SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3931-21 

S.F.-W.,1

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

J.W., 

Defendant-Respondent. 

________________________

Argued February 27, 2024 – Decided March 18, 2024 

Before Judges Whipple, Mayer and Enright. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket 

No. FM-07-0841-12. 

Andrew M. Shaw argued the case for appellant (Shaw 

Divorce & Family Law LLC, attorneys; Andrew M. 

Shaw, on the brief). 

1

 We use initials and pseudonyms to protect the parties' privacy. R. 1:38-

3(d)(13). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3931-21

Respondent has not filed a brief.2 

PER CURIAM 

 In this post-judgment matrimonial appeal, plaintiff S.F.-W. appeals from 

the following: a May 4, 2022 order applying the Wunsch-Deffler3 doctrine to 

calculate child support; a July 29, 2022 order denying reconsideration of the 

May 4 order; and an August 10, 2022 uniform summary support order (USSO) 

incorporating the May 4 order. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and 

remand for recalculation of child support based on changed circumstances. 

 Plaintiff and defendant J.W. married in June 1997 and have two children, 

J.W. (Jane), born in 2002, and S.W. (Sue), born in 2005. In July 2013, the 

parties divorced. At that time, defendant agreed to pay $245 per week in child 

support. He also agreed to pay an additional $100 per month in child support 

for six years, and then a reduced amount of $69.50 per month for the following 

six years. 

2

 In orders dated November 2, 2023 and January 9, 2024, we suppressed 

defendant's brief, citing deficiencies that required correction. Defendant failed 

to correct the deficiencies and his brief remained suppressed. 

 

3

 Wunsch-Deffler v. Deffler, 406 N.J. Super. 505 (Ch. Div. 2009). 
3 A-3931-21

In February 2014, a Family Part judge entered an Amended Dual Final 

Judgment of Divorce, incorporating the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement 

(MSA).4 The MSA provided: "[T]he parties shall share joint legal custody of 

the children. The parties agree temporarily until the arbitrator renders his 

decision that [plaintiff] shall be designated as the parent of primary residence 

(PPR) and [defendant] shall be designated as the parent of alternate residence 

(PAR)." Under the MSA, the parties "agreed to arbitrate the issues of custody 

and parenting time on a post-judgment basis." The MSA's provisions continued 

to govern pending the completion of arbitration.5 

Subsequent to their divorce, the parties engaged in extensive motion 

practice. Between February 2014 and June 2018, the trial court entered multiple 

orders, addressing custody, parenting time, and other issues. In August 2018, 

the judge appointed an attorney to represent the children. 

In March 2019, the parties attended an in-court settlement hearing to

resolve pending applications related to custody and parenting time. Counsel for 

the parties, including the children's court-appointed attorney, were present at 

4

 The parties executed the original MSA on January 17, 2013. However, the 

parties executed a typed version of the MSA on February 21, 2014. 

5

 Despite the terms of the MSA, the parties never arbitrated their issues 

regarding custody or parenting time. 
4 A-3931-21

this hearing. Three agreements were marked at the hearing: J-1 (a custody and 

visitation plan); J-2 (Sue's parenting time plan); and J-3 (handwritten notes from 

the children's attorney regarding Jane). 

 Under J-1, the parties agreed Jane, then age seventeen, would "not be 

required to conform to a fixed parenting time schedule." Instead, Jane could 

"spend time with [defendant] at her option as agreed by and between [Jane] and 

[defendant]." Under J-2, Sue had a 9/5 parenting time schedule, such that Sue 

would spend nine days with plaintiff and five days with defendant in each twoweek period. Under J-3, Jane and defendant would decide whether to participate 

in reunification therapy. J-3 also stated child support for Jane would be 

calculated based on a 50/50 parenting schedule, applying the Wunsch-Deffler 

formula. None of the documents marked during the hearing addressed child 

support for Sue. 

 At the March 2019 hearing, plaintiff and defendant testified they 

understood and agreed to be bound by the agreement. Additionally, defendant's 

attorney told the judge it would be "necessary to re-run child support, because 

there [was] going to be a fundamental change to the overnights" based on the 

agreement. 
5 A-3931-21

 The judge instructed counsel to file an appropriate application to modify 

child support because the March 2019 agreement only resolved the pending 

custody and parenting time issues. The judge explained "the parties [could] 

either . . . submit their own financials and agree to what . . . child support ought 

to be or make an application." Until then, the judge concluded, "[the current 

child support order] [would] remain in effect unless and until the parties either 

agree[d] to alter it or [made] an application for the [c]ourt to consider a 

modification." Counsel did not submit an order memorializing the terms of the 

March 2019 agreement to the court. 

On July 24, 2021, proceeding pro se, plaintiff filed a motion to modify 

child support retroactive to March 2019, and for other relief. Plaintiff asked the 

court to "recalculate child support amounts and percentages based on the change 

of living arrangements and the parties' household incomes." In her motion, 

plaintiff noted Jane lived with her "100% of the time" and Sue was "following 

the 9/5[] schedule." Additionally, plaintiff certified Jane was "attending a fulltime undergraduate program at Rutgers University, . . . and [was] not 

emancipated." 

On November 22, 2021, the Family Part judge entered an order scheduling 

a plenary hearing to resolve plaintiff's motion to modify child support. 
6 A-3931-21

Thereafter, the matter was transferred to a different Family Part judge. 

That judge conducted a case management conference and scheduled the plenary 

hearing for March 30, 2022. 

At the plenary hearing, plaintiff, who continued to proceed pro se, argued 

the Wunsch-Deffler formula was inapplicable because Jane spent one hundred 

percent of her overnights with plaintiff since March 2019. Defendant did not 

dispute this fact. Additionally, during the plenary hearing, defendant agreed his 

employer provided a car as part of his compensation package, and this in-kind 

benefit should be included in any child support analysis. 

Following the plenary hearing, in a May 4, 2022 order, the judge denied 

plaintiff's motion. The judge found no substantial change in circumstances since 

March 2019, notwithstanding that Jane spent no overnights with defendant. 

Additionally, the judge declined to consider defendant's employer-provided 

vehicle as an in-kind benefit and required the parties to "continue utilizing the 

50/50 Wunsch-Deffler doctrine for calculating child support." The judge 

concluded the "child support calculation remains even if [Jane] does not spend 

equal overnights with [p]laintiff and [d]efendant, as this was specifically agreed 

to in the [c]ustody and [v]isitation plan for [Jane]." 
7 A-3931-21

As to Sue's child support obligation, the judge noted her support 

obligation was not addressed as part of the March 2019 hearing. However, the 

judge determined there were no changed circumstances warranting a 

modification to Sue's child support. 

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the May 4, 2022 order. Plaintiff 

argued the right to child support belongs to the child, and the judge abused his 

discretion in failing to recalculate child support in accordance with the number 

of overnights the children spent with each parent and other changed 

circumstances. In a July 29, 2022 order, the judge denied plaintiff's motion for 

reconsideration, finding plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that it 

was in the children's best interests to change the current child support 

arrangement. 

On August 10, 2022, the Family Part judge entered a USSO reflecting the 

May 4, 2022 order. In that order, the judge wrote: 

Pursuant to [p]aragraphs 6, 7 and 10 of the May 4, 2022 

[c]ourt [o]rder, the court shall calculate child support 

under the 50/50 Wunsch-Deffler [d]octrine. 

[D]efendant shall receive a credit for overpayments in 

the amount of $30.50 per month since August 30, 2019. 

The credits shall be applied to [d]efendant's 

arrears . . . . 
8 A-3931-21

Plaintiff appeals from the May 4, July 29, and August 10, 2022 orders. 

On appeal, she contends there were changed circumstances warranting 

recalculation of the parties' child support obligations. Plaintiff further argues 

the judge erred in declining to consider defendant's employer provided a vehicle 

as an in-kind benefit, particularly because defendant acknowledged the vehicle 

would be considered in recalculating child support. We agree. 

Our review of orders issued by Family Part judges is limited. Cesare v. 

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). We "review [a] Family Part judge's findings 

in accordance with a deferential standard of review, recognizing the court's 

'special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters.'" Thieme v. AucoinThieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282-83 (2016) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413). 

"[F]indings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, 

substantial, credible evidence." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12 (citing Rova Farms 

Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). 

"When reviewing decisions granting or denying applications to modify 

child support, we examine whether, given the facts, the trial judge abused his or 

her discretion." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 325-26 (2013) (quoting Jacoby v. 

Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2012)). "The trial court's 'award 

will not disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly 
9 A-3931-21

contrary to reason or other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice.'" Id. at

326 (quoting Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 116). However, we review a Family 

Part judge's legal conclusions de novo. Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 

433-34 (App. Div. 2015). 

A party seeking to modify a child support obligation has the burden of 

demonstrating changed circumstances. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980). 

Any decision must be made in accordance with the best interests of the children. 

Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007). 

 A child support order is not immutable and may be modified upon a 

showing of substantially changed circumstances and a related showing of need. 

Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157; Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 116. A significant change in 

custody or parenting time constitutes a change in circumstances warranting 

modification of child support. See Winterberg v. Lupo, 300 N.J. Super. 125, 

133 (App. Div. 1997). A child's maturation may also warrant a modification of 

support. Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 420 (1999). Similarly, a child's needs 

while attending college may constitute a significant change of circumstances. 

Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 116. 

 Moreover, the changed circumstances analysis applies even when support 

has been fixed by an agreement incorporated into a divorce judgment. See J.B., 
10 A-3931-21

215 N.J. at 326-27. Parents may agree to allocate the payment of child support 

and deviate from child support guidelines, provided the terms of the agreement 

are fair and equitable, O.P. v. L.G.-P., 440 N.J. Super. 146, 155-56 (App. Div. 

2015), and the interests of the child are not prejudiced, Ordukaya v. Brown, 357 

N.J. Super. 231, 241 (App. Div. 2003). However, parents may not bargain away 

a child's right to support. Blum v. Ader, 279 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1994). 

 It is well-established that "[e]ach parent has a responsibility to share the 

costs of providing for the child while [the child] remains unemancipated." 

Martinetti v. Hickman, 261 N.J. Super. 508, 512 (App. Div. 1993). A parent's 

obligation to "proper[ly] support" an unemancipated child "to the extent that 

[one] is financially able" continues "even [if there is currently] no relationship 

between them." J.R. v. L.R., 386 N.J. Super. 475, 484 (App. Div. 2006). A 

parent's "continuing obligation to support the child must be based upon an 

evaluation of the child's needs and interests" regardless of whether the child 

maintains a relationship with the parent. Martinetti, 261 N.J. Super. at 512. 

 Generally, the child support guidelines in Appendix IX of the New Jersey 

Court Rules "shall be applied when an application to establish or modify child 

support is considered by the court." R. 5:6A. The annual number of overnights 

is a factor in applying the child support guidelines. See Child Support 
11 A-3931-21

Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendices IXA(14)(c)(2) and IX-D to R. 5:6A (2024).6

 

The Wunsch-Deffler doctrine deviates from the child support guidelines 

because the doctrine contemplates a true 50/50 parenting time situation. 

Wunsch-Deffler, 406 N.J. Super. at 507. Such a parenting time arrangement 

requires an adjustment to the child support guidelines because both parents pay 

the child's "controlled expenses" equally. Id. at 509. Controlled expenses 

include items such as clothing, personal care, and entertainment. Id. at 508. The 

Wunsch-Deffler doctrine eliminates controlled expenses in a 50/50 parenting 

time arrangement. Id. at 509.

Plaintiff argues the Wunsch-Deffler doctrine does not apply in calculating 

Jane's child support obligation because Jane spends one hundred percent of her 

6

 Based on the ages of the children at the time of the remand, we note that "child 

support guidelines are intended to apply to children who are less than [eighteen] 

years of age or more than [eighteen] years of age but still attending high school 

or a similar secondary educational institution." Additionally, the child support 

guidelines "may be applied in the court's discretion to support for students over 

[eighteen] years of age who commute to college." Id. at Appendix IX-A to R.

5:6A at ¶ 18. Further, it is well established that "[r]esort to the [c]hild [s]upport 

[g]uidelines . . . to make support calculations for college students living away 

from home is error" and "courts faced with the question of setting child support 

for college students living away from home must assess all applicable facts and 

circumstances, weighing the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23a." Jacoby, 

427 N.J. Super. at 113 (citation omitted). 
12 A-3931-21

overnights with plaintiff and has done so since March 2019. Defendant did not 

dispute that Jane spent no overnights with him. Plaintiff further contends a 

modification of Jane's child support obligation is warranted because: Jane is 

over the age of eighteen; Jane is attending college; and Jane declined to 

participate in reunification therapy with defendant. 

We agree these facts present changed circumstances warranting a 

modification of the parties' child support obligations for Jane. While the 

relationship between Jane and defendant may be strained, defendant has an 

obligation to provide financial support for her and the amount of support must 

be based on a judicial evaluation of Jane's needs and best interests. 

Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the Family Part judge 

mistakenly declined to find changed circumstances warranting a child support 

modification for Jane. On remand, the judge shall evaluate Jane's needs and best 

interests, among other factors, in recalculating her child support award. 

 We also remand to the Family Part to recalculate child support for Sue. 

The parties never addressed Sue's child support during the March 2019 hearing. 

On remand, the judge should evaluate Sue's needs and best interests in arriving 

at the amount of her child support. The judge should also consider Sue's 
13 A-3931-21

parenting time schedule and any other relevant considerations at the time of the 

remand proceeding. 

However, we reject plaintiff's request for modification of the parties' child 

support obligations retroactive to March 2019. A parties' child support 

obligation can only be "retroactively modified . . . from the date the notice of 

motion was mailed either directly or through the appropriate agent." N.J.S.A. 

2A:17-56.23a. Here, plaintiff filed her application to modify child support on 

July 24, 2021. On remand, the judge should use the July 24, 2021 filing date 

for recalculating the parties' child support obligations. 

Because we remand to the Family Part to recalculate child support for Jane 

and Sue based on changed circumstances, we need not address plaintiff's 

remaining arguments. Moreover, we note the remand judge should consider, if 

still applicable, defendant's employer-provided vehicle as an in-kind benefit in 

the child support recalculation. 

 Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We 

do not retain jurisdiction.