Opinion issued November 6, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-12-01142-CV

NO. 01-12-01143-CV

———————————

JOHN B. KENNEDY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 178th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case Nos. 1320351 & 1237940

O P I N I ON

After pleading guilty, John B. Kennedy was convicted of two felony 

offenses: (1) falsely holding oneself out as a lawyer1 and (2) money laundering.

2

 

 

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.122(a) (Vernon 2011).

2 See id. § 34.02(a)(1), (e)(4) (Vernon 2011).
2

The trial court sentenced Kennedy to concurrent terms of 10 years in prison. 

Thereafter, in each case, Kennedy filed a motion for the restoration of property 

pursuant to Chapter 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.3 Kennedy asserted

“rightful ownership” to money being held as evidence by the State. The State 

claimed that the money was stolen property, unlawfully acquired by Kennedy in 

committing his crimes. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled 

against Kennedy, rejecting his request to obtain the currency. 

Kennedy appeals the order in each case. Raising two identical issues in each 

appeal, he asserts that no evidence supports the trial court’s order. 

We affirm. 

Background

On April 3 2009, John B. Kennedy was arrested in Harris County, Texas, at 

his place of business, a law office, on an outstanding warrant for falsely holding 

himself out as a lawyer. Outside, the signs were displayed advertising attorney 

services. Parked in front of the office was a van. The van was covered in a banner 

advertising legal services. The license plates on the van were registered to 

Kennedy. Inside the office, signs were displayed on the walls indicating that legal 

 

3 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 47.01–12 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2014).
3

services were provided there. Kennedy was identified on the commercial lease as 

the person who rented the office space.

Kennedy was charged by indictment with the offense of falsely holding 

himself out as a lawyer on October 21, 2009. Kennedy was released on bond. At 

some point, Kennedy left Texas and went to Delaware. On August 11, 2011, 

the Harris County District Attorney’s contacted the City of Wilmington’s police 

department in Delaware to request assistance in apprehending Kennedy. Kennedy 

was believed to be in the Wilmington area and was considered to be a fugitive. 

Sergeant D. Rosenblum of the Wilmington police department received the call for 

assistance. Officer Rosenblum dispatched a number of officers, who soon located 

Kennedy’s vehicle at a local motel. 

Rosenblum went to the motel, where he found Kennedy. After obtaining 

Kennedy’s consent, Rosenblum searched the vehicle. Inside, Rosenblum found 

several identification cards, license plates, and a black attaché case. The case

contained numerous papers, documents, notebooks, and approximately $12,000 in 

cash. Officer Rosenblum also found a receipt with a “code card” to a local storage 

facility. After contacting the storage facility, Officer Rosenblum learned that 

Kennedy had rented a storage unit on August 10, 2011 and had paid rent on the 

unit through September 9, 2011. 
4

Officer Rosenblum obtained a search warrant, signed by a Delaware judge, 

to search the storage unit rented by Kennedy. Inside the storage unit, Officer 

Rosenblum found numerous trash bags stuffed with thousands of white envelopes 

containing cash, comprised of small denomination bills. A ledger was also found, 

containing dates and a handwritten list of names. To the right of each name was a 

corresponding amount of money. 

In another trash bag, Officer Rosenblum recovered a number of documents

entitled “Attorney at Law, Divorce Interview Sheet.” These were form documents,

which had been filled in by hand. For example, in the space for “client,” names 

had been written in and contact information had been provided. Money order 

receipts were also attached to the forms. 

In addition, Officer Rosenblum recovered two guns and other personal items 

from the storage unit. A hand-written “to-do” list was also recovered. On the list, 

were items such as “steal 2 TX license tags” and “sell van.” 

After the search, the Wilmington police counted the cash found in the trash 

bags and determined it to total $851,651. The money was deposited in a bank and 

then transferred to the Harris County District Attorney’s Office. There, it was held 

in a bank account where it accumulated interest. The IRS demanded a portion of 

the money for payment of delinquent taxes owed by Kennedy. Once the IRS was 

paid, a balance of $702,792.99 remained. 
5

R. Montoya, a fraud examiner with Harris County District Attorney’s Office,

analyzed the ledger that had been seized from the storage unit. He created two 

spreadsheets, sorting the handwritten entries chronologically and alphabetically. 

He determined that the time period covered in the ledger was from July 1, 2009 

through July 15, 2011. Montoya also determined that the total for the monetary 

entries reflected in the ledger was $778,663.58.

In addition to the 2009 indictment, charging Kennedy with the offense of 

falsely holding oneself out as an attorney, Kennedy was charged with the offense 

of money laundering on October 27, 2011. With respect to the first offense, the 

2009 indictment read as follows: “John B. Kennedy . . . did . . . on or about 

September 25, 2007 . . . unlawfully, with intent to obtain an economic benefit for 

himself, falsely hold himself out as a lawyer to Sarah E. Lee.” 

The October 27, 2011 indictment for money laundering charged as follows:

John B. Kennedy . . . did . . . on or about April 5, 2011, . . . 

unlawfully, pursuant to a single scheme and continuing course of 

conduct, knowingly acquire and maintain an interest in funds of the 

value of at least two hundred thousand dollars, which constituted the 

proceeds of criminal activity, namely, by falsely holding out as an 

attorney.

On March 29, 2012, Kennedy pleaded guilty to the offenses of falsely 

holding oneself out as an attorney and money laundering, as charged in the 2009 

and 2011 indictments. Pursuant to the State’s punishment recommendation, the 

trial court sentenced Kennedy to concurrent 10-year sentences in prison. The trial 
6

court signed the judgments of conviction. That same day, Kennedy filed his 

“Motion to Restore Property and Claim of Ownership by Interested Party and 

Request for Hearing Pursuant to Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,”

under both cause numbers. 

In the motion, Kennedy claimed as follows:

1. The state of Texas is holding items of property including money 

pursuant to Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was 

evidence in and in part alleged to be contraband.

2. The defendant has pled guilty to the above described causes and 

claims to the property are to be decided by the Court sitting as a 

Magistrate pursuant to Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

3. The code provides that any interested person may make claim that 

the property at issue was not acquired by theft or other unlawful 

means and make claims. Defendant hereby makes claim that money 

and property or a portion of money and property which is being held 

as evidence and for disposition by the State of Texas was not acquired 

by unlawful means and makes a claim of rightful ownership of the 

property.

On May 8, 2012, a hearing was held on Kennedy’s motion for the restoration 

of stolen property. The trial court admitted into evidence Kennedy’s judgments of 

conviction for the offenses of falsely holding oneself out as an attorney and money 

laundering. 

The State presented the testimony of the assistant district attorney who is the 

custodian of the funds obtained from the Delaware storage unit. She testified that, 
7

after payment was made to the IRS, a balance of $702,792.99 remained in the bank 

account. 

In testifying for the State, Officer Rosenblum described the items recovered 

from Kennedy’s vehicle and from the storage unit, including the $851,651.00 in 

cash found stuffed in the garbage bags, the ledger, and the client interview sheets. 

Through him, the ledger and other documents recovered from the storage locker 

were introduced into evidence. 

In addition, fraud examiner R. Montoya testified for the State. The State 

introduced into evidence the spreadsheets Montoya had prepared from his analysis 

of the ledger. Montoya testified that the ledger contained monetary entries totaling 

$778,663.58, covering the period of July 1, 2009 through July 15, 2011. 

Also, the State offered the testimony of C. Johnson, an investigator for the 

district attorney’s office. Johnson stated that, in 2009, he had gone to Kennedy’s 

place of business located at 1585 South Highway 6 in Harris County, Texas. He 

acknowledged that Kennedy had not held himself out to be an attorney that day 

when an undercover officer had approached Kennedy. Johnson stated that 

Kennedy was, however, arrested that day on an outstanding warrant for holding 

himself out to be a lawyer. 

Johnson testified that the office had signs advertising legal services. He 

stated that a van parked in front of the office also had a large banner advertising 
8

legal services. A photograph of the van introduced into evidence showed the 

banner, which said, “We beat everybody’s price! Divorce Cheap Quick!” Johnson 

testified that the license plates on the van were registered to Kennedy. Inside the 

office, Johnson observed signs displayed on the walls indicating that legal services 

were provided there. A photograph of Kennedy standing in the office in front of 

the signs was admitted into evidence. 

To support his motion to restore property, Kennedy offered his own 

testimony. He claimed that he had not held himself out as an attorney while 

working at the Harris County law office. In his testimony, Kennedy indicated that 

he had worked at that location from 2005 to 2011 as a secretary assisting an

attorney. He stated that he would answer the telephone, set up appointments, and 

fill out client interview sheets. Kennedy testified that he was paid a salary of less 

than $25 per week at the law office. 

Kennedy claimed that the $851,651.00 in cash found stuffed into garbage 

bags in the storage locker was not related to the monetary amounts, totaling 

$778,663.58, recorded in the ledger. Kennedy asserted that the cash found inside 

the garbage bags was his life savings and represented money that he had earned 

working since he was 12 years old. He stated that he had earned all of the money 

before moving to Texas in 2004.
9

Kennedy asserted that he had been storing the cash with a person named 

“Frank Madison” in Washington, D.C. Kennedy testified that he had retrieved the 

money from Madison before going to Delaware for medical treatment. Kennedy 

stated that Madison lived somewhere around the “7800 block of Washington, 

D.C.” 

Kennedy claimed that the $778,663.58 reflected in the ledger found in the 

storage unit was money earned by the law firm for which he had worked as a 

secretary. He stated that he had not received the money; rather, it had gone to the 

attorney for whom he worked to pay for office rent and other business expenses. 

On cross-examination, Kennedy admitted that his name was on the commercial 

lease for the law office. The lease for the law office was admitted into evidence. 

In its closing arguments, the State asserted that Kennedy was not entitled to 

the funds held by the district attorney’s office because the evidence was sufficient 

to show that Kennedy had obtained the funds illegally by falsely holding himself 

out as a lawyer. In contrast, Kennedy asserted that the evidence had not 

sufficiently connected the funds recovered in the storage unit to the offenses for 

which he was convicted. He maintained that he was entitled to have the funds 

restored to him because he had acquired them through legitimate means.

On August 10, 2012, the trial court signed its “Order on Motion for 

Disposition of Stolen Property” in both trial court cause numbers. The court 
10

rejected Kennedy’s request to restore the funds to him and made a number of 

factual findings in the order. In the decretal portion of its order, the court ruled as 

follows:

ORDERED that the rest and remainder of the APPROXIMATELY 

$702,792.99 in United States currency, including all accrued interest 

thereon, if any, be awarded to the Harris County District Attorney’s 

Office, the party with superior right to possession of the property, as 

set forth in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, for their official 

purposes, all to be administered and disposed of in compliance with 

Article 47.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

Kennedy now appeals the order in each case. He presents two issues in 

which he asserts that no evidence supports the trial court’s order. 

Chapter 47

Kennedy initiated the underlying proceeding pursuant to Chapter 47 of the 

Code of Criminal Procedure. 4 Chapter 47 provides a procedure by which a person 

 

4 Although he was adamant in the trial court that Chapter 47—not the forfeiture 

statutes—applied to the underlying proceedings, Kennedy now cites civil forfeiture law 

to support his challenge to the trial court’s order. We note that similarities exist between 

Chapter 47 and the civil forfeiture statutes; however, there are also significant 

differences. The forfeiture statutes apply to contraband—property used in the 

commission of crime or proceeds gained by the commission of a crime—that has been 

seized by law enforcement. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 59.01–.14 (Vernon 

2006 & Supp. 2014). The civil forfeiture statutes are remedial in nature. See Fant v. 
11

claiming an interest in stolen property, which is in the custody of a governmental

authority, may seek to obtain possession of the property. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. arts. 47.01–.12 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2014); see also York v. State,

373 S.W.3d 32, 43 (Tex. 2012) (stating that Chapter 47 authorizes a court to make 

determination of possession of property); City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 

231, 234 (Tex. 2011) (explaining that party claiming lien interest in stolen property 

seized by government authority can assert its interest by filling a Chapter 47 

proceeding). 

A question has arisen in the instant appeals regarding which provision of 

Chapter 47 applies to the proceeding initiated by Kennedy in his motion to recover 

property. Kennedy asserts that the proceeding was governed by Article 47.01a. 

The State asserts that Article 47.02 applies. We agree with the State that Article 

47.02 governs here. 

Article 47.01a, the provision relied on by Kennedy, applies only to Chapter 

47 proceedings occurring when a criminal action relating to the allegedly stolen 

property is not pending. CRIM. PROC. art. 47.01a (Vernon 2006). In other words, 

 

State, 931 S.W.2d 299, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The statutes encourage property 

owners to safeguard their property so it is not used for illegal purposes; this ensures that 

persons do not profit from their illegal acts. See id. at 308. In contrast, Chapter 47 serves 

to provide a procedure by which someone claiming a right of possession in stolen 

property may seek to recover it from law enforcement officials by showing a legitimate 

interest in the property. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 47.01–.12.
12

Article 47.01a applies when no indictment or information has been filed initiating a 

criminal action. See Perry v. Breland, 16 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Tex. App.—Eastland 

2000, pet. denied) (holding that Article 47.01a applies only to Chapter 47 

proceedings occurring before filing of indictment or information); see also VSC, 

347 S.W.3d at 235 (discussing utilization of Article 47.01a procedure to remedy 

party’s claim to interest in motor vehicles seized by government; facts there show 

no criminal action pending). 

In contrast, if a criminal action is pending, jurisdiction to dispose of the 

property lies with the trial court under article 47.02. See CRIM. PROC. art. 47.02; 

Perry, 16 S.W.3d at 189. Article 47.02(a)’s express language allows the trial court 

to restore stolen property to its owner during or after a criminal trial. CRIM. PROC.

art. 47.02(a); see, e.g., Nelms v. State, 761 S.W.2d 578, 579–80 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 1988, no writ) (involving appeal by criminal defendant from trial court’s 

order restoring stolen funds to their owners, pursuant to Article 47.02, after 

defendant’s criminal trial). Specifically, Article 47.02(a) provides, “On the trial of 

any criminal action for theft or any other offense involving the illegal acquisition 

of property, the court trying the case shall order the property to be restored to the 

person appearing by the proof to be the owner of the property.” CODE CRIM. PROC.

art. 47.02(a). Here, the circumstances fit under the rubric of Article 47.02(a). 
13

Kennedy filed his motion to restore property the same day that he pleaded 

guilty to offenses of falsely holding himself out as an attorney and money 

laundering. The trial court signed the judgments of conviction that day. The Court 

of Criminal Appeals has made clear that a plea proceeding is considered a trial 

under Texas law. Murray v. State, 302 S.W.3d 874, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 

In addition, the trial involved “the illegal acquisition of property.” See 

CRIM. PROC. art. 47.02(a). The record reflects that Kennedy pleaded guilty to 

charges of falsely holding himself out as a lawyer and money laundering in an 

amount of at least $200,000, which constituted the proceeds of falsely holding 

himself out as a lawyer. Article 47.11 provides that Chapter 47 extends to property 

acquired in any manner which makes the acquisition a penal offense. CRIM. PROC.

art. 47.11. Thus, we conclude that Article 47.02 governed the Chapter 47 
14

proceeding to restore property initiated by Kennedy in these cases.5 We now turn 

to the merits of the appeals.6

Sufficiency of the Evidence

On appeal, Kennedy raises two issues, asserting that there was “no 

evidence,” that is, legally insufficient evidence, to support the trial court’s order 

disposing of the currency. 

A. Standard of Review

When the appellate record includes the reporter’s record, the trial court’s 

factual findings, whether express or implied, may be challenged for legal and 

factual sufficiency. See McMahon v. Zimmerman, 433 S.W.3d 680, 691 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). We review the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting a trial court’s challenged findings of fact by applying the same 

 

5 Kennedy advocates for the application of criminal substantive law to the 

underlying proceeding. However, a proceeding to restore property under Article 47.02 is 

considered a civil case because it concerns the disposition of property. See A. Benjamini, 

Inc. v. Dickson, 2 S.W.3d 611, 612 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.);

Four B’s Inc. v. State, 902 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied); cf. 

Bretz v. State, 508 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (dismissing appeal because Court 

of Criminal Appeals lacks jurisdiction over appeals from order disposing of property 

under 47.02, indicating that such proceeding was a civil matter over which it had no 

jurisdiction). 

6 The State asserts that the appeals should be dismissed because Kennedy did not 

properly perfect his appeals from an Article 47.01a proceeding. See CRIM. PROC. art. 

47.12 (defining procedure for appeal following an Article 47.01a hearing). We need not 

reach this issue because we have determined that Article 47.02 applies here. 
15

standards that we use in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting jury 

findings. See Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). 

When deciding a legal-sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every reasonable 

inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 

(Tex. 2005). We credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and 

disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. at 827. 

The evidence is legally sufficient if it would enable a reasonable and fair-minded 

person to reach the verdict under review. Id.

B. Analysis7

Pursuant to Article 47.02, “the court trying the case shall order the property 

to be restored to the person appearing by proof to be the owner of the property.” 

CRIM. PROC. art. 47.02(a) (emphasis added). On appeal, Kennedy points to his 

own testimony, explaining the origin of the cash found in the storage unit. He 

indicates that his testimony establishes that he is the owner of the recovered 

 

7 Much of Kennedy’s argument in his brief incorrectly presumes that Article 47.01a 

governed the disposition of the funds. In addition, he cites law pertaining to civil 

forfeiture to support his position. As mentioned, there are distinctions between civil 

forfeiture proceedings and Chapter 47 proceedings. Nonetheless, to the extent possible

and applicable, we construe Kennedy’s legal-sufficiency challenges “reasonably, yet 

liberally” to review the merits of his appeals. Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex.

2008). (“[A]ppellate courts should reach the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably 

possible.”).
16

currency and that he acquired it by legal means. In his brief, Kennedy summarizes 

his testimony on this point as follows:

[Kennedy] explained that the money was his personal savings 

collected over fifty-seven years in the workforce, including twentyfour years of practicing law. Put simply, [Kennedy] explained that 

money in the storage unit was collected “before this alleged criminal 

event occurred.” 

The cash seized by Delaware police never entered Texas, 

according to [Kennedy]. Instead, [Kennedy] had stored the money in 

Washington, D.C. with an acquaintance named Frank Madison while 

he worked there, then picked it up once he left Texas and then took 

the cash to Delaware with him. The reason that [Kennedy] stored the 

money in cash rather than in a checking account was due to problems 

he was experiencing with the IRS, which claimed [Kennedy] owed 

approximately $3 million in back taxes.

Kennedy also points to his testimony in which he explained that the 

monetary entries in the ledger, totaling $778,663.58, are unrelated to the cash

found in the storage unit. According to Kennedy, the ledger entries represent

money collected by the licensed attorney for whom he worked as a secretary. He 

claimed that the names listed in the ledger were the clients of the licensed attorney. 

Kennedy testified that he did not personally receive the monies reflected in the 

ledger; rather, those funds went directly to pay the law office’s expenses, such as 

rent. 

As the factfinder in the Chapter 47 proceeding, the trial court was the sole 

judge of Kennedy’s credibility and was permitted to resolve any inconsistencies in 

the testimony. See McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986). 
17

Thus, it was the trial court’s prerogative to disbelieve Kennedy’s testimony 

regarding the origin of the cash recovered from the storage unit. See City of Keller, 

168 S.W.3d at 819; McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 697. 

In its order, the trial court found “that the approximately $702,792.99 in 

United States currency was acquired by theft or other criminal acts as that term is 

used Chapter 31 of the Texas Penal Code.”8

 From this express finding, it may be 

implied that Kennedy was the person who had acquired the currency “by theft or 

other criminal acts.” See Smith v. McDaniel, No. 12–12–00165–CV, 2013 WL 

5302492, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept. 18, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (recognizing 

that, “if the findings are not as definite and specific as they should be, a reviewing 

court will consider not only the facts expressly found, but those that are implied 

from those expressly found”). As the thief of the recovered currency, Kennedy 

would not be a “person appearing by proof to be the owner of the property” under 

Article 47.02. See CRIM. PROC. art. 47.02(a). Accordingly, the trial court’s express 

and implied findings support its rejection of Kennedy’s request to recover the 

currency. See Nelms, 761 S.W.2d at 580 (holding that, despite the appellant’s 

 

8 A person commits the offense of theft “if he unlawfully appropriates property with 

intent to deprive the owner of property.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a) (Vernon 

Supp. 2014). Consent is not effective if induced by deception. Id. § 31.01(3) (Vernon 

Supp. 2014). “Deception” includes “creating or confirming by words or conduct a false 

impression of law or fact that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction 

. . . .” Id. § 31.01(1)(A). As mentioned, Kennedy pleaded guilty to the offense of falsely 

holding oneself out as an attorney. 
18

acquittal of the related criminal offense, the evidence nonetheless showed that the 

appellant had “staged a robbery” related to the funds he sought to recover under 

Article 47.02; thus, the trial court’s award of the funds to the original issuers of the 

funds was supported by the evidence). 

On appeal, Kennedy asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient to 

establish a link between the offenses of which he was convicted—falsely holding 

oneself out as an attorney and money laundering—and the currency recovered 

from the storage unit. We disagree. 

The State offered adequate evidence from which a factfinder could 

reasonably infer that the recovered cash was laundered funds unlawfully acquired

by Kennedy by falsely holding himself out as a lawyer. The record reflects that, 

in 2009, Kennedy was arrested at his Harris County law office, where he admitted 

working, on a warrant for the offense of falsely holding himself out as a lawyer. 

Kennedy was the only person listed on the lease as renting the law office space. A 

van parked in front of the office displayed a large banner, which read, “We beat 

everybody’s price! Divorce Cheap Quick!” The license plates on the van were 

registered to Kennedy.

The record further shows that Kennedy fled Texas, while out on bond, 

ending up in Delaware. The Delaware police arrested Kennedy in August 2011 as 

a fugitive. There, the police obtained a search warrant for his Delaware storage 
19

unit. In the unit, the police recovered trash bags stuffed with over $800,000 in 

cash. Along with the cash, the police found numerous other documents and 

paperwork, a number of which appeared to correspond to the operation of a law 

practice. These included “Attorney at Law Divorce Interview Sheets,” three of 

which were admitted into evidence. These indicated that client information and 

payment had been received from those persons. 

Along with the cash in the storage locker, the police also recovered a ledger, 

listing hundreds of names and corresponding monetary entries. The monetary 

entries totaled $778,663.58. The entries covered the period of July 2009 through 

June 2011. Kennedy admitted that he worked at the Harris County law office from 

2005 until 2011. Lastly, the records shows Kennedy pleaded guilty to falsely 

holding himself out as a lawyer and to laundering funds in an amount of at least 

$200,000. In so doing, he stipulated to, and confessed as true, the facts alleged in 

the corresponding indictments. 

From the evidence, the trial court, as the factfinder, could have reasonably 

inferred that Kennedy unlawfully earned a minimum of $778,663.58 by falsely 

holding himself out as an attorney at his Harris County law office and then fled to 

Delaware with the currency.9

 We conclude that the evidence could have enabled a 

 

9 Kennedy also asserts that the evidence is insufficient because there is a difference

in the total amount of money seized from the storage unit ($851,651.00) and the total 
20

reasonable and fair-minded person to find that Kennedy acquired “approximately 

$702,792.99 in United States currency . . . by theft or other criminal acts,” as found 

by the trial court.10 See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. We hold that the 

evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s order disposing of the 

property and implicitly refusing to award the currency to Kennedy. See CRIM.

PROC. art. 47.02(a); Nelms, 761 S.W.2d 578, 579–80.

We overrule Kennedy’s first and second issues in each appeal.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s August 10, 2012 order in each appellate cause. 

Laura Carter Higley

Justice

 

amount of money reflected in the ledger ($778,663.58). This difference is $72,987.42. 

As mentioned, the ledger entries cover the period of June 2009 to July 2011. By his own 

testimony, Kennedy worked at the Harris County law office from 2005 to 2011. Thus, 

the evidence supports an inference that Kennedy unlawfully acquired the additional 

$72,987.42 by falsely holding himself out as a lawyer in the period preceding the entries 

in the ledger. Moreover, in its order, the trial court found that $702,792.99 had been 

acquired by theft or other criminal acts. This amount is less than the total amount 

contained in the ledger. And, as mentioned, the balance of the $851,651.00 recovered 

from the storage unit was seized by the IRS for taxes owed by Kennedy. 

10 Because this finding supports the trial court’s judgment, we need not address 

Kennedy’s challenges to the other findings made by the trial court in its order. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 47.1. We note that Kennedy has asserted that the State’s evidence failed to 

meet some of the requirements of Article 47.01a; however, as discussed, that is not the 

governing provision in these cases.
21

Panel consists of Justices Higley, Bland, and Sharp.