NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0191n.06 F iled: April 9, 2008 No(s) 06- 3521/3522 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA , Plaintif f-Appellee , v. WAL TE R M. PUGH ; TY RE ES E PUGH , De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lla nts
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D STA TE S DI STR I CT CO UR T FO R THE SOU TH ERN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: SUH RH EIN RI CH , C OLE, and G IBBO NS, Ci r c uitJudg e s. R. G UY COLE, JR. De fe nd ants T y rees e Pug h a

nd his fathe r Wa lte r P ug h a pp e a l th e ir convictions and sentenc es related to an ar med bank r obbery . Ty

ree se ar g ues (1) that the district court

err ed whe n it allowed a witness to testify that afte r the robbe ry

Walter stated “w e hit a lick;” a nd (2) that he should have rec eived a lesser se ntence . I n a s ep ar ate appeal, Walter a rg ues (1) that the district court er

red w hen it allowed the le ad investig ator of the bank robbe ry to testify that he “w as gi v en t h e n am e o f W al t er P u gh as a p o s s i b l e s u s p ec t ; ” (2 ) t h at t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt erre d i nap p l y i n g a two-point s en t en cing enhanc ement for Walter’s role a s a lea der of the offe nse; and (3) that the district court erroneously used a preponde ranc e-of -the-e vidence standard in a pply ing the two-point enhanc ement.Nos. 06-3521, 06-3522

United States v. Pugh

- 2 - For the following rea sons, we AF F IRM the convictions and se ntence s. I. BACKG ROUND On May 15, 2002, Def

endants we re indicte d in the United States Dist ri ct C o u rt for the Sou the rn Di str ic t of

Oh io f or c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it a

rm e d b ank

ro bb e ry in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 371; for aiding and abetting eac h other in ar med bank r obbery

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (d ) a nd 18 U. S.C. § 2 ; and

fo r u sin g a

fi re arm duri ng the ba

nk ro bb e ry in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 924(c) (1)( A)(ii). Ty

ree se was also indicted for being a fe lon in possession of a fire arm in violation of 1 8 U

. S. C. § § 9 2 2 ( g ) ( 1 ) an d 9 2 4 ( a ) ( 2 )

. O nSe p te mb e r 1 0 , 2 0 0 2 , a f

te r a s ix- d ay tr ia l, a jury convicted Walter and Ty

ree se on all counts. On appeal, t his Court reve rsed the c onvictions, ex cept for Ty ree se’s c onviction for beinga felon in possession of a firea rm, beca use t he C ourt found that an out -o f-c ourt identification of a nontestifying w itness violated Def endants’ r ights unde r the Confrontation Clause. See U nited States v. Pugh , 405 F.3d 390 ( 6th Cir. 2005). A re trial was he ld before a jury on November

18 , 2 0 0 5 , and the f

ollowing e vidence was int ro du c e d. On

Ap ri l 24, 20 02 , at app ro xima te ly 2:2 0 p .m. , tw o a

rm e d me n r ob be d th e F ir st Natio na l B ank

in H a mil ton , O hio

. On e ro bb e r, c arr yinga sh otgun and we ari nga

bla c k s hir

t, a ba ll cap, a nd a mask, order ed the bank manag er to li e fa ce down. The other robber , who was unma sked

and wo re a c he c ke re d s hir

t and a sk ull c a p, c arr ie d a h and g un

and he ld a B la c k & Mil d c ig ar i n h is mouth. He orde red the tellers to put cash f rom their dra

wer s and the vault into a bag . The men le ft with approxim ately

$153,900 in cash a

nd drove a

way in what the bank manag er de scribed a s a lateeig hties or ea

rly -nineties Oldsmobile. Detec tive J ames Calhoun of the Hamilton Poli ce Depa rtment testified that upon arr iving atNos. 06-3521, 06-3522

United States v. Pugh

- 3 - the sce ne, he obta ined the bank’ s surveillance came ra vide otape, made still photogr aphs of the a rmed robber s, and dispatche d to local patrol units a gene ral description of t he men and the ge taway car . D e t e c t i v e C a l h o u nt e s t i f

i e d t h a t h e c o n t i nu e d r e v i e w i n g i n f o r m a t i o n a t p o l i c e h e a d qu art e r s t h a td ay,

and wh e n h e re tur

ne d to the statio n the ne xt m or nin g , h e “ wa s g ive n th e name of Wal te r P ug h a s a possible suspect.” He also was advised that Be ssie Pew, Walter’s sister and Ty ree se’s aunt, owned a four -door mar oon Oldsmobile. Pe w t e sti fi e d th a t Wa lte r’ s e x-g ir lf ri e nd , Sh ane ll H ols ton , ca lle d h e r o n th e mor nin g of Ap ri l 25, 2002, and told her that she rea d a new s article in the paper that day about a ba

nk robber y and that the police we re lookingfor a maroon c ar. Pewthen ca lled the police station t o find out if it was her

car , a 1988 four -door mar oon Oldsmobile Cutl as Ciera, that was involved in the robber y . She drove her c ar to the station a

nd told De tective Calhoun that Walter had been in possession of he r ca r for

a c ou ple of we e ks and

ha d r e tur ne d it the da

y be fo re a little a ft e r 3 :00 in t

he a ft e rn oo n. She a lso tol d Detec tive Calhoun that the person in the chec kere d shirt in the bank surveillance photo looked like her br other Walter a

nd that the other ma

n could be Ty

ree se, but that she wa s not sure. Stephanie L

uster, Ty ree se’s g irlfriend i n 2002, also identified Walter in the surve illance photo but stated that she could not ide ntify the other man beca use his fac e wa s masked. She testified that in April 2002, the month of the robber y , she left Ohio with Ty

ree se and Walter a

nd drove south, sto pp ingov e rn ig ht at a

ho te l in Te nn e sse e . L

us te r te sti fi e d that sh e sa

w m on e y in l oo se bil ls a

nd in rubber bands on Walter’s hotel bed and that when she aske d about the money , Walter replied, “ we hit a lic k. ” Lus te r s tate d th a t th e g ro up dr ov e to A tla nta the fo llo wi ng da

y wh e re Wal te r a

nd Ty re e se purcha sed clothes f

or eve ry one; they

returne d to Ohio a fe w day s later.Nos. 06-3521, 06-3522

United States v. Pugh

Ty ree se’s fe lon-in-possession char g e, which w as upheld on the or igina l appea l, was 1 based upon the g un in his possession during this May 3, 2002 arr est. - 4 - Holston testified that once the g roup returne d to H amilton, she met up with them to switch

car s. Walter and Ty

ree se transf

err ed seve ral items from Walter’ s Cadillac t o Holston’s car , including a shotg un, revolve r, newclothes, and a bag containing money . L eavingthe Cadillac be hind, Holston drove Walter, T y

ree se, and Luster to Mt. Hea lthy , Ohio to find a hiding spot for the g roup. She then

we n t h o m e and dec ided to contac t an offic er w ho was a lso a family friend to tell him wher e the police could f

ind Def endants. She ag ree d to call W alter from the Hamilt on County Sheriff’ s Offic e and allowe d the police to tape the conver sation, during which Walter told her that he had $100,000 for he r father “ to wash” a

nd that he re ceive d the money from a “ big lick.” Holston a lso testified that Walter was the ma

n in the bank surve illance photog raph. Walter and Ty

ree se were arre sted in Mt. Healthy on May 3, 2002. Ty

ree se wa s in possession of a shotgun at the time of his ar rest. A sea

rch of the house, pursua

nt to a war

rant, a lso revea led a 1 revolve r and n ewly

purcha sed clothes. Police r ecove red the Cadillac, which c ontained a pa rking pe rm it f ro m a Tr a ve l L od g e in A tla nta , a ba g wi th a

mmunit ion , in c lud ing.1 2 g a ug e sh otgun

sh e lls , and an e mpty

box of B lack & Mild ciga rs. On No ve mbe r 1 8, 20 05 , a ft e r t he re tr ia l, the jur

y c on vic te d Wa lte r a

nd Ty re e se on a ll c ounts
. On Marc h 13, 2006, the district court sente nced Walter to 221 months’ imprisonm ent, five y ear s of

s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e , an d

r e s t i tu t i o n . I n d e t e r

m i n i n g t h i s s e n t e n c e , t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtf o u n d b y a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that Wa lte r’ s o ff e ns e le ve l sh ou ld b e inc re a se d b y tw o po int s fo r h is ag g ravating r ole in the offe nse under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1( c) and Application Note 2. The district cour tNos. 06-3521, 06-3522

United States v. Pugh

- 5 - sentenc ed Ty

ree se to 221 months’ imprisonment, five y ear s supervised r elea se, and r estitution. Walter and Ty

ree se timely

appea led. II. AN AL YSI S Both De fenda

nts contend that the district cour t admitted hear say statements i n violation of the i r r i g h t s s e c u r e d b y t h e C o n f r o n t a t i o n C l a

u s e o f t h e S i xth A m e n dm e n t
. I n a d d i tio n, bo th Def endants c halleng e their se ntence s. We address e ach a rg ument in turn. A. Co nfro nt at ion Cl aus e We revie w evidentiary

ruling s for a

buse of discr etion. United States v. Vasilakos , 508 F.3d 4 0 1 , 4 0 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g G e n . E le c . Co

. v . J o ine r , 5 2 2 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1997))

. Confrontation Clause claims, however, a re que stions of law that are revie wed de novo. Id. (citing United States v. J

ohnson , 440 F.3d 832, 842 ( 6th Cir. 2006)). 1. Tyree se P ugh Ty re e se argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in de nying his mot ion fo r a mis tr ia l a ft e r S te ph anie Luster testified that Walter stated, “w e hit a lick,” in r esponse to her inquiry about the money

on the hotel bed. Counsel for T y re ese obje cted a

nd moved for a

mistrial on the basis that Luster’s testimony violated Ty

ree se’s Six th A mendment rig ht to confr ontation be cause the decla rant, Walter, did not testify

and, therefor e, could not be c ross-examined. The G overnme nt argued to the district court that the c ircumstance s surrounding the statement provide a suff icient indicia of r eliability and thus were admissible ag ainst both Ty ree se and Walter. T h e district court denie d the motion for mistrial but sust ained the objection due to c oncer ns of a violation under Bruton v. United States , 391 U.S. 123, 137(1968), or Crawf ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004), a nd subsequently

admonishedNos. 06-3521, 06-3522

United States v. Pugh

- 6 - the jury not to consider the state ment as evidence ag ainst Ty ree se: “L adies and g entlemen, I do want to a dv ise y ou

tha t th e state me nt t

hat Mi ss L

us te r att ri bute d to Wal te r P ug h th a t ‘ we hit a lic k’ is admissible as it relates to de fenda nt Walter Pugh but not defe ndant Ty ree se Pug h.” (JA 442.) On a p p e a l, T y r e e s e c o n te n d s th a t, e v e n th o u g h th e ju r y w a s in s tr

u c te d n o t to consider the te sti mony a s e vid e nc e a g a ins t hi m, be c a us e the state me nt i mpl ic a te d h im a nd he ha d n o o pp or

tun ity to c ro ss- e xami ne Wal te r, a dmi ssi on of the e vid e nc e vio late d h is c on fr on tatio n r ig hts un de r t he ru le set forth in Bruton : “An acc used is de prived of his rig hts under the Confr ontation Clause when the confe ssion of a nontestifying c odefe ndant that implicates the a ccuse d is introduced into evidenc e at the ir joi nt t ri a l . .

. e ve n if the jur

y is ins tr uc te d to c on sid e r t

he c on fe ssi on

on ly a s e vid e nc e a g a ins t the code fenda

nt.” United States v. Cope , 3 1 2 F. 3 d 7 5 7 , 7 8 0 -8 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Bruton , 391 U.S. at 137). Ty

ree se’s a rg ument fails, howeve r, bec ause the statement at issue — “we hit a lick” — is nontestimoni al in nature , and ther efor e, does n o t implicate the Confrontation Cl ause a s analy zed under Bruton or otherw ise. See D avis v. W ashington , 1 26 S. Ct . 2 26 6 ( 20 06 ); Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 36. The Confrontation Cl ause of the Six th Amendment provides that “i n all criminal prosec utions, the acc used shall enjoy the rig ht .

. . to be confr onted with the witnesses a g ainst him.” U.S. Const. amen d

. VI. T h e S upreme Court in Crawf ord and Da v is held that bec ause the Con fr on ta tio n Cl a

us e is c on c e rn e d w ith test imo nia l st a te me nts on ly , o nc e it i s d e te rm ine d th a t a statement is nontestimonial, only the rules of evidenc e may bar its admission. See U nited States v. Ar no ld , 486 F.3d 177, 192-93 (6th Cir. 2007) (en ba nc) ( “The Confrontation Clause, Da v is e xpla ins , is ‘solely conce rned w ith testim onial hear say ,’ . . . mea ning that the onl y admissibili ty question [forNos. 06-3521, 06-3522

United States v. Pugh

- 7 - a nontestimonal s t atement] is whether the statement satisfies the F eder al (or State) Rules of E v i d en ce . ” ( qu o t i n g Da v is , 126 S. Ct . at 2274 (stating that the Confrontation Clause’s “ focus on te sti mon ia l he ars ay ” “ mus t fa ir ly be sa id to mark ou t no t me re ly

its ‘c or e ,’ bu t it s p e ri me te r” )) ; see also W horton v. Bock

ting , 12 7 S

. C t
. 1 1 7 3, 1183, (2007) ( “[T] he Confrontation Cl ause ha s no application” to “ out-of-c ourt nontestimonial statement[s ].”). Thus, afte r Crawf

ord and Da v is , the ini tia l qu e sti on un de r t he Con fr on tatio n Cl a

us e is whether the statement is testimonial or nontestimonial hearsa y . I f it i s testimonial hearsay , the defe ndant must have an opportunity to cross-e x amine the de clar ant. Cra wfo rd , 5 4 1 U

. S

. a t 3 6

. If it is nont estimonial hearsa y , the s tatement is admissible if it falls within an exception to the hear say bar. Se e Ar

no ld , 4 86 F .3 d at 19 2- 93 ; Da v is , 126 S. Ct . at 2274. Althoug h Crawf ord did not specify a “c omprehe nsive definition” of w hat i s t es t imonial, it cited “ex parte testimony at a pr eliminary hear ing” and “[s]t atements take n by police off

icer s in the course of interr og ations,” as e x amples of “this core class of ‘ testimonial’ statements.” Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 51-52. I n the instant c ase, no one sug g ests that Walter’s statement, “ we hit a lick,” falls into such cate g ory . I n d ee d , n o argume nt can be made that Walter w as ac ting a s a witness, i.e., “ bear ing testimony ,” ag ainst Ty

ree se whe n he made the statement to L uster. L uster wa s not a police of

fice r or g overnme nt ag ent see king to e lici t statements to further prosec ution. To the contrar y , Walter made the statement to Luster duringa private, ca sual con v er s at i on in front of Ty ree se. No

rea sonable pe rson in Walter’s position would “anticipate his stateme nt being used ag ainst [Ty ree se] in investigating a

nd prosec uting the c rime.” See United States v. Cromer , 38 9 F .3 d 66 2, 67 5 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 5) ; se e als o U

nite d S tates v . F ra nk lin , 415 F.3d 537, 545 (6th Cir. 2005) (c oncluding thatNos. 06-3521, 06-3522

United States v. Pugh

- 8 - the statement “ we hit a truck” made by the nont estify ing codef endant to a close friend a

fewwee ks afte r an a rmed truc k robber y wa s ad m i s sible even thoug h it inculpated the def endant be cause the statement did not constitute testimony withing the me aning of Cra wfo rd ). Be cause the s tatement at issue is not testimoni al in nature , the Confrontation Clause is not implicated, and an analy sis under Bruton is unnece ssary . Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 51 (“A n off- hand, overhe ard r emar

k might be unr eliable e vidence an d t h u s a g ood candidate for e x clusion under he ars ay ru le s, bu t it

be ars little re se mbl anc e to t he c ivi l- law a

bu ses th e Con fr on tatio n Cl a us e targ e te d. ” ); see also United States v . Taylor , 2007 WL 4270832, at *9 (7th Cir. 2 0 0 7 ) ( no Bruton

argume nt t o a dmi ssi on

of a no nte sti mon ia l st a te me nt b e c a us e “ he a rs ay e vid e nc e that is nontestimonial is not subject t o the C onfrontation C lause” ). The only require ments that must be met in order to a dmit a nontestimoni al hea rsay statement ar e set for

th in the Fede ral Rules of Evide nce. Se e Ar no ld , 4 86 F .3 d at 19 2- 93 ; Da v is , 1 26 S. Ct . at 22 74 . H e re, th e st ate men t c ome s in a g a ins t Walter as an a dmission of a party opponent. Fe d. R. Evid. § 801(d)(2). I n the abse nce of

a hea rsay exception ( and none was off ere d by the Gover

nment), the stateme nt cannot come in ag ainst Ty ree se; the district court, howe ver, a ddresse d this iss ue by providing an appr opriate limiting instruction. Acc ording ly , the dis t ri ct cour t did not err whe n it allowed, with a limiting instruction, the admission of Luster’s testimony ag ainst Walter. 2. Walter P ugh Walter also claims a violation of his Six th Amen d m en t rig hts under the Confr ontation Clause. Specific ally , Walter argues that t h e district court er red w hen, over

objection, it allowed Detec tive Calhoun to testify that the morning following the robbe ry , he “w as g iven the name ofNos. 06-3521, 06-3522

United States v. Pugh

- 9 - Walter Pugh a s a possible suspect.” Although the discussion relating to the objec tion before the trial court is rather c onfusing , it is clear that Walter w as objec ting to the out-of -cour t statement made by some unknown per son to Calhoun that W alter w as a possible suspect in the bank r obbery . The c ourt

overr uled the objec tion, concluding that the stat em en t wa s not offer ed for the truth of the matter

asser ted (i.e., that Walter was a suspe ct) but rather to show the ef fe ct o n the listener ( i.e., why Ca lho un pr oc e e de d to inv e sti g a te W alt e r b y int e rv ie wi nghis sis te r B e ssi e ), and , a lte rn a tiv e ly , to rebut De fenda

nts’ attack of

the “ve rac ity

of the police investigation.” As we ha ve noted, state ments that are testimonial in nature “may n o t b e offere d by the g ov e rnme nt t o e sta

bli shthe g uil t of

an a c c us e d a

bs e nt a n o pp ortu ni ty

fo r t he a c c us e d to c ro ssexamine” the witness. Cromer , 3 8 9 F. 3 d at 6 7 0 (c i t i n g Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. 36). Howe ver, “ [t ]he admission of a testimonial statement in and of itself is not enoug h to trigge r a violation of the Confrontation Clause. Instead, the state ment must be used as hea rsay — in other words, it must be offe red f or the truth of the matter a sserted.” Pugh , 4 0 5 F. 3 d at 3 9 9 (c i t i n g Cromer , 389 F.3d at 676 (“The Confrontation Clause does not ba r the use of te stimoni al statements for purposes other

than

e sta bli sh ingthe tr

uth of the matte r as se rt e d. ” ))

. F ur the r, te sti mony

that do e s n ot r e ve a l any

sp e c if ic statement made by

a conf idential informant (or

other none stify ing de clar ant) a nd mere ly provides backg round information reg ardingthe cour se of investigation does not violate the Confr ontation Clause. See Crome r , 389 F.3d at 676-77 (conc luding that testimony of off icer that he “ha d information” a

b out drug dealingoccur

red at a par

ticular a ddress wa s permissible as bac kg round information eve n though the jury could link that addre ss to the defe ndant). The lac k of any

detail surroundingthe statement made to Detec tive Calhoun about WalterNos. 06-3521, 06-3522

United States v. Pugh

- 10 - be inga po ssi ble su sp e c t c omp lic a te s a de te rm inatio n o f whe the r t he state ment is testimo nia l in

na tur e . A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e s t a t e m e n t a t i s s u e , “ I w a s g i v e n t h e n a m e o f W a l t e r P u g h a s apo ssi ble suspect,” is not a spe cific state ment of t he nontesti fying declar ant and mere ly provides bac kg round information. See Crome r , 3 89 F .3 d at 67 6. I n an y e ve nt, be c a us e the state me nt wa s not o ff e re d to pr ov e the tr

uth of the matte r a sse rt e d, bu t in ste a d to de mon str a te the a ff e c t on Ca lho un and to e xpla in his ste ps in t

he inv e sti g a tio n, the state me nt w a s n ot h e ars ay , a nd the dis tr ict court

did no t e rr in admitting it. Se e Un ite d S tates v . Ca ntu , 876 F.2d 1134, 1137 ( 5th Cir. 1989) (explaining that if a statement is offe red f

or its effe ct on the listener, to e x plain the listener’s conduct, it is not hear say as def ined by the Fe dera l Rules of Evidence ). B. Sentencing 1. Tyree se P ugh Ty ree se ar gues that he should ha ve rec eived a lower sentenc e for three rea sons: (1) he ha d a minor role in the of

fenc e; (2) his c riminal history was over- repr esente d by misdemeanors; a

nd (3) he pre sented mitigating c ircumstance s. Under Rita v

. United States , 127 S. Ct . 2456 (2007), a nd Gall v. United States , 128 S. Ct . 586 (2007), we revie w a district c ourt’s sentenc ing deter mination f

or rea sonablene ss unde r a def ere ntial abuse- of-discr eti o n s t an dard. United States v. Hollman , 2008 WL 111028, at *2 (6th Cir. 2008) (c i t i n g Ri ta , 12 7 S. Ct . at 24 59 ; Ga ll , 128 S. Ct. at 591, 597). “Reasonable ness has both substantive and proc edura l components, and a ccor dingly , we c onsi d ernot only the leng th of the sentenc e but also the fa ctors eva luated and the proce dures employ ed by the district court in re achingits sentencing deter mination.” United States v. J ones , 489 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations and interna lNos. 06-3521, 06-3522

United States v. Pugh

- 11 - quotation marks omitted). Under Ga ll , this Court must e nsure that “the district court committed no signific ant proc edura l error , such as f ailing to calc ulate (or improperly calc ulating) the Guidelines

ra n ge, tre at i n g t h e G u i d el i n es as m an d at o ry , fa i l i n g t o co n s i d er t h e § 3 5 5 3 (a ) f

ac t o rs , s e l e ct i n g a sentenc e base d on clea rly err oneous fa cts, or fa iling to ade quately ex p l ai n the chose n sentenc e-inc ludin g an explanation for a ny deviation from the Guidelines rang e.” Ga ll , 1 28 S. Ct

. a t 59 7. I n a dd iti on , a ft e r c ompl etin g thi s p ro c e dura l r e vie w, we mus t e ns ur e that th e se nte nc e is substantively rea sonable based on “the totality of the c ircumstance s.” Id. T h i s C o u rtm ay a p p l y a nonbinding, r ebuttable pr esumption of rea sonablene ss to a within-Guidelines sentenc e. Ri ta , 127 S. Ct . at 24 62 -6 3; see also Jone s , 489 F.3d at 252. After revie wing the re cord, w e conc lude that the dist r ic t c o u r t i mpose d a re asonable sentenc e. Ty re e se do e s not ar g ue , nor do e s the re c or d indi c a te , that th e dis tr ic t c ourt inc or re c tly c a lc ulate d h is Gu i d el i n es ra n ge o r t h at t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt t re at ed t h e G u i d e l i n es as m an d at o ry . Du ri n g a compre hensive sente ncing hear ing, the district court consider ed the r eleva nt § 3553(a) fac tors, the Guidelines ca lculations, the evidenc e at tria l, and the ar gu m en t s of counse l before imposing the

se nte nc e . T he dis tr ic t c ourt no te d th e vio le nt n a tur e of the of fe ns e and tha t T y re e se ’s sp e c if

ic ro le in ho l d i ng a shotg un in the fac e of the branc h manag er w hile Walter collec ted the money was not minor. The district cour

t addre ssed Ty

ree se’s ex tensive criminal history , including a conviction that he re ceive d in t h e t i m e b etween the two trials for the bank r obbery . The c ourt explained that althoug h Ty

ree se had twe nty

criminal history

points, placing hi m i n Categ ory VI , offe nders a

re pla c e d in Ca te g or y VI wi th a s li ttl e a s f

ourt e e n p oin ts. De sp ite that fa c t tha t si x of T y re e se ’s po int sNos. 06-3521, 06-3522

United States v. Pugh

- 12 - wer e, ther efor e, not “other wise consider ed” wi t h i n the ra ng e, the c ourt imposed a sente nce in the mid dle of the Gu ide lin e s ra ng e . Ty re e se c ite s no su

pp or t fo r his a sse rt ion that some of his misdemeanor c onvictions should not have been considere d in the criminal history cate g ory calc ulation, or that his categ ory would be diffe rent we re it not for the se prior c onvictions. The c ourt ac knowledg ed Ty ree se’s argument that “he ne ver r eally had a c hance to succe ed” but stated that the imposed mid-Guidelines sentenc e ref lected the seriousness of t h e o ff ense, promoted re spect for

the law, pr ovided just punishment, offere d deter renc e to others, a

nd protec ted the public. We, there fore , conclude that the district court imposed a r easona ble sentenc e. 2. Wa lt e r P ugh W al t er p re s en t s t wo ch al l en ges t o h i s s e n t e n c i n g : (1 ) t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt erre d i nap p l y i n g a two-leve l enhanc ement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1( c) wher e the e vidence was insuffic ient to find that Walterplay ed any

g reater role in the bank robbe ry than did his codefe ndant; and (2) judicial fac tfinding at sentencing , under a preponde ranc e-of

-the-e vidence standard, is unc onstitut ional. The standa

rd of r eview f

or a district court’s application of an ag g ravating- role e nhance ment is unsettled. United States v. Burley , 241 F. App’ x 290 (6th Cir. 2007) (c iting United States v. Milan , 218 F. App’ x 492, 495-96 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding the application of a § 3B1.1( a) e nhance ment

un de r b oth

de fe re nti a l and

de no vo re vie w) ; United States v. Mc Daniel , 398 F.3d 540, 551 & n.10 (6th Cir. 2005) (de clining to resolve the question of the applicable standard of revie w)). “ This Court has traditionally

revie wed the district court’s fac tual finding s for c lear err or and its leg al conc lusions de novo.” Id. ( i n t e r

n a l c i t a t i o n s a

n d qu o t a t i o n s r e m o v e d )

. InBuford v. United States , 532 U.S. 59, 66 (2001), the Supreme Court held t hat “in li g ht of the fa ct-bound nature of the leg al dec ision,” anNos. 06-3521, 06-3522

United States v. Pugh

- 13 - appellate court should re view def ere ntially a district cour

t’s application of § 4B 1.2, the crime- of-violenc e enha

nceme nt. T h is Co u

r t h a s since “ rese rve[d] j udg ment as to whethe r the district court’s a pplication of § 3B 1.1 . . . should be revie wed de fer entiall y o r d e novo.” United States v. Henley , 36 0 F

. 3 d

5 0 9 , 5 1 6 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 4 )

. We n e e d

n o t r e s o lv e th e is s u e in

th is c a s e , h o w e v e r, be c a us e un de r e ith e r sta

nd ard of re vie w, the dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t e rr in a pp lyingthe e nh anc e me nt. We reviewWalter’s constitutional challeng e to his sentence de novo. United States v. Co p eland , 321 F.3d 582, 601 ( 6th Cir. 2003). We quickly

dispose of Walter’s latter argument, which he c oncede s is forec losed by our prec edent. A de fenda

nt’s Six th Amendment rig ht to have fa cts proven be y ond a re asonable doubt is lim ited to those fac ts that increa se the defenda nt’s sentenc e bey ond the s tatutory maxi mum for the offe nse cha

rg ed. Un ite d Sta te

s v . R oge rs , 2 0 0 8 W L1 1 6 2 8 9 , at * 2 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 5 30 U. S. 4 66 , 4 90 (2 00 0) ; Un ite d S tate s v. Cro we ll , 493 F.3d 744, 749 ( 6th Cir. 2007)). H er e, W al t er does not argue that the district cour t increa sed his sentenc e beyond the statut or y ma ximumfo r h is c on vic tio ns ; he ins te a d a rgue s th a t th e c ourt

vi ol ate d his Sixth Am e ndme nt r ig ht t o a

trial by ju ry

wh e n it fo un d f a c ts b y a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e to deter mine the advisory

sentenc ing r ang e under

t h e Gu i delines. Six th Circuit authority , howeve r, permits this preponder ance -of- the-e vidence fac t-finding

. Ro ge rs , 2008 WL 116289, at *3 (c iting United States v. Gate

s , 461 F.3d 703, 708 (6th Cir. 2006) (ex plaining that “using a pre pondera nce

o f t h e e v i d e n c e s t an d ard

po st- B o o ker

does not violate . . . the Six th Amendment rig ht to trial by jury ”) a nd United States v. Book

er , 543 U. S. 220 , 232 -3 3 (20 05 ) (h old ing that a sen te nc ingc ourt is permitted to find fa cts by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e in orde r to appropr iately deter mine theNos. 06-3521, 06-3522

United States v. Pugh

- 14 - advisory Guidelines ra

ng e))

. Walter further argues that, reg ardle ss of the standard, the evidenc e was insuffic ient for the court to apply

the two-leve l enhanc ement. Section 3B 1.1(c) provides for a two-level enha nceme nt “[i] f the de fenda

nt was an or g anizer, lea der, ma nag er, or supervisor in any

criminal ac tivity .” Ap pli c a tio n N ote 2 p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s: To qualify

for a n adjustment under this section, the de fenda nt must have bee n the org anizer, lea der, ma

nag er, or supervisor of

one or more other participa nts. An upwar d depar

ture may be wa rra nted, howeve r, in the ca se of a defe ndant who did not or g anize , le a d, mana g e , o r s up e rv ise ano th er part ic ipa nt, bu t w ho ne ve rt

he le ss exercised mana g ement re s p o n sibili ty over the proper

ty , assets, or a ctivities of a criminal org anization. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, Commentary , Application Note 2. Walter argues that the fa cts established at trial wer e ins ufficie nt to support application of the enhanc ement. Th e district court re jected the objection at the se ntencinghear ing a nd, under the preponde ranc e standa

rd, found that the enhanc ement wa s appropr iate base d on the following evidenc e: Walter is Ty

ree se’s father; Walter sec ured the g etawa y car from his sister B essie; Walter was the one who phy sically took the m oney from the tellers and the bank vault; the robbery proce eds

wer e kept in Walter ’s hotel room and under his c ontrol afte r the robber y ; a nd, signific antly , in the

re c or de d te le ph on e c a ll w ithHo lst on , Wa lter r eferre d to the mon e y a s h is a nd pla nn e d to have it “wa shed.” These f actor s, ta k en t o gether, are sufficie nt to show that W alter w as a ma nag er, le ader , or

o r g a n i z e r o f t h e r o b b e r

y an d t h a tW a l t e r

e x e r c i s e d

m an a g e m e n tr e s p o n s i b i l i t y o v e r t h e p r o p e r t y,Nos. 06-3521, 06-3522

United States v. Pugh

- 15 - assets, or a ctivities of the cr ime. Acc ording ly , the district court committed no err or in applying the enhanc ement pursua

nt to U.S.S .G § 3B 1.1(c) and Applica tion Note 2. V. CO NC LU SION For these re asons, we AF F IRM De fe nd ants ’ c on vic tio ns and se nte nc e s.