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[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 244 (Wednesday, December 20, 1995)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 65977-65986]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-30546]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
14 CFR Part 121

[Docket No. 27264]
RIN 2120-AF96

The Age 60 Rule

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Disposition of comments and notice of agency decisions.

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SUMMARY: This action announces FAA's decisions on a number of issues 
regarding the FAA's ``Age 60 Rule''. The issues include: responding to 
the comments requested in 1993 regarding various aspects of the Age 60 
Rule, including the ``Age 60 Project, Consolidated Database 
Experiments, Final Report'', and issues raised by pilots seeking 
exemptions from the Age 60 Rule, issues raised by a petition for 
rulemaking by the Professional Pilots Federation (PPF), requesting the 
FAA to remove the Age 60 Rule.
    After review of all comments, studies, and other pertinent 
information, the FAA has determined not to initiate rulemaking to 
change the Age 60 Rule at this time. The FAA also has decided not to 
grant any of the pending petitions for exemption or rulemaking.

ADDRESSES: The complete docket containing recent comments on the Age 60 
Rule, including copies of studies related to the Age 60 issue, may be 
examined at the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Chief 
Counsel (AGC-200), Rules Docket, Room 915-G, 800 Independence Avenue 
SW., Washington, DC 20591, weekdays (except Federal holidays) between 
8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.

Availability of Disposition

    Any person may obtain a copy of this Disposition by submitting a 
request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Public 
Affairs, Attention: Public Inquiry Center, APA-220, 800 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-3484. 
Requests should be identified by the docket number of this Disposition.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Daniel V. Meier, Jr., AFS-240, Regulations Branch, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, 
Telephone (202) 267-3749 or (202) 267-8086.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

    Section 121.383(c) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) (14 
CFR Sec. 121.383(c)) prohibits any air carrier from using the services 
of any person as a pilot, and prohibits any person from serving as a 
pilot, on an airplane engaged in operations under part 121 if that 
person has reached his or her 60th birthday. The FAA adopted the ``Age 
60 Rule'', as it has come to be known, in 1959 (24 FR 9767, December 5, 
1959).
    In late 1990, the FAA initiated a study aimed at consolidating 
available accident data and correlating it with the amount of flying by 
pilots as a function of their age. This resulted in a document entitled 
``Age 60 Project, Consolidated Database Experiments, Final Report'', 
dated March 1993 (the ``Hilton Study''). The FAA held a public meeting 
and requested comments regarding various issues related to the Age 60 
Rule, including the Hilton Study (58 FR 21336, April 20, 1993). The FAA 
has reviewed the written comments received in the docket (Docket No. 
27264) and to the comments presented at the public meeting. The FAA is 
also responding to a number of pending petitions from pilots seeking an 
exemption from the Age 60 Rule. Finally, the FAA is responding to a 
petition for rulemaking submitted by the Professional Pilots Federation 
(PPF).
    This document describes the history and basis for the rule, the 
major events during the history of the rule, the FAA's response to the 
issues raised above, and the FAA's rationale for maintaining the Age 60 
Rule.

I(a). Basis for the 1959 Rule

    The FAA promulgated the Age 60 Rule in 1959 because of concerns 
that a hazard to safety was presented by utilization of aging pilots in 
air carrier operations. As noted in that rulemaking, 

[[Page 65978]]
the agency found ``that there is a progressive deterioration of certain 
important physiological and psychological functions with age, that 
significant medical defects attributable to this degenerative process 
occur at an increasing rate as age increases, and that sudden 
incapacity due to such medical defects becomes more frequent in any 
group reaching age 60.'' 24 FR 9767. It also found that ``[s]uch 
incapacity, due primarily to heart attacks and strokes, cannot be 
predicted accurately as to any specific individual on the basis of 
presently available scientific tests and criteria.'' 24 FR 9767. The 
FAA noted ``[o]ther factors, even less susceptible to precise 
measurement as to their effect but which must be considered in 
connection with safety in flight, result simply from aging alone and 
are, with some variations, applicable to all individuals. These relate 
to loss of ability to perform highly skilled tasks rapidly, to resist 
fatigue, to maintain physical stamina, to perform effectively in a 
complex and stressful environment, to apply experience, judgment and 
reasoning rapidly in new, changing and emergency situations, and to 
learn new techniques, skills and procedures.'' 24 FR 9767. While the 
FAA recognized that such losses generally start well before age 60, the 
agency determined that beyond age 59 the risks associated with these 
losses become unacceptable for pilots in part 121 operations.
    The agency noted that, due to seniority, older pilots tend to ``fly 
the largest, highest-performance aircraft, carrying the greatest number 
of passengers over the longest non-stop distances,'' in the highest 
density traffic. 24 FR 9767. The FAA concluded that, because of the 
high risks involved, persons should be precluded from piloting aircraft 
in part 121 operations after reaching age 60.
    While the Age 60 Rule prohibits pilots from operating aircraft 
under part 121 after reaching their 60th birthdays, it does not impose 
mandatory retirement for affected pilots. A pilot may work as a flight 
engineer or flight instructor in operations conducted under part 121 or 
may work as a pilot in operations outside of part 121. The pilot also 
may function as an instructor or evaluator in simulators, an area that 
has expanded over the years.

I(b). Subsequent Rulemaking Actions

    In the early 1980's, the FAA explored possible changes to the Age 
60 Rule, stemming from direction from Congress in 1979 that the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) study the desirability of mandatory 
age retirement for certain pilots. (P.L. 96-171). The NIH assigned the 
National Institute on Aging (NIA) the primary responsibility for 
implementing the legislation. In the report from this study, ``Report 
of the National Institute on Aging Panel on the Experienced Pilot 
Study'' (August 1981) (NIH report), NIA recommended that the age 60 
limit be retained. Among other things, the panel concluded that, while 
no medical significance could be attached to age 60 as a mandatory 
retirement age, age-related health changes endanger aviation safety and 
no medical or performance appraisal system could be identified that 
would single out pilots who would pose a hazard to safety. The 
conclusions reached by the NIA panel and the supporting statements 
contained in the report pointed to an inability to distinguish those 
persons who, as a consequence of aging, present a threat to air safety 
from those who do not. The following recommendations were made:
    1. The age 60 limit should be retained for pilots in command and 
first officers.
    2. The FAA or some other appropriate Federal agency should be 
requested to engage in a systematic program to collect the medical and 
performance data necessary to consider relaxing the age 60 rule.
    3. In view of the growing importance of commuter air carriers, the 
age 60 limit should be extended to cover all pilots engaged in carrying 
passengers for hire, specifically including operations under part 135 
to provide a level of safety equivalent to that provided in part 121 
operations.
    As part of its study, NIA looked at information on functional 
decline with age and the increased frequency of a number of medical 
disorders (including cardiovascular disease, neurological and mental 
disorders, and changes in perceptual, psychomotor and intellectual 
functions) associated with aging. In addition, NIA looked at death and 
disability rates in air carrier pilots and flight engineers, death 
rates in the general population, and accident rates for pilots.
    In response to the NIH recommendations, in 1982 the FAA published 
an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on the Age 60 Rule (47 
FR 29782, July 8, 1982). The FAA was considering identifying a select 
group of pilots who would continue flying in part 121 operations in 
order to allow the FAA to collect data on selected pilots, age 60 and 
over, flying in actual operations under part 121. The FAA was also 
considering establishing age limits for flight engineers serving on 
airplanes operated under part 121. The FAA withdrew the ANPRM in 1984 
(49 FR 14692, April 12, 1984). The FAA found that valid tests did not 
exist for selecting a group of pilots age 60 and over who could act as 
the test group for collecting data. The FAA was concerned that without 
valid selection tests these pilots would create an unacceptable safety 
risk to part 121 operations. The FAA also stated that it was not 
appropriate to establish an age limit for flight engineers at that 
time.

I(c). 1993 Request for Comments on Age 60 Rule and Hilton Study

    In late 1990 the FAA contracted for the Hilton Study, a 2-year 
study to consolidate accident data and correlate it with flying 
experience and age of pilots. This study analyzed accident data between 
1976 and 1988. Although the focus of the study was on part 121 pilots, 
the study analyzed the accident rates for pilots in part 91, 121, and 
135 operations holding Class I, Class II, and Class III medical 
certificates. The authors of the study found ``no hint of an increase 
in accident rate for pilots of scheduled air carriers as they neared 
their 60th birthday'' but noted that there were no data available on 
scheduled air carrier pilots beyond age 60. Observing a ``hint, and a 
hint only,'' of an increase in accident rates for Class III pilots 
older than 63 years of age, they concluded that ``one could cautiously 
increase the retirement age to age 63.''
    In addition, on April 20, 1993, the FAA published a notice of 
public meeting and request for comments regarding various aspects of 
the Hilton Study. (58 FR 21336; April 20, 1993.) The public meeting was 
held on September 29 and 30, 1993, and the comment period closed on 
October 15, 1993. In response to the FAA's notice of public meeting and 
request for comments, 46 members of the public made presentations at 
the public meeting, and the FAA received approximately 1,200 written 
comments on the Hilton Study and the Age 60 Rule in general before the 
close of the comment period.

I(d). Commuter Rule

    The FAA addressed the Age 60 Rule in a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (Notice 95-5, 60 FR 16230, March 29, 1995) that would 
require certain commuter operators that now conduct operations under 
part 135 to conduct those operations under part 121 (the ``Commuter 
Rule''). In that notice, the FAA proposed to apply all part 121 rules, 
including the Age 60 Rule, to those pilots currently employed in 
certain part 135 scheduled operations who would be affected by the 
Commuter Rule. In response to Notice 95-5 the FAA received many 
comments dealing 

[[Page 65979]]
with the question, not raised by Notice 95-5, of whether there should 
be an age limitation for part 121 pilots and what that age should be. 
To that extent those comments have been considered in this Disposition.

I(e). Public Comment

1993 Meeting and Request for Comments
    In addition to the comments at the 1993 public meeting and received 
during the comment period, the FAA received over 2,000 comments after 
the comment period closed. The issues raised in the comments by both 
sets of commenters are similar and will be discussed together. The 
majority of the commenters at the public meeting and those submitting 
written comments before the close of the comment period are in favor of 
raising the age limit, while the majority of commenters submitting 
written comments after the close of the comment period are against 
raising the age limit. Commenters in favor of raising the age limit 
offer several different alternatives, ranging from age 62 to no age 
limit. Some commenters opposed to a rule change state that the age 
limit should be decreased to age 55.
Commuter Rule
    In addition to the above comments, over 2,000 comments on the age 
60 issue (including about 1,000 postcards from members of an airline 
pilot organization) were received in the docket established for the 
Commuter Rule. The overwhelming majority of these comments support 
maintaining the Age 60 Rule and do not express opinions that are 
different from other comments received in response to the public 
meeting and request for comments in Docket 27264.
    The issues raised at the public meeting, the written comments, and 
the Commuter Rule are discussed below.

I(f). Professional Pilots Federation Petition for Rulemaking To Repeal 
the Age 60 Rule

    The PPF, an organization whose membership is composed of pilots who 
oppose the Age 60 Rule, filed a petition for rulemaking in July 1993 
(Docket 27375; 58 FR 46585, September 2, 1993) that requests the 
removal of Sec. 121.383(c). PPF believes that Federal law and policy, 
operational and regulatory developments since promulgation of the rule, 
and the results of the Hilton Study warrant the removal.
    In its petition, the PPF states that the Age 60 Rule has no basis 
in fact; refusal to repeal the rule would constitute arbitrary and 
capricious action by the FAA, contrary to the provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act; refusal to repeal the rule without 
evidence of a need to retain it in the interest of public safety is 
inconsistent with Federal policy against age discrimination; and repeal 
of the rule would have a positive economic impact on the U.S. air 
carrier industry.
    In addition, the PPF states that the FAA should exercise leadership 
in the international community and repeal the Age 60 Rule; the Age 60 
standard in ICAO Annex 1 is ready for change; and the JAA has proposed 
increasing the maximum age limit for air transport pilots to 65. (The 
FAA notes that JAA's proposal is to allow pilots to operate in multi-
pilot operations up to the age of 65, provided no more than one pilot 
in the cockpit is over the age of 60.)
    The major issues brought up in the PPF's petition for rulemaking 
(such as age discrimination, the Hilton Study, economic impacts of the 
Age 60 Rule, etc.) are discussed below in connection with the 
disposition of comments in Docket No. 27264. Because the FAA has 
determined that there is insufficient justification to change the Age 
60 Rule at this time and that the rule is consistent with Federal law, 
PPF's petition for rulemaking will be denied in a separate document.

I(g). Petitions for Exemption From the Age 60 Rule

    Over the years the FAA has received numerous petitions for 
exemption from the Age 60 Rule. The FAA consistently has denied these 
petitions. Some petitioners have sought review in the United States 
Courts of Appeals, and the Courts have upheld the denials. However, in 
1992 when the Hilton Study was underway, the FAA delayed action on the 
pending petitions for exemption and those newly received. Most of the 
issues raised by the petitions were so intertwined with the underlying 
Age 60 Rule issues, the FAA chose to defer action pending deliberation 
of the broader issues involving the Age 60 Rule itself. There are 
currently over 100 petitions for exemption pending. Summaries of the 
petitions were published in the Federal Register, and comments were 
received for some of the petitions. These comments expressed opinions 
and did not provide the FAA with new information. The issues raised by 
commenters are discussed in sections II, III, and V below.
    Overall, the petitioners provide similar information and arguments 
that they contend justify exemptions. Part of their assertions involve 
their personal fitness (see section II(a)) and the ability of the FAA 
to test them individually with simulators (see section III(a)). They 
state that they hold or are qualified to hold first-class airman 
medical certificates (see section III(b)). Some state that they have 
extensive skill and experience as pilots (see section II(c)). They also 
note that the FAA gives many exemptions to younger pilots for various 
medical conditions (see section III(b)).
    The petitioners also contend that the Age 60 Rule is discriminatory 
(see section V(b)). In addition, the petitioners state that the Age 60 
Rule is an arbitrary age and that the age of 60 has not scientifically 
been shown to be an accurate predictor of health or ability (see 
section II(a)). They state that studies used by the FAA in the past to 
justify the rule are flawed, including the NIH Study and the reports 
prepared by Richard Golaszewski (Acumenics Research and Technology, 
Incorporated, The Influence of Total Flight Time, Recent Flight Time 
and Age on Pilot Accident Rates, Final Report (1983) (First Golaszewski 
Report); General Aviation Safety Studies: Preliminary Analysis of Pilot 
Proficiency (1991) and his subsequent work, Additional Analysis of 
General Aviation Pilot Proficiency (1993) (Second Golaszewski Report) 
(section II(b)). They state that pilots at age 60 are in the safest age 
group and that forcing them to retire results in individuals with less 
experience serving as pilots, resulting in lower safety (sections II(c) 
and V(f)). They state that sudden incapacitation is not a cause of 
accidents in Part 121 operations (section II(a)). They state that the 
rule was promulgated for economic reasons alone (section V(a)). They 
state that the rule is contrary to the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (section V(b)). They point out that other countries have higher 
retirement ages for their pilots (section V(c)). They state that 
deleting the rule would save the air carriers money (section IV(a)).
    Under 49 U.S.C. 44701(e) the FAA, in its discretion, may grant 
exemptions from the requirements of a regulation if it finds that such 
an exemption is in the public interest. Section 11.25 (14 CFR 
Sec. 11.25) provides procedures for petitioning for an exemption. 
Section 11.25(b)(5) provides that such a petition must--

Contain any information, views, or arguments available to the 
petitioner to support the action sought, the reasons why the 
petition would be in the public interest and, * * * the reason why 
the exemption would not adversely affect safety or the action to be 
taken by the petitioner to provide a level of safety equal to that 
provided by the rule from which the exemption is sought.

[[Page 65980]]

The petitioners have the burden of showing that the exemption is 
justified.
    The FAA does not doubt that the petitioners, in general, are well-
qualified, experienced, and safe pilots. However, no petitioner has 
suggested or shown how he or she is unique compared to others who are 
subject to the rule.
    To the extent that petitioners' comments involve the justification 
for the Age 60 Rule itself, these issues are discussed in sections II, 
III, and V below.
    As to individual petitioners' fitness to serve as pilots past the 
age of 60, which petitioners assert can be demonstrated by 
individualized testing or evaluation, no petitioner has submitted a 
protocol, nor is the FAA aware of a protocol, that would permit the FAA 
to adequately assess an aging individual's relative risks of 
incapacitation, either sudden or subtle. They have not shown how their 
circumstances are different in a significant way from others subject to 
the rule. For instance, there is nothing unique in petitioners holding 
first-class airman medical certificates; all pilots who exercise the 
privileges of an Air Transport Pilot certificate are required to hold a 
first-class airman medical certificate. Numerous pilots operating under 
part 121, who are approaching age 60, have long, distinguished careers. 
Indeed, the FAA considered these issues in response to the comments in 
Docket 27264, and they are further responded to below.
    The FAA has determined that the petitioners have not shown their 
circumstances to be unique compared with those who comply with the 
rule, and that the issues they raise are more appropriately considered 
in connection with whether the FAA should propose to change the general 
rule. The FAA will in separate documents deny the pending petitions for 
exemption from the Age 60 Rule.
    In addition, the FAA intends to handle future petitions for 
exemptions for the Age 60 Rule differently. The normal procedures for 
handling petitions for exemption are set forth in Secs. 11.25 and 
11.26. They include publishing a summary of the petition, reviewing any 
comments received, and issuing an individualized grant or denial of the 
petition that recites the basis for the petition and the FAA's analysis 
as to why it is granted or denied. This process can take a substantial 
amount of time. It appears not to be necessary, however, to carry out 
all these steps for future petitions for exemption from the Age 60 Rule 
that are substantially similar to those discussed here. In the future, 
the FAA will deny any petition for exemption from the Age 60 Rule 
without first publishing it for comment unless it contains a proposed 
technique, not discussed in this Disposition, to assess an individual 
pilot's abilities and risks of subtle and sudden incapacitation. 
Petitions that do not contain new information or a protocol that may 
allow the FAA to accurately assess the individual will be summarily 
denied. A copy of this disposition will be attached to the denial to 
explain the basis for the FAA's denial. Any petition that does contain 
such a proposal will be processed and evaluated as provided in 
Secs. 11.25 and 11.26.

II. Concerns Regarding Aging Pilots

    After considering all comments and known studies, FAA concludes 
that concerns regarding aging pilots and underlying the original rule 
have not been shown to be invalid or misplaced.

II(a). Physical Degradation with Age

    As noted above, the Age 60 Rule was promulgated in 1959 to address 
the progressive deterioration of physiological and psychological 
functions with age and an increasing occurrence of significant medical 
defects and sudden incapacitation associated with this degenerative 
process. While emphasizing heart attacks and strokes, the agency also 
noted ``other'' factors, less susceptible to precise measurement, 
resulting from aging alone. Major emphasis was placed on the 
difficulties in attempting to predict incapacity.
    Several commenters state that the death rate in general and the 
cardiovascular death rate in particular for men in the relevant age 
groups declined dramatically between 1960 and 1989. The commenters 
believe, therefore, that the age limit could be raised. Other 
commenters, however, state that insurance statistics show a dramatic 
rise in cardiovascular disease in people over age 50.
    In the 35 years since the rule was introduced, there has been 
remarkable progress in medicine, particularly in the ability to 
evaluate cardiovascular fitness and in the diagnosis and treatment of 
cardiac and cerebrovascular illness. For example, cardiovascular 
disease rises with age, steeply, beginning between ages 55 and 65, and, 
though mortality has dropped since 1960, cardiovascular disease remains 
the most frequent cause of death in pilots and the general population. 
With this increased incidence of cardiovascular disease in the older 
population, the risk for unexpected threatening events is raised. 
Cardiac events (e.g., heart attacks, sudden death) during flight have 
continued to occur in low but fairly consistent numbers over the years 
and have caused general aviation accidents.
    Other conditions are known to increase in incidence or to become 
more complicated with aging. Many present greater difficulties of 
detection and risk assessment than does cardiovascular disease. Among 
these are cerebrovascular disease; malignancies; endocrine dysfunction; 
neurological disorders; psychiatric diagnoses including depression; and 
decline in sensory and motor capabilities. There has been an increasing 
awareness of the more subtle adverse conditions affecting performance, 
those related to cognitive functioning.
    The concepts of ``age-related cognitive decline'' or ``age-
associated memory impairment'' describe objective impairment of 
cognitive function (e.g., attention; language; some visuospatial 
skills; and, particularly, memory), as a result of aging. These 
concepts are applied to describe a longitudinal decline in performance 
that is age appropriate, i.e., a normal outcome of aging (Petersen, RC; 
Normal Aging, Mild Cognitive Impairment, and Early Alzheimer's Disease; 
The Neurologist; 1:000-000, 1995 [in press]). Since there now is 
general agreement that a functional decline occurs with normal aging, 
on-going research seeks tools for its identification and quantification 
and to determine its significance for individuals. A condition of 
``mild cognitive impairment'' also is recognized and appears to be the 
herald of degenerative disease or dementia. Again, research looks for 
diagnostic tools and for predictor variables of the ultimate outcome 
for the individual.
    Dementia in the adult population is a major and growing medical and 
social problem. It occurs at all ages, but its incidence increases with 
advancing age so that the largest group of demented patients is in the 
older age groups (Differential Diagnosis of Dementing Diseases; 
National Institutes of Health Consensus Conference Statement; Volume 6, 
Number 11; July 6-8, 1987). One in 10 persons over age 65 and nearly 
half of those over 85 have Alzheimer's disease alone, and increasingly 
it is found in people in their 40's and 50's.
    Many of the dementing diseases can be confirmed or denied with 
certainty only at autopsy. The history includes a decline from the 
individual's previously attained intellectual level and usually 
involves defects in memory, other cognitive capacities, and adaptive 
behavior. Usually, it is marked by significant deterioration of memory 
and 

[[Page 65981]]
of one or more other intellectual functions such as language, spatial 
or temporal orientation, judgment, and abstract thought. Onset is 
usually but not always insidious, and the patient may or may not be 
aware of the dementia. Deterioration may vary from subtle changes that 
are overlooked by coworkers, family, and friends, to totally 
incapacitating.
    Is there a level of cognitive dysfunction acceptable in a part 121 
pilot? On a particular basis, can pilots be screened for mild cognitive 
deficits or for the ``normal'' age-related cognitive decline? Can early 
dementia be identified before the affected pilot becomes a risk? How do 
we know when the pilot becomes a risk? How specifically are the 
deficits identified through currently available neuropsychological 
testing related to performance and to the real requirements of 
piloting? What is an acceptable level of risk in aviation? When does 
the incidence of cognitive deficit become unacceptable? Are current 
proficiency evaluations adequate for determination of a pilot's ability 
to perform adequately under every reasonably anticipated circumstance 
regardless of age? At present, adequate answers to these questions have 
not been provided.
    In its 1981 report, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the National 
Academy of Science (on which the NIH report is based) noted that in 
addition to the increased incidence of cardiovascular disease and 
degradation in cognitive functions associated with aging, other effects 
of aging become more prevalent. For example, diabetes, thyroid disease, 
pulmonary dysfunction, and gastrointestinal malignancy are more common 
with advancing age.
    There is other deterioration with age. For instance, research 
points to a decline with age in the speed and/or quality of many 
aspects of perceptual and motor functioning. In the general population, 
the ability to see fine details declines slightly in adulthood until 
about 60, and more markedly thereafter. With age, there is typically 
some loss in ability to hear effectively; the higher the frequency 
beyond about 1,000 hertz, the greater the loss.
    Clearly, there is progressive anatomic, physiological, and 
cognitive decline associated with aging, albeit variable in severity 
and onset among individuals. Physicians, psychologists, physiologists, 
and scientists of other disciplines have identified many age-associated 
variables, some easily measurable, some not, that may be important to 
human function. There may be other variables, not yet identified, that 
play an equally significant role. We know that, at some age, everyone 
reaches a level of infirmity or unreliability that is unacceptable in a 
pilot in air transportation. That age will vary from person to person 
but cannot yet be predicted in a specific individual. Because it is 
unacceptable for these pilots to work until failure or until there is 
obvious impairment, the age of 60 has served well as a regulatory limit 
since 1959. Many commenters state that the Age 60 Rule is arbitrary and 
there is no scientific basis for it. Others would choose a different 
arbitrary age. For instance, the Acting Chief, Adult Psychological 
Development, Behavioral and Social Research Program, NIA, submitted a 
comment in 1993 on behalf of the NIA. He states the view that the age 
limit could be increased ``to an age closer to the mid-sixties.'' 
However, the studies he cites do not point to an age closer to the mid-
sixties any more definitively than they point to the age of 60 as an 
appropriate age limit.
    While science does not dictate the age of 60, that age is within 
the age range during which sharp increases in disease mortality and 
morbidity occur.

II(b). Hilton Study and Other Accident Rate Studies

    Over the years, several reports have examined the rate of accidents 
as they relate to age in various populations groups, in an effort to 
better understand how aging may affect safety. As discussed above, the 
Hilton Study was initiated by the FAA to look at accident rates in 
pilots. Many commenters state that the report provides justification 
for a rule change. They point out that the report shows the same 
accident rate for pilots who are 50 and pilots who are 65. They state 
that the report finds that accident rates of part 121 pilots decrease 
with age. Some other commenters, however, state that the report does 
not provide justification for a rule change. They state that the report 
is not meaningful since correlating accident rates solely with total 
flying hours and recent flying hours is not a valid measurement. They 
also state that it is not meaningful to compare private pilots who fly 
beyond age 60 with pilots who fly a lot of hours per year in part 121 
operations.
    David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Associate Professor of Epidemiology, 
The City University of New York Medical School, submitted comments on 
the Hilton Study. He points out that accident rates are a very crude 
tool to examine the relationship between pilot age, health, and 
performance. The IOM, he notes, ``recognized the existence of a 
fundamental problem: since there are no Class I pilots flying Part 121 
flights beyond age 60, there are no medical, performance or even 
accident data on the group of greatest interest. Needed are data on 
vision, reaction time, judgment, circadian rhythm and many other 
neurobehavioral and physiological measures.'' This problem led to the 
IOM's recommendation that extensive additional data be collected and 
analyzed to better understand the relationship of aging and pilot 
performance. Dr. Michaels notes that the Hilton Study did not take the 
approach recommended by the IOM. Rather than examining the 
neurobehavioral and physiological measures detailed by the IOM, the 
authors of the Hilton Study examined only accident rates. (However, the 
authors of the Hilton Report fully carried out the work statement of 
their research contract with the agency which asked only that accidents 
be studied.)
    Dr. Michaels further noted that numerous studies have demonstrated 
that, among various groups of pilots examined, increasing accident risk 
is associated with increasing age. He includes papers by Golaszewski 
(1983); Mortimer (1991); and an analysis by the Office of Technology 
Assessment (1990) which support this finding. He also invites attention 
to the citation by the NIA Report of studies by Harper (1964); 
Lategola, et al (1970); Rohde and Ross (1966); and Booze (1977), all 
demonstrating increasing risk with increasing age. Dr. Michaels warns 
that it would be contrary to customary epidemiologic practice to accept 
unconditionally and definitively findings from a single study that are 
substantially different from those of previous studies.
    There is contention regarding the Hilton Study's grouping of pilots 
for comparison purposes. Richard Golaszewski, the author of two papers 
on the relationship between pilot age and accident rates, belives that 
the Hilton Study's conclusions are based on the use of a group of 
pilots (holders of Class III medical certificates who have more than 
500 hours of total flight time and 50 hours of flight time in the last 
year), inappropriate for inferences about the likely accident rate 
performance of airline pilots of age 60 and above. He believes this 
group is least like airline pilots and suggests his own alternative: 
Professional pilots who did not fly for airlines but who held Class I 
or II medical certificates. Mr. Golaszewski cites the Second 
Golaszewski Report for conclusions opposite to the Hilton Study--
increases in accident rates with age for professional pilots.

[[Page 65982]]

    The Hilton Study provides a discussion of the First Golaszewski 
Report, noting those researchers' disagreement with Mr. Golaszewski's 
methodology and questioning his conclusions. The study also notes 
methodological concerns regarding the cited works by the Office of 
Technology Assessment; Mortimer; and Guide and Gibson (1991).
    Dr. Michaels concludes that (1) the Hilton Study does not present 
convincing evidence that pilots holding Class I medical certificates 
past the age of 60 are not at increased risk of accidents, and (2) that 
the study is a methodologically invalid foundation for rulemaking. He 
suggests that the analyses performed are not valid because of the small 
size of the study (very few accidents and a very large number of flight 
hours), because the study is insensitive to the real concerns (whether 
aging is associated with increased risk for incapacitation), and 
because the study does not have well-documented exposure data. The 
later refers the fact that the Hilton Study calculated accident rates 
by comparing the total hours flown. However, because most accidents 
occur during take offs and landings, Dr. Michaels states that hours 
flown is not a useful measure in calculating the risk of accidents. He 
believes that the methods used in the Hilton Study would obscure any 
increased rate of accidents among older pilots in the analyses 
presented.
    The First Golaszewski Report concluded that pilots with Class I 
medical certificates (required for part 121 air carrier pilots in 
command) and Class II medical certificates (required for other 
commercial pilots) had a substantially higher accident rate after age 
60 than at younger ages. This report was cited by the FAA in denying a 
petition for exemption from Sec. 121.383(c) submitted by Courtney Y. 
Bennett et al., and John H. Baker, et al., in 1986. Golaszewski, in the 
study report itself, noted and resolved to the FAA's satisfaction 
various sources of potential error and provided rationale for the 
choices made. Because the study viewed the accident experience of 
holders of Class III medical certificates (required for non-commercial 
operations) and of all classes of medical certificate combined rather 
than that of identified airline pilots, however, and because of 
disagreement with Golaszewski's selection of numerators and 
denominators for calculating accident rates, the study findings and 
methodology were disputed by the petitioners in their later legal 
action in a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Although the court 
identified limitations in the study, it upheld the FAA's denial of the 
petition. Baker v. FAA, 917 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1990).
    The Second Golaszewski Report indicated similar findings. These 
studies were based on data contained in the National Transportation 
Safety Board Accident Records Database and the FAA Comprehensive Airman 
Information System medical database.
    It should be noted that increasing accident rates with age is not 
found just in aviation. The National Research Council (NRC) has found 
increasing car accident rates with increasing driver age. In a report 
published in 1988, the NRC concluded that ``older drivers show an 
involvement in crashes that is more extensive than that of middle-age 
drivers, * * *'' Transportation in an Aging Society, Transportation 
Research Board, National Research Council, Washington, D.C. 1988. While 
safely piloting an airplane is more complex than driving an automobile, 
both require knowledge, quick reflex actions, good judgment, long-and 
short-term recall, and many other skills and abilities. Accident rate 
data represent a quantitative compilation of occurrences where skills 
and abilities were, for one reason or another, inadequate to cope with 
a specific situation.
    Because statistical analysis of over-age-60 pilots in part 121 
operations cannot be done (because there are no such pilots) studies 
must use surrogate data. As has been the case in both the Hilton Study 
and the Golaszewski reports, such analyses are subject to the criticism 
that the data used do not reflect reality and, therefore, are flawed. 
This is even truer with the consideration of accident rate data in car 
crashes. Unfortunately, accurate counts of all pilots flying in 
scheduled air carrier operations during a given time period and their 
age, current and total flight time, and accident experience are not 
available. Accidents in air carrier operations are, fortunately, rare, 
and there are other factors (e.g., seniority bidding for routes) that 
compound the difficulties encountered in developing meaningful 
statistics regarding the effects of aging. Further, flying by non-part 
121 pilots generally involves aircraft, equipment, airports, 
operational conditions, and operating procedures that are quite 
different than part 121 operations. Nevertheless, these studies and the 
efforts of earlier researchers provide a foundation for this current 
consideration of the issue.
    The Hilton Study, the First Golaszewski Report, and the Second 
Golaszewski Report sought to define the effects of aging on older 
pilots in terms of accident rates. While conclusions may differ as to 
the effect of aging on pilots, the studies are similarly limited by the 
rule itself since data cannot be gathered on pilots over age 60 
operating in part 121 operations. Factors that may have contributed to 
the contradictory conclusions are that the accident rates for pilots 
over age 60 can be determined only in operations outside of part 121 
and, therefore, may not be fully useful in drawing conclusions about 
pilot performance in operations conducted under part 121; and grouping 
the data differently may lead to different conclusions. While we 
believe the studies all tend to support a regulatory age limit, they 
provide no consensus as to precisely what that age limit should be.
    In the NIH Study, the most comprehensive study yet performed of the 
issues involved in age-related retirement of airline pilots, the Panel 
found that ``age-related changes in health and performance influence 
adversely the ability of increasing numbers of individuals to perform 
as pilots with the highest level of safety and, consequently, endanger 
the safety of the aviation system as a whole.'' In response to the 
question, ``What is the effect of aging on the ability of individuals 
to perform the duties of pilots with the highest level of safety?'', 
the Panel responded, in part, that--

Undoubtedly, the number of individuals experiencing substantial 
decline in performance does increase with advancing age * * * 
Variability in performance appears to increase, and average 
performance to decrease, with increasing age * * * the risk of an 
accident increases in the later life of a pilot, and * * * such risk 
probably accelerates with advancing age * * * The duties of pilots 
embrace not only maneuvering skill but also decision-making, crew 
coordination and resource management. Decline in cognitive and 
psychomotor performance, as well as in physiological performance, 
occurs with increasing age and will affect how these duties are 
executed. The health status of the pilot is apt to affect his/her 
flying performance. In this regard, subtle decrements in performance 
due to aging processes or subclinical functional impairment are more 
likely to pose a problem than is complete failure of performance due 
to sudden incapacitation.

The Hilton Study has not provided answers to these basic concerns.
    After careful deliberation, the FAA has determined that the Hilton 
Study does not provide an acceptable basis warranting proposing to 
change the Age 60 Rule. Supporters of both the Hilton Study and the 
First and Second Golaszewski Reports have good points. The subgroups 
studied by each is to some extent limited, in that they necessarily do 
not mirror the subgroup 

[[Page 65983]]
of part 121 pilots to which the Age 60 Rule applies. The studies do not 
look at pilot performance, indeed, they count all accidents regardless 
of cause (not just those caused by pilot error), and do not count 
incidents of pilot incapacitation that did not result in accidents.
    Debate surrounding the reliance to be placed on these studies 
illustrates the difficulty of the task. The changes in accident rates 
identified in the Hilton Study were small, and its conclusions, 
therefore, were appropriately cautious. In view of the lack of 
consensus among the best experts who have looked at this matter, the 
FAA considers caution appropriate in declining to consider the Hilton 
Study warranting a change to the Age 60 Rule at this time.

II(c). Performance

    Many commenters assert that older pilots have more experience and 
better performance capability than younger pilots, while other 
commenters state that older pilots lose performance ability. First, age 
does not necessarily imply quantity or quality of experience. 
Experience is valuable, but it does not offset all risks or decrements 
associated with aging. Also, at some point, the law of diminishing 
returns comes into play. Once a pilot achieves a certain level of 
expertise, additional flight time will not significantly improve pilot 
performance.
    It must also be pointed out that reference to ``younger'' pilots 
may be misleading in this context. It is the FAA's experience in the 
industry that retiring age 60 pilots (who generally are captains) are 
not replaced by very young and inexperienced pilots. Rather, they are 
replaced by pilots who have substantial experience as pilots in the 
first officer position, and often as flight engineers before that.
    In addition, some commenters state that pilots near age 60 have 
performed heroically, proving that performance does not degrade with 
age and experience, while other commenters state that courageous 
performances by pilots who were near age 60 are not reasons for 
abandoning the rule. While the FAA recognizes that certain older pilots 
have performed heroically in specific circumstances, the decision to 
change the Age 60 Rule cannot be based on isolated commendable acts. 
The FAA must make a decision on whether change to the rule is called 
for based on the totality of evidence available on the safety 
implications of aging.

II(d). Health and Technology

    Many commenters state that since the rule was issued medical 
technology has advanced and life expectancy has increased; hence, they 
conclude, the rule is obsolete. In addition, they reference that 
medical technology is now more capable of screening out pilots with 
medical risks and that fatigue is no longer an issue due to more modern 
aircraft that reduce workload and stress levels. Many commenters also 
state that the aging process can vary markedly among individuals and 
that some individuals are in worse physical or mental condition at age 
40 than others are at age 60. Hence, these commenters do not believe 
that age should be a means for determining capability. Many other 
commenters, however, state that older pilots are not in good physical 
shape and improvements in medical screening do not detect the subtle 
impairments with age that can undermine the margin of safety.
    As noted earlier, the incidence of cardiovascular disease rises 
with age, and it remains that most frequent cause of death in pilots 
and the general population. Though the FAA relies on sophisticated 
medical assessment and monitoring to permit the certification of 
carefully selected pilots with known heart disease, the need for the 
highest level of safety in air carrier operations has required that the 
increasing, unpredictable danger associated with aging be limited.
    In addition, there has been an increasing awareness of the more 
subtle adverse conditions affecting performance, those related to 
cognitive functioning. Current medical certification procedures 
identify those individuals who are at most risk and are adequate for 
assessing many medical problems in pilots. The significance of the 
known as well as the potential unknown or unmeasurable adverse factors 
increases with aging, however, and reduces confidence in the 
sensitivity of the medical certification process. The Age 60 Rule 
recognizes this reduction of sensitivity in the context of the 
statutory recognition that the highest possible degree of safety is 
required in air carrier operations. As both the incidence of 
incapacitation risk factors and other adverse effects increase with 
age, the Age 60 Rule provides additional confidence in air 
transportation safety.

II(e). Multicrew Concept

    Some commenters point out that operations under part 121 use 2-
pilot crews, and some also have a flight engineer on board. They state 
that if one pilot becomes incapacitated, the other crew member(s) can 
take over. The FAA agrees that the multicrew concept provides an 
additional measure of safety. Indeed, redundancy in safety features is 
an important part of the overall safety benefits in part 121 
operations, including not only pilots but also other personnel, 
aircraft structures, and procedures. The safety benefits of redundancy 
would be reduced, however, if the level of safety of any of the 
elements were to degrade. The sudden incapacitation of a pilot is not 
without risk even in a multiple-member crew and is to be avoided. Of 
equal concern is the prospect of subtle degradation in the judgment, 
cognitive function, and crew coordination that may accompany advancing 
age. Unlike the case of sudden incapacitation, such degradation may not 
be readily apparent to the other crew, and it may be difficult for the 
crew to deal with the results.
    The FAA does not consider the fact that part 121 operations have 
multiple pilots to be a basis for permitting one (or both) of those 
pilots to be at unacceptable risk for age-related problems.

III. Alternatives to an Age Limitation

III(a). Performance Checks

    Some commenters suggested that the FAA can do performance checks 
for pilots past age 60 in simulators to ensure that they meet the 
performance standards. Periodic proficiency and competency checks are 
intended to detect a pilot's performance deficiency and to correct 
those deficiencies before the pilot is returned to flight operations. 
These checks only verify the state of a pilot's performance at the time 
of the checks. They are not useful for detection of early or 
subclinical cognitive defects that may subtly degrade performance or 
which, in time, may progress to risks for errors in judgment or other 
actions that may jeopardize safety. The checks do not predict whether 
an individual pilot's performance will degrade at any time in the 
future as a result of age. In addition, in its 1981 report, NIA noted 
that proficiency checks and simulator checks usually are designed to 
train pilots to meet standards of proficiency under optimal testing 
conditions using known routines and maneuvers. Although the proficiency 
checks suffice for pilot performance purposes, they are not suitable 
for testing complex cognitive functions under actual conditions, such 
as fatigue and stress; nor are they used to determine at what rate the 
skills learned in the training sessions decline between two consecutive 
checks. Standard maneuvers used in proficiency tests are inappropriate 
for measuring any but obvious decrements in pilot performance. Their 
inadequacy stems 

[[Page 65984]]
from the fact that the maneuvers are well-known in advance; they may be 
well-practiced and over-learned by experienced pilots; and they may 
give no indication of the pilot's ability to perform them under 
particular levels of stress, fatigue, or unexpected decision-making 
requirements. Furthermore, the pass/fail nature of the testing program; 
the probable wide variability among testers; and the train-to-
proficiency nature of these tests make them inadequate as a screening 
mechanism.

III(b). Class I Medical Certificates and Special Issuance Certificates

    Some commenters state that part 121 pilots are required to hold FAA 
medical certificates, and that the medical certification process tests 
their medical fitness. Commenters also point out that the FAA issues 
waivers to pilots and permits them to fly with various medical 
conditions, including cardiovascular problems. They state that if such 
pilots can be evaluated, older pilots can too.
    The question of operational privileges for aging pilots is not 
comparable to the question of assessment of younger airmen with 
specific medical conditions. Although individuals with known medical 
conditions have been returned to air carrier duties, their 
circumstances are not comparable with those of an individual who has 
reached an advanced age. For the person with known disease, the 
prognosis for the disease can normally be assessed and specific tests 
or evaluations identified to monitor the condition. Special issuance 
medical certificates are granted to airmen who have certain known 
medical conditions or static defects that are disqualifying under the 
established standards of the Federal Aviation Regulations. This 
practice does not compromise safety and does not demand similar 
consideration with respect to the Age 60 Rule. When a special issuance 
medical certificate is granted, the condition in question has been 
clearly identified, and the agency has been able to develop a means of 
assessment and surveillance specially designed to demonstrate the 
individual's capabilities and to identify any adverse changes. If that 
is not possible, certification is not granted. Such is not the case in 
aging, since there are no generally applicable medical tests that can, 
at this time, adequately determine which individual pilots are subject 
to incapacitation secondary to either acute cardiovascular or 
neurological events or to more subtle adverse conditions related to 
decline of cognitive functioning.

III(c). Suggested Protocol for Gathering Additional Data

    One commenter states that data from actual part 121 pilots under 60 
and over 60 are needed. The commenter suggested that a pilot group 
should be established that can fly over age 60. He believes that a 
cohort of over age 60 pilots can be identified with a quantifiable five 
year cardiovascular risk that is lower than the risk in the 50 to 59 
year age group. Also this group can be tested by serial performance 
testing to ensure that there has not been subtle incapacitation. The 
kind of data that is needed to change the rule could then be collected 
and analyzed.
    The commenter recommends that a consensus working group of experts, 
appointed by the Federal Air Surgeon, deliver a document that describes 
a battery of state-of-the-art testing to identify a group of age 60 or 
older pilots who have the attributes for continued safe flying. A 
second group of non-flying crew age 60 or older would also be 
considered. The document would include all testing, follow up, 
methodology, etc. The Federal Air Surgeon would then review the 
protocol, obtain additional expert help as needed, and produce the 
final protocol. Finally, the FAA would choose the sites for 
participants in the long term surveillance program.
    FAA Response: While the FAA appreciates the proposed protocol that 
the commenter submitted, the FAA does not find it an acceptable basis 
for initiating a rule change at this time. The FAA's ANPRM in 1982 
proposed identification of a select group of aged 60 and over pilots 
who would continue flying in part 121 operations to permit FAA to 
collect data. The FAA withdrew the ANPRM in 1984 because valid 
selection tests for the group did not exist. The FAA was concerned 
that, without valid selection tests, these pilots would create an 
unacceptable safety risk in part 121 operations. The commenter does not 
suggest any data that indicates that a group described would be able to 
identify any such tests. The FAA has the same concerns today.

IV. Financial Impact of the Age 60 Rule

IV(a). Costs

    Some commenters stated that raising the age limit will reduce 
costs, while other commenters stated that raising the age limit will 
increase costs.
    FAA Response: For the reasons discussed in this Disposition, the 
FAA has determined that an amendment to the Age 60 Rule should not be 
proposed at this time. Therefore, the FAA has not evaluated the 
economic impact of a proposed change.

IV(b). Hiring of Pilots

    Some commenters state that increasing the age limit would result in 
the hiring of fewer new pilots, while others state that there would be 
no change in hiring and no increase in furloughs because economic 
success rather than retirements determines hiring and furloughs. 
Commenters estimate that between 10 and 50 percent of pilots would 
continue to fly if the age limit is extended.
    FAA Response: The FAA believes that the primary determinant of new 
pilot hiring and furlough is general economic conditions rather than 
retirements. The effects of increasing the age of mandatory retirement 
would depend on the number of pilots opting to delay their retirement, 
which may vary considerably among air carriers. Pilots with long 
tenures at a single carrier would be less inclined to delay their 
retirement than pilots who began their service at a relatively late age 
and may not have sufficient years of service at their present employer 
to qualify for full vesting in pension plans. In addition, the hiring 
and furlough plans of those air carriers that permit pilots over age 60 
to serve as flight engineers would be less affected. Any effects on 
furlough and new hires would be temporary as retirements would not be 
delayed by more than the difference between the existing and the 
amended mandatory retirement age.

V. Other Comments

V(a). Original Promulgation of Age 60 Rule

    Several commenters contend that the Age 60 Rule was promulgated for 
economic reasons in response to an improper personal request from the 
chairman of American Airlines to the Administrator of the FAA and 
question the FAA's recent actions in reviewing the rule.
    FAA Response: When the Age 60 Rule was first promulgated in 1959, 
the FAA followed standard rulemaking procedures. Notices were published 
in the Federal Register (draft releases 59-4, 5, and 6, 24 FR 5249, 
5248, and 5247, June 27, 1959), the public was given an opportunity to 
comment on the proposal, and then the final rule was issued. The rule 
was not issued to facilitate the operations of any air carrier. The 
rule was promulgated in order to maintain a high level of safety in 
part 121 operations, and that remains the FAA objective at the present 
time.

[[Page 65985]]

V(b). Age Discrimination

    Many commenters state that the current rule discriminates against 
pilots 60 years of age or older and that the Age 60 Rule is not in 
compliance with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In addition, 
many commenters state that the original establishment of the age 60 
limit discriminated against people 60 years and older. However, many 
commenters who are opposed to changing the rule state that since pilots 
knew about the age 60 limit when they were hired, it is not 
discriminatory.
    FAA Response: The FAA agrees that limitations based on age are to 
be avoided if possible. However, safety in air transportation is 
paramount. As discussed above, the FAA has not found a way to 
acceptably evaluate the inevitable deterioration that occurs with age. 
Considering that the consequences of a pilot's subtle or sudden 
incapacitation potentially are so severe, the FAA has determined that 
at this time safety requires the Age 60 Rule to remain unchanged.
    The Equal Opportunity Employment Commission suggests that the FAA 
use special testing or screening to identify those pilots over age 60 
who should be required to stop serving in part 121 operations. They 
note that some employers of pilots in non-part 121 operations have 
resolved age discrimination litigation by agreeing to use such 
additional testing to develop data about pilots' health. However, the 
FAA has not been apprised of the testing protocols or of the results of 
any such testing, has not seen them discussed in the medical 
literature, and has not been party to the agreements. Accordingly, 
these are not a basis to determine that such testing can be used 
instead of an age limitation.

V(c). Foreign Pilots Over Age 60

    Many commenters reference ICAO standards, the JAA proposal, and the 
foreign countries that permit pilots to be over age 60, with varying 
restrictions. In addition, many commenters point out that the FAA 
allows foreign carriers to operate in U.S. airspace and airports with 
over age 60 pilots and questioned why U.S. pilots over 60 can't operate 
in U.S. airspace and airports.
    FAA Response: Following the FAA's promulgation of the Age 60 Rule, 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted changes to 
international safety standards that established an age limit of 60 for 
the pilot in command of large transport aircraft operating in 
international air transport service. ICAO standards do not limit the 
age of the second in command, although an age limit of 60 is 
recommended. In October 1994, a working group of ICAO's Air Navigation 
Commission prepared a working paper on the upper age limits for flight 
crewmembers. The group, acknowledging the lack of medical statistical 
information, recommended that the age limit not be changed. Some 
countries such as France and Germany have an Age 60 Rule similar to the 
United States, while other countries such as the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland have adopted rules that allow pilots to fly after their 
60th birthdays. If foreign airlines operate in the U.S., the FAA 
requires that the carrier adhere to the ICAO standard. In addition, the 
Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) in Europe has proposed to harmonize 
the European rule to allow pilots who have not reached the age of 65 to 
operate in multi-pilot operations, provided no more than one pilot in 
the cockpit is over the age of 60. (JAR-FCL 2-1.11.)
    Accordingly, not all countries have dealt with the issue of age 
limitations in the same manner, and for the reasons discussed elsewhere 
in this Disposition, the FAA has determined that the Age 60 Rule should 
be maintained in the United States.

V(d). Inconsistency With Other Regulations

    Many commenters point out that pilots who operate under other than 
part 121 can fly after reaching age 60. They believe, therefore, that 
there should not be an age limit in part 121 operations.
    FAA Response: The Age 60 Rule, like many other safety rules that 
apply to part 121 operations and not others, provides an increased 
level of safety appropriate to the operations conducted under part 121. 
The Commuter Rule proposal, as discussed above, looked at enhancing the 
level of safety for certain operations now under part 135. The FAA 
proposed one age limit on all pilots employed in part 121 operations, 
including those pilots currently employed in the part 135 operations 
covered by the proposal (60 FR 16230; March 29, 1995). The final 
Commuter Rule is being issued concurrently with this Disposition.
    The FAA's statute requires the Administrator to give consideration 
to the duty resting upon air carriers to perform their services with 
the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest and to 
make rules appropriate to the differences between air transportation 
and other air commerce. The Age 60 Rule is responsive to this mandate.

V(e). Pilot Union Membership

    Many commenters state that pilot unions and employers may favor 
retirement at age 60 and write this into their labor contracts, but 
pilots who do not belong to those unions should not be penalized by 
actions that benefit union members. In addition, commenters state that 
some union members disagree with their union's position and they 
question their union's motivation for changing their position on the 
question of raising the age limit.
    FAA Response: The Age 60 Rule is a safety rule that must apply to 
all pilots, regardless of union membership or labor contracts. The FAA 
cannot speculate as to the basis for union or management positions.

V(f). Experienced Pilot Shortages

    Many commenters state that new pilots have a shorter time for 
gaining experience as second and first officer because of the rapid 
expansion of the major carriers and the increasing numbers of two-
person cockpits. The commenters state that carriers that allow rapid 
promotion to Captain have poor safety records. Commenters also point 
out that industry forecasts project a shortage of pilots between 1995 
and 2010 due to sharply reduced military pilot training, thus the 
airlines' most experienced pilots should be retained.
    FAA Response: The FAA has not been apprised of data that shows that 
the Age 60 Rule will create a shortage of experienced pilots and 
thereby compromise safety.

VI. Conclusion

    While the FAA considered each comment in its evaluation of the Age 
60 Rule, for the most part the comments made assertions and expressed 
opinions but did not provide the FAA with additional facts or analysis 
sufficient to support changing the rule. The FAA's overriding 
regulatory concern is safety. Before issuing a regulation, the FAA must 
be satisfied that it will maintain or raise the current level of 
safety.
    The Civil Aviation Medical Association's (CAMA) comments are 
particularly relevant. CAMA noted that medical conditions are degraded 
by age and that the aging process accelerates with time. It took a 
neutral position as to the Age 60 Rule, however, stating that the basic 
question is one of public policy and determining how much risk is 
acceptable.
    The only things that are clear from review of all of the comments 
and relevant literature is that there is no one obviously ``right 
answer'' discovered through scientific or medical studies, 

[[Page 65986]]
and, as CAMA states, the basic question is one of public policy and 
determining how much risk is acceptable. The FAA must evaluate all the 
varied evidence that indicates what those risks are, and determine 
where the public interest lies. At this time, the FAA cannot be assured 
that raising the age 60 limit will maintain or raise the level of 
safety that the Age 60 Rule offers.
    Although the Hilton Study provides useful information on accident 
rates for pilots as a function of their age, it does not provide a 
satisfactory basis for changing the Age 60 Rule.
    Therefore, after carefully considering the written comments 
submitted to the docket, the comments presented at the public meeting, 
and analysis of the Hilton Study, the FAA has determined for the 
reasons stated above that no change to the Age 60 Rule should be 
proposed at this time.

    Issued in Washington, DC on December 11, 1995.
William J. White,
Acting Director, Flight Standards Service.
[FR Doc. 95-30546 Filed 12-14-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
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