IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs April 5, 2005

PATRICK S. RILEY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2001-E-2085 Seth Norman, Judge

No. M2004-01726-CCA-R3-PC - Filed August 9, 2005 

On May 24, 2004, the petitioner, Patrick S. Riley, filed a petition for post-conviction relief that

challenged his January 11, 2002 conviction of aggravated burglary. The post-conviction court

dismissed the petition as being barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code

Annotated section 40-30-102(a) (2003). The petitioner now appeals. We affirm the dismissal of the

petition.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.

JAMES CURWOOD WITT,JR.,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and

J.C. MCLIN, JJ., joined.

Patrick S. Riley, Appellant, Pro Se.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Jennifer L. Bledsoe, Assistant Attorney General;

Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General; and Dan Hamm, Assistant District Attorney

General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The record reflects that the petitioner’s judgment of conviction of aggravated burglary

was entered in the Davidson County Criminal Court on January 11, 2002. His resulting probation

was revoked by order entered July 9, 2003, and the court placed the petitioner on community

corrections on that date. The community corrections placement was revoked by order entered

October 1, 2003. Subsequently, the petitioner moved for a “suspended sentence,” and apparently

the trial court denied the motion by order entered on May 3, 2004. The post-conviction petition was

filed on May 24, 2004. After the post-conviction court dismissed the petition as being time-barred,

the petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal.

The petition for post-conviction relief from the petitioner’s conviction, which the

present petition appears to be, is barred by the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-
-2-

30-102(a) (2003). To be timely, when no appeal from the conviction was filed, the petition must be

filed within one year of the date on which the judgment became final. Id. The petitioner filed his

petition more than two years after his guilty-pleaded conviction judgment was entered. Thus, the

claim for post-conviction relief from the conviction is barred.

Having said that, we acknowledge “that a petitioner may challenge the revocation of

a community corrections sentence in a post-conviction proceeding.” See Carpenter v. State, 136

S.W.3d 608, 612-23 (Tenn. 2004). We have reviewed the petition in this case to assess whether it

may be fairly viewed as an attack upon the community corrections revocation. We note that the

petition was filed within one year of the October 1, 2003 revocation of the petitioner’s community

corrections placement.

The form petition, including itslengthyattachment, is difficult to characterize. Some

statements contained therein would support a conclusion that the petitioner is challenging his original

conviction on the grounds that his plea agreement was not honored, and other statements suggest that

the petitioner sought to challenge the trial court’s May 3, 2004 denial of a motion for a suspended

sentence. Most of the lengthy, hand-written attachment to the petition addresses the petitioner’s

grievances concerning the treatment he received at the hands of the drug court staff during his

community corrections rehabilitation via the drug court program. The recounting of these

experiences and grievances may be fairly viewed as the petitioner’s defense to the charge of violation

of his community corrections placement that culminated in the October, 2003 revocation. 

Such a charitable view of the petition, however, avails the petitioner nothing.

Although he asserts that the treatment he received by the rehabilitation staff violated his

constitutional rights of due process and equal protection, we discern no claim that the revocation

itself is constitutionally infirm. Post-conviction relief is only available when the challenged action

is “void or voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of

Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103 (2003). 

Thus, even if we were to view the petition as a challenge to the October, 2003

revocation order, we conclude that the petition fails to state a colorable claim for post-conviction

relief. “If the facts alleged [in the post-conviction petition], taken as true fail to show that the

petitioner is entitled to relief . . . , the petition shall be dismissed.” Id. § 40-30-106(f). 

Accordingly, the dismissal of the petition is affirmed.

___________________________________ 

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE