Filed 6/21/22 P. v. Valadez CA4/3

Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LOUIS PALAMINO VALADEZ,

 Defendant and Appellant,

 G059333

 (Super. Ct. No. C-78146)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,

James Edward Rogan, Judge. Affirmed.

Diane T. Letarte and Arthur B. Martin, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and

Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *

This case returns to us after the Supreme Court granted defendant Louis 

Palamino Valadez’s petition for review and remanded the case to this court with 

directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the case in light of the amendments to 

Penal Code1section 1170.95 enacted by Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). In 

our prior opinion, we concluded the trial court did not err by denying Valadez’s section 

1170.95 resentencing petition without first issuing an order to show cause and hearing 

testimony. Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, which required the 

jury to find defendant acted with the specific intent to kill; the jury also found true a 

multiple-murder special circumstance, which required the jury to find that defendant 

possessed a specific intent to kill.

Following the Supreme Court’s instructions, we vacated our prior decision. 

After reevaluating the case, we again conclude the trial court did not err based on the 

jury’s guilty verdict on the conspiracy to commit murder charge, and its finding that the

multiple-murder special circumstance allegation was true. The amendments to 

section 1170.95 enacted by Senate Bill No. 775 do not alter this conclusion. Valadez is 

therefore ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law. 

FACTS

Valadez was convicted by a jury in 1990 of conspiracy to commit murder, 

two counts of first degree murder with a multiple-murder special circumstance, and 

11 counts of attempted murder. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility 

1

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

of parole. We previously affirmed those convictions in People v. Figueroa (Jun. 30, 

1992, G010268, G010371 [nonpub. opn.]).

2

 Factual details concerning the crimes may 

be found in that opinion.

In July 2019, Valadez filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to

section 1170.95. After receiving briefing from the prosecution and Valadez’s counsel, 

the trial court denied the petition, finding Valadez had failed to make a prima facie case 

for relief. In denying the petition, the court concluded Valadez was not eligible for 

resentencing because the record of conviction demonstrated he was not convicted of 

felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequence theory. The court 

relied on the jury’s guilty verdict on the conspiracy to commit murder charge, the jury’s 

true finding on the multiple-murder special circumstance allegation, and the 

corresponding jury instructions, which required a finding of intent to kill.

Valadez timely appealed. 

In People v. Valadez (Jun. 16, 2021, G059333 [nonpub. opn.]), we affirmed 

the trial court’s conclusion. However, Valadez’s petition for review was granted by the 

Supreme Court, which subsequently remanded the case to us with instructions to vacate 

our prior decision and reconsider the matter in light of Senate Bill No. 775, which 

amended section 1170.95.

DISCUSSION

Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) was enacted to “amend the 

felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to 

murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual 

killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying 

felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, 

2

Valadez attached our opinion to his resentencing petition and drew his 

description of the facts “essentially verbatim” from our opinion. 
4

subd. (f).) It accomplished that purpose by amending sections 188 and 189 and adding 

section 1170.95.

Under section 188, subdivision (a)(3), as amended, “[m]alice shall not be 

imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” And under 

section 189, as amended, to be liable for murder based on felony murder or a natural and 

probable consequences theory, a person must be one of the following: (1) the actual 

killer; (2) although not the actual killer, a person who intended to kill and assisted the 

actual killer in the commission of first degree murder; or (3) a major participant in the 

underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189, 

subd. (e)(1)-(3).)

Persons convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable 

consequences theory may seek resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. (People v. 

Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.) The process begins with the person filing “a petition 

with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted 

murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining 

counts . . . .” (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) The trial court then examines whether the petition 

contains the information required by the statute. (§ 1170.95, subd. (b).) If one or more of 

the required elements is missing from the petition, the trial court may deny it without 

prejudice. (§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(2).) If the petition does contain the required information 

and requests that counsel be appointed, the trial court must appoint counsel at this stage. 

(§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(3).)

Next, the prosecution must file and serve a response to the petition. 

(§ 1170.95, subd. (c).) The defendant may file and serve a reply. (Ibid.) After briefing is 

complete, the trial court holds a hearing to determine whether the defendant has set forth

a prima facie case for relief. (Ibid.) If the trial court is convinced the defendant has 

established a prima facie case, the court must issue an order to show cause, and thereafter 

hold a full hearing on the issue of entitlement. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
5

In our original decision in this matter, we concluded the focus of our 

analysis lay in the instructions given to the jury and the jury’s conviction of defendant for 

conspiracy to commit murder and its true finding on the multiple-murder special 

circumstance. Senate Bill No. 775 does not change our conclusion.

Conspiracy to commit murder requires a specific intent to kill. (People v. 

Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 607.) Consistent with this requirement, the jury 

instructions that were given included CALJIC No. 3.31, which includes the following

relevant language: “The crime of conspiracy requires the specific intent to commit the 

crime of murder”; and CALJIC No. 6.10: “A conspiracy is an agreement entered into 

between two or more persons with the specific intent to agree to commit the public 

offense of murder and with the further specific intent to commit such offense, followed 

by an overt act committed in this state by one [or more] of the parties for the purpose of 

accomplishing the object of the agreement.”

The multiple-murder special circumstance also requires an intent to kill. 

(People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 928.) The jury was instructed using 

CALJIC No. 8.80: “If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a 

co-conspirator or an aider or abetter, but you are unable to decide which, then you must 

also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended either to kill a human 

being or to aid another in the killing of a human being in order to find the special 

circumstance to be true.”

The jury convicted defendant of conspiracy to commit murder and found 

the multiple-murder special circumstance to be true as to Valadez. Thus, we conclude the 

jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt Valadez possessed the specific intent to 

kill. This makes him ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.

In supplemental briefing on remand from the Supreme Court, Valadez

contends he may have harbored the intent to kill at the time he joined the conspiracy to 

commit murder (thus making him guilty of that conspiracy), but not at the time at which 
6

the actual murder was committed. In other words, Valadez contends the law now 

requires a finding of intent to kill at the time of the murder for a murder conviction.3 We 

disagree.

Penal Code section 189, subdivision (e)(2), as amended by Senate Bill 

No. 1437, allows a murder conviction in a felony murder situation when “[t]he person 

was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, 

commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission 

of murder in the first degree.” The statute on its face requires an intent to kill at the time 

the defendant aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists the 

actual killer, not at the time of the killing itself.

Here, the jury convicted Valadez of conspiracy to commit murder. As 

discussed above, to convict Valadez of that offense, the jury was required to find he

intended to commit murder and agreed with one or more other persons to commit the 

murder, followed by an overt act by one or more of the conspirators for the purpose of 

accomplishing the murder. At the time Valadez entered the conspiracy, the jury found he

intended to kill. At the same time, by entering the conspiracy, he “aided, abetted, 

counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer.” (Sen. 

Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) § 1.) Thus, the jury found Valadez possessed the 

requisite intent—intent to kill—at the requisite time—at the time he aided or abetted the

actual killer. He is therefore ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.

3 We note this argument does not appear to be premised upon a change in the 

law arising from Senate Bill No. 775, but we nevertheless consider it on the merits. 

Valadez suggests no other basis upon which Senate Bill No. 775 would affect the result.
7

DISPOSITION

The postjudgment order is affirmed.

GOETHALS, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

BEDSWORTH, J.