2024 IL App (4th) 240268-U 

NO. 4-24-0268 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re N.P., a Minor 

(The People of the State of Illinois, 

 Petitioner-Appellee,

 v. 

Xavier P., 

 Respondent-Appellant). 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Winnebago County 

No. 22JA312 

Honorable 

Francis M. Martinez, 

Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Lannerd and Vancil concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed 

the trial court’s judgment, finding no issue of arguable merit could be raised on 

appeal. 

 

¶ 2 In November 2023, the State filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of 

respondent father, Xavier P. (Father), to his minor child, N.P. (born July 24, 2021). The trial court 

found Father to be an unfit parent pursuant to section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) 

(West 2022)) and it was in the child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father 

appealed.

¶ 3 In April 2024, appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the 

consolidated cases and a supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

arguing no meritorious issue could be raised on appeal. For the following reasons, we grant the 

motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

FILED

July 5, 2024

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 5 A. Initial Procedural History

¶ 6 On July 5, 2022, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship alleging N.P. 

was a neglected and/or abused minor whose environment was injurious to her welfare pursuant to 

the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)). The 

allegations all related to the conduct of Taylor B. (Mother), now deceased. The petition named 

Father the putative father of N.P. An amended petition, filed July 6, 2022, changed nothing relevant 

to this appeal. 

¶ 7 In September 2022, Mother and Father stipulated N.P. was a neglected minor. The 

trial court then entered an adjudicatory order based on the first count of the petition, which alleged 

N.P. was in an environment injurious to her welfare. On November 10, 2022, Father stipulated, 

because he was incarcerated, he was, at the least, unable to care for, protect, train, educate, 

supervise, or discipline N.P. The mother also stipulated her unfitness or inability to care for N.P. 

The court thus entered an order of disposition making N.P. a ward of the court and placing custody

with the guardianship administrator of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services 

(DCFS).

¶ 8 In September 2023, the trial court adjudicated Father to be N.P.’s father. 

¶ 9 B. The Petition for Termination of Parental Rights

¶ 10 In November 2023, the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights. The 

motion noted Mother was deceased. As to Father, the petition alleged he was an unfit father

because he (1) failed to make reasonable efforts to progress toward the return of the child to the 

parent during the nine-month periods of September 27, 2022, to June 27, 2023, and January 27, 

2023, to October 27, 2023 (see 750 ILCS 50/1(m)(ii) (West 2022)), (2) had been repeatedly 
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incarcerated as a result of criminal convictions, and his repeated incarcerations had prevented him 

from discharging his parental responsibilities to the child (see id § 1(D)(s)) and (3) was depraved

(see id § 1(D)(i)).

¶ 11 C. The Fitness Portion of the Termination Proceedings

¶ 12 1. The State’s Evidence

¶ 13 The hearing on the fitness portion of the termination proceedings took place on

December 21, 2023. Respondent, who was in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections 

(DOC), was present via Zoom. The trial court, on the State’s motion, took notice of, inter alia, the 

existing court record and admitted onto evidence certificates of conviction for Father’s felony 

convictions in three cases: in Winnebago County case No. 22-CF-283, an April 29, 2022, 

conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)), a 

Class 2 felony; in Winnebago County case No. 21-CF-2287, an April 29, 2022, conviction of 

aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2022)), a Class 2 felony; and in 

Winnebago County case No. 17-CF-1862, an April 26, 2018 conviction of home invasion (720 

ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2) (West 2018)), a Class X felony, which is nonprobationable (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-

25(d) (West 2018)). 

¶ 14 Charo Garlitz testified she was a caseworker with the Youth Service Bureau (YSB)

and had been assigned to N.P.’s case from the outset. She recognized the service plans, and the 

trial court admitted them. The only requirement for Father was his participation in the integrated 

assessment. He completed a written integrated assessment in September 2023. Garlitz had sent 

him the form “at least twice” in 2022, and Father did not complete it then. He participated in 

services available to him through the DOC. Further, N.P.’s case came into care based solely on 

Mother’s conduct.
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¶ 15 N.P. was two years old when the hearing occurred. Father had contact with her 

before he was incarcerated. Garlitz had recently succeeded in arranging in-person visits for N.P. 

with Father at Sheridan Correctional Center of the DOC. N.P. was slow to “warm up” to Father, 

but he was patient with her. However, Garlitz believed N.P. did not know who Father was. Father’s 

projected release date was November 2024.

¶ 16 2. Respondent’s Evidence

¶ 17 Respondent testified he was currently incarcerated, serving his sentence for 

unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. He expected his November 2024 release date to be 

moved forward based on his participation in a drug treatment program. He had participated in a 

program to teach men better parenting skills. He had also participated in a church-based parenting 

program. He had had trouble receiving forms from the YSB. DCFS succeeded in bringing N.P. to 

visit him in prison, but earlier attempts to have N.P. visit him had failed because the adults who 

accompanied her were not acceptable to the DOC. The first two visits he had were “kind of rocky,” 

but the third and last visit went very well. He agreed he had been incarcerated, either in jail or 

prison, since N.P. was seven months old. He further agreed he had been arrested for domestic 

violence against Mother.

¶ 18 Father believed he had grown up since his last arrest and had become a different 

person. He expected to go back to his old job. He stated he had a “stable home” with his sister to 

go to when the DOC released him.

¶ 19 In arguing against the trial court’s finding that Father’s repeated incarcerations had 

prevented him from discharging his parental responsibilities to the child, Father’s counsel noted 

Father had been incarcerated only once during N.P.’s lifetime. However, he further noted Father

had been incarcerated in 2017, presumably when he was serving his sentence for home invasion.
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¶ 20 3. The Trial Court’s Finding of Unfitness

¶ 21 At a January 31, 2024, hearing, the trial court found Father unfit. It recognized the 

State’s burden was to prove at least one count by clear and convincing evidence. The court stated 

it had needed “to wrestle with” the first count, which alleged lack of reasonable progress. It 

concluded a service plan should have been created for father regardless of the availability of an 

integrated assessment, as, without a service plan, it lacked a benchmark for Father’s progress. It 

thus concluded the State had failed to offer sufficient evidence of Father’s lack of progress. 

Concerning the second count, the court noted Father had been incarcerated for approximately 

three-fourths of N.P.’s life. Father’s incarceration had thus “effectively prevented him from 

providing the financial, physical, and emotional support that [N.P.] is entitled to.” Concerning the 

third count, the court found defendant’s three felony convictions, two of which were within the 

last five years, triggered a statutory presumption of depravity. It further held Father’s testimony 

about his participation in services was insufficient to overcome the presumption. It noted 

defendant’s convictions were for “serious crimes of violence,” including aggravated battery and 

home invasion and stated the “programs simply do not rise to the level where they would indicate 

a rehabilitation.”

¶ 22 D. The Best-Interest Portion of the Termination Proceedings

¶ 23 1. The State’s Evidence

¶ 24 The State recalled Garlitz to testify at the best-interest portion of the termination 

proceeding. She said N.P. had been in the current placement for “the majority of her life.” The 

couple with which N.P. was placed—an aunt and uncle of her half siblings—was the only family 

placement willing to take in both N.P. and her half siblings. They had hoped the children would 

return to Mother; however, after Mother died, they affirmed their willingness to adopt all three 
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children. They had experienced harassment from both the maternal and paternal grandmothers, 

and Father’s sister, all of whom favored placements involving one or two of the children but not 

all three. 

¶ 25 Garlitz believed N.P. and her half siblings were integrated into the family of the 

couple with whom she was placed. In her opinion, N.P. felt secure in the placement and felt loved 

and valued. N.P. understood her relationship to Mother but did not really understand her 

relationship to Father. N.P. had visits with Father’s mother once a month. Garlitz believed the 

couple would encourage a relationship between N.P. and Father if his presence was deemed 

appropriate. Garlitz believed N.P. was too young to understand or articulate her preferences 

regarding her placement. 

¶ 26 2. Father’s Evidence

¶ 27 Father testified he spoke to N.P. once or twice a week by phone. He believed she 

had become familiar with those calls. He believed his most recent in-person visit with N.P. showed

they could have a good relationship. N.P. called Father “Daddy.” Father further testified the credit 

he would receive against his sentence would mean the DOC would release him as early as the end 

of June 2024. 

¶ 28 3. The Guardian Ad Litem’s Evidence

¶ 29 The guardian ad litem (GAL) proffered he had observed N.P. in her placement 

many times. She and her two half-sisters had “a very close-knit relationship,” and she was very 

attached to them. She called the couple with whom she was placed “Aunt Jackie” and “Uncle Sell.” 

The GAL believed the couple would allow N.P. to develop a relationship with Father. In his 

opinion, it was in N.P.’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights and thus allow the couple 

to adopt N.P.
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¶ 30 4. The Trial Court’s Best-Interest Ruling

¶ 31 The trial court ruled the preponderance of the evidence showed termination of 

Father’s parental rights was in N.P.’s best interest. It found the evidence from Garlitz and the GAL 

addressed the statutory best-interest factors.

¶ 32 Addressing Father’s desire to retain his rights, the trial court noted permanency was 

the “overriding concern” in the proceedings. Father’s release date was five months away at best,

and then Father would have to comply with a new service plan “certainly contain[ing] extensive 

service requirements.” The court estimated the domestic violence program Father would be 

expected to complete would take six months. Thus, if the court were to consider delaying the 

termination of Father’s rights, permanency would be delayed for at least a year. It deemed such a 

delay to be “not something that the Juvenile Court Act approves of.”

¶ 33 This appeal followed. 

¶ 34 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 35 On appeal, appellate counsel seeks to withdraw contending she cannot raise any 

arguments of potential merit.

¶ 36 The procedure for appellate counsel to withdraw set forth in Anders applies to 

findings of parental unfitness and termination of parental rights. In re S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 

685, 732 N.E.2d 140, 143 (2000). According to this procedure, counsel’s request to withdraw must 

“be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the 

appeal.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Counsel must “(a) sketch the argument in support of the issues 

that could conceivably be raised on appeal, and then (b) explain why he believes the arguments 

are frivolous.” S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d at 685. Counsel must then conclude the case presents no

viable grounds for appeal. Id. In doing so, counsel should review both the unfitness finding and 
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the best-interest determination and indicate in the brief she has done so. Id. at 685-86. 

¶ 37 Here, counsel states she has reviewed the record on appeal, and her motion 

demonstrates she has reviewed the report of the termination proceeding. The record indicates 

counsel sent a copy of her motion and accompanying memorandum of law to respondent by mail. 

Respondent has not filed a response. Counsel addressestwo possible issues for review: (1) whether 

it was arguable both the bases on which the trial court found Father unfit were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence and (2) whether it was arguably contrary to N.P.’s best interest to be 

adopted by a 64-year-old. Appellate counsel has explained, with argument and citation to 

authority, why she deems each of these issues lacks merit. We address each argument in turn and 

ultimately agree with counsel’s conclusion there are no issues of arguable merit to be raised on 

appeal.

¶ 38 A. Unfitness Finding

¶ 39 1. Applicable Law

¶ 40 A determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and credibility 

determinations which the trial court is in the best position to make because “the trial court’s 

opportunity to view and evaluate the parties *** is superior.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 21, 77 N.E.3d 69. “A trial court’s finding of parental unfitness will 

not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re Ta. T., 2021 IL App 

(4th) 200658, ¶ 48, 187 N.E.3d 763. “A trial court’s decision is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the decision is unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re N.B., 2019 IL 

App (2d) 180797, ¶ 30, 125 N.E.3d 444. 

¶ 41 The State must prove unfitness as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 
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ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)) by clear and convincing evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 28, 

115 N.E.3d 102. We can affirm a finding of unfitness if clear and convincing evidence exists to 

support a single ground for unfitness the State has alleged. See M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 43, 77 

N.E.3d 69 (a trial court can properly terminate a parent’s right if a single alleged ground of 

unfitness is supported by clear and convincing evidence).

¶ 42 Section 1(D)(s) of the Adoption Act, defines a parent as unfit due to his or her

incarceration if: 

“The child is in the temporary custody or guardianship of [DCFS], the 

parent is incarcerated at the time the petition or motion for termination of parental 

rights is filed, the parent has been repeatedly incarcerated as a result of criminal 

convictions, and the parent’s repeated incarceration has prevented the parent from 

discharging his or her parental responsibilities for the child.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(s) 

(West 2022).

To show a parent is unfit under section 1(D)(s) of the Adoption Act, “only one incarceration is 

necessary for a finding of unfitness *** if the [trial] court finds the parent was prevented from 

discharging his responsibilities.” In re E.C., 337 Ill. App. 3d 391, 399, 786 N.E. 2d 590, 597 (2003) 

(citing In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 420-22, 752 N.E.2d 1112, 1120-1122 (2001)). When making 

an unfitness determination under section 1(D)(s) “courts may consider the overall impact of the 

parent’s incarceration, such as the diminished capacity to provide financial, physical, and 

emotional support for the child.” Id at 400.

¶ 43 2. This Case

¶ 44 Here, the evidence showed, when the State filed its motion for termination of 

parental rights and at the time of the termination hearings, Father was incarcerated due to his 2022 
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conviction of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. He had been incarcerated since N.P. 

was seven months old. Moreover, he had been convicted of the nonprobationable offense of home 

invasion in a 2017 case. Thus, Father’s current incarceration had prevented him from discharging 

his responsibilities as a parent for the greater part of N.P.’s life. Further, his prior incarceration for 

home invasion suggested defendant had been incarcerated a significant part of his adult life. (The 

certificates of conviction the trial court admitted into evidence at the fitness hearing showed Father 

was born in 1996.) Therefore, it would be frivolous to argue the court’s determination Father was 

unfit due to his incarceration was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 45 B. Best-Interest Determination

¶ 46 1. Applicable Law

¶ 47 At the best-interest stage of termination proceedings, the State bears the burden of 

proving termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest by a preponderance of the 

evidence. In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71, 145 N.E.3d 605. In reaching a best-interest 

determination, the trial court must consider, within the context of the child’s age and 

developmental needs, the following factors, which are derived from section 1-3(4.05) of the

Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022)):

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s 

identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties; 

(4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continuity 

of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes 

and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for 

permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with 

parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the 
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risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to 

care for the child.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 

190537, ¶ 32, 147 N.E.3d 953; see 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022).

¶ 48 In contrast to fitness hearings, at which the Illinois Rules of Evidence apply, “at the 

best interest portion of the termination hearing *** the trial court may consider ‘all evidence 

helpful *** in determining the questions before the court *** even though that evidence would not 

be admissible in a hearing where the formal rules of evidence applied.’ ” In re M.D., 2022 IL App 

(4th) 210288, ¶ 76, 193 N.E.3d 933 (quoting In re Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1070, 918 N.E.2d 

284, 289 (2009)).

¶ 49 A reviewing court affords great deference to a trial court’s best-interest finding 

because the trial court is in a superior position to view the witnesses and judge their credibility.

C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71. An appellate court “will not disturb the trial court’s decision 

regarding a child’s best interests *** unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id.

¶ 68. A best-interest determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the 

opposite conclusion is clearly the proper result. Id.

¶ 50 2. This Case

¶ 51 Here, the evidence showed N.P. was in a placement with her half sisters, to whom 

she was deeply attached. She, her half sisters, and the couple with whom she was placed functioned 

well as a family. By contrast, N.P. was barely familiar with Father. Moreover, because Father was 

incarcerated and, upon release, would need to participate in programs to establish he was an 

acceptable custodial parent, declining to terminate Father’s rights would delay permanency for 

approximately a year in the best case. Thus, it is not clear terminating Father’s rights was contrary 

to N.P.’s best interest, and it therefore would be frivolous to argue the trial court’s best interest 
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determination was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 52 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 53 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm 

the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 54 Affirmed.