Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 27 / Thursday, February 9, 1995 / Notices 7813

030. The EA closing report clearly states

that ‘‘the evidence does not support a

conclusion that a safety defect exists’’

and that ‘‘it does not appear that further

investigation would result in an

enforceable defect finding.’’ NHTSA

finds no information in the subject

petition that demonstrates that these

conclusions should be withdrawn or

modified.

Petitioner’s September 14, 1994,

submission entitled ‘‘Supplemental

Information Relevant to Safety Recall

Petition’’ questions the accuracy of the

number of incidents (230) reported by

Ford to NHTSA during the pendency of

EA92–030, in part on the basis of

numbers of power steering system parts

sales reported in the EA Closing Report,

and in part on the basis of alleged

under-reporting by Ford with respect to

another ODI investigation (EA93–033).

These allegations appear to be

speculative, and seem to be based solely

on petitioner’s opinions, inferences,

beliefs, and grossly unscientific

extrapolations of data that, in and of

themselves, are questionable. In the

absence of factual and reliable

information, NHTSA views these

allegations of under-reporting by Ford to

be without substance.

The data from the NFIRS listing does

not provide compelling evidence that

NHTSA should expand its investigation

of this matter. While the incidents listed

are identified as engine compartment

fires, there is no evidence that the

leakage and ignition of power steering

fluid was in any way the cause of these

incidents. On the contrary, NHTSA

finds no apparent source of ignition of

any such fluid that may leak in those

vehicles equipped with 2.5 liter or 3.0

liter engines. Analyses of the NFIRS

data discloses that the 3.0 liter models

of the subject vehicles have experienced

a relatively low engine compartment fire

incidence, for all causes. In the case of

the relatively small population of

vehicles equipped with 2.5 liter engines,

the incidence of engine compartment

fires does appear to be high. The

absence of an apparent source of

ignition for power steering fluid that

may leak, however, indicates that other

failures or malfunctions are more likely

to be the cause of the fires. On this

basis, even if NHTSA were to consider

this matter as a potential issue for

investigation, it would be a separate

investigation unrelated to the prior

investigation of power steering fluid-fed

fires in vehicles with 3.8 liter engines.

The petition fails to present any

substantive, significant, or new

information of NHTSA’s consideration

regarding the request to reopen EA92–

030. Similarly, no new evidence has

been discovered through any other

source to justify reopening that

investigation.

NHTSA recognizes that engine

compartment fires create a serious safety

problem. Manufacturers have

consistently conducted safety recalls to

remedy problems that lead to such fires,

often in cases with a lower fire rate than

that experienced by these Ford vehicles.

Unfortunately, the available data

indicates that the vast majority of these

fires occurred after maintenance or

repair work had been performed by Ford

dealers or other maintenance facilities.

NHTSA cannot compel dealers to

conduct a safety recall and, under these

circumstances, cannot compel Ford to

remedy problems created by its dealers.

Nevertheless, NHTSA has urged Ford on

several occasions to take action to

reduce the likelihood of engine

compartment fires in these vehicles by

notifying owners of the problem and

bearing the expenses of repairs to

correct the condition that can lead to

such fires. To date, Ford has refused to

do so.

In consideration of the available

information, NHTSA has concluded that

there is not a reasonable possibility that

an order concerning recall and remedy

of a safety-related defect in relation to

the petitioner’s allegations would be

issued at the conclusion of an

investigation. Further commitment of

resources to reopen this investigation

does not appear to be warranted.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162; delegations of

authority at 49 CFR 1.50 and 501.8.

Issued on: February 1, 1995.

William A. Boehly,

Associate Administrator for Enforcement.

[FR Doc. 95–3174 Filed 2–8–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–59–M

Maritime Administration

[Docket S–917]

Notice of Application for Written

Permission Pursuant to Section 805(a)

of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as

amended; Waterman Steamship

Corporation

Central Gulf Lines, Inc. (Central Gulf),

a U.S. corporate affiliate of Waterman

Steamship Corporation (Waterman), by

letter of January 26, 1995, requests

written permission pursuant to section

805(a) of the Merchant Marine Act,

1936, as amended (Act), and

Waterman’s Operating-Differential

Subsidy Agreement (ODSA), Contract

MA/MSB–450, to operate the U.S.-flag

S/S ENERGY INDEPENDENCE (Vessel),

Official Number 657540, in the

coastwise trade of the United States.

Central Gulf states that it has agreed to

purchase the Vessel from New England

Power Company (New England Power)

and, in turn, own and operate the Vessel

beginning on or about May 1, 1995

under time charter to New England

Power for a term of fifteen years.

New England Power, which is

headquartered in Westborough,

Massachusetts, generates and transmits

electricity to consumers in the New

England area, including Vermont, New

Hampshire, Rhode Island and

Massachusetts. In addition, it regularly

purchases coal for transportation by

ship from east coast ports of the United

States to its harbor side facilities located

in Massachusetts.

According to Central Gulf, the Vessel

will transport New England Power’s

proprietary cargo in the coastwise trade

from points along the east coast of the

United States to Brayton Point,

Massachusetts or Salem, Massachusetts.

At other times during the fifteen years,

the Vessel may carry cargo in the

coastwise trade of the United States for

account of other clients of Central Gulf

as yet undetermined. Central Gulf states

that it may also operate the Vessel in the

foreign trade from time to time for yet

undetermined charterers.

The Vessel is a 38,234 long tons total

deadweight capacity self-unloading bulk

carrier with a coal and/or oil-fired steam

turbine main engine and an inclined lift

conveyor system. It was built by General

Dynamics Corporation in Quincy,

Massachusetts in 1983 and has been

documented under the laws of the

United States since that time. Central

Gulf maintains that as a U.S. built, U.S.

flag, U.S. owned and U.S. citizencrewed vessel, the Vessel is coastwisequalified within the meaning of section

27 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (46

U.S.C. App. 883), popularly known as

the Jones Act. It is also uniquely capable

of transporting New England Power’s

cargo requirements, Central Gulf adds.

Central Gulf emphasizes that it will

continue to function as a discrete

corporate entity having entirely separate

financial records and accounts, and that

the operating and accounting activities

of Central Gulf are, and will continue to

be, entirely separate from the operating

and accounting activities of Waterman.

Central Gulf believes that its instant

application clearly warrants MARAD

approval and section 805(a) permission

should be granted until the expiration

date of Waterman’s ODS contract, which

expires on December 31, 1996.

The application may be inspected in

the Office of the Secretary, Maritime

Administration. Any person, firm or
7814 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 27 / Thursday, February 9, 1995 / Notices

corporation having any interest (within

the meaning of section 805(a)) in

Waterman’s request and desiring to

submit comments concerning the

request must by 5:00 PM on February

22, 1995, file written comments in

triplicate with the Secretary, Maritime

Administration, together with petition

for leave to intervene. The petition shall

state clearly and concisely the grounds

of interest, and the alleged facts relied

on for relief.

If no petition for leave to intervene is

received within the specified time or if

it is determined that petitions filed do

not demonstrate sufficient interest to

warrant a hearing, the Maritime

Administration will take such action as

may be deemed appropriate.

In the event petitions regarding the

relevant section 805(a) issues are

received from parties with standing to

be heard, a hearing will be held, the

purpose of which will be to receive

evidence under section 805(a) relative to

whether the proposed operations (a)

could result in unfair competition to

any person, firm, or corporation

operating exclusively in the coastwise

or intercoastal service, or (b) would be

prejudicial to the objects and policy of

the Act relative to domestic trade

operations.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance

Program No. 20.805 (Operating-Differential

Subsidies))

Dated: February 6, 1995.

By order of the Maritime Administrator.

Murray A. Bloom,

Acting Secretary.

[FR Doc. 95–3302 Filed 2–8–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–81–P

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

[Docket No. 95–007; Notice 1]

Antilock Brake Systems; Technical

Report; Preliminary Evaluation of the

Effectiveness of Antilock Brake

Systems for Passenger Cars

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Request for comments.

SUMMARY: This notice announces the

publication by NHTSA of a Technical

Report on its Preliminary Evaluation of

the Effectiveness of Antilock Brake

Systems for Passenger Cars. The

principal goals of ABS are to prevent

skidding and loss-of-control due to

locked-wheel braking, and to allow a

driver to steer the vehicle during hard

braking. NHTSA’s report evaluates the

accident rates of the ABS-equipped cars

currently on the road, and compares

them to the accident rates of similar cars

without ABS.

DATES: Comments must be received no

later than May 10, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Report: Interested people

may obtain a copy of the report free of

charge by sending a self-addressed

mailing label to Ms. Glorious Harris

(NAD–51), National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration, 400 Seventh

Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590.

Comments: All comments should

refer to the docket and notice number of

this notice and be submitted to: Docket

Section, Room 5109, Nassif Building,

400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington DC

20590. [Docket hours, 9:30 a.m.–4:00

p.m., Monday through Friday.]

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. Charles J. Kahane, Acting Chief,

Evaluation Division, Office of Strategic

Planning and Evaluation, Plans and

Policy, National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, Room 5208, 400

Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC

20590 (202–366–2560).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section

2507 of the NHTSA Authorization Act

of 1991 directed NHTSA to publish an

advance notice of proposed rulemaking

(ANPRM) to consider the need for any

additional brake performance standards

for passenger cars, including antilock

brake standards. On January 2, 1994,

NHTSA published an ANPRM in which

the agency announced its plans to

consider various regulatory actions to

improve the brake performance of light

vehicles, particularly the benefits and

costs related to requiring antilock brake

systems (ABS). (59 FR 281). ABS serves

to prevent skidding and loss-of-control

due to locked-wheel braking,

particularly on wet surfaces, and to

allow a driver to steer the vehicle during

hard braking.

Along with that rulemaking notice,

NHTSA has studied the effectiveness of

ABS on passenger cars. NHTSA

compared the accident involvement

rates of passenger cars equipped with

Antilock Brake Systems (ABS) to the

rates of counterpart cars without ABS,

based on 1990–92 Florida, Pennsylvania

and Missouri data, and the 1989–93

Fatal Accident Reporting System. In

general, the statistical analyses

compared the accident involvements of

passenger cars of the first 2 model years

with ABS to cars of the same makes,

models and subseries, but from the last

2 model years before ABS became

standard equipment. The principal

findings and conclusions from the

statistical analyses of accident

experience of cars currently equipped

with ABS were the following:

• ABS significantly reduced the

involvements of passenger cars in

multivehicle crashes on wet roads. ABS

reduced police-reported crash

involvements by an estimated 14

percent, and fatal involvement by 24

percent. The finding is consistent with

the outstanding performance of ABS in

stopping tests on wet roads.

• ABS had little effect on

multivehicle crashes on dry roads.

• The risk of fatal collisions with

pedestrians and bicyclists was reduced

by a statistically significant 27 percent

in passenger cars with ABS. Unlike the

effects for multivehicle crashes, this

reduction was about equally large on

wet and dry roads.

• All types of run-off-road crashes—

rollovers, side impacts with fixed

objects and frontal impacts with fixed

objects—increased significantly with

ABS. Nonfatal run-off-road crashes

increased by an estimated 19 percent,

and fatal run-off-road crashes by 28

percent. The increase in run-off-road

crashes was about the same under wet

and dry road conditions.

• The overall, net effect of ABS on

fatal as well as nonfatal crashes was

close to zero.

It is unknown to what extent the

increase in run-off-road crashes is a

consequence of ABS, or is due to other

causes. In particular, it is unknown to

what extent, if any, the increase is due

to incorrect responses by drivers to their

ABS systems, and, if so, whether the

effect is likely to persist in the future.

The increase may involve all types of

ABS run-off-road ABS or only certain

ABS designs.

NHTSA welcomes public review of

the technical report and invites the

reviewers to submit comments about the

data and the statistical methods used in

the report. The agency is interested in

learning of any additional data that

could be used to expand or improve the

analyses, especially any information

about run-off-road crashes involving

ABS-equipped cars or about factors that

could be making current ABS-equipped

cars more prone to running off the road.

It is requested but not required that 10

copies of comments be submitted.

All comments must not exceed 15

pages in length. (49 CFR 553.21).

Necessary attachments may be

appended to these submissions without

regard to the 15-page limit. This

limitation is intended to encourage

commenters to detail their primary

arguments in a concise fashion.

If a commenter wishes to submit

certain information under a claim of

confidentiality business information,

should be submitted to the Chief

Counsel, NHTSA, at the street address