1

Filed 2/28/14 P. v. Parsons CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRIAN CHARLES PARSONS,

Defendant and Appellant.

A137501

(Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. 5-100801-0)

Defendant Brian Charles Parsons was charged in an information with multiple 

counts and related sentence enhancements arising from several incidents including his 

attempt to steal two vehicles and his successful theft of a third vehicle. Before trial, 

defendant pleaded no contest to resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 691) (counts seven, eight, 

eleven, and twelve) and misdemeanor battery (§§ 242, 243, subd. (a)) (count ten). After a 

jury trial, defendant was convicted of mayhem (§ 203) (count one – victim Shannon 

Biggs); carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)) (count two -victim Shannon Biggs) with a related 

great-bodily-injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a))

(count three-victim Brian Liang); assault with a deadly weapon (car) (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) 

(count four- victim Shannon Biggs) with a related great-bodily-injury enhancement 

(§§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); assault with a deadly weapon (car) (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) (count 

five-victim Brian Liang); second-degree vehicle burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b)) (count 

six – victim John Jones); and attempt to unlawfully drive or take a vehicle (§ 664; Veh. 

 

1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) (count nine –victim Joshua Schultz). The jurors reported a 

deadlock resulting in a mistrial relating to great-bodily-injury enhancements as to counts 

three and five. At a bench trial, the court found true allegations that defendant had 

sustained a prior strike conviction and was not eligible for probation having been on 

parole for a felony conviction at the time of the current offenses and having sustained two 

prior felony convictions (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (b) – (i), 1170.12, 1203, subd. (e)(4), 

1203.085, subd. (b)). 

The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 26 years, consisting of 

consecutive terms of 13 years for count two, three years and four months for count three, 

one year and four months for count six, one year and four months for count seven, one 

year and four months for count eleven, eight months for count nine, and five years for the 

prior strike conviction enhancement. The court also imposed concurrent terms of four 

years for count one, three years for count four, three years for count five, two years for 

count eight, two years for count twelve, and 90 days in county jail with credit for time 

served for count ten. The court imposed but stayed a sentence of four years on the related 

great-bodily-injury enhancement for count four.

On appeal defendant’s sole argument is that the trial court erred by failing to stay 

the sentences imposed on the mayhem (count one) and the assault (counts four and five) 

convictions, pursuant to section 654. We conclude defendant’s contention is without 

merit, and accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS2

At the jury trial held in October 2012, Shannon Biggs testified that on 

September 5, 2009, she and her husband Brian Liang, landed at an airport having flown 

there in their privately-owned plane. Once on the ground, Liang and Biggs were given 

one of the airfield’s crew cars, a Toyota Camry, to use during their stay in the area. 

Liang loaded luggage into the car and parked it in the airfield’s parking lot while Biggs 

took care of the plane on the airstrip. Liang then walked and met Biggs on the airstrip

 

2 We set forth only those facts necessary to resolve the sentencing issue raised on 

this appeal. 
3

and they both walked back to the car in the parking lot. Biggs went to the passenger side 

of the car, retrieved some tip money for the crew, and walked back through the parking 

lot toward the airstrip, leaving Liang at the car in the parking lot. Without warning, 

Biggs heard her husband cry out. She turned and saw defendant holding Liang in “a 

fireman’s hold.” Defendant dragged Liang away from the car and threw him to the 

ground in the parking lot. When Liang attempted to get up, defendant lifted Liang over 

defendant’s head and threw him to the ground again. Liang landed on his shoulder and 

his wrists. 

Biggs ran toward the Camry and when she arrived defendant was fully in the 

driver’s seat. Both doors on the driver’s side of the Camry were open. Biggs scratched 

at defendant’s face and tried to grab his genitals but defendant had no reaction. While 

Biggs was standing within inches of defendant, he put the car into reverse and “floored 

it.” As the car moved in reverse, the open car door struck Biggs with such force that she 

flew into the air about 10 feet and landed on her back on the ground. Biggs thought the 

car continued to back up and pass over her. Defendant continued to back up the car and 

stopped about 11 feet away from Biggs. After 30 or 40 seconds Biggs pushed up onto 

her hands and knees. She then heard the car engine rev up and saw the driver and car 

aimed at both herself and Liang who was lying on the ground nearby. As defendant 

stepped on the gas, Biggs rolled to her left to avoid the car. The car sped between Biggs 

and Liang; Biggs did not see the car swerve as it drove between her and Liang. Biggs 

was not sure if the car actually hit her or Liang at that time. 

Michael Kirk, a pilot, testified that while he was inside the airfield office, he heard 

a woman screaming in the parking lot. He ran to the parking lot and “[i]nitially . . . saw 

the rear of the car as it backed over these two people. Then as it pulled out, I was looking 

at the hood of the car, he spun out and came forward directly at – directly towards me. 

So initially my vantage point was the rear of the vehicle. After it struck the two 

individuals, the vehicle was coming towards me.” Kirk saw “the female standing and 

saw the vehicle strike her, roll over the top and then drive forward back over her again.” 

“It was a real rapid event. I vividly remember the rear of the vehicle coming up elevating 
4

its tires off the ground and when I looked, I watched [the female] fall, the rear of the 

vehicle come up and then land back on the ground.” Kirk’s attention was directed at the 

female “because she got squarely struck by the vehicle. . . .” The female “was near the 

trunk and the vehicle, once it went into reverse, struck her and knocked her down.” 

“Because [the female] was in the direct path of the tires . . . the vehicle bumped over 

her.” Kirk was 100 percent positive the car’s tires went over the woman’s body and, to 

the best of his recollection, at the woman’s midsection. 

Liang and Biggs sustained severe injuries as a consequence of their encounter with 

defendant. Liang suffered a head wound requiring stitches and his hands were placed in 

splints. He wore braces on his arms for three months after the incident. At the time of 

trial Liang had not gotten back the flexibility in his left wrist. Biggs sustained a severe 

injury to her foot requiring stitches and her hip was stapled. She also had bruising around 

her right eye that lasted for about a month. At the time of trial Biggs’s vision in her right 

eye was “useless for ordinary sight,” and she retained only peripheral vision. 

The jury convicted defendant of mayhem (count one – Biggs), carjacking with a 

related great-bodily-injury enhancement (count two – Biggs), carjacking (count three –

Liang), assault with a deadly weapon or by force likely to cause great bodily injury with a 

related great-bodily-injury enhancement (count four –Biggs) and assault with a deadly 

weapon or by force likely to cause great bodily injury (count five – Liang).

At sentencing, the trial court chose the carjacking conviction with the related 

great-bodily-injury enhancement (count two – Biggs) as the principal term and imposed a 

sentence of 13 years on that conviction and a subordinate consecutive term of three years 

and four months on the second carjacking conviction (count three – Liang). The court 

also imposed subordinate concurrent terms on the convictions for mayhem (count one –

victim Biggs) and assault with a deadly weapon or by force likely to cause great bodily 

injury (count four- victim Biggs and count five – victim Liang), and imposed but stayed 

sentence on the great-bodily-injury enhancement related to count four.

In explaining its decisions, the court stated, in pertinent part: “[¶] . . . [T]he 

principal term will be for Count Two, the carjacking offense where Shannon Biggs was 
5

the victim. [¶] . . . I’m going to . . . choose the middle term of five years. That term will 

be doubled by the strike, thus, meaning the principal term, Count Two, is ten years. [¶] 

Added to that will be a term of three years consecutive under Penal Code section 

12022.7, . . . referred to earlier as the great bodily injury enhancement of Shannon Biggs. 

. . . I find it somewhat troubling that such a low term is the only term available 

considering the catastrophic nature of the injuries. [¶] Next is Count One which is the 

mayhem conviction. Now, the way in which the District Attorney’s Office has filed the 

pleadings in his matter, they have essentially alleged five counts for a period of behavior 

that literally took perhaps less than a minute in the parking lot of the aviation business

. . . . Now, considering that I have imposed the term for the great bodily injury 

enhancement to Shannon Biggs, it is this Court’s judgment that while a consecutive term 

is available to the Court, I do not believe it is barred by Penal Code section 654. I am 

choosing to not impose a consecutive term but instead impose a four-year term 

concurrent. [¶] . . . [¶] Next is Count Three which is the carjacking conviction involving 

Brian [Liang] [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I believe that is a separate victim and the assaultive-type 

behavior that took place which resulted in the vehicle being taken was a separate act from 

what occurred with regard to Ms. Biggs and I believe a consecutive term is appropriate 

and so for that count, I will impose one-third of the middle term [of] . . . five years, I will 

then double that term by use of the strike conviction and so the additional consecutive 

term for Count Three is three years, four months.” In explaining its reasons for imposing 

concurrent terms of three years on the assault convictions (counts four and five), the court 

stated: “[¶] . . . “[W]ith regard to Count Four. I believe that the behavior in Count Four 

was directly related to the Defendant’s goal of taking the motor vehicle and while it 

might have been a separate crime from the carjacking, I believe the Defendant’s primary 

goal was the same and so while the People have requested that this Court impose a 

consecutive term for Count Four, I am going to reject that proposal and instead impose a 

three-year concurrent term which is the midterm. [¶] For Count Five, that is the 

conviction for Penal Code section 245 for Brian Liang as the victim. And, again, I 

already imposed a consecutive term for the carjacking of Brian Liang. I believe, again, 
6

that the Defendant’s primary goal when assaulting Mr. Liang, his primary goal, while it 

was a separate crime, was the taking of the motor vehicle and the People have requested a 

consecutive term . . . [but] I’m going to reject that proposal and instead impose the 

midterm of three years concurrently.” 

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues the trial court erred in imposing concurrent terms on the 

mayhem (count one) and assault (counts four and five) convictions, and asks us to stay

the punishment pursuant to section 654. Although the trial court did not expressly so 

rule, its imposition of concurrent terms on the mayhem and assault convictions was an 

implicit finding that section 654 did not bar separate punishments on those convictions. 

(People v. Garcia (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1565 [“implicit in the trial court’s

concurrent sentencing order is that defendant entertained separate intentions”].) 

“[A]lthough there appears to be little practical difference between imposing concurrent 

sentences, as the trial court did, and staying sentence on [three] of the convictions, as 

defendant urges, the law is settled that the sentences must be stayed to the extent that 

section 654 prohibits multiple punishment.” (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 

353.) Nevertheless, as we now discuss, we see no reason to disturb the trial court’s 

imposition of concurrent sentences.

Section 654, subdivision (a), reads, in pertinent part: “[A]n act or omission that is 

punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the 

provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case 

shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” Because “few if 

any crimes . . . are the result of a single physical act, . . . ‘[s]ection 654 has been applied 

not only where there was but one “act” in the ordinary sense . . . but also where a course 

of conduct violated more than one statute and the problem was whether it comprised a 

divisible transaction which could be punished under more than one statute within the 

meaning of section 654.’ ” (Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 (Neal), 

disapproved on other grounds in People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 334.) 

“Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than 
7

one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the 

actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be 

punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.” (Neal, supra, at p. 19.) 

“Decisions since Neal have limited the [‘intent and objective’] rule’s application in 

various ways. Some [courts] have narrowly interpreted the length of time the defendant 

had a specific objective, and thereby found . . . [¶] . . . separate, although sometimes 

simultaneous, objectives under the facts.” (People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 

1211-1212.) Additionally, it has been held that if a defendant “ ‘harbored multiple 

criminal objectives,’ which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, 

he may be punished for each statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, 

‘even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible 

course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) “The question 

whether section 654 is factually applicable to a given series of offenses is for the trial 

court, and the law gives the trial court broad latitude in making this determination. Its 

findings on this question must be upheld on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to 

support them.” (People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312.) 

Relying solely on isolated portions of Biggs’ testimony, defendant contends “[t]he 

uncontested evidence clearly establishes that [his] sole objection was the theft of the crew 

car,” his acts of mayhem and assault were not “gratuitous or committed for some other 

independent purpose,” and he did not intend to harm either Biggs or Liang “independent 

of achieving” his goal of stealing the car. However, “[w]hen a trial court’s factual 

determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, 

the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on 

the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will 

support the determination, and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced 

from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of 

the trial court. If such substantial evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial 

court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have 
8

reached a contrary conclusion.” (Bowers v. Bernarnds (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-

874.) 

Defendant’s arguments are incorrectly premised on isolated portions of Biggs’ 

testimony. The trial court was free to reject those portions of Biggs’ testimony, “ ‘though 

not directly contradicted, and combine the accepted portions with bits of testimony or 

inferences from the testimony of other witnesses thus weaving a cloth of truth out of 

selected available material.’ ” (Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 67-

68.) By reconciling the testimony of Biggs and Kirk, the trial court could reasonably find 

that once defendant was in full possession of the car he had an opportunity to reflect on 

his conduct and abandon his criminal conduct but he failed to do so. Instead, he chose to 

expose both Liang and Biggs to new risks of harm by the manner in which he

maneuvered the car to facilitate his escape from the parking lot. Thus, the trial court 

could conclude separate punishments for carjacking, mayhem and assault were 

commensurate with defendant’s culpability (Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 20) because his

“means to achieve” the carjacking had “become so extreme they c[ould] no longer be 

termed ‘incidental’ and must be considered to express a different and more sinister goal 

than mere successful commission of the original crime” (People v. Nguyen (1988) 204 

Cal.App.3d 181, 191 (Nguyen)). As the court explained in Nguyen, Section 654 “cannot, 

and should not be stretched to cover gratuitous violence or other criminal facts far beyond 

those reasonably necessary to accomplish the original offense. Once robbers have 

neutralized any potential resistance by the victims, an assault or attempt to murder to 

facilitate a safe escape, evade prosecution, or for no reason at all, may be found by the 

trier of fact to have been done for an independent reason.” (Nguyen, supra, at p. 191; see 

also People v. Trotter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 363, 368 [separate punishments upheld on 

two assault convictions where defendant fired two shots a minute apart at the victim as 

“each shot evinced a separate intent to do violence;” “[e]ach shot posed a separate and 

distinct risk to [the victim]”]; In re Jesse F. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 164, 171 [even if “the 

crime of robbery is not actually complete until the robber ‘has won his way to a place of 
9

temporary safety[,]’ . . . it cannot mean every act a robber commits before making his 

getaway is incidental to the robbery”].) 

In sum, we conclude there is no reason to disturb the trial court’s imposition of 

separate punishments for the mayhem and assault convictions. Defendant in effect asks

us to reweigh the evidence and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom 

and substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. We decline to do so. Nothing in 

the cases cited by defendant warrants a different result. 3 

DISPOSITION

The judgments are affirmed. 

_________________________

Jenkins, J.

We concur:

_________________________

McGuiness, P. J.

_________________________

Pollak, J.

 

3 Whether section 654 prohibits multiple punishment is a “separate” decision from 

the question of whether sentences should be concurrent or consecutive. (People v. 

Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 594; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.424 [“Before 

determining whether to impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences on all counts 

on which the defendant was convicted, the court must determine whether the proscription 

in section 654 against multiple punishments for the same act or omission requires a stay 

of execution of the sentence imposed on some of the counts.”].) In deciding whether to 

impose concurrent or consecutive terms, the trial court here relied on proper criteria, 

finding the crimes of carjacking, mayhem, and assault, which “occurred in perhaps less 

than a minute,” and their objectives, were not “predominantly independent of each other” 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a)(1)), and were “committed so closely in time and place 

as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior” (Id., rule 4.425(a)(3)). However, the 

trial court’s comments cannot be read as an implicit finding that section 654 barred 

imposing separate punishments on the mayhem and assault convictions, as defendant 

suggests.