J-A25026-16, J-A25027-16, J-A25028-16, J-A25029-16

2017 PA Super 17

MARGIE BLOOME, ADMINISTRATOR 

FOR DARON RHASHAWN 

TROLLINGER 

Appellant

v.

MORRIS ALAN AND HILLSIDE 

GARDENS, LTD.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 66 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County 

Civil Division at No(s): 03514 of 2014

MARGIE BLOOME 

Appellant

v.

ALAN MORRIS, EDWARDSVILLE 

ASSOCIATES, EDWARDSVILLE 

APARTMENTS MANAGEMENT, LLC, 

EDWARDSVILLE APARTMENTS, LP, 

EAGLE RIDGE APARTMENTS, INC.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 67 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County 

Civil Division at No(s): 3515 of 2014

MARGIE BLOOME 

Appellant

v.

SILVER STREET DEVELOPMENT 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 68 MDA 2016
J-A25026-16, J-A25027-16, J-A25028-16, J-A25029-16

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CORPORATION, EDWARDSVILLE 

APARTMENTS, LP AND HILLTOPEDWARDSVILLE, LP

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Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County 

Civil Division at No(s): 05985 of 2014

MARGIE BLOOME 

Appellant

v.

SILVER STREET DEVELOPMENT 

CORPORATION

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 69 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County 

Civil Division at No(s): 05986-2014

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2017

Appellant Margie Bloome, as administrator for the estate of the 

deceased, Daron Rhashawn Trollinger (“Mr. Trollinger”), appeals pro se1

from the December 15, 2015, order entered in the Court of Common Pleas 

of Luzerne County granting, in part, preliminary objections filed by Silver 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant filed four separate notices of appeal from the entry of the trial 

court’s December 15, 2015, order; however, for the ease of discussion, we 

have sua sponte consolidated the appeals. 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Street Development Corporation, Hilltop-Edwardsville, LP, and Edwardsville 

Apartments, LP, and dismissing Appellant’s amended complaint. After a 

careful review, we conclude the trial court’s December 15, 2015, order is not 

a final order, and accordingly, we quash the pro se appeals.

The record certified to us on appeal presents the following relevant 

facts and procedural history. On March 18, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se 

writ of summons against Alan Morris2and Hillside Gardens, LTD., and the 

matter was docketed in the lower court at 3514 of 2014. The record reveals 

that service of the writ of summons was attempted, but never effectuated, 

by the sheriff. See Sheriff’s Service and Affidavit, filed 3/19/14. 

On June 4, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se civil complaint naming solely 

as a defendant Silver Street Development Corporation, and the matter was 

docketed in the lower court at 3514 of 2014. In a two paragraph complaint, 

Appellant alleged that, as the owner of the Hilltop-Apartments in 

Edwardsville, Pennsylvania, Silver Street Development Corporation was 

negligent as it relates to criminal activity occurring at the property, which led 

to crimes occurring against Mr. Trollinger.3 

____________________________________________

2 The certified record is unclear as to whether the party’s correct name is 

“Alan Morris” or “Morris Alan.” 

 

3 As indicated infra, the record reveals that Mr. Trollinger was shot and killed 

at the Eagle Ridge Apartment building in Edwardsville. Moreover, after Mr. 

Trollinger’s death, someone who lived at the Hilltop Apartment complex 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Silver Street Development Corporation filed preliminary objections 

alleging Appellant’s complaint was not verified and lacked the requisite 

specificity.4 On April 27, 2015, the trial court held a hearing, and by order 

entered on April 30, 2015, the trial court granted Silver Street Development 

Corporation’s preliminary objections and directed Appellant to file an 

amended complaint within thirty days.

On May 21, 2015, Appellant filed an amended pro se complaint naming 

as defendants Silver Street Development Corporation, Hilltop-Edwardsville, 

LP, Edwardsville Apartments, LP, Edwardsville Apartments Development, 

LLC, Edwardsville Apartments Management, LLC, Eagle Ridge Apartments, 

Inc., and Silver Street Development Corporation et al (collectively, and for 

ease of discussion, referred to as “Appellees”). Appellant filed the amended 

complaint at lower court docket number 3514 of 2014. 5

In the amended complaint, Appellant alleged that Mr. Trollinger lived 

with Elishabah Marshall at the Hilltop Apartments in Edwardsville, and on 

May 16, 2012, at approximately 7:00 to 8:00 p.m., Mr. Trollinger went to 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

allegedly requested a replacement credit card to be issued in his name for 

one of his accounts. 

4

The preliminary objections are not included in the certified record; 

however, the preliminary objections were litigated at a April 27, 2015, 

hearing, the transcript for which is included in the certified record. 

5 Appellant filed two pro se amended complaints on May 21, 2015. The 

complaints are substantially similar, except the second amended complaint 

included as a defendant Silver Street Development Corporation et al. 
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the nearby Eagle Ridge Apartment building to visit someone. While he was 

outside of the Eagle Ridge Apartment building, Mr. Trollinger was attacked 

and lethally shot. 

Appellant averred Appellees were liable for the wrongful death of Mr. 

Trollinger by not deterring criminal activity at the Eagle Ridge Apartment 

building, as well as not installing surveillance cameras, proper door locks, 

outside lighting and/or proper fencing. Appellant further averred Appellees 

should have banned George Lee Barnes, who shot Mr. Trollinger and had a 

history of arrests in connection with other crimes occurring at the Eagle 

Ridge Apartment building, from coming onto the property prior to the 

shooting. 

Moreover, Appellant suggested that, after the shooting death of Mr. 

Trollinger, Elishabah Marshall, with whom Mr. Trollinger had resided, 

requested from Comerica Bank a replacement card in the name of Mr. 

Trollinger. Appellant suggested Appellees were liable for this fraudulent 

activity. Appellant ultimately sought five billion dollars in compensatory and 

punitive damages. 

On June 16, 2015, Silver Street Development Corporation, HilltopEdwardsville, LP, and Edwardsville Apartments, LP, filed preliminary 

objections to Appellant’s amended complaint. Therein, they sought to strike 

Appellant’s amended complaint on the following grounds: (1) lack of 

jurisdiction under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(1) due to the fact Appellant added 
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new parties (Hilltop-Edwardsville, LP, and Edwardsville Apartments, LP, and 

Silver Street Development Corporation et al) without the approval of the 

court; (2) failing to join indispensable parties, i.e., George Lee Barnes and 

Elishabah Marshall; (3) lack of capacity to sue and subject matter 

jurisdiction; (4) pendency of prior actions based on the same facts alleged in 

Appellant’s amended complaint; (5) failing to identify material facts upon 

which a cause of action is based and for insufficient specificity; and (6) in 

the nature of demurrer for failing to assert a cause of action. Alternatively, 

the preliminary objections sought to strike certain portions of Appellant’s 

amended complaint under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(2) due to scandalous or 

impertinent material. 

On July 10, 2015, Appellant filed an answer in opposition to the 

preliminary objections, and on September 9, 2015, the trial court held oral 

argument on the matter. Thereafter, by order entered on December 15, 

2015, the trial court granted, in part, the preliminary objections and 

dismissed Appellant’s amended complaint.6 Thereafter, Appellant filed four 

timely pro se notices of appeal. 

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6 Specifically, the trial court granted all averments set forth in the 

preliminary objections, except the trial court denied the motion to strike on 

the basis of the pendency of prior actions.
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Initially, prior to addressing the issues presented by Appellant, we 

must determine whether the trial court’s December 15, 2015, order is a final 

order. As this Court has recently held:

“The appealability of an order directly implicates the 

jurisdiction of the court asked to review the order.” Estate of 

Considine v. Wachovia Bank, 966 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Pa.Super. 

2009). “[T]his Court has the power to inquire at any time, sua 

sponte, whether an order is appealable.” Id.; Stanton v. 

Lackawanna Energy, Ltd., 915 A.2d 668, 673 (Pa.Super. 

2007). Pennsylvania law makes clear:

[A]n appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or 

an order certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); 

(2) an interlocutory order as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); 

(3) an interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P. 

312, 1311, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b)); or (4) a 

collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313).

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 defines “final 

orders” and states:

Rule 341. Final Orders; Generally

(a) General rule. Except as prescribed in 

subdivisions (d), and (e) of this rule, an appeal may 

be taken as of right from any final order of an 

administrative agency or lower court.

(b) Definition of final order. A final order is any 

order that:

(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or

(2) is expressly defined as a final order by statute; 

or

(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to subdivision 

(c) of this rule.

(c) Determination of finality. When more than 

one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether 

as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 

claim...the trial court...may enter a final order as to 

one or more but fewer than all of the claims...only 

upon an express determination that an immediate 

appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. 

Such an order becomes appealable when entered. In 

the absence of such a determination and entry of a 

final order, any order...that adjudicates fewer than 

all the claims...shall not constitute a final order[.]
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Pa.R.A.P. 341(a)–(c). [Thus,] [u]nder Rule 341, a final order 

can be one that disposes of all the parties and all the claims, is 

expressly defined as a final order by statute, or is entered as a 

final order pursuant to the trial court's determination under Rule 

341(c).

In re Estate of Cella, 12 A.3d 374, 377-78 (Pa.Super. 2010) (some 

internal citations omitted).

Instantly, there is no indication from the record that Appellant served 

the amended complaint upon Edwardsville Apartments Management, LLC, or 

Eagle Ridge Apartments, Inc. Furthermore, these parties did not file 

preliminary objections, have not been dismissed from this matter, and 

Appellant has not discontinued her case against them. 

Accordingly, until Appellant obtains the trial court’s determination of 

finality, acquires this Court’s permission to appeal per Chapter 13 of the 

appellate rules, or obtains leave of court to discontinue her case pending 

against various parties, we lack jurisdiction to entertain the appeals as 

filed.7, 8

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7 Appellant makes no argument that the December 15, 2015, order is 

expressly defined by statute as a final order. Likewise, she does not qualify 

the order on appeal as interlocutory as of right or collateral to the main 

cause of action. See Pa.R.A.P. 311; 313. Rather, she mistakenly suggests 

she is appealing from a final order, which dismissed all parties and all 

claims.

8 We note that, as indicated supra, Appellant filed a writ of summons against 

Alan Morris (or Morris Alan) and Hillside Gardens, LTD.; however, she failed 

to effectuate proper service of the writ, thus depriving the trial court of 

personal jurisdiction over them. See Cahill v. Schults, 643 A.2d 121 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appeals Quashed. Jurisdiction Relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/24/2017

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

(Pa.Super. 1994). Moreover, Appellant failed to name either party as a 

defendant in any ensuing complaint and, more particularly, Appellant did not 

include either party as a defendant in the amended complaint. Thus, there 

are no claims pending against them. See Brooks v. B & R Touring Co., 

939 A.2d 398 (Pa.Super. 2007). Additionally, although included as Appellee 

in the caption, the record is unclear as to when Edwardsville Associates was 

added as a party to this case in the lower court. Therefore, the trial court is 

directed to determine whether these parties should be stricken from this 

matter.