Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 32 / Thursday, February 16, 1995 / Notices 9057

over a nominal 24 month operating

cycle.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed

Action

The Commission has completed its

evaluation of the proposed action and

concludes that the licensee has

provided information supporting the

use of a 1.04 multiplier. This multiplier

is applied to pool dynamic loads

previously calculated for the plant

unique analysis report (PUAR), to

account for the EMRV setpoint increase

and to account for errors in calculations

of the PUAR loads due to use of an

incorrect EMRV flow rating. The staff

has reviewed the licensee’s basis for use

of the multiplier and finds it acceptable.

The staff also finds that the structural

analysis of the affected plant

components was adequately

conservative to demonstrate

acceptability of the EMRV setpoint

change.

The proposed amendment involves a

minor change in the operation of the

facility. The change will not increase

the probability or consequences of

accidents, no changes are being made in

the types of any effluents that may be

released offsite, and there is no

significant increase in the allowable

individual or cumulative occupational

radiation exposure. Accordingly, the

Commission concludes that there are no

significant radiological environmental

impacts associated with the proposed

action.

With regard to potential

nonradiological impacts, the proposed

action does involve features located

entirely within the restricted area as

defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It does not

affect nonradiological plant effluents

and has no other environmental impact.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes

that there are no significant

nonradiological environmental impacts

associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded

there is no measurable environmental

impact associated with the proposed

action, any alternatives with equal or

greater environmental impact need not

be evaluated. As an alternative to the

proposed action, the staff considered

denial of the proposed action. Denial of

the application would result in no

change in current environmental

impacts. The environmental impacts of

the proposed action and the alternative

action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use

of any resources not previously

considered in the Final Environmental

Statement for the Oyster Creek Nuclear

Generating Station.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy,

the staff consulted with the New Jersey

State official regarding the

environmental impact of the proposed

action. The State official had no

comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental

assessment, the Commission concludes

that the proposed action will not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment. Accordingly, the

Commission has determined not to

prepare an environmental impact

statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the

proposed action, see the licensee’s letter

dated June 15, 1994, as supplemented

by letters dated September 23, and

November 3, 1994, which are available

for public inspection at the

Commission’s Public Document Room,

The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, DC, and at the local

public document room located at the

Ocean County Library, 101 Washington

Street, Tows River, NJ 08753.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day

of February 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Phillip F. McKee,

Director, Project Directorate I–4, Division of

Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–3876 Filed 2–15–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket No. 50–325]

Carolina Power & Light Co.; Facility

Operating License

Exemption

In the Matter of Carolina Power & Light

Co.; (Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 1).

I

The Carolina Power & Light Company

(the licensee), is the holder of Facility

Operating License Nos. DPR–71 and

DPR–62 which authorizes operation of

the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

(BSEP or the facility), Units 1 and 2,

respectively, at steady state power levels

not in excess of 2436 megawatts

thermal. The facility consists of two

boiling water reactors located at the

licensee’s site in Brunswick County,

North Carolina. The license provides,

among other things, that BSEP is subject

to all rules, regulations and Orders of

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the

Commission) now and hereafter in

effect.

II

Section III.D.1.(a) of appendix J to 10

CFR part 50 requires the performance of

three Type A containment integrated

leakage rate tests at approximately equal

intervals during each 10-year service

period of the primary containment. The

third test of each set shall be conducted

when the plant is shutdown for the 10-

year inservice inspection of the primary

containment.

III

By letter dated November 22, 1994,

CP&L requested a one-time exemption

from the requirement to perform a set of

three Type A tests at approximately

equal intervals during each 10-year

service period of the primary

containment for the Brunswick Steam

Electric Plant, Unit 1 (BSEP–1). the

requested exemption would permit a

one-time extension of the second 10-

year service period by approximately 18

months (from the April 1995 refueling

outage to the September 1996 refueling

outage). The requested temporary relief

would permit the third test of the

second 10-year service period to

correspond with the end of the current

American Society of Mechanical

Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code (ASME Code) inservice inspection

interval.

IV

Section III.D.1.(a) of appendix J to 10

CFR part 50 states that a set of three

Type A leakage tests shall be performed

at approximately equal intervals during

each 10-year service period.

The requirement to perform a set of

three Type A leakage rate tests at

approximately equal intervals during

each 10-year containment service period

provides assurance that containment

leakage will not exceed allowable

values. Type A leakage rate tests were

performed as required by appendix J

during the first 10-year containment

service period that ended in 1986.

Since the first 10-year service period

for BSEP–1 was not aligned with the

service period for BSEP–2, CP&L moved

the end date for the BSEP–1 back to

coincide with the BSEP–2 end date.

Therefore, the second 10-year service

period for BSEP–1 began on July 10,

1986. This caused the first BSEP–1 Type

A test for the second period to be

performed in May 1987, only 11 months

into the interval. The second Type A

test on BSEP–1 was performed within

the 40-month plus or minus 10-month

interval required by the Technical

Specifications.
9058 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 32 / Thursday, February 16, 1995 / Notices

However, BSEP, Unit 1, experienced

an extended shutdown during the

period between April 1992 and

February 1994, and the licensee notified

the NRC in a letter dated August 5,

1994, that the second 10-year period

end date was being extended by one

year due to this outage. Because of this

shutdown, the licensee also rescheduled

the remaining two BSEP–1 refueling

outages (reloads 9 and 10) during the

second 10-year service period. The

reload 9 outage was rescheduled to

begin in April 1995, and the reload 10

outage was rescheduled to begin in

September 1996.

Unlike Section XI, IWA–2400(c), of

the American Society of Mechanical

Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code (ASME Code), appendix J to 10

CFR part 50 does not contain any

provisions for adjusting the 10-year

service period due to extended outages.

The licensee has already performed two

of the Type A tests at BSEP–1 required

during the second 10-year service

period. If a Type A test is conducted

during the next refueling outage,

Appendix J could be interpreted to

require a fourth test to satisfy the

requirement that the final test of the set

be conducted when the plant is

shutdown for the 10-year plant inservice

inspections. Due to the extension of the

inservice inspection period, the final

refueling outage of the current inservice

inspection period is scheduled for

September 1996. This action would

eliminate the need to perform an extra

Type A test, which could otherwise be

required (one test in 1995 and another

in 1996) while recoupling the Type A

test period with the inservice inspection

interval.

V

The Commission has determined that,

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1), this

Exemption is authorized by law, will

not present an undue risk to the public

health and safety, and is consistent with

the common defense and security. The

Commission further determines that

special circumstances, as provided for

in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present and

justify the exemption; namely, that

application of the regulation in the

particular circumstances is not

necessary to achieve the underlying

purpose of the rule. The underlying

purpose of Section III.D.1.(a) of

appendix J to 10 CFR part 50 is to

provide an interval short enough to

prevent serious deterioration from

occurring between tests and long

enough to permit testing to be

performed during regular plant outages.

The last two Type A tests at BSEP–1

for the second 10-year period were

performed in May 1987 and in February

1991. Delaying the third Type A test

until the 1996 refueling outage would

result in a test interval of approximately

68 months rather than the stipulated 40

months plus or minus 10 months

interval. The licensee has presented the

following information which gives a

high degree of confidence that the

containment will not degrade to an

unacceptable extent while this

exemption is in effect:

1. The most recent Type A test data

show that the ‘‘as left’’ leakage rates

(0.2150 weight percent per day and

0.3408 weight percent per day,

respectively) were well within the

acceptance limit of 0.75 La (0.375 weight

percent per day).

2. A review of the potential primary

containment degradation mechanisms,

including both activity-based and timebased causes, concluded that there has

not been any alteration or challenge to

the primary containment since the last

Type A test.

3. No modifications are scheduled

that have the potential to adversely

affect the integrity of the primary

containment boundary.

4. Modification and maintenance

activities that will affect the

containment leakage rates during the

next refueling outage will include

administrative controls requiring the

performance of local leak rate testing,

Type B or Type C tests, as appropriate.

5. The licensee has committed to

perform an inspection of the

containment barrier during the reload 9

outage.

6. The Type B and Type C local leak

rate testing programs will effectively

determine containment leakage caused

by degradation of containment

penetrations.

The NRC staff has reviewed the

licensee’s request and basis and finds

that there is adequate assurance that

there will not be any significant

undetected degradation in primary

containment leakage during the

extended Type A test interval in that the

primary contributors to potentially

excessive leakage paths will be

measured during the required Type B

and Type C tests. These latter tests will

be conducted at least during each 18-

month refueling outage, but in no case

at intervals greater than 2 years

(Sections III.D.2 and III.D.3 of appendix

J to 10 CFR part 50).

The NRC staff agrees that the subject

exemption request does not pose any

undue risk to the public health and

safety in that (1) the last as-left Type A

test leakage rate was below 0.75 La, (2)

no modifications are scheduled that

have the potential to adversely affect the

primary containment integrity, and (3)

there will not be any future

maintenance activity during the

proposed interval extension that would

adversely affect the primary

containment leakage rate without

administrative control requiring the

performance of local leak rate testing.

The licensee will continue to

demonstrate that the test results from

the Type B and C local leak rate tests

will be no greater than their specified

values in the BSEP Technical

Specifications prior to restart after a

refueling outage. Any potentially

excessive leakage paths will continue to

be repaired and/or adjusted prior to

restart and at intervals of 18 months,

thereby continuing to ensure the

integrity of the containment. Based on

these considerations, the NRC staff

concludes that the licensee’s request for

a one-time exemption to Section

III.D.1.(a) of appendix J to 10 CFR part

50 should be granted.

VI

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR

50.12, this exemption is authorized by

law, will not present an undue risk to

the public health and safety, and is

consistent with the common defense

and security. The Commission further

determines that special circumstances,

as provided in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are

present justifying the exemption;

namely that the application of this

regulation is not necessary to achieve

the underlying purpose of the rule.

Further, the NRC staff also finds that the

protection provided by the licensee

against potentially excessive

containment leakage will not present an

undue risk to the public health and

safety. The application of the regulation

is not necessary to assure the integrity

of the containment in the event of a

postulated design basis loss-of-coolant

accident.

The Commission hereby grants the

one-time Exemption with respect to the

requirements of 10 CFR part 50,

appendix J, Section III.D.1.(a), to extend

the interval between the second and

third Type A test for BSEP–1 until the

September 1996 refueling outage.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of the subject Exemption will

not have a significant effect on the

quality of the human environment (60

FR 6567).

This Exemption is effective upon

issuance and shall expire at the

completion of the 1996 refueling outage

(B111R1).

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 9th day

of February.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 32 / Thursday, February 16, 1995 / Notices 9059

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Steven A. Varga,

Director, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II,

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–3873 Filed 2–15–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

[Docket Nos. 50–237, 50–249 50–254, 50–

265]

Commonwealth Edison Co., Facility

Operating License

Exemption

In the Matter of Commonwealth Edison Co.

(Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and

3; Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units

1 and 2).

I

Commonwealth Edison Company

(ComEd, the licensee) is the holder of

Facility Operating License Nos. DRP–19

and DRP–25, which authorize operation

of Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units

2 and 3, at a steady state power level not

in excess of 2527 megawatts thermal;

and Facility Operating license Nos.

DRP–29 and DRP–30, which authorize

operation of Quad Cities Nuclear Power

Stations, Units 1 and 2, at a steady state

power level not in excess of 2511

megawatts thermal. Dresden Station is

comprised of two boiling water reactors

at the licensee’s site located in Grundy

County, Illinois. Quad Cities Station is

comprised of two boiling water reactors

at the licensee’s site located in Rock

Island County, Illinois. These licenses

provide, among other things, that

Dresden and Quad Cities are subject to

all rules, regulations, and Orders of the

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(the Commission) now or hereafter in

effect.

II

By letter dated October 4, 1994, the

licensee requested a revision to an

exemption from certain Type B (local

leak rate) testing requirements of

appendix J to 10 CFR part 50, for twoply containment penetration expansion

bellows at four reactor units. The

request was made because the licensee

has developed a set of alternative

approaches which can be applied to

ensure the intent of requiring a Type A

test, as part of the original exemption,

is met.

On February 6, 1992, the NRC issued

an Exemption from certain Type B

testing requirements of Appendix J. This

exemption stated upon completion of

the two-ply bellows testing program, a

Type A integrated leak rate test (ILRT)

will be performed to verify primary

containment integrity. The testing

program was intended to assure that at

least one ply of a two-ply bellows is

intact and that overall containment

leakage is within its allowable limit as

shown by Type A testing. The Type A

test was the only test available that

could properly quantify the bellows’

leakages, albeit not individually. The

Exemption also stated that if a method

is developed which ensures a valid

Type B test on one or more bellows

assemblies, those bellows will also be

excluded from the Exemption and will

be required to be tested in accordance

with the normal Type B test program.

III

The original Exemption allowed

ComEd to apply special testing

techniques in lieu of performing a test

which meets Type B requirements for

these bellows which, at that time, were

unable to be tested in strict conformance

to the appendix J criteria. The special

testing techniques included a sequence

of air and helium based local leak rate

tests (LLRT) for each affected

penetration and performance of a Type

A leak rate test upon completion of the

bellows testing during each refuel

outage.

Commonwealth Edison Company now

believes that the requirement to perform

a Type A test every outage is not

necessary to ensure that the bellows

assemblies are adequately tested and

leakage from any leaking bellows

assembly is adequately quantified.

Through testing of two-ply bellows at

Dresden Station and Quad Cities

Station, the licensee has developed the

following insights:

1. There is minimal probability for the

occurrence of a large leak in a two-ply

bellows;

2. the special testing program is

effective for identifying small leaks in

two-ply bellows;

3. the Type A test is ineffective for

identifying small leaks in two-ply

bellows; and

4. more cost effective alternative

methods have been developed for

quantifying leakage.

At the time of the original request for

an exemption, a Type A test was

required every outage in accordance

with the Technical Specifications (TS)

and appendix J criteria for

determination of ILRT test frequency.

Based on appendix J and the TS, ComEd

need not do a Type A test every refuel

outage if they have completed two

consecutive successful Type A tests.

Quad Cities has completed two

consecutive successful Type A tests.

However, as previously stated the

original exemption requires a Type A

test every outage to support the two-ply

bellows leakage testing.

The licensee has discovered very

small leaks using the special testing

techniques in some bellows and they

have subsequently been modified,

removed from the list described in the

original exemption and are not on a

Type B testing schedule.

The licensee has identified several

methods for conducting a valid Type B

test on bellows since the original

Exemption was issued. The first method

involves the addition of a bellows test

enclosure equipped with leaktight seals.

The second involves installation of a

rubber boot inside the drywell to form

a seal between the drywell atmosphere

and the bellows. The third is to weld a

cover plate inside the drywell to

provide a seal between the process pipe

and the drywell atmosphere. The

licensee also has the option to

implement a complete replacement of

the existing two-ply bellows assemblies

with a new testable two-ply bellows.

The licensee has proposed the

following revision to the approved

exemption for non-Type B testable

bellows. This proposal eliminates the

need but keeps the option to perform a

Type A test every refuel outage. The

licensee proposed to include the

following alternatives to the current

requirement in place of the existing

Section III.6 and .7 in the original

Exemption:

Upon completion of the two-ply bellows

special testing program, the following actions

shall be taken to address any two-ply bellows

which have been identified as leaking

through both plies:

(A) All bellows which leak through both

plies shall be tested in accordance with Type

B requirements to ensure license limits are

met prior to return to service, or

(B) A Type A ILRT test shall be performed

to verify primary containment integrity. All

two-ply bellows assemblies which

demonstrate leakage through both plies shall

be replaced or subjected to a valid Type B

test to demonstrate license limits are met

prior to return to service from the subsequent

refuel outage, unless ComEd provides

justification for continued operation greater

than one operating cycle.

The licensee states that the estimated

cost of a Type A test, as described in

NUREG–1493, ‘‘Performance-Based

Containment Leak-Test Program,’’ Draft

Revision 2, dated March 31, 1994, is

$1.89 million. Based on the number of

historical leaking bellows found at

Dresden and Quad Cities during the

refuel outages, the cost of the Type A

test per bellows ranges from $378k to

$1.89M. The licensee also states that the

Type A tests performed every outage

since approval of the current exemption

have never found a bellows leak which

was undetected by the special testing

program. The techniques of the special