NO T F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0315n.06 No. 08-3414 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA,

P laintif f-App ellee, ON AP P EA L F RO M THE v. UN ITED STA TES D ISTRIC T COURT F OR THE NORT HERN M IC HA EL D . BA KER , DI STR IC T OF OHI O

Defendan t-Appellant. _________________________________/ BEF OR E: SUH RH EIN RI CH , M c KEA G UE , a nd G RI F F IN , C ir c uitJudg e s. S UH RHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. D e f e n d a nt M ic h a e l D. Ba

ker a ppeals fr om the judgme nt of the district cour

t following his convic tion for pos s es sion with int ent to distribute betwee n 500 g rams and 5 kilogr ams of coca ine and 50 and 100 kilogr ams of marijuana . On appe al he a rg ues that the district court c ommitt ed pl ai n error in not instructing the jury about the five -y ear

statute of limit ations for co n s p i ra cy or about a cts occ urringmore than f ive y ear s befor e the indictment. He also contends that the lowe r cour t erre d by ref

using to va

ry cate g orica lly from the Care er Criminal Gu ide lin e s b a se d o n a

po lic y dis a g re e me nt w iththo se g uid e lin e s. We A F F I RM.

I. On June 6, 20 07 , B a ke r w a s c ha rg e d in a sin g le -c ount i nd ic tme nt w ithc on sp ir a c y to dis tr ibute and

po sse ss w ithint e nt t o dis tr ibute 5 k ilo g ra ms o r m or e of

c oc a ine , a

nd 10 0 k ilo g ra

ms or more of

marijuana , in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and (b)( 1)(B ) and § 846. The indictment alleg ed that beg inning in the ear ly 1990s and throug h the date of the indictment, B aker had conspire d-2-

to possess with inten t t o d i s t ri b u te over 15 kilogr ams of coc aine a nd over 500 kilog rams of marijuana

. Trial wa s held November 26, 28, and 30, 2007. The Gover nment’s witnesses testified that Ba ker w as a me mber of a

drug co n s p i ra cy

that distributed substantial quantities of coca ine and

m ar i j u an a i nt h e F o s t o r i a , O h i o ar e a t o b o t h i n d i c t e d a n d u n i n d i c t e d m e mb e r s o f

t h e c o n s p i r a c y. Th e se i n c l u d e d

A l e j a n d r o W ill iams, Ar

no ld E sc ob ar, Cha d L on g , D a vid Sc ott , Ryan Joh ns on , T ra

vis Willi a mso n, and

To mmy Gr anil lo. Th e se wi tne sse s e sta bli sh e d th a t, f

ro m a pp ro xima te ly

19 95 un til 20 05 , Baker rec e ive d s ub sta nti a l qu anti tie s o f c oc a ine and mari jua na a t hi s r e sid e nc e s in

F os tor ia and Nor walk, Ohio, which he then distributed throug h a network of dealers in Northwe st Ohio. On November

30, 2007, the jury returne d a g uilty verdic t on the sole count of the indictment, but f ound Ba ker guilty of the lesse r off

ense of conspiring to possess with i n tent to distribute between 500 g rams and 5 kilog rams of c ocaine and 50 and 100 kilog rams of ma rijuana. B a ke r’ s p re se nte nc e re po rt re c omm e nd e d a tot a l of

fe ns e le ve l of 35

. Th is i nc lud e d a ba se offe nse level of 32, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c )(4) , an enhance ment under U .S.S.G. § 4B1.1 for be ing

a ca ree r off ender , and a two-leve l reduc tion for acce ptance of re sponsibili ty . Be cause of his car eer offe nder status, his cr iminal hist ory cate g ory was VI . Ba sed on a total off ense le vel of 35 a

nd a criminal history

cate g ory of VI , Ba

ker’ s Guideline ra

ng e wa s 292 m o n t h s to 365 months. The

m an d at o ry minimum statutory rang e wa s ten y ear s and the maximum statutory term wa s life imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)( B) and 851(a) (1). On Marc h 24, 2008, the district court sentenc ed B aker

to 144 months’ imprisonm ent followed by eig ht y ear s of super vised rele ase a

nd a $100 specia l assessment.-3-

At the se nte nc inghe a

ri ng , th e dis tr ic t c ourt

de pa rt e d d ow nw ard, but

state d th a t it

fe lt constraine d by

the ca ree r cr iminal guideline. T he district cour t stated t hat it had neve r see n “a mor e convincingcase for r ehabilitation” base d on Ba ker’ s eff orts at re h ab i l i t ati on afte r he w as ar rested in 2005. The Government urge d the di strict court to adopt a middle g round. Afte r consider ing the 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s in lig ht o f t he Go ve rnme nt’ s argume nt, the dis tr ic t court de c ide d n ot t o “var y all the way

down to 120 months.” The court added that the 144-month sentenc e wa s “also a very substantial varianc e.” T he cour t ultim ately

sentenc ed B aker

to 144 months i n s t ea d o f 120 months. B a ke r a

pp e a ls. II.

A. Ba ker a rg ues that the district cour t c ommitt ed plain err or by failing to instruc t the jury about the five-y e ar

s tatute o f

li mi tati o n s f

o r c o n s p ir a c y . Sp e c if

ic a ll y , h e c o n te n d s th a t b e c a u s e the Gover nment prese nted evidence of drug transac tions occur ring both before and af

ter 2002, the jury could have found him g uilty based entirely on conduct oc curr ing be fore 2002, outside the limit ations period. He furthe r conte nds that the jury should have be en g iven an instruction conc erningacts pre
dating 2002. A tri a l c ourt

ha s b ro a d d isc re tio n in

dr a ft ingjur

y ins tr uc tio ns , a nd thi s c ourt wi ll r e ve rs e on ly for a buse of discr etion. United States v. Prince , 214 F.3d 740, 761 (6th Cir. 2000). Beca use B aker failed to obje ct to the jury

instructions, we re view for plain err or only

. Un ite d S tates v . D e dh ia , 134 F .3 d 802 , 808 (6 th Cir . 199 6)

. Th is me ans tha t w e wi ll r e ve rs e on ly

if the re is ( 1) e rr or , ( 2) that is plain, and (3) that aff

ects substantial rig hts. United States v. Olano, 5 0 7 U

. S

. 7 2 5 , 7 3 2 ( 1 9 9 3 )

. If-4-

these three factors are met, then we may exercise our discretion to notice a forf eited error if the err or (4) se riously

aff ects the f airne ss, integr ity , or public re putation of judicial proce eding s. Id. Se e als o De dh ia , 1 3 4 F. 3 d

at 8 0 8 (c i t i n g Olano ). See also United States v. Morrow , 9 77 F .2 d 2 22 , 2 26 (6 th Cir. 1992) (en ba

nc). The e lements o f a d ru g conspirac y are “(1) an ag ree ment to violate the druglaws, and ( 2)

eac h conspirator ’s knowledg e of, intent to join, and participation in the c onspiracy .” United States v. Crozier , 259 F.3d 503, 517 ( 6th Cir. 2001). “In a § 846 conspirac y , the g overnme nt must show t h e w i l l f u l f o r m a t i o no f a c o n s p i r a c y an d t h e w i l l f

u l m e mb e r s h i p o f

t h e d e f e n d an ti nt h e c o n s p i r a c y, but need not prove that defe ndant committed an over t act in furthe ranc e of the conspirac y .” United States v. Layne , 192 F.3d 556, 567 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). See also United S t a t es v. Shabani , 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994) (“the plain lang uag e of the statute and settled interpr etive princ iples

reve al that proof of

an over t act is not require d t o es t ab l i s h a v i olation of 21 U.S.C. § 846”). The statute of

limit ations for co n s p i ra cy is five y ear s. See 18 U. S.C. § 3 28 2 ( a pp lyingto

no nc a pit a l of fe ns e s) ; Un ite d Sta te

s v . B ro wn , 332 F.3d 363, 373 (6th Cir. 2003). B aker was indicted on J une 6, 2007. Thus, the g overnme nt w as re quired to prove bey ond a re asonable doubt that the conspirac y

at issue “was on-g oing after ” J une 6, 2002. See id.; see also United States v . Maye s , 512 F .2 d 63 7, 64 2 (6 th Cir

. 19 75 ) (r uli ngthat “ wh e re a

c on sp ir a c y

c on te mpl a te s a

c on tin uit y of purp os e and a c ontinued perf

ormanc e o f acts, it is presumed to e x ist unti l there ha s been a n aff irmative showing that it has terminated” ). “[T] he statute of limitations is satisfied if the g overnme nt ‘alleg es and pr oves th at the conspirac y

continued into the limitations period.’” United States v. Hohn , 293 F. App’ x 395, 397 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Harriston , 329 F.3d 779, 783 (11th Cir. 2003)). “ [A] s long-5-

as at lea st one ac t in further ance of t he conspiracy was commit ted wit hin the l imitations period, the statute of limitations i s not violated.” United States v. Tsang , 96 F. App’x 318, 322 (6th Ci r. 2004) (o rd er ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d Sta te s v . La sh , 937 F.2d 1077, 1081 ( 6th Cir. 1991)). Se e als o G ru ne wal d

v. United States , 3 53 U. S. 3 91 , 3 97 (1 95 7) (s tatin g that it wa s “ inc umb e nt o n th e Go ve rnme nt t o pr ov e that th e c on sp ir a c y , a s c on te mpl a te d in the a g reement a s f

ina lly fo rm ulate d, wa s st ill in exis tence [wit hin the limit ations period]”). The testimony of Ba

ker’ s coconspirators was suff icient to prove that Baker’ s involvement in the drugtraff

icking conspirac y

continued we ll into the limit ations period, i.e., past J une 6, 2002. David Scott testified t hat between 2002 and 2003, he boug ht approxim ately one pound of ma

rijuana and one ounc e of c ocaine from B aker ever y fewwee ks. Scott also bought eig ht ounces of c ocaine from B aker

on Aug ust 14, 2003. A rnold Escobar testified that in addition to selling B aker marijuana

and c oc a ine ou tsi de the lim itatio ns pe ri od in 2 00 1, he so ld B a ke r 1 50 po un ds of mari jua na a ft e r h is rele ase f rom prison in 2003. He also trave led wit h Ba ker in 2005 to Detroit, Michig an, whe re B aker boug ht a kil og ram of coca ine from one of Escobar ’s contacts. Ry an Johnson t estified that in 2002- 03 , h e dr ov e Jame s H e rn and e z to B a ke r’ s No rw a lk, Oh io r e sid e nc e on thr e e se pa

ra te oc c a sio ns to buy drug s. I n short, there was e vidence to show that Baker w as involved in the conspira cy alleg ed in the indictment within the lim itations period. Ba ker of fer ed no evide nce de monstrating that he

w i t h dr e w f

r o m t h e c o n s p i r a c y b e f

o r e J u n e 6 , 2 0 0 2

. B a k e r

d o e s n o tar g u e t h i s o na

p p e a l an yw ay. As proof of

err or, that i s p l ai n , Ba ker points to the Six th Circuit pattern jury instruction

conce rning overt acts and the a pplicable statute of

limit ations. See Six th Circuit Pattern Criminal J ury Instructions, Overt Ac ts, (2007). Even if there was e rror , see U nited States v. Fuchs , 218 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2000) (findingerr or whe re the jury was not instruc ted that it ha d to f ind a n overt a ct-6-

in furthe ranc e of c onspiracy occur red w ithin the applicable limitations period), that er ror wa s not

“ p la in , ” “ c le ar , ” o r “ o b v io u s . ” See O lano , 507 U.S. at 734. First, B aker never raised the issue of a potential statute of limitations problem in t he district cour t. Cf. Fuchs , 218 F.3d at 962 (finding plain err or whe re the defe ndant raised both a pre- trial objection and a cha lleng e at tria l claiming that the cha rg es ag ainst him were untimely ). More importantly , Ba

ker ne ver a

rg ued that he withdrew from the c onspiracy

. See U nited States v. Fantroy , 146 F. App’x 808, 818 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that there was no plain e rror wher e the defe ndant never raised a statute of limitations i ssue and ne ver argued that he w ithdrew fr om the conspirac y ). Indeed, B aker ’s princ i p al ar g ument was that ther e

wer e drugsales but no conspirac y , and that the wit nesses were not cre dible. Thus, it would not have been “cle ar” or “obvious” to the district court to g ive such a n instruction. See id. Finally , as noted above, the evidenc e demonstrated that the conspira cy continued into the limitations period. Ba ker’ s claim that the jury

should have be en g iven prior ba d acts instruction for conduc t

occur ring pre- dating 2002 also fails. The indictment a lleg ed the rele vant dates of the conspirac y as beg inning in the e arly

1990’s throug h the date of the indictment, J une 6, 2007. The Gover nment’s evidenc e conc erne d drugtransac tions occurr ing within the relevant t ime period. Thus, the e vidence was not 404(b) testimony , but part of the c harg ed conduc t. S e e U n ite d S ta te s v . Torres , 6 85 F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1982) (pe r cur iam) (statingthat “[a]n act is not extrinsi c and Rule 404(b) is not imp lic a te d, wh e re the e vid e nc e of that a c t and

the e vid e nc e of

the c ri me c ha

rg e d a re ine xtri c a

bly intertwined” ). Cf. United States v. Hardy , 228 F.3d 745, 748 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (explaining that backg round evide nce is a prelude to the char g ed off ense, is dire ctly

probative of

the cha rg ed off ense,

ar i s e s f r o m t h e s a m e e v e n t s a s t h e c h ar g e d o f f e n s e , f o r m s an i n t e g r a l p art o f a

w i t n e s s ’ s t e s t i m o n y, or complete s the story

of the c harg ed off

ense” ; concluding that evidenc e of a n alleg ed drug-7-

transac tion occurr ing six y ear s befor e the date t he conspiracy alleg ed in the i ndictment beg an wa s not proper ba ckg round evide nce) . Her e, the district court did not commit error, le t alone plain er ror, in admitting evidenc e of a cts occ urringoutside the limit ations period. Absent plain er

ror, we need not a ddress the third or fourth Olano fac tors. Cf. Fuchs 218 F.3d at 96 3 ( f in d in g th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s p la in e r r o r in f a il in g to in c lu d e a ju

r y in s tr u c ti o n a f f e c te d the defe ndant’s substantial rig hts beca use it cre ated a

g enuine possibility

that t h e j ury

convicted on a leg ally inadequate g round). B. Ba ker argues t hat the district cour t did not recog nize its authority to vary from the Sentenc ing G u id e li n e s p u r suant to United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Kimbrough v. United States , 552 U.S. 85 (2007). Specif ically , Bak er cl ai ms that the district felt constraine d from depar ting f rom the ca

ree r cr iminal guideline, U .S.S.G. § 4B1.1. This Court r eviews a district c ourt’s sentenc ing deter mination f

or rea sonablene ss, usingan abuse- of-discr etion standard. United States v. Alex ander , 543 F.3d 819, 821 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (citing G a ll v . United States , 562 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)), cert. de nied , 1 29 S. Ct . 2 17 5 ( 20 09 ). Th is

rea sonablene ss inquiry involves both procedur al and substantive c omponents. Id. at 821-22 (c iting Ga ll , 552 U.S. at 51). Policy -base d disag ree ments with the Guidelines ar e prope rl y construed a s proce dural c halleng es. See U nited States v. He rrera-Zuniga , 571 F.3d 568, 579- 80, 583 n.8 (6th Cir. 2009). The 144-month sente nce imposed was twenty -four months a bove the statutory

minimum but well below the a dvisory

g uidelines minimum of 292 months to 365 months. Thus, the essenc e of-8-

Ba ker’ s claim is that the district c ourt should have sente nced him below the statutory minimum of 120 months. This court re cently

held in Herrara-Zuniga that the rule in Kimbrough and Spears v. United States , 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009), allowing district courts to vary from an othe rwise- applicable g uideline based on a policy

disag ree ment, is not li mited to the cra ck coc aine guidelines. Herrara-Zuniga , 571 F.3d at 584-85. Notwithstanding, a court may

not depar t below the sta tutor

y minimum unless the g overnme nt moves for such a depar ture unde r either

18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(e) or 3553( f). Mele ndez v. United States , 518 U. S. 1 20 , 1 25 -2 6 ( 19 96 ); se e als o U nite d S tates v . M c In tos h , 484 F.3d 832, 835 (6th Cir. 2007). These are the exclusive means by which a c ourt may

depar t below the statutory minimum

. Mc

In tos h , 4 84 F .3 d at 83 5; Un ite d S tates v . S te war t , 306 F.3d 295, 331 n. 21 (6th Cir. 2002). Her e, the district cour t lacked a uthority to depar t beca use the e x cept i o n s rec og nized at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (pr oviding that “[u] pon motion of the Governme nt, the court shall have the

a uth or ity to i mpo se a

se nte nc e be low

a le ve l est a bli sh e d by statut e a s a

min imum se nte nc e so a s to ref lect a de fenda

nt’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offe nse”) and (f) (stating that the district court c an only depar t below any

statutory min imum se nte nc e if “ the de fe nd ant do e s no t have mor e tha n 1c ri min a l his tor

y po int ” ), do no t a

pp ly in Baker’ s case . See U

nited States v. Branch , 537 F.3d 582, 594- 95 (6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 1 29 S. C t
. 7 5 2 ( 2 0 0 9 ); Uni te d S tates v . F ra nk lin , 4 99 F .3 d 5 78 , 5 85 -8 6 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) ; United States v. Burke , 237 F.3d 741, 744 (6th Cir. 2001). Contrary to Baker’ s assertion, United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (making guidelines advisory ), and Kimbrough v. United States , 552 U.S. 85 (2007) ( holding that district courts may deviate from s entenc es under the advisory Guidelines base dSee also Spears v. United States , 129 S. Ct. 840, 843-44 (2009) ( per c uriam) ( clar ifying that 1 “district courts are entitled to rejec t and var y cate g orica lly

from the c rac k-coc aine Guide lines based on a policy

disag ree ment with those Guidelines”)

. -9- on policy disag ree ments), do not aff ect mandatory statutory

minimum sentenc es. See B ranch , 537 1 F.3d at 592-93 (stating that “[a]mong the statutory provisions left intact af

ter Booke r

wer e statutory min imum se nte nc e s) ; United States v. Gonzalez , 257 F. App’ x 932, 947 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that

“ w h e r e a d e f e n d an t i s s e n te n c e d

to a s tatuto r y ma n d a to r y mi n im u m s entenc e, B ooker

is not imp lic a te d” ); U

n ite d S ta te s v . Patterson , 145 F. App’ x 988, 991 (6th Cir. 2005) (“ Booke r did not strike down the statutory

safe ty valve, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) .”). Fu rt h erm o re , “s u

b s t an t ively , a sente nce tha

t falls within a corr ectl y

ca l cu l at edgu i d el i n e r an ge is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of re asonable ness.” United States v. Brogdon , 503 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2007) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). I t follows that wher e a district court var ie s b e lo w a

p r e s u mp ti v e ly

r e a s o n a b le g u id e li n e s s e n te n c e , a d e f e n d an t’ s b u r d e nto s h ow that the m ore lenient sentenc e is unrea sonable is “eve n more de manding .” Un ite d Sta te s v . Cu rry , 536 F.3d 571, 573 ( 6th Cir. ) (orde r), cert. de nied , 129 S. Ct . 655 (2008). I t simpl y cannot be said that a 144-mon t h s entenc e wa s unrea sonable in lig ht of Ba ker’ s

a dv iso ry g uid e lin e s r ang e . F ur

the r, it i s c le ar t

hat th e dis tr ic t court no t only c le arl y un de rs too d it s ability to depar t downwar d, it understood the limit s of that rig ht. I n short, the sentenc e imposed wa s both substantively

and proc edura lly

rea sonable.

III. The judg ment of the district cour t is AFF I RMED.