r D irecto r o f H u m an R eso u rces o f Isle C asin o -H o tel B i lo x i; an d (1 0 ) M ich ael C ray , w h o h as n ev er b een serv ed w ith p ro c ess. 4begin to prove an intentional tort, including c onspiracy a n d / o r intentional inf l iction of

em otional distress.” ¶8. Galle appealed, and t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s r e versed t he circuit court’s grant of

sum m ary judgm ent, concluding—as to his wrongf ul-discharge claim

—“that t here is a genuine issue of m aterial f act as to wh e t h er Galle was f ired f or r eporting h is illegally

m an a g i n g t

he poker room ,” 3 and—as f or his other c laim s —that “ [ s]um m ary j udgm ent cannot be granted on grounds not raised and properly supported in the sum m ary judgm ent m otion

. . . . 4 The Court o f App e a l s a d d ed that “the plaintif f is only required to produce evidence
af ter the def endant has m ade a prim a f acie showing that it is entitled to sum m ary judgm ent.” 5 ¶9. The d ef

e n d a n t s t h e n moved f

or rehearing in the Court o f Appeals, and af ter their

m otion w as denied, tim ely f iled a Pe t i t i o n f

or W rit of Certiorari in this Court, which we granted.
ANALYSIS ¶10. Isle of Capri does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ decision reversing t he circuit
court’s sua sponte grant of sum m ary judgm ent on Galle’s c onstitutional rights violations and
intentional inf

liction o f em otional distress claim s. Instead, I sle of Capri u rges that the Court
of Appeals’ reversal of sum m ary judgm ent on Galle’s claim of w rongf ul discharge m

ust be

3 G a l le v. Isle o f C a p r i C a s in o s, In c. , 2 0 1 3 -C P -0 0 0 2 4 -C O A , 2 0 1 4 WL 4 0 6 7 1 8 5 , at * 4 (M i ss. C t. A p p . A u g
. 1 9 , 2 0 1 4 ).

4 I d
. (citin g M

o o re v. M & M L o

g g in g In c. , 5 1 S o
. 3 d 2 1 6 , 2 1 9 (M iss. C t. A p p
. 2 0 1 0 )).

5 Id
. (citin g M

o o re , 5 1 S o
. 3 d at 2 1 9 ).

5reversed on three independent grounds, b ecause: (1) Galle did not report “crim inally ” illegal

conduct, (2) Galle was a willing participant in t he allegedly illegal conduct he reported, and (3) G alle did not report conduct “ because it was illegal.” The Mississippi Def ense Lawy ers
Association in its am icus curiae brief echoes these argum ents. Galle argues that the Court
of Appeals properly

reversed the circuit court. ¶11. W e f

ind t hat Galle’s w illing participation in illegal activity , which he f ailed to report
bef ore the Gam ing Com m ission discovered it, bars him f rom b ringing a McArn wrongfuldischarge claim

. 6 Because t his issue is dispositve, we need not address Isle of Capri’s other

argum ents. ¶12. This Court reviews a circuit court’s grant of a m o tion f or sum m ary judgm e nt de novo , and we view all f

acts in the light m ost f

avorable to the party opposing the m otion when
determ ining if the m o ving party is entitled to sum m ary

judgm ent. 7 ¶13. In Missis s i p p i

— w h e n t h e r e is no written em ploy m e n t contract—the em

ploy m ent relationship is at-will, w hich m eans that “an em ploy ee m ay be discharged at the e m ploy er’s
will f or good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all, excepting only reasons independently
declared legally im

perm i ssible.” 8 But in McArn , this Court recognized “two independent6 M cA r n v. A llied

B ru ce-T erm in ix C

o ., In c. , 6 2 6 S o . 2 d 6 0 3 , 6 0 7 (M i ss. 1 9 9 3 ).

7 C o n ro d v. H

o l d er , 8 2 5 S o
. 2 d 1 6 , 1 8 (M iss. 2 0 0 2 ) (citin g D a n iels v. G N B , In c. , 6 2 9 S o . 2 d 5 9 5 , 5 9 9 (M iss. 1 9 9 3 )).

8 H a r ris v. M iss. V a lley S ta te U n iv. , 8 7 3 S o
. 2 d 9 7 0 , 9 8 6 (M iss. 2 0 0 4 ) (q u o tin g S h a w v. B u rch field , 4 8 1 S o . 2 d 2 4 7 , 2 5 3 -5 4 (M i ss. 1 9 8 5 )).
6tort actions b ased o n ‘a narrow public p olicy e xception to the em ploy m ent at will doctrine.’” 9

W e recently clarif

ied that “[ a] McArn claim alleging wrongf u l discharge in viola t i o n o f public policy is b a sed on an e m p loy er’s duty not to thwart the public interest by term inating

em ploy e es f or speaking the truth.” 10 ¶14. In this case, the undisputed f acts clearly establish that Galle was a willing participant
in Isle of Capri’s allegedly illegal schem e f or him to m anage the poker room without a Key

Em ploy e e License. Although Galle told his superiors t hat his nam e badge identif ied him as
the poker room m anager and that he was ineligible to h old a K ey Em p loy e e License, he willingly a

bided b y I sle of Capri’s instructions to m anage the poker room any w ay
. Galle did

not m ake any r eports of t his allegedly illegal activity bef ore the Gam ing Com m i s s i o n
discovered that Galle was m anaging the p oker room withou t a K ey E m ploy ee License.
Galle’s w illing participation in Isle of Capri’s allegedly illegal activity precludes him f rom

m aking a claim under M

cArn f o r wrongf ul discharge in violation of p ublic policy

. ¶15. As the Supr e me C o u r t o f C o l o r a do stated w hen addressing its o wn public-policy exception to the em

ploy m ent-at-will doctrine:
The public policy exception protects an em ploy ee f r om being f

orced to choose between c om m itting a crim e and losing his or her job. If an em p loy ee c o m m its
a s e ries of crim es and only points the f inger at h is em

ploy er after he has been f ired, then t here is no public policy rationale that s upports the expansion to the general rule that an em

ploy er m ay discharge an at-will em ploy ee without liability

. An at-will em

ploy ee who participates in a crim i nal enterprise and does nothing to blow the whistle on this crim inal enterprise does not g ain

9 C m ty. C a re C tr. o f A b erd een v. B a rren tin e , 1 6 0 S o
. 3 d 2 1 6 , 2 1 8 (M iss. 2 0 1 5 ) (q u o tin g M

cA rn , 6 2 6 S o . 2 d at 6 0 7 ).

10 B a rren tin e , 1 6 0 S o . 3 d at 2 2 0 (citin g M cA rn , 6 2 6 S o . 2 d at 6 0 7 ).
7special protection f rom discharge sim

ply because the e m

ploy er was also a com plicitor in the crim es com m itted. 11 ¶16. W e agree with this r easoning and f ind that it com

ports perf ectly with our own narrow exceptions to the em

ploy m ent-at-will doctrine. M cArn protects em

ploy ees w h o b low the whistle on allegedly

illegal schem es, so long as they a r e not willing participants. 12 ¶17. W e f

ind no public-policy r eason to allow an em ploy ee who willingly participated in

an illegal schem e and w ho blew the whistl e only af ter the i llegal s chem e was revealed, to
claim the McArn exceptions to the em ploy m ent-at-will doctrine. 13 Because Galle is an atwill em ploy ee and because his claim does not f all within McArn ’s narrow public -policy exceptions to the em

ploy m ent-at-will doctrine, G a l le has f ailed to s tate a legally cognizable
claim f or wrongf ul discharge in violation of public policy

. ¶18. A b s ent the narrow public-policy e x ceptions announced in M cArn or p r o h i b i t i o n s
contained in f

ede r a l or state law, an em ploy er m a y f

i re an a t-will e m

ploy ee f or any reason

11 C o o rs B r ew in g C

o . v. F lo yd , 9 7 8 P .2 d 6 6 3 , 6 6 7 (C o l o
. 1 9 9 9 ) (in tern al f o o tn o tes o m itted ).

12 S ee B a rren tin e , 1 6 0 S o
. 3 d at 2 2 0 (citin g M c A rn , 6 2 6 S o
. 2 d at 6 0 7 ) ( “A M cA rn claim alleg in g w ro n g f

u l d isch arg e in v io latio n o f p u b lic p o licy i s b ased o n an em p lo y er’s d u ty n o t to th w art th e p u b lic in terest b y term i n atin g em

p lo y ees f o r sp eak in g th e tru th .”).

13 S ee L o w en b u rg

v. K l ein , 1 2 5 M iss. 2 8 4 , 8 7 S o . 6 5 3 , 6 5 4 (1 9 2 1 ) (q u o tin g 9 C y c. o f L aw , 5 4 6 ):
“N o p rin c ip le o f law is b etter se t t l ed th an th at a p arty to an illeg al co n tract can n o t co m e in t o a co u rt o f law an d ask to h av e h is illeg al o b j ects carried o u t; n o r can h e s e t u p a case in w h ich h e m u st n ecessarily d isclo se an i lleg al p u rp o se a s th e g ro u n d w o rk o f h i s claim

. T h e ru le i s ex p r essed in t h e m ax im , ‘E x d o l o m alo n o n o ritu r actio ,’ an d in ‘In p ari d elicto p o tio r est co n d i tio d ef en d en tis.’ T h e law , i n sh o r t , w ill n o t aid eith er p arty to an i lleg al ag reem en t; it leav es th e p arties w h ere it f in d s th em .”
8or no reason at all. 1 4 Here, Isle of Capri was f ree t o f ire Galle f

or “[ f ]ailure t o e x e c u te a
directive f

rom gam ing in an ef

f ective m anner,” even though G alle m ay have been acting in
conf orm i t y w i t h I sle of C apri’s prior directive to m anage the poker room without a Key

Em ploy e e License.
CONCLUSION ¶19. W e reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision reversing sum m ary judgm ent on Galle’s wrongf ul-discharge claim , and w e af f irm its decision reversing the circuit court’s sua sponte grant of sum m ary j udgm e nt on Galle’s other claim s. W e af f irm the circuit court’s grant of

sum m ary judgm ent in f

avor of Isle of Capri on Galle’s wrongf ul-discharge claim , b u t w e

reverse the circuit court’s sua sponte grant of sum m ary judgm ent on Galle’s other claim s and

we rem a nd this case f

or f u rther proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶20. THE JUDGMENT O F THE COURT OF APPEALS I S A FFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. THE JUDGM E N T OF T HE HARRISON COUNTY C I RCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN P ART, AND T H E CASE IS REMANDED. WALLER, C.J., L AMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE, K ING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR. R A N D O L P H , P
. J
. , S P E C I ALLY CONCURS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION

.

14 H a rris , 8 7 3 S o
. 2 d at 9 8 6

. 9