Filed 8/23/24 Conservatorship of the Person of Lateasa G. CA2/7

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

Conservatorship of the Person of 

LATEASA G.

 B333562

 (Los Angeles County Super. 

 Ct. No. 23NWMH00253)

Public Guardian of County of Los 

Angeles County, as Conservator, 

etc., 

Petitioner, Respondent,

and Real Party in Interest,

v.

LATEASA G.,

Objector and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Scott R. Herin, Judge. Dismissed.

Christian C. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Laura Quinonez, 

Assistant County Counsel, and William C. Sias, Senior Deputy 

County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.

__________________________

Lateasa G. is a conservatee subject to a conservatorship 

under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act (Welf. & Inst. 

Code,1 § 5000 et seq.). Lateasa contends the trial court failed to 

advise her of her right to a jury trial before taking her personal 

waiver of the right in violation of Probate Code section 1828, 

subdivision (a)(6). The Los Angeles County Office of the Public 

Guardian (Public Guardian) does not dispute that the superior 

court failed to provide an adequate jury trial advisement, but it 

argues any error was harmless because substantial evidence 

shows that Lateasa did not have the capacity to make a knowing 

and intelligent waiver of her right to a jury trial.

On August 7, 2024, while this appeal was pending, the 

appointed conservator (then Kerri Otis) filed a petition for 

reappointment. The one-year conservatorship was scheduled to 

expire on August 10, 2024. We requested the parties submit 

supplemental briefing on whether termination of the 

conservatorship rendered this appeal moot. Lateasa’s attorney 

submitted a letter brief stating termination of the 

conservatorship would render the appeal moot, and further, there 

are no unsettled legal issues for which we should exercise our 

discretion to review. We agree that we can no longer grant 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.
3

Lateasa effective relief given that Lateasa will have an 

opportunity to have a jury trial (and a proper advisement) before 

the conservator is reappointed and there are no factors that 

support our exercise of discretion to consider the appeal. We

dismiss the appeal as moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Appointment of the Conservator

On May 18, 2023 the Public Guardian filed a petition under 

sections 5008, subdivision (h)(1)(A), and 5350 through 5368 to be 

appointed as the conservator of Lateasa’s person and estate. On 

June 12, 2023 the superior court held an initial hearing on the 

petition, and the matter was set for trial on August 11, 2023. At 

the June 12 hearing, the following colloquy took place:

“The court: Thank you. Good morning, Miss [G.].

“Lateasa G.: Good morning. [¶]. . . [¶]

“Counsel for Lateasa G.: So Miss [G.] would like a court trial. I 

would like to ask the court to appoint Dr. D’Iingillo.

“The court: All right. Court appoints Dr. Pietro D’Ingillo 

confidentially to report on grave disability. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] And 

court orders transportation and sets the matter for court trial on 

August 10, 2023, 1:30 p.m. Transportation is ordered. 

“Miss [G.], did you have any questions for me?

“Lateasa G.: No. It’s just that I just wanted to have a trial by 

jury. Can I speak for myself?
4

“Counsel for Lateasa G.: You can tell the judge something right 

now, but we are going to have a court trial in front of the judge. 

That’s what you want, right?

“Lateasa G.: Is that who he is?

“Counsel for Lateasa G.: This is the judge (indicating).

“The court: Probably. There’s always a chance I might have the 

day off, but I am usually here.

“Lateasa G.: Okay. Is that August 10th?

“The court: Yes, ma’am.

“Counsel for Lateasa G.: August 10th at 1:30.

“Lateasa G.: So how am I going to get back down here?

“The court: I am arranging transportation for you.

“Lateasa G.: Okay.

“The court: So is that okay with you?

“Lateasa G.: That’s fine.

[¶]. . . [¶]

“The court: . . . . See you on August 10th. Nice to see you.

“Lateasa G.: Okay. Thank you, judge.

“The court: Oh, Miss [G.], I didn’t say this out loud. So you 

would agree to have a court trial and not a jury trial; is that 

correct?

“Lateasa G.: Yes, court trial, not jury.

“The court: Jury trial waiver is taken.”
5

On August 10 Lateasa appeared remotely for trial, with her 

attorney appearing in person. At the outset of the hearing, the 

superior court stated, “We are here for a court trial. Jury trial 

waiver was previously taken.” The court then inquired whether 

Lateasa preferred a closed or private hearing, and she responded 

that she preferred a private hearing. The court proceeded with a 

confidential proceeding. 

At the court trial, Lateasa’s treating psychiatrist, Viet 

Nguyen, M.D., testified that he diagnosed Lateasa with 

schizophrenia, and she had delusions and an inability to 

differentiate between reality and non-reality. As a result, she 

could not provide for her own food, clothing, and shelter. 

Dr. Nguyen opined that Lateasa was gravely disabled. Further,

Lateasa had been prescribed psychiatric medications, but 

Dr. Nguyen did not believe she would take them voluntarily 

because she did not believe she had a mental illness. Therefore, 

Dr. Nguyen stated, Lateasa needed to receive treatment and 

rehabilitation in a residential treatment facility. Lateasa 

testified that she was married, did not need to see a doctor, and 

had talked to the judge when he came to her house. When the 

court inquired as to why she did not need a conservator, Lateasa

responded that they robbed and harassed her at work. 

After hearing argument from counsel, the superior court 

granted the petition and appointed Public Guardian as the 

conservator over Lateasa’s person. The court explained that 

based on the testimony of Dr. Nguyen and Lateasa, Lateasa had 

a delusion that she was employed and had a home, although she 

was homeless.

The superior court expressed its concern that because of 

Lateasa’s mental illness, she would not be able to provide her 
6

own food, clothing, and shelter. The court therefore found beyond 

a reasonable doubt that Lateasa was gravely disabled.

B. August 2024 Petition for Reappointment of Conservator

On August 5, 2024, in advance of the August 10 date for 

termination of the conservatorship, Kerri Otis, as the 

conservator, filed a petition for reappointment as the conservator 

for Lateasa. The conservator provided notice of a hearing on the 

petition scheduled for August 28, 2024.2

DISCUSSION

A. The LPS Act

“The LPS Act governs the involuntary detention, 

evaluation, and treatment of persons who, as a result of mental 

disorder, are dangerous or gravely disabled. (§ 5150 et seq.) The 

Act authorizes the superior court to appoint a conservator of the 

person for one who is determined to be gravely disabled (§ 5350 

et seq.), so that he or she may receive individualized treatment, 

supervision, and placement (§ 5350.1).” (Conservatorship of 

John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142 (John L.); accord, 

Conservatorship of Jose B. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 963, 969-970.) 

“As defined by the Act, a person is ‘gravely disabled’ if, as a result 

of a mental disorder, the person ‘is unable to provide for his or 

her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.” (§ 5008, 

subd. (h)(1)(A).)” (John L., at p. 142; accord, Jose B., at p. 970.) 

2 We augment the record with the August 5, 2024 petition for 

reappointment of conservator and notice of hearing. (Cal. Rules 

of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
7

An LPS conservatorship automatically terminates after one year, 

and the conservator may seek reappointment by filing a petition. 

(§ 5361.) A proposed conservatee has a right to a jury trial upon 

demand at the establishment and annual renewal of a 

conservatorship. (Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 

529, 541-542; Conservatorship of Joanne R. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 

1009, 1016 (Joanne R.); see § 5350, subd. (d).)

B. Jury Trial Waivers Under the LPS Act 

“‘LPS commitment proceedings require the court to obtain a 

personal waiver of the right to a jury trial from the proposed 

conservatee.’” (Joanne R., supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 1016; see 

Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 383; 

Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (a)(6).) Further, Probate Code 

section 1828, subdivision (a)(6), which is incorporated into the 

LPS Act by Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350, requires 

the trial court to inform the proposed conservatee of his or her 

right to a jury trial. (People v. Washington (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 

453, 468.)

Generally, with respect to civil commitments, the failure of 

a court to obtain a valid jury trial waiver where required by 

statute “denies the defendant his or her statutory right to a jury 

trial,” and is a “‘miscarriage of justice’ within the meaning of 

article VI, section 13 [of the California Constitution] [that] 

requires reversal without inquiry into the strength of the 

evidence in a particular case.” (People v. Blackburn (2015) 

61 Cal.4th 1113, 1132-1133 [failure to obtain valid jury trial 

waiver from mentally disordered offender in civil commitment 

proceeding was reversible error]; accord, People v. Tran (2015) 

61 Cal.4th 1160, 1169 [trial court’s acceptance of invalid jury trial 
8

waiver in commitment proceeding for defendant who pleaded not 

guilty by reason of insanity “is not susceptible to ordinary 

harmless error analysis and automatically requires reversal”]; 

Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384-385 [trial court’s 

failure to advise LPS conservatee of her right to a jury trial and 

to obtain personal waiver of that right was reversible error]; 

Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1253 

[reversing conservatorship order where trial court erred in 

accepting counsel’s waiver of LPS conservatee’s right to jury trial 

over conservatee’s objection]; but see Conservatorship of C.O.

(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894, 917-919 [trial court’s failure to 

personally advise proposed conservatee of his right to a jury trial 

was harmless error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 

836 because the evidence showed conservatee was gravely 

disabled at the time of trial and there was no evidence he would 

have elected to have a jury trial had he been personally advised 

of his right].)

C. Lateasa’s Appeal Is Moot

On appeal, Lateasa contends the superior court erred in 

failing to advise her of her right to a jury trial before taking her 

personal waiver of that right, requiring reversal. In its 

respondent’s brief, Public Guardian concedes the superior court 

erred, but it argues the error was harmless because Lateasa

lacked the capacity to understand and waive her right to a jury 

trial. As discussed, the current conservator has now filed a 

petition for reappointment as the conservator for Lateasa, and 
9

the initial one-year conservatorship has expired.3 The 

conservator gave notice of a hearing on the petition set for

August 28, 2024. We agree with Lateasa’s position in her 

supplemental letter brief that her appeal has been rendered moot 

by the expiration of the conservatorship because she will have a 

right to a jury trial (and advisement of that right) with respect to 

a hearing on the pending petition to reappoint the conservator.

As Lateasa explains, “The facts of this case are not unique and 

there is no need for additional published authority on the 

subject.” 

“A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual 

controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and 

not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, 

or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the 

matter in issue in the case before it.”’” (In re D.P. (2023) 

14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) “A case becomes moot when events 

‘“render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in 

favor of plaintiff, to grant [the plaintiff] any effect[ive] relief.”’ 

[Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be 

met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. 

Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being 

rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” (Id. at p. 276.) An 

appeal from appointment of a conservator becomes moot if the 

conservatorship expires prior to resolution of the appeal. (See 

John L., supra, 48 Cal.4th 131 at p. 142, fn. 2; Conservatorship of 

K.Y. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 985, 988 [appeal of conservatorship 

3 We assume that the conservatorship has been extended

pending reappointment of the conservator, but we do not have a 

record of an extension.
10

appointment was moot where conservatorship expired more than 

three months prior to issuance of opinion].) 

However, even where an appeal is moot, “courts may 

exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the 

dispute.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) The Supreme 

Court in D.P. explained that reviewing courts will generally 

exercise their discretion when the case presents an issue of broad 

public interest that is likely to recur, there may be a recurrence 

of the controversy between the parties, or a material question 

remains for the court to determine. (Ibid.; see John L., supra, 

48 Cal.4th at p. 142, fn. 2 [exercising discretion to consider 

whether, despite expiration of conservatorship, the superior court 

violated the conservatee’s constitutional rights by holding a 

conservatorship hearing in his absence, explaining the appeal 

“‘raises important issues that are capable of repetition but likely 

to evade review’”]; Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 

199 Cal.App.4th 953, 960 [exercising discretion to consider appeal 

of conservatorship order where conservatee argued denial of right 

to jury trial]; cf. Conservatorship of K.Y., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th 

at pp. 989, 991 [acknowledging court’s discretion to resolve moot 

appeal but dismissing appeal because conservatee had accepted 

reappointment of conservator].) 

We recognize that appeals of conservator appointments

often may become moot given the one-year length of 

conservatorships. However, we agree with Lateasa that in this 

case there is no important issue that is likely to evade review

because the LPS Act specifically requires the superior court to 

advise the proposed conservatee of his or her right to a jury trial. 

(Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (a)(6); Conservatorship of Heather W., 

supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 383-384.) Public Guardian urges 
11

us to exercise our discretion to consider this appeal to address 

whether the superior court’s failure to follow its statutory 

obligation to advise a proposed conservatee of her right to a jury 

trial before taking a personal waiver is subject to review for 

harmless error. We decline to exercise our discretion because, as 

Lateasa argues, under similar circumstances the Supreme Court 

and all but one Court of Appeal have held that the failure of a 

court in a commitment proceeding to obtain a valid jury trial 

waiver where mandated by statute requires automatic reversal. 

(People v. Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1169; People v. Blackburn, 

supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-1133; Joanne R., supra, 

72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1016-1017; Conservatorship of Kevin A., 

supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1253.)4

4 The only appellate court to apply harmless error review to 

a failure to advise a proposed conservatee of his or her right to a 

jury trial in an LPS proceeding is the Sixth District in its decision 

in Conservatorship of C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pages 917 to 

919. As discussed, the weight of the authority is to the contrary, 

and we concluded in Joanne R., supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 

pages 1016 to 1017 that the Supreme Court holdings in People v. 

Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at page 1169 and People v. Blackburn, 

supra, 61 Cal.4th at pages 1132 to 1133 apply to LPS 

proceedings. We see no reason to depart from our reasoning in

Joanne R.
12

DISPOSITION

We dismiss the appeal as moot.

FEUER, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ P. J.

SEGAL, J.