NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

BELLA P., 

 

 Appellant, 

 

 v. 

 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, Y.D., 

Y.D., 

 

 Appellees 

 

 

__________________________________

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0141

FILED 9-15-2016

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD 510937

The Honorable Timothy Ryan, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Jeffrey M. Zurbriggen, P.C., Phoenix

By Jeffrey M. Zurbriggen

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant
2

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined.

T H O M P S O N, Judge:

¶1 Bella P. (grandmother) appeals from the juvenile court’s 

denial of her motion to intervene and her request to change physical 

custody of her two dependent grandchildren. Because grandmother has 

not shown the juvenile court abused its discretion, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Grandmother is the maternal grandmother of two young 

children adjudicated dependent after one of the children was discovered to 

have had multiple fractures of the legs which occurred during a seven to 

ten-day period. Parents denied the abuse and variously asserted the child’s 

injuries must have been caused by others, including hospital personnel and 

the rabbi who performed the child’s bris. They also alleged that various 

family members had been present in their home. The children’s biological 

parents’ parental rights were terminated in 2014 and that determination 

was affirmed on appeal in Rosabelle P. v. DCS, 2015 WL4455913. 

¶3 Between 2013-2015, the children lived in multiple family

placements, including with their maternal grandfather, the former husband 

of appellant grandmother. The children were removed from maternal 

grandfather’s care after grandfather allowed continued contact with the 

biological parents after the severance. He stated the children “should be”

with their mother. 

¶4 In August 2015, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) began 

the process to transfer the children’s physical custody to grandmother.

Grandmother had, just two weeks before, come from her home state of New 

York in order to adopt these children. Grandmother passed her home 

study. At that time, grandmother denied any prior contact with child 

protective services. 
IN RE: BELLA P.

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 The children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) objected to the 

placement with grandmother. One objection was the home study was not 

done on grandmother’s actual residence, as she was only in Arizona 

temporarily. The objection noted grandmother was staying in an 

apartment where several family members, including maternal grandfather 

and the biological parents, had previously lived. The GAL attached a copy 

of the DCS “Assessment for Kinship Foster Care” which included 

statements by grandmother that she did not believe the parents abused the 

children, but rather that the injuries had occurred during the child’s bris. 

Grandmother stated that her daughter was a “loving” mother and that DCS 

should not have removed the children from her care. The court was further 

reminded that several family member placements had not worked out, 

including placement with the maternal grandfather. The GAL advised the 

court that the children were currently in a prospective adoptive home and 

had bonded to that family. 

¶6 Before the transfer occurred, it came to DCS’s attention that 

grandmother had two prior substantiated interactions with the New York 

child protective services which she had failed to disclose. DCS successfully 

moved to stay the transfer. Grandmother filed a letter with the court 

admitting, and attempting to explain, her two prior contacts with New York 

child protective services.

¶7 Two weeks later, grandmother appeared at a scheduled 

placement report and review hearing. The court voiced concerns about the 

situation with the children being discussed on the internet and that there 

was a potential crowdfunding effort related to legal fees. Grandmother

denied “gossip” that she allowed their mother interact with the children. 

Grandmother was apparently escorted from the courtroom by deputies. At 

the hearing it became clear the placement family believed that their physical 

safety was at risk. The juvenile court advised the placement to obtain 

orders of protection against several of the children’s biological family 

members. 

¶8 Next, grandmother filed the instant motion to intervene and 

a request to change physical custody. She voiced concerns about the 

children’s current placement and, in her motion, provided the court with a 

criminal background search that had been done on one of the placements, 

included copies of Facebook pages, and had photos of the placement letting 

a child ride in the front seat while dropping the child at school. 

¶9 Oral argument was held solely on the motion to intervene. 

The request for change in physical custody was tabled until after the court 
IN RE: BELLA P.

Decision of the Court

4

determined if intervention was appropriate. The court stated that if 

intervention were allowed, an evidentiary hearing would be held on the 

issue of physical custody. Grandmother did not object. 

¶10 At oral argument, DCS advised the court that the 

Department’s record search indicated that the biological parents mailing 

address was still the same as the physical address listed for grandmother. 

DCS objected to grandmother’s private investigator conducting searches on 

the placement and standing in or around the placement’s yard to take 

pictures. The GAL advised the court of a report from the preschool that 

grandmother had caused a disturbance, apparently when asked for 

identification, that nearly required the police being called.

¶11 After taking the matter under advisement, and after review of 

the record, the juvenile court denied grandmother’s motion to intervene 

and for change in physical custody. This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

¶12 Grandmother sought permission to intervene pursuant to 

Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b).

1 That rule reads: 

Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to 

intervene in an action:

1. When a statute confers a conditional right to intervene.

2. When an applicant's claim or defense and the main action 

have a question of law or fact in common.

In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether 

the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 

adjudication of the rights of the original parties.

“Grandparents are among those people eligible to become guardian of a 

child found to be dependent” and, as such, a child's grandparents “should 

be allowed to intervene in the dependency process unless a specific 

showing is made that the best interest of the child would not be served 

thereby.” Bechtel v. Rose, 150 Ariz. at 73, 722 P.2d at 241; see A.R.S. § 8-

 

1 Although grandmother quoted Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) in 

her motion and brief on appeal, she does not assert intervention of right 

under that rule (as opposed to claiming permissive intervention under Rule 

26(b)).
IN RE: BELLA P.

Decision of the Court

5

514(B) (2014). We review the juvenile court's denial of grandmother’s

motion to intervene for an abuse of discretion. See Allen v. Chon-Lopez, 214 

Ariz. 361, 364, 153 P.3d 382, 385 (App. 2007) (citing Bechtel v. Rose, 150 Ariz. 

68, 72, 722 P.2d 236, 240 (1986)). 

¶13 On appeal, grandmother argues that she met all the legally 

required Bechtel factors for intervention and, citing Chon-Lopez, that she 

should have been allowed to intervene even if the juvenile court did not 

expect to eventually award her custody. Bechtel outlined several relevant 

factors which the court should consider prior to determining whether a 

grandparent should be allowed to intervene in a dependency matter. See

Bechtel, 150 Ariz. at 71, 722 P.2d at 239 (citing Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. 

Of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1974) (outlining factors generally 

relevant to permissive intervention)).

2 

¶14 The court here did find that grandmother met the threshold 

standard of Rule 24(b)(1), because there was a conditional right to intervene 

as a family member. However, after consideration of the facts in the case, 

 

2 Those factors are: 

the nature and extent of the intervenors' interest, their 

standing to raise relevant legal issues, the legal position they 

seek to advance, and its probable relation to the merits of the 

case. The court may also consider whether changes have 

occurred in the litigation so that intervention that was once 

denied should be reexamined, whether the intervenors' 

interests are adequately represented by other parties, whether 

intervention will prolong or unduly delay the litigation, and 

whether parties seeking intervention will significantly 

contribute to full development of the underlying factual 

issues in the suit and to the just and equitable adjudication of 

the legal questions presented.

To this end, grandmother asserts that, as she currently has no standing, her 

intervention would contribute to the full development of the underlying 

factual issues and that no other party will provide adequate representation 

of her position related to the stability, consistency, adoption and love for 

her grandchildren. She states that her intervention would actually shorten 

the litigation because she “will strongly pursue placement and adoption 

immediately.”
IN RE: BELLA P.

Decision of the Court

6

the court explicitly found grandmother’s intervention was not in the 

children’s best interests. The court stated grandmother

has consistently acted in a way that places in serious doubt 

her ability to: a) work honestly with the professionals 

involved in protecting the minor children’s best interests, b) 

consider the best interests of the children as paramount to the 

wishes and whims of the extended biological family, and c) 

protect the children from the biological parents, whose rights 

have been terminated. 

The court concluded “[i]ntervention would cause extensive delay and 

detrimentally impact the ability to provide permanency for the children, a 

goal that has already been delayed.” Following that, the court summarily 

denied grandmother’s request to change physical custody. 

¶15 This matter is not akin to Bechtel. In Bechtel, the court found a 

“paucity” of a record and “no indication at all as to why the [grandparent’s] 

motion was denied.” 150 Ariz. at 72, 722 P.2d at 240. Such is not the case 

here. This court did not “summarily” deny intervention, rather it made an 

“individualized determination” based on the evidence as to whether 

intervention was in the children’s best interests as required by Bechtel. See

150 Ariz. at 74, 722 P.2d at 242; see also William Z. v. ADES, 192 Ariz. 385, 

389, 965 P.2d 1224, 1228 (App. 1998) (a summary denial of intervention is 

an abuse of discretion).

¶16 Here, the court had the full severance record before it and had 

interacted with grandmother on more than one occasion. It had 

grandmother’s admission that she failed to disclose to DCS her two prior 

interactions with child protective services in New York—which 

grandmother dismissed as small matters that had occurred a long time ago. 

It knew that the biological family was close knit, with various relatives, 

including the biological parents, previously living in the same apartment 

grandmother listed as her current address. The court knew the biological 

parents appeared to still use that same address as their mailing address. It 

knew that the family had unsuccessfully put forward several family 

members to take the children, and it had removed the children from the 

care of the maternal grandfather, who’s apartment it was, because he 

allowed the biological parents contact with the children. It had the 

information that grandmother advised the DCS worker, that although she 

would keep the children away from their biological mother, she did not 

believe the parents caused the injury and they were “loving” parents. It 

saw the photos and documents she submitted with her motion to intervene 
IN RE: BELLA P.

Decision of the Court

7

demonstrating grandmother and her private investigator were watching 

the placement family. The court heard allegations that grandmother had 

caused a scene at the children’s daycare which had nearly resulted in the 

police being called and had seen her behavior in court. And, most 

importantly, it knew that there was a prospective adoptive family waiting 

to adopt the children. 

¶17 With all that knowledge and evidence, the court reasonably 

determined that grandmother, based on the evidence, was not likely to be 

cooperative or to protect the children from their biological family. It 

reasonably determined that additional delay resulting from intervention 

would detrimentally effect the children. The juvenile court, as the trier of 

fact, is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties’ 

demeanor, and judge the credibility of witnesses. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't 

Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 53 P.3d 203 (App. 2002). We accept the juvenile 

court's factual findings “unless no reasonable evidence supports those 

findings.” Jennifer B. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 189 Ariz. 553, 555, 944 P.2d 

68, 70 (App. 1997).

¶18 Finally, grandmother argues that she requested and was 

entitled to an evidentiary hearing. DCS asserts both that the court did not 

need an evidentiary hearing in order to determine whether intervention 

should be granted and that grandmother assented to oral argument on 

intervention. We agree. The court had sufficient evidence to make this best 

interests determination, even if grandmother had objected to the lack of an 

evidentiary hearing. 

¶19 Given the extensive record in this matter, the court’s prior 

experience with grandmother, the extensive period the children have been 

in care and the need for permanency, grandmother has not shown the 

juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her motion to intervene. For 

these same reasons, we also find the juvenile court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying grandmother’s request to change physical custody. 

See Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 421, ¶ 11, 79 P.3d 667, 670 (App. 2003)

(a change in physical custody determination is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion). 
IN RE: BELLA P.

Decision of the Court

8

CONCLUSION

¶20 The juvenile court is affirmed.