1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

________________________________ 

) 

SHELDON BATTLES, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) Civil Action No. 16-1655 (EGS) 

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA ) 

TRANSIT AUTHORITY, SUMMON ) 

CANNON and DEVIN WALKER ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

________________________________) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Plaintiff Sheldon Battles, proceeding pro se, has sued 

defendants Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 

("WMATA") and two of its employees – Summon Cannon and Devin 

Walker (together, "Individual Defendants") – for breach of 

contract, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, 

defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 

negligent infliction of emotional distress. Before the Court are 

defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). After careful 

consideration of the complaint, the memoranda filed by the 

parties, and the applicable case law, the Court grants in part 

and denies in part WMATA's motion to dismiss, and grants the 

Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss. 
2

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Mr. Battles, a Maryland resident, worked for WMATA from 

January 1997 until his termination on November 27, 2015. Compl. 

¶ 8. Originally hired as a bus operator, Mr. Battles earned a 

series of promotions between 2007 and 2015, eventually holding 

the position of Assistant Superintendent at the West Ox 

Division. Id. 

The facts that eventually led to Mr. Battles' termination 

and this subsequent lawsuit arise out of an approximately twomonth long consensual sexual relationship between Mr. Battles 

and a subordinate female employee. Id. ¶ 9. The relationship 

began in May 2015, while the employee was on leave. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. 

By the time the employee returned to work on July 23, 2015, "the 

relationship between the Plaintiff and the subordinate employee 

had ceased." Id. ¶ 11. 

Shortly after returning to work, the employee "began 

exhibiting attendance issues." Id. ¶ 12. As her supervisor, Mr. 

Battles disciplined the employee about these issues on October 

1, 2015. Id. ¶ 13. That same day, the employee filed a complaint 

with WMATA accusing Mr. Battles of sexual harassment. Id. ¶ 14. 

Defendant Devin Walker, an investigator in WMATA's Office of 

Civil Rights, launched an investigation into the employee's 

sexual-harassment allegations. Id. ¶¶ 15, 20. In the course of 

the investigation, the employee "admit[ted] that her involvement 
3

in the sexual relationship was [] consensual." Id. ¶ 17. At the 

conclusion of the investigation, WMATA "found no probabl[e] 

cause for sexual harassment" and the Office of Civil Rights 

issued a determination letter finding that Mr. Battles had not 

"violate[d] any Title VII laws or policies." Id. ¶¶ 15, 18. 

Despite finding in favor of Mr. Battles on the sexual-harassment 

allegations, Mr. Walker determined that Mr. Battles had violated 

WMATA's nepotism/favoritism policy. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. As a result, 

defendant Summon Cannon, the Superintendent, fired Mr. Battles 

from his position on November 27, 2015. Id. ¶ 22. 

Mr. Battles claims that WMATA's stated reasons for 

terminating his employment are "false and pretextual." Id. ¶ 8. 

According to Mr. Battles, WMATA fired him "in retaliation for 

his numerous complaints and reports regarding events and 

practices that created an unsafe work environment for him and 

create[d] conditions that undermined his ability to effectively 

supervise his subordinates." Id. In particular, Mr. Battles 

asserts that he was terminated as a result of his "complaints to 

administrators about the disparate treatment his female 

subordinates received after falsely accusing him of 

inappropriate behavior" – e.g., "the female subordinate that 

made the false allegations was not even disciplined." Id. 

Based on these allegations, Mr. Battles asserts five causes 

of action: (1) wrongful termination (breach of contract), id. ¶¶ 
4

26-31; (2) wrongful termination (public policy violation), id.

¶¶ 32-37; (3) defamation, id. ¶¶ 38-51; (4) intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, id. ¶¶ 52-55; and (5) 

negligent infliction of emotional distress, id. ¶¶ 56-57. These 

causes of actions are asserted against both WMATA and the 

Individual Defendants. Mr. Battles seeks "lost past and future 

wages" in an amount to be determined. Id. Prayer ¶ 3. He also 

requests damages for "loss of employability, mental pain and 

anguish and emotional distress." Id. Prayer ¶ 1. Finally, he 

seeks punitive damages and costs available under any applicable 

statutory provision. Id. Prayer ¶¶ 2, 4-9. 

WMATA and the Individual Defendants filed the instant 

motions to dismiss on September 9 and 16, 2016, respectively, 

arguing that they are entitled to dismissal on the basis of 

sovereign immunity and because Mr. Battles fails to plausibly 

allege his claims. See WMATA Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 

("WMATA Mem."), ECF No. 3; Individual Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of 

Mot. to Dismiss ("Individual Defs.' Mem."), ECF No. 4. Mr. 

Battles timely opposed WMATA's motion to dismiss, and that 

motion was fully ripe on September 28, 2016. See Pl.'s Mem. in 

Opp. to WMATA's Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp."), ECF No. 5; 

WMATA's Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("WMATA's Reply"), ECF 

No. 6. Instead of opposing the Individual Defendants' motion to 

dismiss, Mr. Battles moved to strike that motion as untimely 
5

filed and for failure to provide accurate information on the 

certificate of service. See Pl.'s Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 7. The 

Court declined to strike the Individual Defendants' motion, but 

it warned defendants that failure to provide accurate 

information could lead to the imposition of sanctions. See 

Minute Order (Apr. 4, 2017). The Court further directed Mr. 

Battles to file his opposition to the Individual Defendants' 

motion by no later than April 21, 2017. Id. Despite this Order, 

Mr. Battles did not file any opposition to the Individual 

Defendants' motion. Instead, on April 24, 2017, without seeking 

leave of the Court, Mr. Battles filed a First Amended Complaint. 

See Am. Compl., ECF No. 19. On May 8, 2017, WMATA and the 

Individual Defendants moved to dismiss that complaint. See

WMATA's Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl., ECF No. 22; Individual 

Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl., ECF No. 21. To date, 

Mr. Battles has not responded to either motion. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A. Rule 12(b)(1) – Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 

"A federal district court may only hear a claim over which 

[it] has subject-matter jurisdiction; therefore, a Rule 12(b)(1) 

motion for dismissal is a threshold challenge to a court's 

jurisdiction." Gregorio v. Hoover, 238 F. Supp. 3d 37 (D.D.C. 

2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To 

survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden 
6

of establishing that the court has jurisdiction by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). 

Because Rule 12(b)(1) concerns a court's ability to hear a 

particular claim, "the court must scrutinize the plaintiff's 

allegations more closely when considering a motion to dismiss 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would under a motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)." Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol 

Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2011). In so doing, 

the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in 

the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff, but the court need not "accept inferences unsupported 

by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as 

factual allegations." Rann v. Chao, 154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 

(D.D.C. 2001). 

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), 

the court "may consider such materials outside the pleadings as 

it deems appropriate to resolve the question whether it has 

jurisdiction to hear the case." Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections 

& Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Jerome 

Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 

2005). Faced with motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and 

Rule 12(b)(6), a court should first consider the Rule 12(b)(1) 

motion because "[o]nce a court determines that it lacks subject 
7

matter jurisdiction, it can proceed no further." Ctr. for 

Biological Diversity v. Jackson, 815 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 (D.D.C. 

2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

B. Rule 12(b)(6) – Failure to State a Claim 

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 

Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A 

complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give 

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Despite this liberal pleading standard, to survive a motion 

to dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 

1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A claim is facially plausible when the facts pled in the 

complaint allow the court to "draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The 

standard does not amount to a "probability requirement," but it 

does require more than a "sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully." Id.
8

"[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss [pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(6)], a judge must accept as true all of the 

factual allegations contained in the complaint." Atherton v. 

D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the court must 

give the plaintiff the "benefit of all inferences that can be 

derived from the facts alleged." Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 

F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). A "pro se complaint is 

entitled to liberal construction." Washington v. Geren, 675 F. 

Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 

519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). Even so, 

"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements" are not sufficient to 

state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Amended Complaint 

The Court first addresses the propriety of Mr. Battles' 

First Amended Complaint, which was filed on April 24, 2017. See 

Am. Compl., ECF No. 19. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 sets forth the 

circumstances and procedures for amending pleadings. Under that 

rule, a plaintiff may amend his complaint once "as a matter of 

course" within 21 days of serving it or within 21 days of the 

filing of a responsive pleading or certain Rule 12 motions. See
9

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise, he must seek consent of the 

defendant or leave from the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 

"The court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so 

requires." Id. Importantly, Rule 15(a) – and its direction to 

courts to freely allow amendment of complaints – "applies only 

when the plaintiff actually has moved for leave to amend the 

complaint." Belizan v. Hershon, 434 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 

2006). Absent such a motion, "there is nothing 'to be freely 

given.'" Id. 

Here, Mr. Battles served his initial complaint on WMATA on 

August 19, 2016. See Return of Service Affidavit, ECF No. 2. Mr. 

Battles served the Individual Defendants a week later on August 

25 and 26, 2016. See id. Defendants filed their Rule 12(b)(6) 

motions in September 2016. See WMATA Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 3 

(filed Sept. 9, 2016); Individual Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 

No. 4 (filed Sept. 16, 2016). As such, there can be no question 

that Mr. Battles First Amended Complaint – which was filed on 

April 24, 2017, approximately seven months after defendants' 

moved to dismiss the initial complaint – was filed long after 

the period for amendment "as a matter of course" had passed. 

As a result, Mr. Battles was required to obtain defendants' 

written consent or seek leave of the court prior to filing his 

First Amended Complaint. He did neither. See, e.g., WMATA's Mem. 

in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 3, ECF No. 22 ("Not only 
10

has Plaintiff failed to seek consent for filing his Amended 

Complaint, he has also failed to seek leave from the Court."). 

Accordingly, the Court strikes the First Amended Complaint from 

the record. See, e.g., Pinson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 975 F. 

Supp. 2d 20, 28 (D.D.C. 2013) (striking pro se plaintiff's 

second amended complaint where plaintiff failed to seek leave 

before filing the complaint); cf. Alston v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 

609 F. App'x 2, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (because plaintiff "did not 

follow the court's rules governing amendments, it could hardly 

have been an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny 

leave to amend") (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).1

B. Mr. Battles' Claims Against WMATA 

(1) Mr. Battles' Breach-of-Contract Claim Cannot 

Be Resolved on a Motion to Dismiss. 

In his first count, Mr. Battles alleges that WMATA breached 

an "oral and implied contract" with him by "terminating [him] 

 

1 The Court notes that the only new allegations in the First 

Amended Complaint appear to relate to Mr. Battles' exhaustion of 

administrative remedies. Even if Mr. Battles had alleged a claim 

under Title VII or some other statutory or other scheme 

requiring administrative exhaustion prior to filing suit, "[a] 

plaintiff need not plead exhaustion in his complaint" because 

"[f]ailure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative 

defense." Moore v. D.C., 445 Fed. Appx. 365, 366 (D.C. Cir. 

2011). Accordingly, nothing in the First Amended Complaint would 

alter the Court's analysis with respect to Mr. Battles' claims 

at this stage in the litigation. 
11

for false, pretextual and defamatory reasons in retaliation for 

his reports and complaints of disparate treatment." Compl. ¶¶ 

27-29. 

In its motion, WMATA initially argued that Mr. Battles' 

breach-of-contract claim failed because Mr. Battles' position as 

an Assistant Superintendent for Bus Service Operations was 

considered "middle management." WMATA Mem. at 3. According to 

WMATA, under its policy, middle managers are "at-will" employees 

who can be discharged "at any time and for any reason, or for no 

reason at all." Mem. at 3 (citing Adams v. George W. Cochran & 

Co., 597 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C. 1991)). 

In his opposition, Mr. Battles asserts that "his employment 

with [WMATA] is not at will." Pl.'s Opp. at 3. He further cites 

Lance v. United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension Tr., 355 F. 

Supp. 2d 358, 360 (D.D.C. 2005), for the proposition that "an 

employee handbook or other policy statement" can create an 

enforceable contractual right in certain circumstances. Pl.'s 

Opp. at 3. Mr. Battles states that, in this instance, an 

"Employee Dispute Resolution" policy "create[d] an enforceable 

right to the particular disciplinary procedures described 

therein." Id. at 4. 

WMATA now appears to concede that Mr. Battles was not a 

middle-management employee at the time of his termination. See

WMATA's Reply at 1 ("Plaintiff is correct that he was terminated 
12

from his position as an Assistant Superintendent . . . which at 

the time was considered a LS-10 position."). Instead, it now 

argues that Mr. Battles' reliance on the employee dispute 

resolution policy "backfires" because the policy specifically 

excepts cases like that of Mr. Battles from the procedures it 

sets forth. Id. at 1-2. WMATA further adds that, even if the 

policy does apply, Mr. Battles' claim still fails because he 

failed to "plead that he exhausted his administrative remedy 

first before filing suit." Id. at 2. 

The Court addresses WMATA's second argument first. The 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "do not require a plaintiff to 

anticipate affirmative defenses which might be raised by a 

defendant." Chem-Met Co. v. Metaland Int'l, Inc., No. CIV. A. 

96-2548(TAF), 1997 WL 74541, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 1997). 

Indeed, "the practice of pleading facts in a complaint to defeat 

anticipated affirmative defenses is disfavored." Id. Consistent 

with this principle, the D.C. Circuit has made clear that "[a] 

plaintiff need not plead exhaustion in his complaint" because 

"[f]ailure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative 

defense." Moore v. D.C., 445 Fed. Appx. 365, 366 (D.C. Cir. 

2011). 

Moreover, the Court declines to convert WMATA's motion to 

dismiss into one for summary judgment because WMATA itself has 

not provided any proof to support its contention that Mr. 
13

Battles failed to employ the dispute-resolution procedures 

outlined in the policy. Instead, WMATA cursorily asserts that 

Mr. Battles' "failure to exhaust [his] administrative rights 

warrants dismissal of his Complaint." WMATA Reply at 2. This is 

insufficient. See Drewrey v. Clinton, 763 F. Supp. 2d 54, 61 

(D.D.C. 2011) ("Meager, conclusory allegations that the 

plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies will not 

satisfy the defendant's burden."). Accordingly, the Court will 

not dismiss Mr. Battles' complaint on this ground. See, e.g., 

Kim v. United States, 632 F.3d 713, 719 (D.C. Cir. 2011)(because 

plaintiffs "were free to omit exhaustion from their pleadings," 

summary judgment would be the appropriate stage to ascertain 

plaintiffs' efforts toward exhaustion); Tapp v. Washington 

Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 15-CV-0768, 2016 WL 7441719, at 

*11 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2016) ("because [plaintiff]'s amended 

complaint does not allege any facts that relate to the 

affirmative defense of non-exhaustion, this Court cannot 

conclude, as a matter of law, that plaintiff cannot prove any 

set of facts entitling him to relief") (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

WMATA's other argument – that the dispute-resolution 

procedures set out in the policy specifically exclude cases like 

those of Mr. Battles' from their purview – fares no better. 

WMATA claims that sexual-harassment complaints "are not eligible 
14

for review" under the dispute-resolution policy. WMATA Reply at 

1. According to WMATA, Mr. Battles' termination due to his 

alleged failure to comply with the favoritism/nepotism policy 

was "directly related" to an investigation of sexual harassment 

– and therefore, Mr. Battles had no "right[]" to have his 

dispute resolved pursuant to the policy. Id. at 1-2. 

At this stage in the litigation, during which the Court 

must draw all inferences in favor of Mr. Battles, the Court 

declines to find that Mr. Battles' termination was "directly 

related" to the investigation into the sexual-harassment 

allegations lodged against him. See Martin v. Washington Metro. 

Area Transit Auth., 273 F. Supp. 2d 114, 117 (D.D.C. 2003) 

(refusing to dismiss breach of implied contract claim "without 

the benefit of affidavits" or other evidence). Although WMATA 

may well be right that Mr. Battles has no enforceable contract 

rights, the Court does not have sufficient evidence to make that 

determination at this juncture. Accordingly, the Court will not 

dismiss Mr. Battles' breach-of-contract claim against WMATA. 

(2) Mr. Battles' Common-Law Tort Claims Are 

Barred By WMATA's Sovereign Immunity. 

Mr. Battles also seeks to maintain tort claims for wrongful 

termination in violation of public policy,2 defamation, 

 

2 Although an employer can generally discharge an at-will 

employee at any time, D.C. law recognizes an exception to this 

rule in the intentional tort for wrongful discharge. See Herron 
15

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress against WMATA. WMATA argues 

that all of Mr. Battles' tort claims must be dismissed because 

"WMATA enjoys sovereign immunity for torts committed in the 

performance of its discretionary decision to terminate the 

Plaintiff from his employment." WMATA Mem. at 3-4. 

The Eleventh Amendment affords each state immunity from 

suits brought against it in federal court. Morris v. Washington 

Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 222–23 (D.C. Cir. 

1986). Although "the immunity is one of the state, some agencies 

exercising state power have been permitted to invoke the 

Amendment in order to protect the state treasury from liability 

that would have had essentially the same practical consequences 

as a judgment against the State itself." Morris v. Washington 

Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). WMATA was 

created by a compact enacted by Congress to which the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, the State of Maryland, and the 

District of Columbia are signatories. Jones v. Washington Metro. 

 

v. Fannie Mae, No. CV 10-943 (RMC), 2016 WL 1177918, at *16 

(D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2016). Under this exception, "there is a cause 

of action for wrongful termination where an at-will employee 

acted in furtherance of a public policy and was terminated 

solely on the basis of such conduct." Id. (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 
16

Area Transit Auth., 205 F.3d 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The D.C. 

Circuit has "consistently recognized that in signing the WMATA 

Compact, Virginia and Maryland each conferred its immunity upon 

WMATA." Id. 

Section 80 of the WMATA Compact includes a limited waiver 

of immunity for tort claims "committed in the conduct of any 

proprietary function" but not for "any torts occurring in the 

performance of a governmental function." D.C. Code § 9-

1107.01(80). "Because it is difficult to distinguish between 

public and private sector functions with any precision," a court 

instead asks "whether the claim seeks to impose liability for 

conduct that is discretionary, in which case the claim is barred 

by immunity, or ministerial, in which case the claim may 

proceed." Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1138 

(D.C. Cir. 2015). "Discretionary duties generally involve 

judgment, planning, or policy decisions and are immunized as 

reflecting sovereign choices." Id. (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Ministerial duties, on the other hand, 

"involve enforcement or administration of a mandatory duty at 

the operational level," and are not immunized. Id. 

To determine whether a WMATA activity is discretionary – 

and therefore shielded by sovereign immunity – the court must 

apply a two-part test. See KiSKA Const. Corp. v. Washington 

Metro. Area Transit Auth., 321 F.3d 1151, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
17

First, the court must determine "whether any statute, 

regulation, or policy prescribes a course of action for [the 

decisionmaker] follow." Id. (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). If so, sovereign immunity does not apply. If the 

governing statutes or regulations leave room for the exercise of 

discretion – or if there is no governing regulation prescribing 

a course of conduct at all – then the court must ask whether the 

decisionmaker's "exercise of discretion is grounded in social, 

economic, or political goals." Id. If the answer to that 

question is affirmative, then the decision at issue is 

"susceptible to policy judgement" and thus fits "within section 

80's retention of sovereign immunity." Id. 

Here, WMATA's decision to terminate Mr. Battles' employment 

was an exercise of discretion and therefore shielded from 

liability by WMATA's sovereign immunity. As the D.C. Circuit has 

explained, "[a]lthough employment decisions are not 

quintessential governmental functions – after all, private 

entities also hire and fire employees – [] decisions concerning 

the hiring, training and supervising of WMATA employees are 

discretionary in nature, and thus immune from judicial review." 

Beebe v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 129 F.3d 1283, 

1287 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). This is because the Compact "confers broad powers on 

WMATA to . . . provide for the qualification, appointment, [and] 
18

removal" of its employees. Id. Mr. Battles' tort allegations 

arise out of an internal investigation conducted by WMATA 

through which it determined that Mr. Battles had violated work 

policies related to favoritism. Mr. Battles has not pointed to 

any "statute, regulation, or policy" that prescribes WMATA's 

decision. To the contrary, this type of employment decision 

inherently involves an "exercise of discretion . . . grounded in 

social, economic, or political goals," "including budgetary 

constraints, public perception, economic conditions, individual 

backgrounds, office diversity, experience and employer 

intuition." Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1287-88 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

In his opposition, Mr. Battles attempts to avoid immunity 

by pointing to the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act. Pl.'s 

Opp. at 5. That statue provides that 

[a] state shall not be immune under the Eleventh 

Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 

from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 

504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, title IX of the 

Education Amendments of 1972, the Age Discrimination 

Act of 1975, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

or the provisions of any other Federal statute 

prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal 

financial assistance. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000d–7(a)(1) (2006). 

Although it is not wholly clear what argument Mr. Battles 

intends to advance, a liberal reading of his opposition suggests 

that Mr. Battles believes that Congress intended to waive 
19

WMATA's immunity from claims for discrimination and retaliation 

through section 2000d-7. But Mr. Battles has not alleged any 

federal causes of action, much less a cause of action under a 

"Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of 

Federal financial assistance." See Compl ¶¶ 32-57 (alleging 

claims for wrongful termination, defamation, intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of 

emotional distress). Mr. Battles points to no authority, and the 

Court has found none, that suggests WMATA has waived its 

immunity from state-law tort claims in federal court through 

section 2000d-7. 

In short, WMATA is shielded from liability for Mr. Battles' 

tort claims stemming from WMATA's decision to terminate Mr. 

Battles' employment. See, e.g., Tapp, 2016 WL 7441719, at *9 

("any tortious conduct that WMATA may have committed here is 

immune from suit because such torts arose out of WMATA's 

administration of its personnel system and property, and its 

decision in this regard was made pursuant to the exercise of its 

discretion") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); 

Malloy v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 187 F. Supp. 3d 

34, 45 (D.D.C. 2016) ("WMATA's actions in suspending and 

removing Malloy from his position . . . are immune for suit in 

tort."); Headen v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 741 F. 

Supp. 2d 289, 295-96 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing plaintiff's 
20

claims for defamation, wrongful termination, and intentional 

infliction of emotional distress because "WMATA is not liable 

for torts concerning personnel decisions"). 

C. Mr. Battles' Claims Against The Individual 

Defendants 

Mr. Battles also asserts his contract and tort claims 

against Summon Cannon, the superintendent who fired him, and 

Devin Walker, the WMATA employee who conducted the investigation 

into the sexual-harassment claim lodged against him. Mr. Cannon 

and Mr. Walker argue that they are immune from all of Mr. 

Battles' claims pursuant to the interstate compact creating 

WMATA. Ind. Defs.' Mem. at 2-4. Section 80 of the Compact 

provides, in relevant part: 

The Authority shall be liable for its contracts and 

for its torts and those of its Directors, officers, 

employees and agent committed in the conduct of any 

proprietary function . . . . The exclusive remedy for 

such breach of contracts and torts for which the 

Authority shall be liable, as herein provided, shall 

be by suit against the Authority. 

D.C. Code Ann. § 9-1107.01(80) (emphases added). "In other 

words, for torts committed in the course of proprietary or 

ministerial functions, WMATA is liable and its employees 

immune." Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1288. 

Mr. Cannon and Mr. Walker assert that section 80 "makes 

WMATA the exclusive defendant for any contractual claims," 

requiring dismissal of Mr. Battles' breach-of-contract claim. 
21

Individual Defs.' Mem. at 2-3. Mr. Cannon and Mr. Walker further 

argue that section 80 precludes any tort liability as well 

because they were acting within the scope of their official 

duties and because "[t]orts arising out of personnel decisions 

are discretionary decisions shielded by WMATA's sovereign 

immunity." Id. at 3. 

Despite being directed to file his opposition to the 

Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss by April 21, 2017, see

April 4, 2017 Minute Order, Mr. Battles failed to do so and 

accordingly offers no response to this argument. In his 

complaint, Mr. Battles does not allege that Mr. Cannon or Mr. 

Walker acted outside the scope of their official duties. To the 

contrary, Mr. Battles' scant particularized allegations against 

these defendants indicate that both defendants were acting well 

within the scope of their official duties. See Compl. ¶¶ 15-21 

(describing Mr. Walker's involvement in the EEOC investigation 

of the sexual-harassment claim filed against Mr. Battles); id. ¶ 

22 ("[A]s a result of [Mr. Walker's] erroneous finding [that 

Plaintiff violated WMATA's nepotism/favoritism policy], 

Superintendent Summon Cannon did, on November 27, 2015, 

terminate Plaintiff from his position[.]"). 

Because Mr. Cannon and Mr. Walker were acting within the 

scope of their official duties, and because this Court has 

already found that they were engaged in discretionary functions, 
22

see supra Part III.B.2, Mr. Cannon and Mr. Walker are immune 

from suit. Therefore, all of Mr. Battles' claims against them 

must be dismissed. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons explained above, WMATA's motion to dismiss 

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, WMATA is 

immune from liability from Mr. Battles' tort claims, and 

therefore Counts II, III, IV, and V against WMATA are dismissed 

with prejudice. Mr. Battles' breach-of-contract claim – Count I 

– survives WMATA's motion to dismiss. The Individual Defendants 

are immune from liability from all of Mr. Battles' claims, and 

therefore Counts I, II, III, IV, and V against Mr. Cannon and 

Mr. Walker are dismissed with prejudice. WMATA and the 

Individual Defendants' motions to dismiss Mr. Battles' amended 

complaint are DENIED as moot. An appropriate Order accompanies 

this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

United States District Judge 

September 28, 2017