1

08
- 16 19
- cr USA v. McG ee U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT

_______________________________ August Term, 2008 (Argued: Dec ember

10, 2008 Dec ided: J anuar y 23, 2009) Docke t No. 08-1619-c r

_______________________________ UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Appellee ,

v. DARIUS DURAND McG EE, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla nt.

____________________________________ B e fo re : PO OL ER, RA GG I , a nd L I VI NG STO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. Appea l from a Ma

rch 27, 2008 judg ment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut ( Hall, J .) deny ing de fenda

nt-appe llant Darius McG ee’ s motion for a reduc ed sente nce pur suant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and the so-c alled cr ack a mendments. VACATED A

ND REMANDED
. Appea ringfor Appe llee: S ANDR A S. G L OVER , Assistant United States Attorney

(Michae l J . Gustafson, Assistant United States Attorney , on the brief ) for Nora R. Dannehy , ActingUnited States Attorney , District of Connecticut, Ne w Have n, CT. Ap pe ari ngfo r A

pp e lla nt: R OB E R T J. S UL L I VAN , Westport, CT.1 The Commission m ade this ame ndment retroa ctively applicable , eff

ective a s of Marc h 3, 2008. 1 2 See U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, amend. 713. 2 PER CU RIAM : In this decision, we addr ess the nar row que stion of whether

a def endant suc h as appe llant Da ri us Mc Ge e , w ho a t se nte nc ingwa s d e signate d a c are e r o ff

e nd e r b ut gra

nte d a de pa rt ur e so that he wa s u lti mate ly

se nte nc e d b a se d o n th e c ra c k c oc a ine (c oc a ine ba se ) guid e lin e s, is e lig ibl e fo r a re du c e d s e nte nc e purs ua

nt t o th e so -c a lle d c ra c k ame ndme nts . A s w e re c e ntl y dis c us se d in Un ite d St a te s v . Wil liams, -- F .3 d- -, 20 09 WL32 56 4, a t *2 (2 d Ci r. 20 09 ), the se ame ndme nts
came about on Novembe r 1, 2007, whe n the United States Sentenc ing Commission promulgate d Amendment 706, which a mended the D rugQuantity Table in United States Sentenc ing Guidelines Section 2D1.1(c ). U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, amend. 706 (2008). The eff ect of Amendment 706 is to provide a two- level re duction in base off ense le vels for c rac k coca ine offe nses. See id. 1 McGe e conte nds that he is elig ible for this two-leve l reduc tion because , at sentenc ing, the district court, thoug h desig nating him a car eer offe nder, se e U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, ultimately based his se nte nc e on

the c ra c k c oc a ine g uid e lin e s a ft e r d ow nw ard ly de pa rt ingba se d o n a

fi nd ingthat the ca ree r off ender classification overre prese nted his criminal history , see U .S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b). Thus, applying the 2001 SentencingGuidelines, the district cour t sentence d McGe e to 115
months ba se d o n a

po st- de pa

rt ur e se nte nc ingra

ng e that w a s c a lc ulate d a s f oll ow s: a ba se of fe ns e level of twe nty -six (the leve l corre sponding to at least five g rams but less than twenty g rams of
c ra c k c oc a ine ) u

nd e r U .S. S.G . § 2D 1. 1( c )( 7) , mi nu s thre e le ve ls f or a c c e pta nc e of re sp on sib ili ty under U .S.S.G. § 3E1.1, resulting in a total off ense le vel of twe nty -three and cr iminal hist ory3

cate g ory of six , and conse quently

a sente ncingrang e of nine ty -two to 115 months imprisonm ent. McGe e asse rts that afte r applying A mendment 706 as we ll as the three -leve l reduc tion under U
. S
. S
. G
. § 3 E 1
. 1 , h i s t o t a l o f f e n s e l e v e l i s n o wtw e n ty- o n e an d h i s s e n t e n c i n g r an g e s e v e n tyse ve n to nin e ty -s ix mon ths . T he dis tr ic t c ourt re je c te d th is a

rgume nt. No tin g that de fe nd ants
se nte nc e d a s c are e r o ff

e nd e rs are un a ff

e c te d b y Am e ndme nt 7 06 , th e dis tr ic t c ourt a g re e d w ith the g overnme nt that McGee was inelig ible for a reduc ed sente nce be cause his pre-de parture rang e, i.e., his ca

ree r off ender g uideline ra

ng e and not the c rac k coca ine guideline ra ng e, wa s the “applica ble guideline ra

ng e” a ffe cted by

Amendment 706. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and though r ecognizi ng the issue to be a very close one , we hold that McG ee is e ligible f or a r educe d sentenc e, vac ate the district c ourt’s decision, and r emand f

or re consideration of McGee ’s 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)( 2) motion for a reduc ed sente nce. We reviewthe district court’s inter pretation of the statute and the Guidelines de novo. See Willi ams, 2009 WL32564, at *3; United States v. Ker ley , 544 F.3d 172, 179 ( 2d Cir. 2008). I t is well established that “[a] dist rict cour t may not ge nera lly

modify a ter m of imprisonment once it has be en imposed.” Cortorr eal v. United States, 486 F .3d 742, 744 (2d Cir. 2007). One of the limited exceptions to thi s rule exists when the sentenc ing r ang e under which the de fenda

nt was sente nced is subseque ntly lowere d by

the SentencingCommi ssion. Section 3582(c)( 2) state s: [I ]n t he ca se of a

defe ndant who has be en sente nced to a term of imprisonment based on a

sentenc ing r ang e that has subse quently been lowe red by

the Sentencing Commi ssion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion of the defe ndant or the Direc tor of the B urea

u of Prisons, or on its own motion, t he cour t may reduc e the te rm of imp ri so nme nt, a ft e r c on sid e ri ngthe fa c tor s se t f or th i n s e c tio n 3 55 3( a ) t o4

the e xtent th a t th e y

are a pp lic a ble , if su c h a re du c tio n is c on sis te nt w itha pp lic a ble policy statements issued by

the SentencingCommi ssion. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (empha sis added). At the outset, we note that we a re not pre sented with the que stion of whether a def endant who is sentence d as a c are er of fende r, but does not re ceive a downwa rd depa rture, qua lifies for a reduc ed sente nce unde r the amendments. The c onsensus is that such a de fenda nt would not. See United States v. Thomas, 524 F .3d 889, 890 (8th Cir. 2008) (pe r cur iam); Sharkey , 543 F.3d at 12 39 ; Mo or e , 5 41 F .3 d at 13 27 -2 8; s e e a lso Un ite d St a te s v . L idd e ll, 54 3 F .3 d 8 77 , 8 82 n. 3 ( 7th Cir. 2008) (statingsame in dicta) . Rather, the que stion we must answer is whe ther the f act that the district court g rante d a downwa rd depa rture unde r U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 from the c are er of fende r g uideline ra

ng e down to the c rac k g uideline ra ng e, upon findingthat the ca ree r off ender status overstate d defe ndant’s cr iminal hist ory , rende rs McGe e elig ible for the two- level sente nce reduc tion. Fr om our revie w of the r ecor d, it is apparent that Mc Gee was sente nced “ based on” a sentenc ing guideline ra

ng e that wa s subsequently lowere d by

the SentencingCommi ssion beca use the district cour

t premised McG ee’ s ultim ate se ntence on the cr ack c ocaine g uidelines. Indeed, ha d the amendme nts been in plac e at the time of sentenc ing, it is likely

that the district court would have g iven McGe e a se ntence within the now reduc ed guideline ra ng e of 77 to 96 months. For, in g rantingthe depa rture, the district court explicitl y stated that it was depa

rting fr om t he c are e r o ff

e nd e r s e nte nc ingra

ng e “ to t he le ve l th a t th e de fe nd ant w ou ld h ave be e n in absent the c are er of

fende r status ca lculation and conside ration,” the reby acc epting the g ov e rnme nt’ s c on te nti on

that th e a pp ro pr iate c a te g or

y fo r M c Ge e wa s th a t in to whic h h e “ wo uld5

have f allen abse nt the car eer

offe nder e ffe ct upon his g uideline ca lculation.” Th e g ov e rnme nt n e ve rt

he le ss o bje c ts t o M c Ge e ’s c la im o f e lig ibi lity , s tatin g a s f oll ow s: (1 ) a c ourt may re du c e a se nte nc e purs ua

nt t o 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 82 (c )( 2) on ly “ if su c h a re du c tio n is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by

the SentencingCommi ssion”; and (2) U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, which is a policy statement, indicate s that its refer ence to the “guideline rang e applica

ble to th[ e] defenda

nt” re fer s to the pre- depar ture (r ather

than post-depa

rture) sentenc ing r ang e. As re levant her e, that policy statement provides that a re duction in a de fe nd ant’ s se nte nc e is n ot a uth or ize d w he re the ame ndme nt i n q ue sti on , in

thi s c a se Amendment 706, “doe s not have the e ffe ct of lowe ringthe def endant’ s applicable g uideline
ra ng e .” I d. § 1 B 1. 10 (a )( 2) (B ). To a sse ss whe the r a re du c tio n is wa

rr ante d, a dis tr ic t c ourt

is ins tr uc te d to de te rm ine the Gu ide lin e s r ang e “ that w ou ld h ave be e n a pp lic a ble to t he de fe nd ant i f the amendme nt(s) to the guidelines . . . had be en in ef fec t at the time the def

endant wa s sentenc ed,” while leaving“all other g uideline application decisions unaffe cted.” I d. § 1B1.10( b)(1) . And af

ter statingthe g ener al rule that “the cour t shall not reduce the def

endant’ s te rm of imp ri so nme nt u

nd e r 1 8 U .S. C. 3 58 2( c )( 2) and thi s p oli c y

state me nt t o a

te rm that is le ss tha n th e min imum of

the ame nd e d guid e lin e ra ng e ,” id. § 1 B 1. 10 (b )( 2) (A ), the dis tr ic t c ourt is ins tr uc te d th a t th e fo llo wi nge xce pti on a pp lie s: I f the orig inal term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term of imprisonment provided by the guideline ra

ng e applica

ble to the def

endant at the t i m e o f s en t en ci n g, a r edu ct i o nco mp ar ab l y l es s th an th e a m en d edgu i d el i n e r an ge deter mined under subdivision (1) of this subsec tion may be appr opriate. H oweve r, if the orig inal term of imprisonment constituted a non-guideline sentenc e de te rm ine d p ur su ant t o 1 8 U .S. C. 3 55 3( a ) a nd Un ite d St a te s v . B oo ke r, 54 3 U .S. 220 (2005), a

further reduc tion ge nera lly

would not be appr opriate. I d. § 1B1.10( b)(2) (B ).6

Foc using on the languag e of the exception, the g overnme nt argues that the policy statement treats the applicable g uideline ra ng e as the pre- depar

ture ra ng e, her e the c are er offe nder guideline ra

ng e which, a s noted, courts have held is unaf fec ted by Amendment 706. The g overnme nt’s contentions are not without force, but we ultimately conclude , g iven that the policy statement is subject to diffe rent interpr etations and takingacc ount of ca se law a s well as the purp os e s o f t

he c ra c k ame ndme nts , th a t th e po lic y state me nt w ou ld p e rm it a de fe nd ant who se po st- de pa rt ur e se nte nc e wa s, a s in

thi s c a se , e xplic itl y

ba se d o n th e c ra c k c oc a ine g uid e lin e s to reque st a reduc ed sente nce pur suant to Amendment 706 and 18 U .S.C. 3582(c)(2)
. In our view, the exception in U.S.S .G. § 1B 1.10(b)( 2)(B ), under stood along with the g ener al rule, c an be r ead a s simply instructing that a def

endant may

not rec eive a

depar ture be low the amende d g uideline ra ng e, except that a de fenda nt who rec eived a

depar ture at sentencingmay rec eive a compar able de parture -- the one instance in whic h a re duced se ntence can f all below the
ame nd e d guid e lin e ra

ng e . It do e s n ot p re c lud e the po ssi bil ity that a de fe nd ant who wa s, e ve n if by virtue of a

depar ture, sente nced “ based on” the cr ack guidelines would be e ligible f or a reduc tion. Si nce, f

rom our re adingof the sente ncingtranscript, the district court sentenc ed McGe e base d on the cr ack c ocaine g uidelines and would likely have c onsidered a

differ ent
se nte nc e fr om t

he on e imp os e d if

the a pp lic a ble c ra c k guid e lin e s h a d s o p ro vid e d, we thi nk that a differ ent re adingwould lend itself to excessive forma lism. S ee L ee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992) ( “L aw r eac hes past for malism.”); United States v. Ba ez, 349 F.3d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 2003) (“ [C ]ourts shoul d not elevate leg alistic formalism over substanc e.”)
. Our re cent de cision in W illiams permits t his conclusion. There , we he ld that a def endant who committed a cr ack c ocaine offe nse and whose sentenc e wa s subject to a statutory minimum1 We f

ur the r s tate d th a t “ [w]he n . . . the Gu ide lin e s se nte nc e e nd s u p a s th e statut or

y min imum, 2 2 both the decision to depa rt and the max imum permissibl e extent of this departure below the 3 statutory

minimum may

be base d only

on substantial assistance to the g overnme nt and on no 4 other mitigating c onsiderations.” Williams, 2009 W L32564, at *4 (quotation marks omitted). A 5 depar

ture unde r the c are er of

fende r guidelines prese nts a somewhat diff ere nt scena

rio. A 6 downwar d depar

ture is per mitted where the cour

t concludes that “a de fenda nt’s criminal history 7 cate g ory

substantially

over- repr esents the se riousness of the de fenda nt’s criminal history

or the 8 likelihood that the defe ndant will commit further c rimes.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(6) (1). Put 9 d i ff

er en t l y , a d ep arture b ac k

d o wn t o th e i n i t i al l y

ap p l i cab l e c ra ckco ca i n e gu i d el i n e r an ge 10 acc epts that a de fenda nt does not fall within the hear tland of the c are er of

fende r guidelines. 7 beca use of a prior drugconviction was not e ligible f or a ne w sentenc e under

the re vised Guidelines. This obtained e ven thoug h the def endant r ece ived a downw ard de parture for substantial assistance, se e U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) , that fell within the cra ck
c oc a ine Gu ide lin e s r ang e , b e c a us e the Gu ide lin e s p ro vis ion un de rl yingthe se nte nc e ult imate ly imp os e d w a s n ot a

pr ov isi on

a ff e c te d b y the su bs e qu e nt a

me ndme nt t o th e Gu ide lin e s. In s o holding, we emphasized that “[t] here [was] no evidenc e that the Guide lines rang e ca lculated under U .S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) played any role in the district cour

t’s deter mination of his sentence , and the district cour

t so found.” Willi ams, 2009 WL32564, at *1. We went on to note that
un de r Unit e d St a te s v . Ri c ha rd so n, 52 1 F .3 d 1 49 (2 d Ci r. 20 08 ), wh e n th e statut or y min imum is the Guidelines sente nce, the orig inal cra ck coc aine Guide lines do not play a role in determining the e xtent of

a su bs tanti a l a ssi sta

nc e de pa rt ur e . Thus , w e a llo we d th a t a de fe nd ant who se po st- 2 depar ture sente nce w as in fac t determined by the cr ack c ocaine g uidelines might be elig ible for a reduc ed sente nce. Indeed, this is the pre vailing vie w. In Moore, the E leventh Circuit thoug h holding that the c ra c k ame ndme nts do no t a pp ly to d e fe nd ants se nte nc e d a s c are e r o ff e nd e rs , w e nt o n to express approva l, albeit in dicta, for the application of A mendment 706 in these c ircumstance s.1 See United States v. Poindext er, 550 F . Supp. 2d 578, 580-81 (E.D. Pa. 2008); United States v. 3 2 Rag land, 568 F. Supp. 2d 19, 20 (D .D.C. 2008); United States v. Collier, No. 05-cr -313, 2008 3 WL

4 2 0 4 9 7 6 , * 3 ( E
. D
. M o . Se p t. 5 , 2 0 0 8 ) ; Un it e d St a te s v . Cl ar

k , N o . 0 0
- 0 3 7 , 2 0 0 8 WL 4 27 05 21 5, *1 (W. D. Pa . July 7, 20 08 ); Un ite d St a te s v . Co rn ish , N o. 05 -3 37 , 2 00 8 U .S. Di st. 5 L E X I S 5 0 5 7 7 , a t * 7
- * 8 ( D
. N
. J. Ju n e 2 5 , 2 0 0 8 ) ; Un it e d St a te s v . N ig a tu , N o . 0 0
- 1 8 , 2 0 0 8 WL 6 926561, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr . 7, 2008); cf. United States v. Boyd, No. 01-29, 2008 WL2537139, 7 at *3 (W.D. Pa J une 24, 2008) ( sug g esting that reduc tion would be war rante d if § 4A1.3 8 do wnwa

rd de pa rt ur e to § 2D 1. 1 r ang e ha d b e e n g ra nte d) . We re c og nize that in so me of the se 9 case s the g overnme nt either did not object or did not make the ar g uments that the g overnme nt 10 makes he re. We have found two c ases, outside of the instant case, that arrive at a c ontrary 11 conclusion. See United States v. Menaf ee, N o. 04-cr -138, 2008 WL3285254, at *3 (D. Conn. 12 Aug . 7, 2008) (Ha ll, J .); United States v. Thompson, No. 03-47-c r, 2008 WL4745879, at *1 (D. 13 Minn. Oct. 27, 2008); cf . United States v. Rivera, 535 F . Supp. 2d 527, 530 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2008) 14 (stating that it was unclea r whe ther § 1B 1.10 reduc tion would be war rante d if defe ndant had be en 15 g rante d downwar d depar ture to § 2D1.1 ra

ng e under § 4A1.3). 8 54 1 F .3 d at 13 29 -3 0. In d oin g so , th e c ourt re c ognize d th a t A me ndme nt 7 06 wo uld be a pp lic a ble wher e ther e wa s some “indication that the c ourt based [the def endant’ s] s entenc e on the guideline rang e that would have applied abse nt the car eer offe nder de signation,” or wa s the “sente ncing rang e re lied upon by

the district court in dete rmining his sente nce.” I d. at 1330. And, the
ov e rwhe lmi ngma

jor ity of dis tr ic t c ourt s f

a c e d w iththi s is su e have a lso c ome to t his se e min g ly
c omm on se ns e c on c lus ion , on e that r e c og nize s th e un de rl yingra tio na le fo r t

he ame ndme nts -- to 3 addre ss the “urg ent and c ompelling” “proble ms associated w ith the 100-to-1 drugquantity ratio.” U.S.S.G. Supp. t o App. C, amend. 706; see also id. amend. 713; Sentenc ing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Re g . 28571-28572 (2007)
. We a c kn ow le dg e that U .S. S.G . § 1B 1. 10 c an b e re a d to pe rm it a re du c e d s e nte nc e on ly wher e the de fenda

nt’s pre- depar

ture sente ncingrang e is found within the cr ack c ocaine g uidelines. Howe ver, “ the meaningof languag e is inhere ntly contextual [ and] the [S upreme ] Court ha s a lw ay s r e se rv e d le nit y fo r t ho se sit uatio ns in whic h a

re a so na ble do ub t pe rs ist s a

bo ut a statute’s intended sc ope eve n afte r re sort to the languag e and struc ture, leg islative history , and9

motivating policies of the statute.” United States v. Da uray , 215 F.3d 257, 264 ( 2d Cir. 2000) (alter ation and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2002) (holdingthat the rule of lenity applies to SentencingGuidelines). He re, w e conclude that there is ambiguity as to whethe r the Sentenc ing Commission int ended to e x clude defe ndants such as Mc Gee , who wer e cle arly sentenc ed base d on the cr ack c ocaine g uidelines and we re disadva

ntag ed by the 100-to-1 se ntencingdisparity that the cr ack a

mendments soug ht to c or re c t, f ro m th e re a c h o f t

he ame ndme nts .

CO NC LU SION We c on c lud e that a

de fe nd ant who wa s d e signate d a c are e r o ff

e nd e r b ut u lti mate ly
e xplic itl y se nte nc e d b a se d o n a

Gu ide lin e s r ang e c a lc ulate d b y Se c tio n 2 D1 .1 of

the Gu ide lin e s is elig ible for a

reduc ed sente nce unde r 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)( 2) and the cra ck ame ndments. Given our holding , we de cline to re ach Mc Gee ’s ar g uments that a re mand pursuant to United States v. Re g a la do , 5 18 F .3 d 1 43 (2 d Ci r. 20 08 ) i s w arr ante d. Th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is
va c a te d a nd thi s matte r r e mand e d to a llo w the dis tr ic t c ourt to c on sid e r whe the r M c Ge e , w ho is elig ible for a

retroa ctive re duction in sentence , should rece ive one.