Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC2021-1479

____________

DAVID WILLIAM TRAPPMAN,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

February 8, 2024

CANADY, J.

Petitioner David William Trappman was not cooperative when 

law enforcement officers came to his home to arrest his wife. As the 

officers were attempting to make the arrest, Trappman shoved an 

officer. After the officer shoved back, Trappman responded by 

siccing a pit bull on the officer. For shoving the officer, Trappman 

was convicted of battery of a law enforcement officer. For siccing 

the dog on the officer, with the resulting bite and scarring of the 

officer’s leg, Trappman was convicted of aggravated battery of a law 

enforcement officer.
- 2 -

In Trappman’s appeal, the First District Court of Appeal 

rejected an argument that the protection against double jeopardy 

precluded his dual convictions and sentences. Trappman v. State, 

325 So. 3d 944, 945 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). The court concluded that 

although the two offenses occurred in one criminal episode, they 

were based on distinct acts for which multiple punishments could 

be imposed without a double jeopardy violation. Id. at 946. 

Recognizing that the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal

in Olivard v. State, 831 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), involved a 

similar fact pattern but reached a different result on the double 

jeopardy issue, the First District certified that its decision was in 

direct conflict with Olivard. Trappman, 325 So. 3d at 947. Based 

on the certified conflict, we decided to exercise jurisdiction. See art. 

V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

Because we agree with the First District that the shoving of the 

officer and the subsequent siccing of the dog on the officer were

distinct criminal acts for which separate punishments were 

properly imposed, we approve the conclusion in Trappman that no 

double jeopardy violation occurred. And we disapprove Olivard as 

inconsistent with our reasoning here. 
- 3 -

In explaining our decision, we first review the facts of the 

incident that resulted in the charges against Trappman and the 

First District’s disposition of Trappman’s appeal and compare that 

decision with the conflict decision. We then examine double 

jeopardy principles, focusing particularly on the multiplepunishment analytical framework set forth in the United States 

Supreme Court’s landmark decision of Blockburger v. United States, 

284 U.S. 299 (1932). Next we turn to the Blockburger-inspired rule 

of construction regarding multiple punishments contained in 

section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (2017). Finally, we consider 

the arguments of the parties on the conflict issue and then analyze 

Trappman’s conduct, concluding that separate impulses resulting 

in distinct criminal acts justify Trappman’s dual convictions and 

sentences.

I.

As explained by the First District, officers arrived at 

Trappman’s home “to execute an arrest warrant for his wife.” 

Trappman, 325 So. 3d at 945.

Once officers entered the home, [Trappman] was 

instructed to proceed back outside with his two dogs 

while the warrant on his wife was executed. At trial, 
- 4 -

officers testified that [Trappman] initially complied; 

however, once outside, he began to rile up the dogs by 

banging their heads together and yelling at them. He 

eventually reappeared in the doorway of the home 

holding both dogs by the collars and refused the officers’ 

orders to go back outside. Sergeant Bird—the victim of 

both batteries—testified that when he approached, 

[Trappman] reached out and shoved him with one hand. 

Sergeant Bird responded by driving [Trappman] towards 

the front door with both hands. [Trappman] then let go 

of a dog while exclaiming “dog up, dog up.” The dog, a 

pit bull, leapt at Sergeant Bird and latched onto his leg, 

causing injury and subsequent scarring.

Id. Trappman was charged with battery of a law enforcement officer 

and aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer.1 

“The theory of the State’s case was that [Trappman] had 

initially committed battery by shoving Sergeant Bird, and that he 

separately committed aggravated battery by subsequently ‘siccing’ 

the dog on Bird.” Id. Agreeing with the State, the First District held 

that Trappman’s acts of shoving a police officer and then siccing a 

dog on the officer were “distinct acts” rendering double jeopardy 

inapplicable, notwithstanding that the two acts “occurred over the 

1. Trappman was also charged with resisting arrest. That 

charge is not at issue.
- 5 -

course of approximately one minute” and “were part of a single 

criminal episode.” Id. at 946.

The First District certified conflict with the decision of the 

Fourth District in Olivard. There, the defendant was convicted of 

battery (for hitting the victim) and aggravated battery (for biting off 

the victim’s ear). 831 So. 2d at 824. The Fourth District reversed 

the lesser conviction, reasoning that the defendant’s “actions were 

within the course of one continuous episode attacking [the victim].” 

Id. The Fourth District, which did not discuss the notion of 

“distinct acts,” viewed the defendant’s conduct as “a single act,” and 

concluded that dual punishments for the greater offense of 

aggravated battery and the lesser included offense of battery could 

not be imposed for such a “single act.” Id. 

II.

The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause provides that 

no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 

jeopardy of life or limb.” Amend. V, U.S. Const. The protections of 

this federal constitutional provision are applicable to the States 

through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 

784, 787 (1969). In any event, the Florida Constitution contains a 
- 6 -

similar provision, which states that no person shall “be twice put in 

jeopardy for the same offense.” Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. We have said 

“that our own double jeopardy clause in article I, section 9, Florida 

Constitution, which has endured in this state with only minor 

changes since the constitution of 1845, was intended to mirror [the]

intention of those who framed the double jeopardy clause of the 

fifth amendment.” Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla. 

1987); see also Trotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362, 365 (Fla. 2002) 

(“The scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause is the same in both the 

federal and Florida Constitutions.”).

The decisions of the United States Supreme Court “have 

recognized three separate guarantees embodied in the Double 

Jeopardy Clause: It protects against a second prosecution for the 

same offense after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the 

same offense after conviction, and against multiple punishments for 

the same offense.” Justs. of Bos. Mun. Ct. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 

306-07 (1984) (citing Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980)).2 

2. Mistrials can also trigger application of the double jeopardy 

clause in some circumstances. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 

82 (1978).
- 7 -

In applying each of the three guarantees, the essential 

determination is whether one charge against a defendant is for the 

“same offense” as another charge against that defendant. And for 

double jeopardy protection to apply, most succinctly put, the 

offenses must be “the same in law and in fact.” Burton v. United 

States, 202 U.S. 344, 380 (1906) (quoting Commonwealth v. Roby,

12 Pick. 496, 502 (Mass. 1832)); see also Boswell v. State, 20 Fla. 

869, 875 (1884) (“In considering the identity of the offence, it must 

appear . . . that the offence charged in both cases was the same in 

law and in fact.” (quoting Roby, 12 Pick. at 509)).

A.

Here, the third guarantee—“against multiple punishments for 

the same offense”—is at issue. A framework for analyzing such 

multiple-punishment double jeopardy questions is laid out in 

Blockburger, which addresses the distinct questions of how to 

determine both whether offenses are the same “in fact” and whether 

they are the same “in law.” The first inquiry addresses whether 

conduct transgressing a single prohibition is subject to multiple 

punishments, and the second is aimed at determining whether a

single act transgressing more than one prohibition may be 
- 8 -

punished separately based on the violation of the separate 

prohibitions. 

Under Blockburger’s reasoning, multiple punishments for 

violations of a single criminal prohibition are permissible if the 

prohibition is aimed at singular acts—as opposed to a continuous 

offense or course of criminal conduct—and the defendant’s conduct 

involves separate acts stemming from “successive impulses.” See

Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302 (quoting Wharton’s Criminal Law 

(11th Ed.) § 34).3 And multiple punishments for a single act that 

violates separate criminal prohibitions are permissible if the 

separate prohibitions each require proof of a fact not required to 

establish a violation of the other prohibition. See id. at 304.

In Blockburger, the defendant was convicted of three counts 

related to the illegal sale of morphine hydrochloride to the same 

purchaser. Id. at 301. One “count charged a sale on a specified 

day of ten grains of the drug not in or from the original stamped 

package,” while another “count charged a sale on the following day 

3. Blockburger does not address when multiple punishments 

may be imposed for a singular act that violates a single prohibition 

but affects multiple victims.
- 9 -

of eight grains of the drug not in or from the original stamped 

package.” Id. The final “count charged the latter sale also as 

having been made not in pursuance of a written order of the 

purchaser as required by the statute.” Id. On review, the 

defendant first contended that the conduct on which the first two 

counts were predicated “constitute[d] a single offense” based on the 

facts. Id. Second, the defendant also argued that the final count—

for violating the separate statutory prohibition concerning the 

absence of a written order—as a matter of law “constitute[d] but one

offense” with the later of the other counts, since the two counts 

were based on the same conduct. Id. The Court rejected both 

arguments. 

Concerning the first argument, the Court concluded that the 

two sales “were distinct and separate sales made at different times.” 

Id. This was so even though payment for the drug in the second 

transaction—to be delivered the day after the drug in the first 

transaction was delivered—was made “shortly after delivery of the 

drug” in the first transaction. Id. The Court reasoned that “the first 

sale had been consummated, and the payment for the additional 
- 10 -

drug, however closely following, was the initiation of a separate and 

distinct sale completed by its delivery.” Id.

The Court pointed to the well-established distinction between 

offenses that are continuous in character and offenses that can be 

committed by a singular act—that is, “uno ictu” or with one blow—

concluding that the statute under examination could be 

transgressed by an “isolated act.” Id. at 302 (quoting Ex parte 

Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 281, 286 (1887)). “Each of several successive 

sales constitutes a distinct offense, however closely they may follow 

each other.” Id. The Court elaborated by highlighting the 

significance of “successive impulses” discussed in Wharton’s 

Criminal Law: “[W]hen the impulse is single, but one indictment 

lies, no matter how long the action may continue. If successive 

impulses are separately given, even though all unite in swelling a 

common stream of action, separate indictments lie.” Id. (quoting

Wharton’s Criminal Law (11th Ed.) § 34).

On the defendant’s second contention, comparing the offense 

of sale “not in or from the original stamped package” with the 

offense of sale “not in pursuance of a written order,” the Court 

observed that “[e]ach of the offenses created requires proof of a 
- 11 -

different element.” Id. at 304. The Court stated this as the 

governing rule: “[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a 

violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied 

to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether 

each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”

Id. Under that test, the defendant’s argument was unavailing 

because “although both sections were violated by the one sale, two 

offenses were committed.” Id.

We have recognized the importance of the two different lines of 

analysis in Blockburger and that conflating those distinct lines of 

analysis is erroneous. Rejecting case law that suggested such a 

conflated analysis, in Graham v. State, 207 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 2016), 

we clarified

that Blockburger ultimately provides courts with two tests 

to apply: (1) where the defendant is convicted multiple 

times under the same statute for acts that occurred 

during the course of a single criminal episode, a “distinct 

acts” test is used, but (2) where a defendant is convicted 

under multiple statutes for one act, the “different 

elements” test applies.

Id. at 141. Regarding “the Blockburger ‘distinct acts’ analysis,” we 

recognized that acts are distinct when they “indicate[] a different 

impulse to violate the statute.” Id. at 139. We also accordingly 
- 12 -

acknowledged “that under Blockburger, a defendant can also 

commit a number of sequential acts within a single criminal 

episode, and each distinct act may be punished under the same 

statute.” Id. at 140.

B.

“With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single 

trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the 

sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the 

legislature intended.” Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983). 

The protection against multiple punishments for the same offense 

thus 

is designed to ensure that the sentencing discretion of 

courts is confined to the limits established by the 

legislature. Because the substantive power to prescribe 

crimes and determine punishments is vested with the 

legislature, the question under the Double Jeopardy 

Clause whether punishments are “multiple” is essentially 

one of legislative intent.

Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984) (citations omitted). In 

line with our law deciding that the state and federal double jeopardy 

protections have the same scope, we have echoed and applied this 

understanding of the limitations on multiple punishments as 

focused on legislative authorization. See, e.g., Valdes v. State, 3 So. 
- 13 -

3d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 2009) (discussing relevant Supreme Court case 

law and stating that “there is no constitutional prohibition against 

multiple punishments for different offenses arising out of the same 

criminal transaction as long as the Legislature intends to authorize 

separate punishments”).

The decision in Blockburger—which notably makes no mention 

of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy—addresses 

how to properly interpret and apply federal criminal laws to insure

that multiple punishments are not imposed when unauthorized by 

Congress. “In the federal courts the [Blockburger] test . . . ordinarily 

determines whether the crimes are indeed separate and whether 

cumulative punishments may be imposed.” Johnson, 467 U.S. at

499 n.8. But “the Blockburger test does not necessarily control the 

inquiry into the intent of a state legislature. Even if the crimes are 

the same under Blockburger, if it is evident that a state legislature 

intended to authorize cumulative punishments, a court’s inquiry is 

at an end.” Id.

III.

In Florida, the legislature has acted to provide very specific 

guidance concerning the general rules for determining when 
- 14 -

separate punishments are properly applied for separate offenses 

that are committed during one criminal transaction or episode. The 

legislative rules were adopted against the backdrop of Blockburger

and Florida’s prior adherence to the “single transaction rule,” under 

which, as we held in Simmons v. State, 10 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. 

1942), “there should be one punishment where . . . the various 

counts of the information presented different aspects of the same 

criminal transaction and . . . the court should impose a sentence on 

the count which charges the higher grade or degree of the offense.” 

From its inception in 1976, section 775.021(4) “abrogated the single 

transaction rule.” Borges v. State, 415 So. 2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. 

1982). The statutory rules thus embody a broad purpose “to 

convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed”—even 

when committed in the course of a single transaction or episode—

and a departure from principles of lenity as previously understood. 

These “rules of construction” are set forth in section 

775.021(4):

(4)(a) Whoever, in the course of one criminal 

transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which 

constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon 

conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced 

separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing 
- 15 -

judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently 

or consecutively. For the purposes of this subsection, 

offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an 

element that the other does not, without regard to the 

accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.

(b) The intent of the Legislature is to convict and 

sentence for each criminal offense committed in the 

course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to 

allow the principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) 

to determine legislative intent. Exceptions to this rule of 

construction are:

1. Offenses which require identical elements of 

proof.

2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense 

as provided by statute.

3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory 

elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.

§ 775.021(4), Fla. Stat.

The “principle of lenity” in subsection (1) requires that the 

provisions of the Florida Criminal Code “and offenses defined by 

other statutes shall be strictly construed,” so that “when the

language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be 

construed most favorably to the accused.” § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. 

But subsection (4) makes clear that this rule of lenity has no 

application to matters within the scope of subsection (4), subject 

only to the specific exceptions set forth in subsection (4)(b)1.-3. 

We have acknowledged that “the Blockburger same-elements 

test”—which is sometimes characterized as a different elements 
- 16 -

test—is “codified” in subsection (4). State v. Marsh, 308 So. 3d 59, 

61 (Fla. 2020); see also State v. Maxwell, 682 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. 

1996) (“Section 775.021(4) is a codification of the Blockburger test, 

sometimes referred to as the same-elements test, which inquires 

whether each offense contains an element not contained in the 

other; if not, they are the same offense and double jeopardy bars 

subsequent punishment or prosecution.”). The Blockburger sameelements test is reflected in the text of the last sentence of 

subsection (4)(a), which provides that “offenses are separate if each 

offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without 

regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.” It 

is also reflected and refined in the exceptions of subsection (4)(b) 

from the general rule that the intent of the legislature is “to convict 

and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of 

one criminal episode or transaction.”

Under the statute—understood against the backdrop of 

Blockburger—multiple punishments for a criminal act that violates 

multiple criminal provisions are precluded if the provisions fall 

outside the ambit of the last sentence of subsection (4)(a) or within 
- 17 -

the exceptions of subsection (4)(b). And nothing in the statute is 

inconsistent with Blockburger’s distinct acts test.

IV.

Trappman’s core argument is that the two offenses of which he 

was convicted were “committed during one continuous criminal 

episode with one criminal intent” and multiple punishments were 

precluded under the exception in section 775.021(4)(b)3. because 

the statutory elements of the lesser offense (battery of a law 

enforcement officer) were subsumed by the greater offense 

(aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer).4 In support of his 

position, Trappman cites Olivard—the conflict case—and various 

other cases, relying principally on our decision in Hayes v. State, 

803 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2001), in which we said that in determining 

whether criminal conduct involves distinct acts rather than “one 

continuous criminal act with a single criminal intent,” “courts 

4. At oral argument, counsel for Trappman argued that this 

Court need not reach the issue of distinct acts and can instead 

resolve this case based on certain alleged deficiencies in the 

charging document. But Trappman never raised this chargingdocument issue below or in his initial brief to this Court. We do not 

now consider this issue that was not properly preserved or 

presented. 
- 18 -

should look to whether there was a separation of time, place, or 

circumstances.” Id. at 704.

The State counters that “[b]ecause Petitioner’s convictions 

were based on two separate distinct acts which were based upon 

separate impulses or intents, a Blockburger [different elements] 

analysis is not triggered.” The State also points us to Graham, 

where—as previously mentioned—this Court “clarifie[d]” its reading 

of Blockburger and distinguished between the “distinct acts” test 

and the “different elements” test and—following Blockburger—

determined that acts are distinct when they are based on separate 

impulses. Graham, 207 So. 3d at 139, 141. According to the State, 

Trappman’s conduct in shoving the officer and subsequently siccing 

the dog on the officer involved two distinct acts flowing from two 

separate impulses. 

V.

The State concedes that the two offenses for which Trappman 

was convicted occurred in the course of a single criminal 

transaction or episode. The material facts related to the 

commission of the two offenses similarly are not disputed. Nor is it 

disputed that the statutory elements of the lesser offense (battery of 
- 19 -

a law enforcement officer) were subsumed by the greater offense 

(aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer) and that only one 

punishment would be applicable if the offenses were predicated on 

a singular act.

Accordingly, the sole question presented for us to decide is 

whether the relevant conduct of Trappman constituted one criminal 

act of battery of a law enforcement officer, subject to only one 

punishment, or two successive criminal acts of battery of a law 

enforcement officer (the latter of which was in an aggravated form), 

subject to two punishments. We review this question de novo. See

Pizzo v. State, 945 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Fla. 2006) (“A double 

jeopardy claim based upon undisputed facts presents a pure 

question of law and is reviewed de novo.”). Concerning whether 

there were multiple acts of battery, there is no suggestion that 

battery is a continuing offense that cannot be committed by an 

isolated act. Nor is there any suggestion that the question here is 

resolved by the manner in which the statutory offenses are defined.5 

5. This stands in contrast to cases such as State v. Johnson, 

343 So. 3d 46, 47 (Fla. 2022), in which we upheld multiple 

punishments for a single act of leaving the scene of an accident 

involving multiple victims. Relying on the text of the statutory 
- 20 -

Ultimately, we agree with the State that Blockburger’s distinct acts 

analysis provides the appropriate basis for deciding the issue in this 

case. That test serves to implement the statutory directive to

“convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed.”

A.

We begin our analysis by examining our decision in Hayes, in 

which the defendant, who was convicted and sentenced for both 

armed robbery and grand theft of an automobile for conduct in the

course of a single criminal episode, challenged the district court 

decision upholding the dual punishments against a double jeopardy 

claim. 803 So. 2d at 697-98. Specifically, we considered 

the issue . . . whether a defendant may be separately 

convicted of both armed robbery and grand theft of a 

motor vehicle where the defendant steals various items 

from inside a victim’s residence, including the victim’s 

car keys, and then proceeds outside the residence to 

steal the victim’s motor vehicle utilizing these keys.

prohibition as understood in the context of the statutory scheme, 

we concluded that the “permissible unit of prosecution” under the 

statute authorized “prosecution on a per-crash-victim basis, rather 

than on a per-crash basis.” Id. The arguments presented here do 

not turn on a unit-of-prosecution analysis. 
- 21 -

Id. at 697. Based on the circumstances described, we decided that 

the two offenses were based on “distinct and independent criminal 

acts” and therefore that the imposition of two punishments was 

appropriate. Id. at 704-05.

The foundation for our analysis in Hayes was our recognition 

that “the prohibition against double jeopardy does not prohibit 

multiple convictions and punishments [when] a defendant commits 

two or more distinct criminal acts,” id. at 700—that is, when the 

offenses are not the same “in fact.” We also recognized that in 

deciding whether criminal conduct constitutes a single criminal act 

as opposed to multiple distinct acts, “it is difficult to formulate a 

bright-line rule because the determination is often fact-specific.” Id.

at 705.

Nonetheless, after surveying Florida case law and case law 

from certain other jurisdictions, we articulated a standard for 

making such a determination “in a case involving a single victim’s 

property.” Id. at 704. We said that 

courts should look to whether there was a separation of 

time, place, or circumstances between the initial armed 

robbery and the subsequent grand theft, as those factors 

are objective criteria utilized to determine whether there 

are distinct and independent criminal acts or whether 
- 22 -

there is one continuous criminal act with a single 

criminal intent.

Id. (emphasis added). We elaborated that in deciding whether 

multiple criminal acts occurred, “the courts should consider the 

location of the items taken, the lapse of time between takings, the 

number of owners of the items taken, and whether intervening 

events occurred between the takings.” Id. 

Based on this analytical framework, we held that even though 

“there was only a single victim . . . and there were no intervening 

acts, . . . the robbery of various items from inside the residence was 

sufficiently separate in time, place and circumstances from Hayes’

theft of the motor vehicle parked outside the victim’s residence to 

constitute distinct and independent criminal acts.” Id. Our 

analysis did not consider whether the conduct of Hayes involved 

“successive impulses,” the touchstone articulated in Blockburger for 

determining whether separate violations of a particular statutory 

provision have occurred.6

6. In our discussion of case law from other jurisdictions, we 

did mention authorities that employed the concept of “impulses” in 

determining whether multiple instances of a particular offense had 
- 23 -

B.

In contrast to Hayes, our more recent decision in Graham 

relied directly on Blockburger’s “distinct acts” analysis. We find that 

Graham—in tracking Blockburger—provides a more helpful line of 

analysis for deciding the issue presented by Trappman.

The question in Graham, in which the First District had 

affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentences, was “whether 

double jeopardy prohibits dual convictions under the same statute 

[when] the acts upon which the charges are based occur within a 

single criminal episode.” 207 So. 3d at 137. The dual convictions 

and sentences were for lewd and lascivious molestation based on 

the successive touchings of different parts of the victim’s body. Id.

at 136. The victim’s testimony established that the defendant went 

to her as she slept and “touch[ed] [her] breasts under her shirt.” Id.

at 141. Then, when the “victim turned over” she felt the defendant 

occurred. See Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 702-03. But we incorporated

nothing regarding the concept of “impulses” in our own analysis.
- 24 -

“touching her buttocks.” Id.7 We concluded that “these touches 

were each individual acts, committed sequentially” and that 

“[u]nder a ‘distinct acts’ analysis, it is clear that punishment was 

warranted for each individual touch.” Id. We analogized the case to 

Blockburger:

Similar to Blockburger—in which the Court held that “the 

payment for the additional drug, however closely 

following, was the initiation of a separate and distinct 

sale completed by its delivery”—in this case, a new act 

began each time one touch ended and another was 

initiated, no matter how closely each one followed the 

other.

Id. (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301). 

We thus approved the First District’s decision to affirm the 

dual convictions and sentences. Id. But we disagreed with its 

reasoning—reasoning that we concluded confused the proper 

analysis concerning multiple punishments for the violation of a 

particular criminal prohibition. Id. We recognized that the First 

District’s reasoning found its genesis in the reasoning of one of our 

7. Although we did not focus on the circumstance, it appears 

that the victim’s act of turning over could be seen as an act of 

resisting the illicit contact.
- 25 -

own decisions—State v. Meshell, 2 So. 3d 132 (Fla. 2009). Graham, 

207 So. 3d at 136.

In Meshell, we considered whether “Meshell’s convictions for 

lewd and lascivious battery . . . for vaginal penetration or union . . . 

and for oral sex . . . violated double jeopardy.” 2 So. 3d at 133. We 

upheld the dual convictions and sentences, concluding that 

“[b]ecause the oral sex . . . is a criminal act distinctively different 

from the vaginal penetration or union . . . , there is not a double 

jeopardy violation.” Id. at 136. We reasoned that “sexual acts of a 

separate character and type requiring different elements of 

proof . . . are distinct criminal acts that the Florida Legislature has 

decided warrant multiple punishments.” Id. at 135. 

Notwithstanding the focus of our reasoning in Meshell, we did quote 

a district court decision stating that “the fact that the same victim 

is sexually battered in the same manner more than once in a 

criminal episode by the same defendant does not conclusively 

prohibit multiple punishments” and that “[s]patial and temporal 

aspects are equally . . . important as distinctions in character and 

type in determining whether multiple punishments are 
- 26 -

appropriate.” Id. (quoting Saavedra v. State, 576 So. 2d 953, 957 

(Fla. 1st DCA 1991), approved, 622 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1993)).

In Graham, we criticized the reasoning of Meshell as follows:

Meshell had violated the lewd or lascivious molestation 

statute twice: First, when he penetrated the victim’s 

vagina, and second, when he penetrated the victim’s 

mouth. Under the Blockburger “distinct acts” analysis, 

each act was distinct because each act indicated a 

different impulse to violate the statute. Therefore, 

multiple punishments under the same statute would not 

violate double jeopardy. However, this Court held that 

the two acts were “distinct” because they were “sexual 

acts of a separate character and type requiring different 

elements of proof, such as those proscribed in the sexual 

battery statute.” Meshell, 2 So. 3d at 135 (emphasis 

added). By including the “different elements” language in 

its analysis of “distinct acts,” it appears this Court may 

have conflated the two tests set forth in Blockburger.

Graham, 207 So. 3d at 139-40.

C.

We reiterate Graham’s emphasis on the importance of 

distinguishing between the two tests set forth in Blockburger. The 

analysis employed in determining whether offenses are the same “in 

fact” is very different from the analysis employed in determining 

whether offenses are the same “in law.” Multiple punishments are 

precluded only when the charged offenses are both the same in fact 

and the same in law. So it is essential that the distinct acts test not 
- 27 -

be conflated or confused with—or displaced by—the same-elements 

test. Acts are distinct when they result from “successive impulses”

even when the character of the acts is the same. But we also 

recognize that in applying the distinct acts test, it is significant that 

the conduct of a defendant has violated a single prohibition in 

multiple ways. Although a variation in the manner in which the 

prohibition is violated is not necessary to establish the existence of 

distinct acts, such variation may signal that the defendant’s 

wrongdoing involves “successive impulses” to violate the same 

prohibition and thus results in distinct acts warranting separate 

punishment for each act.

Likewise, we acknowledge that Hayes’s teaching that “courts 

should look to whether there was a separation of time, place, or 

circumstances” in the conduct of a defendant points to factors that 

may evidence that the defendant was guilty of conduct involving 

successive impulses to violate the same prohibition. See Hayes, 

803 So. 2d at 704. But the touchstone of the analysis—as 

Blockburger held—must be whether there were such successive 

impulses. As in Graham, we adhere to Blockburger’s distinct acts 

test, which recognized that “[e]ach of several successive” violations 
- 28 -

“constitutes a distinct offense, however closely they may follow each 

other” and placed the focus of the analysis squarely on whether 

there were “successive impulses.” Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302. 

Under the Blockburger test, separate instances of an offense—

arising from successive impulses—may be committed at the same 

place, in the same manner, and in close temporal connection.

D.

Applying the Blockburger distinct acts test, we conclude that 

Trappman’s conduct involved successive impulses to commit a 

battery and that his dual convictions and sentences were properly 

affirmed by the First District. After Trappman first battered the 

officer by shoving him and the officer shoved back, Trappman 

responded to the officer’s resistance not by continuing the shoving 

match but by using the pit bull to escalate his violence against the 

officer. Trappman’s conduct unquestionably “unite[d] in swelling a 

common stream of action.” Id. (quoting Wharton’s Criminal Law 

(11th Ed.) § 34). But that does not mean that the conduct involved 

only one criminal act. On the contrary, there was a disjuncture in 

Trappman’s conduct when he moved from shoving to deploying the 

dog. Successive criminal impulses to batter the officer are evident 
- 29 -

in the sequence of events. Those successive impulses resulted in 

distinct acts that are subject to separate punishments.8

In this respect, Trappman’s course of conduct is akin to the 

defendant’s course of conduct in Graham. In both cases, although 

there was a close temporal connection between the successive 

instances of forbidden physical contact, distinct criminal acts 

nonetheless resulted from successive impulses. Cf. Brown v. State, 

430 So. 2d 446, 446-47 (Fla. 1983) (upholding convictions for two 

counts of robbery of a retail establishment in which the taking of 

property was from two different cash registers controlled by two 

different employees, and reasoning that “[w]hat is dispositive is 

whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings 

with a separate and independent intent for each transaction”).

Recently, the Supreme Court of Connecticut applied a similar 

distinct acts analysis in State v. Cody M., 259 A.3d 576 (Conn. 

8. We need not and do not hold that when an offense, such as 

battery, may be committed by a single blow, that each additional 

blow laid on results in an additional offense. The test is not 

whether there are successive blows but whether there are 

successive impulses. We do not suggest that multiple blows may 

not spring from a single impulse.
- 30 -

2020), when it considered “whether multiple convictions for 

violation of a standing criminal protective order, arising from a 

series of statements made during a court hearing by the defendant, 

Cody M., to the person protected by the order, violate the 

constitutional protection from double jeopardy.” Id. at 580. The 

basic facts were as follows:

When the hearing began, the defendant [who was 

under incarceration] tried to engage in “small talk” with 

the victim, but she ignored him and did not make eye 

contact. The victim testified that the defendant had 

“whispered to me that he still loved me and had asked 

me why I had a block on the phone and that I said I 

would never do this to him . . . . [W]hen I wasn’t 

responding to him, his tone changed and he told me that 

‘you’re going to have problems when I get home, bitch,’ 

and . . . I looked at him, and he told me that he was 

going to fucking kill me.”

Id. at 581 (omissions and second alteration in original).

After rejecting an argument that criminal violations of a 

protective order were in the nature of a continuing offense, id. at 

584, the court considered “whether the defendant’s statements in 

th[e] case constituted a single act or multiple acts,” id. at 588. The 

court stated that “distinct repetitions of a prohibited act, however 

closely they may follow each other . . . may be punished as separate 

crimes without offending the double jeopardy clause.” Id. (omission
- 31 -

in original) (quoting State v. Miranda, 794 A.2d 506, 524 (Conn. 

2002)). The court concluded “that the defendant’s statements 

constitute two distinct acts because the victim’s resistance,

effectuated by her silence, was an intervening event causing the 

defendant to escalate his behavior.” Id. The court further reasoned 

that “[w]hat separates the defendant’s statements into two criminal 

acts is the defendant’s clear escalation, showing a ‘fresh impulse’ to 

move from nonthreatening conversation to threatening 

conversation.” Id. (emphasis added).

Although the contexts are somewhat different, we find the line 

of analysis in Cody M.—with its focus on successive impulses—to 

be consistent with our reasoning here.9

We thus approve the First District’s conclusion that 

Trappman’s conduct involved distinct acts. We disapprove the 

conflict case, Olivard, to the extent that it failed to apply 

Blockburger’s distinct acts test, with that test’s focus on successive 

9. Although we recognize—as does Cody M.—that an 

escalation of criminal conduct may provide evidence of successive 

impulses, we do not suggest that such an escalation is necessary to 

a finding of successive impulses.
- 32 -

impulses. We also disapprove the decision of the Fifth District 

Court of Appeal in Rivera v. State, 286 So. 3d 930 (Fla. 5th DCA

2019), for the same reason. In failing to consider the distinct acts 

test, the Fifth District erroneously applied a categorical rule that, 

under section 775.021(4), “multiple convictions and sentences” may 

not be imposed “for aggravated battery and battery committed 

against one victim within the same criminal transaction or episode.” 

Id. at 932 (footnotes omitted).

VI.

Based on the holding in Blockburger—as well as our holding in 

Graham—that multiple punishments may be imposed for distinct 

acts springing from successive impulses to violate a single criminal 

prohibition in the course of a single criminal episode, we approve 

the First District’s decision to affirm Trappman’s dual convictions 

and sentences. And we disapprove Olivard and Rivera as 

inconsistent with our reasoning here.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and 

FRANCIS, JJ., concur.

SASSO, J., did not participate.
- 33 -

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 

AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal

Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions/Direct Conflict of 

Decisions

First District - Case No. 1D19-1883

(Santa Rosa County)

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, Tallahassee, Florida, Michael L. 

MacNamara, General Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida, and Maria Ines 

Suber, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit,

Tallahassee, Florida,

for Petitioner

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and David 

Welch, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Respondent