United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 16-3636

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Paris Limousine of Oklahoma, LLC

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Executive Coach Builders, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

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 Submitted: April 5, 2017

 Filed: August 7, 2017

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Before GRUENDER, MURPHY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Paris Limousine of Oklahoma (Paris Limousine) brought suit againstExecutive

Coach Builders (Executive Coach), alleging that limousines it purchased from

Executive Coach were in breach of warranty. The district court dismissed the

complaint, concluding that Paris Limousine wasimproperly attempting to enforce the
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) via a warranty action. Paris

Limousine appeals, and we reverse.

I. Background

Because this appeal arises from the grant of a motion to dismiss, the following

facts are drawn solely from the complaint. See Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 846

(8th Cir. 2010). Executive Coach is in the business of converting standard vehicles

into limousines. Paris Limousine purchased nine limousines from Executive Coach

that it alleges are in breach of warranty because they are overweight. 

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According to the complaint, Executive Coach expressly warranted to Paris

Limousine that its limousines complied with all applicable FMVSS. The limousines

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sold to Paris Limousine do not comply with the federalstandards because their actual

weights are greater than the weight ratings indicated on the FMVSS-required label

that Executive Coach affixed to the vehicles. As a result, the nine limousines are not

properly certified and suffer from safety hazards associated with overloading. To

remedy the overloading and bring the vehicles into compliance with the FMVSS, the

limousines need to be physically modified.

The complaintstates claims for (1) violation ofthe Magnuson-Moss Warranty

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Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq.; (2) breach of express warranty; and (3) breach of

implied warranty. Although Paris Limousine statesthat it appeals the dismissal of its

express and implied warranty claims, its arguments on appeal address only the

express warranty claim. We thus limit our opinion to that claim.

Executive Coach did not challenge this contention at the district court or on 2

appeal. Because the parties and the district court assumed that Executive Coach

expressly warranted that its limousines complied with the FMVSS, we proceed from

that assumption as well. 

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ExecutiveCoach moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that Paris

Limousine failed to allege damages and the suit was an improper attempt to enforce

the FMVSS. Although it found the damages allegations sufficient, the district court

dismissed the complaint, concluding that Paris Limousine could not use a warranty

action to enforce statutory safety standards that provide no private right of action. 

The district court also denied Paris Limousine’s motion for reconsideration, again

holding that the FMVSS cannot be the basis of a warranty claim. Paris Limousine

appeals the district court’s grant of the dismissal motion and its denial of the

reconsideration motion. We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, but we

will reverse a denial of a motion for reconsideration only for a clear abuse of

discretion. See Hallquist v. United Home Loans, Inc., 715 F.3d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir.

2013). Because we find that the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss,

we do not address arguments related to the reconsideration motion. 

II. Discussion

The FMVSS are promulgated by the Department of Transportation under the

authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act),

15 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864–65

(2000). The parties agree that the Safety Act contains no private right of action to

enforce the FMVSS. See Ayres v. Gen. Motors Corp., 234 F.3d 514, 524 (11th Cir.

2000). Executive Coach argues that the complaint was properly dismissed because

Paris Limousine cannot use a warranty claim to create a private right of action to

enforce the labeling requirements of the FMVSS. 

Assuming that Executive Coach expressly warranted that its limousines

complied with the FMVSS, its warranty obligations are independent of any statutory

obligations imposed by the Safety Act or the FMVSS. Congress made clear that the

Safety Act does “not establish or affect a warranty obligation under a law of the

United States or a State. A remedy under [the Safety Act] . . . is in addition to other

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rights and remedies under other laws of the United States or a State.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 30103(d). Paris Limousine brought its express warranty claim under Missouri law,

which authorizes private enforcement actionsfor breaches of express warranties. See

Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 400.2-313, 400.2-714. The Safety Act and the FMVSS do not

affect Executive Coach’s potential liability under Missouri law for breach of its

express warranty. See Fabian v. Fulmer Helmets, Inc., 628 F.3d 278, 281–82 (6th

Cir. 2010) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the plaintiff “cannot do indirectly

what he cannot do directly by couching his private efforts to enforce the provisions

of the Safety Act as state law misrepresentation claims” because the claims were

authorized under state law and thus the plaintiff “has no need for, and thus need not

invoke, a private right of action under the Safety Act”). 

Executive Coach relies on Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara County, 563 U.S.

110 (2011), to argue that, regardless of the theory pleaded in the complaint, suits to

enforce the FMVSS are barred because they are an improper attempt to create a

private right of action. But Astra does not help Executive Coach. That case

concerned the Public Health Services Act—a statute that does not contain a provision

comparable to 49 U.S.C. § 30103(d) that expressly allows parties to pursue remedies

based on warranties. See Astra, 563 U.S. at 117–22.

On appeal, Executive Coach also appears to argue that Paris Limousine’s

warranty action should be dismissed due to conflict preemption. Perhaps because

Executive Coach did not raise this argument until its reply brief, the district court did 

not rule on it, and “we do not normally consider issues which the district court did not

rule upon.” Bearden v. Lemon, 475 F.3d 926, 929–30 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting First

Union Nat’l Bank v. Pictet Overseas Tr. Corp., 351 F.3d 810, 816 (8th Cir. 2003)). 

To the extent that the argument is properly before us, we find that Executive Coach

has not met its burden to demonstrate that conflict preemption applies: It has not

shown that it is impossible to comply with its warranty obligation and the FMVSS,

nor has it established that its warranty obligation “stands as an obstacle” to the

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objectives of the Safety Act or the FMVSS. Geier, 529 U.S. at 873–74 (internal

quotation omitted); Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 880 (8th Cir.

2009) (burden is on party asserting federal preemption of state law); see also Fabian,

628 F.3d at 282–83 (holding that common law misrepresentation claims were not

preempted because they did not conflict with a FMVSS).

Finally, Executive Coach argues that the complaint should be dismissed

because Paris Limousine failed to allege legally cognizable damages. The district

court rejected this argument, concluding that the complaint “is reasonably read to

allege that it cannot obtain the full use and benefit of the vehicles it purchased

because of the supposed defects.” We agree with the district court. Paris Limousine

alleged that it did not receive the benefit of its bargain when Executive Coach

delivered limousines that were improperly labeled and overweight; such allegations

sufficiently plead legally cognizable damages. See Coghlan v. Wellcraft Marine

Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 542 (5th Cir. 2001); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 400.2-714(2).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of the

express warranty claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

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