Alberino v. Balch, No. 582-10-00 Wncv (Katz, J., Aug. 24, 2005)

[The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted 

from the original. The accuracy of the text and the accompanying data included 

in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]

STATE OF VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT 

Washington County, ss.: Docket No. 582-10-00 WnCv 

ALBERINO 

v. 

BALCH 

 FINDINGS OF FACT 

 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

 NOTICE OF DECISION 

 On the basis of the evidence presented in court on August 15, 2005, 

the following decision is announced. 

 FINDINGS OF FACT 

1. The fence installed by Alberino consists of many 4 x 8 sheets of 

plywood, which have turned grey from weathering without any paint or 
other finish. The sheets are installed vertically, resulting in an eight foot 

high fence. Because the sheets are not adjusted for the terrain, the tops are 

irregularly arrayed, one next to the other. In short, the fence is an ugly 

wall. As Balch mows his lawn, the fence is easily viewed from his yard. 

By contrast, Alberino’s lands leading up to the fence is wooded; leaving the 

fence barely visible from her house or yard. 

2. The fence serves no objective purpose. It does not keep out noise, 

either from Alberino’s dogs or Balch’s portable saw mill. It will not keep 

small dogs in, as they could crawl under the irregularly mounted bottoms of 

the sheets. It serves no real privacy purpose, given the extensive woods 

between the fence and Alberino’s house and hot tub. Although Balch has 

taken many photos of dogs on his property, there is no reason to believe he 

ever watched or photographed any hot tub or other private activities, the 

ostensible purpose of the fence. 

3. Alberino currently has five pomeranians and a papillon—six dogs, 

each weighing between six and ten pounds. They bark. The court is not 

persuaded, however, that their barking is particularly incessant. We are 

persuaded that Alberino is very solicitous of her dogs. In part, this is 

because she believes Balch shot one some years ago. Whether he did, or 

not, is not the question. What is significant here is that she believes he did. 

For that reason, she does not permit them to run about, outside her 

presence. When inside the house, their barking is not all that bothersome at 

Balch’s house, which is several hundred feet distant. She does not leave 

them unattended outside the house. Very occasionally, one has gotten out. 

Her son’s dog has gotten out of their yard, and strayed onto Balch’s. When 

that occurred, Balch held the dog—inside his house—and called the town 

dog warden. From the point of view of Alberino, this was holding the dog 

for ransom. Again, whether that is true is really of no consequence. 

Because she believes that is the intent of her neighbor, she exercises care 

that neither her dogs nor that of her son or any guest be permitted to stray 
onto Balch’s land. While not a perfect insurance against such straying, it 

probably is more effective than any other. 

4. We are not persuaded that there have been any recent incidents of 

mowing grass by Alberino or her employees or guests other than between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m. 

5. A previous decision by this court held Alberino to have possessed a 

very small triangle of property, as against Balch, by adverse possession. To 

ensure that she does not further encroach onto his lands, Balch has 

hammered two sections of half-inch steel “rebar,” spray painted red, at the 

declared boundary. These bars are perhaps two feet in height above the 

ground. It is inevitable that a snow plow will knock them over. They also 

pose a threat to the paint finish of any vehicle in the vicinity. In their own 

way, they overextend the right to mark a boundary in the same spirit as the 

fence discussed above. 

6. We are not persuaded that the small flood-type light bulb on 

Alberino’s house is glaring onto Balch’s property. 

 

 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

1. A spite fence is one which is of no beneficial use or pleasure to the 

owner, but was erected and is maintained for the purpose of annoying a 

neighbor. See Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 509 P.2d 785, 786 (Idaho 1973); 

see also 24 V.S.A. § 3817 (unnecessary fence; maintenance prohibited; 

penalty). Whether a particular fence comes within this definition is 

determined from its character, location, or use—would it strike an ordinary 

viewer as manifestly erected to annoy the adjoining owner. 1 Am.Jur.2d 

Adjoining Landowners § 111. The significance of this latter rule is that the 

fence is to be judged by objective standards, more than some weighing of 
the particular motives of the person who erected it. Annoyance need not be 

the exclusive purpose of the fence, but only the dominant or primary 

purpose. See DeCecco v. Beach, 381 A.2d 543, 545 (Conn. 1977). 

2. Although Balch testifies that “this material is completely unsuited 

to use in fencing,” in fact, plywood sheets are not unknown around 

Vermont. They are used by junk yards, which must hide the inventory 

from the outside. But junk yard operators typically paint their plywood 

fences, something not done here. Is this not evidence of the fence-owner 

caring nothing about the negative visual effect of her fence upon the 

neighbor’s property, which it faces? 

3. A party suffering a spite fence is entitled to a injunction ordering its 

removal. Haugen v. Kottas, 2001 MT 274, ¶ 14; 1 Am.Jur.2d Adjoining 

Landowners § 117. 

4. Any injunction requiring a dog owner to maintain control over the 

wanderings of her dogs suffers an inherent problem—can any person 

effectively control a group of dogs? To hold the dog-owner in contempt, 

would mean that we would have to find either a wilful violation, or at least 

a substantial failure to attempt compliance with the injunction. See 

Matthews v. Riley, 162 Vt. 401, 413 (1994) (permitting finding of 

contempt where party “though able, refuses to comply” with order). 

Although it is conceivable that compliance would require walking each of 

the dogs on a leash, such was never explicitly required in the injunction 

presently outstanding. Further, in a rural area such as this, such would be at 

least somewhat unusual The difficulty of making a finding of contempt is 

fortunately unnecessary here, as the factual context permits us to conclude 

that Alberino has made reasonable efforts to keep her dogs off the property 

of Balch. She is afraid of what would happen if she did not. She is afraid 

of what has happened, when her son’s dog wandered onto Balch’s 

property—in her view Balch “held it for ransom.” 
 NOTICE OF DECISION 

 Alberino shall remove the plywood fence panels. Should she choose 

to install some sort of wire fencing, to keep in animals, using existing posts, 

that would presumably not be a spite fence, it being far less visible than the 

current delaminating panels. Balch’s other requests that she be held in 

contempt of existing orders are denied. Counsel for Alberino to submit a 

proposed declaratory judgment, suitable for recording, to recount all grants 

of final relief. 

 Post Script 

 Most fence cases in Vermont seem to revert to quotation of Robert 

Frost’s thesis that “good fences make good neighbors.” Perhaps a logician 

would infer that the converse of Frost’s proposition is also true here: bad 

fences make bad neighbors. But thinking about Frost’s statement, we have 

in mind that it arose in considerably different circumstances. Frost’s 

“Mending Wall” speaks of a stone wall, which “spills the upper boulders in 

the sun;” of which hunters “left not one stone upon another stone;” of 

“Bringing a stone grasped firmly by the top in each hand.” Were these two 

neighbors to share the time and labor to build such a wall, of piled stones, 

and thereby get to know one the other, such a fence might make good 

neighbors. 

 Dated at Montpelier, Vermont, _______________________, 20__. 
__________________________ 

Judge