alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### E. C. CODY v. R. C. BARRETT.

(Filed 19 December, 1930.)

Schools and School Districts G a — In this case held: mandamus would not lie to compel county superintendent to approve election of teacher.

Tlie approval of the county superintendent of schools is required for the election of a teacher or assistant teacher in a nonlocal tax school district, and his refusal to approve the election of one on the ground that he did not have sufficiently high certificates as a teacher and that his election as a teacher would not be for the best interests of the school will not sustain the finding of the trial judge that the refusal of the county superintendent of schools to approve the election was arbitrary, captious and without just cause, and a mandamus to cause his approval is improvidently issued by the lower court. 3 C. S., 5533.

Appeal by defendant from *Ha/rwood, Special Judge,*at September Term, 1930, of Geahabi.

Application for writ of mandamus to require the respondent to approve tbe election of petitioner as teacher of Eock Springs School in Graham County.

The record discloses that on *11*June, 1930, the school committee of Yellow Creek Township in Graham County voted to employ the petitioner, E. 0. Cody, as teacher of Eock Springs School at a monthly stipend of $85, and a majority of the committee, D. Anderson and S. A. Crisp, signed a contract to this effect, but the respondent, as county superintendent, failed and refused to countersign said contract or to approve said election.

The respondent testified that he declined to approve the election of petitioner as teacher of Eock Springs School because said school had previously been taught by persons holding higher certificates than the one held by petitioner, and that he did what he believed to be for the best interests of said school.

The trial court found that the respondent acted “arbitrarily, captiously and without just cause,” and ordered that he approve the' election of the petitioner and countersign the contract in question. The respondent appeals, assigning errors.

*44
      *No counsel for petitioner.*

*Dillard & Hill for respondent.*

Stacy, C. J.,

after stating tbe case: It is provided by 3 C. S., 5533, tbat no election of a teacher or assistant teacher by the school committee of a nonlocal tax district shall be deemed valid until such election has been approved by the county superintendent, the executive officer of the county school system. 3 C. S., 5389; *Spruill v. Davenport,*178 N. C., 364, 100 S. E., 527.

We have discovered no sufficient evidence on the present record to warrant the finding that the respondent acted “arbitrarily, captiously and without just cause.” Hence, the application for writ of mandamus should have been denied. *Hayes v. Benton,*193 N. C., 379, 137 S. E., 169. Mandamus lies only to enforce a clear legal right. *Umstead v. Board of Elections,*192 N. C., 139, 134 S. E., 409; *Person v. Doughton,*186 N. C., 723, 120 S. E., 481.

Reversed.
#### JOHN H. FORTNER v. MEDFORD DEITZ

(Filed 19 March, 1958)

Appeal by plaintiff from *Huskins, J-,*at October-November 1957 term of SwaiN.

Civil action to recover for personal injury sustained by plaintiff as *74result of alleged negligence of defendant.

Plaintiff testified in substance that he entered into an oral contract with defendant by which defendant was to level off and build service station site for plaintiff and his brother, — defendant to furnish bulldozer for which plaintiff was to pay defendant $2.00 a truck load of dirt. One McMahan was sent by defendant to do the work. On 7 May, 1956, McMahan had ridden the bulldozer about an hour with plaintiff and showed him how to operate it. And next morning plaintiff was out on the job before anyone else. Later McMahan came and told plaintiff to get up on the bulldozer, and he did so. He couldn’t start it. One Cagle, a worker there, started it for him and, though he had no experience in doing so, plaintiff began to operate it back and forth leveling dirt, and that bank gave way and the dozer started over; but the brakes would not stop it. Plaintiff also testified that he knew that the bulldozer is a dangerous instrument in the hands of somebody who doesn’t know how to operate it; that he was inexperienced in operating it; that he did not know how to operate it; that even so, he got up on it and tried to operate it; and that he doesn’t remember just what did happen.

From judgment as of nonsuit entered at close of his evidence, plaintiff appeals to Supreme Court and assigns error.

*T. M.*Jenkins, *B. B. Morphew for Plaintiff Appellant.*

*Williams and Williams for Defendant Appellee*

*Per Curiam.*

The only assignment of error presented for decision on this appeal is based upon exception to entry of judgment as of non-suit.

Taking the evidence offered upon trial below, as shown in the record of case on appeal, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as is done in testing its sufficiency to withstand motion for judgment as of nonsuit, there is lack of evidence from which actionable negligence is shown, or may be inferred. Indeed it is speculative as to what caused the accident.

But if it should be conceded that there is evidence of negligence on the part of defendant, the evidence clearly establishes, as a matter of law, contributory negligence of plaintiff. No new principle of law is involved. Hence the judgment as of nonsuit is

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3413 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 3413

  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend the credit for 
            health insurance costs of eligible individuals.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           December 16, 2021

Mr. Brown (for himself and Mr. Portman) introduced the following bill; 
     which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend the credit for 
            health insurance costs of eligible individuals.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF HEALTH COVERAGE TAX CREDIT.

    (a) In General.--Subparagraph (B) of section 35(b)(1) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ``January 1, 
2022'' and inserting ``January 1, 2026''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to coverage months beginning after December 31, 2021.
                                 <all>
```
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA on the Relation of J. PAUL WILSON, v. LARRY M. PEARSON, JR.

(Filed 21 September, 1955.)

1. Appeal and Error § 40f—

Tbe order of tbe court in striking or refusing to strike certain allegations of tbe pleadings will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing of prejudice.

2. Pleadings § 31: Elections § 18b—

In *quo warranto*proceedings, an allegation that certain ballots were illegal and void states no more than a conclusion, and the trial court should permit the allegation of sufficient facts to remain in the pleading to disclose that the ballots challenged were void for the reason that the voters casting them were nonresidents of the municipality in which the election was held.

Winboene and Higgins, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Appeal by relator and defendant from *Pless, J.,*June Term, 1955, RUTHERFORD.

*Quo warranto*proceedings to try title to the office of Mayor of Lake Lure, heard on motion to strike allegations contained in the pleadings.

When the cause came on for hearing, the court below allowed the motion in part and denied the same in part. Both relator and defendant excepted and appealed.

*B. T. Jones, Jr., for appellant Paul Wilson.*

*S. P. Dunagan and Hamrick & Jones for defendant appellant.*

Per Curiam.

On appeal to this Court from an order entered in the court below on a motion to strike allegations contained in the pleadings, the appellant must show prejudicial error. *Hinson v. Britt,*232 N.C. 379, 61 S.E. 2d 185; *Woody v. Barnett,*235 N.C. 73, 68 S.E. 2d 810.

The complaint contains a prolix statement of evidentiary facts which were stricken by the court below. The allegations which remain in the complaint are sufficient to enable the trial judge to rule on the evidence tendered in the form and manner in which it is offered except in one respect.

The relator alleges in paragraph 10 that two of the ballots cast for the defendant “were illegal and void, said ballots being those cast by Charles R. Yopp and his wife, Mrs. Charles R. Yopp.” Standing alone, this is nothing more than a conclusion. Therefore, the court erred in striking that part of the complaint in which the relator alleges that said Yopp and wife lived outside the corporate limits of Lake Lure “and that *602they failed to establish a new home or permanent residence in the Town of Lake Lure as required by law to qualify one to vote therein, and had no intent so to do.” That is to say, the allegation should be to the effect that the ballots of said Yopp and wife “were illegal and void for the reason that they were nonresidents of the Town of Lake Lure at the time of said election.” The court below may permit the relator to amend accordingly.

The judgment entered must be modified in accord with this opinion, and as so modified, it is affirmed.

Modified and affirmed.

WinboRNe and HiggiNS, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
#### In the Matter of THE WILL OF GEORGE TAYLOR, Deceased.

(Filed 8 April, 1959.)

Appeal by caveators from *Thompson, Special Judge,*October''Civil Term, 1958, of Geeene.

The late George Taylor, a resident of Greene County, died June 7, 1957. The paper writing purporting to be his last will and testament, referred to in the issues, was probated in common - form on June 18, 1957. Under its terms, Annie Taylor, 'widow of George Taylor, was sole beneficiary and executrix. She qualified and acted as executrix.

Annie E. Taylor died January 18, 1958, intestate. Neither George Taylor nor Annie Taylor was survived by linqa'l descendants. A-,ca.-veat was filed February 8, 1958. The caveators are the heirs and next of kin of George Taylor, deceased. The .propounders, are (1) tire Administrator c.t.a.d.b.n. of the Estate of George. Taylor, deceased, (2) the Administrator, of. the. Estate of Annie Taylor,, deceased, and (3) the heirs -and next of kin of Annie Taylor, deceased.'

Issues raised by the. pleadings were submitted to ¡and -answered by the jury, to wit: “1. Was the paper writing dated April 29, 1957, and offered for probate as the last will and testament of George Taylor, deceased, signed and executed according, to law? ANSWER: Yes. .2. If so, did the said George Taylor, deceased, on. April 29, 1957, have *98sufficient mental capacity to make and execute a valid Last Will and Testament? ANSWER: Yes. 3. If so, was the execution of the said Last Will and Testament procured by undue influence, as alleged in the Caveat? ANSWER: No. 4. Is the paper writing, and every part and clause thereof, the Last Will and Testament of George Taylor, deceased? ANSWER: Yes.”

Thereupon, the court adjudged .that said paper writing and every part and clause thereof is the last will ‘and testament of George Taylor, deceased, andi taxed the costs, including allowances to counsel for both propounders and caveators, against the estate of George Taylor, deceased.

The caveators excepted and appealed.

*Jones, Reed & Griffin for caveators, appellants.*

*Lewis & Rouse for propounders, appellees.*

Per CüRiam.

The evidence offeréd by the respective interested parties was in sharp, conflict. The issues, submitted under instructions in substantial accord with well settled legal principles, were resolved in favor of the propounded. We have carefully considered each of caveators’ forty .assignments of error. Suffice to say, none discloses error deemed sufficiently prejudicial to caveators to warrant a new trial.

No error.
* Of the United States Dist ric t Court for the District of

Columbia, sitting by designation.

Not for publication in West's Federal Reporter Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3 

# United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 02-2425 BRUCE JACKSON, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v. LINDSAY NORMAN, individually and in his capacity as President of Massachusetts Bay Community College,

Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FORM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge ]
Before Lynch, Circuit Judge , Lipez, Circuit Judge , and Oberdorfer, * Senior District Judge .
Sam Silverman for appellant. Maite A. Parsi , Assistant Attorney General, with whom Thomas F. Reilly , Attorney General, was on brief, for appellee.

October 24, 2003-2- Per Curiam . Plaintiff Bruce Jackson brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, challenging the procedures associated with the termination of his employment. That termination was, however, still subject to challenge in variou s administrative proceedings and in arbitration under the c ollec tive bargaining agreement. The district court dismissed his complaint with prejudice. Jackson appealed.

At oral argument, this court was informed that the arb itration regarding Jackson's termination is underway and th a t the reinstatement of Jackson is a remedy available to the arbitrator. The court inquired of the parties whether, in a practical sense, the case might be mooted by the arbitr ator's decision, andurged the parties to consider a stipulated resolution that would preserve the rights of both sides.

On October 20, 2003, the parties filed with the court a stipulation that the matter be remanded to the district court for dismissal without prejudice and that Jackson will no longer pursue the appeal in this action.

The equitable decision on vacatur of a district court order rests in the discretion of this court. Kerk of v. MC I WorldCom, Inc. , 282 F.3d 44, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2002). Und er t he circumstances of this case, we think it appropriate to vacate the order of dismissal with prejudice and remand with instructions to the district court to enter a dismissal without prejudice. Wal--3-

Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez , 322 F.3d 747, 750 (1st Cir. 2003). The request to vacate is not sought for strat egic reaso ns or to unfairlyadvantage either side. To the cont rary, it is meant to avoidunnecessary litigation and to preserve the rights of the parties should the matter not be resolved.

So ordered. No costs are awarded.
## Single-Year Tables Consistent With 2022 OASDI Trustees Report

2022 OASDI Trustees Report

            The tables listed below provide estimates by            alternative economic and/or demographic assumptions.            For some of the tables, we also provide historical data.            The tables carry the same designation as in the published report.            Reference should be made to the report            to understand the context in which the estimates are presented.          

            To allow easier access for people who may want to work with the data, we            also supply the tables in Excel.
| Skip to contentSocial Security Online | Automatic Determinations |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|

| www.socialsecurity.gov | Home  FAQs  Contact Us  Search | **Search**  |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|

| Office of the Chief Actuary | Exempt Amounts, 1975-1999   Historical document   |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5596 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5596

    To provide borrowers of Federal Family Education Loans with the 
repayment terms available to borrowers of Federal Direct Loans, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 18, 2014

    Mr. Garcia (for himself, Mr. Hastings of Florida, Mr. Murphy of 
   Florida, and Mr. Payne) introduced the following bill; which was 
        referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To provide borrowers of Federal Family Education Loans with the 
repayment terms available to borrowers of Federal Direct Loans, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Fairness in Student Loan Repayment 
Act''.

SEC. 2. REPAYMENT TERMS FOR FEDERAL FAMILY EDUCATION LOANS.

    (a) In General.--Section 455 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
(20 U.S.C. 1087e) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subsection:
    ``(r) Repayment Terms for Federal Family Education Loans.--
            ``(1) Applicability of programs available under this 
        section.--The Secretary shall apply subsections (d), (e), (f), 
        (l), (m), and (o) to all loans made under part B as if such 
        loans were made under this part.
            ``(2) Payment of balance and interest.--In carrying out 
        paragraph (1), the Secretary shall pay to the holder of a loan 
        made under part B the amount of principal, interest, or special 
        allowance payments necessary to apply subsections (d), (e), 
        (f), (l), (m), and (o) to such loan, as appropriate.''.
    (b) Consolidation Loans.--Section 428C(a)(3)(B)(i) of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087-3(a)(3)(B)(i)) is amended--
            (1) in subclause (III), by striking the semicolon and 
        inserting ``; and'';
            (2) in subclause (IV), by striking ``; and'' and inserting 
        a period; and
            (3) by striking subclause (V).
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-3 (No. 333-59597) of Enbridge
Energy, Limited Partnership and the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-59758, 333-89588 and 333-106660) of Enbridge Energy Partners,
L.P. of our report dated January 27, 2004, except for the first two paragraphs of Note 15, as to which the date is March 1, 2004, relating to the financial statements, which
appear in this Form 10-K.

PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP

Houston,
Texas
March 5, 2004

---

QuickLinks
### Proposed Provision: B5.2. Beginning for those newly eligible in 2024, reconfigure the special minimum benefit: (a) A year of coverage is defined as a year in which 4 quarters of coverage are earned. (b) At implementation, set the PIA for 30 years of coverage equal to 125 percent of the monthly poverty level (about $1,416 in 2022). For those with under 30 years of coverage, the PIA per year of coverage over 10 years is $1,416/20 = $70.80. (c) Index the initial PIA per year of coverage by wage growth for successive cohorts.
## Summary Measures and Graphs

- Individual Provisions
- Retirement Age

### **Description of Proposed Provision:						C2.4: Starting for those age 62 in 2024, increase both the normal retirement age (NRA) and the earliest eligibility age (EEA) by 36/47 of a month per year until the NRA and EEA reach 70 and 65 respectively. For each year, the computed NRA and EEA round down to the next lower full month.**

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II 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5681 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 20, 2014 

Received 

AN ACT 

To provide for the approval of the Amendment to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of 

America and the Government of the United Kingdom 

of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation 

on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 5681 RDS 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. APPROVAL OF THE AMENDMENT TO THE 

4 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT 

5 OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 

6 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KING7 DOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN 

8 IRELAND FOR COOPERATION ON THE USES 

9 OF ATOMIC ENERGY FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE 

10 PURPOSES. 

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the provisions 

12 for congressional consideration of a proposed agreement 

13 for cooperation in subsection d. of section 123 of the 

14 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), the amend15 ments to the Agreement Between the Government of the 

16 United States of America and the Government of the 

17 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 

18 for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual 

19 Defense Purposes, done at Washington, July 22, 2014, 

20 and transmitted to Congress on July 24, 2014, including 

21 all portions thereof (hereinafter in this section referred to 

22 as the ‘‘Amendment’’), may be brought into effect on or 

23 after the date of the enactment of this Act as if all the 

24 requirements in such section 123 for consideration of the 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

HR 5681 RDS 

1 Amendment had been satisfied, subject to subsection (b) 

2 of this section. 

3 (b) APPLICABILITY OF ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF

4 1954 AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW.—Upon coming 

5 into effect, the Amendment shall be subject to the provi6 sions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 

7 et seq.) and any other applicable United States law as if 

8 the Amendment had come into effect in accordance with 

9 the requirements of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act 

10 of 1954. 

Passed the House of Representatives November 19, 

2014. 

Attest: KAREN L. HAAS, 

Clerk. 


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