United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 12-1242

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Justin R. Bicket

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

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 Submitted: December 11, 2012

 Filed: January 30, 2013

[Unpublished]

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Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

A jury found Justin Bicket guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Bicket to sixty-five 1

The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for the District of 1

Nebraska.
months of imprisonment. Bicket appeals his conviction, challenging the sufficiency

of the evidence to support his conviction and arguing the district court abused its

discretion in limiting the scope of his cross examination. We affirm.

Bicket was arrested by two members of the Metro Omaha Fugitive Task Force

who were enforcing a felony warrant for Bicket's arrest. The arrest occurred after

Bicket fled his residence in a white sedan with the officers in pursuit, drove to an

apartment complex, and entered a pickup driven by a friend. The officersstopped the

pickup, searched it, and found a red shoe box on the front passenger floorboard with

two loaded firearms inside. Bicket's DNA wasfound on both weapons in subsequent

DNA testing of the grip, hammer, trigger and safety of each firearm. A federal grand

jury indicted Bicket with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He exercised his right to a jury trial, stipulating

to his status as a felon.

To prove Bicket possessed the two firearms, the government called Bicket's

girlfriend as a witness. On the day of Bicket's arrest, his girlfriend saw Bicket sitting

on his bed with a red shoe box in his lap, wiping down two firearms with his shirt. 

Bicket then left his residence and drove away in a white sedan. Bicket's girlfriend

further testified she had seen the two firearms in the red shoe box about a month

before, while she was cleaning the bedroom closet. The government also called the

pickup's driver. He saw Bicket enter the apartment complex parking lot in a white

sedan, retrieve a red shoe box from its trunk, then approach and enter the pickup

while asking to be driven away. In addition, the two arresting officers told the jury

they found the two firearms inside the red shoe box on the passenger side of the

pickup's floorboard, and that Bicket had been seated on the pickup's passenger side

prior to his arrest. Finally, the government introduced the evidence of Bicket's DNA

on the two firearms.

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At trial, Bicket argued his DNA had been transferred onto the firearms from

one of the two officers during the arrest. Bicket called an expert who opined that a

secondary transfer of DNA was possible through the sweat of an arresting officer. On

cross examination, the expert admitted the possibility of a secondary transfer wasless

likely because of the snow and cold weather present at the time of the arrest, the

location of the firearms inside a closed shoe box, and the fact that the officer who

secured the firearms (using latex gloves) never came into contact with Bicket during

the arrest. The government also recalled its DNA expert, who testified a secondary

transfer was unlikely primarily because of the intensity of Bicket's DNA on both

firearms in multiple places.

To support his claim, however, Bicket asked questions to show DNA samples

had not been taken from the other people present at the time of the arrest (the two

officers and the pickup driver). Bicket's counsel asked one officer whether a DNA

sample had been collected from him, and he answered no. Trial counsel also asked

the same officer whether he knew if a DNA sample had been taken from the other

officer or the pickup driver, and he answered no. During cross examination of the

pickup driver, Bicket's trial counsel asked the driver whether he had supplied a DNA

sample. The government objected, and the district court sustained the objection. 

Similarly, during the cross examination of the government's DNA expert, Bicket's

trial counsel asked him whether he had compared DNA samples from either of the

arresting officers, or from the pickup driver, to the DNA profiles found on the

firearms. The government objected. The district court sustained the objection. After

considering all the evidence, the jury found Bicket guilty. He filed a timely appeal.

We review Bicket's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and giving the verdict

the benefit of all reasonable inferences. United States v. Johnson, 688 F.3d 494, 502

(8th Cir. 2012). In support of his claim, Bicket merely contends both his girlfriend

and his friend (the pickup driver) lacked credibility. This argument is unavailing in

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the context of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The testimony of the

two witnesses, if accepted by the jury, was sufficient to prove Bicket possessed the

two firearms, and it was up to the jury to assess credibility. See id.

Bicket also contends the district court abused its discretion by limiting the

scope of his cross examination with respect to whether DNA samples other than his

own had been collected or analyzed. Reviewing this claim for an abuse of discretion,

United States v. Holy Bull, 613 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir. 2010), we find none. The

district court correctly determined the question posed to the pickup driver about his

DNA was irrelevant because the presence of the driver's DNA on the firearms would

have only shown the possibility of joint possession, but would not have negated the

government's overwhelming proof of Bicket's own possession. See United States v.

Sianis, 275 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2002) (indicating the government need not prove

exclusive possession of a firearm to prove a violation of § 922(g)(1)). In addition, the

question posed to the government's DNA expert about other samples was cumulative,

because Bicket's counsel had already established through one of the arresting officers

that no DNA samples other than Bicket's had been collected or analyzed. Finally, the

evidence the government presented through the girlfriend, the pickup driver, and the

two arresting officers was sufficient to convict Bicket without even considering the

DNA evidence. Thus, any evidentiary errors with respect to the cumulative DNA

evidence would have been harmless in any event. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).

We affirm the judgment of conviction.

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