In the 

Missouri Court of Appeals 

Western District

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.R.T., 

A.J.T. AND K.L.T.; 

MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF 

SOCIAL SERVICES, CHILDREN'S 

DIVISION,

Respondent,

v.

K.T.,

Appellant.

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WD79613 Consolidated with 

WD79614 and WD79615

OPINION FILED: 

December 27, 2016

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri

The Honorable John M. Torrence, Judge

Before Division One: Thomas H. Newton, Presiding Judge, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge 

and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge

K.T. ("Father") appeals from the judgments terminating his parental rights to 

K.R.T., A.J.T., and K.L.T. (collectively "Children"). Father argues that the trial court was 

without jurisdiction to enter the judgments terminating his parental rights because the trial 

court did not have lawful jurisdiction over the Children in the underlying juvenile cases

which preceded the termination of parental rights proceedings. Because Father's point on 
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appeal constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the judgments in the underlying 

juvenile cases, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History1

Father is the legal father of K.R.T., born March 5, 2008; A.J.T., born April 12, 2009; 

and K.L.T., born December 7, 2006. The Children were placed in the temporary legal 

custody of the Missouri Department of Social Services, Jackson County Children's 

Division ("Children's Division") on July 20, 2009, after A.J.G. ("Mother") took K.R.T. and 

K.L.T. to the hospital because she suspected that one or both had been sexually abused. 

On September 15, 2009, the Children were adjudicated by the trial court to have been 

abused or neglected in case numbers 0916-JU000992, 0916-JU000995, and 0916-

JU000996. 

From September 15, 2009, to October 14, 2009, the Children were in the Children's 

Division's custody. On October 14, 2009, the Children were placed in the custody of their 

parental grandmother but remained under the supervision of the Children's Division. The 

Children were returned to the custody of the Children's Division on June 17, 2010, but 

remained placed with their parental grandmother. On September 3, 2010, the Children 

were placed in the custody of Father, but remained under the Children's Division's 

supervision. On August 17, 2011, the Children were ordered placed back into the custody 

of the Children's Division after Father was alleged to have improperly allowed his 

girlfriend and her children to reside with him, to have moved out of the county with the 

 

1On an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights, we view the facts in the light most favorable to 

the judgment. In the Interest of A.C.G., No. WD79274, 2016 WL 4752531, at *1 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. Sept. 13, 

2016). 
3

Children, and to have failed to maintain contact with the Children's Division. The 

Children's Division thereafter also alleged that Father had attempted to steal fuel from 

parked school buses with the Children present. 

At a subsequent hearing, the Children's Division amended its allegations against 

Father to rely solely on the fact that Father had been charged with stealing fuel from parked 

buses in the presence of the Children. On April 12, 2012, the trial court entered a judgment 

awarding custody of the Children to the Children's Division. The Children remained in 

foster care where they had been placed since their removal from Father's custody on 

August 17, 2011. 

The Children's Division filed petitions to terminate Father's parental rights on 

May 21, 2015, in case numbers 1516-JU000541, 1516-JU000542, and 1516-JU000543.2 

The petitions alleged Father's parental rights should be terminated because: (i) the Children 

had been abandoned by Father for a period of six months or longer;

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(ii) the Children had 

been abused or neglected4 because, on September 15, 2009, Father stipulated that the 

children were without proper custody, support, or care for their well-being in that he 

neglected and failed to protect the Children; (iii) that the Children had been under the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court for more than one year, and the conditions which led to 

the assumption of jurisdiction still persist, or conditions of a potentially harmful nature 

continue to exist, and there is little likelihood that those conditions would be remedied so 

 

2Mother's parental rights were terminated voluntarily in case numbers 1416-JU000873, 1416-JU000874, 

and 1416-JU000875. 

3Section 211.447.5(1). All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 as supplemented unless otherwise 

provided. 

4Section 211.447.5(2). 
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that the Children could return to Father or the continuation of the parent-child relationship 

greatly diminishes the Children's prospects for integration into a permanent and stable 

home;

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and (iv) that Father is unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship due to a 

consistent pattern of specific abuse that renders Father unable to care appropriately for the 

ongoing, physical, mental, or emotional needs of the Children.6 

Following a trial, the trial court entered its judgments ("Judgments") terminating 

Father's parental rights to the Children and ordering that the custody and placement of the 

Children remain as previously ordered in the juvenile cases. The Judgments stated that the 

trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to section 211.452 because the trial court had "prior 

and continuing jurisdiction over the Children as set forth in Jackson County Juvenile Court 

case numbers 0916-JU000992, 0916-JU000995, and 0916-JU000996." The trial court 

found that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt7that there were grounds for 

terminating Father's parental rights to Children pursuant to sections 211.447.5(2), (3) and 

(6), and that termination of Father's parental rights was in the Children's best interest. 

Father appeals. 

Analysis

Father raises a single point on appeal. He does not challenge the trial court's 

findings that grounds exist to terminate his parental rights pursuant to sections

 

5Section 211.447.5(3). 

6Section 211.447.5(6). 

7Ordinarily, the burden of proof in a termination of parental rights case is clear, cogent, and convincing 

evidence. Section 211.447.6. However, the Children are Indian Children as defined by the Indian Children Welfare 

Act, 25 U.S.C. section 1901 et seq., so that the burden of proof is a termination of parental rights case is beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 25 U.S.C. section 1912(f). 
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211.447.5(2), (3), or (6). And Father does not challenge the trial court's determination that 

termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the Children. Instead, Father 

challenges the trial court's finding that it had jurisdiction to hear the termination of parental 

rights proceedings pursuant to section 211.452 because the trial court had "prior and 

continuing jurisdiction over the Children as set forth in Jackson County Juvenile Court case 

numbers 0916-JU000992, 0916-JU000995, and 0916-JU000996." Specifically, Father 

argues that the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction over the Children on August 17, 

2011, was not lawful because it was based upon a stealing charge that was later dismissed, 

and as to which Father was not found guilty. "Because the question here is one of 

jurisdiction, it is an issue of law, and our review is de novo." Gosserand v. Gosserand, 230 

S.W.3d 628, 631 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007). 

Father's notices of appeal were filed in his termination of parental rights 

proceedings, case numbers 1516-JU000541, 1516-JU000542, and 1516-JU000543, and 

purport to challenge the Judgments entered in those proceedings. The only finding in those 

Judgments about which Father complains is the finding in paragraph 2 that the trial court 

has "jurisdiction over [the termination of parental rights proceedings] pursuant to section 

211.452." That section provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he petition for termination of 

parental rights shall be filed in the juvenile court which has prior jurisdiction over the 

child." Section 211.452.1. Father does not contest that, in fact, his termination of parental 

rights proceedings were filed in the juvenile court which had prior jurisdiction over the 

Children. As a matter of law, the Judgments properly found that the trial court had the 
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statutory authority to entertain Father's termination of parental rights proceedings pursuant 

to section 211.452. 

Father's complaint on appeal centers on whether the trial court properly assumed 

jurisdiction over the Children on August 17, 2011.

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 The trial court's August 17, 2011 order 

was not entered in Father's termination of parental rights proceedings, but was instead 

entered in the underlying juvenile cases. The trial court's exercise of authority over the 

Children in the underlying juvenile cases on August 17, 2011, and its resulting judgment 

of April 12, 2012, awarding custody of the Children to the Children's Division, were not 

appealed by Father.9 Father is attempting to collaterally attack the August 17, 2011 order 

in these termination of parental rights proceedings. 

"'Where a judgment is attacked in other ways than by proceedings in the original 

action to have it vacated or reversed or modified or by a proceeding in equity to prevent its 

enforcement, the attack is a collateral attack.'" Reimer v. Hayes, 365 S.W.3d 280, 283 (Mo. 

App. W.D. 2012) (quoting Barry, Inc. v. Falk, 217 S.W.3d 317, 320 (Mo. W.D. App. 

 

8We question Father's characterization of the August 17, 2011 order, as the Children were already subject 

to the juvenile court's jurisdiction on that date, though in Father's custody subject to the Children's Division's 

supervision. Father has not included a copy of the August 17, 2011 order or judgment that he asserts was improper 

in the record on appeal. As the appellant, it was Father's responsibility to supply us with the record on appeal, which 

should contain "'all of the record, proceedings, and evidence necessary to the determination of all questions to be 

presented, by either appellant or respondent.'" Developers Sur. & Idem. Co. v. Woods of Somerset, LLC, 455 

S.W.3d 487, 493 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (quoting Rule 81.12(a)). "Where necessary materials are omitted from the 

record on appeal, the appellate court will assume that the omitted items were unfavorable to the appellant and 

favorable to the respondent." Id. 

The Department of Social Services filed a supplemental legal file that includes an order of protective 

custody entered in all three juvenile cases on August 17, 2011, which ordered the Children to remain in the 

protective custody of the Children's Division. It appears the effect of the August 17, 2011 order was simply to 

modify the Children's custodial placement, and not to assume jurisdiction over the Children, as that jurisdiction had 

been assumed many months earlier. 

9Father could have appealed the judgments entered in the underlying juvenile proceedings pursuant to 

section 211.261.1. That statute provides that "[a]n appeal shall be allowed to a parent from any final judgment, 

order or decree under the provisions of this chapter which adversely affects him." Section 211.261.1. 
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2007)). Generally, a judgment must be challenged via direct appeal and not by a collateral 

attack. Id. If a judgment was rendered by a court having both subject-matter jurisdiction 

and personal jurisdiction, the judgment is not open to a collateral attack as to the judgment's 

validity or the conclusiveness of the matters adjudicated therein. Id. However, if a 

judgment was made without subject-matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, the 

judgment would be void so that a collateral attack would be permissible. Blanchette v. 

Blanchette, 476 S.W.3d 273, 278 (Mo. banc 2015). 

Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to "the court's authority to render a judgment in a 

particular category of case." J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Mo. 

banc 2009). "Article V, section 14 [of the Missouri Constitution] sets forth the subject 

matter jurisdiction of Missouri's circuit courts in plenary terms, providing that '[t]he circuit 

courts shall have original jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and criminal.'" Id. 

A juvenile case falls within the purview of "all cases and matters, civil and criminal." Here, 

the underlying juvenile cases were heard by the Jackson County Juvenile Court, which is 

"the juvenile division or divisions of the circuit court of the county." Section 211.021.1(3).

Personal jurisdiction "refers quite simply to the power of a court to require a person 

to respond to a legal proceeding that may affect the person's rights or interests." Webb, 

275 S.W.3d at 253. State courts have always had power to exercise jurisdiction over 

persons living in the state. Id. Father does not assert that neither he nor the Children lived 

in another state at the time of the August 17, 2011 action taken by the trial court.

Father's current complaint that the trial court had no factual basis sufficient to 

support assuming jurisdiction over the Children on August 17, 2011 order does not 
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implicate either subject-matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction. Father cannot 

collaterally attack the August 17, 2011 order entered in the underlying juvenile proceedings 

in these termination of parental rights proceedings. See In re O.J.B., 436 S.W.3d 726, 730-

31 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (holding that parents may not challenge to the trial court's 

assumption of jurisdiction over a child in an appeal from a judgment arising from a 

permanency planning hearing because the challenge amounted to a collateral attack). 

Because Father's point on appeal constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on 

the judgments in juvenile case numbers 0916-JU000992, 0916-JU000995, and 0916-

JU000996, it is denied.10 

Conclusion

The trial court's Judgments terminating Father's parental rights with respect to the 

Children are affirmed. 

__________________________________

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur

 

10Even if we were able to reach the merits of Father's appeal, it would fail for several reasons. First, 

Father's brief neither cites relevant authority nor explains why such authority is not available to support his point on 

appeal, rendering his point abandoned so that dismissal of the appeal would be appropriate. See Kim v. Shelton, 485 

S.W.3d 377, 379 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016). Second, the termination of parental rights judgments indicate that the 

Children were adjudicated to have been abused or neglected on September 15, 2009, so that the Children were 

placed in the trial court's jurisdiction on that date. The record reflects that the Children remained in either the 

custody of, or under the supervision of, the Children's Division continuously thereafter, rendering the August 17, 

2011 order suspect in its effect other than to change temporary custody of the Children. Third, even if the Children 

were not subject to the trial court's continuously between September 15, 2009, and August 17, 2011, and the 

August 17, 2011 order could be properly viewed as having assumed jurisdiction over the Children anew, Father cites 

no authority for the proposition that a juvenile court cannot consider the factually underpinning of a charged crime 

unless the charge results in a conviction.