IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1672

Filed November 8, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

COREY ROBERT FENTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Samantha Gronewald, 

Judge.

Defendant appeals his sentences for convictions of possession of a 

controlled substance, second offense; operating while intoxicated, second offense; 

and three counts of driving while barred. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Carr, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2023).
2

CARR, Senior Judge.

Corey Fenton appeals his sentences for convictions of possession of a 

controlled substance, second offense; operating while intoxicated, second offense; 

and three counts of driving while barred. Fenton claims the State breached his 

plea agreements by failing to advocate for the agreed-upon sentencing 

recommendations. We find the State honored the terms of the plea agreement 

and endorsed the sentencing recommendation that was part of the plea 

agreement. We affirm Fenton’s convictions and sentences.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

In AGCR353222, Fenton was charged with driving while barred. In 

OWOM090871, he was charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI), second 

offense. In FECR35350, Fenton was charged with possession of a controlled 

substance (marijuana), second offense, and driving while barred. In 

AGCR354230, he was charged with driving while barred. At the same time, Fenton 

was facing probation revocation proceedings and felony charges for solicitation.

On April 22, 2022, Fenton signed written plea agreements to the charges of 

possession of a controlled substance, OWI, and three counts of driving while 

barred. Under the agreement, the parties were to recommend a sentence of two 

years for each of the five counts, to be served consecutively for a total of ten 

years.1 They were also to recommend that this ten-year sentence be served 

1 The agreement in AGCR353222 was “Consecutive w/ AGCR354230, 

OWOM090871, & FECR353530, 5 aggs x 2 yrs. each totaling 10 years, argue 

disposition, concurrent w/ROV.” The agreement in OWOM090871 was “All counts 

run consecutive (w/ACGR353222, FECR353530, AGCR354230 – 5 x 2 yrs) for 

total 10 yrs. concurrent w/ROV, argue disposition.” The agreement in 

AGCR354230 was “Consecutive to AGCR353222, FECR35350, OWOM090871 
3

concurrently with the sentence arising from revocation of probation. They were 

free to argue the disposition. The agreements also provided, “[t]he Court is not 

bound by the plea agreement and may impose the maximum sentence as allowed 

by law.”2 The plea agreement did not include the solicitation charge of which he 

was convicted at trial.

A sentencing hearing was held for these offenses and also the solicitation 

conviction and probation revocation matters. The prosecutor stated:

Your Honor, it is the State’s recommendation that the 

defendant be adjudged guilty of each of these offenses, so—and be 

ordered to serve . . . indeterminate sentences not to exceed two 

years on each of the remaining five counts to which the defendant

has pled guilty, including three driving while barreds; possession of 

controlled substance, second offense; and operating a motor vehicle 

while intoxicated, second offense.

. . . .

Furthermore, that the counts—or the 15 years[3]in these new 

sentences run concurrent with the cases for which the defendant has 

previously been placed on probation.

. . . .

So the State is recommending that this 15-year term of 

incarceration run concurrent with his five-year term of incarceration 

for the probation violations.

. . . .

The Court can see these are all separate and serious 

offenses. While driving while barred in and of itself is not always 

seen as the most serious offense out there, it often can lead to 

eluding. It—very rarely do people who do not have a driver’s license 

have insurance. So driving while barred, while in and of itself is not 

seen as the most serious, when we have the number of charges that 

and concurrent to current probation for a total of 10 years—argue disposition.” The 

agreement in FECR353530 was “5 aggs. x 2 yrs. run consecutive (counts in 

OWOM090871, AGCR353222, AGCR354230, Ct. 1 in FECR353530), total 10 

yrs., argue disposition.”

2 The plea agreement in OWOM090871 had slightly different language: “The Court 

is not bound by the plea agreement and may give me the maximum sentence 

allowed by law, including any enhanced sentence.”

3 The reference to fifteen years in the prosecutor’s recommendation is the total of 

ten years (five counts times two years each) plus the five-year sentence for 

solicitation.
4

this defendant continues to pick up and then, on top of that, one of 

those being an operating while intoxicated and also having drugs on 

his person—or in his possession. . . . 

We do believe that the 15-year term, with the separate and 

serious nature of all of these offenses, will provide him the maximum 

opportunity for rehabilitation. I’m glad to see he has already started

down that rehabilitation road, with completing the substance abuse 

classes within the Polk County Jail, but with the long history that he 

has and the number of charges and how it appears his life spiralled 

very quickly, that term of incarceration is appropriate, Your Honor. 

And so we would ask that the Court run these charges consecutive 

to each other but concurrent with the terms of probation.

Defense counsel argued that Fenton should be placed on probation. The 

district court sentenced Fenton to a term of imprisonment not to exceed two years 

on each of the five charges, to be served consecutively. Fenton was also 

sentenced to five years on the solicitation charge and five years in the probation 

revocation matter, giving him a total sentence of twenty years in prison.4 The court 

stated, “These sentences are consecutive, based upon the separate and serious 

nature of the offenses and because the new charges were, in fact, committed while

you were on probation.” The court denied Fenton’s request to be placed on 

probation. Fenton now appeals the sentencing court’s decision.

II. Standard of Review

A sentence that falls within the statutory limits is reviewed “with a strong 

presumption in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W. 2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). 

“To warrant reversal of a sentence, the record must show some ‘abuse of 

discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.’” State v. Patten, 981 

4 This appeal does not involve the sentences imposed on the solicitation charge or 

the probation revocation matter. The only issue here is whether the sentences in 

this case should be served concurrently or consecutively to the sentences in those 

matters.
5

N.W.2d 126, 130 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion is shown 

when the court relies on a reason that is “clearly untenable or unreasonable.” State 

v. Covel, 925 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Iowa 2018). 

III. Sentencing

Fenton claims the State breached the plea agreement by failing to endorse 

the agreed-upon sentencing recommendation.5 He asserts that the prosecutor 

gave only a perfunctory endorsement of the sentencing recommendation. He 

contends the prosecutor did not do enough to follow the agreement’s provision that 

the parties would recommend the ten years in prison for the five offenses should 

be served concurrently with the sentence for revocation of probation, and this 

resulted in the court ordering the sentences should be served consecutively.

“The relevant inquiry in determining whether the prosecutor breached the 

plea agreement is whether the prosecutor acted contrary to the common purpose 

of the plea agreement and the justified expectations of the defendant and thereby 

effectively deprived the defendant of the benefit of the bargain.” State v.

Davis, 971 N.W.2d 546, 556 (Iowa 2022). The supreme court has stated:

A fundamental component of plea bargaining is the 

prosecutor’s obligation to comply with a promise to make a 

sentencing recommendation by doing more than simply informing 

the court of the promise the State has made to the defendant with 

respect to sentencing. The prosecutor must actually fulfill the 

promise. Violations of either the terms or the spirit of the agreement 

require reversal of the conviction or vacation of the sentence. 

5 Following a guilty plea, a defendant must have good cause to appeal. See Iowa 

Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2021). Fenton is challenging his sentence, rather than the 

guilty plea, so he has established good cause to appeal. See Patten, 981 N.W.2d 

at 130.
6

Id. (cleaned up). It is not sufficient if the prosecutor gives only a “perfunctory 

endorsement” of the agreed-upon sentencing recommendations. Id. at 557.

A determination of whether the State breached a plea agreement is “a highly 

context-specific analysis.” Patten, 981 N.W.2d at 133. “Although we agree it is 

often helpful (and sometimes even necessary) to explain a recommendation, doing 

so does not inherently advance a recommendation, . . . just as it does not inherently 

undercut one.” Id. (citation omitted).

We find the State fulfilled its responsibilities under the plea agreement to 

recommend that the five two-year consecutive sentences run concurrently with the 

sentence on the probation revocation matter. The prosecutor stated three times 

that the sentences in the five cases at issue here should run concurrently with the 

sentence arising from the revocation of probation. The prosecutor did more than 

a “perfunctory endorsement” of the sentencing recommendation. See Davis, 971 

N.W.2d at 557. The prosecutor did recite parts of the defendant’s record of 

convictions and argued for incarceration but, in context, her comments countered 

the defendant’s request for probation and did not undercut her adherence to the 

plea agreement. See Patten, 981 N.W.2d at 133. 

Fenton has not established that the State breached the plea agreement. 

We affirm his convictions and sentences.

AFFIRMED.