RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1011-16T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v. 

A.D.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER, 

WHOMSOEVER HE MAY BE,

Defendant.

____________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF C.G.,

Minor. 

____________________________________

Submitted May 2, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Leone and Vernoia.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, 

Docket No. FG-02-0033-16.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

June 9, 2017
2 A-1011-16T3

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Kourtney J.A. Knop, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; 

Nicholas Dolinsky, Deputy Attorney General, on 

the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney for minor (Nancy P. Fratz, 

Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

A.D. ("Mother") appeals the October 21, 2016 judgment 

terminating her parental rights over her son C.G. In her oral 

opinion, Jude Magali M. Francois found the New Jersey Division of 

Child Protection and Permanency ("Division") satisfied the bestinterests test under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). We affirm.1

I.

The following facts come from the trial court's oral opinion, 

except as indicated. C.G. has two older half siblings who were 

removed from Mother's care in 2003 due to Mother's substance abuse. 

The children were placed with their fathers. They have not been 

in Mother's care since 2005. 

 

1 The court also terminated the parental rights of the unknown 

biological father of C.G., who remains unidentified despite the 

administration of numerous paternity tests. 
3 A-1011-16T3

C.G. was born in 2010. The Division's evidence showed it 

received a referral at C.G.'s birth referencing Mother's history 

of substance abuse. However, during 2010, Mother's urine tests

were negative and she completed a substance abuse program at 

Comprehensive Behavioral Healthcare. 

On November 13, 2014, the Division received a referral from 

the police stating Mother was intoxicated at a party and could not 

care for C.G. Mother had glassy eyes, slurred speech, and an 

unsteady gait. Mother admitted drinking several beers and tequila 

shots while taking her prescribed medications, Xanax and 

Oxycodone.2

The Division executed an emergency removal the following day, 

placing C.G. with his maternal aunt.3 The trial court granted the 

Division custody of C.G. At Mother's suggestion, the Division

placed C.G. with his maternal uncle ("Uncle") and his wife ("Aunt") 

in Pennsylvania in April 2015. They continue to care for him and 

want to adopt him. 

The Division referred Mother for substance abuse treatment 

at Comprehensive Behavioral Healthcare, but she was ineligible 

 

2 The Division's evidence indicated Mother again tested positive 

for alcohol in late December 2014. 

3 According to the Division's case manager, the aunt later decided 

she could not provide C.G. long-term care. 
4 A-1011-16T3

because of her prescribed narcotic medications. Mother refused 

to attend another intensive outpatient substance abuse program. 

Mother submitted to a psychiatric evaluation and completed 

parenting classes, but she did not follow through with the 

recommendation to attend therapy, undergo ongoing urine screens, 

and enter a Mentally Ill, Chemically Addicted (MICA) program. 

Mother's psychiatric evaluation found she was addicted to Xanax 

and benzodiazepine and in need of a MICA program to address her 

substance abuse, depression, and anxiety. 

In April 2015, Mother was admitted to a MICA program at 

CarePlus Addictive Services Program to address her substance abuse 

and mental health issues. However, she was discharged in August 

2015 for inappropriate behavior, and failed to complete the 

program. In October 2015, Mother was taken to the hospital after 

planning to commit suicide by overdose, and was involuntarily 

committed. She then began inconsistently attending psychiatric 

and counseling services but was terminated for noncompliance. 

Mother was terminated from services at a mental health clinic in 

March 2016 and recommended for other programs, which she did not 

attend. 

Mother was again admitted to the hospital in January 2016 for 

alcohol intoxication and a head injury. Over the next two months, 

Mother tested positive for alcohol, cocaine, benzodiazepines, and 
5 A-1011-16T3

Oxycodone. In April 2016, Mother attended another psychiatric 

evaluation, in which it was recommended she attend a MICA program 

and detox from Xanax, neither of which Mother did. 

After removal, Mother initially had regular visits with C.G., 

but visitation and phone contact were suspended by May 2015 when 

Mother repeatedly made inappropriate comments to C.G. The Division 

tried to arrange therapeutic supervised visitation (TSV) but 

Mother was not accepted into the TSV programs because of her prior 

noncompliance. All contact between Mother and C.G. ceased in May 

2015. 

After repeatedly refusing to attend evaluations, Mother 

failed to attend the August 2016 guardianship trial, and presented 

no evidence. The trial court found the Division presented clear 

and convincing evidence that it was in the best interest of C.G. 

for Mother's parental rights to be terminated. Mother appeals. 

II.

"Appellate review of a trial court's decision to terminate 

parental rights is limited[.]" In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 

N.J. 440, 472 (2002). Our task is to determine whether the 

decision "is supported by '"substantial and credible evidence" 

[i]n the record.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 

211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012) (citation omitted). "We ordinarily defer 

to the factual findings of the trial court because it has the 
6 A-1011-16T3

opportunity to make first-hand credibility judgments about the 

witnesses who appear on the stand; it has a 'feel of the case' 

that can never be realized by a review of the cold record." N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) 

(citation omitted). 

"Particular deference is afforded to family court factfinding because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and 

expertise in family matters." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & 

Permanency v. N.C.M., 438 N.J. Super. 356, 367 (App. Div. 2014) 

(citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)), certif. 

denied, 222 N.J. 18 (2015). Thus, "[w]e will not overturn a family 

court's factfindings unless they are so '"wide of the mark"' that 

our intervention is necessary to correct an injustice." F.M., 

supra, 211 N.J. at 448 (citation omitted). We must hew to our 

deferential standard of review.

III.

"A parent's right to enjoy a relationship with his or her 

child is constitutionally protected." In re Guardianship of 

K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999). However, this protection "is 

tempered by the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect 

the welfare of children." Id. at 347; see N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1(a). 

Under Title Thirty, the Division must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the 
7 A-1011-16T3

best interest of the child. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15(c); F.M., supra, 

211 N.J. at 447. The Division must show:

(1) The child's safety, health, or 

development has been or will continue to 

be endangered by the parental 

relationship; 

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to 

eliminate the harm facing the child or 

is unable or unwilling to provide a safe 

and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to 

the harm. Such harm may include evidence 

that separating the child from his 

resource family parents would cause 

serious and enduring emotional or 

psychological harm to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts 

to provide services to help the parent 

correct the circumstances which led to 

the child's placement outside the home 

and the court has considered alternatives 

to termination of parental rights; and 

(4) Termination of parental rights will not 

do more harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).] 

A.

We first address whether the Division presented clear and 

convincing evidence to satisfy prongs one and two of the bestinterests test. The first two prongs "relate to the finding of 

harm arising out of the parental relationship." In re Guardianship 

of DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 378 (1999). They "are related to one 

another, and evidence that supports one informs and may support 
8 A-1011-16T3

the other as part of the comprehensive basis for determining the 

best interests of the child." Id. at 379.

Prong one "requires that the State demonstrate harm to the 

child by the parent" in the form of "endangerment of the child's 

health and development resulting from the parental relationship." 

K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348. The second prong requires the 

Division show "the harm is likely to continue because the parent 

is unable or unwilling to overcome or remove the harm." Ibid. 

Harm can be proven "by indications of parental dereliction 

and irresponsibility, such as the parent's continued or recurrent 

drug abuse . . . and the diversion of family resources in order 

to support a drug habit." Id. at 353. "[H]arm and risk of harm 

[can be] proven [where] the parents' drug use resulted in their 

failure to provide a stable home, with appropriate nurture and 

care of the young child[.]" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. 

v. H.R., 431 N.J. Super. 212, 222 (App. Div. 2013).

The trial court found that Mother's "untreated substance 

abuse and mental health issues have caused harm to C.G. and 

continue to pose a risk to his health, safety, and development" 

and that she was "unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm" or 

"safely care for her son within the foreseeable future." There 

was ample evidence to support those findings. 
9 A-1011-16T3

Dr. Frank J. Dyer, a psychologist with expertise in child 

abuse and neglect, testified about Mother's history of alcoholism 

and history of drug abuse, specifically cocaine.4 He found 

reunification with Mother "would place [C.G.] at risk for neglect 

because of [her] very erratic lifestyle punctuated by bouts of 

alcohol intoxication." Indeed, Mother tested positive for cocaine 

as recently as March 2016. 

In addition, Mother was "suffering from mental disorders 

which adversely affect [her] ability to parent" and showed she 

lacked "the mental status sufficient to eliminate the risk of 

future harm to the child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. 

A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 440 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, 

171 N.J. 44 (2002). Dr. Dyer noted Mother had a "history of 

psychiatric problems, primarily depression [and] episodes of 

extremely erratic disorganized behavior." He found Mother 

suffered from anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, and 

personality disorder with borderline antisocial and paranoid 

features. Her mental illness manifested in her interview, where 

she did not "deliver[] a . . . cohesive, rationale account of 

 

4 Dr. Dyer was unable to discuss Mother's history of alcoholism 

and cocaine abuse with her, as she walked out of her psychological 

evaluation.
10 A-1011-16T3

somebody who[se] life adjustment is within norm, but rather . . . 

a fragmentary, often contradictory, disorganized account." 

Dr. Dyer concluded:

The combination of [Mother]'s untreated 

alcohol and substance abuse problem, her 

tendency to have episodes of scattered and 

confused thinking processes, her emotional 

volatility, her paranoid stance toward others, 

and her continued antisocial acting out 

resulting in multiple arrests is a seemingly 

insurmountable obstacle to the subject's 

achieving adequate parenting capacity within 

the foreseeable future. 

Dr. Dyer also testified to the "psychological[] abus[e]" 

Mother inflicted on C.G. Mother would "threaten[] to withdraw her 

love," "threaten[] suicide . . . in front of the child," and 

"tell[] [him] that if he did not behave that he should go and get 

another mommy." Dr. Dyer found this was "terribly destructive to 

the child's formation of a sense of self, specifically the child's 

self-esteem" and could impact "the child's capacity for developing 

intimate relationships in adolescence and adulthood." Dr. Dyer 

testified that if C.G. were placed in Mother's care, there would 

be "a risk of emotional abuse."

The Law Guardian called Dr. Elizabeth Smith, a psychologist 

with expertise in abuse and neglect cases, who testified there was 

"emotional abandonment" by Mother. Mother, during visits and 

phone contact, "would just say things that were incredibly 
11 A-1011-16T3

inappropriate and emotionally rejecting to him," including telling 

C.G. "I don't love you anymore when you do this." Mother also 

"would put him in a high chair and then turn the light out and 

walk out of the room." C.G. said Mother "choked him with a 

necklace." Dr. Smith noted C.G. "didn't even refer to [Mother]

as his mother," instead calling her "the bad lady" or "the zombie 

mommy."5 

Both experts found Mother's abusive and neglectful treatment 

caused C.G. to have behavioral problems and post-traumatic 

symptoms, including bed-wetting. Dr. Dyer found little if any 

likelihood Mother could eliminate her substance abuse, mental 

illness, and abusive behavior, or be able to parent C.G. without 

inflicting further harm. Moreover, Mother was noncompliant with 

all substance abuse and mental health programs. Dr. Dyer testified 

"her prognosis for being able to address these things successfully 

is extremely poor." 

Further, as the trial court found, Mother lacked stable 

housing or employment. She claimed she had her own housing, but 

the evidence showed she had been kicked out of an apartment, was 

staying with the father of an elder son with whom she could not 

have contact, and her employer was unknown. 

 

5 Dr. Smith noted Mother repeatedly exposed C.G. to "frightening 

horror movies that were much too intense for a young child." 
12 A-1011-16T3

Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support the 

trial court's findings on prongs one and two. 

B.

To satisfy prong three, the Division must have "made 

reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct 

the circumstance which led to the child's placement outside the 

home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of 

parental rights." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).

The trial court correctly found the Division clearly and 

convincingly demonstrated it made reasonable efforts to assist 

Mother. The Division repeatedly referred Mother for substance 

abuse assessment and treatment. The Division set up psychiatric 

evaluations and psychological evaluations and referred Mother for

counseling. Mother also had frequent visitation with C.G. until 

it was terminated, at which point the Division made reasonable 

efforts to institute therapeutic supervised visitation. 

Mother argues the Division failed to tailor its services to 

her. Mother claims she should have been allowed to return to 

Comprehensive Behavioral Healthcare. The Division attempted to 

place Mother there, but she was rejected because she was taking 

prescribed narcotic medications. The Division is not to blame if 

Mother's drug use precluded her preferred program. Further, the 

Division provided other services that would aid Mother to overcome
13 A-1011-16T3

her dependency on those medications, and be eligible for admittance 

at Comprehensive Behavioral Healthcare, but she failed to comply. 

"'The diligence of [the Division]'s efforts on behalf of a 

parent is not measured by' whether those efforts were successful." 

F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 452 (citation omitted). Rather, the 

Division's efforts are measured "against the standard of adequacy 

in light of all the circumstances of a given case." DMH, supra, 

161 N.J. at 393. 

Mother, having lost her visitation rights with C.G. because 

of her inappropriate comments, argues the Division failed to 

provide TSV. However, the Division made reasonable efforts. A 

referral was made to Children's Aid and Family Services, which 

would not accept her due to her history of noncompliance and denial 

of substance abuse. Further, the Division made a referral to 

CarePlus, which also would not accept Mother due to her previous 

termination from its program for bad behavior. Mother further 

argues the Division erred in not looking to a doctor frequently 

used by the Division. However, there was no evidence the doctor 

would have provided TSV services to Mother. In any event, the 

court credited both experts' testimony that restoring visitation 

would harm C.G.'s well-being.

In the same vein, Mother argues the Division did not 

adequately review relative placements for C.G. Mother argues the 
14 A-1011-16T3

Division improperly evaluated C.G.'s maternal grandmother and 

godfather. "The Division must perform a reasonable investigation 

of such relatives that is fair, but also sensitive to the passage 

of time and the child's critical need for finality and permanency." 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J. Super. 69, 

87 (App. Div. 2013), certif. denied, 217 N.J. 587 (2014). 

The Division considered placement with C.G.'s maternal 

grandmother and godfather but determined it was not in C.G.'s best 

interest because C.G. had been placed for six months with Aunt and 

Uncle, who were "providing sufficient care and [were] fully 

committed to caring for him long term." "[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1] 

and a related regulation, N.J.A.C. 10:120A-3.1, allow the Division 

to rule out a relative on such 'best-interests' grounds, regardless 

of the relative's willingness or ability to care for a child." 

Id. at 75. "This is especially true in light of this State's 

'strong public policy in favor of permanency.'" Id. at 88, 89 

(quoting K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 357) (noting the "child has 

been in a positive foster home environment for a prolonged period"

of ten months). The Division's decision was further justified by 

the maternal grandmother and godfather, who agreed C.G. should 

remain with Aunt and Uncle. 
15 A-1011-16T3

C.

To satisfy the fourth prong, the Division must prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that "[t]ermination of parental rights 

will not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). 

Prong four "serves as a fail-safe against termination even where 

the remaining standards have been met." N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 609 (2007).

Dr. Dyer completed a bonding evaluation with C.G. and his 

foster parents. Dr. Dyer concluded C.G. was profoundly attached 

to his foster parents, referring to them as "dad" and "mom." By 

contrast, C.G. was terrified of seeing Mother. Dr. Smith also 

performed an evaluation of C.G. She similarly testified C.G. "was 

very happy" with Aunt and Uncle, but when C.G. was "questioned 

about his mother," "he seem[ed] to regress and go back to bed 

wetting . . . and being worried." 

No bonding evaluation was performed with C.G. and Mother. 

Dr. Smith opined "it would not be in [C.G.'s] best interest . . . 

to see his mother on a . . . one-time occasion even for a bonding 

evaluation." Dr. Smith testified if C.G. were to see Mother he 

would "become so overwhelmed by anxiety that he might have . . . 

some psychotic incident" that "might be very distressing for him 

and take time for him to recover." Dr. Dyer concurred that a 

bonding evaluation with Mother would be detrimental to C.G.
16 A-1011-16T3

Generally, to satisfy the fourth prong, the Division should 

present comparative bonding "'testimony of a well qualified expert 

who has had full opportunity to make a comprehensive, objective, 

and informed evaluation of the child's relationship' with the 

natural parents and the foster parents." N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 559, 564 (2014) (quoting In 

re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 19 (1992)). Here, the trial 

court credited Dr. Smith's testimony that C.G. would be traumatized 

by a bonding evaluation with Mother. That was one of the "few 

scenarios in which comparative evaluations would not be required." 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R., 405 N.J. Super. 418, 

440 (App. Div. 2009). 

Moreover, Dr. Dyer testified he had enough data to form an 

opinion about the relationship between C.G. and Mother without 

seeing them together. Dr. Dyer testified he had rarely seen a 

child who was more negative toward his birth mother. Mother 

expressed her own view of her relationship with C.G., telling 

Division workers "take him. Let them adopt him. I don't want 

him." Mother cannot fault Dr. Dyer's information as incomplete 

when she prevented further inquiry by storming out of his 

evaluation. 

The trial court credited Dr. Dyer's testimony that placing

C.G. in Mother's custody would cause him catastrophic 
17 A-1011-16T3

psychological harm, remove the center of his emotional world, and 

cause him to suffer enormous regression. The court found C.G. was 

flourishing with Aunt and Uncle, who were providing him with a 

stable and happy home, were facilitating contact between C.G. and 

his half siblings, and who were committed to adopting C.G. The 

court found that permanency should not be further delayed and that 

C.G. must not be held hostage by Mother's inaction. See N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Family Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App. 

Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 456 (2004). The evidence amply 

supported those findings and the court's conclusion that it would 

not do more harm than good to terminate Mother's parental rights. 

Affirmed.