alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.01



CERTIFICATIONS BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND

CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER RELATING TO THE

ANNUAL REPORT CONTAINING FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS



In connection with the Annual Report of Education Management
Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Security and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, John R. McKernan, Jr., Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, hereby certify in such capacity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and;



2. The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date: September 13, 2005



|                         
|-------------------------
|/s/ JOHN R. MCKERNAN, JR.
|John R. McKernan, Jr.    
|Chief Executive Officer
#### In the Matter of Jeffrey B. La Tour, Petitioner, v New York State Department of Correctional Services Central Office Review Committee et al., Respondents.

[772 NYS2d 887]

Carpinello, J.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review two determinations which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules and denied his grievance.

Petitioner, an inmate assigned to work as a teacher’s aide in a computer classroom, was the subject of a misbehavior report charging him with violating prison disciplinary rules prohibiting inmates from disobeying a direct order and misusing state property. These charges stem from petitioner’s use of a computer in that classroom to compose and print unauthorized personal documents after having been told by the instructor that inmates were not permitted to use classroom computers for personal matters.* At the ensuing disciplinary hearing, petitioner pleaded guilty to disobeying a direct order and admitted that he had used the classroom computer for his personal use. However, he disputed that his use of this computer constituted misuse of state property since there is no specific written regulation prohibiting inmates from using classroom computers.

First, petitioner’s plea of guilty to disobeying a direct order precludes our review of his assertion that the determination of guilt on this charge is not supported by substantial evidence *891(see *Matter of Matos v Goord,*271 AD2d 767 [2000]). As to petitioner’s argument that the determination of guilt on the charge of misuse of state property was not based upon substantial evidence, we disagree. Such evidence exists in the form of the misbehavior report, which included copies of the unauthorized printed material, as well as the hearing testimony which included petitioner’s admission that he had used the classroom computer for personal purposes (see *Matter of Dallas v Bintz,*307 AD2d 561 [2003]).

Finally, petitioner’s challenge to an administrative decision denying a grievance in which he claimed that his removal from a treatment program was in retaliation for pursuing certain legal claims was rendered moot by his release from prison (see *Matter of McKeown v Goord,*284 AD2d 622 [2001]). His remaining arguments, to the extent preserved, lack merit.

Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Rose and Kane, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determinations are confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.

*

 The record reveals that inmates have access to other computers for personal use.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-7050

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHERMAN LITTLE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr., 

Senior District Judge. (2:07-cr-00008-HCM-FBS-1)

Submitted: November 17, 2011 Decided: November 23, 2011

Before KING, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sherman Little, Appellant Pro Se. Laura Marie Everhart, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Sherman Little appeals the district court’s order 

denying his motion to dismiss the indictment underlying his 2007 

federal convictions. Little claimed that a defect in his 

indictment deprived the district court of jurisdiction to 

convict and sentence him. The district court denied Little’s 

motion, and we affirm.

A defective indictment will not deprive a district 

court of jurisdiction in a criminal case, United States v. 

Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 629-31 (2002), and Little’s valid guilty 

plea waived all prior non-jurisdictional defects. See Tollett 

v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); United States v. 

Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 279 (4th Cir. 2010). Therefore, we 

conclude that the district court correctly denied Little’s 

motion. 

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Wykim Williams, Appellant.

[771 NYS2d 911]

Appeal by the defendant, by permission, from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kron, J.), dated March 13, 2003, which denied his motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 (1) (h), to vacate a judgment of the same court rendered March 23, 2000, convicting him of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the order is affirmed.

A motion to vacate a judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10 (1) (h) cannot be made as a substitute for a direct appeal from the judgment when the defendant could have raised his claims on appeal, but failed to do so. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion on that ground *(see People v Cooks,*67 NY2d 100, 104 [1986]; *People v Kotler,*271 AD2d 548, 549 [2000]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Ritter, J.P., Santucci, Adams and Crane, JJ., concur.
#### Nellie Card and another, Respondents, v. The Manhattan Railway Company, Appellant.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. Opinions by

Brady and Daniels, JJ.
#### JOSEPH R. TYSER and LUELLA TYSER v. EMERSON SEARS.

(Filed 24 February, 1960.)

Costs § 3—

,Where the court requires each side to deposit a designated sum with ■the referee to cover the cost of the reference, and in confirming ■the referee’s report fixes the compensation of the referee and makes an allowance for the court reporter and surveyor, taxing these items as a ■part of the cost against plaintiff less the sum theretofore advanced by defendant, the order in effect is an apportionment of the cost and is within the discretionary power given 'the court by G.S. 6-21 (6).

Appeal by defendant from *Moms, J.,*in Chambers in CueRitucK on 14 August 1959.

Petitioners instituted this .proceeding to establish the boundary between their land and the land of defendant. Defendant alleged he was the owner of the land claimed by him by deed and by adverse possession.

At the September Term, 1958 an order was entered reciting that Rhe issue to be answered was the location of the dividing line. The court appointed a referee and directed each side to make a deposit to cover the cost of the reference. Pursuant to the order, respondent deposited the sum of $150 with the referee. The referee, after a hearing, made findings of fact and on these findings concluded the line was located as contended for by respondent.

Exceptions were filed by petitioners. Judge Morris heard the exceptions and confirmed the report. He directed .the court surveyor to permanently mark the line as established by the referee. He-fixed the compensation of the referee, made an allowance to the court reporter and surveyor, and directed these items “be taxed as a part of the -costs against the plaintiff, less the sum of $150.00 heretofore advanced by Respondent. . Defendant excepted and appealed, asserting that he is entitled to recover the amount paid by him to the referee.

*E. Bay Etheridge and McMullan, Aydlett & White for defendant, appellant.*

*No counsel contra.*

PeR Curiam.

The judgment in effect requires the respondent to pay $150 of the compensation allowed the referee. In so ordering, the court merely exercised a discretion given by statute, G.S. 6-21(6); *Cody v. England,*221 N.C. 40, 19 S.E. 2d 10.

Affirmed.
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-17-0000230 29-JAN-2019 09:47 AM
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION  PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Robert W. Peshek, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Belden & Blake
Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this annual report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: March 16, 2004                    /s/ Robert W. Peshek
                                       -----------------------------------
                                        Robert W. Peshek, Senior Vice President
                                        and Chief Financial Officer
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

         In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report of Summit
Environmental Corporation, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period
ended September 30, 2003 (the "Report"), I, Chris Dellinges, Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, hereby certify that to my knowledge:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. Section 78m
or Section 78o(d)); and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated: November 19, 2003
                                        /s/ Chris Dellinges
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Chris Dellinges
                                        Chief Financial Officer

         The above certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350) and is not being filed
as part of the Form 10-QSB or as a separate disclosure document.
EXHIBIT 32.2
                           SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO\
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the quarterly report of Alec Bradley Cigar
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2004
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Alan Rubin, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


Date:  May 17, 2004


/s/ Alan Rubin
---------------------------
Alan Rubin
Principal Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Patricia Franklin, Appellant.

[772 NYS2d 825]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Beal, J.), rendered October 28, 1998, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and sentencing her, as a second violent felony offender, to concurrent terms of seven years and one year, respectively, unanimously affirmed.

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. Issues of credibility, including the victim’s background and her prior inconsistent statements, were properly considered by the jury and there is no basis for disturbing its determinations *(see People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94 [1903]).

The court properly exercised its discretion in receiving expert testimony on battered women’s syndrome and in denying defendant’s motion to strike such testimony. The expert’s response to a hypothetical question premised upon facts in evidence was properly received to explain the victim’s behavior after the assault *(see People v Taylor,*75 NY2d 277, 288 [1990]). The expert did not testify, or suggest, that the victim should be believed or that defendant was guilty. Concur—Andrias, J.P., Williams, Lerner, Friedman and Marlow, JJ.
<PAGE>   1
                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference of our report dated April 13, 
1999, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Belden & Blake 
Corporation included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended 
December 31, 1998, in the following Registration Statements and related 
Prospectuses:


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

REGISTRATION
  NUMBER            DESCRIPTION OF REGISTRATION STATEMENTS
<S>                 <C>

  33-62785          Stock Option Plan; Non-Employee Director Stock Option
                    Plan--Form S-8

  33-69802          Employees' 401(K) Profit Sharing Plan--Form S-8


</TABLE>



                                                  ERNST & YOUNG LLP


Cleveland, Ohio
April 13, 1999
#### ROBERT LeROY DUKE v. THE GENERAL ACCIDENT, FIRE AND LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, LTD.

(Filed 15 December, 1937.)

Insurance §§ 38, 41 — Evidence held to warrant recovery for confining illness.

Judgment for recovery of benefits for confining illness rather than non-confining illness upon evidence tending to show insured was totally incapacitated for the period covered by the policy and was confined to his *683home except for visits to his physician for treatment, which he made by automobile or trolley car, upheld on authority of *Thompson v. Accident Assn.,*209 N. C., 678.

Appeal by defendant from *Harding, J.,*at August Term, 1937, of Guilford.

Affirmed.

This was an action to recover benefits under a health, insurance policy which contained provisions for the payment of a certain amount on account of illness necessitating that insured be continuously confined within the house, and a lesser amount for nonconfining illness. The plaintiff alleged he was entitled to the benefits for confining illness, and the defendant contended he was restricted to those payable for non-confining illness. .

The case was heard upon an agreed statement of the facts. In the statement it was admitted that plaintiff became ill with ptomaine poisoning and was incapacitated and rendered unfit for every duty during the period covered by the provisions of the policy. The plaintiff was confined to his home and visited by physicians there, except on occasions when he was told by the doctors to come to their offices for treatment and examinations by certain laboratory equipment. On each such occasion plaintiff rode in an automobile, or, when unable to obtain an automobile, in a trolley car, walking three blocks to the car.

Judgment was rendered for plaintiff for the amount payable for confining illness, and defendant appealed.

*Charles T. Hagan, Jr., for plaintiff, appellee.*

*Smith, Wharton & Hudgins for defendant, appellant.*

Per Curiam.

The facts agreed bring this case within the decision of this Court in *Thompson v. Accident Association,*209 N. C., 678, 184 S. E., 695, and *Hines v. Casualty Co.,*172 N. C., 225, 90 S. E., 131. In the *Thompson case, supra,*it was said, *Schenck, J.,*speaking for the Court: “The purpose of the provision relative to the insured’s being continuously confined within doors was to describe the character and extent of his illness, rather than to prescribe a limitation upon his conduct.”

Upon the authority of these cases the judgment is

Affirmed.
#### O. P. LUTZ FURNITURE COMPANY, Inc. v. DIXIE HOME STORES, a Corporation, and ROBERT A. GIBBONS and HENRY M. SMITH, t/a GIBBONS & SMITH.

(Filed 30 June, 1955.)

Appeal by defendants from *McSwain, Special Judge,*November Term 1954 of Caldwell.

Civil action to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the destruction by fire on 12 February 1952 of furniture and of a building, and for the loss of rent of said building, allegedly caused by the negligent wiring and installation of electrical fixtures and by the negligent failure to have the wiring and fixtures inspected and approved before turning on electrical current.

Prior to answer or demurrer, or before an extension of time to plead is granted, each defendant made separate motions to strike and to make more definite certain parts of the Complaint. The Trial Court entered separate orders denying the separate motions *in toto.*

From the orders entered, each of the defendants appealed, assigning error.

*W. H. Strickland and Alfred R. Crisp for Plaintiff, Appellee.*

*Adams & Adams and Mull, Patton & Craven for Defendant, Appellant Dixie Home Stores.*

*Townsend & Todd for Defendant, Appellant Gibbons*cfc *Smith.*

PARKER, J.

The questions of law presented for our determination in the present case are identical with the questions of law presented for determination in *Lutz Industries, Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, a corporation, and Robert A. Gibbons and Henry M. Smith, t/a Gibbons & Smith, ante,*332. It was the same fire; the allegations of the Complaint are substantially identical, except as to allegations of damages; the defendants are the same, and their briefs are practically verbatim; and the plaintiff’s briefs contain substantially the same argument.

What is said in that opinion is controlling here. Therefore, it is ordered:

*One.*The assignments of error of the Dixie Home Stores Nos. 3, 4 and 8, and the assignments of error of Gibbons & Smith Nos. 3, 4 and 8 are overruled, except that in each defendant’s assignment of error No. 3 the words: “and also which has been adopted by the City of Lenoir” appearing in Paragraph 7 of the Complaint, will be stricken.

*Two.*The assignments of error Nos. 1, 2, 7 and 10 of the Dixie Home Stores, and assignments of error Nos. 1, 2, 7 and 10 of Gibbons & Smith are sustained.

*347*Three.*The assignment of error No. 11 of each defendant is overruled.

All other assignments of error have been abandoned by the defendants.

The National Electrical Codes of 1935, 1940 and 1951 consist of over 300 pages for each year. The plaintiff shall be required by the Superior Court to amend its complaint, and to specifically plead the parts of the National Electrical Code upon which it relies and the year of the Code.

The orders entered, in accordance with this opinion, will be

Modified and Affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 246 (Friday, December 22, 1995)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 66496]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-31198]



-----------------------------------------------------------------------


DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
21 CFR Part 558


New Animal Drugs; Change of Sponsor

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is amending the animal 
drug regulations to reflect a change of sponsor for two new animal drug 
applications (NADA's) from Farmland Industries, Inc., to A. L. Pharma, 
Inc.
EFFECTIVE DATE: December 22, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas J. McKay, Center for Veterinary 
Medicine (HFV-102), Food and Drug Administration, 7500 Standish Pl., 
Rockville, MD 20855, 301-827-0213.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Farmland Industries, Inc., Kansas City, MS 
64116, has informed FDA that it has transferred the ownership of, and 
all rights and interests in, approved NADA's 46-415 (Tylosin Premixes) 
and 91-749 (Tylosin-Sulfa Premixes) to A. L. Pharma, Inc., One 
Executive Dr., Fort Lee, NJ 07024. Accordingly, the agency is amending 
the regulations in 21 CFR 558.625 and 558.630.

List of Subject in 21 CFR Part 558

    Animal drugs, Animal feeds.

    Therefore, under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and under 
authority delegated to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs and 
redelegated to the Center for Veterinary Medicine, 21 CFR part 558 is 
amended as follows:

PART 558--NEW ANIMAL DRUGS FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEEDS

    1. The authority citation for 21 CFR part 558 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: Secs. 512, 701 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 360b, 371).


Sec. 558.625  [Amended]

    2. Section 558.625 Tylosin is amended in paragraph (b)(83) by 
removing ``021676'' and adding in its place ``046573''.


Sec. 558.630  [Amended]

    3. Section 558.630 Tylosin and sulfamethazine is amended in 
paragraph (b)(10) by removing ``021676'' and by adding ``046573'' in 
numerical order.

    Dated: December 14, 1995.
Robert C. Livingston,
Director, Office of New Animal Drug Evaluation, Center for Veterinary 
Medicine.
[FR Doc. 95-31198 Filed 12-21-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4160-01-F