alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### STATE v. HENRY MOSLEY.

(Filed 5 January, 1938.)

Criminal Law § 77e: Homicide § 28 — Case remanded for correction of record to show proper verdict of jury in this homicide prosecution.

The record disclosed that the jury, in this homicide prosecution, returned a verdict simply of “guilty,” and in settling the case on appeal the trial court found that the clerk inadvertently failed to record the question by the court, “Guilty of what?” and the answer by the jury, “Guilty of murder in the first degree.” It did not appear that the judge’s findings were made in open court and in the presence of the defendant, or that the record was corrected to speak the truth. *Held,:*The case is remanded on motion of the State for a correction of the record.

Appeal by defendant from *Ear ding, J.,*at May Term, 1937, of Forsyth.

Criminal prosecution tried upon indictment charging the defendant with the murder of Clarence Black.

Verdict: Guilty.

Judgment: Death by asphyxiation.

*Attorney-General Seawell and Assistant Attorney-General McMullan for the State.*

*Phin Eorton, Jr., John 0. Wallace, and Richmond Rucker for defendant, appellant.*

*767'WiNBORNE, J.

Tbe record on appeal discloses tbat-tbe verdict as recorded is simply “Guilty.” However, in settling tbe ease on appeal, tbe judge below finds as facts tbat when tbe jury announced its verdict of guilty tbe court said to tbe jury, “Guilty of what?” Tbat tbe jurors answered for tbeir verdict: “Guilty of murder in tbe first degree,” and tbat tbe clerk in writing tbe minutes inadvertently left out tbe said question and answer. Nevertheless it does not appear tbat tbe said findings of fact were made in open court, tbat tbe defendant was present in person, or tbat the records have been corrected to speak tbe truth.

Motion of tbe State to remand tbe cause for correction of tbe record will be allowed in accordance with *S. v. Brown,*203 N. C., 513, 166 S. E., 396.

Remanded.
# Supreme Court of Florida

____________ No. SC18

- 1531

____________ MARK C. JACKSON, Petitioner,

vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, et al ., Respondent s . June 13, 2019
PER CURIAM. Mark C. Jackson

— a pro se litigant

— filed a petition to invoke this Court’s discretion ary jurisdiction

. By order dated April 11 , 2019, we denied Jackson’s petition but expressly reserved jurisdiction to pursue possible sanctions against
him

. Jackson v. Sta te , No. SC18

- 1531 , 2019 WL 1575238 (Fla. Apr

. 11, 2019) ;

see Fla. R. App. P. 9.410(a) (Sanctions; Court’s Motion). While his case was pending in this Court , Jackson filed a litany of motions that were frivolous, devoid of merit, or sought relief previously denied in case numbers SC12

- 367 and SC17

- 1628

. Because of his filing history , Jackson was ordered to show cause why he should not be prohibited from submitting fu rther pro- 2

- se documents in this Court

. See State v. Spencer , 751 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fl a. 1999) ( requiring that a litigant be provide d notice and an opportunity to respond before sanctions are imposed ). Jackson has now filed a response to the Court’s order

. We conclude that Jackson has failed to show cause why he should not be sanctioned

. Through his persistent filing of nonmeritorious requests for relief, Jackson has abused the judicial process. Jackson’s response neglected to provide any justification for this abuse or to express remorse for his repeated misuse of th e Court’s resources

. We are therefore convinced that , if not restrained , Jackson will continue to burden this Court with frivolous and meritless filings , diverting finite judicial resources from other litigants

. See Pettway v. McNeil , 987 So. 2d 20, 22 (Fla. 2008). Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to reject any future pleadings , petitions, motions, documents, letters, or other requests for relief submitted by Mark C. Jackson , unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Fl orida Bar. 1 Counsel may file on Jackson ’s behalf if counsel determines that the proceeding may have merit and can be brought in good faith.

1

. In recent years, we have imposed comparable sanctions on other pro se litigants who have exhibited their disregard for abusing the scarce judicial resources of this Court. See, e.g. , Wetzel v. Travelers Cos

. , Inc

. , 267 So. 3d 978 (Fla. 2019); Shirah v. State , 257 So. 3d 23 (Fla. 2018); Woodson v. State , 242 So. 3d 315 (Fla. 2018); Rivas v. Bank of N

. Y

. Mellon , 239 So. 3d 614 (Fla. 2018).- 3

- No motion for rehearing or clarification will be entertained by the Court. It is so order ed. CANADY, C.J., and POLS TON, LABARGA, LAWSON, LAGOA, LUCK, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur. Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal

– Constitutional Construction First District

- Case No. 1D18

- 242 ( Bradford County) Mark C. Jackson, pro se, St a rke, Fl orida, for Petitioner No appearance for Respondent
EXHIBIT 23

CONSENT OF CROWE, CHIZEK AND COMPANY LLP



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the
prospectuses constituting part of the registration statements on
Form S-3 for the CSB Bancorp, Inc. Share Owner Dividend Reinvestment
Plan and on Form S-8 for The Commercial & Savings Bank of
Millersburg Profit Sharing and 401(k) Savings Retirement Plan and
Trust of our report dated January 10, 1997 on the consolidated
balance sheets of CSB Bancorp, Inc. as of December 31, 1996 and 1995
and the related consolidated statements of income, changes in
shareholders' equity and cash flows for each of the three years in
the period ended December 31, 1996, which report is incorporated by
reference in this Form 10-K.

/S/ Crowe, Chizek and Company LLP

Crowe, Chizek and Company LLP

Columbus, Ohio
March 25, 1997
### Proposed Provision: H6. Eliminate federal income taxation of OASDI benefits that is credited to the OASI and DI Trust Funds for 2054 and later. Phase out OASDI taxation of benefits by increasing relevant "income" thresholds from 2045 through 2053 as follows, for single/joint tax filers:  (a) 2045 = $32,500/$65,000; (b) 2046 = $40,000/$80,000; (c) 2047 = $47,500/$95,000; (d) 2048 = $55,000/$110,000; (e) 2049 = $62,500/$125,000; (f) 2050 = $70,000/$140,000; (g) 2051 = $77,500/$155,000; (h) 2052 = $85,000/$170,000; and (i) 2053 = $92,500/$185,000.  Taxation of benefits revenues for the Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund would be maintained at the same level as if the current-law computation applied.
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## Disability Insurance Trust Fund

Office of the Chief Actuary 

Beneficiary data

Trust fund data

Old-Age & Survivors Insurance Trust Fund

     The *Disability Insurance Trust Fund* is a     separate account in the United States Treasury.  A fixed proportion      (dependent on the allocation of tax rates by      trust fund) of the payroll taxes     received under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and      the Self-Employment Contributions Act are deposited in the fund     to the extent that such taxes are not needed immediately to pay     expenses.  Taxes are deposited in the fund     on every business day. 

     The trust fund provides automatic spending authority to pay monthly     benefits to disabled-worker beneficiaries and their spouses and children.     With such spending authority, the Social Security Administration does not need     to periodically request money from the Congress to pay benefits.

     Funds not withdrawn for current cost      (benefits, the financial interchange with the Railroad Retirement     program, and administrative expenses) are      invested in interest-bearing     Federal securities, as required by law; the interest earned      is also deposited in the trust fund.

     The Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund was created with passage of      the Social Security Act Amendments of 1956.     DI became effective on January 1, 1957.      

     The Board of Trustees currently consists     of 6 members, 4 of whom automatically serve by virtue of their positions     in the Federal Government. These 4 are the     -  Secretary of the Treasury (the Managing Trustee),
-  Secretary of Labor,
-  Secretary of Health and Human Services, and
-  Commissioner of Social Security
     The other 2 members are appointed by the President, and confirmed by the Senate,      as required by the "Social Security Amendments of 1983."      These 2 members serve 4-year terms.    

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#### Ezekiel Y. Bell, Respondent, v. Edward L. Merrifield, Appellant

—Judgmentmodified as directed in opinion, and affirmed as modified, without costs to either party. Opinion by

Davis, P. J.
EXHIBIT 32.1
                           SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO\
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the quarterly report of Online Vacation Center
Holdings Corp (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30,
2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Edward B. Rudner, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



Date:  November 13, 2006

/s/ Edward B. Rudner
--------------------
Edward B. Rudner
Chief Executive Officer
directorfeeschedule.htm




Exhibit 10.4









Director Compensation

Committee Approved February 17, 2009

Board Approved February 17, 2009

Effective May 1, 2009





Board of Director Retainer:

Outside directors to receive an annual retainer of $32,200 to be paid in a combination of cash and restricted stock.





Cash:  A monthly cash payment of $2,100 ($25,200 annually) to be paid at the beginning of the month following the month of service.  Directors may miss a maximum of two scheduled board meetings without penalty.





Restricted Stock:  Annually, subject to full board approval, timing and vesting qualifications, outside directors will receive an equity award (restricted stock) with an economic value of $7,000.





Special Service Retainer

Special quarterly service retainers are paid the month following the end of the quarter for the following service





Board Chair          $2,800

Audit Chair           $2,500

Compensation Chair              $1,500

Governance/Nominating Chair    $1,500

ALCO Chair          $1,500

Executive committee members     $1,500

(Eligible if non-employee and not receiving Chair

Retainer)





Committee Meetings

In addition to the annual retainer, attendance at committee meetings entitles outside directors to additional compensation in the amount of $200 for attendance at scheduled “in-person” committee meetings and $100 for telephone meetings.





Telephone Board Meetings

Occasionally it is necessary to call a telephone meeting of the board of directors.  Directors attending these meetings are entitled to $100.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of E Com Ventures, Inc. (the Company) of Form 10-K for the year
ended February 3, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Donovan Chin, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



By:

/s/ Donovan ChinDonovan ChinChief Financial OfficerMay 4, 2007
| 2001 OASDI Trustees Report |  |  |  |  |
|----------------------------|--|--|--|--|
|                            |

 

### List of Figures

## II. OVERVIEW

II.D1 Short-Range OASDI Trust Fund Ratios
-   II.D2 Long-Range OASDI Annual Income Rate and Cost Rates    II.D3 Number of Covered Workers Per OASDI Beneficiary
  -   II.D4 Long-Range OASDI Trust Fund Ratios      II.D5 OASDI Cost as a Percentage of GDP
    IV. ACTUARIAL ESTIMATES
    -   IV.A1 Short-Range OASI and DI Trust Fund Ratios    IV.B1 Long-Range OASI and DI Annual Income Rates and Cost Rates
  -   IV.B2 Number of OASDI Beneficiaries Per 100 Covered Workers      IV.B3 Long-Range OASI and DI Trust Fund Ratios
    -   IV.B4 Long-Range Test of Close Actuarial Balance   V. ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODS UNDERLYING ACTUARIAL ESTIMATES        V.C1 Primary-Insurance-Amount Formula for the 2001 Cohort
-   V.C2 Maximum-Family-Benefit Formula for the 2001 Cohort    V.C3 DI Disabled Worker Incidence Rates, 1970-2010
  VI. APPENDICES
  -   VI.E1 Estimated OASDI Income and Outgo in Constant Dollars, Based on Alternative II     Privacy Policy        | Website Policies & Other Important Information        | Site Map        | Actuarial Publications3/19/2001
#### WILLIAM M. PIATT v. TOWN OF HILLSBORO.

(Filed 5 January, 1938.)

Appeal by plaintiff from *Parker, J.,*at June Term, 1937, of OraNge.

Civil action for breach of contract.

Plaintiff alleges that in 1926 he was engaged by the town of Hillsboro to design and supervise the construction of a proposed municipal waterworks and sewerage system, his compensation to be 6% of the cost; $300 to be due and payable upon completion of preliminary surveys, and balance as the work progressed. Plaintiff further alleges that he was paid the first item of $300, and nothing more; that other engineers have been engaged to complete the work for which he was employed, and that the estimated balance due under his contract is $7,688.48.

*836Defendant denies tbat plaintiff bolds any valid contract sucb as be alleges; admits tbat be was paid $300 for a preliminary survey in 1926, and avers tbat tbe project was tben abandoned as too expensive.

Later, in 1935, under different circumstances and witb tbe aid of tbe Public Works Administration, tbe defendant again proposed to install a municipal waterworks and sewerage system. Plaintiff was not awarded tbe engineering contract for tbis new project; whereupon be sues upon an alleged contract made witb him in 1926.

Tbe validity of plaintiff’s contract being denied, an issue as to its due execution and existence was submitted to tbe jury and answered in favor of tbe defendant. From judgment thereon, plaintiff appeals, assigning errors.

*J. L. Morehead and Graham & Eshridge for plaintiff, appellant.*

*Bonner D. Sawyer for defendant, appellee.*

Pee Curiam.

Plaintiff seeks to recover upon tbe principle announced in *White Co. v. Hickory,*195 N. C., 42, 141 S. E., 494. But as tbe jury has found tbat be bolds no valid contract witb tbe defendant, bis action fails. *Realty Co. v. Charlotte,*198 N. C., 564, 152 S. E., 686. Tbis ends tbe matter, even though tbe issues submitted, over objection, may not meet witb entire approval.

Tbe result'will not be disturbed.

No error.
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EXHIBIT B

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 4033-2 Filed: 09/30/19 Entered: 09/30/19 12:11:10 Page 1

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COMPENSATION BY PROJECT FOR SERVICES RENDERED 

BY BERMAN AND TODDERUD LLP FOR THE PERIOD 

AUGUST 1, 2019 THROUGH AUGUST 31, 2019

Description Hours Amount

2000-2001 Energy Crisis FERC Litigation 76.80 $64,112.40

Case: 19-30088 Doc# 4033-2 Filed: 09/30/19 Entered: 09/30/19 12:11:10 Page 2

of 2
KFS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0510

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

ALAN EDWIN ERICKSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

GRANT OF EXTENSION

Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30-day extension of time, 

and good cause appearing therefor, Appellee is granted an extension of time to 

and including November 6, 2023, within which to prepare, serve, and file its 

response brief.

Electronically signed by:

Bowen Greenwood

Clerk of the Supreme Court

September 27 2023

09/27/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0510
ACCEPTED

12-14-00363-CR

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

9/11/2015 5:03:10 PM

Pam Estes

CLERK

 FILED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 9/11/2015 5:03:10 PM PAM ESTES Clerk
#### STATE v. FLONNIE WALDEN THOMAS.

(Filed 9 November, 1955.)

Homicide § 25—

Evidence in tins case *held,*sufficient to support conviction of defendant for manslaughter.

Appeal by defendant from *Fountain, Special Judge,*at July Criminal Term, 1955, of Waee.

Criminal prosecution tried upon a bill of indictment charging the defendant with the murder of her husband, Lattie Thomas.

There was a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. From judgment imposing penal servitude of not less than three nor more than five years, the defendant appeals.

*Attorney-General Rodman and Assistant Attorney-General Bruton for the State.*

*Thomas W. Ruffin for defendant, appellant.*

Per Curiam.

The only exceptions brought forward challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to carry the case to the jury over the defendant’s motions for judgment as of nonsuit. The exceptions are untenable. The evidence discloses that the deceased came to his death as a result of a pistol wound inflicted by the defendant under circumstances justifying the inference that the defendant was guilty of manslaughter. The jury rejected her contention that the killing was accidental. The verdict is amply sustained by the evidence, and the judgment is supported by the verdict.

No error.
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-30106

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SEAN O. WATSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Louisiana

(CR-90-175-M)

Janury 20, 1998

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, DUHÉ and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Convicted by a jury of distributing cocaine base and using and carrying a

firearm during and in relation to a drug offense, Sean O. Watson appeals the trial

court’s denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct
1

 116 S.Ct. 501 (1995).

2

his sentence. Watson contends that the facts of his offense do not support his

conviction for “using” a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) in light of the

Supreme Court’sintervening decision in Bailey v. United States,

1

and that the jury

was not instructed properly on the elements necessary to support a conviction for

carrying a firearm.

Our review of the record persuades beyond peradventure that the jury was

instructed adequately on the elements of “carrying” a firearm and that the evidence

abundantly supports Watson’s conviction for that offense. Watson drove an auto

containing crack cocaine with a large pistol protruding from beneath the driver’s

seat. Watson admitted to ownership of the cocaine and the pistol which he said he

carried for protection from robbery. Because of this finding and conclusion we

need not determine whether Watson has raised a constitutional argument

cognizable on section 2255 review.

The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.
#### NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR the ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, Lansing Branch, Cynthia Taylor, Judith Taylor and Andrea Taylor, by their father and Next Friend, James R. Taylor, Melinda Lea Hedley, Christine Michele Hedley, Douglas John Hedley and Daniel Joseph Hedley, by their mother and Next Friend, Joan L. Hedley, Peter Miller and Elizabeth Miller, by their father and Next Friend, Charles Miller, Frank J. Pennoni and James Pennoni, by their mother and Next Friend, Kathaleen Pennoni, and David Kron and Lisa Kron, by their father and Next Friend, Walter V. Kron, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. LANSING BOARD OF EDUCATION, a body corporate, and Members of the Lansing Board of Education, viz., Vernon D. Ebersole, Clare D. Harrington, Michael F. Walsh, Ray A. Hannula, Joan Hess, J. C. Williams, Bruce Angell, Joseph E. Hobrla and Max D. Shunk, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 76-2005.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Feb. 8, 1978.

Fred C. Newman, Newman & Mackay, Lansing, Mich., for defendants-appellants.

John W. Davis, Lansing, Mich., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before CELEBREZZE, PECK and LIVELY, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

This is an appeal from the district court’s desegregation order for the Lansing, Michigan, elementary schools. This court earlier upheld the district court’s finding of liability for intentional segregation in *NAACP v. Lansing Board of Education,*559 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir.), *cert. den.*434 U.S. 997, 98 S.Ct. 635, 54 L.Ed.2d 491 (1977). This appeal was submitted to the Court on the briefs and oral arguments of counsel, and the Court has studied the record and is fully advised in the premises.

The Court is of the opinion that the scope of the district court’s remedy was not overly broad. The record discloses that the remedy is tailored to undo the violations of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights found by the district court. While the district court did not specifically make findings on the “incremental segregative effect” of these violations, we conclude that the remedy imposed was only “designed to redress” the effect of the violations found. *Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,*433 U.S. 406, 420, 97 S.Ct. 2766, 53 L.Ed.2d 851 (1977). The district court did not err in including first and second grade children in the desegregation remedy. Nor did the remedy violate the *116Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974. *Brinkman v. Gilligan,*518 F.2d 853, 856 (6th Cir. 1975).

It is ORDERED that the judgment of the district court be, and it hereby is, affirmed.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-60,939-04

EX PARTE KENNY GONZALEZ, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 753382-A IN THE 228 DISTRICT COURT TH

FROM HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of capital murder

and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. 

Gonzales v. State, No. 14-98-00128-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [14 Dist.] Sept. 14, 1999)(not th

designated for publication). 

On April 13, 2018, this Court remanded this application to the trial court for findings of fact

and conclusions of law. On September 24, 2018, the trial court signed findings of fact and
conclusions of law recommending denying relief on Applicant’s ineffective assistance of counsel

grounds. The trial court recommended that relief be denied.

Based on the trial court’s findings of fact as well as this Court’s independent review of the

entire record, we deny relief.

Filed: December 5, 2018

Do not publish