This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 FRANCISCO VALENZUELA and 2 RACHEL VALENZUELA, 3 Plaintiff-Appellees, 4

v. No. 35,313 5 STATE OF NEW MEXICO TAXATION 6 & REVENUE DEPARTMENT, PROPERTY 7 TAX DIVISION, 8 Defendant, 9 and 10 ALLAN D. SNYDER and SHERRY L. SNYDER, 11 Defendants-Appellants. 12 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF ROOSEVELT COUNTY 13 Fred T. Van Soelen, District Judge 14 Eric D. Dixon 15 Portales, NM 16 for Appellees 17 Allan D. Snyder and Sherry L. Snyder 18 Greeley, CO 192 Pro Se Appellants 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION 2 VIGIL, Judge. 3 {1} This is the second appeal to have b een generated by this case, which was 4 initiated by Plaintiffs to set aside a sale conducted by the department of taxation and 5 revenue (“the State”) because of a property tax deficiency. [1 RP 1] Before turning to 6 the sole issue presented by this second appeal, we briefly outline the procedural 7 history of the case. 8 {2} The Plaintiffs’ original complaint, which was styled as a “complaint to avoid 9 conveyance,” asserted that the State failed to give them proper notice of any tax 10 deficiency or of the pending tax sale. [1 RP 2-3] Several months after initiating suit, 11 the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding Allan D. Snyder and Sherry L. 12 Snyder, who purchased the property at the tax sale, as defendants, asserting that the 13 purchase price was so low as to be uncons cionable. [1 RP 49-52] Following the entry 14 of a partial summary judgment against the Snyders on that basis, the case was 15 appealed to this Court, which held that an inadequate purchase price is not a valid 16 basis for voiding a tax sale. Valenzuela v. Snyder et al. , 2014-NMCA-061, ¶ 25, 326 17 P.3d 1120. 18 {3} Following remand, Plaintiffs filed a second motion for summary judgment, 19 asserting their original argument that they were not provided with prior notice of the 203 tax delinquency sale as required by NMSA 1978 § 7-38-66 (2001). [2 RP 292-93] 1 Before the district court ruled upon that moti on, the Snyders asserted that they were 2 entitled to a judgment on the basis of this C ourt’s mandate in the first appeal and the 3 district court agreed, entering an order by which Plaintiffs’ claim against the Snyders 4 was dismissed with prejudice. [2 RP 300, 377-78] Once the Snyders were dismissed 5 from the case, the district court deniedthe pending summary judgment motion and 6 held a hearing on the merits. [2 RP 373-76, 381-86] That hearing resulted in findings 7 that the State had, in fact, failed to provi de Plaintiffs with the required notice and, 8 ultimately, a judgment against the State. [2 RP 387-391, 394-95] That judgment 9 purports to set aside the sale at which the Snyders purchased the property that is the 10 subject of this case. [2 RP 394] 11 {4} The Snyders then filed their notice of appeal to this Court [2 RP 396], and 12 Plaintiffs responded with a notice of lack of jurisdiction for appeal suggesting that, 13 because the Snyders were dismissed from this case two months before the entry of the 14 judgment that they now seek to appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction. [NOTICE 1-2] 15 Our calendar notice agreed that Plaintiffs’ claims against the Snyders had been 16 dismissed and, noting that non-parties are not bound by judgments entered in their 17 absence, proposed to dismiss on the basis that the Snyders are not aggrieved by the 184 entry of a judgment that cannot affect them or their interest in the realty underlying 1 this case. [CN 3-4] 2 {5} In response to that notice, Plaintiffs have filed a memorandum agreeing that this 3 appeal should be dismissed, but asserting that the reason the Snyders are not aggrieved 4 is that they never had any interest in the property, rather than because the judgment 5 does not affect that interest. [MIO 2-3, 6-7] Having duly considered that 6 memorandum, we are unpersuaded. 7 {6} In their memorandum, Plaintiffs cite to multiple precedents for the proposition 8 that a tax sale conducted without proper notice is void from the outset. [MIO 2-3] That 9 rule was applied in the cases of Chavez v. Derek J. Sharvielle, M.D., P.A., 10 1988-NMCA-005, 106 N.M . 793, 750 P.2d 1119; Cochrell v. Mitchell , 11 2003-NMCA-094, 134 N.M. 180, 75 P.3d 396; and Pratt v. Parker, 1953-NMSC-005, 12 57 N.M. 103, 255 P.2d 311, all of which are relied upon by Plaintiffs. But the validity 13 of a tax sale is not the issue raised by Plai ntiffs’ notice. Instead, the issue before this 14 Court is whether the district court’s decision that the tax sale was invalid can be 15 enforced against the Snyders despite their absence from the lawsuit in which that 16 question was answered. In addressing that issu e, we note that in all of the cases cited 17 by Plaintiffs, the tax sale purchasers were parties to the suits in which the tax sales 18 were litigated. Chavezand Cochrell were both quiet title actions brought by the 195 purchasers, and in Pratt, the tax sale purchasers and a subsequent transferee were the 1 named defendants. Chavez , 1988-NMCA-005, ¶ 2; Cochrell , 2003-NMCA-094, ¶ 1; 2 Pratt, 1953-NMSC-005, ¶ 1. 3 {7} We find no case in which a tax deed was declared void without the putative 4 title-holder under that deed being joined in the litigation at the time of judgment. And, 5 more importantly, Plaintiffs direct us to no such case. See In re Adoption of Doe , 6 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (noting that in the absence of 7 cited authority to support an argument, this Court may assume that no such authority 8 exists). It would appear that the putative owners of the property at issue in the case 9 were necessary parties to the suit if Plainti ffs were to obtain the relief that they seek. 10 As our calendar notice pointed out, anyone“whose interests will necessarily be 11 affected by a judgment in a particular case” is generally an indispensable party. [CN 12 3 (quoting Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Schultz , 1969-NMSC-113, ¶ 6, 80 N.M. 13 517, 458 P.2d 592)] And, more to the point, absent parties are not bound by a 14 judgment entered, by virtue of the fact th at they are not before the court. [Id.] 15 Plaintiffs’ memorandum simply does not address that problem or otherwise explain 16 how the Snyders can by bound by the judgment entered below. 17 {8} The Snyders, who are not represented by counsel, have also filed a 18 memorandum in response (“MIR”) to our calendar notice asking for clarification 196 regarding our proposed disposition of this appeal. In that memorandum, the Snyders 1 propose that Plaintiffs’ only remaining reme dy in this case may be to seek monetary 2 damages from the State, and ask this Court to explicitly say so in this opinion. [MIR 3 1] The Snyders’ request effectively asks th at we issue a ruling proscribing Plaintiffs 4 from pursuing any further action against their putative interest in the subject matter 5 of this suit. It is not the proper role of an appellate court, however, to issue an 6 “advisory opinion in the absen ce of a justiciable issue.” Insure New Mexico, LLC v. 7 McGonigle , 2000-NMCA-018, ¶ 27, 128 N.M. 611, 995 P.2d 1053. And doing so in 8 this case would require that we guess at wh at course of action Plaintiffs choose to 9 pursue in the future. Ultimately, we are in no position to speculate whether any path 10 remains for Plaintiffs to pursue the return of the property at issue in this case. And, 11 because it would not be proper to do so, we decline the Snyders’ invitation to rule 12 upon the propriety of actions not yet taken. 13 {9} Because the judgment on appeal cannot beenforced against the Snyders, who 14 were not before the district court when that judgment was handed down, we hold that 15 the Snyders are not aggrieved parties for purposes of appeal and, accordingly, dismiss 16 this appeal for want of jurisdiction. 17 {10} IT IS SO ORDERED. 187 ___________________________________ 1 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 2

WE CONCUR: 3

__________________________ 4 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 5

__________________________ 6 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge 7