This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1668

Ogbonna Iwu,

Relator,

vs.

Minneapolis City Council,

Respondent

Filed June 8, 2015

Affirmed

Reyes, Judge

Minneapolis City Council

Ogbonna Iwu, Eagan, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Susan L. Segal, Minneapolis City Attorney, Lee C. Wolf, Assistant City Attorney, 

Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and 

Bjorkman, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

REYES, Judge

In this certiorari appeal, pro se relator challenges respondent-city’s revocation of 

his rental license, arguing that he was not given adequate notice of the revocation action. 

We affirm.
2

FACTS

Relator Ogbonna Iwu is the owner of property located at 1626 Dupont Avenue 

North in Minneapolis. When he was awarded a rental-dwelling license for this property, 

Iwu listed himself as both the property owner and the person responsible for maintenance 

and management. Iwu also provided a contact address located in Eagan. 

On July 6, 2012, housing inspector Harold Middleton conducted an inspection at 

the property and noted a number of violations of the Minneapolis Code of Ordinances. 

To remedy these violations, Middleton ordered Iwu to: (1) install storm windows on all 

single-glazed exterior window units; (2) repair the deteriorating roof overhang; 

(3) service the property’s heating system; (4) repair all broken glass in the storm and 

primary windows; and (5) provide a screen door for one of the units. These orders were 

mailed to Iwu, and he was given until August 5, 2012, to comply. 

On December 6, 2012, Middleton conducted a second inspection at the property 

and determined that Iwu had not complied with the previous written orders. Middleton 

issued an administrative citation of $250. The citation payment came due on December 

31, 2012, and Iwu failed to pay it. On January 8, 2013, Middleton issued a warning 

notice which gave Iwu until February 7 to comply with the orders. 

On April 8, Middleton conducted a third inspection of the property, determined 

that the property was still not in compliance with the orders, and issued another

administrative citation in the amount of $500. The citation payment came due on May 4,

and Iwu failed to pay it. 
3

On June 4, Middleton conducted a fourth inspection of the property, determined 

that the property was not in compliance with the orders, and issued an administrative 

citation in the amount of $1,000. The citation payment came due on July 6, and Iwu 

failed to pay it. On July 18, Middleton issued a final warning notice which gave Iwu 

until August 8 to comply with the orders. 

On October 22, Middleton conducted a fifth inspection of the property, determined 

that the orders had not been complied with and issued another administrative citation in 

the amount of $2,000. The citation payment came due on November 16, and Iwu failed 

to pay yet again. All five separate orders were mailed to Iwu at the address he provided 

in his rental-license application. 

After a review of the Housing Inspections Division’s records revealed that Iwu 

neither paid nor appealed any of the administrative citations, a Notice of Director’s 

Determination of Noncompliance was sent to Iwu on February 7, 2014. The notice 

informed Iwu that his property was in violation of Minneapolis, Minn., Code of 

Ordinances (MCO) § 244.1910 (11)(a) (2014) due to delinquent assessments for 

administrative citations. Iwu was given an additional ten days to pay the citations. 

Iwu failed to pay the citations, and on March 31, 2014, a Notice of Revocation of 

Rental License or Provisional License (Notice of Revocation) was sent to Iwu at his 

home address and was also posted at the property. The Notice of Revocation informed 

Iwu that his property remained in violation of MCO § 244.1910 due to the delinquent 

citations. The notice also stated that if Iwu did not appeal within 15 days, the city could 

take action to revoke his license. Iwu did not appeal within the 15-day period. 
4

On July 22, 2014, the Housing Inspections Division made a recommendation to 

the Community Development & Regulatory Services Committee (Committee) to revoke 

Iwu’s rental license based on the unpaid citations. Iwu was not present for the hearing 

and, pursuant to MCO § 244.1960(e), the Committee heard no new evidence. The 

Committee voted to recommend revoking Iwu’s license and forwarded its 

recommendation to the Minneapolis City Council. On August 1, 2014, the city adopted 

the Committee’s recommendation to revoke Iwu’s rental license. By certiorari, Iwu 

appeals. 

D E C I S I O N

A writ of certiorari is the appropriate mechanism for seeking review of a 

municipality’s quasi-judicial decision. In re Khan, 804 N.W.2d 132, 136 (Minn. App. 

2011). A municipality’s decision is quasi-judicial when “it is the product or result of 

discretionary investigation, consideration, and evaluation of evidentiary facts.” Staeheli 

v. City of St. Paul, 732 N.W.2d 298, 303 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted). A city’s 

revocation of a rental license is considered a quasi-judicial decision subject to certiorari 

review. Khan, 804 N.W.2d at 136. On certiorari review, this court “will uphold the 

decision if the lower tribunal furnished any legal and substantial basis for the action 

taken.” Staeheli, 732 N.W.2d at 303 (quotation omitted). 
5

Iwu argues that his procedural due-process rights were violated because the city 

failed to properly notify him of the revocation action.1 “[T]he due process protections 

granted under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions are identical,” Fosselman v. 

Comm’r of Human Servs., 612 N.W.2d 456, 461 (Minn. App. 2000), and “[t]his court 

reviews the procedural due process afforded a party de novo.” Staeheli, 732 N.W.2d at 

304. To determine whether a city has violated a person’s right to procedural due process, 

we conduct a two-step analysis. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 

(Minn. 2012). “First, we must identify whether the government deprived the individual of 

a protected life, liberty, or property interest.” Id. Second, if such a deprivation has 

occurred, we “determine ‘whether the procedures followed by the [government] were

constitutionally sufficient.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 

U.S. 216, 219, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861 (2011)).

The city concedes that Iwu was deprived of a constitutionally protected property 

right. Accordingly, our discussion focuses on Sawh’s second step, which analyzes the 

sufficiency of the procedures followed by the city. Id. These procedures “must provide 

an individual with notice and an ‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner.’” Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 

893, 902 (1976)).

 

1

In response, the city contends that Iwu’s entire argument should be deemed waived for 

failing to provide proper legal citation or analysis. We reject this contention because 

Iwu’s brief does contain references to the relevant city ordinances. Moreover, we note 

that Iwu is pro se, entitling him to “some leeway in attempting to comply with court 

rules,” and conclude that he has satisfied his “burden of . . . adequately communicating to 

the court what it is he wants accomplished and by whom.” Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 

400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987).
6

Iwu’s revocation was based upon MCO § 244.1910, which states in relevant part: 

The following minimum standards and conditions shall be 

met in order to hold a rental dwelling license under this 

article. Failure to comply with any of these standards and 

conditions shall be adequate grounds for 

the . . . revocation . . . of a rental dwelling license . . . .

There shall be no delinquent property taxes or 

assessments on the rental dwelling, nor shall any licensee be 

delinquent on any financial obligations owing to the city . . . .

Also relevant is MCO § 244.1940(a), which describes the proper procedure for revoking 

a rental license. 

Iwu argues that his procedural due-process rights were violated because he was 

not provided adequate notice that the city was considering revoking his license. Iwu 

contends that if the city had posted a notice on the property on March 31, 2014, rather 

than August 18, 2014, his tenants would have informed him of the revocation action, and 

he would have participated in the subsequent hearings. We disagree for two reasons.

First, Iwu’s argument is based on an incorrect factual assertion. Contrary to his

assertions, the record reveals that the city did post a notice on the property on April 2, 

2014. The notice clearly stated that Iwu’s rental license was being revoked due to unpaid 

assessment citations and gave Iwu until April 23 to appeal the decision. The posting was 

also accompanied by a Notice of Revocation, which was sent to Iwu’s listed address in 

Eagan and further informed him of the delinquent payments. 

Second, Iwu’s argument misconstrues the city’s notice requirements. Iwu 

complains that the city’s compliance director “did not use all options available to notify 

[him] and [his] tenants during the process of revocation.” But this is not the standard. 
7

Instead, “[t]he procedures afforded by the government must provide an individual with 

notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 

Sawh, 823 N.W.2d at 632 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). Moreover, the supreme 

court has recognized that where, as here, a municipality acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, 

those proceedings “do not invoke the full panoply of procedures required in regular 

judicial proceedings.” Barton Contracting Co., Inc. v. City of Afton, 268 N.W.2d 712, 

716 (Minn. 1978). “Due process requires only that the method of notice . . . be 

reasonably calculated to reach the intended party.” State v. Green, 351 N.W.2d 42, 43-44 

(Minn. App. 1984). 

Here, the city mailed inspection reports to Iwu on six different occasions, all of 

which detailed the specific ordinance violations, the corresponding administrative 

citations, and the process for appealing the city’s determinations. In addition, the city 

mailed Iwu two official warnings of the violations, both containing details regarding the 

violations and appeals process, and posted the Notice of Revocation at Iwu’s rental 

property. The city also mailed Iwu a Notice of Director’s Determination of 

Noncompliance and a Notice of Revocation, the latter of which satisfied all the 

requirements of MCO § 244.1940(a).

2

 Lastly, the city mailed Iwu a letter dated July 11, 

2014, informing him of the hearing before the Committee and stating that he would be 

 

2

The notice (1) stated that the property was in violation of MCO § 244.1910 (11)(a); 

(2) specified the reasons for the violation and attached the reports; (3) informed Iwu that 

the matter would be passed on to the city; (4) stated that Iwu could appeal the matter 

within 15 days; (5) stated that after revocation, the dwelling must be vacated; (6) attached 

a copy of the appropriate appeals procedure; and (7) posted a notice on the building itself 

for the purpose of notifying the tenants. See MCO § 244.1960. 
8

given the opportunity to speak should he attend. Despite these correspondences, Iwu 

never attempted to appeal the city’s determinations and failed to attend the hearing before 

the Committee. Moreover, Iwu’s argument that he failed to do so because he never 

received any of the mailed items is unavailing because this court has held that “[m]ail is 

an efficient and effective means of communication” and “[a]ctual receipt of the notice is 

not required to meet the due process requirement.” Id. at 44. This is particularly true 

considering the city used the home address provided by Iwu himself on his rental-license 

application. See id. (“The record discloses the department complied with the due process 

notice requirement by mailing a true copy of the notice to appellant’s last known 

address.”). Because the city provided Iwu with reasonable notice and a reasonable 

opportunity to be heard, the revocation action does not infringe upon Iwu’s procedural 

due-process rights. 

Affirmed.