Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson,*

 Lacy, 

Hassell, Keenan and Koontz, JJ. 

MICHAEL F. HAISLIP 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 962214 September 12, 1997 

SOUTHERN HERITAGE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

Buford M. Parsons, Jr., Judge 

 In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 38.2-2204 

requires an insurance company, which had issued an 

automobile liability insurance policy, to provide full and 

separate coverage to its named insured who was allegedly 

guilty of negligent entrustment of a vehicle, even though 

the insurer had already paid the insurance policy limits on 

behalf of a permissive user who negligently operated the 

insured vehicle. 

 Michael F. Haislip filed a motion for judgment against 

Raymond L. Goode and Tina L. Price to recover damages he 

incurred as a result of an automobile accident. Haislip 

alleged that Price negligently entrusted her car to Goode, 

who negligently operated the vehicle. 

 At the time of the accident, Price's car was insured 

under an automobile liability policy issued to her by 

Southern Heritage Insurance Company. Apparently, Goode did 

not have an automobile liability insurance policy, and 

Southern Heritage settled Haislip's claim against Goode and 

 

 *Justice Stephenson participated in the hearing and 

decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 

retirement on July 1, 1997. 
issued a settlement check to Haislip in the amount of 

$25,000, which Southern Heritage believes is the maximum 

amount of insurance coverage available to Haislip under the 

terms of the policy of insurance. 

 Subsequently, Southern Heritage filed a motion for 

declaratory judgment, asking that the trial court declare 

that: the maximum amount of coverage available to Haislip 

under the policy is $25,000; the policy had been exhausted 

by reason of the settlement paid on behalf of Goode and; 

Southern Heritage has no duty to defend or pay any amounts 

related to the claim Haislip made against Price. Haislip 

filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the 

maximum amount of coverage available to him under the 

insurance policy is $50,000. The trial court considered 

argument of counsel and entered an order denying Haislip's 

motion for summary judgment and granting Southern Heritage's 

motion for declaratory judgment. The trial court entered a 

judgment declaring that the insurance coverage available to 

Haislip under the insurance policy had been exhausted by the 

payment of $25,000 to him in settlement of his claim against 

Goode. Haislip appeals. 

 Haislip argues that even though the automobile 

liability insurance contract provided $25,000 of coverage 

per occurrence, Code § 38.2-2204 requires Southern Heritage 

to provide $25,000 of liability coverage to Goode and 

another $25,000 of coverage to Price. Haislip contends that 

Goode and Price are persons insured within the meaning of 
the policy and, as a result, Southern Heritage is required 

to provide a maximum of $25,000 of coverage to Price for her 

negligent entrustment of the vehicle and another $25,000 of 

coverage to Goode for his negligent operation of the insured 

vehicle. Continuing, Price asserts that Code § 38.2-2204 

"provides that all contracts of bodily injury liability 

insurance must contain a provision insuring the named 

insured, as well as any other person using the motor vehicle 

with the express or implied consent of the named insured." 

 Southern Heritage argues, however, that Code § 38.2-

2204 "was not created for the benefit of the insured, nor 

was it created in order to allow double recovery to the 

party who has suffered damage by the negligent use of the 

insured's car when operated by another with the owner's 

permission." Southern Heritage asserts that the purpose of 

Code § 38.2-2204 is to protect the injured party who has 

suffered damage "by allowing that party a single recovery 

under the insured's policy." 

 Code § 38.2-2204, commonly referred to as the omnibus 

clause, states in part: 

 "A. No policy or contract of bodily injury 

or property damage liability insurance, covering 

liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, 

or use of any motor vehicle . . . shall be issued 

or delivered in this Commonwealth to the owner of 

such vehicle . . . or shall be issued or delivered 

by any insurer licensed in this Commonwealth upon 

any motor vehicle . . . that is principally 

garaged, docked, or used in this Commonwealth, 

unless the policy contains a provision insuring 

the named insured, and any other person using or 

responsible for the use of the motor vehicle . . . 

with the expressed or implied consent of the named 

insured, against liability for death or injury 
sustained, or loss or damage incurred within the 

coverage of the policy or contract as a result of 

negligence in the operation or use of such vehicle 

. . . by the named insured or by any such person." 

(Emphasis added). 

 In deciding the meaning of the statute, we must 

consider the plain language that the General Assembly 

employed when enacting this statute. For example, we stated 

in Barr v. Town & Country Properties, 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 

S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990) (quoting Watkins v. Hall, 161 Va. 

924, 930, 172 S.E. 445, 447 (1934)): 

 "'While in the construction of statutes the 

constant endeavor of the courts is to ascertain 

and give effect to the intention of the 

legislature, that intention must be gathered from 

the words used, unless a literal construction 

would involve a manifest absurdity. Where the 

legislature has used words of a plain and definite 

import the courts cannot put upon them a 

construction which amounts to holding the 

legislature did not mean what it has actually 

expressed.'" 

Accord Abbott v. Willey, 253 Va. 88, 91, 479 S.E.2d 528, 530 

(1997); Weinberg v. Given, 252 Va. 221, 225-26, 476 S.E.2d 

502, 504 (1996); Dominion Trust Co. v. Kenbridge Constr. 

Co., 248 Va. 393, 396, 448 S.E.2d 659, 660 (1994). 

 Additionally, in interpreting Code § 38.1-381, the 

predecessor to the current omnibus statute, we stated that 

the omnibus statute "is by force of its provisions made a 

part of a liability policy, and is to be liberally construed 

to accomplish its intended purpose. However, . . . we must 

look to the words used in the statute to determine its 

meaning, and only the meaning of the statute as determined 
should be given effect." Grange Mutual v. Criterion Ins. 

Co., 212 Va. 753, 756, 188 S.E.2d 91, 93 (1972); accord City 

of Norfolk v. Ingram, 235 Va. 433, 437, 367 S.E.2d 725, 727 

(1988); Storm v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 199 Va. 130, 135, 97 

S.E.2d 759, 762 (1957). 

 We are of opinion that the plain language contained in 

Code § 38.2-2204(A) requires Southern Heritage to provide 

$25,000 of insurance coverage for any claim or judgment that 

Price may be legally obligated to pay to Haislip for claims 

arising out of the underlying automobile accident, even 

though Southern Heritage has already paid $25,000 to settle 

Haislip's claims against Goode. The plain language 

contained in the omnibus clause requires the Southern 

Heritage policy to contain "a provision insuring the named 

insured, and any other person using . . . the motor 

vehicle. . . ." 

 The General Assembly's use of the word "and" in Code 

§ 38.2-2204(A) means that Southern Heritage is required to 

provide insurance coverage to both Price, who is the named 

insured, and Goode, who was driving the motor vehicle with 

Price's consent. The word "and" is unambiguous. "And" 

means "along with or together with . . . added to or linked 

to." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 80 

(1986). Even though Southern Heritage's insurance policy 

contains a limitation of $25,000 per occurrence, that 

limitation, if applied, would violate the omnibus clause 

because once Southern Heritage paid the $25,000 to settle 
Haislip's claims against Goode, Price, the named insured, 

who paid the policy premiums, would not receive any 

liability insurance coverage. Thus, Southern Heritage's 

interpretation of its policy and the omnibus clause would 

render the word "and" used in the statute meaningless. 

 Accordingly, we will enter a declaration here that Code 

§ 38.2-2204 requires Southern Heritage to provide a maximum 

of $25,000 in coverage for any claim that Haislip may make 

against Price in addition to the $25,000 that Southern 

Heritage has already paid to settle Haislip's claims against 

Goode. 

Reversed and final judgment. 

JUSTICE COMPTON, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO and JUSTICE 

STEPHENSON join, dissenting. 

 The issue in this case, involving allegations of 

negligent operation by a permissive user and of negligent 

entrustment by a named insured, is whether the policy's 

liability limits are to be paid for each accident or for 

each act of negligence that may result in injuries to the 

claimant. 

 Of course, under the omnibus clause, Code § 38.2-

2204(A), the policy in question must contain a provision 

insuring the named insured "and" any other person using the 

insured's motor vehicle with the expressed or implied 

consent of the named insured against liability for injury 

sustained as a result of negligence in the operation or use 

of the vehicle. Manifestly, Price, the named insured, "and" 
Goode, the permissive user, were "insured" under the policy; 

the insurer was obligated to provide a defense to both Price 

"and" Goode and, if the policy's monetary limits had not 

been exhausted, to pay the claimant's damages upon 

establishment of legal liability. 

 But employment of the word "and" in the omnibus clause 

does not mandate or require payment of the policy's 

liability limits for each act of negligence, that is, both 

negligent driving and negligent entrustment. The insurer's 

policy unambiguously provided that "the limit of bodily 

injury liability . . . applicable to `each person' is the 

limit of the company's liability for all damages . . . 

arising out of bodily injury sustained by one person as the 

result of any one occurrence." Nothing in the omnibus clause 

annuls that policy provision. "Simply put, the liability 

limits are per accident, not per act of negligence. Any 

contrary interpretation of the policy language would be 

unfounded." Helmick v. Jones, 452 S.E.2d 408, 411 (W. Va. 

1994); accord Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Shutt, 845 P.2d 86 

(Kan. App. 1993). But see Iaquinta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 

510 N.W.2d 715 (Wis. App. 1993). 

 Accordingly, the maximum amount that the claimant 

Haislip may recover under the insurance contract is $25,000. 

 Thus, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in 

favor of the insurer.