II 

Calendar No. 243 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3463 

To impose sanctions and other measures in response to the failure of the 

Government of the People’s Republic of China to allow an investigation 

into the origins of COVID–19 at suspect laboratories in Wuhan. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 10, 2022 

Mr. RUBIO (for himself, Mr. SCOTT of South Carolina, Mr. CORNYN, Mr. 

SCOTT of Florida, Mr. CRAMER, Mr. MARSHALL, Mr. DAINES, Mr. 

GRASSLEY, Mr. LANKFORD, Mr. SASSE, Mr. TUBERVILLE, Mrs. HYDESMITH, Mr. BRAUN, Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mr. HAGERTY, Mr. KENNEDY, 

Mr. TILLIS, Ms. LUMMIS, Mr. HOEVEN, and Mr. WICKER) introduced the 

following bill; which was read the first time 

JANUARY 18, 2022 

Read the second time and placed on the calendar 

A BILL 

To impose sanctions and other measures in response to the 

failure of the Government of the People’s Republic of 

China to allow an investigation into the origins of 

COVID–19 at suspect laboratories in Wuhan. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Coronavirus Origin 

3 Validation, Investigation, and Determination Act of 2022’’ 

4 or the ‘‘COVID Act of 2022’’. 

5 SEC. 2. MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO FAILURE OF THE GOV6 ERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 

7 CHINA TO ALLOW AN INVESTIGATION OF SUS8 PECT LABORATORIES IN WUHAN. 

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—If, by not later than the date that 

10 is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

11 the President is unable to certify that the Government of 

12 the People’s Republic of China has allowed a transparent 

13 international forensic investigation of suspect laboratories 

14 in Wuhan to commence, including of the Wuhan Institute 

15 of Virology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (in this 

16 section referred to as ‘‘CAS’’), the President shall— 

17 (1) impose the sanctions described in subsection 

18 (c) with respect to— 

19 (A) individuals who hold positions of lead20 ership in the state-run CAS, including its affili21 ated institutes and laboratories, local branches, 

22 and universities; and 

23 (B) individuals who— 

24 (i) are officials of the Chinese Com25 munist Party, the People’s Liberation 

26 Army, or the State Council of the People’s 


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1 Republic of China, including its subordi2 nate agencies, such as the Ministry of 

3 Science and Technology, the National 

4 Health Commission, the Chinese Center 

5 for Disease Control and Prevention, the 

6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry 

7 of Emergency Management, and the Min8 istry of Public Security; and 

9 (ii) were involved in concealing the 

10 initial outbreak of COVID–19 in the Peo11 ple’s Republic of China from the inter12 national community, restricting the release 

13 of information related to the outbreak, un14 derstating the severity of the outbreak, or 

15 obstructing an international investigation 

16 into the origin of the outbreak; 

17 (2) prohibit Federal funding for any joint re18 search or other collaborative projects between United 

19 States-based researchers and CAS researchers 

20 across all academic fields, including those employed 

21 by the affiliated institutes and laboratories of CAS, 

22 its local branches or universities, or the science and 

23 technology enterprises based in the People’s Repub24 lic of China that were created by CAS or founded 

25 with CAS investment; and 


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1 (3) prohibit United States-based researchers 

2 and institutions that receive Federal funding from 

3 engaging in collaborative projects involving gain-of4 function research of concern on viruses with individ5 uals or institutions based in the People’s Republic of 

6 China. 

7 (b) TERMINATION.—The requirements of subsection 

8 (a) shall terminate on the date on which the Government 

9 of the People’s Republic of China allows the transparent 

10 international forensic investigation described in that sub11 section to be conducted and concluded without— 

12 (1) imposition of restrictions on the scope or 

13 subject matter of the investigation; or 

14 (2) limitations on the access of investigators to 

15 physical sites, persons of interest, information on 

16 laboratory biosafety incidents, or relevant molecular, 

17 genetic, epidemiological, serological, and virological 

18 data. 

19 (c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions to be 

20 imposed under subsection (a)(1) are the following: 

21 (1) ASSET BLOCKING.— 

22 (A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall ex23 ercise all of the powers granted to the President 

24 under the International Emergency Economic 

25 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the exVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:05 Jan 19, 2022 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3463.PCS S3463

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1 tent necessary to block and prohibit all trans2 actions in property and interests in property de3 scribed in subparagraph (B) if such property 

4 and interests in property are in the United 

5 States, come within the United States, or are or 

6 come within the possession or control of a 

7 United States person. 

8 (B) PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROP9 ERTY DESCRIBED.—The property and interests 

10 in property described in this subparagraph are 

11 property or interests in property of— 

12 (i) an individual described in sub13 section (a)(1); or 

14 (ii) any family member or associate 

15 acting for or on behalf of an individual de16 scribed in subsection (a)(1) and to whom 

17 that individual transfers such property or 

18 interests in property after the date on 

19 which the President designates the indi20 vidual for the imposition of sanctions 

21 under that subsection. 

22 (2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR

23 PAROLE.— 

24 (A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An 

25 alien described in subsection (a)(1) is— 


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1 (i) inadmissible to the United States; 

2 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other 

3 documentation to enter the United States; 

4 and 

5 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted 

6 or paroled into the United States or to re7 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra8 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et 

9 seq.). 

10 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.— 

11 (i) IN GENERAL.—An alien described 

12 in subsection (a)(1) is subject to revocation 

13 of any visa or other entry documentation 

14 regardless of when the visa or other entry 

15 documentation is or was issued. 

16 (ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca17 tion under clause (i) shall— 

18 (I) take effect immediately; and 

19 (II) automatically cancel any 

20 other valid visa or entry documenta21 tion that is in the alien’s possession. 

22 (d) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.— 

23 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex24 ercise the authorities provided to the President 

25 under sections 203 and 205 of the International 


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1 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 

2 and 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out this 

3 section. 

4 (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at5 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a 

6 violation of subsection (c)(1) or any regulation, li7 cense, or order issued to carry out that subsection 

8 shall be subject to the penalties set forth in sub9 sections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter10 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 

11 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that 

12 commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) 

13 of that section. 

14 (e) EXCEPTIONS.— 

15 (1) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI16 TIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply 

17 to any activity subject to the reporting requirements 

18 under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 

19 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intel20 ligence activities of the United States. 

21 (2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTER22 NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND FOR LAW ENFORCE23 MENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under subsection 

24 (c)(2) shall not apply with respect to an alien if adVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:05 Jan 19, 2022 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3463.PCS S3463

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1 mitting or paroling the alien into the United States 

2 is necessary— 

3 (A) to permit the United States to comply 

4 with the Agreement regarding the Head5 quarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake 

6 Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force 

7 November 21, 1947, between the United Na8 tions and the United States, or other applicable 

9 international obligations; or 

10 (B) to carry out or assist law enforcement 

11 activity in the United States. 

12 (3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF

13 GOODS.— 

14 (A) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and re15 quirements to impose sanctions authorized 

16 under this section shall not include the author17 ity or a requirement to impose sanctions on the 

18 importation of goods. 

19 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph, 

20 the term ‘‘good’’ means any article, natural or 

21 manmade substance, material, supply, or manu22 factured product, including inspection and test 

23 equipment, and excluding technical data. 

24 (f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 


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1 (1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms 

2 ‘‘admission’’, ‘‘admitted’’, and ‘‘alien’’ have the 

3 meanings given those terms in section 101 of the 

4 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101). 

5 (2) GAIN-OF-FUNCTION RESEARCH OF CON6 CERN.—The term ‘‘gain-of-function research of con7 cern’’ means, with respect to the study of viruses— 

8 (A) the use of genetic engineering or nu9 cleic acid synthesis methods reasonably antici10 pated to increase a pathogen’s transmissibility, 

11 or pathogenicity to humans, or to alter a patho12 gen’s host tropism to include humans; 

13 (B) the use of serial passage methods in a 

14 laboratory culture or in laboratory animals rea15 sonably anticipated to increase a pathogen’s 

16 transmissibility, or pathogenicity to humans, or 

17 to alter a pathogen’s host tropism to include 

18 humans; or 

19 (C) any research conducted in a laboratory 

20 setting less than Biosafety Level Three that in21 volves pathogens or potential pathogens known 

22 to be, or that can be reasonably anticipated to 

23 be, infectious to humans through the inhalation 

24 route of exposure, and known to cause, or that 


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1 can be reasonably anticipated to cause, serious 

2 to fatal disease. 

3 (3) TRANSPARENT INTERNATIONAL FORENSIC

4 INVESTIGATION.—The term ‘‘transparent inter5 national forensic investigation’’, with respect to in6 vestigating the origin of SARS–CoV–2, means an in7 quiry that is objective, data-driven, inclusive of 

8 broad expertise, subject to independent oversight, 

9 and properly managed to exclude individuals with 

10 conflicts of interest and under which the following 

11 takes place: 

12 (A) Relevant research funding agencies, 

13 funding contractors, laboratories, and hospitals 

14 open their records to examination by the inves15 tigative team and grant the investigative team 

16 unfettered access to any and all facilities, per17 sonnel, and other sites of interest, and to any 

18 and all forms of epidemiological or virological 

19 data of interest, including serological records 

20 pertaining to the earliest confirmed or sus21 pected cases of COVID–19, or cases of similar 

22 illnesses that may have been misdiagnosed, 

23 which appeared in and around Wuhan in the 

24 fall and winter of 2019. Investigators document 

25 the veracity and source of the data upon which 


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1 their analysis is based in a manner that allows 

2 independent experts to reproduce their analysis 

3 and validate any conclusions they may draw. 

4 (B) The international team is allowed to 

5 perform a full forensic investigation of the 

6 Wuhan Institute of Virology, the Wuhan Center 

7 for Disease Prevention and Control, and the 

8 Wuhan Institute of Biological Products, and all 

9 other laboratories in Wuhan that the team 

10 might identify as warranting examination. The 

11 team is allowed to review the biosafety level 

12 under which bat coronavirus research was con13 ducted, and to interview any and all personnel 

14 currently or previously employed at those lab15 oratories, or related experts who may have in16 formation pertinent to the investigation. All lab17 oratory logs and notebooks kept by Shi Zhengli 

18 and other researchers at the Wuhan Institute of 

19 Virology who have conducted gain-of-function 

20 experiments between 2007 and the date of the 

21 enactment of this Act, as well as their published 

22 and unpublished work in Chinese and English, 

23 are presented in a full and unaltered condition 

24 for examination by the team. The team is given 

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1 tures, isolates, genetic sequences, databases, 

2 and patient specimens stored at these facilities 

3 as well as all chimeric synthetic viruses grown 

4 in vitro by cell culture passaging or engineered 

5 by genomic editing between 2007 and the date 

6 of the enactment of this Act. Such access must 

7 include the opportunity to examine the Wuhan 

8 Institute of Virology’s database of approxi9 mately 22,000 samples and virus sequences, in10 cluding 15,000 taken from bats, which was pre11 viously available to the public but taken offline 

12 in September 2019. The team is further allowed 

13 to examine in full all training procedures in ef14 fect at the laboratory prior to the pandemic, in15 cluding those pertaining to record-keeping and 

16 safety procedures and strategies to prevent the 

17 accidental escape of potential pathogens. 

18 (C) The investigative team analyzes in de19 tail all research related to the 293 bat 

20 coronaviruses reportedly identified by Shi 

21 Zhengli and her team at the Wuhan Institute of 

22 Virology between 2012 and 2015, particularly 

23 RaTG13, RaBtCoV/4991, and all other viruses 

24 from the abandoned copper mine in Mojiang 

25 Hani Autonomous County in Yunnan province, 


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1 where Wuhan Institute of Virology researchers 

2 are known to have collected bat virus speci3 mens, including specimens of RaTG13, during 

4 the decade preceding the date of the enactment 

5 of this Act, including all virus isolates and cul6 tures. The Wuhan Institute of Virology dis7 closes the content of all classified and unpub8 lished studies that the Institute reportedly con9 ducted with the People’s Liberation Army if 

10 such studies involved gain-of-function research. 

11 The team is able to test all laboratory personnel 

12 for antibodies and other serological indicators 

13 of past infection of COVID–19. The team is 

14 given access to all other records kept by the 

15 Wuhan Institute of Virology, including security 

16 logs, surveillance video footage, audio record17 ings, and electronic logs of employees entering 

18 and leaving the facility. The investigative team 

19 is permitted to take samples and conduct test20 ing of the physical facilities where gain-of-func21 tion research has been conducted, including, if 

22 necessary, sewer samples. Unfettered access is 

23 also granted to the copper mine in Mojiang 

24 Hani Autonomous County in Yunnan province 


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1 referred to in the first sentence of this subpara2 graph. 

3 (D) The international team is comprised of 

4 members chosen by the governments of the 

5 United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 

6 France, the Netherlands, Germany, Australia, 

7 Japan, and India. The team includes molecular 

8 biologists, virologists, epidemiologists, and ex9 perts in biosafety and biosecurity. Individuals 

10 who have previously ruled out the possibility of 

11 either zoonotic transmission or a laboratory 

12 leak are disqualified from participation. The 

13 Government of the People’s Republic of China 

14 may appoint Chinese experts to accompany and 

15 advise the team as it conducts its work in the 

16 People’s Republic of China, but the Government 

17 of the People’s Republic of China has no au18 thority to dictate the selection of team members 

19 and cannot obstruct the participation of any in20 dividual selected by the individual’s government 

21 for the team. The central, provincial, and mu22 nicipal authorities of the People’s Republic of 

23 China facilitate the work of the investigative 

24 team and refrain from imposing any restrictions 


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1 on the scope, scale, and duration of the inves2 tigation. 

3 (4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term 

4 ‘‘United States person’’ means— 

5 (A) an individual who is a United States 

6 citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for perma7 nent residence to the United States; 

8 (B) an entity organized under the laws of 

9 the United States or any jurisdiction within the 

10 United States, including a foreign branch of 

11 such an entity; or 

12 (C) any person in the United States. 


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Calendar No. 243 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3463 

A BILL 

To impose sanctions and other measures in relaboratories in Wuhan. tion into the origins of COVID–19 at suspect People’s Republic of China to allow an investiga- sponse to the failure of the Government of the 

JANUARY 18, 2022 

Read the second time and placed on the calendar 


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