J. A24035/18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

STEVEN ARTHUR TAYLOR, JR., : No. 460 MDA 2018

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, February 6, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County

Criminal Division at No. CP-21-CR-0000715-2017

BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 08, 2019

Steven Arthur Taylor, Jr., appeals from the February 6, 2018 judgment 

of sentence ordering him to pay the costs of prosecution, a $300 fine, and to 

undergo six months’ supervised probation, imposed after he was found guilty 

in a bench trial of driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled 

substance – general impairment (“DUI”).1 After careful review, we affirm the 

judgment of sentence.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:

[O]n June 5, 2016, at around 2:05 a.m., Upper Allen 

Township Police Officer Mark Sanguinito initiated a 

traffic stop in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. The stop 

was made as a result of Officer Sanguinito’s 

observation of a black SUV drifting between the 

street’s fog line and solid yellow line before turning 

into the exit of a Burger King marked by a “Do Not 

 

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
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Enter” sign. Officer Sanguinito identified the vehicle’s 

operator as [appellant], and testified that he observed 

what he concluded to be an odor of alcohol emanating

from [appellant’s] breath, as well as glassy, bloodshot 

eyes. After displaying what Officer Sanguinito 

identified as clues of intoxication during the 

Standardized Field Sobriety Tests, Officer Sanguinito 

arrested and charged [appellant] with two counts of 

DUI, as noted above. Officer Sanguinito’s testimony 

at trial was aided by the officer’s dashboard Mobile 

Video Recording (“MVR”).

On cross[-]examination, Officer Sanguinito admitted 

that [appellant] only touched the painted lines on the 

street and never fully changed lanes. He also 

admitted that there may have been other 

explanations for [appellant’s] glassy, bloodshot eyes 

and that he had no trouble finding his identification 

documents. No blood alcohol evidence was admitted 

at trial.

Trial court opinion, 2/22/18 at 1-2.

As noted, appellant proceeded to a bench trial before the 

Honorable Jessica E. Brewbaker on December 18, 2017. Following the bench 

trial, Judge Brewbaker took this case under advisement to review 

Officer Sanguinito’s dashboard MVR. On December 20, 2017, appellant was 

found guilty of one count of DUI – general impairment, in violation of 

75 Pa.C.S.A § 3802(a)(1).2 As noted, appellant was sentenced to pay the 

costs of prosecution, a $300 fine, and to undergo six months’ supervised 

probation on February 6, 2018. That same day, appellant filed a timely 

post-sentence motion, arguing that the verdict was against the weight of the 

 

2 Appellant was found not guilty of DUI in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3802(a)(2) (driving with BAC of at least 0.08% but less than 0.10%).
J. A24035/18

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evidence and there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for DUI 

– general impairment. (See “Post Sentence Motion,” 2/6/18 at 2-4.)

3

 On 

February 22, 2018, the trial court filed an opinion and order denying 

appellant’s post-sentence motion. This timely appeal followed on March 15, 

2018.

4

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether there was insufficient evidence to 

support the trial court’s finding of guilt as to 

DUI: General Impairment, because the 

Commonwealth failed to present sufficient 

evidence that [appellant] was incapable of 

safely operating an automobile because of 

alcohol consumption[?]

2. Whether the trial court’s verdict of guilt as to 

DUI: General Impairment was against the 

weight of the evidence where the officer was 

unable to link any observations of impaired 

driving to [appellant] and the Commonwealth’s 

evidence did not establish that [appellant]’s 

mental and physical faculties were impaired

such that he could not safely operate a motor 

vehicle[?]

Appellant’s brief at 1.

Appellant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his 

conviction for DUI under Section 3802(a)(1) “because the Commonwealth 

 

3 Appellant’s post-sentence motion does not contain pagination; for the ease 

of our discussion, we have assigned each page a corresponding number.

4 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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failed to present sufficient evidence that [appellant] was incapable of safely 

operating an automobile because of alcohol consumption.” (Id. at 25.)

Our standard of review in assessing a sufficiency of the evidence claim 

is well settled.

We must determine whether the evidence admitted at 

trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 

when viewed in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the 

conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there 

is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find 

every element of the crime has been established 

beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the 

evidence claim must fail.

The evidence established at trial need not preclude 

every possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is 

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented. It is not within the province of this Court 

to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment 

for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth’s 

burden may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence 

and any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be 

resolved by the fact[-]finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no 

probability of fact can be drawn from the combined 

circumstances.

Commonwealth v. N.M.C., 172 A.3d 1146, 1149 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citations 

omitted).

Section 3802 of the Crimes Code defines the offense of DUI – general 

impairment, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) General impairment.--

(1) An individual may not drive, operate or be 

in actual physical control of the movement 

of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient 
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amount of alcohol such that the individual 

is rendered incapable of safely driving, 

operating or being in actual physical 

control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

the verdict winner, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the 

trial court’s conclusion that appellant was incapable of safely operating his 

vehicle due to his consumption of alcohol. This court has long recognized that 

“a police officer who has perceived a defendant’s appearance and conduct is 

competent to express an opinion, in a prosecution for [DUI,] as to the 

defendant’s state of intoxication and ability to safely drive a vehicle.” 

Commonwealth v. Butler, 856 A.2d 131, 137 (Pa.Super. 2004). Here, the 

record demonstrates that in the early morning hours of June 5, 2016, 

Officer Sanguinito observed appellant’s vehicle make a wide left-hand turn 

from Gettysburg Pike onto Cumberland Parkway into the wrong traffic lane 

generally utilized by vehicles exiting the Giant grocery store parking lot. 

(Notes of testimony, 12/18/17 at 13.) As Officer Sanguinito proceeded to 

follow appellant’s vehicle, he observed it drift between the roadway’s fog line 

and solid yellow line before turning into the exit of a Burger King parking lot 

marked by a “do not enter one way” sign. (Id. at 14-16.) Based on these 

observations, Officer Sanguinito initiated a traffic stop of appellant’s vehicle. 

(Id.)
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The record reflects that this incident was memorialized in a video taken 

from an MVR in Officer Sanguinito’s marked patrol car; the MVR was 

introduced at trial and viewed by the trial court. (Id. at 14.) 

Officer Sanguinito testified that during the course of the traffic stop, he 

observed that appellant exhibited multiple signs of intoxication, including 

“glassy and bloodshot eyes” and “an odor of alcohol emanating from his 

breath.” (Id. at 18-19.) The record further reflects that during

Officer Sanguinito’s administration of two standardized field sobriety tests 

(“SFSTs”) to appellant, he observed appellant display multiple “clues” of 

intoxication, including raising his arms for balance and “swaying side to side, 

back and forth.” (Id. at 19-26.) Officer Sanguinito opined that following the 

administration of the SFSTs, he believed appellant to be incapable of driving

safely:

A. [] At the conclusion of these tests, it was my 

professional opinion that based on [appellant’s] 

glassy, bloodshot eyes, the odor of alcohol on 

his breath, and the clue that I observed [during 

the SFST], that he was incapable of safe driving.

Q. Did you take [appellant’s] driving into 

consideration as well?

A. And the driving, yes.

Id. at 24.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the Commonwealth established the 

elements of impairment and inability to drive safely, and appellant’s 

contention that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for 
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DUI under Section 3802(a)(1) must fail. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 890 (Pa.Super. 2011) (holding that the impaired ability 

to drive safely was proven where the defendant failed field sobriety tests, 

smelled of alcohol, and ran a stop sign with a police officer in plain view).

We now turn to appellant’s argument that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence. Appellant avers that “the Commonwealth’s evidence 

did not establish that [appellant]’s mental and physical faculties were impaired 

such that he could not safely operate a motor vehicle.” (Appellant’s brief at 

32.)

“An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is 

addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Galvin, 

985 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1051 

(2010).

[W]here the trial court has ruled on the weight claim 

below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review 

is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused 

its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 40 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted).

Our supreme court has long recognized that,

[b]ecause the trial judge has had the opportunity to 

hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate 

court will give the gravest consideration to the 

findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when 

reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict 
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is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least 

assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial 

is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or 

was not against the weight of the evidence and that a 

new trial should be granted in the interest of justice. 

This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by 

the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a 

new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the 

evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a 

trial court’s discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he 

term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment, 

wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate 

conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not 

exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of 

the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the 

foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, 

personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. 

Discretion is abused where the course pursued 

represents not merely an error of judgment, but 

where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or 

where the law is not applied or where the record 

shows that the action is a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations and 

emphasis omitted).

Instantly, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court 

in rejecting appellant’s weight claim. As noted, Officer Sanguinito testified at 

great length that appellant demonstrated multiple signs of impairment 

throughout both the traffic stop and two subsequent field sobriety tests, 

rendering him incapable of safely driving or operating his vehicle. (See notes 

of testimony, 12/18/17 at 11-28.) “[T]he trier of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to 

believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz, 
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911 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 926 

A.2d 972 (Pa. 2007). Here, Judge Brewbaker, sitting as fact-finder, concluded 

that Officer Sanguinito’s credible testimony and the corroborating MVR

evidence presented at trial weighed in favor of the conclusion “that [appellant] 

was guilty of DUI to a degree that he was incapable of safely driving[,]” and 

elected not to believe appellant’s version of the events. (Trial court opinion, 

2/22/18 at 3.) We are precluded from reweighing the evidence and 

substituting our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055.

For all the forgoing reasons, we affirm the February 6, 2018 judgment 

of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/08/2019