If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re L. S. HOGAN, Minor. October 8, 2019

Nos. 347779; 347780

Jackson Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 17-003050-NA

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and JANSEN and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this consolidated appeal, respondent-mother (Docket No. 347779) and respondentfather (Docket No. 347780) appeal as of right the trial court’s order terminating their parental 

rights to their minor child, LSH, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood that child 

will be harmed if returned to parent). On appeal, mother and father both challenge the trial 

court’s determination that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate their parental 

rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Mother also challenges the trial court’s determination that 

termination was in LSH’s best interests. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In November 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) submitted a 

petition to the trial court. DHHS alleged that: (1) father physically assaulted mother in LSH’s 

presence; (2) mother took LSH to a river at 1:23 a.m. in an attempt to “baptize” her; and law 

enforcement found LSH naked and mother was later diagnosed with postpartum depression and 

psychosis; and (3) mother tested positive for methamphetamine four times and admitted to an 

investigator that she and father used methamphetamine while pushing LSH in a stroller. 

Thereafter, the DHHS additionally alleged that: (1) father left LSH without proper care and 

custody because he was incarcerated on domestic violence charges; and (2) mother stated that 

father provided her with illicit drugs, such as methamphetamine, that they used together.

In February 2019, after LSH had been in foster care for 15 months, the trial court 

conducted a termination hearing and terminated respondents’ parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(j). The trial court also determined that termination of respondents’ parental rights 

was in LSH’s best interests.
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II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

We review the trial court’s determination that a statutory ground for termination has been 

established for clear error. In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). The 

petitioner bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence at least one statutory 

ground for the termination of parental rights. Id. In order for this Court to determine that the 

trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous, it must be “left with a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Long, 326 Mich App 455, 460; 927 NW2d 724 

(2018) (quotation marks omitted).

Termination is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) when “there is a reasonable likelihood, 

based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is 

returned to the home of the parent.” Hudson, 294 Mich App at 268 (quotation marks and 

alterations omitted).

A. RESPONDENT-MOTHER

Mother challenges the statutory ground for termination. She argues that she no longer 

had a substance abuse problem because she no longer used methamphetamine, she was 

complying and benefiting from the services provided, and more time was warranted for her to 

finalize the last few steps she needed to take in order to leave father.

In this case, the evidence presented at the termination hearing supported the trial court’s 

determination that there was a reasonable likelihood that LSH would be harmed if she was 

returned to mother based on mother’s conduct and capacity. Over a 15-month span, evidence 

regarding mother’s progress and treatment positively indicated that she had made improvement 

by only testing positive for methamphetamine once, finding a full-time job, participating in 

parenting classes, and locating Section 8 housing to become financially independent from father. 

However, the evidence also revealed that mother showed resistance to substance-abuse 

counseling, had been intermittently noncompliant, and failed to obtain a medication assessment. 

There was also evidence that, due to mother’s surroundings and association with people who 

used drugs, she was at risk of a relapse despite her current abstinence. This is particularly 

significant because the two incidents where mother put LSH in serious danger—mother’s 

attempt to “baptize” LSH and the domestic violence—occurred while mother was under the 

influence of methamphetamine. Thus, the potential for mother’s relapse demonstrated a 

reasonable likelihood that LSH would be harmed if returned to mother’s care.

The record also demonstrates that mother was resistant to the recommendation that she 

consider planning to care for LSH without father. Acknowledging that continuing the abusive 

relationship with father would likely cause her to lose LSH, mother said she wished to reconcile 

with father and attend couples counseling. Mother explained she did not wish to split up the 

family because the trial court had not ordered her to leave father. Recently, their relationship had 

been good as father was not controlling “so much.” Mother believed that they could stay 

together if they continued in services, noting that she was “not putting up with much anymore” 

regarding his “mental abuse” and “control.” If the relationship got too bad, mother planned to 

leave father.
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The record demonstrated that father remained emotionally abusive and mother blamed 

herself for upsetting him by discussing the incident of domestic violence during their couples 

counseling session in December 2018. Father had also enabled mother’s drug use and the 

domestic-violence incident occurred when both were under the influence of drugs. Mother was 

aware her relationship with father posed a risk to her as well as to LSH. At one point, mother 

testified that she would leave father to keep LSH, but then mother opted to remain with father.

The trial court found mother was “still making excuses” for and “still working on her 

relationship with” father, who was still “scary and threatening and emotionally abusive.” In light 

of this and mother’s long-term drug use, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that LSH 

would likely be harmed if returned to mother’s home. Consequently, termination of mother’s 

parental rights was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Hudson, 294 Mich App at 268.

B. RESPONDENT-FATHER

Father argues that the trial court improperly terminated his parental rights based on the 

one incident of domestic violence where he had otherwise shown compliance and improvement

and there was no evidence that he had ever harmed LSH. In fact, the trial court never required 

father and mother to part ways and, thus, it should not have terminated his parental rights on this 

basis. We disagree.

Contrary to father’s argument, the trial court did not improperly base its termination 

decision on father’s one reported incident of domestic violence or on his criminal record alone. 

See In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 165; 782 NW2d 747 (2010) (stating that a respondent’s criminal 

history alone does constitute grounds for termination, and “termination solely because of a 

parent’s past violence or crime is justified only under certain enumerated circumstances . . .” 

such as if a parent created an unreasonable risk of serious abuse or death of a child). Instead, the 

trial court provided multiple reasons for the termination of father’s parental rights. It found that 

father had been an “angry, defiant person [his] entire life.” Father had a significant criminal 

history starting from his youth and, after ten years in prison, was still angry. Father had a 

“pervasive pattern of disregard for and the violation of the rights of others.” The trial court also 

found that father made mother an “ongoing victim” for “years.” The trial court determined that

the testimony of the DHHS caseworkers demonstrated that father could not live without mother

and that LSH was only an afterthought to him. Thus, the trial court’s determination that father’s 

criminal history and history of being abusive was grounds for termination was based on more 

than just the single incident of domestic violence. Id.

Moreover, the trial court did acknowledge that father’s drug screens were negative for 

methamphetamine. Nevertheless, father’s mental health issues remained. The court understood 

that “it would take virtually every bit of strength” father had to “open up and talk to” the 

caseworkers and therapists in order to address his issues. Father acknowledged that he had 

mental disorders and should be on medications; yet, he refused to see a psychiatrist or 

successfully participate in counseling. The court stated that it did not see father benefiting from 

services. To the contrary, it predicted that father was never going to change his behavior and 

would continue to remain a danger. The trial court also noted that father had not even earned 

unsupervised visits. And, thus far, all of the training and services he had received failed to make 
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any difference in his life. Acknowledging the progress father had made, the trial court 

determined that termination was warranted because father presented a danger to LSH.

The trial court’s findings are supported by the record. Evidence regarding father’s 

treatment showed he had been attending therapy since October 2018, and was resistant to 

feedback. On multiple occasions, father simply walked out of rooms when people were trying to 

speak with him. This happened with DHHS caseworkers, at parenting classes, and even at 

couples counseling while discussing the incident of domestic violence. Notably, although there 

were not any incidents of domestic violence reported aside from the one that resulted in LSH 

being placed in protective custody, there was evidence father continued to be emotionally 

abusive toward mother. In fact, father denied he ever committed domestic violence until the day 

of the hearing. Father’s psychological evaluation confirmed he would be a danger to LSH if he 

was non-complaint with his medications. Yet, father failed to take medication and to see a 

psychiatrist for his mental disorders because he was afraid the medication would cause physical 

damage to him. Because father failed to address his mental health issues, he failed to remedy 

one of the conditions placing LSH in danger if she was returned.

Accordingly, the evidence and testimony presented at the termination hearing supported 

the trial court’s determination that, because father had a history of drug use and criminality; 

failed to address his mental health issues through medication; still had anger and abused and 

controlled mother; and was generally in the same position as at the time of removal, there was a 

reasonable likelihood that LSH would be harmed if she was returned to father’s care. Hudson, 

294 Mich App at 268. Because father does not challenge the trial court’s best-interests

determination, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by determining that termination 

of father’s parental rights was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).

III. BEST INTERESTS

Mother also argues that termination of her parental rights was not in LSH’s best interests 

because the trial court justified its decision based on LSH’s placement in a foster home, without 

addressing her bond with LSH.

“[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be 

proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 

(2013). This Court reviews the trial court’s decision regarding the child’s best interest for clear 

error. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).

“Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that 

termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” Id. When the 

trial court considers a child’s best interests, the focus must be on the child and not the parent. In 

re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87-88. “In deciding whether termination is in the child’s best 

interests, the court may consider the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the 

child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the 

parent’s home.” Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). A trial court can also 

consider the length of time the child is in foster care or placed with relatives and whether it is

likely that “the child could be returned to [the parent’s] home within the foreseeable future, if at 

all.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).
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Here, the trial court did not clearly err in determining that termination was in LSH’s best 

interests. The record demonstrated that LSH had been in the same foster home for most of her 

life. It was likely that mother would need to stay drug-free for a longer period of time before 

LSH could possibly be returned to her. Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42; Frey, 297 Mich 

App at 248-249. The trial court found that LSH was healthy, safe, and bonded to her foster 

parents. LSH looked to her foster parents to meet all her needs. In the foster home, LSH had

love, permanency, and stability. The foster parents wanted to adopt her. Olive/Metts, 297 Mich 

App at 41-42; Moss, 301 Mich App at 87-88.

On the other hand, while LSH had a bond with mother, she could not provide LSH with 

the safety, stability, and permanence she needed. Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42. 

Specifically, the record demonstrated that mother’s sobriety was new and she opted to continue 

to plan to parent with father despite recognizing the danger he posed to LSH.

Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that termination of mother’s

parental rights was in LSH’s best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ James Robert Redford 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen 

/s/ Anica Letica