6334 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 24 / Friday, February 5, 2016 / Notices 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration 

[Docket No. PHMSA–2016–0016] 

Pipeline Safety: Safe Operations of 

Underground Storage Facilities for 

Natural Gas 

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous 

Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA); DOT. 

ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory 

bulletin. 

SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this 

advisory bulletin to remind all owners 

and operators of underground storage 

facilities used for the storage of natural 

gas, as defined in 49 CFR part 192, to 

consider the overall integrity of the 

facilities to ensure the safety of the 

public and operating personnel and to 

protect the environment. Operators are 

reminded to review their operations to 

identify the potential of facility leaks 

and failures caused by corrosion, 

chemical damage, mechanical damage, 

or other material deficiencies in piping, 

tubing, casing, valves, and associated 

facilities and the importance of 

reviewing the location and operations of 

shut-off and isolation systems and 

reviewing and updating emergency 

plans as necessary. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Operators of pipelines subject to 

regulation by PHMSA should contact 

Mr. Kenneth Lee at 202–366–2694 or 

email to: kenneth.lee@dot.gov. 

Intrastate gas pipeline and 

underground storage facility operators 

should contact the appropriate state 

pipeline safety authority. A list of state 

pipeline safety authorities is provided 

at: www.napsr.org. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

On October 23, 2015, Southern 

California Gas Company’s (SoCal Gas) 

Aliso Canyon Well SS25 failed, causing 

a sustained and uncontrolled natural gas 

leak in an area known as Porter Ranch 

in Los Angeles, California. At the 

present time, the well leak is believed 

to be from the subsurface (downhole) 

well casing. The well was drilled in 

1953 and was later converted to natural 

gas storage well in 1972. Over 4,400 

households (families) have been 

relocated due to the natural gas odorant 

(mercaptans) according to the Aliso 

Canyon Incident Command briefing 

report issued on February 1, 2016. On 

January 6, 2016, California Governor 

Jerry Brown issued a proclamation 

declaring the Aliso Canyon incident a 

state emergency. After repeated 

unsuccessful attempts to contain the 

leak, a relief well is being drilled to plug 

the leaking well. The Aliso Canyon 

underground storage field, which can 

store up to 86 billion cubic feet of 

natural gas, has 115 storage wells, and 

is the second largest storage facility of 

its kind in the United States. The root 

cause of this failure is the subject of 

ongoing investigations and assessments 

and the root cause analysis is being 

conducted by an independent third 

party expert firm. PHMSA is working 

closely with the State of California to 

provide technical assistance and to 

support State regulatory agencies related 

to their response and oversight 

activities. 

Since 2001 several accidents 

involving underground gas storage 

facilities have occurred and two of the 

more extensive accidents that occurred 

in Texas and Kansas are highlighted 

below. On August 19, 2004, the Market 

Hub Partners Moss Bluff storage facility 

located in Liberty County, Texas, had a 

well control incident and natural gas 

fire at Cavern #1. Over a period of six 

and one-half days, approximately 6 

billion cubic feet of natural gas in the 

cavern was released and burned. The 

fire eventually self-extinguished, and 

late on August 26, 2004, installation of 

a blowout prevention valve was 

completed, effectively placing the well 

back under control. The Moss Bluff 

storage facility was comprised of three 

separated underground caverns leached 

out of a salt formation beneath the 

surface; a compressor station to help 

move natural gas into and out of the 

caverns; well head assemblies on each 

of the caverns for operational control 

purposes; and natural gas, fresh water 

and salt water (brine) piping and related 

facilities to facilitate transportation and/ 

or holding of those materials A detailed 

investigation by company personnel and 

outside consultants determined the 

accident was caused by a separation of 

the 85⁄8-inch well string inside the 

cavern; a breach of the 8-inch brine 

piping above ground; and the separation 

of the wellhead assembly above the 

cavern. 

On January 17 and 18, 2001, another 

accident occurred at the Yaggy 

underground natural gas storage field 

operated by Kansas Gas Service, where 

a wellbore failure which led to a series 

of gas explosions in Hutchinson, 

Kansas. The storage field injected 

natural gas at a depth of 600 to 900 feet 

underground into salt caverns. Gas 

leaked from the storage field well 

production casing, migrated 

approximately nine miles underground, 

and then traveled to the surface through 

old brine, or salt wells, in the 

Hutchinson, Kansas area. An explosion 

in downtown Hutchinson destroyed two 

businesses, damaged 26 other 

businesses, and killed two persons in a 

mobile home park. Approximately 143 

million cubic feet of natural gas leaked 

from the storage field. 

In this Advisory Bulletin, PHMSA 

recommends that all operators of 

underground storage facilities used for 

the storage of natural gas, as defined in 

49 CFR parts 192, have processes, 

procedures, mitigation measures, 

periodic assessments and reassessments, 

and emergency plans to maintain the 

safety and integrity of all wells and 

associated storage facilities whether 

operating, idled, or plugged. These 

processes and procedures should take 

into consideration the age, construction, 

maximum operating pressures, 

operating and maintenance history, 

product, corrosion, casing and tubing 

condition (including chemical and 

mechanical damage), cement condition 

and depths or heights, safety valves 

(surface and subsurface), operation of 

each well, and the amount of time 

elapsed since the most recent 

assessment. 

II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2016–02) 

To: Owners and Operators of 

Underground Pipeline and Storage 

Facilities. 

Subject: Safe Operation of 

Underground Storage Facilities for 

Natural Gas 

Advisory: Operators of underground 

storage facilities used for the storage of 

natural gas, as defined in 49 CFR part 

192, should review their operating, 

maintenance, and emergency response 

activities to ensure the integrity of 

underground storage facilities are 

properly maintained. This bulletin is 

intended to inform operators about 

recommended practices and to urge 

operators to take all necessary actions, 

including but not limited to those set 

forth in this bulletin, to prevent and 

mitigate breach of integrity, leaks, or 

failures at their underground storage 

facilities and to ensure the safety of the 

public and operating personnel and to 

protect the environment. 

Operators should have comprehensive 

and up-to-date processes, procedures, 

mitigation measures, periodic 

assessments and reassessments, and 

emergency plans in place to maintain 

the safety and integrity of all 

underground storage wells and 

associated facilities whether operating, 

idled, or plugged. Operators must 

adhere to applicable State regulations 

for the permitting, drilling, completion, 

and operation of storage wells. In 

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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 24 / Friday, February 5, 2016 / Notices 6335 

developing, implementing, and 

updating their safety and integrity 

programs, we encourage underground 

gas storage facility operators to reference 

PHMSA Advisory Bulletin 97–04, dated 

July 10, 1997, and to voluntarily 

implement American Petroleum 

Institute (API) Recommended Practices 

(RP) 1170, ‘‘Design and Operation of 

Solution-mined Salt Caverns Used for 

Natural Gas Storage, First Edition, July 

2015,’’ API RP 1171 ‘‘Functional 

Integrity of Natural Gas Storage in 

Depleted Hydrocarbon Reservoirs and 

Aquifer Reservoirs, First Edition, 

September 2015,’’ and Interstate Oil and 

Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC) 

standards entitled ‘‘Natural Gas Storage 

in Salt Caverns—A Guide for State 

Regulators’’ (IOGCC Guide), as 

applicable. The IOGCC Guide provides 

safety standards for the design, 

construction, and operation of gas 

storage caverns. Copies of the API 

recommended practices can be obtained 

at http://www.api.org/PublicationsStandards-and-Statistics/Publications/

Government-cited-Safety-Documents. 

Copies of the IOGCC Guide can be 

obtained from the Interstate Oil and Gas 

Compact Commission, 900 NE 23rd 

Street, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 

73152–3127 (phone: 405/525–3556; 

email: iogcc@oklaosf.state.ok.us). API 

has an accredited process to develop 

recommended practices and standards 

that involves industry, manufacturers, 

engineering firms, construction 

contractors, the public, academia, and 

government. 

In addition, operator’s operating and 

maintenance (O&M) processes and 

procedures should be reviewed and 

updated at least annually, unless 

operational inspections for integrity 

warrant shorter review periods. O&M 

processes and procedures should 

include data collection and integration, 

risk assessments, monitoring, 

operational limits, mitigation measures, 

and record keeping for any underground 

storage facility threat that could impact 

public safety, operating personnel, or 

the environment due to leakage, failure, 

or abnormal operating conditions 

whether above ground or underground. 

At a minimum, operator actions should 

include, but not be limited to, the 

following: 

1. Operators should verify that the 

pressure required to inject intended 

natural gas volumes, including any 

maximum treating and stimulation 

pressures for the underground storage 

well, does not exceed the design 

pressure limits of the reservoir, wells, 

wellheads, piping, casing, tubing, or 

associated facilities, and document such 

verification. 

2. The operator should monitor all 

wells for the presence of annular gas or 

liquids by measuring and recording 

annular pressure, including between 

casing and tubing strings at the 

wellhead, and any known annular flow 

on a periodic basis. 

3. The operator should inspect the 

wellhead assembly and attached 

pipelines for each of the wells used in 

an underground storage facility on a 

periodic basis, with the frequency of the 

inspections defined by the operator’s 

risk assessment. This inspection should 

include leak detection technology and 

monitoring of casing pressure changes at 

the wellhead. The operator’s selection 

and usage of leak detection technology 

should take into consideration detection 

limits for natural gas or any liquids, 

response time, reproducibility, 

accuracy, distance from source, 

background lighting conditions, 

geography, and meteorology. 

4. The operator should conduct 

periodic functional tests of all surface 

and subsurface safety valve systems and 

wellhead pipeline isolation valve(s) for 

proper function and ability to shut-off or 

isolate the well as required for 

operational and emergency situations. 

Deficiencies, test failures, and 

equipment that do not meet functional 

specifications should be repaired or 

replaced promptly in order to assure the 

well’s ability to control and isolate 

natural gas flows from the reservoir and 

well. Inoperable surface and subsurface 

safety valves on storage well(s) should 

be either repaired, removed or replaced, 

the well temporarily plugged, or 

alternative equivalent safety measures 

implemented. 

5. When evaluating the need for 

subsurface safety valves on new, 

removed, or replaced tubing strings or 

production casing, operators should 

perform risk assessments in a manner 

that reviews at a minimum the API RP 

1171 criteria. Where subsurface safety 

valves are not installed on wells, risk 

assessments should be used to inform 

decisions on integrity inspection 

frequencies and reassessment intervals, 

and mitigation criteria and procedures 

for the well production casing and 

tubing should be evaluated and 

implemented as necessary. 

6. Operators should conduct ongoing 

assessments for the verification and 

demonstration of the mechanical 

integrity of each well and related piping 

and equipment used in the underground 

storage facility. The relevant factors to 

consider in verifying and demonstrating 

well integrity should include as a 

minimum: Well service life history; 

design; construction; maximum 

operating pressures (injection, 

withdrawal, maximum treating and 

stimulation); product, corrosion, casing 

and tubing condition; cement condition 

and depths or heights; safety valves 

(surface and subsurface); operation of 

each well; and the time interval since 

the most recent assessment and past 

assessment findings. 

7. Operators should have a corrosion 

monitoring and integrity evaluation 

program that includes the following: 

(i) Evaluation of casing and tubular 

integrity and identification of defects 

caused by corrosion or other chemical 

or mechanical damage; 

(ii) Corrosion potential of wellboreproduced fluids and solids, including 

the impact of operating pressure on the 

corrosion potential of wellbore fluids 

and analysis of partial pressures; 

(iii) Corrosion potential of annular 

and any packer fluid; 

(iv) Corrosion potential of current 

flows associated with cathodic 

protection systems; 

(v) Corrosion potential of all 

formation fluids, including fluids in 

formations above the storage zone; 

(vi) Corrosion potential of uncemented casing annuli, including static 

liquid levels; 

(vii) Corrosion potential of pipelines 

and other production facilities attendant 

to the underground storage facility 

including the corrosion potential of 

adverse-current flows associated with 

their cathodic protection systems; and 

(viii) Periodic usage of the appropriate 

well log evaluations (such as corrosion, 

cement bond, temperature, noise, 

caliper and other appropriate 

assessment logs for integrity evaluations 

of the production casing and tubing 

strings) to determine well integrity, 

mitigation measures, and reassessment 

intervals to maintain the pressure rating 

and flow isolation characteristics of the 

well for all downhole pipe, cement, and 

any other isolation equipment. 

8. Procedures for the evaluation of 

well and attendant storage facilities 

should include analysis of facility flow 

erosion, hydrate potential, individual 

facility component capacity and fluid 

disposal capability at intended gas flow 

rates and pressures, and analysis of the 

specific impacts that the intended 

operating pressure range could have on 

the corrosive potential of fluids in the 

system. 

9. Identification of potential threats 

and hazards associated with operation 

of the underground storage facility 

should include the following: 

(i) Evaluation of risk (likelihood of 

events and consequences related to the 

events); 

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6336 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 24 / Friday, February 5, 2016 / Notices 

1Public Law 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, July 2010. 

2 12 U.S.C. 5365(i)(2)(A). 

3 12 U.S.C. 5301(12). 

4 12 U.S.C. 5365(i)(2)(C). 

(ii) Determination of a risk ranking to 

develop and implement preventive and 

mitigative measures; 

(iii) Documentation of risk evaluation 

and decision basis for preventive and 

mitigative measures implemented; 

(iv) Provision for data feedback and 

validation; and 

(v) Regular, periodic risk assessment 

reviews to update information, and 

evaluate risk management effectiveness. 

10. For ongoing verification and 

demonstration of the integrity of the 

underground storage reservoir or cavern, 

operators should use appropriate 

monitoring techniques such as the 

monitoring of pressure and periodic 

pressure surveys, inventory (injection & 

withdrawal of all products), product 

levels, cavern subsidence, and the 

findings from adjacent production and 

water wells, and observation wells used 

to monitor underground storage 

including any integrity changes. 

11. Emergency procedures should 

identify the types of emergencies for 

which the operator should notify public 

emergency response officials, personnel 

training, periodic communication with 

local emergency response officials, 

identification of the local area impacted, 

notices to the public, and identification 

of any third-party service providers or 

technical experts needed in the event of 

an emergency. Emergency procedures 

should be reviewed, conducted, and 

updated at least annually. 

12. Records of the processes, 

procedures, assessments, reassessments, 

and mitigation measures required 

should be maintained for the life of the 

storage well. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on February 2, 

2016, under authority delegated in 49 CFR 

1.97. 

Alan K. Mayberry, 

Deputy Associate Administrator for Policy 

and Programs. 

[FR Doc. 2016–02228 Filed 2–4–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P 

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

Office of the Comptroller of the 

Currency 

Agency Information Collection 

Activities: Revision of an Approved 

Information Collection; Submission for 

OMB Review; Company-Run Annual 

Stress Test Reporting Template and 

Documentation for Covered 

Institutions With Total Consolidated 

Assets of $50 Billion or More Under the 

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 

Consumer Protection Act 

AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the 

Currency, Treasury (OCC). 

ACTION: Notice and request for comment. 

SUMMARY: The OCC, as part of its 

continuing effort to reduce paperwork 

and respondent burden, invites the 

general public and other federal 

agencies to comment on a revision to 

this information collection, as required 

by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 

1995. An agency may not conduct or 

sponsor, and a respondent is not 

required to respond to, an information 

collection unless it displays a currently 

valid Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) control number. The OCC is 

finalizing revisions to a regulatory 

reporting requirement for national banks 

and federal savings associations titled, 

‘‘Company-Run Annual Stress Test 

Reporting Template and Documentation 

for Covered Institutions with Total 

Consolidated Assets of $50 Billion or 

More under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 

Reform and Consumer Protection Act.’’ 

The OCC also is giving notice that it has 

sent the collection to OMB for review. 

DATES: Comments must be received by 

March 7, 2016. 

ADDRESSES: Because paper mail in the 

Washington, DC area and at the OCC is 

subject to delay, commenters are 

encouraged to submit comments by 

email, if possible. Comments may be 

sent to: Legislative and Regulatory 

Activities Division, Office of the 

Comptroller of the Currency, Attention: 

1557–0319, 400 7th Street SW., Suite 

3E–218, Mail Stop 9W–11, Washington, 

DC 20219. In addition, comments may 

be sent by fax to (571) 465–4326 or by 

electronic mail to prainfo@occ.treas.gov. 

You may personally inspect and 

photocopy comments at the OCC, 400 

7th Street SW., Washington, DC 20219. 

For security reasons, the OCC requires 

that visitors make an appointment to 

inspect comments. You may do so by 

calling (202) 649–6700 or, for persons 

who are deaf or hard of hearing, TTY, 

(202) 649–5597. Upon arrival, visitors 

will be required to present valid 

government-issued photo identification 

and submit to security screening in 

order to inspect and photocopy 

comments. 

All comments received, including 

attachments and other supporting 

materials, are part of the public record 

and subject to public disclosure. Do not 

include any information in your 

comment or supporting materials that 

you consider confidential or 

inappropriate for public disclosure. 

Additionally, please send a copy of 

your comments by mail to: OCC Desk 

Officer, [1557–0319], U.S. Office of 

Management and Budget, 725 17th 

Street NW., #10235, Washington, DC 

20503, or by email to: oira_

submission_@omb.eop.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Shaquita Merritt or Mary H. Gottlieb, 

OCC Clearance Officers, (202) 649–5490 

or, for persons who are deaf or hard of 

hearing, TTY, (202) 649–5597, 

Legislative and Regulatory Activities 

Division, Office of the Comptroller of 

the Currency, 400 7th St. SW., 

Washington, DC 20219. In addition, 

copies of the templates referenced in 

this notice can be found on the OCC’s 

Web site under News and Issuances 

(http://www.occ.treas.gov/tools-forms/

forms/bank-operations/stress-testreporting.html). 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The OCC 

is requesting comment on the following 

revision to an approved information 

collection: 

Title: Company-Run Annual Stress 

Test Reporting Template and 

Documentation for Covered Institutions 

with Total Consolidated Assets of $50 

Billion or More under the Dodd-Frank 

Wall Street Reform and Consumer 

Protection Act. 

OMB Control No.: 1557–0319. 

Description: Section 165(i)(2) of the 

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 

Consumer Protection Act 1 (Dodd-Frank 

Act) requires certain financial 

companies, including national banks 

and federal savings associations, to 

conduct annual stress tests 2 and 

requires the primary financial regulatory 

agency 3 of those financial companies to 

issue regulations implementing the 

stress test requirements.4 A national 

bank or Federal savings association is a 

‘‘covered institution’’ and therefore 

subject to the stress test requirements if 

its total consolidated assets are more 

than $10 billion. Under section 

165(i)(2), a covered institution is 

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