1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PATRICIA KILBY-ROBB , Plaintiff,

v. ARNE DUNCAN , Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, Defendant. Case No. 1:13-cv-978 (CRC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Patricia Kilby-Robb a lleges that during late 2010 and early 2011, her employer, the U.S. Department of Educati on (“DOE” or the “Department”), e ngaged in race- a nd age-based discrimination and retaliation, i n violation of Title VII of th e Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), and the Age Discrimin ation in Employment Act (“A DEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). She claims that the poor perfor mance evaluation she received fr om the Department, as well as a number of measures taken by the D epartment in connection with h er extended medical leave, were discriminatory and retalia tory in violation of law. The C ourt concludes that most of the personnel actions Kilby-Ross compla ins of are not materially ad verse, and that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons explain those that are. Consequently, t he Court will grant summary judgment for the Department.
I. Background Kilby-Robb, an African-American o ver the age of sixty, has beenemployed since November 2009 as an Educational Program Specialist in the Chart er Schools Programs office of the Department’s Office of Innova tion and Improvement (“OII”), which administers over two dozen discretionary grant program s for schools across the count ry. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.2 (“MSJ”), Ex. 1; Ex. 2, at 56; Ex. 3, at 134–137. 1 During the relevant ti me period, Kilby-Robb’s immediate supervisor—and, alleged ly, the one most directly resp onsible for the Department’s adverse actions—was Scott Pearson, who became Acting Director o f the Charter Schools Program in May 2010. MSJ, Ex. 4, at 82. Kilby-Robb’s Complain t also more tangentially implicates Margo Anderson, her sec ond-level supervisor; Nancy P aulu, who was the Coordinator for Fund for Improvement of Education (“FIE”) grants and oversa w the work of all grant monitors (including Kilby-Robb) w orking in the Charter Schools Program; and Carol Lyons, who was a higher-level direct or within OII. Ex. 5, at 93; Ex. 6, at 99; Ex. 7, at 106. For a six-month period beginni ng in March 2010, soon after the start of her employment in the Charter Schools Programs office, Kilby-Robb was evaluate d under the Education Department Performance Appraisal System (“EDPAS”). MSJ, Ex. 8, at 182–209; Ex. 9, at 127– 28. Under EDPAS, non-supervisory employees, including Kilby-Ro bb, are evaluated with respect to their “organizational priorities” and “customer serv ice,” on the following scale: 1 – “Unacceptable”; 2 – “Minimally S uccessful”; 3 – “Successful”; 4 – “Highly Successful”; and 5 – “Outstanding.” MSJ, Ex. 8, at 185, 206. During the relevant e valuation period, Kilby-Robb’s “organizational” res ponsibilities include d such things as “comp let[ing] required activities for awarding grants by adhering to the appropriate grant procedures , including reviewing applications . . . to assist wit h the timely and efficient prep aration of grant sl ates for OII and Department approval.” MSJ , Ex. 10, at 129–30. Grant applicati ons were to be reviewed and processed within eight weeks. MSJ, Ex. 7, at 107. Kilby-Robb’ s “customer service”

1 Certain exhibits attached to the Department’s summary judgment motion derive from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC’s”) Reportof Investigation (“ROI”), compiled in response to Kilby-Robb’ s corresponding administrati ve complaint. For those exhibits, cited page numbers a re those used in the ROI.3 responsibilities in cluded “[p]roviding sound and timely advice to assigned grantees and OII staff concerning project-rela ted inquiries.” Id. at 131. During the evaluation period, Kilb y-Robb was assigned twenty-fi ve FIE applications to process; nineteen of those appl ications were not processed with in the expected eight-week window. MSJ, Ex. 14. In May 2010, a gr ant applicant sent an e mail to the Department, complaining that Kilby-Robb had been nonresponsive to emails an d phone calls, that the processing—not yet completed—ha d already taken fourteen weeks, and that without the grant funding, the applicant was “havi ng to pay all expenses out of [ her] savings and personal credit cards.” MSJ, Ex. 12. The Departmen t received a similar email in September from a grantee seeking approval for some propos ed changes: He had sent a lette r to Kilby-Robb in July, as well as multiple emails, but had not yet received a response. MSJ, Ex. 13. In October 2010, towards the end of the evaluation peri od, Pearson—who as Kilby-Robb’s d irect supervisor was charged with completing her assessment— asked Paulu, the FIE grants coor dinator, for a summary of Kilby-Robb’s work performan ce. MSJ, Ex. 15. Paulu catalogued specific examples of deadlines that were missed and “[i]mportant details [that] often were ove rlooked or ignored,” noting that “far too often I was required to m ake major revisions to [Kilby -Robb’s] work” and “in several cases take over all or parts of assignments for them to be comp leted at an accepta ble professional level and on time.” MSJ, Ex. 14. On October 25, 2016, after r eviewing Paulu’s account and consulting via email with other colleagues, Pearson assessed Ki lby-Robb as “Minimally Successful,” i.e., the second-lo west rating, on both her organi zational and customer service performance. MSJ, Ex. 10, at 132; Ex. 15. Several days after receiving thi s performance rating, Kilby-Rob b took an extended medical leave; she was absen t from October 29, 2010 through Jan uary 7, 2011. MSJ, Ex. 2.4 During this time, she corresponde d via email with Pearson and P aulu, performing some grant assistance work from home and forwarding other work to Paulu. MSJ, Exs. 11, 18–21. However, Kilby-Robb never communi cated to the Department a date on which she would return to work. MSJ, Ex. 11, at 73–74. Most of Kilby-Robb’s leave wa s approved under the Department’s sick leave policy, whi ch requires employees to com plete a request and submit supporting medical documentation for absences longer than four days. MSJ, Ex. 17. However, Kilby-Robb’s approved leave peri od expired at the end of Decemb er, and so on January 4, 2011, Pearson emailed her requesting th at she submit a status update. MSJ, Ex. 22. Later that week, Kilby-Robb responded that she had made progress, had an upcomin g appointment, and would “return to the Department after consultation with [her] medical team.” Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s MSJ (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Ex. E. On Janua ry 10, in response to another email from Pearson reminding Kilby-Robb of the Department’s leave policies and seeking docum entation, she emailed to explain that as of that da y, she would “not be on leave,” but w ould work from home. MSJ, Ex. 23. The following day, Pearson responded with an email grantin g Kilby-Robb permission to work from home, but only for that week, and requesting the prop er medical documentation for two absences in November as well as the first week in January. MSJ, Ex. 24. Pearson and Kilby-Robb, joine d by Paulu, spoke on the phone the following day, January 12, primarily to “review the statu s of [Kilby-Robb’s] work,” gi ven that there was a significant backlog in the grants assigne d to her for processing. MSJ, Ex. 4, at 84–85. During the call, Pearson asked about Kilby-Robb’s health condition “in the conte xt of understanding when she would return to the office,” butwhen Kilby-Robb responded thatshe felt such questions to be inappropriate—since Paulu was not h er direct supervisor—Pearson stopped aski ng health-related questions. Id. at 85. Pearson lat er explained that, after dis cussing the issue with the5 Department’s Human Resources o ffice, he had concluded that it w as “appropriate” for Paulu to meet with him and Kilby-Robb “ when . . . discussing the content of [Kilby-Robb’s] work on FIE [grants],” but that it was “notappropriate when . . . discussi ng broader personnel issues.” Pls.’ Opp’n, Ex. I. On January 14, still la cking the proper document ation for Kilby-Robb’s earlyJanuary absences, Pearson marke d her as being absent without le ave (“AWOL”) on those dates. MSJ, Ex. 25. About a week later, on January 18, K ilby-Robb returned to the o ffice, and Pearson and Paulu met with her in person. M SJ, Ex. 28. Pearson had asked Paulu to join the meeting because she had been involved in coordinating, and partially sh ouldering, Kilby-Robb’s workload in her absence. MSJ, Ex. 4, at 84–85; Ex. 6, at 100–0 1. But when Kilby-Robb objected to Paulu’s presence at the meeting, Pearson asked Paul u to leave. MSJ, Ex. 6, at 101. During the meeting, Pearson gave Plaintiff a “Conduct Note for the File,” which flagged multiple leave dates—two in November, plus the first week in January—for which Kilby-Robb had provided no proper medical documentation. MSJ, Ex. 30. Ultima tely, Pearson rescinded the “Conduct Note,” but on February 1, 2011, he wrote a “Counseling Memorandum” to KilbyRobb, in which he described concer ns regarding her lack of prep aration for the January 18 meeting and her failure to provide l eave requests for early Jan uary. MSJ, Ex. 28. On February 3, in light of medical documentation submitted by Kilby-Robb on January 31, Pearson voided the AWOL designation. MSJ, Ex. 27. Kilby-Robb brought this action i n June 2013, alleging race disc rimination under Title VII (“Count I”); retaliati on under Title VII (“Count II”); and age discrimination under the ADEA6 (“Count III”). 2 Moreover, Kilby-Robb alleged in each count that the Departmen t had “created a hostile work environment.” 3 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 32, 28. All suppos ed legal violations were founded on the same purported misconduct: Kilby-Robb alleged th at the Department discriminated and retaliated aga inst her “by issuing her a low performance evaluation; coercing her into providing confidential medical information; charging h er thirty-two hours AWOL; having Paulu participate in discus sions regarding her performan ce and medical condition; harassing her about her medical l eave and documentation; [and] issuing her a Memorandum of Counseling.” Id. 4 Following discovery, the Departme nt moved for summary judgment, arguing that “aside from her conclusory assertions of discriminatory intent and ret aliatory animus, [Kilby-Robb] is unable to show that Mr. Pears on’s actions were based on reasons that were other than legitimate and non-discriminatory,” and that she had been “unable to show . . . any connection between the alleged actions and Ms. Anderson or Ms. Paulu.” Def.’s Mem. Su pp. MSJ 2. Resting primarily on her own affidavit, Kilby-Robb contends in her Opposition tha t she has put forth direct evidence of discriminatory inten t, and has “demonstrated that e ach of the [Department’s]

2 Kilby-Robb is no stranger to the District Court, having filed— in addition to the instant action—four other complaints against the Department stemming fr om various personnel actions involving numerous supervisors a nd colleagues. See Kilby-Robb v. Duncan, Case No. 14-cv2200 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 26, 2014); K ilby-Robb v. Duncan, Case N o. 13-cv-718 (D.D.C. filed May 13, 2013); Kilby-Robb v. Duncan, 77 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015); Kilby-Robb v. Spellings, 522 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d, 309 F. App ’x 422 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
3 Kilby-Robb does not identify a hos tile work environment claim as a separate count, but the Court will nevertheless anal yze that claim separately. See infra section III.C.
4 Kilby-Robb also alleged that Pea rson had left “her confidentia l medical and personnel records unattended on the copier,” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 26, 32, 28 , a claim the Court addresses briefly below. See infra section III.A.5.7 justifications for its acts is false and [a] pretext for unlawf ul discrimination.” Pl.’s Opp’n 2. The Department filed a Reply, and the Motion is ripe for considerat ion.
II. Legal Standards The Court will grant summary judgment if the movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” such that “judgment as a matt er of law” is proper. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant has the burde n of showing the “absence of a genuine issue of material fact” in dispute, Celot ex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 ( 1986), and the Court accepts as true the nonmovant’s evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). On the other hand, the nonmovant may not rely on mere allegations or conclusory statements. Vei tch v. England, 471 F.3d 124, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The Court is “ most likely” to grant summ ary judgment in favor of a defendant “when a plaintiff’s claim is supported solely by the plaintiff’s own self-serving, conclusory statements.” Mokhtar v. Kerry, 83 F. Supp. 3d 49, 6 1 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Bonieskie v. Mukasey, 540 F. Supp. 2d 190, 195 (D.D.C. 2008)).
III. Analysis As enumerated above, Kilby-Robb bri ngs claims of discrimination , retaliation, and— under a liberal reading of her Complaint—hostile work environme nt. The Court will discuss each claim separately.
A. Race and Age Discrimination Kilby-Robb alleges that the Depar tment subjected her to discrim ination based on her race in violation of Title VII and ba sed on her age in violation of the ADEA. Under both Title VII and the ADEA, since she is undisputedly a member of the relevan t protected classes, Kilby-Robb must establish a prima facie case that she “(i) . . . suffered an adverse employment action (ii)8 because of [her] race [or] age[ .]” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F .3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16( a); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. ). 5 To be materially adverse, an employment action need not result in a loss of salary or grade level. See id. (citi ng Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360 , 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007). However, in the context of a discrimination c laim, it must entail “a signif icant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing t o promote, reassignment with s ignificantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a si gnificant change in benefits.” Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Douglas v. Donovan, 55 9 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, a p laintiff must show that an action led to “objectively tangible harm.” Briscoe v. Kerry, 111 F. S upp. 3d 46, 544 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Doe v. Gates, 828 F. Supp. 2d 266, 270 (D.D.C. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the familiar framework established in McDonnell Douglas C orp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), once a plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of discrimination by establishing an adverse action c aused by a protected characteri stic such as race or age, the burden

5 Kilby-Robb argues that certain “ negative comments [made by Dep artment employees] about African American employees ” and comments to the effect th at it was a “department priority” to “bring[] in younger employees” are “ direct evidence of discrimination.” Pl.’s Opp’n 2 (emphasis added). They are not . “To qualify as direct evide nce, a statement or remark must

‘ itself show[ ] . . . bias in the employment decision.’” Conn v. Am. N at’l Red Cross, 149 F. Supp. 3d 136, 146 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Wilson v. Cox, 753 F.3 d 244, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); see also Wicks v. American Transmission Co., 701 F. Supp. 2d 38 , 44 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[D]irect evidence does not include stray r emarks in the workplace, parti cularly those . . . statements made by decision makers unrelated to the decisional process itself.” ) (citing Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 96 (1st Ci r. 1996)) (internal quo tation marks removed). Leaving aside the fact that Kilby-R obb supports none of her allegations with citations beyond the statements in her own affidavit , none of these alleged discrimi natory comments have relevance to any of the purported adverse em ployment actions taken by the Department. Consequently, Kilby-Robb has produced at most circumstantialevidence in support of her claims.9 shifts to the employer to assert a legitimate, non-discriminato ry reason for its action. See Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 200 8). At that point, courts at the summary judgment stage “must res olve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasona ble jury to find that the empl oyer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentio nally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, c olor, religion, sex, or nationa l origin?” Id.; s ee also Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that to sust ain a discrimination claim, “[t]he plaintiff must . . . demonstrate th at the employer’s stated rea son was pretextual and that the true reason was discriminatory”). Kilby-Robb asserts multiple adve rse actions to support her disc rimination claim: her “Minimally Successful” performa nce rating; her temporary AWOL s tatus; her conduct note and counseling memorandum; Ms. Paulu ’s participati on in her convers ations with Mr. Pearson; and her personnel record being left on the copier. The Court will determine whether these employment actions were cognizab ly adverse, and, if they were, whether Kilby-Robb has adduced sufficient evidence t o cast genuine doubt on the Depart ment’s stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.
1. “Minimally Successful” Performance Rating The Department does not deny tha t Kilby-Robb’s 2010 performance evaluation constituted an adverse action. See Def.’s Reply 11 n.2. Becau se Kilby-Robb’s “minimally successful” rating prevented her from being eligible for annual bonuses, this action affected “the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future employ ment,” and so was materially adverse. See Briscoe, 111 F . Supp. 3d at 544 (quoting Doe, 828 F. Supp. 2d at 270) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the analysis turns on whether there is sufficient evidence10 showing that the Department’s s tated reasons for the action wer e legitimate and nondiscriminatory rathe r than pretextual. The Department’s reason for givi ng Kilby-Robb the rating that i t did was that during the 2010 evaluation period, “her work w as often late, error-filled, and required an unusual and disproportionate degree of rev ision and intervention by the CSP FIE Coordinator.” Def.’s Mem. Support MSJ 6. That rationale is backed up by copious record e vidence, including detailed, contemporaneous emails from Kilby-Robb’s colleagues, and emails from third-party grant applicants complaining of nonres ponsive service. See MSJ, Exs. 12–15. Those emails establish that the vast majority of Kilby-R obb’s grants were processed be hind schedule, that Kilby-Robb repeatedly ignored calls and emails from grant applicants, and that Kilby-Robb’s work was filled with errors. Id. In ot her words, the record fully supports th e conclusion that the “Minimally Successful” rating was legitimate and nondiscriminatory because it was accurate. See MSJ, Ex. 8 at 208 (describing a “Minimally Successful” rating under the EDPAS system as applying where an “employee usually compl etes assigned tasks but they ar e frequently late and occasionally not in accordance with established procedures” and “[t]he supervisor frequently has to correct substantive portions of the employee’s work products ”). On the other side of the scale , Kilby-Robb offers no solid evid ence undermining the Department’s legitimate explan ation for its ra ting. Kilby-Robb maintains that the deficiencies and complaints on which Mr. Pear son based the rating were all f alse, insisti ng that the “2010 performance rating consisted en tirely of fabri cations and disto rtions about [her] performance.” Pl.’s Opp’n 8. But she fails to support this claim with evidence —aside from the self-serving allegations in her own affidavit. Even if the Court accepts as true some of Kilby-Robb’s more specific assertions, those clai ms merely nibble at the margins of the Department’s supporting11 evidence, leaving most of it uncontradicted. For example, Kilb y-Robb attempts to explain away one of the grantee emails compl aining that she was being nonres ponsive by citing to her own email stating that she received on ly one missed call from the g rantee. See Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. C. But Kilby-Robb fails to address the grantee’s contention that s he failed to respond to his emails, or the fact that, as of Septe mber, she had not responded to the grantee’s Jul y letter. In short, Kilby-Robb’s concluso ry assertions and piecemeal refu tations cannot make it a matter of “genuine dispute” that the De partment’s proferred reasons fo r her low performance rating were pretextual, rather than a legitimate reflection of the qua lity of her work. “[A]n employee’s mere disagreement with her performance evaluation does not prov e pretext.” Ramseur v. Perez, 80 F. Supp. 3d 58, 74 (D.D.C. 2015) (citation omitted).
2. AWOL Charge Kilby-Robb contends that the Depa rtment’s temporarily designati ng her as AWOL was an adverse action and the Depart ment’s stated reason for doing so was pretextual. Although the AWOL charge lasted for a short time and was eventually reversed , there remains the possibility that the action was adverse due to the temporary withholding of wages. The D.C. Circuit has held that “a suspension without pa y, even where an employer lat er provided back pay, could be ‘a serious hardship’ to a reasona ble employee, and thus ‘materi ally adverse.’” Greer v. Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53); see als o Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1 321 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding plaintiff’s “temporary depriva tion of wages counts as a materia lly adverse action” when plaintiff was listed as AWOL for one week ). Because Kilby-Robb was tempo rarily denied pay for the brief period that she was on AWOL status, the Court will assume for the sake of argument she suffered a materially adverse action.12 Even under that assumption, however, Kilby-Robb’s claim lacks m erit. The Department’s proferred reason f or placing her on AWOL—i.e., tha t she failed to provide the proper documentation for her abse nces—is undoubtedly legitimate . See Nurriddin v. Bolden, 40 F. Supp. 3d 104, 129–30 (D.D.C. 2014) (holdi ng that the failure to provide sufficient medical documentation for leave requests was a legitimate, nondiscrimin atory reason for placing an employee on AWOL status). A nd Kilby-Robb has brought forth no evidence that would cast genuine doubt on that stated ratio nale. The Department’s sick leave policy requires that sick leave requests for more than four days require a medical certif icate or other supporting documentation. MSJ, Ex. 17. Mr. Pearson complied with that p olicy, requesting documentation that Kilby-Robb was unable to wor k due to her medical condition during the week of January 3, 2011, and temporarily charging Kil by-Robb with AWOL when he did not receive that documentation. MSJ, Exs. 22, 25. When Kilby-Robb did submit t he appropriate documentation, on January 31, he voided the AWOL charge. MSJ, Ex. 27. One do ctor’s note Kilby-Robb submitted on January 7 documented a single medical appointment on that particular date, but nothing submitted before January 31 said anything about her bei ng unable to work during the relevant period. See Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. M. Consequently, Kilby- Robb’s attempt to show that the Department’s reason for placing her on AWOL was pretextual is n ot supported by sufficient evidence. The Court will therefore grant summary judgment for the Department on this claim.
3. Conduct Notes and Counseling Memorandum Kilby-Robb next challenges as discriminatory the Department’s issuance to her of a conduct note and counseling memorandum. These actions were not materially adverse, and in any event, reflected legitimat e, nondiscriminatory consideratio ns.13 “A letter of counseling, writte n reprimand, or unsatisfactory p erformance review, if not abusive in tone or language or a predicate for a more tangible form of adverse action, will rarely constitute materially adverse action.” Hys on v. Architect of C apitol, 802 F.Supp.2d 84, 102 (D.D.C. 2011). Job-related, construc tive criticism that encour ages improved performance by an employee does not rise to the lev el of materially adverse actio n. See Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2009). A change in pay, grade, or w orking conditions, on the other hand, provides an evidentiary ba sis upon which to prove a mater ially adverse action occurred in the workplace. See Herbert v. Architect of Capitol, 766 F. Sup p. 2d 59, 75 (D.D.C. 2011). Kilby-Robb argues that the not e and memorandum negatively affe cted her wages and promotional opportunities. Pl. ’s Opp’n 18. But neither result ed in any tangible harm, such as a pay deduction or unfavorable cha nge in job status. The note wa s rescinded on January 20, 2011, shortly after it was drawn up. MSJ, Ex. 33. The memorandum, w hile not formally rescinded, stated that it was “not a disci plinary action” a nd “[would] notbe placed in [Kilby-Robb’s] personal folder.” MSJ, Ex. 28. Instead, it warned: “any future misconduct could result in the initiation of disciplinary acti on.” Id. In addition, Kilby-Ro bb contends that she was denied a merit promotion in September 2011, l ess than a year after recei ving the note and memorandum, Pl.’s Opp’n 18, but even assuming t he promotion was denied, any connection between the two events is entirely unsubstantiated. Finally, even if the couns eling memorandum were assumed to be an adverse action, the concerns it describes are supported b y uncontradicted evidence in the record, and so there is no e vidence casting genuine doubt on le gitimacy of Pearson’s reasons for issuing it. The Department is t herefore entitled to summary ju dgment on this issue.14 4. Paulu’s Participation in Certain Conversations Kilby-Robb alleges that Paulu’s involvement in discussions with Pearson and herself about her work performance and m edical issues also constituted illegal discrimination. KilbyRobb contends that Paulu’s par ticipation in the January 12 and January 18, 2011 discussions “materially affected” the “c onditions and privileges of her emp loyment.” Pl.’s Opp’n 19. Yet, once again, she fails to back tha t assertion with evidence. Ra ther, the record shows that, during both discussions, once Kilby-Robb mad e her objections to Paulu’ s participation known, Pearson either limited the content of t he discussion to only work-relat ed questions or asked Paulu to leave. MSJ, Exs. 4, 6. Even assuming arguendo that Paulu’s participa tion in the discussions did constitute an adverse action, thi s claim would still fail becau se her involvement was based on a legitimate, nondiscriminatory r eason. While Kilby-Robb was outon sick leave, she discussed her work assignments with Paulu, MSJ, Ex. 11, at 72–73, and Pau lu had been responsible for handling her grants during he r absence, MSJ, Ex. 2, at 84–85, 8 7. Paulu’s participation in these discussions, which related direc tly to Kilby-Robb’s work, was t herefore legitimate. Without any evidence showing that Paulu’s pa rticipation in the conversation s was either materially adverse or illegitimate, summary judgment for the Department is warranted on this claim.
5. Personnel Records Left on the Photocopier Positing a final purported instan ce of discriminatory action, Kilby-Robb contends that Pearson left her personnel recor ds, including confidential medi cal information, on the workplace photocopier. But, to continue a familiar theme, Kilby-Robb pro vides no evidence showing that this action was either materia lly adverse or discriminatory. T he Court will therefore grant summary judgment on this issue.15 B. Retaliation In addition to her discriminati on claims, Kilby-Robb also alle ges that the above actions were undertaken in retaliation for her previous complaints of e mployment discrimination. “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) a reas onable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, and (3) there existed a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.” Na’im v. Clinton, 626 F. Supp. 2d 63, 76 (D.D.C. 2009) (footnote omitted) (citing Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 67-69). Once a prima facie case is established, the employer must show a legitimat e, non-retaliatory reason for its actions. Id. at 76 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993)). As comp ared to claims of pure discrimination, the universe of a dverse actions is larger in th e retaliation context. See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1198 n.4 (quoting Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 64–68) . Retaliatory adverse actions are “not limited to discriminatory ac tions that affect the terms an d conditions of employment,” id., but rather include any actions t hat “could well dissuade a reas onable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Douglas-Slade v. LaHoo d, 793 F. Supp. 2d 82, 98 (D.D.C. 2011). Even assuming that the above-described actions were adverse un der this more lenient standard, Kilby-Robb has neverthe less failed to establish a cau sal connection between the alleged protected activity and t hose actions. To demonstrate acausal connection, a plaintiff must show “but for” causation, or “that the unlawful retaliation wou ld not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employ er.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013). T hat causal link can be established by temporal proximity between the protecte d activity and the alleged advers e act, but “[t]he cases that accept16 mere temporal proximity between an employer’s knowledge of prot ected activity a nd an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establ ish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity m ust be ‘very close.’” Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001). Here, more th an a year passed between Ki lby-Robb’s prior EEOC activity, which occurred in mid-2009, and her negative performa nce review in October 2010, which is the first adverse ac tion she alleges. MSJ, Ex. 2, at 56. Similarly, Pearson learned of Kilby-Robb’s prior EEOC complain t—which raised allegations agai nst a different supervisor— in May 2010, about five months be fore any alleged adverse actio n. MSJ, Ex. 4, at 83. Where the relevant events are sepa rated by a half-year to a year, mor e is needed to establish that the protected activity was a but-for cause of the asserted adverse action. See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273 (citing favorably federal appe llate decisions deeming 3-mon th and 4-month periods of proximity to be insufficient for establishing causality). Furthermore, even if the Court assumes Kilby-Robb has establis hed the requisite causality, Kilby-Robb has not shown t hat the various justificat ions proffered by the Department for its actions were pretextual , meaning that Kilby-Robb is not entitled to a presumption in her favor even if she were to meet the elements for a prima facie case of retaliation. See Peters v. District of Columbia, 873 F. Supp. 2d 158, 201 (D.D.C. 2012) (“ A dismissal may . . . be warranted if the defendant show s a legitimate, non-discriminato ry reason for its a ctions [which] breaks the causal connection betwee n the first two elements and defeats a retaliation claim.”). Consequently, the Court will grant summary judgment for the De partment on KilbyRobb’s retaliation claim.17 C. Hostile Work Environment Kilby-Robb contends that the Depa rtment’s actions allegedly su bjecting her to race discrimination, age discrimina tion, and retalia tion, also const ituted a hostile work environment. To prevail on a hostile work enviro nment claim, “a plaintiff mu st show that his employer subjected him to discriminator y intimidation, ridicule, and ins ult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment an d create an abusive working environment.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “To determine whether a hos tile work environment exists, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its offensiveness, and whether it interf eres with an employee’s work performance.” Id. The acts gi ving rise to a hostile work envi ronment claim must be sufficiently severe or pervasive, and must be adequately connected to each o ther. Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011). No ma tter how “unjustified o r egregious” the hostile behavior is, there must also be “some li nkage between the hostile behavi or and the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class” for a cla im to be supported. Na’im, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (internal citations omitted). “[T]he removal of impor tant assignments, lowered per formance evaluations, and close scrutiny of assignments by manageme nt [cannot] be characterized as sufficiently intimidating or offensive in an ordinary workplace context.” Nurriddin v. Bold en, 674 F. Supp. 2d 64, 94 (D.D.C. 2009). Kilby-Robb’s allegation that th e defendants subjected her to a hostile work environment rests on the same purportedly adver se actions described above. Clearly, even if Kilby-Robb had produced sufficient evidence thatthese alleged actions were ra ce- or age-based, which she has not, none of these instances rise to the “severe” and “pervasiv e” level of seri ousness necessary18 for a hostile work environment claim. The alleged adverse acti ons were either justified work performance evaluations, or the y were supervisory reactions to Kilby-Robb’s medical leave and delayed compliance with office policy. Other than the AWOL cha rge, which was later corrected, neither is Kilby-Robb’s claim supported by evidence of tangible harm in the workplace. In short, nothing in this record pe rmits Kilby-Robb to survive sum mary judgment on her hostile work environment claim.
IV. Conclusion For the reasons outlined above, the Court will grant the Depart ment’s Motion for Summary Judgment. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memora ndum Opinion.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge

Date: September 28, 2016