### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on briefs N

ovember 22, 2000 DARRICK EDWARDS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County

No. 222981 Douglas A. Meyer, Judge

No. E1999- 01204-CCA- R3-PC January 9, 2001 The petitioner, Darrick

Edwards, appeals thetrial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the petitioner was provided the effective assistance of counse l and knowingly and voluntar ily

enteredhis pleas of guilt to first degree murder, conspiracy to c ommit first degree murder, aggravated robbery, and c onspiracy to commit aggrava ted rob bery, the judg ment is affirmed.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Ju

dgment of the Trial

Court Affirmed. G ARY R. W ADE , P.J., delivered the o pinion of the court, in which J OSEPH M. T IPTON and J OE G. R ILEY , JJ., joined. Charles P. Dupree

, Chattanooga, T

ennessee, for th

e appellant, Dar

rick Edwards. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Elizabeth B. Marney , AssistantAttorney Ge

neral; and Rodney Strong, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION
On December 5, 1997, the petitioner accepted a plea offer ma de by the sta

te. Upon his entering pleas of guilt to first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, aggravated rob bery, and conspiracy

to commit aggrav

ated robbery

, the trial court im

posed sentences

as follows:

Offense Sentence (1) First degree murder Life with the po ssibility of parole (2) Conspiracy to commit first degree murder Range III, 40 years (consecut ive t o life sent ence) (3) Aggravate d robbe ry Range II I, 30 years (con secutive to life sentence but concurrentwith 40- year sentence

)-2- Offense Sentence (4) Conspira cy to comm it aggravated robbery Rang e I II, 15 years (consecutive t o life sentence but concurren t with 40- and 30- year sentences) The effective sentence imposed upon the petitioner was for a term of life imprisonment plus 40 years at Range III

(45% release eligibility). The stipulated pro

of announced by

the state at the sub

mission hearing w

as as follows: On September 25, 1996, this defendant a long with codefe

ndant, LaTo nya Townsend robbed and murdered

Sidney Pike. [The] proof would show that they

knew Mr. Pi

ke because he sold i

nsurance in their neighborhood [and] would further show tha t Mr. Edwards in particular had an insurance policy with Mr. Pike; that Mr. P ike was ca l led to an appointment at 1601 Dodds Avenue, which was the codefendant 's cousin's house; that he wa s in vited, lured inside that apartmen t; that there he was beaten and bludgeoned to death with a tire iron. Ther eafter , the codefendants moved the body from the location at 1601 Dodds Avenue to a locatio n at 800 South Watkins by putting the body in an automobile belonging to the victim and driving to that location. Proof would f urthe r show that the defendant and codefendant

took $1900 in cash from Mr. Pike; took his personal belongings;

took the weapons, murder weapons that they had utilized, andhid all th ese items i n a locatio n behind th is defendan t's brother's apartment at 2711 East Main Street. The proof would f

urther show that the defendants then made arrangements

to secure a bus tic

ket t o Enter prise, Alabama, where this defendant secured a hotel room. Before they left for Enterprise, much of the proceeds of this robbery were spent at several different stores in local areas and at a local mall he re in H ami lto n Co unt y, buying shoes and other clothing items. Upon his apprehension in Alabama, Mr. Edwards gave a complete confession to the Cha ttanooga Police Department detectives on the 29 th of September, 1996. On Sep tember 14, 1998, the p etitioner filed a peti tion for po st-convic tion relie f alleging, among other things,

that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty

pleas were not kn

owingly andvoluntarily entered. The petitioner claimed that his trial counsel failed to ad equat ely-3-

communicate

during the course of his representation and ultimately "manipulated" his acceptance of the plea agre

ement. In par

ti c ular, the petitioner contended that his family members were influenced

by trial counsel to recommend acceptance of the plea offer in order to avoid a

possible death penalty. He

also complained th

at his trial counse

l had failed to ade

quate ly investi

gate the charges and had failed to secure the presence of alibi witnesses. At the evidentiary hearing

on the petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner, 19 years of age at the time of his plea, testified that he had only a ninth g

rade education

, could only p

artially read and write, and did

not fully understand the ramifications of his guilty plea. He claimed that he believed that he had received concurrent sentences of 45 y ears, 30 years,

and 15 years with a 45% release eligibility. He asserted that it was not until he was in prison that he learned that he also had a sen tence of life with the possibility of parole. The petitioner explained that he could s erve hi s sentences in 20 to 30 yea rs under the ag

reement as he or

iginally u nderstood it, but that under the actual agreement, it would take as many as 74 y ears to complete his term. On cross-examination, the petitioner acknowledged that he had signed a waiver of rights and confessed to the crimes. He agreed

that the content

of his confession to the police was truthful. The peti tionertestified that he was aware that there was a possibility that the state might file notice of an intention to seek the death penalty. While he recalled having met with his trial counsel "several times" throughout the course of his represen tation, he con ceded that h e had n o alib i defe nse. In response to questioning by the assistant district att orn ey g eneral, the petitioner further testified as follows: Q. So actually, [trial counsel] was able to get the Sta te to reduce their discussion of

the death penalty and

actually a llow you to pleadto a sentence to where you might

get parole rather than life without parol

e, is that correc

t? A. Yes, sir. Q. So obviously [tria l counsel] did a very good job for you keeping you out of the electric chair to begin with, is that righ t? A. Yes, sir. Q. And keeping you out of prison for the rest of

your life on life witho ut par ole, i sn't that c orre ct? A. Yes, sir. Q. So [trial counsel] obviously did a very good job

for you, didn't he?-4- A. Yes, sir. Q. And, in fact, before you entered y our plea, he did go ov

er with you what the plea ag

reement was go

ing tobe, is that correct? Did he come talk to y

ou, say, This

is what the state is offering you, take a life sentence plus 40 years as y our sentence? Did he no t come talk t o yo u abo ut tha t? A. Yes, sir. Q. So you underst

ood that that was wh

at t he plea wa s going to be, is that corre

ct? A. Not really. Further, the petitioner acknowledged that he had two weeks to think about the plea offer and that he discussed the proposal with members of his family befo

re announcing h

is consent. He stated that he accepted the plea agreement becau se his mother "told [ him] go ahead and take it. " Trial counsel, who had extensive experience in the criminalpractice, was a witness for the state. He recalled having discussions with the petitioner on the possible defenses, one contesting the admissibility

of the confession and th

e other offerin

g proof of diminis

hed capacity

or responsibility due to the influence of drugs or alcohol. Trial counsel testified that he had calculated a life sentence at 51 years and fully advised t he peti tioner of that as well as the other sentences that had been proposed. He stated that he had worked to prevent the fi ling of a death penalty notice and had prepared a document

that the petitioner ultimately approved, which indicated the actual length of the proposedsentence. He specifically recalled informing the petitioner that

he could be "92 to 94 years of age" if he survived lon g enough to be r eleased from pr

ison. Trial counse

l stated that, in his opin ion, the petitioner had entered knowing and voluntary pleas. He testified tha t the pe titione r discussedthe plea agre

ement with his

mother before indicating his final approval and entering the pleas of guilt. The proof also established that just prior to his gu

ilty pleas in

this state, the petitioner hadpled guilty to robbery and breaking and entering

for crimes that he

had committed in Ala

bama shortly after the murder. The transcript of the

submission hearing

also established th

at the petitioner had been counseled by

his attorney

before enterin

g his pleas: So I've explained to him, Judge, that though the state is allowing him to plead to a life wit

h possibility of

parole, that for

all intents and purposes . . . this young man will serve the rest of his life in th

e state penitentiary for this offense.-5-

The transcript also demonstrated that the trial judge, who accepted the guilty pleas, explained to the petitioner that life with the possibility of parole was tantamount to 60 years at 85% release e

ligibility or a total of 51 years and

that a sentence of 40 years with a 45% service re quirement added an additional 18 years. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In an accompanying

memorandum, the court concluded that trial counsel had adequately communicated withthe petitioner and that there were n o al ibi witnesses for trial counsel to have interviewed or summoned to trial. The cour t also determined t

hat trial counsel h

ad not pressured

the petitioner to enter the pleas and that they were knowingly and voluntarily entered. Under the terms of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a petitioner bears the burden of proving the allegations by clear and convincing ev idence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f). The credibility

of the witnesses and the weight and value af for ded to their testimo

ny are app

ropriately a ddressed in the trial court. Bates v. State , 973 S.W.2d 615, 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). On appea l, the burden i s on the pet itioner to establish that the ev idence prepo nderated aga inst th e findings of

the trial judge. Clenny v. Stat e , 576 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). Otherwise, the findings of fact by the trial court are conclusive. Graves v. State, 512 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973). In Boyk in v. Alabama

, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the United States Supreme Court ruled tha t defendants

should be advised of certain of their constitutional rights before e ntering pleas of

guilt. Included among those required warnings are the right against self-incrimination, the rig ht to confront witnesses, and the right to a trial by jury. Id. at 243. The o verriding Boykin requirement is that the guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. at 242. I f the proof establishes that the petitioner was aware of his

constitutional rig

hts, he is entit

led to no relief

. Johnson v. State , 834 S.W.2 d 922, 926 (Tenn. 1992). "[A] plea is not 'voluntary' if it is the product of '[i]gnoran ce , incomprehension, coercion, terr or, inducements, [o

r] subtle or blatant

threats .

. . .'" Blankenship v. State , 858 S.W. 2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993 ) (quoting Boykin , 395 U.S. at 242-43). In order fo r the pet itioner to be gra nted relief on g

rounds of ineffe

ctive counsel, he

must establish that the advice given or the services rendered were not within the range of competence demanded

of attorney

s in criminal case

s and that, but for h

is counsel's defic ient performance, the result of his trial would

have been

different. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Baxter v. Rose , 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). This two-part stan

dard, as it applie

s to guilty pleas, is met when th e petition er establis hes that, b ut for his c ounsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on a trial. Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). A review of this record establishes that the petitioner clearly received the effective a ssistance of counsel. On cross-examinat ion by the sta

te, the petitioner

actually complimented his lawyer for the quality of th

e services p

rovided . Moreover, the proof was overwhelming that the petitioner entered knowing and voluntary pleas of guilt, fully aware of

his various altern

atives. This court

fully-6-

concurs with the detailed memorandum entered by the post-conviction court oneach of the issues presented. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE