Filed 1/26/22 P. v. Rouise CA2/1

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

NAKIA TERRELL ROUISE,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B312223

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. NA109605)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Daniel J. Lowenthal, Judge. Reversed and 

remanded with instructions. 

Nicholas Seymour, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________
2

Defendant Nakia Terrell Rouise pleaded no contest to 

possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction, possession 

of a firearm by a felon, giving false information to a peace officer, 

and driving a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license. The 

trial court sentenced Rouise to an aggregate prison term of three

years eight months. Before Rouise pleaded no contest to these 

offenses, the court denied his motion to suppress the evidence

forming the basis of the charge of possession of a firearm with a 

prior violent conviction.

On appeal of the judgment, Rouise challenges the trial 

court’s denial of his suppression motion. At bottom, Rouise 

claims that police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him in a 

business alcove late at night, and that the officers’ subsequent 

discovery and seizure of the weapon giving rise to the charge of

possession of a firearm with a prior violent conviction was the 

product of that illegal detention. 

We conclude the People failed to discharge their burden of 

establishing that the warrantless investigative stop was justified 

by reasonable suspicion, that is, specific and articulable facts that 

Rouise may have been involved in criminal activity. At most, the 

People demonstrated that, at the moment Rouise was seized, the 

detaining officers were aware that Rouise had sought to avoid 

contact with the police late at night in a high crime area. 

Because we conclude the trial court erred in denying the motion 

to suppress, we reverse the judgment and remand for further 

proceedings. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2020, the People filed a second amended 

information charging Rouise with possession of a firearm with a 
3

prior violent conviction, in violation of Penal Code1 section 29900, 

subdivision (a)(1) (count 1); possession of a firearm by a felon, in 

violation of section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2); giving false 

information to a peace officer, in violation of Vehicle Code 

section 31 (count 3); and driving a motor vehicle without a valid 

driver’s license, in violation of Vehicle Code section 12500, 

subdivision (a) (count 4).2 The People also alleged certain 

sentencing enhancements that are not relevant to this appeal. 

On October 19, 2020, Rouise moved to suppress the 

evidence forming the basis of count 1. The trial court held an 

evidentiary hearing on the motion on February 24, 2021. The 

court denied Rouise’s suppression motion on March 24, 2021.

Later on March 24, 2021, Rouise pleaded no contest to 

counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the second amended information. The 

court sentenced Rouise to an aggregate prison term of three years 

eight months, which includes the upper term of three years on 

count 1 and a consecutive term of one-third of the mid-term of 

24 months on count 2 (i.e., eight months). The court released 

Rouise from custody on the ground that the amount of his preimprisonment credits exceeded the sentence imposed. Rouise 

timely appealed the judgment. 

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

2 The second amended information alleged that count 1 

was perpetrated on a different date than when counts 2, 3, and 4

were purportedly committed.
4

FACTUAL BACKGROUND3

We summarize only those facts that are pertinent to this 

appeal.

Shortly after midnight on July 1, 2018, Long Beach Police 

Officer David Kasowski was on patrol when he saw a car that 

had paper license plates. He turned on his lights and sirens to 

stop the vehicle.4 The car continued driving and made two turns.

The vehicle came to a stop at Lemon Avenue and East 17th 

Street. When the car stopped, two Black men exited from the 

passenger’s side and fled north on Lemon Avenue. 

Officer Kasowski observed that one of the two men who 

took flight was wearing a flannel shirt and had long dreadlocks. 

Officer Kasowski remained with the driver of the car, radioed for 

3 We derive the Factual Background primarily from the 

undisputed portions of the parties’ appellate briefing that

summarize the evidence considered by the trial court in ruling on 

the suppression motion. (See Artal v. Allen (2003) 

111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 (Artal) [“ ‘[B]riefs and 

argument . . . are reliable indications of a party’s position on the 

facts as well as the law, and a reviewing court may make use of 

statements therein as admissions against the party. [Citations.]’ 

[Citations.]”].)

4 The Attorney General claims that Officer Kasowski had 

decided to stop the car for some unspecified traffic violation 

relating to the paper license plates. The Attorney General, 

however, fails to identify this alleged traffic violation. In any 

event, we fail to discern the relevance that the driver’s alleged 

traffic violation has on the instant appeal, especially given that

the Attorney General does not claim this unspecified violation 

supplied officers with reasonable suspicion to detain Rouise.
5

assistance, and reported that two Black men had fled, one of 

whom had dreadlocks. 

Officer Jeffery Conrad heard the call regarding a vehicle 

that was refusing to yield, and that two Black men, one of whom 

had dreadlocks, had fled the vehicle and were running north 

along Lemon Avenue toward Pacific Coast Highway.5 

Officer Conrad reached the area within minutes. He stopped at a 

convenience store, but did not see anyone who matched the 

descriptions provided over the radio. 

Officer Conrad continued driving east along Pacific Coast 

Highway, and saw a Black man, later identified as Rouise, round 

the corner at Lemon Avenue and “ ‘trot[ ]’ ” toward the police car. 

Rouise had something in his hand, which Officer Conrad later 

determined was clothing. Rouise, who did not have dreadlocks,

“dove headfirst into a business alcove.” 

Officer Conrad stopped his vehicle just before the alcove. 

No one else was in the area. Officer Conrad told his partner, 

Officer Banuelos, what he had observed. One of the officers 

turned on a spotlight and pointed it toward Rouise. Rouise was 

5 In the respondent’s brief, the Attorney General recites

the facts included in the textual sentence accompanying this 

footnote. Because Rouise does not contest those facts in his reply, 

we consider them to be undisputed. (See Reygoza v. Superior 

Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 514, 519 & fn. 4 [criminal case in 

which the Court of Appeal assumed that an assertion made by 

respondent was correct because “defendant did not dispute 

respondent’s claim in his reply”]; Rudick v. State Bd. of 

Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89–90 [concluding that the 

appellants made an implicit concession by “failing to respond in 

their reply brief to the [respondent’s] argument on th[at] point”].) 
6

laying on his side with clothing under his head, and appeared to 

be pretending to be asleep. 

Officer Banuelos exited the police car, drew his gun, and 

ordered Rouise to show his hands. Rouise rose to his feet and 

said, “ ‘For what? I didn’t do shit.’ ” Officer Banuelos grabbed 

Rouise’s shirt as Rouise tried to get away, and Rouise fell into the 

road. After a brief scuffle in which Rouise attempted to break 

free from the officers while he was on the ground, he was

subdued and handcuffed. 

Rouise was later carried into the back of a police car. 

About 15 minutes later, Officer Banuelos opened the car door, 

and he and Officer Conrad saw a blue revolver at Rouise’s feet.

The firearm was loaded with five rounds of ammunition. This

blue revolver found in the police car is the weapon giving rise to 

the offense alleged in count 1—i.e., the charge of possession of a 

firearm with a prior violent conviction. 

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law

“[W]hen defendants move to suppress evidence, they must 

set forth the factual and legal bases for the motion, but they 

satisfy that obligation, at least in the first instance, by making a 

prima facie showing that the police acted without a warrant. The 

prosecution then has the burden of proving some justification for 

the warrantless search or seizure, after which, defendants can 

respond by pointing out any inadequacies in that justification.” 

(People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 136 (Williams).) 

“ ‘[T]he controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings . . .

[is] proof by a preponderance of the evidence.’ [Citation.]” 
7

(People v. Flores (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 617, 626 (Antonino 

Flores).)

“ ‘ “An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a 

motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. 

[Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court 

(1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, 

and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the 

rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. 

[Citations.] ‘The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these 

inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.’ [Citations.] 

[¶] The court’s resolution of the first inquiry, which involves 

questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantialevidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which 

is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of 

independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, 

which is a mixed fact-law question that is however 

predominantly one of law, . . . is also subject to independent 

review.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255

(Ayala).) 

Under the substantial evidence standard, the trial “ ‘court 

is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 

resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and 

draw factual inferences . . . .’ ” (See People v. Reyes (2009) 

172 Cal.App.4th 671, 683.) This standard requires us to “accept 

all facts in favor of the ruling, including all reasonable inferences 

and deductions” from the evidence. (See People v. Castaneda

(1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1227 (Castaneda).)

A warrantless temporary detention constitutes an 

unreasonable seizure violative of the Fourth Amendment to the 

federal constitution unless it is supported by “reasonable 
8

suspicion.” (See Antonino Flores, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 626–628.) Reasonable suspicion exists if “ ‘at the moment of 

the detention, there were specific and articulable facts, which 

reasonably caused the officer to believe that (1) some activity out 

of the ordinary had taken place or was occurring or about to 

occur; (2) the activity was related to crime; and (3) the individual 

under suspicion was connected to the activity. [Citation.]’ 

[Citation.]” (See id. at p. 628; see also ibid. [“So long as the facts 

known to the officer reasonably cause him or her to suspect the

person he or she intends to detain might be or has been involved 

in criminal activity, the detention is lawful.”].) A court applying 

the reasonable suspicion standard must assess “ ‘the totality of 

the circumstances’ ” of the detention. (See id. at p. 627.) 

Officer Banuelos detained Rouise when the officer exited 

the police vehicle, drew his gun, and ordered Rouise to show his 

hands. (See People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 229 (Souza) [“A 

seizure occurs whenever a police officer ‘by means of physical 

force or show of authority’ restrains the liberty of a person to 

walk away.”].) It is undisputed that the police did not have a 

warrant to detain Rouise. The burden thus shifts to the People to 

show that Rouise’s detention was supported by reasonable 

suspicion. (See Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 136; Antonino 

Flores, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 626.)

B. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding the Police 

Reasonably Suspected Rouise Was Involved in 

Criminal Activity

In denying Rouise’s suppression motion, the trial court 

declared: “The totality of the circumstances that the defendant 

matched the general description of a person who took off on foot 

from a car that was evading police, and was observed, at the time 
9

and place of detention, close to where the car that was evading 

ultimately stopped; that there was no one else visible in the 

location in which the defendant was detained,

[6] and that his 

conduct was not consistent with innocent activities, specifically 

running down an empty street in the middle of the night, and 

then diving into an alcove and pretending he was asleep. [¶] So 

the court particularized an objective basis for suspecting that he 

had been engaged in some kind of criminal activity, and formed a 

basis for reasonable suspicion to detain.” 

We find tenuous the trial court’s conclusion that because 

Rouise was the only Black male found near the location of the 

traffic stop, Officer Conrad and Officer Banuelos reasonably 

suspected that Rouise was an occupant of the vehicle previously 

stopped by police. “[A] number of courts have rejected the notion 

that reasonable suspicion for detaining someone may be based 

6 Upon asserting that “no one else [was] in the vicinity” of 

Rouise’s detention and “[t]here were not even any other cars 

present,” the Attorney General notes “the trial court was also 

able to view body camera footage from at least one of the 

arresting officers,” and cites transcript excerpts showing that the 

trial court reviewed certain video clips. The Attorney General 

does not describe this body camera footage, let alone provide us 

with a copy of it. Accordingly, the Attorney General has not 

shown that this footage should have any impact on our review of 

the trial court’s ruling. (See Pack v. Kings County Human 

Services Agency (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 821, 826, fn. 5 (Pack) 

[“ ‘Although it is the appellant’s task to show error, there is a 

corresponding obligation on the part of the respondent to aid the 

appellate court in sustaining the judgment. “[I]t is as much the 

duty of the respondent to assist the [appellate] court upon the 

appeal as it is to properly present a case in the first instance, in 

the court below.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”].) 
10

upon vague or general descriptions”—e.g., race and sex. (See 

People v. Walker (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1388–1389.) 

Assuming arguendo the trial court’s factual summary were

accurate and that the officers reasonably suspected that Rouise 

was one of the two Black males who fled the car, these 

circumstances do not justify Rouise’s temporary detention. 

This description of the facts indicates the court found 

reasonable suspicion based solely on (a) Rouise’s alleged flight

from Officer Kasowski, and (b) Rouise’s attempts to avoid contact

with Officer Conrad and Officer Banuelos—i.e., diving into an 

alcove and pretending to be asleep. The former does not give rise 

to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because neither party 

suggests that Officer Kasowski “ordered [the two Black males 

exiting the vehicle] to remain where they were,” and they “had no 

obligation to stay put simply because police had shown up.” (See 

Antonino Flores, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 632.)

Although our high court has held that “flight from police is 

a proper consideration—and indeed can be a key factor—in 

determining whether in a particular case the police have 

sufficient cause to detain,” it has rejected the proposition that 

“flight alone, without other indicia of criminal activity, will 

justify an investigative stop by police.” (See Souza, supra, 

9 Cal.4th at pp. 235–239.) Indeed, the United States Supreme 

Court “has a long history of recognizing that innocent people may 

reasonably flee from police: ‘[I]t is a matter of common 

knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes 

fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended 

as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear 

as witnesses.’ . . . [Citation.]” (Antonino Flores, supra, 
11

38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 629–630, quoting Alberty v. United States

(1896) 162 U.S. 499, 511.) 

Additionally, the Attorney General does not claim the 

police reasonably suspected the two fleeing Black males were 

accomplices to whatever Vehicle Code violations the driver had 

committed. In fact, Officer Kasowski admitted that when he 

stopped the car, the two fleeing individuals “had not committed 

any driving infractions or any other crime . . . .” Accordingly, the 

trial court’s oral ruling does not establish “ ‘the detaining 

officers . . . ha[d the requisite] particularized and objective basis 

for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ 

[Citations.]”7 (See Antonino Flores, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 627.) 

7 By stating the police had “an objective basis for 

suspecting that [Rouise] had been engaged in some kind of 

criminal activity,” the trial court intimated that reasonable 

suspicion of criminality generally (i.e., the detainee is connected 

with some as yet unspecified crime)—as opposed to reasonable 

suspicion of a particular type of offense (e.g., possession of a 

weapon or a traffic violation)—is a sufficient justification for a 

warrantless temporary detention. A leading treatise on Fourth 

Amendment jurisprudence has noted that “the Supreme Court 

has never expressly ruled on this question, and the lower courts 

are divided on the issue.” (See 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure

(6th ed. 2020) § 9.5(c).) Because the party charged with justifying 

Rouise’s warrantless detention (i.e., the Attorney General) 

does not address this question, we need not discuss it further. 

(See Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 136 [holding that the 

prosecution has the burden of showing a warrantless search or 

seizure was justified]; Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 255 [noting 

that the trial court’s interpretation and application of the law is 

subject to de novo review]; see also Pack, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th 
12

C. The Attorney General Fails to Demonstrate that 

Rouise’s Detention Was Nonetheless Justified

The Attorney General raises several arguments to salvage 

the trial court’s ruling. First, the Attorney General contends that

“the officers knew that [Rouise] was carrying something in his 

hand which, among other things, turned out to be an 

incriminating traffic vest.” Even if the detaining officers initially 

suspected that Rouise had a weapon or contraband in his hand, 

Officer Conrad’s testimony demonstrates that suspicion was 

dispelled when he and Officer Banuelos “stopped slightly before” 

the alcove and Officer Conrad realized Rouise had actually been

carrying clothing. Furthermore, the Attorney General’s 

contention that the clothing “turned out to be an incriminating 

traffic vest” is predicated on the Attorney General’s assertions 

that Rouise had been carrying “a bright orange traffic vest” and

“Officer Conrad was made aware of an additional description of a 

man with an orange vest running through a backyard in the 

neighborhood from a 911 caller . . . .” Yet, as the Attorney 

General admits, Officer Conrad “was uncertain whether he heard 

[the report from the 911 caller] prior to, or after, [Rouise’s] 

detention.” The Attorney General has thus failed to direct us to

substantial evidence that at the time Rouise was seized, the 

detaining officers reasonably suspected that Rouise may have

committed a trespass in a backyard. (See Castaneda, supra, 

35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1227 [noting that the substantial evidence 

standard requires us to accept “all reasonable inferences and 

deductions” from the evidence, italics added].) Accordingly, the 

at p. 826, fn. 5 [explaining that the respondent has a duty to aid 

the appellate court in affirming the judgment].) 
13

supposed incriminating nature of the clothing in Rouise’s hand

cannot justify his detention. (See Antonino Flores, supra, 

38 Cal.App.5th at p. 628 [holding that reasonable suspicion 

supporting a warrantless detention must exist “ ‘at the moment 

of the detention’ ”].)

In the respondent brief’s factual summary, the 

Attorney General asserts that after the two Black males fled from 

the vehicle stopped by Officer Kasowski, “[t]he driver of the 

car . . . advised Officer Kasowski that he did not stop because he 

thought the two Black male subjects were armed, and they told 

him not to stop.” Yet, the prosecutor conceded during the 

proceedings below that this fact is not pertinent to our analysis 

because when Rouise was detained, that is, when

Officer Banuelos exited the police car, drew his gun, and told 

Rouise to show his hands, Officer Conrad and Officer Banuelos 

were not aware of the driver’s assertions. (See Antonino Flores, 

supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 627 [“ ‘Based upon th[e] whole picture 

the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective 

basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal 

activity,’ ” first italics added]; Artal, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p.

275, fn. 2 [holding that a party’s arguments may be deemed 

admissions against that party].)

The Attorney General further claims that Rouise’s evasive 

behavior—i.e., “ ‘running down an empty street in the middle of 

the night[ ] and . . . diving into an alcove and pretending he was

asleep’ ”—“was suspicious and . . . inconsistent with someone 

engaged in innocent activity.” As we explained in Discussion, 

part B, ante, our Supreme Court has held that although “flight 

from police is a proper consideration” in assessing the validity of 

a detention, “[n]o single fact—for instance, flight from 
14

approaching police—can be indicative in all detention cases of 

involvement in criminal conduct.” (See Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 

pp. 235, 239.) Thus, Rouise’s elusive conduct, standing alone, 

does not demonstrate his detention was proper.8

We also reject the Attorney General’s assertion that People 

v. Flores,

9 establishes Rouise’s evasive behavior justified his 

seizure. In Marlon Flores, Division Eight of this court upheld a 

trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress a gun, drugs, and drug 

paraphernalia that were discovered by officers after they had 

detained the defendant. (See Marlon Flores, at pp. 981–982, 

review granted.) Two officers encountered the defendant “at 

10:00 p.m. at night on a cul-de-sac known for its illegal drug and 

gang activity . . . .” (See id. at pp. 982, 986, review granted.) 

When the defendant saw the officers, he “duck[ed] behind a car,” 

and as “an officer approache[d] to see what [was] going on, the 

[defendant] remain[ed] crouched, with his hands out of sight and 

with his moving arms away from the approaching officer and his 

bright flashlight . . . .” (See id. at p. 986, review granted.) 

8 Similarly, we find unpersuasive the Attorney General’s 

assertion that Rouise’s “ ‘dive’ into the alcove” late at night placed 

“the officers at a tactical disadvantage” warranting his detention

because he was in “a position of cover.” In particular, the 

Attorney General does not explain how the officers supposedly 

remained at any such tactical disadvantage when, upon moving 

closer to the alcove, they were able to observe that Rouise was on 

the ground, apparently pretending to be asleep—i.e., he no longer

seemed to be in “a position of cover” vis-à-vis the officers.

9 Our Supreme Court has granted a petition for review of 

this decision. (See People v. Flores (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 978 

(Marlon Flores), review granted Apr. 21, 2021, S267522). 
15

“Despite the approaching light and noise [from the officer’s 

radio], the man continue[d] to face away from it, to move his 

arms, and to keep his hands out of the officer’s view.” (Marlon 

Flores, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 986, review granted.) The 

officers thereafter “ordered [the defendant] to stand and put his 

hands on his head[,] [and they] handcuffed [the defendant] out of 

concern for their safety”; “[o]ne officer [subsequently] checked 

[the defendant] for weapons.” (See id. at pp. 982, 986, review 

granted.) The defendant thereafter confirmed that the car he 

ducked behind belonged to him. (See id. at p. 982, review 

granted.) In the car, officers found a loaded and unlicensed gun, 

a bindle of what appeared to be methamphetamine, and a 

methamphetamine bong. (See ibid.)

In this case, although Officer Banuelos ordered Rouise to 

show his hands, there is no indication that Rouise was moving 

his limbs at all when the officers decided to detain him. Rather, 

Officer Conrad testified Rouise was “laying on his side with 

clothing under his head, pretending to be asleep” just before 

Officer Banuelos detained Rouise. Thus, unlike the officers in 

Marlon Flores, the detaining officers in the instant matter could 

not “point to specific articulable facts” giving rise to reasonable 

suspicion that at the moment they detained Rouise, he may have 

been drawing a concealed weapon and/or preparing to fire it at 

them. (See Antonino Flores, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 627 [“An 

investigative detention is legally justified ‘when the detaining 

officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in 

light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective 

manifestation that the person detained may be involved in 

criminal activity.’ [Citation.]”]; Marlon Flores, supra, 

60 Cal.App.5th at p. 989, review granted [noting that the 
16

defendant’s “moving his hands . . . . out of the sight of the 

approaching officer” supported the trial court’s finding of 

reasonable suspicion].)

We express no opinion as to the correctness of the Marlon 

Flores decision because it is distinguishable from our case. We do 

note that one of the justices on the panel dissented. (See Marlon 

Flores, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 990–994 (dis. opn. of 

Stratton, J.), review granted.) In that dissent, Justice Stratton 

wrote: “The majority’s overbroad view of what sort of conduct can 

be deemed suggestive of wrongdoing ignores applicable law and 

the realities of 21st century America. In the case of a person 

wary of police interaction, the majority’s approach leaves 

virtually no room for that person’s conduct to be deemed ‘normal’ 

and hence not suspicious.” (See Marlon Flores, at p. 990, review 

granted.) Justice Stratton further opined that “[t]he majority’s 

decision . . . threatens to subject people to [investigative] stops for 

commonplace conduct.” (See id. at p. 993, review granted.) 

The Attorney General also identifies two offenses that 

supposedly warranted the investigative stop: (1) “the officers 

were entitled to stop [Rouise] and detain him for an investigation 

of ‘Pedestrian on roadway’ in violation of Vehicle Code 

section 21956, subdivision (a)”; and (2) “the officers would have 

been entitled to investigate [Rouise’s] presence in the alcove, 

particularly given the late hour and considering that he appeared 

to have dove into it without any apparent business there, to 

prevent a burglary.”10

10 The Attorney General tacitly acknowledges the trial 

court did not rely upon either justification when it denied 

Rouise’s suppression motion. 
17

Regarding the first offense, the parties disagree on whether 

there was substantial evidence that “Officer Conrad saw a Black 

man round the corner at Lemon Avenue, coming westbound on 

the south side of Pacific Coast Highway in the middle of the street 

directly towards the police car.” (Italics added.) We need not 

resolve this factual dispute because regardless of whether the 

Attorney General has identified correctly Rouise’s location when 

the detaining officers first sighted him, the Attorney General has 

not directed us to any evidence showing Rouise was “walk[ing] 

upon [a] roadway outside of a business or residence district” such 

that Vehicle Code section 21956, subdivision (a) was applicable.11

In fact, Officer Conrad’s testimony suggests that the portion of 

the Pacific Coast Highway in which Rouise was trotting may 

have been in a “business . . . district” (see Veh. Code, § 21956, 

subd. (a)), given the officer acknowledged that “there [are] 

businesses on that side of” the highway. Further, the 

Attorney General does not argue that Rouise’s supposed presence

in the middle of the roadway gave rise to reasonable suspicion

that he perpetrated any other offense.

12

The Attorney General’s contention that “the officers would 

have been entitled to investigate” a potential burglary fares no 

better. The trial court found, and Officer Conrad’s testimony 

indicates, that Rouise “d[ove] into an alcove and pretend[ed] he 

11 Vehicle Code section 21956, subdivision (a) provides: 

“No pedestrian may walk upon any roadway outside of a business 

or residence district otherwise than close to his or her left-hand 

edge of the roadway.”

12 We also note the fact that Rouise dove into the alcove 

after Officer Conrad first saw him had eliminated any risk of 

collision that Rouise initially posed to the officers. 
18

was asleep.” Although this behavior evidences Rouise’s desire to 

avoid contact with the officers, it does not suggest he was about 

to enter a structure proximate to the alcove. (See § 459 [“Every 

person who enters any . . . building . . . with intent to commit 

grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.”].) 

While the Fourth Amendment permitted Officer Conrad and 

Officer Banuelos to investigate Rouise’s presence in the alcove by 

approaching him and “ ‘asking . . . if he [was] willing to answer 

some questions,’ ” (see People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 

328), they could not detain him in the absence of “specific 

articulable facts that . . . provide some objective manifestation 

that [he] may [have] be[en] involved in criminal activity.” (See 

Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 231.) 

Additionally, the Attorney General argues that “the officers 

knew that this was a high-crime area and that there had been 

two shootings, one of them a murder, within the last two days in 

that specific area,” and that they encountered Rouise late at 

night. Officer Conrad did testify that on June 28, 2018, a 

homicide occurred “in th[e] particular area” in which Rouise was 

detained, and that there was another “shooting in that same 

area” on June 30, 2018.13 Furthermore, we acknowledge that

“[t]ime, locality, lighting conditions, and an area’s reputation for 

criminal activity . . . may or may not suggest to a trained officer 

13 In the record excerpt cited by the Attorney General in 

connection with this argument, Officer Conrad did not describe 

the location of Rouise’s detention as a “high-crime area . . . .” 

Thus, it seems the Attorney General’s characterization of this 

area is based on Officer Conrad’s testimony that two shootings 

had occurred in the vicinity in the days preceding Rouise’s 

seizure. 
19

that [a] fleeing person is involved in criminal activity.” (See 

Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 239.) 

Entirely absent from the Attorney General’s analysis, 

however, are “ ‘specific and articulable facts, which reasonably 

caused the officer[s] to believe that . . . [Rouise] was connected to

the [criminal] activity’ ” Officer Conrad had identified—i.e., the 

shootings that had occurred in that area. (See Antonino Flores, 

supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 628, italics omitted.) It follows that 

the Attorney General has not shown these circumstances 

supplied the detaining officers with reasonable suspicion to stop 

Rouise. Were we to hold otherwise, officers could detain any 

person who was in that area at a late hour and had exercised his 

or her right to avoid having an interaction with the police. (See 

Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 241 [“ ‘[I]t may be fairly said that 

our entire nation is a high crime area[.]’ ”]; Antonino Flores, at 

p. 630 [“[L]ike flight, presence in a ‘high crime area’ is probative, 

but not sufficient on its own to justify a detention.”].)

Lastly, the Attorney General claims “the trial court 

correctly observed that the detention was not prolonged, because 

it was [Rouise] himself who caused it to persist by not complying, 

by attempting to run from the officers, and then fighting with 

them in violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1).”14 Rouise 

clarifies in his reply brief that he “does not dispute this finding,

or otherwise challenge the length of the detention,” and that he

14 Section 148, subdivision (a)(1) bars any person from 

“willfully resist[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing] any public 

officer[ or] peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to 

discharge any duty of his or her office or employment . . . .” (See 

§ 148, subd. (a)(1).)
20

instead maintains that “the initial detention was [not] supported 

by reasonable suspicion.” 

In sum, the Attorney General has failed to demonstrate 

that Rouise’s warrantless seizure comported with the Fourth 

Amendment. “[T]he Supreme Court [has] developed an 

‘exclusionary rule,’ which generally prohibits evidence obtained 

in violation of the Fourth Amendment from being used in 

criminal trials.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Marquez (2019) 31 

Cal.App.5th 402, 411.) The Attorney General does not argue that 

any exception to that general rule applies. We thus conclude that

the trial court should have granted the suppression motion and 

excluded the firearm seized by the officers that formed the basis 

of count 1. (See Pack, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 826, fn. 5.) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded to 

the trial court with directions to vacate its order denying 

defendant Nakia Terrell Rouise’s suppression motion, enter a 

new order granting the motion, and conduct further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J. CRANDALL, J.*

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.