alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

IVAN A. CERMAK; et al.,

 Defendants,

 and

TIM RICHARDSON, as Trustee of JI

Foundation Trust; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees,

 v.

ERIC LIGHTER,

 Movant - Appellant.

No. 12-36020

D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00603-CL

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Owen M. Panner, District Judge, Presiding

FILED

JAN 30 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Submitted January 21, 2015** 

Before: CANBY, GOULD, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

Eric Lighter appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion

to intervene in a lawsuit to foreclose upon federal tax liens on real property. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the denial of

intervention as of right, and for an abuse of discretion the denial of permissive

intervention. Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 953-54 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). We

affirm in part and dismiss in part.

The district court properly denied Lighter’s motion for intervention as of

right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) because Lighter failed to meet

his burden to show that all requirements for intervention were met. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 24(c) (a motion to intervene “must state the grounds for intervention and be

accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which

intervention is sought”); United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 919

(9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth four-part test for determining intervention as of right

and explaining that “[t]he party seeking to intervene bears the burden of showing

that all the requirements for intervention have been met”); see also Sw. Ctr. for

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 12-36020
Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 2001) (when deciding a

motion to intervene, courts need not take as true allegations that are a sham or

frivolous).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lighter’s motion

for permissive intervention because Lighter failed to show that the requirements

for permissive intervention were met. See S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d

794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002) (listing “threshold requirements” for permissive

intervention). Accordingly, we dismiss that portion of Lighter’s appeal for lack of

appellate jurisdiction. See Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir.

2005) (“[W]e allow appeal of the denial of a motion for permissive intervention

only if the trial court abused its discretion.”).

Lighter’s motion to take judicial notice, filed on April 16, 2013, is denied.

AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.

3 12-36020
#### STATE v. SALLIE CANNADAY.

(Filed 10 October, 1945.)

Appeal by defendant from *Burney, J.,*at May. Term, 1945, of Has-kett. No error.

Tbe defendant was charged with tbe possession of intoxicating liquor for tbe purpose of sale. From judgment pronounced on verdict of guilty tbe defendant appealed.

*Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorneys-General Rhodes, Moody, and Tucher for the State.*

*Neill McK. Salmon for defendant.*

Per Curiam.

Tbe only assignment of error brought forward in tbe case on appeal is tbe denial by tbe court below of defendant’s motion for judgment of nonsuit. An examination of tbe record leads us to tbe conclusion tbat tbe evidence offered by tbe State was sufficient to carry tbe case to tbe jury, and that tbe defendant’s motion was properly denied. Tbe evidence supports the verdict and judgment. In tbe trial we find

No error.
Circuit Court for Baltimore C i ty

Case No. 24

- C

- 20

- 00 4249

Argued: May 5, 2022

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 5 8

September T erm , 20 21

WILLIAM MADISON

v.

THE COPYCAT BUILDING, LLC

Fader , C.J.,

Watts

Hotten

Booth

B iran

Gould

Eaves,

JJ.

PER CURIAM ORDER

Filed: May 10 , 2022WILLIAM MADISON * IN THE

* COURT OF APPEALS

* OF MARYLAND

v.

* COA

- REG

- 005 8

- 2021

* No. 5 8

THE COPYCAT BUILDING, LLC * September Term, 2021



### PER CURIAM ORDER

The petition for writ of certiorari in the above

- captioned case having been granted

and argued, it is this 1 0 th day of May , 2022,

ORDERED , by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the writ of certiorari be, and

it is hereby, dismissed with costs, the pet ition having been improvidently granted.

/s/ Matthew J . Fader

Chief Judge
Exhibit 10.1

  

   

  

   

  

  
    Amendment to Change in Control Agreement

    

    

    This
        Amendment to Change in Control Agreement (this “Amendment”) is effective as of the 1st day of December, 2022, by and between Horizon Bank, an Indiana state bank (the “Bank”)

      and Kathie A. DeRuiter, an employee of Horizon and a resident of the State of Indiana (“Employee”).

    Whereas,
      the Bank and the Employee are parties to that certain Change in Control Agreement dated January 1, 2020, (the “Agreement”) and the parties have
      agreed to amend certain provisions of the Agreement as set forth in this Amendment.

    Now,
        Therefore, the parties mutually agree as follows:

    Section 1.   Amendments. The Bank and the Employee agree as follows:

    
      	
              (a)

            	
              The reference to “1.00” with respect to the Employee’s total cash bonuses in Section 4(c)(ii) of the Agreement is hereby
                deleted and replaced with “2.00”; and

            


    

    
      	
              (b)

            	
              The references to “twelve (12) months” in Section 4(c)(iii) of the Agreement is hereby deleted and replaced with “two years”.

            


    

    Section 2.   No Other Amendments.  The Bank and the Employee agree that all other terms and conditions of the Agreement remain unchanged and in full force and effect.

    

    

    

    

    

    

    	 	
            /s/ Kathie A. DeRuiter

          
	 	
            Kathie A. DeRuiter

          
	 	 
	 	 
	 	 
	 	 
	 	
            Horizon Bank

          
	 	 
	 	 
	 	
            By: /s/ Craig M. Dwight

          
	 	
            Craig M. Dwight, Chief Executive Officer
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 24 (Friday, February 5, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6260-6261]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-02153]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION


Notice of Termination; 10483 Mountain National Bank, Sevierville, 
Tennessee

    The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as Receiver for 
10483 Mountain National Bank, Sevierville, Tennessee (Receiver) has 
been authorized to take all actions necessary to terminate the 
receivership estate of Mountain National Bank (Receivership Estate); 
the Receiver has made all dividend distributions required by law.
    The Receiver has further irrevocably authorized and appointed FDIC-
Corporate as its attorney-in-fact to execute and file any and all 
documents that may be required to be executed by the Receiver which 
FDIC-Corporate, in its sole discretion, deems necessary; including but 
not limited to releases, discharges, satisfactions, endorsements, 
assignments and deeds.
    Effective February 1, 2016, the Receivership Estate has been 
terminated, the Receiver discharged,

[[Page 6261]]

and the Receivership Estate has ceased to exist as a legal entity.

    Dated: February 1, 2016.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2016-02153 Filed 2-4-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6714-01-P
1

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-4192

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Jesus Ibarra-Torres, * District of Minnesota.

*

Appellant. * [UNPUBLISHED]

___________

Submitted: December 29, 2005

Filed: January 5, 2006 

___________

Before ARNOLD, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Jesus Ibarra-Torres appeals the district court’s1

 denial of his 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2) sentence-reduction motion. Having carefully reviewed the record, we

agree with the district court that Ibarra-Torres is not entitled to a sentence reduction

based on Amendment 484 to the Sentencing Guidelines because it was in effect when

Ibarra-Torres was sentenced. See U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 484; United States v.

Alvarez, 210 F.3d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
-2-

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________
#### C. H. SCALES v. R. E. WALL.

(Filed 9 November, 1927.)

Appeal by defendant from *Harding, J.,*at June Term, 1921, of RockiNgham.

No error.

Action to recover upon accounts for supplies sold and delivered by plaintiff, a merchant, to tenants of defendant, a landlord. Plaintiff alleged that prior to the sale and delivery of said supplies defendant agreed to pay for same; this allegation was denied by defendant. The issue was answered by the jury in accordance with the contention of plaintiff.

From judgment upon the verdict defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.

*Bwinlc, Clement & Hutchins for plaintiff.*

*McMichael & McMichael and Manly, Hendren & Womble for defendant.*

Pee Cueiam.

The only matter involved in the controversy which is the subject of this action is whether or not defendant agreed, prior to *805tbe sale and delivery of supplies to bis tenants, to pay plaintiff for same. There *was*evidence tending to support tbe contention of eacb of tbe parties witb respect to tbis matter. Tbis evidence was submitted to tbe jury, wbo returned a verdict for tbe plaintiff. We find no error, and tbe judgment is affirmed.

Defendant’s motion, made in tbis Court for a new trial, for newly discovered evidence is denied. It appears from tbe affidavits filed upon tbe bearing of tbis motion, tbat tbe evidence wbicb defendant alleges be *has*discovered since tbe trial, is merely cumulative. At best it tends only to contradict tbe plaintiff and to corroborate tbe defendant, botb of wbom testified at tbe trial. See *Alexander v. Cedar Works,*177 N. C., 536. Tbe rule there stated is as follows: “Tbe Supreme Court will not order a new trial for newly discovered evidence tbat is merely' cumulative, or without probability tbat tbe result will thereby be changed.”

No error.
Case: 19-30088    Doc# 5249    Filed: 01/02/20    Entered: 01/02/20 14:15:39    Page 1 of2

Case: 19-30088    Doc# 5249    Filed: 01/02/20    Entered: 01/02/20 14:15:39    Page 2 of2
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<PERIOD-START>                              Jan-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                Mar-31-1999
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                                            3,269,054
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                           (20,924)
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                        (47,982)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                   0
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<CHANGES>                                                        0
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<EPS-BASIC>                                                 0.02
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</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1

                           SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO\
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Online Vacation Center Holdings Corp.
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Edward B. Rudner, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.


Date: November 6, 2008


/s/ Edward B. Rudner
--------------------
Edward B. Rudner
Chief Executive Officer
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-11284 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee,

versus RODNEY EUGENE GALGIANI, Plaintiff-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:96-CR-030-Y

- - - - - - - - - - June 16, 1997 Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA and STEWART, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Rodney Eugene Galgiani argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence taken from his person as a result of a nonconsensual search and an unconstitutional seizure. In reviewing the district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, accepting factual findings unless clearlyNo. 96-11284 - 2 - erroneous and reviewing questions of law de novo. See United States v. Shannon , 21 F.3d 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1994). When the district court enters no factual findings and no indication of the legal theory underlying its decision to deny a motion to suppress, we independently review the record to determine whether any reasonable view of the evidence supports admissibility. See United States v. Yeagin , 927 F.2d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 1991). After reviewing the record before us, we conclude the district court’s determination that Galgiani gave valid consent to search his bag and his person was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Olivier-Becerril , 861 F.2d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Sutton , 850 F.2d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1988). Further, although Galgiani’s confrontation with a DEA task force officer amounted to a seizure once the officer asked to search his bag, the fruits of such were admissible because the seizure was based on reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Simmons , 918 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). AFFIRMED.
* Pursuant to 5th C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the
limited circumstances set forth in 5th C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-40989 Summary Calendar

ELIJAH W. RATCLIFF, Individually and doing business as Dunbar Bonding Service,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JOHN S. HOLLEMAN, JR., District Attorney of Polk County, Texas; BILL RAY NELSON, Sherrif, Polk County, Texas; JOE NED DEAN, District Judge, Polk County, Te xas; FRED EDWARDS, District Judge, Polk County,

Texas; STATE BAR OF TEXAS; STATE OF TEXAS; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, State Bar of Texas,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 9:98-CV-93

April 30, 1999

Before JOHNSON, DUHE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Elijah W. Ratcliff appeals from the district court’s order granting

the defendants’ motions to d ismiss and for summary judgment in his pro

se civil lawsuit alleging civil rights violations and other claims.

With respect to all of the captioned defendants other than District

Judges Dean and Edwards and District Attorney Holleman, the district

court did not err in concluding that Ratcliff’s claims were res2

judicata. S ee Nagle v. Lee

, 807 F.2d 435, 439 (5th Cir. 1987). In a

nearly identical lawsuit filed previously by Ratcliff, the district

court determined that Ratcliff’s claims were barred by the applicable

statutes of limitations . Because this was a final adjudication on the

merits for res judicata purposes, Ratcliff was not entitled to bring

those claims in a subsequent suit. See Steve D. Thompson Trucking, Inc.

v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc. , 870 F.2d 1044, 1045-46 (5th Cir. 1989).

Judges Dean and Edwards were entitled to absolute judicial immunity

for the judicial acts attributed to them by Ratcliff. S ee Mays v.

Sudderth

, 97 F.3d 107, 110-11 (5th Cir. 1996). Further, Ratliff’s

claims against District Attorney Holleman were barred by the applicable

Texas statute of limitations. S ee Cooper v. Brookshire

, 70 F.3d 377,

380, n.20 (5th Cir. 1995); H icke y v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. , 976 F.2d

980, 982 & n. 3 (5th Cir. 1992); T E X

. C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. C ODE A NN

. § 16.003

(West 1998).

Ratcliff’s appeal is without merit and is frivolous. Accordingly,

the appeal is DISMISSED. 5 T H C IR

. R. 42.2. We caution Ratcliff that any

additional appeals filed by h im or on his behalf will invite the

imposition of sanctions. To avoid sanctions, Ratcliff should review any

pending appeals to ensure that they do not raise frivolous arguments.

APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
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</TABLE>
#### STATE v. JAMES H. PRIDGEN.

(Filed 5 October, 1927.)

Appeal by defendant from *Grammer, J.,*at June Term, 1927, of GeeeNE.

No error.

Defendant was convicted in tbe county court of Greene County upon a warrant charging tbat be bad violated tbe prohibition law. From judgment upon bis conviction be appealed to tbe Superior Court.

Upon bis trial in tbe Superior Court there was a verdict of guilty. From judgment upon tbe verdict defendant appealed to tbe Supreme Court.

*Attorney-General Brummitt and Assistant Attorney-General Nash for the State.*

*J. Paul Frizzelle and Buhe Lamb for defendant.*

Pee Cueiam.

There was no error in tbe refusal of tbe court to dismiss tbe action, upon defendant’s motion, at tbe close of tbe evidence. O. S., 4643. Tbe evidence was properly submitted to tbe jury; it is sufficient as a matter of law to support tbe verdict.

Two of tbe State’s witnesses, after defendant bad testified as a witness in bis own behalf, as shown by tbe record, in response to questions as to bis general character, testified tbat they beard tbat defendant is a notorious blind tiger. Defendant objected to these statements of tbe witnesses. No motion, however, was made to strike them from tbe record.

A reasonable interpretation of tbe record shows tbat each of tbe witnesses bad qualified as a character witness before be testified tbat be *796bad beard that defendant is a notorious blind tiger. *S. v. Mills,*184 N. C., 694, is therefore not applicable.

In *S. v. Butler,*177 N. C., 585, it is said: “It was open to tbe witness, having stated that be knew tbe defendant’s general character, to qualify and explain bis answer as to what it was by saying that it was bad for selling liquor.”

Tbe record in this case does not present tbe questions decided in *S. v. Mills, supra.*Upon tbe record we find

No error.