63648 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 238 / Tuesday, December 12, 1995 / Rules and Regulations

(b)(3) as (b)(3) and (b)(4), adding a new

paragraph (b)(2), and adding paragraph

(h) to read as follows:

970.5204–17 Legislative lobbying cost

prohibition.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(1) Providing Members of Congress, their

staff members, or staff of cognizant legislative

committees, in response to a request (written

or oral, prior or contemporaneous) from

Members of Congress, their staff members, or

staff of cognizant legislative committees, or

as otherwise directed by the Contracting

Officer, information or expert advice of a

factual, technical, or scientific nature, with

respect to topics directly related to the

performance of the contract or proposed

legislation. In providing this information or

expert advice, the contractor shall indicate to

the recipient that it is not presenting the

views of DOE. Reasonable costs for

transportation, lodging, or meals incurred by

contractor employees for the purpose of

providing such information or advice shall

also be reimbursable, provided the request

for information or expert advice is a prior

written request signed by a Member of

Congress, and provided such costs also

comply with the allowable cost provisions of

the contract.

(2) Providing State legislatures or

subdivisions thereof, their staff members, or

staff of cognizant legislative committees, in

response to a prior written request from a

State legislator, or as otherwise directed by

the Contracting Officer, information or expert

advice of a factual, technical, or scientific

nature, with respect to topics directly related

to the performance of the contract or

proposed legislation. In providing this

information or expert advice, the contractor

shall indicate to the recipient that it is not

presenting the views of DOE. Reasonable

costs for transportation, lodging, or meals

incurred by contractor employees shall also

be reimbursable, provided such costs also

comply with the allowable costs provision of

the contract.

* * * * *

(h) In providing information or expert

advice under paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of

this clause, the contractor shall advise the

Contracting Officer in advance or as soon as

practicable.

[FR Doc. 95–30236 Filed 12–11–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary

49 CFR Part 1

[OST Docket No. 1; Amdt. 1–275]

Organization and Delegation of Powers

and Duties Delegations of Authority to

the Maritime Administrator

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Secretary of

Transportation (Secretary) hereby

delegates to the Maritime Administrator

authority to carry out the provisions of

sections 10 through 13 of the National

Maritime Heritage Act of 1994, Public

Law 103–451. These sections authorize

the Secretary to convey all rights, title

and interests of the United States

Government in specified and nonspecified vessels, and vessel equipment

and spare parts, for various specified

purposes and subject to specified

conditions which vary among the

recipients. This amendment to 49 CFR

Part 1 adds a new paragraph 1.66(p) to

reflect the delegation of authority to the

Maritime Administrator.

EFFECTIVE DATE: December 12, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Linda Somerville, Chief, Division of

Vessel Transfer and Disposal, Office of

Ship Operations, Maritime

Administration, MAR–631, Room 7324,

400 Seventh Street SW, Washington,

DC, 20590, (202) 366–5821, or Steven B.

Farbman, Office of the Assistant General

Counsel for Regulation and Enforcement

(C–50), Department of Transportation,

Room 10424, 400 Seventh Street SW,

Washington, DC 20590, (202) 366–9306.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Sections

10 through 13 of Public Law 103–451,

108 Stat. 4769, 4778–4782, cited as the

‘‘National Maritime Heritage Act of

1994,’’ authorize the Secretary of

Transportation to convey a specified

vessel, or a vessel of comparable size

and class, as well as unneeded vessel

equipment, to the Battle of the Atlantic

Historical Society; an unspecified

vessel, including related spare parts and

vessel equipment, to the City of

Warsaw, Kentucky; three specified

vessels, including related spare parts

and vessel equipment, to Assistance

International, Inc.; and a specified

vessel, as well as unneeded vessel

equipment, to the Rio Grande Military

Museum. The conveyance of one or

more vessels to each specified recipient

is for one or more specified purposes,

respectively, a merchant marine

memorial, historical preservation, and

educational activities; the promotion of

economic development and tourism; use

in emergencies, vocational training, and

economic development programs; and

use as a military museum. Conveyances

to each recipient are subject to specified

common financial requirements and

other conditions relating to the use and

redelivery of the vessels. This

amendment to 49 CFR 1.66 adds the

subject authority to those already

delegated to the Maritime

Administrator. Since this amendment

relates to departmental management,

organization, procedure, and practice,

notice and comment are unnecessary,

and the rule may become effective in

fewer than 30 days after publication in

the Federal Register.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 1

Authority delegations (Government

agencies), Organizations and functions

(Government agencies).

In consideration of the foregoing, Part

1 of Title 49, Code of Federal

Regulations, is amended as follows:

PART 1—[AMENDED]

1. The authority citation for Part 1

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322; Pub. L. 101–552,

28 U.S.C. 2672, 31 U.S.C. 3711(a)(2).

2. Section 1.66 is amended by adding

a new paragraph (p), to read as follows:

§ 1.66 Delegations to Maritime

Administrator.

* * * * *

(p) Carry out the provisions of

sections 10 through 13 of Public Law

103–451, the National Maritime

Heritage Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 4769,

4778–4782;

* * * * *

Issued at Washington, DC this 5th day of

December 1995.

Federico Pen ̃ a,

Secretary of Transportation.

[FR Doc. 95–30144 Filed 12–11–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–62–P

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

49 CFR Part 553

[Docket No. 90–25; Notice 2]

RIN 2127–AD78

Rulemaking Procedures

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: NHTSA is amending its

procedural regulations that apply to

judicial review of regulations issued

under Chapters 301, 325, 329, and 331

of Title 49 of the United States Code.

The provisions at issue address the time

within which affected persons may seek

judicial review of a final rule issued by

NHTSA under those statutes if a

petition for agency reconsideration of

that rule has been filed. The amendment

will make the regulation consistent with

the judicial review provisions of the

statutes and with recent judicial

decisions.
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 238 / Tuesday, December 12, 1995 / Rules and Regulations 63649

EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendments made

in this rule are effective January 11,

1996.

Any petitions for reconsideration

must be received by NHTSA no later

than January 26, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Any petitions for

reconsideration should refer to the

docket and notice number of this notice

and be submitted to: Docket Section,

Room 5109, National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration, 400 Seventh

Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20590.

(Docket Room hours are 9:30 a.m.–4:00

p.m., Monday through Friday.)

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kenneth N. Weinstein, Assistant Chief

Counsel for Litigation, Office of Chief

Counsel, National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration, 400 Seventh

Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20590.

Telephone: (202) 366–5263.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Certain

provisions of the former Motor Vehicle

Information and Cost Savings Act (‘‘Cost

Savings Act’’) and the former National

Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act

(‘‘Safety Act’’) provide for judicial

review of rules and standards issued

thereunder. These statutes were recently

recodified, ‘‘without substantive

change,’’ as various chapters of Title 49

of the U.S. Code. Section 6 of Pub. L.

103–272.

With respect to Chapter 301, ‘‘Motor

Vehicle safety,’’ 49 U.S.C. 30161(a)

(formerly section 105(a) of the Safety

Act) provides that any person adversely

affected by an order prescribing a motor

vehicle safety standard under chapter

301 may file a petition for judicial

review of the order in an appropriate

United States Court of Appeals ‘‘not

later than 59 days after the order is

issued.’’

With respect to Chapter 325, ‘‘Bumper

Standards,’’ 49 U.S.C. 32503(a)

(formerly section 103(a) of the Cost

Savings Act) provides that any person

who may be adversely affected by a

standard issued under section 32502

may file a petition for judicial review of

the standard in an appropriate United

States Court of Appeals ‘‘not later than

59 days after the standard is

prescribed.’’

With respect to Chapter 329,

‘‘Automobile Fuel Economy,’’ 49 U.S.C.

32909 (formerly section 504(a) of the

Cost Savings Act) provides that any

person who may be adversely affected

by a regulation prescribed under

sections 30901–30904, 32908, or

32912(c)(1) may file a petition for

judicial review of the regulation in an

appropriate United States Court of

Appeals ‘‘not later than 59 days after the

regulation is prescribed.’’

With respect to Chapter 331, ‘‘Theft

Prevention,’’ 49 U.S.C. 33117 (formerly

section 610 of the Cost Savings Act)

provides that a person who may be

adversely affected by any regulation

prescribed under that chapter may

obtain judicial review of that regulation

in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 32909, as

described in the previous paragraph.

None of these statutory provisions

require parties to seek administrative

reconsideration before filing a petition

for judicial review. However, NHTSA

has authorized the filing of petitions for

reconsideration of standards and

regulations issued under the Chapters

301, 325, 329, and 331. 49 CFR 553.35.

Time limits and other procedures

applicable to such petitions are set forth

in 49 CFR 553.35–553.39.

Section 553.39 currently provides as

follows:

The filing of a timely petition for

reconsideration of any rule issued under this

part postpones the expiration of the 60-day

period in which to seek judicial review of

that rule, as to every person adversely

affected by the rule. Such person may file a

petition for judicial review at any time from

the issuance of the rule in question until 60

days after publication in the Federal Register

of the Administrator’s disposition of any

timely petitions for reconsideration.

Unfortunately, this regulatory

provision contains several erroneous

statements. First, the applicable time

period for filing petitions for judicial

review under these chapters is actually

59 days rather than 60 days. Prior to the

recent recodification, the statutory

language provided that petitions for

review had to be filed ‘‘prior to the

sixtieth day’’ after the order in question

was issued. Each of the courts that

considered the issue had ruled that this

language required petitions to be filed

not later than 59 days after the issuance

of the order. The recodified language in

each of the four chapters explicitly

states that the applicable review period

is 59 days.

Second, recent judicial decisions

construing the judicial review

provisions of the Administrative

Procedure Act and similar statutory

review provisions have made it clear

that a person who files a petition for

agency reconsideration of a regulation

may not simultaneously seek judicial

review of that regulation, since the

original decision is rendered ‘‘nonfinal’’

as to that person. See, e.g., Wade v.

F.C.C., 986 F.2d 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1993);

United Transp. Union v. I.C.C., 871 F.2d

1114 (D.C. Cir. 1989); West Penn Power

Co. v. U.S. EPA, 860 F.2d 581 (3rd Cir.

1988). See generally I.C.C. v.

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,

482 U.S. 270 (1987); Bellsouth Corp. v.

F.C.C., 17 F.3d 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Third, these decisions also

demonstrate that the filing of a petition

for agency reconsideration by one

person does not affect the judicial

review rights of other persons affected

by the rule. See ICG Concerned Workers

Ass’n v. United States, 888 F.2d 1455

(D.C. Cir. 1989); West Penn, supra;

Winter v. I.C.C., 851 F.2d 1056 (8th

Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 308 (1988)

[GET U.S. CITATION]; Petroleum

Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 22 F.3d

1164, 1171 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Finally, contrary to NHTSA’s current

regulation, a person who files a petition

for reconsideration may not file a

petition for judicial review ‘‘at any

time’’ prior to the expiration of the

statute of limitations. Rather, a petition

for review that is filed by a party prior

to the agency’s action on his or her

petition for reconsideration is

‘‘incurably premature’’ and does not

‘‘ripen’’ when the ruling on

reconsideration is issued. TeleSTAR,

Inc. v. F.C.C., 888 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir.

1989).

On the basis of its review of the case

law, NHTSA issued a Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking (‘‘NPRM’’) to

correct the erroneous portions of section

553.39. 55 FR 45825 (October 31, 1990).

First, the agency proposed to eliminate

the inaccurate reference to a 60-day

limitations period for judicial review.

The proposal did not refer to a 59-day

period, however, since Part 553 applies

to regulations issued under statutes

other than the four chapters identified

above that have statutory 59-day

limitations periods. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C.

Chapters 323 and 327.

In addition, the agency proposed

language to clarify that the filing of a

petition for reconsideration tolls the

limitations period for judicial review

only as to the petitioner, and not as to

other interested persons, and that such

a petitioner may not seek judicial

review until the agency acts on the

petition for reconsideration.

Discussion of Comments

Three commenters responded to the

NPRM: Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler),

the Association of International

Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM), and

the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers

Association (MVMA). (MVMA has

subsequently changed its name to the

American Automobile Manufacturers

Association.)

None of the commenters objected to

the elimination of the erroneous

reference to 60 days as the time period

within which a petition for judicial

review may be filed. However, Chrysler
63650 Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 238 / Tuesday, December 12, 1995 / Rules and Regulations

and MVMA sought clarification as to

what constituted final agency action

upon a petition for reconsideration and

asked when ‘‘a petitioner [is] presumed

to have notice of that action.’’

In the absence of a petition for

reconsideration, regulations and

standards promulgated under Chapters

301, 325, 329, and 331 are deemed final

for purposes of judicial review when

they are ‘‘issued’’ (49 U.S.C. § 30161(a))

or ‘‘prescribed’’ (49 U.S.C. §§ 32503(a)

and 32909(b)). (In this context, NHTSA

interprets the word ‘‘prescribed’’ to be

synonymous with the word ‘‘issued.’’)

The agency deems a decision in

response to a petition for

reconsideration, which usually will be

either a denial of the petition or a

revision to the regulation or standard

that generated the petition, to be final

for judicial review purposes on the date

that it is issued or prescribed.

A petitioner is presumed to have

notice of the agency’s action when it is

published in the Federal Register. See

44 U.S.C. § 1507; Federal Crop

Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380

(1947). However, the language of each of

these statutes indicates that the time

period for judicial review does not begin

to run on the publication date; rather it

runs from the date that the regulation,

standard, or decision on reconsideration

is ‘‘issued’’ or ‘‘prescribed’’ by the

agency.

MVMA and AIAM opposed the

remainder of the proposed amendment,

arguing that one party’s petition for

reconsideration should stay the statute

of limitations for judicial review for all

interested parties, not merely for the

petitioner. They asserted that the

proposed amendment was not

compelled by the case law described in

the NPRM. They also suggested that the

amendment would increase paperwork

and reduce efficiency and could lead to

the filing of unnecessary petitions for

reconsideration and/or protective

petitions for review.

None of the commenters dispute the

agency’s conclusion that the filing of a

petition for reconsideration stays the

running of the limitations period for the

petitioner because the filing of the

petition renders the prior decision

‘‘nonfinal’’ as to that petitioner. (In this

regard, NHTSA is aware that in a recent

case, the Supreme Court ruled that a

petition to reopen a decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals does not

toll the limitations period or otherwise

affect judicial review of the Board’s

decision. Stone v. I.N.S., 115 S. Ct. 1537

(1995). However, the Court based its

ruling on the specific language of the

judicial review provisions of the

Immigration and Nationality Act and

policy considerations arising under that

statute. Indeed, the Court explicitly

confirmed that, in general, the filing of

a request for agency reconsideration

renders the underlying order nonfinal

for purposes of judicial review and that

the petitioning party cannot seek

judicial review until the reconsideration

is concluded. 115 S. Ct. at 1543.)

The commenters also agreed that

persons who have not sought agency

reconsideration may seek judicial

review immediately, without waiting for

the completion of the reconsideration

process. However, in suggesting that

such other persons should be able, at

their option, to await the agency’s

decision on reconsideration before

seeking judicial review, the commenters

lose sight of the fact that the reason such

persons may seek judicial review

promptly is that the regulation is final

as to them. ‘‘If a party has sought only

judicial review, agency action can be

deemed final and hence reviewable as to

that party, regardless of whether other

parties have moved for administrative

reconsideration.’’ ICG Concerned

Workers, 888 F.2d at 1457.

Given that the regulation is final as to

all persons not seeking reconsideration,

there is no basis on which the agency

(or the courts) could legally extend the

limitations period applicable to those

parties beyond the 59 days provided by

statute. The case law clearly

demonstrates that ‘‘finality with respect

to agency action is a party-based

concept.’’ IGC Concerned Workers, 888

F.2d at 1457, citing West Penn, 860 F.2d

at 586–87; Winter, 851 F.2d at 1062; and

American Farm Lines v. Black Ball

Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 541 (1970).

It is true that the cases on this subject

have focussed primarily on whether a

nonpetitioning party may seek judicial

review of an agency action while

another party’s petition for

reconsideration of that action is

pending, rather than on whether such a

party must seek such review within the

statutory limitations period. However,

in the agency’s view, the latter principle

necessarily follows from the fact that the

original decision is final as to all

nonpetitioning parties.

NHTSA recognizes that under this

amendment, some parties may feel

compelled to file protective petitions for

reconsideration or judicial review that

might ultimately be withdrawn

depending on the agency’s response to

another party’s petition for

reconsideration. However, to the extent

that this is ‘‘wasteful,’’ it is not the fault

of the amendment; it is required by the

case law. As noted in the NPRM, an

agency’s regulations may not expand the

jurisdiction of the Federal courts

beyond that established by Congress.

City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma,

357 U.S. 320, 336 (1957); City of

Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927 (D.C.

Cir. 1979).

The agency believes the public

interest would be disserved by a

regulation that erroneously purported to

confer Federal court jurisdiction that

does not exist, since a person might

improperly rely on the regulation to his

or her detriment. To further reduce the

possibility of confusion or

misunderstanding, NHTSA is adding a

phrase at the end of the first sentence of

the amended regulation that explicitly

states that the expiration of the review

period is not postponed for persons who

have not sought agency reconsideration.

Chrysler requested clarification as to

the amended rule’s impact upon

associations composed of various

member companies. Chrysler suggested

that an association’s petition for

reconsideration should stay the

limitations period for judicial review for

the members of the association as well

as for the association itself.

NHTSA realizes that some individual

members of an association might want

to wait for the agency’s response to their

association’s petition for

reconsideration before deciding whether

to seek judicial review. However, as

MVMA emphasized in its comments,

other members might want to seek such

review immediately. Consistent

application of the principle of finality

requires that if individual members of

an association are permitted to seek

judicial review of the original regulatory

action following disposition of the

association’s petition for

reconsideration, they must be precluded

from seeking immediate judicial review

during the pendency of that petition.

Thus, when an association files a

petition for reconsideration solely in its

own name, such a petition would only

extend the right of the association itself

to seek judicial review following

reconsideration. Under those

circumstances, the members would not

have any right to an extended period for

seeking judicial review derived from the

association’s petition. However, if the

association explicitly files its petition

for reconsideration on behalf of all of its

members, or some specifically identified

members, those members would each be

deemed as having filed a petition. Of

course, under that scenario, none of the

identified members could individually

seek judicial review while the petition

for reconsideration is pending.

The purpose of the amended rule is

not to encourage pre-mature requests for

judicial review; rather, the amendment

seeks to provide notice of the applicable
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 238 / Tuesday, December 12, 1995 / Rules and Regulations 63651

law. Thus, each person who considers

himself or herself to be aggrieved by a

NHTSA rule or standard must file a

timely petition for reconsideration or a

timely petition for judicial review in

order to preserve his or her ability to

challenge the underlying rule.

NHTSA wishes to emphasize two

additional points. First, this amendment

does not preclude any person who is

aggrieved by the agency’s action in

response to a petition for

reconsideration from seeking judicial

review of that response, since such a

response is itself a reviewable agency

action. Second, a person who files a

petition for reconsideration may obtain

judicial review of all aspects of the

original order, not merely the portion of

that order on which he or she sought

reconsideration. See Bellsouth Corp., 17

F.3d at 1489–90. However, persons who

did not seek timely reconsideration or

timely judicial review of the original

agency action may only challenge the

actions taken by the agency in response

to the petition for reconsideration. All

other issues were final as to the

nonpetitioning parties at the time of the

original action. Therefore, any court

challenge by nonpetitioning parties to

agency actions not affected by the

response to the petition for

reconsideration must be made within 59

days of the original agency action.

Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

Executive Order 12866 and DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This rulemaking was not reviewed

under E.O. 12866. NHTSA has analyzed

this rulemaking determined that it is not

‘‘significant’’ within the meaning of the

Department of Transportation’s

regulatory policies and procedures.

Because the changes are only procedural

in nature, they will not have any cost

impacts.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

NHTSA has also considered the

impacts of this final rule under the

Regulatory Flexibility Act. For reasons

discussed above, I hereby certify that

this rule will not have a significant

economic impact on a substantial

number of small entities.

Paperwork Reduction Act

There are no requirements for

information collection associated with

this final rule.

National Environmental Policy Act

NHTSA has also analyzed this final

rule under the National Environmental

Policy Act and determined that it will

not have a significant impact on the

human environment.

Executive Order 12612 (Federalism)

NHTSA has analyzed this rule in

accordance with the principles and

criteria contained in E.O. 12612, and

has determined that this rule will not

have significant federalism implications

to warrant the preparation of a

Federalism Assessment. No State laws

will be affected.

Civil Justice Reform

This final rule does not have any

retroactive or preemptive effect.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 553

Administrative practice and

procedure.

PART 553—RULEMAKING

PROCEDURES

In consideration of the foregoing, 49

CFR part 553 is amended as follows:

1. The authority citation for part 553

of title 49 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 1657, 30103,

30122, 30124, 30125, 30127, 30146, 30162,

32303, 32502, 32504, 32505, 32705, 32901,

32902, 33102, 33103, and 33107; delegation

of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

2. Section 553.39 is revised to read as

follows:

§ 553.39 Effect of petition for

reconsideration on time for seeking judicial

review.

The filing of a timely petition for

reconsideration of any rule issued under

this part postpones the expiration of the

statutory period in which to seek

judicial review of that rule only as to the

petitioner, and not as to other interested

persons. For the petitioner, the period

for seeking judicial review will

commence at the time the agency takes

final action upon the petition for

reconsideration.

Issued on: December 5, 1995.

Ricardo Martinez,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 95–30034 Filed 12–11–95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. 74–09; Notice 43]

RIN 2127–AF02

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

Standards; Child Restraint Systems

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA),

Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Final rule; response to petitions

for reconsideration, delay of compliance

date.

SUMMARY: This document delays until

September 1, 1996, the date on which

manufacturers of add-on (portable) child

restraint systems must comply with a

final rule that was published July 6,

1995 (60 FR 35126), and corrected

September 29, 1995 (60 FR 50477). The

rule amended Federal Motor Vehicle

Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 213,

‘‘Child Restraint Systems,’’ to add a

greater array of sizes and weights of test

dummies for use in compliance tests.

Today’s document responds to those

requests in petitions for reconsideration

of the rule relating to the compliance

date. It provides needed leadtime to

manufacturers of add-on (portable) child

restraint systems to make necessary

design changes to conform to the new

requirements.

The agency will respond to the

remaining requests in the petitions for

reconsideration in another document

that will be published in the Federal

Register in the near future.

DATES: The effective date (i.e., the date

on which the text of the CFR is changed)

of the final rule published July 6, 1995

(60 FR 35126) and corrected September

29, 1995 (60 FR 50477), remains January

3, 1996.

For manufacturers of built-in child

restraint systems, the compliance date

for the amendments remains September

1, 1996.

However, for manufacturers of add-on

child restraint systems, the compliance

date for the amendments made by those

rules (i.e., the date on which these

manufacturers must begin complying

with the amendments) is changed to

September 1, 1996.

Petitions for reconsideration of the

rule must be received by January 11,

1996.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration

should refer to the docket and number

of this document and be submitted to:

Administrator, Room 5220, National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration,

400 Seventh Street S.W., Washington,

D.C., 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For

nonlegal issues: Dr. George Mouchahoir,

Office of Vehicle Safety Standards

(telephone 202–366–4919).

For legal issues: Ms. Deirdre Fujita,

Office of the Chief Counsel (202–366–

2992). Both can be reached at the

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, 400 Seventh St., S.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

This document delays until

September 1, 1996, the date on which

manufacturers of add-on (portable) child