J-S29025-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MAURICE HIGHLEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3185 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 3, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-39-CR-0003693-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JULY 09, 2019

Maurice Highley appeals, pro se, from the order, entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Lehigh County, dismissing his petition for relief under the 

Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546 (“PCRA”), and his 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After careful review, we affirm. 

On December 23, 2014, Highley pleaded guilty to two counts of 

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, for which the court 

imposed an aggregate sentence of one to four years’ incarceration on February 

9, 2015. He did not file a direct appeal. Though there are no docket entries 

between May 18, 2015, when the court amended Highley’s sentence to make 

him eligible for boot camp, and May 30, 2018, when the PCRA court appointed 

counsel to pursue the instant PCRA petition, it is clear that Highley was
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released on parole, violated his parole, and returned to confinement.1 

Following his return to confinement, the Board of Probation and Parole (“the 

Board”) determined Highley would not receive credit for his time spent at 

liberty, owing to Highley’s unresolved drug issues and the similarity between 

offences committed while at large and the conviction at issue.2 See PCRA 

Petition, 5/30/18, Exhibit A (reproducing notice of the Board’s decision). 

Highley filed the instant PCRA petition on May 20, 2018, for the purpose 

of challenging the Board’s decision not to grant him credit for time spent at 

liberty, resulting in his release date being pushed back from January 24, 2019

to August 6, 2020. See id. at 5 (“I’m filing [] to receive my time credit [from] 

the Parole Board spent at liberty on parole”) (capitalization adjusted); see 

also Brief of Appellant, Appendix A (attaching to brief Highley’s request for 

administrative review addressed to Board). On May 30, 2018, the court 

appointed Sean Poll, Esquire, who filed a “no-merit” letter and petitioned to 

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1 All involved—including the PCRA court, the Commonwealth, and Highley

himself—failed to fully develop the factual basis underpinning the instant case. 

The clearest picture of what happened below can be gleaned from Highley’s 

initial, handwritten PCRA petition which states, “I was re-arrested on 1-6-2017 

while on parole for criminal case no CP 0003693 [the instant case] for CR266-2017 out of Carbon County Pa. I seen [sic] my parole agent upon reentry 

on 6-21-17. I receive[d] my Parole Board decision on Oct[.] 16[,] 2017 

denying my time at liberty.” PCRA Petition, 5/30/18, at 10 (capitalization 

adjusted). 

2 Highley’s copy of the Board’s decision, reproduced as an appendix to his 

handwritten PCRA petition, states he received a sentence of “9 months for the 

offenses of possession of a controlled substance and use/possession of drug 

paraphernalia.” PCRA Petition, 5/30/18, Exhibit A (capitalization adjusted). 
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withdraw as counsel on August 28, 2018, pursuant to Commonwealth v. 

Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 

213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). On September 4, 2018, the PCRA court 

issued notice of its intent to dismiss Highley’s petition without a hearing 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. In response, Highley filed a petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus. On October 3, 2018, the PCRA court dismissed both 

petitions and granted Attorney Poll’s motion to withdraw. Highley’s pro se

appeal followed.

Highley argues the PCRA court erred in dismissing both his petition for 

PCRA relief and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Brief of Appellant, 

at 8. This Court is without jurisdiction to consider either petition. 

A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed 

within one year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence becomes 

final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); see also Commonwealth v. Bretz, 

830 A.2d 1273, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2003). A judgment is deemed final “at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme 

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); see also 

Commonwealth v. Pollard, 911 A.2d 1005, 1007 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Here, Highley’s judgment of sentence became final on or about March 

11, 2015, following the expiration of the thirty-day period for filing a direct 

appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Thus, he had one 
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year from that date—until March 11, 2016—to timely file a PCRA petition. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Highley did not file the instant petition until May 

20, 2018,3 more than three years after his judgment of sentence became final. 

Accordingly, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain Highley’s PCRA petition 

unless he pleaded and proved one of the three statutory exceptions to the 

time bar.4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i–iii). Highley failed to do so. The

court properly dismissed his PCRA petition. 

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3 We have used the date listed on Highley’s pro se PCRA filings, rather than 

the date provided on the docket. See PCRA Petition, 5/20/18, at 12 (stating 

copies of PCRA petition were mailed on May 20, 2018); see also 

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34, 39 (Pa. Super. 2011) (applying 

prisoner mailbox rule, under which pro se prisoner’s appeals deemed filed on 

date of delivery to prison authorities or placed notice of appeal in institutional 

mailbox). We note the docket states the court appointed PCRA counsel on 

May 30, 2018, and that Highley filed his PCRA petition on June 6, 2018—a 

logical impossibility. 

4 The statutory exceptions are as follows:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
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The court dismissed Highley’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus as a 

second, untimely PCRA petition. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 12/12/2018, 

citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 1942 (providing PCRA is “the sole means of obtaining 

collateral relief [encompassing] all other common law and statutory remedies 

for the same purpose . . . including habeas corpus and coram nobis.”).

True habeas corpus petitions are properly construed as PCRA petitions—

however, a pro se petition, though styled as a habeas corpus petition, falls 

within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court when it seeks 

direct review of the Board of Probation and Parole’s actions. See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 761(a)(1)(i), 762(a)(1)(i) (outlining jurisdiction of Commonwealth Court); 

see also Gillespie v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Corrections, 527 A.2d 

1061 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (considering action properly filed before 

Commonwealth Court, though titled as petition for habeas corpus, when 

petition was “not a proper habeas corpus action but rather akin to an action 

in mandamus.”) and Commonwealth v. McDermott, 547 A.2d 1236, 1240 

(Pa. Super. 1988) (“Appeals from common pleas court parole orders are within 

the exclusive jurisdiction of the Superior Court, while appeals from 

administrative parole orders are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 

Commonwealth Court”). 

Here, Highley is attempting to appeal an administrative parole order and 

is seeking review of the Board’s actions. See Brief of Appellant, Exhibit A, at 

1–6 (reproducing Highley’s “Request for Administrative Review”). As such, 
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neither this Court nor the PCRA court has jurisdiction to consider his habeas 

corpus petition.

5

 See McDermott, supra at 1240. Consequently, though it 

would have been more appropriate to construe Highley’s petition as incorrectly 

filed rather than untimely, the PCRA court correctly dismissed his petition for 

want of jurisdiction. See id. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/9/19

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5 Should Highley seek further review of the Board’s decision, relief lies in a 

petition for a writ of mandamus before the Commonwealth Court. See 

Gillespie, supra.