1

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the 

convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the 

interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

Bound Brook Board of Education v. Glenn Ciripompa (A-57-15) (076905)

Argued November 9, 2016 -- Decided February 21, 2017

Timpone, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

In this appeal, the Court determines whether an arbitrator exceeded his authority by applying the standard for

proving a hostile-work-environment, sexual-harassment claim in a law against discrimination (LAD) case to a claim 

of unbecoming conduct in a tenured teacher disciplinary hearing.

Defendant Glenn Ciripompa is a tenured high school math teacher, in the Bound Brook School District 

(District). Defendant’s behavior came under the scrutiny of the Bound Brook Board of Education (Board) after the 

Board received copies of student Twitter posts alleging “Mr. C” was electronically transmitting nude photographs. 

An investigation uncovered defendant’s pervasive misuse of his District-issued laptop and iPad, as well as evidence 

of inappropriate behavior toward female colleagues, often in the presence of students. The results of the 

investigation spurred the Board to seek defendant’s termination from his tenured position and served as the 

substantive allegations of the two-count tenure complaint against defendant.

Count I of the complaint centered on defendant’s improper use of the District-issued laptop and iPad. The 

District’s policy prohibits “all employees and students using District computers, iPads and District networks” from 

accessing content for “illegal, inappropriate or obscene purposes, or in support of such activities.”

Count II set forth allegations concerning defendant’s inappropriate behavior, noting that “[t]eaching Staff 

members in the Bound Brook School District, including Mr. Ciripompa, receive training with respect to appropriate 

conduct towards staff members and workplace harassment on an annual basis,” and that “[i]nterviews of female staff 

members revealed that Mr. Ciripompa has repeatedly engaged in unprofessional, inappropriate and potentially 

harassing behavior towards female staff members.”

The concluding prayer for relief applied to both counts of the complaint. It stated that “the foregoing 

unbecoming conduct warrants [defendant’s] dismissal from the Bound Brook Borough School District . . . .” 

Pursuant the Tenure Employees Hearing Law (TEHL), N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 to -18.1, the charges were 

brought to the Commissioner of Education and, when the Commissioner agreed that the charges warranted 

termination, to an arbitrator. The arbitrator found that the Board had proven the allegations underlying Count I but 

dismissed Count II with prejudice, reducing the penalty from dismissal to a 120-day suspension without pay.

The arbitrator began his analysis of Count II by noting that, “[w]hile the charges contained in Count II do 

not specifically state sexual harassment, it is clear from the nature of the allegations and the cited policy that this is 

in fact the case, as [defendant] has likewise recognized.” The arbitrator then announced that, under this Court’s 

decision in Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 610 (1993), a successful claim for sexual harassment 

requires a showing that “working conditions were affected by the harassment to the point at which a reasonable 

woman would consider the working environment hostile.” The arbitrator found that defendant’s conduct did not 

meet the Lehmann standard and concluded that misuse of the District-issued electronics did not justify defendant’s 

removal from his tenured teaching position.

The District sought review in the Superior Court, Chancery Division. The court reversed the arbitrator’s 

decision, remanding it for a review before a new arbitrator. The court held that the arbitrator “erroneously changed 

the nature of Count II and imposed an inappropriate standard.” 
2

On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the Chancery Division’s decision vacating the arbitral award 

and reinstated the suspension. 442 N.J. Super. 515, 518 (App. Div. 2015). The panel found no error in the 

arbitrator’s application of the Lehmann standard to the charges proffered against defendant. Id. at 526.

The Court granted the Board’s petition for certification, limited to the issue of whether the arbitrator’s 

reliance on Lehmann in dismissing the Board’s second charge of inappropriate and unprofessional conduct 

supported vacating the arbitrator’s award. 224 N.J. 280 (2016).

HELD: The arbitrator impermissibly converted the second charge of unbecoming conduct into one of sexual 

harassment. The re-characterization of Count II erroneously tasked the Board with substantiating charges it did not file 

with evidence it did not proffer. The arbitrator’s review was not “consonant with the matter submitted,” Grover v. 

Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 221, 231 (1979); rather, he “imperfectly executed his powers” as well as 

exceeded his authority by failing to decide whether Count II stated a successful claim of unbecoming conduct in 

support of termination. N.J.S.A. 2A:41-8(d). The arbitrator’s award is therefore invalid.

1. Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited. An arbitrator’s award is not to be cast aside lightly. It is 

subject to being vacated only when it has been shown that a statutory basis justifies that action. (p. 8)

2. Under New Jersey’s TEHL, “[t]he arbitrator’s determination shall be final and binding,” but “shall be subject to 

judicial review and enforcement as provided pursuant to N.J.S.[A.] 2A:24-7 through N.J.S.[A.] 2A:24-10.” N.J.S.A.

18A:6-17.1. Pursuant to the cross-referenced statutes, there are four bases upon which a court may vacate an arbitral 

award. N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(a) to -(d). The claim of error in this case implicates subsection (d) of N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8, 

which provides for vacatur “[w]here the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, 

final and definite award upon the subject matter was not made.” (pp. 9-10)

3. Limits to the arbitrator’s authority are defined by statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8, as well as by the questions framed by 

the parties in a particular dispute. Indeed, an arbitrator’s award “should be consonant with the matter submitted. 

Otherwise, the determination is contrary to the authority vested in him.” Grover, supra, 80 N.J. at 231. The Third 

Circuit addressed “allegation[s] that the arbitrators exceeded their authority by resolving an issue the parties did not 

intend to submit” under 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(4), which is virtually identical to N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d), by considering 

“whether the arbitrators manifestly exceeded their authority in interpreting the scope of the parties’ submissions.” 

Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs., 409 F.3d 574, 579 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1089 

(2006). The Court agrees that a claim that an arbitrator decided a legal question not placed before him or her by the 

parties is tantamount to a claim that the arbitrator “imperfectly executed [his or her] powers” as well as a claim that 

the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d). (pp. 10-12)

4. Proving hostile work environment is not necessary to satisfy the burden of showing unbecoming conduct. A 

charge of unbecoming conduct requires only evidence of inappropriate conduct by teaching professionals. It focuses 

on the morale, efficiency, and public perception of an entity, and how those concerns are harmed by allowing 

teachers to behave inappropriately while holding public employment. The Court has made it clear that the failure of 

a school board to prove a different offense does not preclude a finding of unbecoming conduct. Claims of hostile 

work environment, sexual harassment and unbecoming conduct are governed by separate, distinct legal standards 

and in separate, distinct legal contexts. (pp. 12-14)

5. There are settings in which sexual harassment claims may provide the underpinnings of an unbecoming conduct 

charge. This is not one of them. The arbitrator erred in his reliance on Lehmann because he imposed a different and 

inappropriate standard of proof on the Board to sustain its unbecoming conduct in the presence of students claim. 

The arbitrator “imperfectly executed” his power by misinterpreting the intentions of the Board so significantly as to 

impose a sexual harassment analysis, when such an analysis was wholly ill-suited in this context. The instant matter 

is not an employee-versus-employer dispute that requires application of the Lehmann standard. Indeed, that standard 

distorts the evaluatory method pertinent to this matter, making it inappropriate for consideration here. (pp. 14-18)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. The matter is REMANDED for arbitration with 

a new arbitrator.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZVINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion.
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-57 September Term 2015

076905

BOUND BROOK BOARD OF 

EDUCATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GLENN CIRIPOMPA,

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued November 9, 2016 – Decided February 21, 2017

On certification to the Superior Court, 

Appellate Division, whose opinion is 

reported at 442 N.J. Super. 515 (App. Div. 

2015)

Robert J. Merryman argued the cause for 

appellant (Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro & 

Murphy, attorneys).

Arnold M. Mellk argued the cause for 

respondent (Mellk O'Neill, attorneys; Edward 

A. Cridge, on the brief).

Robert A. Greitz argued the cause for amicus

curiae New Jersey School Boards Association 

(Cynthia J. Jahn, General Counsel, 

attorney).

JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court. 

In this case we determine whether an arbitrator exceeded 

his authority by applying the standard for proving a hostilework-environment, sexual-harassment claim in a law against 
2

discrimination (LAD) case to a claim of unbecoming conduct in a 

tenured teacher disciplinary hearing. We find that he did.

Defendant Glenn Ciripompa is a tenured high school math 

teacher, in the Bound Brook School District (District). The 

Bound Brook Board of Education (Board) charged defendant with 

two counts of unbecoming conduct. Reviewing under the Tenure 

Employees Hearing Law (TEHL), N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 to -18.1, the 

arbitrator determined that the Board failed to prove that the 

conduct charged in the second count met the four-prong hostile 

work environment test set forth in Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 

132 N.J. 587, 603-04 (1993). 

The arbitrator impermissibly converted the second charge

into one of sexual harassment. Accordingly, we reverse the 

judgment of the Appellate Division and remand for arbitration 

with a new arbitrator to determine whether defendant committed 

unbecoming conduct, and any appropriate penalty.

I.

We distill the following pertinent facts from the record. 

Defendant’s behavior came under Board scrutiny after the Board 

received copies of student Twitter posts alleging “Mr. C” was 

electronically transmitting nude photographs. An investigation 

uncovered defendant’s pervasive misuse of his District-issued 

laptop and iPad, as well as evidence of inappropriate behavior 

toward female colleagues, often in the presence of students. 
3

The results of the investigation spurred the Board to seek 

defendant’s termination from his tenured position and served as 

the substantive allegations of the two-count tenure complaint 

against defendant.

Count I of the complaint, unambiguously labelled “Conduct 

Unbecoming,” centered on defendant’s improper use of the 

District-issued laptop and iPad. The District’s policy 

prohibits “all employees and students using District computers, 

iPads and District networks” from accessing content for 

“illegal, inappropriate or obscene purposes, or in support of 

such activities.” The complaint alleged that defendant had 

“received and signed for a copy of the District’s acceptable use 

policy.” Evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing 

established that defendant used the devices, sometimes during 

work hours, on the District computer network to send explicit

pictures of himself and to seek similar pictures in return from 

various women on the internet. On the District-issued devices, 

defendant saved nude pictures and sexually explicit emails, sent 

and received by defendant, including negotiations for paid 

sexual services. 

Count II, without a specific label, set forth the following 

allegations:

1. Teaching Staff members in the Bound Brook 

School District, including Mr. Ciripompa, 

receive training with respect to appropriate 
4

conduct towards staff members and workplace 

harassment on an annual basis.

2. During the 2013-14 School Year complaints 

were received about Mr. Ciripompa’s 

inappropriate conduct towards female staff 

members.

3. Interviews of female staff members 

revealed that Mr. Ciripompa has repeatedly 

engaged in unprofessional, inappropriate and 

potentially harassing behavior towards female 

staff members.

4. On two occasions Mr. Ciripompa asked 

female staff members out on dates in front of 

students, thereby making the staff members 

very uncomfortable.

5. Mr. Ciripompa has repeatedly commented 

about the physical appearance and dress of 

female staff members, making them very 

uncomfortable.

6. Mr. Ciripompa sent flowers to a female 

staff member, using students to deliver the 

flowers, along with messages that the female 

staff member found to be inappropriate.

The concluding prayer for relief applied to both counts of 

the complaint. It stated that “the foregoing unbecoming conduct

warrants [defendant’s] dismissal from the Bound Brook Borough 

School District in accordance with N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10.”

In support of the charges, the Board produced physical 

evidence taken from defendant’s Board-issued computer and iPad, 

as well as testimonial evidence that defendant, in the presence 

of students, propositioned staff members to date him and 

commented on the physical appearance of female staff. Notably, 
5

defendant’s remark about the tight fit of a female teacher’s 

pants prompted a follow-up question by a student who was present 

when defendant uttered the remark. Defendant also used a 

student as his personal courier to deliver flowers and 

“inappropriate” messages to a colleague he was pursuing. 

In accordance with the TEHL, the Board determined by a 

majority vote that the evidence supported the charges and 

warranted dismissal. The Commissioner of Education 

(Commissioner) reviewed the charges and agreed they warranted 

termination. The charges were then submitted for review by an 

arbitrator, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16. The arbitrator found 

that the Board had proven the allegations underlying Count I but

dismissed Count II with prejudice, reducing the penalty from 

dismissal to a 120-day suspension without pay. 

The arbitrator began his analysis of Count II by noting 

that, “[w]hile the charges contained in Count II do not 

specifically state sexual harassment, it is clear from the 

nature of the allegations and the cited policy that this is in 

fact the case, as [defendant] has likewise recognized.” The 

arbitrator then announced that, under this Court’s decision in 

Lehmann, supra, 132 N.J. at 610, a successful claim for sexual 

harassment requires a showing that “working conditions were 

affected by the harassment to the point at which a reasonable 

woman would consider the working environment hostile.” The 
6

arbitrator emphasized that the subjective feelings of the female 

staff members were insufficient to establish a hostile work 

environment claim. He found that defendant’s conduct was not 

severe or pervasive enough to “modify the [female staff 

members’] behavior or routine in any material way.” While 

announcing that defendant’s “conduct cumulatively amounted to a 

shocking abdication of his professional responsibility” and 

“rais[ed] bad judgment to an art form,” the arbitrator found, 

contrary to evidence presented, that defendant “had no prior 

warnings” concerning misuse of the computer system. The 

arbitrator concluded that misuse of the District-issued 

electronics did not justify defendant’s removal from his tenured 

teaching position.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1(e), the District sought 

review in the Superior Court, Chancery Division. The court 

reversed the arbitrator’s decision, remanding it for a review 

before a new arbitrator. The court held that the arbitrator 

“erroneously changed the nature of Count II and imposed an 

inappropriate standard.” 

On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the Chancery 

Division’s decision vacating the arbitral award and reinstated 

the suspension. Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 442 N.J. 

Super. 515, 518 (App. Div. 2015). The panel found no error in 
7

the arbitrator’s application of the Lehmann standard to the 

charges proffered against defendant. Id. at 526.

We granted the Board’s petition for certification, limited 

to the issue of whether the arbitrator’s reliance on Lehmann in 

dismissing the Board’s second charge of inappropriate and 

unprofessional conduct supported vacating the arbitrator’s 

award. Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 224 N.J. 280 

(2016). We granted leave to the New Jersey School Board 

Association (Association) to appear as amicus curiae. 

II.

The Board urges this Court to reverse the judgment of the 

Appellate Division, contending that the arbitrator’s hostile 

work environment analysis was improper. The Board argues that 

there is a fundamental difference between charges of “unbecoming 

conduct” and “sexual harassment” and that the arbitrator 

improperly conflated the two to require the Board to prove a 

hostile work environment under Lehmann. 

In support of the Board’s position, the amicus Association 

maintains that the arbitrator lacked the authority to alter or 

rewrite the charges. The Association contends that the 

arbitrator should have limited his analysis to a determination 

of unbecoming conduct. The Association underscores the 

practical impossibility of trying to prepare and present 

appropriate evidence if “arbitrators [have] the ability to 
8

unilaterally change the charges presented.” Further, the 

Association asserts that requiring the Board to prove hostile 

work environment “would be anathema in a school setting.” It 

argues that schools would have no recourse against isolated but 

abhorrent incidents that would not rise to the level of a 

hostile work environment, yet would satisfy the standard of

unbecoming conduct. 

Defendant urges this Court to read the underlying facts of 

the count as predicated on allegations of sexual harassment 

sufficient to trigger a Lehmann analysis. Defendant highlights 

the Board’s own reliance on Lehmann during questioning of 

witnesses and on its references to the sexual harassment 

policies as indicative of the true nature of Count II -- sexual 

harassment. 

III.

“Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited.” 

Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass’n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 

N.J. 268, 276 (2010). “An arbitrator’s award is not to be cast 

aside lightly. It is subject to being vacated only when it has 

been shown that a statutory basis justifies that action.” 

Kearny PBA Local #21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979).

We therefore begin with a review of the circumstances under 

which a court may vacate an arbitral award and then consider 

whether this case merits such action.
9

A.

New Jersey’s TEHL provides tenured public school teachers

with certain procedural and substantive protections from 

termination. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 provides that no tenured 

employee of the public school system “shall be dismissed or 

reduced in compensation . . . except for inefficiency, 

incapacity, unbecoming conduct, or other just cause.” If the 

charges are substantiated, they are submitted for review by the 

Commissioner. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-11. If the Commissioner 

determines the tenure charges merit termination, the case is

referred to an arbitrator. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16. “The 

arbitrator’s determination shall be final and binding,” but 

“shall be subject to judicial review and enforcement as provided 

pursuant to N.J.S.[A.] 2A:24-7 through N.J.S.[A.] 2A:24-10.” 

N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1. Pursuant to the cross-referenced statutes, 

there are four bases upon which a court may vacate an arbitral 

award:

a. Where the award was procured by 

corruption, fraud or undue means;

b. Where there was either evident partiality 

or corruption in the arbitrators, or any 

thereof;

c. Where the arbitrators were guilty of 

misconduct in refusing to postpone the 

hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown 

therefor, or in refusing to hear evidence, 

pertinent and material to the controversy, or 
10

of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the 

rights of any party;

d. Where the arbitrators exceeded or so 

imperfectly executed their powers that a 

mutual, final and definite award upon the 

subject matter submitted was not made.

[N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.]

Here, the issue is whether the arbitrator impermissibly 

transmuted Count II’s allegation of unbecoming conduct into a 

charge of hostile work environment sexual harassment and thus 

measured the Board’s claim against an improper legal standard, 

namely the standard articulated by this Court in Lehmann, supra, 

132 N.J. at 603-04. This particular claim of error implicates 

subsection (d) of N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.

“[L]imits to the arbitrator’s authority . . . are defined 

by statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8,” as well as “by the questions 

framed by the parties in a particular dispute.” Local No. 153, 

Office & Prof’l Emps. Int’l Union v. Tr. Co. of N.J., 105 N.J.

442, 449 (1987). Indeed, an arbitrator’s award “should be 

consonant with the matter submitted. Otherwise, the 

determination is contrary to the authority vested in him.” 

Grover v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 221, 231 

(1979); cf. Trentina v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., 135 N.J. 349, 359 

(1994)(“If the arbitrators decide a matter not even submitted to 

them, that matter can be excluded from the award.” (quoting 
11

Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 129 N.J. 479, 

548 (1992))). 

The Third Circuit addressed “allegation[s] that the 

arbitrators exceeded their authority by resolving an issue the 

parties did not intend to submit” under 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(4), 

which is virtually identical to N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d), by 

considering “whether the arbitrators manifestly exceeded their 

authority in interpreting the scope of the parties’ 

submissions.” Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs., 

409 F.3d 574, 579 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1089, 

126 S. Ct. 1021, 163 L. Ed. 2d 852 (2006).

The Third Circuit described how courts review claims that 

arbitrators have exceeded their authority:

[A]rbitrators have the authority in the first 

instance to interpret the scope of the 

parties’ submissions in order to identify the 

issues that the parties intended to arbitrate. 

When confronted with an allegation that the 

arbitrators exceeded their authority by 

resolving an issue the parties did not intend 

to submit, we will review the arbitrator’s 

interpretation of the parties’ intentions 

under a “highly deferential” standard. 

Nonetheless, this deference is not a rubber 

stamp, and our review must focus upon the 

record as a whole in determining whether the 

arbitrators manifestly exceeded their 

authority in interpreting the scope of the 

parties’ submissions.

[Metromedia Energy, Inc., supra, 409 F.3d at 

579 (discussing Matteson v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 

99 F.3d 108, 112-14 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. 
12

denied, 546 U.S. 1089, 126 S. Ct. 1021, 163 L. 

Ed. 2d 852 (2006)).]

We agree that a claim that an arbitrator decided a legal 

question not placed before him or her by the parties is 

tantamount to a claim that the arbitrator “imperfectly executed 

[his or her] powers” as well as a claim that the arbitrator 

exceeded his or her authority within the meaning of N.J.S.A.

2A:24-8(d).

Having concluded that subsection (d) frames our review of

this matter, we turn to the substance of the Board’s claim.

IV.

We first review the standard applied to a claim of 

unbecoming conduct.

This Court has defined unbecoming conduct as conduct “which 

adversely affects the morale or efficiency of the [department]” 

or “has a tendency to destroy public respect for [government] 

employees and confidence in the operation of [public] services.” 

In re Young, 202 N.J. 50, 66 (2010) (alterations in original)

(quoting Karins v. Atl. City, 152 N.J. 532, 554 (1998)). We 

have also held that a finding of unbecoming conduct “need not 

‘be predicated upon the violation of any particular rule or 

regulation, but may be based merely upon the violation of the 

implicit standard of good behavior which devolves upon one who 

stands in the public eye as an upholder of that which is morally 
13

and legally correct.’” Karins, supra, 152 N.J. at 555 (quoting 

Hartmann v. Police Dep’t of Ridgewood, 258 N.J. Super. 32, 40 

(App. Div. 1992)). 

Even when the unbecoming conduct alleged has elements 

similar to those that might comprise a hostile work environment 

claim, this Court has explained that “[t]he absence of 

[harassment] evidence in this type of case is not critical. . . 

. [I]t is not necessary ‘for an employer to allow events to 

unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the 

destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking 

action.’” Karins, supra, 152 N.J. at 561-62 (quoting Connick v. 

Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1692, 75 L. Ed. 2d 

708, 723 (1983)).

Stated otherwise, proving hostile work environment is not 

necessary to satisfy the burden of showing unbecoming conduct. 

A charge of unbecoming conduct requires only evidence of 

inappropriate conduct by teaching professionals. It focuses on 

the morale, efficiency, and public perception of an entity, and 

how those concerns are harmed by allowing teachers to behave 

inappropriately while holding public employment. The Court has

made it clear that the failure of a school board to prove a 

different offense does not preclude a finding of unbecoming 

conduct. In Young, supra, for example, this Court permitted 

tenure charges of unbecoming conduct based on a student’s 
14

allegations of sexual abuse that were deemed unfounded by the 

Department of Children and Families (DCF). 202 N.J. at 68-69. 

We explained that although the “DCF might conclude that sexual 

contact between a student and his former teacher does not 

constitute abuse or neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c),” that 

determination “is a far cry from suggesting that it is not 

conduct unbecoming a school employee.” Id. at 69-70. 

Because claims of hostile work environment, sexual 

harassment and unbecoming conduct are governed by separate,

distinct legal standards and in separate, distinct legal 

contexts, we next turn to the specifics of this case to consider 

whether the arbitrator correctly determined that Count II of the 

Board’s complaint was properly subjected to the Lehmann

standard.

V.

Count II of the Board’s complaint claimed that defendant 

“engaged in unprofessional, inappropriate and potentially

harassing behavior towards female staff members,” and the coda 

to the complaint characterized the ground for termination, 

developed through both counts of the charges, as defendant’s

“unbecoming conduct.” The Board framed the issue before the 

arbitrator as follows: “Has the Board of Education established 

the Tenure Charges of conduct unbecoming by a preponderance of 

the evidence?” This language clearly demonstrates that the 
15

basis for the complaint was a violation of the District’s code 

of conduct by “engag[ing] in inappropriate language or 

expression in the presence of pupils.” The Board’s proofs in 

Count II focused on defendant’s repeated propositions of his coworkers in the presence of students, his inappropriate use of 

students as couriers to deliver flowers and inappropriate 

messages to colleagues he was pursuing, and his lascivious

comments, made in the presence of students, about a colleague’s

clothing.

While there is passing reference to defendant’s 

“potentially harassing behavior” in the charge, even a cursory 

reading of the complaint, and the underlying facts and evidence,

demonstrate that the basis for discipline was broader misconduct

of undermining the morale of his co-workers and behaving 

inappropriately when students were present. 

This count was premised on the Board’s assertion that 

defendant’s actions violated Board Policy Number 4281, which 

addresses “Inappropriate Staff Conduct”: 

School staff’s conduct in completing their 

professional responsibilities shall be 

appropriate at all times. School staff shall 

not make inappropriate comments to pupils or 

about pupils and shall not engage in 

inappropriate language or expression in the 

presence of pupils.

The Commissioner of Education has determined 

inappropriate staff conduct by a school staff 

member outside their professional 
16

responsibilities may be considered conduct 

unbecoming a public employee.

The arbitrator clearly recognized that the Board had proven 

inappropriate conduct when he found defendant’s conduct to be a

fundamental renunciation of his duties and obligations as a 

teacher that “raise[d] bad judgment to an art form.”

Despite that conclusion, the arbitrator found that the 

Board failed to prove Count II. The arbitrator quoted Board 

Policy Number 3362 -- “Sexual Harassment” -- and made only 

fleeting reference to the “Inappropriate Staff Conduct” policy 

in his discussion of Count II. The arbitrator then applied the 

Lehmann standard and found Count II to be unproven because the 

“complained of actions [did] not meet the generally recognized 

definition of hostile work environment sexual harassment and 

[did] not rise to that level.” 

There are settings in which sexual harassment claims may 

provide the underpinnings of an unbecoming conduct charge. This 

is not one of them. Count II of the complaint charges 

“unprofessional, inappropriate and potentially harassing 

behavior.” The arbitrator disproportionately focused on the 

“potentially harassing” allegation in his analysis, ostensibly 

disregarding the word “potentially” and the remaining charges in 

the sentence. The coupling of “unprofessional, inappropriate 

and potentially harassing” should have forewarned the arbitrator 
17

that this was not a harassment charge. Indeed, the inclusion of 

the word “potentially” reveals that the Board was not claiming 

harassment per se.

The explanation we espoused in Karins is instructive: it 

is not necessary “for an employer to allow events to unfold to 

the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction 

of working relationships is manifest before taking action.” 

Karins, supra, 152 N.J. at 561-62 (quoting Connick, supra, 461 

U.S. at 152, 103 S. Ct. at 1692, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 723). Surely, 

a school board must not be required to prove a “severe and 

pervasive” effect for every harassment-based offense that 

buttresses a charge of unbecoming conduct. As this Court 

explained in Young, a school district will not be hamstrung by 

failing to establish a claim beyond unbecoming conduct. 

Here, the arbitrator erroneously faulted the Board for 

failing to prove a charge that it did not bring. The arbitrator 

erred in his reliance on Lehmann because he imposed a different 

and inappropriate standard of proof on the Board to sustain its 

unbecoming conduct in the presence of students claim. The 

arbitrator “imperfectly executed” his power by misinterpreting 

the intentions of the Board so significantly as to impose a

sexual harassment analysis, when such an analysis was wholly 

ill-suited in this context. The Lehmann standards for hostilework-environment, sexual-harassment claims arise in an entirely 
18

different context -- under the New Jersey Law Against 

Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42. 

“The LAD was enacted to protect not only the civil rights 

of individual aggrieved employees but also to protect the 

public’s strong interest in a discrimination-free workplace.” 

Lehmann, supra, 132 N.J. at 600. In Lehmann, we established the 

standard for a cause of action for hostile work environment 

sexual harassment claims under the LAD. Lehmann, supra, 132 

N.J. at 592. This Court promulgated a four-prong test, under 

which the plaintiff must show that “the complained-of conduct:

(1) would not have occurred but for the employee’s gender; and 

it was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable 

woman believe that (4) the conditions of employment are altered 

and the working environment is hostile or abusive.” Id. at 603-

04 (emphasis in original). That standard, however, is not 

implicated in a termination hearing under the TEHL. None of the 

female employees affected by defendant’s actions are suing the 

District-employer for turning a blind eye to sexual harassment 

in the workplace. The instant matter is not an employee-versusemployer dispute that requires application of the Lehman 

standard. Indeed, that standard distorts the evaluatory method 

pertinent to this matter, making it inappropriate for 

consideration here.
19

The re-characterization of Count II erroneously tasked the 

Board with substantiating charges it did not file with evidence 

it did not proffer. The arbitrator’s review was not “consonant 

with the matter submitted,” Grover, supra, 80 N.J. at 231; 

rather, he “imperfectly executed his powers” as well as exceeded 

his authority by failing to decide whether Count II stated a 

successful claim of unbecoming conduct in support of 

termination. We find the arbitrator’s award invalid under 

N.J.S.A. 2A:41-8(d).

VI.

The judgment of the Appellate Division reinstating the 

arbitrator’s award is reversed, and the matter is remanded for 

arbitration with a new arbitrator to determine whether defendant 

committed unbecoming conduct, and any appropriate penalty. 

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, 

PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s

opinion.