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# SASC HEARINGTRANSCRIPT20APR21

# Senate Committee on Armed ServicesApril 20, 2021 1:30 PMOPEN/CLOSED:To receive testimony on United States Strategic Command and United States Space Command in review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and the Future Years Defense Program. Agenda Witnesses 

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**Charles Richard**Troll developing a dedicated nuclear command and control capability that includes a launch under warning and launch under attack. By these measures, China is capable of executing any plausible nuclear employment strategy regionally now and we'll soon be able to do so at Intercontinental ranges I offer for China is important to look at what they do, not what they say and where they're going, not where they Are?And I have no choice but to view China as a significant strategic threat and share Secretary Austin's assessment. China's the pacing threat for the nation and DSD at large. Russia, however, remains the pacing nuclear strategic threat, aggressively engaged conventional and nuclear capability development modernization and are now roughly 80 percent complete.While we are at zero, it is easier to describe what they're not modernizing nothing than what they are, which is pretty much everything including several never before seen capabilities and several thousand non treaty accountable weapons systems. They have a nuclear armed intercontinental ballistic missile that has the avant, garde, Hypersonic Glide vehicle beside nuclear powered and nuclear armed underwater vehicle and the Skyfall, nuclear powered and nuclear armed cruise missiles.

**Charles Richard**Examples of asymmetric strategic weapons capabilities designed to deter us and our allies offset perceived conventional inferiority in an effort to terminate events on Russian terms. So given all that we can no longer assume the risk of a strategic deterrence, failure in crisis or conflict is always low.The days of power projection in a permissive operational environment without regard to a possible nuclear response are over. This is why a secretary Austin testified during his confirmation. Nuclear deterrence is our highest priority. Given that threat the nation requires a fully modernized strategic force and supporting infrastructure.Every Presidential administration of the past 60 years has reaffirmed a safe, secure, effective nuclear force, most credible combinations of capabilities to deter strategic attack, assure allies. Each element has unique capabilities, but it's the combined elements of the triad that allow us to execute our assigned national strategy.

**Charles Richard**We're at a point where end of life limitations and cumulative effects of under-investment in our nuclear to turn and supporting infrastructure against the expanding threat leave me no operational margin nation simply cannot attempt to indefinitely life extend leftover Cold War weapons systems and successfully carry out the Assigned strategy.They're at risk of losing credibility in the eyes of our adversaries. And if they continue to work at all, they will likely not be able to pace the threat that they're intended to deter. I'll just end with, in particular, the nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure. I think is hitting the wall first without the recapitalization of the existing weapons we risk obsolescence and irrelevance.And we could reach a point where no amount of money will adequately mitigate the operational risk we'll be facing. Final point, nation has a long standing, flexible tailored strategy with a well thought out family of policies, capabilities and postures. I welcome and call for a strategic review, but I advise against any individual policy or capability decision made, absent a complete understanding of the overall effects on that strategy as it could risk. The deterrence failure, which is the underpinning of everything we do. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you again for the opportunity to be here today and I look forward to your questions.

**Jack Reed**Thank you Richard. General Dickinson please.

**James Dickinson**Good morning, ladies and gentlemen and thank you Chairman Reid Ranking, Member Inhofe and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee for the chance to speak with you today. In describing the accomplishments of the nation's newest combatant command. I am pleased today to represent the nearly 18,000 military civilian and contractor personnel supporting the United States Space Command's mission in United States Space Command.Our power is absolutely our people. Having just finished the command celebration of the Women's History Month, we proudly recognize our many female war fighters, one of who, one of whom came from us from the 16th Space Control Squadron, where she performed remarkably in our space. Superior already mission set another, an aviator now part of the Navy's new space. Cowdrey built U.S. Space Command's analytic foundation for the development of our space architecture, enterprise a third and a third, establish the Joint Fire Zone element for our joint task force space defense to integrate and synchronize space efforts for combat commanders.And there are countless others that I could go on and on and on about this morning. But I will not because of time, our diverse force will continue balancing combat readiness and preparing for the future. We will provide our people a working environment, a culture that allows them to thrive while reaching their full potential.

**James Dickinson**Our ideals reflect those of our oath to the Constitution of the United States and we remain committed to providing for the common defense, promoting the general welfare and securing the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity. Today I will offer you some insights into our plans for the future which are aligned with the President's new interim Nationals, your digital guidance.When I took command of U.S. space command last August, we were still filling out the structures of our new warfighting combatant command for space. As I outlined in my written statement, we've made tremendous progress since then to include further development of our two functional component commands. An establishment of all of our service component commands significantly advancing warfighting capability in the space domain, all while continuing to support the joint force with exquisite space capabilities while largely focused from the geosynchronous built to the last tactical mile on Earth.We are expanding our focus to keep pace with our nation's push into the CIS lunar region and to the moon and Mars and beyond China's space. Enterprise continues to mature rapidly presenting a pacing challenge for us. They invest heavily in space with more than 400 satellites on orbit today. China is building military space capabilities rapidly including sensing and communications systems and numerous anti satellite weapons.

**James Dickinson**All the while China continues to maintain their public stance against the weaponization of space. Similarly concerning Russia's published military doctrine calls for the employment of weapons to hold U.S. and allied space assets at risk. For example similar to the Russian space based weapons test in 2017, Russia recently conducted another test of a space based anti satellite weapon.Additionally, the December 2020 test of a direct ascent anti satellite weapon demonstrates that even as Russia aims to restrict the capabilities of the United States, they clearly have no intention of halting their own ground base or on orbit counter space weapons systems. Russia currently has close to 200 satellites on orbit and could double that by 2030. In addition to this activity on the part of our competitors, we are observing exponential growth in the commercialization of space.We currently track a challenging thirty two thousand objects in space. Nearly 7000 of those are objects are active or retired satellite payloads among up the roughly three thousand five hundred active satellites. The three largest single constellations belong to the commercial companies Space X as Constellation for broadband Internet capabilities.

**James Dickinson**Planet Labs, earth imaging, constellation inspired blows spaced cloud data analytics. Constellation overlaying this new global security landscape on the already complex operating environment of space demands a new level of awareness on our part. Given that the President's interim national security strategic guidance calls for and I quote, ensuring the safety, stability and security of outer space capabilities. U.S. Space COMM is focused on my number one priority of enhancing existing and developing new space awareness capabilities. Space domain awareness gives us the insight into activity throughout the space domain, including potential adversary activities.But perhaps more importantly, insight into the intent of those potential adversaries to space domain awareness, provides decision quality information to combat commanders and the national command authorities to ensure we can provide viable military options with the appropriate decision space throughout the spectrum of operations from deterrence to Warfighting in order to most effectively accomplish our science missions, U.S. Space Command has assessed our current capabilities and develop the requirements necessary to expand that capability where needed to meet our mission imperatives.We have passed those requirements along to the services into the Department of Defense. In general, our intent is to build the appropriate space operational architecture designed to achieve full operational capability backed by a team of war fighters who can outthink and outmaneuver our adversaries while engaging daily. In a competitive environment, our primary goal remains to deter conflict to deter a conflict that begins in or extends into space.

**James Dickinson**So with the help of this committee and all of Congress, we will achieve that ultimate objective and ensure that the United States and our allies will never have a day without space. Thank you very much this morning. I look forward to your questions.

**Jack Reed**Thank you very much. General Dickinson. Before we begin, let me remind my colleagues that since this is the hybrid hearing, we will not use the early bird rule instead will last questions. In order of seniority. There are five minute rounds. Please stick as closely as you can to the five minutes you'll see the timer before you and I would ask all colleagues to mute the microphones when they're not speaking.Thank you, General Dickinson. Let me begin with what I think is a fundamental question. As I suggested in my opening remarks, you could also be called sensor command as well as space command because your responsibility extend not only the space based sensors but also the many ground based sensors and to integrate them into a system, a coherent system. And so on. Bottom line question, What are you doing to ensure that missile warning infrastructure, radars and satellites are capable of determining whether there is a ballistic or hypersonic missile attack on the United States?

**James Dickinson**Senator thank you for that question. So what we are doing at U.S. Space Command over the past 20 months or so since we stood up was looking at all the sensors and the entire sensor architecture worldwide and in -- in an attempt or at in terms of understanding what sensors we have doing. What specific missions and what we've done over the past year or so has been taken, we've taken the opportunity to take a terrestrial based sensors that traditionally do missile defense type of activities from the different services, the Army and the Navy.And we've looked at them from the perspective of how can they contribute to our ability to understand what's going on in the space domain. And while this is just the beginning of it in terms of making those sensors interoperable in our architecture, we are driving towards the future of where we will actually have those integrated.So in other words, Senator -- we're taking current capabilities that used to traditionally do missile defense and seeing if they have capabilities to help us in the space domain in terms of doing our space, domain awareness type missions. And as we look to further refine our requirements, adding requirements to those capabilities through the department to enhance their ability to space domain awareness.So we've had good success over the last 19 months in doing that and we've demonstrated a couple of times with regards to some of the actions that our competitors have been doing on orbit with a relative degree of success. But so we've taken the first step, the steps after that will be further integration of those capabilities.

**James Dickinson**And again, working with each of the combat commands in terms of prioritization of those sensors to be able to do both space domain awareness as well as missile defense missile warning.

**Jack Reed**Thank you, General and Richard, why do we need to build a ground based strategic deterrent rather than simply extend the life of the minimum three ICBM so Senator?

**Charles Richard**The answer to that fundamentally starts with the idea that nothing lasts forever. You cannot indefinite later life extend anything and I cannot deter with the leftovers of the Cold War forever into the future. That's the fundamental reason here. I am different from the other combatant commands and that I don't come up with my own objectives.They are directed by the President as interpreted by the Secretary of defense and the chairman. So I have a stack of things I've been ordered to do. I need a certain amount of capability to go do that and I need weapons systems that will actually work and actually make it to the targets. So there's any number of reasons the ultimate authority on whether or not Minuteman 3 can be extended.Is the Secretary of the Air Force and the chief staff of the Air Force as judged by the Secretary of defense? I'm not the ultimate authority on that. Well, I think we have repeatedly reported to Congress why it's not cost effective to do that. And from my viewpoint, I'm not sure how they're gonna be able to do it at all that it is in the details.

**Charles Richard**What they are doing to keep that weapons system functioning, remember that is a 70 euros weapons system that I'm going to have to employ against 20, 30 level threats. We are down to two of a particular type of switch that is required to go in the launch control centers. Nobody knows how to make it anymore. It's obsolete.It's not worth a company to put their effort into that. They have repeatedly been pulling rabbits out of the hat to work through those types of issues. A simple one Senator is if you try to life extend a weapons system that was built before the invention of the Internet and then turn around and ask me why it's not cyber secure. I don't know how to retrofit a full cyber socket capabilities forever into the future on a system that wasn't even designed when we had an Internet.

**Jack Reed**So fundamentally nothing lasts forever and we eventually have to get new stuff, sir. Oh, thank you, Adam. Just one final question. My remaining time would a more robust arms control effort by the United States and obviously other countries particularly not to compliment your mission to deter an atomic attack or a nuclear outright.

**Charles Richard**Absolutely, Senator I have said I'll support any arms control agreement less formally. I'll take all I can get right if we actually have arms control and we're confident it is verifiable, it reduces the threat and simply makes my job easier.

**Jack Reed**Thank you very much.

**Unidentified**Senator Inhofe thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**James M Inhofe**I -- in my office, we talked about this admiral Richard and I think you covered it so well in your opening statement you began -- I'm not sure what you might have left out. You've done a great job. We know what Russia is doing. We know what they've been doing. We know that China has been doing North Korea now is presenting a growing risk to the United States and -- and our allies. And yet our nuclear forces are decades past. They're designed lives and we need to be retired soon.So I just think it's important when we are seeing our primary adversaries as as outlined in our days that that we're not doing what we should be doing. We are actually behind our primary adversaries. And so I'd like to have you, you know, restate Russia, we know what they're doing. They've already modernized. Over 80 percent of its force in China's nuclear programs are accelerating.So I'd like to know how important is it that we complete the U.S. nuclear modernization program as quickly as possible. You've outlined that we're not only and where we are relative to our -- our adversaries, but tell me how important it is that we do it now.

**Charles Richard**Senator I will start, mike, the need to make the -- I'll start with -- I want to expand on one point. I said in my opening statement that China could no longer be a lesser included case. And what that means is they're at the point that what it's going to take to turn to deter them is gonna start to be additive to what we have to do with Russia.I don't have the luxury of deterring one country at a time. I am expected to deter all countries all of the time. And then on top of that, I don't have any remaining operational margin right there. We have exhausted the operational margin to allow us to delay this recapitalization. As far as we win, I think it's important to remember that a lot of the quantities that we're talking about in these requirements were set well many years ago when the threat level was actually much more benign than what we have seen now.And we have simply no operate, you're counting now on more and more things having to go right. And we're counting on more and more that we precisely understand the threat we're at. And that is the standard we have never allowed in our history to happen inside the strategic deterrent force. And then the final point is we've never had to deter two opponents at the same time that are different.

**Charles Richard**Most of our theory doesn't even account for that. We're working very hard on that, but that's why we have to have these capabilities in order to execute the direction. The President gave me that that that's -- that's good. And I.

**James M Inhofe**I know there are a lot of people that are leaning on our President and I knew people that are wanting to minimize that concern that we have and that we're expressing today. One of the things is the no first use policy. That's one that I can't remember. One, Secretary of defense, who shares who doesn't share your your view on the no first policy?I mean it's there, it's real. And so what I think even Secretary Gates was quite outspoken in that area. When you think of anyone who doesn't have that policy, one quick word then under no first use since that's going to come up, that's going to be very prominently portrayed in disgust.

**Charles Richard**And what's your feeling, Senator what I would offer on this is and I've testified to this effect before look nation, we have a policy it wants.

**James M Inhofe**Yeah, you should have any guy, you said my best military advice would be to not adopt and no first use policy, you're still right.

**Charles Richard**And I still stand by that statement and here's why. One, we've already run an excursion of what that would do to strategic deterrence. It will diminish it. You will remove a level of ambiguity now that has a deterrent effect, short of employment of nuclear weapons. We won't have that anymore. It'll be mitigated by the fact that nobody's going to believe in any way, right?It won't be credible. We already have assurances that cover all but about 10 nations or so, half of which are our allies. So you're only talking to folks who are probably not going to find it credible. It will have no more credibility than our current missile defense policies do. The catch is that some of the allies will believe it. So it will have a corrosive effect on our assurance and extended deterrence commitments. Then commander of you calm, General Walters mentioned, you'll get a mixed response. I think he's correct, but I don't see the upside to it is my point.And so I continue to recommend we not adopt that yet.

**James M Inhofe**Fortunately, I -- My time is expired. Let me just ask you General Nixon. All these documents that we have here that directly address your area. Do you think that those -- that that the 2018 That was back in 2018 that the NDA still accurately assesses the strategic environment as it pertains to space to me, Senator I do buy?

**James Dickinson**I do in fact believe it does because a U.S. space is a warfighting domain. We have seen the activities by our competitors, both Russia and China, as they've expanded their capabilities. In particular China. In the space domain, we see their capabilities from direct ascent, a set anti satellite capabilities to on orbit activity that they've done with that capability.And we've seen the increase or proliferation of their directed energy efforts in terms of electronic warfare and jamming in terms of jamming as well as laser technology. So I believe that is absolutely a warfighting domain that we need to continue to work very closely with. Thanks a lot.

**James M Inhofe**Thank you. Senator Inhofe Senator Shaheen please.

**Jeanne Shaheen**Thank you and Admiral Richard and general Dickinson. Thank you for being here this morning and for your service. The concern I want to begin with you. The Air Force is currently responsible for space traffic management for both military and civilian satellites. And as we look at the proliferation of commercial satellites, that's become more and more challenging with situational awareness.But over the next few years, the Department of Commerce is going to assume responsibility for managing the civilian component. Senator Moran and I as the ranking member and chair of the Commerce, Justice and Science appropriations subcommittee have asked for additional information about the funding and personnel requirements that that kind of transfer would require.We have not yet saved a definitive answer from the Air Force about how much it spends on the functions that will be transferred to the Commerce Department. The fiscal year 2021 omnibus provides $10 million for the Commerce Department to begin to assume those responsibilities. Can you talk about how this compares to what the Air Force is currently spending center?

**James Dickinson**Thank you. The space traffic management, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, we on a daily basis were tracking close to 32,000 pieces of debris objects satellites whether they're active or or old dead satellites. And that is quite a -- that's a big mission area within U.S. Space Command today that the resources that I use on that provide a what I would term it, a very administrative type of function in terms of identifying objects in space. So that we're able to provide a secure and safe space environment for activities on orbit, in particular the International Space Station for example in low Earth orbit.

**Jeanne Shaheen**I'm sorry to interrupt, but I understand that. I think that's a very important function. That's why we're trying to get some information about how much you're actually spending. So we can figure out as we look at the budget for the Commerce Department. And I would say that I had a certain amount of skepticism about whether this should be moved to the Department of Commerce and there was a study done that came to the conclusion that maybe it does make sense to move that function there.So Do you know or can you provide this committee in the future with the amount of money that you're currently spending on that function?

**James Dickinson**I certainly can -- I can take that back and get you an answer from the Air Force on how much they spend.

**Jeanne Shaheen**Thanks very much. You also talked in your opening comments about the importance you said power is our people and I certainly agree with that. But as we look at the proposed location of Space Command headquarters from Colorado to the Redstone Arsenal in Alabama, I have some concerns based on our past experience with.A similar transfer of operations from the National Capital Region to Huntsville, Alabama of the Missile Defense Agency in that move, the agency lost 80 percent of its civilian workforce because employees refused to move. Do you have any estimate as to how much it's going to cost to move to Redstone from the current location and how many employees you might lose in that process?SENATOR So?

**James Dickinson**I don't have exact numbers on how the estimates on the cost for the move to Huntsville that's actually been determined now by the Department of the Air Force as the basing decision authority and fought for. With regards to the civilian workforce, I would categorize that as -- I don't have a good feel for that right now because it will depend.I think the military we can all agree were -- were somewhat nomadic and we move where they were. The military tells us to when dealing with civilians and I've done that in two previous jobs at the Missile Defense Agency, actually in my last job and Space and Missile Defense Command, it's a little bit different when you're talking about civilians. They've made life choices and where they're currently living and so we will do everything we can to incentivize them to make the move. But I can't give you a percentage on how many that will be.

**Jeanne Shaheen**Well, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would get some more information before this proposal becomes final about how many employees we might lose and about what the difference in cost is, which I think is significant. Admiral Richard, I was very pleased to see the new Biden administration agree to extend the new START treaty for five more years.Can you talk about how Strat Comm uses the information from New START channels, the inspections and data exchanges and how they are important to you?

**Charles Richard**Senator we were also is that your microphone admiral, I'm sorry, you think I've done this before. The -- we were also pleased to see the new START treaty be extended, right? And so you are pointing to one of its primary benefits in addition to the limits. It's the transparency and the confidence now that we have an understanding what that piece of the threat looks like.What I would further encourage is efforts to get a similar degree of control and accountability on the remainder of the Russian arsenal, all of which is something I have to deter.

**Unidentified**Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen, Senator Fisher please.

**Deb Fischer**Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. Admiral Richard, I'd like to thank you for your honesty and your bluntness of your opening statement in explaining the expanding nuclear programs of both China and Russia. Last week, this strategic forces subcommittee held a classified briefing on these threats and yet we continue to hear renewed calls for unilateral cuts to our nuclear forces, abandoning the Triad and delaying or canceling modernization programs.Sir, are you aware of any intelligence or threat assessments that would support these courses of action?

**Charles Richard**Senator I am not in fact that the threat is only getting worse rapidly.

**Deb Fischer**So it is your view that taking such actions would reduce our ability to deter the threats that we face.

**Charles Richard**Yes, microphone sENATOR Yes, and it's not just the nuclear component part of what I'm trying to show us the relationship in all of our elements of national power and how nuclear underpins that.

**Deb Fischer**What about the future because as you know, the impact of cutting modernization programs now it wouldn't be felt until the 20s, 30s when our force begins to age out as you spoke about and replacements aren't ready. Do you see any reason to believe that the world is going to be a lot safer in 2030 and we won't need a viable deterrent then?

**Charles Richard**Senator I see no indications of that these -- that will be an unprecedented threat that we face in 2030. Hopefully we go perhaps we can change that trajectory, but I -- I can't count on hope in terms of having the capabilities needed to do my mission.

**Deb Fischer**Adama, Richard, what are your views on the current distribution of warheads across the three legs of our triad? Right now, we see about 70 percent of our treaty accountable warheads there on our submarines and if we significantly can cut the ICBM leg as some advocates have urged what number would go up further and of course our bombers are not on alert.Do you think there are risks with leaning too heavily on one part of the triad?

**Charles Richard**Senator the answer is yes and I'll give you just one example of that. What is not often recognized is we don't have a triad day to day write the bombers are not available to us. We chose to take them off alert as a type of peace dividend. After the Cold War so day to day, all you have is basically a dyad basic design criterion. The triad is that you cannot allow a failure of any one leg of the Triad to prevent you from being able to do everything. The President has ordered you to do that. If you don't have intercontinental ballistic missiles, we can't meet that criteria.You are completely dependent on the submarine lag and I've already told Secretary of Defense that under those conditions I would request the real or the bombers.

**Deb Fischer**Sir, you've also talked about counting the number of strategic nuclear warheads a nation has that can be a crude way to measure their capability. Your postures statement mentions this as well. Can you elaborate on why this is such an incomplete way to assess an adversary and talk a little bit about the other elements that we need to also be considering?

**Charles Richard**Senator fundamentally you don't deter by accounting, we don't hold up cards and say I have more I win. It is important to know what they can do with that capability to understand operationally the threat that you face. It is important to remember that both Russia and China have a unilateral ability to go to any level of violence if they choose to. If they perceive that the stakes are high enough and there is a point beyond which unlimited conventional capability will not be a sufficient deterrent and so on less you have a strategic deterrent that will deter them from that. Then everything else in the Department of Defense is simply going to get escalated past.And knowing what they're capable of doing is what causes you to come to that conclusion and our.

**Deb Fischer**Our capability, our -- our production capability is basically nonexistent. Isn't it? We just -- that's especially when you compare it to China and Russia, can you speak to that?

**Charles Richard**Both China and Russia have significant capability in their nuclear weapons complexes. I can give you the numbers in a closed session to produce more warheads. We are just barely able right now to life extend our weapons and we're just starting to get to the point we used the two terms interchangeably just to be able to remanufacturing the ones we had. We have no capability right now to actually make a new weapon.

**Deb Fischer**Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Jack Reed**Thank you Senator Fisher and let me recognize via WebEx, Senator Gillibrand.

**Kirsten E Gillibrand**Thank you, Mr. Chairman, general Dickinson. I would like to turn to statements made by Secretary Blinken where he said that the United States will focus on developing standards and norms of responsible behavior in outer space. The DVD defense space strategy also noted our need to promote favorable standards and norms of behavior in space.Could you please discuss space comms role in developing and practicing those norms and what you specifically believe those norms should be? Thank you for the question. So space comms role in that is one is we are.

**James Dickinson**Our ability to understand what's going on in the space domain is fundamental to establishing and deciding what those norms of behavior are. I mentioned a little bit earlier that fact that our ability to increase our space domain awareness capabilities on orbit is very important to just what I described in terms of understanding what our competitors may be doing in the space domain.I believe that from a military perspective that the norms of behavior and what we do in space is very important. We have seen activity over the last 19, 20 months since this command has been established that has shown that we've had some behaviors in space that are inconsistent with providing a safe and secure environment for our military activities as well as our commercial.So in terms of the norms of behavior and how we are working, we work very closely with the Department of Defense, in particular our OSD policy folks on determining our recommendations to that process. The developing norms and behavior is a whole of government idea, an approach. If you will, that will dictate or our position on what those norms and behaviors should be. But in some, I would tell you that we have to have safe activities in orbit.We understand those by space, domain awareness along with what that means in terms of where folks put where our adversaries competitors put their space based capabilities and what they're doing.

**Kirsten E Gillibrand**Thank you. In last week's cyber architecture hearing, the subcommittee discussed the interoperability between our cyber capacity and space operations. Given that your command and cyber comm are both operating in highly complex and ever evolving environments, how integrated would you say your efforts are with theirs? And how do you plan to maintain a high level of integration with cyber com as the threat landscape continues to change?

**James Dickinson**That is very important in terms of our integration of space and cyber. We would do that through several myths. Several means if you will. We've got a general Mark as Sony has provided to us as he has done to the other combat and commands a cyber integrated planning element that is currently residing within my headquarters that provides us a very integrated approach to cyber and space operations.In addition to that, we are standing up a joint cyber center within the command as we speak and I also have as a result of the command standing up, I've got five service components provided by each of the services to the combat command with two of those. My Navy element at my Navy component as well as my Marine component who are dual hatted for me in space as well as cyber.So I've got two service components that are -- cyber is one of their core competencies along with space and in addition to that, Joe Nakasone has given me some support or support from the 16th Air Force. So in other words, I've got three general officer headquarters that provide cyber capabilities to me, I have an integrated planning element, my headquarters and I also have a joint cyber center.

**James Dickinson**So I believe that we're very well integrated in terms of space and cyber type of operations and we are -- we are moving very quickly right now in terms of providing our requirements for activities in the cyberspace domain as well as John Locke of Sony providing me with Requirements of what he'll need and in his mission areas as well.

**Kirsten E Gillibrand**In your written testimony, you mentioned that our adversaries have taken a number of provocative actions in space in order to test us. One concern from the Pentagon's 2020 defense space strategy was that it did not explain in clear full terms how we would deter our adversaries in space and that concerned an overemphasis in offensive space operations would destabilize space, is contested domain domain rather than deter adversaries.What do you believe our best tools are to achieve deterrence in space?

**James Dickinson**That's a great question. I would tell you one of the -- one of our biggest deterrence opportunities is with our allies and partners. We have just since this command has stood up, we have just seen a -- a -- a a about wave, if you will, of allies and partners who want to come and be part of U.S. Space Command and part of the space enterprise. And I think is we've seen it in other domains.One of the greatest deterrence that we have is they are allies and partners and how we can all come together in a very coordinated and synchronized manner in order to do deterrence. One example in particular was the messaging that we did last year in 2000, 19 and 20 with response in response to Russian on orbit activities as well as our direct ascent asset tests that they did last year.And what I mean by that is when we developed our messaging strategy for that particular or those events, we had tremendous, tremendous participation and integration with our allies and partners that we've never seen before. So one of the powers of this command or one of the strengths of this command is that we are able to do that 24 hours a day in terms of holding our adversaries and competitors accountable in the space domain. And our allies and partners provided big piece to that deterrence message. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Kirsten E Gillibrand**I'll submit my questions for General, Richard, for the record. Thank you.

**Jack Reed**Thank you very much Senator Jill and let me recognize via WebEx Underground's. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.

**Mike Rounds**First, let me begin by just saying thank you very much for your service to our country, admiral Richard. I believe that our traditional national defense rests on a bedrock of the nuclear triad. I know that you've hit this a couple of times, but just in plain English. So that folks that don't discuss nuclear triads on a regular basis, the hardworking Americans that are out there that are wondering why we have literally hundreds if not thousands of nuclear warheads.Can you explain to the average guy that's working out there, why it is that the triad is so important to our national security and why it is critical to invest in its modernization?

**Charles Richard**Center, the simple answer to that question is, is that if strategic deterrence doesn't hold, nothing else in the Department of Defense is going to work the way it was designed. That's it. Plain and simple. I get anxious that somehow and remember nuclear and strategic are two different things. All nuclear is strategic, not all strategic is nuclear.But we want to put it into a box by itself. It has its own threat. You can decide how credible you think that threat is. And somehow there's this independent restart that we can take risk over here. And somehow that is not -- has nothing to do with what the rest of the department does when in fact, it underpins and enables it. Yes, we'd like to throw in a lot of numbers around.Bottom line is what is available to the commander to deter and what am I deterring against, right? We are treaty limited to 1,550 accountable nuclear weapons by the New START treaty. That's what's available to me to accomplish all the objectives. The President has given me and the consequence of failure in this mission is enormous.That's fundamentally what we're trying to accomplish, sir, and interesting that, that particular treaty applies to one of our adversaries, but not necessarily all of our adversaries, correct?

**Mike Rounds**Senator that's quite correct. So let's just talk about one of those other competitors or challengers in this particular case. And I know that this may be one that may be difficult to do an open session, but you talk a little bit about what China's civilian nuclear production capabilities are. When you add whether or not we're factoring that in with regard to their ability to produce nuclear material and the number of warheads that they're capable of producing in a very short period of time.And I guess what I'm thinking about are the fast reactors that they have available to them right now.

**Charles Richard**Center that is actually a great example of how rapidly China is changing or at least how rapidly we're figuring it out, right? So the answer to your question is yes, but that is only as of about a week ago that we became aware of that and started the process to understand the implications of that. Obviously with a fast breeder reactor unit have a very large source of weapons grade plutonium available to you.That will change the upper bounds of what China could choose to do if they wanted to. In terms of further expansion of their nuclear capabilities. We haven't yet run all the numbers. Your right, the answers would have to come back in closed session, but it's only been within the last week that we became aware that this limitation on them has changed in an upward direction.

**Mike Rounds**

Thank you. General Dickinson, we've been competing against our adversaries air land sea cyberspace and now we see them most certainly challenging us in space. And while they may talk about having an interest in a military free space or at least one in which we're not actively participating on a military matter in space.Clearly, the threats are there, I'd like to hear your thoughts on our ability to defend against these new threats and what you need in order to maintain unfettered access in space. And do you currently have the equipment and the resources necessary to protect the assets that we have in space right now from the threats from both Russia and China?

**James Dickinson**

SENATOR -- So I agree russia and China are proliferating in the space domain and the one more than the other in terms of capabilities on space, not just numbers but capabilities as well. And that in particular is China. So China is absolutely or are pacing pacing challenge right now in the space domain in terms of how I protect and defend on the -- on orbit or in the space. Domain really boils down to my ability to actually see and understand what's going on in the space domain.So in other words, being able to use a combination of satellites as well as terrestrial assets to understand activities on orbit, not only from an administrative perspective in terms of knowing where things are. But actually having the ability to analyze those capabilities to understand what the threat is or what those capabilities could do and their intent.So space domain awareness, again my number one priority in terms of the command and we have identified that as a requirement to both the Department of Defense and the services as well. But in order to do my protect and defend mission, I must fully understand what's going on in the space domain. Thank you.

**Mike Rounds**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you stand around. Let me now recognize Senator Kane, please.

**Unidentified**

Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member Inhofe and just today I'm gonna be paying a compliment to our staff at every hearing. I'm doing. The staffs have really done a great job of putting these hearings together where we combine people attending in person and people, Senators and witnesses attending virtually.

**Unidentified**

And I don't think we should take it for granted. So I just wanted to offer my thanks to the hard work to make this challenging time work as seamlessly as possible and to all the staff involved in that.

**Tim Kaine**

Thank you for that to the witnesses. Thank you. My colleagues have asked very good questions, many of which I was going to ask and I'm actually just sort of going to follow up on Senator rounds where he was ending with space awareness. General Dickinson. We have -- we had a posture hearing with South Com recently and Admiral Fowler talked about the lack of dedicated HSR. He's not unique in that.Anytime we have a posture hearing with combatant commands, this is a very common theme, sometimes makes me think of you know the old joke about the CEO. That said, I gave my legal counsel an unlimited budget and they overspent it. I think the demand for ice are sort of endless, but I S.R is so critical obviously to our combatant commanders really getting a handle on and successfully executing any missions that they have.I have a large collection of commercial satellite providers in Virginia who -- when these issues come up, they often say that they think they can provide HSR to combatant commanders in a way that would complement and combined with our DSD ISI, our capacities to help us. And so General Dickinson, I'm kind of interested to hear your perspective on whether commercial satellite providers could be woven into the architecture of ISI are to be provided to combatant commands in a way that would be helpful.

**Tim Kaine**

Or do you see challenges or limitations that would make that difficult?

**James Dickinson**

Thank you. Senator -- I'm an advocate for the commercial alliance, our capabilities. I think when we look at the total, as you mentioned, the ISI requirements that we may never have enough and will always ask for more. I agree with that. That comment, particularly as we look at some of our competitors in particular China.And how -- how they are developing themselves into a global projection capability around the world and the fact that that our ISI are our ability to see them and understand what is going on, not only them but other competitors as well is very, very fundamental to our -- are Our military operations and I think the intertwining or interweaving the commercial industry into that is absolutely absolutely necessary.And I think gives us a great advantage. I will tell you right now that we do rely on commercial ICR in terms of what we do each and every day in U.S. Space Command. So I look forward to that. It's very exciting to watch to see how the commercial market, not only when ISIS but other space capabilities is actually developing maturing and in my words, kind of exploding.I mean if you just look at Space X, for example with the starling Constellation where they're able to put out 60 satellites on one, one rocket one rocket shot to build a Constellation of now I think over 1,300 satellites in low Earth orbit is, is amazing. And really shows what the commercial industry can do in support of the space domain operation.

**James Dickinson**

So I agree, I think it should be part of the art, it is today and it should continue.

**Tim Kaine**

So general and I'm heartened to hear that and I will just conclude and then yield my time back by saying that Senator Gellibrand is question about creating norms in space becomes very important. The more we use either state based satellites or commercial satellites nations all over the world are doing it. The more the prospect of collisions and then space debris affecting everybody else's investments become a real challenge.It's hard to imagine us continuing to be vigorous investors in space, satellites all around the world without some kind of international norms where these investments are protected. And so the DOJ sees involvement along with -- with other parts of the U.S. government in creating those norms is really important.And I was glad to hear your answer to Senator Gellibrand on that topic as well. So with that, thank you and I yield back Mr Chair.

**Jack Reed**

**Thank you. Senator McCain.**

**Unidentified**

Let me recognize Senator Ernst place.

**Joni Ernst**

Thank you, Mr Chair and gentlemen. Thank you so much for being here today and sharing your testimonies with us. Your commands do represent very crucial capabilities for our national defense. So thank you again for your input as we continue to develop different policies, whether it's strategic, nuclear deterrence or of course space.So making sure that we have the resources necessary is extremely important and recently Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Gill day recently said we need to innovate and we need to modernize early adoption of emerging and disruptive technologies as well as the need to protect our infrastructure. And technologies from strategic competitors is absolutely critical.I believe that's true not only in the Navy but also to our nuclear and space program. So Admiral Richard as we are looking at the modernization of our nuclear triad, again going back to those resources, there is going to be a tremendous price tag. I think we all recognize that, but can you discuss for us the margins for delay and the potential costs that we would face if we try to spread out these recapitalization efforts over a period of years within the nuclear triad?Not really getting to the heart of the issue center one.

**Charles Richard**

Thank you for the question and to what I would start with is we don't have an opportunity to spread these costs out, right. We have life extended to the maximum extent possible. So to maintain the level of defense that we have historically assumed in this mission right, to not take any further risk in this area.I need the first of these recapitalization to start showing up on time. We don't have any further opportunity to do that. And I do want to present that we can afford this as a nation, right? The dollar amounts we're done. We only do this every 40 years. If you look at the context of what these decisions are and costs relative to all the other things this nation chooses to spend its money on, these are trivial compared to that.This is a choice this nation makes as to how much risk it wants to take in this mission area. I think this is exactly what Secretary Mattis meant when he said we can afford survival.

**Joni Ernst**

I think that is so brilliantly put and not only can we afford it, we must afford this. I think that's a great way to say that Admiral. So talking a little bit more about the ICBM arms and if we're allowing the icy beam legs to atrophy such that it's no longer a credible leg of the triad, what would that then mean to Russia and China, but also for our allies?And can you describe how our allies would react if we no longer have that viable ICBM leg?

**Charles Richard**

So let me put it this way in terms of what it would do relative to Russia and China, I said that China is not yet able to execute every plausible nuclear employment strategy at Intercontinental range. If I was to build a list of the top five things the U.S. could do to accelerate China becoming a strategic pillar of ours.Number one or number two on the list is to get rid of our ICBM because you will have solved a problem that they can't currently solve right now. That would be the implication for that. And they can do the math and our allies can do the math and they will see that we are not backing up our words with our actions, we will lose credibility.And it will affect our extended deterrence and assurance.

**Joni Ernst**

Thank you, sir and General Dickinson as well as we talk about you know congestion in space there, there are over 50 different space faring nations and a number of space ventures as you outlined in your opening remarks. Those will continue to climb. So the risks and opportunities, what are those risks and opportunities that space congestion presents to the command?And how do we overcome that?

**James Dickinson**

So thank you. So the risks to the command are that it's becoming more congested in terms of what I mentioned with the over 1,300 satellites, which is a good thing in terms of a free market economy, commerce space, commerce, but it's becoming a more challenging problem. So the risk becomes that it could become more, it could be more unpredictable in space, more things to look at more things to make sure that don't collide as they are in each of the orbits.And so -- but the benefit to that, I think we can see, you know, the world economy in particular for space is booming and so we -- we need to do that. But that's -- we need to look at it as a domain like we've looked in other domains in terms of how do we manage that to make sure that we have a safe and secure space domain.

**Joni Ernst**

Thank you very much and I yield back. Thank you Mr... Thank you, Senator.

**Rick Scott**

Ernst, let me recognize Senator King via WebEx. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Angus S King Jr**

General Dickinson, I'd like to follow up on Tim Kaine's questions a little bit about the security of our space assets. It seems to me that in a conflict, the very first thing that an enemy will try to do is a major cyber attack and to try to blind us, Senator Kaine talked about commercial satellites is redundancy itself, a strategy for protecting the assets. In other words, lots of lots of small satellites rather than these large multi-billion dollar satellites that we've traditionally depended upon. But a redundant constellation of small satellites that would be harder to disable because do you agree with me that going after our satellites would be one of the first things an adversary would do in a conflict?

**James Dickinson**

Thank you, Senator. So I would -- my opinion on that is I believe that a small satellites, many satellites in orbit provides us a very redundant, resilient, resilient capability that would be very difficult to degrade. Once we have it established. It will provide us the ability to do many different types of missions, whether it's communications, whether it's ice or whether it's a missile warning. Those types of activities I think will absolutely be more redundant, more resilient if we have a, what I would call a mesh network. If you will, and a constellation in terms of what would happen first?I -- I believe we -- we are in competition each day, both space and cyber. And for us, our ability to compete on a daily basis in the competition phase is very important to what we're doing. And that could very well be the first that you mentioned could be a cyber attack followed by something in space, but we're watching that each and every day.And like I said, I think in terms of the redundancy that is a great technique or opportunity. Thank you.

**Angus S King Jr**

Emma Richards, one of the scariest terms I've heard recently is escalate to de-escalate, which I understand is a stated policy of the Russians in terms of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in order to shock everyone into backing off. Is that -- that's something that concerns you in terms of our relationship to Russia and their relationship to nuclear weapons Senator?

**Charles Richard**

Yes, the short answer is yes, actually it may be thought up more as escalate to win, but not to mince words. And so the whole idea here is for that and anything other else they consider doing to show that that won't work, right, that the costs that we could impose are greater than what they may gain by attempting that strategy.That is the essence of deterrence here and in fact the introduction of the low yield ballistic missile weapon. I remind we have always had a low yield capability inside the arsenal. We just added one now that has a much higher probability of facing the threats that we have today. We think that that has successfully improved deterrence against that very strategy.

**Angus S King Jr**

Well, to go back to the center rounds question, the fundamental strategy here and a lot of people, we've gone 25 or 30 years and not thought too much about nuclear weapons. But the whole idea is that those other countries that have nuclear weapons know that we do too and that we have the capability to inflict enormous damage on them if they use the nuclear weapons that theory of deterrence has worked for 70 years.I take it from your comments that that you believe modernization is critical to maintaining the credibility of the deterrent. It's not a deterrent unless your adversaries believe it will work and that's the case that isn't that the essential case for modernization.

**Charles Richard**

Absolutely, sir, fundamentally a deterrence is not credible unless the opponent or the other side does the calculation and comes up with. We can either deny that missile defense is a good example of it or we can impose a cost. It doesn't have to be a nuclear cost. We are thinking very hard. We're the only nation that can go all domain worldwide.I applaud the secretary's efforts at improving cross domain deterrence, but in the end, given the threats that we face there has to be a nuclear component to it because we don't have a combination of other things yet that can deter that.

**Angus S King Jr**

Well, the fundamental theory is that you have nuclear weapons in order to never have to use them. That's -- that's -- that's what it's all about, isn't it Admiral?

**Charles Richard**

It is and I have said that before and that it's the only weapons system you don't have to pull the trigger on for it to work the mirror destructive potential of the system changes the way people think it changes the decisions that they make. That's what we mean by -- we use it every day, but a very quick question.

**Angus S King Jr**

I'm out of time but very quick question. If there were some serious threat, how long would it take to get the bombers aloft served as a short period of time? I'd rather prefer to answer that in closed session. If I could well, we'll follow up later. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Unidentified**

Thank you. Senator King, Senator Cotton.

**Tom Cotton**

Thank you gentlemen for your service and for your appearance. Admiral Richard, I speak about the nuclear posture review which is underway as is the custom of new administrations. I'm concerned that low level political appointees, a deputy assistant, Secretary of defense and deputy assistant Secretary of state may be subverting the integrity of Secretary Austen.Review earlier this month, those political appointees gave an interview in Japanese media implying the reduction of funding for our nuclear forces and perhaps even the enactment of a sole purpose nuclear policy. Neither of those appointees of course have been confirmed by the United States Senate or either you or secretary all.Austin consulted before they made these public comments a Senator.

**Charles Richard**

No, No one it struck home was or myself was consulted.

**Tom Cotton**

Do you believe that it would be in the best interest of our nation to go to a sole purpose nuclear policy Senator?

**Charles Richard**

No, I think again that that would remove a level of ambiguity that us had had useful deterrent value to us. We have never as a nation chosen to do that and that would undermine our ability to deter for instance chemical or biological attacks. If we used the sole purpose policy that we would buy policy, we would not consider a nuclear response to those type of threats.Do you think allies like the United Kingdom or Japan would like the United States to move to a sole purpose policy, sir? You know, in the end I'd have to deter to deferred OSD policy, but my indications, conversations is there would be apprehension. It would depend on exactly how we worded it.

**Tom Cotton**

Yeah, okay, Thank you for that. I hope the integrity of that nuclear posture review is not subverted by low level. Appointees have never been reviewed by the Senate. I want to move to China. I know you touched on some of these points, but I think there's few questions that are more vital today. We know what Russia has.We know the threat Russia poses, they pose it for 60 or 70 years, but I think China is a menacing and rapidly growing threat both in terms of the quantity and the quality of their nuclear forces.

**Charles Richard**

Give us a sense just how fast they're increasing the quantity of their nuclear forces. Senator I just gave an order at Strat Comm two weeks ago that any threat brief or any brief that is discussing China that is more than a month old must be updated with our intelligence folks because it's probably out of date.I can't get through a week right now without finding out something we didn't know about China.

**Tom Cotton**

And in terms of the quality of these forces, it is true that they're moving rapidly towards having a functioning nuclear triad just like the United States and Russia which is to say bombers submarines and missiles is that right? Senator that's correct. And on those ground based forces, in some ways, their quality is more survivable and less detectable than ours since they're moving towards, say, solid fuel rockets, which give you less warning. Since you've got to stand up the missiles and fuel them with liquid fuel or road mobile. And rail mobile missiles, which can be moved around in the back of a tractor trailer or train something this country doesn't use, is that right?

**Charles Richard**

Senator that's correct, the road mobiles up both Russia and China are challenges to make sure that you can maintain accountability of them, hard to find a tractor trailer with a missile on it and a country the size of China which is as big as United States.

**Tom Cotton**

Right and both countries are very good at hiding them and you spoke something a few moments ago. I want to point out that you said that eliminating our ground based missiles would be one of the best things that China could -- that could happen to Chinese planners and is that because the number of our missile systems complicate their targeting center?

**Charles Richard**

That's correct. He would solve a problem right now that they don't have an answer to, which is to use a colloquial term.

**Tom Cotton**

The missile sync with all of our -- I know you may not like to use that term, but with all of those missiles that we have out in the Midwest and the Rocky Mountain states, just the sheer quantity of targeted sites, if you're Russia or China, is very Complicated to get it certainly requires a scale of attack that is makes it very obvious what's going on and part of why I don't like the term missile sync is there's a lot of things where we have forgotten how we got here.

**Charles Richard**

An example is law bolt out of the blue right, highly improbable. We all agree with that. We would be the first to tell you that we look at this risk every day, but we forget why it's improbable, right? We made it improbable as a nation. We invented the ballistic missile submarine. We invented launch under warning, a launch under attack.It's improbable because it probably won't work if we can easily take steps to make it more probable if we forget what it is that got us here.

**Tom Cotton**

That's right and that would be the case, not just if you took the radical step of eliminating an entire leg of our triad, the ground based missiles, but even if you substantially reduce the number of ground based missiles, is that correct?

**Charles Richard**

Senator fundamentally, I got to have enough capacity right and I'm now about to face an additive threat from China. These numbers that we have were based on the threat situation from years ago. So I'm apprehensive right now. Well, I certainly need everything that's in the program of record if you want me to do what the President ordered me to.

**Tom Cotton**

So I'll just conclude with a point out to make we here for some misguided and misinformed people on the left who might want to eliminate a leg of our triad or eliminate the entire nuclear forces. This fanciful idea that somehow we can rid the world of this weapon system. It's often said we spend so much on weapons. We never use to the contrary.We spend very little on these nuclear forces as a percentage of our defense budget, certainly as a percentage of our overall economy. And second, we use them every single day and we have used them every single day for 76 years to deter another war. Like the terrible wars of the first half of the 20th century.They use to cotton the WebEx to war.

**Elizabeth Warren**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to our witnesses for being here. President. Martin has expressed some concerns about the need, the affordability and the safety of the Trump administration's nuclear weapons policy and for good reason, the previous administration's modernization plans, including items like a new sea launched cruise missile and a low yield warhead.Like any new administration, the President's team is taking some time to conduct its own review. So Admiral Richard, you're the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, whose job is it to determine the nuclear policy of the United States, your job or the President's job.

**Charles Richard**

Senator it is the President's job, I am obligated to provide my best military advice.

**Elizabeth Warren**

I appreciate that. Do you agree that the new administration should be allowed to conduct its own review and that it shouldn't feel obligated or pressured to rubber stamp the previous administration's plans?

**Charles Richard**

Ma'am, I absolutely agree with that. I also request an opportunity to make sure that that review and in fact I would broaden it. I again state that I think it is a mistake to think of deterrence and pieces that nuclear is somehow separate from conventional is somehow separate from space and cyber. You have to look at all of that.And I'd ask that it be fully threat informed and then I have an opportunity to provide the operational implications of potential policy choices.

**Elizabeth Warren**

But you're going to do the operational part here and the President does the policy part. I appreciate you saying this because you made some comments early in January that puzzled and frankly concerned me on this score. On January 5th, after President Trump had lost his bid for re-election, you told some reporters that the purpose of a forthcoming Biden administration review of nuclear weapons policy should be quote validation that we like the strategy that we have.It also sounded like to me that you were saying that there was no reason to change course. You stated quote this nation has had basically the same strategy dating back to the Kennedy administration end quote. So now it's your job to provide input and recommend options to the President and the secretary if you're asked, but that doesn't mean making public comments to try to box in the President's decision making.I understand that you believe you're operating well within the scope of your responsibilities, but I'm concerned and I want a commitment from you that you're not going to infringe on or undermine the administration's review. Do I have your commitment on that?

**Charles Richard**

Senator you absolutely do and my reference to our strategy was not in relation to any one administration. I also said I can trace the lineage of our current strategy back to the Kennedy administration. The nation can have any strategy that it wants and then that leads to a commensurate need for a stack of capabilities, policies impostors to execute that strategy.I would just want to make sure that the nation understands the risks it's taking in those decisions.

**Elizabeth Warren**

And I appreciate that you will make that risk clear so that the President and the secretary can work together to make a decision on this. You know, we're currently spending 44 and a half billion dollars a year on nuclear weapons and I know that strap com likes spending that money, but I don't know the purpose of the ongoing review is to quote reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our defense strategy.End quote, I agree with that goal and I think it is incompatible with that staggeringly high level of spending. Every administration makes strategic decisions about our force structure and modernization. And when it comes to nuclear weapons, those decisions carry tremendous rate, but wait as strap com commander. Your role is to support the U.S. nuclear doctrine that is set by the leaders elected to grapple with those decisions, not by military officials alone.So I look forward to seeing the results of the administration's review and I know you'll swiftly implement whatever they determine.

**Unidentified**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Senator Warner Senator tell us the WebEx Now Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Kevin Cramer**

Thank you generals both for your service and for being here and I might just my guess I feel compelled to follow up on what Senator Warner was just talking about. One of the things that I have found frustrating oftentimes is that that they self governed in this country, don't know what we know and a lot of times that's okay, but a lot of times it's not so okay. So generals both of you. I appreciate the fact that you're both.They both travel a lot throughout the country. You both have come to my state in, in your current positions and that you both are willing to speak openly, but always always respectfully about the threats that we face. Because quite honestly, I think one of the great threats in this country is when the people that assume we know what we're talking about aren't aware of the threats.So thank you for doing that. A well-informed, self-governing country is the best. I guess I don't -- I don't feel the need to ask any more questions about whether you supported triad versus something else. Admiral I appreciated your your opening statement as well as your answers to several questions, reaffirming the importance of all three legs of the triad.

**Kevin Cramer**

We've talked a lot, you've -- you've answered questions specifically of course about about the ground based strategic deterrent and I appreciate that and the fact that that delay in the modernization will cost both money and perhaps security. So let's -- let's move over to the -- to the LRAD. So you know, our RB 52 is are incredible weapons, especially especially in the hands of our great airmen like we have in mind.But I am afraid that we'll be risking too much and asking too much of those airmen if we take away the, you know, the LRAD saw and get it off track. So if the aerosol assault were canceled or delayed beyond the service life of the legacy air launch cruise missile, do you think our air leg of the triad would be viable or would it be compromised Senator?

**Charles Richard**

The short answer is no. The -- the bottom line is that without an alarm, so you in effect don't have an air leg or you have at least put it back to sort of a 1950s version of an air leg with much less capacity than they had back then. And I do want to go a bit further. It's not only that it's almost a miracle that they all welcome flies.I think my predecessor General heightened testified to that a couple of years ago to think that a weapons system designed to go against Soviet analogue defenses is going to be able to get through sophisticated Russian and Chinese defenses, I think is optimistic. And the outcome on its first day wasn't good enough for what we asked are going to need for it to do today.I can give you the details on that in closed session. It was designed for a different era. I need a modern weapon in order to do what I've been ordered to do with limited time. I'm wondering which of these last questions I want to ask. When we go to?

**Kevin Cramer**

I'm going to continue on with strategic deterrent commander and I know you're acutely aware that the U.S. credible U.S. nuclear deterrence relies on uninterrupted nuclear command control and communications the NC three system. And that the mission depends on secure operational technologies as well. The recent hack of the Florida water treatment facility certainly highlighted the cyber vulnerabilities of our own system, a threat that's only exacerbate data when you add in the NC three component.Can you update the Committee on efforts of Strat Comm to ensure that cyber protection, both infrastructure and c 3 is on track?

**Charles Richard**

Served as a very extensive answer of the things that we're doing, I'll answer this. I have a separate responsibility as the commander of the nuclear enterprise center with a department wide responsibilities for nuclear command and control. Fundamentally, I am confident in our NC 3 cyber resilieNCy. It exists in relative isolation.It has tremendous redundancy. It gets the best intelligence. We have an intelligence fusion center, thank you Congress for directing that general Nakasone. So everything that space command just mentioned that they get support for we get that and additional abilities to maintain the standards here. The number one thing I need to do to be able to say that in the future is that I have to modernize the system, right?I have to get it out of legacy modes of operation in order to pace this threat going into the future.

**Kevin Cramer**

But I'm confident today to both of you and we'll start with you General Dickinson in addition to the -- to the bomber wing and the missile wing at mine. And of course, North Korea contributes by having the 10th space warning Squadron at Cavalier. And maybe this is a good opportunity for me to ask both of you, but again starting with General Dickinson, yeah.General things and how the two commands work together to enhance the credibility of U.S. deterrence against adversaries who are competing with us really in every domain.

**James Dickinson**

Thank you. Senator so that missile warning architecture is a very integrated capability within U.S. space command. We provide that missile warning to U.S. strategic command on a daily basis and we work very closely together. I mean in general, as you know, Senator -- you know, we were spawned out of a strategic command when we stood up U.S. space command. And so our daily interaction, our daily operations together is very nested in synchronized.

**Unidentified**

I think both of you, jim, you Senator Cramer view whether it's the dimension. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it and thank both of you for your service to our country and the commitment by your families for the service. I think they need to be commended. Also. The first question on one is we'll go to both of you for Admiral Richard with the current and planned advancements in missile technology such as hypersonic, my adversary's defense of the homeland can no longer be taken for granted.

**Unidentified**

So my question would be Admiral Richard, would you tell me about the adequacy of our current missile defense batteries like the ground based interceptors, the PAC 3 missile and our agents assure our platforms. Senator while I would in the end defer to the operational commanders of those systems, for example for our ground based interceptor that's Northern Command.

**Charles Richard**

However, from my vantage point in terms of my mission sets in my overall responsibility and missile defense for advocacy and operations support, we have an adequate missile defense today. We do need to make sure that we pace it into the future against the threats that we're seeing. And the number one thing that I would prioritize is both the ability to warn and the ability to track birth to death because it's not only the defensive pieces to it, that's missile defense on the missile warning side.I need to be able to posture forces and posture people in advance of the threat or I have to take other operational decisions over.

**Joe Manchin III**

And to General Dickinson, if you could tell me how strapped common space com are working to integrate future missile defense technologies like a space sensor layer with our current systems to maintain global awareness and the quickest reaction possible to these threats. Thank you, Senator.

**James Dickinson**

So worked very closely hand in hand with your strategic command and all the other combatant commands in terms of integrating, as I mentioned earlier, in terms of taking existing terrestrial type radars that have not necessarily been used before, particularly in the space domain. But in this particular vignette with a hypersonic.

**Joe Manchin III**

We continue to look at the integration of those assets and we're also working very closely with the missile defense agency and growing capabilities on orbit that will help us address that problem with our dilemma with a hypersonic weapons ammo, which is your testimony stays the next generation Of deterrent forces must encompass responsive weapon systems, world class personnel, resilient infrastructure and intelligence informed decisions.Can you describe the steps that you have taken or relationships that you have established to ensure the time an efficient flow of intelligence in order to provide decision makers with accurate timely information that's going to be needed to make these decisions?

**Charles Richard**

So a number of steps, again, I am fortunate in terms of the priority that is given to strategic deterrence intelligence needs by the intelligence community. I have a number of relationships in a number of liaisons. I mean, as one example, I have 300 Defense Intelligence Agency personnel assigned to Strat Comm headquarters as part of our ability to go do that.Additionally, we have a specific stack of strategic intelligence requirements that had been given to the intelligence community and I received great support in terms of that sound. If I could real quick, I just want to add going back to the missile defense piece, because I've been asked a couple of times, we are very satisfied with the way that space command has taken over the missile.The sensor Commander functioned right by utilizing sensors across missile, warning, missile defense and space situational awareness. I'm actually getting better missile warning data and the nation is getting better utilization of the assets that it purchased.

**Joe Manchin III**

We run it general Dickinson as we all know the availability of speed and communicating data are and always will remain a vulnerability for our forces and with the ease of optical or tight beam communications utilizing lasers in a space environment that speed has increased substantially. So the question will be that is very impressive but how and space.How is space time working to bring that speed of communications back down to earth as we may speak? So Senator that is -- that is what we're currently working with.

**James Dickinson**

I think some of the work that's General Van Herc has done in all domain awareness. I fully support the efforts that he is undertaking as well as the department in terms of increasing our ability to communicate at speed so we can make proper decisions at the proper time. That is a -- what we're doing at U.S. Space Command is kind of looking at the current command and control systems that handle these volumes of information. And we are looking at ways that we can integrate those capabilities to provide and all domain capability where we can see and do an act with -- with speed of relevance to the situation at hand.So we're looking at existing command control architectures that we can leverage. We already have a very robust one in the space domain, but we continue to look at how we can leverage all of them together in an all domain fashion.

**Joe Manchin III**

I just want to thank both you know Richard and general Dickinson. Thank you both for your service again and thank you for being here today.

**Jack Reed**

Thank you. Senator Manchin you now recognized by WebEx Senator tillis.

**Thom Tillis**

Thank you. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen. Thank you for being here in your years of service. Admiral Richard, I want to start with you. I was in the -- in the committee room when you gave your opening statement and as towards the end, you were talking about how we're losing our advantage. And you went on to say that we could reach a point to where no amount of money would allow us to catch back up.

**Unidentified**

Would you go back and give a little bit broader context to the -- to the specific areas that you think that that threat is real and maybe over what sort of time line if we don't have adequate resources or authorities that we could reach that tipping point? So Senator -- what drives me to say that in the opening statement is the observation that we have delayed this recapitalization so long that we're getting two points key pieces of infrastructure or key talent areas, human talent, areas where we have not had to do something in 30 Years?

**Charles Richard**

The best examples are on the weapons complex side of the house right now. There will be more in the delivery system and the command and control to shortly follow. And it's the situation we don't normally face as a nation. Normally when we make a decision and if we find out we were wrong, we can come back two or three years later and buy it back.We can change our minds, we have to write a bigger check. We try to avoid doing it, but at least we can. We are now at the point that if we lose some critical pieces of infrastructure or we lose some key talent bases, a specific example would be how you make a nuclear reentry vehicle heat shield, right? We haven't done it in 30 years.Do you think we've never done it before, if we lose those talent bases it you can't buy it back, it will take five to 10 years to either retrain and redevelop the people or rebuild the infrastructure?

**Thom Tillis**

We don't normally face decisions like that. Thank you. General Dickinson, you mention thirty two thousand space objects out there. I think you said somewhere on the order of about 7,000 or operational. I've been reading a lot of articles on space junk and the dangers that they could pose to the International Space Station commercial assets. How much of solving that problem are emphasis on it and how many resources are actually dedicated to that?Thanks, Senator Shaheen touched on it, but you know, is this a -- Is this the threat that I perceive it to be based on publications of the last month or so?

**James Dickinson**

So Senator that that is a missionary within the command that we do every day, it is about thirty two thousand. It grows as we see the commercials, the nation if you will of space with the multiple civilian companies. Now moving into the space domain, it is something that we do and we do a very good job at that in terms of making sure that we are able to predict where we may have a problem with either a conjunction or a collision on orbit.We have a very close relationship with NASA to your message mentioned to the international space station, very close working relationship where we provide them with that information. And they use that information to do take whatever actions that they feel is appropriate to maintain a safe environment. For the astronauts and cosmonauts on more the International Space Station.But it is one that we saw we spend a lot of time doing each and every day.

**Thom Tillis**

Go for it, I followed Starlink since I first set up the first dishwasher sized satellites to provide broadband ubiquitous broadband. I read a report earlier this week that while they're topping 1,000 on orbit now their goal is to have over 1,000 on orbit. How are we working with the commercial space to make sure that we're sequencing more objects in space with what the goal of not making it more difficult for you to do your job?To what extent would you play a role if any and the commercial decisions and permitting to allow more to go on orbit that create a more complex challenge for you?

**James Dickinson**

So Senator my -- my responsibilities lie in predicting and understanding where those objects are or satellites are. The actual interaction with a commercial company on how they should conduct a space launch or on orbit activities with the -- with their satellites really kind of goes back to a licensing capability or licensing process that I believe the FAA actually conducts with each of those companies before They launch my remaining time.

**Thom Tillis**

Kind of curious about how space com and Strat Comm are going to work to together to -- to create a credible U.S. deterrent, particularly when we seem to be challenged in every domain. So how are you? Two, how are your two commands working together to face up against those threats?

**James Dickinson**

So Senator -- I'll answer that first, then I'll turn it over to my shipmate here Richard. But we work every day with that and one of the notable things within the U.S. Space Command is the stand up of our joint fires element within within the command. That actually does that deterrence type of work in terms of the space domain. But we are very integrated with the rest of the combatant commands to include U.S. Strategic Command in that daily activity. In terms of deterrence, not only in the space domain but Denton and all the other domains, because as the Secretary of defense has asked us and told us to do is that deterrence is not just one domain. It's all domains all the time.And so our synchronization, coordination of those activities, in particular on orbit and then for the other pieces, the other domains is very fundamental that our relationship and synchronization with you AUSTRAC might commit U.S. Strategic Command is very close.

**Charles Richard**

Thank you. Yes, Senator if I could just add, not only do endorse everything a general Dickens friend just said, but Chairman Miller and the vice chairman Hite and have made it really clear, it's not just our two co coms, it is all co coms, right. We are driving hard towards global integration both in planning and operations.We see that as a necessary way forward into the future. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Senator tell us. Let me now recognize Senator Rosen via WebEx.

**Jacky Rosen**

Thank you, Chairman Reed and ranking member in Hoffa for holding this important hearing. I'd also like to thank Admiral Richard and general Dickinson for testifying today and of course I'm grateful for their service to our country. But I'd like to speak a little bit about explosive nuclear weapons testing. Because last May, the prior administration was reportedly considering resuming explosive nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site, the only facility in the nation equipped to accommodate underground nuclear testing.And this is for the first time since 1992 Nevadans do not want to return to a time when explosive nuclear testing was allowed in our state. It puts the health and safety of Nevadans in jeopardy so to prevent this outcome. Senator Cortez master on I introduced legislation requiring Congressional approval before any future explosive nuclear weapons testing were to take place.So Admiral Richard, you've told the Senate Armed Services Committee last year that there is no condition under which you would recommend the need for renewed nuclear testing. Can you confirm for me please today that there is no current need or a resumption of explosive testing in Nevada or elsewhere to ensure the right reliability of our nuclear arsenal?

**Charles Richard**

Senator, as you know, I'm obligated by Congress to report on my assessment of the combat readiness of the stockpile that includes an assessment on the need for nuclear weapons testing. So you are correct. I have certified the stockpile, I do it annually in writing and I have stated that there are no identified conditions at this point that would require nuclear weapons testing to restore that confidence.But I further stated in it that I am concerned about the nation's test readiness and then I endorsed the lab directors calls in an essay nuclear weapons labs for a national review of our test readiness to understand where we sit.

**Jacky Rosen**

Thank you. I'd like to build on that and ask if you agree that a resumption in explosive nuclear testing which would violate longstanding international norms might provide other nations with an incentive to resume their own explosive nuclear testing activities and more broadly would impact global peace and security.So how -- what -- what are you thinking in that realm?

**Charles Richard**

Ma'am, I would defer the political implications of a nuclear weapons test to OSD policy or the State Department. I think from a technical standpoint, a bigger driver in terms of any nation's decision to conduct a test has to do with what level of confidence do they have that their nuclear weapons will work to their standards and what other mechanisms they may may have no words.How much confidence do they want and by what means do they want to get it?

**Jacky Rosen**

Thank you. I'll move on, but I'll just reiterate, we want no nuclear explosive testing in Nevada or anywhere across this country. But I'd like to build now on what Senator Gillibrand spoke about earlier, a cyber mission and space. It's no secret of course as anyone knows our adversaries see the value of a space domain, developing counter space capabilities to undermine our interests.So this week I plan to introduce Senator Blackburn legislation to build a civilian cyber security reserve to ensure additional cyber capacity at our times of greatest need. So General Dickinson does the newest branch of the military. Do you currently possess the necessary workforce to fulfill your cyber mission effectively and how can we help support your needs in growing the workforce? Thank you. Senator.

**James Dickinson**

In terms of the cyber peace that you mentioned earlier, I would -- I would say that's probably General Jay Freeman's Avenue area in terms of what the service the Space Force provides. But as a cadet and Commander, I can tell you that I've got the resources that I need right now and I'm confident in our ability to protect, protect my space missionaries my critical space, mission areas that I do each and every day in my relationship with the Cyber Command in terms of working with Paul Nakasone and his team is very close.And as the newest combat command, I have gotten resources that I've -- that I've determined I need in order to have a resilient cyber capability or protection within the -- within the missionaries I have today. Thank you, Ira?

**Jacky Rosen**

I was able to last year past to promote to help get the promotes Act passed, which has a junior ROTC stem track now and we hope that that will help grow our young men and women as they join J.R. ROTC early to help build all of our Capabilities and technology in the military. Thank you. I yield back.

**Jack Reed**

Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. Let me recognize Senator Scott, please.

**Rick Scott**

Thank you, Chairman and Richard, I read your op ed from February and I appreciate your candor assessment of the challenges we face face regarding communist China. Have you seen anything with regard to behavior, military spending, posturing and public statements that lead you to believe that communist China has any interest in cooperating with other countries on nuclear weapons?

**Charles Richard**

Senator I have not -- they have a very opaque policy that makes it difficult to determine anything about what their intentions are. But I've certainly not seen anything that looks like cooperation. If we don't spend sufficiently to modernize our nuclear forces and commies, China's achieves its goal of having an effective nuclear drive by the middle of this decade. What do we face in terms of defending U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond?Center it would be two things, one of which is this, they could use those capabilities coercively in a way that would limit our decision space in crisis. Additionally, it will rip out the underpinnings by which all the rest of our forces are employed, right? We would not be able to deter China from simply escalating right past us if the stakes were high enough in a crisis or conflict.

**Rick Scott**

So the value of having forces in South Korea and Japan would be this wasteful. There would be no ability to help them.

**Charles Richard**

We would be the first to tell you that those forces are important, but you have to backstop them with a strategic deterrent to dissuade the opponent from attempting to do something like that.

**Unidentified**

Thank you.

**Rick Scott**

Joan, Dickinson, Are we on pace given what we expect from the President's budget to be able to defeat Chinese and Russian goals in space? There's no question they each want to dominate in this area and do you believe we will be able to stop them given our current spending plans and policy?

**James Dickinson**

Center, I think at this point we're on a glide path to that capability. Our ability to -- to protect and defend on orbit is that those capabilities and capacities are growing. And I think that's very important as we -- as we look to the future. But to answer your question, I think we're on a glide path.

**Rick Scott**

So do you -- do you believe going forward that we're going to be expected, the President's budget does not have much of an increase in defense spending? Do you think we're going to -- that's going to be enough to be able to pursue the goals that you have?

**James Dickinson**

Well, so for the command, over the last year, we've -- we've done our first analysis of the requirements, if you will, for -- for the combatant command and have delivered those requirements to the Department Defense as well as the services. And in those requirements, I've identified my priority in terms of developing better space, domain awareness in terms of being able to understand what's on what's happening in the space domain to characterize that and understand what our adversaries and competitors are doing there.So in terms of the budget for this year, I think it is satisfactory for what we're doing right now. The -- Richard, you think we're clear enough about our -- our relationship with Taiwan and our interest in making sure they -- they remain independent of communist China.

**Charles Richard**

Senator ultimately, I would defer to the Department of State and OSD policy in terms of what is the best course of action there. What I am committed to doing is making sure that the U.S. military has the ability to set the appropriate operating conditions and deter Chinese strategic capabilities to allow us those options for the rest of the force in the nation. So if we're in that, if we're in the position that that we believe that we can deter them from doing so, then why are they doing all the flyovers now?

**Rick Scott**

Wise communist China doing taking the aggressive action they're taking against Taiwan right now.

**Charles Richard**

Sir, fundamentally I would defer to -- you'd have to ask China that question right, but that is a point that gets back to deterrence is linked, right. We have to pay attention all the way down into thresholds below conventional armed conflict to make sure that we are putting these things on the right trajectory in the long term.

**Rick Scott**

And I thank both of you and all the men and women that serve with you. Thank you, Mr. Jim. Thank you very much. Senator Scott, Senator, Kelly, please.

**Unidentified**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, admiral Richard. Thank you for your testimony. General Dickinson. I'd like to discuss for a couple of minutes. The ground based strategic deterrent effort, the program to replace the minimum 3 and its command and control system is significant. Often large programs like this are threatened when there's budgetary pressure.

**Unidentified**

Now my understanding is that there's not a cost effective way to modernize the minimum 3 and that the 60 year old missile needs to be replaced. Can you explain in detail Admiral Richard, why that is and what new capability are we gonna get with GSD?

**Charles Richard**

Senator first, I'd offer the department has sent several pretty detailed reports to Congress that go into that and so I would refer to those. But biggest picture, I need a weapon that can fly and make it to the target. Minuteman 3 is increasingly challenged in its ability to do that. There is almost no possibility of an upgrade on that relative to the threat.In particular, I would draw attention to the cyber capabilities, right. Minuteman 3 is a very old system that we have to be able to cyber defend and the GSD will come with a great improvement inside its cyber defenses as well as the overall operational availability, redone scene reliability of its command and control.

**Unidentified**

Well, thank you. And the Russians have been modernizing their systems. Can you highlight some of the -- some of the upgrades that they've been making in delivery system, command and control and their warning systems just top level?

**Charles Richard**

I mean, Senator they across the board are operating new equipment. They're on their second generation of a new ballistic missile submarine. They have a new ballistic missile for that. It's quite capable. They have a very impressive solid fueled intercontinental ballistic missile, all brand new. They have new road mobile missiles.They have up gone their bombers, they have new weapons off their bombers. This is in addition to the novel capabilities that I described in my opening statement. They have new command and control. They have new warning they are exercising on a level we haven't seen since the Cold War President Putin plays in those exercises and we're seeing readiness levels like we've not seen before.So this is an across the board comprehensive improvement in their strategic capabilities, again about 80 percent complete right now and be 1.

**Unidentified**

Mod 12 program underway, gonna give us more accuracy, a smaller CTP for that weapon in that weapon system. Do you see this mod of the B sixty one being able to last here for the next 20 years or so or do you see a point where we're gonna have to find a new air launched ballistic bomb?

**Charles Richard**

So for the B, sixty one right, I do think that modernization program will serve us well going into the future. That's a gravity weapon as you well know and that is in particular importance to NATO in terms of our -- our extended deterrence and assurance commitments. So I am satisfied that that weapon system is going to serve us well.

**Unidentified**

Thank you, Adam and general Dickinson. When we spoke last week, we discussed the importance of cooperation and communication with other spacefaring nations to deal with the common challenges that we face with orbital debris challenge. I had to deal with myself personally on a number of occasions. You know these -- these communications are critical for advanced warning as well test launches with competitors like Russia and China. I want to just in the remaining time in your view, how good are the current structures for communications with Russia and China concerning orbital debris, but also in when they launch unexpectedly could be to put payloads in orbit? And if the communication systems are not adequate, what could we do right now to improve those?

**Unidentified**

So Senator we, as I mentioned Michael, Brown plays.

**James Dickinson**

So we we communicate with -- with our competitors in terms of what's going on in the space domain. Could it be better? Yes, it could be better, but we communicate to them electronically through a a Web site called Space, dot space, dot org that has a catalog, has information on there that that we can alert them to, to a potential collision in space.And so we do communicate that way, but I do believe that we could improve upon that as we go forward.

**Unidentified**

And that would be true for a test launch as well.

**James Dickinson**

Yes, it would be for test launches as well, so that we can make sure that we understand intention as well as what activity they may be doing in the space domain so that we can ensure that we provide a safe environment for -- for space operations.

**Unidentified**

Thank you, General. Thank you. Thank you. Senator Kelly Senator Peters, please.

**Gary C Peters**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and to both of you. Thank you for your testimony here today and your service to our country general Dickinson. In your opening remarks, you addressed space situational awareness in the context of your work with the Department of Commerce and its open architecture data repository. My question to you is, could you ever foresee space situational awareness being a holy Commerce function with Space Command playing a supporting role and if not why?

**James Dickinson**

I think as we look to the future and really the current situation we have now as I mentioned thirty two thousand pieces of debris objects on orbit as we move forward. I do believe that we will see that as a -- or we should see that as a purely administrative type of function in terms of tracking objects in the space domain.My job at U.S. Space Command is to not only understand that, but also be able to characterize what we're seeing in the space domain so that we can understand what our adversaries intentions may be and their capabilities. But I see the future that as we move towards that, that that could be a wholly administrative type function similarly to what the FAA does right now in terms of making sure the air domain is safe.

**Gary C Peters**

So I would be a Commerce function, you would be supportive of that as long as you're playing the role that you mentioned. Yes, on the same topic, the -- in 2020 alone, the -- and I think Senator Kelly mentioned his involvement with space as well, but the International Space Station had to perform three maneuvers to being hit by space debris.Has the command your command undertaken any initiatives to contend with space debris by participating in commercial efforts such as the LSA.D. launch that occurred last month?

**James Dickinson**

We're looking at those types of opportunities right now because that could contribute to our ability to understand the domain better, very good.

**Gary C Peters**

And as a general, it's another question for you much like the economy at large, our operations in space are gonna be facilitated not by just the purchase and the operation of hardware, but also the utilization of services there. That will allow us to maintain a robust presence in space, for example, in Michigan.We have a company called Atlas based operations in Traverse City that were involved in the assistance of launch operations, communications, other types of service and they're doing very innovative work in that area. Under your command. How is Space COMM utilizing private sector partners can provide a variety of these kinds of capabilities?

**James Dickinson**

So Senator we out at Vandenberg Air Force Base, which which is part of the U.S. Space Command. We've got a commercial integration cell where we are working every day with the commercial industry in terms of understanding capabilities that they're bringing online as well as on orbit type of activities. I think we have close to 90 different companies that we work with out there.Right.

**Gary C Peters**

Richard, in your opening remarks, you describe the submarine launched nuclear missile as necessary to address regional deterrence challenges from both China and Russia by increasing the flexibility in your words, quote providing a more credible deterrent to limited attack against the United States end of quote.Could you explain what you mean by quote more credible and does a submarine launched cruise missile fill a capability gap to our extended deterrence posture?

**Charles Richard**

So sir, when I say more credible that was in relationship to the low yield submarine launched ballistic missile aspect of that, you can't deter if you can't get to the targets and that weapon system has a better ability to do that makes it more credible in the Eyes of the other party, the second part on the sea launched cruise missile goes after more.The large disparity that we have a non treaty accountable weapons between us and the Russians I use that term very specifically, sometimes they're used as strategic versus non-strategic. I think that distinction is increasingly irrelevant at a large number of so-called non strategic weapons are a direct threat to the homeland.In addition to our forces regionally and to our allies, the sea launch cruise missile would give us an ability to not rely on host nation support and give us an ability to again provide an effective counter to the disparity that we see in country accountable weapons.

**Gary C Peters**

Well, as you know very well, deterrence depends on capability and credibility and communication. And when a Virginia class submarine launches, a Tomahawk cruise missile into Syria, for example, China, Russia and other nuclear powers can now credibly recognize that such launches are carrying conventional munitions.If my question is if attack submarines require the capability to launch nuclear weapons, then does that mean Beijing and Moscow will need to worry about every missile launch within the range of their territories? And are you concerned therefore that this added ambiguity might lead to some sort of miscalculation?

**Charles Richard**

Senator what I would offer is I think that it is a fundamental error to try to determine what the payload is on any weapon system by assigning it to a particular trajectory. You can make any trajectory carry any payload. The nation has long had a cruise missile. A nuclear cruise missile capability, russia and China or Russia has it today.So the idea that we will somehow sort out what a threat is based on its profile, I think is a flawed idea to begin with and we certainly don't characterize anything based on the flight profile coming at us. All right. Thank you, Barbara.

**Jack Reed**

Thank you. Senator it is recognized. Senator O'Sullivan, please.

**Dan Sullivan**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, thank you for your service and your testimony today. You know, I was in a hearing last week oversight hearing and one of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle was kind of putting out this number of 10 percent. His estimate of the military was extremists racists.I think in my experience, you know, I'm still serving in the Marine Corps Reserves. That number is absurdly high, wasn't based on any data that would make about 200, 250,000 members of the active force supposedly fitting within that category, which I think is a. Disparagement of our.Men and women in the military, I get a little heated in that hearing last week because I'm really tired of hearing about you know what supposedly is all the bad things about the members of the military when I think it's some of the finest young men and Women in America serving volunteering to serve, is that your experience?Ten percent, one in ten, two hundred and fifty thousand active duty forces are somehow extremists racists. It's an absurd number, but it gets thrown around in the newspaper and I'm trying to get the men and women like you who've served for decades to kind of give me your view admiral General. I know that's not the purpose of hearing, but I think it's really important particularly for the men and women that you're leading and that we have oversight of to let them know that we don't think a huge majority that force is extremists.

**Dan Sullivan**

Obviously some of my Senate colleagues do which is absurd.

**Charles Richard**

Can I get your view on that? And let me -- let me go first on that one. I am very confident that the number extremist in my forces is zero. Let me explain why I say that the department has made it clear for decades that we don't tolerate that. My forces are a little bit different. We have certainly done everything Secretary Austen has told us to do. He has made it very clear what the standards are.But it's reiterating a standard -- every person in my organization has to have a security clearance for starters, right? And when you fill that form out and I've been filling it out for 40 years, there is an extensive battery of questions designed to get after that very point. And then somebody goes and investigates you and then they go talk to all your references and then they go talk some more.Hunting for that very thing, we don't care what the source of extremism was those date back to communism was actually what they were looking for when I first came in and today they'll even go look at your social media. If you can't pass that bar and you don't even see you and then on top of that in my forces, I have a personal reliability program for these.So you now have peer monitoring brought in and a number of other standards. So if there are any extremist in my organization, one, they hide it very well and two, it's just a matter of time until I get to them.

**Dan Sullivan**

So you're saying that you -- you agree with me, these are some of the best men and women in America to be besmirched by the media or Senator ten percent is ridiculous.

**Charles Richard**

Sir, I will just explain what the standard is that we uphold. It is contrary to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, it is essential for good order and discipline and my forces meet the highest standard of that that DADT requires great.

**Dan Sullivan**

General your view on this, I know you have a lot of experience given your decades in the U.S. Army.

**James Dickinson**

Thank you, Senator so in my organization a very similar organization to U.S. strategic command. So space as we all understand and know, we've talked about many times in terms of the classification or the security clearances that are required within my organization to be able to do the things we do in the space, domain interest really.And so we have the same rigour in terms of some of the questions that are asked during their security clearances in terms of getting them to the proper clearance level, so they can perform their duties within my command. I would tell you right now that we have done everything that Secretary Austin has asked us to do in terms of training and awareness.But in my organization, I would say that number is zero and we -- we are very keen and aware of those types of activities or what would lead to those and we -- we understand that very well. And so in terms of years of experience, yes, I would tell you in the formations that I've had throughout my career, I have not seen that.So I believe it's close to zero in my organization if not zero. Thank you, but nothing nearing 10 percent.

**Dan Sullivan**

Ridiculous in my view, but obviously you guys, you gentlemen would agree. Let me just ask one final question. Admiral Woods for you. As the North Koreans continued advancement of their weapons systems, what can we do? Are you concerned that's going to outpace our ability to defend the U.S. homeland? I'm talking about the GBI system and what can we do to accelerate development of the next generation interceptor?And is it makes sense to have 20 empty silos right now at Fort Greely center one?

**Charles Richard**

I think the nation has the right standard in policy when it comes to missile defense relative to rogue threats with North Korea right now being the defining example of that. Obviously that is something we may go review. But right now, I would start off with, I think that's the right pace. We will have to pace that threat.I certainly support Northern Command's requirements to be able to do so and would look for the Department understanding resource limitations and other mission sets that are in competition for us to maintain that standard in terms of our missile defenses. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Jack Reed**

Thank you. Senator Sullivan.

**Unidentified**

Senator Blumenthal you prepare General Blum with all Thanks Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here.

**Richard Blumenthal**

Thank you for your extraordinary service Admiral Richard. We've interacted before at a number of submarine related events and I thank you for your service particularly in that area and General Dickinson. Thank you for embarking on this very promising important new area. At a recent hearing, I expressed my concern about white supremacist actions and extremism in our military and I want to just be clear that I said at a prior hearing was very small percentage of our troops that potentially were involved in these activities.I am sure it is well under 10 percent as I believe I indicated then, but I think any percentage of white supremacist or violent extremism in our military is intolerable and unacceptable.

**Unidentified**

I hope you both agree.

**Charles Richard**

Senator I certainly agree with that, right, the extremism eat your either on Team Constitution or you are not and if you are not, you have no place in our military.

**Richard Blumenthal**

Senator I agree as well, there is no place for it in a room in our military today as you know better than all of us general. Much of the operational information you lies within space. Com remains very highly classified and it's often restricted in terms of access. And I have been an advocate in many other areas of sharing more information with the American public so that they understand the threats and the risks in this area. Right now. I think there is almost no awareness among the American public. What can be done to make the American public better informed and aware of the challenges is to use a euphemism that exists in your domain Senator.

**James Dickinson**

Thanks for that question. I would say that's probably in my words one of the most visible things that U.S. space command has done over the last 20 months. In that we have been able to articulate and call out some of the activities that we've seen in orbit that we would determine at a minimum dangerous at a maximum or the other end of the scale is threatening.And what I'm describing is what we've seen over the last year 2019 and 2020 with the on orbit activities of the Russians in terms of conducting a on orbit anti satellite test as well as a ground based missile anti satellite test that was threatening or was demonstrating A capability that they have and so in other words, Senator our ability to be able to discuss that like we do in many other domains, air land and sea is very important to what we do and really working very closely with the intel community.We've been able to do that. So in terms of classification and being able to declassify that so that we're able to communicate and talk not only to the American public about it, but also our allies and partners around the world to make sure that we understand what they're building and what their future Intent could be that that with.My next question, do you think that there are procedures for declassifying information that make our?

**Richard Blumenthal**

Ability to share information with our allies and partners operate.

**James Dickinson**

So we're center, we're working that every day, just the fact last year that we were able to come out publicly and describe what I just mentioned about there on orbit activities is a step, a big step in the right direction. We continue to work within the department as well as within the intel community, so that we can continue to do that and do it more frequently.Thank you.

**Richard Blumenthal**

Thank you very much. Thank you. Senator bloom.

**Joshua Hawley**

Those in a holy place. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen, both of you for being here. Thank you for your many years of service to our country. Admiral can I start with you and I want to talk a little bit about the B to Whiteman Air Force Base in my home state of Missouri of course is proudly home to the B2 bomber.In your testimony, you wrote that the B to -- and I'm quoting you now, is the only heavy payload penetrating stealth bomber in the world able to hold at risk, heavily defended hard and deeply buried targets? I just want to give you an opportunity to talk about why this is so important for our strategic deterrence and what it is we need to do to ensure that the B2 continues to be effective until a B 21 comes fully online.

**Charles Richard**

Well, sir, that's summarized in, in terms of that is the only capability that we have to hold certain targets at risk that are very important in our ability to deter that, right. It is known that that weapon system can do that, that changes decision calculus of people that we're trying to deter. And so I applaud Air Force efforts right to maintain the B2 all the way through with its full range of capabilities while simultaneously taking all the steps necessary to bring the B twenty one in on time such that the nation maintains this capability going into the future.Remember, in addition to its penetration capabilities, one key aspect that the bomber leg adds is its flexibility, the fact that we can move it all over the place that provides a deterrence benefit, it certainly provides assurance to allies. You see us doing that with these forces today. And it's signaling it's visible, right?We can directly show our is the best way we have to directly show our resolve as a nation by what we do with this piece of the try it.

**Joshua Hawley**

Very good, thank you. Let's talk about China a little bit. You said earlier today that what it's going to take to deter China is going to start to be additive to what we have to do with Russia. Could you just elaborate a little bit on what you mean by additive, So fundamentally I am required to deter all?

**Charles Richard**

Nations that I'm a sign all the time, right? I don't get to do it one at a time and I have an obligation such that we are able to meet all the objectives simultaneously with everybody that's involved until recently. It was pretty reasonable to assume that with the margins right for uncertainty that are built into our strategic forces, it would be reasonable to assume you had sufficient residual capability to deter any other lesser included case.That's about to no longer be true and that's what I'm talking about. I can give you some specific numbers in a closed session Senator.

**Joshua Hawley**

Very good, thank you for that. Tell me this, what do you think that China's progress from a nuclear diet to try says about their view of a no first use policy?

**Charles Richard**

Senator that along with everything else in my mind is fundamentally inconsistent with a no first use policy and the implied minimum deterrence strategy. But maybe more importantly than independent of what their intent is. It certainly gives them the capability if they choose to, to any number of possible employment strategies.So, so even if that was the basis of the decision, it still allows a very large range of possible employment strategies independent of why they got it to begin with.

**Joshua Hawley**

Very good admiral tell me many of those who advocate for shrinking or eliminating our ICBM force are also strong proponents of international arms control.

**Charles Richard**

And I'm just wondering from a defense point of view, is it your view that cutting our ICBM force would help or hurt our negotiating position in the future arms control negotiations with Russia or China Center? The way I approach that fundamentally that negotiation is the responsibility of the Department of State with input from OSD policy and I would defer to them on what the best negotiating strategy is. I just have to look at what the actual capabilities are now.And what I have to have to deter that, so my strong advice is to that arms control would be excellent. Additional arms control would reduce the threat, get the arms control in place first before we then decide to take reductions in our capability.

**Joshua Hawley**

Let me ask you one final question and we'll hear in my remaining seconds about the danger of a simultaneous conflict. In your testimony, you wrote that prudence dictates military planners consider and account for the complex threat environment enabled by the strategic cooperation of Russia and China. Tell me how you're thinking about the threat of simultaneous conflicts in both Europe and Asia and how that informs your thinking of what we're going to need to maintain strategic deterrence in the coming years. Deterring opportunistic aggression going into the future will be a challenge that we haven't faced on this scale in a long time.

**Charles Richard**

So we're engaged in one theater, other folks Sensing opportunity and it's not only for their own individual aims. We also have to think through what they might do in cooperation with each other because while they both have different national aims, both of them are inconsistent with us. And it is to both of their advantage for us to potentially get constrained in a particular way.So it's not only opportunistic, it's in combination, this is a -- this three party world that we're in is something we have never faced before and we have a lot of work to continue to do to think our way through that.

**Joshua Hawley**

Thank you very much for that and your testimony. I'll have some questions for you general for the record. Thank you for being here and for your service. Thank you Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Jack Reed**

Thank you. Senator Hollis. Blackburn via WebEx.

**Marsha Blackburn**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you all for the time today to talk a little bit. General Dixon Dickinson I want to come to you. Space come in the southeast is home to three of our nation's top 12 university programs for aerospace engineering. So we are very excited and think it's appropriately placed, having space calm there in Huntsville. We look forward to hosting this in the future and hearing more about space comm and I appreciate some of the vastness of your area of operations and it really is quite literally limitless.And I see a range of reach in space and look forward to that. So let me ask you this. Is there a role for space come in traditional departments of Commerce and Transportation like functions such as this shaping the domestic ecosystem of space activities, space traffic management, launch licensing and other space activities.Because we know that certainly the Chinese are already working on this Senator I think.

**James Dickinson**

I think what you just described is, is appropriate. I think as we look at the rapid commercialization of space just from the United States perspective in terms of numbers of capabilities and satellites going into orbit that that the actual administrative piece to that which is the licensing and those types of functions absolutely are part of The whole of government type of activity for me at U.S. Space Command.My job is to make sure that that I provide that secure environment through my ability to understand what's going on in the space domain in terms of what our competitors, potential adversaries are doing there in terms of characterization of that and understanding what their intentions might be.

**Marsha Blackburn**

Where are you when working with the Department of State and our partners and our allies to create norms of behavior and space to include beyond near Earth orbit?

**James Dickinson**

Senator I learned to work very closely with OSD policy in the Department of Defense on helping to characterize maybe what we would think would be a norms of behavior. But the work there is actually with the Department of State and how they're characterizing that. My job at U.S. Space Command is to make sure that I provide them that type of information that would show them or it'll illustrate to them what those activities or behaviors would be on orbit in terms of our adversaries and competitors.

**Marsha Blackburn**

Now, if there were to be a conflict that began and or either transitioned to space, how do you interpret your current responsibilities to defend U.S. commercial assets?

**James Dickinson**

So, so, so my -- my protect and defend responsibilities in the space domain are one of my fundamental mission sets for this command and I do that in a number of ways. One is understanding the environment, two is communicating that to two in this case a commercial entity. So that they're aware of that and we do that.We were integrated very well with our commercial, some of our commercial partners out at Vandenberg Air Force Base and one of my subordinate commands. And so we work every day to do that, but we would do that in a -- in a timely manner so that we are able to, to, to make them aware of activities. And so you believe these responsibilities are appropriate in scope and scale. So Senator I would take that in terms of my responsibilities and direction from the National Command Authority on which assets in particular to protect.In that case and in terms of the resources, I have resources today that are growing in capacity and capability over the next few years to help.

**Marsha Blackburn**

OK. And then when it comes to development and enhancement of our space based sensor layer, what would you say is the top threat that we should be hedging against and what should be our priority investment to counter that threat?

**James Dickinson**

So the pacing threat, the pacing challenge for in the space domain is like it is in the other domains, which is China and they are growing capability and capacity as we've seen over the last several years. If you look at the vast -- not just the gross number of satellites that the Chinese have today based on what they had just you know, 10 years ago, they've gone from a little been back in 2010. They had about 70 satellites on orbit today. They have well over 400 And so we know that that is a growing and campaign capability and capacity to probably be over a thousand year by 2030. So they are the pacing threat for us in the space domain just as they are in other domains.

**Marsha Blackburn**

I have a couple of questions for Admiral Richard. I will submit those as a QF. Our thanks, Mr. Chairman.

**Jack Reed**

Thank you very much. Senator Blackwater now let me recognize and salute the patience of Senator Barbara.

**Mike Thompson**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I know they're getting tired. Look, they look hungry. They need to go the restroom probably. So I won't be that long. First of all, thank you for your service. I can't imagine starting a new team from scratch. I can't imagine that I'd ever had to do it in football and just had 120 players and general you're -- you've got your hands full.Thank you for your service and and an important service and Admiral. I like your -- your falseness in terms of, hey, we need to modernise at the end of the day you've had a team for a long time or we've had a team that's getting old and we need new players and we need new equipment. And I like what our secretary says.We can't afford survival and he's exactly right. All the money we're spending, we can afford it, you know, growing up. We're all in a space race.

**Unidentified**

General and we're in when a new one now it's competition that we've got to win. The Chinese have weaponized space. Sadly, many in our country don't understand that American life depends on our secure and reliable access to space, whether it's the G.P.S in our phones or watching football game. Well, Richard, you're a native of the great state and general Dixon. I know you've worked at hospital as Army missile command and you both understand firsthand that Alabama and stand firmly behind our men and women in uniform.

**Unidentified**

Alabama's industry stands behind our military, alabama rest on Arsenal are ready for Space Command, but many people in this room probably don't understand stand. Redstone redstone has been involved with space operations for 70 years. NASA's only facility on a military base is a Marshall Space Flight Center. The largest consumer of space products is the U.S. Army, an Army missile command and has been at Redstone Arsenal since it was established in 1962. Space technology won't just be developed by the government to help outpace China and Russia, which is going to be a challenge.

**Unidentified**

We need private industry, the area around Redstone boasts 800 suppliers and contractors building the very latest in spiked space technology. I was at Redstone three weeks ago and Redstone was -- has the land for Space Command to grow as your mission expands. It's dedicated 64 acres behind the fence. I have Space Command as the base has temporary spaces for you right now if needed.

**Unidentified**

So General, I'm looking forward to calling you call the great state of Alabama, your home and animal. You're welcome to come anytime. General Dixon, thank you for your productive call. Last week my colleague asked how much of the civilian workforce we might move to Huntsville. I'd like to follow up on that question first. How much to do your civilian workforce?

**Unidentified**

Have you hired and how many people do you intend to hire in the future?

**James Dickinson**

Senator about my -- my approved Manning document is about 60 percent civilian. We've -- to date, we've hired probably about a not quite a third of that under the command. The command right now is about a third of what our hour and strength will be. So we're a little over 600, Some of that's contractor, some of that civilian.Some of that's military and so as we look -- as we look to the future, you know we are -- we are absolutely looking at incentives that we can provide to our civilian workforce. They are absolutely the bedrock of the command today and in the future. And so we'll look at how we can try to incentivize the civilian workforce for in terms of making the -- making the move to a two to Alabama.But I can't give you -- like I said earlier, I can't give you a prediction on what that percentage will be. There's a lot of factors that go into. What we can do though is try to incentivize them through motivation in terms of wanting to work with the command and some other things that we'll consider as well.

**Mike Thompson**

Well, we're proud of that sector of Air Force selected Alabama is home for Space Command. How do you see National Guard implementing that at all? Do you at all in the future and Space Command Space Force?

**James Dickinson**

Senator as we speak now, the reserve component is a very important part of the U.S. Space Command. Matter of fact, when we stood up or we established about 20 months ago, one of our biggest elements or components within the command was the reserve component. It was the reserves and the National Guard, that's a very important part of the command.They bring a great deal of expertise and knowledge to the command. I see that in the future too. We will always is part of Space Command have the reserve component as an element within the command.

**Mike Thompson**

Richard, russia and China prioritizing investments to compete and win across the range of strategic capability, especially with regard to nuclear and space capabilities. Do you believe we're behind the curve?

**Charles Richard**

Senator I have what I need today to deter to do what the President's asked me to do, but I need it modernized, right. There's no remaining margin. We cannot extend or delay any of the modernization programs for me to continue to say that in the future.

**Mike Thompson**

Do we have the technology we need?

**Charles Richard**

SENATOR Yes, right now the one area that we are working the hardest on to make sure we're fully taking advantage of new technologies is in the nuclear command and control system. We've got the next five years locked in pretty tight, trying to make sure that we take full advantage of our technological development both from the commercial sector and the government sector will be keys to improving that in future iterations.

**Mike Thompson**

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Jack Reed**

Thank you. Senator real gentleman, thank you for your testimony. We will now close the open session Adjourn as quickly as possible the SDC 217 for the classified section and I have a conflict with the Appropriations Committee if the ranking member arrives first, he will begin the initiation of the questions with not know the business before the Committee and the open session during the hearing.

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