[Cite as 1116 Hudson, L.L.C. v. Dry Creek Mtge., Inc., 2024-Ohio-2183.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

1116 Hudson, LLC, :

Plaintiff-Appellant/ :

Cross-Appellee,

v. :

No. 23AP-729

Drycreek Mortgage, Inc. et al., : (C.P.C. No. 22CV-7726)

Defendants-Appellees, :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

Tonya A. Miller, individually :

AKA Tonya Bowersock, individually,

:

Defendant-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on June 6, 2024

On brief: Wells Law Office, and Joquetta S. Wells, for 

plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee. Argued: Joquetta S. 

Wells. 

On brief: Thomas M. McCash, for defendantappellee/cross-appellant. Argued: Thomas M. McCash.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

LUPER SCHUSTER, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee, 1116 Hudson, LLC (“Hudson”), appeals 

from a decision and order of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the 

motion to dismiss of defendant-appellee/cross-appellant, Tonya A. Miller, individually,

AKA Tonya Bowersock, individually (“Miller”). Miller filed a cross-appeal from the same 

decision denying her motion for sanctions. For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal 

and cross-appeal.
No. 23AP-729 2

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On November 4, 2022, Hudson filed a complaint against four named 

defendants: (1) Drycreek Mortgage, Inc., (2) Reflections I, Inc., (3) Reflections II, Inc., and 

(4) Miller. The complaint set forth allegations of breach of contract and damages arising 

from the alleged non-payment of a promissory note. Further, the complaint alleged Miller 

executed the note on July 23, 1994 in the principal sum of $7,009.16 with interest at a rate 

of 10 percent and signed the note in both her individual capacity and as guarantor for 

defendants Drycreek, Reflections I, and Reflections II. The complaint alleged all four 

named defendants were in default on the terms of the note, that Hudson made a written 

demand for payment on April 10, 2017, and that all four defendants have failed to pay. 

Hudson sought judgment against all four named defendants in the amount of $99,547.55. 

On November 14, 2022, Hudson filed an amended complaint against the same four named 

defendants with the same material allegations, attaching to the complaint a copy of the 

note, its written demand for payment, and its calculation of the outstanding balance with 

interest. 

{¶ 3} On December 14, 2022, Miller filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Civ.R. 

12(B)(6), and a motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51. Miller set forth 

several arguments for dismissal, including an argument that the applicable statute of 

limitations operated to bar Hudson’s claim. Relevant to this appeal, Drycreek, Reflections 

I, and Reflections II did not join the motion to dismiss or otherwise file a responsive 

pleading.1 

{¶ 4} Hudson opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing Miller’s motion to dismiss 

relied on evidence outside of the complaint and its attachments. Hudson further argued 

that the question of whether the statute of limitations applied was subject to further 

discovery and thus not appropriate for dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). 

{¶ 5} On November 13, 2023, the trial court granted Miller’s motion to dismiss, 

finding the applicable statute of limitations operated to bar Hudson’s complaint. In the 

1 The record indicates service of the complaint by certified mail was completed to Miller and to Drycreek. 

However, as of the date of the trial court’s decision and order, Hudson had yet to complete service on 

Reflections I or Reflections II. 
No. 23AP-729 3

same decision and order, the trial court also denied Miller’s motion for sanctions. Hudson 

timely appeals, and Miller filed a timely cross-appeal. 

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 6} Hudson assigns the following two assignments of error for our review:

[I.] The trial court erred to Plaintiff-Appellant’s [CrossAppellee’s] substantial prejudice by determining a Civ.R. 12 

(B)(6) motion grounded on the movant’s assertion that a 

complaint is time barred by applying R.C. 1303.16(B), and no 

other statute, to reach the conclusion that the non-movant’s 

complaint does not present proof that a tolling issue plausibly 

exists and thus is conclusively time barred by operation of 

R.C. 1303.16.

[II.] The trial court erred when, in construing the Amended 

Complaint upon a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, the trial court 

analyzed the averments and the Civ.R. 10(C) and (D) Exhibits 

attached to the complaint but did not make all reasonable 

inferences in the non-movant’s favor. 

{¶ 7} Miller assigns the following sole cross-assignment of error for our review:

The trial court errored as a matter of law in denying 

Defendant Tonya Bowersock Motion for Sanctions and not 

holding a hearing pursuant to R.C. §2323.51.

(Sic passim.)

III. Discussion

{¶ 8} Before we can reach the merits of Hudson’s assignments of error or Miller’s 

cross-assignment of error, we must address our subject-matter jurisdiction. Although 

neither party has raised the issue of whether the trial court’s November 13, 2023 decision

is a final appealable order, an appellate court may raise that jurisdictional issue sua sponte 

and must dismiss an appeal that is not taken from a final appealable order. Oakley v. Ohio 

State Univ. Wexner Med. Ctr., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-843, 2019-Ohio-3557, ¶ 9, citing

Riverside v. State, 190 Ohio App.3d 765, 2010-Ohio-5868, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.).

{¶ 9} Ohio appellate courts have jurisdiction to review only final appealable orders 

of lower courts within their districts. Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2); R.C. 

2505.03. If an order is not a final appealable order, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction 

and must dismiss the appeal. Tassone v. Tassone, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-475, 2019-Ohio-
No. 23AP-729 4

683, ¶ 7, citing K.B. v. Columbus, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-315, 2014-Ohio-4027, ¶ 8. Final 

orders are those that “dispos[e] of the whole case or some separate and distinct branch 

thereof.” Lantsberry v. Tilley Lamp Co., Ltd., 27 Ohio St.2d 303, 306 (1971). A trial court 

order is final and appealable only if it satisfies the requirements in R.C. 2505.02 and, if 

applicable, Civ.R. 54(B). Eng. Excellence, Inc. v. Northland Assocs., L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 

10AP-402, 2010-Ohio-6535, ¶ 10. A trial court’s labeling of an entry as a “final appealable 

order” is not dispositive of the issue. In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990).

{¶ 10} R.C. 2505.02(B) defines final orders and provides, in pertinent part:

An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, 

modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of 

the following:

(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in 

effect determines the action and prevents a judgment; 

(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special 

proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after 

judgment;

(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a 

new trial;

(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to 

which both of the following apply:

(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the 

provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in 

favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional 

remedy.

(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or 

effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all 

proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.

{¶ 11} Civ.R. 54(B) provides, as follows:

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action 

whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 

claim, and whether arising out of the same or separate 

transactions, or when multiple parties are involved, the court 

may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all 

of the claims or parties only upon an express determination 
No. 23AP-729 5

that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of a 

determination that there is no just reason for delay, any order 

or other form of decision, however designated, which 

adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities 

of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to 

any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of 

decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of 

judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 

liabilities of all the parties.

{¶ 12} If a trial court enters judgment on some but not all of the claims in a multiclaim action or with respect to some but not all of the parties in a multi-party action, in the 

absence of express Civ.R. 54(B) language, an appellate court has no jurisdiction to review 

the judgment. In re the Estate of Von Endt, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-956, 2014-Ohio-1749, ¶ 10, 

citing Moore v. Gross, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1077, 2010-Ohio-3328, ¶ 12.

{¶ 13} In the present case, the trial court’s decision and order granted Miller’s 

motion to dismiss and denied her motion for sanctions. It is undisputed, however, that the 

underlying action involves multiple parties, and none of the other named defendants joined 

Miller’s motion to dismiss or otherwise appeared in this case. Thus, although the trial court 

granted Miller’s motion to dismiss the complaint, the trial court’s order did not determine 

the action or prevent a judgment because not all of the defendants joined the motion to 

dismiss. See Huntington Natl. Bank v. Troon Mgt., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-655, 2011-

Ohio-1194, ¶ 11 (trial court’s decision granting the appellee’s motion to dismiss the 

counterclaim did not determine the action under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) because additional 

claims had not yet been resolved); Aziz v. Capital Senior Living, Inc., 8th Dist. No. 109814, 

2021-Ohio-2515, ¶ 15 (“it is apparent that the trial court’s order granting the motion to 

dismiss did not determine the action nor prevent a judgment because not all of the 

defendants joined in the motions to dismiss”), citing Mayor v. Ford Motor Co., 8th Dist. 

No. 81835, 2003-Ohio-2869, ¶ 3-7 (trial court’s “order granting the motions to dismiss did 

not determine the action nor prevent a judgment because not all of the defendants joined 

in the motions to dismiss” regardless of the trial court’s order purporting to have “dismissed 

the case”).

{¶ 14} Moreover, the trial court’s decision and order does not contain language, 

pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B), that “there is no just reason for delay” of the appeal. Tonti Homes 
No. 23AP-729 6

Corp. v. Siculan, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-162, 2022-Ohio-3067, ¶ 8-12 (even if the court were 

to assume a trial court’s decision and entry satisfied the requirements of R.C. 

2505.02(B)(1), “it is still necessary for us to consider Civ.R. 54(B) as one claim and one 

party have not been dismissed”); Armatas v. Aultman Health Found., 5th Dist. No. 

2015CA00225, 2016-Ohio-2715, ¶ 14 (where a plaintiff filed a complaint against two 

defendants and only one of the defendants filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, the 

trial court’s judgment granting that defendant’s motion to dismiss “does not determine the 

matter as to all parties,” and, having failed to meet the requirements of Civ.R. 54(B), the 

judgment is not a final appealable order). A trial court’s labeling of an entry as a “final 

appealable order” is not dispositive of the issue where the order does not otherwise satisfy 

the requirements of R.C. 2505.02 and Civ.R. 54(B). Internatl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 

Union No. 8 v. Vaughn Industries, L.L.C., 116 Ohio St.3d 335, 2007-Ohio-6439, ¶ 8 (“[a] 

court may not bypass the requirement to include the express language of Civ.R. 54(B) 

simply by designating the order as final”). Although the trial court labeled its order a “final 

appealable order,” the trial court did not comply with Civ.R. 54(B). Thus, because the trial 

court failed to include the express language of Civ.R. 54(B), the order is not a final 

appealable order and this court may not review it. See Estate of Von Endt at ¶ 10 (“[w]e 

need not consider whether the judgment entry before us is a final order under R.C. 2505.02 

because the lack of Civ.R. 54(B) language is dispositive”).

{¶ 15} Because the trial court’s November 13, 2023 decision and order granting 

Miller’s motion to dismiss and denying her motion for sanctions was not a final appealable 

order, we lack jurisdiction to review Hudson’s assignments of error and Miller’s crossassignment of error.

IV. Disposition 

{¶ 16} Based on the foregoing reasons, the decision and order of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas is not a final appealable order, and this court is without 

jurisdiction to consider the appeal and cross-appeal. Accordingly, we sua sponte dismiss 

this appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

DORRIAN and BOGGS, JJ., concur.