UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND

PRESENTATION TO THE

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

U.S. SENATE

Subject: Fiscal Year 2025 Priorities and Posture of United States Space Command

STATEMENT OF: General Stephen N. Whiting

Commander, United States Space Command

February 29, 2024
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INTRODUCTION

For millennia space has been a mystery that inspired dreamers to imagine what lay 

beyond our terrestrial environment and how it would one day impact our pursuits and prosperity 

upon Earth. Bold visionaries still have sufficient room to dream, but enough mysteries have been 

solved so that virtually every human being on Earth now relies upon and benefits from 

capabilities and resources obtained in or generated from space. U.S. Space Command 

(USSPACECOM) and our network of national and international teammates protect vital 

American interests in space against our strategic competitors with malign intent to hold our 

critical space-based capabilities at risk. Additionally, freedom of action in space is fundamental 

to all Joint military operations as outlined in the National Security Strategy, National Defense 

Strategy, and National Military Strategy. The space domain’s tremendous scientific and 

commercial promise demands the United States continued global leadership. To ensure we fulfill 

our role in these national security imperatives, USSPACECOM is focused on four main lines of 

effort: posturing and preparing to prevail; understanding and offsetting threats; expanding and 

strengthening key relationships; and expanding a competitive warfighting advantage.

In terms of the space domain, we are standing in a period of history that is marked by 

challenges and opportunities much like the Interwar Period between World Wars in the 

Twentieth Century. Just one hundred years ago, technology advancements made the air domain 

essential for overarching strategic advantage. Human’s ability to conquer the skies created 

entirely new security challenges that demanded air superiority relative to strategic competitors. 

Today, this Command faces strategic competitors who aim to deny space’s inherent benefits 

from us, our Allies, and Partners. Space, unlike the skies over land and sea, has no physical limit 

and presents an expanding security challenge that is now central to all-domain security activities.
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Although Earth’s orbits remain the primary focus of today’s space security concerns, we are 

expanding space domain awareness capabilities to monitor for potential threats beyond the 

geosynchronous orbit. 

There is an urgency for our Command to advocate for delivery of new space capabilities 

and capacity to retain an enduring competitive advantage. To ensure the United States – and by 

extension, our Allies, Partners, and the rest of humanity – continues to derive prosperity and 

security from space, the Command postures and prepares to maximize combat readiness, offset 

competitor threats to the space domain, strengthen our relationships with Allies, Partners, 

international organizations, and industry to deliver on new space capabilities. 

There is also a vulnerability window communicated by our competitors and highlighted 

as we watch conflict unfold in Ukraine and Israel where missile defense and space capabilities 

have been tested by the quantity and quality of missile and counterspace systems. To be postured 

to meet this threat, USSPACECOM must sustain enduring advantage over any determined 

adversary threatening our national security in space. Insufficient focus and a lack of imagination 

to appreciate how devastating a future conflict involving space will be is a significant risk to all. 

POSTURING AND PREPARING TO PREVAIL

USSPACECOM remains focused on all our USC Title 10 and Unified Command Plan 

(UCP) missions, in keeping with a clear legal basis for this military organization to defend and 

secure the space domain against continuing and immediate threats to this nation, our Allies and 

Partners. This Command upholds a moral obligation to support the rest of the Joint Force by 

executing our specific mission responsibilities, whether in, from, or to space, reflecting the 

complex realities of modern conflict. We validate our readiness to conduct our UCP missions 

through deliberate certifications and mission assessments. To accomplish this, USSPACECOM
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will continue Joint training exercises, further enable integration of our multi-mission sensors 

with commercial and non-traditional sensors, educate Joint Warfighters in the application of 

comprehensive spacepower, and facilitate diversity of thought by leveraging our Joint workforce 

to increase our lethality as Joint-minded space professionals. 

A highly trained and cohesive workforce of dedicated uniformed and civilian warfighters 

enables all that we do, and thus it is essential to begin with acknowledging the incredible group 

of professionals composing this organization. It is an honor to lead the 1,700 Joint Force 

professionals assigned to the USSPACECOM headquarters and the nearly 18,000 Joint Force 

warfighters postured worldwide to support our efforts. This team, in partnership with the rest of 

the broader national security space enterprise, is responsible for conducting dynamic, 

responsible, and integrated space operations and provides missile defense support to deter, and if 

necessary, prevail in conflict. 

While USSPACECOM has a unique and vital relationship with the United States Space 

Force, given that both of our organizations are focused on the space domain, we also enjoy 

tremendous support from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as the other 

Combatant Commands and Defense Support Agencies. The synergy of Joint Force solutions is 

key to developing and employing combat-ready forces and presenting integrated deterrence 

options to national leadership. This synergy also underpins development of space warfighting 

requirements that inform holistic and critical capabilities.

Similarly, strategic deterrence depends on Combatant Commands and components 

communication and synchronization to achieve Joint Force unified action across multi-domains. 

The Nexus of U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Strategic 

Command, and USSPACECOM supports mutually supported/supporting relationships between 
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combatant commanders required for Joint, all-domain dominance. The space and cyber domains, 

now more than ever before, are increasingly central to any multi-domain national security 

approach and require new thinking and collaboration beyond precedent. 

USSPACECOM is focused on employing our combat-ready forces and capabilities to 

accomplish our missions and responsibilities as assigned in the Unified Command Plan: space 

operations, global sensor management, global satellite communications management, operational 

planning and support to trans-regional missile defense, and our role as the space Joint Force 

provider. Excellence in these core areas will deter aggression, ensure continued access to space, 

deny adversary freedom of action in space, and protect the Joint Force from adversary spaceenabled attacks. To increase resiliency, redundancy, and interoperability, we are building a 

coalition of Allies and Partners to maintain collective advantage over strategic competitors.

UNDERSTANDING AND OFFSETING THE THREAT

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation continue to field 

systems and engage in behavior that threaten U.S., Allied, and Partner access to space and spacebased capabilities. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

have demonstrated terrestrial-based, electronic warfare capabilities that threaten friendly spacebased communications and navigation capabilities. These states’ persistent actions demonstrate 

they are committed to denying American and Allied forces the benefits of our space assets. This

is why USSPACECOM must ensure that we can protect and defend our space architectures and 

protect the Joint Force from space-enabled attacks.

People’s Republic of China: Pacing Strategic Competitor 

The PRC poses the most comprehensive and considerable challenge to U.S. national 

security. Beijing has made clear it seeks to become the preeminent power in East Asia and a 
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major power on the world stage, armed with a world-class military to be able to secure its 

sovereign interests and decide regional affairs to the PRC’s advantage. By 2030, the PRC will,

by many estimates, achieve world-class status in all but a few space technology areas. The PRC 

seeks to match or surpass the United States by 2045. The PRC is growing its military space and 

counterspace capabilities at breathtaking pace to deny American and Allied space capabilities 

when they so choose, while extending its ability to conduct long-range fires improving the 

precision and reach, thus the lethality, of its terrestrial forces. The modernized People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) monitors military forces world-wide, including U.S. forces. The PLA is

focused on offsetting U.S. military advantages and rapidly advancing and integrating its forces 

across all domains to support its comprehensive approach to joint warfare. The PRC is using its 

growing military strength to undermine U.S. alliances and security partnerships while seeking to 

coerce their neighbors in the Indo-Pacific region.

PRC Space Capabilities: Challenge to Space Superiority

The PRC are making advances in areas such as satellite meteorology, human spaceflight, 

and robotic space exploration, some of which have dual-use capability. The PRC is also 

aggressively pursuing advances in military areas that are concerning. As of January 2024, the 

PRC’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) satellite fleet contained more than 

359 systems, more than tripling its on-orbit collection presence since 2018. The PRC has also 

dramatically increased its ability to monitor, track, and target US and Allied forces, both 

terrestrially and on orbit. Substantial improvement in PRC domestic space launch capabilities, 

including nascent progress on reusable rockets and mass production of sophisticated space 

systems, will lower its cost of entry to space. PRC has a continued pattern of uncontrolled 
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reentries of space systems, despite their contributions to international guidelines regarding 

responsible satellite disposal. 

People’s Liberation Army Counterspace Capabilities: Threats to Space Architecture 

The PLA understands counterspace operations to nullify U.S., Allied, and Partner 

satellites and systems must be part of their broader strategy. The PRC openly acknowledges

applying commercial and civilian aerospace technology for military purposes. For example, the 

corporate mandate of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Center declares the intent to 

ensure “military-civilian integration development” to strengthen the PRC military and “secure 

peace with aerospace technology” in accordance with PRC’s stated strategic ambitions. The PRC 

prioritizes space and building international partnerships that advance PRC goals, including 

through their Belt and Road Initiative, to develop its space intelligence and military capabilities. 

The PRC’s counterspace weapons programs seek to provide options for destructive and 

nondestructive disruption of our systems in all orbits through proliferation of jammers and the 

PRC’s rapid fielding of new ground- and space-based antisatellite weapons. Beijing has 

deployed several satellites, at least some of which could function as a weapon, that could pose 

significant risk to our own in geosynchronous orbit. The PRC is further developing and testing 

hypersonic glide vehicles along with advanced space weaponry. These capabilities are intended 

to overcome U.S. traditional missile warning and ballistic missile defense systems.

PRC International Influence: Building Spacepower 

The PRC seeks to expand its influence over nascent space nations beyond East Asia. 

Beijing is currently expanding its engagements with national space programs in Algeria, 

Venezuela, and South Africa through signing data sharing agreements, providing satellite 

manufacturing services, installing satellite ground stations, and seeking cooperation on the 
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International Lunar Research Station. The PRC’s space intentions and capabilities are often 

obscured through its focus on dual-use technologies, academic programs that use ambiguous 

research tracks and efforts, and overlapping space activities in exploration and commerce that 

can also enable the PLA’s military programs and effectiveness. 

Russian Federation: Acute Threat

Russia’s struggles following their invasion of Ukraine should not create a false sense of 

confidence that Moscow is fading in the space domain. Russia will remain a formidable and less 

predictable challenge to the United States in key areas over the next decade, while still facing 

many challenges. Their losses in the Ukraine conflict will take years to rebuild in terms of 

terrestrial offensive capabilities which will likely encourage Russia to become more reliant on 

nuclear, cyber, and space capabilities, including disruptive technologies and actions they believe 

hold the promise to provide asymmetric pathways to achieve their strategic goals. 

Russian Space Capabilities: Challenge to Space Superiority

International sanctions and export controls have impacted Russian space aspirations. As a 

result, Moscow will likely prioritize integrating space services they deem critical to their national 

security. They will continue to maintain their ISR fleet of over 87 satellites providing electrooptical imagery, missile warning, and signals intelligence to provide warning of threats to the 

Russian homeland. Their recent launches of Arctic satellites able to monitor the Northern Sea 

Route provide robust all-weather and round-the-clock, weather radar remote sensing, essential 

for command and control (C2) of military and paramilitary activities, a clear national security 

requirement for Russia. These capabilities can also support worldwide military and paramilitary 

deployments. They are updating and improving space launch capabilities to enhance reliability

and otherwise find ways to offset the burdens imposed by sanctions and export controls levied by 
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the international community. Despite impacting limited supply chain and partnerships, Russia is 

finding ways to circumvent sanctions to maintain their capacity to be aggressive and disruptive 

in space. 

Russian Counterspace Capabilities: Threats to Space Architecture

Russia’s counterspace capabilities represent real threats to the space domain, our national 

security, and this Command’s ability to respond decisively to protect and defend our interests 

and those of our Allies and Partners. Despite their struggles in Ukraine and economic sanctions, 

Russia continues to pursue a suite of counterspace weaponry, from electromagnetic warfare

systems, including directed energy weapons and satellite communications jammers, offensive 

cyberspace capabilities, and on-orbit and ground-based anti-satellite systems that exist for one 

clear purpose. These weapons are intended to disrupt, threaten, and destroy space targets or 

otherwise deny freedom of action in space. Russia views its counterspace capabilities as a means 

to deter aggression from adversaries reliant on space.

Russian International Influence: Building Spacepower 

Russia is collaborating with Iran and various African nations and establishing ties to 

Belarus’ nascent space program. Russia and the PRC are moving forward in their work on 

Beijing’s International Lunar Research Station and have reiterated their plans for Lunar 

exploration and research. Russia attempted and failed in their Luna-25 automated interplanetary 

station mission which crashed into the Lunar South Pole in August 2023. Russia will continue 

collaborating with the PRC, Iran, and other strategic competitors in space and that collaboration 

might provide effective means to compete, challenge, or threaten the United States and its Allies 

and Partners. 

Islamic Republic of Iran: Threatening International Order
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Iran threatens U.S. interests in the space domain. Possessing the largest ballistic missile 

inventory in the Middle East, Iran’s strategy of improving the accuracy, lethality, and reliability 

of these missiles provides a dual purpose that includes potentially extending threats into space 

itself. Their strategy includes the longstanding desire to erode U.S. influence in the Middle East 

and threaten regional stability and order. Without monitoring and appropriate action, future 

Iranian space capabilities present emerging security concerns if they continue to develop space 

systems that possess capabilities that expand their offensive capabilities or otherwise challenge 

the safety and access to space. 

Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Challenge to Space Superiority

North Korea continues to develop space and ballistic missile programs. In November 

2023, they successfully launched a satellite into orbit. Although all nations have a right to 

peaceful operations in space, the launch involved ballistic missile technology, which is a clear 

violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions. Pyongyang’s continued 

intercontinental ballistic missile launches point to a dual-use capability. Long-range missile 

development threatens the United States and our Allies, and space system developments utilizing 

ballistic missile technology violate United Nations resolutions on such practices. Despite their 

frequent missile and satellite program failures, North Korea has demonstrated the ability to 

sustain a high number of missile launches, and has fielded capable cyber and electronic warfare

weapons that present disruptive potential to the space domain. 

Given the accelerating pace of threats to the space domain, it is critical that 

USSPACECOM be an intelligence-led organization to fully understand our changing operating 

environment. Our intelligence personnel and capabilities are integrated across our headquarters 

and our subordinate units, at echelon, and they ensure we are fully integrated with all facets of 
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the broader Intelligence Community to avoid operational surprise and improve all our strategies, 

plans, and operations. Space intelligence enables this Command to take the initiative when 

necessary and exploit potential adversary vulnerabilities. Yet USSPACECOM’s military 

capability and capacity alone are challenged to counter growing threats to the space domain. 

To counter this increased security threat and enable integrated deterrence so that we can 

continue to support all-domain operations in, from, and through space, we also need to continue 

strengthening our relationships with existing Allies and attract new Partners to defend our 

freedom of action in space and for the advancement of all humanity as we continue to be an 

increasingly space-dependent civilization. 

EXPANDING AND STRENGTHENING KEY RELATIONSHIPS

Space is rapidly becoming more contested and congested due to the overlap of the threats 

described above, a quickly expanding commercial space sector, and growing governmental and 

civil use of space, all made possible by the decreasing cost to build satellites and access space. 

Given these complexities, our nation cannot secure the space domain in isolation. Space is a 

team sport, and no one nation, Command, Service, or Department can do alone all that is 

required to meet our objectives there. Rather, collaboration with like-minded Allies, interagency 

Partners, and commercial stakeholders is not only necessary but one of our key asymmetric

advantages.

USSPACECOM will prioritize our operations, activities, and investments to deter and, if 

necessary, defeat threats against our nation and Allies today, while outpacing growing threats 

that challenge the space domain tomorrow. Our recent work with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command on 

the draft Regional Partnerships Strategy is one example of cooperation among the Joint Force 

and with Allies and Partners to link cooperation in space with regional and strategic national 
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objectives. USSPACECOM also continues to take advantage of National Guard relationships 

through the State Partnership Program (SSP), leveraging relationships with nearly 100 nations. 

Future SPP space security cooperation plans include a multinational space exercise with the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Space Center and other European Allies and Partners. 

USSPACECOM has expanded the number of our formal Allies and Partner Space 

Situational Awareness (SSA) agreements to 31 nations, two intergovernmental organizations, 

seven academic institutions, and over 130 commercial satellite owner-operators and service 

providers. The Command also signed governmental SSA data sharing agreements with Poland, 

Peru, and Qatar in fiscal year 2023. USSPACECOM signed 10 sharing agreements with 

commercial aerospace companies registered in the United States, Brazil, France, India, and 

Poland in the same time period. This key work will ensure we remain the partner of choice for 

conveying vital space information, leading to greater domain awareness and transparency, and 

furthering spaceflight safety. By providing advanced information and services to space-faring 

Partners, we display U.S. leadership in the space domain, promote transparency in the 

responsible and peaceful use of space, and support the eventual transition of civil and 

commercial spaceflight safety services to the Department of Commerce (DOC). 

The collaboration highlighted above enables more effective integrated deterrence through

all-domain operations. Our Combined Space Operations enterprise currently includes Australia, 

Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the 

United States. Combined Space Operations improve coordination of space defenses and enhance 

individual and collective space capabilities. Through Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER, our 

standing named operation in which we operate in space alongside our Australian, British, and 

Canadian Allies, we improve mission assurance and enhance our collective resilience. We are 
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continually honing this cooperative and collaborative edge through training, exercises, 

simulations, and modeling to increase our collective security goals.

USSPACECOM’s Exercise GLOBAL SENTINEL (GS) campaign series continues to be 

the gold standard to exercise and expand key partnerships. GS24 included representatives from 

25 nations collaborating in one central location for two weeks in February 2024. The GS24 

capstone modeling and simulation event employed a multinational concept of operations focused 

on space domain awareness, supporting the protection of capabilities, and promoting shared 

multinational operational space security interests. Since its inception in 2014, GS has evolved 

from a small-scale table-top exercise with seven nations into an ongoing annual series. This 

year’s series included multiple live events during the year, wargames focused on current 

operations, and the modeling and simulation capstone exercise. USSPACECOM continues to 

increase interoperability with our Allies and Partners through security cooperation, information 

sharing, exercises, and knowledge curation on space security activities.

Integrating Commercial, Inter-Agency, and Academic Partners

To remain on the cutting edge of capability development, application, and shared 

understanding of space as they relate to national security interests, USSPACECOM partners with

a growing team of commercial, interagency, and academic partners. And while we have 

accomplished much with these partnerships, we see untapped opportunities to continue 

developing and delivering with these partners more robust and varied options to national 

leadership to deter aggression and ensure stability. 

USSPACECOM’s Commercial Integration Center (CIC) includes ten commercial 

mission partners who provide our Combined Space Operations Center information to improve 

our ability to collectively defend satellite constellations in collaborative partnerships. 
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Information sharing is not only a security requirement across the Department of Defense (DOD), 

Allies, and Partners, but also so that all enterprises from national to commercial can safely 

operate in the increasingly congested space domain. The way forward for USSPACECOM’s CIC 

includes growing the number of commercial mission partners to participate in the mutual 

exchange of information on threats to the space domain and shared insights into the operations of 

member constellations, leading to enhanced safety and security as we conduct space operations.

USSPACECOM’s Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) effort now includes eight 

commercial mission Partners in the Americas, Europe, and the Pacific. Altogether, they provide 

Space Domain Awareness information to the Joint Force, Allies, and Partner nations’ 

warfighters. In October 2023, JCO provided early unclassified reporting on the separation of 

additional objects from the newly launched, Russian COSMOS 2570 satellite. JCO coordinated 

with commercial sensors ahead of this launch to track the orbital insertion. On October 30, 2023, 

JCO’s Public Satellite Research and Analysis team was the first to alert the rest of the JCO to a 

possible separation event from COSMOS 2570. Afterward, the separating object appeared in the 

public satellite catalog as OBJECT C. In November 2023, JCO detected an object in the very 

early stages of separating from OBJECT C. They were able to track and analyze this newly 

separating object from commercial observations and publish it in a notice to space operators, 

which later was cataloged as OBJECT D. We must continue to build upon this fusion of 

commercial and military information to increase our understanding of actions in space.

USSPACECOM is also working closely with the DOC, whose personnel are now 

observing the U.S. Space Force’s Space Delta 2 to learn how we perform Space Situational 

Awareness operations. This is a vital partnership as the DOC prepares to assume from the DOD 

the Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management missions in support of 
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commercial and civil customers. USSPACECOM is committed to facilitating the seamless 

transfer of these missions to the DOC in the near future because it will allow us to focus on the 

military-unique aspects of Space Domain Awareness, and progress has been made toward 

finalizing necessary memorandums of agreement for the transfer of data, roles, and 

responsibilities between the organizations. 

Tri-Seal Strategic Framework

On July 12, 2023, USSPACECOM co-signed a Commercial Space Protection Tri-Seal 

Strategic Framework with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to better protect commercial remote space sensing assets and 

information vital to national intelligence. This key partnership will offset the efforts of our 

principal strategic competitors seeking to disrupt and challenge our ability to leverage space 

using commercial capabilities. 

To mitigate such aggression and disruption in space, this Command leads the coordinated 

effort to share threat information with NRO-contracted commercial imagery providers and the 

NRO Operations Center for space events, counterspace threats, and indications and warning. The 

Tri-Seal Strategic Framework presents this organization and the DOD with superior information 

sharing and collective defensive capability with commercial space companies that have existing 

relationships with this Command, the NRO and NGA. With increased space activities, new and 

emergent space-faring nations, and space having become a contested, warfighting domain, our 

hybrid enterprise of governmental and commercial space systems and stakeholders represents the

correct strategy of sharing information and improving our ability to defend commercial space for 

collective national security, scientific, and commercial interests. 

NASA and Human Space Flight Support Improvements: Partners in Space
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USSPACECOM is the lead military support agency to the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA). In this capacity, we provide human space flight support and 

global airlift coordination. Our terrestrial rescue and recovery forces, provided by our Air Force 

Service Component, 1st Air Force, have supported every NASA crewed space flight since the 

Command’s reestablishment. 

Leveraging the collective strength of commercial, interagency, and academic enterprises 

has been critical to USSPACECOM since its establishment four and a half years ago. It will 

remain foundational to our success moving forward and its continued growth and development 

remains a key focus area for our command.

BUILDING AND MAINTAINING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

Our principal space competitors – the PRC and Russia, along with other aggressive 

nation states and proxies – seek to hold at risk free access to space for the United States, our 

Allies, and our Partners. Therefore, we must develop and field capabilities to mitigate threats 

posed by space-enabled attack and by counterspace capabilities, and we must do so in a way that 

promotes integrated deterrence in accordance with the National Defense Strategy. 

USSPACECOM has identified five priority requirements that are key to delivering our 

Unified Command Plan responsibilities: (1) resilient and timely operational C2; (2) integrated 

space fires and protection; (3) modernized agile electronic warfare architectures; (4) enhanced 

battlespace awareness for space warfare; and (5) cyber defense of space systems. Additional

important objectives include investment in persistent and resilient intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance capabilities; communications and data transport capacity; enhanced global sensor 

management tools to include integrated tasking and data retrieval; resilient satellite C2 

architecture at the tactical edge; and, improved operational intelligence. Absent commitment to 
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long-term investment in these integrated requirements, we risk ceding advantage to our principal 

strategic competitors in the space domain. 

These five priority requirements address how this Command continues to build and 

maintain a competitive advantage. These new capabilities must deliver in a timely manner that 

encompasses all testing and training requirements so that USSPACECOM possesses improved 

capabilities. The prioritization of increased funding for the Space Force and other Services to 

deliver the space capabilities we need to support the Joint Force from space in the face of the 

growing threats now arrayed against us, and to protect the Joint Force from space-enabled attack, 

is paramount to USSPACECOM’s 2027 delivery deadline. This will enable the Command to be 

ready for anticipated space security challenges and place new, critical systems into operations to 

provide policy makers and national leadership the necessary options for challenges and crises 

that may threaten long-term peace and prosperity. 

Resilient, Timely Space Command & Control

Resilient, timely operational C2 is key to deterring and defeating hostile action in the 

space and the terrestrial domains. Space C2 enables us to protect our space capabilities from the 

threats we now face and protect the Joint Force from space-enabled attacks by an adversary. 

Rapid and robust communication between space activities, space assets, and partner Combatant 

Commands enables decisive action. The increasingly dynamic space environment requires a 

resilient C2 architecture to synchronize space forces and effects for space domain operations as 

well as in support of traditional terrestrial areas of operations. Congress’s continued investment 

in this Command, the Services’ space C2 programs, as well as the Consolidated Space 

Operations Facility, addresses that need and will remain critical moving forward.

Integrated Space Fires and Protection Capabilities
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The services provided by space-based assets have become foundational to modern life 

and the way the Joint Force operates. These capabilities face rapidly increasing risk from our 

principal competitors. Although conflict is not inevitable and while we remain staunchly 

committed to peaceful competition and deterring conflict, it is prudent and necessary to expand 

our ability to protect and defend critical space assets. Integrated fires, across all domains, 

synchronized in timing represent an increasingly foundational capability for USSPACECOM’s 

pivotal role in national security. Investment in this area must be wide reaching and interweave 

both defensive systems and the capability of commercial partners to achieve mass and scale, and 

we must deliver and present these capabilities on a meaningful timeline – by 2027. 

Modernized, Agile Electronic Warfare Architectures

A modern and agile electronic warfare architecture is vital to protect U.S., Allied, and 

commercial assets from interference or outright attack while preventing an adversary’s hostile 

use of space. Investments in space electromagnetic warfare will enable the Joint Force to protect

space-based critical communications and intelligence capabilities while presenting Joint Force 

commanders a wide array of deterrence options within the space domain. Congress’s continued 

support of a modern suite of electromagnetic spectrum capabilities is vital to the protection of 

key U.S., Allied, and Partner interests.

Enhanced Battlespace Awareness for Space Warfare

USSPACECOM increasingly relies on a near-real time, comprehensive understanding of 

the congested and complex space operational environment. Space Domain Awareness data, 

operational C2 automation, and incorporation of artificial intelligence/machine learning 

capabilities will allow us to better understand and outpace the threat in our unique area of 

responsibility. This critical task requires more accurate, robust, resilient, and timely Space 
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Domain Awareness and operational intelligence data from all interoperable sensors. This will 

produce highly accurate, rapidly available detection, tracking, and characterization of space 

objects, regardless of their origin. Legacy Space Domain Awareness systems are disaggregated

and lack the agility to meet the need for increasingly dynamic tasking. Congressional funding of 

programs to enhance battlespace awareness for contested space operations is crucial to ensuring 

the Command can best protect and defend our vital space assets. 

Space Systems Cyber Defense

Digital superiority is key to building and maintaining our competitive advantage for the 

space domain. The PRC, Russia, and other cyber actors work tirelessly to infiltrate our defense 

industrial base, academic research, mission equipment, and military networks. These strategic 

competitors and actors seek to monitor and exfiltrate data, and reduce, degrade, and deny our 

ability to command, control, and communicate with on-orbit space assets and supporting ground 

systems. The compromise or loss of U.S., Allied, or Partner space systems would degrade our 

ability to conduct operations in space and support operations in the terrestrial domain. Much of 

the digital infrastructure for these space mission systems requires modernization. Given the 

dynamic and constantly evolving nature of our adversaries’ offensive cyber capabilities, we must 

rapidly develop, deploy, and maintain proactive cyber defense capabilities to effectively respond 

to and deter adversarial malicious cyber actions while also outpacing them in the cyber domain. 

We will continue to collaborate with the U.S. Space Force on their plans to strengthen cyber 

requirements and cyber defenses of our vital space systems, as well as working with the other 

Services, U.S. Cyber Command, Combat Support Agencies, and other government partners to 

deploy and integrate defensive cyber systems and tactics to maintain safe, secure, and reliable 
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network operations. Increased funding for cyber experts, cybersecurity systems, and persistent 

defensive cyber capabilities is critical to maintaining dominance in the space and cyber domains.

Planning and Operational Support to Trans-Regional Missile Defense

USSPACECOM was tasked with trans-regional missile defense planning and operational 

support in April 2023 via the updated Unified Command Plan. The transfer was the culmination 

of a comprehensive study on the roles, responsibilities, and authorities associated with the 

missile defense enterprise and represents an alignment to the 2022 Missile Defense Review. The 

Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense is well integrated into 

USSPACECOM’s formation and will help ensure the nation approaches trans-regional missile 

defense in the most effective, collaborative manner. Moving forward, development and inclusion 

of multi-use or expanded sensors will increase resiliency of this critical network, and 

USSPACECOM is working with the Missile Defense Agency and the Services to bring this to 

fruition.

Rapid Reconstitution and Resilient Space Architecture

The trajectory of our strategic competitors’ actions necessitate we build capacity and 

resiliency to defend our critical space systems to preserve freedom of action in space. A key 

portion of this resiliency will be the ability to rapidly reconstitute key components when 

necessary. We continue to examine the resiliency of the space enterprise. We will identify and 

articulate strengths and weaknesses of our current architecture, challenges to interoperability, 

and limitations of current policy. We are examining end-user interfaces, terrestrial systems, and 

communications links to orbital assets. In collaboration with the Services, other Combatant 

Commands, and our Allies and Partners, USSPACECOM is developing the requirements for a 
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modern, integrated space architecture capable of operating in an increasingly contested space 

environment.

USSPACECOM’s exercises and wargames challenge participants to develop new ways 

of thinking about space operations and addressing future crises. Our space exercise GLOBAL 

SENTINEL-24 involved 25 national participants, plus three observer nations and one multinational organization. Another USSPACECOM exercise, NIMBLE TITAN, enhances transregional missile defense and stimulates international cooperation while strengthening integrated 

deterrence. Twenty-five member states and three international organizations will participate in 

the capstone NIMBLE TITAN exercise for 2024.

Our operational C2 requirements begin with our ground segment, ensuring critical 

operational nodes have reliable and adequate redundant capabilities, including back-up facilities 

or contingency operations sites and a mobile augmentation capability. New space systems and 

programs should pursue spiral software upgrade methodology to better protect our link segment 

and ensure new capabilities and vulnerability mitigation can be implemented in a rapid and 

continuous fashion. Finally, satellite development must continue including autonomous 

defensive capabilities, such as auto-maneuver, system load shed protections, and on-board 

electromagnetic pulse detection and protection capabilities.

Dynamic Space Operations

On-orbit refueling, in-space assembly, modular hardware change-out, and urgent orbital 

resupply would enable dynamic space operations and change how this Command achieves and 

maintains space superiority. Legacy space systems, constrained by the technological limitations 

of their time, were launched to space with only the fuel and payloads they would have for their 

lifetimes; thus, they have minimal operational maneuverability, flexibility, or inherent defensive 
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capability. Modern systems, beginning today, must provide greater flexibility through maneuver, 

upgradability, or re-supply. Dynamic space platforms purpose-built to support space maneuver

will provide far greater capability and capacity to deter, surprise, maintain initiative, and conduct 

other operations required today and in the near future. The PRC is moving forward in this area. 

The urgency with which we must approach, and appropriately fund, this critical endeavor cannot 

be overstated.

SHAPING THE FUTURE FOR VICTORY

Through our assigned professionals and network of key stakeholders, USSPACECOM 

will continue to fulfill our vital role to protect and defend an essential domain for maintaining 

national and global security, while continuing to support the Joint Force, the Nation, and our 

Allies and Partners with space capabilities. All humankind benefits from space-enabled 

capabilities and resources. As we receive the new capabilities funded by Congress,

USSPACECOM will continue to ensure integrated deterrence alongside our teammates in the 

Joint Force and our expanding team of Allies and Partners, and, when directed, decisively defeat 

any aggression that threatens our national security interests in space. A keystone of our national 

security strategy now rests 100 kilometers above Earth, underpinned by the assumption that we 

will maintain free access to and freedom of action in a secure and stable space domain. Our

national security and our way of life depend on our continued leadership and enduring advantage 

in this critical area of responsibility. But to be clear, given the threats now arrayed against us in 

space, we will not sustain the freedom of access and action we require in space unless we are 

prepared to defend those freedoms.

The delivery of essential space capabilities and capacities will provide this Command 

with the ability to attain an enduring advantage over any otherwise determined adversary 
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aggressive enough to threaten the stability, safety, sustainability, and security of space. We 

cannot attain an enduring advantage without the rest of the Joint Force, interagency stakeholders, 

our Allies and Partners, along with commercial and academic development and collaboration. 

We cannot attain an enduring advantage without recognizing the threatening aspirations our 

principal strategic competitors have to hold at risk our space interests, to include denying us the 

freedom to access and operate in the space domain. Finally, we cannot attain an enduring 

advantage without continued dedication, support, and initiative from our brave military and 

civilian workforce, their families, and the policymakers representing our nation along with those 

of our Allies and Partners. USSPACECOM deeply appreciates Congress’s continued support to 

our vital national security mission.