United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 18-2244

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Santiago Soto-Garcia

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin

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 Submitted: November 7, 2019

Filed: November 22, 2019

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, WOLLMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Santiago Soto-Garcia appeals after a jury found him guilty of drug and firearm

offenses, and the district court1

imposed a below-Guidelines sentence. His counsel

1The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.
has moved for leave to withdraw, and has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), suggesting that the district court erred in denying

Soto-Garcia’s motionsto suppress evidence, and that his prison term is substantively

unreasonable. In a pro se brief, Soto-Garcia echos counsel’s arguments, and asserts

that inconsistent testimony by government witnesses violated his due process rights.

As to the issues raised by counsel, we first conclude that the denial of SotoGarcia’s motions to suppress was not erroneous. See United States v. Brewer, 624

F.3d 900, 905-06 (8th Cir. 2010) (this court examines factual findings underlying

district court’s denial of motion to suppress for clear error and reviews de novo

whether Fourth Amendment was violated; this court must examine entire record, not

merely evidence adduced atsuppression hearing). Specifically, we conclude that the

officer was justified in stopping Soto-Garica’s car, because he was directed to do so

by a detective, who had witnessed Soto-Garcia distribute methamphetamine fromthe

car earlier that day. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (if police

have reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that person was

involved in completed felony, they may initiate stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968) to investigate); United States v. Jacobsen, 391 F.3d 904, 906-07 (8th

Cir. 2004) (patrol officer wasjustified in stopping suspect because narcotics detective

who ordered him to do so had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot);

see also United States v. Robinson, 664 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 2011) (probable cause

may be based on officers’ collective knowledge and need not be based solely on

information within arresting officer’s knowledge, so long as there is some degree of

communication between officers). We further conclude that the drug-dog sniff of

Soto-Garcia’s car was justified based on the officer’s belief that the car contained

evidence of criminal activity, as the officer had seen guns in the car and a large bulge

of suspected contraband in a passenger’s pants, and the detective had witnessed SotoGarcia distribute meth from the car earlier that day. See United States v. Davis, 569

F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 2009) (officers may search vehicle without warrant if they

have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of criminal activity). We also

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conclude that Soto-Garcia’s prison term is not substantively unreasonable, as it is

below the Guidelines range, and there is no indication the district court overlooked

a relevant factor, gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or

committed a clear error of judgment in weighing appropriate factors. See United

States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (discussing

substantive reasonableness).

As to Soto-Garcia’s pro se argument, we conclude that it was within the jury’s

province to resolve any inconsistenciesin the officers’ testimony, and that there is no

indication he was deprived of a fair trial, given the overwhelming evidence of his

guilt. See United States v. Bower, 484 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir. 2007) (it is within

jury’s province to resolve conflicting testimony); cf. United States v. Clayton, 787

F.3d 929, 933 (8th Cir. 2015) (to establish prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must

show government’s conduct was improper and affected his substantial rights so as to

deprive him of fair trial).

Finally, having reviewed the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75

(1988), we have found no non-frivolousissues. Accordingly, we grant counsel leave

to withdraw, and affirm.

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