THE LONG-RANGE DEMOGRAPHIC ASSUMPTIONS

FOR THE 2018 TRUSTEES REPORT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

June 5, 2018
Demography, Page 2

PRINCIPAL DEMOGRAPHIC ASSUMPTIONS 

OVERVIEW

SECTIONS

1 FERTILITY

2 MORTALITY

3 IMMIGRATION 
Demography, Page 3

Overview

Each year the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and 

Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Funds provides an annual report to the Congress on the financial 

and actuarial status of the OASDI program. The Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) produces 

projections of future cost and income based on three separate sets of long-range (75-year) 

assumptions for key demographic variables. The intermediate (alternative II) set of assumptions 

represents the Trustees’ best estimate for future experience, while the low cost (alternative I) and 

high cost (alternative III) sets of assumptions are more and less favorable, respectively, from the 

perspective of program cost as a percent of taxable payroll. In addition, the intermediate 

assumptions serve as the central tendency for the stochastic projections presented in the OASDI 

Trustees Report. This memorandum presents the demographic assumptions used in the 2018

annual report of the Board of Trustees (the “Trustees Report”).

The basic demographic assumptions are:

 The total fertility rate, along with the single year of age birth rates,

 The annual rates of reduction in central death rates by broad age group (0 – 14, 15 – 49, 

50 – 64, 65 – 84, and 85+) and cause of death (cardiovascular, cancer, violence, 

respiratory, and all other), and

 Immigration levels, by age and sex, of lawful permanent resident (LPR) new arrivals, 

LPR exits, adjustments of status, and other-than-LPR entrants; and other-than-LPR rates 

of exit.

For the 2018 Trustees Report, there are no changes to these basic assumptions from those used in 

the 2017 Trustees Report, except for decreasing new arrival LPRs by 10,000 for each alternative. 

This reflects the fact that the 2014 executive action on immigration for entrepreneurs, which was 

intended to increase the number of entrepreneurs by 10,000 per year, has not been implemented 

and is assumed will not be implemented in the future. The following table shows the basic 

ultimate assumptions or summary measures for the basic assumptions.
Demography, Page 4

Key Demographic Assumptions and Summary Measures for the Long-Range (75-year) Projection Period

2017 Trustees Report and 2018 Trustees Report

2017 Trustees Report 

Alternative

2018 Trustees Report 

Alternative

2018 Trustees Report Less 

2017 Trustees Report

I II III I II III I II III

Ultimate total fertility rate 

(children per woman) 2.2 2.0 1.8 2.2 2.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0

Average annual percentage 

reduction in total age-sex-adjusted 

death rates for the 75-year 

projection period

0.42 0.77 1.16 0.41 0.77 1.15 -0.01 0.00 -0.01

Average annual net LPR 

immigration (in thousands) for the 

75-year projection period

1,008 795 602 1,000 788 595 -8 -7 -7

Average annual net other-thanLPR immigration (in thousands)

for the 75-year projection period

615 491 359 607 484 356 -8 -7 -3

In total, the demographic changes are estimated to have a negligible effect on the OASDI 

actuarial balance. New data and modified transitioning to ultimate values for fertility, mortality, 

and immigration result in a net decrease in the OASDI actuarial balance of about 0.04 percent of 

taxable payroll. Other data updates result in an increase in the OASDI actuarial balance of about 

0.04 percent of taxable payroll. In addition, changes to the method for projecting death rates by 

marital status result in an increase in the OASDI actuarial balance of about 0.01 percent of 

taxable payroll. Law or policy changes related to the demographic assumptions (including the 

scheduled phase-out of the DACA program and the non-implementation of the 2014 executive 

action on immigration of entrepreneurs) are estimated to have a negligible effect on the actuarial 

balance. 

The remainder of this memorandum provides details regarding the historical values and future 

values for each of the demographic assumptions, and the basis for the assumptions.
Fertility, Page 1

1. FERTILITY

ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE 2018 TRUSTEES REPORT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, SSA

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

1.1 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. 2

1.2 HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE........................................................................................................ 2

1.3 ASSUMED FUTURE BIRTH RATES............................................................................................. 3

TABLE 1.1: PAST AND PROJECTED TOTAL FERTILITY RATES FOR THE UNITED STATES..................................................6

TABLE 1.2: HISTORICAL TOTAL FERTILITY RATES, BY COUNTRY..................................................................................7

CHART 1.1: HISTORICAL TOTAL FERTILITY RATES FOR THE UNITED STATES ................................................................8

CHART 1.2: CENTRAL BIRTH RATES FOR FIVE YEAR AGE GROUPS: HISTORICAL AND ALTERNATIVE II PROJECTION ...9

CHART 1.3: HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED TOTAL FERTILITY RATES............................................................................10

CHART 1.4: HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED TOTAL FERTILITY RATES BY BIRTH COHORT .............................................11

CHART 1.5: PAST AND FUTURE EXPECTED BIRTHS PER WOMAN BASED ON THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY 

GROWTH (NSFG)..................................................................................................................................................12
Fertility, Page 2

1.1 Summary

The ultimate total fertility rates (TFRs) assumed for the 2018 Trustees Report are 2.2, 2.0, and 

1.8 children per woman for the low-cost, intermediate, and high-cost alternatives, respectively. 

These ultimate TFRs are the same as those used for the 2017 Trustees Report. Final birth data 

for 2016 from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) produce a TFR of 1.82 for the 

year. Based on provisional data from NCHS for the first quarter of 2017, the intermediate 

alternative TFR is assumed to be 1.80 for the full year 2017.

The sharp drop in the historical TFR from a level of 2.12 in 2007 to a level of 2.00 in 2009 and 

1.85 in 2013 is most likely largely due to the effects of the economic recession. The TFR 

increased slightly to 1.86 in 2014, then decreased in 2015 to 1.85 and in 2016 to 1.82, and is 

expected to decrease further in 2017. The Trustees assume that the TFR will ultimately return to 

an average level of 2.0. This assumption is based primarily on the continued and persistent 

expectation among women of childbearing age that they will have more than 2 children on 

average. Due to the extraordinary depth of the recent recession and extremely slow recovery, the 

assumption that lower birth rates experienced in recent years will be largely offset by additional 

delayed births is being eliminated for the 2018 Trustees Report. Specifically, for the 

intermediate alternative, the Trustees now assume that the TFR will transition from the 2017 

TFR of 1.80 to the ultimate level of 2.0 for 2027, without a rise above 2.0 during that period. 

Compared to the intermediate path of the TFR assumed for the 2017 Trustees Report, this path 

assumed for the 2018 Trustees Report is considerably lower through 2027. This change in the 

transition path, along with the incorporation of recent data, results in a decrease (worsening) in 

the long-range actuarial balance, under the intermediate alternative, of about 0.08 percent of 

taxable payroll.

In addition to the overall level of the TFR, the distribution of birth rates by age of mother has 

implications for the size of the population. As in the prior Trustees Report, the Trustees assume

a continuation of the historical trend toward lower birth rates for women below age 20 and 

higher birth rates for women above age 30 through the transition to the ultimate period. This 

continued trend tends to result in a somewhat smaller population in the future than if the future 

relative distribution of birth rates by age of mother were unchanged.

1.2 Historical Experience

Past TFRs in the United States are shown in table 1.1 and chart 1.1. The TFR for a given year is 

defined as the average number of children that would be born to a woman throughout her 

lifetime if she were to survive the entire childbearing period and were to experience, at each age 

of her life, the birth rate1observed in that year. During the period 1917 through 1924, the TFR 

was more than 3.0 children per woman. From 1924 through 1933, the TFR declined from 3.1 to 

2.2 children per woman, and then remained level at 2.1 to 2.2 children per woman through 1940. 

After 1940, the TFR once again began to rise, reaching a peak of 3.7 in 1957 and stayed above 

2.8 for the “baby boom” years of 1946 through 1965. This period of high fertility was followed 

by a period of declining fertility. The TFR reached a historical low of 1.7 in 1976. Beginning in 

 

1

The ratio of: (1) the number of live births to mothers of a specified age, to (2) the midyear female population of that age.
Fertility, Page 3

1977, the TFR remained fairly stable at 1.8 children per woman until 1987, when it started to

increase, reaching 2.1 in 1990. Between 1990 and the start of the Great Recession, the TFR 

remained fairly stable, fluctuating between 2.0 and 2.1. The TFR decreased from 2.12 in 2007 to 

1.85 in 2013. The 1.86 TFR for 2014 represents the first time the TFR had increased from the 

prior year since 2007. However, the TFR decreased again in 2015 to 1.85 and further in 2016 to 

1.82. The 2017 TFR is estimated to decrease even more. It is important to note that, despite the 

recession, birth expectations of women have not dropped below 2.2, as noted in the next section.

The increase in the TFR after 1976 was primarily due to increases in birth rates among women in 

their 30s. After dropping dramatically between 1960 and 1976, birth rates for women in their 

20s remained quite stable between 1976 and 2007 (see chart 1.2). Because much of the decline 

in birth rates for women in their 20s was understood to represent a desire to defer births until 

women were in their 30s, the gradual increases in birth rates for women in their 30s for 10 to 15 

years after 1976 were expected. However, birth rates for women in their 30s continued to rise

through 2007, partially due to advancements in infertility treatments.

1.3 Assumed Future Birth Rates

The Trustees do not expect the TFR to return to the high levels experienced during the baby 

boom. Several changes in our society have occurred during the past 50 years that have 

contributed to reducing birth rates. Some of these changes are:

 increased availability and use of birth control methods,

 increased female participation in the labor force,

 increased postponement of marriage and childbearing among young women,

 increased prevalence of divorce,

 decreased death rates among children (requiring fewer births for a desired family size), 

and

 increased percentage of women choosing to remain childless.

The Trustees do not expect a significant reversal of these changes. In addition, a sharp decline in 

the TFR to the low levels experienced by certain other industrialized countries is unlikely due to 

economic, demographic, and cultural differences between the U.S. and those countries. 

The Trustees assume an ultimate TFR of 2.0 for alternative II. The 2007 and 2011 Technical 

Panels both recommended retaining the ultimate alternative II TFR assumption of 2.0. However, 

the 2015 Technical Panel recommended an ultimate alternative II TFR assumption of 1.9. The 

Congressional Budget Office adopted the 2015 Technical Panel’s recommended TFR assumption 

of 1.9 for their 2016 projections and continue this assumption for their 2017 projections.

2

 The 

2014 National Population Projections released by the Census Bureau also have a slightly lower 

TFR path. In those projections, Census assumptions resulted in a projected TFR of 1.87 for 

2014. The Census TFR stays almost constant at this level through the end of their projection 

period in 2060.3

 

2 See https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/52298-socialsecuritychartbook.pdf

and https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/52480-ltbo.pdf. 

3 See https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popproj/technicaldocumentation/methodology/methodstatement14.pdf. 
Fertility, Page 4

As shown in chart 1.2, the general historical trend for increasing birth rates for women over age 

30 and decreasing rates for women below age 20 is projected to continue through the transition 

to the ultimate period, with age-specific rates remaining constant in the ultimate period. This 

changing distribution of birth rates by age of woman has significant effects on population size, 

but these effects essentially stabilize after the age distribution of birth rates stabilizes. 

Examining data from other countries is useful in selecting a range of ultimate assumptions for 

the low-cost and high-cost alternatives. Historical TFRs during the period 1980-2013 that were 

reported to the United Nations are shown for 24 countries in table 1.2. The TFRs for the most 

recent year shown in the table range from 1.3 for Greece, Portugal, and Spain to 2.3 for India. If 

India is excluded from the comparison, the highest TFR is 2.1 for Mexico followed by 2.0 for 

France, Ireland, and New Zealand. Although the TFR in the industrialized countries has been 

observed at levels as low as the 1.2 to 1.5 range, the cultural and economic climate in the U.S. 

makes it highly unlikely that our TFR will return to the level of 1.7 achieved in 1976 for any 

sustained period. Thus, the Trustees assume an ultimate TFR for the high-cost scenario of 1.8 

children per woman. Using the range of past experience for the United States and other 

countries as a guide, the Trustees assume an ultimate TFR for the low-cost scenario of 2.2 

children per woman.

The Trustees assume the ultimate TFR is reached in 2027 for both the low-cost and intermediate 

alternatives, and in 2023 for the high-cost alternative. The ultimate years used for the 2017

Trustees Report were 2024, 2027, and 2032 for the low-cost, intermediate, and high-cost 

alternatives, respectively.

For the intermediate assumptions, the Trustees assume that the TFR gradually increases from 

2017 through 2027, with larger increases in the TFR in the middle of the 2017-2027 period and 

smaller increases in the TFR around 2017 and 2027. For the low-cost and high-cost alternatives, 

the Trustees assume that the paths of the TFRs gradually grade away from the intermediate 

alternative path. Chart 1.3 shows the historical path of the TFR starting in 1917 and the 

projected paths of the TFRs for all three alternatives.

Examining the TFR by birth cohort is also a useful tool in evaluating an ultimate assumption. As 

shown in chart 1.4, the cohort TFRs vary much less over time than the annual TFRs shown in 

chart 1.3. Chart 1.4 also shows that the cohort TFR has been near or greater than 2.0 for all 

cohorts who have finished their childbearing years. The most recent cohorts that have just 

completed their childbearing years show an upward trend in their TFRs. The transition path for 

the intermediate alternative continues that trend before coming back down to the ultimate 

assumption of 2.0.

As mentioned above, reported birth expectations for women of childbearing age provide another 

measure to help assess trends in birth rates. NCHS conducts the National Survey of Family 

Growth (NSFG) to gather information about men and women aged 15-44.

4

 Prior to the 2002-

2005 survey, NCHS only asked married women about birth expectations. However, for the 

2002-2005, 2006-2010, and 2011-2015 surveys, NCHS asked all women about past and future 

 

4 Persons are aged 15-44 at the time of the sampling but may have had their 45th birthday by the interview date.
Fertility, Page 5

expected births.

5

 As shown in chart 1.5, past and future expected births in all three survey waves 

is well above 2.0. The consistency of birth expectations well above 2.0 strongly suggests that the 

current reduction in the TFR will not be permanent.

 

5 NCHS refers to the data collected from 2002 through 2005 as “Cycle 6” as shown at 

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nsfg/nsfg_questionnaires.htm. 
Fertility, Page 6

Table 1.1: Past and Projected Total Fertility Rates for the United States

Calendar Year 2018 Trustees Report 2017 Trustees Report

1920 3.263 3.263

1930 2.533 2.533

1940 2.229 2.229

1950 3.028 3.028

1960 3.606 3.606

1965 2.882 2.882

1970 2.432 2.432

1975 1.770 1.770

1980 1.820 1.820

1985 1.835 1.835

1990 2.069 2.069

1991 2.057 2.057

1992 2.043 2.043

1993 2.018 2.018

1994 2.002 2.002

1995 1.981 1.981

1996 1.980 1.980

1997 1.974 1.974

1998 2.002 2.002

1999 2.008 2.008

2000 2.054 2.054

2001 2.032 2.032

2002 2.025 2.025

2003 2.055 2.055

2004 2.059 2.059

2005 2.062 2.062

2006 2.112 2.112

2007 2.123 2.123

2008 2.074 2.074

2009 2.002 2.002

2010 1.925 1.925

2011 1.889 1.889

2012 1.874 1.874

2013 1.851 1.850

2014 1.864 1.860

2015 1.846 1.841

2016 1.818 1.870

Alternative I:

2017 1.818 1.931

2020 1.909 2.066

2025 2.149 2.200

2027+ 2.200 2.200

Alternative II:

2017 1.800 1.898

2020 1.836 1.982

2025 1.986 2.025

2027+ 2.000 2.000

Alternative III:

2017 1.781 1.864

2020 1.764 1.899

2025 1.800 1.891

2030 1.800 1.826

2032+ 1.800 1.800

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018
Fertility, Page 7

Table 1.2: Historical Total Fertility Rates, by Country

1980 - 2013

Country 1980 1985 1990 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Most Recent TFR

Australia 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9

Austria 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 — 1.4

Belgium 1.7 1.6 1.6 — — — — — — 1.8 — — 1.8 1.8 — — 1.8

Canada 1

1.7 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6

China 2.2 2.2 2.3 — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1.8

Denmark 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 — 1.7

Finland 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 — 1.8

France 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 — 2.0 2.0 2.0 — 2.0

Germany 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 — 1.4 1.4 — — 1.4

Greece 2.2 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 — 1.3

India 4.4 4.3 3.8 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3

Ireland 3.2 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 — 2.0

Italy 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 — 1.4

Japan 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4

Mexico 3.1 3.3 3.7 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 — — — — — 2.1

Netherlands 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 — 1.7

New Zealand 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0

Norway 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 — 1.9

Portugal 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 — 1.3

Spain 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 — 1.3

Sweden 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 — 1.9

Switzerland 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 — 1.5 — 1.5

United Kingdom 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 — — 1.9 1.9 — 1.9

United States 2

1.8 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9

1

 Estimates for Canada from Statistics Canada website for 2010-2013

2

 Estimates for the U.S. from NCHS NVSR 64-12

Source: United Nations Demographic Yearbook Historical Supplement 1948-1997

 United Nations Demographic Yearbook Fertility Supplement 1980-1999

 United Nations Demographic Yearbooks 2000 - 2014

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018
Fertility, Page 8

Chart 1.1: Historical Total Fertility Rates for the United States

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Total Fertility Rate

Calendar Year

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018
Fertility, Page 9

Chart 1.2: Central Birth Rates for Five Year Age Groups: Historical and Alternative II Projection

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 Central Birth Rate

Calendar Year

25-29

20-24

30-34

35-39

14-19

40-44

45-49

Historical

Alternative II 

Projection

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018
Fertility, Page 10

Chart 1.3: Historical and Projected Total Fertility Rates

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 Total Fertility Rate

Calendar Year

Alternative I

Alternative II

Alternative III

Historical 

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018
Fertility, Page 11

Chart 1.4: Historical and Projected Total Fertility Rates by Birth Cohort

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0 1901 1906 1911 1916 1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 Total Fertility Rate

Year of Birth

Alternative I

Alternative II

Alternative III

Historical 

Mix of Historical and 

Projected Data

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018
Fertility, Page 12

Chart 1.5: Past and Future Expected Births per Woman Based on the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG)

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-45 All Ages Children Per Woman

Age Group

2002-2005 NSFG 2006-2010 NSFG 2011-2015 NSFG

Note: The portion of the bar below the horizontal break for each age group shows the average births realized up to that age, while the full 

height of each bar indicates the average of total births expected at that age.

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018
Mortality, Page 1

2. MORTALITY

ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE 2018 TRUSTEES REPORT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, SSA

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

2.1 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. 2

2.2 CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECTING A MORTALITY PROJECTION METHOD............................... 2

2.3 CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECTING MORTALITY ASSUMPTIONS BY AGE AND CAUSE OF 

DEATH............................................................................................................................................. 4

2.4 PAST EXPERIENCE BY CAUSE OF DEATH................................................................................. 7

2.5 ASSUMED FUTURE RATES OF REDUCTION IN MORTALITY BY CAUSE OF DEATH ................. 7

2.6 PROJECTED FUTURE RATES OF REDUCTION BASED ON ASSUMPTIONS BY AGE, SEX, AND 

CAUSE OF DEATH ........................................................................................................................... 9

2.7 TRUSTEES’ ASSUMPTIONS VERSUS HISTORICAL TRENDS AND OTHER ASSUMPTIONS ........ 11

2.8 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS TECHNICAL PANELS AND OTHER PROJECTIONS . 12

TABLE 2.1: HISTORICAL AND ASSUMED RATES OF REDUCTION IN MORTALITY...........................................................14

TABLE 2.2: AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN AGE-ADJUSTED CENTRAL DEATH RATES: FOR THE 

2018 TRUSTEES REPORT .......................................................................................................................................17

TABLE 2.3: AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OF REDUCTION IN CENTRAL DEATH RATES BY AGE GROUP, SEX, AND 

CAUSE...................................................................................................................................................................19

TABLE 2.4: AGE-SEX-ADJUSTED CENTRAL DEATH RATES ..........................................................................................20

CHART 2.1: HISTORICAL UNITED STATES AGE-SEX-ADJUSTED CENTRAL DEATH RATES FROM 1900-2015................21

CHART 2.2: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MALE AND FEMALE ANNUAL PERCENT REDUCTION IN AGE-ADJUSTED 

DEATH RATES FOR POPULATION 65+....................................................................................................................22
Mortality, Page 2

2.1 Summary

For the 2018 Trustees Report, the ultimate annual rates of mortality reduction by age and cause 

of death are the same as those used for the 2017 Trustees Report. The assumed ultimate rates of 

reduction apply fully for years 2042 and later in the projection. For years between the most 

recent observed data and the full implementation of the ultimate rates of reduction in 2042, there 

is a transition from recently observed trends by age, sex, and cause to the ultimate assumed rates 

of reduction. 

Projections for this report reflect final National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) data for 

2015, final Medicare data for 2014, and preliminary Medicare data for 2015. These new data 

show an increase in just about every sex/age-group, with death rates higher than those projected 

in last year's report. These additional data result in higher death rates at the start of the longrange projection period than projected for last year’s report, as well as higher death rates 

throughout the projection period. Incorporating these new data results in an increase 

(improvement) in the long-range actuarial balance, under the intermediate set of assumptions, of 

about 0.05 percent of taxable payroll.

Deaths by marital status were modeled based on data from 1995 and 1996. The methodology 

used to project the marital status deaths was updated this year and now uses data through 2015. 

This update results in an additional increase in the actuarial balance of 0.01 percent of taxable 

payroll.

The low-cost and high-cost alternative ultimate rates of improvement by age and cause are set as 

percentages of the intermediate alternative assumed rates and, as such, are not displayed 

separately in the tables. Male and female ultimate rates of improvement by age and cause are set 

equal to each other, but are displayed separately because historical rates of change, projected 

rates of change through the transition years, and rates of change for all causes combined 

throughout the projection period vary by sex.

2.2 Considerations in Selecting a Mortality Projection Method

Projections of mortality improvement are subject to uncertainty that is possibly greater than any 

other variable used in the Trustees’ assumptions. Some demographers argue that life expectancy 

is potentially limitless and that rates of mortality reduction will match or exceed historical trends 

indefinitely into the future. Others believe that biological limitations make mortality 

improvement more difficult to achieve in the future and, combined with behavioral factors and 

economic considerations, future rates of reduction will be more modest than in the past.

Because the method for projecting future mortality is critical in determining the results, this 

section compares four approaches that are currently in use by demographers. These approaches 

can provide very different results, and make very different use of the available data. Some 

relatively simple approaches have been popular for illustrating trends in longevity but do not 

address the full complexities of changing conditions over time. Any projection of mortality used 

to model the size and age structure of the population, which is the foundation for analyzing the 

actuarial status of programs like Social Security and Medicare, should explicitly consider the
Mortality, Page 3

past and expected future conditions that affect rates of improvement.

Perhaps the simplest approach to projecting future mortality is to extrapolate past trends in life 

expectancy. Some have presumed that the rate of increase in life expectancy at birth will be 

linear for the indefinite future. Oeppen and Vaupel in 2002 contended that a trend for the “best 

nation” would continue to rise linearly and that the U.S. would catch up to that trend. Further 

analysis by Ron Lee, and more recently by Jacques Villan and France Meslé, has shown that this

historical trend has not been linear but has been decelerating in recent years. In addition, 

experience for the U.S. and for other countries has demonstrated that there are clear differences 

in the populations among developed nations that have made differences in mortality persist. 

Finally, life expectancy at birth is most highly affected by changes in death rates at young ages, 

particularly at infancy. Even if mortality reduction trends by age were to continue unchanged 

into the future, increase in life expectancy at any age would slow. For assessing the actuarial 

status of Social Security and Medicare, extrapolation of life expectancy is not useful, because it 

does not address the age structure of mortality rates or of the population.

A second approach extrapolates death rates on a cohort basis. Shifts in death rates from one 

cohort to the next have been observed particularly in the U.K., and to a lesser extent in the U.S. 

However, extrapolating such shifts across ages within a cohort requires careful analysis. If a 

cohort shows lower death rates up to a given age due to better health, then the improvement may 

be expected to persist to older ages. However, if the shift is primarily due to interventions that 

have lowered death rates for individuals with compromised physiology, then death rates for the 

cohort at older ages might actually be worse than the prior cohort. In addition, advances that are

for one cohort may reflect a level shift in mortality and not a trend of improvement that will

continue for succeeding cohorts.

A third, more commonly used approach extrapolates past rates of reduction in mortality, by age 

and sex, indefinitely into the future. Lee and Carter are the most notable proponents of this 

approach. They developed a model for fitting a trend to a selected historical period that is then 

applied for projected future improvement, effectively assuming that future conditions for overall 

reduction by age and sex will match the conditions over the past. Key to this approach is the 

selection of the “appropriate” historical period. For many years, Lee and Carter suggested using 

the period starting with 1900. More recently, they suggested a period starting with 1950, which 

results in somewhat faster projected rates of mortality improvement. If a longer period were 

used (starting with 1800, for example), then the rates of reduction would be substantially less. 

Relative to all of human history, the twentieth century, and particularly the latter half of the 

twentieth century, was a time of exceptionally rapid mortality decline. The Lee and Carter 

extrapolation method presumes no deceleration in the future rate of reduction in mortality, and

also presumes no change in the relative rate of decline across ages in the historical period. In 

2016, Ron Lee produced projections of death rates through 2090 using national data by age and 

sex for the period 1950 through 2011. These death rates result in the same overall 75-year 

actuarial balance for the Social Security program as the death rates used in the 2015 Trustees 

Report. See Actuarial Note 158 at https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/pdf_notes/note158.pdf. 

The fourth approach for projecting mortality involves more comprehensive use of available data 

and flexibility for considering how future conditions are expected to differ from the past. This 
Mortality, Page 4

approach takes advantage of historical mortality data by cause of death, age, and sex, which is 

available on a relatively complete basis for the U.S. starting in 1979. Biologists and many 

demographers have long recognized the value of modeling mortality by cause. Ken Manton was 

a pioneer in evaluating effects of eliminating death by a given cause. Others, like Jay Olshansky,

have emphasized the strides made in mortality for some causes and the failure to improve for 

other causes. The Trustees’ model has, for decades, reflected past trends in mortality by cause,

taking into account future expected changes based on input from researchers at the National 

Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and others. More recently,

medical researchers and clinicians at Johns Hopkins University (JHU) independently assessed

prospects for mortality improvement by cause and age. The JHU study has been extremely

useful in evaluating and benchmarking the Trustees’ assumptions. Of course, developing

assumptions for future rates of mortality reduction by cause and age requires judgment about the 

expectation of future conditions relative to the past. Consideration of past changes in the rates of 

mortality reduction for individual causes, along with expert opinion, provides a rich basis for 

such judgment. Perhaps most importantly, this approach provides a clear disclosure of specific 

assumptions used for improvement by age and cause of death. This can then be explicitly 

compared to the historical experience in considerable detail.

It is important to note that the 2015 Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods, appointed by 

the independent Social Security Advisory Board, endorsed the use of mortality assumptions by 

cause group. See page 19 of their report at 

http://www.ssab.gov/Portals/0/Technical%20Panel/2015_TPAM_Final_Report.pdf?ver=2015-

09-24-113145-693.

2.3 Considerations in Selecting Mortality Assumptions by Age and Cause of Death

Simple extrapolation of the average trends experienced for any past period to project long-term 

future trends should only be considered when there is a basis for assuming that future conditions 

will, on average, replicate past conditions. This approach may have merit for processes where 

there is no reason to believe there are natural limits, such as for labor productivity of workers,

where technology has no apparent limit. Human mortality, on the other hand, is limited by 

biology. The maximum verified age of survival for a human is age 122, and shows no signs of 

extending significantly. Biological researchers suggest that extension of the maximum lifespan

would require fundamental alteration of the aging process. This may be possible, but there is no 

clear evidence that it will be achieved in the future. 

In addition, reductions in mortality have occurred in a very irregular pattern over time, closely 

reflecting changes in the economy, access to medical care, and behavior of the population. 

Therefore, in developing assumptions for future mortality improvement by age and cause, it is 

crucial to study the differing historical rates of decline for various periods and the conditions that 

contributed to these variations. Only after considering how future conditions will differ from the 

past can one speculate about future mortality improvement.

The remainder of this section describes many of the overarching factors that have influenced 

mortality improvement during the past century and that will affect it in the future. Section 2.5 
Mortality, Page 5

provides greater detail regarding the Trustees’ assumptions for rates of improvement for each 

cause of death.

A number of extremely important developments have contributed to the generally rapid overall 

rate of mortality improvement during the past century. These developments include:

• Access to primary medical care for the general population (in particular, the access due 

to Medicare and Medicaid health coverage for the elderly, disabled, and poor),

• Discovery of and general availability of antibiotics and immunizations, 

• Clean water supply and waste removal, and 

• The rapid rate of growth in the general standard of living. 

Each of these developments is expected to make a substantially smaller contribution to annual 

rates of mortality improvement in the future. 

Future reductions in mortality will depend upon such factors as: 

• The development and application of new diagnostic, surgical, and life-sustaining 

techniques,

• The rate of future increase in health spending and the efficiency of that spending relative 

to mortality improvement,

• The presence of environmental pollutants, 

• Changes in amount and type of physical activity, 

• Improvements in nutrition, 

• The incidence of violence and suicide, 

• The isolation and treatment of causes of disease, 

• The emergence of new forms of disease, 

• The evolution of existing forms of disease, 

• Improvements in prenatal care, 

• The prevalence of obesity,

• The prevalence of cigarette smoking, 

• The misuse of drugs (including alcohol), 

• The extent to which people assume responsibility for their own health, 

• Education regarding health, and 

• Changes in perception of the value of life. 

In reviewing the above list, future progress for some factors seems questionable when recent 

statistics are considered. Recent NCHS releases have reported a substantial increase in the 

prevalence of obesity and diabetes, decreased environmental air quality, and an increase in 

negative side effects from invasive surgical procedures. On the other hand, there is good basis 

for speculation that there will continue to be substantial breakthroughs in advancing medical 

technology and treatment in the future. The extent to which such new technologies will have 

purely positive effects (like improved sanitation) versus mixed effects (as in the case of 

chemotherapy) will determine their potential for improving mortality. A fundamental 

consideration, however, is the ability and willingness of society to pay for the development of 

new treatments and technologies, and to provide these to the population as a whole. 
Mortality, Page 6

The expansion of national expenditures for health services, research, and development over the 

last 60 years has been remarkable. Total national health expenditures have risen from 4 percent 

of GDP in 1952 to nearly 18 percent of GDP by 2009. This expansion has both enhanced health 

care for those who already had access and extended access to tens of millions through Medicare, 

Medicaid, and more recently, the Affordable Care Act. However, national health expenditures 

cannot continue to expand at this pace in the future. In fact, the Medicare Trustees Report 

projects a dramatic slowdown in the rate of increase in per-enrollee Medicare spending in the 

future, even as the average number of enrollees will be increasing. Even with improved 

efficiency and targeting of medical care in the future, a deceleration in spending per enrollee of 

this magnitude will tend to slow the rate of reduction in mortality.

Much has been made of the reduction in smoking in the U.S. over the past 30 years, particularly 

for males. However, there is a looming concern over other behavioral factors. Reduced physical 

activity and consumption of excess calories has led to the rising epidemic of obesity. In the 

future, assuming the prevalence of obesity stabilizes, an increasing portion of the adult and aged 

population will have been obese for long durations. The effects of prolonged obesity will clearly 

have negative cumulative effects for diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and cancer in the future. 

Education and income are factors that are correlated with mortality differences in the population. 

More education and higher income are associated with lower mortality. It is not entirely clear 

whether this correlation is largely due to the benefits of higher income and education, or to the 

“selection” of more advantaged (and thus healthier) individuals in gaining access to the best 

education and job opportunities. To the extent that the former factor is important, then 

increasing education and income for the population as a whole may provide some further 

benefits, but substantially less than in the past, given that further increases in education are likely 

to slow. 

Future progress in treatment of currently predominant diseases is contingent on the availability 

of funding, research outcomes, society’s views on moral issues, and education about lifestyle 

choices that affect one’s health. Quality of life and average years of healthy living have 

improved on a continual basis. Much progress has been made in the predominant causes of 

death (cardiovascular and respiratory disease) over the past several decades. These medical 

advances have caused the predominant causes of death to become less dominant, so that other 

causes, which have had slower rates of improvement or have only recently emerged, are 

becoming more predominant. For the still-predominant causes of death where significant

progress has been made, further progress may be more difficult. In contrast, causes that have 

been less addressed may receive more research attention in the future. Therefore, many causes 

of death that have recently had rapid rates of reduction may have slower rates in the future. 

Causes that have had slower rates of improvement in the past may have more rapid rates of 

improvement in the future.

Finally, note that improvements in mortality and extension of longevity through the last century 

were relatively unconstrained by limitations of senescence and gradual deterioration of body 

systems, as we had not yet reached the apparent practical limit to life span. While there is likely 

no fixed limit for human longevity, it is true that the average human lifespan has improved much 

more than the maximum observed lifespan. This suggests that even with continued technological 
Mortality, Page 7

advances, the inherent limitations of the physical body and the mind to endure successfully past 

about 110 years will gradually result in a decelerating force of mortality improvement. 

2.4 Past Experience by Cause of Death

In the past, the reduction of mortality rates has varied greatly by cause of death. In assessing 

experience and future possible improvement in mortality, it is important to understand the 

varying trends in mortality by cause of death. For the relatively recent period 1979-2015, 

average annual reductions in central death rates1by age group and sex were analyzed for five 

basic categories of cause of death: four major groups of cause of death, and a residual group 

(Other) that contains all other causes (see table 2.3). (Note that in the past, death rates by more 

than five categories were analyzed and the Trustees developed assumptions for the same. For 

example, in the 1990’s there were 10 different categories. See Actuarial Study 112 at 

https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/pdf_studies/study112.pdf.) The analysis has focused on the 

period 1979-2015 because NCHS has provided death rates by cause on a consistent basis since 

1979, allowing for consistent groupings of death rates by selected cause groups. 

For all ages combined, the largest average annual rate of reduction over the period 1979-2015

was in the category of Cardiovascular Disease, which has been about 2.6 percent for males and 

about 2.4 percent for females. The rate of reduction for Cancer has been about 1.0 percent for 

males and about 0.5 percent for females. For the category of Violence, which includes 

accidents, there has been a rate of reduction of about 0.5 percent for males, but a rate of increase

of about 0.2 percent for females. For the Respiratory Disease category, there has been a rate of 

reduction of about 0.4 percent for males and a rate of increase of about 1.4 percent for females. 

For the Other category, the rate of increase has been about 0.8 and 1.5 percent for males and 

females, respectively.

2.5 Assumed Future Rates of Reduction in Mortality by Cause of Death

The ultimate average annual percentage reductions by age group and cause of death that are 

assumed for the intermediate alternative of the 2018 Trustees Report are presented in table 2.3, 

along with the intermediate assumptions from the 2017 Trustees Report, and the average rates 

experienced during the periods 1979-2015 and 2005-2015. The ultimate rates of improvement 

by age, sex, and cause for the low-cost and high-cost alternatives are developed as a ratio to the 

intermediate alternative, with low-cost being 1/2 of the intermediate rates of improvement and 

the high-cost being 5/3 of the intermediate rates. 

As seen in table 2.3, the rate of reduction in mortality due to cardiovascular disease and

respiratory disease has generally slowed in the last 10 data years (2005-2015) for ages under 65. 

The Trustees believe that ultimate rates of decline for these causes under age 65 will generally be 

higher than for the last 10 years, but somewhat lower than the rapid pace since 1979. For ages 

65 and over, reductions in death rates from cardiovascular disease and respiratory disease have 

 

1 Average annual reductions are calculated as the complement of the exponential of the slope of the least-square line 

through the logarithms of the central death rates. The rates for the period 1900-2015, as shown in table 2.2, are a 

weighted average of the rates shown for the seven distinct periods of change.
Mortality, Page 8

generally increased in the last 10 years, consistent with a partial continuation of the gains at 

younger ages in the previous 10 years. For the ultimate rates of reduction, the Trustees expect 

more modest improvement at ages 65 and over for these causes as the gains from reduced 

smoking and interventions for heart disease will slow, while effects from obesity will increase. 

Reductions in death rates due to cancer for those over age 65 have improved significantly in the 

last 10 data years (2005-2015). As indicated by researchers at NCHS, cancer is actually many 

different diseases and each will be addressed gradually. Progress has been made for lung cancer 

in large part due to reduced smoking. Progress has been made in other areas such as breast 

cancer and prostate cancer due to increased awareness and medical treatments. However, 

progress for other cancers has been slower. In addition, there are indications that treatment for a 

first cancer may result in greater susceptibility to a second cancer at a later time. On balance, 

however, the Trustees expect that the ultimate average rate of reduction in death due to cancer 

will match or exceed the rate of reduction experienced from 1979 to 2015. 

Death rates from violence have actually increased substantially in the last 10 years for ages over 

50. The Trustees believe that this trend will not continue. However, because this category 

includes suicide, it is not clear that the rate of decline will be substantial at older ages. 

Analyzing death rates from all other causes is always a challenge, because this category 

incorporates new causes that are identified over time. In addition, this broad group includes 

neurological diseases like Alzheimer’s disease. Death rates for this category have risen 

substantially since 1979. Progress in reducing death rates in this category will be extremely

challenging in the future, even as the proportion of all deaths from this group increases. Even 

with decelerating spending on health research and services relative to GDP for the future, it is 

reasonable to assume that spending will be redirected from the largest causes of death in the past 

(cardiovascular disease and respiratory disease) to other causes (neurological and emerging 

diseases). Thus, the Trustees expect that some progress, even if modest, will be achieved for this 

category. 

Advice from the medical research community (including CDC, NCHS, and others) has been 

received on a largely informal basis and has been an essential component in guiding the 

Trustees’ assumptions for reductions in mortality by cause. Recently, insights were gained from 

a Johns Hopkins University (JHU) study, which enlisted medical researchers and clinicians to 

develop expectations for reductions in death rates over about the period 2009-2040. This 

specific input has been highly instructive in corroborating the Trustees’ assumptions for the 

medium-term and long-term reductions in death rates by cause. The JHU work was published in 

the North American Actuarial Journal, Volume 20, Issue 3 (see https://www.soa.org/naaj/). Note 

that the JHU expectations included an assumption that declines for causes not specifically 

considered by their experts would occur at about one-half of the rate for all other causes 

combined, somewhat similar to the Trustees’ assumptions for the “Other” category.

There are three directly comparable categories of cause of death between the JHU experts and 

the Trustees. As an example, consider these three categories at ages 85+. For cardiovascular 

disease, the JHU experts project an average annual rate of decline from 2009-2040 of 0.5 percent 

for females and 0.6 percent for males. The Trustees’ ultimate assumption for cardiovascular 
Mortality, Page 9

disease is 1.2 percent. For cancer, the JHU experts project an average annual rate of decline 

from 2009-2040 of 0.4 percent for females and 0.6 percent for males. The Trustees’ ultimate 

assumption for cancer is 0.5 percent. For respiratory disease, the JHU experts project an average 

annual rate of decline from 2009-2040 of 0.1 percent for females and 0.4 percent for males. The 

Trustees’ ultimate assumption for respiratory disease is 0.2 percent. Note in particular the 

similarity of expectations for the respiratory disease and cancer categories between the JHU 

experts and those assumed for the 2018 Trustees Report. 

2.6 Projected Future Rates of Reduction based on Assumptions by Age, Sex, and Cause of Death

The averaging period for determining starting levels of annual mortality reduction is 10 years. 

Average annual reductions observed for the period 2005-2015 are calculated by age group, sex, 

and cause. These average annual reductions are set to be the starting levels. The rates of 

improvement begin grading to the ultimate rates immediately after the last year of data. The 

reductions in mortality are assumed to change rapidly from the starting levels2of average annual 

reductions to the assumed ultimate rates of reduction for years 2042 and later. Under the lowcost and high-cost scenarios, the starting levels of average annual reduction are assumed to be 50 

percent and 150 percent,3respectively, of the starting levels for the intermediate assumptions.

Instead of using the measured mortality rates for the last single year of data (calendar year 2015) 

as the starting point of the mortality projections, mortality rates calculated to be consistent with 

the trend inherent in the last 12 years of available data are used. The last 12 years of data are 

2004-2015. This approach reduces the impact of wide fluctuations that tend to occur in annual 

data on the starting levels used for the mortality projection. 

It is also useful to compare the resulting reductions in death rates for all causes combined to past 

trends. These are the “Resulting Total” entries displayed in table 2.3. This analysis allows for a 

further look at the reasonableness of the projections that result from the cause-specific 

assumptions. In addition, results using the Trustees’ assumptions are compared with those of 

demographers who prefer to extrapolate past trends without specific consideration of the 

underlying causes of death. 

Table 2.4 provides age-sex-adjusted death rates4for historical years and projected years, based 

on the assumed future rates of reduction by cause group. For the 2018 Trustees Report, the base 

year for the mortality projections is 2015. The age-sex-adjusted death rates presented in table

2.4 use the April 1, 2010, Census resident population as the standard population for the age-sex 

adjustment. 

 

2

If the starting level of annual reductions for a particular cause age-sex group is negative, then 75 percent of that 

starting level is assumed for the intermediate alternative.

3

If the starting level of annual reductions for a particular cause age-sex group is negative, then 100 percent of that 

starting level is assumed for the low-cost alternative and 50 percent is assumed for the high-cost alternative.

4 The age-sex-adjusted death rate is the crude rate that would occur in the enumerated total population as of a 

specific date, if that population were to experience the death rates by age and sex observed in, or projected for, the

selected year.
Mortality, Page 10

Because reductions in mortality have differed widely by age in the past, the ultimate reductions 

in death rates vary by age group. Historically, reductions have been very rapid at the youngest 

ages. However, reductions at the highest ages, ages 85 and over, have been very slow. For 

many years, the Trustees’ assumptions have reflected the belief that neither of these extremes 

will persist indefinitely into the future. The Trustees’ assumptions have reflected slower 

improvement at the youngest ages than evidenced since 1900, and faster improvement at the 

highest ages (85 and over) than experienced historically. While this “compression” of rates of 

mortality improvement is in conflict with a literal interpretation of the Lee and Carter method, it 

was nevertheless endorsed explicitly by the 1999 Technical Panel, where Ron Lee was the 

principal demographer on the panel.

Table 2.2 shows historical rates of improvement and the projected rates of improvement based 

on assumed rates of reduction by cause, by alternative for the 2018 Trustees Report, summarized 

by age group and sex. For the intermediate alternative, projected rates of improvement for ages 

under 50 are generally lower than those experienced over the period 1900-2015, consistent with 

the Trustees’ expectation of continued generally slower improvement in the future for these age 

groups. For males age 50 and older, the average projected rates of improvement for years after 

2015 are slightly higher than those experienced since 1900. The projected rates of improvement 

for women age 50 and older are slightly lower than those assumed for men and generally lower 

than the rates experienced by this group of women over the period 1900-2015. This is consistent 

with the Trustees’ long-held belief that average rates of mortality improvement for women, 

which had been faster than for men until around 1980, would ultimately converge with male 

improvement rates. Evidence that improvement for females will not always be faster than for 

males is apparent in data for years since 1980. The rate of improvement in mortality for women 

age 65 and older averaged only 0.51 percent per year during the period 1979-2015. This amount 

was a little less than one-half of the average rate of improvement for aged men during this period 

(1.12 percent). 

Table 2.2 also shows that, for all ages combined, the projected rate of improvement under the 

intermediate alternative for the period 2042-2092 is 0.74 percent per year for men and 0.69 

percent per year for women. The ultimate rates of improvement for the 2017 Trustees Report 

were also 0.74 and 0.69 percent per year for males and females, respectively.

A comparison of the basis for past improvement in mortality with the expected basis for future 

improvement suggests that future improvement is likely to continue, but at a generally slower 

rate than experienced during the extraordinary 1900-2015 period for ages under 65. Based on 

analysis of experience by cause of death, and expected future conditions affecting mortality 

improvement, it seems reasonable to expect the rate of mortality improvement for the age group 

65 and older for the next 75 years to be slightly slower compared to that experienced during 

1900-2015 (0.81 percent as shown in table 2.2). The Trustees believe that the average annual 

rate of decline of 0.69 percent (as shown in table 2.2) over the period 2015-2092 for the 

intermediate assumption is reasonable in this context.
Mortality, Page 11

2.7 Trustees’ Assumptions versus Historical Trends and Other Assumptions 

Table 2.1 shows average rates of reduction in mortality for three broad age groups over two 

historical periods. In addition, the table includes the following ultimate rates of reductions (the 

rate of reduction in mortality averaged over the last 50 years of the 75-year long-range period): 

 Those assumed for the intermediate ultimate assumptions for various Trustees reports 

(choosing those reports that included changes in the ultimate assumptions or in the 

methodology), 

 Those recommended by various Technical Panels, and 

 Those resulting from a survey taken at a Society of Actuaries (SOA) seminar.

Rates of improvement shown on the first page of table 2.1 reflect age-sex adjustment to the 

distribution of the 1990 U.S. population; those on the second page use the distribution of the 

2000 U.S. population; and those on the third page use the distribution of the 2010 U.S. 

population. As seen by comparing the rates on the first and second pages in table 2.1 under the 

intermediate assumptions of the 2002 and the 2004 Trustees Reports (for which ultimate rates of 

improvement were the same), the difference in using the different populations for age-sex 

adjusting makes little difference in the ultimate average rates by the broad age groups. This 

conclusion is further supported by comparing the rates from the 2013 Trustees Report using two 

different populations for age-sex adjusting, as shown on the second and third pages in table 2.1. 

For presentations other than table 2.1 of this memorandum, rates of improvement are presented 

with age-sex adjustment to the distribution of the 2010 U.S. population.

Table 2.1 provides the assumed ultimate average annual percent reductions in mortality for the 

intermediate assumptions of the 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2018

Trustees Reports. The 1999 and 2000 Trustees Reports are included because ultimate annual 

percent reductions were increased substantially in the 2000 Trustees Report. The 2002 Trustees 

Report is included because changes in methodology were made that resulted in increased 

ultimate annual percent reductions. The 2004 Trustees Report is included to provide 

comparability in the results using a different population for the purpose of age-sex adjustment. 

The 2008 and 2009 Trustees Reports are included because ultimate annual percent reductions 

were revised. The 2011 Trustees Report is included because changes in methodology were made 

that put more emphasis on the recent historical data. The 2013 Trustees Report values are shown 

on both the second and third pages of the table to compare results using different populations for 

age-sex adjustment. 

Also included in table 2.1 are the assumed ultimate annual percent reductions in mortality 

recommended by the 1994-96, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015 Technical Panels and the 

median response from actuaries, demographers, biologists, and economists who participated in 

the 1997 Society of Actuaries Seminar. Focusing on mortality for ages 65 and over, it should be 

noted that since 2000, the Trustees’ intermediate assumptions have provided for an ultimate rate 

of reduction that is somewhat less than the average experienced since 1900. A description of the 

recommendations of recent technical panels is presented later in this report. 

Comparisons of historical and assumed rates of improvement are included in table 2.2. All rates 

of improvement shown in this table reflect age-sex adjustment to the distribution of the 2010 
Mortality, Page 12

U.S. population. For the age group 65 and over (where mortality is concentrated), the average 

annual rate of improvement experienced during 1900-2015 was 0.81 percent. In the most recent 

two sub-periods, there has been both a period of fast improvement (1.78 percent per year for 

1999 through 2009) and a period of slow improvement (0.46 percent per year for 2009 through 

2015). In fact, mortality at ages 65 and over generally improved at about 0.51 percent per year, 

or less, during 1900-2015 with the exception of three notable periods. The first was for the 

World War II period and subsequent years, 1936-1954. During this time frame, dramatic 

advances in the standard of living were achieved due to expanded medical practice including the 

introduction of antibiotics. The second period was from 1968-1982, during which additional 

dramatic advancements in medicine were made and access to medical services was greatly 

expanded through Medicare and Medicaid for the old, frail, and disadvantaged, those who 

account for the vast majority of deaths in the population. During the third period, 1999-2009, 

advances in medicines and surgical treatments led to rapid improvements. Cancer and 

cardiovascular patients especially benefitted from these advancements.

Chart 2.1 displays the annual age-sex-adjusted central death rates experienced since 1900. An 

examination of these rates reveals a sequence of distinct periods of mortality reduction. Table 

2.2 provides average annual rates of reduction for these periods. During the period 1900-1936, 

annual mortality reduction averaged about 0.7 percent for males and 0.8 percent for females. 

During the following period, 1936-1954, there was more rapid reduction (with the help of 

antibiotics and other medical advances), averaging 1.5 percent per year for males and 2.3 percent 

per year for females. The period 1954-1968 saw a much slower reduction of 0.7 percent per year 

for females and an increase of 0.3 percent per year for males. From 1968 through 1982, the rate 

of reduction in mortality surged (with the help of Medicare and Medicaid), averaging 1.8 percent 

for males and 2.1 percent for females, annually. From 1982 to 1999, moderately slow reduction 

in mortality returned, averaging 0.9 percent per year for males and 0.4 percent per year for 

females. From 1999 to 2009, another more rapid period occurred, averaging 1.8 percent per year 

for males and 1.4 percent per year for females, annually. The latest period, 2009-2015, has 

mortality reduction slowing with average mortality improvement of 0.4 percent per year for 

males and 0.2 percent per year for females.

For the first four periods mentioned above, spanning 1900 through 1982, the average annual rate 

of improvement for males was less than that for females. For the last three periods, spanning 

1982 through 2015, the opposite was true, i.e., the average annual rate of improvement for 

females was less than that for males. Chart 2.2 shows differences between male and female 

annual rates of mortality improvement for the age group 65 and older for each year of the period 

1969 through 2015. Differences are shown for rates based on Medicare data. Even with normal 

year-to-year variation, improvement was generally greater for females until about 1980, as had 

been the case since the beginning of the past century. However, female improvement was 

generally less than or equal to that for males beginning about 1980.

2.8 Recommendations of the Previous Technical Panels and Other Projections

The 2007 Technical Panel appointed by the Social Security Advisory Board recommended 

generally larger rates of decline than those assumed under the 2007 Trustees Report. Their 

recommendation was for an assumption of 1.0 percent annual reduction in death rates for all ages 
Mortality, Page 13

and both sexes. Their recommendation was based on the average rate of reduction in the total 

population (all ages combined) observed for the period 1953-2003.

The 2011 Technical Panel recommended an increase in life expectancy at birth that was 

consistent with generally larger rates of mortality reduction than those assumed under the 2011 

Trustees Report. Their recommendation was for reductions in mortality at the same rate for all 

ages that would result in a life expectancy at birth of 88.7 years in 2085. This is consistent with 

having an annual 1.26 percent reduction in death rates for all ages and both sexes. This is a large 

increase over the recommendation of the 2007 Technical Panel.

The approach of the 2007 and 2011 Technical Panels fails to take into account significant 

deviations in the rates of reduction by age groups as evidenced by the data shown in tables 2.2 

and 2.3. The rates of reduction at younger ages have been much larger than the rates 

experienced at older ages. While differences by age will likely diminish in the future, it is 

unlikely that they will vanish completely. 

The 2015 Technical Panel recommended substantially larger rates of decline than those assumed 

under the 2015 Trustees Report. Their recommendation was for an assumption of an overall 

average 1.00 percent annual reduction in the age-sex-adjusted death rate for the ultimate period 

(2040 to 2089), compared to the 0.71 percent overall average rate of decline for the 2015 

Trustees Report. However, they supported having an age gradient (i.e., having the rates of 

improvement at younger ages be greater than rates of improvement at the older ages) and using 

cause-specific assumptions. Their 1.00 percent annual reduction recommendation was based on 

the average rate of reduction in the total population (all ages and causes combined) observed for 

the period since 1950. However, the mortality data through 2015 have continued to improve 

much less than was assumed for the 2015, 2016, and 2017 Trustees Reports. Based on recent 

slow rates of mortality improvement, the chairperson of the panel stated that she was glad that 

the Trustees did not follow the panel’s recommendation for faster overall mortality reduction 

(see

http://crr.bc.edu/briefs/social-securitys-financial-outlook-the-2016-update-in-perspective/).

The Congressional Budget Office assumes mortality rates will decrease by 0.985percent per year

in their 2016 Long-Term Budget Outlook. However, unlike in their prior reports, they now 

assume an age gradient in the decline of mortality. Specifically, they assume each five-year age 

group will continue to decline at the average rate that it declined from 1950 through 2012. This 

results in a life expectancy at birth of 87.3 years in 2090.6 Comparing with Census, the assumed 

mortality rates in the 2014 National Population Projections result in a life expectancy at birth of 

85.6 years in 2060.7

 

5 From unpublished correspondence.

6

See https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/52298-socialsecuritychartbook.pdf. 

7

See Table 17 at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2014/demo/popproj/2014-summary-tables.html. 
Mortality, Page 14

Table 2.1: Historical and Assumed Rates of Reduction in Mortality1

1999 1994-96 October-97 1999 2000 2002 2003

1900-2000 1982-2000

Trustees 

Alternative 22

Technical 

Panel3

SOA 

Seminar4

Technical 

Panel5

Trustees 

Alternative 26

Trustees 

Alternative 27

 Technical 

Panel8

0 - 14 3.30 2.74 1.20 3.30 0.95 2.20 1.35 1.55 2.33

15 - 64 1.44 1.15 0.57 1.40 0.75 1.12 0.75 0.78 1.11

65 & Over 0.73 0.49 0.50 0.75 0.60 0.98 0.65 0.70 0.92

1Rates of reduction are the average of male and female annual rates of decline in age-adjusted central death rates. The rates for the period 1900-2000 are a weighted

 average of rates for five separate distinct periods of change.

2The 1999 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2023-2073.

3The 1994-96 Technical Panel (appointed by the Advisory Council) recommended assuming reduction at the average rate experienced during the century.

4The Society of Actuaries Seminar included 60 actuaries, demographers, economists, and other experts on Social Security financing. 

 Values shown are the median responses of the participants.

5The 1999 Technical Panel (appointed by the Advisory Board) recommended that ultimate rate of reduction in mortality be increased at all ages

 (over the 1999 TR assumptions) by enough to increase the projected life expectancy at birth for 2070 by 3.7 years (to the level assumed for the high-cost alternative).

6The 2000 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2024-2074. Ultimate rates of mortality reduction increased.

7The 2002 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2026-2076. Changes to projection methodology increased rates of mortality reduction.

8The 2003 Technical Panel ultimate assumptions are for the period 2027-2077.

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018

Assumed ultimate annual percent reductions in age-sex-adjusted death rates

Historical average 

annual percent 

reductions in 

age-sex-adjusted 

death rates

(Using the 1990 Census Resident population as the standard population for age-sex adjusting)
Mortality, Page 15

 

Table 2.1 (Continued): Historical and Assumed Rates of Reduction in Mortality1

2004 2007 2008 2009 2011 2011 2013

1900-2009 1982-2009

Trustees 

Alternative 22

 Technical 

Panel3

Trustees 

Alternative 24

Trustees 

Alternative 25

Trustees 

Alternative 26

 Technical 

Panel7

Trustees 

Alternative 28

0 - 14 3.15 2.34 1.55 1.00 1.57 1.55 1.56 1.26 1.57

15 - 64 1.38 1.25 0.78 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96 1.26 0.98

65 & Over 0.79 0.77 0.69 1.00 0.65 0.71 0.66 1.26 0.64

1Rates of reduction are the average of male and female annual rates of decline in age-adjusted central death rates. The rates for the period 1900-2009 are a weighted

 average of rates for five separate distinct periods of change.

2The 2004 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2028-2078.

3The 2007 Technical Panel ultimate assumptions are for the period 2031-2081.

4The 2008 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2032-2082.

5The 2009 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2033-2083.

6The 2011 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2035-2085.

7The 2011 Technical Panel ultimate assumptions are for the period 2035-2085.

8The 2013 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2037-2087.

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018

Historical average 

annual percent 

reductions in 

age-sex-adjusted 

death rates

(Using the 2000 Census Resident population as the standard population for age-sex adjusting)

Ultimate annual percent reductions in age-sex-adjusted death rates
Mortality, Page 16

Table 2.1 (Continued): Historical and Assumed Rates of Reduction in Mortality1

2013 2015 2018

1900-2015 1982-2015

Trustees 

Alternative 22

 Technical 

Panel3

Trustees 

Alternative 24

0 - 14 3.04 2.23 1.57 2.44 1.55

15 - 64 1.23 1.17 1.00 1.47 1.01

65 & Over 0.81 0.86 0.63 0.86 0.63

1Rates of reduction are the average of male and female annual rates of decline in age-adjusted central death rates. The rates for the period 1900-2015 are a weighted

 average of rates for five separate distinct periods of change.

2The 2013 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2037-2087.

3The 2015 Technical Panel ultimate assumptions are for the period 2039-2089.

4The 2018 Trustees ultimate intermediate assumptions are for the period 2042-2092.

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018

(Using the 2010 Census Resident population as the standard population for age-sex adjusting)

Historical average 

annual percent 

reductions in 

age-sex-adjusted 

death rates

Ultimate annual percent reductions in age-sex-adjusted death rates
Mortality, Page 17

Table 2.2: Average Annual Percent Reductions in Age-Adjusted Central Death Rates: for the 2018 Trustees Report 1

Sex Age 1900-1936 1936-1954 1954-1968 1968-1982 1982-1999 1999-2009 2009-2015 1900-2015 2015-2042 2015-2092 2042-2092

Male 0-14 2.91 4.79 1.65 4.33 2.91 1.29 1.53 3.02 1.67 1.59 1.54

15-49 1.46 3.01 -0.25 2.21 0.65 0.80 0.13 1.34 0.98 0.91 0.87

50-64 0.42 0.96 -0.13 2.28 1.92 1.15 -0.25 0.92 1.15 1.10 1.07

65-84 0.20 1.16 -0.11 1.46 1.25 2.45 0.84 0.85 1.03 0.86 0.77

85+ 0.22 1.21 -0.89 1.56 -0.29 1.53 0.22 0.45 0.61 0.55 0.51

65+ 0.21 1.17 -0.37 1.50 0.70 2.08 0.58 0.70 0.84 0.72 0.65

Total 0.67 1.49 -0.25 1.78 0.94 1.80 0.41 0.95 0.92 0.80 0.74

Female 0-14 3.14 5.06 1.72 4.15 2.63 1.12 1.49 3.06 1.68 1.61 1.57

15-49 1.53 4.68 0.28 2.91 0.59 0.26 0.02 1.72 0.97 0.95 0.94

50-64 0.71 2.57 0.76 1.72 1.09 1.46 -0.36 1.20 1.13 1.08 1.06

65-84 0.35 2.05 1.06 2.03 0.47 1.72 0.69 1.07 0.93 0.79 0.72

85+ 0.23 1.21 0.13 2.06 -0.14 1.13 -0.04 0.61 0.57 0.52 0.49

65+ 0.31 1.74 0.69 2.04 0.22 1.46 0.36 0.88 0.76 0.66 0.60

Total 0.79 2.31 0.70 2.11 0.43 1.38 0.24 1.15 0.84 0.75 0.69

Total 0-14 3.01 4.90 1.68 4.26 2.79 1.22 1.51 3.04 1.68 1.60 1.55

15-49 1.49 3.69 -0.06 2.44 0.63 0.61 0.09 1.49 0.98 0.93 0.90

50-64 0.55 1.62 0.19 2.08 1.61 1.27 -0.29 1.04 1.14 1.09 1.06

65-84 0.28 1.60 0.42 1.72 0.92 2.11 0.76 0.96 0.98 0.83 0.75

85+ 0.23 1.21 -0.22 1.86 -0.18 1.30 0.06 0.55 0.58 0.53 0.49

65+ 0.26 1.46 0.19 1.77 0.51 1.78 0.46 0.81 0.80 0.69 0.63

Total 0.73 1.88 0.22 1.95 0.75 1.59 0.32 1.05 0.89 0.78 0.72

1Using the 2010 Census Resident population as the standard population for age adjusting

Historical Period (last year of final data is 2015) Intermediate Alternative

June 5, 2018

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary
Mortality, Page 18

Table 2.2 (Continued): Average Annual Percent Reductions in Age-Adjusted Central Death 

Rates: for the 2018 Trustees Report 1

Sex Age 2015-2042 2015-2092 2042-2092 2015-2042 2015-2092 2042-2092

Male 0-14 0.85 0.81 0.78 2.72 2.58 2.50

15-49 0.50 0.47 0.45 1.58 1.47 1.40

50-64 0.56 0.58 0.59 1.89 1.69 1.58

65-84 0.53 0.48 0.45 1.61 1.26 1.07

85+ 0.28 0.28 0.28 1.00 0.84 0.75

65+ 0.42 0.39 0.37 1.34 1.07 0.92

Total 0.46 0.43 0.42 1.47 1.21 1.06

Female 0-14 0.85 0.82 0.80 2.74 2.63 2.57

15-49 0.48 0.48 0.49 1.59 1.53 1.50

50-64 0.55 0.57 0.58 1.86 1.69 1.59

65-84 0.48 0.44 0.42 1.45 1.16 1.00

85+ 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.94 0.79 0.71

65+ 0.37 0.36 0.35 1.21 0.98 0.85

Total 0.41 0.40 0.39 1.35 1.12 0.99

Total 0-14 0.85 0.81 0.79 2.73 2.60 2.53

15-49 0.50 0.47 0.46 1.59 1.49 1.44

50-64 0.55 0.57 0.58 1.88 1.69 1.58

65-84 0.51 0.46 0.44 1.53 1.21 1.04

85+ 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.96 0.81 0.73

65+ 0.40 0.37 0.36 1.27 1.02 0.89

Total 0.44 0.42 0.41 1.42 1.17 1.03

1Using the 2010 Census Resident population as the standard population for age adjusting

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018

Low-Cost Alternative High-Cost Alternative
Mortality, Page 19

Table 2.3: Average Annual Rates of Reduction in Central 

Death Rates by Age Group, Sex, and Cause 

2017 TR 2018 TR 2017 TR 2018 TR 

1979 to 2015 2005 to 2015 2041 to 2091 2042 to 2092 1979 to 2015 2005 to 2015 2041 to 2091 2042 to 2092

Under Age 15

Cardiovascular Disease 2.73 2.53 2.3 2.3 2.63 2.32 2.3 2.3

Cancer 2.28 1.20 1.5 1.5 1.91 1.43 1.5 1.5

Violence 2.78 2.01 1.0 1.0 2.34 2.39 1.0 1.0

Respiratory Disease 2.48 1.37 2.0 2.0 2.50 0.86 2.0 2.0

Other 2.29 2.42 1.7 1.7 2.17 2.17 1.7 1.7

Resulting Total ** 2.41 2.27 1.54 1.54 2.21 2.14 1.58 1.57

Ages 15 - 49

Cardiovascular Disease 1.94 1.62 1.5 1.5 1.18 1.17 1.5 1.5

Cancer 1.90 2.31 1.5 1.5 1.67 1.89 1.5 1.5

Violence 0.74 0.57 0.7 0.7 -0.05 -0.46 0.7 0.7

Respiratory Disease 0.79 0.37 0.5 0.5 -0.21 -0.21 0.5 0.5

Other 0.69 2.20 0.8 0.8 -0.33 0.66 0.8 0.8

Resulting Total ** 1.14 1.28 0.88 0.87 0.56 0.65 0.94 0.94

Ages 50 - 64

Cardiovascular Disease 2.95 1.33 2.2 2.2 2.56 1.37 2.2 2.2

Cancer 1.64 1.40 1.5 1.5 1.41 1.47 1.5 1.5

Violence -0.10 -2.12 0.5 0.5 -0.79 -3.10 0.5 0.5

Respiratory Disease 0.99 -0.49 0.7 0.7 -0.48 -1.04 0.7 0.7

Other -0.47 -0.69 0.6 0.6 -0.49 -0.65 0.6 0.6

Resulting Total ** 1.55 0.41 1.07 1.07 1.10 0.42 1.06 1.06

Ages 65 - 84

Cardiovascular Disease 3.22 2.75 2.2 2.2 2.90 3.07 2.2 2.2

Cancer 0.97 2.00 0.9 0.9 0.09 1.42 0.9 0.9

Violence 0.52 -0.41 0.5 0.5 -0.14 -0.52 0.5 0.5

Respiratory Disease 0.71 1.31 0.3 0.3 -1.76 0.37 0.3 0.3

Other -0.77 -0.58 0.3 0.3 -1.45 -0.54 0.3 0.3

Resulting Total ** 1.59 1.51 0.77 0.77 0.79 1.24 0.72 0.72

Ages 85 and older

Cardiovascular Disease 1.75 2.35 1.2 1.2 1.93 2.72 1.2 1.2

Cancer -0.13 1.11 0.5 0.5 -0.44 0.42 0.5 0.5

Violence -0.67 -1.04 0.3 0.3 -1.29 -2.07 0.3 0.3

Respiratory Disease -0.38 1.45 0.2 0.2 -1.57 0.72 0.2 0.2

Other -2.25 -1.53 0.2 0.2 -3.09 -1.60 0.2 0.2

Resulting Total ** 0.34 0.86 0.51 0.51 0.13 0.68 0.48 0.49

Total

Cardiovascular Disease 2.63 2.32 2.40 2.67

Cancer 1.00 1.70 0.54 1.31

Violence 0.49 -0.26 -0.23 -1.10

Respiratory Disease 0.39 1.15 -1.43 0.30

Other -0.82 -0.59 -1.54 -0.79

Resulting Total ** 1.22 1.11 0.74 0.74 0.64 0.90 0.69 0.69

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

Female

Male Female

Alternative II* Alternative II*

Male

Female

Historical Historical

Female

Male

* Alternative 1 is 1/2 times Alternative 2; Alternative 3 is 5/3 times Alternative 2.

June 5, 2018

Male Female

Male Female

Male

**Resulting total represents average annual percent reduction in age-adjusted death rates for the last 50 years of the 75-year projection period.
Mortality, Page 20

Table 2.4: Age-Sex-Adjusted Central Death Rates

(per 100,000 population)

Year 2017TR 2018TR

1900 2,684.3 2,684.3

1910 2,495.9 2,495.9

1920 2,304.5 2,304.5

1930 2,094.9 2,094.9

1940 1,919.8 1,919.8

1945 1,716.6 1,716.6

1950 1,561.9 1,561.9

1955 1,453.8 1,453.8

1960 1,454.3 1,454.3

1965 1,428.8 1,428.8

1970 1,340.0 1,340.0

1975 1,204.8 1,204.8

1980 1,136.9 1,136.9

1985 1,081.0 1,081.0

1990 1,021.3 1,021.3

1991 1,007.7 1,007.7

1992 992.7 992.7

1993 1,016.4 1,016.4

1994 1,004.1 1,004.1

1995 1,001.5 1,001.5

1996 987.8 987.8

1997 971.9 971.9

1998 963.8 963.8

1999 970.6 970.6

2000 960.7 960.7

2001 951.1 951.1

2002 947.0 947.0

2003 933.4 933.4

2004 898.9 898.9

2005 901.3 901.3

2006 876.1 876.1

2007 856.8 856.8

2008 857.0 857.0

2009 827.1 827.1

2010 821.3 821.3

2011 819.3 819.4

2012 811.9 812.0

2013 811.9 812.1

2014 805.4 805.3

2015 787.9 1 815.8

2016 779.8 1 791.0 1

2017 772.1 1 783.6 1

2017TR 2018TR 2017TR 2018TR

2020 779.0 785.3 750.2 762.4 719.4 737.6

2025 762.6 769.3 716.9 728.9 667.6 684.8

2030 745.9 752.7 686.1 697.7 622.2 638.0

2040 713.8 720.2 630.8 641.1 545.7 558.7

2050 683.6 689.7 582.3 591.5 483.7 494.5

2060 655.4 661.1 539.7 547.9 432.7 441.8

2070 629.1 634.5 502.0 509.4 390.2 398.0

2080 604.4 609.5 468.6 475.2 354.3 361.1

2090 581.2 586.1 438.7 444.7 323.7 329.7

2100 559.5 564.1 411.9 417.4 297.4 302.6

1

 Estimated, Intermediate Alternative Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

Alternative I Alternative II Alternative III

June 5, 2018

2017TR 2018TR
Mortality, Page 21

Chart 2.1: Historical United States Age-Sex-Adjusted Central Death Rates from 1900-2015

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Annual Deaths per 100,000

Year

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018
Mortality, Page 22

Chart 2.2: Difference Between Male and Female Annual Percent Reduction in Age-Adjusted 

Death Rates for Population 65+ 

(based on Medicare data)

-2.0%

-1.5%

-1.0%

-0.5%

0.0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

2.0%

1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 Difference in Rates (%)

Year

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018
Immigration, Page 1

3. IMMIGRATION

ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE 2018 TRUSTEES REPORT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, SSA

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

3.1 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. 2

3.2 LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT (LPR) IMMIGRATION......................................................... 3

3.3 LEGAL EMIGRATION ................................................................................................................ 5

3.4 NET LPR IMMIGRATION .......................................................................................................... 5

3.5 OTHER-THAN-LPR IMMIGRATION .......................................................................................... 5

3.6 RECOMMENDATIONS OF PREVIOUS TECHNICAL PANELS AND OTHER PROJECTIONS........... 8

TABLE 3.1: ANNUAL IMMIGRATION ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY AREA POPULATION............................10

TABLE 3.2: LPR IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES: FISCAL YEARS 1966-1991...................................11

TABLE 3.3: LPR IMMIGRATION LIMITS FOR FISCAL YEARS BEGINNING IN 1995..........................................................12

TABLE 3.4: LPR IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES: FISCAL YEARS BEGINNING IN 1985.....................13
Immigration, Page 2

3.1 Summary

For the 2018 Trustees Report, the ultimate immigration assumptions are changed slightly from 

those used in the 2017 Trustees Report, as a result of clarification from the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) regarding the implementation of the 2014 executive actions on 

immigration. Table 3.1 displays the annual immigration levels assumed for the 2018 Trustees 

Report as well as those assumed for the 2017 Trustees Report. Updated historical data result in a 

decrease (worsening) in the long-range OASDI actuarial balance of about 0.01 percent of taxable 

payroll. The scheduled phase-out of the DACA program and the non-implementation of the 

2014 executive action on immigration of entrepreneurs are estimated to have a negligible effect 

on the actuarial balance.

Historically, the annual number of lawful permanent resident (LPR) immigrants has risen

substantially, averaging around 1.1 million persons per year since 2005. Based on this 

experience and the belief that the number of future LPR immigrants in the category of immediate 

relatives of U.S. citizens will remain close to current levels, the Trustees’ intermediate ultimate 

assumption is 1.05 million new LPRs per year for the 2018 Trustees Report. This is slightly 

lower than the ultimate assumption of 1.06 million for the 2017 Trustees Report. The decrease is 

due to clarification from DHS regarding the implementation of the 2014 executive actions on 

immigration. One of those executive actions was intended to increase the number of

entrepreneur green cards issued. The Trustees assumed an increase of about 10,000 persons per 

year. DHS recently clarified that this executive action was never implemented, and the Trustees 

assume it will not be implemented. Therefore, for the 2018 Trustees Report, the Trustees are 

reversing this earlier assumption. The Trustees made no change to the assumption that legal

emigration out of the Social Security area will be 25 percent of the number of LPR immigrants, 

or 262,500 per year, ultimately. 

For other-than-LPR immigration, there were no changes to the immigration model introduced for

the 2014 Trustees Report, and no changes to the updated exit rates used for the 2017 Trustees 

Report. The model projects the annual other-than-LPR immigration flows in three main 

components: (1) the other-than-LPR immigrants entering the Social Security area each year, (2) 

those who leave the stock of other-than-LPR immigrants and move outside the Social Security 

area, and (3) the other-than-LPR immigrants who adjust status to become LPRs, thereby leaving 

other-than-LPR status. The net other-than-LPR immigration is equal to the gross level of otherthan-LPR immigration, less other-than-LPR emigration out of the Social Security area, and less 

those who adjust status to become LPRs.

The model continues to project these annual other-than-LPR immigrant flows and further

projects the other-than-LPR immigrants in three specific categories: (1) those who have

temporary legal status (“nonimmigrant”), (2) those who never had legal status (“neverauthorized”), and (3) those who originally entered legally as nonimmigrants but overstayed their 

visa (“visa-overstayers”). 

Using this model of other-than-LPR immigration, the level of net other-than-LPR immigration, 

under the intermediate alternative, is projected to be about 853,000 persons for 2018, 710,000 

persons for 2020, 459,000 persons for 2050, and 431,000 persons for 2090. The average level of 
Immigration, Page 3

net other-than-LPR immigration during the 75-year projection period is approximately 484,000 

persons per year. The following table presents the projected net numbers of immigrants for the 

intermediate alternative. 

Annual Net Immigration: Alternative II Levels for the 

2018 Trustees Report

Year LPR

Other-thanLPR Total

2018 825,000 853,000 1,678,000

2020 788,000 710,000 1,498,000

2030 788,000 533,000 1,321,000

2040 788,000 485,000 1,272,000

2050 788,000 459,000 1,247,000

2060 788,000 446,000 1,233,000

2070 788,000 438,000 1,225,000

2080 788,000 433,000 1,221,000

2090 788,000 431,000 1,218,000

 Notes: Totals do not necessarily equal the sums of rounded components.

 Levels rounded to the nearest 1,000.

3.2 Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) Immigration

The term LPR immigration refers to the number of persons granted authorization to live and 

work in the United States on a permanent basis. These individuals are referred to as lawful 

permanent residents (LPRs). Many individuals are admitted to the country legally but on a 

temporary basis. These individuals are included as other-than-LPR immigrants and are 

discussed in the following sections of this memorandum.

LPR immigration has been a very important element in the growth of the United States 

population. For the period 1870 through 1930, the population averaged about 13 percent foreign 

born. The Census Bureau estimates that the percentage of the civilian non-institutionalized 

population that is foreign born declined to a low of about 5 percent in the 1970 Census, rose to 

about 8 percent in the 1990 Census, and was estimated to be approximately 13.5 percent in the 

2016 American Community Survey.

Data on the number of LPR immigrants admitted to the U.S., which include U.S. possessions and 

territories and Armed Service posts abroad, are obtained from the Office of Immigration 

Statistics (OIS), a component of DHS. LPR immigration averaged nearly one million per year 

for the period 1904 through 1914. LPR immigration decreased greatly during World War I and 

following the adoption of quotas based on national origin in 1921. The economic depression in 

the 1930’s caused an additional, but temporary, decrease that resulted in more emigration than 

immigration. Annual LPR immigration increased after World War II to around 200,000 to 

300,000 persons and stayed at that level through the 1950’s and into the 1960’s. With the 

Immigration Act of 1965 and other related changes, annual LPR immigration increased to about 

400,000 and remained fairly stable until 1977. Between 1977 and 1990, LPR immigration 
Immigration, Page 4

(excluding aliens admitted under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 [IRCA]) 

averaged approximately 580,000 per year. This increase was due to the increase in the numbers 

of relatives admitted and to the large numbers of refugees and political asylees admitted during 

this period. Table 3.2 lists LPR immigration for fiscal years 1966 through 1991, reflecting the 

immigration categories established in the 1965 Act. 

The Immigration Act of 1990, which took effect in fiscal year 1992, restructured the immigration 

categories and substantially increased the number of immigrants that may legally enter the 

United States each year. For fiscal years 1995 and later, the 1990 law specified an annual limit 

that could range between 421,000 and 675,000 for certain categories of immigrants. These 

categories and their limits include those admitted based on: family-sponsored preference 

(226,000 to 480,000), employment-based preference (140,000) and diversity (55,000). Other 

categories of immigrants, such as refugees, are subject to separate limits. The Real ID Act of 

2005 eliminated the numerical limit on asylees and no numerical limitation exists for immediate 

relatives of U.S. citizens. For each of the numerically limited categories, the limits may be 

adjusted annually based on unused amounts from prior years or other categories. Table 3.3 

displays these unadjusted limits and the adjusted limits for each fiscal year from 1995 through 

2015.

The annual level of total LPR immigration and the levels by category can vary considerably from 

year to year as shown in table 3.4. For fiscal years 1998 and 1999, annual LPR immigration was 

about 650,000, the lowest level since the 1990 Act went into effect. This drop is attributed to a 

backlog in the process caused mainly by the longer time required to process the affidavit of 

support and the shifting of responsibilities from the Department of State to DHS. LPR 

immigration was 841,000 in 2000 and over 1,000,000 in 2001 and 2002. These levels in 2000 

through 2002 were significantly above the low levels in 1998 and 1999, mainly due to the efforts 

to reduce the backlog of pending immigration applications. In 2003, LPR immigration declined 

to a level of 704,000 due to a slowdown in processing because of increased security checks. 

Since then, the level has increased dramatically and peaked at a level of 1,266,000 persons in 

2006 before declining about 17 percent to 1,052,000 in 2007. However, the decline in 2007 is 

attributed to an unanticipated spike in naturalization applications that temporarily shifted 

resources away from processing immigration applications. In 2008, the level increased slightly 

from the 2007 level, to 1,107,000. In 2009, there was another slight increase, to 1,131,000. 

From 2010 through 2013, total LPR immigration declined from 1,043,000 in 2010 to 991,000 in 

2013. Total LPR immigration then increased over the next two years to 1,051,000 in 2015. For 

the intermediate assumptions, the Trustees assume that the future LPR immigration levels will 

average approximately 1,050,000 persons per year.

It is possible that future global economic conditions assumed under the high-cost alternative 

and/or less favorable attitudes toward immigration could result in generally lower immigration. 

Therefore, the Trustees assume an ultimate level of 850,000 LPR immigrants per year for the 

high-cost (low-immigration) alternative. On the other hand, the possibility of a significant 

increase in the number of immediate relatives admitted and the uncertainty of the number of 

asylees permits the possibility of annual LPR immigration substantially higher than 1,050,000 

persons per year. Therefore, the ultimate level for the low-cost (high-immigration) alternative is

1,250,000 persons per year.
Immigration, Page 5

3.3 Legal Emigration

Statistics on emigration are sparse and most analysis is based largely on estimates. Research 

done by the Census Bureau, the OIS, and other experts suggests that annual emigration may 

generally be in the range of 20 to 40 percent of annual LPR immigration. Expected emigration 

from the Social Security area should be less than emigration from the United States, especially at 

the older ages. This is primarily because most individuals who leave the United States having 

achieved fully insured status are still eligible to receive OASDI benefits and thus are still 

considered to be in the Social Security area population. For the 2017 Trustees Report, the 

assumed ratio of emigration to immigration was 20, 25, and 30 percent for the low-cost, 

intermediate, and high-cost alternatives, respectively. The same ratios of emigration to 

immigration are assumed for the 2018 Trustees Report.

3.4 Net LPR Immigration

Combining the levels of LPR immigration with the ratios for legal emigration yields ultimate 

levels of net LPR immigration of 1,000,000, 787,500, and 595,000 per year for the low-cost, 

intermediate, and high-cost alternatives, respectively. 

3.5 Other-than-LPR Immigration

The term “other-than-LPR immigration” refers to persons entering the United States in a manner 

other than lawfully admitted for permanent residence. This population consists of three

components: 

1) Nonimmigrants who are defined as foreign nationals that enter the U.S. with 

authorization to stay for a temporary period of time and for a specific purpose such as 

students and exchange visitors, temporary workers, and diplomats and other 

representatives. 

2) Those who are unauthorized on entry and were never previously legally authorized to be

residing in the United States (“never-authorized”).

3) Those who at one point had temporary legal authorization to be residing in the United 

States but have overstayed their visas (“visa-overstayers”).

The stock of the other-than-LPR immigrant population is included in the starting year population 

level for the Trustees’ projections, in accordance with the official policy of the Census Bureau to 

enumerate all persons residing in the U.S., as well as to provide a basis for estimating the total 

labor force in the United States and total births in the Social Security area. 

During the 1990s there was rapid growth in the size of the other-than-LPR immigrant population. 

In a joint project, the OIS and the Census Bureau examined the size of the unauthorized 

immigrant population between October 1988 and October 1992. In 1988 there were over 4 

million unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States. Not counting those who would 
Immigration, Page 6

be subsequently legalized under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), it is 

estimated that there were 2.2 million unauthorized immigrants in the population as of October 

1988. At the time of the 1990 Census, 2.6 million persons were estimated to be unauthorized, 

again excluding those who would subsequently be legalized under the IRCA. (The total 

unauthorized population in 1990 was roughly 5.3 million.) Subsequent estimates suggest an 

increase to 3.4 million for October 1992 and approximately 5.0 million for October 1996. The 

rapid rise in the other-than-LPR immigrant population between 1990 and 1996 reflected the 

continued inflow of other-than-LPR immigrants combined with a decreased number leaving this 

status, due to the reduced stock of other-than-LPR immigrants that resulted from the IRCA.

The 2000 Census gave evidence that other-than-LPR immigration since 1990 had been 

consistently underestimated. In producing intercensal estimates of the U.S. population between 

the 1990 and 2000 Census, the Census Bureau estimated the average level of annual net otherthan-LPR immigration to be approximately 550,000. For 2000, DHS estimated a total otherthan-LPR stock of 9.9 million. Based on DHS estimates, the total other-than-LPR stock was

12.2 million in 2005, then increased to a peak of 14.1 million in 2008, and then decreased to 13.3

million by 2012. Using DHS methods, the 2016 total other-than-LPR stock is estimated to be 

13.3 million.

The other-than-LPR immigration model makes explicit estimates of the following categories:

 The annual numbers of new-arrival other-than-LPR immigrants who enter as neverauthorized and who enter legally as nonimmigrants;

 The annual number of non-immigrants who become visa-overstayers;

 The annual numbers of other-than-LPR emigrants (those leaving the Social Security area) 

who were never-authorized, nonimmigrants, or visa-overstayers; and

 The annual numbers of adjustments of status who were never-authorized, nonimmigrants,

or visa-overstayers.

For the 2018 Trustees Report, the Trustees assume no change to the ultimate number of new 

other-than-LPR immigrants per year. The Trustees assume an ultimate level of 1,350,000 per 

year under the intermediate projections. Due to the projected economic recovery, the Trustees 

assume a slow increase in the number of new other-than-LPR immigrants from current levels to 

1,550,000 in 2018 and 2019 before gradually decreasing to the ultimate level of 1,350,000 in 

2022. It is possible that the ultimate level will be higher than 1,350,000 in the future, as otherthan-LPR immigrants already in the U.S. may help family members or additional other-than-LPR 

immigrants enter the country and the demand for other-than-LPR immigrant labor in the 

economy may increase. Thus, the Trustees assume an ultimate level of 1,650,000 per year under 

the low-cost (high-immigration) scenario. Due to the possibility of an increased willingness of 

the government to pursue deportation of unauthorized immigrants or withhold services from 

them and to crack down on those who employ them, the Trustees assume an ultimate level of

1,050,000 under the high-cost (low-immigration) scenario. 

The average annual other-than-LPR emigration level (departures from the Social Security area) 

during 2008 through 2010 is estimated to be around 470,000. Although the expected annual 

other-than-LPR emigration level in 2017 is around 231,000, this number is projected to rise 

throughout the projection period. As the stock of the other-than-LPR immigrant population 
Immigration, Page 7

rises, more emigration is likely to occur. Thus, other-than-LPR emigration is estimated as a 

function of the population at risk. Rates of emigration by age and sex have been developed for 

the never-authorized, the nonimmigrants, and the overstayers based on the number of exits from 

each of these categories estimated to have occurred during the period 2008 through 2011. 

Ideally, these rates would be developed by age, sex, and duration of stay in the country. 

Unfortunately, at this time, data are too sparse to develop accurate estimates of the current stock 

by duration of stay. However, as in the 2017 Trustees Report, the Trustees assume continuing 

higher rates of emigration for recent entrants.

Applying the method described above results in increasing levels of other-than-LPR emigration1

throughout the projection period. Under the intermediate alternative, the gross emigration rate 

(number of other-than-LPR emigrants divided by the midyear other-than-LPR population) is 

about 1.6 percent at the start of the projection period, increasing to a maximum of about 1.7

percent in 2022, but declining to about 1.3 percent at the end of the 75-year projection period. 

Another component of the immigration model takes into account the following two ways 

immigrants attain LPR status:

1) New-arrival LPRs are persons who file an application to become an LPR with the 

Department of State while living outside of the United States and become an LPR upon 

entry.

2) Adjustments of Status2are persons who are already living in the United States as 

temporary workers, students, or unauthorized immigrants and apply and receive an 

adjustment of status to an LPR. 

Historically, the adjustment of status category has been a substantial portion of all new LPRs. 

For years 2000 through 2005, approximately 50 percent of all new LPRs were people that had 

already been in the country as a temporary worker, foreign student, or unauthorized immigrant 

and who filed an application for adjustment to LPR status. Since then, however, the trend 

decreased to slightly under 40 percent. Thus, the Trustees assume slightly over 40 percent of 

future individuals becoming LPRs will be adjustments of status from the other-than-LPR

immigrant population.

 

1 As the population begins to mature, higher numbers of other-than-LPR immigrants in the population and thus 

higher levels of emigration are expected, particularly at the ages 35 and over. The current other-than-LPR immigrant

population is centered very heavily at the younger ages. This concentration at the younger ages is likely due to (1) 

the relatively high levels of other-than-LPR immigration that began in the late 1990’s (individuals entering at 

relatively young ages) and (2) the effects of the IRCA legislation in the late 1980’s (which legalized largely older 

individuals due to required substantial durations of residence in the country). These reasons result in a population of 

other-than-LPR immigrants that is relatively young, with short durations of stay in the country. 

2 DHS also considers refugees and asylees to be adjustments of status, but for the purposes of the immigration 

model, these categories are treated as new arrivals.
Immigration, Page 8

3.6 Recommendations of Previous Technical Panels and Other Projections

The total net levels of immigration recommended by the 2003, 2007, and 2011 Technical Panels 

appointed by the Social Security Advisory Board are higher than the levels assumed for the 2018

Trustees Report. However, the levels recommended by the 2015 Technical Panel are generally 

similar to the levels assumed for the 2018 Trustees Report. For the intermediate assumptions, 

the 2003 Technical Panel recommended a continuing annual growth rate in the total net 

immigration equal to approximately one-half of the annual growth rate in the total population 

through the next 75 years. Under this specification, total net immigration would have been

projected to reach 1.5 million by 2065, with continuing increases thereafter.3 

The 2007 Technical Panel recommended setting total net immigration equal to 1.35 million for 

2007, with increases of 1.0 percent per year for the first 25 years of the projection period and 

increases of 0.5 percent per year thereafter. This would have resulted in a total net immigration 

flow of nearly 2.2 million by the end of the projection period.

The 2011 Technical Panel recommended setting total net immigration equal to 0.32 percent of 

the total population for all years after 2025. This would have resulted in a total net immigration 

flow of nearly 1.63 million by the end of the projection period.

The 2015 Technical Panel recommended setting total net immigration to equal the average 

between that assumed in the 2015 Trustees Report and that projected by the Census Bureau, 

while maintaining the proportion of net LPR and net other-than-LPR the same as assumed in the 

2015 Trustees Report. This would have resulted in a total net immigration flow of nearly 1.32 

million by the end of the projection period.

These increases in the levels of total net immigration recommended by the panels prior to the 

2015 panel reflect a number of factors. One factor is that each panel includes the assumption of 

continuing changes in immigration law to allow more immigrants as the population increases. 

Historically, the Trustees, as well as other Federal Government entities, have assumed that future 

immigration will be consistent with current law and that changes based on potential future 

legislation should not be reflected until enactment. Reflecting the possibility of future changes 

in immigration law is not unreasonable if there is a conviction that such changes are truly 

expected to occur and this change in the basis for projecting is fully disclosed. On the other 

hand, presuming such changes could result in the peculiar situation where the Trustees would 

need to change assumptions in the future because immigration law had not been modified. On 

balance, the Trustees have retained the practice of reflecting changes in the immigration law only 

upon enactment. Another factor is the potential number of immigrants entering the U.S. The 

Trustees recognize that birth rates have dropped in several countries that supply significant 

numbers of immigrants to the U.S. Most of those countries, particularly Mexico, have seen drops 

in birth rates since 1990 and will likely average less emigration in the future.

 

3 All results displayed in this section are based on that current year’s Trustees Report model. For example, the result 

using the 2003 Technical Panel recommendation is based on the 2003 Trustees Report model.
Immigration, Page 9

In their 2017 projections, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects total net immigration

of 1.3 million people in 2047.

4

 Comparing with the Census Bureau, the middle series of the 

2014 National Population Projections results in total net immigration of 1.4 million people in 

2040.5 The Trustees’ assumptions for the intermediate alternative of the 2018 Trustees Report 

result in total net immigration of 1.3 million people in 2040.

 

4 See https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/52480-ltbo.pdf. 

5 See https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popproj/technicaldocumentation/methodology/methodstatement14.pdf. 
Immigration, Page 10

Table 3.1: Annual Immigration Assumptions1for the Social Security Area Population

(All values rounded to the nearest 1,000)

Alternative Year Gross LPR Net LPR

Gross

Other-than-LPR

Net

Other-than-LPR Alternative Year Gross LPR Net LPR

Gross

Other-than-LPR

Net

Other-than-LPR

Low Cost: 2018 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,850,000 1,036,000 Low Cost: 2018 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,850,000 1,044,000

2020 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,750,000 896,000 2020 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,750,000 892,000

2030 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 688,000 2030 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,650,000 685,000

2040 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 617,000 2040 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,650,000 615,000

2050 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 578,000 2050 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,650,000 576,000

2060 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 556,000 2060 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,650,000 554,000

2070 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 543,000 2070 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,650,000 541,000

2080 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 536,000 2080 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,650,000 535,000

2090 1,260,000 1,008,000 1,650,000 534,000 2090 1,250,000 1,000,000 1,650,000 532,000

Intermediate: 2018 1,060,000 795,000 1,550,000 849,000 Intermediate: 2018 1,100,000 825,000 1,550,000 853,000

2020 1,060,000 795,000 1,450,000 717,000 2020 1,050,000 788,000 1,450,000 710,000

2030 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 537,000 2030 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 533,000

2040 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 487,000 2040 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 485,000

2050 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 462,000 2050 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 459,000

2060 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 448,000 2060 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 446,000

2070 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 439,000 2070 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 438,000

2080 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 434,000 2080 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 433,000

2090 1,060,000 795,000 1,350,000 432,000 2090 1,050,000 788,000 1,350,000 431,000

High Cost: 2018 860,000 602,000 750,000 174,000 High Cost: 2018 900,000 630,000 750,000 175,000

2020 860,000 602,000 850,000 274,000 2020 850,000 595,000 850,000 264,000

2030 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 419,000 2030 850,000 595,000 1,050,000 413,000

2040 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 381,000 2040 850,000 595,000 1,050,000 378,000

2050 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 360,000 2050 850,000 595,000 1,050,000 357,000

2060 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 348,000 2060 850,000 595,000 1,050,000 346,000

2070 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 340,000 2070 850,000 595,000 1,050,000 339,000

2080 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 336,000 2080 850,000 595,000 1,050,000 335,000

2090 860,000 602,000 1,050,000 333,000 2090 850,000 595,000 1,050,000 332,000

1

 This table contains basic assumptions along with key summary values that are derived from basic assumptions. Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

Values Used for 2017 Trustees Report Values Used for 2018 Trustees Report

June 5, 2018
Immigration, Page 11

Table 3.2: LPR Immigrants Admitted to the United States: Fiscal Years 1966-1991

(in thousands)

Reflecting Categories Established in the 1965 Immigration Act

Fiscal Year IRCA1

Total non 

IRCA

Numerically 

Limited 2

Western 

Hemisphere 3

Immediate Relatives 

of Citizens

Refugees & 

Asylees

Other Specially 

Legislated Immigrants 4

1966 — 323 126 148 39 4 6

1967 — 362 153 125 47 30 7

1968 — 454 156 154 44 95 6

1969 — 359 291 — 60 1 7

1970 — 373 287 — 79 — 7

1971 — 370 281 — 81 — 8

1972 — 385 284 — 86 — 15

1973 — 400 283 — 101 — 16

1974 — 395 274 — 105 — 16

1975 — 386 282 — 92 — 13

1976 — 399 285 — 102 — 12

TQ 19765 — 104 73 — 28 — 3

1977 — 462 277 — 106 68 12

1978 — 601 341 — 126 122 12

1979 — 460 279 — 138 32 11

1980 — 531 289 — 158 76 8

1981 — 597 330 — 152 107 7

1982 — 594 260 — 168 157 9

1983 — 560 269 — 178 103 10

1984 — 544 262 — 183 92 7

1985 — 570 264 — 204 95 6

1986 — 602 267 — 223 104 7

1987 — 602 271 — 219 92 20

1988 — 643 264 — 219 82 78

1989 479 612 280 — 218 84 30

1990 884 656 298 — 232 97 29

1991 1,133 704 294 — 237 139 34

1

 This category includes those aliens admitted under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.

2

 Legal limits on immigration visas were 170,000 per fiscal year before 1969, 290,000 per fiscal year for 1969 through 1979, 

 280,000 for fiscal year 1980, and 270,000 for fiscal years 1981 and later. Includes additional visas starting 1989.

3

 Natives of Western Hemisphere countries, their children and spouses, Act of October 3, 1965. This category became

 numerically limited to 120,000 starting fiscal year 1969.

4

 This category consists mainly of children born abroad to alien residents, ministers and their families, beginning 1971,

 spouses of U.S. citizens who entered as fiances and their children, and beginning 1988 Amerasians, special

 Cuban / Haitian entrants, and aliens in the U.S. since 1972.

5

 The transition quarter (TQ) for 1976 covers the 3-month period, July-September 1976. Fiscal years 1966 through 1976

 end on June 30. Beginning with fiscal year 1977, the data for fiscal years end on September 30.

Source: Annual Reports of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018
Immigration, Page 12

Table 3.3: LPR Immigration Limits for Fiscal Years Beginning in 1995

Family Sponsored 

Preference

Immediate 

Relatives of 

U.S. Citizens

Employment 

Based Diversity Refugees Asylees

226,000 to 480,000 1 Not Limited 140,000 2 55,000 3 Set Annually Not Limited 4

1995 253,721 Not Limited 146,503 55,000 111,000 10,000

1996 311,819 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 90,000 10,000

1997 226,000 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 78,000 10,000

1998 226,000 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 83,000 10,000

1999 226,000 Not Limited 160,906 55,000 91,000 10,000

2000 294,601 Not Limited 142,299 55,000 90,000 10,000

2001 226,000 Not Limited 192,074 55,000 80,000 10,000

2002 226,000 Not Limited 142,632 55,000 70,000 10,000

2003 226,000 Not Limited 171,532 55,000 70,000 10,000

2004 226,000 Not Limited 204,422 55,000 70,000 10,000

2005 226,000 Not Limited 148,449 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2006 226,000 Not Limited 143,949 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2007 226,000 Not Limited 147,148 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2008 226,000 Not Limited 162,704 55,000 80,000 Not Limited

2009 226,000 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 80,000 Not Limited

2010 226,000 Not Limited 150,657 55,000 80,000 Not Limited

2011 226,000 Not Limited 140,000 55,000 80,000 Not Limited

2012 226,000 Not Limited 144,951 55,000 76,000 Not Limited

2013 226,000 Not Limited 158,466 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2014 226,000 Not Limited 150,241 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

2015 226,000 Not Limited 144,796 55,000 70,000 Not Limited

1 The family preference limit is given as a range because it is equal to the larger of: 226,000 or 480,000 minus 

 the previous year's immediate relatives of U.S. citizens minus certain other small categories of children minus

 certain categories of aliens paroled into the U.S. in the second preceding fiscal year plus unused

 employment preferences from the previous year.

2 The employment-based preference can be higher than 140,000 if certain other preferences go unused in the

 previous year.

3

 The Diversity category includes those immigrating through the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central

 American Relief Act (NACARA).

4

 The REAL ID Act of 2005 eliminated the numerical limit for Asylees.

Sources:

1. Family sponsored, Employment based, and Diversity: Table A1 of 

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Lawful_Permanent_Residents_2015.pdf

2. Immediate Relatives: all "not limited" unless legislation changes

3. Refugees: Table 1 of

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees_Asylees_2015.pdf

4. Asylees: Historical years: text on page 6 of 

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2003/2003Yearbook.pdf

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

Unadjusted 

Limit

June 5, 2018

Limit 

For 

Fiscal 

Year
Immigration, Page 13

Table 3.4: LPR Immigrants Admitted to the United States: Fiscal Years Beginning in 1985

(in thousands)

Reflecting revised categories in the 1990 Immigration Act, Subject to limitation under the overall flexible cap

Fiscal Year IRCA1

Total non 

IRCA2

Family 

Sponsored

Employment 

Based

Immediate 

Relatives

Refugees & 

Asylees Diversity

Other Specially 

Legislated Immigrants

1985 — 570 213 53 204 95 — 4

1986 — 602 213 57 223 104 — 4

1987 — 602 212 58 219 92 3 19

1988 — 643 201 59 219 82 6 76

1989 479 612 217 58 218 84 7 28

1990 884 656 215 58 232 97 29 25

1991 1,133 704 216 60 237 139 22 30

1992 163 811 213 116 235 117 89 40

1993 17 880 227 147 255 127 89 35

1994 4 798 212 123 250 121 75 17

1995 3 716 238 85 220 115 48 10

1996 3 916 294 117 300 128 58 17

1997 1 798 213 90 321 112 49 12

1998 1 653 191 77 283 52 45 4

1999 — 645 217 57 258 43 48 24

2000 — 841 235 107 346 63 51 39

2001 — 1,059 232 179 440 108 42 59

2002 — 1,059 187 174 484 126 43 46

2003 — 704 159 82 331 45 46 41

2004 — 958 214 155 418 71 50 49

2005 — 1,122 213 247 436 143 46 37

2006 — 1,266 222 159 580 216 44 44

2007 — 1,052 195 162 495 136 42 23

2008 — 1,107 228 165 488 166 42 18

2009 — 1,131 212 141 536 177 48 17

2010 — 1,043 215 148 476 136 50 17

2011 — 1,062 235 139 453 168 50 16

2012 — 1,032 202 144 479 151 40 16

2013 — 991 210 161 439 120 46 14

2014 — 1,017 229 152 416 134 53 32

2015 — 1,051 214 144 465 152 48 28

1

 This category includes those aliens admitted under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.

2

 Comprehensive immigration legislation increased total immigration under an overall flexible cap of 675,000 immigrants

 beginning in fiscal year 1995, preceded by a 700,000 level during fiscal years 1992 through 1994. 

Source: Table 6 of Annual Reports of the Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security

Social Security Administration

Office of the Chief Actuary

June 5, 2018