alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### W. M. HARRELSON v. WILMINGTON COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY.

(Filed 1 November, 1935.)

Appeal and Error P b — Exception to judgment of nonsuit without exception to court’s order allowing defendant’s motion therefor is insufficient.

Where appellant does not except to the court’s order allowing defendant’s motion for judgment as of nonsuit at the close of all the evidence, and the sole exception is to the judgment, the order is not subject to review on appeal, and the judgment will be affirmed when no error appears upon its face.

Appeal by plaintiff from *Grady, J.,*at November Term, 1934, of OoluMbus.

Affirmed.

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff and caused, as alleged in the complaint, by the negligence of the defendant.

At the close of all the evidence the defendant moved for judgment dismissing the action as of nonsuit. The motion was allowed. The plaintiff did not except to the order allowing the motion. There was judgment dismissing the action as of nonsuit.

The plaintiff excepted to the judgment and appealed to the Supreme Court.

*Powell & Lewis for plaintiff.*

*Tucker & Proctor and Carr, Poisson & James for defendant.*

*705Pee. CubiaM.

Tbe plaintiff did not except to tbe order of tbe trial court, allowing tbe motion of tbe defendant, at tbe close of all tbe evidence, for judgment as of nonsuit. For tbis reason, tbe order is not subject to review by tbis Court.

Tbe only exception in tbe record is to tbe judgment. As there is no error in tbe judgment, it must be affirmed. *McCoy v. Trust Co.,*204 N. C., 721, 169 S. E., 644, and cases there cited.

Affirmed.
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Momolu B. Stewart, 

Plaintiff, 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

FILED 

AUG - 5 ;r'~1 

Clerk, U.S. District & bankruptcy 

Cour1S for the District of Columbia 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 10 1313 

Ass't u.s. Attorney 

Albert A. Herring et al., 

Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

This matter is before the Court on review of plaintiff s pro se complaint and application 

to proceed in forma pauperis. The application will be granted and the case will be dismissed 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under that statute, the Court is required to screen a prisoner's 

complaint and dismiss it if, among other grounds, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. 

Plaintiff is a District of Columbia prisoner at the Federal Correctional Center in Coleman, 

Florida. He sues the assistant United States attorney who prosecuted him and a Metropolitan 

Police Department crime scene investigator for allegedly conspiring to lie during his criminal 

trial about "a key piece of evidence - a bullet." CompI. at 5. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief 

and monetary damages totaling $400 million. 

Because by his own acknowledgment plaintiff s success on the merits of the complaint 

would necessarily invalidate his conviction, he cannot recover monetary damages without first 

establishing that the conviction has been invalidated by "revers[al] on direct appeal, 
expunge [ ment] by executive order, declar[ ation of invalidity] by a state tribunal authorized to 

make such determination, or ... a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Plaintiff has made no such showing here. In addition, 

"it is well-settled that a [person] seeking relief from his conviction or sentence may not bring [] 

an action" for injunctive and declaratory relief because he has an available remedy in habeas. 

Williams v. Hill, 74 F.3d 1339,1340 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 

(1973); Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 808-10 (D.C. Cir. 1988»; see LoBue v. 

Christopher, 82 F.3d 1081, 1082-84 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (district court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action where habeas corpus remedy was available in the 

location of plaintiffs custodian). Accordingly, the complaint will be dismissed. See Stewart v. 

Assistant United States Attorney, Civil Action No.1 0-1014 (D.D.C., June 17,2010) (dismissing 

under Heck). A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

Dat~-F--__ '2010 

2
II 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3441 

To amend the Community Development Banking and Financial Institutions 

Act of 1994 to reauthorize and improve the community development 

financial institutions bond guarantee program, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 5, 2022 

Ms. SMITH (for herself and Mr. ROUNDS) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 

Urban Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend the Community Development Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1994 to reauthorize and improve 

the community development financial institutions bond 

guarantee program, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘CDFI Bond Guarantee 

5 Program Improvement Act of 2022’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 3441 IS

1 SEC. 2. GUARANTEES FOR BONDS AND NOTES ISSUED FOR 

2 COMMUNITY OR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 

3 PURPOSES. 

4 Section 114A of the Community Development Bank5 ing and Financial Institutions Act of 1994 (12 U.S.C. 

6 4713a) is amended— 

7 (1) in subsection (c)(2), by striking ‘‘, multi8 plied by an amount equal to the outstanding prin9 cipal balance of issued notes or bonds’’; 

10 (2) in subsection (e)(2)(B), by striking 

11 ‘‘$100,000,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$25,000,000’’; and 

12 (3) by striking subsection (k). 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
Laura J. Richardson

General, USA

Commander

U.S. Southern Command

General Laura J. Richardson is a native of Northglenn, Colorado 

and a graduate of Metropolitan State University of Denver, 

Colorado. She was commissioned into the U.S. Army and trained 

as an Army Aviator. She holds a Master of Science in National 

Resource Strategy from the National Defense University’s 

Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and 

Resource Strategy.

General Richardson previously served as the Commanding 

General of U.S. Army North (Fifth Army) at Fort Sam Houston, 

Texas, which is the Army Service Component Command for U.S. 

Northern Command.

Other assignments as a General Officer include Deputy Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces 

Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Chief of Army Legislative Liaison to the U.S. Congress in 

Washington D.C.; Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications at Headquarters International Security 

Assistance Force in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Kabul, Afghanistan; Deputy 

Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas; and Commanding General of 

the U.S. Army Operational Test Command at Fort Hood, Texas. 

Over her career General Richardson has commanded from the Company to Theater Army level. She 

commanded an Assault Helicopter Battalion in combat in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 

deploying her unit from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Iraq 2003-04, in support of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. She has also served in numerous staff assignments at a myriad of locations, including 

Military Aide to the Vice President at the White House in Washington, D.C., the Army’s Legislative 

Liaison to Congress at the U.S. Capitol, and at the Pentagon as an Army Campaign Planner. 

General Richardson’s awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, 

Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf 

Cluster), Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters), Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal 

(with four Oak Leaf Clusters), and the Air Medal (with Numeral 7). She also has various unit, service 

and campaign awards, and numerous badges, including the Combat Action Badge, Parachutist 

Badge, Air Assault Badge, Senior Army Aviator Badge, Vice-Presidential Service Badge and the Army 

Staff Identification Badge. 

She is married to Lieutenant General (Retired) Jim Richardson and they have one daughter and a 

grandchild.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-3214
DUREMEA ANN BUGGS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; THE AMERICAN RED CROSS; SAINT ELIZABETH'S HOSPITAL; GWENDOLYN L. BUGGS; DEBORAH E. ROBERTSON; JAMES LOVETT; ANNE B. SALISBURY, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, District Judge. (CA-95-766-5-BR) Submitted: May 16, 1996 Decided: May 28, 1996 Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.Duremea Ann Buggs, Appellant Pro Se. Phillip J. Anthony, PATTERSON, DILTHEY, CLAY & BRYSON, Raleigh, North Carolina; Virginia Anne Gibbons, Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's orders dismissingher civil complaint as frivolous, denying her motion for reconsideration, and denying her motion to vacate. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinions and find no abuse of discretion and no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Buggs v. United States , No. CA-95- 766-5-BR (E.D.N.C. Oct. 18, 1995; Nov. 7, 1995; and Dec. 26, 1995). We also deny Appellant's motions for correction of the record on appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3350 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 3350

 To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to condition an institution 
  of higher education's receipt of Federal assistance on waiving the 
  application for enrollment fee for homeless children and youths and 
students who were in foster care at any time when the students were 13 
                         years of age or older.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            December 9, 2021

Ms. Rosen (for herself and Mr. Portman) introduced the following bill; 
     which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, 
                     Education, Labor, and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to condition an institution 
  of higher education's receipt of Federal assistance on waiving the 
  application for enrollment fee for homeless children and youths and 
students who were in foster care at any time when the students were 13 
                         years of age or older.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Helping Foster and Homeless Youth 
Achieve Act''.

SEC. 2. WAIVER OF APPLICATION FEES FOR HOMELESS CHILDREN AND YOUTHS AND 
              FOSTER YOUTH.

    Part G of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
1088 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 493E. WAIVER OF APPLICATION FEES FOR HOMELESS CHILDREN AND 
              YOUTHS AND FOSTER YOUTH.

    ``In order for an institution of higher education, or a student 
enrolled at the institution, to receive Federal assistance under this 
Act, the institution shall waive the application for enrollment fee for 
homeless children and youths (as defined in section 725 of the 
McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 11434a)) and for a 
student who was in foster care at any time when the individual was 13 
years of age or older, as indicated on the Free Application for Federal 
Student Aid submitted by the student.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Elizabeth Cowart, plaintiff in error, *vs.*James A. Revere, defendant in error.

Where It does not appear in the petition for *certiorari*that the execution based upon a laborers’ or mechanics’ lien foreclosed before a Justice of the Peace of a district in which the petitioner did not reside, was not to be levied upon property in the district in which she resided, or that she had filed a counter-affidavit, as required by section 1970 of the Code, or if she had done so, that the proceedings would not have been returned, and the case tried in the district of her residence, it was not error in the Judge to refuse his sanction. (R.)

Refusal of *certiorari.*Laborers’ lie% Before Judge Clark. Sumter county. At Chambers. February 15th, 1872.

For the facts of this case, see the decision.

John R. Worrill, for plaintiff in error.

No appearance for defendant.

*10Warner, Chief Justice.

This was an application to the Judge of the Superior Court for a *certiorari*on the ground that a Justice of the Peace of a militia district in which the petitioner did not reside, had foreclosed a laborers’ or mechanics’ lien and issued an execution. The *certiorari*was refused and the petitioner excepted. It does not appear in the petition that the lien *fi. fa.*was not to be levied on property and executed in the militia district in which the petitioner resided, or that she had filed a counter-affidavit, as required by the 1970th section of the Code, or if she had done so, that the proceedings would not have been returned and the case tried in the district in which she resided.

Let the judgment of the Court below be affirmed.
#### THOMAS COWART v. SUNCREST LUMBER COMPANY and DEWEY CORBIN.

(Filed 21 December, 1927.)

Removal of Causes — Diverse Citizenship — Severable Controversy — Fraudulent Joinder.

Upon a motion to remove a canse from the State to the Federal Court, the question of severable controversy will be determined in the State court from the facts as alleged in the complaint, and upon the question of fraudulent joinder of a resident defendant, the undisputed facts of the matter must unerringly lead to the legal conclusion that the moving defendant has the right under the Federal removal act.

*788Appeal by defendant, Suncrest Lumber Company, from *Stack, J.-,*at May Term, 1927, of Haywood.

Affirmed.

*J. Frank Bay, Jr., and Morgan S Ward for plaintiff.*

*BoTlins & Smothers for Suncrest Lumber Company.*

Pee CuRiam.

From a careful inspection of tbe record we are of the opinion that the court below was correct in denying the motion for removal of this action by the appellant defendant. This action is in many respects similar to *Crisp v. Fibre Co.,*193 N. C., p. 77. We repeat what was held in the *Crisp action, supra,*at p. 85: “The facts alleged in the petition for removal neither compel nor point unerringly to the conclusion that the joinder in the instant case is a fraudulent one and made without right. *We*hold,, therefore:

1. That when a motion to remove a suit or action from the State court to the District Court of the United States for trial is made on the ground of an alleged separable controversy, the question of separability is to be determined by the manner in which the plaintiff has elected to state his cause of action, whether separately or jointly, and, for this purpose, the allegations of the complaint are controlling. *Morganton v.*Hutton, 187 N. C., 736.

2. That when the motion to remove is made on the ground of an alleged fraudulent joinder, the petitioner is entitled to have the State court decide the question on the face of the record, taking, for this purpose, the allegations of the petition to be true. To warrant a removal in such case, however, the facts alleged in the petition must lead unerringly to the conclusion, or rightly engender and compel the conclusion, as a matter of law, aside from the deductions of the pleader, that the joinder is a fraudulent one in "law and made without right. *Fore v. Tanning Co.,*175 N. c., 584.” The judgment below is

Affirmed.
Exhibit 10





Exhibit 10.2

AMENDMENT DATED AUGUST 5, 2009 TO THE

VOYANT INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, INC. 2009 CONSULTANT STOCK PLAN

In accordance with Section 8(a) of that certain Voyant International Corporation, Inc. 2009 Consultant Stock Plan (the “Plan”), the board of directors of Voyant International Corporation, Inc. does hereby amend the Plan by deleting Section 4(a) which states:

Shares of stock which may be issued or granted under the Plan shall be authorized and unissued or treasury shares of Common Stock. The aggregate maximum number of shares of Common Stock which may be issued as a grant of Award Shares shall not exceed 10,000,000 shares of Common Stock (the “Stock Pool”).

and by replacing it with the following:

Shares of stock which may be issued or granted under the Plan shall be authorized and unissued or treasury shares of Common Stock. The aggregate maximum number of shares of Common Stock which may be issued as a grant of Award Shares shall not exceed 20,000,000 shares of Common Stock (the “Stock Pool”).

In all other respects, the terms and conditions of the Plan shall remain the same.

WHEREFORE, this Amendment dated August 5, 2009 to the Voyant International Corporation, Inc. 2009 Consultant Stock Plan may be executed in counterparts and with facsimile signatures with the effect as if all parties hereto had executed the same document. All counterparts shall be construed together and shall constitute a single Written Consent.

[SIGNATURES APPEAR ON NEXT PAGE]








DIRECTORS:

		
	 
	 

	 
	/s/ DANA WALDMAN


	 
	Dana Waldman







		
	 
	 

	 
	/s/ MARK M. LAISURE


	 
	Mark M. Laisure







		
	 
	 

	 
	/s/ VOLKER ANHAEUSSER


	 
	Volker Anhaeusser
MANDATE

Court of Appeals 

 

First District of Texas 

NO. 01-16-00890-CV

PRAISE DELIVERANCE CHURCH, Appellant

V.

JELINIS, LLC AND HREAL COMPANY, LLC, Appellees

Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3 of Harris County. (Tr. Ct. No. 

1080764).

TO THE COUNTY CIVIL COURT AT LAW NO. 3 OF HARRIS COUNTY, 

GREETINGS:

Before this Court, on the 19th day of October 2017, the case upon appeal to revise 

or to reverse your judgment was determined. This Court made its order in these words:

This case is an appeal from the final judgment signed 

by the trial court on August 16, 2016. After inspecting the 

record of the court below, the Court holds that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over those issues in this appeal that 

challenge the county court’s judgment awarding possession of 

the property which is commonly known as 2400 Eastex 

Freeway, Houston, TX 77026 to appellees Jelinis, LLC and 

HREAL Company LLC. Accordingly, the Court dismisses

this portion of the appeal.

The Court further holds that there was no reversible error in the 

remaining portions of the trial court’s judgment. Therefore, the 
Court affirms the remaining portions of the trial court’s 

judgment.

The Court orders that the appellant, Praise Deliverance 

Church pay all appellate costs.

The Court orders that this decision be certified below 

for observance.

Judgment rendered October 19, 2017.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and 

Judge. Opinion delivered by Justice Judge.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court 

in this behalf and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

May 25, 2018

Date CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE

CLERK OF THE COURT
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 22 - 0727 RASTA K. DOUGLAS WALID

Petitioner and Appellant v. STATE OF MONTANA, ATTORNEY GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV ICES, CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

Respondents and Appellees **ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME** Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for extension of t ime, there being no objection from

th e Appellant , and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that App ellee is granted an e xtension of

time to and including April 2 4 , 2023, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appell ee’s opening brief on appeal .

Electronically signed by: Bowen Greenwood Clerk of the Supreme Court March 20 2023

03/20/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0727