( Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of t he Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.


## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL, ACTIN G
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

– 773

. Argued November 7, 2018

— Decided January 8, 2019

T he Social Security Act regulates the fees that attorneys may charge

claimants seeking T itle II benefits for representation both before the Social Security Administration and in federal court. For represent ation in administrative proceedings, the Act provides two ways to d etermine fees. If a fee agreement exists, fees are capped at the less er of 25% of past

- due benefits or a set dollar amount

— currently $6,000

. 42 U. S. C. § 406(a)(2)(A). Absent an agreement, the agency may set any “reasonable” fee. §406(a)(1). In either case, the agency is r equired to withhold up to 25% of past

- due benefi ts for direct payment of any fee. §406(a)(4). For representation in court proceedings, fees are capped at 25% of past

- due benefits , and the agency has authority
to withhold such benefits to pay these fees. §406(b)(1)(A).

Petitioner Culbertson represen ted Katrina Wood in Social Security disability benefit proceedings before the agency and in District Court

. The agency ultimately awarded Wood past

- due benefits

, withheld 25% of those benefits to pay any attorney’s fees

, and awarded Cu lbertson fees under §406(a) for representation before the agency. Cu lbertson then moved for a separate fee award under §406(b) for the court proceedings , requesting a full 25% of past

- due benefits. The District Court granted the request, but only in part, because Culber tson did not subtract the amount he had already received under §406(a) for his agency

- level representation. The Eleventh Circuit a ffirmed, holding that the 25% limit under §406(b) applies to the total fees awarded under both §§406(a) and (b).

Held : Section 406(b)(1)(A)’s 25% cap applies only to fees for court repr esentation and not to the aggregate fees awarded under §§406(a) and (b). Pp. 5– 9.2 CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL

Syllabus

(a) Section 406(b) provides that a court rendering a favorable judgment to a claimant “represented before the cour t by an attorney” may award “a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent” of past

- due benefits. Here, the adjective “such,” which means “[o]f the kind or degree already described or implied,” refers to the only form of representa tion “already described” in §406(b)

— i.e.

, “represent[ation] before the court.” Thus, the 25% cap applies only to fees for representation before the court, not the agency.

Subsections (a) and (b) address different stages of the represent ation and use dif ferent methods for calculating fees. Given this stat utory structure, applying §406(b)’s 25% cap on court

- stage fees to §406(a) agency

- stage fees, or the aggregate of §§406(a) and (b) fees,
would make little sense. For example, s uch a reading would subjec t §406(a)(1)’s reasonableness limitation to §406(b)’s 25% cap

— a limit ation not include d in the relevant provision of the statute. Had Co ngress wanted agency

- stage fees to be capped at 25%, it presumably would have said so directly in subsection (a). Pp. 5–7. (b) The fact that the agency presently withholds a single pool of 25% of past

- due benefits for direct payment of agency and court fees does not support an aggregate reading. The statutory text provides for two pools of money for direct payment of fees. See §§406(a)(4), (b)(1)(A). The agency’s choice to withhold only one pool of 25% of
past

- due benefits does not alter this text. More fundamentally, the amount of past

- due benefits that the agency can withhold for direct payment does not delimit the amount of fees that can be approved for representation before the agency or the court. Pp. 7–9.

861 F. 3d 1197, reversed and remanded.

T HOMAS , J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (20 19 ) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.


## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________
No. 17

– 773

_________________ RICHARD ALLEN CULBER TSON , PETITIONER v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY

O N WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRCUIT

[ January 8, 2019 ]

J USTICE T HOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal law regulates the fees that attorneys may charge Social Security claimants for representation before the Social Security Administration and a reviewing court.
See 42 U. S. C. §§406(a)

– (b). The question in this case is whether the statutory scheme limits the aggregate
amount of fees for both stages of representation to 25% of the claimant’s past

- due benefits. Because §406(b) by its terms imposes a 25% cap on fees only for representation before a court, and §406(a) has separate caps on fees for representation before the agency, we ho ld that the statute does not impose a 25% cap on aggregate fees.

I
A
Title II of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 622, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 401 et seq

., “is an insurance pr ogram” that “ provides old

- age, survivor, and disability benefits to insured individuals irrespective of financial
need .” Bowen v. Galbreath , 485 U. S. 74, 75 (1988) . A claimant’s application for Title II benefits can result in2 CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

payments of p ast

- due benefits

— i.e. , benefits that accrue d before a favorable decision, 20 CFR §404.17 03 (2018)

— as well as ongoing monthly benefits, see 42 U. S. C. §423(a)

. A claimant who has been denied benefits “in whole or in part” by the Social Security Administration may se ek administrative review of the initial agency determination, §405(b), and may t hen seek judicial review of the result ing final agency decision, §405(g)

. As presently written, the Social Security Act “discretely” addresses attorney’s fees for the administrative and judicial

- review stages: “§406(a) governs fees for representa

tion in administrative proceedings; §406(b) controls fees for representation in court.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart , 535 U. S. 789, 794 (2002) . The original Social Security Act made no
such provision for attorney’s fees in either proceeding. Id.,

at 793 , n. 2. But in 1939, “ Congress amended the Act to permit the Social Security Board to prescribe maximum fees attorneys could charge for representation of claimants before the agency .” Ibid. In 1965, Congress add ed a new subsection (b) to §406 that explicitly prescribed fees for representation before a court and “a llow [ed] withholding of past

- due benefits to pay ” these fees directly to the a ttorney. Social Security Amendments of 1965, §332, 79 Stat. 403; Bowen

, 485 U. S., at 76. In 1968, Congress
amended subsect ion (a) to give the agency similar wit hholding authority to pay attorney’s fees incurred in admi nistrative proceedings. Id.

, at 76. Section 406(a) is titled “Recognition of representatives; fees for representation before Commissioner” of Social Security. It includes two ways to determine fees for repr esentation before the agency, depending on whether a prior fee agreement exists. If the claimant has a fee agreement, subsection (a)(2) caps fees at the lesser of 25% of past

- due
benefits or a set dollar am ount

— currently $6,000. § 406(a)(2)(A); Maximum Dollar Limit in the Fee Agre ement Process, 74 Fed. Reg. 6080 (2009). Absent a feeC ite as: 586 U. S. ____ (20 19 ) 3

Opinion of the Court

agreement, subsection (a)(1) gives the agency authority to “prescribe the maximum fees which may be charged for services performed in connection with any claim” before the agency. If the claimant obtains a favorable agency determination, the agency may allot “a reasonable fee to compensate such attorney for the services performed by
him.” Subsection (a)(4) requires the agency t o withhold up to 25% of past

- due benefits for direct payment of any fee for representation before the agency:

“[I]f the claimant is determined to be entitled to past

due benefits under this subchapter and the person representing the claimant is an attorney , the Co mmissioner of Social Security shall .

. . certify for pa yment out of such past

- due benefits .

. . to such atto rney an amount equal to so much of the maximum fee as does not exceed 25 percent of such past

- due
benefits .

. . .”

Section 406(b) is tit led “ Fees for representation before

court .” Subsection (b)(1)(A) both limits these fees to no more than 25% of past

- due benefits and allows the agency to withhold past

- due benefits to pay these fees:

“Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a
cla imant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may dete rmine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past

- due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security may .

. . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past

due benefits.”

At issue is whether § 406(b)’s 25% cap limits the aggr e-4 CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

gate fees awarded for representation before both the agency under §406(a) and the court under §406(b), or instead limits only the fee awarded for court representation under §406(b).

B
Petitioner Richard Culbertson represented claimant
Katrina Wood in proceedings seeking Social Security disability benefits. After the agency denied Wood benefits, she brought an action in district court. For the court action, Wood signed a contingency

- fee agreement “to pay a fee of 25 percen t of the total of the past

- due benefits to which [she] is entitled” in consideration for Culbertson’s “representation of [her] in Federal Court.” App. 8

– 9. The agreement excludes fees for “any representation before” the agency. Id., at 9. The District Court reversed the agency’s denial of ben efits and remanded for further proceedings. The court granted Wood attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) , which authorizes a n award against
the G overnment for reasonable fees in “civil action [s].” 28
U. S. C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(A) and (2)(A)

. On remand, the agency awarded Wood past

- due disabi lity benefits and withheld 25% of those benefits to pay any attorney’s fees that might ultimately be awarded. The agency also awarded Culbertson §406(a) fee s for repr esenting Wood before the agency. Culbertson then moved the District Court for a separate fee award under §406(b) for representing Wood there. After accounting for the EAJA award, see Gisbrecht

, s upra , at 796; App. 9, this request amounted to a full 25% of
past

- due benefits. The court granted Culbertson’s request only in part because he did not subtract the amount he had already received under §406(a) for his agency -level representation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying on Circuit preceden t to hold that “the 25% limit from §406(b)C ite as: 586 U. S. ____ (20 19 ) 5

Opinion of the Court

applies to total fees awarded under both §406(a) and (b), ‘preclud[ing] the aggregate allowance of attorney’s fees greater than twenty

- five percent of the past due benefits received by the claimant.’ ” Wood v. Commissioner of Social Security , 861 F. 3d 1197 , 1205 (2017) (quoting

Dawson v. Finch , 425 F. 2d 1192, 1195 (CA5 1970); e mphasis deleted). * Given a conflict between the Circuits on this question,

see 861 F. 3d, at 1205

– 1206, we granted certiorari. 584

U. S. ___ (2018). Because no party defends the judgment, we appointed Amy Weil to brief and argue this case as

amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. 584 U. S. ___ (2018). Amicus Weil has ably discharged her assigned responsibilities.

II
A

We “ begi[n] with the language of the statute itself, and that is also where the inquiry should end, for the statute’s language is plain.” Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal . Tax- Free
Trust , 57 9 U. S. ___

, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 9) (internal quotation marks omitted )

. Under §406(b), when a court “renders a judgment favorable to a claimant .

. . who was represented before the court by an attorney,” the court may award “a reasonable fee for such representation

, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past

- due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such jud gment .” 42 U. S. C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Both at the time of enactment and today, t he adjective “such” means “[o]f the kind or degree already described or i mplied.” H. Fowler & F. Fowler, Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 1289 (5th ed. 1964); Black’s Law Di ctionary 1661 (10th ed. 2014) (“[t]hat or those; having just

——————

* See Bonner v. Prichard , 661 F. 2d 1206, 1209 (CA11 1981) (en banc) (adopting all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit announced prior to October 1, 1 981, as binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit).6 CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

been mentioned”). Here, the only form of representation “already described” in §406(b) is “represent[ati on] before the court by an attorney.” Accordingly, the 25% cap a pplies only to fees for representation before the court, not the agency. This interpretation is supported by “the structure of the statute and its other provisions.” Maracich v. Spears , 570
U. S. 48, 60 (2013). As an initial matter, subsections (a) and (b) address different stages of the representation. Section 406(a) addresses fees for representation “before the Commissioner,” whereas §406(b) addresses fees for representation in court. Because some claimants will prevail before the agency and have no need to bring a court action, it is unsurprising that the statute conte mplates separate fees for each stage of representation. These subsections also calculate fees differently. Se ction 406 (b) applies a flat 25% cap on fees for court repr esentation. By contrast, § 406(a) provides two ways to determine fees for agency proceedings. Subsection (a)(2) caps fees based on a fee agreement at the lesser of 25% of
past

- due benefits or $6,000. Supra

, at 2. If there is no fee agreement, the agency may set any fee, including a fee greater than 25% of past

- due benefits, so long as the fee is
“reasonable.” § 406(a)(1). Given this statutory structure, applying §406(b)’s 25%
cap on court

- stage fees to §4 06(a) agency

- stage fees, or the aggregate of §§406(a) and (b) fees, would make little sense. Many claimants will never litigate in court, yet under the aggregate reading, agency fees would be capped at 25% based on a provision related exclusively to repre sentation in court. Absent a fee agreement, §406(a)(1) subjects agency fees only to a reasonableness limitation, so appl ying §406(b)’s cap to such fees would add a limitation that Congress did not include in the relevant provision of the statute. If Congress had wanted these fees to be capped at 25%, it presumably would have said so directly in subse c-C ite as: 586 U. S. ____ (20 19 ) 7

Opinion of the Court

tion (a), instead of providing for a “reasonable fee” in that subsection and adding a 25% cap in §406(b) without even referencing subsection (a). Thus, the structure of the statute confirms that §406(b) caps only court represent ation fees.

B

Amicus Amy Weil agrees that “§406(a) and §406(b) provide separate avenues for an award of attorney’s fees for representation of a Social Security claimant,” but emphasiz es that “these fees are certified for payment out of a single source: the 25% of past

- due benefits withheld by the Commissioner.” Brief for Court

- Appointed Amicus
Curiae 10. According to A micus , “[b]ecause the Commi ssioner withholds only one pool of 25% of past

- due benefits from which to pay attorney’s fees for both agency and court representation, for an attorney to collect a fee that exceeds the 25% pool of withheld disability benefits,” the attorney may “need to file a lawsuit against his disabled
clie nt” to collect the difference. Id., at 23

– 24. Therefore,

A micus urges, “[w]hen the statute is read as a whole,” “it is evident that Congress placed a cumulative 25% cap on attorney’s fees payable for successful representation of a Social Security claiman t before both the agency and the
court.” Id., at 10.
Amicus is quite right that presently the agency wit hholds a single pool of 25% of past

- due benefits for direct payment of agency and court fees. See Social Security Administration, Program Operations Manual System (POMS), GN 03920.035(A), online at https://policy.ssa.gov/ poms.nsf/lnx/0203920035 (as last visited Jan. 2, 2019); see also 20 CFR §§404.1730(a) and (b)(1)(i). And A micus sensibly argues that if there is only a single 25% pool for direct pay ment of fees, Congress might not have intended aggregate fees higher than 25%. This argument is plaus ible, but the statutory text in fact provides for two pools of8 CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL

Opinion of the Court

money for direct payment of fees. Any shortage of wit hheld benefits for direct payment of fees is thus due to agency policy. Under §406(a)(4), the agency “shall” certify for direct
payment of agency representation fees “ an amount equal
to so much of the maximum fee as does not exceed 25 percent of ” past

- due benefits. In other words, this subse ction requires that the agency withhold the approved fees for work performed in agency proceedings, up to 25% of the amount of the claimant’s past

- due benefits. But this is not the only subsection that enables the agency to wit hhold past

- due benefits for direct payment of fees. Section 406(b)(1)(A) provides that the agency “may” certify past

due benefits for direct payment of court representation fees. As the Government explains, the agency has neve rtheless “exercised its discretion .

. . to withhold a total of 25% of past

- due benefits for direct payment of the a pproved agency and court fees.” Reply Brief for Respondent 8 (emphasis added). The agency’s choice to withhold only one pool of 25% of past

- due benefits does not alter the

statu tory text, which differentiates between agency repr esentation in §406(a) and court representation in §406(b), contains separate caps on fees for each type of represent ation, and authorizes two pools of withheld benefits. More fundamentally, the amount of past

- due benefits that the agency can withhold for direct payment does not delimit the amount of fees that can be approved for repr esentation before the agency or the court. The attorney might receive a direct payment out of past

- due benefits, but that pa yment could be less than the fees to which the attorney is entitled. Indeed, prior to 1968, the statute allowed fees for agency representation but lacked a prov ision for direct payment of such fees from past

- due ben efits. See supra, at 2. And under the current §§406(a)(1) and (4), the agency can award a “reasonable fee” that exceeds the 25% of past

- due benefits it can withhold forC ite as: 586 U. S. ____ (20 19 ) 9

Opinion of the Court

direct payment. In short, despite the force of A micus ’ arguments, the statute does not bear her reading. Any concerns about a shortage of withheld benefits for direct payment and the consequences of such a shortage are best addressed to the agency, Congress, or the attorney’s good judgment.

* * *
Because the 25% cap in §406(b)(1)(A) applies only to fees for court representa tion, and not to the aggregate fees awarded under §§406(a) and (b), the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceeding s consistent with this opinion

. It is so ordered.