UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4728

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SANTOS ENRIQUE HERRERA-REYES, agent of Ricardo Lorenzana Diaz,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. David J. Novak, District Judge. (3:21-cr-00052-DJN-1)

Submitted: August 29, 2023 Decided: August 31, 2023

Before KING, AGEE, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, Nia Ayanna Vidal, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE 

OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica 

D. Aber, United States Attorney, Shea Matthew Gibbons, Assistant United States Attorney, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Santos Enrique Herrera-Reyes appeals his 24-month, upward-variant revocation 

sentence. He argues that his sentence is plainly unreasonable because the district court 

based his sentence predominately on an impermissible sentencing factor—the seriousness 

of the violations. We affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of 

supervised release. [We] will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory 

maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 

(4th Cir. 2020). Before deciding “whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, 

[we] must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable,” id., evaluating “the same procedural and substantive considerations that 

guide our review of original sentences” but taking “a more deferential appellate posture 

than we do when reviewing original sentences,” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 

373 (4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). “Only if a sentence is either procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable is a determination then made as to whether the sentence is plainly 

unreasonable—that is, whether the unreasonableness is clear or obvious.” Patterson, 

957 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation marks omitted).

“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately 

explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding 

Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United 

States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

When fashioning an appropriate revocation sentence, “the court should sanction primarily 

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the defendant’s breach of trust.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b). 

While the court must also consider certain enumerated factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 

excluded from that list is “the need for the sentence . . . to reflect the seriousness of the 

offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A); see id. § 3583(e). We have recognized, however, that the 

“§ 3553(a)(2)(A) [factors] are intertwined with the factors courts are expressly authorized 

to consider under § 3583(e).” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 2013). 

Thus, although the district court may not base a revocation sentence “predominately” on 

the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, “mere reference to such considerations does not render a 

revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when those factors are relevant to, and 

considered in conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 642. 

We conclude that the district court did not predominately sentence Herrera-Reyes 

based on the seriousness of the violations. During the revocation hearing, the court 

repeatedly expressed regret for previously sentencing Herrera-Reyes to time served, as he 

committed the new offenses only five days after his release. Thus, while the court 

described the violations as serious, it is apparent that the court’s “concern with [HerreraReyes’] breach of trust . . . far outweighed any other concerns and provided independent 

justification for the sentence.” United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 201 (4th Cir. 2012).

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Because Herrera-Reyes’ sentence is not plainly unreasonable, we affirm the district 

court’s judgment.∗

 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

∗ Herrera-Reyes did not object to the district court’s consideration of an 

impermissible factor. But because his sentence is not plainly unreasonable, we need not 

address whether any error affected his substantial rights or seriously affected the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Lemon, 

777 F.3d 170, 172-73 (4th Cir. 2015) (reviewing unpreserved challenge to consideration 

of impermissible factor for plain error).

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