RENDERED: MAY 19, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-1148-MR

ALTON FRANKLIN APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JOE CASTLEN, SPECIAL JUDGE

ACTION NO. 21-D-00233-001

JESSICA DAWSON APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND LAMBERT, 

JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Alton Franklin (“Appellant”) appeals from an 

amended domestic violence order entered by the Daviess Circuit Court on August 

24, 2022, and order entered August 29, 2022, finding Appellant to be in contempt. 

Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in entering into evidence an 

unauthenticated internet page and speculative testimony. He also asserts that even 

if the internet page was properly entered into evidence, he had a First Amendment 
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right to make the comments it contained. He seeks an opinion reversing and 

remanding the orders on appeal. After careful review, we find no error and affirm 

the August 24, 2022, and August 29, 2022 orders.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 9, 2021, the Daviess Circuit Court entered a Domestic 

Violence Order (“DVO”) barring Appellant from having contact with his wife,

Jessica Dawson (“Appellee”), for one year. The marriage produced one child 

(“Child”) who was born in 2011. The parties separated and were divorced by way 

of a decree of dissolution entered on September 28, 2022. 

On August 8, 2022, Appellee filed a motion in Daviess Circuit Court 

to amend the DVO by adding Child as a protected party and extending the term 

barring contact. Appellee also moved for an order directing Appellant to appear 

and show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with 

the DVO. 

A hearing on both motions was conducted on August 24, 2022, where 

Appellee testified. Appellant resided out of state and testified at the hearing via 

telephone. In support of the motions, Appellee alleged that Appellant had a 

YouTube channel on which he posted a claim that an unknown person threatened 

to release sexual photographs and videos of Appellant and Appellee. Appellee 

asserted that this was a veiled threat intended to intimidate her and coerce her into 
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not seeking an extension of the DVO. Appellant acknowledged that the YouTube 

channel was his, but testified that the channel was hacked multiple times and the 

content complained of by Appellee was not made by him. Appellant objected to 

the introduction of the YouTube evidence, claiming that it was not his content, that 

it did not identify Appellee by name, and that he did not send it to her by email, 

text, or any other means.

After considering the proof, the Daviess Circuit Court entered an

amended DVO on August 24, 2022.1 The amended DVO added Child as a 

protected party, and extended the no-contact provision until August 24, 2025. On 

August 29, 2022, the court entered a separate order sustaining Appellee’s show 

cause motion. The August 29, 2022 order sentenced Appellant to six months in 

jail for violating the original DVO, with the proviso that the court could probate 

the sentence at its discretion if Appellant refrained from future direct or indirect 

threats against Appellee. This appeal followed.

ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

Appellant, through counsel, now argues that the Daviess Circuit Court 

erred in improperly admitting and relying on unauthenticated internet evidence 

1 The amended order was incorrectly designated on form AOC-275.3 as an amended 

interpersonal protective order rather than an amended domestic violence order. Per Kentucky 

Revised Statutes (KRS) 456.060(1), a personal protective order addresses only claims of dating 

violence, which is not at issue herein. In addressing the amended DVO, we will use the terms 

“amended” and “reissued” interchangeably. 
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which was merely speculative in nature. Appellant argues that authentication is a 

condition precedent to admissibility, and that the YouTube content at issue was not 

shown to be produced by Appellant nor distributed to Appellee. Appellant 

maintains that Appellee’s subjective feelings about Appellant’s YouTube channel 

do not constitute evidence, and do not demonstrate that the YouTube content was 

produced by Appellant nor intended to harass or intimidate Appellee. He asserts 

that even if the wrongly admitted evidence was accurate, the error was 

compounded because the circuit court used it to improperly curtail Appellant’s 

right to free speech and right to bear arms.2 He seeks an opinion reversing the 

amended DVO and contempt order and remanding the matter to the circuit court.

KRS 403.740(4) addresses the reissuance of a DVO and states:

A domestic violence order shall be effective for a period 

of time fixed by the court, not to exceed three (3) years, 

and may be reissued upon expiration for subsequent 

periods of up to three (3) years each. The fact that an 

order has not been violated since its issuance may be 

considered by a court in hearing a request for a 

reissuance of the order.

In 2019, a panel of this Court determined that no proof of additional 

acts of domestic violence is required before reissuing a DVO. Cottrell v. Cottrell,

571 S.W.3d 590, 592 (Ky. App. 2019). “The trial court may consider all facts and 

2 The amended order required Appellant to surrender his Kentucky license to carry a concealed 

firearm.
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circumstances, including the nature, extent and severity of the original acts of 

domestic violence, in finding that there is a continuing need for the DVO.” Id.

(citations omitted). Further, neither the statute governing domestic violence orders 

nor the constitutional right to due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to 

extending the term of a DVO. Id. In the context of a DVO proceeding, “violence” 

may be found “when the accumulation of . . . acts over time can subject one 

intimate partner to the other’s control.” United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157,

165-66, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1411-12, 188 L. Ed. 2d 426 (2014).

Further,

[i]n its role as factfinder, the trial court may 

necessarily have to consider the credibility of each 

witness. The trier of fact has the right to believe the 

evidence presented by one litigant in preference to 

another . . . [and] may believe any witness in whole or in 

part. The trier of fact may take into consideration all the 

circumstances of the case, including the credibility of the 

witness. On appeal, we are mindful of the trial court’s 

opportunity to assess the credibility of each witness, and 

as such, we would only alter the court’s findings if they 

were clearly erroneous.

Sewell v. Sweet, 637 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Ky. App. 2021) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). 

In the matter before us, the circuit court conducted a hearing on 

Appellee’s motion to amend the DVO and on the motion to show cause. The court 

considered the testimony of both parties and found that Appellant was not a 
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credible witness. The court was persuaded by Appellee’s testimony that she was 

familiar with Appellant’s voice and usage of social media; by exhibits which 

demonstrated threats to Appellee of showing explicit videos and photographs; and,

by Appellee’s testimony of her belief that the threats were a means of coercing her

not to continue the domestic violence proceeding. 

We conclude that the Daviess Circuit Court properly considered the 

motions before it, and that its rulings are supported by the record and the law. Per 

Cottrell, no proof of additional acts of domestic violence was required to extend 

the DVO. Arguendo, even if additional proof were required, Appellee’s testimony 

and evidence, coupled with the finding that Appellant lacked credibility, would 

form a proper basis for extending the term of the DVO. Similarly, the same 

testimony and evidence were sufficient to sustain Appellee’s show cause motion, 

as this testimony and evidence supported Appellee’s claim that Appellant’s actions 

violated the DVO.

Appellant also briefly argues that the amended DVO infringes upon

his right to free speech and right to bear arms. He has not, however, cited any case 

law or statutory law supportive of the argument that the scope or term of the DVO 

abridges his constitutional rights. A DVO necessarily restricts the offending 

party’s speech and conduct. Our research has revealed no basis for concluding that 
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Appellant’s constitutional rights have been improperly infringed by the amended 

DVO. We find no error. 

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the orders of the Daviess Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Evan Taylor

Owensboro, Kentucky

NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.