COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00488-CR

RICHARD DANIEL GRANDBERRY APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 43RD DISTRICT COURT OF PARKER COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. CR13-0014

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. Introduction

Appellant Richard Daniel Grandberry, who pleaded guilty to attempted 

possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine, 1–4 grams) in 

exchange for ten months’ confinement, appeals the denial of his motion to 

suppress. We affirm.

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

II. Suppression

In two points, Grandberry argues that there was no reasonable suspicion 

to stop his vehicle and that his continued detention escalated into an arrest.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a 

bifurcated standard, giving almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on 

questions of historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an 

evaluation of credibility and demeanor but reviewing de novo the trial court’s 

rulings on application-of-law-to-fact questions that do not turn on the credibility 

and demeanor of the witnesses. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2007); Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2006); Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson v. 

State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Guzman v. State, 955 

S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 

court’s ruling. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State 

v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the trial court 

makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in 

the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports those fact findings and 

then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact findings 
3

that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Kelly, 

204 S.W.3d at 818–19. 

B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

The trial court made the following findings of fact:

1. On April 29, 2011, a package was addressed to the 24-hour Pilot 

Truck Stop at 1201 I-20 West with the name of the recipient being 

the defendant, Richard Grandberry. This package was opened by a 

representative of the Pilot. Inside the package was a substance 

believed to be methamphetamine. This methamphetamine was 

retrieved by Officer Johnson of the Weatherford Police Department 

and eventually handed to Officer Bravo with the Weatherford/Parker 

County Special Crimes Unit who tested the suspected 

methamphetamine at the Sheriff’s Office where it was logged into 

evidence.

. . . .

3. Later that evening, Officer Bravo was contacted by dispatch and 

informed that a representative from the Pilot had advised that a 

subject was at the Pilot attempting to pick up the package containing 

the methamphetamine. Officer Bravo and Cpl. Ramirez with the 

Parker County Sheriff’s Department both traveled to the Pilot[2]

where they were advised by the Pilot manager that the truck 

belonging to the person who attempted to pick up the package was 

identified as having a brown cab with a white trailer and the numbers 

5200 on the side with an Alabama license plate.

4. The description of the vehicle driven by the defendant was a 

specific description.

5. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Cpl. Ramirez had 

reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop on the vehicle 

 

2Officer Bravo testified that he went to the truck stop and called for another 

officer to meet him there because he was in an unmarked vehicle. Corporal 

Rameriz responded to his call as the nearest deputy to the truck stop, and Officer 

Bravo explained the situation to him, including that it involved a felony narcotics 

offense and investigation.
4

driven by the defendant and to temporarily detain the defendant 

pending further investigation into the methamphetamine offense.

6. Cpl. Ramirez and Officer Bravo both went along Interstate 20 

looking for this vehicle.

7. Cpl. Ramirez located the vehicle and after he verified the specific 

identifiers of the vehicle (that the vehicle had an Alabama license 

plate, was a brown cab and had the numbers 5200 on the side), 

activated his emergency lights and initiated a stop on the vehicle.

8. Mr. Grandberry was the driver of the vehicle.

9. While waiting on Officer Bravo to arrive, Cpl. Ramirez advised the 

defendant that he was being detained and that an officer was en 

route to talk with him.

10. The defendant was not handcuffed and was standing on the 

side of the interstate with Cpl. Ramirez and they engaged in chit chat 

but did not discuss the reason for the detention.

11. Approximately 5 minutes later Officer Bravo arrived on scene 

and told the defendant that he was being detained and that he 

wanted to speak with the defendant.

12. The defendant did not indicate that he would not speak with Ofc. 

Bravo.

13. Officer Bravo and the defendant got into Bravo’s vehicle there 

on the side of the Interstate and they engaged in a recorded 

conversation.

14. This non-custodial recorded conversation contained the Article 

38.22 warnings. . . . 

15. There was no search warrant for the vehicle driven by the 

defendant.

16. There was no arrest warrant for the defendant.

17. Ultimately, the defendant admitted that he had a friend in 

California mail “a teen” of methamphetamine to the Pilot in 
5

Weatherford and that he was attempting to pick up the package 

containing the methamphetamine.[3]

18. The length of the detention of the defendant was not longer than 

was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.

19. The defendant was not arrested on April 29th.

20. Cpl. Ramirez is a 21 year law enforcement officer with 10–11 

years of narcotics experience at the state, local, and federal level.

21. Officer Bravo is a 7 year law enforcement officer with 

approximately 4 years[’] experience with the Special Crimes Unit 

which is a mainly narcotics-related unit.

The trial court concluded that based on the totality of the circumstances, the 

officers lawfully stopped Grandberry and properly detained him for further 

investigation of a felony narcotics offense and that any statements that 

Grandberry made were freely and voluntarily given.

We have reviewed the record, and it supports the trial court’s findings of 

fact, which in turn are dispositive of the trial court’s legal ruling. See Kelly, 204 

S.W.3d at 818–19.

 

3

Their recorded conversation lasted around three minutes and 50 seconds. 

In the recording, Officer Bravo told Grandberry that he had been stopped 

because of the package of methamphetamine that was mailed to Grandberry at 

the truck stop; he then gave Grandberry his Miranda warnings. After he gave 

Grandberry his Miranda warnings, Officer Bravo told Grandberry that he did not 

have to talk to him. Grandberry asked him about going west, and Officer Bravo 

told him that that was a likely possibility. Grandberry said that he did not know 

how much methamphetamine was in the envelope but that it had been sent to 

him because he had asked for it to be sent to him.
6

C. Analysis

In his first point, Grandberry argues that Corporal Ramirez lacked 

reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle because at the time his vehicle was 

stopped, the truck stop’s manager had not provided a physical description of him 

or identified him and had not informed the police that criminal activity had 

occurred or was occurring. In his second point, Grandberry argues that once he 

was stopped, he was effectively arrested. He also complains that Corporal 

Ramirez did not conduct an investigation between the initial stop and Officer 

Bravo’s arrival that would lead to probable cause to arrest or reasonable 

suspicion for the continued detention.

1. Reasonable Suspicion

An officer conducts a lawful temporary detention when he or she has 

reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is violating the law. Crain v. 

State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 

492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the 

totality of the circumstances, the officer has specific, articulable facts that when 

combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably 

conclude that a particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in 

criminal activity. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. This is an objective standard that 

disregards any subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to 

whether an objective basis for the stop exists. Id.
7

This case is similar to others we have addressed that involve vehicle 

descriptions by third parties. See Turley v. State, 242 S.W.3d 178, 181 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); State v. Stolte, 991 S.W.2d 336, 342 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.). A person who is not connected with the police 

or who is not a paid informant is considered inherently trustworthy when he 

advises the police that he suspects criminal activity has occurred or is occurring; 

when he provides self-identifying information that makes himself accountable for 

the intervention, the degree of reliability significantly improves. Taflinger v. State, 

414 S.W.3d 881, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (op. on 

reh’g). Under Texas law, there is an inverse relationship between an informant’s 

reliability and the amount of corroboration needed to justify a stop. Id. at 886. 

Corroboration means that the officer confirms enough facts to conclude 

reasonably, in light of the circumstances, that the information provided is reliable 

and a detention is justified. Turley, 242 S.W.3d at 181.

In Stolte, for example, an officer testified that his dispatcher told him that a 

cell phone caller had reported a suspected DWI and had relayed that the suspect 

was traveling westbound on Highway 183 and exiting at Bedford Road in a red 

and tan Chevrolet pickup with license plate number BV4-358; the cell phone 

caller followed the suspect. 991 S.W.2d at 339. When the officer saw the pickup 

described by dispatch, he turned on his vehicle’s emergency lights and siren and 

stopped the pickup. Id. at 339–40. We concluded that because the caller had 

given the license plate number and a specific description of the vehicle and had 
8

continually updated the dispatcher on the location of the suspect’s vehicle, the 

officer had every reason to believe that he was detaining the right person. Id. at 

342. Compare Turley, 242 S.W.3d at 181–82 (holding there was reasonable 

suspicion to stop appellant when officer knew gas station employee who called 

from work to report drunk driver, continued to observe appellant’s vehicle in the 

parking lot, and gave the officer the vehicle’s make, model, color, and license 

plate number), with Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2013) (concluding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop appellant 

when the police only knew at the time of the stop that an unknown man in a 

described vehicle was taking photographs at a public pool, which was not an 

unusual, suspicious, or criminal activity), and State v. Griffey, 241 S.W.3d 700, 

705 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d) (stating that citizen-informant did not 

witness a crime because his information did not allege any criminal activity).

Although Grandberry complains that the truck stop’s manager did not 

provide any physical description of him, the manager provided a description of 

the vehicle driven by the person who had attempted to pick up the envelope, and 

this description was sufficiently specific to identify the vehicle on the interstate at 

night. Further, Officer Bravo and Corporal Ramirez were aware at the time of the 

stop that a felony—attempted possession of methamphetamine—had already 

been committed by the driver of the described vehicle based on previous testing 

of the envelope’s contents and the truck stop manager’s having informed them 

that the driver of the described vehicle had tried to claim the envelope. 
9

Therefore, the trial court did not err by concluding that the initial stop was lawful, 

and we overrule Grandberry’s first point.

2. Arrest

We consider the following factors when determining whether a seizure is 

an arrest or a detention: the amount of force displayed; the duration of the 

detention; the efficiency of the investigative process and whether it is conducted 

at the original location or the person is transported elsewhere; the officer’s 

expressed intent, i.e., whether he told the detained person that he was under 

arrest or was being detained only for a temporary investigation; the nature of the 

crime under investigation; the degree of suspicion; the location of the stop; the 

time of day; the number of suspects present; the reaction of each suspect; and 

whether the officer actually conducts an investigation. State v. Whittington, 401 

S.W.3d 263, 272 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (citing State v. 

Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d 281, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). Grandberry focuses 

on the duration of the detention and the efficiency of the investigative process.4

The reasonableness of the duration of a detention depends on whether the 

police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or 

dispel any suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the 

 

4

There is no indication in the record that any amount of force was 

displayed, and although Grandberry had a female passenger in the truck at the 

time of the stop, there is no indication that she was considered a suspect or was 

otherwise involved. Grandberry was not transported elsewhere, and he was 

allowed to depart at the conclusion of his interview with Officer Bravo. The stop 

occurred on the side of the interstate around midnight.
10

defendant. Belcher v. State, 244 S.W.3d 531, 539 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, 

no pet.). A delay in an officer’s required investigation to confirm or dispel his or 

her suspicions and a resultant prolonged detention is reasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment when the delay furthers legitimate law enforcement 

purposes, which may include securing the scene, complying with department 

procedure, ensuring officer safety, and bringing in officers with greater expertise 

who can complete an investigation more rapidly. Id. at 539–40; see also Bullock 

v. State, 426 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) 

(stating that ensuring that an adequate number of patrol cars are available to 

respond to emergency calls and using a DWI unit that has greater experience in 

investigating DWIs and can perform such investigations with greater expediency 

is a legitimate law enforcement purpose). Delays of twenty-six minutes or longer 

have been found reasonable, depending on the balancing of the public interest 

served by the delay against the appellant’s right to be free from arbitrary 

detentions and intrusions. Belcher, 244 S.W.3d at 542. When assessing 

whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop, 

if police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, the court should not indulge in 

unrealistic second-guessing. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. 

Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985).

Officer Bravo testified that he had called for another officer to join him at 

the truck stop that evening because he was in an unmarked vehicle, and he was 

not in a typical police officer’s uniform because of the nature of his work in the 
11

Special Crimes Unit, which investigates narcotics-related offenses. Corporal 

Ramirez, a patrol sergeant whose main responsibility at the time of the stop was 

to supervise deputies and respond to “typical law enforcement” calls such as 

“domestics, accidents,” and 911 calls,5 was the nearest officer available to 

respond. He stopped the truck at Officer Bravo’s direction, and he said that his 

responsibility that night at the stop was to back up Officer Bravo. When Corporal 

Ramirez stopped Grandberry, he told him that he was being detained and that an 

investigator, i.e., Officer Bravo, was en route to talk to him. It took around five 

minutes for Officer Bravo to reach them, and Corporal Ramirez stated that when 

Officer Bravo arrived, he “basically just ran the show from that point on.”

Grandberry relies on Wolf v. State, which generally stands for the 

proposition that unparticularized hunches are insufficient to constitute the 

reasonable suspicion necessary to justify prolonging a detention. See 137 

S.W.3d 797, 800–01, 804–05 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.); see also

Simpson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 324, 328 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, 

pet. ref’d). But unlike the situation before us, Wolf involved a state trooper who 

stopped the appellant and his companion for a defective “tag lamp” and then 

 

5Corporal Rameriz also had significant past experience in drug 

enforcement work. During his twenty-one years of law enforcement work (twenty 

of which had been with the Parker County Sheriff’s office), he had spent ten or 

eleven years working in narcotics in a state or local capacity and four years with 

the Drug Enforcement Task Force in Fort Worth; he was with the Cross Timbers 

Narcotics Task Force Unit in the 1990s and with the DEA in the early 2000s. 

However, there was no testimony about his recent experience in drug 

investigations.
12

prolonged the detention for a K-9 unit to arrive—after receiving a clear warrant 

report—based merely on the appellant having been overly cooperative and his 

companion appearing nervous. 137 S.W.3d at 800–02, 804–05.

In contrast, here, the officers had more than an unparticularized hunch 

when they pursued Grandberry’s truck with regard to the driver’s commission of a 

drug-related felony, and the brief delay in the investigation occurred because 

Corporal Ramirez was waiting for the lead investigator to arrive to conduct the 

investigation, a legitimate law enforcement purpose. We cannot conclude, given 

the totality of the circumstances, that Grandberry’s brief detention while awaiting 

Officer Bravo’s arrival was unreasonable or that it became an arrest at any point: 

when Officer Bravo arrived, he conducted a very brief investigation in his vehicle 

because of the noise from the interstate, and then he allowed Grandberry to 

depart.6 See Belcher, 244 S.W.3d at 542; cf. Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 

412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (stating that there was no investigative detention 

when no one asked any questions prior to or during the search and seizure of 

appellant’s person and vehicles); Akins v. State, 202 S.W.3d 879, 886–88 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d) (reviewing cases in which detention was 

unreasonable when no investigation was undertaken). We overrule Grandberry’s 

second point.

 

6Although Grandberry argues that Officer Bravo told him that he was not 

free to leave until the investigation was complete, that is essentially a per se 

definition of a temporary detention. See Johnson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 184, 193 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
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III. Conclusion

Having overruled both of Grandberry’s points, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: MCCOY, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and DAUPHINOT, J.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: July 3, 2014