# FILED December 6, 1996 Cecil W. Crowson Ap pellate Cou rt Clerk CHARLES E. GREER, ) ) Plaintiff/Appellant, ) ) Appeal No. ) 01-A-01-9604- CH-00150 VS. ) ) David son C han cery ) No. 95-3639-II I CORRECTIONS CORPORATION ) OF AMERICA , et al., ) ) Defendants/Ap pellees. )

COURT OF APPE ALS OF TENNESSEE MIDDLE SEC TION AT NASHVILLE
APPEALE D FRO M THE C HANC ERY C OURT O F DAVI DSON COUN TY AT NASHVILLE, TENN ESSEE THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. BRA NDT, CHANC ELLOR
CHARLES E. G REER, #003208 South Central Correction al Center P. O. Box 279, X-D109 Clifton, Tennessee 38 425-0279 Pro Se/Plainti ff/Appellant TOM ANDERSON FRANKIE K. S TANFILL P. O. Box 900 Lexington, Tennessee 38351 Attorneys for Defendants/Appelle es

REVERSED AN D REMAND ED

BEN H. CAN TRELL, JUDGE CONCUR: TODD, P.J., M .S. KOCH, J.- 2 - 

## O P I N I O N

An inmate in a Tennesseeprison operat ed by Corr ections Cor poration of Amer ica f iled a com plai nt whi ch al leged that priso n gua rds e mplo yed by th e corrections

company had conv

erted h is p ersonal property. The chancery court dismissed his complaint for failure to st ate a claim upon which relief can be g ranted. We reverse and reinstate the complaint.
I.

CharlesE. Greer was incarcer ated at the South C entral Corr ectional Center at Clifton Tenness ee, a prison faci lity manag ed for the Tennessee Dep artment of Correction by Correctio ns Corpora tion of America ( CCA). On A ugust 25, 1995, there was a ge nera l cell shak edo wn in the secti on of the prison where M r. Greer w as housed. During the search of his cell, Gree r created a di sturbance, and pr ison guards removed him from t he unit and placed him in segregati on. In accordance with CCA poli cy, Mr. Greer’s personal property was packe d up by the g uards, and broug ht to him for observation fou r hours later.

Mr. Greer clai med that four items of w hat he calls his “relig ious jewelr y” were missing fro m the property brought to hi m. He filed several claims for themissing property w ith CCA’s

internal affairs

officer, but did not

receive any satisfact ion. On November 20 1995, Mr. Greer filed a complaint in the Chan cery Court of Davidson C ounty. The compl aint asserted that the propert y claim w as broughtpursuant to Tenn. C ode Ann. § 28-3 -105 (Section (2) of that stat ute establishesa thre e year limi t ations period for actions inv olving the detention or conversi on of personal proper ty) and that

venue was prop er in Da vidson Cou nty- 3 -

because that was where CCA has it s headquarter s and transacts

its business. CCA and three guard s who were involved in the search of Mr. Greer ’s cell were named as defendant s. The complaint described th e missing items in detail and ascribed a v alue to each one. The items were two gold neck lace s and two gold rin gs, wi th a total value of $579.80.
The defendants did no t file an answer to the complaint , but CCA filed a Motion to Dismiss. See Ru le 12 .02, Ten n. R. Civ. P. The grounds presented in t he motion were that CCA could not be held liabl e for the plainti ff’s loss under the theory of respondeat super iorbecause it had no knowledg e concerning the allegat ions contained in the complai nt, and that the pr oper venue for t he action was Wayne Coun ty, since all the other named defendants were employed in that coun ty. The motion reci tes that a Mem orandu m of Law was being filed contemporaneously with it. However that memor andum has not been made a par t of the record.
The chancery court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on January 26, 1996. Since he was incarcera ted, the plaintiff waived oral argument, but h e submitted his own affidavit and that of another inmate to supp ort his allegatio ns. The chancellor’s judgment was filed and entered on Janua ry 29, 1996. It reads asfollows:

The pleadin g filed by the plaintiff entitled “Property Claim Through Tort of Neglig ence and Ordinar y Negl igence,” which relies upon a statute of limit ation as its basis, doesnot state a claim u pon which r eliefcan be grant ed. Acco rdin gly, the case is dismissed at the plaintif f’s costs. This appeal followed.

II.- 4 - A motion to dismi ss for failure t o state a claim upon which relief can be granted admits the trut h of all the relevant facts alleged in the complaint , but asserts that such facts do not constitu te a cause of action . Rowland v. Bradley, 899 S.W.2d 614 (Tenn. App. 1994). It seems clear to us that, al though inart fully draw n, the plaintiff’s complai nt does state a c laim for conversion of personal property.

Conversi on is a common-law action of an cient origin for wrongfully taking possession and assuming cont rol of another’s property. McCombs v. Guild, Church & Co., 77 Tenn. (9 Lea) 81 (1882) ; McCall v . Owens , 820 S.W. 2d 748 (Tenn App. 1991). It al so lies w here a defendant may h ave rig htfully obtai ned possession of the p rope rty of the o wn er, but wrong fully refuses to return it to the owner

when legally required to do so. Crocket & Woodson v. Beaty , 27 Tenn. (8 Hum.) 20 (1847); Gribble v. Buckner

, 730 S.W.2d 630 (Tenn. App. 1986).
Res p ondeat Superior is a legal doctrine, also of ancient origin, whose Latin n ame means “Let the Master Answer.” Blacks Law Dictionar

y, Fourth Edition, (1957). It enables a pl aintiff to hold a master or employer

liable for the wrongful acts of its serv

ants or employees, when thos e acts are don e in the scope andcourse of the wro ngdoer’s emp loym ent. Craig v. Gentry, 792 S.W .2d 77 (Tenn. App. 1990). Parker v. Vande rbil t Universi ty , 767 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. App. 1988). There is no require ment that t he employer beaware of his agent’s w rongful acts in order to be held liable, Youngblood v. W all, 815 S.W .2d 512 (Tenn. App . 1991). CCAhas not denied that th e guards named in the lawsuit are or were its employees, nor

thatthey were acting in the course of their employ ment when they collected the property fr om the plaintiff’s cell. CCAarg ues o n app eal that the d eci sio n of t he t rial court is entitled to considerable deference, and that “judgments supported by some competent, credible- 5 -

evidence going to all the essential elements will not be reversed by a reviewing court as against the manifest weig ht of the evidence.” While this may be true, a judgment of dismissal for failure to st ate a claim upon w hich relief can be granted is not based on the presentati on of evidence but on th e plead ings alone. There is no indication in the chancellor’s order

that he consider

ed any matters

outside the ple adings. Thus t he presumption of co rre ctne ss t hat n orma lly acc ompan iesthe f indi ngsof a t rie r of f a ct does not apply

in this cas e. III.
The judgment of the tr ial court i s revers ed. Remand this cause to the ChanceryCourt of Dav idson County for further heari ng and for other proceedi ngs consistent w ith this opi nion. Tax the costs on appeal to the appellee.

_____ ________________________ BEN H. CAN TRELL, JUDGE CONCUR:

_______________________________ HENRY F . TODD, PRESID ING JUDGE MIDDLE SEC TION

_______________________________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J UDGE