### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Ma y 2, 200 6 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. AN DR E SM ITH

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 05-01206 Joseph B. Dailey, Jud ge

No. W2005-02232-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Augu st 23, 2006

The de fenda nt, Andre Smith, appea ls the t ri al court’s denial of judicial diver sion. The def endant pled g uiltyto theft over $1000, a Class D felony . Following a hea ring , the trial court denied the defe ndant’s re quest for judicia l diversion and orde red the defe nd ant t o serve his sentence on supervised pr obation. After car eful re view, we aff irm the trial court’s denial of judicia l diversion.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and J.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

Claiborne H. F erg uson (on appe al), a nd Kamilah Turne r (at trial), Memphis, Tenne s s ee , for the appellant, Andr e Smith.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Ra c he l E . Willi s, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorn ey Ge nera l; and Nicole Ge rmain, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Fa cts and Proce dural History

I n this c a se , the de fe nd a nt wa s the on ly wi tne ss to t e sti fy a t th e se nte nc ing he ari ng . H e sa id that this was his first arre st and his first time in the criminal sy stem. He t es t i fi ed that inventory sh orta g e s o c c ur

re d w hil e he wa s st or e ma na g e r at a wi re le ss r e ta il s t or e , T e le tou c h Co mmu nic a tio ns , in Shel b y C o u n t y , Tenne ssee. He said that he be lieved the mer chandise was stolen by other

e mpl oy e e s b ut r a the r tha n n oti fy his su pe ri or s of the the ft
, he ma nip ulate d th e c omp ute r r e c or ds to

a c c ou nt f or the inv e nto ry

. He did no t re po rt the me rc ha nd ise a s st ole n u nti l it wa s d isc ov e re d b y

his

su pe ri or s in a sto re a ud it. He the n pr ov ide d a writt e n state me nt a s to his ve rs ion of e ve nts . H e sa id-2-

that he us e d h is e mpl oy e e nu mbe r andsto re mana g e r p a ssw or d to sh ow the me rc ha nd ise in customers’ a ccounts without their knowledg e.
During his testimony , the def endant wa s interrupted by the court. The court took the position that the def

endant’ s version of e vents d i d n o t make a ny sense a nd acc used the de fenda nt of being untruthful. The c ourt stated, “that just doesn’t m ak e any sense at all what he sa y s. I t just doesn’t have a ny ring of truth to it at all.” The court a lso said that “he’ s conce ding only that which he ha d
to conce de and not a dmitti ng what re ally happene d.”

Th e de fe nd a nt r e su me d h is t e sti mon y by say ing that he wi sh e d he ha d in ve sti g a te d th e the ft s instead of simply

covering the m up. He also said that he did not know how to acquire all the inventory reports or he would have been a ble to detec t the shortag es sooner . He c laimed that he

ne ve r h a d p hy sic a l con tr ol ove r the mis sin g ite ms an d th a t hi s o nly inv olv e me nt w a s e le c tr on ic a lly

acc ounting for the merc handise. Finally
, he said that it wa s his de sire to e nter int o a d i v er sion pr og ra m.

The c ourt then examined the defe ndant by voir dire. The defe ndant testified that ther e we re

a s ma ny a s se ve n e mpl oy e e s a t th e sto re

. He sa id that the the ft s oc c ur re d fr om No ve mbe r 20 02 to Janu ary 20 03 , a ndthat th e sto le n me rc ha nd ise wa s val ue d in exce ss of $8 10 0. He sa id he wa s u na ble to de termine who was responsible for the theft. He claimed that now he would re port the shortag es t o t h e p ar e n t c o m p a n y

. F i n a l l y , h e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e i s c u rr e n t l y e m p l o y e d b y a d i f f e r e n twi re le ss company and that he did disclose his history to them prior to being hired.

The de fenda nt offer ed no other proof a nd arg ued in fa vor of ju d i cial diversion. The de fe nd a nt ar g ue d th a t he wa s a pr op e r c a nd idate fo r d ive rs ion be c a us e he ha d n o p ri or c on vic tio ns

. He a cknowledg ed that he ma de wr ong decisions re lated to this matter and claimed that he conf essed
t o wh at h e h ad d o n e w ro n g.

T h e p re s entenc e re port ref lects that the de fenda nt is a thirty -seve n-y ear -old, married, high school g raduate. He has no other criminal rec ord and has no problems wit h drug s or alc ohol. He works as a n are a mana g er f or a w ireless c ompany

and lives with his wife a nd children.

T h e tr i a l c o u r t f

o u n d t h a t t h e d e f

e n d a n t w a s “ g e n e r a l l y a g o o d c a n d i d a t e f o r p r o b a t i o n

. ” It cited that he is employ ed, has a n education, supports his family , and has no prior rec ord. Howe ver, it ex presse d conce rn with p u t t i n g the def endant on diver sion for two re asons: 1) the off ense w as protrac ted over a three -month period of time and involved theft from an e mploy er; a nd 2) the e x tent of the de fenda nt’s involvement and his ca ndor with the court were questionable. The court found that the de fe nd a nt wa s ca nd id to a poin t bec a us e he wa s “c a ug ht re d- ha nd e d, ” bu t it too k issu e wi th the def endant’ s denial of benef

itting from the t hefts and blaming some “phantom employ ee.” The
court sente nced the defe n dant to two y ear s on supervised pr obation and orde red him to pay restitution in the amount of $8411.68 within one y ear

. The court found the def endant wa s a g ood

c a n d i d a t e f

o r p r o b a t i o n a n d s e n t e n c e d h i ma c c o r d i n g l y.-3- An a ly sis

On appea l, the defe ndant contends that the trial court a bused its discretion in ref

using to g rant judicial diversion. J udicial di version is a “leg islative larg ess” where a def endant, upon be ing f

ound g uilty or pl eading g uilty , may complete a

diversion prog ram a nd rec eive e x pung ement of r ecor ds and dismiss al of the c harg es. State v. Schindler, 986 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tenn. 1999). When a defe ndant contends that the trial court commit ted error in refusing to impose a sentenc e pursua nt to Tennessee Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -3 13
, com mon ly re fe rr e d to a s “

jud ic ia l di ve rs ion ,” thi s c ou rt mus t determine whether

the trial court abused its discr etion in f ailing to se ntence pursuant to the statute. Sta te v. Rob ins on , 1 39 S.W. 3d66 1, 66 5 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 04 ). Judic ia l di ve rs ion is s imi lar t o pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion ; ho we ve r, jud ic ia l di ve rs ion fo llo ws a de te rm inatio n of g uil t, a nd the de c isi on to g rant judicial diversion rests with the trial court rather than the prose cutor. State v. Ande rson, 857 S.W .2d 571, 572 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). W hen a de fenda nt challeng es the trial c ourt’s denia l of judicial diversion, we may not revisit the is s u e i f t he re cord c ontains any substantial evidence

su p p orting the trial court’s decision. State v. Cutshaw, 967 S.W.2d 332, 344 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 97 ); Sta te v. Park e r, 93 2 S. W.2 d 9 45 , 9 58 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ). As thi s c ou rt sa id i n Ander son: We c on c lud e that ju dic ia l di ve rs ion is s imi la r i n pur po se to pr e tr ia l dive rs ion a ndis to b e im po sed wi thi n th e dis c re tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt su bje c t on ly

to the sa me constrain ts a

p p li c a b le to prosec utors in apply ing pr etrial diver sion under T.C.A. § 40- 15 -1 05 . T he re fo re , u po n r e vie w, if “ a ny su bs ta nti a l e vid e nc e to su pp ort th e re fu sa l” exis ts in the recor d, we will g ive the trial c ourt the bene fit of its discretion. Only an

abu se of that di sc re tio n w ill a llo w u s to ov e rturn th e tr ia l c ou rt

. 857 S.W .2d at 572 (c itation omit ted).

Th a t th e de fendan t me e ts the pr e re qu isi te s d oe s n ot e nti tle him to j ud ic ia l di ve rs ion . T his decision is left to the sound discre tion of the trial court. T.C.A. § 40- 35-313. The c riteria c onsidered in determining whether

an elig ible acc used should be g rante d judi ci al d i v ersion include: (a) the de f e n d a n t’ s a me n ab il it y

to c o rr e c ti o n ; ( b ) th e c ir c u ms tan c e s o f th e o f f e n s e ; ( c ) th e d efe ndant’s criminal re cord; (d) the defe ndant’s social history ; ( e) the defe ndant’s phy sical and me ntal health; and (f ) the deterre nce value to the defendant a nd others. Cutshaw, 967 S.W.2d at 343-44; Parker, 932 S.W .2d at 958. An additi onal consideration is whether judicia l diversion will serve the e nds of justice, i.e., t he int ere sts of t he publi c as well as the defendant. Cut shaw, 967 S.W.2d at 344; P arke r, 932 S.W .2d at 958.

There is no dispute that the defe ndant meets the statutory prer equisites for judicial diver sion

as he pled g uilty to a

Class D felony

and had no prior convictions. T.C.A. § 40-35-313( a)( 1)(B )(I ). Howeve r, mee ting the prer equisites does not entitle the defe ndant to judicial diversion. It is clear from the rec ord t hat t he trial court did consider the criteria s et forth by this court in both Cut shaw and Parke r to de termine whether the def endant should be g rante d judicial diversion. The c ourt made f i n d i n g s o n t h e r e c o r d t h a tt h e d e f e n d a n th a d n o p r i o r

c r i m i n a l r e c o r d
, w o rk s a n d s u p p o r t s h i s f a m i l y,

a ndha s a n e du c a tio n. Ho we ve r, the c ou rt ha d c on c e rns abo ut th e de fe nd a nt andwa s ju sti fi e d in deny ing judicia l diversion.-4-

I n consideration of the issue of diversion, this c ourt has rec og nized that the trial court may

c on sid e r tha t th e c ir c ums ta nc e s sur ro un din g the of

fe ns e ind ic a te that it

wa s n ot i mpu lsi ve ly

c omm itt e d. Se e An de rs on , 8 57 S.W. 2d a t 573; Sta te v. He lms , 7 20 S.W. 2d47 4, 47 6 ( Te nn . Crim. A p p

. 1 9 8 6 ) ; St a te v

. L o v v o r n , 6 9 1 S. W. 2 d 5 7 4
, 5 7 7 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. 1 9 8 5 )

. We a ls o r e c o g n iz e that the fa ct that the off

ense refle cts a planned crime does not alway s justify the denial of diversion. Se e Sta te v. He rr on , 767 S.W. 2d 15 1 (T e nn . 198 9) ; Stat e v. Ma rk ha m, 755 S.W. 2d85 0 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1988).

Her e, as in Ande rson, it is appare nt that the trial court did not rely solely upon the fac t that the of fe ns e wa s p la nn e d. Whil e the tr ia l c ou rt de te rm ine d th a t th e c ri me wa s n ot i mpu lsi ve ly

c omm itt e d b e c a us e it w a s p ro tr a c te d o ve r thr e e mon ths a nd res ul ted in th e los s o f $ 84 11 .6 8 in

me rc ha nd ise thr ou g h th e de fe nd a nt’ s ma nip ulatio n o f the bu sin e ss re c or ds of his e mpl oy e r, the y

a lso found that the de fenda nt was untruthful with reg ard to his involvement in the crime.

The de fenda n t ’s l ack of ca ndor ser ves as a n additional g round to deny judicial diversion. This court has pr eviously

held that cre dibilit y bear s on the re habilitative prospec ts of a def endant a nd may serve as the ba sis for denying dive rsion. Ander son, 857 S.W .2d at 574. I n Ander son, this court

c on c lud e d tha t the re wa s no abu se of dis c re tio n in de nying jud ic ia l di ve rs ion wh e n th e tr ia l c ou rt : 1) did not consider the defe ndant sincere in a cce pting responsibility for the offe nse committed, and 2) wa s c on c e rn e d w ith the de fe nd a nt’ s a tte mpt to d ive rt blame to ano the r. He re , th e de fe nd a nt o nly

acc epts responsibility for manipulating the computer r ecor ds. He maintains that he ne ver e x erc ised ph y sic a l c on tr ol o f the me rc ha nd ise or de ri ve d a ny be ne fi t f

ro m it s d isa

pp e aranc e . H e a lso a tte mpt s to div e rt bla me to the oth e r emplo y e e s of the sto re fo r the mis sin g me rc ha nd ise . The re c or d r e fl e c ts that the trial court did not consider the def endant sincere in the explanation of his responsibilityfor the offe nse and was duly conce rned with the defe ndant’s attempt to dive rt blame to other “ phantom employ ee[s].” These c ircumstance s are rele vant t o assessing the deg ree of re habilitation potential shown by the def endant. The trial court is in the best position to vi ew the de fenda nt’s attitude and demea nor, and w e ar e not in a position to view the defe ndant diffe rently on the record be fore us. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in deny ing dive rsion. The judg ment is affirme d.

Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI LL I AMS, J UDGE