alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## NO. 12-08-00313-CR IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTRICT

TYLER, TEX AS

ROBER T EARL C

ALIP, § APPEAL F ROM THE 114TH APPELLANT V . § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF TH E ST ATE OF TEX AS, APP ELL EE § SMI TH CO UN TY, T EXAS

MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION PER CU RIAM Robe rt Earl Calip appe als his conviction for possession of a controlled substanc e. Appellant’s counsel has filed a brief asser ting c ompliance with Ande rs v . Ca lif or nia , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct . 1396, 18 L . Ed. 2d 493 (1967) a nd Ga ino us v

. St ate , 436 S.W .2d 137 (T ex . Crim. App. 1969). We dismiss Appellant’s appea l for wa nt of jurisdiction.

B ACKG ROUND Appellant wa s char g ed by indictment with possession of a controlled substance . As alleg ed, the offe nse was a state jail f elony

. Howeve r, the g rand jury also alleg ed that Appellant ha d t wo prior, seque ntial felony

convictions. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 12.42(a) (2) (Ve rn o n 2 005). Acc ording ly , the ran ge of punishment was that of a se cond deg ree felony

. Id. Appellant plea ded g uilty , and the tria l court plac ed him on defe rre d adjudication community supervision. Appellant vio late d th e te rm s o f h is c omm un ity su pe rv isi on . F oll ow inga

he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt fou nd him g uilty , revoke d his community supervision, and sente nced him to imprisonment for eig ht y ear s.2

At the conc lusion of the hear ing, the trial court a sked if Appellant wished t o g ive notice of appea l. Appellant’s counse l informed the c ourt that Appellant ha d filed “w aiver s.” The r ecor d
co n t ai n s a wa iver sig ned by Appellant and f

iled the day

of the he aring . I n the waive r, Appe llant stated that he unde rstood his right to appe al, did not wish to appeal, a nd expressly

waived his rig ht to appea l. Both Appe ll an t an d t he trial c ourt signe d a ce rtification conf irming that Appellant had
wa ive d h is r i g h t t o a

p p e a l

. W e e k s l a t e r , A p p e l l an t w r o t e t o t h e c o u rt r e qu e s t i n g t o a p p e a l hi s conviction. Counsel was a ppointed, and this appea l followed. Afte r re viewing the re cord, c ounsel filed an Ande rs brief a

nd a motion to withdraw.

C ONCL US I ON The trial c ourt’s ce rtification shows that Appellant waived his rig ht to appeal. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 25.2 (d ). T he ce rtification is signe d by Appellant and his c ounsel. The c lerk’s r ecor d supports the t rial cour

t’s cer tification. See Gre e nwe ll v . T hirt e e nth Co urt o

f A pp e als , 159 S.W .3d 64 5, 64 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); De ar s v . St ate , 154 S.W .3d 610, 614–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Acc ording ly , we dis miss thi s a pp e a l for want of ju ris diction . We take no ac tion on counsel’s motion to wit hdraw

. Opinion delivere d Aug ust 19, 2009. Pane l co ns i s t ed of

Wor t hen , C. J. , Gri

f f i t h, J. , an d Hoyl e, J.

(DO N OT PUBL I SH)
#### J. B. SMOAK v. M. D. NEWTON and JAKE NEWTON.

(Filed 7 November, 1951.)

Appeal and Error § 19—

On appeal from judgment dismissing an appeal for failure to serve statement of case on appeal in apt time, record containing only the judgment of dismissal, notice of the motion, the motion, affidavit filed, and appeal entry, is insufficient, there being nothing in the record to show date of termination of the term at which the original judgment was entered or record from which time for serving ease on appeal may be calculated in determining the validity of the judgment of dismissal. Rule of Practice in the Supreme Court 19 (1).

Appeal by plaintiff from judgment, dated 20 March, 1951, entered in this action by *Phillips, Judge*presiding at March Term, 1951, of Superior Court of EaNDOlph County, allowing motion of defendants to dismiss, and dismissing appeal to Supreme Court taken by plaintiff from a judgment also entered in this action at January Term, 1951, of said Superior Court for that, in accordance with finding of fact made upon hearing of the motion, statement of ease on appeal on such appeal had not been served properly and in apt time.

An order, entered by the judge in settling case on appeal from the judgment of 20 March, 1951, rules that such appeal should, in addition to said judgment, consist of notice of the motion, the motion, an affidavit filed, and appeal entry signed 20 March, 1951. And the transcript of record and case on appeal to this Court contains nothing more.

Plaintiff appeals to Supreme Court, assigning error.

*Otiway Burton for plaintiff, appellant.*

*Miller Moser for defendants, appellees.*

WiNboene, J.

Clearly the transcript of record on this appeal fails to meet the requirements of Eules 19 (1) and 20 of the Eules of Practice in the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 221 N.C. 543, at pages 553 and 557. The summons, the pleadings, and the organization of the court, and the judgment at the January Term, 1951, and the appeal entries from judgment then so entered, are all absent. And there is no record showing date of termination of the said January Term, 1951, or other record from which time for serving case on appeal from the judgment of January Term, 1951, may be calculated in considering the validity of the judgment at March Term, 1951, from which this appeal is taken.

Eule 19 (1) expressly requires “that the pleadings on which the case is tried, the issues and the judgment appealed from shall be a part of *452
      *the*transcript in all *eases.” And in*Rule 20, it is provided *that even*“memoranda of pleadings will not be received or recognized in tbe Supreme Court as pleadings, even by consent.” And “where the pleadings are omitted from the record, the appeal must be dismissed.” See *S. v. Lbr. Co.,*207 N.C. 47, 175 S.E. 713; see also *Washington County v. Land Co.,*222 N.C. 637, 24 S.E. 2d 338; *Ericson v. Ericson,*226 N.C. 474, 38 S.E. 2d 517, where the authorities are assembled.

Whether plaintiff may now be entitled to a writ of *certiorari*as in *Chozen Confections, Inc. v. Johnson,*220 N.C. 432, 17 S.E. 2d 505, is not here presented.

Appeal dismissed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7173

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DAVID MERO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Newport News. Mark S. Davis, Chief District Judge. (4:17-cr-00013-MSD-RJK-1; 4:20-

cv-00038-MSD)

Submitted: February 17, 2022 Decided: February 22, 2022

Before AGEE and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David Mero, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

David Mero seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). A certificate of appealability 

will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 

759, 773-74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that 

the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. 

Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

Limiting our review of the record to the issues raised in Mero’s informal brief, we

conclude that Mero has not made the requisite showing. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b); see also 

Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The informal brief is an important 

document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues preserved in that 

brief.”). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

DISMISSED
Long-range 

actuarial 

balance

Annual 

balance in 

75th year

Long-range 

actuarial 

balance

Annual 

balance in 

75th year

Long-range 

actuarial 

balance

Annual 

balance in 

75th year

-3.61 -4.35 -0.07 -0.07 -2% -2%

Estimates based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2023 Trustees Report Office of the Chief Actuary

Social Security Administration

September 15, 2023

Summary Measures and Graphs

Category of Change: Family Members

Current law

[percent of payroll]

Change from current law

[percent of payroll] Shortfall eliminated

Proposed Provision: D8. Beginning in 2024, continue benefits for children of disabled, retired, or deceased 

workers until age 26 if the child is in high school, college or vocational school.

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

18.0

20.0

2023 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090

Percent

Year

OASDI Cost Rates and Income Rates

(as a percentage of taxable payroll)

Income rates under current law

Income rates with this provision

Cost rates under current law

Cost rates with this provision

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

2023 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090

Percent

Year

OASDI Trust Fund Ratio

(assets as a percentage of annual expenditures)

Current law With this provision
September 15, 2016

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

JIM RICHARDSON, RICHARDSON OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., AND 

ACTION DISPLAY, INC., Appellants

NO. 14-16-00041-CV V.

MH OUTDOOR MEDIA, LLC, Appellee

________________________________

This cause, an appeal from the “Order Denying Richardson Defendants’ 

Special Appearances,” signed January 11, 2016, was heard on the transcript of the 

record. We have inspected the record and find no error in the trial court’s ruling. 

We order the ruling of the court below AFFIRMED.

We order appellants, Jim Richardson, Richardson Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,

and Action Display, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay all costs incurred in this 

appeal. 

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 Nos. 33-66832, 33-52820, 333-12169, 333-62059 and 333-45820)
pertaining to the 1991 Stock Plan, the 1992 Stock Plan, the 1995 Equity
Incentive Plan, the 1995 Non-Employee Director Stock Option Plan, and the
Employee Stock Purchase Plan, and in the Registration Statements (Form S-3 Nos.
33-60526, 333-52471, 333-62309, 333-77543, 333-81481, 333-84487, 333-85673,
333-30938, 333-72798 and 333-72800) of SciClone Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and in the
related Prospectuses, as applicable, of our report dated January 30, 2003, with
respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of SciClone
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year
ended December 31, 2002.

                                                   /s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP


Palo Alto, California
March 26, 2003
#### WILLIAM FRANCIS FRAZIER v. REUBENIA MEADOWS FRAZIER.

(Filed 20 May, 1959.)

Appeal by defendant from *Armstrong, J.,*February 2, 1959 Term of Guilford (Greensboro Division).

This action was begun 8 April 1958. The complaint alleges the parties were married in September 1943; that they separated 8 February 1956 and thereafter lived separate and apart, entitling plaintiff to a divorce *a vinculo,*G.S. 50-6.

The answer denies the separation. It contains a cross action which, *376if established, would entitle defendant to alimony without divorce as provided by G.S. 50-16. She sought alimony *-pendente lite*as well as alimony without divorce.

At the conclusion of plaintiff’s evidence, defendant’s motion to nonsuit was overruledi. The motion was not renewed when all the evidence had been offered.

Plaintiff’s motion to nonsuit -the cross action was allowed.

Issues were submitted and .answered entitling plaintiff to a divorce based on the separation alleged. Judgment was entered on the verdict, and defendant appealed.

*George C. Hampton, Jr., for plaintiff, appellee.*

*J. Kenneth Lee for defendant, appellant.*

PeR Cueiam.

Defendant assigns seven errors as the basis for her assertion. that prejudicial error exists. The first and third are not mentioned in her brief and are therefore deemed abandoned. Rule 28, G.S. 4A, p. 185.

The fourth was abandoned by the introduction of evidence. G.S. 1-183.

The fifth, sixth, and seventh appear only in the assignments of error. This is not sufficient. *Holden v. Holden,*245 N.C. 1, 95 S.E. 2d 118; *In re McWhirter,*248 N.C. 324, 103 S.E. 2d 293.

The only remaining assignment is directed to the refusal of the court to 'submit the issue: “Did the plaintiff desert and abandon the defendant as alleged in the answer?” The court correctly refused to submit the issue. The cross 'action charging plaintiff with wrongful conduct was nonsuited, and that question was not brought forward in the brief Or argued here. There is no basis in the evidence to justify the issue. Plaintiff does not now argue there is, but attempts under that exception to assert that there was no intent on the part of either party to do more than have a separate vacation. The evidence was sufficient to show the defendant abandoned plaintiff, and the separation existed continuously for more than two years. No exception was taken to .tire charge. It correctly defines the separation required by the statute as a basis for a divorce *a vinculo.*Our examination of the record fails to disclose error.

No Error.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 28 (Friday, February 10, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Page 7974]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-3437]



[[Page 7974]]

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES


Technical Electronic Product Radiation Safety Standards 
Committee; Recharter

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration announces the rechartering of 
the Technical Electronic Product Radiation Safety Standards Committee 
(TEPRSSC), by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs or designee. This 
notice is issued under the Federal Advisory Committee Act of October 6, 
1972 (5 U.S.C. App. 2).

DATES: The new charter for this committee will extend to December 24, 
1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Donna M. Combs, Committee Management 
Office (HFA-306), Food and Drug Administration, 12420 Parklawn Dr., 
Rockville, MD 20857, 301-443-2765.

    Dated: February 6, 1995.
Lireka P. Joseph,
Acting Interim Deputy Commissioner for Operations.
[FR Doc. 95-3437 Filed 2-9-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4160-01-F
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE ANNUAL
REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15 (D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
FOR THE ANNUAL PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 1999.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                       1,346,123
<SECURITIES>                                 1,579,083
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,517,500
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              17,893,725
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          175,244
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  16,877,932
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                17,893,725
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               165,608
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               458,612
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,855,225)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,855,225)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,855,225)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (76.88)<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (76.88)<F1>
<FN>
<F1>EPS IS NET LOSS PER $1,000 LIMITED PARTNERSHIP UNIT.
</FN>


</TABLE>
#### MARY CARTER LONG v. THE METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.

(Filed 26 June, 1935.)

Appeal by plaintiff from *Pless, J.,*at February Term, 1935, of RockiNuham.

Affirmed.

This is an action to recover on a certificate issued by the defendant to Clarence 33. Carter, the deceased husband of the plaintiff, under the provisions of a group policy of insurance issued by the defendant to the Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills, of Danville, Virginia, insuring its employees.

At the date of the issuance of the certificate, to wit: 18 August, 1927, Clarence 33. Carter was an employee of the Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills. He ceased to be an employee of said Cotton Mills on or about 23 May, 1930, and died on 6 March, 1933. The plaintiff is the beneficiary named in the certificate. She brought this action in the Superior Court of Rockingham County, North Carolina, on 21 March, 1934, and alleged in her complaint that under the provisions of the certificate the defendant is indebted to her in the sum of $800.00, with interest on said sum from 6 March, 1933.

In its answer the defendant alleged, among other things, that Clarence 33. Carter, after he had ceased to be an employee of the Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills, brought an action against the defendant in the corporation court of the city of Danville, Virginia, to recover on the certificate sued on in this action, and that a final judgment was rendered *834in said action tbat tbe said Clarence B. Carter was not entitled to recover of tbe defendant on said certificate. Tbe defendant alleged tbat tbe plaintiff in tbis action is estopped to recover of tbe defendant on said certificate by tbe judgment in tbe action brought by Clarence B. Carter against tbe defendant in tbe corporation court of tbe city of Danville.

At tbe trial of tbe action, on tbe facts found by tbe court from evidence offered by botb tbe plaintiff and tbe defendant, it was adjudged tbat plaintiff is estopped by tbe judgment of tbe corporation court of tbe city of Danville from recovery on tbe certificate sued on in tbis action.

■ Tbe action was dismissed, and plaintiff appealed to tbe Supreme Court.

*P. T. Stiers for plaintiff.*

*Smith, Wharton <& Hudgvivs for defendant.*

Per Curiam.

There was no error in tbe trial of tbis action. Tbe judgment dismissing tbe action is

Afiirmed.
EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of remote knowledge, inc. (the Company) for the quarter ended September 30, 2004 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), Randy S. Bayne, Chief Executive Officer and Henry Houston, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each do hereby certify, pursuant to and solely for the
purpose of 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of his knowledge and belief, that:



1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and



2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        |  |                  
|----------------------- |  | -----------------
|/s/    Randy S. Bayne   |  | November 15, 2004
|Randy S. Bayne          |  |                  
|Chief Executive Officer |  |                  
|                        | 
|/s/    Henry Houston    |  | November 15, 2004
|Henry Houston           |  |                  
|Chief Financial Officer |  |
#### Donna A. Wilde, Plaintiff, v Ralph Wilde, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Erie County,

September 14, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Maureen A. McCready*for plaintiff. *David A. Siegel*for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Joseph J. Sedita, J.

This case of the first impression requires this court to determine the meaning of the word "retirement” in the stipulated agreement reached between these parties.

The parties herein were divorced in 1984 by judgment of this Justice. Said judgment incorporated a stipulated agreement between these parties which provided in part: "Upon thé husband’s retirement, he is to assign $500.00 a month to the wife from his pension plan at Carborundum. Further, in regard to the same, he agrees to name her the surviving spouse and she shall have the right to said pension plan in the event of his death but her right shall be limited to the sum of receiving $500.00 a month.”

*949In January of 1986, the defendant retired from Carborundum and elected to take his pension in a lump sum exceeding $100,000. The defendant now works for another company and contends that he is not, therefore, "retired” so as to fall within the agreement requiring payments upon retirement.

Our court gives special scrutiny to agreements between spouses to ensure fairness and conscionability in inception and effect. *(See, Christian v Christian,*42 NY2d 63.) Where the language of an agreement is clear, parol evidence is excluded in the interpretation of the agreement *(see,*Fisch, New York Evidence §§ 41, 56-58 [2d ed]; *Boss v Boss,*107 Misc 2d 984).

Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary (unabridged) defines the verb "retire” in part as "to withdraw” or to "remove from a position or office.”

Ballentine’s Law Dictionary defines retirement as "[a] termination of employment under conditions entitling one to retirement benefits.”

It is not at all uncommon today for a person to "retire” from one’s job and find new employment while receiving retirement benefits from the first job. The language and clause in question must be read as a unity to discern a proper interpretation. It is thoroughly obvious from a plain reading of this clause that the retirement in question was retirement from Carborundum. That event "triggered” her rights to her agreed "share” of that pension ($500 per month). Any other interpretation would require interpretative acrobatics which would do a disservice to the application of a fair, just and plain reading of this agreement.

Accordingly, the defendant should be directed to comply with his agreement as above interpreted.