NOTICE
 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

CORRINA I. McCORD, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF ALASKA, 

Appellee. 

Court of Appeals No. A-10982 

Trial Court No. 3PA-10-1743 CR 

O P I N I O N 

No. 2537 — February 3, 2017 

Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer, 

William L. Estelle, Judge. 

Appearances: Callie Patton Kim, Assistant Public Defender, 

and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the 

Appellant. Mary A. Gilson, Assistant Attorney General, Office 

of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael 

C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. 

Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Hanley, 

District Court Judge.* 

Judge MANNHEIMER. 

Corrina I. McCord appeals her conviction for driving under the influence. 

McCord’s blood alcohol level was not over the statutory limit, but testing of McCord’s 

* Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska 

Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

blood showed that she had four different medications in her blood when she was driving. 

These medications were tramadol(a pain medication sold under the name Ultram, among 

others) and three members of the benzodiazepine family: quetiapine (also known as 

Seroquel), clonazepam, and 7-aminoclonazepam (a clonazepam metabolite, which is 

itself a separate benzodiazepine). 

McCord was charged with violating the first subsection of Alaska’s DUI 

statute, AS 28.35.030(a)(1). This provision forbids a person from operating a motor 

vehicle if they are “under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, intoxicating liquor, 

inhalant, or any controlled substance, singly or in combination”. (Emphasis added.) 

Even though McCord’s blood showed the presence of four medications, only one of 

these medications — clonazepam — is a “controlled substance” under state or federal 

law. 1 Thus, the State needed to prove that McCord was under the influence of 

clonazepam. 

In this appeal, McCord argues that the district court violated her Sixth 

Amendment right of confrontation by allowing the State to prove the presence of 

clonazepam through hearsay testimony. For the reasons explained here, we agree that 

McCord’s right of confrontation was violated, and we therefore reverse McCord’s 

conviction. 

Underlying facts, and the district court’s ruling 

At McCord’s trial, the State established the presence and the concentrations 

of the four substances in McCord’s blood through the testimony of Lisa Noble, a forensic 

toxicologist employed as an analyst at the Washington State Toxicology Lab. 

See AS 11.71.170(b)(5). 

– 2 – 2537
 

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Noble conducted the initial drug screening of McCord’s blood sample, and 

she performed the specific test that confirmed the presence (and the concentration) of the 

tramadol. But another analyst, Sarah Swenson, performed the test that confirmed the 

presence and concentrations of the three benzodiazepines in McCord’s blood — 

including the clonazepam. (Swenson performed this testing because Noble was not 

certified to conduct the benzodiazepine test.) 

Because Noble was the primary analyst assigned to McCord’s case, she 

reviewed Swenson’s test results, and she compiled the final lab report. This final report 

included the results of Swenson’s testing for benzodiazepines. In particular, Noble’s 

final report recited Swenson’s findings regarding the presence and concentration of 

clonazepam in McCord’s blood. 

At McCord’s trial, when the prosecutor indicated that Noble would testify 

about Swenson’s findings, McCord’s attorney objected that Noble should not be allowed 

to testify about the clonazepam in McCord’s blood, or about any of the other results of 

the benzodiazepine testing conducted by Swenson. The defense attorney argued that, 

because Swenson had done the testing, he was entitled to cross-examine Swenson about 

her findings. 

McCord’s attorney specifically relied on the United States Supreme Court’s 

decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, a case where a defendant was charged with 

trafficking cocaine. 2 In Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court ruled that, under the 

confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, the government was required to present 

live testimony from the laboratory technician who tested the substance at issue and 

concluded that it was cocaine. 

557 U.S. 305, 310-11; 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2532; 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009). 

– 3 – 2537
 

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But the trial judge concluded that Melendez-Diaz was distinguishable from 

McCord’s case. The judge noted that, in Melendez-Diaz, the government was trying to 

prove the presence of a particular substance (cocaine). According to the trial judge, 

McCord’s case was different because the State’s task was not to prove the presence of 

any specific substances, but rather to prove that McCord was under the influence of 

controlled substances. Thus, the judge reasoned, the presence and concentrations of the 

various substances in McCord’s blood was simply the underlying data that would 

provide the basis for Noble’s opinion as to whether McCord was impaired when she 

drove the motor vehicle. 

Relying on this analysis, the district court overruled McCord’s 

confrontation clause objection and decided that Noble could properly testify about all of 

the test results described in her lab report — including the results of the testing 

performed by Swenson, which showed the presence and the concentration of clonazepam 

in McCord’s blood. 

Why the district court’s ruling violated McCord’s right of confrontation 

To prove that McCord was guilty of driving under the influence as defined 

in AS 28.35.030(a)(1), the State had to show not only that McCord was impaired, but 

more specifically that her impairment was a direct result of her ingestion of “an alcoholic 

beverage, intoxicating liquor, inhalant, or any controlled substance, singly or in 

combination”. See Adams v. State, 359 P.3d 990, 994 (Alaska App. 2015). 

Of the various medications detected in McCord’s blood, the only controlled 

substance was the clonazepam. Thus, the State was required to prove that McCord’s 

impairment was a direct result of her ingestion of clonazepam. 

– 4 – 2537
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Swenson performed the testing that detected clonazepam in McCord’s 

blood. Noble was aware of the clonazepamonly because Swenson’s lab report described 

her test results. For this reason, Melendez-Diaz controls, and McCord’s attorney was 

entitled to cross-examine Swenson regarding the presence and concentration of 

clonazepam in McCord’s blood. 

Accordingly, the district court erred when it allowed the State to introduce 

this evidence through Noble’s testimony, and we must reverse McCord’s conviction 

because of this error. 

McCord’s motion for a judgement of acquittal 

During the trial, McCord asked the court to grant her a judgement of 

acquittal. McCord argued that even if the State validly introduced evidence of the 

presence and level of clonazepam in her blood, the State’s proof of the crime charged 

(driving under the influence) was still legally deficient. The trial judge denied this 

motion, and on appeal McCord renews her attack on the sufficiency of the State’s 

evidence. 

There are two aspects to McCord’s argument. 

McCord first argues that the State failed to present any evidence that the 

concentration of clonazepam found in her blood was capable of impairing her capacity 

to drive safely. 

As we have explained, under Alaska’s DUI statute, the State must prove 

that the driver was impaired and that this impairment was a direct result of ingesting 

alcoholic beverages, inhalants, or controlled substances. Of the four drugs found in 

McCord’s body, only one of them — the clonazepam — was a controlled substance. 

– 5 – 2537
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

McCord asserts that the evidence presented at her trial was legally 

insufficient to prove that the amount of clonazepam in her blood was capable of 

impairing her. This assertion is mistaken; the State did present evidence that the level 

of clonazepam found in McCord’s blood was capable of impairing a person’s ability to 

drive. 

Specifically, Noble testified that clonazepam affects the central nervous 

system in ways quite similar to alcohol: a person on clonazepam may exhibit slurred 

speech, difficulty with balance and walking, double vision, loss of finger control, and 

impaired judgement. Noble also testified that the concentration of clonazepam found in 

McCord’s blood was within the therapeutic range for that drug, and that therapeutic 

levels of clonazepam are sufficient to cause impairment. Although Noble declined to 

offer an opinion as to whether McCord was in fact impaired at the time of her driving, 

Noble testified that the symptoms of impairment which the police observed in McCord 

when they stopped her vehicle were consistent with the side effects of benzodiazepines. 

Because of Noble’s testimony on these subjects, the State’s case was legally 

sufficient to support a verdict that McCord was impaired as a result of her ingestion of 

clonazepam. This remains true even though Noble should not have been allowed to 

testify about the presence of clonazepam in McCord’s blood. 

Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held that, even 

in cases where a portion of the government’s evidence should have been excluded from 

a defendant’s trial, an appellate court must still consider the entirety of the government’s 

evidence — including the portion that should have been excluded — when the appellate 

court assesses the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. 

See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 39-41; 109 S.Ct. 285, 290-91; 102 

L.Ed.2d 265 (1988); Langevin v. State, 258 P.3d 866, 873-74 (Alaska App. 2011); 

Houston-Hult v. State, 843 P.2d 1262, 1265 n. 2 (Alaska App. 1992). In general, see 

– 6 – 2537
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LaFave, Israel, King, and Kerr, Criminal Procedure (4th ed. 2015), § 25.4(c), Vol. 6, 

pp. 841-45. 

In other words, even if particular evidence should have been excluded from 

the defendant’s trial, and even if the government’s remaining evidence was insufficient 

to support the defendant’s conviction, the double jeopardy clause does not bar the 

government from retrying the defendant if the entire evidence (including the evidence 

that should have been kept out of the trial) was sufficient to support the defendant’s 

conviction. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 39-40, 109 S.Ct. at 290. 

The reason for the Lockhart rule is that, had the State known that a portion 

of its intended evidence was inadmissible, the State might have restructured its 

presentation to compensate for the unavailability of this evidence. 3 In McCord’s case, 

for instance, the record shows that the prosecutor had made tentative arrangements to 

bring both Noble and Swenson to Alaska to testify, and that the prosecutor refrained 

from bringing Swenson to Alaska only after the district court ruled that Noble would be 

allowed to testify concerning all aspects of the Washington State Toxicology Lab’s 

testing (including Swenson’s test results). 

We therefore conclude that the State’s evidence was sufficient to allow the 

jury to conclude that the amount of clonazepam in McCord’s blood was capable of 

impairing her. 

The second aspect of McCord’s argument for a judgement of acquittal is 

her claim that, even if the State’s evidence was sufficient to show that the amount of 

clonazepam found in McCord’s blood could have impaired her ability to drive, the State 

nevertheless failed to prove that McCord’s impairment was due solely to the clonazepam, 

See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 42, 109 S.Ct at 291-92. 

– 7 – 2537
 

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as opposed to the other drugs found in McCord’s blood (drugs that were not controlled 

substances) and her unrelated physical condition at the time (e.g., her emotional state). 

When the trialjudge addressed this argument at McCord’s trial, he correctly 

perceived that the argument was not really an attack on the sufficiency of the State’s 

evidence, but was rather an argument about the law of causation. 

As we have explained, the State presented sufficient evidence to justify the 

conclusion that McCord was impaired as a result of her ingestion of clonazepam. But 

McCord argues that even if the clonazepam in her body could have impaired her ability 

to drive, the State nevertheless was required to prove that her impairment was due solely 

to the clonazepam. 

This contention is incorrect. As this Court explained in Adams v. State, 359 

P.3d 990, 994 (Alaska App. 2015), when a defendant is prosecuted for driving under the 

influence, Alaska law does not require the State to prove that the alcohol or controlled 

substances in the defendant’s body were the sole cause of the defendant’s impairment — 

only that the alcohol or controlled substances were a “substantial factor” in causing the 

defendant’s impairment. Ibid. 

Thus, McCord is wrong when she argues that the State was required to 

show that the other substances in her blood played no role in causing her impairment. 

The jury could properly find that McCord was under the influence of clonazepam even 

if the jurors believed that the other substances in her blood, or her unrelated physical 

condition, also contributed in some manner to her impairment, so long as the jurors were 

convinced that McCord’s ingestion of clonazepam was a substantial factor in causing her 

impairment. 

Accordingly, the trial judge correctly denied McCord’s motion for a 

judgement of acquittal. 

– 8 – 2537
 
 

Conclusion 

McCord’s conviction is REVERSED, but McCord can be retried. 

– 9 – 2537