J-A01043-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

DEBORAH K. KING, N/K/A DEBORAH 

K. BOOKHIMER

v.

THOMAS S. KING 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 469 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Dated March 22, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County Civil Division at No(s): 

280-2009

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: JANUARY 19, 2022

Thomas S. King (Husband), appeals pro se from the trial court’s order 

granting relief to Deborah K. King, now known as Deborah K. Bookhimer 

(Wife). Husband argues that the court erred by (1) awarding Wife interest on 

an unpaid amount owed by Husband to Wife, and (2) awarding 50% of 

Husband’s equity in one of the marital properties to Wife. We affirm. 

We present the facts and procedural history as stated by the trial court:

On October 24, 2018, [the trial court] ordered [Husband] to pay 

[Wife] $36,143.67[, which is the total sum of a marital line of 

credit, delinquent taxes, and legal fees. Husband] owes this 

money to [Wife] due to his failure to remove her from a marital 

line of credit before filing for bankruptcy, resulting in her being 

responsible for the $31,770.49 debt. This failure was a breach of 

their marriage settlement agreement dated June 29, 2010. [The 

marriage settlement agreement stated that Wife would convey her 

marital interest in the property located on Sheepskin Hollow Road 

in Dublin Township, Fulton County (Sheepskin Hollow Property),

to Husband. See Ex. A to Wife’s Pet. to Enforce [Marriage]

Settlement Agreement, 7/13/08, at ¶11(C). Husband] had also 
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agreed to compensate [Wife] $2,333.18 for her payment of 

delinquent taxes. The court also ordered [Husband] to pay 

$2,040.00 in legal fees [per the parties’ marriage settlement 

agreement. Husband] was further ordered to sell two parcels of 

real property, his only remaining assets, to satisfy his debt to 

[Wife. Husband] unsuccessfully appealed the order, and [this 

Court affirmed on August 29, 2019. King v. King, 1891 MDA 

2018 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 29, 2019) (King I) (unpublished 

mem.).1]

Throughout 2020, the parties attempted to effectuate a sale of

[the Sheepskin Hollow Property.] Due to both the 

miscommunication between and non-cooperation of the parties, a 

negotiated sale of the Sheepskin Hollow Property fell through. 

[Wife] filed a motion with [the trial] court to enforce its October 

24, 2018, decision.

Trial Ct. Op., 6/8/21, at 1-2. 

Following two hearings, on March 22, 2021, the trial court denied Wife’s 

motion to enforce the marriage settlement agreement but exercised its 

equitable power under 23 Pa.C.S. § 3323 and granted relief to Wife. In 

relevant part, the trial court ordered, inter alia, the sale of the Sheepskin 

Hollow Property and that $36,143.67 plus interest from the sale of the 

property be paid to Wife to satisfy Husband’s obligations. Id. at 3; accord 

Order, 3/22/21. The trial court additionally ordered that Husband and Wife 

were to split equally the remaining proceeds from the sale of the Sheepskin 

____________________________________________

1

In King I, Husband, pro se, argued the trial court violated his right to due 

process. King I, 1891 MDA 2018 at 3. The King I Court held, inter alia, that 

Husband failed to preserve his claim in the trial court and, regardless, failed 

to develop his arguments. Id. at 3-4.
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Hollow Property. Trial Ct. Op. at 9; accord Order, 3/22/21.2 Husband timely 

appealed, and on May 14, 2021, he voluntarily filed a non-court ordered Rule 

1925(b) Statement.3,4

Husband raises the following issues:

1. Did the [trial] court violate [Husband’s] rights to due process 

under Amendment Five of the Constitution by ordering him to 

pay interest on the previous amount awarded to [Wife] from 

October 24, 2018 when interest was never requested by 

[Wife], interest was never ordered by the [trial] court [in its 

October 24, 2018 order, the parties’] settlement agreement 

____________________________________________

2 No post-trial motion may be filed in any domestic relations matter. Pa.R.C.P. 

1930.2.

3 On April 22, 2021, the trial court ordered Husband to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 

1911, which governs the request of transcripts. Order, 4/22/21. Upon review 

of the order, the trial court apparently intended to order Husband to comply 

with Rule 1925(b) but never actually ordered Husband to comply with Rule 

1925(b). See id. at 1 (noting the trial court was “uncertain as to the basis of 

the appeal”). 

We add that Husband is incarcerated and averred he placed the Rule 1925(b) 

statement in the prison mailbox on May 14, 2021. See Thomas v. Elash, 

781 A.2d 170, 178 (Pa. Super. 2001) (per curiam) (extending prison mailbox 

rule to all civil cases).

4 The trial court has suggested that Husband’s appeal is not from an 

appealable order. Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5 (discussing Pa.R.A.P. 311 and 341). We 

respectfully disagree. This Court has held that orders filed subsequent to a 

divorce decree may be appealable when entered. See Danz v. Danz, 947 

A.2d 750, 751 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding that an order refusing to open 

or vacate divorce decree was a final and appealable order); Dalessio v. 

Dalessio, 805 A.2d 1250, 1252 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2002) (concluding that an 

order entered after the parties’ divorce decree was entered and after all 

economic claims were resolved was a final and appealable order). Instantly, 

the parties were divorced on July 16, 2010. Divorce Decree, 7/16/10. The 

order at issue was filed over ten years later on March 22, 2021. Because no 

other claims are outstanding, Husband’s appeal is properly before this Court. 

See, e.g., Danz, 947 A.2d at 751 n.1.
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does not call for any interest to either party for any reason and 

further, at no time during the [hearings] was [interest] ever 

discussed or ever debated upon.

2. Did the [trial] court violate [Husband’s] rights to due process 

under Amendment Five of the Constitution by ordering him to 

pay 50% of his equity in said property to [Wife] when equity 

was never requested by [Wife], equity was never ordered by 

the [trial] court [in its] October 24, 2018 court order, [the 

parties’ marriage] settlement agreement does not call for any 

equity to [Wife] for any reason and further, at no time during 

the [hearings] was this matter ever discussed or ever debated 

upon.

3. Did the [trial] court violate [Husband’s rights] to due process 

under Amendment Five of the Constitution by ordering its 

broad power of equity and jurisdiction offered by 23 Pa.C.S. 

[§] 3323(f) and thereby supervise the sale of [the] Sheepskin 

Hollow Road Property when [trial court] knew from realtor, Ron 

Richards[’] testimony, the problem with the previous offer to 

purchase was due to [Wife’s] lack of responsibility to properly 

negotiate the sale price [and Wife’s] total disregard for 

[Husband’s] ownership and equity in said property.

4. Did the [trial] court violate [Husband’s rights] to due process 

under Amendment Five of the Constitution by ordering [Wife] 

control over various aspects of the sale of said [property] when 

the [parties’ marriage] settlement agreement clearly states 

said property belongs to [Husband].

Husband’s Brief at 7, 19-20 (formatting altered).

We summarize Husband’s arguments together, as they are related. 

Husband contends the trial court erred by awarding interest on the amount he 

owes to Wife. See, e.g., id. at 16. Husband similarly asserts that the trial 

court improperly awarded 50% of the equity from the sale of the Sheepskin 

Hollow Road Property to Wife, when the parties’ marriage settlement 

agreement provided that only Husband owned the Sheepskin Hollow Road 
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Property. Id. at 18-19. Husband apparently argues that the record did not 

support the trial court’s decision to exercise its equitable power to supervise 

the sale of the Sheepskin Hollow Road Property. Id. at 19-21.

As a preliminary matter, this Court has stated:

While this court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a 

pro se litigant, we note that appellant is not entitled to any 

particular advantage because [he] lacks legal training. As our 

Supreme Court has explained, any layperson choosing to 

represent [himself] in a legal proceeding must, to some 

reasonable extent, assume the risk that [his] lack of expertise and 

legal training will prove [his] undoing.

Branch Banking & Trust v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citation omitted and formatting altered). “The Rules of Appellate Procedure 

state unequivocally that each question an appellant raises is to be supported 

by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority.” Eichman v. McKeon, 824 

A.2d 305, 319 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119. 

“When issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when the briefs 

are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a Court will not 

consider the merits thereof.” Gesiorski, 904 A.2d at 942-43 (citations

omitted). “We shall not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we 

scour the record to find evidence to support an argument; instead, we will 

deem [the] issue to be waived.” Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. 

Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

With respect to the merits, by way of background, Section 3502(e) of 

the Divorce Code permits the trial court to supervise the sale of a property in 
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order to enforce a marital settlement agreement:

(e) Powers of the court.—If, at any time, a party has failed to 

comply with an order of equitable distribution, as provided for in 

this chapter or with the terms of an agreement as entered into 

between the parties, after hearing, the court may, in addition to 

any other remedy available under this part, in order to effect 

compliance with its order:

* * *

(4) order and direct the transfer or sale of any property 

required in order to comply with the court’s order . . . .

23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(e); see also Osial v. Cook, 803 A.2d 209, 215 (Pa. Super. 

2002) (holding that the wife was entitled to statutory interest in connection 

with the parties’ marital settlement agreement). Further, the trial court has 

broad equitable powers to enforce a marital settlement agreement:

(f) Equity power and jurisdiction of the court.—In all 

matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity power and 

jurisdiction and may issue injunctions or other orders which are 

necessary to protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate 

the purposes of this part and may grant such other relief or 

remedy as equity and justice require against either party or 

against any third person over whom the court has jurisdiction and 

who is involved in or concerned with the disposition of the cause.

23 Pa.C.S. § 3323(f); see also Annechino v. Joire, 946 A.2d 121, 124 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (holding that Section 3323(f) may be used to enforce a marital 

settlement agreement).

In equity matters, appellate review is based on a determination 

by the appellate court of such questions as whether: (1) sufficient 

evidence supports the findings of the judge; (2) the factual 

inferences and legal conclusions based on those findings are 

correct; (3) there has been an abuse of discretion or an error of 

law. Generally, in an appeal from a trial court sitting in equity, 

the standard of review is rigorous. The function of this Court on 
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an appeal from an adjudication in equity is not to substitute its 

view for that of the lower tribunal; our task is rather to determine 

whether a judicial mind, on due consideration of all the evidence, 

as a whole, could reasonably have reached the conclusion of that 

tribunal.

Hess v. Gebhard & Co., 808 A.2d 912, 920 (Pa. 2002) (citations omitted 

and formatting altered).

Instantly, we have carefully reviewed Husband’s brief and find the 

defects to be substantial. Husband fails to develop any of his arguments by 

applying any legal principles to his case. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); Gesiorski, 

904 A.2d at 942-43. Significantly, Husband’s brief does not contain citations 

to, or appropriate analyses of, any legal authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); 

Eichman, 824 A.2d at 319. Although we liberally construe Husband’s pro se

brief, we are barred from acting as his counsel and developing his arguments. 

See Milby, 189 A.3d at 1079. Because Husband waived his issues, we affirm. 

See id.; see also King I, 1891 MDA 2018 at 3-4 (concluding Husband waived 

his issues due to, inter alia, deficient brief).

Regardless, even if Husband properly developed his claims of error, we 

would affirm on the basis of the trial court’s reasoning and agree with the trial 

court that it had the authority under Section 3323 to award interest on the 

unpaid amount Husband owed to Wife. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 3323(f); Trial Ct. 

Op. at 9-10; see also Osial, 803 A.2d at 215. We also agree with the trial 

court’s reasoning that it properly exercised its equitable authority under 

Section 3323(f) to supervise the sale of the Sheepskin Hollow Property and 
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award Wife a 50% share of the net proceeds due to Husband’s noncompliance 

with the marital settlement agreement. See Trial Ct. Op. at 8-9; 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3323(f). For these reasons, we affirm. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/19/2022
Circulated 01/07/2022 02:13 PM

THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE 39" JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

OF PENNSYLVANIA -- FULTON COUNTY BRANCH 

Deborah K. Seville, a/k/a Deborah K. 

Bookheimer, a/k/a Deborah K. King 

Plaintiff/ Appellee 

V. 

Thomas S. King 

Defendant / Appellant 

FULTON COUNTY { 

PENNSYLVANIA Z 

"2' 

JUN 0 $ 202 

PROTHONOTARY, CLERK UF COURTS 

CLERK OF ORHANS COURT 

REGISTER OF WILLS, RECORDER OF DEEDS 

Case No.: 

Judge: 

2009-280C 

Todd M. Sponseller 

Case Type: Civil Action 

OPINION sur Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

Before Sponseller, J. 

taIAL 3) 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE 39"" JUDICIAL 

DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA - FRANKLIN COUNTY BRANCH 

Deborah K. Seville, a/k/a Deborah K. 

Bookheimer, a/k/a Deborah K. King 

Plaintiff / Appellee 

Case Type: Civil Action 

Case No.: 2009-280C 

V. 

Thomas S. King 

Defendant / Appellant 

, . 

. 

Judge: Todd M. Sponseller 

OPINION sur Pa. R. App. P. 192S(a) 

I. OVERVIEW 

Appellant Thomas S. King ("Mr. King") appeals to the Superior Court following this 

court's Order dated March 17, 2021, which related to the anticipated sale of real property to 

satisfy a debt Mr. King owes to Plaintiff. In his Concise Statement of Matters Complained Of on 

Appeal ("Concise Statement"), Mr. King alleges that various provisions of the March 17, 2021, 

order violated his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. For the reasons that follow, we submit 

that no error was made and respectfully request that the Honorable Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania affirm our decision. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

\ 

On October 24, 2018, this court ordered Mr. King to pay $36,143.67 to Plaintiff, now 

known as Deborah K. Seville ("Mrs. Seville"). Mr. King owes this money to Ms. Seville due to 

his failure to remove her from a marital line of credit before filing for bankruptcy, resulting in 

her being responsible for the $31,770.49 debt. This failure was a breach of their marriage 

settlement agreement dated June 29, 2010. Mr. King had also agreed to compensate Mrs. Seville 
$2,333.18 for her payment of delinquent taxes. The court also ordered Mr. King to pay $2,040.00 

in legal fees.

1 Mr. King was further ordered to sell two parcels of real property, his only 

remaining assets, to satisfy his debt to Mrs. Seville. Mr. King unsuccessfully appealed the order, 

and Your Honorable Court upheld our decision in an Opinion filed October 19, 2019. 

Throughout 2020, the parties attempted to effectuate a sale of one of the properties, 

located on Sheepskin Hollow Road in Dublin Township, Fulton County ("The Sheepskin Hollow 

Property.") Due to both the miscommunication between and non-cooperation of the parties, a 

negotiated sale of the Sheepskin Hollow Property fell through. Mrs. Seville filed a motion with 

this court to enforce its October 24, 2018, decision. We held hearing on the motion in February 

and March of 2021. Thereafter, we issued an Order on March 17, 2021, from which Mr. King 

now appeals. 

Using its broad equity power and jurisdiction afforded by 23 Pa.C.S. $ 3323(0), this court 

determined to supervise the sale of the Sheepskin Hollow Property. Consequently, we ordered 

the following: 

a. A realtor who had prior involvement with the property and known to the parties, 

Ronald Richards, was appointed to serve as the listing agent for the Sheepskin 

Hollow Property and ordered to market the property in accordance with his 

expertise and discretion. 

b. Due to Defendant's incarceration, Plaintiff was ordered to arrange for the 

inspection of the property's septic system in order to secure a certificate in order 

to list the property for sale. 

1 The marriage separation agreement specifically provided that "the breaching or wrongdoing party shall bear the 

obligation of any and all costs, expenses or counsel fees incurred by the non-breaching party." See October 24, 2018 

Order. 

This property has also been referred to as "the Dublin Property" in other filings and proceedings. 

2 
c. The parties were required to submit the names of two suggested appraisers to 

appraise the property for the purpose of determining the listing price for the 

property. Plaintiff, again due to Defendant's incarceration, was to be responsible 

for contacting the appraiser and effectuating the appraisal. 

d. The parties were ordered to accept the first offer on the Sheepskin Hollow 

Property that is within ninety percent (90%) of the asking price. 

e. Following the sale, the proceeds were ordered to satisfy fifty percent (50%) of the 

Plaintiffs expenses in arranging for the inspection and the appraisal. A second 

portion of the proceeds was ordered to satisfy any other fees or expenses incurred 

by the sale of the property. 

f. Following the distribution of expenses, the next $36,143.67, plus interest at the 

prime rate of 3.25% per annum from October 24, 2018, was to be distributed to 

the Plaintiff to satisfy thisc Order of October 24, 2018. 

g. Any proceeds remaining after the distribution to the Plaintiff were to be 

distributed to Plaintiff and Defendant equally. 

Mr. King's appeal arises entirely from this March 17, 2021, Order. Mr. King filed his 

notice of appeal to the Superior Court on April 12, 2021, and was due to supply his Concise 

Statement by May 12, 2021. Mr. King filed his Concise Statement on May 19, 2021. Having 

considered the Mr. King's Concise Statement, this matter is now due for review. 

III. TIMELINESS 

First, we must address the timeliness of Mr. King's Concise Statement. Mr. King's 

Concise Statement was due on May 12, 2021, but was not filed until May 19, 2021. In the first 

paragraph of his Concise Statement, Mr. King states that he did not receive a copy of this court's 

3 
Order pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) directing him to file a statement of errors complained of on 

appeal. Mr. King further attaches a copy of a May 14, 2021 letter to the Fulton County 

Prothonotary claiming not to have received such an order, but stating that, due to his past appeal, 

he knew that a Concise Statement should have been ordered. 

Following the filing of this appeal, this court issued an order on April 21, 2021, which 

directed Mr. King to request any required transcripts and submit the required payment. Mr. King 

did so. The April 21, 2021 Order did not direct Mr. King to file a Concise Statement. 

In Pennsylvania, the failure to timely file a concise statement results in a waiver of any 

claims on appeal. However, noncompliance may be excused if the trial court order directing the 

filing of a Rule 1925 concise statement fails to comply with the language in Rule 1925(b )(3)(iii) 

and Rule 1925(b)(l)." See e.g. Berg v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 607 Pa. 341, 6 A.3d 1002 

(2010); Commonwealth v. Bush, 2018 PA Super 271, 197 A.3d 285 (2018). Because this court's 

Order dated April 21, 2021, did not direct Mr. King to file a Concise Statement, and because 

there were no other orders relating to this appeal, Mr. King's Concise Statement was filed on his 

own volition and must be considered timely. 

IV. RIPENESS 

The March 17, 2021 Order was not a final order for the purposes of Pa. R.A.P. 341, as it 

neither disposed of all claims and of all parties, nor was it entered as a final order pursuant to Pa. 

R.A.P. 341 ( c ). Therefore, this is an interlocutory appeal under Pa. R.A.P. 311. Pennsylvania 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 311 (a)(2) states that an appeal may be taken as of right and without 

reference to Pa. R.A.P. 341 ( c) from "an order confirming, modifying, dissolving, refusing to 

confirm, modify or dissolve an attachment, custodianship, receivership, or similar matter 

4 
affecting the possession or control of property, except for orders pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 

3323(f), 3505(a)." 

The March 17, 2021 order was plainly issued pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3323(f), and 

therefore is not appealable until final disposition of the case. Therefore, Mr. King's appeal 

should be quashed. 

V. ISSUES RAISED 

Mr. King makes four claims in his Concise Statement, each claiming that his Fifth 

Amendment Due Process rights were violated. According to Mr. King, his rights were violated 

when the court: 

a. Took over supervision of the sale of the Sheepskin Hollow Property; 

b. Ordered the Plaintiff to organize the appraisal and septic test; 

c. Ordered equal distribution of the final proceeds on the sale after all debts were 

settled; and 

d. Ordered the Plaintiff to receive interest on the $36,143.67 owed to her following 

the October 24, 2018 Order. 

VI. DISCUSSION 

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has explained the broad equity powers afforded to a 

trial court under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(f), writing: 

Section 3104(a), Jurisdiction, provides that in divorce matters, the trial court may 

"issue appropriate decrees or orders" with respect to spousal support, alimony, APL, and 

"[a]ny other matters pertaining to the marriage and divorce ... authorized by law and 

which fairly and expeditiously may be determined and disposed of in such action." 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3104(a)(l), (a)(5). Similarly, one can glean the legislative intent by viewing 

section 3323(f) of the Divorce Code. Section 3323(f) expressly authorizes the court to 

enter orders requiring either party to act or refrain from acting as equity and justice 

require. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(f). 

5 
Thus, since the court has personal jurisdiction over the parties to the divorce 

action, section 3323(0) is a catch-all provision, granting not only broad enforcement 

powers, but "full equity and jurisdiction" to issue orders necessary to protect the interests 

of the parties and effectuate economic justice and insure the fair and just settlement of the 

parties' property rights. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(£). 

Annechino v. Joire, 2008 PA Super 50, 946 A.2d 121, 124 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

All four of the court's actions in the March 17, 2021, Order with which Mr. King takes 

issue were properly ordered through our broad enforcement powers as set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. § 

3323(). They were also necessary to protect Mrs. Seville's interests, to effectuate economic 

justice, and to insure the fair and just settlement of the parties' property rights. Lastly, they were 

necessary to enforce this court's prior orders. 

a. The undertaking of supervision of the sale by the Court. 

At the hearing on March 9, 2021, the court heard testimony from Ronald Richards 

regarding the prior attempt to sell the Sheepskin Hollow Property. Mr. Richards testified that he 

had been a real estate broker for thirty-two (32) years

3, and that he had been involved in the 

initial listing of the Sheepskin Hollow Property pursuant to court order. Mr. Richards testified 

that he felt the initial listing price of $79,000.00 was too high, but that agreed to list at that price 

following a conversation with Mr. King and Mr. King's Power of Attorney, Daniel Sipes. Mr. 

Richards further testified that he felt the appropriate listing price was $60,000, and that he did 

receive one offer for $60,000, but it fell apart for reasons unknown to him.

6 Mr. Richards also 

testified that, in all of his dealings with Mrs. Seville, she had been cooperative, and that she had 

agreed to a sale price of $60,000.

7 On cross-examination, Mr. Richards testified that he believed 

J Transcript of Proceedings of Petition to Enforce Court Order, February 9, 2021 (T.P., 2/9/2021 "), at 8, In. 4-6. 

4 Id. at 9, In. 8-10. 

5 Id. at 10, In. 14-24. 

6 Id. at 14, In. 11 to p.15, In. I. 

7 Id. at 15, In. 8-13. 

6 
Mr. Sipes had made a counter-offer." Mr. Richards also testified that, because he could not "get 

cooperation to get it sold", he no longer wanted to be involved in the sale of the property after 

the listing expired. 

9 

Following this testimony, as well as testimony from the February 9, 2021, hearing, it 

became clear to the court that this property would not be sold without court intervention to 

oversee the sale. Following the February and March hearings, and after observing the demeanor 

of the litigants and making our credibility determinations, we attributed the failure of the sale of 

the property primarily to Mr. King. Mr. King apparently had a different view of what constitutes 

a fair asking price, and apparently instructed Mr. Sipes to negotiate away from a fair offer. 

Where Mrs. Seville was fully cooperative in the attempts at sale, Mr. King was not. In order to 

protect the interests of the parties, effectuate economic justice, and insure the fair and just 

settlement of the parties' property rights, the court believed it necessary to supervise the sale. 

b. The requirement for Plaintiff, rather than Defendant, to arrange the septic 

system inspection and appraisal. 

Mr. King stated incorrectly in his Concise Statement that the March 17, 2021, Order 

allows Mrs. Seville "control" over ordering the appraisal and the septic test. The March 17, 

2021, Order did not give any level of control to Mrs. Seville over the appraisal and septic test. 

This court ordered Jason Ramsey Septic Service to complete the inspection of the septic system 

and ordered the parties to submit two suitable appraisers each, and we would select an appraiser 

from that list. In other words, neither Mr. King nor Mrs. Seville have any substantive control 

over the choice of the appraiser nor the septic system inspection. Mrs. Seville, as part owner, and 

8 Id. at 25, In. 24. 

9 Id. at 13, In .. 24 top. 14, In. 3. 

7 
the only owner at liberty, is merely responsible for ensuring they take place and making the 

initial payment for them. 

The reason for Mrs. Seville's involvement at this level was Mr. King's repeated assertion 

of his own indigence and apparent inability to pay the fees for the appraisal and septic 

inspection." Thus, the March 17, 2021, Order required Mrs. Seville to pay for the appraisal and 

septic system test, which in tum necessarily requires her to be at least somewhat involved in the 

inspection and appraisal process. Furthermore, the Mr. King is currently incarcerated and is 

acting on this matter through Mr. Sipes.

11 Mr. King's incarceration and claims of indigence have 

proven, at every juncture, to be an obstacle in effectuating this sale. This decision by the court is 

not meant to occlude Mr. King from being involved in the sale of the property. It is merely meant 

to allow for scheduling to effectuate of two critical actions necessary for even listing this 

property for sale which we have has already ordered must take place. 

c. The equal distribution of proceeds after all debts are settled. 

The Sheepskin Hollow Property was ordered to be sold on October 24, 2018, to pay a 

debt incurred by Mrs. Seville due to Mr. King's failure to abide by the marriage settlement 

agreement and continue payments on a line of credit. Mrs. Seville testified at the original hearing 

that she had not been presented with a deed to sign for the Sheepskin Hollow Property, whereas 

Mr. King claimed that she had "unclean hands" for failing to sign. After hearing the parties 

testify and following a credibility determinations, this court found that Mr. King had failed to 

" Id. at 61, In. 5-9; 62, In. 3-15. 

Mr. King has three persons designated as his Power of Attorney, but Mr. Sipes has been handling the majority of 

the sale of this property on Mr. King's behalf. 

8 
ever produce for Mrs. Seville a deed to sign.

12 The record supports this factual determination, 

and it was upheld by the Superior Court.' 

Mr. King's failure to abide by the marriage settlement agreement resulted in significant 

economic loss to Mrs. Seville. Mr. King's failure to present the deed to Mrs. Seville resulted in 

Mrs. Seville retaining both ownership and responsibility over the Sheepskin Hollow Property, as 

she is still named on the deed. According to realtor Mr. Richards, "When her name is on the 

deed, shes considered part owner."! 

Therefore, Mrs. Seville owns half of the Sheepskin Hollow Property. Her name is on the 

deed, therefore she has a right to be involved in the sale. This is entirely the result of Mr. King's 

failure to abide by the marriage settlement agreement. Because Mrs. Seville's interest in the 

Sheepskin Hollow Property is equal to Mr. King's, Mrs. Seville is responsible for fifty-percent 

(50%) of the costs associated with the sale of the property, and she is entitled to fifty-percent 

(50%) of the proceeds of the sale after debts are paid. 

d. The interest on the original $36,143.67, beginning October 24, 2018. 

Mr. King was ordered to sell the Sheepskin Hollow Property on October 24, 2018. It is 

now May of 2021, two-and-a-half (2 1⁄2) years later. As discussed above, it was at least in part 

due to Mr. King's failure to accept a suitable asking price for the property and his lack of 

cooperation throughout this proceeding. We find that Mr. King has been deliberately obstructing 

the sale of this property because he does not want to pay Mrs. Seville the money he owes her. As 

such, this court found that requiring Mr. King to pay a fair amount of interest on his debt is 

See October 24, 2018 Order. 

" See Superior Court Opinion, August 29, 2019, at 5. 

'T.P., 2/9/2021 at 24, In. 1. 

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necessary to effectuate economic justice and insure a fair and just settlement of the parties' 

property rights. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

Based on the above reasoning, we submit that this court did not err as set forth in Mr. 

King's Concise Statement. We furthermore submit that Mr. King's appeal should be dismissed as 

it is not ripe for review. Therefore, this court respectfully requests that its decisions in these 

matters be affirmed. The record in this matter will be transmitted to the Superior Court 

concurrent with this Opinion. 

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