#### EULAS MAYZE v. TOWN OF FOREST CITY, Employer, and U. S. CASUALTY COMPANY, Insurance Carrier.

(Filed 10 October, 1934.)

1. Master and Servant F i—

The finding of the Industrial Commission that claimant is an employee of defendant employer is conclusive on appeal when supported by evidence.

2. Master and Servant F a — Fact that city’s employee is paid from funds obtained from Reconstruction Finance Corporation does not affect contract of employment.

A worker einployed by a city under a contract stipulating the wages to be received by the worker is an employee of the city within the meaning of the Compensation Act, and the fact that the city obtains the money to pay the wages from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is immaterial on the question of the relationship between the worker and the city. N. C. Code, 8081 (i).

Stacy, C. J., dissents.

Appeal by plaintiff from *Finley, J.,*at April Term, 1934, of Rutheb-eobd.

Reversed.

This proceeding was begun before the North Carolina Industrial Commission for compensation under the provisions of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act. Ch. 120, Public Laws of N. C., 1929; ch. 133 (a), N. C. Code of 1931.

*169On tbe facts found bj tbe bearing commissioner, and approved on defendants’ appeal by tbe full Commission, an award of compensation to be paid to plaintiff by tbe defendants was made. On defendants’ appeal to tbe judge of tbe Superior Court, tbis award was reversed.

From tbe judgment reversing tbe award of tbe Industrial Commission, and dismissing tbe proceeding, tbe plaintiff appealed to tbe Supreme Court.

*Tom J. Moss and W. B. Matheny for plaintiff.*

*Ralph V. Kidd for defendants.*

CONNOR, J.

Tbe defendants excepted to tbe finding by tbe Industrial Commission tbat plaintiff was an employee of tbe town of Forest City at tbe time be suffered an injury by accident, wbicb arose out of and in tbe course of bis employment, and contended tbat all tbe evidence showed tbat plaintiff was a relief worker, and not an employee of tbe town of Forest City at tbe time be was injured. Tbis exception was sustained by tbe judge of tbe Superior Court. In tbis there was error. There was evidence at least in support of tbe finding by tbe Industrial Commission, and for tbat reason tbe finding is conclusive. *Bryson v. Lamber Co.,*204 N. C., 665, 169 S. E., 276.

In *Jackson v. Relief Administration,*206 N. C., 274, 173 S. E., 580, and in *Bell v. Raleigh,*206 N. C., 275, 173 S. E., 581, all tbe evidence showed tbat at tbe time plaintiff in each case was injured be was working under an assignment by tbe Welfare Department of Wake County and not under a contract with tbe defendants, or with either of them. In tbe instant case tbe plaintiff was employed by tbe Superintendent of Water and Lights of tbe town of Forest City, at wages agreed upon by plaintiff and said superintendent. Tbe fact tbat plaintiff’s wages were paid out of funds procured by tbe town from tbe Deconstruction Finance Corporation was immaterial on tbe question involving tbe relationship between tbe plaintiff and tbe town of Forest City. Such relationship was established by contract between tbe plaintiff and tbe defendant town of Forest City, and for tbat reason was a relationship of employee and employer.

There was error in tbe judgment reversing tbe award of tbe Industrial Commission, and dismissing tbe proceeding. Tbe judgment is

Beversed.

Stacy, C. J., dissents.