IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-30633

Summary Calendar

MOHAMED ADMED HASSAN ABDALLAH OMRAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; NICOLE ROY; UNKNOWN DEFENDANT,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 1:15-CV-1418

Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Mohamed Admed Hassan Abdallah Omran,1 immigration detainee 

# A079680001, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his Bivens2 and Federal 

Tort Claims Act (FTCA) complaint as frivolous, for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief could be granted, and for lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 Omran lists his full name as “Mohamed Ahmed Hassan Abdallah Omran.”

2 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 

(1971).

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 23, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-30633 Document: 00513648773 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/23/2016
No. 15-30633

2

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A, 2680(c). Omran alleged that U.S. Marshal Nicole Roy 

and a computer expert deleted or erased personal computer files from Omran’s 

computer while it was in the custody of the United States Marshals.

We review the district court’s §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A dismissal of 

Omran’s Bivens claim de novo. See Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (5th 

Cir. 2009); Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005). To the extent 

that Omran asserted that Roy and the expert negligently deleted his electronic 

data, such a claim does not implicate the Due Process Clause. See Daniels v. 

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Lewis v. Woods, 848 F.2d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 

1988). Such a claim thus lacks an arguable basis in law and is frivolous. See 

Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2009).

Although the intentional deprivation of property by a government official 

may amount to a due process violation in certain cases if the deprivation is 

authorized and not random, see Stotter v. Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio, 508 

F.3d 812, 822 (5th Cir. 2007), Omran has not alleged facts showing either an 

authorized or deliberate deletion of his computer data and thus he has failed 

to state a claim of an intentional deprivation of property under Bivens. See In 

re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007).

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of 

Omran’s FTCA claim. See Leleux v. United States, 178 F.3d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 

1999). The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for 

“claims arising out of torts committed by federal employees.” Ali v. Fed. 

Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 217-18 (2008). However, “[t]he FTCA exempts 

from this waiver certain categories of claims,” id. at 218, including, as relevant 

here, claims arising from the detention of property by customs officers, excise 

officers, and “any other law enforcement officer,” § 2680(c). See Ali, 552 U.S. 

at 218. Because employees of the U.S. Marshals Service are such other law 

 Case: 15-30633 Document: 00513648773 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/23/2016
No. 15-30633

3

enforcement officers, see Schlaebitz v. United States Dept. of Justice, 924 F.2d 

193, 195 (11th Cir. 1991), the district court properly concluded that it was 

without jurisdiction to consider Omran’s FTCA claim. See Ali, 552 U.S. at 218, 

228; Leleux, 178 F.3d at 754.

We do not consider Omran’s stated reference to a claim under the Fourth 

Amendment as he has briefed no argument on the issue. See Morrison v. City 

of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d 242, 244 (5th Cir. 1985). Nor do we address Omran’s 

contention that the defendants conspired to deprive him of his constitutional 

rights based on his racial ethnicity and national origin. Omran raised this 

issue for the first time in his objection to the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation and alleged no facts in support of the claim in the district 

court or in this court. See Cupit v. Whitley, 28 f.3d 532, 535 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994). 

To the extent he was attempting in the district court to amend his complaint 

to add this conclusory assertion, the district court acted within its discretion 

in declining to allow such amendment. See United States v. Riascos, 76 F.3d 

93, 94 (5th Cir. 1996).

Because Omran’s appeal is without arguable merit, it is dismissed as 

frivolous. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983); 5th Cir. 

R. 42.2. Omran’s motion for the appointment of counsel on appeal is denied.

The dismissal of the instant appeal as frivolous and the district court's 

dismissal of Omran’s complaint both count as strikes under the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act. See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th 

Cir. 1996). Omran previously received a strike when we affirmed the district 

court’s dismissal of his civil-rights lawsuit as frivolous in Omran v. Metrejean, 

2015 WL 1508382, at *1 (W.D. La. Mar. 13, 2015), aff’d, 2016 WL 1391454 (5th 

Cir. Apr. 7, 2016). Because Omran has accumulated at least three strikes 

under § 1915(g), he is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis in any civil 

 Case: 15-30633 Document: 00513648773 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/23/2016
No. 15-30633

4

action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless 

he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. § 1915(g). As Omran

is not proceeding in forma pauperis in the instant appeal, he is also warned

that sanctions may be imposed in response to future frivolous filings.

APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS; MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL DENIED; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) BAR 

IMPOSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.

 Case: 15-30633 Document: 00513648773 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/23/2016