J-S01001-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.D., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2350 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered July 17, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): 51-FN-001411-2017, 

CP-51-DP-0001507-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.N.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.D., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2353 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree July 17, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): 51-FN-001411-2017, 

CP-51-AP-0000488-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2020

M.D. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree entered on July 17, 2019, that 

granted the petition filed by Philadelphia Department of Human Services 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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(“DHS”) to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her son, Z.D. a/k/a 

Z.N.D. (“Z.D.”).

1

 We affirm.2

The trial court summarized the procedural and factual history as follows:

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as

follows: [Z.D. was born in December 2016, and] has been in care 

continuously since June 6, 2017[, when DHS obtained an order of 

protective custody because the child lacked appropriate care and 

Mother could not be located]. On October 10, 2017, [Z.D.] was

adjudicated dependent and committed to DHS because [Z.D.] “is 

without proper care or control, subsistence, education as required 

by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, 

or emotional health, or morals.” [DHS filed the goal change and 

termination of parental rights petitions on July 2, 2019.] At a 

[combined goal change/termination] hearing held by this [c]ourt 

on July [1]7, 2019,[3] Jacob Kittel, the case manager[,] Turning 

Points for Children, testified that DHS first became aware of [Z.D.] 

and his family when a report was called in where [Z.D.] had not 

____________________________________________

1 By separate decrees entered the same date, the trial court involuntarily 

terminated the parental rights of any unknown father and putative father. No 

unknown father or putative father has filed an appeal or is a party to the 

instant appeals.

2 Mother also appealed the contemporaneous juvenile court order changing 

Z.D.’s permanent placement goal from reunification to adoption. On 

September 30, 2019, we consolidated the appeals sua sponte. However, since 

Mother neglected to oppose the goal change in the statement of questions 

involved section of her brief or present any argument related to the goal 

change in her brief, that claim is waived. See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 

n.3 (Pa.Super. 2011) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any 

discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the 

issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is

waived.”). Hence, we affirm the goal change order without further discussion.

3 Mother attended the hearing and was represented by counsel. Then twoand-one-half-year-old Z.D. was represented by a guardian ad litem and a child 

advocate. In addition to Mr. Kittel, DHS presented H.O., foster mother

(“Foster Mother”), as well as Exhibits DHS 1 through 3. The child advocate 

presented the testimony of Roya Paller, a forensic social worker, whose report 

was admitted as Exhibit C-1. Mother did not present any evidence.
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been seen by a doctor “from 17 days old to four months old.” It 

was also reported that [Z.D.] was born positive for marijuana. 

Based on those concerns, Mr. Kittel further testified that his 

agency established case plan objectives that remained constant 

throughout the life of the case. Mother’s single case plan 

[(“SCP”)] objectives throughout the life of the case were as 

follows: (1) attend CEU (“Clinical Evaluation Unit”) for a dual

diagnosis: (2) attend three random drug screen[s] prior to 

hearings; (3) attend supervised visitation at the agency; (4) 

attend ARC (“Achieving Reunification Center”) for employment, 

housing, and parenting; (5) attend NET West after she completed 

the dual diagnosis. In regards to Mother’s compliance with her

[o]bjectives, Mr. Kittel testified that Mother was non-compliant 

with her goals. Mother “did not attend a random screen until . . . 

April”. 

Mother was also offered supervised visits with [Z.D. during 

2017] at the agency but Mother hadn’t been consistently visiting. 

Mother’s last visit with [Z.D.] was on 1/23/19. Mr. Kittel testified 

that there ha[d] been 51 documented visitations offered 

throughout the life of the case and that “since 2017, [Mother] has 

missed a total of 27 of those 51 visits.” Mr. Kittel further testified 

that there doesn’t seem to be evidence of a bond between Mother 

and [Z.D.]. 

With respect to [Z.D.], Mr. Kittel testified that [Z.D.] refers 

to the foster [p]arent [-a preadoptive resource-] as Mom and that 

[Z.D.] is bonded with the foster parent. Mr. Kittel also testified

that [Z.D.] “has all the love and care” in the foster home, that “all 

his needs are being met,[”] [and that he] has [“]built . . . a 

relationship with his foster mother as well as his foster brother

. . . and . . . seems to [just] be [doing] extremely well” in that 

home. Mr. Kittel further testified that he believes that it would be 

in the best interest of [Z.D.] that Mother’s right[s] be terminated. 

Based on the foregoing testimony, this [c]ourt issued a[n 

order] changing the permanent plan goal for [Z.D.] to adoption, 

and [a decree] involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights 

under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ [2511(a)(1)], (2), (5), and (8), and finding, 

in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), that such termination 

best serves the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and

welfare of [Z.D.].

Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/19, at 1-3 (citations to record omitted).
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Mother filed timely notices of appeal and concise statements of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). She 

raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1) without clear 

and convincing evidence of [M]other’s intent to relinquish her 

parental claim or refusal to perform her parental duties.

2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2) without clear

and convincing evidence of [M]other’s present incapacity to 

perform parental duties.

3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(5) without clear

and convincing evidence to prove that reasonable efforts were 

made by [DHS] to provide [M]other with additional services and 

that the conditions that led to placement of [Z.D.] continue to 

exist.

4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(8) without clear 

and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to placement 

of [Z.D.] continue to exist when [M]other presented evidence of 

compliance with the goals and objectives of her family service 

plan.

5. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b) without clear 

and convincing evidence that there is no parental bond between 

[M]other and [Z.D.] and that termination would serve the best 

interest of [Z.D.].

Mother’s brief at 7.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and 
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credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or 

abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The 

trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely 

because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827. 

We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 

2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). As we previously stated, “The 

trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is 

likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the 

evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). Thus, “if competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we 

will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re 

Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 

The termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis of the 

grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under [§] 2511, the court must 

engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs 

and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the 
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child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have 

defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of 

Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm 

a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to 

any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s 

termination decree pursuant to § 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as 

follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

. . . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.
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. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), and (b).

With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), 

we have indicated,

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002)). Hence,

“[p]arents are required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably 
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prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities . . . [, and] . . . [a] parent’s 

vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the 

necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or 

disingenuous.” In re A.L.D., supra at 340 (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

In concluding that DHS presented clear and convincing grounds to

terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), the trial court 

stated as follows:

Applying [M.E.P.] and the elements set forth under [§] 

2511(a)(2) to the instant case, it is clear that DHS met their 

burden of demonstrating that termination was proper. The 

evidence established that “incapacity” and “refusal” under [§] 

2511(a)(2) existed given that Mother failed to demonstrate a 

concrete desire or ability to care for [Z.D.]

Mother failed to cooperate with her goals throughout the life 

of the case, including parenting classes and visitation. Parenting 

classes are important given that [Z.D.] was adjudicated 

dependent based on the fact that [Z.D.] was “without proper care 

or control”. Mother also failed to establish any stability in her life 

with regard to housing. Moreover, the evidence established that 

“neglect” existed given that Mother had missed most of the visits 

with her [c]hild. This [c]ourt found that [M]other’s failure to 

comply with her goals and consistently visit [Z.D.] has left [Z.D.]

without essential parental care, and the cause of such neglect, 

refusal and continued incapacity will not be remedied by Mother. 

Based on the foregoing, this [c]ourt found that competent 

evidence existed to justify the termination of Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to [§ 2511(a)(2)].

Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/19, at 7 (citations omitted).
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Mother argues that she has remedied the conditions that caused Z.D. to 

be placed in DHS’s care and has the present capacity to parent her son. 

Mother’s brief at 12. She asserts,

Mother, M.D., has documented a present capacity to care 

for her child. Mother has successfully engaged in the drug and 

alcohol program at NET W[est]. Mother has documented her 

continued sobriety by consistently provid[ing] negative drug 

screens at CEU and NET West. Mother completed the housing at 

ARC and has secured appropriate housing. Mother has completed 

the employment program at ARC and is gainfully employed. 

Mother has completed the parenting program at ARC, and most 

importantly, she is actively parenting [Z.D.]’s brother after 

reunification with him. No evidence was offered at the termination 

of parental rights hearing to indicate that [M]other lacks the 

present capacity to care for [Z.D.] Rather, [M]other has resolved 

the issues that contributed to the adjudication of [Z.D.] and his 

brother and has established her present capacity to parent both 

of her children. 

There are no grounds to terminate [M]other’s parental 

rights under [§ 2511(a)(2)] because there is no clear and 

convincing evidence of present incapacity and all conditions that 

contributed to her previous incapacity have been remedied.

Id.

As we outline infra, the certified record supports the trial court’s 

determination that statutory grounds for termination exist under 

§ 2511(a)(2). Stated plainly, contrary to Mother’s assertions, Mother failed 

to complete the objectives of the single case plan. 

As the trial court highlighted in the Rule 1925 opinion, Mr. Kittel testified 

that Mother’s objectives included attending CEU for a dual diagnosis and 

submitting random drug screens prior to hearings. After completing dual 

diagnosis, she was required to attend NET West, supervised visitation, and 
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ARC for counseling in employment, housing, and parenting. N.T., 7/17/19, at 

9. Mr. Kittel confirmed that Mother’s compliance with these objectives 

declined from “moderately compliant” on February 13, 2018, to “minimal[ly]” 

compliant on December 4, 2018, and “no compliance” on March 13, 2019. Id.

at 20-21. 

Mother initially failed to complete the CEU dual diagnosis assessment

during October 2017. However, following a subsequent order she eventually 

completed the assessment in April of 2018. Mother tested positive for 

cannabis during January, April, and September 2018. See DHS Exhibit 3. Her

court-ordered participation with NET West followed a similar path. While she 

ultimately completed the intake for NET West on April 4, 2019, and attended

intensive outpatient since that date, she was previously discharged from the 

program in 2018 for lack of attendance, and she failed to attend multiple 

random drug screens. N.T., 7/17/19, at 10-11, 13-14, 18-19. Specifically, 

Mr. Kittel reported Mother’s failure to submit twenty-eight random drug 

screens between August 28, 2018 and April 1, 2019. Id. at 15-16. Moreover, 

in February 2019, Mother gave birth to a second child who tested positive for 

marijuana. Id. at 16-17. 

With regard to ARC, Mr. Kittel related that Mother failed to satisfy the 

requirements of the ARC program. She did not complete parenting classes, 

and she lacked appropriate housing for Z.D. Mr. Kittle explained that Mother 

“resides in a home in which she has one bedroom where [she] and her . . .

newest-born baby . . . reside.” Id. at 9. The bedroom had space only for 
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Mother’s bed and a crib. Id. at 32-22. Moreover, as it relates to the 

employment component, despite holding different jobs as a cook since Z.D.’s 

placement, Mother was unemployed when the hearing occurred. Id. at 9-10. 

Lastly, as to visitation, Mr. Kittel explained that Mother was to have 

weekly supervised visitation with Z.D. at the agency. Id. at 19. He testified 

that, of the fifty-one total visits offered since 2017, Mother attended twentyseven. Id. at 19-20. Her last visit with Z.D. was on January 23, 2019, 

approximately five months before DHS filed its petition to terminate her 

parental rights. Id. at 19. Eventually, Mother was removed from the 

visitation schedule because she had missed three consecutive visits. 

The foregoing evidence belies Mother’s claim of compliance with the 

court-ordered services and substantiates the trial court’s conclusion that 

Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has 

caused Z.D. to be without essential parental control or subsistence necessary 

for her physical and mental well-being, and Mother cannot or will not remedy 

this situation. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra at 1272. Accordingly, 

we do not disturb it. 

We next determine whether the court erred in concluding that 

terminating Mother’s parental rights served Z.D.’s needs and welfare pursuant 

to § 2511(b). As to § 2511(b), our Supreme Court stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, 
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comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 

(Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], 

this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and 

welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between 

the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to 

discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as 

discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an 

easy task.

In re T.S.M., supra at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any bond 

between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 

(Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, § 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.” 

In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted). 

In finding that the termination of Mother’s parental rights served Z.D.’s 

developmental, emotional, and physical needs and welfare pursuant to 

§ 2511(b), the trial court reasoned as follows:

In the instant matter, this [c]ourt determined that [Z.D.]

would not suffer irreparable emotional harm if Mother’s parental 

rights were terminated. There was compelling testimony that 

[Z.D.] is not bonded with Mother. Mother failed to offer any 

evidence establishing the existence of a parent-child bond. The 

testimony demonstrated that [Z.D.]’s primary bond is with [his

pre-adoptive] foster parent and that the foster parent assist[s]

[Z.D.] with [his] daily needs. Additionally, in determining that 

termination would best serve the needs and welfare of [Z.D.], this 

[c]ourt considered that Mother had not been able to meet [Z.D.]’s 
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emotional, physical, and developmental needs, or provide [Z.D.]

with a healthy, safe environment for almost two years. 

Furthermore, this [c]ourt found Mother’s numerous missed visits 

creates a situation where she is unable to foster a meaningful and 

healthy parental connection. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/19, at 10 (citations to record omitted).

Mother argues that termination of her parental rights is not in Z.D.’s 

best interest since she and Z.D. have a “strong emotional bond,” and because 

termination would sever any relationship between Z.D. and his sibling. 

Mother’s brief at 14. Mother asserts,

Mother and her child have a strong emotional bond. Mother 

was [Z.D.]’s exclusive caregiver during the first 6 month[s] of 

[Z.D.]’s life. Mother breastfed [Z.D.], fed him, bathed him and 

nursed him back to health when he was ill. An indisputable and 

unbreakable bond between mother and child was formed during 

this formative period that was crucial to [Z.D.]’s development and 

well-being. Mother visited with her child after adjudication despite 

CUA’s failure to offer assistance with transportation. Mother only 

missed an average of 9 visits a year, often overcoming 

tremendous obstacles to attend visits. Additionally, termination 

of [M]other’s parental rights has destroyed the bond between 

[Z.D.] and [his sibling]. No evidence was presented at the 

termination of parental rights hearing to establish that destroying 

this fraternal bond would be in the best interest of the child. 

There are no legal grounds to terminate [M]other’s parental 

rights under [§ 2511(b)] because there was no clear and 

convincing evidence offered at trial to establish that termination 

would serve the best interest of [Z.D.]. Mother has established 

that a strong emotional bond exists between her and her child, 

and that she can provide for [Z.D.]’s needs. Termination of

[M]other’s parental rights would not best serve the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs of [Z.D.]. Mother

has a strong emotional bond with her child, and termination of 

[M]other’s parental rights would severely and irreparably harm 

[Z.D.] emotionally.

Id.
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Again, we discern no abuse of discretion. Critically, Z.D. has been 

placed in his pre-adoptive resource home since June 2017, when he was five

months old.

4

 N.T., 7/17/19, at 8, 25, 39-40. Z.D. is thriving in that 

environment, and he bonded with his Foster Mother, whom he calls mom, as 

well as his foster brother. Id. at 22, 24-26, 40, 47. Mr. Kittel stated, 

[Z.D.] has been residing in this . . . home since June of 

2017. For the majority of his life that he’s been there, he’s only 

known this home as his. He has all the love and care that he gets 

in the home. He’s up to date with medical and dental. All his 

needs are being met in this home. He attends child -- daycare. 

He’s built a relationship with his foster mother as well as his foster 

brother and seems to just be doing extremely well in this home.

Id. at 26. Further, when asked to describe how Z.D. and his four-year-old 

foster brother, [P.], get along, Mr. Kittel indicated, “Very, very well. . . . [Z.D.] 

follows [P.] around all the time.” Id. at 24. Moreover, Mr. Kittel testified that 

there is no bond between Z.D. and Mother, who had not visited in 

approximately five months at the time of the hearing. Id. at 22. While he 

observed a positive interaction between Mother and Z.D. in late fall/early 

winter 2018, but there is no evidence that the connection that Mother felt 

toward her son was reciprocal. Id. at 35-36. Accordingly, he opined that it 

would be in Z.D.’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 

23. He expressed that, while Z.D. would experience harm if separated from 

____________________________________________

4 We observe that the witnesses appear to incorrectly indicate that Z.D. had 

been in care since he was four months old. As Z.D. has been in care since 

June 6, 2017, he would have been in care since he was just over five months 

old.
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Foster Mother, he would not suffer any harm if Mother’s parental rights were 

terminated. Id. at 22-23.

Roya Paller, Z.D.’s forensic social worker, confirmed Mr. Kittel’s position 

that Z.D. does not know Mother. Id. at 49. She further testified,

[Z.D.] has been in the home since he was four months old. 

So, truthfully, it is really the only home he’s known. And because 

bond at that age is so important, the maintaining of the visits 

would seal the bond. And[,] because the visits have not been 

consistent, his bonding has been to his foster mother. 

Id. at 47. Ms. Paller similarly recognized that Z.D. would experience harm if 

removed from his current foster home. She stated, “[T]he thing is that he’s 

so bonded because this is just a functioning family home that the severing of 

that bond would cause undue trauma[.] . . . It would be removing a child 

from what child perceives as mother, brother, and home for no apparent 

reason.” Id. at 47. She ultimately opined, “I think it would be [an] 

unnecessary traumatic event to remove [Z.D.] from a very stable, loving 

home because it’s all he knows.” Id. at 49.

Thus, notwithstanding Mother’s protestations to the contrary, there is 

no evidence of “[a]n indisputable and unbreakable bond” between her and 

Z.D., that was formed during the first five months of the child’s life. Mother’s 

brief at 14. Likewise, the record is bereft of evidence that would demonstrate 

a bond between Z.D. and his sibling in Mother’s care. To the contrary, the 

certified record supports the trial court’s finding that Z.D.’s developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare favor terminating Mother’s parental 
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rights pursuant to § 2511(b) so that he can be adopted by Foster Mother. See 

T.S.M., supra at 267. 

While Mother may profess to love Z.D., a parent’s own feelings of love 

and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. 

In re Z.P., supra at 1121. At the time of the hearing, Z.D. had been in 

placement for approximately two years, almost his entire life, and he is 

entitled to permanency and stability. As this Court previously stated, a child’s 

life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the 

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a 

parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is 

converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s 

right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a 

permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 

(Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of 

discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Mother’s 

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b), and changed Z.D.’s 

permanent placement goal to adoption.

Decree affirmed. Order affirmed.
J-S01001-20

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/13/20