IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs October 3, 2023

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GIORGIO JENNINGS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 18-00842 Chris Craft, Judge

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No. W2022-01533-CCA-R3-CD

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The Appellant, Giorgio Jennings, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of six counts of 

aggravated rape, five counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated assault, 

three counts of facilitation of aggravated assault, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, 

aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous 

felony. The trial court sentenced the Appellant to an effective sentence of one hundred and 

thirty-two years in confinement. In this appeal, he challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his convictions; and (2) the trial court’s imposition of partial 

consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.

MONTGOMERY, JR., and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Phyllis Aluko, District Public Defender, and Barry W. Kuhn (on appeal), Assistant District 

Public Defender, and Charles Waldman, Memphis, Tennessee (at trial) for the Appellant, 

Giorgio Jennings.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katharine K. Decker, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Steve Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Abby Wallace, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On January 17, 2011, five friends were gathered at 4388 Owen Road in Memphis, 

Tennessee, when three masked men with guns entered the home looking for drugs and 

money. There was one tall man, and two shorter men. Based on the State’s theory, the 

Appellant was the tall man. The tall man and one of the shorter men took the two women, 

12/27/2023
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L.R. and M.J.,

1

to the bedrooms and raped them. A third woman, S.H., arrived during the 

home invasion, and the tall man and one of the shorter men also raped her. Meanwhile, 

the third masked man remained in the living room with the male victims, K.S., S.R., and 

M.G.2 He shot two of them in the hand and hit the other with a pistol when they denied 

having drugs in the home. The masked men ransacked the home and the victims’ pockets, 

taking numerous items.

One of the items taken, an Xbox, was linked to the Appellant shortly after the home 

invasion. The Appellant admitted involvement to the police, but claimed he was the driver. 

Three years later, testing confirmed that sperm found on a papasan chair, where one of the 

women was raped, belonged to the Appellant. Another three years passed before the 

Appellant was located in another state using an alias, and he was apprehended. A Shelby 

County grand jury indicted the Appellant on twenty-three counts—six counts of aggravated 

rape, six counts of aggravated robbery, six counts of aggravated assault, three counts of 

aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the 

commission of a dangerous felony.

Trial. The Appellant’s five day trial began on November 8, 2021. The proof 

relevant to the issues raised in this appeal is summarized below. 

L.R. L.R. testified that in January 2011, she was living at 4388 Owen Road with 

her then-fiancé K.S. The front door of the home opened into the living room. In the living 

room, there was a couch, oversized chair, television, PlayStation, and Xbox. The couch 

was against the back wall, under a window looking into the kitchen. The home also 

contained two bedrooms, one of which they used as a game room. The game room 

contained a television and a papasan chair.

On January 17, 2011, L.R. and K.S. invited friends over to eat dinner and watch 

Jersey Shore. Around 8:00 p.m., L.R. was in the living room with M.J. and M.G., while 

K.S. and S.R. were in the kitchen preparing their dinners. Suddenly, three black men with 

hoods on their heads and bandanas covering their faces kicked in the front door. The three 

men were each holding a gun and told everyone to get on the ground. One of the men 

jumped onto the couch, held his gun through the window looking into the kitchen, and told 

K.S. and S.R. to come into the living room and get on the ground. One of the guns was a 

black Uzi and one was a black and brown revolver. She could not remember what the third 

gun looked like. One of the men “was tall and kind of [skinnier]” and wore blue plaid 

pajama pants. The other two men were shorter and wore jeans.

 

1

It is the policy of this court to identify victims of sexual offenses by their initials only.

2

It is the policy of this court to identify family members of victims of sexual offenses by their 

initials only.
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L.R. said that after everyone got on the ground, the men made her and M.J. remove 

their clothes. They searched everyone, taking their phones. They did not take L.R.’s phone 

because, when the men initially entered, L.R. had called 911 and had hidden her phone. 

When they made her remove her clothes, she called 911 again and threw her phone under 

the couch. The men asked if anyone had a gun, and M.G. told them he had one in his 

waistband. The men took M.G.’s gun and “hit him upside the back of the head[.]”

One of the shorter men then took L.R. to the game room. He asked her to perform 

oral sex on him and she told him that she had HIV, which was not true, “just to try to get 

him to leave [her] alone.” The man took her back to the living room. When she returned 

to the living room, she saw that M.G. and K.S. had both been shot in the hand. At some 

point, S.H. arrived at the home, opened the door, and took off running. The men brought 

her back inside and made her remove her clothes.

Next, L.R. said the tall man in the pajama pants hit her on the buttocks and took her 

to the bedroom. In the bedroom, he said he had been told they had “dope” and kept asking 

her where it was. She told him they had real jobs and did not sell “dope.” He made her 

get on her knees, and he inserted his penis into her mouth. He held a gun to her forehead 

and threatened to “blow [her] brains out” if she bit down.” He made her bend over the bed 

and inserted his penis into her vagina. She told him that he was hurting her, and he said he 

did not care. He used a condom when he penetrated her vagina, but not when he penetrated

her mouth. She did not know whether he ejaculated.

When L.R. returned to the living room, the men were still searching for drugs. They 

had flipped over her furniture and ripped into its fabric. At some point, one of the shorter 

men took L.R. back to the bedroom. She was unsure if he was the same man who took her 

to the game room initially. The shorter man said he wanted a second girl, so another man

brought M.J. to the bedroom. He said he wanted the other one, so the man brought him 

S.H. instead. He put a condom on, held a gun to their heads, and inserted his penis into 

their mouths. L.R. was unsure if he ejaculated. He made them stop because L.R. started 

gagging and S.H. was “crying so bad[.]” He took them back to the living room.

L.R. said one of the shorter men was in the living room at all times, armed with a 

gun, with K.S., M.G., and S.R. He seemed to be the leader. When the men were walking 

out, they saw L.R.’s puppy in a cage and took her. She begged them not to take the puppy

and one of the men said, “bitch, I’ll take whatever I want[.]” The men took her television, 

jewelry, laptop, and puppy. They also took the PlayStation, Xbox, Wii, swords, phones,

and wallets. L.R. only saw three men, but it was possible that a fourth man came in at 

some point. She thought that there was a fourth person outside because a horn honked and

the leader said “that’s our [c]ue.” When the men left, they told L.R. and her friends to 
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“count to [one hundred] and don’t come out.” When they shut the door, L.R. jumped up 

and locked it. A few minutes later, L.R. and her friends ran to the neighbor’s house and 

had them call 911.

On cross-examination, L.R. said that the tall man was “over six feet” tall. She 

agreed, however, that she had previously testified that he was six feet, five inches tall. She 

acknowledged that the men stole “a little sack” of marijuana from the home. She also 

discussed the incident that she believed led to the home invasion. The day before, M.G.’s 

friend “Heath” came over while she was gone and “supposedly sold some [marijuana] to 

some people” outside of her home.

K.S. K.S. testified that he heard a loud bang while in the kitchen with S.R. He 

looked through the window into the living room and saw three masked men, each holding 

a gun. The men were black and wore bandanas and hooded sweatshirts. Two of the men 

were “medium height” and one of them was “kind of tall.” One of the men immediately 

jumped over the couch and put his gun through the window and into K.S.’s face. He 

ordered K.S. and S.R. to get down. They complied, and the masked men started screaming, 

“Where is the [k]ush? We know it’s here.” K.S. tried to tell them they had the wrong 

house.

K.S. said after twenty to twenty-five minutes, the men made L.R. and M.J. remove 

their clothes. Shortly after, S.H. arrived to see if M.G. was at the home. A fourth man 

outside saw S.H., held a gun to her, and pushed her into the home. The men made her 

remove her clothes. Two of the men took L.R. and M.J. to the bedroom and game room. 

Shortly after, they took S.H. to the room where L.R. was. The third man stayed in the 

living room with K.S., S.R., and M.G. the entire time “making sure [they] didn’t go 

[anywhere].” He walked up and down the hall toward the bedroom and game room, saying 

things like “y’all are raping these bitches. We’re gonna have to kill these folks.”

K.S. stated that after M.G. continued to deny that there were drugs in the home, the 

man in the living room asked him which hand he rolled marijuana with. M.G. responded

his left, and the man shot him in his right hand. The man then turned his attention to K.S. 

K.S. told the man it was his house but insisted that he did not sell drugs. The man told him 

to stick his hand out and shot him in the hand. Then, the man “stuck the gun up [K.S.’s]

ass” and threatened to shoot him if he did not tell him where the drugs were. K.S. continued 

to tell him there were no drugs. The man’s gun looked like a small automatic. The other 

men had a revolver and “maybe a nine.” Each of the men, at different times, were 

screaming “Rob, rape, murder is what we do.” One of the men appeared to be the leader, 

but K.S. was not sure how tall he was.
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K.S. said the men then brought the women back into the living room. One of the 

men picked up K.S.’s puppy. He held a gun to the puppy’s head and threatened to shoot 

her if K.S. did not tell him where the drugs were. He began counting down. When he got 

to one, he said the puppy was too pretty and took her with him instead. The men also took 

cell phones, wallets, cash, jewelry, the television, an Xbox, a PlayStation, and K.S.’s 

medieval swords and knifes. After all the items had been removed from the home, the men 

were talking to each other saying, “let’s get ready to line them up in the back. We’re gonna 

have to kill these folks.” They heard a car horn and one of the men said “that’s the code.” 

The men ordered everyone to stay on the ground and left. K.S. only recalled seeing three 

men, but he knew they had a driver because all three men were in the home when he heard 

the car horn. Once the men were gone, K.S., S.R., and M.G. ran to the neighbor’s house 

to call the police.

K.S. then described the drug sale that occurred at his home the day before the home 

invasion. M.G., S.R., L.R., and Michael Heath Grant, whom they called Heath, were at 

K.S.’s home watching football. Someone knocked on the door, and Heath3said it was for 

him. Without K.S.’s knowledge, Heath had arranged for someone named “Jac” to come 

buy marijuana from him. Heath had never sold drugs from K.S.’s home before. Jac bought 

the marijuana, but came back ten minutes later and said he wanted his money back because 

his friend did not want the marijuana. Heath weighed the marijuana, and there were three 

grams missing. At one point, K.S. thought Jac may have orchestrated the burglary.

M.J. M.J. testified that she and her then-boyfriend S.R. went to L.R.’s home to 

have dinner and watch television. While she and L.R. were sitting on the couch in the 

living room, two to three men “ran through the door and started ransacking the house.” 

The men were each at least five feet, nine inches tall, and one looked taller—six feet, one 

or two inches tall. Each of the men had a gun and told everyone to get on the ground. Two 

of the guns were “plain black guns” and one looked like a revolver. One of the men jumped 

through the window looking into the kitchen and told M.G., S.R., and K.S. to come in the 

living room. Everyone got on the ground, and the men started asking where the drugs and 

money were. They told L.R. and M.J. to remove their clothes. The men ransacked the 

home and went through the women’s purses.

One of the men took M.J. to the bedroom and shut and locked the door. He held a 

gun to her head and made her perform oral sex on him. Then, he told her to stand up, turn 

around, and bend over. He inserted his penis into her vagina while holding the gun to the 

back of her head. He used a condom the entire time. She did not know what the man 

 

3 Because Malik Grant and Michael Heath Grant share the same last name, we will refer to them 

by their first and second names respectively throughout this opinion. We intend no disrespect in doing so.
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looked like because she could only see his eyes. The men were all wearing dark colored 

clothing, long pants, and long shirts or hooded sweatshirts.

M.J. said when she returned to the living room, the men were again asking where 

the drugs and money were. They picked up L.R.’s puppy and threatened to kill her. Then, 

they took L.R. and S.H. to the game room. When L.R. and S.H. returned to the living 

room, another man grabbed M.J., took her to the game room, and shut and locked the door. 

The man was taller and thinner than the first man that raped her. The man forced her to 

perform oral sex on him. He then inserted his penis into her vagina while she was lying on 

her back on the papasan chair. He held her down with one hand and pointed the gun at her 

with the other. He used a condom both times.

When M.J. returned to the living room again, the men were still looking for drugs. 

She saw one of the men using cocaine in the kitchen. At one point, she heard two gunshots. 

She later saw that K.S. had been shot in his hand and was bleeding. The men took M.J.’s 

cash, wallet, and phone. They also took an Xbox, PlayStation, and the puppy. M.J. heard 

a horn honk and one of the men said they needed to go. They tried to tie everyone up with 

electrical cords, but were unsuccessful. They carried the television outside to the car, and 

one of the men “poked their head back in and said don’t move.” After a few minutes, M.J. 

and her friends went across the street and called police. On cross-examination, M.J. said 

she did see one of the men bring S.H. into the home.

S.R. S.R. testified that he was in the kitchen with K.S. when the door swung open 

and three masked men entered the home holding guns. The men were wearing hooded 

sweatshirts, pants, and bandanas. A taller man wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt came 

through the window into the kitchen and pointed a gun at him. The gun looked like a Glock 

with an extended clip. The men were asking where was the money. The men patted 

everyone down and took S.R.’s wallet, cell phone, and some marijuana from his pockets.

S.R. said that one of the men appeared to be in control of the situation. He was 

shorter, between five feet, nine inches and six feet tall. He kept calling the other men his 

boys, calling out times, and telling them what to do. The men kept asking where the “dope”

and money were. One of the men asked K.S. with which hand he rolled marijuana, and he 

responded his left. The man then shot K.S. in his right hand. When M.G. denied knowing 

where the drugs and money were, the man asked him the same question and shot him in 

his hand. S.R. was “almost [] certain” that the man who appeared to be in control was the 

one who shot K.S. and M.G. S.R. was also hit with a pistol six times in the back of the 

head.

S.R. said the men then ordered the women to remove their clothes. One of the men 

took one woman to the bedroom and another man took the other woman to the game room. 
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One man stayed in the living room the entire time to make sure that S.R., K.S., and M.G.

did not get up. The man in the living room jokingly asked the others, “y’all back there 

raping them?” S.R. did not remember hearing the other two men speak, but he heard them 

sniffing drugs. At some point, S.H. walked in and saw everyone on the floor. She took off 

running, and one of the men went out to get her and brought her back in.

S.R. said the men took a television, PlayStation, Wii, Xbox, puppy, and collectible 

weapons. After a car horn honked, someone took the television outside. The men 

apparently did not locate the drugs they were looking for. The main perpetrator said, “[W]e

always get the wrong information. It’s always the wrong house.” The men told them to 

count to one hundred and left. One of the men “popped his head back in the door” and 

jokingly said, “y’all gone have to relocate.” Shortly after, they all went to the neighbor’s 

house to try to get help.

S.R. described the information he provided police to assist with the investigation. 

The stolen Xbox was S.R.’s, which he had left at K.S.’s home the day before the home 

invasion. Shortly after the home invasion, one of S.R.’s friends told him the Xbox “went 

live online.” S.R. checked his Microsoft account, and someone had changed the name to 

“Malikgrantdogazz.” He searched the name on Facebook and found an account with the 

same name. The profile was private, so S.R. made a fake Facebook page, added all of the 

person’s friends, and then added the person. The person made a post on January 18, 2011,

asking for people to play games online with him. Two people commented their account 

names, and those names matched the new friends that had been added to S.R.’s Microsoft

account.

S.R. also described the drug sale at K.S.’s home the day before the home invasion. 

S.R. was at the home with a group of people, including a man named Heath. While they 

were there, Heath got a phone call from a man named Jac asking for marijuana. Jac came

to the home, and Heath went outside and sold him marijuana. Shortly after, Jac entered 

the home complaining that “the bag was light.” Heath weighed the bag and said the man 

“pitched out of [his] bag” because it was now “short.” S.R. did not see or know about any 

other drug transactions happening at K.S.’s home.

M.G. M.G. testified that on January 17, 2011, he went to K.S.’s home and his thengirlfriend S.H. was planning to meet him there later. He was sitting in the living room

when three men came through the front door holding guns. Two of the men had 

“semiautomatics with long clips” and one had a revolver. One of the men was taller, maybe 

six feet, three inches tall, and was wearing pajama pants. The shorter men were wearing 

jeans. The men had shirts tied covering their faces. The men said, “[Y]ou know what this 

is. Get on the ground.” The men made K.S. and S.R., who were in the kitchen, come in 
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the living room. Thirty seconds after the men entered, S.H. arrived. One of the men 

brought her inside.

M.G. said the men were asking where the drugs were. They beat M.G. in the head 

with the gun and put the gun “in [his] butt area” to try to get information from him. The 

shorter man, who appeared to be in charge, asked M.G. with which hand he rolled 

marijuana, and M.G. responded his left. The man then shot him in his right hand. Next, 

the man shot K.S. All three of the men were in the living room when M.G. and K.S. were 

shot. M.G. testified that at some point, the men made all of them take off their clothes. 

The men took a nine-millimeter Hi-Point pistol that M.G. had in his shorts.

M.G. stayed on the ground in the living room the entire time the men were in the 

home. Two of the men took the women to the bedrooms, while the leader stayed in the 

living room with M.G., K.S., and S.R. When the other two men returned to the living 

room, they started taking things and flipping over furniture. They took the television, 

swords, M.G.’s wallet, and two grams of marijuana. After they had taken the property, 

they said, “so, y’all mean to tell us we got the wrong house?” Throughout the night, the 

leader was communicating with someone on the outside letting them know when to come 

back. M.G. heard a car backing up to the front porch, and the men left five minutes later. 

A couple of seconds after they left, they “ducked back in to make sure nobody moved.” 

M.G. and the others then went to the neighbor’s house to get help.

M.G. testified about the drug sale at K.S.’s home the day before the home invasion. 

He was at K.S.’s home with K.S., S.R., and his friend Heath. A man came to the home to 

buy marijuana from Heath. M.G. was not sure what happened, but the man did not get the 

marijuana. He had not seen any other drug transactions at K.S.’s home.

S.H. S.H. testified that she went to L.R.’s home when she got off work. She opened 

the front door and saw a man in a hooded sweatshirt with a silver revolver. She shut the 

door and turned to run down the steps. The man came outside, put a gun to the back of her 

head, and told her to come inside. She threw her wallet across the driveway and put her 

phone in her shirt. When she entered the living room, there were two more men, both with 

guns. Of the three men, one was “distinguishably taller than the other two.” One of the 

shorter men was the one that brought her in the home. The shortest man seemed “a little 

older” than the others and appeared to be in charge. The men told her to remove her clothes, 

but she just removed her jacket and got on the ground. She slid her phone under the 

ottoman, but she could not get it unlocked. The men were asking for marijuana.

One of the men told S.H. to remove the rest of her clothes. She complied because 

he had a gun. The men patted M.G. down and took his gun. She heard a gunshot close to 

her head. One of the men then took her to the game room. The taller man was in the game 
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room with his penis exposed. He had a gun, but told her he was not going to hurt her. He 

made her perform oral sex on him. The man then made her stand up and turn around. He 

inserted his penis into her vagina. He was not wearing a condom initially, but at some 

point, another man opened the door and gave him a condom.

S.H. said after she returned to the living room, one of the men took her to the 

bedroom. The man with gray plaid pajama pants was in the bedroom already with L.R. 

and M.J. Someone took M.J. out of the room. The man in the pajama pants had a gun and 

told S.H. and L.R. that they needed to perform oral sex on him together. He inserted his 

penis into both of their mouths. They were both crying. He stopped, and they went back 

into the living room. The men took everyone’s phones, a gaming system, and a television. 

The men were in constant communication with their driver through a cell phone, giving 

the driver time estimates. Before they left, they loosely tied S.H. and M.J. with an 

extension cord.

Officer Arica Hutchison testified that on January 17, 2011, she was notified of 

multiple 911 calls coming from cell towers near Owen Road. She was driving around the 

area to see if she could identify the address the calls were coming from. Thirty to fortyfive minutes after the initial calls, another 911 call identified a home invasion at 4388

Owens Road. Officer Hutchison responded to the scene.

Michael Heath Grant, who many people called Heath, testified that he was friends 

with M.G. and was at K.S.’s home on January 16, 2011. Heath had marijuana, and “an 

associate” of his who he knew as Jac and Jac’s cousin came over to buy some. They

ultimately did not want the marijuana and gave it back. When Heath spoke to police, he

identified Jac as Jac Kones,4 who is now deceased. Heath acknowledged having recently 

pled guilty to theft.

Officer Wilton Cleveland testified that based on information from one of the 

victims, he learned the IP address that the stolen Xbox was using. Officer Cleveland

searched the house connected to the IP address and did not find the stolen Xbox. He 

discovered, however, that the house’s router was open, meaning anyone within a certain 

range could connect to it. Several months later, he learned the person using the Xbox 

changed the username to “Malikgrantdogazz.” He discovered a Facebook account with the 

same username belonging to Malik Grant. They located and interviewed Malik. Malik

lived two houses down from the open router with his mother and two brothers—one of 

whom was the Appellant. The mother consented to a search of the home. During the 

 

4 Although Heath initially refers to this individual as Jac Konak (spelled phonetically), Heath 

confirms on cross-examination that his name is Jac Kones. We will refer to him as Kones to avoid any 

confusion. 
- 10 -

search, Officer Cleveland found the collectible swords and PlayStation 3 that had been 

stolen. The swords were under the Appellant’s bed. Though the Xbox was not in the home, 

Microsoft records showed that the first time the Xbox was used at the new IP address was 

on January 18, 2011 at 4:37 a.m., hours after the home invasion.

Malik Grant, who was fourteen years old when he spoke to the police in April 2011,

testified and denied remembering the contents of his statement. He acknowledged, 

however, that the following facts appeared in his statement. The Appellant had a key to 

the house police searched and sometimes stayed there. The Appellant brought the Xbox to 

the house in the middle of January 2011. Malik connected it to Wi-Fi and played Xbox 

online. The Appellant also brought a PlayStation 3 to the house. The Appellant told Malik

that he bought the gaming systems off the street from a “crack head.” Malik acknowledged 

that he was serving eight years’ probation for attempted second degree murder.

Eric Gilliam, formerly a sergeant at the Memphis Police Department, testified that 

he was the lead investigator of this case. After receiving information from the victims, he 

interviewed Heath about the drug sale that occurred the day before the home invasion. He 

then interviewed Jacques Kones and collected his DNA. Sergeant Gilliam was unable to 

connect Kones to the home invasion.

Sergeant Gilliam said he interviewed and took a DNA sample from the Appellant 

on April 5, 2011. The Appellant’s statement was entered into evidence. In the Appellant’s 

statement, he admitted to bringing the Xbox, PlayStation 3, and swords to his mother’s 

house at the end of January 2011. He said he got them from a man named “Shawn[,]” also 

known as “PV,” who got them from a home invasion. Shawn offered to pay him if he 

drove Shawn to the home. He drove Shawn and two other men to the home and waited in 

the car. At some point, he went inside to tell the men “they [needed] to be ready to roll” 

because the police had driven by. While he was inside, he saw men and women lying on 

the floor. The women were nude. Ten or fifteen minutes after he returned to the car, Shawn 

loaded a television and two bags into the car and went back into the house. They also took 

a Hi-Point nine millimeter gun and a puppy. The Appellant got tired of waiting and blew 

the car horn. The men came running out. As he drove away, Shawn told him he shot two 

of the males in the hand because they did not “come up with [any] money or [] 

[marijuana].” Shawn also told him that he “got some head” from one of the girls.

In the Appellant’s statement, the Appellant described Shawn as five feet, ten inches 

tall. He said one of the other men involved was named “D”, and was six feet, one inch tall. 

He did not know the third man’s name, but he was the same size as Shawn. The Appellant 

is six feet, one inch tall. Shawn had a revolver, but he did not see the other two men with 

a weapon. Sergeant Gilliam testified that he located Gabriel Deshaun Humphrey, who the 

Appellant confirmed was the Shawn he was referring to. Humphrey was in prison in 
- 11 -

Mason, Tennessee. He obtained a DNA sample from Humphrey, but was unable to connect 

him to the home invasion.

Lieutenant Roosevelt Twilley testified that he conducted a second interview of the 

Appellant on April 8, 2014, after DNA testing confirmed the Appellant’s semen was on 

the papasan chair at the crime scene. The Appellant’s statement was entered into evidence. 

This time, the Appellant admitted to entering the “back room,” where one of the other men 

was receiving oral sex. The man persuaded the Appellant to “come and get some.” The 

blonde woman performed oral sex on the Appellant, but he got nervous and left. He did 

not wear a condom. He claimed that he partially ejaculated and was not sure where the 

semen went. On June 10, 2014, Lt. Twilley requested an arrest warrant for the Appellant. 

He attempted to locate the Appellant numerous times but was unsuccessful. On May 9, 

2017, he was notified that the Appellant was seen in Las Vegas, Nevada, using an alias. 

At some point, the Appellant was apprehended.

Agent Donna Nelson, the lab director for the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation 

Crime Lab, testified that she analyzed the rape kits of L.R., M.J, and S.H. and items 

recovered from the crime scene. She was provided with saliva standards from the 

Appellant, Kones, and Humphrey for comparison. Sperm found on the papasan chair was 

consistent with the Appellant’s DNA. Sperm belonging to an unknown male was found in 

M.J.’s underwear. Agent Nelson confirmed that the sperm in M.J.’s underwear did not 

belong to Humphrey, but she did not compare it to the Appellant’s DNA profile or Kones’ 

DNA profile. Sperm belonging to a second and different unknown male was found on a 

pillow case and sheet. Agent Nelson confirmed that the sperm on the pillow case and sheet

did not belong to the Appellant, Kones, or Humphrey.

The State rested, and the defense did not present proof. The jury found the 

Appellant not guilty of the aggravated robbery of S.H. The jury also found the Appellant 

not guilty of the aggravated assaults of M.G., K.S., and S.R., but guilty of the lesser 

included offenses of facilitation of aggravated assault. The jury convicted the Appellant 

as charged for the remaining nineteen offenses.

Sentencing Hearing. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing and imposed 

an effective sentence of one hundred and thirty-two years.

5

 For the aggravated rapes, Class 

A felonies, and the aggravated robberies and aggravated kidnappings, Class B felonies, the 

trial court found that the Appellant was a Range I offender. For the remaining offenses, 

Class C felonies and below, the court found that the Appellant was a Range II offender. 

The court imposed the following sentences: twenty years for each of the six aggravated 

 

5 The sentencing hearing transcript in the record contains only the trial court’s discussion and ruling. 

Based on the transcript, it appears that evidence was presented at an earlier hearing.
- 12 -

rapes, ten years for each of the five aggravated robberies, eight years for each of the three 

aggravated assaults, six years for each of the three facilitations of aggravated assault, ten 

years for each of the three aggravated kidnappings, six years for aggravated burglary, and 

six years for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Because 

the aggravated burglary was the dangerous felony underlying the firearm conviction, the 

court ordered those sentences to run consecutively. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-

1324(e)(1).

The court ordered that the six aggravated rape sentences be served consecutively. 

The court ordered that the remaining sentences be served concurrently with one another, 

but consecutive to the aggravated rapes, for an effective sentence one hundred and thirtytwo years. The court imposed partial consecutive sentences based on the dangerous 

offender classification, stating:

This was . . . other than when someone was killed by torture or 

dismemberment, which I’ve had unfortunately, this is the most horrible crime 

that I’ve ever had to try. So, in looking at the sentencing factors, the 

consecutive factors, I find that with no hesitation the [Appellant] is a 

dangerous offender, his behavior indicates . . . no regard for human life, [and] 

no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is 

high. And under the Wilkerson factors, I find all three.

The court noted that the circumstances of the offense were “extremely horrifying and 

aggravating” and that if he were a victim in this case, he “would have nightmares about 

this for the rest of [his] life.” The court found that the sentence was “necessary to protect 

society from the [Appellant’s] unwillingness to lead a productive life.” The court noted 

that the Appellant was too dangerous because he “basically enslaved and tortured people 

for a long time.” After an unsuccessful motion for new trial, the Appellant filed an 

untimely notice of appeal, which this court accepted as timely filed in the interest of justice.

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence. The Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of 

the evidence supporting each of his twenty-two convictions. The State responds, and we 

agree, that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. 

When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must determine 

“whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Parker, 350 S.W.3d 883, 903 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Because a guilty verdict removes the 

presumption of innocence and imposes a presumption of guilt, the Appellant bears the 
- 13 -

burden of showing why the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Id. (citing State 

v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 661 (Tenn. 2006)). The State is entitled to the strongest legitimate 

view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. 

State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 

857 (Tenn. 2010)). This court “neither re-weighs the evidence nor substitutes its inferences 

for those drawn by the jury.” State v. Wagner, 382 S.W.3d 289, 297 (Tenn. 2012) (citing 

State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997)).

In addition to the statutory elements, “[t]he identity of the perpetrator is an essential 

element of any crime.” Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 662 (citing State v. Thompson, 519 S.W.2d 

789, 793 (Tenn. 1975)). The identity of the defendant as the perpetrator may be established 

by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Thomas, 

158 S.W.3d 361, 387 (Tenn. 2005). The identification of the defendant as the perpetrator 

is a question for the trier of fact after considering all the relevant proof. Id. at 388. The 

State can prove identity by establishing that the defendant’s own conduct, or the conduct 

of a person for which the defendant is criminally responsible, constituted the offense. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402.

Criminal responsibility is “‘not a separate, distinct crime’” but “‘a theory by which 

the State may prove the defendant’s guilt of the alleged offense . . . based upon the conduct 

of another person.’” State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 214 (Tenn. 2016) (quoting State 

v. Lemacks, 996 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1999)). An individual is criminally responsible 

for the conduct another person if, “[a]cting with intent to promote or assist the commission 

of the offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, the person solicits, 

directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 

39-11-402(2). A person “acts intentionally with respect to the nature of the conduct or to 

a result of the conduct when it is the person’s conscious objective or desire to engage in 

the conduct or cause the result.” Id. § 39-11-302(a).

Under the doctrine of criminal responsibility, a person is liable not only for the target

offense, but also for offenses committed that were the natural and probable consequences

of the target offense. State v. Howard, 30 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tenn. 2000) (citing State v. 

Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951, 954-55 (Tenn. 1997)). Whether an offense was a natural and 

probable consequence of the target offense is a determination for the jury as the finder of 

fact. Id. The natural and probable consequences doctrine is “based on the recognition that 

aiders and abettors should be responsible for the criminal harms they have naturally, 

probably[,] and foreseeably put into motion.” Id. Under this doctrine, the State must prove 

the following beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) the elements of the crime or crimes that 

accompanied the target crime; (2) that the defendant was criminally responsible pursuant 

to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-402; and (3) that the other crimes that were 

committed were natural and probable consequences of the target crime.” Id.
- 14 -

A. Aggravated Rape. The Appellant does not challenge the proof showing that six 

aggravated rapes occurred. Instead, he challenges the proof of his identity as the 

perpetrator. He contends that none of the three victims identified him, and the sperm and 

DNA recovered from the rape kits could not be traced to him. He also contends that he is 

not criminally responsible for the aggravated rapes because he did not intend to assist in 

their commission. He only intended to assist in theft, of which aggravated rape is not a 

natural and probable consequence.

Because the three men that participated in the home invasion had their faces 

covered, the victims instead distinguished between the men based on their heights. Each 

of the six victims testified that one of the men was taller than the other two men. The 

victims’ descriptions of the tall man’s height ranged from over six feet to six feet, three 

inches tall.

Three of the aggravated rapes—counts 1, 4, and, 6—were committed by the tall 

man. In count 1, the State alleged that the Appellant penetrated M.J.’s vagina with his 

penis in the game room on the papasan chair. M.J. testified that the perpetrator was taller 

than the man that raped her in the bedroom. Though she did not specify whether he was 

taller than the third man, the majority of the victims did not notice any difference in the 

heights of the two shorter men. The jury thus could have reasonably inferred that the tall 

man committed this rape. In count 4, the State alleged that the Appellant penetrated L.R.’s 

vagina with his penis in the bedroom. L.R. testified that the perpetrator was the tall man. 

In count 6, the State alleged that the Appellant penetrated S.H.’s vagina with his penis in 

the game room. S.H. testified that the perpetrator was the tall man.

The jury could have reasonably inferred that the Appellant was the tall man. The 

presence of the Appellant’s sperm on the papasan chair in the game room, along with his 

own statement, shows that the Appellant was in the home and committed at least one of 

the rapes. Though the Appellant claimed that he was the driver and only briefly entered 

the home, five of the victims testified that they only saw three men in the home. Only K.S.

testified to seeing a fourth man bring S.H. into the home, but S.H. and the other four victims 

consistently testified that one of the three men already in the home brought S.H. inside. 

Therefore, the evidence supports an inference that only three men were in the home, and 

one of those men was the Appellant. The evidence also supports an inference that the 

Appellant was the person victims described as the tall man. Descriptions of the tall man’s 

height ranged from over six feet to six feet, three inches tall. The Appellant is six feet, one 

inch tall, and his sperm was found on the papasan chair where M.J. was raped by a taller 

man. A rational jury thus could have identified the Appellant as the perpetrator of the 

aggravated rapes in counts 1, 4, and 6.
- 15 -

The remaining aggravated rapes—counts 2, 3, and 5—were committed by one of 

the shorter men. In count 2, the State alleged that the Appellant, or one for whom the 

Appellant was criminally responsible for, penetrated M.J.’s vagina with his penis in the 

bedroom. M.J. testified that the perpetrator was shorter than the man that committed the 

rape alleged in count 1. In counts 3 and 5, the State alleged that the Appellant, or one for 

whom the Appellant was criminally responsible for, penetrated both L.R.’s mouth and 

S.H.’s mouth with his penis in the bedroom. L.R. and S.H. testified that the perpetrator 

was one of the shorter men.

Though the Appellant did not commit these aggravated rapes by his own conduct, a

rational jury could have found that the Appellant intended to assist the shorter man. Despite 

the Appellant’s contention that he only intended to assist in theft, the evidence viewed in 

the light most favorable to the State shows that all three men shared in a plan to rape the 

women. Shortly after entering the home, the men ordered L.R., M.J., and S.H. to remove 

their clothes. K.S. testified that each of the three men were shouting, “Rob, rape, murder 

is what we do.” And the use of condoms shows that the men either brought condoms with 

them to the home invasion, or found condoms in the home and shared them amongst 

themselves. Either way, it is evidence of a shared intent to assist in the commission of the 

rapes.

A rational jury could also have found that the Appellant aided the perpetrator. In 

counts 3 and 5, one of the men—which the jury could have reasonably inferred was the 

Appellant—brought M.J. to the bedroom for the shorter man when the shorter man 

requested a second woman. When the shorter man said he wanted the other woman instead, 

the man brought him S.H. Though the aid in count 2 is less overt, a rational jury could 

have found that the Appellant aided the shorter man. Each of the men, armed with guns, 

ordered the women to remove their clothing. The leader stayed in the living room with the 

male victims to ensure they could not interfere with the rapes. And K.S. testified that after 

the rapes, the men were saying to one another, “We’re gonna have to kill these folks” to 

avoid being caught. The evidence is therefore sufficient to support each of the Appellant’s 

aggravated rape convictions.

B. Aggravated Robbery. The Appellant also challenges the proof of his identity 

as the perpetrator of the five aggravated robberies. He contends that none of the victims 

identified him and he did not enter the home until after the robberies occurred.

Unlike the aggravated rapes, the victims did not identify which man took which 

items. But, as discussed in Section I.A., the Appellant was one of the three men in the 

home. Even if the Appellant did not physically take all of the items, the evidence is 

sufficient to establish that he is criminally responsible for the aggravated robberies. The 

three men had a shared plan to take drugs and money from the individuals in the home.
- 16 -

Each of the three men entered the home, pointed guns at the victims, and ordered them to 

get on the ground so the men could take their phones and other belongings. Each of the 

men repeatedly asked the victims where the marijuana was hidden. They ransacked the 

home, taking a television, Xbox, PlayStation 3, Wii, swords, jewelry, laptop, and puppy. 

The Appellant admitted to bringing the Xbox, PlayStation 3, and swords to his mother’s 

house. Therefore, a rational jury could have found that the Appellant was criminally 

responsible for the aggravated robberies.

Though the Appellant claims he did not enter the home until after the robberies, the 

jury was free to discredit his statements. Even in the Appellant’s version of events, 

however, the Appellant agreed to drive the men to the home for payment, knowing that 

they planned to take drugs and money, and knowing that at least one of them was armed. 

He aided the men by driving them, serving as a lookout, and notifying them when they 

needed to leave. The Appellant is therefore not entitled to relief. 

C. Aggravated Assault. The Appellant challenges the proof of his identity as the 

perpetrator of the three aggravated assaults, again emphasizing that none of the victims 

identified him.

The State alleged that the Appellant, armed with a gun, ordered L.R., M.J., and S.H. 

to undress, causing them to fear imminent bodily injury. The victims did not specify which 

of the three armed men was the perpetrator. But a rational jury could have found that it 

was the Appellant, or a person for whose conduct he was criminally responsible. Even if 

the Appellant did not order the women to undress, he intended to assist the commission of 

the offense and provided aid. As discussed in Section I.A., the evidence viewed in the light 

most favorable to the State shows that all three men shared in a plan to rape the women. 

Ordering the women to remove their clothes was part of this plan. And each of the men 

was armed and monitoring the women to ensure they removed their clothes, or monitoring 

the men to ensure they did not interfere. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support 

the Appellant’s convictions.

D. Facilitation of Aggravated Assault. The Appellant argues that there is 

insufficient evidence to establish that he was criminally responsible for the facilitation of 

the aggravated assaults. Specifically, he argues that he did not provide substantial 

assistance to the perpetrator because there is no evidence that he was in the home when the 

offenses occurred.

The jury acquitted the Appellant of the three counts of aggravated assault against 

K.S., S.R., and M.G. and convicted him of the lesser included offense of facilitation of 

aggravated assaults. “A person is criminally responsible for the facilitation of a felony, if, 

knowing that another intends to commit a specific felony, but without the intent required 
- 17 -

for criminal responsibility under § 39-11-402(2), the person knowingly furnishes 

substantial assistance in the commission of the felony.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403(a).

We first note a discrepancy between the theory of the offense presented in the 

indictment and the theory argued at trial. In counts 16, 17, and 18 of the indictment, the 

State alleged that the Appellant used or displayed a deadly weapon, causing K.S., S.R., and 

M.G. to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-

102(a)(1)(A)(iii). Though the jury was only instructed on aggravated assault based on 

reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury, the State argued at trial that the Appellant 

committed aggravated assault based on actual serious bodily injury. See id. § 39-13-

102(a)(1)(A)(i). The State alleged that the Appellant shot both K.S. and M.G. in the hand, 

and struck S.R. in the head. Neither party addresses this discrepancy.

Regardless of this discrepancy, the evidence is sufficient to support the Appellant’s 

conviction under either theory. The victims testified that the shorter man, who appeared 

to be in charge and had a gun, held K.S., S.R., and M.G. in the living room. When they 

insisted there were no drugs in the home, the shorter man shot both K.S. and M.G. in the 

hand and hit S.R. with a pistol six times. A rational jury could have found that the 

Appellant facilitated the shorter man’s aggravated assault, whether that assault was based 

on the fear of imminent bodily injury or the actual serious bodily injury. First, the evidence, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the State, shows that the Appellant knew that the 

shorter man intended to commit aggravated assault. The Appellant indicated in his 

statement that he knew the leader was armed and intended to steal drugs and money from 

the victims. The jury could reasonably have inferred that the Appellant also knew that the 

man would shoot the victims if his threats were unsuccessful. Second, the evidence shows 

that the Appellant provided substantial assistance to the shorter man. The Appellant 

monitored the remaining victims to ensure they could not interfere with the assaults. Even 

in the Appellant’s version of events, he drove the shorter man to the home, warned him 

when they needed to leave, and drove him away after the offense. Accordingly, the 

evidence is sufficient to support the Appellant’s convictions for facilitation of aggravated 

assault.

E. Aggravated Kidnapping. The Appellant also challenges the proof of his 

identity as the perpetrator of the three aggravated kidnappings.

Two of the aggravated kidnappings—counts 20 and 21—were committed by one of 

the shorter men. In count 20, the State alleged that the Appellant removed L.R. from the 

living room and took her to the game room where an armed man demanded oral sex. L.R. 

testified that the perpetrator was one of the shorter men. A rational jury, however, could 

have found that the Appellant was criminally responsible for this aggravated kidnapping 

for the reasons discussed in Section I.A., including the shared plan to rape the women and 
- 18 -

the Appellant’s participation in ordering the women to undress. In count 21, the State 

alleged that the Appellant forced S.H. to enter the home while holding a gun to the back of 

her head. S.H. testified that the perpetrator was one of the shorter men. Kidnapping a 

person to prevent that person from calling the police and thwarting the planned robbery, 

however, was a natural and probable consequence of the aggravated robberies for which 

the Appellant was criminally responsible. Therefore, a rational jury could have found the 

Appellant criminally responsible for the shorter man’s conduct.

The victims did not testify which of the three men committed the third aggravated 

kidnapping. In count 19, the State alleged that the Appellant, while armed with a gun, 

removed M.J. from the living room and took her to the bedroom where L.R. was being 

held. L.R. testified that she was in the bedroom with one of the shorter men, and the shorter 

man requested a second woman. One of the other men brought M.J. to the bedroom, which 

led to the rapes alleged in counts 3 and 5. As discussed in Section I.A., the jury could have 

reasonably inferred that the man that took M.J. to the bedroom was the Appellant. 

Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support each of the Appellant’s aggravated 

kidnapping convictions.

F. Aggravated Burglary. The Appellant argues that there is insufficient evidence 

to establish that he intended to commit a felony, theft, or assault when he entered the home. 

The Appellant points to his testimony that he only entered the home to warn the men that 

the police had driven by.

The evidence is sufficient to support the Appellant’s aggravated burglary 

conviction. As convicted in this case, aggravated burglary occurs when a person, “without 

the effective consent of the property owner” enters a habitation “not open to the public, 

with intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-403(a) (current 

version at § 39-13-1003), § 39-14-402(a)(1) (current version at § 39-13-1002). The 

evidence established that the Appellant was one of the three men that initially entered the 

home to take drugs and money. The Appellant admitted to police that he raped one of the 

women while inside the home, but contends that when he entered the home he only 

intended to warn the others that the police drove by. The jury, however, was free to 

discredit his statements. Accordingly, the Appellant is not entitled to relief.

G. Employing a Firearm During the Commission of Dangerous Felony. The 

Appellant challenges the proof of his identity as the perpetrator of employing a firearm 

during the commission of a dangerous felony. He contends that “three men came into the 

house with guns, but they were not identified.” As discussed in Section I.A., however, the

evidence shows that the Appellant was one of the three men in the home. The victims 

testified that the three men each had a gun during the commission of the aggravated 
- 19 -

burglary. The evidence is therefore sufficient to show that the Appellant was the 

perpetrator, and he is not entitled to relief.

II. Double Jeopardy. The Appellant, although he frames it as a sufficiency of the 

evidence issue, argues that his convictions for aggravated assault and facilitation of 

aggravated assault violate the double jeopardy clause. He claims that these offenses are 

lesser included offenses of the aggravated robberies, for which he was also convicted. The 

State responds, and we agree, that the Appellant has waived this claim by raising it for the 

first time on appeal. To preserve a double jeopardy issue, a defendant must raise it in his 

motion for new trial and appellate brief. State v. Harbison, 539 S.W.3d 149, 164 (Tenn. 

2018). Because the Appellant failed to raise this issue in his motion for new trial, the issue 

is waived, and he is not entitled to relief.

III. Consecutive Sentencing. The Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

ordering partial consecutive sentences. He contends that his sentence is excessive because 

“other than the one instance of committing oral rape, the [Appellant] was sitting in the car 

when all of the other offenses were being committed[.]” The State responds, and we agree, 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing partial consecutive sentences.

“[T]he abuse of discretion standard, accompanied by a presumption of 

reasonableness, applies to consecutive sentencing determinations.” State v. Pollard, 432 

S.W.3d 851, 860 (Tenn. 2013). When a defendant is convicted of more than one offense, 

the trial court may order the sentences to run consecutively if the court finds, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant fits into at least one of the enumerated 

categories. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b). In this case, the trial court imposed 

consecutive sentencing based on the its finding that the Appellant was a dangerous offender 

whose behavior indicated no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a 

crime in which the risk to human life was high. See id. § 40-35-115(b)(4). Because the 

dangerous offender classification is “the most subjective to apply,” the trial court must 

make two additional findings before ordering consecutive sentences based on this 

classification. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 863 (citing State v. Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 

1999)). The trial court must find that the aggregate sentence is “reasonably related to the 

severity of the offenses” and “necessary in order to protect the public from further criminal 

acts.” Id. (quoting State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995)).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing partial consecutive sentences

in this case. The court found that the Appellant was a dangerous offender whose behavior 

indicated no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which 

the risk to human life was high. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(4). The court also 

found that the aggregate sentence was reasonably related to the severity of the offenses and 

necessary in order to protect the public from further criminal acts. The court noted that the 
- 20 -

offense was “extremely horrifying and aggravating” and the Appellant “basically enslaved 

and tortured people.” The Appellant contends that his sentence is excessive because he 

only committed one rape. But the jury convicted him of six, and the trial court acted within 

its discretion in ordering that the six aggravated rape sentences be served consecutively 

based on the dangerous offender classification. Accordingly, the Appellant is not entitled 

to relief.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above reasoning and authority, we conclude that the evidence is 

sufficient to support the Appellant’s convictions, and the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing partial consecutive sentences. Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgments of the trial court.

___________________________________________

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, PRESIDING JUDGE