66764 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 26, 1995 / Proposed Rules

or employee over which the officer or

employee has no direct or indirect

influence or control, transactions in

mutual fund shares, and all transactions

involving in the aggregate $10,000 or

less during the calendar quarter. For

purposes of this paragraph (e)(4), the

term securities does not include

government securities.

(f) Settlement of securities

transactions. All contracts for the

purchase or sale of a security shall

provide for completion of the

transaction within the number of

business days in the standard settlement

cycle for the security followed by

registered broker dealers in the United

States unless otherwise agreed to by the

parties at the time of the transaction.

(g) Exceptions. (1) De minimis

Transactions. The requirements of

paragraphs (b)(2)(ii) through (b)(2)(iv)

and paragraphs (e)(1) through (e)(3) of

this section shall not apply to banks

having an average of less than 200

securities transactions per year for

customers over the prior three calendar

year period, exclusive of transactions in

government securities;

(2) Government Securities. The

recordkeeping requirements of

paragraph (b) of this section shall not

apply to banks effecting fewer than 500

government securities brokerage

transactions per year; provided that this

exception shall not apply to government

securities transactions by a state

member bank that has filed a written

notice, or is required to file notice, with

the Federal Reserve that it acts as a

government securities broker or a

government securities dealer;

(3) Municipal Securities. The

municipal securities activities of a state

member bank that are subject to

regulations promulgated by the

Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board

shall not be subject to the requirements

of this section; and

(4) Foreign Branches. The

requirements of this section shall not

apply to the activities of foreign

branches of a state member bank.

(h) Safe and sound operations. Every

State member bank qualifying for an

exemption under paragraph (g) of this

section that conducts securities

transactions for customers shall, to

ensure safe and sound operations,

maintain effective systems of records

and controls regarding their customer

securities transactions that clearly and

accurately reflect appropriate

information and provide an adequate

basis for an audit of the information.

By order of the Board of Governors of the

Federal Reserve System, December, 19, 1995.

William W. Wiles,

Secretary of the Board.

[FR Doc. 95–31234 Filed 12–22–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6210–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 95–NM–214–AD]

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell

Douglas Model DC–9 and DC–9–80

Series Airplanes, and Model MD–88

Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the

adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to all

McDonnell Douglas DC–9 and DC–9–80

series airplanes, and Model MD–88

airplanes. Among other things, this

proposal would require repetitive leak

checks of the lavatory drain system and

repair, if necessary; would provide for

the option of revising the FAA-approved

maintenance program to include a

schedule of leak checks; would require

the installation of a cap on the flush/fill

line; and would require replacement or

modification of the vent system piping.

This proposal is prompted by

continuing reports of damage to engines

and airframes, separation of engines

from airplanes, and damage to property

on the ground, caused by ‘‘blue ice’’ that

forms from leaking lavatory drain

systems on transport category airplanes

and subsequently dislodges from the

airplane fuselage. The actions specified

by this proposed AD are intended to

prevent such damage associated with

the problems of ‘‘blue ice.’’

DATES: Comments must be received by

March 28, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–103,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 95–NM–

214–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00

p.m., Monday through Friday, except

Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in

the proposed rule may be obtained from

McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855

Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach,

California 90846, Attention: Technical

Publications Business Administration,

Department C1–L51 (2–60). This

information may be examined at the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,

Washington; or at the FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles

Aircraft Certification Office, 3960

Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood,

California.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Walter Eierman, Aerospace Engineer,

Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM–

130L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft

Certification Office, 3960 Paramount

Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712;

telephone (310) 627–5336; fax (310)

627–5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications shall

identify the Rules Docket number and

be submitted in triplicate to the address

specified above. All communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments, specified above, will be

considered before taking action on the

proposed rule. The proposals contained

in this notice may be changed in light

of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report

summarizing each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket Number 95–NM–214–AD.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

ANM–103, Attention: Rules Docket No.

95–NM–214–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue

SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 26, 1995 / Proposed Rules 66765

Discussion

Over the past ten years, the FAA has

received numerous reports of leakage of

waste fluid from the lavatory service

systems on in-service transport category

airplanes. This leakage has resulted in

the formation of ‘‘blue ice’’ on the

fuselage. In some instances, the ‘‘blue

ice’’ has subsequently dislodged from

the fuselage and has been ingested into

an engine. In several of these incidents,

the ingestion of ‘‘blue ice’’ into an

engine resulted in the loss of an engine

fan blade, severe engine damage, and

the in-flight shutdown of the engine. In

two cases, the loads created by the ‘‘blue

ice’’ being ingested into the engine

resulted in the engine being physically

torn from the airplane. Damage to an

engine, or the separation of an engine

from the airplane, could result in

reduced controllability of the airplane.

The FAA also has received reports of

at least three incidents of damage to the

airframe of transport category airplanes

caused by foreign objects and ‘‘blue

ice,’’ resulting from leakage of the

forward toilet drain valve and flush/fill

line, striking the airframe. One report

was of a dent on the leading edge of the

right horizontal stabilizer on a Boeing

Model 737 series airplane that was

caused by ‘‘blue ice’’ that had formed

from leakage through a flush/fill line; in

this case, the flush/fill cap was missing

from the line at the forward service

panel. Numerous operators have stated

that leakage from the flush/fill line is a

significant source of problems

associated with ‘‘blue ice.’’ Such

damage caused by ‘‘blue ice’’ could

adversely affect the integrity of the

fuselage skin or surface structures.

Additionally, there have been

numerous reports of ‘‘blue ice’’

dislodging from airplanes and striking

houses, cars, buildings, and other

occupied areas on the ground. Although

there have been no reports of any person

being struck by ‘‘blue ice,’’ the FAA

considers that the large number of

reported cases of ‘‘blue ice’’ falling from

the lavatory drain system is sufficient to

support the conclusion that ‘‘blue ice’’

presents an unsafe condition to people

on the ground. Demographic studies

have shown that population density has

increased around airports, and probably

will continue to increase. These are

populations that are at greatest risk of

injury and damage due to ‘‘blue ice’’

dislodging from an airplane during the

airplane’s descent into the airport.

Without actions to ensure that leaks

from the lavatory drain systems are

detected and corrected in a timely

manner, ‘‘blue ice’’ incidents could go

unchecked and eventually someone may

be struck, perhaps fatally, by falling

‘‘blue ice.’’

Current Rules

In response to these incidents, the

FAA has issued several AD’s applicable

to various transport category airplanes:

1. AD 86–05–07, Amendment 39–5250

(51 FR 7767, March 6, 1986): Issued on

February 26, 1986, this AD required

periodic leak checks of all Boeing Model

727 aircraft forward lavatory drain

systems (both dump valve and drain

valve) at intervals not to exceed 15

months, and corrective action, if

necessary.

2. AD 94–23–10, amendment 39–9073

(59 FR 59124, November 16, 1994):

Issued on November 9, 1994, this AD

supersedes AD 86–05–07. It continues

to require various leak checks of Boeing

Model 727 series airplanes, but adds

requirements for leak checks of other

lavatory drain systems; provides for the

option of revising the FAA-approved

maintenance program to include a

schedule of leak checks; requires the

installation of a cap on the flush/fill

line; and requires either a periodic leak

check of the flush/fill line cap or

replacement of the seals on both that

cap and the toilet tank anti-siphon

(check) valve.

3. AD 89–11–03, amendment 39–6223

(54 FR 21933, May 22, 1989): Issued on

May 9, 1989, this AD is applicable to

certain Boeing Model 737–300 and –400

airplanes. It requires repetitive leak

checks of the forward lavatory service

system at intervals of 200 hours time-inservice, and repair, if necessary. That

AD also provided operators with an

optional action in lieu of performing

these periodic checks, which entails

draining the system, locking the

lavatory, and placarding the lavatory

inoperative.

4. The FAA is planning to amend AD

89–11–03 to make it applicable to all

Boeing Model 737 series airplanes, and

to require additional inspections and

other actions similar to those of AD 94–

23–10.

5. The FAA is currently considering

additional rulemaking to address the

problems associated with ‘‘blue ice’’ on

various other transport category

airplanes, including those manufactured

by Airbus, British Aerospace, Fokker,

and Lockheed, as well as other models

manufactured by McDonnell Douglas.

Description of Relevant Service

Information

The FAA has reviewed and approved

McDonnell Douglas DC–9 Service

Bulletin 38–47, dated April 17, 1992,

which describes procedures for

installing a lever lock rinse cap on

lavatory service panels. The

development of this installation was in

response to reports that the quarter-turn

caps, which are normally installed on

the fill/rinse line at the lavatory service

panel, are often removed by ground

service personnel or are not properly reinstalled and reseated after servicing.

Installation of lever lock rinse caps in

place of quarter-turn caps will inhibit

the closing of the service panel doors

when the cap is not properly closed;

this will enable service personnel to

recognize situations when the cap needs

to be closed correctly. This, in turn, will

minimize the possibility of leakage of

lavatory waste liquids from the cap and

the subsequent formation of ‘‘blue ice.’’

The FAA also has reviewed and

approved McDonnell Douglas DC–9

Service Bulletin 38–41, Revision 3,

dated July 5, 1994, which describes

procedures for modifying and replacing

the lavatory vent system piping. The

development of this modification was in

response to reports of ‘‘blue ice’’ buildup at the lavatory overboard vent on

four Model DC–9 series airplanes. The

ice build-up was attributed to lavatory

waste tanks exceeding their capacity

and overflowing through the overboard

vent piping. This build-up of ‘‘blue ice’’

can break loose and damage either the

nose cowl of engine No. 1 or the engine

itself. The modified vent system piping

minimizes the possibility of waste water

siphoning overboard.

Description of the Proposed Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been

identified that is likely to exist or

develop on other products of this same

type design, the FAA is proposing an

AD that would require the following

actions:

Paragraph (a) of the proposed AD

would require repetitive leak checks of

the lavatory dump valve, drain valve

(either service panel or in-line drain

valve), and lavatory vent system. The

intervals for performing these leak

checks would vary from 200 flight hours

to 1,500 flight hours, depending upon

what type of valve is installed at each

location. The leak check of panel valves

would be required to be performed with

a minimum of 3 pounds per square inch

differential pressure (PSID) applied

across the valve. If any leak is

discovered during the leak checks,

operators would be required either to

repair the leak and retest it, or drain the

lavatory system and placard it

inoperative until repairs can be made.

In cases where the panel valve has an

inner seal, in lieu of pressure testing,

operators are provided with the option

of performing a visual inspection for

damage or wear of the outer cap seal
66766 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 26, 1995 / Proposed Rules

and seal surface. Any damaged parts

detected would be required to be

repaired or replaced prior to further

flight, or the lavatory drained and

placarded inoperative until repairs can

be made.

Additionally, the flush/fill line cap

would be required to be leak checked.

In lieu of this particular check,

operators may elect to replace the seals

on the toilet tank anti-siphon (check)

valve and flush/fill line cap.

Paragraph (b) of this proposed AD

would provide an optional procedure

for complying with the rule, which

would entail revising the FAA-approved

maintenance program to incorporate a

schedule to conduct leak checks of the

lavatory drain systems. The

maintenance program change would

also require that procedures be provided

for accomplishing the visual inspections

to detect leakage, and for reporting

leakage. Additionally, a training

program must be provided to

maintenance and servicing personnel,

which would include information on

‘‘blue ice’’ awareness and the hazards of

‘‘blue ice.’’

Operators electing to comply with this

option would be required to obtain

approval from the Manager of the FAA’s

Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office

(ACO) for any revision to the leak check

intervals. Requests for such revisions

would be required to be accompanied

by certain data when submitted to the

ACO [through the appropriate FAA

Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI)]

for approval. In paragraph (c) of the

proposed rule, the FAA proposes a

‘‘data collection format’’ for these

requests. Data submitted in accordance

with the proposed format, if favorable to

an increase in the leak check interval,

will allow the FAA to justify increasing

the leak check interval with assurance

that the valves involved have the

required reliability. The data provided

also will be important in assisting the

FAA in making future determinations of

appropriate leak check intervals for new

valves that have shown promising, but

not conclusive, service data. For

example, the FAA has previously

approved extension of the leak check

interval to 2,000 hours for one operator

using PneuDraulics part number series

9527 valves on Boeing Model 737 series

airplanes. Assuming that this operator

successfully completes two cycles of

2,000-hour leak checks without finding

leakage, the FAA may consider

approving the extension of the 2,000-

hour leak check interval to a 4,000-hour

interval for this operator.

Paragraph (d) of the proposed AD also

would require that all operators install

a lever/lock cap on the flush/fill lines

for all service panels. The cap must be

either an FAA-approved cap or one

installed in accordance with McDonnell

Douglas Service Bulletin 38–47.

Paragraph (e) of the AD would require

that leak checks of the lavatory vent

system be conducted on certain

airplanes at the same time as the leak

checks of the dump valve and flush/fill

line are conducted. If a leak is detected,

the proposed rule would provide for

several optional corrective actions that

operators could accomplish.

Paragraph (e) would also require that,

within 3 years, operators of certain

airplanes either replace/modify the

lavatory vent system piping in

accordance with McDonnell Douglas

DC–9 Service Bulletin 38–41, Revision

3; or install an FAA-approved

modification that deactivates the vent

system. Once either of these actions is

accomplished, the periodic leak checks

of the lavatory vent system may be

discontinued.

Paragraph (f) of the proposed AD

would require that, before an operator

places an airplane subject to the AD into

service, the operator must establish a

schedule for accomplishment of the

subject leak checks. This provision is

intended to ensure that transferred

airplanes are inspected in accordance

with the AD on the same basis as if there

were continuity in ownership, and that

scheduling of the leak checks for each

airplane is not delayed or postponed

due to a transfer of ownership.

Airplanes that have previously been

subject to the AD would have to be

checked in accordance with either the

previous operator’s or the new

operator’s schedule, whichever would

result in the earlier accomplishment

date for that leak check. Other airplanes

would have to be inspected before an

operator could begin operating them or

in accordance with a schedule approved

by the FAA PMI, but within a period not

exceeding 200 flight hours.

Economic Impact

There are approximately 2,097 Model

DC–9 and DC–9–80 series airplanes and

Model MD–88 airplanes of the affected

design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA

estimates that 1,191 airplanes of U.S.

registry, and 47 U.S. operators, would

be affected by this proposed AD.

1. Leak checks. It would take

approximately 4 work hours per

airplane lavatory drain to accomplish

each leak check, at an average labor cost

of $60 per work hour. There normally

are 2 drains per airplane. Depending

upon the type of valves installed and

the flight utilization rate of the airplane,

an airplane subject to this AD could be

required to be inspected as few as 2

times per year or as many as 15 times

per year. Based on these figures, the cost

impact of the proposed leak check

requirement on U.S. operators would be

between $960 and $7,200 per airplane

per year.

2. Inspections. Should an operator

elect to perform the inspection of the

service panel drain valve cap/door seal

and seal mating surface, the inspection

would take approximately 1 work hour

to accomplish, at an average labor cost

of $60 per work hour. Depending upon

the type of valves installed and the

flight utilization rate of the airplane, an

airplane subject to this AD could be

required to be inspected as few as 2

times per year or as many as 15 times

per year. Based on these figures, the cost

impact of the proposed inspection

requirement on U.S. operators would be

between $120 and $1,800 per airplane

per year.

3. Installation of cap on flush/fill line.

The proposed installation would take

approximately 2 work hours to

accomplish, at an average labor cost of

$60 per work hour. The cost of required

parts is estimated to be $275 per flush/

fill line. There are normally 3 flush/fill

lines per airplane. Based on these

figures, the cost impact of the proposed

installation requirement on U.S.

operators would be $1,411,335, or

$1,185 per airplane.

4. Installation of lavatory vent system

replacement/modification. The portion

of this installation that entails

modification of the toilet assembly

would require between 2 and 4 work

hours per airplane to accomplish,

depending on the brand of toilet

involved. The average labor cost is

estimated to be $60 per work hour. The

cost of required parts is estimated to be

between $83 and $2,121 per airplane.

Based on these figures, the cost impact

of this portion of the proposed

installation on U.S. operators would be

between $203 and $2,361 per airplane.

The portion of this installation that

entails modification of lavatory vent

lines would require between 15 and 52

work hours per airplane to accomplish,

depending upon the configuration of the

airplane, if certain other modifications

have already been accomplished, and

the modification option selected. The

average labor cost is estimated to be $60

per work hour. The cost of required

parts is estimated to be between $600

and $13,000 per airplane. Based on

these figures, the cost impact of this

portion of the proposed installation on

U.S. operators would be between $1,500

and $16,120 per airplane.

The number of required work hours,

as indicated above, is presented in this

discussion as if the actions proposed in
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 26, 1995 / Proposed Rules 66767

this AD were to be conducted as ‘‘stand

alone’’ actions. However, in actual

practice, these actions could be

accomplished coincidentally or in

combination with normally scheduled

airplane inspections and other

maintenance program tasks. Therefore,

the actual number of necessary

‘‘additional’’ work hours would be

minimal in many instances.

Additionally, any costs associated with

special airplane scheduling should be

minimal.

In addition to the costs discussed

above, for those operators who elect to

comply with proposed paragraph (b) of

this AD action, the FAA estimates that

it would take approximately 40 work

hours per operator to incorporate the

lavatory drain system leak check

procedures into the maintenance

programs, at an average labor cost of $60

per work hour. Based on these figures,

the cost impact of the proposed

maintenance revision requirement of

this AD on U.S. operators is estimated

to be $2,400 per operator.

The ‘‘cost impact’’ figures discussed

above are based on assumptions that no

operator has yet accomplished any of

the proposed requirements of this AD

action, and that no operator would

accomplish those actions in the future if

this AD were not adopted.

The FAA recognizes that the

obligation to maintain aircraft in an

airworthy condition is vital, but

sometimes expensive. Because AD’s

require specific actions to address

specific unsafe conditions, they appear

to impose costs that would not

otherwise be borne by operators.

However, because of the general

obligation of operators to maintain

aircraft in an airworthy condition, this

appearance is deceptive. Attributing

those costs solely to the issuance of this

AD is unrealistic because, in the interest

of maintaining safe aircraft, prudent

operators would accomplish the

required actions even if they were not

required to do so by the AD.

A full cost-benefit analysis has not

been accomplished for this proposed

AD. As a matter of law, in order to be

airworthy, an aircraft must conform to

its type design and be in a condition for

safe operation. The type design is

approved only after the FAA makes a

determination that it complies with all

applicable airworthiness requirements.

In adopting and maintaining those

requirements, the FAA has already

made the determination that they

establish a level of safety that is costbeneficial. When the FAA, as in this

AD, makes a finding of an unsafe

condition, this means that the original

cost-beneficial level of safety is no

longer being achieved and that the

required actions are necessary to restore

that level of safety. Because this level of

safety has already been determined to be

cost-beneficial, a full cost-benefit

analysis for this AD would be redundant

and unnecessary.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein

would not have substantial direct effects

on the States, on the relationship

between the national government and

the States, or on the distribution of

power and responsibilities among the

various levels of government. Therefore,

in accordance with Executive Order

12612, it is determined that this

proposal would not have sufficient

federalism implications to warrant the

preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this proposed regulation (1)

Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’

under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not

a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if

promulgated, will not have a significant

economic impact, positive or negative,

on a substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft

regulatory evaluation prepared for this

action is contained in the Rules Docket.

A copy of it may be obtained by

contacting the Rules Docket at the

location provided under the caption

ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration proposes to amend part

39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations

(14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 USC 106(g), 40101, 40113,

44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness

directive:

McDonnell Douglas: Docket 95–NM–214–

AD.

Applicability: All Model DC–9–10, –20,

–30, –40, and –50 series airplanes; Model

DC–9–81 (MD–81), DC–9–82 (MD–82), DC–

9–83 (MD–83), and DC–9–87 (MD–87) series

airplanes; and Model MD–88 airplanes;

certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must use the authority

provided in paragraph (g) of this AD to

request approval from the FAA. This

approval may address either no action, if the

current configuration eliminates the unsafe

condition; or different actions necessary to

address the unsafe condition described in

this AD. Such a request should include an

assessment of the effect of the changed

configuration on the unsafe condition

addressed by this AD. In no case does the

presence of any modification, alteration, or

repair remove any airplane from the

applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent engine damage, airframe

damage, and/or hazard to persons or property

on the ground as a result of ‘‘blue ice’’ that

has formed from leakage of the lavatory drain

system and dislodged from the airplane,

accomplish the following:

Note 2: The leak checks of the toilet dump

valve and flush/fill line that are required by

this AD may be performed by filling the toilet

tank with water/rinsing fluid to a level at

least 4 inches above the flapper in the bowl,

and checking for leakage after a period of 5

minutes.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of

this AD, accomplish the applicable

procedures specified in paragraphs (a)(1),

(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5), and (a)(6) of this

AD. If the individual waste drain system

panel incorporates more than one type of

valve, the inspection interval that applies to

that panel is determined by the component

with the longest inspection interval allowed.

Each of the components must be inspected or

tested at that time at each service panel

location.

(1) For each lavatory drain system that has

an in-line drain valve installed, Kaiser

Electroprecision part number series 2651–

329: Within 1,500 flight hours after the

effective date of this AD, and thereafter at

intervals not to exceed 1,500 flight hours,

accomplish the procedures specified in

paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(ii) of this AD:

(i) Conduct a leak check of the dump valve

(in-tank valve that is spring loaded closed

and operable by a T-handle at the service

panel), and the in-line drain valve. The inline drain valve leak check must be

performed with a minimum of 3 pounds per

square inch differential pressure (PSID)

applied across the valve.

(ii) Visually inspect the service panel drain

valve outer cap seal and the inner seal (if the

valve has an inner door/closure device with

a second positive seal), and the seal mating

surfaces, for wear or damage that may allow

leakage.

(2) For each lavatory drain system that has

a service panel drain valve installed, Shaw

Aero Devices part number 10101000C–A (or
66768 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 26, 1995 / Proposed Rules

higher dash number); or Shaw Aero Devices

part number 10101000B–A (or higher dash

number); or Shaw Aero Devices part number

10101B–577–1 or 10101B–577–2; or

Pneudraulics part number series 9527:

Within 1,000 flight hours after the effective

date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not

to exceed 1,000 flight hours, accomplish the

procedures specified in paragraphs (a)(2)(i)

and (a)(2)(ii) of this AD:

(i) Conduct a leak check of the dump valve

and the service panel drain valve. The

service panel drain valve leak check must be

performed with a minimum of 3 PSID

applied across the valve. Both the inner door/

closure device and the outer cap/door must

be leak checked.

(ii) For service panel valves that have an

inner seal: In lieu of pressure testing, the

outer cap seal and seal surface may be

visually inspected for damage or wear.

(3) For each lavatory drain system that has

a service panel drain valve installed, Shaw

Aero Devices part number series 10101000C

[except as specified in paragraph (a)(2) of this

AD], or Shaw Aero Devices part number

10101000B [except as specified in paragraph

(a)(2) of this AD]: Within 600 flight hours

after the effective date of this AD, and

thereafter at intervals not to exceed 600 flight

hours, accomplish the procedures specified

in paragraphs (a)(3)(i) and (a)(3)(ii) of this

AD:

(i) Conduct a leak check of the dump valve

and the service panel drain valve. The

service panel drain valve leak check must be

performed with a minimum of 3 PSID

applied across the valve. Both the inner door/

closure device and the outer cap/door must

be leak checked.

(ii) For service panel valves that have an

inner seal: In lieu of pressure testing, the

outer cap seal and seal surface may be

visually inspected for damage or wear.

(4) For other lavatory drain systems not

addressed in paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3)

of this AD: Within 200 flight hours after the

effective date of this AD, and thereafter at

intervals not to exceed 200 flight hours,

accomplish the procedures specified in

paragraphs (a)(4)(i) and (a)(4)(ii) of this AD:

(i) Conduct a leak check of the dump valve

and the service panel drain valve. The

service panel drain valve leak check must be

performed with a minimum of 3 PSID

applied across the valve. Both the inner door/

closure device and the outer cap/door must

be leak checked.

(ii) For service panel valves that have an

inner seal: In lieu of pressure testing, the

outer cap seal and seal surface may be

visually inspected for damage or wear.

(5) For flush/fill lines: Within 5,000 flight

hours after the effective date of this AD, and

thereafter at intervals not to exceed 5,000

flight hours, accomplish the procedures

specified in either paragraph (a)(5)(i) or

(a)(5)(ii) of this AD:

(i) Conduct a leak check of the flush/fill

line cap. This leak check must be made with

a minimum of 3 PSID applied across the cap.

Or

(ii) Replace the seals on the toilet tank antisiphon (check) valve and in the flush/fill line

cap. Additionally, perform a leak check of

the toilet tank anti-siphon (check) valve with

a minimum of 3 PSID across the valve after

changing the seals.

(6) As a result of the leak checks and

inspections required by this paragraph, or if

evidence of leakage is found at any other

time, accomplish the requirements of either

paragraph (a)(6)(i), (a)(6)(ii) or (a)(6)(iii) as

applicable:

(i) If a leak is discovered, prior to further

flight, repair the leak. Prior to further flight

after repair, perform the leak test.

Additionally, prior to returning the airplane

to service, clean the surfaces adjacent to

where the leakage occurred to clear them of

any horizontal fluid residue streaks; such

cleaning must be to the extent that any future

appearance of a horizontal fluid residue

streak will be taken to mean that the system

is leaking again.

Note 3: For purposes of this AD, ‘‘leakage’’

is defined as any visible leakage observed

during a leak test; the presence of ice in the

service panel; or horizontal fluid residue

streaks or ice trails originating at the service

panel. The fluid residue is usually, but not

necessarily, blue in color.

(ii) If any worn or damaged seal is found,

or if any damaged seal mating surface is

found, prior to further flight, repair or replace

it in accordance with the valve

manufacturer’s maintenance manual.

(iii) In lieu of performing the requirements

of paragraph (a)(6)(i) or (a)(6)(ii): Prior to

further flight, drain the affected lavatory

system and placard the lavatory inoperative

until repairs can be accomplished.

(b) As an alternative to the requirements of

paragraph (a) of this AD: Within 180 days

after the effective date of this AD, revise the

FAA-approved maintenance program to

include the requirements specified in

paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(5),

(b)(6), and (b)(7) of this AD:

(1) Replace the valve seals in accordance

with the applicable schedule specified in

paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (b)(1)(ii) of this AD.

Any revision to this replacement schedule

must be approved by the Manager, Los

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.

(i) For each lavatory drain system that has

an in-line drain valve installed, Kaiser

Electroprecision part number series 2651–

329: Replace the seals within 5,000 flight

hours after revision of the maintenance

program in accordance with paragraph (b) of

this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to

exceed 52 months.

(ii) For each lavatory drain system that has

any other type of drain valve: Replace the

seals within 5,000 flight hours after revision

of the maintenance program in accordance

with paragraph (b) of this AD, and thereafter

at intervals not to exceed 18 months.

(2) Conduct periodic leak checks of the

lavatory drain systems in accordance with

the applicable schedule specified in

paragraphs (b)(2)(i), (b)(2)(ii), (b)(2)(iii), and

(b)(2)(iv) of this AD. If the individual waste

drain system incorporates more than one

type of valve, the interval that applies to that

system is determined by the component with

the longest inspection interval allowed. Each

of the components in that system must be

inspected/tested at that time. Any revision to

this leak check schedule must be approved

by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO, FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate.

(i) For each lavatory drain system that has

an in-line drain valve, Kaiser

Electroprecision part number series 2651–

329: Within 5,000 flight hours after revision

of the maintenance program in accordance

with paragraph (b) of this AD, and thereafter

at intervals not to exceed 24 months or 5,000

flight hours, whichever occurs later,

accomplish the procedures specified in

paragraphs (b)(2)(i)(A) and (b)(2)(i)(B) of this

AD:

(A) Conduct a leak check of the dump

valve (in-tank valve that is spring loaded

closed and operable by a T-handle at the

service panel) and the in-line drain valve.

The in-line drain valve leak check must be

performed with a minimum of 3 PSID

applied across the valve.

(B) Visually inspect the service panel drain

valve outer cap/door seal and the inner seal

(if the valve has an inner door/closure device

with a second positive seal) and seal mating

surface for wear or damage that may cause

leakage. Any worn or damaged seal must be

replaced and any damaged seal mating

surface must be repaired or replaced, prior to

further flight, in accordance with the valve

manufacturer’s maintenance manual.

(ii) For each lavatory drain system that has

a service panel drain valve installed, Shaw

Aero Devices part number series 10101000C;

or Shaw Aero Devices part number series

10101000B; or Pneudraulics part number

series 9527: Within 1,000 flight hours after

revising the maintenance program in

accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD,

and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,000

flight hours, accomplish the procedures

specified in paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A) and

(b)(2)(ii)(B) of this AD:

(A) Conduct leak checks of the dump valve

and the service panel drain valve. The

service panel drain valve leak check must be

performed with a minimum of 3 PSID

applied across the valve. Only the inner

door/closure device of the service panel

drain valve must be leak checked.

(B) Visually inspect the service panel drain

valve outer cap/door seal and seal mating

surface for wear or damage that may cause

leakage.

(iii) For each lavatory drain system that has

a lavatory drain system valve that

incorporates only an outer cap seal (i.e., uses

no inner flapper), or that incorporates an

inner seal that is not an attached part of the

valve (i.e., a ‘‘donut’’): Within 200 flight

hours after revising the maintenance program

in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD,

and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 200

flight hours, conduct leak checks of the

dump valve and the service panel drain

valve. The service panel drain valve leak

check must be performed with a minimum 3

PSID applied across the valve. Both the

donut and the outer cap/door must be leak

checked.

(iv) For each lavatory drain system that

incorporates any other type of approved

valve(s): Within 400 flight hours after

revising the maintenance program in

accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD,

and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 400

flight hours, accomplish the procedures
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 26, 1995 / Proposed Rules 66769

specified in paragraphs (b)(2)(iv)(A) and

(b)(2)(iv)(B) of this AD:

(A) Conduct leak checks of the dump valve

and the service panel drain valve. The

service panel drain valve leak check must be

performed with a minimum 3 PSID applied

across the valve. If the service panel drain

valve has an inner door/closure device with

a second positive seal, only the inner door

must be leak checked.

(B) If the valve has an inner door/closure

device with a second positive seal: Visually

inspect the service panel drain valve outer

door/cap seal and seal mating surface for

wear or damage that may cause leakage.

(3) For flush/fill lines: Within 5,000 flight

hours after the effective date of this AD, and

thereafter at intervals not to exceed 5,000

flight hours, accomplish the procedures

specified in either paragraph (b)(3)(i) or

(b)(3)(ii) of this AD:

(i) Conduct a leak check of the flush/fill

line cap. This leak check must be made with

a minimum of 3 PSID applied across the cap.

Or

(ii) Replace the seals on the toilet tank antisiphon (check) valve and the flush/fill line

cap. Additionally, perform a leak check of

the toilet tank anti-siphon (check) valve with

a minimum of 3 PSID across the valve.

(4) Provide procedures for accomplishing

visual inspections to detect leakage of the

lavatory waste drain line and lavatory flush/

fill line, at each waste service panel, to be

conducted by maintenance personnel at

intervals not to exceed 4 calendar days or 45

flight hours, whichever occurs later.

(5) Provide procedures for reporting

leakage. These procedures shall provide that

any ‘‘horizontal blue streak’’ findings must be

reported to maintenance and that, prior to

further flight, the leaking system shall either

be repaired, or be drained and placarded

inoperative.

(i) For systems incorporating an in-line

drain valve, Kaiser Electroprecision part

number series 2651–329: The reporting

procedures must include provisions for

reporting to maintenance any instances of

abnormal operation of the valve handle for

the in-line drain valve, as observed by service

personnel during normal servicing.

(A) Additionally, for these systems, these

provisions must include procedures for

either: Prior to further flight, following the

in-line drain valve manufacturer’s

recommended troubleshooting procedures

and correction of the discrepancy; or prior to

further flight, draining the lavatory system

and placarding it inoperative until the

correction of the discrepancy can be

accomplished.

(B) If the drain system also includes an

additional service panel drain valve, Shaw

Aero Devices part number 10101000C-A (or

higher dash number); or Shaw Aero Devices

part number 10101000B-A (or higher dash

number); or Shaw Aero Devices part number

10101B–577–1 or 10101B–577–2; or

Pneudraulics part number series 9527:

Indications of abnormal operation of the

valve handle for the in-line drain valve need

not be addressed immediately if a leak check

of the service panel drain valve indicates no

leakage or other discrepancy. In these cases,

repair of the in-line drain valve must be

accomplished within 1,000 flight hours after

the leak check of the additional service panel

drain valve.

(6) Provide training programs for

maintenance and servicing personnel that

include information on ‘‘Blue Ice

Awareness’’ and the hazards of ‘‘blue ice.’’

(7) As a result of the leak checks and

inspections required by this paragraph, or if

evidence of leakage is found at any other

time, accomplish the requirements of either

paragraph (b)(7)(i), (b)(7)(ii) or (b)(7)(iii), as

applicable:

(i) If a leak is discovered, prior to further

flight, repair the leak. Prior to further flight

after repair, perform the leak test.

Additionally, prior to returning the airplane

to service, clean the surfaces adjacent to

where the leakage occurred to clear them or

any horizontal fluid residue streaks; such

cleaning must be to the extent that any future

appearance of a horizontal fluid residue

streak will be taken to mean that the system

is leaking again.

Note 4: For purposes of this AD, ‘‘leakage’’

is defined as any visible leakage observed

during a leak test; the presence of ice in the

service panel; or horizontal fluid residue

streaks/ice trails originating at the service

panel. The fluid residue is usually, but not

necessarily, blue in color.

(ii) If any worn or damaged seal is found,

or if any damaged seal mating surface is

found, prior to further flight, repair or replace

it in accordance with the valve

manufacturer’s maintenance manual.

(iii) In lieu of performing the requirements

of paragraph (b)(7)(i) or (b)(7)(ii): Prior to

further flight, drain the affected lavatory

system and placard the lavatory inoperative

until repairs can be accomplished.

(c) For operators who elect to comply with

paragraph (b) of this AD: Any revision to (i.e.,

extension of) the leak check intervals

required by paragraph (b) of this AD must be

approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO,

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.

Requests for such revisions must be

submitted to the Manager of the Los Angeles

ACO through the FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector (PMI), and must include the

following information:

(1) The operator’s name;

(2) A statement verifying that all known

cases/indications of leakage or failed leak

tests are included in the submitted material;

(3) The type of valve (make, model,

manufacturer, vendor part number, and serial

number);

(4) The period of time covered by the data;

(5) The current FAA leak check interval;

(6) Whether or not seals have been

replaced between the seal replacement

intervals required by this AD;

(7) Whether or not leakage has been

detected between leak check intervals

required by this AD, and the reason for

leakage (i.e., worn seals, foreign materials on

sealing surface, scratched or damaged sealing

surface or valve, etc.); and

(8) Whether or not any leak check was

conducted without first inspecting or

cleaning the sealing surfaces, changing the

seals, or repairing the valve. [If such

activities have been accomplished prior to

conducting the periodic leak check, that leak

check shall be recorded as a ‘‘failure’’ for

purposes of the data required for this request

submission. The exception to this is the

normally scheduled seal change in

accordance with paragraph (b)(1) of this AD.

Performing this scheduled seal change

immediately prior to a leak check will not

cause that leak check to be recorded as a

failure.]

Note 5: Requests for approval of revised

leak check intervals may be submitted in any

format, provided that the data give the same

level of detail specified in paragraph (c) of

this AD.

Note 6: For the purposes of expediting

resolution of requests for revisions to the leak

check intervals, the FAA suggests that the

requester summarize the raw data; group the

data gathered from different airplanes (of the

same model) and drain systems with the

same kind of valve; and provide a

recommendation from pertinent industry

group(s) and/or the manufacturer specifying

an appropriate revised leak check interval.

(d) For all airplanes: Within 5,000 flight

hours after the effective date of this AD,

install a lever/lock cap on the flush/fill lines

at each lavatory service panel. The cap must

be either an FAA-approved lever/lock cap, or

a cap installed in accordance with

McDonnell Douglas DC–9 Service Bulletin

38–47, dated April 17, 1992.

(e) For only those airplanes listed in

McDonnell Douglas DC–9 Service Bulletin

38–41, Revision 3, dated July 5, 1994:

Accomplish the procedures specified in

paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) of this AD:

(1) Conduct leak checks of the lavatory

vent system at the same time as conducting

the leak checks of the dump valve and flush/

fill line required by this AD. If a leak is

discovered, prior to further flight, accomplish

the procedures specified in either paragraph

(e)(1)(i), (e)(1)(ii), (e)(1)(iii), or (e)(1)(iv) of

this AD:

(i) Repair the leak and retest. Or

(ii) Drain the affected lavatory system and

placard the lavatory inoperative until repairs

can be accomplished. Or

(iii) Install an FAA-approved modification

that deactivates the vent system. After

accomplishment of this deactivation, the leak

checks of the lavatory vent system may be

discontinued. Or

(iv) Replace/modify the vent system in

accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC–9

Service Bulletin 38–41, Revision 3, dated

July 5, 1994. After accomplishment of this

replacement/modification, the leak checks of

the lavatory vent system may be

discontinued.

(2) Within 3 years after the effective date

of this AD: Either replace/modify the vent

system in accordance with McDonnell

Douglas DC–9 Service Bulletin 38–41,

Revision 3, dated July 5, 1994; or install an

FAA-approved modification that deactivates

the vent system. Accomplishment of either of

these actions constitutes terminating action

for the leak checks of the lavatory vent

system that are required by this AD.

(f) For any affected airplane acquired after

the effective date of this AD: Before any

operator places into service any airplane

subject to the requirements of this AD, a

schedule for the accomplishment of the leak
66770 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 247 / Tuesday, December 26, 1995 / Proposed Rules

checks required by this AD shall be

established in accordance with either

paragraph (f)(1) or (f)(2) of this AD, as

applicable. After each leak check has been

performed once, each subsequent leak check

must be performed in accordance with the

new operator’s schedule, in accordance with

either paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD, as

applicable.

(1) For airplanes previously maintained in

accordance with this AD: The first leak check

to be performed by the new operator must be

accomplished in accordance with either the

previous operator’s schedule or the new

operator’s schedule, whichever would result

in the earlier accomplishment date for that

leak check.

(2) For airplanes that have not been

previously maintained in accordance with

this AD: The first leak check to be performed

by the new operator must be accomplished

prior to further flight; or in accordance with

a schedule approved by the FAA PMI, but

within a period not to exceed 200 flight

hours.

(g) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Los

Angeles ACO, FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate. Operators shall submit their

requests through an appropriate FAA PMI,

who may add comments and then send it to

the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

Note 7: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

Note 8: For any valve that is not eligible

for the extended leak check intervals of this

AD: To be eligible for the leak check interval

specified in paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(2)(i),

or (b)(2)(ii), the service history data of the

valve must be submitted to the Manager, Los

Angeles ACO, FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, with a request for approval of an

alternative method of compliance with this

AD. The request should include an analysis

of known failure modes for the valve, if it is

an existing design, and known failure modes

of similar valves. Additionally, the request

should include an explanation of how design

features will preclude these failure modes,

results of qualification tests, and

approximately 25,000 flight hours or 25,000

flight cycles of service history data, including

a winter season, collected in accordance with

the requirements of paragraph (c) of this AD

or a similar program.

(h) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on

December 19, 1995.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 95–31245 Filed 12–22–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD

20 CFR Part 211

RIN 3220–AB10

Finality of Records of Compensation

AGENCY: Railroad Retirement Board.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY: The Railroad Retirement

Board (Board) hereby proposes to adopt

regulations pertaining to the finality of

reports of compensation. The proposed

regulations relate to corrections to

records of compensation more than four

years after the date on which the

compensation was required to be

reported to the Board.

DATES: Comments must be received on

or before February 26, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Secretary to the Board,

Railroad Retirement Board, 844 North

Rush Street, Chicago, Illinois 60611.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Michael C. Litt, General Attorney,

Railroad Retirement Board, 844 North

Rush Street, Chicago, Illinois 60611,

telephone (312) 751–4929, TTD (312)

751–4701.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

Board’s rules and procedures regarding

the finality and reports of compensation

are presently contained in Board Orders,

which are not readily available to the

public.

The proposed rule would amend part

211 of the Board’s regulations

(Creditable Railroad Compensation) by

adding a new § 211.16 to this part.

Under section 9 of the Railroad

Retirement Act, the Board will not

change an employee’s record of reported

compensation if the change is requested

more than four years after the report of

compensation is required to be filed

under § 209.6 of the Board’s regulations.

Proposed § 211.16 explains when the

Board will change a record of

compensation beyond the four year

period; for example, where the record is

incorrect because of clerical error or

fraud, where the compensation was

posted to the wrong period or person, or

where the compensation was originally

reported to the Social Security

Administration but the Board or a court

has determined that it should have been

reported to the Board. Changes to credit

compensation and service after the four

year period could be made only where

taxes due under the Railroad Retirement

Tax Act have been paid.

The Labor Member of the Board

dissented from the action of the majority

of the Board approving the proposed

rule. The Labor Member’s reasons for

dissenting from this action are set out

below.

Views of the Labor Member of the

Board

The Labor Member feels that this

proposed revision to part 211 presents

a major change in the crediting of

compensation and service, in that if the

four year time limit for corrections to

records of compensation has passed, no

employee may be credited with service

months or compensation unless the

employee establishes that all

employment taxes have been paid with

respect to this service. The Labor

Member acknowledges that in the

current environment where the Internal

Revenue Service has responsibility for

assessing and collecting taxes under the

Railroad Retirement Tax Act and the

Board has the responsibility for

crediting compensation and service, a

lack of coordination is inevitable. He

contends that this should in no way

compel the Board to limit the granting

of legitimate railroad retirement credits,

but that the change proposed by the

majority of the Board would do this.

The Labor Member feels that this

change could also put an employee in

a ‘‘catch 22’’ situation since there could

be questions as to the employee’s status

under the Social Security Act for the

period where the employer is found to

be covered under the Railroad

Retirement Act, but because no railroad

retirement taxes had been paid, the

employee would receive no railroad

retirement credit. Conceivably, the

employee would receive no credit under

either Act. The Labor Member points

out that currently there are many

situations where the Board may correct

a compensation record retroactively.

There are cases where earnings were

erroneously reported to the Social

Security Administration by the

employer and, subsequently, the Board

rules that the employer is covered under

the Railroad Retirement Act. The Board

may correct a record of compensation

where such correction is determined or

approved by a court having jurisdiction

to make such a decision, or as a result

of a settlement entered into by the

employer and the Internal Revenue

Service.

The Labor Member does not endorse

the change recommended by the

majority of the Board. Instead, he feels

that the Board should make a concerted

effort to identify when an employer or

employee is, in fact, covered under the

Railroad Retirement Act and attempt to

mitigate the consequences of decisions

that retroact over several years. He

submits that we are, in fact, doing this

now with the assistance of our agency’s

Audit and Compliance Division which