IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30992

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

SHAWANDA NEVERS, also known as Shawanda Hawkins, also known as 

Shawanda Bryant, also known as Shawanda Johnson,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:16-CR-88-1

Before SMITH, WIENER, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Shawanda Nevers appeals her four consecutive 21-month prison 

sentences arising from her guilty-plea conviction on four counts of aiding the 

presentation of a false income tax return. Nevers contends that she is entitled 

to resentencing because the district court plainly erred in determining the tax 

loss amount on which her guidelines sentence was based. While the 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 1, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 17-30992 Document: 00514857286 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/01/2019
No. 17-30992

2

Government asserts that Nevers’s appeal is barred by the appeal waiver in her 

plea agreement, Nevers argues that the waiver is unenforceable because her 

guilty plea was unknowing given that the district court failed to properly 

inform her that she faced a maximum prison sentence of 12 years should the 

terms run consecutively. 

We normally review the validity of a guilty plea de novo. United States 

v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2000). However, where, as here, a 

defendant fails to lodge an objection concerning his plea in the district court, 

we apply a plain error analysis. United States v. Brown, 328 F.3d 787, 789 (5th 

Cir. 2003). While Nevers contests the applicability of the plain error standard 

to this issue, her challenge to the knowing nature of her guilty plea fails under 

even the de novo standard, as discussed below. 

A knowing and voluntary guilty plea is required for an enforceable 

waiver of appeal. United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir. 1997). “To 

enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, the defendant must have a full 

understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.” United 

States v. Urias-Marrufo, 744 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). With respect to potential confinement, the 

defendant need only know the statutory maximum prison term for the charged 

offenses. United States v. Guerra, 94 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1996); United 

States v. Rivera, 898 F.2d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 1990); see also FED. R. CRIM. P.

11(b)(1)(H). 

As Nevers acknowledges, the district court accurately informed her at 

rearraignment that three years was “the maximum possible sentence that 

could be imposed on [her] in the event of a conviction with respect to each of” 

the four counts of conviction. See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). Under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3584(a), a district court generally has discretion to order that multiple prison 

 Case: 17-30992 Document: 00514857286 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/01/2019
No. 17-30992

3

terms run consecutively, and we have “conclude[d] that the effect of [§ 3584] is 

not a consequence of which a defendant must be advised before a guilty plea 

may be accepted.” Hernandez, 234 F.3d at 256. 

In light of the foregoing, Nevers’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, 

and her appeal waiver is enforceable. See Dees, 125 F.3d at 269. The appeal 

is DISMISSED.

 Case: 17-30992 Document: 00514857286 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/01/2019