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NORA LYNNE VALENTINE v. JOEL

ROBERT VALENTINE

(AC 35826)

Lavine, Keller and Borden, Js.

Argued February 7—officially released April 29, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Middlesex, Gould, J.)

Joel R. Valentine, self-represented, the appellant

(defendant).
Opinion

BORDEN, J. In this uncontested appeal, the self-represented defendant, Joel Robert Valentine, challenges

the financial orders entered incident to the judgment

of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff,

Nora Lynne Valentine. Although the defendant raises

several claims in this appeal, we need only address

those that we deem dispositive, namely, that the court:

(1) violated his right to due process by granting in part

the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and clarification without providing him notice and an opportunity

to be heard on the motion and its substance; and (2)

improperly issued excessive financial orders.1 We agree

with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse in part the

judgment of the trial court.

The trial court entered financial orders for child support, alimony, and property division incident to its judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. The plaintiff later

filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification of

those orders. The next day, the court granted in part

the plaintiff’s motion and entered additional financial

orders without holding a hearing. The defendant subsequently initiated this appeal challenging both the propriety of the court’s financial orders entered incident to

the judgment of dissolution, and the court’s decision

granting in part the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and clarification. The plaintiff filed notice with this

court, pursuant to Practice Book § 67-3, representing

that she did not intend to file a brief in the present

appeal. We therefore decide this case on the basis of

the defendant’s brief and oral argument before this

court, and the record available to us.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our review. The parties were married on July

8, 1990, and subsequently had two children. The parties’

relationship became increasingly contentious over the

years and in October, 2011, the plaintiff filed this complaint for dissolution of marriage. On May 20, 2013,

following a six day trial, the court, Gould, J., issued a

memorandum of decision dissolving the parties’ marriage and entering financial orders for child support,

alimony, and property division.2

On June 10, 2013, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment

motion for reconsideration and clarification with

respect to several of the financial orders set forth in

the court’s memorandum of decision. The defendant

received a copy of this motion on that same date. The

next day, June 11, 2013, the court granted in part the

plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and clarification

and entered several financial orders without holding a

hearing. In relevant part, it ordered the parties to share

equally in their minor children’s educational expenses,

specifically ordering them to divide the college

expenses of their older son. Additionally, the court
ordered the defendant to provide health insurance coverage to the plaintiff for three years at his sole expense,

and further, determined that the defendant was solely

responsible for the debt on the parties’ three credit

cards, totaling $20,783.55. The court also ordered the

defendant to pay the other debts listed in his financial

affidavit, which totaled $51,200. Finally, the court

ordered him to pay the mortgage arrearage at a rate of

$200 per week by way of immediate wage execution in

the form of alimony and child support.

The defendant thereafter moved the court to clarify

the difference between its orders of May 20, 2013, and

June 11, 2013, with respect to the $200 weekly payment

toward the mortgage arrearage.3 The court denied the

defendant’s motion for clarification with respect to this

inquiry. This appeal followed. Additional relevant facts

will be set forth as necessary.

I

We first set forth the well established standard of

review in domestic relations cases. An appellate court

‘‘will not disturb trial court orders unless the trial court

has abused its legal discretion or its findings have no

reasonable basis in the facts. . . . As has often been

explained, the foundation for this standard is that the

trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess

the personal factors significant to a domestic relations

case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tanzman v. Meurer, 309 Conn. 105, 113, 70 A.3d 13 (2013).

‘‘In dissolution proceedings, the court must fashion its

financial orders in accordance with the criteria set forth

in [General Statutes] § 46b-81 (division of marital property), [General Statutes] § 46b-82 (alimony) and [General Statutes] 46b-84 (child support). All three statutory

provisions require consideration of the parties’ amount

and sources of income in determining the appropriate

division of property and size of any child support or

alimony award.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Mensah v. Mensah, 145 Conn. App.

644, 652, 75 A.3d 92 (2013).

We next note that our review of financial orders

entered by a trial court in a dissolution matter is governed by the ‘‘mosaic doctrine.’’ ‘‘Under the mosaic

doctrine, financial orders should not be viewed as a

collection of single disconnected occurrences, but

rather as a seamless collection of interdependent elements. Consistent with that approach, our courts have

utilized the mosaic doctrine as a remedial device that

allows reviewing courts to remand cases forreconsideration of all financial orders even though the review

process might reveal a flaw only in the alimony, property distribution or child support awards.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Marshall v. Marshall, 119

Conn. App. 120, 135–36, 988 A.2d 314, cert. granted

on other grounds, 296 Conn. 908, 993 A.2d 467 (2010).

Accordingly, because we conclude that at least two of
the defendant’s claims challenging the court’s financial

orders have merit, the entire set of them must fall, and

a new hearing be held regarding them.

II

The defendant first claims that the court violated his

right to due process when it granted in part the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and clarification without affording him adequate notice and an opportunity

to object to the motion and to be heard on its substance.

We agree.

It is a fundamental tenet of due process that ‘‘no court

will proceed to the adjudication of a matter involving

conflicting rights and interests, until all persons directly

concerned in the event have been actually or constructively notified of the pendency of the proceeding, and

given reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard

. . . in sufficient time to prepare their positions on the

issues involved.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Styrcula v. Styrcula, 139 Conn. App. 735, 745, 57 A.3d

822 (2012). When a party moves for reconsideration of

the court’s financial orders, the court is constitutionally

required to provide the nonmoving party with the opportunity ‘‘to contest the factual predicate on which the

court apparently acted or to overcome those facts with

countervailing ones.’’ Bartley v. Bartley, 27 Conn. App.

195, 197, 604 A.2d 1343 (1992).

Here, the plaintiff filed her motion for reconsideration and clarification on June 10, 2013. The defendant

received a copy of the plaintiff’s motion either by e-mail

or fax on that same date, but he did not receive notice

of a hearing on it.4 The next day, the court granted in

part the motion and entered several additional financial

orders without holding a hearing or providing any

opportunity for oral argument.

In rendering its decision, the court significantly

increased the defendant’s financial obligations, ordering him (1) to pay for 50 percent of his minor son’s

college expenses, (2) to provide three years of health

insurance coverage to the plaintiff, (3) to pay $200 per

week toward the mortgage arrearage by way of immediate wage execution, and (4) to pay more than $70,000

in debts. Given the negligible time frame of less than

twenty-four hours between the filing of the motion and

entry of the court’s orders, the defendant did not have

sufficient time to object to the motion or to request a

hearing so as to ‘‘subject the factual determinations

underlying the . . . court’s [orders] . . . to the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing . . . .’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bartley v.

Bartley, supra, 27 Conn. App. 198.

We conclude that the court failed to provide the

defendant with adequate notice and a meaningful

opportunity to be heard on the plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration and clarification in violation of his con-
stitutional right to due process. Hence, because the

court’s financial orders dated June 11, 2013, were

entered in violation of the defendant’s right to due process, they cannot stand. See Styrcula v. Styrcula, supra,

139 Conn. App. 748.

III

The defendant next claims that the court abused its

discretion by entering financial orders that exceed his

weekly income. We agree. The following additional

facts are relevant to our resolution of this claim.

Following the six day trial, the court rendered a judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage and entering financial orders for child support, alimony, and property

division. Prior to setting forth its financial orders, the

court enumerated its findings with respect to the economic status of each party. On the basis of their financial affidavits, it determined that the plaintiff had a net

weekly income of $927.96, which was comprised of

alimony, child support, and payments from rental properties, and that the defendant earned a net weekly

income of $957.52 from his employment as a Web content professional. It further found that the parties were

co-owners of their marital home located in Woodstock

and three apartments located on the premises, which

the parties rented to third parties. It determined that

the marital home had a value of $330,000 and was

encumbered by a mortgage of $330,000. It also determined that ‘‘[t]he defendant, who was and is the sole

wage earner in the home, has not paid the mortgage

on the family home since October, 2011.’’

On the basis of its findings, the court entered several

financial orders on May 20, 2013. First, it ordered the

defendant to pay $300 per week in child support and

$300 per week in periodic alimony for fourteen years.

Second, it ordered him to transfer his rights, title, and

interest in the marital home to the plaintiff by way of

quitclaim deed, and further ordered that he assume all

future mortgage payments, costs, and fees associated

with the property. Third, it ordered the defendant to

make several other payments to satisfy prior outstanding court orders: ‘‘$928 for child support; $16,200 for

discovery noncompliance; $10,800 for parenting education noncompliance; $3250 for attorney’s fees; $31,992

for mortgage arrearage; and $2400 for outstanding utilities, for total payments due in the amount of $65,570.

. . . The child support and attorney’s fees shall be paid

within [ninety] days of the entry of judgment. The other

payments shall be satisfied at the rate of $200 per week

by [way] of immediate wage execution. In addition, the

defendant shall pay $10,000 toward the plaintiff’s trial

and trial preparation attorney’s fees within 120 days of

the entry of judgment.’’

The court also ordered the defendant to continue to

maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy, and to provide
health insurance for the plaintiff. With respect to uninsured medical expenses, it stated that the defendant

shall be responsible for 62 percent and the plaintiff for

38 percent of any such costs, pursuant to the child

support guidelines. Moreover, the court ordered the

parties to divide equally, by way of a Qualified Domestic

Relations Order (QDRO), any retirement accounts, 401

(K) plans, and pensions owned by the defendant, and

to share equally the costs of the QDRO preparation. It

also ordered the parties to share equally in any expenses

associated with their minor children’s extracurricular

activities. Finally, the court ordered that the parties be

solely responsible for any payments associated with

their respective motor vehicles, and, insofar as it did

not conflict with other orders within its decision,

ordered the parties to pay their own attorney’s fees,

costs, and trial expenses.

Contrary to the court’s claim that it considered the

pertinent statutory provisions, we conclude that the

court failed to consider the defendant’s ability to comply with its financial orders. After determining that the

defendant’s net weekly income was $957.52, the court

ordered him to make payments in excess of his financial

capacity. It imposed a weekly obligation of $600 toward

child support and alimony payments, and an additional

$200 toward prior court orders until he satisfied the

outstanding amount of $61,392. This $800 weekly sum

alone constituted more than 80 percent of the defendant’s net weekly income, and left him with a mere

$157.52 to satisfy his weekly living expenses. See Pellow

v. Pellow, 113 Conn. App. 122, 129, 964 A.2d 1252 (2009)

(holding that financial orders consuming more than 90

percent of defendant’s income were excessive).

In addition to those weekly payments, moreover, the

court ordered that the defendant was responsible for

$13,250 of the plaintiff’s trial attorney’s fees and $928

for outstanding child support. What is more, it ordered

him to maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy at his

sole expense, to cover 62 percent of any uninsured

medical expenses for the parties’ two minor children,

and to cover 50 percent of costs associated with their

minor children’s extracurricular activities. All of these

payments are in addition to the court’s order requiring

the defendant to pay his own attorney’s fees, costs,

and trial expenses—not to mention his personal living

expenses. Moreover, the court did not identify any valuable assets that the defendant could use to comply with

its financial orders.

In light of the foregoing, we agree with the defendant’s claim that the court’s financial orders were excessive, leaving him with little to no income to sustain his

basic welfare. See Greco v. Greco, 275 Conn. 348, 361,

880 A.2d 872 (2005) (support and financial orders that

consume defendant’s income offend ‘‘the long settled

principle that the defendant’s ability to pay is a material
consideration in formulating financial awards’’).

We conclude, therefore, that the court abused its

discretion in fashioning its financial orders. Accordingly, we remand the case for a new hearing on all

financial issues.

The judgment is reversed only with respect to the

financial orders and the case is remanded for a new

hearing on all financial issues; the judgment is affirmed

in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant additionally claims that the court improperly: (1) determined that he was responsible for the mortgage arrearage on the marital

home and improperly calculated the amount and form of such payment; (2)

assigned the plaintiff’s personal debt to him; (3) valued the marital home;

(4) violated the stay of appeal in ordering him to pay various fines and fees;

and (5) entered duplicitous orders with respect to the mortgage arrearage.

In view of our decision on the two dispositive claims, it is not necessary

to consider these other claims.

2 The court’s decision did not address issues of custody and visitation

because the court, Adelman, J., previously had approved an agreement

reached by the parties with respect to those matters.

3 Because the court ordered the defendant to pay mortgage payments at

a rate of $200 per week in both its decision dated May 20, 2013 decision and

its June 11, 2013 decision, the defendant requested clarification regarding

whether his required weekly payment toward the mortgage arrearage was

$200 or $400.

In this appeal, the defendant contends that the court’s order issued on

June 11, 2013, impermissibly duplicated its prior order issued on May 20,

2013. As previously stated, we need not address this claim given the dispositive nature of the claims discussed in the body of this opinion.

4 Because the plaintiff failed to defend this appeal, the defendant’s contention that he was not provided with adequate notice and an opportunity

for a hearing remains uncontroverted. Moreover, the records available to

this court on appeal support the defendant’s contention that he was denied

due process, as they indicate that the court granted in part the plaintiff’s

motion one day after it was filed, and there is no evidence that the defendant

had an opportunity to object to the motion or that a hearing took place as

to its substance.