In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 18‐1010

ARCHIE BEATON,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

SPEEDYPC SOFTWARE, a British Columbia Company,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 8389 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 30, 2018 — DECIDED OCTOBER 31, 2018

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and HAMILTON,

Circuit Judges.  

WOOD, Chief Judge. When Archie Beaton’s laptop started

misbehaving, he looked for an at‐home fix. An internet search

turned up a product from SpeedyPC Software (“Speedy”)

that offered both a diagnosis and a cure. Beaton took ad‐

vantage of Speedy’s free trial, which warned that his device

was in bad shape and encouraged him to purchase its soft‐
2 No. 18‐1010

ware solution: SpeedyPC Pro. He did. But he was disap‐

pointed with the outcome: despite Speedy’s promises, the

software failed to improve his laptop’s performance.  

Beaton became convinced that he was the victim of a scam.

He filed a consumer class action against Speedy, raising both

contract and tort theories. The district court certified a nation‐

wide class and an Illinois subclass of software purchasers.

Hoping to dodge the consumer class action, Speedy turned to

this court for relief. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). Because we find

no abuse of discretion in the district court’s certification or‐

ders, we affirm.

I

The ad for SpeedyPC Pro that Beaton found in August

2012 promised that Speedy’s software would fix common

problems affecting computer speed and performance and un‐

leash the device’s “true potential.” It also offered a free scan

to detect any problems. Beaton decided to give it a try, and so

he downloaded and ran the free trial. After assessing the lap‐

top’s health across five modules, the program told Beaton that

his computer was in critical condition as a result of hundreds

of serious errors.  

The free trial prompted Beaton to buy the licensed version

of the software, which (he was promised) would fix the iden‐

tified problems. Beaton was sold. Using his personal busi‐

ness’s credit card, he purchased SpeedyPC Pro and ran it on

his laptop. It began by scanning his device, just as the free trial

had done. The program then told Beaton to click on “Fix All.”

Beaton dutifully did so. Yet nothing happened. Beaton ran the

software a few more times, to no avail.  
No. 18‐1010 3

Feeling ripped off, and suspecting that his experience was

not unique, Beaton sued Speedy in 2013 on behalf of a class of

consumers defined as “All individuals and entities in the

United States who have purchased SpeedyPC Pro.” Despite

Speedy’s lofty pledges, Beaton claimed, the software failed to

perform as advertised. Instead, it indiscriminately and mis‐

leadingly warned all users that their devices were in critical

condition, scared them into buying SpeedyPC Pro, and then

ran a functionally worthless “fix.” The district court had juris‐

diction over this putative class action under the Class Action

Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).

Speedy twice tried, and twice failed, to get the lawsuit

thrown out. The district court first rejected its effort to have

the complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim on which

relief could be granted. Speedy then tried a motion to dismiss

on forum non conveniens grounds, based on the fact that the

software’s End User License Agreement (“the Agreement”)

contained a choice‐of‐law provision selecting the law of Brit‐

ish Columbia (Canada) to govern any claims arising from it.

The district court, however, decided to retain the case without

definitively resolving the choice‐of‐law issue at that juncture.

Four years after the suit was filed, Beaton moved to certify

a class and subclass of software purchasers. Beaton’s pro‐

posed class definition was narrower than the one in his com‐

plaint. It included “[a]ll individuals living in the United States

who downloaded a free trial of SpeedyPC Pro and thereafter

purchased the full version between October 28, 2011 and No‐

vember 21, 2014.” He also proposed a subclass of class mem‐

bers “who reside in Illinois” and several other states.  

The district court certified Beaton’s class claims for

breaches of the implied warranties of fitness for a particular
4 No. 18‐1010

purpose and merchantability. On behalf of a subclass consist‐

ing only of Illinois residents, the court certified claims for

fraudulent misrepresentation under the Illinois Consumer

Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (ICFA). It rejected

the proposed subclass insofar as it included residents from

other states, because Beaton failed to identify the relevant con‐

sumer‐protection laws of those states.

The court had the benefit of dueling expert testimony be‐

fore it at the time it made these certification decisions. Bea‐

ton’s expert, Craig Snead, described how the free trial oper‐

ated across devices. Speedy’s expert, Monty Myers, disputed

Snead’s account. Although the court had not yet issued its rul‐

ing on the parties’ cross‐motions to exclude the testimony of

each other’s expert, it ultimately denied both motions (with

minor exceptions) roughly two months later. See FED. R. EVID.

702. In that order, the court noted that it had “considered the

challenged expert testimony for purposes of class certification

only to the extent consistent with the rulings stated.”

At that point, Speedy filed and we granted a petition for

interlocutory appeal of the class certification decisions. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). We note that Speedy’s petition may have

been untimely, but Beaton chose not to press the issue. The

time limit for an appeal under Rule 23(f) is not statutory, and

so a failure to abide by it does not affect our jurisdiction. See

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210–11 (2007); McReynolds v.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 485

(7th Cir. 2012) (holding that Rule 23(f)’s 14‐day limitations pe‐

riod is not jurisdictional), abrogated on other grounds by Phillips

v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 828 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2016).  
No. 18‐1010 5

II

Before we reach the heart of this appeal—the district

court’s Rule 23 decisions—we address Speedy’s more sub‐

stantial preliminary objections.  

A

Speedy complains that the class definitions and legal the‐

ories covered by the court’s certification orders impermissibly

differ from those outlined in the original complaint. Speedy

first attacks the narrowing of the class from everyone in the

United States who had purchased SpeedyPC Pro, to individ‐

ual persons (not entities) who downloaded the free trial and

purchased the licensed software over roughly a three‐year pe‐

riod. This is nothing like what we faced in Supreme Auto

Transport, LLC v. Arcelor Mittal USA, Inc., 902 F.3d 735, 741

(7th Cir. 2018), where the later proposed class greatly ex‐

panded the scope of the litigation beyond what the defend‐

ants could have imagined. We see no reason here why Speedy

is prejudiced by the narrower certified definition. Speedy

complains that it would have conducted discovery differently

had it known about the narrowed class. See Chessie Logistics

Co. v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2017).

But it has not told us, either in its briefs or at oral argument,

what exactly would have changed. Speedy’s position is fur‐

ther weakened by the fact that the district court allowed ad‐

ditional merits discovery following its certification decision.

District courts may amend class definitions either on motion

or on their own initiative. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C); Chap‐

man v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2015); Abbott 

v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 725 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2013). We
6 No. 18‐1010

are satisfied that the court reasonably exercised its discretion

in adopting its class definition.  

We similarly find no reversible error in the district court’s

decision to certify Beaton’s two implied warranty claims. It is

immaterial that these legal theories were not spelled out in the

initial complaint. See Chessie Logistics Co., 867 F.3d at 860. As

the Supreme Court and this court constantly remind litigants,

plaintiffs do not need to plead legal theories. Johnson v. City of

Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346–47 (2014) (per curiam); BRC Rubber

& Plastics, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 900 F.3d 529, 540–41

(7th Cir. 2018); King v. Kramer, 763 F.3d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 2014).

Rule 8 requires only that a complaint must set forth plausible

facts that, if true, would support a claim for relief. See Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Even where a

plaintiff initially asserts particular theories of recovery, unless

the change unfairly harms the defendant she is allowed to

switch course and pursue other avenues of relief as litigation

progresses. Chessie Logistics Co., 867 F.3d at 859; Whitaker v.

Milwaukee Cnty., 772 F.3d 803, 808 & n.18 (7th Cir. 2014). Here,

the court’s certification of the implied warranty claims was

permissible as long as Beaton’s allegations were plausible and

Speedy had fair notice of what this suit was about. See Run‐

nion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind.,

786 F.3d 510, 517 (7th Cir. 2015). We note as well that applica‐

ble law is no longer in dispute, as the parties now agree that

the implied warranty claims derive from the Agreement,

which chooses the law of British Columbia.  

Beaton’s complaint describes Speedy as a company that

sells software products. He alleges that it marketed SpeedyPC
No. 18‐1010 7

Pro in the hope of persuading consumers to purchase the soft‐

ware to fix their computers. And he asserts that customers re‐

lied on the company’s expertise and representations that the

software would improve their devices. For present purposes,

this is enough to provide fair notice that he intends to pursue

warranty claims under the law of British Columbia. See

R.S.B.C. 1996, ch. 410, § 18(a)–(b). It is hard to imagine how

Speedy suffered any “unfair surprise,” given that the “legal

basis for liability is based on the same allegations” about the

sale of worthless software. Whitaker, 772 F.3d at 809 & n.19.

Though Speedy insists that it is worse off because it cannot

move to dismiss on the ground that the Agreement expressly

disclaimed these implied warranties, there is no final judg‐

ment in this case. Nothing prevents Speedy from pursuing

this point on remand.  

B

Next, we briefly consider Speedy’s assertion that Beaton is

judicially estopped from seeking relief under the law of Brit‐

ish Columbia because initially he argued for Illinois law. Eq‐

uitable estoppel requires that: (1) the party’s later position is

clearly inconsistent with her earlier one; (2) the party success‐

fully persuaded the court to adopt her first position; and

(3) the party would be unfairly advantaged if not estopped.

Janusz v. City of Chi., 832 F.3d 770, 776 (7th Cir. 2016).

Speedy forfeited its estoppel argument by notraising it be‐

fore the district court. 1st Source Bank v. Neto, 861 F.3d 607,

611–12 (7th Cir. 2017). It merely acknowledged that Beaton

changed his position on whether British Columbia or Illinois

law controlled his contract claims.  
8 No. 18‐1010

Even on the merits, Speedy’s estoppel theory falls short. It

is true that Beaton flip‐flopped his position on the source of

his implied warranty claims, and so the first criterion for es‐

toppel may be met. In his opposition to the motion to dismiss

for forum non conveniens, Beaton argued that “[n]one of [his]

claims are based upon [the Agreement].” But by the time he

sought class certification, he sang a different tune, conceding

that the implied warranty “claims derive from the End User

License Agreement.” Still, the other two factors necessary for

estoppel are missing. Beaton may have defeated Speedy’s mo‐

tion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, but he did not per‐

suade the district court that Illinois law controlled. The court

thought that British Columbia law may not apply to Beaton’s

contract claims because they “have little or nothing to do with

the terms of the [Agreement].” But ultimately the court found

that this question did not matter for class certification and so

could safely be postponed. And in any event, we cannot see

how Beaton could derive an unfair advantage by agreeing to

apply the substantive law that Speedy wanted all along.  

C

Speedy also contends that the district court lacks personal

jurisdiction overthe claims of class members from states other

than Illinois. Its argument relies on the Supreme Court’s deci‐

sion in Bristol‐Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San

Francisco Cnty., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). In that mass‐tort action,

there was no connection between the forum and the specific

claims at issue. Under those circumstances, the Supreme

Court held that a state court lacks specific jurisdiction over
No. 18‐1010 9

non‐resident plaintiffs’ claims against non‐resident defend‐

ants. Id. at 1781–82. Speedy seems to be asking us to extend

Bristol‐Myers Squibb to nationwide class actions.  

While briefing the issue now before us—class

certification—in the district court, neither party raised

personal jurisdiction. Thus, we have no need to opine on this

question, because it does not bear directly on our

determination. See Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 652–53

(7th Cir. 2012) (a court’s personal jurisdiction and class

certification decisions were “only tangentially related” and so

the former could not be evaluated on a Rule 23(f) appeal

(quoting Poulos Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 671–72 (9th

Cir. 2004))). On remand, Speedy is free to explain if and how

it preserved this point and how Bristol‐Myers Squibb applies in

these circumstances. For his part, Beaton will be free to

contend that Speedy waived this defense through its conduct.

See, e.g., H‐D Mich., LLC v. Hellenic Duty Free Shops S.A.,

694 F.3d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 2012). On a Rule 23(f) appeal, it is

not for us to take the first bite of this apple.

III

Now we turn to the main event: the district court’s deci‐

sion to certify the nationwide class and the Illinois subclass.

To certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a

district court must rigorously analyze whether the plaintiff 

satisfies the rule’s requirements. Blow v. Bijora, Inc., 855 F.3d

793, 806 (7th Cir. 2017). Rule 23(a) sets forth four universal re‐

quirements for class actions: “numerosity, typicality, com‐

monality, and adequacy of representation.” Messner v.

Northshore Univ. HealthSys., 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012).

Rule 23(b) then identifies particular types of classes, which

have different criteria. Where, as here, certification is sought
10 No. 18‐1010

under Rule 23(b)(3), common questions of law or fact must

predominate over individual inquiries, and class treatment

must be the superior method of resolving the controversy. Id.  

In evaluating these factors, the court must go beyond the

pleadings and, to the extent necessary, take evidence on dis‐

puted issues that are material to certification. Bell v. PNC Bank,

Nat’l Ass’n, 800 F.3d 360, 377 (7th Cir. 2015); Szabo v. Bridgeport

Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675–76 (7th Cir. 2001). At this early

stage in the litigation, the merits are not on the table. Abbott,

725 F.3d at 810 (describing class definition as a “tool of case

management”); Messner, 669 F.3d at 811 (class certification

should not be turned into a “dress rehearsal for the trial on

the merits”). Beaton bears the burden of showing that each

requirement is met by a preponderance of the evidence.

Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902, 917 (7th Cir. 2016).

We review the district court’s class certification orders def‐

erentially, leaving considerable room for the exercise of judg‐

ment unless the factual determinations are clearly erroneous

or there are errors of law. Reliable Money Order, Inc. v.

McKnight Sales Co., Inc., 704 F.3d 489, 498 (7th Cir. 2013).  

A

Speedy complains generically that the district court failed

to give its evidence adequate attention. We see no basis for

that accusation. The court referred to Beaton’s pleadings in

providing the case’s background, and then it considered evi‐

dence submitted by Beaton and Speedy. A district court may

abuse its discretion by omitting key factual and legal analysis.

See Priddy v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 870 F.3d 657, 661 (7th Cir.

2017). But it has no obligation to describe every part of the

record.  
No. 18‐1010 11

Speedy also specifically challenges the district court’s

findings on commonality, typicality, and adequacy of repre‐

sentation for purposes of Rule 23(a). (It concedes that numer‐

osity is not at issue.) We consider each of these in turn.

B

To satisfy the commonality requirement found in

Rule 23(a)(2), there needs to be one or more common ques‐

tions of law or fact that are capable of class‐wide resolution

and are central to the claims’ validity. Bell, 800 F.3d at 374. The

district court identified several such issues:  

 Can the customers avail themselves of any

implied warranties, or is the Agreement’s

disclaimer valid?

 What functions did the marketing materials

represent that the software would perform?  

 Did the software perform those functions?  

Speedy takes exception to some of these questions, but most

are amenable to class‐wide resolution. See Nikka Traders Inc.

v. Gizella Pastry Ltd. (2012), D.L.R. 4th 120, para. 65 (Can. B.C.

Sup. Ct.) (describing the elements of claim for the implied

warranty for fitness for a particular purpose); Dream Carpets

Ltd. v. Sandhedrai, [2009] B.C.W.L.D 5070, para. 68 (Can. B.C.

Prov. Ct.) (elements for implied warranty of merchantability);

Dubey v. Pub. Storage, Inc., 395 Ill. App. 3d 342, 353 (2009)

(same for ICFA). And we can see additional common ques‐

tions, including whether Speedy typically deals in goods re‐

lated to this software and whether a reasonable consumer
12 No. 18‐1010

would be deceived by the advertisements’ representations.

Commonality is easily satisfied.  

C

Second, we consider typicality. See Rule 23(a)(3); Oshana

v. Coca‐Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006). This requires

us to evaluate whether Beaton’s claims arise from the same

events or course of conduct that gives rise to the putative class

members’ claims. The individual claims may feature some

factual variations as long as they “have the same essential

characteristics.” Id. (citation omitted).

The district court thought this requirement satisfied be‐

cause Beaton “appears to have seen the same representations

as the other users of Speedy’s free software, and the software

appears to operate in the same way on each computer.” Un‐

like Speedy, we do not take exception with the court’s use of

the word “appears” to describe the match between Beaton’s

claim and that of the other class members. This semantic

choice suggests only that the court’s determinations are pre‐

liminary, as they should be. See Messner, 669 F.3d at 811.  

On the merits, neither of the court’s findings reflects an

abuse of discretion. We begin with the finding that Beaton

saw the same representations as other users. Speedy empha‐

sizes that some customers bought the software through third‐

party platforms, which could advertise as they saw fit. Yet the

advertisements in the record, drawn from various sites, fea‐

ture almost identical language. The class members were thus

exposed to the same message (and promises) from Speedy.  

Next, we turn to the court’s determination that the free

trial operated the same way across devices. Based on a review
No. 18‐1010 13

of the free trial’s source code, Beaton’s expert, Snead, con‐

cluded that the software was programmed to operate uni‐

formly on all PCs, independent of any differences among in‐

dividual devices. He asserted that the software universally re‐

ported “problems” and “errors,” mislabeled innocuous and

routine features, and issued a low performance rating before

any scan had begun. In his view, the scan failed to account for

factors that do influence a device’s performance, and it incor‐

porated factors that have no impact. Speedy’s senior director

of technical operations confirmed that the scan identified as

problems characteristics that might not affect performance.

Speedy asks us to reject this evidence because Snead ex‐

amined only the source code for the free trial’s scanning por‐

tion, as opposed to the scanning or repair portions of the li‐

censed software. It is not clear how similar the two scanning

programs are, but that does not matter for our purposes. The

district court was entitled to credit the evidence indicating

that the free trial scan software did not differentiate between

devices before declaring them to be in “critical condition.”

This is sufficient to show that Beaton’s claims are typical. He

focuses on Speedy’s uniform (alleged) misrepresentation of

computer health to induce users to buy its product. Though

Speedy issued 19 different versions of the software during the

class period, Snead opined that “the primary features and

functionality remained consistent” across versions. Speedy’s

expert, Myers, disagreed with Snead’s conclusions, and the

company pointed to positive survey responses and third‐

party reviews to argue that Beaton’s experience was atypical.

But that just indicates that there are merits issues to be re‐

solved. For class certification purposes, the district court

needed only to find by a preponderance of the evidence that

the software scanned Beaton’s device in the same way as it
14 No. 18‐1010

scanned other class members’ computers. We see no reason to

reject its conclusion.

But, Speedy argues, the district court did not say out loud

that it weighed both expert reports and found Snead’s conclu‐

sions more persuasive. In fact, the court did not mention My‐

ers’s report at all. Speedy sees this as a glaring omission be‐

cause the court had yet to rule on the Rule 702 cross‐motions.

It points out that a district court should not certify a class, and

thereby raise the stakes of the litigation, based on faulty opin‐

ion evidence. Instead, it “must conclusively rule on any chal‐

lenge to the expert’s qualifications or submissions prior to rul‐

ing on a class certification motion,” if the “expert’s report or

testimony is critical to class certification.” Am. Honda Motor

Co., Inc. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 814–15 (7th Cir. 2010). Speedy

concludes that the court erred by not doing so.

If this was error (a point we need not resolve), it was harm‐

less. See Messner, 669 F.3d at 814. In its Rule 702 ruling, the

district court made clearthat it had considered only the expert

testimony it later deemed admissible. Speedy gives us no rea‐

son to doubt the district court’s assurance. And it is also worth

recalling that the district court permitted additional merits

discovery after its certification decision. Had Speedy wished

to pursue the expert qualifications issue further, it could have

done so. We thus find no abuse of discretion in the court’s rul‐

ing on typicality.  

D

The last requirement is adequate representation. See FED.

R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). A named plaintiff must be a member of the

putative class and have the same interest and injury as other

members. Conrad v. Boiron, Inc., 869 F.3d 536, 539 (7th Cir.
No. 18‐1010 15

2017). A representative might be inadequate if he is subject to

a substantial defense unique to him. CE Design Ltd. v. King Ar‐

chitectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 726, 728 (7th Cir. 2011).

The district court generously characterized Speedy’s ade‐

quacy challenge as “scattershot.” We need not catalog every

objection Speedy raises, but we have considered all of them,

and we will mention a few. First, Speedy claims Beaton is not

actually a class member because he did not purchase the soft‐

ware as an individual. It cites the credit card statement billing

the charge to Beaton’s business, Chlorine Free Products Asso‐

ciation, for which he was the sole shareholder. But Beaton

averred in his declaration that he purchased the software for

a laptop that he personally owned and used for primarily per‐

sonal reasons. The software subscription was in Beaton’s

name. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Bea‐

ton purchased the software in his personal capacity.  

Next, Speedy accuses Beaton of spoliating evidence—an

act that (it says) makes him an inadequate representative. But

spoliation is a harsh word for what happened (or so the dis‐

trict court could conclude). Beaton deleted a potentially use‐

ful email and took his laptop to an IT professional for repairs,

where his data were lost when the hard drive was reformat‐

ted. The district court rejected Speedy’s interpretation of this

incident when it denied Speedy’s motion for sanctions. It

found as a fact that Beaton did not intend to destroy evidence.

Speedy offers no reason for us to revisit that conclusion.  

Speedy also launches a multipart attack on Beaton’s cred‐

ibility. It makes much ado of Beaton’s decades‐old man‐

slaughter conviction. But assaults on the credibility of a

named plaintiff must be supported by admissible evidence. Id.

at 728. Wholly unrelated criminal history does not fit that bill.
16 No. 18‐1010

See FED. R. EVID. 609(b) (a conviction’s probative value must

substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect in order to intro‐

duce it to impeach a witness over 10 years after his release);

e.g., United States v. Rogers, 542 F.3d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 2008).

Beaton’s various “lies” during discovery underlie

Speedy’s next attempt to discredit him. Some of these alleged

discrepancies are minor, such as his omitting a marijuana con‐

viction when asked about his criminal background. Beaton’s

supposed inconsistency in describing his laptop usage—that

he uses his laptop primarily for personal reasons but also for

business ones—is nothing of the sort; in fact, his statements

are consistent. Speedy does, however, point out one relevant

discrepancy. In both the complaint and his first set of inter‐

rogatories, Beaton professed to have purchased the software

for $39.94, while his credit card statement says that he paid

only $9.97. The district court did not abuse its discretion, how‐

ever, in concluding that Beaton’s credibility was not severely

undermined by this detail. See CE Design, 637 F.3d at 728. We

see no reason to disturb the court’s determination that Beaton

was an acceptable class representative.

Speedy also throws barbs at plaintiff’s counsel, Edelson

PC, citing allegations of wrongdoing made against the firm in

another case. Yet Speedy points to no evidence that Edelson is

unqualified, has created a conflict between the firm and the

putative class, or has violated a specific ethical rule. Speedy

may dislike Edelson PC, and we can assume it is not a fan of

class actions, but “general distaste for the class‐action device”

will not preclude certification. Mejdrech v. Met‐Coil Sys. Corp.,

319 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2003). Nothing in this record per‐

suades us to consider Speedy’s request for sanctions under

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. The request is, in any
No. 18‐1010 17

event, procedurally irregular: Rule 38 requires sanctions re‐

quests to be filed in separate motions, see Vexol, S.A. de C.V. v.

Berry Plastics Corp., 882 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2018), and it

does not contemplate sanctions against appellees.

IV

After clearing the hurdles posed by Rule 23(a), a person

wishing to bring a class action must also demonstrate that the

action fits under one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). As

we said, the only one that applies to Beaton is Rule 23(b)(3),

the common‐question variant. It requires the putative class

representative to show that questions of law or fact common

to the class members predominate, and that the class device

is the superior method for adjudicating those claims.  

A

The guiding principle behind predominance is whether

the proposed class’s claims arise from a common nucleus of

operative facts and issues. Messner, 669 F.3d at 815. This re‐

quires more than a tally of common questions; the district

court must consider their relative importance. Parko v. Shell

Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 2014). On the other hand,

not every issue must be amenable to common resolution; in‐

dividual inquiries may be required after the class phase. Kleen

Prods. LLC v. Int’l Paper Co., 831 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2016).

Speedy identified 10 individual issues that allegedly de‐

feated predominance. The district court was not persuaded. It

found that some were best addressed on a class‐wide basis,

and they outweighed the remaining individualized inquiries.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in so con‐

cluding. For example, it will be easy to ascertain from whom

the class members purchased the software. The court found
18 No. 18‐1010

that they all bought it through the portal at the end of the free

trial that redirected customers to two payment platforms.

Similarly, the court found that users saw the same represen‐

tations about the software’s capabilities, and so a common an‐

swer to the question whether a reasonable customer would be

deceived is possible. And based on the court’s preliminary de‐

termination that the software’s diagnostic mechanisms oper‐

ated uniformly across devices, the trier of fact could reach a

single answer on the software’s functionality and value.

Speedy insists that the court needs to inquire individually

about each customer’s level of satisfaction with the product.

But dissatisfaction is not an element of any of the certified

claims. If the product truly serves none of its functions, its us‐

ers’ subjective satisfaction is likely evidence of misrepresenta‐

tion, not that the users were not harmed. See In re Aqua Dots

Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 750–51 (7th Cir. 2011) (purchas‐

ers suffered financial loss by paying more for products than

they would have had they known the products’ true quality).

Admittedly, some individualized questions remain. For

instance, what was the class member’s purpose (business or

personal?) in buying the software? Did the class member seek

a refund? What are each customer’s damages? Speedy re‐

minds us that we have frowned upon class treatment as a

poor fit for warranty and fraud claims because they can in‐

volve so many individualized issues. See Szabo, 249 F.3d at

674. But these theories do not automatically fail the predomi‐

nance test. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625

(1997) (certain consumer‐fraud cases readily establish pre‐

dominance); Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 759–

60 (7th Cir. 2014) (the fact that “[e]very consumer fraud case

involves individual elements” does not preclude class ac‐

tions). Speedy misreads Supreme Court precedent in arguing
No. 18‐1010 19

that liability with regard to all class members must be resolved

in a single stroke. See Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S.

338, 350 (2011) (requiring resolution in “one stroke” of a

“common contention” central to the common claim); see also

Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 759–60; Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d

391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010).

The district court recognized that individualized inquiries

could be handled through “streamlined mechanisms” such as

affidavits and proper auditing procedures. We agree.

Defendants’ due process rights are not harmed by such case‐

management tools. Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654,

667–72 (7th Cir. 2015). Speedy’s attempts to distinguish

Mullins as merely about proving class membership, and not

liability, are unavailing. The company makes the obvious

point that it can neither cross‐examine an affidavit nor depose

every class member. But Speedy will still have the

opportunity to challenge the class members’ credibility. See

Mullins, 795 F.3d at 671. It can obtain the testimony of a

representative sample of the class members and, if necessary,

present evidence contradicting statements found in particular

affidavits.  

Speedy also contends that there is a fatal lack of uni‐

formity in the purpose for which each person acquired its

software. We do not see that as a barrier to class treatment,

however. It is true that the law of British Columbia insists that

a particular purpose be brought clearly to the seller’s atten‐

tion. Compare Kobelt Mfg. Co. v. Pac. Rim Engineered Prods.

(1987) Ltd. (2011), 84 B.L.R 4th 189, para. 104 (Can. B.C. Sup.

Ct.) (leaky brakes did not violate an implied warranty because

no implied communication that purchasers intended to use
20 No. 18‐1010

the brakes on drawworks), with Wharton v. Tom Harris Chev‐

rolet Oldsmobile Cadillac Ltd. (2002), 97 B.C.L.R. 3d 307, para.

59–60 (Can. B.C. App. Ct.) (buzzing sound system violated

implied warranty where salesman knew purchasers wanted a

luxury vehicle). But we do not see that flaw here. The people

who used the free trial and then bought SpeedyPC Pro were

all concerned about the health and performance of their com‐

puters. Why they owned a computer is beside the point. To

the extent it is relevant, each user’s specific reason for buying

the software can be established through affidavits, subject to

the defendant’s right to challenge them with evidence.  

B

Finally, the district court had several reasons for conclud‐

ing that a class action was the superior way to resolve this dis‐

pute. All are well‐supported. First, common questions of fact

and law predominate. Speedy insists that we should categor‐

ically reject class treatment for implied warranty and con‐

sumer fraud claims because of the choice‐of‐law clause. See,

e.g., Szabo, 249 F.3d at 674; In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,

288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002). But that makes no sense

here, since all parties agree that British Columbia law controls

for the nationwide class and Illinois law for the subclass. And

there is no risk of inconsistent rules with respect to recogni‐

tion of the contractual choice‐of‐law clause, because that fol‐

lows the forum, Illinois. See Martin v. Reid, 818 F.3d 302, 308

(7th Cir. 2016).

Second, the amount of damages to which each plaintiff 

would be entitled is so small that no one would bring this suit

without the option of a class. Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 759–60.

“Rule 23(b)(3) was designed for situations such as this, in
No. 18‐1010 21

which the potential recovery is too slight to support individ‐

ual suits, but injury is substantial in the aggregate.” Murray v.

GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006). The fact

that others have not sued over this software is more likely be‐

cause “only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30,” Carnegie v.

Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004), than it is

because the software is flawless. Consumer class actions are a

crucial deterrent against the proliferation of bogus products

whose sticker price is dwarfed even by a court filing fee (now

$400 for a civil case in federal district court). Though punitive

damages may also deter, few litigants would risk filing suit

on the off‐chance that punitive damages would be recovered

after years of litigation. See Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc.,

731 F.3d 672, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court did not

abuse its discretion in finding the class‐action device superior.  

V

Defendants spend much time and money fighting Rule 23

certifications to the hilt. Yet “certification is largely independ‐

ent of the merits ... and a certified class can go down in flames

on the merits.” Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir.

2010). We say this not to imply that the merits in this case fa‐

vor either party, but simply to remind defendants that the

class‐action glass is sometimes half‐full: dismissed claims of a

certified class end litigation once and for all. That, after all, is

why settlement classes are so popular.  

Finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s deci‐

sions to certify the nationwide class and the Illinois subclass,

we AFFIRM the court’s certification orders.