If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re Q. HOLLINS, Minor. March 21, 2024

No. 367302

Calhoun Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2010-003126-NA

Before: PATEL, P.J., and RICK and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent1appeals as of right the trial court order terminating her parental rights to the 

minor child, QH. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2022, respondent contacted Children’s Protective Services (CPS) and reported that 

she was suicidal and admitted she had fired “a round” at a neighbor’s house. The Michigan 

Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition requesting that the trial court 

take jurisdiction over QH under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2), and terminate respondent’s parental 

rights to QH. The DHHS obtained an ex parte order to take the child into protective custody “due 

to concerns of mental health, physical neglect, physical abuse, and lack of proper care and 

custody.” QH was placed in foster care, and respondent was placed in a psychiatric facility for 

mental-health treatment. At the preliminary hearing, respondent consented to the court taking 

jurisdiction over the minor child, but the father did not. Following testimony from a CPS 

supervisor, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that it had jurisdiction over 

QH pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). The child’s foster-care placement was continued, the 

 

1 The petition in this case also named QH’s father and requested that QH be removed from the 

parents’ custody, but did not request termination of the father’s rights. Following adjudication, 

the petition was dismissed as to the father, and the father is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly, 

we simply refer to respondent-mother as “respondent” and the father as “the father.”
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father’s parenting time was ordered to be supervised, and the mother’s parenting time was left to 

the DHHS’s discretion. 

In August 2022, respondent entered a plea of admission to certain allegations in the 

petition. She admitted to being QH’s biological mother, QH’s date of birth, the identity of QH’s 

father, and the father’s last known address. Respondent also admitted to a CPS history of six 

substantiated charges for physical neglect, threatened harm, and physical abuse. She admitted to 

being on the Central Registry. She further admitted that her two oldest sons were removed from 

her care in 2010, returned to her care in 2012, removed again in 2014, and her rights to both of her 

oldest sons were ultimately terminated in 2014. Respondent admitted that CPS had been working 

with her regarding QH since January 2022. She also admitted that she threatened suicide and to 

burn down a DHHS building in July 2022. She further admitted that she needed mental health 

services. And in exchange for the DHHS withdrawing its request for termination at the initial 

disposition, respondent admitted that she called CPS in July 2022 reported that her son was upset 

because she fired a round from her gun at her neighbor’s home. 

In September 2022, the trial court authorized the supplemental petition to remove the father 

as a respondent and QH was returned to the care of the father. Shortly thereafter, the DHHS filed 

an emergency, ex parte motion to suspend respondent’s visitation, which the trial court temporarily 

granted pending a motion hearing. At the hearing, the foster-care worker described respondent’s 

inappropriate behavior during parenting time and the “extreme behavioral concerns” that the child

demonstrated after respondent’s visitations, including defecating on himself and self-harming. 

Because the court determined that parenting time with respondent posed a serious risk of 

emotional, mental and physical harm to QH, it suspended respondent’s parenting time until further 

court order. 

In April 2023, the DHHS filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of respondent’s 

parental rights to QH under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist), 

(i) (parental rights to one or more siblings terminated due to neglect or abuse and prior attempts to 

rehabilitate the parent have been unsuccessful), and (j) (reasonable likelihood that child will be 

harmed if returned to parent).

The foster-care worker testified at the termination hearing that respondent was not 

attending or following up with services offered, such as parenting classes, psychological 

evaluations, and counseling services. Respondent testified that she was homeless and unemployed, 

but that she was looking for housing and work, and that she was attending mental-health classes 

biweekly at the Mental Health Court. The trial court found that there was clear and convincing 

evidence that respondent’s parental rights to QH should be terminated under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent caused physical injury to a sibling of child), (c)(i), (i), and (j). The 

trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in QH’s best interests to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s factual findings regarding statutory grounds for termination of 

parental rights and the decision to terminate parental rights for clear error. MCR 3.977(K); In re 

White, 303 Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). We also review a trial court’s decision that 
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termination is in a child’s best interests for clear error. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346; 990 

NW2d 685 (2022). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special 

opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 276; 976 NW2d 44 

(2021) (cleaned up). “To be clearly erroneous, a decision must be more than maybe or probably 

wrong.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). 

III. STATUTORY GROUNDS

Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by finding statutory grounds for 

termination. We disagree.

“To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory 

grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.” 

In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 472; 951 NW2d 704 (2020) (cleaned up). If at least one 

statutory ground for termination is established, “we need not consider whether the other grounds 

cited by the trial court also supported the termination decision.” In re Foster, 285 Mich App 630, 

633; 776 NW2d 415 (2009).

The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), 

(c)(i), (i), and (j). Respondent does not argue that the statutory grounds for termination were not 

proved by clear and convincing evidence. Instead, she makes a general argument that there was 

insufficient evidence that she had hurt the child, and she should have been afforded additional time 

to obtain mental health services and medications. Notably, respondent does not challenge the trial 

court’s finding that termination was supported under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i), which authorizes a 

trial court to terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds by clear and convincing 

evidence that “[parental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated due to serious 

and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and the parent has failed to rectify the conditions 

that led to the prior termination of parental rights.” It is undisputed that respondent’s parental 

rights to her two oldest sons were involuntarily terminated in 2014 after neglect or abuse. And the 

record reflects that services have been offered to respondent since 2010, but respondent failed to 

rectify the issues that led to those prior terminations. Respondent had ample time to make changes 

and take advantage of a variety of services that were available, but failed to do so. Accordingly, 

we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made in finding that 

termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i). Because termination of parental rights only 

needs to be supported by a single statutory ground, In re Pederson, 331 Mich App at 472, we need 

not address the remaining grounds for termination, In re Foster, 285 Mich App at 633.

2

IV. BEST INTERESTS

Respondent also argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination of her

parental rights was in QH’s best interests. We disagree.

 

2 We note that, regardless, the record supports that the trial court did not clearly err by finding 

clear and convincing evidence that the remaining statutory grounds were met.
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“If a trial court finds that a statutory basis for terminating parental rights exists by clear 

and convincing evidence, it is required to terminate parental rights if it finds from a preponderance 

of evidence on the whole record that termination is in the children’s best interests.” In re 

Brown/Kindle/Muhammad Minors, 305 Mich App 623, 637; 853 NW2d 459 (2014) (cleaned up); 

see also MCL 712A.19b(5). The focus of the best-interest determination is on the child, not the 

parent. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 411; 890 NW2d 676 (2016). Factors to be considered 

for purposes of the best-interest analysis include “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s 

parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a 

foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 

NW2d 144 (2012) (cleaned up). A court may also consider whether it is likely that a child could 

be returned to a parent’s home “within the foreseeable future, if at all.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 

242, 249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Other relevant factors include “a parent’s history of domestic 

violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history 

with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In re 

White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). The trial court may also consider a parent’s 

substance abuse problems. In re AH, 245 Mich App 77, 89; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). Finally, because 

a child’s placement with a relative militates against termination, see MCL 712A.19a(8)(a), “the 

fact that a child is living with relatives when the case proceeds to termination is a factor to be 

considered in determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests.” Olive/Metts, 297 

Mich App at 43. 

In this case, the trial court found that granting sole custody to father alone would not be 

enough to protect QH because “the bond [between respondent and QH] clearly is severed.” The 

court noted that respondent’s visitations were stopped based upon QH’s “visceral reaction” to 

parenting time with respondent, respondent’s abusiveness during parenting time, and because QH

“resorted to physical harming himself” after contact with respondent. Recognizing that QH 

“craves, strives, and benefits from consistency and stability,” the court concluded that if QH knew 

that future contact was even a possibility, he may resort to the same behaviors and thus “a custody 

order in and of itself would not be sufficient. This child is at risk, and it is in the child’s best 

interests to terminate parental rights.” A preponderance of the evidence in the record supports that 

respondent has subjected QH to mental abuse during parenting time, has failed to address her 

mental health issues for more than a decade, and had not shown motivation to make the necessary 

changes to address those issues. Because of QH’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, QH

cannot wait for respondent to seek treatment. We conclude that the trial court did not clearing err 

by finding that termination was in the best interests of QH. 

Affirmed.

/s/ Sima G. Patel 

/s/ Michelle M. Rick 

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney