COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

LESTER FRIZZELL MORRIS, S/K/A 

 LESTER FRIZZELL MORRISS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0060-99-2 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 MAY 16, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA AND 

 COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

William R. Shelton, Judge 

 Linwood T. Wells, III, for appellant. 

 Stephen R. McCullough, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellees. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 A jury convicted Lester Frizzell Morris of grand larceny, 

reckless driving, attempting to elude a police officer, and 

driving on a suspended license. The defendant contends the 

trial court erred by not striking a juror for cause. We 

conclude that the trial court erred when it did not remove the 

juror. 

 During voir dire the venire was asked if any members of 

their families were law enforcement officers. David Morton 

responded that his father was a police officer, and the voir

dire continued: 
THE COURT: Would the fact that your father 

is a police officer lead you to believe or 

make you believe maybe the testimony of a 

policeman over another person who might 

disagree? 

 MR. MORTON: Not really. 

THE COURT: Do you think you could be 

impartial on the issues and decide on the 

evidence presented here today? 

 MR. MORTON: Yes. 

 Following further questions, Mr. Morton volunteered that he 

had worked with the Department of Corrections in Virginia for 

eight and a half years. The defense counsel continued: 

MR. WELLS: Does the fact that you have 

worked as a state correctional officer, I 

guess you've heard a lot of stories? 

 MR. MORTON: Pretty much. 

MR. WELLS: Would that affect your 

impartiality here this morning? 

 MR. MORTON: Somewhat. 

 MR. WELLS: Think it would? 

 MR. MORTON: Yes. 

MR. WELLS: Do you think, in all honesty, 

that you would probably not listen to the 

evidence as fairly if you had not worked in 

that setting? 

 MR. MORTON: Probably. 

 MR. WELLS: Thank you. 

 The court then concluded the questioning: 

THE COURT: Do you think that you can put 

aside all of those eight a half years of 

what you heard and saw, and sit here today 

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on this jury and listen to the evidence that 

comes from that witness box, follow 

instructions of the court, and render a fair 

verdict both to the Commonwealth and to the 

defendant? Do you think you can do that? 

 MR. MORTON: I can try. 

THE COURT: If you'll try, that's all I ask 

you to do. 

 

 When the trial court concluded, the defendant moved to 

strike Juror Morton for cause. The trial court denied the 

motion stating, "I'm satisfied with his answer." The defendant 

noted his objection and later exercised a peremptory challenge 

to remove the juror from the panel. 

 "The partiality or impartiality of an individual juror is a 

factual issue best determined by the trial court." Watkins v. 

Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 480, 331 S.E.2d 422, 431 (1985), 

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1099 (1986). "Since the court observes 

the venireman, its finding is entitled to great weight and will 

not be disturbed on appeal unless manifest error exists." 

Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 256, 258-59, 307 S.E.2d 896, 

898 (1983) (citation omitted). See Vinson v. Commonwealth, 258 

Va. 459, 467, 522 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999); Faison v. Hudson, 243 

Va. 397, 402, 417 S.E.2d 305, 308 (1992) (Batson challenge). 

Whether manifest error exists is determined upon a review of the 

entire transcript of the voir dire. See Calhoun, 226 Va. at 

259, 307 S.E.2d at 898 (citation omitted). If there is 

reasonable doubt about a juror's ability to give the defendant a 

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fair and impartial trial, it should be resolved in favor of the 

accused. See Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 976, 266 

S.E.2d 87, 90 (1980) (reasonable doubt requires positive 

unequivocal testimony of bias), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983 

(1982). 

The facts of this case are very close to those in Clements 

v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 386, 464 S.E.2d 534 (1995). In 

Clements, the court noted that the prospective juror spoke 

honestly and showed no unwillingness to serve, but it also noted 

the answers disclosed equivocation and revealed doubt that he 

would be able to render a fair verdict. Of particular import 

was the concluding statement that the juror "would try" to be 

fair. See id. at 392, 464 S.E.2d at 537. That conclusion 

indicated that the juror's knowledge might affect his decision, 

and raised a reasonable doubt. For the same reasons, the 

concluding remarks of Mr. Morton, "I can try," following 

statements disclosing doubt and equivocation lead us to the same 

result: there is reasonable doubt about the juror's ability to 

be fair and impartial. The denial of the motion to strike Juror 

Morton constituted error. Accordingly, we reverse the 

convictions and remand the case. 

 Reversed and remanded.

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