[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 243 (Tuesday, December 19, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65300-65316]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-30750]



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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Savannah River Operations Office; Interim Management of Nuclear 
Materials at Savannah River Site

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision and notice of preferred alternatives.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final 
environmental impact statement (EIS), ``Interim Management of Nuclear 
Materials'', (DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995) to assess the potential 
environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage nuclear materials 
at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until 
decisions on their ultimate disposition are made and implemented. The 
actions evaluated in the EIS would stabilize SRS materials that 
represent environment, safety and health vulnerabilities in their 
current storage condition or which may represent a vulnerability within 
the next 10 years. These vulnerabilities are the result of the 
suspension of nuclear materials production and processing operations 
which accompanied the end of the Cold War. Although DOE has initiated 
programmatic and project specific environmental evaluations on the 
ultimate disposition of the nuclear materials in the DOE complex which 
are 

[[Page 65301]]
now surplus to national defense requirements, the implementation of 
decisions regarding ultimate disposition will take several years. In 
the interim, DOE wants to eliminate vulnerabilities associated with 
certain current nuclear material storage configurations in order to 
protect the environment and the health and safety of workers and the 
public.
    Several reviews conducted by DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities 
Safety Board (DNFSB) have identified environment, safety and health 
vulnerabilities associated with the continued storage of certain 
nuclear materials at the SRS in their current location and physical 
condition. The Final EIS evaluates alternatives for managing these 
materials. In making the decisions announced in this Record of 
Decision, DOE considered environmental and other factors, such as 
costs, security and nuclear nonproliferation, facility usage, 
technology availability, required new facilities, skilled labor 
availability, minimization of continuing custodial care for the 
materials, the need for maintenance or modifications to aging SRS 
facilities, and, to the greatest possible extent, stakeholder concerns 
and preferences.
    DOE organized the nuclear materials at the SRS into one of three 
categories: stable, programmatic, and candidates for stabilization. The 
nuclear materials, the alternatives, and the potential environmental 
impacts of implementing the alternatives are all described in detail in 
the Final EIS. DOE is announcing its decisions with respect to most of 
these nuclear materials today. With respect to the neptunium-237 
solutions and targets and the plutonium-239 solutions, DOE has 
determined that stabilization is necessary and has narrowed the 
alternatives under consideration regarding how to stabilize these 
materials. Upon completion of further analysis, DOE will issue a 
subsequent Record of Decision to further specify the final 
stabilization strategy for these materials. With respect to the Mark-16 
and Mark-22 fuels, and other aluminum-clad targets, DOE has designated 
new preferred alternatives and will announce its decision on the 
management of these materials in an amended Record of Decision no 
sooner than 30 days from the availability of this notice.

RECORD OF DECISION: DOE has decided to initiate actions which will 
stabilize certain of the SRS materials that represent environment, 
safety and health vulnerabilities in their current storage condition or 
which may represent a vulnerability within the next 10 years. Based on 
the analysis in the Final EIS, and the other factors identified above, 
DOE has made the following decisions:

Stable Materials

    DOE has decided that stable materials can be safely managed in 
their existing physical and chemical forms over the next several years. 
Programs and projects to consolidate storage of stable materials in 
order to reduce surveillance and maintenance costs will continue. These 
materials will remain stored at SRS until DOE makes decisions relative 
to their future use or disposition.

Programmatic Materials

    DOE identified nuclear materials at SRS which may be required to 
support ongoing or planned programs after consultation with national 
laboratories and other appropriate federal agencies, such as the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The bulk of the 
following programmatic nuclear materials at the SRS are contained in 
acidic solutions stored in tanks in the canyon facilities and would 
otherwise be considered Candidates for Stabilization.

Plutonium-242

    DOE has decided to process plutonium-242 solutions stored in the H-
Canyon facility to an oxide using the HB-Line facility. The plutonium-
242 oxide will be packaged into containers and stored at the SRS until 
DOE makes programmatic decisions on its use or disposition.

Americium and Curium

    DOE has decided to process solutions of americium and curium 
isotopes stored in the F-Canyon facility into a glass matrix within 
small stainless steel canisters, and to store the resulting canisters 
at the SRS until programmatic decisions on use or disposition are made 
by DOE. Vitrification equipment will be installed in an existing 
portion of the F-Canyon facility (previously called the Multi-Purpose 
Processing Facility). DOE has decided to continue the storage of metal 
reactor targets and slugs containing americium and curium isotopes in 
existing SRS basin facilities until DOE makes programmatic decisions on 
their use or disposition.

Neptunium-237

    DOE will dissolve, chemically separate and process neptunium 
contained in the nine (9) obsolete reactor targets and will process 
existing solutions in the H-Canyon to either a glass matrix using the 
same vitrification equipment installed in F-Canyon or to an oxide using 
the HB-Line facility. The final form of the neptunium-237 depends on 
actions taken, if any, to consolidate certain activities in the F-
Canyon as outlined in a recently issued DOE staff report entitled 
Facility Utilization Strategy for the Savannah River Site Chemical 
Separation Facilities (December 1995) . The study principally considers 
what effect the consolidation of two primary processing areas to one 
would have on the ability to stabilize nuclear materials at the SRS. 
Budgetary pressures and safety requirements as well as preserving 
capability for future missions necessitates a thorough examination of 
the options for these facilities. The report is available to the public 
(see below). At this time, DOE is narrowing the potential stabilization 
alternatives for the neptunium-237 from the four considered in the EIS 
to either the oxide or vitrified (F-Canyon) form. As noted above, DOE 
will issue a subsequent Record of Decision to specify which of these 
two alternatives will be used to stabilize these materials.
    To vitrify the neptunium solutions in F-Canyon, DOE would develop 
or procure a container suitable for transporting the solutions from H-
Canyon to F-Canyon and make minor modifications to each facility to 
support loading and unloading operations. DOE is currently evaluating 
the feasibility of using a container designed for transport of 
radioactive solutions which is licensed by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). In order to process the solutions to an oxide, 
DOE would start up a new portion of the HB-Line facility (Phase II) 
which has never been operated. Neptunium recovered from the targets 
will be processed along with the existing neptunium solutions into 
either a glass or an oxide. The glass canisters or containers of oxide 
would be stored inside the shielded canyon facilities or in a new 
Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility until DOE makes programmatic 
decisions on their future use or disposition.

Candidates for Stabilization

    Materials that are candidates for stabilization are in forms (e.g., 
liquid) that present inherent management risks, are stored in 
facilities that were not designed for long-term storage, or both. 
Generally, these materials currently present, or can be expected to 
present over the interim period (approximately 10 years), 
environmental, worker or public safety and health concerns or 
vulnerabilities. 

[[Page 65302]]


Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Solutions

    DOE has decided to stabilize highly enriched uranium solutions 
stored in H-Area by blending them with depleted uranium at the SRS to 
produce solutions containing low enriched uranium (LEU). DOE will make 
minor modifications to the F-Canyon and H-Canyon facilities to enable 
loading and unloading of the uranium solutions into containers for 
transport between the facilities and install a spare dissolver in FA-
Line. The LEU solutions will either be stored in existing tanks at SRS 
or converted to a low enriched uranium oxide using the FA-Line 
facility. The final form of the HEU solutions after they are blended 
down will be dependent upon the timing of DOE decisions related to the 
disposition of surplus HEU and upon facility utilization considerations 
related to cost and schedule.

Plutonium and Uranium Stored in Vaults

    DOE has decided to stabilize plutonium and uranium materials stored 
in vaults by (1) heating or repackaging the material into better 
containers, and (2) dissolving some materials to chemically remove 
impurities or radioactive decay products, converting the resulting 
purified solutions to a metal, an oxide or a glass. DOE will determine 
the appropriate method to use upon inspection and analysis of the 
material in each package. DOE will use the H-Canyon, HB-Line, F-Canyon 
and FB-Line facilities to process the materials and remove impurities 
that contribute to the stability concerns. DOE will use the FB-Line 
facility to convert resulting plutonium-239 solutions to a metal, HB-
Line to convert resulting plutonium-238 and plutonium-239 solutions to 
an oxide, and a modified portion of F-Canyon to convert plutonium-239 
solutions to a glass matrix. The use of the modified portion of the F-
Canyon will be subject to the successful vitrification of the solutions 
containing americium and curium isotopes (see above) and additional 
analytical laboratory work. DOE will use a glove box being installed in 
FB-Line to package the plutonium metal. DOE has decided to construct a 
new Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility in F-Area to enable heating 
and repackaging of plutonium metals and oxides to meet new storage 
criteria (DOE Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides 
(DOE-STD-3013-94)) and to provide space for consolidated storage of 
plutonium and special actinide materials at SRS. The storage standard 
imposes stringent requirements regarding the chemical stability of 
plutonium metals and oxides along with requirements for design and 
construction of packages used for storage of the material. The standard 
identifies such measures as residual moisture content allowed in the 
plutonium metal or oxide, materials to be avoided in contact with the 
plutonium or used in the packaging configuration, thermal loading 
limitations, and packaging seals, closures and containment features. 
DOE will incorporate requirements of the IAEA into the design and 
construction of the new Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility to 
provide the latitude for placing the nuclear materials under 
international safeguards in the future. DOE is also pursuing 
declassification of information related to the amount of plutonium that 
would be stored in the new facility.

Mark-31 Targets

    DOE has decided to stabilize Mark-31 targets (short cylindrical 
metal slugs fabricated with depleted uranium and, if irradiated, 
containing plutonium) by dissolving them in the F-Canyon facility and 
chemically separating the plutonium and depleted uranium from fission 
products and other constituents. The resulting plutonium solutions will 
be converted to a metal using the FB-Line facility. Upon installation 
of a new glove box in FB-Line, the metal will be packaged in accordance 
with DOE's storage standard. DOE will use the depleted uranium 
recovered from the Mark-31 targets for blending with highly enriched 
uranium solutions in H-Area (see above).

Aluminum-clad Taiwan Research Reactor (TRR) Fuel and Experimental 
Breeder Reactor (EBR)-II Slugs

    DOE has decided to stabilize 81 canisters of failed fuel from the 
Taiwan Research Reactor and one failed canister of de-clad metal slugs 
from the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II by dissolving the materials in 
F-Canyon and processing them in conjunction with the Mark-31 targets. 
The failed fuel and de-clad metal slugs contain natural or depleted 
uranium and plutonium, similar to the Mark-31 targets. The resulting 
solutions containing plutonium recovered from the fuel and slugs will 
be converted to a metal using the FB-Line facility. The plutonium metal 
will be packaged in accordance with DOE's storage standard. The 
depleted and natural uranium recovered from the fuel and slugs will be 
used for blending with the highly enriched uranium solutions stored in 
H-Area.

Plutonium-239 Solutions

    DOE has decided to stabilize plutonium-239 solutions stored in the 
H-Canyon facility to either a glass using the vitrification equipment 
installed in a modified F-Canyon, an oxide using the HB-Line facility, 
or a metal using the FB-Line facility. At this time, DOE is narrowing 
the potential stabilization alternatives from the five considered in 
the EIS to either the vitrified (F-Canyon), metal, or oxide form. The 
final stabilization strategy would depend in part on actions taken, if 
any, to consolidate certain activities in the F-Canyon as described 
above for the neptunium-237 stabilization activities. As with the 
neptunium-237 materials, a subsequent Record of Decision will be issued 
to specify the final strategy for stabilizing the plutonium-239 
solutions.
    To vitrify the solutions in F-Canyon, DOE would move the solutions 
from H-Canyon to F-Canyon using the same container as described above 
for the transport of the neptunium solutions and also use the same 
facility modifications for loading and unloading the container. The use 
of the modified portion (the vitrification equipment) of the F-Canyon 
would be subject to the successful vitrification of the solutions 
containing americium and curium isotopes (see above) and additional 
analytical laboratory work. In order to process the existing solutions 
to an oxide in HB-Line, DOE would have to start up a new portion of the 
facility which has never been operated. To process the solutions to 
metal, DOE would move the solutions from H-Canyon to F-Canyon as 
described for the vitrification alternative and would use FB-Line to 
convert the solutions to metal.
    Notice: Announcement of Preferred Stabilization Alternatives. DOE 
also is announcing today new preferred alternatives for managing the 
Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and the ``other aluminum-clad targets.'' In 
the Final EIS, DOE identified continued storage (i.e., No Action) as 
the preferred alternative for managing the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels 
(aluminum-clad, highly enriched uranium fuel from SRS reactors) and the 
other aluminum-clad targets (irradiated in SRS reactors) pending 
further review of cost, schedules, and technical uncertainties 
associated with dry storage techniques for failed fuel. DOE has since 
completed its review of these issues and is now announcing the 
designation of processing and blending down to low enriched uranium as 
the preferred alternative for stabilizing the Mark-16 and Mark-22 
fuels. DOE is also 

[[Page 65303]]
announcing the designation of Processing and Storage for Vitrification 
in the Defense Waste Processing Facility as the preferred alternative 
for stabilizing the other aluminum-clad targets. DOE will issue a 
subsequent Record of Decision on the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and the 
other aluminum-clad targets no sooner than thirty (30) days from the 
availability of this notice.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the interim 
management of nuclear materials at the SRS or to receive a copy of the 
Final EIS, the Facility Utilization Strategy Study, or this Record of 
Decision contact: Andrew R. Grainger, NEPA Compliance Officer, U.S. 
Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office, P.O. Box 5031, 
Aiken, South Carolina 29804-5031, (800) 242-8259, Internet: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#ea8b848e988f9dc48d988b83848d8f98aa999899c48d859c"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="94f5faf0e6f1e3baf3e6f5fdfaf3f1e6d4e7e6e7baf3fbe2">[email protected]</span></a>.
    For further information on the DOE National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of 
NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or 
leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor agency of the 
Department of Energy (DOE), established the Savannah River Site in the 
early 1950's. The SRS occupies approximately 800 square kilometers (300 
square miles) adjacent to the Savannah River, mostly in Aiken and 
Barnwell Counties of South Carolina, about 40 kilometers (25 miles) 
southeast of Augusta, Georgia, and about 32 kilometers (20 miles) south 
of Aiken, South Carolina. The SRS mission for the past 40 years has 
been the production of special radioactive isotopes to support national 
programs. The primary mission was the production of strategic isotopes 
(plutonium-239 and tritium) used in the development and production of 
nuclear weapons for national defense. The Site produced other special 
isotopes (e.g., californium-252, plutonium-238, americium-241) to 
support research in nuclear medicine, space exploration, and commercial 
applications. To produce the isotopes, DOE fabricated selected 
materials into metal targets and irradiated them in the SRS nuclear 
reactors. After irradiation and cooling, the targets and reactor fuel 
were dissolved in acid and the special isotopes were chemically 
separated and converted to a solid form, either an oxide powder or a 
metal. The oxide or metal was fabricated into a usable form at the SRS 
or at other DOE sites. The final form of the material depended on the 
application (nuclear weapon component, encapsulated medical source, 
power source, etc.).
    Due to the large scale chemical separation capabilities at the SRS, 
materials containing significant quantities of plutonium-239, uranium-
235, and other special isotopes were shipped to the Site for processing 
and recovery. The materials were in a wide variety of physical shapes 
and forms, including (1) small encapsulated plutonium sources returned 
after use by national laboratories and domestic universities; (2) cans 
or drums of scrap metals and oxides from weapons manufacturing 
operations at other DOE sites; (3) irradiated metal fuel rods, tubes, 
plates, or assemblies from experimental DOE reactors, university 
research reactors, and foreign research reactors; and (4) cans, 
bottles, or drums containing residues or samples used in laboratory 
experiments at other DOE sites. All the materials were stored until 
they could be dissolved and processed in the chemical separations 
facilities (F-Canyon or H-Canyon). The small sources, scrap metals, 
oxides, residues, and samples were typically stored in cans, bottles, 
or drums in safeguarded concrete vaults. The irradiated fuel and 
targets were stored under water in metal racks or buckets. The offsite 
materials were typically processed in conjunction with the materials 
produced at the SRS.
    In March 1992, DOE suspended chemical processing operations in the 
F- and H-Canyon facilities to address a safety concern regarding the 
capacity of the F- and H-Canyon ventilation systems to withstand an 
earthquake. That concern, involving the potential failure of the canyon 
exhaust stack liner in the event of a severe earthquake, was addressed 
through the preparation of appropriate response procedures, training, 
and response drills. However, in April 1992, before operation of the F- 
and H-Canyons could resume, the Secretary of Energy directed that the 
SRS phase out defense-related chemical separations activities in these 
facilities. World events in the late 1980's and early 1990's resulted 
in the end of the Cold War and a reduction in the demand for new 
material for nuclear weapons. As a result, DOE stopped operating the 
SRS reactors to produce strategic isotopes. After the Secretarial 
decision in April 1992, DOE did not process nuclear materials at the 
SRS chemical separations facilities to recover special isotopes, with 
the exception of scrap materials containing plutonium-238. DOE 
continued the processing of plutonium-238 for use as a thermal power 
source by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 
exploratory space missions.
    By September 1992, SRS had developed plans to phase out chemical 
reprocessing. The plans included actions for removing the material that 
remained in the canyons, spent fuel basins, and storage vaults as a 
result of the suspension of chemical separation activities in March 
1992. In February 1993 the Site requested approval from DOE to restart 
F-Canyon after the completion of operational readiness reviews 
conducted as part of the response to the March 1992 safety concern. The 
SRS made this startup request in light of the Secretary's direction to 
accelerate the transition of F-Area reprocessing facilities to a 
standby condition and because all contemplated actions were typical of 
ongoing or previous facility operations.
    During this same time period, DOE was developing new requirements 
for the performance of operational readiness reviews prior to the 
startup (or restart) of nuclear facilities. Under these requirements, 
facilities had to be able to demonstrate the capability to perform 
satisfactorily in relation to a broad range of topics associated with 
the safe operation of a nuclear facility. DOE promulgated these 
requirements in DOE Order 5480.31, ``Startup and Restart of Nuclear 
Facilities'', which it issued in September 1993. DOE decided that the 
SRS should apply these requirements to the F and H-Canyons and, in 
November 1993, determined that the Site should hold the proposed F-
Canyon (and FB-Line) restart in abeyance until it had completed a 
restart review in accordance with the new Order. In part due to 
stakeholder concerns, DOE decided in January 1994 that absent an 
emergency condition, there should be no further material processed in 
the canyons (beyond processing of plutonium-238 for NASA) before 
completion of an environmental impact statement.
    On March 17, 1994, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) (59 FR 
12588) to prepare an environmental impact statement on the interim 
management of nuclear materials at the SRS. The proposed DOE interim 
management actions are to stabilize those nuclear materials at the SRS 
that represent a health or safety concern for the public, workers, and 
the environment and to convert certain materials to a usable form to 
support DOE program needs. These interim actions are necessary while 
DOE makes and implements long-term decisions on the disposition of 
nuclear materials. DOE is addressing 

[[Page 65304]]
long-term decisions in the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
for Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials, for 
which it issued an NOI on June 21, 1994 (59 FR 31985), and in the 
Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium EIS (60 FR 17344, April 
5, 1995) (for which the draft EIS was issued in October 1995 (60 FR 
55021, October 27, 1995)).
    The NOI for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials EIS 
requested public comments and suggestions for DOE to consider in its 
determination of the scope of that EIS, and announced a public scoping 
period that ended on May 31, 1994. DOE held scoping meetings in 
Savannah, Georgia, North Augusta and Columbia, South Carolina, on May 
12, 17, and 19, 1994, respectively.
    In May 1994, the Manager of the Savannah River Operations Office 
recommended that the DOE Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs seek 
alternative methods pursuant to the emergency provisions of 10 CFR 
1506.11 to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to 
allow stabilization of plutonium solutions stored in F-Canyon and Mark-
31 targets stored in the L-Reactor Disassembly Basin.
    In June 1994, the DOE Office of Environment, Safety and Health 
performed an independent evaluation of the SRS request for alternative 
arrangements for compliance with NEPA. DOE evaluated the SRS request in 
light of the Office of Environment, Safety and Health's report and 
determined that the appropriate action would be to accelerate the 
evaluation of stabilization alternatives for the F-Canyon plutonium 
solutions by preparing a separate expedited environmental impact 
statement on this subject. In February 1995, following completion of 
the F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions EIS and issuance of that Record of 
Decision, DOE resumed F-Canyon operations to eliminate the risks 
involved in storing plutonium in solution form.
    DOE issued a Draft EIS on the Interim Management of Nuclear 
Materials for public review and comment on March 17, 1995 (60 FR 
14432). DOE has revised the Draft EIS in response to the comments 
received in letters and electronic messages from individuals, 
organizations, Federal and state agencies and comments received during 
public hearings held in Savannah, Georgia (April 11, 1995) and North 
Augusta, South Carolina (April 13, 1995). On October 20, 1995, EPA 
published a Notice of Availability of the Final EIS on the Interim 
Management of Nuclear Materials in the Federal Register (60 FR 54226), 
following distribution of approximately 400 copies to government 
officials and interested groups and individuals.
    DOE prepared this Record of Decision in accordance with the 
regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality for implementing 
NEPA (40 CFR 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR 
1021). This Record of Decision is based on DOE's Final Environmental 
Impact Statement on the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials, 
Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina (DOE/EIS-0220).

II. Studies of Vulnerabilities of Storage of Nuclear Materials at SRS

    The cessation of processing activities resulted in a large 
inventory of nuclear materials being caught in various stages of the 
production cycle (fabrication, irradiation, reprocessing, and isotope 
recovery). These materials include irradiated and unirradiated reactor 
fuel, targets, and components; solutions containing dissolved nuclear 
materials and recovered isotopes in stainless- steel tanks; and product 
and scrap forms of metals or oxides in containers (cans, drums, etc.) 
typically used for temporary storage or shipment off the Site.
    Between November 1993 and November 1994, DOE completed two 
nationwide reviews of how nuclear materials are stored at the SRS and 
other sites: Spent Fuel Working Group Report on Inventory and Storage 
of the Department's Spent Nuclear Fuel and Other Reactor Irradiated 
Nuclear Materials and Their Environment, Safety and Health 
Vulnerabilities, and Plutonium Working Group Report on Environment, 
Safety and Health Vulnerabilities Associated with the Department's 
Plutonium Storage. The reviews identified vulnerabilities with the 
continued storage of several nuclear materials at SRS: corroded spent 
fuel and targets stored in water-filled basins; tanks with thousands of 
gallons of acidic solutions containing plutonium, neptunium, americium 
and curium isotopes stored in the canyon facilities; and packages 
containing plutonium-bearing materials stored in vaults. The reviews 
defined vulnerabilities as conditions or weaknesses that might lead to 
radiation exposure to the public, unnecessary or increased exposure to 
workers, or release of radioactive materials to the environment.
    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) is an 
independent organization established by Congress to provide oversight 
of DOE. In May 1994, the DNFSB transmitted Recommendation 94-1 to the 
Secretary of Energy. In its recommendation, the Board observed that the 
halt in production of nuclear weapons had frozen the manufacturing 
pipeline in a state, that for safety reasons, should not be allowed to 
persist unremediated. The Board concluded from observations and 
discussions with others that imminent hazards could arise within two to 
three years unless certain problems are corrected. The Board expressed 
special concern about specific liquids and solids containing fissile 
materials and other radioactive substances in spent fuel storage pools, 
reactor basins, reprocessing canyons, processing lines, and various 
buildings once used for processing and weapons manufacture. On August 
3, 1995, the Chairman of the DNFSB transmitted a staff report to the 
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management identifying concerns 
with leaking containers of corroded spent fuel stored in the Receiving 
Basin for Offsite Fuel at SRS. The staff report from the Board 
expressed concerns with DOE having previously identified all of the 
nuclear materials in the basin as ``stable'' in the Draft EIS issued 
for public comment.

III. Categories of Nuclear Materials at the Savannah River Site

    DOE used information from the two nationwide reviews on spent fuel 
and plutonium storage, an SRS site-wide review, and input from the 
DNFSB to categorize the nuclear materials at SRS as either Stable or 
Candidates for Stabilization. Stable materials have physical and 
chemical forms that, combined with their storage configurations, do not 
currently pose environmental, safety, or health concerns and are not 
likely to pose a concern over the next 10 years. Candidates for 
Stabilization are materials that exhibit or could be expected to 
exhibit over the next 10 years, health, safety or environmental 
vulnerabilities because of their physical condition, chemical 
composition, or the manner in which they are stored.
    DOE categorized materials containing plutonium-242, neptunium-237 
and various isotopes of americium and curium as Programmatic after 
consultation with national laboratories and other appropriate federal 
agencies, such as NASA. The bulk of these Programmatic nuclear 
materials are contained in acidic solutions stored in tanks in the 
canyon facilities and would otherwise be considered Candidates for 
Stabilization. Programmatic materials contain special isotopes that 
could be needed to support DOE programs. In their current forms these 
materials are 

[[Page 65305]]
not usable and may not be suitable for continued safe storage. DOE may 
use plutonium-242 in the nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship program. 
Americium-243 and curium-244 are considered national assets for 
potential support of research in nuclear medicine, nuclear chemistry, 
solid-state chemistry, and nuclear physics. The higher isotopes of 
curium (curium-244 through -248) are irreplaceable feedstocks for the 
production of californium-252, which is used as a neutron source for 
both military and industrial applications. DOE may use neptunium-237 in 
the future production of plutonium-238 to provide a power source for 
remote terrestrial and space applications. Future DOE decisions will 
determine if these Programmatic materials will actually be used. Table 
1 lists the nuclear materials at SRS in each category.

IV. Alternatives Evaluated in the Final EIS

    DOE evaluated the following alternatives for managing the nuclear 
materials: (a) Continued Storage (i.e., ``No Action'' within the 
context of NEPA), (b) Processing to Metal, (c) Processing to Oxide, (d) 
Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium, (e) Processing and Storage for 
Vitrification, (f) Vitrification, and (g) Improving Storage. As shown 
in Table 2, DOE has evaluated the environmental impacts of managing the 
nuclear materials using one or more of these alternatives. The 
following is a brief description of each alternative.

A. Continuing Storage (No Action)

    Under this alternative, DOE would continue to store materials in 
their current physical form. DOE would relocate, repackage, or re-can 
nuclear materials stored in vaults, tanks or basins to consolidate the 
material or to respond to an immediate safety problem. Periodic 
sampling, destructive and non-destructive examination, weighing, visual 
inspection and similar activities would continue in order to monitor 
the physical and chemical condition of the nuclear material. Chemicals 
would be added to existing solutions in order to maintain concentration 
and chemistry within established parameters. Repackaging would include 
removing materials from a damaged storage container and placing them in 
a new container or placing the damaged container in a larger container. 
Re-canning would primarily entail placing damaged or degraded fuel or 
targets in metal containers, sealing the containers, and keeping them 
in wet storage.
    Many activities would be required by DOE irrespective of the 
management alternative used. For example, DOE would maintain facilities 
in good working condition and would continue to provide utilities 
(water, electricity, steam, compressed gas, etc.) and services 
(security, maintenance, fire protection, etc.) for each facility. 
Training activities would ensure that personnel maintain the skills 
necessary to operate the facilities and equipment. DOE would continue 
with ongoing projects to alleviate facility-related vulnerabilities 
associated with storage of the nuclear materials and projects to 
upgrade or replace aging equipment (ventilation fans, etc.).
    As shown in Table 2, DOE designated Continuing Storage as the 
preferred alternative for managing all stable nuclear materials and 
metal targets containing isotopes of americium and curium. DOE also 
designated Continuing Storage as the preferred alternative for managing 
Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and other aluminum-clad targets until 
additional reviews on dry storage technologies, costs and schedules 
versus chemical processing techniques could be completed.

B. Processing to Metal

    Under this alternative, DOE would convert plutonium nitrate 
solutions to plutonium metal using the FB-Line facility. After 
conversion, the metal would be packaged and stored in accordance with 
DOE's storage standard. A new glove box is being installed in FB-Line 
to provide the equipment necessary to meet the storage standard 
criteria for packaging of plutonium metal. The plutonium metal would be 
stored at SRS until programmatic decisions are made by DOE on long-term 
storage or disposition.
    The plutonium would come from existing nitrate solutions in H-
Canyon or would be generated as a result of dissolving and chemically 
processing plutonium-bearing material in the F-Canyon. Existing nitrate 
solutions in H-Canyon contain plutonium-239 and plutonium-242. 
Additional plutonium-239 solutions would be generated by dissolving and 
processing plutonium-bearing metals and oxides stored in SRS vaults, 
Mark-31 targets, canisters of failed Taiwan Research Reactor fuel, and 
a failed canister of de-clad Experimental Breeder Reactor-II metal 
slugs.
    DOE would design or procure a container to transport the existing 
plutonium-239 and plutonium-242 solutions from H-Canyon to F-Canyon. 
Some degree of uncertainty exists on the ability to transfer these 
solutions from one canyon to the other. Minor modifications would be 
made to the canyon facilities to support loading and unloading of the 
solutions into the transport container.
    As shown in Table 2, DOE designated Processing to Metal as the 
preferred alternative for stabilizing some of the plutonium and uranium 
vault materials, the Mark-31 targets, failed Taiwan Research Reactor 
fuel, and the failed canister of Experimental Breeder Reactor-II slugs.

C. Processing to Oxide

    Under this alternative, DOE would convert plutonium to an oxide in 
HB-Line or FB-Line. The plutonium would come from existing nitrate 
solutions in H-Canyon or would be generated as a result of dissolving 
and chemically processing material in H-Canyon or F-Canyon. Existing 
nitrate solutions in H-Canyon contain plutonium-239 and plutonium-242 
and would be converted to an oxide in HB-Line. Additional plutonium-239 
nitrate solutions would be generated by dissolving and processing Mark-
31 targets, canisters of failed Taiwan Research Reactor fuel, and a 
failed canister of de-clad slugs from the Experimental Breeder Reactor-
II. FB-Line would require modification to convert the resulting 
plutonium-239 solutions to an oxide. Plutonium-239 solutions and a 
small quantity of plutonium-238 solution could also be generated by 
dissolving plutonium-bearing metals and oxides currently stored in SRS 
vaults. This material would be dissolved and processed in H-Canyon/HB-
Line and converted to an oxide in HB-Line. After conversion, the 
plutonium oxide would be packaged and stored in accordance with the DOE 
Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides (DOE-STD-3013-
94). Modifications would be made to the FB-Line facility to provide the 
equipment necessary to heat and package the oxide in accordance with 
the DOE storage standard or a new Actinide Packaging and Storage 
Facility would be constructed.
    DOE would convert neptunium-237 solutions to an oxide in HB-Line. 
The neptunium would come from existing solutions in H-Canyon and from 
dissolving and processing the obsolete reactor targets containing 
neptunium in H-Canyon. Additionally, if one of the alternatives 
involving dissolution and chemical separation (Processing to Oxide or 
Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium) were implemented for 
stabilization of irradiated SRS reactor fuels (Mark-16 and Mark-22), 
neptunium would be recovered. After 

[[Page 65306]]
conversion of the neptunium solutions to an oxide, the oxide would be 
packaged and stored in the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility.
    DOE would convert the americium and curium solutions in F-Canyon to 
an oxide. DOE would modify an existing portion of F-Canyon to provide 
the necessary equipment. After conversion, the americium and curium 
oxide would be packaged and stored in an existing vault or the new 
Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility. DOE could also transport the 
obsolete targets and slugs containing americium and curium isotopes to 
F-Canyon, dissolve them and convert the resulting solutions in a 
similar manner.
    DOE would convert highly enriched uranium solutions to highly 
enriched uranium oxide. To provide conversion capability, DOE would 
complete the partially constructed Uranium Solidification Facility 
(USF) in H-Canyon. DOE would also dissolve Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels 
containing highly enriched uranium in H-Canyon and convert the 
resulting solutions to an oxide in the same manner. The highly enriched 
uranium oxide would be packaged and stored in a vault in USF until DOE 
makes long-term management and disposition decisions.
    As shown in Table 2, DOE designated Processing to Oxide as the 
preferred alternative in the Final EIS for stabilizing plutonium-242 
solutions, neptunium-237 solutions and targets, plutonium-239 
solutions, and some of the plutonium and uranium vault materials.

D. Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium

    This alternative is only relevant to materials containing highly 
enriched uranium. Existing solutions of highly enriched uranium stored 
in H-Area would be blended with existing depleted uranium at SRS. DOE 
would modify the canyon facilities to support loading and unloading of 
tanks used for transport and install a spare oxide dissolver in FA-
Line. The highly enriched and depleted uranium would be blended to 
produce a low enriched uranium solution.
    Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels containing highly enriched uranium would 
be transported to either H-Canyon or F-Canyon by rail casks, dissolved 
in nitric acid, and the highly enriched uranium separated from fission 
products and other materials. The highly enriched uranium solutions 
would be blended with natural or depleted uranium to produce low 
enriched uranium solutions. The low enriched uranium solutions would be 
converted to an oxide using FA-Line. The oxide would be stored in drums 
in existing facilities or in a new warehouse constructed at SRS.
    Dependent upon the timing of future DOE decisions, the highly 
enriched uranium solutions and the uranium recovered from the 
dissolution of Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels could also be dispositioned in 
conjunction with other highly enriched uranium (by commercial sale, 
etc.).
    As shown in Table-2, DOE designated Blending Down to Low Enriched 
Uranium as the preferred alternative for stabilizing highly enriched 
uranium solutions.

E. Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the Defense Waste 
Processing Facility (DWPF)

    DOE would perform research and development work to develop a method 
for chemically adjusting existing solutions in the canyons in order to 
transfer them to the high level waste tanks in F- or H-Area. The 
research and development work would be to ensure nuclear criticality 
safety due to the large amounts of plutonium-239 and uranium-235 
contained in the existing solutions and to evaluate the effects on the 
systems and facilities used to store and treat the liquid high level 
waste. Upon completion of the studies, existing solutions containing 
plutonium-239, plutonium-242, highly enriched uranium, neptunium-237, 
and americium and curium isotopes would be chemically adjusted and 
transferred to the high level waste tanks via underground pipelines.
    Plutonium-bearing vault materials would be dissolved in either a 
canyon or B-Line dependent upon the amount of material and the chemical 
composition. The degraded reactor components (fuel and targets) stored 
in water-filled basins would be transported by rail casks to F- or H-
Canyon and dissolved in nitric acid. The resulting solutions from 
dissolution of the vault materials and reactor components would be 
chemically adjusted and transferred to the high level waste tanks along 
with existing canyon solutions. The solutions would be mixed with the 
existing volume of high level waste stored in the F- and H-Area tanks. 
The bulk of the radioactivity in the solutions would eventually be 
immobilized in borosilicate glass by the Defense Waste Processing 
Facility (DWPF). The glass would be contained within stainless steel 
canisters that would be stored in an adjacent facility to the DWPF 
awaiting geological disposal by DOE. The bulk of the liquid would be 
immobilized by the Saltstone facility into a grout containing very low 
levels of radioactivity. The grout would be poured into concrete vaults 
located at the Saltstone facility.
    As shown in Table-2, Processing and Storage for Vitrification in 
DWPF was not designated by DOE as a preferred alternative for any of 
the materials.

F. Vitrification (in F-Canyon)

    This alternative would involve modifying existing space in the F-
Canyon, providing equipment to vitrify radioactive solutions using a 
process similar to that developed for the DWPF. The equipment would be 
much smaller in scale to that of the DWPF and the stainless-steel 
canisters of glass produced would contain much higher concentrations of 
actinides, including fissile isotopes. After completing the 
modifications, DOE would vitrify existing solutions of plutonium-242, 
plutonium-239, neptunium-237, and americium and curium isotopes. The 
solutions stored in H-Canyon would be transported to F-Canyon for 
vitrification upon development (or procurement) of a suitable shipping 
container and upon completion of modifications to the canyon facilities 
for loading and unloading.
    Plutonium-bearing vault materials would be dissolved in either a 
canyon or a B-Line and vitrified in the same manner. Similarly, 
degraded reactor components (Mark-31 targets, canisters of failed TRR 
fuel and the failed canister of EBR-II slugs) would be transported by 
rail cask to F-Canyon, dissolved in nitric acid, and the plutonium 
vitrified. The depleted or natural uranium contained in the reactor 
components would be chemically separated and stored in tanks or used 
for blending with highly enriched uranium (see description of Blending 
Down to Low Enriched Uranium).
    The obsolete reactor targets and slugs containing neptunium, 
americium and curium would be transported to F-Canyon, dissolved in 
nitric acid, and the programmatic isotopes chemically separated from 
fission products and other materials. The resulting neptunium, 
americium and curium solutions would be vitrified in conjunction with 
the existing solutions containing those same isotopes.
    Neptunium separated from Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels processing in F-
Canyon for blending down to low enriched uranium would be vitrified in 
conjunction with the existing neptunium solutions.
    As shown in Table-2, DOE designated Vitrification in F-Canyon as 
the preferred alternative for stabilizing americium and curium 
solutions and 

[[Page 65307]]
some of the plutonium and uranium vault materials.

G. Improving Storage

    This alternative would be applicable to plutonium-bearing materials 
stored in vaults and degraded reactor components stored in water-filled 
basins. Based on earlier DOE decisions to stabilize plutonium solutions 
stored in F-Canyon (see background), DOE is modifying the FB-Line 
facility by installing a glove box to enable handling and packaging of 
plutonium without the use of plastic and other organic materials 
(rubber, elastomeric seals, etc.). The existing plutonium metal stored 
in vaults would be repackaged in FB-Line to meet the DOE storage 
standard. DOE would provide the capability to heat, repackage, and 
store plutonium oxide by modifying an existing facility (FB-Line or 
Building-235) or by building a new Actinide Packaging and Storage 
Facility in F-Area. The plutonium-bearing vault materials would be 
repackaged to meet the DOE storage standard and would be stored at SRS 
until DOE makes long-term storage or disposition decisions.
    For degraded reactor components (Mark-31 targets, Mark-16 and -22 
fuels, other aluminum-clad targets, failed TRR fuel, and the failed 
canister of EBR-II metal slugs), DOE would remove the materials from 
the basins and place them in dry storage. Because of technical 
uncertainties (e.g., potentially pyrophoric hydrides of uranium, 
elimination of potential reactive material) associated with the dry 
storage of failed fuel and targets, DOE would perform additional 
research to demonstrate concepts for drying and placing the materials 
into canisters for storage. Work related to the dry storage of low 
enriched uranium and commercial spent nuclear fuel has already been 
done in the United States and other countries. This work has not 
focused on aluminum-clad highly enriched uranium fuels. In conjunction 
with this work, DOE would design and construct a Dry Storage Facility 
at SRS.
    A typical dry storage facility would be a Modular Dry Storage 
Vault. This facility would consist of four major components: a 
receiving/unloading area, fuel storage canisters, a shielded container 
handling machine, and a modular vault for storing the fuel in storage 
canisters. As a variation, canisters could be stored in dry storage 
casks rather than a vault. The degraded fuel and target materials would 
be removed from the basins and dried; canned or placed directly in 
canisters; the cans or canisters would be filled with an inert gas to 
inhibit further corrosion; and if cans were used, loaded into storage 
canisters. This process could be varied as dictated by the condition of 
the material. After the targets were loaded in a canister, a machine 
would transport the canister to the modular storage vault. The vault 
would consist of a large concrete structure with an array of vertical 
tubes to hold the canisters. The canister transport machine would move 
into the vault and load the canister into a storage tube. A shielded 
plug would be placed on top of the tube. The transport machine and the 
vault storage tubes would be heavily shielded to reduce radiation 
levels from the canister. To use dry storage casks, the machine would 
transport the canister to a cask (horizontal or vertical) and discharge 
the canister into the cask, and then the cask would be sealed.
    DOE evaluated the potential environmental impacts associated with 
two variations for implementing this alternative. The first involved 
the use of a traditional project schedule for design and construction 
of the facility, estimated to take about ten years. The second was an 
accelerated schedule for design and construction, estimated to take 
about five years. Until the Dry Storage Facility was completed, DOE 
would store the materials in existing basins, as described under 
Continued Storage (No Action).
    As shown in Table-2, DOE designated Improving Storage as the 
preferred alternative for stabilizing some of the plutonium and uranium 
vault materials.

V. Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

    The Final EIS for Interim Management of Nuclear Materials evaluated 
alternative stabilization methods for each category of nuclear 
materials at the Savannah River Site, as shown in Table 2. DOE analyzed 
the potential environmental impacts that would result from 
implementation of the alternatives and believes there would be little 
or no impact from implementation of any of the alternatives for any 
material group in the areas of geologic resources, ecological resources 
(including threatened or endangered species), cultural resources, 
aesthetic and scenic resources, noise, and land use. Impacts in these 
areas would be limited because facility modifications or construction 
of new facilities would occur within existing buildings or 
industrialized portions of the Savannah River Site. DOE anticipates 
that the existing SRS workforce would support any construction projects 
and other activities required to implement any of the alternatives. As 
a result, DOE expects negligible socioeconomic impacts from 
implementation of any of the alternatives.
    Management alternatives requiring the use of the large chemical 
separations facilities (the canyons and B-Lines) would have greater 
environmental impacts during the time dissolving, processing or 
conversion activities are underway than when these facilities are 
storing nuclear materials. After materials have been stabilized, 
impacts of normal facility operations related to management of those 
materials would decline, and potential impacts of accidents associated 
with those materials would be reduced with certain kinds of accidents 
eliminated. Potential health effects from normal operations from any of 
the alternatives, including those involving the operation of the canyon 
facilities, would be low and well within regulatory limits. 
Alternatives requiring the use of the canyons are: Processing to Metal, 
Processing to Oxide, Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium, Processing 
and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF, and Vitrification (F-
Canyon).
    Improving Storage alternatives generally have lower impacts in the 
near term because they involve only heating, drying and repackaging the 
nuclear materials. These alternatives also potentially involve the use 
of new facilities, such as an Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility 
and a Dry Storage Facility. The newer facilities would incorporate 
improved designs for remote handling, shielding, containment, air 
filtration, etc.; these improvements could reduce worker exposures and 
releases to the environment below levels associated with existing 
storage basins and vaults.
    Annual impacts from normal operations and potential accidents 
associated with material storage would be reduced after material 
stabilization alternatives are implemented. Stabilization alternatives 
requiring longer periods of time to complete are estimated to have 
relatively higher impacts from normal operation and potential accidents 
than alternatives requiring less time to complete.
    Continuing Storage (or ``No Action'') alternatives are estimated to 
result in relatively low annual environmental impacts, but the impacts 
would continue for an indefinite period of time. Stabilization 
alternatives typically are estimated to result in slightly higher 
annual environmental impacts than ``No Action'' in the near-term, but 
upon completion of the stabilization action, result in lower annual 
impacts. Under Continuing Storage alternatives, no actions would be 
taken to chemically or 

[[Page 65308]]
physically stabilize the storage conditions and reduce the potential 
for accidents. All of the stabilization alternatives, upon completion 
of the actions required, are estimated to reduce the potential for 
accidents and the associated consequences. Several of the stabilization 
alternatives would involve a short-term increase in the risks from 
accidents until the required actions are completed.
    Emissions of hazardous air pollutants and releases of hazardous 
liquid effluents for any of the alternatives would be within applicable 
federal standards and existing regulatory permits for the SRS 
facilities. Similarly, high level liquid waste, transuranic waste, 
mixed hazardous waste and low level solid waste generated by 
implementation of any of the alternatives would be handled by existing 
waste management facilities. All of the waste types and volumes are 
within the capability of the existing SRS waste management facilities 
for storage, treatment or disposal.
    SRS facilities that will be used to stabilize and store the nuclear 
materials incorporate engineered features to limit the potential 
impacts of facility operations to workers, the public and the 
environment. All of the engineered systems and administrative controls 
are subject to DOE Order requirements to ensure safe operation of the 
facilities. No other mitigation measures have been identified; 
therefore DOE need not prepare a Mitigation Action Plan.

 VI. Other Factors

    In addition to comparing the environmental impacts of implementing 
the various alternatives, DOE considered other factors in reaching the 
decisions announced here. These other factors included issues addressed 
by the National Academy of Sciences in the 1994 report, Management and 
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium; the Office of Technology 
Assessment's 1993 report, Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear 
Materials; comments received during the scoping period for the EIS on 
the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials, and comments received on 
the Draft and Final EIS's. The other factors considered are briefly 
summarized in the following paragraphs.
    Implementation of certain alternatives would require construction 
and operation of new facilities. The new facilities described in the 
EIS are: (1) F-Canyon Vitrification Facility (for the Vitrification (F-
Canyon) Alternative), (2) a Dry Storage Facility (for the Improving 
Storage Alternative for degraded reactor fuel and targets currently 
stored in basins), (3) a Uranium Solidification Facility (for the 
Processing to Oxide Alternative for highly enriched uranium solutions 
in H-Area and the Mark-16 and -22 fuel stored in basins), (4) an 
Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (for the Processing to Metal 
and Processing to Oxide Alternatives for plutonium-bearing materials, 
for the Improving Storage Alternative for plutonium-bearing vault 
materials, for the Processing to Oxide Alternative for neptunium-237 
materials, and for the Vitrification (F-Canyon) Alternative for 
materials containing plutonium and neptunium). Implementation of some 
alternatives would require minor modifications of existing facilities, 
as described in the EIS. Examples include minor modifications to the F-
Canyon and H-Canyon facilities to provide the capability to load and 
unload radioactive solutions into containers for transport between 
facilities and installation of a spare dissolver in the FA-Line 
facility.
    Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has been a fundamental 
national security and foreign policy goal of the United States since 
1945. The current U.S. policy is summarized in the White House Fact 
Sheet on Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy, dated September 
27, 1993. This policy makes it clear that the United States does not 
encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, does not itself 
engage in plutonium reprocessing (that is, separation of plutonium from 
spent nuclear fuel) for either nuclear power or nuclear explosives 
purposes. In addition, it is U.S. policy to seek to eliminate where 
possible the accumulation of stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and 
plutonium. The stabilization alternatives vary in regard to the 
attractiveness of the stabilized plutonium or highly enriched uranium 
for use in nuclear weapons (either by the U.S. or an adversary). None 
of the alternatives would denature or eliminate the plutonium from the 
current inventory; it would still exist in some form. Of the 
alternatives for stabilization of highly enriched uranium, only 
Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the Defense Waste 
Processing Facility and Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium would 
reduce the inventory of highly enriched uranium. Because of the 
potential concern regarding any processing and consolidating plutonium 
or highly enriched uranium from the SRS inventory, the Secretary of 
Energy has committed that any separated or stabilized plutonium-239 and 
highly enriched uranium would be prohibited from use for nuclear 
explosive purposes. This prohibition would apply to plutonium-239 and 
highly enriched uranium stabilized through actions implemented by this 
Record of Decision.
    In the EIS on the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials, DOE 
examined the potential impacts associated with an integrated 
implementation schedule for management of nuclear materials. DOE 
examined several combinations of alternatives, or management scenarios, 
including continued storage of all the materials (No Action), 
stabilization using the preferred alternatives for each material, and 
alternatives requiring a minimum of chemical processing. DOE expects 
that it will take at least 6 to 7 years to stabilize all of the nuclear 
materials at SRS under any scenario due to the resources (primarily 
trained personnel) required and the time required to make facility 
modifications or construct new facilities. DOE has developed an optimum 
schedule of proposed actions in response to DNFSB Recommendation 94-1. 
DOE will revise and update the schedule as stabilization actions 
proceed and as future budget considerations dictate.
    DOE considered technology availability and technical feasibility in 
reaching decisions on management alternatives. DOE considered the 
extent to which technology development would be required and the 
likelihood of success of such endeavors. All of the alternatives are 
technically feasible. In general, however, the more alternatives vary 
from the historical processes and facilities used at SRS, the greater 
the technical uncertainty and extent to which new facilities or 
modifications to existing facilities would have to be made.
    DOE evaluated labor availability and the existence of core 
competency at the SRS in reaching decisions on management alternatives. 
DOE expects to use the existing workforce at SRS to implement the 
management alternatives selected. There would be differences between 
the level of personnel knowledge and training required for each 
alternative. In general, as an alternative varies from historical 
processes and facilities used at the SRS for material management, 
additional training of personnel may be required. The more unique or 
extensive the differences from past facility operations, the more 
training may be required.
    In reaching decisions on management alternatives, DOE considered 
the fact that many SRS facilities are 30 to 40 years old and do not 
meet all current DOE requirements for the design and 

[[Page 65309]]
construction of new nuclear facilities. DOE and the DNFSB have 
conducted many reviews to evaluate facility vulnerabilities and assess 
facility compliance with current requirements. One vulnerability common 
to many older facilities is that the facility could sustain structural 
damage in the event of a severe earthquake. Rather than initiate 
extremely expensive modifications, DOE has chosen to mitigate the 
potential consequences of a severe earthquake by using engineering 
safeguards, such as structurally reinforcing tanks, and administrative 
controls, such as limiting the amount of radioactive material that can 
be stored in a facility. Ultimately, removal of nuclear materials from 
vulnerable facilities would reduce the risks. All of the alternatives 
except Continued Storage (No Action) would support DOE's objective of 
removing nuclear materials from vulnerable facilities in preparation 
for decontamination and decommissioning.
    Some level of custodial care will be required for the nuclear 
materials as long as they are stored at the SRS, and DOE considered 
minimizing the level of custodial care in reaching management 
decisions. Radioactive solutions require the greatest amount of 
custodial care to ensure safe storage, and radioactive materials in a 
glass matrix (i.e., vitrified) are expected to require the least. Many 
alternatives would produce concentrated oxide or metal forms that would 
be packaged and stored in compliance with new DOE standards for storage 
of nuclear materials. Compliance with the storage criteria will reduce 
the need to handle and repackage the material and is intended to 
minimize the future level of custodial care required.
    In reaching decisions on management alternatives, an important 
consideration for DOE was cost. DOE evaluated the costs of implementing 
the various management alternatives for each type of material on both 
an individual basis and collectively, as part of an integrated 
stabilization program. DOE estimates it will cost approximately $3 
billion to operate and staff the facilities used to stabilize and store 
the SRS nuclear materials over the next 10 years. A large fraction of 
this cost (approximately $2.8 billion) would be required for continued 
storage of the nuclear materials even if DOE implemented no 
stabilization alternatives (i.e., No Action). DOE expects annual costs 
of operating and maintaining the facilities to decrease as nuclear 
materials are removed, stabilized and consolidated for interim 
management. DOE expects further reductions in costs as, and if, 
facilities are deactivated.

VII. Environmentally Preferable Alternatives

    As described in the Final EIS for Interim Management of Nuclear 
Materials, certain management alternatives are expected to result in 
lower environmental impacts than others. However, a single alternative 
was rarely estimated to have lower impacts for all environmental 
factors evaluated by DOE. For example, an alternative might be expected 
to result in lower releases of hazardous pollutants to air or water 
than the other alternatives, but might generate slightly higher amounts 
of radioactive waste. DOE reviewed the environmental impacts estimated 
for the alternatives evaluated for each type of nuclear material and 
identified the following as the environmentally preferable for each. 
The health effects from any of the alternatives are all low and well 
within regulatory limits. Included below is a qualitative description 
of how the identified environmentally preferable alternative compared 
with the other stabilization alternatives for the environmental factors 
that generally are of most interest.

Plutonium-242--Processing and Storage for Vitrification (DWPF)

    Processing and Storage for Vitrification in DWPF is the 
environmentally preferable alternative for stabilizing the plutonium-
242 solutions stored in H-Canyon. Processing and storage for 
vitrification in DWPF is estimated to result in the lowest radiological 
doses to the offsite public and the SRS workers; result in air and 
water emissions of hazardous pollutants comparable to the other 
alternatives; and result in the least amount of transuranic and mixed 
waste generated among the alternatives with comparable amounts of high 
level and low level waste.

Americium and Curium--Processing and Storage for Vitrification (DWPF)

    Processing and storage for vitrification in the DWPF is the 
environmentally preferable alternative for stabilizing solutions and 
metal targets and slugs containing americium and curium isotopes. Of 
the stabilization alternatives, processing and storage for 
vitrification in DWPF is estimated to result in the lowest radiological 
doses to the offsite public and the SRS workers; have the lowest level 
of hazardous pollutant emissions to the air with comparable levels of 
liquid effluent emissions; and result in the least amount of high 
level, transuranic and mixed waste with comparable amounts of low level 
waste.

Neptunium-237--Vitrification (F-Canyon)

    Vitrification in F-Canyon is the environmentally preferable 
alternative for stabilizing solutions and targets containing neptunium. 
Although vitrification in F-Canyon is estimated to result in slightly 
higher radiological doses to the SRS workers, it is estimated to result 
in the lowest radiological doses to the offsite public. Similarly, 
although it could result in higher airborne emissions of hazardous 
pollutants, the levels of liquid effluent emissions would be comparable 
to the other alternatives. Vitrification (F-Canyon) would generate the 
least amount of high level, transuranic and mixed waste, and would 
generate comparable amounts of low level waste to the other 
alternatives.

Plutonium-239 Solutions--Vitrification (F-Canyon)

    Vitrification in F-Canyon is the environmentally preferable 
alternative for stabilizing the plutonium-239 solutions stored in H-
Canyon. Of the stabilization alternatives, Vitrification in F-Canyon is 
estimated to result in the lowest radiological doses to the offsite 
public and SRS workers; result in comparable levels of hazardous 
pollutant emissions to the air and water; and result in the least 
amount of transuranic, mixed, and low level waste with comparable 
amounts of high level waste.

Highly Enriched Uranium Solutions--Processing to Oxide

    Processing to Oxide is the environmentally preferable alternative 
for stabilizing highly enriched uranium solutions stored in H-Area 
facilities. Although it is estimated to result in slightly higher 
radiological doses to the offsite public and SRS workers, the 
Processing to Oxide alternative has comparable levels of air and water 
emissions to the other alternatives and would generate the least amount 
of high level, transuranic, mixed and low level waste.

Plutonium and Uranium Vault Materials--Improving Storage

    Improving Storage in the environmentally preferable alternative for 
stabilizing plutonium and uranium vault materials. Although it is 
estimated to result in higher radiological doses to the offsite public 
and SRS workers, the Improving Storage alternative has comparable 
levels of air and water emissions to the other alternatives and 

[[Page 65310]]
would generate the least amount of high level and mixed waste, with 
comparable amounts of transuranic and low level waste.

Mark-31 Targets--Improving Storage (Accelerated Schedule)

    Improving Storage on an accelerated schedule is the environmentally 
preferable alternative for stabilizing the Mark-31 targets. Improving 
storage is estimated to result in lower radiological doses to the 
offsite public with doses to the SRS workers comparable to other 
alternatives; have the lowest estimates of air and water emissions; and 
result in the generation of the least amount of high level and 
transuranic waste with comparable levels of mixed and low level waste. 
However, improving storage will not reverse or arrest the corrosion of 
these targets and the release of fission products and radionuclides to 
the basin water for the several years prior to the construction and 
operation of the improved storage capability.

Failed TRR Fuel and EBR-II Slugs--

    Improving Storage (Accelerated Schedule) Improving Storage on an 
accelerated schedule is the environmentally preferable alternative for 
stabilizing failed TRR fuel and EBR-II slugs stored in canisters in the 
Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels. Improving Storage is estimated to 
result in the lowest radiological doses to the offsite public with 
doses to the SRS workers comparable to other alternatives; have the 
lowest estimates of air and water emissions; and, result in the 
generation of the least amount of high level, transuranic, mixed, and 
low level waste. However, as with the Mark-31 targets, improving 
storage will not reverse or arrest the corrosion of the fuel or slugs 
and the release of fission products and radionuclides to the basin 
water for the several years prior to the construction and operation of 
the improved storage capability.

VIII. Decision

    After completion of the Final EIS, DOE received several letters 
from stakeholders on issues related to the interim management of 
nuclear materials at the SRS. Letters were received from the following 
individuals and organizations: DNFSB, U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond, U.S. 
Representative Charlie Norwood, U.S. Representative Lindsey Graham, 
U.S. Representative Edward J. Markey, U.S. Representative Frank 
Pallone, Jr., the Energy Research Foundation (ERF), the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and Governor David M. Beasley of 
South Carolina. Two principal issues were raised in the letters: (1) 
the method to be used for the interim- to long-term management of spent 
nuclear fuel, and (2) the operational status of the F- and H-Canyon 
processing facilities. The DNFSB, Congressional, and Governor Beasley 
letters recommended that DOE stabilize the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels 
through chemical treatment (processing), and that both the F- and H-
Canyon facilities be maintained in support of DOE missions and tasks. 
The ERF/NRDC joint letter urged the Department to thoroughly consider 
alternatives, to include the development of new methods, for the 
management of spent nuclear fuel, and to consider carefully all 
factors, particularly safety, environmental, nonproliferation, and 
budgetary issues, in making its materials management and facility 
utilization decisions. Congressmen Markey and Pallone's joint letter 
urged the Department to pursue the closing of the H-Canyon at the 
earliest possible date on the understanding that substantial savings to 
taxpayers could be achieved. After careful consideration of the issues 
identified in these letters (addressed below), along with the analyses 
of environmental impacts and other factors identified in the Final EIS, 
DOE has made the following decisions for the interim management of the 
nuclear materials at the Savannah River Site:

Stable Material--Continuing Storage

    DOE will continue storage of the stable materials in their existing 
physical and chemical forms. Programs and projects to consolidate 
material storage in order to reduce surveillance and maintenance costs 
to DOE will continue.

Plutonium-242--Processing to Oxide

    DOE has decided to process the existing plutonium-242 solutions 
stored in H-Canyon to a purified oxide in HB-Line. The plutonium-242 
oxide will be packaged and stored at the SRS. Processing to Oxide was 
selected for many reasons. First, the facilities and equipment to 
implement the alternative already exist, with HB-Line specifically 
designed for converting purified plutonium nitrate solutions to an 
oxide. The portions of the HB-Line facility required to convert the 
solutions to an oxide are already fully staffed and operational, 
nearing completion of plutonium-238 work in support of NASA. Although 
DOE could transfer the solutions to the adjacent high level waste tanks 
in H-Area along with other liquid high level waste for processing, 
storage and eventual vitrification in DWPF (the environmentally 
preferable alternative), the concentration of plutonium-242 would be 
significantly diluted due to the existing volume of liquids contained 
in the high level waste tanks (approximately 1 million gallons in each 
tank). The dilution and mixing of the plutonium-242 with cesium, 
strontium and other long-lived fission products contained in the high 
level waste tanks would effectively render any future recovery or use 
of the material impractical due to cost and technical complexity. In 
order not to preclude its recovery while the future use of plutonium-
242 is being decided, DOE considers it prudent to stabilize the 
material to a concentrated oxide form, thereby preserving its 
availability for potential use. In evaluating the alternatives, DOE 
determined Processing to Oxide could be implemented sooner than the 
other alternatives, thus eliminating the need to further extend storage 
of the solutions. Although Processing to Oxide is not the 
environmentally preferable alternative, it is estimated to result in a 
similar level of impacts. Processing to Oxide is estimated to have 
slightly higher radiological doses to the public and worker 
populations, but result in the least amount of high level waste for the 
stabilization alternatives.

Americium and Curium--Vitrification (F-Canyon)--Solutions; Continued 
Storage (No Action)--Metal Targets and Slugs

    DOE has decided to process the existing solutions containing 
americium and curium isotopes in F-Canyon to a glass contained within 
small stainless steel canisters. DOE will modify an existing portion of 
F-Canyon (previously called the Multi-Purpose Processing Facility) to 
install the necessary vitrification equipment. The glass canisters will 
be stored at the SRS until DOE makes programmatic decisions on the use 
of the americium and curium. DOE has also decided to continue wet 
storage of the reactor targets and slugs until such programmatic 
decisions are made.
    DOE selected vitrification in F-Canyon for several reasons. First, 
no capability currently exists in either F-Canyon or its associated 
facilities (FA-Line or FB-Line) to convert the americium and curium 
solutions to a solid physical form suitable for continued safe storage. 
DOE could transfer the solutions via underground pipelines to the 
adjacent high level waste tanks in F-Area. The solutions, however, 
would have to remain stored in the high level waste tanks until they 
could be vitrified into glass by the DWPF (the environmentally 
preferable alternative). Vitrification of the 

[[Page 65311]]
solutions by DWPF would not occur within the next 10 years due to the 
large existing inventory (34 million gallons) of high level waste which 
must be vitrified in DWPF. Transfer of the solutions to the high level 
waste tanks would result in significant dilution of the concentration 
of the americium and curium isotopes due to the large volume of the 
tanks (approximately 1 million gallons). The americium and curium 
isotopes would also be mixed with long-lived fission products such as 
cesium and strontium if transferred to the high level waste tanks. The 
vitrified glass form produced in DWPF would contain very dilute 
quantities of americium and curium combined with highly radioactive 
fission products. This would render use of the americium and curium 
isotopes impractical due to the technical complexity and cost of future 
recovery.
    To maintain the americium and curium in a concentrated physical 
form, thus preserving their potential future use, DOE evaluated 
alternatives for converting the solutions to either an oxide or glass. 
Either form could support future use of the material, if required. The 
conversion process associated with the two alternatives would require a 
similar level of modifications and new equipment to be installed in F-
Canyon. However, DOE found that the glass form offers significant 
advantages over the oxide form for future storage and handling. The 
glass matrix produced by the vitrification process provides some 
``self-shielding'' compared to oxide. This reduces the radiation levels 
associated with the glass form, thereby reducing exposure to workers. 
The glass matrix is also a much less dispersible form of radioactive 
material compared to the oxide in the event of a severe facility-
related accident, such as a major fire. Americium and curium isotopes 
do not pose a nonproliferation concern, irrespective of their physical 
form. Existing personnel at SRS will be used to operate the facilities 
and equipment required, and the level of additional training required 
would be similar whether DOE selected conversion to oxide or glass.
    DOE has decided to maintain storage of the metal targets and slugs 
containing significant quantities of americium and curium isotopes in 
the existing storage basins at SRS primarily because there is not an 
immediate need for the isotopes. The targets are stored in the 
Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel (RBOF). The RBOF facility has 
excellent water chemistry and the targets are in good physical 
condition, capable of being safely stored over the next 10 years. The 
metal slugs represent a very small amount of nuclear material whose 
continued storage can be accommodated by relocation to either the RBOF 
facility or the K-Reactor disassembly basin. DOE has made physical 
upgrades to the K-Reactor disassembly basin to provide storage 
conditions comparable to those in RBOF. By maintaining the targets and 
slugs in storage at the SRS, DOE can preserve the option of recovering, 
if needed, the americium and curium isotopes at a later date for 
programmatic use. The targets and slugs contain varying amounts and 
isotopes of americium and curium. It would not necessarily be 
advantageous for DOE to process and recover all of the americium and 
curium isotopes into a single physical form for continued storage, 
because such an operation would result in the mixing of many isotopes, 
increasing the technical complexity of their future separation and 
recovery or making it impractical.

Neptunium-237--Vitrification (F-Canyon) or Processing to Oxide

    DOE has narrowed its alternatives under consideration for the 
stabilization of the neptunium-237 materials (neptunium contained in 
the H-Canyon solutions and nine (9) obsolete reactor targets) into 
either one of two physical forms: (1) a glass matrix using the same 
modified portion of F-Canyon used to vitrify the americium and curium 
solutions (the environmentally preferable alternative), or (2) a 
purified oxide using the HB-Line facility. Only one of these 
stabilization methods will be used. Both the vitrified glass and oxide 
forms can be stored safely pending DOE's decision on use or 
disposition. To implement the vitrification alternative, DOE would move 
the neptunium solutions from H-Area to F-Area using a special truck 
container designed for transport of highly radioactive solutions. The 
nine (9) obsolete reactor targets containing neptunium would be 
transported to F-Canyon in shielded casks, dissolved and the neptunium 
chemically separated from radioactive decay products and other 
impurities. The resulting purified neptunium solution would be 
vitrified in F-Canyon. SRS would store the canisters of neptunium glass 
until programmatic decisions on neptunium's use are made by DOE. To 
implement the Processing to Oxide alternative, DOE would start up and 
operate the Phase II portion of the HB-Line facility and would dissolve 
and process the obsolete reactor targets in H-Canyon.
    Potential environmental impacts, as detailed in the Interim 
Management of Nuclear Materials EIS, of implementing any of the 
stabilization alternatives, irrespective of location, are low and well 
within acceptable regulatory and management limits. In addition, there 
are no substantial differences in potential environmental impacts 
should DOE operate either or both canyon facilities.
    The final form of the neptunium depends on actions taken, if any, 
to consolidate certain activities in the F-Canyon as outlined in the 
facility utilization strategy report. The study principally considers 
what effect the consolidation of two primary processing areas to one 
would have on the ability to stabilize nuclear materials at the SRS. 
Budgetary pressures and safety requirements as well as preserving 
capability for future missions necessitates a thorough examination of 
the options for these facilities. The report is available to the 
public. A subsequent Record of Decision will be issued when DOE's 
review of the utilization strategy, the EIS, and the other relevant 
factors is complete.

Highly Enriched Uranium Solutions--Blending Down to Low Enriched 
Uranium

    DOE has selected Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium for 
stabilization of highly enriched uranium (HEU) solutions. These include 
existing HEU solutions stored in H-Area facilities and any HEU 
solutions produced in conjunction with the stabilization of other 
materials (e.g., plutonium and uranium vault materials). DOE will 
modify portions of the F- and H-Canyon facilities to provide the 
capability to load and unload containers for the transport of depleted, 
natural or low enriched uranium solutions. DOE will dissolve depleted 
uranium oxide in FA-Line. DOE will transport depleted uranium solutions 
to H-Area for blending with the highly enriched uranium solutions. The 
resulting low enriched uranium solutions will be transported back to F-
Area and converted to an oxide in FA-Line. The low enriched uranium 
oxide will be stored at SRS until disposition decisions can be 
implemented.
    DOE selected this stabilization alternative for several reasons. 
Blending down the highly enriched uranium will reduce DOE's inventory 
of this weapons-useable fissile material. This alternative can be 
implemented expeditiously at relatively low cost. Processing the 
solutions to a highly enriched uranium oxide (the environmentally 
preferable alternative) would require the completion and startup of the 
Uranium Solidification Facility. Processing for storage and 
vitrification in the DWPF would extend 

[[Page 65312]]
the period of HEU solution storage with its attendant vulnerabilities 
while mechanisms are developed to assure the safe transfer and 
stabilization of this fissile material through the affected facilities.

Plutonium and Uranium Stored in Vaults--Improving Storage, Processing 
to Metal, Processing to Oxide, and Vitrification (F-Canyon)

    DOE has decided to use a variety of alternatives to stabilize 
plutonium and uranium materials stored in vaults at SRS. DOE is 
installing a glove box in FB-Line (based upon previous decisions to 
stabilize F-Canyon plutonium solutions--see ``Background'') to provide 
the capability to handle and package plutonium metal without the use of 
plastic and other organic materials (rubber, elastomeric seals, etc.). 
This will provide SRS the capability to package (or repackage) 
plutonium metal in accordance with the DOE storage standard. Upon 
completion of the FB-Line modifications, DOE will repackage plutonium 
metal stored at SRS in accordance with the storage standard. This 
implements the environmentally preferable alternative for the candidate 
plutonium metals.
    DOE will dissolve some of the existing vault materials that are 
Candidates for Stabilization in FB-Line and F-Canyon, and H-Canyon and 
HB-Line, chemically separate the plutonium from impurities that 
contribute to the stability concerns and radioactive decay products, 
and process the plutonium to a metal in FB-Line and an oxide in HB-
Line. After vitrification of the americium and curium solutions in F-
Canyon (see above) and subject to successful analytical laboratory 
work, timing and facility availability, and future decisions on 
plutonium disposition, DOE may stabilize some of the plutonium-bearing 
vault materials by vitrification in F-Canyon. DOE will dissolve vault 
materials containing scrap amounts of plutonium-238 that require 
chemical stabilization in HB-Line, chemically separate the plutonium-
238 from impurities that contribute to the stability concerns and 
radioactive decay products, and convert the plutonium-238 to an oxide 
in HB-Line. The plutonium-238 oxide will be stored in an existing SRS 
vault.
    DOE has decided to construct an Actinide Packaging and Storage 
Facility to provide the capability for handling, heating and packaging 
of plutonium oxide and metal in accordance with the storage standard 
(the environmentally preferable alternative) and to provide space 
necessary to consolidate storage of plutonium and special actinides at 
the SRS. DOE will incorporate requirements of the IAEA into the design 
and construction of the facility to provide the latitude for future 
international safeguards inspections. DOE is also pursuing 
declassification of information related to the amount of plutonium 
resulting from stabilization actions at the SRS that will be stored in 
the new packaging and storage facility.
    The plutonium oxide and existing SRS vault materials that do not 
require chemical processing for stabilization, will be heated and 
repackaged in the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility to meet 
criteria in the DOE storage standard. The amount of vault materials 
stabilized using each of the methods will be dependent upon: (a) the 
physical condition and chemical composition of the material (which DOE 
will determine upon opening each of the containers or packages inside a 
glove box in either FB-Line or HB-Line) and, (b) the availability of 
the required facilities. The plutonium will be stored at SRS until DOE 
can implement long-term storage or disposition decisions. Uranium 
recovered from the chemical stabilization of any vault materials will 
be blended down to low enriched uranium and the solutions will be 
stored or converted to an oxide, as described under the stabilization 
of highly enriched uranium solutions.
    As previously discussed, the Improving Storage alternative is the 
environmentally preferable alternative. The environmental impacts 
associated with the other alternatives selected for stabilization of 
vault materials which require chemical processing (i.e., Processing to 
Metal, Processing to Oxide, and Vitrification in F-Canyon) all involve 
slightly higher but similar levels of impacts.
    As explained in the Final EIS, some of the containers stored in 
vaults at SRS have internal packaging configurations which are unknown 
and the exact chemical composition of the material inside the 
containers may also be unknown, with the exception of its content of 
special nuclear materials. Because of the unknown content of some of 
the vault containers, and in light of pending DOE decisions on long-
term management or disposition of surplus materials, several 
stakeholder groups have raised concerns regarding DOE's current and 
future compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA). DOE has provided existing information on the vault materials 
and other materials stored at SRS to the applicable regulatory agency 
for RCRA at SRS, the South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control (SCDHEC). DOE is continuing the dialog with 
SCDHEC on the applicability of RCRA to any of the nuclear materials 
that will be stabilized as a result of this Record of Decision and will 
take appropriate management actions, as necessary to ensure compliance 
with RCRA.

Mark-31 Targets--Processing to Metal

    DOE has selected Processing to Metal for stabilization of the Mark-
31 targets stored in the F-Canyon basin, reactor disassembly basins and 
the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels (RBOF). DOE will dissolve the 
Mark-31 targets in F-Canyon and chemically separate the plutonium and 
depleted uranium from fission products and other materials. The 
plutonium solutions will be processed to metal in FB-Line. After 
modification of the FB-Line (see vault materials above), the metal will 
be packaged to meet the DOE storage standard. The plutonium metal will 
remain at SRS until DOE can implement long-term storage or disposition 
decisions on weapons usable forms of plutonium. The depleted uranium 
solutions recovered from dissolving the targets will be used to blend-
down the highly enriched uranium solutions in H-Area (see highly 
enriched uranium solutions discussion above).
    The stabilization of the Mark-31 targets by processing to metal can 
be accomplished one and one-half to nine years earlier than the other 
stabilization alternatives (four to nine years earlier than Improved 
Storage (the environmentally preferable alternative)). DOE believes 
further delay in removing the Mark-31 targets from wet basin storage 
where they have undergone significant corrosion and release of fission 
and radioactive products would serve no practicable purpose. This 
selected stabilization alternative relies upon existing operating 
equipment and trained personnel; the stabilized plutonium metal will be 
repackaged in conformance with DOE's storage standard within 3 years 
using the FB-Line bagless transfer facility. The technical uncertainty 
for this alternative is very low and the associated costs are well 
established. Potential waste generation impacts are comparable to the 
other alternatives, but greater than the environmentally preferable 
alternative for high level and transuranic waste, but lower for 
hazardous/mixed and low level radioactive wastes. Potential safety and 
health impacts to workers and the public are comparable for all the 
stabilization alternatives. Potential impacts to air and water 
resources are comparable to the other processing alternatives, and 
greater, but well within 

[[Page 65313]]
regulatory and management control limits, than the Improved Storage 
alternatives. Processing and Storage for Vitrification in DWPF would 
make the plutonium more difficult to recover than the selected 
alternative. However, this alternative would also require the extended 
wet storage of these targets, continuing their corrosion and the 
release of fission and radioactive products to the basin water.
    The selected stabilization action will result in plutonium metal, a 
weapons-useable product. However, the quantity produced will be a small 
fraction of DOE's existing inventory of plutonium metal, and DOE 
believes this small amount does not present nuclear proliferation 
concerns. None of the stabilization alternatives would denature the 
plutonium to preclude its recovery and use in nuclear weapons 
manufacture. The plutonium metal produced from this stabilization 
action will be prohibited for use in nuclear weapons. In addition, DOE 
is pursuing options for placing this material under international 
safeguards (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency).

Taiwan Research Reactor Fuel and Experimental Breeder Reactor-II 
Slugs--Processing to Metal

    The 81 canisters of failed Taiwan Research Reactor fuel and a 
single canister of Experimental Breeder Reactor-II slugs will be 
dissolved in F-Canyon and the plutonium recovered will be converted to 
a metal in FB-Line. The processing of these materials will be done in 
conjunction with processing of the Mark-31 targets (see above). Upon 
installation of the new glove box in FB-Line, the plutonium metal will 
be packaged in accordance with the DOE storage standard and be placed 
in an SRS vault until long-term storage or disposition decisions can be 
implemented on weapons usable plutonium. Natural or depleted uranium 
recovered by processing the fuel and slugs located in a failed canister 
will be stored at SRS in tanks or used to support blending down of 
highly enriched uranium solutions (see above).
    DOE selected processing to metal for the Taiwan Research Reactor 
fuel and Experimental Breeder Reactor-II slugs for similar reasons as 
described for the Mark-31 targets. These materials are very similar in 
composition to the Mark-31 targets and can be stabilized concurrently, 
four to nine years earlier than the environmentally preferred 
alternative (Improving Storage--Accelerated Schedule). Potential waste 
generation impacts from the selected alternative are greater than those 
of the environmentally preferable alternative, but less than potential 
high-level waste impacts (equivalent DWPF canisters) from the 
Processing and Storage for Vitrification in DWPF alternative. The 
Processing and Storage for Vitrification in DWPF would make the 
plutonium more difficult to recover. However, this alternative would 
require the extended wet storage of these elements, continuing their 
corrosion and the release of fission and radioactive products to the 
basin water.
    As with the Mark-31 targets, the plutonium metal produced would be 
in a form that is weapons-useable. None of the stabilization 
alternatives would denature the plutonium to preclude its recovery and 
use in nuclear weapons manufacture. The quantity of plutonium to be 
produced is such a small amount (a very small fraction) of DOE's 
current plutonium metal inventory that, standing alone, it does not 
present nuclear proliferation concerns. The plutonium metal produced 
will be prohibited for use in nuclear weapons. In addition, DOE is 
pursuing options for placing this material under international 
safeguards (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency).
    If after removing the Mark-31 targets, failed TRR fuel, and the 
failed canister of EBR-II slugs from RBOF, DOE determines that 
additional fuel, targets, or canisters have failed, as indicated by gas 
releases from a canister, or visible failure of cladding or canisters, 
DOE would categorize those materials as Candidates for Stabilization. 
DOE would perform the appropriate National Environmental Policy Act 
review and evaluation for the stabilization of any additional materials 
in RBOF that may be determined at a later date to have failed (e.g., 
Supplement Analysis).
    Potential environmental impacts, as detailed in the Interim 
Management of Nuclear Materials EIS, of implementing any of the 
stabilization alternatives, irrespective of location, are low and well 
within acceptable regulatory and management limits. In addition, there 
are no substantial differences in potential environmental impacts 
should DOE operate either or both canyon facilities. DOE is considering 
this study and the results of the Interim Management of Nuclear 
Materials EIS, and at this time is announcing a narrowing of potential 
stabilization alternatives for the following materials.

Plutonium-239 Solutions--Processing to Metal, Processing to Oxide, or 
Vitrification (F-Canyon)

    DOE will stabilize the existing plutonium-239 solutions stored in 
H-Canyon using one of three alternatives: (1) Processing the solutions 
to an oxide in HB-Line, (2) processing to a glass matrix by vitrifying 
the solutions in F-Canyon (the environmentally preferable alternative), 
or (3) processing to a metal in FB-Line. Only one of these 
stabilization methods will be used. To implement the processing to 
oxide alternative, DOE would start up and operate Phase II of the HB-
Line facility. The oxide produced would be packaged and stored in an 
existing vault at SRS until the new Actinide Packaging and Storage 
Facility is constructed. To implement the vitrification alternative, 
DOE would transport the solutions from H-Canyon to F-Canyon using a 
special truck/container as described above for the movement of the 
neptunium solutions and the modifications made to F- and H-Canyon for 
loading/unloading of the solutions. The plutonium would be vitrified in 
F-Canyon using the equipment installed for vitrification of the 
americium and curium solutions. The canisters of plutonium glass would 
be stored in an existing SRS vault or the Actinide Packaging and 
Storage Facility, upon construction. To implement the processing to 
metal alternative, DOE would transfer the solutions to F-Canyon in the 
same manner as the vitrification alternative. The plutonium would be 
converted to a metal using the currently operating F-Canyon and FB-Line 
facilities. The metal would be packaged in conformance with DOE's 
storage standard and stored in an existing vault at SRS until the new 
Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility is available. Using any of 
these methods, the form of the plutonium (metal, glass matrix or oxide) 
will remain stored at SRS until DOE implements long-term storage and 
disposition decisions on weapons usable forms of plutonium. If 
vitrification of the plutonium solutions cannot be supported for 
technical or programmatic reasons, but the solutions are transferred to 
F-Canyon, then DOE will stabilize the plutonium by conversion to metal 
using the F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities.
    One of the stabilization alternatives remaining under consideration 
(Processing to Metal) would result in plutonium metal, a weapons-
useable product. However, the quantity produced will be a small 
fraction of DOE's existing inventory of plutonium metal, and DOE 
believes this small amount does not present nuclear proliferation 
concerns. None of the stabilization alternatives would denature the 
plutonium to preclude its recovery and used in nuclear weapons 
manufacture. The plutonium metal produced from this stabilization 
action will be prohibited to be used for nuclear 

[[Page 65314]]
explosive purposes. In addition, DOE is pursuing options for placing 
this material under international safeguards (e.g., International 
Atomic Energy Agency).
    Potential environmental impacts, as detailed in the Interim 
Management of Nuclear Materials EIS, of implementing any of the 
stabilization alternatives, irrespective of location, are low and well 
within acceptable regulatory and management limits. In addition, there 
are no substantial differences in potential environmental impacts 
should DOE operate either or both canyon facilities.
    The final form of the plutonium solutions depends on actions taken, 
if any, to consolidate certain activities in the F-Canyon as outlined 
in the facility utilization strategy report. A subsequent Record of 
Decision will be issued when DOE's review of the utilization strategy, 
the EIS, and the other relevent factors is complete.

IX. Preferred Alternatives for Stabilizing Mark-16 and Mark-22 Fuels 
and Other Aluminum-clad Targets

    In addition to reaching decisions on the management and 
alternatives under consideration for the materials described above, DOE 
is now designating its preferred alternatives for stabilization of the 
Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and Other Aluminum-clad Targets. As explained 
in the Final EIS, DOE identified Continued Storage (No Action) as the 
preferred alternative for management of these materials pending further 
analysis of whether alternatives involving chemical processing or dry 
storage were preferable as a stabilization method. The additional 
reviews were prompted by public comments that DOE received on potential 
stabilization alternatives involving technologies other than chemical 
processing. Based on these additional reviews (discussed in Attachment 
2 of the Facility Utilization Strategy), DOE is designating the 
following as preferred stabilization alternatives:

Mark-16 and Mark-22 Fuels--Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium

    DOE is designating Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium as its 
preferred alternative for stabilization of the Mark-16 and Mark-22 
fuels. Under this alternative, DOE would remove the Mark-16 and Mark-22 
fuels from the water- filled basins in which they are stored and 
transport them to one, or both, of the canyons using the existing SRS 
rail casks. All of the cask shipments would be confined within the 
boundaries of SRS, occurring near the center of the site. The fuel 
assemblies would be dissolved in nitric acid. The highly enriched 
uranium contained in the fuel would be chemically separated from 
fission products and other materials. The highly enriched uranium would 
be blended with existing SRS inventories of depleted uranium to produce 
a low enriched uranium solutions. The resulting low enriched uranium 
solution will be stored or converted to an oxide in FA-Line. The low 
enriched uranium will be stored at SRS until disposition decisions can 
be made. The neptunium separated during the processing of the fuels 
would be stabilized with the other neptunium solutions.
    DOE is designating Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium as the 
preferred alternative for several reasons. Stabilization of the fuels 
with their removal from basin wet storage and elimination of the wet 
storage vulnerabilities through processing can be accomplished two to 
seven years earlier than the improved storage alternatives. Blending 
down to LEU reduces the HEU inventory and eliminates nonproliferation 
and security issues associated with the indefinite storage of HEU fuel 
which is not self-protecting. Cost and cost uncertainties have also 
played a significant role in the selection of the preferred 
stabilization alternative. Near-term annual costs to process and blend 
down the HEU to LEU are estimated at $20 million to $95 million less 
than for the improved storage alternatives. Substantial uncertainty 
exists concerning the disposition of dry-stored (improved storage) HEU 
spent fuel. Little uncertainty exists with the stabilization of the 
fuels through blending down to LEU. Life-cycle costs evaluations favor 
blending down to LEU ($38 million to greater than $1 billion 
advantage)[Facility Utilization Strategy, Attachment 2]. The potential 
environmental impacts from any of the stabilization alternatives are 
acceptable and well below any regulatory or management control limits. 
Projected impacts evaluated in the Final EIS are several times lower 
for the improved storage alternatives than the preferred blending down 
to LEU alternative.

Other Aluminum-clad Targets--Processing and Storage for Vitrification 
in the DWPF

    DOE is designating Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the 
DWPF as its preferred alternative for stabilization of the other 
aluminum-clad targets stored in reactor disassembly basins at SRS. 
Under this alternative, DOE would remove the other aluminum-clad 
targets stored in reactor disassembly basins and transport them to one 
of the canyons via SRS rail casks. The targets would be dissolved, the 
resulting solutions chemically adjusted, and transferred to the 
adjacent underground high level waste tanks. The solutions would be 
stored in the high level waste tanks until they could be processed in 
conjunction with the other high level waste in the tanks. The high 
level waste would eventually be vitrified in the DWPF. The stainless 
steel canisters of glass would be stored in a facility adjacent to the 
DWPF, awaiting geological disposal by DOE. DOE is designating this 
alternative as its preferred stabilization alternative for several 
reasons. These targets contain little or no fissile material, yet are 
in a variety of physical forms and shapes. Their dissolution and 
transfer for vitrification in DWPF (the environmentally preferable 
alternative) has a minimal impact on all processing facilities and 
places these many forms into a single physical form suitable for future 
emplacement in a geological repository. Improved storage would require 
the development of one or more packaging configurations for repository 
emplacement. Although vitrification in DWPF will not occur for several 
years, processing and storage for vitrification in DWPF can be 
implemented one to six years earlier than the improved storage 
alternatives. This will remove the targets and their deteriorating 
condition from the reactor disassembly basins, precluding further 
release of radioactivity to the basin water. As with the improved 
storage alternatives for the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, near-term costs 
are considerably less for the processing alternative as compared with 
the improved storage alternative. The potential environmental impacts 
from any of the stabilization alternatives are acceptable and well 
below any regulatory or management control limits. As with the Mark-16 
and Mark-22 fuels, projected impacts for the improved storage 
alternatives are lower than the preferred alternative of processing and 
storage for vitrification in DWPF.
    Decisions on facility utilization will determine the canyon 
location(s) for implementing the preferred stabilization alternatives 
for the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and the other aluminum-clad targets. 
DOE will issue a Record of Decision(s) for the stabilization of these 
materials no sooner than thirty (30) days following the availability of 
this notice.

X. Conclusion

    While the Final EIS focuses on the interim management of nuclear 

[[Page 65315]]
    materials at the Savannah River Site, the decisions associated with the 
safe management of these materials directly affect the operational 
status of the nuclear material processing facilities at the Site. These 
decisions have been made in the context of then Secretary Watkins' 1992 
decision to phase out reprocessing at the Savannah River Site. The 
decisions in this ROD are structured to effect the earliest completion 
of actions necessary to stabilize or convert nuclear materials into 
forms suitable for safe storage and prepare the facilities for 
subsequent shutdown and deactivation. The actions being implemented 
will support the consolidation of the storage of nuclear materials at 
the SRS. To a great extent, the alternatives will result in 
stabilization of the nuclear materials and alleviation of associated 
vulnerabilities within the time frame recommended by the DNFSB.
    The stabilization decisions utilize existing facilities and 
processes to the extent practical; can be implemented within expected 
budget constraints and minimal additional training to required 
personnel; rely upon proven technology; and using an integrated 
approach, represent the optimum use of facilities to stabilize the 
materials in the shortest amount of time. Although minor modifications 
of a few facilities will be required, only two new facilities will be 
needed: (a) design and construction of an Actinide Packaging and 
Storage Facility in F-Area, and (b) a small vitrification facility 
within the existing F-Canyon. The decisions in this ROD do not imply or 
contribute to any poential decision to change the baseline canyon 
operating strategy from the current two-canyon approach.
    DOE expects to make decisions related to the future management of 
foreign research reactor fuel and on strategies for the disposition of 
surplus nuclear materials within the next year. Similarly, DOE is 
evaluating alternatives for stabilizing nuclear materials stored at 
other locations in the DOE complex. Several years will be required to 
achieve stabilization of the nuclear materials within the scope of this 
Record of Decision. Stabilization of the nuclear materials at SRS will 
entail the operation of many portions of the chemical processing 
facilities. Consistent with DNFSB Recommendation 94-1, this will 
preserve DOE's capabilities related to the management and stabilization 
of other nuclear materials until such decisions are made.
    In summary, the Department has structured its decisions on interim 
actions related to management of the nuclear materials at SRS to 
achieve stabilization as soon as possible, consistent with earlier 
decisions to phase out processing activities at the Savannah River 
Site, while supporting U.S. nonproliferation policies in a safe and 
cost effective manner.

    Issued at Washington, DC, December 12, 1995.
Thomas P. Grumbly,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.

                             Table 1.--Nuclear Materials at the Savannah River Site                             
                        [From DOE/EIS-0220, ``Interim Management of Nuclear Materials'']                        
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Description                        Quantity <SUP>a                             Location(s)                
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Stable                                                                                             
                                                                                                                
Spent fuel......................  3,000 items......................  Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel (RBOF).   
Unirradiated fuel, targets,       315,000 items....................  Buildings 305A, 313-M, 315-M, 320-M, 321-M,
 reactor components, and scrap                                        322-M, 341-M, K- and L-Reactor Assembly   
 from fabrication operations.                                         Areas.                                    
Unirradiated fuel, targets, and   6,900 items......................  K- and L-Reactors.                         
 reactor components.                                                                                            
Unirradiated and irradiated       420 items........................  C-, K-, L- and P-Reactors.                 
 reactor components and control                                                                                 
 rods.                                                                                                          
Depleted uranium oxide..........  36,000 drums.....................  R-Reactor, Buildings 221-1F, 221-12F, 221- 
                                                                      21F, 221-22F, 707-R, 714-7N, 728-F, 730-F,
                                                                      and 772-7B.                               
Depleted uranium solutions......  300,000 liters (78,000 gallons)..  F-Canyon, F-Area Outside Facilities, and   
                                                                      TNX.                                      
Sources, standards, and samples.  20,000 items.....................  Sitewide.                                  
Laboratory materials used in      260 items........................  Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC).   
 research and development.                                                                                      
                                                                                                                
          Programmatic                                                                                          
                                                                                                                
Plutonium-242 solutions.........  13,000 liters (3,500 gallons)....  H-Canyon.                                  
Americium and curium solutions    14,000 liters (3,800 gallons)....  F-Canyon.                                  
 and targets.                                                                                                   
                                  65 assemblies....................  RBOF.                                      
                                  60 slugs.........................  P-Reactor disassembly basin.               
                                  114 slugs........................  RBOF.                                      
Neptunium solutions and targets.  6,100 liters (1,600 gallons).....  H-Canyon.                                  
                                  9 targets........................  Building 321-M.                            
                                                                                                                
  Candidates for Stabilization                                                                                  
                                                                                                                
Plutonium-239 solutions.........  34,000 (9,000 gallons)...........  H-Canyon.                                  
Highly enriched uranium           228,000 liters (60,000 gallons)..  H-Canyon and H-Area Outside Facilities.    
 solutions.                                                                                                     
Plutonium vault materials.......  2,800 packages...................  FB-Line, HB-Line, Building 772-F, Building 
                                                                      235-F, and SRTC.                          
Mark-31 targets.................  16,000 slugs.....................  K-Reactor, L-Reactor, F-Canyon, and RBOF.  
Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels.......  1,900 assemblies.................  K-, L-, and P-Reactors and H-Canyon.       
Other aluminum-clad targets.....  1,800 slugs and assemblies.......  K-, L-, and P-Reactors.                    

[[Page 65316]]
                                                                                                                
Failed TRR <SUP>b and EBR-II <SUP>c slugs.  82 canisters.....................  RBOF.                                      
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<SUP>a Quantities of materials shown are approximate. Quantities of radioactive solutions stored in tanks fluctuate  
  due to natural evaporation and the addition of materials (e.g., nitric acid) to maintain chemistry within     
  established parameters.                                                                                       
<SUP>b Taiwan Research Reactor--81 canisters.                                                                        
<SUP>c Experimental Breeder Reactor-II--1 canister.                                                                  



                                    Table 2.--Alternatives for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials at the SRS                                   
                                            [From DOE/EIS-0220, ``Interim Management of Nuclear Materials'']                                            
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                 Alternatives                                           
                                                     ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                Processing                              
                      Material                         Continuing                                 Blending     and storage                              
                                                       storage (no   Processing    Processing    down to low       for       Vitrification    Improving 
                                                         action)      to metal      to oxide      enriched    vitrification    (F-canyon)      storage  
                                                                                                   uranium       (DWPF)<SUP>a                                
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stable..............................................      <check>   ............  ............  ............  .............  .............  ............
Plutonium-242.......................................            x             x       <check>   ............             x              x   ............
Americium and curium................................   <check>1/2   ............            x   ............             x       <check><SUP>c   .......<SUP>.....
Neptunium...........................................            x   ............      <check>   ............             x              x   ............
Plutonium-239 solutions.............................            x             x       <check>   ............             x              x   ............
Highly enriched uranium solutions...................            x   ............            x       <check>              x   .............  ............
Plutonium and uranium in vaults<SUP>d....................            x       <check>       <check>   ............             x        <check>       <check> 
Mark-31 targets.....................................            x       <check>             x   ............             x              x             x 
Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels...........................      <check>   ............            x             x              x   .............            x 
Other aluminum-clad targets.........................      <check>   ............  ............  ............             x   .............            x 
Failed TRR fuel and EBR-II slugs<SUP>e...................            x       <check>             x   ............             x              x            x  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x=alternative evaluated.                                                                                                                                
<check>=preferred alternative designated by DOE in Final EIS.                                                                                           
<SUP>aDWPF=Defense Waste Processing Facility.                                                                                                                
<SUP>bTargets.                                                                                                                                               
<SUP>cSolutions.                                                                                                                                             
<SUP>dFor the plutonium and uranium stored in vaults, there were four preferred alternatives. DOE will base its choice of the applicable alternative for a   
  particular solid upon inspection of the material.                                                                                                     
<SUP>eTRR=Taiwan Research Reactor, EBR-II--Experimental Breeder Reactor-II.                                                                                  
                                                                                                                                                        

[FR Doc. 95-30750 Filed 12-18-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P-M

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