N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
ER IC AR D OIN, Pe titione r - Appe lla nt,
v. ER IC AR N OLD, Ac ting W arde n, R

e sponde n t - Appe lle e . No. 13-15854

D.C . No. 3:11-c v-05564-EM C
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Northe rn Distric t of C a lifornia Edwa rd M . C he n, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Argue d a nd Subm itte d Oc tobe r 20, 2015 San Fran c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : THOM AS, C hie f Judge and REINHAR DT a nd M c KEOW

N , C irc uit Judge s . Pe titione r Eric Ardoin a

ppe a ls the distric t c ourt’ s de nia l of his pe tition for a writ of ha be a s c orpus. W e re ve rse the distric t c o urt’ s de c ision on Ardoin’ s Sixth Am e ndm e nt c la im , a

nd the re fore do not re a c h the re m a i ning issue s in his ha be a s pe tition. 

# FIL ED MAY04 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S
. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3.I: Fac ts:

In 2007, Ardoin wa s c o nvic te d of first de gre e m urde r and se nte nc e d to 85 y e ars-to-life in prison for the de ath of R odne y

Tom , a San Franc isc o drug de a le r. The sta te c ha rge d Ardoin a long with Re be c c a B urgos a nd Albe rt Ja c que z , a
m arrie d c ouple who live d downsta irs from Tom . All thre e de fe nda

nts kne wthe vic t im and ha d purc ha se d drugs from him . Prior to Ardoin’ s tria l, B urgos ple d guilty to a c c e ssory a fte r the fa c t a nd a g re e d to te s tify

a ga inst he r c o-de fe nda

nts. The sta te trie d Ardoin a nd Ja c que z toge the r on the the ory tha t Ardoin ha d kille d Tom

in the c ourse of Ardoin a nd Ja c que z ’ s robbe ry

of Tom ’ s a

pa rtm e nt. B urgos, the sta

te ’ s prim ary

witne ss, te s tifie d tha

t she re turne d hom e one e v e ning
and found Ardoin in the c o m m on e ntra n c e ha ll se rving thec ouple ’ s a nd Tom ’ s a pa rtm e nts. An individua

l (whose voic e she late r re c o gniz e d a s he r husba nd’ s) ta c kle d he r from

be hind a nd tie d he r up. She te stifie d tha t she the n watc he d Ardoin wa lk up thesta irs towa rd Tom ’ s a

pa rtm e n t. She he ard the sounds of a struggle inside Tom ’ s a

pa rtm e nt a nd Tom “ y e lling.”The n, “ it got quie t” an d she
sa w Ardoin wa lk ba c k down thesta irs with theta c kle box in whic h Tom store d his drugs. Ardoin a

nd Ja c q ue z le ft, a nd B urgos we nt upsta irs a nd disc ove re d Tom ’ s de a d body . B urgos a lso te stifie d tha t whe n she sa

w Ardoin la

te r that night she notic e d “ a

sc ra tc h on his fa c e .” A de te c tive a lso te stifie d tha t a fe w da y s a fte r the 2m

urde r polic e ra ide d a

house and found Ja c que zand B urgos (but not Ardoin) the re with drugs tha

t ha d be longe d to Tom . B e y ond B urgos’ s te stim o ny , the sta t e introduc e d m inim a l e vide nc e in support of Ardoin’ s guilt. First, the pa rtie s stipula te d tha t Ardoin’ s DNA wa s unde r Tom ’ s finge rna il. Se c ond, a c a b drive r te stifie d tha

t he drove two m e n to a

loc ation ne ar Tom ’ s a

pa rtm e nt a round the tim e of the m urde r. The c a

b drive r wa s “ 50/50” sure tha t Ardoin wa s one of the m e n but c ould not identify

Ja c que z . Fina lly , the sta t e introduc e d e vide nc e tha t Ardoin
and Ja q ue z e xc ha nge d m ultiplephone c a lls thenight of, a nd da y s following, Tom ’ s
m urde r. B e fore Ardoin’ s c losing a rgum e nt, the pa

rtie s disc usse d a

nd a gre e d to jury instruc tions. The s e jury

instruc tions c ha

rge d both de fe nda

nts with m

urde r with
m a lic e a fore thought, a

nd the n c ha

rge d Ja c que z , a

nd only Ja c q ue z , with robbe ry fe lony m urde r and a iding a

n d a be tting m urde r. The jury

de libe ra te d for four da

y s be fore se nding thetria l c ourt the following note : “ If we be l ie ve that Eric Ardoin
wa s not thepe rpe trator of the m urde r, c an we still find him guilty unde r a

the ory of fe lony m urde r, or othe rwise ? ” The judge indic ate d tha t he wa s inc l ine d

to re spond in the a ffirm ative , but thejury ha d se nt the note late in the da y and the judge wa s pla nning to le ave the ne xt da y for va c ation. Ac c ordingly , he le ft the m atte r to a
re pla c e m e nt judge , who told the jury tha t it c ould c onvic t Ardoin unde r a fe lony 3m

urde r the ory

and the n de nie d Ardoin’ s m otion to re ope n c losing a rgum e nt, thus de ny ing him

an opportunity

to pre se n t a

de fe nse to the ne w c ha

rge . Approxim ate ly
one hour la

te r, the jury

inform e d the tria l c ourt tha t it ha d re a c he d a

guilty ve rdic t . Ardoin a ppe a le d, ra ising, a

m ong othe r issue s, a

Sixth Am e ndm e nt c la im ba se d on the tria l c ourt’ s re fusa l to re ope n c l osing a rgum e n t. The C ourt of Appe a l
a ffirm e d the c onvic tion, a n d the C a lifornia

Supre m e C ourt sum

m arily de nie d Ardoin’ s pe tition for re vie w. A rdoin the n file d a fe de ra l ha

be a s pe tition. II: Standar d of Re vie w : The Antite rrorism

and Effe c tive De at

h Pe n a lty Ac t of 1996 (“ AEDPA” )
a pplie s, a nd we re vie wsubje c t to its dic t ate s. At thedistric t c ourt, the sta te a gre e d with Ardoin tha

t the C ourt of Appe a l found c onstitutiona l e rror but c onc lude d tha

t the e rror wa s ha

rm le ss. B e fore us, howe ve r, the sta te took a diffe re nt position,
arguing tha

t the C ourt of Appe a l found sta te -law e rror an d tha

t the m e rits of Ardoin’ s c la im

should there fore be subje c t to AEDPA’ s de fe re ntia l re vie w . In our vie w , the sta

te wa s right thefirst tim e . Ardoin’ s c ha l le nge to the de nia l of the m otion to re ope n a rgum e nt wa s pre s e nte d to the C ourt of Appe a l a s one of c o nstitutiona l m a gnitude ; the C ourt of Appe a l de sc ribe d Ardoin’ s a rgum e nts a s ba se d

on the “ due proc e ss right to a fa ir tria l ” and the right to “ e ffe c tive a ssista nc e of c ounse l.” The c ourt’ s a na ly sis 4the re fore tra c ke d tha t fram e work. In its discussion of Ardoin’ s c l a im , the C ourt of Appe a l sta

te d tha t the “ Sixth a

nd Fourte e nth Am e ndm e nts to the Unite d State s C onstitution . . . gua

ran t e e a c rim ina l de fe nda

nt the right to e ffe c tive a ssista nc e of
c ounse l at a ll c ritic a l sta ge s of the proc e e dings,” an d tha t a n a spe c t of this right is

“ a re a sona

ble opportunity

to pre pa re a de fe nse and re spond to the c ha rge s.” It the n he ld tha t if supple m e nta l jury

instruc tions a

re give n without re ope ning c losing
argum e nt, “ the de fe nda

nt’ s right to a

fa ir tria l m ay be c om

prom ise d.” This disc ussion shows tha

t the C ourt of Appe a l re c ogniz e d the sta t e c ourt’ s e rror to be of fe d e ra l c onstitutiona

l m a gnitude . Ac c ordingly , we re vie wthe m e rits of Ardoin’ s c la im

de novo. 1 III: W he the r Constitutional E r r or O c c ur r e d: The “ right to c ounse l . . . is ne xt to m e aningle ss unle ss c o unse l knows a nd ha s a satisfa c tory

opportunity

to re spond to the

c ha rge s a g a i nst whic h he or she

1 The que stion of wha

t sta nda rd of re vie w to a

pply to a sta te c ourt de te rm i nation fa

vora ble to a pe titione r is unse ttle d. Se e Ay ala v . W ong , 756 F.3d 656, 664 n.4, re v ’d on othe r grounds sub nom Davis v . Ay ala , 135 S. C t. 2187 (2015). Argum e nts c an be m a d e 1) tha t a c ourt “ would be re quire d to a c c o rd AEDPA de fe re nc e . . . in fav or of the pe titione r” ; 2) “ that § 2254(d), by its te xt a nd purpose , is ina

pplic a ble to a c la im on whic h the pe titione r pre va ile d in sta te c ourt, and the re fore the c la im

should bere vie we d de novo” ; a nd 3) “ t hat a sta te c ourt’ s de te rm i nation in fa

vor of pe titione r c annot be re litiga t e d on ha be a s re vie w” and thus should not be

re vie we d at a ll. Id. B e c a use we c onc lude tha

t fe de ra l c onstitutiona

l e rror oc c urre d unde r de novo re v ie w— the m o st “ se a

rc h ing” of the s e thre e possibilitie s—

we ne e d not re a c h this que stion. Se e id. at 670 n.8.

5m

ust de fe nd.” She

ppard v . Re e

s , 909 F.2d 1234, 1237 (9th C ir. 1990). In She ppard, we re c o g niz e d a

Sixth Am e ndm e nt viola

tion a fte r the sta

te trie d the pe titione r on a

de libe ra te m

urde r the ory but the n re que ste d, on the m orning of
c losing a rgum e nt, a fe l ony

m urde r instruc tion (whic h the tria l c ourt ga ve ). Id. at 1235-36. Sinc e the n , we hav e sta te d tha t S he ppard is a

“ na rrow ruling” tha

t is

“ lim ite d . . . to its fac ts.” Morrison v . Este lle , 981 F.2d 425, 428 (9th C ir. 1992). He re , howe ve r, the fa c t s pre se nt a n e ve n m ore c om

pe lling c a se for re lie f. Unlike in She ppard, de fe nse c ounse l he re ha d no re a son to a rgue fe l ony

m urde r during the
c losing a rgum e nt he wa s a

ble to de live r, a s the c ourt ha d just a pprove d jury instruc tions tha

t inform e d the jury that only Ja c que z wa s c ha rge d with tha

t offe nse . And, m ore im

porta nt, Ardoin’ s c ounse l ha d no opportunity whatsoe ve r to a

rgue fe lony m urde r a fte r le arning tha

t the jury c ould c onvic t on tha

t the ory . The tria l
c ourt’ s de c ision no doubt viola t e d Ardoin’ s Sixth Am e n dm e nt right to c ounse l during c losing a

rgum e nt. 2 Se e He rring v . N e w York , 422 U.S. 853, 862-63 (1975).

2 The disse nt a

rgue s tha t the C ourt of Appe a l’ s de c ision is not “ c ontra ry to . . . c le arly e sta b lishe d Fe de ra l la

w, a s de t e rm i ne d by

the Supre m e C ourt of the Unite d State s.” 28 U.S.C . § 2254(d)(1). B e c a u se the C ourt of Appe a l found c onstitutiona

l e rror, howe ve r, we are not re quire d to a pply the de fe re ntia l sta

nda rd of re v ie w se t forth in § 2254(d)(1) but inste a d re vie w de novo. S e e Ay ala , 756 F.3d at 670 n.8. 6IV : W he the r the E r r or w as H ar m le ss:

W e c annot gra

nt a sta te prisone r’ s ha

be a s pe tition unle ss we are , at a
m inim um , in gra

ve doubt tha

t the e rror “ h a d

substa ntia l and injurious e ffe c t or influe n c e in de te rm ining thejury ’ s ve rdic t.” O’N e al v . Mc Aninc h , 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995) (quoting B re c h t v . Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619, 627 (1993)). He re , we a pply Bre c h t

/ O’N e al without c onside ra tion of whe the r the C o urt of Appe a l’ s ha rm le s sne ss de te rm ination wa s obje c tive ly unre a sona

ble be c a use , a s the sta

te
re c o gniz e s, the C ourt of Appe a l did not a pply C hapman v . C

alifornia , 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Inste a d, it he ld tha t “ the e rror is one tha

t re quire s re ve rsa l only

if, vie wing the re c ord in its e ntire t

y , a pa rty ‘ wa s unfa irly

pre ve nte d from

arguing his or her de fe nse to the jury

or wa s substa

ntia lly m isle d in form

ulat ing a nd pre se nting
argum e nts’ ” (quoting Unite d State s v . Foppe , 993 F.2d 1444, 1451 (9th C ir. 1993)). W

he n a sta te c ourt a pplie s “ a le ss de m anding” ha

rm le ss e rror sta

nda rd tha n C hapman , “ we owe no de fe re nc e to this ha rm le ss e rror an a ly sis” and inste a d

“ a p ply our ‘ inde pe n de n t

ha rm le ss e rror ana ly sis’ unde r Bre c ht .” C udjo v . Ay e rs , 698 F.3d 752, 768-69 (9th C ir. 2012) (quoting Inthav ong v . Lamarque , 420 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th C ir. 2005)). This rule ha s not be e n a lte re d by Ay a la , whic h he ld that “ [w ] he n a C hapman de c i sion is re vie we d unde r AEDPA,” a fe de ra l c ourt owe s de fe re nc e to tha

t de c i sion. 135 S. C t. at 2199 (e m pha sis a dde d ). 7Thre e c ruc ia l fa c ts fram e our ha rm le ssne ss a

na ly sis. First, the jury
c onside re d this to be

a c l ose c a se , a s it de libe ra te d for four da y s be fore se nding the note re ga rding Ardoin a

nd fe lony m urde r. Se c o nd, the jury

a ssure dly c onvic te d Ardoin unde r a

the ory of fe l ony m urde r, a s it de libe ra te d for da y s without
re solution a

nd the n a nnounc e d tha

t it ha d re a c h e d

a ve rdic t a pproxim ate ly

an hour
a fte r re c e iving thefe lony m urde r instruc tion. Third, the only dire c t e vide nc e of Ardoin’ s guilt introduc e d at tria l pointe d towa

rd Ardoin be ing Tom ’ s kille r, not a n a c c om plic e . 3 C onside ring ha

rm le s sne s s with the se fa c ts in mind, we hav e grav e doubt whe the r the tria l c ourt’ s re fusa l to re ope n c losing a rgum e nt ha d a

substa ntia l a nd injurious e ffe c t on thejury ’ s ve rdic t. C losing a rgum e nt is a

n e s se ntia l a s pe c t of a
c rim ina l tria l, a

n a spe c t tha t is so im porta nt tha t its total de nia l to a

de fe nda n t unde rm ine s the “ ve ry

pre m i se of our a dve rsary sy ste m of c rim i na l justic e .” He rring , 422 U.S. a

t 862
. As de fe nse c o unse l sta te d in his m otion for a

ne w tria l, ha d the tria l c ourt re ope ne d a rgum e nt he would ha

ve a ddre sse d the la

w a nd
e le m e nts of robbe ry , a iding a n d a be tting, a nd fe lony m urde r, an d a

rgue d to the jury

3 R e ga rding theDNA e vide nc e , Ardoin te stifie d tha t, the da y be fore Tom ’ s m urde r, he m e t with him

to purc ha se a

qua rte r ounc e of he roin. Ardoin wa nte d to te st the he roin be fore purc h a sing it, so he ha d Tom inje c t him

with a sa m ple and, a s Tom did so, a fe w drops of blood ra

n down Ardoin’ s arm

to Tom ’ s ha

nd. 8that

no e vide nc e e xiste d to prove the se e le m e nts be y ond a re a sona ble doubt. Spe c ific a lly , he would ha ve e xpla ine d to thejury that, to c onvic t, it ne e de d to find be y ond a re a sona

b le doubt tha

t Ardoin form e d the “ spe c i fic inte nt” to rob, or a id
and a be t in a nothe r’ s robbe ry

of, Tom , a

nd tha t Ardoin’ s “ prove n

a c ts, words or
e nc oura g e m e n t” did in fa c t a i d a nd a be t in this c rim e . Se e Unite d State s v . Gask ins , 849 F.2d 454, 460 (9th C ir. 1988) (c onc luding tha t a de fe nda nt wa s pre j udic e d in simi la

r c irc um sta

n c e s in pa rt be c a use c ounse l’ s c losing a

rgum e nt did not a ddre ss tha

t a n a ide r or a

be ttor m u st a ffirm ative ly

c ontributeto the c rim e , ra the r tha n m e re ly be ing a “ knowing spe c tator” ). He would ha ve told thejury

tha t without spe c ific e vide nc e a s to e a c h of the se points it c o uld not c o nvic t the de fe nda n t, would ha

ve e xpla ine d wha

t e v ide nc e is ne c e ssa

ry to prove e a c h of the se points be y ond a re a sona

b le doubt, a

nd would ha

ve argue d tha

t suc h e vide n c e ha d not be e n e sta

b lishe d by

the te stim ony

at the tria l. Se e He rring , 422 U.S. a t 862 (noting tha

t, “ for the de fe nse , c losing a rgum e nt is thela st c le a

r c h anc e to try

to pe rsua de the trie r of fa c t tha t the re m ay

be re a sona

ble doubt of thede fe nda

nt’ s guilt” ). For e xam

ple , he c ould ha

ve argue d tha t no e vide nc e e x iste d a s to wha t Ardoin did to a

id a nd a be t in som e one e lse ’ s robbe ry , or tha t he ha d form e d the
ne c e ssa ry inte nt to a id a

n d a be t in tha t offe nse . He would ha

ve argue d tha

t Tom ’ s

“ de ath wa s not a

natura l a n d proba ble or fore s e e a

ble c onse que nc e of a

robbe ry in 9this c a s e .” The se are points tha t do not ne c e s sa

rily oc c ur to the ave ra ge juror, le t
a lone a ll twe lve jurors in a pa rtic ula r tria l. Jurors a

re not e xpe c te d

to c onjure up suc h argum e nts the m se lve s. This is e s pe c ia l ly true in this c a se , a s the jury ne ve r he ard any disc ussion of the la

w a nd e le m e nts of fe lony

m urde r at a ll. The instruc tion, a

nd the prose c ution’ s disc ussion of it, only pe rta ine d to Ja c que z , whose
c ounse l did not disc

uss fe l ony

m urde r during his c losing a rgum e nt (inste a d , his
c losing c o nsiste d a lm ost e xc lusive ly of a n atta c k on B urgos’ s c re dibility ). It is c ounse l’ s role to try

to pre se nt a

rgum e nts in them ost forc e ful a nd
c onvinc i ng m anne r so a s to pe rsua de jurors of thec orre c tne ss of the de fe nda nt’ s position, or a

t l e a st to ra ise a

re a sona ble doubt a s to the va lidity of the fa c tors tha

t
m ight othe rwise a

p pe ar to sugge st a

c lie nt’ s guilt bey ond a

re a sona ble doubt. Although the pre c lusion of a rgum e nt a s to thethe ory

on whic h a

de fe n da n t is ultim ate ly c onvic te d m ay

not c onstitute

struc tura l e rror, the re c an be no doubt tha t the i na bility of c ounse l to pre s e nt any argum e nt on a the ory of c onvic t ion we ighs he avily in a

de t e rm ination whe the r the e rror wa s ha rm le s s. Se e Gle bev . Frost , 135 S. C t. 429 (2014) (c onc luding on AEDPA revie w tha t no c le arly

e sta blishe d Supre m e C ourt pre c e d e nt e sta b lishe s tha

t suc h e rror is struc tura l); Gautt v . Le w is , 489 F.3d 993, 1015 (9th C ir. 2007) (noting tha t our pre c e de nt sugge s ting tha t suc h
e rror is struc tura l “p re date s . . . Supre m e C ourt c a se s . . . whic h stre sse d the lim ite d 1 0num

be r of ‘ struc tura l e rrors’ ” ). C e rta inly the de fe nda

nt ha s a far be tte r c ha

nc e of not be ing c onvic te d on a

le ga l t he ory tha t is fore i gn to theave ra g e juror if his
c ounse l is not forc e d

to re m a i n sile n t on tha

t the ory be c a use of a n e rror of
c onstitutiona

l m a gnitudeby

the judge pre siding ove r his tria l. In the c a se be fore us, we have grave doubt a bout whe the r the jury

would ha ve c onvic te d Ardoin ha d
c ounse l be e n a

ble to offe r the argum e nts he sugge ste d, or a ny othe r argum e nts a s to fe lony m

urde r, a fte r this the ory

wa s for the first tim e offe re d to the jury a s the ba sis for c onvic ting Ardoin. It is true , a s the sta

te argue s, tha

t Ardoin’ s c ounse l brie fly m e ntione d during
c losing a rgum e nt tha

t “ the re is no e vide nc e ” tha t Ardoin “ som e how he lpe d”
som e one e l se m

urde r Tom . The sta

te se iz e s on this stra

y re m ark, out of c onte xt,
arguing tha

t Ardoin’ s c ounse l ha d a

n opportunity

to a d dre ss the fe lony

m urde r the o ry unde r whic h Ardoin wa s ultim ate ly c onvic te d. C ounse l’ s re m ark doe s not
a lte r our c onc lusion a s to ha rm le ssne ss, howe ve r. It is c le ar from the c onte xt tha t this sta te m e nt wa s not a

re sponse to the possibility of fe lony m urde r lia bility or the
e le m e nts of tha

t rule , but inste a d pa

rt of a n atta c k on B urgos’ s c re dibility
. Ardoin’ s prim a

ry de fe n se wa s tha

t he la c ke d the phy s ic a l stre ngth to kill Tom due to his own phy sic a l a i lm e nts. During the sta te ’ s c losing a

rgum e nt, the prose c utor
re sponde d to this a

rgum e nt by

c onc e ding tha

t e vide nc e sugge ste d Ardoin a lone did 1 1not m

urde r Tom , but tha

t if the jury

be lie v e d “ only one pe rson did it, tha t six foot two, 210-pound M

r. Ardoin m ay , m ay

have be e n c a

pa ble of doing it.” In his
c losing a rgum e nt, Ardoin’ s c ounse l re sponde d by sta ting tha t the notion tha

t two pe ople pa rtic ipate d in Tom ’ s de ath c ontra d ic te d the te stim ony of the sta t e ’ s prim ary witne ss, sta

ting tha t “ e ve n [the prose c utor] doe sn’ t be lie ve ” B urgos. The pa ssa ge the sta

te re lie s on is there fore in fa c t not a n a rgum e nt a g a inst a c c om

plic e lia bility at a ll, but inste a d pa

rt of a diffe re nt a

rgum e nt c ha lle nging B urgos’ s c re d ibility
. M ore ove r, this stra

y re m ark c annot be an a de quate substitute for a full
c losing a rgum e nt re ga

rding fe lony

m urde r. C losing a

rgum e n t “ se rve s to sha

rpe n and c la rify the issue s” for the jury , He rring , 422 U.S. a t 862, whic h m ay

not initia lly unde rsta nd a n issue a s c om

ple x a s C a lifornia ’ s fe lony m urde r rule . The
argum e nt tha

t Ardoin’ s c ounse l would ha v e m a de ha d

he be e n aware tha

t his c lie nt fa c e d fe lony

m urde r lia bility

— a n a rgum e nt tha

t would ha

ve spe c i fic a lly

a ddre sse d the e le m e nts of theoffe nse and the prose c ution’ s fa ilure to prove the m
— w ould have ha d a

m uc h gre ate r im

pa c t on the jury

tha n the brie f, out-of-c onte x t re m ark offe re d he re . Thus, we have grave doubt whe the r the tria l c ourt’ s c o nstitutiona l
e rror ha d a substa

ntia l a nd injurious e ffe c t on thejury ’ s ve rdic t.

1 2The distric t c ourt is dire c te d to issuethe writ orde ring the sta t e to re try Ardoin within a re a sona

ble tim e or to re le a se him
. RE V E RSE D.

1 3Ardoin v . Arnold , No. 13-15854 M c K EOW

N , J., disse nting I re spe c tfully

disse nt. The disposition c onc lude s tha t the C a lifornia C ourt of Appe a l “ re c ogniz e d the s tate c ourt’ s e rror to be of fe de ra l c onstitutiona l
m a gnitude ”

— and thus tha t the c ourt de c ide d the c onstitutiona l que stion in Ardoin’ s favor. The C ourt of Appe a l’ s a na ly sis doe s not support this c onc l usion. R athe r, the c ourt a c knowle dge d the c onstitutiona l dim e nsions of the

e rror, but de te rm i ne d tha

t the e rror did not rise

to the le ve l of a

c onstitutiona

l viola tion unde r e ithe r fe de ra l or sta

t e la w. This de c ision m

ust be a fforde d de fe re nc e unde r the Antite rrorism

and Effe c tive De ath Pe na lty Ac t of 1996, 28 U.S.C
. § 2254, a nd ha be a s re lie f is una

v a ila ble unle ss the C ourt of Appe a l’ s de te rm ination tha t the re wa s no c onstitutiona

l e rror is “ so la c king in justific ation tha t the re wa s a

n e rror we ll unde rstood a

nd c om pre he nde d in e xisting la

w be y ond a

ny possibility

for fa irm inde d disa gre e m e nt.” Harrington v. Ric hte r , 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). He re , fa irm i n de d j urists c ould c e rta inly disa gre e a

bout thee xiste n c e of a fe de ra l c o nstitutiona

l e rror. No Supre m e C ourt c a s e c le arly e sta blishe s tha

t a tria l
c ourt’ s re fusa l to re o pe n c l o sing a rgum e nts is a

viola tion of theSixth Am e ndm e nt,
se e 2 8 U.S.C . § 2254(d)(1), a nd we c annot re ly

on our own pre c e de nt to de te rm ine

“ that a pa rtic ula r c onstitutiona

l princ iple is ‘ c le a

rly e s ta blishe d.’ ” Lope

z v . Smith , 

# FIL ED MAY04 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S
. CO URT O F APPEALS

1135 S. C t. 1, 2 (2014) (pe r c uriam ).

The m a j ority c ite s He r ring v . N e w York , 422 U.S. 853 (1975), a

nd She ppard
v . Re e s , 909 F.2d 1234 (9th C ir. 1989), to support the de te rm ination of a
c onstitutiona

l viola t ion. Howe v e r, He rring i s distinguisha b le from Ardoin’ s c a se . In He rring , the Supre m e C ourt c onc lude d tha t “ the re c an be no justific ation for a sta tute tha t e m powe rs a tria l judge to de ny

a bsolute ly the opportunity

for any c losing sum

m ation a t a ll,” and note d the high toll tha t “ tota l de nia l of fina l
argum e nt” c an im

p o se on de fe nda

nts. Id. at 863. He re , Ardoin wa s not a bsolute ly de nie d the right to c losing a rgum e nt, a

nd, pa rtic ula rly in light of the

Supre m e C ourt’ s re pe ate d e xhorta

tions to “the lowe r c ourts— and the Ninth C irc uit in pa rtic u la r— a ga inst fra

m i n g [Supre m e C ourt] pre c e de nts a t . . .a high le ve l of ge ne ra lity ,” Lope

z , 135 S. C t. at 4, H

e rring c annot “ e sta

blish c le arly

the spe c ific rule [Ardoin] ne e ds.” Id. Like wise , a s a c irc uit c a se , She

ppard fa ils to provide

the be nc hm ark ne c e s sa

ry to c l e arly

e sta blish a c onstitutiona

l viola tion. Id. Se pa ra t e ly , I que stion them a

jority ’ s ha

rm le ssne ss a

na l y s is unde r Bre c ht v
. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619 (1993). Bre c ht provide s tha

t re lie f m ay

only be gran te d if the re is “ grave doubt” tha t the tria l e rror ha d a

“ substa ntia l an d injurious
e ffe c t or influe nc e in de te rm ining thejury ’ s ve rdic t.” O ’N e al v . Mc Anic h , 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). Bre c ht re q uire s m ore tha

n a “ re a sona

ble possibility

” tha t the 2e rror a lle ge d wa s ha rm ful. Dav is v . Ay ala , 135 S. C t. 2187, 1298 (2015) (c ita tions
om i tte d). “ The Bre c ht sta nda rd re fle c ts the vie w tha

t a “ State is not to be put to th[e ] arduous ta sk [of re try ing a de fe nda nt] ba s e d on m e re spe c ulat ion tha t the de fe nda n t wa s pre judic e d by

tria l e rror; the c o urt m

ust find tha

t the de fe nda

nt wa s a c tua lly pre judic e d by

the e rror.” Id. (quoting C a lde ron v . C

ole man , 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998) (pe r c uriam

)). He re , the e rror did not ha ve a “ substa ntia l a n d injurious e ffe c t” on the jury
ve rdic t for the ve ry

re a sons ide ntifie d by

the C ourt of Appe a l: (1) Ardoin wa s on notic e of his pote ntia l c ulpa bility unde r the fe lony -m

urde r rule a s a

n a ide r-anda be ttor; (2) de fe n se c ounse l kne w tha t fe lony -m

urde r and a ide r-and-a

b e ttor princ iple s we re at

issue ; a n d (3) the prim ary

the ory of the de fe nse wa s tha

t Ardoin
wa s not pre se nt whe n the m urde r took pla c e
— and thus c ould not ha ve pa rtic ipate d
a s e i the r the princ ipa l or a s a n a ide r and a

be ttor. Ac c ordingly , I would a ffirm the distric t c o urt’ s de n ia l of ha be a s c orpus re lie f.

3