### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 18, 200 7 S es sio n
DORIS JONE S AND 

### BILLYJ. JON ES

v. SU SA NN AH P. JOHNS ON
An Appeal f

rom the Circ uit Court for Madison Cou nty No. C-04- 358 RogerA. P age, Judge

No. W2006-01859-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Jul y 16, 2007

This is a persona l injury case involving the Te nnessee suspension statute. On August 27, 2003, the de fe nd ant r e ar- e nd e d th e pla int if f’ s v e hic le . O n Augus t 23, 20 04 , th e pla int if fs fi le d a laws uit ag ainst the defe ndant for da mag es ar ising out of the a cci d en t

. On t he same date, a summons was issued to the defe ndant at her last known addre ss in Tennessee

. A few day s later, the summons was returne d with a notation indicating that the def endant ha d moved to Geor g ia. The plaintiffs failed to rene w proc ess within one y ear of the orig inal date of

service. Fi n al l y , in March 2006, a n alias
summons wa s is s u e d an d s e r v e d o n th e d e f

e n d an t in G e o r g ia

. T h e d e f e n d an t f il e d a mo ti on for summary judgme nt based on the one -y ear statute of limitations. Th e t ri al cour t gr anted the defe ndant’s motion. The plaintiffs now a ppeal, a rguing that the s tatute of limitations was tolled purs ua nt t o the su sp e ns ion statut e , T. C.A . § 28 -1 -1 11 , b e c a us e the de fe nd a

nt l ive d in ano the r s tate when suit was filed. We a ffirm, concluding that the suspension statute is inapplicable in this case

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court is Aff irm ed

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e Co urt, in w h ic hW. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.
Donald A. Donati and W illiam B. Ry an, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellants, Doris Jones and Billy J . J ones.
Dea na C. Sey mour and Todd D. S iroky , J ackson, Tennessee , for the appellee , Susannah P. J ohnson. Wesley A. C l ayton and Will iam B. Palmer tree , J ackson, Te nnessee , for the unna med defe ndant/appellee , Tenne ssee F arme rs Mutual Insuranc e Company

.R ule 3 p ro vid es: 1

A ll c ivil a c ti o n s a r e c o m m e n c e d b y fi ling a c o m p la int w ith the c le rk o f t h e c o u rt. A n a c tio n is
com menced wi t hi n t he meani ng o f any st at ut e o f

l i mi t at i ons upo n s uch f i l i ng o f a com pl ai nt , wh et her p ro ce ss be i s s ued or not i s s ued and whe t her proces s be r et ur ned s er ved or un s er ved. I f p ro ce ss rem ai ns uni ss ued f

o r 90 da y s, or i s no t ser ved wi t hi n 9 0 d ays f rom i ss uance, regardl ess of t he reason, t he p l ai nt i f

f canno t rel y upo n t he o ri gi nal co m m encem ent to t o l l the runni ng o f a s t at ut e o f

l i m i t at i o ns
u n l es s t h e pl ai n t i f

f c on t i n u es t h e ac t i on by obt ai n i n g i s s u an ce of n ew pr oce s s w i t h i n on e y ea r f r om i ss uance of

t h e pr ev i ou s pr oce s s or , i f n o pr oce s s i s i s s u ed, w i t h i n on e y ea r of t h e f i l i n g of t he
c o m p la int.

T en n

. R. Ci v
. P. 3.
-2- OP IN ION

On Aug ust 27, 2003, the vehicle driven by Def endant/Appe llee Susannah J ohnson (“Johnson”) re ar- ended the vehicle d ri v en by Plaintiff/Appellant Doris J ones (“ J ones”) , causing J ones personal injury and damag es. At the t ime of t he accident, J ohnson was a resident of J ackson, Madison County , Tenne ssee. In May 2004, J ohnson moved to the are a of Atlanta, Geor g ia, and has lived there since that time. On August 23, 2004, J ones and her husband, B illy J ones (c ollectively , “Plaintiffs”), f iled a lawsuit i n the Circuit Court for Madison County ag ainst J ohnson for damag es ar ising out of the
acc ident. On t he same date, a summons was iss ued to J ohnson and also to the Plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist insuranc e ca

rrier , Tenne ssee F arme rs Mutual Insuranc e Company (“Te nnessee Fa

rmers” ). See T.C.A. § 5 6 -7 -1 2 0 6 (2 000). Tenne ssee F arme rs was timely serve d with proce ss and filed a n answe r to the complaint. I t soon therea fter f iled a motion for summary judgme nt.
The or i gi n al s u mmons was issued to J ohnson at her Jackson, Te nnessee addre ss. I t was re tur ne d uns e rv e d o n Augus t 26 , 200 4, wi th a no tatio n, “ No t F ound , M ov e d O ut A pp ro xima te ly Thre e Mo nth s A g o T o Po wd er S pri ngs, GA .” Th e or ig ina l pr oc e ss r e ma ine d uns e rv e d f or nin e ty (90) da y s afte r the issuanc e, and the Plaintiffs did not renew pr ocess within one y ear of the orig inal date of issuance pur suant to Rule 3 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure

. 1

Over a y ear later, on Dec ember 6, 2005, an alias summons was iss ued to J ohnson, ag ain at her Jackson addr ess. This w as also returne d unserve d with a notation, “Not F ound, Moved Ove r One Yea r Ag o, Possibl y

To GA.”

On Mar ch 2 , 2 006, a third summons was issued to J ohnson. This one was issued at J ohnson’s Geor g ia addr ess, and she was ser ved on Mar ch 8, 2006. On April 1 2 , 2006, J ohnson filed an a nswer a nd a motion to dism iss and/or for summar y judgme nt based on, amongother thing s, the one-year statute of limitations for persona l injury actions. Discove ry

ensued.-3-

On J une 15, 2006, the Plaintiffs took J ohnson’s deposition. I n her de position, J ohnson te sti fi e d th a t sh e mov e d to Ge or g ia in M ay 20 04 wh e n s he g ra du a te d f ro m Jac ks on

State Com mun ity Col le g e . Sh e mov e d in with a fr ie nd fo r ab out a w e e k a nd the n mo ve d to a

ho me in P ow de r S pr ing s, Geor g ia. Afte r living in Powder Springs f

or appr ox imately

a y ear , J o h n s o n moved to Marietta, Geor g ia, wher e she lived at the time of her de position. J o h n s o n s ai d t h at, when she moved from J ackson, Te nnessee , she visited the post office ; she believed that she had f orwa rded he r mail from Jac ks on to t he Pow de r S pr ing s, Ge or g ia a dd re ss. She tol d h e r b ro the r a nd he r f ri e nd s a t w or

k in J ackson th at s h e wa s m o v ing to Ge org ia. J ohnson also said that she re ported the a ccide nt to her insuranc e co m p any

within a day

or two af

ter the a ccide nt. About a y ear and a ha lf befor e the deposition, J ohnson’s insuranc e compa ny informed her that the Plaintiffs w ere attempting to f ile a lawsuit ag ainst her. Johnson’s insurance c arr ier c ontacted he r in Geor g ia by obtaining he r telephone number fr om her mother.

On J uly 11, 2006, the P laintiffs filed t heir response to J ohnson’s motion as we ll as the motion for summary

judgme nt filed by

Tenne ssee F arme rs. The Plaintiffs a rgued that the law suit was not time-barr ed bec ause the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to the suspension statute, T.C.A. § 2 8- 1- 11 1 ( “ su sp e ns ion

statut e ” ). Th e su sp e ns ion statut e pr ov ide s:
I f at any time a

ny cause of ac tion shall accr ue ag ainst any

person who sha ll be out of this state, the action may be commence d within the time limi ted there for, a fter suc h person sha ll have come into the sta t e; and, after a ny cause of ac tion shall have
acc rued, if the person ag ainst whom it has ac crue d shall be abse nt from or re side out of the state, the time of absenc e or r esidenc e out of the state shall not be taken a s any part of the time limi ted for the commence ment of the a ction. T.C.A. § 28-1-111 ( 2000). The Plaintiffs c ontend that they and their atto rney s had exercise d due diligenc e in attempting to locate Johnson, and despite their due diligenc e, her wher eabouts we re not discovere d until Februa

ry 2006.

On J uly 12, 2006, the t rial court held a hear ing on the m otions for summary judgme nt and/or to dismi ss filed by

J ohnson and by T ennessee F arme rs. On the same day , the Plaintiffs filed the
a ff id avi t of the ir

fo rm e r atto rn e y , L isa

June Cox, atte sti ngto h e r d ili g e nc e in atte mpt ingto l oc a te J ohnson. The Plaintiffs also filed Johnson’s deposition. On August 8, 2006, the trial court issued a n order finding that, afte r consider ing the ple a din g s, John so n’ s d e po sit ion , Co x’s a ff ida vit , and the e nti re re c or d, John so n w a s e nti tle d to
summa ry jud g me nt b a se d o n th e on e -ye ar s tatut e of lim itatio ns . T he tr ia l c ourt he ld t hat th e statut e of limitations ex pired on August 27, 2004, one y ear afte r t he date of t he accident, when t he Plaintiffs failed to r enew proce ss w ithin one y ear afte r the date of issuanc e of the orig inal summons. The trial court found that the suspension statute d i d n o t ap p l y to toll t he statute of limitations, beca use the Plaintiffs did not use due diligenc e in asc erta ining Johnson’s address. Base d on the record, the tr ial
c ourt ma de the fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s o f f a c t:-4-

5. On August 26, 2004, the [ orig inal] summons was re turned, unser ved, with a notation from t he deputy

sheriff “Not found, move d out approxim ately three months ag o to Powder Spring s, GA” 6. The orig inal proce ss remaine d unserve d for 90 da y s after issuance, a

nd Plaintiffs f

a il e d to r e n e w p r o c e s s w it

h in o n e y e ar o f th e o r ig in a l d a te of issuance pur suant to Rule 3 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure ; 7. As a

re su lt, the statut e of

lim itatio ns on

Pla int if fs ’ cl a ims e xpir e d o n Augus t 27, 2004. 8. On Dec ember

6, 2005, Plaintiffs issued an alias summons afte r the statute of limit atio n s ex p i re d , wh i ch wa s re turn edun s erv edn o t i n g aga i nth at Defendant J ohnson had moved to Ge org ia. 9. Plaintiffs were on notice that De fenda nt J ohnson had moved to G eorg ia af ter the orig inal proce ss was re turned unser ved on August 26, 2004, with a notation from the deputy

sheriff “Not found, move d out approxim ately three months ag o to Powder Spring s, GA.” 10

. Pla int if

fs kn e w that D e fe nd ant Johns on wa s c ov e re d by a

po lic y of lia bil ity insurance , and counse l for Plaintiffs re m ai n ed in contact with Defe ndant J ohnson’s liability

car rier. 11. Def

endant Johnson’s liabili ty car rier h ad De fenda

nt’s curr ent contac t information. 12. Plaintiffs’ counsel fa iled to serve a demand notice on Def

endant Johnson’s liability car rier pur suant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1104 to reve al the locatio n a n d wh e r e a b o uts of Def endant Johnson after the or igina l proce ss was re t u rned unserved, notingthat Def endant Johnson was not to be found and had moved to Powder

Springs, Ge org ia. 1 3

. I f P la inti f

f s ’ c o u n s e l h a d

inv o k e d th e p r o c e d

ur e c o n ta in e d

in T e n n

. Code Ann. § 56-7-1104, Def

endant J ohnson’s liability car rier would hav e b een require d to r evea l the curr ent contac t inf ormation it possesse d reg ardingthe location of De fenda

nt J ohnson. 14. Plaintiffs failed to invoke the pr oced u re contained in Te nn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1104. 15. The suspension statute . . . is inapplicable to toll t h e s t atute of limitations be y on d it s Augus t 27 , 2 00 4, e xpir a tio n d a te in t he pr e se nt c a se be c a

us e Plaintiffs had knowledg e that Def endant J ohnson moved t o Geor g ia, did not dema n d h er Georg ia addr ess from De fenda nt J ohnson’s liability

car rier a s p ro v i d ed b y T en n

. C o d e An n

. [ § ] 5 6 -7 -1 1 0 4 , an d d i d n o ts erv e h er

th ro u gh the nonre sident motorist st atute, Te nn. Code Ann. § 20-2- 203. 16. Def

endant Te nnessee Fa

rmers Mutual I nsuranc e Company had a c ontrac tual subrog ation rig ht pursuant to a policy of uninsured motorist cover ag e issued to Plainti ff Dor is J ones in eff ect on or about August 27, 2003. 17. Be cause Plaintiffs destroy ed De fenda nt [ Tenne ssee Far mer’s] subrog ation rig ht by allowing the stat u t e o f limit ations to ex pire, Plaintiffs forf eit any
r igh t o f r e c o v e r y a g a in s t D e f

e n d an t [ T e n n e s s e e F ar

me r s ].-5-

F ro m th is o rd e r, the Pla int if fs no w a pp e a l.

On a pp e a l, t he Pla int if

fs argue that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in g ra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt t o J ohnson based on the statute of l imitations

. The P laintiffs contend that there is a dis puted i ssue of fa c t a s to wh e the r t

he su sp e ns ion

statut e tol ls the on e -ye ar s tatut e of lim itatio ns un de r t

he se c ir c ums tanc e s.
We r e vie w the tr ia l c ou

rt ’s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo with no presumption of
corr ectne ss. Wa rren v

. Es tat eof Kir k , 954 S.W. 2d 72 2, 72 3 (T e nn . 199 7)

. Sum mary jud g me nt i s appropr iate whe re “ the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the a ffidavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue as to a ny materia l fac t and that t h e m o v i n g p ar ty

is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. W e ar e oblige d to view the evide nce in a light most fa

vorable to the nonmoving party , g iving that pa rty the benef it of all rea sonable infe renc es. Warren , 9 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d at7 2 3 (q u o t i n g Bai

n v . W e lls , 936 S.W .2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997)). Once the moving party demonstrates that no g enuine issues of mater ial fac t exis t, the non-moving party must demonstrate, by

aff idavits or otherwise, that a disputed issue of materia l fac t exi sts for trial. By rd v . Ha ll , 847 S.W .2d 208, 211 (Tenn. 1993)

. Th e su sp e ns ion statut e , q uo te d a bo ve , to lls the statut e of

lim itatio ns fo r t

he pe ri od of tim e in which any person ag ainst whom a ca use of a ction has ac crue d is outside the State of Tenne ssee. Ge ne ra lly , h ow e ve r, thi s statut e do e s not ap ply a g a ins t an o ut- of

-s tate de fe nd ant i n a

n a uto mob ile
acc ident/personal injury

lawsu i t , beca

use ser vice of proce ss can be eff

ecte d on the non-re sident driver throug h the S ecr etar y of S tate using the nonre sident motorist st atute, T.C.A. § 20-2- 203. See Car r v . Bo rc he rs , 815 S.W .2d 528, 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). T h i s is beca use, in g ener al, the suspension statute is inapplicable to toll a statute of limitations where the re is a va lid method of service of proc ess on an out-of -state de fenda

nt. Se eArrowo od

v . M c Minn Coun ty , 121 S.W .2d 566, 568-69 (Te nn. 1938).

I n La m v. Smith , 891 S.W .2d 207 (Tenn. 1994) , the Supreme Court re cog nized an exception to t he g e ne ra l Arrowood rule in c ases whe re ( 1) the plaintiff la cked know ledg e that the de fenda nt is an out-of-state resident, a nd (2) the pla intiff had exerc ised due dilig ence in trying to a scer tain the loc a tio n o f t

he de fe nd ant, but ne ve rt

he le ss r e ma ine d una

wa re of the de fe nd ant’ s no nr e sid e nt s tatus

. Th e Pla int if

f’ s argue t hat th is e xce pti on is a pp lic a ble in t his c a se , a

nd that th e su sp e ns ion

statut e the re fo re a

pp lie s.
J ohnson notes that the orig inal summons was returne d a fe w day s afte r it wa s issued stating that J ohnson was no long er in Madison County , Tenne ss ee , and had move d approximately three months earlier

to Powder Spring s, Georg ia. Thus, J ohnson argues that the Plaintiffs kne w she wa s no longe r a Tenne ssee resident in Aug ust 2004, and the first prongof the Lam e xce pti on is n ot m e t. Moreove r, Johns on argues that the Plainti ff s d i d not exercise due dilig ence in obtaining he r new a dd re ss a ft e r t

he y re c e ive d th e re tur

n o f t he or ig ina l summo ns

.T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te § 5 6 -7 -1 1 0 4 p ro v id e s in p e rtine n t p a rt: 2

( a) U pon a s h er i f

f ’ s re t u r n of

“ n ot t o be f

ou n d” wi t h i n t h e par t i cu l ar c ou n t y , or u pon t h e s ec r et ar y of st at e b ei ng unab l e to c o m p l et e p roce ss upo n t he d ef end ant or d ef

end ant s, t he p l ai nt i f

f m ay ser ve d em and noti ce up o n t h e lia b ili ty i nsur ance carri er t o reveal t he l o cat i o n and whereab o ut s o f t he d ef end ant aut o m o b i l e o wner or o p erat o r.

***
(c ) T h e li a b il it y i n s u r a n c e c a rr ie r sh a ll u p o n su c h no tice re v e a l t o the p la intiff o r th e p la intiff ’s at t or n ey a n y i n f

or mat i on w h i ch i t pos s es s es a s t o t h e l oca t i on of t h e def en dan t a u t omobi l e oper at or o r owner. (c o n tinu e d ...)
-6- The Plaintiffs ar g ue that the r ecor d contains suffic ient evidenc e of the ir dilige nce, ba sed on J ohnson’s deposition and Cox ’s affi d av i t

. The Plaintiffs note that Johnson commented in her deposition that, when she moved to Ge org ia, she did not leave contac t information with any one other than her brother and her former employ er. Fur thermore , attorney Cox asser ted i n her a ffidavit that sh e ha d c on fe rr e d w ithan inve sti g a tor , u se d th e int e rn e t, a nd tr ied “ oth e r s ourc e s” in a n e ff or t to obtain J ohnson’s new a ddre s s

. Gi ven all re asonable infere nces, the Plaintiffs argue, summary judgme nt should not ha

ve been g rante d beca

use a g enuine issue of mater ial fac t remaine d reg arding their due dilig ence

. I n o rd e r for th e Pla int if

fs to e sc a pe summa

ry jud g me nt i n th is c a se , th e y mus t po int

to evidenc e in the record sufficient to cre ate a g enuine issue of material f act a s to whether the y

knew of John so n’ s n onre sid e nt s tatu s, and wh e the r t

he y us e d d ue dil ig e nc e in atte mpt ingto a sc e rt a in J ohnson’s location. See Lam , 891 S.W .2d at 212. In this c ase, it is undisputed that the re turn of the orig inal summons noti fied the Plaintiffs that J ohnson had moved from Madison County , Tenne ssee, to Powder Spring s, Georg ia. Thus, only a few day s afte r filing suit, the Plaintiffs we re ma de aw are that J ohnson was a non-reside nt and had be en for three months. Cl ear ly , the Plaintiffs have not met the first prongof the Lam e xce pti on , n ame ly , th a t th e y la c ke d k no wl e dg e that J ohns on wa s an o utof -s tate de fe nd ant. Re g ard ing du e dil ig e nc e , it is und isp ute d th a t th e Pla int if fs ma de no a tte mpt

to have a n alias summons served on Johnson withi n a y ear afte r the orig inal summons was returne d, despite havingbeen inf

ormed that Johnson had moved to Powde r Spring s, Georg ia. In Dec ember 2005, the Plaintiffs inex plic ab l y m ade a second attempt to effec t service of proc ess in Tenne ssee, de sp ite havin g be e n in fo rm e d th a t John so n w a s liv ing in Pow de r Spr ing s, Ge or g ia . Co x’s a ff ida vit is b e st c ha

ra c te ri zed a s v a g ue re g ard inghe r e ff or ts t o f ind John so n. She no te s th a t, wh e n th e fi rs t summons was returne d unserve d, her “staff sear ched f or [J ohnson] us ing va

rious internet a

nd other
so ur c e s o n ma

ny oc c a sio ns .” Th e re is no af fi davit fr om the unname d “st a ff ” and the “ oth e r s ourc e s”
are likewise not identified.

Mo re ov e r, a s the tr ia l c ourt po int e d o ut, the Pla int if

fs we re in c on ta c t w ithJohn so n’ s li a bil ity insurance car

rier, a nd the ca rrier would have been required to disclose he r addr ess to them pursuant to Tennesse e Code Annotated § 56-7-1104 ha d the Plaintiffs merely re q u ested the infor

mation. 2(

. . . con t i n u ed) 2
T

. C

. A

. § 5 6

- 7

- 1 1 0 4 (20 0 0 ).
-7- Cox’ s a ff ida vit me nti on s n o atte mpt s to ob ta in Johns on ’s a ddres s f ro m th is s ourc e . U nd e r t he se c ir c ums tanc e s, the un dis pute d e vid e nc e sh ow s th a t th e Pla int if fs did no t e xer c ise du e dil ig e nc e in
asce rtaining J ohnson’s addre ss, and the exception in Lam is not applicable. See Ballard v. Ard e nhani , 901 S.W .2d 369, 372-74 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1995). There fore , the suspension statute does not apply in this case, and summar

y judgme nt in J ohnson’s favor based on the statute of limitations
was a ppropriate

. Tenne ssee F arme rs had a

contra ctual subrog ation rig ht pursuant to the Plaintiffs’ uninsured mot or ist po lic y
. As no te d by the tr ia l c ourt , be c a us e the Pla int if

fs de str oy e d Te nn ess ee Farm e rs ’ subrog ation rig ht by

allowing the s t at u t e of lim itations to ex pire, the Plaintiffs have forf eited any rig ht of rec overy

ag ainst Tennesse e F arme rs. See T. C.A . § 56 -7 -1 20 4 ( 20 00 ); se e als o Aet na Ca s. & Su r. Co. v. Tenn. Farm ers Mut. In s. Co. , 867 S.W .2d 321, 322 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Th e de c isi on of the tr ia l court is af fi rm e d. Cos ts on ap pe a l ar e ta xed to A pp e lla nts Do ri s J ones and B illy

J . J ones and the ir surety , for whic h execution may issue, if nec essar

y
.

___________________________________ HOL L Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE