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16-4254-cr 

United States v. Henderson 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 30th the day of October, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, 

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

Circuit Judges. 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 16-4254-cr 

 v. 

TERON HENDERSON, 

Defendant-Appellant

 

FOR APPELLEE: Paul D. Silver, Assistant United States 

Attorney of Counsel, for Grant C. Jaquith, 

Acting United States Attorney for the 

Northern District of New York 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Lawrence Elmen, Jr., Elmen Law Firm 

P.C., Saratoga Springs, New York 
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Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

New York (Norman Mordue, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the December 13, 2016 judgment of the District Court be 

and hereby is AFFIRMED. 

Appellant Teron Henderson appeals from the District Court’s final judgment of conviction 

following a conditional guilty plea entered pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, permitting him to appeal the District Court’s determination that 

the police lawfully stopped a taxi n which Henderson was a passenger. We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

In February 2016, New York State Trooper Matthew Ross, surveiling the Plattsburgh, New 

York bus stop, followed Henderson from the station as he departed in a taxi cab bound for 

Burlington, Vermont. Ross suspected that Henderson may have been trafficking drugs. Observing 

what he believed was a violation of New York’s Vehicle and Traffic Law, Ross stopped the taxi and 

searched Henderson, finding him in possession of cocaine base and heroin. The District Court ruled 

that the stop of the taxi was justified by Ross’s reasonable suspicions that the taxi’s left-hand turn 

constituted a traffic violation and that Henderson was engaged in criminal activity. Having reserved 

in his plea agreement the right to appeal whether the traffic stop was lawful, Henderson challenges 

both bases for the District Court’s ruling. 

We review the District Court’s legal finding that Ross had reasonable suspicion to stop the 

taxi de novo, while reviewing the factual findings supporting the reasonable suspicion determination 

by the District Court for clear error, with special deference given to findings based on 

determinations of witness credibility. See United States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307, 312-13 (2d Cir. 2016). 

Henderson first argues that the District Court, based on the collective knowledge doctrine, 

improperly found that Ross possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion to believe that Henderson 

was involved in criminal activity. Under the collective knowledge doctrine, “an arrest or search is 

permissible where the actual arresting or searching officer lacks the specific information to form the 

basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion but sufficient information to justify the arrest or 

search was known by other law enforcement officials initiating or involved with the investigation.” 

United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2001). 

Yet the District Court did not invoke this doctrine. Instead, it relied on the “totality of the 

circumstances”—Ross’s knowledge of drug trafficking patterns between Plattsburgh and Burlington 

from his own experience and information he received from other members of law enforcement, and 

his knowledge of the taxi cab’s intended destination, among other factors. Under the totality-ofcircumstances standard, the District Court did not require confirmation that Ross received 

information from law enforcement officials involved in investigating Henderson. Instead, it needed 

merely to view the totality of the circumstances “through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious 

police officer on the scene.” U.S. v. Bailey, 743 F.3d 322, 332 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. 

Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 133 (2d Cir. 2000)). Since the District Court did not rely on the collective 

knowledge doctrine, Henderson’s argument is without merit. 
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Henderson next contends that the District Court incorrectly determined that Ross lawfully 

stopped the taxi in which Henderson was a passenger. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer 

may conduct a brief investigatory detention as long as the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe 

that the person being detained is committing or has committed a criminal offense. Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1, 9 (1968); see also, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). Similarly, an officer may 

perform an investigatory detention if he possesses reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. United 

States v. Diaz, 802 F.3d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir. 2015). Courts reviewing an officer’s claim of reasonable 

suspicion must take into account the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether the 

officer has a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting wrongdoing. Id. They should view 

those circumstances through the eyes of a “reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, 

guided by his experience and training.” United States v. Compton, 830 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir. 2006) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

We believe that Ross had reasonable suspicion to stop the taxi. New York Vehicle and 

Traffic Law § 1160(b) requires that on two-way roadways, left hand turns “shall be made in that 

portion of the right half of the roadway nearest the center line thereof and by passing to the right of 

such center line where it enters the intersection and after entering the intersection the left turn shall 

be made so as to leave the intersection to the right of the center line of the roadway being entered.” 

N.Y. Veh. & Traff. Law § 1160(b). “Whenever practicable,” it states, “the left turn shall be made in 

that portion of the intersection to the left of the center of the intersection.” Id. The District Court 

properly found that Ross correctly interpreted this rule in pulling over the taxi. Ross testified that 

when the taxi turned left from Route 9 to Route 314, it failed to stay to the left of the center of the 

intersection on Route 9 as required. The District Court credited Ross’s testimony and doing so was 

not clearly erroneous. 

Henderson argues that Ross misinterpreted the law to require the taxi to enter the lane closest 

to the center line of the roadway, as opposed to merely recommending it “when practicable.” The 

District Court did not err in concluding that it was reasonable to interpret the law to mean that if 

entry into that lane is practicable it is required, not merely recommended. Henderson also contends 

that Ross provided his observations only as to the lane that the taxi entered after completing the 

turn—not the lane from which it turned or point at which it passed through the intersection. But Ross 

did not base his reasonable suspicion of a violation on the lane into which the taxi turned; he based 

it instead on his observation of the taxi’s failure to stay to the left of the intersection’s centerline 

when making its turn, as mandated. The District Court did not clearly err in crediting Ross’s 

testimony, and Ross therefore had reasonable suspicion to stop the taxi. 

CONCLUSION 

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Henderson on appeal and find them to be 

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the December 13, 2016 judgment of the 

District Court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk