SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3621-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

ALBERT FRENCH, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

___________________________

Argued November 1, 2023 – Decided December 13, 2023 

Before Judges Susswein and Vanek. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hunterdon County, Municipal Appeal. No. 

2-A-2021. 

Dana Lauren Wefer argued the cause for appellant (Law 

Offices of Dana Wefer, LLC, attorneys; Dana Lauren 

Wefer, on the brief). 

Joseph B. Paravecchia, First Assistant Hunterdon 

County Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent 

(Renée M. Robeson, Hunterdon County Prosecutor, 

attorney; Joseph B. Paravecchia, of counsel and on the 

brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3621-21

PER CURIAM 

Defendant Albert French appeals two convictions for violating Executive 

Order 107 (EO 107)1 and one conviction for violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-342

following municipal court trials and a subsequent de novo review by the Law 

Division. The convictions arise from April 7 and May 6, 2020 incidents when 

defendant was stopped by police officers after they observed him walking on the 

side of a highway in Clinton Township making lewd gestures and holding up 

signs toward passing motorists during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

After careful review of the record and prevailing law, we affirm 

defendant's conviction for walking with traffic in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-34 

and reverse both convictions for violations of EO 107. 

I.

We discern the following material facts in the record on appeal. The State 

asserts that defendant was charged by summons with the following offenses 

1

 EO 107 was signed by Governor Philip D. Murphy on March 21, 2020 in 

response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Order implemented measures to 

address the public health emergency. Exec. Order No. 107 (Mar. 21, 2020), 

52 N.J.R. 554(a) (Apr. 6, 2020). 

2

 The Law Division refers to this count as walking with traffic in violation of 

N.J.S.A. 39:4-34. 
3 A-3621-21

stemming from the April 7, 2020 incident: two counts of disorderly conduct in 

violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2A(2) arising from defendant's alleged shaking of 

his genitalia from outside his clothing and raising his middle finger toward the 

police, two counts of disorderly conduct in violation of local ordinance 198-

10(c), one count of violating EO 107, and one count of violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-

34 for failing to cross within a crosswalk. The summons for the violation of EO 

107 pursuant to N.J.S.A. A:9-49(h), marked SC-002985, does not contain any 

factual basis for the charge.3 

With regard to the May 6, 2020 incident, defendant was issued summons 

S-2020-104, which included one charge for disorderly conduct in violation of 

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(2),4 and violations of EO 107 through N.J.S.A. A:9-49(a) 

and (g) for walking along the highway holding up signs to passing motorists 

stating "PHUCK," "#THIN BLUE," and "Slow Down Police Ahead" in noncompliance with the gubernatorial mandate to stay home that was in effect at the 

time because of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. 

3

 The only summons in the record relating to the April 7 incident alleges a 

violation of EO 107. The summons charging a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-34 

is not in the record before us. 

4

 This charge is based upon a factual predicate similar to the April 7, 2020 

incident. 
4 A-3621-21

All of the charges were tried in municipal court through two proceedings 

held on March 25, 2021. 

II. 

The State called police officer William Musacchio5 of the Clinton 

Township Police Department to testify as to the April 7, 2020 incident. 

Musacchio was in a marked police vehicle located in a median cut out of Route 

22 when he observed defendant walking westbound in the eastbound lanes 

carrying a posterboard. 

Musacchio was only able to read the first word of the sign that read "p-hu-c-k," which the officer took as a misspelling of a curse word. As instructed 

by his superiors, Musacchio contacted the prosecutor's office to discuss a 

potential violation of EO 107 after watching defendant walk across the highway 

in an area with no crosswalk. While he was on the telephone with the 

prosecutor's office, Musacchio observed defendant "grab his genitalia from 

outside of his clothing" and "shake his genitalia in an up and downward motion" 

towards the motorists on the highway and then towards him. He then saw 

defendant "raise his hand and gesture the middle finger to the motoring public." 

5

 We note that the Law Division decision refers to Officer Musacchio as Officer 

Masacchio. We use the spelling of the officer's name from the police 

investigation report. 
5 A-3621-21

Musacchio decided it would be appropriate to take defendant into custody 

to enforce EO 107 and multiple disorderly conduct charges. Musacchio and an 

assisting officer found defendant to be irate and emotional. 

When the officers informed defendant they were detaining him, he 

responded that he was "essential." Musacchio understood this to mean 

defendant was asserting he was an essential worker. Musacchio did not believe 

defendant but he did not ask defendant whether he was commuting to or from 

work. During Musacchio's testimony on direct examination, the municipal court 

judge was presented with video, recorded from the patrol car's dashboard, of the 

incident on which defendant can be heard asking the officers: "Are you saying 

I'm not an essential worker?"6 

Musacchio testified that although defendant was holding up a posterboard 

sign at the time of the interaction, he did not ask defendant if he was protesting. 

The officer also testified that if defendant had not raised the posterboard sign, 

he would have just asked him if he was okay and where he was heading. 

The officers told defendant not to leave the scene, but he walked away 

from them despite the instruction. The officers decided not to pursue him and 

6

 The video is not part of the record on this appeal. The transcript is inconsistent 

as to whether defendant used the word "employee" rather than "worker" during 

this inquiry. This distinction is not essential to our analysis. 
6 A-3621-21

instead mailed the summonses for failure to use a crosswalk, violation of EO 

107 and various disorderly conduct charges. No other witnesses testified at the 

trial. 

After summations, the municipal court issued an oral decision finding it 

was undisputed that the April 7, 2020 interaction between Musacchio and 

defendant occurred while EO 107 was in effect. Further, the court found the 

State had met its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that 

defendant violated EO 107 while on the side of the highway. The court noted 

that regardless of whether or not the sign defendant was carrying was political, 

he should not have been on the roadway in light of the restriction imposed under 

EO 107. Accordingly, the municipal court convicted defendant of violating EO 

107 and imposed fines and court costs.7 

III. 

The municipal court next tried the charges stemming from the May 6, 

2020 incident. The State called Sergeant Jeffrey Glennon as the sole witness. 

Glennon testified that on May 6 around 4:21 p.m., he responded to a report of 

7

 The court also convicted defendant of disorderly conduct, but that conviction 

was vacated by the Law Division judge and is not part of this appeal. 

Defendant was found not guilty of failing to walk in a crosswalk. 
7 A-3621-21

an individual walking in the roadway. When he arrived at the scene, he saw an 

individual, later identified as defendant, walking with a sign. 

When Glennon approached, he recognized defendant from prior police 

interactions. Defendant began yelling that he was an essential employee and 

pointing at the business logo on his sweatshirt. As Glennon attempted to ask 

defendant some questions, defendant continued to yell he was an essential 

employee and he had the right to protest. Glennon observed defendant holding 

a posterboard sign stating in part "PHUCK," "#THIN BLUE," and "Slow Down 

Police Ahead." Defendant further told Glennon as he was protesting that he 

"didn't want to be part of [the sergeant's] investigation anymore," he demanded 

to be freed from detention, and he continued screaming at the officer. 

Glennon testified that two additional officers then reported to the scene, 

and defendant told them he was working. The officers told defendant he could 

leave the scene, and defendant walked away backwards while raising his middle 

finger toward them. The officers observed defendant turn around and begin 

walking in the same direction as traffic. Glennon testified: "When he was 

walking backwards he's facing the proper way, you have to face traffic. But 

then once he turned around, he wasn't facing traffic, he was walking with 

traffic." 
8 A-3621-21

Eventually, defendant got into a vehicle and drove away. Glennon 

subsequently confirmed with defendant's employer that he had worked in the 

afternoon and left his job about twenty minutes before the police interaction. 

Glennon testified that after consulting with the prosecutor's office he mailed 

defendant summonses for violation of EO 107, disorderly conduct and walking 

in the roadway. 

After summations from counsel, the municipal court issued an oral 

decision. The court found it was beyond dispute that the May 6, 2020 incident 

occurred while EO 107 was in effect. The municipal court found that defendant 

had not presented evidence to support his argument that he was returning from 

work at the time of the encounter with police. The municipal court convicted 

defendant of violating EO 107 and the statute prohibiting walking in the same 

direction as traffic. Defendant was not convicted of the remaining charges. 

IV. 

Defendant appealed to the Law Division, contending that the State's 

proofs at both trials were insufficient to sustain the convictions. Defendant 

further argued that he did not violate EO 107 since he was engaged in activities 

permitted under EO 107 including walking, traveling home from work, and 

participating in political speech. 
9 A-3621-21

On June 15, 2022, the Law Division reviewed the municipal court 

convictions de novo. The court deferred to the credibility determinations made 

by the municipal court judge. See State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 382 (2015). 

The Law Division upheld the two convictions for violating EO 107 on April 7 

and May 6, 2020, and the conviction of walking with traffic. 

The Law Division's written decision states because "[t]here is little case 

law or precedent concerning convictions based on violations" of EO 107, "the 

court must rely primarily on the plain text of the order, as well as the text of the 

applicable sections (g) and (h)" of N.J.S.A. A:9-49. The Law Division ruled 

defendant had "an explicit obligation to cooperate with law enforcement in 

connection with any allowed activities. He did not do so, and in not doing so, 

he violated a rule adopted and promulgated by the [G]overnor." 

Although the Law Division found defendant was walking outdoors alone 

and protesting on the side of the road, it concluded he was not engaged in 

"traditional recreational activity" and stated: 

[Defendant] was protesting on the side of the road—he 

was engaged in a high-conflict activity with a much

greater chance of resulting in interpersonal activity than 

jogging around one's neighborhood or taking a solitary 

walk. . . 

 . . . . 
10 A-3621-21

The court finds that while [defendant] was outside, he 

was not engaged in the sort of outdoor recreational

activity contemplated by a broad interpretation of [EO] 

107 and in consideration of the purpose behind that

order. 

 The Law Division also concluded the officers' testimony and the presence 

of the signs bearing profanity "weigh[ed] against the possibility that [defendant] 

was returning from work." The Law Division judge stated: 

[E]ven if he was returning from work, there can be no 

doubt that under the order, essential employees could 

leave their residences to go to work, and to go home 

from work, not to leave work, engage in a disallowed 

activity for a period of time and then continue on the 

way home. 

The Law Division judge made the factual finding that defendant was 

protesting on April 7, 2020 and concluded this could be a form of political 

activity. However, the judge stated: 

[W]hen read with the purpose of the act in mind, 

it is clear that individuals were to leave their residences, 

perform the . . . political purpose of their leaving in as 

efficient and socially distanced a manner as possible, 

and then go home. [Voting, for example, would] fall 

under this type of exception. Instead, [defendant]

engaged in a public high-conflict activity of an 

indefinite [duration,] an activity which unlike voting 

could have waited until the threat of emergency had

subsided. 
11 A-3621-21

As to the May 6, 2020 police interaction, the court concluded EO 107 

"allows for individuals to engage in outdoor recreational activity while 

following best social distancing practices." However, the Law Division found 

defendant was not engaged in such outdoor recreational activity because "[h]e 

was in an unusual place. He was standing on the immediate shoulder of the 

road, very close to where cars would be driving, during a time of emergency." 

The Law Division concluded defendant "demonstrated an utter 

unwillingness to cooperate with the officer[s] or even to engage in reasoned 

conversation with them. He was hostile and combative towards the officers who 

were carrying out their lawful duties during a time of emergency." Further, the 

Law Division found that defendant was not engaged in political activity and 

concluded defendant was not returning home from work. The Law Division 

stated "walking backwards while holding a sign is simply not a part of 

commuting to and from work in an efficient and socially distant manner." 

The Law Division also upheld the conviction under N.J.S.A. 39:4-34 for 

improper walking in the roadway on May 6, 2020. The court found defendant 

walked on the far right of the highway when the statute requires an individual 

to walk on the "extreme left." The Law Division found Glennon's testimony that 
12 A-3621-21

he observed defendant turn around and walk in the direction of traffic was 

undisputed. 

On July 28, 2022, defendant appealed from the Law Division's order. 

V. 

Defendant raises the following contentions on appeal: 

POINT I: 

DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT WAS NOT A 

VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 107 

POINT II: 

THE SUPERIOR COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF 

EO 107 RENDERS THE EXECUTIVE ORDER 

UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE UNDER THE 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 

A. The Superior Court's Interpretation of 

EO 107 Renders the Executive Order 

Unconstitutionally Vague Under the 

Fourteenth Amendment. 

B. As Applied, EO 107 and Disaster 

Control Act Impinge on Defendant's 

First Amendment Right to Protest. 

C. As Applied, EO 107 and Disaster 

Control Act Unconstitutionally 

Infringed on Defendant's Right to 

Freedom of Movement and Fourth 

Amendment Rights Because the State 

Lacked Reasonable Suspicion or 

Probable Cause to Stop and Detain 

Defendant. 
13 A-3621-21

D. Defendant's Speech After Being 

Stopped and Detained by the Police is 

Protected Speech that Cannot Be Used 

as a Basis upon Which to Convict Him. 

POINT III: 

AS APPLIED, THE EXECUTIVE ORDER AND 

DISASTER CONTROL ACT IMPINGE ON 

[DEFENDANT'S] FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 

PROTEST 

POINT IV: 

AS APPLIED, THE EXECUTIVE ORDER AND 

DISASTER CONTROL ACT 

UNCONSTITUTIONALLY INFRINGED ON 

[DEFENDANT'S] RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 

MOVEMENT AND FOURTH AMENDMENT 

RIGHTS BECAUSE THE STATE LACKED 

REASONABLE SUSPICION OR PROBABLE 

CAUSE TO STOP AND DETAIN [DEFENDANT] 

POINT V: 

THE COURT IMPERMISSIBLY SHIFTED THE 

BURDEN TO DEFENDANT TO PROVE HE WAS 

OUT FOR A REASON PERMITTED UNDER EO 107 

POINT VI: 

[DEFENDANT'S] SPEECH AFTER BEING 

STOPPED AND DETAINED BY THE POLICE IS 

PROTECTED SPEECH THAT CANNOT BE USED A 

BASIS UPON WHICH TO CONVICT HIM 

POINT VII: 

THE STATE PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT 

EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANT 

WALKED THE WRONG WAY ON THE HIGHWAY 

AND THE COURT ERRED IN ITS 

INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE AT ISSUE 
14 A-3621-21

VI. 

Appellate review "focuses on whether there is 'sufficient credible 

evidence . . . in the record' to support the trial court's findings." State v. 

Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 148 (2017) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 

(1964)). "[A]ppellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent 

findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent 

a very obvious and exceptional showing of error." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 

463, 474 (1999). 

Legal determinations by the Law Division and municipal court, however, 

are considered de novo. Robertson, 228 N.J. at 148. We review the

interpretation and application of gubernatorial executive orders de novo. 

Talmadge Vill. LLC v. Wilson, 468 N.J. Super. 514, 517 (App. Div. 2021) 

(instructing the courts to "interpret the meaning of a valid executive order de 

novo"). 

VII. 

We first consider defendant's convictions for violating EO 107 on April 7 

and May 6, 2020. Defendant argues that at the time of both incidents he was 

engaged in conduct that is exempted under EO 107, including walking, political 

activity, and commuting from his job. 
15 A-3621-21

"The Governor is authorized to issue executive orders, [as] 'a wellaccepted tool of gubernatorial action.'" Kravitz v. Murphy, 468 N.J. Super. 592, 

610 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Perth Amboy Bd. of Educ. v. Christie, 413 N.J. 

Super. 590, 598-99 (App. Div. 2010)). On March 21, 2020, Governor Murphy 

issued EO 107 "in response to [the] health-related emergenc[y] caused by the 

spread of the COVID-19 coronavirus." JWC Fitness, LLC v. Murphy, 469 N.J. 

Super. 414, 419 (App. Div. 2021). 

In interpreting the meaning and scope of EO 107, we consider the "plain 

language, and if we find the language ambiguous we consider the legislative 

history and purpose of the enactments." State v. Toussaint, 440 N.J. Super. 526, 

530 (App. Div. 2015); see also Rozenblit v. Lyles, 245 N.J. 105, 121 (2021). 

"To that end, we first consider the statutory language. Where words are not 

given specified meanings within the statute, we afford those words their ordinary 

meanings, viewed in context of the legislation as a whole." JWC Fitness, LLC, 

469 N.J. Super. at 425 (internal citation omitted); see N.J.S.A. 1:1-1. "In this 

way, we must construe the statute sensibly and consistent with the objectives 

that the Legislature sought to achieve." Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 480 

(2013). 
16 A-3621-21

EO 107 states in part as follows:8 

2. All New Jersey residents shall remain home or at

their place of residence unless they are . . . 5) reporting 

to, or performing, their job; 6) walking, running, 

operating a wheelchair, or engaging in outdoor 

activities with immediate family members, caretakers, 

household members, or romantic partners while 

following best social distancing practices with other 

individuals, including staying six feet apart; 7) leaving 

the home for an educational, religious, or political 

reason . . . . 

3. When in public, individuals must practice social

distancing and stay six feet apart whenever practicable, 

excluding immediate family members, caretakers, 

household members, or romantic partners. 

. . . . 

24. It shall be the duty of every person or entity in this 

State or doing business in this State and of the members 

of the governing body and every official, employee, or 

agent of every political subdivision in this State and of 

each member of all other governmental bodies, 

agencies, and authorities in this State of any nature 

whatsoever, to cooperate fully in all matters concerning 

this Executive Order. 

[Exec. Order No. 107 (Mar. 21, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 554(a) 

(Apr. 6, 2020).] 

8

 On June 9, 2020, paragraph two of EO 107, as relevant to this matter, was 

rescinded by the issuance of paragraph eleven in EO 153. Exec. Order No. 

153 (June 9, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 1303(a) (July 6, 2020).
17 A-3621-21

N.J.S.A. A:9-49(g) and (h) require cooperation with emergency orders and 

deem the failure to do so a disorderly persons offense. 

At an April 4, 2020 press briefing, the Governor was asked specifically 

about the ability to protest under EO 107. He responded: "[D]on't protest as a 

group. We respect folks who want to protest, find some other way to do it 

virtually online, whatever it might be." (Gov. Phil Murphy, Transcript: 

Coronavirus Briefing Media (April 7, 2020), 

https://nj.gov/governor/news/news/562020/approved/20200407f.shtml).

The Governor further clarified his position regarding protests under the 

relevant executive orders at a press briefing on April 29, 2020: 

People have a right to protest. I wish they would do it 

from home . . . . The thing that really bothered me was 

they were congregating, and they weren't wearing 

masks for the most part and they were on top of each 

other and that's what led to the [violation of the 

executive order] . . . . I wish folks would protest from 

home and virtually, but if they're going to protest we're 

[going to] be tough on enforcing the . . . no 

congregation. 

[Gov. Phil Murphy, Transcript: Coronavirus Briefing 

Media (April 29, 2020), 

https://nj.gov/governor/news/news/562020/approved/2

0200429d.shtml.] 

During oral argument on this appeal, we asked the parties if any 

subsequent guidance on prosecuting violations of EO 107 had been issued. The 
18 A-3621-21

State submitted a letter pursuant to Rule 2:6-11(d)(1) acknowledging a June 17, 

2020 memorandum from the State of New Jersey Attorney General entitled 

"Guidance Regarding Municipal Prosecutors' Discretion in Prosecuting COVID19 Related Offenses" (the Attorney General Memorandum). Att'y Gen., 

Guidance Regarding Municipal Prosecutors’ Discretion in Prosecuting COVID19 Related Offenses (June 17, 2020). 

The Attorney General Memorandum provides instruction on how and 

when to prosecute COVID-19-related charges in municipal courts. Among other 

provisions, the Memorandum directs: 

Unlike most complaints filed in municipal court, 

COVID-19 related charges are only pursued after a 

review of available facts by the COVID-19 Prosecutor 

and with the COVID-19 Prosecutor's authorization to

proceed with the charge. Indeed, without approval by 

the COVID-19 Prosecutor, COVID-19 related charges 

should not be filed. 

. . . . 

To ensure that all outdoor political activities and

outdoor worship services receive uniform treatment, I 

am directing prosecutors to move to dismiss any 

Executive Order violations previously filed for such 

conduct, despite the initial probable cause 

determination or appropriateness of the violation at the 

time it was issued. Based on data maintained by the 

Division of Criminal Justice, there were five 

individuals who received summonses for organizing 

outdoor political protests and religious services in 
19 A-3621-21

violation of Orders prior to the issuance of Executive 

Order No. 152;[9] no individual protestors or worshipers 

have been cited to date. 

[Att'y Gen., Guidance Regarding Municipal 

Prosecutors' Discretion in Prosecuting COVID-19 

Related Offenses (June 17, 2020).] 

 Notably, the Attorney General Memorandum directs prosecutors to

dismiss any pending charges for "outdoor political activities." The Law 

Division made the factual finding that at the time of both incidents defendant 

was protesting. We agree with the Law Division's conclusion that defendant 

was protesting by holding up posterboards expressing speech for motorists to 

see. 

We further conclude that defendant's protesting constitutes political 

activity for the purposes of EO 107 and the Attorney General Memorandum. 

"Political expression obviously includes any fair comment on any matter of 

public interest, whether or not the subject of an election campaign, whether or 

not embarrassing to the local governing body, and whether or not irritating to 

one's neighbors." State v. Miller, 162 N.J. Super. 333, 338 (App. Div. 1978), 

aff'd 83 N.J. 402 (1980); see Ruthenbeck v. First Crim. Jud. Dist. Court, 7 N.J. 

9

 EO 152 issued new guidance on group gatherings but did not supersede the 

portions of EO 107 relevant to this case. Exec. Order. No. 152 (June 9, 2020), 

52 N.J.R. 1301(a) (July 6, 2020). 
20 A-3621-21

Misc. 969, 969-70 (1929) (in which our Supreme Court vacated a conviction 

where the defendant said "you big muttonhead, do you think you are a czar 

around here?" in a loud and offensive tone to a police officer); see also Miller, 

83 N.J. at 411 (finding that when the "message on the defendant's sign concerned 

a matter of public interest . . . it is political speech and occupies a preferred 

position in our system of constitutionally-protected interests"). 

Based upon our careful review of the facts in the record and prevailing 

law, we conclude defendant's conduct on both April 7 and May 6, 2020 

constitutes "outdoor political activity" and that the charges for violation of EO 

107 were required to be dismissed under the Attorney General Memorandum. 

See Fraternal Ord. of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 244 N.J. 

75, 100-01 (2020) (finding that Attorney General directives require prosecutors 

and all other law enforcement officers to "cooperate with, and aid, 

the Attorney General" and while "[i]ndividual law enforcement agencies have 

some discretion in how to fulfill" certain mandates, the policies put forth by the 

Attorney General "are mandatory"). It is undisputed that on April 7 and May 6, 

2020, defendant had one or more posterboard signs he was displaying to passing 

traffic. 
21 A-3621-21

The officers' testified that both posters contained the word "phuck" and at 

least one sign contained a message regarding law enforcement. We conclude 

that defendant's display of the signs to passing motorists on both occasions was 

a form of political expression, constituting "outdoor political activity," 

exempted from EO 107 and precluded from prosecution under the Attorney 

General Memorandum and the First Amendment. 

The State argues that "neither the Clinton Township Police Department 

nor the Hunterdon County Prosecutor’s Office violated the [Attorney General] 

Guideline during their investigation and prosecution of defendant’s violations 

of Executive Order No. 107." We disagree. The EO 107-related charges 

stemming from the April 7 and May 6, 2020 events were pending at the time the 

Attorney General Memorandum was issued on June 17, 2020. The Attorney 

General Memorandum mandated dismissal of all then-pending charges for 

violations of EO 107 based upon outdoor political activities. 

The State also argues that the Law Division properly found that 

defendant's non-compliance with the responding officers is a separate violation 

of EO 107 which is not subject to the enumerated exceptions. Thus, the State 

contends the conviction should be sustained on non-compliance grounds that are 

not covered under the Attorney General Memorandum. But, in a criminal 
22 A-3621-21

matter, the State cannot change the theory of the prosecution on appeal. The

investigation report filed by Musacchio as to the April 7, 2020 incident clearly 

evidences the assistant prosecutor authorized charging defendant with violating 

EO 107 before an officer approached defendant. Accordingly, the decision to 

charge defendant under EO 107 was made before defendant became noncompliant. 

Nor did the State submit at prior proceedings that defendant was guilty of 

an EO 107 violation because he was non-compliant with officers' instructions. 

In any event, we conclude that on both occasions, defendant's uncooperative 

behavior was inextricably intertwined with his outdoor political activity. We 

therefore conclude the Attorney General Memorandum applies and the charges 

against defendant for violation of EO 107 should have been dismissed. 

We instruct the trial court on remand to vacate the convictions for the two 

EO 107 violations consistent with this opinion. We need not address defendant's 

constitutional objections to EO 107 since all of the violations stemming from it 

are vacated. See State in Int. of A.R., 234 N.J. 82, 97 (2018) ("We have often 

stated, '[c]ourts should not reach a constitutional question unless its resolution 

is imperative to the disposition of litigation.'" (alteration in original) (quoting 

Randolph Town Ctr., L.P. v. County of Morris, 186 N.J. 78, 80 (2006)). 
23 A-3621-21

VIII.

We turn next to defendant's argument there is insufficient evidence to 

sustain a conviction for walking in the direction of traffic under N.J.S.A. 39:4-

34. That statute provides: "On all highways where there are no sidewalks or 

paths provided for pedestrian use, pedestrians shall, when practicable, walk only 

on the extreme left side of the roadway or its shoulder facing approaching 

traffic." 

Defendant argues there was no evidence in the record as to when he turned 

so that he was no longer facing oncoming traffic and, therefore, the statutory 

violation was not established beyond a reasonable doubt. Conversely, the State 

contends the court's credibility and factual findings should not be disturbed 

because they are supported by the record. 

We defer to the Law Division's factual findings as to Officer Glennon's 

testimony. Glennon testified that he observed defendant walking with traffic in 

violation of the statute. Although no video evidence capturing this portion of 

the encounter was introduced, the municipal court judge accredited Glennon's 

testimony, finding: 

Clearly, while the defendant was walking backwards at 

one point, he should have been on the other side of the 

roadway. When he turned around, he was in violation 

of the pedestrian statute. Again, this is not a [S]upreme 
24 A-3621-21

[C]ourt matter, but the court finds the defendant guilty 

of that particular violation. . . . 

The Law Division upheld the municipal court's conclusion, holding that: 

"Given the municipal court's credibility findings, the deference that they 

deserve, and based on the totality of the evidence this court finds that the 

appellant is guilty of walking with traffic." 

Defendant argues that there is "significant confusion" surrounding this 

conviction and contends he was never charged with a violation of walking with 

traffic and the record does not include a summons for violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-

34. Defendant did not argue in prior proceedings that he did not receive notice 

of the N.J.S.A. 39:4-34 charge and thus failed to preserve that argument for 

purposes of this appeal.10 R. 2:10-2. 

Similarly, defendant did not argue at the municipal court trials that both 

pedestrian stops violated the Fourth Amendment and that police also violated 

his fundamental right to travel. Defendant never made a motion to suppress 

evidence pursuant to Rule 7:5-2, which requires that "[a]ll motions to suppress 

shall be heard before the start of the trial." 

10

 Additionally, the record on defendant's appeal is incomplete as to the totality 

of the summonses and the specific charges levied against defendant. 
25 A-3621-21

To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's remaining 

arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 

remanded for an entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. We do not 

retain jurisdiction.