[Cite as Nihiser v. Hocking Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2013-Ohio-3849.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HOCKING COUNTY 

MICHAEL D. NIHISER, et al., : 

 : 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, : Case No. 12CA18 

 : 

 vs. : 

 : 

HOCKING COUNTY BOARD OF : DECISION AND JUDGMENT 

COMMISSIONERS, et al. : ENTRY 

 : 

 Defendants-Appellees. : Released: 08/30/13 

_____________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES:

L. Jackson Henniger, Logan, Ohio, for Appellants. 

Randall L. Lambert, Ironton, Ohio, for Appellees. 

_____________________________________________________________ 

 

McFarland, P.J. 

{¶1} Michael Nihiser and Vicki Devol appeal the trial court’s 

summary judgment decision determining the Hocking County Board of 

Commissioners and William Shaw, County Engineer, are entitled to 

sovereign immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 with regard to the function of 

designating street numbers pursuant to R.C. 303.021. On appeal, Appellants 

contend that 1) the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted 

Appellees’ motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue of 

material fact existed; 2) the trial court erred as a matter of law when it 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 2

granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue 

of material fact existed as to whether the delegation of the authority was 

proper; 3) the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted Appellees’ 

motion for summary judgment by holding that the Appellees were covered 

by governmental immunity; and 4) the trial court erred as a matter of law 

when it granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment because the 

Appellees are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

{¶2} In light of our determination that the function of designating 

street numbers is a governmental function for which immunity is granted, 

that the function was properly delegated to Shaw, that no genuine issues of 

material fact exist, and that Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law, we overrule Appellants’ assignments of error. Accordingly, we 

affirm the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of 

Appellees. 

FACTS 

{¶3} Appellants, Michael Nihiser and Vicki Devol, are property 

owners in Hocking County. On December 30, 2010, Appellants filed a 

complaint naming Appellees Hocking County Board of Commissioners 

(hereinafter “Board”) and William Shaw (hereinafter “Shaw”), Hocking 

County Engineer, as defendants. The complaint alleged that Board, which 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 3

possessed authority to designate street names and building numbers pursuant 

to R.C. 303.021, had improperly delegated the authority to perform that 

function to Shaw, as County Engineer. Appellant claimed that Shaw and the 

engineer’s office, in turn, wrongfully failed to number or timely number 

certain lots owned by Appellants and also wrongfully withheld numbers 

based upon an additional requirement that a driveway be located upon the 

property first, a requirement which is not contained in R.C. 303.021. 

Appellants also alleged that Shaw bore a personal animus toward them as a 

result of Appellants’ opposition to a licensing tax proposed by Shaw. None 

of the county commissioners or Shaw were named as defendants in their 

individual capacities. 

{¶4} Appellants’ complaint alleged damages in the amount of 

$250,000.00. A review of the record indicates Appellants believed that the 

value of their property was decreased as a result of having to cut trees down 

in order to place the driveway in a location that would be approved by Shaw. 

Appellants explained that they were selling log cabin lots where trees were 

valuable. 

{¶5} Appellees filed an answer to the complaint on January 31, 2011, 

and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, on June 20, 2012. 

Appellants filed a memorandum contra on July 11, 2012. In a decision dated 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 4

July 27, 2012, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary 

judgment. In reaching its decision, the trial court found that the designation 

of street numbers was a governmental function for which Appellees were 

immune from liability under R.C. Chapter 2744, and that none of the 

exceptions to immunity contained in the statute were applicable. The trial 

court also found that Board had authority to delegate the performance of this 

function to Shaw and that the policy of requiring a driveway was a valid 

exercise of the engineer’s statutory and delegated duty. 

{¶6} It is from this decision that Appellants now bring their timely 

appeal, assigning the following errors for our review. 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

“I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT 

GRANTED PLAINTIFF’S [SIC] MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT BECAUSE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL 

FACT EXISTED. 

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT 

GRANTED PLAINTIFF’S [SIC] MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT BECAUSE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL 

FACT EXISTED AS TO WHETHER THE DELEGATION OF THE 

AUTHORITY WAS PROPER. 

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT 

GRANTED PLAINTIFF’S [SIC] MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT BY HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE 

COVERED BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT 

GRANTED PLAINTIFF’S [SIC] MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 5

JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT 

ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.” 

LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶7} Although Appellants raise four separate assignments of error, 

their brief contains only one legal argument. App.R. 12(A)(2) authorizes us 

to disregard any assignment of error that a party fails to argue separately. 

However, in the interests of justice, and because each assignment of error 

ultimately challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we will 

address the arguments raised. 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 

{¶8} Appellate courts review trial court summary judgment decisions 

de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 

241 (1996). Accordingly, appellate courts must independently review the 

record to determine if summary judgment is appropriate. In other words, 

appellate courts need not defer to trial court summary judgment decisions. 

See Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 

N.E.2d 1153 (1993); Morehead v. Conley, 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 411-412, 

599 N.E.2d 786 (1991). Thus, to determine whether a trial court properly 

awarded summary judgment, an appellate court must review the Civ.R. 56 

summary judgment standard as well as the applicable law. Civ.R. 56(C) 

provides: “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 6

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, 

transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if 

any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this 

rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the 

evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that 

reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is 

adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is 

made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed 

most strongly in the party's favor.” 

{¶9} Accordingly, trial courts may not grant summary judgment 

unless the evidence demonstrates that (1) no genuine issue as to any material 

fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds 

can come to but one conclusion, and after viewing the evidence most 

strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the 

party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. See, e.g., 

Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429-430, 674 N.E.2d 1164 (1997). 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 7

{¶10} Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment to Appellees based upon the doctrine of sovereign 

immunity. Appellants argue that Board improperly delegated the authority 

to designate street numbers to Shaw, the County Engineer, and that Shaw 

impermissibly required a driveway be established prior to the issuance of a 

street number. Appellants further claim that genuine issues of material fact 

exist which should have precluded summary judgment. 

R.C. 2744.02 

{¶11} “The Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, as codified in 

R.C. Chapter 2744, sets forth a three-tiered analysis for determining whether 

a political subdivision is immune from liability.” Cater v. Cleveland, 83 

Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 697 N.E.2d 610 (1998); see also Elston v. Howland Local 

Schools, 113 Ohio St.3d 314, 2007-Ohio-2070, 865 N.E.2d 845, ¶ 10. The 

first tier involves determining whether the political subdivision is generally 

immune from liability under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). Elston at ¶ 10; see also 

Hortman v. Miamisburg, 110 Ohio St.3d 194, 2006-Ohio-4251, 852 N.E.2d 

716, ¶ 12. 

{¶12} Once immunity is generally established, “the second tier of 

analysis is whether any of the five exceptions to immunity in subsection (B) 

apply.” Id. at ¶ 12. Only when one of the exceptions listed in R.C. 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 8

2744.02(B) applies do courts move to the third tier. Terry v. Ottawa Cty. Bd. 

of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 151 Ohio App.3d 234, 2002-

Ohio-7299, 783 N.E.2d 959, ¶ 13; Dolan v. Glouster, 173 Ohio App.3d 617, 

2007-Ohio-6275, 879 N.E.2d 838, ¶ 17. See also Gotherman & Babbit, Ohio 

Municipal Law (2d Ed.1992), Section 32.4 (“The defenses and immunities 

provided to a political subdivision by R.C. 2744.03(A) only become relevant 

if one of the five exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B) applies to 

render the subdivision vulnerable to liability”). If an exception to the general 

immunity provision does apply, “under the third tier of analysis, immunity 

can be reinstated if the political subdivision can successfully argue that any 

of the defenses contained in R.C. 2744.03 applies.” Hortman at ¶ 12. 

{¶13} Here, the general grant of immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) 

applies to the Board, as the county is a political subdivision. See R.C. 

2744.01(F). Additionally, Shaw, the Hocking County Engineer, is an 

employee of Board pursuant to R.C. 2744.01(B), which provides that the 

definition of employee includes any elected or appointed official of a 

political subdivision. Under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), the general rule is as 

follows: 

 “[A] political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil 

action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 9

caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an 

employee of the political subdivision in connection with a 

governmental or proprietary function.” 

{¶14} In this case, the parties disagree over whether designating street 

numbers is a governmental or a proprietary function. R.C. 303.021 governs 

the designation of street names and assignment of numbers to buildings, and 

provides as follows: 

“The board of county commissioners may designate street 

names and assign numbers to buildings along the streets in 

unincorporated areas. The owners of such buildings shall 

number or renumber such buildings in accordance with the 

numbers assigned by the county commissioners.” 

Clearly, boards of county commissioners are given the authority to perform 

this function. We must determine, however, whether the function is 

governmental or proprietary. 

{¶15} R.C. 2744.01(G) defines proprietary functions and provides as 

follows in section (1)(a)-(b): 

“(G)(1) ‘Proprietary function’ means a function of a political 

subdivision that is specified in division (G)(2) of this section or

that satisfies both of the following: 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 10

(a) The function is not one described in division (C)(1)(a) or (b) 

of this section and is not one specified in division (C)(2) of this 

section; 

(b) The function is one that promotes or preserves the public 

peace, health, safety, or welfare and that involves activities that 

are customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons.” 

(Emphasis added). 

Designating street numbers is not one of the functions listed in R.C. 

2744.01(G)(2)(a)-(e) and thus, is not expressly defined as a proprietary 

function. Further, we conclude designating street numbers does not meet the 

definition of proprietary function under R.C. 2744.01(G)(1)(a)-(b), which in 

addition to requiring that the function promote or preserve public peace, 

health, safety or welfare, also requires that the activities be customarily 

engaged in by nongovernmental persons. It cannot be said that designating 

street numbers is customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons. 

Thus, by process of elimination, we conclude that the function of 

designating street numbers is not proprietary in nature. 

{¶16} R.C. 2744.01(C) defines governmental functions and provides 

as follows in section (C)(1)(a)-(b): 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 11

“(C)(1) ‘Governmental function’ means a function of a political 

subdivision that is specified in division (C)(2) of this section or

that satisfies any of the following: 

(a) A function that is imposed upon the state as an obligation of 

sovereignty and that is performed by a political subdivision 

voluntarily or pursuant to legislative requirement; 

(b) A function that is for the common good of all citizens of the 

state; 

(c) A function that promotes or preserves the public peace, 

health, safety, or welfare; that involves activities that are not 

engaged in or not customarily engaged in by nongovernmental 

persons; and that is not specified in division (G)(2) of this 

section as a proprietary function.” 

As already discussed, designating street numbers is not specified in R.C. 

2744.01(G)(2) as a proprietary function. Further, although both Appellees 

and the trial court suggest that the function is governmental pursuant to R.C. 

2744.01(C)(2)(e)1

 and (i)2, we are not persuaded. In fact, the designation of 

street addresses is not explicitly defined as either a proprietary or 

 

1

 R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(e) defines as governmental “[t]he regulation of the use of, and the maintenance and 

repair of, roads, highways, streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, aqueducts, viaducts, and public 

grounds[.]” 

2

 R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(i) defines as governmental “[t]he enforcement or nonperformance of any law[.]” 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 12

governmental function. Further, this Court has been unable to locate any 

guidance whatsoever, related to the issue of whether the function of 

designating street numbers is governmental or proprietary in nature. 

Nonetheless, we conclude that the function can be classified as 

governmental under R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(a)-(b). 

{¶17} First, we find the function of designating street numbers and the 

development of an orderly system and process to do so serves the common 

good of all citizens of the state in accordance with R.C. 2744.01(C)(1)(b). 

Second, not only does the performance of this function promote the public 

safety and welfare, the activities related to this function are not customarily 

engaged in by nongovernmental persons in accordance with R.C. 

2744.01(C)(1)(c) For instance, in Lyons v. Teamhealth Midwest Cleveland, 

et al., 8th Dist. No. 96336, 2011-Ohio-5501, confusion over the location of a 

residential address on the part of the dispatch service, as well as an incorrect 

map prepared by the county engineer’s office, resulted in a delay in the 

arrival of an ambulance, which contributed to the death of a minor in need of 

medical attention. Thus, that case highlights the importance of the function 

of designating street numbers in relation to the health, safety and welfare of 

the public. As such, we conclude that the function of designating street 

numbers is governmental in nature. 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 13

{¶18} Next, we must determine whether any of the exceptions to 

immunity apply. The exceptions to immunity are set forth in R.C. 

2744.02(B)(1)-(5), which provides as follows: 

“(B) Subject to sections 2744.03 and 2744.05 of the Revised 

Code, a political subdivision is liable in damages in a civil 

action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly 

caused by an act or omission of the political subdivision or of 

any of its employees in connection with a governmental or 

proprietary function, as follows: 

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this division, political 

subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or 

property caused by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle 

by their employees when the employees are engaged within the 

scope of their employment and authority. The following are full 

defenses to that liability: 

(a) A member of a municipal corporation police department or 

any other police agency was operating a motor vehicle while 

responding to an emergency call and the operation of the 

vehicle did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct; 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 14

(b) A member of a municipal corporation fire department or any 

other firefighting agency was operating a motor vehicle while 

engaged in duty at a fire, proceeding toward a place where a 

fire is in progress or is believed to be in progress, or answering 

any other emergency alarm and the operation of the vehicle did 

not constitute willful or wanton misconduct; 

(c) A member of an emergency medical service owned or 

operated by a political subdivision was operating a motor 

vehicle while responding to or completing a call for emergency 

medical care or treatment, the member was holding a valid 

commercial driver's license issued pursuant to Chapter 4506. or 

a driver's license issued pursuant to Chapter 4507. of the 

Revised Code, the operation of the vehicle did not constitute 

willful or wanton misconduct, and the operation complies with 

the precautions of section 4511.03 of the Revised Code. 

(2) Except as otherwise provided in sections 3314.07 and 

3746.24 of the Revised Code, political subdivisions are liable 

for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by the 

negligent performance of acts by their employees with respect 

to proprietary functions of the political subdivisions. 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 15

(3) Except as otherwise provided in section 3746.24 of the 

Revised Code, political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, 

or loss to person or property caused by their negligent failure to 

keep public roads in repair and other negligent failure to 

remove obstructions from public roads, except that it is a full 

defense to that liability, when a bridge within a municipal 

corporation is involved, that the municipal corporation does not 

have the responsibility for maintaining or inspecting the bridge. 

(4) Except as otherwise provided in section 3746.24 of the 

Revised Code, political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, 

or loss to person or property that is caused by the negligence of 

their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of, 

and is due to physical defects within or on the grounds of, 

buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a 

governmental function, including, but not limited to, office 

buildings and courthouses, but not including jails, places of 

juvenile detention, workhouses, or any other detention facility, 

as defined in section 2921.01 of the Revised Code. 

(5) In addition to the circumstances described in divisions 

(B)(1) to (4) of this section, a political subdivision is liable for 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 16

injury, death, or loss to person or property when civil liability is 

expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a section of 

the Revised Code, including, but not limited to, sections 

2743.02 and 5591.37 of the Revised Code. Civil liability shall 

not be construed to exist under another section of the Revised 

Code merely because that section imposes a responsibility or 

mandatory duty upon a political subdivision, because that 

section provides for a criminal penalty, because of a general 

authorization in that section that a political subdivision may sue 

and be sued, or because that section uses the term “shall” in a 

provision pertaining to a political subdivision.” 

Here, the exception contained in R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) does not apply as we 

have already determined the function at issue is governmental rather than 

proprietary. Further, we find none of the remaining exceptions are 

applicable. Having determined none of the exceptions under R.C. 

2744.02(B) are applicable, we need not perform an analysis of the defenses 

and immunities provided to a political subdivision by R.C. 2744.03(A). 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to the extent that it 

determined Appellees were entitled to immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.02 

with respect to carrying out the function of designating street numbers. 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 17

{¶19} We next consider whether Board’s delegation of authority to 

Shaw to designate street numbers was a proper delegation of authority. As 

set forth above, Board was vested with the authority to designate street 

numbers pursuant to R.C. 303.021. Appellants contend that Board, and only 

Board, had the authority to perform this function and that the delegation of 

this function to Shaw was improper. Based upon the following, we reject 

Appellants’ argument. 

{¶20} As set forth above, Lyons v. Teamhealth Midwest Cleveland, et 

al., supra, involved the question of whether the county’s provision of 

emergency dispatch services was a governmental or a proprietary function, 

and whether the county had sovereign immunity related to the performance 

of that function. Also addressed as part of the analysis was the fact that the 

county did not have an ambulance service and thus contracted with private 

companies to respond to emergency calls. Id. at ¶ 5. Thus, the court was 

faced with the question of “whether the County can maintain their statutory 

immunity for retaining limited involvement in communicating calls for 

emergency help to the private entity through the provision of dispatch 

services.” Id. at ¶ 45. 

{¶21} In response to the issue raised, the Teamhealth court reasoned 

as follows: 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 18

“This court has previously held that ‘R.C. 2744.01(C) does not 

exclude from the definition of governmental functions those 

functions sometimes performed by private entities for political 

subdivisions. In fact, many of the specifically enumerated 

governmental functions set forth in R.C. 2744.01(C)(1) are 

commonly performed by private entities for political 

subdivisions, including, but not limited to, ambulance services, 

* * *. Where a service is specifically defined as a governmental 

function, what entity actually performs them or a part of them 

on behalf of a political subdivision has no bearing on their 

status as governmental pursuant to R.C. 2744.01(C)(1).’ 

McCloud v. Nimmer (1991), 72 Ohio App.3d 533, 595 N.E.2d 

492, emphasis added.” Id. at ¶ 46. 

Thus, in Teamhealth, the performance of a governmental function on behalf 

of the county by a private entity for profit was at issue and it was determined 

that such a structure did not alter the classification of the function as 

governmental, nor did it destroy the political subdivision’s immunity from 

liability in relation thereto. Id. 

{¶22} Here, the governmental function of designating street numbers 

was delegated to Shaw, as county engineer, an actual employee of the 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 19

political subdivision, not a private entity. It appears from the record that the 

County initiated the development of a countywide rural numbering system 

on February 20, 1975, via a “Proposal/Agreement/Resolution Assigning 

House # To County Engineer,” whereby Board entered into an agreement 

with a private engineering consulting firm. At some point thereafter, the 

function of designating street numbers was delegated to the Hocking County 

Engineer’s Office. We find nothing improper with respect to this delegation 

of authority and have located no prohibition against this practice. 

{¶23} Further, and much like the trial court, we find nothing improper 

with respect to the County Engineer’s system of designating street numbers 

only after driveways have been established. R.C. 303.021 provides no 

specific guidance as to how Board should perform the function of 

designating street numbers. The record reflects that Shaw’s office has a 

formal written policy which covers “Driveway Permitting and Addressing 

On County And Township Roads In Hocking County.” Additionally, there 

is no evidence in the record which suggests that this policy was not 

uniformly applied to any and all persons requesting the designation of a 

street number. 

{¶24} In summary, we have determined that the Hocking County 

Board of Commissioners is a political subdivision entitled to immunity 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 20

pursuant to R.C. 2744.01, which immunity extends to William Shaw, the 

elected County Engineer, an employee of the political subdivision. 

Additionally, we have determined that there was nothing improper with 

respect to Board’s decision to delegate their authority to perform this 

function to Shaw, as County Engineer. Likewise, we have determined that 

Shaw’s policy of requiring a driveway to be in place prior to designating a 

street number was a reasonable policy implemented in connection with 

carrying out the function of designating street numbers. Further, as we have 

determined that the function at issue is a governmental function for which 

immunity attaches, that Board’s delegation of the performance of this 

function to Shaw did not destroy the governmental nature of the function or 

the grant of immunity, and that none of the exceptions to immunity applies, 

we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees 

on the basis of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Finally, although 

Appellants contend an issue exists related to alleged animosity between Mr. 

Nihiser and William Shaw, we find even if such an issue remains, it is not a 

genuine issue of material fact which would preclude summary judgment. 

{¶25} Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly granted 

Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the assignments of 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 21

error raised by Appellants are overruled and the decision of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Hocking App. No. 12CA18 22

JUDGMENT ENTRY

 It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that the 

Appellees recover of Appellants costs herein taxed. 

 The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing 

the Hocking County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

 Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of 

the date of this entry. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Exceptions. 

Harsha, J. & Hoover, J.: Concur in Judgment Only. 

 

 For the Court, 

 BY: _________________________ 

 Matthew W. McFarland 

Presiding Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from 

the date of filing with the clerk.