NOTICE
 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

ADAM PHILLIP IVES, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

STATE OF ALASKA, 

Respondent. 

Court of Appeals No. A-13900 

Trial Court No. 3AN-21-06756 CR 

O P I N I O N

No. 2761 — October 13, 2023 

Petition for Review from the District Court, Third Judicial 

District, Anchorage, David Nesbett, Judge. 

Appearances: Tristan Bordon, Assistant Public Defender, and 

Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the 

Petitioner. Heather Stenson, Assistant Attorney General, Office 

of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney 

General, Juneau, for the Respondent. 

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, 

Judges. 

Judge HARBISON. 

On January 15, 2020, Adam Phillip Ives was arrested on a fugitive from 

justice warrant based on information that he had committed a crime in the state of 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Washington and had fled to Alaska.1 The case was dismissed ninety-one days later, 

when Washington failed to secure a governor’s warrant. But in September 2021, Ives 

was again arrested and charged with being a fugitive based on the same Washington 

arrest warrant. The district court found that Ives’s first case had no bearing on whether 

he could be committed in the second fugitive case, and the court ordered Ives to post 

bond in order to be released from custody. 

Ives filed a bail appeal, arguing that the bail set by the district court was 

excessive. Ives also argued that AS 12.70.140 and AS 12.70.160 limit an accused 

person’s detention without a governor’s warrant to a single ninety-day period at most, 

not renewable ninety-day periods accomplished by re-arresting and re-charging a 

previously discharged prisoner. 

While Ives’s bail appeal was pending before this Court, the district court 

reduced Ives’s bail and Ives was released from custody. We declined to exercise our 

discretion to review the district court’s bail order. 

However, we recognized that Ives’s appeal raised an important question of 

law that justified immediate review: whether the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act 

(UCEA) authorizes the commitment of a defendant on a fugitive from justice warrant 

after the defendant was previously committed for ninety days based on the same 

allegation.2 We accordingly converted the bail appeal into a petition for review and 

accepted the petition in order to address this question.3 Approximately two months after 

1 See AS 12.70.120 (authorizing the issuance of an Alaska arrest warrant for a fugitive 

from another state). 

2 Alaska R. App. P. 402(b)(4). 

3 Ives v. State, 2021 WL 4963601 (Alaska App. Oct. 22, 2021) (unpublished bail order). 

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we granted Ives’s petition, before the briefing was complete, a governor’s warrant was 

issued and Ives was extradited to Washington. 

Although Ives’s case is moot because he was extradited to Washington 

while this petition was pending,4 we have determined that his case raises an important 

question of law that is capable of repetition but evading review.5 For the reasons 

explained in this opinion, we conclude that, under Alaska law, a fugitive from justice 

may be committed without a governor’s warrant for a maximum of a single ninety-day 

period and that such a “commitment” includes both incarceration and bail restraint. 

The extradition procedure set out by Alaska’s UCEA 

Under the extradition clause of the United States Constitution, when a state 

locates a fugitive from justice within its jurisdiction, the locating state must deliver the 

fugitive to the state from which the fugitive fled upon request of the executive authority 

of the requisitioning state.6 Alaska, like a majority of other states, has adopted the 

UCEA, which sets out a mechanism by which states may comply with this constitutional 

mandate. 

The UCEA is codified in Alaska as AS 12.70.010 through AS 12.70.290. 

Under these statutes, a fugitive from justice may be arrested and detained in Alaska 

based on information fromthe requisitioning state that the fugitivehas been charged with 

4 See Fairbanks Fire Fighters Ass’n, Loc. 1324 v. Fairbanks, 48 P.3d 1165, 1167 

(Alaska 2002) (explaining that a claim is moot if it no longer presents a live controversy). 

5 State v. Roberts, 999 P.2d 151, 153 (Alaska App. 2000) (holding that, under the public 

interest exception to the mootness doctrine, a court may resolve an otherwise moot issue 

“when the issue is one of public interest which is capable of repetition and may repeatedly 

circumvent review”). 

6 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2. 

– 3 – 2761
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

a crime, has escaped, or has broken the terms of bail, probation, or parole.7 The warrant 

used to effectuate the fugitive’s initial arrest is known as a “fugitive warrant.”8 But the 

fugitive cannot be extradited to the requisitioning state until that state formally submits 

a demand to the governor of Alaska, and the governor of Alaska signs a warrant of 

arrest.9 This warrant is commonly referred to as a “governor’s warrant.”10 

Because a fugitive may not be released to the requisitioning state until a 

governor’s warrant has been issued and served, there is necessarily a lapse in time 

between when a fugitive is arrested on a fugitive warrant and when the fugitive may 

lawfully be released to a representative of the requisitioning state for extradition. The 

UCEA thus requires that, upon arrest, the fugitive must be committed “to jail” for a 

period of up to thirty days during which the requisitioning state may perfect the process 

for securing a governor’s warrant.11 This commitment may be extended for, at most, an 

additional sixty days if the requisitioning state has been unable to obtain a governor’s 

warrant within the initial thirty-day period.12 Under the UCEA a fugitive is entitled to 

7 AS 12.70.120; see also Ford v. Moses, 606 P.2d 795, 795 (Alaska 1980). Under 

Alaska law, a fugitive from justice is defined as “a person who, having committed or been 

charged with a crime in one state, has left its jurisdiction and is found within the territory of 

another when it is sought to subject him to the criminal process of the former state.” Brown 

v. State, 518 P.2d 770, 773 (Alaska 1974). 

8 See Laverty v. State, 963 P.2d 1076, 

12.70.130 also authorizes the warrantless ar

applicable to Ives’s appeal. 

9 AS 12.70.020-.070. 

10 See Ford, 606 P.2d at 796. 

11 AS 12.70.140. 

12 AS 12.70.160. 

1077-78 (Alaska App. 1998). Alaska Statute 

rest of a fugitive in limited circumstances not 

– 4 – 2761
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

be released on bail during this period, unless the underlying offense of extradition is a 

capital crime.13 

The UCEA allows the court to commit a defendant for a single maximum 

period of ninety days prior to the service of a governor’s warrant 

In his petition, Ives contends that the UCEA only allows for a single 

commitment of up to ninety days pending the service of a governor’s warrant. 

According to Ives, once that period has been exhausted, a fugitive may not be re-arrested 

for the same out-of-state conduct unless the requisitioning state has obtained a 

governor’s warrant. Ives notes that to allow otherwise would permit a fugitive to be 

subjected to potentially “indefinite detention via a continuous cycle of catch-andrelease,” effectively circumventing the statutory time-frame established by 

AS 12.70.140 through AS 12.70.160. 

The State concedes that, prior to the issuance of a governor’s warrant, the 

UCEA prohibits commitment in excess of an aggregate of ninety days, and we conclude 

that this concession is well-founded.14 However, the State contends that a fugitive may 

be arrested and detained on the same fugitive warrant multiple times, so long as the 

composite total of the various periods of commitment does not exceed ninety days. As 

we are about to explain, we reject this contention and conclude that only a single period 

of prerequisition commitment for the same out-of-state conduct is authorized by the 

UCEA. 

13 AS 12.70.150. 

14 See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972) (requiring an appellate court to 

independently evaluate any concession of error by the State in a criminal case). 

– 5 – 2761
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

When interpreting a statute, Alaska’s courts employ a “sliding scale” 

analysis under which a court considers the legislature’s intent as well as the language of 

the statute itself.15 

In accordance with this principle, we first consider the UCEA’s plain 

language, and we conclude that the meaning of the statutory language is clear. In 

relevant part, the UCEA states that a judicial officer shall commit a fugitive “for not 

more than 30 days, as will enable the arrest of the accused to be made under a warrant 

of the governor.”16 But it also provides that, if the fugitive is not served with a 

governor’s warrant by the expiration of this initial commitment, the judge or magistrate 

may either “discharge the accused or may recommit the accused for a further period of 

not more than 60 days.”17 Thus, under the plain language of the statute, the UCEA 

provides for an initial thirty-day confinement period pending service of a governor’s 

warrant, which may be extended for an additional sixty days, but it does not authorize 

commitment for longer than a total of ninety days, nor does it authorize more than one 

prerequisition commitment. 

The legislative history of this statute supports this interpretation. When the 

legislature adopted the UCEA, it explicitly stated that the act should be “so interpreted 

and construed as to effectuate the general purposes to make uniform the law of those 

states that enact it.”18 Thus, we must interpret the language of the act as consistently as 

15 See, e.g., State v. Fyfe, 370 P.3d 1092, 1094-95 (Alaska 2016); Anchorage v. Beezley, 

435 P.3d 978, 981 (Alaska App. 2018). 

16 AS 12.70.140. 

17 AS 12.70.160. 

18 AS 12.70.270. 

– 6 – 2761
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

possible with the courts of other adopting jurisdictions.19 And all of the other 

jurisdictions to have considered this question agree that the act allows only for a single 

commitment of no more than ninety days prior to the service of a governor’s warrant. 

For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that “the outer 

limit of time for which a demanded person may be held in custody pending issuance and 

service of a governor’s rendition warrant is the 90-day limit (initial 30 days, plus further 

60 days) mandated by the UCEA.”20 The West Virginia Supreme Court has similarly 

held that “a defendant incarcerated under a fugitive warrant . . . may not be held solely 

on that warrant for a period exceeding the aggregate of ninety days.”21 Courts in 

Florida,22 Montana,23 Nebraska,24 New York,25 Ohio,26 Oklahoma,27 Pennsylvania,28 

19 See Evans v. State, 820 P.2d 1098, 1100 n.2 (Alaska App. 1991); Laverty v. State, 963 

P.2d 1076, 1079 n.8 (Alaska App. 1998). 

20 State v. Phillips, 587 N.W.2d 29, 36 (Minn. 1998). 

21 State ex rel. Games-Neely v. Sanders, 641 S.E.2d 153, 159 (W. Va. 2006). 

22 Orton v. State, 431 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. Dist. App. 1983). 

23 State v. Holliman, 805 P.2d 52, 53-54 (Mont. 1991). 

24 Bell v. Janing, 199 N.W.2d 24, 25 (Neb. 1972). 

25 People ex rel. Brandolino v. Hastings, 421 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). 

26 State v. Haynes, 456 N.E.2d 1279, 1283-84 (Ohio App. 1982). 

27 Carter v. State, 708 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Okla. 1985). 

28 Commonwealth ex. rel. Coffman v. Aytch, 361 A.2d 652, 654 (Pa. Super. 1976). 

– 7 – 2761
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Texas,29 Vermont,30 and Wisconsin31 have all similarly concluded that the ninety days 

prescribed by the UCEA is the outer limit of a state’s authority to hold a fugitive pending 

the issuance of a governor’s warrant.32 

As authority for its claimthat the UCEA authorizes multiple commitments, 

the State cites only to State ex rel. Games-Neely v. Sanders, a case that arose in West 

Virginia.33 In that case, Jason Eric VanMetre was arraigned on criminal charges in West 

Virginia, given a trial date, and released on bail. After this, he was arrested on a fugitive 

from justice warrant based on crimes he allegedly committed in Virginia. VanMetre 

asked to waive extradition proceedings and to be relinquished to the Virginia authorities, 

but the West Virginia prosecutor claimed that she had discretion to prevent VanMetre 

from being extradited to Virginia until after resolution of the crimes he allegedly 

committed in West Virginia. The trial court entered an order permitting VanMetre to 

29 Lanz v. State, 815 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. App. 1991). 

30 In re Hval, 537 A.2d 135, 139 (Vt. 1987). 

31 State ex rel. Lykins v. Steinhorst, 541 N.W.2d 234, 238, 240 (Wis. App. 1995). 

32 The ninety-day statutory time limit is tolled for periods where the fugitive’s 

confinement is justified by charges pending in Alaska. See Paley v. Bieluch, 785 So. 2d 692, 

695 (Fla. Dist. App. 2001) (“Petitioner’s allegations indicate that for most of the time in 

question, he was held on local charges as well as the fugitive warrant. There is no indication 

that he has been held in excess of the statutory period solely on the fugitive warrant.”); In re 

Lane, 845 P.2d 708, 710 (Kan. App. 1992) (“[T]he district court did not err in allowing Lane 

to be detained for more than 90 days because the filing of the local charges tolled the running 

of the 90-day period for so long as he was held on those charges.”); State ex rel. Ehlers v. 

Endicott, 523 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Wis. App. 1994) (“[T]he thirty-day and optional sixty-day 

extension periods for detention only pertain to those fugitives who are not already in custody 

pending other charges or serving other sentences. Ehlers was already incarcerated, serving 

a sentence for the conviction of another crime, and therefore the time limits are inapplicable.” 

(citation omitted)). 

33 State ex rel. Games-Neely v. Sanders, 641 S.E.2d 153 (W. Va. 2006). 

– 8 – 2761
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

waive extradition and be released to Virginia, prior to the conclusion of the criminal 

proceedings against him.34 

On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed this 

order. The supreme court of appeals first held that, under the West Virginia UCEA, a 

defendant incarcerated under a fugitive warrant may not be held solely on a fugitive 

warrant for a period in excess of ninety days.35 The court then held that, when a person 

charged with committing a crime in West Virginia is arrested on a fugitive warrant for 

crimes committed in another state, the defendant may waive extradition proceedings in 

the fugitive case.36 However, if the defendant executes such a waiver, the prosecutor 

then may elect not to enforce the waiver until after the West Virginia criminal case is 

concluded.37 Thus, VanMetre could not voluntarily turn himself over to Virginia 

authorities before being tried on the West Virginia charges. 

The State suggests that this case stands for the proposition that the UCEA 

authorizes multiple prerequisition commitments, as long as they do not exceed an 

aggregate of ninety days. But we do not construe the holding of the case in this way. 

Indeed, if this were true, the court’s second holding — that the prosecutor has authority 

to delay enforcement of the defendant’s waiver of extradition — would have been 

unnecessary. Ifmorethanoneprerequisitioncommitment werepermitted, theprosecutor 

could have simply dismissed the fugitive case against VanMetre prior to his waiver of 

extradition and then re-arrested him on the fugitive warrant after the West Virginia case 

34 Id. at 154-55. 

35 Id. at 156-59. 

36 Id. at 159-61. 

37 Id. at 161-63. 

– 9 – 2761
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

was resolved. We accordingly reject the State’s suggestion that this case stands for the 

proposition that multiple prerequisition commitments are authorized by the UCEA. 

We have been unable to locate a single case from any jurisdiction that 

interprets the UCEA (or other state equivalent) to authorize more than one period of 

commitment.38 Indeed, some jurisdictions go so far as to only allow one extension of up 

to sixty days beyond the thirty-day initial commitment,39 although others permit multiple 

extensions as long as they do not exceed a total of sixty days — i.e., as long as the total 

aggregate commitment period does not exceed ninety days.40 And, as the State 

acknowledges, at least one jurisdiction has determined that a detention for ninety days 

38 As we explain later in this opinion, “commitment” under the UCEA refers to courtordered restraint on a defendant’s liberty, including both imprisonment and release on bail. 

39 See, e.g., Christopher v. Tozer, 263 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Mo. 1954) (holding that the 

UCEA gives the court “a limited discretionary power to commit the accused for one time 

period not to exceed thirty days, and thereafter to order one recommitment for a further 

period of not to exceed sixty days.”); Treadway v. Heidtman, 284 So. 2d 473, 474 (Fla. Dist. 

App. 1973) (holding that the court may recommit the fugitive for only one period not to 

exceed sixty days when the initial period of commitment expires); People v. White, 140 

N.W.2d 578, 579 (Mich. App. 1966) (concluding that “the use of the article ‘a’ appearing in 

the phrase ‘a further period’ authorized the lower court to recommit one time while awaiting 

the execution of the governor’s warrant”). 

40 See, e.g., Alliey v. Lamm, 711 P.2d 1258, 1259 (Colo. 1986) (holding that the court 

did not abuse its discretion when it granted multiple continuances because the UCEA 

“reposes discretion in the court to extend the initial thirty day commitment for an additional 

sixty days”); Odom v. State, 524 P.2d 217, 219 (Kan. 1974) (holding that the UCEA does not 

limit the court to granting only one continuance and instead authorizes more than one 

continuance as long as the sixty-day statutory limit is not exceeded); Commonwealth ex rel. 

Colcough v. Aytch, 323 A.2d 359, 364 (Pa. Super. 1974) (holding that “although it is not 

good practice to grant numerous continuances,” granting multiple continuances totaling not 

more than sixty days is allowed under the UCEA). 

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without rendition in one jurisdiction defeats future detention on the same warrant by any 

other jurisdiction.41 

We accordingly join the other courts that have addressed this issue in 

concluding that, under the UCEA, a fugitive may not be committed for a period of time 

greater than ninety days while awaiting the issuance and service of a governor’s warrant. 

We also conclude that, once this commitment has expired, the fugitive may not again be 

committed based on the same out-of-state conduct, except upon the service of a 

governor’s warrant. 

A fugitive is committed for purposes of Alaska’s UCEA if they are 

physically incarcerated or if they are restrained on bail or bond 

Given that the UCEA allows for only a maximum period of ninety days of 

“commitment” prior to the service of a governor’s warrant, the next question raised by 

this case is whether “commitment” refers to both incarceration and release on bail, or 

only to incarceration. 

AlaskaStatute12.70.140 provides thatafugitivearrestedon anout-of-state 

warrant in Alaska shall be committed “to jail for not more than 30 days . . . unless the 

accused gives bail . . . or until legally discharged.” But under AS 12.70.150, a fugitive 

from justice shall be released on bail during this period unless the underlying crime of 

extradition is a capital offense. Furthermore, if the requisitioning state does not obtain 

a governor’s warrant within the initial thirty-day period, the court “may discharge the 

accused or may recommit the accused for a further period of not more than 60 days, or 

41 In re Hval, 537 A.2d 135, 139 (Vt. 1987). The record does not indicate that Ives was 

previously detained as a fugitive in any other jurisdiction, and we accordingly express no 

opinion with regard to this issue. 

– 11 – 2761
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. . . may again take bail . . . but within a period of not more than 60 days after the date 

of the new bond or undertaking.”42 

In the briefs submitted to this Court, Ives contends, and the State agrees, 

that these and other references to “commitment” in the UCEA refer both to incarceration 

and to bail release. We conclude that the State’s concession is again well-founded.43 

As the State points out, when AS 12.70.140 is read in isolation, it could 

suggest that the thirty-day limit on commitment is only applicable if the fugitive is in jail, 

but not if they have been released on bail. However, when we engage in statutory 

construction, we must, whenever possible, “interpret[] each part or section of a statute 

with every other part or section, so as to create a harmonious whole.”44 And as the State 

acknowledges, when AS 12.70.140 is read in conjunction with the following two 

provisions of the statute, the more compelling interpretation is that the statutory time 

frame (the mandatory thirty-day commitment and the discretionary sixty-day extension) 

applies regardless of whether the fugitive is incarcerated or released on bail. 

This is also the approach taken by the overwhelming majority of other 

UCEA jurisdictions.45 Indeed, we have found only a single case to the contrary.46 

42 AS 12.70.160. 

43 See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972) (requiring an appellate court to 

independently evaluate any concession of error by the State in a criminal case). 

44 Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 761 (Alaska 1999). 

45 See, e.g., Orton v. State, 431 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. Dist. App. 1983) (holding that 

UCEA requires discharge of the accused “from custody or bond” after the expiration of the 

aggregate ninety-day statutory time period); Stynchcombe v. Whitley, 242 S.E.2d 720, 721 

(Ga. 1978) (“If the warrant is not executed during the 90-day maximum detention period, the 

accused is clearly entitled to be discharged from jail or bail.”); State v. Phillips, 587 N.W.2d 

29, 34, 36 (Minn. 1998) (“Under the clear language of the UCEA and the facts of this case, 

(continued...) 

– 12 – 2761
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Because the legislature’s express intent in adopting the UCEA was that the 

law should be interpreted as consistently as possible with other jurisdictions, we give 

significant weight to the near-unanimity of the approach taken by other jurisdictions. 

Given that this approach is in accord with our interpretation of the statute’s plain 

language, we now hold that “commitment” for purposes of the UCEA refers to both 

incarceration and constraint on bail. 

Conclusion 

For the reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude that, under the 

UCEA, any commitment to await the issuance and service of a governor’s warrant is 

limited to a single period of up to ninety days. We also conclude that commitment 

includes both incarceration and release on bail or bond. After such a commitment has 

ended, a fugitive may not be again arrested for the same out-of-state conduct, except 

upon the service of a governor’s warrant. 

45 (...continued) 

the district court was without the authority to hold Phillips in custody and to continue his 

bond beyond 90 days from his . . . arraignment. . . . Demanded persons have the right . . . 

to be confined for only reasonable periods of time, be it through incarceration or bail.”); In 

re Colasanti, 249 A.2d 1, 3 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1969) (“The sections only limit the time 

during which one arrested as a fugitive may be kept in jail (or on bail in lieu thereof) pending 

the completion of extradition proceedings and the issuance of the governor’s arrest 

warrant.”); Carter v. State, 708 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Okla. 1985) (same); Lanz v. State, 815 

S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. App. 1991) (“[Texas’s UCEA] outlines the procedure to be utilized 

in the issuance of a fugitive warrant and provides that an individual arrested pursuant to such 

a warrant shall not be committed or held to bail for a longer time than ninety days.”). 

46 People v. Williams, 391 N.Y.S.2d 518, 520 (N.Y. Crim. 1977) (“[The dictionary] 

defines ‘commitment’ as a ‘consignment to a penal or mental institution.’”). Contra, e.g., 

Jones v. People, 404 N.Y.S.2d 525, 526 (N.Y. Cnty. 1978) (“It is apparent that this 90 day 

limit would be the maximum time that the fugitive could be detained or held on bail.”). 

– 13 – 2761
 
 In the Court of Appeals of the State of Alaska

Adam Phillip Ives,

 Petitioner, 

 v.

State of Alaska,

 Respondent.

Trial Court No. 3AN-21-06756CR

Court of Appeals No. A-13900

Order

Petition for Rehearing

Date of Order: 10/13/2023

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges

The State of Alaska seeks rehearing of our decision in Ives v. State, 

_ P.3d __, 2023 WL 2721359 (Alaska App. Mar. 31, 2023). The State asserts that this 

ourt misconceived the State’s concession in this case. The State contends that it did 

ot concede that, once an initial commitment has expired, a fugitive may not again be 

ommitted based on the same out-of-state conduct.

1 The State therefore asks us to 

mend our decision to remove our contrary conclusion or, alternatively, to provide 

nalysis in support of our holding.

In response, Adam Phillip Ives agrees that the State did not concede this 

oint in the briefing to this Court. But he contends that we should issue an amended 

ecision that continues to maintain, and indeed further explains, this point of law.

_

C

n

c

a

a

p

d

1 See Ives v. State, __ P.3d __, 2023 WL 2721359, at *3 (Alaska App. Mar. 31, 

2023). 
Ives v. State - p. 2 

File No. A-13900 – 10/13/2023

We agree with the parties that the State did not concede that only a single 

period of prerequisition commitment is authorized by the Uniform Criminal Extradition 

Act. Because our decision could be read to suggest that the State conceded this, and 

because it contains an insufficient analysis of this point of law, we GRANT the petition 

in part. An amended opinion that does not suggest the State conceded this point of law 

will be issued concurrently with this order. The opinion clarifies the reasons for our 

conclusion that a fugitive may not be subjected to multiple prerequisition commitments 

for the same out-of-state conduct. 

IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Opinion No. 2742, issued on 3/31/2023, is WITHDRAWN.

 2. Opinion No. 2761, is issued on this date in its place.

3. In all other respects, the petition for rehearing is DENIED.

 Entered at the direction of the Court.

Clerk of the Appellate Courts

_______________________________

Meredith Montgomery

cc: Court of Appeals Judges

Judge Nesbett

 Publishers (Op. No. 2742, 3/31/2023) 

Distribution:

Bordon, Tristan, Alaska Public Defender Agency

Stenson, Heather, Office of Criminal Appeals