UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

NAWEEN KISHORE TAMSANG, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, United States 

Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 19-9538 

(Petition for Review) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, KELLY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Naween Kishore Tamsang, a native and citizen of Nepal appearing pro se, has 

filed a petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 

upholding an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and 

relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). We dismiss the 

petition in part for lack of jurisdiction and deny the remainder of the petition by 

virtue of our jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 

 * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 29, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
2 

I. Background 

Tamsang entered the United States on a temporary visa but remained in the 

country beyond his allotted time. He then pleaded guilty to one count of indecent 

exposure, third or subsequent offense, in violation of Colorado law.1

 Soon after, the 

Department of Homeland Security served him with a notice to appear in removal 

proceedings, charging him with removability for overstaying his temporary visa, 

see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), and as an alien who had been convicted of a crime 

involving moral turpitude, see id. § 1227(a)(2)(A). 

At his initial hearing before the IJ, Tamsang requested a continuance so he 

could find an attorney. The IJ granted his request. Tamsang next appeared before 

the IJ with counsel, who requested a continuance to prepare. The IJ granted that 

request, too. At the next hearing, Tamsang, through counsel, conceded removability 

as charged and filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal based on 

religion (Christian), political opinion, and membership in a particular social group. 

He also sought CAT relief. In support, he submitted a written declaration and a 

variety of documentary evidence. The IJ set the matter for a merits hearing. 

After Tamsang’s attorney withdrew due to a conflict of interest, Tamsang 

appeared at the merits hearing and requested a continuance to obtain counsel and 

additional supporting documents. The IJ granted the motion but explained there 

 1

 Tamsang was originally charged with internet luring of a child, internet 

sexual exploitation of a child, and criminal attempt to commit sexual assault on a 

child, all in violation of Colorado law. 
3 

would be no further delays and Tamsang should be ready for a merits hearing set for 

several weeks later, with or without counsel. The IJ also told Tamsang to submit any 

additional documentation before the hearing date. 

Tamsang appeared at the rescheduled merits hearing and asked for another 

continuance. The government opposed the motion, and the IJ denied it, finding 

Tamsang had not shown good cause because the IJ had granted several continuances, 

had given Tamsang ample time to find an attorney, and had advised Tamsang this 

would be his final hearing. 

The hearing proceeded, and Tamsang was the only witness who testified. The 

IJ found his testimony was not credible for several reasons, including his evasive 

responses and several significant inconsistencies and contradictions. The IJ also 

noted the lack of corroboration for alleged incidents involving Tamsang’s wife and 

daughter. The IJ found there was no credible evidence to otherwise support 

Tamsang’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief. The IJ also 

found that a safe third-country agreement between Nepal and India, where Tamsang 

lived for sixteen years, barred his claim for asylum and that India provided an 

alternative place for him to live free from the harassment he allegedly experienced in 

Nepal. 

In the alternative, the IJ denied asylum and withholding of removal because 

Tamsang had not established a nexus between the harm he allegedly experienced and 

a protected ground, or shown that the Nepal government was unable or unwilling to 

protect him. The IJ also found Tamsang ineligible for CAT relief because he had not 
4 

demonstrated he faced a likelihood of torture in Nepal or that the Nepal government 

would acquiesce in any harm he might experience. 

Tamsang appealed pro se to the BIA, challenging the IJ’s denial of his final 

motion for a continuance, the IJ’s nexus finding, and the IJ’s reliance on the safe 

third-country agreement between India and Nepal. He also submitted additional 

evidence (letters from his wife, daughter, and several friends), and explained that 

because he was detained, he was unable to obtain this evidence in time to submit it to 

the IJ. 

In upholding the IJ’s decision, the BIA rejected Tamsang’s argument that the 

IJ’s denial of his final motion for a continuance deprived him of due process. The 

BIA concluded that the IJ gave Tamsang an appropriate length of time to find an 

attorney, Tamsang had not shown he would have found counsel if the motion had 

been granted, and Tamsang had ample opportunity to testify. The BIA then 

explained that Tamsang had “not specifically challenged [the IJ’s adverse credibility] 

finding on appeal and the issue is therefore waived . . . [nor] has [he] identified 

evidence to establish his claims to asylum or withholding of removal independently 

of his testimony.” Admin. R. at 3. The BIA also observed that Tamsang failed to 

raise any specific argument regarding CAT relief. Because these findings were 

determinative of Tamsang’s eligibility for asylum, withholding, and CAT relief, the 

BIA did not address the IJ’s alternative bases for denying relief. The BIA 

determined that the new evidence Tamsang submitted did not warrant remand to the 

IJ because it was not likely to change the outcome. 
5 

II. Discussion 

In reviewing a BIA decision, “we decide purely legal questions de novo.” 

Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 974 (10th Cir. 2011). But “[a]gency findings of 

fact are conclusive unless the record demonstrates that any reasonable adjudicator 

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Sarr v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 783, 

788-89 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 We begin by noting Tamsang has not challenged the IJ’s denial of his final 

motion for a continuance or the BIA’s refusal to remand the case for consideration of 

the new evidence he submitted. He has therefore waived review of those issues. See 

Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 913 n.6 (10th Cir. 2007) (“An issue or argument 

insufficiently raised in the opening brief is deemed waived.”). 

In his petition, Tamsang raises a cursory challenge to the IJ’s credibility 

finding. But he did not appeal that finding to the BIA, and we lack jurisdiction to 

consider the issue in the first instance. See Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 

1118-19 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that failure to present an issue to the BIA 

constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, which deprives this court of 

jurisdiction to review it). Tamsang also did not appeal the IJ’s determination that 

there was no credible evidence independent of his testimony to support his claims for 

asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief. We therefore lack jurisdiction to 

consider the arguments Tamsang raises in his petition regarding the documentary 
6 

evidence that was before the IJ. See id.2

 Because these failures are dispositive of the 

IJ’s primary ground for denying his requests for relief, we need not consider 

Tamsang’s arguments regarding the IJ’s alternative grounds (lack of nexus to a 

protected ground and Tamsang’s ability to live in India). 

Tamsang claims the BIA violated “fundamental fairness” by not taking 

“administrative notice of additional official documents that supported [his] asylum 

claim.” Pet’r Br. at 4. The BIA, however, “does not create its own record but relies 

on testimony and evidence presented to the IJ.” Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 

429 F.3d 977, 985 (10th Cir. 2005). And Tamsang fails to identify any extra-record 

 2

 Even if we did not lack jurisdiction to consider this issue, Tamsang’s 

arguments on it are meager. He makes conclusory statements about general 

conditions in Nepal with no citations to the record or any explanation of how he can 

meet his burden to establish his eligibility for any of the relief he requested 

independent of his testimony. And the only “document” he cites is the internet 

address for where the U.S. Department of State’s reports on international religious 

freedom for 2017 reside. See Pet’r Br. at 4. Presumably, Tamsang would have us 

locate the report for Nepal (which, incidentally, is already part of the administrative 

record in this case, see Admin. R. at 300-11), and examine it for evidence to support 

his requests for relief. This we may not do. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & 

Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he court cannot take on the 

responsibility of serving as the [pro se] litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments 

and searching the record.”). Accordingly, Tamsang’s failure to develop a cogent 

argument supported by record citations waives our review. See Becker, 494 F.3d 

at 913 n.6; see also Garrett, 425 F.3d at 840-41 (noting that even pro se litigants 

must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants,” including the 

requirement that an argument contain a litigant’s “‘contentions and the reasons for 

them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the [litigant] 

relies’” (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A)). 
7 

documentation3

 let alone explain how any such documentation would have made a 

difference in the outcome of his removal proceeding. See Alzainati v. Holder, 

568 F.3d 844, 851 (10th Cir. 2009) (“To prevail on a due process claim, an alien 

must establish not only error, but prejudice.”). 

Finally, Tamsang contends his attorney in his Colorado criminal proceeding 

failed to warn him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. But he must 

raise any complaint about that attorney’s constitutional ineffectiveness in state court, 

not in removal proceedings. See Waugh v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. 

2011) (“[N]either the IJ nor the BIA has authority to adjudicate the constitutionality 

of an underlying criminal conviction.”). 

III. Conclusion 

We dismiss the petition for review in part for lack of jurisdiction and 

otherwise deny the petition. We grant Tamsang’s motion to proceed on appeal 

without prepayment of fees or costs, but remind him of his obligation to pay the full 

amount of the filing fee, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (excusing only prepayment of 

appellate fees).

Entered for the Court 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge 

 3

 In support of this argument, Tamsang refers only to the internet address 

discussed in footnote 2, supra, where we explained that the 2017 State Department 

report on religious freedom in Nepal is already part of the administrative record.