Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JASON A. CHILDERS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Hulse, Lacey, Hardacre, Austin, Attorney General of Indiana

Sims & Childers, P.C.

Anderson, Indiana NICOLE M. SCHUSTER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JEREMY L. HOPKINS, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 48A02-1104-CR-342

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Dennis D. Carroll, Judge

Cause No. 48D01-1004-FA-60

February 22, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAKER, Judge 
Appellant-defendant Jeremy L. Hopkins appeals his conviction and sentence that 

was imposed for Dealing in Cocaine, class A. Felony. Specifically, Hopkins contends

that the evidence is insufficient because the State failed to prove that Hopkins was within 

1000 feet of a family housing complex for more than a brief period of time or that 

persons under the age of eighteen were within 1000 feet of the family housing complex at 

the time of the offense. Hopkins also maintains that the trial court abused its discretion 

by failing to find the fact that his imprisonment would cause undue hardship on his sixyear-old daughter as a mitigating circumstance and that his sentence is inappropriate in 

light of the nature of the offense and his character. Finding sufficient evidence and no 

other error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACT

On December 1, 2009, Anderson Police Detective Kevin Earley was parked on 

Morton Avenue conducting surveillance. At about 4:30 p.m., Detective Earley saw 

Hopkins driving a white Ford pull up and park across the street in front of a residence on 

Morton Avenue, opposite the flow of traffic. Another individual, Ryan Steffler came out 

of his residence and approached the driver’s side of Hopkin’s vehicle. At that point, 

Hopkins paid Steffler $20 for 0.12 grams of cocaine. Following the transaction, Steffler 

walked toward his residence.

Detective Earley exited his police vehicle and approached Steffler as Hopkins 

watched from his car. Detective Earley identified himself as a police officer and ordered
Steffler to stop. Steffler ran into his residence, and Detective Earley chased him inside. 

While Detective Earley was in the residence, he heard Hopkins drive away.

Steffler told Detective Earley that he had purchased the drugs from Hopkins and 

threw them under the Christmas tree. Detective Earley located the substance, which the 

Indiana State Police Laboratory later confirmed was cocaine. Steffler identified Hopkins 

in court and in a photo lineup as the individual from whom he had purchased cocaine.

On April 8, 2010, the State charged Hopkins with dealing in cocaine as a class A 

felony because it alleged that the drug transaction occurred with 1000 feet of the cottages 

of Anderson, a family housing complex. On February 22, 2011, following a bench trial, 

Hopkins was convicted as charged.

A sentencing hearing was conducted on March 21, 2011. Several witnesses 

testified as to Hopkins’s good character, work history, learning disability, and difficult 

upbringing, including spending time in foster care. The trial court found Hopkins’s 

difficult childhood and hearing disability to be mitigating factors and his criminal history, 

consisting of three felony convictions, ten misdemeanor convictions, and numerous 

arrests to be an aggravating factor. The trial court sentenced Hopkins to thirty years 

imprisonment, with five years suspended to probation. Hopkins now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

 I. Insufficient Evidence

Hopkins argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction 

 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court will neither
reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Baumgartner v. State, 

891 N.E.2d 1131, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We will consider only the evidence most 

favorable to the verdict and all reasonable inferences. Taylor v. State 879 N.E.2d 1198, 

1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Additionally, this court will affirm if there is probative 

evidence from which a jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Gray v. State, 871 N.E.2d 408, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

To prove that Hopkins committed a class A felony dealing in cocaine, the State 

was required to show that Hopkins knowingly or intentionally delivered the cocaine 

within 1000 feet of a family housing complex. Ind. Code 35-48-41-1; Appellant’s App. 

P. 137. The General Assembly has provided a defense to the enhancement which 

elevated Hopkins’s offense to a class A felony. More particularly, Indiana Code section 

35-48-4-16 provides that it is a defense if:

(1) a person was only briefly in, on, or within one thousand (1,000) feet of...a

 family housing complex... and

(2) no person under eighteen (18) years of age at least three (3) years junior to

 the person was in, on, or within one thousand (1,000) feet of the...family

 housing complex...at the time of the offense.

When a defendant raises this defense and supporting evidence is presented, the 

burden is on the State to disprove at least one element beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Gallagher v. State, 925 N.E.2d 350, 353 (Ind. 2010). This defense contains two 

components, namely, that the defendant was in the proscribed area “briefly” and the 

absence of children, both of which must exist for the defense to apply. Id. Our Supreme 

Court has defined “briefly” as “a period of time no longer than reasonably necessary for a 
defendant’s intrusion into the proscribed zone principally for conduct unrelated to 

unlawful drug activities, provided that the defendant’s activities related to the charged 

offense are not visible.” Griffin v. State, 925 N.E.2d 344, 349-50 (Ind.2010).

In Gallagher, the defendant was in the proscribed zone for as little as 

thirteen minutes. 925 N.E.2d at 353. Nevertheless, our Supreme Court concluded that 

this was not a brief amount of time, inasmuch as “the defendant was principally engaged 

in conduct related to unlawful drug activities clearly visible to anyone present.” Id. at 

355.

By contract, in Griffin, the companion case to Gallagher, our Supreme 

Court held that the State had not sufficiently rebutted the defense because it had failed to 

prove that the defendant was within 1,000 feet of a school longer than reasonably 

necessary to push his moped down the street while in possession of concealed drugs. 925 

N.E.2d at 350. Additionally, the State had failed to prove that there were children 

present. Id. Consequently, the defendant’s conviction was reduced from a class B felony 

to a class D felony. Id.

Here, like the defendant in Gallagher, while Hopkins was in the proscribed 

zone, he was primarily engaged in conduct related to unlawful drug activity clearly 

visible to anyone present. Indeed Detective Earley saw the transaction occur in 

Hopkins’s vehicle. Accordingly, the State sufficiently rebutted the first prong of the 

defense, and this claim fails.

II. Sentence
Hopkins makes two arguments challenging his thirty-year sentence. Hopkins 

contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Additionally, 

Hopkins maintains that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and his character and requests that this Court revise it pursuant to our authority under 

Appellate Rule 7(B).

A. Abuse of Discretion

Hopkins claims that the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing him.

Specifically, Hopkins argues that the trial court failed to find that his imprisonment 

would cause undue hardship on his daughter as a mitigating factor.

Initially, we observe that sentencing decisions rest within the trial court’s sound 

discretion and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of that discretion. Anglemyer v.

State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007) clarified on reh’g 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). A trial 

court may abuse its discretion by entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons 

for imposing a sentence not supported by the record, omits reasons clearly supported by 

the record, or includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. At 490-91.

As stated above, Hopkins argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing 

to find that his imprisonment would cause undue hardship on his daughter as a mitigating 

circumstance. While Hopkins’s witnesses mentioned that he had custody of his daughter 

and was a good father, this court has recognized that absent special circumstances, trial 

courts are not required to find that imprisonment will result in undue hardship. Reese v.

State, 720 N.E.2d 695, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Here, Hopkins did not 

demonstrate special circumstances such that his imprisonment was an undue hardship on 
his daughter. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to 

find hardship to Hopkins’s child as a mitigating factor.

B. Inappropriate Sentence

Finally, Hopkins argues that his sentence of thirty years with five years

suspended to probation for a class A felony dealing in cocaine is inappropriate in light of 

the nature of the offense and his character pursuant to Appellate Rule 7(B). When 

reviewing a Rule 7(B) appropriateness challenge, we defer to the trial court. Stewart v.

State, 866 N.E.2d 858, 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The burden is on the defendant to 

persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 

(Ind. 2006).

As for the nature of the offense, Hopkins entered the proscribed zone around the 

family housing complex for the purpose of dealing cocaine. The drug transaction 

occurred on the street in broad daylight, at 4:30 p.m., where Detective Earley clearly 

witnessed the transaction.

As for Hopkins’s character, at the time of sentencing, he had three felony 

convictions and ten misdemeanor convictions. Thus, it is evidence he has no respect for 

the rule of law and continues to reoffend. Therefore, in light of the nature of the offense 

and Hopkins’s character, he has failed to persuade use that his thirty year sentence is 

inappropriate, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

DARDEN, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.