Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Proposed Rules 65977

duty period limitation purposes the

certificate holder and flight

crewmember must consider deadhead

time as assigned time or as part of a duty

period associated with flight.

§ 135.275 Duty period and flight time

limitations: Other flying for a certificate

holder.

No flight crewmember who is

employed by a certificate holder

conducting operations under this part

may do any other duty or flying for a

certificate holder conducting operations

under part 121 or part 135 of this

chapter if that duty or flying for a

certificate holder plus his or her duty or

flying under this part will exceed any

duty period or flight time limitation in

this part. This section applies to any

other duty or flying under part 91, part

121, or part 135 of this chapter for a

certificate holder whether the duty or

flying precedes or follows the flight

crewmember’s flying under this part.

§ 135.271 [Redesignated as § 135.277]

10. Section 135.271 is redesignated as

§ 135.277 and revised to read as follows:

§ 135.277 Additional flight crewmember

rest requirements.

(a) No certificate holder may assign

any flight crewmember and no flight

crewmember may accept any duty

period or flight time with the certificate

holder unless the flight crewmember

has had at least the minimum rest

required under this subpart.

(b) No certificate holder may assign

any flight crewmember and no flight

crewmember may accept any duty with

the certificate holder during any

required rest period. For example the

flight crewmember may not be required

to contact the certificate holder, answer

the telephone, carry a beeper, remain at

a specific location or in any other way

be responsible to the air carrier during

a rest period.

(c) Rest periods that are required

under this subpart can occur

concurrently with any other rest period.

(d) The reduced rest periods allowed

under § 135.263 may only be used due

to operational delays and may not be

scheduled in advance.

(e) Each certificate holder shall

provide each flight crewmember who is

assigned to one or more duty periods,

standby duty, or reserve time a rest

period of at least 36 consecutive hours

during any 7 consecutive calendar days.

(f) Each certificate holder must

provide each flight crewmember

assigned to assigned time, when the

assigned time is not part of a duty

period, a rest period of at least 10 hours

before the commencement of a

subsequent duty period.

(g) Each certificate holder must

provide each flight crewmember at least

48 consecutive hours of rest upon return

to the flight crewmember’s home base

after completion of one or more duty

periods that terminate in a time zone or

zones that differs from the time zone of

the flight crewmember’s home base by

6 or more hours and the flight

crewmember remains in that time zone

or zones for at least 48 consecutive

hours. The flight crewmember must

receive this rest before beginning a

subsequent duty period. The home base

is determined by the certificate holder

and is where that crewmember is based

and receives schedules.

Issued in Washington, D.C., on December

11, 1995.

Thomas C. Accardi,

Acting Director, Flight Standards Service.

[FR Doc. 95–30547 Filed 12–14–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

14 CFR Part 121

[Docket No. 27264]

RIN 2120–AF96

The Age 60 Rule

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Disposition of comments and

notice of agency decisions.

SUMMARY: This action announces FAA’s

decisions on a number of issues

regarding the FAA’s ‘‘Age 60 Rule’’. The

issues include: responding to the

comments requested in 1993 regarding

various aspects of the Age 60 Rule,

including the ‘‘Age 60 Project,

Consolidated Database Experiments,

Final Report’’, and issues raised by

pilots seeking exemptions from the Age

60 Rule, issues raised by a petition for

rulemaking by the Professional Pilots

Federation (PPF), requesting the FAA to

remove the Age 60 Rule.

After review of all comments, studies,

and other pertinent information, the

FAA has determined not to initiate

rulemaking to change the Age 60 Rule

at this time. The FAA also has decided

not to grant any of the pending petitions

for exemption or rulemaking.

ADDRESSES: The complete docket

containing recent comments on the Age

60 Rule, including copies of studies

related to the Age 60 issue, may be

examined at the Federal Aviation

Administration, Office of the Chief

Counsel (AGC–200), Rules Docket,

Room 915–G, 800 Independence

Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591,

weekdays (except Federal holidays)

between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.

Availability of Disposition

Any person may obtain a copy of this

Disposition by submitting a request to

the Federal Aviation Administration,

Office of Public Affairs, Attention:

Public Inquiry Center, APA–220, 800

Independence Avenue, SW.,

Washington, DC 20591, or by calling

(202) 267–3484. Requests should be

identified by the docket number of this

Disposition.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Daniel V. Meier, Jr., AFS–240,

Regulations Branch, Federal Aviation

Administration, 800 Independence

Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591,

Telephone (202) 267–3749 or (202) 267–

8086.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

Section 121.383(c) of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (FAR) (14 CFR

§ 121.383(c)) prohibits any air carrier

from using the services of any person as

a pilot, and prohibits any person from

serving as a pilot, on an airplane

engaged in operations under part 121 if

that person has reached his or her 60th

birthday. The FAA adopted the ‘‘Age 60

Rule’’, as it has come to be known, in

1959 (24 FR 9767, December 5, 1959).

In late 1990, the FAA initiated a study

aimed at consolidating available

accident data and correlating it with the

amount of flying by pilots as a function

of their age. This resulted in a document

entitled ‘‘Age 60 Project, Consolidated

Database Experiments, Final Report’’,

dated March 1993 (the ‘‘Hilton Study’’).

The FAA held a public meeting and

requested comments regarding various

issues related to the Age 60 Rule,

including the Hilton Study (58 FR

21336, April 20, 1993). The FAA has

reviewed the written comments

received in the docket (Docket No.

27264) and to the comments presented

at the public meeting. The FAA is also

responding to a number of pending

petitions from pilots seeking an

exemption from the Age 60 Rule.

Finally, the FAA is responding to a

petition for rulemaking submitted by the

Professional Pilots Federation (PPF).

This document describes the history

and basis for the rule, the major events

during the history of the rule, the FAA’s

response to the issues raised above, and

the FAA’s rationale for maintaining the

Age 60 Rule.

I(a). Basis for the 1959 Rule

The FAA promulgated the Age 60

Rule in 1959 because of concerns that a

hazard to safety was presented by

utilization of aging pilots in air carrier

operations. As noted in that rulemaking,
65978 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Proposed Rules

the agency found ‘‘that there is a

progressive deterioration of certain

important physiological and

psychological functions with age, that

significant medical defects attributable

to this degenerative process occur at an

increasing rate as age increases, and that

sudden incapacity due to such medical

defects becomes more frequent in any

group reaching age 60.’’ 24 FR 9767. It

also found that ‘‘[s]uch incapacity, due

primarily to heart attacks and strokes,

cannot be predicted accurately as to any

specific individual on the basis of

presently available scientific tests and

criteria.’’ 24 FR 9767. The FAA noted

‘‘[o]ther factors, even less susceptible to

precise measurement as to their effect

but which must be considered in

connection with safety in flight, result

simply from aging alone and are, with

some variations, applicable to all

individuals. These relate to loss of

ability to perform highly skilled tasks

rapidly, to resist fatigue, to maintain

physical stamina, to perform effectively

in a complex and stressful environment,

to apply experience, judgment and

reasoning rapidly in new, changing and

emergency situations, and to learn new

techniques, skills and procedures.’’ 24

FR 9767. While the FAA recognized that

such losses generally start well before

age 60, the agency determined that

beyond age 59 the risks associated with

these losses become unacceptable for

pilots in part 121 operations.

The agency noted that, due to

seniority, older pilots tend to ‘‘fly the

largest, highest-performance aircraft,

carrying the greatest number of

passengers over the longest non-stop

distances,’’ in the highest density traffic.

24 FR 9767. The FAA concluded that,

because of the high risks involved,

persons should be precluded from

piloting aircraft in part 121 operations

after reaching age 60.

While the Age 60 Rule prohibits pilots

from operating aircraft under part 121

after reaching their 60th birthdays, it

does not impose mandatory retirement

for affected pilots. A pilot may work as

a flight engineer or flight instructor in

operations conducted under part 121 or

may work as a pilot in operations

outside of part 121. The pilot also may

function as an instructor or evaluator in

simulators, an area that has expanded

over the years.

I(b). Subsequent Rulemaking Actions

In the early 1980’s, the FAA explored

possible changes to the Age 60 Rule,

stemming from direction from Congress

in 1979 that the National Institutes of

Health (NIH) study the desirability of

mandatory age retirement for certain

pilots. (P.L. 96–171). The NIH assigned

the National Institute on Aging (NIA)

the primary responsibility for

implementing the legislation. In the

report from this study, ‘‘Report of the

National Institute on Aging Panel on the

Experienced Pilot Study’’ (August 1981)

(NIH report), NIA recommended that the

age 60 limit be retained. Among other

things, the panel concluded that, while

no medical significance could be

attached to age 60 as a mandatory

retirement age, age-related health

changes endanger aviation safety and no

medical or performance appraisal

system could be identified that would

single out pilots who would pose a

hazard to safety. The conclusions

reached by the NIA panel and the

supporting statements contained in the

report pointed to an inability to

distinguish those persons who, as a

consequence of aging, present a threat to

air safety from those who do not. The

following recommendations were made:

1. The age 60 limit should be retained

for pilots in command and first officers.

2. The FAA or some other appropriate

Federal agency should be requested to

engage in a systematic program to

collect the medical and performance

data necessary to consider relaxing the

age 60 rule.

3. In view of the growing importance

of commuter air carriers, the age 60

limit should be extended to cover all

pilots engaged in carrying passengers for

hire, specifically including operations

under part 135 to provide a level of

safety equivalent to that provided in

part 121 operations.

As part of its study, NIA looked at

information on functional decline with

age and the increased frequency of a

number of medical disorders (including

cardiovascular disease, neurological and

mental disorders, and changes in

perceptual, psychomotor and

intellectual functions) associated with

aging. In addition, NIA looked at death

and disability rates in air carrier pilots

and flight engineers, death rates in the

general population, and accident rates

for pilots.

In response to the NIH

recommendations, in 1982 the FAA

published an Advance Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on the

Age 60 Rule (47 FR 29782, July 8, 1982).

The FAA was considering identifying a

select group of pilots who would

continue flying in part 121 operations in

order to allow the FAA to collect data

on selected pilots, age 60 and over,

flying in actual operations under part

121. The FAA was also considering

establishing age limits for flight

engineers serving on airplanes operated

under part 121. The FAA withdrew the

ANPRM in 1984 (49 FR 14692, April 12,

1984). The FAA found that valid tests

did not exist for selecting a group of

pilots age 60 and over who could act as

the test group for collecting data. The

FAA was concerned that without valid

selection tests these pilots would create

an unacceptable safety risk to part 121

operations. The FAA also stated that it

was not appropriate to establish an age

limit for flight engineers at that time.

I(c). 1993 Request for Comments on Age

60 Rule and Hilton Study

In late 1990 the FAA contracted for

the Hilton Study, a 2-year study to

consolidate accident data and correlate

it with flying experience and age of

pilots. This study analyzed accident

data between 1976 and 1988. Although

the focus of the study was on part 121

pilots, the study analyzed the accident

rates for pilots in part 91, 121, and 135

operations holding Class I, Class II, and

Class III medical certificates. The

authors of the study found ‘‘no hint of

an increase in accident rate for pilots of

scheduled air carriers as they neared

their 60th birthday’’ but noted that there

were no data available on scheduled air

carrier pilots beyond age 60. Observing

a ‘‘hint, and a hint only,’’ of an increase

in accident rates for Class III pilots older

than 63 years of age, they concluded

that ‘‘one could cautiously increase the

retirement age to age 63.’’

In addition, on April 20, 1993, the

FAA published a notice of public

meeting and request for comments

regarding various aspects of the Hilton

Study. (58 FR 21336; April 20, 1993.)

The public meeting was held on

September 29 and 30, 1993, and the

comment period closed on October 15,

1993. In response to the FAA’s notice of

public meeting and request for

comments, 46 members of the public

made presentations at the public

meeting, and the FAA received

approximately 1,200 written comments

on the Hilton Study and the Age 60 Rule

in general before the close of the

comment period.

I(d). Commuter Rule

The FAA addressed the Age 60 Rule

in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

(Notice 95–5, 60 FR 16230, March 29,

1995) that would require certain

commuter operators that now conduct

operations under part 135 to conduct

those operations under part 121 (the

‘‘Commuter Rule’’). In that notice, the

FAA proposed to apply all part 121

rules, including the Age 60 Rule, to

those pilots currently employed in

certain part 135 scheduled operations

who would be affected by the Commuter

Rule. In response to Notice 95–5 the

FAA received many comments dealing
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Proposed Rules 65979

with the question, not raised by Notice

95–5, of whether there should be an age

limitation for part 121 pilots and what

that age should be. To that extent those

comments have been considered in this

Disposition.

I(e). Public Comment

1993 Meeting and Request for

Comments

In addition to the comments at the

1993 public meeting and received

during the comment period, the FAA

received over 2,000 comments after the

comment period closed. The issues

raised in the comments by both sets of

commenters are similar and will be

discussed together. The majority of the

commenters at the public meeting and

those submitting written comments

before the close of the comment period

are in favor of raising the age limit,

while the majority of commenters

submitting written comments after the

close of the comment period are against

raising the age limit. Commenters in

favor of raising the age limit offer

several different alternatives, ranging

from age 62 to no age limit. Some

commenters opposed to a rule change

state that the age limit should be

decreased to age 55.

Commuter Rule

In addition to the above comments,

over 2,000 comments on the age 60

issue (including about 1,000 postcards

from members of an airline pilot

organization) were received in the

docket established for the Commuter

Rule. The overwhelming majority of

these comments support maintaining

the Age 60 Rule and do not express

opinions that are different from other

comments received in response to the

public meeting and request for

comments in Docket 27264.

The issues raised at the public

meeting, the written comments, and the

Commuter Rule are discussed below.

I(f). Professional Pilots Federation

Petition for Rulemaking To Repeal the

Age 60 Rule

The PPF, an organization whose

membership is composed of pilots who

oppose the Age 60 Rule, filed a petition

for rulemaking in July 1993 (Docket

27375; 58 FR 46585, September 2, 1993)

that requests the removal of

§ 121.383(c). PPF believes that Federal

law and policy, operational and

regulatory developments since

promulgation of the rule, and the results

of the Hilton Study warrant the removal.

In its petition, the PPF states that the

Age 60 Rule has no basis in fact; refusal

to repeal the rule would constitute

arbitrary and capricious action by the

FAA, contrary to the provisions of the

Administrative Procedure Act; refusal to

repeal the rule without evidence of a

need to retain it in the interest of public

safety is inconsistent with Federal

policy against age discrimination; and

repeal of the rule would have a positive

economic impact on the U.S. air carrier

industry.

In addition, the PPF states that the

FAA should exercise leadership in the

international community and repeal the

Age 60 Rule; the Age 60 standard in

ICAO Annex 1 is ready for change; and

the JAA has proposed increasing the

maximum age limit for air transport

pilots to 65. (The FAA notes that JAA’s

proposal is to allow pilots to operate in

multi-pilot operations up to the age of

65, provided no more than one pilot in

the cockpit is over the age of 60.)

The major issues brought up in the

PPF’s petition for rulemaking (such as

age discrimination, the Hilton Study,

economic impacts of the Age 60 Rule,

etc.) are discussed below in connection

with the disposition of comments in

Docket No. 27264. Because the FAA has

determined that there is insufficient

justification to change the Age 60 Rule

at this time and that the rule is

consistent with Federal law, PPF’s

petition for rulemaking will be denied

in a separate document.

I(g). Petitions for Exemption From the

Age 60 Rule

Over the years the FAA has received

numerous petitions for exemption from

the Age 60 Rule. The FAA consistently

has denied these petitions. Some

petitioners have sought review in the

United States Courts of Appeals, and the

Courts have upheld the denials.

However, in 1992 when the Hilton

Study was underway, the FAA delayed

action on the pending petitions for

exemption and those newly received.

Most of the issues raised by the

petitions were so intertwined with the

underlying Age 60 Rule issues, the FAA

chose to defer action pending

deliberation of the broader issues

involving the Age 60 Rule itself. There

are currently over 100 petitions for

exemption pending. Summaries of the

petitions were published in the Federal

Register, and comments were received

for some of the petitions. These

comments expressed opinions and did

not provide the FAA with new

information. The issues raised by

commenters are discussed in sections II,

III, and V below.

Overall, the petitioners provide

similar information and arguments that

they contend justify exemptions. Part of

their assertions involve their personal

fitness (see section II(a)) and the ability

of the FAA to test them individually

with simulators (see section III(a)). They

state that they hold or are qualified to

hold first-class airman medical

certificates (see section III(b)). Some

state that they have extensive skill and

experience as pilots (see section II(c)).

They also note that the FAA gives many

exemptions to younger pilots for various

medical conditions (see section III(b)).

The petitioners also contend that the

Age 60 Rule is discriminatory (see

section V(b)). In addition, the

petitioners state that the Age 60 Rule is

an arbitrary age and that the age of 60

has not scientifically been shown to be

an accurate predictor of health or ability

(see section II(a)). They state that studies

used by the FAA in the past to justify

the rule are flawed, including the NIH

Study and the reports prepared by

Richard Golaszewski (Acumenics

Research and Technology, Incorporated,

The Influence of Total Flight Time,

Recent Flight Time and Age on Pilot

Accident Rates, Final Report (1983)

(First Golaszewski Report); General

Aviation Safety Studies: Preliminary

Analysis of Pilot Proficiency (1991) and

his subsequent work, Additional

Analysis of General Aviation Pilot

Proficiency (1993) (Second Golaszewski

Report) (section II(b)). They state that

pilots at age 60 are in the safest age

group and that forcing them to retire

results in individuals with less

experience serving as pilots, resulting in

lower safety (sections II(c) and V(f)).

They state that sudden incapacitation is

not a cause of accidents in Part 121

operations (section II(a)). They state that

the rule was promulgated for economic

reasons alone (section V(a)). They state

that the rule is contrary to the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act

(section V(b)). They point out that other

countries have higher retirement ages

for their pilots (section V(c)). They state

that deleting the rule would save the air

carriers money (section IV(a)).

Under 49 U.S.C. 44701(e) the FAA, in

its discretion, may grant exemptions

from the requirements of a regulation if

it finds that such an exemption is in the

public interest. Section 11.25 (14 CFR

§ 11.25) provides procedures for

petitioning for an exemption. Section

11.25(b)(5) provides that such a petition

must—

Contain any information, views, or

arguments available to the petitioner to

support the action sought, the reasons why

the petition would be in the public interest

and, * * * the reason why the exemption

would not adversely affect safety or the

action to be taken by the petitioner to provide

a level of safety equal to that provided by the

rule from which the exemption is sought.
65980 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Proposed Rules

The petitioners have the burden of

showing that the exemption is justified.

The FAA does not doubt that the

petitioners, in general, are wellqualified, experienced, and safe pilots.

However, no petitioner has suggested or

shown how he or she is unique

compared to others who are subject to

the rule.

To the extent that petitioners’

comments involve the justification for

the Age 60 Rule itself, these issues are

discussed in sections II, III, and V

below.

As to individual petitioners’ fitness to

serve as pilots past the age of 60, which

petitioners assert can be demonstrated

by individualized testing or evaluation,

no petitioner has submitted a protocol,

nor is the FAA aware of a protocol, that

would permit the FAA to adequately

assess an aging individual’s relative

risks of incapacitation, either sudden or

subtle. They have not shown how their

circumstances are different in a

significant way from others subject to

the rule. For instance, there is nothing

unique in petitioners holding first-class

airman medical certificates; all pilots

who exercise the privileges of an Air

Transport Pilot certificate are required

to hold a first-class airman medical

certificate. Numerous pilots operating

under part 121, who are approaching

age 60, have long, distinguished careers.

Indeed, the FAA considered these issues

in response to the comments in Docket

27264, and they are further responded

to below.

The FAA has determined that the

petitioners have not shown their

circumstances to be unique compared

with those who comply with the rule,

and that the issues they raise are more

appropriately considered in connection

with whether the FAA should propose

to change the general rule. The FAA

will in separate documents deny the

pending petitions for exemption from

the Age 60 Rule.

In addition, the FAA intends to

handle future petitions for exemptions

for the Age 60 Rule differently. The

normal procedures for handling

petitions for exemption are set forth in

§§ 11.25 and 11.26. They include

publishing a summary of the petition,

reviewing any comments received, and

issuing an individualized grant or

denial of the petition that recites the

basis for the petition and the FAA’s

analysis as to why it is granted or

denied. This process can take a

substantial amount of time. It appears

not to be necessary, however, to carry

out all these steps for future petitions

for exemption from the Age 60 Rule that

are substantially similar to those

discussed here. In the future, the FAA

will deny any petition for exemption

from the Age 60 Rule without first

publishing it for comment unless it

contains a proposed technique, not

discussed in this Disposition, to assess

an individual pilot’s abilities and risks

of subtle and sudden incapacitation.

Petitions that do not contain new

information or a protocol that may allow

the FAA to accurately assess the

individual will be summarily denied. A

copy of this disposition will be attached

to the denial to explain the basis for the

FAA’s denial. Any petition that does

contain such a proposal will be

processed and evaluated as provided in

§§ 11.25 and 11.26.

II. Concerns Regarding Aging Pilots

After considering all comments and

known studies, FAA concludes that

concerns regarding aging pilots and

underlying the original rule have not

been shown to be invalid or misplaced.

II(a). Physical Degradation with Age

As noted above, the Age 60 Rule was

promulgated in 1959 to address the

progressive deterioration of

physiological and psychological

functions with age and an increasing

occurrence of significant medical

defects and sudden incapacitation

associated with this degenerative

process. While emphasizing heart

attacks and strokes, the agency also

noted ‘‘other’’ factors, less susceptible to

precise measurement, resulting from

aging alone. Major emphasis was placed

on the difficulties in attempting to

predict incapacity.

Several commenters state that the

death rate in general and the

cardiovascular death rate in particular

for men in the relevant age groups

declined dramatically between 1960 and

1989. The commenters believe,

therefore, that the age limit could be

raised. Other commenters, however,

state that insurance statistics show a

dramatic rise in cardiovascular disease

in people over age 50.

In the 35 years since the rule was

introduced, there has been remarkable

progress in medicine, particularly in the

ability to evaluate cardiovascular fitness

and in the diagnosis and treatment of

cardiac and cerebrovascular illness. For

example, cardiovascular disease rises

with age, steeply, beginning between

ages 55 and 65, and, though mortality

has dropped since 1960, cardiovascular

disease remains the most frequent cause

of death in pilots and the general

population. With this increased

incidence of cardiovascular disease in

the older population, the risk for

unexpected threatening events is raised.

Cardiac events (e.g., heart attacks,

sudden death) during flight have

continued to occur in low but fairly

consistent numbers over the years and

have caused general aviation accidents.

Other conditions are known to

increase in incidence or to become more

complicated with aging. Many present

greater difficulties of detection and risk

assessment than does cardiovascular

disease. Among these are

cerebrovascular disease; malignancies;

endocrine dysfunction; neurological

disorders; psychiatric diagnoses

including depression; and decline in

sensory and motor capabilities. There

has been an increasing awareness of the

more subtle adverse conditions affecting

performance, those related to cognitive

functioning.

The concepts of ‘‘age-related cognitive

decline’’ or ‘‘age-associated memory

impairment’’ describe objective

impairment of cognitive function (e.g.,

attention; language; some visuospatial

skills; and, particularly, memory), as a

result of aging. These concepts are

applied to describe a longitudinal

decline in performance that is age

appropriate, i.e., a normal outcome of

aging (Petersen, RC; Normal Aging, Mild

Cognitive Impairment, and Early

Alzheimer’s Disease; The Neurologist;

1:000–000, 1995 [in press]). Since there

now is general agreement that a

functional decline occurs with normal

aging, on-going research seeks tools for

its identification and quantification and

to determine its significance for

individuals. A condition of ‘‘mild

cognitive impairment’’ also is

recognized and appears to be the herald

of degenerative disease or dementia.

Again, research looks for diagnostic

tools and for predictor variables of the

ultimate outcome for the individual.

Dementia in the adult population is a

major and growing medical and social

problem. It occurs at all ages, but its

incidence increases with advancing age

so that the largest group of demented

patients is in the older age groups

(Differential Diagnosis of Dementing

Diseases; National Institutes of Health

Consensus Conference Statement;

Volume 6, Number 11; July 6–8, 1987).

One in 10 persons over age 65 and

nearly half of those over 85 have

Alzheimer’s disease alone, and

increasingly it is found in people in

their 40’s and 50’s.

Many of the dementing diseases can

be confirmed or denied with certainty

only at autopsy. The history includes a

decline from the individual’s previously

attained intellectual level and usually

involves defects in memory, other

cognitive capacities, and adaptive

behavior. Usually, it is marked by

significant deterioration of memory and
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Proposed Rules 65981

of one or more other intellectual

functions such as language, spatial or

temporal orientation, judgment, and

abstract thought. Onset is usually but

not always insidious, and the patient

may or may not be aware of the

dementia. Deterioration may vary from

subtle changes that are overlooked by

coworkers, family, and friends, to totally

incapacitating.

Is there a level of cognitive

dysfunction acceptable in a part 121

pilot? On a particular basis, can pilots

be screened for mild cognitive deficits

or for the ‘‘normal’’ age-related cognitive

decline? Can early dementia be

identified before the affected pilot

becomes a risk? How do we know when

the pilot becomes a risk? How

specifically are the deficits identified

through currently available

neuropsychological testing related to

performance and to the real

requirements of piloting? What is an

acceptable level of risk in aviation?

When does the incidence of cognitive

deficit become unacceptable? Are

current proficiency evaluations

adequate for determination of a pilot’s

ability to perform adequately under

every reasonably anticipated

circumstance regardless of age? At

present, adequate answers to these

questions have not been provided.

In its 1981 report, the Institute of

Medicine (IOM) of the National

Academy of Science (on which the NIH

report is based) noted that in addition

to the increased incidence of

cardiovascular disease and degradation

in cognitive functions associated with

aging, other effects of aging become

more prevalent. For example, diabetes,

thyroid disease, pulmonary dysfunction,

and gastrointestinal malignancy are

more common with advancing age.

There is other deterioration with age.

For instance, research points to a

decline with age in the speed and/or

quality of many aspects of perceptual

and motor functioning. In the general

population, the ability to see fine details

declines slightly in adulthood until

about 60, and more markedly thereafter.

With age, there is typically some loss in

ability to hear effectively; the higher the

frequency beyond about 1,000 hertz, the

greater the loss.

Clearly, there is progressive anatomic,

physiological, and cognitive decline

associated with aging, albeit variable in

severity and onset among individuals.

Physicians, psychologists, physiologists,

and scientists of other disciplines have

identified many age-associated

variables, some easily measurable, some

not, that may be important to human

function. There may be other variables,

not yet identified, that play an equally

significant role. We know that, at some

age, everyone reaches a level of

infirmity or unreliability that is

unacceptable in a pilot in air

transportation. That age will vary from

person to person but cannot yet be

predicted in a specific individual.

Because it is unacceptable for these

pilots to work until failure or until there

is obvious impairment, the age of 60 has

served well as a regulatory limit since

1959. Many commenters state that the

Age 60 Rule is arbitrary and there is no

scientific basis for it. Others would

choose a different arbitrary age. For

instance, the Acting Chief, Adult

Psychological Development, Behavioral

and Social Research Program, NIA,

submitted a comment in 1993 on behalf

of the NIA. He states the view that the

age limit could be increased ‘‘to an age

closer to the mid-sixties.’’ However, the

studies he cites do not point to an age

closer to the mid-sixties any more

definitively than they point to the age of

60 as an appropriate age limit.

While science does not dictate the age

of 60, that age is within the age range

during which sharp increases in disease

mortality and morbidity occur.

II(b). Hilton Study and Other Accident

Rate Studies

Over the years, several reports have

examined the rate of accidents as they

relate to age in various populations

groups, in an effort to better understand

how aging may affect safety. As

discussed above, the Hilton Study was

initiated by the FAA to look at accident

rates in pilots. Many commenters state

that the report provides justification for

a rule change. They point out that the

report shows the same accident rate for

pilots who are 50 and pilots who are 65.

They state that the report finds that

accident rates of part 121 pilots decrease

with age. Some other commenters,

however, state that the report does not

provide justification for a rule change.

They state that the report is not

meaningful since correlating accident

rates solely with total flying hours and

recent flying hours is not a valid

measurement. They also state that it is

not meaningful to compare private

pilots who fly beyond age 60 with pilots

who fly a lot of hours per year in part

121 operations.

David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH,

Associate Professor of Epidemiology,

The City University of New York

Medical School, submitted comments

on the Hilton Study. He points out that

accident rates are a very crude tool to

examine the relationship between pilot

age, health, and performance. The IOM,

he notes, ‘‘recognized the existence of a

fundamental problem: since there are no

Class I pilots flying Part 121 flights

beyond age 60, there are no medical,

performance or even accident data on

the group of greatest interest. Needed

are data on vision, reaction time,

judgment, circadian rhythm and many

other neurobehavioral and physiological

measures.’’ This problem led to the

IOM’s recommendation that extensive

additional data be collected and

analyzed to better understand the

relationship of aging and pilot

performance. Dr. Michaels notes that the

Hilton Study did not take the approach

recommended by the IOM. Rather than

examining the neurobehavioral and

physiological measures detailed by the

IOM, the authors of the Hilton Study

examined only accident rates.

(However, the authors of the Hilton

Report fully carried out the work

statement of their research contract with

the agency which asked only that

accidents be studied.)

Dr. Michaels further noted that

numerous studies have demonstrated

that, among various groups of pilots

examined, increasing accident risk is

associated with increasing age. He

includes papers by Golaszewski (1983);

Mortimer (1991); and an analysis by the

Office of Technology Assessment (1990)

which support this finding. He also

invites attention to the citation by the

NIA Report of studies by Harper (1964);

Lategola, et al (1970); Rohde and Ross

(1966); and Booze (1977), all

demonstrating increasing risk with

increasing age. Dr. Michaels warns that

it would be contrary to customary

epidemiologic practice to accept

unconditionally and definitively

findings from a single study that are

substantially different from those of

previous studies.

There is contention regarding the

Hilton Study’s grouping of pilots for

comparison purposes. Richard

Golaszewski, the author of two papers

on the relationship between pilot age

and accident rates, belives that the

Hilton Study’s conclusions are based on

the use of a group of pilots (holders of

Class III medical certificates who have

more than 500 hours of total flight time

and 50 hours of flight time in the last

year), inappropriate for inferences about

the likely accident rate performance of

airline pilots of age 60 and above. He

believes this group is least like airline

pilots and suggests his own alternative:

Professional pilots who did not fly for

airlines but who held Class I or II

medical certificates. Mr. Golaszewski

cites the Second Golaszewski Report for

conclusions opposite to the Hilton

Study—increases in accident rates with

age for professional pilots.
65982 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Proposed Rules

The Hilton Study provides a

discussion of the First Golaszewski

Report, noting those researchers’

disagreement with Mr. Golaszewski’s

methodology and questioning his

conclusions. The study also notes

methodological concerns regarding the

cited works by the Office of Technology

Assessment; Mortimer; and Guide and

Gibson (1991).

Dr. Michaels concludes that (1) the

Hilton Study does not present

convincing evidence that pilots holding

Class I medical certificates past the age

of 60 are not at increased risk of

accidents, and (2) that the study is a

methodologically invalid foundation for

rulemaking. He suggests that the

analyses performed are not valid

because of the small size of the study

(very few accidents and a very large

number of flight hours), because the

study is insensitive to the real concerns

(whether aging is associated with

increased risk for incapacitation), and

because the study does not have welldocumented exposure data. The later

refers the fact that the Hilton Study

calculated accident rates by comparing

the total hours flown. However, because

most accidents occur during take offs

and landings, Dr. Michaels states that

hours flown is not a useful measure in

calculating the risk of accidents. He

believes that the methods used in the

Hilton Study would obscure any

increased rate of accidents among older

pilots in the analyses presented.

The First Golaszewski Report

concluded that pilots with Class I

medical certificates (required for part

121 air carrier pilots in command) and

Class II medical certificates (required for

other commercial pilots) had a

substantially higher accident rate after

age 60 than at younger ages. This report

was cited by the FAA in denying a

petition for exemption from § 121.383(c)

submitted by Courtney Y. Bennett et al.,

and John H. Baker, et al., in 1986.

Golaszewski, in the study report itself,

noted and resolved to the FAA’s

satisfaction various sources of potential

error and provided rationale for the

choices made. Because the study viewed

the accident experience of holders of

Class III medical certificates (required

for non-commercial operations) and of

all classes of medical certificate

combined rather than that of identified

airline pilots, however, and because of

disagreement with Golaszewski’s

selection of numerators and

denominators for calculating accident

rates, the study findings and

methodology were disputed by the

petitioners in their later legal action in

a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.

Although the court identified

limitations in the study, it upheld the

FAA’s denial of the petition. Baker v.

FAA, 917 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1990).

The Second Golaszewski Report

indicated similar findings. These

studies were based on data contained in

the National Transportation Safety

Board Accident Records Database and

the FAA Comprehensive Airman

Information System medical database.

It should be noted that increasing

accident rates with age is not found just

in aviation. The National Research

Council (NRC) has found increasing car

accident rates with increasing driver

age. In a report published in 1988, the

NRC concluded that ‘‘older drivers

show an involvement in crashes that is

more extensive than that of middle-age

drivers, * * *’’ Transportation in an

Aging Society, Transportation Research

Board, National Research Council,

Washington, D.C. 1988. While safely

piloting an airplane is more complex

than driving an automobile, both require

knowledge, quick reflex actions, good

judgment, long-and short-term recall,

and many other skills and abilities.

Accident rate data represent a

quantitative compilation of occurrences

where skills and abilities were, for one

reason or another, inadequate to cope

with a specific situation.

Because statistical analysis of overage-60 pilots in part 121 operations

cannot be done (because there are no

such pilots) studies must use surrogate

data. As has been the case in both the

Hilton Study and the Golaszewski

reports, such analyses are subject to the

criticism that the data used do not

reflect reality and, therefore, are flawed.

This is even truer with the

consideration of accident rate data in

car crashes. Unfortunately, accurate

counts of all pilots flying in scheduled

air carrier operations during a given

time period and their age, current and

total flight time, and accident

experience are not available. Accidents

in air carrier operations are, fortunately,

rare, and there are other factors (e.g.,

seniority bidding for routes) that

compound the difficulties encountered

in developing meaningful statistics

regarding the effects of aging. Further,

flying by non-part 121 pilots generally

involves aircraft, equipment, airports,

operational conditions, and operating

procedures that are quite different than

part 121 operations. Nevertheless, these

studies and the efforts of earlier

researchers provide a foundation for this

current consideration of the issue.

The Hilton Study, the First

Golaszewski Report, and the Second

Golaszewski Report sought to define the

effects of aging on older pilots in terms

of accident rates. While conclusions

may differ as to the effect of aging on

pilots, the studies are similarly limited

by the rule itself since data cannot be

gathered on pilots over age 60 operating

in part 121 operations. Factors that may

have contributed to the contradictory

conclusions are that the accident rates

for pilots over age 60 can be determined

only in operations outside of part 121

and, therefore, may not be fully useful

in drawing conclusions about pilot

performance in operations conducted

under part 121; and grouping the data

differently may lead to different

conclusions. While we believe the

studies all tend to support a regulatory

age limit, they provide no consensus as

to precisely what that age limit should

be.

In the NIH Study, the most

comprehensive study yet performed of

the issues involved in age-related

retirement of airline pilots, the Panel

found that ‘‘age-related changes in

health and performance influence

adversely the ability of increasing

numbers of individuals to perform as

pilots with the highest level of safety

and, consequently, endanger the safety

of the aviation system as a whole.’’ In

response to the question, ‘‘What is the

effect of aging on the ability of

individuals to perform the duties of

pilots with the highest level of safety?’’,

the Panel responded, in part, that—

Undoubtedly, the number of individuals

experiencing substantial decline in

performance does increase with advancing

age * * * Variability in performance appears

to increase, and average performance to

decrease, with increasing age * * * the risk

of an accident increases in the later life of a

pilot, and * * * such risk probably accelerates

with advancing age * * * The duties of pilots

embrace not only maneuvering skill but also

decision-making, crew coordination and

resource management. Decline in cognitive

and psychomotor performance, as well as in

physiological performance, occurs with

increasing age and will affect how these

duties are executed. The health status of the

pilot is apt to affect his/her flying

performance. In this regard, subtle

decrements in performance due to aging

processes or subclinical functional

impairment are more likely to pose a problem

than is complete failure of performance due

to sudden incapacitation.

The Hilton Study has not provided

answers to these basic concerns.

After careful deliberation, the FAA

has determined that the Hilton Study

does not provide an acceptable basis

warranting proposing to change the Age

60 Rule. Supporters of both the Hilton

Study and the First and Second

Golaszewski Reports have good points.

The subgroups studied by each is to

some extent limited, in that they

necessarily do not mirror the subgroup
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Proposed Rules 65983

of part 121 pilots to which the Age 60

Rule applies. The studies do not look at

pilot performance, indeed, they count

all accidents regardless of cause (not

just those caused by pilot error), and do

not count incidents of pilot

incapacitation that did not result in

accidents.

Debate surrounding the reliance to be

placed on these studies illustrates the

difficulty of the task. The changes in

accident rates identified in the Hilton

Study were small, and its conclusions,

therefore, were appropriately cautious.

In view of the lack of consensus among

the best experts who have looked at this

matter, the FAA considers caution

appropriate in declining to consider the

Hilton Study warranting a change to the

Age 60 Rule at this time.

II(c). Performance

Many commenters assert that older

pilots have more experience and better

performance capability than younger

pilots, while other commenters state

that older pilots lose performance

ability. First, age does not necessarily

imply quantity or quality of experience.

Experience is valuable, but it does not

offset all risks or decrements associated

with aging. Also, at some point, the law

of diminishing returns comes into play.

Once a pilot achieves a certain level of

expertise, additional flight time will not

significantly improve pilot performance.

It must also be pointed out that

reference to ‘‘younger’’ pilots may be

misleading in this context. It is the

FAA’s experience in the industry that

retiring age 60 pilots (who generally are

captains) are not replaced by very young

and inexperienced pilots. Rather, they

are replaced by pilots who have

substantial experience as pilots in the

first officer position, and often as flight

engineers before that.

In addition, some commenters state

that pilots near age 60 have performed

heroically, proving that performance

does not degrade with age and

experience, while other commenters

state that courageous performances by

pilots who were near age 60 are not

reasons for abandoning the rule. While

the FAA recognizes that certain older

pilots have performed heroically in

specific circumstances, the decision to

change the Age 60 Rule cannot be based

on isolated commendable acts. The FAA

must make a decision on whether

change to the rule is called for based on

the totality of evidence available on the

safety implications of aging.

II(d). Health and Technology

Many commenters state that since the

rule was issued medical technology has

advanced and life expectancy has

increased; hence, they conclude, the

rule is obsolete. In addition, they

reference that medical technology is

now more capable of screening out

pilots with medical risks and that

fatigue is no longer an issue due to more

modern aircraft that reduce workload

and stress levels. Many commenters also

state that the aging process can vary

markedly among individuals and that

some individuals are in worse physical

or mental condition at age 40 than

others are at age 60. Hence, these

commenters do not believe that age

should be a means for determining

capability. Many other commenters,

however, state that older pilots are not

in good physical shape and

improvements in medical screening do

not detect the subtle impairments with

age that can undermine the margin of

safety.

As noted earlier, the incidence of

cardiovascular disease rises with age,

and it remains that most frequent cause

of death in pilots and the general

population. Though the FAA relies on

sophisticated medical assessment and

monitoring to permit the certification of

carefully selected pilots with known

heart disease, the need for the highest

level of safety in air carrier operations

has required that the increasing,

unpredictable danger associated with

aging be limited.

In addition, there has been an

increasing awareness of the more subtle

adverse conditions affecting

performance, those related to cognitive

functioning. Current medical

certification procedures identify those

individuals who are at most risk and are

adequate for assessing many medical

problems in pilots. The significance of

the known as well as the potential

unknown or unmeasurable adverse

factors increases with aging, however,

and reduces confidence in the

sensitivity of the medical certification

process. The Age 60 Rule recognizes

this reduction of sensitivity in the

context of the statutory recognition that

the highest possible degree of safety is

required in air carrier operations. As

both the incidence of incapacitation risk

factors and other adverse effects

increase with age, the Age 60 Rule

provides additional confidence in air

transportation safety.

II(e). Multicrew Concept

Some commenters point out that

operations under part 121 use 2-pilot

crews, and some also have a flight

engineer on board. They state that if one

pilot becomes incapacitated, the other

crew member(s) can take over. The FAA

agrees that the multicrew concept

provides an additional measure of

safety. Indeed, redundancy in safety

features is an important part of the

overall safety benefits in part 121

operations, including not only pilots but

also other personnel, aircraft structures,

and procedures. The safety benefits of

redundancy would be reduced,

however, if the level of safety of any of

the elements were to degrade. The

sudden incapacitation of a pilot is not

without risk even in a multiple-member

crew and is to be avoided. Of equal

concern is the prospect of subtle

degradation in the judgment, cognitive

function, and crew coordination that

may accompany advancing age. Unlike

the case of sudden incapacitation, such

degradation may not be readily apparent

to the other crew, and it may be difficult

for the crew to deal with the results.

The FAA does not consider the fact

that part 121 operations have multiple

pilots to be a basis for permitting one (or

both) of those pilots to be at

unacceptable risk for age-related

problems.

III. Alternatives to an Age Limitation

III(a). Performance Checks

Some commenters suggested that the

FAA can do performance checks for

pilots past age 60 in simulators to

ensure that they meet the performance

standards. Periodic proficiency and

competency checks are intended to

detect a pilot’s performance deficiency

and to correct those deficiencies before

the pilot is returned to flight operations.

These checks only verify the state of a

pilot’s performance at the time of the

checks. They are not useful for detection

of early or subclinical cognitive defects

that may subtly degrade performance or

which, in time, may progress to risks for

errors in judgment or other actions that

may jeopardize safety. The checks do

not predict whether an individual

pilot’s performance will degrade at any

time in the future as a result of age. In

addition, in its 1981 report, NIA noted

that proficiency checks and simulator

checks usually are designed to train

pilots to meet standards of proficiency

under optimal testing conditions using

known routines and maneuvers.

Although the proficiency checks suffice

for pilot performance purposes, they are

not suitable for testing complex

cognitive functions under actual

conditions, such as fatigue and stress;

nor are they used to determine at what

rate the skills learned in the training

sessions decline between two

consecutive checks. Standard

maneuvers used in proficiency tests are

inappropriate for measuring any but

obvious decrements in pilot

performance. Their inadequacy stems
65984 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Proposed Rules

from the fact that the maneuvers are

well-known in advance; they may be

well-practiced and over-learned by

experienced pilots; and they may give

no indication of the pilot’s ability to

perform them under particular levels of

stress, fatigue, or unexpected decisionmaking requirements. Furthermore, the

pass/fail nature of the testing program;

the probable wide variability among

testers; and the train-to-proficiency

nature of these tests make them

inadequate as a screening mechanism.

III(b). Class I Medical Certificates and

Special Issuance Certificates

Some commenters state that part 121

pilots are required to hold FAA medical

certificates, and that the medical

certification process tests their medical

fitness. Commenters also point out that

the FAA issues waivers to pilots and

permits them to fly with various

medical conditions, including

cardiovascular problems. They state that

if such pilots can be evaluated, older

pilots can too.

The question of operational privileges

for aging pilots is not comparable to the

question of assessment of younger

airmen with specific medical

conditions. Although individuals with

known medical conditions have been

returned to air carrier duties, their

circumstances are not comparable with

those of an individual who has reached

an advanced age. For the person with

known disease, the prognosis for the

disease can normally be assessed and

specific tests or evaluations identified to

monitor the condition. Special issuance

medical certificates are granted to

airmen who have certain known

medical conditions or static defects that

are disqualifying under the established

standards of the Federal Aviation

Regulations. This practice does not

compromise safety and does not

demand similar consideration with

respect to the Age 60 Rule. When a

special issuance medical certificate is

granted, the condition in question has

been clearly identified, and the agency

has been able to develop a means of

assessment and surveillance specially

designed to demonstrate the

individual’s capabilities and to identify

any adverse changes. If that is not

possible, certification is not granted.

Such is not the case in aging, since there

are no generally applicable medical tests

that can, at this time, adequately

determine which individual pilots are

subject to incapacitation secondary to

either acute cardiovascular or

neurological events or to more subtle

adverse conditions related to decline of

cognitive functioning.

III(c). Suggested Protocol for Gathering

Additional Data

One commenter states that data from

actual part 121 pilots under 60 and over

60 are needed. The commenter

suggested that a pilot group should be

established that can fly over age 60. He

believes that a cohort of over age 60

pilots can be identified with a

quantifiable five year cardiovascular

risk that is lower than the risk in the 50

to 59 year age group. Also this group

can be tested by serial performance

testing to ensure that there has not been

subtle incapacitation. The kind of data

that is needed to change the rule could

then be collected and analyzed.

The commenter recommends that a

consensus working group of experts,

appointed by the Federal Air Surgeon,

deliver a document that describes a

battery of state-of-the-art testing to

identify a group of age 60 or older pilots

who have the attributes for continued

safe flying. A second group of nonflying crew age 60 or older would also

be considered. The document would

include all testing, follow up,

methodology, etc. The Federal Air

Surgeon would then review the

protocol, obtain additional expert help

as needed, and produce the final

protocol. Finally, the FAA would

choose the sites for participants in the

long term surveillance program.

FAA Response: While the FAA

appreciates the proposed protocol that

the commenter submitted, the FAA does

not find it an acceptable basis for

initiating a rule change at this time. The

FAA’s ANPRM in 1982 proposed

identification of a select group of aged

60 and over pilots who would continue

flying in part 121 operations to permit

FAA to collect data. The FAA withdrew

the ANPRM in 1984 because valid

selection tests for the group did not

exist. The FAA was concerned that,

without valid selection tests, these

pilots would create an unacceptable

safety risk in part 121 operations. The

commenter does not suggest any data

that indicates that a group described

would be able to identify any such tests.

The FAA has the same concerns today.

IV. Financial Impact of the Age 60 Rule

IV(a). Costs

Some commenters stated that raising

the age limit will reduce costs, while

other commenters stated that raising the

age limit will increase costs.

FAA Response: For the reasons

discussed in this Disposition, the FAA

has determined that an amendment to

the Age 60 Rule should not be proposed

at this time. Therefore, the FAA has not

evaluated the economic impact of a

proposed change.

IV(b). Hiring of Pilots

Some commenters state that

increasing the age limit would result in

the hiring of fewer new pilots, while

others state that there would be no

change in hiring and no increase in

furloughs because economic success

rather than retirements determines

hiring and furloughs. Commenters

estimate that between 10 and 50 percent

of pilots would continue to fly if the age

limit is extended.

FAA Response: The FAA believes that

the primary determinant of new pilot

hiring and furlough is general economic

conditions rather than retirements. The

effects of increasing the age of

mandatory retirement would depend on

the number of pilots opting to delay

their retirement, which may vary

considerably among air carriers. Pilots

with long tenures at a single carrier

would be less inclined to delay their

retirement than pilots who began their

service at a relatively late age and may

not have sufficient years of service at

their present employer to qualify for full

vesting in pension plans. In addition,

the hiring and furlough plans of those

air carriers that permit pilots over age 60

to serve as flight engineers would be

less affected. Any effects on furlough

and new hires would be temporary as

retirements would not be delayed by

more than the difference between the

existing and the amended mandatory

retirement age.

V. Other Comments

V(a). Original Promulgation of Age 60

Rule

Several commenters contend that the

Age 60 Rule was promulgated for

economic reasons in response to an

improper personal request from the

chairman of American Airlines to the

Administrator of the FAA and question

the FAA’s recent actions in reviewing

the rule.

FAA Response: When the Age 60 Rule

was first promulgated in 1959, the FAA

followed standard rulemaking

procedures. Notices were published in

the Federal Register (draft releases 59–

4, 5, and 6, 24 FR 5249, 5248, and 5247,

June 27, 1959), the public was given an

opportunity to comment on the

proposal, and then the final rule was

issued. The rule was not issued to

facilitate the operations of any air

carrier. The rule was promulgated in

order to maintain a high level of safety

in part 121 operations, and that remains

the FAA objective at the present time.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Proposed Rules 65985

V(b). Age Discrimination

Many commenters state that the

current rule discriminates against pilots

60 years of age or older and that the Age

60 Rule is not in compliance with the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

In addition, many commenters state that

the original establishment of the age 60

limit discriminated against people 60

years and older. However, many

commenters who are opposed to

changing the rule state that since pilots

knew about the age 60 limit when they

were hired, it is not discriminatory.

FAA Response: The FAA agrees that

limitations based on age are to be

avoided if possible. However, safety in

air transportation is paramount. As

discussed above, the FAA has not found

a way to acceptably evaluate the

inevitable deterioration that occurs with

age. Considering that the consequences

of a pilot’s subtle or sudden

incapacitation potentially are so severe,

the FAA has determined that at this

time safety requires the Age 60 Rule to

remain unchanged.

The Equal Opportunity Employment

Commission suggests that the FAA use

special testing or screening to identify

those pilots over age 60 who should be

required to stop serving in part 121

operations. They note that some

employers of pilots in non-part 121

operations have resolved age

discrimination litigation by agreeing to

use such additional testing to develop

data about pilots’ health. However, the

FAA has not been apprised of the

testing protocols or of the results of any

such testing, has not seen them

discussed in the medical literature, and

has not been party to the agreements.

Accordingly, these are not a basis to

determine that such testing can be used

instead of an age limitation.

V(c). Foreign Pilots Over Age 60

Many commenters reference ICAO

standards, the JAA proposal, and the

foreign countries that permit pilots to be

over age 60, with varying restrictions. In

addition, many commenters point out

that the FAA allows foreign carriers to

operate in U.S. airspace and airports

with over age 60 pilots and questioned

why U.S. pilots over 60 can’t operate in

U.S. airspace and airports.

FAA Response: Following the FAA’s

promulgation of the Age 60 Rule, the

International Civil Aviation

Organization (ICAO) adopted changes to

international safety standards that

established an age limit of 60 for the

pilot in command of large transport

aircraft operating in international air

transport service. ICAO standards do

not limit the age of the second in

command, although an age limit of 60

is recommended. In October 1994, a

working group of ICAO’s Air Navigation

Commission prepared a working paper

on the upper age limits for flight

crewmembers. The group,

acknowledging the lack of medical

statistical information, recommended

that the age limit not be changed. Some

countries such as France and Germany

have an Age 60 Rule similar to the

United States, while other countries

such as the United Kingdom and

Switzerland have adopted rules that

allow pilots to fly after their 60th

birthdays. If foreign airlines operate in

the U.S., the FAA requires that the

carrier adhere to the ICAO standard. In

addition, the Joint Aviation Authorities

(JAA) in Europe has proposed to

harmonize the European rule to allow

pilots who have not reached the age of

65 to operate in multi-pilot operations,

provided no more than one pilot in the

cockpit is over the age of 60. (JAR–FCL

2–1.11.)

Accordingly, not all countries have

dealt with the issue of age limitations in

the same manner, and for the reasons

discussed elsewhere in this Disposition,

the FAA has determined that the Age 60

Rule should be maintained in the

United States.

V(d). Inconsistency With Other

Regulations

Many commenters point out that

pilots who operate under other than part

121 can fly after reaching age 60. They

believe, therefore, that there should not

be an age limit in part 121 operations.

FAA Response: The Age 60 Rule, like

many other safety rules that apply to

part 121 operations and not others,

provides an increased level of safety

appropriate to the operations conducted

under part 121. The Commuter Rule

proposal, as discussed above, looked at

enhancing the level of safety for certain

operations now under part 135. The

FAA proposed one age limit on all

pilots employed in part 121 operations,

including those pilots currently

employed in the part 135 operations

covered by the proposal (60 FR 16230;

March 29, 1995). The final Commuter

Rule is being issued concurrently with

this Disposition.

The FAA’s statute requires the

Administrator to give consideration to

the duty resting upon air carriers to

perform their services with the highest

possible degree of safety in the public

interest and to make rules appropriate to

the differences between air

transportation and other air commerce.

The Age 60 Rule is responsive to this

mandate.

V(e). Pilot Union Membership

Many commenters state that pilot

unions and employers may favor

retirement at age 60 and write this into

their labor contracts, but pilots who do

not belong to those unions should not

be penalized by actions that benefit

union members. In addition,

commenters state that some union

members disagree with their union’s

position and they question their union’s

motivation for changing their position

on the question of raising the age limit.

FAA Response: The Age 60 Rule is a

safety rule that must apply to all pilots,

regardless of union membership or labor

contracts. The FAA cannot speculate as

to the basis for union or management

positions.

V(f). Experienced Pilot Shortages

Many commenters state that new

pilots have a shorter time for gaining

experience as second and first officer

because of the rapid expansion of the

major carriers and the increasing

numbers of two-person cockpits. The

commenters state that carriers that allow

rapid promotion to Captain have poor

safety records. Commenters also point

out that industry forecasts project a

shortage of pilots between 1995 and

2010 due to sharply reduced military

pilot training, thus the airlines’ most

experienced pilots should be retained.

FAA Response: The FAA has not been

apprised of data that shows that the Age

60 Rule will create a shortage of

experienced pilots and thereby

compromise safety.

VI. Conclusion

While the FAA considered each

comment in its evaluation of the Age 60

Rule, for the most part the comments

made assertions and expressed opinions

but did not provide the FAA with

additional facts or analysis sufficient to

support changing the rule. The FAA’s

overriding regulatory concern is safety.

Before issuing a regulation, the FAA

must be satisfied that it will maintain or

raise the current level of safety.

The Civil Aviation Medical

Association’s (CAMA) comments are

particularly relevant. CAMA noted that

medical conditions are degraded by age

and that the aging process accelerates

with time. It took a neutral position as

to the Age 60 Rule, however, stating that

the basic question is one of public

policy and determining how much risk

is acceptable.

The only things that are clear from

review of all of the comments and

relevant literature is that there is no one

obviously ‘‘right answer’’ discovered

through scientific or medical studies,
65986 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 244 / Wednesday, December 20, 1995 / Proposed Rules

and, as CAMA states, the basic question

is one of public policy and determining

how much risk is acceptable. The FAA

must evaluate all the varied evidence

that indicates what those risks are, and

determine where the public interest lies.

At this time, the FAA cannot be assured

that raising the age 60 limit will

maintain or raise the level of safety that

the Age 60 Rule offers.

Although the Hilton Study provides

useful information on accident rates for

pilots as a function of their age, it does

not provide a satisfactory basis for

changing the Age 60 Rule.

Therefore, after carefully considering

the written comments submitted to the

docket, the comments presented at the

public meeting, and analysis of the

Hilton Study, the FAA has determined

for the reasons stated above that no

change to the Age 60 Rule should be

proposed at this time.

Issued in Washington, DC on December 11,

1995.

William J. White,

Acting Director, Flight Standards Service.

[FR Doc. 95–30546 Filed 12–14–95; 8:45 am]

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