Cite as 2016 Ark. 459

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

No. CR-16-245

MICHAEL LEE WILLIAMS

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered: December 15, 2016

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. 60CR-12-3694]

HONORABLE HERBERT T. 

WRIGHT, JR., JUDGE

AFFIRMED.

RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice

Appellant, Michael Lee Williams, appeals the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s denial, 

following a hearing, of his petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 37.1 of 

the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. For reversal, Williams maintains that his counsel 

was ineffective for failing to present exculpatory testimony or statements from three 

codefendants. We agree with the circuit court that Williams’s argument is without merit. 

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

Williams was convicted by a Pulaski County jury of five counts of aggravated robbery 

and five counts of theft of property obtained by threat of serious physical injury. He was 

sentenced to a total of fifty years’ imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed 

the judgment. Williams v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 561, 444 S.W.3d 877.

Williams contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not calling three witnesses

at trial, Antonio Bozeman, Joe Bell, and Johnathan Hattison. At the Rule 37 hearing, the 

witnesses testified that Williams accompanied them to the crime scene but that he remained 
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in the car and did not participate in the robberies. Williams claims that the circuit court 

erroneously denied relief because each of the witnesses would have testified at his trial that 

he did not participate in the crimes. However, Williams’s trial counsel, Don Trimble, 

testified that his defense strategy was that Williams was not present at the crime scene. The 

focus of his case was one of misidentification, in part due to Williams’s facial scars that 

witnesses failed to describe in their identification. Thus, Williams’s counsel did not offer the 

testimony of the subject witnesses because it would have undermined his trial strategy by 

placing Williams at the scene at the time of the robberies. The circuit court concluded that 

Williams’s counsel’s failure to offer testimony that would have undercut this theory of the 

case was reasonable trial strategy. 

This court does not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the circuit 

court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Sartin v. State, 2012 Ark. 155, 400 S.W.3d 694. A 

finding is clearly erroneous when the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is 

left with the definite and firm conviction that the circuit court made a mistake. Id. In 

making a determination on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court considers 

the totality of the evidence. Id. 

Our standard of review requires that we assess counsel’s effectiveness under the twoprong standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). In asserting ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant 

to Strickland, the petitioner first must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 

McDaniels v. State, 2014 Ark. 181, 432 S.W.3d 644. This requires a showing that counsel 

made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth 
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Amendment. Id. Additionally, counsel is allowed great leeway in making strategic and 

tactical decisions, particularly when deciding not to call a witness. Noel v. State, 342 Ark. 

35, 26 S.W.3d 123 (2000). “[M]atters of trial strategy and tactics, even if arguably 

improvident, fall within the realm of counsel’s professional judgment and are not grounds 

for finding ineffective assistance of counsel.” Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 

(2006). The reviewing court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct 

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. 

Second, the petitioner must show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense, which requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the 

petitioner of a fair trial. Id. In doing so, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that the fact-finder’s decision would have been different absent counsel’s errors. 

Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome of the trial. Id. 

Unless a petitioner makes both Strickland showings, it cannot be said that the 

conviction resulted from a breakdown of the adversarial process that renders the result 

unreliable. Id. “[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . .

to address both components of the inquiry if the defendants make an insufficient showing 

on one.” Anderson v. State, 2011 Ark. 488, at 3–4, 385 S.W.3d 783, 786–87 (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 

Given this precedent, we affirm the circuit court’s finding that it was reasonable trial 

strategy for Williams’s counsel not to proffer the testimony of individuals who would have 

undercut his case theory. The decision whether or not to call particular witnesses is a matter 
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of professional judgment, and even if another attorney would have chosen a different course,

it is not grounds for postconviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

See Noel, 342 Ark. at 42–43, 26 S.W.3d at 128. Because Williams does not meet his burden 

of proof on the deficiency prong of the Strickland test, we hold that the circuit court did not 

clearly err in denying Rule 37 relief. See Anderson, 2011 Ark. 488, at 3–4, 385 S.W.3d at 

786–87. We affirm the circuit court’s denial of postconviction relief. 

Affirmed. 

Jeff Rosenzweig, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee