### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

CHARLES SEARCY
, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 18

- 2201

[ November 20, 2019 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Edward H. Merrigan, Jr. , Judge; L.T. Case No. 15

- 007019 CF10A

.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Stacey Kime, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rhonda Giger, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

C IKLIN
, J

.

In his motion to suppress evidence, Charles Searcy argued that (1) law enforcement officers did not have grounds to conduct a protective sweep

of his home and (2) that the subsequent consent to search given by another resident of the home, his mother, was thus invalid. We must reverse and remand for the trial court to make factual findings so this court can engage in meaningful appellate review.

During the hearing on Searcy’s pivotal motion, a law en forcement

officer gave an account of events which starkly differed from the version of

events offered by the defense , which includ ed sworn testimony from Searcy’s mother. The detective testified that after Searcy was arrested

outside his home for sale of drugs, officers conducted a protective sweep

to ensure there were no other people in the home. The detective indicated they were also concerned that someone remaining in the home might “destroy the drugs.” Shortly after the sweep concluded, the detect ive testified, Searcy’s mother arrived home. The detective testified that he and

his fellow officers invited her to go into the house and confirm the presence2 of contraband ; that she obliged ; and that she then gave consent for the

officers to search the h ome she shared with Searcy and her daughter

.

Meanwhile, Searcy’s mother offered vastly different testimony. She

testified that during a family meal, Searcy stepped outside of the home

. The mother then looked out through her window and saw that Searcy was being detained by a group of officers who were wearing military

- type fatigues and carrying weapons

. Searcy’s mother testified that after she

then exited the home, the SWAT team barred her from reentering it ; removed her daughter from the home ; and obtained a written consent from the mother while they ransacked her home with the assistance of a police

canine

.

The trial court summarily denied the motion without making any factual findings or provid ing any ra tionale for its oral pronouncement

.

Give n the diametrically opposed testimony offered by the state an d the defendant, we find it impossible to discern the grounds for the trial court’s denial. To the extent the trial court accepted the state’s argument that

, based on the officer’s testimony, the protective sweep was legal, the court erred, as th e officer’s testimony did not indicate that circumstances existed supporting a protective sweep. See Diaz v. State , 34 So. 3d 797, 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (recog nizing that officers may conduct a protective sweep when they “have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the protective sweep is necessary due to a safety threat or the destruction of evidence”). Rather, it appears to us that the officer’s testimony e stablished that the sweep was based on the sort of generalized concerns that are insufficient to support a protective sweep of a home. See Rozzo v. State , 75 So. 3d
409, 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

And if it was established that the protective sweep was illegal, then “the unlawful police action presumptively taints and renders involuntary any

consent to search.” Diaz , 34 So. 3d at 804 (quoting Gonzalez v. State , 578 So. 2d 729, 734 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) ) . When there is such a taint, t he state

has the burd en to prove “by clear and convincing evidence that there was

a clear break in the chain of events sufficient to dissolve the taint

. ” Id

. (quoting Navamuel v. State , 12 So. 3d 1283, 1286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). Without factual findings, we cannot ascertain whether the trial court

considered this issue. It may have simply ended its analysis by accepting the officer’s testimony and finding that the protective sweep was legal. Or the trial court may have recognized that the protective sweep was illegal,

but f ound that by clear and convincing evidence that there was a clear

break in the chain of events sufficient to dissolve the taint. We simply

cannot tell.3 It is the trial court’s responsibility, as fact finder, “to assess witness credibility and to determ ine what happened in this case.” State v. Shaw

, 784 So. 2d 529, 533 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). It is exceedingly helpful when trial judges “indicate [ their ] rationale,” so that the reviewing court can determine whether the trial court’s application of the law to the facts was

erroneous. See State v. Moore , 791 So. 2d 1246, 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

While not an independent ground for reversal, unexplained rulings are generally anathema to a sound appellate opinion . While we decline to enunciate a ruling that would require factual findings following hearings on motions to suppress, we implore trial judges to consider such a routine procedure , whether they be written or orally pronounced.

“ Ordinarily, when reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an appella te court presumes the trial court ’ s findings of fact are correct and reverses only those findings not supported by competent substantial

evidence. Additionally, the trial court's findings of law are reviewed de

novo. ” Black v. State , 59 So. 3d 340, 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)

. It is with that backdrop that we take this opportunity to encourage trial courts to exercise the prerogative to explain their adjudications and not cede that responsibility to a

rev iewing court. De novo review of unexplained rulings do not efficiently resolve this issue because the trial court is still in the best position to judge the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses at a pretrial suppression hearing.

Based on the foregoi ng, we reverse and remand for the trial court to provide a rationale for its ruling and to make necessary factual findings

. If the trial court is unable to do so because of the passage of time, it may hold another evidentiary hearing.

Reversed and rema nded with directions

.

D AMOORGIAN and G ERBER
, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.