UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) CHRISAVGI SOURGOUTSIS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 16-1096 (KBJ/RMM) ) UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE, ) ) Defendant. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION Pending before the Court is Movant Capitol Police Board’s (“Mov ant” or “CPB”) Motion to Quash and for a Protective Or der (“Motion to Quash”) [ECF No . 15], which seeks to quash two subpoenas served by Plaintiff Chrisavgi Sourgoutsis (“Plain tiff” or “Ms. Sourgoutsis”) on non-parties Fay Ropella, Inspector General of the United States Capitol Police (“USCP”), and the USCP Office of Inspector Gen eral (“OIG”). United States Di strict Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson referred the Motion to Q uash to the undersigned Magistr ate Judge for resolution. See 6/12/17 Minute Order. Having consid ered the parties’ submissio ns and attachments thereto, 1 the arguments presented at the motions hearing held August 4, 2017 (“Motions Hearing”), and after reviewing the CPB’s in camera submissions, the Court GRANTS Movant’s Motion to Quash and DENIES without prejudice Movan t’s Motion for Protective Ord er.

1 The relevant filings are: Movant’s Mot. to Quash, ECF No. 15; Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 17; Movant’s Reply, ECF No. 18; Movant ’s Response to Court Order, E CF No. 25; Pl.’s Response to Movant’s Response to Court Order, ECF No. 26.2 BACKGROUND
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 Ms. Sourgoutsis alleges that the USCP discriminated against her on the basis of her gender and retaliated against he r for engaging in protected act ivity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. Ms. Sourgoutsis joined the USCP on May 11, 2014 and became a probationary USCP Offi cer after she completed trai ning. See Compl. ¶¶ 9, 28, ECF No. 1. Ms. Sourgoutsis’s pr obationary period was schedule d to end on November 15,
2015. Id. ¶ 28. During that period, Ms. Sour goutsis was disciplined for the following alleged conduct: wearing socks that were not the mandated uniform color ; cursing; using a mobile phone indoors; criticizing the role player in a role-playing exercise ; failing to wear an appropriate uniform shirt; and sitting while on duty. See id. ¶¶ 15–17, 21–24, 40–41. Near the end of her probationary period, the USCP r ecommended that Ms. Sourgoutsis be terminated. See id. ¶¶ 80, 98. Ms. Sourgoutsis contends that the discipline and her termi nation were based on her gender.
See id. ¶¶ 109–12. She further alleges t hat the USCP terminated her i n retaliation for her participation as a witness in a n interview regarding allegation s that her supervisor had sexually harassed female officers. See id. ¶¶ 120–22.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On June 13, 2016, Ms. Sourgoutsis filed a Complaint alleging gender discrimination and retaliation by the USCP in viola tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et
seq. See Compl. The USCP filed an answer to Ms. Sourgoutsis’s Complainton September 6,
2016. See Def.’s Answer, ECF No. 7. Disc overy commenced thereafter.

2 Given the procedural posture of the case, the Court relies o n the facts alleged in the Complaint.3 The current discovery dispute ar ises from two subpoenas that Ms . Sourgoutsis served on Ms. Fay Ropella, Inspector Ge neral of the USCP, and OIG. See Movant’s Mot. to Quash at 2, ECF No. 15-1; Pl.’s Opp’n at 3, ECF No. 17. The subpoenas seek production of certain documents and testimony regardi ng the USCP’s disciplinary polic ies and practices, including a report reflecting OIG’s evaluation of the USCP disciplinary pro cess. Movant’s Mot. to Quash, Ex. 1, ECF No. 15-2 (Subpoena to Fay R opella) (hereinafter “Rop ella Subpoena”) and Ex. 2, ECF No. 15-3 (Subpoena to OIG, USC P) (hereinafter “OIG Subpoena ”). The CPB, 3 a non-party to this action, moved to quash t he Ropella and OIG Subpoenas, a nd alternatively sought a protective order if the Court does not quash the subpoenas. See Movant’s Mot. to Quash, ECF
No. 15. By Minute Order dated July 31, 201 7, the Court requested that t he CPB submit for in

camera review a copy of the OIG repor t at issue in the subpoenas. See 7/31/2017 Minute Order;
see also Movant’s Mot. to Quash, Ex. 3, E CF No. 15-4 (hereinafter “Privi lege Log”) (Doc. Number 31). On August 4, 2017, the unde rsigned held a Motions Hearing at which counsel for the Plaintiff and Movant were present. See 8/4/2017 Minute Entry. The undersigned heard argument and took the motion under advisement. After the Motio ns Hearing, the Court issued three Orders directing the CPB to submit additional documents f or in camera review and to further supplement the record. See 8/15/2017 Minute Order; Ord er, ECF No. 24; 11/7/17 Minute Order. The CPB timely submitted the requested information.

3 The Inspector General, to who m OIG reports, is appointed by and under the supervision of the CPB. 2 U.S.C. § 1909; see also Movant’s Mot. to Qua sh at 5, ECF No. 15-1.4 LEGAL STANDARD
I. MOTION TO QUASH Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 allows for “discovery regard ing any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any pa rty’s claim or defense and pro portional to the needs of the case.”
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. P. 26(b)(1). As part of this di scovery, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 permits a party to issue a subpoena to anon-party to command attendance at a deposition or to produce or permit inspection of documents, i nformation, or tangible things . F ED

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. P. 45(a)(1). Rule 45 subpoenas may only be used to com pel production of informati on that is discoverable under Rule 26. See AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-1058 , 752 F.3d 990, 995 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Therefore, upon timely motion, a court must quash or modify a Rule 45 subp oena that “requires disclosure of privileged or other protecte d matter[s], if no exception or waiver applies; or subjects a person to undue burden.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 45(d)(3); cf. In re Subpoena to Goldberg , 693 F. Supp. 2d 81, 83 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting resolu tion of motion to quash governed by Rules 26 and 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedur e). That standard “applies to b oth document and testimonial subpoenas.” Watts v. SEC , 482 F.3d 501, 508–09 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The party moving for relief bear s the burden of showing that th e subpoena should be quashed or modified. See Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1,062 , 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 354 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. , 751 F.2d 395, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1984). “The quashing of asubpoena is an extraordin ary measure, and is usually inappropriate absent extrao rdinary circumstances.” Flanagan v. Wyndham Int’l Inc. , 231 F.R.D. 98, 102 (D.D.C. 2005) (citations omitt ed). Accordingly, a “mov ant’s burden is greater for a motion to quash than if [the mova nt] were seeking more limited protection.” Id. (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington, Vt. , 351 F.2d 762, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1965)); see5 also U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. , 301 F.R.D. 20, 25 (D.D.C. 2014).
II. MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER Federal Rule of Civil Procedur e 26 provides that “for good caus e” a court may issue a protective order “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” F ED

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. P. 26(c)(1). The party request ing the protective order bears the burden of showing good cause “by demonstrating specif ic evidence of the harm that would result.” Jennings v. Family Mgmt. , 201 F.R.D. 272, 275 (D.D.C. 2001); Alexander v. FBI , 186 F.R.D. 71, 75 (D.D.C. 1998); see also Washington v. Thurgood Marshall Acad. , 230 F.R.D. 18, 21 (D.D.C), on reconsideration , 232 F.R.D. 6 (D.D.C. 2005) (re considering a separate proposition). Protective orders may “deny discovery completely , limit the conditions, time, place, or topics of discovery, or l imit the manner in which the confidential information is to be revealed.” Univ. of Mass. v. Roslin Inst. , 437 F. Supp. 2d 57, 60 (D.D.C. 2006).
ANALYSIS
I. MOTION TO QUASH The CPB moves to quash two s ubpoenas: one issued to Fay Ropella , current Inspector General of the USCP; and one i ssued to OIG. The subpoenas requ est both testimony and the production of documents, and overl ap substantially. Both subpo enas seek production of the following documents:

 Any documents regarding U.S. Capitol Police’s (USCP) disciplina ry policies and practices, including but not limited to: any investigation or r eport by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) regarding USCP’s disciplinary process, including but not limited to whether USCP consistently applied its disciplinary p olicies and practices.

 Any documents regarding recommendations the OIG made to Chief M atthew Verderosa or USCP or any USCP offi cials within the past five ye ars related to USCP’s disciplinary policies , practices, or processes.6  Any documents showing summaries, reports, or compilations regar ding the volume and nature of disciplinary actio ns that the USCP took within th e past five years. Ropella Subpoena at Attach. A (Items #1–3) (footnote omitted); OIG Subpoena at Attach. A (Items #4–6). In her subpoena to OIG, Ms. Sourgo utsis also requests that OIG designate one or more officers, directors, managing age nts, or other persons to testi fy about:

 USCP’s disciplinary policies a nd practices, including but not l imited to: any investigation or report by the O ffice of Inspector General (OIG ) regarding USCP’s disciplinary process, i ncluding but not limited to wheth er USCP consistently applied its discip linary policies and practices.

 Recommendations the OIG made to Chief Matthew Verderosa or USCP or any USCP officials within the past five years related to USCP’s dis ciplinary policies, practices , or processes.

 The manner in which the OIG maint ains summaries, reports, or co mpilations regarding the volume and nature of discip linary actions that US CP took within the past five years. OIG Subpoena at Attach. A (Items #1–3) (footnote omitted). Ms. Sourgoutsis’s subpoena to Ms. Ropella also seeks testimony, but does not identify the topics to be addressed. See Ropella Subpoena at Attach. A. The CPB moves to quash both subpoenas. See Movant’s Mot. to Quash,
ECF No. 15.
A. The Subpoenas for Production of D ocuments by OIG and Ms. Ropell a 4
1. USCP’s Disciplinary Policies and Practices The Ropella and OIG Subpoenas both seek documents “regarding US CP’s disciplinary policies and practi ces, including but not limited to: any inves tigation or report by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) regardi ng USCP’s disciplinary process . . . .” Ropella Subpoena at

4 As both the Ropella and OIG s ubpoenas seek production of rec ords covering the same topics, the following analysis addre sses those subpoenas jointly.7 Attach. A (Item #1); see also OIG Subpoena at Attach. A ( Item #4). Although the parties’ arguments primarily focus on the discoverability of a report re flecting an OIG review of the USCP disciplinary process (hereina fter “OIG Report”), the scope of the subpoenas is broader and also would encompass the documents used to prepare the OIG Repo rt and any records documenting the USCP’s di sciplinary po licies.

a. The OIG Report The parties contest the discove rability of the OIG Report. The CPB raises relevance and privilege arguments, asserting: (1) that the OIG Report is not relevant because it does not address individual cases or the applica tion of policy to an individual’ s case; and (2) that the deliberative process privilege shields the O IG Report from disclosure. Mova nt’s Mot. to Quash at 6–12, ECF No. 15-1. Ms. Sourgoutsis contends that the OIG Report is not privileged and that it is relevant to her discrimination claims to the extent it contains informat ion about how the USCP has disciplined others and the “USC P’s failures to fairly and consi stently impose discipline.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.
i. Relevance The Federal Rules of Civil Proce dure allow for “broad access to relevant information at the discovery stage.” Jewish War Veterans of the U.S. of Am., Inc. v. Gates , 506 F. Supp. 2d 30, 41 (D.D.C. 2007). Relevance is “co nstrued broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to ot her matter that could bear on a ny party’s claim or defense.” United States ex rel. Shamesh v. CA, Inc. , 314 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders , 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the court must limit the ex tent of discovery that is, inter alia , unreasonably cumulative or8 duplicative, outside the permitted scope of Rule 26(b)(1), or o btainable from another source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. See F ED

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. P. 26(b)(2)(C). The OIG Report is not relevantto Ms. Sourgoutsis’s claims. Ms . Sourgoutsis appears to believe that the OIG Report will provide useful comparator info rmation and insight into how the USCP has treated other individua ls similarly situated to her. But the OIG Report contains no such analysis. The Court’s in camera review of the OIG Report conf irms that the report does not address the discipline of i ndividual USCP employees. See Movant’s Reply, Attach. 1, Declaration of Fay F . Ropella ¶ 6, ECF No. 18-1 (“Ropella Decl. ”). The OIG Report also does not attempt to define the level of discipline that would compri se an appropriate response to the alleged conduct underlying Ms. S ourgoutsis’s termination. Nor does the OIG Report compare the way that the USCP has applie d discipline to its male and fe male officers. Instead, the OIG Report simply reflects OIG’s ev aluation of the USCP disciplinary process and its recommendations for how to improve or modify that process. Not hing in the OIG Report has any tendency to make the existen ce of any “fact [that] is of co nsequence” to the resolution of Ms. Sourgoutsis’s claims more probabl e or less probable than it oth erwise would be. F ED

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. 401. Therefore, the OIG Report is not relevant.
ii. Deliberative Process Privilege The deliberative process privilege “covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberati ons comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” Dep’t of the Interior & Bu reau of Indian Affairs v.
Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n , 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001) (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co. , 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This privilege “rests on the obvious realization that official s will not communicate candidl y among themselves if each9 remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news,” a nd is designed to “enhance the quality of agency decisions by protecting open and frank discus sion among those who make them within the Government.” Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n , 532 U.S. at 8–9 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To qualify for the privilege, documents must be both “predecisi onal” and “deliberative.” In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig. , 236 F. Supp. 3d 150, 159 (D.D.C. 2017); see also Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior , 976 F.2d 1429, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1992). A document is predecisional if it was “prepared in order to assis t an agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision, rather than to support a decision alr eady made.” Petroleum Info. Corp. , 976 F.2d at 1434 (citations and inter nal quotation marks omitte d); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Defense , 847 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Cobell v. Norton , 213 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2003). A document is “deli berative” if it “is intended to facilitate or assist development of the agency’s final position on the relevant issue.” Nat’l Sec. Archive v. CIA , 752 F.3d 460, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Under the deliberative process privilege, “factual information generally must be disclosed, but materials embodyi ng officials’ opinions are ordi narily exempt.” Petroleum Info. Corp., 976 F.2d at 1434; see In re Sealed Case , 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The D.C. Circuit employs a “functional a pproach” to determine whether in formation is factual or embodies an opinion, and considers whether “the selection or organizatio n of facts is part of an agency’s deliberative process.” Hardy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives , 243 F. Supp. 3d 155, 164–65 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of
State , 641 F.3d 504, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The privilege shields factual information if it “is so inextri cably intertwin ed with the deliberative sections of10 documents that its disclosure would inevitably reveal the gover nment’s deliberations.” In re Sealed Case , 121 F.3d at 737. “This is so because the privilege serves to protect the deliberative process itself, not merely documen ts containing deliberative ma terial.” Mapother v. Dep’t of
Justice , 3 F.3d 1533, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. , 926 F. Supp. 2d 121, 136 (D.D.C. 2013). Moreover, the delibe rative process privilege is qualified, and eve n documents that reflect agency officials’ deliberative opinions may be disclosed if “the private need for disclosure outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure.” In re Anthem, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 159 (citing In Re Sealed Case , 121 F.3d at 737). Before determining whether the O IG Report is del iberative and p redecisional, the Court must address whether the CPB ha s properly invoked the deliberat ive process privilege. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 6–8 (contending that CP B failed to provide a declarati on of an authorized official invoking the privilege based on actua l personal consideration). To assert the privilege, a party must include: (1) a formal cla im of privilege by the head of th e relevant department; (2) based on actual personal consideration by th at official; and (3) a detai led specification of the information for which the privilege was claimed and why it properly falls w ithin the scope of the privilege. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. , 751 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1984) for requirements of the de liberative process privilege) (other citation omitted). The CPB’s motion did not contain all of the elements necessary to assert the deliber ative process privilege. But pa rties may cure such deficiencies by supplementing the record. Cobell , 213 F.R.D. at 7. The CPB has done precisely that, by including with its Reply a declar ation from Fay Ropella, the cu rrent Inspector General. In that declaration, Ms. Ropella formally a sserted the privilege, based on her personal review of the relevant materials, and specifie d why the privilege was claimed for the disputed documents. See11 Ropella Decl.; see also Landry, 204 F.3d at 1135. Accordingly, the CPB has properly invoked the deliberative process privilege. The OIG Report is clearly pred ecisional. It does not constitute “the final Department policy.” Ropella Decl. ¶ 4. Inst ead, it contains recommendati ons from OIG that had not been implemented at the time the Report was issued. See id. ¶¶ 4, 6. Although the USCP intended to issue a new discipline directive after the OIG Report was relea sed, see id. ¶ 5, counsel for the CPB clarified at the Motions Hear ing that the OIG Report was ne ver implemented. Instead, the USCP responded to the OIG Repor t by providing its own opinions that differed in some respects from OIG’s recommendations. The refore, subsequent agency actio n did not deprive the report of its predecisonal status. See Judicial Watch , 847 F.3d at 739; Horowitz v. Peace Corps. , 428 F.3d 271, 276 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (observing that documents can lose th eir predecisional status if an agency expressly adopts them as official agency policy). The OIG Report is also deliberat ive. The OIG Report is “an adv isory opinion and recommendation from the Office of Inspector General (OIG) to th e United States Capitol Police which assists the Department w ith improving its operations.” R opella Decl. ¶ 6. It reflects OIG’s evaluation of the USCP di sciplinary process and suggestio ns on how that process could be improved. As the report consists of OIG’s “recommendations or opinions on legal or policy matters,” it is “clearly deliberative in nature.” Hardy , 243 F. Supp. 3d at 169 (citing Vaughn v.
Rosen , 523 F.2d 1136, 1143–44 (D.C. Cir. 1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the OIG Report is both deliberativ e and predecisio nal, and thus fa lls within the deliberative process privilege. Although the deliberative process privilege is not absolute, Ms . Sourgoutsis has not articulated a need that would out weigh the public interest in p rotecting the internal deliberations12 reflected in the OIG Report. See In re Anthem, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 159 (noting that information may be disclosed if the private need outweighs the public inter est). When making that assessment, courts balance the competing interests on a flexible, case by case, a d hoc basis, considering such factors as the relevance of the evidence, the availability of alternate evidence, the seriousne ss of the litigation or invest igation, the harm that could flow from disclosure, the possibility of future timidity by government employees [should the materials be disclosed], and whether ther e is reason to believe that the documents would shed light on government misco nduct. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform v. Lynch , 156 F. Supp. 3d 101, 112–13 (D.D.C. 2016);
see also In re Anthem , 236 F. Supp. 3d at 159. The party seeking the document bears the burden of demonstrating that “the bala nce of interest tips in his or h er favor.” In re Anthem , 236 F. Supp. 3d at 159. Ms. Sourgoutsis has not articul ated a strong need to receive th e OIG Report. As discussed above, the OIG Report is not relevant to Ms. Sourgout sis’s claims. The report reflects OIG’s recommendations regarding how the discipline process opti mally should work; however what is relevant to Ms. Sourgout sis is how the process worked a t the time of her alleged misconduct and how disciplinary po licies have been applied to s imilarly situated USCP officers. Further, to the extent that Ms. S ourgoutsis desires informationabout the USCP disciplinary process, she can obtain it thr ough discovery directed at the US CP and its officials. Indeed, Ms. Sourgoutsis already has explored t his topic in written discovery and in depositions of USCP officials. Maintaining the confidentiality of the OIG Report would advance the public interest. The “OIG has a serious interest in maintaining the confidentiality of its procedures and methods so as to insure [sic] the integrity of the OIG processes.” Ropella D ecl. ¶ 17. The OIG Report references employees’ candid cri tiques of the USCP disciplinarypolicies and prac tices, and it is13 unlikely that USCP employees would have been willing to speak s o openly absent an expectation of confidentiality. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy , 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“To test whether disc losure of a document is likely to adversely affect the purposes of the privilege, courts ask thems elves whether the document is so candid or personal in nature that public disclosure is likely in the future to stifle honest and frank communication within the agency.”). Thus disclosing the O IG Report likely would lead to “future timidity by government employees.” In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 738 (quoting In re Subpoena Served upon Comptroller of Currency, & Sec’y of Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. , 967 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). In sum, the OIG Report is protected by the deliberative process privilege, and Ms. Sourgoutsis’s desire to revie w it does not overcome the pri vilege. Accordingly, the Court quashes the OIG and Ropella Subpoen as insofar as they seek the OIG Report.
b. Documents Used to Prepare the OIG Report Ms. Sourgoutsis’s subpoena also encompasses the documents prepared as part of OIG’s evaluation of the USCP disciplin ary process. The CPB has ident ified 31 documents that were used to prepare the OIG Report, a nd contends that those documen ts are protected by the deliberative process privilege. See Privilege Log; Movant’s Mot . to Quash at 8–13, ECF No. 15- 1. The CPB also raises a broad c hallenge to the relevance of the requested documents.
i. Deliberative Process Privilege The Court begins its analysis wi th the deliberative process pri vilege — the principal objection raised by the CPB to the production of these records. The 31 documents at issue consist of notes, drafts, wor king papers, and an email regardin g the OIG Report. See Privilege Log; Ropella Decl. ¶¶ 8–15. The de liberative process privilege applies to each of those documents.14 Interview Notes Nineteen of the responsive documents 5 — Privilege Log Entries 6–24 — are “notes of interviews with Department offi cials, attorney, and bargaining unit representatives in preparation for the report.” Ropella Decl. ¶ 9; see Movant’s Mot. to Quash at 12, ECF No. 15-1. Although the deliberative process privil ege typically does not extend to factual material, it protects interview notes that summari ze facts “culled . . . from the muc h larger universe of facts presented to [the agency]” because such notes “reflect an exercise of jud gment as to what issues are most relevant to the pre-decisiona l findings and recommendations.” Ancient Coin Collectors Guild , 641 F.3d at 513 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Hardy , 243 F. Supp. 3d at 169– 70 (noting application of the deli berative process privilege to interview notes and summaries in the Freedom of Information Act’s Exemption 5 context) (citing c ases). The Court’s in camera review confirmed that the interv iew notes at issu e here are bot h predecisional and deliberative. They are predecisional because they predate the preparation of the OIG Report, and thus necessarily predate the adop tion of any final agency policy. T he interview notes are deliberative, although they contain factual inf ormation relayed by the interv iewees, because they reflect OIG’s assessment of which aspects of the interviewed employees’ testimony would be most pertinent to OIG’s evaluation of the USCP disciplinary practice s, thereby implicating an “exercise of judgment.” See Mapother , 3 F.3d at 1539; see also Hardy , 243 F. Supp. 3d at 170. The CPB contends that the interview notes must remain confident ial so as to ensure that employees will be honest and candi d during their interviews. See Ropella Decl. ¶ 16 (“When

5 Although the Ropella Declaration cites Privilege Log Entry 2 6 when it discusses interview notes, the Privilege Log descri bes Entry 26 as a draft report. See Ropella Decl. ¶ 9; Privilege Log. To resolve that ambiguity, the Court reviewed the documen t in camera . That review revealed that this document sum marizes the results of OIG’s eva luation of the USCP disciplinary process, and thus is more aptly described as a draft.15 interviewing Department employees for the evaluation, the OIG r elies on honestly [sic] and candidness from the employees. As such, release of interviews with employees will be harmful to the candid discussions and runs the risk of future timidity of employees coming forward or being frank in their discussions w ith the independent OIG.”). Although a significant public interest exists in ensuring th at employees speak frankly with O IG, Ms. Sourgoutsis’s need for documents pertinent to her disc rimination claims may overcome t hat interest if her need outweighs the public interest i n nondisclosure. As noted, whenweighing those interests, courts consider several factors includi ng relevance, the role of the g overnment, and the availability of alternate evidence. See Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform , 156 F. Supp. 3d at 112–13. Ms. Sourgoutsis has not identifie d a need that outweighs the pu blic interest in protecting the confidentiality of the interview notes. The interview note s neither discuss Ms. Sourgoutsis’s case nor address any alleged gende r discrepancy in the applicat ion of USCP disciplinary policies. As the notes are not relevant t o Ms. Sourgoutsis’s discriminati on claims, their disclosure would not benefit her. Ms. Sourgoutsi s can obtain alte rnate evidence from a first-hand source — the USCP employees who are familiar with the disciplinary policies and practices. Therefore Ms. Sourgoutsis cannot overcome the pub lic interest in protecting O IG’s evaluative process. See Ropella Decl. ¶ 16 (noting that “O IG relies on honestly [sic] a nd candidness from the employees.”).
Drafts Eight of the responsive document s are drafts — five drafts of the OIG Report and three drafts of disciplinary polici es. Privilege Log, Doc. Nos. 1, 2 , 24, 25, 26, 28–30; see also Ropella Decl. ¶¶ 10–11; supra n.5. The drafts are predecisional because they predate the pre paration of the OIG Report, which itself precedes the development of revise d disciplinary policies. See16 Ropella Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8, 10–11. Four dr afts of the OIG Report (P rivilege Log Entries 25, 28, 29, and 30) “include editing, indexi ng and referencing, and draft r equests for extension,” id. ¶ 11, and are deliberative because thei r disclosure “would divulge in formation regarding ‘decisions to insert or delete material or to c hange [the] draft’s focus or e mphasis.’” Hardy , 243 F. Supp. 3d at 174 (quoting Dudman Commc’ns Corp. v. Dep’t of the Air Force , 815 F.2d 1565, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). The draft containe d in Privilege Log Entry 26 pro vides a detailed overview of OIG’s investigation and includes proposed changes to the discip linary process; as such, it reflects OIG’s impressions and tentative recommendations regarding agenc y policy and is deliberative. Drafts of the disciplinary polic ies (Privilege Log Entries 1, 2 , and 24) also are deliberative; their status as drafts indicates that they were “intended to facilita te or assist development of the agency’s final position on t he relevant issue.” Nat’l Sec. Archive , 752 F.3d at 463. Ms. Sourgoutsis’s desire to obt ain the drafts does not outweigh the public interest in protecting them from disclosure. The drafts are a quintessenti al example of deliberative material. There is a significan t public interest in allowing a gency employees to develop policy recommendations without being i nhibited by the ri sk that their preliminary thoughts will be publicly disclosed. See In re Anthem , 236 F. Supp. 3d at 165 (noting that disclosing deliberative materials “greatly risks thwarting employees’ ability to freely communicate and exchange ideas”). The draft disciplinary pol icies are not relevant to M s. Sourgoutsis’s claims because they shed no light on how the existing pol icies were applied to Ms. Sourgoutsis’s alleged conduct. The drafts of the OIG Report al so are not relevant because OIG’ s evaluation of the disciplinary process neither advances nor unde rmines Ms. Sourgoutsis’s sex d iscrimination or retaliation claims. As the drafts are not rel evant, Ms. Sourgoutsis has no compelling need to obtain them, and the balance therefore favors nondisclosure. See Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform , 15617 F. Supp. 3d at 112 (noting rel evance of the evi dence as a facto r in balancing competing interests in disclosure). Working Documents The CPB also asserts the deliber ative process privilege for two documents consisting of “OIG’s working document regarding t he flow chart of the USCP di scipline process” — Privilege Log Entries 5 and 32. Ropella Dec l. ¶ 13. The Privilege Log d escribes these documents as a “Disciplinary Process Outline” and “IG notes on USCP process an d flow chart.” See Privilege Log, Doc Nos. 5, 32. Both documents are predecisional because they were used to prepare the OIG Report, which itself is a predecisional document. See Ropella Decl. ¶ 8. These documents summarize facts gathered in the r eport and “reflect an exercise of judgment as to what issues are most relevant to the pre-decisi onal findings and recommendation s” that ultimately were included in the OIG Report. Ancient Coin Collectors Guild , 641 F.3d at 513 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly they are deliberative for substant ially the same reason as the drafts and interview notes. As neither doc ument contains information that would advance or undermine Ms. Sourgoutsis’s disc rimination or ret aliation claim s, she has no compelling need that would outweigh the public i nterest in protecting the secre cy of OIG’s deliberative process. The CPB also asserts the deliber ative process privilege for a 1 9-page email communication with OIG, and avers t hat the email is a “Departme nt Response to Draft Report OIG-2017-01.” Privilege Log, Doc . No. 3; Ropella Decl. ¶ 15. The email predates the finalization of the OIG Report , and therefore is predecisional. The document is also deliberative. It contains the USCP’s response to OIG’s evaluation and informa tion that the USCP proposed be included in the OIG Report, and thus reflects the “give-and-tak e of the consultative process.” Petroleum Info. Corp. , 976 F.2d at 1434; In re Anthem , 236 F. Supp. 3d at 164 (withholding18 emails where they were “at the ir core, the back-and-forth delib erative process required for an agency to reach a decision.”). For the foregoing reasons, the C ourt quashes the Ropella and OI G subpoenas insofar as they seek the documents underlying the OIG Report.
ii. Relevance The CPB appears to challenge t he relevance of the documents und erlying the OIG Report, but has not fully develope d the relevance argument as t o those documents. See Movant’s Mot. to Quash at 6–8, ECF No. 15- 1. As discussed above, the de liberative process privilege shields these documents from di scovery. Therefore the Court wi ll not reach the CPB’s relevance arguments.

c. Additional Records Regarding USCP Disciplinary Policies and Practices In addition to seeking the OIG Report and its underlying docume nts, the subpoenas also request all other records in t he possession of OIG or Ms. Ropel la regarding USCP disciplinary policies and practices. See Ropella Subpoena at Attach. A (It em #1); OIG Subpoena at Attach

. A (Item #4). The CPB contends tha t Ms. Sourgoutsis has obtaine d any pertinent documents, except for the OIG Report and its underlying documents, through the USCP’s discovery
responses. See Movant’s Mot. to Quash at 6–7, EC F No. 15-1; Movant’s Reply at 2, ECF No. 18. Therefore the CPB contends t hat requiring OIG or Ms. Ropel la to provide this information would be unduly burdensome and beyond the scope of permissible discovery. As noted, Rule 26’s limitations on the scope of discovery also apply to subpoenas issued pursuant to Rule 45. See, e.g. , Coleman v. District of Columbia , 275 F.R.D. 33, 36–37 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[I]t is settl ed that a subpoena is limited in scope by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”). Rule 26 direct s courts to limit discovery t hat “is unreasonably cumulative or19 duplicative, or can be obtained f rom some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive,” or if “the party seeking discov ery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action.” F ED

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. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i), (ii). Ms. Sourgoutsis has acknowledged, in he r opposition and at the Moti ons Hearing, that the USCP’s discovery responses included the disciplinary rules, policies, and guidelines that are germane to this matter. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. Given that Ms. Sourgoutsis already has recei ved that information directly from the USCP, neither OIG nor Ms. Ropellashould be required to produce the same materials. See F ED

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. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i), (ii). Therefo re the Court quashes the OIG and Ropella Subpoenas insofar as they seek documents reflecting the USCP’s disciplinary policies and practices.
2. Recommendations Made to Chief Verderosa and USCP Officials The subpoenas also seek producti on of documents regarding “reco mmendations the OIG made to Chief Matthew Verderosaor USCP or any USCP officials w ithin the past five years related to USCP’s disciplinary pol icies, practices, or processe s.” OIG Subpoena at Attach. A (Item #5); Ropella Subpoena at At tach. A (Item #2) (footnote om itted). OIG has explained, in Ms. Ropella’s supplemental declar ation, that “[t]he OIG Report (OIG-2017-01) constitutes the only recommendation[] related to d isciplinary policies, practic es and processes the OIG has made to Chief Verderosa” and t hat “[t]he OIG did not make any o ther recommendations in any related documents.” Movant’s Resp onse to Court Order, Suppleme ntal Decl. of Fay F. Ropella ¶ 5, ECF No. 25-1 (“Ropella Supple mental Decl.”). Accordingly, the OIG Report is the only document responsive to this portion of the OIG and Ropella Subp oenas. Given that the OIG Report is protected by the deliberat ive process privilege for t he reasons discussed above, the20 Court quashes the OIG and RopellaSubpoenas insofar as they see k recommendations made to Chief Verderosa and USCP officials.
3. Summaries, Reports, or Compilati ons Regarding the Volume and Nature of Disciplinary Actions Finally, the subpoenas seek pr oduction of documents “showing su mmaries, reports, or compilations regarding the volume and nature of disciplinary ac tions that the USCP took within the past five years.” Ropella Subpoena at Attach. A (Item #3); OIG Subpoena at Attach. A (Item #6). Requiring OIG or Ms. Ropella to produce these documents t o Ms. Sourgoutsis would be contrary to Rule 26’s proscripti on against discovery that is cu mulative, duplicative, or available from another source. Plaintiff’s counsel clarified at the Moti ons Hearing that Ms. Sourgoutsis primarily seeks the OIG Report and underlying documents, and ha s no interest in receiving records that the USCP alrea dy has produced. Ms. Sourgoutsis al so has acknowledged that the USCP already has produced extensi ve written discovery regarding its disciplinary policies and practices. Any information that OIG could obtain regarding the volume and nature of disciplinary actions would origin ate from the USCP and would du plicate the material the USCP already has produced. Thus requi ring OIG to produce this infor mation would be duplicative of discovery already conducted, a nd would not benefit Ms. Sourgout sis at all. The burden that OIG would incur by producing such record s, while arguably minimal, outweighs the nonexistent benefit. Therefore the Court quashes the OIG and Ropella Subpo enas insofar as they seek records showing summaries, repo rts, or complications regarding the volume and nature of disciplinary actions taken by the U SCP within the last five yea rs. See Ropella Subpoena at Attach. A (Item #3); OIG Subpoena at Attach. A (Item #6).21 B. Testimony
1. Deposition of OIG Ms. Sourgoutsis also seeks tes timony from OIG regarding: the U SCP’s disciplinary policies and practices; recommenda tions from OIG to USCP offici als regarding disciplinary policies or practices; and the ma nner in which OIG maintains summaries, reports, or compilations regarding USCP disc iplinary actions in the last fi ve years. See OIG Subpoena at Attach. A (Items #1–3). Ms. Sourgo utsis argues that the first two categories of testimony will help her identify comparators a nd gather “information about USC P’s failures to fairly and consistently impose discipline.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. Ms. Sourgo utsis seeks the third category of information to assess the burdens omeness of her proposed discov ery. Ms. Sourgoutsis’s request for te stimony regarding USCP discipli nary policies and practices duplicates subjects addressed in the depositions of s everal USCP witnesses. At the Motions Hearing, the CPB contended, and Ms. Sourgoutsis did notrefute, that Ms. Sourgoutsis had deposed several USCP officials 6 who testified about the USCP disciplinary policies and practices at a macro-level as w ell as the application of those policies to Ms. Sourgoutsis’s individual case. OIG is not r esponsible for developing or impl ementing those policies and practices, and thus would have no f irst-hand knowledge regardin g them. See generally Movant’s Reply at 7 (“Any information gather ed from the OIG was obtained from Department employees.”). In addition, no “OIG official participated in or ha[s] any personal knowledge regarding the decision to disciplin e or terminate Plaintiff, Ch risavgi Sourgoutsis.” Ropella Supplemental Decl. ¶ 6. Thus although the disciplinary policie s and practices would be

6 At the Motions Hearing, the CPB indicated that Ms. Sourgouts is had deposed: Chief Matthew R. Verderosa, Sergeant Mark Shut ters, Deputy Chief Chad Thomas, Inspector Eric Waldow, Captain Andrew Bolinger, and multiple other Sergeants. See also Movant’s Reply at 7.22 appropriate topics to explore with the USCP, it would be unduly burdensome and duplicative of prior depositions to require O IG, a non-party, t o produce witne sses to testify about the subject, based entirely on second-hand information from USCP witnesses. Ms. Sourgoutsis’s request for te stimony regardin g OIG’s recomme ndations to the USCP seeks information that is protec ted by the deliberative process privilege. The CPB has established by unrebutted sworn t estimony that the OIG Report c omprises the “only recommendations related to disc iplinary policies, practices and processes the OIG” made to the USCP and that “[t]he OIG did not m ake any other recommendations in any related documents.” Ropella Supplemental Decl. ¶ 5. T hus any testimony from OIG wi tnesses regarding this deposition topic would necessari ly be based upon the informatio n gathered and conclusions reached during the development of the OIG Report. As discussed above, the deliberative process privilege protects the OIG Report and its underlying documents. Consequently, testimony about those documents “may violate th e privilege” and would be protec ted from disclosure. Broderick
v. Shad , 117 F.R.D. 306, 313 (D.D.C. 1987); see Walker v. NCNB Nat’l Bank of Fla. , 810 F. Supp. 11, 14 (D.D.C. 1993) (finding de liberative process pri vilege protected information sought by deposition subpoena); cf. Watts , 482 F.3d at 508–09 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior , 34 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994)) (“Ru le 45’s privilege and u ndue burden standard thus applies to bot h document and testimonial subpoena s”). Ms. Sourgoutsis’s request for testimony regarding how “OIG mai ntains summaries, reports, or compilations regarding the volume and nature of dis ciplinary actions that USCP took within the past five years” s eeks information that is no longer relevant. At the Motions Hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel clarifie d that Ms. Sourgoutsis sought such information in order to determine how burdensome it would be for OIG to produce the information r equested. The Privilege Log23 identifies the reports, notes , and other records that OIG posse sses regarding its recent evaluation of the USCP’s disciplinary act ions. Learning how OIG maintains those records would neither facilitate Ms. Sourgoutsis’s abil ity to obtain those records th rough discovery nor advance Ms. Sourgoutsis’s claims. By Plainti ff’s counsel’s own admission, the progression of discovery has rendered this information virtua lly useless. Therefore the Cou rt quashes the subpoena insofar as it seeks testimony regarding this topic. See generally Phillips & Cohen, LLP v. Thorpe , 300 F.R.D. 16, 18 (D.D.C. 2013) (quash ing subpoena where documents were “of no conceivable relevance” to the “context of the action now pending”).
2. Deposition of Fay Ropella The Ropella Subpoena also seeks deposition testimony but, unlik e the OIG Subpoena, does not identify specific topi cs. Ms. Sourgtousis appears to wish to explore facts pertinent to her discrimination and retaliati on claims, the preparation and the content of the OIG Report, OIG’s reaction to USCP employees’ criticism of USCP disciplinar y practices, “information about how USCP disciplines employ ees, the policies USCP follows to discipline employees, and how USCP disciplines other emp loyees.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 11. The CPB contends that the subpoena should be quashed because: the OIG Report is subject t o the deliberative process privilege; requiring Ms. Ropella to testify regarding any of th e remaining topics would impose an undue burden on a high-ranking government official; and the requested information is duplicative of testimony from US CP witnesses and could be obtai ned directly from those witnesses. See Movant’s Mot. to Quash at 1, 14–1 5, ECF No. 15-1; Movant’s Repl y at 6–8. The deliberative process privil ege provides a basis to quash th e subpoena insofar as it seeks testimony regarding the OIG Report and its contents or th e conclusions OIG reached in its evaluation of the USCP’s disc iplinary policies and practices. The Court has determined that the24 report and the conclusions draw n therein are privileged. Those protections extend to deposition testimony as well as the privileged documents. See Broderick , 117 F.R.D. at 313; Walker 810 F. Supp. at 14 (finding deliberativ e process privilege protecte d information sought by deposition subpoena). With respect to any other subjec ts Ms. Sourgoutsis may wish to explore in the Ropella deposition, the CPB asks the C ourt to quash the subpoena becaus e Ms. Ropella is a high ranking government official who lacks pers onal knowledge of the relevan t matters and the information is available from an alternate source. See Movant’s Mot. to Quas h at 14–15, ECF No. 15-1. “[H]igh ranking government official s are generally not subject to depositions unless they have

some personal knowledge about the ma tter and the party seeking the d eposition makes a showing that the information cannot be obtained elsewhere.” Alexander v. FBI (

Alexander I ), 186 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing cases) (emphasis in original); see also Payne v. District of Columbia , 859 F. Supp. 2d 125, 136 (D.D.C. 2012). This rule allows “high -level public servants to spend their valuable time performing their duties rath er than prepari ng for and testifying in depositions, unless the individual has some relevant personal knowledge abou t the subject matter.” Kline v. Berry , No. 10-1802 (RWR), 2012 WL 2376982, at *5 (D.D.C. June 25, 20 12). Ms. Sourgoutsis effectively con cedes that Ms. Ropella, in her r ole as USCP Inspector General, qualifies as a high-ranking government official. Thus , although it is unclear whether Ms. Ropella’s position has suffici ent prominence to qualify for this exception to courts’ general permissiveness regarding depositions, the Court will assume for purposes of resolving this motion that Ms. Ropella is a hi gh-ranking government official. 7

7 Most cases applying this rul e involve agency heads. See Alexander I, 186 F.R.D. at 4 (noting that most cases protect agency heads); Byrd v. District of Columbia , 259 F.R.D. 1, 6–7 (D.D.C.25 As a high-ranking official, Ms. R opella should not be deposed i n this matter. Ms. Ropella has no personal knowledge r egarding Ms. Sourgoutsis’s d isciplinary action or termination, and is unaware of a ny gender dispar ity or bias in the application of the USCP’s disciplinary policies. See Ropella Supplemental Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6. Even if Ms. Ropella’s revi ew of the OIG Report and related docum ents imparted knowledge about U SCP disciplinary policies and how the USCP disciplines other employees, that knowledge is second-hand; the USCP employees who provided that inform ation to OIG are better equip ped to answer any questions that Ms. Sourgoutsis may have. T hus Ms. Sourgoutsis has not ma de a sufficient showing that she is unable to obtain the information elsewhere. Accordingly , the Court quashes the deposition subpoena to Fay Ropella. Even if Ms. Ropella were not a hi gh-ranking official, the Court would quash the deposition subpoena because the proposed testimony subjects Ms. Ropella to an undue burden. In determining whether an undue bur den exists that would warran t quashing a Rule 45 subpoena, “courts generally employ a bala ncing test, weighing the burdens omeness to the moving party against the deponent’s need for , and the relevance of, the info rmation being sought.” Flanagan , 231 F.R.D. at 102; see also Coleman , 275 F.R.D. at 36–37. Similarly, Rule 26 requires district courts in “[a] ll discovery” to consider a num ber of factors potentially relevant to the que stion of undue burden, including : whether the discovery is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative”; whether the discovery sought is “obtainable from some other source that is more conve nient, less burdensome, or less expensive”; and whether “the burden or expe nse of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into ac count the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, th e importance of the
2009) (noting that the “Mayor of the District of Columbia, Unit ed States Senators, the General Counsel to United States House of Representatives, the Attorney General of the United States and certain high administrative heads are high -ranking official s for this purpose.”); Kline, 2012 WL 2376982 at *4 (noting additional ex amples of “high-ranking” officials from other cases, including the Deputy Chief of Sta ff of the Environmental Protec tion Agency and close assistants to the United States President).26 issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the pr oposed discovery in resolving the issues.”
Watts , 482 F.3d at 509 (quoting F ED

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. P. 26(b)(1)–(2)). To the extent that the Ropella Subpoena seeks testimony regardi ng the USCP’s disciplinary practices and polic ies and their application to other employees, it imposes an undue burden upon Ms. Ropella. Like the related requests for product ion, the deposition subpoena seeks to retread topics that ha ve been explored at depth with U SCP witnesses. Ms. Sourgtousis already has had an opportunity to ob tain that information from a first-hand source, by deposing a number of USCP officials familia r with the disciplinary process in general and Ms. Sourgoutsis’s individual case. See supra n.6. Ms. Ropella and other OIG employees lack “first-hand knowledge of the enactment of the USCP’s disciplinary policies. ” Movant’s Reply at 7. Accordingly, there is no reas on to believe that Ms. Ropella or any other OIG witness 8 would have personal knowledge of the rel evant topics, or that the pro posed testimony would add anything of benefit to the recor d Ms. Sourgoutsis already has d eveloped. Therefore this proposed line of inquiry would s ubject Ms. Ropella or any other OIG witness to unreasonably cumulative and duplicative discovery.
II. MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER The CPB also moves in the alter native for a protective order. Specifically, the CPB asks that the Court order that any doc uments that must be produced t o Ms. Sourgoutsis be subject to a protective order requ iring that the docume nts remain under seal and not be disclosed to any third

8 The CPB has indicated that if the Court deems it appropriate to have a witness testify regarding the OIG Report, Micha el Bolton would be better suited to do so than Ms. Ropella. See Movant’s Mot. to Quash at 15, E CF No. 15-1. Ms. Sourgoutsis re sponded that if Mr. Bolton is more knowledgeable, she would be willing to reissue Ms. Ropella ’s subpoena to Mr. Bolton. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 11.27 parties. See Movant’s Mot. to Quash — Pr oposed Order, ECF No. 15. The Courthas not ordered the production of any doc uments and has quashed both su bpoenas. Therefore there is no need for a protective order, a nd the Court DENIES without preju dice the CPB’s request for a protective order.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Movant’s Mot ion to Quash [ECF No. 15] and DENIES without prejudice Movant’s Motion for a Prot ective Order [ECF No. 15]. A separate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

DATED: November 21, 2017 ROBIN M. MERIWEATHER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE