NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 23a0267n.06

Case No. 22-1503

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SHANNON DAWN HAWKINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN

OPINION

Before: WHITE, THAPAR, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. After escaping federal custody and evading local police during 

a dangerous high-speed chase, Shannon Dawn Hawkins was arrested and charged with both federal 

and state crimes. Hawkins pled guilty to federal escape, and the district court sentenced Hawkins 

to 18 months’ imprisonment to run consecutively to her undischarged state and federal sentences. 

On appeal, Hawkins challenges her consecutive sentence as procedurally unreasonable. Because 

the court properly exercised its discretion, we affirm.

I.

After serving most of her 16-month sentence for aggravated identify theft in prison, the 

Federal Bureau of Prisons transferred Hawkins to the Cherry Street Services reentry center 

(“Cherry Health”) in Grand Rapids, Michigan. But with less than three weeks left to serve, 

Hawkins took advantage of the trust that Cherry Health placed in her and absconded. Specifically, 
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Hawkins obtained permission to take some items to her car, which was parked across the street 

from the facility. Instead of returning, she got in her car and drove away. 

Days later, an Ionia County police officer observed Hawkins driving well above the posted 

speed limit with one broken headlight. So he attempted a traffic stop. But instead of pulling over, 

Hawkins fled. 

The officer called for backup. During the chase, Hawkins drove as fast as 90 miles per 

hour while evading officers across 3 separate counties. After deploying stop sticks on 4 separate 

occasions and puncturing multiple tires, the officers finally stopped her. During her arrest, 

Hawkins appeared to be paranoid. She complained of government plots to kidnap and surveil her. 

Hawkins was also quite inebriated. Her car was littered with 9 empty beer cans, she had trouble 

speaking and walking, and she had a blood-alcohol level of 0.172—more than double the legal 

limit. 

Months later, Michigan charged Hawkins with two offenses: (1) felony fleeing and eluding 

a police officer, and (2) misdemeanor driving while impaired. To protect the community from 

Hawkins’s dangerous behavior—indeed, she had committed a similar crime years before—the 

Michigan court sentenced Hawkins to 22–60 months’ imprisonment for the first offense concurrent 

with a 93-day sentence for the second offense. 

A federal grand jury then indicted Hawkins for escaping from federal custody at Cherry 

Health in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). In a written plea agreement, Hawkins and the United 

States made two key stipulations. First, the parties agreed that U.S.S.G § 5G1.3(a)’s consecutivesentence provision applied to Hawkins’s felony-escape sentence and the three weeks remaining on 
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her sentence for aggravated identity theft.1 Second, the parties stipulated that “U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) 

and/or (d)”—including Application Note 4(D)—applied to Hawkins’s felony-escape conviction 

and the undischarged term of her state convictions. R. 21, Pg. ID 40

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) directs that a district court impose a concurrent sentence if it 

determines that “a term of imprisonment resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct to 

the instant offense of conviction.” Section 5G1.3(d) grants district courts discretion “[i]n any other 

case involving an undischarged term of imprisonment” to structure the sentences “concurrently, 

partially concurrently, or consecutively . . . to achieve a reasonable punishment.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 5G1.3(d). Finally, Application Note 4(D) says that courts may exercise their discretion under 

subsection (d) when “faced with a complex case” involving multiple undischarged terms of 

imprisonment “that seemingly call for the application of different rules.” Id. cmt. n.4(D). As the 

plea agreement acknowledges, Hawkins was subject to “more than one undischarged term of 

imprisonment.” R. 21, Pg. ID 40 (paraphrasing Application Note 4(D)).

At sentencing, the court enhanced Hawkins’s sentence by two levels for recklessly 

“creat[ing] a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to [the] police officer[s] who [were] 

trying . . . to stop her vehicle.” R. 39, Pg. ID 168. In light of that enhancement, the court initially 

calculated Hawkins’s Guidelines range to be 30–37 months’ imprisonment. But after finding that 

Hawkins’s conduct supporting the enhancement overlapped with her conduct punished by her state 

sentences, the court concluded that it was “more appropriate” to sentence Hawkins without the 

two-level enhancement. Id. at 196. So the court varied downward to a new range of 24–30 

months’ imprisonment. 

1 Under U.S.S.G § 5G1.3(a), “[i]f the instant offense was committed while the defendant was serving a term of 

imprisonment . . ., the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the undischarged term 

of imprisonment.”
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After considering various mitigating factors, the court then varied downward again, 

ultimately imposing an 18-month consecutive sentence. While the court acknowledged that 

Hawkins’s state offenses were in some sense relevant to her federal-escape conviction, it found 

that a consecutive rather than concurrent sentence was necessary to respect each government’s 

interests in punishing Hawkins for fleeing arrest from local officers and escaping from federal 

custody at Cherry Health. The court also determined that a consecutive sentence would be “the 

better way to effectuate all of the 3553 factors” and U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. Id. Hawkins objected and 

timely appealed. 

II.

Hawkins argues that her consecutive sentence was procedurally unreasonable under 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). Specifically, she claims that the court offered “no explanation” for varying 

from “5G1.3(b) despite finding [that] the state term of imprisonment was relevant conduct.” 

Appellant Br. 22. 

We review the district court’s decision to impose a consecutive sentence under Sentencing 

Guideline § 5G1.3 for abuse of discretion. United States v. Campbell, 309 F.3d 928, 930 (6th Cir. 

2002). Hawkins can prove procedural error by showing that the court failed to calculate the proper 

Guidelines range, treat the Guidelines as advisory rather than binding, consider the § 3553(a) 

factors, or adequately explain the chosen sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

“When deciding to impose consecutive sentences, . . . a district court must indicate on the record 

its rationale, either expressly or by reference to a discussion of relevant considerations contained 

elsewhere.” United States v. Cochrane, 702 F.3d 334, 346 (6th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other 

grounds by Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015). But so long as a judge sufficiently 

considers the parties’ arguments and fashions a reasonable sentence, “[t]he appropriateness of 
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brevity or length, conciseness or detail” of the decision is largely left to the “judge’s own 

professional judgment.” Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1964 (2018) (quoting 

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). “At bottom, the sentencing judge need only set 

forth enough [detail] to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments 

and has a reasoned basis” for his decision. Id. (citation omitted)

Here, the district court sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing a consecutive 

sentence. The court considered § 5G1.3’s provisions but found that, in the context of this case, 

“the better way to effectuate all of the 3553 factors” was to focus on Hawkins’s hypothetical 

guideline range without the obstruction enhancement and impose the resulting sentence to run 

consecutively. R. 39, Pg. ID 196. This allowed the court to respect the state and federal 

governments’ respective interests in punishing Hawkins. 

Beginning with the Michigan crimes, the court noted the “very significant” harms posed 

by Hawkins’s eluding-police and impaired-driving offenses. R. 39, Pg. ID 195. She could’ve 

killed officers and Michigan residents while driving inebriated at dangerously high speeds, and it 

took substantial state resources—including four sets of stop sticks—to finally stop Hawkins’s car. 

See also id. at 168 (“When the car hits the sticks, there is a risk . . . that the car is going to go out 

of control and [harm] the officers.”). Moreover, though Michigan had previously convicted 

Hawkins for engaging in similar criminal conduct, that hadn’t stopped her from endangering her 

community again. So to preserve Michigan’s ability to prevent recidivism and future harm to its 

officers and residents, the court imposed a consecutive sentence. 

Turning to the escape offense, the court then noted the federal government’s separate 

interest in deterring detainees from escaping custody. Thus, according to the court, imposing a 
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concurrent sentence would improperly minimize the federal government’s interest in preventing 

other inmates from escaping federal custody. 

Second, the court found that imposing a consecutive sentence, while removing the 

enhancement that double counted the state criminal conduct, would be “the better way to effectuate 

all of the 3553 factors.” Id. at 196. Consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and for the reasons just 

discussed, the court found that a consecutive sentence would best reflect the seriousness of the 

offense, deter future criminal conduct, protect the public from further crimes, and satisfy the 

Guideline’s’ policy statements. 

For these reasons, the court “adequately explain[ed] the chosen sentence to allow for 

meaningful appellate review.” Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1965 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). 

We affirm.