Pursuant to Feder al Rule of Appellate Pr ocedure 43(c) (2), Attorne y General Eric H. 1 Ho lde r, Jr., is a

uto m ati cal ly s ub sti tut ed

fo r f orm er A tto rne y G en era l A lbe rto Go nz ale s as a res po nd en t in

thi s ca se. Ju dg e Jane A. Re stani, Ch ief Ju dg e o f t

he Un ite d S tat es C ourt o f I nte rnatio na l T rad e, 2 sitti ng by designati on. 07- 3736- ag Sum bundu v. H ol der UNITED STA TES COU RT OF AP PEALS FO R T HE SE CO ND CI RC UI T

August Term, 2008 (A rgu ed : March

12 , 2 00 9 D eci de d: A pri l 7, 20 10 ) Do ck et N o. 07 -37 36 -ag 1 2 3 4 EBRIMA SUMBU NDU and FAT OUMATA Y AFFA, 5 6 Pe tit ion ers , 7 8 – v. – 9 10 ERIC. H. HO LDER, JR., ATTORN EY GENE RAL, 1 11 UNITED STA TES DEPA RTMENT OF JUSTICE, 12 13 Re sp on de nt. 14 15 16 17 18 19 Before: CALABRESI and LIVINGSTON, Ci rcu it J ud ges , and RESTANI, Judge

. 2 20 21 Pe tit ion

fo r re vie w o f t

he Bo ard of Imm igr ati on

Ap pe als ' ("B IA ") d eci sio n a ff irm ingan 22 Imm igr ati on

Ju dg e' s d en ial of

can cel lat ion

of rem ov al o n th e g rou

nd s th at P eti tio ne rs l ack ed 23 m ora l ch ara cte r un de r th e "c atc ha ll" pro vis ion of 8 U .S .C . § 11 01 (f

). W e h old

that, whe n2 1 pe tit ion ers rai se " co ns tit uti on al c lai m s o r qu est ion s o f l aw ," 8 U. S. C. § 1 25 2(a )(2 )(D ); see 2 Men de

z v. Ho lde r , 566 F.3d 316, 317, 322 (2d Cir. 2009), we have jur isdicti on to review the 3 agency's m oral char acter det erminations made pursuant to the c atchall provision. A revi ew of 4 the recor d in this ca se demonstrates that , while Petit ioners ra ise such quest ions of law, thereby 5 giving us jur isdicti on, Petitione rs' arguments nonetheless la ck merit. Accordingly, the petiti on 6 for review is DENIED. 7 8 EDWARD J. CU CCIA, Ferro & Cuccia, New York, N.Y., 9 for Pe tit ion ers . 10 11 P. MICHAEL TRUMAN , Trial Attorney, for Mic he lle 12 Gorden Latour , Assistant Dir ector, Office of Imm igrati on 13 Litigati on, and Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assist ant 14 Attorney General, Civil Division, United St ates Depart ment 15 of Justice , W ashington, D.C., for Respondent

. 16 17 18 19 CALAB RESI, Circuit Judge : 20 Pe tit ion ers Eb rim a S um bund u and Fatoum ata

Ya ff a, hu sb an d and

wi fe , s eek

rev iewof

an 21 August 17, 2007 decision of the Boar d of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") that affirmed the 22 Imm igrati on Judge's ("IJ") Novem ber 30, 2005 denial of their appli cations for canc ellati on of 23 removal. In re Sumbundu , No. A73 648 267 (B.I.A. Dec. Aug. 17, 2007), aff'g Nos. A73 6483 1 267 and No . A 98 27 9 4 14 (Im m ig. Ct . N .Y . C ityNo v. 30 , 2 00 5). Th e IJrej ect ed Pe tit ion ers ' 2 applicat ions in partbecause he found that Sumbundu and Yaffa f ailed to de monstrate the good 3 moral character r equired for obtai ning cancell ation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 4 1229b(b)(1)( B). In reachi ng this concl usion, the IJ did not rel y on any of the liste d 8 U.S.C. § 5 1101(f) categori es that pr eclude a finding of good moral charact er; inst ead, as the BIA expla ined, 6 his ruli ng relied on t he "catcha ll" provi sion of § 1101(f), which provides t hat although a 7 pe tit ion er' s co nd

uc t m ayfa ll o uts ide on e o f t he se e nu m erated cat eg ori es, that f

act do es n ot b ar " a 8 fi nd ing that f

or o the r re aso ns su chpe rso n is or w as n ot o f g oo d m ora l ch ara cte r." 9 Petitione rs contend, inter a lia , that the I J and BIA erred as a matter of law by applying 10 the wr on g s tan dards in e va luatin g th eir m ora l ch ara cte r. I n re sp on se, the Re sp on de nt argu es t hat 11 thi s C ourt h as n o ju ris dic tio n to rev iewthe ag en cy ' s d eci sio ns m ad e p urs uant t o th e catch all 12 lan gu ag e o f § 11 01 (f ). T his Co urt

ha s n ot y et d eci de d to wh at e xte nt w e h av e juris dic tio n to 13 ex am ine su chde cis ion s, an d th is c ase req uir es u s to de ter

m ine fo r th e f

irs t ti m e whe the r w e can 14 rev iewpe tit ion s whe re a qu est ion of lawis r ais ed

ch all en gin g th e B IA ' s m ora l ch ara cte r 15 de ter

m inatio n und er the cat ch all pro vis ion of § 1 10 1(f ). W e h old

that—at le ast

in s uc h li m ite d 16 cir cum stanc es—

we do have jur isd ict ion , b ut f ind that th e P eti tio ne rs' cla im s f ail on the ir m eri ts. 17 Background 18 Pe tit ion ers Sum bund u and Ya ff a ar e n ati ve s an d c iti zen s o f t he Gam bia . T he y c am e to 19 the Un ite d S tat es i n M ayan d O cto be r 19 92 , re sp ect ive ly, on tou ris t vi sas wh ich

have lon g s inc e 20 expired. They have five c hildren who are United States citize ns and are now ages se venteen, 21 fifteen, thirte en, nine, and five. The fifteen-yea r-old is their onl y daughter. 22 On September 22, 1994, Sum bundu filed an applic ation for asylum and withholding of4 1 removal, claiming that he was perse cuted in the Gam bia because of his r eligion. The 2 Department of Hom eland Securi ty began removal proceedi ngs against hi m on F ebruary 2, 2004 3 by issuing a Noti ce to Appear (" NTA"), which charged him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 4 12 27 (a) (1) (B ), a s an ali enwh o re m ain ed

in t he Un ite d S tat es w ith out autho riz ati on . A t hi s 5 he ari ng on

Mar ch3, 20 04 , S um

bund u c on ced ed

rem ov ab ili ty a s ch arg ed , b ut s tat ed that he wa s 6 also applyi ng for cancellat ion of removal and that he wanted his case to be j oined with his wife's. 7 Ya ff

a f ile d an a sy lum

ap pli cat ion

on Mar ch9, 20 04 , c lai m ing that sh e und erw ent f em ale ge nit al 8 m uti lat ion ("F GM ") i n th e G am

bia as a ch ild , and

that sh e f ear ed that he r da

ug hte r w ou ld s uf

fe r 9 the sam e tr eatm ent if the fam ilyret

urn ed the re. Af

ter the De partm ent of

Ho m eland

Se curity 10 starte d re m ov al p roc eed ing s ag ain st Y af fa , s he als o c on ced ed

rem ov ab ili ty and , li ke he r 11 hu sb an d, fi led

anap pli cat ion

fo r canc ell ati on

of rem ov al. 12 Th e ca ses we re c on sid ere d to ge the r be fo re I J T ho m as J . M ull igan who , a ft er a m eri ts 13 he ari ng on

No ve m be r 30 , 2 00 5, ord ere d b oth Pe tit ion ers rem ov ed . T he IJ n ote d th at P eti tio ne rs 14 initia lly appli ed for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under Arti cle 3 of the Convention 15 Ag ain st T ort

ure , and that th ese ap pli cat ion s w ere su bs eq ue ntl y w ith drawn . A s a r esu lt, the on ly 16 m att ers be fo re the IJ w ere Pe tit ion ers ' ap pli cat ion s f or c an cel lat ion

of rem ov al. 17 8 U .S .C . § 12 29 b(b )(1 ) pr ov ide s th at: 18 19 Th e A tto rne y G en era l m aycan cel rem ov al o f, an d a dju st t o th e st atu s o f an a lie n lawf ull y 20 admitted for permanent residence, an a lien who is ina dmissible or deportable from the 21 Un ite d S tat es i f t he ali en -- 22 (A) has been physi cally pre sent in the United States for a continuous per iod of not5 1 less than 10 ye ars imm ediatel y preceding t he date of such appli cation; 2 (B) has been a per son of good m oral char acter dur ing such peri od; 3 (C ) ha s n ot b een co nv ict ed

fo r an of fe ns e und er [ 8 U .S .C . § 11 82 (a) (2) , 4 1227(a)(2) , or 1227(a)( 3)] . . . ; and 5 (D ) es tab lis he s th at r em ov al w ou ld r esu lt i n e xc ep tio na l an d e xtr em ely unus ua l 6 hards hip to t he ali en ' s sp ou se, parent, o r ch ild , who is a cit ize n o f t

he Un ite d 7 St ate s o r an ali enlaw fu llyadm itt ed

fo r pe rm an ent re sid en ce. 8 9 Th e IJan d B IAde nie d P eti tio ne r' s ap pli cat ion fo r canc ell ati on

of rem ov al b ase d o n tw o o f t he se 10 ele m en ts: (1) Pe tit ion ers ' fa ilure t o e sta bli shthat the ir c iti zen

da ug hte r w ou ld s uf

fe r ex cep tio na l 11 an d e xtr em ely

unus ua l hards hip , 8 U. S. C. § 1 22 9b (b) (1) (D ), and (2) Pe tit ion ers ' fa ilure t o 12 de m on str ate that th eywe re p ers on s o f g oo d m ora l ch ara cte r du rin g th e te n y ear s im

m ed iat ely 13 preceding t heir appli cation, id. § 1 22 9b (b) (1) (B ). B eca us e w e af fi rm the BI A' s d eci sio n b ase d 14 on

its m ora l ch ara cte r f

ind ing , and

be cau se t hat f ind ingalo ne is s uf

fi cie nt t o d eny P eti tio ne rs 15 cancella tion of removal, we discuss only tha t element. 16 Th e IJha d "a num be r of co nc ern s ab out [ Pe tit ion ers ' ] g oo d m ora l ch ara cte r." J.A. 141. 17 Specifically, t he IJ noted t hat Petit ioners had misreport ed their i ncome on their tax returns 18 rep eat ed ly b etw een 19 96 an d 2 00 4. Whil e m isr ep ort ing the ir i nc om e, Pe tit ion ers we re l ivi ng in 19 taxpayer subs idized housi ng in New York City, leading t he IJ to concl ude that the y "were taki ng 20 advanta ge of

taxpaye r f

un de d h ou sin g and

no t ad eq uatel y re po rti ng to t

he inc om e tax a

uth ori tie s 21 an d to the Ne w Y ork Ci ty H ou sin g Auth ori ty .

. . the ex tent of the ir w ork

act ivi ty and

the ir 22 income." J.A. 142. Mo reo ve r, t he rec ord rev eal ed that S um bund u h ad fi rst tes tif ied that he did6 1 no t w ork

in 2 00 4, an d later

adm itt ed that he did

wo rk f or h is " own b us ine ss" but di d n ot f ile tax 2 returns for t hat year. Id. 3 After consideri ng this evide nce and in view of Petit ioners' "need to feed, cl othe and 4 sh elt er this m any c hil dre n in the city o f N ewYo rk, " th e IJfo un d th at the re h ad be en"a g ros sly 5 ina ccu

rat e an d p rob ab ly f

rau du lent re po rti ng of

taxinc om e si nc e p rob ab ly 1 99 2, " id. , whil e 6 Pe tit ion ers we re l ivi ng in t axpaye r su bs idi zed ho us ing . A cco rdi ng ly, the IJ c on clu de d th at 7 Sum

bundu and Yaffa failed to establi sh that the y acted as peopl e of good m oral char acter dur ing 8 the requis ite ti me period. Petitioner s appealed t he ruling t o the BIA. 9 On April 3, 2006, while Peti tioners' appeal was pe nding, Sumbundu and Yaf fa m oved the 10 BI A t o re m an d th e m att er t o th e IJso that th eyco uld int rod uc e ev ide nc e th at the y c lai m ed wa s 11 not available during t heir ear lier r emoval proceedings. Petit ioners al legedly had corrected t he 12 ina ccu

rac ies that ha d b een

m ad e in the ir t axret

urn s f or 2 00 1 throu gh20 04 , and wante d to su

bm it 13 tho se am en de d re tur ns to t he ag en cy . T he am en de d re tur ns ref lec ted ad dit ion al i nc om e th at h ad 14 pre vio us ly b een

unrep ort ed

an d, acc ord ing to P eti tio ne rs, ad dit ion al d ep en de nts we re p rop erl y 15 ad de d to the 20 02 taxret urn , th ere byaf

fo rdi ng the m

a d ed uc tio n th at the y c ou ld h av e p rev iou sly 16 tak enbut ha d n ot. 17 Th e B IAaf fi rm ed the IJ' s d eci sio n o n b oth

the hards hip an d m ora l ch ara cte r ratio na les 18 an d re fu sed

to r em an d th e ca se t o th e IJto c on sid er the am en de d tax re tur ns . A s to the m ora l 19 characte r decisi on, Petitione rs asser ted that be cause they had notsought to avoid pa ying a 20 "substant ial sum" in taxes, t he IJ's finding was erroneous i n view of the BIA's holding in In re 21 Lo cic ero , 11 I & N Dec. 805 (BIA 1966). The BIA disagre ed, stati ng that nothi ng in In re 22 Lo cic ero pre clu de d a fi nd ingof

po or m ora l ch ara cte r ba sed on on go ingm isr ep res entat ion inAdditionall y, the BIA explained i n a footnote that i t would be improper to remand to the 3 IJ b ase d o n th e am en de d tax f orm s b eca

us e P eti tio ne rs h ad

no t es tab lis he d th at s uc h am en de d returns wer e unavailabl e and undiscover able to the m prior to their r emoval hearing. 7 1 multiple years' income tax returns, i rrespect ive of whether the misrepres entations involved a 2 "su

bs tantia l sum ." I ns tea d, the BI A n ote d th at an IJ ha s latit ud e in ev alu ati ng a p eti tio ne r' s m ora l 3 ch ara cte r be cau se " wh ere sp eci fi c co nd uc t do es n ot p rec lud e a f

ind ingof go od m ora l ch ara cte r 4 un de r on e o f t

he enum erated

cat eg ori es o f .

. . 8 U .S .C . § 11 01 (f ), t hat sam e co nd

uc t m ay 5 ne ve rth ele ss b e co ns ide red in m ak inga d ete rm inatio n o n g oo d m ora l ch ara cte r in acc ord an ce 6 with the 'catchall ' provision of [§ 1101(f)]." J.A. 2-3. 7 W ithres pe ct t o th e am en de d tax re tur ns , th e B IAfo un d th at the rev ise d f orm s f or y ear s 8 2000-2004 and the "purported payment of taxes due for such year s, subsequent to the 9 Im mi

grati on Ju dge's iss ua nc e o f a rem ov al o rd

er ," did not show thatthe IJ had erred in finding 10 that th e earli er l on gs tan din g tax m isr ep res entat ion s d em on str ate d a lac k o f g oo d m ora l ch ara cte r 11 during the st atutori ly mandated period. J.A. 3. Th e am en de d f orm s in ste ad

ser ve d to co nf

irm 12 that P eti tio ne rs h ad ini tia llydis clo sed

on ly a po rti on of the ir a ctu al i nc om e in

eac h o f t he cit ed 13 taxye ars , in

so m e ca ses ori gin all y d isc los ing les s th anha lf of the ir a ctu al i nc om e to the Int ern al 14 Revenue Service. The BIA concl uded that the Petitione rs "failed t o provide any expl anation for 15 the ori gin al m isr ep res entat ion s th at w ou ld u nd erm ine the Imm igr ati on Ju dg e' s f ind ing " th at the y 16 lac ke d g oo d m ora l ch ara cte r, n or h ad the y e num erated

any "c ounte rva ili ng eq

uit ies " th at c ou ld 17 overcome the IJ's decision. Id. Petitione rs filed a ti mely petition for revie w. 3 18 Discussion 19 Pe tit ion ers co nte nd that th e B IAerr ed

as a m att er o f l awin f

ind ingthat th eyfa ile d to 20 de m on str ate go od m ora l ch ara cte r. S pe cif

ica lly , th eyarg ue that th e B IAap pli ed the wr on g le ga lTh e G ov ernm ent is no t al tog eth er c lear as to whe the r it is a sse rti ng (a) that w e la ck 4 jur isd ict ion

ev enif pe tit ion ers have rai sed

a p lau sib le i ssu e o f l aw , o r (b ) th at h ad pe tit ion ers rai sed su chaniss ue we wo uld

have jur isd ict ion , b ut t

hat, i n th e ca se b ef

ore us , p eti tio ne rs f

ail ed to presentsuch a plausi ble questi on of law. 8 1 standard i n determining that t hey lacked good moral charac ter becaus e it denie d their appl ication 2 without finding (1) that they intended to file inacc urate ta x returns, or(2) thatthey failed to pa y a 3 substantial

sum of taxes. In respons e, the Government argues thatthis Court has no jurisdi ction 4 to r ev iewthe ag en cy ' s d eci sio ns m ad e p urs uant t o th e catch all lan gu ag e o f § 11 01 (f ). W e writ e 4 5 to clari fy, and to decide in par t, the quest ion—open in thi s Circuit—of whetheror to what exte nt 6 we have jurisdi ction to r eview the BIA's m oral char acter dec isions underthe catcha ll claus e. 7 I. Jurisdicti on 8 Th e st atutor y d ef ini tio n o f " go od

m ora l ch ara cte r" e num erates a se rie s o f o ff en ses that 9 wi ll a

uto m ati cal ly p rec lud e a f ind ingof go od m ora l ch ara cte r. T he se pe r se cat eg ori es are 10 followed by a catchal l provisi on. Se e 8 U .S .C . § 11 01 (f ): 11 12 (f

) F or t he purpo ses of

thi s ch ap ter

— 13 No person shall be regarded as , or found to be, a person of good moral charact er who, 14 during the per iod for which good moral characteris requir ed to be established, is , or 15 wa s-- 16 (1) a habitual drunkard; 17 (2) [Repealed] 18 (3) a mem ber of one or more of the classes of persons, whet her inadmissible or 19 no t, d esc rib ed in p ara gra

ph s (2 )(D ), ( 6)( E) , and

(10 )(A ) of

sec tio n 1 18 2(a ) of

thi s9 1 title ; or subpara graphs (A) and ( B) of section 1182(a) (2) of this ti tle and 2 su

bp ara gra ph(C ) th ere of

. . . (e xc ep t as su chparag rap h re lat es t o a sin gle of fe ns e 3 of

sim ple po sse ssi on

of 30 gram s o r le ss o f m ari hu an a), if the of fe ns e d esc rib ed 4 therein, for which s uch person was convic ted or of which he admits the 5 comm ission, was comm itted dur ing such peri od; 6 (4) on e who se i nc om e is de riv ed pri nc ipa llyfr om

ill eg al g am

bli ng act ivi tie s; 7 (5) on e who ha s b een co nv ict ed

of tw o o r m ore gam

bli ng of fe ns es c om

m itt ed 8 during such per iod; 9 (6) on e who ha s g ive n f als e te sti m ony f

or t he purpo se o f o bta ini ng any b en ef its 10 un de r th is c ha pte r; 11 (7) one who during suc h period has bee n confined, as a resul t of conviction, t o a 12 pe na l in sti tut ion fo r an ag gre gate p eri od

of on e hun dre d and

eig hty days or m ore , 13 reg ard les s o f whe the r th e o ff en se, or o ff

en ses , f or whic h h e h as b een

co nf ine d 14 were comm itted wit hin or without s uch period; 15 (8) on e who at anytim e h as b een co nv ict ed

of anag gravated

fe lony (a s d ef

ine d in 16 subsection ( a)(43) of this section) ; or 17 (9) one who at any t ime has engaged in conduct desc ribed in se ction 18 1182(a)(3) (E) of this ti tle (r elating t o assista nce in Nazi per secution, par ticipat ion 19 in genocide, orcomm ission of acts of tor ture or ext rajudici al kill ings) or 20 11 82 (a) (2) (G ) . . . (r elatin g to sev ere vio lat ion s o f r eli gio us fr eed om ). 21 Th e fa ct t ha t an y p ers on is n ot w ith in a nyof t heforegoing c las ses sh all no t preclud

e a 22 finding that for other re asons such person is or was not of good moral charac ter. . . . .10 1 2 (emphasis added). See also In re Urpi-Sancho , 1 3 I & N D ec. 64 1, 64 3 (B IA19 70 ) (h old ingthat 3 where specific conduc t does not pre clude a fin ding of good m oral char acter underone of the 4 enum erated

cat eg ori es o f § 11 01 (f

), t hat sam e co nd

uc t m ayne ve rth ele ss b e co ns ide red in 5 m ak ing a d ete rm inatio n o n g oo d m ora l ch ara cte r in acc ord an ce w iththe cat ch all pro vis ion ). 6 In Se

pu lve da v. Go nz ale

s , 407 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2005), we found that we had jur isdicti on 7 to review an I J's determination that a pe titione r had been confined for an aggr egate peri od of 8 m ore than o ne hund red an d e ighty d ay s, an d th at h e, the ref ore , la ck ed

m ora l ch ara cte r un de r 9 subsection ( f)(7) of 8 U.S.C. § 1101. Id. at 6 2-6 3. In r eac hin g th is c on clu sio n, we he ld t hat "8 10 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) does notstrip cour ts of jurisdi ction to r eview non-discr etionary de cisions 11 reg ard ing anali en ' s el igi bil ityfo r th e re lie f s pe cif ied in 8 U. S. C. § 1 25 2(a )(2 )(B )(i )." Id. Being 12 inc arc erated

fo r an ag gre gate p eri od

of m ore than o ne hund

red an d e ighty d ay s is a pe r se 13 cat eg ory , b arr inganIJ f rom granti ng can cel lat ion

of rem ov al. 8 U .S .C . § 11 01 (f )(7 ). B eca

us e 14 the IJ' s d eci sio n to de nycan cel lat ion of rem ov al i n S ep ulv ed a w as b ase d o n a gro un d who se 15 presence di d not entail discret ionary findings, we concl uded that § 1252 did notbar revie w. 16 It i s und isp ute d th at P eti tio ne rs' ina ccur ate taxfi lin gs do no t f all wi thi n anyof

the pe r se 17 cat eg ori es o f § 11 01 (f ). T his cas e, the n, pre sents t he qu est ion

of ho w t o tr eat

anIJ’ s f ind ingthat 18 a p eti tio ne r la ck s g oo d m ora l ch ara cte r ba sed on § 1 10 1(f )’s cat ch all pro vis ion . W e h av e three 19 po tentia l op tio ns . F irs t, i t co uld be co ns ide red

a n on -di scr eti on ary

de cis ion (an d und er 20 Sepulveda we wo uld ret ain jur isd ict ion

to r ev iewthe de ter

m inatio n b roa dly , e .g ., fo r su bs tantia l 21 ev ide nc e). Se co nd , it co uld be a d isc ret ion ary

de cis ion , b ut o f t

he kin d a s to wh ich

we have be en 22 given juri sdiction t o review plausi ble questi ons of law and constitut ional cla ims (in the way we11 1 no w r ev iewthe ag en cy ' s d ete rm inatio n o f whe the r a p eti tio ne r ha s d em on str ate d "e xc ep tio na l 2 and extremely unusual har dship"). See, e.g. , Men de z v. Ho lde r , 5 66 F. 3d

31 6, 32 2 (2 d C ir. 3 20 09 ). T hir d, anag en cy ' s d eci sio n und er the cat ch all pro vis ion m ight be co ns ide red

tot all y 4 discret ionary, i.e., one that is s o fully comm itted t o the agency's choice t hat we have no 5 jur isd ict ion

to r ev iewit at al l (s uc h a s B IArul ing s o n whe the r to reo pe n c ase s su a s po nte ). Se e 6 Al i v. Go nz ale

s , 4 48 F. 3d

51 5, 51 8 (2 d C ir. 20 06 ). F or c lar ity , w e w ill ref er t o th e fir

st as 7 "no n-d isc ret ion ary de cis ion s, " to the second as " RE ALID Ac t, p art ly r ev iew ab le, dis cre tio nary 8 de cis ion s, " an d to the third as "pure age ncy judgment decisions." 9 Our jurisdi ction to r eview the agency's discr etionary de terminations rega rding 10 cancella tion of removal is limited by statute. The Ill egal Imm igrati on Reform and Imm igrant 11 Re sp on sib ili ty A ct o f 1 99 6, Pu b. L. No . 1 04 -20 8, 11 0 S tat . 3 00 9 (1 99 6) ( "II RI RA "), co dif ied in 12 rel ev an t part at IN A S ect ion 24 2(a )(2 )(B )(i ) an d (i i), am en de d th e Im m igr ati on an d N ati on ali ty 13 Ac t (" IN A" ) to pre clu de jud ici al r ev iewof "any ju dg m ent re gardi ng the granti ng of rel ief ” und er 14 8 U .S .C . § 12 29 b, am on g o the r se cti on s, an d o f " any o the r de cis ion or a cti on of the Attor ne y 15 Ge ne ral or t

he Se cre tar

y o f H om eland

Se curity th e autho rity f

or whic h is sp eci fi ed

un de r th is 16 subchapter t o be in the dis cretion of the Att orney General orthe Secret ary of Hom eland 17 Se cu ri ty ." 8 U. S. C. § 12 52 (a )( 2) (B )( i) an d ( ii ). But , t he sc op e o f the II RI RA's 18 jurisdi ction-st ripping provi sion was subsequent ly limited by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 19 No . 1 09 -13 , 1 19 St at. 23 1 (“ RE AL ID Ac t”) , c od if ied in r ele vant p art

at INASe cti on

24 2(a )(D ), 20 wh ich

pro vid es t

hat "[ n] oth ingin s ub parag rap h (B ) or (C ) [ of § 1 25 2] wh ich

lim its or e lim inates 21 judicial review, shall be construed a s precludi ng review of constitutional cl aims or questions of 22 law raised upon a petiti on for review filed with an appropriat e court of appeals ." 8 U.S.C. §Th e F irs t an d N int h C irc uit de cis ion s p re- dated

the RE AL ID Ac t, and , th ou ghthe y 5 have seemingly been applie d after that Actas well , they do not appearto have conside red the Act or the quest ion of what sort of discre tion is ent ailed underthe catcha ll provis ion in view of that Act. The Ninth Cir cuit, even be fore the RE AL ID Ac t w as p ass ed , tr eat ed ev en discret ionary deci sions as subj ect to re view for constitut ional viol ations. Se e, e.g. , Sa lva do rCa lle ro s v. As hc ro

ft , 389 F.3d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 2004). 12 1 1252(a)(2) (D). 2 It i s in

thi s co nte xt t

hat w e co ns ide r th e re vie wa bil ityof ag en cyde ter

m inatio ns wi th 3 res pe ct t o m ora l ch ara cte r. A s n ote d a bo ve , whe re d eci sio ns wi th r esp ect to m ora l ch ara cte r ar e 4 deemed to be "non-discre tionary," they are fully r eviewable. See Sepulveda , 407 F.3d at 62-63. 5 Th e E ighth C irc uit ha s h eld that de cis ion s und er the cat ch all pro vis ion of § 1 10 1(f ) f all wi thi n 6 this cat egory. Ikenokwalu-W hite v. INS , 3 16 F. 3d

79 8, 80 2-0 4 (8 th C ir. 20 03 ) (m ora l ch ara cte r 7 de ter

m inatio ns , e ve n whe n n ot m ad e p urs uant t o o ne of the en um erated cat eg ori es, are 8 no n-d isc ret ion ary

an d re vie wa

ble fo r su bs tantia l ev ide nc e). Othe r ci rcu its have dis ag ree d a s to 9 cat ch all de ter

m inatio ns . S ee Bernal-Valle jo v. INS , 195 F.3d 56, 62-63 (1st Cir. 1999) 10 (expla ini ng that de cis ion s und er the cat ch all pro vis ion are dis cre tio nary) ; Kalaw v. INS , 133 F.3d 11 11 47 , 1 15 1 (9 th C ir. 19 97 ) (s am e). But it is n ot a lto ge the r cl ear

wh eth er the se c irc uit s w ou ld 12 tre at c atc ha ll d ete rm inatio ns as " RE AL ID Ac t, p art ly r ev iew ab le, dis cre tio nary d eci sio ns ," o r as 13 "pu

re a ge nc y ju dg m ent" o ne s. 5 14 Until today, we have nothad reason to de cide whether c atchall moral character de cisions 15 are no n-d isc ret ion ary an d f ull y re vie wa

ble , o r whe the r ou

r juris dic tio n to rev iew

the m is e ith er 16 m ore lim ite d o r no n-e xis tent. B eca us e w e co nc lud e th at p eti tio ne rs i n th e ca se b ef ore us ha ve 17 raised pl ausible ques tions of law, we do not need to c onsider whetherwe would have jurisdi ction 18 had they not done so. I nstead, we expres sly leave t hat questi on (and the posi tion we would take13 1 on the ab ov e-m entio ne d c irc uit sp lit ) op en , and

ass um e arguendo that whateverjurisdi ction we 2 have is l im ite d to err ors of lawan d to pla

us ibl e co ns tit

uti on al c lai m s. 3 The question tha t we must decide today, ther efore, is simply whether deci sions under t he 4 cat ch all pro vis ion are "pu re a ge nc y ju dg m ent" o ne s an d to tal ly u nre vie wa ble or are " RE AL ID 5 Act, partly r eviewable" one s. Guidance in making this deci sion is give n to us by our handli ng of 6 findings with respe ct to "exc eptional a nd extremely unusual hards hip," anotherelement of 7 can cel lat ion

of rem ov al und er 1 8 U .S .C . § 12 29 b(b )(1 ). 8 As to whe the r "e xc ep tio na l an d e xtr em ely unus ua l ha

rds hip " is pre sent, w e h av e h eld that 9 su chde ter

m inatio ns are be yo nd

our juris dic tio n to rev iewex cep t in tho se c ase s whe re a

BI A 10 de cis ion

is m ad e "w ith out ratio na l ju sti fi cat ion or b ase d o n a

leg all y e rro ne ou s st an dard" or r est s 11 on

fa ct- fi nd ing"w hic h is fl aw ed byanerr or o f l aw ," Ba rco -Sa nd ov al v . G onza les , 516 F.3d 35, 12 39 -40 (2d

Ci r. 2 00 8) ( int ern al q

uo tat ion m ark s o m itt ed ); seeals o Me nd ez , 5 66 F. 3d

at 3 22 . T his 13 holding, in tur n, rested on ourdecision i n Xi ao Ji C he n v . D ep ar tm en t of

Ju sti ce , 471 F.3d 315 14 (2d

Ci r. 2 00 6) ( "Xi ao Ji C

he n II "), where we acknowledge d that the REAL ID Act rest ored our 15 jur isd ict ion

to r ev iew"co ns tit

uti on al c lai m s o r qu est ion s o f l aw ," id. at 324 (quoti ng 8 U.S.C. § 16 1252(a)(2) (D)), but tha t we remain deprived of juris diction t o review discr etionary de cisions 17 "when the peti tion for revie w essential ly disputed t he correct ness of an IJ's fact-finding or the 18 wi sd om

of his ex erc ise of

dis cre tio n, " id. at 3 29 ; seeals o Barco-Sandoval , 516 F.3d at 39. 19 Accordingly, ass uming as we do for purposes of this opinion thatmoral character de terminations 20 m ad e und er the cat ch all pro vis ion are dis cre tio nary, it w ou ld s eem to f oll owthat, a s w ith 21 hardship det erminations, our revi ew should be limited to thos e relat ively rar e instance s where the 22 petiti oner rais ed a "consti tutional claim or question of law."14 1 The Government suggests, however, thatthere is not a revie wable "algor ithm" for 2 determining when an applica nt lacks good moral chara cter for any of the "ot her reasons " upon 3 wh ich

su cha f ind ingpursu ant to the cat ch all pro vis ion m aybe ba sed . And , b eca us e th ere is 4 all eg ed ly n o m ean ing fu l st an dard a ga ins t whic h to jud ge the ag en cy ' s ex erc ise of its 5 de cis ion -m ak ingautho rity, the ag en cy ' s d isc ret ion ary de ter m inatio n w ithreg ard

to t he cat ch all 6 language must be beyond our revi ew powers. In this r espect an ana logy is sought t o be drawn 7 between the pre sent questi on and that in Al i v. Go nz ale s , wh er e w e h el d t ha t t he ag en cy 's 8 de cis ion

no t to ex erc ise its autho rity to reo pe n d ep ort ati on pro cee din gs su a s

po nte co ns tit

ute d an 9 unrev iew ab le e xe rci se o f i ts d isc ret ion , in part b eca us e "n o m ean ing fu l st an dard e xis ts a ga ins t 10 wh ich

to j ud ge anIJ’ s d eci sio n to ex erc ise su a s po nte authorit y" to do so. 448 F.3d at 518 11 (quoting En riq ue z-A lva ra do v. As ch ro

ft , 3 71 F. 3d

24 6, 24 9-5 0 (5 th C ir. 20 04 )). 12 But, a s th e G ov ernm ent al so no tes , th ere is n ot an "a lgo rithm " f or t he ag en cy ' s h ard sh ip 13 determinations, yetwe retain j urisdict ion to revi ew that element for constitutional cl aims and 14 questions of law. Se e Z ha ng v. Go nz ale

s , 4 57 F. 3d

17 2, 17 8 n .3 (2d

Ci r. 2 00 6) ( Ca

brane s, J. 15 concurring) (noting tha t hardship de terminations "ar e by their ve ry nature fact -intensi ve and 16 entail a discret ionary weighing of multiple, non-e xclusive factor s"). And, the Government 17 makes no attempt to distinguish t he agency's decisions unde r the cat chall provi sion of 8 U.S.C. § 18 11 01 (f

) f rom its de cis ion s as to whe the r th ere is e xc ep tio na l an d e xtr em ely unus ua l hards hip . In 19 both instanc es, it sugges ts, we must look to the agency's precede ntial dec isions for guidanc e on 20 the m ean ingof

hards hip or g oo d m ora l ch ara cte r. 21 Likewise the pr oposed analogy bet ween decisions pur suant to the catchall language and 22 ag en cyde cis ion s o n whe the r to ex erc ise su a s po nte authorit y to reopen under8 C.F.R. §15 1 10 03 .2 (a) , is no t pe rsu asi ve . "[ T] he reg ulatio n p rov idi ng fo r re op en ingor r eco ns ide rin g a cas e 2 su a s

po nte of fe rs n o s tan dard g ov ern ingthe ag en cy ' s ex erc ise of dis cre tio n. " Ca lle -V

uji les v. 3 As hc ro

ft , 3 20 F. 3d

47 2, 47 5 (3 d C ir. 20 03 ). T he re are n o m ark ers pro vid ed in t he statut ory 4 language for when su a s po nte reo pe nin g w ou ld b e ap pro pri ate . H en ce, "th e d eci sio n o f t he BI A 5 whether to invoke its sua spont e authorit y is comm itted t o its unfetter ed discret ion [and is] not 6 su bje ct t o ju dic ial rev iew ." Luis v. I.N.S. , 1 96 F. 3d 36 , 4 0 (1 st C ir. 19 99 ). I n c ontra st, wi th 7 m ora l ch ara cte r de cis ion s und er the cat ch all cla us e, the re m ayno t be analg ori thm , b ut t he re 8 remains a standard—good moral chara cter—which t he agency must find before granting 9 cancella tion of removal. Significantly, t he same is true as to whet her there is "except ional or 10 ex tre m ely

unus ua l hards hip ." A s a r esu lt, our de cis ion s und er that cl au se w ou ld s eem at l eas t to 11 pro vid e u s w itha cl os er ana log y f or d ete rm ini ng our m ini m um jur isd ict ion

to r ev iewin m ora l 12 ch ara cte r ca ses . 13 Moreover, i t would seem incongruent to t reat moral charac ter dete rminations based on a 14 pe tit ion er’ s ag gre gate p eri od of co nf ine m ent un de r 8 U .S .C . § 11 01 (f )(7 ) as no n-d isc ret ion ary 15 an d f

ull y re vie wa

ble , b ut t o tr eat

jud gm ents m ad e p urs uant t o th e catch -al l pr ov isi on as 16 completely beyond our juri sdiction t o review. Cf . Ik en ok wa lu- Whi te , 316 F.3d at 803 ("[I]t 17 would be anomalous to allow judici al revie w of a m oral char acter det ermination to someone who 18 was allegedl y a habitual drunkard, with t he attendantfactual disput es that suc h a finding might 19 inv olv e, but to de nyjud ici al r ev iewto s om eo ne . . . who se a lle ge d m isc on du ct w as n ot s ev ere 20 en ou ghto b rin g h er w ith in anyof Se cti on 11 01 (f )' s p er s e categ ori es. ") A"pu re a ge nc y 21 judgment" rule for the cat chall sec tion of § 1101 would prohibitus from reviewing the decision 22 to d eny an a

pp lic ati on

ba sed on the pe tit ion er' s re ad ing un po pu lar bo ok s, wh ile all ow ing us toOn ce a ga in w e n ote that w e expre ssl y le av e o pe n th e q ue sti on of wh eth er m ora l 6 ch ara cte r de ter

m inatio ns un de r th e catch all pro vis ion are ess entia llyno n-d isc ret ion ary an d h en ce subject t o substanti al evidence review, and we take no pos ition on the seeming circuit spl it on that iss ue. 16 1 review a moral charact er deter mination of an applicant who has been i ncarcera ted as a re sult of 2 his convict ion for various cr imes. 3 Ac co rd in gl y, we co nc lu de , a ndho ld , t ha t w e h av e j ur is di ct io n t o r ev ie w the ag en cy 's 4 m ora l ch ara cte r de ter m inatio ns m ad e p urs uant t o th e catch all pro vis ion of 8 U .S .C . § 11 01 (f

) at 5 least when the petiti oners, as her e, raise " constitut ional cla ims or questions of law," 8 U.S.C. § 6 12 52 (a) (2) (d) ; seeMen de z v. Ho lde r , 566 F.3d at 322. 6 7 II. Mer its 8 Pe tit ion ers ass ert that th e IJan d B IAap pli ed the wr on g le ga l st an dard i n e va luatin g th eir 9 moral character i n two ways: (1) by faili ng to find that the ir misconduct was intent ional, and (2) 10 byfa ili ng to f

ind that th eym isr ep res ented a "s ub stanti al s um " on

the ir t axret

urn s. Fi rst , 11 Pe tit ion ers ass ert that th eir be havio r in

qu est ion —h ere the fi lin g o f i na ccu rat e tax re tur

ns —m us t 12 be acc om

panie d b y "k

no wi ng or i nte nti on al c on du ct. " See In re Perez -Contreras , 2 0 I & N D ec. 13 61 5, 61 8 (B IA19 92 ). And , b eca us e P eti tio ne rs h ad

little or n o f

orm al s ch oo lin g, an d th ere wa s 14 no direct e vidence thatthey knew of or intended t o misrepresent thei r income, they argue thatthe 15 finding that the y lacked good moral charact er is le gally insufficient . Second, they clai m, citing 16 Lo cic ero , that no "fail ure to show good moral charact er" dete rmination may legally be made 17 wi th re sp ec t t o t ax re pr es en ta ti on s u nl es s t he y i nv ol ve a " subs ta nt ia l s um." Bot h o f the se cl ai ms 18 raise non- frivolous questi ons of law, and hence support ourfinding that we have j urisdict ion. 19 But in the end, both c ontentions a re unavail ing.Mo reo ve r, w e re jec t P eti tio ne rs’ arg um ent th at the BI A w as r eq uir ed to r em an d th e ca se 7 to t he IJ t o c on sid er the ir am en de d tax re tur ns . P eti tio ne rs argu e th at u po n d isc ov ery

that th eir tax es w ere ina ccu

rat ely fi led , th eypro m

ptl y m ad e th e n ece ssary c orr ect ion s. Th e f act that Petitione rs amended their tax r eturns to r eflect more accuratel y their i ncome after being caught bythe IJ d oe s n ot n eg ate the IJ’ s f ind ingthat th eir

ori gin al, lon gs tan din g m isr ep res entat ion s to the IR S i nd icated

a la ck of go od m ora l ch ara cte r.

17 1 As to the first, t he alleged r equirement of intent is de rived by Peti tioners from the 2 qu es ti onof w he th era c ri min al al ie n i s r emov ab le forha vi ng be enco nv ic te d fo r acr ime 3 involving moral turpi tude. Perez-Contreras , 2 0 I & N D ec. at 618. We do not doubt that inte nt 4 to comm it misconduct is re levant to a n IJ's decision tha t a petit ioner lac ks good moral character

. 5 The degree to which i t is a re quirement need not, however, be dec ided today. Here, t he IJ found 6 a d eca de -lo ng patte rn o f g ros s und er- rep ort ingthat w as " pro ba bly fr au du lent," an d e m

ph asi zed 7 that, at t he same time that they were under-r eporting t heir income, Petiti oners appear ed to take 8 improper advantage of taxpayersubsidized hous ing. Income level is cl early a r equirement for 9 su bs idi zed ho us ingan d p eti tio ne rs d id n oth ingto s ho w that th e large pe rce nta ge un de rst ate m ents 10 of

inc om e w ere im

m ate ria l. Und er the cir cum stanc es, wh ate ve r intent re qu ire m ent m ayap ply 11 co uld

be fo un d to be pre sent. And the BI A d id n ot a

pp ly t he wr on g le ga l st an dard i n th is 12 regard. 7 13 Si m ilarly , P eti tio ne rs' co nte nti on that th e IJ ' s m ora l ch ara cte r de ter m inatio n w as l eg all y 14 fl aw ed

be cau se t he IJ d id n ot f

ind that th eym isr ep res ented a "s ub stanti al s um " of

tax es f ail s. In 15 making this claim they rely on In re L oc ice ro , 11 I & N Dec. 805 (BIA 1966). In tha t case, the 16 BIA found that the respondent"fraudulentl y understat ed his income [for two years] for the 17 purpo se o f avo idi ng the paym ent of a su bs tantia l sum

in t ax es. " Id. at 8 10 . T he ag en cy 18 consequently c oncluded thathe was not a person of good moral charact er and his adj ustment ofBe fo re u s, Pe tit ion ers ass ert fo r th e f irs t ti m e th at the IJ and

BI A s ho uld

co ns ide r 8 Petitione rs' previously withdr awn asylum applications i n light of our rec ent holding i n Ba h v

. Muk as ey , 529 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2008), and the BIA' s precedential dec ision in In re S-A-K and HA-H , 2 4 I. & N . D ec. 46 4 (B IA20 08 ). A s th e ag en cyha s n ot y et h ad anop po rtunit

y to de ter m ine wh eth er the asy lum ap pli cat ion s sh ou ld b e re co ns ide red , w e d ecl ine to r ev iewthi s argument at this ti me. Petitioners als o argue, based on a not ation in t he IJ’s dec ision thathe went “off the record” and t hen “on the rec ord,” that r emand is required to ens ure that t he decision was cor rectly t ranscri bed. This argument is frivolous a nd does not supportany grant of relief. 18 1 status coul d be rescinde d. Id. at 8 10 -11 . B ut, tho ug h th e B IAdid fi nd that th e re sp on de nt i n 2 Locicero m iss tat ed a "s ub stanti al s um ," n oth ingin t he de cis ion

su gg est s th at this wa s a 3 req uirem en t for m oral char acter det erminations rela ted to inac curate t ax returns . In the inst ant 4 cas e, Pe tit ion ers m ayno t have m isr ep res ented a "s ub stanti al s um "; s til l, t he IJ f ound that th eir 5 m isr ep res entat ion s h ad pe rsi ste d o ve r m any y ear s an d th at the y h ad tak enadvanta ge of

taxpaye r 6 fu nd ed ho us ingsin ce 1 99 2. W e co nc lud e th at m isr ep res entin g a "su bs tantia l sum " m aycer

tai nly 7 be a f

act or i n th e IJ ' s m ora l ch ara cte r de ter m inatio n. W e, ne ve rth ele ss, rej ect Pe tit ion ers ' 8 suggestion t hat the agenc y's discretion underthe catcha ll provis ion is so narrow, as to entai l any 9 su chreq

uir em ent. 10 Conclusion 11 Although we hold that we have jurisdi ction to r eview Petiti oners' claims that the IJ and 12 BI A m ad e le ga l er ror s in fi nd ingthat, b ase d on

the cat ch all pro vis ion

of 8 U .S .C . § 11 01 (f

), t he y 13 failed to meet the moral charact er requir ement for cancella tion of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 14 1229b(b)(1)( B), we conclude thatPetitione rs' arguments lack merit. Accordingly, the petiti on 15 for review is DENIED. 8