(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2012 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

LOZMAN v. CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 11–626. Argued October 1, 2012—Decided January 15, 2013 

Petitioner Lozman’s floating home was a house-like plywood structure

with empty bilge space underneath the main floor to keep it afloat.

He had it towed several times before deciding on a marina owned by 

the city of Riviera Beach (City). After various disputes with Lozman

and unsuccessful efforts to evict him from the marina, the City

brought a federal admiralty lawsuit in rem against the floating home, 

seeking a lien for dockage fees and damages for trespass. Lozman 

moved to dismiss the suit for lack of admiralty jurisdiction. The District Court found the floating home to be a “vessel” under the Rules of

Construction Act, which defines a “vessel” as including “every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable 

of being used, as a means of transportation on water,” 1 U. S. C. §3,

concluded that admiralty jurisdiction was proper, and awarded the

City dockage fees and nominal damages. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the home was a “vessel” since it was “capable”

of movement over water despite petitioner’s subjective intent to remain moored indefinitely. 

Held: 

1. This case is not moot. The District Court ordered the floating 

home sold, and the City purchased the home at auction and had it

destroyed. Before the sale, the court ordered the City to post a bond

to ensure Lozman could obtain monetary relief if he prevailed. P. 3. 

2. Lozman’s floating home is not a §3 “vessel.” Pp. 3–15.

(a) The Eleventh Circuit found the home “capable of being used 

. . . as a means of transportation on water” because it could float and 

proceed under tow and its shore connections did not render it incapable of transportation. This interpretation is too broad. The definition 

of “transportation,” the conveyance of persons or things from one 
 

 

 

 

 

 

2 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

Syllabus 

place to another, must be applied in a practical way. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U. S. 481, 496. Consequently, a structure does 

not fall within the scope of the statutory phrase unless a reasonable

observer, looking to the home’s physical characteristics and activities, 

would consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or

things over water. Pp. 3–5.

(b) But for the fact that it floats, nothing about Lozman’s home 

suggests that it was designed to any practical degree to transport 

persons or things over water. It had no steering mechanism, had an

unraked hull and rectangular bottom 10 inches below the water, and

had no capacity to generate or store electricity. It also lacked selfpropulsion, differing significantly from an ordinary houseboat. 

Pp. 5–6.

(c) This view of the statute is consistent with its text, precedent, 

and relevant purposes. The statute’s language, read naturally, lends

itself to that interpretation: The term “contrivance” refers to something “employed in contriving to effect a purpose”; “craft” explains

that purpose as “water carriage and transport”; the addition of “water” to “craft” emphasizes the point; and the words, “used, or capable

of being used, as a means of transportation on water,” drive the point 

home. Both Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola 

Bottling Co., 271 U. S. 19, and Stewart, supra, support this conclusion. Evansville involved a wharfboat floated next to a dock, used to 

transfer cargo, and towed to harbor each winter; and Stewart involved a dredge used to remove silt from the ocean floor, which carried a captain and crew and could be navigated only by manipulating

anchors and cables or by being towed. Water transportation was not

the primary purpose of either structure; neither was in motion at relevant times; and both were sometimes attached to the ocean bottom 

or to land. However, Stewart’s dredge, which was regularly, but not 

primarily, used to transport workers and equipment over water, fell

within the statutory definition while Evansville’s wharfboat, which 

was not designed to, and did not, serve a transportation function, did 

not. Lower court cases, on balance, also tend to support this conclusion. Further, the purposes of major federal maritime statutes—e.g., 

admiralty provisions provide special attachment procedures lest a 

vessel avoid liability by sailing away, recognize that sailors face special perils at sea, and encourage shipowners to engage in port-related

commerce—reveal little reason to classify floating homes as “vessels.”

Finally, this conclusion is consistent with state laws in States where 

floating home owners have congregated in communities. Pp. 6–11.

(d) Several important arguments made by the City and its amici 

are unavailing. They argue that a purpose-based test may introduce 

a subjective element into “vessel” determinations. But the Court has 
 

 

Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 

Syllabus 

considered only objective evidence, looking to the views of a reasonable observer and the physical attributes and behavior of the structure. They also argue against using criteria that are too abstract,

complex, or open-ended. While this Court’s approach is neither perfectly precise nor always determinative, it is workable and consistent

and should offer guidance in a significant number of borderline cases.

And contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, the Court sees nothing to be 

gained by a remand. Pp. 11–14.

(e) The City’s additional argument that Lozman’s floating home 

was actually used for transportation over water is similarly unpersuasive. P. 14. 

649 F. 3d 1259, reversed. 

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and SCALIA, THOMAS, GINSBURG, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY, J., joined. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

 

Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 11–626 

FANE LOZMAN, PETITIONER v. THE CITY OF
 

RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[January 15, 2013]

 JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Rules of Construction Act defines a “vessel” as including “every description of watercraft or other artificial

contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of 

transportation on water.” 1 U. S. C. §3. The question before

us is whether petitioner’s floating home (which is not selfpropelled) falls within the terms of that definition.

In answering that question we focus primarily upon the

phrase “capable of being used.” This term encompasses

“practical” possibilities, not “merely . . . theoretical” ones. 

Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U. S. 481, 496 (2005).

We believe that a reasonable observer, looking to the 

home’s physical characteristics and activities, would not

consider it to be designed to any practical degree for carrying people or things on water. And we consequently conclude that the floating home is not a “vessel.” 

I 

In 2002 Fane Lozman, petitioner, bought a 60-foot by 

12-foot floating home. App. 37, 71. The home consisted of 

a house-like plywood structure with French doors on three 

sides. Id., at 38, 44. It contained a sitting room, bedroom, 
 

 

2 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

Opinion of the Court 

closet, bathroom, and kitchen, along with a stairway 

leading to a second level with office space. Id., at 45–66. 

An empty bilge space underneath the main floor kept it 

afloat. Id., at 38. (See Appendix, infra, for a photograph.)

After buying the floating home, Lozman had it towed 

about 200 miles to North Bay Village, Florida, where he 

moored it and then twice more had it towed between 

nearby marinas. In 2006 Lozman had the home towed a 

further 70 miles to a marina owned by the city of Riviera

Beach (City), respondent, where he kept it docked. Brief 

for Respondent 5.

After various disputes with Lozman and unsuccessful

efforts to evict him from the marina, the City brought

this federal admiralty lawsuit in rem against the floating 

home. It sought a maritime lien for dockage fees and 

damages for trespass. See Federal Maritime Lien Act, 46 

U. S. C. §31342 (authorizing federal maritime lien against 

vessel to collect debts owed for the provision of “necessaries to a vessel”); 28 U. S. C. §1333(1) (civil admiralty 

jurisdiction). See also Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185 

(1871); The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213, 215 (1867). 

 Lozman, acting pro se, asked the District Court to dismiss the suit on the ground that the court lacked admiralty jurisdiction. See 2 Record, Doc. 64. After summary

judgment proceedings, the court found that the floating 

home was a “vessel” and concluded that admiralty jurisdiction was consequently proper. Pet. for Cert. 42a. The 

judge then conducted a bench trial on the merits and

awarded the City $3,039.88 for dockage along with $1 in

nominal damages for trespass. Id., at 49a. 

On appeal the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Riviera Beach 

v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F. 3d 1259 (2011).

It agreed with the District Court that the home was a

“vessel.” In its view, the home was “capable” of movement 

over water and the owner’s subjective intent to remain 
Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

moored “indefinitely” at a dock could not show the contrary. Id., at 1267–1269. 

Lozman sought certiorari. In light of uncertainty among 

the Circuits about application of the term “capable” we 

granted his petition. Compare De La Rosa v. St. Charles 

Gaming Co., 474 F. 3d 185, 187 (CA5 2006) (structure is 

not a “vessel” where “physically,” but only “theoretical[ly],” 

“capable of sailing,” and owner intends to moor it indefinitely as floating casino), with Board of Comm’rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. M/V Belle of Orleans, 535 F. 3d 1299, 

1311–1312 (CA11 2008) (structure is a “vessel” where

capable of moving over water under tow, “albeit to her 

detriment,” despite intent to moor indefinitely). See also 

649 F. 3d, at 1267 (rejecting views of Circuits that “‘focus

on the intent of the shipowner’”). 

II 

At the outset we consider one threshold matter. The 

District Court ordered the floating home sold to satisfy 

the City’s judgment. The City bought the home at public

auction and subsequently had it destroyed. And, after the 

parties filed their merits briefs, we ordered further briefing on the question of mootness in light of the home’s 

destruction. 567 U. S. ___ (2012). The parties now have

pointed out that, prior to the home’s sale, the District 

Court ordered the City to post a $25,000 bond “to secure

Mr. Lozman’s value in the vessel.” 1 Record, Doc. 20, p. 2. 

The bond ensures that Lozman can obtain monetary relief 

if he ultimately prevails. We consequently agree with the 

parties that the case is not moot. 

III
 

A 

We focus primarily upon the statutory phrase “capable

of being used . . . as a means of transportation on water.” 

1 U. S. C. §3. The Court of Appeals found that the home 
 

 

 

 

 

4 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

Opinion of the Court 

was “capable” of transportation because it could float, it

could proceed under tow, and its shore connections (power

cable, water hose, rope lines) did not “ ‘rende[r]’” it “‘practically incapable of transportation or movement.’” 649 

F. 3d, at 1266 (quoting Belle of Orleans, supra, at 1312, 

in turn quoting Stewart, 543 U. S., at 494). At least for 

argument’s sake we agree with the Court of Appeals about

the last-mentioned point, namely that Lozman’s shore

connections did not “‘render’” the home “‘practically incapable of transportation.’” But unlike the Eleventh Circuit, 

we do not find these considerations (even when combined

with the home’s other characteristics) sufficient to show 

that Lozman’s home was a “vessel.” 

The Court of Appeals recognized that it had applied 

the term “capable” broadly. 649 F. 3d, at 1266. Indeed, 

it pointed with approval to language in an earlier case, 

Burks v. American River Transp. Co., 679 F. 2d 69 (1982), 

in which the Fifth Circuit said: 

“‘No doubt the three men in a tub would also fit within our definition, and one probably could make a convincing case for Jonah inside the whale.’” 649 F. 3d, 

at 1269 (brackets omitted) (quoting Burks, supra, at 

75). 

But the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation is too broad. Not 

every floating structure is a “vessel.” To state the obvious, 

a wooden washtub, a plastic dishpan, a swimming platform on pontoons, a large fishing net, a door taken off 

its hinges, or Pinocchio (when inside the whale) are not 

“vessels,” even if they are “artificial contrivance[s]” capable 

of floating, moving under tow, and incidentally carrying 

even a fair-sized item or two when they do so. Rather, the

statute applies to an “artificial contrivance . . . capable of 

being used . . . as a means of transportation on water.” 1 

U. S. C. §3 (emphasis added). “[T]ransportation” involves

the “conveyance (of things or persons) from one place to 
 

 

Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

another.” 18 Oxford English Dictionary 424 (2d ed. 1989) 

(OED). Accord, N. Webster, An American Dictionary of 

the English Language 1406 (C. Goodrich & N. Porter 

eds. 1873) (“[t]he act of transporting, carrying, or conveying 

from one place to another”). And we must apply this

definition in a “practical,” not a “theoretical,” way. Stewart, supra, at 496. Consequently, in our view a structure 

does not fall within the scope of this statutory phrase 

unless a reasonable observer, looking to the home’s physical characteristics and activities, would consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or things 

over water. 

B 

Though our criterion is general, the facts of this case 

illustrate more specifically what we have in mind. But 

for the fact that it floats, nothing about Lozman’s home

suggests that it was designed to any practical degree to 

transport persons or things over water. It had no rudder 

or other steering mechanism. 649 F. 3d, at 1269. Its hull 

was unraked, ibid., and it had a rectangular bottom 10 

inches below the water. Brief for Petitioner 27; App. 37. 

It had no special capacity to generate or store electricity

but could obtain that utility only through ongoing connections with the land. Id., at 40. Its small rooms looked like 

ordinary nonmaritime living quarters. And those inside 

those rooms looked out upon the world, not through watertight portholes, but through French doors or ordinary

windows. Id., at 44–66. 

Although lack of self-propulsion is not dispositive, e.g., 

The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17, 31 (1903), it may be 

a relevant physical characteristic. And Lozman’s home 

differs significantly from an ordinary houseboat in that it

has no ability to propel itself. Cf. 33 CFR §173.3 (2012)

(“Houseboat means a motorized vessel . . . designed primarily for multi-purpose accommodation spaces with low 
 

 

6 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

Opinion of the Court 

freeboard and little or no foredeck or cockpit” (emphasis 

added)). Lozman’s home was able to travel over water 

only by being towed. Prior to its arrest, that home’s travel 

by tow over water took place on only four occasions over a 

period of seven years. Supra, at 2. And when the home 

was towed a significant distance in 2006, the towing company had a second boat follow behind to prevent the home 

from swinging dangerously from side to side. App. 104.

The home has no other feature that might suggest a

design to transport over water anything other than its

own furnishings and related personal effects. In a word, 

we can find nothing about the home that could lead a

reasonable observer to consider it designed to a practical

degree for “transportation on water.” 

C 

Our view of the statute is consistent with its text, precedent, and relevant purposes. For one thing, the statute’s

language, read naturally, lends itself to that interpretation. We concede that the statute uses the word “every,” 

referring to “every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance.” 1 U. S. C. §3 (emphasis added). But 

the term “contrivance” refers to “something contrived for,

or employed in contriving to effect a purpose.” 3 OED 850 

(def. 7). The term “craft” explains that purpose as “water

carriage and transport.” Id., at 1104 (def. V(9)(b)) (defining “craft” as a “vesse[l] . . . for” that purpose). The addition of the word “water” to “craft,” yielding the term 

“watercraft,” emphasizes the point. And the next few words, 

“used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water,” drive the point home. 

For another thing, the bulk of precedent supports our 

conclusion. In Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. 

Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U. S. 19 (1926), the Court 

held that a wharfboat was not a “vessel.” The wharfboat 

floated next to a dock; it was used to transfer cargo from 
 

Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

ship to dock and ship to ship; and it was connected to the

dock with cables, utility lines, and a ramp. Id., at 21. At 

the same time, it was capable of being towed. And it 

was towed each winter to a harbor to avoid river ice. Id., 

at 20–21. The Court reasoned that, despite the annual 

movement under tow, the wharfboat “was not used to 

carry freight from one place to another,” nor did it “encounter perils of navigation to which craft used for transportation are exposed.” Id., at 22. (See Appendix, infra, 

for photograph of a period wharfboat). 

The Court’s reasoning in Stewart also supports our 

conclusion. We there considered the application of the

statutory definition to a dredge. 543 U. S., at 494. The 

dredge was “a massive floating platform” from which a

suspended clamshell bucket would “remov[e] silt from the 

ocean floor,” depositing it “onto one of two scows” floating

alongside the dredge. Id., at 484. Like more traditional 

“seagoing vessels,” the dredge had, e.g., “a captain and 

crew, navigational lights, ballast tanks, and a crew dining

area.” Ibid. Unlike more ordinary vessels, it could navigate only by “manipulating its anchors and cables” or by

being towed. Ibid. Nonetheless it did move. In fact it 

moved over water “every couple of hours.” Id., at 485. 

We held that the dredge was a “vessel.” We wrote that 

§3’s definition “merely codified the meaning that the term 

‘vessel’ had acquired in general maritime law.” Id., at 490. 

We added that the question of the “watercraft’s use ‘as a

means of transportation on water’ is . . . practical,” and not

“merely . . . theoretical.” Id., at 496. And we pointed to 

cases holding that dredges ordinarily “served a waterborne

transportation function,” namely that “in performing their

work they carried machinery, equipment, and crew over

water.” Id., at 491–492 (citing, e.g., Butler v. Ellis, 45 

F. 2d 951, 955 (CA4 1930)).

As the Court of Appeals pointed out, in Stewart we also 

wrote that §3 “does not require that a watercraft be used 
 

 

 

 

 

8 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

Opinion of the Court 

primarily for that [transportation] purpose,” 543 U. S., 

at 495; that a “watercraft need not be in motion to qualify 

as a vessel,” ibid.; and that a structure may qualify as a

vessel even if attached—but not “permanently” attached—

to the land or ocean floor. Id., at 493–494. We did not 

take these statements, however, as implying a universal

set of sufficient conditions for application of the definition. 

Rather, they say, and they mean, that the statutory definition may (or may not) apply—not that it automatically 

must apply—where a structure has some other primary

purpose, where it is stationary at relevant times, and 

where it is attached—but not permanently attached—to

land. 

After all, a washtub is normally not a “vessel” though it 

does not have water transportation as its primary purpose, it may be stationary much of the time, and it might 

be attached—but not permanently attached—to land.

More to the point, water transportation was not the primary purpose of either Stewart’s dredge or Evansville’s 

wharfboat; neither structure was “in motion” at relevant 

times; and both were sometimes attached (though not 

permanently attached) to the ocean bottom or to land.

Nonetheless Stewart’s dredge fell within the statute’s 

definition while Evansville’s wharfboat did not. 

The basic difference, we believe, is that the dredge was

regularly, but not primarily, used (and designed in part to 

be used) to transport workers and equipment over water 

while the wharfboat was not designed (to any practical 

degree) to serve a transportation function and did not do 

so. Compare Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U. S. 625 

(1887) (floating drydock not a “vessel” because permanently

fixed to wharf), with Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great 

Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U. S. 527, 535 (1995) (barge 

sometimes attached to river bottom to use as a work platform remains a “vessel” when “at other times it was used 

for transportation”). See also ibid. (citing Great Lakes 
Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

Dredge & Dock Co. v. Chicago, 3 F. 3d 225, 229 (CA7 1993) 

(“[A] craft is a ‘vessel’ if its purpose is to some reasonable

degree ‘the transportation of passengers, cargo, or equipment from place to place across navigable waters’”)); Cope, 

supra, at 630 (describing “hopper-barge,” as potentially 

a “vessel” because it is a “navigable structure[,] used for 

the purpose of transportation”); cf. 1 Benedict on Admiralty

§164, p. 10–6 (7th rev. ed. 2012) (maritime jurisdiction

proper if “the craft is a navigable structure intended for

maritime transportation”).

Lower court cases also tend, on balance, to support our 

conclusion. See, e.g., Bernard v. Binnings Constr. Co., 741 

F. 2d 824, 828, n. 13, 832, n. 25 (CA5 1984) (work punt

lacking features objectively indicating a transportation

function not a “vessel,” for “our decisions make clear that 

the mere capacity to float or move across navigable waters

does not necessarily make a structure a vessel”); Ruddiman v. A Scow Platform, 38 F. 158 (SDNY 1889) (scow, 

though “capable of being towed . . . though not without

some difficulty, from its clumsy structure” just a floating

box, not a “vessel,” because “it was not designed or used 

for the purpose of navigation,” not engaged “in the transportation of persons or cargo,” and had “no motive power,

no rudder, no sails”). See also 1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law §3–6, p. 155 (5th ed. 2011) (courts 

have found that “floating dry-dock[s],” “floating platforms,

barges, or rafts used for construction or repair of piers, 

docks, bridges, pipelines and other” similar facilities are 

not “vessels”); E. Benedict, American Admiralty §215, 

p. 116 (3d rev. ed. 1898) (defining “vessel” as a “‘machine

adapted to transportation over rivers, seas, and oceans’”).

We recognize that some lower court opinions can be read

as endorsing the “anything that floats” approach. See 

Miami River Boat Yard, Inc. v. 60’ Houseboat, 390 F. 2d 

596, 597 (CA5 1968) (so-called “houseboat” lacking selfpropulsion); Sea Village Marina, LLC v. A 1980 Carlcraft 
 

 

10 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

Opinion of the Court 

Houseboat, No. 09–3292, 2009 WL 3379923, *5–*6 (D NJ,

Oct. 19, 2009) (following Miami River Boat Yard); Hudson 

Harbor 79th Street Boat Basin, Inc. v. Sea Casa, 469 F. 

Supp. 987, 989 (SDNY 1979) (same). Cf. Holmes v. Atlantic Sounding Co., 437 F. 3d 441 (CA5 2006) (floating dormitory); Summerlin v. Massman Constr. Co., 199 F. 2d 

715 (CA4 1952) (derrick anchored in the river engaged in

building a bridge is a vessel). For the reasons we have 

stated, we find such an approach inappropriate and inconsistent with our precedents.

Further, our examination of the purposes of major federal maritime statutes reveals little reason to classify

floating homes as “vessels.” Admiralty law, for example,

provides special attachment procedures lest a vessel avoid 

liability by sailing away. 46 U. S. C. §§31341–31343 (2006 

ed. and Supp. IV). Liability statutes such as the Jones Act 

recognize that sailors face the special “‘perils of the sea.’” 

Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U. S. 347, 354, 373 (1995) 

(referring to “‘vessel[s] in navigation’”). Certain admiralty

tort doctrines can encourage shipowners to engage in 

port-related commerce. E.g., 46 U. S. C. §30505; Executive 

Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U. S. 249, 269–270 

(1972). And maritime safety statutes subject vessels to U. S. 

Coast Guard inspections. E.g., 46 U. S. C. §3301. 

Lozman, however, cannot easily escape liability by 

sailing away in his home. He faces no special sea dangers.

He does not significantly engage in port-related commerce. 

And the Solicitor General tells us that to adopt a version 

of the “anything that floats” test would place unnecessary and undesirable inspection burdens upon the Coast 

Guard. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29, 

n. 11. 

Finally, our conclusion is consistent with state laws

in States where floating home owners have congregated in 

communities. See Brief for Seattle Floating Homes Association et al. as Amici Curiae 1. A Washington State 
 

 

Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

environmental statute, for example, defines a floating 

home (for regulatory purposes) as “a single-family dwelling unit constructed on a float, that is moored, anchored,

or otherwise secured in waters, and is not a vessel, even 

though it may be capable of being towed.” Wash. Rev. 

Code Ann. §90.58.270(5)(b)(ii) (Supp. 2012). A California 

statute defines a floating home (for tax purposes) as “a

floating structure” that is “designed and built to be used, 

or is modified to be used, as a stationary waterborne residential dwelling,” and which (unlike a typical houseboat), 

has no independent power generation, and is dependent 

on shore utilities. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. 

§18075.55(d) (West 2006). These States, we are told, treat 

structures that meet their “floating home” definitions like 

ordinary land-based homes rather than like vessels. Brief 

for Seattle Floating Homes Association 2. Consistency of

interpretation of related state and federal laws is a virtue

in that it helps to create simplicity making the law easier 

to understand and to follow for lawyers and for nonlawyers alike. And that consideration here supports our 

conclusion. 

D 

The City and supporting amici make several important

arguments that warrant our response. First, they argue against use of any purpose-based test lest we introduce into “vessel” determinations a subjective element—

namely, the owner’s intent. That element, they say, is 

often “unverifiable” and too easily manipulated. Its introduction would “foment unpredictability and invite gamesmanship.” Brief for Respondent 33.

We agree with the City about the need to eliminate the 

consideration of evidence of subjective intent. But we 

cannot agree that the need requires abandonment of all 

criteria based on “purpose.” Cf. Stewart, 543 U. S., at 495 

(discussing transportation purpose). Indeed, it is difficult, 
 

 

 

12 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

Opinion of the Court 

if not impossible, to determine the use of a human “contrivance” without some consideration of human purposes.

At the same time, we have sought to avoid subjective 

elements, such as owner’s intent, by permitting consideration only of objective evidence of a waterborne transportation purpose. That is why we have referred to the views of

a reasonable observer. Supra, at 1. And it is why we have 

looked to the physical attributes and behavior of the structure, as objective manifestations of any relevant purpose, 

and not to the subjective intent of the owner. Supra, at 

5–6. We note that various admiralty treatises refer to 

the use of purpose-based tests without any suggestion that 

administration of those tests has introduced too much 

subjectivity into the vessel-determination process. 1 

Benedict on Admiralty §164; 1 Admiralty and Maritime

Law §3–6.

Second, the City, with support of amici, argues against 

the use of criteria that are too abstract, complex, or openended. Brief for Respondent 28–29. A court’s jurisdiction, 

e.g., admiralty jurisdiction, may turn on application of 

the term “vessel.” And jurisdictional tests, often applied 

at the outset of a case, should be “as simple as possible.” 

Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., 

at 1).

We agree with the last-mentioned sentiment. And we 

also understand that our approach is neither perfectly precise nor always determinative. Satisfaction of a designbased or purpose-related criterion, for example, is not 

always sufficient for application of the statutory word 

“vessel.” A craft whose physical characteristics and activities objectively evidence a waterborne transportation

purpose or function may still be rendered a nonvessel by

later physical alterations. For example, an owner might

take a structure that is otherwise a vessel (even the Queen 

Mary) and connect it permanently to the land for use, say,

as a hotel. See Stewart, supra, at 493–494. Further, 
 

Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

changes over time may produce a new form, i.e., a newly 

designed structure—in which case it may be the new design that is relevant. See Kathriner v. Unisea, Inc., 975 

F. 2d 657, 660 (CA9 1992) (floating processing plant was 

no longer a vessel where a “large opening [had been] cut 

into her hull”).

Nor is satisfaction of the criterion always a necessary

condition, see Part IV, infra. It is conceivable that an 

owner might actually use a floating structure not designed 

to any practical degree for transportation as, say, a ferry

boat, regularly transporting goods and persons over water.

Nonetheless, we believe the criterion we have used, 

taken together with our example of its application here,

should offer guidance in a significant number of borderline 

cases where “capacity” to transport over water is in doubt.

Moreover, borderline cases will always exist; they require 

a method for resolution; we believe the method we have 

used is workable; and, unlike, say, an “anything that 

floats” test, it is consistent with statutory text, purpose, 

and precedent. Nor do we believe that the dissent’s approach would prove any more workable. For example,

the dissent suggests a relevant distinction between an owner’s “clothes and personal effects” and “large appliances

(like an oven or a refrigerator).” Post, at 8 (opinion of 

SOTOMAYOR, J.). But a transportation function need not 

turn on the size of the items in question, and we believe

the line between items being transported from place to 

place (e.g., cargo) and items that are mere appurtenances 

is the one more likely to be relevant. Cf. Benedict, American Admiralty §222, at 121 (“A ship is usually described as

consisting of the ship, her tackle, apparel, and furniture 

. . .”).

Finally, the dissent and the Solicitor General (as amicus 

for Lozman) argue that a remand is warranted for further

factfinding. See post, at 10–12; Brief for United States as 

Amicus Curiae 29–31. But neither the City nor Lozman 
 

 

 

 

14 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

Opinion of the Court 

makes such a request. Brief for Respondent 18, 49, 52. 

And the only potentially relevant factual dispute the dissent points to is that the home suffered serious damage 

during a tow. Post, at 10–11. But this would add support

to our ultimate conclusion that this floating home was not 

a vessel. We consequently see nothing to be gained by a 

remand. 

IV 

Although we have focused on the phrase “capable of being used” for transportation over water, the statute also

includes as a “vessel” a structure that is actually “used” 

for that transportation. 1 U. S. C. §3 (emphasis added).

And the City argues that, irrespective of its design, Lozman’s floating home was actually so used. Brief for 

Respondent 32. We are not persuaded by its argument.

We are willing to assume for argument’s sake that 

sometimes it is possible actually to use for water transportation a structure that is in no practical way designed for

that purpose. See supra, at 12–13. But even so, the City

cannot show the actual use for which it argues. Lozman’s 

floating home moved only under tow. Before its arrest, it 

moved significant distances only twice in seven years. 

And when it moved, it carried, not passengers or cargo, 

but at the very most (giving the benefit of any factual

ambiguity to the City) only its own furnishings, its owner’s

personal effects, and personnel present to assure the

home’s safety. 649 F. 3d, at 1268; Brief for Respondent 32;

Tr. of Oral Arg. 37–38. This is far too little actual “use” to 

bring the floating home within the terms of the statute.

See Evansville, 271 U. S., at 20–21 (wharfboat not a “vessel” even though “[e]ach winter” it “was towed to [a] harbor to protect it from ice”); see also Roper v. United States, 

368 U. S. 20, 23 (1961) (“Unlike a barge, the S. S. Harry 

Lane was not moved in order to transport commodities

from one location to another”). See also supra, at 6–11. 
 

Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

V 

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 

is reversed. 

It is so ordered. 
 

Opinion of the Court 

 

16 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

Appendix to opinion of the Court 

APPENDIX
 

Petitioner’s floating home. App. 69. 
Opinion of the Court 

Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 17 

Appendix to opinion of the Court 

50- by 200-foot wharf boat in Evansville, Indiana, on Nov. 13, 1918. 

H. R. Doc. No. 1521, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., Illustration No. 13 (1918). 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 11–626 

FANE LOZMAN, PETITIONER v. THE CITY OF
 

RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[January 15, 2013]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY 

joins, dissenting. 

I agree with much of the Court’s reasoning. Our precedents fully support the Court’s reasoning that the Eleventh Circuit’s test is overinclusive; that the subjective

intentions of a watercraft’s owner or designer play no role

in the vessel analysis of 1 U. S. C. §3; and that an objective assessment of a watercraft’s purpose or function

governs whether that structure is a vessel. The Court, 

however, creates a novel and unnecessary “reasonable

observer” reformulation of these principles and errs in its

determination, under this new standard, that the craft 

before us is not a vessel. Given the underdeveloped record below, we should remand. Therefore, I respectfully 

dissent. 

I 

The relevant statute, 1 U. S. C. §3, “sweeps broadly.” 

Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U. S. 481, 494 (2005). It 

provides that “[t]he word ‘vessel’ includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or 

capable of being used, as a means of transportation on

water.” This broad phrasing flows from admiralty law’s

long recognition that vessels come in many shapes and 

sizes. See E. Benedict, American Admiralty §218, p. 121 
 

 

 

2 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

(1870 ed.) (“[V]essel, is a general word, many times used 

for any kind of navigation”); M. Cohen, Admiralty Jurisdiction, Law, and Practice 232 (1883) (“[T]he term ‘vessel’ shall be understood to comprehend every description of 

vessel navigating on any sea or channel, lake or river 

. . . ”).

Our test for vessel status has remained the same for 

decades: “Under §3, a ‘vessel’ is any watercraft practically 

capable of maritime transportation . . . .” Stewart, 543 

U. S., at 497; see also Evansville & Bowling Green Packet 

Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U. S. 19, 22 (1926); 

Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U. S. 625, 627 (1887). 

At its core, vessel status has always rested upon the objective physical characteristics of a vessel (such as its structure, shape, and materials of construction), as well as its 

usage history. But over time, several important principles

have guided both this Court and the lower courts in determining what kinds of watercraft fall properly within

the scope of admiralty jurisdiction. 

Consider the most basic of requirements. For a watercraft to be “practically capable” of maritime transportation, it must first be “capable” of such transportation.

Only those structures that can simultaneously float and 

carry people or things over water are even presumptively 

within §3’s reach. Stopping here, as the Eleventh Circuit

essentially did, results in an overinclusive test. Section 3, 

after all, does not drag every bit of floating and towable 

flotsam and jetsam into admiralty jurisdiction. Rather, 

the terms “capable of being used” and “practical” have real

significance in our maritime jurisprudence. 

“[A] water craft is not ‘capable of being used’ for maritime transport in any meaningful sense if it has been 

permanently moored.” Stewart, 543 U. S., at 494. So, to 

take an obvious example, a floating bridge over water does 

not constitute a vessel; such mooring is clearly permanent.

Cf. The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213, 216 (1867). Less 
Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

dramatically, a watercraft whose objective physical connections to land “evidence a permanent location” does not 

fall within §3’s ambit. See, e.g., Evansville, 271 U. S., at 

22 (“[The wharfboat] served at Evansville as an office, 

warehouse and wharf, and was not taken from place to 

place. The connections with the water, electric light and

telephone systems of the city evidence a permanent location”); Dunklin v. Louisiana Riverboat Gaming Partnership, No. 00–31455, 2001 WL 650209, *1, n. 1 (CA5, May 

22, 2001) (per curiam) (describing a fully functional casino boat placed “in an enclosed pond in a cofferdam”). Put 

plainly, structures “permanently affixed to shore or resting on the ocean floor,” Stewart, 543 U. S., at 493–494, 

have never been treated as vessels for the purposes of §3.

Our precedents have also excluded from vessel status 

those watercraft “rendered practically incapable of transportation or movement.” Id., at 494. Take the easiest 

case, a vessel whose physical characteristics have been so

altered as to make waterborne transportation a practical 

impossibility. Ibid. (explaining that a “floating processing 

plant was no longer a vessel where a ‘large opening [had

been] cut into her hull,’ rendering her incapable of moving

over the water” (quoting Kathriner v. UNISEA, Inc., 975 

F. 2d 657, 660 (CA9 1992)). The longstanding admiralty

exception for “dead ships,” those watercraft that “require

a major overhaul” for their “reactivation,” also falls into

this category. See Roper v. United States, 368 U. S. 20, 21 

(1961) (finding that a liberty ship “deactivated from service and ‘mothballed’ ” is not a “vessel in navigation”); see

generally Rutherglen, Dead Ships, 30 J. Maritime L. & 

Comm. 677 (1999).1 Likewise, ships that “have been 

—————— 

1The converse category of ships “not yet born” is another historical 

exclusion from vessel status. See Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424, 

438 (1902) (“A ship is born when she is launched, and lives so long as

her identity is preserved. Prior to her launching she is a mere congeries of wood and iron—an ordinary piece of personal property—as 
 

4 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

withdrawn from the water for extended periods of time” in 

order to facilitate repairs and reconstruction may lose 

their status as vessels until they are rendered capable of 

maritime transport. Stewart, 543 U. S., at 496. Cf. West 

v. United States, 361 U. S. 118, 120, 122 (1959) (noting 

that “the Mary Austin was withdrawn from any operation

whatever while in storage with the ‘moth-ball fleet’ ” and

that “[t]he Mary Austin, as anyone could see, was not in 

maritime service. She was undergoing major repairs and

complete renovation . . . ”). 

Finally, our maritime jurisprudence excludes from vessel status those floating structures that, based on their 

physical characteristics, do not “transport people, freight,

or cargo from place to place” as one of their purposes. 

Stewart, 543 U. S., at 493. “Purpose,” in this context,

is determined solely by an objective inquiry into a craft’s

function. “[N]either size, form, equipment nor means of 

propulsion are determinative factors upon the question of

[vessel status],” though all may be considered. The Robert 

W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17, 30 (1903). Moreover, in assessing a particular structure’s function, we have consistently examined its past and present activities. Stewart, 

543 U. S., at 495; Cope, 119 U. S., at 627. Of course, a 

seaborne craft is not excluded from vessel status simply 

because its “primary purpose” is not maritime transport. 

Stewart, 543 U. S., at 497. We held as much in Stewart 

when we concluded that a dredge was a vessel notwithstanding that its “primary purpose” was “dredging rather

than transportation.” Id., at 486, 495. So long as one

purpose of a craft is transportation, whether of cargo or

people or both, §3’s practical capability requirement is 

satisfied. 

Certainly, difficult and marginal cases will arise. For-

—————— 

distinctly a land structure as a house, and subject only to mechanics’

liens created by state law and enforceable in the state courts”). 
Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

tunately, courts do not consider each floating structure 

anew. So, for example, when we were confronted in Stewart with the question whether a dredge is a §3 vessel, we

did not commence with a clean slate; we instead sought 

guidance from previous cases that had confronted similar 

structures. See id., at 490, and n. 5; see also Norton v. 

Warner Co., 321 U. S. 565, 571–572 (1944) (likewise surveying earlier cases).

In sum, our precedents offer substantial guidance for 

how objectively to determine whether a watercraft is 

practically capable of maritime transport and thus qualifies as a §3 vessel. First, the capacity to float and carry

things or people is an obvious prerequisite to vessel status. 

Second, structures or ships that are permanently moored 

or fixed in place are not §3 vessels. Likewise, structures 

that are practically incapable of maritime transport are 

not vessels, whether they are ships that have been altered 

so that they may no longer be put to sea, dead ships, or 

ships removed from navigation for extended periods of 

time. Third, those watercraft whose physical characteristics and usage history reveal no maritime transport purpose or use are not §3 vessels. 

II 

The majority does not appear to disavow the legal principles described above. The majority apparently accepts 

that permanent mooring suffices to take a ship out of 

vessel status, ante, at 8, 12,2 and that “[a] craft whose 

—————— 

2 In discussing permanent mooring, as well as Stewart’s rejection of 

primary-purpose and state-of-transit tests for vessel status, Stewart v. 

Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U. S. 481, 495 (2005), the majority states that

our holdings “say, and they mean, that the statutory definition [given 

by §3] may (or may not) apply—not that it automatically must apply—

where a structure has some other primary purpose, where it is stationary at relevant times, and where it is attached—but not permanently

attached—to land.” Ante, at 8. This must mean, by negative implication, that a permanently moored structure never falls within §3’s 
 

6 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

physical characteristics and activities objectively evidence 

a waterborne transportation purpose or function may still

be rendered a nonvessel by later physical alterations,” 

ante, at 12–13.3 No one argues that Lozman’s craft was

permanently moored, see App. 32 (describing the “deteriorated” ropes holding the craft in place), or that it had undergone physical alterations sufficient to take it out of 

vessel status, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 13 (Lozman’s counsel

arguing that the craft was never a vessel in the first 

place). Our precedents make clear that the Eleventh 

Circuit’s “anything that floats” test is overinclusive and 

ignores that purpose is a crucial factor in determining

whether a particular craft is or is not a vessel. Accordingly, the majority is correct that determining whether 

Lozman’s craft is a vessel hinges on whether that craft 

had any maritime transportation purpose or function.

The majority errs, though, in concluding that the purpose component of the §3 test is whether “a reasonable 

observer, looking to the [craft]’s physical characteristics 

and activities, would not consider it to be designed to any

practical degree for carrying people or things on water.” 

Ante, at 1. This phrasing has never appeared in any of 

our cases and the majority’s use of it, despite its seemingly 

objective gloss, effectively (and erroneously) introduces a

subjective component into the vessel-status inquiry. 

For one thing, in applying this test the majority points

to some characteristics of Lozman’s craft that have no 

relationship to maritime transport, such as the style of the 

craft’s rooms or that “those inside those rooms looked out 

upon the world, not through water-tight portholes, but 

—————— 

definition. 3Presumably, this encompasses those kinds of ships “otherwise rendered practically incapable of transportation or movement.” Stewart, 

543 U. S., at 494. That is, ships which have been altered so they cannot 

travel the seas, dead ships, and ships removed from the water for an

extended period of time. Supra, at 3–4. 
 

Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

through French doors or ordinary windows.” Ante, at 5. 

The majority never explains why it believes these particular esthetic elements are important for determining vessel 

status. In fact, they are not. Section 3 is focused on 

whether a structure is “used, or capable of being used, as 

a means of transportation on water.” By importing windows, doors, room style, and other esthetic criteria into the 

§3 analysis, the majority gives our vessel test an “I know it 

when I see it” flavor. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 197 

(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). But that has never been 

nor should it be the test: A badly designed and unattractive vessel is different from a structure that lacks any

“practical capacity” for maritime transport. In the majority’s eyes, the two appear to be one and the same. 

The majority’s treatment of the craft’s past voyages is

also strange. The majority notes that Lozman’s craft could 

be and was, in fact, towed over long distances, including

over 200 miles at one point. Ante, at 2–6. But the majority determines that, given the design of Lozman’s craft, 

this is “far too little actual ‘use’ to bring the floating home

within the terms of the statute.” Ante, at 14. This is 

because “when it moved, it carried, not passengers or 

cargo, but at the very most (giving the benefit of any 

factual ambiguity to the City) only its own furnishings, its

owner’s personal effects, and personnel present to assure 

the home’s safety.” Ante, at 13–14. 

I find this analysis confusing. The majority accepts that

the record indicates that Lozman’s craft traveled hundreds 

of miles while “carrying people or things.” Ante, at 1. But 

then, in the same breath, the majority concludes that a 

“reasonable observer” would nonetheless conclude that the 

craft was not “designed to any practical degree for carrying people or things on water.” Ibid. The majority fails to

explain how a craft that apparently did carry people and 

things over water for long distances was not “practically

capable” of maritime transport. 
 

 

 

8 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

This is not to say that a structure capable of such feats

is necessarily a vessel. A craft like Lozman’s might not 

be a vessel, for example, if it could only carry its owner’s 

clothes and personal effects, or if it is only capable of 

transporting itself and its appurtenances. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U. S. 

527, 535 (1995) (“[M]aritime law . . . ordinarily treats an

‘appurtenance’ attached to a vessel in navigable waters as 

part of the vessel itself ”). But if such a craft can carry

large appliances (like an oven or a refrigerator) and all of

the other things we might find in a normal home in addition to the occupants of that home, as the existing record

suggests Lozman’s craft may have done, then it would

seem to be much more like a mobile home (and therefore a 

vessel) than a firmly rooted residence. The simple truth is

that we know very little about the craft’s capabilities and 

what did or did not happen on its various trips. By focusing on the little we do know for certain about this craft

(i.e., its windows, doors, and the style of its rooms) in

determining whether it is a vessel, the majority renders 

the §3 inquiry opaque and unpredictable.

Indeed, the little we do know about Lozman’s craft 

suggests only that it was an unusual structure. A surveyor was unable to find any comparable craft for sale in the 

State of Florida. App. 43. Lozman’s home was neither 

obviously a houseboat, as the majority describes such 

ships, ante, at 5–6, nor clearly a floating home, ante, at 

10–11. See App. 13, 31, 79 (sale, lease, and surveying 

documents describing Lozman’s craft as a “houseboat”).

The only clear difference that the majority identifies between these two kinds of structures is that the former are 

self-propelled, while the latter are not. Ante, at 5–6. But 

even the majority recognizes that self-propulsion has 

never been a prerequisite for vessel status. Ante, at 5 

(citing The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S., at 31); see Norton, 321 U. S., at 571. Consequently, it is unclear why 
Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 9 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Lozman’s craft is a floating home, why all floating homes

are not vessels,4 or why Lozman’s craft is not a vessel. If 

windows, doors, and other esthetic attributes are what 

take Lozman’s craft out of vessel status, then the majority’s test is completely malleable. If it is the craft’s lack of 

self-propulsion, then the majority’s test is unfaithful to our

longstanding precedents. See The Robert W. Parsons, 191 

U. S., at 30–31. If it is something else, then that something is not apparent from the majority’s opinion. 

Worse still, in straining to find that Lozman’s craft

was a floating home and therefore not a vessel, the majority calls into question the conclusions of numerous lower 

courts that have found houseboats that lacked selfpropulsion to be §3 vessels. See ante, at 9–10 (citing 

Miami River Boat Yard, Inc. v. 60’ Houseboat, 390 F. 2d 

596, 597 (CA5 1968); Sea Village Marina, LLC v. A 1980 

Carlcraft Houseboat, No. 09–3292, 2009 WL 3379923, *5– 

*6 (D NJ, Oct. 19, 2009); Hudson Harbor 79th Street Boat 

Basin, Inc. v. Sea Casa, 469 F. Supp. 987, 989 (SDNY 

1979)). The majority incorrectly suggests that these cases 

applied an “ ‘anything that floats’ ” test. Ante, at 9. These 

cases suggest something different. Many of these decisions in assessing the crafts before them looked carefully 

at these crafts’ structure and function, and determined 

that these ships had capabilities similar to other longestablished vessels, suggesting a significant maritime 

—————— 

4To be clear, some floating homes are obviously not vessels. For example, some floating homes are structures built upon a large inverted

pyramid of logs. Brief for Seattle Floating Homes Assn. et al. as Amici 

Curiae 14. Cf. App. 38 (Lozman’s craft was buoyed by an empty bilge 

space). These kinds of floating homes can measure 4,000 or 5,000

square feet, see Brief for Seattle Floating Homes Assn. et al. as Amici 

Curiae 4, and may have connections to land that require the aid of 

divers and electricians to remove, ibid. These large, immobile structures are not vessels and have physical attributes directly connected to

their lack of navigational abilities that suggest as much. But these 

structures are not before us; Lozman’s craft is. 
 

10 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

transportation function. See Miami River Boat Yard, 390 

F. 2d, at 597 (likening houseboat at issue to a “barg[e]”); 

Sea Village Marina, 2009 WL 3379923, *7 (“According to 

the available evidence, [the houseboats in question] float 

and can be towed to a new marina without substantial 

effort . . . ”); Hudson Harbor, 469 F. Supp., at 989 (houseboat “was capable of being used at least to the extent that 

a ‘dumb barge’ is capable of being used” and comparable

to a “yach[t]”). Their holdings are consistent with older 

cases, see, e.g., The Ark, 17 F. 2d 446, 447 (SD Fla. 1926),

and the crafts at issue in these cases have been widely 

accepted as vessels by most treatises in this area, see 1 S.

Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty §164, p. 10–6, n. 2 (7th ed. 

rev. 2012); 1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law 

§3–6, p. 153, n. 10 (5th ed. 2011); 1 R. Force & M. Norris,

The Law of Seamen §2:12, p. 2–82 (5th ed. 2003). The 

majority’s suggestion that rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s 

test necessitates jettisoning these other precedents is

simply wrong. And, in its rejection, the majority works 

real damage to what has long been a settled area of maritime law.5 

III 

With a more developed record, Lozman’s craft might be 

distinguished from the houseboats in those lower court 

—————— 

5The majority’s invocation of two state environmental and tax statutes as a reason to reject this well-established lower court precedent

is particularly misguided. See ante, at 10–11. We have repeatedly

emphasized that the “regulation of maritime vessels” is a “uniquely 

federal are[a] of regulation.” Chamber of Commerce of United States 

of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. __, __ (2011) (plurality opinion) (slip op.,

at 19) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U. S. 89, 

99 (2000) (explaining that “the federal interest [in regulating interstate

navigation] has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic and 

is now well established”). Our previous cases did not turn to state law

in determining whether a given craft is a vessel. There are no good 

reasons to do so now. 
 

 

Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013) 11 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

cases just discussed. For example, if Lozman’s craft’s 

previous voyages caused it serious damage, then that

would strongly suggest that it lacked a maritime transportation purpose or function. There is no harm in remanding the case for further factfinding along the lines 

described above, cautioning the lower courts to be aware

that features of Lozman’s “incomparable” craft, see App. 43,

may distinguish it from previous precedents. At most, 

such a remand would introduce a relatively short delay

before finally ending the years-long battle between Lozman and the city of Riviera Beach.

On the other hand, there is great harm in stretching the

facts below and overriding settled and likely correct lower

court precedents to reach the unnecessary conclusion that 

Lozman’s craft was not a vessel. Without an objective

application of the §3 standard, one that relies in a predictable fashion only on those physical characteristics of a 

craft that are related to maritime transport and use,

parties will have no ex ante notion whether a particular

ship is a vessel. As a wide range of amici have cautioned 

us, numerous maritime industries rely heavily on clear

and predictable legal rules for determining which ships

are vessels.6 The majority’s distorted application of our 

—————— 

6For example, without knowing whether a particular ship is a §3 

vessel, it is impossible for lenders to know how properly to characterize

it as collateral for a financing agreement because they do not know

what remedies they will have recourse to in the event of a default.

Brief for National Marine Bankers Assn. as Amicus Curiae 14–15. 

Similarly, cities like Riviera Beach provide docking for crafts like

Lozman’s on the assumption that such crafts actually are “vessels,”

App. 13–21 (Riviera Beach’s wet-slip agreement referring to Lozman’s 

craft as a “vessel,” “boat,” or “houseboat”), that can be “remove[d]” upon 

short notice, id., at 17 (requiring removal of the craft on three days’ 

notice). The majority makes it impossible for these marinas to know 

whether the “houseboats” that fill their slips are actually vessels and

what remedies they can exercise in the event of a dispute. See id., at 

15 (“In addition to any other remedies provided for in this Agreement, 
 

 

 

12 LOZMAN v. RIVIERA BEACH 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

settled law to the facts of this case frustrates these ends. 

Moreover, the majority’s decision reaches well beyond relatively insignificant boats like Lozman’s craft, id., at 79 

(listing purchase price of Lozman’s craft as $17,000), 

because it specifically disapproves of lower court decisions

dealing with much larger ships, see ante, at 10 (questioning Holmes v. Atlantic Sounding Co., 437 F. 3d 441 (CA5

2006) (finding a 140-foot-long and 40-foot-wide dormitory 

barge with 50 beds to be a §3 vessel)). 

IV 

It is not clear that Lozman’s craft is a §3 vessel. It is 

clear, however, that we are not in a good position to make

such a determination based on the limited record we possess. The appropriate response is to remand the case 

for further proceedings in light of the proper legal standard. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29–31. 

The Court resists this move and in its haste to christen 

Lozman’s craft a nonvessel delivers an analysis that will 

confuse the lower courts and upset our longstanding admiralty precedent. I respectfully dissent. 

—————— 

the Marina, as a provider of necessities to this vessel, has a maritime 

lien on the vessel and may bring a civil action in rem under 46 United 

States Code 31342 in Federal Court, to arrest the vessel and enforce 

the lien . . . ” (emphasis added)). Lozman’s behavior over the years is 

emblematic of this problem. For example, in 2003, prior to his move to

Riviera Beach, Lozman had his craft towed from one marina to another 

after a dispute arose with the first marina and he was threatened with 

eviction. App. 76–78. The possibility that a shipowner like Lozman 

can depart so easily over water and go beyond the reach of a provider of 

necessaries like the marina in response to a legal dispute is exactly the 

kind of problem that the Federal Maritime Lien Act, 46 U. S. C. §31342, 

was intended to address. See Dampskibsselskabet Dannebrog v. Signal 

Oil & Gas Co. of Cal., 310 U. S. 268, 272–273 (1940).