GENERAL
OF TEXAS

Honorable Q. J. Campbell GbuntyAttorney Gai+zaCounty Post, Texas

Dear Sir: Opinion No. o-5082 Re: Reversion of property conveyed to and to be held by a School District 50 long as used for schoolpurposes. Acknowledgment is made herein of your 'letterof February 1, 1943, yequesting an opinion of thisDepartment ana of your letter5 of February 12th and 20th submittingadditional factual Informationrequested by thisDepartment, the substance of all of said letter5 being a5 follows:
The deed conveying the one acre of land,~upoti which the building of the Laforest Common School District is located, contain5 the following clauses: "To have and.to hold the

. D Ddescribed pretilses * 0 *as long as such property is used for school puPpose o o
.with the axppess understanding that when saidproperty Is no longer used for schoolpurposes, it reverts to a
. eand his heirs or assigns.'

That because of the close proximity and availability of the Justiceburg School ana its school buses and the fact that there were but thirteen (13) OP fourteen (14) scholastics in 1935, said scholastics
were transferred to Justiceburg and no school has been had or held in that Laforest SchoolDistrict for the past seven (7) years, or since the year 1935. The Laforest SchoolDistrict, however, Is dill functlonlng, trustees are elected at regular elections. The trustees have never expressed abanclonmentof the location or an intention to abandon same.

An old school bullding std.11 stands on the location and up until the last term and a part of this term neither the building nor the location has been used. During the last school term and a papt of this term the schoolhousewas used to accommodate the school bus driver.Hon. V. 6. Campbell;page 2 o-5082

j

:;.: It may be necessary to have school at this

place this year atid ~f0rtheaar's ~durationin view of tha fact the schoolbuses are quite worn and cannot be replaced, the manufacture of buses and other automobiles having been discontinued.

The question submittea for answer is: Do the described facts constitute abandonment of the property 50 that it reverts to the grantor? Howafer, the quo'tion involved herein 3eema more clearly to be: 'Underthe dfscribed%‘facfs has the title reverted to~~the original owner, hi5 heirs ore assigns, because of the elamses quoted above from the deed? The departmentproceeas to answer the question in its revised form.

By the terms of the deed itself, the land so conveyed would be forfeited automaticallyupon its ceasl for schoolpurpoees. Eyssen v. Zeppa, 100 S.W. n$2;,o~fiG"q~:xl Civ.hpp.) and the several authorities cited therein;.Swink.v. City ofDallas, 36 SiW. (2d),222 (Tex.Comm. App;, Sec.'B.); 37 Tex. Ju?;, Sec. 80, p. 949. It is, therefore/the use to xhich the land la put, not the intention of the school trustees with respect thereto,which governs. Putney~ v. SchoolDist ; HO. '4of Town of Mookfield, 255 I:W. 76 (Wlsci)';Richey v., eorralitdsUnion Schoolpiat. of Santa Crnz'county,228 P. 348 (Calif.); Attorney G$meral Opinion MoI.0-49?9.

From these authorities and the cases cited therein it follow5 that the words "as long as suchproperty is used for sahoolpurposes'I~

iti the said deed fr~om J. 3';: Reed to theLaforest SchoolDistrict create5 a conditional limitationana the title thereto ipso factowould revert to the grantor, his heirs o@ aselgns, at that time when the same ceased to be used by the schooldistrict fur schoolpurpoaes. It shouldbe noted, however, that instrumentscontaining such condition5 are strictly construed agalnst the grantor. ,%&lox v. Aaair, (Civ.App.) 66~S.W.~811 (Writ of Error denied 95 Tex, 682; 12 Tex. Jur.
sec. 88, P.,,134.
chit has been held that the term "schoolpurposes includes the recreation ti@ pupils attend1 school. St.gawaras College V. Tax Collector, 82 Tex. 1 0891,~. 7 In Peoples exral Pearsall county CollectorV. CatholicBishop of Chicago, 142 El. E. 520,
a 385 acre tract used by a school for boating, swimming, skating, and some ofwhich had been beautifiedwith drives, walks and other improvements,and of which only a smallpart was used for buildings,was exempt from taxes under a State statuteproviding that all propertyused exclusivelg for schoolpnrposes should be exempt fram taxes.

In McCullough v. Swifton Consolidated SchoolDist., 155Hon. Q,J. Campbell,page 3 0-5082

S.W. (28) 353, (1941) the Supreme Court of Arkansas, held that where a deed to the schooldistrict provided that property should be used for schoolpurposes only and should the district at any time abandon the property, title should revert to the grantor, and thereafter the schooldistrict was consolidated with another which tore down the schoolbuilding located on the land, part of the material ofwhich was used in the erection of a waiting station on the land for the comfort of children who rode schoolbus to the consolidated school, the land
was not "abandoned"for%chool purposes" and aid not revert to the grantor, notwithstandingthat no schoolwas conducted there, since Itwas still used for schoolpurposes. The court
reasoned, and correctlywe think, that the school aLstrict has not abandoned the land for schoolpurposes although,lt has done

50 as a school. See also Atty. Gen, OpinionNo. O-485.

Cn the other hand, it has been held that the-use of a building for the storage of school furniture,books, etc., is not "for schoolpurposes' and. does not prevent an abandonment of the property under a deed specifying that the propertywas to be used for such purposes and containinga reversionary clause. Putnam v. SchoolDist. No, 4 of Town of Brookfield'~ (Wise.),255 R.W. 76; Riche of Santa Cruz County (Calif. 7.v. CorralitosUnion SchoolDist. 228. P. 348.

An opinion in a case of this kind depends entirely upon all the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed and the use made bf the land. We could not give an entirely accurate opinionwithout the benefit of all such facts, which could only be brought out upon a trial or upon a thorough investigationpreparatory for trial. However, based upon the facts submitted in your lettersand herein summarized wherein it is shown that the land in questionwas used for~no school purposeswhatsoever from and during the year, 1935, until "the last school term In the year, 1942 and partof this school term In the year, 1943," and then only 'to accommodate the school bus driver", It is the opinion of this department that the land ceased to be used for schoolpurposes prior to the time when the schoolhousewas used to accommodate the bus driver. Under the law and the facts herein submitted, the said land has ceased to be used for school purposes, and under the terms of the deed the title thereto reverted automatlcallg to the grantor, his heirs or assigns.

Your attention is directed to Attorney General Opinion MO. O-4939, for any assistance itmay offerwith respect to school property on said land,wherein Itwas held that where under a deed containing a reversionary clause, land has been conveyed to a schooldistrict for school purposes only and thereafter a schoolhouse is erected thereon, the schooldistrictEon. V. J. Campbell,page 4 o-5082

may remove such buildfngwhen the property has been abandoned for school purposes and has reverted under the deed to the grantor.

Yours very truly

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

By s/ChesterE. Ollistin Chestee E. Ollison Assistant

CEO:flo:wc

APPROVED MAR 3, 19'43 s/GroverSellers FIRST ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Approved Oplnlon CommitteeBy s/BWB ChaLrman