62884 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 235 / Thursday, December 7, 1995 / Notices

Schedule

Normorphine (9313) ..................... I

Acetylmethadol (9601) ................. I

Alphacetylmethadol except LevoAlphacetylmethadol (9603).I

Normethadone (9635) ................. I

3-Methylfentanyl (9813) ............... I

Amphetamine (1100) ................... II

Methamphetamine (1105) ........... II

Methylphenidate (1724) ............... II

Amobarbital (2125) ...................... II

Pentobarbital (2270) .................... II

Secobarbital (2315) ..................... II

Phencyclidine (7471) ................... II

1-Piperidinocyclohexane- ............

carbonitrile (8603) ........................

II

Dihydrocodeine (9120) ................ II

Oxycodone (9143) ....................... II

Hydromorphone (9150) ................ II

Diphenoxylate (9170) .................. II

Benzoylecgonine (9180) .............. II

Ethylmorphine (9190) .................. II

Hydrocodone (9193) .................... II

Isomethadone (9226) .................. II

Meperidine (9230) ....................... II

Methadone (9250) ....................... II

Methadone-intermediate (9254) .. II

Morphine (9300) .......................... II

Levo-alphacetylmethadol (9648) . II

Oxymorphone (9652) ................... II

Alfentanil (9737) .......................... II

Sufentanil (9740) ......................... II

Fentanyl (9801) ........................... II

A registered manufacturer filed a

request for a hearing with respect to

amphetamine and methamphetamine.

The requesting party subsequently

submitted a letter dated August 29,

1995, withdrawing their request for a

hearing. On September 1, 1995, an order

terminating the proceedings was issued

by Administrative Law Judge Mary

Ellen Bittner. Another registered

manufacturer filed a comment

requesting that the firm’s application to

manufacture meperidine be denied

because there is no need for Radian to

register as a third domestic

manufacturer of meperidine and that

Radian must show it can maintain

adequate safeguards against the theft

and diversion of meperidine. In regards

to this comment, the firm, which has

been approved as a manufacturer of

meperidine for previous applications,

has been subject to periodic in-depth

investigations by DEA to evaluate the

firm’s fitness as a DEA registrant.

Additionally, in response to this recent

application, the firm was inspected by

DEA and found to have adequate

safeguards to prevent the theft or

diversion of meperidine. Therefore,

pursuant to Section 303 of the

Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention

and Control Act of 1970 and Title 21,

Code of Federal Regulations, Section

1301.54(e), the Deputy Assistant

Administrator, Office of Diversion

Control, hereby orders that the

application submitted by the above firm

for registration as a bulk manufacturer

of the basic classes of controlled

substances listed above is granted.

Dated: November 29, 1995.

Gene R. Haislip,

Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement

Administration.

[FR Doc. 95–29772 Filed 12–6–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

[Docket No. 94–23]

Prince George Daniels, D.D.S.; Denial

of Application

On January 31, 1994, the Deputy

Assistant Administrator, Office of

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA), issued an Order

to Show Cause to Prince George Daniels,

D.D.S., (Respondent) of San Jose,

California, notifying him of an

opportunity to show cause as to why

DEA should not deny his pending

application under 21 U.S.C. 823(f), as

being inconsistent with the public

interest. Specifically, the Order to Show

Cause alleged that:

(1) Between December 2, 1982 and

February 3, 1983, [the Respondent]

issued four prescriptions for Didrex, a

Schedule III controlled substance, to

two undercover individuals[,] and these

prescriptions were not issued for a

legitimate medical purpose in the usual

course of [his] professional practice.

(2) On June 7, 1983, in the Municipal

Court, Santa Clara County Judicial

Circuit, State of California, [the

Respondent] pled no contest to two

counts of prescribing controlled

substances to a person not under [his]

treatment for a pathology in violation of

California Health and Safety Code

[Section] 11154 and one count of

practicing unauthorized medicine in

violation of California Business and

Professions Code [Section] 2052.

(3) On January 7, 1985, the Board of

Dental Examiners, Department of

Consumer Affairs, State of California

(Dental Board), suspended [the

Respondent’s] state dental license for

one year, but stayed this suspension

pending the successful completion of

three years probation.

(4) On or about May 1, 1986, [the

Respondent] arranged for the sale of

cocaine to an undercover DEA agent.

Furthermore, [he] made arrangements

for other individuals to forcibly take the

cocaine from the DEA undercover agent

after [he] sold him the cocaine.

(5) On January 3, 1987 [the

Respondent’s] previous DEA number,

AD6665838, expired [,] and [he] did not

submit a renewal application for that

number. Thereafter [his] DEA number

was retired from DEA registration.

(6) On August 14, 1987, in the United

States District Court, District of

Northern California, [the Respondent]

pled guilty to one count of conspiracy

to deliver cocaine in violation of 21

U.S.C. 841 and 846 and to one count of

possession of cocaine in violation of 21

U.S.C. 841. On October 2, 1987, [the

Respondent was] sentenced to three

years imprisonment.

(7) On August 22, 1988, the Dental

Board terminated [the Respondent’s]

probation and revoked [his] state dental

license. Effective January 10, 1990, the

Dental Board restored [his] state dental

license but placed [his] license on a

three year probationary term.

On March 9, 1994, the Respondent

filed a timely request for a hearing, and

following prehearing procedures, a

hearing was held in San Francisco,

California, on November 9, 1994, before

Administrative Law Judge Paul A.

Tenney. At the hearing, the Government

offered the stipulated testimony of two

witnesses and introduced various

documentary exhibits, and the

Respondent, represented by counsel,

testified, called three witnesses, and

introduced several documentary

exhibits. After the hearing, counsel for

both sides submitted proposed findings

of fact, conclusions of law and

argument. On January 30, 1995, Judge

Tenney issued his Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Recommended

Ruling, recommending that the

Respondent’s application for a DEA

Certificate of Registration be denied.

Neither party filed exceptions to his

decision, and on March 9, 1995, Judge

Tenney transmitted the record of these

proceedings to the Deputy

Administrator.

The Deputy Administrator has

considered the record in its entirety,

and pursuant to 21 CFR 1316.67, hereby

issues his final order based upon

findings of fact and conclusions of law

as hereinafter set forth. The Deputy

Administrator adopts, in full, the

opinion and recommended ruling of the

Administrative Law Judge, and his

adoption is in no manner diminished by

any recitation of facts, issues and

conclusions herein, or of any failure to

mention a matter of fact or law.

The Deputy Administrator finds that

the Respondent received his license to

practice dentistry in California in 1975.

Further, the Respondent previously held

a DEA Certificate of Registration,

AD6665838, which expired on June 30,

1986, and which the Respondent did

not renew but let lapse. However, on

November 12, 1992, the Respondent
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 235 / Thursday, December 7, 1995 / Notices 62885

submitted an Application for

Registration under the Controlled

Substances Act of 1970, as a practitioner

for handling controlled substances in

Schedules II through V.

On December 2, 1982, the Respondent

issued a prescription for Didrex to an

undercover police officer (Officer). The

parties stipulated that Didrex

(benzphetamine) is a Schedule III nonnarcotic stimulant, and has been a

Schedule III controlled substance since

1973. The Officer received dental work

and then requested the Didrex

prescription, purportedly for weight

control. The Respondent testified that,

although he ‘‘didn’t know that much

about Didrex,’’ he issued the

prescriptions based upon the Agent’s

representation that her doctor had

previously prescribed Didrex, and upon

a pharmacist’s representation that he

would fill the prescription. On

December 21, 1982, the Respondent

authorized a Didrex refill, and on

January 4, 1983, he indicated that he

would authorize an additional refill.

The Respondent was arrested shortly

after he prescribed the Didrex, and on

June 7, 1983, in a California State court,

he pled nolo contendere to two counts

of violation of California Health and

Safety Code Section 11154 by

prescribing a controlled substance to a

person not under his treatment for a

pathology, and a violation of Business

and Professions Code Section 2052 for

the unauthorized practice of medicine.

Based on the facts underlying his nolo

contendere plea, the California Board of

Dental Examiners suspended the

Respondent’s dental certificate for one

year in January 1985, but the suspension

was stayed in favor of a three-year

probationary period with various

conditions.

In April 1986, a DEA Special Agent

was introduced to the Respondent’s

brother as a potential cocaine purchaser.

In stipulated testimony, an Agent who

had monitored the cocaine transaction

noted that after negotiations, the

undercover Agent on the scene arranged

to buy two kilograms of cocaine from

the Respondent’s brother. On May 1,

1986, this Agent and the Respondent’s

brother met at the Respondent’s dental

clinic, the Respondent showed them

into his office, locked the office door,

and directed his brother to give the

Agent a cardboard box containing two

cellophane bags, each filled with a

white powdery substance. The

Respondent then gave a note to the

Agent which represented the contents of

the two bags, 1,667 grams of cocaine,

and the price for both bags, $61,679.00.

The Agent asked why two kilograms of

cocaine were not tendered as originally

agreed, and the Respondent explained

and stated that the rest of the cocaine

could probably be obtained later that

day. The Respondent also indicated that

after May 17th, he could obtain up to

three kilograms of cocaine from his

source if given four days’ notice. While

still in the Respondent’s office, the

Respondent explained that he expected

$250 for his part in the cocaine

transaction, and when the Agent

expressed his opinion that $250 seemed

to be a low payment, the Respondent

replied that he was doing ‘‘a favor for a

favor.’’ Upon leaving the dental clinic,

the Agent arrested the Respondent and

his brother.

On May 7, 1986, the Respondent was

indicted in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

California on one count of conspiring to

distribute cocaine, a Schedule II

controlled substance, in violation of 21

U.S.C. 846. He was also indicted on one

count of unlawfully distributing 1,667

grams of cocaine in violation of 21

U.S.C. 841(a)(1). On October 2, 1987, the

Respondent pled guilty to both counts.

He was sentenced to three years’

imprisonment on each count, the

sentences were ordered to run

concurrently, and he was fined $100.00.

The Respondent served approximately

16 to 18 months in prison from late

1987 until March 1989, when he was

released to a half-way house. He was

discharged from his sentence on August

25, 1989.

Effective August 22, 1988, the

California Board of Dental Examiners

(Dental Board) revoked the

Respondent’s dental license based on

the cocaine-related convictions. The

Dental Board also noted that the

Respondent’s conduct resulted in a

violation of the probationary period that

it had imposed after the Didrex

incident. On January 10, 1990, the

Dental Board reinstated the

Respondent’s dental license subject to

various conditions, and by letter dated

February 24, 1993, the Dental Board

informed the Respondent as follows:

‘‘Our records show that you have fully

complied with the terms of your

probationary order. Therefore, all the

rights and privileges associated with

your dental license have been restored.’’

The Respondent testified that since his

release from prison in March 1989, he

has had no negative encounters with

law enforcement agencies.

At the hearing before Judge Tenney,

the Respondent testified about the

cocaine transaction, indicating that he

never had sold drugs with his brother

until the May 1, 1986 incident, and that

his involvement then was minimal. He

stated that his brother sought his help

‘‘to get out of a jam,’’ and that his

brother hinted that the transaction

would involve cocaine. The Respondent

explained that ‘‘all I did was read a

note, and that’s all I had intended to

do * * *. I wasn’t sure what I was

supposed to do.’’ He testified that he

never received any money for his part

in the cocaine transaction, nor that there

were ever any arrangements to pay him.

Further, as to answers he gave to agents

who had questioned him about his

source for the cocaine, the Respondent

testified before Judge Tenney that he

had ‘‘made up’’ the names of cocaine

suppliers and deliverers. The

Respondent also testified that he had

‘‘made up the story’’ he gave the agents

after his arrest concerning a ‘‘plan’’ to

rob the Agent of the cocaine after he had

paid for it. Finally, he stated that he

‘‘was involved with something [he]

shouldn’t have been involved in. Right,

wrong [,] or indifferent, didn’t matter. I

should not have been involved with the

selling of drugs, as a dentist or as a

person * * *.’’

The Respondent provided extensive

information concerning his

rehabilitative efforts, including his

involvement with Christian workshops,

his studies to become a minister during

his prison time for the cocaine

convictions, his involvement since 1990

with the Morris Cerullo World

Evangelists in visiting prisons and

evangelizing, his monetary

contributions to narcotics programs, his

devotion of approximately 12 hours per

week working with street gangs and

prisoners, his additional ministry work,

such as teaching English to Spanish,

Vietnamese, and Cambodian people,

providing food and clothing to the

needy, and his work with the Kenneth

Hagen Ministry, the Roberts Ministry,

the American Fellowship Church, and

various other ministries and religious

organizations. The Respondent testified

that he had recently visited China,

Singapore, Malaysia, and Mexico, to

‘‘share[] the gospel,’’ and that while in

Malaysia, he had donated his dental

services.

While the Respondent was

incarcerated, Dr. Lloyd Dickey, and his

son, Dr. Leonel Dickey, continued

operating the Respondent’s practice.

After the Respondent’s dental license

was reinstated in January 1990, the

Respondent returned to that practice.

Currently Dr. Leonel Dickey continues

to assist the Respondent several times

per week. The Respondent treats a

diverse ethnic population, primarily

individuals of Mexican or Vietnamese

descent, and currently treats patients

who have private insurance, although

he devotes about 10 percent of his
62886 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 235 / Thursday, December 7, 1995 / Notices

practice to providing free treatment to

poor individuals. He testified that he

could not treat ‘‘MediCal’’ patients at

the present time because he does not

have a DEA Certificate of Registration.

Also, the Respondent stated that he

performs a variety of dental work, the

Respondent stated that he performs a

variety of dental work, but that he can

only perform extractions or root canals

when Dr. Leonel Dickey was available

in case the patient needed controlled

substances for relief from pain. The

Respondent stated that his inability to

prescribe controlled substances

prohibited him from maximizing his

patient load, inhibited his earning

potential, and prevented him from

giving his patients full and complete

treatment. Further, in some cases, he is

required to refer his patients to other

dentists because his inability to

prescribed controlled pain medications.

Both the Respondent and Dr. Dickey

testified that controlled substances were

not stored at the office, but that when

a patient required pain medication, Dr.

Dickey wrote a prescription. However,

the Respondent testified that if he was

granted a DEA Certificate of

Registration, he will would not want to

store any controlled substances at his

office.

Dr. Leonel Dickey, a dentist licensed

to practice in California since 1979,

testified that he had known the

Respondent since the early 1970’s, but

that they had lost tough from 1974 until

approximately 1987. He also stated that

the Respondent had informed him of

‘‘[p]roblems he ran into with the law’’

when he asked him to cover for his

practice while he was incarcerated.

Based upon his experiences of working

with the Respondent since 1990, Dr.

Dickey expressed the opinion that the

Respondent was a very competent

dentist. He also testified that the

Respondent provided free dental work

to a portion of his patients, but that

without a DEA Certificate of

Registration, it was difficult for the

Respondent to ease the discomfort level

of his patients. He also attested to the

Respondent’s involvement in Christian

ministries. Dr. Dickey also stated that he

had no ‘‘hesitations’’ about the

Respondent receiving a DEA

registration, and that he had seen no

evidence of ‘‘any kind of unusual

activity’’ that would suggest that the

Respondent was untrustworthy or

incompetent. However, he testified that

he had very little knowledge about the

details of the Respondent’s convictions

for selling cocaine, and that he was

unfamiliar with the Respondent’s

problems with Didrex in 1982 and 1983.

De. Lloyd Dickey, an experienced

Doctor of Dental Surgery since 1947,

testified that he had know the

Respondent since approximately 1971,

and that he regarded him as ‘‘a son.’’ He

stated that he believed the Respondent

should be granted a DEA registration,

for it would benefit his patients.

However, he testified that he was not

very familiar with the Respondent’s

cocaine charges, having heard only

‘‘street gossip’’ about the incidents. Dr.

Dickey was more familiar with the

Respondent’s problems with Didrex,

because he had testified on the

Respondent’s behalf before the Dental

Board.

Finally, Reverend Kevin West, who

holds a Doctor of Divinity degree,

testified that he had met the Respondent

in late 1989, and that they had decided

to form a ministry together, which was

incorporated in 1991. The ministry

consists of Bible studies, Alcoholics

Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous

meetings, and general acts of ‘‘[ministry]

to the local people at a local church.’’

Reverend West stated that he had

observed the Respondent closely, and

he attested to the Respondent’s

ordination as a minister, his work as

Reverend West’s associate pastor, his

visits to prisons, his work with gang

members, and various other good deeds

performed by the Respondent. He

opined that the Respondent was

‘‘definitely * * * rehabilitated.’’

However, Reverend West testified that,

prior to the hearing before Judge

Tenney, he had heard only limited

information about the Respondent’s

involvement with cocaine in May of

1986, and that he was totally unaware

of the Didrex prescription problems.

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(f), the

Deputy Administrator may deny a

pending application for a DEA

Certificate of Registration if he

determines that the registration would

be inconsistent with the public interest.

Section 823(f) requires that the

following factors be considered:

(1) The recommendation of the

appropriate State licensing board or

professional disciplinary authority.

(2) The applicant’s experience in

dispensing, or conducting research with

respect to controlled substances.

(3) The applicant’s conviction record

under Federal or State laws relating to

the manufacture, distribution, or

dispensing of controlled substances.

(4) Compliance with applicable State,

Federal, or local laws relating to

controlled substances.

(5) Such other conduct which may

threaten the public health or safety.

These factors are to be considered in

the disjunctive; the Deputy

Administrator may rely on any one or a

combination of factors and may give

each factor the weight he deems

appropriate in determining whether an

application for registration should be

denied. See Richard J. Lanham, M.D., 57

FR 40,475 (1992); Henry J. Schwarz, Jr.,

M.D., 54 FR 16,422 (1989).

In this case, although the Government

argued that it had established a prima

facie case under all five factors, the

Deputy Administrator agrees with Judge

Tenney, and finds that a prima facie

case has only been established under

factors 2 through 5. As to factor one,

‘‘recommendation of the appropriate

State licensing board,’’ the Dental Board

restored all rights and privileges

associated with the Respondent’s dental

license in 1993. Since the record

contains no adverse recommendations

from the ‘‘appropriate State licensing

board or professional disciplinary

authority,’’ the Deputy Administrator

agrees with Judge Tenney and finds that

the Government has not established a

prima facie case under factor one.

As to factor two, ‘‘the applicant’s

experience in dispensing * * *

controlled substances,’’ the Deputy

Administrator again agrees with Judge

Tenney that the Government has

established a prima facie case under

factor two. First, the evidence of the

1982 Didrex prescriptions demonstrated

that the Respondent, lacking familiarity

with that substance’s characteristics,

prescribed Didrex to a patient merely at

her request, without a legitimate

medical purpose, and outside the

regular course of his practice. Further,

the evidence of the Respondent’s

participation in May 1986, in the

distribution of cocaine and in a

conspiracy to distribute cocaine,

contributed to the establishment of the

Government’s case under factor two.

The Deputy Administrator also agrees

with Judge Tenny’s finding that the

Government established a prima facie

case under factors three and four, ‘‘the

applicant’s conviction record under

Federal or State laws relating to the

* * * distribution * * * of controlled

substances,’’ and ‘‘[c]ompliance with

applicable State, Federal * * * laws

relating to controlled substances,’’ for

the Respondent had pled nolo

contendere to State charges involving

Didrex, a controlled substance, and he

had pled guilty to two Federal charges

involving the distribution of cocaine.

Further, the Respondent’s conduct

underlying these two convictions

demonstrate his participation in illegal

activities, thus violating applicable State

and Federal laws relating to controlled

substances.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 235 / Thursday, December 7, 1995 / Notices 62887

Finally, the Deputy Administrator

agrees with Judge Tenney’s finding as to

the relevancy of the Respondent’s

testimony before him concerning the

cocaine incident and factor five, ‘‘other

conduct which may threaten the public

health or safety.’’ Specifically, the

Deputy Administrator finds that the

Respondent’s lack of candor in his 1994

testimony as to the full extent of his

involvement in the cocaine incident

creates concern about his future

conduct. The record discloses that the

Respondent was quite involved in the

cocaine distribution and conspiracy, as

evidenced by the stipulated testimony

of the undercover Agent involved firsthand in the incident, and by the fact

that the Respondent pled guilty to the

charges of conspiracy to distribute

cocaine and unlawfully distributing

cocaine. His failure to take

responsibility for his past misconduct

causes concern about his commitment

to protecting the ‘‘public health and

safety’’ in the future, should he be

granted a DEA Certificate of

Registration.

However, the Government’s

establishment of its case does not end

the inquiry, for the Respondent has

submitted extensive evidence of his

rehabilitative efforts. The issue then

becomes whether the Respondent has

offered sufficient proof of rehabilitation

to mitigate the egregious conduct

established by the Government, such

that the DEA can now find that granting

the Respondent’s application for a

Certificate of Registration would be

consistent with the ‘‘public interest.’’

See Shatz v. United States Dept. of

Justice, 873 F.2d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir.

1989) (holding that, in a case such as

this, the Respondent has the burden to

prove rehabilitation).

Again, the Deputy Administrator

agrees with Judge Tenny’s findings as to

the weight to be given the Respondent’s

rehabilitative evidence, for the

Respondent’s evidence concerning his

rehabilitative efforts, to include his

commitment to performing good deeds

through a variety of Christian ministries,

was credible. However, the

Respondent’s November 1994 testimony

concerning his conduct surrounding the

May 1, 1986, cocaine transaction was

indeed troubling, for despite the plea

and conviction, the Respondent

continued to minimize his involvement

and resulting responsibility for the

conspiracy and cocaine distribution

incidents. As Judge Tenny noted, ‘‘the

Respondent’s inability to be completely

candid at the hearing causes sufficient

doubt as to whether he is fully

rehabilitated.’’ Further, the Deputy

Administrator also notes the lack of

evidence of continuing education

relevant to controlled substances,

evidence which would have been

helpful in light of the Respondent’s

experience in prescribing Didrex

without understanding its

characteristics.

Therefore, the preponderance of the

evidence supports denial of the

Respondent’s application at this time. If

the Respondent reapplies and submits

evidence of his continuing rehabilitative

efforts, such as evidence of completion

of educational courses at least partially

focused upon the handling of controlled

substances, then his application may

receive more favorable consideration.

See, e.g., Shatz, 873 F.2d at 1092

(suggesting that ‘‘careful consideration’’

be given to any future application for

registration, and in particular, to ‘‘any

additional evidence in support of [a]

claim of rehabilitation’’); Sokoloff v.

Saxbe, 501 F.2d 571, 576 (2d Cir. 1974)

(stating that ‘‘permanent revocation’’ of

a DEA Certificate of Registration may be

‘‘unduly harsh’’)

Therefore, the Deputy Administrator

finds that the public interest is best

served by denying the Respondent’s

application at this time. Accordingly,

the Deputy Administrator of the Drug

Enforcement Administration, pursuant

to the authority vested in him by 21

U.S.C. 823, and 21 C.F.R. 0.100(b) and

0.104, hereby orders that the

Respondent’s application for a DEA

Certificate of Registration be, and it

hereby is, denied. This order is effective

January 8, 1996.

Dated: November 30, 1995.

Stephen H. Greene,

Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 95–29771 Filed 12–6–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–M

[Docket No. 93–39]

William F. Skinner, M.D., Continuation

of Registration

On April 5, 1993, the Deputy

Assistant Administrator, Office of

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA), issued an Order

to Show Cause to William F. Skinner,

M.D., (Respondent) of Santa Monica,

California, notifying him of an

opportunity to show cause as to why

DEA should not revoke his DEA

Certificate of Registration, AS7287534,

under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4), and deny any

pending applications under 823(f), as

being inconsistent with the public

interest. Specifically, the Order to Show

Cause alleged that:

(1) During the period April 1987

through November 1988, the

Respondent prescribed, administered,

and dispensed excessive amounts of

controlled substances to a single patient,

including Demerol, Dilaudid, Xanax,

Ativan, Percodan, Tylenol with

Codeine, Valium, Percocet, Methadone,

and Doriden, without a legitimate

medical purpose and while not acting in

the usual course of professional

practice; and

(2) During the same time period, the

Respondent prescribed narcotic drugs to

the same narcotic dependent patient for

the purpose of maintenance treatment,

and engaged in detoxification treatment

of the patient without holding a separate

DEA registration to conduct a narcotic

treatment program.

On April 27, 1993, the Respondent,

through counsel, filed a timely request

for a hearing. On February 23, 1994, the

case was consolidated for hearing with

Michael S. Gottlieb, M.D., Docket No.

93–53, and Michael J. Roth, M.D.,

Docket No. 94–10. Following prehearing

procedures, a hearing was held in Los

Angeles, California, on March 29–30

and May 10–12, 1994, before

Administrative Law Judge Paul A.

Tenney. At the hearing, both parties

called witnesses to testify and

introduced documentary evidence, and

after the hearing, counsel for both sides

submitted proposed findings of fact,

conclusions of law and argument. On

October 17, 1994, Judge Tenney issued

his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law, and Recommended Ruling, finding

that Respondent’s registration was not

inconsistent with the public interest,

and recommending that no action be

taken against Respondent, Dr. Skinner.

On November 8, 1994, the Government

filed exceptions to Judge Tenney’s

opinion, and on December 7, 1994, the

Respondent filed his response to the

Government’s exceptions. On December

12, 1994, Judge Tenney transmitted the

record of these proceedings to the

Deputy Administrator.

The Deputy Administrator has

considered the filings of the parties and

the record in its entirety, and pursuant

to 21 C.F.R. 1316.67, hereby issues his

final order based upon findings of fact

and conclusions of law as hereinafter set

forth. The Deputy Administrator adopts,

in full, the opinion and recommended

ruling of Judge Tenney, and his

adoption is in no manner diminished by

any recitation of facts, issues and

conclusions herein, or of any failure to

mention a matter of fact or law.

The Deputy Administrator finds that

the Respondent is licensed to practice as

a physician in the State of California,

and that he had served as the medical

director of the St. John’s Hospital

Chemical Dependency Center from 1981