COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Bumgardner and 

 Senior Judge Hodges 

GEORGE P. BROOKS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 1810-00-1 PER CURIAM 

 JANUARY 9, 2001 

CAROLE W. BROOKS 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Alan E. Rosenblatt, Judge 

 (Carl W. Isbrandtsen; Carl W. Isbrandtsen, 

P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 (Barry Dorans; W. Brantley Basnight, III; 

Wolcott, Rivers, Wheary, Basnight & Kelly, 

P.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 George P. Brooks (husband) appeals from a final decree of 

divorce entered by the Circuit Court for the City of Virginia 

Beach (circuit court). He contends the circuit court erred in 

setting the amount of spousal support and child support payable to 

Carole W. Brooks (wife). Upon reviewing the record and the briefs 

of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the judgment of the circuit 

court. See Rule 5A:27. 
Background

 The parties were married on June 29, 1974. Wife worked 

full-time as a school teacher until 1977, at which time she quit 

to stay home with the couple's eldest daughter. Except for 

working briefly part-time when the couple's first child was a 

baby, wife did not work outside the home during the marriage. 

 After the parties separated in January 1997, wife went back 

to school to renew her teaching certificate. As of the date of 

the hearing before the circuit court, wife was apparently 

eligible to be, but had not yet been, re-certified. Although 

wife conceded that she could earn $27,500 as a teacher, there 

was no evidence presented regarding the availability of teaching 

positions in wife's field (English and drama). 

 In support of her request for spousal support, wife 

prepared a statement of expenses, which included a number of 

expenses related to the couple's children, one of whom was away 

at college. Excluding expenses related to the daughters and 

including the expense of purchasing a new car, wife calculated 

her monthly expenses to be approximately $4,800.1

 In the last full year before the parties separated, husband 

earned $202,966.74. At the commissioner's hearing, husband 

 1

 This figure did not include an allowance for the taxes 

wife would have to pay on the alimony. On a March 10, 1999 

expense statement, wife estimated that her annual income taxes 

would be $6,835. This is apparently the amount of taxes she 

anticipated paying on the $5,850 per month spousal support she 

requested. 

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testified that his monthly income was $26,668. By the time of 

the circuit court hearing, husband's monthly income had risen to 

approximately $31,166. 

 Husband's expert witness, Mark DesRoches, testified that a 

person could expect a rate of return of 7% in a reasonably safe 

investment "in this market."2 Wife testified that she had no 

experience in investing. Husband conceded that, recently, many 

of his investments had rates of return significantly lower than 

7%. 

 Noting that wife was not yet certified as a teacher and the 

absence of evidence regarding available employment, the 

commissioner recommended that income not be imputed to wife for 

the purpose of calculating spousal support. The commissioner 

found that wife's listed monthly expenses--including an 

allowance for the purchase of a new car, but excluding expenses 

related to the daughters--were reasonable. The commissioner in 

chancery recommended that wife be awarded $5,000 per month in 

spousal support "under present circumstances, i.e., prior to the 

allocation of assets under equitable distribution." 

 The commissioner found that the monthly child support 

obligation of the parties was $1,457 (excluding health insurance 

coverage). The commissioner recommended husband to pay 81% of 

this amount, or $1,148. In calculating this amount under the 

 2

 DesRoches testified on May 11, 1999. 

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child support guidelines, the commissioner did not impute any 

income to wife, although he did factor in wife's $5,000 monthly 

spousal support. 

 After the commissioner issued his report, but prior to the 

hearing before the circuit court, the parties reached an 

agreement regarding equitable distribution of the marital 

property. As part of that agreement, husband agreed to pay wife 

$550,000. 

 The circuit court found that the parties were equally 

responsible for the breakup of the marriage. The court agreed 

with the commissioner's finding that income should not be 

imputed to wife. Although agreeing that wife would eventually 

have to obtain employment, the court found that wife was not yet 

re-certified as a teacher and there was no evidence that she 

would be successful in seeking employment at that time. The 

court also agreed with the commissioner's finding regarding the 

reasonableness of wife's claimed expenses, commenting that they 

were "relatively modest for the parties under these 

circumstances." 

 In deciding the amount of spousal support, the circuit 

court indicated that it was considering husband's significant 

ability to pay, as well as the lifestyle to which the parties 

became accustomed over nearly twenty-three years of marriage. 

The court also stated that it was considering the award wife 

received as a result of the equitable distribution agreement, 

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noting that "without the settlement, the amount of spousal 

support the Court would have awarded Mrs. Brooks would be 

significantly higher." 

 The circuit court rejected appellant's assertion that it 

should, in essence, "impute" investment income to wife at a 7% 

rate of return on the equitable distribution payment. The court 

questioned whether someone without experience in investing could 

expect such a rate of return. The court stated that investment 

income could not be imputed to wife until she had a "track 

record" with investing the equitable distribution monetary 

award. 

 The court concluded: "Considering all of these factors and 

all of the other statutory factors, I think that the amount of 

support that was set by the commissioner, $5,000 is still a 

reasonable and appropriate amount." 

Spousal Support

 Husband contends the circuit court erred in 1) awarding 

spousal support to wife without considering the equitable 

distribution award; 2) failing to impute investment income to 

wife based on a 7% rate of return on wife's equitable 

distribution cash award; 3) assessing wife's needs and expenses; 

and 4) not imputing wage income to wife. We disagree. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the party prevailing below. Piatt v. Piatt, 27 Va. App. 426, 

430, 499 S.E.2d 567, 569 (1998). "We accord great deference to 

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the trial court's findings of fact and will not disturb them 

unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

them." Vissicchio v. Vissicchio, 27 Va. App. 240, 249-50, 498 

S.E.2d 425, 430 (1998). 

 "A spouse's entitlement to support and the amount of the 

award are matters within the sound discretion of the trial 

court. In determining the amount of an award, the court must 

consider all of the factors set forth in Code § 20-107.1." 

Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 22 Va. App. 703, 707, 473 S.E.2d 72, 

74 (1996) (en banc) (citation omitted). "When the record 

discloses that the trial court considered all of the statutory 

factors, the court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal 

unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion." Gamble v. 

Gamble, 14 Va. App. 558, 574, 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992). 

A. Failure to Consider Equitable Distribution Award

 In determining the amount of support one spouse should pay 

another, a circuit court must consider any equitable 

distribution award made pursuant to Code § 20-107.3. Code 

§ 20-107.1(E)(8). 

 The circuit court specifically stated that it was 

considering the equitable distribution award in determining 

wife's entitlement to spousal support. Indeed, the court stated 

that it would have awarded even more spousal support, but for 

the size of wife's equitable distribution award. Especially 

considering the great disparity between husband's income and 

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wife's earning potential, we cannot say the circuit court abused 

its discretion. 

B. Imputing Investment Income

 "[A] trial court is not required to accept the opinion of 

an expert. 'It is well established that the trier of fact 

ascertains [an expert] witness' credibility, determines the 

weight to be given to their testimony, and has the discretion to 

accept or reject any of the witness' testimony.'" Piatt, 27 Va. 

App. at 434-35, 499 S.E.2d at 571 (citations omitted). 

 Although DesRoches testified that one could expect a 7% 

rate of return for money invested in reasonably safe 

investments, husband conceded that many of his investments had 

failed to reach that benchmark and wife testified that she had 

no experience in investing money. Moreover, the circuit court 

did not find that wife's investment income could never be 

considered. Rather, the court concluded that DesRoches' 

estimates were excessive under the circumstances and that it 

would be too speculative to estimate what rate of return wife 

might eventually earn on her money. The court did not abuse its 

discretion, therefore, in refusing to impute investment income 

to wife. 

C. Assessment of Wife's Needs and Expenses

 A circuit court's award of spousal support "should not be 

interfered with by an appellate court unless it is clear that 

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some injustice has been done." Papuchis v. Papuchis, 2 Va. App. 

130, 133, 341 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1986). 

 The evidence proved that husband's income was significant 

and more than sufficient to pay the spousal support award. Wife 

had given up her career to stay home with the couple's children 

and had been out of the work force, for all intents and 

purposes, for twenty-three years. Furthermore, the evidence 

proved that wife made substantial non-monetary contributions to 

the family during the marriage. The trial court found that 

wife's needs were modest--especially compared with the standard 

of living the parties enjoyed during the last years of the 

marriage. We cannot say that this decision was plainly wrong or 

that the court abused its discretion in weighing the statutory 

factors. 

 Appellant complains that the circuit court improperly 

considered expenses related to the couple's children in 

determining the amount of support to which wife was entitled. 

There is nothing in the record supporting this assertion. 

Indeed, the commissioner stated that he was specifically not 

considering expenses related to the daughters. Moreover, 

husband was responsible for only 81% of the child support 

obligation calculated under the statutory schedule. Thus, wife 

was directly responsible for a percentage of expenses related to 

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the youngest child and the court was entitled to consider this 

fact in fashioning a spousal support award.3

D. Imputing Wage Income to Wife

 "[A] court may impute income to a party who is voluntarily 

unemployed or underemployed. Imputation of income is based on 

the principle that a spouse should not be allowed to choose a 

low paying position that penalizes the other spouse or any 

children entitled to support." Calvert v. Calvert, 18 Va. App. 

781, 784-85, 447 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (1994) (citations omitted). 

"[I]n setting support awards, [a court] must look to current 

circumstances and what the circumstances will be 'within the 

immediate or reasonably foreseeable future,' not to what may 

happen in the future." Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 

728, 735, 396 S.E.2d 675, 679 (1990). Where a spouse has not 

worked during a marriage and where there is no evidence that she 

has unreasonably refused employment, a trial court does not 

abuse its discretion by granting that spouse a reasonable period 

of time to secure employment before imputing income. See id.

 At the time of the hearing, wife was not yet re-certified 

to teach and there was no evidence that she had refused any 

offers of suitable employment. The circuit court recognized 

that wife would eventually have to go back to work. We cannot 

say the court abused its discretion by refusing to impute income 

 3

 Based on the commissioner's calculations, wife's "share" 

of the child support obligation was $309 per month. 

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to wife before she had a reasonable period of time to re-enter 

the job market. 

Child Support

 Husband contends that the circuit court erred in 

determining his child support obligation due to its failure to 

impute income to wife. For the same reasons the circuit court 

did not abuse its discretion in refusing to impute income for 

purposes of calculating spousal support, the court did not abuse 

its discretion in calculating the parties' child support 

obligations. 

 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the judgment of 

the circuit court is affirmed. 

Affirmed.

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