Docket Nos. 98649, 98668 cons. 

IN THE 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

COLLINSVILLE COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 

10 et al., Appellants, v. THE REGIONAL BOARD OF SCHOOL 

TRUSTEES OF ST. CLAIR COUNTY et al., Appellees. 

Opinion filed January 20, 2006.

CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion. 

Justices Freeman, McMorrow, and Karmeier concurred in the 

judgment and opinion. 

Justice Garman concurred in part and dissented in part, with 

opinion. 

Justice Fitzgerald dissented, with opinion. 

Justice Kilbride also dissented, with opinion. 

OPINION

This appeal involves the joinder requirements of the 

Administrative Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3B101 et 

seq. (West 2000)). At issue is whether the circuit court erred in 

allowing the plaintiff in an administrative review action additional 

time to amend its complaint to join, as defendants, the petitioners in 

the underlying administrative proceeding. The appellate court held 

that the circuit court erred in allowing amendment of the complaint 

and dismissed the cause of action. 348 Ill. App. 3d 685. For the 
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reasons discussed below, we reverse the judgment of the appellate 

court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

 BACKGROUND 

On October 25, 2000, a group of Fairmont City residents filed a 

APetition for Detachment and Annexation@ with the St. Clair County 

Regional Board of School Trustees (Board). The petition sought to 

detach a section of Fairmont City from East St. Louis School District 

No. 189 (East St. Louis) and annex it to Collinsville Community Unit 

School District No. 10 (Collinsville). The petition was signed by over 

400 individuals, representing more than two-thirds of the registered 

voters in the area proposed to be detached. In accordance with section 

7B6 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/7B6 (West 2000)), 10 of the 

petitioners were designated the ACommittee of Ten@ to act as attorney 

in fact for all of the petitioners.1

 The first page of the petition 

identified the members of the Committee of Ten by name. The 

petitioners were also represented by counsel. 

 

 1Section 7B6 states in part: AWhen a petition contains more than 10 

signatures, the petition shall designate a committee of 10 of the petitioners 

as attorney in fact for all petitioners, any 7 of whom may make binding 

stipulations on behalf of all petitioners as to any question with respect to the 

petition or hearing or joint hearing, and the regional board of school 

trustees, *** may accept such stipulation in lieu of evidence or proof of the 

matter stipulated.@ 105 ILCS 5/7B6(c) (West 2000).

In January 2001, the Board held a hearing on the petition. Both 

school districts opposed detachment and annexation. After 

considering the evidence, the Board granted the petition finding, inter 

alia, that the educational welfare of the students subject to 

detachment will be better served in Collinsville rather than East St. 

Louis. The Board=s order granting the petition did not expressly 

identify any party as a Aparty of record.@ The caption on the order 
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referred only to the petition for detachment from East St. Louis and 

annexation to Collinsville, and did not otherwise identify the parties. 

The text of the Board=s order referred generally to the APetitioners,@

and noted that a ACommittee of Ten@ had been appointed. The order 

did not, however, identify the committee members by name. 

Collinsville filed a petition for rehearing, which the Board denied. 

The Board=s order denying rehearing, like the Board=s earlier order, 

did not expressly identify the parties of record, nor did it identify the 

committee members by name. 

Within the statutory 35-day period (see 735 ILCS 5/3B103 (West 

2000)), Collinsville filed a complaint for administrative review in the 

circuit court of St. Clair County. Collinsville named as defendants the 

Board, the members of the Board, the St. Clair County regional 

superintendent of schools, East St. Louis, and the East St. Louis 

superintendent of schools. East St. Louis and its superintendent 

immediately joined in Collinsville=s complaint. Collinsville did not 

name as a defendant the Committee of Ten, any member of the 

committee, or any of the other numerous individuals who initiated the 

administrative action that was the subject of Collinsville=s complaint. 

Two weeks after Collinsville filed its complaint, two members of 

the Committee of Ten, Mark Ostendorf and Paul Garcia, filed a 

motion to intervene, which the circuit court granted. Ostendorf and 

Garcia also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the committee 

members and the other signatories to the petition for detachment and 

annexation were necessary parties who had not been made defendants 

within the statutory 35-day period. See 735 ILCS 5/3B103 (West 

2000). 

Prior to the circuit court=s disposition of the motion to dismiss, 

Collinsville filed a motion to amend the complaint to add the 

remaining eight members of the Committee of Ten as party 

defendants. Collinsville relied on a statutory exception to the 35-day 

rule that permits amendment of a complaint where the omitted 

defendant Awas not named by the administrative agency in its final 

order as a party of record.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000). In 

April 2002, the circuit court allowed the motion to amend and denied 

the motion to dismiss. The case proceeded on the merits. The circuit 

court affirmed the Board=s order granting the petition for detachment 

and annexation. 
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Collinsville and East St. Louis appealed. The individual members 

of the Committee of Ten, on behalf of the petitioners, filed a crossappeal, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to 

dismiss. A majority of the appellate court agreed with the petitioners 

and vacated the order of the circuit court. 348 Ill. App. 3d 685. The 

appellate court held that the exception to the 35-day rule, set forth in 

section 3B107(a) of the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 

2000)), was inapplicable where, as here, the petitioners were 

referenced in the final administrative order en masse, were present 

and testified, and were represented by counsel at all the relevant 

hearings. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 698. The appellate court stated that it 

Awould be stretching logic to find that because the names of the 10 

petitioners were not spelled out in the order, their involvement in the 

case is any less than as parties of record.@ 348 Ill. App. 3d at 696. 

Because the school districts failed to name and serve the petitioners 

as required by the Review Law, the appellate court concluded that 

Athe trial judge lacked jurisdiction to allow the school districts=

request to amend their complaints and to thereafter specifically name 

each of the parties of record. The trial judge should have granted the 

petitioners= motion to dismiss.@ 348 Ill. App. 3d at 698-99. The 

appellate court thus allowed the Board=s order, granting the petition 

for detachment and annexation, to stand. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 699. 

Collinsville and East St. Louis each filed a petition for leave to 

appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315), which we allowed and have 

consolidated for review. 

 ANALYSIS 

The operative facts in this case are undisputed. Thus, this appeal 

concerns only the legal issue of whether amendment of the complaint 

was proper under the joinder requirements of the Review Law. 

Accordingly, our review proceeds de novo. See Hobbs v. Hartford 

Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11, 17 (2005) (applying de 

novo standard where salient facts were undisputed and appeal 

involved legal issue); ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 

191 Ill. 2d 26, 29 (2000) (same). 

Under the Illinois Constitution, final judgments from the circuit 

courts are appealable as a Amatter of right,@ but final administrative 

decisions are appealable only Aas provided by law.@ Ill. Const. 1970, 
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art. VI, ''6, 9. Because review of a final administrative decision may 

only be obtained as provided by statute, a court is said to exercise 

Aspecial statutory jurisdiction@ when it reviews an administration 

decision. ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 30. Special statutory jurisdiction 

Ais limited to the language of the act conferring it and the court has no 

powers from any other source.@ Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. 

Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 210 (1985). A party seeking 

to invoke a court=s special statutory jurisdiction must strictly comply 

with the procedures prescribed by statute. ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 

30; Fredman Brothers, 109 Ill. 2d at 210. See also Lockett v. Chicago 

Police Board, 133 Ill. 2d 349, 353 (1990) (ASince the Administrative 

Review Law is a departure from common law, the procedures it 

establishes must be strictly adhered to in order to justify its 

application@). 

Here, section 7B7 of the School Code expressly provides for 

judicial review of a decision of the Board in accordance with the 

Review Law. See 105 ILCS 5/7B7 (West 2000). The Review Law 

makes plain that Collinsville and East St. Louis were required to 

comply strictly with its provisions: AUnless review is sought of an 

administrative decision within the time and in the manner herein 

provided, the parties to the proceeding before the administrative 

agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of such 

administrative decision.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B102 (West 2000). 

As to the time and manner of proceeding, the Review Law states 

that an action to review a final administrative decision Ashall be 

commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons 

within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be 

reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision.@ 735 

ILCS 5/3B103 (West 2000). If the complaint is not timely filed, no 

jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit court and judicial review of the 

administrative order is barred. Nudell v. Forest Preserve District, 207 

Ill. 2d 409, 423 (2003); Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d at 354-55. Here, 

Collinsville timely filed its complaint in the circuit court. 

The Review Law also directs who must be made a defendant 

within the 35-day period: Athe administrative agency and all persons, 

other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings 

before the administrative agency, shall be made defendants.@ 735 

ILCS 5/3B107 (West 2000). Although some panels of the appellate 
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court, including the panel in the present case, have described the 

joinder requirements of the Review Law as Ajurisdictional,@ this court 

has not done so. See McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm=n, 

165 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (1995). Rather, we have described the joinder 

requirements as Amandatory.@ E.g., Lockett, 133 Ill. 2d at 355; Cox v. 

Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 399, 403-04 

(1983); Cuny v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 613, 617 (1952). The failure to 

join necessary parties, however, is no less serious for being 

nonjurisdictional. Noncompliance with the joinder provisions of the 

Review Law requires dismissal of the review proceeding. McGaughy, 

165 Ill. 2d at 12. 

 In the present case, the petitioners, who instituted the detachment 

and annexation proceedings before the Board, were clearly parties of 

record who should have been joined in the administrative review 

action. See ESG Watts, 191 Ill. 2d at 33 (state=s status as a party of 

record Acould not be more clear@ where the state instituted the 

proceedings before the agency). Collinsville and East St. Louis do not 

dispute that the petitioners were parties of record. They argue, 

however, that under the exception contained in section 3B107(a) of 

the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000)), their failure to 

name and serve the petitioners within the 35-day statutory period did 

not require dismissal. Section 3B107(a) states: 

AExcept as provided in subsection (b) [involving review 

of decisions of a zoning board of appeals], in any action to 

review any final decision of an administrative agency, the 

administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, 

who were parties of record to the proceedings before the 

administrative agency shall be made defendants. No action 

for administrative review shall be dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction based upon the failure to name an employee, 

agent, or member, who acted in his or her official capacity, of 

an administrative agency, board, committee, or government 

entity, where the administrative agency, board, committee, or 

government entity, has been named as a defendant as 

provided in this Section. Naming the director or agency head, 

in his or her official capacity, shall be deemed to include as 

defendant the administrative agency, board, committee, or 

government entity that the named defendants direct or head. 

No action for administrative review shall be dismissed for 
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lack of jurisdiction based upon the failure to name an 

administrative agency, board, committee, or government 

entity, where the director or agency head, in his or her official 

capacity, has been named as a defendant as provided in this 

Section. 

If, during the course of a review action, the court 

determines that a party of record to the administrative 

proceedings was not made a defendant as required by the 

preceding paragraph, and only if that party was not named by 

the administrative agency in its final order as a party of 

record, then the court shall grant the plaintiff 21 days from 

the date of the determination in which to name and serve the 

unnamed party as a defendant. The court shall permit the 

newly served defendant to participate in the proceedings to 

the extent the interests of justice may require.@ (Emphasis 

added.) 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000). 

Collinsville and East St. Louis argue that, because the Board=s order 

did not explicitly name the petitioners or Committee of Ten as parties 

of record, the circuit court was required to allow amendment of the 

complaint. They contend that the appellate court misconstrued 

section 3B107(a) by focusing on whether the petitioners were parties 

of record, rather than whether the Board=s final order named the 

petitioners as parties of record. The petitioners counter that the 

exception to the 35-day rule applies only in two situations, neither of 

which is present here. Alternatively, the petitioners argue that, under 

the facts of this case, the Board=s order sufficiently identified the 

petitioners as parties of record, thus precluding amendment of the 

complaint under section 3B107(a). 

We turn our attention first to the petitioners= argument that the 

exception to the 35-day rule set forth in section 3B107(a) applies in 

only two situations, neither of which is present here. In support of 

this argument, the petitioners note that the exception, which is set 

forth in the second paragraph of section 3B107(a), expressly applies 

only if a party of record is not made a defendant Aas required by the 

preceding paragraph.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000). According 

to the petitioners, the Apreceding paragraph,@ i.e., the first paragraph 

of section 3B107(a), addresses two situations: where a plaintiff fails 

to name as a defendant the appropriate administrative official, but 
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names the administrative agency, and where a plaintiff fails to name 

the administrative agency as a defendant, but names the appropriate 

administrative official. The petitioners argue that under the doctrine 

of in pari materia, the first and second paragraphs of section 

3B107(a) must be read with reference to each other and construed 

harmoniously, giving effect to both paragraphs. The petitioners 

maintain that the exception to the 35-day rule contained in the second 

paragraph of section 3B107(a) must be construed as limited to the two 

situations described in the Apreceding paragraph.@ Because this is not 

a case involving the failure to name either the agency or the 

appropriate administrative official, the petitioners conclude that the 

exception simply does not come into play. 

Under the doctrine of in pari materia, two statutes dealing with 

the same subject will be considered with reference to each other, Aso 

that they may be given harmonious effect.@ Land v. Board of 

Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002). This 

doctrine is also applicable to different sections of the same statute 

and is consonant with one of our fundamental rules of statutory 

constructionBAto view all of the provisions of a statute as a whole.@

Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 422. We agree that under this doctrine, we must 

construe the second paragraph of section 3B107(a) harmoniously with 

the Apreceding paragraph.@ In doing so, however, we are not at liberty 

to disregard the plain language of the statute. The cardinal rule of 

statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to 

ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Sylvester v. 

Industrial Comm=n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001); In re Estate of 

Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 331 (2000). The language of the statute, 

which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best 

indicator of the legislature=s intent. In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 229 

(2003). Based on the plain language of section 3B107, we conclude 

that the exception to the 35-day rule may be applied where, as here, a 

plaintiff fails to name as defendants the petitioners in the underlying 

administrative proceeding. 

Section 3B107 addresses, in broad terms, who must be made 

defendants in an administrative review action: A[I]n any action to 

review any final decision of an administrative agency, the 

administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who 

were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative 

agency shall be made defendants.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 
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2000). The statute then addresses two frequently recurring scenarios: 

where the plaintiff names the appropriate administrative official, but 

fails to name the administrative agency, and where the plaintiff 

names the administrative agency, but fails to name the appropriate 

administrative official. The statute prohibits dismissal of the 

complaint under either circumstance. The fact that the statute 

addresses two scenarios involving certain defendants in greater detail 

does not mean that the exception to the 35-day rule cannot apply to 

other scenarios. The exception itself contains no such limiting 

language. The exception refers generally to whether a party of record 

was made a defendant Aas required by the preceding paragraph.@ The 

universe of parties Arequired@ to be made defendants Aby the 

preceding paragraph@ is not confined to the administrative agency and 

administrative officialBthe only parties involved in the two scenarios 

on which the petitioners focus. Rather, the Apreceding paragraph@

requires that the Aadministrative agency and all persons@ who were 

parties of record be made defendants. AAll persons@ who were parties 

of record include the petitioners here. To construe section 3B107(a) in 

the manner the petitioners suggest would ignore the plain language of 

the statute and render the first sentence of section 3B107(a) 

superfluous. See Quad Cities Open, Inc. v. City of Silvis, 208 Ill. 2d 

498, 508 (2004) (AWe must construe the statute so that each word, 

clause, or sentence is given reasonable meaning and not deemed 

superfluous or void@); Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 

158 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1994) (AStatutes should be construed, if 

possible, so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless@). 

Justice Fitzgerald points out that, in reaching this result, Athe 

majority overlooks the service of summons provisions contained in 

section 3B105@ of the Review Law. Slip op. at 20 (Fitzgerald, J., 

dissenting). Indeed we do, for the simple reason that section 3B105 

has absolutely nothing to do with this appeal. According to Justice 

Fitzgerald, Asections 3B105 and 3B107 of the Review Law both 

involve the joinder requirements for an administrative review action.@

(Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 21 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). The only 

difference between the two statutes is that, while section 3B107(a) 

sets forth the Ageneral requirement@ that A >the administrative agency 

and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to 

the proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made 

defendants,= @ section 3B105 sets forth the more Aspecific@
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requirement that, in school board proceedings involving a committee 

of 10, A >only the administrative agency involved and each of the 

committee of 10 shall be served.= @ (Emphasis added and omitted.) 

Slip op. at 21 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting), quoting 735 ILCS 5/3B105, 

3B107(a). Justice Fitzgerald then suggests that, as the more specific 

provision, section 3B105 controls. Slip op. at 22 (Fitzgerald, J., 

dissenting). 

There are several problems with Justice Fitzgerald=s approach. To 

begin with, Justice Fitzgerald never quite explains how a statement 

concerning who must be served can possibly be characterized as a 

more specific statement of who must be named. Such an explanation 

would seem incumbent, as service and joinder are wholly distinct 

legal concepts. Service relates to A[t]he formal delivery of a writ, 

summons, or other legal process.@ Black=s Law Dictionary 1399 (8th 

ed. 2004). Joinder, by contrast, relates to Athe uniting of parties *** in 

a single claim.@ Black=s Law Dictionary 853 (8th ed. 

2004).Obviously, these are not the same thing. As importantly, this 

distinction is clearly manifested in the plain language of sections 

3B105 and 3B107. Titled AService of Summons,@ section 3B105 

speaks solely to where, how, and upon whom a A[s]ummons issued in 

any action to review the final administrative decision of any 

administrative agency shall be served.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B105. Section 

3B105 says absolutely nothing about who must be joined or named as 

defendants in a complaint for administrative review. Section 

3B107(a), by contrast, speaks solely to who Ashall be made 

defendants@ in a complaint for administrative review and says 

absolutely nothing about where, how, or upon whom a summons 

must be served. 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000). Simply put, 

section 3B105 is a service statute, and section 3B107(a) is a joinder 

statute. Neither statute speaks to the other. Justice Fitzgerald=s 

assertion that Asections 3B105 and 3B107 *** both involve the joinder 

requirements for an administrative review action@ is demonstrably 

false. 

Which is not to say that section 3B105=s Acommittee of 10@ clause 

is not a more specific statement of legislative intent. It undeniably is. 

The question is, more specific in relation to what? Section 3B105 

answers this question clearly: 

ASummons issued in any action to review the final 
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administrative decision of any administrative agency shall be 

served by registered or certified mail on the administrative 

agency and on each of the other defendants except in the case 

of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional 

board of school trustees, regional superintendent of schools, 

or State Superintendent of Education, as the case may be, 

when a committee of 10 has been designated as provided in 

Section 7B6 of the School Code, and in such case only the 

administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 

10 shall be served.@ (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3B105 

(West 2000). 

This statute could not be more clear. The general rule is that 

summons must be served on Athe administrative agency and on each 

of the other defendants.@ In certain school board cases, however, 

summons must be served Aonly [on] the administrative agency 

involved and each of the committee of 10.@ In other words, the 

Acommittee of 10 clause@ is an exception not to the general joinder

requirements of section 3B107(a), but to the general service

requirements of section 3B105. 

 Be that is it may, there is absolutely nothing in the text of either 

section 3B105 or section 3B107(a) to support Justice Fitzgerald=s 

conclusion that lack of compliance with section 3B105 is a bar to 

invoking section 3B107(a)=s exception to the 35-day rule. The second 

paragraph of section 3B107(a) sets forth two, and only two, 

conditions for application of that exception: (1) a party of record was 

not made a defendant Aas required by the preceding paragraph;@ and 

(2) that same party was not named by the administrative agency in its 

final order as a party of record. 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000). 

Compliance with section 3B105 is mentioned nowhere. 

Nevertheless, both Justice Fitzgerald and Justice Garman insist 

that we should disregard the plain language of the exception because 

Collinsville was Aon notice, by virtue of section 3B105, that they were 

required to serve >each of the committee of 10.= @ Slip op. at 21 

(Fitzgerald, J., dissenting), quoting 735 ILCS 5/3B105; slip op. at 19 

(Garman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ASection 

3B105 precisely informed the district of whom to serve when 

appealing a decision of the regional school board of trustees@). The 

obvious problem with this position, aside from a complete lack of 
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support in the statutory text, is the fact that it effectively renders the 

exception to the 35-day rule a nullity. This is because section 3B105 

puts every administrative review plaintiff Aon notice@ as to who must 

be served. In most actions, this will be Athe administrative agency and 

*** each of the other defendants.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). In 

school board proceedings involving a committee of 10, this will be 

Athe administrative agency and each of the committee of 10.@ 735 

ILCS 5/3B105. Either way, section 3B105 leaves no doubt as to who 

must be served. Consequently, if simply knowing who must be served 

is a bar to invoking section 3B107=s exception to the 35-day rule, then 

no party will ever be able to avail itself of that exception. 

Justice Fitzgerald goes on to suggest that our reading of section 

3B105 and 3B107 is Aartificially narrow@ because A[s]ection 3B107 is 

not simply a naming provision.@ Slip op. at 22 (Fitzgerald, J., 

dissenting). According to Justice Fitzgerald, A[s]ection 3B107 

addresses who must be >made= a defendant,@ and Aa party is not >made=

a defendant simply by naming that party in the caption of the 

complaint.@ Slip op. at 22 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). Rather, Justice 

Fitzgerald maintains, to be Amade@ a defendant, Aa party must be both 

named and served within the statutory period.@ Slip op. at 22 

(Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). Conspicuously absent from Justice 

Fitzgerald=s analysis on this point is any citation to authority, which 

is likely attributable to the fact that its conclusion is flatly 

contradicted by the plain language of the Review Act, this court=s 

established case law, and the legislative history surrounding the 

enactment of section 3B107=s exception to the 35-day rule. 

As for the plain language, Justice Fitzgerald asserts that a party is 

not Amade@ a defendant until it is both named in the complaint and 

served with a summons. Slip op. at 22 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). 

Section 3B105 says otherwise. Indeed, that section states that A[t]he 

plaintiff shall, by affidavit filed with the complaint, designate the last 

known address of each defendant upon whom service shall be made.@

(Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). Likewise, section 

3B105 directs the clerk of the court to Amail a copy of the summons to 

each of the *** defendants, addressed to the last known place of 

residence or principal place of business of each such defendant.@

(Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). This language 

confirms that, under the Review Law, a Adefendant@ exists as such 

before summons is served. In fact, by requiring the plaintiff to file 
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with the complaint an affidavit setting forth Athe last know address of 

each defendant,@ section 3B105 confirms that a Adefendant@ is anyone 

designated as such by the plaintiff. In other words, a party is made a 

defendant simply by being named in the complaint. 

As for this court=s case law, McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights 

Comm=n, 165 Ill. 2d 1 (1995), is instructive. The Review Law, of 

course, governs circuit court review of administrative orders. Not all 

administrative orders, however, are reviewed in the circuit court. 

Some are directly reviewed in the appellate court. The procedures 

governing direct appellate court review of administrative orders are 

set forth in Supreme Court Rule 335. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 335(a). In 

McGaughy, this court was asked to consider the consequences of a 

petitioner=s failure to comply strictly with Supreme Court Rule 

335(a), which states: 

AThe petition for review shall be filed in the Appellate 

Court and shall specify the parties seeking review and shall 

designate the respondent and the order or part thereof to be 

reviewed. The agency and all other parties of record shall be 

named respondents.@ (Emphasis added.) 155 Ill. 2d R. 335(a). 

Two petitions were at issue in McGaughy. The first Afailed to name 

the Department of Human Rights ***, joining only the [Human 

Rights] Commission and the Department of State Police as 

respondents.@ McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 1. As for the second, A[t]he 

caption *** read only, >In the Matter of the Request for Review by: 

Betty L. Barnes,= and failed to name the Commission, the 

Department, or [the employer] as respondents.@ McGaughy, 165 Ill. 

2d at 2. The court began its analysis by thoroughly reviewing Lockett, 

which held that the failure to comply strictly with section 3B107(a)=s 

joinder requirements mandates dismissal of a complaint for 

administrative review. McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 9-12. The court then 

concluded that the same consequence should attach to the failure to 

comply strictly with the joinder requirements of Rule 335(a). In 

reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized: 

A[T]he joinder requirements of section 3B107(a) of the 

Administrative Review Law and of Supreme Court Rule 

335(a) are substantively similar. (Compare 735 ILCS 

5/3B107(a) (West 1992) (>the administrative agency and all 

persons * * * who were parties of record * * * shall be made 
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defendants=) with 134 Ill.2d R. 335(a) (>The agency and all 

other parties of record shall be named respondents=).) There is 

nothing in the plain language of the statute or the rule that 

would justify the development of two divergent procedural 

standards for the review of administrative matters, and we do 

not believe that the meanings of these similar requirements 

should vary.@ (Emphasis added.) McGaughy, 165 Ill. 2d at 12. 

In other words, McGaughy treated Rule 335(a)=s requirement that 

A[t]he agency and all other parties of record shall be named 

respondents@ as synonymous and therefore legally indistinguishable 

from section 3B107(a)=s requirement that Athe administrative agency 

and all *** parties of record *** shall be made defendants.@ Once 

again, contrary to the Justice Fitzgerald=s unsupported assertion, a 

party is Amade@ a defendant simply by being Anamed.@ Indeed, the 

linchpin of McGaughy is that, in this context, the two words mean 

exactly the same thing. 

As it turns out, McGaughy=s reading of section 3B107(a) perfectly 

vindicates the General Assembly=s intent, as evidenced by the 

relevant legislative history. The exception to the 35-day rule was 

enacted on January 1, 1994, as part of Public Act 88B1. See Pub. Act 

88B1, '7, eff. January 1, 1994. Speaking on the floor of the Illinois 

Senate, the bill=s chief sponsor in that body described the purpose of 

the exception as follows: 

AAs amended in the Senate, [the bill] also deals with who 

should be named parties in an administrative review ***. 

*** 

There have been some difficulties because, on occasion, 

the final order in the administrative agency does not name all 

parties who ought to be named. Therefore, this bill, as 

amended, provides that the petitionerBthe person bringing the 

action for administrative reviewBwill name all those parties 

who are named in the final order of the administrative action, 

and then if a court subsequently determines that another party 

ought to be named, the person bringing the action will be 

granted leave of twenty-one days to add those other parties to 

the petition for administrative review.@ (Emphases added.) 

88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, March 12, 1993, 

at 20 (remarks of Senator Hawkinson). 
-15-

These remarks, which describe the focus of section 3B107, speak 

exclusively to who must be named and make no mention whatsoever 

of service. Moreover, Senator Hawkinson=s statement that the 

exception grants 21 days Ato add those other parties to the petition@

flatly refutes the Justice Fitzgerald=s assertion that Aa party is not 

>made= a defendant simply by naming that party in the caption of the 

complaint.@As Senator Hawkinson=s statement confirms, that=s 

exactly what it means to be Amade@ a defendant. 

Finally, we note that, even if the Justice Fitzgerald=s reading of 

section 3B107(a) is correct, the school districts still may invoke the 

exception to the 35-day rule. Again, the exception states: 

AIf, during the course of a review action, the court determines 

that a party of record to the administrative proceedings was 

not made a defendant as required by the preceding paragraph, 

and only if that party was not named by the administrative 

agency in its final order as a party of record, then the court 

shall grant the plaintiff 21 days from the date of the 

determination in which to name and serve the unnamed party 

as a defendant.@ (Emphasis added.) 

According to Justice Fitzgerald , to be Amade@ a defendant, Aa party 

must be both named and served within the statutory period.@

(Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 22 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). If this is 

true, then the school districts= lack of compliance with section 

3B105=s service requirement is not a barrier to the invocation of 

section 3B107(a)=s exception. On the contrary, it triggers the 

exception. Indeed, by Justice Fitzgerald=s own reasoning, as long as 

the Committee of Ten was unserved, it Awas not made a defendant.@

The exception therefore applies.2

 

 2

We also note that, if Justice Fitzgerald is correct in asserting that a 
-16-

 

party is not Amade@ a defendant until it is both named and served, then the 

exception set forth in the second paragraph section 3B107(a) is easily the 

most specific statutory provision at play, as it excuses noncompliance with 

both section 3B105 and section 3B107. Indeed, under Justice Fitzgerald=s 

approach, the exception would apply when a party omitted from the 

agency=s final order is (1) not named in the petition for administrative 

review, (2) not served with the petition for administrative review, or (3) 

neither named in nor served with the petition for administrative review.
-17-

The only question remaining, then, is whether the Board=s order 

identified the petitioners as parties of record. Clearly, it did not. As 

discussed above, the Board=s order granting the petition did not 

identify any party as a Aparty of record.@ The caption on the order 

referred only to the petition for detachment from East St. Louis and 

annexation to Collinsville, and it did not otherwise identify the 

parties. And while the text of the Board=s order referred generally to 

the APetitioners@ and noted that a ACommittee of Ten@ had been 

appointed, the order did not identify any of the petitioners or 

committee members by name. Even the appellate court conceded this 

point, noting that A[n]either the school districts involved nor the 

petitioners seeking detachment and annexation were explicitly 

labeled as >parties of record= in the final orders at issue.@ 348 Ill. App. 

3d at 698.3

Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court properly granted the 

school districts= motion to amend. The exception set forth in the 

second paragraph of section 3B107(a) sets forth two, and only two, 

conditions for application of that exception: (1) a party of record was 

not made a defendant as required by the first paragraph of section 

3B107(a), and (2) that same party was not named by the 

administrative agency in its final order as a party of record. 735 ILCS 

5/3B107(a). Both of those conditions are present in this case, and the 

school districts therefore were entitled to 21 days in which to name 

and serve the additional defendants. 

 CONCLUSION 

 

 3The appellate court got around this point by insisting that Athe omission 

of their names, purposefully or by clerical error, from the final order does 

not convert the petitioners into nonparties.@ 348 Ill. App. 3d at 694. This is 

undeniably true. But whether the petitioners were parties of record is not the 

issue. Rather, the issue is whether the petitioners were named as parties of 

record in the Board=s final order. 
-18-

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the appellate 

court is reversed, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, and 

the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

decision. 

Appellate court judgment reversed; 

circuit court judgment affirmed; 

cause remanded. 

JUSTICE GARMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 

I agree with the Justice Fitzgerald=s conclusion that Collinsville 

Community Unit School District No. 10 is barred from obtaining 

judicial relief because of its failure to strictly comply with section 

3B105 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 

2000)). However, I also agree with the majority=s determination that 

section 3B105 addresses service, not joinder. Accordingly, it is the 

school district=s failure to serve the committee of 10 and its members, 

rather than its failure to join them, that mandates dismissal of this 

action. 

As both the majority and the Justice Fitzgerald=s dissent note, a 

party seeking review of an administrative decision must strictly 

comply with the procedures established by the Review Law. ESG 

Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26, 30 (2000); 

Lockett v. Chicago Police Board, 133 Ill. 2d 349, 353 (1990). Strict 

compliance must begin with section 3B103 of the Review Law, 

entitled ACommencement of Action@: 

AEvery action to review a final administrative decision 

shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the 

issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy 

of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the 

party affected by the decision[.]@ 735 ILCS 5/3B103 (West 

2000). 

Section 3B105 goes on to establish how summons, once issued, must 

be served: 

ASummons issued in any action to review the final 

administrative decision of any administrative agency shall be 
-19-

served by registered or certified mail on the administrative 

agency and on each of the other defendants except in the case 

of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional 

board of school trustees, regional superintendent of schools, 

or State Superintendent of Education, as the case may be, 

when a committee of 10 has been designated as provided in 

Section 7B6 of the School Code, and in such case only the 

administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 

10 shall be served.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). 

Thus, sections 3B103 and 3B105 require summons to be issued 

within 35 days for the administrative agency and each of the other 

defendants, except in cases where a committee of 10 has been 

appointed. Where there is a committee of 10, the Review Law 

requires issuance of summons for the administrative agency and each 

member of the committee of 10. As the majority correctly notes, this 

provision says nothing about whether the committee and its members 

should be joined as defendants. Slip op. at 10. However, it does 

require that they be served with summons properly issued within 35 

days, regardless of whether they are joined. 

Section 3B107, in contrast, speaks solely to joinder. 735 ILCS 

5/3B107 (West 2000). In addition to establishing who must be joined, 

it allows petitioners a second chance to join defendants who were not 

named as parties of record in the final administrative order. 735 ILCS 

5/3B107 (West 2000). However, the district=s failure to join the 

committee of 10 was not the district=s critical shortcoming. Rather, 

the district failed to strictly comply with the Review Law when it 

failed to obtain issuance of summons for the committee of 10 and its 

members within the 35 days mandated by section 3B103 (735 ILCS 

5/3B103 (West 2000)). Although the application of section 3B107 

allows the belated joinder of certain parties, it cannot excuse the 

district=s failure to timely serve the committee of 10 and its members 

in accordance with the requirement of sections 3B103 and 3B105. The 

consequence for this failure to comply is dismissal of the review 

proceeding. McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm=n, 165 Ill. 2d 

1, 12 (1995). 

Most petitioners for administrative review will not find 

themselves in the school district=s position. The section 3B105 

requirements for service are unique and specific only in their 
-20-

treatment of cases involving a committee of 10 under the School 

Code. Other petitioners are merely required to serve Athe 

administrative agency and *** each of the other defendants.@ 735 

ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). As the majority notes, a party is made a 

defendant by being named in the complaint. Slip op. at 12. Thus, in 

most cases section 3B105 does not require service until a defendant is 

named. When petitioners fail to name a party of record who was not 

named in the agency=s final order, most will be able to fall back on 

the section 3B107 exception that allows extra time to join and then to 

serve that defendant. 735 ILCS 5/3B107 (West 2000). However, 

when a committee of 10 is involved, the Review Law requires 

issuance of summons within the 35-day limit of section 3B103 no 

matter whether or when the committee is named as a defendant. Slip 

op. at 23 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). 

In cases where the appellate court has properly applied the 

language at issue in the section 3B107 exception, the facts suggest 

legitimate confusion about the appropriate defendants to join. In 

United Methodist Village Retirement Communities, Inc. v. Property 

Tax Appeal Board, 321 Ill. App. 3d 456 (2001), the petitioner 

taxpayer appealed a notice of assessment change to the county board 

of review. United Methodist, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 458. He then 

appealed the board of review decision to the Property Tax Appeal 

Board, which did not name the board of review as a party in its final 

order. United Methodist, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 458-59. On appeal of the 

Appeal Board=s decision, the petitioner joined only the Appeal Board. 

The appellate court applied section 3B113(b) of the Review Law (735 

ILCS 5/3B113(b) (West 1998)), which contains language identical to 

the section 3B107 exception, and allowed amendment of the petition 

for review to add the board of review as a defendant. United 

Methodist, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 460-61. In an earlier property tax case, 

the petitioner appealed directly to the Appeal Board, bypassing the 

board of review entirely. Villa Retirement Apartments, Inc. v. 

Property Tax Appeal Board, 302 Ill. App. 3d 745, 750-51 (1999). 

Holding that the board of review was nevertheless a party of record, 

the appellate court determined that the petitioner was entitled to 

amend its complaint to add the board of review as a defendant. Villa 

Retirement, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 751-52. 

In each of these cases, it was unclear whether the Board of 

Review was an appropriate party to join and serve. But no confusion 
-21-

as to service exists in the instant case. Section 3B105 precisely 

informed the district of whom to serve when appealing a decision of 

the regional school board of trustees. 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). 

In contravention of this explicit language, the district did not obtain 

issuance of summons for the committee of 10 and its members within 

35 days. 

The section 3B107 exception allowing belated joinder cannot 

excuse this failure to comply with the Review Law=s service 

requirements. In this regard, I join Justice Fitzgerald=s dissent. 

JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting: 

I agree with the majority that one of our fundamental rules of 

statutory construction is A >to view all of the provisions of a statute as 

a whole.= @ Slip op. at 16, quoting Land v. Board of Education of the 

City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002). Under this rule, each 

provision of a statute must be construed in connection with every 

other section (Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 466 (2000)), and not as 

isolated provisions (Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of 

Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000)). The majority, however, fails to 

follow this rule by overlooking other provisions of the Administrative 

Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3B101 et seq. (West 2000), 

relevant to the issue before us. In particular, the majority overlooks 

the service of summons provisions contained in section 3B105 (735 

ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000)). Consideration of section 3B105, in 

conjunction with section 3B107 (735 ILCS 5/3B107 (West 2000)), 

leads to the conclusion that the appellate court judgment, dismissing 

the complaint for administrative review, should be affirmed. 

Accordingly, I dissent. 

 Section 3B105 of the Review Law states, in relevant part: 

ASummons issued in any action to review the final 

administrative decision of any administrative agency shall be 

served by registered or certified mail on the administrative 

agency and on each of the other defendants except in the case 

of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional 

board of school trustees, regional superintendent of schools, 

or State Superintendent of Education, as the case may be, 

when a committee of 10 has been designated as provided by 

Section 7B6 of the School Code, and in such case only the 
-22-

administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 

10 shall be served.@ (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3B105 

(West 2000). 

The relevance of section 3B105 to this appeal is evident. 

Collinsville challenged a Afinal administrative decision of the 

regional board of school trustees@ and a Acommittee of 10@ was 

designated in accordance with the School Code. See 105 ILCS 5/7B6 

(West 2000). Pursuant to section 3B105, Aeach of the committee of 10 

shall be served.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). The focus of this 

appeal, therefore, is not solely section 3B107. Rather, we must 

consider the interplay between sections 3B107 and 3B105. 

A[S]ettled principles of statutory construction call for the specific 

to control over the general.@ People v. Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339, 345 

(1984). Accordingly, where a statute contains two provisions relating 

to the same subject, one specific and one general, the specific 

provision controls and should be applied. Knolls Condominium Ass=n 

v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 459 (2002). Here, sections 3B105 and 

3B107 of the Review Law both involve the joinder requirements for 

an administrative review action. Section 3B107 sets out the general 

requirement: Athe administrative agency and all persons, other than 

the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the 

administrative agency shall be made defendants.@ 735 ILCS 

5/3B107(a) (West 2000). Section 3B107(a) also contains an exception 

to this general rule, allowing amendment of the complaint where the 

omitted defendant was Anot named by the administrative agency in its 

final order as a party of record.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000). 

Section 3B105, on the other hand, addresses a specific case: Athe 

case of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional 

board of school trustees,@ where a Acommittee of 10 has been 

designated.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). A[I]n such case only the 

administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 10 shall 

be served.@ (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). 

Section 3B105 specifically addresses the present situation and 

controls over the more general provisions of section 3B107(a). 

Accordingly, the school districts= argument that the petitioners or the 

Committee of Ten were not Anamed@ in the Board=s final order as 

Aparties of record@ is irrelevant. The school districts were on notice, 

by virtue of section 3B105, that they were required to serve Aeach of 
-23-

the committee of 10.@ Under the statute, and our case law, 

Collinsville=s failure to comply strictly with the Review Law is fatal 

to its complaint. See 735 ILCS 5/3B102 (West 2000) (barring review 

unless sought within the time and manner provided by the Review 

Law); ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26 

(2000) (affirming dismissal of administrative review petition based 

on failure to join the party who instituted the underlying 

administrative proceeding); McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights 

Commission, 165 Ill. 2d 1 (1995) (in consolidated appeal, dismissing 

one administrative review action and affirming dismissal of the other, 

where petitioners served respondents but failed to name those parties 

in their review petitions); Lockett v. Chicago Police Board, 133 Ill. 

2d 349 (1990) (affirming dismissal of complaint for administrative 

review for failure to name a party of record). 

The majority maintains that because section 3B105 addresses 

service of process, and section 3B107 addresses who must be named 

as a defendant, section 3B105 cannot be deemed the more specific 

and controlling of the two statutory provisions. Slip op. at 10. The 

majority=s reading of these statutory sections is artificially narrow. 

Section 3B107 is not simply a naming provision. Section 3B107 

addresses who must be Amade@ a defendant in an administrative 

review proceeding. 735 ILCS 5/3B107 (West 2000). A party is not 

Amade@ a defendant simply by naming that party in the caption of the 

complaint for administrative review. A party must be both named and 

served within the statutory period. Thus, section 3B107 allows 

additional time to Aname and serve@ an unnamed party. 735 ILCS 

5/3B107 (West 2000). Similarly, section 3B105 is not simply a service 

statute as the majority contends. To be sure, section 3B105 addresses 

how service shall be made on defendants in a review actionBby 

registered or certified mail. Section 3B105, however, also addresses 

who must be served as defendants in a case such as the present one: 

Athe administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 

10.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). Thus, section 3B107 and 3B105 

both speak, in some fashion, as to who must be joined or Amade@ a 

defendant in a case such as the present one, but section 3B105 is the 

more specific. 

Even if the majority=s characterization of section 3B107 as a 

naming provision and section 3B105 as a service provision is correct, 

I disagree with the majority=s conclusion that section 3B105 is 
-24-

irrelevant to this case. Lockett and its progeny firmly establish that 

administrative review is barred unless the complaining party is in 

compliance with the procedures set forth in the Review Law. As the 

majority states, AA party seeking to invoke a court=s special statutory 

jurisdiction must strictly comply with the procedures prescribed by 

statute.@ (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 5. Section 3B105 expressly 

required Collinsville to serve Aeach of the committee of 10.@ 735 

ILCS 5/3B105 (West 2000). That obligation was not made dependent 

on any obligation to name the committee, its members, or the 

underlying petitioners as defendants. Collinsville failed to serve the 

committee members and thus failed to Astrictly comply with the 

procedures prescribed by statute.@

I recognize that the Review Law Awas not intended to be a trap 

for the unwary to establish a bar to relief.@ Chestnut v. Lodge, 34 Ill. 

2d 567, 571 (1966). In this case, however, no trap was set. Section 

3B105 of the Review Law set forth in explicit terms how a case of 

this type must proceed. Accordingly, Collinsville=s failure to serve 

the members of the Committee of Ten cannot be overlooked. I would 

hold that because review was not sought in the manner provided in 

the Review Law, the school districts are Abarred@ from obtaining 

judicial review. 735 ILCS 5/3B102 (West 2000). 

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also dissenting: 

I agree with Justice Fitzgerald=s dissent that section 3B105 

controls in this appeal. I write separately to explain that, even if the 

exception in section 3B107 were applicable, the conditions for 

application of that exception have not been met in this case. The 

appellate court=s dismissal of the complaint for administrative review 

should be affirmed in either case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 

The majority concludes that the exception contained in section 

3B107 of the Administrative Review Law (Review Law) allows the 

school districts an opportunity to name and serve the members of the 

Committee of Ten as defendants. Slip op. at 15. The exception in 

section 3B107 only applies, however, if the party who was not made a 

defendant Awas not named by the administrative agency in its final 

order as a party of record.@ 735 ILCS 5/3B107(a) (West 2000). The 

majority finds this exception applies because the Board=s order failed 

to identify the petitioners as parties of record. Slip op. at 16. The 
-25-

majority notes that the caption of the order did not identify the 

parties, and the text of the order did not identify any of the individual 

petitioners or members of the Committee of Ten by name. Slip op. at 

16. 

I disagree with the conclusion that the order did not sufficiently 

identify the members of the Committee of Ten as parties of record 

within the meaning of the Review Law. The body of the order recites, 

in pertinent part, that Athe Petition was signed by more than twothirds (2/3) of the legal registered voters of the area involved, that a 

Committee of Ten was appointed in the Petition and that the legal 

requirements set forth in 105 Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/7 have 

been met by the Petitioners.@ Under the School Code, a committee of 

10 is a group of petitioners designated in the petition as attorney in 

fact for all of the petitioners. 105 ILCS 5/7B6(c) (West 2000). Thus, 

the order, by referring to the appointment of the Committee of Ten, 

identifies the members of that group as petitioners. Under any 

characterization, the petitioners are parties of record. As noted by the 

majority, the petitioners were Aclearly parties of record.@ Slip op. at 6. 

Thus, the order is sufficient to identify the members of the Committee 

of Ten as petitioners and as parties of record. 

In my view, the majority gives the exception in section 3B107 too 

broad of a construction. The majority would apparently require that 

each member of the Committee of Ten must be specifically named 

and referred to as Aa party of record@ for the exception not to apply. I 

believe the exception should be construed more narrowly. The 

identification of the Committee of Ten as petitioners in the order was 

sufficient to name the members of that group as parties of record. 

Thus, the exception in section 3B107 that would allow the school 

districts to add the members of the Committee of Ten as defendants is 

not applicable based on the facts of this case. 

I would also note that the circumstances of this case show this 

construction of the exception cannot be considered unfair or Aa trap 

for the unwary.@ See Chestnut v. Lodge, 34 Ill. 2d 567, 571 (1966) 

(Review Law Awas not intended to be a trap for the unwary@). The 

petitioners, who were represented by the Committee of Ten, instituted 

the proceedings. The Committee of Ten represented the petitioners 

throughout these proceedings. The record shows there were three 

separate hearings before the Board on this petition. The attorney for 
-26-

the petitioners appeared at each of these hearings. Julia Martinez, one 

of the members of the Committee of Ten, testified during the 

proceedings. The Board members referred to Athe petitioners@

repeatedly throughout the hearings. The entire administrative 

proceeding focused on the petition, prominently identifying the 

members of the Committee of Ten by name on page one. The petition 

specifically states A[t]he following Petitioners are designated as the 

Committee of Ten to act as attorney in fact for all Petitioners.@ In 

sum, the record is replete with references to the petitioners and the 

Committee of Ten. 

Based on these facts, the school districts cannot claim that they 

did not know that the members of the Committee of Ten were parties 

of record. The status of the members of the Committee of Ten as 

parties of record could not be more apparent. Thus, denying the 

school districts additional time to add the members of the Committee 

of Ten as defendants would not be unfair. 

Finally, as noted by both Justice Fitzgerald and Justice Garman, 

section 3B105 clearly required the school districts to serve each 

member of the Committee of Ten. Slip op. at 21 (Fitzgerald, J., 

dissenting); Slip op. at 18 (Garman, J., concurring in part and 

dissenting in part). The school districts failed to serve the members of 

the Committee of Ten when this action was initiated. Additionally, 

after the school districts were granted leave to add the members of 

the Committee of Ten as defendants, the school districts were 

obligated to arrange for the service of the defendants. Nonetheless, 

according to the record, the school districts completely failed to serve 

the members of the Committee of TenBeven after they were granted 

leave to add these parties as defendants. In failing to serve the 

committee members, the school districts failed to comply strictly with 

the Review Law. 

In sum, this appeal should be resolved based on application of 

section 3B105 as explained in Justice Fitzgerald=s dissent. However, 

even if the exception in section 3B107 were applicable to this appeal, 

the conditions for application of that exception have not been met. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court dismissing the 

complaint for administrative review should be affirmed.