Filed 7/9/21 P. v. Mejia CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CIRILO MEJIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 H048793

 (Santa Cruz County

 Super. Ct. No. 18CR07842)

Defendant Cirilo Mejia pleaded no contest to three counts of committing a lewd 

act on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)).1 The trial court committed

defendant to state prison for a stipulated term of 12 years, and gave defendant 764 days 

of actual custody credit and 114 days of conduct credit (§§ 2900.5, 2933.1) for a total of 

878 days of presentence custody credit. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal 

challenging only his sentence. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. 

Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 on behalf of defendant. Defendant has filed a letter. 

We affirm the judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 22, 2018, defendant was living in a room in the same residence as 

the victim, who was 11 years old. That night, the victim’s mother reported to police that 

she could not find her daughter, who has special needs because of a diagnosis of 

microcephaly. The victim’s mother looked and found the bathroom door was locked. 

1 All further references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2

The victim’s mother called out for her daughter and heard “ ‘Ma’ ” in response. She 

directed her daughter to unlock the door, and she did so. The victim appeared frightened. 

The victim’s mother discovered defendant behind the shower curtain with his pants 

partway down and asked what he had done. Defendant responded that he did not do 

anything.

The victim’s mother later placed a pretext phone call to defendant during which 

defendant stated, “ ‘I did nothing. I was going to be with her, but, no. I was going to 

rape her, but, no. Then you knocked on the door and I left. I hid because I believe[d]

you were going to hit or kill me. That’s why.’ ” On December 20, 2018, defendant was 

arrested. In an interview with police, he admitted to consuming seven or eight beers and 

one or two drinks of whiskey on the night of the incident. He went to the bathroom, and 

the victim was outside. He took the victim into the bathroom and locked the door. 

Defendant lowered his pants and the victim’s pants and underwear and began touching 

himself. While holding the victim’s buttocks, defendant tried to penetrate the victim but 

was unable to do so. As he tried again to penetrate the victim, the victim’s mother 

knocked on the door and he hid behind the shower curtain.

Defendant was charged with kidnapping for the purpose of rape (count 1; § 209, 

subd. (b)(1)), attempted rape of a person incapable of giving consent because of a mental 

disorder or developmental or physical disability (counts 2-3; §§ 261, subd. (a)(1), 664), 

committing a forcible lewd act on a child under age 14 (counts 4-5; § 288, subd. (b)(1)), 

and committing a lewd act on a child under age 14 (counts 6-8; § 288, subd. (a)).

At the change of plea hearing, the trial court stated that defendant would be 

sentenced to a 12-year prison term pursuant to a negotiated agreement. The trial court 

advised defendant of the immigration consequences of his plea. Defendant was also 

advised of his rights to a jury trial, to cross-examine witnesses, to testify, to present a 

defense, and to remain silent. Defendant, who was assisted by a Mixteco language 

interpreter, stated that he understood his rights and waived them. Both the prosecutor and 
3

defense counsel stipulated to a factual basis for the pleas. Defendant agreed that he had 

enough time to speak with his attorney, that he was not threatened or promised anything 

other than what was stated in court, and that he was not under the influence of anything 

that interfered with his ability to make well-reasoned decisions. Defendant pleaded no 

contest to counts six through eight. On January 21, 2021, the trial court sentenced 

defendant as described above.

Appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief that states the case and the 

facts but raises no issues. Defendant was notified of his right to submit written argument 

on his own behalf, and he submitted a letter in which he raises several concerns.

Defendant states that the “two lawyers” who worked on his case never 

investigated his case, “they only took the words that the detective asked me when they 

arrested me . . . .” Defendant states that he told his lawyer he did not understand the 

questions that the detective asked him “because I speak another dialect which is Mixteco 

and then they found me an interpreter in Mixteco, but they never asked anyone to 

investigate my case . . . .” Defendant also requests that this court review his time in 

county jail to see if “they took away my credits, because I know that it counts double for 

all the time I am in the county.”

Defendant is precluded from challenging the validity of his plea on appeal because 

he failed to timely obtain a certificate of probable cause. “A guilty [or no contest] plea 

amounts to an admission of every element of the crime and is the equivalent of a 

conviction.” (People v. Ward (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 574; People v. Mendez (1999) 19 

Cal.4th 1084, 1094.) “No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of 

conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere . . . except where both of the 

following are met: [¶] (a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written 

statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, 

jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings. [¶] (b) The trial 

court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the 
4

county clerk.” (§ 1237.5, emphasis added.) This requirement applies to defendant’s 

suggestion that trial counsel was ineffective. (In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 651.) 

Thus, defendant’s claims about the validity of the plea are not cognizable in this appeal.

As for defendant’s sentencing claim, which is cognizable in this appeal, we 

conclude he is not entitled to additional custody credit. Defendant was arrested on 

December 20, 2018 and sentenced on January 21, 2021, which means defendant was in 

actual custody for 764 days. Under section 2933.1, subdivision (c), “the maximum credit 

that may be earned against a period of confinement in . . . a county jail . . . following 

arrest and prior to placement in the custody of the Director of Corrections, shall not 

exceed 15 percent of the actual period of confinement for any person” convicted of a 

violent felony listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c). (§ 2933.1, subds. (c), (a).) 

Committing a lewd act on a child is a violent felony. (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(6).) Thus, 

defendant was entitled to no more than 15 percent conduct credit, which based on 

764 days of actual custody resulted in 114 days of conduct credit, for a total of 878 days 

of presentence custody credit.

Having examined the entire record, we conclude that there are no arguable issues 

on appeal.

II. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
_________________________________

ELIA, ACTING P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_______________________________

GROVER, J.

_______________________________

DANNER, J.

People v. Mejia

H048793