Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JOEL M. SCHUMM GREGORY F. ZOELLER

MATTHEW P. HAYES Attorney General of Indiana

Certified Legal Intern

Appellate Clinic RICHARD C. WEBSTER

Indiana University Robert H. McKinney Deputy Attorney General

School of Law Indianapolis, Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

DARVELLE WHITE, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1307-CR-623

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Amy Barbar, Magistrate

Cause No. 49F19-1208-CM-53777

April 2, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CRONE, Judge
2

Darvelle White challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction 

for class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”). We affirm.

The facts most favorable to the jury’s verdict are that at approximately 1:50 a.m. on 

August 5, 2012, Beech Grove Police Officer David Parker was driving westbound in a

residential neighborhood when he saw a two-door car traveling eastbound at approximately 

twice the legal speed limit. As Officer Parker turned his vehicle around to stop the car for 

speeding, he saw the car pull to the side of the street and park. Within three seconds after the 

car stopped, White exited the driver’s-side door with keys1in his hand, staggered, and 

“hurried to the other side of the street[.]” Tr. at 39. Officer Parker ordered him to stop. 

White, who lived on that street, asked the officer why he was “bothering him” and said, “I’m 

not driving any more, why are you stopping me[?]” Id. White’s breath smelled of alcoholic 

beverage, his speech was “thick and slurred[,]” and his eyes were “watery.” Id. at 40. White 

was uncooperative, so Officer Parker handcuffed him and called for assistance. Officer 

Parker noticed a female sitting in the car’s front passenger seat. When Major Tom Hurrle 

arrived, Officer Parker administered three sobriety tests to White, which he failed. Major 

Hurrle administered a portable breath test, which detected alcohol. Officer Parker arrested 

White for OWI.

 

1

 The State says that “Officer Parker observed that [White] was holding his car keys.” Appellee’s Br. 

at 3 (citing Tr. at 40). In fact, Officer Parker testified that he “didn’t confirm” that the keys were White’s car 

keys, Tr. at 78, and White claimed that they were his house keys, which were not attached to his car keys. Id. 

at 163. Although the jury was entitled to disbelieve White’s testimony and draw the reasonable inference that 

he was holding his car keys, we caution the State to avoid misrepresenting the record.
3

White refused to take a chemical breath test, so Officer Parker obtained a warrant for a 

blood draw, which was performed at a hospital. As Officer Parker was transporting White 

from the hospital to the arrestee processing center, White said that he “just could not 

understand why [the officer] was wasting [his] time on him, when there [were] other 

robberies and other more serious crimes. [White] was already parked and he wasn’t driving 

any more.” Id. at 59. According to Officer Parker, White “never said that he wasn’t driving. 

He said that now he was done driving [the officer] shouldn’t be wasting [his] time on him.” 

Id. at 77. At the processing center, White became unruly and had to be subdued by several 

officers. The blood draw revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.16 percent. The State 

charged White with class A misdemeanor OWI and class A misdemeanor resisting law 

enforcement. At trial, White claimed that his passenger had driven the car and that he had 

exited the car from the back seat. The jury found him guilty as charged.

On appeal, White challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his OWI 

conviction, claiming that the State failed to prove that he was the driver of the car. Our 

standard of review is well settled.

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither 

reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Instead, we will 

consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be 

drawn therefrom in support of the verdict. If the probative evidence and 

reasonable inferences could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction must be affirmed. 

A conviction may be based entirely on circumstantial evidence. The 

circumstantial evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence; rather, the evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be 

drawn from it to support the verdict.
4

Mendoza v. State, 869 N.E.2d 546, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted), trans. 

denied.

Although it is true, as White observes, that Officer Parker never actually saw him 

driving the car, the foregoing circumstantial evidence favorable to the verdict was more than 

sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that he did. 

White’s argument is merely an invitation to reweigh evidence and judge witness credibility, 

which we will not do. Therefore, we affirm his OWI conviction.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.