(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1 

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL, ACTING 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–773. Argued November 7, 2018—Decided January 8, 2019

The Social Security Act regulates the fees that attorneys may charge 

claimants seeking Title II benefits for representation both before the 

Social Security Administration and in federal court. For representation in administrative proceedings, the Act provides two ways to determine fees. If a fee agreement exists, fees are capped at the lesser 

of 25% of past-due benefits or a set dollar amount—currently $6,000. 

42 U. S. C. §406(a)(2)(A). Absent an agreement, the agency may set 

any “reasonable” fee. §406(a)(1). In either case, the agency is required to withhold up to 25% of past-due benefits for direct payment 

of any fee. §406(a)(4). For representation in court proceedings, fees 

are capped at 25% of past-due benefits, and the agency has authority

to withhold such benefits to pay these fees. §406(b)(1)(A).

 Petitioner Culbertson represented Katrina Wood in Social Security 

disability benefit proceedings before the agency and in District Court. 

The agency ultimately awarded Wood past-due benefits, withheld 

25% of those benefits to pay any attorney’s fees, and awarded Culbertson fees under §406(a) for representation before the agency. Culbertson then moved for a separate fee award under §406(b) for the 

court proceedings, requesting a full 25% of past-due benefits. The 

District Court granted the request, but only in part, because Culbertson did not subtract the amount he had already received under 

§406(a) for his agency-level representation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the 25% limit under §406(b) applies to the total 

fees awarded under both §§406(a) and (b).

Held: Section 406(b)(1)(A)’s 25% cap applies only to fees for court representation and not to the aggregate fees awarded under §§406(a) and 

(b). Pp. 5–9.
2 CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL

Syllabus

 (a) Section 406(b) provides that a court rendering a favorable 

judgment to a claimant “represented before the court by an attorney” 

may award “a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 

25 percent” of past-due benefits. Here, the adjective “such,” which 

means “[o]f the kind or degree already described or implied,” refers to 

the only form of representation “already described” in §406(b)—i.e., 

“represent[ation] before the court.” Thus, the 25% cap applies only 

to fees for representation before the court, not the agency.

Subsections (a) and (b) address different stages of the representation and use different methods for calculating fees. Given this statutory structure, applying §406(b)’s 25% cap on court-stage fees to 

§406(a) agency-stage fees, or the aggregate of §§406(a) and (b) fees, 

would make little sense. For example, such a reading would subject 

§406(a)(1)’s reasonableness limitation to §406(b)’s 25% cap—a limitation not included in the relevant provision of the statute. Had Congress wanted agency-stage fees to be capped at 25%, it presumably 

would have said so directly in subsection (a). Pp. 5–7. 

 (b) The fact that the agency presently withholds a single pool of 

25% of past-due benefits for direct payment of agency and court fees 

does not support an aggregate reading. The statutory text provides 

for two pools of money for direct payment of fees. See §§406(a)(4), 

(b)(1)(A). The agency’s choice to withhold only one pool of 25% of 

past-due benefits does not alter this text. More fundamentally, the 

amount of past-due benefits that the agency can withhold for direct 

payment does not delimit the amount of fees that can be approved for 

representation before the agency or the court. Pp. 7–9. 

861 F. 3d 1197, reversed and remanded.

 THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

No. 17–773

_________________ 

RICHARD ALLEN CULBERTSON, PETITIONER v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER

OF SOCIAL SECURITY

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[January 8, 2019] 

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Federal law regulates the fees that attorneys may 

charge Social Security claimants for representation before 

the Social Security Administration and a reviewing court. 

See 42 U. S. C. §§406(a)–(b). The question in this case is 

whether the statutory scheme limits the aggregate 

amount of fees for both stages of representation to 25% of 

the claimant’s past-due benefits. Because §406(b) by its 

terms imposes a 25% cap on fees only for representation 

before a court, and §406(a) has separate caps on fees for 

representation before the agency, we hold that the statute 

does not impose a 25% cap on aggregate fees.

I 

A 

Title II of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 622, as 

amended, 42 U. S. C. §401 et seq., “is an insurance program” that “provides old-age, survivor, and disability 

benefits to insured individuals irrespective of financial 

need.” Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U. S. 74, 75 (1988). A 

claimant’s application for Title II benefits can result in 
2 CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

payments of past-due benefits—i.e., benefits that accrued 

before a favorable decision, 20 CFR §404.1703 (2018)—as

well as ongoing monthly benefits, see 42 U. S. C. §423(a). 

A claimant who has been denied benefits “in whole or in 

part” by the Social Security Administration may seek 

administrative review of the initial agency determination, 

§405(b), and may then seek judicial review of the resulting 

final agency decision, §405(g). 

As presently written, the Social Security Act “discretely” 

addresses attorney’s fees for the administrative and

judicial-review stages: “§406(a) governs fees for representation in administrative proceedings; §406(b) controls fees for

representation in court.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U. S. 

789, 794 (2002). The original Social Security Act made no

such provision for attorney’s fees in either proceeding. Id.,

at 793, n. 2. But in 1939, “Congress amended the Act to 

permit the Social Security Board to prescribe maximum 

fees attorneys could charge for representation of claimants 

before the agency.” Ibid. In 1965, Congress added a new 

subsection (b) to §406 that explicitly prescribed fees for

representation before a court and “allow[ed] withholding 

of past-due benefits to pay” these fees directly to the attorney. Social Security Amendments of 1965, §332, 79 

Stat. 403; Bowen, 485 U. S., at 76. In 1968, Congress 

amended subsection (a) to give the agency similar withholding authority to pay attorney’s fees incurred in administrative proceedings. Id., at 76.

Section 406(a) is titled “Recognition of representatives; 

fees for representation before Commissioner” of Social 

Security. It includes two ways to determine fees for representation before the agency, depending on whether a prior 

fee agreement exists. If the claimant has a fee agreement, 

subsection (a)(2) caps fees at the lesser of 25% of past-due 

benefits or a set dollar amount—currently $6,000. 

§406(a)(2)(A); Maximum Dollar Limit in the Fee Agreement Process, 74 Fed. Reg. 6080 (2009). Absent a fee 
Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 

Opinion of the Court

agreement, subsection (a)(1) gives the agency authority to 

“prescribe the maximum fees which may be charged for 

services performed in connection with any claim” before 

the agency. If the claimant obtains a favorable agency 

determination, the agency may allot “a reasonable fee to 

compensate such attorney for the services performed by 

him.”

Subsection (a)(4) requires the agency to withhold up to 

25% of past-due benefits for direct payment of any fee for 

representation before the agency:

“[I]f the claimant is determined to be entitled to pastdue benefits under this subchapter and the person 

representing the claimant is an attorney, the Commissioner of Social Security shall . . . certify for payment out of such past-due benefits . . . to such attorney an amount equal to so much of the maximum fee 

as does not exceed 25 percent of such past-due

benefits . . . .”

Section 406(b) is titled “Fees for representation before 

court.” Subsection (b)(1)(A) both limits these fees to no 

more than 25% of past-due benefits and allows the agency 

to withhold past-due benefits to pay these fees:

“Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a 

claimant under this subchapter who was represented 

before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable 

fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 

of the total of the past-due benefits to which the 

claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and 

the Commissioner of Social Security may . . . certify 

the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney 

out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such pastdue benefits.”

At issue is whether §406(b)’s 25% cap limits the aggre-
4 CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

gate fees awarded for representation before both the agency

under §406(a) and the court under §406(b), or instead 

limits only the fee awarded for court representation under 

§406(b).

B 

Petitioner Richard Culbertson represented claimant 

Katrina Wood in proceedings seeking Social Security 

disability benefits. After the agency denied Wood benefits, 

she brought an action in district court. For the court 

action, Wood signed a contingency-fee agreement “to pay a 

fee of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to 

which [she] is entitled” in consideration for Culbertson’s 

“representation of [her] in Federal Court.” App. 8–9. The 

agreement excludes fees for “any representation before” 

the agency. Id., at 9.

The District Court reversed the agency’s denial of benefits and remanded for further proceedings. The court 

granted Wood attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to 

Justice Act (EAJA), which authorizes an award against 

the Government for reasonable fees in “civil action[s].” 28 

U. S. C. §§2412(d)(1)(A) and (2)(A). 

On remand, the agency awarded Wood past-due disability benefits and withheld 25% of those benefits to pay any 

attorney’s fees that might ultimately be awarded. The 

agency also awarded Culbertson §406(a) fees for representing Wood before the agency.

Culbertson then moved the District Court for a separate 

fee award under §406(b) for representing Wood there. 

After accounting for the EAJA award, see Gisbrecht, supra, at 796; App. 9, this request amounted to a full 25% of 

past-due benefits. The court granted Culbertson’s request 

only in part because he did not subtract the amount he 

had already received under §406(a) for his agency-level 

representation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying on 

Circuit precedent to hold that “the 25% limit from §406(b) 
Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 5 

Opinion of the Court

applies to total fees awarded under both §406(a) and (b), 

‘preclud[ing] the aggregate allowance of attorney’s fees 

greater than twenty-five percent of the past due benefits 

received by the claimant.’” Wood v. Commissioner of 

Social Security, 861 F. 3d 1197, 1205 (2017) (quoting 

Dawson v. Finch, 425 F. 2d 1192, 1195 (CA5 1970); emphasis deleted).*

Given a conflict between the Circuits on this question, 

see 861 F. 3d, at 1205–1206, we granted certiorari. 584 

U. S. ___ (2018). Because no party defends the judgment, 

we appointed Amy Weil to brief and argue this case as 

amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. 584 U. S. 

___ (2018). Amicus Weil has ably discharged her assigned 

responsibilities. 

II

A 

We “begi[n] with the language of the statute itself, and 

that is also where the inquiry should end, for the statute’s 

language is plain.” Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free 

Trust, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 9) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Under §406(b), when a court 

“renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was 

represented before the court by an attorney,” the court 

may award “a reasonable fee for such representation, not 

in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits 

to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” 42 U. S. C. §406(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Both 

at the time of enactment and today, the adjective “such” 

means “[o]f the kind or degree already described or implied.” H. Fowler & F. Fowler, Concise Oxford Dictionary 

of Current English 1289 (5th ed. 1964); Black’s Law Dictionary 1661 (10th ed. 2014) (“[t]hat or those; having just 

—————— 

*See Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F. 2d 1206, 1209 (CA11 1981) (en banc) 

(adopting all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit announced prior to 

October 1, 1981, as binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit).
6 CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

been mentioned”). Here, the only form of representation 

“already described” in §406(b) is “represent[ation] before 

the court by an attorney.” Accordingly, the 25% cap applies only to fees for representation before the court, not 

the agency.

This interpretation is supported by “the structure of the 

statute and its other provisions.” Maracich v. Spears, 570

U. S. 48, 60 (2013). As an initial matter, subsections (a) 

and (b) address different stages of the representation. 

Section 406(a) addresses fees for representation “before 

the Commissioner,” whereas §406(b) addresses fees for 

representation in court. Because some claimants will 

prevail before the agency and have no need to bring a 

court action, it is unsurprising that the statute contemplates separate fees for each stage of representation.

These subsections also calculate fees differently. Section 406(b) applies a flat 25% cap on fees for court representation. By contrast, §406(a) provides two ways to 

determine fees for agency proceedings. Subsection (a)(2) 

caps fees based on a fee agreement at the lesser of 25% of 

past-due benefits or $6,000. Supra, at 2. If there is no fee 

agreement, the agency may set any fee, including a fee 

greater than 25% of past-due benefits, so long as the fee is 

“reasonable.” §406(a)(1).

Given this statutory structure, applying §406(b)’s 25% 

cap on court-stage fees to §406(a) agency-stage fees, or the 

aggregate of §§406(a) and (b) fees, would make little sense. 

Many claimants will never litigate in court, yet under the 

aggregate reading, agency fees would be capped at 25% 

based on a provision related exclusively to representation 

in court. Absent a fee agreement, §406(a)(1) subjects 

agency fees only to a reasonableness limitation, so applying §406(b)’s cap to such fees would add a limitation that 

Congress did not include in the relevant provision of the 

statute. If Congress had wanted these fees to be capped at 

25%, it presumably would have said so directly in subsec-
Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 7 

Opinion of the Court

tion (a), instead of providing for a “reasonable fee” in that 

subsection and adding a 25% cap in §406(b) without even 

referencing subsection (a). Thus, the structure of the 

statute confirms that §406(b) caps only court representation fees.

B 

Amicus Amy Weil agrees that “§406(a) and §406(b) 

provide separate avenues for an award of attorney’s fees 

for representation of a Social Security claimant,” but 

emphasizes that “these fees are certified for payment out 

of a single source: the 25% of past-due benefits withheld 

by the Commissioner.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus 

Curiae 10. According to Amicus, “[b]ecause the Commissioner withholds only one pool of 25% of past-due benefits 

from which to pay attorney’s fees for both agency and 

court representation, for an attorney to collect a fee that 

exceeds the 25% pool of withheld disability benefits,” the 

attorney may “need to file a lawsuit against his disabled 

client” to collect the difference. Id., at 23–24. Therefore, 

Amicus urges, “[w]hen the statute is read as a whole,” “it 

is evident that Congress placed a cumulative 25% cap on 

attorney’s fees payable for successful representation of a 

Social Security claimant before both the agency and the 

court.” Id., at 10.

Amicus is quite right that presently the agency withholds a single pool of 25% of past-due benefits for direct 

payment of agency and court fees. See Social Security 

Administration, Program Operations Manual System 

(POMS), GN 03920.035(A), online at https://policy.ssa.gov/

poms.nsf/lnx/0203920035 (as last visited Jan. 2, 2019); see 

also 20 CFR §§404.1730(a) and (b)(1)(i). And Amicus

sensibly argues that if there is only a single 25% pool for 

direct payment of fees, Congress might not have intended 

aggregate fees higher than 25%. This argument is plausible, but the statutory text in fact provides for two pools of 
8 CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

money for direct payment of fees. Any shortage of withheld benefits for direct payment of fees is thus due to 

agency policy.

Under §406(a)(4), the agency “shall” certify for direct 

payment of agency representation fees “an amount equal 

to so much of the maximum fee as does not exceed 25 

percent of” past-due benefits. In other words, this subsection requires that the agency withhold the approved fees 

for work performed in agency proceedings, up to 25% of 

the amount of the claimant’s past-due benefits. But this is 

not the only subsection that enables the agency to withhold past-due benefits for direct payment of fees. Section 

406(b)(1)(A) provides that the agency “may” certify pastdue benefits for direct payment of court representation 

fees. As the Government explains, the agency has nevertheless “exercised its discretion . . . to withhold a total of 

25% of past-due benefits for direct payment of the approved agency and court fees.” Reply Brief for Respondent 

8 (emphasis added). The agency’s choice to withhold only 

one pool of 25% of past-due benefits does not alter the 

statutory text, which differentiates between agency representation in §406(a) and court representation in §406(b), 

contains separate caps on fees for each type of representation, and authorizes two pools of withheld benefits.

More fundamentally, the amount of past-due benefits 

that the agency can withhold for direct payment does not 

delimit the amount of fees that can be approved for representation before the agency or the court. The attorney 

might receive a direct payment out of past-due benefits, 

but that payment could be less than the fees to which the 

attorney is entitled. Indeed, prior to 1968, the statute 

allowed fees for agency representation but lacked a provision for direct payment of such fees from past-due benefits. See supra, at 2. And under the current §§406(a)(1) 

and (4), the agency can award a “reasonable fee” that 

exceeds the 25% of past-due benefits it can withhold for 
Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 9 

Opinion of the Court

direct payment.

In short, despite the force of Amicus’ arguments, the 

statute does not bear her reading. Any concerns about a 

shortage of withheld benefits for direct payment and the 

consequences of such a shortage are best addressed to the 

agency, Congress, or the attorney’s good judgment.

* * * 

Because the 25% cap in §406(b)(1)(A) applies only to fees 

for court representation, and not to the aggregate fees 

awarded under §§406(a) and (b), the judgment of the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is 

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.