FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D19-4086

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JARROD ROBERTS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

Mark W. Moseley, Judge.

September 11, 2020

B.L. THOMAS, J.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his rule 3.850 

motion for postconviction relief, alleging a single claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. On April 21, 2016, a jury 

convicted Appellant of sexual battery by threat of force or violence. 

On July 7, 2016, at sentencing, the trial court sentenced Appellant 

to thirty years in prison. On appeal, this Court affirmed 

Appellant’s judgment and sentence without opinion, and the

mandate was issued on December 20, 2017. See Roberts v. State, 

237 So. 3d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). This Court has also affirmed 

without opinion other collateral postconviction filings that 

Appellant has appealed. See Roberts v. State, 268 So. 3d 105 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2019).
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On September 23, 2019, Appellant filed a motion for 

postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 

3.850. On October 7, 2019, the trial court denied Appellant’s 

motion.

In his motion for postconviction relief, Appellant argued that 

he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel 

failed to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. 

Appellant alleged that he was assaulted by Alachua County Jail 

correction officers prior to trial and that he sustained injuries to 

his neck and head after his head was pushed into a wall. Trial 

counsel was notified of the incident, and Appellant argued that he

advised counsel on multiple occasions that he had suffered severe 

memory loss, amnesia, a concussion, and debilitating headaches 

from the injuries. Appellant “affirmatively submits” that he was 

not competent to stand trial as a result of these injuries and that 

trial counsel should have known this. Appellant argued he was 

prejudiced because the amnesia and impaired cognitive 

capabilities prevented him from assisting in his trial as he could 

not remember pertinent facts and details of events around the 

incident, the legal matters at issue, and could not provide 

meaningful and relevant testimony in his own defense. Further, 

his condition allowed the State to insinuate he was lying under 

oath and discredit his testimony. Had counsel moved to investigate 

his competency, the outcome of the proceedings would have been 

different. 

We find Appellant’s motion is successive. Appellant previously 

appealed the denial of a rule 3.850 motion before this Court, which 

we affirmed. See Roberts v. State, 268 So. 3d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2019). Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(h) identifies a 

second or successive motion as an “extraordinary pleading” and 

states that such a motion may be dismissed if it: 

fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the 

prior determination was on the merits or, if new and 

different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the 

failure of the defendant . . . to assert those grounds in a 

prior motion constituted an abuse of the procedure or 

there was no good cause for the failure of the defendant 

. . . to have asserted those grounds in a prior motion.
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Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h)(2). 

On appeal, Appellant contends that his motion is not truly 

successive because “[the] memory of the events in question has 

now begun to come back” and that he could not have previously 

raised this motion in good faith because of his cognitive

impairments. He further argues that he “never knowingly filed an 

original 3.850 motion,” but rather that he previously filed two 

petitions for habeas corpus that were “improperly converted” to 

rule 3.850 motions by the lower court. For reasons outlined below, 

we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument and do not believe 

that he has demonstrated good cause to be entitled to such an 

extraordinary pleading. 

Even if not successive, Appellant’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel is meritless. To prove ineffective assistance 

of counsel, a defendant must allege (1) the specific acts or 

omissions of counsel which fell below a standard of reasonableness 

under prevailing professional norms and (2) the defendant’s case 

was prejudiced by these acts or omissions such that the outcome of 

the case would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 690–92 (1984). The deficient performance prong requires 

a “showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 

not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. The prejudice prong requires that

the defendant demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The 

defendant must demonstrate a likelihood of a different result 

which is substantial and not just conceivable. Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).

“To satisfy the deficiency prong based on counsel’s handling of 

a competency issue, the postconviction movant must allege specific 

facts showing that a reasonably competent attorney would have 

questioned competence to proceed.” Thompson v. State, 88 So. 3d 

312, 319 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). “The question is ‘whether the 

defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with counsel 

with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether 
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the defendant has a rational, as well as factual, understanding of 

the pending proceedings.’” Id. (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.211(a)(1)). 

“In order to establish prejudice in a properly raised ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, the postconviction movant must . . . set 

forth clear and convincing circumstances that create a real, 

substantial and legitimate doubt as to the movant’s competency.” 

Id. “Conclusory allegations of incompetency are not enough to 

warrant an evidentiary hearing.” Id. (citing Atwater v. State, 788 

So. 2d 223, 229 (Fla. 2001)). Further, “[n]ot every manifestation of 

mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand trial; rather, 

the evidence must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or 

understand the charges.” Id. at 319 (citing Card v. Singletary, 981 

F. 2d 481, 487–88 (11th Cir. 1992)).

This Court’s review of the record on appeal shows that 

Appellant testified extensively in his own defense at trial. 

Appellant’s testimony was thorough and highly detailed. He 

advised the jury of what he was doing when he met the victim, and 

he remembered that he had gotten off work early that night. He 

remembered what he had been doing earlier that evening and 

what his plans had been for that night. He told the jury the precise 

times that he met with a friend and remembered meeting other 

people that he knew. Appellant gave detailed descriptions of the 

places that he had been, what he did at those locations, and 

approximately how long he stayed at those locations. He gave a 

thorough explanation of how he met the victim and what activities 

they engaged in. Appellant was even able to describe the victim’s 

behavior after the incident. He continued to give detailed 

testimony and explanations for his behavior after the incident and 

during a subsequent meeting with the police. Additionally, at his

sentencing hearing, Appellant gave a detailed and coherent pro se

argument on a motion of reduction to lesser charge, which further 

demonstrated that he understood the proceedings and the nature 

of the charges against him.

Therefore, the trial proceedings thoroughly refute Appellant’s 

allegations that he was suffering from amnesia, an inability to

recall events on the night of the incident, or that his cognitive 

capabilities were otherwise impaired by his injuries. Because of 

this, trial counsel could not be ineffective for failing to file a 

suggestion of incompetency because she would not have had a good 
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faith basis to file such a pleading. See Williams v. State, 987 So. 2d 

1, 10 (Fla. 2008) (concluding that counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to file a motion where there was no legally sufficient basis 

for doing so). In view of the above, we AFFIRM the trial court’s 

ruling as to all of Appellant’s claims.

LEWIS and BILBREY, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Jarrod Roberts, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.