In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-22-00190-CV 

 

STATE BOARD FOR EDUCATOR CERTIFICATION, APPELLANT 

V. 

BRADLEY KEITH BOWEN, APPELLEE 

On Appeal from the 98th District Court 

Travis County, Texas 

Trial Court No. D-I-GN-18-004203, Honorable Catherine Mauzy, Presiding 

July 17, 2023 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ. 

State administrative agencies possess broad discretion to determine an 

appropriate disciplinary sanction when licensees violate a statute or board rule.1 When 

an administrative law judge (ALJ) recommends a particular sanction, it is not 

1 See Firemen’s & Policemen’s Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. 

1984); State Bd. for Educator Certification v. Lange, No. 03-12-00453-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1886, at 

*16 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 25, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.); State Bd. for Educator Certification v. 

Montalvo, No. 03-13-00370-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 12025, at *15 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 24, 2015, 

pet. denied) (mem. op.); Tex. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Brown, 281 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tex. App.–

Corpus Christi 2009, pet. denied) (exercising jurisdiction via transfer from Third Court of Appeals). 
2

presumptively binding on the agency in the same way that findings of fact and conclusions 

of law might be.2 In this teacher certification case, in which findings detailing the 

educator’s numerous contumacious acts are undisputed and supported by substantial 

evidence, we hold the State Board for Educator Certification (Board) did not act arbitrarily 

or capriciously when revoking Appellee Bradley Bowen’s Texas Educator Certificate

despite such sanction being different than that recommended by the ALJ.

3

 Because the 

district court erred when it reversed the Board’s Final Decision and Order, we reverse the 

judgment of the district court and render judgment reinstating the decision of the Board.

Background

On April 26, 2017, the staff of the Texas Education Agency, Educator Leadership 

and Quality Division, filed a petition on behalf of the Board seeking disciplinary action to 

revoke Bowen’s educator certificate. Bowen answered, and the case was referred to the 

2

Id. “The mere labeling of a recommended sanction as a conclusion of law or as a finding of fact 

does not change the effect of the ALJ’s recommendation.” Brown, 281 S.W.3d at 697. When a state 

agency’s disciplinary decision differs from that proposed by the administrative law judge, it must comport 

with TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.058(e). Granek v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 172 S.W.3d 761, 781

(Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied).

3 See State v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 190, 204 (Tex. 1994) (“The true test is not 

whether the agency reached the correct conclusion, but whether some reasonable basis exists in the record 

for the action taken by the agency.”); Sanchez v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 229 S.W.3d 498, 510

(Tex. App.–Austin 2007, no pet.) (holding that under substantial-evidence review, courts presume that 

agency's decision is valid and supported by substantial evidence and explaining that complaining party has 

burden of proving otherwise).
3

State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) for hearing. Among other things, 

allegation was made that Bowen violated Standard 1.74 of the Educators’ Code of Ethics.

5

The matter proceeded to a contested case before the ALJ. Following the hearing, 

the ALJ issued a Proposal for Decision (PFD) containing findings of fact and conclusions 

of law. One of the ALJ’s conclusions of law upheld the allegation that Bowen violated 

Standard 1.7 of the Code. It is not productive or necessary to list every one of the 108 

findings of fact, but we summarize several of the most pertinent findings here. In 2015-

16, Bowen taught seventh grade math at a Texas middle school. A 12-year-old described 

as “Student A” was in Bowen’s math class. Later, Bowen asked that Student A also be 

placed in his study hall.6 During the year, Bowen and the student regularly interacted. 

Student A was “friendly, helpful, and polite to” Bowen, and Bowen “frequently said that 

Student A was his favorite student.” Bowen once showed another student that Student 

A was his favorite by “eras[ing] that student’s name and excitedly [writing] Student A’s 

name in its place.”

On May 18, 2016, Student A’s mother met with school administrators and reported 

that Bowen’s actions made Student A feel very uncomfortable. This was the mother’s 

4 This standard provides:

(1)(G) Standard 1.7. The educator shall comply with state regulations, written local school 

board policies, and other state and federal laws.

19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 247.2 (1)(G), (J), (3)(B), (F), (H), (I).

5 See 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 247.1 (State Board for Educator Certification, Purpose and Scope; 

Definitions), 2 (Code of Ethics and Standard Practices for Texas Educators).

6

“Student A never objected to being assigned to Respondent’s study hall.”
4

first time to ask that Student A be removed from Bowen’s class. The school reassigned 

Student A to another teacher’s math class for the remainder of the school year.

With only a few days remaining in the school year, but less than one week after 

Student A’s mother met with school officials, the school’s principal and assistant principal 

met with Bowen to discuss Student A. The school’s principal issued several directives to 

Bowen, which ordered: 

a) There will be no contact with [Student A].7

b) There will be no contact with [Student A’s] family.

c) If the family reaches out to [Respondent], he is to report it to administration 

immediately.

d) If [Student A] reaches out to [Respondent] in any manner, he is to report it 

to administration immediately.

e) It [is] strongly recommended that [Respondent] be aware of his 

surroundings and avoid time alone with any one student, especially before 

and after school. Classroom doors should always be open when tutoring or 

helping students with math or otherwise.

f) It [is] strongly recommended that [Respondent] not discuss this incident with 

staff other than administration or counselor.

g) It [is] strongly recommended that [Respondent] carefully exam[ine] his 

social media for contacts with students, present or otherwise.

These directives were said to greatly upset Bowen, who desired to discuss the 

matter with Student A’s parents. After the directives were issued, Bowen saw Student 

A’s parents at a supermarket; each said hello.

8 Bowen and the student’s mother also 

7 The directives’ bracketed material appears in the original.

8 There is no evidence that Bowen reported this to the school’s administration.
5

exchanged several text messages.9 In one exchange, the mother told Bowen that the 

family wanted no contact with him.

When the new school year began, Student A was in the eighth grade. Despite the 

principal’s instruction to have no contact with Student A or the family (as well as the 

mother’s admonitions by text), Bowen had the following interactions the first month, in 

August 2016:

• He stood next to Student A at an all-school assembly;

• As Student A once passed Bowen in the hall, he quietly whispered, “Say hi.”

• When Bowen was performing lunch duty, he sometimes talked to students who 

sat next to Student A. 

• Bowen told another teacher that during lunch duty, he once spoke to another 

student sitting next to Student A and said he missed his former students, 

including one student in particular.

• Student A worked in the school’s office. Bowen was frequently in the school’s 

office when Student A worked. Bowen once told another in the office that he

had lost a lot of weight since May 18, 2016 (the date Student A’s mother met 

with school officials). Bowen also once approached the desk in the office where 

Student A sat, “and said to no one directly, ‘I really need to talk to someone’s 

parents.’”

• Student A told Bowen to contact the parents by phone.

• Bowen sometimes waved to Student A’s mother as she drove in the line to pick 

up the student.

• Bowen and Student A’s mother sent text messages to each other.10 

One of Bowen’s colleagues at the time, “R.S.,” teaches eighth grade math; the two 

teachers’ classroom doors were within a few feet of each other. R.S. was Student A’s 

9 There is no evidence that Bowen reported this to the school’s administration before August 22, 

2016.

10 There is no evidence that Bowen reported this to the school’s administration before August 22, 

2016.
6

eighth grade math teacher. Despite the principal’s recommendation to not discuss the 

incident with school staff, Bowen discussed and sent messages to R.S. about the matter 

involving Student A. Among other things, Bowen told R.S. the following:

• Tutoring Student A again “would be a dream come true”;

• Student A was “like a daughter” to Bowen;

• Bowen wanted to communicate with Student A’s parents to seek closure;

• Bowen planned to go to the car pick-up line when he was not on duty so 

that he could wave to Student A’s mother as she drove by; and

• Student A had waved and smiled at Bowen, and that made him very happy.

On August 17, 2016, R.S. made a report to the assistant principal. One day after 

R.S.’s report, the school issued Bowen a second set of directives, which specified the 

following:

a) You will have no contact with [Student A].

b) You will have no contact with [Student A’s] family.

c) If [Student A] reaches out to you in any manner, you will report this to 

administration.

d) You will have your door open and visible by staff when meeting/tutoring with 

student(s).

e) You will follow the [school]11 Employee Handbook guidelines on p. 46–47 

under Ethical Conduct toward Students.

f) You will not discuss this incident with other staff members on campus.

11 Bracketed material added; all other brackets are in the original.
7

Nevertheless, even after the second set of directives were issued, Bowen continued to 

discuss the Student A matter with R.S. On August 22, 2016, Bowen was placed on 

administrative leave. He resigned from employment one week later.

Again, despite the directives that had been given to him, Bowen announced his 

resignation to Student A’s mother by text message. Bowen was seen on other occasions 

in the vicinity of Student A and the family. For example, in October 2016, Bowen saw 

Student A’s parents at a supermarket and said hello to them. Student A also saw Bowen

three times after his resignation: (1) holding a sign, (2) at a Nativity scene, and (3) at a 

splash pad:

• Regarding Bowen holding a sign, Student A and the mother saw Bowen

parked in his vehicle on the side of a road. He then exited the vehicle and 

held a sign that read, “God Forgives” or “Jesus Forgives.” This made 

Student A and the mother upset and fearful; Student A cried.

• In December 2016, Student A saw Bowen and his children at a distance 

while attending a Nativity scene; hundreds of others were also present. 

Student A made eye contact with Bowen and left. Bowen also left, making 

Student A feel anxious.

• In the summer of 2017, Bowen and his children visited a splash pad; Bowen

parked his vehicle next to the mother’s vehicle. Student A and the mother 

saw Bowen and left. Bowen allegedly watched as Student A left. Student 

A reported feeling ill and like crying when seeing Bowen and where he had 

parked.

The ALJ made additional findings of fact (summarized below); the parties on 

appeal disagree about their importance:

• Student A is afraid to see [Bowen].

• There is no evidence that [Bowen] ever had sex with, made sexual 

advances toward, or used sexual language with Student A or any other child. 

There is no evidence that [Bowen] had sexual feelings for Student A.

• There is no evidence that [Bowen] and Student A had a romantic 

relationship or that [Bowen] solicited such a relationship.
8

• There is no evidence that [Bowen] attempted to be alone with Student A.

• [Bowen] has taught math for 13 years, has taught 1,000 students, and is an 

excellent teacher.

• No prior complaint has ever been made against [Bowen] by a student, a 

parent of a student, a school, a school district, or the Texas Education Agency 

(TEA).

• Over the years, [Bowen] has demonstrated a deep concern for the wellbeing of children.

In its final conclusion of law, the ALJ recommended that the Board issue a non-inscribed 

reprimand to Bowen for his violation of Standard 1.7.12 

When the Board held its hearing to consider the PFD and issue a final order, 

Student A and parents appeared in person. Student A’s parents addressed the Board

and read prepared statements requesting permanent revocation of Bowen’s educator’s 

certificate. Student A stood at the mother’s side as the mother tearfully delivered her 

plea. A representative for the TEA made oral argument that largely reiterated the reasons 

provided by the parents; he recommended that the Board accept the ALJ’s findings and 

conclusions, except for the final conclusion of law, and that Bowen’s license be 

suspended for two years. Counsel for Bowen also made a statement to the Board where 

he emphasized the ALJ’s findings and pointed out that the statement from the parents did 

not constitute evidence. A Board member then offered her opinion that based on the 

findings of fact there was “no question” that Bowen was exhibiting “grooming behaviors”

and “incapable of following a directive to stay away from a student, and [who] brought 

12 A “‘non-inscribed’ reprimand is a formal, unpublished censure that does not appear on the face 

of the educator’s virtual certificate.” 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 249.3(46)(B). It is “the least serious sanction 

the Board can impose.” Madden v. State Bd. for Educator Certification, No. 03-11-00584-CV, 2014 Tex. 

App. LEXIS 5444, at *13 (Tex. App.—Austin May 22, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see 19 TEX. ADMIN.

CODE § 249.15(a) (Disciplinary Action by State Board for Educator Certification).
9

harm to a student.” That Board member proposed a motion that the Board permanently 

revoke Bowen’s teaching certificate.

The Board adjourned to executive session. After it returned, the Board voted to 

adopt the ALJ’s findings of fact and all but one of the conclusions of law.13 Consistent 

with the Board member’s proposal, the Board modified the final conclusion of law to order

permanent revocation of Bowen’s educator certificate. It later prepared a signed written 

order reflecting the same. 

Consistent with its obligations under section 2001.058(e) of the Texas Government 

Code,

14 the Board explained that it modified the recommended sanction because the ALJ

did not properly apply Board rules and policies. The Board pointed out from the ALJ’s 

findings that Bowen flouted the school’s two directives by continuing to contact Student 

A and the family after being prohibited from doing so, and by continuing to discuss his 

feelings about Student A with another staff member after being directed to stop. The 

Board found that Bowen’s repeated conduct was flagrant, premeditated, and intentional, 

and that Bowen concealed his conduct from school administrators. Moreover, the Board 

referred to the findings of fact that Bowen’s conduct made Student A feel uncomfortable, 

13 As indicated above, the ALJ concluded that Bowen violated Standard 1.7 of the Educators’ Code 

of Ethics (“The educator shall comply with state regulations, written local school board policies, and other 

state and federal laws.”). The other conclusions of law determined that the evidence did not show Bowen

violated Standards 1.10, 3.2, 3.6, 3.8, or 3.9 of the Educators’ Code; or lacked good moral character; or is 

unworthy to instruct. 

14 When a state administrative agency rejects an ALJ’s recommended sanction against a licensee, 

the decision implicates TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e). Granek, 172 S.W.3d at 781. This requires 

the agency to show, in writing, at least one of the following: (1) that the administrative law judge did not 

properly apply or interpret applicable law, agency rules, written policies provided under Subsection (c), or 

prior administrative decisions; (2) that a prior administrative decision on which the administrative law judge 

relied is incorrect or should be changed; or (3) that a technical error in a finding of fact should be changed. 

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.058. Bowen’s complaint to the trial court regarding section 2001.058(e) was 

solely limited to whether the Board properly found “grooming behaviors.”
10

afraid, and upset, and was thus potentially dangerous to the health and welfare of 

students and detrimental to the student victim of the conduct. The Board also made the 

following statement:

Mr. Bowen’s repeated violation of the directives regarding prohibited 

student contact are indicative of grooming behavior.

The Board stated that Bowen’s repeated violations “show that Mr. Bowen was not able to 

rehabilitate himself,” and “require[] a stronger sanction than the non-inscribed reprimand 

the Administrative Law Judge recommended.” Finally, the Board stated that a permanent 

revocation of Bowen’s teaching certificate will not only allow Bowen time to reflect on his 

behavior, but will “better deter other Texas educators from violating school district

directives and policies than a non-inscribed reprimand.”

Bowen filed suit for judicial review of the Board’s final order in a Travis County 

district court. Though he framed his brief to track the grounds for reversal identified in 

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2),

15 his arguments were threefold: (1) the Board 

improperly permitted Student A and parents to appear and for the parents to speak at the 

hearing;16 (2) no evidence supports the Board’s statement that Bowen engaged in 

conduct indicative of grooming behavior;17 and (3) the punishment (revocation of a 

license) did not fit the crime (violating school policy) in light of Bowen’s teaching 

15 See also Scally v. Tex. St. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 351 S.W.3d 434, 440 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, 

pet. denied) (identifying the grounds on which the Administrative Procedures Act authorizes reversal or 

remand of an administrative agency’s decision that prejudices a licensee’s substantial rights).

16 “In short, the Board violated its own rule by allowing individuals who should not have been 

allowed to present information about the case to it outside its normal process for doing so.”

17 “[T]he Fact Findings cited by the Board affirmatively refute or fail to support the conclusion that 

Mr. Bowen was engaged in ‘grooming behavior.’”
11

experience.

18

 Bowen did not challenge the evidence supporting the ALJ’s findings of fact 

(that were adopted by the Board) or argue that his conduct was legally protected. 

The court reversed the Board’s order, concluding the order was (1) arbitrary and 

capricious and characterized by abuse of discretion and clearly unwarranted exercise of 

discretion; (2) made through unlawful procedure; (3) affected by other error of law (i.e.,

denial of due process); and (4) not reasonably supported by substantial evidence 

considering the reliable and probative evidence in the record as a whole. The Board

brought this appeal.19

Analysis

Via two issues, the Board challenges each reason articulated by the district court 

for setting aside the final order. We address the Board’s second issue first.

1. The Board Followed Lawful Procedures When Considering and Entering the Final 

Order.

We begin with the Board’s argument that it acted consistent with Bowen’s due 

process rights when considering and entering its final order. Bowen does not direct us to 

any alleged violations of procedure other than to assert that Student A’s parents should 

not have been permitted to speak at the hearing; nor do we find additional theories in our 

own review. The Board’s rules expressly permit parties to make oral argument before the 

18 “It is unreasonable to conclude that a teacher who does not comply with directives is so 

pernicious that no school district in the state is to be permitted to offer him or her employment . . . .”

19 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by 

the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. 

Should a conflict exist between precedent of the Third Court of Appeals and this Court on any relevant 

issue, this appeal will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court. TEX. R. APP. P.

41.3.
12

Board issues an order. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 249.38. Moreover, Board policies allow 

some time for the public to make comments about agenda and non-agenda items. Per 

board policy, oral argument is not evidentiary and may not include presentation of new 

facts or testimony. After the parents’ comments, Bowen’s attorney reminded the Board 

that the comments did not constitute evidence. When the Board returned to announce 

its sanction, it discussed the findings of fact contained in the PFD.

Based on the entire record, we do not find that the Board failed to follow lawful 

procedures when considering the evidence and argument, or when issuing a final order. 

We judge the comments at the hearing in light of what the entire record reveals. 

Pedernales Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 809 S.W.2d 332, 341 (Tex. 

App.—Austin 1991, no writ). This case presents a starkly different set of facts than those 

in matters in which a procedural violation was found, such as Tex. State Bd. of Med. 

Examiners v. Nacol, 696 S.W.2d 687, 688 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 

There, the record revealed that at the medical board hearing, (1) “[t]he Board acted like 

prosecutors rather than fact[-]finders and, in voting, used the word ‘guilty’ to the 

allegations, rather than ‘true.’”; (2) the board considered vials that were never introduced 

into evidence; and (3) there was evidence of possible intimidation of a witness, who 

testified under subpoena after being assured of immunity. 

In this case, there is no evidence that the parents presented new evidence that 

differs from the ALJ’s undisputed findings of fact. Other than recommending a different 

sanction, the statements by the representative of the TEA are consistent with those of the 

parents; Bowen does not allege any procedural deprivation caused by the 

representative’s remarks. Rather than complain of the content of the statements, 
13

Bowen’s complaint appears to be that the presence of the parents and Student A “injected 

extreme emotion and anger into the Board’s deliberations which, based on the video of 

the Board member who made the motion to revoke Mr. Bowen’s certificate . . . arguably, 

if not certainly, influenced the Board.” (ellipsis added). However, the extent to which a 

display of emotion may (or may not) have somehow influenced individual Board members 

is a speculative task we will not venture to undertake here. See City of Frisco v. Tex. 

Water Rights Comm’n, 579 S.W.2d 66, 72 (Tex. App.—Austin 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“The 

thought processes or motivations of an administrator are irrelevant in the judicial 

determination whether the agency order is reasonably sustained by appropriate findings 

and conclusions that have support in the evidence.”). We hold there is no evidence that 

the presentations by the parents violated Bowen’s procedural rights or unfairly prejudiced 

the Board’s decision.

Here, Bowen was given notice of the intent to revoke his license and an opportunity 

to be heard. He was provided notice of the ALJ’s findings supporting the application to 

revoke his license, an opportunity to contest those findings, and an opportunity to argue

why circumstances did not warrant the imposed sanction. Bowen also utilized his right to 

use counsel to participate and defend him, and his attorney properly reminded the Board 

to render its decision based on the evidence, not on the parents’ comments. There is no 

indication the Board failed to heed counsel’s instruction. We hold that the proceedings of 

the Board met the requirements of due process of law and the rudiments of fair play. See 

Grace v. Structural Pest Control Bd. of Tex., 620 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Tex. App.—Waco 

1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

We sustain the Board’s second issue.
14

2. The Board’s Final Order Was Not Arbitrary or Capricious or Characterized by Any 

Abuse of Discretion. 

Having determined that the Board’s hearing afforded Bowen with the requisite 

process, we next examine whether the Board had any basis for imposing a disciplinary 

sanction greater than that recommended in the PFD. Here and in the trial court below, 

Bowen devoted much of his briefing to the question of whether the administrative record 

contains substantial evidence that Bowen engaged in “grooming.” The Board’s brief does 

not mention grooming when complaining of the trial court’s order. For purposes of this 

opinion, we will therefore assume that the Board’s comments and its order’s finding

regarding grooming were “not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering 

the reliable and probative evidence in the record as a whole.” See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.

§ 2001.174(2)(E).

However, our analysis does not end here. Per section 2001.174, reversal of the 

Board’s order is only mandated when the “substantial rights of the appellant have been 

prejudiced” because of an incorrect administrative finding, inference, conclusion, or 

decision. Id. In other words, notwithstanding the improper findings regarding grooming, 

Bowen’s substantial rights are not prejudiced if an independent ground for revoking his 

license is supported by substantial evidence. See Brown, 281 S.W.3d at 704–05 (“When 

an agency offers more than one ground as the basis for its decision, we will affirm if we 

find substantial evidence supporting one ground even if all bases given would be 

independently sufficient to support the decision.”); Tex. State Bd. of Med. Examiners v. 

Scheffey, 949 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. denied) (“This Court need 

only find substantial evidence supporting one ground for suspension in order to uphold 

the Board’s order . . . .”). It is therefore necessary to assess whether substantial evidence 
15

supports the Board’s explanations for why a non-inscribed reprimand would be 

inappropriate as a sanction.

20

In a review for substantial evidence, this Court examines the record to determine 

whether the evidence constitutes more than a mere scintilla; thus, the evidence “may 

preponderate against the decision of the agency and nonetheless amount to substantial 

evidence.” Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. v. Tex. Indus. Energy Consumers, 620 S.W.3d 418, 

427 (Tex. 2021). We presume the agency’s order is valid and that its findings, inferences, 

conclusions, and decisions are supported by substantial evidence; the burden to prove 

otherwise rests with Bowen. Id. at 427. “[W]e will sustain an agency’s finding if 

reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion.” Hinkley v. Tex. Bd. of Med. 

Exam’rs, 140 S.W.3d 737, 743 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied). Ultimately, we 

assess whether the Board’s order is reasonable, not necessarily correct. Cty. of Reeves 

v. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 266 S.W.3d 516, 528 (Tex. App. —Austin 2008, no 

pet.).

No party contests the 108 findings of fact made by the ALJ—or 14 out of its 15 

conclusions of law. In addition to the complained-of comment regarding “grooming

behaviors” as a reason for permanently revoking Bowen’s license, the member 

additionally argued from the findings of fact that Bowen “was incapable of following a 

directive to stay away from a student, and [who] brought harm to a student.”21 It is

undisputed that Bowen did just that—and violated Standard 1.7 of the Educators’ Code 

of Ethics by repeatedly violating the orders of school administrators to cease 

20 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e); Granek, 172 S.W.3d at 781.

21 Bowen never complains of this statement as improper or unsupported by evidence.
16

communicating with Student A, the student’s family, and school staff. Bowen also violated 

Standard 1.7 when he failed to report these contacts to school officials. Violating the

Educators’ Code of Ethics is listed among the conduct authorizing the Board to impose

sanctions by revoking an educator license. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 249.15(a)(4), (b)(3). 

The Board’s exercise of discretion to impose a harsher sanction than the ALJ is not a 

matter this Court will second-guess, particularly in light of the undisputed facts and the 

legal authority that is unchallenged here. See State Bd. for Educator Certification v. 

Demiglio, No. 13-21-00331-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 2242, at *13 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi Apr. 6, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

22

Given the substantial evidence confirmed by the undisputed record, we hold that 

the district court erred by reversing the Board’s revocation of Bowen’s educator certificate. 

“The district court was prohibited from substituting its own judgment for that of the Board’s 

judgment on the weight of the evidence or questions committed to the Board’s discretion.” 

Id. at 8; see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.174. We sustain the Board’s first issue.

Conclusion

We reverse the district court’s judgment and render judgment affirming the Board’s 

decision.

Lawrence M. Doss

 Justice

22 The Board also detailed its reasons for its departure from the ALJ’s proposed sanction by 

identifying six factors in 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 249.17(c) that it believed weighed in favor of revoking 

Bowen’s educator certificate: (1) the seriousness of the violation; (2) that Bowen’s conduct was premeditated and intentional; (3) that Bowen attempted to conceal his misconduct; (4) that the conduct was a 

potential danger to the health and welfare of students; (5) that the conduct had a negative effect on the 

victim; and (6) that the conduct was repeated. See 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 249.17(c)(1)–(3), (5), and (10).