NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

CAMERON SCOTT GRIFFIN,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-30242

D.C. No. 3:06-cr-00067-EJL

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 24, 2016**

Before: REINHARDT, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Cameron Scott Griffin appeals pro se from the district court’s order granting

in part his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and 

denying his petitions for a writ of error coram nobis. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 31 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 15-30242

Griffin first alleges that the district court violated its general orders when it 

refused to appoint new counsel for him after his public defender withdrew from the 

case. We disagree. There is no right to counsel in section 3582(c)(2)

proceedings, see United States v. Townsend, 98 F.3d 510, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1996), 

and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint substitute 

counsel. See United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009).

Griffin next contends that the district court erred by calculating the amended 

Guidelines range without making a finding regarding drug type and quantity. The 

record reflects, however, that the court properly relied upon the drug type and 

quantity calculated at Griffin’s initial sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(3), 

(b)(1); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 831 (2010).

Griffin next argues that the district court erred in declining to hold an 

evidentiary hearing on whether an informal immunity agreement existed. We 

reject this claim because the issue of whether Griffin’s criminal conduct was 

immunized is not cognizable in a section 3582(c)(2) proceeding. See Dillon, 560 

U.S. at 825-26; see also Townsend, 98 F.3d at 513 (the district court has discretion 

to decline to hold an evidentiary hearing on a section 3582 motion). For the same 

reason, the court properly denied Griffin’s motion for confession of judgment 
3 15-30242

relating to the alleged immunity agreement.

Griffin next asserts various challenges to the district court’s treatment of his 

mitigating arguments, including its reliance on facts contained in the presentence 

report. The record reflects that the district court carefully considered all of 

Griffin’s mitigating arguments in granting a 33-month reduction in his sentence. 

Even assuming that the court could entertain Griffin’s challenges to the 

presentence report at this stage, it gave them due consideration and rejected them.

Finally, Griffin argues that the district court erred by denying his petitions 

for a writ of error coram nobis. Reviewing de novo, United States v. Riedl, 496 

F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007), we find no error. Griffin cannot show that a 

more usual remedy is unavailable to attack his conviction. See Matus-Leva v. 

United States, 287 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 2002) (coram nobis relief is 

inappropriate for those who are in custody even if § 2255 relief is technically 

unavailable). 

AFFIRMED.