COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Annunziata and Senior Judge Coleman∗

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

STACIE LYNN REID 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION∗∗ BY 

v. Record No. 0557-00-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 MARCH 13, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GOOCHLAND COUNTY 

David F. Berry, Judge Designate 

Anthony Paone, II (Law Offices of Darvin E. 

Satterwhite, on brief), for appellant. 

Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 ∗

 Judge Coleman participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 

December 31, 2000 and thereafter by his designation as a senior 

judge pursuant to Code § 17.1-401. 

∗∗ Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Stacie Lynn Reid was convicted in a bench trial of 

possession of cocaine. On appeal, Reid argues that the trial 

court erred by denying her motion to suppress because the 

cocaine was seized as the result of an unlawful search of her 

purse. She further contends that the evidence was inadmissible 

because the officers unlawfully detained her and the driver of 

the vehicle in which she was riding by failing to release the 
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driver "forthwith" as required by Code § 19.2-74. We disagree 

and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

BACKGROUND

 Shortly after 9:00 p.m. on May 22, 1998, Goochland County 

Deputy Sheriff James Mann, while on routine patrol, drove 

through a convenience store parking lot and observed Kevin 

Michie standing beside a gas pump. Mann knew Michie to be a 

person who had previously been convicted of weapons, drug, and 

assault offenses. Mann waited in his vehicle until Michie got 

into his pickup truck and drove away, and then, Mann followed 

Michie. Thinking that Michie "might" possess drugs, Mann 

followed him, hoping to "find probable cause on which to stop 

him." Mann testified that he paced Michie's vehicle for several 

miles and observed Michie exceeding the 65 m.p.h. speed limit on 

Interstate 64. 

 Mann stopped the vehicle and informed Michie that he had 

exceeded the speed limit. At that point, Chief Deputy Don 

Bewkes, who heard on his police radio that Mann had stopped 

Michie, arrived at the scene. Bewkes approached the 

passenger-side door of Michie's pickup truck where the 

defendant, Stacie Reid, was sitting. Bewkes noticed that the 

pickup truck displayed a rejection sticker rather than a valid 

inspection sticker. Mann informed Michie that he would issue a 
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warning for his exceeding the speed limit and a summons for the 

rejection sticker. 

 Michie signed the summons, and Mann returned Michie's 

driving permit and registration card. Mann then asked Michie if 

he had any firearms, drugs, or contraband in his truck. Michie 

responded that he did not. Mann asked Michie for permission to 

search the truck, and Michie refused. Chief Deputy Bewkes then 

told Mann that because the vehicle did not have a proper 

inspection sticker, the vehicle could be towed. Michie 

responded that, if they were going to tow the vehicle, the 

deputies could search it. At that point Michie and Reid exited 

the vehicle and the deputies "patted [them] down" for "officer 

safety." 

 Mann then requested permission from Reid to search her 

purse for weapons. Reid consented to the search. Inside the 

purse, Mann found a small zippered pouch which he described as 

large enough to hold a penknife. Mann manipulated the pouch 

from the outside and felt a hard, metallic object. Mann 

testified that, based on his training and experience in 

investigating drug cases, the object felt like a device used for 

smoking drugs. Mann opened the pouch and found a brass pipe. 

Reid admitted that the pipe was hers and that it was used to 

smoke marijuana. Mann also found a partially burned marijuana 

cigarette in Reid's purse. The smoking pipe was seized and 
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analyzed for drugs; it was found to contain cocaine residue. 

Reid was charged with possession of marijuana1 and possession of 

cocaine. 

 Michie testified that he observed Deputy Mann following him 

before being stopped and that he was not speeding. Michie 

stated that Mann did request to search the truck and he refused 

to give permission. Michie testified that he later gave Mann 

permission to search the truck, but only after Mann and Bewkes 

discussed having the vehicle towed if Michie withheld 

permission. Michie testified that Mann never patted him down. 

Michie stated that after Mann searched the truck, Mann 

approached Reid, removed her purse from her shoulder, and told 

her that he needed to search the purse. Michie testified that 

Mann never asked Reid for permission to search her purse. 

Michie acknowledged that Mann told Reid that he had found the 

pipe. 

 Reid filed a motion to suppress the evidence consisting of 

the pipe and cocaine residue on the ground that it was illegally 

seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and she further 

objected to the admissibility of the evidence based on its being 

seized after the officers violated Michie's rights in violation 

of Code § 19.2-74. Code § 19.2-74 provides that whenever any 

1

 The misdemeanor possession of marijuana charge was 

dismissed. 
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person is detained for a misdemeanor or an offense for which no 

jail sentence could be imposed, the officer shall issue a 

summons and upon the person's written promise to appear, the 

officer "shall forthwith release him from custody." Reid argues 

that Mann's failure to forthwith release Michie from custody 

resulted in her being illegally detained and the pipe and drug 

residue being illegally seized. The trial court denied the 

motion to suppress and overruled Reid's objection to the 

admissibility of the evidence, finding that she voluntarily 

consented to the search of her purse. 

ANALYSIS

 When we review a trial court's denial of a motion to 

suppress, "[w]e view the evidence in a light most favorable to 

. . . the prevailing party below, and we grant all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible from that evidence." Commonwealth 

v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). 

"[W]e are bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact 

unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to support them." 

McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 

(1997) (en banc) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 

699 (1996)). "However, we consider de novo whether those facts 

implicate the Fourth Amendment and, if so, whether the officers 

unlawfully infringed upon an area protected by the Fourth 

Amendment." Hughes v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 447, 454, 524 
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S.E.2d 155, 159 (2000) (en banc) (citing McGee, 25 Va. App. at 

198, 487 S.E.2d at 261). The trial judge expressly ruled that 

he found "no reason to doubt the credibility of the officers in 

this case." Thus, we resolve any conflict in the evidence in 

favor of the Commonwealth. 

 "A warrantless search is per se 

unreasonable and violative of the Fourth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution, 

subject to certain exceptions." Tipton v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 370, 373, 444 

S.E.2d 1, 3 (1994) (citation omitted). 

However, searches made by law enforcement 

officers pursuant to a valid consent to 

search do not implicate the Fourth 

Amendment. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 

412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2045, 36 

L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); Iglesias v. 

Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 93, 99, 372 S.E.2d 

170, 173 (1988) (en banc). When relying 

upon consent as the justification for a 

search, the Commonwealth must prove, based 

upon the totality of the circumstances, that 

the consent was freely and voluntarily 

given. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 

U.S. 543, 548, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792, 

20 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1968); Hairston v. 

Commonwealth, 216 Va. 387, 388, 219 S.E.2d 

668, 669 (1975); Commonwealth v. Rice, 

28 Va. App. 374, 378, 504 S.E.2d 877, 879 

(1998). 

Hughes, 31 Va. App. at 454, 524 S.E.2d at 159. "[W]hether a 

consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product 

of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact 

to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." 

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. 
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 Although Deputy Mann acknowledged that he began following 

Michie in hopes of "find[ing] probable cause on which to stop 

him" because he "believed" that Michie "might" possess drugs, 

Mann's subjective intent is of no consequence if, in fact, the 

deputy observes conduct that constitutes probable cause to 

believe that a crime or traffic offense has been committed. 

Here, the trial judge accepted as fact Deputy Mann's testimony 

that he observed Michie's truck speeding. Thus, Mann lawfully 

stopped Michie's vehicle after having determined that Michie was 

exceeding the speed limit. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 

806, 813 (1996) (finding that "[s]ubjective intentions play no 

role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis"). 

While investigating the speeding violation, Mann was alerted to 

the fact that the vehicle displayed a rejection sticker. 

 Mann decided to give Michie a warning for the speeding 

violation and to issue him a summons for driving the truck with 

a rejection sticker. After Mann returned Michie's driver's 

license and registration card, he asked Michie if he had any 

contraband, drugs, or firearms in the vehicle. See Ohio v. 

Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996) (holding that consensual 

encounter may begin after legitimate detention has ended even if 

detainee is not told he is "free to go"). Mann requested 

permission from Michie to search the truck, which Michie 

initially denied. Only after Deputies Mann and Bewkes discussed 
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having the truck towed did Michie grant Mann permission to 

search the truck. Cf. Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 232, 

236-37, 532 S.E.2d 25, 27-28 (2000) (holding that defendant was 

unlawfully seized where, after officer completed lawful traffic 

stop and informed defendant he was free to go, officer requested 

permission three times to search defendant's vehicle).2 

 After Michie consented to a search of his truck, Mann asked 

Michie and Reid to get out of the vehicle. Mann requested and 

received permission from Michie and Reid to conduct a pat-down 

search for weapons of each of them. Noticing that Reid had 

removed her purse from the vehicle, Mann requested permission to 

search it for weapons and Reid consented to the search. Upon 

searching Reid's purse, Mann found a small zippered pouch large 

enough to hold a penknife. Upon feeling the pouch, Mann felt an 

object that he readily identified as a device suitable for 

smoking drugs. Believing that the object was contraband, Deputy 

Mann lawfully removed the item from the pouch. See Minnesota v. 

Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993) (finding that the same 

practical considerations justifying a warrantless seizure under 

the "plain view" doctrine apply to a warrantless seizure under 

the "plain feel" doctrine); see also Pierson v. Commonwealth, 

 2

 Whether Michie voluntarily consented to a search of his 

truck is not dispositive or germane to the issues before us in 

Reid's appeal. 
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16 Va. App. 202, 205, 428 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1993) (upholding 

search for weapons of small velvet pouch, "just large enough to 

hold an ordinary teabag," as reasonable where officer observed 

suspicious and furtive conduct by passenger in trying to secrete 

the pouch). 

 Here, the evidence supports the trial judge's finding that 

Reid voluntarily consented to the search of her purse. When Mann 

requested permission to search her purse, there was no show of 

force or claim of legal right or authority to search the purse 

absent consent; Mann did not threaten Reid, and the record does 

not show that Reid was deceived as to the deputy's purpose. See

generally Limonja v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 532, 540, 383 S.E.2d 

476, 480-81 (1989) (en banc) (stating that police need not warn 

the suspect that he has a right to refuse the search, but the 

suspect's knowledge of his right to refuse is a factor in 

considering the totality of the circumstances). The fact that 

Reid's consent to search the purse may have been influenced by 

her belief that if she withheld consent the deputies would tow 

Michie's truck and leave her stranded on Interstate 64 does not 

render her consent legally involuntary. 

 Regardless of whether the officers had authority to tow and 

impound Michie's truck or otherwise prevent him from driving the 

vehicle because the vehicle displayed a rejection sticker, Reid 

remained free to leave the area and, thus, she was not 
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unlawfully seized. A person is "seized" under the Fourth 

Amendment "only if, in view of all of the circumstances 

surrounding an incident, a reasonable person would have believed 

that [she] was not free to leave." Mendenhall v. United States, 

446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion). "In order for a 

seizure to occur, an individual must be under some physical 

restraint by an officer or have submitted to the show of police 

authority." Thomas v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 49, 54, 480 

S.E.2d 135, 137 (1997) (en banc) (citing California v. 

Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991)). See also Rettinger, 260 

Va. at 236, 532 S.E.2d at 27 (stating that whether a person is 

seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is reviewed de novo

on appeal). "'[T]he test for existence of a "show of authority" 

is an objective one: not whether the citizen perceived that 

[she] was being ordered to restrict [her] movement, but whether 

the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that to a 

reasonable person.'" Wallace v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 497, 

503, 528 S.E.2d 739, 741 (2000) (quoting Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 

628). 

Among the factors to be considered in 

determining whether a reasonable person 

under the circumstances would have believed 

he or she was not free to ignore the request 

of the officer are: "the threatening 

presence of several officers, the display of 

a weapon by an officer, some physical 

touching of the person of the citizen, or 

the use of language, or tone of voice
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indicating that compliance with the 

officer's request might be compelled." 

Weathers v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 652, 659-60, 529 S.E.2d 

847, 850-51 (2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Mendenhall, 446 

U.S. at 554). 

Here, the officers did not, by their words or actions, 

convey a message that Reid was not free to leave by asking her 

to exit the vehicle in order to facilitate a search of the 

truck. They in no way indicated to Reid that if the vehicle was 

towed that she would be detained or would not be free to go. 

Irrespective of their authority to detain Michie, in the absence 

of his willingness to remain, regardless of the situation as it 

pertained to Michie, the officers did not prevent Reid from 

leaving and they exercised no legal restraint of her that was 

not consensual. Although Reid may have been confronted with 

undesirable or inconvenient options if she chose to leave the 

scene when the officers searched Michie's truck, or if the 

officers had towed the truck or otherwise prevented Michie from 

driving away, Reid was under no legal restraint or compulsion to 

remain at the scene. Under these circumstances, a reasonable 

person would have believed the officers had no legal right to 

detain her and that she was free to terminate the encounter, 

even though as a practical matter she might not wish to pursue 

that course. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding 
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that Reid voluntarily consented to the search of her purse and in 

denying Reid's motion to suppress. 

 Reid's contention that the evidence was inadmissible because 

the officer did not release Michie "forthwith" as required by Code 

§ 19.2-74 after issuing the summons is without merit. We have 

stated that "'[h]istorically, searches or seizures made contrary 

to provisions contained in Virginia statutes provide no right of 

suppression unless the statute supplies that right.'" Troncoso v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 942, 944, 407 S.E.2d 349, 350 (1991) 

(citations omitted); see also Taylor v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 

638, 641, 507 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1998) (stating that alleged 

violation of Code § 19.2-59.1 does not provide basis for 

suppression of illegally obtained evidence); Webber v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 549, 560-61, 496 S.E.2d 83, 88 (1998) 

(applying same principle to alleged violation of Code § 19.2-80); 

Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 646, 651, 472 S.E.2d 649, 

651-52 (applying same principle to alleged violation of Code 

§ 19.2-54), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 23 Va. App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 

534 (1996). Therefore, assuming that Deputy Mann violated Code 

§ 19.2-74 by requesting permission to search the truck and by 

failing to release Michie "forthwith" after issuing the summons, 

and, assuming further that Reid could properly challenge such a 

violation, the statutory violation would not provide a basis for 

which to exclude the evidence. 
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 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Reid's 

motion to suppress and her challenge to the admissibility of the 

evidence based on a violation of Code § 19.2-74. We, therefore, 

affirm. 

Affirmed.